The Governors’ Lobbyists: Federal-State Relations Offices and Governors Associations in Washington

Citation preview

Page viii →Page ix →

Acknowledgments No book is written alone, and this one is no exception. First, I thank the federal-state relations liaisons, association staff members, and others who worked in and with the community of governors’ lobbyists for their willingness to share their insights and stories with me. More than 100 of you generously gave your time and memories, and often documents from your files. With a few exceptions, none of you is named in this book. Without you, however, this book would not have been possible. It is with sadness that I must thank James L. Martin posthumously. The first Washington lobbyist for the National Governors Association, Jim served in that capacity for more than 30 years. When I first met Jim, he was about to retire from the NGA. In addition to granting me an extensive interview, he gave me access to both his files and his Rolodex. I found newspaper stories about early state offices and NGA initiatives that I would never have discovered otherwise, and there is no doubt that I gained access to many current and former office directors because he provided the contact. I returned to Jim with questions again and again. At a retirement reception that a former state office director hosted, Jim announced that all the former state office directors in the room should give me their business cards before leaving so that I could contact them. Jim, thank you for your unflagging support of this project. I thank Governor Daniel J. Evans for granting me a two-hour interview about his efforts to establish a lobbying arm of the National Governors Association and subsequently develop the Hall of the States building that has become home to the NGA and dozens of other state offices and public official organizations. It was incredibly valuable to capture this perspective. Steve Roberts and Nelle Sandridge at the State Services Organization Page x →were very generous in answering my questions about the building occupants of the Hall of the States over the years. They also provided me access to records about the early planning for the Hall of the States. The first phase of this research began as a dissertation that focused narrowly on explaining the variation in state lobbying offices in the late 1990s. David Lowery pushed me as I grappled with the significance the interest group exchange, and helped me think carefully about the importance of context. Thad Beyle guided me as I thought about governors and their motivations, ambitions, and powers. Deil Wright—whom I must also thank posthumously—introduced me to the scholarship of intergovernmental relations and helped me think about how governors’ lobbyists contributed to this enterprise. This early research was funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant SBR-9818696). I set this project aside for several years before deciding that I wanted to investigate the earliest lobbying offices as well as the governors associations. I also realized that it was time to see how state lobbying offices were managing in the context of a national recession and heightened party polarization. This led to additional trips to archives, many more research interviews, and more feedback from colleagues as I completed this work. I thank Carol Weissert, Joe Zimmerman, Olga Shvetsova, Susan Wolcott, Mikhail Filippov, Benjamin Fordham, and Wes Leckrone for their comments on early drafts of chapters. I thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the manuscript, which unquestionably made it stronger. David Cingranelli dug up and shared with me the data from interviews that he conducted with state office directors in the 1980s, and provided thoughtful feedback in our discussions about these offices. Beth Leech graciously shared survey instruments that she had used in her own research, as well as a subset of data from state and local government liaisons that she had collected in a larger survey of a cross-section of Washington lobbyists. Sarah Maximiek of the Binghamton University Libraries was especially helpful (and good-spirited) as I searched for old newspaper articles. Carl Klarner generously shared annual data on state legislatures and state budgets. Jenna Kelkres Emery was the other half of a terrific coauthorship that produced an article on the state lobbying offices in Washington during World War II, a portion of which is included in chapter 2. John Nugent, John Dinan, Mitch Herian, Troy Smith, Robert Jay Dilger, and Heather Creek joined me in fruitful exchanges about federalism and state lobbying.

Tonia Shadduck had the challenge of protecting my time as I was conducting research interviews while in a fulltime administrative position, and reading my handwriting as she assisted with typing efforts. She, Kathy Brunt, and Wendy Martinek were terrific cheerleaders. The Busy People’s Writing Page xi →Group helped me stay focused at difficult points in the project. Melody Herr was a skilled and supportive editor as I moved this book to press. Of course, all errors are my own. My sister and several friends housed me during many of the trips to Washington that were necessary for this project, providing renewal as well as a sofa or spare bedroom. Thank you, Tracy, Jenn, Eric, Donna, Rosalyn, and Paul. Finally, I thank my family—Bob, Kris, Geoff, and Tracy—for their unflagging support throughout every phase of this project.

Page xii →Page 1 →

Introduction: The Puzzle of the Governors’ Lobbyists There are more than 17,000 lobbying organizations in Washington, DC.1 Between 30 and 40 of these organizations represent state governments and their governors. They are composed of offices that represent individual states as well as associations that represent governors. State governments are seldom what come to mind when someone—citizen or scholar—thinks of interest groups. They are not the businesses that comprise more than 40 percent of the lobbying community. They are not trade associations, which represent collections of private interests and include more than 20 percent of lobbying organizations and 14 percent of clients of lobbying firms.2 Nor do they fit into the set of interest organizations that encompass smaller portions of the Washington lobbying universe: consumer groups, nonprofit organizations, or unions. Nonetheless, states are interests. American state governments and the governors that lead them have interests vis-Г -vis the federal government, and they have organized to pursue those interests. For most of the last 70 years, every state has been a dues-paying member of the National Governors Association. Most are duespaying members of at least one other governors association. Almost every state, at one time or another, has had its own office in Washington, DC, to represent the governor and state government in the federal system. Collectively, the people working in these offices are the governors’ lobbyists. Why do states and their governors use lobbyists to represent them in Washington, and what role do these lobbyists play in our federal system? This question frames the argument of this book. The very short answer is that governors associations and state lobbying offices exist because there is a need Page 2 →to fill, and governors and their agents have worked to fill that need. But rich nuances are overlooked in this too-simple answer. A federalism scholar would say that this need results from a gap in the coverage of existing safeguards that allows for these two types of political safeguards in our federal system. An interest groups scholar would say that there are opportunities for lobbyists to assist states and governors in achieving gains from the federal government, and those opportunities create the conditions that allow for these organizations. Political development and bureaucracy scholars would add that these offices have developed over time and are path dependent, tied to the history of a federal government that has become more active in state affairs over time and more financially important to state governance—and that, over time, these organizations have developed their own institutional strength and have an interest in their own continuation.

Three Puzzles This question is a multifaceted puzzle. Within it, there are three discrete puzzles to lay bare, and these puzzles structure this book.

The Federalism Puzzle The first puzzle is about the need for additional safeguards of federalism. In later chapters, I will refer to this as the federalism puzzle. It is not apparent why, given the construction of the American federal system, states and their governors would need organized representation in Washington. The founders of the United States established its political system so that state interests would be fundamental to federal government operations, integrated into the fabric of governance. There are constitutionally provided safeguards, the structures designed to ensure that states are a check on the federal government. There are many examples of these structures: members of both houses of Congress are elected from states or districts within states to undergird the connection between the national legislature and the states; in this country’s early years, U.S. senators were elected by their state legislatures, further reinforcing a connection to the state and forging a direct connection to the state government, but even after passage of the 17th Amendment, senators as well as representatives have a strong geographic tie to their states or districts within states; the 10th Amendment reserves powers for the states or the people; and the Electoral College is designed so that states structure citizens’ and electors’ participation in the selection of the president. Why the need for another political safeguard?

Page 3 →It is widely acknowledged that these safeguards of federalism have not provided the protection that our Founders argued they would. In some cases they have not been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court. In some cases they have faltered by themselves. What have worked more effectively, argues a long line of scholars beginning with Herbert Wechsler, are political safeguards—the safeguards that do not stem from constitutional design but rather from informal political structures and activities.3 We will discuss this issue at length in chapter 1, but existing political safeguards of federalism also have their inadequacies. The link between political parties and states that so many argue function as the strongest support of federalism is not as strong as it seems. The culture of federalism that undergirds our political system can also be undermined. In this book, I argue that the existing safeguards of federalism have weaknesses, leaving gaps that make them unreliable. Governors have not depended on these existing safeguards, but have instead elected to forge new mechanisms to protect their interests before the federal government. These new political safeguards of federalism augment the other (existing, also imperfect) political safeguards and constitutional safeguards to provide a firmer foundation for federalism and greater protections for states.

The Lobbying Puzzle In creating offices and associations, state governments mobilize as organized interests. Yet as organized interests, state governments are a puzzle—the second puzzle at the center of this book. In subsequent chapters, I will refer to this as the lobbying puzzle. Governors are powerful people. They can pick up the phone and call senators, representatives, cabinet secretaries, and presidents. Lobbyists exist in large part to provide access to important politicians. Don’t governors already have that access by themselves? What benefits can lobbyists bring? Lobbyists often use money to gain or improve access, distributing campaign contributions strategically to select members of Congress who can provide benefits or defend them from attack. Most of the governors’ lobbyists can give no contributions. Likewise, they do not participate in many other types of lobbying activities that are typical, such as mobilizing their members—citizens—in sweeping advocacy efforts. In short, governors seem to have what lobbyists could bring—inside access—and they cannot use many of the tools that lobbyists could provide. So why would governors invest resources in Washington representation? This book demonstrates the ways that governors associations and Page 4 →state offices provide benefits to state governments that governors cannot acquire—or cannot acquire as efficiently—on their own. More than 40 years ago, Robert Salisbury argued that interest organizations are created when an entrepreneur identifies benefits that can be offered to a group of members at a particular price.4 At its most basic, Salisbury’s exchange theory of interests is straightforward: interest organizations are formed when an entrepreneur identifies and offers benefits that are worth the costs to the buyer (Salisbury focused on membership organizations and their individual members). The power in Salisbury’s theory is exploited in fully delineating the role of the entrepreneur, and in identifying the particular costs and benefits that make an exchange worthwhile—or not worthwhile. This book also examines the governors and association executives who have acted as entrepreneurs, working to found Washington lobbying operations. I identify the role these entrepreneurs have played in the development of the governors’ lobby over the last 60 years, and I untangle the cluster of costs and benefits that governors weigh as they consider establishing or maintaining lobbying operations in Washington. These organizations have clear financial benefits that accrue to states, and although they can be difficult to quantify, the financial benefits are virtually always greater than the financial costs. There are potential political benefits that can accrue to governors. There are costs and risks to these organizations as well. The financial costs are easier to identify: dues to an association, the costs of office space and staff, the benefits of the staff members who are state employees rather than working under a contract with the state. The political risks accrue primarily to state lobbying offices, and they may be less obvious at first glance, but they can be far more significant than the financial costs. Furthermore, I examine how context influences the interest group exchange. These exchanges do not exist in a vacuum. They transpire at a particular time and with a particular state. The political and economic context of the exchange influences whether a governor establishes or continues to maintain a state office in Washington. Likewise, a state’s maintenance of a Washington office over time—the history of any office—will

structure a governor’s consideration of its place in the current state government. It is both context as well as the individual governor that lead to variation in the development of the governors’ lobby over time. This context displays itself in several ways. Context includes the economic conditions of the nation and the individual states; political characteristics of the federal and state governments; and characteristics of the Page 5 →states’ electorates. Infused in many of these factors is culture—both political culture broadly and the culture of federalism that is amorphous but fundamental to our federal system. Some states have cultures that are more favorable toward the federal government. Others have cultures that are hostile to Washington. These economic, political, and cultural characteristics influence whether governors engage lobbyists to represent their interests in Washington—and these characteristics frame a governor’s decision to initiate or maintain interest representation.

The Proliferation Puzzle The governors’ lobby offers a third puzzle, which is not related to why it exists but rather to why it is as various as it is. Even in a capital city where interest group proliferation is rampant, the number of organizations representing governors seems extremely high for 50 officeholders—55 officeholders if you count the governors of territories. If one does determine that states need representation in Washington, it seems excessive to have one national association, four regional associations, and two partisan associations, as well as two dozen or more state offices. This appears at first glance to be interest group proliferation on steroids. Why do governors need both the associations of their peers and their own individual lobbying offices? Why do governors need multiple associations, with nearly every governor belonging to a partisan association and at least one regional association in addition to paying dues to the national association? I will refer to this third puzzle as the proliferation puzzle. I find that these organizations fill specialized niches within the larger intergovernmental lobbying community. While there is some overlap in their agendas and purposes, they are not duplicative. The easier part of the puzzle is why there are offices for individual states and their governors as well as associations that represent groups of governors. The reasons why the governor of New York would be active in the NGA and maintain a state office in Washington are in many ways similar to why the U.S. Steel Corporation would be active in the National Association of Manufacturers and also maintain its own office a few blocks from the White House. The more difficult part of the puzzle is why there are seven governors associations. I explore the roles of the four regional governors associations as well as the two partisan associations to understand how the division of issue areas and services to governors functions for the benefit of their members—the governors—as well as the organizations themselves. Page 6 →

The Importance of the Puzzles Given the significance of states and the federal-state relationship, these puzzles are important ones. The lobbyists who represent the 50 American states are relatively few in number, considered within the 17,000 lobbying organizations in the Washington, DC, area. Yet they represent governments that spend over $1.6 trillion each year, excluding bond payments, and affect the daily activities of every citizen in the country.1 States and their localities spend far more on domestic programs and services, and employ far more people, than the federal government does.5 The sheer size and impact of state governments make them fundamentally important. Furthermore, states rely on the federal government for more than one-third of state expenditures. In fiscal year 2013, more than $502 billion of the $1.65 trillion in spending by the 50 states came from the federal government.6 The governors’ lobbyists seek this funding, and seek to affect what is funded and what strings come with the funding. Lobbyists seek more funding with fewer strings, and they fight requirements that come without funding—unfunded mandates. The governors’ lobbyists help governors avoid having their own interests overrun. After all, governors’ policy and political prospects will rise and fall on the decisions, policies, and allocations of the federal government.

The state-federal relationship is additionally important because states are the implementers of not only their own policies and programs but of federal policies and programs. Lobbyists help shape whether, and what, and how states implement the designs of the federal government. The lobbyists help us understand the policy goals and interests of state governments and their governors vis-Г -vis the federal system. As the largest single policy area where state and federal governments share governance, health care is an excellent illustration of how federal policies and funds affect states. Medicaid—the program to provide health care to the poor, jointly funded by the federal and state governments—weighs in as the biggest piece of the health care funding pie. Though states were responsible for health care for the poor before the enactment of Medicaid, this program eclipsed all previous initiatives.7 Medicaid spending totaled $413.7 billion, and comprised 24.5 percent of state expenditures, in fiscal year 2013.8 It has been the single fastest growing component of most state budgets for many years. In fiscal year 2013, the federal government provided $234 billion of that funding, so states depended on federal funds for Page 7 →56.6 percent of the funding for a program critical to the more than 68 million people it covers.9 Federal funding through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (enacted in 1997, SCHIP was shortened to CHIP in the Children’s Health Insurance Reauthorization Act of 2009) is allocated through a formula that is tied to the formula for Medicaid funds, and covers more than 8 million children.10 CHIP cost $11.3 billion in fiscal year 2013, and the federal government provided states with twothirds of this funding.11 More recent legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010—often abbreviated as the Affordable Care Act, and often referred to as “Obamacare”—was the most significant overhaul of health care in the United States since the 1965 legislation that created Medicare and Medicaid, and it has far-reaching implications for state policies and budgets. Even today governors are still determining exactly how their states will be affected, but perhaps the most significant component requires states to expand Medicaid coverage.2 States will also be affected by more modest provisions, such as requirements to cover certain procedures and medications. For each—Medicaid, CHIP, and the Affordable Care Act—governors had enormous interests in federal action. Lobbying by state offices and governors associations was vigorous. Health care is only one of many policy areas in which the federal government plays such a major role in state activities. States’ dependence on federal funds has only increased in the last few years. The recession of 2008 hit state governments particularly hard, leading them to lean even more heavily on the federal government. Hundreds of billions of dollars in federal aid flowed to states via the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Again, governors had an enormous incentive to have advocates in Washington to see that this stimulus program benefited states as much as possible. In another vein, we should care about these puzzles because they help us understand lobbying. Governments are a small piece of the lobbying universe numerically, but carry significant weight. Political scientists have not focused on governments nearly as much as they have focused on businesses,Page 8 → unions, consumer groups, and trade associations. In recent decades most studies of organized interests in Washington have given short shrift to governors’ offices and associations, and indeed to public official organizations more generally. Most major studies of lobbying focus on other types of lobbying organizations—the membership-based advocacy groups that represent millions of individual members and are typically nonprofit nongovernmental organizations, and the private businesses and trade associations that spend millions lobbying for their economic interests. Large survey research studies of Washington interest organizations have tended to leave governments out.12 This study, covering the complete population of one set of government lobbyists, helps us understand the intergovernmental lobby and how it is similar to and different from other types of organized interests. It is my hope that this study sheds some light on a broader question about interests: Why do some interests organize and others do not? Political scientists know a good bit about membership recruitment and mobilization—why individuals join groups (selective benefits). We don’t know much about why some groups organize when others with the same interests do not organize. My investigation of the role of governors (actors) and political and economic factors (context) helps us understand what forces are at work. I did not set out to investigate how changes in partisanship have affected the federal balance, but my work on

these puzzles has highlighted this phenomenon. Thus, finally, these puzzles are important because their answers illuminate some larger shifts in politics—the growing role of partisanship in governance—and help us understand the effects of hyperpartisanship. In this case, we see how partisanship is causing challenges for federalism.

What We Know So Far Though we know less about governments as organized interests than we know about these other types of interests, there have been some excellent investigations of the community of large public official associations.13 These works typically focus on more than one public official association and thus help us understand the governors lobby as part of the intergovernmental lobby. Three books have focused exclusively on the National Governors Association. Glenn Brooks’s When Governors Convene focuses exclusively on what was then called the Governors’ Conference.14 It provides an excellent history of the organization, and a window into governors’ interests and activities in the early days of their national association, but as Page 9 →it was published before the organization even established a Washington lobbying office, it is limited in its relevance to the NGA as a contemporary Washington lobbying force. Mitchel Herian’s Governing the States and the Nation: The Intergovernmental Policy Influence of the National Governors Association examines the impact of NGA lobbying from 2000 to 2005 using case studies of legislation as well as an analysis of the effectiveness of NGA letters to Congress.15 Herian’s examination of impact is a significant contribution to our understanding of the policy efforts of the NGA, but of necessity leaves other aspects of the organization unexplored. Albert Prendergast’s Not a Ship of Fools: The Incredible Voyage of the SS Independence provides an interesting account of the 1967 NGA annual meeting held aboard a cruise ship and on the U.S. Virgin Islands, but it does not shed light on the policy or political issues of the organization.16 Several scholars have investigated individual states’ lobbying offices in Washington. John Nugent’s Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking provides the most indepth exploration of these offices as one portion of its thoughtful examination of state activities in the federal system.17 Yet Nugent’s chapter cannot provide a full investigation of these offices, their histories, and activities. Several scholarly articles and book chapters have focused more specifically on the Washington lobbying offices of individual states and other governments, and thus contribute to our understanding of this population of interests.18 Articles on state lobbying offices in the popular press are quite informative in providing descriptions of activities and, on occasion, controversies.19 While the literature on the governors associations and state lobbying offices helps us understand much about these organizations, the puzzles I set out at the start of this chapter have not been fully untangled. Some aspects of these puzzles have scarcely been touched. It is my hope that this study helps us better understand these puzzles. I also hope that the breadth of my investigation provides a comprehensive view of these interests in a way that is often difficult to do. Most often, the literature on gubernatorial lobbying structures examines either an association—almost invariably the National Governors Association—or individual states’ lobbying offices, but not both. But looking at the governors associations without examining individual states’ lobbying mechanisms is akin to studying the lobbying efforts of the National Association of Manufacturers while ignoring the institutional lobbying efforts of manufacturers such as U.S. Steel: a big piece of the picture is left out. One way I seek to contribute to our scholarship is by investigating both states’ stand-alone lobbying offices and the governors associations. Page 10 →In addition to studying the full community of governors’ lobbyists in Washington, I seek to ease a frustration of interest groups scholars: too often, it is impossible to study an entire population of an interest. Suppose you wish to study the political interests of independent gas station owners. You might seek a list of these individuals by turning to the (hypothetical) Service Station Owners of America, or you might study the organization itself. There are limits to this approach, however, since these approaches would lead one to examine only those who were association members—those who had already organized. It would be very cumbersome, if

not impossible, to gather a representative list of those gas station owners who had opted not to organize. Certainly you could not survey every gas station owner in the country. As a result of problems such as this one, we have a selection bias problem in many of our studies of organized interests. We know a lot more about the ones that organize than the ones that don’t. An examination of the governors’ lobby escapes these difficulties. There are only 50 states, a number not so large that I cannot study every one of them. In conducting this study, I interviewed not only the directors of state lobbying offices in Washington but also the people who handled federal-state relations for governors who did not have Washington offices. Although this book does not explore these state capital operations at any length, my understanding of both sets of governors’ liaisons has allowed me to better understand the unique aspects of the Washington offices.

Methods, Sources and Terminology I apply qualitative and quantitative analysis to these puzzles. I use descriptive statistics in many chapters; one chapter relies on statistical analysis—an event history model—to understand the factors that affect why some states have Washington offices and other states do not. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods allows me to understand the political development of these organizations, capture the nuances of what they do, and examine the factors that affect them in the aggregate. My analysis relies heavily on more than 100 in-depth interviews I conducted from 1999 to 2011. During 1999, I interviewed approximately 70 directors and former directors of federal-state liaison offices in Washington or in state capitals. Included in this group was each director of the 31 Washington offices that existed in the 105th Congress,3 as well as 16 of the 19 directors of state capital offices that existed in the 105th Congress. Page 11 →Thus I interviewed the current liaisons for 47 of the 50 states. I was able to speak with many original directors of Washington offices, allowing me to explore differences in offices and the factors that influence their creation across time as well as across space (the population of 50 states). While only 31 states had Washington offices during the 105th Congress, perhaps only one state has never had Washington representation.20 As a result, interviewing previous directors has yielded especially rewarding material, especially in cases where a given Washington office had closed. I benefited tremendously from the explosion of Internet search engines and Web directories that has occurred since the late 1990s. During my initial interviews, office directors gave me the names of former staff members and others involved with state lobbying offices, but I was unable to locate many of them. “You should talk to Peggy Hackett,” one former director told me in 1999. “She worked in the Alaska office for years. I think she moved to Nome in the 1980s.” In 1999 that was a dead end. In 2008, however, I was able to use the Internet to locate Peggy Hackett, now retired and living in Anchorage. In this way, I was able to track down many early office directors, and I interviewed several between 2008 and 2010. In 2010 and 2011, I conducted another round of interviews. I interviewed 23 Washington office directors, nine current senior staff members of the several governors associations, and other current or former staff members of associations that worked with these organizations. Several current and former staff members at the National Governors Association granted interviews. In 2008, former governor Dan Evans of Washington granted me a lengthy interview regarding the NGA and its establishment of the Hall of the States. Nearly all of these interviews took place in person. Archival records were critical as I worked to unearth the early history of these offices. Most useful were the New York State Archives and the Connecticut State Archives; also useful were the papers of New York governors Herbert Lehman and Thomas Dewey, located at Columbia University and the University of Rochester, respectively, as well as the records of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations at the National Archives. Newspaper articles from 1908 to the present were another source of valuable information about the activities of these offices over the years. The proceedings of the annual meetings of the National Governors Association, as well as the board books for nearly 30 years of board meetings for the State Services

Organization, provided critical background. David Cingranelli generously provided me with his notes from his research on state lobbying offices in the early 1980s; I also use his previously published aggregate data on these offices. Page 12 →Someone familiar with governors’ state offices could rightly point out that there is significant variation in the structure of these Washington lobbying offices. The most common structure today is an actual office, likely housed in the Hall of the States building on Capitol Hill, with the state seal on the door and employees of the state working inside. Some states have their own office space with the state seal on the door, but the staff members inside have contracted with the state. Some states hire a lobbyist who works either full-time or part-time on state interests; many of these consultants work for a lobbying or law firm. In these cases, it is typically the firm’s or consultant’s name on the door. Sometimes the office structure matters a lot, and when the structure makes a difference, I point it out in the text. Most of the time, however, the structure is not relevant to the discussion. As a result, I have classified the states categorized by any of the above situations as having a Washington office. I use the term “Washington lobbying office,” “governor’s office,” “state lobbying office,” or similar variations to describe any state’s office in Washington, whether through a contract with a large lobbying firm, a lobbyist who works solely for the state but under contract, or staff members who are on the state payroll. I also refer interchangeably to governors’ lobbyists and governors’ liaisons. I use “governors associations” when discussing the associations. I use either “governors’ lobbying offices and associations,” “governors’ lobbying organizations” or “governors organizations” when I refer to both the individual state offices and the associations together. Scholars and journalists have used a few different terms for the lobbying organizations that represent government officials, typically state and local government officials. The most common is public interest group. I have always disliked this moniker, for two reasons. First, most people associate this term with the collection of grassroots membership organizations that represent large numbers of citizens. They do not think of government entities. Since most people think of groups such as Public Citizen, it seems somewhat misleading to use the term to describe organizations representing governments or government officials. The second reason is the rather unfortunate acronym of PIGs, which has been used to describe these organizations, often with less than favorable connotations. “The PIGs: Out of the Sty, Into Lobbying with Style” was the title of one National Journal article on the state and local government associations.21 Another common label is intergovernmental lobby. One colleague urged me to provide more clarity by replacing PIGs with SLIGs, for state and local interest groups. Public administration scholars David Arnold and Jeremy Plant use public Page 13 →official associations.22 This is the term I use when I speak generically about membership associations composed of elected or appointed government officials. I use the term intergovernmental lobby when discussing the associations and state offices in conjunction with other state and local government associations and organizations. The governors associations have had a number of large and small changes in their names over the years. Most notably, the National Governors Association was started in 1908 as the Governors’ Conference. It became the National Governors’ Conference in 1965 and then the National Governors’ Association in 1977, and took the current version of its name in 2003. Likewise, the regional and partisan governors associations have had minor name changes. Apostrophes have been dropped by some but not all of the associations. When writing about the associations, I use the organization’s name as it stood at the time of events I discuss. Thus, and in chapter 4 in particular, the NGA evolves in the text from the Governors’ Conference to the National Governors Association. The organizational changes over time are an important part of the story I am telling, and I hope that using temporally appropriate names will help remind the reader of the associations’ proper structural and organizational context. When I refer to the contemporary associations collectively, I have elected the contemporary style without the plural possessive (governors associations). When I mention a governor, I include the governor’s party identification, state, and years in office as governor in parentheses after the name. As gubernatorial terms usually end in early January, the reader should be aware that in most cases the governor left office very early in that year.

Outline of Chapters Chapter 1 tackles the first puzzle and sets the stage by explaining the place that governors’ lobbying operations play in the American federal system. These organizations act as political safeguards of federalism. As there are many other political safeguards, why do governors believe that they need more? I discuss how other political safeguards are intended to function, and discuss the gaps that are left by other safeguards. I then contemplate why governors might need representation in Washington, how lobbying offices and associations might benefit governors and their states, and the potential limitations of these lobbying organizations. I also explore how state interests can differ from one another, and how they can differ from the collective interests of states. Understanding the heterogeneity of interestsPage 14 → is critical to understanding why we have seen the development of a community of governors’ lobbying organizations, one with both individual state offices and governors associations. Chapters 2 through 5 move from the theoretical to the empirical, looking at the puzzle of why governors need lobbyists and what these lobbying offices and associations provide to governors. Chapter 2 focuses on the political development of governors’ offices in Washington. This chapter aims to place the initial establishment of governors’ offices in Washington within the larger context of federal-state relations from the 1930s through the late 1960s, as both federal funds to states and state autonomy have ebbed and flowed. I start by describing the growth of financial transfers from the national government to the states. The beginning of cooperative federalism brought the federal government’s steadily increasing involvement in state activities. It also brought increases in the funds flowing to states. The first state lobbying offices were an element within the larger system of cooperative federalism that began in the 1930s, but it was World War II defense spending that led the first states—New York and Connecticut—to mobilize in Washington. Only the New York office has remained open continuously to this day. Then the Great Society, with its growth of federal intervention and spending, set the stage for the next office establishments. More states, most notably the larger states, established offices in the 1960s, followed by several more by the mid-1970s. Throughout chapter 2, I discuss governors and other initiators of these offices as interest group entrepreneurs. I argue that these offices needed a governor to act as an entrepreneur in establishing the office, just as Salisbury theorized in his path-breaking work on interest group establishment.23 Without a governor with the political will and economic incentives to set up an office, none would be created. Though over time offices became institutionalized and generally pursue broad agendas, most were created with some narrower purpose in the governor’s mind. Chapter 3 focuses on the political development of the National Governors Association. I track the organization from its beginning in 1908 to the present, focusing in particular on the 1960s and 1970s, when governors grew in their professionalism and recognized the importance of a forceful lobbying presence in Washington. At this point, governors’ lobbying offices became much more institutionalized. In 1977, the NGA established the Hall of the States as a center for state organizations and activities, and this fueled another wave of individual state offices in Washington. The latter part of chapter 3 explores the NGA in its current bifurcated structure, Page 15 →with its lobbying arm and the NGA Center for Best Practices, which is the research arm of the association. Chapter 4 investigates the purposes and goals of Washington offices that represent single states. I investigate these offices’ goals and activities, which include serving as intergovernmental conduits for information; advocating for flexibility in federal regulations; and seeking federal funding through line-item appropriations, grants-in-aid, and discretionary grants. I then discuss how lobbying for federal funds has changed over time. Finally, I discuss the policy areas that receive attention from state lobbying offices, looking in particular at health care policy. In chapter 5, I examine governors’ lobbying organizations as organized interests. I examine the structure and funding of state offices in Washington as well as the lobbying techniques they use, and I draw comparisons to other types of interest groups. These are sophisticated interest organizations that are skilled in their activities, but they are not always typical of other types of interest groups. I compare their activities to those of trade association, citizen interest groups, and businesses. I also discuss organizational staffing, expertise, and issue coverage. State

offices have grown smaller in recent years, and their staff members tend to be more focused on the political aspects of Washington policy making rather than the technical details of policy. This has implications for the expertise of these offices as a whole, and it has implications for the partisan focus of lobbying efforts. In the latter half of chapter 5 and in chapter 6, I turn to the third puzzle of the proliferation of governors organizations. In chapter 5 I discuss the four regional governors associations that maintain Washington offices, detailing their structure and organizational maintenance; activities and policy focus; and coalition efforts. There is considerable variation among the regional groups, and each has carved its unique niche in the Washington lobbying space. Finally, I turn to the two partisan associations, and discuss how increasing partisanship among governors’ lobbying organizations has affected the governors’ power to act collectively. Chapter 6 investigates the variation in state lobbying offices. I discuss the costs and benefits of establishing a Washington lobbying office. After all, not all states have these offices. If they were uniformly beneficial and had no drawbacks, they would be universal. They are not. Almost every state has had an office at some point, but almost every state has closed its office as well. Some state offices have opened and then closed, and later reopened, several times. This raises interesting questions about the offices’ longevity. What do these offices do for organizational maintenance and Page 16 →office continuity? What events typically lead to office closures? Offices can bring great benefits: funding from line-items and federal formulas; occasional policy successes, both large and small; and political benefits accruing to a governor’s political career. They also bring risks that manifest themselves largely in the form of political costs to the governor. Of course, managing costs and benefits is crucial to any interest organization’s survival. Chapter 6 also presents a quantitative analysis to explain what factors influence the establishment of state lobbying offices in Washington. I find that the characteristics of the governors and their states have a far greater effect on office existence than factors relating to the federal government. In chapter 7, I present my conclusions, reviewing the three puzzles and my findings. I also argue that all states would benefit by having a federal lobbying office in Washington, although the political costs of these offices have to be managed. I argue that not only would these offices help their individual states, but that there are collective benefits that would be strengthened as well. I recap the shift of lobbying alliances, from one allied by federalism to one allied by partisanship. The increasing partisanship in Washington, particularly Congress, and the growing role of the partisan governors associations in political campaigns has brought new challenges to the cohesiveness of governors as guardians of state interests in a federal system.

Page 17 →

Chapter 1 Governors’ Lobbyists as Political Safeguards of Federalism When I tell people that I study governors’ offices and associations in Washington, I usually get one of a few reactions. Most people—including most political scientists, and some who study American interest groups—don’t know anything about these offices. They are an unknown group of organized interests. It does not surprise me that the general public isn’t aware of these offices—most people can’t name their members of Congress. I have been surprised by a relative dearth of academic scholarship on these organizations, in either the federalism literature or the interest groups literature. Those political scientists and Washington policy types who are aware of these offices generally believe that there is one governors association—the National Governors Association—and 50 state offices in Washington. They are wrong on both counts. In addition to the NGA, there are six governors associations in Washington that represent different subsets of governors. And only about half of the 50 American states have branch offices in Washington. Their vague sense is that the governors organized in the 1960s, that all states organized, and that the structure has been static since then. That sense is wrong on all counts. If I present my research in a normative sense—why do these states have these offices, and what role do they play vis-Г -vis their state’s congressional delegation to Washington?—it is almost assured that I will get a reaction that is somewhat skeptical of the need for governors to have Washington representation. Furthermore, it is very easy to prime an audience to elicit the response that these offices seem an affront to our federal system and its reliance on elected representatives in Washington. Page 18 →I have used these typical views of governors’ lobbying organizations as a starting point of this chapter because I wish to emphasize that the need for governors’ offices and associations is not obvious in our federal system. (Or, I should say, is not obvious to most scholars of American federalism, though it would appear perfectly understandable to scholars of comparative federalism. A federalism student outside the United States would be more likely to express surprise if there were not some institutionalization of subnational government organizations functioning in the federal arena.1) It is with this in mind that I proceed. This chapter addresses the first puzzle of the book: Why do governors believe they need lobbyists to defend and advance their states’ interests when the American federal system is explicitly designed to protect states, and when federalism has so many other political safeguards? I first present the political safeguards of federalism as they are designed to function, and then examine the failings of these safeguards. I next review what states and their governors need vis-Г -vis the federal government, how lobbying offices and associations can assist, and what their limitations are. In unwrapping this puzzle, I hope to offer a framework with which to consider the subject matter of subsequent chapters on the development and purposes of governors’ offices and associations.

The Political Safeguards of Federalism The United States was conceived as a federal system with structures that would protect states from the national government. In Federalist 45, James Madison wrote that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”2 As the federal government would have far fewer employees than the state governments, “[t]here will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter.”3

In Federalist 46, Madison further explained how the states would remain secure in the face of a national government.4 Madison’s argument relies in part on the structure of the proposed government, which is in line with the requirements William Riker has outlined: for all federal systems, the same land must be governed by both the central and subnational Page 19 →governments; constitutional principles limit in some way the powers of the central government; and these systems also control in some way the interactions of the subnational governments.5 For the proposed United States constitution, enumerated powers—eventually articulated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution—limited or at the very least guided the powers of the federal government. The federal government had power for such activities as printing money and raising an army, but most service provision is unmentioned, and presumably either left to or open to state government action. Herbert Wechsler pointed out that it was not formal structures but the political power of states acting within institutions such as Congress that are—in the term he coined—“the political safeguards of federalism.”6 Political scientists and legal theorists have explored whether and how various political safeguards function, and I will detail some prominent safeguards here. The first such safeguard is an ideological orientation toward federalism. This is a major part of Madison’s argument in Federalist 46. Madison writes of the “attachment of the people” to their own particular state, and that legislators will carry these “prepossessions of the people” to the federal government. Madison was the first of many to write of these attachments and prepossessions. Daniel Elazar views territoriality, a local or regional allegiance or tie to the land, as a countervailing force against an overly powerful central government. This focus on thinking federally is an expectation of an informal but fundamental safeguard, that of political culture. Elazar’s explorations of federalism in particular have centered on culture as the essence of federalism; political culture plays a major role in the “system of systems” that is American federalism.7 Indeed, Elazar argues that there is no successful federal system “whose people do not think federal, that does not have a federal political culture and a strong will to use federal principles and arrangements.”8 William Riker theorizes, “It is very likely that the basic condition that allows for both centralization and resistance to centralization is the degree of popular identification with national and state governments.”9 This popular identification is the basis for culture as a popular safeguard of federalism. The people are tied to each level of government and act to protect their balance. Voters can take action against those in government who might not respect the federal system. In addition, culture manifests itself as an elite safeguard of federalism. Federal officials are citizens who are from this culture, and they too are likely to be steeped in this orientation, at least in theory. Their actions as officeholders will reflect the culture of Page 20 →federalism. Furthermore, of course, they must be aware of the voters who are watchful of the federal balance, for these voters have the power to cast them from office if they diverge too much in their respect for a limited central government. In theory, at least, the federal culture should be as heavy a force on elites as on the people. As Jenna Bednar writes, “Culture haunts the federalism literature.”10 Though a federal culture is seen as fundamental by many federalism theorists, Bednar explains that it “cannot be designed, but must emerge (although its emergence is facilitated by confidence in other safeguards).”11 From the Federalist authors forward, the United States has been perceived as embodying a strong federal culture, and while this culture cannot be designed, it is acknowledged as resting at the heart of the American political system. Political culture is amorphous. A second, more concrete political safeguard of federalism is political parties. Morton Grodzins, in his foundational exposition of the American political system, points out that national leaders are beholden to state and local party leaders, as the latter are responsible for their nominations to office.12 “Any tightening of the party apparatus,” he argued elsewhere, “would have the effect of strengthening the central government.”13 Federal legislation would be less likely to take into account the perspectives of “decentralized power groups and institutionsВ .В .В . including state and local governments.В .В .В . It would dampen the process by which individuals and groups, including state and local political leaders, take advantage of multiple cracks to steer national legislation and administration in ways congenial to them and the institutions they represent.”14 Elazar considers parties one of three political “channels” of the political process that sustains the federal-state relationship.15 The party system, with its noncentralized structure across the 50 states and hundreds of thousands of local, state, and federal officials serving “nearly 100,000 different

governmentsВ .В .В . sustains American federalism.”16 Likewise, David Truman considers the political party structure as “the most responsive instrument of restraint upon federalism’s centrifugal tendencies.”17 Bednar writes, “A sympathy develops between the levels of the party system; the hope is that this sympathy translates into mutual respect for authority, and federal productivity.”18 Riker speaks of the importance of political parties giving states some independence from the central government, conjecturing that “[t]he institution that seems to be most significant in separating the relationship between the center and electorate, on the one hand, and states and electorate, on the other hand, seems to be the widely decentralized party system.”19 Page 21 →The challenge of federalism, posit Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, is to provide a stable political system. Integrated party systems, they argue, protect federalism by linking political elites at different levels of government as they act within a competitive system. Parties provide political inducements to act federally by sharing their labels, resources, and coattails. Constituents provide constraints that political actors are not inclined to violate, constraints that make politicians beholden to state interests in a broadly redistributive federal context. In this network of inducements and constraints lies the federal balance at which these actors jointly arrive as they seek to maximize their electoral benefits. Party members act at least somewhat “federal” even though they are elected locally because they care about their party label, and they care about expanding their electoral coalitions. “The federal constitution itself is not a constraint, at least with regard to federal matters,” they argue, “and the primary or only concern of those who would design a federation should be the establishment of a good party system.”20 Government capacity is another political safeguard of federalism. In Federalist 46, Madison has an expectation that the national government will remain small, and would not have the means to dominate the states.21 Elazar does not see size so much as he sees the division of duties, prerogatives, or both, as maintaining the federal system: larger governments responsible for raising revenues and setting standards, and smaller ones for administering the programs, and all governments contributing to making policy.22 Nugent’s discussion of the political safeguards of federalism is in this vein, as he discusses not only state lobbying in Washington but also state legislatures’ efforts at uniform state lawmaking as a means to preempt congressional lawmaking, and states’ power as implementers and enforcers of federal laws and regulations as another means to defend against federal encroachment. Nugent sees the strongest political safeguards of federalism as “informal and extraconstitutional.”23

Weaknesses of Political Safeguards And yet these safeguards are grossly imperfect. I will set aside the fact that some have argued that the federal government has encroached so much upon the states that we cannot claim to be a federal system.24 Susan Clarke reminds us that we have so many metaphors for federalism—laboratories, cakes, fences, networks, and menus, along with others—because “they serve as organizing devices to make sense of increasingly complicated political dynamics.”25 Perhaps that explains why the political safeguards of federalismPage 22 → so often do not function as expected. This fact helps us begin to understand the puzzle of the need for additional political safeguards for states. Though it would not be fair to say that the existing safeguards have failed—we still have an intact federation, something that cannot be said for so many countries that have attempted their own—they are challenged and pressed to respond and evolve as our system grows ever more intricate. Let me detail some particular weaknesses of the safeguards I have named, and the arguments supporting their powers of protection, to demonstrate their vulnerabilities. I turn again to The Federalist as a starting point. James Madison’s presumption of the power of states is predicated on a number of assumptions about our federal system that no longer hold, or at least do not wield the power he presumed they would. “The prepossessions of the people,” Madison argued, “will be more on the side of the State governments.” He further expected these prepossessions, this culture of state affinity more than national affinity, to hold among federal officeholders: “A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular states.”26 Even if such a spirit held before the passage of the 19th Amendment—and it is a stretch that such a spirit was infallible even then—it is a spirit that

has captured at best a small minority of those in Congress today. Paul Posner observes that fewer members of U.S. Congress have local government experience than in the past.27 Even those who served in state governments can lose their state orientations quite quickly after entering Congress. If such a spirit does exist, it tends to consider the concerns of one’s local constituents more than the concerns of those occupying positions in the state institutions that govern. A member of Congress representing a western state with a strong antigovernment orientation will consider this more than the needs of the governor or state legislature, neither of whom elects her. Madison further argues that “ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm.”28 There is perhaps some truth here. After all, the Civil War stemmed from what Southern states saw as intolerable expansion of federal power; clearly, then there was a signal of general alarm. In recent times, we have seen a portion of the public as well as the media object to the federal expansion of powers; if the contemporary Tea Party movement has an ideological core at all, it is a commitment to reduced federal government. But on the whole, neither the media nor the people are sounding a general alarm, despite what many would say have been ambitious Page 23 →encroachments of the federal government. Indeed, the media do not see the state governments as worthy of the coverage they give to the federal or local governments.29 If they do not see state government as worthy of coverage, it is hard to see our media as supporting Madison’s aforementioned “prepossessions of the peopleВ .В .В . on the side of state governments.” This is not to say that the United States has no federal political culture. Americans have maintained greater faith in state and local government than in the federal government, as measured by the American National Election Study and other surveys.30 Anti-Washington rhetoric is a mainstay of certain strains of media coverage as well as political campaigns; even those associated with the federal government know to emphasize their alignment with their geographic roots and their hostility to the central authority. But today we do not have the territoriality undergirding our sense of culture the way Elazar argued, if we ever did. With a population that is increasingly mobile, we have weaker and weaker ties to geography, ties that Elazar presumed were a critical component of a federal political culture. Likewise, the political parties in federal government have not protected the interests of state governments as some have argued they might. Though once more firmly in charge of their federal representatives, over time the states themselves altered electoral processes in ways that undercut the power of state political parties. Senators became directly elected, and for longer terms. Political parties, structured with local units as their building blocks, used to control entry to office through both selection methods and delivery of votes.31 Both roles have diminished over time.32 Primaries replaced political conventions or caucuses in the candidate nomination process in many states. Candidate-centered rather than party-centered campaigns became the norm. Writing in the 1960s, David Truman observed that television and radio were bringing “the presence of the presidential candidates in every living room,” thus reducing the need for canvassers and centralizing the electioneering function of political parties; but, he argued, the nomination function was still decentralized.33 Today, with more primaries and fewer nominating conventions, even the nominating function is less dependent on the party. Achieving and maintaining elective office are no longer so dependent on party selection methods and party-organized voter mobilization efforts. They are instead based more and more on the dispatching of large quantities of money to fund a political campaign.34 As I will discuss in chapter 6, the partisan governors associations engage actively in the fundraising and fund dissemination processes. This does not necessarily tie political parties to state interests. Rather, we have seen an emphasis on partisanship over federalism in such a system. Page 24 →Filippov et al. and Bednar both argue that assured, sustaining linkages between party leadership levels bind parties together and constrain them to respect the federal balance.35 The difficulty here is that these linkages are not assured if there is a drive among politicians to move up the ambition ladder. National parties and interest groups have greater fundraising power than their state and local counterparts. As politicians want to move to more prominent offices—moving up the ambition ladder, which today means from local to state to federal offices—they are beholden to a fundraising machine that relies on the prominence of federal party leaders. This lessens their incentives to bargain with and placate state parties and party activists, and in turn makes them more open to engaging in federal encroachment. As I will argue more fully in later chapters, particularly chapters 5 and

7, we have seen a weakening of the federal balance as money has become a greater and greater part of our political process. The capacity of government has cut two ways with regard to safeguarding federalism. The increased capacity of state governments can prevent or at least deter encroachment. The increased capacity of the federal government increases the likelihood of federal government encroachment on states. Federalism is dynamic, and as the capacities of the two levels of governments have shifted, so has the federal balance. At key times in American history, the central government expanded because the state governments had no capacity to handle the responsibilities demanded by the people. Obvious expansions of federal power include the establishment and implementation of a national income tax, the New Deal, and the Great Society initiatives. The latter was an expansion predicated in part on the argument that the states could not provide needed social programs on their own. Some states did not have the political will to do so; others did not have the fiscal or bureaucratic capacity. The Great Society expansion of government, though implemented with substantial state partnership, was funded by the federal government. State acceptance of conditional federal grants-in-aid increased the powers of Congress. There is no question that the governing capacity of states has also increased over time, with institutional and political changes that led to a “resurgence of the states” between the 1960s and the 1980s.36 Timothy Conlan argues that increasing state capacity meant that the federal government no longer had to dominate as it had in the past.37 This led to the “devolution revolution” many pundits and scholars identified as a policy centerpiece resulting from the Republican takeover of Congress in January 1995.38 Page 25 →Yet the increased capacity of state government does not negate the growth of federal regulation and involvement in state government policy domains. John Kincaid described the competing forces as the “devolution tortoise and the centralization hare.”39 In fact, state government activity spurred at least some federal government activity. As states became active in regulation—as environment, health, and welfare concerns blossomed across the country—the federal government followed with mandates to set minimum standards.40 Governors do not always oppose federal mandates. Southern governors supported federal Medicaid mandates during the 99th Congress.41 The National Governors Association, acting with the knowledge that federal mandates and preemptions protect states from others that would go below a federal floor, has favored preemption of state standards in areas such as product liability, appliance energy standards, air pollution, and driver’s licenses.42 The latter case provides a useful illustration. When truck drivers held licenses in more than one state, they could drive legally under another state’s license if one state revoked its license. Most state officials supported a ban on commercial drivers having more than one state license, and this prohibition became part of the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (100 Stat. 3207).43 Governors might seek congressional intervention under a few different types of circumstances. They might do so for simple efficiency. Governors might advocate federal action simply to reduce the transaction costs of states individually passing and enforcing similar or uniform legislation. Put plainly, it might be easier to motivate one Congress to act than to motivate 50 legislatures to act. A group of governors might also urge Congress to act in order to win a policy position that they might not be able to enact across all states. They might turn to Congress to solve some collective action problem such as a commons problem or some type of shirking; we have often seen this with clean water and clean air standards. Congress preempted completely state standards for emissions from motor vehicles, with the exception of California’s much stricter standards.44 Some scholars view this federal government activism as problematic for federalism. John Kincaid classifies the 1970s and 1980s as a period of “coercive federalism,” one relying on heavy use of unfunded mandates and federal preemption.45 Joseph Zimmerman writes, “The sharp increase in the number and variety of preemption statutes enacted by the Congress since 1965 has reduced substantially the discretionary authority of the States, based upon their reserved powers, and their political subdivisions; promoted additional interest group lobbying in the Congress and national Page 26 →regulatory agencies; and affected the power relationships between the governor and the state legislature in each State.”46 Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin state this

more plainly when they write, “What passes for federalism in the United States is actually managerial decentralization. When there is consensus, national norms swamp state prerogatives. What at times appears to be a manifestation of federalism is the absence of national norms; when there is disagreement, states are permitted discretion.”47 Others do not see the complexity of contemporary American federalism as inherently problematic. Elazar argues that “a noncentralized system functions to a great extent through bargaining and negotiation.В .В .В . Stated baldly, congressional authorization of new federal programs is frequently no more than a license allowing federal authorities to begin negotiations with the states and localities, in other words, a license to bargain with them over scope, terms, and standards.”48 There is no doubt that the very large size of the federal government, coupled with program complexities and societal complexities, at least allow for a federal government that encroaches on the states, even if they do not encourage it. Elazar refers to various “squeak points, pitfalls, and dangers” that include money from Washington, which tends to skew state appropriations via the matching funds that states provide; project grants; administrative requirements; direct federal-local relationships; and “the proliferation of new federal aid programs planned in Washington without prior consultation with those who are responsible for general government in the states—the governors and legislatures.”49 The sorting out of policy areas and programs between federal and state domains, and what Jeffrey Chapman calls “the assignment problem” with regard to government finances, are problems that have not become simpler over time.50 The resulting complexity creates challenges for governors and their states, regardless of whether one sees federal government activity as shrinking, remaining generally stable, increasing slowly, or increasing significantly, or whether one sees it as hostile to states or supportive of them. What is striking about this complexity is that governors are active components of the existing, working political safeguards of federalism—of several, in fact, as they are the party leaders, state legislative leaders, and chief managers of the bureaucracies that implement so many federal actions. In each of these roles they defend individual and collective state interests. But they have also needed to act in new ways to tap the nascent intergovernmentalism of the federal system when the guard of the existing political safeguards is down. Page 27 →

States’ Needs in the Federal System, and the Role for Governors’ Lobbyists What are states’ needs in this federal system? Governors seek to be partners in government, rather than agents. Too often, states can be ignored, or states can be seen as just another interest organization. Governors seek flexibility in the face of federal regulation. And they seek federal funds in the face of ever-increasing program costs, costs often linked to federal requirements. These needs have not lessened over time, despite President Richard Nixon’s New Federalism, President Ronald Reagan’s New Federalism, the Republican Party’s 1994 Contract with America—much of which was enacted in the following Congress, including its proposed ban on unfunded mandates—or whatever degree of devolution has occurred since 1995. Flexibility has been an increasing need amid the increasing federal involvement in state activities that has occurred since the end of dual federalism—which dissolved, incidentally, fewer than 10 years before the first state lobbying offices appeared. Medicaid is the largest, but not the only, jointly provided program that is not simply growing in its expense but becoming a larger portion of state budgets; for many years, its costs have increased at a pace faster than the rate of inflation. Robert Jay Dilger argues that there are three common misconceptions about American federalism: that national grant-in-aid funding is declining; that a “devolution revolution” is taking place; and that the national government does not make more than incremental changes in budgetary allocations from year to year.51 It is some

of these misconceptions that lead to misconceptions about governors’ need for their own representation in Washington. The federal government has not lessened its involvement in state activities, and federal funding has not evaporated (though as we have moved to an era of continuing resolutions, some would argue that we do not see significant opportunities for the programmatic shifts that we saw in the past). So governors have a need to regularly remind their political brethren in Washington of the importance of the federal balance in the political system, as well as the specific flavor of federalism that favors a governor’s own state. Given the imperfections of existing safeguards as mechanisms to protect governors’ interests, and given governors’ continuing need for representation in the federal partnership, what roles might governors associations and offices fill? Page 28 →In the language of Bednar’s framework, they can both protect against encroachment and engage in opportunism. The governors associations work to ensure that a state’s interests are represented among the numerous interests seeking favor in Washington. If governors were not represented in Washington, they would be one of the few major interests without a voice in the policy process. Amid the business organizations, the labor organizations, the public interest organizations, the ideological and partisan organizations—as well as the internal interests of the president, the Congress, and the federal agencies—who would remember to bring the perspective of state governments to the table? What defense would there be against encroachment on state governments’ domains? Governors’ state offices can serve in this protective role, and they can also seek to protect their own state’s interests against those of other states. States can encroach upon other states, both because the federal pot of money is finite and one state’s gain might be another’s loss, and also because regulatory decisions can favor one state at the expense of another. A governor’s liaison can help ensure that a state is represented among other states in federal decisions. They can act as a protector against other states’ opportunism. And in fact, a major role that governors associations and offices can fill is that of an opportunist. Here state offices are in a better position to perform, as they do not have to make the compromises that come with representing many governors, and they can seek narrow benefits or protections from the federal government. One of a governor’s major responsibilities is that of manager.52 A governor administers a complex state system that is intricately connected to the federal system. Bearing in mind that Feeley and Rubin as well as others argue that bureaucracy has grown so much as to obliterate—or at least diminish—federalism, and governors’ demands for attention lies primarily in their states, it is evident that another role that governors’ lobbyists can play is that of protector and defender of state government interests with regard to federal regulation. Liaisons can facilitate the flow of information between various components of the intergovernmental system, seeking to represent the perspective of the state or states, smoothing communication, and helping ensure that policymakers in Washington consider the needs of policy implementers in the states. Governors’ lobbyists can provide better representation of state interests than can U.S. senators and representatives, in part because—as I explained earlier in this chapter—the latter group cannot be assured of having their own state government’s interests at the forefront of their concerns, and in part because governors’ lobbyists can Page 29 →bring specialized knowledge to the table. They can communicate information on state programs and needs, explain how a proposed regulation might affect a state’s functioning. Recall Elazar’s point that the federal government, in initiating new programs, is at only the start of a negotiation process with the states. Governors’ lobbyists become agents in this bargaining. The federal government depends on states for implementation, and this requires conversations to begin. Governors’ offices and associations allow these conversations to start earlier, more easily, more regularly, and more completely. Furthermore, governors’ lobbyists have the potential, at least, to bring a bipartisan managerial perspective to an arena filled with politicians who typically consider policy choices from the frame of partisanship rather than the frame of federalism. They can build coalitions across states based on state government interests. Unified by their positions, if not their parties, governors can help facilitate coalitions and bargains that would not come to

fruition without them as brokers. With this discussion of governors’ lobbyists as brokers of deals, I should set aside the puzzle of why governors with access and power themselves would need to hire advocates, and discuss the implications of calling governors’ Washington representatives lobbyists. This is particularly the case as a number of the liaisons I interviewed were uncomfortable with both the term and its implications. Rather, these liaisons argued, governors (and their staffs) should be viewed as partners in government, colleagues in the federal system. To call these liaisons lobbyists is to imply that they are outside the government, that states have the same sort of relationships with the federal government that Microsoft or the American Heart Association does—clearly external to the institution from which they seek favors. I sympathize with such a perspective. Furthermore, unless a liaison is a contract lobbyist with a state as a client, a liaison is not a lobbyist in the eyes of the federal government. Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which regulates federal lobbying practices, the staff members of governor’s offices in Washington are not required to register with either house of Congress.4 On the other hand, as we will discuss in chapter 5, governors associations and offices do engage in many of the types of activities that lobbyists for private interests pursue. Subnational governments have a special role in the lobbying universe. They are indeed partners in government, but they are not always seen that way, and this presents two problems. First, states do not appear to have Page 30 →the natural enemies in Washington that would lead a group or institution to mobilize and lobby. Ostensibly, a state’s congressional delegation is on the state’s side. No member of Congress says of his or her state, “Well, I’m from X, but goodness I hate the state!,” and few have ever publicly said, “I won’t support my state government’s requests.” It is difficult to name those who would be open and obvious enemies of states, certainly not in the way that Mothers Against Drunk Driving could be seen as an enemy of the liquor lobby. Open hostility is not the problem that governors face. Instead, they face the problem of recognition. As Frank Baumgartner et al. point out, “A great number of worthy policy proposals go nowhere not because of active opposition but because agenda gatekeepers and their allies have more urgent concerns.”53 The challenge is drawing Washington officials’ attention to the needs of state governments. The second problem is that this unique position of state governments is not always understood by those in state government. The patrons of these lobbying offices—the governors and state governments who sponsor them—may view the position of the state government as sufficiently special that they do not need to retain lobbyists. This can cause problems for a governor if state legislators, who can be the biggest opponents of governors’ lobbying offices, do not understand the challenges that governors face in getting their agenda items considered. After all, why wouldn’t members of a state’s congressional delegation pay heed to the concerns of their governor? The irony here is that governors and their states must in fact defend against being seen as “just another interest group.” Despite the limiting and, in the eyes of some, somewhat pejorative characterization of the lobbyist designation, I maintain its use. Governors and their states are partners in government, and governors associations and state offices in Washington are their lobbyists. I use the term not for lack of sympathy with the position that state governments are partners of government. I do so because this is how governors’ liaisons act, and this is what they are commonly called and how they are commonly viewed in Washington. In addition, the activities of these liaisons fit within the interest groups literature in history and political science, as well as the federalism, intergovernmental relations, and state government literature in those fields.

Shortcomings of Governors’ Lobbying Organizations Can governors associations and state offices fulfill the role that federalism would prescribe to them, given other failures of the political safeguards Page 31 →of federalism? It is unreasonable to presume that governors organizations could serve as a fail-proof political safeguard, given the shortcomings of all the other political

safeguards. As with other political safeguards, both the associations and the offices have their own shortcomings, and they are useful to review. There are some shortcomings that most or all the associations and the state offices share. One is the difficulty with being viewed as lobbyists rather than as partners. A second one that is shared by the state offices and all the associations save the NGA is the challenge of regional limits. No state office and no regional or partisan association can speak for all the states. The 50 governors and their states have widely varied interests on many issues, and subsets of states can land on different sides of the same issue. Some associations have a bigger challenge in finding consensus, as some have more heterogeneous member states than others. Likewise, state offices vary in their ability to find common ground with other states. (This second shortcoming hints at one key to the third puzzle of this book, that of the variety of governors’ lobbying offices and organizations. We will examine this point much more closely in chapter 5.) A third shortcoming is the ability to manage political partisanship. Governors have partisan identities; presidents and members of Congress have partisan identities. These identities cannot be hidden. The American Heart Association can appear nonpartisan. A business trade association can work to appear nonpartisan. Governors’ lobbyists cannot escape their bosses’ affiliations. Filippov et al. point out the benefits of an integrated party system, but, that aside, the heightened partisan tensions of Washington can frustrate the ability of governors’ lobbyists to work across or even within their parties. Garrick Pursley reminds us that “[p]olitical safeguards work only if states retain significant political significance,” and he argues that changes in campaign finance law have made other campaign organizations—notably 527 organizations—more significant, thereby diminishing state power.54 These shifts have also undercut the linkages between federal, state, and local politicians that integrated party systems are able to offer. Associations have some challenges that are not faced by state offices. The aforementioned challenges of finding consensus are borne much more heavily by associations than by state offices. State lobbying offices are not immobilized by a lack of consensus; they represent the governor, or in a few cases the governor and the legislature, or the state government more broadly. Associations can be and are immobilized by a lack of consensus. When this happens, there are reputational costs to add to the damage done to the associations as lobbying forces. Also, as with any other association, all Page 32 →the governors associations must contend with free riders. Though the associations claim to speak broadly for all governors eligible for membership in their group, not all governors pay dues, and not all governors are active in their associations. Shirking and free riding are problems. Finally, associations also have the burden of size. Though they can have the advantage of speaking for a larger group, managing a group with many members—and more members with political careers and egos—is an organizational challenge that is one price of being a membership organization. The offices of the individual governors have their own shortcomings. (Once again, this point foreshadows issues we will explore in depth in chapter 5.) They are unstable. The vast majority of offices exist at the discretion of the governor. Only a few exist by statute or as independent agencies that represent more than the governor’s office. This means that they are easy for a governor to disband. There is also an institutional instability; even if a state maintains its office over many years, most will change their staff members with the arrival of a new governor. They suffer from the slippage in authority, communication, and information that comes from speaking for the governor without being the governor, and representing a state government while being many miles—in some cases thousands of miles—away from that government. State office directors will not have the resources of the state capital at their fingertips. Finally, these offices are at risk of citizen outcry. Just as state legislators might not understand the need for these offices, their potential benefits may not be understood by the media or the public. State offices do not have the protection of constitutional authority. Bednar explains that citizens may punish their governments for transgressions that violate the balance of federalism.55 If a state office appears to citizens as a governor currying the favor of the national government or seeking the attention of the national electorate rather than doing the bidding of the state, citizens might punish a governor at the ballot box for such a transgression.

Redundant, but Not Duplicative

Despite their own shortcomings, both governors associations and state offices act as important safeguards of federalism. Bednar points out that well-functioning federal systems depend on redundancy to function effectively and to punish transgressions appropriately. Multiple political safeguards of federalism will protect federalism in different ways. As with the other safeguards I have discussed, governors’ lobbyists do not function perfectly as political safeguards, and they cannot safeguard federalism Page 33 →by themselves. The key to our first puzzle—why these organizations are needed in our federal system—lies in the fact that their contribution is one layer of protection, perhaps redundant in some ways but also filling gaps left by other safeguards, and thus not duplicative. Over the course of the rest of this book, we will review the particular challenges that governors associations and governors’ lobbying offices face today, not in the abstract but in specific ways in specific contexts. We will also see how some of these challenges threaten their functionality as safeguards of federalism. Most notably, we will see the effects of partisan pressures on governors’ power and effectiveness in the federal-state balance. The changes that these offices and associations are facing as a result of hyperpartisanship are a marker of larger changes that challenge the federal system. Nonetheless, we will also see that these offices continue to serve as federalism safeguards in important ways. With the stage set for understanding the role that governors’ lobbyists can play as political safeguards of federalism, I will now turn to the beginnings of this lobbying. Governors first established a formal presence in Washington more than 70 years ago. The next chapter begins with an examination of the earliest offices.

Page 34 →

Chapter 2 The Political Development of State Lobbying Offices Chapter 1 presented the theory of why states and their governors might need their own representation in Washington. This chapter turns to the empirical story, exploring the political development of state lobbying offices in Washington. Why did state offices start appearing when they did, and what does their political development tell us about our first puzzle? We can gain insight into this question by exploring the circumstances that framed the creation of state lobbying offices as well as the motivations of the governors who established them. The governors did not send lobbyists to Washington in a single wave. The development of these offices occurred over several decades. Connecticut and New York established offices during World War II, leading the establishment of the earliest offices. The next wave of governors’ offices began in the mid-1960s and continued its momentum, sometimes in fits and starts, through the mid-1990s. Texas started an office in 1965; California started an office under Governor Ronald Reagan in 1967. Maryland established an office under Governor Spiro Agnew in 1967 as well.5 By the 1970s, 17 states had established Washington offices. This chapter details the three major factors that influenced the establishmentPage 35 → of the early lobbying offices: a changing political landscape and an encroaching federal government; the growing pool of federal dollars available to be captured by states and their citizens; and governors acting as entrepreneurs, facilitating individual states to seek benefits. To better situate the creation of the first state lobbying offices in the 1940s, I start with a discussion of the rapid expansion of the federal government that occurred in the 1930s. I then tell the stories of the New York and Connecticut lobbying offices, which were established in World War II. Next, I examine the establishment of the Illinois office at the start of the Great Society years. What did these offices do, and why did their governors establish them? I investigate the initial reasons individual offices were established, and lay out a picture of these offices as a manifestation of the larger federal system. Exploring these cases helps us further understand why states establish lobbying arms in Washington. We will see that the governors of New York and Connecticut established their offices to gain material benefits for constituent businesses. Changing the federal balance was not the motivation for governors during the 1940s. The wave of state offices formed in the 1960s, however, was motivated by both material benefits and an encroaching federal government. After presenting the early history of these state offices in Washington, I explore the commonalities in the reasons individual offices were established. The individual stories of the founding of Washington offices illuminate how governors seek to exercise policy and receive benefits from their national partner in governance. I argue that governors are acting as interest group entrepreneurs when they establish offices. Finally, I review the growth of gubernatorial lobbying as a manifestation of the evolution of a dynamic federal system.

The Great Depression, Federal Government Expansion, and the States Before the 1930s, the governors were comfortable with the system of dual federalism that separated most federal and state government activities. When the Governors’ Conference formed in 1908, it was not an announcement of the power of governors in the federal system. Most governors were opposed to an organization that sought to influence federal policy making, either formally or informally.1 The governors’ lack of interest in federal government activities might have been influenced by the size of the federal government relative to states and localities. In the 1920s, states and localities gathered 67 percent of tax revenues and spent 74 percent of public dollars, concentrating this spending in the areas of education and public welfare.2 Page 36 →As noted federalism scholar David Walker points out, approximately 2 percent of state revenues came from the federal government in 1927, “hardly a significant sign of major efforts in cooperative federalism.”3 Though the federal government had been increasingly active in state government affairs since the

federal income tax became constitutional in 1913, most government spending in 1932 was still state and local government spending. Approximately half of government spending was local government spending, and only 20 percent was state spending.4 Social welfare programs and education were the purview of state and local governments, and they had far more impact than the federal government had on the day-to-day lives and pocketbooks of most American. States and localities were used to managing their responsibilities without the aid or interference of the federal government. Before the Depression, it was local governments and private agencies that cared for a population of 1.5 million elderly, ill, and handicapped unemployed, and such programs had led to new local taxes, especially sales taxes.5 The economic crisis that hit in 1929 was well beyond what state and local governments could manage. In 1932 charitable giving reached its highest level in American history, and public welfare spending had doubled since the twenties, and still tremendous need went unmet. Writes historian Robert McElvaine, “Federal relief was the only possible answer.”6 Yet before 1933, states had received little help from the federal government.7 With overwhelmed governors seeking assistance from the federal government, President Herbert Hoover had signed a relief bill in July 1932 that provided $300 million in federal funds for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, but the money came with significant strings. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, he established programs that sent a flood of funding to state and local governments. President Roosevelt asked for, and Congress quickly provided, $500 million in direct grants to states for relief.8 And so the Great Depression spurred a tremendous increase in spending by the federal government. The proportion of state expenditures stayed roughly level, the proportion of federal expenditures increased, and the proportion of spending by local governments decreased. Since government spending at all levels increased, state expenditures still grew significantly from 1932 and 1940, from $2.5 billion to $4.5 billion, an increase of more than 75 percent. During the same period, federal expenditures went from $4.3 billion to $10.1 billion (a 136 percent increase), while local government expenditures increased 3 percent, from $5.6 billion to $5.7 billion.9 In 1932, federal grants-in-aid comprised less than 2 percent of state and Page 37 →local government receipts. By 1934, that number was nearly 20 percent. The federal government was responsible for over 40 percent of all government spending by 1939. Three-quarters of the growth in federal expenditures from 1932 to 1940 was from cooperatively administered programs.10 All major New Deal programs except the Civilian Conservation Corps were cooperatively administered.11 Furthermore, there was discretion regarding how to distribute a large portion of funds among the 48 states. Half of the original Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) appropriation was distributed as matching grants, providing one federal dollar for every three state dollars, but FERA head Harry Hopkins had broad latitude to distribute the other $250 million on the basis of need. Of course, need can be identified in a variety of ways, and a number of politicians claimed that Hopkins was distributing the funds based on politics rather than need.12 Though some histories note that there was no evidence that Hopkins did so,13 more recent studies indicate that politics played no small role. Gavin Wright found that political variables influenced allocation to allow Roosevelt to maximize votes in swing states; Gary Anderson and Robert Tollison found that congressional committee power also mattered, as did state need.14 Jim Couch and William Shughart found evidence of this political influence in their quantitative analysis of the factors that influenced the distribution of Works Progress Administration funds.15 The fiscal federalism of the Depression demonstrated to states the importance of Washington. Washington could provide money—but it also often provided it with strings attached. As the country prepared for World War II, and the American economy began to regain steam, federal spending skyrocketed. The domestic spending increases of the 1930s were eclipsed by the federal military spending that began with World War II. In fiscal year 1941, federal spending on national defense increased substantially, but the following years led to even greater increases. Spending in current dollars went from $1.7 billion, or 17.5 percent of federal outlays in fiscal year 1940, to $6.4 billion (47.1 percent of federal outlays) in fiscal year 1941, to $25.7 billion (73.0 percent of federal outlays) in fiscal year 1942, to $66.7 billion (84.9 percent of federal outlays) in fiscal year 1943.16 To put these figures in even greater perspective, in 1940 American spending on national defense was 1.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In 1941 it was 5.6 percent of GDP; in 1942 it was

17.8 percent of GDP; and in 1943, it was 37 percent of GDP. By comparison, spending on national defense since the end of the Cold War has rarely been above 4 percent of GDP. Of course the defense budget comprised myriad expenses, but a large component was goods produced Page 38 →for the war effort—and that meant war contracts that private companies could procure.

World War II and the First Lobbying Offices The Depression had brought general assistance checks, government jobs programs, and social service assistance. Citizens benefited, but state governments did not necessarily benefit. The federal involvement in what were previously state domains often came without negotiation or input from state governments. States had little leverage: their citizens needed the federal programs and support. World War II brought a different type of federal government mobilization. The government needed men in uniform—a peacetime draft had been enacted in September 1940—and it needed the supplies and munitions to support a war. Production of these materials would mean that billions of dollars of war contracts would be granted to private companies. States would benefit as their economies flourished. Conveniently, the rapid expansion of the federal government during World War II did not come with the political strings attached that had constrained states during President Roosevelt’s New Deal.

New York Comes to Washington In 1940, the Feather Pillow Company of Long Island had a problem. It had learned that the U.S. Department of War and the U.S. Department of the Navy were purchasing feather pillows from overseas to supply military personnel during World War II. As the Feather Pillow Company considered its pillows to be suitable for use by the military, and indeed superior in quality to those of its overseas competitors, it was irritated that the federal government would be patronizing a foreign company. The Feather Pillow Company of Long Island began a correspondence with Governor Herbert Lehman of New York, seeking his assistance in acquiring a contract with the federal government. Over a period of time and a considerable amount of correspondence with the governor’s office, the Feather Pillow Company got what it wanted: a federal contract to supply its high-quality bedding to the troops.17 At around the same time, Governor Lehman began focusing on the larger need reflected by the Feather Pillow Company. New York businesses were not getting as many federal contracts as he and they thought they could. Addressing the Fifth General Assembly of the Council of State GovernmentsPage 39 → in Washington, DC, on January 21, 1941, Lehman indicated that there needed to be better linkages between the federal government and manufacturers in the states: It seems to me that it is important that Washington should let the country know more specifically just what is needed for defense. It seems to me important too that there should be more ready contact between government and the great number of smaller manufacturers who have facilities available and who are eager to place these facilities of plant and man-power at the disposal of the government. Authoritative direction is needed. A clearing house of productive capacity is needed. Unfortunately, there still seems to be great ignorance on the part of small manufacturers as to the method of getting information about defense contracts or to whom to go for that information. Many of them do not know how to contact either the procurement officers or the primary contractors. I believe that full information of how small manufacturers may proceed to secure defense contracts is essential and should be distributed widely throughout the country.18 Of course what Governor Lehman saw as a problem for all states, he also saw as a particular concern for his own state of New York. Solving this problem became a significant goal of the governor, causing him to create the first of what would become an established institution in Washington—a federal-state relations office located in the nation’s capital, to lobby the federal government for relaxed regulations, aid state agencies and private

interests as they dealt with federal regulations, and seek federal funds for state projects. Shortly after creating the State Division of Commerce—established by statute on May 1, 1941, as a division within the Executive Department—Lehman established a Washington office for the Division. The office was to act as a liaison between the state and federal governments.19 The office was funded by the State Council of Defense, and the staff was operating in Washington in 1941.20 Of particular concern was the acquisition of federal contracts by state companies, but also understanding and if possible lobbying to simplify the byzantine federal regulations that proliferated during the war era. The New York State Division of Commerce 1941 Annual Report stated, “The facilities made available by this office in conjunction with the work of the Division of Commerce in Albany have made it possible to help New York businesses by obtaining promptly information on a variety of Page 40 →subjects, such as priorities and defense contracts, and to obtain the solution to many problems involving Washington relationships that can not be handled by letter or telephone.”21 In particular, the office investigated the reasons why particular defense contracts were not awarded to New York companies.22 The division’s 1942 Annual Report provides further detail: During the year, representatives of approximately 500 New York industries visited the Washington office and were given assistance. In addition, hundreds of other New York industries communicated their problems to the Washington office by telegrams, telephone calls, and correspondence. The essential usefulness of this service is also demonstrated by the increasing utilization of the office by procurement and other governmental agencies to find and develop sources of production quickly. It has become increasingly clear that there are important broad fields in which the Washington office can function in addition to assisting individual firms. Many of the problems taken up at the request of individual firms are of industry-wide significance. Furthermore, the Washington office has performed service of general benefit to the people of the State in such matters as the following: negotiations for the more adequate use of the facilities of small industries; efforts to develop federal policies which would utilize idle manpower and facilities in New York City; and efforts to clarify and improve federal directives restricting the placement of war work in areas with a shortage of labor. Also the Washington office assisted in increasing the use of the Barge Canal to relieve the petroleum products emergency in the East.23 The office received substantial recognition. Governor Lehman praised the office to others, and supported its enlargement, though initially he was concerned about the availability of funds to do so.24 Senator Jim Mead of New York wrote the governor that the Washington office representatives were “doing an excellent job. They are highly competent and thoroughly efficient and their efforts in numerous cases have been highly successful.”25 The New York Herald Tribune wrote an article about the wool blanket contracts that New York State companies received, and although the office was not mentioned by name, many of the firms listed had received help from the state’s Washington office.26 When Governor Thomas E. Dewey became New York’s chief executive Page 41 →in 1943, he continued the state’s Washington office and enlarged its size, a proposal that was made at the end of the Lehman administration. The success of the office’s activities continued. C. J. Grace Jr., general manager of A.A. Walker & Co. (“Producers of Blue Ribbon Potato Chips Since 1900”), wrote Governor Dewey to express their gratitude for the office’s assistance in the firm’s efforts to earn government contracts in food preparation and packaging.27 In 1942, during the month of May, the office received 23 long-distance phone calls, 23 telegrams, and 38 visits from representatives of New York State companies or, in a few cases, other agencies or organizations.28 The contacts grew steadily; in March 1943, there were 62 calls or telegrams and 56 visitors. The office succeeded in helping individual companies navigate the contracting process. Upon learning that John Chatillon and Sons of New York City had submitted the third lowest bid for a $160,000 Navy Bureau of Ships contract for 2,500 defueler units, the office asked the Smaller War Plants Division of the U.S. War Production Board in New York City to consider the firm as a distressed manufacturer. The Smaller War Plants Division subsequently lobbied procurement officers in Washington to give the contract to John Chatillon and Sons. The New York office in Washington advised the Swanson Machine Company, based in Jamestown, New York, on its

successful bid for a $370,000 contract with the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot for 500,000 stainless steel canteens. The plastic caps for the canteens were contracted to the Victor Metal Products Corporation in Brooklyn for $67,500.29 While it is impossible to know the precise amount of federal funds that went to New York companies through war contracts due to the efforts of the Washington office, or the size of the impact that the office had on federal policy making, clearly the office increased both. Between June 1940 and November 1942, New York ranked behind California and Michigan in number of war contracts received, and New York contracts per capita were $667, versus a national average of $749.30 The modest level of contracts is particularly noteworthy since New York was the most industrialized state during that era. During 1943, however, war contracts awarded in New York reached almost $7 billion, bringing the state’s contracts to 10.1 percent of the national total awarded since June 1940.31 Governor Lehman was succeeded in office by Thomas Dewey (R-NY, 1943–54). Dewey maintained the office. In fact, the New York office in Washington still operates today. Although the office has varied in size and duties since its inception, every governor of New York has maintained the office, making it by far the longest-running state lobbying operation in Washington. Page 42 →

Connecticut’s Washington Office Connecticut established its office in Washington in June 1942. The office was a branch of the Connecticut War Industries Commission, which Governor Robert Hurley (D-CT, 1941–43) had established within a month of Pearl Harbor. The Washington office representatives kept “in close contact with the various procurement agencies of the federal government as well as the purchasing commissions of the United Nations’ governments.” The office was smaller than New York’s; its professional staff members were not employees of the state government, but instead were 15 “dollar-a-year men” loaned by Connecticut prime contractors to the War Industries Commission to pursue contracts in Washington.32 By October 18, 1942, the Hartford Courant reported that the Commission had taken credit for over $1 million in orders for war materials.33 According to the Commission, Connecticut had the “largest per capita volume of war contracts,” 4.5 percent of the national total.34 In a letter to Joseph Woolfson, who served in Hurley’s office in Hartford, War Industries Commission director Harvey Hooke explained why the office was so effective. He used as an example a Mr. Bristol, a building contractor from Brookfield, who had come to call on Connecticut’s Washington office. The federal offices that were supposed to be helping businesses were doing a poor job. “All they do is operate an exchange desk.В .В .В . They gather blueprints of subcontract work here and there. They organize these blueprints in their office and when a man like Mr. Bristol comes in, they dig around and find blueprints of something that is to be made of wood. Mr. Bristol tells them what he can do in his shop. When they find blueprints of something that can be made of wood, they hand it to him and say, вЂHere it is. God bless you’—or words to that effect.” This is why, Hooke argued, that the federal organizations were failing in their efforts to help small companies. Then he explained what his office did: “When a man comes in here we investigate his plant by giving it a visual inspection, we talk with him and he is вЂone of ours’ and then we set about to help him—real help and not just imaginary help.” The office had helped 50 businesses in this way, where the office could “figure out in dollars and cents about what the initial orders amounted to,” and another hundred or so that the office had helped, but for which it would take too much time to render a dollar figure in benefits.35 War contracts brought war bureaucracy, and Connecticut’s staff members in Washington sought to help businesses navigate through it, with Page 43 →considerable praise coming from the companies they helped. Hooke sought additional radio publicity for his office, which he argued had been an undeniable success where federal agency efforts had been a failure, and where no other state had “successfully coped with the problem.” In order to help more companies, the companies needed to learn of the office and what it could do.

Hurley was a one-term governor. He lost his 1942 reelection bid to Raymond Baldwin (R-CT, 1939–41, 1943–46), a former governor who had lost to Hurley in 1940. In the election, Republican campaigners had criticized Hurley’s establishment of the Washington office, and Baldwin closed it when he took office. In the election, Republican campaigners had “heartily condemned” Hurley’s establishment of the Washington office, and Baldwin “abolished both the commission and the Washington office as unnecessary.”36 The office staff campaigned for it to remain, however, and argued that it had shown considerable success. The office was not closed, but in July 1943 the Hartford Courant reported that the War Industries Commission was receiving about 75 percent less funding under Baldwin. Commission director Harvey Hooke stated, “Many requests for aidВ .В .В . are going unansweredВ .В .В . because of lack of funds.В .В .В . We are carrying on in a greatly reduced way, but we can not cope.В .В .В . The need for the type of assistance we give is greater now than ever before. Several of the larger manufacturers in the southern parts of the state who have had war contracts cancelled recently have asked us for aid, but we are unable to do much for them with the staff we now have available.” The Washington office was closed soon after when the entire WIC was dissolved on June 30, 1943.37 However, the offices, employees, and mission were transferred to the Connecticut Development Commission under a new war industries division. On March 1, 1944, Governor Baldwin announced a new Washington office would be established at a new address. This office opened April 1, 1944, meaning that Connecticut was without a Washington branch office for nine months.38 The Connecticut Development Commission provided this explanation: “Because of the fact that many of the current problems with which the Development Commission deals are vitally affected by the programs and plans of the Federal Government, and because Federal Government operations are subject to frequent changes and revisions, the Commission decided that it would operate more effectively in behalf of the people of Connecticut if it could maintain contacts in Washington through a branch office.” To explain his reversal, Governor Baldwin said, “вЂIt is felt in many quarters that theseВ .В .В . proposals are among the most important Page 44 →thus far advanced in connection with preparing Connecticut to meet the future situation.’”39 Connecticut has retained an office in Washington for the majority of the time since World War II. It has had several incarnations and at least four addresses. As the need for war contracts declined, the office became an arm of the Connecticut Development Commission. Kenneth Gregg became the head of the Washington office,40 and he continued his earlier work of surveying Connecticut factories. Over time, the office moved away from its original mission as an extension of the War Production Board and began to focus on other areas.

Explaining the First Offices Why New York? Why Connecticut? And why would these two states establish Washington offices when they did? After all, every state had an interest in getting war contracts, and in having close interactions at a time when the federal government was increasingly involved in state affairs. Federal funds to state governments had grown during the Depression, and as World War II began to revitalize the economy, states watched as federal grants-inaid decreased.41 Federal funds were now going toward war contracts, and each state had an incentive to seek these funds. Any state would have benefited. What set New York and Connecticut apart was the advantages they would have in seeking these funds. As industrialized, professionalized states, they were better situated than other states to lobby effectively for contracts, and thus better maximize the benefits of a Washington office. Importantly, they also had governors who were predisposed to understand the benefits of working closely with Washington.

State Government Professionalism and Capacity in Connecticut and New York There are two reasons why states with highly professionalized state governments would be more likely to establish offices. First, these states have higher capacity than other states; they have the institutional structure and resources to support the operations of—and reap the benefits of—the lobbying office. Second, any political opposition to an office is less likely to find traction in a highly professionalized state.

Data on governmental structure and spending indicate that Connecticut and New York were both highly professionalized states with substantial government capacity. State and local government spending on wages and Page 45 →salaries in these states was also much higher than the national average of $33.90 per capita. New York ranked first at $77.99 per capita, and Connecticut ranked ninth at $38.88 per capita.42 In January 1942, there were approximately 518,000 people working for the 48 state governments, and over 10 percent of them were working for the state of New York. Though Connecticut had only 11,600 state employees, it still ranked 14th nationally, notable given that Connecticut was one of the smallest states, by both area and population.43 (In 1942, just over 10 percent of the country’s population lived in New York; just under 1 percent lived in Connecticut.44) The governors in the two states have traditionally been among the most powerful in the country, with considerable institutional authority at their disposal. While we do not have information on the size of the gubernatorial staff in Connecticut, we know that New York had one of the largest, and perhaps the largest, staffs in the country. There were 11 professional staff members and 31 clerical staff members in 1949, when the average was about 11 staff members total.45 Executive compensation, another measure of professionalization, was tellingly high in New York. In 1943, when the median gubernatorial salary was $7,500, New York’s governor was paid $25,000 a year, more than any other governor. Connecticut’s governor was paid $12,000—still a high figure given the state’s size.46 Furthermore, both legislatures were highly professionalized, which meant that their members were not in a good position to argue against the establishment of a relatively small Washington office that would be under the governor’s control. In 1941, New York’s legislature was one of two state legislatures to have annual sessions and no limit on the number of legislative days.47 With salaries of $2,500 annually, New York’s legislators were paid more than any other in the country, and the state’s total legislative expenditures in fiscal year 1943 were far and away the highest in the country at nearly $2.7 million. The national average was $354,600. (Despite the comparatively enormous expenses of the New York Assembly, it totaled only .7 percent of total state expenditures in 1940.) For its part, Connecticut’s total legislative expenditures fell far short of New York’s, but still ranked seventh nationally at $548,000, and on a per capita basis Connecticut’s legislature was more expensive than New York’s—31 versus 21 cents per capita, compared to a national average of 13 cents.48 In either state, these well paid and generously staffed legislators would hardly be in a position to oppose a small Washington office. The larger the state government, the greater the need for an office to help coordinate activities involving the federal government. Materials from these offices indicate that a significant portion of their activities involved Page 46 →coordination with the state government back home. Connecticut’s Washington office worked in coordination with several district offices of the Connecticut War Industries Commission that had been spread across the state to aid businesses in pursuing contracts.49 Perhaps this distributed model of office creation helped assuage any concerns that Connecticut legislators across the state might have had regarding Governor Hurley’s initiative. Governor Dewey also emphasized the Washington office’s role in working with other state offices. In March 1943, James C. Haggerty, Dewey’s executive assistant, wrote to various secretaries of the state agencies, saying, “It is the belief of Governor Dewey that the Washington office of the New York State Division of Commerce can be increasingly useful to the various departments of the State Government.В .В .В . In addition to its war contract work and other activities for the State Division of Commerce, the Washington office has already been of assistance to such State agencies as the War Council, the Department of Public Works and the Department of Correction, in handling a number of problems with different Federal agencies.”50 A less professionalized state would not have had the capacity to benefit in so many ways.

The Industrial Base in Connecticut and New York The unprecedented level of military spending during World War II had enormous economic effects. Research on military spending during the postwar era raises doubts about whether military spending contributes to growth in the economy as a whole.51 Yet there is no doubt that it creates jobs and stimulates economic growth in the communities where military production actually takes place. Although spending for World War II was far greater than during previous wars, neither the economic effects of war nor political leaders’ concerns that their

constituencies receive a fair share of the benefits were new. Mobilization for the Civil War had substantial economic effects.52 There is evidence that the benefits the battleship-building program of the 1890s held for the steel and shipbuilding industries influenced political support for the program.53 During World War I, Allied purchases of war materiel in the United States had important economic and political effects even before the United States declared war.54 The mobilization effort that followed the declaration of war in 1917 magnified these effects. The mobilization effort even provided models for some New Deal programs for coping with the Great Depression.55 Yet Washington-based lobbying offices cannot successfully lobby for Page 47 →war contracts if their states do not have the relevant resources. In order to make a convincing case for a contract, a state would have to demonstrate adequate manufacturing infrastructure and production workers. New York and Connecticut were astute in their pursuit of war contracts. For two decades preceding entry into World War II, Connecticut and New York were above the national average in the number of production employees per capita.56 Connecticut had an even larger manufacturing base on a per capita basis, and as home to several major defense companies, it was better situated than any other state to take advantage of war contracts. Thousands were employed in war-related industries in cities throughout the state.57 Governor Hurley sought to distribute the economic benefits of the war to the smaller businesses in the state that had been hit hard during the Depression. Businesses and unions had expressed their concern about small businesses; at one of the early meetings of the WIC, the governor stated that “there was danger of certain towns including Danbury and Shelton becoming вЂghost towns’ because of the loss of markets, etc., of the fur hat and textile industries” as the nation’s needs shifted from civilian consumer goods to war production.58 Given that there was political pressure to disperse war contracts across the country, it was in Connecticut’s interest to protect its dominance.59 Though New York was home to farms and orchards in addition to metropolitan centers that were its industrial anchors, it was much bigger than Connecticut, and had a greater manufacturing base overall. In 1939, New York had 957,854 production workers, more than four times as many as Connecticut.60 The industrial base of both states was established in the years prior to the Depression, though the economic crisis that began in 1929 hit the manufacturing industries hard. This meant that both states had a demonstrable surfeit of additional skilled and unskilled workers to produce war goods. Furthermore, New York and Connecticut were not as well situated to pursue federal dollars in other ways. Direct military spending was not a source of federal funding that these states could maximize. Pursuit of contracts took far better advantage of the manufacturing strengths of these states. These were two rich, industrial states with few military bases. In 1945, military expenditures accounted for 13.6 percent of total wages and spending nationally. In poor states with a growing military presence, the figures are much higher. In Virginia, Florida, and Mississippi, approximately 35 percent of total wages and earnings came from military expenditures. In New York and Connecticut the percentages were 7.9 and 5.8 percent, respectively.61 The country as a whole became more industrialized Page 48 →during World War II, and earnings from manufacturing increased by 5 percent nationally from 1939 to 1945. The biggest winners were the states that were heavily industrialized in the first place. The proportion of New York’s economy based in manufacturing increased by 8.1 percentage points over the course of the war, and Connecticut’s economy went from 44.1 to 56.5 percent manufacturing. Connecticut’s change of 12.4 percentage points was greater than for any other state. We know that New York obtained more than 10 percent, or close to 200 billion dollars, in major prime war supply and facility contracts awarded by U.S. and Allied governments from June 1940 to September 1945, making it second only to Michigan.62 World War II prime contracting data broken down by state are sparse, and so we cannot present a listing of the amount of each state’s war contract receipts during this period. Data from the Korean War are available, however, and spending during World War II was structurally similar to the Korean War—fewer than five years had elapsed, and the defense manufacturing base that was mobilized in the summer of 1950 was the same one that had been decommissioned in 1945. New York and especially Connecticut received enormous benefits. Twenty-four percent of all prime contracts awarded during 1951 were distributed in these two states.63

Characteristics and Interests of the Governors What would lead a governor to establish a branch office in Washington—a federal lobbying office? The governors we have just discussed had previous involvement with the federal government that likely impressed on them the benefits that could result. Connecticut’s Governor Hurley had experience in state-federal relations for several years before becoming governor. In 1935, he was director of Fairfield County’s Works Progress Administration; in 1936, when the Connecticut River had an epic flood, he was named a special representative of the federal government and coordinated flood relief.64 Later that year, Governor Wilbur Cross (D-CT, 1931–39) appointed him state director of the Works Progress Administration.65 In 1937, Governor Cross created a state Department of Public Works and appointed Hurley as commissioner. Hurley’s first assignment was to travel to Washington and get nine construction projects approved by the federal WPA administrator. Hurley secured funding for those projects and more. Between 1937 and 1940, Hurley successfully lobbied Washington for $18 million in construction money.66 These activities put Hurley in an excellent position to campaign for Page 49 →governor in 1940, and they also gave him a glimpse of the benefits that could accrue from a close relationship with Washington. Despite his WPA background, Governor Hurley favored spending on defense over relief programs after the war began. This preference made practical sense, as we shall see; the massive shift in the federal budget toward military spending was bound to benefit a highly industrialized state with more than its share of defense-related corporations. It was also patriotic. The Connecticut office in Washington could play a role to both help national defense efforts and the state’s economy. As I noted earlier, the Connecticut office barely survived the next gubernatorial transition from Democrat Hurley to Republican Raymond Baldwin when he took office in 1943. Baldwin’s reestablishment of the state’s Washington office some months after he closed it probably reflects both its support from industry and his own recognition of the growing importance of the federal government. Though he bridled at the increased activism of the federal government during the New Deal, he was ideologically moderate and an activist governor. He was aware of the employment benefits of defense contracts. As governor, he also established the State Development Commission and the Aeronautical Development Commission, both of which worked to convert Connecticut’s industrial base to war production, and established a job training program to prepare citizens for government defense jobs. New York’s Governor Herbert Lehman was a Democrat who had served as lieutenant governor under Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (D-NY, 1929–32). Lehman was part of Roosevelt’s inner circle during his governorship, and the banker became skilled at Albany politics under Roosevelt’s tutelage. Under Lehman’s leadership, New York passed its “little New Deal,” extending welfare assistance and social insurance to its citizens and “often acting in concert with Washington” while doing so.67 In 1935, Congress established the WPA; the WPA did not provide support to as many New Yorkers as Roosevelt had originally promised, and Lehman was diligent in pressing WPA director Harry Hopkins for additional support. Writes biographer Robert Ingalls, “Although Lehman sometimes irritated other officials by fighting against any relaxation of federal or local commitments, his tactics often got more money from both levels of government than would have been otherwise forthcoming.”68 Lehman was learning that pressing one’s case with the federal government resulted in additional commitments to the state. Though Lehman was a banker who eschewed big government in principle, the Depression led him to champion both expanded state programs Page 50 →and the aid to local governments that comprised more than half the state budget in the 1930s. During his time in office, tax increases nearly doubled state revenues. The state budget grew from $225 million in 1933–34 to $395 million in 1938–39.69 The end of the 1930s brought increased opposition to these increases, however, and the election of 1940 brought a Republican majority to the New York Senate, where it joined a Republican-controlled Assembly. It is easy to see why Lehman might have turned to Washington out of necessity. State dollars were drying up. Lehman had significant experience working with the federal government, and had a particularly close relationship with the president who was both pouring dollars into states and ramping up what would later be named the military industrial complex.

When Republican Thomas Dewey succeeded Lehman in 1943, he had multiple reasons for maintaining New York’s office in Washington. First, the office was proving itself successful in bringing war contracts to the state. Second, having political staff members in Washington could be useful for an ambitious governor. Though Dewey was famous for his crime-fighting efforts as a U.S. special prosecutor and New York City district attorney, he had a national reputation, and in 1937 he had been mentioned as both a possible gubernatorial candidate and a possible presidential candidate.70 His race against Lehman in 1938 had brought a loss of the thinnest margins, and it did not dampen his ambitions. As biographer Richard N. Smith put it, he “had lost an election but won a national audience.”71 Dewey had sought the GOP presidential nomination in 1940, and though he lost to Wendell Willkie, the run positioned him well for his successful gubernatorial run in 1942.72 Dewey clearly had national ambitions long before his runs against President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 or against President Harry Truman in 1948. Dewey would be followed by a long line of ambitious governors who either opened or maintained their state’s lobbying office in Washington. While the benefits of New York’s office were more than political, it would have made no political sense for Dewey to close the relatively new office after he was inaugurated. Was the openness of these men toward the federal government typical? While attitudes varied, not all similarly situated states had governors who wanted to open a state lobbying office in Washington. For example, Michigan’s Governor Murray Van Wagoner, who served from 1941 to 1942, recognized the importance of war contracts to his state but opposed formal lobbying by the state. He preferred that the lobbying be managed by the private companies themselves.73 Notably, Lehman and Baldwin left their governor’s mansions to move to Page 51 →positions in the federal government. Lehman left office one month before his term expired when President Roosevelt appointed him to a position in the U.S. State Department. After losing a race for the U.S. Senate in 1946, he won a special election to the state’s other U.S. Senate seat and subsequently served in the U.S. Senate from 1949 until he retired at the end of 1956.74 Baldwin was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1946, where he served until his appointment to Connecticut’s court of last resort in 1949.75 Only Robert Hurley retired to private life after completing his term as governor. For the three governors with an eye on the Washington stage, a lobbying office could have provided some personal political benefit to accompany the benefits to their states.

Office Openings in the 1960s Though the Depression and World War II ended, the tighter relationship between the federal government and the states did not. The federal government continued to expand its role into new areas. Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, providing billions of dollars in federal appropriations to states in order to build the interstate system. The Great Society programs initiated by President Lyndon Johnson greatly increased federal involvement in social welfare programs. There are sparse records about state lobbying offices during the 1950s and early 1960s, but we know that other states began to procure their own Washington representatives. Coleman Ransone’s study of the governorship, published in 1956, mentions such liaisons, saying, “Some of the larger states have established a Washington representative who can deal with the federal agencies on policy matters, particularly in the fields in which federal grants-in-aid are of considerable importance.” California, Massachusetts, and New York had such representatives.6 This was at a time when gubernatorial staffs were becoming more formalized, although they were still very small by today’s standard. The California governor’s office had five staff members in 1938, increased to 21 people in 1943, and to 242 people by 1947.76 Though California’s population increased by nearly 60 percent during these years, this did not match the exponential growth in staff size. According to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), by 1968 a total of 17 states had either established or authorized offices.77 These offices are listed in table 2.1. At this point, not all Washington offices were under the control of the governor. The California Page 52 →governor’s office was first started in 1961, with funding through the California Department of Finance. The ACIR list does not accurately list the year of every office opening, although it is probably the best early list of state offices in Washington.78 For example,

the ACIR report lists the Massachusetts office founding as 1967. Massachusetts actually established an office in 1961, although it existed for only a year or two. Governor John A. Volpe (D-MA, 1961–63, 1965–69) sent a representative to Washington who reported directly to him. Volpe had served as the first federal highway administrator under President Eisenhower, and like his counterparts in New York and Connecticut, he understood the benefits that close communication and lobbying could bring to a state. Volpe had wanted to better control the contacts that state agencies had with their federal counterparts, but the office was a political football. The state legislature subsequently eliminated the funding.79 In many cases, Washington offices were established by their governors to focus on a specific issue. The rationale of newly established Washington offices, as described by the original directors (or, in a few cases, the second or third director), was to provide some economic benefit for the state. Page 53 →Then, these offices typically broadened their portfolios, just as the New York and Connecticut offices did. This was the case with the Illinois office, which was founded more than 20 years later. Table 2.1. Federal-State Liaison Offices in Washington in 1967 State Full-Time Office Part-Time Office When Established Professional Staff Size California Department of Finance X 1961 1 California Legislature X 1967 1 Florida X 1967 2 Illinois X 1965 3 Indiana X 1965 1 Kentucky X 1967 1 Louisiana 1967a Maryland X 1967 2 Massachusetts X 1967 2 Michigan 1967a Missouri X 1967 1 New Jersey 1967a New York X 4 1943b Ohio X 1964 1 Pennsylvania X 1963 3 South Dakota X 1965 1 Texas X 1966 1 West Virginia X В 1962 2 Source: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “ACIR Ninth Annual Report,” (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1968), app. D, p. 41. a“Authorized, bAs

but not yet established.”

we have seen, the New York office was actually established in 1941.

The Illinois Office In 1966, the federal government was building a new high-energy physics laboratory. Where would it be built? The laboratory, with its first phase construction costs estimated at $240 million, was a plum, and existing research communities lobbied aggressively to land the project. The scientific elite favored siting the lab at Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island in New York, or the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, California, but both physicists and politicians in the Midwest disagreed. Illinois governor Otto Kerner Jr. (D-IL, 1961–68) had made economic development a top priority, and he saw science and technology as the path to economic

prosperity.80 Physicists who wanted an accelerator in the Midwest were a scientific constituency for an Illinois site, and Illinois politicians fought particularly hard as “a fierce contest erupted for community prestige and economic benefit.”81 At one point, Kerner and Michigan governor George Romney (R-MI, 1963–69) argued to the other Midwestern governors that each governor should establish a full-time lobbying office in Washington to work for R&D funding. At the time, only Ohio had an office, and it was hoped that “if each state established such an office regional cooperation would be a fairly simple next step.”82 To aid the state in acquiring the lab, Kerner subsequently opened his own lobbying office in Washington. The office, which was housed under the Illinois Department of Business and Economic Development, opened in September 1965.83 Acquiring the lab was the department’s top priority, and it consumed the energies of that department and others. “The entire state government bureaucracy was mobilized by pressing units to provide any expertise that might help with the accelerator,” wrote Anton Jachim about the lobbying effort, and “the department’s two-man Washington Office, which was authorized when the code department was created, was responsible for this operation almost exclusively on a day-to-day basis until the siting issue was resolved.”84 During 1965, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission received 125 proposals, with at least one from each of 46 states. In 1965, when St. Louis Post-Dispatch political correspondent Taylor Pensoneau went to Springfield to cover Illinois politics, he was assigned to spend a day with Kerner, getting to know him. That day, Kerner was lobbying for the Fermilab. “We’ll eliminate red tape, we’ll help Page 54 →with zoning,” Pensoneau recalled that Kerner argued. “If you give us the project, you’ll have no problems with bureaucracy.”85 The lobbying effort was successful. By the fall of 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission had reduced the number of proposals in the running to 85. After site visits by a National Academy of Sciences evaluation team, there were six finalists—two in Illinois.86 In December 1966, the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory was sited in Illinois cornfields an hour west of Chicago. The project was “the scientific prize of the century.”87 Groundbreaking for the lab began in December 1968, but this did not mean the end of the Illinois office. Kerner left the governor’s office before the end of his term to take a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals. Lieutenant Governor Samuel H. Shapiro, another Democrat, took office in May 1968, but was narrowly defeated by Richard Ogilvie (R-IL, 1969–73), a former sheriff and commissioner from Cook County. In 1969, Governor Ogilvie opened a permanent Washington office with a broader mission of federal-state relations.88 During the 1960s, states became strategic in their efforts to benefit from the rapidly expanding availability of federal funds. The Washington office moved from its original focus on Fermilab to a broader effort to seek federal dollars for Illinois. Thomas J. Corcoran was sent to Washington to seek federal money from a variety of sources. Despite his success in passing the state’s first income tax, Ogilvie was facing a revenue shortage. In the fall of 1968, he hired Corcoran, then a staff member for the Illinois State Senate leadership, to run the state’s Washington office. Ogilvie’s creation of an Illinois Bureau of the Budget helped him centralize budgetary control; he hired a director, who then hired a budget analyst for each state agency. Corcoran’s salary was paid from the budget of the Department of Business and Economic Development, but he reported to the governor. Said Corcoran, “I was able to revive the office, expand it quite a bit. And our first mission was to maximize federal dollars.”89 What sort of economic development work specifically? Corcoran explains: It was the grants and the federal entitlement changes primarily. What we had learned particularly through the efforts of the Bureau of the Budget was that at that time in the federal-states relationship, if a state program were structured in certain ways—for example, we were doing some major changes in the correctional program for the state of Illinois, and if you constructed it from the standpoint of Page 55 →funding, from the standpoint of the purposes, from the standpoint of the relationship with affected federal agencies—you could participate. In other words, if the state contributed, let’s say, $5 million to a project and if that tied in to a pertinent federal program, that $5 million could be used as the 25 percent match.В .В .В . So we converted a lot of programs and we made a lot of money on it. I should have been on commission.

The Washington office worked with the Illinois Bureau of the Budget to develop program proposals that would maximize federal dollars to the state. They were very successful at increasing dollars to the state—enough to make some waves. Says Corcoran, “At the time Senator Russell Long was the chairman of the Finance Committee and we made such a successful attack that eventually they had to close some of these programs. They had to really tighten them up. And they should have, because we changed everything and we, therefore, enabled the states to get a lot more money. And Senator Long made a speech in which he said that he was tired of hearing from the governors about how poor they were and how much they needed more federal dollars and so forth. He said, вЂI have information that the governor of the state of Illinois hired Tom Corcoran, the famous lobbyist’”—referring to the Thomas G. (“Tommy the Cork”) Corcoran who served as an influential advisor to Franklin D. Roosevelt and subsequently became a Washington power broker and lobbyist for such interests as the United Fruit Company—“.В .В .В and so Senator Percy got up on the floor and in a nice way basically said, вЂYou’re talking about the young man from Illinois, and these are two different people.’ It was kind of funnyВ .В .В . but see, what we were after, [this] was the rougher side of it, and that’s the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means.” In the end, Senator Long changed the entitlement program. The Illinois Department of Corrections was costing the program too much money. Governor Ogilvie had another reason for maintaining a Washington office. Richard J. Daley, the legendary boss of the Chicago Democratic machine and mayor from 1955 to 1976, was a powerful force at a time when more and more federal funds were being allocated directly to large cities. Donald Haider quotes one Washington observer as saying that Ogilvie “made it quite clear to President Nixon and cabinet officials alike that he might be privy to any federal agency dealings with Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley.” The political benefits of this office must be inferred, as no governor is likely to leave a paper trail that says, “I need Page 56 →to have an office to keep tabs on my enemies and pursue political gain.” But the usefulness of sending to Washington a young Tom Corcoran—a skilled protГ©gГ© and politician who was later elected to Congress in his own right—is hard to refute. Why did Kerner start the Washington office, and why did Ogilvie continue it? Kerner had come from a politically prominent family and had been a U.S. attorney in Chicago before moving to the governor’s mansion. Handsome and debonair, he had been handpicked by Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley to run for governor. Kerner served on the NGA’s executive committee from 1967 to 1968, simultaneously serving as chair of the Midwestern Governors’ Conference. Declining to run for a third term, he was appointed by President Johnson to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Soon thereafter Kerner was indicted for taking bribes during his time as governor. He went to prison and thus ended his political career, but clearly as governor he was ambitious and had national politics in mind. Richard Ogilvie was also ambitious. He implemented sweeping organizational reforms as governor, reorganizing most state agencies in the first reorganization since World War I. He also proposed a state income tax and got it, and though the tax was widely seen as necessary, both supporters and opponents believe it killed his chances for a future in national politics.90 Illinois was one of more than a dozen states to found a Washington office during this time, so it was not an original idea, and the office was not as unusual as the New York and Connecticut offices were in their day. Yet its story helps us further understand the puzzle of why states would establish these safeguards of federalism. First, the office started with a material goal, but it subsequently brought the state money and its governors political benefits. Second, the office started with narrow goals, but it fairly quickly expanded its portfolio to a broad array of activities. Third, the office was effective enough in its pursuit of federal dollars that, in at least one case, Congress subsequently changed its way of writing formulas. This is no small feat, and speaks to the effectiveness of the office. Today the Illinois Washington office continues to commit very substantial resources to increasing the flow of federal funds to the state. For example, in 1999 the office developed the Illinois Federal Clearinghouse, “a web-site with information that can assist individuals and organizations in improving their access to Federal funding.”91 The clearinghouse helped state agencies increase their federal funding to $10 billion in fiscal year 2001, an increase of nearly 19 percent above the fiscal year 1999 level.92 Page 57 →

The Importance of Context and Entrepreneurs Given states’ multiple political safeguards, what is it that leads a governor to decide to establish a Washington office? Ultimately, it is the governor who makes the call, but governors do not operate in isolation. A governor’s actions will reflect his or her personal preferences and interests, as well as his or her broader situation—the politics and economics of the day will frame a governor’s options. The creation of Washington lobbying offices depends on a mix of the governor and circumstances. What generalizations can we take from the illustrations of New York, Connecticut, and Illinois? These insights help us understand the puzzle of why certain states have offices. Both political and economic context play a crucial role. The context in which governors operated influenced their decisions to open Washington offices, and this is consistent with what we know about interest groups more generally. The broader environment in which interests operate is critical to whether an interest group is actually established. Other states had similar interests, but they didn’t set up lobbying offices. Why not? Context matters, and in Washington that context is set by the federal government. Interest groups scholars have demonstrated that as government activity increases, interest groups organize. For example, Beth Leech et al. found that interest groups mobilize in Washington when the federal government becomes active in issue areas that concern them. Furthermore, Leech and her colleagues found that the breadth of government activity has a bigger impact on mobilization than increases in government spending. Then, as the number of interest organizations increase, they differentiate themselves by carving out a lobbying domain that separates them from other organizations.93 Virginia Gray and David Lowery also find that interest organizations form niches, and that they flourish under certain conditions.94 They argue that it is not the sheer size of government that drives the creation of interest organizations, but rather the “stock of resources” available, such as funding that could be provided to relevant interest organizations.95 In their population ecology model, Gray and Lowery argue that organized interests proliferate when there is more energy available to fuel them. In the natural world, energy could be sunlight, water, or food. In the world of organizational ecology, it could be material resources useful to interest organizations—such as increased federal funding to states.96 It fits, then, that governors would seek representation at times when the federal government had entered a host of policy domains that were formerlyPage 58 → controlled exclusively by states. The relief funds to states and their residents were decreasing, but the federal role in policy areas ranging from welfare to transportation was not. Furthermore, federal funds were available for industries that could capture them, benefitting states in an indirect but very significant way. In the case of Illinois, the opportunity for a major accelerator laboratory served as a catalyst. It also makes sense that states would want to differentiate themselves from the other public officials that were mobilizing. Despite their power in the federal system, governors were being threatened. In particular, cities were a threat. If governors began to focus on Washington because of the growth of funds available for both government programs and private contracts, they had to worry about competition. The same funds had drawn the attention of other state and local government officials, and a variety of public official associations were established during this era.97 Big-city mayors had founded the United States Conference of Mayors in 1933, and the group and its members played a major role in urban affairs policy.98 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had a strong relationship with the urban mayors; Roosevelt directed public works programs to large cities, which earned the mayors’ support and gained Roosevelt a large voting bloc.99 Urban mayors have more in common than the governors of 50 disparate states, and the mayors became a significant lobbying force during the New Deal. The urban lobby was also a powerful force in the 1960s, when President Johnson’s Great Society funneled more money to cities.100 Governors did not want to cede funds or authority to the mayors. Each group wanted the larger say in federal policy toward states and localities, as well as the larger share of funds flowing to its level of government. Thus, the development of intergovernmental policymaking, the increased federal funds to states and localities, and the realization that other public officials were mobilizing, each played a role in leading governors to realize that they would also benefit from lobbying Washington.

Haider identifies the period from the Depression to the early 1960s as the first phase of intergovernmental lobbying, arguing that cities had the most powerful collective voice, but a voice that spurred their counterparts at other levels of subnational government to lobby more actively. Samuel H. Beer argues that changes in public sector politics—including, quite notably, the growing role of bureaucrats in policy making and public administration—led to the development of a thriving intergovernmental lobby. These changes began during the 1950s, but had the greatest influence during the Great Society: “A major reason for this increase in activity and influence on the part of subnational governments is, paradoxically, the Page 59 →increasing use of them for the delivery of a multitude of services originating with professional elements and mandated by the central government as a condition of its financial aid.”101 As Beer continues to develop his point about the enactment of general revenue sharing in 1972, he even more pointedly identifies the growth of the intergovernmental lobby: “Lobbies with an interest in particular programs do arise and use their influence to maintain and expand programs. But in a professional-bureaucratic complex, in contrast with the older responsive models of policymaking, the initial sequence of causality is reversed: it is the program that creates the lobby, not the lobby that creates the program.”102 In a similar vein, Arnold and Plant argue that the policy-making process grew more diffuse from the New Deal and into the 1950s, leading the intergovernmental relations lobby to grow and thrive.103 According to noted federalism scholar David Walker, the federal government dispersed monies to a broad variety of constituencies in a “вЂconcert of interests’ strategy,” which was composed of “efforts by the national government to encourage various sectors of the economy in order to further its development and to assist national defense.”104 Though governors were latecomers to the intergovernmental lobbying activities that were dominated by the cities, they were beginning to recognize the benefits of organized lobbying efforts. Washington lobbying offices began to appear from the 1940s to the 1960s in response to larger changes in fiscal federalism. Whether or not a particular state mobilized depended on that state’s characteristics, but the decision to send a man to Washington to lobby was made by the governor. Ultimately, though, the larger context influences but does not create an interest organization. It is a person acting within that larger context—in this case, the governor—who acts. The governors discussed in this chapter were acting as interest group entrepreneurs. Individuals and groups have many, many interests—and only some of them organize. The rest remain latent, unrepresented in a pluralist system.105 Political and economic context are not the only forces at work. Opportunities need to be grasped by people. Governors act in a particular time and place to grasp these opportunities. They are the second crucial part of the puzzle. Political scientist Robert Salisbury understood that it took someone, often someone with a personal commitment, to start a new interest organization. This interest group entrepreneur must have a vision that will sustain him or her even if the material benefits from these efforts are not immediate. They very likely see an opportunity that others do not see—or at least have not acted on. The organizer, said Salisbury, makes the Page 60 →difference—someone who recognizes that there are benefits to be had, and who is willing to spend the time and resources to found an organization. Salisbury explained that entrepreneurs are not usually “economic men, ” but rather those who believe in the goals of the organization.106 This entrepreneur enters into what Salisbury calls an interest group exchange: he or she receives payments from patrons in exchange for benefits the entrepreneur provides. This entrepreneur might see opportunities that others don’t, or might be willing to invest the start-up costs required to organize when others are not. In all cases, the benefits to organizing must outweigh the costs. Salisbury focused on entrepreneurs who formed membership groups, extracting membership fees in return for material, social, and purposive (policy-driven) benefits. Salisbury’s later work on institutional lobbying links it to the leadership of the organization, and he points out that institutions might enter the policy-making arena because of the personal convictions of their leaders. They might enter because they have organizational leaders who achieved their positions because of their activity in certain policy arenas, and these leaders are inclined to continue to act in these arenas. Institutional leaders are also likely to find the policy investment beneficial to organizational interests, as institutions are large and complex, and are likely to be affected by policy decisions on a variety of fronts.107

Using Salisbury’s framework, we can see how these early governors acted as interest group entrepreneurs. According to Salisbury, interest group entrepreneurs mobilize where they can bring enough benefits to make the exchange worthwhile. Connecticut, New York, and Illinois would be easy pickings. Salisbury also points out that an interest group must have some resources at its disposal to mobilize, and these states had the governmental machinery in place to mobilize in Washington.108 Salisbury points out that leaders with previous experience with government are likely to lead their organizations in interacting with the government.109 Both Governors Hurley and Lehman had experience seeking funds from the federal bureaucracy before they were elected governor. They would have understood the benefits of having men in Washington to seek war contracts and interact with federal agencies. By the time Illinois established its office, the concept was not new; Kerner would not have needed direct, personal experience working with Washington to realize that setting up an office was worth the costs that it would bring. As we will discuss further in chapter 6, governors are often accused of having a Washington office to further their own political advancement. There is no question that a Washington satellite office can be a politicalPage 61 → boon, with political benefits accruing to the governor even as material benefits accrue to the state. This is not a situation unique to Washington offices; a U.S. senator who effectively represents her state might be mentioned as a possible presidential or vice presidential candidate. An effective volunteer leader of a grassroots environmental group might win battles that protect the environment—and simultaneously launch a career as a political officeholder. Each of these people might even make choices along the way that benefit themselves more than, or at the expense of, their organizations. Governors Lehman, Dewey, Baldwin, Volpe, and Kerner each realized political ambitions beyond their governorships, and all but Kerner were prominent in national politics after their gubernatorial terms. Kerner’s felony conviction made his term as a federal judge unusually short, but he did achieve a major federal government position. A Washington office could have benefited each governor’s political advancement. Such personal benefit is consistent with Salisbury, who argues that interest group entrepreneurs realize personal benefits from the interest group exchange.110 Five of these six governors of three states, then, had connections to the federal government before they became governor and were not opposed to turning to the federal government for aid. Their political orientations and personal histories led them to act as interest group entrepreneurs in Washington. The enticement of federal funds and the encroaching federal government set the stage for office creation. Governors must initiate that creation. To understand our puzzle of why governors create these safeguard offices, we need to remember the three factors at work: funds, encroachment, and state entrepreneurs. During World War II, there was not a collective voice for governors in Washington. Before Illinois shifted its Washington office from an arm of a state agency to an arm of the governor’s office, the National Governors’ Conference had come to town. When the NGC decided to establish its own Washington office in 1966, it joined and eclipsed the individual governors’ offices as the single most prominent voice for governors. Then in less than a decade, the organization moved all operations to Washington, recruited other state offices to Washington, and became the core of a growing group of governors’ lobbyists. Chapter 3 examines the political development of the governors’ national association.

Page 62 →

Chapter 3 The Political Development of the National Governors Association Though individual governors recognized the importance of maintaining a presence in Washington, the governors collectively did not have the same realization for many years. The National Governors’ Conference did not come to Washington until the late 1960s, decades after the first states made their claim. But when the national association did set up shop in Washington, it did not do so halfheartedly. Within a decade, the renamed National Governors’ Association was the largest occupant of a new 552,000-square-foot building that was located a few blocks from the Capitol, one that served as the center of state and local government activity in Washington.1 The NGA, through both the efforts of its executive committee of governors and the institutional efforts of the association, became an active recruiter for individual state offices to join the complement of governors’ agents in Washington. Today, the NGA and governors’ state offices are a significant and visible force for states in the federal arena. In this chapter, I address the puzzle of the governors’ need for political representation—specifically representation by a national association. In the first section, I tell the story of how the NGA came to Washington, how it came to establish its own building, and how it sought to enlarge the pool of governors’ offices in Washington. The second part of the chapter investigates the factors that led to this rise: significant changes in fiscal federalism; competition from other public officials, particularly big-city mayors; the entrepreneurial efforts by key political actors; and, as it became institutionalized and sought to maintain its organization, the NGA itself. In the Page 63 →third part of this chapter, I examine the NGA as it exists today, detailing its organizational structure and activities and considering its strengths and its challenges.

The Governors’ Conference: An Absent Federal Player When the governors formed their loose association in 1908, they focused on state issues rather than a federal agenda. The Governors’ Conference was established following a suggestion from William George Jordan, the former editor of the Saturday Evening Post, and at the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt, who focused this first meeting of the governors on natural resources policy.2 In his history of the Governors’ Conference, Brooks described the start of the organization as less than auspicious: “Outstanding governors—Augustus E. Willson, of Kentucky [R, 1907–11]; Charles Evans Hughes, of New York [R, 1907–10]; and Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey [D, 1911–13]—led the state executives in forging an anti-activist tradition for the Governors’ Conference that endured for twenty-five years.”3 Hughes oversaw the largest state budget in the nation. He had successfully broadened his powers by pushing through legislation that authorized gubernatorial oversight of civil servants and officials, and by implementing the state’s first executive budget. His reform efforts did not extend to activism in federal affairs, however. At the second meeting in January 1910—the organization did not meet in 1909—temporary chairman Willson opened the meeting by saying that it was not a “House of Governors,” as Jordan had proposed it, but simply a “Conference of Governors,” meeting for “the common interest of our people and for the common pleasure of the Governors. . . . We shall reserve the right to have a meeting that doesn’t amount to anything except having a good time together if we want to; but it is likely that such a gathering of men as this will bring forth something, on many occasions, that will be useful to our country.”4 Governor Hughes continued along this same vein: “We are not here to accelerate or to develop opinion with regard to matters which have been committed to Federal power. How the Federal administration shall be conducted is not a matter which concerns State Governors in their official capacity. Whether Congress shall pass a law or not, is for Congress to decide, and with respect to this it is the President’s prerogative to make recommendations.”5 He then spelled out where, he believed, the governors could properly focus their attentions: “The scope of these conferences may be deemed to embrace at least three groups of questions: The

first relates to uniform laws; the second relates to matters of State comity where, if Page 64 →absolute uniformity may not be expected, causes of friction may be avoided and the general welfare may be promoted by accommodating action; the third relates to matters which though of local concern can be better treated in the light of the experience of other States.”6 Early attempts led by Governor John F. Shafroth (D-CO, 1909–13) to spur the Governors’ Conference to a more activist role were futile. The governors had chosen a narrow path, and one which emphasized the social as well as substantive nature of the conference. The press, for its part, was mixed in its reactions to these first few conferences. A 1910 article in the Washington Post ridiculed the initial “governors’ conference” evolving into the “House of Governors.” This was in large part a reaction to the powerlessness of governors, at least as viewed by the Post: “The вЂHouse of Governors’ is wasting its effort. It has no excuse for being, beyond the social, unofficial intercourse of the gentlemen who hold a temporary and uncertain tenure of office as governors. They come and they go; they have restricted powers even in their own bailiwicks, and are concerned with legislation in an advisory way only. To be sure, the вЂHouse of Governors’ will furnish fat berths for a few ingenious promoters, secretaries, understrappers, etc., but nobody will object to this if the governors pay the bills out of their own pockets.”7 The Post’s commentary on the next year’s conference was no better, saying, “the generality of governors are so lightly burdened by the cares of state that no wonder ennui drives them to start something, although hazily aware that the impulse is too slight to carry the thing to its logical conclusion.В .В .В . it is seen that we have on our hands a convention of dilettantes, each represented on the program by his favorite topic—a proposition of the most importance—the uniform adoption of which by all the States he has had his heart set on for years.” After listing several policy agenda items, the Post continues, “But why run the gamut, since it is announced that nothing tangible is to come of it at all? All of the things touched upon came over from last year’s conference and are to go over till next year.”8 The Post puts forth accusations that have haunted the association for decades: that it is long on talk, but short on action. If this inaction seems, well, puzzling—can one imagine a group of governors meeting today and electing to advance no federal agenda item?—it is prudent to remember context. The federal government was relatively small and limited in scope, it infringed less frequently in areas of state prerogative, and it had smaller coffers to tempt the governors. Even as states reeled from the effects of the Depression, governors avoided the greatest issues of the day. After a governors-only discussion of Page 65 →Prohibition at the 1930 meeting, the governors voted to exclude the topic from the agenda of the 1931 meeting. Instead, they discussed what powers states could and should exercise over local spending.9 This topic was consistent with others in the early decades of the meetings. The governors chose to focus on concerns spanning within and across states, but avoided any spanning broadly enough to involve the federal government. Governors presented speeches, but did not engage in any robust debate. They also rejected efforts to expand the organization’s role; for example, in 1931 they rejected a call to establish a research division.10 It was not until 1944 that the style moved from canned speeches to at least some policy discussions in roundtable formats. The efforts to move to the newer format were led by New York’s Governor Dewey.11 Although the Governors’ Conference was considerably more active in the years following World War II, it still avoided issues of major controversy—and that often meant avoiding the most significant political issues of the day. The location of the 1957 annual meeting in Hot Springs, Arkansas, led the New York Times to note that civil rights and school integration were especially significant political issues in Hot Springs, but “there was little likelihood that such touchy problems would come up.” The executive committee had not placed them on the meeting agenda. The New York Times reported that Governor William Stratton (R-IL, 1953–61), the chair of the Conference, indicated that such “вЂpartisan topics’ as integration, the third party or civil rights at this meeting would hurt the spirit of cooperation that had developed.”12 It would not be fair to say that governors were never active in federal affairs before the 1960s. The changes in the federal government that had influenced a few governors to seek Washington representation on their own led some

governors to seek a more active association. For example, the possibility of a federal highway system occupied much of the 1954 and 1955 meetings of the Governors’ Conference. Governors of larger states had thruways or were struggling with their creation, and they saw the advantages to a federal system that would help fund and coordinate them. Other governors were opposed to the project, however—most particularly its $50 billion price tag.13 Support for President Eisenhower’s proposed superhighway system was initially divided, but at the 1955 meeting the governors unanimously voted to urge Congress to act on the president’s proposal as soon as possible. A panel of governors also appeared before congressional committees when Eisenhower first proposed the legislation in 1955.14 Both individually and through the Governors’ Conference, governors played a leading role in helping the Federal Aid Highway Act of Page 66 →1956 become law.15 The Governors’ Conference was a facilitator here, as it would be in subsequent efforts for transportation funding.16 Furthermore, southern governors were active in lobbying at the federal level, particularly over railroad freight rates and more generally on economic development.17 Yet it was unusual in the 1950s to see the governors be this active in federal policy making. An article in the Economist in 1955 presented the annual meetings as worthy of attention not for their own activities, but because the governors dominated their home states politically: “вЂWhile the Governors ostensibly discuss matters which are of interest to them as state executives, the real reason for their gathering is to make them accessible as a group to political reporters. They do everything they can to interest and attract journalists and, long after interstate resolutions on highways, hospitals, and what not are forgotten, the sum of their political judgments is being weighed against the current party scene.’”18 In his history of the Governors’ Conference, Brooks found that “the evidence indicates that the Governors’ Conference has at best a modest influence on the development of public policies,” although Brooks did believe that a highly organized group of governors had the potential to be politically powerful.19 Brooks identified three major functions of the Conference: its federal lobbying role; a forum for information exchange and analysis of problems facing state governments, both formally through studies and reports, and informally through governors’ conversations; and a nationwide forum for partisan political activity.20 The latter was not a formal function but rather a natural result of so many governors meeting together—partisan networking was bound to occur, and the media would take notice. Indeed, Franklin Roosevelt and Thomas Dewey had each used the annual meetings particularly effectively as they sought their party’s presidential nominations.21 The Governors’ Conference had developed a reputation of an organization that was social rather than policy oriented. One New York Times article on the summer meeting in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, described the governors’ visit to President Eisenhower’s farm to deliver the Eisenhowers an anniversary gift of a silver tea set as a highlight of the meeting.22 Political reporter David Broder, who provided insightful coverage of American state politics for decades, covered many governors’ meetings. A 1965 New York Times story, titled “Governors’ Talk Is Picnic, Politics and Policy,” began with the lede, “A national Governors’ Conference is a curious mГ©lange of family outing, political convention and policy seminar.” Covering the 1966 summer meeting, Broder wrote that it had a “curious air of ineffectuality.” The federal government’s expanding scope and authority might have been having an impact, Broder pointed out: “Perhaps it was the luxury setting Page 67 →in the tinsel worldВ .В .В . perhaps it was the weather and the constant lure of pool and golf course. And perhaps it was, as someone unkindly suggested, that the Governors have a decreasing degree of control over their own destinies.”23 The 1967 summer meeting did not even take place in the United States, but rather on a cruise to the Virgin Islands aboard the SS Independence. Though the Conference represented governors of the U.S. territories as well as the states, and the summer meeting rotated to different locations with different governors hosting, a meeting on a cruise ship did not present a serious image to the press. The New York Times coverage discussed the political impasses that stymied resolutions supporting President Johnson’s Vietnam policy and open housing, as well as the possible presidential runs of Nelson Rockefeller (R-NY, 1959–73), George Romney (R-MI, 1963–69), and Ronald Reagan (R-CA, 1967–75). The tone of the article underlined the ineffectuality of the meeting. Photos accompanying the article included Governor Romney dancing with his wife and Governor Reagan swimming in the pool. The caption accompanying the photos read “All at Sea.”24 The Economist ran a photo of Reagan sipping a drink through a straw, and referred to the meeting as a “bizarre floating conference.”25

Even governors themselves acknowledged the social role of the conferences, which had been known for their heavy libations as well as their politicking. Speaking to the conference in 1964, former governor Ernest Gruening (D-AK Territory, 1939–53) was a sitting U.S. senator when he related a conversation that he had just had with Senator Milward Simpson (R-WY, 1955–59; U.S. Senate, 1962–67), another former governor, as they were on their way to the meeting. When Gruening asked Simpson why he was not carrying his ever-present case of liquor, Simpson replied, “It will not be necessary. We are going to the Governors’ Conference.” Gruening then told the sitting governors that he and Simpson were disappointed to arrive at the meeting that afternoon and find only two cases of Coca-Cola in the room. But, he noted, “you’re living in a more ascetic age than we were in those good old days. I can understand that. Especially in an election year, you have to be very careful what you do.”26

The Governors’ Conference Grows Up By the mid-1960s there were inklings that the Governors’ Conference was trying to modernize. Though the political world was changing around it, the structure of the association did not lend itself to responsiveness. The association was headquartered in Chicago, where it shared a limited staff Page 68 →with the Council of State Governments (CSG). The Conference did not have a professional staff large enough to act as a full-service organization, and instead acted as the organizer of annual and occasional meetings. There were other structural challenges. The only document that governed NGC activities were the articles of organization, and these did not include language on managing meetings. It was not until the 1964 meeting that the Conference adopted separate rules of procedure, which specified the rules on such issues as when the body could consider resolutions proposed by governors. At the same meeting, the organization authorized an amendment proposed by Governor Mark Hatfield (R-OR, 1959–67) to allow its executive committee to change its committee structure. “We have had a committee on the National Guard year after year. We have had a standing committee on fallout and civil defense. And yet, on the other hand, we have probably not been able to undertake some studies of important issues because our standing committee system was haphazard,” explained Hatfield.27 In another sign of seeking more technical information from the Conference, in 1964 the Conference charged its executive committee to “make appropriate investigation and recommendations to the states for the standardization of statistical data in reporting, analyzing and evaluating governmental services.”28 When the governors changed their name to the National Governors’ Conference in 1965, the name reflected an organization that was more active than the one that had started more than 50 years ago, if much less active than it would be a just few years later. At the 1965 meeting in Minneapolis, Governor Philip Hoff (D-VT, 1963–69), pointing to the report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations, expressed concern that the states were not adequately consulted on policy decisions regarding programs that the states would jointly fund and administer. “To paraphrase Franklin,” Hoff said, “we are being hung separately because we are not hanging together.В .В .В . [We need] a mechanism or mechanisms to facilitate the dialogue between the policy makers at the two levels of government.” He then proposed that the conference direct its executive committee “to study this problem; to suggest the means whereby the influence of the states as a whole on matters of federal-state concern may be strengthened; and to report its findings and recommendations, including those with respect to personnel and financing, to the next annual meeting.” Governor Hoff’s motion was unanimously accepted, setting in motion the possibility of an NGC Washington office.29 No governor or committee proposed a Washington office at the 1966 annual meeting, but transcripts of the open sessions of the meeting make Page 69 →it clear that the possibility was under discussion, at least informally. Meeting in an executive session, the Conference adopted a motion calling for the Executive Committee to review the “purposes, structure, staffing and financing of the Conference.” The Conference also scheduled an unprecedented winter meeting, to be held by the end of the year.30 The NGC held this special interim meeting in December 1966. Though the meeting was held in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, it started the tradition of annual winter meetings that have subsequently been held in Washington, DC. At this meeting, the Committee on Federal-State-Local Relations presented its report. The

committee had traditionally reported on policy items, such as congressional legislation, and recommended policy positions. In this case, the report addressed one of the major purposes—perhaps the major purpose—of the special meeting: “How can the Governors increase their influence on national policies that affect the states? ” The governors were recognizing their conundrum: despite existing political safeguards, they were not appropriately represented in the federal system. It was not effective to rely on the press to provide useful and usable information to governors on the activities of the scores of federal agencies as well as Congress with its nearly 40 committees. Using the example of taxation of multistate businesses—an issue that had been of great concern to the governors—the report noted that “little has appeared in the general press, and much of what has appeared has been special pleading in support of curtailing state and local jurisdiction to tax.” The report declared “that the representation of the National Governors’ Conference in Washington is inadequate is a simple matter of fact.”31 More to the point, the NGC did not have any of its own staff in Washington. The governors were represented by the Council of State Governments, which employed three senior and three junior professionals, as well as four secretarial and clerical staff members.7 Even if the size of this staff were doubled, the committee report noted, it would still be “appreciably smaller” than either the National Association of Counties or the National League of Cities.32 And of course, cities were also represented in Washington by the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Each of these three organizations Page 70 →was headquartered in Washington, and focused substantially if not primarily on federal affairs. The governors needed two things, the report said: better, more timely access to information and analysis, as well as suggestions for courses of action, when appropriate; and a structure for responses by governors or their designees. After all, the committee explained, “Inattentiveness or indifference in state capitals can forestall action on the most meaningful subject on which an excellent report has been made.” The report recommended that each state have a staff member reporting directly to the governor who would serve as the point of contact on federal issues. “Whom the Governor or his representative consults—agency heads, Members of Congress, other Governors—is a matter of no concern to this Committee nor to the staff.” What did matter was that the communication between Washington and the states, and between the various state capitals, be “easy and rapid.” The report did not recommend that the NGC establish its own Washington office, but it did indicate that strengthening the staff presence in Washington was a prerequisite to other action: the CSG staff should be at least doubled, and an even greater expansion of staff was justified. It was the NGC’s Critique Committee, the ad hoc committee that had been tasked with assessing the NGC’s organization and staffing, that recommended establishing an office in Washington and amending the NGC Articles of Organization to allow for this organizational expansion. The Conference voted to establish an office of state-federal relations, and in March 1967 the office opened its doors. State contributions, assessed by population, funded the $265,000 office.33 The office was administratively under the Council of State Governments, but reported only to the NGC. Said the Wall Street Journal six months later, “The National Governors’ Conference Office of Federal State Relations—to use the lobby’s formal name—has scored several Capitol Hill successes since opening its doors just six months ago.” The article went on to detail several of these, noting in particular the House of Representatives altering President Johnson’s crime bill to give states “an important say” in how cities could use federal funds to train police.34 These structural changes reflected an organization that was growing in scope and professionalism. One governor who took office as these changes were beginning was Daniel J. Evans (R-WA, 1965–77). Evans remembers departing from his first NGC meeting in 1965 and telling his chief of staff, “вЂI don’t think I even want to come back to these governors’ conferences anymore because they are so useless.’ It was a big party. There was not very Page 71 →much substance and there was a whole lot of entertainment.” The organization’s name was indicative of its purpose, felt Evans, because “it really was the title of a little meeting that was held once a year.”35 But incoming NCG chair Bill Guy (D-ND, 1961–73) wanted to change things, said Evans. Guy pushed for a second meeting of the Conference meeting every year. Other

prominent governors, such as John Connally (D-TX, 1963–69), supported him,36 and the winter meetings became a tradition. With these meetings, “[i]t started to get a lot more substantive,” said Evans, and he became much more interested in federal policy making. At the 1968 winter meeting—the first in Washington since 1916—the governors met with President Johnson in a closed-door session.37 A meeting with the president has since become a tradition of the winter meeting. The new Washington office allowed governors to work more closely with Congress and the White House. In one 12-month period from 1967 to 1968, more governors testified before Congress than had done so in the previous 10 years.38 In moving to Washington, the Governors’ Conference was treading a path cut by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and subsequently followed by other groups. Left behind was the model of administrative professionalism and better management that had grown from the reform movement and scientific management; the new model was based on professional linkages. The new model was this, explain Arnold and Plant: “Locate in Washington, use the staff to put key association members together with leaders of the executive and legislative branches, and push for policy to advance the interests of level of government or specific jurisdiction.”39

Evolving as a Policy Instrument In 1974 the NGA further broadened its operations when it established the Center for Policy Research and Analysis, which housed the Division of State Services. The National Governors’ Conference was beginning to see itself as having twin missions. One of these missions was collective advocacy at the federal level. The second was, as executive director Ray Scheppach put it in 2000, “to help governors become better governors in their individual states.”40 The Center was established as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, so the two were separate legal entities.41 The separation created a wall between the advocacy and research activities, which was important for organizational, legal, and political reasons. Funding from most foundations, and from federal contracts, cannot be used for lobbying. The funding was critical to the NGC’s second mission, and yet it put impossible constraints on the first mission. At its summer 1975 meeting, Page 72 →the NGC disaffiliated from the Council of State Governments, becoming an autonomous, Washington-based organization for the first time. The National Governors’ Conference changed its name to the National Governors’ Association at the 1977 annual meeting in an effort to emphasize its new portfolio as a full-service association and the only national voice of all the governors. Evans remembers the regional governors associations as a significant factor in the decision to adopt the new moniker. Steve Farber, former executive director of the NGC, remembers the primary impetus as the need for a name that reflected the organizational growth beyond semiannual meetings of governors, a name that reflected the broadened role of the organization.42 The NGC had 30 staff members in 1975. In 1983, when Farber stepped down as executive director, it had approximately 100.43 Much of this growth was in the Division of State Services. The additional staff enabled the association to provide policy information to governors, and in turn enabled the governors to engage Washington policy makers on issues of concern to states. The NGC was in a position to defend against efforts by President Jimmy Carter’s administration to bypass states and work directly with local governments. When President Reagan proposed his New Federalism initiative, the states were in a position to go toe to toe in the debate with his administration. President Reagan first presented his New Federalism initiative in his 1982 State of the Union address, mapping out some key concepts. Its centerpieces were twofold. The first was his proposal for a “swap” in which the federal government would assume full responsibility for Medicaid and the states would assume full responsibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, both of which were jointly funded and administered. The second was a “turnback” in which the federal government would phase out 40 programs in education, transportation, community development, and social services, and instead create a trust fund from which states could either fund the programs if they chose to continue them independently or take the funds for other purposes.44 Richard Williamson, who as assistant to the president for intergovernmental affairs was one of the central negotiators for the White House, later wrote that “[i]n a sense, the turnback component of the package was a giant revenue sharing program.”45 These two components of the proposal would have affected 75

percent of federal aid to state and local governments. Most governors, both Democrats and Republicans, supported the proposal in theory, but the devil is always in the details, and many objected to specific provisions.46 After extended negotiations with the governors, Page 73 →mayors, state legislators, members of Congress, and others, the major components of the proposal failed, although smaller components—still affecting substantial sums of money—moved forward.47 Other scholarship explores the details and substance of those negotiations.48 Relevant here is the major role that the NGA, and particularly the NGA Executive Committee, played in the negotiations. Williamson makes clear that the NGA was a major broker in the negotiations.49 The association was able to provide its governors with policy analysis that it had no capacity to generate several years before. The association held its own in negotiations with the White House even as it worked to find common ground among its own disparate governors.50

The Formation of the Hall of the States By all accounts, Dan Evans was the person most responsible for the creation of a building that would serve as the center for state activities in Washington. As governor of Washington from 1965 to 1977, and chair of the National Governors’ Conference from 1973 to 1974, he felt strongly about the need for a stronger stage presence in Washington. His successor as NGC chair, Governor Cecil Andrus of Idaho, later referred to him as “the father of the Hall of the States.”51 Under Evans’s leadership, the NGC joined forces with the National Conference of State Legislatures and the Council of State Governments to seek a space that would serve as a central location for state activities in Washington. An NGC policy statement from June 11, 1975, indicates the governors’ support for creation of a Building of the States in Washington, DC.52 The National Governors’ Conference was located in downtown Washington at 1150 17th Street, NW, in the early 1970s. Initial conversations with the management indicated that the building had significant amounts of space available over the next several years to meet the space demands that the NGC projected for itself and its compatriot organizations and offices. As negotiations progressed, the amount of space that the management could expect to provide the NGC collective declined. At the same time, a new building at 400–444 North Capitol Street became an attractive possibility. The office building was located on the Senate side of Capitol Hill and a few blocks from the Capitol and Union Station. Capitol Hill in the mid-1970s was not a vibrant area of the city. As airline transit reduced train travel in the Northeast in the 1960s and 1970s, Union Station had deteriorated, and even Congress’s creation of a National Visitor Center in Union Station in 1976 did not make the building an attraction. Page 74 →A major renovation of Union Station would revitalize the area when it was completed in 1988, but most staff affiliated with the NGC and other involved organizations preferred to remain in the downtown area, which was more convenient to dining and shopping. Nonetheless, the proximity to the Capitol provided convenience, visibility, and prestige, and Union Station contained a station for the newly opened Metro rail transit system. Its role as the anchor tenant of the Hall of the States helped the NGA become a centralizing and organizing force among other state public official associations. By early 1982, more than two dozen associations of state officials and 23 states maintained offices in the building, although not all state offices were governors’ offices (see appendix 3.1 following this chapter). The Hall of the States drew three of the regional governors associations to Washington. By 1990, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors, the Southern Governors Association, and the Western Governors’ Association all maintained offices in the Hall of the States.53 The Hall of the States also continued to draw the offices of individual states, some of which were already in Washington at other locations and some of which were new to the nation’s capital. The Hall of the States had an immediate impact in two ways. First, the states now had a highly visible piece of Capitol Hill real estate. The large letters on the front of the building read, “The Hall of The States.” The opening of the Hall of the States closely coincided with the inauguration of President Carter, and governors used the building as a home base for their activities during the inauguration activities. Even governors who had been cool to the newly renamed NGA took advantage of its new facilities. California governor Jerry Brown (1975–83, 2011–) had been cool to NGA activities, as he remembered the association as the social club it

had been when his father, Pat Brown (D-CA, 1959–67), had served as governor. So it was not inconsequential that he participated in the NGA’s opening events of the Hall of the States during his visit to Washington in early 1977. The Carter inauguration allowed the NGA to showcase the value of its expanded office—both building and staff—to the governors. Second, the building was soon filled with many related organizations. The NGA and the State Services Organization worked to bring state lobbying offices to the building as tenants. In some cases, this meant that state offices moved from their existing locations in downtown Washington to the Hall of the States. In other cases, governors established Washington offices for the first time—or for the first time in many years. The NGA’s new building was the impetus for a critical mass of state organizations forming tighter ties, an informal coalition tied tightly by their tenancy Page 75 →at the same address. Some occupants, such as the National Association of State Budget Officers, already worked collaboratively with the NGA. As appointees of governors, budget officers have always worked closely with their chief executives. State transportation directors were often independently elected, however, and the NGA’s relationship with the American Association of State Highway Officers (AASHO) was more tenuous. When AASHO decided to move to the Hall of the States, it sent a strong message about the significance of the quarters and the coalition. After AASHO signed on to move to 444 North Capitol Street, other offices soon followed.54 Today, descendants of many of the groups that were originally part of the “1313 Group” in Chicago—the Public Administration Clearing House—are now occupants of the Hall of the States. As appendix 3.2 (following this chapter) shows, in 2015 the Hall of the States housed 21 state offices and 2 territory offices, the Council of State Governments, offices for several public universities, and far more state public official associations than it did in its early years.55

Explaining the Expansion of the NGA What led to the tremendous expansion of the NGA? Four key factors were at work: the tremendous changes in fiscal federalism and massive influx of funds to states and localities; the activism of other public official associations, and especially the urban lobby; the actions of key governors and association leaders; and internal organizational maintenance efforts. The same primary motive that led Governors Lehman and Baldwin to establish Washington outposts more than 20 years earlier led the governors to bring their association to Washington: money. The fiscal changes of the 1960s were not unprecedented—the Depression had ushered in cooperative federalism, after all—but it is difficult to overstate the impact of the millions of dollars in intergovernmental transfers on the expansion of the intergovernmental lobby. Total funds to states increased from $6.4 billion in 1961 to $16.9 billion in 1969.56 Though formula-based grants were responsible for most of this increase, some funds were allocated through project-based grants, which gave federal officials more discretion in how they distributed the funds to subnational governments as well as nongovernmental organizations and nonprofit groups. From 1964 to 1969, the number of project grants increased from 120 to 380.57 The discretion was given to federal agencies and not the recipient governments and other organizations. These project grants meant that vast new funding was available, but each grant targeted a specific population and had extensive Page 76 →requirements for implementation. The states and localities were a means through which to implement national objectives. This funding structure led states, localities, and groups and organizations to organize in Washington, seeking these funds. Haider labels this the second phase of intergovernmental lobbying in Washington, one that began “[b]y the middle1960s” and followed the first phase of intergovernmental lobbying that began with the New Deal in the 1930s.58 During this second phase, the NGC opened its Washington office, and many governors established their own offices in Washington to seek these funds. Some states did have offices in the 1950s—though the exact number is unknown, California, Massachusetts, and New York all had offices59—and offices proliferated in the 1960s. By 1967, 17 states had established or authorized offices.60 The most populous states all had offices, but so did several less populous states. A rival political force complicated the states’ chances to maximize their share of these newly available

federal funds. The cities were the biggest threat to the governors. The social problems of the 1960s had been framed as urban problems, a term that became shorthand for a specific set of policy challenges. As Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones ably demonstrate, cities became a national problem.61 The media, citizens, policy experts, and politicians cried for solutions.62 Congress responded by placing cities on its agenda, and sending funds to cities—much to the chagrin of governors, who were used to seeing funding to cities go through the states for distribution. A number of factors brought urban issues to the forefront in the 1960s. The social unrest that began in the late 1950s focused national attention on issues of education, housing, health care, race relations, and poverty. Congress responded with hearings, legislative authorizations, and appropriations. The Supreme Court’s 1962 establishment of the one person–one vote standard in Baker v. Carr brought political power to cities. In 1964 President Johnson launched his War on Poverty and outlined his Great Society vision, which led the way to the eventual passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. The Economic Opportunity Act provided $1.75 billion in 1968 in funding for community-based programs such as VISTA, Job Corps, and Head Start.63 The federal government established the Department of Housing and Urban Development when Johnson signed the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act into law in September 1965, and HUD provided $988 million directly to cities in 1968, with the bulk of the funding going to renewal and housing assistance as well as metropolitan development.64 In the 1970s, funding was even more substantial. The number of associations of public officials of all types—NGO executivePage 77 → associations, membership groups for government agencies, public education associations, and professional groups for government officials—grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s; also during this time, most moved to Washington.65 Suzanne Farkas describes this activity as the development of an urban policy subsystem.66 The forces that led to the creation of these associations had been active even in the 1930s. The growth of the federal government, increasing professionalism in government, scholarly research on public administration, and an emphasis on economy and efficiency growing from Frederick Taylor’s scientific management movement spurred entrepreneurial efforts to create these groups.67 In themselves many of these groups brought important professional services and support to their members. The mayors lobbied for funds aggressively during this period. The U.S. Conference of Mayors had formed in 1932 as a result of the American Municipal Association’s unwillingness to lobby Washington for money.68 In 1954, the American Municipal Association moved to Washington for the same reason.69 By the 1960s these two organizations were fully focused on maximizing federal funds to cities.70 William Browne and Robert Salisbury quote the mayor of a large city in Missouri as saying, “I can’t afford the time for any organization that keeps telling me things I already know and does nothing but feed me beer and sandwiches. What I need is someone to help me get to the money I need, not just tell me where it potentially is at.”71 Farkas argues that if governors had joined the large consortium of municipal executives in establishing the Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago in 1933, much competition and misunderstanding between mayors and governors could have been avoided.72 This seems an oversimplification. Mayors and governors have interests in the same federal funding pie, and that conflict is not easy to defuse. Mayors of the largest cities were a particularly powerful adversary. Governors wanted highway funds; mayors wanted mass transit funding. The mayors were not the only officials to organize. The National Association of Counties had been formed in the 1930s, but it was little more than a letterhead organization as late as 1957, when it was run on a part-time basis by two Washington lawyers on an annual budget of $18,000.73 Its first full-time executive director had clear intentions to increase the visibility of the National Association of Counties in Washington.74 By 1963, 400 counties were members. By 1973, the National Association of Counties had 800 counties as members, 100 staff members—30 in Washington, the rest in affiliated association offices—and represented counties with 60 percent of the U.S. population.75 The International City Management Page 78 →Association, which had been established in 1914 as the City Managers’ Association, also expanded its operations when it moved to Washington in 1964.76 Even the American Society for Public Administration, an organization that is focused on the professionalization of administrators rather than advocacy, moved from Chicago to Washington in 1964.77

Governors also began to face competition from other officials in their own state governments. Governor Evans of Washington recounted the difficulties of this competition. Governor Evans was at a Senate subcommittee hearing chaired by Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX, 1971–93), and he was sitting with Governor Cal Rampton (D-UT, 1965–77), who was to be the next chairman of the Governors’ Conference: We sat in the back of the room and listened while the first panel testified. The first panel had representatives of the American Association of State Highway Officers. We listened with increasing astonishment to these state officials testifying in exactly the opposite way that we were about to testify. We were stunned. My memory is thatВ .В .В . one of the officials who was there for the state highway officials was this highway director of Utah. And after they finished they came back up the aisle as we went forward, and as we passed them, Cal Rampton said, “I want to see you immediately!” And we went up and testified, to the enormous puzzlement of Senator Bentsen. He asked the question, вЂWho speaks for the states?’ And we said, вЂthe governors speak for the states.’ We came out of that meeting and I said to Cal, вЂThis is crazy. We’ve got to—how many organizations are there that speak for us?’ And we decided to do that study [a study produced in 1975 assessing the number of state executive associations].788 These new associations of state officials cost states millions in dues payments as well as meeting and travel expenses, and led to coordination problems as these groups lobbied the national government. The NGC report on the subject argued that the NGC should not take over or attempt to control these organizations, but that the NGC should improve communication with these groups—including “the development of means by which the associations can provide staff and technical support to the standingPage 79 → committees of NGC”79—cut back dues payments to associations; and reduce the number of state personnel participating in association activities and conferences. At its 1975 annual meeting, the NGC adopted 11 recommendations addressing the proliferation of state executive associations in Washington. (The Hall of the States would be one means for the governors to try to manage the messages from the various associations.) Individual political actors were the third force spurring the political development of the NGA. Just as state offices had their interest group entrepreneurs, the NGA had particular champions who were crucial to its establishment and maintenance. Frank Bane, who was the executive director of the Council of State Governments from 1938 to 1958, was “highly influential in persuading the governors of the forty-eight states to recognize their common interests.”80 Joining the NCG at around the same time that Evans became active was James L. Martin, who had started as one of the Conference’s first professional staff members in 1967. Martin had come from the National Association of Counties, and subsequently spent over 30 years working for the governors. As the organization’s chief lobbyist, he developed a reputation as a skilled and successful lobbyist for the states. Though he was careful to let the governors receive the overwhelming bulk of the media attention, it was Martin who helped direct the governors’ message, provided the ammunition of facts and figures, and worked assiduously at a staff level to further the governors’ agenda.81 Farber joined the organization in late 1975. He had previously worked for Governor Richard Hughes (D-NJ, 1962–70), and was working for Harvard University president Derek Bok when he was recruited to be the executive director of the National Governors’ Conference. Farber was executive director when the NGC moved from its office on 17th Street, NW, to the Hall of the States, but, more significantly, he oversaw its internal expansion. The NGC was rapidly developing its presence in Washington, but its infrastructure as a policy organization had not been developed. Farber was hired to create it. “You very seldom get a chance to build an organization like that,” reflected Farber. As the organization established its policy bona fides, there was a “quantum leap forward” in its effectiveness.82 The governor most critical to the growth and stability of the NGC was Governor Evans, the father of the Hall of the States. Evans was not only a skillful politician but also an outstanding managerial governor. He took office in 1965 after upsetting two-term incumbent Albert Rosillini (D-WA, 1957–65) in a year when both houses of the Washington legislature went Democratic, and Lyndon Johnson took 62 percent of the vote in the state. A moderate Republican, Evans was one of the new breed of governors who Page 80 →were modernizing their states. In 1970, for example, he called a special session of the legislature to address environmental issues, and

signed into law legislation that created the country’s first state environmental agency, the Washington Department of Ecology, which preceded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In 1982 George Weeks named Evans one of the ten outstanding governors of the 20th century.83 In his book on the evolution of governors from 1950 to 1975, Larry Sabato included him in his list of “top dozen” governors.84 A Navy veteran of World War II and Korea, Evans was a civil engineer when he went into politics in 1956. Other than his military service, he did not have experience in Washington, DC, or in working with the federal government. It was not long before he realized the importance of intergovernmental relations, however. Evans increased state funds to localities while pointing out that the coordinating role of the state was crucial in responding to problems that did not respect jurisdictional boundaries.85 He further argued that federal control was “too often unsatisfactory.В .В .В . State government must learn to be a watchdog over the federal programs, and it must develop effective power to act.86 Articulate, driven, and good looking, Evans was a governor to watch.87 The Boston Globe described him as “a man of impeccable integrity, gracious, a master of the intricacies of government, eager to involve everyday citizens, courageous and tenacious in pursuing his idealistic goals.”88 Evans was well suited to become a leader among governors. Though his first experience with the National Governors’ Conference left him unimpressed, he subsequently became a member of the executive committee, eventually serving as NGC chair from 1973 to 1974. Evans worked to make the voice of the governors a proactive policy force in Washington. It was Evans’s vision of the organization that most attracted Farber to the position of executive director. As Farber described it, the job was “a tremendous opportunity to bring life to Dan Evans’s vision, the vision of a national policy instrument for governors.”89 Evans was the architect of that vision, and Farber was the engineer. Interest groups scholars know that any interest group wishing to last for long spends considerable time on organizational maintenance. This point raises the specter of internal organizational forces—namely professional staff activities—as a fourth factor at work in the expansion of the NGA. Although the aforementioned forces were the principal mechanisms at work in the NGA’s expansion over time, internal institutional interests were additional contributing factors. It is worth taking a bit of time Page 81 →to explore the role that internal organizational forces have played in the NGA’s development. It is easier for organizations to expand their portfolios of activities than it is to contract them. These patterns were prevalent at the NGA in the 1970s and 1980s. Those who have the most intense commitment can drive the organization. NGA expansion was fostered by governors who were committed to the organization and wished to see its expansion. These interests were more forceful than those of any governors who did not see the benefit of an expanded NGA. As is typical in interest organizations, we see the committed versus the uninvolved rather than the committed versus the hostile. Evans led a group of governors who were committed to expanding the NGA. It is difficult to say whether their strong commitment represented that of a majority of governors, but it was enough at least to carry the day with the majority. This is not dissimilar from a pattern we see again and again in interest group politics: concentrated benefits and dispersed costs create an incentive structure for action that favors those on the side of the benefits.90 Evans did not spearhead the initiative for the Hall of the States because he wanted to expand the NGA’s strength for its own sake. The NGA’s expansion in the late 1970s and early 1980s was driven by governors’ wishes. It was governors who continued to pay NGA dues, which increased rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the association grew—and they paid these dues during a time when states were facing significant fiscal challenges, which speaks to their support of the enlarged NGA. Yet nearly every organization—and in particular, its professional staff—has an interest in its own maintenance.91 The expansion of the NGA created a professional association with professional staff members who would have a vested interest in the organization’s maintenance. And with the establishment of the Hall of the States, the NGA now had an interest beyond seeing the building filled and the State Services Organization

maintained financially. More central to the organization’s mission, it had an interest in supporting and expanding the collection of state offices and associations that would comprise the coalition of the states. By 2000, the National Governors Association had a staff of more than 80 people—somewhat smaller than its size during its heyday in the early 1980s, but very substantial nonetheless.92 As we will see in chapter 5, the Hall of the States fosters considerable informal networking among staff of the various organizations that reside there. In researching the NGA’s early years in Washington and the formation of the Hall of the States, I have Page 82 →often asked, tongue only partially in cheek, can a building be an interest group entrepreneur? In their NGA leadership roles, Evans and others encouraged other governors to establish offices. Today the association introduces all new governors to the concept of a Washington office at the new governors seminar that takes place in even-numbered years and serves as a sort of orientation. In many years, the seminar has had a panel on managing federal-state relations in which a director of a Washington office and a staff member who handles federal relations from a state capital speak about what they do and about the pros and cons of each location. The association also provides information on how to structure an office, typical duties, typical pay scales, and so forth. Gone are the days when Governor Lehman, with no model before him, conceived of a branch office in Washington that could interact with federal agencies and Congress to assist the state. A new governor need not develop the idea for a Washington office; the idea is presented to him or her. Although today the NGA does not take a formal position on whether a governor should have a Washington office, there may still be some informal encouragement to do so. The existence of the Hall of the States itself has also fostered the proliferation and maintenance of governors’ lobbying operations in Washington. It did this by decreasing the costs that a governor would incur by retaining a lobbyist in Washington. I do not mean the costs of rent; in fact, some state liaisons in other buildings considered, and today still consider, the Hall of the States to be a bit expensive compared to other options. (The State Services Organization is quick to point out that costs are extremely competitive with comparable buildings in good locations with similar amenities.) Rather, it is the nonmonetary costs that decrease. A governor—or more likely the aide tasked with exploring the possibility of an office—has an easy option for office location when considering where to lease space in Washington. Almost all the state offices today are in the Hall of the States.93 The Hall of the States—and the presence of many other state offices—may decrease the political risks of such an office, as a governor might be less likely to be accused by a reporter of doing something unusual or unreasonable by opening an office. (I will talk much more about the political risks of Washington offices in chapter 7.) As Jack Walker writes, “Political mobilization is seldom spontaneous.”94 Although Walker then goes on to frame his observation for the mobilization of the larger public, it is at least as true for political elites. The mobilization of governors in Washington that began in the 1960s was not an accident, and this mobilization has had lasting effects. The governors’ Page 83 →larger vision of the NGA as a full-service organization that lobbied, fulfilled contract work, and conducted policy research became a reality in the decade spanning the 1970s. The Hall of the States was the physical manifestation of the governors as a collective voice, a voice that was nonexistent in national politics prior to 1967. As the Boston Globe commented, this was a time when states believed they were “вЂcoming of age’ as vital forces in the nation’s capital—both as lobbyists for their collective interests and as collaborators with the Federal government.”95 History has shown that the states were right.

The NGA Today Understanding today’s roles and activities of the two halves of the NGA is crucial to understanding its organizational and political strengths and weaknesses. The NGC Center for Policy Research and Analysis, established in March 1974 at the NGC winter meeting, became the NGA Center for Best Practices in 1996.96 The advocacy arm continues as the National Governors Association. (In 2002 the membership voted without ceremony to drop the apostrophe, and the new name was implemented at the start of 2003.) For the remainder of this

chapter, I will refer to the Center for Best Practices as the NGA Center, and its NGA parent as simply the NGA.

The NGA Center for Best Practices With an organizational purpose of “tracking, evaluating, and disseminating information on state innovations and best practices,” the Center is the research arm of the NGA.97 Called “the governors’ think tank” by the Washington Post, it gathers information, brings stakeholders together, and facilitates consensus building among governors and states regarding standards and best practices in state government.98 Funded primarily through grants and contracts, the Center’s spending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009, was $17 million. Close to half its funding is from federal contracts, and just over one-quarter of its funds are from foundation grants and contracts—one sign of the NGA Center’s skill and reputation is its foundation funding sources. In recent years the Ford Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have funded Center projects. A smaller portion of Center funds comes from the corporations that contribute $20,000 each to participate in the Corporate Fellows Program, Page 84 →which was founded in 1988 and “promotes the exchange of information between the private sector and governors and stimulates discussion among the Corporate Fellows on emerging trends and factors affecting both business and government.”99 In 2011, it had over 100 fellows.100 Representing approximately three-quarters of NGA expenditures in the last few years, the Center is the bulk of NGA projects and personnel. The Center has five policy divisions—Economic, Human Services and Workforce; Education; Environment, Energy and Transportation; Health; and Homeland Security and Public Safety—as well as a management consulting and training office. These divisions produce issue briefs on policy innovations and provide this information to relevant state and national officials; they are information disseminators.101 As the research arm of the NGA, the Center has two powerful tools at its disposal. First, it speaks for governors rather than a more specialized group of officials. It carries more clout than the average Washington nonprofit policy organization. Second, and related to this, it has been effective at bringing stakeholders—individuals and organizations—to the table to find common goals and standards. The Center is a logical roundtable for consensus building among not only state governments but also other policy actors. One NGA Center project initiative addressed voluntary standards for electronic health care records. In 2004, President George W. Bush issued an executive order creating a national health information technology coordinator and set a goal that most Americans have electronic health care records by 2014. Also in 2004, the federal government provided grants to several states for demonstration projects and to several corporations to develop electronic systems for these records.102 Federal funding continued in subsequent years, and governors began to develop parallel initiatives. With the federal government pushing for electronic health care records, and states working to implement standards, the time was ripe for coordination. In 2007, the Center brought together current and former governors, state attorneys general, state insurance commissioners, state legislators, and a state health department director to establish the State Alliance for E-Health. The Alliance focused not only on electronic patient records but on health information technology and electronic health information exchange more broadly. With several advisory members from academia, state government, and the health care industry, and staffed by the Center, the State Alliance for E-Health produced its first annual report in 2008. The report reviewed the challenges brought by the move to electronic health care records and made six recommendations to states; each recommendationPage 85 → identified several “strategies” that governors and legislators could pursue. Among them were to “Designate a single authority for state government interagency coordination and collaboration with statewide public-private efforts”; “Participate in national certification and standards-setting processes”; and “Direct each state health professional board to work with its counterparts in other states to develop a nationwide core set of credentialing parameters.”103 Additional reports by the Alliance have provided information on current standards across the states, assessments of difficulties, and detailed discussions of electronic health initiatives in particular states. The Alliance is not the Center for Best Practices. One strength of the Alliance is that its members and advisers include a broad range of political and policy actors. But it is the Center that provides the support for the Alliance.

By identifying challenges for government and presenting possible paths forward, the Alliance helped keep the National Governors Association relevant when the health care debate of 2009 turned to health information technology and electronic innovation. And the list of Alliance members belies the research work of the coalition, which relies heavily on the professional staff members of the Center’s health policy division. Another of the Center’s major initiatives has been core standards in K-12 education. State and local governments have traditionally rankled at federal education standards for teachers or students. The Common Core State Standards Initiative began in 2009 as a joint effort of the Center and the Council of Chief State School Officers. The result has been sets of common standards in English language arts and mathematics. Work on a set of standards for social studies is currently under way. States have been loath to relinquish control of their standards, and states currently develop and implement their own educational standards. The latest large federal foray into education policy, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, left many governors, education policy makers, and practitioners with a bitter taste in their mouths. Since No Child Left Behind tied student success and accountability to standards that were determined by states, many of these same stakeholders were justifiably skittish about adopting standards not produced by their own states. So it speaks to the political effectiveness of the Common Core efforts that 46 states had joined the Common Core Initiative by June 2009.104 By November 2010, 30 states had voluntarily adopted the English language arts and mathematics standards.105 Although many stakeholders are wary of externally established standards, they are more accepting of standards forged by a coalition of states than by the federal government.106 Page 86 →

The Association Organizationally, the NGA is something of an oddity. The Internal Revenue Service has determined that it is an “instrumentality of the states.”107 It is not subject to taxes and does not have a classification as a 501(c)(6) or any other IRS classification. Funded by dues from the 55 states, commonwealths, and territories, the NGA considers all governors of all states and territories as members, regardless of whether they currently pay dues. This allows the association to present itself as speaking for all governors, even during years when the support from some governors is nonexistent. Though smaller—it had $6 million in expenses in fiscal year 2009—this is the side of the NGA that most people think of when they think of NGA activities. It runs the winter and summer meetings and other meetings during the year, such as the postelection new governors meetings. The NGA is the lobbying end, and the governors themselves work more directly with the NGA than the NGA Center. The NGA has three oversight committees—the executive, finance, and legal affairs committees—and a chair and vice chair of different parties. The vice chair succeeds the chair after a one-year term, and thus the chair alternates between a Republican and a Democrat. The number of policy committees has changed over time. In the 1990s, when governors were more active and the organization had more resources, there were more committees, but today there are four: the Economic Development and Commerce Committee; the Education, Early Childhood and Workforce Committee; the Health and Human Services Committee, and the Natural Resources Committee. There is also a Special Committee on Homeland Security and Public Safety. The committees serve multiple gubernatorial needs, in much the same way that congressional committees benefit their members.108 Each committee’s activities are fueled in part by NGA staff work and in part by the commitment of its constituent governors. The committees send many letters to Congress each year, signed by the committee’s chair and vice chair, and they endorse many resolutions that then are considered by the full body at the summer and winter meetings. These proposals need a two-thirds vote in favor to pass. Gone are the days of the unanimity rule that so severely limited the NGA’s advocacy efforts, though the two-thirds rule still ensures broad support for any policy. In practice, a few governors can stop any resolution if they are vocal in their concerns. If the governor wants to propose a new policy or resolution at winter or summer meetings, and the proposal has not gone through the committee process, the full body must approve a suspension of the rules with a Page 87 →three-quarters affirmative vote. This bolsters the committees as the basis for policy development, and helps limit gubernatorial grandstanding and policy extremism, but it has its drawbacks. The NGA resolution process is neither speedy nor agile, and some say it produces policy positions so uncontroversial as to be effectively meaningless.

The NGA has approximately 10 lobbyists on staff. Many have previous experience working in Congress. Some have previous experience working in state government or for other state associations. By one official’s estimate, 80 percent of NGA lobbying is targeted at its own members as well at as other organizations in the Hall of the States. The remaining 20 percent is aimed at federal officials in Congress or elsewhere. Much of the work done by the lobbying staff is providing information to congressional staff members and their bosses. Someone from the government relations division is on the Hill at least three times a week. NGA staff members work to maintain connections so that governors can come to do the heavy lifting during an NGA lobbying mobilization. An NGA senior staff member explained, “A huge part of our job is what I call table setting. Any table that the governors want to sit at, it’s our job to be able to pull out the chair and let them sit down, and that means maintaining relationships.”

Strengths of the NGA We have multiple means to help us understand what factors lead to a strong NGA. Multiple interview subjects who worked for or with the NGA over many years discussed what they saw as the NGA’s strengths and weaknesses, and we can analyze the peaks and valleys of organizational strength. When is the NGA strongest? When the national policy agenda favors policies that are in governors’ interests; when there is divided government in Washington; when there is strong gubernatorial leadership; and when money—campaign fundraising—does not get in the way. Each of these conditions deserves its own discussion in turn. First, try as they might to influence the policy agenda in Washington, governors are to a large extent at the mercy of larger political influences. In the 1960s and 1970s, domestic social issues were at the fore, and it was easy for governors to make the case that they were critical players in policy solutions. In the new millennium, when national security, wars in the Middle East, and the national economy have taken center stage, the NGA has faced a much tougher battle to demonstrate its relevance. Governors are not seen as partners the way they were in earlier times. They play a role in influencing the national policy agenda, but they are only one set of players Page 88 →on a stage with many, many actors. Presidential leadership is perhaps the biggest single influence on the national policy agenda. Presidents Reagan and Bill Clinton saw state governments as capable partners in domestic policy implementation; governors had considerable influence on policymaking during these presidencies. (Many would argue that Washington has not viewed federalism as a central issue since Reagan’s presidency.) Figure 3.1 provides a demonstration of the NGA’s prominence over time, as captured by the number of times that the NGA (or its forebears) has been mentioned in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Online Edition). The spikes in the figure reflect the activity of the governors when working with these two presidents—and also the governors’ activity when Presidents Johnson and Nixon were creating initiatives that bypassed states and provided allocations to cities. The second factor in NGA strength is divided government. One NGA official explained it like this: When Washington, DC, is a one-party town, it is more partisan than at any other point.В .В .В . The party of the minority is going to fight hard to be heard and the party of the majority is going to fight hard to not have to include the minority.В .В .В . The NGA, as a bipartisan organization, is strongest when there is divided government. It gives both parties an entry point into governance. That becomes more of a shared responsibility, and that makes it easier for us. This official explained how the NGA can take advantage of divided government. After an election, the governors from the two parties will develop policy positions, but if there is divided government in Washington, they will realize that they will need some support from the other party to see the policy enacted or otherwise put into place. The parties can take their policy positions to the NGA, and then the NGA works to find common ground. If the NGA can meld the policy proposals together, it will then push for policy adoption. If the NGA is not able to find common ground between the Democrats and Republicans, then the NGA will leave the issue by the wayside. One significant NGA success was the Family Support Act of 1988, the law that created the first federal work requirement for welfare beneficiaries. Republican Ronald Reagan was in the White House, but Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. President Reagan called for welfare reform in his 1986 State of the Union

address, and the NGA began working on its own welfare reform legislative proposal immediately thereafter.109Page 89 → NGA chief lobbyist Jim Martin helped craft a deal with compromises from each side; Governor John Sununu (R-NH, 1983–89), then chair of the NGA, lobbied Republican President George H. W. Bush, and Governor Mike Castle (R-DE, 1985–92) lobbied Republicans in Congress. Governor Bill Clinton (D-AR), 1979–81, 1983–92) lobbied congressional Democrats.110 The political balance of the NGA—with Democrats controlling 26 state governorships and Republicans controlling 24—was ideally suited to lobby the divided government in Washington.

Fig. 3.1. Number of articles in the CQ Almanac mentioning the Governors’ Conference, NGC, or NGA, 1945–2010 Likewise, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 occurred with President Clinton in the White House and Newt Gingrich (R-GA, U.S. Congress, 1979–99) as Speaker of the House of Representatives. The governors helped craft a landmark welfare reform law that remains in effect today.111 Directors of state offices in Washington in the late 1990s identified welfare reform as one of the most significant agenda items to face the states in years, and most saw it as a major success. It was during this time that the NGA was listed by Fortune magazine as one of the 25 most powerful interest groups in Washington.112 The third, and perhaps most critical, factor influencing the NGA’s strength is the commitment of its gubernatorial leadership. A strong NGA Page 90 →chair or vice chair, or a core executive committee member, can mobilize the governors behind common agenda items and can help promote the agenda in Washington. When several governors commit, the opportunities for action increase exponentially. In the 1990s the NGA was led by very effective governors. In particular, Roy Romer (D-CO, NGA chair 1992–93), Howard Dean (D-VT, NGA chair 1994–95), Tommy Thompson (R-WI, NGA chair 1995–96), George Voinovich (R-OH, NGA chair 1997–98), Tom Carper (D-DE, NGA chair 1998–99), and Mike Leavitt (R-UT, NGA chair 1999–2000) were experienced governors and strong NGA leaders. They were committed to the organization and to states’ voices in Washington. It was also helpful that a centrist former governor and NGA chair, Bill Clinton (D-AR, NGA chair 1986–87), was in the White House from 1993 to 2000. The fourth factor influencing NGA power is causing more and more difficulty for the association: money. Campaign funds are one thing that the NGA cannot bring to the table for its members. This affects the association in two different ways. First, it affects the NGA as a bipartisan organization. As gubernatorial campaigns become more expensive, governors are turning to organizations that can help with this. The two partisan governors associations—the Democratic Governors Association (DGA) and the Republican Governors Association (RGA)—have become major fundraisers for their respective parties. In the 2013–14 election cycle, the DGA and the RGA each spent more money than any other state-oriented (rather than federally oriented) 527 political organization. Together, the two groups raised half of all funds spent by state-oriented 527 groups.113 We will talk much more about DGA and RGA fundraising in chapter 6, but here I will point out these groups’ impact on the NGA. The fundraising capacity of these two groups has increased their power significantly. They receive more attention from governors, they receive more attention from the national political parties, and they receive more notice from political leaders in Washington. The NGA might be precluded from taking on certain issues in which partisanship limits consensus building, but the DGA and RGA do not have these limitations. The DGA and RGA face their own policy debates internally, but they have a much easier time reaching consensus among members, and the associations provide a platform to promote the positions of their respective governors. The DGA and RGA piggyback their meetings on the NGA meetings each year. The partisan groups used to be very respectful of the NGA’s schedule; this is less true today. Furthermore, the NGA must watch to ensure that the partisan groups do not steal its Page 91 →thunder with their own press conferences, which in at least one or two cases have been scheduled opposite the NGA’s press conferences. If the NGA is working to speak for all governors, it is undercut if there are two other groups creating their own partisan commentary. What results is an organization less able to take policy positions and advocate for governors and states as a whole.

Second, money plays a role in the NGA’s prominence in Washington. It is acknowledged by both political scientists and Washington political players that campaign contributions help provide access to elected officials. The NGA does not precede its meetings with House or Senate offices with campaign contributions to the senator or representative. This means that other interest groups have a tool that the NGA does not. Members of Congress and their staff have limited time to meet with lobbyists, and the NGA cannot use contributions to help with highlevel access. It must also face a policy-making setting where other players are able to donate to campaigns. This is what led one interview subject to say that the NGA can be effective “when money does not get in the way.”

Complaints about the NGA Today, the NGA faces more challenges from its membership, and it is broadly considered less powerful than it was 15 years ago. Though virtually all the governors’ lobbyists interact regularly with the NGA, a sizeable minority are deeply frustrated with the organization. Governors are political animals, as are their staff members. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many complaints that they have about their association are colored by partisanship. This has always been the case, but in the 1990s there were more efforts at bipartisanship. The following quotation, from an office director for a prominent Republican governor—one who was considered quite conservative—is representative the recognition of the benefits of bipartisan gubernatorial efforts: We spent a lot of time [in] the last two yearsВ .В .В . working to form a joint position of the governors, which meant that it had to be very bipartisan, at least among the executive committee of NGA. And we spent a lot of time, in some cases, bridging partisan differences on key issues, but when we were able to do so we were enormously effective. I think the best example of that was the changes in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act on Medicaid and then children’s health. Our partisan difference really helped us because then the governorsPage 92 → reunified and the Republican governors were working with the Republican delegations very hard and the Democrats were doing the same thing. I think that is the real strength and the beauty of those organizations. When there is true consensus, they can be enormously effective because you hit both parties. (Office director for Republican governor, 1999) But what counts as conservative has changed over time. Governors Rick Perry (R-TX, 2001–) and Scott Walker (R-WI, 2011–) have very different federalist ideals than Governors Tommy Thompson (R-WI, 1987–2001) and Mike Leavitt (R-UT, 1993–2003). It is not only that today’s governors are more conservative. They also are more likely to be anti-Washington, and by extension more hostile to the NGA and its intergovernmental work. There is a growing sentiment among a number of Republican governors’ offices that the NGA is too liberal an organization, one that is biased toward a Democratic agenda. Today’s Republican governors are also more likely to be vocally anti-Washington in their rhetoric and policy positions than earlier Republican governors. For their part, some Democratic governors’ lobbyists today believe that the NGA is catering too much to this conservative criticism. Some do not place fault with the association, but rather believe that it is limited by today’s conservative Republican governors. One state liaison, a Democrat, viewed the organization as hamstrung by not being able to operate under majority rule, and that policy efforts became a “war of attrition, ” a contest of who could nitpick the most. Naming two prominent Republican governors, he continued that they “would want one last thing and kill it [the consensus].” This liaison concluded by saying, “I don’t think the governor saw any benefit to the NGA at all.” What has happened in the NGA mirrors to some extent the party polarization we have seen in Congress—with, as Marc Hetherington describes it, “party members clustering toward the ideological poles and the middle a vast wasteland.”114 As Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal point out, Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA, 1995–2007) was more conservative than the man who had held the seat earlier, Senator John Heinz (R-PA, 1977–91); and House party leaders Nancy Pelosi (D-CA, 1987–) and John Boehner (R-OH, 1985–2015) were more partisan than Tip O’Neill (D-MA, 1953–87) and Gerald Ford (R-MI, 1949–73), who had

served in the same positions thirty-plus years earlier.115 While we may not see as much party polarization among the governors as we do in Congress, the Washington political atmosphere in which the governors and their lobbyists must operate Page 93 →is certainly more polarized, and certainly we have seen more ideologically extreme governors holding office. Scheppach, who served as executive director of the association from 1982 to 2011, was able to guide the organization through partisan conflicts with enough deftness to serve for nearly 30 years.116 Stateline referred to him as “the glue quietly holding together the National Governors’ Association.” Scheppach has acknowledged that his leadership was not universally supported throughout his tenure—he noted in an interview that there were a number of efforts to fire him over the years—but he was also able to help forge bipartisan consensus on critical issues.117 Forging consensus has become more and more difficult, however. In recent years some governors have withheld their states’ dues. It appears this first occurred in 1997, when Governor Fob James (R-AL, 1979–83, 1995–99) announced he would not be renewing his state’s contribution to an organization he considered too liberal. The NGA is understandably discreet regarding nonpayment, and so it is difficult to ascertain all cases where a state did not pay dues, but it has become more common. In his 2003 state of the state address, Governor Rick Perry disparaged the association dues that various government offices paid even when the state was facing a significant budget shortfall.118 Subsequent to that, Texas stopped supporting the NGA, and as of the end of 2011, Texas remained a nonpayer. Governor Butch Otter (R-ID, 2007–) did not pay dues in 2010 or 2011; Florida has also refused to pay dues in at least some recent years. South Carolina joined Texas and Idaho as one of at least three states to withhold dues when Governor Nikki Haley (R-SC, 2011–) announced that she would neither pay dues nor attend the NGA annual meetings.119 The withholding of dues delivers a financial and political message to both constituents in the state and the NGA leadership, and it seems to be a recent phenomenon. Farber, the executive director from 1975 to 1982, could not recall any instance of a state not paying its dues during his tenure with the organization. Fewer Washington office directors today believed that the NGA added value to the intergovernmental lobby. In part this is because today’s office directors seem less focused on the details of public policy, and more on political efforts. This leads to a disconnect with an organization that is more about policy than about politics, one that deals with politics on a federalism dimension rather than a partisanship dimension. Whatever the cause, it is a challenge for the NGA. What results from all this is an organization that is less able to adopt policy positions and less able to advocate effectively for governors and states as a collective whole. Page 94 →Taken together, the factors that influence the NGA’s strength help us answer our second puzzle, that of why governors, who have such power and good political connections themselves, would need lobbyists. Power and connections vary in strength under different circumstances. We will look at this puzzle much more closely in the coming chapters.

The Future of the NGA Those who work closely with the NGA believe that its role may be changing. Its reputation is not what it was 15 years ago, and its political impact is slipping. The heightened partisanship, the increasing role of money in politics, the greater and greater hostility toward Washington from state leaders, and the waning commitment to ideals of federalism on the part of Washington lawmakers: all these chip away at the NGA’s influence. The association also has to worry about its financial base. Since the political arm of the association is funded entirely through dues, it is not inconsequential if governors elect not to contribute. Dues are structured by state size, and so it is especially damaging when a state such as Texas opts out. The NGA’s strengths have evolved somewhat over the last 15 years. Scheppach, then serving as executive director of the NGA, alluded to this in an interview with Stateline.org in 2000: “If you were to ask the average governor over time, вЂWhat does NGA provide for you?,’ I think three years ago eight or nine out of 10 governors would have said, вЂthe lobbying function. They protect me from the federal government.’ Now I think if you were to ask, you would probably get six. But the other four would say, вЂthey’re really helpful

to me in terms of policy in my state.’ So, the Center [for Best Practices] has actually moved up, I think, in terms of priorities.”120 The variation in gubernatorial support between 1997 and 2010 likely reflects a change in governors as well as a change in the NGA. Since then, the NGA Center has continued to increase its size and scope, and the advocacy arm has struggled more than in the past to maintain financial and political support from all the governors. Although there are some in the community of governors’ lobbyists who say that the NGA does not add value, it is difficult to imagine any scenario in which the NGA ceases to exist. The organization has many, many strengths, and with 80 employees and several funding streams across the NGA and the NGA Center, it has an infrastructure for organizational maintenance. If today’s governors are less personally vested in the NGA than were their counterparts in the 1990s, this will not be fatal to the organization. Ultimately, the association’s political power depends on the Page 95 →commitment and cohesion of its governors. During times without strong political support from its members, the NGA is well situated to flourish as a full service organization that provides expertise to gubernatorial offices and executive branches. Should the gubernatorial political will increase again, the NGA lobbying portfolio is likely to rise to greater prominence. As is typical of successful political organizations, the NGA must continue to evolve to survive.

Appendix 3.1 Selected State Government-Related Offices in the Hall of the States, 1982 (Source: Listing from the State Services Organization Agenda Book for the February 11, 1982, SSO Board Meeting.)

State Offices Alaska Alaska Legislative Information Office California Legislature California State Department of Education Connecticut Delaware Florida Florida Department of Education Illinois Illinois General Assembly Illinois State Board of Education (sharing suite with Illinois) Indiana Kentucky Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Missouri Missouri, University of Montana New Jersey New York New York State Assembly New York State Senate North Carolina Page 96 →North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (sharing suite with North Carolina) Pennsylvania

Rhode Island South Carolina Utah Virginia Washington Wisconsin

Public Official Associations That Include State Officials American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials Coalition of Northeastern Governors Policy Research Center Inc. Council of Chief State School Officers Council of State Community Affairs Agencies Council of State Governments Council of State Planning Agencies Criminal Justice Statistics Association Education Commission of the States Federation of National Tax Administrators National Association of Tax Administrators National Tobacco Tax Administrators North American Gasoline Tax Conference Governors’ Council on Regional Development Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies National Association of Attorneys General National Association of Development Organizations National Association of Governors’ Highway Safety Representatives National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers National Association of State Boards of Education National Association of State Budget Officers National Association of State Development Agencies National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors National Black Caucus of State Legislators National Governors’ Association National Governors’ Association Center for Policy Research Southern Growth Policies Board State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators Page 97 →

Appendix 3.2 Selected State Government-Related Offices in the Hall of the States, 2015 (Source: State Services Organization Tenant List, State Services Organization web page. Accessed April 18, 2015, http://www.sso.org/about-us/our-clients.html.)

State/Territorial Offices Alabama Alaska

Arizona California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Guam Indiana Iowa Kentucky Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina U.S. Virgin Islands Virginia Washington Wisconsin

College/University Offices California State University Carnegie Mellon University Cornell University Kent State University Ohio State University Princeton University Page 98 →State University of New York Rutgers University University of Kansas University of Washington Washington State University

Public Official Associations That Include State Officials American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials Coalition of Northeastern Governors Policy Research Center Inc. Coastal States Organization, Inc. Council of State Governments Delta Regional Authority Federal Funds Information for States Federation of Tax Administrators Multistate Tax Commission National Adult Education Professional Development Consortium National Association of Government Archives and Records Administrators National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors National Association of Clean Air Agencies

National Association of Insurance Commissioners National Association of RC&D Councils, Inc. National Association of Secretaries of State National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers National Association of State Budget Officers National Association of State Chief Information Officers National Association for State Community Services Programs National Association of State Foresters National Association of State Retirement Administrators National Association of State Treasurers National Association of State Workforce Agencies National Black Caucus of State Legislators National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers National Conference of State Legislatures National Council of State Housing Agencies National Emergency Management Association National Governors Association National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators Southern Governors’ Association Western Governors’ Association

Page 99 →

Chapter 4 Modern State Offices at Work If the NGA is the anchor store in the Hall of the States, the individual state offices are the boutiques. The NGA represents the collective interests of states, safeguarding federalism writ large. The lobbyists representing a single state attend to issues that affect only their state or perhaps a subset of states. Issues that affect all states are a minority of their lobbying agenda. These offices are safeguarding federalism writ small. While they are sometimes working toward an agenda shared with most or all other states, often they are pursuing interests unique to their state. While they are sometimes protecting against the encroachment of the federal government, often they are acting opportunistically to seek material gains. To investigate our second puzzle—why do governors need lobbyists?—as it applies to state lobbying offices, we need to understand what these offices do. In chapter 1, I set out the ways that lobbying offices could, at least in theory, fill gaps left by other safeguards as well as benefit their sponsors. In this chapter, I examine contemporary governors’ offices. How do they pursue their roles as safeguards of federalism: as opportunists, protectors of state flexibility, brokers of deals? More generally, how do they serve as governors’ eyes and ears in Washington? According to its 1998 annual goals, the Missouri office “helps coordinate and monitor policy between Missouri’s congressional delegation, federal agencies, the Governor’s office, and Missouri agencies.”1 In 1999, the state of Alaska office defined its mission as being to “identify and monitor issues which arise in Congress and various federal agencies in Washington, D.C.; analyze and help formulate State policy on those issues; and advocate policy in appropriate federal forums.”2 More recently, the website for the Texas Office of State-Federal Relations stated, “Texas State officials realize that in order for the state government to maintain a strong position in our Page 100 →relationship with the federal government, Texas must maintain a real presence in Washington, DC.”3 Another portion of the Texas website states, “The goal of [the office] is to increase the influence of the Governor and the Legislature over federal action that has a direct or indirect economic, fiscal, or regulatory impact on the state and its citizens, maintaining an active role for Texas in the national decision-making process.”4 Most of this chapter looks at the three major activities of lobbying offices. Washington office liaisons will change their tactics as needed to best suit the situation, but their strategic goals have remained the same since the 1960s. First, they serve as an intergovernmental conduit for information that flows between the state and federal governments. Second, they seek policies and regulations that are favorable to the state. This often means opposing unfunded mandates. Third, they are seekers of funds for their states. This is a major activity for all state offices, though the avenues for funding—for line-item appropriations, grants-in-aid, and discretionary grants—vary with changes in the political environment and fiscal health of the federal government. I use these three categories to structure most of this chapter, with a caveat that these categories can be somewhat fluid. The line between policy advocacy and resource advocacy can be particularly fuzzy. Many office directors said they found it difficult to delineate which efforts were focused on funding and which were focused on regulations affecting state programs. Washington offices engage in lobbying efforts that are not directly seeking federal funds, but that still have significant financial implications. Many policy fights in Washington translate to funding issues for the states. They are not always mutually exclusive. In each of these categories, although least in the first, they are lobbying. Washington offices exist to lobby, which I define as attempting to persuade another actor or

organization to adopt some position or provide some benefit. These offices do many other things, but if they didn’t lobby, they would not exist. In the 105th Congress (1997–98), Washington lobbying offices spent an average of 65 percent of their time lobbying on behalf of the states, including time spent preparing for lobbying, versus all other nonlobbying activities. The time spent lobbying decreased in the 111th Congress (2009–10), when the offices spent an average of just over 50 percent of their time lobbying. The decrease in time spent on advocacy is likely related to smaller staff sizes in the 111th Congress. In addition to exploring the three major activities of state lobbying offices, this chapter also examines the substantive policy areas that are the focus of these offices. I provide a broad review of issue areas and the time they take, and then investigate in more detail state office efforts on one Page 101 →policy area that is primary to every office: health care. Most of the evidence for this chapter comes from the two waves of interviews I conducted. I leave the discussion of office structure for chapter 6.

Offices as Intergovernmental Conduits Washington office directors identify the role of intergovernmental conduit as being primary to their work. Governors’ liaisons consistently identify “acting as a liaison between the governor and the federal government” and “acting as a liaison between the state government and the congressional delegation” as their most important activities (see table 4.1). These goals have not changed since at least the early 1980s, when David Cingranelli interviewed Washington office directors to determine their office priorities.5 John Pelissero and Robert England found a similar emphasis on forming relationships with those in Congress as well as federal agencies.6 The ability to attain information and then hand it on—both to the state and to Washington institutions—is paramount. This is defending federalism in the gentlest manner: gathering information and facilitating the federal partnership. Table 4.1. Major Activities of Federal-State Relations Offices State Office Directors Ranking the Activity 1997–98 Activity (n = 27) Providing information to state and local government officials about federal-state issues, programs, and regulations 81% Serving as liaison between the governor and other state officials and state and federal program officers in Washington 93% Providing information to the state’s delegation in Congress 81% Coordinating contacts (such as arranging appointments or speeding the flow of paperwork) between state and federal officials 19% Seeking grant money from federal agencies 0% Working to make federal grant formulas beneficial to your state 11% Working for a reduction in federal mandates placed on state government 19% Serving as liaison between private corporations in the state and federal officials 0% Page 102 →Governors’ lobbyists work with politicians and government employees who can be lumped into two groups: the Washington players, and the players back home. The purpose is to connect the two, providing information that benefits the state, and engaging in persuasion when appropriate.

The average office spends just over 50 percent of its time working with people in Washington versus those in the state capital, although some offices spend considerably more than that. Percentages do not always reflect the importance of the relationship. One director guessed he spent about 20 percent of his time working with people in the state capital, and 80 percent of his time with people in Washington, and then added, “Of course, the 20 is driving the 80.” Nonetheless, as frequency of contact provides one measure of the importance of other organizations, I asked the state liaisons how often they or their staff interacted with key individuals or offices located in both places. Table 4.2 presents the average frequency of contact between a state office and other governmental and nongovernmental bodies; the discussion that follows explores the relationships that state offices have with these other organizations.

Working with the Washington Players It is the direct contact with the Washington players that justifies the existence of a Washington office. Personal relationships are critical in Washington, and relationships are built with sustained direct contact over time. This sort of personal interaction yields three benefits for states with Washington lobbyists. First, these lobbyists receive information that they would not get if they did not have these relationships. Extensive, if sometimes diffuse, networks are a hallmark of effective Washington lobbyists.7 Second, a Washington presence also helps during policy negotiations. Political deals are made in person, if not in backrooms, and they are not made over e-mail. When deal-making occurs on a critical issue, it pays to be in the room. Third, a lobbyist can use these personal relationships to smooth over some of the political conflicts that might frustrate a governor’s ability to work with other politicians. As we shall see, these conflicts are particularly likely to present themselves between governors and members of Congress. Working with Congress Congress is the primary focus of personal contact in Washington for two reasons. First, it holds the purse strings for funds that could reach the state. Second, Congress has many access points for lobbyists: the state delegation, committee members, and party leadership, as well as the occasional Page 103 →idiosyncratic connection. A given state’s congressional delegation has obvious linkages to the state—and the delegation members have interests that may sometimes be related to, but are rarely identical to, those of that state’s governor. These delegation members might need a nudge to understand or support the governor’s interests. That makes the delegation a particularly ripe target for the governor’s Washington liaison office. Directors on both sides of the aisle emphasized the importance of keeping the state’s congressional delegation focused on state issues. I asked one Republican director if he thought his delegation would not stay as focused on state issues if the Washington office was not active. He responded, “One hundred percent, that is a true statement. [The state’s congressional delegation would not be] focused on any state issues if we were not here.” A Page 104 →Democratic director reported, “It’s the liaison work representing the state and getting your delegation to work and play well with each other that defines the effectiveness of the office.В .В .В . [Members of the delegation] look at their own priorities. It’s not their role to think of the governor’s priorities. Therefore, they have to be given those opportunities.” One Republican director with a sizeable bipartisan delegation commented, “Your delegation, I’m sorry, no matter how wonderful they are, they are not looking out for the interest of state government of whatever state you are from. It doesn’t happen.В .В .В . Out of our entire delegation, there are probably two members that I’m closest to, one in the House and one in the Senate, who will [look out for state interests].”

Person or Agency

Table 4.2. State Office Contact with Government Officials, Offices, and Others Mean Frequency of Contact Mean Frequency of Contact Mean Frequency of Contact

Governor’s office State’s U.S. Senate delegation State’s U.S. House delegation

1981–82a (n = 24) Weekly

House personal offices from other states White House and presidential staff

Weeklyb Weeklyb Dailyc Dailyc Dailyc Dailyc (n/a)

Federal executive agencies Federal judiciary State legislature State agencies City officials County officials Public interest groups (e.g., NGA) Private lobbyists and corporate representatives

Weekly 3 or 4 times a year Monthly Daily 3 or 4 times a year 3 or 4 times a year Weekly Monthly

U.S. Senate committee staff U.S. House committee staff Senate personal offices from other states

aData

1997–98

2009–10

(n = 31) Daily Daily Daily

(n = 21) Daily Daily Daily

Weekly Weekly Weekly

Weekly Weekly Monthly

Weekly Monthly

Monthly Weekly

Weekly Almost never 3 or 4 times a year Daily Monthly Monthly Daily Weekly

Weekly Never 3 or 4 times a year Daily Monthly Monthly Daily Weekly

from David Cingranelli, When State Governments Come to Washington (1982).

bCingranelli

differentiates contact with members of Congress from contact with congressional staff members, whereas I did not do this. The increased frequency in contact in the 105th and 111th Congresses undoubtedly reflects contact with staff as well as members. cCingranelli

combines all staff members into two categories—“House Staff Members” and “Senate Staff Members,” both of which had a daily mean frequency of contact. Thus Cingranelli combines my separate classifications of committee staff members and personal staff members from other states. Ideally, the flow of information works both ways and benefits both the state office and the delegation. The Washington office might be the only day-to-day source of information for members of the congressional delegation and their staff regarding the governor’s position and interests. It is also helpful for a delegation’s staff to be able to easily contact its Washington office for information about state needs or about how federal programs or legislation might affect the state. “You become an additional staff person to [the delegation],” noted one director from the 1970s. Another director described his office by saying, “I always analogize us to the Marines—we’re mobile, quick, light artillery. You know, we hit the beach, and we can take the beach, but we can’t hold the beach, so we have to bring in the heavy battalions when there’s really a concerted effort over a long period

of time. And fortunately for us, the interactions back and forth between here and home are good enough to do that.” It is an apt analogy. The Washington office can be the link between the delegation and the forces of the larger state government back home. The personal office of a member of Congress is not able to create large reports analyzing the effects of a specific change in an entitlement funding formula for his or her constituents. Neither can many governors’ offices in Washington, for that matter. But a governor’s Washington office can call on the state bureaucracy to produce such analyses, and thus further the interests of the governor and his or her state government. After all, as one director from the early 1980s noted, the delegation “can’t watch every detail of everything that’s important to the state.” The Washington office works to fill the gap. This sort of collaborative information exchange between lobbyist and legislative office is common across many types of interest groups.8 The director of a large Washington office stressed the importance of being the communications link for the state: “I would say the most importantPage 105 → thing we are is a conduit between the governor and the delegation.” The communications links between Washington offices and their congressional delegations—both members and staff—are built informally, over time. Washington offices not only benefit from working closely with their delegation offices but also from helping states with large congressional delegations overcome a lack of communication between delegation members. Members of the House of Representatives are more focused on district than statewide issues, and Washington offices work to coordinate efforts by the delegation to benefit the state government. The Washington office of a large and diverse state holds monthly meetings with the chiefs of staff for all the delegation members, which the director described as “very productive meetings.” This office also began initiating happy hours for the delegation staff, and although it is mostly the junior staff members who attend, the social events are considered worthwhile: “It is beneficial to us because we get to meet everybody and we get to interact with people on the Hill, but it is also beneficial to the state. We might have nothing to do with the fact that an LA [legislative assistant] for an upstate member might meet an LA for a downstate member and they might agree to work on something together, and whenever that happens it is good for the state.” Forging solid relationships with the members of the state’s delegation and delegation staff is an almost universal goal of Washington lobbyists. Congressional offices today are sizeable enterprises.9 As a result, staff members even from the same political party might not know each other, and fruitful collaboration can spring from strong informal relationships. One Washington director said that she would like to bring her delegation together more often, but that there were financial constraints. Only a few state offices have a slush fund to pay for lunches or other group events for their delegation. Governors’ lobbyists sometimes contend with sticky relationships between the governor and Washington politicians. When they can, they try to smooth over difficulties so that they do not interfere with a state’s objectives; when they cannot, they will try to work around them. This is not always easy. Many, but not all, of these difficulties revolve around partisan conflicts. Since most states have congressional delegations that are composed of both Democrats and Republicans, governors’ offices must work with both political parties. The resulting sensitivities can be challenging for lobbyists. Partisanship ebbs and flows over gubernatorial and congressional election cycles. Ideally, a governor’s office works with all delegation offices, regardlessPage 106 → of ideological differences and partisan divides. In reality, of course, it is unusual if ideology and partisanship do not have at least some effect, and lobbyists can be limited in both access and effectiveness as a result. When the governor and delegation members have different party affiliations, not only interactions but also expectations differ from those that would exist between politicians sharing the same party. Offices might be especially careful not to go to the other party with projects they know that they cannot or will not support. One Democratic director noted that relationships with the conservative Republicans in the delegation were very limited, “because they are not interested in our goals

and because we don’t trust each other on precedent. Our state agencies will still work with them if they need to, so it is not as if they don’t interact with the state, but they don’t interact a lot. It is not an easy relationship. Well, it is easy because we don’t deal with each other, but it is not smooth.” The liaisons who served during the 111th Congress indicated that, on average, partisan difficulties had only a modest impact on their state’s support from its delegation, but partisan relationships were trickier with the congressional leadership. Not surprisingly, governors’ lobbyists believe that they get little attention from the congressional leadership if they do not share the same political party. Furthermore, during political campaigns, bipartisan relationships can get tricky. This is a seasonal occurrence; good relationships can turn cool by a sort of mutual unspoken understanding. This is particularly true if the governor and a delegation member are running against each other in an election, or if the governor is perceived as a candidate for the U.S. senator’s seat in the next election. A Democratic office director from the late 1990s whose state had a heavily Republican delegation explained how partisan relationships could change during a year with a U.S. Senate election in the state, rather than simply the House elections: The dynamics change. I mean, the camaraderie between a Democratic governor, the Democratic Clinton administration, and a Democratic congressional delegation is gonna be much more positive and on the same message when everybody’s running for reelection than a year when we had an incumbent [Republican] senator running and a challenger who was successful. It’s a very unique anti-incumbent vote and we had the governor and [the state] asking the senator for support throughout the year. As we got closer to Election Day, the governor was out campaigning for the Democratic candidate to unseat the current senator. So, as you get closer to Page 107 →Election Day, the dynamics do change.В .В .В . My relationship with the Senate staff never changed. We had a healthy respect for what we could expect from one another. They knew my limitations; I knew theirs. They didn’t ask for things that they knew I couldn’t produce. I didn’t ask for things that I thought would box them in and be impolite. And we continued to try to maximize opportunities for our Democratic House members that were also running for reelection. The tenor of this office’s relationships with the Republican members of the delegation became more sensitive between Labor Day and the election. While the offices still worked with each other, the interactions were altered. While it is expected that relationships across party lines can be delicate regardless of the time of year, the staff-level interactions can mitigate some of those difficulties. A Democratic director explains a relationship of mutual benefit: “We have some very good relationships with staff members of both parties. In fact, we work with one of the Republican senator’s staff constantly. And they are very responsive to us. They will call us sometimes, as much as we call them.” If a congressional office has a good relationship with the governor’s office, the former might reach out to the latter to gather information, or ask for political favors, that the congressional office cannot do itself. For example, the office director for a Democratic governor serving in 2010 talked about assisting Republican members of the delegation when they wanted to reach out to the White House. The perception was that a request would be viewed more favorably if it came from the Democratic governor’s office than from a Republican House or Senate office. If the request was not particularly ideologically infused, the governor’s office was happy to help. The sorts of challenges presented by partisanship change over time. Sometimes this shifts as a result in changes in the partisan control of Congress. For example, the Republican control of Congress that began in 1995 altered the relationships that had existed between governors and the Congress earlier in the 1990s. During the 104th Congress (1995–96) in particular, the congressional leadership needed Republican gubernatorial support to help achieve its policy agenda.10 Republican office directors who served during this time spoke of the benefits stemming from their ties to the leadership. The increasing partisanship of Congress in recent years

has made cross-party work more difficult for governors’ lobbyists, a point we discussed with regard to the NGA in chapter 3. The anti-Washington attitude of many governors has also made it difficultPage 108 → for some of their lobbyists to work collaboratively in Washington. If a governor is constantly criticizing Congress, it can rankle congressional offices; in extreme cases, it can rankle members of the delegation even within the same party. One office director who had to contend with this said that staff members from congressional offices had told him on a number of occasions, “Hey, we are doing this for you. We are not doing this for your boss.” Working with the White House and Executive Agencies Though the White House is not as universal a lobbying target as Congress, it receives substantial attention from lobbyists in the state offices.9 State offices interact more with Congress than with the White House, regardless of the political party of the state’s governor, but the amount of this interaction is influenced by partisanship. If a Democrat is in the White House, it receives more attention from Democratic governors’ offices. During the Clinton administration years, the typical Democratic state office contacted the White House weekly, while the typical Republican office contacted the White House somewhat less than once a month. Yet even Democratic offices did not spend the time lobbying the Clinton administration that they spent lobbying Congress. During the 111th Congress, when Barack Obama was in the White House, most Democratic offices were in touch with the White House weekly, and a few on a daily basis, while most Republican offices were in touch with the White House monthly, and a few on a weekly basis. By contrast, there was no difference in the amount of contact that Democrats and Republicans had with either the Congress or the executive agencies. Work with federal agencies is a substantial and regular part of governors’ lobbyists’ activities. Of the 20 office directors who indicated how often they interacted with federal agencies during the 111th Congress, one did so monthly, 12 did so weekly, and seven did so daily. Democratic offices were more likely to work with the agencies daily, but this was not a statistically significant difference. Likewise, office directors who served during the 105th Congress indicated that they had weekly contact with federal Page 109 →agencies. The same was true when David Cingranelli interviewed directors in 1981–82. Though the amount of contact that state lobbying offices have with federal agencies has not changed over time, the substance of these interactions has changed somewhat. Washington offices have fewer experienced policy experts on their staff today, the types who might have several years or more of experience in a state agency—we will talk more about staffing changes in chapter 5. This has meant that the interactions with some of the agencies are not as deep for some offices as they might have been in the past, which is also a reflection of the political climate in Washington. A director who served in the 1970s believed that she spent more time working with federal agencies than most offices did, but that the time was well spent: “I always felt that Congress was only part of the picture. I think a lot of Washington offices looked exclusively at Congress. I felt that the picture was as important dealing with the [federal] agencies, and in fact the agencies can do you more damage or more good than the Congress can, because they write the regs and they make the decisions.” And agencies may be more central to the political debate in some years than in others. Several offices noted that the policy issues at hand during the 111th Congress led to more interaction with the White House and the federal agencies. Health care reform, financial reform, and the stimulus package were particularly intensive efforts for the executive branch. Other State Offices and Governors Associations Even before most state offices were located in the Hall of the States, they exchanged information regularly. Beginning in the 1970s, or perhaps as early as the 1960s, state office directors met informally on Mondays, establishing the Washington Reps Group. Today this group continues to meet on Mondays when Congress is in

session, sharing information and strategizing. The meetings take place in the Hall of the States—often in the Dan Evans Conference Room—and are organized by the NGA. Now that conference calling has become routine, governors’ liaisons in state capitals can join their Washington counterparts each week by phone. Almost every Washington office engages in considerable coalition work, although some find it more useful than others. We will talk more extensively about coalition work in chapter 5, but it is worth some discussion here. Washington offices work with each other and with their national, regional, and partisan governors associations. Small states need coalitions the most, as they do not have the advantage held by states with large congressional Page 110 →delegations. If the governors’ offices of New York and California can work together on an issue affecting states and get their delegations’ support, they are virtually unstoppable. Nearly all current and former Washington office directors stated that the other state offices in Washington played an important role in their own office’s daily work. While the other offices generally did not alter their goals, they did play a large role in information exchange and tactics. One office director from the 1970s explained, “In some cases you are sharing information and in some cases you are sharing load. вЂI’ll take X, you take Y, and we’ll get back in touch. I’ll go see Jones and you go see Smith.’ So I saw them as—to say an extension of my office would be too far, but certainly an extraordinarily valuable resource.” In 1999, the director of that state’s office echoed these remarks, saying, “There are whole issue areas I don’t have to work on because someone else [in the Hall of the States] is doing it.”

Working with the Players Back Home To work best, the information exchange needs to go both ways; this means certain offices in the state capital are also critical. Washington offices spend approximately half their time working with people in the state. State agencies are particularly important. Washington offices often use state agencies for research on how particular federal policy proposals would affect their states. Washington offices can then use the information provided by state agencies to lobby Congress. Interaction with the state legislature is less common. State agencies in particular provide information to Washington offices for use in lobbying; Washington offices inform the governor’s office and state agencies with information about federal legislation and regulations. Most Washington office directors believed that their state agencies were very supportive of the existence of the Washington office. Just as they tried to do in the 1970s, most Washington offices today also work to organize and control state contacts with the federal government. Many governors require state agency personnel to at least notify their Washington office if they make professional visits in Washington. Enforcement of such a policy can be difficult, but most directors believe that their state’s policy is followed most of the time. While one office director stated that his office was not the “Washington political police,” very few office directors do not attempt to control in some way Washington visits from state agency contacts. Most Washington office directors who talked about the subject felt that managing contacts, or at the very least being aware of them, is very important. One director explained, “There’s a rule Page 111 →that there are no Hill contacts directly from our state. It all comes through our office. And that’s very strongly enforced. It’s something the governor feels strongly about. It’s something that keeps us useful and relevant.” Political and professional state agency personnel may have agendas that do not match their governor’s, and this is a perennial challenge for Washington directors. One director from a Midwestern state elaborated on this point: It is very frustrating. You’ll have every office director say this, when you have cowboy agencies shooting from the hip, thinking they know what they’re doing, having dealings in WashingtonВ .В .В . I mean it’s happened to me a number of times. It’s no reflection on me but they look

stupid. Really stupid. The first thing I do is I pick up the phone and call the chief of staff and their actions get squashed pretty quickly. I don’t mean that in a mean sense, but if you’re going to be out here you need to know what you’re doing and you ought to avail yourself of me. . . . I like to think I know what I’m doing out here. I know the people and I know the procedures and I know the protocols, and I know what you do do and what you don’t do. [If you don’t, it’s a] good way to get cross-fires with members, or the administration or things like that.

The director would not give an example of such an occurrence, saying that the situations are “too political.” Directors noted that sometimes state agency personnel can initiate contacts with Congress or federal agencies and innocently create problems, even if they are not attempting to circumvent the Washington office or the governor’s wishes. One director described such an incident: “I had a situation as recently as 10 days ago where one particular kind of cabinet level somebody showed up and they had an agenda of meetings with all of the delegation, and they had a particular pitch they were making, and it hadn’t dawned on them that we may have some pretty regular contact with [the delegation]. And this actually came from somebody that would have been on the lowest of my list of anybody who would freelance because it was somebody who understands the chain of command, who understands authority, and who understands loyalty.” If Washington offices have a systemic weakness, it is without question their lack of contact with the rest of the state government they represent. They simply do not have the face-to-face interaction with their colleagues in the state capital, or daily (or even weekly) interaction with most of the playersPage 112 → in the state. Washington directors seldom visit the state they represent. A 1997 NGA survey of Washington offices found that 35 percent of directors visited the state three or fewer times per year, and another 46 percent visited between four and 12 times per year; a majority (58 percent) reported six or fewer trips per year.11 There are limits on time and money. Some Washington directors have no prior history with the states they represent. While this is certainly not a requirement to be a good Washington representative, it can be helpful to have long-term relationships with the people back home, and even an excellent director cannot build those overnight. Some Washington office directors do not have close relationships with their governor, and this can limit their ability to speak with authority. How often this happens is difficult to assess, because presumably not all directors will admit to their lack of authority. Of the 23 directors who served during the 105th Congress, and who responded to an interview question about the quality of contact with their respective governors, 15 directors stated that they were “very pleased,” and seven said they were “generally pleased” with their access to their governor. Only one chose another category on the four-point scale, choosing the lowest rating, “feel significantly limited at times by lack of access.” Additional directors did note difficulties, however, indicating that it can be more than an occasional problem for Washington offices. When asked how she would improve her office, one director stated, “I would put in a Batman phone directly to the governor.” Directors who served during the 111th Congress were similarly positive about their ability to get access to their governor when they needed it. Director after director noted that a Washington office can only be successful if a governor is supportive. If a governor is not interested in Washington activities generally, or the Washington office, then the Washington office is very limited in its effectiveness. One director from the late 1990s explained, “I think it really does make a difference here if you know your governor, if you speak for your governor, if you talk to him regularly. There are certainly Washington directors here who probably communicate with their governor in writing once every couple of weeks and that is about it. Missouri has a staff conference call with their governor in the morning, so they literally talk to their governor every single morning. We are somewhere in between.В .В .В . It really does make a huge difference in our effectiveness up here, because everybody knows, if you go into these rooms or you go to the Hill, [whether] you are talking to your governor or not.”

State Legislatures State legislatures are a much less frequent point of contact for governors’ Washington offices. It is rare for offices to report to the legislature as well Page 113 →as the governor. State legislators also have their own associations—notably the National Conference of State Legislatures—and some state legislatures have their own offices in Washington. It seems likely that most state legislators are not focused on the daily activities of their states’ Washington offices, and most Washington offices do not view legislators as a key constituency. Many offices produce a monthly or quarterly newsletter or reports for distribution to state agencies and state legislators, but there is limited direct contact with state legislators or their staffs. Despite this lack of contact, most office directors were aware that their state legislature was critical to the continued existence of the office. Some state offices are funded by a line-item appropriation. Even those that are not can sometimes see legislators move to ban the channeling of funds—such as discretionary funds from the governor’s office budget, or state agency funds—to support the governor’s lobbying presence. These offices can become political footballs, mechanisms for a legislator to question the governor’s fiscal responsibility and political judgment. One recent example is the Massachusetts office. Although the Massachusetts office had been open for many years, the office became a target under Governor Deval Patrick (D-MA, 2007–15). The office had traditionally been funded by an amendment to the budget every year. According to one person familiar with the situation, Patrick was simply seeking transparency in the budget when he included a $453,292 line item in his fiscal year 2009 budget request. This was an amount consistent with projected spending for the office for fiscal year 2008.12 Republican legislators made an issue of the request, claiming that Patrick was asking for funding that his Republican predecessor, Mitt Romney (R-MA, 2003–7), had not needed. The issue made the news, although ultimately the office was funded.13 This political spat is reminiscent of the 1961 conflict over Massachusetts governor John Volpe’s (R-MA, 1961–63, 1965–69) Washington office, which was defunded by the legislature.14 One director explained that, during most budget cycles, a legislator would put forth an amendment to close the office. But most legislators, this director continued, were indifferent to the office. There was a legislative requirement that the office submit quarterly reports to the legislature, but the office never got questions as a result of the reports. For the most part, the office did its work and did not have significant threats to its existence from the state legislature. When governors’ Washington offices do draw the attention of the legislature, it is usually tied to budget issues. As a result, these offices are cognizant that they need to justify their value. As part of this process, many offices work to catalog their successes, even their small successes. FollowingPage 114 → the decline of the earmark, and following the end of stimulus funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2008, many victories are small. In chapter 7 we will explore in greater depth the political challenges that these offices face, but we should remember that at any point in time most offices are not wracked by difficulties with the legislature. For most offices, the legislature is to be remembered, to be kept in the loop, but not to be considered as a primary constituency. This relationship reflects the distance between most state legislators and how they see their responsibilities, and the federal government. In the days before the 17th Amendment, when state legislatures selected their states’ U.S. senators, there was a tight bond between the state and federal legislatures. Today, institutional structures have changed, and there is enough distance that there is not a tight bond between the state legislator and the state’s lobbyist in Washington. The lobbyists, as I have stated repeatedly, are representing their states’ interests as pursued by their governors. This means that what binds the interactions between the governor’s Washington office and the state legislature is not federalism, or even necessarily policy, but politics.

Regulatory and Policy Efforts One of governors’ lobbyists’ biggest efforts is to fight against unfunded mandates. Governors typically oppose even funded mandates, preferring flexibility in the specific policy area. The NGA produces many policy positions that oppose mandates. The states’ lobbyists will typically work with their delegations to help them understand the implications of a particular mandate for that state. Some mandates burden certain states more than others, and so efforts on any particular mandate might vary across states. A state’s lobbyists will lobby quite actively if a mandate will place a particular burden on its government. Sometimes a state has a particular interest in a piece of legislation, or a regulation, that is unrelated to government funding. One example was Oregon’s interest in legislation to protect the Steens Mountain area of the state. The governor’s Washington, DC, office worked closely with the state’s congressional delegation and the U.S. Department of the Interior to craft a bill to protect 900,000 acres of federal land. This effort resulted in the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000, which protected nearly 100,000 acres from livestock grazing, protected certain areas from mineral extraction, and otherwise created a structurePage 115 → for natural resource management in order to “maintain the cultural, economic, ecological, and social health of the Steens Mountain area.”15 Given the significant timber, grazing, and minerals interests in this area, the Steens Mountain legislation took significant effort by Governor John Kitzhaber’s (D-OR, 1995–2003, 2011–15) Washington office. This is state opportunism at work, Washington office–style. Oregon got benefits; the federal government paid the expense. The Equitable Escheatment Act is a particularly vivid example of state office lobbying on a piece of legislation that concerns policy rather than federal funds—but as with almost all policy issues that concern state offices, there were substantial financial implications. It is also an example of multiple offices competing to protect their own states. This legislative issue involved the escheatment, or reversion, of stock dividends and interest to state governments when their owners could not be identified. When the Supreme Court found in Delaware v. New York that these funds should escheat to the state where the financial intermediary was incorporated at the time of issuance rather than where it was headquartered, it also suggested that Congress could pass legislation to override its decision.16 Under the Court’s decision, 99 percent of unclaimed funds, or $100 to $150 million annually, would escheat to three states—Delaware, New York, and Massachusetts.17 Given this, the other 47 states had a strong incentive to seek legislation to change escheatment law so that funds would escheat to the state of the nonlocatable stock owner. If legislation were crafted to redirect funds that New York had improperly escheated since 1972—perhaps a dubious possibility constitutionally, but nonetheless one that was politically viable—then the funds at stake would total $1 billion. The Equitable Escheatment Act of 1993, legislation to change escheatment law so that funds would be distributed more broadly, garnered over 300 cosponsors in the House of Representatives and over 70 cosponsors in the Senate. As the states took sides, many Washington offices became involved in the lobbying effort. Delaware took the lead on one side; Texas on the other. In the end, the states brokered a compromise agreement that stopped the bill from coming to a vote.18 By all accounts, the Delaware office considered killing the bill a tremendous accomplishment for Delaware, one in which the state lobbying office played a leading role. Another example of lobbying on a policy issue involved distributing food stamps to legal immigrants. The 105th Congress ended food-stamp eligibility for most legal immigrants. One state legislature decided that it wished to continue providing food support to this group through its own funding. The difficulty was the mechanics of this provision. It didn’t make sense for Page 116 →the state to establish its own mini-food-stamp system and print its own food stamps, so the state tried to purchase federal food stamps with state funds. The state’s Washington office director told the story: “The [U.S.] Department of Agriculture did not feel they had the legal authority to sell us a big box of food stamps. And if they weren’t going to sell us a big box of food stamps then we were going to have to make our own, in that we were going to have to contract with all the grocery stores that they have contracts with, and it just became this huge hassle and would have cost

literally millions of dollars. We just kept saying, вЂCome on. Just put them in a box. We’ll pay postage. Just give us the damned food stamps.’” When the USDA refused to exchange the food stamps for a payment from the state, the lobbyist took action: “I went over and got language on a supplemental appropriations bill saying they had to do it. They [the USDA] were very nice about it. They sent a guy down at 11:00 at night to tell the conferees that no, they didn’t object to this.В .В .В . This is something that I was very proud of because it was less than 72 hours from the time that the state got a definitive answer that no, we’re not going to sell you a big box of food stamps, until I got this through conference. It was an emergency supplemental.” As the state was paying for the food stamps, the issue was not money, but regulatory authority. The liaison concluded, “It had nothing to do with money. This was an absolute wash in terms of money. We gained nothing, they lost nothing. It wasn’t about money. It was a vehicle.”

The Money Chase Every Washington office pursues economic interests. Of the time that offices spend lobbying their state delegations and others, nearly half is spent lobbying for dollars (see table 4.3). This has been a major, consistent effort of state offices in Washington since their inception in the 1940s. Attention to line-item appropriations in congressional appropriations bills, the funding formulas of categorical grants-in-aid, and discretionary grants has waxed and waned, but these three types of funding have been the funding focus of the governors’ lobbyists for decades, ever since state offices turned away from the defense contracts of World War II. The changes in funding have reflected both the evolution of fiscal federalism and broader congressional funding trends over time. Republican directors spend more time fighting mandates than their Democratic counterparts. In the 105th Congress, four Republican and only one Democratic office director listed fighting mandates as one of their top three activities. In the 111th Congress, no director listed fighting mandates Page 117 →in their top three activities, but during interviews Republican directors mentioned mandates more than their Democratic counterparts. Efforts on mandates were one of the few instances where office activities differed by party. Yet fighting for additional federal appropriations and policy fights, especially fighting for fewer mandates, are in many ways two sides of the same coin. Each has a financial impact on a state, and the line between lobbying for funding and lobbying for policy change can be a blurry one. One office director named the efforts to receive and protect a Medicaid waiver for the state as a particularly sweet accomplishment. While the Medicaid waiver was a policy goal—release from federal mandates—it had tremendous financial implications for the state. For that office, the amount of time spent either directly on federal appropriations or on policy issues that affect federal funding was substantially more than the 45 percent indicated on the questionnaire. Putting aside these murkier efforts, I will now focus on the three types of funding that have received considerable attention by state offices.

Line-Item Appropriations One of the archetypal images of Washington lobbyists of all types is that of seeker of congressional funding for specific projects through the line-item appropriations in the various congressional appropriations bills, otherwise known as earmarks. This is funding specified by Congress for a specific project, typically one in the requester’s state or district.19 Disparaged as wasteful “pork” funding by many in the media and in politics, earmarks are Page 118 →considered by others a valuable mechanism for Congress to fulfill important, specific needs.20 Table 4.3. State Office Time Spent Lobbying for Funding

Office directors were asked to consider the amount of time that their offices spent working on two activities, and indicate how time was allocated between those two activities. Allocations were always between two categories, with percentages summing to 100. Activity

Mean for Washington Offices, 1997–98 Mean for Washington Offices, 2009–10 (n = 29) (n = 22)

Percentage of lobbying time spent on lobbying for federal funds (versus 47.2 lobbying for other things) Percentage of time spent on increasing federal funding to the state (versus 48.2 maintaining federal funding) Percentage of time spent on improving federal funding formulas (versus time 51.0 spent working for appropriations earmarks)

54.8 53.2 74.0

In the 105th Congress, the governors’ state offices allocated 47 percent of their lobbying time to lobbying for federal funds. Of the time they spent lobbying for funding, they spent just shy of half their time lobbying for earmarks. Given that formulas affect far more money, this is a lot of time allocated to special funding projects. This concentration on earmarks reflected fervor for earmarks that all lobbyists felt at a time when congressional earmarks were increasingly prevalent. In an interview that occurred early in the year, and thus early in the congressional budget process, one Republican office director commented, “We spend a prodigious amount of time on the [congressional] appropriations process.В .В .В . By Friday, for example, we’ll have a master matrix of all the state agency appropriations requests [for federal funds], with a one-page justification for each one.” A former staff member for a Democratic office talked about the overarching importance of acquiring federal funds: “You know those big thermometers they have for the United Way? We had one of those. We were dialing for dollars.В .В .В . When you pulled down some federal money for something you got to go color in. It was a big deal. It was like, вЂYea!!! Steve did it. We’re going to have money for—.’ And everybody would run up and you’d color in and you knew how much you got the year before and how much we had to do to meet that.” The thermometer was scaled to the funds that the state had received the previous year, so it indicated how much funding the Washington office had yet to acquire to match the prior year’s funding successes. Beginning in the 1990s, earmarks became particularly lucrative for interest groups. Adjusting for inflation (using 2014 dollars), congressional earmarks totaled over $5 billion in 1991; when they peaked in fiscal year 2005, they totaled nearly $34 billion (see figure 4.1).21 Specific pieces of legislation have been especially fertile sources of earmarks. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century—the 1998 transportation reauthorization bill known at TEA-21—authorized $217.9 billion in spending over six years. This was 40 percent more than the original authorization bill, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.22 TEA-21 brought out the governors’ lobbyists in force. A substantial amount of the TEA-21 debate focused on the return on investment to states from the Highway Trust Fund, which was a donor/recipient state issue. For example, a 21-state coalition of “donor states”—states that paid more in taxes to the federal Highway Trust Fund than they received—lobbied for a return of at least 95 cents for each dollar contributed by a state to the Page 119 →trust fund.23 The legislation also meant hundreds of millions of dollars in earmarks for state projects,24 and earmarks peaked in 2005 in large part because TEA-21 was reauthorized in 2005, allocating billions of dollars in funding for highways, highway safety, and transit. It was a happy success for governors, as one of the largest sources of earmarks was transportation projects that benefited states. Fig. 4.1. Congressional earmarks by number of projects and total annual spending, FY 1991–2014. (Spending in billions and adjusted to 2014 dollars.)

By the 111th Congress, the earmarks bloom was off the rose. Republicans had initiated an effort to end earmarks.25 Earmarks did not end completely, but they dropped precipitously beginning in the 109th Congress. (The interest group Citizens Against Government Waste points out that the decrease in spending on earmarks is somewhat deceptive, because some spending is simply hidden in legislative and report language rather than clearly identified as earmarks in appropriations bills.26) As funding dried up, state lobbyists’ efforts changed as well. In the 111th Congress, state offices in Washington were spending more of their lobbying time—now 54.8 percent—lobbying for federal funds than they were in the 105th Congress. However, they were spending far less time lobbying for earmarks than for formulas. Only about one-quarter of lobbying for funds was targeted toward appropriations. Office directors indicated that they were not focusing on earmarks because they were politically sensitive and difficult to Page 120 →get. Republican offices in particular were sensitive to the unpopular nature of earmarks, but directors from both political parties were clear that the concern over earmarks had led to fewer opportunities to seek them. In addition, political stalemates over the budget had led to a de facto change in the budget process: rather than passing all appropriations bills each year, Congress more and more often funded the federal government through continuing resolutions. Fewer appropriations bills means fewer bills that can contain line-item appropriations. The mechanism for earmarks had changed, and that in turn led to a shift in lobbying for federal funding.

Grant-in-Aid Formulas As earmarks declined, state lobbying offices increased their focus on funding allocated through funding formulas used for federal grants-in-aid. When Congress establishes a grant-in-aid program, it uses one of several funding mechanisms. These include project-based funding, block grants, and general revenue sharing, but the lion’s share of funding is via categorical grants. In 2011, the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance identified over 200 formula grants; more than 100 were directed at state governments.27 Some of these are enormous: the Medical Assistance Program, commonly known as Medicaid, had nearly $300 billion in expected outlays in FY2011, making it by far the largest federal grant-in-aid program.28 Others are comparatively tiny. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program awarded approximately $4 million in funding to state governments in FY2011.29 These grants in-in-aid formulas are composed of variables to represent characteristics such as the group’s targeted need for aid, a state’s capacity to provide its own support for this population, and so forth. Formulas are supposed to ensure fair distribution of funds that are allocated unequally across states. The basis for determining funding is more transparent if Congress uses a formula rather than simply provides a dollar amount of funding for every state for every program. In principle it prevents the possibility of arbitrary or capricious allocation. It also provides immense lobbying opportunities for the funding recipients, because the formulas themselves become monumentally important. A small change in the formula itself, or a change in what measures are used to calculate the formulas, can mean millions more dollars for a state—or millions less. For a few programs, Congress has specified only the program goals, leaving agency administrators to determine the basic formula, the variables used in the formulas, and the data used to calculate allocations.30 In Page 121 →most cases, Congress constrains at least some of these determinations, and federal agencies determine what Congress does not specify. The resulting formulas reflect not only program goals and recipient needs but also such factors as the interests of the legislators who served on the committee that crafted the bills, the legislators who did not serve on these committees but have constituents who will benefit from the grants, and the White House.31 The process is replete with advocacy opportunities for state lobbyists. The formula for Medicaid illustrates these issues. Because the Medicaid program is so large, even a tiny formula change can have enormous financial ramifications. Nonetheless, states have been successful at attaining changes that benefit their states. Formulas are used to establish each state’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which are used to determine the level of federal funding for certain social and medical services—most notably Medicaid. A state’s FMAP

is based on a formula that reflects a state’s average per capita income relative to the national average. By law, no state’s FMAP can be lower than 50 percent, but FMAPs can and do vary both by state and over time.32 States lobby vigorously to protect or, where possible, increase their FMAP. Louisiana faced the possibility that its FMAP would decrease significantly because of the amount of disaster funding the state received following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.33 The disaster funding provided aid that would, in effect, reduce poverty in the state—and in turn Louisiana’s calculated FMAP would decrease, in effect reducing the benefit of the disaster funding. Louisiana succeeded in getting a special disaster recovery FMAP in order to offset this effect. The same legislation that aided Louisiana also guaranteed that Alaska’s FMAP would not decrease.34 The director of a large state played defense when the formulas for the FMAP and the enhanced FMAP—which set funding for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)—were under review. A formula change had the potential to reduce that state’s Medicaid and SCHIP funding by more than $1.5 billion. “And without my daily involvement with that issue that might have occurred, but it didn’t,” the director recalled. “I mean it wasn’t that we didn’t get hit, but we took a much lesser hit than we would have otherwise.” Another state director talked about working to get a waiver in order to expand SCHIP and Medicaid coverage: “The governor submitted his plan and rolled it into a Medicaid waiver, so that what he was asking for from the federal government was permission to expand health insurance to 90,000 uninsured kids in [the state] and [to] 90,000 adults transitioning to work.В .В .В . It was the most hellish, horrendous, drawn-out process we went through. And it flat out would not have happened if this office hadn’t been here.” Page 122 →State offices have lobbied vigorously for other formula funding. This includes transportation dollars distributed in accordance with formulas established in the major transportation authorization bills—one director described the transportation reauthorization as “a bright light drawing lots of moths”—and welfare assistance. The transition from Aid to Families with Dependent Children welfare assistance to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grants was a particularly significant funding battle. Federal funding for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, is also a lobbying target for many state offices. The formula for regular (nonemergency) LIHEAP funding was set in the original legislative authorization in 1984, but the division of the allocation to states varies depending on how much funding Congress allocates to the program.35 This makes the allocation particularly complex, and states lobby vigorously to ensure that LIHEAP (referred to as HEAP today) is fully funded.

Competitive Grants In the early 1980s, a number of state offices in Washington were active in monitoring opportunities for federal discretionary grants or in facilitating the grant proposal process for their states.36 Most, however, did not find discretionary grants worthy of much of their time.37 Likewise, in the late 1990s most offices were not heavily involved with seeking these grants for their state. A Republican director interviewed in the late 1990s explained that, early during his tenure, his office put a tremendous amount of effort into helping state agencies pursue discretionary grants, and established a process to track agency grant applications. This reflected the governor’s efforts to increase economic efficiency, and the state’s getting its “fair share” from the federal government was part of this process. After two years of efforts on grants, however, the office discontinued the work. This director noted that the grant process, supposedly apolitical, could be difficult to influence. “My conclusion is that it is a mistake for states to try to get involved across the board. It is just ineffective and it doesn’t really matter,” he said. “I concluded as directorВ .В .В . that this is a very, very poor use of our time. It takes away from the things that we really can make a difference, it is ineffective, particularly with an administration that is not politically looking to help us and do us favors.” A Democratic director echoed these views, saying, “Back in вЂ94 or so we put a major focus in this office on trying to better prepare our agencies, Page 123 →or

better equip them to compete for discretionary grants. And so we did a whole grants workshopВ .В .В . making them better grants writers, trying to make them more competitive because we did think that with less federal formula funding, less increases in programs, that we would have to become more competitive with discretionary kind of money. And we improved our lot there slightly but not huge.” The office encouraged grant writers to work with each other, getting the experienced ones to work with those who were less sophisticated in order to improve the quality of grant proposals. The director called those efforts “somewhat successful,” but noted that it was not as important anymore. By the late 1990s, the office had shifted to focus more closely on the largest grant prospects rather than overseeing every grant possibility. Another director serving during that time said that her office would write letters of support for a grant application if a department secretary in the state capital requested one, but that grant applications were prohibitive because they required so many resources. That office twice considered becoming active in the pursuit of federal grants for the state, but decided that it was not worth the expense to make it work. Washington office directors with larger staffs were somewhat more likely to indicate that they did grant work than their counterparts who led smaller offices, and a few directors commented that if they had more staff they would focus more on grants. One noted that grant seeking was very decentralized in his state. He had told the governor’s office that it shouldn’t be, and that the Washington office should coordinate them, but most state agencies did not utilize the Washington office in this regard. Another director said that his office did not work on grants, but that he would like the office to work on grant coordination. The grant process was useful beyond simply the funding opportunities, he reflected: “I think though that you kind of get a window—what the federal government is up to, what they’re pushing out the door, what they’re trying to keep hold of, and I think that helps our policy development process.” In general, however, directors in the late 1990s did not see the competitive grants process as one that added much to the Washington office’s portfolio. This is consistent with what Pelissero and England as well as Cingranelli found in the 1980s.38 State lobbyists tend to be generalists, better utilized in the political arena than in technical ones, and grant applications are technical and time consuming. Washington office staff members are better coordinators than grant writers or grant writing advisers. By 2010, grant seeking had again become a significant effort for a few Page 124 →state offices. Perhaps the best example of this sort of effort is that of Eric Brenner, who worked in the Illinois office in Washington in the late 1990s and then went to work for the state of Maryland. Brenner’s work demonstrates how a state might use its resources in Washington to improve its success with competitive federal grants, and for this reason it is worth a bit of exploration. I first learned of Brenner’s work in 1998, when I interviewed the director of the Illinois office in Washington. The office had a staff member working on a grants database, explained the office director, and the director said he expected it to have a significant impact on the state’s ability to land grants. At the time, there was no easy way to track all the federal grants available to states and their public and nonprofit constituencies. Eric Brenner was working to create the Illinois Federal Clearinghouse, an Internet-based database of all federal grants. This would lead to a big step forward in federal funding for Illinois, the office director told me. Hearing about this effort, a number of questions went through my mind. Is this really innovative? Isn’t this information already collected somewhere? Will Illinois really increase its grant proposals as a result of this effort? And will the effort pay off for the state? In short, it was innovative, and it did pay off. The federal government’s grants database—widely known through its Grants.gov website—had not been created yet.39 There was no central clearinghouse for grant opportunities for states, cities, and nonprofits. The Illinois office created its own, and set about encouraging the state’s agencies to apply for grants. The effort was a clear success. Largely due to the success of the clearinghouse, federal funds to Illinois had

increased to $10 billion in fiscal year 2001—18.7 percent higher than the state’s funding just two years earlier.40 How did this come about? Why did Illinois put such emphasis on grants when other states did not, and how did this effort unfold? Part of Brenner’s job when he started working for Illinois was to determine why Illinois received so much less federal procurement funding than many other states. Maryland, for example, got a significant amount of procurement grants. Illinois sold a lot of coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority, but aside from that the state’s businesses had almost no federal contracts. Brenner thought that Illinois could do better. He worked with universities as well as state agencies to pursue federal grants. Now, working in a similar capacity for the state of Maryland, he also works with localities and nonprofits to assist them in their efforts to capture grants. Brenner sees working with a broad cross-section of organizations as beneficial to the state: Page 125 →I would argue that just one year of paying attention to this usually gets some things, whether it is a big agency that would see a grant application and say, вЂThat’s too small for me to go after, it’s only $500,000,’ but you hand it off to another agency that would love to get a $500,000 grant for something. And anyone who starts this stuff up fresh is usually going to get a few of those things that would just slip away before. And by having this team of contacts together—most of the meetings are now electronic, but the people who do grants in one agency now know the people who do grants in the other agenciesВ .В .В . it is good team building.41 It is also a way to create a network of grant writers who might be suited to go after a particular grant opportunity. Although Brenner’s official office is in Annapolis, he splits his time between there and Washington. Brenner believes that his links to both capitals are critical in his efforts to increase Maryland’s grant acquisition success. Coordination is the key.

The Evolution of Lobbying for Funds over Time While bringing federal funds home to the states has been a consistent goal of Washington offices, tactics have changed over the years. Washington office directors from the 1970s and 1980s describe lobbying for funds somewhat differently than office directors from the 1990s and 2000s; directors who have served in their roles for many years say that they themselves have seen changes over shorter periods of time. The Reagan era produced one shock to the Washington office lobbying efforts; the Republican takeover of 1994 produced a second. The budget surplus during the Clinton years provided opportunities for funds, and it may be no coincidence that the use of earmarks peaked during this period. The economic crisis that started in 2007 left state lobbyists scrambling to protect funds for states, but the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided an enormous pot of money that states could target. Every fiscal shift produces changes in how state lobbyists seek federal funds. Changes in the flow of funds from the federal government to the states lead offices to change their lobbying techniques. One Republican director who served through most of the 1990s said that with the Republican takeover in 1995, the office spent more time attempting to shape legislative language than reaching for funds. (The director was quick to note that the state was not dissatisfied with the reduction of federal funds, since a balanced budget was a policy favored by the Republican governor as well Page 126 →as the Republican-led Congress.) Other directors echoed similar changes in approach. Both a Democratic and a Republican office director for large states stated that during the 104th Congress, they shifted to a strategy of fighting cuts almost exclusively, rather than supporting increases. Another director said that he had changed lobbying efforts because of the reduction in funds for states. Instead, he focused on the larger formula fights that were crucial, and that coincided with the tighter budget strings of the Republican Congress: “You look where the money is and you go where the money is and you try and

manipulate that formula. The big chunks are still the same—highway funding, Medicaid, welfare.” In the late 1990s, when it appeared that Congress would have a budget surplus for the first time in decades, many Washington offices (along with a plethora of other Washington lobbies) changed tactics, seeking increases once more. Though the Republican rhetoric of fiscal responsibility filled the background, there was greater possibility for additional funds. However, states were not returning to the broad lobbying efforts that they had orchestrated when they sought to shape President Nixon’s revenue-sharing legislation.42 Another surge in lobbying for funds occurred both before and after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was signed into law by President Obama in 2009. “They wrote a $787 billion check and sort of handed it to the states,” is how one office director described the stimulus package. In fact, more than $246 billion of the stimulus package was either given to states or administered by states.43 ARRA provided between $135 and $140 billion in funds directly to states, which was projected to cover approximately 40 percent of state budget deficits.44 This included $87 billion in increased Medicaid funds via the enhanced FMAP, as well as $48 billion in the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, of which $39.5 billion was reserved for education.45 The lobbying for ARRA money and flexibility with regard to ARRA money is, in large part, responsible for the fact that so many office directors labeled their lobbying for funding the 111th Congress as seeking increases rather than protecting against cuts. It is important to remember that the availability of federal funding varies not only with time but also across the states. Even during the tightest of times, some Washington offices are still well positioned to find funds for their states. A state can receive windfalls if a senior member of its congressional delegation sits on either the House or Senate Appropriations Committees. One director said, “Everybody wants someone on Approps,” and having multiple members on the appropriations committees is even more beneficial. Page 127 →In sum, while state pursuit of federal funds has been a consistent effort of Washington offices since they were established, the types of funding that states pursue evolve over time. These changes are consistent with what Haider found in his exploration of public official associations, where he classified governmental lobbying in three temporal phases, and what Anne Marie Cammisa found in her investigation of the urban lobby, which included what she deemed a fourth phase of lobbying (after 1995).46 These shifts in lobbying reflect changes in how the federal government allocates money to states, and how much money it has to allocate. Again, we see how the evolution of federalism manifests itself in the activities of Washington offices. As Congress has altered how it has dispersed its funds, state offices have reacted by adapting how they lobby for federal funds. A state lobbyist’s adaptation will reflect not only the tenor of the times but also the characteristics of the state, its governor, and its delegation. When the governors’ lobbyists are successful, they can sometimes shape how these funds are dispersed, but they are working within a much larger system, and they must respond to the macro forces at work.

The Policy Focus of State Offices As state lobbying offices exchange information and seek policy change and federal funds, they focus on several key policy areas. Every office focuses on health care and transportation. The federal funding in these areas is so substantial that they are impossible for a lobbyist to ignore. States also focus on energy issues, although exactly what energy issues varies by state. Oil and gas matters to some states; wind energy and hydropower to others. Using policy area classifications adapted from those of Baumgartner and Jones, table 4.4 lists the mean level of state office activity by policy area in the 105th and 111th Congresses.47 There is relatively little variation across states for these high-attention policy areas. If a state has an office in Washington, it is almost inevitable that its lobbyists are active on these issues.

For other policy areas, there is much less activity. Virtually no state focuses on issues related to the judiciary or government operations. And as we would expect, when Congress pursues legislation on an issue that would affect the states, the lobbyists turn to that issue. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 2001—commonly nicknamed the No Child Left Behind legislation—led states to become more active in education policy, an effect that has been sustained over time. The economic stimulus package of 2008 led to an increase in lobbying in the area of domestic economy. Social issues were at the forefront of state lobbyists’ concerns following the Page 128 →1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which established the Temporary Aid to Needy Families program as the successor to Aid to Families with Dependent Children. By the 111th Congress, social issues were not on the forefront of the agenda for the federal government or for governors’ lobbyists. On the whole, though, there is considerable consistency over time in the level of activity in the various policy areas. The fact that many of the areas of focus relate in some way to social welfare has significant implications. Lobbying on domestic social welfare issues has been a major activity for the governors’ lobbyists. As Geoffrey Layman and Thomas Carsey point out, these are issues where we have also seen greater party polarization over time.48 Over the last several decades and arguably accelerating in more recent years, there is widening disagreement on policies that relate to social safety nets. In particular, Republicans in Congress are less committed to generous redistributive policies.49 A more polarized congressional membership and leadership has led to more institutional gridlock in Congress, as filibusters, debate rules, and floor problems make it more difficult to pass legislation.50 This means that while the governors’ lobbyists are Page 129 →working on the same issues, the arena in which they work has changed significantly, and their techniques and effectiveness will reflect this. Table 4.4. Activity of State Offices by Policy Area Policy Area Health policy Transportation Environmental policy Social welfare Education Natural resources Crime and law enforcement Energy Domestic economy (money supply, taxation, and regulations affecting business, insurance, or banking) Foreign trade Technology Agriculture Urban issues Labor policy Defense, national security, and foreign affairs

1997–98 2009–10 4.86 4.80 4.62 4.50 4.55 4.19 4.55 3.90 * 4.28 4.48 4.07 3.81 3.45 2.71 ** 3.43 4.52 3.34 4.14 * 3.34 2.14 ** 3.34 3.10 3.17 3.14 2.72 2.43 2.59 3.24 ^ 2.21 2.95 ^

Civil rights and civil liberties

1.82

1.71

Government operations 1.55 1.43 Note: Policy areas were ranked on a scale from 1 to 5: 1 = office is not active in that area; 5 = office is very active in that area.

В

** = Difference of means is statistically significant at p < .01. * = Difference of means is statistically significant at p < .05. ^ = Difference of means is statistically significant at p < .10.

Lobbying on Health Care Two health care initiatives demonstrate the strengths and challenges that governors’ lobbyists face. One is the allocation of funding in the 2008 economic stimulus package that provided states additional money for Medicaid costs. The second is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the sweeping health care initiative that was signed into law by President Obama in March 2010. For years governors have considered Medicaid their states’ biggest financial challenge. The challenge is not only that Medicaid accounts for so much of state budgets; it is that Medicaid costs are increasing far faster than inflation.51 Furthermore, many states have argued that because Medicaid dollars are so important to their budgets, they cannot refuse to participate in the program.52 The governors were in a particularly good position to lobby on the health care bill for three reasons. First, every governor realized that Medicaid changes could make or break their budgets; it was a very high-priority issue for governors. Second, all states are affected by this issue and in largely the same ways. Yes, some states have a larger percentage of poor residents who qualify for Medicaid under federal standards, and states that have expanded Medicaid to other groups had concerns not shared by nonexpansionist states. But on the basic lobbying points, governors faced the same economic realities of Medicaid. As John Dinan puts it, they perceived universal interests.53 Finally, the health care bill lobbying process was quite closed. True, this was a very high profile bill that received much media and public attention and active lobbying by associations and institutions of all types. But this was also a 2,000-page bill and a legislative process that included late night deals and next day votes. It was a process for insiders, and governors’ lobbyists are insiders. In this case the governors associations—and particularly the DGA and RGA, given the partisan nature of the politics of the Affordable Care Act—were playing a major role in coordinating the individual states’ lobbying efforts. As they faced escalating Medicaid costs, the states had received a life preserver in the form of the aforementioned Federal Medical Assistance Percentages. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided funds for myriad purposes, including additional funds to states to supplement the FMAP funding. The ARRA funding was initially allocated from Page 130 →October 1, 2008, to December 31, 2010—the legislation provided retroactive funding—and extending this funding quickly became a major agenda item for the governors. Some of the governors’ lobbyists identified FMAP primarily as economic development lobbying since the funding was through the stimulus package; others identified it as primarily health care lobbying. All identified it as a critical issue. The enhanced FMAP was also crucial. A nearly universal state lobbying effort to extend it occurred when it expired, as most states were still mired in budget shortfalls when the funding was scheduled to run out. Lobbying on the enhanced FMAP

was a collaborative effort of the associations and the state offices. It is particularly notable that 47 governors—43 representing American states and four representing territories, and including some prominent conservative governors—signed a letter submitted by the NGA to the U.S. House and Senate leadership that urged extending the enhanced FMAP for an additional six months.54 Governors wanted not only the continued funding but also increased flexibility. The maintenance of effort requirements attached to ARRA funding were another point of significant lobbying. The governors wrote to the congressional leadership, “Restoring flexibility to manage our Medicaid programs and enact common sense reforms is critical to ensuring the program’s ongoing and future stability.”55 Maintenance of effort requirements are commonly attached to federal legislation. These requirements are designed to ensure that the recipient government does not reduce its own funding in a particular area upon receipt of federal funds, but instead uses the federal funds to augment its existing efforts in a particular program. The maintenance of effort requirements attached to the enhanced FMAP funding were particularly problematic for governors, who were facing increasing Medicaid enrollments as the recession continued. In the end Congress did extend the enhanced FMAP through June 30, 2011. Although the extension was less generous than many states had expected, it provided six additional months of enhanced funding, extending the benefit through the end of most states’ fiscal years.56

Implications The specific goals and daily activities of governors’ Washington lobbyists today differ from those of the New York and Connecticut offices in World War II. They also differ—though less significantly—from the offices of the 1960s and even the early 1980s. These offices matter. So do their changes Page 131 →over time. They tell us a good bit about governors’ interests, and how governors have pursued their interests, as federal-state relations have evolved over nearly 70 years. The portfolios of these offices have broadened over the years. During World War II, these lobbying efforts were quite narrow, with an overwhelming focus on aiding private companies in their pursuit of federal dollars. The offices of the 1960s and 1980s were focused on the pursuit of grants to government agencies. Offices also became broader conduits for information, funneling news from Washington back to state capitals. These offices have become more institutionalized over time. In part, this is because the Hall of the States has become a permanent home for many state offices. But it is also because the broader intergovernmental portfolios of the offices have made them more valuable. Today, these offices continue to spend some time pursuing grants from federal agencies, but they spend more time with Congress and less with agencies than they did 25 years ago. An office spends a good bit of time attempting to influence the language and formulas in legislation so that more money reaches its particular state. This shift reflects the decreases in categorical grant money—at least relatively speaking—available to states today versus the 1970s. These offices still spend a substantial amount of time pursuing earmarks, although with fewer rewards than in the late 1990s. Again, governors’ offices are following the money. The federal government distributes funds to states differently today than it did 1943 or 1973 or 2003. The activities of Washington offices are a means by which to measure changes in the federal government’s fiscal relationship with the states. These offices serve as a gauge to measure the dynamics of federalism. Most of the activities described in this chapter are ones that state lobbying offices pursued to benefit their own states. A few lobbying efforts, such as the enhanced FMAP funding in ARRA and the subsequent effort to extend the enhanced FMAP, had such financial significance for all states that lobbying on those issues was either universal or nearly so. Other lobbying efforts brought together a subset of states to lobby. Yet each office’s decisions on prioritizing lobbying efforts were

made with one state in mind. In all cases, a state office pursues its own state’s interests. I will make two points about the implications of these activities as they contrast with the NGA activities that I discussed in chapter 3. Both regard these offices as safeguards of federalism. Elazar argues that federalism is a process.57 In this tradition, these offices are engaging in federalism. They are sometimes working against Page 132 →the encroachment of the federal government, but they are at least as often acting opportunistically—manipulating the federal structure for their member government’s own benefit.58 State offices are designed to respond to opportunism—as the Texas office did with its showdown with Delaware—or to act opportunistically, as Alaska did when it sought changes in its FMAP formula. This is not a bad thing. As Bednar reminds us, “Opportunism is inherent in federalism.”59 Bednar and Nugent each point out that states use multiple mechanisms to act opportunistically.60 Lobbying is one such mechanism. There are weaknesses in state lobbying offices as safeguards of federalism. As Bednar says, “State supervision is suspect; states cannot be counted upon to defend one another as states.”61 This does not undercut the role of these offices as safeguards of federalism, but it does delineate them as clearly distinct from the safeguard of a national (or, in some cases, regional) association of governors. The state offices help maintain balance in a federal system, even if they are motivated by opportunism rather than federalism. The NGA defends and advances states; individual state offices advance and defend their own states. They are multiple, but not duplicative, safeguards. My second observation is that these defenders of federalism, writ small, pursue narrower interests and attack more operational problems. In this way, they are more likely to engage in intergovernmental relations than is the NGA. Deil Wright differentiates between the two frameworks of federalism and intergovernmental relations.62 Within certain parameters the NGA defends the larger principles of federal-state relations, while the individual state offices are interested in what they can procure from the federal government. The state that worked to get “a big box of food stamps” serves as one illustration of this. This is not to say that the NGA never involves itself in operational details; clearly it does as it seeks policies that states find manageable to implement. Specific operational details occupy a larger portion of individual state offices’ efforts than they do the NGA’s efforts, however. These offices pursue the nitty-gritty. The NGA pursues the nitty-gritty writ large, as broader policy. This chapter has aimed to provide information that until now has been unavailable—namely, a thorough description of how governors structure their Washington lobbying operations, and the basic activities of these operations. With this discussion, I hope I have provided at least a partial answer to our second puzzle—what benefits these offices offer governors. I have argued that these Washington offices are different beasts than Page 133 →their governors association counterparts, and in chapter 5 I turn to how Washington lobbyists compare with other types of interest organizations such as businesses, trade associations, and consumer groups. I also continue to untangle our second puzzle of why these governors need lobbyists, and I turn to our third puzzle of the diversity of state offices and governors associations in Washington.

Page 134 →

Chapter 5 Modern Governors Organizations as Organized Interests Most major studies that provide taxonomies of the Washington interest group communities exempt governmental lobbies from their analyses.1 Yet as we have discussed, governors’ lobbying offices and associations are indeed organized interests, and to understand them—and to understand our second and third puzzles of why governors believe they need lobbyists, and why there is such variation—we need to examine them through an interest groups lens. This chapter does this. In this process, I hope to illuminate further the lobbying benefits that accrue to governors through the efforts of these liaisons. I also hope to illuminate the reasons there are seven governors associations in Washington. First, I examine the organizational structure and maintenance of state offices. I detail the lobbying techniques they use and compare them to the techniques used by lobbyists who work in other sectors, such as industry trade associations and nonprofit, nongovernmental interest groups. Governors’ lobbyists often argue that as state governments are partners in government, they are not “just another interest group.” As we shall see, this is true: these organizations are not typical, and their lobbying activities do not mirror those of any other sector of lobbying organization. Second, I turn to the regional associations, examining their structure and maintenance, as well as their activities and policy niches. The regional variations are distinct from both the NGA and state offices, but also vary substantially within their own subgroup, and I examine the factors that have led to this variation. Third, I look at the larger communication networks of the governors’ lobby. Who do governors’ lobbyists work with, Page 135 →how often, and under what circumstances? The targets of state lobbying have changed over time, and I seek to explain this evolution. Fourth, I look at the rise of the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations and the niche they fill in the gubernatorial lobbying community, and what their recent prominence says about state-federal relations in a partisan era. Finally, I assess the gubernatorial lobbying community and how its development has influenced the power of the states’ voice in the federal system.

State Lobbying Offices The offices of the 1970s were far less institutionalized than those of today. One director who headed a Washington office at the age of 25 stated, “In many cases we were young and naïve and idealistic, and we had to figure out what to do, because nobody had done it. And we hadn’t done it, because we were all green. And why were we hired? In some cases I think it was because we were so cheap. We met some sort of need so that [their governors] could say they had a Washington presence. In some cases I understand that the congressional delegations asked governors to have offices set up.” Over time, however, this director saw Washington offices become more professional. It also helped that more states established Washington offices: “There were more of them. And as we figured things out, we were learning from each other. We were starting off with a blank slate. I think that the Governors’ Association got more professional, I think that the staffs got more professional.” An early director discussed taking over a Washington office that she felt had been less effective than it could be: “When I took over the office I really felt that the office needed to do something, and so I started by trying to figure out how I could become indispensable doing things like summarizing the Federal Register for cabinet members, sending out newsletters and copies of stuff, sending summaries of Washington activities to [the state capital], mostly on a day to day activity. I don’t think that [the governor] cared. He cared about some special projects.” Over time, however, the newsletters produced by the Washington office were sent to hundreds of offices in the state capital. It was their only source of information about congressional and other federal activities, and so the newsletter became valuable. In this way, the early Washington office built considerable support from

state agencies and other offices. By the 1990s, producing this sort of Washington update for government offices in state capitals was commonplace, although today, with smaller staffs, Washington offices are less likely to produce substantial newsletters. Page 136 →

Structure and Funding Today, Washington federal liaison offices come in a variety of shapes and sizes. Most federal liaison offices in Washington are staffed by one or more employees of the state government they represent. Yet this arrangement is only one of three structures that states use. The state lobbying offices that are located in the Hall of the States, or occasionally elsewhere in Washington, may in fact be offices that are run by a professional who contracts with the state to provide representation. It is also possible that the federal liaison works for a major law or consulting firm, and the state’s issues are only one part of a larger lobbying portfolio. It is not always easy to determine what staffing arrangement a state uses. Lists of Washington representatives will list a state’s main contact in Washington, but do not necessarily list the consulting firm that might employ the representative. Representatives are typically listed as “Washington Office Director” or “Federal Liaison.” It is even more difficult to determine whether a state’s lobbyist represents the state full-time through a contract or is on the state payroll. Two-thirds of Washington offices are funded at least partially by the governor’s discretionary funding. About one quarter of Washington offices are funded solely with gubernatorial funds. The other offices are funded partially by their governor’s office and partially by state agencies. A few states fund their Washington offices through a legislative appropriation specifically for Washington representation, but they are in the minority. In 2010, the smallest Washington offices had one staff member, and the Texas office was the largest with a staff of 12 people, including several funded by state agencies. Office budgets, including staff and overhead, range from under $150,000 to over $1 million. There are political and financial motivations to fund these offices through disparate sources, even if they are controlled by the governor. When asking about the structure of his office’s budget, one director was told, “If you had a budget, it would be cut.” While the total Washington office budget was several hundred thousand dollars, the governor’s office shared the costs with two state agencies, so each carried a smaller burden. Some governors are aware that they would not be able to receive a line-item appropriation for an office without a fight with the legislature, and discretionary funding avoids this problem. (We will discuss the politics of state legislative support in chapter 6.) Agencies most likely to fund or partially fund Washington offices are economic development agencies, departments of transportation, and departments of health and social services. These agencies have key stakes in Washington activities. Page 137 →Two states have Washington offices that are not under the exclusive control of the governor. The first is Florida, which has an office that represents both the governor and the state legislature. The second is Texas, which is a nonpartisan office representing the state government as a whole. The Texas office director is appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate, and the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house form the office’s three-member advisory board. Both these offices are funded primarily through direct appropriation, and both seem to take their daily cues from the governor. Though some Washington offices are funded by state agencies or are ostensibly a nonpartisan office that represents “the state,” in practice the offices are almost always under the governor’s control. In this way, they are similar to most state agencies. Some offices have staff members whose positions are supported by a specific state agency. This can create difficulties for the office director, as they might not have true control over their staff. Furthermore, it can be difficult to require a staff member detailed by one agency to work on a policy issue outside their purview, even if Washington events require it. One director spoke about the challenges of funding from multiple agencies. As new staff members are hired, the director might want to change issue assignments. Since four agencies pay for staff, and each pays for one or more staff members, the agency might not end up paying the salary of someone working consistently on its issues. This director said, “If we are ever audited, we’d probably have to do a big

memo explaining how we handle things. And [how we do it] makes sense, because you can’t go switching who pays whom all the time just because they take up a different issue.В .В .В . More or less all of us work on all issues at one point or another.” She did note that while the situation was somewhat complex, it was not particularly problematic: “Some offices here have agencies funding certain positions and they kind of think, вЂWell, we own this person, they have to do what we [want].’ We don’t have any problems like that.” The largest structural difference between types of Washington offices is the division between consultants and offices staffed by state employees. Several states have federal-state relations liaisons in Washington who are hired by contract as consultants. Some of these arrangements are nearly indistinguishable from the more traditional offices. These consultants have their states as primary or exclusive clients, and maintain offices in the Hall of the States. Almost always, the state seal is on the door. This office arrangement is more common today than it was in the 1990s.2 There are considerable advantages to this type of arrangement. The governor can minimize many political risks attached to a Washington office. Also, Page 138 →if a governor has been critical of Washington offices in the past, but then wishes to have his or her own Washington representation, hiring a consultant can bring the best of both worlds: a Washington presence without the symbolism attached to a governor’s office in Washington. For example, Indiana governor Evan Bayh criticized the state’s Washington office when he was a gubernatorial candidate in 1988, and pledged to close the office when elected.3 When he took office, he closed the office and hired a well-known consulting firm—Cassidy and Associates—to represent the state in Washington, which he argued would be less expensive. Although the move met with some modest criticism, it allowed Bayh to maintain a Washington presence and still showcase budget cutting.4 Other consultants are not so similar to traditional Washington governors’ offices. States may choose to hire a lobbying firm to represent the state in Washington on an ongoing basis. This structure applies to a few state liaisons. In addition, some states that manage routine federal-state relations from the state capital may use consultants for special projects on an intermittent basis. The most common reason given for using consultants is that it is cheaper than maintaining a full-fledged office. Why establish an office with multiple staff members when a governor’s office could contract with a large firm for specific issues at crucial times—for example, during key legislative reauthorization or appropriation battles? There is certainly some merit to this approach. Several states contract with a Washington consulting firm for their transportation appropriations lobbying. Since states are so dependent on transportation dollars, it can be well worth hiring heavy artillery for the authorization and appropriation fights. Lobbying firms can have a particular area of expertise, and they can dispense several staff members to work for a client when necessary. They can also have the advantage of bipartisan ties. One Washington director who was a consultant noted that the bipartisan ties of the consulting arrangement were a great benefit to the state. More traditional Washington offices might be able to form ties across party lines, but they are not bipartisan. Party identification is always clearly that of the governor. Finally, a state’s representation can suffer if the lobbying firm is not strongly associated with that particular governor and state. While consultants who have a state as a primary or exclusive client become known as “the office of” a particular state, hiring a major Washington law firm does not establish the same affiliation. One former state liaison, who represented a state as part of her portfolio with a larger consulting firm, noted that it could be difficult to represent a state at times because she couldn’t carry the business card with the state’s name on it. In lobbying, trust and Page 139 →familiarity are important, and on these merits firms can lose to Washington offices, even if they might win on the measures of bipartisanship and congressional contacts. It is an open question whether hiring a consultant or consultants is actually less costly than establishing a Washington office. On the one hand, a consulting firm has the advantage of allowing the state to avoid paying for benefit packages for state employees. Since benefit packages might add another 50 percent to the cost of employee salaries, this savings is substantial. A state might also wish to have lobbying efforts ramp up or down during the year, particularly if the governor is focused on only one or two critical issues. Hiring a consultant allows for this. Even if a consultant is on retainer, the state can arrange a contract based on less than full-time work for one lobbyist. On the other hand, consultants do not come cheap, particularly if they are affiliated with established firms, or have built their own reputations for success. Given that a typical Washington office with two to four full-

time state employees can be established for a few hundred thousand dollars a year, using a lobbying firm rather than establishing a Washington office does not necessarily save money, particularly if one Washington office employee is a junior-level staff member. Lease expenses vary with the office building location, but a typical annual lease might cost from $50,000 per year for an office with space for a couple of staff members, to somewhat over $100,000 per year for an office with space for several staff members. Annual salaries for office directors are difficult to ascertain, and they vary significantly, but they are more in line with state government salaries than business trade association salaries. The median director salary in 2006 was between $90,000 and $100,000.5 Salaries for other staff members can be significantly lower.6 Yet perhaps the biggest consideration is whether the Washington office might be staffed by state employees who are already on the government payroll. If a Medicaid policy expert moves from a state capital to Washington to oversee Medicaid, and is not a new hire, then the money spent toward a Washington office is not additional money to the budget, although employees might need adjustments to account for the cost of living in Washington. Yet despite the variation in types of state lobbying operations in Washington, the biggest differences are not between various types of Washington offices. These differences pale in comparison to the differences between those states that have a lobbying presence in Washington and those that do not. A governor’s biggest political decisions (and political costs) surround the decision to have a Washington representative at all. Page 140 →

Comparisons to Other Interest Organizations Ronald Hrebenar and Bryson Morgan identify three major roles for lobbyists: contact persons, who offer access to decision makers; strategists, who organize lobbying campaigns; and liaisons. Liaison lobbyists have two subcategories: watchdogs who gather information for their constituencies, and advocates who work to persuade decision makers.7 The governors’ lobbyists act in each of these roles, and as representatives of the states, governors’ liaisons are almost by definition inside lobbyists. They use tactics that rely on contacts with political elites, including direct access to those who make policy, rather than relying on grassroots efforts or public opinion and the media to influence decision makers. But they are also quite different from other inside lobbyists, as they have smaller staffs and do not fundraise. Staff members in both state and association offices have policy or political expertise and professional experience that provides them an understanding of the nuances of federal policy making and intergovernmental relations. Across time, nearly all the heads of state offices in Washington, as well as the executive directors of the governors associations, have previous employment experience working in state government or Congress. Almost all the rest have previous experience working for a public official association—if not a governors association, then an association representing other state officials such as lieutenant governors, state attorneys general, or state treasurers. These liaisons also have regular contact by phone and in person with Washington decision makers. As we saw in chapter 4, they have daily contact with governors and state agency personnel. The vast majority have daily or weekly contact with personnel from their U.S. Senate and House delegation offices; congressional committees; the White House; and executive agencies. They engage in certain activities that are the hallmarks of inside lobbyists. They are on a first name basis with policy makers in Washington and in state capitals. Though the staff members rarely testify before congressional committees, they arrange for their governors to testify; in this way, they act as many trade associations do, laying the groundwork and preparing testimony for the corporate executive who will represent the membership at congressional hearings. Some are involved in writing legislative language for a bill, an activity that is more common among NGA staff members than individual governors’ liaisons. As inside lobbyists, representatives from state lobbying offices and governors associations share many characteristics of corporate lobbies and business trade associations, but there are important differences. First, Page 141 →almost none employ former political officials. There have been some notable exceptions—for example, Governor Bob McDonnell (R-VA, 2010–14) hired former Virginia Senate majority whip Jeannemarie

Devolites Davis as the director of the Virginia Liaison Office in Washington when he took office in 2010, and John Katz, who was Alaska’s office director for many years, had previously served for two years as the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources—but most Washington offices are staffed with political professionals. As prominent elected officials themselves, governors have less need of a lobbying office with a former official’s name on the masthead than many others who maintain Washington representation. Second, with the important exception of the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations, governors’ liaisons in Washington do not engage overtly in electoral politics, including fundraising or contributing to campaigns. Although almost all of them acknowledged the role that partisan politics plays in policy making, they stressed their roles as partners in a federal system rather than as agents of elected officials with campaign agendas. By contrast, most other types of organized interests in Washington play at least some role in financing electoral campaigns, either by managing their own political action committee or through contributing to individual campaigns or political action committees, or by financing political advertising through 527 groups.8 One-third of interest organizations in Washington have affiliated political action committees.9 Third, these offices interact with the media far less than most organized interests. The majority of interest organizations in Washington interact with the media at least once a month,10 and slightly more than one-third of lobbying organizations hold press conferences or issue press releases.11 Yet only a handful of individual state offices have contact with the media on more than an occasional basis. They do not issue press releases or hold press conferences, and it is uncommon for a state office director to speak to a reporter on the record. If a governor’s liaison does work with the media, it is typically because their governor’s press office has referred a reporter to the Washington office. In this case, they might provide policy details or speak on background. It is unusual that they are quoted, and almost none seek out the media. Press releases are issued by state press offices, not state office directors. For their part, the NGA and the other governors associations do issue press releases and work with the media, although the frequency of this activity varies with the organization staff size. Some state offices have never served as a bully pulpit, but in earlier years some liaisons used the media as a mechanism to raise awareness of the Page 142 →effects of federal policies on states. For example, during Governor Hugh Carey’s (D-NY, 1975–82) tenure as governor of New York, Washington office director Brad Johnson was often quoted in the New York Times on how general revenue sharing and other initiatives would affect New York specifically and state governments collectively. In more recent years—during either Democratic or Republican gubernatorial administrations—the Washington office is rarely mentioned in the New York Times. This change in tactics reflects a number of changes in the greater Washington political arena. One is the development since the 1990s and 2000s of both the 24-hour news cycle and nontraditional news outlets such as websites and blogs. Public officials and their representatives are very careful in their public statements, and governors’ offices are less likely to be quoted on the record. A second is the visibility of federalism and state interests, which—due first to attention to urban and social issues, and then to President Reagan’s policy agenda—received considerable attention from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This is a bit of a self-fulfilling cycle. Many issues critical to state governments are less salient to politicians and citizens today than they were in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn means they are less likely to receive attention from the media, which in turn keeps them less visible. The end result is that governors’ Washington representatives are less visible in the media today.

State Lobbyist Experience, Expertise, and Issue Coverage If Washington office staffs are judged on the later political accomplishments of their directors, then they carry considerable clout. A large number of directors have moved on to impressive political and policy careers. Political commentator Mark Shields directed the Ohio office in the early 1970s. Former Peace Corps director and current Hobart and William Smith Colleges president Mark Gearan directed the Massachusetts office. At least two directors were later elected to represent districts in their states in the U.S. House of Representatives—Thomas Corcoran (R-IL, 1977–84) and Ronnie Flippo (D-AL, 1977–91). Gwen King, the first director of the Pennsylvania office, later worked as President Reagan’s intergovernmental relations director, and went on to

become the director of the Social Security Administration under President George H. W. Bush. Sarah Weddington, who had represented “Jane Roe” in the landmark Roe v. Wade Supreme Court case, had also served as a state legislator and then as an assistant to President Carter before leading the Texas office from 1983 to 1985. Page 143 →Anne Shields, who was an early director of the Wisconsin office, served as the chief of staff for the U.S. Department of Interior during the Clinton administration. Linda Breathitt, who ran the Kentucky office for 13 years, later served as a commissioner at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Other Washington office directors have moved on to high-level positions in the federal executive branch and a variety of Washington law and consulting firms, as well as positions in state capitals. Richard Durbin, U.S. senator and current Democratic whip, worked in the Illinois office (but did not direct it) while he was in law school.12 State office positions, particularly office director positions, are good launching pads. The positions have other advantages. A lobbyist working for a governor is representing a partner in government rather than another outside interest. States, even small states, are large, complex entities with name recognition and considerable weight. To direct the office of the governor of Michigan means you are representing one of 50 states in Washington. A parallel position for a trade association or corporation is not in nearly as elite a club. Many government offices treat a Washington office director as they would a chief of staff, particularly if it is clear that the director has the ear of the governor. The position carries prestige and strengthens a liaison’s professional portfolio. In addition to offering prestige and good work experience, these lobbying office positions are considered to have less pressure and better work hours than serving as a legislative director, chief of staff, or senior committee staff member in the House or Senate. Most governors are not calling their Washington liaisons every day with new demands, and liaisons do not have to work late every time Congress stays in session until the wee hours of the morning. These benefits should make these jobs attractive ones, and they do. The pay for governors’ lobbyists should not have to climb as high as pay for trade association lobbyists, and generally it does not. This might have some impact on recruitment for these positions. Perhaps the salary range of office directors is one reason why office directors are not likely to be lawyer-lobbyists. Only a few directors hold law degrees. There have been two notable shifts in staffing of state offices in Washington over the last 20 years. First, the offices are somewhat smaller than they used to be. In 1998, five of 31 state offices were solo operations, typically because the state contracted with a consultant or firm for less than one full-time professional. As table 5.1 indicates, the average number of full-time paid staff members in an office was 4.4, and the median staff Page 144 →size was four. By 2010, the average number of paid staff members in an office had dropped to 2.9 staff members, and the median staff size was two. Approximately one-third of state offices had a staff of one. Second, as office budgets have stagnated or decreased over the years, fewer staff members have come to governors’ Washington offices with extensive experience. They are more likely to be bright staffers who come with some Washington experience and then get training on the job. In 1999, one sitting director commented, “I think we are more professionally staffed than the House [of Representatives], certainly, and I would say we are on par with the Senate as a whole. We are not as professionally staffed as we were in the early ’90s.” In 2011, there were some who believed that the offices were not staffed as professionally as they were in the late 1990s. Of course, staff members who join Washington offices with only a few years of experience on Capitol Hill can be highly skilled and adept in representing state interests. “Some of them are rock stars,” as one experienced observer put it. But implicit in this comment, and the comments of many others working in and around the Hall of the States, was that only some are rock stars. Many of those working in and with governors’ lobbying offices during Page 145 →the 111th Congress noted that the office staffs were younger, and had less policy expertise, than a decade earlier. Furthermore, two staff members working in the Hall of the States at the end of the 1990s, each of whom had been working with states in Washington for 10 years or more, noted a decline in staff levels since the late 1980s, when the number of Washington offices peaked. In the late 1980s, each commented, there were both more staff members in the state

offices, and staff members with more experience and skill, often with extensive congressional or agency or Washington public official association experience. One staff member described the changes in one state liaison office: “Now it’s kind of a grab bag, but I think pretty uniformly there are smaller staffs. And when you have smaller staffs, that is when you are throwing more issues at each person. So you tend to dilute the effectiveness. You know everyone is sort of just managing issues that they don’t have direct experience in . . . as opposed to always having somebody on board who can take care of things.”

Number of paid staff members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 15 Median: Mean: Minimum: Maximum:

Table 5.1. State Lobbying by Office Staff Size Office size in 1987 Office size in 1998 Office size in 2010 (NGA data, augmented with interview data) (Jensen data) (Jensen data) data on 25 of 33 offices data on all 31 offices data on 25 of 29 offices 5 offices 4 offices 3 offices 3 offices 1 office 3 offices 1 office 3 offices 1 office 1 office 4 4.63 1 12

5 offices 6 offices 4 offices 1 office 5 offices 2 offices 1 office 3 offices 3 offices

10 offices 3 offices 7 offices 1 office 1 office 1 offices 1 office

1 office 1 office 4 4.40 1 15

2 2.84 1 12

As state offices have decreased in size, collectively they have lost many of the staff members with the most experience with state issues. These changes parallel a shift in focus among offices. In the 1980s and 1990s, the larger offices typically had at least two or three staff members with many years of experience in his or her area of expertise. This was particularly true for offices representing the larger states, or midsized states with highly professionalized state governments. This meant that, collectively, the states had advocates who were policy experts with in-depth knowledge of issues such as Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Today, there are fewer of those staff members with detailed knowledge of policy areas or policy history. Collectively, states suffer from this change. These smaller offices are still able to serve their states very well in many respects. They can interact with the state’s congressional delegation, lobby on special projects of particular importance to the governor, and update agencies on major congressional actions. The offices are well suited to provide political support and representation for governors and their state. The biggest drawback of these smaller offices is their inability to develop expertise in certain areas of policy that require nuanced understanding. These areas are covered less well. A particularly critical area is health care, since Medicaid and other health care programs are such a large part of state budgets. Health care policy is tremendously complex, and the implications of health care financing decisions are enormous for states. Smaller offices are not able to have staff members who can dedicate themselves to health care policy. Another related challenge is that governors’ lobbyists are active on a Page 146 →wide variety of issue areas, especially given the size of their offices. They are almost always generalists, by necessity. Fifteen of 21 state

office directors indicated that their office was very active on at least five issue areas during the 111th Congress. By contrast, Beth Leech found that across all types of interest organizations, only 17 percent of those with two to five staff members focusing on federal government relations were very active in five or more issue areas. Furthermore, most groups that were active in five or more areas had substantially more staff members than state lobbying offices have.13 The coverage that a small Washington office can provide on complicated issues is necessarily limited. They simply cannot accrue the same level of skill and knowledge across a broad range of issue areas in the way that larger lobbying operations can. Most offices were aware of this. The most common answer, when I asked office directors what they would change if they could change one thing, was “more staff.” Those who wanted additional staff did not wish to expand substantially; most wanted to add only one or two more staff members. Yet they were conscious of the significantly better depth of coverage that these additional staff members would bring.

Regional Governors Associations Four regional governors associations have an office in Washington, DC.10 The Southern Governors’ Association (SGA), Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG), Midwestern Governors Association (MGA), and Western Governors’ Association (WGA) each have offices in Washington, although the WGA is headquartered in Denver. The Southern Governors’ Association formed in 1934, and was a force in national politics much earlier than the National Governors’ Conference. At the start of its existence, Southern governors were active advocates for economic development in their region, lobbying vigorously on rail freight issues in particular.14 The region’s governors identified shared concerns and organized to balance the industrial northeast in particular.15 The SGA moved its offices from Atlanta to Washington in the early 1980s.16 The Midwestern Governors’ Association was founded in 1962. Western governors formed the Western Governors’ Policy Office (nicknamed WestPO) in 1977, breaking from the 11-year-old Federation of Rocky Mountain States, which was composed of governors, legislators, educators, and business leaders.17 Always located in Page 147 →the nation’s capital, WestPO subsequently merged with the Western Governors’ Association. The regional associations are notable federal representatives, although the federal relations and lobbying for each office is generally handled by the organization’s executive director and federal relations coordinator. The Southern Governors’ Association has both the most distinguished history, and with three employees in 2015, it ties the MGA in staff size. The Western Governors’ Association is the largest overall, with a staff of 11 in Denver and one in Washington. CONEG has five staff members in Washington, and in 2012 it formalized a relationship with the New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers.

Structure and Organizational Maintenance The regional governors associations face organizational challenges that stem from being in the middle. Neither fish nor fowl, they do not carry the visibility or clout of the NGA, but they cannot cater solely to the individual needs of any particular state. Given this, they carry special burdens. As organizations that seek both membership dues from states and attention from their governors, they may be given short shrift compared to their national brethren or their state liaisons. They are particularly at risk during state budget crises, when governors are more likely to withhold dues to the regional associations even as they maintain support for the NGA and their own Washington offices. To top it all off, some regional associations must grapple with overlapping constituencies. Governors may participate in more than one regional association. For example, of the MGA’s member states, all but one—Iowa—belongs to another association as well. Kansas is a member of the WGA; Missouri also belongs to the SGA; Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin belong to the more technically oriented Council of Great Lakes Governors. In particular, the presence of the Council of Great Lakes Governors, whose membership also includes Pennsylvania and New York and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec as associate members, limits the policy niches that the MGA can enter.

As state governments have been pressed for resources in recent years, the regional associations have had to clearly articulate their purposes and effectiveness. This is particularly true given the current budget stresses facing states, and it is true not only for the regional associations but for any budget item that could be eliminated. Said one regional association Page 148 →member, “I do not know that it is so much as a statement on the regionals, but I think the states and governors have been so pressed in terms of resources, people, revenues, budgets, demands on their time.В .В .В . You are not fighting for attention, but you really have to show value, why you are relevant to the top three things that the governor personally, or his office, has to grapple with.” This mix of circumstances yields particular challenges for organizational maintenance. Even if all states consistently paid their dues, the income from membership fees is not enough to sustain the regional associations’ activities. Given this, the associations have taken one of two routes to develop both their portfolios and their income streams. CONEG and the WGA sustain themselves through grants and contract work. For example, the WGA received only $564,000, or 7.5 percent of its income, from dues in FY 2013; the organization states in its annual report that it has not raised dues since 1994. Grants and federal contracts provided over $7.5 million, 69 percent of the WGA’s income.18 By necessity, grants and contracts will determine a large portion of these associations’ issue agendas. The SGA and MGA have smaller staffs and have traditionally relied on corporate partners programs rather than contracts for a large portion of their funding, although in recent years the MGA has moved to seek more grant and contract funding. In most cases the partners are large corporations, but trade associations or nonprofit organizations comprise a modest percentage of the partners. The funding from partnerships can be significant. The benefit of membership in such a program is access to governors and key staff members. A partner organization is able to send representatives to portions of the regional association’s annual meeting and an array of other events, and receives sponsorship recognition. The SGA has a robust Corporate Affiliates Program with six membership levels; in 2011 it had 71 partners. The SGA does not release specific dues or revenue information, but in fiscal year 2011 the association received 34 percent of its revenues from state dues and 63 percent of its revenues from its Corporate Affiliates Program.19 Its dues for the highest levels of membership are reputed to be upwards of $100,000 per year. The MGA, which is newer to the partners’ format, had 26 partners across two membership levels in 2011. In fiscal year 2011, the MGA received $60,000 in dues from six dues-paying states, and $210,000 in partnership program dues.20 It received $385,000 in grants from the U.S. Department of Energy and the Joyce Foundation.21 Two of the four regional associations were originally affiliated with the Council of State Governments. The CSG provides organization assistance to its affiliates, such as assistance incorporating as a nonprofit and managementPage 149 → of payroll and benefits. In turn, the CSG receives management fees from the organizations. Today, the ubiquity of computers and employee payroll and management firms offer other mechanisms for organizational operations, and the regional associations have all separated from the CSG. CONEG and the MGA in Washington are each really two organizations, a larger unit for grant and contract work and a smaller unit funded by dues and supporting the lobbying activities of the association. As it does for the NGA, the dual-organization structure provides a legal barrier between the grant-funded arm and the advocacy arm of the associations.

Activities Most of the efforts of the regional associations are in fact regional in nature. They are information gatherers and coordinators. Three of the four have institutionalized this role through grant and contract work. When they do focus on issues as they relate to Congress or other arms of the federal government, it is often in a monitoring capacity. Do these associations lobby? In a sense. None of the four files lobbying reports with the House or Senate, nor are any of their staff members registered lobbyists. They provide their member governors and their allies information on whom should be lobbied. When regional association staff members visit a congressional office, they are usually accompanying a staff member from a governor’s office. Yet these associations do have a federal

relations coordinator, and clearly they work strategically to achieve political goals. The SGA often works in concert with the Southern Rail Association on surface transportation issues. CONEG staff members do not lobby directly, but rather help governors’ staffs with information about issues and about whom should be lobbied. The staff members are more likely to work with state policy staff members than with Washington lobbying office staff members. CONEG focuses heavily on transportation and energy issues. Rail transit, including the Northeast Corridor and intercity rail, is particularly important. In their role as CONEG leaders, CONEG chair Governor Jim Douglas (R-VT, 2003–11), chair-elect Governor David Paterson (D-NY, 2008–10), and transportation lead Governor Jon Corzine (D-NJ, 2006–10) wrote to the U.S. House and Senate leadership soliciting ARRA funds, 22 and the organization coordinated state proposals for the $8 billion available in ARRA funds for high speed rail projects. Two initiatives illustrate the facilitative role of the regional governors associations. The first is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an institutional disaster management structure that was formed through Page 150 →SGA efforts after southern governors faced historic hurricanes. Governor Lawton Chiles (D-FL, 1991–98) focused on disaster policy in 1992, after Hurricane Andrew had devastated Florida. When Hurricane Hugo struck in 1989, Governor Carroll Campbell (R-SC, 1987–2005), faced the costliest hurricane damage the United States had ever seen—there was over $7 billion in damage nationwide, and over $4 billion in damage to South Carolina.23 When Hurricane Andrew struck Florida in 1992, Campbell called Chiles and said, “Here’s what we needed, here’s what we used, here you go,” offering advice, supplies, and emergency personnel. Following his experience post-Andrew, and remembering Campbell’s experience postHugo, Governor Chiles took the issue to the SGA annual meeting, and the group issued a charge for a better disaster response protocol. The result was the Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an agreement between states and territories to provide aid to other signers in the case of emergencies. The “Southern Regional” was dropped from the compact’s name in 1995 when the SGA voted to open to any state that wished to join, and all 50 states have subsequently signed the compact. (No state is required to assist other states unless it is able to do so.) The compact was ratified by Congress in 1996.24 A second initiative in which a regional organization was a key facilitator was the creation of Western Governors University. Growing from a discussion at the 1995 annual WGA meeting, Western Governors University was incorporated in 1997 and began accepting students in 1999. Hitting an enrollment of 20,000 students and $111 million in revenues in 2010, it has grown rapidly. Today, Western Governors University awards 10,000 bachelor’s and master’s degrees per year in professional fields, including teaching, business, information technology, and health care.25 A not-for-profit online university, it is the only regionally accredited, competencybased (rather than credit-based) university serving students in all 50 states. It is a freestanding university, separate from the WGA, and one of the western governors’ biggest collective achievements.

Issue Areas How do regional associations identify their policy goals? “We try to focus on issues they agree on,” as one association director said and others echoed. There are many issues that can rise to the top of a policy agenda, so why not select those with consensus? This means that the regional associations avoid issues that are too partisan or politically sensitive, but can find areas of common concern that might divide the governors nationally. Ethanol Page 151 →is one such issue. There are politicians who object to subsidies for ethanol, but they are not governors of Midwestern states. As an issue that cuts across agriculture policy, economic development policy, and energy policy, ethanol is a major focus of the MGA. In fact, energy policy is a key issue area of each of the regional associations, as energy plays a large role in the economy of every region of the country, but each region has its own energy policy niche. The MGA also focuses on wind energy and power transmission, while the Home Energy Assistance Program is one of CONEG’s largest issue areas. Likewise, each association has its own twist on transportation policy, depending on the geography and population concentration of its region—roads for the Midwest, intercity rail for the Northeast, and regional rail for the South. The NGA does not stake out positions on transportation policy, beyond a general “let states decide for themselves” approach to intergovernmental funding. With significant regional differences in policy goals, this

is an issue that naturally devolves to the regional associations. The regional associations are also better situated to lobby for policies favorable to economic development, since these policies are dependent on the characteristics of a state or region. It is policy that can also pit states and regions against each other. In keeping with what we know about interest group niches from interest group research, the regional associations have created niches to meet the needs of their membership in these areas.26 Notably absent from any regional association agenda is health care. Medicaid and other health care programs are critically important to states, and there are some regional differences in health care needs. For example, managed care does not work as well in Alaska, where the population density is so low. States with high poverty rates have particular needs. The myriad political sensitivities of the health care debate divide governors from within the same region as well as across regions, however. It is an example where lines are drawn more by partisanship than by region. No staff member for any regional association I interviewed mentioned health care policy at any time during their interviews. It is not an area where the regional associations lobby. This was in sharp contrast to the directors of individual state offices, who lobby vigorously on health care policy.

Coalitions Regional groups rarely work with each other, and they work only occasionally in coalition with the NGA. The associations have partitioned themselves, each forming its own niche. The regional associations, which vary Page 152 →in staff size and overall strength, focus their attention on the policy areas where their governors can agree on policy positions. This means that they do not focus on many policy areas that are of critical importance to states. For example, in keeping with their general avoidance of health care lobbying, no regional association had the Affordable Care Act as a major agenda item during the 111th Congress. The policy positions of governors were too fragmented, and certainly the issue was one that extended beyond one or two regions. Rather than trying to forge common ground on health care, the regional associations left that to the NGA and individual governors’ representatives. The regional associations carve out niches that stem from the geographical linkages or historical linkages of states. The Western Governors Association, with its main office located in Denver and a smaller office in Washington, focuses on such issues as power provision and federal lands issues. The regional associations also work with corporations located in their states, and corporations sponsor annual association meetings that in turn provide access to the governors and opportunities to further common interests. It seems that one reason the regional associations do not often work in coalitions is because other, more specific coalitions or task forces—or even associations—form when governors have common interests. For example, the Council of Great Lakes Governors, launched in 1983, was formed to respond specifically to the needs of the Great Lakes states. Neither the Midwest Governors’ Association nor CONEG include all states that border the Great Lakes, and so the new group filled a niche that existing associations did not fit perfectly.

Variation among Regional Associations There is considerable variation among the regional governors associations. The variation starts with size, but the size differences are a reflection of more substantial differences between them. The southern and western governors were the quickest to organize, and these two associations not only have the longest histories, but are today the largest. In part, their prominence rests on decades of organizational development and maintenance. But it also relates to how particular policy areas shape states’ relations with, and attitudes toward, the federal government. As Elazar explained, “certain common sectional bonds give the states of each section a special relationship to national politics. This is particularly true in connection with those specific issues that are of sectional importance, such as the race issue in the Page 153 →South, the problems of the megalopolis in the Northeast, and the problems of agriculture and agribusiness in the Northwest.”27 SGA and WGA prominence also stems from an early focus on economic development. The open spaces of the West and the agricultural tradition of the South left these two regions at a political and economic disadvantage to

the more industrialized Northeast and Midwest. Both the western states and the southern states had strong regional identities and powerful regional policy interests that cemented coalitions among their brethren. Although certainly the other regions of the country had their own economic and policy interests, they did not share them as broad and enduring commonalities, and they did not face the same economic disadvantages in the first part of the twentieth century. The Southern Governors’ Conference was born in 1937 to lobby for lower railway freight rates.28 The southern governors lobbied vigorously to convince the Interstate Commerce Commission to adjust rates, which were lower in the Northeast and industrial Midwest than in the South.29 The other regions’ lower rates had put the South—as well as the West and Southwest—at a substantial disadvantage for industrial development. The SGC finally won their battle with the ICC in 1945, and economic development would remain a core effort of the association (and its SGA successor) until the present day. Not surprisingly, civil rights were another galvanizing issue for southern governors. The efforts of an SGC delegation of governors to lobby President Truman in 1948, for example, carried a larger message to the Democratic Party: do not ignore the Southern Democratic wing of the party, or assume the security of the South in presidential campaign politics.30 Southern governors continued to wrangle with the federal government. In 1965, Elazar notes, southern states collectively “ranked highest in degree of intrastate unity and in degree of deviation from national patterns and policies.” He adds that “[t]his was reflected in the frequency of conflict with the federal government,” not only in the area of civil rights but also criminal law and social welfare.31 The SGC was an effective organization and it was not afraid of advocacy. The SGC would pass resolutions in its early years, while the National Governors’ Conference did not allow them. Though the NGC passed its first resolutions under majority rule during the New Deal, from the mid-1930s to 1954 it required unanimous consent for any resolution to pass, effectively rendering the national organization mute on major policy issues.32 The Western Governors’ Conference also focused on economic development and faced issues of growth management. The West faced its own policy issues that demanded the involvement of the federal government, Page 154 →including the management of the public lands that were a vast portion of the western states, mineral mining rights, and the management of hydroelectric power.33 Yet the prominence of particular policy areas, and their linkages to federal policy making, explain only some of the differences in the histories and current structures of the regional associations. The second major force is the political culture of their various component states. Political culture influences what people expect of their government, who is active in government, and what government does,34 and the different political cultures in the United States tend to be sectionally distributed. As Elazar explains, “ManyВ .В .В . differences in state responses within the federal system appear to be stimulated by differences in political culture among the states.”35 Despite having the largest organization, the Western Governors Association has not followed the path of so many interest organizations and moved its headquarters to Washington. The WGA—filled with governors who present at least a faГ§ade of hostility, if not genuine hostility, toward the federal government—has the smallest regional association office in Washington, and its lobbying operation is especially small when considered as a proportion of the organization. The rugged individualism of the American West does not lend itself to an orientation of close interaction with the federal government, particularly for the governors of the region’s typically red states. The sentiment toward the federal government that is most often found in the western mountain and plains states is “Leave us alone.” Accordingly, only a very small portion of the WGA annual budget is used to support its Washington office, and direct lobbying is only one focus of that office. The WGA stays focused on the policy agenda that unifies the region—natural resources, energy, and public lands—and it defines much of that activity as information gathering and coordination rather than lobbying. With no official role for corporate interests, the organization further downplays any political orientation. The Midwestern Governors Association faces challenges that stem in part from political culture. It too has many governors who represent constituents hostile toward the federal government. With many well-respected governors maintaining an attitude that “We can manage things better ourselves”—including in recent years such nationally prominent conservatives as John Engler (R-MI, 1991–2003), Tommy Thompson (R-WI, 1987–2001), Jim Edgar (R-IL, 1991–99), Terry Branstad (R-IA, 1983–99, 2011–), and Scott Walker

(R-WI, 2011–)—the governors have been hesitant to expand. Historically, the MGA has had the smallest budget of the four Washington associations. The more taciturn midwestern governors Page 155 →may also be less willing to recruit corporate affiliates than their more social southern counterparts. As one regional association staff member put it, “Southern governors love to socialize—it’s in their blood to throw parties and to brag about their states and to call up their fellow governors and say, вЂGet over here to Mississippi. We’re throwing the best party you’ve ever had. Come eat our seafood. Come drink our alcohol. It’s gonna be a good time. You’re gonna leave having the best time, experiencing the best party of your life.’” They are also willing to make calls to heads of corporations inviting them to participate in the SGA. This is a big advantage—an advantage that not all regional associations share.

Who Works with Whom The governors’ lobbyists work together. Washington is a town that favors coalitions. The Hall of the States was created in large part to foster coalitions among governors and between governors and other government officials and associations. The governors’ individual offices and associations vary in how often they form coalitions, and these coalitions vary in their objectives and successes. Governors’ representatives work most frequently with each other and with the NGA. Nearly every office interacts with other state offices on a daily basis, although some of this is informal interaction and information exchange rather than more organized coalition work. The fact that most are in the same building facilitates this. In 2010, nearly every state office in Washington interacted daily with the NGA. Only a few dealt with the NGA on a weekly basis. The Washington Reps Group still meets on Mondays, where they come together in the Dan Evans Conference Room in the Hall of the States. NGA staff members are present, along with representatives from most of the state offices in Washington as well as the regional and partisan governors associations. Liaisons from the states without offices in Washington may participate via conference call. The Monday meetings still form the core of the formal coalition of governors’ lobbyists in Washington, although the Washington Reps meetings are not nearly as critical to coalition building and policy strategizing as they used to be, in part because these meetings follow the weekly meetings of the Democratic and Republican governors’ caucuses. Governors’ liaisons in Washington today do not work nearly as much with the associations representing other types of state and local public officials. They seldom interact with the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Attorneys General, or the National Page 156 →Association of Counties. They work somewhat more with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials and the National Association of State Budget Officers, interacting with these two groups an average of once a month. They work on a daily basis with their governor’s office in the state capital and with state agencies, and occasionally with individual cities and counties from the state, but they have very little contact with their state legislatures. Though these groups are frequently lumped together as the state and local government lobby, states and localities do not work in coalition as often as this image implies. Cohesion is difficult for 50 states, or even a substantial subgroup of states. Adding cities and counties makes coalition building even more challenging logistically and politically, as the interests of governors and mayors and county executives do not mesh as often as it might seem. Policy cleavages cut many different ways, and though a coalition of 50 people might be numerically modest, it is a challenge when the 50 are governors, each with policy expertise as well as his or her own political and policy agenda. So it is no surprise that smaller informal coalitions regularly form among governors’ lobbyists, fading away when they are no longer useful. These are notable in that they form so frequently. It is relatively uncommon for one governors’ liaison to contact a personal office staff member who works for a member of Congress from another state. Instead, the liaison will contact her counterpart in that state’s governor’s office to see if he will make the call. Sometimes, these issues map on regional lines, and regional associations might also be involved. Other times, the coalitions are composed of whatever handful of states has a particular program that will be affected by some federal action. There has been one coalition that was notable because it was unusual—and potentially destabilizing for broader

gubernatorial coalitions. In 2004, the governors of the four most populous states—California, Texas, New York, and Florida—pooled their clout to communicate their wishes to the Republican leadership in Congress. These governors took advantage of the relatively uncommon partisan alignment of these four states. Republicans controlled the governorships of these four states from November 2003 to December 2006; Illinois, the fifth most populous state, had a Democratic governor during these years. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA, 2003–11) buttonholed his three counterparts at an NGA meeting, and their Washington office staff members began to meet weekly.36 The result was a congressional lobbying effort that took the form of a three-page letter signed by Governors Schwarzenegger, Rick Perry (R-TX, 2000–2015), Page 157 →George Pataki (R-NY, 1995–2006) and Jeb Bush (R-FL, 1999–2007) and sent to House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-OH), Senate majority leader Bill Frist (R-TN), House Ways and Means Committee chair Bill Thomas (R-CA), and Senate Finance Committee chair Charles Grassley (R-IA). It presented a list of provisions the governors sought to include in Congress’s final conference report on legislation to reform the United States’ Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial Income tax regime, which had passed both the House and Senate and had moved to conference committee. The letter was a wish list of sorts, a mix of broad benefits for all states and particularistic benefits that were especially important to at least one of the four states. The letter reflected typical lobbying efforts of state offices in Washington, as a state’s lobbying tends to focus on a few broad agenda items that have overwhelming impact for all states, along with a variety of agenda items unique to that state. The letter from the Big Four included a request for a provision allowing citizens the option to deduct either their state sales taxes or state income taxes on their federal income tax returns. The option to deduct state sales taxes was repealed in the 1986 tax reform bill, leaving citizens in states without an income tax with a larger tax burden than their counterparts in states that raised revenue through income taxes. Citizens in Florida and Texas, states with no income tax, would have benefited from this provision, and its passage would not have directly penalized the citizens of any particular state. In fact, it would have benefited the citizens of all nine states without an income tax, as well as citizens whose state sales taxes were greater than their income taxes. Other requests were much narrower. One was an “incentive to stop runaway film production” to overseas, a provision that would provide tremendous benefits to California’s film industry. Sent on specially designed letterhead representing the four states, the letter emphasized the four states’ collective economic power explicitly, their political power implicitly. “Our states employ over 43 million people and represent the largest agricultural, manufacturing, technology, tourism and service-based economies in the country,” the letter read. And the governors signing the letter carried clout. As the New York Times wrote, “these governors are pooling their considerable political influence to advance the interests of their states, in a move that has caught the attention of politicians and power brokers along K Street in Washington.”37 As all four states did not have Republican governors for long, the coalition was not sustained over the long term, but it was significant enough to give pause to the NGA and smaller states. Page 158 →

The Rise of the Partisan Associations The Republican governors formed an association in 1963; the Democrats formed theirs in 1983. Yet it has been only within the last 10 years that the groups have become a major force in gubernatorial or intergovernmental politics. In 2005, the Democratic Governors Association moved from the basement of the Fairchild Building, an annex to the Democratic National Committee’s main headquarters in Washington, to an office on K Street. The organization expanded, was rebranded, and got a new logo. In 2006, the Republican Governors Association moved from the Metro Center area in Washington to its current space less than two blocks from the White House. It too expanded and rebranded. Today, both groups are significant forces. Furthermore, many governors’ representatives say that their partisan association is more useful to them than the NGA. The DGA and RGA have always been mechanisms for governors to coordinate and promote their vision of governance and intergovernmental relations. For example, shortly after it was established, the DGA published

Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors’ View from the States, a volume composed of essays by Democratic governors on management and policy.38 The two associations hold meetings that piggyback on the semiannual NGA meetings, providing an opportunity to network and strategize. Every Monday there are Democratic and Republican caucus meetings of the governors’ liaisons; then the liaisons meet together for the Washington Reps meeting. Though the caucuses are not officially sponsored by the partisan associations, it is difficult to distinguish where the policy operations of the two groups end and the informal networks begin. At the caucus meetings, the governors’ liaisons will discuss strategy on a conference call with representatives of the states without Washington offices as well as others. The conference call might include an update on congressional activities from congressional leadership staff members. A White House representative might participate in his or her party’s conference call. One goal of these meetings is to get the governors to “speak with one voice”—or more specifically, one Democratic voice or one Republican voice. Representatives from both partisan associations state that their groups tried to facilitate policy networking between governors and help disseminate best practices among governors. This work on “best practices” seems to be substantially different from the work done by the NGA’s Center for Best Practices, with its capacity for research and data gathering, and its ability to reach across partisan lines. The partisan associations cannot offer these resources. What they can offer to governors who are operating in an Page 159 →ever more partisan environment is a framework of trust. Explaining how the organization facilitates one governor’s sharing information about a state activity with a new governor, an RGA representative noted, “When the RGA does it, they know it is coming from a friend.” Implicit in this comment is that the NGA and governors from the other party might not be trustworthy. As best practices become more politically infused—which, to be sure, many public administration and policy scholars would say is inherently contradictory to the concept of best practices—the benefits of partisan policy networks become apparent. Though NGA staff members emphasize that the organization takes pains to be bipartisan, it has had a harder and harder time convincing the governors and their lobbyists of this. Multiple Republican liaisons told me that the NGA was far too Democratic in its orientation. For their part, some Democratic liaisons indicated that the NGA had made too many concessions to Republican governors and had become a Republican-leaning organization. Further complicating the partisan divide is the increasing role of money in political campaigns. The expense of campaigns, as well as changes in election law and its interpretation, led to the current RGA and DGA focus on campaign strategy and fundraising. In the last 10 years, both organizations have made fundraising their primary focus. The policy role is still present, but the organizations have grown substantially. The bulk of this growth has been committed to electoral politics. The size of each organization is cyclical, as each adds staff members in the years when there are more gubernatorial elections. (In 2011 there were gubernatorial elections in Kentucky, Louisiana, and West Virginia. In March 2011 the DGA employed 16 people;39 in September 2011 the RGA employed 21 people.40) Each association maintains a political committee that is regulated by Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. A 527 group can spend unlimited amounts of money in political races as long as it avoids certain words that trigger spending limits. Spending by 527 groups has grown exponentially in recent years, as figure 5.1 indicates, and the DGA and RGA have been a very significant part of this. Both organizations have moved away from raising funds and spending them in the same election year to a longerterm strategy. Given that 36 of the 50 state governors are elected in the same year every four years, and in the following year only three governorships are in play, the move to operating on a four-year spending cycle helps smooth the peaks and valleys in fundraising. As they have grown, the two groups have become more sophisticated in their allocation of funds, spending more strategically in 50 states that have 50 different sets of election rules. Increased funding Page 160 →has brought election modeling, more extensive polling, and broader use of paid media. Both the RGA and the DGA have substantially more to offer gubernatorial candidates, and their parties, than they did even 10 years ago. The RGA has had a particularly significant increase in contributions since 2009. Fig. 5.1. Democratic Governors Association and Republican Governors Association expenditures by election cycle, 2003–14 (adjusted to 2014 dollars). (Data from Center for Responsive Politics,

http://www.followthemoney.org. Data based on records released by the Internal Revenue Service on January 27, 2015.) The contributions to both associations come from the same types of organizations. Of the 100 largest nonindividual contributors to the RGA and DGA in 2010, 45 corporations and three trade associations gave to both groups, and they gave similar amounts to each.41 The bulk of the contributions are from corporations and, for the DGA, from unions, although both groups also target individual donors. In 2008, Governor Haley Barbour (R-MS, 2004–2012), a former Republican National Committee chair, led the RGA in establishing an individual giving program. The result was the Executive Roundtable, formally established in 2009 and composed of those contributing $25,000 or more to the RGA.42 In 2011, the Executive Roundtable had about 600 members. Why would a donor contribute to the DGA or RGA instead of the Democratic National Committee or the Republican National Committee, or one of the other partisan campaign committees? For some, a donation Page 161 →is an avenue for maximizing contributions in a system that limits contributions to any one 527 to $100,000. It is also an avenue for access to important political figures. As a staff member for one of the partisan groups explained, there is one tier of donors composed of corporations that already have many established routes to political actors. Corporations such as Altria have their own federal relations offices in state capitals and Washington, and they contribute broadly to campaigns and candidate committees. For these corporations, contributions to the DGA or RGA—or both—are part of a larger campaign strategy. But for other groups, the “second and third tier” corporations, a DGA or RGA contribution is a very efficient route to politicians they would not otherwise be able to access directly. They can “write a $100,000 check and get in front of a roomful of governors” at one of the policy programs or roundtables that both the DGA and RGA host, as one association staff member said. From a governor’s perspective, the time committed to such an event has a very real benefit. There is an electoral return on their investment in time. This type of return does not accrue as a result of the time a governor spends at an NGA event.

Governors Associations, Interest Group Niches, Partisan Politics, and Collective Action “The governors are effective when they speak with one voice.” “The governors can make a difference when all of them are on board.” These statements were made by association staff members. Each is true, although perhaps the second more than the first, as it recognizes that the governors might make a difference under these circumstances—or they might not. And though these statements are true, they are also not terribly illuminating. After all, almost all interest groups are more effective when their members hold the same positions on an issue, and they are more effective when they are vocal in their advocacy. The most interesting observations surround the circumstances under which these things occur, and whether these circumstances are the same for other types of organized interests. How easy is it to get the governors to speak with one voice on an important issue that affects them? First, they must understand the issue. This is where their lobbyists can help. For large, complicated issues, it isn’t always clear what position to take, or whether to take one at all. A good example is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. A governor’s liaison provides information on the matters at stake. Particularly important on these matters is the NGA, since its policy office can provide extensive research Page 162 →on the implications of legislation, and because the NGA is the national group that would issue any resolutions in support of, or in opposition to, a federal initiative. That governors are major political players, well informed on the issues, cuts both ways when building a coalition. Most small-business owners do not follow the details of congressional activity. When their trade association contacts them to ask them to mobilize to support or oppose some issue, they likely accept the association’s position as the correct one, the one that best represents their own interests. On the other hand, not all small-

business owners are likely to heed their association’s call to action. Governors are knowledgeable, visible, and political. If a governor does not take a position on an agenda item, it is not likely to be due to apathy, but due to his or her own assessment of the politics and policy significance of the matter at hand. The key to gubernatorial political power in Washington is not unanimous support from all governors, but a lack of vocal opposition from any minority of governors. Sometimes this is due to a formal arrangement, but even in organizations without formal rules, the same dynamic holds. The DGA and RGA are the latest players to achieve prominence, although both have existed for decades. They join five other associations in Washington representing governors, and more than two dozen state offices that represent their own governors. This vigorous cluster of government offices is its own niche in the enormous lobbying environment that exists in Washington, and its vibrancy brings both strengths and weaknesses. In one way, they create a louder voice for governors—or if not a louder single voice, then multiple voices that can speak to more issues. This is the benefit of the regional associations. They rarely oppose each other directly, preferring to partition their efforts as they monitor and lobby on policy areas that do not often overlap and rarely compete. When the regions do compete, it is often about funding and fights over formulas. In these cases, the states are competing for dollars rather than opposing each other on policy, and it is possible for all states to gain. The gain is not necessarily zero-sum, as the money comes from somewhere, and it can be win-win for states if all states increase their federal funding. The refrain from the competing associations is “Give my region more, ” not “Give me more and give that other region less.” In these cases, the multiple associations strengthen the voice of the states in Washington, and reinforce each other with relative harmony as they act as political safeguards of federalism. But in other ways the proliferation of governors’ lobbyists causes discord. There are issues where governors and their associations do take Page 163 →strong opposing positions. This is most likely to occur with the DGA and RGA. The partisan associations align themselves with their national parties on significant policy issues such as health care, and they assist their member governors in their political statements on these issues. These efforts change the focus of governors’ agendas from state-federal interactions to Democratic-Republican interactions. The parties reap rewards from this alignment, and, as we have seen, the governors themselves benefit from their partisan association’s efforts, and they can benefit politically from taking partisan stances on significant policy issues. It does not appear, however, that the partisan discord strengthens the governors’ collective position as the voices for the states in the federal arena. When allegiances to political party trump allegiances to one’s level of government—when a governor heeds his or her political party rather than his or her state’s interests—the safeguards of federalism are weakened.

Page 164 →

Chapter 6 Politics, Culture, and Variation in Maintenance of State Offices We have examined the benefits that Washington representation can bring a state and its governor, examined the cases of several governors who acted as interest group entrepreneurs and established their state’s first federal lobbying office, and looked at what state lobbying offices and governors associations do. We have not yet investigated the broader puzzle of why some states have Washington lobbying offices and others do not. This chapter tackles that puzzle. This chapter has two parts. The first part looks more precisely at the political costs and benefits that governors incur by opening or maintaining a Washington office. These costs and benefits vary by state and over time, so governors will make different decisions about the value of Washington representation. Though most state offices are maintained once they are established, a number of offices have opened, then closed, and then reopened at some later time. I draw on my interviews as well as primary documents to illustrate individual cases that demonstrate these patterns. The second part of the chapter turns to the presence and absence of state offices in the aggregate. With 50 states to examine over many years, we have an opportunity to use a particular kind of quantitative analysis—an event history model—to understand the factors that affect whether or not a particular state has a Washington lobbying office. Together the qualitative and quantitative evidence provides good purchase on the forces that influence the existence and stability of these offices. Page 165 →

The Political Costs and Benefits of Washington Representation At many points in the preceding chapters, I have discussed the material benefits of Washington offices. Governors typically establish their own offices to secure federal dollars, and the NGA’s move to Washington in the 1960s was motivated in part by the same intention. It is difficult to quantify the precise amount of funding that these offices have secured for their states, just as it is difficult to determine the impact of any interest group.1 It is challenging to assess in any broad set of cases exactly how critical a particular lobbyist is in delivering a particular earmark or influencing a particular grant formula. But because they are such a tiny part of a state’s budget, the offices do not have to do much to justify their financial value. This is convenient for the governor making a decision about an office, because calculating the precise cost of an office can also be a bit tricky. For example, if the office staff members are state employees, what is the cost of their fringe benefits? If the Washington office did not exist, would its employees still be state employees? After all, some Washington offices are staffed with employees who moved from a state agency to the Washington office, and would be working in the state capital if the office were not open. The average of a few hundred thousand dollars that a governor commits for an office is often recouped if the state gets even a single earmark or funding formula change that it would have not have received without the efforts of the Washington office. From a rational perspective, the financial costs are not what are keeping some governors from setting up shop in Washington. These offices are financially worthwhile, and looking only at the dollars expended and generated by Washington lobbyists, it would seem that every state would have an office. But they don’t. What could be at work here? I suggest that political costs and benefits play a significant role in determining whether a governor maintains a Washington office. A governor who establishes an office must be concerned with the reaction of the congressional delegation, the legislature, the press, and the public. Governors differ in their personal political goals, and they have different incentives to maintain a presence in Washington. These political costs and benefits must be weighed by governors, and then managed by the governors’ liaisons.

Political Risks A Washington office can bring attacks from other political actors, and these attacks carry a political price. The criticisms can be grouped into Page 166 →four categories: campaign attacks; the legislature’s concerns; risks stemming from partisan or personal political struggles; and attacks based on financial management, particularly during budget shortfalls. According to James L. Martin, the NGA’s director of state-federal relations for over 30 years, a Washington office comes under fire during a political campaign in nearly every gubernatorial election. It is an obvious target for a challenger seeking to criticize the governor. There can be two approaches for criticism: the governor might be accused of not managing money wisely by spending state funds on a needless Washington office, or there might be a more political angle, with the governor accused of seeking the federal limelight for personal benefit rather than staying true to state concerns. A few office directors told me that the press attention from the media was positive when the office opened, or that the criticism was that the office was too small. For example, Illinois Republican congressman Ray LaHood criticized Governor Rod Blagojevich (D-IL, 2003–9) when he downsized the state’s Washington office.2 This sort of reaction to a Washington office generally occurs in either “big government” states or “good government” states. Any potential for positive stories on Washington offices, which are often feature stories on a governor’s liaison and what they do, does not balance the risk of a negative article that implies that the governor is wasting money or seeking personal political gain. Though office directors were reluctant to talk about the attacks their Washington office had faced, they were sometimes a bit less reluctant to mention challenges another state had faced, and sometimes references to political difficulties make the state newspapers. The Missouri office presents a good example of how an office can draw the ire of legislators. The office became a “political football” during Governor Bob Holden’s (D-MO, 2001–5) administration, said one observer in an interview. In 2003 the Missouri Senate acted to close the office, stripping $234,238 in proposed office funding when it approved the 2004 fiscal year state budget.3 Ultimately, the budget cut $130,000 in office funding.4 Governor Holden subsequently funded the office through agency funds. In January 2004, Republican state senator John Cauthorn gave his Gold Goose Egg award to Holden for “recklessly circumventing the General Assembly’s budget mandates in a petulant move to keep a вЂlegislative liaison’ office open in Washington, DC.” Referring to the office as a “fiscal boondoggle,” Cauthorn’s press release quoted the state senator as saying, “the Governor pulled $200 million from money we appropriated for schools in 2004. But the nearly quarter of a million dollars needed to run an un-needed beltway listening post—money the General Assembly specifically removed from the 2004 Page 167 →budget—he finds by robbing other agencies such as mental health, social services, higher education and half a dozen other state agencies. If that’s concern for our children’s education, I’m concerned Governor Holden is concentrating on other things.”5 Holden became the first sitting governor in Missouri history to lose his reelection primary campaign. The Washington office was not the only campaign issue, of course, but no governor wants this sort of negative publicity in a difficult race. There are many other cases of legislators criticizing or attempting to defund state offices. For example, the Massachusetts office was nearly defunded in 2009. As discussed in chapter 4, Governor Patrick was the first governor in recent memory to include a line item for the office in his budget proposal rather than support the office from internal and agency funds. The legislature, led by Republicans, moved to eliminate the allocation, which was ultimately restored.6 Wisconsin’s Washington office on a number of occasions has faced an amendment to defund the office. These efforts have never succeeded, but they have inclined the office—which must submit quarterly reports to the legislature—to articulate its benefits very clearly.7 If a governor is smart, he or she will be sensitive to the political risks of establishing an office. The case of the Nevada office is illustrative of this. An office for the state of Nevada was first proposed in a report of the Nevada Economic Development Advisory Commission. When the office was established, the office director position was established as a nonpartisan professional hire rather than a partisan position, which reduced the political costs to the governor when facing the state legislature. Subsequently, the director of the office held a contract with the state to administer the Washington office. This created a bit of distance between the Washington office and the

governor; the office was less likely to be portrayed as an extension of the governor’s office. Sometimes political fire can lead to an office’s elimination; in other cases, the office might be reduced in size as a result of a political compromise. Offices need to manage these risks. Several observers told me that West Virginia could not maintain an office because Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV, U.S. Senate, 1959–2010) would object. From his seat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Byrd had a long tradition of arranging for many earmarks that funneled projects to West Virginia, and he was adamant that paid intermediaries were not necessary to win federal funds. In one case, upon hearing that West Virginia University had procured Cassidy and Associates to lobby for university building funds—WVU was one of a number of institutions that Cassidy and Associates had assisted in an effort Page 168 →to land several hundred million dollars in earmarks for university building funds—Byrd decided not to seek $16 million to $18 million for a WVU building effort. Upon learning of lobbyist involvement in the university’s effort, Byrd spoke to university representatives about his “вЂindignation and angerВ .В .В . I asked them: Why do you think you have to employ a lobbyist? I said I was for anything that benefits West Virginia, and I was always going to be supportive. I’m on the Appropriations Committee—if I can’t do it, nobody can. I asked them: Why do you waste your money on a lobbyist when I’m being paid to be your senator? I voiced my anger.В .В .В . I voiced my displeasure and anger and non-belief that they were being taken in by lobbyists. And I resented it and I said so.’”8 With such intense opinions from the powerful senator, it was inconceivable for any West Virginia governor to risk offense by establishing a Washington lobbying office. The NGA has produced a number of documents on the activities, structures, and benefits of Washington offices.9 One early document recommended that governors seek to establish their offices by statute.10 This makes the offices harder to eliminate, and of course the NGA has its own interests in stable offices. In more recent years, perhaps recognizing that no one size fits all political situations, NGA documents have not favored any one office structure.11 The association does emphasize that it provides support for governors’ Washington offices, however.12 It is difficult to get an accurate picture of how often Washington offices become an issue in a gubernatorial campaign. At least three Washington offices (or 10 percent of the offices with paid staff) became an issue in the late 1990s. At least one became the focus of a campaign spat in the 2010 election. Offices that come under political fire are more likely to be disbanded. Most offices survive the political firestorm, but some do not. Handling the political sensitivities of a Washington office can take considerable care by the office director. One former director explained that political difficulties are best managed by sticking closely to the written objectives of the office. As his office was one of those established by statute, and the statute stipulated the office’s activities, he had strong justification for office activities as long as they did not stray from those that the statute enumerated. Nonetheless, the director was aware that the office had to be careful of engaging in questionable activities, as other political players such as state legislators—who fund the office—might object: “This is like a governor’s embassy, OK? Which means that a legislator says, вЂwhat the hell is this?’ .В .В . I’ll tell you, you have got to have a favorable constituency in order to survive. I’ve never ever worried about that, because if you do what Page 169 →you are supposed to do, if you follow the statutory requirements, you’re not going to have a problem.” Political factors can affect that structure of individual offices. According to the first director of one Washington office, the governor did not want to look as if he were looking for a “national beachhead” for advancing his career. Though the governor was a Democrat and the state legislature was controlled by Democrats, the legislature was more conservative, both politically and fiscally. This was potentially problematic since funding for the office had to be approved by the state legislature. After this director was hired he made a courtesy call to a state senator who, incidentally, was not pleased with the job that the congressional delegation was doing representing the interests of the state government. During this meeting, the senator said that the idea of an office was “a crock of shit. But [a political colleague] says you are a good boy. So you just go and kick the shit out of the delegation.” With this dГ©tente, the office director had a successful career representing the state, but he remained sensitive to the political visibility of the office, and took care not to appear to be too narrowly focused

on the governor’s political agenda. One director said candidly about Washington governors’ offices, “When I first came up here I thought they were going to be political. They’re not.” This is largely true. But a former director who served the same state in that position for over 10 years said, “Damage control was a big and serious undertaking.” These comments are representative of those made by a broad number of Washington office directors, though they are somewhat less representative today, as some governors and by extension their offices have become more partisan.

Political Benefits Washington offices can increase the political prestige and visibility of a governor. In some cases, Washington offices seek quite specifically to increase a governor’s prestige or visibility. Political activities cannot be supported if an office does not conduct the other substantive activities that provide the main justification for the office, but political benefits can play an important, if secondary, role for a Washington office. When I conducted my first interviews, Washington office directors were wary of discussing how they worked to gather political prestige for their bosses. It is an aspect of the job that can be heavily criticized by political opponents. In subsequent interviews I tried to ease their concerns about Page 170 →talking about political prestige. I explained that presidential scholar Richard Neustadt argued that presidential prestige was crucial to achieving the president’s agenda, and I was investigating whether and how Washington offices tried to increase the political prestige and visibility of their governors.13 Under this framework, I could have very productive discussions about the role that prestige and visibility played in the activities of Washington offices. Because the early interview subjects were reluctant to talk about prestige, I cannot present the exact number of offices working to increase the governor’s political prestige, but the vast majority of Washington office directors are sensitive to how the work of the office influences the political prestige and visibility of the governor. One Democratic Washington office director explained how his office sought to increase political prestige for the governor while still maintaining a strong policy orientation: “One thing that we’ve done since I’ve been here is to try to help position him on some key national boards and the NGA, obviously. We got him onto [a national board of directors for a public institution], which he got a lot out of in terms of national exposure. Right now he’s actually just agreed to serve on this [another national foundation]. Huge foundation, [more than $1 billion] dollars. That’s gonna help him. Those are the kinds of things we’ve done.” When asked whether the office was criticized for engaging in activities only for political reasons, this director said no. He went on to explain: No, because we do so much policy stuff and every one of those things I named that gives him national exposure also translates into huge benefits for [the state] in terms of policy stuff. Every single one of those things. So, there’s no one that could accuse him of doing things for political purposes I don’t think.В .В .В . There’s policy and there’s certainly political reasons for doing everything. I do it, I do that on purpose. If I sit here and I say there’s five things he could be chairman of, I’m gonna recommend to him the one that gives him the greatest political advantage and policy advantage. He has been asked to be chairman of a lot of things and we’ve said, “No, you shouldn’t do it.” This director also stated that if the office could not be used for political prestige that it would still exist for policy reasons, and indeed noted, “I would argue that it only exists for policy reasons.” Savvy directors ground their offices’ political advantages in substantive policy benefits. A Republican Washington office director articulated many of the same Page 171 →points. When asked what role political prestige or visibility played in her office, she stated: By keeping this office involved in a lot of different venues—the NGA, the RGA, certain high profile issues—it keeps the governor or our cabinet directors highly visible. A lot of what I do is

help set up a visibility for the governor to be a chairman of a variety of different organizations. If I’m speaking, if I’m vocal and speaking a lot, people think [the governor is], you know, he has a position, he’s strong. So, yeah, I think staff can help governors keep a perception out there or increase the perception. If you work with the press, your state-based press . . . there are ways to do it. And then just looking for opportunities when they [the governor and cabinet directors] are out here to do other things . . . I think for us it’s a very significant role. . . . Now, admittedly, unless you have a governor that’s willing to back you up on that, but if you have a governor who wants that for him- or herself, then, yeah, you can help with that.

When asked if her office tried to be high visibility or low visibility, this director went on to say that the office tried to be a high visibility office within certain domains: “High visibility within the areas where we can affect policy. I purposely don’t have this office be highly visible with our legislature because there’s not a role for it. But I want to be highly visible with congressional leadership, with our congressional delegation, with all of our departments and agencies. I want them to know we’re here. I want them to work through us. Not to be a command and control freak, but because the more organized and coordinated we are, the more helpful we can be.” One office director I interviewed was aware that Washington offices can be helpful in situating a governor for a position after the governor leaves office. During his interview for the job, he told me, he asked, “When you are in the final two years, do you want to come to Washington to work in an agency, or to be an ambassador or something.В .В .В . I mean, we can tee it up so that it is more likely, if you want it.” The governor was very clear, this director said, that he would not be seeking this sort of position, and did not have use for his Washington office to help smooth any path in this direction. This director then spoke more generally about the fact that some governors sought more visibility generally, and that this affected their Washington offices—as no doubt it did their offices in the state capital: Page 172 →I’ve watched some of my peers who have governors who definitely come to Washington all the time, who have very high visibility, and they work that. And I think I know how to work that if I were in this position and the next governor wanted that. But I have been very grateful that he hasn’t wanted to do that because I think it has kept tensions between the delegation and the governor to a minimum. There is no competing for credit or anything like that. And it’s given him the flexibility when he has wanted to make a direct impact on something to come to Washington and not be seen as a showboater or anything like that.

Openings and Closings Contrary to what most people familiar with these offices believe, but as the discussion above indicates, the number of state offices in Washington has varied over time. Many states established their first offices in the 1960s and 1970s, but the number continued to rise as the United States entered the Reagan era. By 1985, there were 30 Washington offices. (In 1980, seven state legislatures were also represented in Washington, but legislatures with federal offices have always remained few in number.) President Reagan’s New Federalism of the 1980s brought to Washington an era that was clearly different from the era of President Johnson’s Great Society and President Nixon’s New Federalism. During the 1980s, states were fighting a recession and federal funds to states were less readily available. If the 1970s were all the money with no strings attached, then the Reagan era brought less money and more strings.14 Still, however, a substantial majority of governors saw a need for a Washington lobbying office. Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s the number of state offices in Washington peaked at 36. The late 1990s started a period of more office closings than openings; if one is to consider this a third wave in state lobbying office change, it was one of ebbing. By the 105th Congress (1997–98) the number of Washington offices had dropped to 31. In 2010, there were 30. In early 2015, there were 26. Though nearly all states have had a Washington office at some point, only a handful of these have stayed open since their establishment. Table 6.1 and figure 6.1 illustrate the existence of state offices over time; figures 6.2

through 6.5 show the geographic dispersion of the states with offices in 1967, 1978, 1988, and 2008. The offices can be grouped into three categories according to their longevity: the permanent offices; the fleeting offices; and the intermittent offices. Page 173 →Table 6.1. Years of Existence of State Lobbying Offices in Washington, 1981–2010 State Years of Existence Total Number of Years Alabama 1982; 1987–1994 9 Alaska 1981–2010 30 Arizona Arkansas California

1987; 2004–2010 2003–2007 1981–2010

8 5 30

Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana

2004–2005 1981–2010 1981–2010 1981–2010 1983–1990; 2000–2002; 2005–2010 1982–2002 1999–2006 1981–2010 1981–1988; 1990–2004; 2006–2010 1986–2010 1984–1987; 1989–1990; 2004–2010 1981–1996; 2002–2003; 2005–2010 1982–1983; 1988–1991; 2004–2007 1982–1992 1981–2010 1981–2010 1981–2010 1981; 1984–2010 1982–1997; 2001–2003 1981–2004 1981–1988; 2002

2 30 30 30 17 21 8 30 28 25 13 24 10 11 30 30 30 28 19 24 9

Nebraska 1992–1998 Nevada 1986–2010 New Hampshire 1983 New Jersey 1981–2010 New Mexico 1982–1986; 1992–1994; 2004–2010 New York 1981–2010 North Carolina 1981–2010 North Dakota 1998–2010 Ohio 1982–2010 Oklahoma 1991–1994 Oregon 1997–2002; 2007–2010

7 25 1 30 15 30 30 13 29 4 10

Pennsylvania

1981–2010

30

Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee

1981–1982; 1997–2005 1981–2010 1988–1993 1995–1999

11 30 6 5

Texas Utah Vermont

1981–2010 1981–2004 2006–2007

30 24 2

Virginia Washington

1981–2010 30 1981–1983; 1989–1993; 1996–2002; 2006–2010 20

West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

— 1981–2010 —

0 30 0

Fig. 6.1. Number of Washington offices over time Page 174 →A plurality of states have offices that, once opened, have never closed their doors. These offices have become permanent parts of their states’ governments. The office space might be vacant for a few or several months during gubernatorial transitions as the departing governor’s staff leaves and the new staff arrives, or they might switch forms; shifting from a larger office with state employees to a smaller consulting operation has not been uncommon as offices have downsized over the years. For these states, however, these short-term vacancies are transitions rather than closures. Once a governor establishes the Washington office, his or her successors maintain it. These states tend to be large industrial states, and we have seen examples of this continuity in the New York and Illinois offices. Governors from a second set of states seldom have offices. Some of these states had representation in Washington in the 1960s or 1970s, but they have not had an office in Washington since the 1980s. These are the fleeting offices. They typically represent states that have smaller populations. New Hampshire had an office in Washington, but for only one year. Montana had an office only briefly; Governor Judy Martz (R, 2001–5) established an office in 2002, with plans to measure its success by the amount of federal funding returned to the state.15 NGA lists of WashingtonPage 175 → representatives have no record of a Montana office in 2003. West Virginia had an office in the early 1960s. Fig. 6.2. States with Washington offices, 1967 Then, in the third category, there are a dozen or so states that have had their offices come and go—sometimes repeatedly. These are the intermittent offices. The Minnesota office is one example. The office was established in 1977 by Governor Rudy Perpich (DFL-MN, 1976–79, 1983–91). When Al Quie (R-MN, 1979–83) became governor after Perpich’s first term, he closed the office; the recession of the early 1980s has been mentioned as the reason for the closure. Perpich returned to the governor’s office in 1983, and he reestablished the office in 1984. It has been open since then, though vacant for brief times during staff changes that typically coincided with gubernatorial transitions. Closing an office in a recession is not uncommon. As a sign of leadership, a governor must demonstrate that he or she is sharing the staff cuts that are affecting state agencies. The Washington office, which might be seen by some as an extravagance in the first place, is a visible way to cut gubernatorial staff. Unlike the state’s department of finance, a Washington Page 176 →office is something that can be eliminated. A Republican Washington office director explained how state budget cuts had caused the Washington office to be eliminated and then reestablished: Fig. 6.3. States with Washington offices, 1978

It’s like when a corporation looks to reduce their overhead and they look to see which divisions aren’t producing items for the bottom line. And, you know, it’s very hard for a Washington office to say, “Well, you know, I saved the state $7 million or I saved the state $500 million because we were in the room when they doing the formula. We were able to do X, Y, and Z.” .В .В . You know, there’s got to be a reason to justify why you’re here, why I’m here, and it’s to protect the state’s interest and protect 20 percent of the state’s budget, which was federal transfers. And, you know, it’s bad enough to start cutting expenditures because the revenues in the state aren’t meeting expectations. It’s quite another when you have to cut because the feds are nicking you. That’s a problem, so that’s the kind of thing Page 177 →that we tried to sell it on. And actually I think we did pretty well. But I think it’s hard to do it. Fig. 6.4. States with Washington offices, 1988 In this case, selling the case pretty well was not enough to save the office. These examples reflect Salisbury’s observation that “in hard times group membership may be one of the first luxuries to be sacrificed.”16 Salisbury’s assessment of interest group membership also appears to be accurate for Washington office continuation, even if closing the office is not in the financial best interests of the state.

Why Do Some, But Not All, States Have Washington Lobbyists? How do we explain the puzzle of the variation in office establishment and maintenance, and in office closings? An office director is likely to tell you that the decision to open or maintain a Washington office is all up to the governor—that it simply gets down to what the governor believes and Page 178 →chooses to prioritize. This explanation begs the question. Yes, in almost all states it is the governor’s decision. But would Mario Cuomo have chosen to maintain a lobbying office in Washington if he had been the governor of Nevada rather than New York? Fig. 6.5. States with Washington offices, 2008 Elite political actors are influenced and constrained by their political circumstances. Governors make choices not in a bubble but at a particular time and place, under particular economic conditions, with a specific state legislature to consider, facing constituents who have a particular attitude toward the federal government, in a state with a certain political culture. They make their decisions in a very specific context, and they are influenced by that context. But in what ways? Aside from the entrepreneurial instincts of a governor—which are difficult to capture in an aggregate model—we can take advantage of the collection of state offices in Washington to see what commonalities there are. For the benefit of those who are unfamiliar with statistical analyses, I will explain my terms carefully. Specifically, we can use a type of statistical analysis to determine what factors are linked to a state’s having a WashingtonPage 179 → office. An event history analysis takes advantage of information on all 50 states over many years. We want to examine whether or not a state has a Washington office in a given year; this is our dependent variable, and in this model it is coded with a 1 if the state has a governor’s office in Washington in a given year, and a 0 if the state does not have such an office.11 Unfortunately, there are not reliable records on which states had offices in every year of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but there are reliable data for the existence of these offices for every year since 1981.12 My analysis considers the existence of Washington offices from 1981 to 2010, and so there are 1,500 observations in the dataset, one for each of the 50 states over a 30-year period. As I use a dichotomous variable for the political party of the governor, I remove the 20 observations for state-years with third party or independent governors, leaving 1,480 observations for analysis.

From my knowledge of Washington lobbying offices, which has been culled from archival records, other scholarly work, and my own research interviews, I developed a number of hypotheses about what factors might explain whether a state had a Washington office. Some of these factors reflect the background and characteristics of the governor. Others stem Page 180 →from the characteristics of a given state—its economy, government, or population. Most of my hypotheses concern these characteristics, as they are the ones that vary across states in any given year; I expect them to have the most explanatory power in whether states have Washington offices. But there are changes in the federal government over time, and I expect that certain characteristics of the federal government will matter as well.

Gubernatorial Characteristics Political ambition. I hypothesize that a governor’s political ambition matters. As we have seen, political rivals and the media often accuse governors of maintaining Washington offices for purely political purposes, to help the governor’s own career and goals rather than to serve the state. Some office directors have acknowledged that these offices can help raise a governor’s visibility and prestige. The benefits of visibility and prestige are hard to measure, but they are likely to be valued much more highly by ambitious governors, and so I expect that ambitious governors are more likely to maintain Washington offices. While scholars have studied political ambition, no modern index for gubernatorial ambition exists, and so I use multiple variables to tap political ambition. I use the governor’s age; I expect younger governors to be more ambitious, since they are not constrained by older age. While clearly there are weaknesses to this operationalization, it is one of the most used proxies for political ambition of elected officials.17 I also include a variable for governors who have run for president as a proxy for ambition, since running for president is a clear indication of progressive ambition. If a governor has been on the ballot in at least one presidential primary, then I consider him to have run for president. Two additional gubernatorial characteristics reflect both political ambition and a heightened awareness of the federal government’s role in state governance. As we saw in chapter 3, the New York and Connecticut offices in Washington were established by governors who had previous experience working with the federal government. There are many ways to gain this sort of experience, but perhaps the most significant is to have served in Congress. I hypothesize that governors who have previously served in the U.S. House of Representatives or U.S. Senate will be more likely to maintain a Washington lobbying office, as they will be more aware of the benefits of daily personal contact with Washington. Finally, I expect governors who have served or will serve as the chair of the National Governors Association to be more ambitious, as well as more cognizant of the importance of intergovernmental relations. It is telling what was written by political scientist, Page 181 →future governor, and future NGA chair Parris Glendening (D-MA, 1995–2003) and his coauthor about serving as NGA chair: “Were it not for the recognition it brings, which might be useful in some other context, what Governor would want to devote the time to being chairman of the Governors’ Conference, adding an interstate compact, or performing 1001 other duties that may not advance the fortunes of his state?”18 I hypothesize that states governed by governors who have been or will serve as NGA chairs will be more likely to have Washington offices. Gubernatorial institutional power. Governors differ in their institutional power. I expect governors who have more institutional power to be more likely to have an office. Governors with strong institutional powers are likely to be more successful in their dealings with the legislature, and they have broader use of executive orders; more generally, stronger governors are in a better position to bargain and to pursue their goals.19 I include a variable tapping a governor’s institutional powers; for this, I use Thad Beyle’s widely used institutional powers index.20 Political party. I include a variable for the governor’s political party, specifically a dichotomous variable for a Democratic governor. Partisanship has been linked to government size.21 There are several ways that partisanship could manifest itself. Democratic governors might be more inclined to have a larger staff because they support an expansionist government agenda, thus requiring more staff, for example. Or Democrats might be more inclined to view the federal government as important, or might be more inclined to seek federal funds. I hypothesize that Democratic governors are more likely to maintain Washington offices.

State Characteristics

Legislative professionalism. Highly professionalized legislatures pay higher salaries to their members, have longer sessions, and hire more legislative staff, and professionalized legislatures affect governance.22 Professionalized legislatures are found in states with professionalized state governments more generally, and government officials in these states should be more comfortable with a Washington office. Furthermore, members of a highly professionalized legislature have fewer grounds to argue that a governor should not also have more staff and spend additional state funds. David Cingranelli found that during 1981 and 1982 there was a correlation between states with more professionalized governments and the states Page 182 →that maintained federal relations offices in Washington.23 I make use of the well-regarded legislative professionalization measure created by Peverill Squire.24 I expect that states that have a higher level of legislative professionalism are more likely to have Washington offices. Party control of state legislature. Divided government has a negative impact on a governor’s success with the legislature generally,25 and we have seen examples of the political fights over state lobbying offices. State legislators are in the best position to object to a governor’s office, and to stop its creation or end its existence. Legislators are much less likely to do this, however, if they share the governor’s party. For this reason, I expect a state to be more likely to have a lobbying office if the party control of the houses of the state legislature matches the governor’s party. I use Carl Klarner’s state partisan control data for this variable.26 Urban population. Without a doubt, the federal government provides more money to states for certain policy areas than for others. The creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development led to the rapid growth of funds to urban areas, for example, and with HUD’s establishment the representation of subnational governments in Washington skyrocketed.27 States with substantial urban areas have great opportunity to appeal to the federal government for aid to serve these areas, and as I detailed in chapter 4, mayors and mayoral associations seek these funds as well.28 So governors have an incentive to work hard to ensure that the federal government provides funds to states rather than directly to cities. Therefore, I hypothesize that states with a greater percentage of their population in urban areas are more likely to have Washington offices. Trust in government. As we have seen, Washington offices are political footballs. In states where citizens are more hostile toward Washington, attacks on a Washington office are more likely to occur, and more likely to have traction with voters if they do occur. I expect that lower levels of citizen trust in the federal government will decrease the likelihood that a state has a Washington office. I use a measure of trust in the federal government drawn from the American National Election Study.29 Large though it is, the NES does not survey individuals in every state in every year; several states have very small response samples or are excluded entirely. As a result, I pool NES survey responses by decade and region, which provides a substantial sample number for each regiondecade, thus gaining statistical rigor for the variable. Page 183 →Citizen ideology. Citizens who are more conservative ideologically might perceive a Washington office as unnecessary or as emblematic of big government. They then would be likely to oppose such an office, should they learn of it, and again this makes maintaining an office riskier for the governor. To test this, I use the revised 1960–2010 citizen ideology series constructed by William Berry et al.30 I expect that states with more liberal citizens are more likely to maintain a Washington office. Western grazing states. States with large amounts of federal land have an interest in appealing either for support for these properties or for greater local use and control of them. When I was first considering the role that federal lands might play in state lobbying, I expected states with considerable federal land to be more likely to have lobbying offices. Yet states with large proportions of federal land have not consistently maintained Washington offices. Furthermore, state lobbying offices spend comparatively modest amounts of time on the two policy areas most relevant to federal lands: agriculture policies that might affect livestock grazing, and defense policies that might affect military bases.31 So what else might be at work here? It struck me that states with considerable federal lands, particularly grazing land, had citizens who tended to be politically conservative and ideologically disconnected from the federal hand that feeds them. For whatever reason, states with larger percentages of federal grazing lands are likely to have higher percentages of what James Coke and Steven Brown call localists, those who prefer local to federal control in public policy.32

As these states were in different geographic regions of the country, I created a dichotomous variable capturing whether a state is one of the 17 states that has livestock grazing on federal land.33 Since my trust in government variable is an index based on both region and decade, this variable allows me to isolate these particular states to see if there is an effect. I hypothesize that states with livestock grazing on federal land are less likely to have a Washington office. Budget surplus. States have economic booms and busts. While a dollar is a dollar is a dollar, there are times when scarcity makes an allocation that much more valuable. During periods of economic recession and state budget cuts, governors need to be seen as “sharing the pain” and must cut their own budgets.34 I hypothesize that governors are less likely to have Washington offices when there are state budget shortfalls. In many ways, their lobbying might be even more valuable during recessions, since federal funds can be Page 184 →that much more crucial to states. But there is anecdotal evidence that states are more likely to cut offices; the closing of the Minnesota office, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, is one example. Manufacturing interests. While the sheer size of a state might be an indication of whether a state would have a Washington office, it is a simplistic one. After all, several small states have Washington lobbying offices. Perhaps the issue is not size but economic complexity. If a state has interests in a broad number of economic sectors, it has interests across a broad number of intergovernmental policies, and would need sophisticated efforts to stay abreast and lobby effectively on all issues more than would states with less diverse economies. Lowery and Gray find that institutions are more likely to be present in the political arena if the population of interests is dense.35 By extension, states with dense interest representation—indicating greater complexity in the interest group system—should be more likely to enter the lobbying fray. When a state’s economy diversifies, it is likely to do so within the manufacturing sector. The agricultural sector is fairly constant in states, and the governmental sector is relatively stable as well. Though it does not tap the technology and related service industries, it is a reasonable measure of a state’s economic diversity. I hypothesize that a large manufacturing base leads a state to be more likely to have a Washington office. I use Standard Industrial Classification codes and North American Industry Classification System codes, which classify industries, to create a measure of a state’s personal income from the manufacturing sector as a percentage of all personal income.

Federal Characteristics Federal funds to state and local governments. The growth of the federal government leads interest groups to seek funds. General revenue sharing was created in 1972 and increased during the 1970s, but provision of these funds to the states was essentially ended in 1980.36 During President Johnson’s Great Society years and President Nixon’s general revenue sharing, state lobbying increased. Lobbying by states and localities and the related public official associations blossomed. We know that, in general, growth in the availability of federal funds leads to increased interest group activity; as Gray and Lowery analogized, federal dollars are to organized interests what sunlight is to plants; it helps them flourish.37 Thus I hypothesize that states are more likely to have Washington offices when there is an increase in federalPage 185 → funds for intergovernmental purposes. This hypothesis is consistent with observations made by other scholars who have studied the lobbying efforts of subnational governments, although it has never been tested in a fully specified model. Partisan composition of the state congressional delegation. My interviews with Washington office directors indicated that party divisions have led some governors to establish Washington offices. There are several ways that partisanship could manifest itself. For example, one Washington director told me that his office never worked with its congressional delegation. I learned through other sources that tensions between the Democratic governor and Republican delegation were high, and the office was created because the governor had such limited interaction with the delegation. Recall that the delegation is not elected by the governor; in this case, the delegation had very different political interests. Party divisions between governors and members of Congress seem to have led to Washington office creation in at least some cases. Party divisions might stem from policy disagreements. Just because elected officials represent the same state does not mean that they share similar views about state material interests. Republican governors might not receive much help on state initiatives from

Democratic senators or representatives. After all, party members will likely have differing ideological views on what a state needs, or at least what sort of pork would benefit a state (or a politician) most. In 1995 the Republican-controlled 104th Congress worked to increase states’ program authority and reduce federal funds, but Democratic governors wanted maintenance or increases in federal funds rather than budget cuts. If a state’s Republican senators and Democratic governor have different agendas—if the governor wants federal funding for urban areas while the senators want to support economic development in rural areas—then a governor might need to turn to avenues beyond the state’s U.S. senators for political support. Party divisions might also stem from political conflicts. A state’s elected officials might have run against each other during previous campaigns, or might oppose each other in future ones. Each one has an interest in credit claiming, or “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor that one is personally responsible” for a government initiative.38 This does not make for an environment with strong bipartisan efforts. It is the governor who would choose to establish a Washington office, so his or her perceptions about elected counterparts in Congress likely would play a factor in the establishment of a Washington office. If party composition in either Page 186 →the Congress or the governor’s mansion should change, perhaps the presence of that Washington office might come into question; but the termination of an existing office would be based on a different calculus than the creation of one. Political leaders within the same party could experience these difficulties and disputes, but their likelihood is much greater between parties than within them. This variable taps the potential material benefits of a Washington office, which should be higher if a state’s delegation is composed heavily of members from one party and a governor from the other. I hypothesize that states with party divisions between governors and members of Congress are more likely to have Washington offices, and I operationalize this using one variable each for the proportion of the Senate and House delegations that shares the governor’s party. I include three control variables: state population, the number of years since the state has last had an office, and the total number of years that the state has had an office. The latter two variables are important in an event history model in order to control for the effects of earlier office existence; it is easier to continue an office than start a new one, and it is easier to establish or maintain an office if the state has had one in many previous years. The binary time-series cross-section regression I use for my event history analysis is appropriate for my data.39 This technique, developed by Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker, uses cubic splines to control for the effects of time.40 My dataset is left-truncated, a situation that is not uncommon in political science; data collection begins at a certain point, and so events that take place earlier cannot be incorporated into the analysis. In this case, though I know of early office existence for some states, I do not have reliable annual data on office existence for every state in years prior to 1981. Though this is unfortunate, and it means that I am more comfortable interpreting the analysis as an examination of factors that affect the existence of an office, rather than the opening of an office, it should not preclude our investigating the variation in state lobbying offices since 1981. I use data from a variety of standard sources, such as the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the Book of the States series, the Almanac of American Politics, and gubernatorial biographies to gather the data for the explanatory variables in the model. Data sources for the independent variables are shown in table 6.2; descriptive statistics are shown in table 6.3. Page 187 →

Analysis Table 6.4 presents the regression results for two models, one that includes the variable that relies on a partisan legislature—thus excluding Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature, from the model—and one that excludes this variable but includes Nebraska in the observations. Twelve of 17 substantive variables and all three of the control variables are significant at p < .10 or better in at least one model.41 (Those who are unfamiliar with the conventions of regression analysis may wish to focus on table 6.5, which presents the size of the impact of the

variables that have effects that are statistically significant—that is, that we are confident are not due to chance alone.) It is clear that, collectively, the characteristics of a governor have a considerable influence on whether a state has a Washington office. All but one gubernatorial characteristic was statistically significant in at least one of the two models, and most gubernatorial variables were statistically significant in both models. Younger governors are indeed more likely to have a Washington office, controlling for all other factors, as are governors who previously have served in the U.S. Congress and those who have served or will serve as NGA chair. Each of these variables is an indicator of ambition, although, as I discussed, the congressional and NGA chair positions also reflect an interest in, and experience with, federal issues. Interestingly, governors who go on to run for president are less likely to have a Washington office, which is counter to my expectation. Perhaps those who expect to run for governor are particularly careful of the political risks of a Washington office. This is a hypothesis worth exploring further in another venture. Democratic governors are more likely to have a Washington office in only one of the two models—the model that excludes the variable that requires a partisan legislature, and thus does not exclude Nebraska from the sample. The variable mapping whether the governor’s party controls none, one, or two houses of the state legislature seems to dampen the effect of being a Democratic governor. We should be mindful of placing too much weight on the finding that Democratic governors are more likely to have offices, as it is sensitive to changes in model specification. Only one hypothesis regarding governors did not yield fruit in at least one of the two models: a state is not more likely to have an office if its governor has strong institutional powers. We can use the regression model and its coefficients to calculate the predicted probability that a state will have an office under certain conditions. Table 6.5 shows the impact of statistically significant variables by Page 189 →looking at the predicted likelihood of a Washington office if a variable goes from its lowest value to its highest, with all other variables set at their median values. For example, if we set each variable at its median value and then set the variable for a presidential run at zero—meaning that the governor has not run for president—there is an 81 percent chance that the state would have an office. If the governor has run for president, there is a 68 percent chance that the state would have an office. In this way, we know that the gubernatorial variable that has the largest impact is whether a governor has run or will run for president. If we adjust a governor’s age from the youngest age in the dataset to the oldest, we also see a jump from an 81 percent chance of an office to a 68 percent chance of an office, but that also assumes that we are going from a 34-year-old governor to a 78-year-old governor—a rather extreme shift. The effects of having held a congressional seat, or serving as NGA chair, are more modest—8 and 7 percent, respectively—but they should not be interpreted as inconsequential, particularly as more governors have served as NGA chair or have been in Congress than have run for president.

Variable Office existence Age

Page 188 →Table 6.2. Data Sources and Operationalization Operationalization and Data Source 1 = the state had a Washington lobbying office or other employed liaison during the year; otherwise 0. See the text for a further discussion of this coding. Age in years, compiled from biographies of American governors available from the National Governors Association website.

Served in U.S. House or Senate 1 = served in the U.S. House or U.S. Senate prior to becoming governor; otherwise 0. Compiled prior to from biographical information available from the NGA website. governorship 1 = served as NGA chair; otherwise 0. Compiled from biographical information available from NGA chair the NGA web site. 1 = governor was on a primary ballot as a candidate for president in at least one state; otherwise Presidential 0. Compiled from Havel, U.S. Presidential Candidates and the Elections, and U.S. Federal candidate Election Commission reports.

1–5 scale, 5 = strongest institutional powers. Data compiled by Thad L. Beyle. Available at www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html. Scores compiled for 1980, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2007; other years carried forward. 1 = Democrat; 0 = Republican; third-party governors coded as missing data. Compiled from the Democrat Statistical Abstracts of the United States and the NGA data archive. 0–1 scale, 1 = most professionalized. Created by Peverill Squire. See Squire, Evolution of Legislative American Legislatures. Scores for 1979, 1986, 1996, 2003, and 2006; other years carried professionalism forward. Proportion of state legislature’s Compiled from the State Partisan Balance dataset, created by Carl E. Klarner. Available at houses http://www.klarnerpolitics.com. controlled by governor’s party 1–4 scale, 4 = “Just about always.” Mean trust in federal government, by regionTrust in federal decade. Mean response to American National Election Study question vcf0604, aggregated by government U.S. region and by decade. See endnotes for additional information. 0–100 scale, 100 = most liberal. Revised 1960–2010 citizen ideology series created by Citizen ideology William Berry et al. See Berry et al. (1998; 2010). Grazing on 1 = state has grazing on U.S. Bureau of Land Management or U.S. Forest Service land within federal lands its borders; 0 = otherwise. Data from the U.S. General Accounting Office; constant over time. Private manufacturing income divided by total personal income (in thousands of dollars), by Proportion of state. SIC industry data from 1981 to 2001 and NAICS data from 2002 to 2010. Compiled from manu-facturing the Regional Economic Information System, prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in state economy U.S. Department of Commerce. Percent urban Percent of population living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, by state-decade. population Compiled from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, various editions. State budget Compiled from the State Economic Data dataset, created by Carl E. Klarner. Available at surplus as a http://www.klarnerpolitics.com. percent of GSP Variable Operationalization and Data Source Proportion of state’s U.S. senators sharing Compiled from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, various editions. governor’s party Proportion of state’s U.S. representatives Compiled from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, various editions. sharing governor’s party Federal grants outlay to state and local Compiled from the Survey of Current Business, various editions. U.S. Department of governments, in Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. billions, 2005 dollars Institutional powers score

Population (in By state-decade. U.S. Census data. 1,000s) Number of years since the state last had a Computed from dependent variable. Washington office Total number of years state has had a Computed from dependent variable. Washington office The characteristics of a state have even more influence than gubernatorial characteristics. They indicate that certain types of states are almost certain to have offices. If a state legislature is highly professionalized, but typical in other ways (that is, the other variables are at their median values), its predicted probability of having an office is 96 percent. If a state has a large budget surplus, its likelihood of an office is 99 percent. A state with a Page 192 →legislature that is not professionalized has only a 73 percent likelihood of having an office, and a state with budget challenges has only a 43 percent likelihood of having an office. The impact of the state’s budget is particularly notable; a state with a large surplus is more than twice as likely to have an office as an identical state with a deficit. Likewise, states that have a governor whose political party also controls the legislature are somewhat more likely to have an office, although the change in probability is much smaller, at 13 percent. Citizen ideology also matters. States with more liberal citizens are more likely to have an office, as are states that are more urban. States with complex economies—as measured by the percentage of manufacturing in a state—are also more likely to have an office, although we are a bit less confident in this effect because we are left certain that the result is not due to chance (p < .10). Page 190 →Table 6.3. Descriptive Statistics Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 1,500 0.63 0.48 0 1

Variable Office existence Gubernatorial Characteristics Age 1,500 Served in U.S. House or Senate prior 1,500 to governorship NGA chair 1,500 Presidential candidate 1,500 Institutional powers score Democrat State Characteristics Legislative professionalism Proportion of state legislature’s houses controlled by governor’s party Trust in federal government Citizen ideology Grazing on federal lands Percent manufacturing in state economy

54.38

7.82

34

78

0.14

0.35

0

1

0.18 0.10

0.39 0.31

0 0

1 1

1,500 1,500

3.53 0.54

0.50 0.52

2 0

4.8 2

1,500

0.20

0.13

0.03

0.66

1,450

0.55

0.44

0

1

1,500 1,500 1,500

2.39 49.72 0.34

0.08 15.39 0.47

2.27 8.45 0

2.52 95.97 1

1,500

0.12

0.06

0.01

0.32

Percent urban population

1,500

State budget surplus as a percentage 1,500 of GSP Federal Government Characteristics Proportion of state’s U.S. senators sharing governor’s 1,500 party Proportion of state’s U.S. representatives sharing 1,500 governor’s party Federal grants outlay to state and local governments, in billions, 2005 1,500 dollars Control Variables Population (in 1,000s) 1,500 Number of years since the state last 1,500 had a Washington office Total number of years state has had 1,500 a Washington office

69.96

14.59

33.8

94.4

0.29

1.07

в€’8.45

13.53

0.52

0.40

0

1

0.49

0.29

0

1

297.12

103.26

179.30

531.70

5,349.53 5,854.62

418.49

37,253.96

2.89

5.48

0

29

9.07

8.46

0

29

Page 191 →Table 6.4. Factors Influencing the Existence of State Lobbying Offices in Washington, 1981–2010 Model 1 Model 2 (without Nebraska) (with Nebraska) Gubernatorial Characteristics Age в€’0.021* в€’0.023* (0.012) (0.012) Served in U.S. House or Senate prior to governorship 0.685** 0.573** (0.286) (0.282) NGA chair 0.552** 0.518** (0.252) (0.247) Presidential candidate в€’0.730** в€’0.742** (0.303) (0.293) Institutional powers score 0.004 0.062 (0.200) (0.195) Democrat State Characteristics Legislative professionalism Proportion of state legislature’s houses controlled by governor’s party Trust in federal government Citizen ideology

0.241 (0.200)

0.568*** (0.186)

3.489** (1.639) 0.850*** (0.237) в€’0.996 (1.632) 0.015**

1.991 (1.491)

в€’0.980 (1.600) 0.018***

Grazing on federal lands Percent manufacturing in state economy Percent urban population State budget surplus as a percent of GSP

(0.007)

(0.006)

в€’0.074 (0.244) 3.690* (2.176)

в€’0.051 (0.241) 3.709* (2.122)

0.024*** (0.008) 0.206**

0.022*** (0.008) 0.215**

(0.086)

(0.088)

Federal Government Characteristics −0.291 (0.280) −1.087*** Proportion of state’s U.S. representatives sharing governor’s party (0.371) Federal grants outlay to state and local governments, in billions, 2005 −0.002 dollars (0.002) Control Variables Population (in 1,000s) 0.000*** (0.000) −0.581*** Number of years since the state last had a Washington office (0.049) Total number of years state has had a Washington office 0.093*** (0.020) Spline-cubed (other splines dropped due to collinearity) −0.001*** (0.000) Constant 0.689 (3.658) Observations 1,450 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses. Proportion of state’s U.S. senators sharing governor’s party

0.137 (0.258) в€’0.984*** (0.336) в€’0.002 (0.002) 0.000*** (0.000) в€’0.578*** (0.048) 0.093*** (0.019) в€’0.001*** (0.000) 0.767 (3.592) 1,480

The models did not find a connection between the citizenry’s trust in government and having a Washington office; nor did they find a connection for states with grazing on federal lands. Operationalizing trust in government over time and across states is challenging, and we should keep this in mind when evaluating the null finding. These results do not prove that there is not such an effect, but certainly it should make us look more skeptically at these hypotheses. Perhaps the issue is less trust in government—what each of these variables was trying to tap—than simple ideology in a state, or some other force at work. Only one of the federal characteristics was statistically significant. A state is more likely to have an office if a higher percentage of its U.S. House Page 194 →of Representatives delegation shares the governor’s party. There is no similar effect for the U.S. Senate. It is particularly notable that a change in the amount of funds the federal government transfers to state and local governments did not have an effect in the models. Page 193 →Table 6.5. Impact of Statistically Significant Variables on the Probability of State Office Probability Probability Minimum Maximum Difference in if X = if X = Percent change in Probability value value Probabilities minimum maximum Gubernatorial Characteristics

Governor’s 34 78 age Governor served in U.S. House or 0 1 Senate prior to governorship Governor was a chair of the 0 1 NGA Governor ran in presidential 0 1 primaries State Characteristics Legislative 0.03 0.66 professionalism State legislature controlled by 0 1 governor’s party Citizen 8.45 95.97 ideology Percent manufacturing 0.01 0.32 in state economy Percent of state population 33.8 94.4 living in urban areas State budget surplus as a −8.45 13.53 percent of GSP Federal Government Characteristics State’s U.S. House delegation 0 1 sharing governor’s party Control Variables State population (in 418.49 37,253.96 1,000s) Number of years since the state last had a 0 29 Washington office

0.87

0.73

в€’0.14

в€’16.30

0.81

0.90

0.08

10.15

0.81

0.88

0.07

8.56

0.81

0.68

в€’0.14

в€’16.67

0.73

0.96

0.23

32.13

0.74

0.87

0.13

17.41

0.70

0.90

0.20

27.88

0.75

0.90

0.15

20.63

0.65

0.89

0.24

37.57

0.43

0.99

0.56

131.45

0.88

0.72

в€’0.17

в€’18.70

0.71

1.00

0.29

39.93

0.81

0.00

в€’0.81

в€’100.00

Total number of years state has had a 0 29 0.70 Washington office Note: Probabilities are based on Model 1.

0.97

0.28

39.71

Discussion Upon learning one of my research questions—“Why do some states establish offices in Washington and others do not?”—Washington office directors repeatedly told me, “It is the governor’s decision. It depends on the individual governor.” Could it really be based solely on a governor’s background or other characteristics? This seemed too idiosyncratic to be accurate. Of course the governor makes the decision to establish such an office, but either governors are making their decisions about offices in a random way or there are underlying factors influencing the governors’ decisions. The regression analyses indicate that, yes, gubernatorial characteristics do play a substantial role in whether a state has a Washington lobbying office. Age matters, a governor’s previous experience in Congress matters, his or her political party matters, serving as NGA chair matters, running for president matters. When federal liaisons talked about the importance of the governor in the decision to establish an office, they might not have been thinking of these specific characteristics—or any specific gubernatorial characteristics, for that matter. A governor’s personality becomes paramount in a personal relationship, but that does not mean that personality dominates the decision-making process. Here I have been able to tease out specific characteristics that are linked to the governor’s decision to maintain an office. Almost every federal liaison in Washington that I interviewed believed that Washington offices were a good investment for just about any state. There were a few federal liaisons and former federal liaisons in state capitals, as well as one who had worked part-time as a liaison in Washington, who told me that they believed that Washington offices were absolutely not worth the money they cost. Perhaps not surprisingly, this perspective tended to come from those in Republican states that have the reputation as having a constituency that is hostile to Washington and the federal government. Stated one former liaison, “I see little reason for a state like [this one], with a [names a small number] million population, surrounded by other states—there is virtually no issue thatВ .В .В . would only involve [this state].” Interestingly, this liaison stated that his state had benefited from the efforts of other offices, thus indicating that he believed some states did gain Page 195 →from their offices. “Generally, there are regional conflictsВ .В .В . so I don’t get involved in the fray, but I derive benefit from their success.” When asked if he believed that a Washington office was worthwhile, he replied, “My feeling is, it is not worth it. But that is only because there are other offices. If everyone bailed, we couldn’t do this.” Setting aside the free riding comment, the results of the models parallel the remarks of these interview subjects. The liaisons in state capitals who were more skeptical of Washington offices were most often from less populous, more rural, conservative states. This matches what the quantitative analysis demonstrates—that smaller, more conservative states are less likely to have a Washington office, even controlling for other factors. States with more professionalized legislatures, states where the governor and the legislature share the same political party, and states in good fiscal shape are more likely to have an office. The fact that these factors matter helps us put the importance of the governor in context. Yes, the governor matters, but—as the aforementioned interview subject pointed out—state characteristics matter as well. In fact, they matter more than gubernatorial characteristics. This helps us understand why a state such as California or Illinois has maintained its Washington office over the years, regardless of the political party and orientation of the governor. The variation across states and over time is influenced far less by federal government characteristics. Taken as a whole, the statistical analyses indicate that the biggest factors are the governors and their states, and both sets of factors have a substantial impact on whether a state has an office. It is not just the governor, and it is not just the

state. It is both. This makes sense, as there is more variation in office existence across states than over time. If the variation stemmed more from federally centered variables than state-centered variables, I would expect to see more variation across time than across states. The lack of any effect from federal funding for states and localities is a bit befuddling, particularly since one big reason why governors have lobbyists is to get federal funds. It is difficult to conclude, even with the null findings of these models, that federal dollars don’t matter. More investigation might help us tease out exactly how federal funds influence office creation and maintenance. Perhaps what matters is not simply that money is transferred, but whether the money is dispensed in a way that governors believe they can influence. Or perhaps the forces of fiscal federalism have been in place for enough time that simply the availability of funds—regardless of whether it is a somewhat smaller or larger pot of money in any given year—is now a constant in the decision to maintain an office, Page 196 →and thus not captured in the period we are examining. If we had annual data from the 1950s through the 1970s on the existence of state lobbying offices, we might see a statistically significant effect from federal funds to states. It is also worth remembering that even in the lean years of the dataset used here, funds to states and localities always increased from the previous year. We can only speculate about what the effects would be if funds to states and localities actually dipped. Finally, we see the impact of political culture. In chapter 1, I detailed the role that political culture plays in supporting federalism. Here, we see the role political culture plays in explaining the puzzle of the variation in office maintenance. All states would benefit financially from an office, but states with political cultures more hostile to Washington—demonstrated through citizen ideology, party identification, and degree of legislative professionalism—are less likely to have offices. These variables do not tap culture alone, but they are steeped in it. True, the trust in government variable (admittedly not ideal, as it measures trust aggregated by region and decade) is not statistically significant; nor is the grazing lands variable. But combined with the interview data, the evidence underscores that culture plays a major role in having an office. From a federalism perspective, this is ironic: the offices that act to defend a state’s interests are viewed as evidence that a governor is aligning with Washington rather than fighting it. Here, political culture manifests itself as political risk.

Page 197 →

Chapter 7 The Value of the Governors’ Lobbyists In 1979, Bill Clinton began his first term as governor of Arkansas. That year, he established a lobbying office in Washington to represent the state’s interests before the federal government. At that time, there were 23 state lobbying offices in Washington. At the time Arkansas had two-year gubernatorial terms, and in 1980 Democrat Clinton faced Republican challenger Frank White, a candidate most observers thought couldn’t win.1 During the campaign, White had pledged to leave vacant 1,000 to 1,500 state government jobs as they were vacated through attrition or retirement; to cut the governor’s staff by 25 percent; and to close the Washington office established by Clinton “вЂas soon as I can legally do it.’”2 Keeping his promise, when he was elected governor, White promptly closed the Washington office. Why the opening? Why the closing? The experience of the Arkansas Washington office is in many ways a microcosm of the exchange that establishes a Washington office, as well as the benefits and perils that an office brings to a governor. It is not surprising that Arkansas did not already have a federal relations office in Washington at the end of 1978. Arkansas had a relatively small population, did not have a high proportion of manufacturing interests, and had a heavily Democratic delegation to support its Democratic governors of the 1970s. It had one of the least professionalized state governments in the country. Clinton was a young, ambitious governor, and he faced many challenges. There was no growth in the state budget from 1978 to 1979, and so Clinton had no increase in funds to use to implement his programs. Page 198 →It is now widely acknowledged that Clinton had national political ambitions from early on, and it is easy to see why a governor’s lobbying office in Washington would be attractive to the young Governor Clinton. He could use the office to try to increase the amount of federal funds flowing to Arkansas each year, and to increase his personal visibility as well. In his later years as governor, Clinton became the chair of the NGA. For Clinton, establishing a Washington office may have been an easy decision. The potential return on the funds spent to establish an office is enormous for almost any state, and the financial benefits outweighed the financial costs for Arkansas. The political benefits of a Washington office were quite large as well. A voice in Washington could help the progressive governor stay abreast of potential policy changes initiated by Congress or the federal agencies, and provide this information to appropriate staff in Arkansas state agencies. It could serve as a collection point for information on best practices in various policy areas. The office could serve to increase gubernatorial visibility and prestige. It was certainly not an unprecedented decision for a governor; larger states with more professionalized governments, as well as some smaller states, had already paved the way. And so the Washington office for the state of Arkansas was created. After two years in office, Governor White was ousted from office in a rematch with Clinton. When he took office once again in 1983, however, Clinton did not reestablish the office that White had closed, and did not reopen it at any point during the next decade of his gubernatorial tenure. In the early 1990s either Clinton or Governor Jim Guy Tucker (who served from December 1992 to 1996), or both, must have considered reestablishment of the office, as the Arkansas Institute examined the issue, preparing a white paper—almost certainly commissioned—entitled “State Washington Offices: Models for Arkansas?”3 But neither reestablished the office. The political ramifications of White’s assault on Governor Clinton’s Washington office continued to weigh on the minds of staff in the Arkansas governor’s office even 20 years later. The office was not reestablished until Governor Mike Huckabee (R-AR, 1996–2007) took office. Huckabee

was another fast-moving Arkansas governor; he was active in the NGA and served as NGA chair in 2005–6. And—perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not—he was not only the next Arkansas governor to have a Washington office, but the next after Bill Clinton to mount a serious campaign for the presidency, winning the Iowa caucuses in 2008 before losing the nomination to Senator John McCain (R-AZ). Huckabee maintained the office throughout his time as governor.Page 199 → His successor, Mike Beebe (D-AR, 2007–15) considered keeping the office, but he did not staff the office after becoming governor, and in 2008 he elected to sublet Arkansas’s suite in the Hall of the States to another organization.4 The Arkansas illustration underscores a number of points about the establishment and closure of state lobbying offices in Washington. The most obvious is that the first two governors to open a state office in Washington were each highly politically ambitious; this is no stretch claim, as each ran for president. An office could have helped each as he pursued his political career. But there are other reasons besides the potential benefits to their personal political careers that either governor might have established an office. President Clinton was the protГ©gГ© of his immediate predecessors in the Arkansas governor’s office, Dale Bumpers and David Pryor, both of whom moved to the U.S. Senate and were sitting senators for most of Clinton’s time in office. Clinton had an ambitious agenda for Arkansas, and he would have known the importance of federal funding to succeed. We also see the effects of state economic health and the flow of federal funding to states. Clinton began his first tenure as governor after the Hall of the States had been open for less than two years, when the National Governors’ Association was encouraging its members to consider opening a Washington office. General revenue sharing was under way; it was an era when copious federal funds were flowing to states. When Clinton returned to office in 1980, however, the country was in a national recession, one that lasted until 1982. As we have seen, tight financial times have led many states to close their offices. And given the negative press that Clinton’s first office received, it is not surprising that he elected not to reopen his office. Like Clinton, Huckabee too had an ambitious policy agenda for his state, pushing the legislature to pass one of the nation’s first state expansions of Medicaid coverage for poor children, fighting to consolidate school districts (the legislature passed a watered-down version of his initiative), and surprising many in the state with his support of multiple tax increases.5 He was politically active at the national level, and of course he had future political ambitions. Huckabee reopened the state’s Washington office in 2003, when he was well established as governor and had comfortably won election to a third term. He may have wanted an office in part to plan his advancement to NGA chair. The Clinton and Huckabee cases illustrate how difficult it can be to untangle the effects of personal political ambition from a governor’s policy or political goals for a state. Personal ambition and policy ambition are Page 200 →often intertwined, and both can play a role in a governor’s maintaining a Washington office. These cases highlight the importance of political leaders, context, and culture.

The Governors’ Lobbyists as a Community of Organized Interests It is time to return to the question I posed in the introduction to this book. Why do states and their governors use lobbyists to represent them in Washington, and what role do these lobbyists play in our federal system? We have dissected this question into three puzzles—the federalism puzzle, the lobbying puzzle, and the proliferation puzzle—that have led us to three separate inquiries into governors organizations. In this concluding chapter, I seek to integrate themes we have seen in these inquiries and end with some final thoughts on the value of the governors’ lobbyists. As we have worked to find an explanation for each puzzle, three pieces have played a major role. These three factors are actors, context, and culture, which determine whether we have state lobbying offices and associations in Washington at all, and what role these organizations play—as lobbying organizations and as safeguards of federalism. Let’s look at the first part of our big question. Why do governors and their states use lobbyists? Our

investigation of governors’ liaisons in Washington has focused on two separate stages of using a lobbyist. If a state uses a lobbyist, there is a decision to establish representation, and there is the maintenance or continuation of that representation. The same is true for an association that represents a collection of states. There is a decision to establish collective representation, and then the maintenance or continuation of that association’s representation. The establishment of a lobbying organization and the ongoing maintenance and activity of that lobbying organization are two different things. By extension, equations explaining the establishment versus the continued maintenance of the organizations would differ somewhat: the weights would differ, but we would see the same forces at work. Though we have not been able to analyze office creation statistically due to a lack of reliable data on years of creation, we can draw this conclusion from the many individual cases we have seen. Governors typically establish lobbying offices because they want something specific—usually money, in some form, and usually because they see a particular opportunity to get more. Governors Lehman and Dewey of New York wanted federal war contracts that would bring federal funds to businesses in the state. For Illinois, the opportunity was not federal war contracts but a federal lab, Page 201 →Fermilab. In other cases, a state seeks policy flexibility that will ease a state’s financial constraints or will provide some other tangible benefit. The case studies presented in chapter 2 are not the only illustrations. For example, in 1997 Governor John Kitzhaber (D, 1995–2003, 2011–15) opened Oregon’s first Washington office since the early 1970s. He did so “to save the salmon,” as its first director put it. The economic and ecological importance of salmon to the state led this to be the main driver for Governor Kitzhaber to establish the office. Though the office has remained small, over time its lobbying portfolio has covered a wide variety of issues. The reasons why states and their governors maintain offices are typically different from the reasons they established offices. Over time, offices usually broaden their portfolios. With their broadened portfolios, state offices typically devote energy to organizational maintenance. The same is true for the associations. Governors continue to support existing offices because there are benefits somewhere in this broader portfolio, even if there is not a benefit to the governor in every part of the portfolio. Likewise, governors support their existing associations because there is benefit in what the associations offer today, not because of the potential benefits that motivated their establishment. The factors leading to organization establishment can be more idiosyncratic than the factors leading to the maintenance of one. Establishing a lobbying office involves initiating something new (or something returning); it is changing the institutional status quo. This involves some degree of risk. Governors are the ones who take that risk, and it is in organizational establishment that we are most likely to see the influence of specific political actors. An example is the state of Arkansas—a state that does not fall into the group of states likely to have a state office. Yet when two governors who were ambitious in both policy and politics were in office, Arkansas had a state office and was a lead state in NGA activities. Throughout this book, we have seen the significance of interest group niches and specialization in the development of the community of governors’ lobbyists. In this, we have found the solution to our puzzle of why we have a proliferation of lobbying organizations. As political safeguards of federalism, governors’ offices and the several associations fill different niches. The NGA is the advocate for states’ collective interests. Its notable political successes have been negotiating deals that have, on the whole, benefited all (or nearly all) states, such as negotiations around the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and the effort to block the federal government from taking a portion of funds that states received from tobacco companies in the Tobacco Master Settlement Page 202 →Agreement of 1998. As the largest governors association, it is also the best situated to serve as a policy arm, a resource for best practices, a network across states. This side of the NGA—not the political arm, but the NGA Center—has become more important over time. The NGA is a coordinator, an opportunist for state benefits, and a defender against encroachment by the federal government. The regional associations fill another niche. They avoid the political issues that consume the NGA, preferring issues that are relevant to their region but are not major national agenda items. They might take a particular policy

issue, such as energy, and work on the regional spin on that issue. Their opportunism is likely to be against other regional collections of states. Although the regional associations are not so clearly divided against each other as when the Sun Belt and Snow Belt regions faced off for federal benefits in the 1970s, each association still frames its agenda and the strengths of its states in contrast to those in other regions—even if it does so implicitly.6 For their part, individual state offices focus on the particular needs of one state, though they might participate in larger coalition efforts with other states. As single-state operations, they are the most likely to act opportunistically to seek some small benefit from the federal government: an altered federal funding formula, a line-item appropriation, a small change in regulatory language that might benefit their state without causing a furor among all states. They are also the most likely to pursue some federal benefit that encroaches on another state. We have seen that state offices vary in both existence and activity as federal budget conditions vary and the federal agenda varies. Context matters. Individual state offices have almost always been established with a primary goal of improving a state’s fiscal lot, either by acquiring federal resources or by achieving regulatory flexibility or protection that helps a state’s bottom line. During World War II, state offices in Washington benefited their states by helping businesses acquire federal contracts. In the 1960s, we saw a surge of activity. More state offices were established, the NGA moved to Washington as federal social programs expanded, and states fought to keep federal funds from going directly to cities. The 1970s and 1980s were a sort of heyday for governors’ lobbyists as yet more offices and associations came to Washington and the governors’ lobbyists became an established community of interests. In the later 1990s and into the 2000s, as federalism faded from the national agenda, as the federal government provided less money to states, and as Congress pulled back from generosity in funding Page 203 →earmarks, we saw a modest reduction in the number, and a more significant reduction in the size, of state lobbying offices. Though we did not find evidence in the statistical analyses to link changes in the federal budget to the existence of offices from 1981 to 2010, it is clear that changes in federal spending have affected the number and activities of state offices over the course of seven decades. At least as significant, we saw how state budgets affect the lobbying organizations. Occasionally governors retract their support for the associations during challenging fiscal times. Though a lack of complete information on association dues payments makes it difficult to assess how regularly this happens, there is no doubt that a governor is less likely to maintain a state lobbying office when the state is facing a budget shortfall. We saw in chapter 6 that states are more likely to maintain Washington offices when they have budget surpluses. We discerned how the lobbyists altered their tactics to fit what might work best in a particular congressional environment. When earmarks were big, offices pursued earmarks. When earmarks fell out of favor and congressional budget bills were replaced with continuing resolutions, governors’ lobbyists worked around the edges to make what changes they could in formula language. The governor is critical to the establishment and maintenance of all these organizations; the costs and benefits matter as well. Those vary by context and are profoundly influenced by culture. All this aligns with what Salisbury articulated in his exchange theory of interests.7 Salisbury himself threw down the proverbial gauntlet regarding his exchange theory, asking others to test it by applying it in other settings. Salisbury himself applied his theory to farm group origins; I adapted his theory to apply it to the governors’ lobby. I hope we have learned a good bit about the interest group exchange along the way, and how its three pieces—the entrepreneur, the costs, and the benefits—matter. The fact that each exchange varies leads to the wide variety in type and use of these lobbying organizations as a group. We have illuminated the importance of the governor as entrepreneur. Governor Dan Evans and a small group of like-minded governors were entrepreneurs in bringing the NGA to Washington and initiating its entry into Washington lobbying. Furthermore, we have seen what characteristics are likely to lead a governor to have a Washington lobbying office. The institutional powers of the governor are not a factor here. It is the personal characteristics, such as gubernatorial background and connection to Washington and gubernatorial ambition, that affect gubernatorial Page 204 →commitment to lobbying representation in Washington. Some governors have been more entrepreneurial in the Washington arena than others, and I hope that this investigation has provided

some purchase on why that is so. This research has also highlighted the role of costs in understanding our third puzzle. Salisbury’s discussion of costs and benefits is primarily a discussion of the various types of benefits—material, purposive, expressive—that members receive from joining a political group. He assumes costs are generally monetary. Here, we have seen that political costs can play a major role in an interest group exchange. As I conducted dozens of interviews with current and former Washington office directors and federal relations liaisons in state capitals, I began to realize that benefits were not the crucial factor in the decision to establish a state lobbying office in Washington. Washington offices appeared to offer tremendous benefits to their states. In almost every case, it appeared that they recovered the financial costs of their offices—from less than $100,000 to over $1 million—many times over. Though it is difficult to know exactly what financial benefits rested on the Washington office’s efforts rather than on other forces, and even though some states stood to gain more than others, I felt certain that these offices were financially worthwhile for virtually every state. Even though some states stood to gain more than others, establishing a Washington office still seemed a worthwhile exchange for all states. The financial benefits were present. So why did some governors not have an office? The answer was political costs. Think of the political price that Bill Clinton paid for his Washington office. While certainly Clinton did not lose reelection because he established a Washington office for Arkansas, the office nonetheless haunted him during his campaign. It was used as evidence for challenger Frank White to argue that Clinton was too ambitious, not statefocused, and wasteful with state funds. The fact that Clinton never reestablished the Washington office underlines the powerful sting of this campaign issue. I presented many other cases where a Washington office came under political fire from the state legislature or from the press, and the statistical analysis in chapter 6 demonstrated that political costs affected the presence of a state lobbying office. Factors such as legislative professionalism, party control of the statehouse, and citizen ideology relate to the political costs that a governor might pay for a Washington office. Political costs have been largely unexplored in the scholarship on interest group formation and maintenance, and so I hope my exploration of political costs is useful in some way to our knowledge in this area. Chapter 5 demonstrated how governors’ lobbying organizations are Page 205 →similar to and different from other types of organized interests. Governors’ lobbyists represent governors who are partners in governance rather than outsiders. Aside from the partisan associations, the state lobbying offices and associations do not participate in electoral activities, and they do not make campaign contributions. But they practice the same inside lobbying techniques used by a wide variety of interest groups. Finally, I have attempted to demonstrate how these organizations have become established institutions in Washington. As institutions, they have worked to maintain organizational support. Associations in particular have worked to diversify their activity portfolios and income streams by pursuing grants and contract work. Effective state offices foster ties not only with the governor’s office in the state capital but also with state agencies, and they work to avoid political conflicts with the state legislature. Despite this institutionalization, however, we have seen state lobbying offices being staffed by fewer and less experienced staff members over time.

The Governors’ Lobbyists as Political Safeguards of Federalism In chapter 1 I mapped out the potential benefits that governors’ lobbying organizations might bring as political safeguards of federalism, as well as the potential challenges they might face in the same capacity. In chapters 2 through 6, we saw how governors’ lobbyists have actually served—their activities, benefits, and shortcomings and costs. What have we learned about these organizations and their role in federal-state relations? One of the most notable lessons is that a culture of federalism is critical to their existence and functioning. Governors fall into two camps in their views on political safeguards of federalism. Governors who engage state lobbyists, or who engage with their governors associations, see benefit to an additional political safeguard. They do not see lobbying organizations as redundant. They see opportunities to engage with the federal government and

needs for lobbyists to fill. On the other hand, other governors see the existing political safeguards of federalism as sufficient to their needs. They either do not see the federal government as having something positive to offer, or do not have a positive view of the process of engaging with the federal government. Governors’ perceptions of this need are infused with political culture. We saw in chapter 2 in particular how early governors who initiated Washington offices viewed Washington as an important political force—and one that could provide considerable funding. We saw in chapter 3 that a set of forceful governors saw the need for the National Governors’ ConferencePage 206 → to establish itself in Washington, defending state interests before Congress and in the face of threats from urban mayors. These governors were not necessarily more vociferous about state rights than other governors, but their perspective on federalism rested on engagement rather than isolationism. It seems that it is not just a governor’s perspective on federalism, writ large, but her or his view of intergovernmental relations, writ small, that is critical in determining gubernatorial commitment to formalized lobbying organizations in Washington. Some governors prioritize their relationship with Washington and with their Washington office. They may staff their offices better—with slightly larger staffs and more experienced staff members. Some become active in the NGA, perhaps serving on the executive committee. What governors want from Washington is funding and flexibility, but these desires are nearly universal among governors—and not all governors establish Washington lobbying offices, and not all are active (or even dues-paying) members of the NGA or other regional associations. If governors made their decisions regarding a presence in Washington based only on financial costs and benefits, all governors would have their own offices in Washington. They do not, and much of the reason why not gets down to culture. Does the state have a political culture that sees Washington as a federal partner, or a federal enemy? If the state’s culture of federalism fosters engagement, the governor is more likely to employ a federal liaison. The NGA is a symbol of governors, but for some governors it is also a symbol of Washington and of what they do not like about the federal government. Although this is a more recent phenomenon, and more difficult to measure, it seems that a governor’s desires for the pace of change affects that governor’s relationship with the NGA, the regional associations, and the state offices—but particularly the NGA. The partisan associations are more akin to electoral organizations today, with goals of fundraising and issue framing and promotion. As such, it seems they are not viewed with the same taint by their own partisans. By design, American government moves slowly. Any organization that is truly bipartisan in its processes, and that has a membership with a broad range of political orientations, will be slow moving, and so it is with the NGA. As a bipartisan membership organization, it avoids position-taking on many issues. Positions must reflect the consensus of member governors who might have very disparate interests. A growing number of politicians today are not only suspicious of Washington but also anxious for rapid change. This orientation does not mesh well with the bipartisan, associationalPage 207 → style. The regional associations are less crippled by this, as their memberships are more homogeneous (though almost assuredly still bipartisan). State lobbying offices are affected insofar as they are situated in a sphere that is complex and slow to adopt changes. Any Washington lobbyist can move only so fast if Washington is moving slowly. Culture not only affects a governor directly; it also constrains a governor’s actions. A state’s political culture informs not only its political leaders’ cultural orientation to federalism but also its citizens’ cultural orientation to federalism. Ironically, the states with more conservative populations, populations that are more likely to have lower trust in the federal government, are more likely to be hostile to gubernatorial activity in Washington—even if that activity is designed to protect the state. These states have political cultures that are more likely to foster an election-year attack on a Washington office. To be sure, culture is not the only constraint on a governor. Many factors influence a governor’s maintaining a Washington lobbying office, and the largest states have maintained their Washington offices over many decades, regardless of the political or cultural orientation of their governors. Yet we should not underestimate the role that culture plays in the existence and strength of the governors lobby.

What Makes the Governors’ Lobbyists Most Effective? This book did not attempt to quantify the impact of the governors’ lobbyists, but it is possible to identify the circumstances that maximize their effectiveness. The most effective state lobbying offices share certain characteristics. First, an effective state office has skilled staff members. These are staff members who understand the workings of Congress and who have good relationships with staff members in state delegation offices and ideally in congressional committee offices. They should also have good relationships with staff members in federal agencies. The strongest staff members come to state office positions already having some of these relationships. Often, they have worked in Congress, or perhaps they have worked for a public official association. Less commonly, a skilled staff member comes from the state capital, and learns the Washington players. This too has its advantages, as staff members must cultivate relationships with those in state agencies as well. No governor’s lobbyist begins the job knowing all the relevant players, but any good lobbyist must be a selfstarter and make connections to fill any gaps. It is much more difficult to build relationships Page 208 →by e-mail and conference call, and relationship building is what yields benefits for states. Without effective staff members, a Washington office will bring fewer benefits, and yet still carry inherent political risks. Second, an effective state office has enough staff to allow for some degree of specialization. Solo operations, which have become more common, carry the costs of a lease and one professional staff member. There is a better return on an investment in a bit more office space, a second and perhaps third professional staff member, and a support staff member who will allow the professional staff members to maximize their advocacy efforts. Staff members can also be hired as policy specialists rather than as generalists, and develop more policy expertise if they handle fewer issue areas. This is not to say that there is no case to be made for an office staffed with one person, and certainly there is justification for many states to have even larger offices. A consulting firm avoids this dilemma by ramping up its hours during peak advocacy efforts. Yet consulting firms bring other drawbacks; they do not represent only the state and must juggle multiple clients’ interests when meeting with legislators. They also are unlikely to know the players in the state capital as well. There are cases where a governor has a strong relationship with a consultant, and these can be beneficial, but hiring out representation to a large firm does not seem to maximize all the benefits of an office. Consultants might or might not be more economical. Some of my interview subjects told me that consultants wound up being more expensive than staffing a state office with state employees; others told me that consultants were less expensive. Third, an effective office has a governor who is willing to focus on federal-state relations when necessary. Staff members can do only so much if they are unable to receive direction from their governor, to know the governor’s wishes and have the authority to negotiate on the governor’s behalf. One Washington director who worked for two different governors said, “The work and the action and the priorities really have to do with the personality of the governor, and the amount of work, and if he is focused on federal priorities.В .В .В . And, you know, staff just adds to that.” My observations lead me to believe that even an office with a governor who is less than fully interested in federal-state relations can still bring benefits to the state, particularly material benefits. But the office takes its cues from its governor, and it is the governor who unleashes the potential of the office. Halfhearted gubernatorial leadership can significantly limit the effectiveness of an office. Fourth, an effective office avoids the partisan fray when possible, works with both political parties, and emphasizes the policy issues at hand. The Page 209 →message that a media person should receive from a Washington player who worked with the state office is that the office is working in an evenhanded way to represent the state’s perspective in Washington and bring benefits to the state. An effective office gives the appearance of representing the state rather than the governor. This does not mean an office can or should avoid or ignore partisan politics. This would be naГЇve and short-sighted. Yet, when possible, politics should be grounded in enough bipartisanship to forge coalitions where the potential is present, and to maintain goodwill across the parties—goodwill that might be useful in the next political foray. Though this bipartisan approach might stand in contract to the growing party polarization in Congress, and the increasingly ideological orientation of some governors, it nonetheless is the best path for effective lobbying representation. The weight of state governments in Washington is often described by political actors and federalism scholars as

lacking.8 Yet there are circumstances when the governors can make use of their collective voice, separate themselves from the many other organized interests in Washington, and maximize their position as partners in governance. This is primarily the job of the associations, and there are conditions that maximize the associations’ effectiveness. First, the associations are most effective when a core group of governors from both parties commit to prioritizing federal-state relations. This is perhaps obvious but worth stating, as it does not always happen. Chapter 5 provided illustrations of the NGA’s successes when it had bipartisan leaders who focused on communicating the needs of governors to those in Washington. Those in Congress and the executive branch do not discern states’ needs or interests without guidance, and the voices of states in Washington, even at their most effective, are not always able to rise over the cacophony of myriad other interests. Those representing state governments in Washington are relatively few in number, at least when compared to those working for the interests of the federal government and private organizations. Fewer than 100 staff members work in state offices in Washington; not more than another 100 work for the NGA. Compare this to the thousands who work in the House of Representatives, and the additional employees of federal agencies in Washington. Likewise, state offices in Washington are a relatively small addition to the interest group community. The American Gas Association alone, located in Washington, had a staff of 93 in 2011.9 In 2012 there were more than 12,000 lobbyists registered with Congress.10 The 2010 edition of Washington Representatives lists approximately 18,000 individuals and organizations that lobby.11 In Page 210 →the context of the larger Washington lobbying community, vigorous lobbying efforts by states may be relatively modest in terms of the staff hours committed by professional lobbyists. Governors must prioritize their objectives if they want to be effective advocates. This means visiting Washington to represent their interests in Congress, attending NGA meetings—something a few governors no longer do with regularity—and engaging with the NGA staff leadership on a regular basis. NGA staff members cannot represent states without governors leading the way. Second, the associations are most powerful when their members can work together. No association is strong with substantial internal cleavages. Governors have more diverse interests than most other interests in Washington, both because their portfolio of relevant issue areas is so wide ranging and because the political orientations of governors run such a wide spectrum. Policy disagreements are a matter of course among governors. When governors can unify on a particular position, however, their voices can be quite powerful. One side benefit of gubernatorial lobbying power is that, historically, governors collectively have been less partisan than their colleagues in Congress. Governors can serve as a moderating political force in Washington—a force that many say Washington often needs today, when partisan rancor is so often at such great heights. By speaking pragmatically, the state executives who manage our subnational governments on a dayto-day basis can help facilitate cross-party dialogue and help identify pathways to legislative success. It is unrealistic to presume that governors will forget their party identifications and ignore their partisan associations. As we saw in chapter 5, the two partisan associations have gained power and effectiveness in recent years. They are staffed by fundraisers, spokespersons, and campaign organizers, and they have become increasingly effective in these roles. They are doing so because the governors who comprise their memberships support and encourage these roles. However, the rising strength of the partisan associations undercuts the bipartisan power of the NGA. In earlier decades, the partisan associations gave latitude to the NGA during its annual meetings; though the partisan associations schedule their meetings around the NGA’s gatherings, the partisan associations would avoid going head to head with the NGA when timing press conferences or receptions. More recently, there have been ruffled feathers when the partisan associations have tried to schedule events in ways that could be seen as competing with NGA meetings or their media limelight. The difficulty here is that Page 211 →what is good for the partisan associations and their members in the short run can undercut the power of the all governors in the long run. Some state office directors do not attend the Monday meetings of the Washington Reps Group that is coordinated by the NGA, but will attend the Monday caucus meeting of their partisan association. There are troublesome implications for the federal balance if governors’ lobbyists too often prioritize partisanship over federalism.

Should Every State Have a Washington Office? One question I asked the office directors I interviewed was, “If you could wave a magic wand, would you establish 50 state offices in Washington?” The directors were split on this issue. Some said no, believing that because they could not increase the size of the pie for federal resources, additional offices would place additional limits on the lobbying potential of their own state operations in Washington. They viewed state lobbying in Washington, particularly the lobbying for financial resources, as a zero-sum game, and felt they were better off having some states absent from the bargaining table. The other Washington office directors said that they would establish a Washington office for every state. Almost none believed that it would help their own state specifically, but they believed it would increase the clout and lobbying resources of governors in Washington, and that would benefit all states. These directors also believed that states without offices were hurt, and thus it was in the best interests of these states to establish offices. They further believed the appropriations game was large enough already that the new offices would not hurt the appropriations efforts of existing state offices. These directors believed that all states were receiving benefits from their congressional delegations, and so states without offices were already receiving their maximum share of appropriations. Without Washington representation, states might be getting appropriations that did not reflect their governors’ priorities. Thus these directors felt that additional Washington offices would help influence already existing appropriations benefits to include those supported by their governors. It seems in the interests of each state to establish a Washington office, and it is in the interests of our federal system to have a robust group of state lobbying offices in Washington. Not only do state offices produce appropriations benefits that are greater than the cost of these offices, but offices collectively provide a perspective in Washington that is beneficial to the federal programs that are administrated by states and that affect millions Page 212 →of citizens. Some benefits of individual Washington offices were detailed in the previous section. It is worth underlining the argument for the benefits of Washington offices as a collective force. If an individual state office can offer a perspective on governmental needs and administrative challenges to its congressional delegation and others that would otherwise be absent, offices collectively can offer the full range of perspectives on federal policies that affect states. Some would say that the NGA provides this collective perspective, and individual state offices are unnecessary, but 50 state offices would not duplicate the NGA. First, many issues that have tremendous impact on states are not the focus of NGA lobbying efforts because the NGA is split on the best position to take. Fifty state offices in Washington would allow governors to promote their own positions, and thus promote the perspective of states on more issues—even if the perspectives would at times vary. Such is the case in a federal system. Second, in cases where there is broad consensus, NGA lobbying efforts would be augmented by more state offices in Washington. More offices would bring more staff to lobby the enormous legislative and executive branches of the federal government, and coalitions provide increased political clout. Third, the lobbyists for the individual states help the NGA better understand the positions of their member governors. State offices can serve as a bridge between the NGA and the governors. A governor’s chief of staff in the state capital is not able to devote as much time to federal-state relations as a Washington office director does. Like all lobbyists, the governors’ lobbyists rely on the sympathy of those in the federal government to respect and protect their patrons’ interests. In many other fundamental ways, these lobbyists are not like other lobbyists. Just as the American governors as governmental partners hold a unique and significant place in our federal system, their lobbyists fill a unique and significant place in our system of organized interests. I hope that, in some modest way, this research has illuminated how governors’ lobbyists have defended their states, fought for their interests, and safeguarded federalism.

Footnotes 1. State spending figures in this chapter include those from general funds and other funds, but not bond funds. 2. Some states had already met the expanded coverage levels before the Affordable Care Act was passed. The U.S. Supreme Court also took the sting out of the expansion provision when it declared that states opting out from the requirement could not be penalized by losing preexisting Medicaid funding; without the threat of this penalty, many states have elected not to expand Medicaid. Nonetheless, 29 states are implementing the expanded coverage requirements, with tremendous financial and administrative implications. Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga, and MaryBeth Musumeci, “The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers” (Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). 3. In two cases, the director of the Washington office was unavailable, and the assistant director was interviewed instead. 4. Consultants who are not state employees might be required to register if their state lobbying activities were to fall under the criteria of the legislation. 5. Almost all offices report to the governor. The Florida Washington office answers to the governor, the state house, and the state senate. The Texas office is an independent agency representing the entire state. In both cases, however, the governor’s interests are strongly if not exclusively represented. The state of New York has offices for the state house and the state senate as well as the governor’s office, but the legislature’s offices are outside the scope of this study. As nearly all offices are under the governor’s control, and the remaining ones answer to the governor, among other institutions, I refer to these offices as governors’ offices throughout the text. 6. Ransone examined 25 states, and Connecticut was not one of these. We cannot have confidence from Ransone’s mention of these three states that only these three states had offices. 7. The CSG had other limitations. Serving as a facilitator of intergovernmental compacts and other coordination efforts, and a clearinghouse for information on the states, the CSG served the tradition of organizational professionalism rather than politics. Serving governors, legislators, and other state officials, the CSG was not active in lobbying, and certainly was unable to present itself as the voice of the governors alone. The NGC fully separated from the CSG in 1977. 8. I tried to identify the hearing that Governor Evans discussed, and review the hearing report. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify the hearing where this exchange would have occurred, so it is possible that some details in this reflection have been obscured by time, but I am confident in the veracity of the basic exchange. 9. I should note that when I interviewed office directors that I did not define who counted as “the White House,” and generally neither did they. The White House is commonly shorthand for not only the president—who would rarely have direct interaction with state office directors—but also all those who work in the Executive Office of the President. This includes the policy advisers and others located in many offices, including the Office of the Chief of Staff; the Office of Management and Budget; the Office of Legislative Affairs; and the Office of Intergovernmental Relations. 10. Another regional governors association, the Council of Great Lakes Governors, does not have an office in Washington and thus I do not include it in this discussion. 11. For the analyses in this chapter, I code the data annually. A state is coded as having an office in Washington if it has an office at any point during a given year. This means that an office will be coded as existing in a given year even if it was closed or vacant for some of that year. When this happens, it is typically because of a gubernatorial transition or the departure of the office director, particularly if the office director is the sole staff member. If the office stays closed, it is going to appear in the dataset as closed in the following year. If it is closed or vacant for only a short time, then the dataset will have missed an office closing. Short-term office closings happen only rarely, however; usually when a governor makes the decision to close an office, the office remains closed for a couple of years or more. I make one exception to this coding rule. If an office is open for the first few weeks in January after a new governor has taken office, and then closes, I code the state as not having an office for that year; the office is clearly closing down its operations at the end of a gubernatorial term.

12. With a few exceptions, I use the NGA lists of Washington representatives as the record for whether a state had an office during particular years. In some cases these lists will include a state office that I know from other sources was vacant during that time; in that case, as I just mentioned, I consider the state to be without an office. In a small handful of instances, some might dispute the accuracy of the NGA lists as records of offices. One notable case is Mississippi, which is not listed as having a Washington representative under Governor Haley Barbour. When Governor Barbour was in office from 2004 to 2012, the state did not maintain a Washington office—but Governor Barbour did have a staff member in Washington working with the Republican Governors Association, which he chaired. This staff member was considered by many in the gubernatorial lobbying community to be representing Governor Barbour and Mississippi. Nonetheless, Governor Barbour did not identify this staff member as a state liaison, and so I did not code the state as having an office during this time. I recognize that other coders might have made a different coding judgment in this case. Aside from a very few instances such as this one, the NGA lists provide a data source that is both very reliable and noncontroversial.

Page 213 →

Notes Introduction

1. Washington Representatives, ed. J. Valerie Steele (Washington, DC: Columbia Books, 2000). 2. Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics,” Journal of Politics 63, no. 4 (2001). 3. Herbert Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,” Columbia Law Review 54, no. 4 (1954). 4. Robert H. Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (1969). 5. Thomas L. Gais, “Federalism during the Obama Administration,” paper presented at the annual conference of the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico, May 7, 2010. 6. National Association of State Budget Officers, “State Expenditure Report: Examining 2012–2014 State Spending” (Washington, DC: National Association of State Budget Officers, 2014), table 1. 7. Colleen M. Grogan and Vernon K. Smith, “From Charity Care to Medicaid: Governors, States, and the Transformation of American Health Care,” in A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, edited by Ethan G. Sribnick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 205–9. 8. National Association of State Budget Officers, “State Expenditure Report,” tables 28 and 29. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 72. 11. Ibid., table A-2. 12. For example, Kay Lehman Schlozman and John Tierney’s broad study, based on hundreds of surveys and interviews, does not include subnational governmentsPage 214 → in their list of nonmembership organized interests. The same is true for Jack Walker’s survey of interest groups. One notable interest groups study that did include these offices is the doctoral dissertation of Beth L. Leech. Frank Baumgartner and Leech and Baumgartner et al. also include governments in their sample of lobbyists. Interestingly, research in the 1950s and 1960s did discuss governmental lobbying, if relatively briefly. See, for example, Congressional Quarterly Service, Legislators and the Lobbyists, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968); Lewis Anthony Dexter, How Organizations Are Represented in Washington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); Jack L. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Beth L. Leech, “Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups” (PhD thesis, Texas A&M University, 1998); Baumgartner and Leech, “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons”; Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech, Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 13. Donald Haider’s When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying examines the several large associations that dominated the Washington intergovernmental lobby when the book was published in 1974; Anne Marie Cammisa’s Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System focuses on the urban lobby; and David Arnold and Jeremy Plant’s Public Official Associations and State and Local Government looks at these associations from a public administration perspective. Suzanne Farkas provides an excellent review of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena, and although the governors are not the subject of her monograph, her examination of mayoral lobbying efforts in the 1960s illuminates the governors’ lobbying environment during this era. Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974); Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995); David S. Arnold and Jeremy F. Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994);

Suzanne Farkas, Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena (New York: New York University Press, 1971). 14. Glenn E. Brooks, When Governors Convene: The Governors’ Conference and National Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961). 15. Mitchel N. Herian, Governing the States and the Nation: The Intergovernmental Policy Influence of the National Governors Association (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011). 16. Albert J. Prendergast, Not a Ship of Fools: The Incredible Voyage of the SS Independence (Mustang, OK: Tate Publishing, 2009). 17. John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009). 18. David Cingranelli provided the first academic snapshot of state lobbying offices in Washington. As very little was known about Washington offices at that time, Cingranelli focuses on a description of Washington office communication—“who is communicating what, to whom, and with what effects?” John Pelissero and Page 215 →Robert England examined Washington-based state and local government offices used during the first Reagan term. Beryl Radin has examined the various Washington offices representing of the state of California as well as its various substate governments and other public organizations. Beverly Cigler provides an overview of the major organizations in the intergovernmental lobby in the early 1990s, providing a particularly good categorization of the types of organizations at work in Washington. David L. Cingranelli, “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process,” State Government 56, no. 4 (1983); John P. Pelissero and Robert E. England, “State and Local Governments’ Washington вЂReps’—Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan’s New Federalism,” State and Local Government Review 19, no. 2 (1987); Beryl A. Radin, “California in Washington: California Public Organizations in the Nation’s Capital,” in California Policy Choices, ed. John J. Kirlin and Donald R. Winkler (Los Angeles: University of Southern California School of Public Administration, 1990); Beverly Cigler, “Not Just Another Special Interest: Intergovernmental Representation,” in Interest Group Politics, ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995). 19. Journalists have written about federal-state relations offices in a variety of national newspapers. See, for example, Martin Tolchin, “Fiscal Crises Keep Official Lobbyists Busy,” New York Times, June 22, 1976; Spencer Rich, “Hired Lobbyists Seek Largess for States and Localities,” Washington Post, February 26, 1978; Matthew L. Wald, “Lobbying for Connecticut on Capitol Hill,” New York Times, May 7, 1978; Eugene Carlson, “State Lobbyists in Washington Emphasize вЂDamage Control’, ” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1982; Jane Perlez, “City and State Lobbyists Vie for Dwindling Federal Aid,” New York Times, October 24, 1983; “White Declares Victory, Says Message Clear, ” Arkansas Gazette, November 6, 1983; Cathy Trost, “States’ Lobbyists Want Bucks to Stop at Home,” USA Today, January 7, 1983. There have also been features on individual state offices in their corresponding state newspapers and magazines. See, for example, Jack Betts, “N.C. Washington Office May Be Key вЂEmbassy’,” Greensboro Daily News, September 10, 1977; Steve Weinburg, “The $120,000 Watch on Washington,” Illinois Observer, October/November 1975; “Kentucky to Open Grants Office in D.C.: State Wants to Be More Closely Attuned to Jingle in Uncle Sam’s Research Pockets,” Lexington Herald-Leader, July 31, 2001; Tania Anderson, “Hoosiers Get a Helping Hand,” Post-Tribune (IN), December 25, 1999; Elsa C. Arnett, “Small Washington Office Relays State of Florida Affairs,” News, 1996; Associated Press, “Critics Hit Closing of State’s D.C. Office,” Post-Tribune (IN), July 31, 1989; “PR Firm Will Move Indiana into Future: Bayh Fulfills Campaign Promise to Cut Budget of Washington Office by $100,000,” Post-Tribune, May 22, 1989; Carlson, “State Lobbyists in Washington Emphasize вЂDamage Control’”; “Sarah Sibley Taking Ohio Capital Office in Brand New Directions,” Greenville Daily Advocate (OH), July 13, 1983; Katherine Gregg, Scott Mayerowitz, and Liz Anderson, “Carcieri Brings Washington Liaison Back as Policy Director,” Providence Journal (RI), January 17, 2005; Bill Salisbury, “State Lobbyist Scores High in D.C.,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, October 9, 1995; Deirdre Shesgreen, “Connecticut’s New DC Lobbyist Plans to вЂRamp up’ State’s Presence,” Connecticut Mirror, March 3, 2011, http://www.ctmirror.org/story/11730/desimone; Henry J. Cordes, “Maurstad’s Role to Be D.C. Liaison: New Lieutenant Governor’s Job to Save on Lobbying Fees,” Omaha World-Herald, Page 216 →January 6, 1999; Dorothy Yagodich, “Former Valley

Resident Serving as Governor’s Sentinel inside Beltway,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, April 19, 1998; John S. Day, “Larrabee to Continue as Ambassador,” Bangor Daily News (ME), December 6–7, 1986; Frank Reeves, “Ridge’s Right Arm in D.C.: Rebecca Halkias Keeps a Close Watch on State Interests,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 15, 1998. 20. The lack of archival records for Washington offices made the search for their founding dates quite challenging. I have found evidence that an office has existed at some point for every state except Wyoming. 21. Rochelle L. Stanfield, “The PIGs: Out of the Sty, into Lobbying with Style,” National Journal 8, no. 33 (1976): 1134–39. 22. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government. 23. R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.”

Chapter 1

1. See, for example, Roger Gibbons, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1981), esp. 90–97. 2. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Bantam Classic edition ed. (New York: Bantam Books, [1787] 1982), No. 45. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., No. 46. 5. William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). 6. Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism.” 7. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 1. 8. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 192. 9. Riker, Federalism, 104. 10. Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 186. 11. Ibid., 212. 12. Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 13. Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System,” in American Federalism in Perspective, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 269. 14. Ibid. 15. Elazar, American Federalism, 47. 16. Ibid., 212. 17. David B. Truman, “Federalism and the Party System,” in American Federalism in Perspective, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 107. 18. Bednar, Robust Federation, 114. 19. Riker, Federalism, 104. 20. Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of SelfSustainable Federal Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 180. 21. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers, No. 46. Page 217 →22. Elazar, American Federalism. 23. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism, 9. 24. Robert Nagel sees federalism as imploding under the weight of the current system: “The idea of limited regulatory authority is being buried by the realities of day-to-day life and is unlikely to reemerge.” Robert F. Nagel, The Implosion of American Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 31. 25. Susan E. Clarke, “вЂThinking Federally’ from a Governance Perspective,” in The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems, ed. Michael A. Pagano and Robert Leonardi (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 57. 26. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers, No. 46.

27. Paul L. Posner, The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism? (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 78–80. 28. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers, No. 46. 29. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore, “The Governor and the Public,” in Being Governor: The View from the Office, ed. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983), 63–66; William T. Gormley Jr., “Television Coverage of State Government,” Public Opinion Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1978); Thomas B. Littlewood, “What’s Wrong with Statehouse Coverage?, ” Columbia Journalism Review 10 (March/April 1972). 30. M. Kent Jennings, “Political Trust and the Roots of Devolution,” in Trust and Governance, ed. Valerie Braithwaite and Levi Margaret (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998). 31. V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964); V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Knopf, 1956). 32. I should note that this perspective is not universal. Sarah Morehouse, for example, has argued that state political parties remain the central force in state electoral politics. Sarah M. Morehouse, “Money versus Party Effort: Nominating for Governor,” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (1990). 33. Truman, “Federalism and the Party System,” 88. 34. Samuel C. Patterson, “Campaign Spending in Contests for Governor,” Western Political Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1982); Thad L. Beyle, “The Cost of Becoming Governor,” State Government 56, no. 2 (1983). 35. Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, Designing Federalism; Bednar, Robust Federation. 36. Ann O’M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, The Resurgence of the States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986). See also U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “The Question of State Government Capability” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985). 37. Timothy J. Conlan, From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 38. Richard P. Nathan, “The Role of the States in American Federalism,” in The State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996), 15–17. 39. John Kincaid, “The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare,” New England Economic Review (May/June 1998). 40. Posner, Politics of Unfunded Mandates. 41. Ibid., 84. 42. Ibid., 85–86. Page 218 →43. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power (New York: Praeger, 1992), 60. 44. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption: Regulatory Federalism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 112. 45. John Kincaid, “From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509, no. 1 (May 1990). 46. Zimmerman, Contemporary American Federalism, 56. 47. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), ix. 48. Elazar, American Federalism, 212. 49. Ibid., 217–21. 50. Jeffrey I. Chapman, “Wealth and Tax Systems,” in The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems, ed. Michael A. Pagano and Robert Leonardi (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 110–18. 51. Robert Jay Dilger, “The Study of American Federalism at the Turn of the Century,” State and Local Government Review 32, no. 2 (2000): 99. 52. Lynn R. Muchmore, “The Governor as Manager,” State Government 54, no. 3 (1981). 53. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 114. 54. Garrick B. Pursley, “The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism,” Emory Law Journal 63, no. 3 (2014). 55. Bednar, Robust Federation, esp. 193–95.

Chapter 2

Portions of this chapter were previously published in Jennifer M. Jensen and Jenna Kelkres Emery, “The First State Lobbyists: State Offices in Washington during World War II,” Journal of Policy History 23, no. 2 (2011). 1. Brooks, When Governors Convene. 2. James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 3. David B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1995). 4. John Joseph Wallis, “The Birth of the Old Federalism: Financing the New Deal, 1932–1940,” Journal of Economic History 44, no. 1 (1984): 140–41. 5. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 6. Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941 ( New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993). 7. J. Patterson, New Deal and the States, 34. 8. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 52–53. 9. Wallis, “Birth of the Old Federalism,” 140–41. 10. Ibid., 145. 11. Ibid. 12. John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates, “The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism, ” in The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the Page 219 →American Economy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 13. J. Patterson, New Deal and the States. 14. Gavin Wright, “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics 56, no. 1 (1974); Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison, “Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933–1939,” Journal of Law and Economics 34, no. 1 (1991). 15. Jim F. Couch and William F. Shughart II, “New Deal Spending and the States: The Politics of Public Works,” in Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History, ed. Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse, and Robert M. Whaples (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000). 16. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008). 17. Various letters between the Feather Pillow Company of Long Island and Governor Herbert Lehman. Papers of Herbert H. Lehman, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library, New York, NY. Subseries II.1 (General Correspondence Files), Box 296, Folder 24; also Subseries XV.2 (Governorship Files, 1927–1945), Reel 31. Some duplicate correspondence is also found in the New York State Archives. 18. Address of Governor Herbert H. Lehman at the Fifth General Assembly of the Council of State Governments, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, January 21, 1941. Papers of Herbert H. Lehman, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library, New York, NY. Subseries II.1 (General Correspondence Files), Box 296, Folder 24. 19. New York State Executive Department, “New York at Work for Victory and the Future: Annual Report of the Division of Commerce” (Albany: New York State Executive Department, Division of Commerce, 1942). 20. The office did not have a lease until January 1, 1942. Ibid. A Division of Commerce report indicates that the Washington office was located at 719 Fifteenth Street, NW, and was directed by Howard L. Volgenau, with additional staff support from Frank B. Ruoff. New York State Archives, Papers of the New York State War Council, Albany, NY, Series A4295 (Governor’s office correspondence on war issues, 1940–1945), Box 2, Folder 40.

21. “Annual Report of the Division of Commerce, 1941,” ed. Division of Commerce (Albany: New York State Executive Department, 1941), 8. 22. Ibid., 14. 23. New York State Executive Department, “New York at Work for Victory and the Future.” 24. Governor Herbert H. Lehman to Maurice Neufeld, Assistant to the Coordinator, New York State War Plans Office, September 28, 1942. New York State Archives, New York War Council records, Series A4295-78 (Governor’s office correspondence on war issues, 1940–45), Box 2, Folder 40. 25. Senator James M. Mead to Governor Lehman, July 8, 1942. New York State Archives, papers of the New York War Council records, Albany, NY, Series A4295 (Governor’s office correspondence on war issues, 1940–45), Box 2, Folder 40. Page 220 →26. “New Contracts Awarded for U.S. Blankets,” New York Herald Tribune, September 15, 1942. 27. C. J. Grace, Jr., to Governor Thomas E. Dewey, January 11, 1943. New York State Archives, Papers of Thomas E. Dewey, University of Rochester Library, Rochester, NY, Department of Commerce files, Series 4, Box 216, Folder 5. 28. New York State Division of Commerce, “Division of Commerce Monthly Report of Defense Activities,” ed. New York State Executive Department (May 1942). 29. “Monthly Report of War Activities, March 1943” (Albany: New York State Executive Department, 1943). 30. New York State Executive Department, “New York at Work for Victory and the Future.” 31. “New York Produces for Victory: Annual Report of the Division of Commerce, 1943,” (Albany: New York State Executive Department, Division of Commerce, 1943). 32. Governor Robert Hurley to John A. Coe, American Brass Company, May 26, 1942. Connecticut State Archives, Papers of Governor Robert A. Hurley, Hartford, CT. RG 005:28, Series 2 Subject Files, Box 437, Folder “Defense—Connecticut War Industries Commission.” 33. “State Group Gets $1,000,000 Orders for Small Plants,” Hartford Courant, October 18, 1942. 34. “Connecticut Progress,” a monthly pamphlet issued by the Connecticut Development Commission; sourced from March 1942 issue, Connecticut State Archives, papers of the Department of Economic and Community Development, Hartford, CT. Record Group 022, Series 1 (Connecticut Development Commission, 1939–1971), Item 34, Folder “Connecticut Progress.” 35. Harvey L. Hooke to Joseph J. Woolfson, September 16, 1942. Connecticut State Archives, Papers of Governor Robert A. Hurley, Hartford, CT. Record Group 005:28, Series 2 Subject Files, Box 437, Folder “Defense—Connecticut War Industries Commission.” 36. “Funds Given for Office in Washington: Governor’s Plan for State Development Headquarters Is Granted Total of $22,500,” Hartford Courant, March 2, 1944. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. “Connecticut Progress,” a monthly pamphlet issued by the Connecticut Development Commission, November 1945 issue. Connecticut State Archives, Record Group 022, Series 1, Department of Economic and Community Development, 1939–1997, Item 34. 41. David B. Walker, Toward a Functioning Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1981), 79. 42. Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Data in 1942 dollars. 43. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1943 edition. Table 305, “Employees and Pay Rolls of State and Local Governments, by Type of Governmental Unit, by States: January 1942.” 44. US Bureau of the Census, Population Distribution Branch, 1996. “IntercensalPage 221 → Estimates of the Total Resident Population of States: 1940 to 1949.” Available at http://www.census.gov/popest /data/state/asrh/1980s/tables/st4049ts.txt. 45. Coleman B. Ransone Jr., The Office of the Governor in the United States (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1956), 344. 46. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1941–1942, vol. 4 (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1941).

47. Ibid. New York State Red Book (Albany: Williams Press, 1941); New York State Red Book (Albany: Willliams Press, 1942). 48. W. Brooke Graves, American State Government, 3rd ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1946), 271–73. 49. “Connecticut Body Spreads War Work,” New York Times, October 19, 1942. 50. This letter was sent to the heads of the state agencies, including Elliott V. Bell, superintendent of banks; Hilo R. Maltbie, chairman of the Public Service Commission; Holton V. Noyes, commissioner of agriculture and markets. March 12, 1943. Papers of Thomas E. Dewey, University of Rochester Library, Rochester, NY. Series 4, Box 216, Folder 5. 51. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 200–220; Steve Chan, “Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares,” Mershon International Studies Review 39, no. 1 (1995). 52. Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 204; Mark R. Wilson, The Business of War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 53. Ben Baack and Edward Ray, “The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States,” Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (1985); Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 31–95. 54. Benjamin O. Fordham, “Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I,” International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007); Kathleen Burk, Britain, America, and the Sinews of War, 1914–1918 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985). 55. David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 93–143; Gregory Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 76; Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 476–77. 56. Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 57. Connecticut supplied 54 percent of the nation’s munitions during World War I, and during World War II Bridgeport was nicknamed the “arsenal of the free world.” The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company was in East Hartford; Sikorsky Aircraft was based in Bridgeport; and the Electric Boat Company had its headquarters and shipyard in Groton. These defense products were directly linked to the employment rate in the state, and during World War II the state’s unemployment rate fell to one half of 1 percent. David Pinsky, “Defense Contracts and the Connecticut Economy” (Storrs: Labor Education Center of the University of Connecticut, 1982); Jack Cavanaugh, “State Seeks Ways to Retain Manufacturing Companies,”Page 222 → New York Times, April 10, 1988; Matthew Roth, Connecticut: An Inventory of Historic Engineering and Industrial Sites (Washington, DC: Society for Industrial Archeology, 1981). 58. “Minutes of Meeting between Gov. Hurley and Manufacturers, May 19th, 1942,” Connecticut State Archives, Papers of Governor Hurley, Hartford, CT. Record Group 005:28, Series 2 Subject Files, Box 437, Folder “Defense—Connecticut War Industries Commission.” 59. In addition, other states perceived a “competitive threat” after seeing their counterparts flourish as a result of the war manufacturing boom. David Koistinen, “Public Policies for Countering Deindustrialization in Postwar Massachusetts,” Journal of Policy History 18, no. 3 (2006): 326–61. The South and the West were the ultimate beneficiaries. Gregory Hooks and Leonard E. Bloomquist, “The Legacy of World War II for Regional Growth and Decline: The Cumulative Effects of Wartime Investments on U.S. Manufacturing, 1947–1972,” Social Forces 71, no. 2 (1992): 303–37; Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). 60. U.S. Department of Commerce, “Census of Manufactures: 1939,” ed. Bureau of the Census (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940). 61. Council of State Governments, Book of the States 1941–1942, 4. 62. Alan Clive, State of War: Michigan in World War II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979). 63. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports United States Department of Defense, “Military Prime Contract Awards by State: Fiscal Years 1951 to 1983” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1984).

64. David O. White, “Robert Augustine Hurley: Governor of Connecticut, 1941–1943,” Connecticut State Library, http://www.cslib.org/gov/hurley.htm (accessed June 6, 2008). 65. Albert E. Van Dusen, Connecticut (New York: Random House, 1961), 369. 66. Wilbur L. Cross, Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), 369–70. 67. Robert P. Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York’s New Deal (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 71. 68. Ibid., 54–55. 69. Ibid. 70. Barry K. Beyer, Thomas E. Dewey, 1937–1947: A Study in Political Leadership (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979). 71. Richard N. Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 72. Beyer, Thomas E. Dewey, 1937–1947. 73. Michigan Governor Murray Van Wagoner, a Democrat who served from 1941 to 1942, spoke about this in a speech to his colleagues at the National Governors’ Conference annual meeting in 1942: “Government has had a place in this war—a vital place. But no government agent ever got a contract placed, or a job of production finished. The best way to get war orders is to get production and technical engineers together, representing buyer and potential seller. In Michigan, we advised our manufacturers to go right to the government purchasing men, whether they be military or civilian. Or better yet, go right to the prime contractor, and find Page 223 →out what sub-contracts are available, and get the engineers together to find out what their plants could handle. No meeting of non-technical officials ever placed a war contract.” Murray D. Van Wagoner, “Operating the Tool Shop of America,” Vital Speeches of America 8, no. 21 (1942). 74. Allan Nevins, Herbert H. Lehman and His Era (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963). 75. Moving to the Senate was unusual at this time; fewer than one in five governors moved to the Senate after leaving the governor’s mansion. 76. Ransone, Office of the Governor in the United States, 255. 77. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “ACIR Ninth Annual Report” (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1968). 78. Another list published in 1968 does not include offices for Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, or South Dakota; this list does note, however, that it “may not be complete.” Congressional Quarterly Service, Legislators and the Lobbyists, 63–64. 79. Dexter, How Organizations Are Represented in Washington, 29. 80. Anton J. Jachim, Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975). 81. Catherine Westfall and Lillian Hoddeson, “Thinking Small in Big Science: The Founding of Fermilab, 1960–1972,” Technology and Culture 37, no. 3 (1996): 465. 82. Jachim, Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator, 79–80. 83. Jerry G. Udell, “The Governor’s Ambassador: A New Concept in the Representation of State Interests at the Federal Level,” research paper for seminar in American Government, American University, 1966. 84. Jachim, Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator, 118, 20. 85. Author interview with Taylor Pensoneau, Illinois political correspondent for the St. Louis PostDispatch, 1965–78, on June 1, 2010. 86. Adrienne Kolb and Lillian Hoddeson, “A New Frontier in the Chicago Suburbs: Settling Fermilab, 1963–1972,” Illinois Historical Journal 88, no. 1 (1995). 87. Fermilab National Accelorator Laboratory, “The Creation of a Laboratory: Fermilab, the First Five Years, 1967–1972,” Batavia, IL, online exhibit (1999), http://history.fnal.gov/exhibit/index.html (accessed March 16. 2010). 88. Richard J. Durbin, July 13, 1999. Letter from U.S. Senator Richard Durbin to Jennifer Jensen. Copy on file with the author. 89. Author interview with Thomas J. Corcoran, director of the Washington office for the state of Illinois, 1968–1973, on December 16, 1999.

90. Taylor Pensoneau, Governor Richard Ogilvie: In the Interest of the State (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997). 91. Eric Brenner, “The Illinois Federal Clearinghouse” (Washington, DC: Washington Office for the State of Illinois, 1999). 92. Eric Brenner, Measuring and Increasing Federal Funds to Your State: Findings and Recommendations from the Illinois Federal Clearinghouse Experience (Washington, DC: Center for Best Practices, National Governors’ Association, 2004), white paper. Page 224 →93. Beth Leech, Frank Baumgartner, Timothy La Pira, and Nicholas Semanko, “Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and Interest Group Mobilization,” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2005). 94. Virginia Gray and David Lowery, The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 95. David Lowery and Virginia Gray, “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States,” American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (1995). 96. Virginia Gray and David Lowery, “Interest Representation and Democratic Gridlock,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1995). 97. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government. 98. Farkas, Urban Lobbying; Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups. 99. Richard M. Flanagan, “Roosevelt, Mayors and the New Deal Regime: The Origins of Intergovernmental Lobbying and Administration,” Polity 31, no. 3 (1999). 100. Farkas, Urban Lobbying. 101. Samuel H. Beer, “The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics,” Public Policy 24, no. 2 (1976): 131. 102. Ibid., 160. 103. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government. 104. D. B. Walker, Toward a Functioning Federalism, 93–94. 105. Mancur Olson and others have argued that interest groups form to receive specific benefits. Those most likely to capture those benefits are more likely to organize, especially if they are unable to capture those benefits in other ways. This means, contrary to David Truman’s pluralist argument, that some groups and organizations are more likely to organize and lobby than others. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1951] 1981). 106. R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.” 107. Robert Salisbury, “Interest Representation: : The Dominance of Institutions,” American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (1984). 108. Ibid. 109. R. Salisbury, “Interest Representation.” 110. R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups”; R. Salisbury, “Interest Representation.”

Chapter 3

1. The square footage of the building was listed on an advertisement produced by the Braedon Companies, which handled leasing for the building. 2. Brooks, When Governors Convene, 9. 3. Ibid., 14. 4. Governors’ Conference, “Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Governors of the States of the Union,” Washington, DC, January 18–20, 1910, 2. AvailablePage 225 → at the National Governors Association web site, http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf /1910NGAAnnualMeeting1.pdf.

5. Ibid., 13. 6. Ibid., 15–16. 7. “The вЂHouse of Governors’,” Washington Post, November 27, 1910, E4. 8. “Our Governors in Conference,” Washington Post, September 15, 1911, 6. 9. National Governors Association, “NGA Timeline,” National Governors Association, http://centennial.nga.org/cms/home/timeline/1900 (accessed November 20, 2011). 10. Ibid. 11. Brooks, When Governors Convene, 46. 12. “Governors Chart Plans for Parley,” New York Times, December 6, 1957. 13. Dan McNichol, “Connecting the United States: Governors and the Building of the Interstate System, ” chap. 4 in A Legacy of Leadership: Governors and American History, ed. Clayton McClure Brooks, 85–106 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 101. 14. Brooks, When Governors Convene, 80. 15. McNichol, “Connecting the United States,” 105–7. 16. Robert Jay Dilger, “Moving the Nation: Governors and the Development of American Transportation Policy,” chap. 7 in A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, ed. Ethan G. Sribnick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 170. 17. H. C. Nixon, “The Southern Governors’ Conference as a Pressure Group,” Journal of Politics 6, no. 3 (1944): 338–45. 18. “Political Rites,” Economist, August 27, 1955. 19. Brooks, When Governors Convene, 163. 20. Ibid., 165–66. 21. Ibid., 133–39. 22. David S. Broder, “Gift-Bearing Governors Drop in on Eisenhowers,” New York Times, July 2, 1962. 23. David S. Broder, “The Governors Seem out of the Mainstream,” New York Times, July 9, 1966. 24. Warren Weaver Jr., “The Governors Try Not to Rock the Boat for 1968,” New York Times, October 22, 1967. 25. “Floating Governors,” Economist, October 28, 1967, 398–401. 26. Governors’ Conference, “Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Governors’ Conference” Cleveland, June 6–10, 1964, 27. 27. Ibid., 118–19. 28. Ibid., 122. 29. National Governors’ Conference, “Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the National Governors’ Conference,” Minneapolis, July 25–29, 1965, 81. 30. National Governors’ Conference, “Official Papers of the Special Interim Meeting of the National Governors’ Conference,” White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, December 16–17, 1966, i. 31. Ibid., 16. Page 226 →32. Ibid. 33. Arlen J. Large, “Taming the Octopus: States, Weary of Being Bypassed, Open a Lobbying Office, ” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1967, 6. 34. Ibid. 35. Author interview with Daniel J. Evans, governor of Washington (1965–77), July 11, 1998. 36. Carol S. Weissert, “The National Governors’ Association: 1908–1983,” State Government 56, no. 2 (1983): 44–52. 37. The 1968 winter meeting was held in February, 14 months after the first winter meeting of December 1966. Since 1966, there has been a meeting of the governors each winter. 38. Weissert, “National Governors’ Association: 1908–1983.” 39. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government, 78. 40. Blair S. Walker, “On the Record: NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach,” Stateline (Washington, DC: Pew Center on the States, 2000), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action? siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=14078 (accessed 2009).

41. National Governors Association, “NGA Timeline.” IRS records indicate that the organization was originally named the National Governors’ Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis. NGA Center IRS Form 1023, May 3, 1974. Available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf /NGACENTERIRSFORM1023.PDF (accessed November 27, 2011). 42. Author interview with Stephen B. Farber, director of the National Governors Association, 1975–83, on September 12, 2012. 43. Ibid. 44. Williamson, “1982 New Federalism Negotiations.” 45. Ibid., 19. 46. Conlan, New Federalism. 47. Williamson, “1982 New Federalism Negotiations.” 48. Timothy Conlan and Richard Williamson have each written thorough discussions of the New Federalism proposal. Stephen Farber has written on the negotiations from the perspective of the governors. Conlan, New Federalism; Williamson, “1982 New Federalism Negotiations”; Stephen B. Farber, “The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations: A View from the States,” Publius 13, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 33–38. 49. Williamson, “1982 New Federalism Negotiations.” 50. Ibid.; Farber, “1982 New Federalism Negotiations.” 51. Letter from Governor Cecil D. Andrus, NGC chairman, to Governors Reubin Askew, Robert Ray, Robert Bennett, Arthur Link, James Rhodes, James Edwards, Ray Blanton, and Mills Godwin, December 15, 1976. State Services Organization papers, State Services Organization, Washington, DC, file “Hall of States History.” 52. Daniel J. Evans, June 30, 1976. Memo to the NGC Executive Committee from Governor Daniel J. Evans, Chairman, NGC Building Committee. Subject: “Building of the States.” 53. State Services Organization, “Hall of States Acronyms, December 1990.” Page 227 →From the Agenda book for the SSO board meeting on September 19, 1991. Located in the offices of the State Services Organization, Washington, DC. 54. Author interview with Stephen B. Farber. 55. State Services Organization, “Tenant List,” State Services Organization, http://www.sso.org/? page_id=31&sn=home (accessed March 17, 2012). 56. U.S. Census Bureau, “Statistical Abstract of the United States” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), table 567; U.S. Census Bureau, “Statistical Abstract of the United States” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), table 627. 57. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington, 55. 58. Ibid., 52. 59. Ransone, Office of the Governor in the United States. 60. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “ACIR Ninth Annual Report.” 61. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), chap. 7. 62. Farkas, Urban Lobbying, 31. 63. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Bureau of the Budget, “Budget of the United States Government, 1970—Appendix” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 90–91. 64. Ibid., 312–23. 65. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government. 66. Farkas, Urban Lobbying, 31–34. 67. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government; William P. Browne and Robert H. Salisbury, “Organized Spokesmen for Cities: Urban Interest Groups,” in People and Politics in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 6 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972). 68. Brown and Salisbury, “Organized Spokesmen for Cities”; U.S. Conference of Mayors, “About the U.S. Conference of Mayors,” http://usmayors.org/about/overview.asp (accessed May 28, 2012). 69. The AMA was renamed the National League of Cities in 1964.

70. Browne and Salisbury, “Organized Spokesmen for Cities.” 71. Ibid., 265. 72. Farkas, Urban Lobbying. 73. Beer, “Adoption of General Revenue Sharing.” 74. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government, 100. 75. Samuel Beer cites a 1974 interview with Bernard Hillenbrand, the executive director of National Association of Counties, for these staffing figures. Beer does not explain where the 70 staff members “in the field” were located, but a table in the same article lists national associations and their affiliate groups. Presumably these 70 staff members worked for the various state or regional affiliates. Beer, “Adoption of General Revenue Sharing,” 168. 76. Ibid. 77. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government, 89. 78. Author interview with Daniel J. Evans. Page 228 →79. Kenneth C. Olson, “The Proliferation of State Executive Branch Associations” (Washington, DC: National Governors’ Conference, 1975), 7. 80. Arnold and Plant, Public Official Associations and State and Local Government, 81. 81. Jacqueline Calmes, “Jim Martin: The Governors’ Man,” Governing (November 1989): 64–68. 82. Author interview with Stephen B. Farber. 83. George Weeks, “A Statehouse Hall of Fame,” State Government 55, no. 3 (1982): 67–73. 84. Larry Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governor Transformed, 1950–1975 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978). 85. Daniel J. Evans, “Our Time Is Up,” Puget Soundings (WA), October 1966, available at http://depts.washington.edu/pbafsa/598-Aut05/readings/1966_our-time-is-up_10.jpg (accessed January 7, 2016); “Loner from Olympia,” Time, August 9, 1968. 86. Evans, “Our Time Is Up.” 87. Tom Wicker, “G.O.P. Governors Pictured by One of Them as National Leaders,” New York Times, May 27, 1966; Congressional Quarterly, Candidates 1968: The Public Records of Twenty-Five Americans Prominently Mentioned for the Presidency or Vice Presidency (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968). 88. “Governors’ Role in National Policy Growing,” Boston Globe, December 13, 1976. 89. Author interview with Stephen B. Farber. 90. Douglas Arnold explains how this dynamic affects interest group success in federal legislation. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 91. For more on the organizational maintenance concerns of interest group entrepreneurs, see R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups”; Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 92. B. Walker, “On the Record: NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach.” 93. The few Washington representatives who are in other buildings tend to be consultants who serve as a state’s liaison and work at the consulting firm’s office. Typically, these consultants are not handling a state as their sole client. 94. J. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America. 95. “Governors’ Role in National Policy Growing.” 96. National Governors Association, “NGA Timeline.” 97. National Governors Association and National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Consolidated Financial Report” (Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2009), 6. 98. David S. Broder, “Governors Face the Music,” Washington Post, February 21, 2010. 99. National Governors Association and National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Consolidated Financial Report,” 20; National Governors Association, “What Is NGA’s Corporate Fellows Program?,” http://www.nga.org/cms/home/about/faq/col2-content/main-content-list /g-what-is-ngas-corporate-fellows.html (accessed November 27, 2011). Page 229 →100. National Governors Association, “Plenary Session Transcripts from the 103rd Annual Meeting of the National Governors Association,” Salt Lake City, July 15–17, 2011.

101. Andrew Karch, Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion among the American States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 123. 102. National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Accelerating Progress: Using Health Information Technology and Electronic Health Information Exchange to Improve Care: First Annual Report and Recommendations from the State Alliance for E-Health” (Washington, DC: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2008), 13. 103. Ibid., 23–34. 104. National Governors Association, “Forty-Nine States and Territories Join Common Core Standards Initiative: NGA Center, CCSSO Convene State-Led Process to Develop Common English-Language Arts and Mathematics Standards” (Washington, DC: NGA, 2009). 105. Willona Sloan, “Coming to Terms with Common Core Standards,” InfoBrief (Alexandria, VA: ACSD [formerly the Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development], 2010). 106. Ibid. 107. National Governors Association and National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Consolidated Financial Report” (Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2010). 108. Richard F. Fenno Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). 109. Mark C. Rom, “The Family Support Act of 1988: Federalism, Developmental Policy, and Welfare Reform,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 58–60. 110. Calmes, “Jim Martin,” 65–66. 111. Stephen C. Fehr, “Ray Scheppach: Gubernatorial Guru Departs,” Stateline, March 30, 2011, http://stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=563090 (accessed December 13, 2011). 112. The NGA ranked 22nd on Fortune’s inaugural list in 1997. It then fell just off the Power 25 in 1998, ranking 26th, and rose significantly to 12th in 1999. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Washington’s Power 25,” Fortune, December 8, 1997, 144–49; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Follow the Money,” Fortune 140, no. 11 (1999). 113. Center for Responsive Politics, “Opensecrets.Org Opendata Database,” https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cands.php?cycle=2014 (accessed April 29, 2015). 114. Marc J. Hetherington, “Putting Polarization in Perspective,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 413–48. 115. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “On Party Polarization in Congress,” Daedalus 136, no. 3 (July 2007): 104–7. 116. B. Walker, “On the Record: NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach.” 117. Author interview with Raymond C. Scheppach, on April 20, 2011. 118. Rick Perry, “Texas State of the State Address” (Austin: Texas State Legislature, 2003). 119. Peter Hamby, “GOP-Led States Skipping Payments to Governors Association,”Page 230 → CNN Political Ticker blog, February 24, 2011, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/24/gop-ledstates-skipping-payments-to-governors-association/ (accessed May 23, 2012). 120. B. Walker, “On the Record: NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach.”

Chapter 4

1. State of Missouri Washington Office, “State of Missouri Federal Priorities 1998” (Washington, DC: State of Missouri, 1998). 2. State of Alaska Washington Office, “Governor Knowles’ Washington, D.C. Office,” State of Alaska, http://www.gov.state.ak.us/dc/dc.htm (accessed January 10, 1999). 3. Office of the Governor, “Texas Office of State-Federal Relations,” State of Texas, http://governor.state.tx.us/osfr/ (accessed November 20, 2012). 4. Texas Office of State-Federal Relations, “The Texas Office of State-Federal Relations: Our Mission and Goal,” Texas Office of State-Federal Relations, http://www.osfr.state.tx.us/Updated%20OSFR% 20Website%20Base/Mission2005.htm (accessed March 16, 2010). 5. Cingranelli, “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process.” 6. As Pelissero and England’s survey included liaisons for local governments and state and local

associations as well as state governments, I do not make many comparisons to their findings, but their findings are generally consistent with those from Cingranelli’s survey of just a few years earlier. Pelissero and England, “State and Local Governments’ Washington вЂReps.’” 7. John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury, The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 8. For a concise discussion of the relationship between organized interests and representative government, see Alan Rosenthal, Burdett A. Loomis, John R. Hibbing, and Karl T. Kurtz, Republic on Trial: The Case for Representative Democracy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), chap. 6, “How Special Are the Special Interests?” 9. Robert H. Salisbury and Kenneth A. Shepsle, “U. S. Congressman as Enterprise,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1981): 559–76. 10. Troy Ellis Smith, “When States Lobby” (PhD thesis, University at Albany, State University of New York, 1998). 11. National Governors Association Office of Management Consulting & Training, “The Governor’s Washington, D.C. Office” (Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2007). 12. Massachusetts House of Representatives, Governor’s Budget Recommendation, Fiscal Year 2009, House Bill 2. 13. Matt Viser, “Patrick Hints at Hike in Gas Tax,” Boston Globe, June 30, 2009. 14. Dexter, How Organizations Are Represented in Washington, 28–30. 15. PUBLIC LAW 106-399—OCT. 30, 2000. See also U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, “Steens Mountain: Legislation—CooperationPage 231 → Brings Protection to Steens Mountain,” http://www.blm.gov/or/districts/burns/recreation/steens-mtn.php (accessed November 29, 2012). 16. Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993). 17. Tony West, “The Equitable Escheatment Act Is Long Overdue,” Tucson Citizen, May 3, 1994. 18. “Dividend Bill Aimed at State Is Withdrawn,” New York Times, October 6, 1994; Government Accounting Office, “Escheat Rule Agreement” (Washington, DC: General Government Division, GAO, 1995). 19. This is a broadly accepted definition of earmarks, but various government and nongovernment organizations have different definitions. See Karen Kunz and Sean O’Leary, “The Importance of Federal Earmarks to State Coffers: An Examination of Distribution Trends Over the Decade,” Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management 24, no. 4 (2012): 579–608. 20. Citizens Against Government Waste, “2010 Congressional Pig Book Summary” (Washington, DC: Citizens Against Government Waste, 2011); Bob Sheckler, “Benefits of Federal Earmarks Obscured by High-Profile Abuses,” Seattle Times, July 29, 2008, http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion /2008078282_desmoinesop29.html (accessed June 10, 2013); Citizens Against Government Waste, “2010 Congressional Pig Book Summary”; Jonathan Rauch, “Earmarks Are a Model, Not a Menace,” National Journal, March 14, 2009: 15. 21. Citizens Against Government Waste, “Pork Trends, 1991–2010,” http://www.cagw.org/reports /pig-book/#trends (accessed May 1, 2010). 22. Joseph R. Marbach and J. Wesley Leckrone, “Intergovernmental Lobbying for the Passage of TEA21,” Publius 32, no. 1 (2002): 45–64. 23. Robert Jay Dilger, “Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 24. Surface Transportation Policy Project, “TEA-21 User’s Guide” (Washington, DC: Surface Transportation Policy Project, 1998), available at http://transact.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Tea21_Users_Guide.pdf (accessed January 8, 2016). 25. CNN Wire Staff, “Earmarks Get Ax from GOP Senators,” CNN Politics (November 17, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/16/lame.duck.congress/index.html (accessed June 10, 2013). 26. Sean Kennedy and Alexandra Booze, “2014 Congressional Pig Book Summary” (Washington, DC: Citizens Against Government Waste, 2014). 27. U.S. General Services Administration, “Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance” (Washington, DC: GSA, 2011).

28. Robert Jay Dilger, “Federal Grants-in-Aid: An Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues,” ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 2011). 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Institute of Food and Agriculture, “Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program (BRAG),” U.S. Department of Agriculture, http://www.nifa.usda.gov/fo/biotechnologyriskassessment.cfm (accessed December 8, 2011). 30. National Research Council, Statistical Issues in Allocating Funds by Formula: Panel on National Statistics (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003). Page 232 →31. Dan Melnick, “The Legislative Process and the Use of Indicators in Formula Allocations,” Journal of Official Statistics 18, no. 3 (2002): 353–69. 32. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “An Overview of Changes in the Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAPs) for Medicaid” (Washington, DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). 33. Hurricane Katrina ravaged Louisiana, and particularly New Orleans, when it struck in 2005. It caused over $108 billion in damages, more than three times more financially damaging than any other hurricane to hit the United States. Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina” (Miami: National Hurricane Center, 2005). 34. Chip L. Peterson, “Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP),” Report RL32950 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010). 35. Libby Perl, “The LIHEAP Formula: Legislative History and Current Law” (Washington, DC: Congessional Research Service, 2012). 36. Cingranelli, “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process.” 37. David L. Cingranelli, When State Governments Come to Washington (Binghamton: Center for Social Analysis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1982). 38. Pelissero and England, “State and Local Governments’ Washington вЂReps’”; Cingranelli, “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process.” 39. Grants.gov was created as part of the President’s 2002 Fiscal Year Management Agenda. Grants.gov, “About Grants.Gov,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, http://www.grants.gov/aboutgrants/about_grants_gov.jsp (accessed April 28, 2013). 40. Brenner, Measuring and Increasing Federal Funds to Your State. 41. Author interview with Eric Brenner, director of the Maryland governor’s grants office, and formerly of the Illinois office in Washington, on October 29, 2010. 42. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington. 43. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Follow the Money: State and Local Oversight of Stimulus Funding.” Testimony of Ray Scheppach, PhD., Executive Director, National Governors Association, April 23, 2009. 44. Nicholas Johnson, Iris J. Lav, and Elizabeth McNichol, “Funding for States in Economic Recovery Package Will Close Less Than Half of State Deficits” (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). 45. U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Follow the Money,” April 23, 2009. 46. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington; Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups. 47. Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 48. Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey, “Party Polarization and вЂConflict Extension’ in the American Electorate,” American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (October 2002): 786–802. 49. Nolan M. McCarty, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), esp. chaps. 2 and 6. Page 233 →50. Barbara Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), esp. 190–211. 51. Phil Galewitz, “State Medicaid Spending Skyrockets,” Kaiser Health News, October 27, 2011, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/october/27/state-medicaid-spending-increase.aspx (accessed January 5, 2012); The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, Data Source: Medicaid & CHIP, Medicaid Spending 2010 (2011). 52. Bradley W. Joondeph, “Federalism and Health Care Reform: Understanding the States’

Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Publius 41, no. 3 (July 2011): 447–70. 53. John Dinan, “Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Publius 41, no. 3 (2011): 395–420. 54. National Governors Association, “ARRA FMAP Extension,” letter signed by 47 governors of states and territories, February 22, 2010. Available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/ngaletters/executive-committee-letters/col2-content/main-content-list/title_february-22-20.html (accessed September 22, 2014). 55. Ibid. 56. Debra Miller and Jennifer Burnett, “Extension of Enhanced Medicaid Benefits to States (FMAP),” in Capitol Facts & Figures (Washington, DC: Council of State Governments, 2010). 57. Elazar, Exploring Federalism. 58. Bednar, Robust Federation, 68; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, Designing Federalism. 59. Bednar, Robust Federation, 78. 60. Bednar makes this point theoretically; Nugent provides many empirical examples including those of state lobbying operations. See Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism; Bednar, Robust Federation. 61. Bednar, Robust Federation, 104. Italics in the original. 62. Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988).

Chapter 5

1. Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy; J. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America. 2. National Governors’ Association Office of Management Services, “The Governor’s Washington Office” (Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1997). 3. Associated Press, “PR Firm Will Move Indiana into Future: Bayh Fulfills Campaign Promise to Cut Budget of Washington Office by $100,000,” Post-Tribune (IN), May 22, 1989, B2. 4. Associated Press, “Critics Hit Closing of State’s D.C. Office.” 5. National Governors Association Office of Management Consulting & Training, “Governor’s Washington, D.C. Office.” 6. Ibid. Page 234 →7. Ronald J. Hrebenar and Bryson B. Morgan, Lobbying in America: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2009), 29. 8. 527 groups, called this because they are organized under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, are tax-exempt entities used to funnel money to voter mobilization and issue advocacy. By ostensibly focusing on issues in media campaigns, and avoiding references to elections and electing (or defeating) candidates, they can avoid Federal Election Commission regulation and thus funnel great sums of “soft,” or unregulated, money to the electoral arena. 9. Leech, “Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups,” 45. 10. Ibid. 11. Marie Hojnacki, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech, “Advocacy Behavior and Conflict Expansion in Policy Debates,” annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28–31, 2008). 12. Durbin, Letter to Jennifer Jensen, July 13, 1999. Copy of file with the author. 13. Leech, “Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups,” 48. 14. Nixon, “Southern Governors’ Conference as a Pressure Group.” The Southern Growth Policies Board was another state association, supported by southern governors but separate from the Southern Governors’ Association, that established a Washington office and lobbied actively in the 1970s; it was subsequently subsumed by the Southern Governors’ Association. See Robert Jay Dilger, The Sunbelt/Snowbelt Controversy: The War over Federal Funds (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 52–62. 15. Jon C. Teaford, The Rise of the States: Evolution of American State Government (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 2002); Jon C. Teaford, “Governors and Economic Development,” in A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, ed. Ethan G. Sribnick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 16. Southern Governors’ Association, “History of the Southern Governors’ Association,” http://www.southerngovernors.org/AboutSGA/ShortHistory.aspx. Accessed November 15, 2011. 17. Western Governors’ Association, “2010 Annual Report” (Denver: Western Governors’ Association, 2010), 6–7. 18. Western Governors’ Association, “2014 Annual Report” (Denver: Western Governors’ Association, 2014), 14. 19. Southern Governors’ Association, “2011 Annual Report” (Washington, DC: Southern Governors’ Association, 2011). 20. Midwestern Governors Association, “2011 Annual Report” (Washington, DC: Midwestern Governors Association, 2011). 21. Ibid. 22. Letter from Governors Jim Douglas, David Paterson, and Jon Corzine on behalf of the Coalition of Northeastern Governors to U.S. congressional leadership, February 10, 2009, available at http://coneg.org /reports/correspondence/transportation/tr090210.pdf (accessed October 25, 2010). 23. 1989 dollars. 24. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “The History of Mutual Aid and EMAC,” http://www.emacweb.org/?321 (accessed August 21, 2011). 25. Western Governors University, “WGU’s First Fifteen Years: A Timeline,” Page 235 →Western Governors University, http://www.wgu.edu/about_WGU/timeline (accessed April 20, 2015). 26. William P. Browne, “Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain,” Journal of Politics 52, no. 2 (May 1990): 477–509. 27. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 138. Elazar saw sectionalism as a broader and more lasting force than regionalism, which he conceived as bringing states or portions of states together as a result of more immediate and fleeting interests. 28. “The Battle of Freight Rates,” Economist, June 2, 1945, 734. 29. Teaford, Rise of the States, 187; ibid. 30. “Half-Out of the Democrat’s Bag,” Economist, March 6, 1948. 31. Elazar, American Federalism, 20. 32. Brooks, When Governors Convene, 45. 33. “Governors Urge Widened Pensions: Western Group Asks Revision of the Policy Pertaining to Old Age Assistance,” New York Times, November 9, 1949, 33; N. L. Wilson, “Western States Solid for Silver: Conference of Governors Holds Its Recognition Will Aid the Country. Favor Sugar Bill, Too but Want No Restriction on Domestic Output—Public Domain Issues Vex.,” New York Times, March 25, 1934, 7; Lawrence E. Davies, “Army’s Fertilizer Is Sought by West: Governors’ Conference Asks 6,000 Tons a Month to Help Farming for World Use,” New York Times, April 24, 1948, 9. 34. Elazar, American Federalism, 112. 35. Ibid. 36. Raymond Hernandez and Al Baker, “Governors Join as вЂBig Four’ to Pool Clout,” New York Times, July 20, 2004, 8. 37. Ibid. 38. Bernard Aronson, ed., Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors’ View from the States (Washington, DC: Democratic Governors’ Association, 1984). 39. Eric M. Appleman, “Democratic Governors Association 2011,” Democracy in Action, http://www.p2012.org/parties/committees/dga11.html (accessed May 29, 2013). 40. Eric M. Appleman, “Republican Governors Association 2011,” Democracy in Action, http://www.p2012.org/parties/committees/rga11.html (accessed May 29, 2013). 41. Spencer MacColl, “Corporations Give Big to Both Sides,” Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/democrats-and-republicans-sharing-b.html (accessed November 10, 2013).

42. Peter H. Stone to the Center for Public Integrity, Politics blog, “The Republican Governors’ San Diego Schmooze,” November 19, 2010, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/11/19/2302/republicangovernors%E2%80%99-san-diego-schmooze (accessed May 29, 2013).

Chapter 6

1. Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Page 236 →2. Paul Merrion, “Guv Needs to Raise State’s Profile in Nation’s Capital,” Crain’s Chicago Business, July 21, 2003. 3. Peter Kinder, “The Looming Battle over 1.8%,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 29, 2003. 4. Josh Flory, “Senate Panel Argues over Governor’s Authority to Shift Money,” Southeast Missourian (Cape Girardeau, MO), April 14, 2004. 5. John Cauthorn, “Senator John Cauthorn Awards Golden Goose Egg Award to Governor Holden” (Jefferson City, MO: Office of Senator John Cauthorn, 2004). 6. Viser, “Patrick Hints at Hike in Gas Tax”; State House News Service, “House Rejects D.C. Office Cut,” State Capitol Briefs, April 28, 2009, archives.statehousenews.com (accessed August 19, 2013). 7. Kathleen Murphy, “States Lobby Congress for Federal Funds,” State Government News 45, no. 4 (April 1, 2002): 31. 8. Dan Morgan, “Byrd Drops Home-State Effort in Anger over Lobbyists’ Role: Home-State Project Loses Byrd’s Backing,” Washington Post, July 31, 1989. 9. One early report was a survey of state offices. National Governors’ Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis, “State-Federal Relations in the Governor’s Office” (Washington, DC: National Governors’ Conference, 1976). 10. James L. Martin, “Purposes and Functions: State of ________________ Office of State-Federal Relations,” 1978, Papers of James L. Martin, National Governors Association, Washington, DC. This document appears to be boilerplate for states to use in arguing for a Washington office. Its first paragraph reads, “The Office of State-Federal Relations should be authorized by state statute. A minimum staff would include a director, appointed by the Governor, two additional professional staff, and an administrative assistant. Offices should be maintained in the Hall of the States at 444 North Capitol Street in Washington, D.C. where the National Governors’ Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, various national associations of state administrative officials, and the liaison offices of twenty other states are located. Additional staff representing the State Department of Transportation, Economic Development, and Education should be co-located within the Governor’s office.” 11. See, for example, National Governors Association Office of Management Consulting & Training, “Governor’s Washington, D.C. Office”; National Governors’ Association Office of State Services, “The Governor’s Washington Office” (Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1991). 12. See, for example, National Governors’ Association Office of State Services, “NGA Assistance to Governors’ Washington Offices” (Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1995). 13. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1990). 14. Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups. 15. Murphy, “States Lobby Congress for Federal Funds.” 16. R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” 10. 17. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Richard Page 237 →L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, “To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 642–59; E. Nelson Swinerton, “Ambition and American State Executives,”

Midwest Journal of Political Science 12, no. 4 (1968): 538–49; Paul L. Hain, “Age, Ambitions, and Political Careers: The Middle-Age Crisis,” Western Political Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1974): 265–74. 18. Parris N. Glendening and Mavis Mann-Reeves, Pragmatic Federalism: An Intergovernmental View of American Government (Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers, 1977), 48. 19. Thad L. Beyle, “Enhancing Executive Leadership in the States,” State & Local Government Review 27, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 18–35; C. Dometrius Nelson, “Measuring Gubernatorial Power,” Journal of Politics 41, no. 2 (1979): 589–610; Thad L. Beyle, “The Governor’s Formal Powers: A View from the Governor’s Chair,” Public Administration Review 28, no. 6 (1968): 540–45. 20. Thad Beyle, “Governors: Elections, Powers, and Priorities,” in The Book of the States, ed. Council of State Governments (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 2002); Thad L. Beyle, “Governors,” in Politics in the American States, ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, 180–221 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983). 21. Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice, “Government Growth in the United States,” Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 (1985): 2–30; Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Support for this argument is not universal, however. See, for example, David Lowery and William D. Berry, “The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations,” American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1983): 665–94. 22. Peverill Squire, “Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures, ” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1992): 69–79; Peverill Squire, “Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1997): 417–32. 23. Cingranelli, “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process.” 24. Peverill Squire, “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (June 2007): 211–27; Christopher Z. Mooney, “Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices,” State and Local Government Review 26, no. 2 (1994): 70–78; Peverill Squire, The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States, 1619–2009 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012). 25. Margaret Robertson Ferguson, “Chief Executive Success in the Legislative Arena,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2003): 158–82; McCally Morehouse, “Legislative Party Voting for the Governor’s Program.” 26. Carl Klarner, “The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3, no. 3 (2003): 309–19. 27. Farkas, Urban Lobbying. 28. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington. 29. “The American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative Data File,” ed. Stanford University and the University of Michigan (2010). ANES Question VCF0604: “People have (1958, 1964: I’d like to talk about some of the) differentPage 238 → ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don’t refer to Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to government in general. We want to see how you feel about these ideas. (1996 and later: For example:) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time (not 1996: or only some of the time) (1996: or almost never)?” 30. William D. Berry, Evan Ringquist, Richard Fording, and Russell L. Hanson, “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (1998): 337–48; William D. Berry, Richard C. Fording, Evan J. Ringquist, Russell L. Hanson, and Carl E. Klarner, “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-Appraisal,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 10, no. 2 (June 2010): 117–35. 31. The exceptions were during the rounds of base closure list creation by the U.S. Base Realignment and Closure Commission; if states had military bases that were targeted for closing, then state offices lobbied actively. 32. James G. Coke and Steven R. Brown, “Public Attitudes about Land Use Policy and Their Impact on State Policy-Makers,” Publius 6, no. 1 (1976): 97–134. 33. U.S. Bureau of Land Management and U.S Forest Service grazing fees are applied in 11 states. U.S.

Forest Service grassland fees are applied in nine states. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Livestock Grazing: Federal Expenditures and Receipts Vary, Depending on the Agency and the Purpose of the Fee Charged” (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). 34. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). 35. David Lowery and Virginia Gray, “The Dominance of Institutions in Interest Representation: A Test of Seven Explanations,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (January 1998): 231–55. 36. General revenue sharing continued to cities until 1986. Bruce A. Wallin, From Revenue Sharing to Deficit Sharing: General Revenue Sharing and Cities, ed. Barry Rabe and John Tierney, American Governance and Public Policy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 6. 37. Leech et al., “Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and Interest Group Mobilization”; Gray and Lowery, Population Ecology of Interest Representation. 38. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 39. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 634–47. 40. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously: Time-SeriesCross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1260–88; Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Erratum: Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (1999): 978. 41. The asterisks in table 6.4 denote different degrees of statistical significance. Regression coefficients are marked with one asterisk if the model indicates that Page 239 →there is at least 90 percent confidence that the effect is not due to chance; two asterisks if this confidence is at least 95 percent; and three asterisks if this confidence is at least 99 percent.

Chapter 7

1. “His First Priority Is State’s Salaries, White Tells ALC,” Arkansas Gazette, November 6, 1980, 1A. 2. “White Declares Victory, Says Message Clear.” 3. Wayne I. Boucher, “State Washington Offices: Models for Arkansas?” (Little Rock: Arkansas Institute, 1993). 4. TVH-11.com, “Beebe: Arkansas Won’t Reopen Washington Office,” April 30, 2008. http://www.thv11.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=64890 (accessed July 25, 2012). 5. Adam Nossiter and David Barstow, “Charming and Aloof, Huckabee Changed State,” New York Times, December 22, 2007, A1. 6. For more on the conflict between the Sun Belt and the Snow Belt, see Dilger, Sunbelt/Snowbelt Controversy. 7. R. Salisbury, “Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.” 8. See, for example, John Kincaid, “A Proposal to Strengthen Federalism,” Journal of State Government 62, no. 1 (January–February 1989): 32–45; John Sununu, “The Spirit of Federalism: Restoring the Balance,” Journal of State Government 62, no. 1 (1989): 25–27; D. Walker, Rebirth of Federalism; John Dinan, “Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate of Recent Federalism Legislation in the U.S. Congress,” Publius 34, no. 3 (2004): 55–83. 9. As reported by the American Gas Association on its IRS Form 990 for 2011. 10. Peter Grier, “So Much Money, So Few Lobbyists in D.C.: How Does That Math Work?,” Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Wire /2012/0224/So-much-money-so-few-lobbyists-in-D.C.-How-does-that-math-work (accessed March 12, 2013). 11. Washington Representatives, ed. Valerie S. Sheridan, 38th ed., Fall 2010 (Bethesda, MD: Columbia Books, 2010).

Page 240 →Page 241 →

References “Alabama Governor Declines to Remain in National Group.” (Salt Lake City) Deseret News, May 22, 1997. “The American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative Data File.” Edited by Stanford University and the University of Michigan, 2010. Anderson, Gary M., and Robert D. Tollison. “Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933–1939.” Journal of Law and Economics 34, no. 1 (1991): 161–75. Anderson, Tania. “Hoosiers Get a Helping Hand.” (Northwest Indiana) Post-Tribune, December 25, 1999, A14. Appleman, Eric. “Democratic Governors Association 2011.” Democracy in Action, http://www.p2012.org /parties/committees/dga11.html. Accessed May 29, 2013. Appleman, Eric. “Republican Governors Association 2011.” Democracy in Action, http://www.p2012.org /parties/committees/rga11.html. Accessed May 29, 2013. Arnett, Elsa C. “Small Washington Office Relays State of Florida Affairs.” The News (Boca Raton, FL), 1996, 2A. Arnold, David S., and Jeremy F. Plant. Public Official Associations and State and Local Government. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994. Arnold, R. Douglas. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Aronson, Bernard, ed. Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors’ View from the States. Washington, DC: Democratic Governors’ Association, 1984. Associated Press. “Critics Hit Closing of State’s D.C. Office.” Post-Tribune (IN), July 31, 1989, B3. Associated Press. “PR Firm Will Move Indiana into Future: Bayh Fulfills Campaign Promise to Cut Budget of Washington Office by $100,000.” Post-Tribune (IN), May 22, 1989, B2. Baack, Ben, and Edward Ray. “The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States.” Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (1985): 369–75. Page 242 →“The Battle of Freight Rates.” Economist, June 2, 1945, 734. Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” Journal of Politics 63, no. 4 (November 2001): 1191–213. Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section

Data.” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 634–47. Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. “Erratum: Taking Time Seriously: Time-SeriesCross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (1999): 978. Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1260–88. Bednar, Jenna. The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Beer, Samuel H. “The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics.” Public Policy 24, no. 2 (Spring 1976): 127–95. Bensel, Richard Franklin. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Berry, William D., Richard C. Fording, Evan J. Ringquist, Russell L. Hanson, and Carl E. Klarner. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-Appraisal.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 10, no. 2 (June 2010): 117–35. Berry, William D., Evan Ringquist, Richard Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93.” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (1998): 337–48. Betts, Jack. “N.C. Washington Office May Be Key вЂEmbassy’.” Greensboro Daily News, September 10, 1977, B1. Beyer, Barry K. Thomas E. Dewey, 1937–1947: A Study in Political Leadership. New York: Garland Publishing, 1979. Beyle, Thad L. “The Cost of Becoming Governor.” State Government 56, no. 2 (1983): 74–84. Beyle, Thad L. “Enhancing Executive Leadership in the States.” State and Local Government Review 27, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 18–35. Beyle, Thad L. “Governors.” In Politics in the American States, edited by Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, 180–221. Boston: Little, Brown, 1983. Beyle, Thad. “Governors: Elections, Powers, and Priorities.” In The Book of the States, edited by the Council of State Governments, 135–44. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 2002. Page 243 →Beyle, Thad L. “The Governor’s Formal Powers: A View from the Governor’s Chair.” Public Administration Review 28, no. 6 (1968): 540–45. Beyle, Thad L., and Lynn R. Muchmore. “The Governor and the Public.” Chap. 5 In Being Governor: The View from the Office, edited by Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore. Duke Press Policy Studies, 52–66. Durham: Duke University Press, 1983. Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. “Follow the Money.” Fortune, December 6, 1999, 206–8. Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. “Washington’s Power 25.” Fortune, December 8, 1997, 144–49. Boucher, Wayne I. “State Washington Offices: Models for Arkansas?” Little Rock: Arkansas Institute,

1993. Bowman, Ann O’M., and Richard C. Kearney. The Resurgence of the States. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1986. Brenner, Eric. “The Illinois Federal Clearinghouse.” Washington, DC: Washington Office for the State of Illinois, 1999. Brenner, Eric. Measuring and Increasing Federal Funds to Your State: Findings and Recommendations from the Illinois Federal Clearinghouse Experience. Washington, DC: Center for Best Practices, National Governors Association, 2004. Broder, David S. “Gift-Bearing Governors Drop in on Eisenhowers.” New York Times, July 2, 1962. Broder, David S. “Governors Face the Music.” Washington Post, February 21, 2010. Broder, David S. “The Governors Seem out of the Mainstream.” New York Times, July 9, 1966. Brooks, Glenn E. When Governors Convene: The Governors’ Conference and National Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961. Browne, William P. “Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain.” Journal of Politics 52, no. 2 (May 1990): 477–509. Browne, William P., and Robert H. Salisbury. “Organized Spokesmen for Cities: Urban Interest Groups.” Chap. 14 in People and Politics in Urban Society, edited by Harlan Hahn, 255–78. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972. Burk, Kathleen. Britain, America, and the Sinews of War, 1914–1918. Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. Calmes, Jacqueline. “Jim Martin: The Governors’ Man.” Governing (November 1989): 64–68. Cammisa, Anne Marie. Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Carlson, Eugene. “State Lobbyists in Washington Emphasize вЂDamage Control’.” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1982. Cauthorn, John. “Senator John Cauthorn Awards Golden Goose Egg Award to Governor Holden.” Jefferson City, MO: Office of Senator John Cauthorn, 2004. Cavanaugh, Jack. “State Seeks Ways to Retain Manufacturing Companies.” New York Times, April 10, 1988. Center for Responsive Politics. “Opensecrets.Org Opendata Database.” https://www.opensecrets.org/527s /527cands.php?cycle=2014. Accessed April 29, 2015. Chan, Steve. “Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the ConversionPage 244 → of Swords into Plowshares.” Mershon International Studies Review 39, no. 1 (1995): 53–95. Chapman, Jeffrey I. “Wealth and Tax Systems.” Chap. 5 in The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems, edited by Michael A. Pagano and Robert Leonardi, 107–35. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Cigler, Beverly. “Not Just Another Special Interest: Intergovernmental Representation.” In Interest Group Politics, edited by Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, 131–53. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995.

Cingranelli, David L. “State Government Lobbies in the National Political Process.” State Government 56, no. 4 (1983): 122–27. Cingranelli, David L. When State Governments Come to Washington. Binghamton: Center for Social Analysis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1982. Citizens Against Government Waste. “2010 Congressional Pig Book Summary.” Washington, DC: Citizens Against Government Waste, 2011. Citizens Against Government Waste. “Pork Trends, 1991–2010.” Citizens Against Government Waste, http://www.cagw.org/reports/pig-book/#trends. Accessed May 1, 2010. Clarke, Susan E. “вЂThinking Federally’ from a Governance Perspective.” Chap. 3 in The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems, edited by Michael A. Pagano and Robert Leonardi, 55–85. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Clive, Alan. State of War: Michigan in World War II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979. CNN Wire Staff. “Earmarks Get Ax from GOP Senators.” CNN Politics, November 17, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/16/lame.duck.congress/index.html. Accessed June 10, 2013. Coke, James G., and Steven R. Brown. “Public Attitudes about Land Use Policy and Their Impact on State Policy-Makers.” Publius 6, no. 1 (1976): 97–134. Congressional Quarterly Inc. Candidates 1968: The Public Records of Twenty-Five Americans Prominently Mentioned for the Presidency or Vice Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968. Congressional Quarterly Service. Legislators and the Lobbyists. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968. Conlan, Timothy J. From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998. Conlan, Timothy J. New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988. “Connecticut Body Spreads War Work.” New York Times, October 19, 1942, 9. Connecticut State Archives. Hartford, CT. Cordes, Henry J. “Maurstad’s Role to Be D.C. Liaison: New Lieutenant Governor’s Job to Save on Lobbying Fees.” Omaha World-Herald, January 6, 1999. Couch, Jim F., and William F. Shughart, II. “New Deal Spending and the States: The Politics of Public Works.” In Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History, edited by Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse, and Robert M. Whaples, 105–22. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000. Council of State Governments. The Book of the States 1941–1942. Vol. 4. Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1941. Page 245 →Cross, Wilbur L. Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Davies, Lawrence E. “Army’s Fertilizer Is Sought by West: Governors’ Conference Asks 6,000 Tons a Month to Help Farming for World Use.” New York Times, April 24, 1948, 9. Day, John S. “Larrabee to Continue as Ambassador.” Bangor Daily News (ME), December 6–7, 1986,

11. Dexter, Lewis Anthony. How Organizations Are Represented in Washington. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. Dewey, Thomas E., Papers of. University of Rochester Library, Rochester, NY. Dilger, Robert Jay. “Federal Grants-in-Aid: An Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues.” Edited by Congressional Research Service. Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 2011. Dilger, Robert Jay. “Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. Dilger, Robert Jay. “Moving the Nation: Governors and the Development of American Transportation Policy.” Chap. 7 in A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, edited by Ethan G. Sribnick. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Dilger, Robert Jay. “The Study of American Federalism at the Turn of the Century.” State and Local Government Review 32, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 98–107. Dilger, Robert Jay. The Sunbelt/Snowbelt Controversy: The War over Federal Funds. New York: New York University Press, 1982. Dinan, John. “Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” Publius 41, no. 3 (2011): 395–420. Dinan, John. “Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate of Recent Federalism Legislation in the U.S. Congress.” Publius 34, no. 3 (2004): 55–83. “Dividend Bill Aimed at State Is Withdrawn.” New York Times, October 6, 1994. Douglas, Jim, David Paterson, and Jon Corzine. Letter sent on behalf of the Coalition of Northeastern Governors to the leadership of the U.S. congressional leadership, February 10, 2009. http://coneg.org/reports/correspondence /transportation/tr090210.pdf. Accessed October 25, 2010. Durbin, Richard J. Letter to Jennifer Jensen. July 13, 1999. Copy on file with the author. Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States. 3rd ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. Elazar, Daniel J. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987. Emergency Management Assistance Compact. “The History of Mutual Aid and EMAC.” http://www.emacweb.org/?321. Accessed August 21, 2011. Evans, Daniel J. Memo to the NGC Executive Committee from Governor Daniel J. Evans, Chairman, NGC Building Committee. Subject: “Building of the States.” June 30, 1976. Evans, Daniel J. “Our Time Is Up.” Puget Soundings (WA), October 1966, 5. Farber, Stephen B. “The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations: A View from the States.” Publius 13, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 33–38. Page 246 →Farkas, Suzanne. Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena. New York: New York University Press, 1971. Feeley, Malcolm, and Edward Rubin. Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.

Fehr, Stephen C. “Ray Scheppach: Gubernatorial Guru Departs.” Stateline, March 30, 2011, http://stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=563090. Accessed December 13, 2011. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. Ferguson, Margaret Robertson. “Chief Executive Success in the Legislative Arena.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2003): 158–82. Fermilab National Accelorator Laboratory. “The Creation of a Laboratory: Fermilab, the First Five Years, 1967–1972.” Batavia, IL, online exhibit, 1999. http://history.fnal.gov/exhibit/index.html. Accessed March 16, 2010. Filippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova. Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Flanagan, Richard M. . “Roosevelt, Mayors and the New Deal Regime: The Origins of Intergovernmental Lobbying and Administration.” Polity 31, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 415–50. “Floating Governors.” Economist, October 28, 1967, 398–401. Flory, Josh. “Senate Panel Argues over Governor’s Authority to Shift Money.” Southeast Missourian (Cape Girardeau), April 14, 2004. Fordham, Benjamin O. “Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I.” International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007): 277–310. Fowler, Linda L., and Robert D. McClure. Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. “To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition.” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 642–59. “Funds Given for Office in Washington: Governor’s Plan for State Development Headquarters Is Granted Total of $22,500.” Hartford Courant, March 2, 1944. Gais, Thomas L. “Federalism during the Obama Administration.” Paper presented at the annual conference of the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico, May 7, 2010. Galewitz, Phil. “State Medicaid Spending Skyrockets.” Kaiser Health News, October 27, 2011, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/october/27/state-medicaid-spending-increase.aspx. Accessed January 5, 2012. Gibbons, Roger. Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States. Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1981. Glendening, Parris N., and Mavis Mann-Reeves. Pragmatic Federalism: An Intergovernmental View of American Government. Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers, 1977. Gormley, William T., Jr. “Television Coverage of State Government.” Public Opinion Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1978): 354–59. Government Accounting Office. “Escheat Rule Agreement.” Edited by General Government Division. Washington, DC: GAO, 1995. “Governors Chart Plans for Parley.” New York Times, December 6, 1957.

Page 247 →Governors’ Conference. “Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Governors’ Conference.” Cleveland, June 6–10, 1964. Governors’ Conference. “Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Governors of the States of the Union.” Washington, DC, January 18–20, 1910. “Governors’ Role in National Policy Growing.” Boston Globe, December 13, 1976. “Governors Urge Widened Pensions: Western Group Asks Revision of the Policy Pertaining to Old Age Assistance.” New York Times, November 9, 1949, 33. Grants.gov. “About Grants.Gov.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, http://www.grants.gov /aboutgrants/about_grants_gov.jsp. Accessed April 28, 2013. Graves, W. Brooke. American State Government. 3rd ed. Boston: D.C. Heath, 1946. Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. “Interest Representation and Democratic Gridlock.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (November 1995): 531–52. Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Gregg, Katherine, Scott Mayerowitz, and Liz Anderson. “Carcieri Brings Washington Liaison Back as Policy Director.” Providence Journal (RI), January 17, 2005. Grier, Peter. “So Much Money, So Few Lobbyists in D.C.: How Does That Math Work?” Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Wire/2012/0224/Somuch-money-so-few-lobbyists-in-D.C.-How-does-that-math-work. Accessed March 12, 2013. Grodzins, Morton. The American System: A New View of Government in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Grodzins, Morton. “The Federal System.” Chap. 13 in American Federalism in Perspective, edited by Aaron Wildavsky, 256–77. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Grogan, Colleen M., and Vernon K. Smith. “From Charity Care to Medicaid: Governors, States, and the Transformation of American Health Care.” In A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, edited by Ethan G. Sribnick, 204–30. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Haider, Donald H. When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying. New York: Free Press, 1974. Hain, Paul L. “Age, Ambitions, and Political Careers: The Middle-Age Crisis.” Western Political Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1974): 265–74. “Half-Out of the Democrat’s Bag.” Economist, March 6, 1948, 379. Hamby, Peter. “GOP-Led States Skipping Payments to Governors Association.” PoliticalTicker.blogs.cnn.com. CNNPolitics.com, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2012. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Bantam Classic edition ed. New York: Bantam Books, [1787] 1982. Havel, James T. U.S. Presidential Candidates and the Elections: A Biographical and Historical Guide, vol. 2,: The Elections, 1789–1992. New York: MacMillan Library Reference USA, 1996.

Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. Herian, Mitchel N. Governing the States and the Nation: The Intergovernmental Policy Influence of the National Governors Association. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011. Page 248 →Hernandez, Raymond, and Al Baker. “Governors Join as вЂBig Four’ to Pool Clout.” New York Times, July 20, 2004, 8. Hetherington, Marc J. “Putting Polarization in Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 413–48. “Hired Lobbyists Seek Largess for States and Localities.” Washington Post, 1978, A10. “His First Priority Is State’s Salaries, White Tells ALC.” Arkansas Gazette, November 6, 1980, 1A. Hojnacki, Marie, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. “Advocacy Behavior and Conflict Expansion in Policy Debates.” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2008. Hooks, Gregory. Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991. Hooks, Gregory, and Leonard E. Bloomquist. “The Legacy of World War II for Regional Growth and Decline: The Cumulative Effects of Wartime Investments on U.S. Manufacturing, 1947–1972.” Social Forces 71, no. 2 (1992): 303–37. “The вЂHouse of Governors’.” Washington Post, November 27, 1910, E4. Hrebenar, Ronald J., and Bryson B. Morgan. Lobbying in America: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2009. Hughes, Charles E. “Governors’ Conferences, Their Scope and Purpose.” 1910. Ingalls, Robert P. Herbert H. Lehman and New York’s New Deal. New York: New York University Press, 1975. Jachim, Anton J. Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975. Jennings, M. Kent. “Political Trust and the Roots of Devolution.” Chap. 9 in Trust and Governance, edited by Valerie Braithwaite and Levi Margaret, 218–44. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998. Jensen, Jennifer M., and Jenna Kelkres Emery. “The First State Lobbyists: State Offices in Washington during World War II.” Journal of Policy History 23, no. 2 (2011): 117–49. Johnson, Nicholas, Iris J. Lav, and Elizabeth McNichol. “Funding for States in Economic Recovery Package Will Close Less Than Half of State Deficits.” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009. Joondeph, Bradley W. “Federalism and Health Care Reform: Understanding the States’ Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” Publius 41, no. 3 (July 2011): 447–70. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. “An Overview of Changes in the Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAPs) for Medicaid.” Washington, DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011. Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts. “Data Source: Medicaid & CHIP, Medicaid Spending 2010.”

Washington, DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011. Karch, Andrew. Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion among the American States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. Kennedy, David M. Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Page 249 →Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Kennedy, Sean, and Alexandra Booze. “2014 Congressional Pig Book Summary.” Washington, DC: Citizens Against Government Waste, 2014. “Kentucky to Open Grants Office in D.C.: State Wants to Be More Closely Attuned to Jingle in Uncle Sam’s Research Pockets.” Lexington (KY) Herald-Leader, July 31, 2001. Key, V.O. American State Politics: An Introduction. New York: Knopf, 1956. Key, V.O. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. 5th ed. New York: Crowell, 1964. Kincaid, John. “The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare.” New England Economic Review (May–June 1998): 13–40. Kincaid, John. “From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509, no. 1 (May 1990): 139–52. Kincaid, John. “A Proposal to Strengthen Federalism.” Journal of State Government 62, no. 1 (January–February 1989): 32–45. Kinder, Peter. “The Looming Battle over 1.8%.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 29, 2003. Klarner, Carl. “The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3, no. 3 (2003): 309–19. Knabb, Richard D., Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown. “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina.” Miami: National Hurricane Center, 2005. Koistinen, David. “Public Policies for Countering Deindustrialization in Postwar Massachusetts.” Journal of Policy History 18, no. 3 (2006): 326–61. Kolb, Adrienne, and Lillian Hoddeson. “A New Frontier in the Chicago Suburbs: Settling Fermilab, 1963–1972.” Illinois Historical Journal 88, no. 1 (1995): 2–18. Kunz, Karen, and Sean O’Leary. “The Importance of Federal Earmarks to State Coffers: An Examination of Distribution Trends Over the Decade.” Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial Management 24, no. 4 (2012): 579–608. Large, Arlen J. “Taming the Octopus: States, Weary of Being Bypassed, Open a Lobbying Office.” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1967, 6. Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. “Party Polarization and вЂConflict Extension’ in the American Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (October 2002): 786–802. Leech, Beth L. “Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups.” PhD thesis, Texas A&M University, 1998.

Leech, Beth, Frank Baumgartner, Timothy La Pira, and Nicholas Semanko. “Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and Interest Group Mobilization.” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2005): 19–30. Lehman, Herbert H., Papers of. Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library, New York, NY. Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom W. Rice. “Government Growth in the United States.” Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 (1985): 2–30. Littlewood, Thomas B. “What’s Wrong with Statehouse Coverage?” Columbia Journalism Review 10 (March–April 1972): 39–45. Page 250 →“Loner from Olympia.” Time, August 9, 1968, 16. Loomis, Burdett A. The New American Politician: Elected Entrepreneurs and the Changing Style of Political Life. New York: Basic Books, 1988. Lowery, David, and William D. Berry. “The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations.” American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1983): 665–94. Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. “The Dominance of Institutions in Interest Representation: A Test of Seven Explanations.” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (January 1998): 231–55. Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States.” American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 1–29. MacColl, Spencer. “Corporations Give Big to Both Sides.” Center for Responsive Politics, November 10, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/democrats-and-republicans-sharing-b.html. Accessed November 10, 2013. Marbach, Joseph R., and J. Wesley Leckrone. “Intergovernmental Lobbying for the Passage of TEA-21.” Publius 32, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 45–64. Martin, James L. “Purposes and Functions: State of ________________ Office of State-Federal Relations.” Draft National Governors Association document. 1978. Papers of James L. Martin. National Governors Association, Washington, DC. Copy on file with the author. Massachusetts House of Representatives. Governor’s Budget Recommendation, Fiscal Year 2009. House Bill 2. Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. McCarty, Nolan M. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. McElvaine, Robert S. The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941. New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993. McNichol, Dan. “Connecting the United States: Governors and the Building of the Interstate System.” Chap. 4 in A Legacy of Leadership: Governors and American History, edited by Clayton McClure Brooks, 85–106. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Melnick, Dan. “The Legislative Process and the Use of Indicators in Formula Allocations.” Journal of

Official Statistics 18, no. 3 (2002): 353–69. Merrion, Paul. “Guv Needs to Raise State’s Profile in Nation’s Capital.” Crain’s Chicago Business, July 21, 2003. Midwestern Governors Association. “2011 Annual Report.” Washington: Midwestern Governors Association, 2011. Miller, Debra, and Jennifer Burnett. “Extension of Enhanced Medicaid Benefits to States (FMAP).” In Capitol Facts & Figures, 2. Washington, DC: Council of State Governments, 2010. Moe, Terry M. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Mooney, Christopher Z. “Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices.” State and Local Government Review 26, no. 2 (1994): 70–78. Page 251 →Morehouse, Sarah M. “Money versus Party Effort: Nominating for Governor.” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (1990): 706–24. Morehouse, Sarah McCally. “Legislative Party Voting for the Governor’s Program.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1996): 359–81. Morgan, Dan. “Byrd Drops Home-State Effort in Anger over Lobbyists’ Role: Home-State Project Loses Byrd’s Backing.” Washington Post, July 31, 1989. Muchmore, Lynn R. “The Governor as Manager.” State Government 54, no. 3 (1981): 71–75. Murphy, Kathleen. “States Lobby Congress for Federal Funds.” State Government News 45, no. 4 (April 1, 2002): 31. Nagel, Robert F. The Implosion of American Federalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Nash, Gerald D. The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Nathan, Richard P. “The Role of the States in American Federalism.” In The State of the States, edited by Carl E. Van Horn, 15–32. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996. National Association of State Budget Officers. “State Expenditure Report: Examining 2012–2014 State Spending.” Washington, DC: National Association of State Budget Officers, 2014. National Governors Association. “Forty-Nine States and Territories Join Common Core Standards Initiative: NGA Center, CCSSO Convene State-Led Process to Develop Common English-Language Arts and Mathematics Standards.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2009. National Governors Association. “ARRA FMAP Extension.” Letter signed by 47 governors of states and territories, February 22, 2010. Available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-letters/executivecommittee-letters/col2-content/main-content-list/title_february-22-20.html. Accessed September 22, 2014. National Governors Association. “NGA Timeline.” National Governors Association, http://centennial.nga.org/cms/home/timeline/1900. Accessed November 20, 2011. National Governors Association. “Plenary Session Transcripts from the 103rd Annual Meeting of the National Governors Association.” Salt Lake City, July 15–17, 2011.

National Governors Association. “What Is NGA’s Corporate Fellows Program?” http://www.nga.org /cms/home/about/faq/col2-content/main-content-list/g-what-is-ngas-corporate-fellows.html. Accessed November 27, 2011. National Governors Association and National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. “Consolidated Financial Report.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2009. National Governors Association and National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. “Consolidated Financial Report.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2010. National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. “Accelerating Progress: Using Health Information Technology and Electronic Health Information Exchange to Improve Care; First Annual Report and Recommendations from Page 252 →the State Alliance for E-Health.” Washington, DC: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2008. National Governors Association Office of Management Consulting & Training. “The Governor’s Washington, D.C. Office.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2007. National Governors’ Association Office of Management Services. “The Governor’s Washington Office.” Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1997. National Governors’ Association Office of State Services. “The Governor’s Washington Office.” Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1991. National Governors’ Association Office of State Services. “NGA Assistance to Governors’ Washington Offices.” Washington, DC: National Governors’ Association, 1995. National Governors’ Conference. “Official Papers of the Special Interim Meeting of the National Governors’ Conference.” White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, December 16–17, 1966. National Governors’ Conference. “Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the National Governors’ Conference.” Minneapolis, July 25–29, 1965. National Governors’ Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis. “State-Federal Relations in the Governor’s Office.” Washington, DC: National Governors’ Conference, 1976. National Research Council. Statistical Issues in Allocating Funds by Formula: Panel on National Statistics. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003. Nelson, C. Dometrius. “Measuring Gubernatorial Power.” Journal of Politics 41, no. 2 (1979): 589–610. Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. 3rd ed. New York: Free Press, 1990. Nevins, Allan. Herbert H. Lehman and His Era. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963. “New Contracts Awarded for U.S. Blankets.” New York Herald Tribune, September 15, 1942. New York State Archives, Albany, NY. New York State Division of Commerce. “Division of Commerce Monthly Report of Defense Activities.” Albany: New York State Executive Department, May 1942. New York State Division of Commerce. “Monthly Report of War Activities, March 1943.” Albany: New York State Executive Department, 1943.

New York State Executive Department. “Annual Report of the Division of Commerce, 1941.” Division of Commerce. Albany: New York State Executive Department, 1941. New York State Executive Department. “New York at Work for Victory and the Future: Annual Report of the Division of Commerce.” Albany: Division of Commerce, 1942. New York State Executive Department. “New York Produces for Victory: Annual Report of the Division of Commerce, 1943.” Albany: Division of Commerce, 1943. New York State Red Book. Albany: Williams Press, 1941. New York State Red Book. Albany: Willliams Press, 1942. Page 253 →Nixon, H. C. “The Southern Governors’ Conference as a Pressure Group.” Journal of Politics 6, no. 3 (1944): 338–45. Nossiter, Adam, and David Barstow. “Charming and Aloof, Huckabee Changed State.” New York Times, December 22, 2007, A1. Nugent, John D. Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009. Office of the Governor. “Texas Office of State-Federal Relations.” State of Texas, http://governor.state.tx.us/osfr/. Accessed November 20, 2012. Olson, Kenneth C. “The Proliferation of State Executive Branch Associations: A Report for the National Governors’ Conference.” Washington, DC: National Governors’ Conference, 1975. Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. “Our Governors in Conference.” Washington Post, September 15, 1911, 6. Patterson, James T. The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Patterson, Samuel C. “Campaign Spending in Contests for Governor.” Western Political Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1982): 457–77. Pelissero, John P., and Robert E. England. “State and Local Governments’ Washington вЂReps’—Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan’s New Federalism.” State and Local Government Review 19, no. 2 (1987): 68–72. Pensoneau, Taylor. Governor Richard Ogilvie: In the Interest of the State. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997. Perl, Libby. “The LIHEAP Formula: Legislative History and Current Law.” Washington, DC: Congessional Research Service, 2012. Perlez, Jane. “City and State Lobbyists Vie for Dwindling Federal Aid.” New York Times, October 24, 1983, B1. Perry, Rick. “Texas State of the State Address.” Austin: Texas State Legislature, 2003. Peterson, Chip L. “Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).” Report RL-32950. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010.

Pinsky, David. “Defense Contracts and the Connecticut Economy.” Storrs: Labor Education Center of the University of Connecticut, 1982. “Political Rites.” Economist, August 27, 1955, 695–96. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “On Party Polarization in Congress.” Daedalus 136, no. 3 (July 2007): 104–7. Posner, Paul L. The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism? Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998. Prendergast, Albert J. Not a Ship of Fools: The Incredible Voyage of the SS Independence. Mustang, OK: Tate Publishing, 2009. Prewitt, Kenneth. The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1970. Pursley, Garrick B. “The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism.” Emory Law Journal 63, no. 3 (2014): 781–855. Radin, Beryl A. “California in Washington: California Public Organizations in the Nation’s Capital.” In California Policy Choices, edited by John J. Kirlin and Donald R. Winkler, 279–300. Los Angeles: University of Southern California School of Public Administration, 1990. Page 254 →Ransone, Coleman B., Jr. The Office of the Governor in the United States. University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1956. Rauch, Jonathan. “Earmarks Are a Model, Not a Menace.” National Journal (March 14, 2009): 15. Reeves, Frank. “Ridge’s Right Arm in D.C.: Rebecca Halkias Keeps a Close Watch on State Interests.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 15, 1998, B1. Rich, Spencer. “Hired Lobbyists Seek Largess for States and Localities.” Washington Post, February 26, 1978, 10. Riker, William H. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. Rom, Mark C. “The Family Support Act of 1988: Federalism, Developmental Policy, and Welfare Reform.” Publius 19, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 57–73. Rosenthal, Alan, Burdett A. Loomis, John R. Hibbing, and Karl T. Kurtz. Republic on Trial: The Case for Representative Democracy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003. Roth, Matthew. Connecticut: An Inventory of Historic Engineering and Industrial Sites. Washington, DC: Society for Industrial Archeology, 1981. Rudowitz, Robin, Samantha Artiga, and MaryBeth Musumeci. “The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers.” Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015. Sabato, Larry. Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governor Transformed, 1950–1975. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978. Salisbury, Bill. “State Lobbyist Scores High in D.C.” St. Paul Pioneer Press, October 9, 1995, 1C. Salisbury, Robert H. “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (1969): 1–32.

Salisbury, Robert H. “Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (1984): 64–76. Salisbury, Robert H., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. “U. S. Congressman as Enterprise.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1981): 559–76. Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. “Sarah Sibley Taking Ohio Capital Office in Brand New Directions.” Greenville Daily Advocate, July 13, 1983. Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Schlesinger, Joseph A. How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870–1950. East Lansing: Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957. Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Sheckler, Bob. “Benefits of Federal Earmarks Obscured by High-Profile Abuses.” Seattle Times, July 29, 2008, http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2008078282_desmoinesop29.html. Accessed June 10, 2013. Shesgreen, Deirdre. “Connecticut’s New DC Lobbyist Plans to вЂRamp up’ State’s Presence.” Connecticut Mirror, March 3, 2011, http://www.ctmirror.org/story/11730/desimone. Accessed May 10, 2011. Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. Page 255 →Sloan, Willona. “Coming to Terms with Common Core Standards.” InfoBrief. Alexandria, VA: ACSD (formerly the Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development), 2010. Smith, Richard N. Thomas E. Dewey and His Times. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. Smith, Troy Ellis. “When States Lobby.” PhD thesis, University at Albany, State University of New York, 1998. Southern Governors’ Association. “2011 Annual Report.” Washington, DC: Southern Governors’ Association, 2011. Southern Governors’ Association. “History of the Southern Governors’ Association.” http://www.southerngovernors.org/AboutSGA/ShortHistory.aspx. Accessed November 15, 2011. Squire, Peverill. “Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1997): 417–32. Squire, Peverill. The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States, 1619–2009. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012. Squire, Peverill. “Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1992): 69–79. Squire, Peverill. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (June 2007): 211–27.

Stanfield, Rochelle L. “The PIGs: Out of the Sty, into Lobbying with Style.” National Journal 8, no. 33 (1976): 1134–39. State House News Service. “House Rejects D.C. Office Cut.” State Capitol Briefs, April 28, 2009, archives at http://www.statehousenews.com. Accessed August 19, 2013. State of Alaska Washington Office. “Governor Knowles’ Washington, D.C. Office.” State of Alaska, http://www.gov.state.ak.us/dc/dc.htm. Accessed January 10, 1999. State of Missouri Washington Office. “State of Missouri Federal Priorities 1998.” Washington, DC: State of Missouri, 1998. State Services Organization. “Tenant List.” State Services Organization, http://www.sso.org/? page_id=31&sn=home. Accessed March 17, 2012. Stone, Peter H. “The Republican Governors’ San Diego Schmooze.” Center for Public Integrity “Politics” blog. November 19, 2010. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/11/19/2302/republicangovernors%E2%80%99-san-diego-schmooze. Accessed May 29, 2013. Sununu, John. “The Spirit of Federalism: Restoring the Balance.” Journal of State Government 62 (1989): 25–27. Surface Transportation Policy Project. “TEA-21 User’s Guide.” Washington, DC: Surface Transportation Policy Project, 1998. http://transact.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Tea-21_Users_Guide.pdf. Accessed January 8, 2016. Swinerton, E. Nelson. “Ambition and American State Executives.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 12, no. 4 (November 1968): 538–49. Teaford, Jon C. “Governors and Economic Development.” Chap. 4 in A Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, edited by Ethan G. Sribnick, 107–23. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Page 256 →Teaford, Jon C. The Rise of the States: Evolution of American State Government. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. Texas Office of State-Federal Relations. “The Texas Office of State-Federal Relations: Our Mission and Goal.” Texas Office of State-Federal Relations, http://www.osfr.state.tx.us/Updated%20OSFR%20Website% 20Base/Mission2005.htm. Accessed March 16, 2010. Tolchin, Martin. “Fiscal Crises Keep Official Lobbyists Busy.” New York Times, June 22, 1976. Trost, Cathy. “States’ Lobbyists Want Bucks to Stop at Home.” USA Today, January 7, 1983. Trubowitz, Peter. Defining the National Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Truman, David B. “Federalism and the Party System.” Chap. 5 in American Federalism in Perspective, edited by Aaron Wildavsky, 81–109. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Truman, David B. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1951] 1981. Tufte, Edward R. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. TVH-11.com. “Beebe: Arkansas Won’t Reopen Washington Office.” April 30, 2008. http://www.thv11.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=64890. Accessed July 25, 2012.

Udell, Jerry G. “The Governor’s Ambassador: A New Concept in the Representation of State Interests at the Federal Level.” Research paper for Seminar in American Government, American University, 1966. Copy on file with the author. United States Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. “Military Prime Contract Awards by State: Fiscal Years 1951 to 1983.” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1984. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. “ACIR Ninth Annual Report.” Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1968. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. “The Question of State Government Capability.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985. U.S. Census Bureau. “Statistical Abstract of the United States.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. U.S. Census Bureau. “Statistical Abstract of the United States.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. U.S. Conference of Mayors. “About the U.S. Conference of Mayors.” http://usmayors.org/about /overview.asp. Accessed May 28, 2012. U.S. Department of Agriculture. National Institute of Food and Agriculture. “Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program (BRAG).” U.S. Department of Agriculture, http://www.nifa.usda.gov/fo /biotechnologyriskassessment.cfm. Accessed December 8, 2011. U.S. Department of Commerce. “Census of Manufactures: 1939.” Edited by Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940. Page 257 →U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management. “Steens Mountain: Legislation—Cooperation Brings Protection to Steens Mountain.” http://www.blm.gov/or/districts/burns /recreation/steens-mtn.php. Accessed November 29, 2012. U.S. General Accounting Office. “Livestock Grazing: Federal Expenditures and Receipts Vary, Depending on the Agency and the Purpose of the Fee Charged.” Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005. U.S. General Services Administration. “Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.” Washington, DC: U.S. General Services Administration, 2011. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. “Budget of the United States Government, 1970—Appendix.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Bureau of the Budget. “Budget of the United States Government, 1970.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. “Follow the Money: State and Local Oversight of Stimulus Funding.” Testimony of Ray Scheppach, Ph.D., Executive Director, National Governors Association. April 23, 2009. Van Dusen, Albert E. Connecticut. New York: Random House, 1961. Van Wagoner, Murray D. “Operating the Tool Shop of America.” Vital Speeches of America 8, no. 21 (1942): 662.

Viser, Matt. “Patrick Hints at Hike in Gas Tax.” Boston Globe, June 30, 2009. Wald, Matthew L. “Lobbying for Connecticut on Capitol Hill.” New York Times, May 7, 1978, CN 21. Walker, Blair S. “On the Record: NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach.” Stateline. Washington, DC: Pew Center on the States, 2000. http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action? siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=14078. Accessed 2009. Walker, David B. The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995. Walker, David B. Toward a Functioning Federalism. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1981. Walker, Jack L. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. Wallin, Bruce A. From Revenue Sharing to Deficit Sharing: General Revenue Sharing and Cities. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998. Wallis, John Joseph. “The Birth of the Old Federalism: Financing the New Deal, 1932–1940.” Journal of Economic History 44, no. 1 (1984): 139–59. Wallis, John Joseph, and Wallace E. Oates. “The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism.” In The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, edited by Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White, 155–80. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Washington Representatives. 2000. Edited by J. Valerie Steele. Washington, DC: Columbia Books, 2000. Page 258 →Washington Representatives. Fall 2010. Edited by Valerie S. Sheridan. 38th ed. Bethesda, MD: Columbia Books, 2010. Weaver, Warren, Jr. “The Governors Try Not to Rock the Boat for 1968.” New York Times, October 22, 1967. Wechsler, Herbert. “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government.” Columbia Law Review 54, no. 4 (April 1954): 543–60. Weeks, George. “A Statehouse Hall of Fame.” State Government 55, no. 3 (Fall 1982): 67–73. Weinburg, Steve. “The $120,000 Watch on Washington.” Illinois Observer (October–November 1975): 23–24, 38. Weissert, Carol S. “The National Governors’ Association: 1908–1983.” State Government 56, no. 2 (1983): 44–52. West, Tony. “The Equitable Escheatment Act Is Long Overdue.” Tucson Citizen, May 3, 1994. Western Governors’ Association. “2010 Annual Report.” Denver: Western Governors’ Association, 2010. Western Governors’ Association. “2014 Annual Report.” Denver: Western Governors’ Association, 2014. Western Governors University. “WGU’s First Fifteen Years: A Timeline.” Western Governors University, http://www.wgu.edu/about_WGU/timeline. Accessed April 20, 2015. Westfall, Catherine, and Lillian Hoddeson. “Thinking Small in Big Science: The Founding of Fermilab,

1960–1972.” Technology and Culture 37, no. 3 (1996): 457–92. White, David O. “Robert Augustine Hurley: Governor of Connecticut, 1941–1943.” Connecticut State Library, http://www.cslib.org/gov/hurley.htm. Accessed June 6, 2008. “White Declares Victory, Says Message Clear.” Arkansas Gazette, November 6, 1980, 1A. Wicker, Tom. “G.O.P. Governors Pictured by One of Them as National Leaders.” New York Times, May 27, 1966. Wildavsky, Aaron. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. 4th ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. Williams, Shirley, and Edward L. Lascher, Jr., eds. Ambition and Beyond: Career Paths of American Politicians. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1993. Williamson, Richard S. “The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations.” Publius 13, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 11–32. Wilson, Mark R. The Business of War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Wilson, N. L. “Western States Solid for Silver: Conference of Governors Holds Its Recognition Will Aid the Country. Favor Sugar Bill, Too but Want No Restriction on Domestic Output—Public Domain Issues Vex.” New York Times, March 25, 1934, 7. Wright, Deil S. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. 3rd ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988. Page 259 →Wright, Gavin. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis.” Review of Economics and Statistics 56, no. 1 (1974): 30–38. Yagodich, Dorothy. “Former Valley Resident Serving as Governor’s Sentinel inside Beltway.” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, April 19, 1998. Zimmerman, Joseph F. Congressional Preemption: Regulatory Federalism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Zimmerman, Joseph F. Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power. New York: Praeger, 1992.

Page 260 →Page 261 →

Index Note: Page numbers in italics refer to figures and tables. 10th Amendment, 2 17th Amendment, 2, 114 99th Congress, 25 104th Congress, 107, 126, 185 105th Congress, 100, 108, 112, 115–16, 118–19, 127, 172 109th Congress, 119 111th Congress, 100, 106, 109, 112, 116, 119, 126, 127–28, 145–46, 152 527 organizations, 31, 159, 234n8 A.A. Walker & Co., 41 actors, individual, 79–80, 178, 200–201. See also entrepreneurs Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 51–52 Aeronautical Development Commission, 49 Affordable Care Act, 7, 129, 152, 161 Agnew, Spiro, 34 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 72, 122, 128 Alaska: health care, 151; opportunism, 121, 132; Washington office, 99, 141 ambition, political, 24, 56, 61, 180–81, 187, 198–200 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (formerly American Association of State Highway Officers), 75, 156 American Gas Association, 209 American Municipal Association, 77 American National Election Study, 23, 182, 238n29 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 7, 125–26, 129–30, 131, 149 American Society for Public Administration, 78 Andrus, Cecil, 73 anti-Washington attitudes, 5, 23, 26, 94, 107–8, 182, 196, 207; among Republicans, 92, 194; in WGA, 154. See also political culture

Arkansas, 197–99, 201, 204 Arnold, David, 12, 59, 71, 214n13 Baker v. Carr, 76 Baldwin, Raymond, 43, 49, 50–51, 61, 75 Bane, Frank, 79 Barbour, Haley, 160, 179n Baumgartner, Frank, 30, 76, 127, 214n12 Bayh, Evan, 138 Bednar, Jenna, 20, 24, 28, 32, 132 Beebe, Mike, 199 Beer, Samuel H., 58–59 Page 262 →Bell, Elliott V., 221n50 Bentsen, Lloyd, 78 Berry, Jeffrey, 214n12 best practices research, 83–85, 94, 158–59 Beyle, Thad, 181 Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program, 120 bipartisanship, 29; of consulting firms, 138; during electoral campaigns, 106; of NGA, 91–93, 159, 206–7, 210; in state lobbying offices, 208–9 Blagojevich, Rod, 166 Boehner, John, 92 Boston Globe, 83 Branstad, Terry, 154 Breathitt, Linda, 143 Brenner, Eric, 124–25 Broder, David, 66 Brooks, Glenn, 63, 66; When Governors Convene, 8 Brown, Jerry, 74 Brown, Pat, 74 budgets: federal, 49, 202–3 (see also federal funds); state, 175–77, 183–84, 189, 199, 203

Bumpers, Dale, 199 Bush, George H. W., 89, 142 Bush, Jeb, 157 business trade associations, 8, 31, 139, 140 Byrd, Robert, 167–68 California: coalitions, 156–57; influence of, 110; Washington office, 34, 51–52, 76, 110, 195 Cammisa, Anne Marie, 127, 214n13 campaign finance law, 31 campaigns. See electoral campaigns; presidential campaigns Campbell, Carroll, 150 Capitol Hill area, 73–74 Carey, Hugh, 142 Carper, Tom, 90 Carsey, Thomas, 128 Carter, Jimmy, 74, 142 Cassidy and Associates, 138, 167 Castle, Mike, 89 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, 120 Cauthorn, John, 166 Center for Best Practices (NGA), 83–85, 94 Center for Policy Research and Analysis (NGA), 71, 83 centralization, 19, 25 Chapman, Jeffrey, 26 Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 7. See also State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Chiles, Lawton, 150 Cingranelli, David, 11, 101, 103n, 109, 123, 181, 230n6 cities: and coalitions, 156; competition for funding, 58–59, 76–77, 182, 206; general revenue sharing, 238n36. See also U.S. Conference of Mayors citizen ideology, 183, 192, 196, 204

Citizens Against Government Waste, 119 civil rights, 65, 153 Civil War, 22, 46 Clinton, Bill: as Arkansas governor, 89, 197–99, 204; as president, 88, 90, 108, 125, 143 Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG), 74, 146–49, 151–52 coalitions, 109–10, 151–52, 155–57, 162 college/university offices, 97–98 Committee on Federal-State Relations, 68 Common Core State Standards Initiative, 85 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 88 Conlan, Timothy, 24 Connally, John, 71 Connecticut: industrial base, 46–48; professionalism and capacity, 44–46; war contracts, 42–44, 46–48, 221n57; Washington office, 14, 34–35, 42–46, 60 Connecticut Department of Public Works, 48 Connecticut Development Commission, 43–44 Connecticut State Development Commission, 49 Connecticut War Industries Commission, 42–43, 46 Page 263 →consensus, 31, 150, 212; in NGA, 83–84, 93, 206; in partisan associations, 90, 92 conservatives, 92–93, 183, 192, 195, 207 consulting firms: bipartisanship, 138; staffing state lobbying offices, 136–39, 208, 228n93 context, importance of, 4–5, 57–59, 64, 178, 195, 200, 202–3 cooperative federalism, 14, 36–37, 75 Corcoran, Thomas G. (“Tommy the Cork”), 55 Corcoran, Thomas J., 54–56, 142 Corporate Affiliates Program (SGA), 148 Corporate Fellows Program (NGA), 83–84 corporations: business trade associations, 8, 31, 140; partisan contributions, 160–61 Corzine, Jon, 149 Council of Great Lakes Governors, 147, 152

Council of State Governments (CSG), 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 148–49 counties, 156. See also National Association of Counties Cross, Wilbur, 48 culture, 200; of federalism, 5, 22–23, 205; of state affinity, 22–23. See also political culture Daley, Richard J., 55–56 Davis, Jeannemarie Devolites, 141 Dean, Howard, 90 defense contracts, 38–50, 221n57, 222n73 Delaware, 115, 132 Delaware v. New York, 115 Democratic Governors Association (DGA), 90–91, 141, 158–63; best practices research, 158–59; campaign fundraising, 159–61; as interest group, 135. See also partisan associations Democrats: governors, 181, 187; opposition to mandates, 116–17. See also partisanship Dewey, Thomas E., 40–41, 46, 50, 61, 65, 66, 200 Dexter, Lewis Anthony, 214n12 Dilger, Robert Jay, 27 Dinan, John, 129 disaster funding and policy, 121, 150, 232n33 divided government, 87–89, 182 Douglas, Jim, 149 dual federalism, 27, 35 dual-organization structure, 83, 149 dues, association, 4–5, 32, 78–79, 203, 206; NGA, 81, 86, 93, 94; regional associations, 147–49 Durbin, Richard, 143 earmarks, 116, 117–20, 167–68, 203, 231n19 economic context, 4–5, 8, 57, 178; 1920s to 1940s, 36–38, 44, 46–49; 2000s, 87, 125, 127; economic diversity (manufacturing), 184, 192; recessions, 7, 130, 172, 175, 183, 199; state economic health, 175–77, 183–84, 189, 199, 203. See also Great Depression; Great Society programs; New Deal economic development lobbying, 53–54, 66, 127, 130, 146, 151, 153 Economic Opportunity Act, 76 economic stimulus package (2008), 127, 129

Economist, 66 Edgar, Jim, 154 education, 35–36; federal standards, 85, 127 Eisenhower, Dwight, 65, 66 Elazar, Daniel, 19–21, 26, 29, 131, 152–54, 235n27 electoral campaigns: and 527 groups, 31, 159, 234n8; bipartisan relationships during, 106; and campaign finance law, 31; financing, 16, 23, 90, 141, 159–61; and partisan associations, 16, 23, 90, 159–61; and political parties, 217n32; political risk and attacks, 166–68, 197–98, 204. See also presidential campaigns Electoral College, 2 Elementary and Secondary Education Act. See No Child Left Behind Act Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 149–50 encroachment, 21, 26, 28, 35, 61, 132 energy issues, 122, 127, 149, 151 England, Robert, 101, 123, 230n6 Page 264 →Engler, John, 154 entrepreneurs, interest group: governors as, 14, 35, 59–61, 178, 194, 203–4; role of, 4 environmental issues, 80 Equitable Escheatment Act, 115 ethanol, 150–51 Evans, Daniel J., 11, 70–73, 78, 79–82, 203 event history analysis, 164, 179, 186 exchange theory of interests, 4, 60, 203 Family Support Act, 88 Farber, Steve, 72, 79, 93 Farkas, Suzanne, 77, 214n13 Feather Pillow Company of Long Island, 38–39 Federal Aid Highway Act (1956), 51, 65–66 Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), 37 federal executive agencies, lobbyists’ contact with, 108–9 federal funds: changes in, 125–27, 199, 202–3; discretionary (competitive) grants, 116, 122–25, 131; grant-in-aid formulas, 116, 120–22; grants database, 124; increase in, 35–38, 54–56, 75–76,

184–85; line-item appropriations (earmarks), 116, 117–20, 167–68, 203, 231n19; lobbying efforts, 6–8, 14, 58, 61, 116–27, 205–6; military spending, 38–50, 221n57, 222n73; procurement grants, 124–25; swap, 72; turnback, 72; war contracts, 38–50, 221n57 federal government: budget, 49, 202–3; capacity of, 24–25; encroachment, 21, 26, 28, 35, 61, 132; expansion of, 22–24, 38; hostility toward, 5, 23, 26, 92, 94, 107–8, 154, 182, 194, 196, 207; mandates, 25, 114, 116–17; national policy agenda, 87–88; preemptions of state standards, 25; regulations, 25, 39, 217n24; size of, 21, 26, 35, 181 federalism: cooperative, 14, 36–37, 75; culture of, 5, 22–23, 205 (see also political culture); dual, 27, 35; federal balance, 8, 20–21, 24, 27, 35, 211; ideological orientation toward, 19–20; metaphors for, 21; as a process, 131–32. See also fiscal federalism; political safeguards of federalism federalism puzzle, 2–3, 200 Federalist Papers, 18–22 Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), 121, 126, 129–30, 131 Federation of Rocky Mountain States, 146 Feeley, Malcolm, 26, 28 Fermilab, 54, 201 Filippov, Mikhail, 21, 24 fiscal federalism, 37, 59, 62, 75, 116, 195. See also federal funds Flippo, Ronnie, 142 Florida: coalitions, 156–57; hurricanes, 150; military spending, 47; support for NGA, 93; Washington office, 34, 137 FMAP. See Federal Medical Assistance Percentage food stamps, 115–16 Ford, Gerald, 92 Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial Income, 157 founders, 2–3 free riding, 32, 195 Frist, Bill, 157 Gearan, Mark, 142 Gingrich, Newt, 89 Glendening, Parris, 181 Governing the States and the Nation (Herian), 9 governors: age of, 180, 187, 189, 194; ambition, 180–81, 187, 198–200; anti-Washington attitudes,

107–8; campaigns (see electoral campaigns); characteristics and interests of, 48–51, 180–81, 187, 189, 194, 203–4; commitment to NGA, 89–90, 94–95, 206, 209–10; complaints about NGA, 91–94; congressional experience, 180, 187, 189, 194; contact with Washington politicians, 3, 29–30, 71, 105–7, 206; discretionary funding, 136; fiscal responsibility, 113; as individual political actors, 79–80, 178, 200–201; institutional powers of, 181, 187, 203; as managers, 28; party identification,Page 265 → 105–7, 181, 194, 196; political advancement, 60–61, 169, 171; political prestige, 169–72, 198; running for president, 180, 187, 189, 194, 198–99; salaries, 45; serving as NGA chair, 180–81, 187, 189, 194, 198; staff size, 45; visibility, 169–72, 198. See also state lobbying offices governors associations: activities, 205; coalitions, 155–57, 162; effectiveness, 161–63, 207–11, 208–10; need for, 1–2, 200–205; as organized interests, 15, 134–35; press releases, 141; proliferation of, 5, 15, 200–201; public awareness of, 17–18; shortcomings of, 30–32; use of term, 12. See also National Governors Association (NGA); partisan associations; regional associations; specific associations Governors’ Conference, 8, 13, 35, 63–67. See also National Governors Association (NGA) governors’ lobbyists, 1–2; roles of, 140; use of term, 12–13. See also governors associations; state lobbying offices Grace, C. J., Jr., 41 grant-in-aid formulas, 36, 116, 120–22 grants: discretionary (competitive), 116, 122–25, 131; procurement, 124–25 Grants.gov website, 124, 232n39 grant writers, 123 Grassley, Charles, 157 Gray, Virginia, 57, 184 grazing, on federal land, 183, 192, 238n33 Great Depression, 36, 46–47, 49–50 Great Society programs, 14, 51, 58–59, 76, 172, 184 Gregg, Kenneth, 44 Grodzins, Morton, 20 gross domestic product (GDP), 37 Gruening, Ernest, 67 gubernatorial campaigns. See electoral campaigns Guy, Bill, 71 Haggerty, James C., 46 Haider, Donald, 55, 58, 76, 127, 214n13 Haley, Nikki, 93

Hall of the States: coalitions, 155; college/university offices, 97–98; formation of, 14, 73–75, 199; and NGA expansion, 81–83; public official associations, 96, 98; state government-related offices, 95–98; state lobbying offices in, 74, 95–97, 99, 131, 136, 137 Hartford Courant, 42, 43 Hastert, Dennis, 157 Hatfield, Mark, 68 health care: electronic patient records, 84–85; lobbying, 127, 129–30; policy knowledge, 145; and regional associations, 151–52; spending, 6–7. See also Medicaid Heinz, John, 92 Herian, Mitchel, 9 Highway Trust Fund, 118 Hoff, Philip, 68 Hojnacki, Marie, 214n12 Holden, Bob, 166–67 Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP), 122, 151. See also Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) Hooke, Harvey, 42–43 Hoover, Herbert, 36 Hopkins, Harry, 37, 49 “House of Governors,” 63–64 Hrebenar, Ronald, 140 Huckabee, Mike, 198–99 HUD (Housing and Urban Development), 76, 182 Hughes, Charles Evans, 63 Hurley, Robert, 42–43, 46–49, 60 Hurricane Andrew, 150 Hurricane Hugo, 150 Hurricane Katrina, 121, 232n33 hyperpartisanship, 8, 33 Idaho, 73, 93 Illinois: coalitions, 156; regional association membership, 147; Washington office, 35, 53–56, 60, 61, 124, 143, 166, 174, 195, 200–201

Illinois Bureau of the Budget, 54–55 Illinois Department of Business and Economic Development, 53, 54 Illinois Federal Clearinghouse, 56, 124 Indiana, 147 Page 266 →information: best practices research, 83–85, 94, 158–59; flow of, 28–29, 56, 68–69, 100–114 interest groups: compared to state offices, 140–42, 205; concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, 81; establishment of, 4, 14; mobilization, 8, 57–61, 224n105; niches, 57, 151, 161–62, 201–2; organizational forces, 80–82; types of, 1. See also entrepreneurs intergovernmental lobbying: development of, 58–59; specialized niches in, 5; use of term, 12–13. See also state lobbying offices Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, 118 Internal Revenue Code, 159, 234n8 International City Management Association, 77–78 Interstate Commerce Commission, 153 Iowa, 147 James, Fob, 93 Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot, 41 John Chatillon and Sons, 41 Johnson, Brad, 142 Johnson, Lyndon: election, 79; governors’ meeting with, 71; policies and programs, 51, 58, 67, 70, 76, 88, 172, 184 Jones, Bryan, 76, 127 Jordan, William George, 63 Kansas, 147 Katz, John, 141 Kentucky, 143, 159, 223n78 Kerner, Otto, Jr., 53–54, 56, 60–61 Kimball, David, 214n12 Kincaid, John, 25 King, Gwen, 142 Kitzhaber, John, 115, 201

Korean War, 48 LaHood, Ray, 166 Leavitt, Mike, 90, 92 Leech, Beth, 57, 145, 214n12 legislative professionalism, 44–46, 181–82, 189, 196, 204 Lehman, Herbert, 38–41, 49–51, 60–61, 75, 82, 200 liaisons: roles of, 140–42; use of term, 29. See also state lobbying offices liberal citizens, 183, 192 line-item appropriations (earmarks), 116, 117–20, 167–68, 203, 231n19 lobbying: proliferation of organizations, 5, 15, 200–201; role of subnational governments, 29–30; scholarship on, 7–9; use of term, 100; Washington community, 1, 209–10. See also governors associations; interest groups; state lobbying offices Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 29 lobbying puzzle, 3–5, 200 local government, 35–36, 156. See also cities localists, 183 Long, Russell, 55 Louisiana, 121, 159, 232n33 Lowery, David, 57, 184 Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), 122. See also Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP) Madison, James, 18–19, 21–23 Maltbie, Hilo R., 221n50 mandates, 25, 114, 116–17 manufacturing, 184, 192 Martin, James L., 79, 89, 236n10 Martz, Judy, 174 Maryland, 34, 124–25 Massachusetts, 51, 52, 76, 115, 142, 167 mayors. See cities; U.S. Conference of Mayors McCain, John, 198

McDonnell, Bob, 141 Mead, Jim, 40 media visibility, 141–42 Medicaid: expansion, 199; federal mandates, 25; grant-in-aid formulas, 120–21; importance of, 151; increased funding, 126, 129; policy knowledge, 145; spending, 6–7, 27, 72; swap, 72; waivers, 117 membership-based advocacy groups, 8 Page 267 →Michigan, 50, 147, 222n73 Midwestern Governors Association (MGA), 56, 146–49, 151, 154 military bases, 238n31 military spending, 38–50, 221n57, 222n73 Minnesota, 147, 175, 184 Mississippi, 47, 179n Missouri, 99, 112, 166–67, 223n78 Montana, 174–75 Morehouse, Sarah, 217n32 Morgan, Bryson, 140 Nagel, Robert, 217n24 National Association of Attorneys General, 155 National Association of Counties, 69, 77, 155–56 National Association of State Budget Officers, 75, 156 National Conference of State Legislatures, 73, 113, 155 National Governors Association (NGA), 1, 5, 62–95, 212; avoidance of controversy, 65, 87; bipartisanship, 91–93, 159, 206–7, 210; Center for Best Practices, 83–85, 94, 158; Center for Policy Research and Analysis, 71, 83; chair of, 180–81, 187, 189, 194, 198; coalitions, 155–57; in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 88; consensus, 83–84, 93, 206; criticism of, 91–94; dues, 81, 86, 93, 94; expansion factors, 75–83; Fortune ranking, 229n112; future of, 94–95; governors’ commitment to, 89–90, 94–95, 206, 209–10; and Hall of the States, 73–75, 81–83; information on opening a Washington office, 82, 168, 199, 236n10; IRS classification, 86; lists of Washington representatives, 179n; name changes, 13, 68, 72, 83; organizational structure, 80–82, 86–87; policy advocacy (lobbying), 25, 71–73, 86–87, 161–62; political development of, 14–15, 62–75, 165; political impact of, 94, 201–2; press releases, 141; as safeguard of federalism, 132 (see also political safeguards of federalism); scholarship on, 8–9; social role of meetings, 66–67, 155; source materials, 11; strengths, 87–91, 94 National Governors’ Association: name change, 13, 62, 72, 83. See also National Governors Association (NGA) National Governors’ Conference: Articles of Organization, 70; Critique Committee, 70; Division of State

Services, 71–72; federal policy advocacy, 69, 71–73; name change, 13, 68, 72; resolutions, 153; and state executive associations, 78–79; Washington office, 61, 62, 68–73, 205–6. See also National Governors Association (NGA) National League of Cities, 69 Nebraska, 187 Neustadt, Richard, 170 Nevada, 167 New Deal, 37, 46, 58–59 New Federalism, 72–73, 172 New Hampshire, 174 New Jersey, 223n78 New York: coalitions, 156–57; and escheatment law, 115; governor’s lobbyist, 51; industrial base, 46–48; influence of, 110; professionalism and capacity, 44–46; regional association membership, 147; Republicans, 50; war contracts, 38–41, 47–48; Washington office, 14, 34–35, 38–41, 44–46, 60, 76, 110, 174, 200 New York Herald Tribune, 40 New York State Division of Commerce, 39–40, 46 New York Times, 65, 66–67, 142, 157 Nixon, Richard, 55, 88, 126, 172, 184 No Child Left Behind Act, 85, 127 North American Industry Classification System, 184 Not a Ship of Fools (Prendergast), 9 Noyes, Holton V., 221n50 Nugent, John, 21, 132; Safeguarding Federalism, 9 Obama, Barack, 108, 126 “Obamacare.” See Affordable Care Act Ogilvie, Richard, 54–56 Ohio, 53, 142, 147 Olson, Mancur, 224n105 Page 268 →O’Neill, Tip, 92 operationalization, 188–89

opportunism: of regional associations, 202; of states, 28, 115, 121, 132, 202 Ordeshook, Peter, 21 Oregon, 114–15, 201 organizational maintenance, 80–82 Otter, Butch, 93 partisan associations, 5, 15, 158–63, 210–11; best practices research, 158–59; campaign fundraising, 16, 23, 90, 159–61; and consensus, 90, 92; contributions to, 160–61; and NGA, 90–94. See also Democratic Governors Association; Republican Governors Association partisanship: of congressional delegations, 185–86, 194; divided government, 87–89, 182; and federal balance, 8; in governors associations, 31, 66; governors’ party identification, 105–7, 181, 194, 196; hyperpartisanship, 8, 33; party polarization, 16, 92–93, 128–29; and political risks, 166–67; and state lobbying offices, 105–8, 181, 208–9; and trust, 159. See also bipartisanship; Democrats; Republicans Pataki, George, 157 Paterson, David, 149 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Affordable Care Act Patrick, Deval, 113, 167 Pelissero, John, 101, 123, 230n6 Pelosi, Nancy, 92 Pennsylvania, 142, 147 Pensoneau, Taylor, 53–54 Perpich, Rudy, 175 Perry, Rick, 92, 93, 156 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 89, 128, 201 Plant, Jeremy, 12, 59, 71, 214n13 policy-making process: bureaucrats’ role in, 58–59; federal negotiations with states, 26, 29, 72–73, 102, 201, 208 political action committees, 141 political benefits, 16, 56, 60–61, 164–65, 169–72, 198 political culture, 5, 154, 178, 196, 206–7; as safeguard of federalism, 19–20, 22–23 political parties: and electoral politics, 217n32; as safeguard of federalism, 20–21, 23. See also Democrats; partisan associations; partisanship; Republicans political risk, 4, 82, 113–14, 164–69, 196–98, 201, 204 political safeguards of federalism, 2–3, 18–21; governors’ lobbyists as, 3, 13, 17–18, 27–33, 99,

131–32, 162–63, 201–2; political culture, 19–20, 22–23; political parties as, 20–21, 23; weaknesses of, 21–26, 30–32, 132 population ecology model, 57 pork funding, 117, 185. See also earmarks Posner, Paul, 22 Prendergast, Albert, 9 presidential campaigns, 180, 187, 189, 194, 198–99 presidents: interaction with governors’ lobbyists, 71, 73, 107, 108–9; national policy agendas, 88. See also individual presidents press conferences and releases, 141–42 prestige, 169–72, 198 procurement grants, 124–25 professional staff, 44–46, 80–82, 135, 181–82, 189, 196, 204 proliferation of lobbying organizations, 5, 15, 200–201 proliferation puzzle, 5, 200 Pryor, David, 199 Public Administration Clearing House (“1313 Group”), 75, 77 public interest groups (PIGs), 12 public official associations: as competition for governors, 58, 76–78; in Hall of the States, 96, 98; scholarship on, 8–9; use of term, 12–13 qualitative analysis, 10 quantitative analysis, 10, 16, 164, 179–96 Quie, Al, 175 rail transit, 149 Rampton, Cal, 78 Ransone, Coleman, 51 Page 269 →Reagan, Ronald, 34, 67, 72, 88, 125, 142, 172 recessions, 7, 130, 172, 175, 183, 199 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 36 redundancy, 32–33

regional associations, 5, 15, 146–55, 202, 207; activities, 149–50; benefits of, 162; coalitions, 151–52; corporate affiliates, 148, 155; dues, 147–49; funding sources, 148; issue areas, 150–55; limits of, 31; niches, 152; organizational structures, 147–49; as organized interests, 134–35; variation among, 152–55 regression analysis, 187, 194, 239n41 Republican Governors Association (RGA), 90–91, 141, 158–63; best practices research, 158–59; campaign fundraising, 159–60; contributions to, 160–61; Executive Roundtable, 160; as interest group, 135; and Mississippi representative, 179n Republicans: anti-Washington attitudes, 194; coalitions, 156–57; criticism of NGA, 92–93; and earmarks, 119–20; and mandates, 116–17. See also partisanship reputational costs, 31 research methods and sources, 10–11, 186, 188–89 Riker, William, 18–20 Rockefeller, Nelson, 67 Romer, Roy, 90 Romney, George, 53, 67 Romney, Mitt, 113 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 36, 49–51, 58, 66 Roosevelt, Theodore, 63 Rubin, Edward, 26, 28 Ruoff, Frank B., 219n20 Sabato, Larry, 80 Safeguarding Federalism (Nugent), 9 safeguards. See political safeguards of federalism salaries, 45, 139, 143 Salisbury, Robert, 4, 14, 59–60, 77, 177, 203–4 Santorum, Rick, 92 Scheppach, Ray, 71, 93, 94 Schlozman, Kay Lehman, 213n12 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 156 sectionalism, 235n27 Shafroth, John F., 64 Shapiro, Samuel H., 54

Shields, Anne, 143 Shields, Mark, 142 shirking, 25, 32 Shvetsova, Olga, 21 Simpson, Milward, 67 Smaller War Plants Division, U.S. War Production Board, 41 small states, 109, 143, 157, 184, 195, 198 social unrest, 76 social welfare programs, 35–36, 127–28 South Carolina, 93, 150 South Dakota, 223n78 Southern Governors Association (SGA), 74, 146–50, 148, 153, 155, 234n14 Southern Growth Policies Board, 234n14 Southern Rail Association, 149 Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 150 specialization, 5, 29, 201, 208 staff: consulting firms, 136–39, 208, 228n93; experience, 140, 142–45, 207–8; expertise, 145–46, 207–8; of NGA, 80–82; professionalism in state legislatures, 44–46, 181–82, 189, 196, 204; salaries, 139, 143; of state lobbying offices, 109, 136, 142–46, 205 standards, regulatory, 25 state affinity, culture of, 22–23 state agencies: funding for Washington offices, 136–37; state lobbying offices’ contact with, 110–11 State Alliance for E-Health, 84–85 State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 7, 121. See also Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, 126 state governments: autonomy, 14, 20; budget cuts, 175–77, 183–84, 203; budget surplus, 183–84, 189, 203; capacity of, 24–25; congressional delegations, 28, 30, 102–5, 185–86; economic diversity, 184, 192; economic health, 183, 199; expenditures, 6, 35–36; federal involvement in policy, Page 270 →state governments (continued)25–26; importance of, 6–8; needs in federal system, 27–30; opportunism, 28, 132, 202; as organized interests, 3–5; revenues, 36, 56; small states, 109, 143, 157, 184, 195, 198 state legislatures: party control of, 182, 187, 204; professionalized, 44–46, 181–82, 189, 196, 204; state

lobbying offices’ contact with, 110, 112–14 state lobbying offices: activities, 100, 101, 130–33; coalitions, 109–10, 155–57, 162; effectiveness, 207–11; federal funding, advocacy for, 100, 116–27, 130–32, 195–96; and federal mandates, 25, 114, 116–17; goals, 15, 56, 100, 130–33, 202; and governors’ prestige, 169–72; as insider lobbyists, 129, 140–41; as intergovernmental conduits, 100–114; media visibility, 141–42; need for, 1–2, 200–205, 211–12; newsletters, 135; as organized interests, 15, 134–35, 140–42; and partisan politics, 105–8, 181, 208–9; policy areas, 127–30, 145–46; policy efforts, 100, 114–16, 117, 170–71; political development of, 14, 34–61; relationships with governors, 112; as safeguards of federalism, 3, 13, 17–18, 27–33, 162–63, 201–2; scholarship on, 9; shortcomings of, 30–32, 132; state officials, contact with, 110–14; use of term, 12–13; value of, 113–14, 165; Washington officials, contact with, 102–10, 140 state lobbying offices, establishment and maintenance: 164, 172–77, 197–205; closings, 164, 172–77; and federal characteristics, 184–86, 192, 194–95; financial benefits, 4, 16, 56, 198, 204; financial costs, 4, 139, 165, 204; fleeting offices, 174–75; funding sources, 136–39; and gubernatorial characteristics, 180–81, 187, 189, 194–95; in Hall of the States, 74, 95–97, 99, 131, 136, 137; intermittent offices, 175–77; openings, 38–56, 57, 164, 172–77, 200–201; organizational structures and maintenance, 135–39, 136–39, 201; permanent offices, 172, 174; political benefits, 16, 56, 60–61, 164–65, 169–72, 198; political risks, 4, 82, 113–14, 164–69, 196–98, 201, 204; and state characteristics, 181–84, 189, 192, 195; by statute, 168; variation in, 177–80, 195. See also staff State Services Organization, 74, 81–82 statistical analysis, 164, 178–79, 186–87, 194, 239n41 Steens Mountain legislation, 114–15 strategists, 140 Stratton, William, 65 Sununu, John, 89 Supreme Court, 3, 7n, 76, 115 taxes: federal income tax, 36; Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial Income, 157; Illinois state income tax, 56; local, 36 Taylor, Frederick, 77 Tea Party movement, 22 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 122, 128, 145 terminology, 12–13 territoriality, 19, 23 Texas: coalitions, 156–57; and opportunism, 115, 132; support for NGA, 93, 94; Washington office, 34, 99–100, 136–37, 142 Thomas, Bill, 157 Thompson, Tommy, 90, 92, 154 Tierney, John, 213n12

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, 201–2 Transportation Equity Act (TEA-21), 118–19 transportation funding, 65, 118–19, 122, 127, 138 transportation policy, 149, 151 Truman, David, 20, 23, 224n105 Truman, Harry, 50, 153 trust: in government, 182, 192, 194, 196 (see also anti-Washington attitudes); and partisanship, 159 Tucker, Jim Guy, 198 turnback, 72 unions, 160 Union Station, 73–74 Page 271 →urban areas. See cities; U.S. Conference of Mayors U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 53–54 U.S. Base Realignment and Closure Commission, 238n31 U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 238n33 U.S. Conference of Mayors, 58, 69, 77 U.S. Congress: 99th, 25; 104th, 107, 126, 185; 105th, 100, 108, 112, 115–16, 118–19, 127, 172; 109th, 119; 111th, 100, 106, 109, 112, 116, 119, 126, 127–28, 145–46, 152; governors’ lobbyists, contact with, 102–8; governors testifying before, 71; grant-in-aid formulas, 120–21; institutional gridlock, 128; intervention in state policy, 25; partisan composition of, 185–86, 194; party polarization, 16, 92–93, 128–29; powers of, 24; Republican control of, 107, 126, 156–57, 185; state affinity, 22; state delegations, 28, 30, 102–5, 185–86 U.S. Constitution, 2, 18–19, 114 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 116, 120 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 76, 182 U.S. Department of the Navy, 38 U.S. Department of War, 38 U.S. Forest Service, 238n33 U.S. House of Representatives, 61, 105; Appropriations Committee, 126 U.S. Senate, 51, 61; Appropriations Committee, 126, 167–68; elections, 106–7, 114; former governors in, 223n75 U.S. State Department, 51

U.S. War Production Board, 41 value: of associations, 148; of state lobbying offices, 113–14, 165 Van Wagoner, Murray, 50, 222n73 Victor Metal Products Corporation, 41 Virginia, 47, 141 visibility, 169–72, 198 Voinovich, George, 90 Volgenau, Howard L., 219n20 Volpe, John A., 52, 61, 113 Walker, David, 36, 59 Walker, Jack, 82, 214n12 Walker, Scott, 92, 154 Wall Street Journal, 70 Washington, DC: lobbying community, 1, 209–10; state offices (see state lobbying offices). See also federal government Washington Post, 64 Washington Reps Group, 109, 155, 158, 211 Washington State, Department of Ecology, 80 Wechsler, Herbert, 3, 19 Weddington, Sarah, 142 Weeks, George, 80 welfare reform, 88–89, 128, 201 Western Governors’ Association (WGA), 74, 146–48, 150, 152–54 Western Governors’ Policy Office (WestPO), 146–47 West Virginia, 159, 167–68, 175 West Virginia University, 167–68 When Governors Convene (Brooks), 8 White, Frank, 197–98, 204 White House, 71, 73, 107, 108–9. See also individual presidents Williamson, Richard, 72–73

Willkie, Wendell, 50 Willson, Augustus E., 63 Wilson, Woodrow, 63 Wisconsin, 143, 147, 167 Works Progress Administration (WPA), 37, 48–49 World War I, 46 World War II defense contracts, 14, 37–50, 202 Wright, Deil, 132