The German Soldier's Pocket Manual: 1914–1918 9781472831064, 9781472831057, 9781472831071

Table of contents :
Title
Contents
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
The New Tactics
2 Der Spatenkrieg: The Spade War
Preface
The spade as a weapon of defence
Appendix 1
3 Proposals for Technical Methods
What errors do the French appear to have committed?
Considerations.
Piercing the Line in the true sense of the expression.
Principles governing the attack.
Plan of Attack.
Preparation of the Attack.
Action of the infantry during the attack.
Action of the artillery during the attack.
Development of a penetration of the enemy’s line.
4 German Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors
Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors.
Additional Remarks By xiv. Reserve Corps
5 Trench Raid Report
Captain Wagener’s Report on the Raid on the Evening of 11th April, 1916.
6 Machine Gun Instructions
Order of the 6th Bavarian Division Regarding Machine Guns.
Regulations For Machine-Gun Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers [German, 1916]
Instructions For the Employment of Machine Guns in the Attack. [German staff]
7 Nahkampfmittel
Note By General Staff.
Hand Grenades.
“Granatenwerfer” (Stick Bomb Throwers).
8 Minor Tactics
Information Drawn From the Use of the Light Machine Gun, Model 1908–15, in the Sixth Army.
Preparation and Execution of the German Attack Along the Ridge From the Mennechet Signal Station to the Cepy Farm.
Tactics Of German Assault Detachments.
9 Notes on Recent Fighting
10 Anti Tank Rifle Instruction
Provisional Instructions for the anti Tank Rifle (T-Gewehr) 1918
11 The Attack In Position Warfare
a. introduction.
b. general principles.
F. The Various Arms.
Index
Copyright

Citation preview

Contents

Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. Der Spatenkrieg: The Spade War 3. Proposals for Technical Methods 4. German Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors 5. Trench Raid Report 6. Machine Gun Instructions 7. Nahkampfmittel 8. Minor Tactics 9. Notes on Recent Fighting 10. Anti Tank Rifle Instruction 11. The Attack in Position Warfare Index

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals and institutions have helped make this manual possible. I should particularly like to thank Johannes Bayer, the librarian, and Carmen Boehm of the Bayerisches Armeemuseum (Bavarian Army Museum), Ingolstadt, whose knowledge of sources and kind hospitality at the museum library are hugely appreciated. The assistance of Dot Boughton (née Bruns) – a former colleague at Lancashire Museums – has also been invaluable. The documents in this book include both complete and edited examples. Omissions from the originals are signified by elipses in the text.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction In 1914 the German Army was arguably the most potent war machine in the world. With a standing peacetime strength of 840,000 men, it was larger than the armies of France, Italy or Austro-Hungary, and considerably larger than those of Britain or the USA. Though smaller than the Imperial Russian Army, it was better equipped and supplied, deployed more effectively by means of the modern German rail network, and was better led. As the Prussian Army had been the primary instrument of German unification, culminating in the declaration of the King of Prussia as German Emperor or Kaiser in January 1871, the German Army was recognised as an essential pillar of the new state. At the outbreak of World War I the titular supreme commander was Kaiser Wilhelm II, King of Prussia, who also assumed command of the Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg contingents in times of conflict. The core of the Imperial German Army was its General Staff. Its operations section not only transmitted directions and correspondence from the Chief of the General Staff, senior professional officer under the Kaiser, but also supervised the organisation and training of the Army, and processed its operational plans. Other sections and subsections of the staff dealt with intelligence, equipment, munitions and the various arms of service. In August 1914 German military forces were divided into separate armies: the First to Seventh armies facing west, the Eighth Army to the east. The armies were made up of 24 corps created in a similar number of regional districts. Corps in their turn were built of divisions. In 1914 the standard infantry division had two infantry brigades, each with

two regiments of three battalions each. The usual division was therefore 12 battalions of infantry, plus a Jäger battalion of light (literally ‘hunter’) infantry; an artillery brigade, and specialists including pioneers and engineers. Huge expansion of the German Army during the war saw the raising of fresh armies and a total of 251 divisions, though not all were in existence simultaneously and divisions were reduced to three regiments. Given the total nature of a struggle fought on two major and several minor fronts, there was unrelenting demand for new recruits. Peak wartime strength of all branches of the German Army reached about eight million men. Though no nation foresaw the sort of war that occurred on the Western Front, the German Army had technical branches as advanced as any, and its heavy ‘foot’ (Fuß) artillery in particular was a world leader. Largest of all the Army’s guns in 1914 were the 42cm howitzers popularly known as the ‘Dicke Bertha’ (‘fat’ or ‘big’ Bertha), so named after Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (1886–1957), daughter of armaments and industrial magnate Friedrich Alfred Krupp. These pieces came to particular prominence during the suppression of the Belgian forts during the 1914 summer campaign, but the heavy artillery also included 21cm Mörser (also more readily defined as heavy howitzers in English) and 15cm and 10cm howitzers, as well as other guns. The field artillery had mainly 7.7cm guns and 10.5cm light field howitzers. Contrary to popular belief, the artillery was a bigger killer than machine guns, the numbers of which also grew exponentially during the war. Though not yet much manufactured, a heavy ‘trench mortar’ had also been developed before 1914 and a small stock of hand grenades was held for use by pioneers.

The 7.7cm gun was standard issue to the German field artillery in 1914, and in various improved models was still serving in 1918. It was capable of firing a variety of shells including shrapnel and high explosive.

The mechanism of the issue G98 bolt-action rifle with its five-round integral magazine, from the manual Der Gute Kamerade, Berlin 1915.

Dashing as the mounted branch appeared with its regiments of Kürassiere (‘cuirassiers’), dragoons, ulans, hussars, Jäger zu Pferde, as well as Bavarian and Saxon heavy cavalry and Bavarian Chevaulegers , it was the infantry that formed the bulk of the Army in 1914. Though there were career officers and non-commissioned officers, plus some ‘one year volunteers’, the standing army was fuelled mainly by conscription. At 18 years of age German males became liable for service, and, if selected from the annual tranche, joined the

standing army at 20. The states provided men in proportion to their populations, with Prussia raising the bulk (78 per cent), Bavaria 11 per cent, Saxony 7 per cent, and Wurttemberg 4 per cent of the total. Infantrymen served two years with the active army, cavalry and artillerymen three, before moving into the reserve. Infantry were reservists for five years, the artillery and cavalry four, all being expected to undertake yearly training. At the age of 27 liability was reduced with men accounted Landwehr until the age of 39, and finally Landsturm (‘general draft’) from 39 to 45 years. In a state of emergency all categories could be called upon to take the field and the period of service was unlimited. Men who had been passed over previously could also be inducted. Pre-war training moved in yearly cycles, culminating in the Kaisermanöver – a full-scale army manoeuvre in the presence of the Emperor. Instructional literature was of three main varieties: official volumes produced by the relevant War Ministry and the General Staff; volumes from commercial publishers, often based on official documents or updated historic texts; and newly compiled unofficial material, usually by serving or former officers. Recruits were normally expected to purchase a basic manual to support their own training: typical examples included Dienstunterricht des Deutschen Pioniers by Major von Rabenau and Dienstunterricht des Bayerischen Infanteristen by Oberst Otto Schulz. Transfeldt’s Dienstunterricht für Kriegsrekruten der Deutschen Infanterie proved particularly popular, reaching its 52nd edition by early 1917. Most of these volumes included a history lesson on past glories; a note on the Empire and its geography and military organisation; and some summaries of aspects of basic training. These last generally focused on the skills of rifle shooting and marching; military discipline; maps; uniforms and equipment. The yearly training schedule began with the individual and worked up to small units, then companies and battalions.

The model 95 Tornister or backpack. In standard use by the infantry at the outbreak of war, it was still seen, often in simplified forms, in 1918. The manual illustration from Der Gute Kamerade, Berlin 1915, shows how various items including spare cartridges, food, coffee, field cap, shirt, wash kit, boots and camping equipment are packed.

As far as strategy and tactics were concerned, attack was considered by far the most important option. This was partly because offensive action proved so successful in the wars of Bismarck in the 19th century, but also because maladroit diplomacy left Germany outnumbered by potential opponents under the later regime of Wilhelm II. The only plausible antidote to this situation was imagined to be a swift coup to dispatch at least one enemy nation quickly. Although training documents such as the manual of field pioneer work for all arms (1911) showed trenches and field works, defence

was seen as merely a temporary way to buy time, or to spare men, while offensive action was performed elsewhere. Such preconceptions were rudely upended with the failure on the Marne in 1914 and the unenviable prospect of a long war on two or more fronts for which Germany was largely unprepared. Defence and trench warfare came suddenly to the fore while new methods of offence were worked out, often with the aid of trial and error and observation of enemy methods – be they things to avoid or to emulate.

THE NEW TACTICS The long-held idea that the ‘Stormtroop’ tactics that revolutionised infantry combat during World War I had their origin only in the German Army, were developed in secret on the Eastern Front in late 1917, and appeared by surprise in the west during the Spring Offensive of 1918 has now been completely debunked. Gen d.Inf Emil Oskar von Hutier (1857–1934) – victor at Riga against the Russians and later commander of the German 18th Army in the west – was a successful commander, a relative of Generalquartiermeister Ludendorff, and a winner of the coveted Pour le Mérite in recognition of his outstanding contribution on the Eastern Front. However, it is untrue that he was single-handedly responsible for inventing entirely new tactics that helped the German Army come close to victory. Indeed, the focus of the Entente press on ‘Stormtroopers’ during and immediately after the war was something of a smokescreen. It was designed both to explain away a major, if temporary, German advance and, more importantly, to conceal the weaknesses that contributed to create near catastrophe in early 1918. For German tactical skill was but one factor: the collapse of Russia had enabled large numbers of men to be transferred west; heavy casualties and French mutinies undermined the Western Front; Italian setbacks dogged the south; and the USA was not yet ready to deploy large numbers of men. The British Army was therefore on the ropes, and advanced German methods might have been the final straw.

German troops at Riga with grenades and gas masks, 1917. Gen d.Inf von Hutier’s attack was highly successful, but the tactics used were developed over a period of years and with the Russians already weakened.

The original documents that form the body of this manual focus on the German infantryman and how his tactics changed over four years of war. Crucially, they illustrate two key things. The first is that while ‘storm’ or ‘shock’ troop tactics were undoubtedly very significant, and small flexible units of men moving in fluid groups in battle armed with a variety of weapons eventually became the norm around the world, the notion of sudden creation and any claim to authorship by a single hand are completely erroneous. Infantry combat methods began to change as soon as there were trenches and as soon as the dreadful impact of artillery and machine guns were felt. Nor was this unique to the German Army. Moreover, contrary to popular depiction, pre-war German drill regulations already allowed some flexibility in combat. ‘Skirmish’ lines and firing ‘at will’ were normal. The advance was supposed to be at ‘a free natural pace’,

and the ‘rush’ and ‘creeping’ were officially recognised tactics. While the ability of the soldier to shoot and hit his target was paramount, taking cover and screening from the enemy were already important considerations. That such dictates were not always followed in the 1914 campaigns was due to accidents of command, enemy ambush, overwhelming defensive fire, overconfidence, poor training, or battlefields simply too crowded to admit proper deployment. The new battlefield environment from the autumn of 1914, the ‘otherworld’ of trenches, quickly demanded new tactics, new routines and new weapons. To break into field fortifications, let alone through them, required moving in different ways and in different, more flexible formations. ‘Trench raids’ began in late 1914, as did small-scale use of hand grenades. Pioniere and Jäger, the German battlefield engineers and light infantry, took early roles in the development of new tactics: the former because they already used explosives and grenades, the latter because their traditional battlefield role demanded deployment as skirmishers and in small units. 1915 saw the frontline appearance of sometimes informal ‘shock’ and ‘hand grenade’ squads for close action. Also created early that year, at the behest of Oberst Max Bauer (1869– 1929), were three small High Command Versuchstruppen or experimental units. One, under Maj Lothes, was to test trench mortars, another under Hptm Reddemen used flame-throwers, and the third, commanded by Maj Kalsow, experimented with small ‘assault cannon’ designed to bring artillery firepower right into the front line to deal with enemy positions. Kalsow’s Sturmabteilung (‘Storm detachment’) saw action against the French in June 1915, though Kalsow himself was replaced by Hptm Willy Rohr in September. The formation was later regarded as the first German true Stormtroop unit. At the same time, attacking under cover of darkness, gas or smoke was gradually increasing on both sides of the line. The new tactics evolved continually through interaction with other nations: initially the most significant foreign influence was French; at the end of the war, British. Any

impact of Russian techniques is very much more difficult to discern. During 1916, gathering assault detachments for counter-attacks or allocating them specific tasks in battle became common procedure. So it was, among many other examples, that a Saxon Sturmkompanie (‘assault company’) drawn from the resources of the 24th Reserve Infantry Division was deployed against the British in counter-attacks on the Somme. Storm detachments were also approved officially as army assets. In October 1916 the German High Command decreed that full-sized Sturmbataillone (‘assault battalions’) should be raised for each army on the European fronts, and many of these were created by the expedient of uniting some of the existing storm detachments from divisions. In some cases it appears that the creation of Sturmbataillone was essentially a renaming exercise: as of 25 September 1916, for example, the 2nd Army already possessed a Sturmabteilung of three infantry storm companies supported by a machine-gun company, a Minenwerfer (‘mortar’) detachment, an infantry gun battery and a flamethrower platoon. Its sub-units were better provided with leaders than much of the infantry with a full complement of lieutenants, one to lead each platoon, and at least a dozen of its 32 officers were drawn from Garde and Grenadier units. While the new Sturmbataillone were a useful pool of skilled manpower to lend vim to specific attacks, their primary purpose was not to fight but to teach. Groups of personnel were sent to them to train, then returned to their own units to spread the latest tactical methods throughout the German Army. Sturmbataillone losses, which could quickly have proved catastrophic if the battalions were at the spearhead of every attack and counter-attack, were moderated by selective deployment and later the establishment of small fieldrecruit depots to replenish their ranks. By early 1917 new teaching was being absorbed throughout the German Army, and instruction had changed dramatically. A year of training had shrunk to a mere 12 weeks into which were packed not only the basics of rifle, bayonet, drill, maps, skirmishing and discipline but also a wealth of recognisably modern techniques. As the manual Anleitung für

Kompagnieführer (Instruction for Company Commanders) explained, grenade throwing, simple entrenchment and bayonet fighting were now all tackled in the first week alongside an increasingly gruelling schedule of route marches and traditional shooting skills. Week two included running and jumping as well as fox holes, barbed wire, a night march and squad combat. By week three, recruits were undertaking combat shooting and throwing themselves prone, exercising in gas masks, and working in shell holes. Week four involved the methods of crossing ground under shell fire, the attack, obstacle zones and wearing assault kit. In addition to repeating exercises, marches and more grenade practice, by the mid-point of the course troops also looked at signalling, protective shields, and fighting in woods and villages.

German soldiers pose with their Sturmgepäck (‘assault packs’). ‘Full marching order’ with standard backpack was unsuitable for the attack, and as a result lightened equipment using greatcoats or shelter-halves wrapped around mess tins were soon used. These appeared in printed instructions

as early as 1915.

The second half of training mixed physical activity with theoretical and technical instruction. Recruits now operated as platoons, practised attacks night and day, dug in, ran messages and studied trench warfare and observation. The last two weeks included a mammoth 30km (18½-mile) march as well as operation as a company complete with machine guns, the use of telescopic sights and ‘shock’ action. Non-commissioned officers covered these and other subjects from the point of view of junior command and discipline, with emphasis on such things as basic paperwork, weapon cleaning, orders, iron rations, identification, the duties of armourers and bivouacs. Nevertheless, dwindling manpower and equipment problems meant that not all units were as well trained as others. New recruits were trained at home and in centres nearer the front, but finding enough instructors with recent experience and withdrawing troops from active duty for retraining was often problematic. While numbers of machine guns grew exponentially, shortage of light machine guns hampered mobile small-unit tactics well into the new year of 1917. In this respect in particular the Germans were well behind the French and the British, both of whom obtained light automatic weapons more quickly. Wherever possible, therefore, German units made use of captured guns, particularly the American-designed Lewis. This last neatly illustrates the point that though the German Army achieved early leads in many areas – including sniping, flame-throwers, trench mortars, gas and grenades – they lagged in other fields. French tactical organisations improved in the middle-war period, as did British methods after the Somme. Initial German leads in gas technology and mortars were progressively eroded, and German tank manufacture was virtually nonexistent until 1918 when a rather ineffective machine was finally produced in tiny numbers. Late in the war the US infantry, which had not made a particularly impressive start, now scored with support from French-made tanks and better training. The German Army, beset with manpower problems,

became ever more reliant on automatic weapons. The usual establishment of the German infantry battalion, initially 1,080 all ranks with two machine guns, shrank progressively by 1917 to 750, though by the middle of the year many battalions possessed upwards of 20 machine guns and four or six light mortars and bomb-throwers. The second objective of this volume is a much simpler one than the first. Much ink is spilled about Storm troops without the benefit of knowledge about what they were supposed to do, or how they were trained, organised or armed at different times. Too often commentators take a stance on what should have happened without asking why things transpired as they did, or what troops were actually taught. Here the selection of primary material is shown in broadly chronological order to form a coherent explanation of the development of German tactics over time. These instructions and reports are crucial since the Stormtrooper had but two ways to hone his craft during World War I. The first was experience on the battlefield: something that was possible, but all-too-often fatal. The second was the approved method: the published distillation of experience that was then taught on the training ground, range and in the classroom. Given the use of live ammunition, learning through training could also occasionally be fatal, but this was accounted a risk worth taking. The source of each document or extract reproduced here is given at the beginning of each piece, for though the ultimate origin of all is the German High Command, a German unit, or an individual contemporary German theorist, much has been passed down to us through British, French or US military intelligence. This is interesting in itself, showing as it does that the Entente Cordiale and ‘associated powers’ were aware of the bulk of the new methods very soon after the enemy started using them. In some instances German sources are clear that specific developments were down to observation of their opponents, whether in emulating or avoiding techniques, or in parrying a new development on the other side of the line. Taken together, these documents give us an alternative and arguably much more accurate history of the development tactics than the myth of sudden and

completely one-sided inspiration.

First introduced in 1813, the Iron Cross was reconstituted in 1870, and again on 5 August 1914 by the Kaiser Wilhelm. The Iron Cross second class, won by many, was suspended on a black and white ribbon. The First Class, seen here, was much more sparingly given and affixed to the uniform by a pin on the reverse.

CHAPTER 2

Der Spatenkrieg: The Spade War A mentor for garrison and front line, based on the latest war experience, gathered by Heinrich Fitschen of Bergedorf near Hamburg: published Berlin 1915.

PREFACE After the completion of each and every war collective experiences are used for the education and equipment of the troops. This will be the case especially after the present, and still ongoing, war of nations. However, we can already draw some conclusions from the current struggle and learn from it. Most of all we will have to prepare ourselves for more positional warfare, trench warfare, which appears to be what currently every encounter leads to. Because of this we will have to concentrate mainly on the education of infantrymen in efficient use of the spade. For this, Spatenkrieg, the ‘Spade War’ means to give practical advice to soldiers. May this be a guidebook for both the garrison and on the battlefront! May our young soldiers use these experiences, which we paid for so dearly with our blood, take them to heart, and follow our advice so that they in turn will live and not perish.

THE SPADE AS A WEAPON OF DEFENCE Motto: Sweat saves blood! Everybody who has spent a long time in the trenches will agree with me:

with every passing day our appreciation for the spade grew. How difficult it was to explain to the soldiers the importance of entrenching tools when we were still in garrison! No one was prepared to carry the heavy, unwieldy, and uncomfortable weight of these tools! But how different in the field! When spades were only available in military hospitals and sick bays, everyone would be after them, whether they had earned their stripes or not. Whoever had been fortunate enough to get this much sought after tool would not part with it again. Hardly a surprise; because the spade is our most important defensive weapon in modern warfare. With its help we can encounter and successfully overcome our two greatest enemies: wet weather (cold) and heavy artillery. I. CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTERS PROTECTING FROM BOTH RAIN AND SHRAPNEL A spade can be used to construct shelters that can protect us from both rain and shrapnel. In the beginning our shelters could only be called pitiful due to us not being adequately equipped with the correct entrenching tools, coupled with a severe lack of knowledge. In extreme wet weather we often got stuck in the mud and many soldiers decided it was best to sleep in a squat position, under a tree, or else they repeatedly offered to take over night sentry duty to avoid letting the wetness get the better of them. In certain circumstances wet can be more dangerous than the enemy guns. Quietly, the irresistible dampness makes no distinction in whose body it creeps – and will not let go of its victim. In the hospital train I met a young Bavarian comrade. He was only 19, but plagued by rheumatism so bad he was not able to move his foot. He had had wet feet for a full five days; that caused his joints to swell and in the end, they had to cut his boots from his calves. Did we really have to lose this young fighter’s skills so needlessly? And at what cost of our doctors? No and no again! The spade could have saved him!

However, he had not learned the skills to use it properly. He had, just like us in the beginning, dug either new trenches or deepened already existing trenches, then padded out the ground with brushwood and straw and roofed this with some soil. However, the rain soon ran down the walls of the trench, the soil from the top of the trench with it, drenching our makeshift beds of straw and leaving our ‘den’ uninhabitable. Still, some refused to leave their ‘warren’. Coughs and rattling breathing were quickly followed by comrades leaving due to pneumonia and rheumatism. That is why we decided to pay more attention to how we constructed our shelters. Most importantly, we needed more entrenching tools. Field hospitals and temporary clinics near the town of ‘M’ were able to spare a number of entrenching tools – short spades, picks etc. – so that in the future, almost every soldier would have his own spade. Before, one spade was shared between about three soldiers. Officers, sergeants, ordinary soldiers: everybody who had laid a hand on a spade would never be separated from it again. Our general sent out the cycle company to search for longer spades, and ordered 6000. After a couple of hours the cyclists had found 90 spades in the empty houses, which were loaded onto the individual company’s cook wagon and driven into the valley. The cyclists also supplied roofing felt, nails, pliers, saws, etc. Now the work could start. We built a model billet: so high, or rather, so deep that you could stand in it upright and so long you could lie in it. With the roofing felt on top it sheltered us against the weather, and 30cms of soil on top of that sheltered us from grenades and shrapnel. A thick layer of straw on the floor protects against the cold and wetness from the ground below. The walls should also be covered in straw – or at least one of the walls – so you can lean against it [and not get wet]. There have to be carefully built steps, slightly angled towards the back, so that one can very quickly move into the trench or the company battle stations. There should also be a door – made from timber and roofing felt or tent sections to keep out the draft and

allow a cigarette or candle to be lit inside (e.g. for reading). If there is no roofing felt available, take brushwood or a bundle of sticks, leaves or soil and timber boards from doors and window shutters from the deserted houses and apartments. The log bunker can be more simple and does not need to be as tall; it can be lower. However, if you hit groundwater, you naturally have to stop digging. Dryness is more important than comfort. “But”, some people asked me, “why do I have to put so much effort in building myself such a ‘home’ when I have to leave it again very soon?” In order to answer this question, we have to differentiate between ‘manoeuvre-’ and ‘static warfare’. With the former, the digging is much more restricted. Proper static warfare, in which we have to struggle relentlessly to keep every foot of ground, may develop after a few days. The times when wars were decided on just one day in just one fight are definitely over. Sometimes it takes weeks, yes, even months, to come to some kind of verdict. Like waves on the oceans, soldiers move doggedly to and fro, locked grimly into a seemingly never ending struggle: these are the distinguishing marks of this new kind of war, especially along the long Western front. And THIS is why we should have to build strong shelters that should seemingly last forever and ever. And if we REALLY have to leave the shelters, what does it matter that we put so much more effort than strictly necessary into building them in the first place? We shall take with us on the wagon for entrenching equipment what we can and, next time, shall build an even better, stronger shelter! Practice makes perfect. We can add niches and nooks so we can stow away our knapsacks, mess tins and canteens, etc. We can get chairs from the deserted house to make ourselves feel at home inside the shelters. II. CONSTRUCTION OF CONNECTING AND FIRE TRENCHES With the help of the simple spade, digging and constructing communication and fire trenches, the front line can be slowly pushed forward further and further.

Darkness has fallen. The hostile droning shells have sent their last greetings to us. And now, now our proper work starts: patrols move noiselessly through the front line to scout out the enemy, determine what plans are afoot, and protect us from sneak raids. These are immediately followed by pioneers, who test the ground and determine the location where a new trench should profitably be dug, a new ‘village’ founded. Then we will move up with our spades, and shall burrow into the soil, deeper and ever deeper. Some will have to build the breastwork, others zigzag trenches connecting them with the old, covered positions at the rear. The enemy will hear the spadework. He will know something is up, but not where and what. He will shoot into the dark. No way could they find a target in this fog and darkness. If he tries to overwhelm us with volleys or rapid fire, we will find cover. If they only shoot intermittently we will ignore that because, as experience has taught us, shots fired blindly rarely hit the intended target. How far we will get using this method depends on the ground, terrain and distance from the enemy lines. If we manage to get as close as a few hundred meters we must no longer be seen above ground. We will have to keep digging using the long spades on either side of the connecting trench, up to a man’s height in depth. And of course, there is work rotation: there will be relief for the diggers. All companies stationed at the rear must supply a certain number of men. We will burrow in turn, by day and by night, as long as we can take quick cover, if needed, at any time. If we manage, in this way, to get close to the enemy, 100, 80, 60 or even 40m, this effort will have to be crowned with a surprise attack that will force the enemy to withdraw from their position. Quietly, without a single sound, the silent spade men will rise from the morning mist or the darkness of the night, out of the safety of the earth’s womb: each man carries two hand grenades which he will hurl towards the enemy positions as soon as the enemy appears to smell a rat. All hell will break lose. The enemy has a rude awakening and will run towards the

breastwork. He may manage a couple of shots, but certainly no more because he’ll be surrounded by raging hell: unit after unit will rise from our trenches to undertake the now short march to victory. There will be no loss of life before they reach the foremost trench, because obviously, everybody moving through the trenches – every company, every man, will be automatically fully covered. Above all this way of, quite literally ‘underground’ warfare, will rid us of the dangers of the hostile shrapnel fire. Well before the batteries have noticed where exactly the attack is coming from, it will be done and dusted. At the worst they may plaster the trenches at the rear, but will not actually cause any damage if we have fortified them well. The space between the two front line trenches they can only attack with the utmost care because shrapnel fire can scatter up to 100m, thus easily hitting both friends and foes. Now and then the enemy, especially the English, have fortified their positions so well that even the short distance of 50m can only be won with great sacrifices. Their positions were so efficiently barricaded with planks of steel and wire mesh attached to power lines of heavy current: only floods of blood could wash these obstacles away. Then we will have to move on to siege warfare. But we know well how to take down enemy fortifications: Lüttich, Namur, Maubeuge and Antwerp bore witness to the proof of that! We will conquer even the strongest fortress in our way, be it in the North or South or anywhere on the Continent! III. THE SPADE AS ASSAULT WEAPON Even during assaults, the spade is our most important weapon of defence. Some people’s ears may prick up when hearing or reading this: especially the ears of those who think of themselves as experts in modern warfare. Of course we do not really use the spade during assaults or as assault weapons. However, guns and rifles have only very limited use and only the first line of soldiers may use them. Normally, you can only successfully shoot when you are as close to enemy lines as about 100m. The enemy will sit protected in their trenches and will not be foolish enough to come out and offer you any

kind of target. He will obverse and follow all our movements through embrasures and loop holes in the trenches, and even through their periscopes. Their helmets will be rarely seen above the trench line. That is why rifles have little use. Only when the enemy is fleeing can we riddle them with bullets to our heart’s content. It goes without saying that the units at the rear must never fire because they would of course endanger their own comrades at the front. With the gun resting on our lower left arm, the head ducked, and the body nestled against the ground we just lay there, totally inactive and letting enemy fire tear us apart. Howling and hissing the murderous hostile monsters came flying to bring us death and destruction. Why ever in all the world did we not try to help ourselves, seek shelter, even in the open field? As soon as you hear the command ‘Lie down!’ or ‘Position!’, get your spade out without delay and start digging! Just a few stabs and a head defence is done! Turn over onto your side, burrow yourself into the sheltering earth, and push the soil ahead of you for additional protection! Later succeeding columns can then use the now empty scrape, and keep working at it, hollowing it out even further until the riflemen no longer have to shoot in the lying position – but can kneel to fire. Most importantly, this type of spadework is meant to stop common head and chest injuries, which would be a small victory. Moreover you won’t get caught up in dark thoughts due to idleness: you are doing something and you are fighting against hostile powers, rather than just providing an easy target. Some regiments, mainly the pioneers, carry two sand bags with them which they fill during assaults and use as cover from hostile fire. To me this does not seem logical or practical because each new formation will have to redo the previous effort. However, with what I suggested above, each new wave of soldiers could use the already dug trenches and need not waste time on building their own. However, what do you do when the soil is frozen solid? This question was answered by a Bavarian comrade who lay in my sick bay. He had stuffed the spade, handle first, behind his back, between his

backpack and his back so that the metal plate was shielding part of his head against shrapnel. The pack shielded his back and the spade his head – thus protecting the most vulnerable parts of his body. The Bavarian had learned this method from the Saxons. It seems prudent to me to spread the word and copy this method! IV. SPADEWORK FOR SAFEGUARDING ONE’S WELLBEING Using the spade to dig keeps the soldier healthy in both body and mind. The current tenacious struggle has already been going on for months and it is now evident that only a patient and persistent army will be victorious in the end. This will be the army best equipped to resist the weather, the wet and the cold as well as guns. Thank the Lord that nature has equipped us much better than our enemies to resist the strains of winter campaigns! Our state of health has always been better than that of the French. Moreover, because we are accustomed to a harsher climate we are more immune to the cold than the people from southern France, let alone the Zouaves, Senegalese, Gurkhas and other exotic peoples, which will now have to perish: melt like the snow in the bright sun. We have got to do nothing but stay healthy and fit for military service. Each and every soldier has to contribute, and he will have to take these demands to heart: do not give in to dark thoughts and pointless brooding, but instead keep active at all times and keep improving and fortifying your position. Take your spade and axe and improve your fortifications and barricades. Make sure you adapt to the countryside and replicate its lay-out to hide your position from aircraft flying overhead: cover your positions with turf and grass, plants, shrubs and bushes, and dig out fake trenches to trick airplanes into thinking you are elsewhere. Add embellishments such as old helmets and guns, and laugh when the enemy waste their ammunition on them! Make sure your cover is always clean: get rid of animal cadavers and other foci of diseases which befoul air and soil. Make sure to erect well-built latrines. This is often the first order given by commanders, but soldiers are unwilling to dig latrines and do a poor and superficial job: that is why we often have a

disgusting state of affairs in the trenches. We can’t have that! If you are in the forest – like me – the first thing you have to do is cut a path so no one gets lost when fetching water or straw, or when on errands for the troops. Cut away the shrubs and brushwood, mark the trees with your axe, make the path nice and even (smooth out potholes in the path) and build log causeways, corduroy trails, where the countryside is boggy and wet. Cover the entirety of the path with straw so you can find it even at night and in fog. Straw-covered paths through the dense forests are easily visible and can be used for easy access to the fresh water, straw and brushwood supplies, and create a way to dressing stations. These are just a few examples of what you can and must achieve with your spade. We can add many more. Do not be afraid to engage your brain, and you will be surprised at how many more things you can come up with to improve and fortify your positions, and make life hard for the enemy. Try and enjoy wood craft and mine craft and the outdoors. I bet you enjoyed reading Robinson Crusoe when you were young! This is your chance to prove that the daredevilry of your ancestors still resides within you: the spirit of adventure and the enjoyment of the outdoors! Show that you are daring and full of bravery! Try and probe your enemy’s weaknesses during your bold reconnaissance. Use mirrors or a periscope to observe your enemy in his trench when you cannot look over your own parapet. Use underground tunnels to creep towards vegetation that will hide you from the enemies’ eyes: you will be well hidden, as they keep watch on your trenches but do not expect you to have crept so much closer to their own lines like some unseen rascal! Their bullets will not hit you, and they will be none the wiser as to where the bullets are coming from that are flying around their ears, and will hit them as soon as they show the tips of their noses! But enough of this. My comrade, you see how you can occupy yourself efficiently and not be idle, by keeping up with the struggle. Your spade is your helper and inseparable companion. Just working with entrenching tools will help your blood circulate, exercise and strengthen your muscles, whet your appetite, and keep you fresh and healthy. This is a thousand times better

than sitting idle in the trench and letting the wetness and cold take effect on you. “But what about enemy projectiles?!?” you say. Some of my friends did indeed tell me not to put myself forward, to think of my wife and children, and just keep hidden in the trenches and safe from hostile bullets. However, it was exactly because I wanted to return home healthy and fit that I did not remain sat lazily on the wet straw. I did not sleep for three nights because I did not want damp to get the better of me! I’d rather work than try and rest on wet ground: I made use of my pioneering spirit, preferring to work or supervise others working in the forest. In fact the danger of being hit by bullets is a lot less severe than you would think. You have to accustom your ears to the horribly beautiful symphony of the battle music. Hidden deep down in your fox hole you cannot tell if the deep sounds, carrying the thumping echo chamber of the war above, are played by instruments belonging to friend or foe. All you hear is the thumping racket above you, flinching and twitching at every sound. Come out into the light! It is our artillery firing and engaging in battle! It is the enemy villages coming under fire – look, a barn is set alight! Another shot, slightly further right, and the farmhouse will bite the dust! All of these salvoes come from your friends! Soon you will be able to distinguish them from hostile fire! And you do not need to be more afraid of them than obviously necessary. This is because each and every friendly battery is being given clear instructions as to which enemy positions to take under fire, and they will approach this very systematically. Obviously random shelling is seldom used these days. If the hostile fire is concentrated on other positions than your own, you can carry on with what you were doing, or just observe what is going on. However, if the enemy changes target and your position comes under fire – then quick! Hide in your own strongpoint. Take cover at once! Don’t even show the tip of your boot! Just let the enemy waste their ammunition! If you have done a great job with your spade you will not mourn any losses. On one occasion in the past,

we had only two injuries on one day, and just one on the following day amongst all the soldiers of the regiment, even though the hostile fire was relentless, and we were under a constant hailstorm of iron shells. It is however inexcusably stupid, flippant, and light-headed to walk around outside in hostile fire as if it were a training manoeuvre, without cover, just to prove your cold-bloodedness and sheer cheek! Silly actions like this only weaken our army and help the enemy! Let us use our nation’s most precious resources wisely and economically: I mean human bodies, hearts and souls and the dedication of our men and youths! I am certain that everybody who has read these arguments will give the spade the credit that is its due. You will no longer shy away from carrying entrenching tools! If you already occupy trenches, you will go and get a spade from your injured comrades. Men returning to the front, and the recruit who still needs to be inducted into the secrets of survival and forest craft, will never ever, under any circumstances, leave the garrison and walk out into the field without a spade! As every soldier has his spade, every garrison needs to have its own supply wagon, carrying axes, pickaxes, saws, pliers, boxes of screws and nails, roofing materials, water containers, rope, and most of all, long spades. And then make sure you practise using all the different types of entrenching implement! Keep at it and improve your competence day after day until you have surpassed the skills of your enemy. Keep your spade and wits sharp and clear! The spade beats the shell! Or spades above grenades! Pick your motto. The spade is the key that will open up the enemy lines. Using the spade to dig will keep you healthy, sound of body, mind and spirit, fresh and active and with zest for action. Above all else, never lose your spirit or courage, even if the dirt comes up to your neck: that’s the German way! Grab the spade and dig yourself out of the mire: move up and engage with the enemy. Heaven helps those who help themselves!

APPENDIX 1 What every infantry soldier needs to know prior to any wartime spadework.

Shooting and Trenching: those are the two most important abilities a soldier needs to know, inside out, in our ‘Spade War’. Every infantry soldier needs to discover his inner pioneer, at least as far as entrenching and fortifications are concerned. The lay-outs shown below need to be internalised by every soldier prior to any spadework: During enemy fire you have to be able to dig shallow trenches and scrapes very quickly to shoot from in a prone position or to hide. One man of a pair shoots while the other digs a hollow, about 15cm deep, pulling the spade towards him gradually, in a backward motion. First, build a rest for the rifle. Behind, create a platform about 30cm deep where you can rest your elbows. The soil being removed should be used to build up a crescent-shaped breastwork. The excavation should be about 60cm wide and 110cm long. If there is enough time, the position can be deepened even further and slowly connected with the neighbouring hollows through careful, covert sideways digging. These primary pits can therefore turn into proper fire trenches if hollowed out further and made much deeper.

Figure 1: Firing trench for kneeling riflemen on firm ground.

Figure 1 shows the simplest version for the construction of a fire trench for a kneeling rifleman. We found trenches like that in Belgium, where the war had come over the people like a frantic storm that had not left the enemy any time to dig themselves any deeper into the ground. In fact, knee-deep trenches are not uncommon: they are found in circumstances when there is not enough time to dig deeper trenches, or else, when the soil is simply too hard to dig any deeper. One would always hope that scrapes can be deepened to man-

deep trenches to stand in.

Figure 2: Trench in firm soil, offering good command.

Immediately with the start of the construction you will have to remember to include traverses every 4–5m to counteract the effect of direct hits and hand grenades, as well as protect from flanking and oblique fire. The squad deploys into skirmish line, one step apart. You count out every seven men: nos. 5, 6 and 7 will step back three steps to build the path around the traverse while the four men in front will dig the fire trench: mark out the front and back line of the trench, then dig from left to right, keep the turf with grass safe to use it for camouflage later. If the forward lip is meant to be a solid area to prop your elbows when shooting (see Figure 2), then the traverse fill has to be piled up ca. 30cm from the front edge of the trench. Make sure you spread the removed soil well across the ground around the trench, and further away – you don’t want to use up too much energy spreading the soil from the deeper levels later. Keep the trench walls even, and as vertical as possible. If the subsoil is loose or sandy you will have to use some revetment to strengthen the trench. To do this you will need wooden planks or brushwood behind poles, fascines, or wattle, and for the final layer, brush hurdles. The more vertical and narrow the trench, the more secure it will be.

Figure 3: Fire trench in loose soil with poor command.

Revetted breastwork with vegetation (1–1.5m between securing posts), the firing line decked with turf and grass. If you need to raise the breastwork, do not take the soil from the sides of your own trench: dig towards enemy lines and use that soil rather than sacrifice the walls of your trenches. The scrapes and holes you dig in doing this will also serve as obstacles and pits/traps, should the enemy move further towards your lines.

Figure 4: Reinforced fire trench serving as an infantry position: created overnight in favourable ground.

You can develop your basic position transforming it into an ‘enhanced trench’ by working on the back wall: dig deeper and widen the trench by about 0.4m so that you create a walkway behind the ledge on which the riflemen stand, so soldiers can move up and down the walkway without

disturbing them. For the fully developed trenches you will need to erect a parados, because you will want to protect soldiers in the trenches against shell splinters from the back. For a platoon of reserves, you will need to dig shelter trenches, close to the forward trenches, but no closer than 50m, taking into consideration possible high angle fire. All field fortifications will be connected with communication trenches. These trenches will have to follow the fall of the land exactly and will have to be camouflaged extremely well. Communications trenches are used as a protected route to latrines, dressing stations, kitchens, telephone positions, etc.

Figure 5: Shelter trench with step for sitting on (Sitzstufe).

Figure 6: Communication trench: the dotted line indicates an upgrade that can be added during progress of operations.

All firing trenches have to incorporate shelters, one for every four men. If shelters are small, accommodating few men, a direct hit taking out a shelter will not cost as many lives as a direct hit on a larger shelter built to accommodate more men. You can either include shelters during the initial entrenching or add them later, once the trench has been built.

Figure 7: Fire trench with cover trenches and communication trench: latrines, telephone position, and aid post indicated.

CHAPTER 3

Proposals for Technical Methods 3rd Army Headquarters No. 3800 B.

14th April, 1915

MEMOIR WRITTEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEMORANDUM OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY. No. 603, DATED 18TH MARCH, 1915. PROPOSALS FOR THE TECHNICAL METHODS TO BE ADOPTED IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH A STRONGLY FORTIFIED POSITION, BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED FROM THE ERRORS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE FRENCH DURING THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN CHAMPAGNE.

WHAT ERRORS DO THE FRENCH APPEAR TO HAVE COMMITTED? 1. The French only made two indisputable mistakes. They attacked on too narrow a front, and did not press home their offensive sufficiently. It can be considered later whether what appeared to us as errors, especially their inability to silence our batteries, Minenwerfer and front line flanking works were in reality avoidable errors, or whether it was impossible, under the prevailing conditions, to do better. There can be no doubt, however, that when we attack we must endeavour to do better from this point of view.

2. In the initial stages, the French front of attack measured 8 kilometres. As soon as they saw that the desired result could not be obtained under these conditions, they reduced it to 2 or 3 kilometres. This reduction was of the greatest advantage to us, which is in itself sufficient proof that it was an error on the part of the French, for it allowed us, with comparatively insignificant reserves, to continue reinforcing the front which was being attacked and to relieve exhausted troops. The tactical situation was thus always well in hand. From the point of view of the operations, the situation was at no time serious, for it was evident that even if the enemy broke through, a gap formed on so narrow a front could not be developed, even by bringing up fresh troops from the rear. 3. The French apparently intended to advance methodically from trench to trench, relying entirely on their artillery and trench mortars, and in this way enable the infantry to gather the fruits of victory. This was a fatal misconception of the decisive role which infantry plays even in the present day. Although the artillery preparation had been comprehensive, the infantry attacks which should have followed immediately, either by accident or design, lacked the necessary power to penetrate our positions. The majority completely failed; only after efforts spreading over several weeks were they successful in capturing some of our advanced trenches at the cost of enormous losses. We had by then succeeded not only in bringing up a division of the Guard into reserve, but had constructed so many supporting positions, that each fresh advance on the part of the enemy must soon reach a deadlock. 4. The fire of our own batteries, which was in no way hindered, proved not only disconcerting to most of the French attacks, but in addition often stopped them before they could be launched. Even when the first line of the French succeeded in entering our trenches, our fire prevented the arrival of reserves, and thus enabled us to recapture the position lost. The fact that the French, in spite of their well-developed artillery aeroplane service, did not succeed in neutralizing the fire of our batteries gives food for reflection. So long, however, as it is not definitely proved that the failure of

their efforts was due to inherent difficulties, and that it is impossible to do better, we must maintain the opinion that it is quite possible to silence the French artillery by a lengthy preparation, assisted by aerial observation. Our trench mortars and our flanking works have been more often hit by chance shells fired among our infantry lines than by a methodical bombardment. Consequently their effectiveness was, as a rule, but slightly diminished, and a number of assaults were repulsed by flanking fire. In this connection, we should endeavour, by a detailed reconnaissance of all objectives and a methodical bombardment, to fire with greater effect. 5. It must not be supposed that the French attempt to break our front was, as a whole, badly conceived or carried out with insufficient forces. From the 16th to the 19th February, when two Army Corps attacked the first line and their artillery expended ammunition recklessly, there was considerable danger of our line being pierced. Only the infantry attacks were lacking in persistence. Had the two Army Corps mentioned above succeeded in reaching the high ground north of the line Tahure—Ripont, the other three Corps which were massed in rear could have enlarged the breach to formidable dimensions, for at that time we had not the smallest reserve. On the 19th February, however, when the two Army Corps had failed in their allotted task of penetrating our front, the situation underwent a decisive change and the battle entered on its second phase. The French, either in order to spare their infantry, or because the latter was incapable of further effort, decided to bring up into front line the three Corps hitherto kept in reserve. But these again were unable to give their infantry the necessary power of penetration and consequently five French Corps gradually became exhausted. Even had the French succeeded in breaking through during this period, they would have had no troops available with which to develop their success. From the 20th February onwards, the German higher command was master of the situation; this is proved by the fact the 1st Guard Division which came up on the 20th February, was not engaged until the 28th, and remained in position until relieved on the 10th May by the 1st Guard Brigade.

CONSIDERATIONS. 6. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the following:— (a.) The piercing of the line, a purely tactical operation, the object of which is to capture a hostile position and destroy the troops which have been holding it; as far as this phase is concerned, we are superior to the enemy. (b.) The development and completion of the piercing of the line. When this has been effected the measures taken by the enemy begin to be felt, and we must not allow our superiority to be wrested from us. As regards (a), a plan of attack embracing all the necessary details can and must be drawn up, and requires merely application and care; as regards (b), probabilities only can be foreseen; other decisions must be made according to the exigencies of the moment.

PIERCING THE LINE IN THE TRUE SENSE OF THE EXPRESSION. 7. The total front of attack should be very considerable, at least 20 kilometres: this does not imply that the attack should be of uniform strength throughout this front. The action taken will depend on the nature of the ground and the strength of the enemy’s positions. Certain sectors will be chosen where every possible effort will be made to pierce the hostile defences, while in other sectors the attack will, indeed, be carried out with energy, but will depend more for its success on the result of the attack in the neighbouring sectors. 8. The objective of the penetration should at least include the capture of the enemy’s artillery positions for only thus will the principal arm of the French, their artillery, be put out of action. In each particular case, a definite line will be given as the objective, which should as far as possible be some natural feature. Such an objective must obviously be situated beyond the hostile artillery positions. The attack, from a strategical point of view, should come

as a surprise, and from a tactical point of view should take the form of a crushing blow; it should not be a gradual progression with intervals of preparation. In this way alone can we be certain of possessing and maintaining numerical superiority in the attack, for it will be impossible for the enemy to collect any considerable force before the penetration is an accomplished fact. 10. The frontage for a division in the sector where a decision is to be sought at all costs should not exceed 2½ to 3 kilometres; at other points it may be slightly more according to the nature of the ground and the strength of the hostile position; frontages should not, however, be unduly extended, so that our action may take the form of genuine attacks everywhere and not merely of demonstrations. 11. The artillery allotted to a divisional sector of attack is as a rule distributed in the following manner:— (a.) Field artillery.—The usual amount forming part of a division, i.e., at least six 6-gun batteries of field guns and three 4-gun light howitzer batteries. Guns employed previously to the attack for flank defence in the lines of entrenchments must not be counted, as they form part of the purely defensive organization. (b.) Heavy artillery.—One or two heavy long range batteries, the mission of which is to enfilade neighbouring sectors, as well as to fire on distant targets (communications, batteries, aerodromes &c.). Batteries of 10cm. guns will be sufficient, those of 13cm. are only necessary for especially distant targets. The positions of these batteries will be well advanced and the batteries will not be grouped. Four batteries of light field howitzers and one battery of mortars (as counter batteries to engage the hostile artillery and to bombard the enemy’s infantry position. Positions of batteries more grouped and further back). (c.) Ammunition.—According to experience gained during some of the

heaviest fighting in Champagne, the following are the figures for the average daily allotment of ammunition to batteries:—

Four days’ supply at least should be available, partly with the batteries, and partly in the depots. 12. Each sector will be allotted engineer troops as follows:— 3 or 4 pioneer companies (1 per regiment). 2 Heavy Minenwerfer 20 Light trench mortars

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ATTACK. 13. (a.) Against the enemy’s infantry, a surprise assault proved to be the most effective method in Champagne, but only on condition that the position attacked was not too far distant, and that the hostile wire entanglements and flanking works had, at the least, suffered some damage. If your own most advanced trenches are more than 150 to 200 metres from the enemy’s line, sap-heads must be pushed out in front. If this is impossible at certain points, an advance should be made towards the enemy’s position during the night preceding the assault and a trench dug there. It is difficult for the enemy to complete the destruction of stationary obstacles and particularly of defensive organizations from which flanking fire can be brought to bear on the enemy. The best results are obtained by methodical bombardments repeated several times for varying periods, which will give no indication of the hour fixed for the attack. Explosions of mines under or immediately in front of the enemy’s trenches have proved very effective; they not only demolish obstacles, but damage the enemy’s moral[e]. (b.) A surprise attack is very little protection against artillery fire. The

hostile artillery watches very carefully the ground over which an attack may come and can open fire on it at a few minutes’ notice, creating barrages of fire which have been methodically prepared. Such fire, even though it may not be completely neutralized, can be considerably affected if the hostile guns have already been engaged over a long period, and if rapid fire is opened on them about half-an-hour before the assault takes place. To obtain this result there can never be too much artillery in position. During the assault, part of this artillery, at least one gun per battery, must still continue to engage the hostile guns, in order to prevent any attempt on the part of the enemy to renew his activity. (c.) The best hour at which to commence the attack would appear to be about dawn; our own troops can then be brought up under cover of night and we have the whole day in front of us. (d.) The conduct of the attack should be governed by the following principles:— The attack should be carried out by successive waves, which will cross the trenches one after the other and thus give the enemy’s front line no time to recover; in addition, the arrival of the enemy’s reserves must be prevented by barrage fire (see paragraph b). Progress will naturally vary in the different sectors of attack. The task of our reserves will be to attack in flank the portion of the enemy’s line which could not be carried by frontal attack. Nevertheless, in the most favourable circumstances there will come a moment when the force of the attack will be completely exhausted and the offensive will come to a standstill. (e.) The uncertainty which exists, owing to want of experience, as to the distance our leading assaulting troops can cover (that is, the divisions in first line), necessitates, at any rate in the areas where complete penetration is desired, keeping fresh divisions at hand and putting them into the fight before the enemy has time to consolidate his new positions. It may be of advantage to push forward and deploy these divisions, and to wait for nightfall, during which the troops which have made the assault may be relieved.

PLAN OF ATTACK.

14. From what has already been said, it follows that the plan of attack must be very carefully prepared a long time beforehand. It is neither possible nor desirable to attack on the whole front in the same manner. It is not possible because the nature of the ground, the distances to be traversed, and the organization of the hostile positions vary in different sectors; it is not advisable because we do not wish the enemy to have an accurate idea as to our intentions. The assault will not be carried through everywhere, e.g., where the distance to be crossed is too great, or where obstacles exist which cannot be crossed or destroyed. In such cases, reserves will be required only in rear of the trenches adjoining the sector where the real assault is to take place. The special task of these reserves will be to attack later on in flank those portions of the hostile line which are not attacked in front. The strength of the troops will vary in the different sectors selected for the assault. Where there is little chance of a rapid advance, troops may be economized in order to employ them in enormous numbers in the sectors where success is probable. Communication, especially to the rear, will entail different arrangements in the various sectors, and depending on the number of hostile trenches. The artillery preparation, even as regards its duration, will also vary greatly. In certain localities it should commence several days beforehand, at other points only a few hours before the attack is launched. Pauses in the fire may last either for days or for hours. At times, deliberate fire will be employed; at other times, rapid fire. In one place, the assault may follow immediately on the artillery preparation; in others, it will take the form of a surprise, several hours or even days after artillery fire has ceased. The technical preparation of the assault by the engineers may also be organized in different ways, particularly as regards its duration. Certain mines will be exploded close to or underneath the enemy immediately prior to the assault; others, which are intended to form positions from which the assault can start, will, naturally, be exploded earlier.

PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK. 15. (a.) Thorough reconnaissance of the objective carried on for weeks, especially battery emplacements, then the infantry positions throughout their whole depth, and especially as regards flanking works, and finally the retired positions which can be taken up by the enemy. The results will be shown on 1/10,000 maps. (b.) Registration of all the hostile artillery positions, in order to be certain of engaging them at the moment of attack; obstacles are to be registered in the same way. While this is being done, merely a few batteries will open deliberate fire. (c.) Increase in the number of the support trenches, so as to give cover to the troops intended for the assault. By this means it will be possible to move forward all the available forces in order to avoid the barrage fires which are sure to be opened. (d.) Construction of trenches from which the assault may start, or at least of sap heads, in cases where our own trenches are too far from the enemy. This work should be carried out a small portion at a time, so as not to attract the enemy’s attention. It is of great advantage to prepare mines so that craters may be formed shortly before the assault takes place. (e.) Formation of depots, for artillery ammunition as well as engineer stores. (f.) Bringing up the attacking troops into their proper sectors and detailed preparation in each sector.

ACTION OF THE INFANTRY DURING THE ATTACK. 16. (a.) First line.—The companies in front line have the most difficult task, that of actually piercing the front; they must therefore be very strong. In order to carry out penetration, these companies are formed in four to six lines; the centre of the directing company moves on a clearly distinguishable point which everyone should know. Circumstances must decide whether a definite

objective should be laid down and the attack halted on attaining it, or whether the attack should advance in all its depth until it is brought to a standstill. Flanking works will be dealt with by troops specially posted and held in readiness to attack them. Other special troops will be detailed for clearing the trenches and evacuating prisoners. The grenade is the principal weapon for use against an enemy in the trenches. Small obstacles must be crossed by the infantry unaided; pioneers will be responsible only for the more important works necessitating technical knowledge and equipment. The men should as far as possible be in light order: helmet, no pack, greatcoat, otherwise only ammunition and food. Flanking fire, which can never be entirely avoided, should be overcome by a resolute forward movement; this principle should be especially impressed on all the men. (b.) Reserves.—The primary duty of the reserves is to prevent the first line from being checked. As a general rule, this object can be obtained as soon as a check is noticed, by attacking the flanks of the hostile troops who are offering resistance. Secondly, the reserves have to repulse the counter-attacks which are certain to be delivered. The reserves must be brought up as far forward as possible and follow immediately behind the companies in front line. The reserves have machine guns and guns with teams (infantry guns). In the event of the reserves of the division in first line being drawn in before the objective has been reached, portions of the divisions in second line must be unhesitatingly engaged; unless this is done the attack will be without result. (c.) It is of importance for the guidance of the troops, as well as for the artillery, that the amount of progress made by the advanced line should be known in rear. For this purpose signals will be employed (coloured flags, &c.)

ACTION OF THE ARTILLERY DURING THE ATTACK.

17. (a) Preparatory positions.—The artillery, in view of effecting a breakthrough, should be strongly reinforced, and should be ready at least 3 days beforehand; it is, however, most important that the enemy should not notice any increase in the number of batteries. Certain field batteries will be detailed for distribution among the reserves by single guns or by sections and “infantry guns.” They do not fire during the preparation, but are held in readiness to follow the infantry as soon as the latter advances. (b.) Principal task during the fighting.—The preparation of the attack. Neutralization of the enemy’s artillery during the assault is also of the greatest importance; it is only possible to effect this after several weeks’ reconnaissance of the targets, and provided that the closest touch is kept with aeroplane observers for days beforehand. A few days before the commencement of the attack, the artillery as a whole comes into action. Once the attack has started, one gun per battery continues to engage the hostile batteries and hinders them from reopening. Barrages of fire during the assault to prevent the arrival of the enemy’s reserves, in addition to fire devoted to stopping counter-attacks. In order to carry out this task, the whole of the artillery will be employed, except those guns which have been detailed to engage the enemy’s batteries. Accompaniment of the attack by “infantry guns.” The mission of these guns is essentially to bring direct fire to bear, wherever possible, on especially formidable centres of resistance, particularly against localities accompanied by the enemy in the shape of infantry and artillery flanking positions. (c.) Change of position.—Field artillery, except the “infantry guns,” makes preparation for changing position as soon as the positions it has selected have fallen into the hands of its own infantry. Heavy artillery will usually move forward when the hostile battery positions have been captured, for only then is its task against their initial positions finished. In such cases rapid changes of position are essential in order to hinder the enemy from reopening fire. The movement of artillery across an area cut up by trenches and obstacles demands considerable preparation, which is the task of the engineers. (d.) Registering and observation of fire during the attack.—Observers and

telephone detachments should accompany the infantry.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PENETRATION OF THE ENEMY’S LINE. 18. In the event of a successful penetration of the enemy’s line, the measures to be taken must be arranged in advance, for penetration is merely the means to an end. There can be only one object: “to be in a position to fight a decisive engagement in the open field by the operation, which is thus rendered possible, of enveloping the enemy’s flanks, and by attacking the reserves which he will bring up.” Thus, at all costs, delay must be avoided; for in that event we shall find ourselves in a cul-de-sac in far more unfavourable circumstances than when we started. This inability to develop our success may result from a dispersion of our offensive force after penetration has been effected. This defect may be avoided by organizing a defensive flank with comparatively weak forces, in order to continue engaging the main force in the desired direction. In order to create a defensive flank, we must utilize the ground; this can be done in many ways. For instance, we may be able to rest the flank of our attack from its commencement on a feature nearly perpendicular to our front. This feature can eventually be utilized as a defensive flank; we can also make use of several kilometres of ground parallel to our front or, what is better still, a ground feature running obliquely across our front. This point is so important that every effort should be made to select ground which favours the attack from this point of view, as well as from the point of view of the tactical execution of the operation of penetration. 19. The action to be taken after penetration has been effected must also be prepared methodically. This principle is as applicable to both the selection and organization of one’s forces for the defensive plan, as it is to the preparation, execution and development of the offensive.

Metal army identity tag from the middle part of the war giving the soldier’s name, address, date of birth and unit. In event of death the tag was broken into two parts, one remaining with the body the other serving to record the deceased. Approximately two million German soldiers died.

CHAPTER 4

German Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors Issued by the CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY. 12th December, 1915. Issued by GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE) [British], GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 10th December, 1916. SECRET. NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT LINE.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF FLAME PROJECTORS. A.—TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. 1. Flame projectors (Flammenwerfer) are a new weapon for trench warfare. The 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion (6 Coys.) has been equipped with them and trained in their use. They are under the command of General Headquarters and will be placed at the disposal, as a unit or by sections, or particular formations for a particular purpose, when they will, for the time being, be entirely under the orders of the responsible Commander, who, after consulting with the Flame Projector Commander and taking the limitations of

the weapon into consideration, will give the tactical orders for the assault. The responsibility for their technical employment rests entirely with the Flame Projector Coordinator. 2. Each company of the 3rd Guide Pioneer Battalion is equipped with 20 to 22 large flame projectors (range of jet 33-44 yards). They will be built into sapheads, advanced galleries or the front line position. In addition, each company has 18 small flame projectors (range of jet 16-19 yards). These are easily portable and will be carried on the back. B.—CAPABILITIES OF FLAME PROJECTORS. 3. During a flame attack each large flame projector (built in at about 27 yards distance from the enemy’s trench), will cover the enemy’s foremost trenches with flames on a front of about 55 yards. The enemy in these trenches will either be destroyed or driven off, or if he happens to be in deep dugouts will have his moral[e] so shaken that he will allow himself to be captured without resistance. Machine guns, even if provided with overhead cover or in blockhouses, are put out of action by directing the flames against the loopholes. The flame attack lasts about one minute. 4. The front covered by a company of the 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion is about 1100 to 1640 yards. The effect, physical and moral, of such a flame attack on the enemy is very great.

German troops with a French flame-thrower. The modern flame-thrower was patented in Germany before the war and first used in combat in 1915. The latest small German models were carried backpack style, and were thus rather more practical than many types used by other nations. Naturally, flame attacks generated new tactics.

5. The assault will be made by infantry and pioneers immediately after the flame attack. Detachments with small flame projectors will accompany the assaulting troops in order to overcome any resistance which may be offered by blockhouses etc., and also to spread the fear of the flames to the enemy’s rearward positions. Many successive positions can often be taken by assault at the same time. 6. The small, portable flame projectors may often be employed with advantage in combination with bombers in making progress in the enemy’s trenches, and for flank attacks on portions of trench, etc. C.—NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR FLAME ATTACKS 7. For large flame projectors, trenches, sapheads and galleries must have been pushed forward to within 27 yards at least of the enemy’s position at several points, or there must be a prospect that they will be able to approach

so near within the next few days. 8. For small flame projectors, the portions of trench referred to in para. 6 must be approached under the cover of trenches or saps. 9. In both cases (paras 7 and 8) an accurate previous reconnaissance of the points at which the flame projectors are to be employed, and of the approaches to them is absolutely essential. This must be made by the officers of the Flame Projector Battalion. The reconnaissance, transport of the apparatus and other preparations take, as a rule, several days. The building in of the large flame projectors requires 12 hours and can be done without the enemy becoming aware of it. 10. The direction of wind has very little influence on the effect of a flame attack. A postponement of an attack will become necessary only if there is a very strong head wind. D.—TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLAME PROJECTOR DETACHMENT 11. Flame projectors must be used offensively. It is forbidden to build flame projectors in as defensive weapons in the foremost lines. Small flame projectors may be used, however, to drive off counter-attacks against positions, the capture of which has been facilitated by a flame attack, until such positions have been consolidated. For technical reasons they cease to be effective after about 48 hours. In other special, and quite exceptional, cases when it is proposed to use them defensively, the Commander of the Flame Projector Detachment should be consulted beforehand. 12. Flame attacks proper (i.e. sudden attacks with a number of large flame projectors, without any special preparation by artillery and trench mortars) should be the usual method of employment. The assaulting troops (infantry, pioneers, and the small flame projectors) must advance at once (i.e., 1 minute after the large flame projectors have come into action) and take every advantage of the panic caused in the enemy’s ranks by the flame attack, with a view to capturing the 2nd and 3rd Line Positions. For the action of the artillery and trench mortars see para 35.

13. If the Commander of the Flame Projector Detachment considers it safe to do so, one or more sections of the front to be attacked may be left untouched by the flames, between the areas covered by the individual large flame projectors which have been built in. The length of such sections may be 100 yards or even more. 14. The fact that the enemy is taken by surprise by the flame attack has much to do with making it a complete success. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that the enemy should not obtain information of the arrival of a Flame Projector Detachment in the Division, etc, or of the sector in which it is intended to employ it. It is consequently necessary that the word “Flammenwerfer” should never be mentioned during a conversation, when speaking over the telephone or in orders. A code word is to be used, such as “Neue Minenwerfer” or something similar. The Detachment will not be spoken of as “Flammenwerfer” Company, but as —th Company, 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion. E.—GENERAL TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS 15. When giving orders for an attack in which large flame projectors are to be employed, the following points based on previous experience should be considered:— (I.)—OBJECTIVES 16. Exact instructions must be given how far the attack is to be pushed under the most favourable conditions. It has happened that our troops, taking advantage of the panic of the enemy, have carried the advance too far, thereby coming under our own artillery barrage. 17. In order to ensure secrecy as much as possible, it is advisable that the intended operation should be denominated by a code word (in writing or when using the telephone), such as “Vortrag,” “Vorführung,” ‘Verhandlung,” (lecture, production, negotiation). (II.)—TIME OF ATTACK 18. As a rule, half an hour, or on dull days one hour before sunset is the most

suitable time. Only in exceptional cases, when, in the course of the day, the destruction, by artillery or trench mortars, of the large flame projectors which are built in appears to be fairly certain, may the attack be carried out in the early morning. 19. It is sometimes advisable that the day and hour should not be mentioned in the orders for the attack, but should temporarily be kept secret, and should be referred to as “X” and “Y”. In later orders, which will be issued in writing only to Battalion, Artillery, and Group Commanders, and the Commanders of independent Companies, inclusive, the time should then be indicated, for instance, as follows: “X” equals 27th Nov. “Y” equals 3.20p.m. (III.)—ASSAULTING TROOPS. 20. The carrying out of the preparations for the attack is often better done if the assault is not made by the troops occupying the trenches, but by a detachment which has been kept in rest billets. All troops which up to that time have been in the trenches will then retire to the 2nd Position shortly before the assault, and as soon as the attack by the assaulting party has begun, again move forward into the foremost trenches previously held by them, in order to hold a possible counter strike. 21. The size of the assaulting force must not be too great. The calculation should be one (man?) of the assaulting party to each metre of front. Each party must have a good Second in Command in addition to the Commander. 22. The individual assaulting columns will be distributed in four successive waves, as follows:— (a) Assaulting Party, which advances immediately after the flame attack and occupies the enemy’s positions. In this party are included bombers, engineers (for the demolition of obstacles) and small flame projectors. (b) Consolidating Party for the consolidation of the enemy’s trenches. (c) Communication Trench Construction Party, to construct communication trenches from the captured trenches to our previous foremost position. (d) Carrying Party, which will take forward material for obstacles,

especially knife-rests, sandbags, hand grenades and ammunition. The attacking parties on the flanks will have several bombing parties and Small Flame Projector Detachments attached to them to assist them in clearing the trenches from the flanks. 23. Assaulting Detachments and Consolidating Parties will take up positions in the saps or in the front line trenches; Communication Trench and Carrier Parties will be ready behind them in the communication trenches. The stationing of troops in readiness will of course depend upon the existing system of saps, and will sometimes necessitate previous reconstruction of this system. 24. The division of the assaulting columns into these parties is best carried out well behind the front. If no other troops are to be employed except those manning the trenches, it is advisable to relieve them, for a short period at least, from the foremost trenches for the purpose of preparation and organization. The troops will march up to their positions in the line in the order detailed for the assault. (IV.)—PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT. 25. Special preparations must be made in order that the assaulting troops can mount the parapet rapidly. Short ladders with one pole about 1 metre longer than the other are the most useful means. These should be made previously in the Engineer Parks. One ladder is required for every 3-4 men of the Assaulting Party. When being taken up to the front line they must be carried horizontally. They must not be placed in position in the trenches until the commencement of the flame attack. 26. All necessary material, such as hand grenades, loophole plates, sandbags, knife-rests, barbed wire, entrenching tools, and light-pistols with ammunition must be kept in readiness either in the communication trench depots or with the assaulting columns. 27. Communication trenches and approaches must be divided up and allotted to the assaulting columns and reserves. Communication trenches, saps, etc., will be marked with numbers, letters or names.

28. Should other troops than those holding the trenches be employed for the assault, their officers and N.C.O.s must carry out a thorough reconnaissance of their trenches in the early dawn and during the day. No unusual movement, however, must take place in the trenches and there must be no loud talking. 29. The advance of the assaulting troops into the front line trenches and the relief of the troops in the trenches must be carried out in complete silence. No talking is to be allowed. Unnecessary crowding together should be avoided. Bayonets will be fixed behind the lines and not in the front line. Rifles must be carried at the trail as far as possible. (V.)—THE ASSAULT IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FLAME ATTACK. 30. Charges (long or concentrated) to create gaps in our own obstacles, will be exploded by the engineers at the earliest 15 minutes before the flame attack, and this work must be completed 10 minutes before the flame attack. It will often be found sufficient if, on the night previous to the attack, the engineers cut the wire which connects the knife-rests in front of the foremost trenches. This must be done without attracting attention, the knife-rests being left in their original position until the troops are ready to attack, i.e., immediately after the flame attack when the engineers will precede the assaulting force, swinging the knife-rests round lengthways at right angles to the parapet. Engineers also hurry forward and make gaps in the enemy’s wire should these not have been made previously by trench mortars or engineer detachments. Obstacles which are not too strong can very often be easily crossed by the assaulting troops, as after a flame attack the enemy fires very little or not at all. 31. The duration of the flame attack is only one minute. The signal for it is given by a siren whistle, or at a given time, watches having been previously synchronized. The assaulting troops must be instructed that they have nothing to fear from the flames and smoke, nor need they fear that they may themselves be caught by the fire jet, as this is cut off by simply turning a tap

previous to their advance. They must understand that they can advance immediately after the cessation of the spray without danger, as small bursts of flame on the ground or in the enemy’s trenches will burn out at once, and a little fire on the ground is at once extinguished when trodden upon. It is most important to impress upon the troops that the assault is much facilitated by the use of the flame projector, as it has been proved by experience that the enemy fires very little or not at all after a flame attack. 32. The assault is made immediately after the flame attack. The Assaulting Party charges, followed closely by the Consolidating Party. The small flame projectors allotted to the Assaulting Party attack any machine guns that are still in action, blockhouses that are still being defended etc., with short bursts of fire. They are at the disposal of the Commander of Assaulting Party for this purpose. It is of the highest importance to drive out the enemy simultaneously to a considerable distance on both flanks by means of bombing and flame projector detachments (see para. 22), and to construct sandbag barricades at these points. Communication trenches which lead into the captured position must also be cleared for a certain distance and blocked by constructing sandbag barricades about 27 yards forward of the position won. The action of the Communication Trench Construction Party will commence immediately after the nearest enemy position has been taken. Material is brought up as soon as possible by the Carrier Party, which will continue to bring up fresh material from the rear as required. Carrier parties can at times on their return journey also take charge of prisoners as far as the point at which the reserves are situated in rear. It is especially important to bring up and dig in machine guns immediately. 33. It may be of advantage to order a password for our attacking troops, especially if several successive positions are to be taken, and in the twilight of dull days. Words which the enemy would find it difficult to pronounce are particularly suitable, such as “Schweineschmalz,” “Stiefelwichse,” etc. (VI.)—ACTION OF THE ARTILLERY AND TRENCH MORTARS

34. In a flame attack pure and simple, which is generally to be preferred (see para. 12), the action of the artillery and trench mortars will not commence until about one minute after the projection of the flames, when the more retired positions, which it is not intended to take, should be shelled. Barrage fire will be opened on the ground behind these positions and on the communication trenches, etc. 35. Should it be impossible, in exceptional circumstances, to dispense with previous preparation by the artillery and trench mortars, only the enemy’s rear positions and not his foremost position are to be shelled. It does not matter if this results in the enemy pressing forward into the positions nearest to us in order to obtain shelter, thereby reinforcing the garrison. It must, however, always be borne in mind that by artillery and trench mortar preparation, the enemy is warned of an imminent attack, and is thus enabled to take precautionary measures. 36. In most cases, however, it is advisable to request the Divisions on the right and left to open with artillery on the enemy’s rear positions behind the front which it is intended to capture. Registration must be carried out so as not to attract attention. 37. As a rule it is advisable to detail a special Artillery Group to repulse hostile counter-attacks. Its commander must take up his position with the Commander of the attacking force and must arrange for special telephonic communication. (VII.)—FORCES ON THE FLANKS OF THE FRONT OF ATTACK. 38. The effect of a flame attack is sometimes felt to the right and left of the front which is covered with flame. Our troops which are posted on the flanks of the actual front of attack can sometimes, therefore, gain ground by a prompt advance in force. It is consequently necessary to keep under close observation the enemy’s troops on the flanks of the front of attack, and, according to circumstances, either subject them to heavy fire or attack them as well. Engineer detachments are to be posted in readiness for forming gaps through the obstacles, should this be necessary.

(VIII.)—EQUIPMENT, AMMUNITION AND RATIONS. 39. The assaulting troops will wear “assault order.” Each man will take his greatcoat, tent square, mess tin, full water bottle, 4 days’ rations in his haversack, and, in addition, at least 200 rounds, 2 hand grenades and rifle with fixed bayonet. The Consolidating Parties are similarly equipped, except that they sling their rifles (bayonets not fixed). Each man will carry a loophole plate, 50 sandbags and heavy entrenching tool. Communication Trench and Carrier Parties will appear in their usual order of dress. Only the N.C.O.s will carry rifles. The men of the Communication Trench Party will each carry a heavy entrenching tool, 50 sandbags and at least 2 hand grenades. (IX.)—TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS 40. A number of infantry telephone lines will be laid from the captured position to the rear, immediately after the assault. 41. All lines leading to the Commander of the attacking force are to be used solely for service messages which concern the attack, so that he can bring his personal influence to bear upon every part of the front.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY XIV. RESERVE CORPS XIV Res. Corps H.Q. Ia No. 629, Secret, Dated 28.4.16. On the 23.3.16 attention of the Divisions was called to the fact that information had been received from the Moritz listening apparatus as to practice by the British with flame projectors and lachrymatory bombs (corps H.Q., Ia No. 451, Secret, dated 23.3.16). During the raid against the 99th Res. Inf. Regt. on the night of the 22nd–23rd April, 1916, lachrymatory bombs were employed. The enemy continues to practice with flame projectors behind his front. Moritz Listening Post No. 62 reports on such a practice for the 29th of this month. It is quite possible that the enemy intends shortly to use this weapon against us. Whether he will combine his flame attack with

artillery fire is doubtful. It is not absolutely necessary. The troops are to be instructed as to the special features of this new weapon (corps H.Q. Ia. No.1505, Secret, dated 19.12.15). Flame projectors which have been built in the enemy’s positions (see para. 2 of the above-mentioned order) must be destroyed as soon as possible by concentrated artillery fire. The small portable projectors constitute a danger to the enemy’s own troops if the men carrying the apparatus are hit. Every effort must be made to do this. (Sd.) V. STEIN.

Postcard sketch of the 1915 type gas mask in use. The German mask was a practical design consisting of a rubberised canvas face piece, and a changeable screw fit metal cylinder filter.

CHAPTER 5

Trench Raid Report CAPTAIN WAGENER’S REPORT ON THE RAID ON THE EVENING OF 11TH APRIL, 1916. At 4 p.m the raiding party marched from Martinpuich through Pozières, then by the Lattorf Graben—Regimentstrichter—Krebs Graben to the appointed dug-outs on the left of Sap No.3, where the evening meal was found ready prepared. At 8 p.m. the artillery preparation commenced as pre-arranged. Shortly after fire was opened, the whole of the enemy’s position from Windmühle to Besenkecke was wrapped in greyish-white smoke, which the wind drove back over Sap No. 3 into our lines. By 8.10 p.m. it was impossible to remain in our trench east of Sap No.3 without wearing a gas mask. This was still the case at 8.20 p.m., when the patrols moved forward from their dug-outs to the Hohlweg, in the order Stradtmann, Dumas, Böhlefeld and Freund. Lieut. Boening followed close behind Lieut. Stradtmann. By 8.25 p.m. the party was posted ready in the Hohlweg. The clouds of gas and smoke, however, still hung so thick over the enemy’s trenches that it was impossible to distinguish whether our own shells were still falling on the point of entry or whether our artillery had already lengthened their range. At 8.27 p.m. Lieut. Stradtmann received the order to advance to the attack with his patrol. Lieutenant Boening, with the six stretcher bearers, left the Hohlweg simultaneously and in rear of Stradtmann’s patrol, and posted

connecting files, whose positions were marked by red signal lamps shaded to the front and to the sides. At 8.28 p.m. Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s patrols advanced. Following the line of connecting files, they reached the point of entry, to find that Stradtmann’s patrol was already in possession of 16 yards of trench, and had captured three prisoners. The latter had come out of their dug-outs just as Lieutenant Stradtmann appeared in front of the enemy’s trench. They carried hand grenades and rifles with bayonets fixed, but were immediately disarmed by Lieutenants Boening and Stradtmann. Dumas’ patrol immediately turned to the left down the trench, and, in a few steps, came upon a half-destroyed machine-gun emplacement. Reservist Nadolny, of Stradtmann’s patrol, was already occupied in digging out the buried machine-gun. Lieutenant Dumas penetrated further along the enemy’s trench, and soon reached the communication trench which runs, roughly, along the dividing line between Target Sectors 79 and 80, towards the Weisse Steinmauer. At this point a large dug-out had been wrecked, apparently by a direct hit. Lieutenant Dumas had previously sent three men of his patrol along behind the enemy’s trench; they reached the communication about 11 yards behind the front line trench. A few Englishmen, who came out of this communication trench, endeavoured to reach the parados of the front line trench, whence they evidently intended to defend it. They were, however, surprised by our three men and bayoneted. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Dumas, with the rest of his men, forced his way further along the trench, and just north of Besenhecke reached the communication trench which leads to the brown prolongation of the Weisse Steinmauer (white stone wall). They passed another wrecked dug-out, in which dead bodies were seen. Adjoining the above-mentioned communication trench, another large dug-out was found, which the patrol intended to clear. As, however, a number of Englishmen advanced upon Dumas’ patrol from the communication trench and alongside it, a mêlée ensued with grenades, rifles and pistols, in the course of which the enemy, after suffering evident loss, either retreated or surrendered, while none of

Dumas’ patrol received wounds of any account. Meanwhile Lieutenant Böhlefeld advanced along the enemy’s trench to the right of the point of entry, and, in a few yards, came to three large dug-outs, of which one was wrecked and full of dead and wounded. At his summons the enemy came out of the others and surrendered without more ado. Lieutenant Böhlefeld sent back the prisoners and asked for reinforcements in order to clear the dug-outs, undertaking, meanwhile, to hold the enemy’s trench with two men. At 8.30 p.m., as no noise came from the point of entry, or from the right of the same, while from a point 65 yards to the left shots and reports of grenades could be heard, I ordered Vice-serjeant-major Elb to advance with five men and reinforce Dumas’ patrol. Lieutenant Erb, the regimental adjutant, attached himself to this party. He was wearing an oxygen-breathing apparatus and had been waiting in the Hohlweg. Shortly after, the sounds of fighting ceased on the left, and the first batch of prisoners was brought back from the enemy’s trench. I had come to the conclusion that we had the upper hand everywhere, especially on the right … At the same time, I sent forward Viceserjeant-major Wölfle with 4 men to reinforce Lieutenant Böhlefeld. In order to have a reserve in hand for meeting all eventualities, I ordered up the Commanders of the two groups on the flank of the 12th Company, which was stationed immediately to the right of Sap No. 3. The groups had been warned in the afternoon and given the necessary instructions. Whilst Viceserjeant-majors Elb and Wölfle, with their men, went in search of Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s patrols, Lieutenant Freund dashed across the enemy’s trench at the point of entry and followed it along to the right as far as the communication trench which leads into the front line trench near the Spion. Freund’s patrol leapt into the enemy’s front line trench on both sides of the communication trench, captured 10 men almost without a struggle, and secured several rifles and articles of equipment. A few Englishmen who offered resistance were bayoneted; Volunteer Herrmann, of the 7th Company, and Lance-Corporal Haufler, of the 4th Company, particularly distinguished themselves. A few Englishmen attempted to get away but were shot dead.

Volunteer Herrmann further discovered an extemporised trench mortar. The latter could not be carried off, however, as it was securely built in. Viceserjeant-major Wölfle, who arrived on the scene shortly after, destroyed the trench mortar as well as he could with hand grenades and pistol shots. Böhlefeld’s reinforced patrol had accompanied the advance of Freund’s patrol along the trench, and came across three or four more wrecked dugouts, which were filled with dead. Individuals standing about in the trench were killed by the patrol or made prisoner. During this affair, Under-Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, repeatedly distinguished himself. Whilst our party was breaking into the enemy’s trenches or perhaps even before, a party of the enemy, approximately 25 to 30 strong, succeeded in getting away from the front line trench and making their way back to the Weisse Steinmauer, but were again driven back by our artillery fire, and now came running towards Stradtmann’s patrol. The latter, apprehending a counter-attack, opened fire. Ersatz Reservist Walzer, of the 11th Company, followed by Under-Officer Staiger, of the 10th Company and others, raised a cheer and charged the Englishmen, bayoneting two of them. Those who did not put up their hands and surrender were killed. Lieutenant Erb had soon caught up Dumas’ patrol and took part in the subsequent fighting, which was practically continuous, for almost every one of the enemy offered resistance. With hand grenade and pistol, Dumas’ patrol killed more than 20 of the enemy, besides wounding a large number. In this fighting Volunteer Hees, of the 6th Company, particularly distinguished himself. Always to the fore, he alone accounted for several Englishmen. On our side only one man was slightly wounded. In consequence of the events described above, Dumas’ patrol remained in the enemy’s trench considerably longer than intended. When all the other patrols had returned to the Hohlweg, the Dumas-Erb patrol was still missing. Hereupon, Lieutenants Boening and Stradtmann, with several noncommissioned officers and men, went back to the enemy’s lines and searched the trench to the left until they met the Dumas-Erb patrol on its way back. Here again Under-Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, 110th Reserve

Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself. At 8.50 p.m., the last of the entire party had returned to the Hohlweg and went back to their dug-outs. At 8.51 p.m., the first shell fell on the front line trenches east of Sap. No.3. At 8.57 p.m., the artillery commander was informed that the artillery fire could be gradually broken off. At 9 p.m., a heavy battery near Albert dropped a few shells near Sap. No.3. At 9.05 p.m., the conclusion of the operation was reported. The following were captured:— 24 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners, 1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles, and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks and gas helmets. Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the advanced dressingstation and immediately returned to the patrol. (Signed) WAGENER, Captain and Company Commander 40 copies, as appendices to the Report of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of the 11th April, 1916.

Section through a double tube concrete shelter for reserve troops. Taken from the official manual Stellungsbau, 1916. The use of concrete defences increased during the war, particularly on the Western

Front.

Helft uns Siegen ! Zeichnet Kriegsanleihe : Help us to win ! Sign war bonds, 1917, an image by Fritz Ehrler of Munich created in support of the war effort. The soldier is depicted with gas mask and grenade bag. The bombs are 1916-type stick grenades with caps removed and pull cords exposed ready for use.

CHAPTER 6

Machine Gun Instructions [S.S. 487]

1a/20744

ORDER OF THE 6TH BAVARIAN DIVISION REGARDING MACHINE GUNS. No 35191 6th Bavarian Infantry Division

Divisional Headquarters September 3rd, 1916.

MACHINE GUNS. The Battle of the Somme has again shown the decisive value of machine guns in defence. If they can be kept in a serviceable condition until the enemy’s infantry attacks and are then brought up into the firing position in time, every attack must fail. The greater the efforts the enemy makes in the future to destroy our trenches before his assault by an increased expenditure of ammunition, the greater the extent to which we must rely on the employment of machine guns for repulsing attacks. These should be brought into action unexpectedly and continue the fight when the greater part of the garrison of the front line trenches is out of action, and the enemy’s barrage fire renders it difficult to bring up reinforcements. In view of the above, all improvements to existing works and all new construction must be carried out on the following principles:— 1. In regular trench systems, the accurate trace of which is known to the enemy by aeroplane photographs and which he is therefore able to destroy, as

regards the greater part, at least, of the foremost trenches, the employment of machine guns is only permissible when they can be kept in a serviceable condition in deep dug-outs with several exits, and when it is possible to bring them into position in time, owing to the existence of strong obstacles which cannot be completely destroyed by bombardment, or to the possibility of close observation of the enemy’s movements. The 1st Trench and the ground between it and the 2nd Trench are, therefore, quite out of the question, for even if they contain excellent dug-outs there is no certainty that the enemy’s assault can be seen in time. Machine guns should therefore be placed, as a rule, behind the 2nd or, better still, behind the 3rd Trench. The methodical fire by which the enemy seeks to destroy our trenches is considerably less effective here, and further, the obstacles erected in front of the 2nd or 3rd Trenches and round the machine gun emplacements themselves make it possible to see the enemy’s assault in time. Commanding positions with a very wide field of fire, or positions which can at least flank the trench system should be selected. About half the machine guns should be allotted to such positions. 2. The remainder should be sited behind the trench system on ground further in rear, in deep pits which are usually covered over and also on platforms concealed in trees, in such a manner that the enemy is caught in an unexpected cross-fire if he breaks through. The important point is that the machine guns should not, in any circumstances, be detected beforehand. They must not, therefore, be too close to trenches which can be photographed or to well-defined woods which the enemy will suspect in any case. The best sites are in the open, in or under clumps of trees and bushes, or in hedges. All the earth excavated must be removed or concealed under hedges, etc. A low network of trip-wires has proved to be the best form of obstacles. To each machine gun there should be allotted a certain number of infantrymen armed with hand grenades, who can also work the gun if necessary. 3. The construction of special machine gun emplacements is not advisable. If sited in the position itself, they are destroyed, and if further in rear they disclose their positions. The guns should either be fired from improvised

mountings or from sandbags. 4. In cases where the ground which the enemy’s attack has to cross is not covered by machine guns sited in retired positions, it is necessary to hold machine guns in readiness even in the 1st Trench, particularly by night or during misty weather, as a means of defence against surprise attacks made without artillery preparation, though these can only be of local and minor importance. The machine guns mentioned in para. 2 should be employed for this purpose. By day, however, or at the very latest as soon as intense artillery fire begins, they should be taken back to their proper positions. 5. Machine guns may always be sited in the front trench in thick woods or under other exceptional conditions. The decision in such cases will rest with me; suggestions should be submitted. (signed) V. HOEHN. ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES A—10/16—S409— 1,600

German troops pose with a captured Russian Maxim gun on a wheeled ‘Solokov’ carriage. The weapon

was pulled along on its wheels but could be raised on legs for steady fire. Automatic weapons of all descriptions had an important influence on the development of tactics.

S.S. 450.

1a/18577 M.

REGULATIONS FOR MACHINE-GUN OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS [GERMAN, 1916] 1. Emplacements.—Machine-Gun emplacements must always be kept in such a condition as will allow the gun to cover the whole of the prescribed field of fire. Heaps of earth which catch the eye or other means of identification, are to be avoided. Close to each emplacement, there must be two alternative emplacements, each of which has, on the whole, the same field of fire as the main emplacement. Only during an engagement will firing take place from the main or alternative emplacements. As a matter of principle, daily firing must be carried out elsewhere. As much care as possible must be taken not to damage entanglements by fire. Every Officer and N.C.O. must be thoroughly acquainted with the M.G. emplacements of his sector. 2. Ammunition.—Sixteen full boxes are placed by each gun. As soon as a box has been fired, it will be immediately replaced from the belt-store. Each man must know the position of the belt-store. Repeated miss-fires and serious jambs will be immediately reported to the sector machine-gun officer, who will forward the reports to the company commander (in the trenches). The platoon commander will take stock daily of the filled belts in the beltstore. Each No. 1 is responsible that the belts are kept dry. Damp belts must be kept in the dug-outs and dried at an even temperature, but not put close to the stove. Belts must not be exposed to too great a heat or they will deteriorate. A reserve of 2,500 loose rounds per gun will be kept in the ammunition store as an iron ration, and will only be used in the event of an engagement. As soon as the ammunition supply is below 5,000 loose rounds per gun, exclusive of the iron ration, a report will be made to the sector

machine-gun officer, who will immediately indent for ammunition on the company commander (in the trenches). 3. Water.—In addition to the filled water buckets, a water barrel will be kept filled, and stored in a safe place near the gun. The sector machine-gun officer will report weekly to the company commander (in the trenches) as to the existence and proper condition of the barrel. 4. Barrels.—Three good “S” barrels will always be kept by each gun. In addition, one new “S” barrel per gun will be kept in the ammunition store; it will be regarded as an iron ration. 5. Hand Grenades.—Near each gun, six hand grenades will be kept in a safe place, within reach of the sentry. In addition, six hand grenades will be properly stored in each dug-out, and ten hand grenades per gun will be kept with the reserve ammunition as an iron ration. 6. “Flare” Pistols and Ammunition.—With each gun there will always be one “flare” pistol and 35 “flare” cartridges—20 white, 10 red and 5 green. In the ammunition store will be kept 20 “flare” cartridges per gun—10 white, 5 red and 5 green. At night, one of the sentries will always carry a “flare” pistol and ammunition. 7. Small-arms.—Small arms will always be kept clean. No pistol (automatic) will be kept with a cartridge in the chamber; only at night will a sentry have his pistol loaded and at safety. On being relieved, he will unload. Otherwise, one filled charger will be kept in the pistol and a second in the pouch. The No. 1 will inspect small-arms once a week and report the result to the platoon commander. The sector machine-gun officer and the platoon commanders will satisfy themselves as to the condition of the small-arms by frequent and unexpected inspections. Side-arms will be kept slightly greased. It is forbidden to put them into the fire. 8. Tools.—With each gun is a tool-case of which the contents must be kept complete (with the exception of files and chisels). Files and chisels, and also a tool chest will be kept in the armoury of the sector, where small repairs will

be executed. No repairs must be carried out except under the supervision of the armourer. *Each box contains a belt of 250 rounds. (Trans.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS IN THE ATTACK. [GERMAN STAFF] FEBRUARY, 1918. I. The great material and moral effect of machine gun fire must be allowed full play in the infantry attack. The machine gun groups must fight in close cooperation with the groups armed with the rifle, care being taken that they do not mutually impede each other’s section. The time is past when it was sufficient to engage machine guns with a view to obtaining isolated successes at decisive points in the infantry combat. The value of the machine gun in defence is well known. In attack it is only now being tentatively grasped. The experience gained in the more recent fighting shows that the very number of machine guns, with their multifarious tasks, necessitates measures being taken for directing their activity continuously. Once the battle begins, the moment soon arrives when orders can no longer reach their destination. Everyone must then act on his own initiative, and this is especially the case with the heavy machine gun sections which are engaged as isolated units behind the front line. For these reasons it is necessary, especially for the attack, to lay down the principles of the employment of machine guns, and to train the subordinate commanders and the troops in accordance with these principles. II. The organization of the intended attack is the essential condition for its success.

Commanders and troops must have a thorough knowledge of the ground conditions of fighting and object of the battle, and must be fully instructed on the ground in the details of the plan of attack. The commander must be given a clear and not too restricted idea of the task required of his men. The man must be convinced that the attack has been methodically prepared and must have a thorough knowledge of his own task. Machine gun observation and reconnaissance will be employed to supplement other means of obtaining information, in cases where the peculiarities of the arm necessitate special measures (e.g. reconnaissance of the enemy’s defensive line, maps to be supplemented by photographs, determination of the heights of the enemy’s lines as compared with those of our own trenches at the jumping-off point). The machine-gun emplacements of the enemy’s forward battle zone must be located. Knowledge of the ground to be crossed is of special importance to the light machine guns, which are intended to carry forward the attack of the more lightly equipped riflemen. Further, the heavy machine guns require instructions which regulate their advance, sector by sector, and facilitate their further engagement. Before the attack they must know where their next fire position is to be sought for. III. The following machine guns are available for the attack:— (a) The light machine guns of the infantry companies. (b) The heavy machine guns of the infantry (one machine gun company per battalion). (c) The machine gun marksman detachments (each consisting of three companies) will be allotted to the sectors of attack as required. In the attack, these various kinds of machine guns will be employed as follows:— 1. The light machine gun groups (each of one N.C.O. and eight men, with one light machine gun), which are to be equipped for independent action (rifles, pistols, hand grenades, entrenching tools), form, owing to their great mobility and concentrated fire power, the framework of the infantry attack.

They can carry on the fire fight, if necessary, without any groups of riflemen. An endeavour should be made to form two of these machine gun groups in each infantry platoon, so that they may mutually support each other by fire. From the jumping-off trenches, the machine gun groups push as far forward as they can (if possible, before the end of the artillery and trench mortar preparatory bombardment) as “offensive points” (“offensive nests”). Their task is to secure the advance of their own infantry within the sectors allotted to them, by keeping down the fire of the enemy’s front line and of any hostile machine guns which may remain intact. The fire of the advanced light machine guns will be opened suddenly, directly the artillery and trench mortar preparatory bombardment ceases; it will cease when the first wave penetrates into the enemy’s position. These machine gun groups then follow the first wave. Other machine gun groups form part of this wave. Their place is with the platoon commanders. During the advance, they open fire at close range; they take part in rolling up the enemy’s trenches and form the main fire power of the platoons which push right through as far as the initial objective of the assault. Here the machine gun groups will at once dig themselves in, will cover the reorganization of the attacking troops and will pursue the retreating enemy with fire. If bunching occurs in the line, the machine gun groups which are following up will fill up the resulting gaps, either by occupying them or by fire. If the advanced machine gun groups encounter resistance, they will take up the fire fight, keep down the enemy’s fire by their own fire, and thus enable the groups of riflemen and the machine gun groups following them up to reach the enemy. The back waves will, on their own initiative, make good any casualties in the first wave among the machine gun groups and groups of riflemen. Machine gun groups will be pushed forward to form an advanced wave, even when a considerable distance has to be covered before reaching the enemy. If the fighting strengths do not permit of special groups of riflemen being formed, the machine gun groups can be correspondingly strengthened.

Particularly brave and level-headed N.C.O.s should be selected as the commanders of these groups. The infantry platoon commander will be with one of these groups. It is the duty of all commanders, as the attack progresses, to maintain the full power of the light machine guns and to arrange for the continual replenishment of ammunition. If the light machine guns are supported in this way, their mobility and fire power will be equal to the greatest demands. 2. The heavy machine guns should, in the infantry battle, above all assist the progress of the attack of the light machine gun groups. They support the light machine guns in their fight against battle aeroplanes and tanks. By distribution in depth, they should afford a permanent security against the enemy’s counter-thrusts, even during the forward movement of an offensive. By the manner in which they are at all times echeloned, they must, even when advancing, always be in a position to bring heavy fire to bear to a flank as a protection against hostile, outflanking movements. In the preparations for the attack, there should be no difficulties in employing the heavy machine guns so that they can fulfill all these tasks, provided the plans are well thought out. It is, of course, essential to redistribute them in depth for the attack before they leave their departure positions. If the attack eventually develops into a steady advance, the trained initiative of the subordinate machine gun commanders must be exercised. In the co-operation of the various arms on the battlefield, the heavy machine guns form the connecting link with the Minenwerfer and field guns. In virtue of their mobility, they must have come into action in support of the attack especially at points where the heavier weapons have not been able to co-operate, owing to the rapidity of the advance. The engagement of hostile machine guns is not their principal task; Granatenwerfer and Minenwerfer are more suitable for this. In the employment of heavy machine guns, the object in view must be to produce the greatest fire effect at points where the hostile infantry is fighting a decisive battle. In principle the heavy machine guns are employed in sections, apart from

the infantry. Their place is only in the infantry lines when the latter require an immediate increase in the intensity of their fire, and when the co-operation of the heavy machine guns from their positions in depth (overhead or through gaps) or from a flank is impossible. They then conform to the movements of the front line and form part of the infantry company. The assembly positions of the heavy machine guns must be concealed from the enemy’s view and every advantage of ground taken with a view to fire effect. Conspicuous localities should be avoided in principle. It is essential that extremely accurate ranging should have been carried out in good time. The first task of the heavy machine gun in the attack is to cover the first objectives of the infantry with a belt of fire, in which there should be as few gaps as possible. The object of this is to keep the enemy down in his trenches and communication trenches, after the artillery and Minenwerfer fire has ceased or lifted. Whether this machine gun fire is directed against the enemy’s front line or against the ground in rear, depends upon the distance between the battle lines and the nature of the ground. Fire for effect directed against the foremost portions of the enemy’s position will, in principle, be carried out by sections, direct fire being employed. Barrage fire necessitates the concentration of several sections with an increased allotment of ammunition and centrally controlled; it can be either direct or indirect. The individual guns fire alternately (up to four minutes’ continuous fire). Commanding and flanking positions are particularly valuable. Special attention should be paid to the direction of machine gun fire on the enemy’s back lines, as heavy machine guns can here, at the critical moment of penetration, to a certain extent take the place of the artillery fire, which has been lifted. The fire of all the heavy machine guns in the intermediate ground is opened methodically at the moment the infantry dashes forward. Arrangements must in any case be made to regulate the duration of the fire according to a timetable. Direct observation of the fire cannot be relied on owing to the dust and

smoke raised by the enemy’s barrage. Indirect fire, which requires particularly accurate and careful preparation, can alone be employed if the ground does not permit of direct overhead fire and if it is not possible to open flanking fire or to fire through gaps. Indirect fire will give considerable assistance in harassing the enemy’s messenger service and his traffic behind. When the enemy’s line has been penetrated, and the task of the attacker is not merely the capture of hostile trenches but is a question of making a further advance, the heavy machine guns are free to carry out the fresh tasks which have been previously assigned to them. Pushing forward sector by sector, they follow the infantry waves, making full use of the ground and avoiding the enemy’s artillery fire. Their objectives are points from which overhead and flanking fire can be brought to bear. Their task while the attack progresses is to undertake repeatedly the protection of the infantry and light machine guns, wherever an opportunity of effective action is presented. The heavy machine guns advance by sections and alternately. One section must always be in action ready to open fire. During the advance, the sections must always bear in mind that it will be their task to offer resistance to a hostile counter-attack, and that they must be able to intervene rapidly to a flank. This advance by sections is controlled by the machine gun company commander, in accordance with the instructions of the battalion commander, with whom he must make every endeavour to maintain uninterrupted communication. Nevertheless, he must never omit to take the necessary measures in case orders fail to reach him. He must continually watch the advance of his own infantry and of the Granatenwerfer and Minenwerfer. 3. The assembly and advance of the mobile machine gun reserve (for instance, the machine gun company of the reserve battalion or the machine gun marksman detachment) will be carried out under the orders of the higher command. Its equipment must be suitable for every possible mode of employment. Its engagement, if possible as a complete unit, will become necessary at points where the fire of the machine gun company is insufficient, where artillery fire is wanting, or where a threat from a flank, or a counterattack, endangers the success of the infantry attack.

4. In this manner, the attack progresses to its final objective. From the distribution in depth which is effected at the assembly point, the attack of the machine guns, with their continually repeated co-operation, develops automatically with overwhelming force. Task after task springs up, depending on the tactical situation and merging one into another, all of which must be carried out by the machine gunners on their own initiative within the sector allotted to them. The raison d’étre of the machine guns, however, is always the same, viz., to clear the way for the resolute forward drive of our infantry by a determined endeavour to bring their offensive power to bear as far forward as possible. IV. Machine guns which, during the attack, lose touch with the troops in front or with the supplies coming up from the rear, become valueless as fighting troops. Mobility and the ability to adapt themselves to any kind of ground are absolutely essential, and presuppose suitable equipment and training. The guiding principle must, therefore, be to relieve the fighting troops of everything which is not of immediate necessity, and to make suitable arrangements for it to be sent up as required. With the present fighting strengths and number of horses available, the infantry company should calculate on four light machine guns with 2,000 rounds per gun (in addition, one spare gun), and the machine gun company should calculate on six heavy machine guns with sledges and 5,000 rounds per gun, as the daily requirement (in addition, three spare guns) for the carrying out of an attack from the moment the unit is engaged, A suitable proportion of the ammunition should be armour-piercing. About 1,500 rounds for the light machine gun and 2,000 rounds for the heavy will be carried with the guns; the remainder of the ammunition will follow as a mobile reserve, partly with the company commander and partly with the battalion commander, in any case within the battalion. By means of carrying parties, hand-carts, pack animals and vehicles, all that the fighting troops cannot take with them, but will require in order to replace

expenditure, will be methodically brought up behind them and sent forward in accordance with orders issued by the regiment (regimental machine-gun officer). The conscientious bringing forward of the ammunition echelons demands that their commanders should be unsparing towards themselves and should exercise the strictest discipline. V. Machine-gun troops, equipped for the attack as here outlined, will be trained while at rest, on ground presenting as far as possible suitable features. The method of attack of alternating light machine gun groups, viz., those which by their fire keep down the enemy’s fire and those which simultaneously work forward supported by groups of riflemen, and of the heavy machine guns which intervene wherever the attacking troops encounter obstinate resistance, requires careful preparation; this should include practice with ball ammunition on a field firing range, with carefully considered arrangements for representing the enemy. Commanders and men must be tested as to their fitness to carry out their battle tasks and must be trained in the most minute details of all tasks which can fall to their lot in the attack. The whole of the infantry must have an accurate knowledge of the capabilities of the light and heavy machine guns, and must be accustomed to fight under the screen of fire furnished by the machine guns. The infantry must learn how great is the assistance which the machine gun can afford it in the attack. Thorough training must be carried out in the employment of the technical aids, the use of special ammunition (for use against tanks and aeroplanes), of the signaling apparatus and flares, and of every form of observation and communication. A quick eye, the capability of forming a decision and an intimate knowledge of the technical side of the machine-gun fire fight, combined with ruthless personal driving power and energy, are the attributes which should characterize a machine gun commander. General Staff (Intelligence)

Central Headquarters

The water-cooled belt-fed 08/15 light machine gun was based on the MG 08 machine gun that had been issued before the war. Though still fairly cumbersome, it could be carried into the attack and set up more quickly. By the end of the war it was the most widespread automatic weapon in German service.

CHAPTER 7

Nahkampfmittel MANUAL OF POSITION WARFARE FOR ALL ARMS. PART 3. WEAPONS OF CLOSE COMBAT (“Nahkampfmittel”) 1st January, 1917. Issued by the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army. BERLIN, 1917. “This manual takes the place of the one dated 7-8-16 which is to be destroyed.” GENERAL STAFF (HEADQUARTERS), GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, [BRITISH] 23rd May, 1917.

NOTE BY GENERAL STAFF. The new edition of “Nahkampfmittel,” dated 1st January, 1917, is considerably fuller than the earlier one of the 1st August, 1916. The most important change is contained in the announcement that there are now only time hand grenades in the German service; only two, the “Stick”

and the “Egg,” are mentioned in the text. It is stated, as in the earlier edition, that no more rifle grenades will be manufactured, as, owing to their inaccuracy, no real effect can be obtained with them. Details of the duties of parties for bombing along trenches, with diagram, are given for the first time. Whilst stick grenade throwers engage the enemy’s bombers, egg grenade throwers are to bomb the carriers behind them. There are no bayonet men, the leader of the party is in front and guards it with rifle or pistol. It is laid down that the best weapons for repelling an enemy are the machine gun and rifle, but that the hand grenade is especially suited to get him out of shell holes. Every man of the fighting troops of all arms is to be trained in the use of hand grenades. There are new sections on the use of stick hand grenades as charges for demolition purposes.

HAND GRENADES. GENERAL. 1. For close combat, hand grenades are in every way as important as rifles and pistols. Every man of the fighting troops of all arms must be trained in their use and thoroughly understand the nature of hand grenade fighting. 2. For success in this, the decisive factors are:— The accuracy, length and quickness of throwing of the individual bombers, and a well-arranged supply of grenades. A short but heavy and unexpected volley of grenades is often sufficient to stop the enemy. 3. The cylinder hand grenade with stick (stick hand grenade) has only concussive effect; the egg grenade produces a large number of useful fragments and can be thrown farther owing to its more suitable form and smaller weight. Egg grenades, in view of their fragmentation, should be thrown from cover if possible. At the present moment, all the hand grenades used in the German Army are time grenades. ATTACK.

4. In the attack, the special use of hand grenades is to cause the destruction or the surrender of the enemy, if he is behind or under cover where he cannot be reached by rifle fire. 5. The equipment of bombers varies with their task. The following is often suitable:— Steel helmet; slung rifle or carbine, or pistol; two sandbags containing hand grenades slung round the neck or over both shoulders, or two special hand grenade carriers; entrenching implement; gas helmet; haversack with four iron rations; two water bottles; no valise nor pouches (cartridges being carried in the pockets or in the haversack). 6. As a rule, each man, including the commander of the party, should carry 6 to 8 stick hand grenades or rather more egg grenades. Detachments and men employed on special tasks where very heavy close fighting is taking place, should be given larger quantities. 7. If it happens in an attack that the attackers are fired on from a hostile trench beyond hand grenade range, they must all close on the trench at full speed, throwing their grenades, lie down whilst the grenades burst, and then rush into the trench without hesitation. If, in the course of this, the men come upon an obstacle which has not been completely destroyed, a continuous stream of hand grenades must be kept up whilst it is being cut. In an attack on special points in the enemy’s line, e.g., a flanking emplacement, or in rolling up the enemy by working along a trench, only a few men as a rule should throw, the others should supply hand grenades and protect the throwers. 8. Special enterprises carried out by means of hand grenade attack, e.g. fighting for identifications, occupation of shell craters, capture of a particular piece of trench, seizure of blockhouse, copses and farms, etc., generally require a thorough preparation by the fire of other arms (machine guns, trench mortars, artillery), and also their support during the attack. 9. Special measures must be taken to secure the maintenance of the supply of hand grenades.

DEFENCE. 10. To repel an assault, the best weapons are machine guns and rifles. If time hand grenades are thrown at assaulting infantry, they will not as a rule explode until the enemy has passed beyond them, and so do him no damage. The use of hand grenades becomes valuable only when firearms cannot be employed; or when the enemy has got a lodgement in a dead angle, in shell holes, etc., close to our position, where he cannot be reached by firearms; or when he has broken into our trenches anywhere. 11. Skilled bombers should be stationed under cover at places where communication trenches run into fire trenches, alongside the trench blocks, near flanking machine guns, and near the company or platoon commander to act as his reserve. 12. Hand grenades should be available at such places; but care must also be taken that they are ready to hand in every other part of the position. 13. In the dumps nearest the front, they should be kept “fuzed” —that is, with the detonator or fuze in them. They should be packed in watertight boxes, and stored in recesses in the casing of dug-outs, or in the front slope of the trenches. In critical situations, hand grenades should be issued to every man detailed to the front line. Patrols and listening posts should always be supplied with hand grenades. 14. Further supplies should be kept in the rearward lines and positions, and in communication trenches, stored in hand grenade recesses and in special shell-proof dumps. Sign boards, visible both by day and night, to indicate the position of the dumps, are desirable. 15. There must be a good supply of hand grenades stored in the dug-outs occupied by the supports and reserves, so that there are sufficient to issue to troops for a counter-attack. 16. Command and observation posts, emplacements for guns detailed for repelling assaults, batteries, and trench mortar positions should be allotted a certain number of hand grenades for their defence. …

TRAINING. [Sections 22–40. Of these, Sections 37–39 are translated below. In Sections 22–36 and 40, the only points of special interest are that the following are taught:—] (a) Throwing over a wire netting fence 13 ft. high to secure a good angle of descent. (b) Throwing from one sap head into another. (c) Throwing from shell holes. (d) Throwing between trees and tree stumps. (e) Method of using the enemy’s hand grenades. 37. The prescribed course of instruction should be followed by exercises with a definite objective, e.g., attack of blockhouses and machine guns, and working along a trench. 38. For working along trenches, the practices should take place first in straight trenches, then in wavy ones, and finally in zigzag ones and in connected shell holes. The practices can be arranged in the following manner:— For the distribution of the group, see Figs. 5, 6 and 7. Only the two bombers, “a,” throw; one throws stick grenades over two traverses, the other throws egg grenades farther into the enemy’s trench, so as to interfere with his supply of grenades. The group commander, “b,” observes the throwing, standing to a flank, and gives direction and range. Armed with a rifle or pistol, he also guards the group against a hostile rush. The connecting files, “c,” pass the hand grenades forward. The rest of the men in the group, at “d,” are carriers; they stand near the traverse behind the bombers; two of them, armed with rifles or pistols, guard the flanks from a hostile attack. If the enemy’s grenades fall into the trench, the men are so far apart that they have room to get clear. The exercise can be carried out with two parties, with umpires. When casualties are adjudged, the spare men must take over the duties of the numbers who have fallen out. Every man of the group must be trained in all duties.

39. Attack of a blockhouse or machine gun emplacement.—For this exercise the ground must be prepared as in Fig 8. Whilst a machine gun or 1 or 2 snipers keep up an uninterrupted fire on the loopholes of the objective, the remaining men of the group, making use of ground and shell holes, work round towards the flanks and rear of the enemy, until they get within bombing distance. They then bombard the loopholes and entrance with grenades until the enemy is disabled and the objective can be captured. DESTRUCTION OF OBSTACLES. 41. In an emergency, when other explosives are not available, hand grenades can be used for the destruction of obstacles. They are not suitable for mining. 42. A lane through a wire entanglement can be cleared by means of a “long” charge. For this purpose, a number of the cylinders of the stick grenade should be made fast to a pole or narrow plank corresponding in length to the depth of the entanglement. There should be about six inches’ interval between the cylinders. All the openings of the cylinders must be in the same direction (see Fig. 9). To ensure detonation, there must be a detonator in each cylinder. It should be wedged in securely by means of a wooden match. The charge should be carried up by two men crawling on their hands and knees, and pushed or thrown into the entanglement. The charge is prepared for firing by screwing on the wooden handle, with the detonator in it, to the last cylinder (see Fig. 9). It is fired from cover by means of a long string. 43. A “concentrated” charge can be made up by securing the cylinders of six stick grenades round a complete grenade. It is unnecessary in this case for every cylinder to have a detonator (see Fig. 10). One man should crawl up to the obstacle that is to be destroyed. He should then arm the grenade, pull the cord and throw the charge into the middle of the obstacle. 44. If the obstacle is formed of wire network, a small “long” charge should be pushed in at about half the height of the entanglement above ground, and

then fired. If this is not possible, single hand grenades with hooks attached should be thrown at the entanglement. Wire net obstacles and abates can also be destroyed by “concentrated” charges thrown just in front of, or under the obstacle.

“GRANATENWERFER” (STICK BOMB THROWERS). 45. Granatenwerfer are used in the front line against targets which cannot be reached with hand grenades. Their maximum range is 330 yards, and their rectangle of error 3.3 to 5.5 yards wide by 55 yards long. They should therefore be employed in groups of 2 to 6, in flanking positions. Rate of fire, 6 rounds a minute. The Granatenwerfer has the great advantage over the Minenwerfer that the enemy has more difficulty in detecting the position. 46. In defence, Granatenwerfer should be dug in—either in, or better still, behind the front line. Their task is to keep down the enemy’s fire, to cause him daily losses, and to hinder work. For these purposes there should be continuous fire from one Granatenwerfer at a time, or surprise bursts by many, by day and night. If the enemy attacks, a barrage should be made with Granatenwerfer to prevent him from reaching our position; if he has penetrated into it, fire should be directed at the trenches he has captured to compel him to evacuate them. Frequent change of position is necessary. 47. In attacks by our own troops, Granatenwerfer have proved most valuable for the preparation of the places chosen for the assault, about two or three minutes before its delivery. This has been particularly the case where, on account of the proximity of the two positions, our artillery has not been able to engage the enemy’s front line satisfactorily. In the attack, Granatenwerfer follow up the assaulting columns; they should be dug in, either in the captured line or in adjacent shell holes, to deal with the enemy’s rearward lines and to assist in repelling counter-attacks.

48. For training in the use of the Granatenwerfer, see the manual “Der Granatenwerfer 16.”

CHAPTER 8

Minor Tactics CONFIDENTIAL! For official use only GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS TRANSLATED AND COMPILED AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, 1917. WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 [Extracts from investigations made by the Second Bureau of the Third Army and of the Eleventh Army Corps.]

INFORMATION DRAWN FROM THE USE OF THE LIGHT MACHINE GUN, MODEL 1908–15, IN THE SIXTH ARMY. [EXTRACT.] The 1908–15 machine gun is capable of giving very good results in the hands of men who have perfect knowledge of the arm and its handling, commanded by officers who have a very exact understanding of the conditions under which it should be used in battle. As the 1908–15 machine guns were distributed to the troops rather tardily, sufficient use has heretofore not been made of this weapon, for the men have

not received the thorough technical instruction which is absolutely necessary for the use of the guns. It is extremely urgent that the infantry regiments of the divisions which have been withdrawn from the front be provided with 1908–15 machine guns for instruction purposes. It is also advisable that not only the gunner but the other two men serving the 1908–15 machine gun should be armed with carbines in order that these three men should not be completely lost for combat in case the machine gun should not work. I. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT. Use in the trench.—The 1908–15 machine gun should always be used near the platoon commander, who assigns the machine gunners the post which they must occupy. The battalion commander should keep a reserve of these guns near him for possible counter attacks. The troops should not forget that the use of the 1908–15 machine gun should be entirely independent of that of the 1908 machine gun of the machine-gun companies. It is on this principle that the emplacements of the 1908–15 machine guns must be determined. They should be posted in the first line, in shell craters, or in other available places which have been reconnoitered in advance. It is not necessary to arrange them in platoons, but very special importance should be attached to flanking fire, which should be practiced in such a way that two machine guns posted at different points can both sweep the same ground. This model of machine gun should not fire over the heads of infantry and therefore should be installed between the first and second line only in very exceptional cases. Their emplacement should be changed frequently in order to deceive the enemy about their position and to keep them as long as possible sheltered from artillery fire and from view by airplanes. This is the only means of securing full advantage of their great mobility on ground full of shell craters, of the facility with which they can be concealed from terrestrial and aerial observation, and their ease of operation. The end of the small communication trenches in front of the first trench also offers a favourable emplacement for isolated machine guns of this model, free from risk of surprise fire.

Good results can be obtained by fire on momentary targets (men working on auxiliary defenses, detachments of carriers, at night, in front of our lines); this is true of fire on offensive patrols and on troops marching to the assault. Bursts of harassing fire executed by surprise in short volleys have also had very good results. It should not be forgotten, however, that the precision of the 1908–15 machine gun is limited and that this fact must be taken into account in regulating its utilization. This gun must never completely take the place of infantry, but, on the contrary, the infantry must have clearly in mind that for them the 1908–15 machine gun is only a means of increasing their firing capacity. By reason of imperfections of a technical order the 1908–15 model does not serve entirely to replace the 1908 machine gun. In mobile defense the 1908–15 is indispensable. In this case it is posted either in the advanced first line or in front of the first line proper, in machinegun nests, shell craters, etc. Its high capacity for fire will bring a certain moral support to the first-line infantry. On the attack the 1908–15 machine gun, well handled and judiciously posted, brings a very valuable increase in the volume of fire. In this case it can be carried forward with the first line and used to fire on the parts of the enemy trench before which our attack is stopped. This requires a certain spirit of initiative. An effort should also be made always to use the 1908–15 machine gun near the platoon commander in order that the latter may be able to throw it rapidly during the battle to the most favourable place. In small enterprises the gun can be used very effectively to protect the flanks of the infantry attack and to support the attack in case of need. The gun should not be carried prematurely into a newly conquered position, but should be brought up only when the bomb fighting has ended. While waiting, the gun remains in front of the enemy trench and observes the ground toward the enemy, looking for important targets. When it has once been installed in the conquered trench, its task is to protect the flanks or to stop enemy counter attacks if any are delivered. It is absolutely indispensable in this case to protect the gun by special details of bomb throwers. By reason if its extremely light weight, the 1908–15 machine gun is perfectly capable, with

some dragging, of following the infantry. It is not at all too heavy for this (with water reservoir, drum, and belt it weighs 22 kilos). The 1908 machine gun (which weighs 25 kilos with water reservoir and assault carriage) has already frequently been used in assaults. If the 1908–15 machine gun is used judiciously, the consumption of ammunition is not excessive, from 1,200 to 1,500 cartridges should be enough. It should not deliver continuous fire, but should be used only for precise fire on targets which are offered under particularly favorable conditions. The highest consumption of ammunition which has heretofore been reported is 5,000 cartridges. This was an exceptional case where the targets were extraordinarily advantageous. The longest continuous fire was 250 cartridges. The 1908–15 machine guns should regularly be placed under the order of the infantry company commander, both for its tactical use and for ammunition supply. The machine-gun officer of the regimental staff is responsible only for the care of the gun after battle. For this reason the replenishment of ammunition for this model gun should be completely independent of that of the machine-gun companies. The latter, moreover, will generally be between the lines or in rear of the first trench. For all men of the infantry carriers’ detachment detailed to supply the 1908–15 machine guns with ammunition, it should be a duty of honor to bring back to the ammunition depot near the battalion commander all empty cartridge boxes and belts. They must be carefully trained in this practice. II. DIRECTIONS FOR INSTRUCTION. The 1908–15 machine gun can be used with profit only by a well-trained machine-gun man thoroughly familiar with the technique of this model of machine gun. Jams should not embarrass him. He should, first of all, learn the following points: How to get the machine gun rapidly into position in a shell crater without letting the barrel touch the edge of the crater; to change breech blocks and tubes at the bottom of a shell hole; to load under the most unfavorable conditions, even if his body is very cramped in its movements; to

carry the machine gun while crawling; to spring from one shell crater to another carrying the machine gun slung over the shoulder. It is necessary thoroughly to convince the machine-gun man that his weapon yields nothing to the infantry for mobility, and this conviction can be developed in him by exercising him energetically and incessantly in jumping. His training must also habituate the machine-gun man to act promptly and on his own initiative, and must also endeavor to develop in him a certain tactical sense in view of the different situations he may encounter during the course of an action. For this purpose drills in detail, executed in concert with the infantry, are absolutely necessary. It is only by satisfying these conditions that this fine weapon can be made to give its maximum results.

PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN ATTACK ALONG THE RIDGE FROM THE MENNECHET SIGNAL STATION TO THE CEPY FARM. NIGHT OF AUGUST 9–10, ACCORDING TO STATEMENT OF PRISONERS. Objective.—According to the consistent statement of all the prisoners, corroborated by a document found on the person of the commanding officer of the Third Battalion, Four Hundred and Fifty-first Regiment, the Germans wanted to seize the ridge Mennechet Signal—Hill 124—Cepy Farm, as far as the western military crest. The plan required that the Four Hundred and Fifty-first, to which this operation was assigned, should retake its former trenches which it had lost on the 13th of last April, gain enough terrain in front to cover these trenches against any surprise attack, and install itself securely in the conquered position by constructing a double line of trenches. TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK—FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1. In the first line.—A platoon of the Ninth Company, ordered to cover the right flank of the attack; the Eleventh, Twelfth, Seventh and Sixth Companies; a platoon of the Eighth Company ordered to flank the attack on the left; “Stosstrupps” (assault units), some belonging to the Third Light Infantry Battalion (“Sturmbataillon” of the Second Germany Army), the others belonging to the “Sturmkompagnie” of the Two Hundred and Thirtyfourth Infantry Division; pioneers of the Three Hundred and Sixtieth Company; three Stosstrupps (assault units, each of 8 to 10 men) and two groups of pioneers were assigned to each of the Twelfth and Seventh Companies; five to six “Stosstrupps” (assault units) and two groups of pioneers to each of the Eleventh and Sixth Companies placed on the wings. The liaison between the Cepy Farm and the Eighth Company was assured by elements of the regiment at the right of the division occupying the Saint Quentin sector (Four Hundred and Forty-eighth Infantry Regiment, Two Hundred and Thirty-third Infantry Division). 2. As support.—Along the entrenched line of Hyènes, Bois Squaw, Terrier de Renard, 94.05: Two platoons of the Ninth Company, the Tenth and Fifth Companies, and two platoons of the Eighth Company. These units were to furnish fatigue detachments, to reinforce and relieve at need the companies which suffered heavy losses, and to construct a line of trenches on the eastern slope of the ridge. 3. As reserve.—The First Battalion, with two companies in the former first position; the second company in the Hauptmann trench; the first company in the southern part of the Hêtre trench; two companies a little further to the rear; the fourth company in the shelters of the Huissier trench, and the third company in the Hamac trench. The whole regiment had thus been pushed forward to take part in the attack or to support it if there were need. The attacking troops proper included 150 men for the “Stosstrupps” (assault units), 70 men for the pioneers, and 450 men at least of the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment. Preparations for the attack.—During the fortnight preceding the attack the Germans worked steadily in the construction of battery emplacements, trench

mortar emplacements, shelters, buried telephone lines and new communication trenches. In addition the four companies intended for the first line were sent to Remaucourt between the 1st and the 7th of August to practice the projected attack; and each one of these companies took a part in at least one attacking practice by day and two by night. Preliminary movements.—On the 6th the attacking companies were taken to the Jungwaldstellung (Huissier and Hamac trenches); on the evenings of the 7th and 8th they occupied the first line (Hêtre trench). During the night from the 9th to the 10th, between 11 and 12 o’clock p.m. (all time indicated is French time), the supporting companies in their turn occupied the first line. The attacking companies, the “Stosstrupps” (assault units), and the pioneers attached to them were assembled, the Eleventh Company on the western edge of the Indian Wood, the Twelfth near the road from Crater 93.13 to Fayet, the Seventh at Terrier de Renard, and the Sixth on road No.44. Between 12 o’clock midnight and 1 a.m., these four companies made a new rush forward and occupied their positions for the start, almost at the eastern military crest of the ridge, at a distance from the French line varying from 75 to 200 meters, while the supporting companies took their place. Arrangement.—The Sixth, Seventh and Twelfth Companies were arranged in two waves, each formed of a line of skirmishers 20 meters apart. The eleventh company was formed in three waves, each composed of small detachments of eight men and one noncommissioned officer. The first wave included the “Stosstrupps” of the Third Light Infantry Battalion and of the divisional Sturmkompagnie, reinforced by groups chosen from the companies (Ersatzstosstrupps). The second wave of each company (and the third of the Eleventh Company) had two or three light machine guns and two “Granatenwerfer” (bomb throwers). The ordinary machine guns, grouped behind the Gangue and Hoquet trenches on the evening of the ninth, were to follow up the advance, but none

of the prisoners saw them during action. Finally, 100 or 200 meters to the rear of the second wave, fatigue detachments brought up material and munitions. Missions.—The mission of the first waves (“Stosstrupps” and “Ersatzstosstrupps”) was to seize the first French trench (LanderneauDancourt-Eylau) and to push on as quickly as possible to the determined objective. The second waves were to occupy the Dancourt and Landerneau trenches, then utilize the shell holes to organize an advanced line, following approximately the military crest and passing about 30 meters west of crater 87.10, returning along the Gricourt Road, then advancing anew toward the west in the region of the Dancourt-Eylau junction. The “Stosstrupps” were ordered to return to the rear as soon as their mission had been fulfilled and as soon as the fire of the French artillery should permit. The aim of the support companies, in addition to the contingent reinforcement of the attacking waves and their replenishing, was likewise to advance to the eastern military crest of the ridge and to establish a trench there immediately, connecting the Indian Wood and the Squaw Wood, then to pass west of the Terrier de Renard to the extremity of the communication trenches dug before the attack connecting with garden 93.05. (Photographs taken the 13th show that only a portion of this trench had been constructed at that date.) Execution.—At 1 a.m. the German artillery and the “Minenwerfer” (noticeably increased for the operation) opened an extremely heavy fire on our first lines and to the rear of them. At 10 minutes past 1 the heavy and medium trench mortars ceased fire and the artillery increased its fire. The attacking waves, without waiting for any other signal, immediately rushed toward our trenches. In spite of the resistance of our troops they succeeded in seizing the Landerneau and Dancourt trenches and in reaching the Saint-Quentin-Gricourt Road. On the wings the “Stosstrupps” attempted

to advance to the Chilly and Eylau trenches, but they were soon stopped, and then repulsed in the vicinity of the road. AUGUST 10 AND 11. (a) South sector of the line 87.09–91.11.—As soon as they reached the west side of the hollow road the Sixth and Seventh Companies were subjected to a violent bombardment from the French artillery and suffered serious losses. They were each reenforced by a platoon of the Eighth Company, which was thus entirely engaged. In the afternoon of the 10th they tried in vain to advance to the Eylau trench, but a French counter attack pushed them back into the Dancourt trench, which position they held with difficulty. At nightfall the Sixth and Seventh Companies were hastily relieved by the Fifth and Third Companies, each reinforced by a platoon of the South Company. These latter succeeded in stopping our advance in the Dancourt trench and tried to organize their position but were prevented everywhere by our machine-gun fire. On the afternoon of the 11th the French artillery fire, which was very accurate, increased in intensity. The number of killed and wounded increased rapidly and many men tried to escape into the Squaw Wood, the Terrier de Renard, and the Garden 93.05 (die Gärtnerél), but the majority of them, stopped by the former French wire entanglements, which had not been completely destroyed, were killed by our projectiles. In the energetic French counter attack at 6 p.m., the last occupants of the Dancourt trench, about 30 men per company, were either captured or killed. (b) North sector of the line 87.99–91.11.—The Eleventh and Twelfth Companies, which took a position at the hollow road on the two sides of the Crater 87.10, immediately after the 1 o’clock attack, occupied at daybreak a line of shell holes situated about 30 metres west of this road. There they were subjected to a violent French bombardment, which was responsible for heavy losses, and they likewise suffered from a heavy German artillery barrage fire. In the afternoon of the 10th they were driven from the hollow road by one of our counter attacks and left several prisoners in our hands. They still hold the

Landerneau trench. In the evening they had to be relieved or reenforced by the Ninth and Tenth Companies which were in a position behind them as support. On the morning of the 11th the French troops cleared the Landerneau trench by grenade combat and took up their position there, thus retaking all the terrain lost in this sector. ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE GERMAN COMMANDER FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONQUERED TERRAIN. The enemy intended to organize strongly the conquered position and to occupy it against all counter attacks from us. Careful orders had been given to this end. All the regimental companies, including the machine-gun companies, three companies of pioneers, and of the “Armierungs bataillone” (battalions of labourers) were to participate in the work, each at a carefully defined point. ROLE OF THE ENEMY ARTILLERY AND THE TRENCH MORTARS. Preparation.—It seems that the enemy artillery began, on July 25, to adjust their fire on all the important points of the sector, communication trenches and trenches; but this adjustment was made with such care not to alter the appearance of the regular fire that it was scarcely discernible. On July 27 different caliber trench mortars in turn began their adjustment with the same caution. There was increased activity in the adjustment during the first days of August; but at this time, following statements made by Polish deserters of the Twenty-third Reserve Infantry Regiment, who disclosed the intentions of the enemy, our artillery became more active and began its demolition fire on the trench-mortar positions which were known. This recrudescence of activity of the enemy artillery might easily have been taken as a simple reprisal. On the 6th of August counter-battery fire began against our 75-mm. batteries in the Bois de la Loutre; 200 rounds of the 150’s [sic] on one, 30 rounds of the 105’s [sic] on the other.

The 7th was a quiet day, doubtless because of the thickness of the weather. On August 8, at 9 a.m., the enemy began a violent demolition fire with 150’s [sic] and large caliber trench mortars (350 rounds in a few hours). From this time on the enemy artillery kept up a less violent but steady fire on our whole first line to prevent the trenches and auxiliary defenses from being repaired. At 8 in the evening, moreover, the enemy caused us to open our barrage fire by firing red rockets. This was doubtless for the purpose of finding the range of our barrage batteries. On the 9th, at 11 a.m., he resumed his counter-battery fire, always in the region of the Bois de la Loutre, with time-fuze 105’s [sic] and 150’s [sic] (150 rounds in 3 hours). EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK. (a) On August 10, at 1 a.m., a very violent fire opened suddenly on our lines. The signal for it was given by two white rockets, one coming from Cepy Farm and the other from the Indian Wood, marking the line of attack. This fire included: 1. A very heavy bombardment of all caliber trench mortars on our first lines and their auxiliary defenses, from the Eylau trench to the Chilly trench. Flange bombs were thrown at the same time on the same points. 2. A violent barrage fire on the whole Fayet hollow. 3. A bombardment with all caliber shells on the village of Fayet, the Breton communication trench, and the Selency road. At 10 minutes past 1 the trench-mortar fire stopped abruptly. This was the signal agreed upon for the attacking waves to start. The barrage fire and the rear bombardment continued until half-past 2, slightly diminishing in intensity. During the entire afternoon of the 10th there was keen activity of the enemy artillery in the sector. (b) Counter battery.—Neutralization fire on our batteries likewise commenced at 1 o’clock. It was aimed principally at the battalion which ordinarily dropped barrage on the attacked front. The fire seemed to be

executed by two batteries of 150 mm. and one battery of 77 mm., solely with tear-producing and asphyxiating shells, and was conducted in two periods from 1 to 1.30 and from 2 to 3 at a slow rate, interspersed by rapid volleys. The number of projectiles thus sent was calculated at 1,500. DAYS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK. The activity of the enemy artillery during the 10th and 11th consisted for the most part of barrage fire opened at different times to prevent any attempts at counter attacks and to keep our troops from being reassembled. This fire was directed almost exclusively on the hollow of Fayet and on the Chilly trench. Several times, and particularly on the 11th, at 5 p.m., the enemy conducted a violent fire on our first line with heavy caliber. No particular activity of the trench mortars was noticed after the attack. IMPORTANCE OF ARTILLERY IN ACTION. Forty-seven battery emplacements were reported in action during the night of the 10th–11th, 10 of which had not before this been sighted. A comparison of all the batteries reported in action opposite the front of the Army Corps in the period from the 13th to the 23rd of July (German attack on the Pire-Aller) with those in the period from the 3rd to the 13th of August shows that the number of batteries was practically the same. But it was observed that 29 batteries seen in action from the 13th to the 23rd of July, and almost all in the region including Isles-Harly-Mesnil-Saint-Lauemplacements, either new or long since silent, displayed activity, almost all in the region Omissy-Morcourt-Saint-Quentin. Account must be taken of the fact that certain emplacements are doubtful and that others may correspond only to a section, or even a single piece. We are led to the conclusion that whenever the enemy makes attacks like that on Pire-Aller or on the Mennechet signal station they have at their disposal 15 or 20 batteries, withdrawn from near-by commands, to reinforce the commands supporting the attack. As for the trench mortars, information supplied by prisoners regarding emplacements which they saw in action lead us to believe that the enemy

used for the attack: All the trench mortars (heavy, medium and light) of the trench-mortar company of the Two Hundred and Thirty-fourth Infantry Division; light trench mortars of the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment (12 pieces); and the larger part of the light trench mortars of the two regiments on the right and on the left of the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment, or a total of four 240mm. trench mortars, six 170mm. trench mortars, and from thirty to forty 75-mm. trench mortars. ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE ENEMY TO ORGANIZE THE CONQUERED POSITIONS (DANCOURT TRENCH). By their attack on the 9th and 10th of August on our Landernean and Dancourt trenches the Germans counted on taking from us the whole ridge from the Mennechet signal station to the Cepy Farm, solidly organizing themselves there, occupying it in force, and repulsing all counter attacks on our part. This fact is proved by a document found on the corpse of the lieutenant in command of the Third Company, Four Hundred and Fifty-first Regiment. This document includes: (1) A battle map, with the plan of the trenches and communication trenches to be constructed. (2) A detailed list of the work to be undertaken by each company as soon as the position was conquered. Before the attack the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment occupied a first position (position A), including two lines of trenches—the Hauptmann and Hêtre trenches, the Gangne and Hoquet trenches: a second position (Bereitschaft support position), likewise including two lines—the Condole and Huissier trenches, the Humour trench (unfinished); and, finally, toward the rear, an intermediate position—the Gland and Hamac trenches. As soon as the Mennechet Ridge signal station was taken a new position, including two lines of trenches, was to be constructed—an “advanced line” following the western military crest of the ridge, utilizing in part our Dancourt trench, with a “counterslope line” following the eastern military

crest. These two lines were to be protected by extensive wire entanglements. Four communication trenches were to be constructed, starting from the initial sections made before the attack, to connect this new position with the old ones. In order to execute this work and at the same time occupy the sector with sufficient strength to resist all our counter attacks, the new position was to be held by four companies in the advanced line and four companies in the counterslope line. The reserve battalion was to have two companies in the old first position and two companies in the old support position, and the works were to be carried on by trench-mortar companies and machine-gun companies in the preparation of their own positions, three companies of pioneers, specially charged with the construction of shelters (or Armierungs battalions) to make improvements in the former position and in its rear. Everything had been carefully provided with reference to success.

TACTICS OF GERMAN ASSAULT DETACHMENTS. Three successful coups, which are recounted below, were recently executed by German assault detachments on the heights of the Meuse and to the north of Rheims. The methods used in the three cases varied according to the distance of the objective and the nature of the terrain. In the first two cases it was a question of taking a distinct objective. The method used presents the following characteristics: 1. Minute preparation of the operations in the rear.—Getting together the units for the attack raised from the Sturm battalions, Sturm companies and Stosstrupps for preparatory exercises lasting about one week on practice trenches representing the objectives to be taken. 2. Preliminary reconnaissance.—Executed by the heads of assault detachments one or two days in advance.

3. Preparatory work.—Openings in the German entanglements one or two days ahead of time, and in the French entanglements a few hours before the attack, the breeches being made with wire cutters. 4. Preparation by the artillery and by the trench mortars.—Very violent during the preparatory work. No immediate preparation. Caging fire from the beginning of the attack. 5. Attack of the Stosstrupps (distance 1,100m).—By groups, using the shell holes. Reenforced groups on the wings to insure the protection of the flanks. In the third case it covered a very close objective, over difficult ground. The Germans wanted to take it by surprise, no means of a mine explosion. No preparations in the rear. No previous reconnaissance. Breeches made one day in advance for Minenwerfers and artillery firing of all calibers, to isolate the breeches. The troops, not knowing the terrain, failed to find the breeches. In the three cases the attacks failed, thanks to the vigilance of our watchmen and, especially in the third case, thanks to the ability of one regimental information officer. 1. Operation at Villers-sous-Bonchamps (distance between the lines 1,100 meters).—The village of Villers and the trenches to the east have the appearance, according to aerial photography, of an isolated center of resistance bound to the rear by one single very long communicating trench. The Germans might have hoped, had they realized their surprise attack, to capture quite a large garrison and retire before the supporting troops could counter attack, because of their too great distance and because of the barrage fire. Consequently, the operation was confided to one very well trained Stosstrupp. Minute reconnaissance was made of the terrain, breeches were prepared in the entanglements, and a well-planned itinerary made. In a word, the operation was studied to the smallest detail. On our side the flat and bare terrain, the great distance between the lines, and the difficulty of counter attacking had led us to cover ourselves by a mobile watching unit, which, seeing the arrival of the Stosstrupp, delayed it, gave the alarm, asked for a barrage, and, in a word, suppressed their surprise.

2. Operation to the south of the Sechamp Woods (distance between the lines, about 250 meters)—Composition of assault detachment.—Twenty men taken from Sturm Battalion I: 8 men taken from Sturm company of the Two Hundred and Twenty-seventh Division; 60 men taken from the infantry regiment of the Two Hundred and Twenty-seventh Division: 6 officers, 3 sergeants, 9 gefelte (106 men all told).

The Eierhangranate or ‘egg grenade’ was a bomb introduced in 1916. It was intended to fill a specific

tactical niche, as, being small, it could be thrown longer distances than existing grenades. In trenchbombing duels it was often thrown by a second rank of grenadiers over the heads of comrades armed with other grenades.

Preparatory exercises.—From the 17th to the 24th of July the detachment was exercising at a special training ground to the northwest of Avaux. The French trenches to be taken were represented in accordance with the most recent aerial photographs. A very detailed preparation of the surprise attack was made. In these preparatory exercises the artillery officers who were to support the attack took part. The front attack was about 300 meters wide. The detachment had two light machine guns and one automatic rifle (musket). Each man had a mauser pistol, a trench knife, a bayonet and in a sandbag 16 grenades with handles and 8 egg-shaped grenades. Several heavy and field artillery batteries and about 530 trench mortars (small and medium-size Minenwerfers and Granatenwerfers) supported the attack. Execution of the attack.—Two days before, viz, on the 24th of July, two men of each group and one lieutenant went up to the front-line trench to look over the position, and that night they made breaches in the German entanglements. On the 25th of July, at 20 (8 p.m.) o’clock, the remainder of the detachment embarked in three autos for Pignicourt, by way of Neufchatel. From there they went on foot to the Moulin du Merlet, where it crosses the Suippe, reached the Fink Woods and the Sechamp Woods. On July 26th, at 3 o’clock (a.m) (German time), the detachment left the Sechamp Woods. Each group sent two men ahead, who advanced by creeping or by bounds, to make eight breaches of from one to one-and-a-half meters in the French entanglements. The work was done in 10 minutes with wire clippers. The men returned, and the entire detachment came out of the V. Haeseler trench at 3.50 a. m, through the breach made in the German entanglements, and laid down in shell holes between the German and French entanglements.

During this time the light and medium size Minenwerfer and the Granatenwerfer, placed back of the German front-line trenches, opened fire and battered the points from which a counter attack might come. Then the Minenwerfers lengthened their fire on the French lines of resistance. At the same time the light and medium size Minenwerfer and the Granatenwerfer, placed back of the German front-line trenches, opened fire and battered the points from which a counter-attack might come. Then the Minenwerfers lengthened their fire on the French lines of resistance.

‘Disposition of a Company for the Attack’, late 1917, a diagram from the War Diary of Canadian 43rd Battalion showing a typical deployment of German troops. Formations have changed dramatically since 1914: the men are spread out and sections are arranged in depth, and different weapons and equipment are used by individuals. Three light machine guns are carried with the company – two guns in the third rank, the third towards the rear.

At the same time the infantry attack was started, but it was stopped, thanks to our illuminating rockets, and was attended to by one of our machine guns. The men fell to the ground or hid in the grass. The attack did not pass our line of watching posts. In case the detachment had succeeded in further penetrating our lines the signal of lengthening fire was to have been given by means of small white signal flags, which were to be waved by signal men echeloned along the way they had come. 3. Operations of the Eparges Woods.—This operation, which was executed July 17, began the 14th, with enemy artillery adjustment on all the important points in the region between the Calonne trench and the Montgirmont crest, and heavy fire on our batteries. On the 16th fire became greater and was accompanied by a destruction fire on the Gross trench with large Minenwerfers. A breach was opened in our entanglements. The day of the 17th was calm, but at 8.30 p.m. a mine was fired at les Eparges and an extremely violent fire of all calibers began to isolate the points where the destruction had been made. Here, too, the operation was confined to a “Stosstrupp,” but these men were only brought up in an auto the evening of the 17th, without having made any previous reconnaissance. They had shown each man on an old aerial map what he must do. On our side the regimental information officer of the sector interpreted correctly the declarations of two deserters a few days before in that region. He studied with care the fire of the enemy’s artillery and Minenwerfers and the information from the special posts. He kept everybody awake and watching, and having guessed the point aimed at by the enemy, the disposition for the defense and the counter attack were made automatically. The enemy gained nothing but losses.

An officer demonstrates the use of a ‘concentrated charge’. Made of the heads of six stick grenades wired around a seventh, this missile was intended to take out small strong points and tanks. Though innovative, it required considerable bravery to use, being difficult to throw any distance. The oblong object on the ground is a steel loophole plate for improving positions.

CHAPTER 9

Notes on Recent Fighting [British observations, 1918] Issued down to Divisions (for distribution down to Battalions). NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING—No. 13. GERMAN TACTICS IN THE ATTACK. (Issued by the General Staff.) 1. The method of concentration of the attacking troops and their movement to the position of assembly in the recent operations on the Western Front were very similar to those employed by the Germans in the attack on Riga in September 1917. Several of the attacking and second line divisions were brought forward by night marches and by easy stages. In certain cases these marches were so regulated as to bring the divisions into their assembly positions at the end of their last march. This method of attacking after long marches was a feature of the training and manoeuvres carried out by the German divisions in the back areas during the early part of this year. In some cases, the starting point of the attacking divisions was at a considerable distance behind the enemy’s line. Prisoners who have been captured from divisions which adopted this practice state that their losses during the advance were comparatively light. 2. The enemy has employed two or three different methods for the deployment of his assaulting troops. There is evidence to show that in some

cases an assault division was brought up through a division already in the line. The 3rd Naval Division, for instance, is stated to have marched through another division to attack Contalmaison, and in the attack north of the Scarpe on the 28th of March the three attacking divisions passed through the regiments of the two divisions which were holding the line. As a general rule, however, the enemy appears to have distributed his divisions in depth in groups of two or three, and the assaulting division attacked with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in reserve. Thus, the German IX. Corps (St. Quentin Group) for the attack on the 21st of March was organized with three divisions in the front line and three divisions in reserve. The Corps frontage was about three miles, so that each division attacked on a frontage of about 1,700 yards, with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in divisional reserve. The heads of the central reserve division were ordered to arrive at positions about 4,500 yards behind the German front line at the moment of the assault. The leading regiments of the assaulting division had two battalions in front and one battalion in reserve. The leading battalions had two companies in front and two in close support. … 4. The special assault detachments which form the first wave of an attack advances in extended order but there is no definite information to shew the exact formation adopted by the succeeding waves of the heading battalions. It is probable that the usual method of advances is in lines of groups in file until the battalions reach our trenches, when the men deploy into line. The reasons for this kind of formation are obvious. Casualties from artillery and machine gun fire are reduced to a minimum and the strength of the attack is liable to be underrated. The reserves follow the assaulting battalions in artillery formation, taking advantage of every form of natural cover. 5. The enemy’s maxim that the light machine gun is not an auxiliary weapon, but just as much the chief weapon of the infantry as the rifle, has been acted upon throughout the recent offensive. Light machine guns have always been well forward with the assaulting troops. On one portion of the

front it was noticed that the system adopted was for one big man to carry the gun until the attaching troops came within our rifle fire. The No. 1 then took the gun from the carrier and crept forward as far as possible before opening a machine gun barrage, under the protection of which the infantry attacked. 6. The enemy’s light trench mortars have usually followed close behind the assaulting infantry. They have been used to support the attack if it appears to have been definitely checked and to reinforce machine guns in the defence of captured localities against our counter attacks. 7. In some cases, as in the attack carried out by the enemy on the 24th of April between the Somme and Hangard, attacks have been delivered by mixed groups of infantry and artillery, a minimum of one field gun battery accompanying an infantry regiment. Although this form of attack may not have been universally adopted by the enemy, it has been employed on all known occasions by various divisions during the recent operations on the Somme and Lys battle fronts. It should be noted that the constitution of mixed groups was laid down by the Germans for the engagement of intervening divisions during the fighting in Flanders in 1917. 8. In the majority of cases, the objectives of the attack appear to have been unlimited and the orders to the troops have been to push on until an organized resistance was encountered. In this connection, it is of interest to note that many of the prisoners who have been captured have been in possession of maps, complete in every detail, of the country into which they might penetrate. 9. In the development of his offensive operations the enemy has aimed at establishing continuous action. He has, therefore, allowed his unit commanders of all grades the fullest initiative, and has endeavoured immediately to exploit any success which he obtains. His tactical methods during the recent fighting constitute a complete return to the principles laid down in the training regulations of German infantry before the war. 4th of June, 1918.

Bavarian Landwehr man from a postcard sketch of 1914. Later in the war the spiked Pickelhaube was replaced by the Stahlhelm (steel helmet), and the long marching boots by laced boots and puttees. Pipes and cigars were popular in the German army, tobacco being included in rations.

CHAPTER 10

Anti Tank Rifle Instruction Vorläufige Anleitung zum Gewehr für Tankbekämfung (T-Gewehr)

PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ANTI TANK RIFLE (T-GEWEHR) 1918 PART VII: ORGANISATION AND TACTICAL USE OF THE WEAPON For every rifle you need a shooter and a substitute shooter (ammunition carrier). The shooter carries and uses the weapon and is first and foremost responsible for it. He carries twenty cartridges in his cartridge carrier, a bag on his left hip. On his belt, he carries the tool pouch. The substitute shooter (ammunition carrier) carries two cartridge bags with 20 cartridges in each, one on each hip; additionally, either attached to a strap, or in his hand, he carries an additional cartridge box of 72 cartridges. Furthermore, both shooter and ammunition bearer each carry light assault equipment, bayonet and pistol. If the bipod remains attached to the weapon, you will carry it in a similar manner to the light machine gun, slung over the right hip. Without the bipod and sling it is balanced across your right shoulder. Shooters and ammunition bearers must be strong, decisive and cold-blooded; they also have to be excellent marksmen. The use of anti-tank rifles, alone, or in troops of three guns, is dependent on tactical position and terrain. The use of anti-tank rifles will be greatly

enhanced if combined with the use of machine guns firing steel cored armour piercing bullets. HOSTILE TANKS There is a difference between ‘male’ and ‘female’ tanks. Male tanks are armed with cannon as well as machine guns while female tanks carry machine guns only. The tanks are equipped with comparatively little ammunition. This is because the value of the tank is more moral than firepower. English prisoners of war who were tank crew admit that aiming with unerring certainty was practically impossible because of the fierce jolting movements of the tank during operations. However, tanks carry a few smoke hand grenades for masking themselves. Tanks’ weak points: your ammunition can penetrate the armour plating of the tanks and hit the crew. There is little point in targeting the tank’s tracks. It is important to hit the driver and the commander, who are positioned behind the frontal area of the tank. It is also your goal to render the tank immobile. This can be achieved by the tank’s engine which is located in the middle of the tank.

The machine gun arm badge of MG Scharfschützen personnel. These special machine gun sections were first formed in early 1916 later being amalgamated to create complete companies. The badge depicts the MG 08 surrounded by ammunition.

CHAPTER 11

The Attack in Position Warfare German General Staff, 1918 A. INTRODUCTION. 1. This manual treats of the attack in position warfare with a limited objective and the offensive battle leading from position warfare to the breakthrough. The manual equally applies to the methodical counter-attack in the defensive battle. The immediate counter-attack, on the other hand, being an affair of minor tactics, is not dealt with here. B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 2. Education of the troops in that spirit of bold attack and will to conquer, with which we entered the present war, is the first guarantee of success. The instruction of commanders and troops for the attack cannot be too minute or thorough. Formations that are going to take part must have rehearsals of the attack against trenches specially constructed for the purpose; the smallest details must be practised. It is particularly important that the troops who are to be used in an offensive should be rested and kept fit until the moment of attack. Thorough knowledge of the effect of the arms employed, and the capabilities of the various means of warfare, such as trench mortars, artillery and ammunition, as well as of the modern means of communication, is indispensable. … 3. Command.—The attack, no less than the defence, requires that the troops should be really commanded and that careful and detailed instructions

are given to ensure the co-operation of all arms in a particular sector, and with the troops of neighbouring sectors, and that the objectives are clearly defined. On the other hand, every attack offers an opportunity for independent decision and action even down to the private soldier. The art of conducting an attack consists in a clear appreciation of the enemy’s defensive dispositions and their tactical influence on the execution of the attack, in careful preparation, clear instructions and consistent direction. The offensive battle requires, finally, complete mastery of the art of moving large masses of troops in a narrow space and of supplying them with all that they require. For military success the influence of commanders of all ranks and all arms is the decisive factor. It is properly used when scope for independent action and initiative is left even to the private soldier and the exercise of these qualities is required. This is one of the basic principles of the manual. There is, however, a limit to the possibilities of commanding and supplying large masses of troops concentrated in a narrow space. Too close concentration produces congestion. Careful reflection, practical imagination and personal experience will give the Higher Command some idea of the actual conditions that will arise. … 4. Liaison.—The maintenance of close liaison between all arms and all commanders from the front to the rear, from the rear to the front, and to the flanks, is indispensable. It ensures the methodical progress of the attack and prevents surprises, especially from the flanks. Where liaison is good, the Higher Command is always in a position to take measures to suit any emergency, and at the right moment. 5. Centre of gravity of attack.—Every attack must have a centre of gravity. On this must be calculated the grouping of the forces, the breadth of front…the concentration of artillery, trench mortars and other means of warfare, and the assembly and engagement of reserves. 6. Various kinds of offensives.—The objective, purpose and conduct of an attack will vary according to its extent and depth. In addition to inflicting losses on the enemy, attacks with limited objective may be undertaken to

improve the position, to relieve the main battle fronts, to mystify and mislead the enemy, or to obtain information. If it is intended that the objective should be permanently held, it should offer more favourable conditions for defence than the “departure” trench. The object of an attack may, however, be frequently attained when a withdrawal is subsequently made to the “departure” trench. Limited attacks should, as a rule, be carried out in one continuous thrust until the objective is attained. The offensive battle is an effort to obtain a tactical penetration and the ultimate development therefrom of a strategical break-through. In the latter case it works up to the battle for a break-through, which aims at compelling open warfare. When it becomes possible for the Higher Command to have this important objective in view, all measures for its attainment must from the very first be set in motion. From the moment of penetration, the attacker will have to reckon with fresh troops being continually put in by the enemy and with hostile counter-attacks. It is in this way that the break-through battle acquires its especial characteristics:— Penetration of the enemy’s position with the furthest possible objective. Capture at least of the enemy’s artillery on the first day. Firmness in consolidating gains and in meeting the enemy’s counter-strokes and counter-attacks. Bringing up the mass of artillery and fresh infantry. New attacks and the counter-measures taken by the enemy, &c. The break-through battle consists of “devouring” the series of hostile positions for the most part in the face of heavy offensive opposition by the enemy. It must be carried through rapidly and in depth. The first penetration is comparatively easy. The difficulty lies in maintaining the vigour of the attack. The enemy must not be allowed to recover from his surprise. His counter-measures must be rendered useless by the rapid progress of the attack. It is a question of taking rapid action with the consciousness that protection of flanks and rear, as well as support from artillery, will be provided from behind.

The danger of slackening in the force of attack is great. The dead centre must be overcome by the energy of commanders well forward in the line and by fresh effectives. Here, less importance should be attached to mass than to the intensity of artillery and infantry fire. Too numerous effectives are a hindrance to themselves and add to the difficulties of command and supply. All depends on rapid and independent local action within the general scheme and on bringing up artillery and supplies of ammunition. The vital point in the conduct of the attack lies in steady co-operation between the assaulting infantry and the artillery. Artillery and trench mortars are indispensable for breaking the resistance of the enemy, even while the attack is in progress. By skilful and rapid action, they must put the finishing touches to the success of the infantry. If the attack is held up, it is not fresh infantry that is first required but renewed artillery preparation. When the attack has pressed on beyond the range of the mass of our guns, the rapid pushing forward of the artillery and the ammunition supply of this advanced artillery are decisive in securing the success of the attack. … After the first penetration, a few rounds from the accompanying artillery (or trench mortars) or even machine gun fire—these make the enemy keep his head down—are often sufficient as a renewal of the fire preparation. The stronger the resistance, the more the concentrated fire of numerous pieces, particularly heavy ones, is required. The more powerful artillery, with a good supply of ammunition, that accompanies the advance, the easier will it be possible to keep the attack going. The infantry, on the other hand, should be put in sparingly. Distribution in depth must always be maintained, or, if it should be temporarily lost during an attack, it should always be restored, and, as far as possible, by pushing forward the most advanced units. 7. Surprise.—The greatest successes in war are to be looked for from measures for which the enemy is least prepared. Therefore, in all offensive actions, surprise of the enemy is of decisive importance. To secure this are necessary: strictest secrecy regarding intentions, execution of preparatory measures as inconspicuously as possible, restriction of new works to the indispensable minimum, simulation of intended attack or

actual attacks in other sectors, and variations in the details of the attack. In these matters the official manual allows sufficient latitude. It is the business of all commanders to make the proper use of the methods available. Complete surprise is rarely attainable, nor is it necessary. In important attacks, by skilful mystification and deception at other points, it will generally be possible to secure that the enemy will be late with his measures of defence, even though he may have partly noticed the imminence of an attack. As a rule, the hour of the infantry assault at least will come as a surprise to him. This at any rate will be some advantage to the attacker. 8. Flanking action.—The great importance of flanking action, even with small forces, especially of artillery and machine guns, has been repeatedly shown in all offensive operations. Flanking movements, therefore, should continue to be methodically planned. Strong defensive works should not be attacked from the front, but from the flanks and rear. In the break-through battle, the tactical surrounding of whole sectors of a position should be aimed at in the preliminary dispositions for the battle. 9. Study of the ground.—All commanders should be thoroughly instructed in the tactical exploitation of positions and natural features of the ground. The study of the field of battle and its tactical significance cannot be too careful; it is the necessary preliminary to that working out of tactical detail which is indispensable for the mounting and successful execution of all attacks. The fight for commanding positions, which has lost its importance in position warfare, will come all the more into prominence the more battles assume the character of the war of movement. … 12. Frontages.—In attacks of considerable depth, a thrust with one and the same formation (division), continued until its strength is used up, is preferable to successive attacks with fresh formations. Accordingly, the fronts of attack should be so chosen that a formation may be capable, without assistance, of maintaining the vigour of the attack for a long period and of fighting its way through the whole depth of the enemy’s trenches without a pause. The idea that, in a break-through, a division which takes part in the first

attack will be relieved on the first or second day, as a matter of course, should be strongly discouraged. If the attack has been properly prepared and the artillery pushed on in good time, the attack should succeed without too many casualties. After the first attack, therefore, an attacking division should have a sufficient fighting strength for the moment. The further advance will depend more upon putting in an adequate and powerful artillery than fresh infantry…A change of staffs at this time would affect the continuity and coherence of command injuriously and is therefore extremely undesirable. The width of the front of attack, however, must not be made too narrow on the grounds of facilitating unity of command. Where it is merely a question of seizing an enemy’s front line system of trenches, a division may cover as much as 3,300 yards and more. If, however, it is intended to penetrate an enemy’s position in depth, narrower divisional fronts must be allotted; they can hardly be reduced below 2,200 yards. With reference to the statements made in the last portion of para. 6, even with present strengths, the width of a divisional sector should not be less than 2,200 yards for divisions of 3 infantry regiments. A greater width facilitates command (especially of the artillery) and the bringing up of reserves and supplies. Giving all divisions the same fixed width of sector is to be avoided. In attacks on a large scale, fresh formations will be held close up in readiness so that they can be thrown in at once as the attack progresses. Their task is to extend the successes already obtained. Second line divisions should not be thrown into the battle prematurely. There is a danger of this when the commander of the front line division has, from the first, both divisions at his disposal. The second line divisions must remain for a long time under the control of the Corps Commander, whose place must be well forward if he is to command properly. They should be brought up in the same way as reserves used to be, to be put in at the points where the attack is proceeding well. For this purpose, in view of the fan-shaped extension of the attack, they will usually be interpolated between other divisions and will not, except in special cases, be employed to relieve divisions in line.

Like all tactical reserves, second line divisions must be kept close at hand by the Corps Commanders, so that they can be put in at the right moment. The task of the Higher Command is not ended with the initiation of the attack. It must direct the battle into the course that it desires, without, however, interfering too much in details. For this purpose, it must have control of reserves which it can put in as required. It is only thus that a preliminary success can be developed into an important victory. The protection of the flanks should be entrusted to forces especially detailed for the purpose. 13. Considerations of supply.—The necessary conditions for the development of an initial success to a strategic break-through, are that strong forces of infantry and a large number of light and heavy guns are able to push on without a pause and that there is no hitch in the sending up of ammunition and other supplies. Numerous mobile ammunition and supply columns, labour companies, etc., are, therefore, necessary. Requirements of this nature, just as the number of fighting troops necessary, must be considered in forming the plans. 14. Preparations.—Every attack requires more or less extensive preparations. The more important the attack, the earlier must these be taken in hand. The first step in the preparations is an accurate estimate of requirements in troops of all arms, ammunition, equipment and all kinds of stores. It must be based on a definition of the scope of the attack and of the target sectors for guns and trench mortars. The following list of preparatory measures will serve as a guide:— (a) Reinforcement of all existing staffs and administrative authorities (officials), including those on the lines of communication. (b) Sending forward of staffs and advance parties of the formations to be employed in the attack. [Group (Corps) and divisional headquarters, administrative authorities, special units, etc.]    Sending forward of signal units and the necessary transport and labour units for the supply of material, etc.

(c) Working out of the whole scheme of operations and supply, commencement of provision of supply of material, stores, etc. (d) The gradual clothing of this “skeleton deployment” by sending forward subordinate staffs and additional advance parties to learn the ground.    Moving up of the mass of ammunition and supply columns and material and stores. (e) Deployment of the fighting troops (artillery and trench mortars first). Where a break-through is to be attempted, the contingents of special units necessary for its exploitation (ammunition and supply columns, road construction companies, railway troops, labour companies) are very numerous. … 17. Extent of preparations.—Good preparations take time. Too great haste endangers the success of the undertaking and results in heavy casualties. On the other hand, preparations should be confined to what is strictly necessary, with the object of obtaining a surprise and avoiding useless expenditure of men and material. Much must be done without for the sake of effecting surprise, but, on the other hand, preparations which can be carried out free from the enemy’s observation must be all the more thorough. 18. Requirements after a successful attack.—After a successful attack, a high degree of activity will usually continue for a time on the battle front. This must be taken into account in calculating requirements in men, ammunition and stores. Even in important attacks, the division is the battle unit. Special tactical channels, short-circuiting the division, are prejudicial to co-operation. 20. Subordinate commanders.—The attacker has the start in the attack. He has it in his power to settle beforehand the course that will be taken by the battle, at least in its earlier stages, down to the smallest detail. He should make full use of this advantage. The limitation of the independence of the subordinate commanders that results from this cannot be avoided. 21. A plan of attack must next be drafted, laying down the general lines of the projected course of the fighting. In particular, the action of the artillery

and trench mortars and the arrangement of the replenishment of ammunition and supplies requires to be worked out as a whole from the outset. In important attacks, on receipt of the plan of attack drafted by the Higher Command, subordinate commanders of formations, down to and including divisions, submit drafts of orders for the infantry attack and for the deployment and action of the artillery, &c., based on local reconnaissances. The attack order is then issued, which settles the action of all arms on the whole front as a combined operation, especially in regard to time, and thus definitely fixes the limits of time and space for the whole attack. This is necessary, as all arms must co-operate exactly to the minute on the whole front. 22. Fresh formations for the attack.—It is generally necessary before attacks on a large scale to put fresh formations into the line. This should be concealed from the enemy as long as possible. The order and time of the arrival of these troops, and their instruction in the nature of the ground, by means of practice trenches and lectures, conferences, sketches, &c., will be carefully arranged. A model of the ground where the attack is to be made, representing its form and natural cover on a greatly reduced scale (say 1/500), made in a back area, may be useful. 23. Second and third line troops must be assembled at the proper time for reliefs and for feeding the attack. The intention to attack must not be revealed to the enemy by premature massing of these troops on the battle front. 24. Employment of reserves.—Even in an attack which it has been possible to plan methodically beforehand in all its details, the Higher Command must come to an early decision as to the employment of reserves, and generally on imperfect information. Any weakening on the part of the enemy and any advantages gained must be foreseen and rapidly exploited. The Higher Command must aim at directing the course of the battle to its wishes by the use of reserves. Their employment is most effective where the attack is gaining ground most quickly; this is also the best method of assisting those parts of the line which are only advancing slowly or are being held up. If the enemy is preparing to make heavy counter-attacks, it is most important

to realize whether their effect may be counteracted by carrying the attack forward at other points, or whether direct support should be given to certain parts of our line. From the beginning of the attack, the Higher Command must be careful to keep its reserves well forward. At the same time, any overloading of lines of communication which might lead to their being blocked should be avoided. It is of first importance that the fire power of the fighting troops should be maintained by the uninterrupted and rapid supply of ammunition. It is an important duty of all commanders to see that this is the case in their area. Notwithstanding this, the higher commands should relieve the lower to as large an extent as possible from having to occupy themselves with replenishment of ammunition and stores. This especially applies to Corps staffs. … F. THE VARIOUS ARMS. i. ARTILLERY AND TRENCH MORTARS. 35. The artillery preparation for the attack will vary in character; it is dependent on the nature of the battle ground, the scope of the projected attack, the strength of the enemy’s means of defence and the degree of surprise intended. A complete abandonment of artillery preparation is only permissible in exceptional cases. Against a watchful enemy, there is small prospect of success by this means. In minor and medium operations, an artillery preparation lasting a few minutes has been found useful. Notes regarding this are given in “The mounting of minor offensive operations in the Vailly Group in May and June, 1917.” The crippling of the enemy’s artillery and the practical destruction of his defences can only be effected by an artillery preparation lasting several hours. 36. Battle tasks.—In attacks during position warfare, the following are the usual battle tasks of the artillery in co-operation with trench mortars:— (a) The engagement and neutralization of the enemy’s artillery and trench

mortars. (b) Neutralization of the enemy’s trench garrisons and destruction of the enemy’s positions in preparation for an assault. (c) Bombardment of reserves and rearward communications, observation and command posts, parks, balloons, and traffic and ammunition supply in the rear of the objective. (d) Support of the infantry attack by a creeping barrage. (e) Accompaniment of the infantry attack with “infantry guns” and field artillery, with the object of breaking down local resistance by shelling at close range over open sights. (f) Protection of the infantry by means of a protective barrage after the attainment of the objective. (g) Repulse of hostile counter-attacks, keeping back of advancing reserves. … 38. Trench mortars, which are eminently weapons of attack, are exceptionally well fitted for bombarding trenches in preparation for an assault and engaging the enemy’s trench mortars. The whole of the trench mortars of the trench mortar battalions and companies form, during an attack, a constituent part of the attacking artillery. They will be placed as a whole, or by sectors, under trench mortar commanders, who will be under the orders of artillery commanders and incorporated as groups into the organization of the attacking artillery. Even the light Minenwerfer of the infantry may be temporarily incorporated with the attacking artillery in order to secure unity of artillery preparation. … In a deep break-through attack, each infantry battalion will usually take with it 2 light “Minenwerfer” provided with teams. In addition, a horsed trench mortar company of 4 to 6 medium “Minenwerfer,” with 2 or 3 ammunition carts for each mortar will be formed from the divisional trench mortar company. This company is a divisional unit. All the other trench mortars will remain at first in their original positions and will gradually be collected later on. When an advance is made, the light Minenwerfer of the infantry, which

must be made mobile, remain at the disposal of the infantry and are taken with it; on the termination of the preparatory bombardment of the enemy’s trenches, the medium and heavy Minenwerfer should be got ready for new tasks and, as far as possible, provided with teams. 39. Neutralization of the enemy’s artillery…at any rate during the actual assault, is one of the most important of the artillery preparations for the attack. The deeper the attack is to press forward into the enemy’s positions, the more completely and finally must this task be performed. Any conspicuous increase in the intensity of artillery fire before the day of attack is generally inadvisable, as it will prematurely arouse the attention of the enemy. If the enemy’s batteries are not very strong and their positions are known, the engagement of each hostile battery singly on the day of the attack with H.E. fire can be entrusted to certain of our batteries, other batteries being held in positions in observation to engage any new hostile batteries that may appear. This system requires a very large number of guns and good observation. A complete neutralization of the enemy’s artillery is not thus attainable. As a preparation for the attack, therefore, bombardment with gas on a large scale is decidedly preferable to engaging the enemy’s batteries singly. When this is contemplated, the possibility of subsequently passing the “gassed” ground must not be left out of consideration. The particular characteristics of gas used must be taken into account… In certain circumstances, a portion of the enemy’s batteries included in the objective of the attack will be shelled with H.E. In addition to the batteries required for gas bombardment, other batteries (with gas or H.E. shell) will be held in positions in observation for engaging especially troublesome batteries and any that suddenly become active, not having been successfully “gassed”. If the gas bombardment takes place at night or in the early morning and the attack does not begin until considerably later, it is advisable to bombard the most dangerous batteries with gas again just before the attack.

It will frequently happen that the gas bombardment and preparation for assault will not take place at the same time. In that case, it is not desirable to allot targets in the preliminary bombardment to batteries which have been engaged in the gas bombardment, as this would entail great strain on men and guns; it can rarely, however, be entirely avoided. 40. Preparatory bombardment of the trenches.—The following principles are applicable to neutralization of trench garrisons and to bombardment preparatory to assault … (a) The objective is divided into target sectors for each battery. The target sectors cover all systems of defence works which are to be destroyed, especially fire and communication trenches, dug-outs, wire entanglements, command posts, machine gun emplacements, &c. With regard to the size of the target sectors, experience has shown that there should be one howitzer battery on an average for every 100 metres of enemy trenches. Enfilade bombardment of all trenches is especially effective. If flanking fire is possible, field guns will often suffice. The fire of the heavy and super-heavy artillery should be concentrated on the most solidly constructed defences (command posts, dug-outs, flanking arrangements and machine gun emplacements) and on the most important points for penetration. In this case target sectors should, in certain circumstances, be made narrower. … The nearest sectors should generally be allotted to the trench mortars. Their destructive action is fully sufficient without assistance. Owing to the lesser dispersion of their fire, bombardment by them can generally be carried out in a shorter period than with artillery. Where, however, there is a danger of their ceasing fire prematurely owing to difficulties of ammunition supply and insufficient cover, it may be necessary in exceptional cases for the trench mortar target sectors to be double banked with artillery. (b) The destruction of trenches and other defence works is not alone sufficient preparation for an assault, as the enemy will take refuge in areas which are being less heavily shelled, especially in cratered areas. The ground between trench lines must also be taken under effective fire.

Ground in the vicinity of the trenches will come sufficiently under fire as a consequence of the dispersion of the fire of bombarding batteries. Special batteries must be used for ground not thus brought under fire. Generally speaking, field guns will suffice for this; the 1916 pattern field gun is particularly suitable for this purpose. The enemy must also be prevented from evading fire by moving forward. The fire necessary for this must be available close up to our trenches and may therefore be properly entrusted to trench mortars and gun batteries firing obliquely. (c) It is always necessary to bombard also portions of the enemy’s positions which it is not intended to take, but which are so near to the objective that the infantry and machine gun fire from them may increase the difficulties of the attack. Too sharp a fire boundary, moreover, would indicate in advance to the enemy the exact width of the projected attack, and thereby facilitate defensive measures and the assembly of troops for the counter-attack. The area covered by the artillery preparation must, therefore, be wider than the actual objective. … (d) Bombardment with gas may be effectively used to supplement shelling with H.E., so far as this can be done without endangering our advancing troops. Whether it is possible to rely solely upon gas bombardment to prepare the whole, or parts, of the objective for the assault, depends on the weather and local conditions and must be decided according to each particular case. Special attention will be paid to the possibility of using trench mortar gas shell and gas projectors at the actual point of attack, or at other points in order to divert attention from it. (e) The employment of smoke screens over adjacent fronts, artillery observation posts, or even the points to be penetrated may be a matter for consideration. (f) The allotment of targets which are to be prepared for the assault is made primarily in view of the material effect desired, due regard being paid to the necessary concealment of intentions. Equal consideration should, however, be given to the moral effect. It may require closer concentration of the fire,

and especially the employment of heavier guns, against certain points— generally the points to be penetrated—even if this is not indicated by the strength of their construction and garrison. The moral effect of trench mortars is specially great. Consideration of moral effect will also lead to flanking fire being invariably preferred. All kinds of false ideas prevail regarding artillery preparation for assault. The manual requires on an average one howitzer battery for the destruction of about 100 metres of trench. Naturally, accuracy of fire (the nature of gun and ammunition, observation, range, weather conditions, etc.) and the quantity of ammunition fired (and thus, principally, rapidity of fire and length of bombardment) also play an essential part. The complete destruction of a trench 100 metres long by one battery in an hour will generally be a very good performance. Hence it follows that in a short preparatory bombardment (one to two hours and less) the destruction of all the enemy’s fire trenches, etc., would necessitate the employment of unlimited masses of batteries. Such complete destruction, however, is not necessary. If the trenches are destroyed, the enemy will occupy the cratered area. It may suffice if the most important works (flanking trenches, the intersection of communication trenches, obstacles at points where the attacker wishes to penetrate, etc.) are destroyed. The weaker the garrison and the more surprise may be relied on, the lighter will be the task of destruction, pure and simple. The bombardment of the intervening ground … cannot annihilate all living resistance. It is solely intended to cause loss to the enemy, to make him keep his head down and to shake his moral[e]. It is further intended to deprive him of the power of observation and communication, so that he may finally be surprised by the moment of the infantry attack, thrown into confusion and, having lost touch with his commander, may become incapable of the necessary determination to ensure energetic resistance. Moral effect will therefore be particularly aimed at, especially if the artillery preparation is brief … Success depends on the attacking infantry not allowing the moral effect attained to pass off, but at once taking full advantage of it. It will rarely happen that the infantry will be entirely spared

thereby from hand to hand fighting; this will, however, be light if the infantry makes a really determined attack and presses forward so rapidly that the leading men reach the defenders simultaneously with the last rounds from their own guns. Accurate registration can be considerably accelerated and, in part, replaced by preparation behind the front (calibration, plotting of battery emplacements and targets on the map, calculation of the allowance for the error of the day, ascertainment of the “line” from guns already in position). This means a considerable simplification of the artillery preparations which are likely to attract the enemy’s attention, and thus facilitates surprise. Experiments in this direction are now being undertaken and the result will be communicated in due course… 43. Preparation for the assault is generally carried out in daylight. In no circumstances can destructive fire carried out at night be relied on to have its full effect. Accurate fire is more effective than too rapid fire…The best results are generally obtained by steady firing with observation if possible. The increase of fire to its highest intensity (drum-fire) from time to time is necessary, however, in order to deceive the enemy, to deepen the moral impression and to expedite the effect desired. In any circumstances, however, too great a strain on men and material must be avoided. It is necessary to give attention during the bombardment to changing atmospheric conditions. Pauses in the firing serve to deceive the enemy as to the moment of assault, to give rest to our own men and material and to provide an opportunity for carefully observing the effect of fire obtained. Reopening fire with a sudden burst may cause the enemy considerable losses. Lengthening the range exactly as will be done in the real attack, is often a good means of concealing the time of the real attack from the enemy. In any case, nothing in the action of the artillery should inform the enemy of the moment of attack, as even a slight delay in the opening of the enemy’s barrage is a great gain. Generally speaking, this object will be best attained by irregularity in the time, place and rate of fire. The changes will be

regulated by definite orders. 44. Duration of artillery preparation.—As far as this can be carried out with due regard to the points mentioned in para. 43, the whole effect aimed at as fire preparation in accordance with para. 36 a–c should be concentrated in relation to time and space in order to increase the surprise and moral effect. In certain circumstances, however, individual targets must be demolished by destructive fire before the artillery preparation proper begins. The artillery preparation may then, as an exceptional case, last several days. The duration of the actual preparation for assault may be prolonged from a few minutes to several hours at most. Drum-fire lasting several days must not be employed. 45. The creeping barrage in front of the attack will be formed by the largest possible number of batteries, so that it may possess the necessary depth. The extent to which Blue Cross [gas] ammunition can be used for this purpose depends on local circumstances. In order that the infantry when it advances may be able to move forward almost into the artillery fire, it is advisable, in order to lessen the danger from splinters, to fire the last rounds of the artillery preparation with delay action fuze (if this is available), or to finish by firing some blind rounds from trench mortars. Troops must be trained in advancing behind a barrage. The lifting of the fire takes place by “bounds”, of which the times and length are regulated in the attack orders. The length depends on the ground, the nature of the country and the probable duration of the attack. The rate of progress of the barrage must be so calculated that the advance of the infantry in the attack continues uninterruptedly. In order to bring the infantry advance, in attacks with distant objectives, into touch with the progress of the creeping barrage again after long distances (1–2 kilometres) have been covered, it may be advisable to fix certain lines on which the barrage will halt. Lengthening of the range will only begin again when the infantry asks for it by means of an agreed signal. The advance of the infantry must on no account be checked by a proceeding of this kind. The artillery must also be in a position to protect the infantry by shortening its fire in case of any temporary reverse. If certain areas (strong points,

villages, woods) are not to be dealt with by frontal attack, but surrounded after a break-through has been effected in neighbouring sectors, artillery fire will be continued on them during the assault, particularly on their edges, and will be switched to a flank or to the rear at carefully fixed hours, or on a previously arranged signal. In certain circumstances, a concentration on the interior of the area to be assaulted will be necessary before fire is withdrawn. Misconceptions exist regarding the creeping barrage. … (b) Constitution of the creeping barrage. Even if one battery is allowed for every 50 metres of front or less and the batteries in action are pushed well forward, the barrage, as a consequence of natural dispersion increased by bad shooting and owing to the necessity of the heavy artillery shooting well forward, will not constitute a thick wall, but will cover the zone of attack to a depth of about 100 metres. The barrage besides must not be of the same theoretical density throughout. The fire, especially that of the heavy artillery, should have a greater lateral density on important points. The greater the range, the deeper will be the barrage. As the advance proceeds, an increasing number of batteries will gradually be unable to fire, until finally the sole artillery support will be furnished by the accompanying batteries (and trench mortars) and the light and heavy batteries selected for rapid change of position. It is then no longer possible to form a solid barrage without considerable loss of time. Direct artillery preparation by artillery and trench mortar fire, concentrated on the points where it is desired to penetrate and as far as possible observed, will have to be used, just as in open warfare, and will generally be sufficient. (c) Execution of the barrage. The barrage will not work properly unless precise orders are given beforehand. It should begin at the moment of the infantry assault, and should be lifted by bounds (200 to 400 metres, or more) from the targets nearest our own infantry as this infantry moves forward. The lifting of the fire of the heavy batteries will be carried out according to a special scheme in some

cases (longer bounds, a greater distance from their own infantry, concentration on important points). The barrage is either carried out according to a time scheme, or an attempt is made to control its advance by visual signals. The latter is preferable and must, therefore, always be attempted. The movements of the infantry must not be dependent on the barrage, but vice versâ, otherwise the dash of the infantry will be checked by the rigid curtain of fire. The possibility of attaining this will depend on observation and the rapid transmission of signals and orders. It will seldom be feasible to depend on these alone. The order to put down the barrage should, therefore, generally be so given that the barrage is carried out according-to a fixed programme, unless a change in orders reaches the batteries whilst they are firing. When the barrage is carried out according to a programme, it should be given a speed at the commencement, and in easy country, of about a minute, and later, or in difficult country, a maximum of 4 minutes for every 100 metres. The guiding principle is that the advance of the infantry should not be checked by too slow an advance of the barrage, but, on the other hand, that the infantry must keep close up behind the barrage … The artillery preparation proper will be carried out by the previous artillery bombardment (para. 40); the creeping barrage merely gives a rapid final blow. It moves forward until the objectives are reached (according to circumstances halting longer at certain lines, e.g., rearward positions which must be prepared for assault by renewed artillery bombardment …) and then remains as a protective barrage in front of the infantry. If the infantry fails to reach its objective, there may be an absolutely useless expenditure of ammunition. On the other hand, the advance of the infantry may require a more rapid movement of the barrage. It will be necessary to arrange a few signals beforehand for such cases, e.g., “Barrage halt!” and “Barrage forward!” Whilst the barrage halts, the fire must be regulated as far as possible by ground and air observation (with correction for daily error). (d) Experiments.

Further experiments in the effectiveness and nature of the barrage arrangements (e.g., length of bounds) are still in progress. The possibility of employing gas (Blue Cross) is also being tested. A warning is necessary against expecting too much of the barrage. Fire at definite targets with observation will always prove superior to a barrage, which will always remain to a certain degree inelastic and unadaptable, however skilfully handled. Its effectiveness is dependent on succeeding, contrary to the British practice, in making the barrage depend on the infantry, and in training our infantry to keep immediately behind the barrage in spite of loss from stray “shorts” and injury from our own shell splinters … 47. Batteries for the close support of the infantry.—The employment of batteries of “infantry” guns and batteries firing at close ranges over open sights in the attack … is extraordinarily effective. These batteries are placed in position under cover and do not open fire until shortly before the attack, or even after the infantry has begun to advance. Attacks of considerable depth are accompanied also by horsed batteries, guns and trench mortars placed under the orders of the infantry regiments. They are intended to engage isolated defensive posts, flanking defences, machine guns, and tanks, directly at close range, and to repel the enemy’s counter-strokes. These batteries must be well trained by practice with the infantry. It is advisable to equip each gun of these batteries beforehand with two ammunition wagons, as it is not in this case a question of the number of guns but of replenishment of ammunition. The employment of gas will be found useful. … 50. General Artillery Considerations.—The moving forward of artillery and trench mortars is an extraordinarily difficult matter and requires units (some of which, at any rate, have been rested) which have not been employed in the artillery preparation, with a separate allotment of ammunition and ammunition columns. Within our own zone, careful preparation will facilitate the operations

(reconnaissance, arrangement and allotment of positions, approach routes, command communications, observation and command posts, dumping of ammunition, the attachment of engineers to assist in overcoming obstacles presented by the ground, etc.). In the further course of the break-through battle, however, a bold spirit of initiative can alone lead to success. Every minute gained strengthens the enemy; the more so, the greater his initial surprise was. Order, liaison, working for the good of the whole combined with drive, are at no time more important for the artillery than in such situations. Matters to lay stress on are: —keeping the artillery commander accurately informed on the battle situation and the topography of the ground; observation; rapid co-operation with the infantry and air forces; an adequate supply of ammunition which is sent up at the right time and to the right place. One of the principal duties of the Higher Command is the proper direction and support of the artillery in these matters. But complete success can only be attained by the intelligent and independent action of all ranks of artillery commanders. The position of the staffs (well forward) has a decisive influence on the success in bringing up the artillery. The advance of the whole of the mobile artillery and trench mortars is seldom possible. The difficulties are:— (a) The ground, which will be devastated by fire and full of trenches, obstacles and craters. (b) The danger of blocks, if there is too much traffic from front to rear and vice versá. (c) The small number and indifferent quality of our horses. It is therefore necessary to provide the artillery with bridging material and parties of engineers; to ensure rapid road construction and strict traffic control; and to limit the total of guns and trench mortars brought up. In settling the last, it must not be overlooked that guns and trench mortars are

useless in battle without ammunition. Artillery horses (especially those of the ammunition columns) which are standing idle should be made use of as extra horses for other guns or ammunition wagons, or taken forward as spare. All guns, especially those it is intended to push forward, must have their limbers and ammunition wagons loaded and horsed before the attack begins, and these must not be drawn upon during the artillery preparation. In deep attacks, the following should be brought up as quickly as possible: — (a) The accompanying artillery (para. 47 and para. 50, 3rd sub-para.), which should endeavour to open fire at close range over open sights and always to keep abreast of the infantry:—As a general rule, an infantry regiment should have I field battery of the divisional field artillery regiment and the 6 light Minenwerfer of the infantry. (b) Additional light and heavy artillery for the tasks laid down in para. 50, 4th sub-para:—As a rule, a division should have, first, the remainder of the divisional field artillery regiment and a heavy artillery battalion permanently attached, secondly, the divisional trench mortar company, finally, further heavy and light artillery, in about equal proportions. For this, 21-cm. mortars and 10-cm. guns are specially valuable. With sufficient extra horses and assistance from engineers and infantry, they are sufficiently mobile even in difficult country. A few shells from a 21cm. mortar will often break down hostile resistance against which field guns are powerless. 51. Artillery defence.—If the objective is to be held for any time (para. 6, sub-para. 2) the artillery defence must be rapidly organized. The same applies to objectives reached in different phases of the breakthrough battle. Hostile counter-attacks must always be counted upon. … II. INFANTRY. 53. Factors of success.—In the success of the infantry attack, the numbers of

infantry employed is not the decisive factor, but their fighting power (which depends on rest, training and equipment), the care taken in preparation and the skill of officers and men, combined with rapid and determined action. 54. Strength.—The strength necessary for the attack depends on:— (a) The distance of the objective. (b) The artillery preparation and support during the assault, as well as on the strength of the enemy’s position and its garrison. (c) The possibilities and manner of assembly of the troops for the attack. (d) The equipment (e.g., machine guns, flame projectors, trench mortars) of our own infantry. As regards (a), the nearer the objective lies the weaker may be, as a general rule, the attacking infantry. In deep attacks distribution in depth is necessary, in order to provide assistance at particular points, to check reverses, to close gaps which may arise and to protect threatened flanks. As regards (b), assaulting infantry must, especially in deep attacks, possess sufficient fighting strength from the outset, in order to be able to break down any unforeseen resistance and the opposition which will become stronger and stronger as the attack progresses. Nevertheless, fighting strength is not expressed only in terms of the number of men with rifles and of bombers, but just as much in intensity of fire (number of machine guns, fire support). As regards (c), the possibilities and manner of assembly of the attacking infantry and the choice of approach routes have a decisive influence on the mounting and course of the attack. Assembly points should be so chosen that the troops in readiness shall be as much as possible withdrawn from artillery fire and that favourable approach routes and lines of attack shall be available. If the attack is conducted from carefully constructed, permanent positions, the assembly will be possible in the trenches, and partly even in dug-outs. As a rule, trenches without dug-outs, shell-craters or natural cover are sufficient. Even in cratered areas, an attempt should at least be made by joining up the craters, to enable subordinate commanders to inspect the assembly, to

supervise the men and to get orders to them. Earthworks which might be recognised as jumping-off trenches must be avoided. It is of the greatest importance to conceal the assembly from air observation. The difficulties in the way of carrying out the assembly without the enemy noticing it, and of effecting a surprise attack, increase with the number of troops to be assembled. Endeavours should therefore be made to carry it out with as small a share of infantry as possible. The shorter the distance over which the attack has to pass, the smaller will be the effectives required. The assembly will be in close formation or more or less distributed in depth, according in local conditions. In the first case, the troops do not open out until the advance begins. In particularly favourable circumstances, the assembly may be carried out else in front of the zone of the enemy’s barrage fire. The assembly of the attacking infantry is the crisis of the attack. Of especial importance are strict limitation of its numbers to what is necessary, and avoidance of too extensive concentrations, which make cover for bringing up and assembly very difficult, endanger the chance of a surprise and may incidentally lead to unnecessary losses, confusion and panic. If the whole of the assembly position lies forward of the enemy’s barrage zone, distribution in depth must be gained during the advance. Otherwise, the infantry will be used up too rapidly without any result. … Similarly, the detailing of reserves in the course of the attack is of very great value. As regards (d), machine guns are not auxiliary weapons but just as much the principal weapon of the infantry as their rifles. Nevertheless, at the present time in break-through attacks, in view of their reduced fighting strengths, infantry companies cannot take more than 4 light machine guns (and one in reserve), and machine gun companies only 6 heavy machine guns (and 3 in reserve). Regarding bringing up the light “Minenwerfer,” … “Granatwerfer” will be kept in the departure position during break-through attacks. Their detachments, like those of the light Minenwerfer of the infantry which remain behind, will join in the attack as riflemen. 55. Time of the attack.—The determination of the right moment to attack

is most important; it depends essentially on considerations connected with the artillery. If the enemy has a considerable force of battle artillery, the reaction of the enemy’s artillery to our fire for effect will generally render the moving up and regular assembly of infantry impossible. An occupation of the assault position by day, also, is only possible in exceptionally favourable country and where enemy ground and air observation is out of the question; it is, however, generally impossible to foresee whether the weather will prevent enemy air observation. It follows, therefore, that the moving up into the assault position will take place, as a rule, on the night before the attack. It will proceed all the more smoothly and surely the less the enemy is expecting an attack, and the smaller the number of assault troops employed. If our own artillery does not require very much time for its fire for effect, it will be as well not to begin this until the morning after the infantry has moved up and to carry out the assault during the course of the day. If the fire for effect by the artillery should, as an exceptional case, take more than one day, our own trenches should at first be quite weakly held. The assault position must then be occupied during the night before the assault. More or less heavy hostile fire must be put up with. It might, therefore, seem best to carry out the fire for effect on one day, move up the infantry in the night and carry out the assault early the following morning. But experience shows that an enemy who has been bombarded during the day will, in spite of harassing fire and gas shelling, bring up reserves and, particularly, fresh machine guns into the position during the night, will repair the position temporarily, and will be specially on the alert in the early morning. As a rule, therefore, fire for effect adjusted to the weather conditions, and sufficiently intense to shake even fresh effectives, must precede the assault on the actual day of the attack. In minor attacks, besides the possibility of the assembly, the manner in which the captured position is to be consolidated governs the choice of the hour of attack. It is most favourable for the exploitation of a preliminary

success, if the first assault takes place in the early hours of the morning. It is, however, a general principle that all hard and fast rules for the hour of attack are wrong. The times must, therefore be changed, in order to keep the enemy in continual apprehension of an attack. This is not an impossibility if circumstances are not too unfavourable, as good infantry, well rationed with preserved food and drink, should be able to remain for a long time in the jumping-off position, keen and fit for fight, throughout our own artillery fire for effect and the enemy’s reply. 56. Attack formations.—The infantry will attack on the lines laid down in their training manual (“Manual of Infantry Training in War,” 1918). The peculiar nature of the objectives necessitates the attack being generally led by assault detachments. Endeavours must be made to form these assault detachments from groups of riflemen, which will be reinforced or formed as required. Whether it is better to employ waves formed of lines of skirmishers or waves of assault detachments, or a combination of both, must be decided according to each particular case. 57. Allotment of definite tasks.—Definite tasks must be allotted to the waves of skirmishers or assault detachments at the position of assembly, such as the capture of definite portions of the hostile position, machine gun nests, dug-outs, etc., or change of direction to execute envelopment, protection of flanks, mopping up trenches, etc. The allotment of machine guns to the first line troops must receive most careful attention (“Manual of Infantry Training in War,” 1918, para. 70). As the equipment of units with machine guns progresses, the greater must the effort be to ensure the closest co-operation in the attack between each infantry group and the machine gun allotted to it … Numerous machine guns must be attached from the very first to the troops leading the assault in order that, where there is a check, they may be available to cover the advance of the riflemen and bombers by keeping down the fire from hostile nests, or to repulse hostile counter-attacks. Other machine guns will be at first posted in the neighbourhood of the jumping-off position, in readiness to carry out similar tasks. During the assault, a portion of the machine guns should

advance with the first line infantry, and others should follow, so that on reaching the objectives, there may be a sufficient number of machine guns ready in the front line and distributed in depth to repulse counter-attacks. … Anti-aircraft measures must also be taken into account. Similarly, trench mortars must be made as mobile as possible and brought forward. Their fire at short range is a highly effective support, both when the attack threatens to come to a standstill and for the repulse of counter-attacks. … Flame projectors may be very usefully employed in breaking down local resistance, clearing out dug-outs and caves, and similar tasks. It is not advisable, however, to allow them to open fire at the point of attack itself at the moment that the attack begins, as this would draw the enemy’s attention to the commencement of the attack and he would put down his barrage. 58. Communications and supplies.—Parties for communication purposes, and carrying parties for ammunition, rations, engineer stores, etc., must be regularly detailed. The infantry ammunition supply, especially machine gun ammunition in belts is particularly important; the ammunition supply for trench mortars also requires to be specially regulated. 59. Passage of enemy’s barrage.—The commencement of the attack must be a surprise, and, as a rule, must take place simultaneously on a wide front with very careful timing. The probable zone of the enemy’s barrage must be passed over at the quickest pace. It may be expected with certainty that at least the first waves will escape part of the hostile barrage. The first wave should frequently, therefore, be made relatively thick, and it must gain the distribution in depth indispensable in the attack as it advances. Waves and reserves advancing later from a greater depth often have more difficulty in passing through the hostile barrage, as in the meanwhile it will have become more intense. They will endeavour to profit by gaps, areas which are less heavily shelled and moments when the fire slackens. Troops that are bent on attacking will not let themselves be held up long by a barrage. Rapid and determined action will often bring them through successfully with extraordinarily few casualties. 60. Method of carrying out the attack.—In the assault, it is most

important to exploit to the full the effects of the artillery preparation and support. The assaulting infantry must be in the enemy’s position simultaneously with the last rounds from their artillery and trench mortars, and during the further course of the attack must follow immediately behind their own barrage, so that the enemy has no time to come out of the dug-outs that may still be intact, or to prepare for action in any other way. Besides making full use of the weapons at their disposal and exploiting the enemy’s known weaknesses, the troops must have dash if an assault is to be successful. Success is gained by determined and reckless drive and initiative on the part of every individual man. A check in the attack at one place must not spread to the whole line; infantry which pushes well forward will envelop the parties of the enemy which are standing fast, will sweep them aside and pave the way for the advance of any of their own detachments which have been held up. Hesitation leads to failure. The battle sectors are best arranged when the front waves can attack straight to the front. Boundaries should be formed by conspicuous points and lines on the ground, e.g., roads, railways, edges of woods. Within the battle sectors the attacks must not be carried out uniformly. Strong points, villages and woods must be neutralized, in certain circumstances by means of smoke clouds. The troops should pass them and, distributed in depth, attack the points which appear likely to offer the least resistance. Rearward waves will capture the strong points, etc., by envelopment. In order to compel the rapid surrender of nests and strong points which the leading waves have over-run, it may be advisable to detail special mixed detachments—if necessary composed of all arms—under energetic leaders, to deal with them. The leading infantry should avoid all halts which are not absolutely necessary. The front line is frequently weakened more rapidly by men falling out to rummage through the enemy’s dug-outs, dumps and baggage in search of food, etc., than by the enemy’s fire and by exhaustion. Strict supervision is therefore necessary. Men shirking and looting must be got hold of by parties from their own regiments and brought on immediately (cf. para. 109).

Attacks conducted on the principle of rolling up the defence by working along the trenches are only advisable in small unimportant operations and minor enterprises, which are more of the nature of retaliation and raids, and have not been preceded by an effective fire preparation for assault. The smaller the attack and the nearer the objective, the more minutely must the routes to be followed by the attacking infantry be marked out and the details of the operation laid down. The deeper and more important the attack, the more frequently do situations occur in which a decision will be brought about by the independent action of individual assault detachments or groups, provided this action properly conforms to the spirit of the whole operation. In this way, small advantages gained may at once be developed into great successes. All directions given and measures taken must aim at ensuring that the commander’s ideas are carried out. Every man must be trained to keep continuously in touch with the commander of his assault detachment. No commander may even for an instant lose sight of co-operation with the unit to which he belongs and the neighbouring detachment, as well as with other arms. Signals by means of flares (also flame projectors) should be carefully arranged. When sections or assault detachments broken up in the attack get bunched together in the enemy’s defences, endeavours must be made, as soon as the situation permits, and in order to avoid being surprised in a formation unsuited to fighting, to extend their in regular lines of skirmishers, as laid down in the “Manual of Infantry Training in War,” 1918, to detail a reserve and flank guards, and to send out patrols to the front and flank. The principle that in the attack the infantry must advance into their own artillery and trench mortar fire, which was so successfully taught in the assault battalions, must become general among all infantry. It requires reckless pluck and high moral[e], as occasional casualties from their own artillery fire must be put up with. By such an advance, on the other hand, close fighting with the enemy’s infantry and its machine guns will be made easier. The total casualties will, therefore, be considerably less. The infantry must be taught by every means to understand this. It must be possible. The energy of the infantry attack and

its success essentially depend upon it. 61. Necessity for keeping troops in hand.—In the élan of an attack, good troops often over-run the objective. A quick grasp of the situation often secures successes which would otherwise only be won by renewed preparation. Troops pressing forward, therefore, should not be held too much in hand. In a break-through on a large scale, particularly, the boldest decision is always the best. On the other hand, reverses are easily occasioned by merely rushing on without consideration. It is therefore of decisive importance that the troops should not get out of hand during the attack and that the co-operation of all arms should always be assured. 62. Consolidation of the objective.—On reaching the objective of the attack, preparations for defence must be made as rapidly as possible (distribution in depth, co-operation with other arms, command communications, junctions, provision of ammunition, rations, medical service, improvement of position). A state of sufficient readiness to resist an immediate counter-attack, generally feebly supported by artillery, can be attained in a few minutes. The measures required for this must be prepared before the attack. Even if an attack is to be carried further, the first objectives attained must be consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of a reverse owing to immediate or deliberate counter-attacks. 63. Necessity for relief.—It is a matter of experience that infantry generally suffers less in the attack than in the subsequent bombardment and counter-attacks. The Higher Command must, therefore, make timely provision for the relief of the infantry, or the continuation of the attack, by new formations. Regarding reliefs in a deep break-through, compare para. 12, 2nd–4th subparas. 64. Action if portions of the attacking troops are held up.—An assault which fails can, as a rule, be renewed only after a further fire preparation. The fact that small portions have not been able to get forward must not hinder the forward pressure of the whole. If isolated elements only cannot advance,

support on the flanks from neighbouring bodies of troops and a short preparation by machine guns, light trench mortars and the guns accompanying the infantry will often be sufficient to enable them to get on. 65. Employment of reserves.—Especial circumspection, tactical knowledge and decision must be demanded from the commanders of reserves. The Higher Command will, in many cases, not be in a position to make its influence felt at the right time. This difficulty increases with the depth of the attack. In such cases, independent and self-reliant action on the part of subordinate commanders is important. The main consideration in putting in the reserves must be that in no circumstances must the attack be allowed to come to a standstill. … III. ENGINEERS. 67. Mining.—As preliminary to an attack, mines are often fired. If the explosion takes place at the moment of commencing the attack, it may inflict considerable loss on the enemy. Mines have, moreover, an important moral effect and facilitate the first rush forward. They demand, however, very tedious preliminary work and a considerable amount of labour; their effect does not reach far back. If the enemy notices that mining is going on, he will endeavour to make its success doubtful by counter-mining. … 70. In attacks with limited objective, the engineers will be mainly employed on the support of the other arms in consolidating the positions taken and especially on bringing up material and ensuring rearward communications. If required, additional labour must be allotted to the engineers. … V. SIGNAL SERVICE. 76. Concealment of the attack from the enemy must be secured by strict enforcement of traffic discipline in the telephone and wireless services. It may be advisable to forbid all telephonic communication during a certain period in the forward zone. Every man employed in the Signal Service must

know that the slightest negligence in signal matters may jeopardize the success of the operation. … VI. AIR FORCES. 94. The moment of the assault is the most critical for the engagement of aircraft units. The machines must not betray the beginning of the assault by their presence, nor must they appear until the enemy’s barrage has opened. But on the other hand, they must take part in the infantry battle with machine gun fire, hand grenades and bombs, and engage the hostile artillery and air forces.These results can only be obtained by means of detailed instructions in the orders for the attack as to their activity, and by the most absolute punctuality in their engagement in the battle. 95. Battle formations.—Battle flights should not direct their attacks only on the enemy’s front line, they should also seek suitable targets farther to the rear, e.g., hostile batteries still in action, reserves in readiness or advancing, traffic on the roads chiefly used by the enemy for bringing up reinforcements and supplies. … 98. Bombing attacks on hostile aerodromes are specially effective during and shortly after the attack, as they considerably dislocate the engagement of the enemy’s air forces and may partly prevent it, whereas attacks on camps and ammunition and supply dumps are of less importance at the moment. On the other hand, bombing and machine gun attacks on batteries in action or against reserves may seriously hinder the enemy’s action.

The final model of German rifle grenade from a British report: earlier models relied on a metal rod inserted into the rifle barrel. In this version the grenade rested in a cup and a round from the rifle passed through a channel in the bomb, creating the pressure to discharge the missile.

Detail of the finned bomb, sometimes known as the ‘Pigeon’, projected by the model 1916 Granatenwerfer or bomb thrower. These small mortars were issued to the infantry in the latter part of the war, forming a more mobile counterpart to larger trench mortars.

The Flugelminenwerfer, one of several types of trench mortar, this 24cm heavy weapon threw a 94kg (207lb) projectile more than 1km (0.6 miles). These high-trajectory pieces were well calculated to take on field works.

Index

note: references in italics indicate illustrations. Air Forces here ammunition supplies here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here anti tank rifles (T-Gewehr) here artillery here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here enemy here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Assault Detachments - Stosstrupps here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm; Stormtroop tactics assault execution here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm; Attack in Position Warfare, German General Staff, 1918; Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors; Trench Raid Report assault preparation here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm; Attack in Position Warfare, German General Staff, 1918 Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm August 9 and 10 - Statement of Prisoners here Troops Participating in the Attack here August 10 and 11 here Organization of the Conquered Terrain here Role of the Enemy Artillery and Trench Mortars here Execution of the Attack here Days Following the Attack here Importance of Artillery in Action here Arrangements Made by the Enemy to Organize Conquered Positions here Attack in Position Warfare, German General Staff, 1918 B. General Principles here F. The Various Arms here see also assault preparations

backpacks here, here Bauer, Oberst Max here Big Bertha - Dicke Berta here Bismarck, Otto von here bomb throwers - Granatenwerfer here, here, here, here, here, here see also hand grenades British Army here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here notes on German tactics here cavalry here Champagne, French errors at here close combat see Weapons of Close Combat - Nahkampfmittel clothes here, here, here, here concentrated charges here, here connecting/communication trenches here, here, here, here, here conscription here creeping barrage here, here Disposition of a Company in the Attack here, here egg grenades here, here, here, here, here enemy reports on German tactics here engineers here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here experimental units – Versuchstruppen here finned bombs – ‘the Pigeon’ here, here firing trenches here, here, here, here, here, here Fitschen, Heinrich here flame projectors/throwers – Flammenwerfer here, here, here, here, here British use of here see also Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors flare pistols here French forces here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm gas warfare here, here, here, here, here General Staff, German here, here, here see also Attack in Position Warfare, German General Staff, 1918 hand grenades here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here heavy ‘foot’ artillery here heavy machine gun attack here, here, here helmets here High Command here, here howitzers here, here, here, here

see also artillery Hutier, Gen d.Inf Emil Oskar von here identity tags here, here Imperial German Army, organisation of here, here infantry here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm; Information Drawn from the Use of the Light Machine Gun, Model 1908-15, in the Sixth Army; Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors; machine guns; Notes on Recent Fighting - No. 13. German Tactics in the Attack; Order of the 6th Bavarian Division Regarding Machine Guns; Proposals for Technical Methods; Spade War - Der Spatenkrieg Information Drawn from the Use of the Light Machine Gun, Model 1908-15, in the Sixth Army here I. Tactical Employment here II. Directions for Instruction here instructional literature here, here Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors here, here A. Troops and Equipment here B. Capabilities of Flame Projectors here C. Necessary Conditions for Flame Attacks here D. Tactical Employment of the Flame Projector Detachment here E. General Tactical Instructions here I. Objectives here II. Time of Attack here III. Assaulting Troops here IV. Preparations for the Assault here V. The Assault in Conjunction with a Flame Attack here VI. Action of the Artillery and Trench Mortars here VII. Forces on the Flanks of the Front of Attack here VIII. Equipment, Ammunition and Rations here IX. Telephone Communications here Instructions for the Employment of Machine Guns in the Attack - February, 1918 here Iron Cross here, here Italian forces here Jäger battalion (light infantry) here, here Kaisermanöver here Kalsow, Major here Krupp, Friedrich Alfred here lachrymatory bombs here Landsturm here Landwehr here, here latrines here

Lewis machine guns here light machine guns here, here, here, here, here Lothes, Major here Ludendorff, Generalquartiermeister here machine guns here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here heavy machine gun attack here, here, here instructions for employment in attack here light machine guns here, here, here, here, here MG Scharfschützen personnel here, here regulations for officers here siting of here see also infantry Marne (1914), 1st Battle of the here Maxim guns, Russian here, here mine launchers - Minenwerfer here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here mines here, here, here, here mobile machine gun reserve here, here Mörser here, here mortars here N.C.O.s here, here 95 Tornister here, here Notes on Recent Fighting - No. 13. German Tactics in the Attack here Order of the 6th Bavarian Division Regarding Machine Guns here pioneers here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here see also Attack Along the Ridge from the Mennechet Signal to the Cepy Farm; Instruction for the Employment of Flame Projectors posters, war here, here preparatory bombardment of trenches here Proposals for Technical Methods here What Errors do the French Appear to Have Committed here Considerations here Piercing the Line here Principles Governing the Attack here Plan of Attack here Preparation of the Attack here Action of the Infantry During the Attack here Action of the Artillery During the Attack here Development of a Penetration of the Enemy’s Line here Provisional Instructions for the Anti Take Rifle (T-Gewehr) 1918 here

rations here, here Reddemen, Hptm here Regulations for Machine-Gun Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Emplacements here Tools here Ammunition here Water here Barrels here Hand Grenades here ‘Flare’ Pistols and Ammunition here Small-arms here reservists here rifle grenades here, here rifles here, here, here Riga (1917), Battle of here, here Rohr, Hptm Willy here Russian forces here, here, here shelter trenches here, here, here signal service here small-arms here Somme, Battle of the here, here, here Spade War - Der Spatenkrieg here construction of connecting/communication trenches here, here, here construction of firing trenches here, here, here, here, here, here construction of shelters trenches here, here, here, here enemy projectiles here, here safeguarding wellbeing here stick grenades here, here, here, here, here, here Stormtroop tactics here, here tactics, development of new here see also Attack in Position Warfare, German General Staff, 1918; Notes on Recent Fighting - No. 13. German Tactics in the Attack; Proposals for Technical Methods; Tactics of German Assault Detachments Tactics of German Assault Detachments here tanks here, here telephone communication here, here 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion here, here, here tool-cases, gun-repair here training bomb throwing here machine gun here, here, here

manuals here, here, here pre-war here Sturmbataillone here, here trench construction here, here, here, here, here trench mortars here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Trench Raid Report here United States of America here, here Wagener, Captain here War Ministry here Weapons of Close Combat - Nahkampfmittel Hand Grenades General here Attack here Defence here Training here Destruction of Obstacles here Note by General Staff here Wilhelm II, Kaiser here, here, here

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