The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia 2016011585, 9781138831186, 9781315736709

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Acknowledgments
Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia
Part I Political and economic tensions
1 The Contemporary Geopolitics of Cambodia: Alignments in Regional and Global Contexts
2 Justice Inverted: Law and Human Rights in Cambodia
3 Justice and the Past: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal
4 Civil Society in Cambodia: Challenges and Contestations
5 Micro-Saturated: The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit as a Development Solution
6 The Media in Cambodia
7 Tourism in Cambodia: Opportunities and Challenges
Part II Rural developments
8 Exploring Rural Livelihoods through the Lens of Coastal Fishers
9 Practices and Challenges towards Sustainability
10 The Imperative of Good Water Governance in Cambodia
11 Cambodia’s Highlanders: Land, Livelihoods, and the Politics of Indigeneity
12 Under Pressure: Environmental Risk and Contemporary Resilience Strategies in Rural Cambodia
13 Concessions in Cambodia: Governing Profits, Extending State Power and Enclosing Resources from the Colonial Era to the Present
14 From Chicken Wing Receipts to Students in Military Uniforms: Land Titling and Property in Post-Conflict Cambodia
Part III Urban conflicts
15 Urban Megaprojects and City Planning in Phnom Penh
16 Labor Rights and Trade Unions in Cambodia
17 The Ties that Bind: Rural–Urban Linkages in the Cambodian Migration System
18 Real Estate Productions, Practices, and Strategies in Contemporary Phnom Penh: An Overview of Social, Economic, and Political Issues
19 Forced Relocation in Cambodia
20 Homelessness in Cambodia: The Terror of Gentrification
21 Phnom Penh’s Relocation Sites and the Obliteration of Politics
22 Street Vending in Phnom Penh: Flourishing but Invisible
Part IV Social processes
23 The Contemporary Landscape of Education in Cambodia: Hybrid Spaces of the “Public” and “Private”
24 Health: Medical Cosmologies and Medical Inequities
25 Violence against Women and Girls in Cambodia
26 Gendered Politics of Power in Contemporary Cambodia
27 Sex Politics and Moral Panics: LGBT Communities, Sex/Entertainment Workers and Sexually Active Youth in Cambodia
28 Children, Childhood and Youth in Contemporary Cambodia
29 Households and Family Processes
30 Digital Technologies in Contemporary Cambodia
Part V Cultural currents
31 Ethnic Identities in Cambodia
32 Violence and Memorialization in Cambodia
33 A Shifting Universe – Religion and Moral Order in Cambodia
34 The Persistent Presence of Cambodian Spirits: Contemporary Knowledge Production in Cambodia
35 Natural and Cultural Heritage in Cambodia
36 Destination Cambodia: A Volunteer Tourism Boom
37 Addressing the Contemporary: Recent Trends and Debates in Cambodian Visual Art
38 Finding New Ground: Maintaining and Transforming Traditional Music
Index

Citation preview

THE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CAMBODIA

Offering a comprehensive overview of the current situation in the country, The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia provides a broad coverage of social, cultural, political and economic development within both rural and urban contexts during the last decade. A detailed introduction places Cambodia within its global and regional frame, and the handbook is then divided into five thematic sections: • • • • •

Political and Economic Tensions Rural Developments Urban Conflicts Social Processes Cultural Currents.

The first section looks at the major political implications and tensions that have occurred in Cambodia, as well as the changing parameters of its economic profile. The handbook then highlights the major developments that are unfolding within the rural sphere, before moving on to consider how cities in Cambodia, and particularly Phnom Penh, have become primary sites of change. The fourth section covers the major processes that have shaped social understandings of the country, and how Cambodians have come to understand themselves in relation to each other and the outside world. Section five analyses the cultural dimensions of Cambodia’s current experience, and how identity comes into contact with and responds to other cultural themes. Bringing together a team of leading scholars on Cambodia, the handbook presents an understanding of how sociocultural and political economic processes in the country have evolved. It is a cutting-edge and interdisciplinary resource for scholars and students of Southeast Asian Studies, as well as policymakers, sociologists and political scientists with an interest in contemporary Cambodia. Katherine Brickell is Reader in Human Geography at Royal Holloway, University of London, UK, and recipient of the 2014 Royal Geographical Society Gill Memorial Award. For over a decade, her research has focused on gender, violence and rights in Cambodia. Simon Springer is Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Victoria, Canada and recipient of the 2015 Association of American Geographers Stanley D. Brunn Young Scholar Award. He has authored four books, including Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order (Routledge, 2012).

This handbook is sure to become the definitive starting point for just about anyone—from students to policymakers—to understand the political and economic tensions, rural developments, urban conflicts, social processes, and cultural currents underpinning today’s Cambodia. The contributors are top-notch and include a wide range of scholars ranging from geographers turned social constructivists to demographers to anti-corruption experts to journalists turned biographers. The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia is truly a collection of gems that will be mined for many years to come. Sophal Ear, Occidental College, Los Angeles, USA In this crowded, courageous and penetrating collection of essays, over fifty scholars and activists examine some of the issues that press against Cambodia today. These deeply committed, highly professional chapters come together to form a path-breaking, invaluable, but often saddening book. David Chandler, Monash University, Australia Having given six years of my service for the promotion and protection of human rights in Cambodia as a senior UN official, I was pleased to see the publication of this book which examines in an interdisciplinary manner different facets of Cambodia. After going through a tragic past, Cambodia is emerging out of the ashes of conflict, lasting more nearly 30 years, as a forward-looking nation. It has started to build state institutions and infrastructure from scratch and is making significant progress in this regard. However, there is a dearth of academic literature on different aspects of Cambodian life and this book seems to fill that gap and fill in a handsome manner. Hence, it is a welcome and timely publication. The coverage of the book is comprehensive and should thus provide the reader with a good overview of the situation of the legal, political and economic landscape in Cambodia, a country with a rich cultural heritage. I highly commend this book to those interested in Cambodia. Surya P. Subedi, University of Leeds, UK

THE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CAMBODIA

Edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Brickell, Katherine, editor. | Springer, Simon, editor. | Sok Udom Deth. Contemporary geopolitics of Cambodia. Container of (work): Title: The handbook of contemporary Cambodia/edited by Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer. Description: New York: Routledge, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016011585 | ISBN 9781138831186 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315736709 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Cambodia–Politics and government–21st century. | Cambodia–Social conditions–21st century. | Cambodia–Economic conditions–21st century. Classification: LCC DS554.8 .H36 2016 | DDC 959.604/3–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016011585 ISBN: 978-1-138-83118-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-73670-9 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Brixham, UK

CONTENTS

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgments

ix x xi xx

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

1

PART I

Political and economic tensions 1

15

The Contemporary Geopolitics of Cambodia: Alignments in Regional and Global Contexts Sok Udom Deth, Kairat Moldashev and Serkan Bulut

17

2

Justice Inverted: Law and Human Rights in Cambodia Catherine Morris

29

3

Justice and the Past: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander

42

4

Civil Society in Cambodia: Challenges and Contestations Louise Coventry

53

5

Micro-Saturated: The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit as a Development Solution Maryann Bylander

6

The Media in Cambodia Sebastian Strangio

64 76

v

Contents

7

Tourism in Cambodia: Opportunities and Challenges Richard Sharpley and Peter McGrath

87

PART II

Rural developments

99

8

Exploring Rural Livelihoods through the Lens of Coastal Fishers Melissa Marschke

101

9

Practices and Challenges towards Sustainability Young Sokphea

111

10 The Imperative of Good Water Governance in Cambodia Joakim Öjendal and Ros Bandeth

123

11 Cambodia’s Highlanders: Land, Livelihoods, and the Politics of Indigeneity Jonathan Padwe

134

12 Under Pressure: Environmental Risk and Contemporary Resilience Strategies in Rural Cambodia Laurie Parsons

146

13 Concessions in Cambodia: Governing Profits, Extending State Power and Enclosing Resources from the Colonial Era to the Present Jean-Christophe Diepart and Laura Schoenberger

157

14 From Chicken Wing Receipts to Students in Military Uniforms: Land Titling and Property in Post-Conflict Cambodia Robin Biddulph and Shaun Williams

169

PART III

Urban conflicts

179

15 Urban Megaprojects and City Planning in Phnom Penh Tom Percival

181

16 Labor Rights and Trade Unions in Cambodia Dennis Arnold and Dae-oup Chang

191

17 The Ties that Bind: Rural–Urban Linkages in the Cambodian Migration System Sabina Lawreniuk

vi

202

Contents

18 Real Estate Productions, Practices, and Strategies in Contemporary Phnom Penh: An Overview of Social, Economic, and Political Issues Gabriel Fauveaud

212

19 Forced Relocation in Cambodia Jessie Connell and Mark Grimsditch

223

20 Homelessness in Cambodia: The Terror of Gentrification Simon Springer

234

21 Phnom Penh’s Relocation Sites and the Obliteration of Politics Giorgio Talocci and Camillo Boano

245

22 Street Vending in Phnom Penh: Flourishing but Invisible Kyoko Kusakabe

257

Part IV

Social processes

269

23 The Contemporary Landscape of Education in Cambodia: Hybrid Spaces of the “Public” and “Private” Will C. Brehm

271

24 Health: Medical Cosmologies and Medical Inequities Jan Ovesen and Ing-Britt Trankell

283

25 Violence against Women and Girls in Cambodia Katherine Brickell

294

26 Gendered Politics of Power in Contemporary Cambodia Mona Lilja and Mikael Baaz

306

27 Sex Politics and Moral Panics: LGBT Communities, Sex/Entertainment Workers and Sexually Active Youth in Cambodia Heidi Hoefinger, Pisey Ly and Srorn Srun

315

28 Children, Childhood and Youth in Contemporary Cambodia Melina T. Czymoniewicz-Klippel

326

29 Households and Family Processes Patrick Heuveline

336

30 Digital Technologies in Contemporary Cambodia Jayson W. Richardson

346

vii

Contents PART V

Cultural currents

357

31 Ethnic Identities in Cambodia Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim

359

32 Violence and Memorialization in Cambodia Savina Sirik and James Tyner

368

33 A Shifting Universe – Religion and Moral Order in Cambodia Alexandra Kent

378

34 The Persistent Presence of Cambodian Spirits: Contemporary Knowledge Production in Cambodia Courtney Work

389

35 Natural and Cultural Heritage in Cambodia Jo Gillespie

399

36 Destination Cambodia: A Volunteer Tourism Boom Tess Guiney

410

37 Addressing the Contemporary: Recent Trends and Debates in Cambodian Visual Art Joanna Wolfarth 38 Finding New Ground: Maintaining and Transforming Traditional Music Catherine Grant Index

420 432 442

viii

FIGURES

1.1 8.1 13.1 13.2 21.1 21.2 22.1

23.1 37.1

37.2

37.3 37.4 37.5

Share of major trade partners of Cambodia in country’s total trade Selected World Bank development indicators compared, 1962–2013 Forest and fisheries concessions and Protected Areas as of the early 2000s Distribution of ELCs in Cambodia by type of crop/investment Borei Santepheap II, view of the incremental housing units for the poor built by 7NG Andong, view of the housing units of the Build a City project by PCL Number of employed women in Phnom Penh, and percentage of own account workers and percentage of service and sales workers among employed women in Phnom Penh by year Government education recurrent expenditures, budgeted versus actual (2000–2014) Svay Sareth, Mon Boulet, 2011, Durational performance, 5 days, Siem Reap to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Single-channel video, colour, sound, 8’ 25’’ looped Svay Sareth, Mon Boulet, 2011, Durational performance, 5 days, Siem Reap to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Single-channel video, colour, sound, 8’ 25’’ looped Khvay Samnang, Untitled, 2011. Digital photograph, 80 × 120 cm Khvay Samnang, Untitled, 2011. Digital photograph, 80 × 120 cm Leang Seckon, Heavy Skirt (Somput Mien Domngun) Installation, 2009. Mixed media

ix

22 103 161 163 249 252

261 274

426

427 428 429 429

TABLES

5.1 5.2 5.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 22.1 23.1 30.1

Expansion of microfinance in Cambodia (1997–2013) Formal credit expansion and characteristics (2004–2011) CSES Primary purpose of formally sourced loans in Cambodia (2011) Cambodia tourist arrivals (1993–2014) Accommodation supply in Cambodia (1998–2010) International tourist arrivals to regions, 2013 and 2014 Tourism policy in Cambodia: key areas An example of recent Cambodia Daily newspaper articles focusing on change in the countryside Household livelihood trajectories, 2002–2014 Composition of wages of unskilled workers as a percentage of total income by geographical domain by year (percentage of total income) Public versus private schools, 2013 Technology indicators of Cambodia as of 2014

x

67 67 68 90 91 92 94 104 105 261 276 347

CONTRIBUTORS

Dennis Arnold is Assistant Professor at the University of Amsterdam, Department of Human Geography, Planning and International Development. Dennis publishes and teaches on labour, migration and citizenship; global production network analysis; and borderlands of continental Southeast Asia. He does research in Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Mikael Baaz is a Reader in Peace and Conflict Studies and a Senior Lecturer in International Law at the School of Business, Economics and Law, the University of Gothenburg. His papers have been published in many journals, for example: Journal of International Relations and Development, International Studies Review, Asian Politics and Polity, Journal of Political Power, Global Public Health, Peace Review, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Scandinavian Studies in Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Journal of Civil Society and Journal of Resistance Studies. Ros Bandeth is a consultant for the World Food Program on a desk review on the gendered nature of intra-household decision-making in Cambodia. She formerly worked as a Research Fellow at the Cambodia Development Resource Institute for seven years. She holds a Master’s degree in Environmental Management from Massey University, New Zealand. Her research experience is in water governance, participatory resource management, gender and health-seeking behavior with the use of a life history approach. Robin Biddulph lived in Cambodia from 1991 to 2001, working first as a lecturer at the University of Phnom Penh (1991–3) and then conducting humanitarian mine-clearance with the HALO Trust (1993–6) and finally as an independent researcher (1997–2001). His 2010 PhD thesis entitled ‘Geographies of Evasion’ examined community forestry and land titling in Cambodia and suggested that these programmes largely avoid the problems they claim to address. While much of his work focuses on rural livelihoods and development assistance, his work in Cambodia has also addressed climate change mitigation, mass tourism’s impacts on local development and understanding elite corruption. Camillo Boano, PhD, is an architect, urbanist and theorist. He is Senior Lecturer at the Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL, where he directs the MSc in Building and Urban xi

Contributors

Design in Development. He is also co-director of the UCL Urban Laboratory. Camillo has over 20 years’ experience in research, design consultancies and development work. His research interests revolve around the encounters between critical theory and radical philosophy with urban and architectural design processes – especially those emerging in informal and contested urbanisms. He is the author, with William Hunter and Caroline Newton, of Contested Urbanism in Dharavi: Writings and Projects for the Resilient City (2013), and has written several journal articles on Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy related to design and architecture. He is currently working on a book collecting such reflections. Will C. Brehm is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science post-doctoral Research Fellow at the graduate school of education, University of Tokyo. His research focuses on comparative and international education in Southeast Asia. Katherine Brickell is Reader in Human Geography at Royal Holloway, University of London and prize-holder of the 2014 Royal Geographical Society Gill Memorial Award for her contributions to the study of gender relations. For over a decade, Katherine’s research has focused on contemporary domestic life in Southeast Asia, namely Cambodia and Vietnam. Her expertise lies in the qualitative analysis (through visual methods) of gendered injustices which manifest in, and emerge from, the interactions between macro- and micro-level socio-economic change in these dynamic country contexts. She is currently writing her first monograph Home SOS: Gender, Violence and Law in Cambodia (2017), which brings together longstanding interests in the unmaking of home via domestic violence, marital breakdown and forced eviction. Serkan Bulut is a PhD candidate, at University of Delaware, where he specializes in foreign policy analysis, conflict resolution, and transnationalism, and a Research Fellow at Cambodian Institute for Peace and Cooperation (CICP). He previously worked at various international organizations and universities including NATO Allied Command Transformation’s Operational Analysis Branch as a civilian intern, University of Delaware, teaching courses on American foreign policy and Developing Nations, US State Department as an international election observer in Iraq; and Bilkent University as a research assistant. He received his MA in Eurasian-Atlantic Security Studies from Bilkent University and his BA in Foreign Language Education from Bogazici University. Maryann Bylander is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Lewis & Clark College. Her research focuses on questions of migration and development in the global South, particularly Cambodia. Her most recent project, funded through the ASA/NSF’s Fund for the Advancement of the Discipline, explores the relationship between migration and microfinance in the Cambodian context, highlighting the links between international migration and access to microfinance. Recent work has been published in Development and Change, Population Research and Policy Review, and Oxford Development Studies. Maryann is a founding board member of PEPY, an NGO working to promote education in Siem Reap. Dae-oup Chang teaches at the Department of Global Korean Studies, Sogang University in Seoul, South Korea. He is also affiliated to the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He has been widely published, with articles and chapters on East Asian development, labour relations and migration. His major works include Capitalist Development in Korea: Labour, Capital and the Myth of the Developmental State (2009). His current research focuses on the ways in which Korean capitalism affects the social development of the least-developed countries in Asia through migration, investment and aid. xii

Contributors

Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim is a research fellow with International Public Policy Pte. Ltd, and is the author of Cambodia and the Politics of Aesthetics (2013). He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and has taught at Pannasastra University of Cambodia and the American University of Nigeria. Jessie Connell has recently completed her PhD with the Mekong Research Group, University of Sydney, focusing on population displacement and the resettlement safeguards of international financial institutions. She has over ten years’ experience working as a researcher and social development consultant in Australia, Cambodia, Vietnam and Bangladesh. Jessie is currently working for the International Organization for Migration in Bangladesh. Louise Coventry has worked in a range of research, policy and management roles in the community and government sectors, as well as in international development. Louise spent six years in Phnom Penh, working with civil society organizations on peace-building and capacity development issues. She now lives in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, and works in a research management role at RMIT Vietnam. Louise is also a PhD candidate at RMIT University. Her dissertation explores the governance of civil society organizations in Cambodia. Melina T. Czymoniewicz-Klippel’s expertise as a public health teacher and scholar lies in understanding and addressing the determinants of health and the health risks and resilience of vulnerable and marginalized children and families. Her doctoral thesis, awarded by Monash University, Australia, in 2010, examined the impact of globalization on the definition of childhood, and therein the shape of children’s and families’ everyday lives, in contemporary Cambodia. Over the past 15 years, Melina has worked in child health implementation and research for a range of non-governmental agencies and universities in Southeast Asia and Australia (2001–6), as well as more recently the US (2007–present). Sok Udom Deth received his BA with High Honors in Sociology from Bogazici University (Turkey); MA in Southeast Asian Studies from Ohio University (USA), and PhD in Southeast Asian Studies from Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany). He is currently the Provost and Vice Rector of Academic Affairs and teaches history, political science, and international relations courses at Zaman University, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He is concurrently a Senior Research Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) and an Advisory Board member of Action Aid Cambodia. Jean-Christophe Diepart is a multidisciplinary researcher working in Cambodia since 2002 through an affiliation with Gembloux Agro-Bio Tech (University of Liège, Belgium). His research examines agrarian dynamics in Cambodia in a historical perspective and focuses on the transformations of household production systems, the political economy of agricultural colonization in northwest Cambodia and the resilience of peasant communities to environmental changes. Maria Elander is a Lecturer in Criminology at La Trobe Law School, La Trobe University. Her research explores questions related to international criminal justice, legal practices and feminist theory, and has a particular interest in encounters between the local, national and international in crime and criminal justice. Her PhD thesis in law from Melbourne Law School examined the figure of the victim in international criminal justice with a focus on the ECCC. She is currently developing the thesis into a monograph that will be published by Routledge in early 2018. xiii

Contributors

Gabriel Fauveaud holds a PhD in Urban Geography from the University of Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne. He is currently Invited Professor at the University of Montreal (Institute of Urban Planning and Department of Political Sciences). Since 2006, he has worked on the contemporary transformation of Phnom Penh by focusing on the role of real estate activities, strategies and realizations in the transformation of the city. Gabriel published a book on Phnom Penh with Publications de la Sorbonne in 2015, and produced several papers in French and English on real estate issues in Cambodia, Southeast Asia and developing countries. Jo Gillespie is an academic in the School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Australia. Jo’s research focuses on environmental governance in the context of natural and cultural heritage protection and she has worked on a number of research projects in Cambodia over the past 12 years. She is interested in the intersection of regulation and society and she has published in the area of legal geography, heritage regulation and conservation protection in Cambodia. Her research highlights the complexities of the people/place/law nexus, especially in non-Western contexts. Catherine Grant is the author of Music Endangerment: How Language Maintenance Can Help (2014). She has collaborated with the government and non-government cultural sector in Cambodia for several years and in 2015 was Endeavour Australia Research Fellow, hosted by Cambodian Living Arts. Now Lecturer in Music Literature at Queensland Conservatorium Griffith University (Brisbane, Australia), Catherine is recipient of the Australian Future Justice Medal for her research, activism and advocacy on cultural sustainability. Mark Grimsditch is a campaigner and researcher with ten years’ experience working in the East and Southeast Asia regions. Mark currently works as Mekong Regional Coordinator for the human rights organization Inclusive Development International. His work focuses on land and natural resource rights, and the accountability of domestic and transnational investors and financiers engaged in land-based developments in the Mekong countries. Tess Guiney, PhD, is a graduate of the Geography and Tourism Departments of the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. Her research focuses on untangling perceptions of place, the popularization of particular humanitarian forms, impacts on host communities and the international system, and resistance to these development trends. Her doctoral research adopted a critical geography approach to examine orphanage tourism in Cambodia and to unravel the complexities of popular humanitarianism. Patrick Heuveline has conducted research on Cambodia and, in particular, on the demographic and social consequences of the Democratic Kampuchea. On the demographic side, he first studied the death toll of the regime and analysed its impact on fertility and the post-DK baby boom. This work was based in part on data collected between 2000 and 2006 as part of a health and demographic surveillance system (HDSS). In 2008, the HDSS was substantially expanded and its focus broadened to the social consequences of the regime and four additional rounds of surveys have been conducted since. Heidi Hoefinger, PhD, is a Professor of Science at Berkeley College in NYC, an adjunct lecturer in Public Health at the Institute of South East Asian Affairs, Chiang Mai University, Thailand, and a scholar of international gender and sexuality studies. She has spent over a decade conducting ethnographic research on the sex and entertainment sectors in Cambodia, xiv

Contributors

which has culminated in her book, Sex, Love and Money in Cambodia: Professional Girlfriends and Transactional Relationships (2013). Her work has been featured in the Phnom Penh Post, South East Asia Globe Magazine, Huffington Post, Asia Life, BBC 4, and Voice of America, and she is active in the international sex worker rights movement. Rachel Hughes is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Geography at the University of Melbourne, Australia. She has wide-ranging interests in the geographies of law, geopolitics, public memory, and visual and material cultures. Her current project examines the relationship between the non-judicial legacies of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and wider social and political change. She is the author of a number of book chapters and journal articles on the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide, and co-editor of the collection Observant States: Geopolitics and Visual Culture (2010). Alexandra Kent is an Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen. She has previously worked on issues relating to religion, politics and justice in South India and Malaysia, but since the early 2000s her research has focused upon these issues in Cambodia. She co-edited the volume People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today (2008) and has authored numerous articles in peer-reviewed academic journals. Kyoko Kusakabe is an Associate Professor in Gender and Development Studies at the School of Environment, Resources and Development, Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) in Thailand. Her research focuses on women in the informal economy in Southeast Asia. Her recent research includes gender analysis of cross-border labour migration, cross-border agriculture investment and land acquisition, and gender issues in special economic zone development in the Mekong Region. She has been studying street vendors and retail traders since the late 1990s, and has also focused on fish traders. She teaches gender analysis, gender-responsive policy and project management, and enterprise and organization analysis at AIT. Sabina Lawreniuk is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography at King’s College London. Sabina’s research examines the shifting bases of production and consumption in the global South. Drawing on multivariate statistical analysis in conjunction with detailed ethnographic research, her current work explores the interrelated roles of changing patterns of labour migration and everyday consumption practices in the reproduction and transformation of class structures in contemporary Cambodia. Previous work has been published in geography and development journals, including the Journal of Development Studies and Population, Space and Place. Mona Lilja currently serves as the Faculty Professor in Sociology at Karlstad University and as an Associate Professor in Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Lilja’s area of interest is the linkages between resistance and social change as well as the particularities – the character and emergence – of various forms of resistance. In regard to this, she is currently working on how different articulations of gendered resistance emerge. Some of Lilja’s papers have appeared in Feminist Review, Global Public Health, Nora and Signs. Pisey Ly worked for Women’s Agenda for Change (WAC), which empowered women garment and sex workers. After WAC was phased out in 2009 after ten years of operation, she xv

Contributors

joined Social Action for Change (SAC), a feminist activist unit with the role of providing technical assistance to sex workers’ organizations such as Women’s Network for Unity, which included strategic planning, fundraising and coaching for sex workers. SAC is one of the four social groups of the United Sisterhood Alliance (Us), which works to strengthen the grassroots people’s network, especially grassroots women in activism. It works towards critical thinking and participation in the analysis of social, political and economic structures. Peter McGrath is a Lecturer based at the University of Central Lancashire, UK, within the School of Management. He teaches on both the undergraduate and postgraduate programmes and leads regular student field visits to Cambodia. Peter is involved in working with the Institute of Transport and Tourism, also based at the University, and his primary research area revolves around slow travel and slow tourism. Melissa Marschke is an Associate Professor at the School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. Her training is in human–environment relations, with a particular emphasis on livelihoods, common pool resources and environmental governance (co-management, certification). More recently, she has begun exploring coastal transitions (agrarian and aquarian transitions) in the greater Mekong Region and labour issues in the seafood sector. Melissa is the author of Life, Fish and Mangroves: Resource Governance in Coastal Cambodia (2012), and has published in various journals including Environmental Science & Policy, Ecology & Society, Global Environmental Change and Marine Policy. Kairat Moldashev is Assistant Professor at the International School of Economics, Kazakh-British Technical University, Almaty, Kazakhstan. His main research interests include regionalism studies and identity politics. Kairat published articles and commentaries in English and Russian on politics and economics of the Eurasian regionalism. He also worked at Zaman University in Cambodia and taught courses on the ASEAN. His recent work on the actorship capability of the Eurasian Economic Union was published in the Journal of International Relations and Development. Catherine Morris, BA, JD, LLM, is an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria, Canada, and a regular visiting professor at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. Her work in the field of conflict resolution spans three decades and includes the founding of Peacemakers Trust, a Canadian organization for education in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. She has taught international human rights since 2004 and acts as research director for Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada. Her publications include works on dispute resolution, religion and peacebuilding, human rights education, and peacebuilding in Cambodia. She has visited Cambodia regularly since 1995. Joakim Öjendal is Professor of Peace and Development Research at the University of Gothenburg. He has been researching water management for 20 years, starting with a PhD dissertation, ‘Sharing the Good’ (2000). He has subsequently published widely within water management as well as within Cambodia studies. Works include co-authoring Transboundary Water Management and the Climate Change Debate (2014), and he co-edited, Politics and Development in a Transboundary Watershed: The Case of the Lower Mekong Region (2010). In Cambodia, he is also widely published within democracy studies and has published works such as Beyond Democracy in Cambodia (2009).

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Contributors

Jan Ovesen is Associate Professor (now retired) of cultural anthropology at Uppsala University. After earlier fieldwork in Afghanistan (1970s) and Burkina Faso (1980s) he shifted to Southeast Asia and from the mid-1990s worked mainly on Cambodia. His research interests include political and economic anthropology, and development. Publications include When Every Household is an Island: Social Organization and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia (with Joakim Öjendal and Ing-Britt Trankell, 1996); and Cambodians and their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia (with Ing-Britt Trankell, 2010). Jonathan Padwe is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Hawai’i at Ma¯noa. His work examines human–environment relations in northeast Cambodia, where he has worked for over ten years. His current work, based on research with Jarai ethnic minority communities in Ratanakiri Province, is an exploration of the ways that violent pasts come to be inscribed in the landscape, often to be erased again. Laurie Parsons has conducted large-scale projects for CARE International, ActionAid, the IDRC and the Royal University of Phnom Penh. He completed his PhD at King’s College London in 2015, in which he investigated the impact of mass labour migration and ecological change on the culture and social structures of Cambodia. That work now forms part of a broader agenda to inflect stronger linkages between the economic, ecological and socio-cultural dimensions of labour migration via the combination of visual, statistical, and qualitative methods. It has been published in a variety of academic and lay journals, including Population, Space and Place, Journal of Development Studies and The Diplomat. Tom Percival completed his PhD at the University of Leeds in 2012 and his thesis investigated urban development in contemporary Phnom Penh, in particular the influence of foreign property development on urban development and planning. Tom is currently a Senior Consultant at Ipsos Business Consulting in Hong Kong, whose work focuses on fact-based consulting and market analysis for businesses, international organizations and governments. Jayson W. Richardson is a Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of Technology Leadership in Education (CASTLE) (www.schooltechleadership.org) and an Associate Professor at San Diego State University in the US. He teaches school leadership, research methods, emerging technologies, and technology leadership at the graduate level. His research focuses on how school leaders create and sustain digital learning environments that enhance students’ learning experiences. He researches leadership, technology and international development. Laura Schoenberger is a PhD candidate in Critical Human Geography at York University, Canada, and an Associate at the York Center for Asian Research. She has been researching and working in Southeast Asia since 2005. Laura’s research interests are political ecology, agrarian transformations, state power, conflict and land. Richard Sharpley is Professor of Tourism and Development at the University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK. He is co-editor of the journal Tourism Planning & Development and a member of the editorial boards of a number of other tourism journals. His principal research interests are within the fields of tourism and development, island tourism, rural tourism and the sociology of tourism, and his books include Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues, 2nd edition (with David Telfer, 2015) Tourism and Development in the Developing World, 2nd

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Contributors

edition (with David Telfer, 2016), and Tourism, Development and Environment: Beyond Sustainability (2009). Savina Sirik is a PhD student in the Department of Geography at Kent State University, Ohio. Her research examines survivors’ memories and their everyday experiences in the Khmer Rouge’s sites of violence during and after the Cambodian genocide. Her work has focused on documenting the life histories of the Khmer Rouge survivors and how their memories impact the reconciliation process in Cambodia. She is the director of the Museum of Memory, a project at the Sleuk Rith Institute in Cambodia. She led the Living Documents Project at the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), where she brought villagers to observe trial proceedings at the ECCC in Phnom Penh and conducted forums and film screenings in rural Cambodia. Young Sokphea is a PhD candidate in Political Science in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia. His research interests are in the areas of movements of grassroots community and civil society, globalization and development, environmental politics, political economy of natural resource use, sustainable development, and corporate social and environmental responsibility in Southeast Asia. His research has been published in the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, the Asian Journal of Social Science, the International Journal of Environment and Rural Development, and as book chapters and other working papers. Simon Springer is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, Canada. His research explores the political, social and geographical exclusions that neoliberalism has engendered in post-transitional Cambodia. Simon’s books include The Discourse of Neoliberalism: An Anatomy of a Powerful Idea (2016), The Anarchist Roots of Geography: Towards Spatial Emancipation (2016), Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse and Dispossession in Cambodia (2015), and Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space (2010). Simon serves as a co-editor of ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. Srorn Srun is currently Regional Rights Training Program Consultant at Asia Catalyst. He has over 12 years’ experience providing management and technical assistance to projects and programmes in the areas of: public health, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS, communication for social and behavioral change, SOGIE (sexual orientation and gender identity/expression), adolescent issues, poverty and equity, environment, literacy and disability; all are based on human rights perspectives. Sebastian Strangio is a researcher and journalist based in Phnom Penh, covering the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2008, his writing from across the region has appeared in more than 30 publications, including Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, and the Nikkei Asian Review. He is also the author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia, published in 2014. Giorgio Talocci teaches Urban Design for Development and Critical Urbanism in the MSc in Building and Urban Design in Development at the Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL. His current research investigates the significance of the so-called ‘urban voids’ in the government of the city. He has authored several academic papers reflecting on the impact and political significance of forced displacements and on the agency and social relevance of architecture and urban design. During the last five years, he has collaborated with the Community Architects Network and the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights. xviii

Contributors

Ing-Britt Trankell is Associate Professor at Uppsala University. She has done fieldwork in northern Thailand and in Laos, and, since the mid-1990s, in Cambodia. Her research interests include medical and nutritional anthropology, and symbolism and world-view. Her publications include Cooking, Care and Domestication: A Culinary Ethnography of the Tai Yong, Northern Thailand (1995); ‘Royal Relics: Ritual and Social Memory in Luang Prabang’, in Laos: Culture and Society (ed. Grant Evans, 1999); When Every Household is an Island: Social Organization and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia (with Joakim Öjendal and Jan Ovesen, 1996); and Cambodians and their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia (with Jan Ovesen, 2010). James Tyner is Professor of Geography at Kent State University, Ohio. His research interests include violence, genocide, and the politics and commodification of memorialization. His most recent book is Violence in Capitalism: Devaluing Life in an Age of Responsibility (2016). Shaun Williams led an Oxfam GB research project focused on endemic property-related conflicts in Cambodia after a decade working for Australian native peoples seeking land rights. Subsequently the World Bank engaged Shaun to provide the social assessment for a proposed land project design and Germany’s aid agency asked him to provide support for the Royal Government’s national land dispute adjudication initiatives. In 2003, UK DFID commissioned a completion assessment of the Thailand Land Titling Program 1984–2002 for EC land policy deliberations. Subsequently, Shaun was jointly responsible for Oxfam International’s facilitation of global NGO engagement with the World Bank Land Policy Research Report. Joanna Wolfarth completed her PhD in art history at the University of Leeds in 2014. Her thesis focused on the face throughout Cambodian history and the ways in which this history was constructed. Her research interests include contemporary Southeast Asian art and photography, Cambodian history and culture, and Buddhist image-making. She is presently working at SOAS University on a new conservation and pedagogical project in Cambodia and teaches at Sotheby’s Institute of Art, the University of Leeds and SOAS. Courtney Work is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with a joint appointment at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague and the Regional Center for Sustainable Development at Chiangmai University, Thailand. She received her PhD in Anthropology from Cornell University in 2014. She has conducted research in Cambodia since 2005 and is currently based in Phnom Penh investigating the intersections of climate change mitigation and land-use policies. Other research interests include the anthropology of religion, development, and the environment; the history of Southeast Asian political formations; contemporary political economy; and the study of regional flows of people and power in Southeast Asia.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful for the support of our families in bringing together this collection. Hellene Sarin, Channy Him, Samphors Doung, Veasna Long, Kanha Sok, Kim Phealy, Rithy Oun, Ros Sopheap, Prak Baureaksmey and Chorlida Leng have all provided much support on the ground in Cambodia throughout the years. Our thanks are extended to the Asian Studies team at Routledge, and to Melanie Nowicki at Royal Holloway, University of London. Last, but not least, we are grateful for the 53 contributors who participated in this project.

xx

INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY CAMBODIA Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

Cambodia has risen from the ashes, but the embers still smolder. (Ablin and Hood 1987, xv) Where does one begin? It is no easy task to organize a volume on the contemporary conditions of any given country and the tumultuous history of Cambodia makes this undertaking all the more difficult. There is no particular historical line in the sand that defines the ‘contemporary’ moment, and with all the twists and turns in Cambodian history over the preceding century it is a real challenge to decide where to pick up the narrative. Cambodia has played host to colonialism, war, genocide and intensive foreign intervention (Chandler 2008; Kiernan 1996; Osborne 1997). So many of Cambodia’s important current events and a great deal of the country’s present conditions find their foundations in the past. Such an acknowledgement presents difficulty in compiling an edited volume that seeks to stand out from other collections inasmuch as our commitment is to examining what’s happening in Cambodia now. Yet rather than allowing our misgivings about time to get the better of us, we will start with the rush of emotions that first drew us into our love for Cambodia in the first place. What better place to begin than with the personal, and the desire we both felt to study Cambodia’s people, places and politics upon first encountering the country and its people? We both came to study Cambodia in the early 2000s, and, accordingly, with the help of our contributors, we want to take stock of the changes in society that we’ve witnessed since then. Our travels in the country soon after the arrival of the new millennium elicited profound and paradoxical responses, seemingly mirroring this transitory stage in the country’s history, which was rife with incongruities. These ambiguities remain, and in presenting contemporary Cambodia to you here in 2016, we do not assume to have resolved all of the issues that pulse through the veins of the country’s social, political and cultural anatomy. Instead, our investigations and those of the included authors are intended as contemplative and reflective. It is this pensive approach that allows us to appreciate Cambodia for the complexity that it represents. Such reflection further allows us to remember that it was a blend of admiration and dismay, sorrow and joy that first captured our imaginations and compelled us to study Cambodia. These dualisms in our understandings of the country have remained with us ever since. Cambodia is beautiful, yet haunted – haunted, yet beautiful. There is both strength and tragedy to be found in contemporary Cambodia, where the contrasts and contradictions are precisely what make it such a fascinating, frustrating and fulfilling country to study. 1

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

The image on the front cover of this book is perhaps not an obvious choice to represent contemporary Cambodia, but this was intentional on our part. We spent a long time discussing what we might like to see on the cover of this volume, each sifting through countless pictures as we looked for ideas. Books on development contexts often use juxtaposition to highlight the co-existence of change and continuity as well as the growth in societal inequality – be this a street vendor carrying her baskets of noodles past a Gucci store, or an aerial shot of a wall separating slum housing from new modern high-rise condominiums. Instead, rather than opt for this trope, we felt it more compelling to select an image that might leave the reader with questions such as “Why that cover?” and “What is the story here?” So when we came across the photography of Thomas Cristofoletti and the wider Ruom Collective (www.ruom.net) we were both captivated by the way he was able to tell such a powerful and complex story about the fate of many Cambodians in a single image, and we knew we were on to something. The photograph was taken in a village in Mondulkiri Province in 2014 and shows a Phnong family sitting around the fire inside a traditional house. For us, as geographers, it speaks to the global and intimate as mutually constituted entities – it represents the antithesis of what Anderson and Smith (2001, 9) have critiqued as ‘anemic knowledges predicated on the artificial separation of private and public, body and citizens, domestic and global’. Intersections between Cambodia’s integration into the global economy and people’s everyday lives are a key theme woven throughout the handbook. The machinations of global capital have left a deep scar on the country, as land grabbing, forced evictions and environmental destruction have ensured the perpetuation of Cambodia’s encounters with violence (Springer 2009; 2010). Indeed, the political economy context of the village and the struggles that it is has faced are all too common in the country as seemingly non-political sites have become key to the operation of sovereign and global power. The people of the village were tricked into signing over their land to an extractive company who went on to decimate their sacred forests and replace them with a large-scale rubber plantation. We see the experiences of the community at the hands of the agro-industry company as an inevitable outcome of the unfolding of accumulation by dispossession in Cambodia. Still coming to grips with the pain of its past, contemporary Cambodia is now faced with renewed patterns of violence and the acute difficulties of weathering the seemingly relentless storm of predatory and extractive capitalism (Springer 2015). While a picture is worth a thousand words, it can never encompass the whole story, one that we very briefly tell here. The book cover exemplifies the interface of both the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’, and how these lines are increasingly blurred. The fact that this could have been taken 20 years ago, or indeed 20 years from now is also part of what is so interesting about it. Not everything is what it seems in Cambodia. Most people know Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge, and while the genocide that killed approximately 1.5 million people between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979 continues to have profound reverberations within present-day Cambodia (Etcheson 2005), it can hardly be considered as a contemporary event. Oddly enough, Cambodians themselves experience this apparent lack of current relevance most acutely. This is at least partially explained by the fact that over 65 per cent of the population is under the age of 30, meaning that they were not yet born when Pol Pot’s nightmare swallowed their country into darkness. Yet that many Cambodians remain largely unaware of the sheer profundity of the scars that the Khmer Rouge legacy has left on their society stems from the fact that until very recently there has been little public discussion of Pol Pot’s reign. As a peace process was brokered by the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s – following a decade of Vietnamese occupation that ensured the capital-centric international community turned their backs on Cambodia – the teaching of the Pol Pot genocide disappeared from the national curriculum as a compromise for political stability and possible 2

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

reconciliation (Dy 2013). This void in national awareness characterized much of the 2000s as well, where public understanding of the history of the Khmer Rouge was marginalized by political conflicts. In the aftermath of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from February 1992 to May 1993, a series of strained elections held in 1993, 1998 and 2003 followed (Peou 2007). The first of these almost saw the resumption of war in the country, as the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the successor party to the State of Cambodia (SOC) that ruled under Vietnamese tutelage throughout the 1980s, refused to respect the outcome of the vote. Hun Sen forced his way into a coalition government as Second Prime Minister to serve alongside First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, leader of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), who had won the election (Gottesman 2003). The uneasy arrangement eventually led to armed confrontation on the streets of Phnom Penh in July and August 1997, as both sides courted and accused the other of courting the Khmer Rouge who remained active on the peripheries of the country. The clash resulted in the ousting of Ranariddh, and from then onwards Hun Sen has ruled, using his political power to steer the country towards a neoliberal path of greater marketization. Disparities in wealth have once again become pronounced in Cambodia (Slocomb 2010), as the elite have manipulated the sell-off of public assets and lined their own pockets from reforms in property relations that have led to widespread landlessness and the systematic dispossession of the poor (Springer 2015), see also Global Witness 2016 on what the campaigning organization describes as the ‘hostile takeover’ of the Cambodian economy by Hun Sen’s family. It was not until 2007 onwards that young Cambodians were finally being taught about the genocide, a concession that was made as the foundations for a tribunal were finally established in a formal agreement between the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and the UN in 2003 (Tyner 2008). The fragility of an ongoing tribunal has ensured that the reflections on the wider geopolitics of this atrocity are not discussed. There is no established national dialogue on the historical role of French colonialism (1867–1946) in producing vast disparities in wealth that gave rise to social discontent and thereby radicalized segments of the population (Kiernan 2004). Nor is there consideration of the genocide before the genocide, when from October 1965 to August 1973 the United States (US) dropped an unintelligible 2,756,941 tons of bombs on Cambodia, killing an estimated 600,000 people (Owens and Kiernan 2006). The middle class, which largely pursues the neoliberal dream of affluence, has scarcely noticed this lack of public debate. Yet a storm has nonetheless been brewing in very recent years, where a renewed sense of class-consciousness has been emerging in Cambodia since at least the mid-2000s. Today we see a multi-platform social movement that has grown largely out of strained labour relations in the garment factory sector to incorporate a vast swath of Cambodian society. More and more Cambodians are now protesting their working and living circumstances, eager for a change in the material conditions that determine their lives and an improvement in the corporeal wellbeing of their compatriots (Brickell 2014). The lead up to the 2013 elections was a genuinely hopeful period, where the electricity of the public showing of solidarity was infectious among Cambodians who saw a real possibility for regime change in Cambodia. In the end, those in favour of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) fell just short of securing an electoral victory, but the narrow margin of the ruling CCP’s win has changed Hun Sen’s tune. While he still very much sings his own praises with the same discordant arrogance of his preceding 30-year dynasty, there is an undeniable sense of anxiety that now characterizes his public appeals ahead of the 2018 general election. It is widely believed among the younger generation of Cambodians that the sun is about to set on Hun Sen’s rule, and that a new day is about to dawn on Cambodian politics. We share this optimism for Cambodia’s future, but we are not without trepidation. This is a fear which was tragically borne out at the proof stage of this handbook 3

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

when Dr Kem Ley, a political commentator and researcher critical of Hun Sen’s administration, was shot dead in Phnom Penh on 10 July 2016. It remains to be seen how a transfer in power could even be orchestrated given the deep roots of patronage in Cambodia and the way that it entwines the military within the ruling party’s grasp. Contemporary Cambodia is without question a complex entity that is not easily partitioned into discrete units for academic inquiry. There are multiple connections to be drawn across the whole of Cambodian society, where associations can be made between what are even, seemingly, the most disparate phenomena. Nonetheless, for the purposes of making our understandings of Cambodia decipherable and relatable to others, we have had to rise to the challenge of organizing our thoughts. We have accordingly organized the discussion into five major sections: (1) Political and Economic Tensions; (2) Rural Developments; (3) Urban Conflicts; (4) Social Processes; and (5) Cultural Currents. Clearly this particular ordering is contestable, and we’re quite certain that there will be readers who would have preferred that the chapters were organized in an alternative way and perhaps even that different thematic sections were chosen. We are happy to concede to these critiques. To each their own, and so our answer is to encourage you to read the collected chapters in this volume in a way that makes sense to you. While we have tried to draw together themes within the particular sections, there is no hard and fast rule stating that this book must be read cover to cover in the order that it is presented here. Individual readers may benefit tremendously from jumping between chapters according to their particular interests and we welcome this kind of approach.

Political and economic tensions Following this general introduction, we first focus our attention towards examining Political and Economic Tensions, where we set the stage for understanding many of the major recent developments that have shaped the political economy of contemporary Cambodia. A chapter called ‘The Contemporary Geopolitics of Cambodia: Alignments in Regional and Global Contexts’ by Sok Udom Deth, Kairat Moldashev and Serkan Bulut is our starting point, where the authors trace the key geopolitical trends that have shaped the country’s position in the world. While they offer a brief historical overview that reaches back to the eighteenth century and covers the twists and turns that came with French colonization, independence and the war in Vietnam, their primary concern is for more recent events, such as the accession into ASEAN in 1999 and the WTO in 2004 as examples of deepening integration into regional and global forms of capitalism. In particular, they discuss the implications of China’s rising influence and the implications Cambodia faces with the purported US pivot back towards Southeast Asia. Next up is Catherine Morris with ‘Justice Inverted: Law and Human Rights in Cambodia’, where she examines the watchword ‘peacebuilding’ in the Cambodian context and how this sets the parameters of justice in the country. The term has been used to emphasize that peace must extend beyond intervention and towards governance structures and legal institutions, yet there is still ample room for critique. Using a critical lens, Morris discusses the results of more than two decades of liberal legal development as peacebuilding in Cambodia, highlighting how this has impacted upon the constitution, human rights, the judiciary, the legal profession and civil society organizations. Continuing this critical understanding of legal processes in Cambodia, Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander follow with their chapter ‘Justice and the Past: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal’. Here they introduce us to Cambodia’s ongoing Khmer Rouge Tribunal, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). They lay out the formal legal character, mandate and functioning of the ECCC as a UN-supported effort that seeks to bring both Cambodian and international law to bear upon the alleged crimes of 4

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

the Khmer Rouge. The chapter explores the political tensions of the tribunal’s negotiation, progress, setbacks and reparations between the years 1997 and 2014, framing the tribunal as a socio-political event with multiple national and international influences and repercussions. Changing gears a little, Louise Coventry follows with ‘Civil Society in Cambodia: Challenges and Contestations’, a chapter that argues mainstream understandings of civil society have low relevance and applicability to Cambodia. For Coventry, Cambodian civil society is embedded in a complex political and unique socio-historical context. Her chapter examines the relationship between Cambodia’s civil society and (neo)patrimonialism, the sponsorship of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by international aid organizations and the concurrent emergence of NGOs as a proxy for broader civil society. Since current initiatives to strengthen civil society in Cambodia are generally donor driven and poorly conceived, she contends that the future of a progressive and independent Cambodian civil society is not assured. Part of the threat to civil society is the role of capitalism, which Maryann Bylander assesses in terms of the way microfinance has entered into the Cambodian fray. With a chapter called ‘Micro-Saturated: The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit as a Development Solution’, she outlines the growth and saturation of microfinance over the past two decades. While unpacking the meanings and uses of microcredit among borrowers, Bylander’s particular emphasis is on the disconnection between the idea of microfinance as a development solution and the lived realities of what microfinance means and does in the Cambodian context. Her findings challenge the primary goals and stated expectations of microcredit, and suggest that we need to seriously reconsider microcredit as a development strategy in the Cambodian context. Journalist Sebastian Strangio follows with ‘The Media in Cambodia’, where he explores the distinct character of the Cambodian press in Southeast Asia. While there are few formal restrictions, pre-publication censorship is typically rare and few journalists are jailed, there is still reason for concern. In particular the ruling CCP party controls the bulk of the Cambodian media and insofar as Khmer language media is concerned, the flow of information remains tightly controlled. He concludes that the government remains intolerant of dissent, worrying that recent developments like the drafting of a recent Cybercrime Law will have dire effects on the future of the Cambodian media. The closing chapter in this section is called ‘Tourism in Cambodia: Opportunities and Challenges’ by Richard Sharpley and Peter McGrath. The authors outline how tourism has become a significant part of the Cambodian economy – the third largest sector after agriculture and textiles. Providing a critical appraisal of the relationship between tourism and development, the chapter highlights how despite the apparent success of the sector in Cambodia, it has, in the main, failed to translate into local economic growth and development for those who are in need of it most.

Rural developments In the next section we shift our attention towards Rural Developments. While we recognize that there is a false dichotomy between the rural and the urban, we nonetheless felt that this would be a useful analytical frame given that Cambodia is still primarily an agricultural society, where the bulk of the population continues to live in rural areas. This section begins with a chapter called ‘Exploring Rural Livelihoods through the Lens of Coastal Fishers’ by Melissa Marschke, where she recalls that Cambodians remain dependent on natural resources, with fish in particular being a vital means for Cambodians. Factors such as stock declines and climate variation threaten the future of the fishing industry in the country, placing significant pressure on rural peoples. Marschke acknowledges rural livelihoods as dynamic, complex and, oftentimes, unpredictable since household goals, interests, resources and means are constantly being reassessed in light of such ongoing change. She pays particular attention to the agriculture and fisheries 5

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

sector, changes in land use and key human development indicators to give us a holistic picture of rural life in Cambodia before grounding her analysis in one resource-dependent fishing village where she has tracked the stresses that people have experienced over a 16-year period (1998–2014). Young Sokphea follows with ‘Practices and Challenges towards Sustainability’, where he defines the practice and challenges of sustainability in rural development in Cambodia. The chapter argues that sustainability in contemporary development practice remains complex and challenging, as development practitioners and government agencies perceive different meanings. The result is that the current sustainability practices have had a limited impact in rural areas given the imbalance between the social, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability. In the next chapter on ‘The Imperative of Good Water Governance in Cambodia’, Joakim Öjendal and Ros Bandeth also talk about the challenges of sustainability, despite ample water resources in the country. These range from the environmental harm and social injustices of dam building; the threat to the Tonle Sap; to the inequality of water supply and use between rural and urban areas. The authors identify how vital matters of water governance are stymied by the common disregard of local community livelihoods and rights. Concomitant precarity in ordinary people’s lives is also furthered by a patronage culture that hinders much needed collaboration across ministries, agencies and departments. Jonathan Padwe’s chapter, entitled ‘Cambodia’s Highlanders: Land, Livelihoods, and the Politics of Indigeneity’ also highlights the significance of patron–client relationships which have generated large off-budget surpluses through the state territorialization of forested land and the granting of concessions to extractive industries and enterprises involved in the large-scale production of agricultural commodities. Padwe goes on to document the asset stripping of indigenous highlanders and the deepening land crisis they face from logging concessionaires, illegal loggers and the construction of largescale infrastructures including hydroelectric dams. In the succeeding chapter ‘Under Pressure: Environmental Risk and Contemporary Resilience Strategies in Rural Cambodia’, Laurie Parsons provides the reader with an in-depth account of the disproportionate environmental risk that marginalized rural communities encounter and try to mitigate, often through migration to urban areas. Parsons shows how there is a triple disadvantage at work that has the potential to become a cycle – the poorest are less able to absorb or mitigate climate shocks; they struggle to plan or save for the incidence of their family’s labour movement; and, as a result, suffer a greater risk of migrating unsuccessfully. Evidence of deepening inequality in Cambodia is also found in the next chapter by Jean-Christophe Diepart and Laura Schoenberger, entitled ‘Concessions in Cambodia: Governing Profits, Extending State Power and Enclosing Resources from the Colonial Era to the Present’. The reader is provided with a potted history of enclosure in Cambodia, from large forest enclosures brought about by colonial rule to Economic Land Concession policies of the present-day regime. Echoed in the chapters that precede it, the authors detail how the reconstruction of patronage networks have concentrated power for Hun Sen and the CPP through a “progressive concentralization and control of power” via land. The final chapter in this section, by Robin Biddulph and Shaun Williams, is titled ‘From Chicken Wing Receipts to Students in Military Uniforms: Land Titling and Property in Post-Conflict Cambodia’ and tells the story of three successive attempts by the state to register and title private property during the post-Khmer Rouge period. The authors argue that although Cambodia was officially communist during the 1980s, the political leadership of the time fostered market relations both by turning a blind eye to private economic activity and then in 1989 by introducing new legislation and attempting a mass land-titling campaign. A lack of administrative capacity caused this initiative to fail. In 2002, following the passage of a new land law and recruitment of international technical and financial assistance, a second programme of mass titling called LMPA was initiated. While popular where implemented, LMAP failed to strengthen state 6

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

legitimacy largely because it was implemented away from regions where ownership was disputed. A third programme, Order 01, apparently aimed at ending disputes on state public land, was a personal initiative of the Prime Minister but petered out following the 2013 national elections. Unpacking the ins and outs of these developments, Biddulph and Williams weave a tale of political intrigue.

Urban conflicts Despite the fact that the rural frame continues to exemplify the lived experience of most Cambodians, urbanization has been a major force of change in the country in recent years. This shifting dynamic of how Cambodians live and experience politics, culture and economics has resulted in numerous tensions that are worthy of our sustained attention, which we offer in the third section on Urban Conflicts. Tom Percival begins this section with ‘Urban Megaprojects and City Planning in Phnom Penh’. In this chapter he offers an overview of Phnom Penh’s development, planning and governance from the early 1990s to the present day with a particular focus on the production and implications of urban megaprojects. Percival discusses the growing integration of Phnom Penh into global and regional economic systems and how these networks of capital drive megaprojects. Dennis Arnold and Dae-oup Chang follow with a chapter called ‘Labor Rights and Trade Unions in Cambodia’. The nascent trade union movement in Cambodia has been centred on the garment industry and the authors argue that the attention that has been paid to factory-level work conditions has yielded mixed results. Industrial relations remain highly conflictual and are regularly violent in Cambodia, particularly as the state and employers exert influence over many workers’ organizations. While there is undoubtedly reason for concern, it is argued here that workers and their organizations are beginning to show signs of strengthening social and political economic rights in Cambodia. The following chapter from Sabina Lawreniuk is titled ‘The Ties that Bind: Rural–Urban Linkages in the Cambodian Migration System’, which affords readers with an understanding of the ways in which migratory populations, particularly garment factory workers, are in constant flux according to the dynamically structured household-based livelihood system that has emerged in contemporary Cambodia. In a context where impermanent peripheral migrant enclaves are a common feature of the urban frame, this chapter elucidates the rural–urban linkages that have emerged in the country as an outcome of labor demands and their implications for those involved. Next up is Gabriel Fauveaud’s ‘Real Estate Productions, Practices, and Strategies in Contemporary Phnom Penh: An Overview of Social, Economic, and Political Issues’, which draws our attention towards the ways in which Phnom Penh has been undergoing significant changes in its built environment. Satellite cities, condominiums, gated communities, new economic centres and great shopping malls have become features of the contemporary urban landscape in Cambodia, which has resulted in the reorganization of real estate activity. Fauveaud argues that as this urban metamorphosis unfolds, urban planning remains deficient, while land grabbing, forced evictions and socio-economic marginalization are rife. He demonstrates how private investments and financial profitability have supplanted inclusivity, and by considering the economic, social, cultural, symbolic and spatial dimensions of the emergent ‘real estate’ production in Phnom Penh, the chapter provides us with significant insight into the changing character of urban life in Cambodia. Building on a similar theme, Jessie Connell and Mark Grimsditch offer an appraisal of ‘Forced Relocation in Cambodia’. They provide us with a working definition of forced relocation and argue that relocations have been increasing across Cambodia owing to major infrastructure, hydropower, urban beautification and private development projects. As Cambodians experience the secondary impacts of these developments, it often becomes untenable for them 7

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

to continue living in their communities of origin. Weak tenure security arrangements exacerbate the vulnerability of many Cambodians. This chapter overviews the main tensions and debates involved in forced relocations and displacement in Cambodia. The following chapter from Simon Springer, entitled ‘Homelessness in Cambodia: The Terror of Gentrification’ examines the plight of homeless peoples in Phnom Penh as a consequence of their enmeshment in these broader patterns of urban governance. Springer argues that the ongoing pattern of violence utilized by municipal authorities against homeless peoples is part of a gentrifying process that has been euphemized as ‘beautification’. Of particular concern is how city officials have begun actively promoting the criminalization of the urban homeless and poor through arbitrary arrests and illegal detention, holding them in ‘re-education’ or ‘rehabilitation’ centres. These sites play host to the systemic abuse of marginalized peoples who are unwanted on the streets of the capital city, as they are deemed to present a negative image for Phnom Penh. Giorgio Talocci and Camillo Boano’s chapter, ‘Phnom Penh’s Relocation Sites and the Obliteration of Politics’ focuses on the alternative to homelessness in the aftermath of forced evictions. This chapter reviews Phnom Penh’s relocation sites, highlighting the fundamental advocacy role that certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played. The authors unpack the struggles in two particular relocation sites near Phnom Penh: Borei Santepheap II and Andong, which demonstrate a tendency of de-politicization within the urban realm. Analysing the discourses and actions of those involved and drawing on the recently approved National Housing Policy in particular, they reflect on the future role of relocation sites in Phnom Penh’s urban development. The final chapter in this section is called ‘Street Vending in Phnom Penh: Flourishing but Invisible’, where Kyoko Kusakabe shifts gears slightly by introducing us to the situation of public markets in Cambodia. Her concern is for street vending in particular, which has been a core occupation to support middle-class families, as formal employment opportunities are few. The chapter familiarizes us with various types of street vendors, from professional vendors to survival vendors and describes how street vending influences intra-household gender relations, defines relations with authorities and shapes individual identities. Kusakabe concludes by offering some notes on support for street vendors in securing their rights to place.

Social processes The fourth section of the handbook, entitled Social Processes, is intended as an introduction to the changing landscapes of social relations and structures in Cambodia. The first chapter by Will Brehm is entitled ‘The Contemporary Landscape of Education in Cambodia: Hybrid Spaces of the “Public” and “Private”’. Brehm shows how the host of inadequacies in Cambodia’s public schooling system – namely limited teaching time, crowded classrooms and low teacher salaries – is causing households to seek out private alternatives, including tutoring and enrolment at NGO-sponsored schools. Brehm even reports of ‘forced private tutoring’, in which a teacher encourages students to take extra classes by threatening lower grades. Behaviours such as these, Brehm argues, cause and exacerbate socio-economic inequality, as many families cannot afford private education or unofficial payments. These public-sector realities, which are faced on a daily basis, are also covered in the following chapter, ‘Health: Medical Cosmologies and Medical Inequities’ by Jan Ovesen and Ing-Britt Trankell. Here the authors explain how growing numbers of Cambodians use unlicensed private clinics due to the necessity of unofficial payments in public health centres and hospitals. The chapter also traces ‘geographically determined health inequalities’, including the concentration of quality medical treatment in urban areas in comparison to their rural counterparts. They note a range of reasons for this, including 8

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

donor priorities and the placing of NGO health projects in places attractive to foreign and national personnel. Carrying forward the theme of health, in the next chapter Katherine Brickell presents her overview of ‘Violence against Women and Girls in Cambodia’. Positioning violence against women and girls (VAWG) as one of Cambodia’s most systematic and widespread human rights abuses, the chapter examines its multiplicity of types, including domestic and sexual violence. The chapter also affords space for the discussion of two forms of VAWG, which she argues are commonly overlooked: first, acid attacks and second, political violence against female activists. Brickell provides a critique of policy responses to this range of gendered violences and highlights potential reasons for the glaring gap between the rhetoric and practice of human rights in the country. Following on from Brickell’s chapter, which foregrounds the lives of Cambodian women, the next chapter, ‘Gendered Politics of Power in Contemporary Cambodia’, considers a range of subject positions which women hold in Cambodia today. From female members of parliament, NGO workers and women activists, to mothers-in-laws, Mona Lilja and Mikael Baaz impress upon the reader the significance of everyday political practices and statuses of both ‘ordinary’ and ‘elite’ women who are, intentionally or otherwise, challenging the stereotype of the apolitical woman in traditional discourses on the ‘proper’ Khmer woman. In the next chapter, by Heidi Hoefinger, Pisey Ly and Srorn Srun, entitled ‘Sex Politics and Moral Panics: LGBT Communities, Sex/Entertainment Workers and Sexually Active Youth in Cambodia’, the authors speak to both discrimination and resistance. In respect to the former, the authors explain the prejudice faced by sex and entertainment workers who are subject to violence, rape, police brutality and bribery. They go on to give details on the 2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation, which initially led to the closure of urban brothels and the pushing of women onto the streets where they become vulnerable to police removal (see also Springer’s chapter on the omnipresence of ‘sweeps’). Linking back to the discussion of gender norms in in Lilja and Baaz’s chapter, Hoefinger, Ly and Srun also detail anti-trafficking NGO work to ‘rehabilitate’ women by sending them to work in more ‘dignified’ garment factories (under what the authors cast as exploitative conditions). Turning to the latter theme of resistance, the chapter simultaneously paints a more hopeful picture of community activism efforts in the area of LGBT rights. Noting the significance of Facebook and Twitter as organizing platforms, their chapter, in addition to those that precede it, underscores the impact of the Internet and smartphone technology for the mobilization of a more progressive politics in contemporary Cambodia. Next, akin to the chapter by Mona Lilja and Mikael Baaz, which brings to the fore the diversity of subject positions which Cambodian women occupy, the chapter by Melina Czymoniewicz-Klippel illuminates the divergent experiences and life outcomes of different cohorts of youth. In her chapter, ‘Children, Childhood and Youth in Contemporary Cambodia’, she distinguishes between privileged and disadvantaged young people who will, in their own ways, come to shape the future of Cambodia. On the one hand Czymoniewicz-Klippel foregrounds the new cohort of higher status youth who enjoy an extended period of youthcum-‘emerging adulthood’. Many can be found engaging in a sub-culture of wealth through the consumption of alcohol and drugs at local nightclubs, where the next generation of strategic patron–client relationships are (re)made. On the other hand, she tells a story of the lives of lower socio-economic status children who, by contrast, often have shortened childhoods given the need to take on full adult responsibilities to support their families. Developing this focus on the survival and life cycle of households, the subsequent chapter in the Social Processes section is written by demographer Patrick Heuveline. It provides an overview of living arrangements in contemporary Cambodia, from childhood to marriage. In his chapter entitled “Households and Family Processes” the author emphasizes the flexibility of living arrangements in Cambodia, 9

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

with one exception, living alone, which remains a rarity. Another pattern of particular note is that adult mortality rather than divorce or migration is the major cause of children being separated from their parents. This observation has much in common with the conclusion reached by Ovesen and Trankell in their chapter on health, namely that patterns of mortality have remained largely unchanged despite the country’s economic development. This is especially the case in rural areas of the country, illuminating once more, enduring rural–urban inequalities, which are identified throughout the handbook. The final chapter in the section is entitled ‘Digital Technologies in Contemporary Cambodia’. Here, Jayson Richardson reviews the state of Cambodia’s technology infrastructure, educational initiatives, and e-government efforts. Having explored recent trends in these areas, Richardson turns to the impact of the online environment for political developments in the country, with questions of freedom of expression and the visibility of citizens’ voices taking centre stage. As such, his chapter, like many others we feature, sits across multiple section themes of the handbook.

Cultural currents In the fifth and final section of the handbook, Cultural Currents, contributors not only consolidate a range of themes highlighted in preceding chapters, but also expand its scope towards contentious questions of Khmer tradition, authenticity and identity in the twenty-first century. In the first chapter ‘Ethnic Identities in Cambodia’, Alvin Lim provides us with a historical overview of the Khmer ethnic majority and the Cham, Chinese, Vietnamese and Thai ethnic minorities. Against a so-called ‘idealized model of the “authentic” Khmer’, he raises a host of markedly visible trends including escalating hostility and exclusion of the ethnic Vietnamese community and the rise of Oknha as the latest expression of patron–client relationships between the Chinese business elite and the Khmer political leadership. Next up is the chapter ‘Violence and Memorialization in Cambodia’, by Savina Sirik and James Tyner, which attends to the legacy politics of the Khmer Rouge period. In it, the authors allude to the social injustice that comes from what they see as the historical erasure of Cambodia’s victims of the Khmer Rouge – that by concentrating memorialization almost entirely on the official sites of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, the vast number of ‘unmarked sites of violence’ across Cambodia exist only in the memories of those who survived rather than the national and international consciousness. In the following chapter, Alexandra Kent moves the reader to consider the religious history of Cambodia with a particular emphasis on its post-genocidal manifestations. In her chapter, ‘A Shifting Universe: Religion and Moral Order in Cambodia’, the anthropologist includes, for example, how monks have become increasingly vocal in protesting election irregularities and forced evictions (both issues covered in a multitude of earlier chapters). As she writes, after a period of quiescence and timidity in Cambodia’s recovering sangha, the country is now seeing a young, internet savvy, post-war generation come of age and there are signs that the government’s mixture of protection, patronage and menace may no longer be working to control either monks or the laity. (Kent, this volume, p.385) Courtney Work’s chapter, entitled ‘The Persistent Presence of Cambodian Spirits: Contemporary Knowledge Production in Cambodia’, goes on to explain how struggles for forest and land-use rights are also shaped by the summoning of spirits. These are spirits that still, more broadly, influence community life in Cambodia. On the topic of living heritage, Jo Gillespie 10

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

turns to ‘Natural and Cultural Heritage in Cambodia’. From the monuments of Angkor, the Tonle Sap, to the Cardamom Mountains, Gillespie’s chapter demonstrates the dynamic and often tempestuous relationship between the articulation of Khmer national identity, heritage conservation and development imperatives. Linking to this, and an earlier chapter by Sharpley and McGrath on tourism, the following chapter is titled ‘Destination Cambodia: A Volunteer Tourism Boom’ by Tess Guiney. In it, Guiney questions the harm of volunteer tourism organized through NGOs on account of a lack of training, reinforcement of Western superiority and the fostering of dependency. This is especially the case for orphanage tourism, which has been met with sustained criticism for its damage to children and its potential for exploitation. The chapter encompasses however, a concern for positive impacts of the trend towards volunteerism in Cambodia, including the (re)building of physical infrastructure and the possibility for fostering mutually beneficial relationships. In the penultimate chapter of the book, Joanna Wolfarth presents ‘Addressing the Contemporary: Recent Trends and Debates in Cambodian Visual Art’. Among other things, Wolfarth documents the work of contemporary Khmer artists in exploring questions of social justice and gender inequalities. She discusses the artwork of Khvay Samnang, for example, on violent urban development in Phnom Penh, notably Boeung Kak Lake. As our cover image of the book tries to capture, photo-journalism is playing a significant role in bringing social injustices to light nationally and internationally. The chapter also speaks to motivations of ‘Khmerness’ and authenticity woven through the visual art world in Cambodia. According to Wolfarth, the French colonial period promoted the idea that Cambodians should learn traditional forms of decorative arts – largely based on the copying of authentic and traditional art forms. Foreign scholars, she argues, have often been ‘blinded to the idea that present-day Cambodians were capable of producing original art work’. Tourists too often expect a certain ‘Khmerness’ to be represented either in relation to the Angkorian temples or to the genocide. The integration of Cambodian art into the global art market has brought some changes – while the art speaks for and to Cambodia, the choice of mediums used by contemporary artists speaks both to local and global audiences. In contrast to Wolfarth’s chapter which evidences a growing cultural hybridity of the visual arts, Catherine Grant’s chapter on ‘Finding New Ground: Maintaining and Transforming Traditional Music’ emphasizes governmental efforts towards safeguarding ‘authentic’ traditions from the pre-war era. This political energy, she argues, is driven by a concern for the ‘contamination’ and ‘corruption’ of Cambodian traditional genres. Yet as Grant suggests in the context of cultural endangerment, ‘attempting to preserve an “unchanging” or “authentic” tradition in a fast-changing contemporary world is not always the most promising avenue for sustainability’. Together then, the final chapters by Wolfarth and Grant bring to the fore the ongoing politics of revitalizing artistic practices and traditional cultural expressions in contemporary Cambodia.

Conclusion We want to conclude this introductory chapter by returning to the image that graces the front of this edited volume. It is often said that one should not judge a book by its cover. Fair enough. We only hope that the collection we have compiled can live up to the potential that is represented by the image on the cover. The family’s gravitational pull around the fire speaks to warmth, cohesion and resilience in the face of relentless accumulative practices of global capitalism which have led to land grabbing in their village. The spirit of resolve in the face of incredible adversity is contemporary Cambodia to us. Yet the metaphor ‘fire’ also evokes for us other, less positive, associations that can be found in the following pages. Domestic violence, 11

Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer

often referred to by Cambodians as ‘fire in the house’, remains one of the most enduring problems in contemporary Cambodian society, but it is a phenomenon that is deeply connected to the multitude of other forms of violence that are intimately woven into its agonizing history (Brickell 2008, 2015). Much like the equivocal symbolism associated with fire, Cambodia is a place of paradoxes, of contradictions, of inconsistencies, ambiguities and incongruities that fuel our passion for the country and its people. Cognizant with the girl’s contemplative gaze into the fire, it is to the growing demographic of young people to whom the opportunities and burdens of contemporary Cambodia will ultimately fall. Along with Cambodia’s other sons and daughters, what she does through the passage of time will shape the course of her country’s future. But nothing is assured. Will Cambodia be once more consumed in the darkness of an apocalypse wrought by inequality, or will there be a dawn of something new, where an innovative and viable egalitarian ethic is inaugurated? While we can never forget the past, in response to the epigraph that opens this chapter, we maintain that the embers that continue to smoulder in contemporary Cambodian society don’t have to represent the blazes of turmoil. Instead they could serve as a metaphor for the desire that animates social change, and perhaps even the source of ignition that we saw in the run up to the 2013 election. Of course it would be foolish to try and confine the ‘tragedy of Cambodian history’ to its past (Chandler 1993), and this volume will make very clear that calamity and misfortune continue into the present. Yet the real question for Cambodia is whether its future will be one where the embers of strife continue to sear the soul of its people and Reahu is allowed to swallow the sun, or one where Cambodians will collectively rise from the ashes of a traumatic past and embrace the epithet of Hanuman as Sankata Mochana, the destroyer of demons.

References Ablin, D. A. and M. Hood. 1987. The path to Cambodia’s present, in D. A. Ablin and M. Hood (eds.), The Cambodian Agony. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. xv–lvi. Anderson, K. and S. J. Smith. 2001. Editorial: Emotional geographies. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 26(1): 7–10. Brickell, K. 2008. ‘Fire in the house’: Gendered experiences of drunkenness and violence in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Geoforum, 39(5): 1667–1675. ——. 2014. ‘The whole world is watching’: Intimate geopolitics of forced eviction and women’s activism in Cambodia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104(6): 1256–1272. ——. 2015. Towards intimate geographies of peace? Local reconciliation of domestic violence in Cambodia. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 40(3): 321–333. Chandler, D. 1993. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ——. 2008. A History of Cambodia. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Dy, K. 2013. Challenges of teaching genocide in Cambodian secondary schools. Policy and Practice: Pedagogy about the Holocaust and Genocide Papers. Paper 4. http://commons.clarku.edu/pedagogy2013/4 (accessed 28 May 2016). Etcheson, C. 2005. After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide. Westport, CT: Praeger. Global Witness. 2016. Hostile Takeover: The Corporate Empire of Cambodia’s Ruling Family. London, UK: Global Witness. Gottesman, E. 2003. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kiernan, B. 1996. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ——. 2004. How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975. 2nd ed. London: Yale University Press. Osborne, M. 1997. The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia. Bangkok: White Lotus.

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Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia Owens, T. and B. Kiernan. 2006. Bombs over Cambodia, The Walrus, October: 62–69. Peou, S. 2007. International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding: Cambodia and Beyond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Slocomb, M. 2010. An Economic History of Cambodia in the Twentieth Century. Singapore: NUS Press. Springer, S. 2009. The neoliberalization of security and violence in Cambodia’s transition, in S. Peou (ed.), Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action. New York: Routledge. 125–141. ——. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space. London: Routledge. ——. 2015. Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse and Dispossession in Cambodia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Tyner, J. A. 2008. The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide, and the Unmaking of Space. Aldershot: Ashgate.

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PART I

Political and economic tensions

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1 THE CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS OF CAMBODIA Alignments in Regional and Global Contexts Sok Udom Deth, Kairat Moldashev and Serkan Bulut

Introduction Cambodia is a country known for two contradicting geographies and histories: on one hand, as home to the splendid temple Angkor Wat, the largest religious edifice in the world built during the twelfth century, and on the other hand as the “Killing Fields” – popularized by the Oscar award-winning film of the same name that portrayed the genocide of Cambodians between 1975 and 1979 under the Khmer Rouge (known formally as Democratic Kampuchea). Visitors who are not well read on Cambodia’s history are often perplexed by the stark contrast between the country’s past glory and the contemporary signs and symptoms of poverty. Although there has been remarkable urban development during the last decade, this paradox remains largely unchanged. There are certainly multiple lenses through which one can look at Cambodia and its current place in the world. This chapter does so by focusing on the country’s geopolitics, seeking to situate and discuss Cambodia in the post-Cold War context. Specifically, we examine Cambodia’s transformed relations and ongoing tensions with neighboring countries, Cambodia’s place in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional bloc, as well as Cambodia’s position in the context of a “rising” China and the pivot to Southeast Asia by the US. Finally, we propose a way forward for Cambodia’s advancement of interests in domestic and global affairs. Since the end of the Cold War, Cambodia has been reintegrated into different regional and global economic and political communities, notable among which were the accession into ASEAN in April 1999 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2004. These processes of regionalization and globalization have certainly contributed to the changes of geopolitical landscapes of Cambodia during the last two decades. Cambodia is no longer an isolated nation of the 1980s that only had diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist Eastern bloc, but a vibrant economy with one of the highest growth rates (expected to be over seven percent in 2015 and the following years) (Asian Development Bank 2015, 213). The Global Financial Crisis in 2008–9 had an indirect impact on the country, hitting its major service sectors that comprised tourism, construction and garment/footwear exports (mainly to the US and Europe). This is a testimony to the connectedness of the country’s position in the global economy. At the same time, on different levels, traditional security issues with neighboring countries, as well 17

S. U. Deth, K. Moldashev, and S. Bulut

as an apparent emergence of the rivalry between a rising China and the purported “pivot to Asia” by the US remain the core geopolitical concerns for Cambodia (and the region at large). The following sections deal with these issues in further detail.

Relations with neighboring countries Following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge and a United Nations-sponsored transition of the early 1990s, Cambodia was faced with the prospect of being “wedged between two more prosperous and newsworthy neighbors: the economic dynamo of Thailand, the soaring dragon of Vietnam,” where Cambodia’s affairs attracted little interest outside the country (Strangio 2014, xiv). In July 2008, however, a brewing conflict between Cambodia and Thailand attracted global media attention when the Preah Vihear temple and a 4.6 square kilometer tract of land adjacent to the temple became the focus of a militarized standoff. After the Cold War, the relationship between Cambodia and Thailand had been heading towards a more cooperative situation of shared interests. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thai politics in the late 1990s, and Hun Sen’s emergence as the dominant political figure in Cambodia after 1998, helped forge closer ties between the two countries. Thaksin’s pro-business foreign policy in the region was warmly received by Hun Sen’s “neoliberal” government in Cambodia (Springer 2010). Save for the brief diplomatic rupture following the early 2003 riots in Phnom Penh (which had to do more with domestic politics in Cambodia), relations between the two countries from 1993 to 2008 were by and large amicable, especially during Thaksin’s term (2001–6). Cambodia’s proposal to have the Preah Vihear temple recognized as a World Heritage Site was supported by Thaksin’s proxy government under Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej (Deth 2014). The conflict over Preah Vihear became a linchpin in Thai domestic power struggles, which eventually saw a military-backed opposition Democrat Party come to power in late 2008. Between December 2008 and July 2011, relations between Cambodia and Thailand deteriorated significantly, with strong mutual distrust, frequent accusations and threats of violence in press releases and through the media, and, worse, occasional deadly military clashes along the border. It was only after Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, won the national election in July 2011 that hostilities subsided and diplomatic relations reverted back to friendship and cooperation. Trade relations between the two countries reached US$4.5 billion in 2013, a 12 percent increase from the previous year (Shen Qing 2014). In November 2014, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Preah Vihear temple and the promontory over which it is located is within the Cambodian territory, but fell short of ruling entirely in Cambodia’s favor over the disputed 4.6 square kilometer area (Raymond 2014). Due to ongoing domestic conflict in Thailand the dispute over the temple has dissipated, where a renewed focus on pursuing aspects of economic cooperation has prevailed. This holds true both for Cambodia’s relation with Yingluck’s government and with the Thai military government after the recent coup in May 2014. Thailand’s troubles have been felt in Cambodia in other ways, where, as an immediate impact of the Thai coup, more than 200,000 Cambodian migrant workers fled Thailand due to the Thai military government’s crackdown on illegal migrant workers in the country. The crackdown was likely due to concerns that Cambodian workers might join forces with the pro-Thaksin demonstrators. The implication of this policy for Cambodia was huge, resulting in an estimated loss of more than US$1 million per day in revenue (Leng 2014). Relations between the two countries have once again improved, with high-level diplomatic visits and pledges of cooperation on various fronts (Chheang 2014b). Apart from the Preah Vihear conflict, an issue of particular contemporary concern is the problem of the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, which measures 18

The Contemporary Geopolitics of Cambodia

26,000 square kilometers, and is estimated to contain up to 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and an undetermined quantity of oil (Open Development Cambodia 2012). Cambodia and Thailand had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2001, setting a joint-development regime over certain areas of the OCA, as well as defining a maritime border. The Thai government unfortunately shelved this agreement in 2009. Talks over the joint effort to explore the OCA re-emerged under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration, but were halted once more as Thailand was undergoing political turmoil before the May 2014 coup. In early December 2014, Cambodia’s Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP 2014) reported that a Joint Technical Committee for Border Demarcation and Common Development of Oil Resources in Cambodia–Thailand Maritime Overlapping Claims Area chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Sok An had been established. According to the report, in addition to overseeing maritime border demarcation, the Committee is commissioned to “negotiate, prepare for treaties and other legal documents related to the common development of oil resources in the maritime overlapping claims area between the two neighboring countries”. It remains to be seen, however, whether the recent drop in the global price of oil will slow down the negotiation process between the two countries. With mutual economic and political legitimacy interests at stake, it looks plausible that the Cambodian government and its military counterpart will continue to cooperate on most aspects and avoid highly sensitive issues that may jeopardize the two countries’ relationship in the foreseeable future. While the OCA may eventually serve as a win–win outcome and increase amity between the two nations, the Thai military’s past rhetoric about “protection of Thailand’s national sovereignty” over the Preah Vihear conflict means that the issue will probably be left untouched for some time to come. To the east, Cambodia’s relationship with Vietnam has also experienced ebbs and flows during the past several decades, particularly as a result of the spillover effects of the Vietnam War. While the pro-US governments of the Khmer Republic (1970–5) fought against Vietnamese communist troops (attempting to get rid of the Vietnamese sanctuaries along the Ho Chi Minh Trail on Cambodian soil), the Khmer Rouge (1975–9) engaged in border conflicts with the now unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, both on land and at sea (Kiernan 2008). During the 1980s, under Vietnam’s patronage, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (whose core leaders still comprise the current ruling Cambodian People’s Party leadership) was established but had to continue to fight against the then in-exile Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which was comprised of three main Cambodian factions: the communist Khmer Rouge, the royalist FUNCINPEC, and the republican KPNLF. Prior to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, some 150,000 Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from Cambodia. Since then, official diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Vietnam have been largely cooperative. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$184 million in 2001 to US$1.8 billion by 2010 (Thayer 2012). In 2008 and 2009, the two countries signed several cooperation agreements including: visa exemption, goods transit, railway linkages, information exchanges between ministries, and shared radio transmissions (Thayer 2012). In August 2012, the presidents of both countries’ national assemblies committed to building bilateral relations based on the motto, “good neighbors, traditional friendship, comprehensive and long-term sustainable cooperation” (Chheang and Wong 2014, 243). By 2013, the bilateral trade had jumped to US$3.43 billion; Vietnam’s foreign direct investment in Cambodia totaled over $3 billion, while close to one million Vietnamese tourists visited Cambodia during the same year (Chheang 2014a). Yet, as Thayer (2012) has pointed out, two main issues have continued to dominate Cambodia’s relations with Vietnam since the 1990s: ethnic Vietnamese residents in Cambodia and the land border. Chheang (2014a) has similarly observed that “although bilateral ties strengthened over 19

S. U. Deth, K. Moldashev, and S. Bulut

the decades, they remain vulnerable to domestic politics, nationalism, and external powers’ intervention.” Many Cambodians who support the opposition party (Cambodia’s National Rescue Party—CNRP) also resent perceived hegemonic dominance by Vietnam over the Cambodia. The opposition party has attempted to use this to score political points, often engaging antiVietnamese rhetoric. This public discourse underscores the problems of illegal Vietnamese migrants in Cambodia, the granting of long-term Economic Land Concessions to Vietnamese companies along the Cambodia–Vietnam border, which also allegedly bring in Vietnamese workers/residents, as well as Cambodia’s perceived disadvantages in the boundary demarcation process with Vietnam. It is in such a context that Chheang (2014a) argues that “although anti-Vietnam protests do not have much impact on the wider, positive trend of the bilateral relations, both countries need to work transparently to resolve outstanding issues: border demarcation, cross-border migration and economic land concessions granted to Vietnamese companies.” This is particularly salient given the evident decline of popularity of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in the latest 2013 national election. In December 2014, the incumbent governments of Cambodia and Vietnam pledged to advance further cooperation between the two countries. In particular, they sought to reach a bilateral trade target of US$5 billion by 2015, strengthen collaboration in such areas as tourism and petroleum, demarcate and plant markers along the 1,200 kilometer-long border, and improve mutual understanding and connectivity (Parameswaran 2014). If the CPP remains in power following the 2018 election, Cambodia–Vietnam relations will remain cordial at the state level, though at the expense of further alienating a major part of the electorate. If the CNRP comes to power, its government will have to tread a fine line between maintaining good diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam on the one hand, and appearing firm in the eyes of its supporters in its dealing with this neighboring country on the other. To the north, unlike Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia’s relationship with the Lao PDR makes very few news headlines. In general, although the two countries have a cordial relationship, one particular issue stands out as being a potential flashpoint for conflict: Laos’s construction of hydropower dams on the Mekong River, most notably the massive 1,285 megawatt Xayaburi Dam and the 260 megawatt Don Sahong Dam. If built, according to International Rivers (2014), the dams would block critical fish migration routes, destroy the river’s complex ecosystems that serve as important fish habitats, and affect agriculture as far downstream as the Mekong Delta in Vietnam (see Öjendal and Bandeth this volume, p. 123). Nevertheless, in November 2014, the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian premiers agreed to promote trade, investment and tourism among the three countries, and although Cambodia and Vietnam expressed concerns over dam construction, no serious opposition to Laos’s plans appear to be in place (Thanh Nien Daily 2014).

Cambodia in ASEAN: prospects and challenges In line with Emmers (2003) the prospects and challenges for Cambodia can be explored by viewing ASEAN as a cooperative security regime concerned with both defense and socioeconomic development. Cooperative security emphasizes confidence building and preventive diplomacy through the promotion of norms and the creation of “habit of dialogue” amongst the participants (Emmers 2003, 50). ASEAN was established in a period when the “outlook for regional security and stability in Southeast Asia was particularly grim,” with competing territorial claims among its members and a possibility of becoming a playing field for the interests of external powers (Acharya 2009, 4). Despite its weaknesses, ASEAN has contributed to the avoidance of large-scale, intra-regional 20

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conflicts, which in turn, has prevented the intervention of external powers. The diminishing of hostilities and absence of pressing military security issues among its members enabled ASEAN to deepen socio-economic cooperation among member states. For Cambodia, which has suffered from both internal conflicts and external intervention, ASEAN provides an institutional framework that arguably improves the country’s prospects for development. With Cambodia’s economic development policies primarily based on attracting foreign investors due to lack of domestic financial resources, ASEAN represents an opportunity to source capital from its richer members and to attract investors from outside the region who may see greater security on investments as a result of the organization’s activities (Springer 2009). ASEAN’s share in Cambodia’s total trade was equal to 37.8 percent in 2013 and the bloc is the country’s main trading partner (see Figure 1.1). Starting from 2004, the ASEAN’s share of Cambodia’s trade, particularly in imports, has grown as the share of the United States (US) has declined. China’s share in total trade of Cambodia has been increasing over the years but still, as of 2013, it is 2.5 times less than ASEAN’s share. It should be noted that ASEAN and China are main sources of Cambodia’s imports while the United States and European Union (EU) are main destinations for exports. While the importance of ASEAN as a trade partner for Cambodia is unquestionable in terms of goods, with respect to investment, China is the main source of capital for Cambodia, with approved investment from 1994 to 2011 reaching US$8,849 million. Approved investment from ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, reached US$5,209 million for the same period (Sophal 2012). The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) planned for the December of 2015 will further liberalize trade among ASEAN member states and may contribute to the creation of a more favorable business environment for investors. Although the issue of AEC is a topic of numerous conferences, roundtables, and seminars, which present the end of 2015 as a milestone in ASEAN regional cooperation, the analysis of the AEC blueprint suggests that important obstacles to trade liberalization, such as tariffs, remain in place on particular goods in Cambodia (ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2008). The liberalization of trade in services has gradually been implemented since 2008 for priority sectors, including healthcare, air transport, logistics, and tourism, yet with respect to the financial sector, ASEAN may follow an “ASEAN-X” formula that allows some members to proceed with liberalization while other members, who feel their service markets are not yet ready, delay until a later date. The progress of ASEAN in promoting norms of dialogue, self-restraint, and non-interference alongside the trade liberalization process is in synergy with Cambodia’s current political landscape and its export-oriented economic development policies. However, the changes in ASEAN and in its member states in the last decades challenge the current relationship between Cambodia and ASEAN. These challenges include growing expectations among ASEAN members for Cambodia to make good on human rights protections and improve its handling of disputes. In particular, Cambodia has been taken to task for its response to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. It is often argued that Cambodia “spoiled” ASEAN’s stance towards the SCS disagreement by rejecting the inclusion of more decisive statements in an ASEAN communiqué on the dispute (Graham 2012; Thayer 2013). It was the first time in the organization’s history that the outcome was publicly criticized by its members, and it witnessed a rare case of harsh exchanges during the negotiation process. It should be noted that the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed in Phnom Penh in 2002 and, at the time, Cambodia had backed ASEAN’s adoption of the Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. Although Cambodia’s reluctance to include the SCS issue in a 2012 communiqué could stem from an attempt to balance between appealing to China and ASEAN, there are other factors to 21

S. U. Deth, K. Moldashev, and S. Bulut

China

EU 28

United States

ASEAN

0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05

Figure 1.1

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

0

Share of major trade partners of Cambodia in country’s total trade

Source: Calculated by authors based on UNCTAD trade database.

consider. First, the harsh stance of some countries, particularly those of the Philippines and Vietnam, to strengthen ASEAN’s role in the SCS dispute was not very compatible with the nature of ASEAN itself. Second, from the beginning Cambodia faced accusations of promoting the interests of China that bothered its leadership, where Hun Sen notably responded by stating that “Cambodia [is] not for sale” (Sidaway et al. 2014, 1181). While ASEAN is attractive for Cambodia owing to its contribution to intra-regional stability and the prospects for economic development that this brings with it, the SCS incident demonstrates some of the dilemmas that come with membership. If the organization is expected to tackle specific internal (for example, the Cambodia–Thailand dispute) or external issues (for example, the SCS dispute) it will, as ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan recognized, need to do some “soul searching” (Lee-Brago 2012).

Cambodia under US–China hegemonic rivalry Cambodia has long been dependent upon foreign aid, an economic orientation that remains significant (Ear 2012), where China and the US stand out as the two major donors. Cambodia’s relationships with these two superpowers are diverse and multi-faceted, yet the center of gravity rests on economic growth and business partnerships. Cambodia has extensive trade relations with both economies, though the US is more of an export partner and China is stronger in the imports market as well as direct investment in Cambodian manufacturing, services, and energy industries. While Cambodia significantly benefits from its association with both China and the US, there are also serious challenges and questions regarding the underlying dynamics and the future direction of these relationships. On the Chinese–Cambodian front, large (around US$500 million per annum) and seemingly non-conditional loans, grants, and aid donations have carried China to the top donor and 22

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investor position in recent years. While China is rising in the ranks of the Cambodian economic system, so are concerns about the intentions of this non-traditional donor. The opposition party is outspoken about the potential negative consequences (Hunt 2013), while the government argues that “the country’s strong economic growth in past years owes a great deal to China’s steady technical and financial assistance” (Heng 2012). On the US–Cambodia front, contrary to China’s so-called non-conditionality, the relatively small (US$74.5 million in 2014) level of American aid comes with strings attached and strong criticism from the US State Department accusing the government of a “flawed and poorly managed electoral process that disenfranchised a significant number of eligible voters, politicized and ineffective judiciary, constraints on freedom of press and assembly, and abuse of prison detainees” (US State Department 2013). Such a critique strains relations between the two countries, where the latest episode of tension arose following the 2013 election period when the US threatened to cut aid to Cambodia over allegations of election fraud. The response from Cambodia has been one of indifference, knowing that Chinese aid is readily available and comes without criticism (Thul 2013).

Dancing with the dragon: Chinese aspirations versus Cambodian expectations Chinese and Cambodian officials like to point out the continuity in friendship between the two states; this began to develop in the 1950s, shortly after Cambodia’s independence from French colonial control. At the groundbreaking ceremony for the enlargement project of National Road 6 in February 2012, Hun Sen lauded “the magnificent bond of relations between Cambodia and China which was built by previous generations of leaders. . . . Norodom Sihanouk and leaders Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi” (Ciorciari 2013). Despite the rosy picture presented today, the history of Chinese relations in the Cold War and post-Cold War Cambodia bears many examples of controversial decisions on the Chinese side. China supported the Khmer Rouge (KR) both during their reign of terror and after, when the insurgents continued to fight Vietnamese forces in the jungles of western Cambodia. How much of the KR brutality Beijing was aware of between 1975 and 1979 is a matter of debate, yet the decision to provide financial and military support to Pol Pot stemmed from the geopolitical interests of the Communist Party as it was an attempt at containing Soviet influence in the region and countering the increasing Soviet–Vietnamese rapprochement. During the Khmer Rouge period, China, with little or no success, spearheaded several infrastructure projects (Mertha 2014), yet by the early 1990s, major changes took place on the global and regional level: the Cold War was over and Vietnam had withdrawn from Cambodia. While the 1980s and the early 1990s were overshadowed by bitterness over Chinese support for Pol Pot, Chinese efforts to distance themselves from former Khmer Rouge entanglements and the peace agreement in 1993 paved the way for a new beginning. When CPP leaders sought international support after the July 1997 partisan clashes and the consolidation of Hun Sen’s grip on power was widely condemned as a coup, China extended its economic and political reach by seizing this diplomatic opening (Ciorciari 2013). From being “the root of everything that was evil” in Cambodia, as Hun Sen had described China in 1988, the country quickly became a key business patron (Strangio 2012). While the first Chinese financial assistance to Cambodia goes as far back as 1956 (Armstrong 1977), economic relations were ramped up with Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Phnom Penh in November 2000, making the first official visit by a Chinese president to Cambodia. The parties signed the Joint Statement on Bilateral Cooperation and expanded areas of cooperation from agriculture to human resource development, education, and resources 23

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extraction. With the winds of economic growth blowing, bilateral trade grew in value from US$1.44 billion in 2010 to US$2.49 billion in 2011, with prospects of pulling the volume up to US$5 billion a year by 2016. According to Cambodian government sources, by the end of 2011 China was supporting 317 projects—ranging from bridge construction, to hydroelectric dams, to coal-fired power plants—with a value of US$8.9 billion (Sutter and Huang 2012). Such fast and sizable growth in China’s presence in the Cambodian economy, along with accumulating loans, triggered debates on Chinese intentions as well as questions over the long-term value and sustainability of this model of partnership. While foreign assistance by traditional donors (such as the US, EU, Japan, and Australia) aims at political change—economic liberalization and pushing for democratization—the scholarship on emerging donors points to a more geopolitical orientation in aid distribution with three potential risks: (1) greater access to aid may once again condemn recipient countries to unsustainable debt; (2) governance reform proposed by traditional donors in exchange for aid may be unduly postponed; and (3) the absence of careful investment appraisals may result in the proliferation of over-ambitious or unproductive capital projects (Manning 2006). China views aid and loans as a means for geopolitical ends, which tends toward the “expansion of desirable cross-border trade and the suppression of negative inflows” (Sato et al. 2011). Another motivation for China stems from its interest in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), where its abundant and untapped resources offer significant potential for energy investment. China has shown great willingness to work with GMS countries, including Cambodia, to push forward energy infrastructure projects and further consolidate and develop China’s traditional relationships with the region (NDRC 2007). Hydropower plants such as Kamchay, Kirirom III, Stung Atay, Stung Tatay, and Stung Russey Chhrum, with a combined capacity of 915 megawatts and a cost of US$1.8 billion, represent just a few examples from a long list of completed or planned investments (Heng 2012). There are numerous risks associated with aid from non-traditional donors and recipients, not least of which is the increasing national debt, which is obscured by non-transparent bureaucratic structures. The government’s limited responsiveness to pressure from traditional donors for political reform is also cause for potential concern, as is the questionable quality of the infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans, which are carried out by Chinese companies that have demonstrated shoddy construction practices. The question of whether China’s economic investments will translate into political influence, especially over foreign policy choices, is yet to be answered. The aforementioned South China Sea dispute is often seen as the result of Chinese economic efforts bearing political fruits. While the numbers are in China’s favor compared to its global competitors, the history does not paint a promising picture for China in terms of solid and unshakable influence over Cambodian politics. Despite its march to the top in trade and finance, China’s soft power seems to be lagging behind and in the realm of public opinion with Cambodians still tending to view the US more favorably than China.1

When the eagle eats rice: US pivot to Asia and implications for Cambodia While US–Cambodian relations are still haunted by a decade of American carpet bombing that extended the US–Vietnam war into Cambodia, the current relationship is one of economic pragmatism, with human rights issues lurking in the background. US financial assistance programs predate Chinese initiatives, where between 1955 and 1963 Washington provided US$ 409.6 million in economic grant aid and US$83.7 million in military assistance, mostly to repair the damages of the first Indochina war. While increasing US involvement in Vietnam turned 24

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into a full-scale war, Cambodia was pulled into the vortex and became another Cold War proxy site from the late 1960s to the first half of the 1970s. Nixon’s secret bombing campaign of Cambodia soured an already fragile relationship. Normalization of the relations came slowly, as the US only restored its economic ties with Cambodia in 1992 by lifting the embargo on Cambodian goods (Le Billon 2000). The first official visit by an American president came in 2012, which to modern Cambodia reflected the tug of war between the hopes of deeper US–Cambodian relations and troubling differences over normative issues. While Obama was in Phnom Penh for the ASEAN summit, he had one-on-one talks with several Southeast Asian leaders including the host Prime Minister Hun Sen, though the meeting was far from warm. Reportedly Obama asked for the release of political prisoners, the end of land grabbing, and election reform for the then-upcoming 2013 parliamentary elections, while the Cambodian side defended its policies with determination (Pace 2012). Amid much criticism over human rights issues and accusations of meddling with domestic politics, there were a few instances that pleased the Cambodian government and brought the sides closer together. One such case was the sentencing of Chhun Yasith, a survivor of the Khmer Rouge and a self-declared freedom fighter who migrated to the US in the early 1980s. The armed skirmishes in the streets of Phnom Penh in November 24, 2000 between a group calling itself the “Cambodian Freedom Fighters” (CFF) and the Cambodian military left 8 people dead and 14 wounded (Strangio 2014). The unsuccessful coup attempt put Yasith, the leader of CFF, under scrutiny both in Cambodia and in the US. He was charged with violating the US Neutrality Act, a law that was passed in the 1930s banning economic and military involvement of American citizens in operations against nations with which the US is at peace. In 2010 Yasith was sentenced in the US to life in prison without parole. Joint military exercises, cooperation over counter-terrorism issues and officer training is another area where the US and Cambodia have maintained cooperation despite occasional setbacks and fluctuations due to the changing political climate. In 1994, the US provided non-lethal humanitarian demining training assistance to the RCAF, making it the first instance of military cooperation between the two counties (Roberts and Williams 1995). Since then, the US provision of training has continued even to include Hun Sen’s oldest son, Lt. General Hun Manet’s education in West Point where he graduated in 1999 as the first Cambodian to graduate from a US Military Academy. Electoral controversy in Cambodia in 2013 and the US criticism over alleged election fraud and voter intimidation were voiced as the reasons for Cambodian suspension of military programs with the US that same year (Seiff 2013). Military assistance was restored to its pre-election level quickly and the two countries held the Angkor Sentinel military exercise in February 2014, a bilateral military exercise hosted by the Royal Cambodian Army and sponsored by US Army Pacific.

Conclusion The geopolitics of contemporary Cambodia are wrapped up in multilateral relationships with varying degrees of cordiality and commitment. With neighboring countries, Cambodia enjoys strong economic ties, especially in the cases of Thailand and Vietnam. Although issues such as border disputes have occasionally disrupted these relationships, current trends suggest further progress and mutual cooperation for the foreseeable future. Peaceful relations are helped by the fact that Cambodia’s neighbors are fellow member states of ASEAN, whose vision is to engage in more economic, political, and cultural integration from 2015 onward. Even if such a vision cannot be fully realized, it seems quite likely that the integration will bring about more synergy and economic development in the region, which will potentially help reduce 25

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tension among its members. While some internal and external issues may challenge the relevance and centrality of ASEAN, the organization’s emphasis on consensus building, non-interference, and self-restraint will ensure that ASEAN remains an important regional player in Cambodia’s foreign affairs, particularly as the country has much to gain economically from continued membership. The rise of China and the purported “pivot to Southeast Asia” by the US has caused concerns, but for the time being China’s economic power has allowed it emerge as the top investor and aid donor to Cambodia. Nonetheless, China’s influence on Cambodia, especially in terms of foreign affairs, is far from a foregone conclusion. Domestic concerns about the rising debt to China, poor quality infrastructure projects through Chinese loans and Cambodia’s reliance on the West for its primary exports all mean that Cambodia will continue to pragmatically balance its cordial relations with all regional and global powers that bring potential benefits to the country.

Note 1 According to the 2011 Gallup Poll on US and Chinese leadership, 68 percent of Cambodians approve of US leadership as opposed to 55 percent for China. For more information on the survey see: www.gallup. com/poll/150830/Leadership-Approval-Ratings-Top-China-Asia.aspx (accessed April 4, 2015).

References Acharya, A. 2009. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. London: Routledge. AKP. 2014. Cambodia establishes a Joint Technical Committee for Maritime Border Demarcation and Joint Development of Oil Resources, Agence Kampuchea Presse. www.akp.gov.kh/?p=54700 (accessed January 19, 2015) ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. 2008. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Asian Development Bank. 2015. Asian Development Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth. Asian Development Bank Institute. www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154508/ado-2015.pdf (accessed April 13, 2015). Chheang, V. 2014a. Cambodia–Vietnam ties remain strong despite turbulence, https://vannarithchheang. wordpress.com/2014/09/19/cambodia-vietnam-ties-remain-strong-disturb-turbulence/ (accessed January 19, 2015). ——. 2014b. Thailand’s Cambodian charm offensive, East Asia Forum. www.eastasiaforum. org/2014/11/29/thailands-cambodian-charm-offensive/ (accessed January 19, 2015). Chheang, V., and Y. Wong. 2014. Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam: Economic reforms and sub-regional integration. Kyoto Sangyo University Economic Review (1): 225–254. Ciorciari, J. D. 2013. Cambodia and China: Patron and Client. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, International Policy Center. Deth, S. U. 2014. Factional politics and foreign policy choices in Cambodia-Thailand diplomatic relations. http:// edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/deth-sok-udom-2014-07-10/METADATA/abstract.php?id=40849 (accessed January 19, 2015). Ear, S. 2012. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Emmers, R. 2003. Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF. London: Routledge. Graham, E. 2012. South China Sea: China closes ranks, RUSI. www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ ref:A50460EE558EA8/ (accessed January 16, 2015). Heng, P. 2012. Cambodia–China relations: A positive-sum game? Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (1): 57–85. Hunt, L. 2013. Cambodian protests expected to focus on China, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat. com/2013/09/cambodian-protests-expected-to-focus-on-china/ (accessed February 19, 2015).

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The Contemporary Geopolitics of Cambodia International Rivers. 2014. World Rivers Review – December 2014: Focus on the Mekong. International Rivers. www.internationalrivers.org/node/8456 (accessed January 19, 2015). Kiernan, B. 2008. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79 (3rd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press. Le Billon, P. 2000 The political ecology of transition in Cambodia 1989–1999: War, peace and forest exploitation, Development and Change 31(4), 785–805. Lee-Brago, P. 2012. ASEAN should do some soul searching, philstar.com. www.philstar.com/headlines/ 2012/07/15/827968/asean-should-do-some-soul-searching (accessed January 16, 2015). Leng, T. 2014. The Cambodian fallout from Thailand’s coup. East Asia Forum. www.eastasiaforum. org/2014/06/27/the-cambodian-fallout-of-thailands-coup/ (accessed January 19, 2015). Manning, R. 2006. Will “emerging donors” change the face of international co-operation. Development Policy Review 24 (4): 371–385. Mertha, A. 2014. Brothers in Arms: China’s Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. NDRC (NDARC). 2007. Country Report on China’s Participation in Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation. Beijing: China National Development and Reform Commission. Open Development Cambodia. 2012. Oil and gas blocks, www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/ oil-and-gas-blocks/ (accessed January 19, 2015). Pace, J. 2012. Obama in Cambodia makes history as first president to visit country. Huffington Post. www. huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/19/obama-cambodia-first-president_n_2157956.html (accessed March 6, 2015). Parameswaran, P. 2014. Cambodia, Vietnam vow to boost bilateral ties. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat. com/2014/12/cambodia-vietnam-vow-to-boost-bilateral-ties/ (accessed January 19, 2015). Raymond, G. 2014. Thai–Cambodia relations one year after the ICJ judgement. East Asia Forum. www. eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/11/thai-cambodia-relations-one-year-after-the-icj-judgement/ (accessed January 19, 2015). Roberts, S., and J. Williams. 1995. After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. Oxford: Oxfam. Sato, J., H. Shiga, T. Kobayashi, and H. Kondoh. 2011. “Emerging donors” from a recipient perspective: An institutional analysis of foreign aid in Cambodia. World Development 39 (12): 2091–2104. Seiff, A. 2013. Cambodia suspends US military programs. Phnom Penh Post. www.phnompenhpost.com/ national/cambodia-suspends-military-cooperation-us (accessed January 19, 2015). Shen Qing. 2014. Cambodia’s trade with Thailand hits 4.5 bln USD last year: Minister, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/business/2014-02/06/c_133095545.htm (accessed April 13, 2015). Sidaway, J. D., T. F. Paasche, C. Y. Woon, and P. Keo. 2014. Transecting security and space in Phnom Penh, Environment and Planning A 46 (5): 1181–1202. Sophal, S. 2012. CAMBODIA: FDI and government policy. Asian Development Bank Institute. www. adbi.org/files/2012.10.09.cpp.sess3.3.suon.cambodia.fdi.pdf (accessed April 13, 2015). Springer, S. 2009. The neoliberalization of security and violence in Cambodia’s transition, in S. Peou (ed.), Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action. New York: Routledge. 125–141. ——. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space. New York: Routledge. Strangio, S. 2012. China’s aid emboldens Cambodia. Yale Global Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/chinas-aid-emboldens-cambodia (accessed January 15, 2015). ——. 2014. Hun Sen’s Cambodia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sutter, R., and C. Huang. 2012. Hu visits Cambodia as South China Sea simmers, Comparative Connections 14 (1): 1–13. Thanh Nien Daily. 2014. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia to expand triangle cooperation, Thanh Nien Daily. www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-laos-cambodia-to-expand-triangle-cooperation-34510. html (accessed January 19, 2015). Thayer, C. A. 2012. Cambodia and Vietnam: Good fences make good neighbours, in P. Sothirak, G. Wade and M. Hong (eds.), Cambodia: Progress and Challenges since 1991. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: ISEAS. ——. 2013. ASEAN, China and the code of conduct in the South China Sea, SAIS Review of International Affairs 33 (2): 75–84.

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S. U. Deth, K. Moldashev, and S. Bulut Thul, P. C. 2013. Defiant Hun Sen says to form government despite Cambodia poll row. Wallstreet Journal. www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-cambodia-election-idUSBRE9710G920130802 (accessed January 21, 2015). United States. Dept. of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Cambodia. (2013). Washington: 2013. www.state.gov/documents/ organization/220395.pdf (accessed March 25, 2016).

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2 JUSTICE INVERTED Law and Human Rights in Cambodia Catherine Morris

Introduction Much has changed in Cambodia since the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, a series of peacebuilding initiatives by the United Nations (UN) and foreign donors that aimed to uproot violence and impunity in the country and implant human rights and the rule of law. As part of this transitional process, Cambodia adopted a liberal democratic Constitution in 1993 and the country became party to an impressive array of international human rights treaties. Implementation is another story. Cambodia’s government, led by the long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodia People’s Party (CPP), has resisted reforms that would put liberal legal frameworks and human rights ideologies into practice. Contemporary Cambodia remains haunted by Pol Pot’s 1975–79 Khmer Rouge regime, which eradicated Cambodia’s traditional dispute resolution processes and colonial civil law system. The subsequent decade of Vietnam-sponsored rule in the 1980s entrenched centralized socialist governance and legal institutions that have stubbornly challenged reform efforts of the 1990s and onwards. Cambodian and foreign observers alike often mutter the French adage: “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (see Ear 2013, 38; Chandler 2010). This chapter considers two decades of international human rights promotion and liberal legal development efforts in Cambodia with emphasis on courts, lawyers, and human rights defenders. For their own benefit, elites in Cambodia manipulate its laws, its corrupt and politically dominated courts, and a weak legal profession. The dysfunctional legal system has played a leading role in Cambodia’s lopsided economic growth characterized by widespread land-grabbing, rapacious environmental destruction, and marginalization of the poor, minorities, and indigenous peoples (Springer 2015). Concern about Vietnam’s historic domination and economic power finds expression in discrimination against Cambodia’s Vietnamese minority, including xenophobic opposition political rhetoric (Oesterheld 2014). Corruption and lack of independence from the ruling party have corroded public trust in Cambodia’s courts, police, lawyers, and public officials. Those exposing lawlessness and corruption or resisting the powerful are likely to experience threats, harassment, or even murder. Rarely is there accountability for attacks on opposition members, journalists, environmentalists, or human rights activists. This contemporary state of affairs defies the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, the 1993 Constitution and Cambodia’s international human rights obligations. In 2007, the prominent 29

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Cambodian human rights organization, LICADHO, called the justice system a “charade,” urging international donors to “wake up” and realize there is “no reason to believe the Cambodian government is serious about improving the country’s courts” (LICADHO 2007, 1). The 2013 national election revealed popular support for the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and considerably reduced the CPP’s majority in the National Assembly, demonstrating new political boldness led largely by Cambodian youth. During the post-election period, mass street demonstrations, featuring opposition leaders, youth, women, and activist monks, dramatized public concern about election irregularities including partisan election bodies and fraudulent manipulation of election laws (Transparency International Cambodia 2013). The power shift yielded more CPP promises of reform to strengthen the rule of law, but there has been no abatement of judicial harassment of opponents and no change in Cambodia’s “rule by decree” legal culture. It is difficult to reconcile the CPP’s version of the “rule of law” with its UN definition as: a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. (UN Security Council 2004) This definition articulates standards for laws themselves and for the manner in which they are made and implemented. As Kheang Un (2012, 202) writes, Cambodia “has moved toward rule by law rather than rule of law, meaning ‘for my friends everything; for my enemies, the law’” (emphasis in original). This chapter proceeds first with a discussion of some conceptions of law in Cambodia, including village dispute resolution. Second is an outline of aspects of Cambodia’s legal framework, touching on the Constitution, international human rights, selected laws and two cases illustrating how courts operate. Third is a discussion of alternatives to Cambodia’s distrusted formal courts, contrasting foreign-led alternative dispute resolution (ADR) initiatives with community-based conciliation. Fourth is a discussion of Cambodia’s weak legal profession. Finally, Cambodia’s robust civil society is featured, with case studies demonstrating how the CPP makes and uses laws to try to quell dissident voices. The chapter concludes with a discussion of reasons for the glaring failure of international interventions to instil the rule of law and human rights and suggests some local movements that may produce positive change.

Conceptions of “law” in Cambodia Despite six written constitutions since 1947, including the liberal democratic 1993 Constitution, Cambodia has no liberal constitutional history. No discussion about law in Cambodia makes sense without awareness that written laws and formal courts have never been the primary social ordering mechanisms for most Cambodians (Donovan 1998; Springer 2013a). Western understandings of law that underwrite international rule of law projects differ from traditional Cambodian conceptions of “law,” such as customary dispute resolution processes or Buddhist moral law (dhamma) (Geertz 1983). According to Cambodian academic, Hor Peng (2012, 32), “ancient regimes in Cambodia had always had a constitutional law . . . [which] applied local customary, social and religious norms . . . [and] referenced the king as a God on earth . . . all powers were focused in the King himself.” Social order has traditionally necessitated “a righteous ruler at the top of a social and moral hierarchy” (Ledgerwood 2008, 198), maintained 30

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through vertical networks of patron-client relationships emanating from the center to the grass roots (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002, 114–117). People secured their wellbeing by remaining in harmony with patrons’ power and authority. Buddhist monks, as guardians of dhamma, have traditionally undergirded popular legitimacy of the ruler who maintained clergy support (and social control) by observing the dhamma. Cambodia’s post-colonial regimes have all appealed to the “cultural and political cloth of both Theravada Buddhism . . . and the people-centred kingship that has been tied to it” (GyallayPap 2007, 72). Even Pol Pot’s anti-religious regime sought legitimacy by inverting Buddhist morality, claiming that its cadres had “surpassed the discipline of monks” (Gyallay-Pap 2007, 89) and by keeping Sihanouk alive, albeit in the “gilded prison” of the palace (Sihanouk 1980–1982; Marlay and Neher 1999). Nowadays, Buddhist ethical practice is often shallow, but monks still evoke deference. The monk establishment has aligned itself with the CPP since the 1980s. Both the CPP and monk leaders have punished activist monks (Heng 2008b), many of whom align Buddhist teaching with international human rights (Heng 2008b; LICADHO 2014b). At the village level, dispute resolution traditionally involved informal conciliation by a monk, elder, village chief, or commune chief (Luco 2002). The community-based, non-adversarial conciliation system re-emerged soon after Vietnam’s ousting of the Khmer Rouge (Donovan 1993, 446). If unable to settle disputes locally, villagers traditionally might go to the capital to plead their case before the King (Luco 2002). Since the 2004 abdication of “the last God-King,” Norodom Sihanouk, villagers are more likely to seek Prime Minister Hun Sen’s intervention (Strangio 2014). Hun Sen’s displays of power have increasingly featured use of his royal-sounding title, Samdech Akka Moha Sena Pedei Techo (“exalted supreme great commander of gloriously victorious troops”), signalling his “political reinvention” as God-King “towering over” King Sihanouk and his son, King Norodom Sihamoni (Heder 2012, 104; Gyallay-Pap 2007; Strangio 2014). Hun Sen’s governance style evokes traditional Cambodian kingship while retaining the centralized, authoritarian decision-making established under socialism in the 1980s by which all institutions, including courts, were controlled by the communist Central Committee. These patterns have challenged international legal development efforts and local human rights advocacy since the early 1990s.

Laws, legal institutions and foreign intervention The Paris Peace Agreements, Annex 5, prescribed a liberal democratic constitution, and accordingly, Cambodia’s 1993 Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary and assures recognition and respect for human rights “as stipulated in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the covenants and conventions related to human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights” (Article 31). Cambodia is a party to the core UN human rights treaties (except for the Migrant Workers Convention) and has ratified a number of International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. Legal development projects since the early 1990s have been led by foreign experts from civil law and common law traditions. As a result, pluralism marks Cambodia’s “hybrid legal system . . . [which is] an amalgamation of Cambodian customs, the French based legal system (an influence from French colonization), and the common law system, which is an influence arising from foreign . . . assistance to legal and judicial reform” (Kong 2012, 8). Civil law experts from Japan and France influenced the drafting of Cambodia’s civil and criminal laws respectively (Sok 2008). Beginning in 1999, the Japan International Cooperation Agency worked with Cambodia’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to draft a Code of Civil Procedure and a Civil Code, in effect in 2007 and 2011 respectively. Over the period of a 31

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decade, experts from France and the MOJ drafted a new Code of Criminal Procedure and a new Criminal Code, in effect since 2007 and 2010 respectively. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) aimed not only to bring senior Khmer Rouge leaders to justice but also to be a model court by which to strengthen judicial reform and the rule of law (see Hughes and Elander, this volume, p. 42). Such a legacy is predicted to be “superficial at best,” because the slow and costly ECCC has been fraught with allegations of political interference and corruption, thus delivering a “message to the national judiciary that the ECCC is no different than the Cambodian courts” (Coughlan et al. 2012, 16, 28). In the regular courts, endemic corruption is facilitated by judicial salaries that are insufficient to maintain a middle-class living standard (Transparency International Cambodia 2014, 6). According to a judge who admitted to accepting money and gifts, “[i]f a judge is a clever man . . . he can find ways to make a lot of money” (LICADHO 2007, 22). In addition, even though the Judicial Police officially report to the courts (through the prosecutor), the police have a history of non-cooperation with the courts (Un and Ledgerwood 2010, 5). Judges also experience interference through letters, calls, or visits from “fixers” sent by powerful parties or government officials. This leads to fear for personal or job security (Un 2008). Two cases are illustrative: the 2003 murder of Judge Sok Sethamony and the 2004 murder of trade union leader Chea Vichea. In April 2003, Judge Sok Sethamony had refused to comply with the demand of then Phnom Penh Police Chief Heng Pov to reverse a verdict. The next morning, gunmen shot the judge to death. Kheang Un (2008) has argued that the killing unnerved other judges and undermined progress towards judicial independence. While Heng Pov is now serving a jail sentence for the murder, his unfair trial creates uncertainty that he was the killer (Phann and Piore 2006; US Embassy Phnom Penh 2006). Nine months later, in January 2004, gunmen murdered Chea Vichea, leader of the prominent Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTU), which was allied with the then opposition Sam Rainsy Party (Hughes 2007; Springer 2010). Chea Vichea had received death threats purportedly from “someone in a position of power” (RFA 2004). Police arrested Born Samnang and Sok Sam Oeun, even though both men had good alibis. In March 2004, Judge Hing Thirith refused to confirm the charges, citing insufficient evidence and irregularities in the investigation. LICADHO (2004) applauded the judge’s decision as a step towards judicial independence. Within days, the judge was removed from his position and reassigned to a remote provincial court; he explained that he had refused to comply with a senior official’s order to confirm the charges (Phann and Barron 2004). The Appeals Court overturned Hing Thirith’s decision and reinstated the charges. Born Samnang and Sok Sam Oeun were convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment (LICADHO 2005). After years of convoluted court proceedings, in 2013 the Supreme Court dropped the charges and freed the two men. There has been no proper investigation, and the killers of Chea Vichea remain at large. In 2004 and 2007, unknown gunmen shot two other FTU leaders; there were no proper investigations, and courts wrongly convicted individuals who served considerable jail time before verdicts were overturned. These cases are not atypical. They demonstrate how Cambodia’s courts facilitate the intimidation of those who oppose the plans of the powerful. The murder of Judge Sok Sethamony and the removal of Judge Hing Thirith from his position show how judicial independence has been punished. Over the years, donor skepticism turned to frustration about glacial progress of law-making, court reform, anti-corruption, and democratic development. Yet donors have continued to supply hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. In 2006, Sophal Ear (2006, 87) denounced such “international collusion,” noting that the government is “adept at doing just enough to win donor support.” LICADHO noted in 2007 that the millions poured into “research, legislative 32

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drafting, training of court and law enforcement officials, judicial mentoring and the improvement of court and prison facilities” has helped to some degree in that judges and prosecutors are seen as more knowledgeable and competent, but “the most important area of all has seen no change whatsoever. The political and financial influence over the courts is as strong as it has ever been, and there is nothing to suggest that this will change” (LICADHO 2007, 27). Some legal development donors withdrew from Cambodia, including the Danish Institute for Human Rights (Buhmann and Castellani 2012 ), which in 2013 phased out its longstanding work with Cambodia’s Legal Reform Strategy, citing the government’s lack of political commitment (Pedersen 2013). In 2014, the government passed three judicial reform laws that had long been promised to donors to improve the independence of courts. Local and international human rights organizations deplored the process and the results. The CPP rushed the laws through the National Assembly without debate during the CNRP’s post-election boycott of parliament. Promised consultations with civil society and other stakeholders were bypassed. Instead of advancing judicial independence, the laws entrench government control of courts in violation of Cambodia’s constitution and international human rights obligations (International Commission of Jurists 2014). Human Rights Watch (2015, 58) summarizes the problems of political influence; Most judges report to the CPP, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Dith Munthy, who is a member of the CPP Standing Committee. Judges around the country are regularly called to party meetings and report to senior provincial officials as well as the Minister of Justice, who since UNTAC [the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] has been a CPP appointee. The CPP controls both the Constitutional Council and Supreme Council of Magistracy, a constitutional body set up to appoint, remove and discipline judges. After years of foot-dragging and promises to implement the rule of law, the CPP chose the time of the opposition’s post-election parliamentary boycott to spring into action and deploy its law-making power to try to legitimize its control over the judiciary.

Bypassing courts? Alternative dispute resolution and community-based conciliation Most Cambodians avoid the courts, which are not only distrusted but also inaccessible to the poor. Lack of legal assistance and advocacy is a significant impediment, and people prefer informal conciliation at village and commune levels to settle cases such as small land disputes, defamation and insult, divorce, domestic violence, contracts, and inheritance (Luco 2002; Coghlan 2009; McGrew and Virorth 2010). Ninh and Henke (2005, 11) report that mediation at the village and commune level is experienced as easier, cheaper, and more effective than mediation at higher levels. However, citizens see corruption, nepotism, and (need for) impartiality as important problems in commune council mediation, while councillors view a lack of legal knowledge/respect for the law, a lack of knowledge/skills on the part of the council, and a lack of resources as most challenging. Mediation of domestic violence cases achieves mixed results (Lim 2009). Access to mediation does not extend much beyond the commune level (Coghlan 2009). For those in the court system, mandatory mediation by court administrators or judges has been a formal part of Cambodian law for decades, albeit interrupted during the Pol Pot years (Neam 1998, 47–54; Code of Civil Procedure 2006, for example Articles 97, 104, 220, 222), with 33

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mediated agreements treated as court orders (Article 222). Austermiller (2012) indicates a need for mediation training for judges, “administrative guidance on how and when to mediate,” and a specific law on mediation to protect confidentiality and improve enforcement of mediated agreements. To resolve labor disputes out of court, in 2003 Cambodia set up an Arbitration Council under the Labor Law. More than 90 percent of the Council’s cases originate from the garment sector. Commentators have lauded the Council as a successful foreign-funded legal reform; from 2003 to 2010, the Council resolved more than 70 percent of the 1,000 cases it received (van Noord et al. 2011). The process is mandatory but emphasizes conciliation and non-binding arbitration. Parties may voluntarily agree to binding arbitration. A regulation (prakas) drafted in consultation with the ILO and major stakeholders (management, labor and government) ensures arbitrators’ independence, largely through a tripartite design in which each of the Ministry of Labor, unions and employers appoint a third of the arbitrators, who must not be officials of unions, employer organizations, or the Ministry. The Council operates outside the Ministry’s funding or administrative control. The voluntariness of the Council’s processes may have contributed to its reputation for independence and integrity, but it is criticized as having “no teeth.” Also, unions represented on the Labor Advisory Committee (which appoints the arbitrators) are largely CPP-aligned (Nuon and Serrano 2010, 130). Deterioration of labor relations in the garment sector, including wildcat strikes, plus violent crackdowns against garment workers’ strikes, has led to accusations of bias by unions and the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia. In early 2015, the FTU threatened to boycott the Council because of factories’ non-compliance with rulings (Mom and Teehan 2015). To foster international business, in 2006, Cambodia enacted a Commercial Arbitration Law (Austermiller 2012) and set up a National Commercial Arbitration Center (NCAC). However, the NCAC did not receive its first case until May 2015 (Kang 2015). Preconditions for NCAC success include parties’ ability to trust its independence from government and local courts (Verghese 2014), so for the forseeable future, businesses are likely to prefer the Hong Kong or Singapore international arbitration centers or the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.

Denial of access to justice: Cambodia’s weak legal profession “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,” said the rebel plotter, Dick the Butcher, in Shakespeare’s Henry VI. As Neilson (1996) notes, the Pol Pot regime did exactly that as part of its systematized elimination of all social institutions and all possible sources of opposition. Only a handful of lawyers survived the Pol Pot period. In 1995, the new government agreed to adopt a Law on the Bar, creating an independent Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia (BAKC). In 1997, the first law students graduated from the Royal University of Phnom Penh. Within two years, the number of lawyers burgeoned to about 250. Yet, in early 2015 there were only 725 practicing lawyers, not enough for Cambodia’s population of 15 million. The shortage of lawyers, especially legal aid lawyers, is critical, particularly in rural areas. Some legal aid is provided by Cambodian legal aid and human rights NGOs, supported by uneven foreign funding. The BAKC provides legal aid representation to several hundred people a year with MOJ funding. While there are hundreds of law school graduations annually, the Bar Council admits only 35 to 70 lawyers to the bar each year. Many applications are delayed or denied. Allegations of corruption have dogged bar admission processes for years (Dunlap 2014), but evidence is difficult to obtain, because persons paying bribes are unwilling to report their experiences on record 34

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for fear of implicating themselves. Nor are applicants for bar admission willing to blow the whistle on powerful people who might retaliate against them by thwarting their ability to enter the legal profession. To date, there has been no independent investigation or review of bar admission processes to identify and eliminate opportunities for bribery or delay. While the BAKC is independent “on paper,” it has a reputation for being controlled by the CPP (Dunlap 2014). Assertion of CPP control became evident in 2004, when the BAKC President was Mr. Ky Tech, a lawyer with links to powerful CPP members, including the Prime Minister (Global Witness 2007, 24). In July 2004, the Bar Council admitted four senior government officials to the bar, who lacked qualifications for membership; all had honorary, not earned, law degrees. The four were none other than Prime Minister Hun Sen, Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, Minister of Interior (MOI) and Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng and MOI Secretary of State Prum Sokha. This move signaled that the CPP controlled Bar Council decisions, and that the BAKC was an organ of government control over the legal profession rather than a guardian of the independence and integrity of lawyers. The BAKC has not noticeably countered harassment of lawyers by well-connected parties or government officials through intimidation, threats of disbarment, criminal prosecutions, or obstruction of lawyers, particularly those representing villagers or indigenous communities in land-grabbing cases or lawyers representing opposition politicians (Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada 2009).

Attempts to control civil society UNTAC is credited with creating space for development of Cambodia’s now skilled and vigorous civil society organizations. However, the government regularly denies civil society rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and other rights guaranteed by the Constitution and international human rights treaties. Human rights defenders from urban, rural, and indigenous communities, along with NGO workers, journalists, trade unionists, and opposition parliamentarians, regularly face threats “simply for promoting and protecting human rights” (Amnesty International and LICADHO 2013). For example, in April 2012 a military police officer shot and killed an unarmed environmental activist, Mr. Chut Wutty, while he was investigating illegal logging in an indigenous community in Koh Kong province. Before he was killed, he had received a number of death threats. A military police officer was also shot dead at the scene, and a logging company security guard was convicted of unintentionally killing the police officer and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He served six months. There has never been a credible investigation (LICADHO 2012a, 19–20). In another incident of profound violence on May 2012, hundreds of armed soldiers and police converged on a village in Kratie province to forcibly evict residents and clear land around a rubber plantation. Soldiers fired recklessly on protesting villagers, fatally shooting a 14-year-old girl (LICADHO 2012b). There was again no investigation. Authorities instead jailed several village protesters for ostensibly plotting a “secession.” In a June 2012 televised speech, Hun Sen accused a 71-year-old journalist and political activist, Mam Sonando, of inciting the supposed “insurrection.” Despite the complete absence of evidence, the Phnom Penh Court convicted and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment for leading a secession plot (LICADHO 2012a, 57). On March 14, 2013, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence, releasing him after eight months in jail (RFA 2013). The village protesters were released a few days later (Peter and Khuon 2013). In December 2012, 30-year-old Ms. Yorm Bopha, was convicted and jailed on fabricated charges of masterminding an assault. The prosecution was one of a number of cases against members of Phnom Penh’s Boeung Kak Lake community in retaliation for peaceful protests 35

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seeking fair compensation for evictions by a company with connections to senior government officials. Her case was still under appeal in March 2013, when Hun Sen claimed on television that her arrest was unrelated to land issues; rather, she had acted “violently and unjustly in the eyes of the government” (Yorm Bopha v. Cambodia 2013). Days later, a court denied Yorm Bopha’s bail application. She spent over a year in jail before Cambodia’s Supreme Court reduced her sentence and released her, albeit upholding her conviction. In another high-profile case, ten women land rights activists and a Buddhist monk were sentenced to year-long prison terms, the maximum sentence for obstructing traffic. During a peaceful protest in November 2014, they had pulled a bed onto a busy Phnom Penh street to protest government inattention to flooding in the Boeung Kak community (LICADHO 2014a, 2015; RFA 2014b). In January 2015, the Appeal Court upheld the sentences. Responding to the decision, a human rights defender commented that, “evidence of a crime is not necessary for a conviction in Cambodia. Mere criticism of the government is all it takes to secure a prison term” (LICADHO 2015). Hun Sen insists, however, that the government has no power to interfere in independent court decisions (Kuch 2012; RFA 2014a). Belying this claim, in April 2015, Hun Sen agreed to royal pardons and the release of the ten activists from prison as part of a political accord between the CPP and CNRP on electoral reforms (Dech 2015). In addition to underlining political interference with courts, these cases illustrate two phenomena. First, land disputes have created numerous “accidental activists,” notably women and indigenous villagers affected by logging, agribusiness or urban developments that intrude on their homes and livelihoods. Second, activism by young monks is increasing. Despite prosecutions and threats of discipline by the conservative monk establishment, young activist monks are standing for Buddhist principles of righteous rule, framed in terms of non-violence, human rights, and the rule of law (Heng 2008b). In July 2015, the CPP appears to have struck a coup de grâce against civil society. After vigorous demand for public consultation and extensive legal criticism of several drafts of a Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO law) by Cambodian and international NGOs and the UN since 2009, the CPP used its parliamentary majority to pass, without consultation, a law that contradicts Cambodia’s Constitution and international human rights obligations. Mandatory registration provisions and broad government powers to regulate activities create increased opportunities for government restriction, harassment, and criminalization of civil society groups (Amnesty International et al. 2015, see Coventry, this volume, p. 53). Despite government assurances that such concerns were unwarranted, just days after the law came into force, police threatened “punishment” of a group of litigants in a land rights dispute if they protested without being registered under the NGO law (Aun 2015). Several unregistered community-based organizations have reported being forbidden to hold meetings, and the implementation of the NGO law is said to be contributing to Cambodia’s “very disempowering environment” for civil society (Kiai 2016).

Conclusion Lack of an accessible and trustworthy legal system means that impunity, malfeasance, and corruption remain the norm. These factors are among the roots of Cambodia’s poverty, landlessness, environmental degradation, and land conflicts. Despite years of urging by Cambodia’s civil society organizations, donors have failed to insist on government accountability beyond its many promises of reform. With the rise of China’s economic power, Western countries have become more eager to develop economic relationships throughout Asia (Strangio 2014) than to cultivate respect for human rights and the rule of law in Cambodia. 36

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Several reasons have been posed for the failure of foreign legal development assistance to further law reform and the integrity and independence of courts. Some have blamed Western “arrogance, ethnocentricity, failure to recognise plurality and lack of imagination” (Nicholson and Kuong 2014, 176). One independent evaluation of Cambodia’s Legal Reform Strategy suggested that efforts might bear more fruit with increased emphasis on “[b]uilding rule of law awareness and a rule of law culture” (Buhmann and Castellani 2012, 16). The implied assumption is that the key to the “rule of law” in Cambodia is more awareness. Such an assumption is challenged by Un and Ledgerwood (2010, 9), citing Evan Gottesman’s finding (2004, viii) that as far back as the 1980s, “Cambodia’s top leaders were clearly familiar with the concepts of human rights and the rule of law . . . [but] were unlikely to alter the way they governed the country merely in response to Western advisors.” Cambodia’s socialist history partly explains CPP resistance to the liberal rule of law efforts. The 1980s solidified socialist court administration. Many of Cambodia’s current judges were appointed during those years (Neilson 1996, 3). Nowadays, no one imagines that Hun Sen or the CPP hold socialist economic values, but the ruling party benefits from maintaining its grip on socialist-style power structures that subordinate courts to the ruling party. Toope (2003, 393) suggests that: “The one ‘precondition’ [for success] that seems to exist in almost all cases is indigenous demand for legal and judicial reform, be it driven by an elite (the common pattern) or by broad popular sentiment.” Neither CPPbased elites nor popular sentiment have driven reform. Foreign-led rule of law projects have emphasized law reform and judicial and lawyer training, often giving priority to measures that support neoliberal economic development (Springer 2010, 2015). Rule of law projects have not emphasized grassroots mobilization to facilitate broad-based human rights claims (Hughes 2007). While human rights projects have emphasized public dissemination of human rights information, a large focus has been on building NGO workers’ skills in monitoring, investigation, and funnelling of human rights reports to governments, donors, international NGOs, and international organizations. According to Hughes, human rights work has become professionalized and technocratic, and human rights struggles are “largely restricted to a limited role for the educated middle class, operating in a subordinate relationship with international organizations” (Hughes 2007, 841). Springer (2013b) emphasizes that law itself, created by elites and abetted by neoliberal economic reforms, is the chief mechanism for the legitimization of “violent accumulation” of land and resources by powerful elites. While the most extreme expressions of direct violence— political assassinations—have abated over the past two decades, people’s suffering from injustice —or “structural violence” as Galtung (1969) terms it—remains acute as laws themselves are created and used by the powerful to dispossess people of their land, livelihoods, and other entitlements. Judicial and administrative harassment, using literal or perverse interpretations of laws and regulations, are routinely used by the powerful to repress opponents and silence those who advocate for them. Increasingly, the norms created by contemporary law-making in Cambodia work to invert justice, facilitate structural violence, and deepen inequality. Cambodia’s legal processes promote injustice, rather than limiting it, and provide few or none of the limitations on power promised by liberal conceptions of the rule of law. Yet, no society remains static. In Cambodia, there are three arenas of potential resistance to “law’s violence” (Sarat 2001). First, there may be increased interest in the possibilities of expanding and improving traditional village-level dispute resolution processes, which have proven to be both resilient and effective to settle many local disputes (Coghlan 2009; Luco 2002; McGrew and Virorth 2010; Ninh and Henke 2005). Second is the emerging movement of young, educated Buddhist monks seeking to hold rulers accountable to the dhamma (Heng 2008a; Heng 2008b) and inspire Cambodians to become a “just populace” (Heng 2008a). 37

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Third is Cambodia’s energetic civil society, increasingly led by young, well-educated women and men who think for themselves and are less prone than their elders to fear Hun Sen’s threats that without his saving strong hand at the helm, Cambodia might return to civil war. At the close of the last millennium, David Chandler (1999) observed that entrenched power structures may, “[f]or the first time in history be under serious threat, largely from the young.” He saw the concept of individual human rights as posing serious challenges to authoritarian rulers: “The notion of empowering the powerless, through the protection of their individual rights, is genuinely revolutionary. So is the notion that power can exist outside the grip of those at the top of a regime.” In the twenty-first century, people in Cambodia—including indigenous communities, rural villagers, women, and youth—are even more impatient with ceaseless, violent land-grabbing, corruption, and lack of respect for their rights. The CPP’s grip on power is under threat by grassroots activists using strategies of nonviolent protest aided by social media communications. More than foreign expertise, Cambodian activists seek solidarity from transnational networks of activists. The future will reveal whether Cambodia’s young women and men will succeed in shifting Cambodian governance towards justice and peace on Cambodians’ terms.

Bibliography Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris, October 23, 1991). Amnesty International and LICADHO. 2013. Cambodia: A Deteriorating Situation for Human Rights Defenders, Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, January–February 2014. Amnesty International et al. 2015. Withdraw Draft Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organization, Letter to the President of the National Assembly, June 21, 2015. Aun, C. 2015. Kratie Families Feel Effects of NGO Law. Cambodia Daily, August 17, 2015. Austermiller, S. 2012. Cambodian Alternative Dispute Resolution, in P. Hor, P. Kong, and J. Menzell (eds.), Introduction to Cambodian Law. Phnom Penh: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Buhmann, K., and F. Castellani. 2012. Evaluation of DIHR’s Partnership Program with the General Secretariat - Council of Legal and Judicial Reform (GS-CLJR): Implementation of Legal and Judicial Reform in Cambodia. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights. Chandler, D. 1999. Asian Millennium: Might Makes Right, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 9, 1999: 54–56. ——. 2010. Cambodia in 2009: Plus C’est la Même Chose, Asian Survey 50 (1): 228–234. The Code of Civil Procedure of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 2006. Coghlan, D. 2009. Transforming Conflict and Building Peace in Cambodia, in D. Bagshaw (ed.), Mediation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace. London: Routledge. Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. As amended 2008. Coughlan, J., S. Ghouse, and R. Smith. 2012. The Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Maintaining the Status Quo of Cambodia’s Legal and Judicial System, Amsterdam Law Forum 4 (2): 17–35. Danish Institute for Human Rights. 2012. Implementation of Legal and Judicial Reform in Cambodia. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights. Dech, M. 2015. With Election Talks Over, Jailed Activists Freed, Cambodia Daily, April 13, 2015. Donovan, D. 1993. Cambodia: Building a Legal System from Scratch, International Lawyer 27: 445–454. ——. 1998. Codification in Developing Nations: Ritual and Symbol in Cambodia and Indonesia, UC Davis Law Review 31 (3): 693–733. Dunlap, B. 2014. The Rule of Law Without Lawyers: American Legal Reformers and the Cambodian Lawyer Shortage, in Working Paper, Fordham University School of Law: Leitner Center for International Law and Justice, April 2014. Ear, S. 2006. Change and Continuity in Cambodian Human Rights and Freedom of Expression: Learning from Experience. Paper submitted to Pact Cambodia, May 2006. ——. 2013. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy: Columbia: Columbia University Press.

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Law and Human Rights in Cambodia Galtung, J. 1969. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Journal of Peace Research 6 (3): 167–191. Geertz, C. 1983. Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in C. Geertz (ed.), Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books, pp. 167–234. Global Witness. 2007. Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite. London, UK: Global Witness. Gottesman, E. 2004. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Gyallay-Pap, P. 2007. Reconstructing the Cambodian Polity: Buddhism, Kingship and the Quest for Legitimacy, in I. Harris (ed.) Buddhism, Power and Political Order. London: Routledge. Heder, S. 2012. Cambodia: Capitalist Transformation by Neither Liberal Democracy Nor Dictatorship, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2012: 101–115. Heng, M. 2008a. In Search of the Dhammika Ruler, in A. Kent and D. Chandler (eds.), People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Morality in Cambodia Today. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Heng, S. 2008b. The Scope and Limitations of Political Participation by Buddhist Monks, in A. Kent and D. Chandler (eds.), People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Morality in Cambodia Today. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Hor, P. 2012. The Modern Era of Cambodian Constitutionalism: Constitutional Analysis of Historical and Contemporary Development, in P. Hor, P. Kong, and J. Menzell (eds.) Introduction to Cambodian Law. Phnom Penh: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Hughes, C. 2007. Transnational Networks, International Organizations and Political Participation in Cambodia: Human Rights, Labor Rights and Common Right, Democratization 14 (5): 834–852. Human Rights Watch. 2015. 30 Years of Hun Sen: Violence, Repression, and Corruption in Cambodia. USA: HRW. International Commission of Jurists. 2014. Briefing Paper: Key Concerns over Three Judicial Reform Draft Laws in Cambodia. ICJ. Kang, S. 2015. Arbitration Body Receives First Complaint, Cambodia Daily, May 27, 2015. Kiai, Maina. 2016. 2015: The Year in Association and Assembly Rights. A report issued by United Nations Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai in January 2016. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 2016. Kong, P. 2012. Overview of the Cambodian Legal and Judicial System, in P. Hor, P. Kong, and J. Menzell (eds.), Introduction to Cambodian Law. Phnom Penh: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Kuch, N. 2012. Hun Sen Says No Political Prisoners, Cambodia Daily, November 26, 2012. Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada. August 28, 2009. Concerns about the Independence of Lawyers and Judges in Cambodia, Written Statement to the UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council 12th Session. Geneva: Human Rights Council. Ledgerwood, J. 2008. Ritual in 1990 Cambodian Political Theatre: New Songs from the Edge of the Forest, in A. R. Hansen and J. Ledgerwood (eds.), At the Edge of the Forest: Essays on Cambodia, History, and Narrative in Honor of David Chandler. New York: South East Asia Program Publications, Cornell University. Ledgerwood, J., and J. Vijghen. 2002. Decision Making in Khmer Villages, in J. Ledgerwood (ed.), Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays. DeKalb, Illinois: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University. LICADHO. 2004. CHRAC Welcomes Dismissal of Charges against Chea Vichea Murder Suspects, LICADHO, March 25, 2004. ——. 2005. Chea Vichea’s Murder: Born Samnang and Sok Sam Oeun Trial Issues and Transcript. A LICADHO Briefing Pape, LICADHO, August 2005. ——. 2007. Human Rights in Cambodia: The Charade of Justice, December 2007. ——. 2012a. Attacks and Threats against Human Rights Defenders in Cambodia 2010–2012 LICADHO, December 2012. ——. 2012b. LICADHO Calls for Investigation into Deadly Kratie Shooting, LICADHO, May 17, 2012. ——. 2014a. LICADHO Calls for the Release of the 19 Men and Women Wrongfully Imprisoned in Prey Sar’s CC1 and CC2 Prisons, LICADHO, December 8, 2014. ——. 2014b. Monks to Lead International Human Rights Day March, LICADHO, December 2, 2014. ——. 2015. Civil Society Groups Condemn the Ongoing Detention of 11 Activists, LICADHO, January 26, 2015. Lim, J.-A. 2009. Out of Court Resolutions of Violence against Women: Practices and Issues in Cambodia: Phnom Penh: DanChurchAid.

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Catherine Morris Luco, F. 2002. Between a Tiger and a Crocodile: Management of Local Conflicts in Cambodia. An Anthropological Approach to Traditional and New Practices. Phnom Penh: UNESCO. Marlay, R., and C. D. Neher. 1999. Patriots and Tyrants: Ten Asian Leaders. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. McGrew, L., and D. Virorth. 2010. Access to Justice Project in Cambodia: Final Evaluation Report: UNDP, Council on Legal and Judicial Reform, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior. Mom, K., and S. Teehan. 2015. FTU Vows Boycott of Arbitration Council, Cambodia Daily, January 20, 2015. Neam, K. 1998. Introduction to the Cambodian Judicial Process. Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation. Neilson, K. E. 1996. They Killed All the Lawyers: Rebuilding the Judicial System in Cambodia. Victoria, BC: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives. Nicholson, P., and T. Kuong. 2014. Japanese Legal Assistance: An East Asian Model of Legal Assistance and Rule of Law?, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 6 (2): 141–177. Ninh, K., and R. Henke. 2005. Commune Councils in Cambodia: A National Survey on their Functions and Performance, with a Special Focus on Conflict Resolution. Phnom Penh: The Asia Foundation in collaboration with Center for Advanced Study. Nuon, V., and M. Serrano. 2010. Building Unions in Cambodia: History, Challenges, Strategies. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Oesterheld, C. 2014. Scapegoating Cambodia’s “Yuon”: Historical Perspectives on Khmer Anti-Vietnamism, 10th International Academic Conference, Vienna, June 3, 2014. Peter, Z., and N. Khuon. 2013. Last Three Kratie Province “Secessionists” Released from Prison, Cambodia Daily, March 21, 2013. Phann, A., and P. Barron. 2004. Judge Says his Removal was Political, Cambodia Daily, March 25, 2005. Phann, A., and A. Piore. 2006. Heng Pov: Cop, Criminal, Hero or Killer?, Cambodia Daily, August 11, 2006. RFA. 2004. Slain Cambodian Labor Leader Received Death Threats, Radio Free Asia, January 22, 2004. ——. 2013. Cambodian Radio Journalist Mam Sonando to be Freed, Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2013. ——. 2014a. Cambodia’s Hun Sen Says No Political Motive behind Recent Arrests, Radio Free Asia, November 20, 2014. ——. 2014b. Cambodian Court Jails Activists, Monk on “Rebellion” Charges, Radio Free Asia, November 12, 2014. Sarat, A. 2001. Situating Law between the Realities of Violence and the Claims of Justice, in A. Sarat (ed.), Law, Violence, and the Possibility of Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sihanouk, N. 1980–1982. Norodom Sihanouk: The Cup to the Dregs. Transcript of Norodom Sihanouk. Available from http://norodomsihanouk.info/history/list_id_64.html (accessed May 25, 2016). Sok, S. 2008. Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Cambodian Economic Development: Opportunities to Skip the Learning Curve. PhD, School of Law, Bond University. Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space. London: Routledge. ——. 2013a. Illegal evictions? Overwriting Possession and Orality with Law’s Violence in Cambodia, Journal of Agrarian Change 13 (4): 520–546. ——. 2013b. Violent Accumulation: A Postanarchist Critique in Neoliberalizing Cambodia, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103 (3): 608–626. ——. 2015. Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse and Disposession in Cambodia. New York: Palgrave. Strangio, S. 2014. Hun Sen’s Cambodia. Chiangmai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Toope, S. J. 2003. Legal and Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some Lessons, McGill Law Journal 48: 357–417. Transparency International Cambodia. 2013. Final Election Observation Report on Cambodia’s 2013 National Election. Phnom Penh: Transparency International Cambodia. ——. 2014. National Integrity System 2014: Corruption and Cambodia’s Governance System. Phnom Penh: Transparency International. Un, K. 2008. The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia, in K. Öjendal and M. Lilja (eds.), Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. ——. 2012. Cambodia in 2011: A Thin Veneer of Change, Asian Survey 52 (1), 202–209. Un, K., and J. Ledgerwood. 2010. Is the Trial of “Duch” a Catalyst for Change in Cambodia’s Courts?, AsiaPacific Issues, No. 95, Honolulu: East–West Center.

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Law and Human Rights in Cambodia UN Secretary General. 2014. Role and achievements of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in assisting the Government and people of Cambodia in the promotion and protection of human rights, A/HRC/27/43, August 15, 2014. UN Security Council. 2004. Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, S/2004/616, August 23, 2004. US Embassy Phnom Penh. 2006. Reaction to Finnish Visa for Convicted Cambodian Cop, December 12, 2006 (Wikileaks). van Noord, H., H. S. Hwang, and K. Bugeja. 2011. Cambodia’s Arbitration Council: Institution-Building in a Developing Country, Working Paper 24, ILO, August 12, 2011. Verghese, K. 2014. Arbitration in Asia: The Next Generation? Asian Legal Business, July 1, 2014. Yorm Bopha v. Cambodia. 2013. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 24/2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/24.

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3 JUSTICE AND THE PAST The Khmer Rouge Tribunal Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander

This chapter concerns the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, a criminal tribunal held in Cambodia with international assistance. Fully operational since 2007, the ECCC tries “senior leaders” and those most responsible for serious crimes committed in Cambodia between April 1975 and January 1979. These dates refer to the infamous historical period of “Democratic Kampuchea,” being the name given to the country by the Khmer Rouge during their nearly four-year rule. In this chapter we set out the rationale and legal functioning of the tribunal, before turning to a discussion of the politics and geopolitics of the initial negotiation of the tribunal, as well as its progress to date. Following this, we comment on the historic role played by victims in this legal process—a world first in tribunals of this kind—finishing with a discussion of reparations measures and the contested social and political legacy of the ECCC.

The (unprecedented) form and function of the ECCC It is estimated that between 1.5 and 2.25 million Cambodians – more than one-fifth of the population – died during the Democratic Kampuchea period from targeted killings, starvation, overwork, and lack of sanitation and medical care (see Heuveline 2015; Kiernan 2003 and 2004). The murdered and untimely dead were buried in Cambodia’s so-called “killing fields,” mass graves found throughout the country. Many of those who survived had experienced forced transfer into the Cambodian countryside (and some further relocations beyond), the collectivization of work, severe restrictions on family life, forced marriages, and the abolition of religious and cultural observance and institutions. The suffering felt by the victims of Khmer Rouge rule is ongoing. Until the advent of the ECCC, only a single event had attempted to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to legal account for this violence, a 1979 trial in absentia of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, an attempt that had lacked international legal and political legitimacy (see Hughes 2015). The ECCC brings a mix of international law and Cambodian law to bear upon the alleged crimes of the defendants. It is thus known as a “mixed” or “hybrid” legal tribunal (see Cohen 2007; Mendez 2009; Williams 2012). Unlike the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the permanent International Criminal Court, the ECCC is located inside the affected country, 42

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Cambodia, and also within Cambodia’s legal system as a series of “Extraordinary Chambers.” It is a “national court with international characteristics” (Sok An quoted in Heindel 2009, 87), established by domestic Cambodian law pursuant to a 2003 Agreement between the United Nations (UN) and the Cambodian government. In many ways this means the ECCC, as a socio-legal event, shares more with the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor/Timor Leste, held in the capital of that country, Dili, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, also held “in country” in Freetown (Sierra Leone), than it does with the larger and better-known international criminal tribunals in The Hague (Netherlands) and Arusha (Tanzania). Like all international(ized) tribunals and accountability mechanisms, however, the ECCC has a limited legal mandate. It can only consider crimes committed during the period from April 17, 1975 (the day the Khmer Rouge took control of the country) to January 6, 1979 (the last day it held power). This temporal limit omits much of the military and political violence of the civil conflict that preceded 1975, as well as that of the civil war fought between the ousted Khmer Rouge and allied Cambodian and Vietnamese forces for more than a decade after 1979. As well, only a small number of crimes will be prosecuted by the ECCC. Those taken from international criminal law include crimes against humanity, genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (war crimes), and destruction of cultural property and crimes against diplomatically protected persons; those taken from Cambodian law include homicide, torture, and religious persecution (see ECCC Law 2004). Although small in number, the gravity of these crimes could not be greater, and attests to the extreme ideological positions taken by the Khmer Rouge leadership, their extensive and organized enterprise, and their willingness to severely persecute any deviation (or perceived deviation) from total obedience on the part of their “citizenry.” The question of whether the Cambodian experience constitutes genocide is a long-running academic and popular debate. Some commentators have suggested that Democratic Kampuchea is a case of “auto-genocide” because the majority of crimes were committed by ethnic Cambodians (or Khmer) against other Khmer. The aim was not to eradicate the Khmer but to produce a compliant, productive and “clean” (of foreign influences) or “pure” revolution. However, this notion of an “autogenocide” lacks a legal grounding. According to the Genocide Convention, genocide requires “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” a definition the ECCC also employs. The office-bearers of the former Khmer Republic regime, the educated and the entrepreneurial classes, targeted for murder and torture, do not meet the criteria of “group” and can therefore not be considered to have been victims of genocide. Thus, in Case 002/02, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan are only charged with genocide in relation to the targeting of Cambodia’s ethnic minorities: the Cham and the Vietnamese. Furthermore, in accordance with the ECCC jurisdiction, only “senior leaders and those most responsible” will be tried, a limit that has been much debated, especially among international commentators. This focus means that many former mid-ranking Khmer Rouge still living will likely never face formal accountability proceedings for their individual criminal actions during Democratic Kampuchea. It also excludes any criminal investigation of the actions of those actors engaged in the Third Indochina War (the Vietnam War) of the late 1960s and early 1970s either in, or having effects on, Cambodia. The ECCC will not be indicting any foreign actors or leaders, although some victims and commentators have raised the issue of the culpability of figures such as Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State (who, along with Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson before him, was responsible for the secret bombing of Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Owens and Kiernan 2006)), and Chinese politicians and technical experts (for providing political, financial and technical support to the Khmer Rouge during their reign). 43

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The question of how many individuals are likely to be brought before the ECCC has also been at issue since the original negotiations between the Cambodian task force and the United Nations. International negotiators preferred a larger number of defendants of a dozen or more, and Cambodian negotiators preferred a smaller number of around five or six (Ciorciari 2009). Concerns about cost and perceptions of what would appear just and political arrangements made during Cambodia’s post-1979 civil war are all probable reasons for this dissonance. Some international media commentators have claimed that a smaller number of defendants is in the political interest of the current ruling party of Cambodia, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) because a small number of CPP office-bearers held positions as Khmer Rouge cadre prior to their defection to join Vietnamese forces in overthrowing the Khmer Rouge (see Giry 2012; Morris 2010). More recent analyses have found the ruling party’s claim that bringing further cases to trial may risk civil unrest in Cambodia improbable, and have pointed instead to “efforts to limit international leverage on domestic politics” as the basis of CPP aversion to further trials (Un 2013, 786). The main institutional limitations of the ECCC are financial in nature. The tribunal has faced significant funding shortfalls and funding insecurity over its years of operation. Initially funded for three years, UN donor pledging conferences and the continued assistance of its Principal Donors Group (comprised of Japan, Australia, the United States (US), the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and Germany, with the European Union as an observer) has allowed for the continued existence of the tribunal. The cost of the tribunal for the period 2006–2014 has approached US$205 million, with the international component being nearly US$155 million and the national (Cambodian) component near to US$50 million. While a significant sum, relative to the annual budgets of any of the ICTY, ICTR and the permanent International Criminal Court (at upwards of US$140 million) justice is coming significantly cheaper in Cambodia, although defendants are also noticeably fewer. Of international spending on the five international criminal courts between 1993 and 2015, the ECCC’s share is only 5.4 percent (Ford 2011).

The negotiation and progress of the ECCC As an internationalized tribunal investigating crimes of the late 1970s some 30–40 years after they occurred, the ECCC must be seen in the context of the long “post-conflict” period of the 1980s and 1990s. National political and social developments, as well as geopolitical factors, are important to this story. During the 1980s and 1990s, a civil war continued between, on the one side, Cambodian and allied Vietnamese forces and, on the other, remnant Khmer Rouge who had retreated to the remote northern and western parts of the country. At the same time, a socialist reconstruction of the country was taking place with assistance from Vietnam and the Soviet bloc (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2003). These two factors, the ongoing civil conflict and the reconstruction of Cambodia as a socialist state, also produced a Cambodian refugee population at the border with Thailand numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Through the 1980s, the US, China and Thailand (among others) supported a Cambodian government-in-exile (that included the ousted Khmer Rouge) against the Soviet-allied, Vietnamese-assisted government in Cambodia that had brought an end to Khmer Rouge rule. The United Nations General Assembly, where the Khmer Rouge remained the recognized representatives of Cambodia for more than a decade after their ousting, is also implicated in this history. In 1997, nearly 20 years after the end of Khmer Rouge rule, Cambodia’s then co-prime ministers, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, wrote to the UN to request assistance in bringing former Khmer Rouge leaders to trial. Following a report by a UN Group of Experts 44

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in 1999 that recommended prosecutions, the two parties entered into negotiations over the possible form of a future tribunal. The UN and the Cambodian government remained “uneasy partners” during the many years of designing a Khmer Rouge Tribunal (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004). The 1999 Group of Experts report had originally recommended an ad hoc tribunal like those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, in which international judges and international support staff would predominate, to be held in a city outside of Cambodia. The UN was concerned by the arrangements made with defecting Khmer Rouge in the mid- to late 1990s that had split the movement and brought Cambodia’s civil conflict to an end. The most significant of these was the royal pardon brokered for Ieng Sary. Although they had taken up arms against the Khmer Rouge and been part of an administration that had long sought the military and political defeat of the Khmer Rouge movement, current Cambodian politicians who had served as young Khmer Rouge cadre prior to 1978, along with those who had brokered the 1990s defections and pardon, remained under international suspicion. The Cambodian government justified the defection arrangements and pardon as having been necessary to defeating the Khmer Rouge and not a hindrance to future justice (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004), whereas the UN considered these arrangements and the pardon indicative of Cambodia’s culture of impunity and feared that the “political pressures of Cambodia” would hamper an in situ tribunal (UN Group of Experts Report 1999, paragraph 171). Hun Sen and other senior figures in the Cambodian government publically and privately lampooned the stance taken by the UN during the tribunal negotiations in light of the past position of the UN: insisting upon and overseeing a general election in Cambodia in which the Khmer Rouge was an invited participant (and to which the Khmer Rouge responded with violence and boycott). Cambodian task force negotiators were also adamant that the tribunal be held in Cambodia, within the Cambodian legal system, and involve the participation of Cambodians at all levels. Although negotiations were protracted, much of the legal and socio-legal innovation of the ECCC arises from the unique compromises forged through this process of dialogue and the concerted effort of those involved to hybridize two very different legal systems—international and Cambodian law—in a way that remained workable, relevant, and legally rigorous. The resulting tribunal operates across three languages (Khmer, English, and French), has separate “international” and “domestic” budgets, and is staffed by both international and Cambodian office-bearers in a novel system of “doubled” roles. For example, there is a national and international Co-Investigating Judge, a national and international Defence Co-Lawyer for each defendant, Cambodian and international public affairs officers, and so on. The main aim of this system is to build capacity in the Cambodian judiciary and legal services. Cambodian judges outnumber internationals in all chambers,1 but a “supermajority” is needed for most decisions so that the Cambodian judges need the vote of at least one international judge to carry a decision, while the international judges need two Cambodian judges to vote with them to prevail. In the first case to come before the ECCC, a single defendant, Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Duch”) was found guilty of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention. During the Democratic Kampuchea period, Duch presided over the “S-21” secret facility located in a suburb of Phnom Penh, where victims were imprisoned and tortured before being trucked to a nearby location, killed, and buried in mass graves. At least 12,000 individuals passed through S-21, the majority being Khmer Rouge cadre purged as “internal enemies,” but including a small number of foreign nationals and members of the previous Khmer Republic regime (see Chandler 1999; ECCC 2010). Documents from S-21, including a significant archive of “confessions” (that had been extracted under torture) and administrative records, along with testimonies of survivors of S-21, served to incriminate Duch. He was sentenced in 45

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2010 to 35 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity, willful killing, torture, and other inhumane and criminal acts. On appeal, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber sentenced Duch to life imprisonment. The substantive hearing of evidence in a second case began in late 2011. The two remaining defendants in this case are Noun Chea and Khieu Samphan, former leaders of the regime, both now in their eighties and in poor health. The defendants remitted to stand trial in this case originally numbered four, but Ieng Thirith was found mentally unfit to stand trial and Ieng Sary died in 2013. The events, crimes, and evidence contained within Case 002 are so numerous and complex that the Trial Chamber has “severed” it into mini-trials, with the first mini-trial of Case 002 referred to as “Case 002/01”, the second as “Case 002/02”, and so on. The first minitrial2 dealt with the forced “movement of population” (taken to have been conducted in two phases) and “crimes against humanity committed in their course” as well as executions of Khmer Republic soldiers that took place at the crime site of Tuol Po Chrey. The judgment in the first mini-trial of the case was handed down in August 2014: both defendants were found guilty of crimes against humanity (see ECCC Trial Chamber Judgment in Case 002/01).3 It is widely believed that the ECCC has interdependent and mutually reinforcing retributive, restorative, and procedural justice roles (Ciorciari 2009). In the first role, that of retributive justice, the tribunal seeks to try and punish “senior leaders” and those most responsible for the crimes of the 1975–79 period. It has the convictions of three individuals chalked on this ledger (pending the forthcoming judgment by the Supreme Chamber) and, although they were not convicted, the formal indictment of an additional two former leaders (Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith) is also significant. In a restorative justice sense, the ECCC can claim to be establishing a detailed historical record of this period of Cambodian history for current and future education and debate. Due to the political priorities and development realities of the two decades following the end of Khmer Rouge rule, the details of this dark period have generally been unreported or misreported. Illiteracy, a lack of access to secondary schooling especially and low levels of public media access are still experienced in Cambodia, especially in rural areas. With a third decade having now passed, there is a significant sense in which those with first-hand experience of Khmer Rouge rule are becoming ever fewer, while at the same time the generation born in the aftermath of the mass political violence has not received any formal education about the period (Pham et al. 2009). Alongside some other NGO-based initiatives, including the development of a textbook for high school students (Dy 2007) and teacher training programs, the ECCC is working to facilitate knowledge and understanding of this history beyond familial and community-based accounts of the period and its crimes. The ECCC is also highly innovative in terms of its provision for restorative justice in the form of victim participation and “collective and moral” reparations (Jarvis 2014), of which more will be said in the next and final discussion sections. The procedural justice role of the ECCC centers on its modeling and developing of Cambodian skills and capacity in all forms of fair legal process. This is a specific and specialized form of restorative justice inasmuch as it aims to restore or build trust in the legal system, its processes, office-bearers and outcomes. Labeled unwieldy by its detractors, the complex form and functioning of the tribunal is seen by many others as successfully contributing to capacity building in Cambodia’s legal system. Perhaps just as importantly, the popular legitimacy of the ECCC has grown around a sense of the tribunal being locally embedded and therefore relevant to survivors and victims, and at the same time internationally supported, therefore independent, fair, and rigorous. Two population-based studies conducted by the University of California, one in 2008, and the second after the conclusion of the first case in 2010, attest to Cambodians’ increasing level of knowledge about, and trust in, the ECCC (Pham et al. 2009; 2011). 46

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The ECCC as a socio-legal event: outreach and victim participation A population-based survey conducted in 2008 found that 80 percent of those surveyed consider themselves to be victims of Khmer Rouge rule, despite only 69 percent of the surveyed group reporting that they lived under the regime (Pham et al. 2009), suggesting a growing recognition of the intergenerational effects of the genocide. Until recently, most Cambodians have remembered their losses and harms within their immediate communities, often in relation to Buddhist observances, and sometimes in relation to unmarked local sites.4 A minority of the Cambodian population has visited the national-level memorial sites, Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek.5 The initial curatorial thrust of these sites, however, was to emphasize the collective nature of Cambodians’ suffering, and the criminal nature of the Khmer Rouge. But this was a national narrative imposed from above, with little space for reflection, deliberation, or different experiences. One of the rationales for the ECCC to be held inside Cambodia was that of the engagement of Cambodians with the attempt to find justice in their name. As this section will discuss, the engagement of victims, although not universal or uncontested, has resulted in many notable achievements. While all international criminal tribunals to date have engaged in public information dissemination about their work, only recently have dedicated “legal outreach” programs become a central concern of these courts and tribunals. One of the long-standing critiques of the ICTY is that it only engaged in legal outreach with affected communities in parts of the former Yugoslavia many years after legal proceedings had commenced in The Hague. As more recent iterations of these kinds of justice endeavors, the ICC and the ECCC are attempting far more extensive legal outreach programs (Clark 2009; Vinck and Pham 2010). In the early years of the ECCC, the activities and progress of the tribunal were promoted to Cambodian audiences by Cambodian NGOs such as the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), the Cambodian League for the Protection and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), the Cambodian Human Rights Action Commission (CHRAC) and the Khmer Institute for Democracy (KID), among others (Jarvis 2014; Sperfeldt 2013). All of these organizations had, with the help of international donors, already undertaken work in the field of documentation gathering, atrocity site registration, research and memorialization, reconciliation forums, public debates, or projects aimed at stimulating democratic dialogue in the county. Along with media organizations, these NGOs worked in tandem with the Public Affairs Section of the ECCC to disseminate information about the tribunal6 and inform survivors and victims of the Khmer Rouge about their possible participation. As an official function of Public Affairs, legal outreach work has developed to encompass routine activities such as: talks to community and school or college groups; the facilitation of interested groups of students, monks, and communities to attend public hearings; and the “Khmer Rouge Study Tour,” whereby communities can request an information and film night in their local area, followed by a day-tour (with food and transportation provided) to Phnom Penh to visit the ECCC. If there is additional time, Study Tour participants are also taken to visit the crime sites of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, now a national memorial and museum. Outreach staff have visited dozens of provincial areas, and hundreds of thousands of Cambodians have sat in the Public Gallery of the ECCC to observe or hear about the work of the tribunal (Public Affairs Section 2014). In addition to developments in legal outreach, through which many victims come to participate in the proceedings as spectators, the ECCC also provides two main forms of victim participation in the legal process. The first is the opportunity for victims to submit information to the court in the form of a “complaint,” which may be used in official investigations and 47

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potentially lead to their being called as witnesses. The second is for those victims who can show that they have been directly affected by the crimes under consideration to join the proceedings as “civil parties.” The provision for civil parties is an aspect of the ECCC taken from Cambodian law, itself drawn from the French and civil law tradition. These parties participate in the case through their co-lawyers. They may call and question witnesses and the accused, make written submissions, lodge appeals, and give closing statements (ECCC Internal Rules 2015). Some 90 civil parties participated in Case 001, while 3,866 civil parties are participating in Case 002. There are no restrictions on nationality or place of residence for civil parties, so some 125 civil parties in Case 002 are resident overseas, many of these being members of the Cambodian diaspora in France and North America and one-time Cambodian refugees in Thailand. In the first mini-trial of Case 002, some 31 civil parties were heard in the Trial Chamber, with 15 giving testimony specifically on their suffering during a week dedicated to such testimony in August 2012. Cambodian and international NGOs have organized the majority of victim submissions, as well as a system for managing submissions, and have provided pro bono legal representation for the majority of those victims who have been recognized as civil parties. Much of the costs of civil parties’ attendance at meetings and trial proceedings have also been borne by NGOs. As for human rights and other so-called “civil society” work in Cambodia, ECCC victim participation work has been heavily dependent on NGOs and their donors (see Stover et al. 2011; Sperfeldt 2013). The significant involvement of NGOs in this endeavor is not unexpected (given Cambodia’s significant local NGO population and its historical aid and expertise dependence) though also not unproblematic (see Coventry’s chapter in this volume; Hughes 2009). For its part, the Cambodian government has given increased attention “to the involvement of survivors in the proceedings [and] the development of restorative measures for victims” such that “there is ground for a constructive relationship between the government and local NGOs in the context of the ECCC’s victim participation and reparations process” (Sperfeldt 2013, 364). According to critics of the tribunal, victim participation has not only been an underfunded aspect of the tribunal, but victims’ rights, and those of civil parties especially, have been curtailed over the course of its two cases (Studzinsky 2013; Werner and Rudy 2010). ECCC judges have changed and refined aspects of civil party participation, with various early provisions and practices arguably rolled back, including civil parties having the right to directly address the chambers on request, and being officially considered “party to the case.” Significant disquiet arose when, on the day of the 2010 judgment in Case 001, 24 of the 90 civil parties who had participated in the case were rejected (their status having been only provisionally confirmed for the duration of the trial). The timing of this rejection was regrettable in terms of the confusion, distress, and loss of face that it caused amongst civil parties (Pham et al. 2011; Stover et al. 2011). Ten civil parties were subsequently rejoined to the case following the Supreme Court Chamber 2011 Case 001 appeal judgment. Studies based on interviews with civil parties have emphasized the importance of victims’ participation in the proceedings, but also suggest that “participation alone is unlikely to bring about healing, closure, and reconciliation for the victims” (Pham et al. 2011; see also Stover et al. 2011). Talk of victim rights has also been a notable effect of victim participation at the ECCC, propelling some individual victims to greater national and international prominence during their participation in the tribunal.7 But for administrative workability and to ensure the timely completion of cases, individual civil parties have more recently been required to group together and appoint lawyers in groups.8 These groupings have largely arisen around the NGOs who originally facilitated individual civil party submissions to the tribunal. Nonetheless, various 48

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different interests are also represented within the 11 Case 002 civil party groupings, including those of the Cham, those of ethnic Vietnamese who are currently officially stateless but have long been resident in Cambodia, and those of victims of specific crime sites (often prisons) under investigation in Case 002.

Reparations and legacy Collective and moral reparations are yet another important set of advances of the tribunal. The ECCC is mandated to award only “collective and moral reparation,” rather than individual reparations.9 Victims who indicate that they wish to be joined as an ECCC civil party are asked if they have a “preference as to the form of collective or moral reparation.” Where applicants indicate that they have a preference, they are asked to include details of this preference. Notwithstanding the somewhat alien and normative context in which ECCC outreach is being facilitated (Hinton 2013), this process represents consultation about appropriate forms of remembrance on a scale never before seen in Cambodia and amongst the Cambodian diaspora. Case 001 reparations included the naming of confirmed civil parties in the published judgment, and a compilation (published on the ECCC website) of the statements of apology made by the defendant during trial, but many victims considered these reparations to be less than satisfactory. For Case 002, the ECCC required that its own Victim Support Section, in dialogue with civil parties and lawyers, assisted by Cambodian and international NGOs, design and secure funding for reparations prior to their announcement in the Case 002/01 judgement. The 13 reparations set out in the judgement include a national day of remembrance, projects to build memorials and education centers in multiple locations within Cambodia, a memorial for Paris, funding to publish the court’s full judgment in Khmer, and funding for cross-cultural testimonial therapy and the development of self-help groups within Cambodia. These reparations measures are indicative of the possibility of social and political change in post-tribunal Cambodia; they attempt to acknowledge and ameliorate the suffering of victims, and provide education and memorial opportunities for many more. The facilitation of these measures also says a great deal about what may not easily change. In the first instance, and like so much else in Cambodia, these measures are project-based and dependent on local and international donors and investors. Second, some powerful figures in Cambodia will be resistant to the social and political possibilities produced by tribunal-endorsed reparations and legacies. The public memorialization of Khmer Rouge crimes has long been under guard by the political elite in Cambodia. Resistance to new demands for reparation can be seen, for example, in the Cambodian government’s role in the first reparation project of the Case 002/01 judgment—a national day to remember the victims of the Khmer Rouge. This reparation measure met with official support and May 20 was decreed as the ongoing annual date—a date that has long marked a CPP-instigated commemoration known as tveer chang kamhoung (the Day of Anger). This national day is, then, not a new development for post-tribunal times, but an instance in which new calls for recognition and remembrance have been subsumed within an existing, and for some, highly politicized, commemoration. The legal outreach and victim participation work of the ECCC Public Affairs Section, along with that of Cambodian and international NGOs, has contacted more than half a million Cambodians within Cambodia, and some thousands in the diaspora. Many more will have heard of the existence of the tribunal via their radios and televisions. While it is not yet known what effects the ECCC will have on wider public understandings of law and the past, population-based research has shown that an increasing number of Cambodians are aware of, have an interest in, and trust the tribunal’s work. To date, the tribunal has contributed to the piecing 49

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together of an historical record, the punishment of key figures, the development of collective reparations, capacity building in shared roles and responsibilities, and legal training in international criminal law. It has also afforded various participants a direct experience of how a hybrid criminal tribunal can work. The geographies of ECCC justice are significant within existing rural–urban and national–international dynamics in Cambodia and are likely to be productive of further social and political change.

Notes 1 There are five judges in each of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers (three Cambodian and two International), and seven judges in the Supreme Court Chamber (four Cambodian and three International). 2 The substantive hearing of evidence in this trial commenced on November 21, 2011 and concluded with closing statements on October 31, 2013. 3 See www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/nuon-chea-and-khieu-samphan-sentenced-life-imprisonment-crimesagainst-humanity (accessed January 18, 2015). 4 Zucker (2013) gives an ethnographic account of post-1979 remembrance in two village communities in southwestern Cambodia. 5 These national sites were developed within explicit political narratives and used as grounds for commemorative, diplomatic, and religious events by the political elite and international delegations. These sites are now significant destinations for international tourists to Cambodia. 6 Important publications of the Public Affairs Section in the first few years of the tribunal’s operation included the introductory color booklet Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials (numerous editions), and a monthly Court Report, available in Khmer and English. 7 Elander (2013) argues that accounts of Khmer Rouge victimization generally fail to recognize the blurred zone of perpetrators, the purged, and their families as victims. 8 See http://eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/Joint_statement_by_Judicial_officers_on_the_4th_ plenary_ EN.pdf (accessed December 1, 2014). 9 In October 2014, four civil parties went public with claims for individual monetary compensation, suggesting that collective and moral reparations “reflected [only] the will of the court and NGOs,” see www.phnompenhpost.com/national/krt-civil-parties-say-reparations-benefit-ngos-not-victims (accessed December 1, 2014).

References Chandler, D. 1999. Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Ciorciari, J. D. 2009. History and Politics behind the Khmer Rouge Trials, in Ciorciari, J. D. and Heindel, A. (eds.) On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia. Clark, J. N. 2009. International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach, International Criminal Law Review 9: 96–116. Cohen, D. 2007. Hybrid Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: Lessons Learned and Prospects for the Future, Stanford Journal of International Law 43: 1–38. Dy, K. 2007. A History of Democratic Kampuchea. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia. ECCC. 2004. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 NS/RKM/1004/006. ——. 2010. Trial Chamber Judgement in Case 001 www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ courtdoc/20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf. Accessed February 1, 2015. ——. 2014. Trial Chamber Judgement in Case 002/01 www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ courtdoc/2014-08-07%2017:04/E313_Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_01_ENG. pdf. Accessed February 1, 2015. ——. 2015. (Internal Rules, Revision 9, January 16, 2015). Elander, M. 2013. The Victim’s Address: Expressivism and the Victim at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, International Journal of Transitional Justice 7(1): 95–115.

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The Khmer Rouge Tribunal Fawthrop, T. and H. Jarvis. 2004. Getting Away With Genocide: Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. London: Pluto Press. Ford, S. 2011. How Leadership in International Criminal Law is Shifting from the US to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and Contributions to International Criminal Courts, Saint Louis University Law Journal 55(3): 953–999. Giry, S. 2012. Necessary Scapegoats? The Making of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, New York Review of Books Blog, July 23, www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/23/necessary-scapegoats-khmer-rougetribunal. Accessed January 29, 2014. Gottesman. E. 2003. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Heindel, A. 2009. Overview of the Extraordinary Chambers, in Ciorciari, J. D. and Heindel, A. (eds.) On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia. Heuveline, P. 2015. The Boundaries of Genocide: Quantifying the Uncertainty of the Death Toll during the Pol Pot Regime in Cambodia (1975–79), Population Studies 69(2): 201–218. Hinton, A. 2013. Transitional Justice Time, Uncle San, Aunty Yan, and outreach at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, in D. Mayersen & A. Pohlman (eds.) Genocide and Mass Atrocities in Asia: Legacies and Prevention. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis. Hughes, C. 2009. Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hughes, R. 2015. Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33(4): 714–731. Jarvis, H. 2014. “Justice for the Deceased”: Victims’ Participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 8(2): 3–5. Kiernan, B. 2003. The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80. Critical Asian Studies 35: 585–597. ——. 2004. How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia 1930–1975. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mendez, P. K. 2009. The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals: A Sophisticated Approach to Enforcing International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises? Criminal Law Forum 20: 53–95. Morris, S. 2010. Mock Trial: How America is Helping to Whitewash Cambodia’s Crimes against Humanity, New Republic, July 26, www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/76574/america-whitewash-cambodiangenocide. Accessed September 4, 2013. Owens, T. and B. Kiernan. 2006. Bombs over Cambodia, The Walrus (October), 62–69, www.yale.edu/ cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf. Accessed July 6, 2015. Pham, P., P. N. Vinck, M. Balthazard, S. Hean, and E. Stover. 2009. So We Will Never Forget: A PopulationBased Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Berkeley: University of California Human Rights Centre. ——. 2011. After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Berkeley: University of California Human Rights Centre. ——. 2011. Victim Participation at the Trial of Duch at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Journal of Human Rights Practice 3(3): 264–287. Public Affairs Section (ECCC) 2014 PAS Outreach Figures 2009–2014 at www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/ files/Outreach_stats_June_2014.pdf. Accessed February 3, 2015. Slocomb, M. 2003. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Sperfeldt, C. 2013. The role of Cambodian Civil Society in the Victim Participation Scheme of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in T. Bonacker and C. Safferling (eds.) Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse. The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 345–372. Stover, E., M. Balthazard, and K. A. Koenig. 2011. Confronting Duch: Civil Party Participation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, International Review of the Red Cross 93: 503–546. Studzinsky, S. 2013. Participation Rights of Victims as Civil Parties and the Challenges of their Implementation before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Bonacker, T. and Safferling, C. (eds.) Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse. The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 175–188.

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Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander Un, K. 2013. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice, Journal of Asian Studies 72(4): 783–792. United Nations. 1999. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia. http://unakrt-online.org/Docs/ GA%20Documents/1999%20Experts%20Report.pdf. Accessed January 18, 2015. Vinck, P. and P. N. Pham. 2010. Outreach Evaluation: The International Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, International Journal of Transitional Justice 4: 421–442. Werner, A. and D. Rudy. 2010. Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the Retreat in International Criminal Law? Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 8(3): 301–309. Williams, S. 2012. Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Zucker, E. 2013. Forest of Struggle: Moralities of Remembrance in Upland Cambodia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

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4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN CAMBODIA Challenges and Contestations Louise Coventry

Civil society in Southeast Asia and Cambodia Within the contemporary literature, a romantic view seems to dominate analyses of Southeast Asian civil societies (Hewison and Rodan 2012). This view manifests itself in – often naïve – initiatives to strengthen civil society (Aspinall and Weiss 2012). Donor discourse and practice, for example, reifies civil society as a natural and historically inevitable component of a developed capitalist economy, capable of engendering increased democracy. Compounding the problem, donors fund civil society as if it is an unproblematic given. The romantic view needs to be problematized to better understand civil societies in Southeast Asia. The distinction between the public and private sphere does not translate well to Southeast Asia. Both top-down and bottom-up models of civil society need to be adjusted to account for the nuances that are found within Southeast Asia. Civil societies in Southeast Asia – and elsewhere – are sometimes a force for contention, not for civility or democratization (Schak and Hudson 2003).1 More radically, some theorists go so far as to suggest that civil society is a neo-colonial project driven by global elites in their own interests (Sen 2007). Setting aside debates about the relevance and various applicability of romantic, culturally nuanced or politicized views of civil societies, the concept of an associational realm that connects otherwise atomized individuals and supports their interactions with the state or other large-scale institutions has some analytical potential to better understand social and political configurations, and relations in the non-“Western” world (Guan 2004). Focusing on Cambodia, it is clear that Cambodian society may have a hard time conceiving of civil society or even finding adequate words to describe it. Cambodia has no language equivalent of “public interest”, “civil”, or “pluralism”. Even the word for “society”, sangkum, only entered the Cambodian language in the 1930s, via Pali and Thailand (Chandler 2008). These ideas and concepts are notably absent from the Confucian and Buddhist thought that has historically influenced Asia (Wiarda 2003), which in some ways brings legitimacy to the idea that civil society is a neo-colonial project: the concept would seem born from the European experience. Understandably then, participation, solidarity and collective action do not come easily in Cambodia (Öjendal 2014). Instead of civil society in the “Western” sense, Cambodia, like much of Southeast Asia, is dominated by intersecting political and business networks and complex patron–client ties (Un 2005; Springer 2011a). These ties entail a powerful sense of obligation, 53

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reciprocity and indebtedness. In many respects, these are the functional equivalents of civil society (Wiarda 2003). Understanding the socio-political, historical and economic context is important for determining which aspects, forms or functions of civil society might be most relevant to Cambodia. Noting that cultures are not fixed but are in a constant state of flux, some key defining features of contemporary Cambodian society can nonetheless be identified. These include very low levels of social capital and a lack of general trust (Öjendal and Kim 2012), generalized social fragmentation (Roberts 2001; Springer 2015), ongoing experiences of trauma which are also transmitted to new generations (Tyner 2008; Sirik and Tyner, this volume, p. 368), political patronage, relational rigidities, imbalanced power relations, social hierarchies and significant distance between the state and the people (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013; Öjendal and Kim 2012), as well as patriarchal dominance (see Brickell 2008; 2011; this volume, p. 294) alongside significant capital accumulation and sustained economic growth (Hughes and Un 2011; Springer 2013). Each of these phenomena shapes the form and nature of Cambodian civil society and potentially compromises its strength and effectiveness. A deeper exploration of some of the socio-historical, socio-political and economic tensions affecting civil society in Cambodia, which follows below, underscores the importance of patron–client relations. Such an inquiry helps to explain how and why non-government organizations (NGOs) have taken up the space for civil society in Cambodia and why smaller, community-based organizations (CBOs) have been slower to emerge, or, at least, to be recognized. A review of the relationships between civil society organizations and communities, donors and the Cambodian government highlights some difficulties in securing an enabling environment for civil society in Cambodia. Contemporary efforts to secure the legitimacy of Cambodian civil society, especially NGOs, are then discussed, which helps to frame some final comments on the potential future direction for civil society in Cambodia.

Socio-historical contexts: civil society, self-preservation and pragmatism Until the twentieth century, Cambodia had no durable, functionally important groups or voluntary associations aside from the family and the Buddhist monastic order, or sangkha (Chandler 2008). Lay positions associated with temples or pagodas offered the only avenue for community participation and leadership outside of the family. The French colonial period was marked by the active discouragement of voluntary associations by the French administration and simultaneous laments about “the Cambodian aversion to solidarity” (Chandler 2008, 199). Change came slowly, from around the middle of last century. By 1936, the first voluntary association was established in Cambodia with more than 500 members, all graduates of Cambodia’s first high school, the Lycée Sisowath. The group appealed to the king against favouritism allegedly shown to students of Vietnamese heritage (Chandler 2008), which suggests that promoting self-reliance was not part of its agenda. Vickery (1984, 14) further suggests that there is no serious conception of self-reliance at any level in Cambodian society, where Cambodians were said generally to look “to a powerful saviour from above or outside rather than seeking a local solution”. This claim merits attention, although care must be taken in assessing cultural generalizations. Later, during World War II, paramilitary youth groups were organized, giving thousands of young Cambodians their first experience, outside the sangkha, of membership in an extra-familial group (Chandler 2008, 203). Later again, during the Khmer Rouge period, officially Democratic Kampuchea (DK), Cambodian society was thoroughly collectivized. While the legacy of trauma from the DK period is well known, a lesser-known consequence of the DK regime is 54

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its inspiration and entrenchment of widespread contemporary suspicion, if not outright hatred, of collectives and formal efforts to promote communal life (Ear 2013). The People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which replaced DK under the sponsorship of Vietnam, instituted solidarity production groups, krom samaki, comprised of several families to cultivate land, as part of the recovery of Cambodia’s economy (Slocomb 2003). However, village-level interpretation of the new policy varied widely, with pre-1975 owners of private property likely favoured, and confusion reigning among villagers about exactly what kind of teams existed in their villages (Vickery 1984). Civil society organizations established during PRK rule, including the Communist Youth Alliance and Cambodian Federation of Trade Unions, were “ornaments attached to the state rather than integral or essential components of the state” (Slocomb 2003, 190). An exception was the women’s associations, perhaps because village women were more accustomed to organizing themselves to give assistance in times of need. From 1991 onwards, coinciding with the UN intervention in Cambodia, associational life began to emerge in a more structured manner. For example, local human rights organizations, unthinkable in earlier times, flourished (Chandler 2008). While less than 4 per cent of NGOs in Cambodia in 2012 were founded in the 1980s or earlier (noting that these instances generally refer to local NGOs tracing their history back to international NGOs that worked in refugee camps on the Thai border and subsequently localized), Cambodian NGOs have grown exponentially since 1991 (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2013). NGOs now have significant revenues, are perceived as a lucrative opportunity for employment and deliver services that would otherwise be the responsibility of government. Moreover, the conception of civil society in Cambodia is commonly conflated with the presence of NGOs (Springer 2010). Overall then, formal associational life in Cambodia has a short but dramatic history. Small (unregulated) groups with pragmatic agendas, such as women’s associations, pagoda committees and mutual help groups, have long existed and continue to do so. However, they are mostly unregistered and undocumented, which renders them largely invisible. The development of a (donorfriendly) and more structured civil society sector is likely the most substantial and lasting legacy of the UNTAC mission in Cambodia (Strangio 2014).

Socio-political contexts: civil society, power and neo-patrimonialism Power dynamics shape relationships. Like other Southeast Asian societies, Cambodia experiences high power distance: inequalities among people are both expected and desired (Henke 2011); less powerful people depend on the more powerful through the patronage system; might prevails over right and whoever holds the power is deemed right and good; power is based on family or friends, charisma and the ability to use force; and suffering is accepted, as part of the laws of karma (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013; Un 2005). For Cambodians, power resides in individuals because of their morally commendable acts. The positions they hold simply provide the means for them to exercise the power that is theirs by right (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013). While a large and emerging cohort of young people are increasingly less likely to hold this view and resistance to authoritarian power appears to be on the rise, especially among the urban middle class and poor communities uprooted by land conflict, acceptance of inequalities in power is nonetheless common. Some defining features of relationships in a Cambodian context include respect for elders and tradition, attention to patterns of kinship and patron–client dynamics. Indeed, neo-patrimonialism broadly defines socio-political power relations in Cambodia (Springer 2011a). It helps to ensure that existing power relations are protected or at least not challenged (Pak et al. 2007). Incentives to participate in civic activities premised on the “empowerment” of ordinary citizens are thus patchy, with participation in advocacy being 55

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perhaps least attractive on the basis that it is most likely to upset existing power relations. Notable individuals willing to challenge authority, such as Yorm Bopha and her fellow Boeung Kak Lake activists, have been subjected to sustained efforts designed to silence and marginalize them.2 As earlier noted, village and family organization in Cambodia are generally extremely weak: Khmer villages are not cohesive units that deal collectively with officials. Beyond the nuclear household, families easily disintegrate (Oveson et al. 1996; Kiernan 2002). If a village organization – or other form of civil society organization – is required, it is likely that a respected elder, sometimes as an act of benevolence, will establish it. The founder then makes all key decisions associated with the management of the organization. Membership of a civil society organization is understood as a given and not subject to challenge. This approach to civil society organization is open to abuse and corruption. Furthermore, the line between patronage and outright corruption is often obscure (Un 2005; Wiarda 2003). More positively, this approach rests on timehonoured traditions of personal integrity, tradition and the maintenance of social harmony (Onyx 2008). Yet as Öjendal and Kim (2006, 525) remind us, the political context of Cambodia is in a continual state of flux where “routine references to top-down, traditional authoritarianism or mono-structural patronage relations as an all explanatory device are no longer adequate, nor are casual references to Cambodia as an ancient, unchanging, unchangeable, conservative society”. This is an important point but notwithstanding wide-reaching socio-political change, it seems that Cambodian civil society actors continue to experience difficulties in building an empowered constituency and establishing meaningful processes and systems for fully engaging all relevant stakeholders critical for a strong civil society (Malena and Chhim 2009; Merla 2010). It seems that civil society groups, when expressed as community-based organizations, are likely to emerge under the sponsorship of local patrons and, in the case of NGOs, foreign funders. With few exceptions, they are unlikely to have an empowered constituency; they are also likely to continue relying on long-standing patterns of patron–client relations and to engage in mutual assistance and service delivery rather than advocacy.

Economic contexts for civil society: growth and disparities in wealth Growth has been a consistent feature of the Cambodian economy for the past 20 years. With the exception of the 2008 economic crisis, which effectively halted growth in 2009, economic growth rates have averaged nearly 10 per cent per annum for the past ten years (Hughes and Un 2011). The poverty rate is also dropping, having halved between 2008 and 2012, and currently sitting at about 17.5 per cent.3 These positive numbers hide another more concerning story. The gap between rich and poor is widening (Hughes and Un 2011; Springer 2015), and the poor, especially in rural areas, are often bound to subsistence lifestyles that preclude time and energy to engage in issues of advocacy, beyond immediate concerns for survival, such as contesting individual instances of land-grabbing. Similarly, mutual help in these circumstances tends to be highly pragmatic and focussed on self-preservation, more so than grander ideas about social and economic justice and equity. Economic development schemes, which contribute to growth rates, have also had a perverse individualizing effect on communities (Hughes 2012; Springer 2015). Craig and Pak (2011) explain further that the current practice of powerful political elites distributing largesse – schools, hospitals and roads – to Cambodian villages could potentially open up the possibility of more democratic consultation about how resources are allocated. They find, however, that such patronage invites intense surveillance of collective action at village level and thus mitigates against the organization of coalitions to contest existing power alliances. 56

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Complicating the economic picture, NGOs in Cambodia are wholly reliant on foreign funds: all funded NGOs in Cambodia receive foreign funding (Bañez-Ockelford 2011). Total annual expenditure by international and local NGOs in Cambodia has been estimated at US$600–700 million, which is comparable to current total government expenditure on social services (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2013). Smaller community-based associations are economically weaker. Many have no funds other than modest member contributions, although an estimated US$44 million is disbursed annually by NGOs to associations and community-based organizations (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2013). The near absence of local philanthropy, except in relation to religious or political causes, seriously constrains local fundraising, which in turn undermines the strength of civil society in terms of connection to a supporter base and access to flexible funds (Coventry et al. 2013). The pressure for civil society organizations to generate independent income has inspired some to consider transforming partially or fully into social enterprises. This, however, has the potential to displace the core work of civil society (Coventry et al. 2013). Overall, Cambodia’s economic success has undermined rather than strengthened civil society in Cambodia by foregrounding inequalities in wealth and power and atomizing communities. Further, the vagaries of subsistence lifestyles in rural areas combines with, intersects and traverses the social, historical and political factors explained earlier. These issues – subsistence lifestyles, disparities of wealth, low levels of trust, the legacy of trauma and acceptance of imbalanced power relations in a context of (competitive) authoritarianism, etc. – reinforce and compound each other and together serve to render complex the creation or maintenance of pluralist networks of support and collective advocacy. Instead, as Wiarda (2003) found, networks that entail obligation, reciprocity and indebtedness among family members, and between clients and patrons, seem more likely to find fertile ground. The next section examines the forms and functions of civil society in Cambodia in more detail.

Contemporary forms and functions of civil society in Cambodia Civil society is, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, poorly understood especially at the village level. What is clear is that civil society in Cambodia is diverse and expanding, but it is also extremely fragmented with many competing agendas, interests, features and methods. In the contemporary context, civil society organizations in Cambodia are generally understood to include traditional associations, “modern” community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, youth organizations, as well as think tanks and independent research organizations, independent institutions of higher learning, students’ associations, independent media organizations and associations, and business associations (Bañez-Ockelford 2011; Malena and Chhim 2009). Civil society organizations are constituted as different organizational types – NGOs and associations are defined in broad terms in the Civil Code of Cambodia (2007) and are administered by the Ministry of Interior or the Council of Ministers. According to a census undertaken in 2012, there are 1,315 “open” NGOs and associations in Cambodia (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2013) although the World Bank has estimated that there may be as many as 30,000 small CBOs or traditional associations in Cambodia, which averages out to about three per village (Henke 2011). In many respects, NGOs and associations have supplanted rather than augmented or solidified the more traditional role for civil society in Cambodia. NGOs, and to a lesser extent associations, despite their many and significant contributions to national development, are commonly seen as driven by the imperatives of international donors, owing their existence to the influence and financial support of international donors instead of being the consequence of the 57

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gradual opening up of democratic spaces or the scaling up of grassroots organizations (Malena and Chhim 2009). Many NGOs have only tenuous and tokenistic connections to a membership base, if one exists, and accountability to service users or other constituents is low. The situation of NGOs in Cambodia is appraised more fully elsewhere in other recent works, for example Ou and Kim (2014) and Öjendal (2014), and trade unions are discussed in this volume (see Arnold and Chang, this volume, p.191). Accordingly, the focus here is on smaller, less formal civil society groups. Generally, these are poorly understood, and certainly underresearched, in Cambodia. Home-grown civil society organizatons are smaller and less “professional” than NGOs, but perhaps better culturally adapted (Öjendal 2014). However, questions can legitimately be asked about whether community-based organizations (CBOs) fit the traditional definition of civil society as an associational realm distinct from the state. CBOs are often set up by government directives and are inclusive of sub-national government officials, albeit in a non-official role. Nonetheless, CBOs, identified loosely as people’s movements, have “greater legitimacy” than local NGOs (Oxfam 2014), although they are themselves often the outcome of NGO interventions (Henke 2011). As these movements increase in effectiveness, they come to the attention of international donors. This dynamic is explained later in the chapter. The functions of traditional associations and CBOs vary enormously – even more so than NGOs – and these functions have not been rigorously mapped. Indigenous groups tend to be authentic; they are likely to be event based, independent from NGOs and government, and with informal leadership. Women and youth groups often promote peer-based solidarity and/ or education; these were organized under state auspices in the 1980s and have more recently been revived by NGOs. Youth groups, in particular, have been increasingly co-opted by the state. Many youth groups, such as the Boy Scout movement, are greatly influenced by partypolitical interests, creating some doubts about their authenticity as pluralist networks of mutual support and collective advocacy.4

Responses to the rise of civil society: communities, donors and the Cambodian government The rise of civil society in Cambodia can be understood differently across the ideological spectrum. An extreme neoliberal view may regard an increasingly strident civil society as a potential threat, powered by vested interests intent on diverting public resources from efficient private investments into rents or collective goods. Ambiguously, civil society can also be seen as co-opted by neoliberalism, filling gaps in services and carrying the agenda of international financial institutions and donors (Springer 2011b). Political elites in Cambodia may concur that civil society is a potential threat to the political order, but for a different reason. Securing a more equitable distribution of state resources diverts these resources from existing state–business partnerships necessary to oil the wheels of political patronage. Mainstream liberals would regard the rise of civil society in a Tocquevillean sense, as the inevitable upsurge of a progressive and entrepreneurial middle class straining against the restrictions of the state. The World Bank and other multi- and bilateral donors seem to regard civil society as a potential store of entrepreneurial energies and would-be allies against governments, bureaucracies and elites that resist market reforms and “good governance” (Robison 2012). Contemporary investment in civil society in Cambodia by the World Bank and other development organizations takes the twin forms of social capital construction, often framed as capacity building, and administrative and political decentralization. The underpinning assumptions are that decentralization will liberate society from the constraints of centralized authoritarian 58

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control, that local powerbrokers, criminals and partisan groups will be depoliticized through capacity-building programs and that hyper-decentralization, as promoted through microcredit and small-scale participatory infrastructure creation, will penetrate through the uncivil elements of “civil society” to mobilize atomized individuals at the grassroots level (Robison 2012). This approach confuses the relationship between democratic transition and civil society. Hughes (2012), for example, argues cogently that creating individual opportunity further atomizes society rather than building political communities. This effectively vacates political space to the state and undermines civil society. Simultaneously, investment in capacity development avoids measures that upset existing power relations and ignores how existing power relations underpin and perpetuate poverty and marginalization. It is thus clear that neither international actors and donors nor the government have a sufficiently nuanced and theoretically rich understanding of how best to engage with civil society in Cambodia. In practice, the weakness of civil society in Cambodia makes it extremely vulnerable to either co-option or intimidation by the state and/or to shifts in donor funding and/or the imperative for professionalization, sometimes called “NGO-ization” (Henke 2011; Yacobi 2007). In this sense, community-based organizations and people’s movements are pulled in multiple – and sometimes competing – directions simultaneously. Government–civil society relations vary significantly depending on the nature of each civil society organization, its constituents and location and the type of work it carries out (e.g. advocacy or service delivery). Civil society organizations engaged in service delivery in sectors such as health, agricultural development, humanitarian responses and education generally have better relationships with government, whereas those engaged in democracy or human rights issues have a more fraught relationship with government. The nature of relations also varies depending on the level of government with which the civil society organization is engaged. In the past decade, democratic decentralization has inspired significant improvements in government–civil society relations at sub-national level (Öjendal and Kim 2012): Government–civil society relations at provincial, district and commune level are often stronger and more effective than those at national level. The operation of civil society groups at sub-national levels is, in turn, affected by their relationships with local elected officials, and those officials’ interpretation of the legal framework governing civic activities (Coventry et al. 2013). Often, NGOs – as the default representative of Cambodian civil society – are perceived as agents of foreign interests and sometimes also as oppositional forces against the government. Notwithstanding some regulatory permissiveness, state and civil society relations involve much mutual suspicion and the government’s occasional crackdowns on NGOs betray the official rhetoric of partnership. There is growing concern that the Cambodian government is increasingly applying pressure and intimidation on people in communities where NGOs work and also directly on NGOs and their staff. It seems that NGOs rather than other forms of civil society are singled out. This could be because other civil society groups are less visible to the state, and/or are actively supported by government officials at sub-national levels, or conversely, it may be because they are less disruptive of pre-existing power relations and/or are more active contributors to government coffers and government plans. Examples of state action include refusal to give permission for peaceful protests, insistence that community members require permission to travel, even between villages, monitoring of meetings by police and state authorities, photographing meeting participants and asking for names and contact details of meeting participants, police disturbance of meetings, and threatening communities that engage with NGOs. In regard to relationships between civil society and donors, the pressures towards NGO-ization threaten small, informal civil society groups in Cambodia; NGO-ization shifts the focus of organizations away from constituents and towards donors. Donors struggle to determine how best to support emerging civil society groups, financially and technically, while 59

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avoiding exerting undue influence, where a “light touch” seems to be required (McMahon and Kem 2013; Henke 2011). Turning to community responses to civil society, despite the limited efforts generally made by NGOs to build and nurture a constituency, Öjendal and Kim (2006) detected only positive sentiments among Cambodian citizens about the emergence of formal civil society in Cambodia. NGOs are more likely to regard donors as their primary stakeholders, rather than orienting their accountability towards beneficiaries. When asked to nominate their three main stakeholders, NGOs participating in the 2011 NGO Census nominated, in order, donors (65 per cent), beneficiaries (48 per cent) and local authorities (39 per cent) (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 2013). Community members are generally supportive and welcoming of civil society, even though full engagement of communities in civil society processes seems uncommon. A law governing NGOs and associations was adopted in 2015, as this chapter was being finalized, and many interested observers will doubtless monitor closely its impact on civil society in Cambodia. What is immediately clear though is that government–civil society relations are strained, thin and often confused, where donors often have significant influence over civil society, intended or otherwise.

Securing legitimacy for civil society Challenges to the legitimacy of civil society in Cambodia are serious. Reiterating the issues canvassed here, several authors have variously identified key challenges facing civil society organizations as: a perception that NGOs, especially human rights NGOs are in opposition to the government; weak governance and poor accountability; limitations in empowering constituencies; the potential displacement of grassroots people’s movements by NGOs; and low technical capacity linked to poor skills in critical thinking and poor coordination (Bañez-Ockelford 2011; Merla 2010; Ou and Kim 2014; Suárez and Marshall 2014). Similarly, Un (2005) suggests that a major reason for the ineffectiveness of Cambodia NGOs is their own organizational structures, operations, and top-down mode of internal governance, which falls short of being democratic, tending to privilege donor (upwards) relationships and mirroring the patron–client relationships that are endemic in Cambodian political culture. Poor understanding of the full range of civil society organizations in Cambodia – and specifically the distinction between NGOs and other forms of civil society – hampers efforts to market the benefits and value of civil society to donors and government alike. More positively, the recent regularizing of annual reviews of the sector and the presence of a peer accountability system constitute key efforts to secure the legitimacy of civil society, and especially NGOs, in Cambodia. The size of civil society organizations’ collective budgets, noted earlier, also adds to its legitimacy. The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, the professional association of Cambodian NGOs, has conducted annual reviews of civil society in Cambodia since 2010. These documents have progressively added to understanding of the sector, and together they demonstrate an increasing ability for self-critique and sector-led improvement. An important response of Cambodian NGOs to their short history in Cambodia and suspicion from government sources is the self-certification system introduced by the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. The self-certification system is part of a national Governance and Professional Practice programme that aims to strengthen standards of governance among NGOs. It is based on a Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGOs, developed through a large-scale participatory process. This initiative has been progressively implemented since 2007, but has had a low take-up rate. Only 33 organizations have been certified as compliant with the code and minimum standards although a further 80 organizations are engaged 60

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in the process of securing certification (Coventry et al. 2013). There is some interest in extending and adapting the code to fit the needs of smaller CBOs and traditional associations, and this is a topic of periodic discussion within the sector. Low adherence to minimum standards of governance undermines and compromises the NGO sector’s capacity to demonstrate their full potential as agents of change and as powerful development actors. It also limits the credibility of NGOs in the eyes of Cambodia’s donors and damages public perceptions of their effectiveness. In Cambodia, any erosion of public trust in the NGO sector can provide an opportunity for the government to marginalize the role and contribution of civil society in shaping the country’s development agenda.

Future directions for civil society Overall space for civil society in Cambodia seems likely to shrink in coming years (Coventry et al. 2013). The much-discussed law for NGOs and associations, finally adopted in 2015, will likely increase the government’s role in the oversight of civil society organizations and potentially allow for government control of ‘unwelcome’ civic activities such as advocacy (Coventry et al. 2013). A different trend is also apparent, where it has been suggested that sub-national government authorities will strengthen cooperation between the state and civil society in the coming years (Öjendal and Kim 2012). Yet with the politicization of sub-national levels of government – village development committees have recently been brought under the control of commune and sangkat councils, which sometimes seek to impose restrictions on civil society activities in their areas – it is also possible that sub-national government actors will seek to co-opt CBOs and traditional associations, much as national government actors have sought to do in regard to NGOs (Ou 2013). These trends do not necessarily contradict each other. Increased crackdowns will likely be driven by the national government and targeted to specific subsectors within civil society, with a probable focus on those NGOs focused on advocacy. Increased cooperation – or co-option – will likely be driven by sub-national levels of government and targeted to CSOs engaged in service delivery for the purposes of cooperation, and targeted towards CSO engaged in advocacy for the purposes of co-option. In the meantime, international NGOs are being encouraged to develop plans for extracting themselves and handing over autonomy to local counterparts (Oxfam 2014). This may create space for local NGOs to transform and develop their roles as conduits of international assistance to people’s movements, grant managers and developers of local capacity. An emerging challenge for NGOs, however, is how successfully they can untangle the conflation of NGOs and civil society in its broader conceptualization, and thereby yield space to people’s movements operating at a grassroots level (Oxfam 2014).

Conclusion Civil society is relatively new in Cambodia. Contemporary civil society in Cambodia would appear to be built on traditions of self-preservation and pragmatism – and the availability of resources – more so than an abiding commitment to social and economic equality. The social, political, historical and economic context intersects to mitigate against community organization in Cambodia. Current initiatives to strengthen civil society are often poorly conceived – ideologically driven rather than culturally nuanced – and insufficiently attentive to issues of power. Challenges to the legitimacy of civil society are serious and wide-ranging. Efforts to secure enhanced legitimacy through self-critique, standard-setting and certification processes are important and valuable but probably, of themselves, insufficient. How civil society actors navigate shrinking political space in the face of a new law, the imperative to work more locally 61

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with stronger relationships with sub-national government and the reduction in international funding and international NGO activity in years to come promises to be interesting to observe.

Notes 1 Schak and Hudson (2003) focus on Asia but the argument continues to hold when applied specifically to Southeast Asia. 2 See www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/11/cambodia-release-yorm-bopha-just-first-step-againstinjustice/, accessed 30 April 2015. 3 See http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia, accessed 13 January 2015. 4 See www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/scouting-out-the-next-generation-of-cpp-supporters-1550/, accessed 30 April 2015.

References Aspinall, E. and M. L. Weiss. 2012. The limits of civil society: Social movements and political parties in Southeast Asia, in Robison, R. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Bañez-Ockelford, J. 2011. Cambodia (country chapter), in Chong, T. and Elies, S. (eds) An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Brickell, K. 2008. “Fire in the house”: Gendered experiences of drunkenness and violence in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Geoforum 39(5): 1667–1675. ——. 2011. “We don’t forget the old rice pot when we get the new one”: Discourses on ideals and practices of women in contemporary Cambodia. Signs 40(1): 437–462. Chandler, D. P. 2008. A History of Cambodia. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Civil Code of Cambodia. 2007. www.cambodiaip.gov.kh/DocResources/8e68a867-097f-4768-90e259527abbe418_c786a043-b88d-4f64-9429-60a330efdc5f-en.pdf, accessed 25 May 2016. Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. 2013. CSO Contributions to the Development of Cambodia 2012: Opportunities and Challenges. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. Coventry, L., N. Menh and A. Hillis. 2013. Assessment of the Enabling Environment for Civil Society – Country Report: Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. Craig, D. and K. Pak. 2011. Party financing of local investment projects: Elite and mass patronage, in Hughes, C. and Un, K. (eds) Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. Thailand: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Ear, S. 2013. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Guan, L. H. (ed). 2004. Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Henke, R. 2011. NGOs, people’s movements and natural resource management, in Hughes, C. and Un, K. (eds), Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. Thailand: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Hewison, K. and G. Rodan. 2012. Southeast Asia: The Left and the rise of bourgeois opposition, in Robison, R. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Hughes, C. 2012. Tackling the legacies of violence and conflict: Liberal institutions and contentious politics in Cambodia and East Timor, in Robison, R. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Hughes, C. and K. Un. 2011. Cambodia’s economic transformation: Historical and theoretical frameworks, in Hughes, C. and Un, K. (eds) Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. Thailand: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Jacobsen, T. and M. Stuart-Fox. 2013. Power and Political Culture in Cambodia. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Kiernan, B. 2002. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979. 2nd ed. 2005. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. McMahon, D. and L. Kem. 2013. Political economy analysis of civic space in Cambodia: Challenges and opportunities for active citizenship. Unpublished report. Phnom Penh: Oxfam America. Malena, C. and K. Chhim. 2009. Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: World Bank. Merla, C. 2010. Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia: Civil Society Empowerment and Democratic Governance in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: UNDP.

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Civil Society in Cambodia Öjendal, J. 2014. In search of a civil society: Renegotiating state–society relations in Cambodia, in Waibel, G., Ehlert, J. and Feuer, H. (eds) Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam. London and New York: Routledge. Öjendal, J. and S. Kim. 2006. Korob, Kaud, Klach: In search of agency in rural Cambodia, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37(3): 507–526. ——. 2012. Is Your Ground as Common as Mine?: A Critical Review of the Role of Civil Society in Local Governance in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation. Onyx, J. 2008. Third sector organizatons and governance process, in Hasan, S. and Onyx, J. (eds) Comparative Third Sector Governance in Asia: Structure, Process and Political Economy. New York: Springer. Ou, S. 2013. Sub-National Civil Society in Cambodia: A Gramscian Perspective. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Ou, S. and S. Kim. 2014. NGOs and the Illusion of a Cambodian Civil Society, in Waibel, G., Ehlert, J. and Feuer, H. (eds) Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam. London and New York: Routledge. Oveson, J., I.-B. Trankell and J. Öjendal. 1996. When every household is an island: Social organization and power structures in rural Cambodia. Uppsala Research Reports in Cultural Anthropology, No. 15. Stockholm: Uppsala University. Oxfam. 2014. The Future Role of INGOs in Cambodia, discussion paper based on original research by Marchal, M. and Ngo, S., synthesized for publication by C. Mortensen. Phnom Penh: Oxfam. Pak, K., V. Horng, N. Eng, S. Ann, S. Kim, J. Knowles and D. Craig. 2007. Accountability and Neopatrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature Review. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Roberts, D. W. 2001. Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy. Richmond: Curzon. Robison, R. 2012. Interpreting the politics of Southeast Asia: Debates in parallel universes, in Robison, R. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Schak, D. C. and W. Hudson (eds). 2003. Civil Society in Asia. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Sen, J. 2007. The power of civility. Development Dialogue, Special issue: Global Civil Society – More or Less Democracy? edited by M. Löfgren and H. Thörn, 49: 51–68. Slocomb, M. 2003. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 1979–1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism and the Contestation of Public Space. New York: Routledge. ——. 2011a. Articulated neoliberalism: The specificity of patronage, kleptocracy, and violence in Cambodia’s neoliberalization. Environment and Planning A 43(11): 2554–2570. ——. 2011b. Public space as emancipation: Meditations on anarchism, radical democracy, neoliberalism and violence. Antipode 43(2): 525–562. ——. 2013. Violent accumulation: A postanarchist critique of property, dispossession, and the state of exception in neoliberalizing Cambodia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103(3): 608–626. ——. 2015. Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse and Dispossession in Cambodia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Strangio, S. 2014. Hun Sen’s Cambodia. Chiang Mai: Yale University Press/Silkworm Books. Suárez, D. and J. H. Marshall. 2014. Capacity in the NGO sector: Results from a national survey in Cambodia. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 25(1): 176–200. Tyner, J. A. 2008. The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Un, K. 2005. Patronage politics and hybrid democracy: Political change in Cambodia, 1993–2003. Asian Perspective 29(2): 203–230. Vickery, M. 1984. Cambodia: 1975–1982. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. 2nd reprint. Wiarda, H. J. 2003. Civil Society: The American Model and Third World Development. Boulder: Westview Press. Yacobi, H. 2007. The NGOization of space: Dilemmas of social change, planning policy, and the Israeli public sphere. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25: 745–758.

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5 MICRO-SATURATED The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit as a Development Solution Maryann Bylander

Introduction Over the past two decades microfinance has become firmly entrenched as a development solution throughout the global South, offering broad promises of poverty reduction, empowerment, rural development, and livelihood generation through access to financial services. While the sector initially focused on the extension of microcredit—small loans targeting the rural poor—the microfinance sector is now comprised of a diverse set of actors, practices, and financial products. Few countries have incorporated microfinance so rapidly into their development strategies as Cambodia. In the early 1990s, rural Cambodia had a minimally functioning cash economy and nearly non-existent formal banking services. Only two decades later, by the end of 2013, there was roughly one active microfinance borrower for every two Cambodian households.1 Globally, microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer a range of financial services; however, in Cambodia, MFIs are centrally organized around the provision of microcredit, which is the focus of this chapter.2 MFIs offering relatively low-cost credit can be found in the most remote areas of the country, and have had striking success at “banking” the rural poor. In 2012, an estimated 46 percent of working-age adults below the national poverty line had a loan from a microfinance institution (Krauss et al. 2012), indicating the extent to which formal credit is a normative part of the contemporary social and economic landscape of the poor. Indeed microfinance experts suggest that Cambodia is among the top countries in the world in terms of microcredit penetration (Gonzalez 2010; Krauss et al. 2012; Planet Rating 2013). Such dramatic shifts in credit access raise important questions about impact. Yet despite the rapid uptake of microcredit by both development institutions and the rural poor, there has been limited inquiry into its consequences. Drawing on recent empirical work, as well as nationally representative data, this chapter offers a broad overview of the current state of knowledge on microcredit in the Cambodian context. To do so, I first document the entrée, growth, and saturation of microcredit over the past two decades. I then explore what we know about the meanings and uses of such loans. In doing so, this chapter raises critical questions about the saturation of microcredit in Cambodia, and highlights the potential of microcredit to generate and heighten vulnerability for borrowers and their families. 64

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Credit as a development solution Credit programs were not understood as large-scale development solutions until the late twentieth century, when the concept of microcredit gained increasing attention and traction (Roy 2010). A critical inspiration for contemporary microcredit models was the now infamous work of Muhamad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. At the heart of the Grameen philosophy was the belief that small loans offered at relatively low interest rates could help end cycles of poverty. Such loans were expected to free Bangladeshis from reliance on the usurious rates of traditional moneylenders, and in tandem enable them to expand their livelihood strategies in small, but sustainable ways. Underpinned by these beliefs, Grameen’s microcredit, at its origin, aimed to provide “collateral-free tiny loans for income-generating activities of the poor” (Yunus 2004, emphasis added). Income generation through self-employment was a cornerstone of the original Grameen model, and was fundamentally connected to how credit was understood to be powerful in transforming the lives of the poor.3 Importantly, the Grameen model recognized that credit on its own wasn’t necessarily transformative—and that it could exacerbate, or indeed create, vulnerability.4 Thus within the Grameen model, how credit was given, and how it was used were just as important then as the fact that it was readily available. To that end, Grameen’s model specifically supported credit for self-employment (i.e. microenterprise). Self-employment was both a practical and an ideological goal of microcredit, and a strategy Yunus defended “on sound economic reasons” that derived both from his own experiences in Bangladesh, and his own ideologies about sustainable development and empowerment (Bornstein 1996, 231). International institutions were quick to praise microcredit as an ideal development solution, as its tenets nicely resonated with dominant theories of neoliberal, market-driven development (Bateman 2012). By enabling the poor greater entry into the market, advocates suggested microcredit would have positive multiplier effects on local economies; reducing poverty and spurring development at the same time (Sachs 2008). Development economists also suggested the positive role credit could have on consumption smoothing, which is often a critical need in rural areas that operate on agricultural cycles (Zeller and Sharma 2000). In what has aptly been called a “revolution” (Robinson 2001), by the early 1990s microcredit had come to be seen as the “panacea of choice” for poverty reduction, women’s empowerment, and general livelihood improvement by most actors in the international aid/development community (Roy 2010, 22). More recently, these expectations have come under increased scrutiny. Both randomized controlled trials and qualitative studies raise serious doubt about the potential of credit to reduce poverty (Roodman 2011; Banerjee et al. 2015). Moreover, there is widespread recognition that microlending can increase vulnerability for the poor (Hulme 2000; Bateman 2012; Taylor 2011; Guerin et al. 2014). Even those who advocate for the potential of credit as a development solution suggest that high rates of growth can pose risk for both clients and institutions (Gonzalez 2010), recognizing that where credit markets are saturated and oversight low, over-indebtedness is a clear risk (Planet Rating 2013). As Planet Rating (a pro-microfinance agency specializing in rating the microfinance sector) notes, “unlike other development interventions, too much credit can be a bad thing” (Planet Rating 2013, 3).

Microcredit in Cambodia: from entry to saturation The history of microcredit in the Cambodia is best characterized as a relatively rapid transition from early NGO-supported empowerment projects to increasingly commercial models aimed at poverty reduction through market expansion (Flaming et al. 2005; Norman 2011; Clark 65

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2006). The first microcredit projects in the country began after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 through the work of several international NGOs operating primarily with demobilized soldiers (CMA 2010; Clark 2006). With some initial success, these programs were soon funded by donors and investors and rapidly expanded as governments, donors, and the central bank began to incorporate microcredit into their plans for rebuilding the infrastructure and economy of the country (CMA 2010; Flaming et al. 2005; ADB 2008). Through the 1990s, NGOs remained the primary providers of credit, with microcredit programs clearly linked to social objectives around poverty reduction and post-conflict rebuilding (Flaming et al. 2005; Norman 2011). Beginning in the early 2000s, neoliberal rationality, and the rise of “new public management” ideologies from Western donors and development institutions began to shift the framework for credit provision, suggesting that the MFI sector would best serve the country by embodying the ideals of privatization, commercialization, and competition (Norman 2011). In line with such ideals, both donors and government policies supported the transformation of NGO-funded credit programs to licensed (market-based, private-sector, self-sufficient) microfinance institutions (Norman 2011; ADB 2008). The Cambodian government’s commitment to commercial microlending as a cornerstone of development planning is evident through the inclusion of microfinance in poverty reduction strategy, and national strategic development plans since the early 2000s (Norman 2011). The transformation of the MFI sector in Cambodia from empowerment-focused credit programs provided by NGOs, to profit-oriented microlending under commercial, shareholderbased models has had important consequences (Norman 2011). Most critically, such transformations have been critical in enabling the dramatic expansion the sector has experienced since the early 2000s (detailed in this chapter). However the commercialization has also raised questions of mission drift,5 as changes in the structure of MFIs have also been associated with decreases in group-lending options and a focus on repayment over poverty reduction. Patterns of expansion and mission drift are related. Clearly, the increasing scale of service provision poses a challenge for MFIs seeking to monitor and attend to their social missions. Yet even more critically, research into MFI impacts has consistently raised concern about the potential of over-indebtedness, and links debt stress to overly rapid expansion of access to credit. In Cambodia this question is particularly salient given the lack of government oversight within the sector. The next section of this chapter offers an illustration of the speed and scope of MFI expansion, building on these trends to introduce the critical discussion that follows.

Microcredit by the numbers While data from prior to 2000 is limited, reports from MFIs to MIX Market, an information clearinghouse on microfinance, offer a clear view of the expansion of the sector since the early 2000s. Table 5.1 shows the expansion of microfinance institutions and borrowing drawing from data collected by MIX. Of particular note is the degree to which average loan sizes have exceeded gross national income per capita throughout the past decade. Though not shown in the data above, MIX also reports that 92 percent of microfinance loans from reporting MFIs are taken out for microenterprise (MIX 2010). Nationally representative data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys (CSES) in 2004, 2009, and 2011 show similar patterns of microcredit expansion. Table 5.2 describes basic patterns of MFI expansion from a village and household perspective. Over the decade, we see that Cambodians are located closer to credit providers, and are increasingly borrowing higher dollar amounts at lower rates of interest. Over this period interest-based loans are also 66

The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit Table 5.1 Expansion of microfinance in Cambodia (1997–2013) Fiscal year

MFIs

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

2 3 4 5 9 9 12 13 14 15 15 15 17 17 17 16 16

Total offices

183 180 254 264 431 476 577 705 759 895 1,051

Active borrowers

Percent female Average loan * balance per borrower* (USD)

Average loan balance per borrower / GNI per capita *

Total gross loan portfolio (in millions, USD)

1,347 42,784 117,156 175,051 249,289 281,724 355,221 419,666 493,754 606,266 799,414 1,049,292 1,123,180 1,247,681 1,386,480 1,571,655 1,826,845

65% 74% 80% 66% 71% 67% 72% 73% 75% 72% 79% 76% 77% 81% 77% 83% 82%

42% 13% 49% 49% 41% 51% 51% 60% 66% 81% 107% 118% 97% 135% 140% 159% 209%

6.0 11.6 16.8 24.8 31.7 42.8 61.8 98.7 149.4 245.5 468.7 739.9 835.3 1161.5 1625.7 2090.0 2637.1

125 36 138 137 124 152 174 235 303 405 586 705 744 931 1,170 1,336 1,755

Source: MIX Market Cross Market Analysis (2010). Accessed January 10, 2015. All information is of MFIs reporting to MIX. Note: *weighted averages. Table 5.2 Formal credit expansion and characteristics (2004–2011) CSES 2004

2009

2011

Villages indicators Percent of villages with a bank or credit provider Average distance (km) of villages to a formal credit provider Median distance (km) of villages to a formal credit provider

12.2 11.0 5

17.0 7.1 3

16.8 7.0 3

Characteristics of formally sourced loans Mean loan amount Median loan amount Mean monthly interest rate (%) Median monthly interest rate (%)

$249 $75 3.5 5.2

$685 $250 3.0 2.9

$949 $300 3.0 2.7

Source: Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys 2004, 2009, 2011. Note: 2004 sample size: 900 villages, 1,319 loans. 2009 sample size: 720 villages, 2,184 loans. 2011 sample size: 351 villages, 688 loans.

increasingly sourced from formal institutions. In 2004, the CSES suggests that 32 percent of reported loans with interest were sourced from banks or NGOs, whereas by 2011, more than two thirds (69 percent) of reported loans with interest were being sourced from formal institutions (not shown). 67

Maryann Bylander Table 5.3 Primary purpose of formally sourced loans in Cambodia (2011)

Reported primary loan purpose Agricultural activities Non-agriculture activities Household consumption Illness or injury Rituals (weddings, funerals) Purchase of repair of home Other durable goods (vehicles, etc.) Repayment of existing debts Other All formal loans

%

Median loan amount*

Mean loan amount*

21.5 20.5 34.6 5.4 1.9 6.4 2.9 5.7 1.2 100%

$250 $500 $250 $200 $500 $813 $663 $750 $1,515 $300

$752 $1,428 $613 $262 $875 $1,324 $1,142 $1,441 $4,478 $949

Source: Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (2011) N = 688. Note: *Calculated on the basis of 4,000 KHR = 1 USD.

Table 5.3 focuses on the most recent CSES data (2011) to highlight how households report they are using formally sourced loans. Several points are worth noting. First, despite the fact that MFIs suggest that 92 percent of loans are given for microenterprises (MIX 2010), nationally representative data from households largely contradict this picture. While loans for both agricultural and non-agricultural investments comprise an important minority of loans (42 percent), the majority of loans are taken for other purposes. It is also noteworthy that loans for non-productive investments, including servicing existing debts, tend to be for high dollar amounts. The median value of loans taken for the purpose of “servicing existing debt” is $750—more than double the median value of formal loans in general. This suggests that where debt stress occurs, it is severe.6

Consequences of credit expansion: critical perspectives The data presented above highlight the rapid expansion of the sector, and also raise critical questions, in particular around the problem of over-indebtedness among borrowers (as 5.7 percent of loans are taken to service existing debts) and the disconnect between MFI understandings of how credit is used, and how borrowers report the purpose of loans. Indeed, the rapid expansion of the sector has recently raised concern both within and outside Cambodia. Global studies of microfinance penetration identify Cambodia as a significant outlier. In a 2013 study, Cambodia was identified as one of six countries in the world where credit utilization rates were at least double what was predicted by the country’s level of human development, which the study notes presents high risks (Planet Rating 2013). The analysis further indicated that Cambodia’s low savings rate suggests “a deeply unbalanced financial sector” at risk of high levels of cross-indebtedness and over-indebtedness (Planet Rating 2013). The Cambodian Microfinance Association (CMA), an umbrella organization of MFIs in the country, describes similar concerns. In early 2015, their website identified three key challenges in the sector, all of which relate to the speed of credit expansion. First, CMA notes the prevalence of over-indebtedness, suggesting that many clients hold multiple loans they struggle to repay. Second, the organization suggests that there is a legitimate concern of mission drift resulting from commercialization. Finally, they highlight that credit is the primary product being offered by MFIs, noting that this is particularly problematic given decreases in group-lending 68

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options and the degree to which loan schedules and types fail to meet borrower preferences (CMA 2015). Evaluations of the sector by CGAP also suggest evidence of over-lending and clients borrowing from moneylenders to pay off MFI loans (CGAP 2009). The same report notes that there are no clear guidelines governing fair treatment of clients who are subject to debt collection in the event that they fail to repay. Most loans in Cambodia are secured by real or personal property, often land titles, and CGAP identifies “customer confusion on repossession of security” (CGAP 2009, 9) as a particular concern. Such problems, raised in multiple assessments of the sector, highlight the degree to which MFIs see legitimate issues of over-indebtedness and economic stress among borrowers. Unfortunately, much of what we know about microcredit in Cambodia comes from research conducted by and for the sector. This translates to a wealth of knowledge from and about MFIs, but little understanding of how borrowers use, interpret, and understand microcredit. Indeed, as is true in other contexts, the little we do know about borrower perspectives on microfinance draws on relatively small studies (several funded by the sector itself) suggesting somewhat incongruous conclusions.7 For example, recent studies associate microcredit with increased women’s empowerment (Chhay 2011; Chandararot and Liv 2011), increased income (subjectively reported, Liv 2013), as well as consumption smoothing and farming productivity (Lun 2013). At the same time, microcredit has also been identified as posing problems of distress migration (Bylander 2014; Ovesen and Trankell 2014), over-indebtedness (Liv 2013; CARE 2012), and social and spatial exclusion (Ovesen and Trankell 2014). The optimistic side of these debates suggests that while microcredit may not be targeting the poorest of the poor, it has significant positive impacts for borrowers. An impact assessment commissioned by the Cambodia Microfinance Association suggests that there are associations between measures of women’s empowerment (women’s voice, recognition, and participation in household decision-making) and microcredit use, and that women borrowers are more socially active in their communities than non-borrowers (Chandararot and Liv 2011). The same study suggests that microcredit borrowers have more diverse economic activities, more assets, and were more likely to report increases in income over the past year. Given that the study is cross-sectional, however, there is no way of knowing whether microcredit is causing any of these differences, or whether more empowered women, those with more assets, etc. are more likely to become MFI clients in the first place. Notably, other measures of human development such as children’s education and food security were no different between borrowers and non-borrowers. Based on surveys with borrowers in Aoral district, Chhay (2011) also suggests that microfinance has clearly contributed to women’s empowerment. Among those in her sample, borrowers subjectively related improved economic conditions to their participation in MFI programming. The majority started businesses, and most would recommend MFI participation to a friend. Despite such improvements, a significant number of women (21.5 percent) suggested that microfinance may negatively impact their lives, noting the increased fragility of family relations and/or competition/jealousy from neighbors. In a similarly optimistic study Lun (2013) notes that MFI borrowing increased during the financial crisis of 2009, interpreting this as evidence of the importance of formal credit during times of hardship. Yet these findings could also be read as highlighting the degree to which holding formal debt during times of crisis can lead to over-indebtedness. For example, Pide notes that MFI data shows increasing lending despite the crisis, with the number of multiple loans rising significantly. Loan-use data suggest that households used post-crisis loans to both invest in farms and repay existing debts. Lun’s report concludes (2013, 14): “our evidence shows that during the crisis households could neither afford to buy inputs for farm investment 69

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nor settle outstanding debts; hence they had no choice but to borrow.” While Pide interprets this as evidence of the positive contribution of credit, one might easily see the same evidence as highlighting problems of over-indebtedness. Drawing on similar findings in the wake of the 2011 floods, a study by CARE (2012) also found that households in crisis resorted to MFI loans, and that many used new loans to repay existing loans. Yet rather than interpret additional MFI borrowing post-crisis as a sign of the usefulness of formal credit, the report highlights this as evidence that growing numbers of Cambodians are at risk of “drowning in debt.” Critical research tends to focus on the potential for debt to threaten the livelihoods of respondents and/or draw down household social and economic resources. A key theme in critical studies is the potential for microfinance to lead to over-indebtedness. For example Ovesen and Trankell (2014), draw on ethnographic and qualitative research in Takeo province to suggest that the expansion of microfinance is not only threatening the livelihoods of the poorest, but also “precipitating their social, economic and spatial exclusion from their local communities.” In Takeo,8 Ovesen and Trankell note that debt stress is significant for borrowers, and can lead to the sale of key household assets, distress migration, and/or the use of informal loans to repay MFIs, all of which heighten vulnerability for borrowers. The authors suggest that such vulnerability cannot simply be read as economic, as indebtedness can have important “socio-cosmical” consequences, whereby those in debt are cut off from spiritual blessings and rituals, as well as social events and connections. My own qualitative work in Siem Reap province suggests that MFI borrowers regularly experience similar exclusions (see Bylander 2014). Based on mixed method research in rural Siem Reap between 2009 and 2014, I found that debt stress is common among MFI borrowers, can lead to increased household vulnerability, and is a clear driver of migration to Thailand. The latter point is particularly noteworthy given that the primary goals of microfinance are to support income generation and livelihood generation at home.9 Instead, borrowers in rural Siem Reap were primarily using microcredit in coordination with international migration, which was regarded as the only possible means of repaying large formal loans.10 Unplanned and undesired (usually undocumented) migrations to Thailand were commonly required as a result of debt stress. These links were clear to MFI sub-branch managers and loan officers. Both borrowers and lenders in Siem Reap were aware that they were participating in a mutually understood act of smoke-and-mirrors. Borrowers asked for (and loan officers extended) credit “for productive purposes” when it was mutually understood that loans would be repaid primarily via remittances and/or the migration of a household member. MFI officials saw these exchanges as gray areas in terms of policy,11 but also argued that there would be few ways to repay loans through local livelihood strategies. Multiple loan officers suggested to me that they were less worried about migrant borrowers (or borrowing households with migrants) than those expecting to rely on microenterprise for loan repayment. Loan officers clearly linked their perspectives to policies and MFI development plans, noting the importance of meeting loan targets and repayment goals, while marginalizing the value of protecting borrowers or strictly following loan evaluation criteria. Such examples suggest that rather than note degrees of “mission drift” in the sector, we might appropriately speak of “mission disconnect”—the contradiction between what microfinance institutions suggest they do, versus how credit is used and understood in practice. Here I distinguish “mission disconnect” from “mission drift” to highlight the distinction between profit prioritized over social goals (i.e. mission drift) from what appears to be occurring in parts of Cambodia, where profit motivations are in clear contradiction to the goals stated by MFIs. For example, from the perspective of MFI officials I spoke with, a borrower who was unable 70

The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit

to repay loans through a local strategy and thus resorted to undocumented migration to Thailand (or encouraged their children to do so) was considered “creative and strategic” in their loan repayment commitment. Conversely, among borrowers, undocumented migration in response to over-indebtedness was more routinely described as “a last resort” and an undesirable coping strategy.

Credit in microsaturated communities It is noteworthy that research inquiring into the consequences of commercial forms of microlending generally offers more pessimistic perspectives (see Ovesen and Trankell 2014; Bylander 2014) than research on participatory and NGO-supported credit programming (see Chhay 2011). Given the different incentives, profit motivations and policies of commercial versus non-commercial forms of credit provision, it would not be surprising if further research suggested that NGO-supported borrowers have systematically different experiences of vulnerability and improvement than commercial borrowers. However over-indebtedness is also linked to the availability of microcredit. Here both advocates and critics of microcredit tend to agree: too much credit is likely to be a problem. In response to concerns about levels of microcredit saturation, investors in Cambodian MFIs recently commissioned a study on microfinance-saturated areas, seeking to understand the degree of, and drivers of, over-indebtedness in saturated areas. The study results offer a rare illustration of patterns in microfinance use and repayment and are particularly insightful in two respects. First, the study’s self-described motivation highlights the extent to which the microfinance sector sees both saturation and over-indebtedness as (1) legitimate concerns and (2) linked. The report introduction, written by representatives from three MFI investment companies,12 states: The microfinance sector in Cambodia has grown rapidly over the last ten years. . . . Aggressive growth of microfinance, even if driven by the desire to reach out to those with limited access to capital, could have a negative impact when borrowers take too much debt. Over-indebtedness has become among the most serious risks of microfinance today. . . . Most importantly, borrowers who are unable to repay their loans risk losing their assets, even their livelihoods, potentially worsening their living conditions. Where client protection and safety nets are weak, microfinance borrowers are often left with no financial or social support once they become over-indebted. The potential economic, psychological and sociological consequences are far reaching. (Liv 2013, 8) Second, the report itself offers a compelling illustration of the degree to which over-indebtedness is a problem in microfinance-saturated areas. Taken as a whole, the report paints a picture of credit use and consequences that diverges sharply from the sector’s stated goals of livelihood generation, entrepreneurship, and supporting risk diversification for the rural poor. Rather, it highlights the degree to which over-indebtedness occurs, the frequency with which borrowers rely on coping strategies that might heighten vulnerability, and the degree to which repayment is linked with employment and remittances. To be clear, this study aims to represent microfinancesaturated areas, not the whole of Cambodia.13 The study included a random sample of loan files from MFIs in saturated areas, and borrower interviews from a random sample of a subset of these files. Based on MFI-generated measures of over-indebtedness, 22 percent of the 1,480 loan files analyzed were classified as insolvent or 71

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over-indebted.14 More than half (51 percent) of the 465 borrowers interviewed reported that they have struggled to repay loans. Families noted a variety of coping strategies, suggesting that the qualitative experiences discussed above are not uncommon. Out of the borrowers interviewed, 48 percent had reduced food quality as a result of a loan, 44 percent had reduced food quantity, 27 percent had a family member migrate to find work, 25 percent depleted their savings, 23 percent had taken out a new loan to repay an old (microcredit) loan, 13 percent had felt harassed or threatened by peers or family, 11 percent had worked more than ten hours a day, 9 percent had postponed needed medical expense, 8 percent felt threatened or harassed by loan officers, 7 percent had pawned assets, and smaller numbers had taken children out of school to either reduce costs (5 percent) or work (3 percent). While the report goes out of its way to suggest that borrowers find such sacrifices acceptable, these numbers still raise questions about the degree to which microcredit in saturated areas is associated with increased vulnerability. Such questions are even more pressing given that Liv’s data raises questions about the potential of credit to support profitable businesses and income generation. In fact, while the files from MFIs noted that 81percent of loans were taken out for productive, income-generating purposes, responses from the random sample of the same borrowers suggested that for the majority of borrowers, loans were repaid via wage income and remittances. Most borrowers noted that they didn’t earn enough from their entrepreneurial activities to cover all of their debt obligations, while only 35 percent said that profit from their economic activities was sufficient to repay their loan. In fact in 41 percent of loan files, only wage income was noted in the loan file, meaning that loan officers or borrowers noted no income from microenterprise/livelihoods. Such revelations are not new. In 2008, Ito’s study of ACLEDA Bank noted that while entrepreneurship was a key ideal of bank discourse, its borrowers were “not so much the people who have entrepreneurial ideas as those whose household members have regular, stable income sources” (Ito 2008, 19). Yet the report findings are striking in the degree to which they resonate with critical findings from qualitative studies and suggest a mission disconnect between MFIs and their borrowers.

Conclusions Both in Cambodia and elsewhere, microcredit is prioritized and invested in as a development strategy on the basis of its potential to create jobs and secure livelihoods. If these goals are clearly not being met, it is worth considering what benefits credit expansion does offer, and whether it does more harm than good. As this chapter has highlighted, credit can both mediate and create risk. In Cambodia over-indebtedness is a clear problem, and likely to be of particular concern in microfinance-saturated areas. There are some promising shifts in the sector suggesting that investors, MFIs, and government actors are cognizant of the real risks of over-indebtedness. The fact that the over-indebtedness study (Liv 2013) was both undertaken and made publicly available highlights the degree to which the sector is willing to openly address challenges. In line with this, the Cambodian Credit Bureau, which has been in practice since 2012, holds some promise to limit multiple loans and the most severe forms of over-indebtedness. Similarly, public calls for MFI debtrestructuring in the face of recent floods and other crises suggest the potential of social movements in forcing MFIs to respond to at least some situations of over-indebtedness with greater leniency.15 At the same time, these shifts do little to meaningfully reshape neoliberal ideologies advocating for market participation as a means towards poverty reduction. Critics of neoliberalism rightly raise questions about the narrow understandings of poverty underlying this perspective. 72

The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit

Moreover, Springer (2011) suggests that neoliberalism has interacted with patron politics in Cambodia to support a particularly brutal articulation of neoliberalism linked with kleptocracy and violence. In the contemporary Cambodian context, where neoliberalism is characterized by widespread dispossession, land grabbing, corruption, and patronage, it is unclear the extent to which “market participation” is likely to engender either meaningful development or poverty reduction (Springer 2015). In my own research experience, both current and would-be borrowers would agree with such critiques. While they would suggest that credit is a useful tool for household consumption smoothing, risk mediation, coping with crisis, and (to a lesser extent) investment, they would also recognize the potential for predatory lending, understand over-indebtedness as an increasing problem, and offer a range of alternative understandings of poverty and/or development. Some of the alternative understandings of development I have heard among respondents include: schools where teachers have adequate training, oversight, and support; adequate roads and transportation links; transparency in governance; the right to the rule of law; opportunities for decent work in both the public and private sector; access to safe drinking water; electricity; affordable healthcare; and opportunities for legal, safe migration. Even at its best, microcredit is limited in supporting solutions to such critical development challenges.

Notes 1 Based on 2013 World Bank population estimates of 15.14 million, and an average household size of 4.7 persons (WHO estimate), in comparison to MIX statistics suggesting 1.8 million active borrowers in 2013 (See Table 5.1). 2 Cambodia has a particularly skewed set of financial offerings, with CGAP suggesting that “microfinance in Cambodia . . . is almost completely focused on the provision of credit” (Flaming et al. 2005, 1). More recently the Cambodia Microfinance Association still suggests the sector is characterized by a “saturated” credit culture, and relatively low numbers of active savers (CMA 2015). 3 Yunus held five fundamental beliefs about microcredit (1) credit should be accepted as a fundamental human right, (2) self-employment should be preferred over wage-employment as a faster and more humane way to combat poverty, (3) women should receive top priority in development efforts, (4) the concept of “development” should be redefined as an action that brings about an identifiable, positive change in the lives of the poorest 50 percent of the population, and (5) he “conceptual vagueness” of development theorists should be replaced by sharp and immediate attacks on poverty (Bornstein 1996, 331). 4 In fact, the first loans Yunus gave in Bangladesh were to women who were indebted to moneylenders—unable to keep the profits from their small businesses because were consistently racking up debt. Thus even as Yunus argued that credit could be the key to transformation for the rural poor, he also recognized that debt was often at the heart of their problems. 5 Mission drift is used in a variety of ways, but broadly to suggest that MFI welfare and/or social goals can conflict with the potential for profitability. As MFI provision is increasingly linked to the commercial sector, there is a risk of giving up welfare goals in favor of profit (Copestake 2007). 6 2004 and 2009 data show similar distributions of loan purpose among formal loans. 7 It is worth noting that the two most extensive borrower surveys we have in the Cambodian context (Chandararot and Liv 2011; Liv 2013) were commissioned by stakeholders in the sector. 8 According to MFI data, Takeo has the highest level of microfinance penetration in the country (Liv 2013). 9 Interestingly, one MFI in the area included in its mission a goal to reduce high-risk migration. 10 The degree to which microcredit and migration are linked has been observed in the Cambodian context both in prior research (Sophal and Sovannarith 1999; Ovesen and Trankell 2014), and in nationally representative data (Bylander and Hamilton 2015). 11 Those I spoke with suggested that loans could not be given explicitly to cover the costs of migration or for activities undertaken outside the area, but suggested that asking about existing or planned remittance streams was a typical part of repayment assessments. While the loan had to ostensibly be for a productive asset or particular forms of consumption (i.e. housing improvement), any form of potential

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12 13

14

15

repayment could be considered. Notably one respondent also noted repaying loans through local extra-legal activities that she stated were known to the loan officer at the time. Blue Orchard, Oikocredit, and Incofin Investment Management. See Liv (2013) for a full methodological discussion. The study selected 44 villages which were both “microfinance saturated’ according to their measure, and had representation from all of the eight main MFI providers. A consolidated database of all eight MFIs operating in these 44 villages was created (10,266 clients), from which a random sample of 1,500 clients was drawn for the client survey (based on MFI files). From those 1,500 clients, a random sample of 500 borrowers (of which 465 were interviewed) were drawn for in-person interviews. The discussion that follows draws on the analysis of both client files (N = 1326, which removes missing data from borrowers with no income information listed) and face-to-face interviews (N = 465). This is based on: (monthly installments on all business and household debt)/(monthly net income). Where the resulting proportion is over 100 percent, households are identified as insolvent. Between 76 percent and 100 percent are at risk, and less than 75 percent are solvent. This calculation should be read with caution, as it suggests that households who are handing over 75 percent of their monthly income towards debts are “solvent.” In both 2012 and 2013, Prime Minister Hun Sen called on MFIs to ease financial stress for those affected by recent floods. In both cases MFIs responded to allow debt-stressed flood victims opportunities for loan restructuring and/or elimination of interest for a period.

References ADB. 2008. Cambodia: Rural Credit and Savings Project. Project Validation Report: Asian Development Bank. Banerjee, A., D. Karlan, and J. Zinman. 2015. Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(1): 1–21. Bateman, M. 2012. The Role of Microfinance in Contemporary Rural Development Finance Policy and Practice: Imposing Neoliberalism as “Best Practice.” Journal of Agrarian Change 12(4): 587–600. Bornstein, D. 1996. The Price of a Dream: The Story of the Grameen Bank and the Idea that it is Helping the Poor to Change their Lives. New York: Simon & Schuster. Bylander, M. 2014. Borrowing across Borders: Migration and Microcredit in Rural Cambodia. Development and Change 45(2): 284–307. Bylander, M. and E. Hamilton. 2015. Loans and Leaving: Migration and the Expansion of Microcredit in Cambodia. Population Research and Policy Review 34(5): 687–708. DOI: 10.1007/s11113-015-9367-8 CARE. 2012. Drowning in Debt: The Impact of the 2011 Cambodia Floods on Household Debt. Access to Finance Consortium: CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam and PACT: Phnom Penh. CGAP. 2009. CGAP Consumer Protection Policy Diagnostic Report. CGPAP: Cambodia. Chandararot, K. and D. Liv. 2011. Impact of Micro Finance Services in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Microfinance Association. Chhay, D. 2011. Women’s Economic Empowerment through Microfinance in Cambodia. Development in Practice 21(8): 1122–1137. Clark, H. 2006. When there was No Money: Building ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia’s Evolving Financial Sector. Berlin: Springer. CMA. 2015. CMA Website. Microfinance Environment. http://cmanetwork.org/drupal/Microfinance Environment. Accessed January 15, 2015. ——. 2010. Microcredit in Cambodia. http://cma-network.org/drupal/download/yellow_print/ Microfinance%20in%20Cambodia.pdf. Accessed December 28, 2013. Copestake, J. 2007. Mainstreaming Microfinance: Social Performance or Mission Drift? World Development 35(10): 1721–1738. CSES. 2004. Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey. Cambodia: National Institute of Statistics and Ministry of Planning. ——. 2009. Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey. Cambodia: National Institute of Statistics and Ministry of Planning. ——. 2011. Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey. Cambodia: National Institute of Statistics and Ministry of Planning. Flaming, M., E. Duflos, A. Latortue, N. Nayar, and J. Roth. 2005. Country Level Effectiveness and Accountability Report: Cambodia. CGAP Aid Effectiveness Initiative.

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The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit Gonzalez, A. 2010. Is Microfinance Growing Too Fast? MIX Data Brief No. 5: Microfinance Information Exchange. Guerin, I., S. Morvant-Roux and M. Villarreal. (eds.) (2014). Microfinance, Debt and Over-Indebtedness: Juggling with Money. London: Routledge. Hulme, D. 2000. Is Microdebt Good for Poor People? A Note on the Dark Side of Microfinance. Small Enterprise Development 11(1): 26–28. Ito, S. 2008. Cambodian Microfinance: A Case of Successful Commercialization. Forum of International Development Studies 37: 19–33. Krauss, A., L. Lontzek, J. Meyer, and M. Frommelt. 2012. Lack of Access or Crowded Markets? Towards a Better Understanding of Microfinance Market Penetration. Working Paper: University of Zurich. Department for Banking and Finance Center for Microfinance. Liv, D. 2013. Study of the Drivers of Over-Indebtedness of Microfinance Borrowers in Cambodia. An In-Depth Investigation of Saturated Areas. Final Report. Cambodia Institute of Development Study. Lun, P. 2013. The Role of Rural Credit during the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Nine Villages in Cambodia. CDRI Working Paper No. 79. Cambodia Development Research Institute. MIX 2010. Microfinance in Cambodia: Country Briefing. Washington, DC: Microfinance Information Exchange. Last Updated July 2010. Norman, D. J. 2011. Neoliberal Strategies of Poverty Reduction in Cambodia: The Case of Microfinance, in Hughes, C. and Un, K. (eds.) Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. 161–181. Copenhagen: Nias Press. Ovesen, J. and I. Trankell. 2014. Symbiosis of Microcredit and Private Microlending in Cambodia. Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 15(2): 178–196. Planet Rating. 2013. MIMOSA: Microfinance Index of Outreach and Saturation. Foundation PlanetFinance. Robinson, M. 2001. The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. Roodman, D. 2011. Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Roy, A. 2010. Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development. New York: Routledge. Sachs, J. 2008. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. London: Penguin. Sophal, C. and S. Sovannarith. 1999. Cambodian Labour Migration in Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment. Working Paper 11. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Springer, S. 2011. Articulated Neoliberalism: The Specificity of Patronage, Kleptocracy, and Violence in Cambodia’s Neoliberalization. Environment and Planning A 43(11): 2553–2570. ——. 2015. Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse, and Dispossession in Cambodia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor, M. 2011. Freedom from Poverty is Not for Free: Rural Development and the Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India. Journal of Agrarian Change 11(4): 484–504. Yunus, M. 2004. Grameen Bank, Microcredit and Millennium Development Goals. Economic and Political Weekly 39(36): 4077–4080. Zeller, M. and M. Sharma. 2000. Many Borrow, More Save, and All Insure: Implications for Food and Micro-Finance Policy. Food Policy 25(2): 143–167.

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6 THE MEDIA IN CAMBODIA Sebastian Strangio

Introduction At first glance, the Cambodian media landscape seems like one of the freest in Asia. Unlike neighboring countries like Vietnam, Laos, China, and Myanmar, Cambodia has relatively few formal restrictions on the press, and pre-publication censorship by the state is rare. Unlike Thailand, which levies harsh penalties on those breaching its notorious lèse-majesté laws, Cambodia jails few reporters or bloggers. For more than 20 years, the country has even had two English-language newspapers, the Phnom Penh Post and Cambodia Daily, which publish hard-hitting reports on sensitive issues like government corruption, political violence, and illegal logging, with little reprisal. Foreign journalists are able to live and work in Cambodia without formal hindrance, as are human rights monitors and other researchers. But beneath the surface—or “between the lines,” as one recent report (LICADHO 2008) put it—the Cambodian press remains under tight central control. Almost all of the Khmer-language publications and broadcast outlets are aligned or sympathetic to the country’s prime minister, Hun Sen, and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which has been in power in various guises since 1979. The presence of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992–93 pried open a space for a rambunctious press, but diversity of the press has since declined as the CPP has consolidated its control over the Cambodian political landscape. This reality is broadly reflected in the 2015 Reporters Without Borders press freedom index, which ranked Cambodia at number 139 out of 180 countries surveyed (Mueller 2015). Today, the exact degree of control depends on the form of media. Television is totally owned or controlled by the government or CPP, as are most daily newspapers, with the exception of the foreign-language press. The freest medium is radio, which despite periodic government crackdowns, still has some important independent voices. On the whole, the Cambodian press mirrors the country’s political system itself: to the outside world it presents an open face, apparently tolerant of dissent and criticism. But behind this outer façade, media remains much as it has throughout modern Cambodian history: cowed by power and harmonized to the prerogatives of key political figures.

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Historical background A free and impartial press has never really existed in Cambodia. Most of the country’s politicians, even those educated abroad, have tended to be intolerant of a critical press and have seen media outlets as “no more than a slave through which they could get their political ideas across” (Mehta 1997, 13–14). The first Khmer-language newspapers were established in Cambodia in the 1930s, in the context of nationalist opposition to the French protectorate (Chandler 2008, 194). Under the patrician rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who ruled Cambodia from independence in 1953 until 1970, Cambodia’s print media flourished, and some 30 newspapers were published regularly in Phnom Penh. But these publications were forced to toe the official line; Sihanouk never hesitated to haul uncooperative editors or journalists into prison, or ban foreign journalists whose work displeased him (Mehta 1997). Under the republican regime of General Lon Nol, which overthrew Sihanouk in a coup d’état in March 1970, similar restrictions remained in place, with the addition of a regime of pre-censorship. After the communist Khmer Rouge overthrew the Lon Nol government in April 1975 and evacuated the cities, they instituted a regime of total censorship: the country’s only television station was destroyed as a symbol of Western “imperialism,” along with the majority of Cambodia’s 40,000 TV sets. Radio, in the form of the stentorian “Voice of Democratic Kampuchea,” was used for communication and propaganda broadcasts, but never for entertainment or education. Those printing presses that were spared from destruction were pressed into service producing copies of a newspaper and magazine that ventriloquized the views of the regime and its chief ideologues (Mehta 1997). In total, the 1975–79 rule of the Khmer Rouge resulted in the death of an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians from disease, overwork, and summary execution; in addition, most of the country’s journalists were either exiled or killed (Clarke 2000). When the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and toppled the Khmer Rouge in January 1979, state control of the press persisted. The socialist People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–89) and the State of Cambodia (1989–91) that succeeded it preached a benign form of communism compared to the Khmer Rouge, but still controlled the media tightly in line with the precepts of Vietnamese-style “democratic centralism.” A few publications, such as Pracheachon, the house publication of the ruling Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and Kampuchea, a weekly mouthpiece, provided anodyne updates on Soviet bloc state visits, agricultural production, and other bleached public announcements (Mehta 1997, 155–60). The signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, as in many other fields, marked an important turning point in the development of the Cambodian press. The treaty was signed by the four Cambodian armed factions that had been fighting one another since the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in 1979: the Cambodian People’s Party (formerly the KPRP), which had ruled since the fall of the Khmer Rouge; the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, a loose collection of pre-war republicans and nationalists; Funcinpec, a royalist political organization founded from exile by Prince Sihanouk in 1981; and the so-called “Party of Democratic Kampuchea,” the rebranded Khmer Rouge, which, thanks to Cold War expediency, had continued to occupy Cambodia’s UN seat throughout the 1980s. The Paris Agreements created the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was tasked with taking temporary control of the Cambodian state, disarming the four factions, and shepherding the country towards peace and democratic elections. The scope and ambition of the mission were unprecedented. The retiring UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, described it as “probably the most important and most complex in the history of the United Nations” (Riding 1991). The political settlement, followed by the return to Phnom

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Penh of competing political factions under the protection of the UN, resulted in a sudden flowering of the Cambodian press. The new constitution promulgated in 1993 contained guarantees of “freedom of expression, press, publication, and assembly” (Jennar 1995). After nearly two decades of communism, Cambodia now had “scores of mini-press barons” (Mehta 1997, 22). According to one estimate, about 30 newspapers were established in Cambodia in 1993; the following year this rose to about 45; by 1995 there were around 90 (LICADHO 2008, 6). At the head of the media comeback were a number of editors who had worked before the Khmer Rouge, who joined a newer generation of Cambodian journalists trained during the socialist 1980s (Clarke 2000). The UNTAC period also saw the establishment of two English-language newspapers: the bi-weekly Phnom Penh Post, founded in mid-1992 and the Cambodia Daily, which began publishing on a daily schedule the following year. In the end, the UNTAC spring proved short-lived. The coalition government which emerged from the UN-organized 1993 election was an unstable coalition between two civil war-era enemies: Prince Norodom Ranariddh of Funcinpec, who held the post of “first” prime minister, and Hun Sen of the CPP, who served as “second.” This arrangement, which Evan Gottesman (2003, 353) has described as less a proper coalition than “a tenuous compact among competing patronage systems,” quickly broke down as the two sides intrigued and vied for supremacy. The struggle eventually came to a head in July 1997, when forces loyal to Hun Sen and the CPP vanquished Funcinpec’s military wing in two days of street battles, driving Ranariddh into self-exile and murdering many of his key commanders (Peou 1998; Barber and Rizzi 1997; United Nations Center for Human Rights 1997). When new elections were held in 1998, the CPP won and Hun Sen became sole prime minister—a position that he has held ever since. Since then, as Hun Sen and the CPP have steadily consolidated their control over the political landscape, co-opting, sidelining, or buying off opponents, the press has been slowly “harmonized” with the ruling party’s political consensus. In a broad sense, the CPP has viewed politics and dissent in much the same way as previous Cambodian regimes. The country’s political system since UNTAC has operated less on principles of transparency and popular sovereignty than on the premodern currencies of bunn (merit) and omnaich (power). Trudy Jacobsen and Martin Stuart-Fox (2013, 17) argue that we can only understand how political power functions in Cambodia by looking “beyond the institutions of the state” to the cultural and symbolic languages employed by the country’s leaders. They argue that political power in Cambodia resides not in the political institutions imported by UNTAC, but in the vertical strings (ksae) of patronage linking the village level to the top levels of government, which bind the country’s business-political-military elites into a tight bond of inter-dependence. These networks act as a fluid form of authority, an organic currency of power and obligation which infuses, and is thus unimpeded by, formal political institutions (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013; see also Springer 2011). In this scheme, political power has cosmic significance: the main measure of a leader is his or her bunn, which can be built and expressed through displays of wealth and power, distributions of patronage, and expressions of charismatic oratory. Those with superior bunn are perceived to hold their power as if by right. “In a very real sense,” Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox (2013, 11) write, “bunn determines destiny.” This view of political power permits no room for principled opposition or legitimate dissent. To criticize a leader is the equivalent of questioning his or her bunn, a transgression that often brings a disproportionately violent response. The only aim of the system is total consensus. “Patrimonial power is only secure when it manages to isolate and neutralize all alternative power networks that might challenge it,” Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox (2013, 18) write. “Its logical goal is to embrace the entire socio-political order, which occurs when the superior omnaich of a single supreme ruler”—in this case Hun Sen—“enjoys universal recognition” (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013, 20). 78

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In practical terms, this means that Cambodian politics is marked by a sharp polarization between those who support the patrimonial status quo and its supporting myths, and those who oppose them. Today, the CPP sees opposition politicians, “unharmonized” media outlets, and independent NGOs as expressions of the same oppositional tendency. Opposition in this sense is not ideological, but existential. The CPP presents itself as a big tent in which any opponent is welcome, as long as they divest themselves of political ambitions, humbly accept their place in the scheme of ksae, and recognize the leadership and superior omnaich of Prime Minister Hun Sen. But those who remain outside the tent are seen as illegitimate by definition, as nation-wreckers and the stooges of foreign interests. As a result, few Cambodian leaders have ever accepted the role of an independent press, with a duty to “comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable”; nor have they accepted the idea of a neutral political space more generally (Springer 2010). While UNTAC helped pry open the space for the creation of a diverse Cambodian press, most of the publications that emerged during this period were lodged firmly in the ksae of various political factions and prominent individuals within them. Instead of pursuing the news with professionalism and balance, most served their patrons, presenting a Punch-and-Judy narrative of Cambodian politics full of caricatures and personal insults. In post-UNTAC Cambodia it was entirely routine for Samleng Reas Khmer (Voice of the Khmer People) to describe Ranariddh as “the prince of evil” and Hun Sen as a “rat,” as it did on one day in 1994. In 1995 Sereipheap Thmei (New Liberty News) ran a cartoon showing Hun Sen pointing a gun at Ranariddh’s head and forcing him to put his signature to documents—an acid satire on the true balance of power in the CPP–Funcinpec “coalition” (Mehta 1997, 187–88). Later, the paper’s offices were ransacked by angry villagers from Kraingyov commune in Kandal province, where Hun Sen had bankrolled rural development projects (Barber and Munthit 1995). While the CPP-aligned press lampooned its opponents as criminals and stooges of the West, the opposition press reveled in pointing out the CPP’s close historical and political relationship with Vietnam, a country many Cambodians view with existential fear. These sorts of excesses led one observer to describe the Cambodian press as “a ‘mad dog’ not a watchdog” (Tenove 2001). Of course, things in the 1990s were better than they had been in decades: despite all the political sniping and shoddy professionalism, readers finally had access to a diversity of viewpoints, and there were a small number of Cambodian journalists who did what they could to hold the powerful to account. But as appendages of political parties, media outlets were seen as legitimate targets for attack. Like previous Cambodian leaders, neither Hun Sen nor Ranariddh showed much tolerance for dissent; nor did they admit much of a distinction between reporters and the figures who paid them. In September 1994, Nuon Chan, editor of Samleng Yuvachun Khmer (Voice of Khmer Youth), was gunned down in broad daylight in Phnom Penh by two men on a motorbike. Two months later, Chan Dara, a reporter for Koh Santepheap (Island of Peace), was fatally shot while driving away from a restaurant in Kampong Cham. Both journalists had written extensively on the corrupt activities of powerful officials in government. Neither killer was ever brought to justice (Mehta 1997, 197; Biggs 1994). Independent bodies and individuals came under intense pressure to conform. The Khmer Journalists Association (KJA), founded in December 1993 to advocate for press freedoms, effectively ceased to exist in July 1995 after pro-CPP and pro-Funcinpec members broke away to establish a new “League of Cambodian Journalists” backed personally by Ranariddh and Hun Sen (Munthit 1995; Mehta 1997, 23). Riven by internal disputes, the KJA quickly faded into obscurity and inactivity (LICADHO 2008, 18). The organization’s demise spelled the end of unity among Cambodian journalists: by 2008, reporters were represented by 15 clubs and associations registered with the Cambodian Ministry of Information (LICADHO 2008, 18–19). 79

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Journalists and editors resisting the consensus and the dictates of patronage have been subject to bribes, threats, intimidation, and other forms of government pressure. The Committee to Protect Journalists lists 12 journalists murdered in Cambodia since 1993. The perpetrators remain mostly unpunished.1 As violence has declined in Cambodian party politics—a by-product of the ruling CPP’s consolidation of control over government—critics have been subject instead to dubious lawsuits utilizing legal provisions governing criminal defamation and incitement. A new Penal Code, which came into force in December 2010, contains a range of provisions which criminalize various forms of expression, including “incitement,” which is so broadly defined that it can mean pretty much anything (Human Rights Watch 2010; see Morris, this volume, p. 29). The evolution of the Cambodian press since the 1990s is demonstrated by the tangled journey of Samleng Yuvachun Khmer, which cycled through just about every party allegiance en route to harmonious coexistence with the CPP. Founded as a Funcinpec party bulletin in 1992, it shifted its loyalty to Sam Rainsy, a former Funcinpec finance minister who broke from his own party in 1995, and became one of the country’s most outspoken opposition broadsheets—a reputation for which its editor was killed in 1994. It re-defected to Funcinpec in the late 1990s, and then accompanied Prince Ranariddh when he was fired from Funcinpec in October 2006 and went on to form his eponymous Norodom Ranariddh Party (LICADHO 2008, 41). When Ranariddh retired from politics in October 2008, it finally bowed to Hun Sen’s consensus and “joined” the CPP (Sokha 2008). In January 2015, Ranariddh came out of retirement and was reinstalled as head of Funcinpec, though he openly admitted that Hun Sen “played a clear role” in orchestrating his return to politics (Willemyns 2015). An echo can also be found in the history of Ta Prohm, a Funcinpec radio station founded in 2001. During the year-long political deadlock which followed the 2003 election, in which Ranariddh and Rainsy joined forces to leverage concessions out of Hun Sen, who lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to rule alone, the station reflected Funcinpec’s strong anti-CPP line. In apparent response, its news director Chuor Chetharith was shot outside the station’s office in October 2003, just four days after Hun Sen had “warned” Ta Prohm about its critical broadcasts (Sokheng 2003). After Hun Sen and Ranariddh ended the deadlock and formed a coalition government in mid-2004, Ta Prohm remained pro-royalist. Then, on October 19, 2006, after Ranariddh was removed as Funcinpec president by pro-CPP elements in the party, bodyguards belonging to General Nhek Bunchhay, a close associate of Hun Sen, stormed the station’s offices, removed its pro-Ranariddh staff at gunpoint, and instated a pro-CPP line (LICADHO 2006).

The Cambodian media today On the whole, Cambodia has avoided instituting the sort of heavy-handed censorship and press control regime that characterizes countries like Vietnam, Laos, China, and pre-reform Myanmar—a fact that gives the country its reputation for having a relatively “free” press. But the Cambodian media landscape is much more complex than the legal and institutional framework alone suggests. Again, this is broadly reflected in the Cambodian political landscape as a whole. Since the UNTAC era, the Cambodian government’s heavy reliance on foreign aid has produced a curious bifurcation of the political system. While the CPP governs the country in much the same fashion as in previous Cambodian regimes—through the highly individualized system of patron–client relations described above—it has also become fluent in the language of pluralism and democratic reform, which it directs outwards to international donor constituencies, while “strongly resist[ing] outside pressure” to reform its patrimonial system of government 80

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(Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013, 17). Steve Heder (2007) has described the resulting system as an “involuted façade state,” characterized by political theater and cardboard institutions. Elsewhere, I have referred to this as Cambodia’s “mirage” of liberalism and reform, which the government has fostered—consciously and strategically—in order to placate and manipulate its international “partners” (Strangio 2014). Where the press and freedom of expression is concerned, this balancing act continues: the government’s aim has not been to silence dissenting voices altogether, but rather “to create a mirage of freedom, keeping the country partway between outright freedom and outright repression” (Strangio 2014, 207). Maintaining the “right” balance has naturally been a piecemeal process. Since UNTAC, periods of relative openness have alternated with crackdowns, the latter tending to coincide with national elections or periods of political tension. One such period took place around the time of the 2008 national election, which the CPP won in a landslide, clinching 90 of the National Assembly’s 123 seats—its largest majority since UNTAC. The following 18 months saw members of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and editors of opposition-aligned publications dragged into court on charges of defamation and disinformation. With no chance of winning, the threat of jail or insurmountable fines fostered self-censorship and, by 2010, had forced the closure, at least for a time, of the most significant opposition outlets.2 The CPP’s control of the press has been achieved in much the same way as its control of the political landscape—through a combination of “politics, money, and fear” (LICADHO 2008). To start with, all the main Khmer-language newspapers are controlled by interests friendly to the CPP (LICADHO 2009). The largest-circulation publications—Kampuchea Thmei, Koh Santepheap, and Rasmei Kampuchea—all toe the official line. There are currently two main opposition-aligned newspapers: Moneaksekar Khmer, which, following its relaunch in 2010, now publishes daily and Khmer Machas Srok, which publishes both online and in a weekly print edition.3 The few other opposition papers that remain are obscure operations that publish irregularly and raise few alarms in Hun Sen’s cabinet. The foreign press, perhaps the most visible advertisement of the country’s “commitment” to media freedom, enjoys a great deal of freedom, but remains quarantined to an audience of expatriates and educated Cambodians living in the cities. The Phnom Penh Post and Cambodia Daily provide quality reporting and valuable training for Khmer reporters, but the only reason they are given such freedom is that they ultimately have so little impact.4 Even though the two papers now publish in Khmer as well as in English, their reach is limited: one 2003 survey found that just 9 percent of respondents read a newspaper of any kind regularly—a function of the low levels of literacy among the rural population, the relatively high cover price, and the lack of distribution outside Phnom Penh and the major towns (LICADHO 2008, 8–9).5 Though literacy has increased in the 12 years since the survey was conducted, newspapers are only available in Phnom Penh and the larger provincial towns, and therefore fail to have much impact on public opinion beyond these areas. Broadcast media have the potential to effectively reach more rural Cambodians and are accordingly subject to much tighter controls. The state broadcaster TVK is run by the ruling party, showcasing official ribbon-cuttings and speeches, but offering little airtime to opposition activities (ahead of the 2007 commune council elections, non-CPP candidates were forced to buy airtime on TVK with Australian aid money, according to leaked cables from the US embassy in Phnom Penh (US Embassy Phnom Penh 2007)). Bayon TV is owned by Hun Sen’s family and run by his daughter Hun Mana (LICADHO 2008, 29). The remaining stations are controlled by pliant business interests (LICADHO 2009, 3–12). While new television and broadcast licenses have been handed out to CPP-friendly firms and business people, the 81

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Ministry of Information has repeatedly refused opposition parties’ requests for bandwidth of their own.6 On the whole, political coverage on Cambodian television offers little more than a diet of government propaganda. “News” consists of footage of Hun Sen and other senior officials delivering speeches, slicing ribbons, and handing out gifts to the poor. There is little to no coverage of opposition activities, unless it is to denigrate them, as was common in the run-up to the July 2013 national election, when such stations also ignored massive opposition-led protests in the streets of Phnom Penh. In the Apsara TV newsroom, a sign reportedly hangs from the wall, which reads, “Banned from broadcasting: Stories on human rights and land disputes”—two issues that are seen as staples of “opposition” politics (interview with Moeun Chhean Nariddh, 2013). It is in radio that independent voices remain the strongest. During 1992 and 1993, UNTAC officials distributed around 346,000 free transistor radios to help disseminate voting information and other announcements made by Radio UNTAC, the mission’s broadcaster (LICADHO 2008, 13; Zhou 1994). Since then, radio has since remained popular for Cambodians in rural areas, due to the ease and low cost of running a transistor radio, even in remote areas lacking electricity. One of the most popular and prominent voices in Cambodian radio is Mam Sonando, the Franco-Cambodian director of Beehive Radio 105 FM, one of the country’s only independent broadcasters (Neumann 2003). After three decades in Paris, Sonando returned to Cambodia in 1994 and obtained a radio license. After a failed run in the 1998 election, he dedicated himself to independent broadcasting full-time and was soon selling airtime to the US-funded Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, which had been refused their own broadcast licenses. As a critical voice beamed into Phnom Penh and rural areas surrounding the capital, Sonando has come under frequent attack. His radio station has been assailed by armed goons. He has fled the country, had his radio license suspended, and has been jailed on three occasions on a range of charges including incitement (Neumann 2003), criminal defamation and disseminating false information (Sokheng and Cochrane 2005), and insurrection (Titthara 2012)—the latter charge under the terms of the new Penal Code. Sonando has also been repeatedly refused a television broadcast license on mostly spurious grounds (Peter and Naren 2014). Working journalists still tread a fine line in reporting on sensitive topics. According to one Khmer newspaper journalist, those reporting on sensitive issues can be subject to a broad range of pressures and inducements. Enterprising journalists are frequently put on a “blacklist” at the Ministry of the Interior. From there the threats escalate. Some reporters receive “warnings” from Hun Sen’s cabinet. Others receive calls from officials working in the Council of Ministers, as the county’s cabinet is known, who urge them, in the guise of friendly advice, to “do the right thing” and stop publishing critical material (interview with Cambodian journalist, 2013). Other journalists report threatening text messages and anonymous calls. In a 2007 survey of 150 reporters, 54 percent said they had been threatened with physical harm or legal action in the course of their work (LICADHO 2008, 56). Occasionally the name of a recalcitrant journalist is even broadcast on national television, where they are publicly labelled as “opposition,” alienating them from friends and colleagues fearful of being tarred with the same brush. Threats, as always, come wrapped in inducements. In exchange for their acquiescence, reporters are often offered cash or jobs in the Council of Ministers’ Press and Quick Reaction Unit, the government’s public relations department (interview with Cambodian journalist, 2013). In a broader sense, hierarchy and personal ties introduce an element of favor and obligation into the business of news. Journalism in Cambodia is seen as a relatively low-status job: salaries at Khmer-language newspapers and broadcasters are paltry—as little as a couple of hundred dollars a month—and training in issues like journalistic ethics is lacking. A third of respondents 82

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to the survey cited above said they knew a colleague who took bribes for not reporting stories, either to supplement their income or to ensure their family’s safety (LICADHO 2008, 21). In line with the dictates of patronage, cash bribes are also frequently offered (and accepted) at press conferences, in the expectation of positive coverage, or privately as an inducement for journalists willing to sidestep sensitive stories. According to the human rights group LICADHO, partisan ownership and patrimonial politics combine to create a media which is highly supine to the prerogatives of those in power: The partisan ownership of Cambodia’s media produces institutionalized political bias in news reporting. This bias is reinforced by a culture of corruption in which journalists are regularly bribed to attend press conferences and photo opportunities, a practice so common it isn’t even considered corruption by most Cambodia reporters. The result is news coverage weighted heavily in favor of those who can pay, namely the government and the CPP. (LICADHO 2008, 1) The payola element in Cambodian journalism has even given rise to a curious creature: the journalist-extortionist. In rural areas, dozens earn a living by combing the countryside for news and then requesting bribes not to publish stories. These individuals work for publications which are newspapers in name only, with irregular schedules and poor distribution, and which are used as vehicles for extracting small payments from illegal loggers and other local big-men (Wallace and Naren 2014). The reporters who take part in this activity are like free-riders on the Cambodian patronage system, trying to make a peripheral living from flows of patrimonial resources. These reporters, who can’t be said to serve public accountability in any meaningful way, play a dangerous game. They are frequently beaten, threatened, or injured in stand-offs with loggers and other local thugs. In February 2014, a reporter who covered illegal fishing was beaten to death in Kampong Chhnang province (Kongkea 2014); in October a colleague was killed while chasing illegal loggers through Kratie province (Sokchea and Pye 2014). They stand as a reminder that much of the press in Cambodia, despite the gains of recent years, remains lodged within a patrimonial system of social relations in which scrutiny and accountability are of limited importance.

Conclusion Being a journalist in Cambodia today means navigating around ambiguous laws, invisible triggers, and the personal sensitivities of those in power. The system’s very unpredictability and informality explains its effectiveness so far in neutralizing dissent and critical reporting in the Khmer language. Despite the apparent openness of Cambodia’s media landscape, its lack of formal controls, and the ease with which foreign journalists can live and work in the country, important political and economic interests have been all but firewalled from public scrutiny. Despite all this, the Cambodian media has come a long way since UNTAC. Cambodian reporters are slowly becoming more professional, and many within government-aligned publications now try to push the boundaries when they can and occasionally slip sensitive stories into the mainstream press. At the same time, Cambodian readers have also become more sophisticated, and more able to distinguish real stories from party propaganda. This tendency was marked during and after the July 2013 national election, when the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), led by Sam Rainsy, made significant gains, winning 55 seats in the National Assembly and consigning the CPP to its worst return since 1998. When Rainsy returned to Cambodia before the election after four years in self-exile to a crowd of more than 83

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100,000, it was not covered by the nation’s TV stations, which were instead “filled with the usually dull mix of karaoke starlets, Chinese soap operas, sports, and the CPP’s election campaigning across the country” (Naren 2013; Teehan and Sokchea 2013). But now there is an alternative. Instead of tuning in to government television, many young Cambodians—armed with web-enabled smartphones and Facebook accounts—simply access news about opposition activities via the Internet (Woodside 2013; Willemyns 2013). The Internet is still in its infancy in Cambodia, but a recent connectivity boom has already gone a significant way towards reconfiguring the country’s information landscape. In 2010 just 320,000 Cambodians had access to the Internet; by the end of 2013 that number had climbed more than tenfold to 3.8 million, according to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications—nearly a quarter of the country’s population (Sokhean 2014). Driven by the increasing availability of cheap smartphones and extensive mobile networks, young Cambodians—mostly in urban areas—have embraced social media networks like Facebook and YouTube. There are now approximately 1.76 million Cambodians on Facebook, with an estimated 1,100 new users joining every day.7 During the political deadlock that followed the 2013 election, digital media became a key source of information for ordinary people. The Facebook sites of politicians and community activists attracted tens of thousands of “likes,” in addition to popular news sites like “I Love Cambodia Hot News.” Increasing access to the Internet has given Cambodians a way around the government’s media controls and information firewalls, allowing them to share dissenting information outside the patrimonial consensus. The popularity of the Internet has also heaped pressure on government-aligned TV stations to raise their game. Still, the Cambodian government remains intolerant of dissent, whatever the forum. In 2012 the Cambodian government announced it was drafting a Cybercrime Law to rein in critical comment online and help “prevent any ill-willed people or bad mood people from spreading false information, groundless information that could tend to mislead the public and affect national security or our society” (Di Certo and Yuthana 2012). According to a draft leaked to the media in April 2014, the new law would outlaw the production, publication, or sharing of any content deemed to “hinder the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia” or anything else threatening to “generate anarchism” or “generate insecurity, instability, and political cohesiveness [sic]” (LICADHO 2015). In December 2014, the government announced it was scrapping the Cybercrime Law, though officials still expressed the need to tightly regulate Internet communications (Mueller and Narim 2014). The courts have also demonstrated that they are willing to treat online dissent no differently than the way they treat ordinary criticism in the press and public domain (LICADHO forthcoming). With internet access likely to continue its rapid spread, the Cambodian media, like the country as a whole, finds itself at a crossroads: one way points to greater scrutiny and limitations on those in power, the other to a familiar extension of patrimonial control over emerging digital technologies. Only time will tell in which direction the country’s press is heading.

Notes 1 A full list is available at https://cpj.org/killed/asia/cambodia/ (last accessed January 20, 2015). 2 In March 2008, a few months before the election, Sralanh Khmer, a paper linked to the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), inverted its editorial line when its publisher, also an SRP steering committee member, defected to the CPP and took the publication with him (Samean, 2008). In June, Dam Sith, another high-ranking SRP figure who edited Moneakseka Khmer was arrested on defamation and disinformation charges after quoting comments from Sam Rainsy accusing Foreign Minister Hor Namhong of having committed crimes during the Khmer Rouge years. Despite being released a week

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3 4

5 6

7

later on bail, the charges hung over Sith until mid-2009, when he wrote to the prime minister to express his “sincere apology” and beg for the charges to be dropped. In exchange he promised to cease publication of the newspaper. The charges disappeared and the last edition of Moneakseka Khmer rolled off the presses in mid-July. One observer described it as “the beginning of the end for press freedom in Cambodia” (Sokchea and Strangio 2009). The crackdown was eventually relaxed and Moneakseka Khmer relaunched the following year, but everybody now knew just how far they could go. Author interview with Moeun Chhean Nariddh, director of the Cambodia Institute for Media Studies, February 26, 2015. It might also be noted, pace Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox (2013), that these media organizations, owned and largely run by foreign citizens, sit outside Cambodia’s system of patrimonial ties and relations. This is of course an advantage; it enables the publications to pursue the news objectively, as well as providing a measure of support and protection to the Cambodian reporters who work for them. But this isolation also means that their impact is shallow: in patronage terms, they inhabit a closed system, isolated from outside pressure, but also isolated from imposing any effective check on entrenched economic and political interests. The adult literacy rate in Cambodia is estimated at 77.6 percent. Statistics available at www.unesco.org/ new/en/phnompenh/education/learning-throughout-life/literacy/ (last accessed February 24, 2015). In November 2014, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that as part of a political agreement with the CNRP, the government would finally grant the opposition party the right to operate an analogue TV station (Naren 2014). However, it remains too early to say how much freedom this station will enjoy if and when it goes to air. Statistics available at www.socialmediacambodia.com/ (last accessed February 25, 2014).

References Barber, J. and K. Munthit. 1995. The Hun Sen Town of Kraingyov. Phnom Penh Post, November 3–16, 1995. Barber, J. and C. Rizzi. 1997. Funcinpec Military Chiefs Hunted Down. Phnom Penh Post, July 12, 1997. Biggs, B. 1994. Slain Editor Pressured By Gov’t, Letters Show. Cambodia Daily, September 9–11, 1994. Chandler, D. 2008. A History of Cambodia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Clarke, J. 2000. Training Journalists in an Emerging Democracy: The Case of Cambodia. Asia Pacific Media Educator 1 (8): 82–98. Di Certo, B. and K. Yuthana. 2012. The “Ill-Willed” Spark Cyber Law: Officials. Phnom Penh Post, May 24, 2012. Gottesman, E. 2003. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation-Building. New Haven: Yale University Press. Heder, S. 2007. Political Theatre in the 2003 Cambodian Elections, in J. Strauss and D.C. O’Brien (eds.) Staging Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa. London: I.B. Tauris. Human Rights Watch. 2010. Cambodia: New Penal Code Undercuts Free Speech. December 23, 2010. Jacobsen, T. and M. Stuart-Fox. 2013. Power and Political Culture in Cambodia. Working Paper Series No. 200. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, May 2013. Jennar, R. (ed.). 1995. The Cambodian Constitutions (1953–1993). Bangkok: White Lotus. Kongkea, B. 2014. Journalist Beaten to Death in K Chhnang. Phnom Penh Post, February 2, 2014. LICADHO. 2006. Staff of FM Radio Ta Prohm Threatened and Replaced after Criticizing Prime Minister. October 23, 2006. ——. 2008. Reading Between the Lines: How Politics, Money & Fear Control Cambodia’s Media. May 2008. ——. 2009. Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression in Cambodia’s Media. May 2009. ——. 2015. Going Offline?: The Threat to Cambodia’s Newfound Internet Freedoms. May 2015. Mehta, H. 1997. Cambodia Silenced: The Press under Six Regimes. Bangkok: White Lotus. Mueller, C. 2015. Latest Press Freedom Index Says No Gain for Cambodia. Cambodia Daily, February 13, 2015. Mueller, C. and K. Narim. 2014. Controversial Cybercrime Law “Scrapped.” Cambodia Daily, December 12, 2014. Munthit, K. 1995. Hun Sen Joins New Journalist League. Phnom Penh Post, July 14–27, 1995. Naren, K. 2013. Pro-Government Media Blank on Rainsy’s Return. Cambodia Daily, July 20–1, 2013.

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Sebastian Strangio ——. 2014. Hun Sen, Rainsy Settle Differences in Reform Deal. Cambodia Daily, November 29, 2014. Neumann, A. 2003. Sonando’s Beehive Abuzz With Free Speech. Phnom Penh Post, September 24– October 6, 2003. Peou, S. 1998. Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One? Asian Survey 38 (1): 69–74. Peter, Z. and K. Naren. 2014. Still No Room on the TV Dial for Radio’s Mam Sonando. Cambodia Daily, December 2, 2014. Riding, A. 1991. 4 Parties in Cambodian War Sign UN-Backed Peace Pact. New York Times, October 24, 1991. Samean, Y. 2008. Sralanh Khmer Newspaper Publisher Confirms Defection to CPP. Cambodia Daily, March 28, 2008. Sokha, D. 2008. Director of “Samleng Yuvachun Khmer” Jumps the NRP Ship to Join the CPP. KaSet, October 8, 2008. Sokchea, M. and D. Pye. 2014. Journalist Killed in Kratie. Phnom Penh Post, October 13, 2014. Sokchea, M. and S. Strangio. 2009. Editor Pleads for PM’s Pardon. Phnom Penh Post, July 10, 2009. Sokhean, B. 2014. Mobile Users Top 20 Million, Internet Usage Still Rising. Cambodia Daily, March 27, 2014. Sokheng, V. 2003. Pro-Funcinpec Journalist Shot Dead. Phnom Penh Post, October 24–November 6, 2003. Sokheng, V. and L. Cochrane. 2005. Border Treaty Sparks Backlash, Arrests. Phnom Penh Post, October 21–November 3, 2005. Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space. New York: Routledge. ——. 2011. Articulated Neoliberalism: The Specificity of Patronage, Kleptocracy, and Violence in Cambodia’s Neoliberalization. Environment and Planning A 43 (11), 2554–70. Strangio, S. 2014. Hun Sen’s Cambodia. London: Yale University Press. Teehan, S. and M. Sokchea. 2013. All the News That’s Safe to Print. Phnom Penh Post, July 22, 2013. Tenove, C. 2001. Cambodian Media: A “Mad Dog” Not a Watchdog. University of British Columbia Journalism Review, April 2001. Titthara, M. 2012 Activist Mam Sonando Gets 20 Years. Phnom Penh Post, October 1, 2012. United Nations Centre for Human Rights. 1997. Evidence of Summary Executions, Torture and Missing Persons since July 2–7, 1997. August 21, 1997. US Embassy Phnom Penh. 2007. Bucking a Disturbing Trend in Southeast Asia: Press Freedom in Cambodia. Diplomatic cable 07PHNOMPENH682, May 17, 2007. Wallace, J. and K. Naren. 2014. Cambodia’s Bribe-Seeking Press Corps. Al Jazeera, October 31, 2014. Willemyns, A. 2013. CNRP Wins With Local and Social Communications Strategy. Cambodia Daily, July 31, 2013. ——. 2015. Prince Says Funcinpec to Work Closely with CPP. Cambodia Daily, January 3, 2015. Woodside, A. 2013. Social Media Shows Election Day Muscle. Phnom Penh Post, July 29, 2013. Zhou, M. 1994. Radio UNTAC of Cambodia: Winning Ears, Hearts, and Minds. Bangkok: White Lotus.

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7 TOURISM IN CAMBODIA Opportunities and Challenges Richard Sharpley and Peter McGrath

Introduction During the 1960s, Cambodia was one of the foremost tourism destinations in Southeast Asia. Attracted primarily by the culture of Phnom Penh and the temples of Angkor, between 50,000 and 70,000 tourists visited the country each year (Hall and Ringer 2000), a significant number in those early days of mass international travel. However, as a result of the political turmoil of the following two decades, Cambodia became off-limits to international tourists and it was only in the early 1990s that it regained its place on the international tourism map. Following the Paris Peace Accords, some 22,000 people visited Cambodia in 1991, more than doubling to around 50,000 the following year although, according to Chheang (2008a, 291), the majority were UN personnel. In 1993, the year that international tourist arrivals were first officially recorded, the country adopted an open-door policy to attract foreign investment in tourism and since then, the sector has grown rapidly (Grihault 2011). Some 118,000 tourists visited Cambodia in 1993, a number that increased to almost half a million by 2000 and subsequently grew remarkably to more than 4.5 million by 2014 (MoT 2015). The economic contribution of tourism has increased commensurately. In 1996, tourism receipts amounted to US$118 million; by 2014, the figure had risen to US$2,736 million (MoT 2015). Not surprisingly, therefore, tourism has become a significant element of the Cambodian economy (the third largest sector after agriculture and textiles), directly contributing 10.4 percent of GDP (the wider tourism economy representing 23.5 percent of GDP) and directly supporting 735,000 jobs, or 8.9 percent of total employment (WTTC 2014). As in many other countries with significant tourism sectors, it has also become a pillar of the country’s development policies, including poverty reduction (Chen et al. 2008). Despite the growth of tourist numbers and receipts, however, success in utilizing tourism as a catalyst of wider economic and social development has been more limited. In other words, although tourism is embedded in Cambodia’s development policies, its contribution to social and economic development in the country has been less than might have been expected. For example, it has been found that “despite being a major tourist destination, [Siem Reap] is still one of the poorest provinces in the country” (Mao et al. 2013, 121), while in a study of the economic yield from different nationalities of tourists in Cambodia, Dwyer and Thomas (2012, 325) conclude that, overall, the “pro-poor income effect of tourism in Cambodia is very low compared with that of the 87

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expenditure injected into the destination.” More simply stated, despite its economic significance in terms of contribution to GDP, tourism has had relatively little impact on poverty reduction in the country, even in those regions such as Siem Reap where tourism activity is relatively intense (Brickell 2008; Mao et al. 2014). The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to address this evident disconnect between tourism, economic growth, and development in Cambodia. More specifically, it seeks to identify the opportunities and challenges facing tourism in Cambodia and how these may influence its developmental role. Putting it another way, tourism more generally has long been considered an effective vehicle of economic growth and development in destination areas, particularly developing countries with few other policy options (Telfer and Sharpley 2008). However, the achievement of that economic growth and development typically faces a number of challenges. This is clearly the case in Cambodia and so the question is: can such challenges be overcome? The first task, then, is to review briefly the relationship between tourism and development in general as a framework for considering the development of tourism in Cambodia in particular.

Tourism and development: an overview More than thirty years ago, the World Tourism Organization—the United Nations agency charged with “the promotion of responsible, sustainable and universally accessible tourism” (UNWTO 2015)—stated that: “World tourism can . . . ensure the steady acceleration of economic and social development and progress, in particular in developing countries” (WTO 1980, 1). Since then, not only has tourism become an integral element of the local, regional, and national development policies of numerous countries, both less-developed and industrialized, but for many it has also become a major and essential economic sector, representing a vital source of income, foreign exchange, government revenues, and employment (Sharpley 2015). It is easy to understand why tourism should be considered, in principle, an effective and appropriate catalyst of development, particularly for peripheral nations and regions, not least because of its record of continual growth. During the second half of the twentieth century, global international arrivals increased at an annual average rate of 6.2 percent (Telfer and Sharpley 2008, 17). More recently, the rate of growth has, perhaps inevitably, slowed; for example, between 2005 and 2013, international arrivals increased at an annual average of 3.8 percent (UNWTO 2014, 4). Nevertheless, this growth rate is expected to be maintained, the World Tourism Organization forecasting annual growth in arrivals of 3.3 percent through to 2030 (UNWTO 2014, 14). This translates into a projected 1.8 billion international arrivals by 2030, to which must be added domestic tourism activity estimated to account for up to six billion trips annually. Thus, tourism is considered to be a “safe” development option, and one that is of increasing economic significance. Globally, the tourism economy contributes 9.8 percent of GDP, one in every eleven jobs, 6 percent of total exports, and is worth US$7.6 trillion (WTTC 2015). Beyond its scale and value, tourism is also favoured as a development option for a number of other reasons. These include its potential to redistribute wealth through tourist spending in both the formal and informal tourism sectors in the destination and through foreign direct investment in the sector and its contribution to employment. Tourism is also considered to offer the potential for backward linkages throughout the local economy, while it is also perceived to be an industry with limited barriers to entry and in which start-up costs are relatively low, although infrastructural development costs may be high. At the same time, the infrastructure necessary for tourism may benefit the wider community, while measures to 88

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protect and enhance the natural environment are also often a positive outcome of tourism development (Sharpley 2015). Nevertheless, the extent to which the benefits of tourism may accrue to destinations is limited by a variety of factors. Inevitably, the nature and scale of tourism development has a direct bearing on its economic contribution. Large-scale mass tourism, for example, may generate a large number of jobs and stimulate wider economic activity, but net receipts per tourist might be relatively low, particularly when many travel on pre-arranged (and pre-paid) package tours. Conversely, higher spending independent tourists will bring higher net economic benefits, hence the low volume–high value policy of many destinations. The diversity and maturity of the local economy also determine the extent of tourism’s benefits to the destination; thus, healthy visitor numbers and gross receipts may be negated by the inability of the local economy to meet tourists’ needs and a subsequent high level of “leakages,” or imports to supply the tourism sector (Mihalicˇ 2015). Equally, the availability of financial, human, and other resources, or the ability or willingness on the part of the state to engage positively in tourism, are also significant factors influencing tourism’s contribution to economic growth and development. While tourism is generally promoted as a development option, in the context of this chapter it is important to note that it is considered to be of particular potential value to the so-called least developed countries (LDCs), a sub-group of 48 less developed countries, including Cambodia, that face major obstacles in achieving even limited development. Over the last two decades, a number of LDCs, including Cambodia, have experienced rates of growth in tourist arrivals and receipts significantly higher than the world average, while their economies have become increasingly reliant on tourism. Hence, “when the importance of tourism is recognized [in LDCs], all dimensions of the tourism economy should be regarded as an integral part of the development strategy” (UNCTAD 2001, 18). Nevertheless, it has also long been recognized that the particular economic, political, and socio-cultural characteristics of LDCs may restrict the extent to which opportunities presented by tourism may be realized (Mowforth and Munt 2009). More specifically, tourism development in LDCs faces a number of challenges which may restrict not only the growth of the tourism sector but also the extent and spread of tourism’s benefits to the destination economy and community. These may be summarized as follows (UNCTAD, 2001: 8–13). 1 2 3

4

Geographical characteristics of LDCs: smallness, remoteness and “land-lockedness” may limit access and investment. Vulnerability to external shocks: these include both natural disasters and external political or economic factors. Structural handicaps: limited transport and accommodation facilities; poor telecommunications; limited access to global distribution systems; human resource weaknesses and high leakages and inter-sectoral weaknesses. Policy environment: an absence of appropriate domestic policies for and investment in tourism development may be exacerbated by a lack of international recognition of the specific challenges facing LDCs. At the same time, ineffective institutional structures and a lack of expertise in planning or managing tourism at the national level may compound this problem.

Not all of these barriers or challenges to the successful development of tourism exist in all LDCs. Nevertheless, they provide a useful point of reference for considering tourism in Cambodia and, in particular, the factors that need to be addressed if tourism is to play a more effective role in the country’s future economic growth and development. 89

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Tourism in Cambodia: a success story? As noted in the introduction to this chapter, since it re-emerged as a viable industry in 1993 tourism in Cambodia has demonstrated remarkable and, for the most part, consistent growth. For much of the last two decades, annual growth rates in tourist arrivals have been well above the global average (see Table 7.1), suggesting that tourism has been something of a success story in the country’s development. In particular, since 2000 tourist arrivals have increased almost tenfold in absolute terms, with declines in 1997 and 2003 being a response to local political unrest. To an extent, this growth has been driven by the overall relative political stability in Cambodia and, certainly for leisure tourists who tend to be risk averse (Lepp and Gibson 2003), the perception that it is now a safe country to visit. However, it has also been underpinned by the rapid development of the local tourism industry, particularly the accommodation sector. As can be seen from Table 7.2, there has been a steady increase in the supply of both hotel and guest house accommodation since 1998 although, according to Grihault (2011), between 2007 and 2010 in particular there was a 50 percent increase in the total number of hotels and guest houses with most growth in the top-end and budget categories. Importantly, however, the data in Table 7.2 mask the fact that the majority of tourist accommodation facilities are to be found in the two main tourist centres of Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. In 2010, for example, 77 percent of all of Cambodia’s hotels and guest houses and 65 percent of all rooms were located in these two cities; conversely, just 13.9 percent of hotels and guest houses were located along the coast, primarily in Sihanoukville. As discussed shortly, this points to a more general challenge facing tourism in Cambodia. However, it is also important to note that after uninterrupted growth, occupancy rates have begun to decline, falling from 69.5 percent in 2013 to 67.6 percent in 2014. Though relatively small, this decline is perhaps evidence of a growing mismatch between supply and demand. At the time of writing, for example, Siem Reap boasts 175 hotels and 275 guest houses offering a total of 15,805 rooms, a 26 percent increase in rooms since 2010 (124 hotels and 232 guest houses). Moreover, from the authors’ own observations, new hotel development is continuing apace in Siem Reap, suggesting that the problem of oversupply may become more acute; according to a tourism sector worker in the city, even in the high season it is now easy to find accommodation (2015, personal communication). The inevitable outcome will be a fall in room rates as competition increases, with knock-on effects on income and employment.

Table 7.1 Cambodia tourist arrivals (1993–2014) Year

Arrivals

Change (%)

Receipts (US$ million)

Year

Arrivals

Change (%)

Receipts (US$ million)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

118,183 176,617 219,680 260,489 218,843 289,524 367,743 466,365 604,919 786,524 701,014

0 49.4 24.4 18.6 −16.0 32.3 27.0 26.8 29.7 30.0 −10.9

n/a n/a 100 118 103 166 190 228 304 379 347

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

1,055,202 1,421,615 1,700,041 2,015,128 2,125,465 2,161,577 2,508,269 2,881,862 3,584,307 4,210,165 4,502,775

50.5 34.7 19.6 18.5 5.5 1.7 16.0 14.9 24.4 17.9 7.0

578 832 1,049 1,400 1,595 1,561 1,786 1,912 2,210 2,547 2,736

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Tourism, Cambodia. Tourism Statistics Report March 2015.

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Tourism in Cambodia Table 7.2 Accommodation supply in Cambodia (1998–2010) Year

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Hotels

Guest houses

Av. hotel occupancy (%)

Units

Rooms

Units

Rooms

216 221 240 247 267 292 299 351 351 395 398 451 440

8,247 9,115 9,673 10,804 11,426 13,201 14,271 15,465 17,914 20,470 20,678 23,010 24,393

147 186 292 370 509 549 615 684 742 891 925 1,018 1,087

1,510 1,897 3,233 3,899 6,109 6,497 7,684 9,000 9,166 11,563 12,180 14,512 15,321

40 44 45 48 50 50 52 52 54.8 54.8 62.7 63.6 65.7

Source: Chheang (2008a); Grihault (2011); MoT (2015).

To return to the rapid growth of tourism to Cambodia since 1993, the apparent success demonstrated by the arrivals and receipts data needs to be treated with some caution. Indeed, as Dwyer and Thomas (2012) imply, focusing on visitor numbers alone (a common policy objective and measure of success for many tourism destinations) is unhelpful and may be misleading. That is, it is more important to consider the spending patterns of tourists, how long they stay, where and how they travel to and within the destination, and so on. For example, Dwyer and Thomas identified that the most “valuable” tourists in terms of daily expenditure injected into the Cambodian economy are from China, the USA, and Australia. However, although China was the second largest market for tourism to Cambodia in 2014 accounting for 12.4 percent of arrivals, the USA and Australia account for just 4.2 percent and 3.0 percent of arrivals respectively. Conversely, Vietnam is the largest source of tourists to Cambodia (20.1 percent of all international tourists in 2014) yet the Vietnamese display some of the lowest direct expenditure per trip of all tourists, although their daily expenditure is more average. Two related weaknesses are inherent in the nature of tourism in Cambodia, both of which serve to limit tourism’s contribution to socio-economic development. First, average length of stay in 2014 was just 6.75 days, low for an international tourist destination. In neighboring Thailand, for example, the average length of stay in 2012 was 10.02 days, varying from 16.47 days for European visitors to between six and seven days for Asian visitors (thaiwebsites. com 2015). Although length of stay data for specific visitor nationalities in Cambodia are not available, there is likely to be little variation because, second, the country is in essence a two-centre destination. For many international tourists, Cambodia is synonymous with Angkor; that is, the principal and, often, only reason for travelling to Cambodia. In 2013, 2.23 million international tourists (over half of all international arrivals that year) visited Angkor Wat; not surprisingly the same number was recorded as visiting Siem Reap region (Table 7.3). This dominance of Angkor is problematic in a number of respects (Winter 2008). The sheer volume of visitors—it is equally popular amongst domestic as international tourists—is having a significant physical impact on all the cultural sites in the Angkor complex itself, while nearby Siem Reap has been transformed both economically and culturally into a tourist town. On the one hand, this has provided employment for many and, as Winter (2008, 535) observes, for 91

Richard Sharpley and Peter McGrath Table 7.3 International tourist arrivals to regions, 2013 and 2014

Phnom Penh Siem Reap/Angkor Coastal areas Ecotourism areas Total

2013

2014

1,972,879 2,237,286 513,891 60,501 4,784,557

2,151,838 2,350,937 570,045 60,031 5,132,851

Source: Adapted from MoT (2015).

some, “tourism has proved a lucrative industry to work in. After tips, commissions and bonuses, the monthly income for head chefs, tour guides and hotel management staff often exceeds 1,000 US dollars.” Moreover, for entrepreneurial business owners, such as those running restaurants and bars on “Pub Street,” tourism is highly profitable. On the other hand, many others working in the sector earn less than US$100 a month and, far from reducing inequality both within and beyond the city, tourism has exacerbated it (Brickell 2008). At the same time, it may be argued that the rapid development of tourism in Siem Reap has served to diminish the city’s cultural integrity. Chheang (2008b, 68) suggests that “the Cambodian government also views tourism as an effective tool to promote the cultural values and identity of Cambodia which had been lost due to the external intervention from neighboring countries” yet the “touristification” of Siem Reap, where Western-style bars, clubs, coffee shops and restaurants sit alongside more traditional Cambodian businesses, appears to be achieving the opposite. Equally, as a tourist attraction, Angkor has, perhaps, a stronger identity than the country in which it is located; at least one tourist guidebook to the region is titled Vietnam and Angkor Wat (Forbes and Sterling 2013). The other centre for tourism is, of course, Phnom Penh. As can be seen from Table 7.3, more than two million tourists visited the city in 2014 although the implication from the total figure is that relatively few tourists visit both the capital city and Siem Reap. It is unclear if particular markets visit Phnom Penh or whether, for example, tourists on organized package tours are more likely to visit both centers than independent tourists. Indeed, there remains a lack of detailed published information that might better inform tourism planning and promotion in Cambodia. Nevertheless, attractions such as the Royal Palace and, increasingly, sites associated with the Khmer Rouge regime (the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and, on the outskirts of the city, the “killing fields” of Choeung Ek), as so-called “dark tourism” sites (Sharpley and Stone 2009), attract significant numbers of visitors, though not on the scale of Angkor. The implication of tourism being focused on Siem Reap and Phnom Penh is, of course, that the direct benefits of tourism accrue to a small and concentrated sector of the population; for much of the country, tourism and the jobs and income it brings is something that happens somewhere else. At the same time, it is interesting to note that, more generally, Cambodia remains dependent on regional markets for the majority of international tourist arrivals. In 2014, for example, the top five source markets alone (Vietnam, 20.1 percent; China, 12.4 percent; Laos, 10.2 percent; South Korea, 9.4 percent; Thailand, 6.2 percent) together accounted for almost 59 percent of all international arrivals. While leaving Cambodian tourism vulnerable to potential external “shocks,” such as a repeat of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the opportunity exists of course to develop markets in Europe and North America. Beyond these weaknesses in contemporary tourism to Cambodia, other challenges— and indeed opportunities—facing tourism development in the country can be considered under the four categories introduced earlier in this chapter. 92

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Smallness/remoteness Geographically, Cambodia is a relatively small country but does not suffer remoteness in terms of links to its key tourism markets. Reasonable road connections exist with neighboring countries and, as a consequence, the majority of regional tourists travel overland into Cambodia by road. Conversely, most international tourists arrive by air; in 2014, a total of 2,229,282 tourists arrived by land or waterway (49.5 percent of all arrivals) and 50.5 percent by air (MoT 2014). Of the latter, 60 percent arrived at Siem Reap International Airport and 40 percent at Phnom Penh International Airport—the country’s third “international” airport, at Sihanoukville, handles only domestic traffic. While this underpins Siem Reap as the principal destination for international as opposed to regional tourists, it should be noted that further growth in tourism is perhaps hindered by the lack of direct international flights to both airports; many tourists are obliged to transfer onto regional carriers such as Bangkok Air and Vietnam Airlines to fly into Cambodia. Nevertheless, Cambodia does not suffer the access challenges of many other LDCs, while planned improvements to the airports represent an opportunity to develop further the country’s international tourism markets. Nor, significantly, are there barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia in general and in tourism in particular. Indeed, between 1994 and 2011, FDI in the tourism sector totalled US$19,769 million, representing 49.6 percent of all FDI in Cambodia during that period (CIB 2015). Moreover, the World Bank (2013a) reports cautious optimism for further growth in FDI in Cambodia while, according to the WTTC, tourism attracted 15 percent of all national investment in 2014. Hence, the outlook for tourism development appears, in some respects, to be positive.

Vulnerability According to UNCTAD (2001), tourism in LDCs may be threatened by vulnerability to external shocks. Reference has been made above to Cambodia’s potential over-reliance on regional tourism markets. In reality, however, cooperation with neighboring countries (for example, developing joint tourism marketing campaigns or combined tours) represents an opportunity for Cambodia to exploit its neighbors’ strong tourism sectors, while the country is no more vulnerable to external shocks than any other tourism destination in the region.

Structural handicaps With regard to structural handicaps in Cambodia, the country claims to offer a rapidly developing business environment for investment based on a growing economy and advances in infrastructure band communications (Royal Embassy of Cambodia 2013). Nevertheless, two structural challenges face tourism. First, as discussed above, tourism in Cambodia is dominated by Siem Reap (Angkor) and Phnom Penh. Current tourism policy (see next section) seeks to diversify tourism around the country, yet this is hindered by the poor road network, which limits the extent to which tourists are either willing or able to travel more extensively within Cambodia. Grihault (2011) observes, for example, that the south-west and north-east of Cambodia boast large areas of natural beauty offering significant potential for the development of nature/ecotourism: however, not only do these areas have few tourism facilities, but access is also difficult—according to Grihault (2011), in 2007 only 3,000 kilometres of the country’s 38,000 kilometre road network was paved. Similarly, the World Bank (2013b) states that “the quality of transport infrastructure [in Cambodia] remains a serious constraint to growth” and 93

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the “road transport industry is still embryonic and inefficient, reflecting the poor state of the network.” Although improvements are being made, given the poor road infrastructure tourism is unlikely to expand beyond the two main centers in the foreseeable future. Second, and as recognized by a number of commentators (Beresford et al. 2004; Leung 2002; Mao et al. 2013; 2014), inter-sectoral weaknesses in the economy serve to limit the extent to which the opportunities offered by tourism can be more widely accessed. In other words, although tourism has generated direct employment for some and entrepreneurial opportunities for others, links between tourism and the wider economy, particularly agriculture, remain limited, with consequential implications for poverty reduction

Policy environment It is, perhaps in the area of tourism policy, planning, and management that tourism in Cambodia faces the greatest challenges (Chheang 2008a, 2008b; Chen et al. 2008). This is not to say that policies for tourism do not exist. Tourism has not only been recognized for its potential role in poverty reduction in its National Strategic Development Plan (Chen et al. 2008); in 2009, the Law on Tourism (Kingdom of Cambodia 2009) was published, establishing roles and responsibilities for tourism policy and planning, jurisdiction, institutional frameworks and funding, licensing, and so on. Moreover, in a review of policy speeches made by Prime Minister Hun Sen between 1998 and 2008, Chheang (2008b) analyses 28 tourism-related speeches, identifying tourism’s formal role in economic development in Cambodia and ten sub-policy areas (Table 7.4). A number of these policies are reflected in the Tourism Strategic Development Plan 2012–2020, the overall objective of which is to increase international arrivals to seven million by 2020. It also seeks to increase domestic tourism to between eight and ten million trips annually, with the tourism sector as a whole contributing US$5 billion to the economy by 2020. Significantly in the context of this chapter, the Plan also claims that: “the tourism sector is part of a closely linked system that will contribute to the development of other sectors” (Hun Sen 2012). More specifically, the Plan identifies eight zones for diversifying tourism away from Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, and proposes a marketing strategy focusing on new market segments, means of facilitating travel to Cambodia, human resource capacity building, as well as noting the need to develop links between tourism and other sectors of the economy. Undoubtedly, some headway is being made in some elements of the Plan, although it remains unclear to what extent the policy objectives are achievable. For example, attempts to diversify tourism around the country remain hindered by the need for significant investment in both infrastructure and product development while, as Mao et al. (2014) point out, the Plan contains no details as to how economic linkages might be developed. In other words, questions

Table 7.4 Tourism policy in Cambodia: key areas Tourism management for economic development Environmental protection Cultural heritage management Tourist destination diversification Infrastructure and tourism facilities development Marketing promotion

Legal measures Regional cooperation Political stability, security, and safety Human resource development Stakeholders’ collaboration

Source: Adapted from Chheang (2008b).

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might be raised regarding the government’s ability or, indeed, willingness to implement fully the policy’s outlines in the Tourism Strategic Development Plan or, more precisely, to commit sufficient investment to support the development of tourism and enhance its economic and social benefits. For example, many tourist sites have, in effect, been privatized. That is, the rights to ticket sales/revenues at many sites have, somewhat curiously, been sold off to private companies. Specifically, much controversy surrounds the operation and management of the country’s main tourism asset, Angkor. Although officially managed by an independent public body, APSARA (Autorité pour la Protection du Site et l’Aménagement de la Région d’Angkor), entrance fees to Angkor (amounting to US$200 million annually) are collected by a major private company, Sokha, which has significant leisure and hospitality interests in Cambodia. Though no official figures are available, it is suggested that just 10 percent of entrance fee income goes towards restoration at Angkor and 30 percent to APSARA. Similar arrangements also exist at other tourist attractions, including boat trips to visit the floating villages on Tonle Sap and the Choeung Ek Genocide Museum. Moreover certainly in Siem Reap, many of the properties leased by bars and restaurant are thought to be government owned (2015, personal communication), reflecting perhaps the claim that “the patronage system and corruption are the main barriers to fair economic development and business activities, adversely impacting the investment environment and poverty reduction [in Cambodia]” (Chheang 2008a). Hence, although further research is necessary, the manner in which tourism in Cambodia in governed may indeed represent a barrier to wider socio-economic development through tourism.

Tourism and development Despite the concerns regarding its governance, there are two notable ways in which tourism is contributing directly to development. First, there are numerous examples of charities/NGOs working with the poor and exploited in Cambodia, which benefit from the support and income from tourists (see Guiney this volume on voluntourism, p. 410). Perhaps one of the better known is the PHARE Cambodian Circus, which presents shows every night in Siem Reap and has become the most popular non-temple attraction for tourists in the city. The performers, all from difficult backgrounds, have developed their skills at the Phare Ponleu Selpak (PPS), which provides arts education for underprivileged children in Battambang and which is supported by proceeds from the circus (see www.pharecambodiancircus.org/circus/). However, many other smaller organizations provide goods and services to tourists, the funds raised being used to further their work. Just two examples are the Kamonohashi Project, a Japanese NGO near Siem Reap, which supports the production of handmade craft products to be sold to tourists, with all profits used to provide food, clothing, and education for women living in poverty, and Daughters of Cambodia, which provides employment and training in its businesses, including a tourist café, a boutique hotel, and a spa center, for women and men in Phnom Penh who are victims of sex-trafficking and sex-exploitation (http://daughtersofcambodia.org/). Although there is limited documented evidence, research is likely to reveal that, collectively, significant income is generated by these organizations through tourism. Second, the events that removed Cambodia from the international tourism map for more than two decades are now commemorated and interpreted at a number of sites around the country, which now attract tourists. Indeed, according to Sion (2011), there are more than 100 sites in Cambodia commemorating the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime, although just two, Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek in Phnom Penh, are major tourist destinations. Much controversy surrounds the establishment, purpose, and management of these two sites (Hughes 95

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2008; Sion 2011; Williams 2004), particularly the extent to which they are intended for an external (and profitable) audience as opposed to national commemoration and reconciliation, yet nevertheless they are powerful representations of the country’s recent history and, implicitly, the problems it still faces (see Sirik and Tyner this volume (p. 368) for more on the memorialization of Khmer Rouge violence). These problems are, perhaps, more explicitly revealed at two lesser-known sites near Siem Reap: the Cambodia War Museum, where guides are either war veterans or landmine victims, and the Cambodian Landmine Museum. Both seek to reveal the story of Cambodia’s conflicts in general and the problem of landmines in particular, while income from the Landmine Museum’s 30,000 or so annual visitors supports a relief center for local men, women and children (see www.cambodialandminemuseum.org/). Collectively, these sites all reveal the “darker” side of Cambodia, but arguably play a positive role in generating a deeper understanding of contemporary Cambodia among tourists.

Conclusion In statistical terms, then, the development of tourism in Cambodia is a success story. Since the early 1990s, the country has achieved unprecedented growth in international tourist arrivals and receipts, in so doing firmly establishing tourism as a major economic sector. Moreover, current growth rates suggest that the target of seven million international visitors annually by 2020 is ambitious, but subject to appropriate developments in transport and infrastructure, potentially achievable. Nevertheless, Hall and Ringer (2000, 182) observed some years ago that “Cambodia’s quest to generate greater tourism is fraught with difficulties,” not least the fact that the country is overshadowed by its larger neighbors as tourist destinations. Particularly Thailand but also Vietnam continue to offer a greater diversity of natural and cultural attractions, more developed infrastructure, and better communications and, hence, Cambodia faces a major challenge in competing with these countries which, ironically, it also depends upon for a significant proportion of its international visitors. Moreover, it also needs to overcome the “Angkor problem.” For most international, as opposed to regional, tourists, Angkor is the principal reason for visiting Cambodia and thus, there is a need to encourage and enable tourists to spend more time (and money) and travel more widely in the country. However, not only must such diversification be facilitated by significant investment in infrastructure and the wider development of the tourism sector beyond the two principal centers and the coastal region around Sihanoukville, but potential tourists must also have the perception that travelling more widely in the country is worthwhile. Changing that perception may be the most difficult task. Yet, Cambodia already attracts a significant number of tourists. Although concentrated in and around Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, however, research consistently demonstrates that the intensity of tourism in these areas, particularly in Seam Reap, is not reflected in commensurate local economic growth and development. In other words, tourism in these regions is not fulfilling its purpose in reducing levels of poverty and reaching out to the wider economy. This, in turn, reflects inherent structural weaknesses that must be addressed by appropriate government policies. Hence, the need remains for tourism policy to address issues beyond increasing the number of tourists and encouraging them to travel more widely around the country, to focus on the fundamental challenge of translating tourism’s growth and economic contribution into positive socio-economic development. If this does not occur, if tourism development does not benefit from more appropriate governance, then the opportunity to utilize tourism as a foundation for economic growth and development in Cambodia may be missed. 96

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References Beresford, M., S. Nguon, R. Roy, S. Sau, and C. Namazie. 2004. The Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: United Nations Development Programme. Brickell, K. 2008. Tourism-generated employment and intra-household inequality in Cambodia, in J. Cochrane (ed.), Asian Tourism: Growth and Change. Oxford: Elsevier, 299–310. Chen, C.-Y., P. Sok, and K. Sok. 2008. Evaluating the competitiveness of the tourism industry in Cambodia: Self-assessment from professionals, Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research 13 (1): 41–66. Chheang, V. 2008a. The political economy of tourism in Cambodia, Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research 13 (3): 281–297. ——. 2008b. State and Tourism Planning: A Case Study of Cambodia. Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, MPRA Paper No. 25306. Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25306/. Accessed May 2, 2015. CIB. 2015. Investment Trends, Cambodia Investment Board. Available at: www.cambodiainvestment.gov. kh/investment-enviroment/investment-trend.html. Accessed June 3, 2015. Dwyer, L., and F. Thomas. 2012. Tourism yield measures for Cambodia, Current Issues in Tourism 15 (4): 303–328. Grihault, N. 2011. Country Report: Cambodia. London: Mintel. Forbes, A., and R. Sterling. 2013. DK Eyewitness Travel Guide: Vietnam and Angkor Wat. London: Dorling Kindersley. Hall, C.M., and G. Ringer. 2000. Tourism in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar: From terrorism to tourism? in C.M. Hall, and S. Page (eds.), Tourism in South and South East Asia: Issues and Cases. London: Routledge, 178–194. Hughes, R. 2008. Dutiful tourism: Encountering the Cambodian genocide, Asia Pacific Viewpoint 49 (3): 318–330. Hun Sen. 2012. Address at the launching of the Tourism Strategic Development Plan. Available at: http://cnv.org. kh/address-at-the-launching-of-the-tourism-strategic-development-plan-2012-2020/. Accessed June 17, 2015. Kingdom of Cambodia. 2009. Law on Tourism. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Tourism. Available at: http://tourismcambodia.org/camtourismlaw/index.php. Accessed June 17, 2015. Lepp, A., and H. Gibson. 2003. Tourist roles, perceived risk and international tourism, Annals of Tourism Research 30 (3): 606–624. Leung, P. 2002. Tourism and economic development of less developed countries: The case of Cambodia, Tourism Recreation Research 27 (1): 91–102. Mao, N., T. Delacy, and H. Grunfeld. 2013. Local livelihoods and the tourism value chain: A case study in Siem Reap-Angkor region, Cambodia, International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development 4 (2): 120–126. Mao, N., T. Delacy, H. Grunfeld, and D. Chandler. 2014. Agriculture and tourism linkage constraints in the Siem Reap-Angkor region of Cambodia, Tourism Geographies 16 (4): 669–686. Mihalicˇ, T. 2015. Tourism and economic development issues, in R. Sharpley and D. Telfer (eds.), Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues. 2nd ed. Bristol: Channel View Publications, 77–117. MoT. 2014. Cambodia Tourism Statistics Report December 2014. Ministry of Tourism: Statistics and Tourism Information Department. Available at: www.nagacorp.com/eng/ir/tourism/tourism_statistics_201412. pdf. Accessed June 17, 2015. MoT. 2015. Cambodia Tourism Statistics Report March 2015. Ministry of Tourism: Statistics and Tourism Information Department. Available at: www.tourismcambodia.org/images/mot/statistic_reports/ tourism_statistics_march_2015.pdf. Accessed June 17, 2015. Mowforth, M., and I. Munt. 2009. Tourism and Sustainability: Development, Globalisation and New Tourism in the Third World. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge. Royal Embassy of Cambodia. 2013. Investing in Cambodia 2013–14. London: Press and Information Unit, Royal Embassy of Cambodia. Sharpley, R. 2015. Tourism: A vehicle for development? In R. Sharpley, and D. Telfer (eds.), Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues. 2nd ed. Bristol: Channel View Publications, 3–30. Sharpley, R., and P. Stone. 2009. The Darker Side of Travel: The Theory and Practice of Dark Tourism. Bristol: Channel View Publications. Sion, B. 2011. Conflicting sites of memory in post-genocide Cambodia, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 2 (1): 1–21.

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Richard Sharpley and Peter McGrath Telfer, D., and R. Sharpley. 2008. Tourism and Development in the Developing World. Abingdon: Routledge. thaiwebsites.com. 2015. Revenue from Foreign Tourists Visiting Thailand. Available at: www.thaiwebsites. com/tourism-income-Thailand.asp. Accessed June 2, 2015. UNCTAD. 2001. Tourism and development in the least developed countries, Third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries. Las Palmas, Canary Islands. UNWTO. 2014. UNWTO Tourism Highlights 2014. UN World Tourism Organization. Available at: http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_highlights14_en.pdf. Accessed May 31, 2015. ——. 2015. Who We Are. UN World Tourism Organization. Available at: www2.unwto.org/content/ who-we-are-0. Accessed June 17, 2015. Williams, P. 2004. Witnessing genocide: Vigilance and remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 18 (2): 234–254. Winter, T. 2008. Post-conflict heritage and tourism in Cambodia: The burden of Angkor, International Journal of Heritage Studies 14 (6): 524–539. World Bank. 2013a. East Asia and Pacific Economic Update. Available at: www.worldbank.org/content/ dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/cambodia/Cambodia_EAP_Update-Oct2013_ENG.pdf. Accessed June 3, 2015. ——. 2013b. Transport in Cambodia. Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPTRANSPORT/0,,contentMDK:20458706~menuPK:2066305~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:574066,00.html. Accessed June 4, 2015. WTO. 1980. Manila Declaration on World Tourism. Madrid: World Tourism Organization. WTTC. 2015. Economic Impact of Travel & Tourism 2015 Annual Update: Summary. World Travel & Tourism Council. Available at: www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20research/ economic%20impact%202015%20summary_web.pdf. Accessed May 31, 2015. ——. 2014. Travel and Tourism Economic Impact 2014 Cambodia. World Travel and Tourism Council. Available at: www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20research/country%20 reports/cambodia2014.pdf. Accessed June 17, 2015.

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PART II

Rural developments

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8 EXPLORING RURAL LIVELIHOODS THROUGH THE LENS OF COASTAL FISHERS Melissa Marschke

Introduction Cambodia is an aid-dependent country with (relatively) limited state capacity, high levels of poverty, and a large agrarian population (Yusaf and Francisco 2009) that is currently enduring a process of profound change. Key drivers include declining land availability (Scheidel Farrell et al. 2014), an epidemic of forced evictions (Springer 2013; Connell and Grimsditch, this volume, p. 223), and the expansion of non-farm and non-resource-related activities as seen elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia. Household goals, interests, resources, and means are constantly being reassessed in light of emerging and contracting opportunities (Lagerqvist 2014). An analysis of rural livelihood dynamics requires a comprehensive perspective that considers why livelihoods are changing, the unpredictable nature of such change, and the relationship between past and present livelihoods (Scoones 2009). Classic agrarian questions of “who owns what,” “who does what,” “who gets what,” and “what do they do with it” (Bernstein 2010) continue to be of central importance to illustrate household livelihood dynamics. At the same time, attention to regional drivers of change and broad trends in economic development are important. This chapter begins by providing an overview of rural transformation in Cambodia, paying attention to how political change has impacted life in the countryside since the 1960s and considering why land availability is declining for rural households. A macro perspective of key socio-economic and environmental changes experienced in the countryside is given, before turning to an analysis of newspaper articles that highlight some of the tensions facing rural dwellers. I ground this macro-level analysis through focusing on the livelihood trajectories of six households located in one rural fishing village. This longitudinal analysis shows how households tend to diversify their income sources beyond resource-based livelihoods, sometimes resulting in individual or household-level migration within Cambodia and mainland Southeast Asia. This chapter highlights an emerging tension: while Cambodian livelihoods are generally becoming less dependent on farming, fishing, or forestry activities, with households being connected to other localities and pursuing non-farming activities, there are individuals and households that continue to rely on farming and fishing. While some such households may be specialized, others are poorer households struggling to access non-farming or non-resourcebased livelihood opportunities. 101

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Cambodia’s rural transformation, 1960s to 2010s Cambodia has experienced significant political change over the past 50 years, changes that have dramatically impacted life in the countryside. While agrarian change is linked to forms of modernization and economic development, as found elsewhere in Asia (Rigg 2006), the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979) left a particularly challenging legacy. Beyond the psychological trauma of the genocide, all forms of private property were abolished with rural and urban populations alike being uprooted and forced to collectively cultivate rice. Collectivization continued, to a certain extent, through solidarity groups under the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989) (Slocomb 2006) until 1989 when private property and land concessions were reintroduced (Chandler 2008). There has since been a scramble for land, often at the expense of smallholders, and Cambodia’s countryside is rapidly transforming, largely associated with the declining availability of land for smallholder farmers (Scheidel et al. 2014). This is problematic from a smallholder livelihood perspective since Cambodia, unlike many other Southeast Asian countries, continues (for the moment) to be an agrarian economy: 80 percent of its population lives in rural areas; 51 percent of the active labor force works in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing (World Bank 2013). The portion of the active labor force working in agriculture is shifting, linked to declining land availability and the general pace of change found in this region. Declining land availability is driven by two main factors: population growth and the rapid increase of economic land concessions in rural farming areas (Scheidel et al. 2014). Cambodia’s rural population has doubled since the 1960s, from around 5 million to around 11 million (Heuveline and Poch 2007). There is a small post-30 population cohort, as a result of the Khmer Rouge genocide, compared with a rapidly growing under-30 population cohort (see Scheidel et al. 2014). While not all young people enter farming, some continue to do so. The NIS estimates that of the 1.3 million people who entered the labor force between 2004 and 2009, one million were located in rural areas (CSES 2010). Meanwhile, the amount of land under economic land concession (ELC) has rapidly increased throughout the 2000s. ELC is a tool used to ensure trade flows, taxes, and economic growth for the Cambodian government. Significant amounts of rural land have been granted as economic land concessions: estimates range from 1.2 million hectares of ELC by 2012, with 118 companies (OpenDevelopment 2015), to a total of two million hectares of land in ELC (Vrieze and Naren 2012). Meanwhile, the smallholder sector includes 10.7 million Khmer farmers who access an average land amount of 0.3 hectares per capita within 3.1 million hectares of land (Scheidel et al. 2013). ELCs limit rural people’s access to farm land, and have not led to employment creation, reforestation, or poverty alleviation as was anticipated (see Neef et al. 2013; Scheidel et al. 2013). As one local NGO working on land conflicts noted, 2014 saw a threefold increase in documented land disputes from 2013 (see www.licadho-cambodia. org/pressrelease.php?perm=374). Figure 8.1 provides a macro perspective of the socio-economic and environmental changes experienced in the countryside. Cambodia’s rural population is in slight decline as a percentage of the total population, although this decline has been dampened by the Khmer Rouge regime (for example, 1969 and 1993 rural population levels were the same). Forest land has decreased from 70 percent in 1993 to 57 percent in 2010, and Cambodia boasts one of the highest rates of deforestation globally, where deforested land has been converted into ELCs that grow food and biofuel crops for export. This decline of forest land is linked to an increase in agriculture land (32 percent of land in Cambodia is now being used for agriculture). Cambodia’s top export crops include cassava, maize, mung beans, and soya (Hought et al. 2012): the total cultivated area of these four crops increased 380 percent between 2001 and 2010 (MAFF 2010). Crops 102

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100

Percent

90 80

Agricultural land (% of land area)

70

Forest area (% of land area)

60

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)

50 40

Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)

30 20

Rural population (% of total population)

10 0 1960

Figure 8.1

1970

1980

1990 Year

2000

2010

Selected World Bank development indicators compared, 1962–2013

Source: World Bank database (2013), accessed August 2014.

grown within and outside of ELCs are part of an overall trend of rapid development, resource exploitation, logging, and the expansion of settlements (Hought et al. 2012). From a food security perspective, it is unclear if crops grown for export or for biofuels (sugar, cassava) are impacting rural people’s access to food. At the same time, ELCs are impacting people’s livelihoods, particularly in those villages surrounded by ELCs (see Hought et al. 2012; Scheidel et al. 2013; 2014). Employment in agriculture (which includes fishing) dropped from 70 percent in 2001 to 51 percent in 2012. This decline is not only linked to limited access to land, but also to opportunities for young people to work in factories or, for those speaking a second language, to work in the tourism sector. From a macro perspective, poverty rates are in decline, although broad trends do not reveal the widening gap between rich and poor, nor how this gap impacts the opportunities of poorer rural households. A brief scan for news related to rural life in the Cambodia Daily, the country’s oldest Englishlanguage newspaper, illustrates the challenges facing households in the countryside. Table 8.1 pulls out a few examples. Several articles discuss migration, in the context of movement within Cambodia and beyond. When people move, they do not necessarily register where they are living, particularly if they are working in the informal economy (motor-taxi drivers, street vendors). This puts immense pressure on municipalities who are responsible for registered and unregistered people, and means that a cadre of the population is not able to be politically active. Economic opportunities in Thailand, in construction or fishing, are key drivers for many young Cambodians looking for work outside of Cambodia, and the time and expense of obtaining a Cambodian passport, as an example, mean that many people cross the border illegally. Without formal documents, migrants have few options in terms of work that they can do. As Table 8.1 illustrates, multiple land disputes are causing tensions in rural areas, further squeezing people out of land-based activities. Meanwhile, economic development impacts flows of labor and contributes to household members or entire households moving in and out of rural areas. Economic land concessions are an example of broader development trends, but so too is dam development from upstream Mekong countries. Dam development will severely impact the Tonle Sap flood plain ecosystem and thousands of fisher livelihoods. Finally, heavy deforestation continues to be an issue in Cambodia. Once areas are deforested, they are not 103

Melissa Marschke Table 8.1 An example of recent Cambodia Daily newspaper articles focusing on change in the countryside Newspaper article title

Date

“Difficulty of obtaining passports adds to illegal migration” “Migration another hurdle to participating in election” “Land-dispute villagers protest outside cabinet meeting” “Lao Dam raises fears of damage to fisheries” “Commission calls for review of land concessions in Koh Kong” “Forestry officials seize luxury wood on plantation” “New maps show heavy deforestation in 2013”

June 12, 2013 July 18, 2013 August 23, 2014 March 14, 2014 November 26, 2014 December 31, 2014 January 16, 2015

Source: Cambodia Daily, June 2013–January 2015.

converted to farmland that locals could use; instead such land is often turned into economic land concessions, since significant profits can be made. Land grabbing in general has been a big issue in the countryside since the mid-2000s (Springer 2015).

Insights from the field: how fishing households are dealing with rural change To ground this macro analysis, I take a longitudinal perspective drawn from interviews with six households moving in and out of one mangrove-estuary forest village, 25 km from the provincial capital of Koh Kong town and 30 km from the Thai–Cambodian border. The village is accessible only by boat, which takes around 30 minutes from the provincial town (until recently, however, the village took up to three hours to access by slow boat; connectivity has since increased vis-à-vis speed boat). Insights from this case illustrate how classic questions of resource expropriation, and the associated struggles, have widened beyond land to also include fish, forests, water, and rivers Marschke 2012b. Key is the interaction between people and their surrounding environments, or the co-production of livelihoods with nature, something that is often fraught and contested as more and more people vie for limited land or natural resources. These households live in what was a frontier area—Cambodia’s “wild west” throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see Marschke 2012a and Marschke 2012b for a detailed analysis). Resource rights were ill defined and state regulations were weak, an attractive combination for those (often young men, but also households) that had lost their land during the Khmer Rouge era or wanted to try their luck in another part of the country. This area was isolated from other parts of Cambodia and remained a Khmer Rouge stronghold until well into the 1990s, two factors that contributed towards the accessibility of a series of resource-related livelihood activities available to those migrating into the area. By 2000, the state was slowly permeating into this frontier-like area; in doing so, most illegal resource extraction activities became too risky for households to pursue (Marschke 2012a). Some households left the area; those that stayed were forced to rely mainly on the crab fishery1 or to diversify into non-resource-based livelihoods. Fast-forward to 2015 and this area continues to serve as a frontier for business interests. However, this is now driven by capital-intensive business that, for the most part, does not include local households. Table 8.2 highlights the livelihood trajectories of six households since 2002.2 I first met these households in the late 1990s, and began working with them formally in 2002 as part of my doctoral research. I have been returning to this field site on an annual or biennial basis ever since. What this table illustrates is how dynamic households have been over this period of time. 104

Livelihood activities similar to 2008, as he controls one-third of village water supply. Fruit and veggies growing well so sells some. Active in politics.

Stopped fishing in 2008; controls water supply for village; son is a taxi boat driver; claimed 2 ha of land in village; active with politics.

Fisher, sets deep-sea traps for high-value species (grouper); sells basic goods from home; also sells ice (only person in village to do so). Crab fisher (150 traps).

Born in village. Pursued a range of activities: some illegal (charcoal production and dynamite fishing); some legal (trap fishing).

Came to area in 1984 to work at narcotics plantation, switched to crab fishing.

Wayne Born in 1957, married w/3 children; 1 living in HH (1 married, the other working).

Preun Born in 1947, married w/3 children; 2 living in HH w/1 grandchild.

(Continued)

Stops fishing, turns to select construction work (won several bids, which he and his son oversee); son is the secondary school teacher; large home shop; electricity that supplies one-third of the village.

Middle person: buys groceries, dried meat and fish, fruit, and vegetables, DVDs from Phnom Penh and distributes in local villages (he reopened his store in 2013); Khmer medicine seller; money lender; farmer (children pick fruit to sell); rubber plantation will be ready to tap rubber in two years.

Moneylender; farmer (10 ha —sells fruit in village); no longer fishes or tries farming elsewhere; considering growing rubber.

Middle person (crab and grouper—lending fishing gear with clients selling product at reduced price); fisher (circle net); sells luxury goods (beauty products); exploring farming options in another province.

Arrived in the late 1980s to work in the narcotics plantation; learned to fish and ran a coffee shop; became a fishing middle person in 1990s.

Sovanna Born in 1969, married w/12 children (10 live in HH, 1 studies in Phnom Penh, 1 married).

Hires laborer to operate his crab traps (150 crab traps); runs a section of the village electricity supply (operating a generator that supplies one-third of the village); small home shop.

Livelihood activities 2014

Livelihood activities 2010

Livelihood activities 2002

Arrival in village

Household

Table 8.2 Household livelihood trajectories, 2002–2014

Came to village in 1988 to work at narcotics plantation which closed down shortly after. Learned to fish.

Crab fisher (gill nets, 2000 m); raises chickens.

Note: For greater detail, see Marschke (2012a) and Marschke (2012b).

Sok Born 1969, married with 5 children; 4 children still living in HH.

Crab fisher (200 traps); Came to village in 1990 operates a karaoke shop, to fish, then became sells dog soup (2002–2003). involved in transporting logs until he was caught in 1999.

Dom Born 1955, married w/1 child; lives with his wife, daughter and granddaughter.

Returns in 2013; makes cakes, but returns to farm land every few months. Son-in-law is a bodyguard for a house involved in sand mining, granddaughter works in Malaysia (sends $). Had three plots of lands outside the village, two of which she sold at $2,000 per plot in 2013.

Livelihood activities 2014

Continues crab fishing (gill nets, 3000 m); first son working at a factory in Phnom Penh; second son helps with fishing; raises chickens and ducks.

Left village with HH to farm in Pursat in 2013, but plans to come back for swimming crab fishing season (mid-Nov.–May). Has sent several children back to study in the village.

Left village to farm (2005).

Makes cakes; rents newly Left village to farm (2008). constructed home to gamblers; pig raising (2003).

Came in 1984 to work at the narcotics plantation; became a middle person for charcoal.

Milorn (f) Born 1959, 2x divorced w/4 children; 2 children and a grandchild live with her.

Livelihood activities 2010

Livelihood activities 2002

Arrival in village

Household

Table 8.2 Continued

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Many households moved into the area, attracted by the frontier-like mentality. Multiple livelihood activities have been pursued, many linked to petty resource extraction (transporting illegally cut logs, charcoal production, using banned fishing gear). As opportunities have ebbed and flowed, some households have moved out of fishing into business-related livelihoods while other households move in and out of the village. In recent years the connectivity of households to other parts of the country vis-à-vis farmland or to economic opportunities in Thailand and beyond has become apparent. It is now unusual if family members are not pursuing livelihood activities in multiple locations. Table 8.2 gives insights into this phenomenon. It is nearly impossible for households to make it by fishing alone, and households complement fishing by engaging in other agrarian activities such as farming or selling their labor in the fishing industry abroad, or by diversifying into non-fishing activities including small household shops and a growing reliance on remittances. Table 8.2 highlights how much people move in, out and in between multiple livelihood activities. Change is the one constant. Many of the households that migrated into the village in the 1980s came to work in the hills behind the village growing marijuana. When this business closed down, people switched into fishing or other resource-related activities. Meanwhile, there was a small population that either remained in the village or fled to Thailand and returned post-Khmer Rouge, and these folk were mainly fishers. In the 1990s, several shrimp farms began in and around the village, and many people were involved in charcoal production (often as laborers). A few households were involved in the transportation of logs and other goods through the mangrove estuaries into Thailand. In the 2000s there was more movement in and out of the village, with entire households or household members leaving to try farming or other livelihood activities in other parts of Cambodia, and often returning to fish or have a small business in the village at a certain point in time. Only one of the six households that I began working with in the early 2000s left permanently (in 2005) linked to high debt levels and needing to move with their daughter and grandchild to create distance from their daughter’s abusive ex-husband. The influences on these six households are wide ranging, with each using their connections to further their livelihood opportunities. At the same time, a careful look at each household’s livelihood trajectory illustrates how entrepreneurial households have had to be. It is not enough to only rely on fishing, since there is little catch in the rainy season. Conversely, the school situation has improved over time (students can stay in the village through to grade 9; villagers are happy with the quality of teachers that have moved into the village), and households value this opportunity for their children and see this as an important reason to remain in the area. As seen throughout Cambodia, infrastructure has generally improved in the village although it is still a mix of thatch and tin roofs that one observes. In October 2014 I learned that Preun—whose household had done a mix of fishing and small business activities—was now in the construction business. This shocked me, as he is nearly 70 years old. He explained to me that, “long ago, before I came here to fish, I used to build things with my Dad. I have a skill set that no one has here, and was able to win a bid to construct a local mosque. They trust me to do it well.” Preun works with his son, who does most of the physical labor. There have been few construction opportunities in the village on this scale, and he jumped at the opportunity to place a bid. Neighbors comment on how diligent Preun is and that they too did not realize he possessed this skill. A second surprise was that Sok and his household had moved to another province to farm. Sok has extensive local knowledge about crab fishing and is much admired in the village for his skills. When we spoke to Sok by phone, he thought that it was better to farm in the rainy season and return to do fishing in the dry season. Having a multi-local livelihood producing rice and other food for subsistence that 107

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is complemented by fishing makes a lot of sense for Sok, since he relies solely on fishing when in the village. At the same time, he was not happy with the school where he moved, so has already sent several children back to the fishing village to study and plans to return in the dry season himself with his other family members. Wealth is not the only determinant of one’s livelihood, and is by no means static in the Cambodian context, but it is a lens that is worth considering. Broadly speaking, poor villagers face real livelihood limitations. They either sell their labor (to work for other fishing households, or on construction projects) or will fish using traps in and around the mangrove estuaries near the village. Women in poorer households often peel crabs for crab meat and collect mangrove snails (Cerithidea sp.). While crabs are abundant in the dry season, it is hard to fish in the rainy season due to frequent storms and species seasonality. This group struggles with livelihood options, and may work as laborers in construction, farming or offshore fishing in Thailand. Poor households do not own land. These households express frustration at needing to leave the village in pursuit of other livelihoods, as construction or working on an offshore fishing boat is viewed as far more physically demanding. That said, if they can find a position in a factory or doing guard work they jump at this type of chance. Households that are doing a little better, or are perceived to be part of the “middle,” tend to fish a little further away from the village, beyond the mangrove estuaries, using traps or gill nets. These households may have someone with a specialized skill set (hairdresser, tailor, carpenter) or have a household member that has trained to be a teacher, midwife, or nurse. Many of these households claimed farmland at some point in the land craze of the 2000s, often within 10 km or so of the village. This land has since been sold, or is being held in the hopes of selling it for a higher price (the limited land that exists in and around this mangrove-estuary village is controlled by a dozen or so rich households; when land is too far from the village, people do not use it to grow food). These households may have a child or two working in a garment factory or businesses near Phnom Penh, or elsewhere. In this category, households can imagine non-farm or non-fishing work for their children, but are generally doing all right in the village context with their mixed portfolio of activities. Finally, those households that are perceived as well off in the village tend to have cornered the market on a specialized service (water supply, taxi supply, electricity supply), or have managed to claim land close to the village to plant rubber or to farm intensively. These households, while few and far between, tend to have lived in the village for a long time and were able to move out of fishing at a particular point in time. They tend to have had enough money to give at least one or two children a chance at university; in some cases these children return as government officials or school teachers; in other cases they leave fishing and rural life behind. Those that return do so with connections and capital, and are able to continue to be entrepreneurial within the village context and surroundings.

Discussion and conclusions This chapter has highlighted the complexity of people’s lives and the places in which they live. Life in the Cambodian countryside is changing, with agricultural and resource-based activities no longer being the default for all rural households. There are many endogenous and exogenous reasons for this, including resource decline, shrinking land availability (vis-à-vis population dynamics, economic land concessions, and land grabbing), and shifting economic opportunities. Mainland Southeast Asia is rapidly urbanizing, as seen in the growth of industrial zones in border areas and emerging infrastructure such as the planned high-speed train built by Japanese–Thai money that will link Cambodia with Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam. For the 108

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first time in decades, people can move with relative ease between places, although many do so in an informal manner and may be subjected to poor working conditions. What is surprising and difficult to concretely assess is the sheer pace and magnitude of change. Twenty years ago, it made sense to think of Cambodia as an agrarian economy in the classic sense; we now need to rethink what life in the countryside means for rural Cambodian households. The dichotomy between rural and urban is loosening, and rural communities are being constantly remade through various agrarian processes (see Rigg and Vandergeest 2012). While many rural households may continue to farm and/or rely on natural resources in rural areas, households are also increasingly moving between several locations, are dependent on multiple livelihood activities, and are shifting their livelihood choices depending on options that may emerge. As households and individuals consider their livelihood strategies, outcomes are rarely as intended: chance and fortune, good and bad, play a key role (Lagerqvist 2014). Some household members may temporarily leave farming, only hoping to return; others are moving into forms of wage-based employment permanently. What are the implications of a changing countryside? Farming and fishing are increasingly less appealing for younger generations, linked to land shortages, the physical demands of farming and fishing, and price volatility for such commodities. The drive to be modern, influenced by education and social media, also plays a role in shifting livelihoods (Lagerqvist 2014). As youth search for work in secondary cities and Phnom Penh, villages are in turn impacted in terms of economic and social practices. Villagers are also influenced by national and regional development processes, which both push and pull people in and out of the countryside. Regardless, for those wanting to stay in farming or fishing greater support is needed to secure these types of livelihoods, particularly when the policy environment for both farming and fishing is to pursue these kinds of activities at larger scales. Policy must recognize that households, and individuals, are diverse and extend between multiple spaces. At the same time agrarian transitions can be reversed or sidetracked, as work on re-agrarianization has illustrated (Rigg and Vandergeest 2012).

Notes 1 Cambodians rely on a significant amount of fish products as their primary source of protein (consuming, on average, 52 kg per year as compared with other animal proteins, which are consumed at levels below 10 kg per year) (Belton and Thilsted 2014). The fisheries sector is important from a poverty alleviation, food security, and economic development perspective. Fisheries contribute around 7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and this sector employs 10.5 percent of Cambodians on a fulltime basis along with an additional 34 percent of people being employed on a part-time basis. This is a sector employing mainly small producers and a large portion of supply remains in Cambodia for domestic consumption. Cage culture, as a form of grow-out, has long been practiced in the Tonle Sap, and to a lesser extent in coastal areas, being stocked at low densities and acting as a “bank in the sea.” Only in recent years has aquaculture begun to intensify, although production levels remain relatively low due to stocking, infrastructure, and disease issues. 2 This table builds from work published in Marschke (2012a) and (2012b).

References Belton, B. and S. Thilsted. 2014. Fisheries in transition: Food and nutrition security for the global South, Global Food Security, 3(1): 55–66. Bernstein, H. 2010. Class dynamics of agrarian change. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. Chandler, D. 2008. A history of Cambodia (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. CSES. 2010. Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey. National Institute of Statistics. Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

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Melissa Marschke Heuveline, P. and B. Poch 2007. The phoenix population: Demographic crisis and rebound in Cambodia, Demography, 44(2): 405–426. Hought, J., T. Birch-Thomsen, J. Petersen, and A. Neergaard. 2012. Biofuels, land use change and smallholder livelihoods: A case study from Banteay Chhmar, Cambodia, Applied Geography, 32(2): 525–532. Lagerqvist, Y. 2014. Flexible livelihoods in a complex world: Asian lives and economies in transition, Australian Geographer, 45(3): 261–268. MAFF. 2010. Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) Annual Report. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Marschke, M. 2012a. Life, fish and mangroves: Resource governance in coastal Cambodia. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. ——. 2012b. Koh Sralao village, Cambodia: An exploration into social-ecological decline and marginalization, in J. Rigg, and P. Vandergeest (eds.) Revisiting rural places: Pathways to poverty and prosperity in southeast Asia. Singapore: NUS Press, pp. 250–268. Neef, A., S. Touch, and J. Chiengthong. 2013. The politics and ethics of land concessions in rural Cambodia, Journal of Environmental Ethics, 26: 1085–1103. Open Development Cambodia. 2015. Economic Land Concessions. https://data.opendevelopmentmekong.net. Accessed on August 18, 2014. Rigg, J. 2006. Land, farming, livelihoods and poverty: Rethinking the links in the rural South, World Development, 34(1): 180–202. Rigg, J. and P. Vandergeest (eds.). 2012. Revisiting rural places: Pathways to poverty and prosperity in Southeast Asia, Singapore: NUS Press. Scheidel, A., M. Giampietroa, and J. Ramos-Martin. 2013. Self-sufficiency or surplus? Conflicting local and national rural development goals in Cambodia, Land Use Policy, 34: 342–352. Scheidel, A., K. Farrell, J. Ramos-Martin, M. Giampietro, and K. Mayumi. 2014. Land poverty and emerging ruralities in Cambodia: Insights from Kampot province, Environment Development Sustainability, 16: 823–840. Scoones, I. 2009. Livelihoods perspectives and rural development, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(1): 171–196. Slocomb, M. 2006. The nature and role of ideology in the modern Cambodian state, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37(3): 375. Springer, S. 2013. Illegal evictions? Overwriting possession and orality with law’s violence in Cambodia, Journal of Agrarian Change, 13(4): 520–546. ——. 2015. Violent neoliberalism: Development, discourse, and dispossession in Cambodia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Vrieze, P. and K. Naren. 2012. Carving up Cambodia: One concession at a time. Cambodian Daily Weekend, www.licadho-cambodia.org/land2012/. March 10–11, 2012. Accessed on September 15, 2015. World Bank. 2013. World Bank Development Indicators Database, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ world-development-indicators. Accessed on August 18, 2014. Yusuf, A. and H. Francisco. 2009. Climate change vulnerability mapping for Southeast Asia, http://web. idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12324196651Mapping_Report.pdf. Accessed on November 11, 2013.

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9 PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY Young Sokphea

Introduction Since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, in tandem with peace reconciliation and democratization, Cambodia has worked to restore its economy, and to ensure sustainable macro-economic growth, which is believed to benefit both urban and rural communities. In so doing, since the late 1990s, the Cambodian government has delineated a number of development policies and strategic plans. Given that approximately 91 per cent of rural Cambodians are poor (ADB 2014), rural development and poverty reduction have always been the loci of government strategies and policies, apart from stabilizing macro-economic growth. To implement the plans and policies, the government frequently calls upon the contributions of the private sector and civil society. Consequently, the government enjoyed its double-digit economic growth of about 10 per cent annually from 2004 to 2007. Although the growth – due in part to global economic crisis – declined to about 6 per cent in 2008, it recovered up to 7 per cent in 2012 (World Bank 2014). While these gains denote the efforts of the government in concert with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors, whether or not these achievements have contributed to sustainability remains an open question. This chapter simultaneously examines the current practices and the challenges towards achieving sustainability in Cambodia’s rural communities. Based on an extensive empirical literature review, field observation and interviews with key informants around the country since 2013, the chapter argues that the current practices, especially of the government and private sectors, have fractionally contributed to rural sustainability. Driven by a neoliberalism agenda (Springer 2010), the government’s and the private sectors’ practices have successfully sustained economic growth but at the expense of social equity and environmental safeguards. Meanwhile, a number of civil society organizations have attempted to ensure social equity and to protect the environment, though the outcomes have been far from encouraging. Due to these competing practices, balancing social, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability is a difficult proposition with multiple challenges, including ineffective regulatory enforcement of the government, lack of corporate responsibilities and the weak influence of civil society. To flesh out these arguments, the remainder of the chapter is organized into four sections. It begins by defining the overarching concept of sustainability, followed by a survey of current 111

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practices of the government, the private sectors and civil society. The chapter then discusses the factors that undermine efforts towards achieving sustainability. Finally, the chapter recaps and concludes by underlining the trends and ongoing challenges facing rural sustainability in Cambodia.

Concepts of sustainability Sustainability and sustainable development have become buzzwords in contemporary development studies. Though the two terms are often used interchangeably, they have slightly different roots. Sustainable development is “the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 40). The term accordingly integrates social, economic and environmental concerns within its formulation (Bañon Gomis et al. 2011; Elkington 1998). In essence, sustainable development is only attainable when these three aspects are balanced in such a way that serves present and future needs. For its part, sustainability is understood differently according to context. Ihlen and Roper (2011) assert that the notion of sustainability first arose within ecological studies, where it was intended to speak to the ability of a biotic community to extend its form into the future. In contrast, Ameer and Othman (2012) perceive sustainability as the impacts of current human endeavours on the societies, ecosystems and environment of the future. In broader terms, Anupam et al. (2011) and Becker (2012) argue that sustainability is an interdisciplinary approach that brings together social, economic and environmental aspects. In this regard, though scholars tend to define sustainability based on the nexus between ecological and human perspectives, it still embraces the social, economic and environmental conditions that are claimed as components of sustainable development. Sustainability and sustainable development are thus often used interchangeably, where a working definition for the purpose of this chapter would be the development that meets the economic, environmental and social needs of present and future generations in rural areas.

The practice of sustainability in Cambodia Since sustainability incorporates multiple practice dimensions in contemporary Cambodia, including poverty reduction, natural resources and human security, it is important to observe the role of government, the private sector and civil society by taking note of the particular practices these different actors pursue within rural settings.

Government practices Sustainable development is frequently used as a mainstream rhetorical device in several strategic plans and policies of the government (RGC 2009). Within this discourse, economic aspects tend to dominate the other domains, influenced by a particularly Cambodian iteration of neoliberal economics (Biddulph 2014; Springer 2011). Despite this critique, the Cambodian government has significantly reduced the poverty rate in recent years, although the poverty measurement and calculation remain contested. In 1999, data show that 35.9 per cent of the country’s total population lived under poverty line,1 of which more 40.1 per cent lived in rural areas (RGC 2000). By 2004, the poverty rate declined slightly to 34.68 per cent, of which 39.18 percent was the rural population (RGC 2013). By 2009, the poverty rate continued to reduce to 22.9 per cent, whereby poverty in rural areas remained 24.6 per cent (RGC 2013). As of 2012, the rate continued to decline to 18.89 per cent, of which 19.98 per cent was the 112

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rural population (MoP n.d). In spite of the reduction, the country’s disparity remains large. Although the Gini coefficient2 of consumption declined from 0.41 in 2007 to 0.34 in 2009, and to 0.31 in 2011, it remains wide (ADB 2014). This indicates the inequality of the government’s approaches to development among the population. Aside from poverty reduction, the government has tried to protect natural resources and the environment by maintaining a high rate of forest cover and existing protected areas. In 2010, the government claimed that of the country’s total area, 57.7 per cent was covered by forest. When compared to the 1960s, when it was believed to be about 74 per cent of the country’s area, forest cover appears to have declined by 16.3 per cent over the past half century (RGC 2012). This indicates a considerable deforestation rate, and, in recent years, the Forestry Administration3 (2010) note that the annual deforestation rate was 0.5 per cent from 2002–2005/6. Despite government estimates, a local NGO claimed that, as of 2013, the forest cover in Cambodia remained at only 46.33 per cent4 of the country’s land area (ODC 2013; Worrell 2013), regardess of the quality of the forest. More recently, in early 2015, the government contradictorily asserted that forest cover remains at up to 51 per cent of Cambodia’s total land area (Peter 2015). As a contribution to ensure sustainable forest management and livelihoods for rural communities, the government has maintained 11 protected and wildlife conservation areas, which, as of 1993, constituted 3.3 million hectares. Coupled with the concerns about quality, the protected areas later decreased to 3.1 million hectares by 2010 (RGC 2012). Civil societies allege that the protected areas are disappearing quickly owing to illegal encroachment, and in particular their illegal sale to domestic and foreign companies as part of economic land or forest concessions (ADHOC 2013; Worrell 2013). From a regulatory point of view, the government passed a number of laws, and sub-decrees to ensure sustainable natural resources management and environmental conservation.5 However, the enforcement of these laws and sub-decrees, especially EIA, Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), remains uncertain (Oldenburg and Neef 2014; Trzcinski and Upham 2014). As a result, the protected areas and natural resources, which are the primary sources of income for most rural communities, have been unsustainably exploited by a number of large-scale agricultural investments (ADHOC 2013; Burgos and Ear 2010), though these investments tend to render substantial economic growth (O’Neill 2014). So far, the government has succeeded in several aspects of economic sustainability, especially poverty reduction, but the current neoliberal approach to development has harmed the social and environment conditions of rural communities (Springer 2010).

Private sector practices Informed by the United Nations’ (UN) sustainable development, business scholars define sustainable development as to how a business or firm integrates economic, social and environmental concerns of stakeholders into their operations (Artiach et al. 2010). Viewing the private sector as an important means of rural development, the government has attracted a large amount of both foreign and private capital (Biedermann 2010). Capital investment in the agricultural sector increased rapidly from US$27 million in 2005 to US$446 million in 2009 (CDC 2010). As of late 2012, at least 2.6 million hectares of land were granted to those investors in the form of ELCs (ADHOC 2013), aiming not only at sustaining economic growth, but also at creating jobs and reducing poverty in rural communities (RGC 2005). Regardless of their substantial contribution to national economic growth and the rural economy (Hang et al. 2012), a number of ELCs have been accused of deteriorating the socioeconomic and environmental conditions of marginalized rural communities dependent upon natural resources (Subedi 2012; Un 2009). 113

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For example, Chinese state-owned companies, Fuchan and China Cooperative State Farm Group, engaged in a joint venture with the Cambodian company, Pheapimex, to develop agricultural plantations in Mondolkiri, Kampong Chhnang and Pursat provinces, but failed to produce an EIA as required by law. The impact of these joint ventures on local communities is extremely severe, including population displacement, loss of access to land and resources, food insecurity and general impoverishment (Barney 2005; Global Witness 2007; Middleton 2008). In Oddar Meanchey, before the arrival of ELCs, interviews with villagers confirmed that they could generate more than subsistent incomes from the cultivation and collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Once ELCs arrived, these families lost access to NTFPs and cultivation land. Some households were compensated in cash in the order of about US$100 per hectare, but they lost forest and NTFPs. Though these ELCs had created a number of jobs for the adults, they paid very low wages (US$2–3 per working day), which is not enough to support a family. Consequently, the majority of the affected families chose not to work for the ELC companies but to illegally migrate to Thailand in search of better wages.6 Other research on ELCs in five provinces (Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, Mondulkiri, Kratie and Kampong Thom) shows both negative and positive impacts on socioeconomic and environment conditions within rural communities. Although some ELCs created jobs and improved roads for the communities, other ELCs did not, offering little benefit for locals. Due to the lack of proper public consultation and comprehensive impact studies, most of the ELCs not only caused land conflict but also harmed community livelihoods, undermined cultural sites and places of worship, and destroyed the environment (via soil erosion, reduced water quality and deforestation) in the target provinces (Hang et al. 2012). Hang et al.’s (2012) study further illuminates the impacts of ELCs on NGO conservation areas, and national protected areas and parks. For example, in Koh Kong and Kampong Speu, large-scale land acquisition for a sugarcane plantation encroached on conservation areas and threatened community forestry, which had been supported by a number of NGOs for many years prior to the concession. Likewise, ELCs in Oddar Meanchey and Kratie have been accused of damaging forest communities (Neef et al. 2013). This has ruined the efforts of NGOs and donors who have long been supporting sustainable natural resource management. Other investigations have revealed that ELCs exploited 6 of the country’s 23 protected (wildlife) areas across Cambodia (Global Witness 2009). While there is recognition of the contribution that private investments have had on economic growth in general, the contribution to social and environmental sustainability in rural areas is far from explicit. The livelihoods of rural communities have been compromised in the interests of foreign business and a handful of local elites (UNHRC 2007), resulting in an apparent imbalance of social, economic and environmental concerns.

Not-for profit organizations’ practices Since the early 1990s, Cambodia has relied primarily on foreign aid for national development (Godfrey et al. 2002). From 1992 to 2011, aid was accumulated – up to US$12.13 billion. Among several donors, the EU funded about 21.9 per cent of the total budget and is by far the largest donor to Cambodia (RGC 2011). Out of the total amount, 9.2 per cent was funded by and through (local and international) NGOs.7 On account of NGOs, per year aid increased significantly from US$104 million in 2005 to US$220.4 million in 2010 (RGC 2011). Despite international donors and the government having recognized the contributions of NGOs (ADB 2011; RGC 2011), there is a lack of study evidence to concretize this. 114

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Once piece of research claims, however, that more than 1,350 NGOs have been working in several sectors.8 Even though the impacts of these NGOs’ activities are difficult to assess, their activities reached and benefited at least between 2.8 to 4.5 million (20–30 per cent of) Cambodians (CCC 2012). Arguably, NGOs, through a service delivery approach, have considerably contributed to the rural local economy, poverty reduction, and social equity and environmental safeguards. Yet, recently, there has been a considerable shift of NGOs’ approaches to (sustainable) development from the above service delivery approaches (ADB 2011; Barton 2001) to community empowerment, advocacy and rights-based activities, for they believe rights are the centre of development (Parks 2008; Wells-Dang 2013). Despite suffering from government suppression, a number of leading advocacy NGOs have paid more attention to sustainability. Hereunder a few good examples to cite are movements of people and NGOs against the impacts of large-scale investments (Un 2013). Indigenous communities in the Areng valley, with strong support from Mother Nature and other NGOs, have been striving, protesting and advocating against a dam project proposed by a Chinese company. The construction would not only cause horrendous impacts on their sustainable livelihoods but also deplete the largest and last biodiversity resources in Cambodia. Even though there has been no solution offered by the government, the commencement of the plan has been adjourned so far. Another publicized conflict is the movement of large-scale, sugarcaneaffected communities in Koh Kong, Kampong Speu and Oddar Meanchey. These large-scale investments not only caused unfavourable impacts on livelihoods and the environment, but also violated the rights of the communities. Since 2006, the communities, with the strong support of a number of NGOs, have launched several approaches targeting both the government and sugar companies. Even though the concerned stakeholders, the newly established ministerial working group and the EU have all taken action, they have not yielded any significant results (Sokphea 2015). Similarly, there have been protests of ELCs or land acquisition-affected communities from across the country (Sokha and Channyda 2010; Titthara and Teehan 2013). As of 2014, about half a million affected families have been recorded (Radio Free Asia 2014). A fruitful result, which could be claimed, was the government’s ELC moratorium in 2012. Though the effectiveness of the ELC moratorium’s enforcement is subject to criticism (Sokphea 2015), licences of some exploitative and inactive ELCs were revoked by the concerned ministries. By early 2015, the Ministry of Environment, for example, announced the revocation of 23 ELCs in 12 provinces, constituting about 90,000 hectares (Titthara 2015). Last, but not least, there have been a number of local and international NGOs participating in protecting Prey Lang Forest, which is believed to be the largest forest landscape in Southeast Asia. This forest has been encroached upon by a number of private companies and illegal loggers. The Prey Lang Network, which is claimed to have 200,000 members from the surrounding provinces, was formed to patrol and defend the forest for sustainable use (Un 2013; Wells-Dang 2013). Other NGOs have contributed significantly to sustainable natural resource management (Beang and Sethaphal 2004). With active support from the government, especially the Forestry Administration, a number of community forests have been established, covering about 20 provinces. As of 2010, 430 community forests, constituting 380,976 hectares of forestland, were established and supported by NGOs and the government (RGC 2012). These Community Forests not only contribute towards environmental and natural resource management, but also provide substantial sources of income to the poor communities they serve (McKenny and Tola 2002; Turton 2000). To recap, a number of NGOs have been working towards development in general and sustainability in rural communities in particular. These NGOs’ activities reached a large proportion of poor Cambodians in rural areas. Though their approach to development was quite conventional, 115

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since the early 2000s there has been a considerable shift from service delivery to rights-based approaches, advocacy and community empowerment, for they have learned that the current economy-driven development policies of the government have been leading to inequity, injustice and inequality. These new approaches ultimately would lead to sustainable development.

Challenges towards sustainability in rural Cambodia Driven by the neoliberal economic development approach, Cambodia is facing several challenges including, but not limited to, ineffective regulatory enforcement, insufficient corporate responsibility of private sectors and weak civil society. These have prevented the country from achieving sustainability in rural areas.

Government’s politics of ineffective regulatory enforcement Having discussed the practice of sustainability, the government formulated a number of laws and regulations to ensure sustainable practices of the concerned stakeholders, especially the private sector’s involvement in the implementation of the country’s strategic development plans and policies. The enforcement of these regulations, EIA, ELCs, Forestry Law, National Resources Management and Protection and Land Law, is however lax. As a result, economicdriven rural development has caused adverse socioeconomic impacts on rural communities in most, but not all, places where large-scale economic development projects were endorsed by the government. A study by ADHOC (2013) shows that most large-scale land concessions face conflict over land and natural resources with local (indigenous) communities. These are due to ineffective regulatory enforcement, especially via social and environmental impact studies. If these studies were conducted, little to no proper consultation with local people and the affected communities was apparently observed (Hang et al. 2012; Neef et al. 2013). The studies were accepted by the concerned government agencies – the Ministry of Environment, and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) alike – though the quality was poor and insufficient (Oldenburg and Neef 2014). Hence, the lack of proper social and environmental law enforcement induced not only adverse impacts on rural livelihoods but also conflict and social injustice. Another reason why regulatory enforcement is lax is the lack of political will. Driven by neoliberal economic development, the government unintentionally and intentionally deregulates to attract foreign capital or private investors. The government understands that, apart from foreign aid, foreign capital is another approach to economic growth and the development of Cambodia (Biedermann 2010). To attract foreign investment and to avoid the relocation of foreign investment to other counties with lower standards, the government opts not to heighten social and environmental benchmarks. In this sense, social inequity and environmental degradation are widely accepted by the government in order to achieve greater development goals. This is a situation replicated in other neighbouring developing countries such as Laos, where a “growth first and clean-up later” development strategy is being adopted (Sokphea 2014). Therefore, Cambodia has attracted a number of solvent but irresponsible investors. They are, according to Baird (2014), “money laundering” and ultimately contributing adversely to the imbalance of social, economic and environmental domains of sustainability in rural areas.

Politics of the private sectors’ (ir)responsibility Private companies can contribute to sustainable development through a number of approaches, especially corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Schwartz and Carroll 2008). CSR is, however, 116

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a new concept and is not widely understood among enterprises, companies and consumers in Cambodia. In 1999, the CSR, including social and labour standards, were incorporated into garment industries, but not into natural resources and agricultural investments. In particular, CSR embeddedness was not required when foreign investors registered new companies in Cambodia. Even though the concepts of social funds or ethical investments were mentioned in the related regulations sub-decree on ELCs and EIA,9 these have not been well practised by most companies. This enables most companies to behave in a more unsustainable way towards rural society and the environment. Despite the obvious detrimental impacts of these investments, they have been secured in Cambodia because they have partnered or joined ventures with powerful Cambodian politico-commercial individuals, tycoons and elites, and Oknha (wealthy/affluent persons) (UNHRC, 2007). These affluent people have played very significant roles in facilitating and protecting investments in Cambodia (Sokphea 2015). As mentioned above, in spite of their apparent adverse impacts, Chinese Fuchan and China Cooperative State Farm Group have secured their licences. These have been made possible through joint ventures between Chinese investors and Cambodian magnates who are dominated by Sino-Khmers (Un 2009). A political reason behind this is that these joint venture investments strengthen the financial positions of Cambodian business tycoons. These tycoons have formed a symbiotic relationship with the ruling party, and they have financially supported the party to ensure electoral success and legitimacy (Un 2009). In sum, natural resources and the environment are exploited for the benefit of the few elites and to secure political hegemony of the ruling party. Sustainability, by contrast, is left to suffer.

Weak civil societies and donors’ influence Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a very significant role in development, and they are perceived as a major influence outside the government and private business (Nugroho 2011). However, the influence of CSOs, and NGOs in particular, to ensure rural sustainability in Cambodia, remains weak since they suffer from being suppressed. Generally, there are two forms of suppressive measures employed by the government and the companies to retaliate against the communities and NGO activists engaging with social equity, rights and land rights, and environmental and natural resource protections. First, the government in collaboration with the companies represses communities and NGOs through the judicial system (Un 2006), and, second, they do this through direct measures, such as violently dispersing community protests (UNHRC 2007). According to ADHOC (2013), in 2012, 232 people were arrested in relation to land and housing issues. As of 31 December 2012, 38 activists and victims were still imprisoned and 50 remained missing. Another serious case was the murder of NGO activist, Chut Wutty, director of a local NGO who attempted to monitor illegal forest logging and encroachment of ELCs in Koh Kong. The provincial court of Koh Kong prosecuted, but NGOs and the family of Chut Wutty were not satisfied with the court’s verdict. According to the NGO Forum on Cambodia (2011), several cases of land dispute have occurred between powerful or rich people, in which the local or provincial authorities intervened by intimidating and violently dispersing crowds of protesters. In Kratie, for example, a conflict over 9,780 hectares of land between the villagers and an Oknha erupted in January 2012, when the company cleared farmland in the Veal Bei village of Pir Thnu commune. As the villagers protested, the company security guards deliberately opened fire with AK-47 rifles. Four people were injured, two of them seriously (ADHOC 2013). In Koh Kong, a protest by the affected communities, which demanded that the sugar company as well as a notorious 117

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Oknha and senator returned their farmland and ensured sustainable investment, was violently dispersed by shooting, assaulting and injuring protestors (Sokphea 2015). Although international donor aid plays an important role in Cambodia, the extent to which this influences the government, especially in large-scale land disputes, remains controversial and ambiguous (Oldenburg and Neef 2014). For example, the EU on the one hand supports the government’s development policies and plans and, on the other, invests resources in local and international NGOs to advocate against the adverse impacts of the government’s policies, ELCs in particular. The blood sugar campaign is an example in Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, and Oddar Meanchey, where the EU have funded local NGOs to work with affected communities to resist large-scale land acquisition. This reflects the ambiguous role and position of international donors and development agencies in sustainable development in Cambodia. Though the role and influence of civil societies as well as international donors remain weak, they have to some extent shaped the behaviour of both the government and the private sector in a particular issue in order to address a particular aspect of sustainable development.

Conclusion This chapter has discussed the performance of the government, the private sector and civil society with respect to the practice of sustainability in rural communities. From the government’s limited neoliberal perspective, there has been considerable progress towards economic sustainability, particularly in terms of poverty reduction and growth in the rural economy. However, this progress is made possible only at the expense of social and environmental conditions, where the theft of natural resources in particular has compromised livelihoods within rural communities. Though the government has endeavoured to manage natural resources, evidence shows that they are being widely exploited, primarily for economic purposes, leaving heightened marginalization, environmental degradation and social inequality in the wake of these initiatives. Likewise, the contribution of the private sector to sustainable rural communities remains doubtful in spite of government discourse that claims success. While contributions to macro-economic development may be noticeable, several studies have indicated that these investments cause unfavourable and even ruinous impacts on rural livelihoods and the environment. Protests have emerged among affected communities demanding sustainable solutions. Unlike the practices of the government and the private sector, local and international NGOs contribute to rural socioeconomic development in terms of poverty reduction, education, health and agriculture by attempting to protect natural resources and by working to ensure social equity. Though a number of NGOs are still working within a business-as-usual social service delivery model, there has been gradual but vital change in their approaches, where we have seen shifts towards a more rights-based approach that targets securing livelihoods, advocacy and community empowerment. This has occurred as NGOs have begun to realize that their previous approaches tend to render an inadequate contribution to sustainability in rural communities. The current practices of the government, the private sector and civil society have only minimally contributed to sustainability in rural communities owing to several challenging factors. First, the government’s ineffective regulatory enforcement induces unsustainable development in rural areas, where deregulation has played a significant role in undermining the capacity to procure a more sustainable version of development. Such an approach is tied to a problematic outward orientation that attempts to attract foreign capital for the country’s economic development. Second, although private investments are proven to make a significant contribution towards economic growth, the spin-off effects for the wider economy are minimal, as capital 118

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remains concentrated among particular actors. This has produced a situation where accountability remains questionable and businesses tend to act in a more irresponsible way towards rural communities, extracting resources without considering the social impacts of their actions. While this is due in part to lax and ineffective regulatory enforcement, we must also consider the general lack of corporate social and environmental responsibility as a key dimension to the problem. Even though regulatory violations of the companies are repeatedly reported, the concerned government institutions refuse to engage an effective response. Among the several reasons behind this is the strong connection between investors and political elites (Springer 2015). In essence, these investments generate benefit for a few elites with strong ties to the current ruling party, at the expense of local communities. Civil society organizations are also at least partially to blame, as they remain weak in the face of government push-back, despite being branded as crucial watchdogs in the country’s development. Efforts towards achieving greater sustainability by NGO advocacy among affected communities are being actively suppressed by government interference. In spite of this difficult context, Cambodian civil society has played an essential role in empowering local communities by monitoring the government and the private sector, compelling them to act in more sustainable ways through the spread of information that calls their practices into question. Achieving sustainability in rural communities in contemporary Cambodia remains a very challenging proposition that will require not only the collective efforts of local communities and the support of NGOs, but also a government that finds the political will to place sustainability at the centre of its agenda.

Notes 1 The poverty line is defined as an adequate income for a person to consume a food basket that provides at least 2,100 calories of energy per day with a small allowance for non-food items such as shelter and clothing. The overall poverty line is US$0.46 per person per day (RGC 2000). 2 In the Gini coefficient, 1 denotes perfect distribution or equality, and the value smaller than 1 denotes the degree of inequality. 3 This is an arm of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 4 Including tree crops, such as rubber and teak. 5 Including Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the Forestry Law, the Law on Mineral Resource Management and Exploitation and the Law on Environment Protection and Natural Resource Management. 6 Interview with key informants, and field observation. 7 The number of local NGOs increased from a few in the early 1990s to more than 3,492 in 2010 (CCC 2012). 8 Such as education, public health, child welfare and rights, agriculture and rural development, community development, environment and natural resources, gender and women’s issues, humanitarian and disaster responses, micro-credit, disability, advocacy and policy dialogue, etc. 9 Interview with a former Minister of Ministry of the Environment.

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Young Sokphea ——. 2014. Cambodia: Country Poverty Analysis 2014. The Philippines: Asian Development Bank. Baird, I.G. 2014. The Global Land Grab Meta-Narrative, Asian Money Laundering and Elite Capture: Reconsidering the Cambodian Context. Geopolitics 19 (2): 431–453. Bañon Gomis, A.J., M. Guillén Parra, W.M. Hoffman, and R.E. McNulty. 2011. Rethinking the Concept of Sustainability. Business & Society Review 116 (2): 171–191. Barney, K. 2005. Customs, Concessionaires and Conflict: Tracking Cambodia’s Forest Commodity Chains and Export Links with China. Washington, DC: Forest Trend. Barton, M. 2001. Empowering a New Civil Society. Phnom Penh: Pact Cambodia. Beang, L., and L. Sethaphal. 2004. Community Forestry in Cambodia, in Sim, H.C., Appanah, S. and Lu, W.M. (eds) Forest for Poverty Reduction: Can Community Forestry Make Money? Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad511e/ad511e0a.htm. Accessed 15 January 2015. Becker, C.U. 2012. Sustainability Ethics and Sustainability Research. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. Biddulph, R. 2014. Can Elite Corruption be a Legitimate Machiavellian Tool in an Unruly World? The Case of Post-Conflict Cambodia. Third World Quarterly 35 (5): 872–887. Biedermann, Z. 2010. Cambodia Today or Is China Eating America’s Lunch in Southeast Asia? Academic and Applied Research in Military Science 9: 139–152. Burgos, S., and S. Ear. 2010. China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources, Asian Survey 50 (3): 615–639. Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC). 2013. A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resource Rights in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: ADHOC. Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). 2012. CSO Contributions to the Development of Cambodia 2011. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC). 2010. Cambodian Investment Board: Projects by Sector Approved. Phnom Penh: Council for Development of Cambodia. Elkington, J. 1998. Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business. Oxford: Capstone Publishing. Forestry Administration. 2010. Cambodia Forestry Outlook Study. Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, www.fao.org/docrep/014/ am627e/am627e00.pdf. Accessed 15 January 2015. Global Witness. 2007. Cambodia’s Family Trees. Washington, DC: Global Witness. ——. 2009. Country for Sale, Welcome to Cambodia: How Cambodia’s Elite Has Captured the Country’s Extractive Industries, USA: Global Witness. Godfrey, M., C. Sophal, T. Kato, L. Vou Piseth, P. Dorina, T. Saravy, T. Savora, and S. Sovannarith. 2002. Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia. World Development 30: 355–373. Hang, S.C., H. Socheth, and O. Chandarany. 2012. Foreign Investment in Agriculture in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Ihlen, Ø., and J. Roper. 2011. Corporate Reports on Sustainability and Sustainable Development: “We Have Arrived”. Sustainable Development 22 (1): 42–51. McKenny, B., and P. Tola. 2002. Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Baseline Assessment. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Middleton, C. 2008. Cambodia’s Hydropower Development and China’s Involvement. USA and Cambodia: International Rivers/Rivers Coalition in Cambodia. Ministry of Planning (MoP). (n.d.) Poverty Estimation in 2012 in Cambodia, www.mop.gov.kh/Projects/ tabid/148/Default.aspx. Accessed 13 January 2015. Neef, A., S. Touch, and J. Chiengthong. 2013. The Politics and Ethics of Land Concessions in Rural Cambodia. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26: 1085–1103. NGO Forum on Cambodia. (2011). Statistical Analysis on Land Disputes Occuring in Cambodia 2010. Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia. Nugroho, Y. 2011. Opening the Black Box: The Adoption of Innovations in the Voluntary Sector – The Case of Indonesian Civil Society Organisations. Research Policy 40: 761–777. Oldenburg, C., and A. Neef. 2014. Reversing Land Grabs or Aggravating Tenure Insecurity? Competing Perspectives on Economic Land Concessions and Land Titling in Cambodia. Law and Development Review 7: 49–77. O’Neill, D. 2014. Playing Risk: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Cambodia. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36: 173–205.

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Sustainability Practices and Challenges OpenDevelopment Cambodia (ODC). 2013. Forest Cover. OpenDevelopment Cambodia, www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefings/forest-cover/. Accessed 10 January 2015. Parks, T. 2008. The Rise and Fall of Donor Funding for Advocacy NGOs: Understanding the Impact. Development in Practice 18 (2): 213–222. Peter, Z. 2015. New Maps Show Heavy Deforestation in 2013. Cambodia Daily, January 16, www. cambodiadaily.com/news/new-maps-show-heavy-deforestation-in-2013-76239/. Accessed 16 January 2015. Radio Free Asia. 2014. Half a Million Cambodians Affected by Land Grabs: Rights Group, 1 April 2014, www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/land-04012014170055.html. Accessed 16 January 2015. Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). 2000. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning. ——. 2005. Sub-Decree on Economic Land Concessions. Phnom Penh: Royal Governnment of Cambodia. ——. 2009. National Sustainable Development Strategy for Cambodia. Phnom Penh: UNEP and ADB, www. rrcap.ait.asia/nsds/uploadedfiles/file/Publication%202-NSDS%20Cambodia.pdf. Accessed 16 January 2015. ——. 2011. Aid Effectivness Report 2011. Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, www.cdc-crdb. gov.kh/cdc/aid_management/DER 2011 FINAL (31 Oct 2011).pdf. Accessed 10 January 2015. ——. 2012. The Cambodian Government’s Achievements and Future Direction in Sustainable Development: National Report for Rio+20, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment. ——. 2013. Poverty in Cambodia – A New Approach: Redefining the Poverty Line. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning. Schwartz, M.S., and A.B. Carroll. 2008. Integrating and Unifying Competing and Complementary Frameworks: The Search for a Common Core in the Business and Society Field. Business & Society 47 (2): 148–186. Sokha, C. and C. Channyda. 2010. 60,000 Sign Land-Dispute Petition. Phnom Penh Post, 14 June 2010, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/60000-sign-land-dispute-petition. Accessed 16 January 2015. Sokphea, Y. 2015. Contention and Corporate Sustainability Practice in the Cambodian Agricultural Sector, Working Paper 166. Hong Kong: Southeast Asea Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong. ——. 2014. Contribution of Corporate Social Investment to Livelihoods of Local People in Lao PDR. Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 1: 28–48. Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space. New York: Routledge. ——. 2011. Articulated Neoliberalism: The Specificity of Patronage, Kleptocracy, and Violence in Cambodia’s Neoliberalization. Environment and Planning-Part A 43 (11): 2554–2570. ——. 2015. Violent Neoliberalism: Development, Discourse, and Dispossession in Cambodia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Subedi, P. 2012. Human Rights Analysis of Economic and Other Land Concession in Cambodia: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: United Nations, Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Titthara, M. 2015. Minister Says 23 ELCs Nixed. Phnom Penh Post, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ minister-says-23-elcs-nixed. Accessed 7 January 2015. Titthara, M., and S. Teehan. 2013. Scuffles at land rights protest. Phnom Penh Post, 11 October 2013, www.phnompenhpost.com/national/scuffles-land-rights-protest. Accessed 16 January 2015. Trzcinski, L.M., and F.K. Upham. 2014. Creating Law from the Ground Up: Land Law in Post-Conflict Cambodia. Asian Journal of Law and Society 1 (1): 55–77. Turton, C. 2000. The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach and Programme Development in Cambodia. London: Overseas Development Institute. Un, K. 2006. State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia. Pacific Affairs 2 (4): 225–245. ——. 2009. China’s Foreign Investment and Assistance: Implications for Cambodia’s Development and Democratization. Peace & Conflict Studies 16 (2): 65–81. ——. 2013. Cambodia in 2012: Towards Developmental Authoritarianism? Southeast Asian Affairs 1: 71–86. UNHRC. 2007. Land Concessions for Economic Purposes in Cambodia: A Human Rights Perspective. Phnom Penh: United Nations, Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

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10 THE IMPERATIVE OF GOOD WATER GOVERNANCE IN CAMBODIA Joakim Öjendal and Ros Bandeth

Introduction Most developing, agriculturally based countries are dependent on adequate water resources. Cambodia is, however, extreme in this regard, because it has been defined by its use of water resources more than most countries. Geographically, Cambodia is centred on the Mekong mainstream and the Tonle Sap system. Politically, water is becoming increasingly important both regionally and domestically. In terms of development, both “big” development (as in dams, hydropower, and major irrigation schemes) and “small” development (as in health, smallscale irrigation and household supply) are of absolute top priority in contemporary Cambodia. Water is also becoming a critical resource, marked by tension, rivalry and conflicts – both at a regional level and in the sub-national arena. This chapter takes note of the historical significance of water management in the attempts to create Cambodia’s infrastructure, followed by an inventory of contemporary challenges, including water for energy, managing the Tonle Sap, water for irrigation and water services. The chapter ends on an analytical note, offering conclusions on the nature of Cambodian water dilemmas. The “imperative” emanates from Cambodia’s historical and contemporary reliance on its particular water regime, and from the (sometimes invisible) fact that much of its development ambitions hinges on said regime.

Water and the historical construction of Cambodia Khmer culture and society have thrived on water-driven rice growing and fisheries for millennia. During critical historical periods, particular ways of dealing with water issues have defined precisely how to structure Cambodian society (Öjendal 2000). Already during the pre-Angkor era, water management was important for the local pre-civilisation (Vickery 1998). The Angkor Empire itself was made possible through the effective ulitisation of water. It has even been named a “hydraulic civilisation” (Wittfogel 1957). Accordingly, water has been of central importance and recent research has shown that the mass of the water was controlled in a sophisticated mix of central control and small-scale usage. The result was an efficient rice culture allowing what at that time was the generation of an unprecedented surplus contributing to a

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flourishing court, the growth of a high culture and the maintenance of a solid military (van Liere 1980; Chandler 1983; Öjendal 2000). In the Sihanouk era – the Sangkum Reastr Niyum period – the construction of local irrigation structures was a common village activity, and often romanticised as a happy and common concern around which festivities were centred (Than 1982). During the Khmer Rouge period, the megalomaniacal idea of transforming the entire agricultural landscape into one entity crisscrossed by straight irrigation canals as a way to enhance rice yield and thereby generating wealth was an integrated part of the prevailing ideology. In fact, a major share of the massive casualties during that period, was caused by forced labour under this idea, being a contributing factor to the downfall of the Khmer Rouge (Öjendal 2000). In contrast, in the post-Khmer Rouge era, the water sector has at large been neglected (see Halcrow 1994), mostly for lack of resources and knowledge, but also because of the stigma of violence and failure of irrigation during the Khmer Rouge regime. This is understandable, but it has nevertheless left Cambodia at a critical stage where smallholders and rural households alike struggle to safeguard water and proper water supply for their rice plots.

Water in contemporary Cambodia In contemporary Cambodia, the significance of water governance may seem less dramatic than previous times, but it in fact has a massive impact on livelihoods and sustainable poverty alleviation, as well as on regional politics and long-term modernisation. The “big story” about water in Cambodia concerns the struggle for the benefits from the Mekong River system and who will be allowed to harness its riches, be it hydropower generation or ecosystem services. The “small story” about water management concerns to what extent Cambodia can establish governance systems that allow the existing water to be utilised in an efficient, equitable and sustainable way. In both these “stories”, challenges are emerging as the Mekong cooperation – up to now safeguarding a reasonable flow of water in the Mekong mainstream – is crumbling at the regional level (Öjendal and Jensen 2012). Domestically, the issue of water access is becoming ever more tense and progressively politicised: both tributary and mainstream dams are being planned and constructed; the sustainability of major fisheries (notably the Tonle Sap system) is falling into jeopardy (Orr et al. 2012); and the access, distribution and allocation of water for small-scale agriculture and households are increasingly contested. At the most local level, a participatory water management system is developing, but it also faces difficulties as local and central level systems do not always harmonise, and very few resources are offered to support local water governance efforts (Ros et al. 2010). These issues pose major threats to the livelihoods of people in Cambodia. Some 80 per cent of the population resides in rural areas, of which the mainstay relies on agriculture, fisheries and/or foraging for their survival. The majority of the rural population is very close to absolute poverty, hence vulnerable to shifts in access to natural resources. Moreover, Cambodia is the fourth largest country in the world as regards inland fisheries – most of which stem from the highly productive Tonle Sap system. This livelihood supplies some 75 per cent of the protein for the rural people and employs a vast number of people directly or indirectly (Orr et al. 2012). Cambodia is also the country in the region (together with Laos) with the lowest yield of rice per hectare, a fact often explained by the inadequate, unreliable and inefficient supply of water, as well as poorly governed irrigation and drainage systems. With respect to the population surviving on small-scale fishing and rice growing, proper water governance is the key to survival and development. Water is also the absolute key for health and household-level development (see Öjendal 2000). Water has gradually been receiving growing attention, including some 124

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institutional reforms and comprehensive master plans (covered later). However, results are so far meagre, and popular dissatisfaction is growing. Water “should not” be a problem in Cambodia. The country enjoys ample rainfall annually and has massive waterways and wetlands. In total, it commands almost 50,000 m3 per person a year; a figure indicating extreme abundance for those living in water-stressed areas (Theng 2004). But it is clear that what counts is rarely the absolute amount of theoretically available water, but rather how this water is managed, distributed and shared. As this chapter testifies, the quality of management makes a world of difference. Phnom Penh, for example, enjoys high-quality water services in contrast to rural areas which are commonly neglected. Of course, major difficulties to overcome include the seasonally and geographically uneven monsoon-based rainfall, the lack of storage facilities, and the inadequate institutional and physical infrastructure. Beyond these challenges, four major concerns, and topics for further academic study, can be identified: 1

2

3

4

Water for hydropower. Up until recently, Cambodia basically had no dams for hydropower, but as in the Mekong system as a whole, dam building is now exploding, igniting critical issues on environmental sustainability, local livelihoods and overall fairness in distribution of the riches vested in the water resource. The management of the Tonle Sap. The system – whereby water flows “upwards” and fills Tonle Sap Lake during parts of the year and in the process inundates huge areas with water – has proven to be the lifeline of Cambodian rural livelihood for centuries, but it is now under threat. Water for irrigation. Rural Cambodia and its food production (mainly rice) are the key to sustained livelihood and poverty alleviation. It faces, as we shall see, major challenges in how to better utilise water and not least how to share the often limited access to water (and how to deal with the conflicts in its wake). Water supply in rural and urban areas. At times it seems like the state has given up on supplying adequate and safe water to its citizens; this is the common story in rural areas. However, the Phnom Penh water supply is efficiently managed and an encouraging contrast to many less well-governed water contexts.

The rest of the chapter examines these four priority areas in turn before we provide some concluding thoughts on the current state of water governance in Cambodia and the potential for it to better benefit the people of Cambodia.

Water for hydropower dam building In the Master Plan on Rural Electrification by Renewable Energy in Cambodia 2006, the government set a goal to provide 100 per cent of villages with access to electricity services by 2020 and 70 per cent of rural households by 2030 (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 2012). To achieve this goal, one strategy is to explore and diversify power supply and energy sources in the country in various mechanisms, one of which is to invest in hydropower dams through foreign investment. There are currently 72 projects under hydropower dam development in Cambodia, of which seven projects1 are in operation, while the rest are in the planning phase, under feasibility study or under construction (Open Development Cambodia 2014). The mandate for the management of hydropower dams falls under several government institutions, but the core decision-making rests with the Council of Ministers. The Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) has a core interest in using water for producing energy or 125

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electricity while the Ministry of Environment (MoE), Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MoWRAM), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) and Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) focus on using water for ecosystem sustainability, agricultural production and livelihoods. There is a lack of institutional collaboration and information sharing across ministries, and decisions seem to often be driven by particular, and often vested, interests (Suon et al. 2013). The development of hydropower dams has become highly controversial in Cambodia during the last decade, often due to inadequate processes and questionable outcomes (Grimsditch 2012). For instance, Kamchay Hydropower Dam in Preah Monivong National Park, Kampot Province was initiated in 2007 and completed in December 2011. With a total capacity of 194 MW, the Kamchay project was developed by a Chinese company called Sinohydro at the cost of about US$280 million (Grimsditch 2012). Even though the price of electricity in Kampot city has fallen from 1,100 riels to 920 riels after the project, it is unclear how much electricity has benefited the local area (Gray 2012). The negative impacts of the dam were obvious on water quality, the loss of farmland and loss of tourism. There were several environmental and social impacts derived from the Kamchay project. First, there was a lack of compliance with the existing legal framework by the project proponents. Although Cambodia does not have specific laws that deal with hydropower (except the draft law on resettlement and compensation emerging in January 2013), it has other related laws to assist such works. However, in practice, compliance with the laws was not realised (Grimsditch 2012). Second, the guidance of the design of hydropower dams relies on the quality of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study. In this case, the project was approved and even implemented before a full EIA was completed. Third, the limited financial and technical capacity of concerned ministries to review the EIA and monitor the process and the limited participation of affected communities and civil society in the public consultation phase, was also identified (Grimsditch 2012). In spite of the bad experience from Kamchay, dam construction in Cambodia has not halted. Lower Sesan 2 (LS2) and Stung Chhay Areng are cases of renewed concerns. The LS2 project is located on the Sesan River, Stung Treng Province, north-eastern Cambodia. After the final EIA was approved in 2009, the project is now under construction (NGO Forum on Cambodia 2014). This project costs about US$781 million (Voice of America 2013) and is funded through a joint venture between the Royal Group Company and a Chinese Company (NGO Forum on Cambodia 2014). This dam will have a capacity of 400 MW and the electricity generated by this dam will be shared between Cambodia and Vietnam. The impacts from this dam will be felt by the local communities, of which 5,000 people, including indigenous groups from four communes, may have to relocate. The dam will, reportedly, affect the fish species and the flow of water (Rutmanee et al. 2013). Yet another proposed dam project is the Stung Chhay Areng on the Areng River, 12 km from the district capital of Thmo Bang, Koh Kong Province. This dam will have a capacity of 108 MW, with a reservoir of at least 10,000 ha and will be built on the Central Cardamom Protected Forest by the above-mentioned Chinese company, Sinohydro (Mother Nature 2014a, 2014b). According to the summary report prepared by Conservation International and Cambodia’s Forestry Administration, at least 1,800 people will be affected by the project, and most of them are the descendants of the Khmer people called Khmer Daeum (old Khmer). The reservoir will inundate 874 ha of evergreen forests, 3,790 ha of semi-evergreen forest, and several species of fish and wildlife (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 2014). In return, the project will generate 595 million kW-hours annually, which is planned to be higher than that generated at Kamchay (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy 2014). The Stung Chhay Areng 126

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project has been under criticism by environmental activists, who instead see the negative impacts before the possible benefits it provides. The fate of Stung Chhay Areng Dam is still unclear. The website of Sinohydro shows the project is moving ahead despite local protest, but the minister of MIME claimed that the feasibility study is still ongoing. The Prime Minister recently stated that the project would not happen until the end of his term in 2018 (Radio Free Asia 2015). Despite contradicting statements, local people in Chhay Areng are determined to protest, refuse compensation and demand cancellation of the project (Radio Free Asia 2014).

Water at the core of Cambodia: managing the Tonle Sap Lake The Tonle Sap Lake contributes considerably to the national economy and to food security in Cambodia. Its special flood pulse, caused by the connection to the annual flooding of the Mekong River, ensures water flow and nutrients to the flood plains making the area highly efficient for fisheries and agriculture. The ecosystem and environmental value at the Tonle Sap, including flooded forests and biodiversity, are also important for the sustainability and ecology of the area. Therefore, since 1997, the management of Tonle Sap has not only focused on the management of fisheries, but also on the management of the environment and ecosystems in the area. This initiative led to the establishment of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat (TSBRS) managed by MoE under the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) in 2001 (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001). In spite of the fishery reform in 2001, the Tonle Sap has faced several challenges rooted in the overlapping mandates and interests of various stakeholders, competition over resources and different ideas on how to manage it. At the community level, there are often conflicts between local fishermen and major lot-owners (fishing professionally), and between fishermen and officials. Local fishermen accuse lot-owners of violating the boundaries of their lots and using illegal fishing gear to maximise their profits, while the officials are accused of taking bribes and neglecting law enforcement (Mak and Grundy-Warr 2007). Conflicts between fishermen and farmers on water retention are also found (Johnstone et al. 2013). Some farmers encroach upon free land in the wetlands and inundate forest zones for farming crops (Mak and Grundy-Warr 2007). For state agencies, the confusion over mandates and poor coordination over planning priorities between relevant ministries, such as the Department of Fisheries under MAFF, MoE and MoWRAM still occurs (Mak and Grundy-Warr 2007). Given increasing rivalries, the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSA) was established in 2007 in order to harmonise interests (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007). The TSA is chaired by the minister of MoWRAM, which marked the transfer of power from MAFF (the former integral agency for managing Tonle Sap) to MoWRAM. This somehow infers that the government is taking water as the core component for river basin management, instead of focusing solely on fishery resources. The TSA aims to coordinate the management, conservation and development of the Tonle Sap Basin area. According to the Royal Decree, the TSA is powerful in that it can sign agreements, protocols or contracts, monitor any development works at the basin and has a right to invite high-level officials from ministries and authorities to participate in its meetings (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007). The TSA seeks to change the existing institutional setting at the Tonle Sap from a focus on individual sectors and administrative boundaries to being organised around the physical structure of a basin as an administrative unit. However, many scholars (e.g. Keskinen and Varis 2012; Dina and Sato 2014) express scepticism over the intention of having the TSA and its effectiveness in addressing issues at the lake. First, the establishment process of the TSA was not participatory but strongly driven by the government, serving central government interests rather than 127

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seeking to address the interests of relevant stakeholders, especially local communities (Keskinen and Varis 2012). Second, the organisational structure of the TSA is also centralised, since only government institutions are members of the authority while other key stakeholders are excluded (Mak 2011; Keskinen and Varis 2012). Third, the function of the TSA tends to focus on power transfer from one institution to another, rather than having an interest in addressing confusion over mandates between institutions and addressing existing issues at Tonle Sap (Keskinen and Varis 2012; Dina and Sato 2014). Each institution still has overlapping mandates and does not coordinate effectively within or between institutions (Keskinen and Varis 2012; Johnstone et al. 2013).

Water and food: rural water for irrigation As stated in the National Strategy for Agriculture and Water (SAW) (2010–2013), irrigation management is considered the government’s key priority for contributing to improving food security and poverty reduction in the country. In 2003, MoWRAM claimed Cambodia had more than 2,000 irrigation schemes (Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 2003). The Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) in 2009 conducted an inventory and found 2,525 irrigation schemes across 13 provinces, of which 23 per cent functioned during the dry season, 49 per cent functioned during the wet season, and 23 per cent functioned during both seasons (Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture 2009). Irrigation management in Cambodia is under the responsibility of MoWRAM, but since the participatory approach was introduced by the Asian Development Bank in 1999, the responsibility to operate and maintain irrigation schemes has had to be shared between the government and farmers. The Farmer Water User Communities (FWUCs) were established and formed according to the Circular 01 of MoWRAM in the same year in which farmers were obliged to participate in all aspects of scheme development, including collecting irrigation service fees (ISFs), maintaining irrigation schemes and addressing conflicts among their members. The Circular 01 does not address clearly how FWUCs should interact with local authorities and other local groups and how other government institutions should provide support to FWUCs. There is no other legal framework that supports it except the sub-decree on Farmer Water User Communities that was drafted by MoWRAM in 2014. Transferring irrigation management to local farmers means promoting local participation in resource management and decision-making, which is aligned with the recent government reform on decentralisation and deconcentration. However, the success of FWUCs is limited (Perera 2006; Thuon 2007; Chea 2010; de Silva et al. 2014). Perera (2006) claims that the implementation of participatory irrigation management, in the context of the high degree of poverty and deteriorated irrigation systems, is a task too challenging for local farmers. Thuon et al. (2007) add that some of the existing schemes were structurally unable to withstand the complex Cambodian water regime, causing maintenance costs beyond what ordinary farmers could afford. Chea (2010) found that the failure of an FWUC in Kampong Chhnang arose from three factors: the low participation of farmers in paying ISFs, the lack of sense of local ownership and the limited power of FWUCs due to their low management skills, poor networks and limited revenue (and unclear legal mandate, we would add). Moreover, according to Thuon (2007) and de Silva et al. (2014), the government failed to build human resources of local farmers and to finance the maintenance of irrigation schemes before and after transferring the responsibility to them. Also, some FWUCs could perform well when they had a good relationship with local authorities, but often mutual misunderstandings regarding roles and responsibilities occurred (Ros et al. 2010). The challenges of 128

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FWUCs are even more complex in the context of managing water for use across sectors (Thuon 2007) and at the catchment scale (Ros et al. 2010). In different administrative boundaries and resource sectors, players often had fewer incentives and channels to cooperate (Thuon 2007; Ros et al. 2010). The participatory irrigation management at the local level is often hindered by the sectoral ministries at the national level that, after all, meddle with local priorities (Ros et al. 2010). Drawing from various studies, de Silva et al. (2014) argued that the government aimed to place responsibility for irrigation management under local farmers in order to reduce its operational costs. As a result, local farmers had to find their own ways to manage water and often at their own expense (Ros et al. 2010). However, evidently, delegating (dumping, some would say) responsibility to FWUCs with inadequate support is not an ideal solution to water management. This is especially the case in a country still constrained by its single-sector orientation; ad hoc planning by departments; poor capacity of local farmers; limited local resources; and the absence of hydrological data to assist local planning on water use and agricultural production (Ros et al. 2010; de Silva et al. 2014). Reasonably, the government should not only focus on the FWUC model for institutional options for irrigation management, but look at other opportunities of incorporating other local institutions in support of FWUCs such as local authorities and small-scale private sector initiatives (de Silva et al. 2013; de Silva et al. 2014).

Water supply: urban versus rural dynamics The Cambodian government, through its National Policy for Water Supply and Sanitation adopted in 2003, aims to improve people’s access to safe water in order to enhance citizen health and wellbeing. Cambodia has met its Millennium Development Goal of ensuring that 50 per cent of the rural population has access to safe water by 2015. However, the government in its National Strategy for Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene 2011–2025, acknowledges that it is unlikely that Cambodia could reach the target of 100 per cent coverage by 2025 (as previously hoped) since the sector faces a shortage of facilities and hardware to provide services to rural areas, and the general awareness in relation to water use and health is still limited (Royal Government of Cambodia 2012). There is still a huge gap in water supply between the urban and rural areas. For instance, the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) is a state-owned enterprise, legally independent, and financially autonomous, although under the supervision of MIME and the Ministry of Finance (Binayak et al. 2010). PPWSA has the capacity to produce 460,000 m3/day of potable water in 2014 through four water treatment plants. By 2013, PPWSA could achieve 264,600 connections to its customers across Phnom Penh and the urban areas of Kandal Province. The water tariffs are classified into three types, depending on the ability to pay, and PPWSA also has its own program called “Clean Water for Low-Income Families” to support poor communities, in which water tariffs can be discounted and instalment could be subsidised (Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority 2013). After its reform process in 1993, PPWS demonstrated improved performance including improving water supply capacity, reducing water loss, increasing its coverage and increasing its net annual profits (Binayak et al. 2010; Biswas and Tortajada 2010). The success of PPWSA was determined by many factors, first of which was the sufficient autonomy to manage and implement its tasks free from political influence, and this has allowed flexibility and creativity in the leadership’s capacity to manage the institution effectively. Second, were the clear and transparent operating procedures and the use of a performance-based incentive approach to encourage 129

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and discipline staff. Third, was the support from donors in providing technical assistance and access to financing, which also contributed to strengthening the autonomy of PPWSA. Fourth, was that it made an effort to develop good relationships with customers through its effective services and appropriate water tariffs. Last, was the strategy of cost recovery being based not only on the high tariffs, but also on the appropriate billing rates and efficient fee collection, which made it financially sustainable (Binayak et al. 2010). However, Cambodia still faces challenges in providing water supply, especially in the rural areas. Rural water supply provision has mixed sources, combining providers such as rural households/communities, the government, the private sectors and NGOs. Depending on the seasons and local characteristics, rural water supply includes piped water, the harvesting of rainwater, the use of surface water, or the use of tube and dug wells (Rautavuoma 2014). Rural water supply is overseen by the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), under the Department of Rural Water Supply. Due to insufficient funds, MRD often works in partnership with development partners (e.g. Asian Development Bank, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or Japan International Cooperation Agency) and NGOs. Other challenges faced by MRD include limited research and development for water supply options in the difficult context that rural Cambodia sometimes constitutes (Royal Government of Cambodia 2012). Sadly, the most common situation may after all be that the local communities have to solve water supply issues by themselves (Öjendal, Plummer and Tritt 2013). The local governments (commune/sangkat councils), through their commune/sangkat fund, also invest in water supply services in their jurisdiction, but most often they have higher priority in building rural roads (Plummer and Tritt 2011; SNV 2014). According to Plummer and Tritt (2011) this is because the investment in water supply often involved investigation and coordination with line ministries or line departments which take time and could result in delays or uncertainty about the project development. Aside from the lack of interest, local governments also perceive that water supply tasks are in the domain of donors, NGOs or higher government, rather than the responsibility of local authorities and understandably so, since line ministries rarely have local representation, a budget or any interest (SNV 2014). The service of rural water supply in Cambodia is by default covered by small-scale private enterprises. These are rather effective in supplying water and maintaining accountability to users, rendering them popular locally (Water and Sanitation Programme 2004). Despite their success, the small-scale private enterprises also have weaknesses. First, they cannot guarantee the standard of water quality and they do not invest in social marketing for health promotion services to rural people. Second, considering their profit motives, private enterprises have little interest in the poorest group, which means that it is unlikely that the services of private enterprises can ensure water access to all people, especially to the marginalised groups (Water and Sanitation Programme 2004).

Conclusion Water remains central to Cambodia’s development. In attempts to utilise available water it has been observed that good governance under robust institutions is often the scarce resource, not necessarily the lack of water in itself. Cambodia is extreme in this case, with ample water resources and, as we have seen in all our cases above, weak governance and thin institutions. As a result, “big” water development benefits neither the local communities nor citizens at large. Rather, it is constructors, entrepreneurs and the urban elite that see their dividends. “Small” development, meanwhile, becomes sub-optimal, with huge gaps in coverage and omissions of services and severe consequences for general wellbeing. 130

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Four issues stick out. First, the historical authoritarian state with centralist planning and dirigiste economy has been replaced by a “do-it-yourself” participatory approach, allowing local strongmen to benefit from the de facto open access landscapes of water. One extreme has moved to another and of course the impoverished, uneducated and unorganised rural population do not benefit from this “participatory” approach. Second, ministries, agencies and departments have a habit of working within their own sector, with a resistance to collaborate outside the boundaries of “their” unit. This of course goes all the way back to the patronage culture, and how it is being re-ignited in neoliberal, post-conflict Cambodia. Third, the designed formal mechanism to connect the local community with the central state, the decentralisation and deconcentration process, is so far a halfway house whose design has not (yet) been allowed to evolve fully and address the gap between the local and the central in the water sector. Fourth, disregarding local communities by proceeding with large-scale evictions for the purpose of building dams is likely to lead to unrest, social conflict and political controversy. So is – as is increasingly the case – the undermining of broad livelihood strategies for the rural population emanating from the elite’s water grabbing or exploiting vulnerable groups and their dependence on safe water. Having said that, Cambodia has made improvements in many sectors. The ones involving large amounts of money – dam construction and large-scale fisheries – are difficult to influence since they involve high-level political and economic interests. The minor water management issues, have, after all, slowly improved and both drinking water services and small-scale irrigation are far more advanced now, compared to two decades ago. Painfully slow as the improvement may be, the water sector would benefit from further inquiries into, inter alia, how water should be managed for the benefits of all.

Note 1 Stung Tatay, Kamchay, O Chum II, Kirirom I, Kirirom III, Stung Atay I and Stung Atay II.

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Joakim Öjendal and Ros Bandeth Johnstone, G., R. Puskur, F. Declerck, K. Mam, O. Il, S. Mak, B. Pech, S. Seak, S. Chan, S. Hak, S. Lov, S. Suon, K. Proum and S. Rest. 2013. Tonle Sap scoping report. Penang, Malaysia: CGIAR. Keskinen, M. and O. Varis. 2012. Institutional cooperation at a basin level: For what, by whom? Lessons learned from Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake. Natural Resources Forum 36: 50–60. Mak, S. 2011. Political geographies of the Tonle Sap: Power, space and resources. Singapore: NUS. Mak, S. and C. Grundy-Warr. 2007. Space of engagement and contested territories of the Tonle Sap, http://rcsd. soc.cmu.ac.th/InterConf/paper/paper83.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2014. Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy. 2012. Cambodia’s rural electrification minigrid systems, standard and regulation, www.gms-sef.org/docs/workshops/Regional/REGIONAL_presentations_chiang_mai/ S4.4%20CAMBODIA.pdf. Accessed 18 November 2014. ——. 2014. Clarification on the Chhay Areng hydroelectric project. Phnom Penh: MIME. Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology. 2003. Modules 1–7 on PIMD [Participatory Irrigation Management and Development]. Phnom Penh: MOWRAM. Mother Nature. 2014a. Saving the Areng Valley, http://mothernature.pm/saving-the-areng-valley.html. Accessed 17 November 2014. ——. 2014b. Social and environmental impacts on the Areng dam, http://mothernature.pm/areng-damimpacts.html. Accessed 17 November 2014. NGO Forum on Cambodia. 2014. Communities and CSOs concerns on Lower Sesan 2 Dam. Bi-monthly e-Newsletter 1: 1–2. Öjendal, J. 2000. Sharing the good: Modes of managing water resources in the Lower Mekong River Basin. Gothenburg: Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University. Öjendal, J. and K. M. Jensen. 2012. Politics and development of the Mekong River Basin: Transboundary dilemmas and participatory ambitions, in J. Öjendal, S. Hansson, and S. Hellberg (eds) Politics and development in a transboundary watershed: The case of the Lower Mekong region. London: Springer, 37–59. Öjendal, J., J. Plummer and G. Tritt. 2013. Voice, choice, and decision: A study of local basic service delivery in Cambodia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Open Development Cambodia. 2014. Hydropower dams, www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/hydropower/ hydropower-dams/. Accessed 17 November 2014. Orr, S., J. Pittock, A. Chapagain and D. Dumaresq. 2012. Dams on the Mekong River: Lost fish protein and the implications for land and water resources. Global Environmental Change 22 (4) 925–932. Perera, L. R. 2006. Factors affecting the formation of FWUCs in institution building for PIMD in Cambodia: Two case studies. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority. 2013. Clean water for all and customer information. Annual Report 2013. Phnom Penh: PPWSA. Plummer, J. and G. Tritt (eds). 2011. Voice, choice and decision: A study of local governance processes in Cambodia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Radio Free Asia. 2014. Cambodian’s parliament OKs dam compensation plan, www.rfa.org/english/news/ cambodia/dam-06192014195419.html. Accessed 29 October 2014. ——. 2015. Cambodia’s Hun Sen defends deportation of Spanish activist, www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/ deportation-02242015163334.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=chhay+areng. Accessed 1 April 2015. Rautavuoma, P. 2014. Assessing rural water supply levels of service in Cambodia: Findings and lessons learned from a baseline assessment. Phnom Penh: SNV. Ros, B., T. Ly and A. Thompson. 2010. Catchment governance and cooperation dilemmas: A case study from Cambodia. Phnom Penh: CDRI. Royal Government of Cambodia. 2001. Royal decree on the establishment and management of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve. Phnom Penh: RGC. ——. 2007. Royal decree on the establishment of Tonle Sap Authority. Phnom Penh: RGC. ——. 2012. National strategy for rural water supply, sanitation and hygiene 2011–2025. Phnom Penh: RGC. Rutmanee, O., D. N. Vinh, H. T. Lap, V. Ngonvorarath, L. Bouapao, K. Chay and S. Suon. 2013. Equity in allocation of benefits, burdens and risks in hydropower development projects in Mekong countries, http://wlemekong.cgiar.org/download/mk4-water-governance/MK4_Equity%20in%20Dam%20Management_ Document.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2014. SNV. 2014. Learning brief: Functionality of rural water supply services in Cambodia, www.snvworld.org/ sites/www.snvworld.org/files/documents/snvkh_wash_frwslearning_2014_08_27.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2014. Suon, S., C. Keartha, S. Phyrom and S. Pech. 2013. Institutional arrangements: Policies and administrative mechanisms on water governance in the Kingdom of Cambodia. Phnom Penh: CPWF.

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11 CAMBODIA’S HIGHLANDERS Land, Livelihoods, and the Politics of Indigeneity Jonathan Padwe

Throughout Southeast Asia, a distinction can be made between the inhabitants of lowland “state” societies and those of remote upland areas. This divide between hill and valley is one of the enduring social arrangements in the region—one that organizes much research on Southeast Asian society (Scott 2009). In Cambodia, highland people number some 200,000 individuals, or about 1.4 percent of the national population of approximately 15 million (IWGIA 2010). Located in the foothills of the Annamite Mountains in Cambodia’s northeast highlands, in the Cardamom Mountains to the southwest and in several other small enclaves throughout the country, Cambodia’s highland groups include, among others, the Tampuan, Brao, Jarai, Bunong, Kuy, and Poar. These groups share in common a distinction from lowland Khmer society based on language, religious practices, livelihood practices, forms of social organization, and shared histories of marginalization. This chapter provides an overview of research and writing about key issues concerning Cambodia’s highlanders. The focus is on research undertaken since the 1992–1993 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), when an improved security situation allowed for a resumption of research with and about highland people. Important areas of concern for research on the highlands have included questions about highlanders’ experience of war and genocide, environmental knowledge, access to land and natural resources and problems of “indigeneity” within the politics of identity and ethnicity in Cambodia.

Early ethnography of the highlands The earliest written records of highland people in the region are ninth- to twelfth-century inscriptions from the Po Nagar temple near present-day Phan Rang, in Vietnam, which describe the conquests of Cham rulers “against the Radé, the Madas [Jarai], and other barbarians” (Schweyer 2004, 124). Early European explorers documented the presence of upland ethnic minorities beginning with the travel narrative of Cristoforo Borri (1633), a Jesuit missionary who refers to the inhabitants of the present-day Annamite mountains as kemoi, a local term signifying “savages.” Over the course of the following centuries, French explorers, administrators and orientalist scholars likewise referred to highlanders using locally prevalent terms meaning “savage” and “slave’” in the dominant languages of the lowland states—moï in present-day Vietnam, kha in Laos, and pnong in Cambodia (e.g. Leclère 1881; Maître 1912; see also Jonsson 134

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2001, 53). French attitudes towards the highlanders built on or in many cases coincided with those held by lowland populations. In Cambodia, deeply held traditional understandings of the moral order have long turned on the distinction between srok, a term for settled and cultivated land (and for an administrative district), and prei, the wilderness or forest, such as that of the uplands. The former is considered orderly and civilized, while the latter is a zone of wildness, lawlessness, and barbarism (Chandler 1982; Zucker 2013, 114–115). Like the nature–culture divide in Western thought to which it corresponds, the distinction between srok and prei places highlanders at the opposite end of the civilizational continuum from Khmers, an ordering of the civilized and the savage is common to the region (Turton 2000). Oscar Salemink’s (2003) history of the ethnography of Vietnam’s Central Highlanders describes in detail the historical evolution of missionary, military, and administrative ethnography of the highlands within French Indochina and recounts the processes through which this scholarship brought into existence reified ethnic categories that had previously been far more fluid. Because much of Cambodia’s highlands were under Lao and Thai control through the nineteenth century and because Cambodia was administered as part of French Indochina until the middle of the twentieth, Salemink’s discussion provides a useful guide to the early ethnography of Cambodia’s highlanders as well. Also relevant to this story is the emerging body of research on highlanders’ experience of colonialism in lands that are today part of present-day Cambodia. Mathieu Guérin (2008), for instance, has documented the history of the French pacification of the highlands and of highlander resistance to French rule, basing his analysis on meticulous archival research as well as oral history. Other authors (see Baird 2009; Guérin and Padwe 2011) document colonial history episodically and have provided insight into the actions of individuals who shaped the colonial encounter in the highlands. A professionalized ethnography of highlanders specifically within the Cambodian context emerged in full only during the second Indochina War (mid-1950s–1975). Whereas Pierre Bitard’s (1952) research on the Brao conformed to the earlier model of “administrative ethnography” proposed by Salemink (2003, 16), the work of Jacqueline Matras represented a new mode of ethnographic practice oriented towards academic research. From 1966 to 1968 Matras conducted fieldwork in Ratanakiri Province on Brao social and religious life, farming systems and material culture, and analyzed the gendered dimensions of the ritual cycle (Matras-Troubetzkoy 1983). Matras-Troubetzkoy (1983, 51) also described highlanders’ incensed response to the establishment of the Lebansiek rubber plantation on Brao and Tampuen lands in Ratanakiri Province in 1959. The effort was one of several heavy-handed measures taken by the Sangkum regime to establish control over the remote northeast, a campaign which also included internal colonization by military families sent to the northeast to assure the Khmerization of the remote region. Sihanouk re-named the highlanders Khmer Loeu, or “upper Khmer,” and sought to portray them as inherently part of a Khmer-centric Cambodian nation state. But the campaign, and especially the establishment of the plantation on highlander territory, provided a recruitment tool for communist rebels operating in the region (Baird 2008a, 230–231; see also Meyer 1979). One of Matras’s research collaborators was the ethnobotanist and anthropologist Marie Alexandrine Martin, with whom she worked to produce a detailed study of Brao ethnobotany (Matras and Martin 1972). Martin herself conducted research on environmental knowledge, agricultural practices and forms of social organization among Pearic-speaking groups of the Cardamom Mountains, culminating in an ethnography of the Khmer Daeum of the Phnom Aural area (Martin 1997). Along with Matras, Martin’s field-based research became impossible as the security situation worsened. By 1970, as the Vietnam War finally overwhelmed the country, research in Cambodia’s highlands ground to a halt. With the exception of work 135

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done in Vietnam by social scientists affiliated with the American war effort, scholarly engagements with highland culture and society would not resume in earnest until after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991.

Research in the post-war moment Documenting Cambodian highlanders’ experience of the Second Indochina War and the Cambodian genocide became one of the primary research concerns of the immediate post-war moment, one first addressed by historians of the Cambodian genocide. Beginning in the 1950s, the northeast had become a stronghold of revolutionary activity and the time spent by Ieng Sary and Pol Pot in the jungles of Ratanakiri Province contributed to Khmer Rouge understandings of highlanders and provided an origin story for the revolution (Kiernan 1996, 302–3). The repressive policies of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes, in tandem with the American-led bombing of northeast Cambodia, were instrumental in pushing the highlanders into the arms of communist revolutionaries (Kiernan 1985, 269; see also Meyer 1979). As David Chandler (1992, 80) has noted, the revolutionaries expressed an appreciation for highland “traditions of autonomy, solidarity and mutual aid.” Khmer Rouge leaders believed the highlanders to be uncorrupted by money and capitalism, and this perceived primitive communism was “ideologically significant” in their eyes. Yet Kiernan (1996, 305) argues that while the highlanders were originally embraced as anti-capitalist supporters of the revolution, in the later stages of the regime highlander cadres were “increasingly swept up in purges” as Khmer Rouge policies became more chauvinist. As armed conflict wound down, some of the first reports on the situation of highland people based on new research were produced under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The linguist Gerard Diffloth (1993) undertook an important survey of the indigenous minorities at that time, which provided approximate population figures and mapped locations of each group, its linguistic affiliation and level of Khmer literacy and identified issues of concern relating to the upcoming UN-sponsored election. The report documented very low levels of Khmer-speaking ability among highlanders, especially among women, a fact that provides some insight into the continued isolation of highlanders from Cambodian society well into the latter part of the twentieth century. Some reports have suggested that the Khmer Rouge prohibited highlanders from speaking their own languages in the agricultural collectives (Minority Rights Group 1995, 13); Diffloth’s Khmer literacy figures demonstrate that such policies, if they existed, could not have been widely enforced. Another UNTAC observer was Patrick Hughes, a human rights officer in Ratanakiri. Hughes (1993) identified a series of emerging challenges for highlanders in the northeast, among them in-migration of non-indigenous populations, pressure on land and resources, racial and ethnic discrimination, and threats to the position of women within highlander society. Hughes proposed a number of interventions be taken in defense of highlander livelihoods and helped to form one of the first associations of highland peoples to advocate for the rights of indigenous minorities, the “Association for the Progress and Development of the Highlander Nations of Ratanakiri Province.” While subsequent associations and organizations have promoted the measures he advocated for in his report, many of the threats he identified have indeed come to pass in the intervening years. As researchers began to spend more time in highland areas, both in the northeast and elsewhere in Cambodia, a more detailed picture emerged of highland minorities’ experiences of Democratic Kampuchea, and the challenges they faced as a result. Colm’s (1996) account of this period, based on numerous interviews, remains one of the most complete depictions of the 136

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northeast under the Khmer Rouge. In an initial take on these issues, historian Henri Locard (1994) had noted that while killings, population relocations, collectivization of agriculture, and repression of religion and culture characterized the regime in the northeast, the collectives there had also enjoyed greater food sufficiency, better medical care and even schooling. Colm’s research generally supports this view. Colm (1996, 3–8) attributes the less harsh treatment of highlanders in the Northeast Zone to two factors: first, the ideological fit between the communists and the highlanders; and second, the relative latitude with which local leaders interpreted the commands of the Party Center, opting to use re-education and other corrective measures to discipline the population. Even so, there was great variation from site to site, and the situation became increasingly repressive over time. The stringent impositions, especially prohibitions on religious practices, dismayed highlanders, and thousands of them fled to Vietnam and Laos (Colm 1996, 69). In Mondulkiri Province, home of the Bunong ethnic minority, most residents of the dispersed villages and hamlets of the region were relocated to Koh Nhek, a large agricultural settlement dedicated to padi rice agriculture. Colm and Sim Sorya (2007) present a detailed depiction of the situation in Mondulkiri, and of the relentless purges of Khmer Rouge cadres and of suspected Vietnamese spies there during the later years of the revolution.

Livelihoods, environmental knowledge, and environmental change The flourishing of international agencies and non-governmental organizations that took place in Cambodia beginning in the 1990s also extended to highland regions and several organizations worked in highland areas beginning in this moment. The “opening” of the area to these organizations coincided with an intensified focus on “sustainable development” internationally. The reports and studies undertaken by NGOs during this period emphasized issues of highlanders’ livelihoods, their natural resource use systems and environmental knowledge. Other development-related topics included work on those elements of the social welfare system that the Cambodian state was unable or unwilling to attend to, such as the culturally specific health and educational needs of highland people (White 1995; Jonsson 1992; Escott 2000). The sparsely populated uplands have traditionally served as a vast forest reserve in the region, and this is one reason that issues of highlanders’ relation to the environment have been of particular concern to scholars. Highland people had long specialized in the extraction and use of forest products like resins, honey, beeswax, fruit, dammars, and rattans, as well as wildlife products including ivory, skins, and various animal products used in traditional medicine. Additionally, their practices of long-fallow swidden agriculture—in essence the cutting of forest plots to plant rice and other crops for a few seasons before fallowing the land and allowing it to return to forest—depended on the existence of standing forest. Yet forest resources served as one of the main revenue sources for the many factions in Cambodia’s complicated political struggles and as political infighting continued in the post-UNTAC period, pressure on these resources intensified (Le Billon 2000). Logging concessionaires and illegal loggers operated throughout the zones where Cambodia’s highland people lived, presenting a major threat to the highlanders’ systems of land and resource use. Studies of land cover and land-use change based on remote sensing provide an understanding of the rapid nature of the social and ecological transformations taking place in recent decades and their probable implications for inhabitants of these areas. While the extent of forest cover had remained relatively stable for the latter half of the twentieth century, according to Jefferson Fox (2002) forest fragmentation was increasingly a problem by the mid-1990s. Fox identified a series of trends, such as the commericalization of forest resources and a rise in the production of industrial agricultural crops including palm oil, cassava, rubber, and kapok, that would, over 137

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time, result in “a major change in land use practices from swidden agriculture to commercial crops, and a change in land cover from secondary vegetation to monocultural agriculture” (Jefferson Fox 2002, 113). As the logging of Cambodia’s forests emerged as an important environmental problem in the post-UNTAC period, changing land-use patterns and contestations over forests had significant repercussions for highland communities (Bottomley 2002). In the early 1990s a number of advocacy groups working from Banlung, Ratanakiri, began to focus their efforts on highlanders’ access to resources and their experience of the rapid economic transformations then beginning to take shape. Organizations like NTFP, CIDSE and Health Unlimited sought to engage policymakers where possible and produced a series of reports that detailed highlander livelihood practices and sought to demonstrate the important transformations taking place in the highlands at the time (Colm 1997; NTFP 1997; Paterson 1997). Researchers working with these groups produced ethnographic studies of highlander life and culture that took up where Matras, Martin and others had left off in the 1970s and this task was soon expanded upon by researchers working with highland groups for extended periods. Ian Baird’s early research on the livelihoods and resource-use practices of Brao language speakers (Brao, Kavet and Kreung) included detailed studies of Brao ethnoecology and classification of habitat types (Baird 2000; Baird, Tubtim and Baird 1996). Frederic Bourdier’s research addressed a broad range of subjects, including highlander environmental knowledge and management of natural resources, inter-ethnic relations in the highlands, and the cultural ecology of highlander belief systems (Bourdier 1998, 2006). Vogel (2011) documented Bunong traditional material culture, agricultural, and ecological practices. The Bunong have historically played a special role in the capture and sale of elephants in the region and Vogel’s work is notable for bringing the practices and knowledge of Bunong elephant culture to life. Other studies looked at agro-ecology, resin-tapping and resource tenure and the relationship between changing human ecologies and changing belief systems (Ironside and Baird 2003; Baird and Dearden 2003; Evans et al. 2003; Baird 2005; Zweers and Sok Mary 2002).

Development, marginalization, and struggles over land Research on customary tenure regimes and traditional resource-use practices quickly led to questions of power and the politics of access to land and resources. While resource use in the highlands has long been a political question, the forms that this politicization has taken have changed. With the exception of the imposition of rubber plantations in the colonial era, land scarcity had not previously posed a problem in the highlands. During the post-conflict moment, however, and especially as Cambodia entered a period of rapid economic transition beginning around the turn of the century (see Hughes and Un 2011), the question of access to land became newly important. The rapid transformations taking place under the sign of “development” have been experienced by highlanders not only in the form of rapid land loss, but also as processes of political and economic marginalization. Some of the most visible transformations of highland areas have involved the construction of infrastructure on a large scale. Regional integration planning processes including the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle have spurred on and helped to guide a construction boom in highland areas (Ishida 2013). Hydroelectric dams built or under development in Cambodia, and upstream in Vietnam and Laos, have contributed to the extension of the regional electrical grid, while at the same time causing major environmental and social impacts along Cambodia’s Mekong tributaries, affecting fisheries and displacing communities (Lacombe et al. 2010). The creation of the Southern Economic Corridor within the GMS has seen surfaced roads linking provincial capitals in highland 138

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provinces to regional road networks (Sau 2012). The elaboration of transportation, communication and power grids reflects the dominant role in the regional economy played by Vietnam (Fortunel 2014) and has ushered in the series of rapid changes taking place in the organization of land ownership, rural production, and associated environmental changes. The Cambodian state has played a critical role in the forms development has taken. As Milne et al. (2015) demonstrate, the system of patronage that mediates Cambodian political life is maintained by massive off-budget surpluses generated through the state territorialization of forested land and through the subsequent granting of concessions to extractive industries and to enterprises engaged in the large-scale production of agricultural commodities. As on other indigenous frontiers, in Cambodia the expropriation of highlanders’ land has been made possible by the state’s refusal to acknowledge locally recognized tenure regimes. In place of these systems, powerful interests within the state have placed large areas of supposedly uninhabited land—much of it fallows and forests managed by highlanders—under the control of wellconnected private firms, first as logging concessions and later as controversial “Economic Land Concessions” (UNCOHCHR 2004). At the same time, the government has undertaken several initiatives to establish private property in land as the basis of the tenure system throughout the country, an effort that was in part made possible through the World Bank-financed Land Management and Administration Project (Un and So 2011). The transition to private property in land, coupled with massive land concessions, has radically destabilized common-property regimes in the highlands. A communal land-titling measure, designed to head off some of the most egregious problems among indigenous communities, has been largely ineffective. Coopted by powerful interests, the communal titling program reached few communities, allowed for significant fragmentation of land held in common and failed to produce significant benefits for highlanders (Milne 2013). Seeking to improve this situation, non-governmental organizations have undertaken research on social problems relating to land allocation and have sought to outline policy options and advance appropriate alternatives (NGO Forum 2006; McAndrew et al. 2009). A growing literature in the geography, history, and anthropology of the highlands has sought to understand the implications of this “asset-stripping” model of development for highlanders’ lives. Several authors have taken a regional perspective on these issues, seeking to understand the complex transnational character of the changing upland economy and of highland groups who often inhabit both sides of national borders. Guérin et al. (2003) focus on the Central Highlands of Vietnam and northeast Cambodia, looking in particular at the relationship between commodity production, migration, and the question of highlander forms of national belonging within increasingly “multicultural” states. Bourdier (2009) draws together studies from Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia to identify commonalities in the impositions of developmentalism, and in highlanders’ responses. And researchers working in both Vietnam’s Central Highlands and northeast Cambodia have explored the social and environmental implications of the extending agricultural frontier (e.g. Fortunel and Gironde 2011). Work within Cambodia, often undertaken at the scale of the village, has produced important insights into the ways that large-scale economic and ecological transformations have been expressed in communities and households. In a series of studies of traditional production systems and tenure regimes, Jeremy Ironside has sought to demonstrate that “learning about how traditional institutions, ownership and governance models function, and could be adapted, can offer options for redefining our key culture-land relationships” (Ironside 2010, see also 2004, 1999). Based on the study of a Jarai community in Ratanakiri Province, Padwe (2011) analyzed smallholder cashew production, a common production strategy adopted by highlanders beginning in the mid-1990s. The adoption of cashew offered numerous advantages. In particular, because 139

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continuous cultivation makes legible an asserted property right, land under cultivation was deemed less of a risk for seizure by the state. But the adoption of cashew also led to fundamental changes in the swidden system: the elimination of fallowing raised questions about ecological sustainability and the increasing amount of land under cultivation raised the prospect of additional constraints on household labor availability. Resultant alterations of household economies have implications for gendered power relations as well as for intra-village social differentiation associated with the emergence of capitalist social relations. Park and Maffii (2015) also explore the gendered dimensions of the land crisis in Ratanakiri, finding that as women’s roles have been negatively affected by the transition to new land ownership regimes, women “have been at the forefront of mobilization and resistance to land grabbing.”

Practices of resistance and the politics of indigeneity Highlanders in Cambodia are today faced with a deepening land crisis, threats to their livelihoods, and increasing marginalization within processes of “development.” They have taken a number of actions in response to these challenges, among them efforts to use the legal system to enforce their land claims, localized protests and organized political opposition, and forging alliances with non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, and transnational social movements. Increasingly, highlanders and their advocates have adopted the language of indigenous rights to frame these practices of resistance. Non-governmental organizations, international agencies, multilateral institutions, and the Cambodian state also engage the discourse of indigeneity to represent highlanders in their relation to Cambodian society. The implication of this emerging indigenous politics for social life in the highlands is a research problem that several authors have taken up. One important question within this subject is the historical production of the identities that are today categorized as “indigenous.” Indigeneity is a very new concept in Cambodia: although the English-language term has circulated among international development workers and some policymakers in Cambodia since the early 1990s, a translation of the term “indigenous people” as chunchiet daeum pheak taic did not emerge in Khmer until around 1998 (Baird 2011; Padwe 2013, 285–8). A long history of previous efforts to categorize and define highland people has structured contemporary glosses of indigenous identity in Cambodia today, and state practices including colonial administrative procedures, orientalist scholarship, legal pluralism, and the establishment of national boundaries have all contributed to the social construction of highlanders as certain types of “others” (i.e. Baird 2008b; Padwe 2010; Backstrom et al. 2007). Highland people themselves have exerted agency in these processes. Baird (2010) for instance has looked at the ways that the Brao of northeast Cambodia and southern Laos have crossed national borders, attempting to use differing political conditions to their own advantage, with implications for understandings of Brao national belonging and ethnic identity. Recently, scholars have sought to understand the adoption of indigenous identity as a social and political category within Cambodia and to examine the potential of indigenous politics for promoting a more inclusive, democratic, and multicultural society. Baird (2011, 158) argues that while contested, the concept of indigeneity “has gained considerable credence in identity discourses in the country,” owing in part to NGO efforts and funding, the creation of the 2001 land law, and other factors such as an “easing of Khmer nationalism.” Swift (2013) provides some support for the notion that indigeneity is an increasingly important political framing; he argues that the Kuy people of Preah Vihear province have in recent years “reasserted” their ethnic identity, “driven by the awareness of benefits of identifying as Kuy” at a time when indigeneity is increasingly valorized. Keating (2013) emphasizes the recent origins of Kuy 140

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identification as indigenous, noting that the Kuy people were formerly more closely identified with lowland states and state-making projects, in the kingdoms of Angkor and Chenla. In the present moment, however, Keating finds that Kuy indigeneity is an “emergent and observable form of sociality” and argues that “a more substantive political engagement with indigenous identity and history offers a pluricultural reframing of aspects of Cambodian politics, perhaps serving to promote more sustainable and equitable social arrangements in the future.” In a recent doctoral thesis based on years of research, Ehrentraut (2013) follows Kymlycka in arguing for the importance of liberal multiculturalism as a desirable governmental norm, one that would be partially realized in Cambodia by meaningful state recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. Ehrentraut provides numerous reasons why one might expect to find these norms embraced in Cambodia and seeks to explain why the efforts of the international community to promote this norm have failed in Cambodia to date. In his analysis, Ehrentraut makes the interesting suggestion that the relative insignificance of the highland population in relation to the Cambodian majority might actually be a point in favor of the state’s acceptance of claims for indigenous rights. According to this view, because of the “opportune structure of Cambodia’s cultural diversity,” ethnic opposition poses little real threat to the state and therefore “the scale of state reorganization that would be required to realize international minority rights norms is comparatively modest” (Ehrentraut 2013, 3). There are, however, numerous reasons why claims made on the basis of indigenous identity have failed to find “traction” in Cambodia to date. Because internationally circulating notions like “indigeneity” are not simply adopted ex nihilo in new settings, but are rather made meaningful within existing structures of meaning, problems of definition and translation of the concept of indigenous identity have shaped the ways that “indigenous” identity has been received and made political within Cambodia (Padwe 2013). Numbers also make a difference. Although trying to make a count of the numbers of highlanders living in Cambodia is particularly difficult, a rough estimate suggests that they make up only 1.4 percent of the national population of Cambodia; this is the smallest ratio of highlanders as a percentage of national population in all of Southeast Asia (IWGIA 2010). The estimated population of 197,000 highlanders living in Cambodia in 2010 is furthermore the second smallest absolute number of “indigenous” people in a Southeast Asian country after Brunei (IWGIA 2010; see discussion in Padwe 2013). In numerical terms, then, Cambodia’s highlanders have little significance as political actors. At the same time, Western donors who have long advocated for social protections for Cambodia’s marginalized populations have seen their influence on the regime of Prime Minister Hun Sen decline in recent years, in part owing to increasing financial support from China and increasing international investments in Cambodia’s mineral resources (Burgos and Ear 2010; Ehrentraut 2013, 227–9). These and other factors help to explain why highlanders’ political marginality is increasingly pronounced, even as the language of indigeneity has been adopted in the political arena. The most recent national election, in 2013, would seem to provide some insight into these dynamics. The elections presented the first occasion in decades that the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) faced a significant electoral challenge, which arrived in the form of the newly significant opposition party, the Cambodian National Rescue Party. A key issue in the election was the administration’s land concessions policy, a policy that adversely affects highlanders. Yet in the final result, the strongest support for the CPP was to be found in the provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, and Pursat, provinces where much of the country’s indigenous population lives. Graham (2013) aptly characterized this outcome as an “inverted Mandala”: the power of the ruling party is concentrated at its rural edges and diffuse in the urban center, an ironic twist on traditional cosmologies of power in the region. 141

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Regarding the election, it may be the case that highlanders were more easily coerced by the regime than others. Furthermore, indigenous politics in Cambodia, as elsewhere in Asia, is not merely a question of internal political constituencies, but also involves transnational coalitions engaging in advocacy on behalf of ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the support for the ruling regime in the highlander heartland suggests that the potential of indigenous mobilizations to enact meaningful political change remains unfulfilled at the national level and demonstrates that significant challenges still stand in the way of advocates’ hopes for a liberatory indigenous politics in Cambodia.

References Backstrom, M., J. Ironside, G. Paterson, J. Padwe, and I. G. Baird. 2007. Indigenous Traditional Legal Systems and Conflict Resolution in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri Provinces, Cambodia. Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme. Baird, I. G. 2000. The Ethnoecology, Land Use, and Livelihoods of the Brao-Kavet Indigenous Peoples in Kok-Lak Commune, Voen Say District, Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia. Ban Lung, Cambodia: NTFP Project. ——. 2005. Dipterocarpus Wood Resin Tree Tenure, Tapping and Trade in Teun Commune, Kon Mum District, Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia. Ban Lung, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia: NTFP Project. ——. 2008a. Various Forms of Colonialism: The Social and Spatial Reorganisation of the Brao in Southern Laos and Northeastern Cambodia. Ph.D. Dissertation. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia. ——. 2008b. The case of the Brao: Revisiting physical borders, ethnic identities and spatial and social organisation in the hinterlands of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, in Y. Goudineau and M. Lorrillard (eds.). Recherches Nouvelles sur le Laos, 596–620, Etudes thématiques No. 18. Paris and Vientiane: Ecole Française d’Extrème-Orient. ——. 2009. From Champasak to Cambodia: Ya Chao Tham (Chao Thammatheva), a wily and influential ethnic Lao leader. Aséanie 23 (June): 31–62. ——. 2010. Making spaces: The ethnic Brao people and the international border between Laos and Cambodia. Geoforum 41 (2): 271–81. ——. 2011. The construction of “indigenous peoples” in Cambodia, in L. Yew (ed.). Alterities in Asia: Reflections on Identity and Regionalism. London: Routledge. Baird, I. G. and P. Dearden. 2003. Biodiversity conservation and resource tenure regimes: A case study from Northeast Cambodia. Environmental Management 32 (5): 541–50. Baird, I. G., K. Tubtim and M. Baird. 1996. The Kavet and the Kreung: Observations of Livelihoods and Natural Resources in Two Highlander Villages in the Districts of Veun Say and Ta Veng, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. Ratanakiri, Cambodia: NTFP Project. Bitard, P. 1952. Rites agraires des Kha Braou. Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises 27 (1): 9–17. Borri, C. 1633. Cochin-Chine; Containing Many Admirable Rarities and Singularities of that Country. London: Robert Ashley. Bottomley, R. 2002. Contested forests: An analysis of the highlander response to logging, Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia. Critical Asian Studies 34 (4): 587–606. Bourdier, F. 1998. La nature apprivoisée: Symbolisme et savoir technique chez les populations indigènes du nord-est combodgien, in G. Rossi, P. Lavigne Delville, and D. Narbeburu (eds.). Sociétés rurales et environnement: Gestion des ressources et dynamiques locales au Sud. Paris: Karthala, 25–41. ——. 2006. The Mountain of Precious Stones: Essays in Social Anthropology. Rev. and updated ed. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Center for Khmer Studies. —— (ed.). 2009. Development and Dominion: Indigenous Peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Bangkok: White Lotus Press. Burgos, S. and S. Ear. 2010. China’s strategic interests in Cambodia: Influence and resources. Asian Survey 50: 615–39. Chandler, D. P. 1982. Songs at the edge of the forest: Perception of order in three Cambodian texts, in D. K. Wyatt and A. Woodside (eds.). Moral Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series. ——. 1992. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Cambodia’s Highlanders Colm, S. 1996. The Highland Minorities and the Khmer Rouge in Northeastern Cambodia 1968–1979. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia. Unpublished report. ——. 1997. Options for Land Security among Indigenous Communities, Ratanakiri, Cambodia. Ratanakiri, Cambodia: NTFP Project. Colm, S. and Sim Sorya. 2007. Winds from the West: Region 105. Khmer Rouge Purges in the Highlands of Mondul Kiri. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Documentation Center of Cambodia. Diffloth, G. 1993. The Indigenous Minorities in Cambodia and the Elections: Report for the Electoral Component of UNTAC. Phnom Penh: UNTAC. Ehrentraut, S. 2013. Challenging Khmer Citizenship: Minorities, the State, and the International Community in Cambodia. Ph.D. Dissertation. Potsdam: Potsdam University. Escott, J. 2000. Minority education in Cambodia: The case of the Khmer Loeu. Intercultural Education 11 (3): 239–51. Evans, T. D., H. Piseth, P. Phaktra, and H. Mary. 2003. A study of resin-tapping and livelihoods in southern Mondulkiri, Cambodia, with implications for conservation and forest management. Phnom Penh: Wildlife Conservation Society. Fortunel, F. 2014. L’intégration régionale en Asie du Sud-Est continentale, domination ou coopération? L’exemple de l’hévéaculture entre Viêt Nam, Laos et Cambodge, in L’or blanc: Petits et grands planteurs face au “boom” de l’hévéaculture (Viêt Nam-Cambodge), Carnet de l’IRASEC No. 24., eds. F. Fortunel and C. Gironde. Bangkok: Institut de Recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine. Fortunel, F. and C. Gironde. 2011. Transition agraire et recompositions sociales en Asie du Sud-Est, in J.-Y. Guibert and M. Guibert (eds.). Dynamiques des espaces ruraux dans le monde: État des lieux. Paris: Armand Coline. Fox, J. M. 2002. Understanding a dynamic landscape: Land use, land cover, and resource tenure in northeastern Cambodia, in S. J. Walsh and K. A. Crews-Meyer (eds.). Linking People, Place, and Policy: A GIScience Approach. Boston, Dordrecht and London: Springer, 113–30. Graham, C. 2013. Cambodia’s Inverted Mandala? New Mandala. August 22, 2013. http://asiapacific.anu. edu.au/newmandala/2013/08/23/cambodias-inverted-mandala/. Accessed January 5, 2014. Guérin, M. 2008. Paysans de la forêt à l’époque coloniale: La pacification des aborigènes des hautes terres du cambodge, 1863–1940. Caen, France: Association d’histoire des sociétés rurales. Guérin, M. and J. Padwe. 2011. Pénétration coloniale et résistance chez les Jarai: Revisiter le rôle des colonisés dans la mise en place des frontières en Indochine. Outre-Mers (370–71): 245–72. Guérin, M., A. Hardy, N. Van Chinh and S. T. Boon Hwee. 2003. Des Montagnards aux Minorités Ethniques. Paris and Bangkok: L’Harmattan/IRASEC. Hughes, C. and K. Un. 2011. Cambodia’s economic transformation: Historical and theoretical perspectives, in C. Hughes and K. Un (eds.). Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 1–26. Hughes, P. 1993. Report on highlanders of Ratanakiri for the year of indigenous people. UNTAC Human Rights Component. Ironside, J. 1999. Defending Community Livelihood Rights–Community First/Food First: A Community Resource Management Planning Case Study, Yeak Laom Commune, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. Phnom Penh: UNDP/CARERE/CBNRM. ——. 2004. Securing land tenure rights for Cambodia’s indigenous communities. Indigenous Affairs of IWGIA (4): 14–19. ——. 2010. The Outbreak of Peace: Communal Land Management and Traditional Governance in a Remote Cambodian Province. Paper presented at the CAPRi Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management. June 28–July 1, 2010. Siem Reap, Cambodia. Ironside, J. and I. G. Baird. 2003. Wilderness and Cultural Landscape: Settlement, Agriculture, and Land and Resource Tenure in and adjacent to Virachey National Park, Northeast Cambodia. Ban Lung, Ratanakiri, Cambodia: Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project (BPAMP), Ministry of Environment. Ishida, M. 2013. Five Triangle Areas in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Bangkok: Bangkok Research Center. Institute of Developing Economies/Japan External Trade Organization. IWGIA. 2010. ASEAN’s Indigenous Peoples. Copenhagen: AIPP, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development. www.iwgia.org/publications/ search-pubs?publication_id=511. Accessed April 21, 2012. Jonsson, H. 1992. Health Issues among Uplanders in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia: Final Report. London and Phnom Penh: Health Unlimited.

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Jonathan Padwe ——. 2001. French natural in the Vietnamese highlands: Nostalgia and erasure in Montagnard identity, in J. B. Winston and L. C.-P. Ollier (eds.). Of Vietnam: Identities in Dialogue. New York: Palgrave, 52–65. Keating, N. B. 2013. Kuy alterities: The struggle to conceptualise and claim Indigenous land rights in neoliberal Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 54 (3): 309–22. Kiernan, B. 1985. How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975. London and New York: Verso. ——. 1996. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Lacombe, G., A. Pierret, C. T. Hoanh, O. Sengtaheuanghoung, and A. D. Noble. 2010. Conflict, migration and land-cover changes in Indochina: A hydrological assessment. Ecohydrology 3 (4): 382–91. Le Billon, P. 2000. The political ecology of transition in Cambodia 1989–1999: War, peace and forest exploitation. Development and Change 31: 785–805. Leclère, A. 1881. Les Pnongs: Peuple Sauvage de l’Indo-Chine. St. Valery en Caux, France: E. Dangu. Locard, H. 1994. Hunting KR roots among hill tribes. Phnom Penh Post, May 20, 1994. McAndrew, J. P., Oeur Il, and J. Perera. 2009. Access to natural resources: Case studies of Cambodian hill tribes, in J. Perera (ed.). Land and Cultural Survival: The Communal Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Asia. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Maître, H. 1912. Les Jungles Moï. Paris: Emile Larose. Martin, M. A. 1997. Les Khmers Daeum, “Khmers de l’Origine:” Société Montagnarde et Exploitation de la Forêt. De l’écologie a l’histoire. Paris: Monographies, No. 183. Presses de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient. Matras, J. and M. A. Martin. 1972. Contribution à l’ethnobotanique des Brou (Cambodge-Province de Ratanakiri). Journal d’agriculture tropicale et de botanique appliquée 19 (1–2, 4–5): 1–49, 93–139. Matras-Troubetzkoy, J. 1983. Un Village en Foret: L’essartage chez les Brou du Cambodge. Paris: Selaf. Meyer, C. 1979. Les nouvelles provinces: Ratanakiri – Mondolkiri. Mondes en Développement 28: 682–90. Milne, S. 2013. Under the leopard’s skin: Land commodification and the dilemmas of indigenous communal title in upland Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 54 (3): 323–39. Milne, S., K. Pak, and M. Sullivan. 2015. Shackled to nature? The post-conflict state and its symbiotic relationship with natural resources, in S. Milne and S. Mahanty (eds.). Conservation and Development in Cambodia: Exploring Frontiers of Change in Nature, State and Society. London: Routledge, 28–50. Minority Rights Group. 1995. Minorities in Cambodia. London: Minority Rights Group. NGO Forum. 2006. Land Alienation from Indigenous Minority Communities in Ratanakiri: An Update. Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia. NTFP. 1997. Swidden Cultivation in Ratanakiri Province: A Sustainable System for Cambodia? Ban Lung, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia: NTFP Project. Padwe, J. 2010. Customary law, traditional authority and the ethnicization of rights in highland Cambodia, in F. Bourdier (ed.). Development and Dominion: Indigenous Peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Bangkok: White Lotus Press. ——. 2011. Cashews, cash and capitalism in northeast Cambodia, in C. Hughes and K. Un (eds.). Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 123–53. ——. 2013. Highlands of history: Indigenous identity and its antecedents in Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 54 (3): 282–95. Park, C. M. Y. and M. Maffii. 2015. Landscapes of Control and Appropriation: The Missing Indigenous Woman. Chiang Mai, Thailand. Paterson, G. 1997. Traditional Resource Tenure and Livelihood Systems of Ethnic Minorities in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. “Responding to Rapid Change.” Paper presented at UNDP/HPP/IMC Regional Workshop, Phnom Penh. Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia: NTFP Project. Salemink, O. 2003. The Ethnography of Vietnam’s Central Highlanders: A Historical Contextualization, 1850–1990. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Sau, S. 2012. A study on cross-border trade facilitation and regional development along economic corridors in Cambodia, in M. Ishida (ed.). Emerging Economic Corridors in the Mekong Region, BRC Research Report No. 8. Bangkok: Bangkok Research Center, IDE-JETRO. Schweyer, A.-V. 2004. Po Nagar de Nha Trang (1re partie). Aséanie 14 (1): 109–40. Scott, J. C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Swift, P. 2013. Changing ethnic identities among the Kuy in Cambodia: Assimilation, reassertion and the making of Indigenous identity. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 54 (3): 296–308. Turton, A. (ed.). 2000. Civility and Savagery: Social Identity in Tai States. London: Routledge.

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Cambodia’s Highlanders Un, K. and S. So. 2011. Land rights in Cambodia: How neopatrimonial politics restricts land policy reform. Pacific Affairs 84 (2): 289–308. UNCOHCHR. 2004. Land Concessions for Economic Purposes in Cambodia: A Human Rights Perspective. Phnom Penh: United Nations Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Vogel, S. 2011. Aspects de la Culture Traditionnelle des Bunoong du Mondulkiri. Phnom Penh: Tuk Tuk Editions. White, J. 1995. Of Spirits and Services: Health and Healing amongst the Hill Tribes of Rattanakiri Province. Phnom Penh: Health Unlimited. Zucker, E. M. 2013. Forest of Struggle: Moralities of Remembrance in Upland Cambodia. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. Zweers, J. and Sok Mary. 2002. “The Spirits are Leaving”: Changing Beliefs and Attitudes among the Krueng, Jarai and Tompuen regarding their Natural Resources. Phnom Penh: International Development Research Center.

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12 UNDER PRESSURE Environmental Risk and Contemporary Resilience Strategies in Rural Cambodia Laurie Parsons

Cambodia is a country long acquainted both with risk and its mitigation. The unpredictability of the climate, predominantly low-lying and flat topography, and historical reliance on rain-fed agriculture makes the maintenance of livelihoods a considerable challenge. Nevertheless, it is one to which the Kingdom’s inhabitants have historically risen, using innovation and ingenuity to offset and mitigate the worst effects of the environment. The development of over 2,000 varieties of rice seed (Helmers 1997) suitable for various types and elevations of land under myriad conditions is a tangible example of this talent for adaptation, but of equal importance in the centuries-long struggle with nature have been the flexible, pragmatic, and enduring social resources upon which much of Cambodia continues to depend. The malleability of these institutions, systems, and conventions has long been their strength, allowing organizational principles of hierarchy and reciprocity to endure vast external changes. Even in the decade immediately following the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, Narak ([1998] cited in Pellini 2004) noted 29 different types of community association in contemporary use in Cambodia’s villages, almost all of which play some sort of role in community planning and the redistribution of wealth. Formal and semi-formal bodies such as these, however, tell only part of the story. Informal modes of association play an equally important role, helping villagers with similar income sources and asset levels to pool risk via traditional lending practices and labor sharing; in doing so giving rise to the multi-layered structure, “like a Buddhist temple” (Mehmet 1997, 676), of Khmer society. Nevertheless, such systems, through reciprocal, are constructed and maintained for practical, not egalitarian reasons (Platteau and Abraham 2002; Ledgerwood 2002; Scott 1985). Rather than existing automatically, or on a purely moral basis, they require a degree of inter-reliance amongst patrons, clients, and peers (Fafchamps 2005; Platteau 1991; Scott 1985), a factor that is being eroded by the mechanization of agriculture and disaster-led smallholder land concentration. As a result, the landless or smallholding labor force, long vital to the rural economy, has been forced to seek out new sources of credit and risk mitigation. Increasingly, this has meant mass recourse to Cambodia’s booming microfinance environment (Bylander 2014), whose client base has more than quadrupled since 2005 (Cambodia Microfinance Association 2014) and which has been hailed as a “tremendous success” (World Bank 2009, 1) in various quarters. What these plaudits fail to note, however, is that despite its easy quantification, debt is a fundamentally social process. As forewarned by Bateman (2010, 2), among others, the easy 146

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availability of credit in this way serves not only to further “structurally weaken” traditional systems of community solidarity, but to impel the poorest members of those communities towards an inescapable commitment to modern-sector labor. Thus, rather than assuaging the risk of Cambodia’s worsening natural environment, the burgeoning debt landscape has instead transformed it from a socio-ecological to a socio-economic phenomenon, as each new shock sees more debt taken up and more migration taking place. In this way, the “haves” and “have nots” of Cambodia’s economic development are chosen, as ever, by the climate. Now, though, the whims of the weather are rendered permanent by capital. In seeking to elucidate this process, this chapter will begin by outlining the ecological risks faced by rural Cambodians and the strategies undertaken to mitigate them. Having noted the ongoing changes underway in terms of both risks faced and responses employed, it will highlight the negative feedbacks to local ecology that the avoidance of short-term risk can bring. Having laid these foundations, a broader conception of risk incorporating migration, debt, and wage dependency will highlight the impact of ecological vulnerability on modern-sector livelihoods and, finally, on long-term inequality.

The development of rural risk: local responses and negative feedbacks In Cambodia, as in many parts of the developing world more generally, farming is as much about managing the various modalities and permutations of risk as the tending of crops or livestock. Indeed, for the millions of Cambodians engaged in subsistence agriculture, the potential detriments to their livelihoods are so many and the margins for error so small that preparation for the worst is an essential daily activity in an environment where “perhaps the one constant is the day-to-day uncertainty of survival” (Marshke and Berkes 2006, 1). These preparations take a variety of forms, but the power of the climate in Cambodia is such that physically prophylactic measures are costly. Farmers who can afford to dig wells or channels, or purchase a pump to provide their land with water in case of drought, do so, but effectively mitigating the effects of flood is almost impossible for anybody not in possession of expensive high land. As a result, an important element in the response of rural Cambodians to the rigors of their climate, in common with many of their peers in the developing world, has been a social one. Traditional labor-sharing practices such as provas dei (lit.: lend a hand), interpersonal lending arrangements, charity, and information exchange have all historically served to hedge against the unfavorable odds of a lifetime’s successful harvests. In recent years, however, the margins between which farmers must work have become yet finer. In the roughly two decades since Cambodia’s first post-war elections took place, a string of record-breaking natural disasters has ravaged the agricultural livelihoods of a predominantly rural populace. The devastating flood, and in some cases subsequent drought, of 1993 was one of the worst in the country’s recorded history and rather than being an isolated event, would prove to be a harbinger of an ecologically unstable new era. The turn of the millennium brought a succession of alternating floods and droughts “for five successive years” between 2000 and 2005 (Oeur et al. 2012) and shock-free years have since been rare. In total, Cambodia has suffered six of the worst ten natural disasters in its history during the previous two decades (EM-DAT 2014). The frequency and extent of such disasters, often affecting millions at a time (EM-DAT 2014) render it difficult to avoid reference to global climate change. In this respect, although a link “has yet to be established” (Oeur et al. 2012, 61), “the Mekong River Commission has calculated that the average temperature in Cambodia increased by 0.8°C from 1960 to 2005” (MRC in CDRI 2012, 62). Moreover, it has been further “projected that the mean 147

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temperature will have risen by a further 0.3° to 0.6°C by 2025 and another 1.4°C to 4.3°C by 2090” (CDRI 2012, 62). As such, this process of environmental change, rather than being a case of numbers, forecasts and warnings as it often appears in the Western world, is a daily reality in Cambodia. Throughout the Kingdom, farmers complain of increasingly erratic patterns of rainfall, oscillating unpredictably between too much and too little, which render the traditional balance of inputs and outputs obsolete and force many practitioners of agriculture to absorb huge crop losses on a regular basis. Profits can still be made, but only the possession of expensive, irrigated, high land, or a portfolio of multiple land types can guarantee them in the long term. For those not thus endowed, farming has become an increasingly unappealing livelihood, characterized by rising production costs and falling returns (Bylander, 2013). Resultantly, the volume of sales of agricultural land has increased markedly over the past 20 years (Parsons 2016), with each major climate shock prompting a new flurry of “distressed land sales” (Oeur et al. 2012). Invariably, these transfers take place from owners of one, or a few plots, to farmers with several, thereby enhancing the latter’s ability to hedge against climate shocks via multiple land locations and seed types and making further gains more likely during any subsequent shocks. In this way, the widely noted implications of climate change for global inequality (e.g. Roberts 2001; Redclift and Sage 1998) are in some ways mirrored at the local level, as the better off find themselves more able to adapt to less predictable agricultural conditions and the less well off are forced into alternative livelihoods. Moreover, this process is not a linear one, but incorporates multiple negative feedbacks, as the alternative rural livelihoods into which former farmers are compelled by the climate become subject to increasing pressure from the community. For example, the unpredictability of the conditions upon which Cambodian agriculture depends has a corollary in the creeping diminution in the quality of fisheries in the area. As fishermen reported during a recent study in Kandal province, south Cambodia, “the quantity of fish is getting lower and lower . . . and also it is getting hotter and hotter, making the water levels low” (Yan Yin, cited in Parsons 2014, 117). Nationwide, this has already resulted in “ongoing stresses for resource dependent fishing communities” (Marschke and Berkes 2006, 1), but the threat of negative feedbacks looms even larger. Indeed, as a second Kandal fisherman noted, the key issues faced by those involved in local fisheries have begun to compound each other, putting increasing pressure on fish stocks and forcing many to “use illegal equipment which kills all the fish” (Run Tooks, cited in Parsons 2014, 117). The latter of these fishers refers, in particular, to the masin chut, a jerry rigged device comprising a plastic fishing rod tied to a basket and hooked up to a car battery. From the tip of the rod, two small, stiff, wires extend a few centimeters apart which, when touched upon the surface of the water, discharge a current strong enough to electrocute any fish within a radius of a few feet. Compared with traditional fishing methods, which require not only a far greater level of skill, but also considerable time and energy, the yields are enticingly high. Some fishers reported a yield of roughly double the average obtainable without the device, although even this may be an underestimate: according to data from Battambang province, in the northwest of Cambodia, improvements of up to five times may be commonplace (Kurien 2007). Although such practices are illegal throughout Cambodia, the ability to make as much as quintuple yields (Kurien 2007) provides a strong incentive to circumvent such legal prohibition. Moreover, given that those involved in fishing tend to have among the least assets available with which to move away from the use of deteriorating water resources—and in many cases also lack the money and social connections to migrate—many fishermen in Cambodia are left only with the choice between accruing formal debt for consumption, or, at an investment 148

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cost of only US$30–40 (Kurien 2007), the masin chut, and the short-term prospect of a better life it offers. One villager, who charges the batteries used by the fisherman for a fee, explained that those involved in the practice have no other choice: These batteries are for electrocuting mice, which are a major pest in the fields, but people also use them for fishing. Most of the people who use them to catch fish are poor people. The authorities have banned this [practice], but they continue because if they don’t do it they will have nothing to eat. (Bo Simlai, cited in Parsons 2014, 18) An irony of which many of those involved in electric fishing are all too aware, however, is that the use of such methods within water resources already under severe pressure from the effects of overpopulation, land concessions and development, and changing rainfall patterns (Bansok et al. 2011) creates a vicious cycle which forces ever greater numbers into unsustainable fishing practices. Already, fishermen across the country have been noted to complain that whereas “two or three decades ago fish were plentiful, especially big fish,” now “fish catches are changing; fish are smaller and the size of individual catches has been decreasing” (Bansok et al. 2011, 33). Earning a livelihood via engagement in traditional, sustainable, fishing practices is consequently becoming an increasingly difficult task in many parts of the Kingdom, forcing many of its poorest or most disaster-hit inhabitants into illegal activities to survive. Moreover, for those dependent upon fisheries for their survival the pursuit of yield-enhancing, often illegal, activities is rendered all the more pressing by the proliferation of upstream dams on the Mekong River. Despite warnings that hydropower generation projects in Laos and Northern Cambodia would “directly . . . influence fish catches and hence people around the lake” (Kummu et al. 2005, 89), a number of such schemes have already come to fruition. Further dam construction is (counter to the recommendation of the Mekong River Commission 2010) ongoing and planned in the coming decade, a development likely “to degrade the livelihoods of the poorest communities in Mekong riparian provinces.” Faced with such developments, and as is often the case for the world’s poorest, the only means to mitigate one sort of risk is to expose one’s household to several others: in this case, electrocution, arrest, and the long-term destruction of vital local fish stocks. Moreover, the masin chut is merely a microcosm of the technological pressures placed on the livelihoods of the landless or near landless. Running in parallel to the declining viability of two of the key bases of rural livelihood, smallholder agriculture and fisheries, has been a concordant falling off of a third: rural wage labor. This situation derives largely from the rise of mechanized farming, which, as highlighted during the earlier development of Malaysia by Scott (1985), has had a socio-economic impact with ramifications far beyond the increased efficiency it offers its owners in their farming practices. As a result of such technological advancements, agricultural wage labor during peak farming periods, long the key check and balance within patron–client relations (see also Scott 1972), is in many areas needed in considerably smaller quantities than it once was. Consequently, a near guarantee of well-paid work for at least a few weeks per year has in some parts of the country been replaced with a pool of work which even during good years is far smaller than the labor force available to do it. As such, Cambodia’s rural development has not been limited to the economy. Interwoven with this economic shift in rural production factor values—capital leapfrogging labor as the dominant resource for village-level investment—is a social metamorphosis of equal importance. The patron–client system, as a result of the lessening role of hired labor in the village economy, 149

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has become “drastically unbalanced” (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002, 115) in favour of the patron, whose increasingly favorable position with regard to rural wage labor purchase provides little incentive to cultivate connections or fulfil obligations to clients. In this way, as the “web of traditional social relations . . . [is] . . . loosened” (Platteau 1991, 47) so too is the protection it provides against risks of various kinds decreased, forcing clients to look elsewhere for the loans, wages, and credit necessary to smooth consumption in the face of unpredictable rural incomes. In response to these changing realities, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians, caught between a worsening climate and failing community support structures, have abandoned traditional livelihood strategies in favor of those presented by the Kingdom’s economic development. Increasingly, this has meant migrating either to urban centers or abroad. However, migration, even to the homogeneous environment of a factory, is neither a uniform process nor one which eliminates risk. Just as environmental pressures are experienced differently by individuals and households holding differing resources, so too is the character of migrant labor dependent also on rural factors. What follows will begin to delineate something of the nature of these complex interlinkages and their implications for Cambodian society.

The new landscape of risk: rural–urban linkages and mobile inequality Although many of the threats to Cambodian livelihoods have their origins at the national or international level—most obviously in the case of climate change, economic land concessions and overfishing—the manner in which these broad changes are experienced is in fact local, diverse, and intimately connected to heterogeneous household livelihoods. Small differences in the demography, asset portfolio, or land location of a given household often mean an entirely different set of responses to, and outcomes from, a pressure or shock. Economic opportunities, similarly, though they may originate from global market forces, are mediated via local level constraints. Part of the reason for this heterogeneous response to the natural and economic environment is the multiple combinations of livelihoods that characterize Cambodia’s villages. Rather than being a land whose household activity is dominated entirely by rice production, as some statistics might understandably, but ultimately misleadingly, suggest, the unpredictability of the climate from the point of view of rice growing (Helmers 1997) has long necessitated a variety of alternatives to the staple. Nevertheless, the range of response was predominantly local, as for many centuries during the pre-colonial period lower population densities and the cultivation of multiple seed types designed to hedge against uncertain farming conditions meant that alternative strategies rarely extended beyond recourse to the “abundant food coming from forests and lakes” (Helmers 1997, 2). In the modern era, by contrast, the spread of physical infrastructure—which has rapidly accelerated following “major rehabilitation efforts since the mid-1990s” (Un 2013, 455)—has transformed this picture, investing fruit and other cash crops with a value they previously did not have, promoting trade in livestock, and multiple opportunities to move away from agriculture entirely. Today, a diminishing proportion of Cambodian households rely entirely on rice farming for their subsistence, preferring increasingly to use the excess labor which most households possess outside of peak agricultural periods to engage in alternative earning strategies, including petty trade, rural–urban and rural–rural labor migration, and cash crop cultivation amongst others. This broadening range of alternatives to traditional agriculture undoubtedly constitutes one of the strategies utilized by Cambodians as a means of coping with the increasingly unpredictable 150

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environment. Despite this, however, it would not be correct, as Barnett and Webber (2010, 3) have argued, to suggest that the pursuance of such alternative strategies constitutes an effective means of “sustain[ing] livelihoods in the face of environmental and economic perturbations and change.” Nor, furthermore, is it reasonable to assert that labor migration of this sort “enhances the sustainable development of both sending and host areas” (Barnett and Webber 2010, 3). Chief among the failures of this perspective are its inability to address either the nuance of household labor management, or the vital interrelationships between the rural and urban contexts. Indeed, as various authors have sought to show in the Cambodian context (see Parsons et al. 2014; Diepart 2010; Kalab 1968) and abroad (see Potts 2010; Gugler 1968; 1991), the linkages which bind rural and urban livelihoods do not degrade, freeing migrants from rural pressures, but even strengthen over time. Moreover, there exists a broadening understanding that these ties engender bi-directional flows (Hobbs and Jameson 2012), thereby drawing the countryside—and the increasing unpredictability of production and livelihoods it suffers—into an ever-tighter embrace with the city. In this way, the idea that the modern sector might serve as a panacea, or even a sustainable treatment, for progressive degradation in the agrarian environment is falsely grounded. The nature of household labor distribution strategies in Cambodia is such that migrants very rarely escape and often do not even reduce their engagement with environmental risk. Indeed, even today only a small proportion of households, comprising elderly widows primarily (Parsons 2014), rely exclusively on remittances, with a majority incorporating homeward-bound urban wages into a diverse livelihoods portfolio, which often retains a strong grounding in agriculture. The social and financial obligations which bind factory to farm in this way ensure that migrant workers feel the impact of a failed crop on their livelihoods every bit as acutely as those who remain in the village. In addition to remittances, one of the key mechanisms linking rural and urban livelihoods is the changing character of debt, the uptake of which has adapted, rather than expanded, in the wake of Southeast Asia’s microfinance “revolution” (Goenka and Henley 2013). Indeed, in contrast to the oft-quoted narrative of credit voids and “dependence on commercially specialized minorities” (Henley and Goenka 2010, 3), many of the quotidian requirements of agricultural income smoothing have traditionally been met via informal lending arrangements, often between peers and on a reciprocal, small-group basis (Phlong 2009; Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Many of these credit systems were, and in some cases continue to be, based on “a culture of reciprocity embedded in kinship practices, loyalty and sharing among family, close friends, neighbours” rather than profit making (Phlong 2009, 1; Parsons 2016). Increasingly, however, the rising cost of inputs and the unreliability of returns from agriculture (Bylander 2013) are driving more and more farmers to take on formal debt, the total volume of which has more than quintupled during the last decade (Cambodia Microfinance Association 2014; World Bank 2009). Today, many rural Cambodians borrow money from formal institutions and informal lenders on at least a yearly basis in order to purchase agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, or hired labor during harvest and planting periods. Notwithstanding the cost of interest payments, such arrangements allow many poorer rural Cambodians to ensure their ability to farm with little immediate change or detriment to their livelihoods. However, when the crop, in anticipation of which the funds are borrowed, fails, alternative measures become necessary in order to meet interest payments, secure further debt to re-plant, or both. In many parts of Cambodia, labor migration to the modern sector is the obvious solution, prompting waves of new factory and construction workers in the wake of each major climate shock (Parsons et al. 2014). 151

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These linkages between the modern and traditional sectors are well understood in sender villages and migrant enclaves alike, where almost any conversation concerning the problems faced by themselves or their peers tends to include heavy reference to the issue of indebtedness, either on a household or community basis. Indeed, as a petty trader in Cham Jao, a suburban migrant enclave of Phnom Penh, stated last year: People come here due to very bad conditions in their home villages, especially related to debt. However, they often have to borrow money to come here in the first place, so after sending back repayments they often have nothing left at the end of the month, even to eat. (Cham Jao shopkeeper, cited in Parsons 2014, 164) This scenario, wherein the level of remittances needed to service household debt repayments is sufficiently high as to compromise even the basic consumption needs of the sending migrant, is far from uncommon in Cambodia. Moreover, it is made even less so by the greater difficulties and costs faced by poorer migrants compared with their wealthier counterparts. Indeed, as elsewhere in the developing world, the poorest members of rural communities often live furthest from commercial and infrastructural resources and consequently possess weak linkages, not only to these physical assets but also to the information, connections, and linkages with which they tend to be associated (Chambers 1983). As a result, those at the socio-economic and geographic margins of these communities are more exposed to risk not only from the environment, but also in any attempts they may make to secure modern sector work (Parsons 2016). Thus, the worst effects of the climate serve, in many cases, not only to promulgate labor migration via the imposition of debts and the need to repay them, but also to determine the manner in which it takes place. The more marginal are therefore triply disadvantaged: they are less able to absorb or mitigate climate shocks; are consequently less able to plan or save for the incidence of their family’s labor movement; and as a result suffer a greater risk of migrating unsuccessfully. Should failure in this regard occur, moreover, this three-stage process redoubles to become a cycle. More of any remaining assets must be sold, even greater levels of debt taken on and further, riskier, migrations attempted. All Cambodian villages have their stories of those who have gambled on the city and lost in this way. However, in spite of, or perhaps due to, the ubiquitous presence of such warning tales, outright failures of migration are in fact rare in reality. Far more commonly, those migrants who are forced by climate pressures to attempt a migration without the social connections, information, and finance that for the better off would be a prerequisite, are simply less efficient in their search, requiring more time, money, and debt to reach employment. For example, without up-to-date employment information, more factories must be visited, more rent paid, and more food eaten prior to the first paycheck. Additional expenses may also be higher, with some migrants suggesting that family connections, in particular, may help to reduce the bribes certain “gatekeeper” individuals demand for entry to factory or construction work. Moreover, once ensconced in a modern-sector job, the stain of disadvantage does not disappear. Even in a garment factory environment, where the majority of employees earn roughly the same salary, the much higher burden of remittances on poorer migrants means that they lead vastly different lives to their wealthier counterparts (Parsons 2016). Migrants whose households fall within the lowest third of village incomes remit on average nearly 50 percent more than those whose rural incomes place them in the highest third: a hugely significant difference in terms of the urban livelihood each group is able to lead. As a result of these inequalities of obligation, the poorest migrants, many of whom send the majority of their monthly paycheck home, have little or no ability to engage with their urban 152

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environment, whereas migrants from better-off households are far more able to consume, explore, and experience the world around their work places. In turn, this greater degree of freedom, and especially the reduced need to remit, is associated with considerably improved outcomes from migration. Migrants who may be judged to have “advanced” in the urban environment since arriving—either by improving their salary or their working conditions—remit less than 10 percent of their earnings, compared with nearly 45 percent among those who have not done so (Parsons 2016). Thus, migrants from wealthier households have the opportunity to thrive in the city, building durable social networks to peers or even urban patrons—such as policemen, businessmen, or local officials—in the process (Parsons et al. 2014). As long held within network theory (see Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Burt 2001; Granovetter 1973), linkages of this sort are a crucial means of gaining informational advantage and hence access to a wider pool of employment options compared with those who are more restrained in their urban activities by the scale of their remittance commitments. Moreover, given that debt repayments are one of the primary motivations for migrants to come to and remain in the city, many individual migrants’ futures are bound up in the weighty financial legacies of their households’ ecological misfortunes. In this way, the opportunities offered by Cambodia’s economic development and the liabilities threatened by its degrading environment do not act discretely upon the Kingdom’s inhabitants. Rather, the two forces combine catalytically to alter rural livelihoods: one reducing the viability of smallholder agriculture, while the other provides both an alternative—the modern sector—and the means to get there—debt. Each shock or sustained period of climate pressure sends a new wave of rural Cambodians from badly affected households in search of urban wages, often beginning a new life which continued crop losses, or land sale, make permanent. However, the construction site or factory floor peers of these disaster-hit migrants are not necessarily their equals either at present or in the future. For every sold plot there is a buyer in the village; for every migrant chipping away at unending household debts, a saver, working to invest in land, a new business or farming equipment. Thus, rural society in Cambodia, though certainly “less harmonious and more differentiated” (Rigg 2001, 83) than the eulogistic accounts of the French colonialists, is becoming more and more unequal in terms not only of assets but also of risk. Patronage systems, long the lifeline of the poor, but ultimately pragmatic and flexible in character, can do little to hold communities together under such circumstances (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2007; Ledgerwood 2002; Platteau 1995; Scott 1985, 1972). Consequently, although “adaptive capacity to climate change is continually being reshaped through social relationships” (Pelling and High 2005, 308), so too are the wider social systems from which these responses emerge being themselves re-wrought by the Cambodia’s changing profile of risk.

Conclusion Many of the pressures with which Cambodian farmers are increasingly burdened are ancient ones: storms, droughts, pests, and floods have troubled farmers’ livelihoods for centuries and, as Helmers (1997, 2) notes, have long been the objects of “specialized rice production . . . and rice breeding and selection” designed to meet the idiosyncratic difficulties of these local conditions. Nevertheless, as highlighted above with reference to the masin chut, for instance, changes in the manner of the response to these difficulties, promulgated partly by technology and partly by the greater regularity and severity of the climate pressures in recent times, alter the manner in which they are experienced, ultimately increasing the risk faced at both a community and individual level. Indeed, electric fishing in this way effectively replaces one 153

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risk—not catching enough fish—with several others of greater long-term severity: electrocution, arrest, and the exhaustion of fisheries. Thus, as the preceding section sought to demonstrate, the nature of risk in twenty-firstcentury Cambodia has been, and continues to be, subject to a process of disaggregation and deepening. Where once the climate, subsequently in conjunction with taxes (Helmers 1997), provided the core of a risk environment predominantly confined to the village itself, today’s liabilities often extend across hundreds, or even thousands, of miles, to the land concessions, factories, and construction sites of Rattanakiri, Thailand, and Malaysia. Furthermore, although risk in Cambodia has never been a uniform process, the traditionally iniquitous exposure to hazards in the Kingdom is growing further and further apart as the smaller scale of risk faced by the better off allows them to consolidate an advantage in the long term, both in terms of assets and progressive risk reduction. As such, the economic and ecological changes currently underway in Cambodia are not experienced by its population directly, but are mediated via social systems operating at multiple scales. Consequently, village- and household-level power relations alike are in the process of being reordered according to the new realities of income generation and risk mitigation in the Kingdom. However, although this process has seen certain individuals, households, or groups make gains, the general trend, in common with several of the outcomes of Cambodia’s two decades of neoliberalization, is one of economic and social polarization. Two decades of “tremendous . . . pro poor” growth (Sobrado et al. 2014, 13) have raised mean incomes, but at the cost of a deepening inequality that cannot be accurately demonstrated by economic measures alone. Thus, as a result of two decades of untrammelled economic expansion, some of Cambodia’s poorest have gained access to modern-sector wages, but increasingly at the cost of economic relevance to their own communities and with it their social safety nets against the rigors of a capricious and worsening climate.

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Under Pressure Goenka, A. and D. Henley (eds.). 2013. Southeast Asia’s Credit Revolution: From Moneylenders to Microfinance. London: Routledge. Granovetter, M. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78 (6): 1360–1380. Gugler, J. 1968. The impact of labor migration on society and economy in sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical findings and theoretical considerations. African Social Research, 6: 463–486. ——. 1991. Life in a dual system revisited: Urban–rural ties in Enugu, Nigeria, 1961–87. World Development, 19 (5): 399–409. Helmers, K. 1997. Rice in the Cambodian economy: Past and present, in H. J. Nesbitt (ed.) Rice Production in Cambodia. Manila: International Rice Research Institute. Henley, D. and A. Goenka. 2010. Introduction: From moneylenders to microfinance in Southeast Asia, in A. Goenka and D. Henley (eds.) Southeast Asia’s Credit Revolution: From Moneylenders to Microfinance. London: Routledge. Hobbs, A. W. and K. P. Jameson. 2012. Measuring the effect of bi-directional migration remittances on poverty and inequality in Nicaragua. Applied Economics, 44 (19): 2451–2460. Kalab, M. 1968. Study of a Cambodian village. Geographical Journal, 13 (4): 521–537. Kummu, M., J. Koponen, and J. Sarkkula. 2005. Modelling sediment and ecosystem in Tonle Sap Lake for impact assessment. RMZ – Materials and Geoenvironmental, 52 (1): 87–89. Kurien, J. 2007 “Shocking reality”: Cambodia’s electro-fishing. Samudra Report (48) ICSF. Ledgerwood, J. and J. Vijghen. 2002. Decision-making in rural Khmer villages, in J. Ledgerwood (ed.) Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays. DeKalb: Northern Illinois Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 109–150. Marschke, M. J. and F. Berkes, F. 2006. Exploring strategies that build livelihood resilience: A case from Cambodia. Ecology and Society, 11 (1): 42. Mehmet, O. 1997. Development in a wartorn society: What next in Cambodia? Third World Quarterly, 18 (4): 673–686. Mekong River Commission. 2010. Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream: Summary of the Final Report Victoria: International Centre for Environmental Management. Narak, S. 1998. Historically Rooted Organizations in the Traditional Rural Community in Stung District, Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia,” Internal Report, GTZ Provincial Development Programme, Kampong Thom. Oeur, I. L., A. Sopha, and J. McAndrew. 2012. Understanding social capital in response to flood and drought: A study of five villages in two ecological zones in Kampong Thom Province, in A. Pellini (ed.) Engaging for the Environment: The Contribution of Social Capital to Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Learning Institute, 60–84. Parsons, L. 2014. From Risk to Society: Function, Form and Discord in the Cambodian Labor Migration System. Doctoral dissertation, King’s College London. ——. 2016. The Dark Side of Remittances: The Replication of rural inequalities in Cambodia’s urban migrant enclaves. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Online before print. Parsons, L., S. Lawreniuk, and J. Pilgrim. 2014. Wheels within wheels: Poverty, power and patronage in the Cambodian migration system. Journal of Development Studies, 50 (1): 1362–1379. Pelling, M. and C. High. 2005. Understanding adaptation: What can social capital offer assessments of adaptive capacity? Global Environmental Change, 15 (4): 308–319. Phlong, P. 2009. Informal Credit Systems in Cambodia. Doctoral dissertation, Northern Illinois University. http://media.proquest.com/media/pq/classic/doc/1798481141/fmt/ai/rep/NPDF?_s=oJqV3AzKS drX2qWW1X5%2FMy6XVPk%3D. Accessed June 16, 2014. Platteau, J. P. 1991. Traditional systems of social security and hunger insurance: Past achievements and modern challenges, in E. Ahmad, J. Dreze, J. Hills, and A. Sen (eds.) Social Security in Developing Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 112–171. ——. 1995. A framework for the analysis of evolving patron-client ties in agrarian economies. World Development, 23 (5): 767–786. Platteau, J. P., & Abraham, A. 2002. Participatory development in the presence of endogenous community imperfections. Journal of Development Studies, 39 (2): 104–136. Potts, D. 2010. Circular Migration in Zimbabwe and Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer. Redclift, M. and C. Sage. 1998. Global environmental change and global inequality: North/South perspectives. International Sociology, 13 (4): 499–516. Rigg, J. 2001. More than the Soil: Rural Change in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge.

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13 CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA Governing Profits, Extending State Power and Enclosing Resources from the Colonial Era to the Present Jean-Christophe Diepart and Laura Schoenberger

Introduction In Cambodia, the notion of concession (sambathian) traces back to the French colonial period when concessions were introduced to allow for large-scale management and exploitation of forest and fisheries resources and the development of agricultural land under plantations. Since their inception, concessions have been much more than a tool for natural resources management; they also function as a central instrument in power and governance systems. In this chapter we focus on forestry and land concessions. Starting from the large forest enclosures initiated by colonial rule, concessions have been re-tooled and re-shaped continuously until the present. In contemporary Cambodia— characterized by weak regulating institutions—concessions have become a central instrument of sovereign power through patronage-based distributive practices. At the end of the 1990s, the forest concession system was dismantled and transformed in the context of the new regulatory framework for land that emerged with the 2001 Land Law. In spite of the political economy underpinning concession management remaining unchanged, the system evolved into Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) for agro-industrial development paired with Social Land Concessions (SLCs) functioning as a mechanism to allocate land to landless and landpoor households. Driven by strong interests in farmland investment, large land deals have been concentrated in the uplands of the entire country. It is against the rapid changes unleashed by these ELCs that we hold up the ineffectiveness of redistributive land reform through SLCs. The chapter discusses contemporary issues revolving around ELCs. We challenge the contribution of ELCs as a tool to promote rural development in Cambodia. Instead, we maintain that ELCs have contributed—in convergence with other drivers—to land dispossession and an increase in farm/non-farm wage labor. We also suggest that ELCs have induced the emergence of very violent struggles for land played out across the country and have concurrently fomented and emboldened various social movements. We show that recent attempts to address land insecurity in the uplands created by ELCs have resulted in new forms of fragmentation of upland territories while simultaneously reinforcing the role of ELCs in the rural landscape of contemporary Cambodia. 157

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Historical trajectories of concessions: from colonial roots to post-Khmer Rouge conflicts Cambodia owes the introduction of concessions (sambathian) to the French protectorate (1863– 1953). In the colonial era, these concessions aimed towards a gradual modernization of administrative mechanisms, along with the management of forest, fisheries, and agricultural land sectors though large-scale investment and operations.

Forestry To sustain colonial forest rents, the French administration initiated a system of forest reserves to allow for forest regeneration. Starting in 1902, logging activities were regulated within these state enclosures according to licenses signed between French companies and the forest administration, the so-called “exclusive logging privilege—privilèges exclusifs de coupe.” This was a clear attempt to substitute small-scale indigenous forest use with large-scale entrepreneurial exploitation (Thomas 1999) and represents the beginning of the concession system in Cambodia. As part of this, Cambodians were denied access to these forests (Gouvernement Général d’Indochine 1910) which also meant the drastic reduction of grazing herds. The rules and coercive measures that accompanied colonial forestry tended to spare the French entrepreneurs and hung the repression over peasants and local authorities (Thomas 1999). After independence, acute nationalism during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) meant that foreigners were not able to manage forest concessions. The civil war from 1970 to 1975 and the Khmer Rouge’s focus on agricultural development paradoxically saved Cambodia’s forests from the destruction associated with economic growth in the ASEAN region (Le Billon 2000). In 1989, an official at the Council of Ministers remarked “if we have no good way to manage timber, we will become a country with no trees because we have been cooperating with Vietnam to the East and with Thailand to the West” (Gottesman 2003, 293). As early as 1979, agreements on forest exploitation were made between Khmer Rouge (KR) leaders and the Thai military in the Northwest (Le Billon 2000; Hibou 2004). Approximately 15 Thai companies that were subject to a logging ban in Thailand were granted access to large forest areas in the northwestern territories controlled by the KR (Gottesman 2003). The profits derived from these agreements were tremendous and allowed the KR to finance their resistance war against government and Vietnamese troops (Le Billon and Springer 2007). Meanwhile, in eastern Cambodia, logging was primarily for trade with the Vietnamese. In some cases this meant that the Vietnamese-led People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government granted logging licenses to Vietnamese investors on a year-to-year basis (Curtis 1989, cited in Analyzing Development Issues 2004); in other cases local military units took control of logging activities and timber revenues; while in others joint timber companies were formed with Vietnamese investors to facilitate timber exports to Vietnam and PRK control of the timber trade (Gottesman 2003). It is on the basis of these initial “joint ventures” that forest concessions were (re)established in the mid-1980s, 100 years after they were first introduced in Cambodia by the French (Le Billon 2000; Hibou 2004).

Agriculture Land concessions for plantation agriculture were an important tool of French colonization in Indochina, particularly in southern Vietnam but also in Cambodia. The first rubber plantation in Cambodia, the Chup Plantation, was established by the French in 1921 and was at one time 158

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the largest rubber plantation in the world (Slocomb 2007). By the 1930s, less than a decade after land was first granted to French investors, rubber was the third largest export from Cambodia. Commentators writing during this period made claims that the large rubber plantations “marked the beginning of capitalist colonisation in Indochina” (Virginia Thompson 1937, cited in Slocomb 2007). Slocomb (2007) argues that these colonial rubber plantations provided a form of modern innovation for agriculture in that they commodified land and labor in entirely new ways by introducing habits of speculation in land and development of land for profit and capitalized rents. Extending beyond transformations of the agrarian system, Slocomb (2007) further locates plantations in changes to state structures by linking the development of the plantations to a rationally functioning, modern bureaucratic state—albeit a French colonial state—on which they depended. As such, the plantation system was intimately tied with forms of state power and its manifestation. French companies continued to run the plantations they had developed in the 1920s and 1930s after independence, but no new concessions were granted to foreign investors (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2010). In the Sangkum Reastr Niyum period (1955–70), rubber was the principal source of foreign currency reserves and together with rice was one of the twin pillars of national development and economic independence (Slocomb 2010). The political sea change that swept through Cambodia in the 1970s shifted the control over the important rubber plantations and revenue. In 1970, the war destroyed half of the rubber plantations’ production, and communist forces blocked all transport of rubber (Slocomb 2010). In the early days of the PRK regime, Vietnamese advisors focused on producing rubber exclusively in areas near to the Vietnamese border where they could control the day-to-day operations and trade (Slocomb 2010). State rubber plantations, one of the few state-owned enterprises that generated revenue, faced declines over the course of the 1980s and yet rubber was the second largest export earner after timber in 1988, the last year of the PRK regime (Slocomb 2010). In the context of privatization of state-owned enterprises and intensive rubber smuggling, the control of rubber plantations and their future was tense by 1990. Rifts at the national level led Hun Sen and the Council of Ministers to grant control of tens of thousands of hectares directly to provincial authorities (Gottesman 2003).

The development of a concession economy in the 1990s In the 1990s, the forest concession system was reintroduced with strong support from international organizations, particularly the World Bank, and became the main tenure system for natural resource management in Cambodia. The central objectives of this system were to put an end to the prevailing anarchy in forest management by introducing a “transparent” concession system so as to generate revenues for post-war reconstruction efforts, to create value-added products from the timber sector, and to stimulate local employment (Hibou 2004). These aims were not aligned with the political context of the 1990s, which was characterized by post-war political struggles between factions of the new governmental coalition (CPP and FUNCINPEC) and the continued war with the KR in the Northwest. The reconstruction of patronage networks by each party seeking to control the country generated violent political struggles, and the need for both parties to generate revenue intensified the recourse to grant forest and land concessions. Le Billon (2000, 785) argues that timber was a key stake in the rapacious transition from the socialism of the post-KR period to capitalism, and, in the process, became the most politicized resource in the reconstruction process. Indeed, the public–private partnership ideal—created by the international community to assist reconstruction—resulted in 159

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a generalized and uncontrolled privatization of state natural resources to serve the interests of political and military leaders (Global Witness 2007; McKenney and Prom 2002).

Centralization and concentration of state power through concessions The development of a concession economy served important processes tied to ending the civil war and Hun Sen concentrating power for himself and the CPP. This concession system allowed for a progressive centralization and control of power by Hun Sen at the expense of opposition leaders and even of his rivals within the CPP; it resulted in a fusion of economic, political, military, judicial, and even religious power at all levels (Marchal 2004). In this context it is not surprising that the conception, implementation, and control of concession activities suffered from major deficiencies on the part of state administrators, the concessionaires and their sub-leasers (McKenney and Prom 2002; Hibou 2004). The absence of properly allocated human and financial resources made it virtually impossible to control the activities of concessionaires on the ground. Concession contracts did not include specific forest management measures that would allow for the regeneration of species, and so on. The exploitation of timber occurred not just within concession areas, but also frequently outside, too. There was no independent judicial system that could have conducted proper arbitration of the many conflicts. In the 1990s, the revenue generated from concession operations was immense, particularly in the forest sector. Le Billon (2002) suggests that between 1989 and 2001 at least 10 million cubic meters of timber, representing a total value of US$2.4 billion, was exported from Cambodia. Yet this generated only US$120 million for the national treasury (Le Billon 2002). A significant fraction of these informal revenues generated by forest exploitation and trade was captured by provincial or district authorities, members of the military and police, political party representatives and high-level civil servants (McKenney and Prom 2002). There was little incentive at the sub-national level to actually put an end to the concession system, since it gave enough freedom and benefits to key sub-national actors so that no one really questioned it. The social and territorial dynamics revolving around large concession activities—decided at the highest level of the state—allowed a variety of actors to become involved in similar processes at the sub-national level under the discretion of provincial, district, or commune authorities (Diepart 2007a). In the 1990s, this dynamic led to massive and illicit land acquisitions in the Cambodian countryside and to de facto privatization of state resources. The corollary was decreased access to common pool resources, which had a profoundly negative impact on rural livelihoods (Diepart 2010).

The extent of the Cambodian enclosures Between 1994 and 2001, 39 percent of Cambodia was allocated to forest concessions comprising 51 areas totalling 7,084,215 hectares (ha) and covering more than half of the forest resources at that time (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2006). The state did not turn to granting agricultural land on a rapid and large scale until somewhat later, and yet during the 1990s, the granting of agricultural concessions (palm oil, cassava, rubber, cashew, and sugarcane) was already on the move. As of December 31, 2001, the total area under agricultural concessions in Cambodia was 809,296 ha, leased to 40 companies (McKenney and Prom 2002). At that time, Cambodia had a relatively low population density, but the allocation of these concessions, combined with the establishment of protected areas in 1993, reinvigorated the land access problem that prevailed at the beginning of the century under French rule (Figure 13.1). 160

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Forest and fisheries concessions and Protected Areas as of the early 2000s

Data soucres: Forestry Administration, Fisheries Adminisration, Ministry of Environment (all data accessed in 2004); Open Development Cambodia, www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net; LICADHO, www.licadhocambodia.org; Map background: Natural Earth, www.naturalearthdata.com; Mapping: Authors.

Economic land concessions To address the fiasco of concessions management of the 1990s, the government, with the support of donors, began to reform forest concessions. These reforms established forest and fisheries co-management schemes between the state and local communities (the so-called community forestry, community fisheries, and community protected areas) but also were accompanied by the gradual substitution of forest concessions by economic and social land concessions—representing the cornerstone of the new Land Law established in 2001. Although the idea and rationales for concessions drew from the past, the implementation of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) resulted in new types of large-scale investments in rural Cambodia.

Rationale Economic Land Concessions were expected to stimulate agro-industrial activities and to develop so-called “under-utilized” land that required large capital investments that the state did not have. They were intended to increase employment in rural areas, to offer new opportunities for labor and employment in the countryside, and to encourage local economic diversification through investments upstream and downstream of the concession. ELCs were also meant to generate state revenue at national and sub-national levels. This rhetoric is largely the same as that which supported earlier forms of concessions decades earlier. 161

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Rising interest in farmland tied to price increases of agricultural commodities and land (Deininger et al. 2011), which echoed the influential 2008 World Development Report (2007b), renewed the urgency in large-scale investment agriculture. In Cambodia, the World Bank saw an opportunity to attract private investment and promote large-scale agricultural operations. While acknowledging the importance of securing property rights, the report suggested that that new investments were essential to increase the competitiveness of agriculture and other rural enterprise activities (World Bank 2007a). For the government of Cambodia, ELCs represent an opportunity to reinvigorate the very profitable concession economy after the collapse of forest and fisheries concessions in the 1990s. As potential opportunities for foreign investment, ELCs were also seen as a political tool to engage in ASEAN integration by allowing neighboring states and companies to invest in the Kingdom.

Legal framework ELCs were limited to land measuring no more than 10,000 ha granted for a maximum of 99 years (Royal Government of Cambodia 2005). There are no conditions with respect to who can apply for an ELC and no restrictions on foreigners obtaining concession contracts. An ELC must be developed within 12 months after issuance, otherwise the contract will be canceled. The 2005 sub-decree stipulates a number of safeguards to avoid adverse impacts on the local population, such as the production of a locally designed and approved land-use plan and solutions for re-settlement. Environmental and social impact assessments must be conducted and public consultations held with local authorities and residents. A Technical Secretariat, with representatives from eight ministries and other government institutions, was formed to support contracting authorities, including requests for a voluntary reduction of land concessions exceeding the new limit of 10,000 ha (Sperfeldt et al. 2012). The original sub-decree stipulated that provincial and municipal governors had authority to grant ELCs of less than 1,000 ha in land area or with a total investment value of less than US$2,500 (Article 29), but this provision was revoked in a revision of the sub-decree released in 2008 (Royal Government of Cambodia 2008). This arguably signals a deliberate attempt to re-centralize the management of these concessions. Officially, all operations are coordinated by MAFF and ratified by the prime minister. But, starting in 2008, the government has granted ELCs inside Protected Areas and Protection Forests under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry Administration, respectively. It is notable that the legal framework does not contain anything pertaining to ELCs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment or its territory.

The geography of economic land concession It is difficult to formulate an accurate picture of the location, size and status of all Economic Land Concessions because of a clear lack of transparency in ELC contracts. To depict the allocation of ELCs, we have tried to consolidate datasets available at the national level to obtain a spatially explicit database. This database suggests that 2,547,718 ha of land had been granted as ELCs by the end of December 2012. This represents 271 contracts but also includes ELCs that were canceled afterwards. Among these, 86 ELC contracts (32 percent of the total) exceed the legal limit of 10,000 ha. All ELCs are located in the peripheral uplands on both sides of the Tonle Sap Great Lake, with a higher concentration in the northeast. According to our database, nearly one million ha and 37 percent of the total area were granted for rubber plantations, by far the most important 162

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Legend Provincial boundary Area with private land title (as of February 2013) Protected areas Economic Land Concessions Total allocated = 2,547,718 ha Rubber (949,599 ha) Tree plantation (696,566 ha) Unknown (475,986 ha) Agro-industry–unspecified (132,489 ha) Oil palm (73,414 ha) Sugarcane (72,552 ha) Mixed (71,001 ha) Annual crop (46,705 ha) Tourism (29,406 ha)

Figure 13.2

Distribution of ELCs in Cambodia by type of crop/investment

Data source: Open Development Cambodia, www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net, ICADHO; www. licadho-cambodia.org; Map background: Natural Earth; www.naturalearthdata.com; Data Processing and Mapping: Authors.

crop (Figure 13.2). Actual figures may be higher, since in 2011 MAFF signed a deal with its Vietnamese counterpart granting 300,000 ha to grow rubber (Voice of Vietnam 2011).

Continuities in exclusions triggered by ELCs There is a broad consensus in Cambodia among NGOs and researchers that the process of authorizing and implementing Economic Land Concessions shows clear deviations from the established legal and policy framework (Sperfeldt et al. 2012; Subedi 2012). Public consultations and social and environmental impact assessments that should be carefully undertaken before any agreement is signed are rarely conducted properly, if at all (Sperfeldt et al. 2012). During the implementation of these large-scale agricultural investments, a number of irregularities have also been routinely reported. In certain instances, ELC contracts are signed to bypass the 2002 logging ban on timber, given that ELC implementation presupposes the clearing of the land before the establishment of agro-industrial plantations (the sub-decree on ELCs is explicit about this) and is likely tied to new trends in granting ELCs in protected areas. Logging operations regularly proceed well beyond the boundaries of the concession area (Hibou 2004; Pye and May 2014; Global Witness 2015). Partly connected to logging operations inside ELCs, another abuse frequently reported is the under-utilization of land (Hibou 2004; Sperfeldt et al. 2012). A survey by the UNDP (cited in Sperfeldt et al. 2012) reported that as of 2005, only 2 percent of the land under concession was being actively cultivated. 163

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Very often the land granted to concessionaires is already occupied and/or cultivated by people. Basic field visits to these sites would have sufficed to make this clear. In these cases, logging or land-clearing operations have led to land dispossession and forced evictions. Military forces working for the concession companies tend to provide the force to drive people from the land. Human rights violations associated with these evictions have been consistently highlighted in reports and public declarations by successive High Commissioners for Human Rights in Cambodia (Leuprecht 2004; Ghai 2007; Subedi 2012). An even more pernicious effect of the concession system is what some scholars have called neo-patrimonialism. In Cambodia, the elite used natural resources to serve their private interests and to consolidate their power as part of neo-patrimonialism (Un and So 2009; Sok 2014; Milne 2013). It is understood that private investors pay approximately US$500 in informal fees for each hectare approved in an ELC agreement, an important proportion of which goes as unofficial payments to the ruling party and their officials. This revenue generates resources to fund patronage-based distributive politics via the provision of services and infrastructure in populated rural areas. In return, the people are expected to support the government through the electoral machine, which has secured acceptable levels of domestic and international legitimacy for the CPP (Un and So 2011).

Contemporary issues with ELCs In addition to an obvious lack of transparency that serves the political and economic interests of the national elite, the granting of economic land concessions affects the development of upland areas in many ways.

Local economic development Economic assessments of concession activities have underestimated or simply ignored the opportunity costs of the investment, which include the value-added that would have been created if the land had been left to peasants. Hansen and Neth (2006) have shown that under most scenarios of conversion of natural forest into plantations, the sustainable management of natural forest generates direct and indirect values (for consumption or sale) that exceed the value generated along many different land-use conversion scenarios (wood plantations, cashew, oil palm). Only rubber represents an advantage in their model. Likewise, comparative surveys undertaken in the Tonle Sap flood plain show that peasants are more efficient in generating value-added per hectare than large-scale rice production (Evens et al. 2005; Diepart 2007b, 2010). There is contradictory evidence about the impact of ELCs on local labor opportunities. Although there is growing consensus around the idea that the return of an ELC on local labor is marginal (Middleton and Hak 2006; Sperfeldt et al. 2012), some research points to certain cases where ELC activities generate wage labor opportunities that are beneficial to local people (Ngo and Chan 2010). Others advance a more nuanced argument that the socio-economic environment in which people reorganize their livelihoods is more dynamic than is often assumed due to livelihood diversification and rural–urban linkages, but that the new opportunities do not benefit the bulk of the population (Gironde et al. 2014). In a wider perspective, ELCs are instrumental for the emergence or consolidation of capitalist social property relations. This occurs through social differentiation that is usually indicated by the polarization of a labor-selling class of agrarian proletarians (or semi-proletarians) and an entrepreneurial labor-buying agrarian class on the other (Bernstein 2010). This operates through two related processes. On the one hand, the direct enclosure of land leads to varying degrees of 164

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land dispossession of small farmers and forces them into the wage labor market (Diepart and Sem 2015). On the other hand, the establishment of an ELC reinforces the commoditization of land and land acquisition through the market in areas neighboring the concession, which stimulates social differentiation between farmers (Hak et al. 2015). Exacerbating the difficulties surrounding smallholder land dispossession linked to ELCs are the weaknesses of any credible alternative land tenure regimes that could offer villagers a means to secure other forms of land access. Social Land Concessions (SLCs), a tool the government has promoted to address landlessness, were supposed to offer land security for smallholders and also targeted areas located at the periphery of ELCs as part of promoting contract farming schemes. But, as of June 2014, the total number of recipients of the SLC programme was 12,374 families on 113,167 ha of land registered (for settlement, infrastructure, and agriculture). Remarkably, this figure represents only 4 percent of the total area granted as Economic Land Concessions. The asymmetric competition between ELCs and SLCs in the allocation of state land by state representatives limits considerably the potentially positive effects of a government-backed redistributive land reform. Further, weaknesses in granting communal land titles to ethnic minority groups (Baird 2013) means that communal land tenure does not represent a counter-balance to the allocation of ELCs. The establishment of protected areas further limits territory available to smallholder agrarian expansion. Indeed the alternatives in the Cambodian uplands are very narrow.

Land conflicts and social unrest Over the past decade, the implementation of ELCs has initiated a huge increase in land conflicts revolving around the question of land dispossession and forced eviction (Schneider 2011). They have been exacerbated by the total lack of coordination between lowland–upland migrations and, as a result, the granting of large land concessions has meant an overlapping of land claims between concessionaires and farmers (Diepart and Sem 2015). Resulting confrontations have been discussed and analyzed in a number of comprehensive reports (ADHOC 2013; Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee 2009). Climactic moments of violence have also attracted widespread attention. On April 26, 2012, Chut Wutty, a prominent environmental activist, was shot dead in Koh Kong while investigating forest crimes and illegal logging (Saing and Seiff 2014). His murder occurred two weeks before a 14-year-old girl was shot dead by heavily armed officials who opened fire on a group of about 1,000 families they were sent to evict in Kratie province (May 2012). These events have contributed to the emergence of social movements for land rights played out across the country.

Order 01: incomplete attempts to reform ELC management The decision by the prime minister to suspend the granting of ELCs and to issue Order 01 in May 2012 was the result of the convergence of a number of events at play at different scales. There is little doubt that the decision by the prime minister to announce Order 01 was motivated politically in a move to lessen social unrest one month before the 2012 commune elections and one year ahead of the legislative election in July 2013. In addition to freezing the granting of ELCs, Order 01 initiated an unprecedented land-titling campaign in areas where the land rights of people and companies overlap on state land, including ELCs, forest concessions, forest land, and other types of state land. It also made possible seizures of ELCs where companies had not complied with the existing legal procedure or with the 165

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contract, in particular by engaging in timber logging activities and/or leaving concession land unexploited (Royal Government of Cambodia 2012). The land-titling process, addressed in a separate chapter in the handbook, has proven to be largely incomplete and large areas claimed by people have been left untitled. This incompleteness of land titling in areas where people live and/or cultivate might give false legitimacy to ELCs’ efforts to evict people from the untitled land.

ELC cancellations The cancellations have proceeded along ministerial lines, with the MoE and the MAFF making separate announcements in January 2015. Turning first to the MoE, it announced that it had revoked ELCs covering a total area of 90,682 ha from 23 companies, that an additional three companies voluntarily handed over a total of 28,855 ha of ELC land, and that two other ELCs were reduced (Khuon 2015). MAFF announced the cancellation of eight ELCs within MAFF territory of about 50,000 ha since the 2013 elections, in addition to 100,000 ha that have been cut out of four other ELC areas (Aun 2015). These cancelations have opened an institutional vacuum. A consolidated and comprehensive list of all concessions that have been reduced or canceled under Order 01 has not been made available to the public. There is also no information on how the land within canceled ELCs is going to be utilized or managed in the future and whether or not there will be any acknowledgement or awarding of land rights to people who may be living on or using these land areas.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have traced the historical trajectories of concessions so as to contextualize current waves of large-scale land acquisition in the dual processes of intensifying centralized state control over territory and natural resources, along with the extraction and use of these resources to underpin state formation and the extension of political control—both of which have played out in pre- and post-conflict Cambodia. Current mechanisms of ELCs are variations of old processes of capitalist penetration associated with the capture of profits by ruling elites. The political economic context in which concessions are granted and monitored was put in place under French rule to serve the interests of the protectorate administration; it was reinvigorated in the post-war reconstruction period to serve the interests of the emerging political elite. The system gradually moved into agro-industrial concessions, but continued to serve the centralization of state power. The very nature of the concession system was never challenged, but rather different actors re-engaged with concessions as a tool for development and political or economic advancement. At present, ELCs are not integrated into a comprehensive and holistic vision for land development that centers family farming as key to the rural development of Cambodia. Instead, ELCs remake rural contexts in ways that lead to varying degrees of land dispossession of smallscale farmers and exacerbate the recourse to wage labor, which usually does not compensate for the loss of resources that local people depend on. Current reforms in the system are responses triggered by political imperatives rather than tackling the exclusionary nature of the system. Rural land insecurity was instead reinforced due to the incompleteness of the land-titling campaign that had aimed to protect family farms against land dispossession linked to concessions. The campaign also discredited collective forms of land tenure, since it granted only private titles. 166

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If the top-down reforms do not seem very promising, ELCs have aroused new forms of struggles and have spurred on popular mobilization around questions of land access and rights. Arguably, it is the resilience and ability of farmers to strengthen their autonomy over local resources that will engender a genuine reform of the system of concessions and land tenure.

References ADHOC. 2013. A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resources Rights in Cambodia in 2012. ADHOC: Phnom Penh. Analyzing Development Issues. 2004. Indigenous Responses to Depletion in Natural Resources: A Study of Two Stieng Villages in Snuol District, Kratie Province. Phnom Penh: ADI. Aun, P. 2015. Government cancels more land concessions. Cambodia Daily, January 22. Baird, I. 2013. “Indigenous peoples” and land: Comparing communal land titling and its implications in Cambodia and Laos. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 54 (3): 269–281. Bernstein, H. 2010. Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change, Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies. Canada: Fernwood Publishing. Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee. 2009. Losing Ground: Forced Evictions and Intimidation in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: CHRAC. Deininger, K., D. Byerlee, J. Lindsay, A. Norton, H. Selod, and M. Stickler. 2011. Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? Washington, DC: World Bank. Diepart, J.-C. 2007a. The Problems and Challenges of Cambodian Rural Economy: Between New Governances and Peasants’ Realities, Gembloux: Department of Rural Economics and Development, University of Liège, Gembloux Agro-Bio Tech. ——. 2007b. Recent land dynamics in the Tonle Sap flood plain and its impacts on the local communities. Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Bulletin 3: 20–22. ——. 2010. Cambodian peasants’ contribution to rural development: A perspective from Kampong Thom province. Biotechnology, Agronomy, Societies and Environment 14 (2): 321–340. Diepart, J.-C., and T. Sem. 2015. The Cambodian Peasantry and the Formalisation of Land Rights: Historical Overview and Current Issues. Etudes et documents du GRAESE No 11/2015. Gembloux: Groupe de Recherches Asie de l’Est et du Sud Est. Evans, T., T. Gray, C. Hong, M. Sry, and V. Lou. 2005. Farming and Its Impact on Flooded Grassland around the Tonle Sap Lake: A Survey in the Kruos Kraom Area of Kampong Thom. Phnom Penh: Wildlife Conservation Society. Ghai, Y. 2007. Economic Land Concessions in Cambodia: A Human Rights Perspective. Phnom Penh: United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights. Gironde, C., C. Golay, P. Messerli, A. Peeters, and O. Schönweger. 2014. Large Scale Land Acquisitions in Southeast Asia: Rural Transformations between Global Agendas and People’s Right to Food. Geneva: Swiss Network for International Studies. Global Witness. 2007. Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite. Washington: Global Witness. ——. 2015. The Costs of Luxury: Cambodia’s Illegal Trade in Precious Wood with China. London: Global Witness. Gottesman, E. 2003. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. Chiang Mai: Silkworm. Gouvernement Général d’Indochine. 1910. Arrêté portant sur la création de 6 réserves forestières au Cambodge. Hanoi: Archives d’Outre-Mer. Hak, S., D. So, I. Oeur, and J. McAndrew. 2015. Prosperity and poverty: Livelihood transitions emerging from land use change in two Mondulkiri communes, in J.-C. Diepart (ed.). Learning for Resilience: Insights from Cambodia’s Rural Communities. Phnom Penh: Learning Institute, 103–146. Hansen, K. and T. Neth. 2006. Natural Forests: Benefits and Economic Analysis of Natural Forest Conversion in Cambodia. Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Working Paper 33, Phnom Penh, December. Hibou, B. 2004. Cambodge: quel modèle concessionaire?, in J.-F. Bayart (ed.). Le Royaume Concessionaire: Libéralisation économique et violence politique au Cambodge. Paris: Fonds d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques (FASOPO). Khuon, N. 2015. Try Pheap concessions among 26 canceled by Ministry in 2014. Cambodia Daily, January 7, 2015. Le Billon, P. 2000. The political ecology of transition in Cambodia 1989-1999: War, peace and forest exploitation. Development and Change 31: 785–805.

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Jean-Christophe Diepart and Laura Schoenberger ——. 2002. Logging in muddy waters: The politics of forest exploitation in Cambodia. Critical Asian Studies 34 (4): 563–586. Le Billon, P. and S. Springer. 2007. Between war and peace: Violence and accomodation in the Cambodia logging sector, in W. de Jong, D. Donovan, and K. Abe (eds.). Extreme Conflict and Tropical Forests. Dordrecht: Springer, 17–36. Leuprecht, P. 2004. Land Concessions for Economic Purposes in Cambodia: A Human Rights Perspective. Phnom Penh: United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights. McKenney, B. and T. Prom. 2002. Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Baseline Assessment, Working Paper 23. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resources Institute. Marchal, R. 2004. Cambodge, de la guerre à la paix, ou d’un régime militaire à un régime policier, in J.-F. Bayart (ed.). Le Royaume Concessionaire: Libéralisation économique et violence politique au Cambodge. Paris: Fonds d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques (FASOPO). May, T. 2012. Teenage girl shot dead in Kratie land eviction. Phnom Penh Post, May 16, 2012. Middleton, C. and S. Hak. 2006. Fast-Wood Plantations, Economic Concessions and Local Livelihoods in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia. Milne, S. 2013. Under the leopard’s skin: Land commodification and the dilemmas of indigenous communal title in upland Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 5: 323–339. Ngo, S. and S. Chan. 2010. Does large scale agricultural investment benefit the poor? Research Report No. 2. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Economic Association. Pye, D. and T. May. 2014. The calculus of logging. Phnom Penh Post, October 10, 2014. Royal Government of Cambodia. 2005. Sub-Decree on Economic Land Concessions, 146 ANK/BK. Phnom Penh. ——. 2008. Sub-Decree on the Revision of the Sub-Decree No 146 on Economic Land Concessions, 131 ANK/ BK. Phnom Penh. ——. 2012. Order 01BB on the Measures of Strengthening and Increasing the Effectiveness of the Management of Economic Land Concesssions (ELCs). 7 May, Unofficial Translation from the Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction. Saing, S. and A. Seiff. 2014. Chut Wutty, prominent environmental activist, shot dead in Koh Kong. Cambodia Daily, April 26, 2014. Save Cambodia’s Wildlife. 2006. The Atlas of Cambodia: National Poverty and Environment Maps. Phnom Penh: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife. Schneider, A. 2011. What shall we do without our land? Land grabs and resistance in rural Cambodia. International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 6–8 April 2011. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex: Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) and Journal of Peasant Studies. Slocomb, M. 2007. Colons and Coolies: The Development of Cambodia’s Rubber Plantations. Bangkok: White Lotus Press. ——. 2010. An Economic History of Cambodia in the Twentieth Century. Singapore: NUS Press. Sok, S. 2014. Limited state and strong social forces: Fishing lot management in Cambodia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 45 (2): 174–193. Sperfeldt, C., F. Tek, and B. Chia-Lung Tai. 2012. An Examination of Policies Promoting Large-Scale Investments in Farmland in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC). Subedi, S. 2012. A Human Rights Analysis of Economic and Other Land Concessions in Cambodia. Addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia. Human Rights Council. Thomas, F. 1999. Histoire du Régime et des Services Forestiers Français en Indochine de 1862 à 1945. Hanoi: Editions THÊ GIÓI. Un, K. and S. So. 2009. Politics of Natural Resource Use in Cambodia. Asian Affairs 36 (3): 123–138. ——. 2011: Land rights in Cambodia: How neopatrimonial politics restricts land policy reform. Pacific Affairs, 84 (2): 289–308. Voice of Vietnam. 2011. Cambodia boost agricultural cooperation. Available online at: english.vov.vn/ Economy/Vietnam-Cambodia-boost-agricultural-cooperation/227830.vov. Accessed March 24, 2011. World Bank. 2007a. Cambodia Rural Sector Note and Business Plan. World Bank: East-Asia and Pacific Region, Sustainable Development Department. ——. 2007b. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC.

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14 FROM CHICKEN WING RECEIPTS TO STUDENTS IN MILITARY UNIFORMS Land Titling and Property in Post-conflict Cambodia Robin Biddulph and Shaun Williams

Introduction By examining three successive attempts at registering land and issuing titles in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, this chapter focuses on one aspect of property relations during one particular period of time. Property relations are social relations enforced by an authority. The extent to which the state is, or seeks to be, the authority which determines property relations may vary over time according to the nature and reach of the state. Furthermore, the formal pronouncements, laws and regulations issued by the state may bear little resemblance to how property relations are actually enforced. Interventions in the name of the state will rarely be as consistent, comprehensive or impartial as they are represented. That enactment and enforcement are invariably the remit of different state actors only adds to this inconsistency. This chapter is therefore inescapably concerned with both the creation of property and the building of state authority (Sikor and Lund 2009). A longer, deeper historical analysis would shed light on the extent to which state-building and property relations in Cambodia have combined in recognisable patterns and path dependencies. Any new regime will seek to reconfigure property relations in its own interests and to stabilise property relations as a cornerstone stabilising its own rule. In turn, groups losing out in these processes will become sources of resistance and disruption to newly configured property relations. The upheavals and revolutions in Cambodian rule over the centuries might create an expectation of rather unstable, insecure property relations. However, there are indications that property relations in Cambodia might be rather more stable and resilient than the political context would lead us to suspect. The Buddhist religious foundations were, for example, the largest land owner according to the early 1990s register (Vickery 1988). In this chapter, however, we focus on the post-Khmer Rouge period, by reviewing three programmes of systematic land registration and titling, which in hindsight can be viewed as 169

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different phases of the same process of post-Khmer Rouge entrenchment. The 1989 attempt to bolster state legitimacy by enhancing PRK’s non-communist credentials in anticipation of the Vietnamese withdrawal, the 2002 LMAP project where the modernisation of the Cambodian state was linked to international assistance inspired by institutional theories of development and the 2012 Order 01 initiative, which took land-titling technology out to state land in order to address the persistent land conflicts which the previous programmes had avoided. Institutions, with property relations at the fore, are often seen as the key difference between developed and developing countries. Predictable, stable institutions administered by a relatively impartial state are seen as the distinguishing features of successful, developed economies. In the case of land, this would be reflected in clear, secure entitlements and reduced disputes. We will conclude by reflecting on whether such notions provide a pathway to development, or merely a problem description.

Case 1: PRK land titling, 1989 Few societies can have undergone as extensive an overturning of property relations as in Cambodia during the 1975–79 period. Not only was private property abolished, but the state also undertook a sustained assault on the social relations in which property relations are embedded. As Cambodia scholars have long been aware, there was considerable variation across time and place with regard to how CPK rule was experienced (Vickery 1984). As we know from anecdotal evidence during our own field research, there are even cases of rural households who remained in the same dwelling throughout that time. The replacement of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime by the Vietnamesesupported People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) heralded a more ambivalent application of communist ideology and centralised state planning. Recent histories of the period emphasise the extent to which state legitimacy depended on allowing an informal return to traditional social relations, including market and property relations (Gottesman 2004; Slocomb 2003). Hence, while farming was formally organised into cooperatives, the local reality was often that cooperative farming was only used when it was needed during the first years after the fall of the DK regime. This is not an aspect of rural life that is well researched and documented, and there are many villages that were shifted during the DK time that never relocated back. However, our experience is that while local authorities will often describe a process of redistributing land in the early 1980s, in practice villagers often explain that the fields that they are farming and the land they have built on, is the same farmland and house-land that their households occupied in the 1960s. The change in the constitution in February 1989, the party meetings in April 1989 and the attempt at systematic titling that followed were framed in a discourse of improved agricultural production. However, as Frings (1994) suggests, it is more likely that the real motivation for these reforms was political. The apparent transition from collective farming to individualised farming with inheritable and tradable use and possession rights had, as government officials were well aware, already taken place on a de facto basis in most places. Changing the law would bring the formal system into line with reality on the ground, but could not be expected to yield significant economic change. In the political sphere, meanwhile, the threat of Vietnamese withdrawal towards the end of the 1980s made the PRK more vulnerable to military attacks launched from the Thai border. Forced conscription to defend against the return of the CPK and their allies had already strained the relationships between the state, its local representatives and the people (Slocomb 2001). The PRK leadership’s concern, then, was to strengthen the legitimacy of the government by 170

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identifying it with both traditional practice and with a market economy, both of which the population would prefer to communism. Registration of private occupation and user rights, was an attempt to shore up state legitimacy by reassuring the people that the state would not appropriate family property (Frings 1994, 51). The implementation of the titling programme was protracted and ultimately unsuccessful. Households were to complete requests for title, which would initiate a government survey of the plots, which would in turn lead to the issue of a title. Even the simplest stage, the submission of a request, was delayed as an original deadline of 31 December 1989 was first postponed by six months and then left open-ended. Surveying began in spring 1991 and by May 1992 a quarter of a million plots had been surveyed and 55,899 titles had been issued.1 However, four million titles remained to be surveyed. Furthermore, as the process slowly and unevenly rolled out, there were increasing concerns about partiality and corruption by local authorities. Eventually, burdened by the rising number of complaints, the unwillingness to investigate the complaints and the huge backlog, the titling process ground to a halt and it was decided to wait for the passage of a new land law before proceeding further (Frings 1994, 54–56). In practice, the main effects of the 1989 initiative to introduce formal, private land rights related to the political signal it sent, which served as a death knell to communal farming in the few places where it was still practised. According to some of Frings’ informants, in remote rural areas this sometimes meant the loss of social safety nets. Poor households without the capital and labour to farm their land on a household basis were left in difficulty when the collectives ceased to function. In some areas it was even suggested that overall production might have declined temporarily because of poor households being unable to farm. While the programme may have enhanced state legitimacy by suggesting a move away from communism and back towards traditional property relations, it appears to have had contradictory effects regarding local authorities. Many villages still held a reserve of land communally, but after 1989 (foreshadowing events on urban and forested state land in the following two decades) local authorities frequently claimed this for themselves, exacerbating resentments people already had towards the state and its local representatives.

Case 2: LMAP land titling, 2002 During the 1990s, as the Khmer Rouge threat diminished, land disputes became the most high profile source of potential threat to peace and stability. Regular disputes occurred, typically between groups of villagers and well-connected companies or individuals whose identity was difficult to pin down (Cooper 2002; Kato 1999; Williams 1999). Villagers often came to the Royal Palace, the parliament building, or the Prime Minister’s residence in Ta Khmao to plead their case. The Prime Minister began lamenting land grabbing in his speeches and warning his officials of dire consequences if they continued the practice (Williams 1999). The specific issue of land conflicts and their political consequences in Cambodia was married to an institutional turn in international development theory which gave prominence to property rights. The rise in prominence of Hernando de Soto (2000) gave new life to development assistance programmes which sought to catalyse economic development by formalising informal property and informal businesses. Advocates of land titling suggested that it would deliver threefold benefits of: first, increased security leading to increased investment by farmers in their land, and therefore increased agricultural productivity; second, (de Soto’s main argument) increased access to credit as titles enable land to be used as collateral, enabling land owners to raise capital to invest in their land or elsewhere; third, the facilitation of functioning land markets, which would lead to land being re-allocated to the most efficient farmers, so again leading to improved agricultural productivity (Deininger 2003). 171

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The specific threat to social order and regime legitimacy in Cambodia from the 1990s onward, coinciding with the general orientation in international development assistance towards formalising property, established the basis for a major programme of cooperation. The Cambodian government, with international financial and technical assistance, began putting in place the legal and institutional framework that would be required to enable systematic registration of land (So 2009; Springer 2013b). The passage of the new land law in August 2001 provided the basis for a second attempt at the systematic registration of land in Cambodia, which proceeded with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and the governments of Germany, Finland and, later, Canada. The programme of systematic land registration which began in 2002 was, like the abortive programme in 1989, essentially an attempt to formalise already existing property rights. This time, however, the resources were in place to enable successful implementation within selected target areas. Survey teams from the Ministry would arrive in a village and work with volunteers to survey and map every plot of land within the village boundaries. Each plot was then provisionally allocated to an owner, as identified during the survey process. This resulted in the production of a village map which was displayed in the village for thirty days. During these thirty days anybody unhappy with any of these provisional allocations could dispute them. This triggered a local attempt at dispute resolution facilitated by cadastral staff and local authorities who were present at the board during the display period (So 2009). On completion of the display period, titles were then issued to all uncontested plots. By mid-2007 this process was resulting in the issue of approximately 20,000 land titles per month (World Bank 2007), with 1.7 million titles issued by November 2011 (Grimsditcch et al. 2012). This impressive technical service-delivery achievement was enabled by a combination of in-house managerial competence and external technical and financial assistance. The head of LMAP, a director-general at the Ministry, oversaw considerable investment in the technical upgrading of cadastral staff. This was achieved through both in-house short courses and university-level professional training delivered in collaboration with the Royal University of Agriculture and with financial and technical support provided by the World Bank and the government of Germany (Setha and Mund 2008). This mass production of titles was with justification regarded as a technical success. Technical and financial support meant that the government was able to deliver on its promises in a way that the 1989 attempt at mass titling had failed to do. Furthermore, computerisation and the efficiency of the training and management meant that costs of the titles both to the land owners and to the national budget were low. Lessons had also been learned from international experience. For example, a few conflicts in one adjudication area were not allowed to delay the issue of titles for all the other plots. And the default practice of issuing joint titles ensured that women’s rights to land were formalised and the trap of issuing to a male “head of household” was successfully avoided. These successes were reflected in a series of positive donor-commissioned evaluations of the land-titling process (Deutsch 2006; Deutsch and Makathy 2009). While one early evaluation identified allegations of corruption (O’Leary 2005), subsequent independent assessments, including those which were critical of land registration in various ways, were nevertheless unanimous in finding most recipients to be satisfied with the process and with the fact that they now had titles (Biddulph 2010; Grimsditch et al. 2012; Mehrvar et al. 2008). While the titling programme was relatively uncontroversial in the areas in which it was implemented, it was also subject to criticism, not least because the land conflicts and tenure insecurity which it claimed to address continued unabated. Some authors have seen this as a consequence of the mismatch between the technical impartiality of the land registration process 172

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and the partial elite orientation of Cambodian politics. Registering land and issuing titles cannot in themselves put an end to tenure insecurity given the absence of political will and complementary reforms in the fields of justice and public administration (So 2009, 231). This in turn has been related to the broader political economy of Cambodia, where a neo-patrimonial system looks to reproduce itself by fostering a wealthy elite whose off-the-books wealth is used to secure loyalty and election success (Un and So 2011). Critics have suggested that a dual system is in play, whereby elite actors receive protection and security, while the poor are only allowed property when it does not conflict with the claims of the elite (Bugalski et al. 2010). Inevitably, these claims of partiality and selectivity have given rise to various geographically based analyses of land registration. It has been suggested that claims made in the mid-2000s that land titling itself could transform smallholder agriculture into a third engine of economic growth were overblown, particularly given that smallholder agricultural plots were generally secure (Biddulph 2014). The case that systematic land registration has been selectively implemented away from the areas where property is subject to dispute has been made generally as an “evasion” (Biddulph 2010, 2011) “and more specifically in relation to land concessions as a ‘formalization fix’” (Dwyer 2013). Provisions in the 2001 Land Law laid the foundations for community title to be issued in native ethnic minority areas in upland Cambodia. However, subsidiary legislation—specifically a sub-decree prescribing arrangements for registering indigenous communities’ land which was not passed until 2009—dragged, so that a decade after the law was passed still no community titles had been issued (Baird 2013, 273). Whilst there is evidence that the legal recognition of indigenous identity has provided a rallying point for groups, particularly in pilot areas receiving international support, and enabled them to protect their agricultural land (Baird 2013), the larger picture seems to be that land grabbing has continued as the process unfolds too slowly to provide effective protection (see Keating 2013; Milne 2013). Furthermore, the issue of evasion has also arisen in relation to community titles: “communities” have become entitled to secure formal rights to land classified as agricultural. However, land classified as forest, upon which they have also traditionally depended, has not been included in the community demarcations (Baird 2013). Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in rural areas, it is in urban areas that LMAP has become a source of sustained controversy and in Milne’s (2013, 324) words “an exemplar of the challenges faced by donors working in partnership with authoritarian regimes that are intent on elite accumulation and have little regard for human rights”. The story of rural land registration had been one of quiet evasion. Decision-makers had been adept at ensuring that LMAP avoided sites of elite entrepreneurship and economic land concessions. Conflicts over what was nominally state land persisted, but the LMAP sponsors could dismiss these as political disputes occurring elsewhere and continue to celebrate the programme as a success. The hapless inclusion of the Boeung Kak Lake in Phnom Penh as an LMAP adjudication area ended the notion that land concessions and land registration might be two separate independent spheres. Srah Chok commune in Phnom Penh became an adjudication area in May 2006 and provisional assignments were posted in January 2007. These included the whole of the lake and its shores being registered as a single block with the owner listed as “unknown”. Simultaneous with the display period, the municipality signed a 99-year lease agreement with a private company called Shukaku Inc. There thus began a prolonged conflict between the people living on the banks of the lake and the government (Brickell 2014). The government reclassified the land as state public land and issued eviction notices, while the residents, supported by NGOs, challenged the legality of these moves and campaigned for fair compensation. The residents demanded that the World Bank review its own involvement in the case, leading to a report that 173

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was critical of the failure to follow Bank procedures and safeguards and which pointed out the contradiction between a programme that claimed to address the problem of tenure insecurity, but which had an implementation schedule specifically oriented towards areas free of conflict (World Bank Inspection Panel 2010). The government, however, did not wait for this report and simply cancelled the LMAP loan and continued the titling programme with German, Canadian and Finnish assistance (Grimsditch and Henderson 2009). For the majority of the rural population, property relations are uncontroversial and governed by custom. A household that had lived on land, farmed it or bought or inherited it, encountered little difficulty beyond the normal family conflicts and disputes with neighbours over borders (Springer 2013a). It is not here that the state is faced with the challenge of reconfiguring and stabilising property relations. Rather it is the land between the villages that is the subject of controversy. The transformation that state–market relations underwent during the two decades between the two Kingdoms of Cambodia is best represented at these sites of contention. During the 1960s, the land between the villages was formally the property of the state, but continued to function largely as a de facto commons and land reserve. Most of the land between villages and most of the forest which grew on it, was sufficiently remote and sufficiently abundant that it had no market price. During the 1990s, land prices increased from tens to hundreds to thousands of dollars per hectare. Meanwhile, the deforestation of the 1990s and the depletion of the nation’s fish stocks meant that the rural population became ever more dependent on agricultural land to support its in situ livelihoods. It is the emerging tenure rights and property relations on these former commons and the role of the state in mediating those rights and relations that have become the continuing source of disruption. LMAP registration and titling were never set up to address these issues. This is in contrast to our third case, however, which set out to address property relations on exactly this difficult, contested terrain.

Case 3: Order 01 land titling, 2012 While land disputes between wealthy investors and groups of relatively poor villagers had been a feature of the political landscape during the 1990s, they became increasingly linked to economic land concessions during the 2000s. Economic land concessions are provided for in the 2001 Land Law and in the 2005 SubDecree on Economic Land Concessions (Royal Government of Cambodia 2005). They are described as a mechanism to attract investment into the agricultural sector, broaden the range of crops grown, introduce modern technology and increase agricultural productivity and rural employment. However, they have also been a source of controversy. Criticisms have been raised with regard to the lack of achievement in relation to the policy goals, a lack of transparency in awarding and management and above all the land disputes that have arisen between concessionaires and local people claiming a prior right to the land (Springer 2013a; Subedi 2012). Order 012 was issued by Prime Minister Hun Sen on 7 May 2012 and appeared to constitute an attempt to extend land registration and titling to areas which it had previously evaded (Biddulph 2010; Dwyer 2013). The stated intention of the order was to adopt a “leopard skin policy” to land disputes between local people and the holders of economic land concessions (ELCs) (Milne 2013). By this, it was meant that the boundaries of the ELCs would be re-drawn in such a way as to recognise the rightful claims of local people (the spots on the leopard), thereby ending disputes and allowing both local people and the concessionaires to pursue their interests more effectively (Royal Government of Cambodia 2012, 1). While adopting the technology, personnel and much of the rationalities of the international LMAP blueprint, the Order 01 initiative was distinctively the personal project of the Prime 174

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Minister. Foreign advisors who had worked on LMAP were surprised by Order 01 (Müller and Zülsdorf 2013), and participants were reportedly warned off speaking to foreign advisors and journalists about it (Milne 2013, 327). The implementation of Order 01 was rapid and high profile. Young, well-paid “student volunteers” were recruited, issued with military uniforms and deployed in tandem with MLMUPC surveyors who had worked on LMAP titling. Substantial political capital was invested in the initiative, as the Prime Minister lauded it in his speeches and students were interviewed regularly on national television. It was not altogether clear whether Order 01 represented a short-term political move only really aimed at garnering votes in the 2013 national elections, or whether it was the beginning of a sustained personal attempt by the Prime Minister to put a permanent halt to the problems of land disputes in relation to ELCs. Unpublished research into Order 01 suggests that its implementation has been very partial and its effects somewhat uneven. As with the LMAP titling, villagers who have received titles have been pleased with those titles and the process which yielded them. Furthermore, the process has been found to be broadly in line with the laws and regulations passed since 2001 governing land registration and titling. However, there appear to be far more people who have been excluded by the process including in cases where the title has only been issued to land that is outside areas claimed by concessionaires. Unlike LMAP, there have been reports in some areas of students and authorities being subject to influence from wealthy land claimants, whose claims have been registered before, or in preference to, poorer land claimants. Milne (2013) found that in areas where community titling had been pursued, Order 01 had, ironically enough, created a different “leopard’s spots” effect to that initially promoted. Individuals who had been part of groups seeking community titles, had instead taken the opportunity to get their land registered by the student teams. Doing so required their withdrawal from the community claim. This was a direct inversion of Order 01, which stated specifically that individualised titles under the order would not be issued to community lands. There are echoes here of Biddulph’s (2010) case study of Bey, where an order from the Prime Minister in May 2006 was supposedly targeted at powerful officials and wealthy individuals encroaching on state forest; by the time it had travelled to the village it had local maps appended to it which precisely reversed the Prime Minister’s order and sought to evict poor settlers in the village, but left the sawmills and illegal concessions deeper in the forest unaddressed. To some degree, one could ascribe the difficulties encountered in implementing Order 01 to issues of time and human resources. Order 01 titling was pursued within a much shorter time frame than LMAP titling, using large quantities of hastily trained personnel. However, the key difference is surely contextual. Whilst LMAP adjudication areas were primarily in areas where there were very few competing claims, Order 01 is a programme oriented specifically towards addressing competing claims to state lands where regulation has not previously been systematically enforced. A complete and successful implementation of Order 01 would entail erasing the claims and earning opportunities of many of the CPP’s key clients – both business people and civilian and military officials – in remote rural areas. The motivation behind Order 01 thus remains open to debate. Was this mainly a piece of short-term electioneering intended to enhance the populist credentials of the Prime Minister as an ally of the poor and a distributor of largesse? Or was there a genuine belief that it would be possible to survey the boundaries of concession land, adjudicate broadly in favour of poor possessors and thereby close the agricultural frontier and put a permanent end to land disputes as a source of political disruption? To do so would be to garner support from current occupiers, but would also entail disappointing future migrants and the local authorities who mediate and profit from the in-flow of new settlers onto public land. It would also rely on the 175

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student volunteers and local authorities embracing the spirit of Order 01 and resisting the sticks and carrots provided by concessionaires and land speculators seeking to secure their own claims at the expense of poor occupiers. It remains to be seen whether Order 01 will be shelved, having to some degree fulfilled its short-term political function, in the manner of the 1989 titling, or whether it will be resumed and take on the characteristics of a more sustained titling campaign more comparable with the systematic registration process that LMAP began.

Conclusions During the post-Khmer Rouge period there have been successive attempts to systematically register land and distribute title to that land. These attempts have been one component of stabilising property relations within the broader project of establishing a stable and legitimate state. An institutional turn within development theory tends to argue that for long-term economic development, it is necessary for the state to become rule-based and neutral. This imagines the state transforming from being “partial” to “impartial” (Theorell and Rothstein 2008), from “predatory” to “inclusive” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013) or from “limited access orders” to “open access orders” (North, Wallis and Weingast 2005). While this constitutes a body of literature in general agreement about the nature of institutional change that is required in order to achieve development, it is also a literature with no clear prescriptions for how to get from A to B. A form of Catch 22 operates. Institutions are complex and interrelated. It is not possible to create a blueprint for a total national institutional development. However, interdependence of different institutions means that proceeding piecemeal by introducing a reform in one sector or one set of institutions cannot work (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). Land reforms, for example, will not be effective without complementary reforms in banking and in justice. In this respect, attempts to reform property institutions in Cambodia through titling have been theoretically impoverished. The necessary complementary reforms have not been in place, but the programme of surveying and titling land has continued as though these were not in fact necessary. The CPP, with Hun Sen dominant, remains at the hub of a limited access social order. It will continue to try to maintain its own position, continue to learn from experience and to look for strategies to legitimise its rule. As the experience of Order 01 demonstrates, it is not possible for the executive to simply flick a switch from partiality to impartiality. The unwritten rules of the game over the past three decades have entailed many actors developing a sense of private entitlement to benefits from what is formally state land. Order 01 may represent a wish to be seen to be acting on behalf of the poor with respect to competing claims for state public land. However, it does not yet appear that there is a political crisis of sufficient depth to induce the CPP leadership to give up its own discretionary power or to extinguish the property claims of its strategic clients. Neither does international assistance promise an effective, bloodless technical solution. Land disputes and land titling will continue to be part of the Cambodian political scene and attempts to apply the latter to the former will remain infernally difficult.

Notes 1 The owners of each surveyed plot were issued a receipt which featured a table that resembled a bird’s wing, which led to them being known colloquially as chicken wing receipts in the 1990s. The receipts sometimes served as informal substitutes for actual land titles. 2 “Order 01” is shorthand for is shorthand for “Order 01BB on the Measures Strengthening and Increasing the Effectiveness of the Management of Economic Land Concessions (ELC)”.

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References Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2013. Why Nations Fail: The Origin of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. New York: Crown Business. Baird, I. 2013. “Indigenous peoples” and land: Comparing communal land titling and its implications in Cambodia and Laos. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 54 (3): 269–281. Biddulph, R. 2010. Geographies of Evasion: The Development Industry and Property Rights Interventions in Early 21st Century Cambodia. Gothenberg: University of Gothenburg. ——. 2011. Tenure security interventions in Cambodia: Testing Bebbington’s approach to development geography. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 93 (3): 223–236. ——. 2014. Cambodia’s land management and administration project, in WIDER Working Paper. Helsinki: UNU Wider. 14 Brickell, K. 2014. “The whole world is watching”: Intimate geopolitics of forced eviction and women’s activism in Cambodia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104 (6): 1256–1272. Bugalski, N., M. Grimsditch and D. Pred. 2010. Land Titling in Cambodia: Lessons from the Land Management and Administration Project. Phnom Penh: BABSEA. Cooper, G. 2002. Land Policy and Conflict: The Cambodia Portion of an Eight-Country Study by the NorthSouth Institute for the World Bank. Phnom Penh: World Bank. Deininger, K. 2003. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: OUP/World Bank. de Soto, H. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. Deutsch, R. 2006. Beneficiary Assessment of Land Title Recipients under the Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP). Phnom Penh: Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction. Deutsch, R. and T. Makathy. 2009. Beneficiary Assessment (BA-II) for the Land Administration Sub-Sector Program (LA-SSP), GTZ Land Management Project (PN 03.2250.3). Phnom Penh: GTZ. Dwyer, M. 2013. The formalization fix: Land titling, state land concessions, and the politics of geographical transparency in contemporary Cambodia. LDPI Working Paper 37. Brighton: Land Deal Politics Initiative. Frings, V. 1994. Cambodia after decollectivization (1989–1992). Journal of Contemporary Asia, 24 (1): 49–66. Gottesman, E. 2004. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation-Building. Bangkok: Silkworm. Grimsditch, M. and N. Henderson. 2009. Untitled: Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in the Cambodian Land Sector. Phnom Penh: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. Grimsditch, M., K. Leakhana and D. Sherchan. 2012. Access to Land Title in Cambodia: A Study of Systematic Land Registration in Three Cambodian Provinces and the Capital. Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia. Kato, E. 1999. We have rights, they have power, in Where has all the Land Gone? (Vol. 2). Phnom Penh: Oxfam Great Britain. Keating, N. 2013. Kuy alterities: The struggle to conceptualise and claim Indigenous land rights in neoliberal Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 54 (3): 309–322. Mehrvar, M., S. Kim Sore and M. Sambath. 2008. Women’s Perspectives: A Case Study of Systematic Land Registration in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Milne, S. 2013. Under the leopard’s skin: Land commodification and the dilemmas of Indigenous communal title in upland Cambodia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 54 (3): 323–339. Müller, F. and G. Zülsdorf. 2013. Old Policies – New Action: A Surprising Political Initiative to Recognize Human Rights in the Cambodian Land Reform. Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty Washington, DC: World Bank. North, D., J. Wallis and B. Weingast. 2005. A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. NBER Working Paper (Vol. 12795). Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research. O’Leary, D. 2005. Pilot Independent Review of Systematic Land Titling Field Systems and Procedures (Transparency and Accountability). Phnom Penh: Land Management and Administration Project. Pritchett, L. and M. Woolcock. 2004. Solutions when the solution is the problem: Arraying the disarray in development. World Development, 32 (2): 191–212. Royal Government of Cambodia. 2005. Sub-Decree No.146 ANK/BK of December 27, 2005 on Social Land Concessions Phnom Penh: Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries. ——. 2012. Manual on Implementation of Order 01 Dated 07 May, 2012: On Measures Strengthening and Increasing Effectiveness of ELC Management. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction.

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PART III

Urban conflicts

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15 URBAN MEGAPROJECTS AND CITY PLANNING IN PHNOM PENH Tom Percival

Introduction The majority of urban studies research on Phnom Penh has tended to emphasize issues facing the urban poor such as tenure security, land rights, and evictions (see Khemro and Payne 2004; Springer 2010, 2015). In contrast, the processes by which new urban developments are produced are less well understood. The primary focus of this chapter will be on urban development in the contemporary era, which I delineate here as from the early 2000s onwards. It was during this time that the city began to develop rapidly as political stability led to an increase in both domestic and foreign investment. A prominent feature of contemporary urban growth in Phnom Penh is the development of satellite city megaprojects. Satellite city development in Phnom Penh is a more recent example of a trend that occurred in the larger cities of Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s (Winarso 2002) and that has since moved into Cambodia, China, Vietnam, India, as well as more widely in the Middle East and Africa. Satellite cities are defined here as integrated, purpose-built developments that are normally to some degree gated and provide access only to residents. Ranging in size from a few hundred to more than 8,000 hectares, they contain features associated with postmodern urbanism, such as villa and condominium housing marketed to upper and emerging middle-class city dwellers and expatriates. These developments also contain consumption spaces such as shopping malls, office space, private hospitals, schools, and other facilities (Gotsch and Peterek 2003). Satellite cities in Southeast Asia are for the most part constructed and managed by the private sector, by companies located within the East Asian region. They are normally constructed in peri-urban areas on formerly rice-growing agricultural land or reclaimed marshland. They differ from gated communities because satellite cities are typically of a larger size, and, more significantly, they integrate the various functions—residential, commercial and leisure—that are normally present in an urban system. Privatized urbanization is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia (Hogan et al. 2012). Satellite cities, however, represent an unprecedented role for the private sector in influencing the future development of urban regions. These contemporary urban environments are being built on the peripheries of cities and are conspicuously devoid of local context. There are a number of reasons for this trend. They include the increasing globalization of capital, especially in the property and real estate sector (Haila 1997; Olds 2001; Dick 2009), which looks to 181

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expand into new and unexplored territories. City governments are competing to lure this capital, under an “entrepreneurial” mode of urban governance, in which a greater premium is placed on attracting private-sector investment (Harvey 1989). Satellite cities are being constructed in poorer and developing countries, where there exist weak and often opaque governance, ineffective planning laws, and a high level of social inequality. The lack of organized planning frameworks has certainly contributed to private interests dominating the development of the city. This phenomenon has been termed the privatization of planning, defined as “the transfer of power over and responsibility for the visioning of urban futures and the exercise of social action for urban change from public to private sector actors” (Shatkin 2008, 388). The trend also reflects demand from the growing middle and upper classes for housing and better infrastructure and from businesses for modern office space in less congested areas (Dick and Rimmer 1998). The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter outlines urban development, planning, and governance issues in contemporary Phnom Penh. Second, the chapter will examine how urban development projects are driven by networks of capital and concepts from primarily within the East and Southeast Asian region. The third and final section will critically discuss the relationship between the large-scale private production of urban space and public planning.

Urban development in Phnom Penh Phnom Penh remains relatively small compared to most Southeast Asian capital cities. According to the latest official data in 2013, Phnom Penh’s population was 1.69 million people (National Institute of Statistics 2013), although unofficial estimates regularly place the figure at around two million people. Furthermore, there are many people, especially garment workers, who commute to the capital daily from the surrounding countryside. While still a relatively small city, the urban growth rate is one of the fastest in East Asia, at 4.4 per cent per year from 2000 to 2010 (World Bank Group 2015). The city is at least ten times larger than the second city of Battambang. The official boundary of the city has been expanded on multiple occasions. The outer districts remain predominately rural: the average population density of the four inner khan (districts) was 25,300 people per square kilometer, whereas the average population density of the peri-urban khan was 1,800 people per square kilometer (Municipality of Phnom Penh 2011). Urban development is set in the context of Cambodia’s political economy and changing position in networks of global capital accumulation (Springer 2010). A real estate market emerged as the economy transitioned from a socialist to a market-oriented economy in the years after 1989. At the same time, the large influx of well-paid foreigners arriving as part of the UNTAC peacekeeping force looking for high-end villa accommodation created a demand for rental housing in the Boeung Keng Kang district of the city. However, there were only small investments in urban development, thus there was little pressure on land and prices remained mostly very low. The real estate market took off significantly after 1998 and grew at a rapid rate between 2004 and 2008. The price of land in central Phnom Penh increased greatly between 2004 and 2007, from around US$250 to over US$2,000 per square meter in some key locations (GTZ 2009). This was due to a number of factors. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Cambodia became relatively peaceful and politically stable for the first time in almost three decades. This political stability enabled the economy to flourish. Between 2004 and 2008, the country reported an average GDP growth rate of 11 percent (Slocomb 2010). The country was granted considerable 182

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international legitimacy by joining ASEAN in 1999 and becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in 2004. During this time, foreign money began flowing in to Cambodia, wealthy Cambodians began to repatriate their funds stored overseas and also invest their liquid cash savings. Between 2000 and 2006, foreign investment increased tenfold from US$270 million to US$2.63 billion (Hughes 2009). In terms of real estate and urban development capital, South Korea was one of the leading investors in the mid-to late 2000s. Real estate and construction accounted for 71 percent of the total South Korean investment in 2010 (KOTRA 2010). During the mid-2000s Cambodia began to be known as an “emerging market” within property investment circles. This was down to the potential for large profits to be made. Cambodia was termed “the next big thing in Southeast Asia” (Property Report Asia 2010) and “an Asian mouse . . . ready to roar” (Kinetz 2007). As well as foreign investment, local capital has a played key role in reshaping the urban landscape. For similar reasons to foreign investors, many wealthy Cambodians too decided to invest their money in real estate in and around Phnom Penh in the mid-2000s (Fauveaud 2014, this volume, p. 212). In 2008, the global economic crisis began to impact Cambodia’s urban development. Real estate prices fell, economic growth declined, and banks began to restrict loans for developers and customers as global capital markets slowed down. The value of approved building projects peaked at US$3.2 billion in 2008, falling by a third during 2009 and dropping down to 2005 levels of US$840 million in 2010 (Soeun 2011). Many of the projects announced in the boom period were either canceled (for example, the International Financial Centre by GS E+C), put on hold (POSCO E+C’s Star River condominiums) or paused mid-way through construction (Gold Tower 42). All of these three were South Korean developments. South Korean projects were hit the hardest because they purchased land at the height of the boom, thus resulting in very high prices for finished developments (Galliano 2008). Financing from Korean banks also began to diminish. By 2012, the real estate market had picked up and returned to pre-crisis levels, although one key project, “Gold Tower 42”, remains unfinished. The total value of approved construction was US$2.1billion, a 72 percent increase on the previous year (Dorn and Lewis 2013). This is evident in changes to the urban landscape, notably large condominium and mixed-use developments (similar to Jakarta “superblocks”) (Kusno 2010) centered on the Boeung Keng Kang and Tonle Bassac communes. Whereas in 2010 there were only a small number of condominium projects, there is expected to be approximately 5,000 units completed by 2017 (Kang and Styliss 2014). East and Southeast Asian companies are constructing the vast majority of these large projects. For example, The Bridge is a joint venture between a local company and the Singaporean property development company Oxley Holdings Ltd., and a number of Chinese developments on the Diamond Island, a large urban development on a 75-hectare island in the Bassac River. Much of the demand is driven by foreign nationals who buy-to-let (Horton 2014), since a 2010 law permitted foreign nationals to buy units in condominium developments above the first floor. Renting units in these condominiums is out of reach of the vast majority of Phnom Penh residents, with one-bed units renting for over US$1,000 per month and two bed units costing over US$2,500 per month (Savills World Research 2013). The residents are generally foreign nationals working in management positions in international companies and non-governmental organizations. Although the city center has changed spectacularly with the construction of shopping malls and high-rise buildings, much of the new development has occurred in peri-urban areas. The outer districts experienced a population growth increase of between 90 and 180 percent between 1998 and 2008. Meanwhile, all but one of the central districts saw a small decline in 183

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population (Municipality of Phnom Penh 2011). This is due to a number of factors. First, informal settlements in the central districts have been cleared and residents relocated to sites on the periphery of the city. Much of the land around the Tonle Bassac area, an area highlighted above as where a significant amount of new property development is occurring, was previously informal settlements (for example, Sombok Chap and Dey Krahom). It is estimated that approximately 100,000 people were displaced between 2000 and 2009 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2009). Second, the outskirts of the city are the location of many garment factories and there are estimated to be approximately 100,000 workers renting in Phnom Penh (Vong and Taguiam 2015). Third, families in the central city are capitalizing on increasing property prices to sell their property and move to the suburbs—often to gated communities or satellite cities—where they can afford more space. The peri-urban zone of Phnom Penh is the location of several types of large-scale residential and commercial developments catering to this demand. These include satellite cities, gated communities, and shophouse developments. There are seven notable satellite cities currently under construction. Four of these are fronted by local companies: Koh Pich and Chrouy Changvar City of the Future are being built by Overseas Cambodian Investment Corporation (connected to Canadia Bank, a Cambodian financial institution), AZ City by ING Group, and LYP Garden City by the LYP Group. Although local companies front these projects, much of the capital is from abroad. Three other satellite cities are led by foreign companies, often in conjunction with a local partner for land acquisition reasons. Camko City and Booyoung Town are being built by Korean developers and Grand Phnom Penh International City (GPPIC) by Ciputra, a large Indonesian property company. The ways in which these satellite cities are produced will be examined in the next section. A focus on large-scale urban development by foreign companies is not to deny, however, the importance of smaller-scale local actors. As Fauveaud (2014) suggests, smaller residential projects by local Cambodian companies are numerous and are a key driving force of real estate production in Phnom Penh. Locally developed gated housing estates,1 known locally as borei, are becoming popular housing choices for the emerging middle class as they are priced at a lower level than the satellite cities.

Urban megaprojects and intra-Asian mobilities As highlighted above, the production of new urban forms in Phnom Penh is bound up with regional flows of capital and urban development concepts. This highlights the suitability of tracing the networks of urban development capital and concepts within the East Asian region when investigating urban change in Phnom Penh (Percival and Waley 2012). The majority of the investment in urban megaprojects originates from within the East Asian region. This is either directly through foreign urban development companies, or local companies in joint ventures with foreign entities, where much of the invested capital is from abroad (most notably from China). As well as urban development capital, the activities of overseas buyers are also significant. Half of the units in one new central city condominium development were sold to Chinese buyers, mostly for speculative investment (Horton 2013). Buyers are attracted because prime real estate costs are lower than the regional average and therefore the potential for property value increases is high. As well as urban development companies, the flow of urban development capital and concepts is also mediated by consultants specializing in market research and positioning, master planning, environmental impact assessment, architecture, construction, and engineering companies. The geographies of these development arrangements are becoming progressively more complex as urban planning is becoming increasingly internationalized. 184

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In terms of capital, South Korean investors are one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Cambodia, especially in the real estate and construction industry. South Korean investors are behind two large satellite cities: Camko City and Booyoung Town. Camko City is a US$2 billion project, planned to cover 120 hectares if all phases of the project are constructed as originally intended. Construction began in 2007, but work was stalled from 2010 to 2013, after the financing banks were hit by the global financial crises and a corruption scandal due to the way the financing was structured (Styliss and Kang 2014). The development of this project is indicative of the close political, diplomatic, and cultural ties between Cambodia and South Korea, as well as the commonalities in the business environment. It is also reflective of the prediction by South Korean investors that Cambodia would follow South Korea’s path of rapid economic development in the post-war period (Percival and Waley 2012). South Korea has a state-led internationalization strategy that supports and encourages South Korean firms to operate overseas. The construction and real estate industry is one of the key globalized South Korean economic sectors, and Korea’s expertise in this industry is now being exported across the world. In contrast, the development of GPPIC is more contingent upon the activities of the Indonesian developer, Ciputra Group. Indonesia does not have a particularly large presence in Cambodia in terms of investment, nor significant political and cultural ties. The development of GPPIC highlights the second key flow, that of urban development concepts. Ciputra initiated the private satellite city concept in and around Jakarta, and now has over 20 satellite cities across Indonesia as well as commercial centers, hotels, shopping malls, and a private hospital and university. The company’s overseas satellite city projects in Cambodia, Vietnam, India, and China tend to share broadly similar architectural styles and urban forms, regardless of their location, particularly the residential architecture reminiscent of historical European styles. The exterior and interior design in GPPIC is European in appearance and each type of house is named after places in Italy and France. It has been argued that satellite cities represent the “purest form of inter-referenced urbanism” because they symbolize the complete adoption of urban planning and design principles “based on an interpretation of how a global urbanism should look and function” (Shatkin 2011, 79). It is clear that there is a tendency for new urban developments in East Asia to represent the globalization of culture, generally—but not always—referencing neo-traditional European and North American architectural motifs (Wu 2004). However, the intra-Asian nature of these flows of capital and urban development concepts calls into question the assertion that there is a convergence around American styles of urbanism (Dick and Rimmer 1998). Other urban development projects in Phnom Penh are heavily inspired by architectural styles originating in Southeast Asia. Two developments are clear copies of buildings in Singapore: the Diamond Island Riviera is an imitation of Marina Bay Sands, while the nearby The Bridge development is influenced by the Pinnacle@Duxton public housing project, with walkways linking the different blocks.

Urban megaprojects: planned or unplanned? It may seem logical that large-scale, private urban developments such as satellite cities are the result of a lack of state capacity in urban planning. This could be because of insufficient state finances, rapid and seemingly unmanageable urban development, and a legal framework that is not suitable for the type and scale of contemporary urbanization. However, while this is certainly true in some respects, the state also has a central role in the production of private urbanism. This role may include assisting developers in acquiring low-cost land and promoting 185

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cities and countries as favorable destinations for foreign investors. The increasing involvement of private actors, especially from abroad, is not necessarily directly attributable to a weak state, but reflects the complex power relations between state and corporate actors. Comprehensive urban planning in Phnom Penh is affected by the disjuncture between market-led urban development and the institutional and administrative capacity of the state. The challenges include the absence of an adequate budget for urban development and planning, a shortage of local expertise, the lack of laws directing urban development, and laws and policies not being correctly implemented. These challenges are similar across various spheres of government, as has been recounted elsewhere (Hughes and Un 2011). In the context of urban development, the state has been unable to provide high standard infrastructure, whether through a lack of funding or technical incapacity. These infrastructures and services include flood defenses, water supply, sewerage systems, waste collection, public transport, and road improvement and telecommunication networks. The lack of money available for urban planning or urban infrastructure development can be partially explained by the fact that the national priority is rural development. These insufficient urban services can be provided by the private sector in satellite cities, where the entire urban system is built from scratch. The development of high-quality infrastructure caters to the demand from those who can afford the extra costs required, while excluding those who do not fit the particular market profile. The lack of planning skills and education is an equally serious issue. There are few institutions teaching urban planning, and even when it is taught, the subject tends to be adjoined to courses focused on architecture or engineering. In addition, the planning legal framework has been slow to keep pace with the rapid changes in the type and pace of urban development. The most significant piece of legislation governing urban development is Sub-Decree No. 86 on construction permits (Royal Government of Cambodia 1997). However, this legislation was ratified before the real estate boom period. The lack of legal framework may mean that the impacts of urban megaprojects on surrounding areas, such as increased traffic and drainage issues, are not adequately considered. Nonetheless, the legal framework is beginning to be developed. Sub-Decree No. 39 on the organization and management of borei (gated communities and housing complexes) was approved in 2011. The goal of the Sub-Decree is to determine the organization and management of borei as well as to establish principles, mechanisms, and procedures for the registration of land lots and designation of property rights within borei developments (BNG Legal 2011). The municipality pay occasional visits to borei developments in order to check their compliance with the new law, which involves checking the water supply, access routes, and wastewater treatment facilities. There currently exists no legally binding plan or policy for the future development of the city. A “strategic orientation” masterplan for Phnom Penh was developed with French assistance during the mid-2000s. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded the creation of a “White Paper of the Development and Management of Phnom Penh” (Bureau des Affaires Urbaines 2007) and revisions to the masterplan were undertaken in 2008–2009 with financial assistance from the French Embassy in Cambodia. Yet, a number of years on the masterplan is still being discussed at the municipal and ministerial levels due to the work required to extend the plan up until 2035, and is unapproved by the Council of Ministers (Agence Kampuchea Presse 2014). The masterplan did identify what are referred to as “secondary centers” and although this alludes to development being spread out to the suburbs, they are not exactly satellite cities of the kind that are being built. Nonetheless, despite the lack of a ratified masterplan, there are a number of positive recent developments in urban planning. A ring road system is under development that could reduce traffic congestion in the city center. At the same time, a 186

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public bus system commenced in 2014, which has so far received reasonable ridership levels especially on routes from suburban areas. Nonetheless, for journeys within the city center, travelling by motorbike or car remains the most convenient method of transport for the vast majority of people. A challenge to the implementation of a formal masterplan is that laws and policies are often not implemented or ignored because property developers and individuals do not follow the official procedures. The developers of large urban development projects such as satellite cities generally meet with high-level government officials before the project is made public. Thus projects already have the support of the most powerful actors and therefore any official planning evaluations or studies are either undertaken in a perfunctory manner or not at all. For example, the managing director of Ciputra had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Cambodia, who then pledged his support for the project. When big projects have the support of the highest levels of government, urban planners at the municipal level are left only to facilitate. They are provided with the opportunity to comment on projects, but there is an implicit requirement to be tactful and not overly critical (Percival 2012). In addition, when large parcels of peri-urban land are controlled by private companies and individuals, the role of the government becomes limited and it is difficult to build new public infrastructure such as roads. Speculation based upon the masterplan has also become a problem. It has been reported that individuals with insider information are those who are driving speculation in areas designated as having potential for future development (Cambodia Development Resource Institute 2007). Companies have also purchased land in areas of future development potential. For example, in anticipation of better connections across the Mekong River, local company 7NG have bought large areas of land in the Aray Krasat area in order to profit from the huge jump in land value should that land gain better transport connections and become part of Phnom Penh. While the development of satellite cities is reflective of state weaknesses, the state has a key role in the development of satellite cities. First, the government has engineered a highly open economy and created a government entity called the Council for Development of Cambodia to attract and assist foreign investors. Registered investors can receive benefits such as tax breaks and duty-free imports of materials. Both GPPIC and Camko City were granted incentives such as duty-free imports of construction materials and machinery. Second, the government assists property developers in acquiring land for development. State land can be transferred to a private individual or company through the use of a Sub-Decree (Thiel 2010). This mechanism is used for developments planned on land previously owned by the state, for example the Boeung Kak project in central Phnom Penh and the Chrouy Changvar City of the Future project. These projects have been the cause of much conflict when existing residents are living on state land without or with unclear formal land titles. The state has facilitated land acquisitions through complex arrangements that are legally unclear and rather opaque. Underneath the veneer of this formal legal framework, a complex and opaque network of informal relationships pervades Cambodia’s political economy at every level of society (Un and So 2011; Springer 2011).This is no less the case in urban development as any other sector of the economy (Paling 2012). The arrangements for these land transfers are generally not decided in a publicly accountable manner, and the types of companies who are awarded state land for development are often in some way connected to high-ranking politicians. For instance, the local partner of GPPIC, YLP Group, is a company with little available public information, but with a connection to the family of a former military general and current deputy prime minister. A number of other urban megaprojects are fully or partially owned by senators and other influential political figures.The close relationship between property development companies and the state leads to what Roy (2009) labels “informal planning.” 187

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Conclusions This chapter has highlighted contemporary debates on urban development in Phnom Penh, with particular reference to the development of satellite cities. In the absence of strict laws and with free capital flows, private actors are able to build and manage bounded urban spaces at the city district scale, covering large areas and housing thousands of people. However, the majority of satellite cities are in fact not completely “gated,” private spaces. Although individual residential clusters are secured, the remainder of the development is open to access by the general population. This is a response to the potential commercial advantages of allowing public access to the shopping and leisure facilities, while retaining the image of privacy and security for those living in the residential clusters. Projects such as Diamond Island are not entirely gated (only the residential areas are fully private), and have become very popular public space in a densely populated city with little green space. As Kusno (2010) has noted with regards to Jakarta, large urban development projects are by no means unanimously negative and produce new public spaces and ways of living in the city. The chapter illustrated how the development of satellite cities in Phnom Penh is driven by intra-Asian networks of capital and urban development concepts. The companies undertaking these large urban development projects and/or the capital behind them are mostly foreign, and foreign buyers are significant customers. The chapter also discussed the role of the state in the development of satellite cities, which is reflective of both state weaknesses in urban planning and infrastructure development, while the state at the same time has a supporting role in the development of urban megaprojects. The scale of private urban development poses some interesting questions for the future development of the city. The implications of large areas built and managed by private sector for urban politics and governance are currently not well understood. The total area of land managed by private companies building satellite cities in Phnom Penh is almost 5,000 hectares, which is significantly larger than the 3,000 hectares of the four central city districts. If in the future a large proportion of the wealthy live in private cities, paying service charges for their services, will this affect the financial health of city governments in developing cities? How can public infrastructure such as roads and railways be planned? Understanding these dynamics will be important as private urbanization continues.

Note 1 For example, Borey Peng Houth, which has nine gated communities currently under construction, and Borey Piphup Thmei (New World).

References Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP). 2014. Phnom Penh’s development master plan discussed. www.akp.gov. kh/?p=50989. Accessed 10 February 2015. BNG Legal. 2011. Primary law update. March 2011. Bureau des Affaires Urbaines (Bureau of Urban Affairs). 2007. Livre blanc du développement et de l’aménagement de Phnom Penh (White Paper on Development and Management of Phnom Penh). Phnom Penh: Bureau des Affaires Urbaines. Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI). 2007. Cambodia land titling urban baseline survey report December 2007. Phnom Penh: CDRI. Dick, H. 2009. Capitalising on urbanisation, in P. Rimmer and H. Dick (eds.), The city in Southeast Asia: Patterns, processes, and policy. Singapore: NUS Press, 193–228. Dick, H. and P. Rimmer. 1998. Beyond the third world city: The new urban geography of South-East Asia. Urban Studies 35 (12), 2303–2321.

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Urban Megaprojects and City Planning Dorn, D. and S. Lewis. 2013. Construction sector picks up pace in 2012. Cambodia Daily, January 27. Fauveaud, G. 2014. Mutations of real estate actors’ strategies and modes of capital appropriation in contemporary Phnom Penh. Urban Studies 51 (16), 3479–3494. Galliano, A. 2008. The property year in review. Phnom Penh Post, December 31. Gotsch, P. and M. Peterek. 2003. New settlements in the South: Urban models for the 21st century Paper presented at Megacities III Conference, October 24–26. GTZ. 2009. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in land in Cambodia. Eschborn: GTZ. Haila, A. 1997. The neglected builder of global cities, in O. Kalltorp, I. Elander, O. Erricsson, and M. Franzen (eds.), Cities in transformation—transformation in cities: Social and symbolic change of urban space. Aldershot: Avebury, 51–64. Harvey, D. 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler Series B—Human Geography 71 (1), 3–17. Hogan, T., T. Bunnell, C. P. Pow, E. Permanasari, and S. Morshidi. 2012. Asian urbanisms and the privatization of cities. Cities 29 (1), 59–63. Horton, C. 2013. Report: The time is now to invest in Phnom Penh’s condo market. Phnom Penh Post, December 26. ——. 2014. Giant development in Cambodia hinges on Chinese buyers. New York Times, May 6. Hughes, C. 2009. Cambodia in 2008: Consolidation in the midst of crisis. Asian Survey 49 (1), 206–212. Hughes, C. and K. Un. 2011. Cambodia’s economic transformation. Copenhagen: Nias Press. Kang, S. and G. Styliss. 2014. Lack of construction regulations a concern. Cambodia Daily, October 2. Khemro, B. H. S. and G. Payne. 2004. Improving tenure security for the urban poor in Phnom Penh, Cambodia: An analytical case study. Habitat International 28 (2), 181–201. Kinetz, E. 2007. Cambodia, long an Asian mouse, may be ready to roar. New York Times, July 27. KOTRA. 2010. Trade and investment status: Cambodia. Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. Kusno, A. 2010. The appearances of memory: Mnemonic practices of architecture and urban form in Indonesia. Durham: Duke University Press. Municipality of Phnom Penh. 2011. Phnom Penh districts. www.phnompenh.gov.kh/district.php. Accessed January 25, 2015. National Institute of Statistics (NIS). 2013. Cambodia inter-censal population survey 2013. Provisional Report. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning. Olds, K. 2001. Globalization and urban change: Capital, culture, and Pacific Rim mega-projects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paling, W. 2012. Planning a future for Phnom Penh: Mega projects, aid dependence and disjointed governance. Urban Studies 49 (13), 2889–2912. Percival, T. 2012. Articulating intra-Asian urbanism: The production of satellite city megaprojects in Phnom Penh. Unpublished PhD thesis. Leeds: University of Leeds. Percival, T. and P. Waley. 2012. Articulating intra-Asian urbanism: The production of satellite cities in Phnom Penh. Urban Studies 49 (13), 2873–2888. Property Report Asia. 2010. The next big thing in South East Asia? July 27. Roy, A. 2009. The 21st century metropolis: New geographies of theory. Regional Studies 43 (6), 819–830. Royal Government of Cambodia. 1997. Sub-Decree No. 86 on construction permits. Phnom Penh: RGC. Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT). 2009. The 8 khan survey: Urban poor settlements in Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh: STT. Savills World Research. 2013. Briefing: Phnom Penh, Cambodia (1H 2013). Ho Chi Minh City: Savills. Shatkin, G. 2008. The city and the bottom line: Urban megaprojects and the privatization of planning in Southeast Asia. Environment and Planning A 40 (2), 383–401. ——. 2011. Planning privatopolis: Representation and contestation in the development of urban integrated megaprojects. In A. Roy & A. Ong (eds.), Worlding cities: Asian experiments and the art of being global. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 77–97. Slocomb, M. 2010. An economic history of Cambodia in the twentieth century. Singapore: NUS Press. Soeun, S. 2011. Hope alive despite poor construction data. Phnom Penh Post, January 26. Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s neoliberal order: Violence, authoritarianism, and the contestation of public space. New York: Routledge. ——. 2011. Articulated neoliberalism: The specificity of patronage, kleptocracy, and violence in Cambodia’s neoliberalization. Environment and Planning A 43 (11), 2554–2570. ——. 2015. Violent neoliberalism: Development, discourse and dispossession in Cambodia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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16 LABOR RIGHTS AND TRADE UNIONS IN CAMBODIA Dennis Arnold and Dae-oup Chang

Introduction: labor in the regional and global context Capitalist labor and trade union history in Cambodia is recent. Any serious consideration of a working class begins in the mid-1990s and today many workers remain partial-proletarians, with interests and identities largely agrarian in orientation and not fully divorced from rural livelihoods. This can be explained by Cambodia’s peculiar modern history. In the French colonial era, Cambodia largely remained a rice-exporting “backwater” with limited infrastructure and other fixed capital investments. It was private investors in the plantations of the early twentieth century who initiated the development of wage labor by importing foreign workers. When France turned Indochina into a vast plantation for primary commodity production such as tea, rice, pepper, and rubber as well as mineral mines, Cambodia, located at the periphery of French Indochina, also attracted private investment for rubber plantations, worked by Vietnamese workers (Elson 1999, 155). Cambodia’s post-colonial development led by the constitutional monarchy was short-lived as Cambodia was dragged into the US-induced war in Vietnam, which sparked over 20 years of conflicts in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge’s Democratic Kampuchea was a disastrous attempt to build a utopian agrarian communism that almost entirely eliminated any industrial capacity, while radically transforming Cambodia’s limited capitalist labor to agrarian bonded servitude. Today, Cambodia maintains a precarious position in the global economy and suffers from an acute form of neoliberal development (Springer 2010). Structurally, the economy is not diversified, relying on four so-called economic growth pillars, namely textiles, garment construction, agriculture, and tourism. Cambodia’s population remains largely rural and agrarian, yet the rapidly increasing rate of landlessness and land-poverty means there is a large “surplus population” in the country and high numbers of rural–urban and international migrant workers working in precarious jobs. The vicious cycle of rural poverty and urban exploitation begins in rural Cambodia where 8.1 of the 14.9 million population resides and makes a living (NIS and ILO 2013). Hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted to make way for developers, deprived of their means of subsistence, becoming mobile workers who either work for those companies occupying lands that once belonged to them, or migrate to cities in search of survival jobs (see Lawreniuk, this volume, p. 202 and Springer, this volume, p. 234).1 The benefit of development goes mostly, if not exclusively, to the foreign companies and a few local businesses 191

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with strong ties to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The investments in Economic Land Concessions (ELC) are primarily export-oriented—sugarcane and rubber plantation, logging and mining, or luxury resorts and casinos for tourism, not serving the needs of the locals. For the land-poor, they increasingly rely on remittances from family members with precarious jobs in factories, construction, street vending, and other informal sectors, as unstable market prices, high costs of seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs and natural disasters, among other factors, lead to highly tenuous agrarian livelihoods. Therefore, the rural and urban is not necessarily a divide in Cambodia, but a continuum. Official labor force statistics reflect these and other trends. Cambodia’s labor force (aged 15 or older) experienced changes over the past decade and increased at a per annum average of 3.3 percent. Although unemployment rates remained low and even fell further over the decade, a large proportion of workers (82.5 percent) continued to labor in “vulnerable” employment, defined as unpaid family workers and own-account workers (NIS and ILO 2013). A challenge for social and labor rights is that an estimated 81.2 percent (5.9 million persons) of the 7.2 million employed persons aged 15 or older worked in an informal sector enterprise; 17.7 percent (1.3 million persons) worked in a formal sector enterprise; and the other 1.1 percent of them (75,729 persons) were employed in a household (NIS and ILO 2013).2 Another key consideration for labor issues in Cambodia is the all-important garment industry, which in 2014 employed over 600,000. The garment industry has expanded considerably since downturns at the peak of the global economy crisis of 2008–2009, yet Cambodia remains a lower-tier assembly platform relying on imported inputs, with over 90 percent foreign ownership. Without much developed indigenous industries or trickle-down from developed countries in the region, Cambodians offer what those foreign investors continuously require: cheap and disciplined labor. Wages are low, while basic rights including freedom of association and collective bargaining are regularly denied. These and other factors have led to large-scale strikes in 2010 and 2013–2014; the latter strikes were met with military force. Thus, despite myriad constraints for workers collective action, workers and their organizations are becoming protagonists in struggles over social and political economic rights in Cambodia. This chapter begins with an overview of the history of trade unions in Cambodia. It then discusses the largely non-unionized informal sector, before turning to the most focal points of Cambodia’s labor movement, the textile and garment industry. This sector is critical to understand labor activism, and the important role garment workers play in debates and struggles over social and political economic disparity and uneven power relations.

Trade unions in Cambodia: from transition to institutional overcrowding During the Khmer monarchy regime from 1954 to 1970, trade unions existed in the very limited number of factories in the country, though little is known about the unions (Nuon and Serrano 2010). During the Khmer Rouge regime, there were unions in the few factories and production sites that existed; yet again, little is known about these unions. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea government established trade unions, which were one of the most important mass organizations through which the party implemented its policies. Like Vietnam, these unions, called the Union Federation of Kampuchea (UFK), were largely a transmission belt for the party’s policies rather than an institutional channel for the workers’ voice. Alongside activities including propaganda and international relations, unions focused on matters including living standards (distributing food to members), establishing childcare centers in workplaces, education, and women’s affairs (Nuon and Serrano 2010). After 1990, when Cambodia transitioned to a market economy, trade 192

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unions and other mass organizations were disbanded. A reformulated version of the UFK was later established in 1999, the Cambodia Federation of Independent Trade Unions (CFITU), led by former UFK members. The CFITU is still active, yet it is marginal compared to federations discussed below. In the 1990s, numerous union federations emerged, and remain key players. The Khmer National Party (KNP) leader Sam Rainsy and union activists started to organize local unions to counter unions associated with the ruling party, drawn together under the Cambodian Union Federation (CUF),3 established in 1996. Rainsy and Chea Vichea led the formation of the Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC), also in 1996. Vichea was the federation president until his murder in 2004 (see Morris, this volume, p. 29). The FTU focused its organizing efforts on heavily exploited garment workers and initiated international networks that were instrumental in US-based efforts to establish the US–Cambodia trade agreement on Textile and Apparel (see below) (Arnold and Toh 2010). From the early years, a cleavage between the pro-opposition and pro-CPP unions emerged, while unions claiming political independence were established, including the Coalition of Cambodian Apparel Workers Union (C.CAWDU), formed in 2000 and led by former garment factory workers, an anomaly at the time. The ILO and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), an international NGO of the American AFL-CIO began formally classifying unions as belonging to the opposition or ruling party camp, deepening the splits among the federations. In the same period unions in other sectors were initiated, including the Cambodian Independent Teachers’ Association (CITA) led by Rong Chuun (now leader of the pro-opposition Cambodian Confederation of Unions), as well as the Cambodian Association for Informational Economy Development (CAID) and the Cambodian Union Federation of Building and Wood Workers (FBWW) (Nuon and Serrano 2010). From the early 2000s, the increasing number and rate of both enterprise-level and nationallevel union federations is staggering. In 2014, there are 96 trade union federations in Cambodia, an estimated 60 percent are active, with roughly 90 percent of the unions’ primary activity and membership in the garment sector. Approximately 3,000 enterprise unions are registered in the country, but it is unknown how many are active. It is quite common for a single factory to have five or more competing in-house unions. In the garment sector, 60 percent of all workers in registered factories are trade union members—an exceptionally high rate. In neighboring Thailand, for example, the unionization rate in textiles and garments is below 1 percent. Despite any claims that garment sector unionization and a “robust” number of federations demonstrate a high level of worker representation and freedom of association, in fact, the situation complicates matters considerably. For example, as noted by Arnold and Toh (2010): •

•

•

Despite high union membership, basic rights are often neglected or abused. For example, overtime work beyond legal limits and occupational health and safety issues have not been sufficiently addressed at the garment industry-wide level. Furthermore, freedom of association is regularly denied and the prevalence of FDCs (fixed-duration contracts) contracts in the garment sector means workers are reluctant or unable to promote their rights. Related, the high number of federations and plant-level unions makes it difficult for “genuine” unions to promote the interests of their members. Competition and conflict among the unions and the national federations limit their effectiveness at the enterprise level. Following on the last point, an atomized labor movement characterized by pro-capital and pro-CPP unions loses effectiveness. The CPP is encouraging the formation of friendly federations to prove that opposition and independent federations are a minority and do not represent the workers. 193

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•

•

• •

The proliferation of unions and federations is associated with the rise of unions as businesses. Running a union can be lucrative as corrupt unions can seek kickbacks from employers. Many unions show little concern about improving bottom-up communication with their members. Union structure is often undemocratic and majority views are not reflected in union policies and programs (Nuon and Serrano 2010). Male domination of union leadership in the garment industry is particularly problematic because the absolute majority of women workers are represented by the male minority, who often lack understanding of particular needs of female members (Murray 2014). Employers and the government regularly use legal threats and court cases against unions that are outside of their direct control—thus pressuring such unions to “fall into line.” The past decade has seen recurring incidents of violence against the (minority) oppositionoriented and politically independent unionists and their members. Most prominently, three FTUWCK leaders were murdered between 2004 and 2008 and in January 2014, five protesters were shot and killed by the military in an industrial zone that had witnessed strikes for the preceding week (AMRC 2014; WRC 2014).

Despite these and other obstacles, workers’ concerns have reached both national and international prominence. Cambodia’s much-touted apparel sector is illustrative. Before turning to the garment sector, an overview of the “real” labor market of Cambodia, the informal economy, is provided.

Informal economy labor In industrializing Asia, the pattern of rapid growth over the past few decades has been based on both expansion of the informal sector and an informalized labor system in the formal economy, with government protection absent or ineffective in both sectors of the economy (Chang 2009). Importantly, previous patterns of care provision within the family or other social systems, which went some way to redress unequal social distribution in colonial and post-colonial Asia, have been eroded without being replaced by other forms of social security. Indeed, in much of industrializing Asia, any form of social security has often been deemed anathema to economic development, particularly the perceived needs for greater flexibility for firms and a limited role of the state in the social realm. The objective, it would appear, is to ensure one’s sole means of subsistence is labor power in the market. In Cambodia, informal sector establishments comprise private non-farm businesses, private farm enterprises and other enterprises not registered with the Ministries of Commerce, Industry or Tourism, or any other authority. Formal enterprises are those that are registered, plus government establishments, public/state-owned enterprises and non-profit organizations (NGOs). Roughly 82 percent of Cambodia’s labor force is comprised of informal economy workers who are not covered by the Labor Law. Informal economy workers are not recognized, not regulated, and not entitled to legal protection. In the informal economy, women workers are subject to a wider range of potential problems or abuses because they have no legal rights, no protection under occupational safety and health regulations (OSH), and no access to social security protection. They are often subject to extortion, bribery, repression, and harassment— sometimes sexual—by authorities. The formal economy does not have the absorptive capacity to deal with Cambodia’s young and urbanizing population. This is leading to calls for intensification of engagement with the regional and global economy, including efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which 194

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provides a significant proportion of jobs in the formal economy.4 Yet the Cambodian state actively reproduces precarious and informalizing “formal” labor, deemed a necessity to attract capital flows. Instead of a formalization of labor relations, the employment dynamics have gone even further in the opposite direction: the informalization of the formal and the persistence or expansion of the informal sector. Addressing the needs of informal economy workers is a major challenge. For trade unions, it differs from their traditional strength—representing workers at registered, typically fixed workplaces. Such “formal” workers often identify themselves primarily in relation to their employers, while regularly making demands of the state to intervene in capital–labor relations, whereas informal workers are more likely to identify themselves in relation to the state through their social consumption needs. That said, many informal economy workers have no expectation of the state either, they employ a variety of survival strategies involving family and social networks. In this context organizations, including the independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association (IDEA), have begun organizing informal sector workers, primarily tuk-tuk drivers and street vendors (see Kusakabe, p. 257 this volume). The IDEA’s major activities include anti-corruption campaigns, the provision of various education programs, a mutual-help fund and other welfare services to the members, and bargaining for better working environment with local authorities and business leaders on behalf of the members. While membership remains low, roughly 5,000 members nationwide, the organization and its leader Vorn Pao have been active campaigners for the opposition CNRP. Interestingly, contrary to many experiences of other unions of informal workers in neighboring countries, the establishment of the IDEA has been assisted by formal sector unions such as C.CAWDU. This is largely because Cambodia does not have a clear division between trade unions of privileged formal workers and organizations of impoverished informal workers. Workers in the formal economy such as the garment sector, remain the working poor and are not much better off in comparison to informal economy workers. This is a root cause of increasing discontent among garment workers.

Garment and tension Cambodia’s garment sector is characterized by an institutional overcrowding of unions, combined with the decoupling of an international CSR paradigm of labor rights monitoring under the Better Factories Cambodia program for workers’ and independent unions’ interests (Arnold 2013). This constellation of relations is embedded in a country experiencing rapid economic growth marked by increasing inequality and instability generated by regional economic dynamics, of which highly volatile and competitive garment production for global markets is particularly important. For example, employment in garment and shoe manufacturing has fluctuated from 350,000 in 2008, to 297,000 in 2009, and up to roughly 530,000 in 2014 (BFC 2014).5 These structural forces tightly delineate workers’ agency. Workers’ response to this configuration is marked by increasing frequency of strikes, many of which are led by “real” unions, indicating, despite numerous obstacles, that the ability to undertake industrial actions has emerged. This section explores these issues, with attention to the ways in which both foreign and domestic interests have manipulated workers’ concerns, for both political and economic gains. The first factories producing textiles and garments for export opened in Cambodia around 1994, with investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. The industry remains dominated by foreign investors.6 The Economic Institute of Cambodia (2007) estimates that direct production-related employment accounts for only 53 percent of employment generated, meaning that total employment related to this sector may exceed well over a million, significant for a country of some 14 million people.7 Over 85–90 percent of textile and garment workers 195

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are rural–urban migrant women who contribute a significant proportion of their earnings to their families in rural areas. As stated above, work conditions in the early years of Cambodia’s garment production (1994– 2000) were exceptionally poor. In June 1998, trade unions and textile manufacturer groups in the US petitioned their government to review the alleged abuse of workers’ rights in Cambodian factories (Polaski 2006), drawing on reports of dismal work conditions from the FTU. Such protectionist efforts, coupled with a more general crisis of legitimacy for neoliberal globalization, led to the US and Cambodian governments initiating the three-year US–Cambodia Textile and Apparel Trade Agreement (Arnold and Toh 2010). It was extended for another three years, ending on the same day as the MFA phase-out on December 31, 2004—the MFA consisted of nontariff bilateral quotas established by developed countries to protect domestic industry. Along with the US–Cambodia Trade Agreement, an independent but complementary factory-monitoring project, later named Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) was established in 2001 involving the ILO, the Cambodian government, garment manufacturers, and trade unions.The BFC’s initial purpose was to inform US import quota allocation decisions. If labor conditions in Cambodia’s factories improved, the country was granted increased US market access under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA). US market access was the carrot of the program, with ILO monitoring the stick. Much attention has been paid to the workplace-specific initiatives that comprise BFC, particularly the impacts of monitoring on labor standards compliance and the role of international buyers, among other issues (see Brown et al. 2014; Miller et al. 2007; Oka 2012; Polaski 2006; Wells 2007). For over a decade the BFC has regularly been held up as a model of “fair” export-led development, largely by mediating global brands and retailers’ needs to address reputation risk, with calls from labor activists for increased factory monitoring and space for workers to organize and join trade unions of their choosing (Arnold 2013). Since the end of global MFA quotas under the WTO in 2005, numerous cracks have emerged in the system. The ILO has lost its power of enforcement with the elimination of global quotas, which drove the factory-level improvements associated with the early years of the project (Arnold and Toh 2010). Lacking power of enforcement, BFC has been criticized for playing into global retailers’ and brands’ desire to protect their image, while the ILO and World Bank continue to promote Cambodia’s garment sector as a model of decent work in global supply chains—a necessity since the establishment of their global Better Work program in 2006.8 A recent evaluation of BFC adds more weight to these criticisms and casts doubt on the effectiveness of the program in addressing the problems workers face. Although the program had expanded to cover as many as 473 garment factories by 2014, compliance rates began to steeply decrease from 2010 in all aspects including contracts, wages, hours, leave, welfare, and safety and health (BFC 2014). Underlying the BFC project is a set of mechanisms to initiate tripartite industrial relations systems in a country with no such history. Not only does the project aim to establish stable industrial relations based upon tripartite structure, it presupposes that a tripartite system is the best solution to enhance the working and living conditions of Cambodian workers. However, this approach ignores the fact that such a system can only emerge from and be sustained on the basis of the power of well-organized and unified labor vis-à-vis employers and the state. In other words, an effective tripartite system is a historical product of a strong workers’ movement rather than a policy remedy for workers. That is why, without empowered labor, the seemingly fair tripartite system more often than not works for the interest of employers making profits under the auspices of the state. This shortcoming has been thrown into the light for numerous reasons, one being that Cambodia’s garment and shoe factories have become notorious for mass fainting, with numbers 196

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involved of 1,686 in 2012, 823 in 2013, and 1,800 in 2014, according to the Cambodian Labor Confederation (Teehan and Mom 2015). A driver of many faintings is poor occupational health and safety—including exposure to chemicals, poor ventilation, excessive heat, and insufficient access to drinking water (Labor Behind the Label and CLEC 2013).9 Moreover, faintings are attributed to overwork and malnourishment or undernourishment, commonly cited by ILO researchers and Cambodian NGOs and trade unions (Arnold 2013). For example, an ILO-led survey finds that 43.2 percent of garment workers suffer from anemia, and 15.7 percent are underweight (ILO, Agence Française de Développement and Angkor Research and Consulting, Ltd. 2014). The study also found that workers spend only US$9 per week on food, or US$1.30 per day. An underlying factor is that the inflation-adjusted minimum wage had not risen above its 2001 level until the new minimum wage was implemented on February 1, 2014 (BFC 2014)—forcing workers into excessive overtime shifts, while compromising sufficiently nutritious food in order to save money to remit. The majority of global brands and retailers utilizing the BFC program have maintained their distance from wage negotiations in Cambodia, claiming they are a matter of national interest. Another critical issue is the increasing prevalence of fixed-duration contracts (FDCs); these also contribute to overwork as the renewal of contracts is subject to workers’ performance, with some 90 percent of workers in the industry employed on short-term contracts. Stable industrial relations based upon a fair tripartite system also seem far from reality. The total number of strikes in the industry rose by 8 percent and the number of lost person-days increased to 895,553 between May 2013 and April 2014, up from 628,759 between May 2012 and April 2013 (BFC 2014). The number of strikes has risen dramatically between 2010 and 2013—up nearly 250 percent. The number of strikes in 2014 fell by 25 percent, yet the figures do not include the 15 days of strikes in late 2013 and early 2014, as the GMAC considers them to be political events rather than industrial actions, due to the alleged association of the strikes with the opposition CNRP protests (BFC 2014). Large-scale garment workers’ strikes in September 2010 and again in December 2013– January 2014 have moved beyond workers’ sector-specific issues to the center of the national political debate (Arnold 2014; AMRC 2014). Both nationwide strikes demonstrate the highly skewed power dynamics in Cambodia’s main tripartite body, the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC), which consists of 14 representatives from the Ministry of Labor, seven from the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (GMAC), and seven from the trade unions. Cambodian garment workers’ potential to negotiate a decent wage and other critical issues is closely related to the balance of forces between these stakeholders. Union representatives include only two independent unions including C.CAWDU and the National Independent Federation Textile Union of Cambodia (NIFTUC). The other five participating unions are neither independent of the government and employers nor accountable to rank-and-file workers they claim to represent. The nature of these unions’ role in the LAC and the capacity for the Committee to fairly represent workers’ interests in any meaningful way have been clearly revealed in the national minimum wage negotiation in December 2013. In May 2013 the monthly minimum wage increased from US$61 to US$75 per month, well short of a “survival wage” of US$100. Garment workers’ concerns became a key campaign platform for the opposition of Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in the lead up to the July 2013 elections—with opposition leader Sam Rainsy promising a US$160 per month minimum wage if elected. Trade unions including C.CAWDU and NIFTUC had been campaigning for minimum wage increase to US$160 (later US$177 in 2014) on the basis of a recommendation of a proper minimum wage range between US$157–177 from the Survey Working Group of the LAC, whose independent study of the proper minimum wage level for 197

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the garment and footwear industry in Cambodia was agreed in the tripartite body. The LAC called for a meeting on December 24, 2013 to negotiate. However, two participating independent unions found that this meeting was called by the committee to simply issue a decision made without their consultation (AMRC 2014). Instead of discussing the level of minimum wage increase, the head of the LAC announced in the meeting its plan to increase the legal minimum wage from US$80 to US$95. The announcement did not reflect the growing aspiration of many rank-and-file workers and their representatives for decent wages. According to LAC’s decision, unions’ demand for US$160 will be met by 2018. The announcement triggered a massive wave of strikes between December 24, 2013 and January 2, 2014. Workers organized various forms of protests, including mass rallies in streets, sit-ins, slowdowns in factories and mass absenteeism. A major feature of this strike was that it was a “self-motivated strike” by rank-and-file workers who voluntarily created actions and participated in them, even without instructions given by union federations (AMRC 2014). Collective actions took place also in factories without any union leadership as well as in factories with pro-government union leadership (AMRC 2014). Inevitably, workers’ actions attracted more unions into the strike wave. As a result, an unprecedented number of unions participated in the strike together. In the beginning, C.CAWDU, NIFTUC, the Collective Union of Movement of Workers (CUMW), and the Cambodian Alliance of Trade Unions (CATU) were leading figures in the campaign demanding a US$160 minimum wage. From December 25, the following union federations joined the strike: FTUWKC, the Workers Friendship Union Federation (WFTU), the Independent Youth Union (IDYTU), and the Cambodian Confederation Unions (CCU). These federations joined because workers—their members— began to join the strike regardless of their union memberships. Together, the federations comprise 386 plant-level unions and represent 249,700 workers in the textile, garment, and footwear industries (AMRC 2014). Surprised by the strike, Cambodia’s economic and political elites began to take a heavyhanded approach. On December 29, GMAC announced its plan to seek legal responsibility for financial losses to union leaders. The Council of Ministers issued a letter to urge the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOL) to send an ultimatum to striking workers that they had to get back to work by January 2, 2014. Protesters were challenged by an increasing number of policemen armed with electric batons, shields, and guns on December 30 and 31. Nevertheless, workers refused to accept MOL’s modified proposal to increase the minimum wage to US$100, announced on December 31, and continued to protest. The first violent crackdown occurred in front of the gate of Yakjin, a Korea–US-owned company. The Military Special Command Unit 911 was called; it attacked the workers with iron bars and arrested 10 workers, including leaders of the informal sector union IDEA and the plantation workers union. The authorities also cracked down on protesters in the Canadia Industrial Zone on the same day. The military police attacked protesters with electric batons, smoke grenades, slingshots, and finally AK-47 rifles with live ammunition. The military shot live ammunition at unarmed protesters at around 2 a.m. on January 3, and the brutal manhunt continued until 2 p.m. The result was tragic: five young people died and 25 people suffered bullet wounds, while another 13 had other types of serious injuries. Thirteen more were arrested. The leaders of the unions faced complaints assembled by GMAC for losses to the sector, worth millions of dollars. The general strike in 2013–14 clearly manifested the fragility of the “stable” industrial relations system the BFC had been promoting since the introduction of the program. Without empowered, organized, and unified labor and the determination of the state to move away from a development strategy relying solely on cheap labor, implanting a system of industrial relations 198

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is like building a sand castle. Perhaps the best achievement of the BFC is that an increasing number of rank-and-file workers and leaders of independent unions began to realize the importance of self-mobilization and workers’ empowerment.

Conclusion Cambodian workers are subjected to an acute form of neoliberal development that creates massive landlessness and land-poverty, on the one hand and precarious jobs on the other (Arnold 2014; Springer 2010). Extremely uneven regional development, volatile capital movement, and competitive global markets contextualize the particular pattern of development through which the Cambodian workforce survives as the working poor. The neoliberal state does not hesitate to utilize authoritarian measures to reproduce a docile workforce and desperate working and living conditions for ordinary working people in Cambodia. While the vast majority of people have to live on survival jobs in the informal economy in urban and rural Cambodia, factory workers have to deal with stagnant real wages, insecure work contracts, and harsh working conditions. Whereas the BFC contributed more to building a better image of global fashion giants by offering them an opportunity to distance themselves from the daily exploitation in Cambodia’s garment factories, Cambodian workers, increasingly defiant to the state and employers, prove that workers’ agency can survive and grow despite the onset of neoliberalism. Informal workers’ mobilization and a high degree of voluntary participation of rank-and-file workers in garment strikes have clearly demonstrated that workers are not merely victims but rule-changers. Cambodian trade unions can play an important role in steering Cambodian development toward a more equitable and sustainable direction as long as they continue to embrace the aspirations of formal and informal workers in factories, streets, and plantations.

Notes 1 Of roughly 3,900,000 hectares of arable land in Cambodia, LICADHO (2012) research shows that the government has leased 2,033,664 hectares of land to private companies under its land concession schemes—approximately 800,000 hectares in 2011 alone. According to some estimates (Sochua and Wikstrom 2012), roughly 420,000 Cambodians have been affected by evictions since 2003. 2 The contribution of informal employment in urban areas was 81.8 percent, and in rural areas it was 53.2 percent. In general, there were more male than female workers in both the formal and informal sector enterprises. When factoring in agricultural work, 60.2 percent were in informal employment, followed by 33.3 percent in agriculture employment, and 6.5 percent in formal employment (ILO and NIS 2013). 3 The CUF is a member of the Cambodian Confederation of Trade Unions, the main CPP-aligned confederation in Cambodia. CCTU was formed in 2004. It is the oldest active confederation in the country. 4 To this end, since 2005 the Cambodian government has approved nearly 30 special economic zones in border, coastal and rural areas—with the exception of one SEZ in Phnom Penh, the Phnom Penh SEZ. 5 In Bangladesh and Vietnam, total employment remained steady or increased in the same period, demonstrating volatility and susceptibility to external shocks in Cambodia. 6 A majority of factory owners originate from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and other regional countries. Top buyers currently include retailers and big box stores, primarily US and European companies, in addition to East Asian intermediaries. H&M and Gap have long been the two most important, other prominent buyers including Levi’s, Li & Fung, Wal-Mart, Inditex, Adidas, Target, Sears, and VF. 7 Food sellers (street vendors) represent almost 40 percent of indirect jobs, housing 25 percent, and transportation 5 percent. Another 30 percent include small traders, clothing shops and other supporting businesses (Economic Institute of Cambodia 2007).

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Dennis Arnold and Dae-oup Chang 8 Cambodia is the flagship of the ILO and the International Finance Corporation’s global Better Work program, currently operating in Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, with plans to expand further in coming years. 9 Although factories in Cambodia are not characterized by large-scale, and regular, mass industrial disasters as is the case in Bangladesh, in recent years physical safety concerns have come to the fore after a shoe factory collapse killed three workers in May 2013.

References Arnold, D. 2013. Better work or “ethical fix”? Lessons from Cambodia’s apparel industry. Global Labor Column No. 155. ——. 2014. Workers’ agency and power relations in Cambodia’s garment industry, in A. Rossi, A. Luinstra, and J. Pickles (eds.). Towards better work: Understanding labor in apparel global value chains. London: ILO and Palgrave Macmillan, 212–231. Arnold, D. and H. S. Toh. 2010. A fair model of globalisation? Labor and global production in Cambodia. Journal of Contemporary Asia 40(3): 401–424. Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC) 2014. A week that shook Cambodia: The hope, anger and despair of Cambodian workers after the general strike and violent crackdown, www.amrc.org.hk/sites/default/files/ FFM-Cambodia-Report-022014-amrc_0.pdf. Accessed December 12, 2014. Better Factories Cambodia (BFC). 2014. Thirty first synthesis report on working conditions in Cambodia’s garment sector. Geneva: International Labor Office, International Finance Corporation. Brown, D., R. Dehejia and R. Robertson. 2014. Regulations, monitoring and working conditions: Evidence from Better Factories Cambodia and Better Work Vietnam, in D. McCann, S. Lee, P. Belser, C. Fenwick, J. Howe, and M. Luebker (eds.). Creative labor regulation. London: ILO and Palgrave Macmillan, 185–203. Chang, D. O. 2009. Informalising labor in Asia’s global factory. Journal of Contemporary Asia 39(2): 161–179. Economic Institute of Cambodia (EIC). 2007. Export diversification and value added: Addressing the impact of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing expiration on Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Economic Institute of Cambodia. Elson, R. E. 1999. International commerce, the state and society: Economic and social change, in N. Tarling (ed), The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia, Vol. 3: From c 1800 to the 1930s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 127–192. International Labor Organization (ILO), Agence Française de Développement and Angkor Research and Consulting, Ltd. 2014. Study on the impact of food provision on garment workers’ health and productivity. Phnom Penh: International Labor Organization. Labor Behind the Label and Community Legal Education Centre. 2013. Shop ’til they drop: Fainting and malnutrition in garment workers in Cambodia. London and Phnom Penh: Labor Behind the Label and Community Legal Education Centre. LICADHO (Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights). 2012. Cambodia’s draft law on the management and use of agricultural land. Briefing Paper. Phnom Penh: LICADHO. Miller, D., N. Veasna, C. Aprill, and R. Certeza. 2007. “Business as usual?” Governing the supply chain in clothing post-MFA phase-out. The case of Cambodia. Discussion Paper 6. Geneva: Global Union Research Network. Murray, B. 2014. Garment unions: The call for women to represent women. Phnom Penh: Phnom Penh Post. National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of Cambodia and International Labor Organization (ILO). 2013. Cambodia labor force and child labor survey 2012: Labor force report. Geneva: International Labor Organization and National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of Cambodia. Nuon,V. and M. Serrano. 2010. Building unions in Cambodia: History, challenges, strategies. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. Oka, C. 2012. Does better labor standard compliance pay? Linking labor standard compliance and supplier competitiveness. Better Work Discussion Paper 5. Geneva: ILO. Polaski, S. 2006. Combining global and local forces: The case of labor rights in Cambodia. World Development 34(5): 919–932. Sochua, M. and C. Wikstrom. 2012. Land grabs in Cambodia. New York Times. July 18, www.nytimes. com/2012/07/19/opinion/land-grabs-in-cambodia.html. Accessed May 25, 2016.

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Labor Rights and Trade Unions Springer, S. 2010. Cambodia’s neoliberal order: Violence, authoritarianism, and the contestation of public space. New York: Routledge. Teehan, S. and K. Mom. 2015. Faintings up: Union report. Phnom Penh: Phnom Penh Post. Wells, D. 2007. ‘“Best practice” in the regulation of international labor standards: Lessons of the US-Cambodia Trade Agreement. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 28(1): 357–376. Worker Rights Consortium (WRC). 2014. Crackdown in Cambodia: Workers seeking higher wages meet violent repression. Washington, DC: Worker Rights Consortium.

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17 THE TIES THAT BIND Rural–Urban Linkages in the Cambodian Migration System Sabina Lawreniuk

The “miracle” (World Bank 2009) of Cambodia’s recent development has been driven by the movement of labor. Beginning in the 1990s, when the first garment factories opened their doors, a trickle of migrant workers to Phnom Penh’s nascent export industry would soon become a flood, amounting to what is presently more than 300,000 workers employed in the garment sector alone (CCHR 2015). Taking account of the construction industry and the various other migrant employers, almost a million of Cambodia’s population of fifteen million people are now urban migrant workers (NIS 2010). Such figures are evocative of the earliest development models, such as W. Arthur Lewis’s (1954) two-sector typology, wherein unemployed or underemployed rural dwellers flood inflexibly to new urban opportunities, abandoning the fields for the modern sector. However, if such a conception has ever been applied accurately, it has not been so in contemporary Cambodia, where labor migration is not unilinear but rather complex and churning. Migrants abandon neither the countryside, nor their engagement with agriculture, but utilize the modern sector to enhance their rural livelihoods via bi-directional remittance, which flows throughout Cambodia in vast sums. This chapter will explore the nature, meaning and implications of Cambodia’s epoch-defining period of mass labor migration in three parts. First, it will outline the divergent trajectories underway in Cambodia’s urban and rural areas, emphasizing the concomitant push and pull factors which drive the phenomenon. Though migrants frequently suppose that urban work offers prospects for “easy” or “comfortable” labor and living (Derks 2008) and a route out of the strictures of rural deprivation, these assumptions are tested in the second section of the chapter, which considers the stark realities of migrant experience in low-wage industries in Phnom Penh. As a third and final section explores, migration is rarely an escape from rural poverty. Instead, as rural circumstances continue to impinge on urban livelihoods, rural social divisions are reinscribed in the city and the problem of poverty is thereby reproduced.

Rural and urban: divergent development Rice is more than simply Cambodia’s staple crop. For centuries, it has been the ongoing soul of rural life in the Kingdom, in which resources and economy have been “remarkably consistent over two millennia” (Chandler 2000, 6), the monsoon has dictated the seasonal rhythm of 202

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society and the cultivation of wet rice has been the bedrock of subsistence. The centrality of rice to the organization and very sustenance of existence has forged a deep imprint on the rural identity. Indeed, the very word for “rural dweller” in the Khmer language is “neak srae” or “rice person.” Seizing on the apparent stability of rural livelihoods, scholars have painted rural society as somehow immune to change, and labels of traditionalism, conservatism, and timelessness abound in depictions of the countryside (Derks 2008). Were such labels ever apt, they carry little resonance in rural areas of Cambodia today, where farm livelihoods have come under environmental and economic strain and patterns of work and labor are in a state of flux. The increasing frequency and ferocity of natural disasters in the Kingdom (Oeur et al. 2012), linked to human-made pressures such as climate change and deforestation (DeLopez 2001; Le Billon and Springer 2007), have eroded the ability of smallholders to rely upon their land. The unpredictability of such shocks, alternating blows of devastating floods and droughts, limits the ability of farmers to prepare or adapt in order to mitigate losses. Wealthier farmers might hedge their bets with different varieties of seed spread over multiple plots and multiple croppings, but for the poorest, with little land and little to invest, each rice season represents a high stakes spin on Cambodia’s climatic roulette where success, in the words of villagers, “depends on the sky” (Bylander 2015). The cost of failure is borne by affected households and communities rather than the national economy, to which smallholder agriculture contributes a diminishing share of GDP. For those already on the margins of survival, successive disasters of the sort which have beset the Kingdom at least six times since the turn of the millennium1 leave few courses of action. The choice that households face is often stark: debt, land sale, or both (see Springer, this volume, p. 234). The demographic background to this dwindling agricultural contraction is a rapidly growing population, the dividend of which, in rural areas alone, sees 220,000 persons entering the workforce each year (Scheidel et al. 2013, 347). As the workforce has grown, economic land concessions have swallowed up large parts of the countryside, contributing to “rapidly declining land availability for the smallholder sector” (Scheidel et al. 2013, 347). All this entails that the ranks of the landless and near landless in the countryside, already substantial, are swelling (see Biddulph and Williams, this volume, p. 169). The Cambodian government has long pointed to the rising price of rice as a potential solution to this problem, arguing that it will serve to maintain the value of rural labor in the face of increasing supply. Yet such a view is myopic at best, failing as it does to appreciate this high— and in view of the above pressures, increasing—proportion of rural dwellers who are net consumers of the staple, the landless and the near landless (