The Greek State at War: Part 2 [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520342064

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THE GREEK STATE AT WAR Part II

The Greek State at War Part II

By W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, F.B.A.

UNIVERSITY BERKELEY

OF CALIFORNIA

PRESS

• L o s ANGELES • LONDON

U N I V E R S I T Y OF C A L I F O R N I A PRESS B E R K E L E Y AND L O S A N G E L E S , C A L I F O R N I A U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A PRESS, L T D . , L O N D O N , E N G L A N D LIBRARY OF C O N G R E S S C A T A L O G C A R D N O . : ISBN: ©

0-520-02565-2

1 9 7 4 BY T H E REGENTS OF T H E UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

P R I N T E D IN T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

74-77991

TO

EDP (AGAIN)

CONTENTS

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV.

Abbreviations Introduction Trials of Generals The Generals and the State The Condottieri of the Fourth Century Iphikrates and His Corinthian Peltasts Profits of Generals Fortified Camps The Challenge to Battle Surprise Attacks Ambuscades The Wings of the Allied Phalanxes and Fleets Greek Military Training Greek Military Discipline The Battlefield Trophy Aristeia in Greek Warfare Index of Ancient Authors Cited Index of Inscriptions Cited Index of Important Greek Words

viii 1 4 34 59 117 126 133 147 156 177 190 208 232 246 276 291 312 314

ABBREVIATIONS Bengtson, Staatsverträge CAH CetS 11

CSCA Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire Davies, APF FGH

Griffith, MHW Grote, History HCT

IG Kahrstedt, Magistratur

Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen Meiggs-Lewis, SGHI

Parke, GMS Pritchett, Part I

Pritchett, Topography

H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums (Munich and Berlin) 2 (1962), 3 (1969). The Cambridge Ancient History 5 (1927), 6 (1933). Civilisations et Sociétés 11 (Paris 1968), "Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne," sous la direction de J.-P. Vernant. California Studies in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley). C. Daremberg et E. Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités (Paris). The date of the volume is placed after the index word. J . K . Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. (Oxford 1971). F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker 1-3 (Berlin and Leiden 1923-1958). The number allotted to any historian can be ascertained from the Index in vol. I I I C, pp. 947-964. G. T . Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge 1935). George Grote, A History of Greece ( 12-vol. edition, London 1869/70). A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J . Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vols. 1—4 (Oxford 1945-1970). Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin 1873ff.). U. Kahrstedt, Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens, Teil I, Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen (Stuttgart 1936). J . Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (Munich 1928). R . Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford 1969). H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933). W. K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part I, University of California Publications: Classical Studies vol. 7 (Berkeley 1971). W. K . Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part I (Berkeley 1965), Part I I (1969),

Abbreviations

ix

RE

Rostovtzeff,

SEHHW

SEG Tod, GHI Walbank, Polybius

University of California Publications: Classical Studies, Vols. 1 and 4. Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart 1893ff.). T h e date of the volume is placed after the index word. M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 3 vols. (Oxford 1941). Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (Leiden 1923ff.). M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford), 1 (2nd ed. 1946) 2 (1948). F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford) vol. 1 (1957), vol. 2 (1967).

INTRODUCTION explained in the Vorwort to the fourth volume of his Geschichte der Kriegskunst that the purpose of his work was to establish the connection between the State on the one hand, and tactics and strategy on the other, and that it was intended not only for the student of the art of war but for the world historian: HANS DELBRÜCK

Die Erkenntnis der Wechselwirkung zwischen Taktik, Strategie, Staatsverfassung und Politik wirft ihr Licht auf den Zusammenhang der Universalgeschichte und hat Vieles, was bisher im Dunkel lag oder verkannt wurde, aufgehellt. Nicht um der Kriegskunst willen ist dieses Werk geschrieben worden, sondern um der Weltgeschichte willen. Wenn Militärs es lesen und darauf Anregungen entnehmen, so kann mir das nur recht sein und ist mir eine Ehre; geschrieben aber ist es für Geschichtsfreunde von einem Historiker.1

Delbrück commented that before any general conclusions could be drawn from wars of the past, the historian must determine as accurately as possible how these wars had been fought. He must grapple with the "trivial h a p p e n i n g s " and the "smallest facts" of past warfare. 2 Military organization was a typical product of the whole social system of antiquity. T h e ancient historians, however, generally speaking, interpreted their tasks within narrow limits and wrote, not economic or social histories of war, but strictly military ones. Such is our main mass of material; from this we have to glean what we can about social and economic matters; and hence I have interpreted my title in a general way, and have not hesitated to offer conclusions about economic conditions. T h e investigations of the trials of Greek generals revealed, for instance, that home authorities maintained throughout the Hellenic period a rigid control over hegemones serving abroad and led me to question in the two chapters following this investigation a prevailing modern theory that the state lost control over the military machine, much as occurred in the period of the condottieri in the history of fifteenth century Italy. T h e fourth chapter, on Iphikrates and Konon, has to do with the economic revival brought about in Athens, and never fully appreciated, by the pouring in of Persian money. Other chapters in this second volume treat various aspects of warfare which have not been handled adequately in the modern literature. M y practice has been to collect the testimonia about a given topic and present the facts as succinctly as possible, preferably in the form of tables. I hope that this procedure may lead others into further exploration of the subjects treated, as evidence unknown to me may be brought to light. My approach is mainly philological; the interpretation of specific words is the keystone. 1 2

Geschichte der Kriegskunst 4 (Berlin 1920) ii—iii. Cf. also the Vorrede to the first volume: I 2 (Berlin 1920) vi-xi.

[ 1]

2

Introduction

I n this connection I must deplore the lack of complete concordances for m a j o r Greek authors. I t has taken hours of patient labor to amass the material. I t is in the n a t u r e of things that w h e n one embarks on a large project of this sort, one has only a vague notion of w h a t the conclusions will be, a n d it is only in the advanced stage of research that one begins to form a clear idea of w h a t the a p p r o a c h should have b e e n ; the conclusions force themselves u p o n one gradually as the material piles up. T h e r e is inevitably some overlapping a n d some repetition, as subjects are successively e x a m i n e d ; the same ground m a y have to be gone over a n u m b e r of times f r o m different points of view, a n d new insights m a y be revealed a t each turn. I n some chapters I have h a d cut-off dates; for instance the battle of Chaironeia, after which the Greek world changed so m u c h . But for other subjects for which evidence is sparse, I have collected d a t a as late as Lucian. Absolute consistency has not been possible, or perhaps even desirable. Ideally, one should spend fifteen or twenty years collecting all the material a n d , only then, sit down a n d sift it a n d present it with m a x i m u m effectiveness. This volume marks the halfway point in a n investigation which I would hope would p e r m i t a more accurate appraisal of the vofujxa of ancient warfare. I hope ultimately to correlate the present study with m y topographical investigations, a n d to conclude with some personal appraisals of the relative reliability of the various Greek historians, not only in the battle accounts proper, b u t in their general t r e a t m e n t of military matters. T h e i n n u m e r a b l e references have been checked by four g r a d u a t e students in the D e p a r t m e n t of Classics at Berkeley, Miss B a r b a r a Saylor, Mrs. Helena Miller, M r . W. Batstone, a n d M r . J o s e p h Breslin. T h e first d r a f t of the manuscript was carefully typed by Miss M a r c i a T o y ; w h e n she was unable to continue, Miss Saylor kindly completed the task. Some chapters have been read by Professors I. M . Linforth, R . Sealey, R . Stroud, a n d F. Stone, a n d I have appreciated their criticisms. I a m indebted to H u g h Lloyd-Jones for clarification of one point a b o u t the trophy. M y particular thanks go to August Fruge, Director, a n d Susan Peters, of the Editorial D e p a r t m e n t , of the University of California Press for their help while the manuscript was in their hands. T h r e e of the chapters were written while in residence at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, a n d I wish to t h a n k the authorities at the School for granting m e every facility. Some financial assistance has come f r o m the Committee on Research a n d the W o r k Studies P r o g r a m of the University of California. A former volume was dedicated to m y wife. N o w I can only renew the dedication with still deeper feeling for all that she has done for m e in the course of thirty years. T h e manuscript was completed in April, 1973.

Introduction

3

T h e first p a r t of this study was originally published in the University of California Publications in Classical Studies as volume 7, u n d e r the title Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part I. I t is now reissued as a companion v o l u m e to this present one u n d e r the changed title The Greek State at War, Part I.

CHAPTER I

TRIALS OF GENERALS (4 First Philippic 47) says that Athenian generals die like malefactors by sentence of the law and not on the field of battle: " H o w then is all this to be stopped? As soon as you, men of Athens, definitely appoint the same men as soldiers and as eyewitnesses of the campaign, and, on their return, as jurymen at the audit (evdvvai) of your generals. I n this way you will not merely learn about your affairs by hearsay, but you will be witnesses on the spot. So scandalous is our present system that every general is tried two or three times for his life in your courts" (Loeb). T h e context of this statement, delivered in the spring of 351, is the claim, which will be discussed later, that Athenian armies were mercenary ones, lacking any force of citizens. T h e speech of Demosthenes was ineffectual, and not until October did the Athenians send an armament against Philip; and even then it was the mercenary commander Charidemos who was dispatched to the Chersonesos with only ten triremes and five talents in money. 1 Similarly, the orator Hypereides begins his speech In Defense of Euxenippos with an expression of surprise that the jury was not tired of impeachments. " S o m e , " he says, " w e r e accused of betraying ships, others of giving u p Athenian cities, and another, an orator, of speaking against the people's interests." 2 Finally, Demosthenes speaks of the number of indictments, audits, impeachments, and the like (ypads, evdvvas, elcrayyeXias, ndv-ra ravra), which took place in the period which followed Chaironeia. 3 DEMOSTHENES

Attested examples of the trials of Greek hegemones are presented in Table l. 4 There are seventy of these. 5 With one exception, the collection includes examples down to 354 B.C. when it becomes difficult to unravel the evidence in the Attic Orators. An example of our difficulty occurs in Demosthenes 19 De false legatione 180, where the speaker refers to sentences of death or fine upon hegemones who had failed in Thrake. Four of the names can be identified as Athenian strategoi; but about the fifth, Dionysios, we can only speculate that he is the same as the naval leader mentioned in Xenophon Hell. 5.1.26. Bribery was included in the charges. 1

Demosthenes 3 Third Olynthiac 5. Of the five named, Philon cannot be identified. 18 On the Crown 249. 4 I use hegemon in a non-technical sense for the commanding office. In the Antigonid army the word was used for the commander of a chiliarchy: Feyel, Rev. arch. 6 (1935) 54. 5 The Athenian law prescribed that each hegemon was to be tried separately, but, as after Arginousai, it was not always obeyed. Our sources usually group together the generals of a campaign and I have followed this practice. 2 3

[4]

ft, S c a

e t¡ 3 er o

T3 0

m

3 er u

«_»

S

<
«

2 M a ¡2 rt J3 U °

E V

Pi

•a o o pa—the general presumption in Athens that they did was no doubt grounded on ample experience of venality in high places, . . . What is important is to ask, as always in such cases, why he was so accused." 90 Lipsius (Das attische Recht 1 [Leipzig 1905] 192) reconstructs the law pertaining to prodosia in part as follows: eav TLS TTOXLV riva npoSw t) rau? RJ IRE^TJV rj vavriKVv arpariav, rj €AV

TIS

ety TOVS iroXtfiiovs av€v

TOV

TTGP,aiv 6 n

29 %pTj ttadelv

rj cnroretaai,

av 8'

aTrovyrj, -naXiv ap^ei. A vote was taken in the kuria assembly of each prytany on the conduct of magistrates. 9 5 A volunteer accuser was permitted to bring charges if he h a d a grievance: Lipsius, op. cit. 295. Such " d e n u n c i a t i o n " was called elaayyeXla, although this word is usually rendered " i m p e a c h m e n t , " since, like m o d e r n i m p e a c h m e n t , it was a n action tried initially before a political body—the Areiopagos (in early times), the boule, a n d the ekklesia. Cf. P. J . Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972) 162-171. Eisangelia was employed in the trial of the generals after Arginousai. It became a very popular process at Athens until it was abused to the extent described by Hypereides in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter. A chapter in Bonner-Smith, op. cit. 1.294309, analyzes the procedure. T h e eisangelia, as they note, afforded a means of bringing a case to trial with utmost dispatch. Moreover, it was advantageous for any accuser w h o was a good speaker, inasmuch as he always a p p e a r e d in either the boule or the ekklesia before the m a t t e r came to court. " S i n c e the case never came before a court unless the senate or the assembly thought it w o r t h while, the result was that the case was prejudiced before it came into c o u r t " (p. 296). O u r chief information a b o u t elaayyeXla rrpoSoolas derives f r o m Pollux (8.52: eylyvovro Se elaayyeXlai . . . irpos TOVS rroXepilovs avev TOV Tre/xdrjvaL aneXdovTwv,

rj TrpoSovriov tf>povpiov rj orpariav

rj vavs)

and

the

Lexicon

Rhetoricon Cantabrigiense s.v. elaayyeXla, both quoting Theophrastos, as well as f r o m the speeches of Hypereides. T h e generals seem to have been prosecuted very often u n d e r this law. See Demosthenes 8 On the Chersonese 28: eiyap Seiva noiet AiovelOrjS Kal Karayei TO. TTXOM, puKpov, a> avSpes Adrjvctioi, puKpov TTivaxiov TavTa 7Tavra KutXvaai Svvair' av, Kal Xeyovaiv ol vopLoi, ravra TOVS aSiKovuras elaayyeXXeiv etc. Hager (op. cit. 82-88) has collected evidence to show t h a t most of the generals were b r o u g h t to trial at Athens by an elaayyeXla irpohoalas. T h e variety of the cases seems to prove that generals were held responsible for anything which did not come u p to the expectations of the people. O n e factor to bear in m i n d in connection with the n a t u r e of the indictm e n t is that the ruling body of the Greek city-state exercised tighter reins over the c o m m a n d e r in the field t h a n is generally recognized. 9 6 A general of a n expedition m i g h t be sent avTOKparwp, b u t he h a d to anticipate approval of his actions a n d j u d g m e n t s on his return. O u r most interesting 95

Alh. Pol. 43.4; Demosthenes 58 Against Theokr. 27. See now the pertinent remarks of C. W. Fornara, " T h e Athenian Board of Generals," Historia Einzelschriften 16 (1971) 37. Of course, generals were frequently recalled. According to FGH 328 Philochoros frg. 48 ( = Lex Cantabr. 355), one of the special functions assigned to the sacred triremes Paralos and Salaminia was to bring back generals who were to be brought to trial (et Scot OTpaT-qyov iieraTrtixifiaodai Kpid-qoopzvov). 96

30

Trials of Generals

document in this respect is IG I 2 , 98/99, republished by K. J . Dover, HCT 4 224-228. 9 7 Although it is in fragmentary condition, enough is preserved to show that part at least was a proboulema containing explicit instructions about rates of pay and enjoining strong penalties if some unrecoverable acts were not carried out. T h e existence of such a document is enough to show that avTOKparaip (Thucydides 6.8.2) must not be understood as meaning the possession of full powers to do anything one wished. 9 8 Xenophon reports that the ephors of Sparta ordered first T h i b r o n 9 9 and later Derkylidas 1 0 0 to leave what they were doing in the north and transfer the war south to Karia. 1 0 1 Nikias anticipated reproach if he brought the army away from Sikily without orders from home (el 8e Set firq anayeiv TTjv oTpandv

avev Adrjvaltuv

€KA

¡XRJ xvpiov

yap

avBpas etvai

EnapTiaTiov

anayeiv

arpanav

irpoaeiXovTO ¿K

rrjs

Cf. Meiggs and Lewis, SGHI no. 78. For the meaning of avroKparwp, see U . Kahrstedt, Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen (Stuttgart 1936) 266; C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford 1952) 248; and A. W. Gomme, HCT 1 (Oxford 1945) 426. Cf. C. W. Fornara, " T h e Athenian Board of Generals," Historia Einzelschriften 16 (1971) 14, 37 n. 34. See also infra p. 42. "Hell. 3.1.7. 100 3.2.12. 101 A. Andrewes in Ancient Society and Institutions (Oxford 1966) 12 says, "There are many other comparable instances." 102 Diodoros 13.64.6. 103 Nepos 16 Pelopidas 1.2: idque suo privato, non publico fecit consilio. 104 Lucubrationes Thucydidiae (Berlin 1841) 88-90. Hasse compares aop¡i6ioBai ¿K iroXe/xias of 7.75.3, and lists more than a score of examples in classical authors where ánáytiv arpartáv is used for leading an army out of hostile territory. 98

Trials of Generals

31

77ÓAecüí.105 After the surrender of Orchomenos, a restriction, new to the S p a r t a n constitution, was now placed u p o n the authority of Agis, the king. But there is no evidence that a single king ever h a d the prerogative to lead out the a r m y single-handed a n d on his own authority. Yet according to the T h u c y d i d e a n passage, the king was now interdicted f r o m exercising some power. As A. Andrewes notes on this passage, 1 0 6 the verb aváyeiv is used of w i t h d r a w a l of troops f r o m foreign territory. O t h e r examples of S p a r t a n ov/j.[3ovXoi have to do with expeditionary forces. 1 0 7 T h e new provision was aimed at preventing such a n occurrence as Agis g r a n t i n g a truce of four months to the Argives. T h e Spartans w a n t e d some control over the hegemon in the field. I n contrast with the A t h e n i a n practice of a trial by the p o p u l a r court of the Heliaia, m a j o r S p a r t a n trials including those of the kings were held before the gerousia, of twenty-eight m e m b e r s aged over sixty, plus the two kings a n d the five ephors; a total of thirty-five: Pausanias 3.5.2. Examples of the trials of S p a r t a n kings have been collected by G. E. M . de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 350-353. 4. Widespread n a t u r e of the trials. O n e fact revealed by the table is t h a t the n u m b e r of banished S p a r t a n kings a n d hegemones of other states is a b o u t as c o m m o n as t h a t of p r o m i n e n t A t h e n i a n strategoi. T h e r e are thirty-one examples of trials f r o m city-states other t h a n Athens, where so m u c h of our information derives f r o m the Attic orators, while there is no c o m p a r a b l e body of literature elsewhere. W e are clearly dealing with a p h e n o m e n o n which was characteristic of the Greek city-state in general, not of Athens alone. 1 0 8 5. Fear of accusation. T h e clearest example of the threat of possible legal proceedings acting as a deterrent to a c o m m a n d e r in the field is t h a t of Chabrias at the battle of Naxos in 376. T h e A t h e n i a n a d m i r a l defeated the fleet of Pollis a n d regained for Athens the mastery of the sea. Diodoros reports t h a t Chabrias might have destroyed the entire L a k e d a i m o n i a n fleet h a d he not suspended the attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick u p both the living m e n a n d the dead bodies on board, as well as Athenians w h o were swimming for their lives. 1 0 9 Diodoros uses the v e r b eúAajSeo/xai to express C h a b r i a s ' feeling of caution. H e recalled, 105 Classen gets the proper meaning by asserting that onráyav applies to all actions after the army had left the city; but there is no parallel for this use of the word. 106 HCT 4.90. 107 See the examples in U . Kahrstedt, Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen 1922) 200. 108 T h e Karthaginians crucified their strategos H a n n o when he lost the citadel of Mamertini prior to the First Punic W a r : Polybios 1.11.5. Walbank comments on this passage: " A R o m a n general with limited powers and precise instructions could rely on the backing of the Senate; a Punic commander had greater authority for decisions, but might always be sacrificed in a crisis." 109 1 5.35.1.

32

Trials of Generals

we are told, the fierce displeasures of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of Arginousai in 406. T h e historian George Grote comments (History 9.347) on what he calls the salutary effect of that celebrated trial in these words: " M a n y a brave Athenian owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406 B.C., thirty years before." After the Athenian defeat at Syrakuse, the hesitation of Nikias to go back to Athens and rescue the force which yet remained was due, according to Thucydides, 1 1 0 to the anticipated reproach from the Athenians against the generals. T h e special ground of complaint was bringing away the army without orders from home. Nikias adds harsh criticism upon the injustice of the popular j u d g m e n t and the perfidy of his own soldiers who would cry out that their generals had been bribed to betray them and withdraw. T h e idea of meeting the free criticisms and scrutiny of his fellow citizens at a judicial trial must have been humiliating to any defeated general. As for Nikias, he deluded himself into believing that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up. 1 1 1 There are at least three examples of a hegemon committing suicide after a defeat. For none of these cases do our sources suggest an explicit motive. I n the naval battle near Naupaktos, the Spartan hegemon Timokrates, on board a Leukadian trireme, slew himself when he saw that his ship was lost and the smaller fleet of Phormio victorious. 112 In 373, the Syrakusan admiral Krinippos died by a self-inflicted wound after he was captured by Iphikrates at Kerkyra. 1 1 3 In 365/4, Andromachos, an hipparchos of the Eleans, fell upon his sword, because, as Xenophon says, 114 he had prompted an unsuccessful attack upon Arkadians who had invaded Elis. Possibly these examples illustrate the disgrace felt by a defeated hegemon. T h e reform in the procedure for the trials of generals suggested by Demothenes and quoted at the beginning of this chapter points u p the difference between the Greek trial and our modern notion of justice. For the Greeks the trial was a popular decision as opposed to our concept of an expert verdict made according to fixed rules. As long as such decisions are popular, success in arms seems to be the essential factor in winning favorable adjudication. I n the frontier language of Natty Bumppo in J . Fenimore Cooper's Pathfinder, chap. 23: " M i l i t a r y glory is a most 110

7.48. K. J. Dover (Thucydides Book VII [Oxford 1965] 41) comments: "Thucydides, as a member of a noble family in a society which was hungry for public honour and fearful of public disgrace, takes a more lenient view of Nikias than we ought to take." For a different viewpoint, see H. D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge 1968) 198. 112 Thucydides 2.92.3. 113 Xenophon Hell. 6.2.36. 114 Hell. 7.4.19. 111

Trials of Generals

33

unsartain thing. . . . Even the Indians rate a warrior's character according to his luck. T h e principal thing with a soldier is, never to be whipt; nor do I think mankind stops long to consider how the day was won or lost." In spite of sporadic attempts to find patterns of individual and group associations and allegiances in the politics of the Greek city-state, it would seem that each case was decided as it came up, according to the mood of a single court and the argument and oratory to which it was subjected that day. For those who believe that they can tell the politics of a strategos by the campaign in which he commands, the discussion by A. W. Gomme in More Essays (Oxford 1962) 103-111 is recommended.

CHAPTER I I

THE GENERALS AND THE STATE I N T H E P R E C E D I N G chapter, the close surveillance exercised by the Greek city-state in holding their hegemones responsible for failure and corruption in military campaigns has been examined. A more general investigation of the degree of control of the civil authority over the military seems a natural sequel. 1 The problem is one which has confronted every state, ancient and modern alike. 2 The purpose of this chapter is to assemble ancient testimonia about the relation of the hegemon in the field to the demos or political governing body at home. Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodoros, in particular, have been studied for this purpose. There seems to be a widespread impression that in the fourth century the state abdicated control over the military and that military adventurers seized power in the manner of the condottieri in Italian history of the fourteenth to sixteenth century. To take one example. In two books devoted to Timoleon in this century, the Corinthian strategos is seen as something of a condottiere operating almost independently for eight years in Sikily. The central thesis of one work is that Timoleon was an ardent democrat at odds with the Corinthian government and was dispatched to Syrakuse because the oligarchs wished to be rid of him. 3 Yet the ancient historian who presents the events in chronological order, and whose account seems objective, says that Timoleon was chosen to the strategia in 345/4 by the citizens (WRO TWV 1 P. J . Rhodes (The Athenian Boule [Oxford 1972] 43-44) seems to have established that Athenian generals never enjoyed a privileged status vis-à-vis the boule, although boule and generals were often required to cooperate. 2 T o d r a w briefly from the history of m y own country, the F o u n d i n g Fathers adopted a simple and clear clause in the Constitution of the United States (Art. 2, Sec. 1) : " T h e President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. . . . " T h e neglect of this clause has on three occasions resulted in generals being relieved of their c o m m a n d . T h e first was J o h n Charles Fremont, the western explorer and unsuccessful Republican candid a t e for president in 1856, who was n a m e d by President A b r a h a m Lincoln as c o m m a n d e r of the Mississippi T h e a t e r at St. Louis when the Civil W a r opened. O n the 30th of August 1861 Fremont issued a proclamation in which h e declared the property of Missourians in rebellion confiscated a n d their slaves emancipated. This action was contrary to a n act of Congress of the 6th of August a n d to the policy of President Lincoln. Lincoln wired him to rescind. H e refused; so Lincoln removed him from c o m m a n d , a n d his further p a r t in the w a r was negligible. O u r m o d e r n general, Douglas M a c A r t h u r , attempted to make national policy in Asia while c o m m a n d i n g in Korea. President T r u m a n relieved him, and h e retired to private life. Even as this chapter is being written, Lieutenant-General J o h n D. Lavelle, one of the top commanders in Indochina, has admitted that he ordered a b o u t twenty unauthorized bombing raids into N o r t h V i e t n a m . H e called this "protective reaction." W h e n this action was disclosed, he was relieved of c o m m a n d a n d demoted. 3

M . Sordi, Timoleonte (Palermo 1961). [ 34 ]

The Generals and the State

35

TToXiTwv) a n d dispatched with seven warships f r o m Corinth. 4 T h e following year, the Corinthians are said to have m a n n e d ten ships, supplied additional funds, a n d sent t h e m to Timoleon. 5 W h e n Dionysios surrendered, he was sent in a trireme with his goods a n d a few friends to Corinth. T h e proclamation for the resettlement of Syrakuse was a n official one m a d e by the Corinthians at the various games of Greece as a result of which m a n y people flocked to Corinth. 8 T w o Corinthians were sent to legislate for the new commonwealth. After the battle of the Krimisos, Timoleon sent some of the spoils to Corinth, 7 a n d the votive inscription from the battle carried the text, " T h e Corinthians a n d T i m o l e o n " freed Sikily a n d dedicated thank-offerings. 8 It is t r u e t h a t in the interval Timoleon's m e n went u n p a i d a n d the general t u r n e d to pillage; 9 b u t this was characteristic of both citizen a n d mercenary armies of the period. 1 0 T h e venture in Sikily was conceived in Corinth, approved by the citizenry, a n d financed, at least initially, by local funds. T h e Timoleon legend of a freebooter operating independently derives in great p a r t from Plutarch who in conformity with his biographical technique was highly selective in choosing incidents from his career. 1 1 I n this chapter, I shall collect relevant testimonia for (1) the S p a r t a n a n d A t h e n i a n practice of sending various supervisory officials to accomp a n y the hegemones in the field; (2) the n a t u r e of instructions given by h o m e authorities to hegemones on their d e p a r t u r e ; (3) communications between h o m e authorities a n d hegemones serving a b r o a d ; (4) lawless acts a t t r i b u t e d to hegemones a b r o a d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y there are no specific words or formulaic phrases which could be investigated a n d thereby assure some measure of completeness. T h e collection of testimonia is, therefore, a r a n d o m one. F u r t h e r m o r e , there is little in the literature on which to build. Kahrstedt's studies have been useful; b u t they were not directed at our specific problems. T h e books on ancient warfare have very little to say. This investigation was continued into the following chapter w h e n it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that the relations between h o m e authorities a n d the m e r c e n a r y captains of the fourth century deserved separate treatment. This subject, therefore, is reserved for C h a p t e r I I I . A study of Greek 4

Diodoros 16.66.1. 16.69.4. 6 Plutarch Tim. 23. 7 16.80.6. 8 P l u t a r c h Tim. 29.6. See infra p. 94. 9 16.73. 10 E. A. F r e e m a n , History of Sicily 4 (Oxford 1894) 322. 11 T h e activities of Timoleon a r e studied in greater detail in C h a p t e r I I I . O n the value of Diodoros, w h o is t h o u g h t to h a v e been following Theopompos, see H a m m o n d CQ. 32 (1938) 141-144. 6

36

The Generals and the State

military manpower would be a natural sequel; but it is postponed for further investigation. SUPERVISORY OFFICIALS

Sparta: Lakedaimonian practice of sending symbouloi.—In Thucydides there are four cases where Lakedaimonian symbouloi in varying numbers are sent to control the king or monarch in the performance of his duties; 1 2 the institution was clearly a transitory o n e : 1 3 1. 2.85.1-3 (429 B . C . ) . Indignant at the naval defeat at the hands of Phormio, the Lakedaimonians sent three symbouloi, including Brasidas, to assist Knemos with advice and efforts in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. A large fleet of seventy-seven ships was speedily mustered. 2. 3.69 (427). In the campaign in Kerkyra, Brasidas is referred to as a single symboulos to the nauarchos Alkidas. From 3.79.3, it appears that the symboulos was subordinate to the nauarchos: looifnjfiov Se OVK OVTOS.

3. 5.63.4 (418). When Agis returned home from Argos after granting a truce of four months, the Lakedaimonians enacted a nomos which had no precedent among them, the selection of ten Spartiatai as symbouloi without whose consent Agis could not withdraw his army from a foreign territory. 1 4 This meant that the king was still commander in the field, for the Lakedaimonians did not want a divided command (5.66.3). 15 It is to be noted that there is no mention of symbouloi at Dekeleia in 413, where Agis is said to have had complete authority (/cu/xoy Jjv. 8.5.3). 4. 8.39.2 (412/1). T h e Lakedaimonians, in dispatching a fleet of twenty-seven ships under the command of the Spartiates Antisthenes as 12 T h e powers of the Spartan nauarchos at sea corresponded to those of the king in c o m m a n d of an army on l a n d : Aristotle Pol. 2.6.22 (17 vavapxia oxeSov eripa fiaoiXeia KaOeoTTiKcv). T h e nauarchos served for a year, apparently from a u t u m n to a u t u m n : G o m m e HCT 2.199. Spartan armies outside of Lakonia were led only by her kings or regents. Ultimately, Sparta modified her military organization by the adoption of harmosts, a type of c o m m a n d e r w h o was placed in charge of garrisons in allied cities. T h e s e harmosts have been studied most recently by G. Bockisch, Klio 46 (1965) 129-239. She includes a lengthy catalogue of all cities occupied by harmosts within the period 4 3 1 - 3 8 7 . T h e subject of harmosts is not treated in this volume. 13 U . Kahrstedt (Gr. Staatsrecht 1 [Gottingen 1922] 200) believed that the two Spartiatai attendants (£VVT]KO\OV6OVV auraj) of Eurylochos in T h u c y d i d e s 3.100.2 were symbouloi. Arnold, comparing T h u c y d i d e s 4.38.1, believes that they were to take the leader's place if he was killed. 14 For Hasse's text of this passage, w h i c h I believe to be the correct one, see supra, Chapter I, n. 104. 15 Diodoros reports this same appointment of ten symbouloi (12.78.6): napaKaTcoTtjoav crvpfiouXovs Kai ixpoaira^av p.'q&tv aveu rfjs TOVTOJV yvcbfi-qs irparTCiv. Later (79.6) one of the symbouloi interferred with Agis' conduct of the battle of Mantineia. Andrewes ( H C T 4.91) regards Diodoros' account as a romanticized version derived from Ephoros.

The Generals and the State

37

apxcov, sent eleven Spartiatai who were directed to review the state of affairs at Miletos and to exercise control together with the nauarchos Astyochos. They were also empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss Astyochos, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritos of Chios had cast suspicion, and to appoint Antisthenes in his place. These commissioners play a major role in the remaining chapters of Book 8 of Thucydides. Learning that Tissaphernes was slack in the Peloponnesian War, being both irregular in furnishing pay and paralyzing operations by assurances that he was bringing the vast fleet of Phoinikia to their aid, they discussed with him at Knidos the future conduct of the war. Lichas, the only symboulos named by Thucydides, protested against the symmachia concluded by Chalkideus (8.18) and the synthekai by Therimenes (8.27) and stated that he would not honor them (8.43.4). 16 In addition, there is a fifth case (4.132.3) where three Spartans were sent to Brasidas at Skione in 423 to inspect and report upon the state of affairs (¿TTiSetv TrefitjjdvTwv AaKiSaifj.oviojv rce Tipayjiara).17 This mission was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to the posts of harmosts, for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. These inspecting commissioners, or symbouloi as Kahrstedt believes them to have been, 1 8 may have had a part in fettering the activity of Brasidas. As Grote notes, 19 we hear very little of his exploits for more than six months. In addition to the references to Lakedaimonian symbouloi in Thucydides, we are told by Plutarch (Lysander 23, Agesilaos 6; cf. Xenophon Agesilaos 1.7) that when Agesilaos was sent by Sparta with a land-force for the purpose of attacking the Persians in Asia in 396, thirty symbouloi, of whom Lysander was first and foremost (iSv o AuoavSpos rjv Trpwros),20 accompanied King Agesilaos. 21 All were Spartiatai. Apparently Lysander wished to achieve the restoration of dekarchies but failed because of the firmness of Agesilaos. 22 T h e Spartiatai were given r/ytfiovias TrpayiiuTaiv Kal 8ioiKrjaeis noXewv.23 G. Bockisch believes that the thirty were sent 16

Later, near the end of Astyochos' term, Lichas disavowed an act of rebellion on the part of the Milesians against Tissaphernes (8.84.5) and when he died was refused burial at Miletos. 17 Parke (JUS 50 [1930] 42) refers "to a yearly inspection by a board of three commissioners sent from Sparta." 18 Op. cit. (supra n. 13) 200. 19 History 6.228. 20 Possibly the phrase means that Lysander was to preside. 21 Cf. Xenophon Hell. 3.4.2, where the thirty are called Spartiatai. See also Hell. 5.3.8, where thirty Spartiatai were sent out with Agesipolis in his expedition to Olynthos in 381/0. Smith (Historia 2 [1954] 279 n. 9) would distinguish these commissions from symbouloi attached to generals. 22 See Parke, JHS 50 (1930) 67. 23 Plutarch Lysander 23.11.

38

The Generals and the State

out to be harmosts. 2 4 There is no evidence that they attempted to exercise surveillance over Agesilaos. Again in 361 when Agesilaos was sent to Egypt to fight with Tachos, Plutarch (Agesilaos 36.3) says that he was accompanied by thirty symbouloi. Symbouloi are also mentioned by Plutarch (Perikles 22) as being sent along with King Pleistoanax by the ephors in 446 because he was a very young m a n . 2 5 Although Xenophon does not use the word ovjxfiovXoi, in the spring of 398 a commission of three Spartans inspected Derkylidas at Lampsakos, exhorted his army, and told him to continue in command for another y e a r : Hell. 3.2.6. It was among the further instructions of the commissioners to visit all of the principal Asiatic Greeks and report their condition at Sparta. 2 6 Xenophon says that Derkylidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey at a moment when they would find the cities in peace and tranquillity. 2 7 Athens: Tamiai and Public Slaves.—We have no record of symbouloi for Athens; but it is not without interest that when Iphikrates in 372 accepted the strategia under hazardous circumstances a n d amid great doubts whether he could relieve Kerkyra, he singled out both Chabrias and Kallistratos, an orator by profession and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates

(TOV 8-qfi.rjyopov, ov ¡xrxXa hTiTrfieiov

ovra : Hell.

6.2.39),

as

his colleagues. It was important to involve both of them with any ill success which might await him. T h e expedition, however, was altogether favorable. Athenian strategoi were assisted in their administration of finances by tamiai who were in turn assisted by public slaves in keeping the accounts on expeditions. Aischines 1 Against Timarchos 56 refers to the tamias Hegesandros who accompanied Timomachos to the Hellespont. Demosthenes 49 Against Timotheos 10 related that the tamias Antimachos who served under Timotheos in 373 was condemned to death because of misuse of funds. T h e regular use of public slaves to accompany tamiai is attested in the scholia to Demosthenes 2 Second Olynthiac 19. 28 T h e slaves were chosen from captives of war who knew how to read and write. T h e Athenians preferred that public slaves should be financial clerks because in an investigation of the moneys of the strategoi and tamiai they could be 24

Klio 46 (1965) 215 n. 6. At Sparta, a king assumed military command by the end of the twentieth year : M. E. White, JHS 84 (1964) 140-141. 26 Cf. Parke, JHS 50 (1930) 66. 27 Hell. 3.2.9. 28 See O.Jacob, "Les esclaves publics à Athènes," Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège 35 (1928) 121-125. 25

39

The Generals and the State

immediately subject to torture; and torture was considered the surest means to ascertain the truth. T h e passage reads in p a r t as follows: SouXovs cl)(ov hrtfiooiovs

ol Adrjvaioc

¡xaTa, Ktxi ¿¿¡¿TrefJiTTov aureus 7a avaXiGKOfieva. SovXovs,

EX COAI

OVK

aKaipcos

ftavdavetv

TO

el Se Sia TWV irXtyyaiv rjXiyx^ KCCKOJS

ccno al^aXwTOJv

¿v rots iroXepois

Se

r OVTO

eiroiovv,

¿X-qdes' alaxpov o orpaTTjyos

TroirfoavTes,

/¿era tojv rafita)v

yap

aAA' "iva, Sia ¿VO^L^CTO

Kai o radios

TOV

Kai eStSaoKov Kai GTparrjyojv, Svvaodai

irapa A6t]vaiois

rothovs

ypap--

'iva airoypatJ>oi€v

TVTTTCLV

TOVTOVS

eXtvdepovs

d)s

TUTTT€LV.

i/f€vSop.€vos, a>s SovXoi Xonrov /cat auTol

ZIRAOXOV.

For these slaves, cf. also Demosthenes 8 On the Chersonese 47 a n d 10 Fourth Philippic

22.

T h e use of laphyropolai, booty-dealers, for Spartan and Athenian armies has been discussed in Part I, 90-92. Not only was the booty sold by state officials, but the religious conventions were so strong that the deities received a tenth of all booty and even of prizes captured by privateers. I n the period of mercenary armies, Athens created ¿{eraoTal, boards of inspectors for mercenary troops. Aischines (1 Against Timarchos 113) refers to such a group being sent to Euboia. F r o m the beginning of the third century there are four Athenian inscriptions which refer to exetastai: IGII2, 641.31, 646.44, 1270.3; Hesperia 11 (1942) 278; cf. W. B. Dinsmoor, Archons

of Athens

( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . 1931) 6 4 . I . B e k k e r (Anecdota Graeca

1 [Berlin 1814] 252), publishing the Lexicon of P. Seguier, has the following entry for exetastai: '' officers sent out to m a k e preliminary investigation of the n u m b e r of mercenaries, so that p a y might be sent to them, because the generals used to tell lies and exaggerate their n u m b e r s " (tr. of H . W . Parke, GMS J49). 2 9 For one area of supervision, we would like to have more information. This has to do with the collection of funds from allied cities by hegemones in the field. Isokrates complains that city-states allied to Athens had been a b a n d o n e d to the caprice of the strategoi. I n 355, he says in a context which clearly has reference to C h a r e s : 3 0 " [The way to escape from our ills is] . . . not to grant our allies independence in words, while in fact giving them over to our generals to do with as they p l e a s e . " 3 1 Any appraisal of this passage must be tempered with the fact t h a t the reference is to Chares. I n the history of Diodoros, Chares is the sole Athenian general of w h o m it is said that he committed "lawless a c t s " {TRAPAVONA). As to the allies, Diodoros reports that Chares TOVS AVJX^AXOVS ¿SLKWV SiereAet.32 29

Cf. also Aischines 2 Defalsa legatione 177; and Etym. Magn. s.v. iiiZfo: TOVS VEPLTROFIIVOVS TOV e^eraffat TTOOOL etoiv, Iva fiiodos aurois OTaXrj. eytyvero Se TOUTO, OTL OL oTparqyoi iifievSOVTO, ¿v feVai? /iiadovfievoi xpais. See also IG II 2 , 1270, and Kirchner's note. 30 See Norlin's note in the Loeb edition. 31 8 On the Peace 134. 32 15.95.3. On the subject of Chares' actions, see infra, Chapter III. apxovras

40

The Generals and the State

As to the collecting of avvra^eis, a word euphemistically used in the fourth century for ópoi, there is a sweeping generalization in Demosthenes 8 On the Chersonese 24-25 (341 B.C.) (Loeb tr.) : I shall speak freely, for indeed I could not speak otherwise. All the generals that have ever set sail from your land—if I am wrong, I submit myself to any penalty—raise money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean the Greeks of Asia Minor. Generals with only one or two ships raise less ; those with a larger fleet raise more. Also those who pay do not pay the sum, be it large or small, for nothing; they are not such madmen. No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their own harbours immunity from injury or robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort.

I n four places T h u c y d i d e s mentions vfjes àpyvpoXóyoi u n d e r the comm a n d of one or more generals who collected t r i b u t e : 2.69, 3.19, 4.50, a n d 75. G o m m e believes that these squadrons normally collected arrears of tribute a n d escorted the tribute-bringing ships. 3 3 O n one occasion (4.50) they seem to have m a d e a special levy. Plutarch says that Alkibiades, in order to pay his troops, was forced to levy money from the allies. 34 This h a p p e n e d in 410 a n d 408 B.C.35 I t is expressly said of Timotheos t h a t he collected money from the allies a n d that he was obligated to account for it. 3 6 Authorized levies were collected also by Chabrias a n d Phokion. Plutarch even says that they dealt with the allied cities in a straightforward m a n n e r (¿ttielkms koù àe\ws) ,37 I n a decree of the year 356 B.C. a garrison was to b e m a i n t a i n e d on the island of Andros by the provision of its pay f r o m the contribution (ovvrdgeis) according to the resolutions of the allies (/farà r à Sóy/xara TWV av/X/J.a^cov).38 I n 339 B.C., w h e n the Athenians wished to show their benevolence to the inhabitants of Tenedos, they accorded an i m m u n i t y f r o m the collection of syntaxis by any general or any other person. 3 9 W e have one other epigraphical d o c u m e n t which tells of the collection of tribute in the Second A t h e n i a n Confederacy. T h e inscription in question, IG I I 2 , 207 ( = H . Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2 [ M u n i c h 1962] 324), has been interpreted by Parke in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 43, section C (1936) 367-378. T a m i a i are to collect the allies' contributions 33 HCT 2.202-203. See, however, the recent comments of R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 254. 34 Alkibiades 35.4. , 35 Xenophon Hell. 1.1.20 and 1.3.8. 36 Demosthenes 49 Against Timotheos 49 : eV yàp TWV KOIVWV AVVTA^EWV ij piodofiopla RJV TOJ nrparcurari' rà Sè XPV/-IURII TCCVTCC efeAe^cc? cV TWV avp-p.aywv, KAI at éSet CCVTWV Xóyov anoSovvai. 37 Phokion 7.1. 38 7GII 2 , 123 ( = T o d GHI no. 156). O n e of the strategoi is instructed to make the collections. For the historical background, see F. H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge 1905) 111. 39 IG II 2 , 233 ( = T o d GHI no. 175).

The Generals and the State

41

from Lesbos ([ra xp\vhiaTa Tt"v OVVTV SeVa VYA8IKUIV TPN)PWV [ten triremes manned by refugees]. Men driven out of their cities in the north may have been willing to fight in Athenian hulls without misthos in order to regain their homes. 150

Demosthenes

1 5 2 Op. cit. 105. As Jaeger brings out, Demosthenes probably believed that it was to Athens' interest to strengthen the power of Amadokos, brother and rival of Kersebleptes. In 352, Amadokos was in alliance with Philip: so Pickard-Cambridge CAH 6.219. 1 5 3 J a c o b y on 324 Androtion frg. 19.

154

3 Third Olynthiac 5: ¿(jxtre TOV anooroXov.

155 IQ n 2 ; 207 ( = Bengtson, Staatsvertrage no. 3 2 4 : 349/8) names the generals Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion. See H. W . Parke, Proceedings R. Irish Acad. 43, Sect. C, no. 12 (1936) 3 6 7 - 3 7 8 .

88

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

W h e t h e r he achieved any i m p o r t a n t success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares a n d Gharidemos, the anecdotes descending to us tell of insolence, extortion, a n d amorous indulgences with b o t h sexes (Theopompos frg. 143), r a t h e r t h a n of military exploits. T h e Olynthians' final urgent a p p e a l , TTijxijjai ¡iorjOiiav

fx'q £evuaev TOV Srjfioy.26"1 I would infer from the ease a n d rapidity of the 260

261

259

Diodoros 16.3.5. Demosthenes 23 Against Aristokrates 121. Cf. Demosthenes 23 Against Aristokrates 139. Of course, we have a basic difficulty with vocabulary, for Diodoros (15.44) flatly says that hoplites were commonly called peltasts. 262 Diodoros (16.7) places the war in his account of the events of the year 358/7 and states that it lasted for a considerable time. 263 8 On the Chersonese 74. 264 21 Against Meidias 164,174. 265 22 Against Androtion 14. Grote, History 11.22. 266 23 Against Aristokrates 173. 267 22 Against Androtion 72; 24 Against Timokrates 180. 260

261

108

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

success over a major foe that the war was won by full mobilization of the Athenian demos supplemented by a band of mercenaries. T h e Athenian victory was attributed by Plutarch, not to Chares, but to Timotheos. 2 6 8 In 352, the Athenians energetically voted to send an expedition against Philip, who was besieging a stronghold in Thrake. T h e expedition was to be made up of men up to forty-five years and they were to m a n forty triremes. 2 6 9 Presently, there were reports that Philip was ill, and that he was dead, and the armament was disbanded. Also in 352 (so Diodoros), Athens sent a force to Thermopylai which prevented Philip from penetrating the pass. 270 Demosthenes often alludes with pride to this exploit of the Athenians and contrasts it with many expeditions which were sent too late. 2 7 1 Parke reasons that the army must have been a citizen one. 2 7 2 In the preceding chapter Diodoros had referred to 400 lime is and 5,000 •neZpi with Nausikles as the strategos sent to the Phokians; 2 7 3 and it is generally assumed that this is the force which took up positions at Thermopylai. 2 7 4 I am not sure that the forces are identical, since Diodoros says that the Nausikles contingent was lured into the field by Phokian gold. In any case, Demosthenes says that the cost of the armament to Thermopylai would have been two hundred talents; but part of the expense was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually. 2 7 5 There is good reason to conclude, therefore, in spite of Diodoros, that the army was a citizen one. T h e dispatch of an army of citizen soldiers for the relief of Olynthos in the spring of 348 is described by Dionysios Hal. (First Letter to Ammaios 9) as follows: The Olynthians sent a fresh embassy to the Athenians, begging them not to see them irretrievably ruined, but to send out, in addition to the troops already there, a force consisting not of mercenaries but of Athenian citizens. Thereupon the Athenian people sent them other seventeen triremes, together with two thousand hoplites and three hundred horsemen conveyed in transports, the force being composed of citizens. The entire expedition was under the command of Chares.

T h e expedition ended in failure. 2 7 6 If it is safe to generalize from this passage, it would seem that the Athenians tended to use mercenaries for 268

Mor. 350f. 269 Demosthenes 3

Third Olynthiac 4: €ifn]ioaode TLTrapaKdvra rpiypcis KizOiXxtiii' Kif-L TOVS fl *Xl>i TTO'Tt Kai TCTTapOLKOVT tTCOV aVTOVS C^iijrtil-'t U\ 270

271 272 273

Diodoros 16.38.2.

4 First Philippic 17, 35, 41; 18 De corona 32; 19 De falsa legatione 83-85. CMS 146.

16.37.3. See Grote, History 11.100. 275 19 De falsa legatione 84: ras ISlas bairavas TOCS TCOV arparevaapevaiv. 276 Philochoros in FGH 328 frg. 51. For the chronology of events, see Parke, Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 43, Sect. C (1936) 377-378; Cawkwell, CQ_ 56 (1962) 130-134. 274

The Condottieri

of the Fourth

Century

109

year-round operations, but citizen-hoplites for more limited summer campaigns. Finally, we learn from Aischines 2 De falsa legatione 133 that in 346, after the Phokians, who were in fear of a new invasion from Thessaly, sent to Athens asking help, the Athenians voted to call up all citizens to the age of forty years ( T O V S ¡¿¿XPL TERTAPAKOVRA ¿TOJV I^IEVAI) and to man fifty triremes. 277 Sparta and Athens at times had more commitments abroad than their military organization could meet. But that all such commitments were met by the use of mercenaries is a gross exaggeration although this idea became a rhetorical topos fostered by the Attic orators in general, and Demosthenes in particular. 278 Economic conditions were such at Athens in much of the fourth century that a priori it would be extremely unlikely that impoverished citizens did not offer themselves for military service. 279 One piece of evidence which testifies to the economic plight of Athens in the period under consideration is the number of klerouchoi the city dispatched. 280 The aim of the klerouchy was partly military; but it also served the purpose of providing land for the poor. 281 When Athens reorganized her confederacy in 377, she distinctly agreed to discontinue the system and the covenant declares that no land is to be held by Athens or an Athenian citizen within the territory of the allies. 282 Yet in 366/5, on the conquest of Samos, she renewed the system which Demades called "the city's drain." 2 8 3 277 Demosthenes 21 Against Meidias 95 comments that a hoplite Straton of Phaleron had served on all the expeditions for which his age group had been called up. 278 Parke has an excellent page ( G M S 235) on the lucrative employment of young men who were willing to go abroad for military service. But it is to be noted that virtually all of the references are to New Comedy; to this material may be added the recently published Aspis of Menander. 279 w i t h regard to xenoi at Athens, it is not to be overlooked that if a non-citizen took up residence, he was required to pay a head-tax of a drachme a month for males and half a drachme for females: see, most recently, P. Gauthier, " S y m b o l a , " Annates de t'Est. Memoire 42 (1972) chap. 3. Isokratean passages relating to the poverty of Athenians and mercenaries alike are collected by A. Fuks, Ancient Society 3 (1972) 24-29. 280 T h e thesis of chapter I of A. H. M . J o n e s , Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1957) is that many of the citizens of Athens were workmen and comparatively poor. W. W. T a r n has asked the question where did all the Greeks come from who were in Bactria at the time when he picks u p the story. H e concludes (The Greeks in Bactria and India2 [Cambridge 1951] 70) that at least a generation before 300 B.C. there must have been a much greater Greek migration than we had any idea of, but he does not pursue the subject. 281 Pickard-Cambridge (Demosthenes [London 1914] 102) does not refer to klerouchies in saying, " In former days the surplus population had been drafted off by emigration to newly founded colonies. But the available sites for colonization had all been taken." 282 For the precise meaning of this sentence in the charter, see A. H . M . J o n e s , Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1957) 167. 283 Athenaios 3.99d. Isokrates (4 Panegyrikos 107) felt called upon to defend the system, and did so by asserting that it promoted peace and peopled depopulated lands. See, however, Cawkwell, CQ 66 (1972) 272.

110

The Condottieri

of the Fourth

Century

In the period between 365-343, six (or possibly seven) groups of colonists were sent out, as indicated in the following list. A T H E N I A N K L E R O U C H I E S : 365-343 B.C. DATE

PLACE

365

Samos

364 362/1 361/0

Sestos 2 8 4 Poteidaia Samos

353 352

Chersonese Samos

344/3

Chersonese

COMMENTS

SOURCE

2,000 klerouchoi with escort of Isok. 15.111; Demosth. 15.9; 30 ships a n d peltasts Polyainos 3.10.9. Sent o n d e m a n d of inhabitants IG I I 2 , 114 ( = T o d 146) Schol. Aischines 1.53; IG I I 2 , 1437.20 (?) Diod. 16.34.4. 2,000 Athenians Strabo 14.1.18 (638); Aischines 1.53; Diog. L . 10.1; Diod. 18.8; Herakleid P o n t . 10.7. Demosth. 8.6; 12.16; Libanios H y p . to Demosth. 8.

The fact that there was so much emigration either to strengthen the allies or to relieve the congestion in the city is mute testimony to support the thesis that considerable civilian manpower was available in Athens for military service. 285 6. Citizens volunteered for service and might defray their own expenses. 286 Although I have never seen the point made in studies of Athenian military economy, the fact is not to be overlooked that on at least two expeditions some of the Athenian troops, presumably the more opulent citizens, defrayed their expenses privately. Patriotism, or love of one's country, was not an unknown phenomenon; and Demosthenes was not 284 So Glotz-Cohen, Histoire grecque 3 (Paris 1941) 189, a d o p t i n g a conjecture of A. Schaefer, Demosthenes l 2 (Leipzig 1885) 101 n. 5, based on Isokrates 15 Antidosis 112. 285 If we m a y take Isokrates a t his word, t h e streets of Athens were filled with beggars a n d destitute: 7 Areopagitikos 83 ( " s h a m i n g the city by begging f r o m passers-by today, while those w h o are destitute of means o u t n u m b e r those w h o possess t h e m " ) ; 8 On the Peace 24; Epistle 9.9-10. I n spite of such economic conditions, we h a v e no allusion even in the orators t h a t a military coup was ever p l a n n e d . 286 T h e r e were also voluntary contributions (eViSocreis) in money, arms, or ships which were m a d e b y citizens. W h e n the expenses of the state were greater t h a n the revenue, it was usual for the prytaneis to s u m m o n a n assembly a n d to call u p o n citizens to contribute (Plutarch Alk. 10, Phokion 9 ; Demosthenes 21 Against Meidias 161-162; Athenaios 4.168f.; Theophrastos Char. 22). T h e names of those w h o promised to contribute, together w i t h the a m o u n t , were written on tablets which were placed before the statues of t h e Eponymoi, where they r e m a i n e d until the a m o u n t was p a i d (Isaios 5 Dikaigenes 37—38). Pasion furnished one thousand shields, together with five triremes (Demosthenes 45 Against Stephanos 1 85). Charidemos a n d Diotimos m a d e a gift of eight h u n d r e d shields (Demosthenes 18 De corona 115). Aristophanes gave thirty thousand d r a c h m a i for an expedition against Kypros (Lysias 19 Aristophanes 43). For epidoseis for military purposes in t h e Greek world in general, see A. Kuenzi, Epidosis (Bern 1923) 67-68.

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

111

the only Athenian patriot. W e have in Thucydides' account of the preparation of the Sikilian expedition under Nikias a reference to the private outlay of those who served: TO>V ATPAT€vop.evwv TT/V ISlav (6.31.5). Public-spirited citizens sometimes volunteered for continuous service; so the speaker of Lysias 21 On a Charge of Taking Bribes (2) says that he served as trierarch for a period of seven years, expending six talents. 2 8 7 With regard to the Athenian force which in 353 (Diodoros' date 2 8 8 ) held the pass at Thermopylai and kept Philip out of Southern Greece, Demosthenes refers to the private expenses of the troops (ray I'Sia? Sonravas r a j arpaTevaafievaiv) , 2 8 9 I n this case, Demosthenes may be regarded as a reliable witness, because one of his favorite themes was the indolence of the citizenry. There are at least two passages where " v o l u n t e e r s " are contrasted with troops who served for pay. Thucydides 2.96.2 says of Sitalkes, rovs fuoOco eveidev, ol 8' ¿deXovrai ¿¡vvrjKoXovdovv. Similarly, in 1.60.1, the Corinthians dispatched volunteer hoplites and light-armed: nefiirovcnv ¿AVT&V re ¿OeXovras Kal TOJV oiXXwv IleXoTTOvvqalwv ¡xiaOoi ireiaavres . . . ¿TrXiras Kal ipiXovs. Thucydides explains that Corinthians volunteered for the expedition out 6f regard for their commander Aristeus son of Adeimantos. According to the Thesaurus, Eustatios explains iOeXovral SiSaoKaXoi Spa/xdraiv as ol eK TWV ISIOJV ^op-qyovvres, making ¿deXovrai synonymous with ¿K TOW ISlwv.290 I n 381 an expedition was sent to Olynthos from Sparta which included a select body of volunteer perioikoi, who are characterized as kaloi kagathoi, the sons of wealthy foreign parents, 2 9 1 and volunteers from the allied states. 292 In an inscription dated about 306 B.C., a metic Euxenides of Phaselis is praised, among other reasons, for having voluntarily recruited and embarked twelve nautai during a war 267 Cf. Demosthenes 18 De corona 99; 45 Against Stephanos 1 85. When Thibron was placed in charge of the Spartan campaign in Asia Minor in 400/399 B.C. he recruited three hundred cavalrymen from Athens on the commitment that he would provide the misthos himself: Xenophon Hell. 3.1.4 (e'mwv on avros fuodov Trapegei). In spite of this personal contribution, Thibron was later banished. The speaker of Lysias 16 In Defense of Mantitheos 14 says, " I myself gave thirty drachmai each to two men (for ephodia); not as being a person of great possessions, but to set a good example to the others." 280 1 6.38.2. 289 1 9 De falsa legatione 84. See supra n. 275. 290 Of course, the word ethelontes may be also used for one who volunteers for a task without any implication about expense. See the examples in the Thesaurus 174-175, and compare Thucydides 3.20.2. In the expeditioil of T o l n i d e s around the Peloponnesos in 456 B.C., at a time when many believe that hoplite pay i ad not been introduced (Part I, 7-14), the Athenian general was accompanied by volunteir hoplites: Diodoros 11.84.4—5; Plutarch Perikles 18. 291 The sons of Xenophon and Phokion are examples of youths who were brought up at Sparta. 292 Xenophon Hell. 5.3.9.

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

112

which Wilhelm and Kirchner identify as the Lamian W a r : ™

nporepov

edeXovT-qs vuvras

ScuSe/ca

¿vepiflauev.293

¿v

TO>

Another

woXifiu)

inscrip-

tion, dated in 301, records numerous services performed by two metics of Ilion and Ephesos. In addition to contributions for the ship-sheds in every year from 347/6 to 323/2, they had served personally and at their own expense in the Athenian army and navy. 2 9 4 According to the most recent text of IG I 2 , 97, 2 9 5 there were volunteer nautai and stratiotai. These men were to be transported to some place overseas. T h e word ethelontai is preserved in line 15. 7. Not to be overlooked in any appraisal of the possible independence of Athenian hegemones in foreign service is the fact that Athenian trierarchs either accompanied the vessels which they had equipped or sent proxies. 286 Thus in an expedition to Kerkyra, Timotheos was sent out with sixty triremes, 2 9 7 and Demosthenes (49 Against Timotheos 11) says that there were sixty trierarchs under his command. After Arginousai, it was the trierarch Theramenes who brought the most serious charges against the generals. 2 9 8 According to the express testimony of Aischines, and of the speech of Demosthenes against Polykles, the trierarch was under obligation to render account. Moreover, the trierarch had command even over the epibatai. 2 9 9 Now, trierarchs did not hesitate to inveigh against any bad management. Thus, men, primarily of the pentakosiomedimnoi class, were serving abroad on every naval expedition, and to j u d g e from the example of Demosthenes would not hesitate to bring charges of corrupt collusion. 300 Indeed, the evidence collected in Chapter I shows that what was being debated and voted on in Athens was the conduct of her generals while serving overseas. Unsuccessful generals often did not return to Athens, not because they were surrounded by bands of mercenaries to whom they owed allegiance, but because they feared the Athenian demos. 8. O n e area where comparison of the Greek city-state with the Italian states of the period of the condottieri breaks down is that of public finance. 293

IG I I 2 , 5 5 4 (brackets omitted).

5 0 5 : OVVTOTPATEVVTAT S c NAL ras (jTfnxTCIds iraaas ras RE VCCVTLKOCS Kal ras IRE^AS Ta oir\a fxtra. TOV HRTFIOV rt^t/xerot xaXu)S Kal ^iXoTLfiats CK TWV iSicttv (brackets omitted). Gf. Pecirka, Eirene 6 (1967) 25. 295 B. J o r d a n , The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley 1974) (in press). 296 Cf. A. Boeckh, The Public Economy of the Athenians (trans, b y A. L a m b , Boston 1857) 695. 297 X e n o p h o n Hell. 5.4.63. 298 X e n o p h o n Hell. 1.6.35 a n d 7.3. 299 Demosthenes 50 Against Polykles 44. 300 Thus, Chabrias served as trierarch at the battle of Chios in 357 under the generalship of Chares, w h o at an earlier time h a d replaced h i m in the strategia. For the evidence of Chabrias' trierarchy, see J . Kirchner, PA 2, p. 407. Pickard-Cambridge ( C 4 / / 6 . 2 1 0 ) has Chabrias in c o m m a n d . 2 9 4 JQ

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

113

I n the recent monograph by A. Mohlo on Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), the author has traced the exorbitant demands on the communal treasury made by bands of condottieri. T h e soldiers achieved a quasi-sovereign status demanding ever higher wages and fees. I n order to raise large sums of cash on short notice, states resorted to a system of public indebtedness; and much of Mohlo's monograph relates to the efforts to amortize the public debt of Florence. T h e fiscal history of the Greek city-state discloses no comparable system of public indebtedness. " P u b l i c loans were the exception throughout Greek history and completely unknown in Athens." 3 0 1 When generals and trierarchs in the fourth century were forced to resort to borrowing, the loans were strictly private; and the fact that the debt rose out of the performance of a public duty was irrelevant in the eyes of the law. Finley conjectures that a substantial number of the horoi were set u p to mark precisely such obligations. A. N. Andreades has collected the few examples of public borrowing which resulted in what he calls "comical situations," 3 0 2 such as the story told in the Pseudo-Aristotle Oeconomica (2.2.9) of the Lakedaimonians raising a loan for the Samians by fasting for one day and giving the Samians what each would have expended. T h e consequence of lack of public credit was that the bargaining power of the mercenary was limited. 3 0 3 9. O n e by-product of our study of the " condottieri" is to refute the claim frequently made that the outbreak of the Social War is ultimately to be attributed to the conduct of Athenian generals acting independently in the North Aegean. This claim overlooks the fact that within five or six years, between 362 and 356 (adopting the chronology of Schaefer), eight generals sent to T h r a k e to regulate affairs in the Chersonese were recalled and condemned or rebuked by the Athenian demos. Leosthenes, charged with the defense of Peparethos, lost five triremes, and six hundred Athenians were taken prisoner. T h e demos condemned Leosthenes to death and confiscated his property. 3 0 4 Kallisthenes listened to the vain promise of Perdikkas and consented to a truce which his opponent did not respect; he was put to death. 3 0 5 Another general, Ergophilos, was brought before 301

M. I. Finley, Land and Credit (New Brunswick 1951) 90. Cf. R. Bogaert, Banques et Banquiers (Leyden 1968) 401-408. The borrowings from the treasuries of Athena were in no sense loans, but merely the expenditure of reserves. 302 A History of Greek Public Finance 1 (Cambridge, Mass. 1933) 168-176. 303 Estimates of military expenditures such as those of C. H. Wilson, Athenaeum 58 ( 1970) 302—326, are valuable for showing what might be expended during periods of war ; but they do not prove that the public treasury had such reserves, or that the state adopted a system of deficit financing. 304 Diodoros 15.95.3; Polyainos 6.2.1. Cf. A. Schaefer, Demosthenes l 2 (Leipzig 1885) 131. 305 Aischines 2 De falsa legations 30; Aristotle Rhet. 2.3.13. Cf. A. Schaefer, op. cit. 152.

114

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

the same tribunal, acquitted on the capital charge b u t fined.306 Autokles, M e n o n , a n d T i m o m a c h o s succeeded t h e m in T h r a k e , b u t m e t with the same ill success. T h e y were deposed a n d T i m o m a c h o s at least was fined.307 Kephisodotos signed a treaty with Kersebleptes which was rejected with indignation. H e was fined five talents a n d barely escaped with his life. 3 0 8 Chabrias, sent out to negotiate with Athenodoros a n d Charidemos, signed a treaty which the demos again found unacceptable, 3 0 9 a n d Chares was dispatched to supersede him. Finally, the tight control over receipts a n d expenditures is b r o u g h t out in a passage in Isokrates 15 Antidosis 129, where Menestheus, Iphikrates' son, is reported as rendering an accurate account in 358/7 of all the funds received a n d disbursed by the a r m y operating in the Hellespont. T h e view is incontestable that the A t h e n i a n h o m e authorities h a d decided on a policy of defending A t h e n i a n interests in T h r a k e a n d in m a i n t a i n i n g her dominion over the Hellespont. T h e rapid sequence of deposed generals in this one area belies any contention that the A t h e n i a n ekklesia was without authority a n d h a d lost control of foreign affairs. W h a t authority could generals have w h e n their agreements were being r e p u d i a t e d at h o m e ? T h e civil power was p a r a m o u n t , a n d the f u n d a m e n t a l axiom of civilian supremacy was m a i n t a i n e d . So far from the fourth-century general acquiring une autorité sans limite,310 the extent of the vigilance of the A t h e n i a n demos over even the most successful strategoi is well b r o u g h t out in a passage f r o m Deinarchos (3 Against Philokles 17) a b o u t Timotheos, son of K o n o n , w h o played a very conspicuous part in Athenian history f r o m 380 B.C. until his d e a t h in a b o u t 352 B.C. : Was it not you and your ancestors w h o made no allowance for Timotheus, though he had sailed round the Peloponnese and beaten the Spartans in the sea-fight at Corcyra, though his father was Conon w h o liberated Greece and he himself had taken Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and twenty cities besides ? Y o u did not take this record into consideration at all, or allow such services to outweigh the case before you or the oaths which you swear before giving your verdict, but fined him a hundred talents, because Aristophon said he had been bribed by the Chians and Rhodians. (trans, of Burtt)

W e lack, a n d presumably always shall lack, any mobilization decree of the fourth century which would explicitly set forth the age-groups of 306

Aristotle Rhet. 2.3.13 (with Cope-Sandys' note); Demosthenes 19 De falsa legations

180. 307 Demosthenes 19 De falsa legations 180; 23 Against Aristokrates 104; 36 For Phormio 53; 50 Against Polykles 12. 308 Demosthenes 23 Against Aristokrates 167. 309 Demosthenes 23 Against Aristokrates 169-173. 310 C. Mosse, La fin de la démocratie athénienne (Paris 1962) 275. Demosthenes 4 First Philippic 26 (351 B.C. ?) goes so far as to say that most strategoi were chosen to make a brave show in the public processions at Athens.

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

115

citizens to be called and the ratio of mercenaries, whether domestic or foreign. Such a decree would presumably set forth provisions for siteresion and misthos, just as the ail-too fragmentary IG I 2 , 98/99 does in the fifth century. Furthermore, the subject of transient military manpower in the fourth century is deserving of a more penetrating study than it has yet received. But we are safe to conclude that the Greek city-state did not abdicate its authority and turn the control of its government over to banditti chieftains. I n contrast with the tyrants of the Greek city-states, 311 the legally appointed military strategoi of the fourth century never attained a position where they could exploit the economy distress of the period in which they lived, and although they were at times unscrupulous, their personal ambitions were always held in check by home authorities. There is little evidence to support the current view that the free communities of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, etc., were dominated by private armies. Finally, one may observe that the practice of offering sociological generalities on the basis of isolated passages from the Attic orators is not a sound one. As cited above, there are passages in Isokrates and Demosthenes which represent the allies as entirely abandoned to the discretion of the Athenian generals. There are even more numerous passages which expostulate that the people must discard their dishonest counsellors at home and that the demos itself must cease to be indolent, voluptuous, rapacious, contemptuous of the allies, greedy of flattery and impatient of reproof. O n e may indeed find passages (Isokrates 8 On the Peace 14; Demosthenes 3 Third Olynthiac 32) to the effect that the democracy did not permit full freedom of speech, or that the old Athenian citizenry was wiped out and its place filled by a motley race of foreign extraction (Isokrates 8 On the Peace 88). For the historical value of Isokrates, the essay by N. H . Baynes (Byzantine Studies and Other Essays [London I960]) is recommended; for Lysias, the valuable conclusions of K. J . Dover (Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum [Berkeley 1968] 54-56). 3 1 2 G. Grote (History 4, 52-53 end of Chap. 30) has shown how completely Andokides misconceived the history of Athens. Lastly, A. Holm (The History of Greece 3 [London 1896], tr. from the German) has a chapter ( X I I I ) , warning us against taking at their face value the pictures painted by Isokrates and Demosthenes of the degeneration of the Athenian democracy in the 311 The testimonia relating to the armies of such tyrants (Pherai, Sikyon, etc., as well as Sikily) have never been collected. This is, however, a separate study. Polybios (11.13.58) acutely observes that mercenaries are more appropriately employed by tyrants than democracies, since, when they defeat the enemies of democracy, they put themselves out of work. 312 p Ferckel, Lysias und Athen (Wiirzburg 1937), shows that Lysias had no deep-seated political convictions. He regards him as an unscrupulous opportunist.

116

The Condottieri of the Fourth Century

fourth century, which has not been superseded in more up-to-date histories. 3 1 3 W e should look not so m u c h to the moral decline of Athens b u t to the military power of M a k e d o n i a to explain Chaironeia. 3 1 4 313 K . J . Dover {Cambridge Journal 5 [1951/2] 637-638) has two interesting paragraphs comparing the historical use of Comedy and Oratory. I think that he underrates the difficulties in the use of Oratory, because Demosthenes and Isokrates not only used rhetorical exaggeration; they deliberately falsified. 314 Cf. Cawkwell, JHS 83 (1963) 67.

CHAPTER

IV

IPHIKRATES AND HIS CORINTHIAN PELTASTS Iphikrates' career in the preceding chapter allows us to make a n observation a b o u t a u n i q u e b u t arrested stage in the evolution of Greek warfare. For a period of nearly five years, a n a r m y was maintained continuously in one place outside Athenian boundaries u n d e r one leader. 1 T h e m a j o r source of funds making this possible was Persia. 2 T h e result of this high level of training was unusual success even against L a k e d a i m o n i a n hoplites. H . W. Parke says of Iphikrates, " T h e esprit de corps a n d its accompanying discipline were the greatest contribution m a d e to fourth-century warfare by the mercenary s o l d i e r . " 3 But Iphikrates' performance at Corinth was not repeated until Alexander; a n d the Athenians themselves looked back on this period w i t h utmost pride a n d some twenty years later honored Iphikrates for his prowess at this time. Persian gold ran out, a n d the same measure of success with peltasts was not achieved in the m a j o r battles on Greek soil. T h e citizen-hoplite, not the mercenary peltast, won or lost the d a y at Leuktra, M a n t i n e i a a n d Chaironeia. I n the spring of 393, after the great naval victory of Knidos (394), 4 K o n o n a n d the Persian satrap Pharnabazos came to the Isthmus of Corinth. T h e y arrived with their fleet after m a k i n g a n adventurous voyage through the Aegean a n d ravaging the Lakonian seacoast. 5 T h e a r m y of the anti-Spartan Alliance was stationed at Corinth. Pharnabazos, indignant as he was with the Lakedaimonians, exhorted the alliance to

T H E STUDY OF

c a r r y o n t h e w a r z e a l o u s l y (TrapaKeXevod/xevos TTOXEFIEIV)

a n d sailed for h o m e (a>xero

rots

OIKOV

avyLfxayoii

Trpodvfiws

¿TroTrXewv).6

O n his

1 According to A. E. Vacalopoulos, Origins of the Greek Nation (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970) 129, the problem of keeping an army in the field for twelve months was an acute one during the Greek War of Independence. What caused the difficulty was the soldiers' ever-present need to return to their villages and farms to stave off their families' destitution. Kolokotrones divided the citizens into classes with each class alternating every six months between stints of military service and of farming. 2 Lysias in 33 Olympic Oration 5, delivered in 388 B.C. (the date according to Diodoros 14.105), characterized the military situation, "You are aware that empire is for those who command the sea, that the King has control of the money" (iVioraoflf Sc o n ij a PXV Tt*>v KPAROVVTIUV rrjs 8A\¿TTTJS, TQJV 5e XPRJILATWV @AOI\evs RAFITAS). 3 GMS 54. 4 According to Hell. Oxy. 1.25 and 16.30, Konon's crews came in part from Greece. Cf. B.Jordan, CSCA 2 (1969) 200. 5 Xenophon Hell. 4.8.7: ap.a 8e TU> eapi vavs re noXXas ovfi-nX^pwaas KAL KOV TTpoafiiadwotxp.€vos ZirXtvoev o 0apva^a^os re Kal o Kovtov ¡-Ltr' aiirov. Cf. Diodoros 14.84. 6 Xenophon Hell. 4.8.8.

[ H7 ]

118

Ifihikraies and His Corinthian Peltasts

departure, he furnished Konon with a large sum of money [KaraXiTrcbv avTols

XPVHLATA

°

o a

€*X€V)-

O n e important result of the conference at Corinth was the establishment by Konon of a Legion of Mercenaries, TO ¿eviKov, in connection with the allied army at Corinth. T h e source of the legionnaires has been variously debated. H . W . Parke believes that they had been recruited from the Hellespontine region in the winter of 394/3 ; 7 B. B. Rogers suggests that they were levied in Asia and used in the attacks on the Lakonian coast ; 8 J . G. P. Best rejects Parke's theory of a Thrakian source and suggests that some were recruited from Athens. 9 Indeed, Demosthenes (4 First Philippic 24) says that Athenian citizens served at Corinth. 1 0 In view of Xenophon's explicit statement that Pharnabazos hired a mercenary force before sailing for Greece (^tviKov Trpoafj.iadojaaiJ.evos enXevaev: 4.8.7), one would assume a mixture of Greeks and Asians. 11 Indeed, the question of Greek participation in Konon's fleet has been put in a new light by the Hell. Oxy., where we are told in the context of events in the year 396/5 that " n o t only were they (the Athenians) in the habit of dispatching both arms a n d sailors (hyperesia) for Conon's fleet, but on a former occasion . . . crates, Hagnias, and Telesegorus with their companions were dispatched on an embassy to the k i n g . " 1 2 T h e ambassadors were captured by the Spartans and executed. As early as 397/6 the Athenians were sending crews for the fleet which Konon was mustering, and when Konon went to Babylon in 396 he turned the command of the fleet over to two Athenians. 1 3 Isokrates (8 On the Peace 68) refers to the numerous embassies which Athens sent to the king during this period. 1 4 Harpokration and Suidas both refer to the legion, citing Androtion and Philochoros ( S . V V . ¿¡evixòv ¿v Kopivdw) : avvear-qaaro 8' avrò npcÌTOV KÓVOJV, TrapéXafie 8' avrò ' IiKparrjs vortpov Kcù Xafìplas- ai xprjaafievoi T7]V AaKeSaifjLOviojv fiópav

7

KaTexoifiav.

aTparrjyovvTOS

avrols

'IfiiKparovs

GMS 50. The Plutus of Aristophanes (London 1907) p. v. 9 Thrakian Peltasts (Groningen 1969) 86, 93. 10 Funerary monuments of Athenian citizens who died fighting at Corinth include IG II 2 , 5221,5222,6217. 11 At the battle of Knidos, Konon commands the Greek element: TO 'EXXTJVIKOV (Hell. 4.3.11). Brownson in his commentary observes that his "fleet was 'Greek' merely in the sense that it was manned by Greek mercenaries and volunteers." Derkylidas clearly has the fleet of Konon in mind when he says (4.8.4) that there is no Greek fleet on the sea. 12 Col. 2.1. Trans, of Grenfell and Hunt. 13 Diodoros 14.81.4. 14 Demos, son of Pyrilampes, may have been an ambassador on one of these missions. He is mentioned by Lysias (19 On the Property of Aristophanes 25) as having received from the King a present of a large golden phiale. 8

Iphikrates Kal

and His Corinthian

KaXXiov,

Kadi

119

Peltasts

r)aiv AvSporiaiv

re

Kal

(

PiXô)(opos

év

8 trarj.15

Jacoby (ad Philochoros frg. 150) expresses the opinion that owcar^aaro means not "he organized the troop," but "he furnished Athens with this troop." 16 Two other passages contain a reference to the Legion. Aristophanes Plutus (170-174), produced in 388, says: ¡xéyas

8è pacnXevs

ixKXrjola

ov\l

8ià

TOVTOV

8' ovyl 8tà TOVTOV yiyverai

TL 8é; tus Tpirjpeis ov av nXrjpots; TO 8' év Kopivdu)

KO{J.&;

; ehré [toi.

¿¡GVIKOV ov% OVTOS Tpéec;

Secondly, Demosthenes 4 First Philippic 24 expressly says that Athens had maintained the mercenaries: KAL -NPOTTPOV 7TOT' ¿KOVW ÇeviKov RPÉFIEW ¿v KopLvdu) Trjv TTOXÎV, oS IJoXvaTpaTos rjyçÎTO 'IiKpv rroXeoiv eìXrjfj.¡xéva: 28.5). Ergokles was said (29.2) to have procured a fortune of thirty talents by his misappropriation of public funds. I n addition to information which we obtain from indictments, we learn in T h u c y d i d e s 6.12.2 that Nikias charges that Alkibiades hopes to recoup his finances by abuse of the office of generalship (òjeXr]6fj rt èx rrjs âpxvs)'> a n d in 6.15.2, Thucydides seems to accept the accusation as just (icai r à Ï8ia a/ux evTvyrjoas xpr/fiacrl r e Kal 8ó/jr)