The Geopolitics of Iran (Studies in Iranian Politics) [1st ed. 2021] 9789811635632, 9789811635649, 9811635633

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
1 Why Is Geopolitics of Iran a Matter of Importance?
2 Structure of the Book
Framing the Debate
Neighbors and Rivals: Iran and Great Power Diplomacy
1 Introduction
2 Iran’s Early History: The Achaemenid Empire and Its Successors
3 The Safavids and the Ottoman Threat
4 Iran Between Russia and Britain, 1722–1914
5 From World War I to the Cold War
6 Iran’s Islamic Revolution
7 Conclusion
References
The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy: International Balancing Act
1 Introduction
2 The Weight of Loses
3 Valued Independence
4 Challenged Independence
5 The Shift
6 The Spoiler
7 Conclusion
References
Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System
1 Introduction
2 The Conflicting Narratives on Iran
3 The Construction of Political Iran
4 The Apparent Hybridity of the Iranian Political System
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Beating the (White) House: How a “Rogue” Iran Broke Free from the “Axis of Evil” and Became an Antifragile State
1 Framing the Issue: Iran and the JCPOA
2 On Uncertainty: Iran, the United States and the Variations in Foreign Policy Discourse
3 Crossing the Rubicon: The Military in Post-Revolution Iran and the Dawn of Antifragility
3.1 Ideology: Harnessing Revolution and Conflict Towards Antifragility
3.2 Ingenuity: Fighting Obsolescence with Specialization
3.3 Asymmetry: The Sine Qua Non Condition of Antifragility
4 Iranian Antifragility at a Crossroads: From Beating the House to Rewriting the Rules of the Game?
Bibliography
The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran
1 Introduction
2 Literature Review
3 Iran as a Shareholder of International Financial Institutions
4 Iran as a Borrower of International Financial Institutions
5 Iran’s Borrowing from International Financial Institutions Looking Forward
6 Concluding Remarks, Limitations, and Avenues for Further Research
References
Iran and the Major Powers
The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations
1 Introduction
2 Iran’s Geostrategic Decision-Making Process
3 The U.S. Role in Iran’s Geostrategic Decision-Making Calculus
4 Where Interests Align: Iran–U.S. Cooperation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Fight Against Terrorism in the Levant
4.1 Afghanistan
4.2 Iraq
4.3 Fight Against Terrorism in the Levant
4.4 Summary
5 Geostrategic Opportunities and Consequences of the 2015 Nuclear Deal
6 Conclusion: Trajectory of Iran–U.S. Relations in the Post-Trump and Rouhani Era
References
Iran’s Understanding of Strategic Stability: In the Light of Relations with the U.S. in the Middle East
1 Introduction
2 Conceptual Framework: Geographical Centrality and Identical Values
3 Strategic Stability in Historical Perspective
4 Strategic Stability in the Light of Containment and Deterrence
5 Nuclear Program and Strategic Stability
6 Approaches to Strategic Stability
7 Conclusion
References
Controversial Efficiency? The Experience of the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
1 Introduction
2 Literature Review
3 Historical Perspective
4 Assessing Washington’s Demands and Expectations
5 The Damage That the Sanctions Regimes Have Caused to the Reconciliation Process
5.1 Violation of the Non-proliferation Regime
5.2 Unrest in Iran and the Consolidation of Power
5.3 The Widening Gap Between Washington and Tehran
5.4 Escalating Tensions in the Middle East
6 Damage to the Iranian Economy
7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran–China Relations: A Game Changer in the Eastern World
1 Introduction
2 Why the Middle East?
3 Iran and China Relations: A Game Changer for the Middle East
4 Reasons to Look East
5 Energy Prevalence in the Bilateral Ties
6 The Political Dimension of the Partnership
7 The Security Dimension of the Partnership
8 Bilateral Relations Perspectives
9 COVID-19 Impact
10 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran and Russia Relations: Conceptions of Cooperations
1 Introduction
2 Russia in Iranian Politics: Ally or Rival?
3 Iran and Russia in the Middle East: (Dis)Integration of Interests
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement
1 Introduction
2 Dynamics of European Engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran
3 Engagement—Heterarchy and the RSCT
4 Containment—Balancing EU and U.S. Interests
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era
1 Introduction
2 Specific Factors in Iran–EU Relations
2.1 The Iran Nuclear Dossier
2.2 Iran–EU Economic Relations
3 Geopolitical Components
3.1 Energy
3.2 Regional Matters
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran and Neighbourhood
Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs
1 Introduction
2 Historical Background of the Three Islands
3 Iran’s Ownership Over the Three Islands in the Pahlavi Era
4 Geopolitical Significance: Islands’ Role in Survival of Islamic Republic of Iran
5 Messages and Ambitions: Iran’s Approach Toward the Three Islands
6 Exploratory Analysis: Assessing the Driving Factors Behind This Decision
7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage
1 Introduction
2 Shia Geopolitics: A Dangerous Reality or a Misinterpretation Leading to Shia-Phobia?
3 Hostility Versus Hospitality: History of Iran and Iraq Relations
4 Religious Tourism in Islam: A Cultural Background
5 Geopolitical Pilgrimage: Implications of Arbaeen Walk to the World’s Politics
6 Methodology
7 Data Analysis and Discussion
8 Conclusion: Political Convergence and Shia Geopolitics
Bibliography
De-Coding Fabric of Iran-Israeli Hostility in the Regional Context
1 Introduction
2 Changing Global and Regional Context
2.1 Regional Transformation
3 Enemy Image
3.1 Israel as an Ideological Adversary
3.2 Iran and the Existential Threat
4 Nuclear Issue for Iran and Israel
5 Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
6 Syria and Lebanon as a Key Area for Iran’s Security
7 The Role of the United States in the Iranian-Israeli Confrontation
8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Realpolitik?
1 Introduction
1.1 History of the Shiism-Sunni Dichotomy: Iran and Saudi Arabia
1.2 Religious Legitimacy and Islam in the Changing Geopolitical Landscape
2 Background and Significance
2.1 Literature Review
2.2 Concept of Soft Power: Religion
3 The Iranian–Saudi Arabian Struggle
3.1 Sectarian Differences and Struggle for Dominance in the Region
4 Developments in Iran
4.1 Broad-Based Approach in the Export of Shiism and Changing Domestic Attitudes Towards Saudi Arabia
4.2 COVID-19 and the Regime: Strengthening or Threatening?
5 Developments in Saudi Arabia
5.1 Functionalities of Wahhabism and its Transformation
5.2 Reorientation of Policies and Goals: The Rise of Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and Its Implications
6 Proxy Conflicts: External Developments
6.1 The Yemeni Variable: The Houthi Movement
6.2 The Israeli Variable
6.3 The Lebanese Variable: Hezbollah
6.4 The Syrian Variable
7 Assessment: Constructing a Peace Agreement and Its Feasibility
8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Iran’s National Security and Afghanistan Politics
1 Introduction
2 Setting the Stage
2.1 Dimensions of Study
2.2 Research Obstacles
3 The “first Afghan Civil War” (1979–1989)
4 The “Second Afghan Civil War” (1990–1996)
5 The “Third Civil War”: The Taliban Period (1996–2001)
6 The “Fourth Afghan Civil War”: The Democratic Regime (2001–2020)
6.1 The International and Regional Front
7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Not All Plain Sailing: The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa
1 Introduction
2 The Horn of Africa: Defining the Region and Its Inherent Value
3 The Dimensions of Iran’s Presence in the Region
4 Taking the Broader View: Before the Revolution
5 Early Post-1979 Revolutionary Connections
6 Raising the Stakes
7 Sparking Mayhem: Ahmadinejad’s Africa Push
8 Widening the Gulf
9 Conclusion: It Is Not All Gloom and Doom
References
Iran-India Relations Before and After the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal and the Consequent Sanctions
1 Introduction
2 The Historical Setting
3 Bilateral Relations: Energy and Else
4 The Regional Environment: Connectivity
5 On the Global Agenda: Nuclear Programs: Both Ways
6 Conclusion
Bibliography
New Development of Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism
1 Introduction
2 “Eurasianism” in Russia: From Classical Eurasianism to Neo-Euraisanism
3 “Eurasianism” in Turkey: Kemalist Eurasianism with Turkish Characteristics
4 Turkey-Iran Relations in History
5 Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism
6 Conclusion
Bibliography
The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 Colonial Legacies: Geopolitical Conflict of Interests at the Roots of the Conflict
2.2 The Anatomy of the Current Conflict: 1988 to 2020
3 Major Players in the Conflict
3.1 Regional Players
3.2 Extra-Regional Players
4 Iran’s Interests in the Caucasus
5 Iran’s Position During the Conflict
5.1 Signalling to Its Domestic vs. International Audience
5.2 Iran’s Diplomatic and Political Engagements
5.3 Iran’s Military Manoeuvres During the Conflict
6 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: New Transnational and International Dimensions
6.1 New Reality on Ground Level: The Risk of Ethno-Nationalist Spill-Over and the Presence of Foreign Fighters
6.2 Iran’s Strategy: Tactical Retreat to Ensure Maximum Damage Control at the Cost of Influence in the Caucasus
6.3 Turkey’s Blow to Iran’s Economic and Energy Policy and the Role of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

STUDIES IN IRANIAN POLITICS SERIES EDITOR: SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

The Geopolitics of Iran

Edited by Francisco José B. S. Leandro Carlos Branco Flavius Caba-Maria

Studies in Iranian Politics

Series Editor Shahram Akbarzadeh, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

This series offers much-needed insights into the internal and external dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A major player in the Middle East, Iran faces a range of challenges and opportunities that have significant ramifications for its citizens and the neighbourhood. Questions of political representation, Islamic rule, as well as youth and civil society movements are contentious topics in a state that feels besieged by hostile forces. The intersection of such factors present fascinating case-studies. Studies in Iranian Politics will publish ground-breaking research that draw on original sources and contribute to our understanding of contemporary Iran. The Advisory Board for this series includes Prof. Mohammed Ayoob (Michigan State University), Prof. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University), Prof. Mehran Kamrava (Georgetown University) and Prof. Mahmood Sariolghalam (Shahid Beheshti University).

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15186

Francisco José B. S. Leandro · Carlos Branco · Flavius Caba-Maria Editors

The Geopolitics of Iran

Editors Francisco José B. S. Leandro City University of Macau Macau, China

Carlos Branco Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais Lisboa, Portugal

Flavius Caba-Maria Middle East Political and Economic Institute Bucharest City, Romania

ISSN 2524-4132 ISSN 2524-4140 (electronic) Studies in Iranian Politics ISBN 978-981-16-3563-2 ISBN 978-981-16-3564-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Jenny Meilihove/Getty Images Cover design by Tom Howey This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

Imagine the view from Tehran. It is early 2021. You are an Iranian, with inherited memories of empire and conquest, yet also of foreign invasions and defeat; a citizen of a country isolated in the world, yet also a rising power accused of hegemonic ambitions, one that may be poorly managed but also has accumulated and deployed remarkable technical brainpower; you’re part of a population kept down by harsh economic sanctions but that has proved doggedly resilient; you’re saddled with a leadership that champions a revolutionary ideology, now fading, even as it projects its power across the region; and you belong to a society that veers between forbearance and protest, but is kept in check by a security apparatus that uses an effective blend of co-optation and naked repression to stay in power. This is Iran today—located on a geopolitical junction between the Asian and European continents, hemmed in between former Soviet republics, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Arab world, and commanding a strategic chokepoint—the Strait of Hormuz—through which flow onefifth of the world’s global oil consumption and a quarter of its LNG trade. The country is a magnet for foreign interests as it strives to escape its containment and attain its full potential, which it deems an entitlement after four decades of isolation. For centuries, Iran has fought for its security and survival by warding off outside threats. For the same length of time it also has forged critical alliances with external powers to better insulate itself against such threats. v

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It has had experience of foreign powers vying to partition the country into spheres of influence. Yet in the process it has perfected the art of divide and rule in confronting both internal and external challenges. Ever since its Islamic revolution, it has attempted to project its power into its neighbourhood, initially in Lebanon but also, in the more recent past, in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where it succeeded by capitalizing on the weakness and mistakes of its adversaries. The 2011 Arab uprisings, and their destructive aftermath, proved a turning point as Arab states collapsed, creating a vacuum into which Iran, among others, was keen to step before one of its rivals would. It thus spread or deepened its influence partly by design but mainly by default, either way terrifying its enemies. Its main strategy in the region, from the days it established Hezbollah in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, has been to court local non-state allies, and to arm and train them. For this it used the Qods Force, an expeditionary arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Pasdaran, commanded by Qasem Soleimani until his killing in an American drone strike in January 2020. That attack was part of an unremitting U.S. effort to keep Iran leashed, which started with the Islamic revolution and hostage crisis more than 40 years ago. Even the Obama administration, which sought to overcome the bitter legacy of the 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup that overthrew the elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, the embassy hostagetaking, and ongoing sparring in the Middle East and beyond, remained intent on keeping Iran contained. The next administration, led by Donald Trump, went back to the old way, throwing the nuclear accord President Obama had negotiated out of the window, re-imposing sanctions, and endeavouring to clip Iran’s regional power projection through economic coercion and military deterrence. This campaign, dubbed “maximum pressure”, further impoverished a population already stressed by a badly run economy while failing to achieve any of its stated objectives: further limiting Iran’s nuclear programme, reducing its footprint in the region, destabilizing the country, and forcing its leadership back to the negotiating table on far less favourable terms. To the contrary, Iran appeared undeterred, if perturbed, by sanctions and setbacks, which merely re-empowered the hard-line elements of its political class. It lashed out at the United States and its allies in the region, displaying an astute sense of how close to the limit it could take an escalation short of precipitating a full-throated U.S. military response. On the

FOREWORD

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nuclear front, it countered new U.S. sanctions by incrementally violating the nuclear deal, but it made clear its steps were reversible and that indeed it would reverse them should the Trump administration or its successor come around or the Europeans decide to compensate Iran. The arrival of the Biden administration seemed to offer a new opening. The experience of both the Obama and Trump years shows that the Islamic Republic is here to stay unless one of two things happens: a violent overthrow by the United States and its allies, or its collapse in a popular uprising. Neither scenario appears likely. The 2003 Iraq invasion showed the limits of U.S. power in the region, and even laid bare its vulnerabilities through the consequences it unintentionally unleashed: the empowerment of jihadist groups; the United States learned an important lesson, which it heeded in subsequent discussions about the wisdom of using American power in the pursuit of regime change and state rebuilding in Libya and Syria. And while a significant segment of the Iranian population may be thoroughly fed up with the clerical leadership—there is every indication many people are—they appear to have neither the means to effectively counter a deeply entrenched repressive security apparatus nor a viable alternative. It is an axiom of international relations that one negotiates with one’s enemy. As long as the notion that the Islamic Republic will somehow disappear remains as fanciful as it is today, Iran and its adversaries will have to find ways to accommodate one another. This requires dialogue and diplomacy. From their side, the Iranians have proved to be as capable as diplomats as they have been in military affairs, and have shown they can effectively combine the two. The United States, by contrast, has shown inconsistency and, at least in the last four years, an unhealthy resort to coercion as the only way of dealing with Iran. A return to such an approach, during the Biden administration or the one succeeding it, might well deliver a self-fulfilling prophecy: the further rise of a vengeful power, nurtured by the resourcefulness that its long isolation forced it to develop, now with explicitly hegemonic ambitions and an ability to disrupt an oil-dependent global economy. There is much to recommend the volume in front of you. Its main objective is to show why and how Iran has been and remains a relevant actor in the international order, and particularly in the context of the Middle East—a regional power we ignore at our peril. To accomplish this, this volume: addresses Iran’s intertwined interests and perceptions, basing the country’s foreign policymaking on its religion-inspired ideology and

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FOREWORD

four-decade enmity with the United States; examines Iran’s relations with states in its wider neighbourhood, as well as with world powers—China, the European Union and Russia, in addition to the United States; and offers an array of scholarly views on the many and various aspects of Iran’s durability in an unsparing world. In doing so, this volume offers a window on Iran looking in, providing a glimpse of a nation’s lived experience. It is as close as we can come to a firm grasp of how such an experience can be lived in the first place. May it serve a global audience that values the importance of reciprocal understanding as the foundation for sound decision-making in the management of inter-state relations. Joost Hiltermann Program Director, Middle East & North Africa International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium

Joost Hiltermann Author of Poisonous Affair (Cambridge University Press), a book about U.S. policy and the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war.

Acknowledgements

The preparation of this volume lasted from 2018 to 2021, and involved senior and young scholars, international relations practitioners, members of think tanks, politicians, economists, historians and Ph.D. students. Throughout the process, the editors had in mind four editorial avenues, to limit the possibility of a biased narrative: (1) diversity in affiliations of authors; (2) encouragement of co-authorship of research, between different nationalities; (3) publication opportunity for young researchers and Ph.D. candidates; (4) gender balance, or at least a significant participation of women. Generally speaking, these four editorial lines were fulfilled with the inclusion of twelve different nationalities, the presentation of five chapters in co-authorship, the participation of six young researchers, and a noteworthy participation of female authors. The editors are particularly grateful to Joost Hiltermann for his outstanding foreword and for having a thorough and constructive dialogue regarding the structure and rationale of the book. In the same line of reasoning, the editors wish to extend their deepest gratitude to all contributors, with whom a constant academic discussion has allowed us to overcome all challenges. Likewise, the editors wish to convey sincere recognition and gratitude to Palgrave Macmillan, especially for

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

the contractual flexibility in terms of book completion, as the pandemic of 2020–2021 has caught us all off guard. The Editors Francisco José B. S. Leandro Carlos Branco Flavius Caba-Maria

Contents

Introduction Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Carlos Branco, and Flavius Caba-Maria

1

Framing the Debate Neighbors and Rivals: Iran and Great Power Diplomacy Priscilla Roberts The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy: International Balancing Act Hassan Ahmadian Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System Francisco José B. S. Leandro Beating the (White) House: How a “Rogue” Iran Broke Free from the “Axis of Evil” and Became an Antifragile State Bruno Reynaud de Sousa The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran Enrique Martínez-Galán

17

61 83

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CONTENTS

Iran and the Major Powers The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations Mehran Haghirian and Younes Zangiabadi

165

Iran’s Understanding of Strategic Stability: In the Light of Relations with the U.S. in the Middle East Kayhan Barzegar

195

Controversial Efficiency? The Experience of the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran Petr Kortunov and Ivan Timofeev

215

Iran–China Relations: A Game Changer in the Eastern World Flavius Caba-Maria

245

Iran and Russia Relations: Conceptions of Cooperations Davood Kiani

275

EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement Łukasz K. Przybyszewski

293

Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era Roxana Niknami

317

Iran and Neighbourhood Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs Mohammad Eslami and Saba Sotoudehfar

343

Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage Mohammad Eslami, Morteza Bazrafshan, and Maryam Sedaghat

363

De-Coding Fabric of Iran-Israeli Hostility in the Regional Context Alexey Khlebnikov and Nikita Smagin

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Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Realpolitik? Yip Fu Faustina

419

Iran’s National Security and Afghanistan Politics Carlos Branco

443

Not All Plain Sailing: The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa Tiziana Corda

485

Iran-India Relations Before and After the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal and the Consequent Sanctions Erzsébet Rózsa

531

New Development of Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism Yang Chen

553

The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus Valentina Pegolo Index

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Notes on Contributors

Hassan Ahmadian is an Assistant Professor of Middle East and North Africa studies at the University of Tehran (Iran) and an Associate of the Project on Shi’ism and Global Affairs at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He is also a Middle East security and politics fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran. Ahmadian received his Ph.D. in Area Studies from the University of Tehran and undertook a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at the Iran Project, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science, and International Affairs. Fluent in Arabic, Persian, and English, his research and teaching are focused on Iran’s foreign policy and international relations, political change, civil–military relations and Islamist movements in the Middle East. His research and analyses have appeared in peer-reviewed journals as well as prestigious Persian, English, and Arabic outlets (https://orcid. org/0000-0002-2168-9973). Kayhan Barzegar is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of the Islamic Azad University (Iran) and the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations. Barzegar was a Research Fellow at Harvard University during 2007–2011, and a Postgraduate Research Fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE) during 2002–2003. His works on Iran’s foreign and regional policy and Iranian nuclear politics has been published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, the Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, World Policy Journal, and numerous academic journals. His latest xv

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publications include, The Hard Chess Puzzle: Trump’s “Maximum Pressure” Versus Iran’s “Maximum Resistance” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (June 2020). His latest book is entitled, Iran Regional Policy in Time (August 2019) (http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3571-6204). Morteza Bazrafshan is a member of Tourism and Hospitality Department, Higher Education Complex of Bam in Iran. His research interest is in tourism policy and planning, strategic management in tourism and hospitality, branding, service quality in tourism and hospitality and religious tourism. He has already written and translated some books into Persian, which are used by different universities and tourism training schools as the references. He also has the experience of teaching tourism and hospitality at Tabriz University, Allameh Tabtabaei University of Tehran, and Yazd University (Iran). Bazrafshan manages a tourism company in Iran (Seven Climata Tourism Company) as well, which mostly focus on training and standardization of tourism companies (https:// orcid.org/0000-0001-6134-856X). Carlos Branco (Editor and Author) is Major General (retired) who served in the Portuguese Army. Currently, he is a Ph.D. candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). He is a researcher in the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI) and associate researcher in the National Defense Institute (IDN). He authored three books and more than eight tens scientific articles on conflict resolution, security and defence matters published in books, periodicals, and newspapers, and co-edited four books. He lectures at various higher education schools and defence institutions on security and defence, and international relations, and was the scientific co-director of postgraduate studies in media and crisis management at Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais, do Trabalho e da Empresa (ISCTE). He was ISAF commander spokesperson, Director of the Cooperation and Regional Security Division of the International Military Staff at the NATO HQ (Brussels), Deputy Director of the Portuguese War College and National Defence Institute and is member of various Think Tanks (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-79804324). Flavius Caba-Maria (Editor and Author) is the President of the Romanian ThinkTank “Middle East Political and Economic Institute” (MEPEI), and director of marketing and legal consultant, offering consulting services on Middle East affairs. He is a Ph.D. Candidate at

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the Bucharest University of Economic Studies, focusing on international affairs—the role of the state and of the multinationals in the global economic warfare, highlighting the cases in the Middle East. B.A. in Law (Babes, Bolyai University of ClujNapoca, Romania) with specialization in forensic firearms and postuniversity course in Political Science; B.A. in military science (Land Forces Academy). Also, he graduated diplomatic international courses and political adviser training programmes (Geneva Centre for Security Policy), with extended expertise on the Middle East, authoring, and coordinating articles and scientific works on Business Affairs, Defence & Security, International Relations, and Regional Development. He is a commentator on politics and security in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) at events around the world and in the media. Yang Chen is an Assistant Professor and Executive Director in the Center of Turkish Studies at Shanghai University (China). From 2013 to 2015, he worked as a visiting researcher at Asian Studies Center of Bo˘gaziçi University (Turkey). His research interests include Turkish Studies, Islamic Movement, China and Middle East Relations. His publications include Guide to the World Nations: Turkey (Social Sciences Academic Press, China, 2015); Annual Report on Turkey’s National Development (Social Sciences Academic Press, China, 2015). He has also published several articles on Critical Sociology, Sociology of Islam, and Journal of Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly (http://orcid.org/00000002-4840-6427). Tiziana Corda is pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Studies at the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP), jointly held at the University of Milan, University of Pavia and University of Genoa (Italy). Currently, within the framework of her doctoral research, she is analysing the economic and political impact of sanctions, specifically those targeting Iran. Previously, she worked as an Assistant Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan for its Africa Programme and other Centres, including the MENA and Business centres. As part of her work at ISPI, she also edited Treccani’s Geopolitical Atlas. Earlier, she had worked in South Africa for a local NGO dealing with migration issues and spent a semester at the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels, Belgium, working for the Global Issues division on a broad range of issues including the environment, energy and migration (http://orcid.org/0000-0002-60490748).

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Bruno Reynaud de Sousa is based in Porto (Portugal) and works fulltime in academia. He is Guest Assistant Professor both at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities (University of Porto) and the School of Law of the University of Minho. In addition, he is lead researcher on the project “Security in a changing world: hybrid threats, societal resilience and disruptive thinking” under development at Instituto Jurídico Portucalense (IJP), a research centre. He holds a B.A. and a LL.M. in Law (Catholic University of Portugal), and a M.A. in EU International Relations and Diplomacy (College of Europe). He completed the high-level National Defence Course (Institute of National Defence, Portugal), having also attended MoD courses on civilian crisis management and cybersecurity. In 2015, he concluded his doctorate degree (Catholic University of Portugal, magna cum laude) with a thesis on the topic of failed States in International Law. Currently he is a member of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), the European Centre for Space Law, and the European Law Institute (ELI) (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-05021305). Mohammad Eslami is a collaborative researcher of the Research Centre for Political Science (CICP) at the department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Minho (Portugal). His Ph.D. dissertation entitled “Strategic Culture and the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Assessing the Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles programme” supervised by Professor Alena Vieira (University of Minho) and Professor Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (SOAS University of London). He holds a B.A. Degree in Arab Studies, and a master’s degree in political science and International Relations. Between 2015 and 2017, he worked as a journalist at the Tamasha newspaper and Mahruyan weekly journal (Iran). His research interests are primarily related to Middle East Studies, Security Studies, Arms Control, and Iranian Studies. His last publication is Iran’s Strategic Culture: The “Revolutionary” and “Moderation’”Narratives on the Ballistic Missile Programme. He has received 3 academic awards (https://orcid.org/ 0000-0003-0283-1839). Yip Fu Faustina holds an M.A. from King’s College London and a B.A. from the University of Hong Kong. Her research topics are multidisciplinary and diverse, with a focus on exploring the interconnectedness of global political economies, social disparities, their dynamics and how they have interacted and developed alongside throughout history. The author is passionate in the concepts of social inequities and social justice, especially in the domains of public health. She is currently working in the

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healthcare industry relating to research towards youth empowerment, the elderly and mental health, funding and its development (http://orcid. org/0000-0002-5823-9984). Mehran Haghirian is a Ph.D. candidate at Qatar University and a researcher and assistant director at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences. He is a graduate of American University’s School of International Service in Washington D.C., with a master’s degree in International Affairs. Previously, he worked at the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative as a project assistant and at American University as a graduate assistant. His research focus is on Iran, Persian Gulf security, and United States foreign policy (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-57676288). Alexey Khlebnikov is an independent strategic risk consultant and a MENA expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). He also lectures at Lobachevsky State University on Nizhni Novgorod. Alexey works as a consultant to various think tanks, institutions and humanitarian INGOs in Europe, Middle East, Russia and the United States. He has been published on international relations topics in particular on the MENA region in academic journals and media sources in Russia, Europe, United States and the Middle East. He holds an M.A. in global public policy from the University of Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs and a B.A. and M.A. in Middle Eastern studies from Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod. He was an Edmund Muskie fellow (2012–2014) in the United States, a research fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2013 and a visiting fellow at Tel Aviv University in 2011 and Central European University in 2012. Alexey’s research interest is focused on the regional transformations, conflicts, intra-regional tensions and global powers’ Middle East policies (https://orcid.org/0000-00019177-0323). Davood Kiani is an Associate Professor of International Relations in Islamic Azad University of Qom (Iran). He presided Iranian Institute of Iran-Eurasia Studies (IRAS) in years 2015–2019 and now serves as a member of IRAS’s Board of Directors. He was also a visiting fellow at Iranian Center for Strategic Research (CSR) (2006–2016). Kiani’s main areas of research include Iranian foreign policy and Iran’s policy

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towards European Union and Russia (https://orcid.org/0000-00033904-9234). Petr Kortunov is Program Coordinator at the Russian International Affairs Council. He holds a Master’s degree in International Financial Law at the MGIMO University (2019) and a Master’s degree at the University of Reading (2019). Petr Kortunov is an author of a number of publications on the political affairs at the Middle East, focusing mostly on the use of nuclear energy in the region and related issues (https://orcid.org/ 0000-0003-3623-8216). Francisco José B. S. Leandro (Editor and Author) earned a Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal in 2010. From 2016 to 2017 he took part in a postdoctoral research programme on state monopolies in China—One belt one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. He is currently Associate Professor and Associate-Dean of the Institute for Research on PortugueseSpeaking Countries at the City University of Macau (China). His most recent books are titled: Steps of Greatness: The Geopolitics of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges, Development and Promise of TimorLeste (2019), City University of Macau; and The Belt and Road Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New Development Model (2020), Palgrave MacMillan. Francisco Leandro is a researcher at OBSERVARE—Observatory of Foreign Relations, a research unit in International Relations of the Autónoma University of Lisbon, Portugal (https://orcid.org/00000002-1443-5828). Enrique Martínez-Galán earned a Ph.D. in economics from ISEGLisbon School of Economics and Management of the University of Lisbon (Portugal) in 2018. Currently member of the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank. Previous professional experience in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, European Investment Bank, World Bank, European Commission, Portuguese Public Debt Agency and Portuguese Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministries. Strategic consultant for national governments in Africa, Asia and Europe. Researcher, lecturer,

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reviewer and author of several books and book chapters in development finance, international trade, foreign direct investment, higher education and science, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Co-author of several recent scientific articles published in the following peer-reviewed journals: The World Economy, Applied Econometrics and International Development, Baltic Journal of European Studies, Portuguese Economic Journal, and Portuguese Review of Regional Studies (http://orcid.org/0000-00019321-9105). Roxana Niknami is an Assistance Professor in European Studies at the University of Tehran (Iran) and member of the Faculty of Law & Political Science. Her areas of interest and research are in the European Union matters and her main research area is European foreign policy. She has presented papers at conferences both home and abroad, published books, articles and papers in various journals in this area. Some of her most related works on Iran–EU relations includes: European Sanctions against Iran: Impacts & Effectiveness (2015), European Union Economic & Financial Sanctions against Iran and their Human Rights Implications (2020), Iran and the European Union: Experiences and Perspectives (2012), and the prospect of convergence in the European Union and its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (2014) (http://orcid. org/0000-0003-4694-4835). Valentina Pegolo is a researcher at Middle East Political and Economic Institute, is a DPhil Candidate in International Relations (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford) and an ESRC (Economic and Social Science Research Council) studentship holder. Her thesis focuses on the foreign policy of Iran in Central Asia. She has previously completed a M.Phil. in International Relations (University of Oxford) and a B.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (University of Oxford). She has conducted research as a political analyst for UK NGOs. Her areas of expertise include Iranian foreign policy, the international relations of Central Asia and the Middle East, and the study of ideology (http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3341-7489). Łukasz K. Przybyszewski earned a B.A. Iranian Studies, a M.A. in International Business (Warsaw School of Economics), and a postgraduate studies diploma in Internal Security (University of Warsaw). He was awarded with the Erasmus Mundus SALAM 2 Action 2 scholarship (University of Warsaw—University of Tehran). Since 2016, Przybyszewski

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is employed as West Asia Researcher at the Asia Research Centre, Centre for Security Studies, War Studies University in Warsaw, Poland. His main research areas and interest include, Islamic Republic of Iran’s defense and security budget and expenditures, parastatal institutions (bonyads), Iran’s security and defense policy, regional security of the Persian Gulf and West Asia. Przybyszewski was awarded with the title of “Best student” of the 8th edition of the Academy of Young Diplomats (European Academy of Diplomacy). His is a founder and president of the Abhaseed Foundation Fund and a contributor of publications for BiznesAlert.pl and TheConser vative.online (Polish edition). Priscilla Roberts is an Associate Professor of Business and Co-Director of the Asia-Pacific Business Research Centre at City University of Macau. She has published many books and articles in twentieth-century international and diplomatic history. Her recent books include two edited collections, Hong Kong in the Cold War (2016); and (with Odd Arne Westad) China, Hong Kong, and the Long 1970s: Global Perspectives (2017); and several documentary works, including The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Documentary and Reference Guide (2017); The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict Through Primary Documents (2018); the documents volume of Spencer C. Tucker, ed., Middle East Conflicts from Ancient Egypt to the 21st Century: An Encyclopedia and Document Collection, 4 volumes (2019); and (with Spencer C. Tucker et al.) The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection, 5 volumes (2020). She is currently working on a study of Anglo-American Think Tanks and China Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s (http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8092303X). Erzsébet Rózsa is an Arabist and an Iranist by training. Rózsa received a Ph.D. in International Relations (topic: nuclear non-proliferation). She has been working on the security, political and social processes of the Middle East and North Africa, including the “cold war” in the Persian Gulf, the Arab Spring and the Da’ish, since the early 1990s—both as a researcher (Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, currently at the Institute for World Economics) and as a Professor in International Relations at the National University of Public Service. She has been a guest lecturer at several other Hungarian as well as at foreign universities (http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8498-426X).

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Maryam Sedaghat is a member of tourism department in Kharazmi University. She has the experience of teaching at Allameh Tabtabaei University of Tehran, and at Yazd University (Iran). Maryam published a book titled of Tourism in Islamic Iranian Pattern of Progress in Persian and she has published different articles on tourism and hospitality. Maryam is one of the first graduate students who completed all her grades, from B.A. to Ph.D. in tourism. She is one of the boards of directors of a tourism company in Iran (Seven Climata Tourism Company), which mostly focus on training and standardization of tourism companies. She is also the manager of Tourism Innovation Center in Yazd, Iran (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7298-0907). Nikita Smagin is a Tehran-based international affairs expert and journalist focusing on Iran and regional affairs. He is also a non-resident expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Nikita has been published on international relations topics in academic journals and media sources in Russia and Iran. He speaks Arabic and Persian, holds a M.A. in International Policy from University of Manchester, a M.A. in Linguistics from Russian New University (RosNOU), and a B.A. in History from Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (https://orcid. org/0000-0002-1421-833X). Saba Sotoudehfar is a Ph.D. Candidate in Law at the University of Nova Lisboa (UNL) in Lisbon (Portugal). Her research interests are focused on Liability of Artificial Intelligence in war and healthcare which is also resonated in her Ph.D. thesis titled “Law of Armed Conflict and Artificial Intelligence”. She is working under supervision of Professor Armando Marques Guedes, director of Centro de Investigação e Desenvolvimento sobre Direito e Sociedade (CEDIS)—Research Center on Law and Society. Other research interests are comparative law, legal challenges in new era and international disputes. She holds a B.A. in Law from University of Tehran (Iran) and a M.A. in International Trade Law from Islamic Azad University (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0998-8479). Ivan Timofeev is Director of Programs at the Russian International Affairs Council, holding a Ph.D. in Political Science from the MGIMO University (2006), as well as a Master of Arts in Society and Politics (Lancaster University and Central European University [2003]) and a B.A. in Sociology (Saint-Petersburg State University [2002]). Timofeev is the author of more than 80 publications, issued in Russian and foreign

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academic press. He is a member of editorial board at the “Comparative Politics”—an academic journal on foreign policy and political science. Since 2006 he has been teaching Political Science and International Relations at MGIMO University of the Russian MFA, currently holding a position of Associate Professor (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-16762221). Younes Zangiabadi is Co-Founder and Executive Vice-President of the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. Younes convenes briefings and prepares foreign policy analysis for federal parliamentarians and bureaucrats in Canada. He obtained his Master of International Affairs from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva with a major in Global Security and a minor in International Trade. His research areas include foreign policy and international security, with a particular focus on Iran and the Middle East region (https://orcid.org/ 0000-0003-0084-7036).

List of Figures

Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System Fig. 1

The 9 leading institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Map 1

Electoral seats allocation for the Parliament of Iran (Source Alem, 2011, p. 34)

97

106

The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran Fig. 1

Iran’s historical project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per year (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors) (Source Authors based on IFI websites’ information retrieved on 20 December 2020)

155

The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations Fig. 1

Key actors, institutions, and factors contributing to Iranian geostrategic decision-making process figure by authors

169

xxv

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LIST OF FIGURES

Iran–China Relations: A Game Changer in the Eastern World Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Center of world economy moving East (Source: India Post News Paper, 2018, May 5) China’s crude oil imports (Source https://www.eia.gov/ todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43216)

255 256

EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement Fig. 1

The Middle East security complex map (Source Buzan and Wæver [2003, p. 187])

304

Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

5 6 7 8

Conceptual model (Source The Author) The EU initiatives vs. U.S. sanctions on Iran. (Source The Author) EU-Iran economic relations (2017–2019) (Source EC [2020a]) The geopolitical threats affecting the interests of European companies (Source Geostrategy in Practice 2020 [2020, p. 5]) Iran Eastern cooperation (Source Author) Iran energy constrains for EU. (Source Author) Iran Regional capabilities (Source Author) The strategic interests of the EU in relations with Iran in the post-JCPOA era (Source Author)

319 323 325

327 327 331 333 336

Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs Picture 1

The map demonstrates the location of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian islands which gives Iran the opportunity of controlling maritime transport in the Persian Gulf

345

LIST OF FIGURES

xxvii

Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage Fig. 1

Fig. 2

The red flag linking Iran and Iraq flags during Arbaeen pilgrimage conveys the message that: “Love of Imam Hussein brings us (Iran and Iraq) together” (ISNA 2019) Structural model of Iran and Iraq’s political convergence

364 378

De-Coding Fabric of Iran-Israeli Hostility in the Regional Context Fig. 1

U.S. imports of crude oil and petroproducts (Source EIA 2019)

392

The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Map of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring countries (Map credits Aivazovsky—Azerbaijan districts numbered.png, ArmeniaNumbered.png, Gg-map.png, and Iran map.png, Public Domain. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid= 1476455) Map of the seven Azerbaijani districts (Note (1) Kalbajar, (2) Lachin, (3) Qubadli, (4) Zangilan, (5) Jabrayil, (6) Fuzuli, and (7) Agdam—occupied by Armenian forces between 1994 and 2020, where the Republic of Artsakh is depicted in pink and post-2016 Azerbaijani-held territory in yellow. Map credits CuriousGolden—Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0. Retrieved from: https://commons. wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=95220616)

568

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xxviii Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Fig. 5

LIST OF FIGURES

Map of Nagorno-Karabakh before and after the November 10 ceasefire (Note The orange area is the Republic of Artsakh; the blue is Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was military conquered prior to November 10; the dark green area is Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was ceased to Baku with the November 10 agreement. The map shows in indigo the territory of the Lanchin Corridor, which, after the ceasefire, is the only land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Map credits Kalj, based on File: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war map.png by User: CuriousGolden—See File: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war map.png, CC BY-SA 3.0. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ index.php?curid=99452389) Chart showing the exponential different in Azerbaijan’s increase in military expenditure compared to Armenia Map of Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) pipeline linking Azerbaijan with Europe (Source Retrieved from: https:// bankwatch.org/press_release/eu-ombudsman-launchesinvestigation-into-financing-of-europe-s-largest-fossilfuels-project)

586 587

594

List of Tables

Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System Table 1 Table 2

Electoral circles of the Iranian 5th Assembly of Experts for the Leadership Key Political Institutions in Iran

100 110

The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran Table 1 Table 2

Table 3

Iran’s membership of International Financial Institutions (ordered in descendent voting power) Iran’s historical project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per institution (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors) Iran’s estimated annual project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per institution in 2023 (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors)

147

150

158

Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Demography of the population of interest KMO and Bartlett’s Test Reasons behind Iran’s decision for inhabiting people in the islands

345 353 354 xxix

xxx

LIST OF TABLES

Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage Table 1 Table 2

Measurement model quality Convergent validity and reliability of the model

374 376

Introduction Francisco José B. S. Leandro , Carlos Branco , and Flavius Caba-Maria

Geopolitics concerns relations among human perceptions, geography, and power. To decode geopolitics is to anticipate struggles and forecast events that stem from the control of spaces and advancement of the interests of sovereign states, at the same time factoring in alternative, even opposing notions and perspectives. No consensual interpretation exists for geopolitics, but we feel compelled to embrace an operational concept of it to serve as reference for the authors and readers of this work: we interpret geopolitics as geographical knowledge projected onto politicised readings of the reality, in order to model, reify, and evaluate how sovereign interests are exploited to support political decisions, with reference made to core powers and hegemonic states. This concept of geopolitics, applied specifically to the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) to explore—from

F. J. B. S. Leandro (B) City University of Macau, Macau, China e-mail: [email protected] C. Branco University of Nova Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal F. Caba-Maria Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_1

1

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F. J. B. S. LEANDRO ET AL.

an unbiased viewpoint—its geographic-positioning, human perspectives on culture-religion, and sovereignty-power relations, is the subject of the book. This volume offers a comprehensive, in-depth study on the decisions with geopolitical impact taken by post-revolution Iranian elites to guarantee the survival of the new regime within the Middle East’s chaotic environment. The manuscript details Iran’s strategies to deter adversaries from attempting to overthrow the power installed in Tehran, and to preserve the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. The stance that the post-Khomeini leadership takes is that to mitigate existential threats and physical attacks to the state necessitates a defensive, rather than an expansionist, strategic posture. Consequently, foremost priority has been given to the survival of the regime, outweighing the need to induce or endorse Islamic revolutions elsewhere. For context, it is important to define what the editors understand by “Middle East”—indeed, there is no consensus among scholars on its geographic boundaries. In fact, the term is challenging to define because it often transcends geography, triggering debates over which countries it should comprise and which to exclude. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer, was he who coined the term “the Middle East” at the very beginning of the twentieth century, and it was readily adopted by European circles of diplomacy and military strategy to identify a region stretching from Turkey to China. After 9/11, we have witnessed the emergence of the term “Greater Middle East,” which includes the North African countries, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Implicitly, this indicates how fluid the concept is, as it carries a translation of strategic concepts that stem from national interpretations, symbols, and perceptions we give to geography. For the purpose of analysis in this book, the editors include in the Middle East all territories spreading from the Levant,1 Sinai Peninsula, 1 According to Cyrus Schayegh (2011, p. 273), “The term ‘Levant’ denotes what is often referred to in Arabic as Bilad al-Sham: Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and their margins, i.e. the border zones shared with Turkey, Iraq, and the Sinai Peninsula.” In Arabic Levant is called ‫( بالد الشام‬Bil¯ad ash-Sh¯am) or ‫( المشرق العربی‬al-Mashr¯ıq al-‘Arabiyy). “Levant” originated from the French idea for “rising”—the rising of the Sun in the East. The Levant region includes Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Israel. The region is bounded by the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the west, the northern Arabian Desert to the south, and Upper Mesopotamia to the east (Cyrus Schayegh. (2011). The Many Worlds of ‘Abud Yasin; or, What Narcotics Trafficking in

INTRODUCTION

3

Arabic Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf region. For “Broader Middle East,” we also consider the strips of land adjacent to the Middle East (both to the west and east) comprising eastern North Africa, South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. Specifically, for Iran—as this book revolves around her—“middle” points to the “middle of Asia” and reflects the aforementioned European interpretation and point of view. Iran therefore prefers the term “West Asia” over “Middle East,” distancing herself from that Eurocentric understanding of foreign territories. Iranian decision-makers, in order to increase the security of the country, have chosen to balance Washington while maintaining an active regional presence. To sustain such regional presence, they have decided to: (1) engage in regional affairs, supporting non-state actors, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; (2) employ asymmetric strategies including the use of soft power instruments through religious networks; and (3) continue direct and indirect engagement with major regional powers. Tehran sought partners to circumvent and undermine the archenemies’ efforts to encircle and isolate the country. At the same time, the regime diversified its networks of commercial partners in Asia and developed particular relations with China and Russia. This book further addresses Iran’s resilience and unusual ability to exploit external shocks for national enhancement and unity. Against all odds, Iran authorities have been able to keep the country free from foreign interference, despite being surrounded by enemies perceived by Tehran as existential threats. In the early years of the twenty-first century, Iran lived with nearly 300,000 foreign soldiers deployed close to its west and east land borders. As Leandro suggests (chapter “Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System”) while drawing on some of the points asserted by Buzan (1983)2 : As Iran emphasises the concept of a strong state in the domestic sense and associates it with resilience of its political system and legitimacy of its institutions, it relies on its theocratic political mindset as the main instrument of unity and legitimacy. As Reynaud de Sousa discusses in chapter “Beating the (White) House: How a “Rogue” Iran Broke Free from the “Axis of Evil” and Became an the Interwar Middle East Can Tell Us about Territorialization. The American Historical Review, 116(2), 273–306). 2 Barry Buzan. (1983). People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. London: Wheatsheaf Books.

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F. J. B. S. LEANDRO ET AL.

Antifragile State”, Iran has become an antifragile state—a state that is able to “positively leverage uncertainty and a complex set of circumstances.” As explained along the pages of the book, Iranian political elites were able to leverage the pressures caused by years of continued U.S. hostile policies, expressed in attempts of international isolation, lengthy and tough sanction regimes, of which Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy is the latest example. Despite being labelled by the United States as a “rogue state” sponsor of international terrorism and a member of an “axis of evil” bent on “developing nuclear weapons,” Iran has successfully resisted being transformed into a pariah state.

1

Why Is Geopolitics of Iran a Matter of Importance?

There is no simple answer to this question. The study of the geopolitics of Iran and its importance for the broader Middle East is, indeed, a complex matter. The gamut of matters to ponder in its evaluation is massive, intertwined, and comprehensive. We have selected those that we believe are relevant and make a difference. Such importance heightened in 1979 with the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah, when the new regime that emerged in Tehran was no longer aligned with the United States’ strategy for the region. This book answers the query above through compiling a coherent set of studies that address the facts and circumstances that made Iran an uncircumventable geopolitical player, combining human perceptions, geography, culture, and power. From a geostrategic perspective, Iran’s privileged geographic location in the centre of the Middle East is of utmost importance. The blend of history and geography permits Tehran to extend influence beyond its borders, to its “near abroad.” Iran is the 17th largest country in the world with a population of about 82 million souls (2019). It is the second largest, after Saudi Arabia, and the most populated country in the Middle East. Iran functions as a land bridge between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and is simultaneously a pathway connecting Asia to the Mediterranean Sea. Beijing has seen this as a geostrategic opportunity to take advantage of, which explains why the “China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor,” one of the Belt and Road Initiative economic corridors connecting China with the Mediterranean Sea, traverses Iran from east to west. Several projects to make it happen are currently in motion.

INTRODUCTION

5

Moreover, Iran’s location entrusts it with nodal centrality, which benefits regional connectivity, transportation, trade, energy, and communications. Furthermore, Iran shares borders with 13 states3 —it shares land borders with seven (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan), and maritime borders with six (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates)— many of them cannot be considered friends. The insecurity that remains in most of those states has had a negative effect on Iran’s security, compelling Tehran to intervene and assume a more assertive role. The United States’ invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan turned them— both neighbours of Iran—into geopolitical battlefields, where Iran had to compete with the United States and Saudi Arabia, thus contributing to upgrading Iran’s geopolitical importance. Iran became an indispensable player in the conflicts that followed the invasions, an outcome contrary to Washington’s desire to promote Tehran’s international isolation. There were two major contributing reasons: in the initial phases of the military campaigns, Tehran provided the United States with extensive assistance; later, it became an inevitable actor in peace negotiations bringing warring factions politically closer. In a similar vein, Iran became an involuntary actor in the South Caucasus, a region adjacent to its northwest border, where Armenia and Azerbaijan fight over Nagorno-Karabakh, which, similar to the other two conflicts, also represents a security threat to Iran. On the one hand, Iran’s northern provinces are inhabited by a significant Azeri minority sympathetic to the Azeri cause4 ; on the other hand, Erdogan’s Pan-Turkic expansionist ambitions in the South Caucasus with immense geopolitical repercussions may evolve, from a national security matter, into a territorial integrity threat. Another security threat with geopolitical implications comes from the South-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, second largest of Iran’s 31 provinces and a frontier with Afghanistan and Pakistan. It belongs to the so-called Baluchistan region, which spreads into Afghanistan and Pakistan, is home of Islamist militant separatist groups who have attacked

3 Tehran considers 15 neighbours. In addition to those referred above, Tehran includes the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), and Nakhchivan. 4 Azerbaijan has close historical and cultural ties with Iran. It was part of Iran before Tsarist Russia forced Iran to give it up, and most of the people in Azerbaijan are Shiites.

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both civilian and government targets, and is also a haven for smuggling gasoline, undocumented Afghan workers, and drugs. The situation requires careful handling and smooth accommodation with Pakistan, as it is, from the Iran perspective, an unreliable partner who competes with Iran for influence in Afghanistan. From a different perspective, we must also consider Iran’s cultural influence in Central Asia, where Tehran acts—neither with ideological purposes nor to compete with Russia—to circumvent the blockade imposed by the United States in order to participate in development, trade, and investment cooperative forums, such as the “Economic Cooperation Organization,” a privileged platform, where Iran can develop economic relations with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the other Central Asia states. Iran’s geopolitical importance also comes from its control over the Strait of Hormuz as well as the islands under its sovereignty in the Persian Gulf, one of the most important choke points in the world connecting the Persian and Oman Gulfs. It is a major shipping route where around one-third of the world’s oil transported by sea and a quarter of the world’s liquefied natural gas supply pass through—the presence of a robust American military apparatus in the region confirms this geopolitical importance. The United States has military bases in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arabs Emirates, having entered into military cooperation and defense agreements with some of these countries.5 The United States’ reduced dependence on the Middle East hydrocarbons may downgrade the importance of the region in Washington’s geopolitical calculus, but not Iran’s geopolitical importance. An evaluation of Iran’s geostrategic and geopolitical importance must also consider the dimension of its proven oil and gas reserves. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2020, Iran ranked second in the world in terms of natural gas reserves, behind Russia and ahead of Qatar, and ranked fourth in terms of the world’s oil proven reserves.

5 The naval forces of the North American Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 5th United States Navy Squadron are installed in Bahrain, and the Air Command of Central Command forces in Qatar. In the case of Oman, the agreement not only provides for the installation of military bases but also allows access to the military bases of the Kingdom.

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The control of the southern—deepest—part of the Caspian Sea (largest inland and landlocked body of water on earth) which is especially rich in natural resources, fish, and hydrocarbons also contribute to augmenting Iran’s geopolitical importance. The 2018 delimitation agreement on the Caspian Sea borders was a strong reminder that Iran and Russia might turn into rivals in the Caspian region. The struggle for hegemony in the broader Middle East region between Iran and Saudi Arabia is another facet of Iran’s geopolitical importance that deserves a thoughtful examination. Rooted in the Shia-Sunni schism, that competition is translated into proxy conflicts in neighbouring countries and regions with deleterious humanitarian consequences. As discussed by Yip (chapter “Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Realpolitik?”), the rivalry between Iran and Saudi is not a bilateral but multilateral relationship that involves various actors participating in its proxy conflicts, as seen in Yemen. Moreover, what have contributed to reinforcing Tehran’s geopolitical importance in the region, on one hand, are Iran’s aspirations to become a nuclear power capable of defending against attacks from regional antagonists as well as to equip itself with diplomatic bargaining leverage, and, on the other, its hostility towards Israel, which has stemmed from complex ideological confrontation and animosity around the Palestinian issue and Iran’s increased influence on Lebanon and Syria. ∗ ∗ ∗

2

Structure of the Book

This book contains 22 chapters arranged in three parts, covering an array of matters with strong geopolitical implications, and Tehran’s respective responses and policy choices. The first part (chapters “Neighbors and Rivals: Iran and Great Power Diplomacy”–“The International Financial Institutions An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran”) addresses the historical, political, and economic aspects that condition the current debate. To a certain extent, it functions as a preparation to the discussions that follow in the next two parts: the second part (chapters “TheU.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations”–“Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era”) asserts the relations that Iran maintains with major powers (United

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States, China, Russia, and the European Union), analysing them from a geopolitical perspective where Iran struggles to guarantee its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Tehran’s political choices vis-à-vis each of them vary according to the nature of the relationship, trying to balance the United States’ open hostility with cooperative and positive relations with China and Russia; the third part (chapters “Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs”–“The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus”) is devoted to examining Iran’s relations with its neighbours. Except for India, in all cases, one way or another, directly or indirectly, those relations were bound, with different intensities, by security concerns, going from open regional competition for regional hegemony, to influence management to avoid encirclement and physical isolation. Albeit an incomplete coverage of the aspects that explain Iran’s geopolitical importance, this book includes and reviews the most important ones. The first part opens with chapter “Neighbors and Rivals: Iran and Great Power Diplomacy”, which places Iran’s recent foreign policies in the Cold War and beyond in the broader context of the country’s experiences in international affairs, starting with the emergence of modern Iran around 1501. According to Roberts, to cope with its opponents (Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain) along the centuries, Iran’s leaders sought support from imposing external allies or patrons who could help the state to resist threats, demands, and assaults of powerful and often threatening neighbours. This approach still prevails in the post Islamic Revolution period. In the early twenty-first century, Tehran balanced continued hostility from the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia with Russia and more recently with China. Iran’s approach to relations with major powers is further developed in chapter “The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy: International Balancing Act”, but from a different view. While explaining why the Islamic Republic of Iran took a non-aligned posture and has been struggling to pursue an “independent foreign policy,” considering neutrality the best way for maintaining independence and territorial integrity, Ahmadian elaborates on why and how that neutrality posture was crossed with the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the strategic cooperation with Russia in the Middle East.

INTRODUCTION

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Looking inwards, chapter “Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System” describes the contours of Iran’s political system born with the 1979 revolution. Leandro sheds light on the political consequences of refuting secularism and of building a political system dominated by theological beliefs and a hegemonic clergy, presenting it as an apparent theocratic hybridisation, combining democratic and religious representation. In chapter “Beating the (White) House: How a “Rogue” Iran Broke Free from the “Axis of Evil” and Became an Antifragile State” and still looking inwards, based on the concept of antifragility first developed by Nassim Taleb, Reynaud de Sousa argues that the demise of the Iranian regime has become the most unexpected event that can be expected in the Middle East. However, this highly anticipated event has not occurred because Iran has become an antifragile state, i.e. a state with the ability to positively leverage uncertainty and a complex set of circumstances. Part I ends with chapter “The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran”, where Martínez-Galán discusses the role played by the largest international financial institutions in Iran, and vice versa, framing the discussion in the theoretical frameworks of financial statecraft and of soft power, debating their relevance in the context of the external financing of the Iranian economy. ∗ ∗ ∗ In Part II, chapters “The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations”–“Controversial Efficiency? The Experience of the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran” address different perspectives of Iran’s relations with the United States. In chapter “The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations”, Haghirian and Zangiabadi delve into understanding the United States’ role in Iran’s geostrategic and foreign policy decision-making process from three different angles: assessing the United States’ structural role in Iran’s foreign policy calculations under the broader framework of Iran’s geostrategy in the postrevolution period; examining the areas in which the geostrategic interests of both countries align in regional developments, from the Iran–United States cooperation in forming the governments in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), to the fight against terrorism in the Levant region; investigating the process that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

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which, for the first time, allowed constructive diplomatic engagements between Iran and the United States. In chapter “Iran’s Understanding of Strategic Stability: In the Light of Relations with the U.S. In the Middle East”, Barzegar elaborates on the concept of “strategic stability” and its evolution in the last decades, arguing that its understanding has evolved according to the nature of the threats that Iran has to face. The dynamics of regional politics— such as the continued crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, developments of the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis, the emergence of Daesh, and the socalled “maximum pressure” policy promoted by President Trump—has further centred Iran’s sense of “strategic stability” on the concepts of containment and deterrence through increased regional presence, taking advantage of its geopolitical centrality and soft power to eradicate newly emerging national security threats. Chapter “Controversial Efficiency? The Experience of the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran” analyses the efficiency of the sanction’s regime imposed on Iran by the United States. Timofeev and Kortunov question whether it is reasonable to expect sanctions to succeed in Iran in the near future. They conclude that, contrary to previous positive perceptions of the role of sanctions in global politics, a lot of researchers are now disputing their efficiency, attributing the success of the cases studied to other factors besides sanctions. In Chapter “Iran–China Relations: A Game Changer in the Eastern World”, Caba-Maria elaborates on Iran and China relations, their potential, and limitations, their common views, and their divergences. The increased number of partnerships with China in the Middle East, with a focus on Sino-Iranian relations, were translated over the past decades into practical and economic cooperation. Through the connection with Iran, Chinese leaders are seizing the opportunity to advance China’s economic and strategic interests in the Middle East, which go beyond energy into the security and political dimensions. Nevertheless, Sino-Iranian interests also intersect enough to cement a growing relationship. Relations between Iran and Russia are discussed in chapter “Iran and Russia Relations: Conceptions of Cooperations”. Kiani points out that current interactions between the two countries have grown out of proportion, if one takes into consideration their historical relations, and argues that cooperation is based on countering regional crises or common enemies, and the politicisation of various joint security and economic

INTRODUCTION

11

projects, rather than long-term common interests. As far as the ideological ends of Iran and geopolitical goals of Russia at the global level coincide, both players will have strong incentives to manage their bilateral and regional differences, but the scope of their strategic cooperation will remain limited. Chapters “EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement” and “Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era” explore different perspectives of European Union– Iran relations. Chapter “EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement” reviews those relations, starting from the 1992 European Council, through the “critical dialogue,” emphasising the crucial moments of that relationship. Przybyszewski deconstructs the European Union’s Iran policy and Iran’s responses, through the theoretical lens of Kennan’s “containment strategy” and Donnelly’s notion of “heterarchy,” relating them to the Regional Security Complex Theory. He argues that despite the rising interconnectedness of the Levant, Maghreb, and Gulf Mena region subcomplexes, the European Union applies a controlled hierarchical type of containment strategy in the first two subcomplexes, while applying a limited heterarchical type in the third, thus also towards Iran. Part II ends with chapter “Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era”, which analyses European Union– Iran relations in the post-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) period. Niknami argues that their relations have been quite ambivalent. The JCPOA opened a new chapter in the relations between the two sides and clearly marked Iran’s desire to start a détente in international relations. It created conditions for Iran to revitalise ties with the European Union based on mutual interests and needs. But these positive developments vanished in 2018 when the United States withdrew from the agreement, with ensuing problems. The change of Iranian posture vis-àvis the deal was brought about by a shift in perception by the European Union’s ability to keep the agreement alive. ∗ ∗ ∗ Part III is dedicated to studying Iran relations with its neighbourhood, starting with chapter “Iran– UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs”. Eslami and Sotoudehfar analyse Iran–UAE relations through the

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longstanding dispute over the sovereignty of three islands in the Persian Gulf: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which in April 2020 were converted into residential properties by Iranian authorities. They argue that although Iran’s primary purpose for turning the three islands into residential areas is to settle disputes over sovereignty as well as to preserve territorial integrity, the latter aim is to increase domination over the Persian Gulf and extend its influence in the region, concluding that the most important drivers that led to this strategic decision were of geopolitical nature. Relations between Iran and Iraq are studied in chapter “Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage” from a unique perspective. Eslami, Bazrafshan, and Sedaghat argue that one of the most important dimensions of Iran and Iraq’s political convergence has been projected in the “Arbaeen Pilgrimage,” which is a religious and politically-led movement that drives Iran and Iraq to political convergence and empowerment of Shia nations that represent Shia geopolitics, and seeks to expand their relations in the religious, political, economic, technology, and security spheres. The complex Iran–Israeli relations are examined in chapter “De-Coding Fabric of Iran-Israeli Hostility in the Regional Context” by Khlebnikov and Smagin, who look at several major factors which largely set the hostile agendas between the two states: the transformation of the Middle East’s security system, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian issue, Iran’s increased influence in Lebanon and Syria, the use of enemy image of each other in their policies, the nuclear issue, and the United States’ regional policies. They anticipate that despite existing hostility and ideological animosity between both countries, pragmatism will prevail, thereby averting any large-scale conflicts. In chapter “Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Realpolitik?”, Yip studies the geopolitical importance of Iran and Saudi Arabia through their struggle for religious hegemony, strategic role, and attempts of using power as a means to emerge as regional powers. She delves into Iran and Saudi Arabia’s historical use of religion as a soft power tool to engage with societal development, particularly for regime stability purposes and geopolitical objectives. She also explores the different broad-based approaches that each country has adopted in its use of religion, and the use of proxy conflicts by each side in their struggle for regional dominance. Chapter “Iran’s National Security and Afghanistan Politics” examines Iran’s responses to political and security developments in Afghanistan, from the Soviet intervention in 1979 until February 2020, when an

INTRODUCTION

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agreement was signed between the United States and Taliban officials. Branco argues that Iran is a rational, pragmatic actor whose relations with Afghanistan aimed, first and foremost, at ensuring its security and preserving its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Iran neither has a hegemonic ambition in Afghanistan nor wants to export a political ideology throughout the region by following a sectarian approach and using its perceived leverage upon Shia groups. Iran’s policies are fundamentally driven to limiting its opponents’ influence over the Afghan elites and reducing the threat they may pose to Iran’s national security. In chapter “Not All Plain Sailing: The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa”, Tiziana Corda traces the evolution and significance of Iran’s presence in the Horn of Africa, addressing an issue largely under-researched. She explores the reasons why the Horn of Africa is a very coveted spot for many foreign powers, including Iran, whose objectives have driven Tehran’s policies in that area, and how its elites have tried to pursue them over the past decades. According to Corda, the empirical analysis reveals the existence of a complex web of global, regional, and domestic factors behind Iran’s Horn policies, exposing the impossibility to separate the dynamics of Iran’s reach towards the Horn from those of its regional and extra-regional competitors. In chapter “Iran-India Relations Before and After the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal and the Consequent Sanctions”, Rózsa analyses Iran–India relations on the bilateral, regional, and multilateral/global levels. She argues that despite their centuries-old relations, their focus and scope are much more defined by contemporary interests, strategic perceptions, and a regional/global balance of power than historical or cultural connections. Their bilateral relations fit into a wide-ranging regional as well as global context. Present-day bilateral relations per se are usually symbolised by energy. The regional context is in fact a complex of their direct and/or their overlapping neighbourhoods presenting converging and/or overlapping interests and threat perceptions at the same time; on the multilateral/global level, the nuclear issue stands out. In chapter “New Development of Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism”, Yang uses the theory of Eurasianism to analyse Turkey–Iran relations covering the following aspects: Turkey and Iran’s roles in Eurasianism, the historical relations of Turkey and Iran with a focus on geopolitics, Turkey–Iran relations in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period, and the prospects of Turkey-Iran cooperation within the framework of Eurasianism and new geopolitics. Yang argues

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that although Turkey and Iran will not become allies, there is potential for the two, together with Russia, to establish a triangular nexus to coordinate key issues in the Greater Middle East. Finally, in chapter “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus”, Valentina concludes the book with an analysis of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict in the Caucasus, which she asserts has shifted regional equilibria, pushing Iran, Turkey, and Russia to compete for influence. The newly emerging balance of power is rendered more fragile by the intervention of extra-regional players such as Pakistan and Israel, as well as by China’s vested interests in strategic infrastructures in the Caucasus. Valentina suggests that the unpreparedness of Iran, for a military and political proxy war in the Caucasus, drove the retreat from the region. ∗ ∗ ∗ This publication has not exhausted the debate on Iran geopolitics— the editors are fully cognizant of the book’s insufficient or outright lack of coverage on certain important subjects, such as JCPOA and the nuclear programme, relations with Pakistan, the proxy wars in Syria and Yemen, and culture as an instrument of power. Iran will continue to be a topic for responsible research and inclusive debate, and more books on this topic must include Iran’s perspective, as the editors have endeavoured to ensure in the present case.

Framing the Debate

Neighbors and Rivals: Iran and Great Power Diplomacy Priscilla Roberts

1

Introduction

Modern Iran emerged around 1501, when Esma‘il I, a youthful prince descended from Muslim, Georgian, Turkish, and Byzantine royalty and nobility, proclaimed himself shah, re-establishing a Persian state after a hiatus of nine centuries. From that time onward, ensuring Iran’s security and at times its survival repeatedly impelled its leaders to seek support from imposing external allies or patrons who could help the new state to resist the threats, demands, and assaults of powerful and often threatening neighbors. A recent study of revolutionary Iran’s foreign policies goes so far as to argue: “The Islamic Republic’s strident revolutionary rhetoric coupled with the opacity and complexity of its power centers mask the elements of continuity between pre- and post-revolution Iran… However, beneath the surface lies a leadership concerned with many of the same fundamental matters as its pre-revolution predecessor, and which is in fact driven by the same core assumptions and beliefs embedded in both the collective and institutional memories of its leadership and organizations” (Tabatabai, 2020: 3).

P. Roberts (B) City University of Macau, Macau, China e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_2

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From the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was by far the most dangerous international opponent of Iran. In 1514, Ottoman Sultan Selim I inflicted a massive defeat on Esma‘il at the Battle of Khaldiran, checking Iran’s hopes of further expansion (Newman, 2006; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017). In response, Esma‘il and his successors turned to European powers and Russia for assistance. From the late eighteenth century, expansionist Russia represented the greatest threat to both Iran and the Ottoman Empire, prompting both states to seek the protection of the British Empire. In practice, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this often meant that Britain and Russia effectively colluded in dividing Iran into spheres of influence. This pattern recurred when Britain and the Soviet Union were allied against Adolf Hitler’s Germany during World War II, a conflict that also brought the United States into direct involvement in Iran’s affairs. When Soviet forces initially declined to leave northern Iran once the war was over, the United States took the lead in pressuring the Soviets to withdraw, an episode that constituted one of the earliest crises of the developing Cold War. As British power in Iran declined and nationalist resentment of the monopoly power of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company intensified, the United States stepped in, organizing a coup that cemented the hold on power of Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi and effectively replacing Britain as Iran’s foremost international ally and patron. Following the Shah’s overthrow in 1979 and the Islamic Revolution, which left the nation locked in bitter antagonism with the United States and vulnerable to attack by neighboring Iraq, Iran was initially somewhat friendless. From 1980 to 1988, it was locked in a bitter, stalemated war with Iraq, in which up to one million Iranians died or were seriously wounded. Across the Middle East, Shi‘ite Iran also became a major supporter of radical Islamist forces and groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, a pattern that continued and intensified following the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of neighboring Iraq, which destabilized that country. Facing continuing hostility from the United States and also from Israel and Saudi Arabia, together with threats to its vaunted nuclear program, Iran turned for security to post-Soviet Russia, where President Vladimir Putin sought to rebuild Russia’s international influence following the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. As China’s reach expanded dramatically in the early twenty-first century, stretching well into Central Asia and beyond, Iran’s leaders also believed it profitable to align their country with the ambitious and increasingly influential new global superpower.

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2 Iran’s Early History: The Achaemenid Empire and Its Successors For most of its long and complicated history, Iran was embattled. The original Persian Empire that Esma‘il I claimed he was re-establishing traced its origins much further back in time, to the Achaemenid Empire centered on modern-day Iran that became a major power in the Middle East during the seventh century BCE. For the next three centuries, the empire expanded across territories including present-day Syria and Iraq, campaigning in Afghanistan and extending as far as western India. In the fifth century BCE, under Emperor Darius I and his son Xerxes I, the might of Persia was turned westward against the smaller Greek states of the Aegean, which nonetheless managed to repulse their formidable neighbor and maintain their independence. In the following century, King Alexander III of Macedon (r. 336–323 BCE) conquered both Greece and Persia, as well as Egypt and much of north India, before dying unexpectedly at the age of 37 (Gershevitz, 1985). Alexander’s empire rapidly fell apart into competing successor states. By 247 BCE, nomadic tribes known as the Parthians controlled most of the former Persian domains, establishing an empire ruled by the Arsacid dynasty that endured until 224 CE, when the Sassanid dynasty came to power. From the third century BCE until the seventh century AD, the greatest rival of the revitalized Persian Empire was a new power, the Roman Empire that soon extended its rule and authority territory across much of central and western Europe, the near East, and Egypt. For almost nine centuries, intermittent, bitter, and hard-fought warfare between the Persian and Roman states was a constant feature of the international scene, becoming if anything more fervent when the Romans abandoned their original capital in Italy in 330 AD and established a new imperial metropolis at the ancient Turkish city of Byzantium, rechristened Constantinople (Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Yarshater, 1983a, b). Traditional hostilities between these rival powers were ultimately overtaken by the rise of a third and still more redoubtable force that threatened both Rome and Persia: militant Islam, a monotheistic faith propounded by the Prophet Muhammad that arose in the Arabian peninsula in the early seventh century AD. Adherents of this creed first took over the cities of Mecca and Medina, the birthplaces of this new religion, aggressively imposing the new faith on both the urban and tribal inhabitants of Arabia, and then turned their forces against those of both

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the Byzantine Empire and Persia. The Rashidun caliphate, established on Muhammad’s death in 632 AD, quickly overran most of presentday Iraq, and Sasssanid rule ended in 651. By this point, Arab troops had also taken Egypt, the Levant, and much of Afghanistan, as well as Syria, Iraq, and Iran; within another century, north Africa, Spain, and the rest of Afghanistan had likewise fallen to the Arabs. Ruled by a caliphate based first in Damascus in Syria and then from the mideighth century in Baghdad, a newly founded city in Iraq, the new Islamic dominions were governed by an elite that included many bureaucrats of Persian origin, while even its non-Persian members were heavily influenced by Persian culture and learning of every kind and looked to Persian governing practices for models. While Arabic became the official bureaucratic language of the Islamic state, Persian or Farsi, a distinctive Indo-European language, was also widely used in administration and diplomacy (Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Frye, 1975). These patterns continued, even as a succession of new rulers gained the ascendancy. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, a new Seljuk Turkish dynasty emerged and won considerable autonomous power within the Islamic domains, moving aggressively against the Byzantine Empire’s remaining provinces, and prompting the first of a series of crusades, Western military expeditions intended to win back for Christianity the territories bordering the Mediterranean that had been the setting for most of the events recounted in the Bible. From the late eleventh until the fourteenth century, coalitions of Western powers dispatched a succession of often poorly coordinated armies that succeeded in seizing assorted redoubts on the Levantine coast, kingdoms and principalities that then became foci of contention between Christian and Muslim forces. In 1204, Christian forces even seized Constantinople from its Roman–Greek rulers, the beginning of over half a century of Western or Latin rule that ended only when the Byzantines recaptured the city in 1261 (Boyle, 1968; Foltz, 2016). From the east, other still more destabilizing forces threatened the Islamic territories. From the early thirteenth century, attacks by Mongol tribes from the Asian steppes brought much of Central Asia under Mongol control. In 1256, the Mongol Ilkhan Hulegu launched an invasion of Persia, successfully subduing the territory before moving on to Baghdad, still the home of the now decidedly weak Abbasid caliphate. The city was sacked and the caliph was killed. Hulegu then proceeded to move

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against Syria and Egypt, only to be repulsed by the forces of the increasingly independent Mamluk sultanate of Egypt, which proceeded to annex Syria and take over the mantle of the caliphate. Thereafter, the Mamluks continued to assail the Mongol holdings in Persia and Georgia, while moving successfully against the remaining Christian crusader redoubts in Palestine (Boyle, 1968; Foltz, 2016). In the early fourteenth century, a new rising power appeared in the region, that of the Ottoman Turks, a tribe that originated in Anatolia and soon became a formidable military force, attacking Christians and Muslims alike when rival family members were not pursuing civil wars against each other. What remained of the holdings of the Byzantine Empire was steadily eroded, falling under Ottoman rule, with the emperor reduced to something close to vassal status. By 1400, it seemed inevitable that within a few years Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1403) would fulfill his oft-proclaimed goal of capturing Constantinople. His plans were interrupted in 1402, when the forces of the last great Mongol khan or warlord, Timur the Lame or Tamerlane (1336–1405), routed Bayezid’s army at the Battle of Ankara, capturing the sultan, who died while imprisoned. Timur’s conquests also encompassed all of Persia and Iraq, where he campaigned for much of the 1380s and 1390s, as well as the capture of Delhi, India, in 1398. He then rampaged again across Syria and Iraq, taking Aleppo, Damascus, and Baghdad, and sacking the latter city in 1401, a prelude to defeating Bayezid in 1402 (Foltz, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986).

3

The Safavids and the Ottoman Threat

Following Timur’s death in 1405, the Timurid Empire rapidly disintegrated. The Ottomans rebounded, and in a symbolic blow to the Christian faith, Bayezid’s great-grandson Sultan Mehmet II (r. 1450– 1481) finally captured Constantinople in 1453, renaming it Istanbul and making the city the Ottoman capital. Prevailing disarray and flux across the entire region in the later fifteenth century meant that in present-day Iran and Iraq, two major Turkic tribal groupings, the AqQoyunlu or White Sheep and the Qara-Qoyunlu or Black Sheep, battled for supremacy. Ultimately, the first confederation, led by the charismatic warrior Uzun Hasan (r. 1453–1478), prevailed in this competition. In 1458 Uzun Hasan married as his fourth wife the beautiful Byzantine princess Theodora, daughter to the Emperor John Komnenos IV (r.

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1429–1459) and niece to the Emperor David of Trebizond or Trabzon, a remnant of the Byzantine Empire that survived until 1461, when it too fell to Mehmet II. The sultan initially spared David, but two years later accused the ex-emperor of treason and executed him, together with his sons and nephew. Encouraged by his wife’s Venetian relatives, in 1473 Uzun Hasan embarked on open warfare against Mehmet and his sons, a campaign that ended in August that year in wholesale defeat for Uzun Hasan at the Battle of Otlukbeli. Thereafter, he prudently refrained from further overt challenges to Ottoman power (Jackson and Lockhart, 1986). Ever since the Muslim conquest of the seventh century, the official religion within Iran and the other territories had been Islam, with the caliphate adhering to the orthodox Sunni strain that recognized competent non-descendants of the prophet Muhammad as his authorized successors. Yet Iran also possessed a strong mystical tradition, the product of the Persian Sufi heritage that pre-dated Islam, that emphasized intense devotional prayer, meditation, and visionary and spiritual elements, under the direction of charismatic leaders. The country also possessed numerous shrines to departed saints and holy men and women. In the late thirteenth century, a mystical sect known as the Safavid Order or Safaviyya came into being and began to attract numerous followers. By the 1450s, numbers of adherents had grown to the point where the Safaviyya constituted a major political force in northern Iran and the Caucasus. To differentiate themselves from the dominant Aq-Qoyunlu, the sect also adopted the Shi‘ite version of Islam, that claimed that only direct descendants of the prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and her husband, Ali, were entitled to lead the Islamic faith. The sect’s fighting men, who wore a red turban with twelve intricate knots and folds symbolizing major Shi‘ite historical figures, became known as Kızılba¸s or “red hats” after their distinctive headgear (Axworthy, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986). As part of Uzun Hasan’s efforts to maintain his supremacy across his domains and ensure good relations with the Safaviyya, he contracted various marriage alliances with Safavid leaders. His sister was married to Sheikh Junayd, foremost leader of the Safavid Order from 1447 until his death in 1460, when their son Sheikh Haydar (1459–1488) succeeded him. In 1471 or 1472 Martha (Halima), Uzun Hasan’s daughter by Theodora Komnena, married her cousin Sheikh Haydar. Before his death in battle in 1488 at the hands of the Aq-Qoyunlu, now led by his brotherin-law Yaqub bin Usun Hasan, the couple produced three sons, the

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youngest of whom would become Shah Esma‘il I. Ali Mirza Safavi, who succeeded Sheikh Haydar, though encouraged by his Safavid advisers to avenge his father’s death, was instead held captive with his brothers for several years by the Aq-Qoyunlu. In 1494 the young boys escaped, with Ali Mirza dying in the attempt as he held off their pursuers to win the younger Esma‘il, then seven, whom he had designated his successor, the time to reach safety at the city of Ardabil, the Safavid power base. Esma‘il possessed exceptional physical strength and precocious military and leadership abilities, as well as loyal supporters and fighting men of fervent dedication. Although the Aq-Qoyunlu soon expelled the young prince and his followers from Ardabil, over the next seven years the Safaviyya allied themselves with tribes from northern Iran and the Caucasus, enabling them to capture the strategic strongholds of Sharur and Tabriz. In 1501 the 14-year-old Esma‘il was acclaimed and crowned the first shah of Iran’s new Safavid dynasty (Axworthy, 2016; Newman, 2006; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017). Esma‘il’s coronation marked the re-emergence of Iran as a distinct and independent nation, a status it would retain thereafter. Over the following ten years, Esma‘il and his Kızılba¸s enjoyed a succession of military victories, gaining control over all of present-day Iran and Iraq. While eliminating most rival Sufi sects in Iran, he and his followers also embraced a particularly extreme form of Shi‘ism, repudiating all the four caliphs preceding Ali, the prophet’s son-in-law. A skilled fighter renowned for his strength and prowess in battle, Esma‘il was also a prolific poet, who compared himself in his verses with Alexander the Great and other legendary warriors and regretted that he had encountered no foes worthy of his valor (Minorsky, 1942: 1050a–1053a). He was tempting fate. Ultimately, these extravagant and hubristic complaints proved premature and ill-founded. Esma‘il’s territorial gains often represented incursions into territory previously controlled by the neighboring Ottoman sultanate, the world’s leading Sunni power. Sultan Bayezit II (r. 1481–1512) preferred to focus upon threats to Ottoman domains from the Spanish, Genoese, and Venetians in the west and south, while showing relative restraint toward the rising new Iranian power, with which he sought to reach an accommodation. Selim, his fourth son, governor of the province of Trabzon, which bordered on Iranian territory and in 1505 was subjected to pillaging by a Kızılba¸s force commanded by Esma‘il’s brother Ebrahim, was less forbearing, launching retaliatory raids against Iran and suppressing

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Shi‘ism within his own province. In 1510, Esma‘il launched a second expedition against Selim’s domains, which was repulsed, with Selim’s forces making inroads into Safavid-held lands, before Bayezit negotiated a diplomatic settlement with the shah. In 1511, a major Shi‘ite rebellion erupted in the Ottoman Empire, inspired in part by Safavid Iran, which welcomed fugitive insurgents following the uprising’s eventual failure. Following complicated intra-family maneuverings among himself and two rival half-brothers, in April 1512, Selim overthrew his father, taking power as Selim I (r. 1512–1520). Within a year, he had eliminated his brothers and most of their sons, though two of his nephews fled to Esma‘il’s court (Mikhail, 2020; Newman, 2006). Selim lost little time in moving against Esma‘il, who had thrown his support in the Ottoman succession struggle to Selim’s now-dead halfbrother Ahmed, even sending some forces to fight on the prince’s behalf, and now planned to helped Ahmed’s son Murad to overthrow Selim. In 1514, the two monarchs exchanged a lengthy series of belligerent and bombastic letters, highlighting their religious differences and their mutual determination not to back down from the impending fight. Selim imposed an economic land and sea blockade on the Iranian silk trade, one that would be maintained throughout his reign. He also persuaded leading Sunni religious leaders (muftis) to issue declarations of holy war (fatwas) against his Shi‘ite opponents, condemning them as heretics and denying them the religious toleration granted to Jews or Christians. This set the stage for a permanent and bitter Sunni–Shi‘ite divide between the Ottoman Empire and Persia. During his march through Ottoman territory and into Iran, Selim massacred up to forty thousand of his own empire’s Shi‘ite subjects. Marching across Anatolia, present-day Iraq, and then Iran with an army of over 100,000 men, equipped with heavy artillery, in August 1514, Selim’s forces encountered the Safavid troops at Khaldiran in northwestern Iran. The Ottomans inflicted a devastating defeat upon their opponents, before taking and sacking Tabriz, Esma‘il’s capital. Selim hoped to winter in Tabriz and complete the subjugation of Iran the following year, but his soldiers refused to remain in the city, compelling him to withdraw back to Istanbul (Mikhail, 2020). Even so, the Ottomans had seized control of Eastern Anatolia and much of the territory that now constitutes present-day Iraq. Following their defeat at Khaldiran, the Safavids were undoubtedly the weaker party in what would become recurrent conflicts with the Ottomans over the following two centuries. Repeatedly, the Safavids

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sought international allies elsewhere, looking especially to the various European powers that were also threatened by Ottoman expansionism. Esma‘il gained a breathing space when, after decamping from Tabriz, Selim subsequently turned his attention to subduing the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt, which also controlled Syria and Arabia, including the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as port cities in Yemen. The campaign, waged in 1516–1517, was brief and conclusive, bringing the overthrow of the Mamluk sultanate and the annexation of all its territories by the Ottoman state. The Ottoman rulers also took over the Islamic caliphate, constituting themselves the official guardians of Sunni Muslim orthodoxy. (Mikhail, 2020). Ironically, given their long-running conflict with Iran, the Ottomans used Persian as the language of international diplomacy, emulating the Arabs, Seljuks, Mamluks, and Mongols whom they had supplanted. Hostilities between Safavid Iran and the Ottomans were renewed in 1519–1520, with the Safavids seeking and receiving assistance from European trading states, including Portugal and Venice, as well as Georgia and the Tatars of the Crimea. Hoping that their two countries might be able to form an anti-Ottoman alliance, in 1521, Esma‘il also established diplomatic relations with Tsar Vasili III of Russia. The Persians massacred the Turkish populations of the cities of Mosul and Baghdad, while the Ottoman authorities sought to suppress and even eliminate their Shi‘ite subjects, at best forcibly transferring them elsewhere in the empire, at worst simply killing them (Newman, 2006; Axworthy, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017). Selim’s death in September 1520 brought a temporary albeit brief hiatus in Ottoman–Safavid confrontations. His son and successor, Suleiman I (r. 1520–1566), known as “the Lawgiver” to his subjects and “the Magnificent” in the West, gave first priority to fulfilling his father’s European ambitions, taking the Serbian city of Belgrade in 1521 and besieging and capturing the Eastern Mediterranean island of Rhodes from the Christian Knights of St. John in 1522. He then mounted further campaigns in Central Europe against Hungary and the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire, mounting unsuccessful sieges of the Austrian capital of Vienna in 1526 and again in 1532. Seeking to profit from Suleiman’s preoccupation with his European adversaries, Esma‘il’s son and successor, Tahmasp I (r. 1524–1576), attempted to stir up rebellion in the eastern Ottoman provinces, while making overtures to the Hapsburg emperor Charles V that he hoped would result in a mutual

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alliance against the Ottomans. In response to these initiatives, in 1526 Suleiman launched renewed attacks on Iranian-held territory in Iraq, beginning a brutal war that lasted three decades, during which Tahmasp responded to Ottoman invasions with scorched-earth tactics. A rebel son of Suleiman and his family also found refuge at Tahmasp’s court, though only temporarily, since once relations between Iran and the Ottomans improved, Tahmasp acquiesced in their execution. Under the terms of the Treaty of Amasya, concluded in 1555, Persia kept Azerbaijan, eastern Armenia, eastern Kurdistan, and eastern Georgia, while the Ottomans received Iraq, Arabia, western Georgia, western Armenia, and western Kurdistan (Newman, 2006; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017). Following Tahmasp’s death in 1576, a period of civil war among his potential successors ensued, from which Ottoman Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–1595) sought to profit by launching renewed assaults on Persia in 1578. The war lasted until 1590, when Shah Abbas I “the Great” (r. 1588–1629), a grandson of Tahmasp, signed the Treaty of Constantinople, ceding extensive territory to the Ottomans, including Qarabagh Province, all of Persian Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, and most of Persian Kurdistan, Luristan, and Dagestan. Abbas, far from being resigned to this loss, was determined to reverse the outcome of previous wars. In the 1590s, Abbas set about modernizing the Persian military, investing heavily in artillery, while strengthening his own internal political authority over Iran’s sometimes obstreperous provincial governors. He moved his capital to Isfahan, beautifying the city with magnificent mosques, palaces, buildings, and bridges, and encouraging the arts and all forms of material culture. Abbas also sought to conclude antiOttoman alliances with Western powers, dispatching a diplomatic mission to Europe in 1599, which made tentative and largely unreciprocated overtures to Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, Poland, and Russia. Contacts with England proved rather more fruitful: British experts helped to upgrade Iran’s military technology, especially its artillery, and in 1622 four ships of the English East India Company helped Abbas to retake the strategically valuable port of Hormuz from the Portuguese, re-establishing an Iranian presence in the Persian Gulf (Newman, 2006; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017). English assistance in overhauling Iran’s military capabilities had other consequences. In 1603 Shah Abbas’s forces launched a surprise attack on

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Tabriz, beginning a decade in which Persia regained most of the territory lost since the 1520s, acquisitions formally recognized in 1612 in a new Treaty of Constantinople, and confirmed—after further hostilities— in the Treaty of Sarab Iran and the Ottomans concluded in 1618. A further Ottoman–Persian war began in 1623, when Abbas I attempted to profit from Ottoman succession disputes to wrest back Iraq. Early Iranian successes in seizing most of Iraq, including the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad, were facilitated by civil unrest within the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) restored order at home, whereupon he launched a major offensive to retake Iraq, recapturing Baghdad and the rest of the province in 1638. The Treaty of Zuhab, signed the following year, established frontiers between Iran and Ottoman domains, including both modern Iraq and present-day Turkey, that would remain largely unchanged from then onward. Iraq, including Baghdad, plus western Caucasia and the Kurdish territories fell under Ottoman control, while Persia retained southwestern Caucasia (Newman, 2006; Axworthy, 2016; Jackson and Lockhart, 1986; Amanat, 2017; Matthee, 2012).

4

Iran Between Russia and Britain, 1722–1914

Internal weakness in any state almost invariably tempted its neighbors to profit thereby. In 1722, with the machinery of Iranian government now somewhat decrepit following the reigns of several rather ineffectual shahs, a revolt erupted in Iran’s Afghan provinces. The rebels captured and sacked Isfahan, conquering much of Iran and prompting the Ottoman Turks to annex Iran’s western provinces, including Tabriz, Kermanshah, and Hamadan, enslaving many Shi‘ites, while Tsar Peter the Great of Russia, seeking to counter this expansion of Ottoman power, occupied the Caspian Sea’s southern coast. Under the 1723 Treaty of St. Petersburg, Iran ceded Derbent, Baku, and the three provinces of Guilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad to Russia. Iran, however, subsequently refused to ratify this treaty. Resistance to the new Afghan rulers was headed by Nader Qoli, a young warlord based in the northeastern province of Khorasan, who raised a highly trained, disciplined, and well-equipped army that reoccupied Isfahan in 1729, after inflicting multiple defeats on the Afghans. Nader then proceeded to vanquish the Ottomans, forcing them to withdraw to the pre-1722 frontiers established under the 1639 Treaty of

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Zuhab. The Russians, now allied with Iran against the Ottomans, had already withdrawn from the Caspian coast. Nader, until this time nominally a subordinate first of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp II (r. 1729–1732) and then of his infant son Abbas III (r. 1732–1735), proceeded to depose the latter and assume the throne himself. He instituted military and governmental reforms, including far greater toleration and acceptance of Sunni Muslims, who constituted a significant portion of Iran’s population. After restoring Iran’s position in the west, turning eastward in 1738, Nader regained the Afghan citadel of Kandahar, took Kabul, and then proceeded to trounce the forces of India’s Moghul emperor, Mohammad Shah, at the battle of Karnal (1739), conquering and occupying Delhi, seizing enormous quantities and treasure, and annexing all Moghul territory west of the Indus River. By 1743, Nader had gathered an army of 375,000 men, the largest in the world at that point, which he planned to employ in retaking Ottoman Iraq. This venture proved fruitless, while the hardships that the expense—despite Nader’s massive Moghul booty— of supporting this huge army imposed upon Iran’s population prompted widespread resentment and revolts across the country, insurrections that were suppressed with great brutality. Nader succeeded in repulsing an attempted Ottoman invasion, but new internal revolts against his continuing demands for money erupted, while he himself was afflicted by mental instability. In 1747, officers of his own bodyguard assassinated the shah who had been one of his country’s greatest military leaders and had once enjoyed the unstinting loyalties of most of his subjects. Most of his commanders returned home with their forces to their native provinces, with two establishing independent kingdoms in Afghanistan and Georgia (Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Avery et al. , 1991; Amanat, 2017). For the rest of the eighteenth century, Iran descended into chaos, poverty, and complicated tribal civil war. The country enjoyed a period of relative calm under Karim Khan Zand (r. 1751–1779), a tribal military leader who refused the title of shah and sought to promote the welfare of his subjects. By 1765, after fighting off threats from both internal and external rivals, including warlords based in Azerbaijan and Mazanderan, he and his allies controlled the bulk of Iran’s territory. Karim Khan established his capital in Shiraz, building numerous mosques and palaces in the city. He resumed relations with Britain, allowing the East India Company to establish a trading outpost in the south of the country. He also succeeded in taking the city of Basra in Iraq, a prize that had eluded

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previous Iranian rulers. This interlude represented a rare oasis of tranquility in an otherwise turbulent century, with civil war resumed on Karim Khan’s death (Avery et al., 1991; Amanat, 2017). Eventually, a Qajar leader, Agha Mohammad Khan, emerged triumphant, taking Isfahan in 1785 and Teheran—which became his capital—in 1786, gradually winning control of the former Safavid territories, and eliminating his last major rival in 1795. Crowned shah in spring 1796, the new monarch, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, was assassinated little more than a year later. He had, however, already paved the way for the succession of his nephew, Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834), during whose long reign Iran’s existing traditional pattern of seeking aid and protection from outside allies to hold off more powerful rival neighbors would become a far more pronounced feature of the country’s international posture. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russia was a determinedly expansionist power, acquiring territory first at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and later Poland, with Persia and China as well as tribal khanates in the Caucasus and central Asia also becoming major targets during the nineteenth century and beyond. Besides deploying their own military forces, the Ottomans and Iran each turned to Western powers, especially Great Britain, to assist them in withstanding Russian depredations. The British had an additional interest in restraining Russia, because they feared Russian incursions on their own imperial holdings in India. From the mid-1790s to 1815, the situation was complicated by the Napoleonic Wars, with Britain and sometimes Russia too arrayed against France, their common enemy. In 1795, Agha Mohammad invaded Georgia, reasserting Iranian sovereignty over the territory, taking Tbilisi, the capital, and massacring or enslaving many thousands of the population. In 1783, the king of Georgia had placed himself under Russia’s protection, so the Iranian expedition angered Czarina Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796) and her successors, Paul I (r. 1796–1801) and Alexander I (r. 1801–1825). Following Agha Mohammad’s incursion, the Russians made Georgia into a protectorate, stationing troops there in 1799 and abolishing the monarchy following the king’s death. Although Fath Ali Shah continued to claim sovereignty over Georgia, the Russian actions amounted to annexation, with czarist military officers eager to expand the frontier further south. In 1804, the Russians launched an armed expedition for the purpose, meeting Iranian forces in inconclusive battle, before the Iranians succeeded in assassinating

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the Russian commanding general (Axworthy, 2016; Amanat, 2017; Avery et al., 1991). The British East India Company had dispatched a mission to Teheran in 1801. Seeking to preclude an Iranian alliance with France, which they feared might facilitate French plans to attack India, the British concluded treaties whereby the Iranians agreed to exclude France from Persia, in exchange for British military assistance should the Afghans or French attack Iran. The East India Company’s trading and commercial privileges were also increased. The arrangement did not, however, mention Russia. Initially, the British had suspected Russia of wishing to cooperate with France, but shortly afterward, Britain and Russia became allies against the French Emperor Napoleon. Consequently, when Fath Ali Shah tried in 1804 to invoke his treaty with Britain and obtain assistance against Russia in the Caucasus, the British ignored his entreaties. In May 1807, the shah therefore turned to the French, who were about to attack Russia, signing the Treaty of Finckelstein, whereby the Persians agreed to expel the British from Persia and invade India, while Napoleon accepted Persia’s claims to sovereignty in the Caucasus and promised to provide Iran with military assistance against Russia. A French military mission arrived in Teheran, to train the Persian army for an attack on India. A month later, however, the French defeated Russia at Friedland, whereupon Tsar Alexander and Napoleon signed a treaty of alliance, leaving Iran once more out in the cold. After various maneuverings, in 1809 the French military mission left Iran, while the British and Persians signed a second Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, with stronger guarantees that Iran would receive assistance from British troops, or at least subsidies, artillery, and the presence of British officers, in the event of an invasion by any European power. While Persia continued its draining war with Russia, British interest in prolonging this conflict disappeared in 1812, when Russia once more changed sides and became an ally of Britain against the French. Following a serious Iranian defeat in October 1812, British officials helped to mediate a peace agreement between Iran and Russia, the Treaty of Golestan, signed in October 1813. Iran formally ceded to Russia the bulk of its Caucasian territories, including present-day Dagestan, eastern Georgia, most of Azerbaijan, and portions of Armenia, including cities that had been part of the Persian Empire since 1501. Russia alone was permitted to maintain warships in the Caspian Sea, while provisions that Russia would offer support and recognition to the legitimate heir to

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the Persian throne offered ample scope for Russian intervention in the succession. The treaty provoked enormous anger in Iran and demands for further jihad or holy war against Russia. All sides recognized that the agreement represented only a truce before the resumption of hostilities, as Iran planned to regroup with British assistance, while Russia sought a breathing space that would allow Tsar Alexander I to concentrate on the war against Napoleon. Iranian resentment of Golestan’s terms prompted Iran to launch a further and equally unsuccessful war in 1826, a conflict in which Britain declined to assist, since Persia rather than Russia was the aggressor. Persian forces were defeated, forcing Fath Ali Shah to conclude the still more disadvantageous Treaty of Turkmenchay, signed in 1828. Iran lost Yerevan Province and what remained of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russia and was forced to pay Russia reparations of 20 million roubles, while Russian merchants and businesses could operate freely in Iran, exempt from Persian legal jurisdiction. All inhabitants of these lost territories previously taken as captives to Iran were to be returned, a provision that provoked riots when Russian officials made overly zealous attempts to retrieve married women who had since converted to Islam, some of whom had no wish to leave their new families. Even today, Iranians regard these two treaties as humiliating and unequal agreements that were forcibly and unfairly imposed upon the country, with Fath Ali Shah widely considered one of the most incompetent rulers in Iran’s history (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Avery et al., 1991; Tabatabai, 2020). Throughout the nineteenth century, both British and Russian officials in Iran meddled in the country’s internal and external affairs, each viewing the other as rivals and competing for influence. For at least a century, Iran became embroiled in the “Great Game” between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia, in which each protagonist sought to dominate Eurasia, with Britain seeking to protect its imperial position in India and its control of Egypt and eventually the Suez Canal, while Russia expanded its territories and influence at the expense of Ottoman Turkey, China, and the tribal khanates of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both Russia and Britain perceived their relations with Iran through the prism of this broader competition for Eurasian dominance. Russia encouraged the Persian government to try to regain its former possessions in Afghanistan, a move that was anathema to the British, who feared any development that might threaten their hold upon India. This competition became pronounced during the reign of Shah Naser od-Din (r. 1848–1896). At

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Russian urging, in 1856 a Persian army marched on Herat, taking the city that October, but also prompting war with Britain. Shortly afterward, British forces landed at the port of Bushire, defeating the defending Persian troops and imposing a settlement upon Iran, the Peace of Paris (1857), whereby the Persians were compelled to renounce all claims to their former Afghan territories (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Andreeva, 2007; Avery et al., 1991; Tabatabai, 2020). In practice, the pronounced Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran broadly served to block modernization in the country, since each power tended to prioritize maintaining the status quo in preference to aligning itself with reformers who might have disrupted the existing order. For the most part, rather than pursuing positive policies, each side found it more convenient to act as a spoiler to proposals that might have been advantageous to its rival as well as Iran. In 1872, Baron de Reuter, a German-born British Jew, offered the shah £40,000 in exchange for a concession to build a railway, develop the mining industry, and launch a wide range of industrial and economic ventures. The shah took the funds, but then discovered that the Russians were opposed and the British only lukewarm, while domestic opposition focused on the transfer of sovereign rights this program would involve. The concession was canceled, though since the shah retained the funds, in 1889 Baron de Reuter was finally permitted to establish the Imperial Bank of Persia, which was granted exclusive rights to issue paper currency. Meanwhile, in 1879 the Russians assisted the shah in establishing the Iranian Cossack Brigade, a well-disciplined modern military force, led and trained by Russian officers, that was loyal to the shah but also under Russian influence. Following a public furor and demonstrations in 1890–1891 in response to the granting of a tobacco monopoly to a British firm, the shah became more repressive, leaning toward Russian rather than British interests (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). This pattern continued beyond Naser od-Din’s assassination in 1895 and into the reign of his son, Mozaffar od-Din (r. 1895–1907). He took out additional Russian loans and brought in Belgian customs administrators, who increased internal tariffs. Economic difficulties and falling revenues in 1904–1905, prompted first by bad harvests and then by the disruptions of the Russo-Japanese War, led the shah to increase internal customs dues. He also sought a further Russian loan, but declined when this was made conditional on his handing over command of all his military

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units to Russian officers. Rising prices brought popular protests, initially met with repression, that in its turn provoked demands for the dismissal of the Belgian head of the customs administration, and calls for the introduction of Islamic shari ‘a law, a new constitution, and a representative national assembly. The shah initially dragged his heels, but following threats of mutiny among his Cossack Brigade, in late 1906 Mozaffar odDin bowed to the demands for political reform. The Majles, the new national assembly, convened in October 1906, whereupon it drafted a new constitution, a document the shah ratified on December 30, dying five days later. Throughout 1907 and the first half of 1908, the new Majles, split between religious conservatives and liberal modernizers, passed a program of reform measures affecting taxation, finance, education, and the judiciary. In June 1908, however, the shah instructed his Cossack Brigade to attack the Majles in Teheran and closed it down, though reform supporters retained control of Tabriz. The previous year, Britain and Russia, mutually alarmed by the rising power of Germany, had come together to sign a treaty delineating their interests in Persia. Their new agreement divided Iran into three zones of influence: a Russian zone in the north, covering most of the major cities, including Tabriz, Teheran, Mashhad, and Isfahan; a British counterpart in the southeast, adjoining Iran’s border with British India; and a neutral zone of separation elsewhere. In 1908, the Russians aligned themselves with the shah, dispatching troops to restore his rule in Tabriz. The following year, however, revolutionaries successfully captured Teheran and Isfahan, deposing the shah, who had taken refuge in the Russian legation and subsequently went into exile in Russia (Abrahamian, 2018; Axworthy, 2016; Bayat, 1991; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). Ahmad (r. 1909–1925), Mozaffar’s young son, replaced him. Although the Majles continued to operate, divisions between radicals and conservatives intensified, with violence and assassinations increasingly frequent on both sides and growing disorder in many provinces, as tribal leaders enhanced their authority at the expense of the center. In 1910, the Majles appointed Morgan Schuster, a young, reformist American, as financial adviser to the Iranian government. The Russians, probably eager to keep Persia close to bankruptcy and therefore dependent upon loans and assistance from themselves, soon objected to Schuster’s nomination of a British officer as head of a new tax collection office, and the British acquiesced in Russian complaints. Soon afterward, in December 1911, Russian

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officials presented an ultimatum demanding that Schuster be dismissed, a request the Majles rejected. In response, Russian troops marched on Teheran, while conservatives in the Iranian cabinet mounted a coup, firing Schuster and dissolving the Majles (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). Meanwhile, the British stake in Iran was, if anything, growing. In exchange for £20,000 and 16% of future profits, in 1901 Mozaffar od-Din had granted an exclusive 60-year concession covering fisheries and other resources in the southern part of the country to William Knox D’Arcy, a British entrepreneur. The rights included under this contract included prospecting for oil and other minerals. In 1908, D’Arcy discovered large quantities of oil in southwest Iran, the first discovery of its kind in the entire Middle East. That same year, he established the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to exploit these resources. Four years later, the British navy switched from using coal as fuel to burning less bulky and more efficient oil, making Iran’s petroleum reserves a vital national interest for Britain, which at that time had not yet identified any oil deposits in its own territories. In 1914, the British government purchased a 51% controlling shareholding in the company, giving it a major stake in events in Persia (Shafiee, 2018; Kuniholm, 1994). Meanwhile, in the decade following 1911, disorder was rife across the country. Even within the British and Russian spheres of influence, foreign control was limited, while the authority of the central government was largely restricted to Teheran, the capital. A new Majles met in 1914 but accomplished little, as poverty, suffering, and strife spread across much of the country.

5

From World War I to the Cold War

When a major global war broke out in 1914, a conflict in which the British Empire and Russia were allied with France against Germany, the AustroHungarian Empire and, by the end of 1914, the Ottoman Empire, Persia declared itself to be neutral. This did not exempt it from becoming a theater in the conflict, which caused widespread famine and disease across Iran, as many tens of thousands of the population died due to hunger and a major cholera outbreak. Russian troops were based in the north, while the government in Teheran commanded—at least nominally—the services of its Cossack Brigade, as well as a Swedish gendarmerie. With German assistance, the Ottomans took advantage of the war to attack

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the Russians in the west and north of Iran, while German forces moved against the south. Largely to protect the vital oil fields, in spring 1916 the British established a military unit known as the South Persia Rifles, with troops mostly recruited from the local tribes. By the time an armistice was concluded in November 1918, these forces had succeeded in repelling the German and Ottoman invaders. Russia, meanwhile, had experienced successive revolutions in February and November 1917, the second of which brought to power a communist regime that signed a peace treaty with Germany in January 1918. At least temporarily, thereafter Russian influence largely disappeared from Iran (Abrahamian, 2018; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Amanat, 2017; Tabatabai, 2020). In 1919, with postwar territorial settlements under negotiation and the situation in what had been Tsarist Russia in flux, Iranian officials made an unsuccessful approach to the wartime leaders gathered at the Paris Peace Conference, requesting the return to Iran of the territories ceded to Russia the previous century, under the Treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828). Simultaneously, Britain sought to take advantage of the absence of its longstanding Russian rival by concluding an Anglo-Persian Agreement that would have effectively made Iran into a British protectorate, with British officials left responsible for the country’s military and fiscal affairs, in exchange for providing security guarantees, loans, and assorted infrastructure. When the young Ahmad Shah’s government signed the agreement in August 1919, this had the effect of uniting Iran’s otherwise bitterly divided political factions in ferocious opposition to these arrangements. Azerbaijan rebelled, an insurgency that was not suppressed for several weeks, and the government dared not summon the Majles to approve—as was constitutionally required—the profoundly unpopular treaty. When British commanders tried to take over Persian military units in June 1920, the government disintegrated, with the first minister resigning. Although significant British forces were still present in the country, based at Qazvin, they were unpopular and unlikely to be able to impose their own control. Instead, their commander, General Sir Edmund Ironside, prevailed upon the shah to dismiss the remaining Russian officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade and replace them with Iranians. As their commander he selected Reza Khan, previously a sergeant, whom he and other British officers regarded as the most effective Persian military man. Ironside intended this reorganization to facilitate the withdrawal of British troops, and nurtured private

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hopes that it would result in a military dictatorship headed by Reza Khan (Abrahamian, 2018). Ironside’s wishes were soon fulfilled. In February 1921, Reza Khan and 2,500 Cossacks marched into the capital of Teheran, where the shah authorized him to establish a new government. Reza Khan first became commander of the army, and a few months later Minister of War. Shortly afterward, Britain and Persia reached a new agreement with Soviet Russia’s Bolshevik government, whereby the areas of Iran that had fallen under Tsarist dominance in recent decades were returned to Iran, and the remaining Soviet forces were withdrawn from the northern province of Gilan. Reza Khan promptly subdued the rebellious Jangali tribesmen of the area, as a preliminary to reasserting government control over other tribes across the country. These moves went in tandem with measures to boost and stabilize state revenue and strengthen and modernize the armed forces. Conservative elements in the Majles were willing to back his reforms. In 1923, Reza Khan appointed himself prime minister, even as Ahmad Shah departed for an extended stay in Europe. While he was gone, Reza Khan unsuccessfully attempted to establish a republic, after which he briefly resigned. When the absent monarch announced his intention of returning, the Majles deposed him in October 1925, offering the throne to Reza Khan at the end of the year (Abrahamian, 2018; Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). The new ruler, who had recently added the traditional Persian name of Pahlavi to his own, was crowned shah early in 1926. Although Iran’s latest leader was a military strong man who relied heavily on conservative support, he sought to achieve reformist and nationalist goals, including the liberalization and modernization of his country, an efficient centralized government that would promote state-directed industrialization, economic development, and a strong army, all of which were intended to facilitate ending foreign intervention and meddling. He modeled himself on Kemal Atatürk, president of the secular Turkish republic that replaced the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Reza Shah invested heavily in upgrading his country’s infrastructure of highways and railroads, increasing the size of his army and equipping it with tanks, artillery, aircraft, and modern rifles, and expanding education approximately eightfold between 1922 and 1940. Traditional dress, including the wearing of the veil by women, was banned, with the population expected to wear western clothes. Increasingly autocratic, the new shah imprisoned

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and often killed many political opponents and imposed heavy censorship upon journalists and writers. In the 1930s, Communism was banned in Iran, and Soviet sympathizers were expelled from the government (Abrahamian, 2018; Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). In this and other respects, Reza Shah sought to assert national independence. He ended the capitulations, the agreements under which, ever since the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, foreigners were not subject to Iranian courts but fell under extraterritorial jurisdiction. In 1935, “Iran” rather than “Persia” became his country’s official name, used in all diplomatic correspondence. In 1928, the shah demanded that the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company renegotiate the original terms of the D’Arcy oil concession, which he unilaterally canceled in 1932, after oil revenues paid to Iran fell dramatically in 1931, to a mere one-fifth of what they had been the previous year. The decrease was due not just to declining demand for oil due to the Great Depression, but also to changes in the company’s accounting practices. The British took the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, while deploying additional naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. In 1933, a new 60-year concession was negotiated, whereby the area under the oil company’s control was reduced to 260,000 square kilometers, and Iran would receive annual payments amounting to at least 20% of the company’s profits, with a minimum of £750,000 guaranteed. In addition, the APOC/AIOC promised its workers higher pay and more chances of promotion, and pledged to construct schools, hospitals, roads, and a telephone system. Most of these benefits never materialized. Although superficially an improvement on the previous terms, the agreement was widely considered disadvantageous to the Iranian government, which renounced any right to annul these terms, in favor of a lengthy and complicated arbitration procedure (Shafiee, 2018; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Tabatabai, 2020). As one means of neutralizing British and Soviet influence, during the 1930s Reza Shah sought German assistance in the modernization of Iran. By mid-1941 several hundred German technicians and advisers were present in Iran, which in return supplied Germany, by now its most important trading partner, with oil and other valuable resources. From September 1939, Britain and Germany were at war. In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, which meant that Britain immediately welcomed the latter as an ally against Adolf Hitler, while the still

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officially neutral United States soon offered Germany’s latest opponent large quantities of supplies under its Lend-Lease program, to help Russian forces in their battle to resist the Germans. The Allies wished to use overland routes transiting Iran to deliver these goods to the Soviet Union, and also to deny Iranian oil to the Germans. They also feared that—as had already occurred in neighboring Iraq—German officials in Iran might instigate a coup against the shah’s government, which would stymie plans to send supplies overland to Russia via Iran, while making Iranian oil inaccessible to the Allies. In summer 1941, Britain and Russia therefore demanded that the shah expel all German nationals. Reza Shah refused the ultimatum, prompting a joint invasion by British and Soviet forces in August 1941. After three days, Reza Shah ordered his troops to end their resistance, but he declined to cooperate with the occupying powers, who forced him to abdicate. Reza Shah went into exile in South Africa, to be replaced by his young son, Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941–1979). Replicating the earlier Anglo-Russian division of Iran into spheres of influence, Soviet forces occupied the north of Iran, while the British controlled the south (Abrahamian, 2018; Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Jackson, 2018). The United States government, still formally neutral, did not participate in the actual invasion of Iran, but did send several missions almost immediately to the country. Their first objective was to help expedite the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet Russia. Within the U.S. State Department, moreover, a small and close-knit team of Middle Eastern experts began to develop more ambitious schemes for American involvement in the Middle East, viewing Iran as a potential test case for their country’s ability to encourage democracy and social and economic reforms in developing countries, as envisaged under the Atlantic Charter of war objectives that Britain’s Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, had concluded in August 1941. The United States could, they believed, promote beneficial social and political change in such nations, its ability to do so enhanced by the fact that it was free from the taint of imperialism and colonialism that made British intervention so unpopular. Such benign U.S. involvement in Iran would also check the expansion of communist Soviet influence in the north of the country. An enhanced American role in Iran would further enable the United States to provide better protection for its existing oil interests in Saudi Arabia, and possibly even help it to gain a new stake

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in Iran’s own British-dominated oil industry (Ghazvinian, 2021; Jackson, 2018). During and after World War II, Iran saw a resurgence of nationalist feeling, especially resentment of the distribution of the profits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), of which the British government, the majority shareholder, received the lion’s share. Mohammad Reza Shah, still only 22 when he replaced his father in 1941, had announced his intention of ruling as a constitutional monarch. Although the occupying Allied powers were broadly unpopular, the British and Russians were generally perceived as more unacceptable than the Americans, leading the shah to incline toward seeking backing from the United States. In speeches, he deliberately drew comparisons between Iran’s nationalist quest for independence and the earlier struggle of the American colonies to break away from British rule. In 1944, elections for the Majles took place, with a new leftist party, the Tudeh, founded three years earlier, winning eight seats (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2016; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Ward, 2009). As early as 1939, Reza Shah had attempted to entice the United States into taking more interest in his country and acting as its patron against other great powers by offering oil concessions to American firms. For similar reasons a sizeable group of Iranian politicians, including the young shah, encouraged the growing American interest in their country, which they viewed as a means of countering both British and Russian influence. In August 1943 Secretary of State Cordell Hull recommended to President Roosevelt a policy of enhanced U.S. involvement in Iran, aimed at building up that country under American patronage as a model democracy on Atlantic Charter principles, guidelines Roosevelt accepted. Toward the end of the year, at the Teheran Conference, a wartime summit meeting of the top Allied leaders, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States all affirmed their commitment to maintaining Iran’s postwar independence and territorial integrity. This switch to a pro-active United States policy toward Iran marked an important long-term turning point in American involvement in the Near and Middle East. From early 1943 assorted missions—often poorly coordinated—of American experts attempted to guide and direct the wholesale reform of the Iranian military, police, and finances, together with the political and agricultural systems. Thousands of American servicemen also arrived as part of the Persian Gulf Command, established to expedite the transport of supplies to the Soviet

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Union via Iran (Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Jackson, 2018; Tabatabai, 2020). Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly strained from late 1944 onward, when an Iranian offer of oil concessions in the north of the country to American companies brought Soviet protests. Occupying Russian troops banned Anglo-American forces from their zone of Iran and tightened their own control over the area. The Soviets also proclaimed themselves the allies and protectors of the new Tudeh Party. The independence promised Iran under the Teheran declaration seemed increasingly in jeopardy, even more so after late 1945, when the Soviet Union backed separatist forces in establishing an independent Soviet Socialist Republic in Iran’s northern province of Azerbaijan, and encouraged a similar separatist movement in Kurdistan, setting up a puppet state there in early 1946. The United States and British forces withdrew on schedule in early 1946, but the Russians announced their intention of retaining at least some troops in the north of the country, precipitating one of the early crises of the developing Cold War, the bipolar strategic and ideological antagonism and competition that for almost half a century to come divided the world into two bitterly hostile camps, one led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union. After complicated maneuverings between Iranian politicians and Soviet representatives, the Russians withdrew their forces in exchange for promises of oil concessions in northern Iran. With the backing of American advisers, in late 1946 Iranian prime minister Qavam es-Sultanah, who had in the interim successfully negotiated with the United States a substantial package of military, economic, and cultural support, reneged on this bargain. Shortly afterward, Iranian forces successfully and at times somewhat brutally overturned the Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics and reimposed central government control in the region (Amanat, 2017; Kuniholm, 1994; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Jackson, 2018; Ward, 2009; Tabatabai, 2020). Although the Soviets’ reluctance to leave northern Iran had discredited them with some Iranians, the Tudeh Party did not share this antagonism, but supported Soviet demands. In the mid-1940s, the Tudeh Party advocated socialist reforms, backing strong labor laws, the introduction of a minimum wage, and women’s rights. It developed a strong grass-roots national organization, winning particular strength among workers and the trade union movement and women’s and youth groups. Iranian conservatives, by contrast, sought to suppress the Tudeh Party. The organization

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also became a target for propaganda written and translated by the newly established U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which portrayed the party as an anti-Islamic Soviet front which sought to make Iran a Soviet satellite. In February 1949, following an assassination attempt on the shah’s life, for which the Tudeh Party was publicly held responsible, the government outlawed and dissolved the Tudeh, seizing its assets and driving it underground. A National Front opposition coalition subsequently emerged in the Majles, headed by Mohammad Mossadeq, a veteran liberal activist and reformer who had opposed the 1919 AngloPersian Agreement and Reza Shah’s seizure of power, for which he had been imprisoned (Abrahamian, 2018; Ghazvinian, 2021). Discontent over the terms of the oil agreement with the British-run AIOC continued to intensify, dominating Iranian politics. Attempts in 1949 to negotiate an agreement more favorable to Iran proved fruitless, as Britain insisted on retaining control of all the productive oilfields, excluding Iran from any role in their management, and offered a guaranteed annual sum of £4 million in royalties that fell well below the minimum Iran was ever likely to receive. The National Front, which was widely believed to have reached an accommodation with surviving Tudeh elements, and which greatly improved its political representation in 1950 Majles elections, uncompromisingly demanded the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. In late 1950, the U.S.-owned Arabian American Oil Company of Saudi Arabia reached an agreement with its host country, whereby revenues would be split equally between the Saudi government and the American shareholders. The British Foreign Office refused to contemplate similar arrangements with Iran, which in 1947 received just £7 million of the £40 million in after-tax profits the AIOC made that year. Employees, meanwhile, received daily wages equivalent to approximately 50 US cents, working in primitive and dangerous conditions, living in shanty towns, and receiving no compensation for injuries or sickness (Amanat, 2017; Marsh, 2003; Shafiee, 2018; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021). In March 1951, a radical Islamic group murdered Ali Razmara, Iran’s prime minister, a former military officer who was suspected of proBritish sympathies. Under the leadership of Mossadeq, who replaced him, the Majles voted to nationalize the AIOC. The British, who controlled the refineries, withdrew their technicians and blockaded all exports of Iranian oil, provoking severe economic difficulties within Iran. Mossadeq approached the United States government for a loan, but this was refused,

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largely thanks to the part the Tudeh Party had played in organizing strikes and demonstrations, which aroused American fears that communists were orchestrating Iranian demands for nationalization. American oil companies joined in boycotting purchases of Iranian oil. The Mossadeq government stood firm and eventually, after the young shah had made an abortive attempt to replace him, declared a national emergency and took control of the Iranian military. In alliance with radical Muslims and the Tudeh Party, in 1952 Mossadeq implemented socialist reforms, especially in agriculture, and broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Britain turned to the United States for assistance, characterizing Mossadeq as a radical who was edging toward communism and steering Iran into the Soviet orbit (Abrahamian, 2018; Amanat, 2017; Marsh, 2003; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Arjomand, 1988; Tabatabai, 2020). The administration of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which took office in January 1953, proved sympathetic and authorized the CIA to spend up to US$1 million removing Mossadeq. The road to a successful coup in Iran proved somewhat convoluted. CIA agents in Tehran spread rumors and disinformation and in some cases acted as agents provocateurs. Economic problems intensified, whereupon Mossadeq suspended parliament and extended his emergency powers. The National Front coalition split, with the more conservative elements turning against Mossadeq. The CIA sought to persuade the indecisive young shah to dismiss Mossadeq, while Mossadeq urged the monarch to leave the country. Eventually, on 15 August 1953, the shah dismissed Mossadeq, replacing him with General Fazlollah Zahedi, a top military leader, but the incumbent prime minister refused to step down from office, so the shah took refuge in Italy. Major protests for and against the monarchy were held throughout the country, as Iranians of all political stripes assumed that before long Mossadeq would declare Iran a republic and himself head of state. Pro-monarchy forces, heavily funded by the CIA, eventually gained the upper hand. On 19 August, Iranian tanks and troops entered Tehran, the Iranian capital, and besieged the prime minister’s residence until Mossadeq surrendered to Zahedi. He was subsequently put on trial for treason and sentenced to three years in prison, following which he remained under house arrest. Zahedi became prime minister, while the shah flew back from Italy—accompanied by CIA director Allen W. Dulles—and resumed power (Amanat, 2017; Marsh, 2003; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021).

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Following the 1953 coup, the United States was firmly established as the foremost patron and protector of Iran and the Pahlavi dynasty. The United States, earlier perceived by many Iranians as offering a more sympathetic and enlightened alternative to British exploitation, was now viewed as just one more self-interested great power that sought to use and manipulate Iran for its own ends. The credibility and popularity of the young monarch also suffered, compromising his claims to legitimacy and the policies of aggressive westernization and modernization that he implemented over the next twenty-five years. Diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran were resumed in 1954. A consortium was established to exploit and develop Iran’s oil reserves, with the AIOC (renamed British Petroleum (BP) in 1954) and U.S. companies each holding a 40% stake, and the Iranian government receiving 50% of the profits (Marsh, 2003; Shafiee, 2018). The Iranian authorities quickly cracked down on political dissent, pre-selecting acceptable candidates for the 1954 Majles elections, disbanding Mossadeq’s National Front, and using the security forces to track down and imprison or kill Tudeh sympathizers. From 1953 until the shah’s overthrow in 1979, Iran would be a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. In 1955, it became a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or Baghdad Pact, a security alliance for the Middle East, modeled upon the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Intended to counter the spread of communism in the area, it initially included Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain; after Iraq withdrew in 1958 following the overthrow of the monarchy by the leftist Baath Party, the United States formally joined the organization. Large portions of Iran’s oil revenues were spent on military equipment, and in the decade following 1953, Iran also received $500 million in U.S. military aid, followed by a further $200 million loan in 1964 for additional weaponry for the armed forces. In the early 1960s, the dominant position the United States appeared to exercise in setting Iran’s foreign policy, including the shah’s willingness to approve oil sales to Israel, prompted attacks from some Islamic clerical leaders. Legislation granting American armed forces personnel immunity from prosecution provoked fierce sermons from one such Shi‘ite imam, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose arrest in June 1961 prompted popular demonstrations, leading to the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators, the imposition of martial law, and in 1964 the exile of the obstreperous Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2018; Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Amanat, 2017; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Ward, 2009; Tabatabai, 2020).

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From 1954 to 1969, Iran enjoyed annual economic growth rates of 7–8%, as the regime invested heavily in industry and education. Due in part to improved health care and sanitation and higher living standards, infant mortality fell and life expectancy gradually rose. Between 1950 and 1976, Iran’s population grew from 19.3 million to 33.7 million. By the mid-1970s, half of the country’s population were aged under sixteen and two-thirds were less than thirty years old. Between 1963, when the shah launched what he termed a “white revolution,” and the later 1970s, the economy boomed, with annual per capita GNP rising tenfold, from $200 to $2,000. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states, oil prices rose dramatically, quadrupling in 1973 and fuelling additional growth in Iran, as well as new purchases of military armaments. In 1963 the shah introduced an extensive land reform program that made 2 million peasants landowners in their own right. Some were able to prosper, but others found their holdings too small to be viable. Displaced agricultural laborers flooded into the cities. The oil boom of the early 1970s brought prosperity but also inflation, followed in the later 1970s, as in most of the world, by deflationary policies accompanied by an economic slump, which in turn prompted a massive loss of confidence in the government. Following the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah Reza Pahlavi ruled as an autocrat, with opposition parties banned and the Majles reduced to a rubber stamp role. Repression of political dissent was fierce: Iran’s secret police, the much feared SAVAK, arrested, routinely tortured, and on occasion killed those considered adversaries of the regime, whether secular leftists or Islamic—usually Shi‘ite—critics. The foreign community within the country also swelled dramatically. In 1970, less than 8,000 Americans were living in Iran; by 1979, their numbers had reached almost 50,000. British and European expatriates likewise flooded into Iran to work for the expanding defense industry, on development projects, or for major overseas or Iranian corporations, often living in sheltered enclaves almost totally detached from the Iranians around them. Their presence and privileged existence nonetheless provoked resentment, while Muslim traditionalists perceived as threatening the increasingly secular lifestyles associated with both the West and modernization (Abrahamian, 2018; Alvandi, 2014; Amanat, 2017; Foltz, 2016; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021). By the mid-1970s, middle class opposition to the shah’s dictatorial tendencies was rising, as was religious dissatisfaction with the regime,

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which had alienated both liberals and conservatives within Islam. The distance between most Iranians and their ruler, a remote figure who had little rapport with his subjects, weakened whatever loyalties they felt for him. From 1977 on, the authoritarian shah sporadically attempted to relax the repression that had characterized his earlier years in power, but this failed to prevent the eruption of massive demonstrations, many of them religious students inspired by a mixture of leftist Marxist writings and the teachings of domestic Islamic activists and the exiled Ruhollah Khomeini. In January 1978, religious demonstrations against government-inspired press reports attacking Khomeini led to clashes in which several students were shot dead, provoking further, larger, and more violent nationwide protests, in which more people died. By summer 1978, labor unrest and strikes by factory workers affected by the government’s deflationary measures broke out, prompting the imposition of martial law. This, in turn, sparked further massive demonstrations in working-class neighborhoods, where the people erected barricades. When tanks and helicopter gunships were sent in, some protesters responded with Molotov cocktails, while others who were unarmed were gunned down on 8 September 1978, thereafter known as Black Friday. Opposition groups united in backing Khomeini against Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Concessions by the shah, including promises of free elections, the release of political prisoners, and greater press freedom, proved too little and too late, as protests continued and intensified, to be met once again with violence, even as many soldiers deserted from the government’s forces. In January 1979, the shah left the country for medical treatment; two weeks later, Khomeini returned (Abrahamian, 2018; Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Avery et al., 1991; Ghazvinian, 2021; Arjomand, 1988; Crist, 2012).

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Iran’s Islamic Revolution

For twenty-five years, Iran had been a key Middle Eastern ally of the United States, where successive presidential administrations had largely tolerated human rights shortfalls in exchange for access to useful military facilities in the country, a U.S. ally, plus the shah’s international backing. Ultimately, his pro-American and pro-Western orientation proved insufficient to keep the monarch in power. In domestic and external policies alike, his fall brought radical changes to Iran. As Khomeini and his dedicated followers gradually strengthened their hold on power and

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ruthlessly eliminated rivals, executing some of the shah’s most hated officials, including top security service figures, liberals and moderates were squeezed out of power and an increasingly radical regime in which Shi‘ite clerics exercised ultimate authority emerged. By late 1978, many Westerners had already left the country. The new revolutionary regime took over the security apparatus, restricted press freedom, and rhetorically assailed the United States as the “great Satan,” the ultimate source of Iran’s growing secularism and renunciation of traditional Islamic principles under the shah. In November 1979, students who resented the fact the deposed shah had been permitted to enter the United States for medical treatment broke into the American embassy in Teheran, seizing 63 diplomats there and holding them hostage for almost fifteen months, until late January 1981. The episode marked the beginning of at least four decades of profound hostility between the United States and Iran, that left the country uncomfortably vulnerable not just to its former ally but also to more hostile neighbors. The United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980 and took the lead in imposing harsh economic sanctions, many of which remained in place for decades. Khomeini’s new regime was no more pro-Soviet than it was pro-Western; the ayatollah even used charges of spying for the Soviet Union to discredit some of his internal political opponents—and onetime allies—from the Tudeh Party and moderate Islamist groups (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2012; Crist, 2012). At least one leading regional opponent wasted little time in attacking Iran. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, probably impelled by a mixture of resentment of the new Iranian government’s encouragement of revolutionary Shi‘ite elements in Iraq and the hope of making opportunistic territorial gains at Iran’s expense, invaded Iran in September 1980, the beginning of an eight-year conflict in which up to one million Iranians died or were seriously injured. Ultimately, the brutal war ended in stalemate, with a ceasefire concluded in July 1988. Western nations, ostensibly neutral, kept Iraq well supplied with up-to-date military technology; Iran, by contrast, faced great difficulties in purchasing spare parts for the advanced weaponry inherited from the shah. A complicated secret initiative by the administration of Ronald Reagan to improve relations with Iran by providing the country with U.S. arms in exchange for the release of further American hostages seized by the regime ultimately proved fruitless. When the existence of this scheme—which also involved using the

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funds Iran paid for this weaponry on illegally equipping anti-communist “contra” guerrilla fighters in Nicaragua—became publicly known, it led to a major political scandal that resulted in a U.S. congressional inquiry (Amanat, 2017; Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Foltz, 2016; Murray and Woods, 2014; Ghazvinian, 2021; Ward, 2009; Crist, 2012; Tabatabai, 2020). In 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed the small, oil-rich emirate of Kuwait, leading the United States to head a multinational military coalition that went to war with Iraq in 1991 and reversed the seizure of Kuwait. At that time, the coalition forces chose to end hostilities with Iraq after one hundred hours, leaving Saddam Hussein still in power after he had brutally suppressed internal efforts by disaffected Shi‘ite and Kurdish elements to overthrow him. Many Iraqi Shi‘ites fled to Iran. Western hostility toward Iran’s neighbor and enemy did not, however, automatically imply any improvement in Iran’s relations with the United States and some other Western powers. Hard-liners in both the United States and Iran itself remained reluctant to contemplate any improvements in their relationship, and a wide range of international economic sanctions against Iran remained in place, while neither country maintained diplomatic missions on the other’s territory. On 11 September 2001, radical Islamist activists belonging to the Sunni-based al-Qaida network hijacked airliners and used them to attack symbolic landmark targets in New York and Washington, DC, the financial and political capitals of the United States. The Iranian government condemned these actions, while ordinary people held candlelit vigils in Teheran’s streets. In autumn 2001, a military coalition led by the United States invaded Afghanistan, Iran’s neighbor, which al-Qaida had been using as a base, inflicting military defeat upon Northern Alliance forces supporting the fiercely Islamic Sunni Taliban government. Iran helped to persuade Afghanistan’s leaders to negotiate a settlement with the United States that included democratic arrangements for the country’s future (Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Ghazvinian, 2021; Crist, 2012). These conciliatory gestures had no apparent impact, at least in terms of moderating American hostility toward Iran. Indeed, in his first State of the Union address in January 2002, President George W. Bush of the United States listed not just Iraq and North Korea but also Iran as the three key member rogue states that “constitute[d] an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” Bush highlighted particularly

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the efforts of these three states to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear armaments (Bush, 2002; Ghazvinian, 2021; Crist, 2012; Tabatabai, 2020). Just over a year later, in March 2003, Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain launched a second and more extensive war against Iraq, ousting Saddam Hussein from power. Eventually, the deposed president was captured, put on trial for crimes against his own people, and executed. Top American leaders, including the president and Secretary of Defense Donald W. Rumsfeld, apparently expected that, once major hostilities had ended, it would be simple for the United States and its allies to establish a democratic government in Iraq, one that would prove so successful that all other nations in the Middle East would rapidly emulate it and embrace democracy themselves. In reality, the rapid coalition victory was soon followed by the eruption of civil war in Iraq, as insurgents from the Shi‘ite majority of the population rebelled against the Sunni ruling class who had supported Saddam Hussein’s rule and effectively monopolized political power in Iraq, while the country’s Kurdish ethnic minority also sought independence or at least autonomy. The Bush administration had once more ignored Iranian overtures in spring 2003, following the fall of Baghdad, that envisaged restraints on Iran’s ongoing development of its nuclear capabilities, cutbacks in Iran’s support for Shi‘ite insurgencies, and possibly Iranian recognition of the state of Israel, in return for the resumption of relations with the United State (Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Ghazvinian, 2021; Crist, 2012; Tabatabai, 2020). By the end of the twenty-first century’s second decade, a new axis had emerged in the Middle East, with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States on one side pitted against Iran, Syria, and Russia on the other. Within the region, with states bitterly divided, the Saudis and their allies generally supported Sunni groups while Iran and its friends backed Shi‘ite factions. With Iraq in chaos, Iran was able to enhance its regional standing and power, backing Shi‘ite militia units in Iraq in an effort to influence the political outcome within that state, its long-time rival. When a brutal and in 2021 still ongoing civil war erupted in Syria in 2011, Iran provided assistance to the government of President Bashar al-Assad, an alignment that Israeli leaders suspected was designed to reduce Syria to the status of an Iranian client and to bolster Iran’s regional strategic position. In Yemen, by contrast, when Houthi rebels mounted an insurgency in 2014 against the existing government, a conflict that was still continuing in mid-2021, Iran backed the Shi‘ite Houthi forces against the

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Sunni government, which received extensive backing from Saudi Arabia (Ghazvinian, 2021; Tabatabai, 2020). As the standard-bearer of Shi‘ite Islam, from the 1980s onward, Iran also provided financial and military support for the radical Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, a political grouping that destabilized Lebanon while launching numerous rocket attacks upon towns and civilians in neighboring Israel. These raids, in which Iranian Revolutionary Guards were believed to have assisted, provoked several Israeli invasions of Lebanon, in 1993, 2003, and 2006. In the early 2000s, following the establishment of the semi-autonomous Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza territories, Iran also became a major supplier of funding, aid, and weaponry to the Palestinians’ radical (albeit Sunni) Hamas political wing, who won control of Gaza in 2006. Like Hezbollah, Hamas launched repeated rocket attacks and raids against Israel, to which Israel responded fiercely. Hostilities became particularly intense for protracted periods in 2006, 2007–2008, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2018, and 2021. In what became widely perceived as a proxy war between Iran and Israel, Iran often worked in close partnership with Shi‘ite Syria (Eilam, 2018; Ghazvinian, 2021; Tabatabai, 2020). On the international front, the most sensitive issue affecting Iran was whether or not it should seek to produce nuclear weapons. Once acquired, these armaments might prove highly effective as a deterrent against external attack, but while still in the development phase they might equally become a target for a pre-emptive outside strike against the manufacturing facilities. As early as the 1950s, Iran had launched a nuclear power program, albeit ostensibly for the purpose of boosting domestic energy production. Drawing on Russian support and expertise, in the 1990s Iran embarked on a clandestine nuclear enrichment program, which focused upon developing nuclear power plants with centrifuges capable of producing uranium which could then be enriched until it reached weapons quality. In 2011, Iran completed its first such power plant, the Bushehr I reactor, a project that benefited from extensive Russian assistance. This action represented a breach of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, to which Iran was a signatory. By the twenty-first century, one major purpose of United States backing for continued international economic sanctions against Iran, including embargoes on oil sales and on foreign investment, was to put pressure on Iran to abandon or at least modify its nuclear undertakings and confine these to peaceful purposes (Axworthy, 2012, 2016; Tabatabai, 2020).

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In November 2013, Iran, the United States, and the four other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, reached preliminary understanding on the terms of an interim agreement whereby Iran would suspend its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions. This became the foundation for a more extensive final arrangement, concluded in July 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), that included commitments by Iran to greatly reduce its numbers of centrifuges, accept tight limits on its stocks of enriched uranium, suspend research intended to make its centrifuges more efficient, and end its program of producing plutonium. In exchange, sanctions would gradually be lifted. Saudi Arabia and Israel both objected strenuously to this agreement, contending that Iran could not be trusted to observe its stipulations, sentiments shared by some Republican members of the U.S. Congress, but President Barack Obama lobbied hard and successfully for its approval by the United States (Eilam, 2018; Ghazvinian, 2021; Tabatabai, 2020). Obama’s successor, President Donald Trump, campaigned promising that the United States would withdraw from this deal, a pledge he implemented in May 2018, over strong opposition from major U.S. allies, including Britain, France, and Germany. Claiming that Iran had failed to honor the provisions of the JCPA, Trump imposed additional sanctions upon Iran, while pressuring other countries to observe similar restrictions. In April 2019, the United States designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a “terrorist organization”; one month later, the United States ceased granting sanctions waivers to countries purchasing Iranian oil, causing sales to plummet from 2.5 million barrels per day to less than 200,000. By July 2019, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) had concluded that Iran, which had initially stated it would continue to observe the agreement’s provisions, was in breach of some of its terms. Allies of the United States and members of the UN Security Council nonetheless refused to take further action against Iran for these violations by reimposing additional sanctions (Jakes and Sanger, 2020; Ghazvinian, 2021; Tabatabai, 2020). Tensions between Iran and the United States escalated even more sharply in January 2020, when an American drone strike near Baghdad International Airport targeted and killed ten people, including Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, who was visiting Iraq to meet the prime minister. The general, who headed the elite Iranian Quds Force, part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was a national hero who was

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widely considered the second most powerful political figure in Iran and the guiding force behind his country’s foreign policies since the late 1990s (Ghazvinian, 2021; Werner, 2020). Iran vowed retribution against all involved, launched rocket strikes against American bases in Iraq, and later killed at least one CIA informant reportedly implicated in Soleimani’s death (Ghazvinian, 2021; Prothero, 2020; Tabatabai, 2020). Following Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election by his Democratic rival, Joseph W. Biden, it remained unclear whether the JCPA could be resurrected. Iran insisted that it would only re-enter the agreement if the United States first dropped all its preconditions (BBC, 2020). Israel and Saudi Arabia, both staunch opponents of the original agreement, showed little enthusiasm for revitalizing it. As Biden embarked on planning his transition, Israel used gunmen and a drone to assassinate Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist (Fassihi et al., 2020). Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister announced that the assorted Gulf states must be consulted before any U.S. resumption of the agreement (Al Jazeera, 2020). Fears were expressed that Trump would impose further sanctions on Iran or even launch military strikes against nuclear facilities there before leaving office, while hard-liners in Iran were believed to be equally opposed to any relaxation of tensions before impending elections in Iran, scheduled for June 2021 (Erlanger, 2020). Iran’s continuing poor relations with assorted Western nations, conservative Arab states, Sunni elements, and Israel did much to facilitate a rapprochement with Russia, one that became particularly pronounced after Vladimir Putin returned to power as Russian president in 2012. In the 1980s, Iran’s Revolutionary Islamic Republic was just as hostile to the Soviet Union as it was to the United States, not least because the Soviets supplied Iraq with weapons in its protracted war against Iran. In the 1990s, however, Iranian leaders, perceiving Russia as a potential ally in breaking their own country’s international isolation, refrained from aggressively propagating radical Islam in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iranian–Russian dealings were nonetheless somewhat volatile and unpredictable, with Russia generally giving the promotion of good relations with the United States far higher priority than its connections with Iran. In 1999, for example, Russia yielded to American pressure and agreed to break its contracts to provide Iran with military supplies, a decision that economists believed cost Russia approximately $3 billion. By the early 2000s, Russia found the scope of

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Iranian ambitions to develop nuclear weapons somewhat disturbing and a potential threat to regional stability, leading Russia to restrict transfers of associated technology to Iran while supporting UN Security Council resolutions designed to keep Iran’s nuclear program in check. On occasion, Russia also found Teheran an unreliable ally: in 2008, for example, Iran reneged on a bargain to locate the headquarters of the new Gas Exporting Countries Forum in St. Petersburg, voting instead to base the organization in Doha in the Persian Gulf (Kozhanov, 2015; Tabatabai, 2020). When Putin returned to power in 2012, he began a rebalancing of Russian strategy that included more dialogue with Iran on nuclear issues, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, closer economic cooperation, and the expansion of trade, investment, and commercial ties. Growing tensions with Western powers over Russian intervention in Ukraine also led Putin to look to Iran to generate Muslim support for Russia’s policies and provide economic outlets and development opportunities for Russia, which faced increasing sanctions from the West (Kozhanov, 2015). Once Trump succeeded Obama as president in January 2017, the Iranian– Russian connection deepened dramatically, impelled not just by Trump’s profound hostility and distrust toward Iran and the JCPA, but also by what one commentator characterized as “Vladimir Putin’s relentless quest to make Russia a superpower again” and “Iran’s goal… to be a player again.” These common interests overrode differences on such subjects as Israel, a nation toward which Iran was uncompromisingly antagonistic, while Russia accepted Israel’s existence, considered it just another state, and was willing to work with it. Meanwhile, Russia vetoed Westernbacked resolutions to censure Iran in the United Nations over its role in supplying weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen and its violent suppression of popular demonstrations in Iranian cities (Wright, 2018; Tabatabai, 2020). Trade with Russia helped to moderate the impact of Western sanctions on Iran. In October 2019, Iran also became a probationary member of the Eurasian Economic Union, joining a multilateral free trade agreement with the Russian-led grouping, of which four other states were also members. Strategic and military cooperation was also growing, with Russia and Iran the leading external backers of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the brutal and disruptive civil war that began in 2011 and was still in progress ten years later. Russia became increasingly willing to provide Iran with advanced weaponry that had once been withheld

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(Franiok, 2020). Yet Iranian intelligence operatives and political commentators still feared that, despite their growing collaboration, Russia had no wish to see Iran become too strong, but preferred that it should remain relatively weak and therefore dependent on Russian backing (Khoshnood, 2020). In a ploy reminiscent of earlier traditional strategies of playing one great power against another, Iran therefore turned to China, a nascent superpower that by 2010 was dramatically expanding its global diplomatic, strategic, and economic footprint. In 2005, Iran for the first time attended a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Chinese-led Eurasian regional political, economic, and security alliance established in 2001, and was granted observer status. Three years later, Iran applied for full membership, with Chinese president Xi Jinping expressing support for this during a 2016 state visit to Teheran (Khoshnood, 2020). In December 2019, China, Russia, and Iran conducted unprecedented four-day joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman. Russia and China were relatively restrained when publicizing these maneuvers, presenting them as fairly routine anti-piracy undertakings and peacekeeping operations, whereas Iranian officials hailed them effusively as betokening a new Middle Eastern triple alliance, tangible evidence that, with assistance from non-Western allies, Iran could withstand external sanctions (Westcott and Alkhshali, 2019; Haider, 2020). Nine months later, in September 2020, Chinese and Russian forces conducted six-day joint military drills christened “Caucasus 2020” in southern Russia, exercises in which troops from Iran, Armenia, Belarus, Myanmar, and Pakistan also joined (AP, Reuters, 2020; Middle East Monitor, 2020). Political commentators were quick to speculate that a new axis of Russia, China, and Iran was emerging, one that would unite several states perceived as international antagonists of the United States against a range of external opponents and embolden Iran to remain intransigent to Western demands (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2018). A prominent article in Foreign Affairs, house journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, the premier U.S. foreign policy think tank, noted in late 2020 that unlike Russia, which had ample energy supplies of its own, China was eager to purchase all of Iran’s surplus oil and natural gas production, and had already earmarked around US$400 billion for investment in upgrading Iran’s energy industries and transportation facilities. An oil and natural gas pipeline linking Pakistan and China would soon be extended

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to reach Iran. US sanctions would force Iran to accept Chinese yuan in payment, boosting Chinese efforts to internationalize the yuan. In addition, Iran would be able to spend the proceeds of its energy sales on purchases of advanced Russian weaponry. Russia and China were already helping to upgrade Iran’s defense capabilities and infrastructure, facilities, expanding a port and airfield near the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, and building a communications eavesdropping post with an intelligencegathering range of three thousand miles. The authors concluded that this new international alignment, prompted by Trump’s determination to dismantle the JCPOA, constituted “a Russia–China–Iran iron triangle” with the potential to massively enhance the strategic position of all three partners, at the expense of the United States and its allies (Choksy and Choksy, 2020).

7

Conclusion

The introduction of China as a potential ally and backer of Iran added a new element to the mix of neighboring and more distant powers that had for centuries played some part in Iran’s external—and often internal—affairs. Over more than five centuries, Iran had invariably stood at least on the fringes of and on occasion been integral to several global contests between rival international camps: the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian West; the nineteenth-century “Great Game” in which the maritime British Empire and Tsarist Russia each sought to dominate much of Eurasia; the struggle between Adolf Hitler’s Germany and the Allied powers led by Great Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia; the subsequent Cold War that pitted the United States and other Western powers against the Soviet Union; trans-millennial conflicts involving several rival schools of radical and conservative Islam, Israel, and liberal Western states; and a renewed great power competition in which—at least initially—Russia and a revitalized China vied for global supremacy with the United States and its Western allies. In an extremely perceptive analysis published in October 2020, Ariane Tabatabai points out that, once in power, Iran’s “revolutionaries would often draw on their country’s history to outline the contours of their security thinking, thus retaining elements of the same belief system that shaped the monarchy.” She argues, indeed, that “the revolution and the war that followed it actually served to reinforce and reify many prerevolutionary precepts of Iranian security thinking.” This ensures that

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“the Iranian leadership today shares a set of assumptions with statesmen past and these stem from the country’s historical experiences and perceptions of these events.” Most significantly: “The nation’s wars have created traumas, as have the means by which peace was achieved—negotiations and treaties, often seen by Iranians as capitulation.” Tabatabai further argues that: “The most prominent element of Iranian security thinking… lies in the country’s experience of foreign meddling, which has led to a deep distrust of foreign powers and the international order more generally.” Therefore, “to understand the choices Iran may make when faced with several possible courses of action and why, one must examine Iran’s historical experiences and its perceptions thereof.” According to Tabatabai’s analysis: The themes dominating Tehran’s security thinking … include Iran’s feeling of otherness in the region, deep distrust of foreign powers and the international system, and the fear of domestic turmoil and resulting chaos and disintegration. These have produced a set of foundational drivers behind Iran’s security policy, including the view that the country must be selfreliant; its institutions coup-proofed; and its territorial integrity, national unity, and sovereignty secured through deterrence and constant defense…

Finally, Tabatabai argues that Iranian policy is fundamentally defensive. “Ultimately, while many perceive Iran to be aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist, Iran’s strategic culture shapes its view of itself as striving for survival in a deeply anarchic international system—a system in which the nation must go it alone as it cannot trust international law and institutions, and much less, the powers that, as Iran sees it, shape them to suit their own ends.” Tabatabai concludes that Iran’s policies are “guided by historical memory. Hence, while the country does not see itself as seeking out conquests, neither does it shrink from doing all it can to avoid defeat” (Tabatabai, 2020: 5, 7, 8, 19, 21). As the twenty-first century’s third decade began, Iran remained active and influential across much of the Middle East, while on the broader international stage, it had apparently attracted formidable backing from two far weightier but dissatisfied states, Russia and China. Yet a cautionary note was perhaps in order. Iran’s entanglements in broader global contests had rarely ended happily. Almost invariably, when major powers became allies or patrons of Iran, they did so for their own self-interested reasons,

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seeking to control Iran’s resources or pursuing an alliance or understanding with Iran for their own strategic advantage. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Russia had a long history of annexing Iranian territory and attempting to incorporate what remained of the country within its own sphere of influence. China, the newcomer, was increasingly intolerant of Islam within its own borders, brutally suppressing the Uighur minority in Xinjiang and targeting Muslim scholars and writers across the country (Myers, 2019; Feng, 2020). Like the Russians, the Chinese tend to be authoritarian, overbearing, and demanding when dealing with allies and clients, especially those they consider inferior. For reasons of expediency, the ostensibly ill-assorted alignment of Iran with Russia and China may well prove durable. The history of Iran’s involvement with major external powers nonetheless suggests that the purported new triple alliance will soon find itself navigating treacherous territory and troubled waters.

References Abrahamian, E. (2018). A History of Modern Iran. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al Jazeera. (2020). “US Must Consult Gulf States on Reviving Iran Nuclear Deal: Riyadh.” Dec. 6. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/6/gulfstates-must-be-consulted-in-us-iran-nuclear-deal-riyadh. Alvandi, R. (2014) Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Amanat, A. (2017). Iran: A Modern History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Andreeva, E. (2007). Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism. New York: Routledge. AP, Reuters. (2020). “China and Iran Embark on Joint Military Drills in Russia.” Sydney Morning Herald, Sept. 10. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/ china-and-iran-embark-on-joint-military-drills-in-russia-20200910-p55ueq. html. Arjomand, S. A. (1988). The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Avery, P., Hambly, G., and Melville, C., eds. (1991). The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Axworthy, M. (2012). Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Axworthy, M. (2016). A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind. Rev. and updated ed. New York: Basic Books.

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20:1, Jan 17. https://jamestown.org/program/the-strategic-implications-ofchinese-iranian-russian-naval-drills-in-the-indian-ocean/. Jackson, A. (2018). Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq. New Haven: Yale University Press. Jackson, P., and Lockhart, L., eds. (1986). The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jakes, L., and Sanger, D. E. (2020). “Instead of Isolating Iran, U.S. Finds Itself on the Outside Over Nuclear Deal.” New York Times, Aug. 20, Nov. 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/us/politics/trump-irannuclear-deal.html. Khoshnood, A. (2020). “Iran-Russia Ties: Never Better But Maybe Not Forever?” Middle East Institute, Feb. 12. https://www.mei.edu/publicati ons/iran-russia-ties-never-better-maybe-not-forever. Kozhanov, N. (2015). Understanding the Revitalization of Russian-Iranian Relations. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, May. https://carnegieendo wment.org/files/CP_Kozhanov_web_Eng.pdf. Kuniholm, B. R. (1994). The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Rev. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marsh, S. (2003). Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Matthee, R. (2012). Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan. London: I. B. Tauris. Middle East Monitor. (2020). “China, Iran and Russia to Take Part in ‘Caucus 2020’ Military Drills.” Middle East Monitor, Sept. 11. https://www.mid dleeastmonitor.com/20200911-china-iran-and-russia-to-take-part-in-caucus2020-military-drills/. Mikhail, A. (2020). God’s Shadow: Sultan Selim, His Ottoman Empire, and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Liveright. Minorsky, V. (1942). “The Poetry of Sh¯ ah Ism¯ a’¯ıl I.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 19:4, 1006a–1053a. Murray, W., and Woods, K. M. (2014). The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Myers, S. L. (2019). “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China.” New York Times, Sept. 21, 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/ asia/china-islam-crackdown.html. Newman, A. J. (2006). Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. London: I. B. Tauris. Prothero, M. (2020). “Iran Says It Has Found a CIA Informant Who Helped the US Assassinate Qassem Soleimani and Has Sentenced Him to Death.” Business Insider, June 9. https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-qassem-soleimani-ciainformant-helped-assassination-sentenced-to-death-2020-6.

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Shafiee, K. (2018). Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural History of BP in Iran. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tabatabai, A. M. (2020). No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ward, S. R. (2009). Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Werner, D. A. (2020). “Soleimani Killing Threatens to Break Open US-Iranian Conflict.” New Atlantic, Jan. 3. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlanticist/soleimani-killing-threatens-to-break-open-us-iranian-conflict/. Westcott, B., and Alkhshali, H. (2019). “China, Russia and Iran Hold Joint Naval Drills in Gulf of Oman.” CNN, Dec. 29. https://edition.cnn.com/ 2019/12/27/asia/china-russia-iran-military-drills-intl-hnk/index.html. Wright, R. (2018). “Russia and Iran Deepen Ties to Challenge Trump and the United States.” New Yorker, March 2. https://www.newyorker.com/news/ news-desk/russia-and-iran-deepen-ties-to-challenge-trump-and-the-unitedstates. Yarshater, E. ed. (1983a). The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3, Pt. 1: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yarshater, E. ed. (1983b). The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3, Pt. 2: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy: International Balancing Act Hassan Ahmadian

1

Introduction

Established with a non-allied posture, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been struggling to pursue an “independent foreign policy” ever since. The revolutionary slogan of “Neither Eastern nor Western, Islamic Republic” (na sharqi na gharbi, jomhurie eslami) is still curved on the entrance of the main hall of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This did not come out of the blue. It was based on a historical background of Iranians’ collective memory. With the onset of Russo-Iranian wars, Iran started losing huge chunks of its territory. This trend, exacerbating in the nineteenth century, rendered Iran a dependent political and economic status in the century to come. That is why preserving Iran’s polity and territorial integrity preoccupied its elites and leaders. After rounds of war and perilous developments from early 1880s to 1921, Iran’s nationalist including its Ulama (the clergy) started arguing “that the best way for maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the county was to remain neutral and thus avoid being drawn into the power game of the major powers”

H. Ahmadian (B) University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_3

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(Tarock, 1999, p. 3). Though that background and orientation was sidelined for half a century under the Pahlavis, it was quite present in the 1979 revolution, making its way into Iran’s post-revolution foreign policy. Iran, thereafter, refrained from becoming part of international alliances. The presumption was such that alliances with international powers will disparage Iran’s independence. And although it overcame this “absolute independence” psyche and started engaging internationally after the 1979 revolution, Iran’s mistrust with world powers persisted. In 2015, however, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 (six world powers) on the one hand and embarked on a strategic cooperation with Russia in the Middle East on the other. Both engagements portray, among other things, a shift in Iran’s strategic conduct and culture. This chapter is aimed at explaining the rationale behind Iran’s traditional mistrust and why and how it was crossed. In other words, it intends to elaborate on why Iran’s non-alliance posture was so strong in the post-1979 period and why was it crossed in the international front through the JCPOA and regionally through the strategic partnership with Russia both in 2015. The hypothetical answer is that because of systematic pressure as well as geopolitical necessities in the region, Iran’s balancing act via the non-alliance posture went through a shift, incorporating engagement as a new way of balancing international actors.

2

The Weight of Loses

Iran’s modern history reflects huge losses on the international arena. For centuries, “Iran’s political destiny, foreign policy choices, and margin of independence have been strongly affected by systemic factors” (Hunter, 2010, p. x). Reflecting on this, Iranian ruling elite value independence as a means to preserve the state. According to Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini, the people have to choose “welfare and consumerism” or “hardship and independence” (Khomeini, 1999, p. 233). For Ayatollah Khamenei, the dichotomy lies between “being strong” or “losing [Iran’s unique and independent] identity” (Javid, 2016). This, strongly present in Iranian public and political debates, is reflective of Iranians’ collective memory– the contours of which are still alive and synergetic in comprehending Iran’s strategic conduct.

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The first is that Iran’s territorial shrinking, starting during the last decades of the Safavid Empire (1501–1736) and exacerbating during the Qajar’s (1785–1925), rendered Iran its current territory. The IranOttoman wars shrunk Iran’s Kurdish regions (see Sabbagh, 1999); confrontations with Russia deprived Iran of its central Asian and Caucasian territories (see Kazemzadeh, 2007); and Britain’s policies cut off Iran’s Afghan territories and deprived it of its historical presence in parts of the Persian Gulf (see Greaves, 2007). As such, systematic changes kept shrinking Iran’s territory. In other words, “whenever the international system is destabilized, because of its special position, Iran has been one of its victims” (Sajjadpour, 2004, p. 27). Second, territorial losses gradually dwindled Iran’s independence and sovereignty. Iranian debates on the matter suggest that great powers meddling juxtaposed with a dependent Iran led to its occupation in both World Wars (see Gholi Majd, 2012; Motter, 1952). Russian and British rivalries in the years leading to World War I, “superseded Persia’s integrity and independence” (Ryan, 2018, p. 97). This was also the case during the run up to World War II, leading to the “joint Russo-British invasion of Iran in August 1941 (Gholi Majd, 2012, p. 247). Additionally, the coup of 1953, which created “a long-lasting social, political and psychological malaise [passing] from generation to generation” (Rahnema, 2015, p. 294), remained a main part of the “big powers meddling” debate in Iran. Third, the loss of both Iran’s territory and dependence are seen as a result of its economic and military dependency. Besides foreign agenda, the 1953 coup against Mossadeq, the idol of Iranian nationalism (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 156), for instance, is analyzed and portrayed in accordance with Iran’s oil-dependent rentier economy.1 Additionally, Iran’s military requirements (arms, training, etc.) are also a part of the dependency narrative. From the collapse of Mohammad Mosadegh

1 Understanding the 1953 coup in Iranian’s collective memory is important as it is seen as the loss of Iran’s first democratic rule and, even more important, its independence after centuries. For more on this see Mohammad Ali Movahhed, The Disturbing Dream of Oil: Dr. Mosaddegh and Iran’s National Awakening (Khabe Ashofteye Naft: Doctor Mosaddegh va Nehzate Mellie Iran), Tehran: Karnameh, 2015 (Farsi). See also Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and The Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations, New York: The New Press, 2013.

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and the ensuing 25 years of iron-fist-rule, to the devastating occupation of Iran in both World Wars, Iran’s military weakness and economic dependency continued to be among its foreign policy debates. Therefore, “Iran’s experience with foreign domination and its impact on policy making is patently clear” (Kinch, 2016, p. 34). Over time, those components shaped a multifaceted political and strategic culture imbedded in the post-1979 foreign policy. The two main features of it are: 1. Trust-deficit: never trust an international power as a means to protect Iran’s independence and territorial integrity and, as such, avoid international alliances; 2. Self-reliance: keep the country intact and safe by keeping it politically independent and economically and militarily self-reliant.

3

Valued Independence

Iran’s political thought is an embodiment of the history of a religious minority’s struggle for survival. Over centuries, Shiite Muslims of Iran built their own polity and in doing so, learnt how to coexist with the Sunni majority. The history of Shi ‘ite adherence to taqiya tends to confirm its strategic importance as a survival strategy for Islamic minorities (Abdulaziz Sachedina, 2010, p. 245). As such, surviving along with their religious faith became their daily life’s strategic calculation (Sachedina, 2010, p. 245). The Safavid dynasty brought back Iran’s uniqueness as an independent Shiite state (see Newman, 2008; Floor, 2005). Once an individual struggle, Survival became a state strategy thereafter. To survive, Iran had to balance its enemies and rivals—the Ottomans, Russians, etc.— who tried, successfully at times, to occupy and annex parts of its territory. With the gradual weakness of the Iranian state, preserving its territorial integrity became the linchpin of its survival strategy. In a state of weakness, Iran’s grand strategy was based on international alliance-building. This was rejected, however, by the revolutionary leaders of 1979 as forsaking Iran’s independence. This does not mean that the revolutionary elites had a clear roadmap for foreign policy. In fact, none of them was a political scholar or theorist, and as such they were not capable of… developing a unique worldview (Shoori, 2013, p. 47). As such, besides the weight of history and Iranians’ collective memory, the

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post-1979 foreign policy took shape and direction in an empirical process. Accordingly, Iran’s elites’ attribution of international alliance with the loss of Iran’s independence led to the emergence of Iran “as a defiant, fiercely independent, proactively religious, and nonaligned power” (Ehteshami, 2002, p. 283). The revolutionary elites kept cherishing the principles of “independence, freedom and Islamic Republic”—which are deeply rooted in Iranian history and culture (Ramazani, 2008, p. 1). And because the revolution “did not bring an end to [these] persistent features of Iranian political culture” (Randjbar-Daemi, 2018, p. 264), they kept guiding Iran’s post-1979 foreign policy. Beyond the root causes of Iran’s 1979 revolution,2 there lied a collective memory amplifying the danger of international alliances and alliance-building, which in turn based on a centuries-old desire “for liberation from foreign domination” (Naghibzadeh, 2009, p. 35), distanced Iran from both superpowers of the Cold War. The United States won the lion’s share of Iran’s big powers-free foreign policy. Iranians’ previously positive perception of America (Kinch, 2016, p. 32) was ravaged by Washington’s 1953 coup in Iran and its support of the ensuing dictatorship. While American strategists felt “it was necessary to fill the vacuum produced by the pullback of Great Britain and other colonial powers” (St. Marie & Naghshpour, 2011, p. 81), viewing the Shah “as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf (Katzman, 2016, p. 42), this policy shrunk Iran’s independence with “Iran’s foreign policy… determined mainly by [the Shah] regime’s ‘dependence’ on Washington” (Saikal, 2007, p. 426). That’s why, according to Ayatollah Khamenei “an anti-American revolution triumphed” (Khamenei, 1994) in 1979, rejecting the U.S.-Shah alliance, which in turn set the standard for an independent foreign policy post-1979. “Getting America out [of Iran] does not mean that the Soviet [Union would] replace it” according to Ayatollah Khomeini (Khomeini, 1999, p. 158). Besides the free-big power foreign policy of the “neither Eastern

2 There are five main explanations: foreign power’s conspiracy against the Shah; the rapid pace of modernization before the revolution; the Shah’s failed economic policies; the Shah’s non/anti-religious policies and behavior; and the Shah’s authoritarianism. See Sadegh Zibakalam, An Introduction to the Islamic Revolution, Tehran: Rowzaneh Publications, Chapter 1: 55–143.

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nor Western, Islamic Republic” principle, Iranians’ collective memory with Russia contained their appetite for an alignment with the USSR. The Soviets could not profit from the revolutionary anti-Shah-U.S.-alignment approach. Refuting the previous rationale, Iran’s post-revolution foreign policy was characterized by three main components: 1. Non-alliance: rejecting any sort of alliance with international powers as a means to preserve independence and to protect Iran’s credibility as an independent Muslim nation; 2. Regionalism: opposing international interference in the Middle East on the one hand and preferring—and calling for—regional solutions for regional issues on the other; 3. Active independence: upholding Iran’s foreign policy ideals regionally and globally.3

4

Challenged Independence

Independence and self-reliance mattered the most in Iran’s foreign policy post-1979. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, remaining in a dire situation and “isolated” but continuing toward “self-reliance” is better than being “rich and dependent” (Khomeini, 1999, p. 524). Iran’s new foreign policy, however, “was not wholly derived from the idealism of revolutionary leaders, but rather from the reality of international events” as well (Shoori, 2013, p. 35). Iran had to shift some of its policies to overcome obstacles facing its foreign policy (Hunter, 2010, p. 239). The drive of absolute independence, therefore, soon gave way to an issue-based interactions with world powers. There were three empirical components to the process: Iran–Iraq war; Iran–U.S. relationship; and sanctions and international pressure. The weight of war: The “imposed war” between Iran and Iraq (1980– 1988) exhausted Iran’s economy for eight long years. The war left Iran

3 According to article 154 of Iran’s constitution, Freedom and independence is a right of all mankind and that Iran should support the oppressed struggle against their oppressors. Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution including 1989 Revisions (Matne Ghanoone Asasie Jomhoorie Eslamie Iran Hamrah ba Eslahate 1368), p. 27. https://dlp.msrt.ir/file/ download/regulation/1497687031-.pdf.

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“devastated with massive loss of life and casualties that touched virtually every Iranian family, and with an economy in shambles” (Esposito, 2001, p. 2). It “proved to be the longest, bloodiest, and costliest war ever fought in the modern history of the Middle East” (Saikal, 2015, p. 19). And though providing the Islamic Republic “with a highly potent rallying cry” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 176), the war also brought up the candid truth that besides manpower, Iran needed arms. While Tehran was struggling to overcome her shortage, Iraq enjoyed the support of an international patron (USSR) and received Western arms and GCC money to pay for them. Politically, Baghdad was not recognized as the aggressor until December 1991—after its occupation of Kuwait (Ramazani, 1992, p. 70). Suffering Iraqi chemical and missiles attacks during the “war of the cities” (see Khateri & Jannati-Moheb, 2007; Johnson, 2011), Iran’s strategic community came to terms with the need to engage international powers.4 In many issues, thereafter, “practical-national considerations outweighed the ideological ones” (Ramazani, 2001, p. 229), and the Iran-Contra Affairs (see Draper, 1991; Byrne, 2014), for instance, came as a military necessity. Suffering horrific human and material losses (Razoux, 2015, p. 470), and realizing their own military limits on the one hand and witnessing the international support Iraq received on the other, “created an Iranian psychology that lacks trust in international institutions and alliances… for national protection and defense” (Hadian, 2008, p. 574). Iran-U.S. conundrum: the “American Shah” slogan of the 1979 revolution summarized public frustration with the Shah-U.S. alignment. Although revolutionary Iran did not embrace the Soviet Union as an international alternative, the U.S. sanctions, the hostage crisis, as well as continued U.S. policies of containment and regime change weighed down Iran–U.S. relationship for decades to come. While for Iran, the U.S. policy remained hostile, for the U.S., Iran kept challenging its Middle East policy (see Maleki & Tirman, 2014; Bennis, 2009). To overcome the U.S. sanctions’ effect, Iran started shifting to other big powers. Hence began Iran’s “balancing act” or bandbazi according to Fred Halliday (2001) early in the 1980s leading to 4 Besides forcing Iran to seek international engagement, the war had another effect as well: coupled with the fact that the rest of the world supported the oppressor and not the oppressed, it left deep psychological scar on the Iranian psyche and that, in turn, impacted the country’s foreign policy. Adam Tarock, op. cit, 1999, 4.

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enhanced ties with China and Russia—which was reiterated by Iranian officials time and time again to this day. Iran’s relations with the EU, however, remained gripped by issues such as the Salman Rushdie Fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran’s nuclear program–enhancing on a gradual pace over the course of four decades. While Tehran started engaging big powers, the Iran-U.S. conundrum—and pressure on Iran—persisted. The nuclear standoff : Iran’s nuclear program turned to be the center piece in the new international approach. After decades of balancing policy, Tehran faced an international deadlock over her nuclear program. As the “main vehicle” of the campaign to “securitize” Iran to “delegitimize the Islamic Republic by portraying it as a threat to the global order” (Zarif, 2014, p. 57), the nuclear file’s peaceful resolution gained the utmost traction of the Rouhani administration. Since continued standoff was riskier than a diplomatic process based on “mutual respect” (Washington Post Staff, 2015), this was a “security-providing” decision according to President Rouhani (Rouhani, 2011, p. 92). Despite “Iranians’ support for the country’s nuclear program [for] the perceived status and deterrence benefits garnered from such programs” (Fair & Shellman, 2008, p. 553). Tehran agreed to a deal that contains it. Besides the U.S. dropping of its regime change policy, economic difficulties played a role in Tehran’s willingness to negotiate and sign the JCPOA).5 “The nuclear deal has opened the possibilities of Iran returning to the global mainstream including the world energy market” (Pant, 2016, p. 23). In fact, Iran’s decision to ink the deal resulted from a consensual decision of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) (Entekhab, 2015). In General, Obama’s trust-building policy, which contained a departure from the regime change policy, coupled with mounting pressure of the “crippling sanctions” structured by Washington (see Nephew, 2017), and the acceptance of Iran’s peaceful program under the NPT, were the main parameters paving the way for the huge shift in Iran’s foreign policy. To balance the JCPOA effect, Iran was to depart from a regionalist policy and deepen its ties with Russia. In general, Iran’s challenged independence, aimed at balancing international powers, gave way to its new course. 5 Without the dropping of the regime change policy, Tehran wouldn’t have embarked on the deal according to many Iranian experts. That shift paved the way for Iran to think about the dividends of such an engagement.

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The Shift

The “imposed war” and U.S. sanctions shifted Iran’s independencedriven policy to international engagement. And though gradual, the shift was deep. While the Islamic Republic had to prioritize “national security and territorial integrity (its vital interests)” as its short-term goals (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2008, p. 260), the “main goal became sustainable development with a global approach based on constructive engagement with the world” after the Iran–Iraq war ended (Moosavi Shafaee, 2008, p. 30). Over time, however, the shift fell short in tackling Iran’s foreign challenges. The post-2011 regional challenges and the widening gap over Iran’s nuclear program urged its strategic community to start a new approach based on the assumption that “Iran cannot be an island of stability surrounded by unpredictable states and ongoing conflict (Hadian, 2015). The decades-long rift over its nuclear program which led to the crippling sanctions under President Obama, placed Iran between a rock and a hard place: to keep its nuclear program and prepare for the worst, including war, or to conclude a deal with big concessions. The first choice was risky as the program reached a tipping point and the second had to deal with Iran’s trust-deficit with Washington. Iranian strategists had 2003 in mind, when after voluntary acceptance of restrains on the nuclear program,6 Tehran found itself under U.S. pressure “to give up enrichment” permanently (Warnaar, 2013, p. 151). That approach led to a defiant policy on the part of Iran.7 In 2013, President Rouhani was inaugurated calling for a revision in Iran’s foreign policy that included “rebuilding the economy, resolving the nuclear issue, and ending Iran’s international isolation” (Akbarzadeh &

6 In October of that year, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom under which Iran temporarily suspended aspects of its nuclear program, including enrichment of uranium, and signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, but also asserted its right to develop nuclear technology. Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement,” In Iranian Foreign Policy: Context, Regional Analyses and U.S. Interests, Edited by Lucille Beck, New York: Nova Publishers, 2016, 96. 95–131. 7 Hassan Rouhani, then Iran’s chief negotiator, discussed the 2003–2004 nuclear negotiations in detail in his book National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy.

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Conduit, 2015, p. 4). Before the elections, Iran’s Supreme Leader reiterated what he has for long called “heroic flexibility” (Khamenei, 2013). This along with the new approach was a result of two main developments: First, Washington’s dropping of its regime change policy. Since “dynamics of representation, recognition and identity have a significant impact on Iran-U.S. dealings” (Duncombe, 2016, p. 640), the U.S. pursue of a “diplomatic option toward Iran with greater seriousness” (Hunter, 2014, p. 265), let Tehran open up to candid negotiations. As such, Iran decided to trade nuclear transparency for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions, putting to test U.S. willingness for a new course with Iran. The JCPOA came unprecedented in many aspects. Iran moved beyond the revolutionary paradigm filled with historical trustdeficit with world powers and accepted a deal premised on international breakthrough. Second, the deadlock in the Syrian crisis–and Iran’s regionalism. For decades, Tehran preferred regional solutions for Middle Eastern issues. Its concerns with big powers was focused on “how these states interacted with regional issues in the Middle East and West Asia (Halliday, 2001, p. 175). Iranian leaders routinely criticize, for instance, the presence of foreign troops and military bases in the Persian Gulf” (Bahgat et al., 2017, p. 5). This regionalist approach entailed primarily an opposition to the U.S. Middle East policy. Washington’s regime change policy, persisting across the aisle, played well into this posturing. Iran’s regionalist approach eventually hit the hard rocks of the Arab Spring. Tehran responded to regional push against its main Arab ally with more support to the Syrian government. According to the former IRGC Quds force Commander, General Qassem Solaimani, targeting Syria was aimed at “thwarting the Islamic Republic with these plots… and to bring it to its knees through this religious sedition” (Soleimani, 2020). Ayatollah Khamenei said that the U.S. is plotting against Syria “to harm the line of resistance” (Khamenei.ir, 2012) in the region—that include Iran and its allies. Supporting Iran’s Syrian ally per se did not alter Tehran’s regional posture. Mounting costs, however, did. As the opposition gained momentum, the Syrian government was caught in a dire situation. And to offset that, Iran welcomed a big power, namely Russia, into the region. Still, this is not the whole story. Despite the urgent need for partnering up with Russia, Iran’s shift came in accordance with its “balancing act.” Strategically, Iran’s cooperation with Russia was a balancing endeavor. Internally, the cooperation

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started after the signing of the JCPOA. Tehran and Washington led the negotiations concluding the JCPOA, and it “was unlikely to occur unless the United States and Iran were able to agree on [its] terms” (Colleau, 2015, p. 50). As such, Iran’s politics—going Western with the JCPOA— needed a balancer. For many reasons, including Iranian–Russian shared perception of “hegemony of the U.S., NATO’s enlargement [etc.]” (Paulraj, 2016, p. 106) Moscow qualified to be the one. Russia was to balance the West in Iran’s politics. Regionally, Iran needed a balancer as well.. American support, in the Iranian view, tipped the balance to its rivals favor in Syria—and the region more broadly. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran fought the United States in Syria.8 In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2017, Ayatollah Khamenei said that the “American coalition supporting the terrorists in Syria was defeated and that [Iran and Russia need to] continue their robust cooperation” (Khamenei.ir, 2017). Balancing Washington was not a new strategy. During Ahmadinejad’s years in office, Iran “sought alternative partners to both circumvent ad undermine United States’ attempts at isolating Iran (Warnaar, 2013, p. 135). What came new, however, was Iran’s move beyond its regionalist approach. In general, Iran’s foreign policy shifted into a new phase under systematic (U.S.’s ability to build up an international consensus) and geostrategic (regional rivals’ gains in Syria) pressures. As such, Iran crossed two of its traditional obstacles in dealing with international powers: first, its trust-deficit; and second its calls for regionalism in the Middle East.

6

The Spoiler

Iran’s international involvement brought palpable results. The JCPOA was signed on the assumption that “growing foreign relations are of paramount importance for domestic growth” (Sariolghalam, 2000, p. 147). The deal got Iran out of UNSC scrutiny and chapter “The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations”—the

8 Ayatollah Khamanei said that the US “was defeated in Syria” in early 2015. http:// farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=28896.

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first nation to do so without a war or regime change.9 This is especially crucial when considered alongside the U.S. decades-long efforts for regime change in Iran (see Rostami-Povey, 2010). In addition, Iran started reintegrating into the global economy—though falling short of its expectations. Still, coming into terms with the P5+1 obliterated much of Iran’s traditional mistrust with world powers. Iran’s cooperation with Russia, on the other hand, turned the tide into its allies’ favor. As a shift from Iran’s regionalism, this came a result of the JCPOA. According to an Iranian specialists on Iranian–Russian relations, those relations shifted to a more balanced status after the nuclear deal (Shoori, 2017). As such, geostrategic pressures along with Iran’s post-JCPOA policy, provided the base for Iranian–Russian strategic cooperation in Syria. And despite continued debates on “who is on the call in Syria,”10 Iran’s main goal of stopping its rivals’ gold rush toward Damascus was achieved. Nevertheless, Iran’s new course was to fall victim to American partisan politics, as it was the case ever since “the Reagan campaign seize the Iran issue as a political weapon against Carter” (Ryan, 2018, p. 104). Depicting Iran as the main source of evil11 and labeling the JCPOA as “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into”12 by President Trump, and his eventual withdrawal from the deal,13 casted a shadow on the future of Iran’s new international course. But will this lead to the restoration of Iran’s international

9 In the Iraqi, Libyan, and Afghan cases, both war and regime change happened while in other cases like North Korea, the state is suffering one of the worst cases of international sanctions in history. 10 The debate started at the advent of Russia’s involvement and continues today. See for instance: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/syria-civilwar-next/553232/; https://www.quora.com/Whos-calling-the-shots-in-Syria; https:// www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/02/27/russia-calls-the-shots. 11 According to President Trump, “Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/. 12 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-str ategy/. 13 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-jointcomprehensive-plan-action/.

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isolation? There are three points to consider with regards to Iran’s future approach: Firstly, Iran’s engagement was multilateral and international. As Iran’s FM wrote “Multilateralism will play a central role in Iran’s external relations” (Zarif, 2014, p. 57). While backing Iran’s negotiating team, Ayatollah Khamenei kept insisting that Washington cannot be trusted (Khamenei, 2015). In fact, although Iran signed the JCPOA, it was expected that changes in Washington could “impact the future successes and survivability of the agreement” (Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 18) and that a different U.S. administration may “interpret the document in a very broad way in order to find excuses to apply pressure [on Iran]” (Hadian Jazy, 2016). Within such a view and right after the conclusion of the JCPOA, Iran embarked on a strategic cooperation with Russia. In other words, Iran was moving both Western (JCPOA) and Eastern (Russia). And while Iran’s main trade partner for over 7 years have been China, the JCPOA was intended to bring Western businesses and investments into Iran. In other words, Iran’s international engagement aimed at both reintegrating Iran into the global economy and preserving its independent foreign policy by broadening the scope of its international partnerships. Secondly, the JCPOA was a balancing act. Prior to the JCPOA”, Iran embarked on nuclear negotiations with Western parties back in 2003 and 2004. And while Washington was not a party to the process, it used to pressurize Iran through its EU allies–demanding, for instance, the permanent freeze of Iran’s nuclear program. As such, while under pressure from “Western” powers, Iran insisted on the inclusion of non-Western parties. Along with the hope of an international breakthrough, this showed Iran’s continued mistrust with international powers. Iran’s strategic cooperation with Russia was to balance the JCPOA and its business dealings with Western countries was to balance those with China. The JCPOA basically merged Iran’s international drive with its historical mistrust through a balancing act. Thirdly, the nuclear negotiations process was an issue-based one. While staying at odds with much of American regional priorities, Iran insisted on decoupling the nuclear file from other differences. Iran’s missile program, its regional policy and most importantly, its internal affairs were to stay out of the process. While Iran agreed to sign the JCPOA and accept the UNSC resolution 2231 for sanctions-relief, it also stated that its “military capabilities, including its ballistic missiles, are only for legitimate

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defense” (Asre Iran 2015), reserving that it is beyond the qualification of the resolution’s missile-related restrictions.14 Therefore, Iran’s negotiators embarked on the process with the goal of ending the standoff on Iran’s nuclear program. It was never intended to include other issues gapping Iranian-American regional policies. As a consensual decision based on those three presumptions, Iran’s international engagement was aimed at resolving the nuclear issue, not to be restrained by it. Although the decoupling strategy was an indicator of Iran’s continued mistrust, the JCPOA needed to work to provide room for addressing other differences. In other words, Iran did not put all of its eggs in the same basket. While President Trump withdraw the United States from the JCPOA because it “gave the Iranian regime too much in exchange for too little,”15 Ayatollah Khamenei, who kept insisting that the United States is not trustworthy, was proven right. Besides the goal of preserving its independent foreign policy, Iran’s balancing act was aimed at addressing a Trump-withdrawal-like-scenario. Iran’s bet on the European Union to counter a “rogue white house” was an old bet--preceding the JCPOA. Iran also insisted on the inclusion of Russia and China in the nuclear talks. In other words, Iran’s decision of engagement alongside its decoupling and balancing dimensions were to minimize its vulnerability against such a setback. Nevertheless, after Trump’s withdrawal, Iran’s Supreme Leader casted his doubts in, saying that “those three European countries have shown that in the utmost sensitive situations, they accompany America.”16 In another speech in June 2018 he said that “Iranian nation and government will not stand being under both sanctions and nuclear restrictions” (Khamenei, June 2018). Tehran’s engagement which led to the JCPOA was in fact an engagement with Washington—as the main counterpart. As such, this was seen as Iran’s Western orientation aimed at “resolving the West issue in Iran’s foreign policy (Sariolghalam, 2000, p. 154). Tehran’s strategic cooperation with Russia was to balance that orientation. Besides the Syrian 14 See the restrictions added to the resolution here: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/

restrictions-ballistic.shtml. 15 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-end ing-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/. 16 Addressing Iranian officials from across the spectrum, Ayatollah Khamenei also brought up Iran’s conditions to be fulfilled by the EU in order for Iran to stick to a deal without the US. See his speech on: http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=39650.

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conundrum, this cooperation was to balance the first orientation. Even within the JCPOA, Iran chose its “Russian friend” to ship 25,000 pounds of its enriched uranium to it as “safe hands” (Mahapatra, 2016, p. 43). Therefore, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA alongside EU’s inability or unwillingness to observe its commitments according to the Iranian view played into the second orientation and hence, bolstered IranRussia-China relations instead of forcing Iran back into an isolationist posture. The Rounai administration shift to the East to compensate for the shortcomings of the “Western orientation” stemmed from an old debate in Iran obvious in Iran’s Supreme Leader insistence on the need to “prioritize the East over the West” (Khamenei, February 2018). In general, Iran’s internal debates minimized the possibility of a setback to an isolationist approach after U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Instead, Iran banked on its balancing policy. Expecting its differences with Washington to amplify, Iran’s insistence on the decoupling policy was to preserve its deterrent capabilities. As such, Iran’s missile program remained—and will remain—off the table according to Iranian officials— which brings up a sort of a security dilemma. The tougher Washington pushes Iran, deepening its threat perception, the more urgent the need for defensive capabilities and security-based foreign policy gets for Iran. Therefore, Iran’s balancing policy went hand in hand with the development of its deterrent capabilities and, thus, did not mean a setback from Iran’s international approach. Iran’s downgrading of its JCPOA commitments—starting a year after U.S. withdrawal—showed the tipping point after which those commitments could easily turn into a liability–both internally and regionally. The EU stance was crucial in preventing/accelerating such an outcome. Iran’s Supreme Leader called EU attempts to keep Iran in the deal without compensating for the U.S. sanctions a “disturbed dream [that] is not going to be realized” (Khamenei, February 2018). Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to the Supreme Leader outlined Iran’s next steps should the deal collapses that included using more advanced centrifuges and producing nuclear propulsion systems (Al-Monitor, 2018). Later on Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency announced that “Iran was developing infrastructure for building advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility” (Reuters, June 2018). In other words, once the EU was not able to deliver, the Islamic Republic kept losing the support of its people for the JCPOA (Reuters, May 2018), and hence was forced to lower its compliance after exhausting diplomacy—and as a means of

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reactivating it as well. Three years after Trump’s withdrawal and the imposition of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, Tehran remained committed to the deal despite the lowering of commitments. The Biden elections may either pay off for Iran’s strategic patience or lead to the completion of the shift to the East in Iran’s international engagement.

7

Conclusion

Deeply rooted in its modern history and collective memory, Iran’s trust-deficit with international powers barred it from alliance/coalitionbuilding for decades. An alliance according to this reading was a kind of domination in which the big power dominates and the weaker state suffers setbacks in its independence and sovereignty. While working with world powers started as a practical necessity during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, coalitions and alliances remained a taboo. Iran’s international conduct, however, shifted as geopolitical necessities and systematic pressures went up over time. Systematic pressures elevated as a result of U.S. attempt to squeeze the Iranian economy and to grind it to a halt should Iran continue its nuclear program without additional limits. The dropping of Washington’s regime change policy by the Obama administration paved the way for Iran’s new approach which produced the JCPOA. Also, Iran’s geostrategic needs in the regional context rationalized a more “internationalized” response and, thereupon, Iran joined hands with Russia—in yet another shift in its foreign policy conduct. Before Trump’s election as president, Iran’s gains out of the new international approach seemed guaranteed. Its commitment to the JCPOA seemed to be garnering expected economic dividends with economic and trade deals signed to reintegrate its economy into the global one. On the regional front, Russia’s involvement shifted the tide to Iran’s favor in Syria. Nevertheless, while Iran’s Syria campaign proved the effectiveness of Tehran’s internationalist approach, expected dividends of the JCPOA were soon to fade away as a result of U.S. withdrawal from the deal. While Trump’s violation of U.S. commitments in the JCPOA decreased the incentive in Tehran for engaging Washington, the global reaction to his policy kept Iran in the JCPOA—though lowering its own commitments as a response to the maximum pressure campaign and EU’s inability to make up for Iran’s economic losses. The possible revival of the JCPOA under the Biden administration can strengthen Iran’s international engagement drive. Additionally, Iran’s gains out of its strategic

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cooperation with Russia kept the incentives high for Iran’s international course. As such, it is highly unlikely for Iran to be pushed back into an isolationist approach. The JCPOA and regional cooperation with Russia are expected to direct Iran’s foreign policy according to their outcomes. Iran’s Supreme Leader’s reiteration of the call for “prioritizing the East over the West” after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA is an indicator of that.

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baray-i arzyabiy-i siyasat-i kharejiy-i jomhoriy-i eslamiy-i Iran], Tehran: Islamic Azad University. Draper, Theodore (1991). A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs, New York: Hill & Wang. Duncombe, Constance (2016) “Representation, recognition and foreign policy in the Iran–US relationship,” European Journal of International Relations, 2016, 22 (3): 622–645. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2002). “The foreign policy of Iran,” in The foreign policies of Middle East states, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 283–309. Entekhab, “JCPOA ratified by the Supreme National Security Council,” [Tasvibi barjam dar shoray-i aali-i amniyat-i melli], Entekhab, October 3, 2015. . Esposito, John L. (2001). “Introduction: From Khomeini to Khatami,” In John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, Iran at the Crossroads, New York: Palgrave, 1–11. Fair, C. Christine & Stephen M. Shellman (2008). Determinants of Popular Support for Iran’s Nuclear Program: Insights from a Nationally Representative Survey, Contemporary Security Policy, 2008, 29(3): 538–558, 553. Floor, Willem (2005). Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, London & New York: I.B. Tauris. Gholi Majd, Mohammad (2012). August 1941: The Anglo-Russian Occupation of Iran and Change of Shahs, Lanham & Plymouth: University Press of America. Greaves, Rose (2007). “Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798-1921,” In The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Edited by Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third Printing, 374-425. Hadian, Nasser (2016). “The Iran Accord One Year On,” EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2016. https://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu-con ference/sections/eu-conference-2016-c74a/plenary-3-7518/nasser-hadianjazy-039b. Hadian, Nasser (2015) “Iran Debates its Regional Role,” Iran Task Force at the Atlantic Council. file:///C:/Users/Hassan/ Downloads/Documents/Iran_Debates_Its_Regional_Role_0910_web.pdf. Hadian, Nasser (2008) “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Background and Clarification,” Contemporary Security Policy, 29 (3), 573-576. Halliday, Fred (2001) “The Iranian Revolution and International Politics: Some European Perspectives,” In Iran at the Crossroads, Edited by John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, New York: Palgrave, 175–190. Hunter, Shireen T. (2014) “Can Hassan Rouhani Succeed where Muhammad Khatami Failed? Internal and International Politics of Reform in Iran” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 1 (3): 253–268.

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Hunter, Shireen T. (2010) Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, Santa Barbara: Praeger. Javid, Ali (2016, July 3) “Iran Khamene on Islamic Republic diplomatic path & independence.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VR5Dj97x2ss. Johnson, Rob (2011) The Iran – Iraq War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 124–128. Katzman, Kenneth (2016) “Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy,” In Iranian Foreign Policy: Context, Regional Analyses and U.S. Interests, Edited by Lucille Beck, New York: Nova Publishers, 41–93. Kazemzadeh, Firuz (2007) “Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union,” In The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Edited by Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third Printing, 314–349. Khateri, Shahriar & Ahmad Jannati-Moheb (2007) Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons Against Iran: UN documents, Terhan: Research Center for Studies of Holy Defense. Khamenei, Seyed Ali (February 2018) “Statements in Meeting with the People of Eastern Azerbaijan,” [bayanat dar didar-i mardom-i azarbayejan-i sharghi], khamanei.ir. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=38975. Khamenei, Seyed Ali (June 2018) “Statements at the 29th anniversary of the death of Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy on him),” [bayanat dar marasem-i bisto nohomin salgard-i rehlat-i emam Khomeini (rahmatollah alayh)], Khamenei.ir. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=39796. Khamenei, Seyed Ali (2015) “Statements in meeting with Maddah’s of Ahl alBayt,” [bayanat dar didar ba maddahan-i ahl-i beyt] Khamenei.ir, April 9. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=29415. Khamenei, Seyed Ali (2013) “Statements in a meeting with the Chairman and members of the Assembly of Experts,” [bayanat dar didar-i raees va a’zayi majles-i khebregan-i rahbari] Khamenei.ir, September 4. https://farsi.kha menei.ir/speech-content?id=23810. Khamenei, Seyed Ali (1994) “Statements in a meeting with a group of Students,” [bayanat dar didar-i jam’i az daneshamoozan va daneshjooyan] Khamenei.ir, November 2. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/newspart-print?id=2731&nt=2&year= 1373&tid=4077. Khamenei.ir (2017) “Russian president’s meeting with the leader of the revolution,” [didar-i raees-jomhoori-i roosie ba rahbar-i enghelab], Khamenei.ir, November 1. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=38052. Khamenei.ir (2012) “The revolution’s leader meeting with the secretary general of the Islamic Jihad of Palestine,” [didar-i dabir kol-i jehade eslami-i felesteen ba rahbar-i enghelab], Khamenei.ir, January 30. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/ news-content?id=18890.

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Outlays of Iran’s Hegemonic-Hybridized Political System Francisco José B. S. Leandro

1

Introduction1

Secularism, as a foundation stone of any political system, was first identified by George Holyoake (1896) to describe the idea and the need to promote a separation between the social order and religion. Holyoake (1896, p. 37) refers to secularism as ‘a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations purely human, and intended mainly for those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable.’ However, secularism draws its intellectual basis from Greek and Roman philosophers as well as thinkers from the enlightenment, as a rationale to achieve widespread societal integration of citizens, which is vital in the perspective of political participation. Scholars and political thinkers, such as Alberico Gentili, Max Weber, Leo Strauss, Jürgen Habermas, Charles 1 All the articles mentioned in this chapter, correspond to the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, approved in 1979 and amended in 1989, published by Iran Studies, 47:1, 159– 200 (2014), as translated in the republication published in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), with the permission of Homa Katouzian, the editor of Iranian Studies. Retrieved in August 2020, from https://irandataportal.syr.edu/constitutions-andconstitutional-debates.

F. J. B. S. Leandro (B) City University of Macau, Macau, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_4

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Larmore, and Jacques Berlinerblau, have argued in favor of and against limited secularism, putting forward interesting arguments, which basically discuss the legitimacy of political power. In light of this reasoning, the intellectual struggle of Saint Thomas Aquinas is particularly interesting in reconciling divine and human law. This is also the argument put forward by Martin Luther (1523) on ‘temporal authority’ advancing the need for the division of the church and the state, as well as the ideas of inclusiveness and overlapping consensus, suggested by John Locke and John Rawls. John Locke in his ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’ (1689) and John Rawls in his treatise on political liberalism (1993) argue in favor of accepting all views, by seeking inclusion based on religious toleration: ‘a central feature of political liberalism is that it views all such arguments the same way it views religious ones, and therefore these secular philosophical doctrines do not provide public reasons. Secular concepts and reasoning of this kind belong to first philosophy and moral doctrine, and fall outside the domain of the political ’ (Rawls 1993, p. 457). More recently, Noah (2005, p. 14) clearly made a case in favor of secularism: ‘[Legal secularists] claim that separating religion from the public, governmental sphere is necessary to ensure the full inclusion of all citizens.’ This research does not intend to discuss the merits or demerits of secularism as a political foundational principle advancing the separation between religion and the exercise of executive, judicial and legislative powers. Theocraticism, for the purpose of this study, is a political assumption, which the authors do not challenge, because it is a collective choice based on popular acts of faith. In contrast, this chapter aims to shed light on the political consequences of refuting secularism and building a political system dominated by theological beliefs and a hegemonic clergy. In the case of Iran, Gray (2007, p. 175) suggests that behind this teleological drive is a quasi-political imperative—‘In societies where religion plays a strong and important role, the institutions of the society reflect the religion. Yet in societies where religion plays a more secondary role to say that all political concepts are secularized theological concepts is an overstatement.’ We argue that the Iranian political system presents an apparent theocratic hybridization, designed to combine democratic and religious representation. In addition, we claim that in the political system of Iran, the apparent hybridization misrepresents popular sovereignty as put forward by contractualists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Alexis de Tocqueville.

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The Conflicting Narratives on Iran

What is different, distant, or unknown is likely to be rejected and labeled as wicked. The Westernized narrative on Iran is located within a longstanding contradictory opposition between enchantment and nonacceptance. In fact, the West has long been mesmerized by Iran’s civilization, and Iran still represents a hidden world. From an Iranian perspective, the West is not only unreliable in its commitments but it also shows a lack of respect for Shia revelation (in its divine dimension). This has given rise to post-colonial opposites, in which cultural structures of discourse are translated into binary oppositions. The narrative and discourse between Iran and the West is founded on these oppositions: admiration vs. fear; unreliable vs. disrespectful. In this section, we strive to shed light on these longstanding oppositions. The Western enchantment—The region of the Fertile Crescent alongside Mesopotamia was regarded as the cradle of human civilization, and runs up to the western fringes of Iran. Currently, the Fertile Crescent encompasses Syria, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, portions of Turkey and west Iran, connecting the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf and forming a land arch. The inner southern limit is demarcated by the dry Syrian Desert. The outer northern limit is well defined by the Anatolian and Armenian highlands, the Sahara Desert to the west, Sudan to the south, and the Iranian Plateau to the east. Benefiting from this advantageous location, the Persian civilization flourished and made many significant contributions to humankind. Today, the strategic value of Iranian sovereign territory (land and seas) is one of its main assets, because it controls the Ormuz Strait, enjoys access to the Arabian Sea and Caspian Sea, borders central parts of Eurasia—Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan—and sits between China and Europe. All Eurasian trade land corridors, from India and China to South Europe, Africa and Mediterranean, run through Iran. In the Western view, and perhaps others around the world, Persia is mostly associated with its gorgeous carpets, sumptuous gardens, its strategic location and its deep belief in the Shia revelation, which led to the establishment of a constitutional theocracy. While the Persian legacy is difficult to summarize, it was certainly one of the most influential cultures along the ancient Silk Road.

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In the words of Foltz (2016, p. XII), Persia has delivered an ‘extraordinary broad range of contributions […] to the world history through the spread of their cultural norms […] from the prehistoric times to the present.’ One of the remarkable aspects when one studies Iran is the fact that the composite nature of Iranian culture ‘remains multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious ’ (Foltz, 2016, p. XIV) arises from an interplay between Mesopotamian, Greek, Indian, Turkish, European, Russian, and Chinese cultures. Religion, law, literature, music, fine arts, poetry, film (Foltz, 2016, p. 92), gastronomy, clothing, etiquette, architecture, and language are among the universal sciences of the Persian legacy. The Persian heritage as a whole was and, to a certain extent, still is influential. But religion based on ‘Twelver Shiism’ constitutes the driving political force. Shiism became a dominant religion in Persia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when King Ismail Safavi declared Twelver Shiism the ‘state religion’ and ordered the Sunnite majority to convert to Shiism. Mahmood (2006, p. 36) suggests that King Ismail Safavi’s decree was based on political motives to protect his kingdom from the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Sunnite Sultans because ‘he was afraid that Persia might be absorbed by Turkey.’ Mahmood (2006, p. 33) explained that ‘Shiism in all its variety is founded on the core doctrine of divine hereditary Imamat (spiritual and temporal leadership of the community after the Prophet) as opposed to the classical Sunnite doctrine of the Khilafat (viceregency of the Prophet in spiritual and temporal affairs of the community)’ Shiism, as a distinct sect of Islam, is based on two fundamental beliefs: (1) the divine hereditary succession (Imamat) by which the Prophet transferred His authority to his cousin and male descendants; (2) the existence of the Prophet’s successors (The Twelvers—Twelve Imams), which leads to the acceptance of the vilayat-i-amma (general guardianship principle). In the course of this chapter, we shall return to the general guardianship principle as a political concept. The Western nonacceptance of Iran’s rejections—The Western narrative on Iran appears to be dominated by an endemic perception of isolationism within the context of the international order. Different international actors seem to engage in portraying an image of an evil and self-centered society, controlled by a ‘démodé elite of clerics,’ with little understanding of modern sovereign relations and no regard for human happiness. The West gives the impression of

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being unable to accept the Iranian rejection of any forms of neocolonialism, imperialism, or external political influence, as well as the country’s rejection of secularism as a pillar of state political organization. Western nonacceptance of the Iranian rejection of an open and secular society and to be subject to the interests of key international actors has led to a narrative which frames Iran as remote, closed, inaccessible, and driven by political centralism in a system of rebalancing the interpretation of God’s will. Western nonacceptance of the Iranian rejection of Sunni Islam, especially in relation to Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s acceptance of antagonism against Israel, are not driven by political or ideological empathy, but by geopolitical interests. The Western nonacceptance of Iran’s rejection of basic sovereign actions and principles, such as the unconditional striving for the dignity of human free will, appears to be irreconcilable. The West is particularly critical of the use of terrorism as a means to achieve state goals, the diminished social and political position of Iranian women, the status of journalists, and the disrespect shown to the human rights of political dissidents.2 Iran is currently portrayed as a locus for terrorist operations, especially in the border areas with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as a terrorist sponsor-state. In 2020, UK government advised tourists that ‘Terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in Iran. Attacks could happen anywhere, including in places visited by foreigners.’3 Furthermore, in 2020 the US government published the National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, which stated: ‘the US designated Iran a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’ in 1984 […] and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a foreign terrorist organization in […] 2019, for its direct involvement in terrorist plotting,4 […] Iran likely views terrorist activities as an option to deter or retaliate against its perceived adversaries.’ In 2015, the Georgetown Security Studies Review, a publication of the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies, published 2 Amnesty International—Iran 2019. Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www. amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/report-iran/. 3 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/iran/ter rorism. 4 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/ale rts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf.

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a column titled: ‘Misunderstanding Iran: The West’s False Narratives about the Islamic Republic,’5 in which Ian K. (2015) identified three false Western narratives: ‘(1) Iran’s public political discourse dictates the substance of regime policy; (2) The nuclear accord could result in a thaw in bilateral relations and serve as a precedent for cooperation in other areas; (3) The regime embraces reintegration into the international economy.’ In relation to the 2015 nuclear agreement, the 2019–2020 developments of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in which the US administration withdrew unilaterally from its international commitments, contributed to inflaming even more of the binary oppositions between the West, and to a certain extent parts of the Arab world and Iran. Axworthy (2017, p. 173) describes the US hostility toward Iran as one that is ‘based on the assumption that Iran was incorrigible, malevolent and untrustworthy.’ Nevertheless, Iran ‘meets the commitments under JCPOA.’ To sum up, the root causes of this exacerbated and provocative narrative are: (1) mutual disregard and little empathy for cultural traditions on both sides; (2) from the Western and Arab sides, the scramble for geopolitical interests in the Middle East; (3) from the Iranian side, the self-imposed prophetic mission, to be the protector of the affairs and interests of the Muslim world; (4) From the Iranian side, the disregard for international standards of justice, the poor record of Iran’s international diplomacy, the lack of domestic public restraint, the absence of transparency, and the practice of traditional Islamic punishments. Axworthy (2017, p. 166) reminds us that ‘clerics may deliver judgments according to Sharia’a law independently of the official legal system.’ Iran sees Westerners and in particular US and UK officials, as capable of betrayal, behaving arrogantly and acting in an inconsiderate manner. Westerners, even if they respect the deep beliefs of Iran concerning the Shia revelation and the political consequences of that fact, do not assent to Iran’s self-proclaimed monopoly on virtue, especially in regard to its

5 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2015/ 12/12/misunderstanding-iran-the-wests-false-narratives-about-the-islamic-republic/.

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international actions and the intrinsic association between religion, education, and justice. That is probably the most difficult point to reconcile in the context of the opposites and contradictions discussed earlier.

3

The Construction of Political Iran

From the political point of view, Iran has built on its rich inter-cultural past, and on the long-lasting proximity of the Iranian clergy with the people. The clergy were (and are) seen as educators, judges, and interpreters of the dogmatic Shia revelation and on historical international humiliations, which created an anti-Western and anti-encirclement (antiSunni and anti-US) sentiment. In addition, there is the so-called Islamic mysticism (Axworthy, 2017, p. 79), a sort of system of Sufi belief, in which an ‘individual could through meditation, study and prayer polish his soul – in other words to develop himself mentally and spiritually – to become the Perfect Man.’ The formation of political Iran presents multi and intertwined perspectives, centered on identity and the call for an exercise of recognized sovereignty. The official designation of ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran’ has also been subjected to vicissitudes. According to Fishman (2010, p. 266), in 1935, Reza Shah Pahlavi changed the official designation of Persia to Iran, which corresponds to the Land of the Aryans (a self-designated term used by Indo-Iranian people). Later in 1959, in a formal correspondence, Mohammad Reza Shah formally announced that both ‘Persia’ and ‘Iran’ could be used interchangeably.6 The Safavid regime collapsed in 1722, with the capitulation of the city of Isfahan after the Battle of Golnabad and the abdication of the last Safadi Shah after his defeat by the Afghan leader Shah Mahmud Hotak. After retaking control of Isfahan in 1726, political power changed several times, but it was under the leadership of the successors of Nader, and later Fath Ali Shah that Iran initiated contact with European powers. The Dutch and the English established trade missions on the Persian Gulf (Axworthy, 2017, p. 47), and the Portuguese dominated Hormuz Island. Two wars against Russia (1804–1813; 1826–1828) as well as the

6 “Iran” and “Persia” are synonymous. The former has always been used by the Iranianspeaking peoples themselves, while the latter has served as the international name of the country in various languages.

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treaties of Golestan and Tukmanchai in 1813–1828 left a trail of humiliation because of a large loss of national territories. During the Napoleonic Wars, Iran was caught between the superpowers of France, Russia, and England. During World War I, Iranian oil was used as a strategic asset by England and Russia, and during World War II, Russia and England invaded and occupied Iran (Axworthy, 2017, p. 68). To this day, these events of foreign aggression are engraved on the soul of Iran. However, the construction of political Iran departed from the cultural Persian legacy,7 proceeded through autocratic monarchical regimes (Reza Khan 1921–1941; Muhammand Reza 1941–1978), continued to endure foreign interference (allegedly by Russia, the US, and UK), experienced clerical hegemony, and experienced widening educational, wealth, and social disparities. For more than one century, Iran had been involved in a permanent political struggle involving democratic initiatives (with 1905– 1911 as the most prominent period of democratization), the search for a consistent balance between Shiism and constitutionalism (the amendments to the 1906 Constitution), and the leadership of a central and powerful figure fulfilling the role of Plato’s philosopher-king (adherence to Muslim Shiism). The first key moment of Iranian constitutionalism is associated with the initial steps put forward by the 1906 Constitution and its 1907 supplement. Indeed, the 1907 supplement crafted two very important features, which would be driving factors in all subsequent evolutions: (1) Shiism was declared the state religion; and (2) the institutionalization of the ‘Islamic Shariat.’ This certified parliamentary legal acts and conformed to Islamic principles. Two important features of the political construction of Iran were first, the fact that the majority of the Iranian population in the nineteenth century was nomadic or semi-nomadic (Foltz, 2016, p. 85). Therefore, the population was difficult to control and mobilize in terms of political engagement. The second important feature concerns the narrative on women who, for centuries, have been associated with harems and places

7 Among other cultural and religious aspects of the Persian civilization is the principle

Velayat-e faqih, which is deeply rooted in Shia Islam, and as we shall explain later, became a dominant concept in the Iranian political system. The Velayat-e faqih principle has historically been applied to justify limited clerical guardianship over vulnerable popular groups incapable of protecting their own interests, namely widows, orphans, and the disabled.

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of pleasure, court intrigues, and ambitious schemers (Foltz, 2016, pp. 23, 90). Nizam al-Mulk in the Book of Government or Rules for Kings (eleventh century) (Darke 2011, p. 179) states that ‘The king’s underlings must not be allowed to assume power, for this causes the utmost harm and destroys the King’s splendor and majesty. This particularly applies to women, for they are wearers of the veil and have not complete intelligence.’ To this day, women continue to face obstacles in achieving parity in society, especially in terms of political representation. The number of women in the Iranian national parliament is but a token. The representation of women in the Guardian Council and in the Assembly of Experts is null. The possibility of a woman as Supreme Leader is probably considered a profanity. The Pahlavi rulers, despite all political theater such as the ‘White Revolution’ (1963) and the Persepolis celebration (1971), left a legacy of tolerance toward US influence and ruled ‘in a bubble’ (Axworthy, 2017, p. 77), keeping immeasurable distance between ruler, clergy, and people. The 1951 nationalization of oil resulted from a movement in the Iranian Parliament to control the industry which had been run by private companies largely controlled by foreign actors. The movement was led by Mohammad Mosaddegh, who later became Prime Minister of Iran. Two years later, the 1953 coup d’état overthrew the democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in favor of the monarchy of the Shah. This coup d’état was allegedly supported by the US. All of these factors led to the galvanizing of the clergy, a legacy of antiWesternization and poor economic performance, which reduced political life to the discussion of theological questions and scorning the use of reason at the expense of an over empowerment of the Shia revelation. Perhaps the only outstanding footprint of the White Revolution was the introduction of women’s suffrage in 1963. Nevertheless, the White Revolution is described by the current Iranian Constitution as ‘a step intended to stabilize the foundations of despotic rule and to reinforce the political, cultural, and economic dependence of Iran on world imperialism.’ In 1979, the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the head of Iran’s new Islamic state. A second important step occurred in that year, with the constitutional initiative of Prime Minister Bazargan, in which he envisaged the construction of the Islamic Democratic Republic to be approved by the constituent assembly. As mentioned by Mahmood (2006, pp. 25–26), Khomeini disapproved the idea and instead proposed the election of an Assembly of Experts to consider and

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adopt the final draft. ‘A 73-member Assembly of Experts was elected on 3 August 1979, with mujtahids8 forming a clear majority […] After due deliberations the Assembly rejected the proposal of Prime Minister Bazargan and instead incorporated Khomeini’s concept of Vilayat-i-faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisconsult) as the core concept of the new constitution.’ The 73-member Assembly of Experts approved the amended draft on 15 November 1979, and later on 2–3 December 1979 it was the subject of a national referendum. In the conjugation of Articles 5 and 107 of the new Constitution, Ayatollah Khomeini was designated the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and Custodian of the Affairs of the Muslims of the World for life (Valiyy-i-faqih). Prime Minister Bazargan resigned on 5 November 1979. According to Aarabi (2019), ‘The concept of velayat-e faqih […] transfers all political and religious authority to the Shia clergy and makes all of the state’s key decisions subject to approval by a supreme clerical leader, the vali-e faqih – guardian Islamic jurist. The supreme clerical leader (the faqih) provides guardianship (velayat ) over the nation and, in doing so, ensures the top-down Islamisation of the state.’ Actually, the developments mentioned before in relation to the Constitution of 1979 are in line with the fact that Khomeini published a book in 1970 titled ‘Islamic Governance: The Governance of the Jurist,’ in which he adapted the doctrine of velayat-e faqih for the purpose of the political governance of a state. In the same publication, he claims that God had made Islam for it to be implemented as shown by the creation of divine law (sharia). It is a given that no one knows Islam better than the clergy (Aarabi, 2019). Consequently, the institutionalization of the Vilayat-i-faqih principle, as it was enshrined in the 1979 Constitution, implies the recognition of four important political ideas: (1) Popular sovereignty has been given to the people by God, and therefore the people are not the title holders of original sovereignty; (2) Original sovereignty is divine, and it stands as the only source of political power; 8 A mujtahid is a person who has the ability to deduce jurisprudential rulings and has, through this process, deduced the majority of jurisprudential rulings (Mishk¯ın¯ı, M¯ırz¯a Al¯ı. Is.til¯ ah.¯ at al-us.¯ ul. Sixth edition. Qom: al-H¯ad¯ı, 1416 AH, p. 19).

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(3) Precisely because popular sovereignty is understood to be derived, it requires the corrections of the guardianship of the jurisconsult. That is why, the Iranian political system was built on a particular form of theocratic contractualism, in which the people accept the velayat-e faqih principle, as an instrument reconciling reason and revelation; (4) Article 2 of the 1979 Constitution, especially paragraph 6 (a), indirectly recognizes the primacy of the Holy Quran over constitutional law. Therefore, only those who possess special qualifications are empowered to interpret the Constitution. The war against Iraq from 1980 to 1988 imposed an extreme collective hardship on Iranian people, the scars of which are still visible today. This fact, once again, especially during hostilities, reinforces the acceptability of the Shia revelation and the popular legitimacy of the Iranian hegemonic clergy. Indeed, although the spiritual father of the Iranian revolution (Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini) passed away in 1989, the institutionalization of the Vilayat-i-faqih principle continued. The 1989 constitutional amendments removed the constitutional requirement for the Supreme Leader to be recognized as marja-e taghlid (the highest rank in the Shiia clergy) to allow the cleric Ali Khamenei to assume the role of the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader was to be appointed for life, and according to Article 110, the Supreme Leader rules over the President, the Guardian Council, the Judicial Power, the Armed Forces, and the Islamic Pasdaran Revolutionary Corps. A closer analysis of Article 110 reveals that the 1989 amendments expanded the scope of the Supreme Leader’s powers to virtually all organs of the state. As a consequence, the Supreme Leader is at the heart of the Iranian political system, which also relies on the long tradition of strong local governments.

4 The Apparent Hybridity of the Iranian Political System Studying the Iranian political system is not an easy exercise, because we are hindered by language barriers and by the poor transparency of political processes. Nevertheless, in this section we intend to elaborate on two questions: (1) what is a political system? and (2) how is the Iranian political system structured?

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A political system depicts formal and informal state structures of power allocation and their interactions at different levels. A political system can be associated with an apparatus capable of delivering and, therefore, generating acceptance and social legitimization. Witmer (2013, p. 6) understands political systems as ‘large-scale methods of social organization.’ In different words, political systems are schemes of political organization to provide for human and social needs. Political systems are materialized by the existing government institutions, the interactions (relations of power) between those institutions, and the ideas or the ideology (as a set of political values) that put forward arrangements in relation to the distribution of political power. If one refers to the state in terms of a balance of powers, then a particular balance of the power allocation status quo constitutes the political system. A political system is also represented by the dynamic interplay of people’s ideas and their interests based on a structural (constitutional) arrangement. Foremost, each political system is the result of an evolution and represents the whole process of demand and response (Derbyshire, 1996, p. 4). Therefore, political systems are schemes for balanced interaction and decision-making concerning who gets to decide on the goals of a state and how they may be achieved. In a political system (Almond, 2006), the term ‘system’ satisfies the need for an inclusive concept capable of exercising the ‘control’ of political and legal events, which covers all the patterned actions relevant to the making of political-administrative and executive decisions. The study of political systems cannot be reduced to the study of the current sovereign constitutions. In fact, the interplay of political and nonpolitical agents, formal and informal pressure groups, as well as the circumstances created by the processes of transitions to democracy, are important factors to consider. Yet, as Wright (2015, p. 36) asserts, ‘… as with all political systems - also has powerful informal and unofficial entities that in some cases overshadow and control formal and official bodies.’ In the same vein of thought, Skaaning (2006, p. 15) states, ‘[a] political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of ultimate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts (extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power (extension and character of division of powers – control and autonomy).’

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State institutions are the physical representations of the political system, and the state constitution is metaphorically its skeleton. Political systems are the state’s apparatus of power designed to provide internal supremacy and external equality. Law, in the context of political systems, functions as an instrument to organize relations of power and, at the same time, it is the result of the established power relations. In this vein of reasoning, the state is a stable (permanent), political, legislative, judicial, and executive entity, effectively ruling with supremacy over a population in a defined territory, and capable of establishing sovereign relations with other states. States exercise internal supremacy of power through state branches—executive, legislative, and judicial; and external equality through the ability to seek international justice (Jus Juridictionis), the capacity to be represented and to receive external representation (Jus Legationis active and passive); the right to enter into international agreements (Jus Tractum); and their capacity to wage wars and to use their armed forces alone or as part of international coalitions (Jus Bellum). A political system must be capable of providing long-term institutional stability and, at the same time, allowing for constant systemic adaptation and transitions of political power. The formulation of responses appears to be a result of institutional, formal, informal, and structural interactions which take place within every political system. As Wright (2015, p. 63) puts it, challenges, desires, and demands are among the crafters of the evolution of political systems: ‘As a result, the political system has become more responsive to popular demands, grievances and desires.’ The survival of all political systems is directly proportional to their capacity for evolution, within the idea of continuity and stability in power transitions. In the context of this chapter, we understand political systems as the creation, institutionalization, stabilization, and development of power relations, within the sovereign state apparatus. The process involves political, executive, judicial, and legislative power endowments as well as the dynamics between state branches and actively engaged social pressure groups. Furthermore, the political system accounts for the ability to act as a unified whole and consequently advance effective and acceptable public decision-making processes, arising from public demands. As every political system must be equipped with instruments of transformation and adaptation to new realities, it likewise encompasses the capacity to effect peaceful political change in the context of new power arrangements. State political systems are composed of an array of sub-systems such as the electoral system, the party-system, the system of government,

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the system of representation or assembly, the legal system, and the judicial system. Based on this definition of political systems, we now examine how the Iranian political system is structured. We are particularly interested in the allocation of power, decision-making processes, political transformation, and the interaction between the political apparatus and the different sub-systems. Iran is a sovereign theocracy. The Iranian constitutional system has been deliberately conceived to exercise strict religious scrutiny, based on religious law as prescribed in the Quran. Axworthy (2017, p. 154) describes the Iranian Constitution as a document that ‘seeks to satisfy two principles; the idea of Islamic government, and the idea of popular sovereignty.’ In this line of reasoning, Iran as a theocracy portrays an overwhelming necessity to reconcile the divine nature of the governing law with the circumstances of mass political participation, leading to the creation of a solution similar to the one advanced by Plato’s philosopher-king—a prominent religious figure, with the capacity to ‘protect the commands of Islam’ (Article 91) as the sovereign interpreter of God’s wishes. The Supreme Leader is a Sayyid (that is why he always wears a black turban). Sayyid is an honorific denoting people accepted as descendants of the Prophet. By the same token, all individuals exercising public powers, in particular those that were elected, must believe and behave according to the fundamental principles of Islam (for example the president (Article 115)). This fact, in the eyes of the Iranian political system, calls for pre-electoral scrutiny. The Supreme Leader, acting as the ultimate religious sovereign, and the clerical council of experts are the best qualified to interpret Islam and to ensure that those acting as public representatives strictly adhere to its principles. Reconciliation between reason (as a political standard form of civil political participation) and revelation (as a political standard for the ultimate need for religious leadership) is the key rationale of the Iranian political system. On the one hand, the system is theocratically democratic with universal and direct but selective suffrage to elect the legislative and executive bodies. As depicted in Fig. 1, the Local Councils, the President, the Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts are pre-selected elected bodies. The expression ‘theocratically democratic’ here is used in the sense that the requirements to evaluate the active electoral capacity (the pre-selection is carried out by the Guardian Council) of the mentioned four bodies are prescribed by civil and religious laws. Likewise, the three branches of political power (legislative, executive, and judicial) in the light

MOIS

Local Governors

Supreme Council of the Provinces

Bills (A102)

Electorate

Vetoes

Approves

8 Years-term

(A107) 88 Clerics

Assembly of Experts for Leadership

Appoints

6 Years-term (A92)

6 Just Islamic Jurisprudents 6 Legal scholars (A98) ConsƟtuƟonal InterpretaƟon (A99) Electoral Supervision

The Guardian Council

Appoints or Approves

Appoints or Controls

Iran populaƟon is esƟmated at 83,992,949 people at mid year according to UN data (2020).

Elected (A100)

Parliamentary Standing Commissions 15 Permanent CommiƩees 4 Years-term

16 Seats for women (5,8%) – NO QUOTA

05 Seats for minoriƟes (designated)

290 Seats/285 elected

NaƟonal Islamic ConsultaƟve Assembly (Unicameral)

Majles Shoraye Eslami

LegislaƟon (A72+94+96) Approves the candidates

(A112)

Expediency Council

8Y (no term limits)

Valiyy-i-Amr (HoS) The Supreme Leader (A110+177)

Fig. 1 The 9 leading institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Dominantly Religious InsƟtuƟons

Unelected InsƟtuƟons

Appointed by Elected InsƟtuƟons

NaƟonal Accounts Bureau Local ConsultaƟve Councils

4 Years-term (A114)

Minister of JusƟce

Elected Non Religious insƟtuƟons

Vetoes

PromulgaƟon (A123)

Council Ministers

Chairs

AppoinƟng, dismissing and accepƟng the resignaƟon (A110+130)

Confirms Bills (A74) and (A87+133)

(A117+134) Absolute majority

President (2T)

Islamic Republic of Iran: TheocraƟc Unitarian State

Other Courts

Courts

Military Courts

Family Courts

AdministraƟ ve Courts

Criminal and Civil Courts RevoluƟonary

NaƟonal Supreme Court General Prosecutor

Recommends the lawyers

Appointment (A162) 5 Years-term

Head of Judiciary

Head Radio-TV

Media Council (A175)

Armed Forces Islamic RevoluƟonary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Supreme NaƟonal Council of NaƟonal Security

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of Article 57 operate separately but ‘under the supervision of the absolute authority and religious leadership.’ Legislative power is bestowed on the National Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Parliament), executive power is partially vested in the President, and judicial power is independent (Article 156), but dominated by the Head of Judiciary, a position that is appointed by the Supreme Leader. In every political system, a very important aspect to be analyzed is the rigidity of the Constitution. In other words, rigidity measures the capacity that every constitutional system possesses: to evolve and adapt, within its own rules. Great flexibility allows for constant adaptations to new realities and, therefore, to preserve the constitution to endure longer. In contrast, a high degree of rigidity prevents amendments to be passed and the constitutional law has a higher likelihood to be replaced entirely. Article 177 establishes the procedures for amendments. Four main ideas stand out: (1) The initiative rests exclusively with the Supreme Leader; (2) Amendments require the formation of the Council of Reevaluating the Constitution composed of 88 representatives, largely appointed or selected by the Supreme Leader; (3) The existence of a special clause imposing an absolute limit on revising the Islamic nature of the political system. In more than 40 years, the 1979 Iranian Constitution has been amended only once, in 19899 ; and (4) All amendments must be submitted to a national referendum.10 In our perspective, the Iranian constitutional system is rigid with a limited capacity to self-adopt substantial changes. Figure 1 depicts a simplified model of Iran’s political system, representing the nine key institutions, organized according to four types: (1) elected non-religious institutions, but in which all candidates are scrutinized and may be declassified if they do not have an acceptable profile according to religious principles. This scrutiny is carried out by a number of different offices and each office presents their findings to the Guardian Council, which in turn decides whether or not the candidature is ‘legitimate.’ If a candidate is rejected the candidate can contest the decision, but 9 According to Alem (2011, p. 46) ‘The constitutional amendment of 1989 changed Iran’s political structure dramatically. The post of prime minister was abolished and the president, elected by a direct popular vote, became the head of the executive branch.’ 10 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://irandataportal.syr.edu/constitutions-andconstitutional-debates. Details of the constitutional referenda are here: https://irandatap ortal.syr.edu/referenda.

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since no legal reason for the decision is given, the possibilities of a contestation are limited11 ; (2) appointed by elected institutions; (3) unelected institutions; and (4) dominantly religious institutions. We now look at the main features of all these institutions12 : 1. The first and probably the leading institution is the Assembly of Experts for the Leadership (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari), which is composed of 8813 clerics (mujtahids and ayatollahs). It was originally formed to draft the 1979 Constitution. According to Article 107, the main responsibility of this assembly is to designate the Supreme Leader. The fifth election for the Iranian Assembly of Experts was held on 26 February 2016, and the elected representatives are supposed to be in office until 2024. They are elected directly according to the seats available for the constituencies for a term of eight years. As suggested by Dareini (2016) and Saber (2016), this body is the core of the Iranian political system14 because it represents the different religious political perspectives and it has the power to shape the political landscape for years ahead. Table 1 shows the number of seats available for each of the 31 electoral provincial circles, and compares the number of registered candidates with the number of qualified candidates to emphasize how demanding this selection is. In addition, there are no clear constitutional criteria on the requirements that a candidate must possess. According to a law passed by the Iranian Parliament, the members of the assembly must be experts in Islamic jurisprudence. To date, the representation has never included women and only about 20% of the total number of applicants are approved as candidates (Table 1). All Iranian citizens above the age of 18 years are eligible to cast their ballots in their local district assembly. Each district assembly corresponds to the 11 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/que stions/replies/981474880. 12 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/103/. 13 Kurum, 2019, p. 119 and “‫( ”تعداد نمایندگان مجلس خبرگان رهبری افزایش یافت‬in

Persian). Iranian Students’ News Agency (2 September 2015). 14 Retrieved on 13 August 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon key-cage/wp/2016/02/24/why-irans-assembly-of-experts-election-is-the-real-race-to-bewatching/.

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Table 1 Electoral circles of the Iranian 5th Assembly of Experts for the Leadership Constituencies based on provinces

Seats

Registered

Qualified

Percentage (%)

1 2 3 4

02 02 01 01

024 008 005 016

06 02 01 02

25 25 20 12.5

05 05 04 02 02 01 01 05 03 02 06 01

046 029 030 016 013 011 014 061 021 021 024 009

06 08 06 04 03 01 02 16 05 04 07 02

13.04 27.58 20 25 23.07 09.09 14.28 26.22 23.81 19.04 29.16 22.22

02 02 02 04 01 02 01 06 01 02

023 019 016 029 010 013 020 047 007 023

04 03 05 08 01 03 04 12 01 03

17.39 15.78 31.25 27.58 10 23.13 20 25.53 14.28 13.04

01 16 03 01 01 88

007 176 034 011 018 801

02 36 03 03 03 166

28.57 20.45 08.82 27.27 16.66 20.75

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Alborz Ardabil Bushehr Chaharmahal & Bakhtiari East Azerbaijan Fars Gilan Golestan Hamedan Hormozgan Ilam Isfahan Kerman Kermanshah Khuzestan Kohgiluyeh & Boyerahmad Kurdistan Luristan Markazi Mazandaran North Khorasan Qazvin Qom Razavi Khorasan Semnan Sistan & Baluchestan South Khorasan Tehran West Azerbaijan Yazd Zanjan Total

Note Compilation of sources. Due to transparency issues, those are estimated figures with reference to the 2016 election

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provincial level, and has an apportioned number of seats, depending on its population. According to Kamrava and Hassan-Yari (2004, p. 505), the assembly meets regularly on a weekly basis, and its main task is to elect the Supreme Leader and, if required, to remove him from office. Yet, they have never overtly resisted any of the decisions of the Supreme Leader and the minutes of the Assembly are deemed secret documents. The Assembly of Experts is a sort of incubator for all major political changes. 2. The Supreme Leader of Iran (Maq¯am mo’azzam rahbari) is the leader of the Islamic Revolution. He is the head of state, the highest ranked religious leader in the country, and appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts. Therefore, he cannot be removed from office in popular elections. Since 1989, this position has been given to the second and current Supreme Leader of Iran in office, Ali Khamenei. As the head of state, he is a prominent mujtahid that has reached the status of a Marja, a leading mujtahid practicing the religious obligations in accordance with the jurisprudential views. Axworthy (2017, p. 155) describes the Supreme Leader as ‘the ultimate authority of the state.’ According to Article 109, the Supreme Leader must be an Islamic scholar who is just, pious, brave, a genius in social and political matters, has common sense, foresight, administrative, and leadership features … as stated before, a sort of philosopher-king as posited by Plato. The Supreme Leader, chosen by the Assembly of Experts, stands as the supreme religious legal authority or source of emulation. According to Pike (n.d.), ‘the concept of a Marja-i Taqlid (literally source of emulation) is central to Usuli Shi’a Islam.’ This act of appointment by a select group of clerics is perceived as a sort of ‘revelation’ guided by divine will. Consequentially, the acceptance and the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader’s mandate to rule over the entire political system rests with the perception that it originates from God. Therefore, the Supreme Leader receives a divine mandate because the appointment is made by the Assembly of (Clerical) Experts (on behalf of God), and he is one in the succession line of the twelve men from the progeny (or successors) of the Prophet. According to Mahmood (2006, p. 31) ‘The valiyy-ifaqih or the guardian jurisconsult 15 […] is drawn from among the 15 Also designated as the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Custodian of the Affairs of the Muslims of the world.

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guardian class of Ithna Ashari mujtahids (the Twelver theologianjurists). This guardian class claims to be the inheritor of the mantle of the twelve Imams of the Shiite community and the repository of their absolute authority in both spiritual and temporal matters.’ Iran’s political society today is the result of the fact that this ‘guardian class’ abandoned their traditional role exclusively limited to religious and charity matters. By the ‘force of circumstance’ (Mahmood, 2006, p. 31), they turned to become the heart of the political system and the driving force of society. As prescribed by Article 12, the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja’fari School of Shia religion. Article 13 recognizes Zoroastrians, Jewish, and Christian Iranians as minorities. That is why the Supreme Leader is regarded as the guardian and leader of Iranian society after the Prophet. In this line of reasoning, the Iranian theocratic political system is based on the deepest faith of Shia revelation, made visible through the chosen Marja, who possesses quasi-divine qualities. The Supreme Leader is thought to have divine knowledge, infallibility, and the right of intercession [for the people]. The Supreme Leader’s power (Article 110) puts him at the pinnacle of the Iranian political system (Article 113). However, despite the fact that Article 57 establishes the principle of division of powers between the three branches of the state, in Iran there is no separation of power, nor separation between religion and politics (Aykaç & Durgun, 2012, pp. 564–568). These facts legitimate the authority of the Supreme Leader to oversee the functioning of the Iranian political system, namely the power to veto parliamentary bills and appointments to key positions in the state structure, and the power of initiative to revise the theocratic constitution. In appointing the Guardian Council, the Head of Judiciary (Articles 61 and 110) and the key positions in the security apparatus, the Supreme Leader ensures the ultimate compliance with Islamic precepts, as prescribed by his divine duties, because he is thought to be closer to God. Provisions in Articles 56 and 57 reiterate that ‘absolute sovereignty over the world and human beings belongs to God [… and] the nation exercises this God-given right in ways that are specified in the following articles.’ That is why opposition to the Supreme Leader is considered to be a sort of challenge to God himself.

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3. The Guardian Council is a non-elected body vested with the authority to ensure guardianship of the principles of Islam. It is responsible for the interpretation of the Iranian Constitution. According to Article 91, this body is composed of 12 members, half of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the other half of whom are nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power and later approved by the Iranian Parliament. Of the twelve members, six are constitutional law experts and the other six experts of Islamic law. The Council, according to Article 99, not only scrutinizes all candidates of the elected Islamic Consultative Assembly, but also scrutinizes and often vetoes all the laws passed by the Majlis to ensure that they are in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic percepts (Articles 72, 94 and 96) and serves as the ‘constitutional court’ (Article 98). According to Iran Data (2020), ‘the Guardian Council has three constitutional mandates: (a) it has veto power over legislation passed by the parliament (Majles); (b) it supervises elections; and (c) it approves and disqualifies candidates seeking to run in local, parliamentary, presidential, and Assembly of Experts elections.’ Axworthy (2017, p. 155) refers to the bills and candidate veto processes as ‘brutal […] and ultimately controlled by the Supreme Leader.’ In sum, the Guardian Council is a non-elected body vested with powers to pre-select candidates, to veto bills passed by elected MPs, and to interpret the Constitution. Naini (2006) and William (2001) refer to this council as the force ‘hindering’ the democratization process in Iran. 4. The Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami or simply the Majlis) (Parliament) is unicameral and currently composed of 290 seats. It is directly elected by a qualified plurality vote and its members serve 4-year terms (Articles 62 and 63). Where the 290 parliamentary seats are concerned, 285 are directly elected by universal suffrage, and five seats are designated because they are reserved for the following minorities: Zoroastrians (1); Jews (1); Assyrian and Chaldean Christians (1); Armenian Christians in the north of the country (1); and Armenian Christians in the south of the country (1). Another important fact is the representation of women and youth. According to the Inter-parliamentary Union

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(2020),16 and in view of the global average of 25% women in parliaments worldwide, in the National Islamic Consultative Assembly, there are only 16 seats allocated to women (5.8%); there are no available statistics on youth. According to Articles 77 and 125, the Islamic Consultative Assembly approves all international treaties, agreements, and cabinet ministers nominated by the president (Article 87). It also has the power to impeach cabinet ministers and the president. According to Articles 89 and 110 (paragraph 10), presidential impeachment requires a qualified majority and the approval of the Supreme Leader. We cannot say that there are no political party structures, despite a 1995 law on political parties. According to the Iran Data Portal17 ‘There are a number of political parties prohibited to operate inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (the People’s Mojahedin of Iran) being one of the most prominent among them’ But the existing political parties (not referring to those outlawed or those in exile) are structures of a framed political debate, within the religious continuity. According to Nasseri et al. (2013), ‘within Iranian politics, a principlist (or fundamentalist) refers to the conservative supporters of the Supreme Leader and advocates for protecting the ideological “principles” of the Islamic Revolution’s early days.’ Mousavian (2012, p. 486) asserts, ‘The Principlists constitute the main right-wing/conservative political movement in Iran. They are more religiously oriented and more closely affiliated with the Qom-based clerical establishment than their moderate and reformist rivals.’ Iranian reformists are associated with the idea of a gradual transition to a system of more individual rights and better representation. Currently, the Principlists dominate the Assembly of Experts as well as the Guardian Council and the Judiciary. According to Alem (2011, pp. 32–33), ‘Iran has had a century long history of parliamentary elections. In 1906, Iran’s first Majlis was established with a combination of directly and indirectly elected representatives. Since 1980, the electoral law has undergone numerous

16 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www.ipu.org/parliament/IR. 17 Retrieved on 22 August 2020, from https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-parties.

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amendments. Today, the Majlis is a body consisting of 290 directly elected deputies [MP] who compete in a mix of single and multimember districts.’ Parliamentary elections are held every four years, according to the two-round voting system.18 In Iran, popular parliamentary representation is not proportional. Where presidential elections are concerned, voting is also based on a two-round system. It is a majority run-off system, in which an absolute majority is required for victory in the first round, with a run-off round if this does not occur. According to Alem (2011, p. 46), ‘Out-of-country voting is administered in Iranian consulates and embassies abroad. With the exception of the 2005 election, the outcomes of all presidential elections have been determined in the first round of voting ’ (Map 1). In relation to the election of the Assembly of Experts, Schmidt (2016) stresses that ‘Unlike in the Majlis, women and religious minorities, including non-Shiite Muslims, face de facto ineligibility to run for the assembly. Nine women applied for candidacy in the third assembly elections in 1998, and ten women applied in the fourth assembly elections in 2006. None received Guardian Council approval. The complete absence of religious minority candidates includes Sunnis, who make up fully 10 percent of Iran’s population.’ The Assembly of Experts electoral system uses a one-round, plurality electoral system. Under this system, the candidate who has secured the largest number of votes (not necessarily a majority) wins the election. In all three cases, the ‘Achilles heel’ of these electoral systems seems to be the fact that it is not governed by the constitution, but regulated by law. All candidates standing for all elections are scrutinized (pre-selected) by the Guardian Council according to Article 99. 5. The President is the second highest-ranking official in Iran and is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to

18 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/que stions/replies/981474880. According to Alem (2001, p. 33), the electoral system is based on a modified block vote system, as voters in multi-member districts have as many votes to cast as there are seats to fill. Candidates able to secure at least one-fourth of the votes cast in the first round are elected to the Majlis. Run-off elections are held in districts where one or more seats are left uncontested. The number of candidates who may run in the second round of elections is restricted to twice the number of seats to be filled in a single-member district (i.e. two) and one and a half times the number of seats to be filled in a multimember district. In run-off elections, candidates with the most votes win the contested seats.

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Map 1 p. 34)

Electoral seats allocation for the Parliament of Iran (Source Alem, 2011,

serve a 4-year term. The presidency is limited to 2 terms, according to Articles 113, 114, and 117. The candidates running for this position, after being selected by the Guardian Council, must be approved by the Supreme Leader, according to Article 110 (paragraph 9). The cabinet ministers are appointed by the President, but subject to the approval of the National Islamic Consultative Assembly (Article 133). The President chairs the Council of Ministers (Article 134) and as the head of the Supreme National Security Council, the President helps coordinate the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy directives. This component of the political system resembles broadly a mitigated presidential system, but the President of Iran is not the head of state (Article 113), and, therefore, presidential powers in foreign affairs and defense are limited. According to Article 122, the President of the Republic is responsible before the nation, the Supreme Leader and the Parliament. In this vein

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of reasoning, the President has especial responsibilities in relation to the national budget,administrative planning and employment (Article 126). 6. The Expediency Council was created in 1988 when stalemates between Parliament and the Council of Guardians proved intractable. When the Constitution was changed in 1989, the Council was integrated into the Constitution. The Expediency Council is a non-elected advisory body with the ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the elected body (Parliament) and non-elected body (Guardian Council). According to the Iran Data Portal (2020),19 it has two functions: first, it functions as an expert council advising the Supreme Leader in all policy areas; second, it may function as a legislative body in the following manner: after the Guardian Council (which screens all legislation with regard to its constitutionality and its congruence with Islamic law) has vetoed a piece of legislation, the parliament (Majles) may decide with a two-third majority to send the legislative draft to the Expediency Council. The veto power of the Guardian Council over legislation means that substantive political and economic reform—even if supported by the Majles—can be obstructed. Due to this, in 1989 Iran established a third legislative body, the Expediency Council, which is empowered to mediate between Parliament and the Guardian Council. With the power to overrule both bodies (Belal, 2016, p. 4), the Expediency Council further functions as a consultative body for the Supreme Leader with regard to the general policies. The Supreme Leader appoints its members, who are prominent religious, social, and political figures. 7. The Head of Judiciary—Another sharp difference from Western political systems is the fact that the Iranian judiciary is different from the traditional ministry of justice, since the country’s judiciary system is based on Shi’a Islamic law. Consequently, a senior cleric is required to be the head and, therefore, to be appointed directly by the Supreme Leader for a five-year term. The judiciary is presented as an independent power (Article 156) but according to Article 162, the Supreme Leader appoints the head of the judiciary, 19 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-institutions/ the-expediency-council.

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who in turn appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor. In addition, the head of judiciary and the public prosecutor must be scholars of jurisprudence and knowledgeable in judicial matters. Therefore, the judiciary branch of Iran’s government is largely controlled by the Supreme Leader because the head of judiciary nominates the minister of the justice to the Council of Ministers chaired by the President of the Republic. The head of judiciary also nominates the six non-clerical members of the Guardian Council, subject to the approval of the Iranian Parliament. Finally, the head of judiciary appoints key high-level bureaucrats responsible for judicial affairs. 8. National and Security Services—Iranian security services are probably the least transparent part of the state, and very few individuals really know their structure. Nevertheless, Iran is perhaps the only state in the world in which the executive power is not in full control of the armed forces and security services. According to Frontline (2019),20 though the president has nominal rule over the Supreme National Security Council and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, in practice the Supreme Leader dictates all matters of foreign and domestic security. The three major institutions are (1) The Supreme National Security Council; (2) Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); and the (3) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (a) According to Article 176, the Supreme National Security Council operates under the leadership of the President, and its duties are to preserve ‘the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty.’ Its members include the speaker of Parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the combined general staff of the armed forces; the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence; the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular military; and two representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader. All the legislation passed by the Supreme National Security Council must be approved by the Supreme Leader; (b) The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is one of the most inscrutable governmental bodies of the political system. As 20 Retrieved in August 2020, from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/tehran/inside/govt.html.

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the Supreme Leader is in charge of all matters of defense, security, and foreign policy, a special law prescribes that the head of the MOIS must be a cleric, which deepens the Supreme Leader’s influence. The appointment of the minister of intelligence and security and the minister of foreign affairs is based on the personal trust of the Supreme Leader in them; (c) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created in May 1979. It is charged with protecting the revolution and its achievements. They are an ‘army inside the army’ as the IRGC is separate and distinct from the ‘regular’ military. Despite having 200,000 fewer troops than the regular military, the Guards are considered the dominant military force in Iran and are behind many of the country’s key military operations. The Guards are also said to own or control several university laboratories, arms companies, and even a car manufacturer.21 9. The Governor-Generals—Currently, Iran is organized into 31 provinces (Table 1), each with a capital city and provincial authority—the provincial council and the governor-general. The provincial council is directly elected by the people, and the governor-general is appointed by the minister of the interior, subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers. Governor-generals report directly to the President, and they act as the direct representative of the centralized powers. The provinces are subdivided into counties, districts, and townships. The minister of the interior also appoints the county governors and the city mayors. At each level there is a council, and the Supreme Council of Provinces is formed from representatives of the provincial councils. The city councilmen are locally elected. Villages are administered by an elected village leader advised by elders. The entire structure is answerable directly or indirectly to the President. Table 2 summarizes the most important aspects of the nine key institutions in Iran’s political system, depicting the elected and the appointed institutions as well as the electoral methods and the terms of their mandate. 21 Retrieved in August 2020, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/706435 3.stm.

Supreme Leader

Guardian Council

2

3

12

Appointed by the Supreme Leader

Indirectly elected by the Assembly of Experts

6

823

Elected by 31 electoral circles. Represents different religious and political perspectives. Is vested with the power of selecting the next Supreme Leader, and it can remove the Supreme Leader. Meets weekly and the meeting minutes are secret. No women are represented The Supreme Leader is the head of state and the ultimate state authority because his mandate is a divine mandate. Elected by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader holds authority to appoint the head of armed forces, heads of major religious foundations, director of the national radio and television network, prayer leaders of city mosques, chief judge, members of the National Security Council, Chief Prosecutor, the 12 jurists of the Guardian Council. Has the power to remove President and runs foreign affairs and defense It is a non-elected body. It oversees the consistency of legislation with Islam and holds the power of veto. Also vets electoral candidates. It serves as the Constitutional Court of the state

Term Main Characteristics (yrs.)

One-round, 8 plurality—Simple majority system

Method

22 According to Iran Data Portal, this number may vary. More details at https://irandataportal.syr.edu/assembly-of-experts-ele ctions. 23 Unlimited number of terms. In practice this amounts to a life-long appointment.

Assembly of Experts

1

Elections 8822 1979, 1982, 1990, 1998, 2006, 2016 1 1979– 1989 1989-

Key Political Institutions in Iran

Institution/Members

Table 2

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President and Cabinet, except Minister of Justice

5

24 Limit of two consecutive terms.

Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament -Majles)

4

Institution/Members

1

1980, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

290 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Elections 4

424

Nonproportional modified block vote system and Two-round voting system

Two-round voting system

(continued)

Directly elected for a 4 year-term. Passes bills into law and oversees the government. Validates the appointment of the cabinet by the President. The Parliament is unicameral and currently composed of 290 seats, and is directly elected by qualified plurality vote. In the context of the 290 parliamentary seats, 285 are directly elected by universal suffrage and five seats are designated because they are reserved for the following minorities: Zoroastrians (1); Jews (1); Assyrian and Chaldean Christians (1); Armenian Christians in the north of the country (1) and Armenian Christians in the south of the country (1). In the National Islamic Consultative Assembly, there are only 16 seats allocated to women (5.8%) and no statistics on youth are available The president is not the Head of State. Elected by the direct vote of people, subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Appoints the Head of Cabinet and Government, the Head of Council of National Security. Selects all Vice-presidents, sends and receives foreign ambassadors and is Head of Council of Cultural Revolution. The president is primarily responsible for the national budget, state planning, and employment

Term Main Characteristics (yrs.)

Method

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Security Services

Governorgenerals

8

9

31

Appointed by the Interior Minister

N.D Appointed by the Supreme Leader

Appointed by the Supreme Leader

Head of Judiciary

7

1

Appointed by the Supreme Leader

39

Expediency Council

6

Method

Elections

(continued)

Institution/Members

Table 2

4

N.A

5

5

It is a non-elected body. It has two functions: first, it functions as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader in all policy areas; second, it may mediate between the Guardian Council and the Parliament The head of Judiciary is a non-elected cleric. It nominates the Minister of Justice and the 6 clerics for the Guardian Council The Supreme National Security Council operates under the leadership of the President. The Minister of Intelligence and Security is one of the most inscrutable clerics of the political system. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is charged with protecting the revolution and its achievements operating as an ideological ‘army inside the army.’ Non-elected body. Governor-generals report directly to the President and act as the direct representatives of the centralized powers

Term Main Characteristics (yrs.)

112 F. J. B. S. LEANDRO

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All the political power in terms of decision-making and the delivery of such decisions as well as the power to transform the system rests with the first three bodies: the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader, and the Guardian Council. All the remaining institutions operate under the framework of these three, as a sort of apparent hybridization between the representation of the will of the people and the representation of the interpreters of the divine commands.

5

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to shed light on the political consequences of refuting secularism in building a political system, dominated by theological beliefs and a hegemonic clergy. We argue that the political system of Iran presents an apparent theocratic hybridization, which is designed to combine democratic and religious representation. Why do we regard the Iranian political system as an apparent theocratic hybridization? Consequently, which are the outlays of the clerical hegemonic hybridization? Iran rejects dogmatic secularism. Iran refuses to import Westernized political models, and it discards natural structures of representation. The theocratic hybridization of the Iranian political system appears to convey a combination of political bodies dominated by citizen representation whose purpose is to emulate democratic representation, and political institutions dominated by clergy who exercise theocratic representation. The hybridization is an apparent apparatus of a balanced political power allocation, but it is biased. A careful observation of the unipolar macro structure of the nine key political institutions of Iran reveals a system completely dominated by a kind of theocratic and dogmatic contractualism, where the democratic representation is pre-scrutinized by clergy, based on the need to ensure the observation of a higher law—the law of the divine commands of the Prophet. Given that the Guardian Council pre-selects all citizens exercising their electoral active capacity for all positions in the political apparatus and together with the fact that it operates as a constitutional court, the system is bestowed with a complete dominance of religious (Shia) revelation over reason, which therefore confers the character of a hegemonic clergy, not a real hybridization. In addition, the role of the Head of Judiciary in conjunction with the Council of Experts gives the Supreme Leader a unipolar undisputable dominance over the

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entire political system. Iranian contractualism is a particular form of theocratic contractualism, in which the velayat-e faqih principle is accepted as an instrument reconciling reason and revelation. Moreover, the political incorporation of the velayat-e faqih principle has cultural, historic, and social grounds, which cannot be overlooked or minimized. Several outlays of this theocratic contractualism can be identified. There are several problematic aspects about such theocratic contractualism. Firstly, it legitimates autocratic regime identity, functioning as a self-protective apparatus, which serves as a mechanism to forge unity and, at the same time, as a shield against foreign interference, particularly against American interference. Secondly, theocratic contractualism transforms the regular parliamentary political struggle, into an ordinary, inconsequential human mechanism, while at the same time ensuring that the semi-divine leadership remains indisputable. Thirdly, theocratic contractualism operates in a closed circuit because it self-controls and corrects all possible deviations, according to the vision of a unitarian leadership. The future constitutional adaptations or transformations are also tightly controlled within the same theocratic framework. Fourthly, in the Iranian political system, the apparent hybridization misrepresents popular sovereignty as conceptualized by classic contractualists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Alexis de Tocqueville because this sort of secular contractualism is based on a combination of individual free will and reason. In contrast, Iran’s theocratic contractualism is dogmatic, undisputable, and subject to a single and unquestionable interpretation of what is good. As prescribed by Article 2 of the Iranian Constitution, ‘the Islamic Republic is a system based on the faith in […] divine inspiration and its foundational role in the articulation of laws.’ Fifthly, Iranian foreign affairs, as laid out by the constitutional Article 3 (state goals) declares that ‘the foreign policy of the country [is] on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world.’ This is probably a tough division between Iran and the Western world. Finally, perhaps the most controversial aspect of Iranian theocratic contractualism is the fact that in the eyes of the Western world divine (Shia) revelation and reason are irreconcilable. The Western world struggles with the unconventional solutions adopted by the Iranian political system—not only to make sense of it, but to establish meaningful relations within the space infused with a theological understanding of the world. The Iranian Constitution once again underlines categorically in

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(Article 56: ‘Absolute sovereignty over the world and human beings belongs to God.)’ In Western contractualism, every law is a contract between the ruler and the people. In Iranian theocratic contractualism, every law is a human interpretation of God’s command to the people.

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2020, from https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2015/12/12/mis understanding-iran-the-wests-false-narratives-about-the-islamic-republic/. Kamrava, M., & Hassan-Yari, H. (2004). Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System. The Muslim World, 95, 495–524. Retrieved in July 2020, from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2004. 00071.x. Khomeini (2015). Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. Retrieved in August 2020 from: https://books.google.com/books/about/Islamic_Government.html? id=od87jwEACAAJ&source=kp_cover. Kurun, Ismail (2017). Iranian Political System: “Mullocracy?”. Journal of Management and Economics Research, 15 (1). Mahmood, M. (2006). The Political System of the Republic of Iran. Kalpaz Publications, Delhi. Mousavian, Seyed Hossein (2012). The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir. Brookings Institution Press. Naini, M. (2006). Iran’s Second Chamber? The Guardian Council. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(2), 198–222. Nasseri, Ladane, Foroohar, Kambiz, Salehi, Yeganeh (2013, June 16). Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope. Bloomberg. Retrieved on 17 August 2020, from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201306-15/rohani-clinches-iran-presidency-in-surprise-victory. Pike, John (n.d). Twelvers / Ithna Ashari Islamic Schools of Thought. Retrieved in August 2020, from: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islamithna-ashari2.htm. Rawls, John (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Sabet, Tarzan (2016). Why Iran’s Assembly of Experts Election Is the Real Race to Be Watching. Washington Post. Retrieved on 17 August 2020, from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318122928_Why_ Iran%27s_Assembly_of_Experts_Election_is_the_Real_Race_to_be_Watching. Schmidt, Patrick (2016). Understanding Iran’s Assembly of Experts Vote, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved on 22 August 2020, from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assembly-test. Skaaning, S. (2006). Political Regimes and Their Changes: A Conceptual Framework. CDDRL Working Papers, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 55, p. 15. William, S. A. (2001). Iran’s Guardians Council as an Obtacle to Democracy. The Middle East Journal, 55(4), 643–662. Witmer, Scott (2013). Political Systems, Ethics of Politics. Raintree. Wright, Teresa (2015). Party and State in Post-Mao China. Polity Press, Malden, Cambridge.

Beating the (White) House: How a “Rogue” Iran Broke Free from the “Axis of Evil” and Became an Antifragile State Bruno Reynaud de Sousa

1

Framing the Issue: Iran and the JCPOA

On 14 July 2015, the Peoples Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (U.S.), supported by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, reached an agreement on a treaty encompassing a set of key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)1 to be implemented in accordance with several determinations (Alcaro, 2018). This historical moment contributed to influence perceptions regarding Iran in a positive way for the first time in many years. However, the positive dynamic that followed did not last. In 2018, references to Iran being a “rogue State” re-emerged pursuant to U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s determination to reinstate all bilateral sanctions—the first of which date back to the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA)—previously suspended pursuant to the JCPOA, deciding

B. R. de Sousa (B) Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] 1 JCPOA (2015) and European Union (2015).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_5

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additional and harsher sanctions. This decision was based on the argument that Iran was not fully complying with obligations assumed under the JCPOA, contradicting eleven reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published from January 2016 to February 2018 that confirmed that Iran was in full compliance.2 Surprisingly, only in mid-2019 did the IAEA report that “[…] Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile [had] exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235” (IAEA, 2019a, §3) and secondly that “[…] Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP” (IAEA, 2019b, §2), thus confirming the material breach by Iran of the obligations deriving from the JCPOA. Previously, in May 2019, President Hassan Rouhani had stated that “in implementation of its rights set forth in Paragraph 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran has issued an order to stop some of Iran’s measures under the JCPOA from today” (Islamic Republic of Iran, 2019)—specifically, Paragraph 26 refers to Iran’s right to interpret new sanctions as grounds to partially or totally cease compliance with the obligations deriving from the JCPOA. Soon after these developments, the United States set in motion one of the most puzzling policy decisions of the past decades with respect to Iran. Acting under the direction of President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. government undertook to “designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Quds Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (United States of America, 2019) marking the first time that U.S. legislation targeting non-state actors engaged in terrorism was applied to an entity part of another State. The effects of this decision were amplified by recalling a foreign policy discourse dating back to 2002. Specifically, official U.S. statements underlined “the reality that Iran is not only a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft (…) directing and implementing its global terrorist campaign” (United States of America, 2019). In January 2020, this discourse was echoed in the statements of the Department of Defence (United States of America, 2020b) and the serving U.S. Secretary of State when justifying the extra-judicial killing of the IRGC Quds Force Commander, General Qassem Soleimani—a senior military officer who 2 See International Atomic Energy Agency (2016a, b, c, d, e, f, a, b, c, d, 2018), International Atomic Energy Agency (2016), and Agency (2016).

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was remarkably respected in the IRGC (Azizi, 2020) and, at the time of his death, the most popular military figure in Iran (Gallagher et al., 2019). Dramatically, the decision to strike was prompted by an alleged “imminent threat” (United States of America, 2020a) to U.S. national security, proof of which was never made available to the legislative branch of the U.S. Government. Shortly after, in a display of constitutional vitality, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favour of curtailing presidential war-making powers (Edmondson & Savage, 2020). Considering the past thirty years, naming, shaming and isolating specific States on the international scene appears as an intermittent component of U.S. foreign policy discourse, at times supplemented by the threat or the use of force. For example, even before the significant overtures vis-à-vis Iran during the eight years (2009–2017) of the Obama Administration (Ghazvinian, 2020), changes in U.S. policy had been proposed in the report by the Iraqi Study Group, namely “extensive and substantive” contacts with Iran (Iraq Study Group, Baker et al., 2006). Whereas the National Security Strategy of 2015 contains absolutely no reference to “backlash”, “pariah” or “rogue” States (United States of America, 2015)3 it is certainly worth noting that the use of this language was revived in U.S. foreign policy discourse during the Presidency of Donald J. Trump. Firstly, the United States National Security Strategy of 2017 refers to Iran in tandem with North Korea (United States of America, 2017)4 qualifying both States as “rogue” (United States of America, 2017).5 Secondly, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 further labels Iran and North Korea as “rogue” States (United States of America, 2018b)6 —in both instances reviving a concept dating from the early 2000s. In assessing the added value of qualifying Iran as a “rogue” State two dimensions should be considered. Firstly, the Iranian post-revolutionary regime is characterized by a unique political architecture where sovereign power has both a theological and a popular basis (Hourcade, 2016). Categorizing Iran as an autocratic regime constitutes an oversimplification that (a) disregards the complex internal power dynamics, and (b) ignores

3 Nonetheless, there are references to “fragile” States—see, op. cit., pp. 1, 4, 10, 11. 4 See, pp. 8, 25, 26, 45, 48. 5 See, pp. 25. 6 See, pp. 13.

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additional ideological, economic, political and cultural factors (Hourcade, 2016). This being said, Iranian foreign policy actions are mixed. On the one hand, it is widely accepted that Iran has developed a strategy of asymmetry—the inception of which is contemporary to the invasion by Iraq in 1980—characterized by different levels of support to non-State actors, thereby enabling them to undertake both actions in the context of armed conflict and acts of terrorism. On the other hand, Iran behaves as a rational actor taking part in the rules based international order, most recently playing a key role in the negotiations of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea—perhaps ending decades of perplexing legal uncertainty (Karataeva, 2020). Concluded in 2018 following twenty-two years of discussions, this treaty joins the five littoral states of the world’s largest enclosed sea—the Russian Federation, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan—representing an historic first step in view of the exploitation of the potentially vast oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea. One final point concerns State practice towards Iran in contemporary international relations. In essence, the approaches by other States— namely, U.S. NATO allies—stand in stark contrast with the U.S. foreign policy discourse regarding Iran: the most relevant policy documents authored by the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland—although specifically referring to Iran and/or North Korea— contain no mention whatsoever of the word “rogue” or any equivalent term with reference to Iran,7 Furthermore, no reference to “rogue” States is made in NATO’s Strategic Concepts of 1999 or 2010, and most recently no mention can be found in the document of the reflection group appointed in 2020 by the NATO Secretary General in connection with the “NATO 2030” initiative (NATO, 2020). In this context, it is not surprising that no such references can be found in the EU’s Global Strategy of 2016 (European Union, 2016). Overall, the question remains concerning the possibility of outlining which conceptual limits frame the notion of “rogue State”. On the one hand, a “rogue State” is a country that exhibits either a lack of respect, or a rejection for the norms and principles of International Law, tolerating, directing and/or supporting non-state actors engaged in terrorist activities—either based in its territory and/or in the territory of another 7 See France (2013), Italy (2015), United Kingdom (2015), Germany (2016), Spain (2017), France (2017), and Poland (2017).

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State—and that is unwilling or refuses to stop such activities (United States of America, 2006). On the other hand, a “rogue State” is also a country that is ideologically unaligned with liberal democracies and whose values clash with the values of Western civilization, therefore rejecting free and fair elections, a multiparty system and freedom of speech (United States of America, 2002a). Although, exhibiting only one of these characteristics may be sufficient for a country to be qualified as a “rogue” State, one additional element is part of the equation: a connection with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), namely nuclear weapons. The inherent fragility of this exercise is that certain national policy options might not be clearly incompatible with International Law. In this regard, one need only to point to the fact that currently there is no International Law rule establishing that respect for democracy, the rule of law or human rights is an essential requirement for statehood or admission to the UN.8

2 On Uncertainty: Iran, the United States and the Variations in Foreign Policy Discourse According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, language decisively influences the way in which reality is perceived. Interestingly, the use of the expression “rogue State” in foreign policy discourse dates back at least to the 1970s, at the time designating a small group of democracies—namely, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and South Korea—that exhibited a worrying inclination to acquire nuclear weapons (Litwak, 2000). In the 1980s, instead of referring to State behaviour on the international scene, references to “rogue” States rematerialized in view of describing the threat posed by the internal behaviour of some States with regard to their own nationals (Litwak, 2000).9 Accordingly, the conclusion may be drawn that by using this term the intention was to isolate any State characterized as “rogue”, with the unintended (or, intended) consequence of contributing to the erosion of the International Law principles of sovereign equality and of non-intervention (Litwak, 2000). 8 The settled criteria for statehood under current International Law are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other States—see, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1934) 165 LNTS 19, 28 AJIL Supp. 75. 9 On “pariah” States see Courmont (2007).

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In the following decade the term “rogue” was thenceforth included in U.S. foreign policy discourse and amplified in the framework of a strategy aimed at designating and isolating specific States on the international scene. In line with the conceptualization of the previous decade, the designation “rogue State” was used to express concern regarding WMD proliferation with reference to three States: North Korea, Iraq and Iran (Litwak, 2000). This discourse was amplified by the use of the designation “backlash States” with reference to Cuba, Libya, North Korea and Iran, who were further described as being “outlaw” States (Lake, 1994). Entering the twenty-first century, and in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, a conceptualization of certain countries as “pariah” States—most recently revived with reference to Saudi Arabia (Sanger, 2021)—was proposed in literature and framed as a phenomenon verifiable during the twentieth century, the examples of which were Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia in 1936 and Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in 1990 (Bederman, 2002). In parallel, other works authored in this period were attempting to conceptualize so-called “outlaw” States (Simpson, 2004). Although having already been named a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran gained renewed centrality in U.S. foreign policy discourse in 2002 following its inclusion in the so-called “axis of evil” (United States of America, 2002b). Further designating Iraq and North Korea as members, the existence of an “axis of evil” in international relations was one of the main messages of the State of the Union speech by President George Bush (43rd President of the United States) that year.10 References to “rogue” States then became part of a wider U.S. foreign policy discourse arguing in favour of a more flexible interpretation of the UN Charter regarding the limits on the use of force. Previously, the preventive use of force had been supported by President William J. Clinton, especially following the terrorist attacks against the United States’ embassies in Kenya and Tanzania—an understanding in

10 “North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens (…) Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom (…) Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror (…) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger” (United States of America, 2002b).

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line with the vision previously held by President George H. W. Bush (41st President of the United States) (Reisman, 2003). In the wake of the events of September of 2001, the Bush Administration (43rd President of the United States) adopted a reactive posture strongly linked to the nature and perception of threats to U.S. national security based on a narrative attributing centrality to the risk of inaction (United States of America, 2002a). Thenceforth, decisions concerning the use of force would rest on the premise that (a) inaction by the UN Security Council would—in certain cases—pose a very high risk to U.S. interests, and (b) that article 51 of the UN Charter was ill adjusted to the existence of new types of threats to U.S. national security (Benvenisti, 2004; United States of America, 2002a; Wedgwood, 2000)—in essence, a low threshold of probability was the main criteria to assess the legitimacy to use force in self-defence when facing up to threats by so-called “rogue States”. Between 2001 and 2009, during the tenure of President George Bush (43rd President of the United States), the “rogue State” narrative gained prominence in key U.S. foreign policy documents. This was in line with the attempts to reconceptualize the right of self-defence in International Law by expanding it well beyond the limits of Article 51 of the UN Charter11 in view of legitimizing unilateral preventive uses of force (Franck, 2003). Namely, the National Security Strategy of 2002 made specific reference to the need of adapting “the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries (…) even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (United States of America, 2002a, p. 15). In similar terms, the National Security Strategy of 2006 referred to certain States as “rogues” in connection with WMD proliferation (United States of America, 2006, pp. 12, 18–21, 29– 30) designating Iran as a “tyrannical regime” (United States of America, 2006, p. 43) along with North Korea, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma and Zimbabwe (United States of America, 2006, pp. 3–4).

11 “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the interna-

tional community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively […] We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries (…) even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (United States of America, 2002a, pp. 6, 15).

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In wider terms, juxtaposing the “rogue State” narrative to U.S. foreign policy towards Iran during the past thirty years, there were a few decisions expressing abrupt shifts in strategy. For example, in 1991, the United States accepted Iranian support during the Gulf War, despite Iran’s support for non-state actors in the Middle East already being a reality. A decade later, during the tenure of President Mohammed Khatami, Iran undertook to support United States’ operations in Afghanistan bringing about interesting diplomatic contacts (Brzezinski et al., 2008). However, it was precisely in this context that President George Bush (43rd President of the United States) designated Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in his famous speech of 29 January 2002 (United States of America, 2002b). In 2003, however, Iran launched diplomatic overtures towards the United States following the toppling of Saddam Hussein (Brzezinski et al., 2008). Conversely, juxtaposing the above to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s engagement with the international community, at least two types of foreign policy stance are identifiable, also linked with the issue of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, a more balanced approach with the international community was the case between 1989 and 1997 during the mandate of President Hashémi Rafsanjani. This openness has largely been echoed by President Hassan Rohani since 2013 (Akbarzadeh & Conduit, 2016). On the other hand, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad evidently practiced a more unbalanced approach vis-à-vis the international community, whether by refusing to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions demanding a termination of uranium enrichment, or by provocation at different levels such as convening an international conference on the Holocaust. In truth, in the years preceding the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a negative rhetoric towards the United States was already prevalent in Iran and echoed in society. Although not entirely comparable, one may look at the “Great Satan” description of the United States, coupled with the historically popular slogan “death to America” (Abedin, 2019) as partial justification for the “rogue State” and “axis of evil” U.S. discourse starting in 2002. In this context, the inclusion in 2007 of the IRGC Quds Force in the list of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” by the U.S. House of Representatives (United States of America, 2007) may be said to have reinforced perceptions of Iran as a “rogue State”. Interestingly, nowadays the “Great Satan” rhetoric seems to have subsided, especially since the Iranian presidential elections of 2013 when all candidates showed an openness to normalizing relations with the West

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(Le Monde, 2017)—conversely, popular openness towards the U.S. is still very low (Gallagher et al., 2019). Furthermore, although in the past there was a very strong narrative concerned with western cultural aggression (Siavoshi, 1997) in recent years Iran sees signs of tolerance regarding western forms of cultural expression (Le Monde, 2017). Against this backdrop, the foreign policy ebb and flow beginning in 2015 is extraordinary. Different authors converge on the point that during the transformative post-revolutionary period one central player emerged in Iran: the military (Ostovar, 2016; Abedin, 2019; Alfoneh, 2019; Bajoghli, 2019). Although not ignoring the distressing consequences of the asymmetric warfare strategy that Iran seems to excel at, it is increasingly difficult to deny the crucial role the Iranian military—especially the IRGC—has played in (a) ensuring the survival of the post-revolutionary regime, and (b) transforming post-revolutionary Iran into a State that increasingly exhibits an ability to harness different types of external shocks for national enhancement, consolidation and unity. This unique characteristic “beyond resilience or robustness” (Taleb, 2012, p. 4) that was first conceptualized by Nassim Taleb (2012), is called antifragility (Taleb, 2012).

3 Crossing the Rubicon: The Military in Post-Revolution Iran and the Dawn of Antifragility Regionally, concerning the way societies relate to the armed forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran stands out vis-à-vis the Gulf monarchies. Largely, this may be explained by the role the military has achieved in Iranian society and the fact that military service in the IRGC is mandatory for every male citizen (Alfoneh, 2019): adding to the more than six-hundred thousand men and women in uniform overall (IISS, 2020), there are thousands of military veterans that, following the 1980–1988 war, either transitioned to the public sector, or to the bonyads (Charitable Trusts or Economic Foundations), or to the wider private sector with state support (Hourcade, 2016). Moreover, the role played by the military in Iran has for decades been amplified by the Basij, especially with reference to Iranian youth (Golkar, 2015).

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The present chapter proposes that by leveraging the military’s resilient standing, the post-revolutionary regime in Iran has perfected the deployment of a variable geometry strategy combining ideology, ingenuity and asymmetry. Fascinatingly, the State is able to harness the impacts of foreign policy measures adopted against it, leveraging them towards either a strengthening of national unity and/or a strengthening of the regime’s hardliners. Most recently, Iran’s antifragility was revealed with reference to the United States so-called “maximum pressure” of 2019—a strategy destined to fail for the reasons described by Richard Nephew in his analysis of U.S. Iranian sanctions’ policy prior to the JCPOA (Nephew, 2018). As U.S. bilateral sanctions intensified, significantly impacting trade relations with the EU, Germany’s foreign minister Heiko Mass called for alternatives to conduct trade as international bank transfers were severely conditioned due to U.S. government pressure on the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) (Harper, 2018)—bringing to mind the spirit of European Council Regulation No. 2271/96 of 22 November 1996. Furthermore, in the framework of the fight against the pandemic caused by the Sars-Cov-2 virus—as Iran’s ability to access internal markets continued to be severely conditioned—the EU granted 20 million euros in humanitarian aid to Iran (European Union, 2020) and in January 2021 reaffirmed the commitment to preserving the JCPOA, although expressing concern following reports by the IAEA pointing to the initiation of uranium enrichment to up to 20%12 at the underground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (European Union, 2021). Remarkably and undeniably, Iran underwent a highly transformative experience following the events of 1979 and the war of 1980–1988. For the past decade, the post-revolutionary regime has demonstrated an increasing ability to position itself in the circumstance where it is able to leverage policy decisions precisely aimed at coercing, conditioning and containing the State—in a word antifragility (Taleb, 2012). The Iranian 1979 revolution can be seen as an example of a how Islam can be mobilized towards liberation from perceived forms of foreign influence where society mobilized irrespective of class divide for fundamental 12 Percentages close to 20% qualify as high-assay low-enriched uranium, useful for certain special power reactors. For comparison, weapons-grade uranium has a content of at least 90% Uranium-235. See Hippel et al. (2019).

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political change. In a way one could say that the “Arab springs” of 2011 are an echo of such a dynamic, namely when considering what happened in Egypt (Malouf, 2019). However, while these popular movements have all faltered—with the exception of Tunisia—post-revolutionary Iran has endured for the past four decades. The Islamic Republic of Iran thus appears to have arrived at a circumstance whereby broadly the tendency is “to gain from (a) volatility, (b) randomness, (c) errors, (d) uncertainty, (e) stressors, (f) time” (Taleb, 2012, p. 427). In essence, Iran has achieved the antifragility status through a national whole-of-society strategy that (a) is personified in the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, and (b) employs an antifragility toolbox in a variable geometry composed of three elements: ideology, ingenuity and asymmetry. As discussed below, this constitutes the main reason why predictions of “the demise of the mullahs ” (Rajavi, 2019) have failed to materialize for the past decades. 3.1

Ideology: Harnessing Revolution and Conflict Towards Antifragility

The national defense of Iran restson a “two-pillar” structure that dates back to 1979, namely (a) ensuring territorial defense, and (b) safeguarding of the post-revolutionary regime (Ostovar, 2016). The first and oldest pillar is an attribution of the regular armed forces (the Artesh, or Artesh jomhuri-e eslâmi-e irân, in full) that were reformed by Reza Khan Pahlavi following the coup of 15 December 1925, whereby the new Shah rose to power ending the Qajar dynasty’s rule dating back to 1794. The second pillar is an attribution of the “Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”, a literary translation of the organization’s name in Persian (sepah-e pasdaran-e enqelab-e eslami) (Ostovar, 2016, p. xiii), frequently referenced in literature as the Guards of the Revolution or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Seliktar & Rezaei, 2020) (henceforth, IRGC). When the IRGC came into legal existence it was essentially an assortment of pro-revolutionary militias that had no military training or combat experience (Ostovar, 2016). Originally created by the April 22 1979 decree of Imam Khomeini, the IRGC has a complex past, having metamorphosed from “undisciplined armed groups” to an “omnipresent” entity in Iran (Alfoneh, 2019, p. 6). As fate would have it, the war of 1980–1988 projected the IRGC to the fore given that the Artesh emerged from the Islamic revolution largely

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deprived of soldiers, seasoned officers and even some equipment (Razoux & Elliott, 2015). The war that began in the wake of Iraq’s invasion was a catalyst for the consolidation of post-revolutionary Iran, in essence laying the foundations for Iran’s antifragility. Firstly, it forced the regime to defend itself at a time when the revolutionaries had little or no combat training or experience, propelling the militias to the front lines against the armed forces of Iraq (Razoux & Elliott, 2015). In turn, this circumstance greatly influenced the ideological component that is perhaps most present in the mindset of the IRGC because in practice it led to a strengthening of a nexus between a religious element and a nationalist element. Secondly, Iran leveraged the Shia community in Lebanon effectively, leading to the creation of Hezbollah in 1982—thereby expanding the conflict—as part of a strategy aimed at affecting support for Iraq (Ostovar, 2016)—a first demonstration of assymetry. Different authors support the idea that the role of the revolutionary militias—the backbone of the IRGC—was absolutely essential in ensuring the early survival of post-revolutionary Iran (Karsh, 2002) proving very important to achieve military success in the 1980–1988 war (Ostovar, 2016). In part due to the post-revolutionary context, the regular armed forces were incapable of sustaining operations against Iraqi forces, namely in the South of the country (Ostovar, 2016). Therefore, the role played by the highly devoted paramilitary forces was crucial, as dramatically exemplified by the Basij’s “boy soldiers” (Karsh, 2002, p. 62). The units of the recently formed IRGC were essential in supplementing the regular army’s efforts initially employing asymmetric tactics due to the limited capabilities available (Ostovar, 2016). In closing, it is worth noting that overall popular support for the IRGC is high, having risen following the U.S. decision to apply “maximum pressure” to Iran (Kahalzadeh, 2021). The most recent data shows that Iranian society perceives the Guards of the Revolution as giving a decisive contribution to Iran’s current circumstance of antifragility: four in five Iranians support IRGC activities in the Middle East and seven in ten Iranians support increased IRGC involvement in the economy (Gallagher et al., 2019).

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Ingenuity: Fighting Obsolescence with Specialization

Ingenuity appears to be the answer to a noticeable contradiction: Iran has a “sizeable defence sector”, the country is currently “incapable of meeting the armed forces’ need for modern weapons systems” (IISS, 2017, p. 376). In essence, Iran’s armed forces are under increasing pressure to address a double challenge regarding capabilities: (a) maintain existing capabilities; and, (b) endeavor to develop new capabilities, mainly for territorial defense. On the one hand, there are reports that the Aerospace Industries Organization of Iran had initiated an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programme developing the Shahed 129 platform (IISS, 2018). In addition, despite the bilateral and multilateral sanctions in place, there are reports of defence-related exports to Venezuela (IISS, 2018). On the other hand, the regular armed forces are characterized by ageing military hardware. For example, although Iran has high number of main battle tanks—ca. 1500 tanks, second only to Egypt’s ca. 2400 in the region—the large majority is outdated (IISS, 2019). Furthermore, Iranian military capabilities reveal an uncommon composition regarding the manufacturers—namely, the United States, USSR/Russian Federation and European countries—therefore complicating all procurement. Taking as an example the main battle tanks, the Iranian Army (Artesh) operates the U.S.-made M47/M48 and M60A1, along with the USSR-made T72 tank and also the British-made Chieftain Mk3/Mk5 (IISS, 2020). Another example is the status of Iran’s Air Force: reportedly being composed by a 312-strong tactical combat aircraft fleet (IISS, 2019) these are ageing aircraft deprived of regular maintenance such as the MiG29A/MiG-29UB Fulcrum, the Su-25 K Frogfoot A and the Su-24MK Fencer D (IISS, 2020). Astonishingly, Iran is the only country in the world still flying the U.S.-made F-14 Tomcat aircraft, two of which were recently photographed in operation at the Persian Gulf Air Show 2018 (Bruijn, 2019). Capabilities aside, the Iranian military is impressive in the Middle Eastern context in terms of the number of personnel in uniform, not only in the regular armed forces but also in the IRGC. The Islamic Republic’s 610’000-strong armed forces are the largest in the Middle East by number of active military personnel, of which 190’000 are in the IRGC and 40’000 are in the paramilitary forces (IISS, 2020). However, a main

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question for the future relates to the military’s decreasing combat experience: seasoned officers in the Artesh have their experience limited to the 1980–1988 war (IISS, 2020). In this context, ingenuity became an important component of Iran’s antifragility toolbox, the most striking example of which are the defence sector’s advances in the field of missile technology. For the past ten years, Iran’s air defences have been improving at pace (Taremi, 2005). In 2008, Iran test fired the Sajjil, a medium-range ballistic missile using solid-fuel, thereby enabling a faster launch time making it less vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes (IISS, 2010). In 2009, information was made public regarding the fielding of a missile with a range encompassing Israel and Saudi Arabia—the Shahab-3. Further attesting to Iranian ingenuity in the field of missile technology, the U.S. reportedly led efforts to “construct an integrated air- and missile-defence architecture in the Gulf” (IISS, 2014, p. 301). Most extraordinarily, Iran has managed to advance a space programme in part by leveraging developments in missile defence technology. For example, the Shahab-3 missile actually formed part of “the first stage of the two-stage rocket Iran used to launch its first satellite into low-earth orbit in February 2009” (IISS, 2010, p. 239). However, the Iranian space programme has been plagued by extremely curious mishaps—the most spectacular of which was made public in social media by U.S. President Donald J. Trump in 2019—possibly attributable to the U.S. (Grunert, 2020). Overall, Iranian ingenuity is largely a response to a two-level arms embargo hindering the Iranian defence sector’s ability to fully address the modernization challenge. Further to an embargo specifically relating to its nuclear programme, Iran was placed under a blanket arms embargo as determined by UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) encompassing “[…] any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)”, as well as a large set of activities in connection with “the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel”. Unsurprisingly then, Iran reportedly sought to engage with the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation in connection with plans to modernize its air force

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and air defences, “further to the acquisition of naval- and land-weapon systems” (IISS, 2019). Interestingly, pursuant to the agreement of the JCPOA, a timeline was established by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) according to which these particular UN mandated sanctions were to be progressively disengaged. This scenario was further complicated by U.S. bilateral sanctions adopted under the so-called “maximum pressure” initiated by President Donald J. Trump in connection with the decision to abandon the JCPOA. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic has been able to maintain an advantage in the Middle East region, namely vis-à-vis the Gulf monarchies. Overall, Iran’s regional prominence in military terms may be said to have benefitted somewhat from the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has “failed to agree on a common strategic vision to guide the integration of military forces or establish a collective defence system capable of meeting the security requirements of member States” (IISS, 2014, p. 301). Formed in 1981, the GCC is a forum bringing together the monarchies of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, who collectively spend an estimated U.S.$130 billion each year on defence (Strategy&, 2017). Significantly, “demand for local defence products and services could grow to approximately $30 billion annually” (Strategy&, 2017, p. 3)—a trend signalled by the creation of the Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC) by the UAE in 2014. Against this backdrop, a final point should be made regarding Iran’s defence budget. Although total military expenditure data is complex to determine and largely based on estimations, Iran featured on the 2019 list of the world’s top ten defence spenders by share of GDP, spending above 4% of GDP (IISS, 2019). Previous data points to a trend whereby “Iran’s nominal defence spending rose from an estimated U.S.$15.9bn [in 2016] to U.S.$16bn in 2017, although this still meant a slight decline of 1.2% in real terms” (IISS, 2018), with an additional U.S.$609m authorized by Iran’s parliament in connection with the ballistic-missile programme (IISS, 2018). In this context, although procurement by the GCC countries has generally disregarded interoperability, integration, unified logistics, joint training and sustainment, or even collective combat effectiveness (IISS, 2012), any reversal of this context would certainly be consequential for

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Iran, posing additional—possibly unsurmountable—difficulties that no amount of ingenuity will be able to address. 3.3

Asymmetry: The Sine Qua Non Condition of Antifragility

Since its early days the Islamic Republic of Iran has counterbalanced disadvantages by developing the last component of the State’s antifragility toolbox—asymmetry—ranging from supporting non-state actors, to conducting operations in third States. Crucially, under the renewed foreign policy impulse of President Hassan Rohani (Akbarzadeh & Conduit, 2016), Iranian asymmetric tools increasingly involve a soft power instrument: the bonyads (Charitable Trusts or Economic Foundations). Regarding asymmetric warfare and tactics, the post-revolutionary Iranian regime has a proven track-record and decades of experience in the Middle East region dating back to 1982. Unquestionably, the IRGC-QF has prominence as the main element of Iran’s expeditionary capability and the main enabler in the pursuit of an asymmetric strategy within the territory of other States (IISS, 2018). Most recently,the IRGC’s Quds Force (IRGC-QF) has reportedly been providing material support to the rebel Houthi forces of Yemen (IISS, 2019). Specifically, Iran is said to have “provided support to the Houthi forces in Yemen […] further to the involvement in the Syrian conflict with lines of supply to and direction of Shia militias […] [having] deployed a 5000-strong (including 2000 IRGC) presence in Syria” (IISS, 2018). Cyberspace is a privileged domain for asymmetry that Iran is increasingly leveraging to strengthen its antifragility toolbox. The most interesting developments were the creation of (a) a “Cyber Defence Command” within the IRGC and (b) a “Joint Chiefs of Staff Cyber Command” in 2011/2012. Also, in 2012 the “Civil Defence Organization” announced plans to develop a cyber-defence strategy (IISS, 2014). Furthermore, in 2015, Iran’s Supreme Leader concluded appointments to the “Supreme Council for Cyberspace” a structure reportedly designed to be “a policy making and supervisory board” (IISS, 2017). These policy developments were most likely prompted by two wellknown operations that targeted Iran which were widely attributed to State actors (Buchanan, 2020). Starting in 2007, the use of the computer virus designated as Stuxnet targeted the Iranian nuclear programme causing significant malfunctions that later were linked to a coordinated foreign

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action (Ostovar, 2016). A second operation dating back to 2012 targeted Iran’s oil industry causing severe disruptions to the computers of the Iranian Oil Ministry on April 23rd and consequently hindering the extraction and commercialization of oil—an action attributed to the Unites States (Buchanan, 2020). With reference to Iranian actions in the cyber domain, research can be found stating that three cyber operations dating back to 2012 and to 2013 originated in Iran. In 2012, Iran reportedly launched its first major cyber operation with the deployment of a code designated Shamoon targeting the national oil company of Saudi Arabia—Aramco—causing serious disruption for at least five months (Buchanan, 2020). Subsequently, a more impactful cyber operation was launched, which was well underway at the time when U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta famously warned against a “cyber Pearl Harbour” (United States of America, 2012). Attackers identifying themselves as the “Cyber Fighters of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam” targeted the New York Stock Exchange and two U.S. banks (Bank of America and Chase Bank), causing a disruption that faded after January 2013 (Buchanan, 2020). Finally, in October 2013, a final cyber operation attributed to Iran targeted the Las Vegas Sands corporation (Buchanan, 2020)—at the time headed by Sheldon Adelson, the late casino entrepreneur. Intriguingly, these three operations did not achieve their maximum disruptive potential, instead apparently aiming to achieve short-term gains quickly (Buchanan, 2020). There were further reports in 2017 that Iran had been the point of origin of cyber-attacks targeting “the UK Parliament and companies in Saudi Arabia” (IISS, 2018). Although the “Iranian Cyber Army” is said to have claimed responsibility for disruptive cyber actions in the past, no definitive information exists regarding connections to Iran’s military (IISS, 2017). In this context, new facts came to light in 2018 that could potentially signal a shift in asymmetric tactics, assuming the attribution to Iranian state actors is proven to be accurate. In March 2018, the Justice Department of the United States formally accused nine Iranian nationals of conducting a massive cyber theft campaign between 2013 and 2017 on behalf of the IRGC (United States of America, 2018a). Surprisingly, to date this was the only event that warranted an official response by another State. With respect to asymmetry, one final point should be made regarding the bonyads (Charitable Trusts or Economic Foundations). Following

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President Hassan Rohani’s election in 2013 the external action of these traditional organizations has been amplified capitalizing on their “independence and pursuit of agendas different from the state [allowing] them to flexibly project soft power in ways the Iranian state cannot” (Jenkins, 2016, p. 169). In one example, a single bonyad, the Komiteh Emdad Imam Khomeini (IKRC), has reportedly “disbursed $11 million in aid in Palestine between 1995 and 2011, with a special campaign in 2012 after Israel’s (…) military operations in Gaza […]” but also to “Iraqi Displaced” in 1991 and 2003 to “the Displaced of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995)” and also to “Chechnya (…) Kosovo [and] (…) Azerbaijan” (Jenkins, 2016, p. 165). By enhancing the bonyads’ independent activities with official strategic communication through traditional media and social media, the Iranian regime appears to be actively developing its soft power in support of asymmetry deployed at other levels. Nonetheless, Iran has also been faced with setbacks hindering strategic communications, namely with reference to Press TV, the state-owned news network launched in 2007. Firstly, in 2012 the UK’s media regulator revoked Press TV’s license in a decision that would be followed by the progressive disappearance of the channel in other European countries. Most recently, in January 2020—just days after the extra-judicial killing of General Qassem Soleimani—Press TV’s London-based account on YouTube was officially shut down by the platform for violation of the terms of service.

4 Iranian Antifragility at a Crossroads: From Beating the House to Rewriting the Rules of the Game? In 2021, as Iranians celebrate Nowruz and the beginning of a new century, all around the world many are steadfastly waiting for the collapse of the Iranian post-revolutionary regime in a way increasingly resembling the cast of Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. In essence, the present chapter posits that “the demise of the mullahs ” (Rajavi, 2019) has become the most unexpected and undetermined event that has been expected to happen in the Middle East, and that somewhat inexplicably continues not to arrive. As this chapter posits, the reason for this non-event is simple: Iran has become an antifragile State.

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As international relations under a chaos paradigm increasingly resemble a game of roulette played amidst an earthquake, Iran’s strategic potential may be said to be unique following four decades throughout which it has consistently beat the house against all odds. In sum, the argument may be made that Iran currently exhibits a unique type of strategic potential beyond resilience that enables the postrevolutionary regime to strengthen from adversity at different levels: inserted in a region characterized by geopolitical chaos and under sanctions for more than a decade, encircled by threats and having the IRGC declared a foreign terrorist organization by the United States—still, the post-revolutionary regime stands. As discussed in the present chapter, the unique ability of Iran to deploy a variable geometry strategy composed of (a) ideology, (b) ingenuity and (c) asymmetry, enabled the post-revolutionary regime to adapt effectively to uncertainty at different levels, while sternly conditioned both multilaterally and bilaterally. U.S. foreign policy discourse and decisions greatly contributed to this outcome, especially since the year 2002. At first view, one could conclude that events taking place in the last decade signal that “the Iranian masses’ search for freedom continues” (Takeyh, 2021, p. 264). Nonetheless, considering national unity and what Stenner (2005) calls “normative threats” (Stenner, 2005, p. 17) thereto, Iran may have achieved a degree of antifragility enabling the regime to effectively leverage the external threats to Iranian societal “oneness and sameness” (Stenner, 2005, p. 17), thereby generating an unexpected degree of political stability and national cohesion. Far from being a “rogue State”, Iran gained the ability to leverage the pressures resulting from years of (a) international sanctions, (b) isolation in international relations and (c) regional instability. In large part due to the important role Iranian military institutions have played since 1979, post-revolutionary Iran underwent a transformative period during which the State developed an antifragility toolbox. The first component—ideology—was personified by the armed forces in the wake of the 1979 revolution, currently being present in the mindset of Iranian citizens (Gallagher et al., 2019). This characteristic was a decisive factor in the military success against Iraq in the 1980s and has prevailed until today. The second component—ingenuity—has been Iran’s answer to the inability to modernize its armed forces for many years. On the one hand, a sizable military (in personnel and equipment), extensive experience

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in asymmetric tactics, close contacts with regional non-state actors and capabilities in the field of missile technology seem to be key for Iran’s strategic potential. On the other hand, Iran faces a double challenge of modernizing its armed forces and acquiring new types of capabilities. Up to this point, the post-revolutionary regime has effectively countered obsolescence by supplementing ingenuity with asymmetry. With missile technology and the innovative use of UAVs and cyberspace tools being exceptions, Iran’s primary advantage rests with the IRGC and the continued use of the asymmetry—nowadays increasingly being deployed in the cyber domain and encompassing a growing strategic communications’ dimension. Nevertheless, two key questions remain: (a) what value will antifragility continue to add to Iran’s strategic potential and (b) how sustainable is Iran’s antifragility? Momentously, two developments have been taking shape. First, the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf for the United States has lessened. Second, Israel has undertaken to normalize relations with key monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. At present time, a Democratic White House—counting known experts on U.S.–Iran relations—and a Democratic majority in both houses of U.S. Congress, does not increase the probability of immediate policy decisions being taken vis-à-vis the existing status quo facing the incoming U.S. administration under President Joseph R. Biden. In this context, Iran may be expected to continue to leverage its antifragility with minor changes in strategy. However, Iran could be expected to recalibrate its foreign policy and regional engagements by adjusting the key component of the regime’s antifragility toolbox—asymmetry—in view of combining sharper soft power with a renewed approach to diplomacy. Overall, for the short- and medium-term, perhaps analytical value could be drawn from considering the geopolitics of Iran through the renewed lens of antifragility. Alternatively, there is always the option to stand the ground and—oblivious to the passing of time—keep waiting for Godot to arrive.

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The International Financial Institutions: An Ajar Door to the External Financing of Iran Enrique Martínez-Galán

1

Introduction

Iran is a regional superpower in the juncture of the Caucasus region, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent, and the Persian Gulf. With a population close to 83 million inhabitants, its infrastructure needs are vast. The upgrade and expansion of its infrastructure is key in increasing its growth potential, promoting job creation for a very young population, and decreasing poverty levels. Iran’s economy is led by the hydrocarbon, agriculture, and services sectors, as well as a noticeable state presence in manufacturing and financial services. Iran ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves. However, the rough relationship of Iran with its neighbors as well as with major superpowers, particularly the United States (U.S.) has led to several periods of international sanctions that have critically limited the access of the Iranian economy to the resources needed. While the Iranian economic base is relatively diversified for an oil-exporting country, the sanction-related constraints have particularly affected both the Iranian

E. Martínez-Galán (B) ISEG-Lisbon School of Economics and Management, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_6

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financial sector and the government revenues. On one hand, in the case of the financial sector, this is related to the limited access to international markets, including a basic absence of corresponding banks for international transfers. On the other hand, in the case of the government revenues, highly dependent on oil revenues, this is related to the limited and volatile exports of oil and gas. In a context of limited access to international markets and government revenues, the role to be potentially played by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is crucial. These institutions not only directly supply financing for project finance in infrastructure, but also provide technical assistance, knowledge products, and leverage co-financing. This formula ultimately increases the trust and credibility in the economy and brings along other non-IFI-related investment. In the case of Iran, we are referring to global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and those of the World Bank Group (WBG), but also regional multilateral development and investment banks, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), as well as development funds, namely, the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), subregional banks, namely, the Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank (ETDB). But in a classical gordian-knot, the access of Iran to these IFIs is also limited by the sanctions themselves. Despite these limitations, Iran has managed to have intermittent access to IFI finance, particularly from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) of the WBG and from the IDB. Although these erratic flows have prevented Iran benefitting from a structured and continued financing and from its associated knowledge and leveraging services, they have had an important contribution to local development in those projects that were financed. In this chapter, Sect. 2 will contextualize this discussion in the relevant literature. Section 3 will list and present Iran’s membership of IFIs. Section 4 dynamically assesses the historical access of Iran to IFI financing, quantifies these flows, and discusses the reasons why borrowing from each one of these institutions was constrained. Section 5 discusses the dynamics and potential of Iran’s access to IFI borrowing looking forward. Section 6 concludes.

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2

145

Literature Review

We will frame the discussion in the terms of financial statecraft (Steil and Litan, 2006) and smart power (Nye, 2009). Both co-exist under the theoretical framework of international relations provided by the Neoliberalism, and Neoliberalism Institutionalism, which defends that, in a context of anarchy within the international system, cooperation is promoted through international institutions, as they lower coordination costs, raise the cost of cheating, and diffuse information, as explained by Keohane (1984). We will apply these frameworks to the strategic policy followed by the U.S., as a major shareholder of the main global and regional IFIs worldwide, with regard to Iran. The U.S. is the largest shareholder of the institutions of the World Bank Group, so the pressure imposed on them by Washington DC to avoid financing to Iran when U.S. sanctions were in place is relevant. The U.S. has been historically very active in using the power of the U.S. dollar and the international role of its financial markets as anchors of the global financial system to put political pressure to Iran, as described by Steil and Litan (2006) under the term ‘financial statecraft’. This term includes bailouts of indebted foreign countries, capital flow guarantees and restrictions, dollarization, currency unions, and financial sanctions on non-state actors. These authors noted an increasing trend by the U.S. to seek to shape and influence international capital flows to further strengthen its foreign policy and national security goals. These officially include, according to the U.S., prevent money laundering, hinder the financing of terrorism, or inhibit the proliferation of nuclear and mass destructions weapons. Unofficially, also punishing non-compliant countries with the goals of the Administration in the White House (see the cases of Cuba or Venezuela). Treasury (2020) presents a full list of sanctions by the U.S. Treasury, which could be easily grouped in these four items. Through this financial statecraft, the U.S. has been seeking to make efficient use of both its hard and soft powers. On one hand, Nye (2011, p. 11) defines hard power as ‘the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies’. This is the ability to coerce, through threats and inducements (‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’). On the other hand, Nye (2004, p. 5) defines soft power is the ability to get ‘others to want the outcomes that you want’, and more particularly ‘the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’. While hard power is more effective and faster, it is also costlier than soft power. Also, in the context of an increasing number of global issues, a multilateral

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approach would be preferred in international relations and, therefore, soft power should be prioritized over hard power. Nye (2004, p. 10) affirms that ‘institutions can enhance a country’s soft power’, as they are likely to promote a country’s policies, both with other members and countries outside the institution. Nye (2005, p. 75) argues that U.S. multilateralism has been key to the longevity of its supremacy, as it has reduced incentives for emerging countervailing alliances. Later on, Nye (2008, p.107; 2009) proposed the term ‘smart power’, defined as ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively’.

3 Iran as a Shareholder of International Financial Institutions Iran is currently a member of four of the largest IFI operating in the Asian region, namely, in chronological order according to its accession, (i) the IMF (1945), (iii) four out of the five institutions of the WBG, namely, the IBRD (1945), International Finance Corporation (1956), International Development Association (1960) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (2003)1 ; (iii) the Islamic Development Bank (1989), (iv) the Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank (2005), and (v) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2017). Table 1 below lists the relevant details of Iran’s IFIs membership. We note that Iran is a founding member of the ECTB, IBRD, and IMF. Measured by its relative voting power, the weight of Iran in the governance is particularly high in the ECTB (30.6%) and Islamic Development Bank (8.4%). This higher weight will have positive consequences in the level of borrowing granted to Iran despite sanctions, as we will see in Sect. 3. Iran has been also requesting to become a shareholder of the Asian Development Bank, the largest multilateral development bank operating in the region of Asia and the Pacific. Being a member of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2020), Iran is eligible to become a member of the ADB. Being classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank (World Bank, 2020), Iran would be eligible to borrow from the ADB.

1 Iran is not a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

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Table 1 Iran’s membership of International Financial Institutions (ordered in descendent voting power) International Financial Institution

Membership date

Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank Islamic Development Bank International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WBG) Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

3 August 2005a

Voting power (%) 30.6%

Total subscription U.S.D million (%)

Constituency

0.461 (30.6%)

Iran

22 February 1989

8.40%

6,027 (8.25%)

Iran

29 December 1945a

1.39%

3,496.3 (1.44%)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia

16 January 2017

1.0383%

15 December 2003

0.86%

International Monetary Fund

29 December 1945a

0.74%

International Development Association (WBG)

10 October 1960

0.4%

1,580.8 (1.6339%) Belarus, Kazakhstan, Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan 16.59 (0.94%) Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia 3,567.1b (0.75%) Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia n.a Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia

(continued)

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Table 1

(continued)

International Financial Institution

Membership date

International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation (WBG)

1977

28 December 1956

OPEC Fund for 1976 International Development

Voting power (%)

Total subscription U.S.D million (%)

Constituency

0.33

13.83

-

0.08%

11.01 (0.06%)

–

529.5 (15.7%)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia Iran

Source Authors based on IFI websites’ information retrieved on 15 December 2020. n.a. stands for not applicable. a means founding shareholding. b Millions of Special Drawing Rights instead of U.S. dollars

However, regular attempts by Iran to become a member of the ADB have fallen short of gathering enough support from current shareholders, with the U.S. in the frontline of the opposers. Teheran claimed already in 1992 that he had gathered enough support from the Bank’s shareholders to start membership (JoC, 1992). It would need, according to ADB’s Articles of Agreement, at least 2/3 of the shareholders representing at least 3/4 of the Bank’s voting power. However, ADB never observed this minimum support. It is interesting in this regard to remember that Teheran applied for hosting ADB headquarters during the initial negotiations of the Bank. At a meeting held in Manila in November 1965, 18 Asian prospective members voted the decide the location of the headquarters. Teheran ended third, after Tokyo and Manila, the winner (McCawley, 2017). Due to this fact, as well as to not have been able to secure the position of first ADB President for an Iranian national, Iran decided later not to proceed with ADB membership, despite having joined the group of 22 first signatories of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement on 4 December 1965, and did not participate in the Bank’s inaugural meeting in Tokyo on 24 November 1966.

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4 Iran as a Borrower of International Financial Institutions Iran is classified as an upper-middle-income economy, with a Gross National Income according to the Atlas method of U.S.D 5,300 in 2018 (World Bank 2020a). Therefore, it is eligible to obtain financing from International Financial Institutions. According to their charter and policies, Iran is eligible for borrowing from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the institutions of the World Bank Group. However, Iran’s borrowing has been significantly constrained by the United Nations (UN) sanctions. First sanctions on Iran were imposed bilaterally by the United States in 1979 and 1987. The first UN sanctions on Iran were approved in December 2006 (UNSC, 2006), after Tehran refused to halt its uranium enrichment program, and expanded in March 2007 (UNSC, 2007). The latter calls on ‘all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes’. This UNSC explicitly exempts humanitarian and development activities, as conducted by IFIs. IFIs complied with these sanctions and their internal control mechanisms reviewed all transactions and disbursements to monitor that these are compliant with those sanctions. However, IFIs have been very shy in financing project infrastructure and development activities in Iran. We will take a closer look at the approach followed by each IFI about these sanctions. Iran has historically obtained financing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group; the Islamic Development Bank; the Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank; and the OPEC Fund for International Development. Despite eligible, it has not borrowed from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund so far. Table 2 shows Iran’s historical financing (borrowing plus guarantees) from IFIs, per institution. Iran’s main source of IFI financing has clearly been the World Bank Group, and particularly the IBRD. The financing approved by the IBRD to Iran totaled almost U.S.D 3.5 billion, disaggregated in 50 projects. The first IBRD loan to Iran was approved on 22 January 1957. It was a

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Table 2 Iran’s historical project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per institution (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors) Institution International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WBG) Islamic Development Bank Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank International Finance Corporation (WBG) OPEC Fund for International Development Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank European Investment Bank International Fund for Agricultural Development International Monetary Fund Total

Borrowing (million U.S. dollars) 3,463.1 3,303.3 297.2 28.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7,092.1

Source Authors based on IFI websites’ information retrieved on 20 December 2020. WBG stands for World Bank Group

U.S.D 75 million project for economic management to support the country’s seven-year development plan. Since then, Iran continued borrowing regularly until 1974: U.S.D 1.21 billion cumulatively until that year, divided into 33 projects, and mainly in the financial sector, energy, and transport, with around 25% each. Since 1974, first due to the creation of the Islamic Development Bank in 1975 and later due to the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran stopped borrowing from the IBRD. Borrowing resumed only in 1991, for three years (almost U.S.D 850 million in 7 projects), and then again between 2000 and 2005 (almost 1.35 billion in 9 projects). During the first three years, from 1991 to 1993, the U.S. opposed the proposals at the IBRD Board of Directors, but its 16.5% of relative voting power were insufficient to prevent projects to be approved. In 1993, the U.S. managed to create a coalition of G-7 countries that opposed to any borrowing to Iran, so projects were not approved until 2000. In 18 May 2000, the G-7 coalition broke and lending to Iran was resumed when two projects totaling U.S.D 232 million, in health and water, were approved by the IBRD Board of Directors, with the opposition of the U.S. and the abstention of Canada and France. Reportedly, the other G-7 countries decided that further progress in dissuading Iran from continuing its nuclear program was possible through partial normalization

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of economic relations rather than through economic pressure (Weiss and Sandford, 2020). These authors also state however that ‘the United States has been successful behind the scenes to stop the disbursement or slow it down substantially’. The 16 projects approved from 1991 to 2005 were concentrated in water (50%) and earthquakes emergency support (30%) sectors. Since 2005, Iran had not requested financing to the IBRD. In 2007, the U.S. H.R. 1400, Iran Counter-Proliferation Act and S. 970, Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007 stated that the U.S. would cut future funding to the institutions of the World Bank Group (including its concessional window, the International Development Association) if any new financing was made available to Iran. These sanctions also affected disbursement requests received by the World Bank from Iran due to legacy projects. These were temporarily delayed in the fourth quarter of 2007 due to difficulties in executing through regular channels caused by the sanctions placed on most Iranian banks. Arrangements were put in place to find alternative payment channels. Additionally, the World Bank strengthened screening mechanisms to ensure that project disbursements are screened in advance to prevent proceeds being paid to sanctioned entities or individuals. This understanding and the compliance of the World Bank with the UNSC Resolution was confirmed in writing to the World Bank’s General Counsel by the UN Legal Counsel in September 2007. Regarding other institutions of the WBG, limited financing to Iran had been approved for the first time by the IFC (U.S.D 28 million invested in five projects between 2002 and 2005, including two U.S.D 10 million credit lines for working capital to Iranian Banks in 2004) and by the MIGA (a U.S.D 122.2 million guarantee for Japanese and Thai investors to invest in 2006 in a petrochemical company).2 The rationale for the U.S. position was that concept of fungibility (or the interchangeability of various financial assets), assuming that ‘if the IBRD lends money to Iran (…) its Government can use the money it would have otherwise spent on these activities to fund other activities, such as nuclear development

2 It was later issued in December 2015, representing MIGA’s first coverage issuance

in Iran. However, the guarantee was withdrawn on 7 August 2018. MIGA guarantees provide political risk insurance for foreign investment. MIGA does not provide or infuse cash. It is the insured party—the foreign company—that pays MIGA a premium for the guarantee, and it is to the insured party that MIGA would make payment in the event of a valid claim.

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or terrorist groups that Iran is known to sponsor’ (Weiss and Sandford, 2008). The Islamic Development Bank had approved by the end of 2019 more than 270 projects in Iran, totaling U.S.D 6.3 billion. This amount comprised project financing totaling $3.3 billion (trade financing and guarantees add U.S.D 3.0 billion and U.S.D 1.4 billion, respectively) (IDB, 2019). The bulk of project financing funds are concentrated in urban development and services (29%), water resources and environment (26%), and energy, IT and communications (21%). The IDB managed to have some projects when the sanctions were still in place, as referred by Motamedi (2017). According to this author, quoting its field representative in Iran, ‘based on IDB rules and regulations, we only recognize UN, Arab League and African sanctions, not unilateral sanctions of the U.S. or the EU’. IDB’s Vice-President Mansur Muhtar also referred that Saudi Arabia, which holds around one-quarter of the shares of the Bank, does not influence the approval of projects to Iran. The Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank has disbursed U.S.D 297.2 million since the beginning of its operations in 2008. This amount is not negligible, bearing in mind the relatively small size of this bank and its recent creation. The Bank was able to contribute mostly to the development of irrigation and wastewater management projects in Iran. Finally, the OPEC Fund for International Development, despite having as mission financing projects in non-oil exporters developing countries, recently approved in 2020 a U.S.D 500,000 to support fight to the COVID-19 pandemic. In recent years, a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA, 2015) was agreed with Iran on 14 July 2015 by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russian Federation, U.S., and United Kingdom) plus Germany to lift most of the sanctions in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear program for at least ten years. As a result, UN sanctions were lifted on 16 January 2016. However, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the JCPoA announced on 8 May 2018 (Landler, 2018) had also serious consequences for the capacity of IFIs to finance development projects in Iran. The U.S. sanctions applied not only to Iranian agents but also to third-country counterparts trading with Iran, including IFIs. The U.S. sanctions had a direct effect on the ability of the IFIs to operate with Iran, but the indirect effects were more important. The direct effect was that agents operating with Iran

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would not be able to operate in the U.S. This would not be very relevant for IFIs not operating in the U.S. market, such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or the European Investment Bank. However, the indirect effect of the sanctions had farreaching consequences. First, the agents operating with Iran would not be able to make transactions in U.S. dollars, as these transactions would not be authorized when going through the U.S. financial system for clearance. This effect had a critical impact in preventing IFIs from operating with Iran. Second, more importantly, the U.S. sanctions would apply not only to the agents operating with Iran but also to third-party stakeholders operating with those agents operating with Iran. This precisely prevented has the European Investment Bank to start financing projects in Iran, as requested by the European Commission. The latter announced on 17 May 2018 its decision (i) to declare the U.S. sanctions against Iran illegal in the European Union (EU), (ii) to ban European Union (EU) citizens and firms from complying with them, and (iii) to instruct the European Investment Bank to facilitate and support the investment of EU firms in Iran (European Commission 2018). However, the EIB rapidly concluded that it was incapable to circumvent the U.S. sanctions and, therefore, that it was impossible to invest in Iran without jeopardizing the Bank’s financial and business model. On 18 July 2018, EIB President publicly announced that ‘the EIB cannot do business in or with Iran’ (Rios, 2018). First, around onequarter of the Bank’s portfolio is or relies on U.S. dollars. Investing in Iran would prevent the Bank from operating in that currency and from having access to U.S. capital and financial market. More importantly, many stakeholders of the EIB with interests in the U.S. or a relevant portfolio in U.S. dollars would not risk doing business with the EIB. Finally, the decision of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on 21 February 2020 to place Iran in its blacklist for its deficiencies in implementing antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing controls (FATF, 2020) makes it challenging for the IFIs to act in or with Iran. As Belgium’s Foreign Minister Didier Reynders put it on 31 January 2019, ‘the U.S. pressures had made business with Iran too risky’ (Farda, 2019). These almost 14 years of inaction in Iran by the WBG were recently concluded on 26 May 2020, when IBRD’s Board of Directors approved a U.S.D 50 million emergency loan to Iran in support of the fight to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. But this was a special loan. It did not go directly into the Iranian Treasury, as the borrower, but

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it was transferred by the World Bank to the World Health Organization (WHO) to procure medical equipment for Iran’s Health Ministry (Shahla, 2020). The World Bank will therefore make direct payments to the WHO, with no funding channeled to the Government of Iran. This author also refers that ‘Iran had sought a U.S.D 5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund to tackle the virus outbreak’, but the U.S. Administration blocked the request. Financial Tribune (2020) referred besides that Iran also requested a $141 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank for buying medical equipment needed to fight the pandemic and that the OPEC Fund for International Development had approved an emergency grant of U.S.D 500,000 for the same purpose. In both cases, the financing is made available through the WHO. Financial Tribune (2020) adds that financing was also requested to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. A potential source of lending for Iran is the AIIB, particularly due to the absence of the U.S. from its membership and by the limitation of non-Asian shareholders to 25% of the Bank’s capital. However, it is worth noting that Israel and the Gulf Arab countries are also AIIB shareholders. Indeed, no financing has been approved so far in Iran and no project in the country has been included so far in the Bank’s official pipeline of proposed projects, despite AIIB President, Jin Liqun, having referred during an official visit of the Iranian Minister of Transport, Abbas Akhoundi, to AIIB headquarters in Beijing on 16 November 2016 that Mr. Liqun himself will take action to finance them once these are introduced and outlined to the bank (Financial Tribune, 2016). Iran showed interest during the visit to obtain financing for projects in aviation, railways, roads, and maritime industries. Figure 1 shows Iran’s historical financing from IFIs, per year. We note that (i) the main source of financing has intermittently been the IBRD, when allowed by UN sanctions, (ii) the sanctions imposed by the U.S. in 2006 and 2007 made the IBRD stop borrowing to Iran, (iii) the position of Iran’s main source of IFI financing has been gradually occupied by the IDB, which has been able to increase project finance approvals to Teheran until the record level of U.S.D 626 million reached in 2012; and (iv) after three years of zero approvals (2017–2019), motivated by the pressure exerted by the U.S. Administration under Donald Trump’s Presidency, limited lending has been resumed 2020, but exclusively related to the acquisition of medical equipment to support the mitigation of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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90,00,00,000 80,00,00,000 70,00,00,000 60,00,00,000 50,00,00,000 40,00,00,000 30,00,00,000 20,00,00,000 10,00,00,000 0

IBRD

IFC

OFID

IsDB

ETDB

Fig. 1 Iran’s historical project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per year (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors) (Source Authors based on IFI websites’ information retrieved on 20 December 2020)

5 Iran’s Borrowing from International Financial Institutions Looking Forward Ianchovichina et al. (2016) uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran, with average per capita welfare gains ranging from close to 3–6.5%. These authors also conclude that oil importers will be better off, due to the increase in oil supply in international markets. However, this chapter does not consider the impact in the long-term growth potential of Iran starting to borrow from IFIs with no limitations, catching-up on its infrastructure gap. It is not easy to estimate what would be that impact and we will not aim to do so in this chapter. Therefore, we will opt for producing four idealized scenarios about how the borrowing of Iran from IFIs could evolve. These are designed as (i) Scenario 1—No financing; (ii) Scenario 2— status quo enhanced; (iii) Scenario 3—regular financing; and (iv) Scenario 4—half-regular financing. Under Scenario 1, we assume that Iran continues with the uranium enrichment program and sanctions of the international community worsen to also include the Islamic Development Bank and the Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank.

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Under Scenario 2, we assume that the current levels of financing obtained by Iran from IFIs are broadly maintained, but also slightly enhanced to include some emergency financing, namely, COVID-19 pandemic-related in the short-run and natural disasters-related (such as earthquakes) in the medium- and long-term run. Under Scenario 3, we assume that (i) the sanctions imposed to Iran due to its uranium enrichment program disappear, (ii) Iran leaves the FATF blacklist of non-compliance with anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing, and (iii) lack of corresponding banks to transfer funds to Iran normalizes. Therefore, IFIs start lending at regular levels the Iranian economy, based on Iran’s Gross Domestic Product and population. For this scenario, we produce a very basic back-of-the-envelope estimate of what would be the amount borrowed by Iran from IFIs in 20233 if no constraints were imposed on the country’s access to these institutions by extrapolating it from the current borrowing observed in 2019 by other two neighboring regional powers, namely, Pakistan and Turkey. We chose these two countries as countries that arguably represent upper and lower limits for Iran’s development in terms of infrastructure needs, development stage, and development challenges. Turkey as upper-middle-income country and Pakistan as a lower-middle-income country. So we argue that an extrapolation of Iran’s importance on IFIs’ borrowing between Pakistan and Turkey could be accepted for an indicative back-of-the-envelope estimation. For this purpose, we first estimate the borrowing granted to these two countries by each IFI per million of inhabitants (World Bank, 2020b) and per million of its Gross Domestic Product (U.S.$ current prices) (World Bank, 2020c). We therefore apply those results to the population and the Gross Domestic Product of Iran, relatively (World Bank, 2020b, 2020c). We finally produce a weighted average of those results (with weights of 50% for population and 50% of Gross Domestic Product). This exercise is summarized in Eq. 1 below. We do not consider in this simulation the unlikely scenario that Iran becomes a member of the Asian Development Bank and, since we based our estimation in 2019 data, it does not include any financing that could be given

3 We choose 2023 by admitting that the approval by the Board of Directors of a given IFI of financing for a project needs that project to be prepared. Grosso modo, a given project takes around two years from the concept note to Board approval, so, if the concept note is prepared in 2021, the project will be expected to be approved by the Board of Directors in 2023.

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related to the COVID-19 pandemic. ⎡ ⎣

B O R R O W P AK n,i x B O R R O W T U Rn,i x

+ B O R R O W I R ANn,i =

 ⎤

P O P I R ANn P O P P AK n +  ⎦ P O P I R ANn P O P T U Rn

⎡

2  ⎤ ANn B O R R O W P AK n,i x GGDDPPIPRAK + n ⎣  ⎦ n B O R R O W T U Rn,i x GGDDPPITRUAN Rn 2

2

(1)

where BORROWIRAN represents the amount of financing obtained by Iran from IFIs; n represents a given year; i represents a given IFI; BORROWPAK represents the amount of financing obtained by Pakistan from IFIs; BORROWTUR represents the amount of financing obtained by Turkey from IFIs; POPIRAN represents the population of Iran; POPPAK represents the population of Pakistan; POPTUR represents the population of Turkey; GDPIRAN represents the Gross Domestic Product of Iran; GDPPAK represents the Gross Domestic Product of Pakistan; and GDPTUR represents the Gross Domestic Product of Turkey. Equation 1—Iran’s estimated annual project financing obtained in a year n from the International Financial Institution i (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors). Under Scenario 4, we plainly assume that, since the IFIs do not have the same first-hand long-standing knowledge of the Iranian economy as they do of the Pakistani and Turkish economies, they will take additional time to prepare initial projects, so by 2023 the IFIs would just have approved, on average, half of the regular level in the long-term. Table 3 shows the financing from each IFI to Iran estimated under each one of the four scenarios. We observe that, first, if sanctions would be toughened to include also emergency assistance, Iran’s economy would get no financing from IFIs, neither the knowledge nor the leveraged co-financing associated to that financing. Second, if sanctions would be enforced at the current level, i.e., allowing for limited financing for the support to the fight against the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and, analogously, for other natural or health disasters that could occur in Iran in 2023, we estimate that the Iranian economy would see the IFIs to approve U.S.D 180.5 million for project finance in Iran. The Islamic Development Bank would have a preponderant role in that borrowing among the IFIs operating in Iran. Third, if sanctions would

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Table 3 Iran’s estimated annual project financing obtained from International Financial Institutions, per institution in 2023 (million U.S. dollars, approved by the Board of Directors) Institution

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WBG) Islamic Development Bank International Monetary Fund Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank International Finance Corporation (WBG) OPEC Fund for International Development European Investment Bank Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank International Fund for Agricultural Development Total

Borrowing (million U.S. dollars) Scenario 1

Scenario 2 status quo

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0.0

50.0

1,954.0

977.0

0.0 0.0

130.0 0.0

815.6 502.5

407.8 251.3

0.0

0.0

294.7

147.3

0.0

0.0

87.3

43.6

0.0

0.5

86.4

43.2

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0

52.1 37.3

26.1 18.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

180.5

3.829.9

1,915.0

Source Authors based on IFI websites’ information retrieved on 20 December 2020 about approvals in Pakistan, Turkey. WBG stands for World Bank Group

cease to exist in 2021 and the borrowing obtained by Iran would be fully equivalent to the simple average of the population- and GDP-weighted average of the borrowing granted to Pakistan and Turkey in 2019 (the latest available in preparation of this chapter), we estimate that the IFIs would channel into the Iranian economy U.S.D 3,829.9 million in project finance in 2023. In such a situation, we estimate that the IBRD of the WBG would be a dominant role, representing nearly half of the total financing approved to Iran. However, we also estimate that other IFIs will start lending to Iran, particularly the AIIB, the EIB, and the IMF. Finally, if sanctions would cease to exist in 2021 and the borrowing obtained by Iran would be in 2023 just half-equivalent to the one estimated under scenario 3, we estimate that the IFIs would channel into the Iranian economy U.S.D 1,915.0 million in project finance in 2023.

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159

Concluding Remarks, Limitations, and Avenues for Further Research

When the Presidency of Joe Biden is officially inaugurated on 20 January 2021, it is very likely that the hawkish U.S. stance that the Administration of Donald Trump imposed on Iran is reviewed. If the position is revisited and the U.S. comes back to the table of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. sanctions would be softened, Iranian banks will get corresponding banks abroad and will be able to channel foreign exchange inflows into the Iranian economy, and IFIs’ margin to operate and finance projects in Iran will increase significantly. In such a scenario, bearing in mind the significant needs in infrastructure and knowledge of the Iranian economy, as well as the usual race-to-the-top among IFIs to start operating in similar situations (see the recent case of Myanmar), Iran will gain access to hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in lending from IFIs. Looking backwards, we list in this chapter the IFIs where Iran is currently a member. We also compile and quantify the historic flows of annual lending in project finance to Iran, per IFI. We note that the lending approvals to Iran are highly volatile depending on the capacity and appetite of each IFI to officially or unofficially circumvent the sanctions imposed by the U.S. or by the UN. We see that the IBRD of the WBG and the IDB share ex-æquo de role of main IFI financier of the Iranian economy historically, with U.S.D 3.46 billion and U.S.D 3.3 billion, respectively. We note however that IBRD financing has been intermittent and with no financing to Iran since 2005 (other than a symbolic U.S.D 50 million COVID-19 pandemic-related financing granted through the World Health Organization in 2020) and that it has been substituted since then by borrowing from the IDB. The Economic Co-Operation Organization Trade and Development Bank, with headquarters in Istanbul, shows up as third IFI with some significant financing to Iran. Looking forward, we took the IFI borrowing to two neighbors of Iran that could be also considered as regional powers, namely, to Pakistan and to Turkey, as a reference to the IFI borrowing that Iran could aspire to obtain if sanctions would cease to exist. In the worst-case scenario, no IFI financing is granted to Iran in 2023. In the best-case scenario, we estimate that the Iranian economy could benefit in 2023 from U.S.D 3.9 billion in additional project finance. These flows would also bring important knowledge, technical assistance, and leverage in co-financing. This estimated financing in 2023 would represent nearly 40% of all the historic

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IFI financing granted to Iran. Half of the 2023 financing would come from the IBRD of the WBG, but it is also worth noting that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund would inaugurate operations in Iran. Main limitations to this study include the difficult access to information on the projects financed by IFIs in Iran as well as limited digital access to sources in Iranian websites. Avenues for further research include producing more robust and tested methodologies to estimate the potential of Iran to borrow from IFIs. Furthermore, special cases could be assessed in detail, per IFI, including a sectoral analysis of the sectors that both Iran and the IFIs would be interested to finance.

References European Commission (2018). ‘European Commission acts to protect the interests of EU companies investing in Iran as part of the EU’s continued commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ [online] Press Release. European Commission. 17 May. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf. Farda (2019). ‘INSTEX: A real solution or symbolic move to keep Iran in nuclear deal [online] Radio Farda. 1 February. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-ins tex-real-solution-or-symbolic-geture/29745697.html. FATF (2020). ‘High-risk jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action [online] Financial Action Task Force. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/highrisk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/call-for-action-february2020.html. Financial Tribune (2016). ‘AIIB ready to support Iran projects’ [online] Financial Tribune. 16 November. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-bus iness-and-markets/53778/aiib-ready-to-support-iran-projects. Financial Tribune (2020). ‘Iran seeks help from int’l banks to fight coronavirus’ [online] Financial Tribune. 14 March. https://financialtribune.com/articles/ business-and-markets/102589/iran-seeks-help-from-int-l-banks-to-fight-cor onavirus. Ianchovichina, E., Devarajan, S. and Lakatos C. (2016). ‘Lifting economic sanctions on Iran: global effects and strategic responses’. Policy Research Working Paper Series n. 7549. Office of the Chief Economist. World Bank. February. https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/worldbankiransanctionslift-020116.pdf. IDB (2019). Annual Report 2018. [online] Islamic Development Bank. Jeddah. JCPoA (2015). Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Vienna. https://www.eur oparl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf.

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JoC (1992). ‘Iran expects to join Asian Development Bank soon’. [online] Journal of Commerce, 5 May. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122 460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf. Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Chichester: Princeton University Press Landler, M. (2018). ‘Trump abandons Iran Nuclear Deal he long scorned’ [online] The New York Times. 8 May. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/ 08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html. McCawley, P. (2017). Banking on the Future of Asia and the Pacific: 50 Years of the Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Bank. https://www. adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/235061/adb-history-book-secondedition.pdf. Motamedi, M. (2017). ‘Iran integral to Islamic Development Bank Operations’ [online] Financial Tribune. 12 December. https://financialtribune.com/ articles/economy-business-and-markets/77825/interview-iran-integral-to-isl amic-development-bank. Nye, J.S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, J.S. (2005). ‘On the Rise and Fall of American Soft Power’, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 75–77. Nye, J.S. (2008). ‘Public diplomacy and soft power’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, pp. 94–109. Nye, J.S. (2009). ‘Get smart: combining hard and soft power’. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 88, No. 4, July–August, pp. 160–163. Nye, J.S. (2011). The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Rios, R. (2018). ‘EIB cannot do business with Iran, bank chief warns’ [online] Euractiv. 18 July. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ eib-cannot-do-business-with-iran-bank-chief-warns/. Shahla, A. (2020). ‘Iran says World Bank will loan it $50 million to fight virus’ [online] Bloomberg. 14 July. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2020-07-14/iran-says-world-bank-will-loan-it-50-million-to-fight-virus. Steil, B. and Litan R.E. (2006). Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy. Council of Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution. Yale University Press: New Haven and London. Treasury (2020). ‘Sanctions program and country information’ [online] U.S. Department of the Treasury. Washington, DC. https://home.treasury.gov/ policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-inform ation. UNESCAP (2020). ‘The ESCAP Member States and Associate Members’ [online] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unescap.org/about/member-states.

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Iran and the Major Powers

The U.S. Factor in Iran’s Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Calculations Mehran Haghirian

1

and Younes Zangiabadi

Introduction

The United States has played a key role in the geostrategic and foreign policy calculations of the Islamic Republic since its establishment after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Even though diplomatic relations severed after the hostage crisis later that year, the Cold War-like rivalry between Tehran and Washington became an omnipresent factor in Iran’s policymaking calculus. The primary reason for the high level of importance given to the U.S. can be attributed to the Islamic Republic’s quest for recognition and legitimacy at the regional and global levels. This chapter delves into understanding the U.S. role in Iran’s geostrategic and foreign policy decision-making process through three different angles. First, the U.S.’ structural role in Iran’s foreign policy calculations is assessed under the broader framework of Iran’s geostrategy in the postrevolution period. The chapter then presents an analysis of the areas in which the geostrategic interests of both countries aligned in regional

M. Haghirian (B) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar Y. Zangiabadi Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, Toronto, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_7

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developments. This section looks at Iran–U.S. cooperation in helping form democratic governments in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2005), as well as the fight against terrorism in the Levant region (since 2011). Lastly, this chapter examines the process that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which, for the first time, allowed for direct diplomatic engagements between Iran and the United States since the 1979 revolution. Moreover, the Nuclear Deal is used to examine the changing role of the U.S. in Iran’s geostrategic calculations during the 2013–2021 period. The concluding section of the chapter looks at the trends in, and the trajectory of, Iran–U.S. relations in 2021 and onward.

2

Iran’s Geostrategic Decision-Making Process

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, provided an official presentation of the Islamic Republic’s determinants and objectives in an article in Foreign Affairs in 2014.1 He argued that Iran’s foreign policy conduct since the revolution is based on ideals that have been embedded in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, including the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, national security, and the achievement of long-term and sustainable national development. Through these ideals, Zarif enumerates objectives Iran wants to achieve with its foreign policy that include enhancing its regional and global stature, promoting its ideals, including Islamic democracy, expanding its bilateral and multilateral relations, and promoting understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction. Moreover, Iran has, according to Zarif, a “significant potential for a prominent regional and global role” and seeks to fulfill its potential by engaging the world diplomatically and through multilateral institutions.2 What can be added to these objectives and determinants are other aspects that are enumerated in the Islamic Republic’s constitution.3 Article 3.16 of the constitution states that the organization of the nation’s foreign policy is based on Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unrestrained support for the impoverished people of the 1 Mohammad Javad Zarif, What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era. Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014): 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Translation of the Constitution of the

Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition), Iranian Studies 47, no. 1 (2014): 159–200.

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world. In addition, Article 152 stipulates the general foreign policy approach of the Islamic Republic as being based on the rejection of any kind of domination, both its exercise and submission to it; the preservation of the all-inclusive independence of the country and its territorial integrity; the defense of the rights of all Muslims; and non-alignment in relation to the domineering powers. Article 146 of the constitution forbids the establishments of any kind of foreign military base in the country, even for peaceful purposes, and Article 153 forbids any form of agreement that would result in foreign domination over the natural and economic resources, culture, the army, and other affairs of the country. A broad point raised in the constitution is Article 154, which states that “while it completely abstains from any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the struggles of the oppressed for their rights against the oppressors anywhere in the world.” The three most prevalent foreign policy ideals in the constitution are, thus, opposing foreign interreference inside Iran, rejecting foreign domination of the region (or the Islamic World), and supporting the oppressed around the (Islamic) world. While most of the points raised in the Iranian constitution are not completely novel and are present in the constitutions of many countries around the world, the pre-revolution relations between Iran and the United States are without a doubt a reason for inscribing such strict legal constraints on relations with global powers. These principles and ideals form the core, non-flexible, tenets of the Iranian geostrategic decision-making calculus. The popular argument that the Supreme Leader has the ultimate say in Iran’s foreign policy is to an extent accurate. However, that does not mean that a decision-making process does not exist in the Islamic Republic. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is one institutional example which exemplifies the Islamic Republic’s adoption of a more structured approach toward its geostrategic decision-making after 1989. The SNSC was established following the 1989 Referendum in Iran and was officially recognized in the constitution as Article 176. The Council’s primary responsibilities include “determining national security policies, ensuring that domestic policies align with national security policies, and marshaling resources to defend Iran from external and internal

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threats.”4 While the Supreme Leader has the final say on any matter at the SNSC, the president presides over the Council. Moreover, aside from the president, the heads of the two other branches of government, chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs, ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence, the highest-ranking officials from the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader are present at the SNSC. The existence of such an institution that is in essence a platform for the key actors to propose, deliberate, and execute the most critical of Iran’s geostrategic decisions is illustrative of the complex decision-making process in Iran. The SNSC is merely one factor in Iran’s geostrategic decision-making process. The Expediency Council is another institution in Iran’s decisionmaking process. The Expediency Council was established in 1988 by Ayatollah Khomeini with the objective of mediating disputes between the Majles (Parliament) and the Guardian Council. A year after its establishment, it was recognized in the revised constitution and tasked with acting as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader. The Expediency Council is constantly growing, and the Supreme Leader has regularly added new members to the body. The actual impact of the Expediency Council and the SNSC are research topics on their own, nevertheless, they are two of the many pillars contributing to Iran’s geostrategic decision-making process. Moreover, these institutions have also established a number of think tanks and research centers that are further adding layers to the decision-making process. Figure 1 illustrates part of the actors, institutions, and factors contributing to the Iranian foreign policy decision-making process. Mohammad Ali Shabani and Mahsa Rouhi argue that “Iranian decisionmaking resembles a pentagon, rather than a pyramid.”5 We build on their argument by adding that the Iranian decision-making process resembles a dynamic pentagon. Figure 1 visualizes the complex nature of the decisionmaking process in Tehran. While key actors, including those represented in the SNSC and the Expediency Council, form the core of this dynamic 4 Translation by Iran Primer at the United States Institute of Peace. Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Iran Primer—United States Institute of Peace, updated on July 15, 2020, accessed on February 23, 2021. 5 Mohammad Ali Shabani and Mahsa Rouhi, Rowhani the Decision Shaper, The National Interest, August 26, 2013.

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Fig. 1 Key actors, institutions, and factors contributing to Iranian geostrategic decision-making process figure by authors

pentagon, other institutions, groups, and individuals are also considered in Iranian geostrategic decision-making processes. Furthermore, there are a myriad of internal and external factors that have also had an effect on the decision-making process, including (the geopolitical consequences of) regional developments, interests of global powers, international energy markets, the Iranian diaspora abroad and foreign-funded Farsi satellite channels, and domestic issues such as unemployment, strength of the economy, and social issues. The outcome and geopolitical consequences of regional (and international) developments, in particular, have significantly impacted Iranian geostrategic decision-making process. Specifically, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990– 1991), dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), the fall of Saddam Hussein in and the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), blockade against Qatar (2017–2021), the war in Afghanistan (2001–present), the Arab–Israeli Conflict (1948–present), and the Arab Uprisings (2010–present) have directly affected Iranian geostrategy.

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Since the early days after the revolution Iranian leaders have shifted between ideological and pragmatic approaches. For example, David Menashri writes that Iran has juggled between different approaches to find “a proper equilibrium” between “religion and state,” between “Islam and the West” and between “dedication to its revolutionary convictions and the importunate demands of governance.”6 Clearly, ideological and often revolutionary policies were advanced during the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini in the first decade after the revolution; however, pragmatism has often prevailed since 1989. With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the results of the national referendum in 1989, the Iranian decision-makers have interpreted their religious ideology pragmatically in order to advance national interests.7 In line with this argument, Farhad Rezaei writes that Ayatollah Khomeini “tended to idealism,” but Ayatollah Khamenei has “zigzagged between idealism and realism” in an effort to “assure the survival of the regime.”8 In other words, Iran started to chart its geostrategic approach with greater realism and pragmatism since the transition of power to Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Rafsanjani as the Supreme Leader and President, respectively. Ever since, As Menashri argues, “whenever ideological convictions have clashed with the interests of the state—as prescribed by the ruling elite—state interests ultimately have superseded revolutionary dogma in both foreign relations and domestic politics.”9 Thus, while there is an established framework that all Iranian officials observe, there is a wide gap between the approaches of different presidents (and Supreme Leaders). In other words, Iran’s complex decisionmaking process provides a flexibility in the actual conduct of foreign affairs. Since 1989, with the end of the Iran–Iraq War, transition from the Khomeini period, and the abolishment of the Prime Minister’s post through the national referendum, the president gained considerable executive authority in foreign affairs, albeit still under the ultimate command 6 David Menashri, Iran’s Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism. International Affairs 60, no. 2 (2007): 165. 7 Rouhollah Ramazani, Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy, Middle East Journal, 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 549. 8 Farhad Rezaei, The Negotiated Political Order and the Making of Iran’s Foreign Policy, in “Iran’s Foreign Policy After the Nuclear Agreement: Politics of Normalizers and Traditionalists,” ed. Farhad Rezaei, Palgrave Macmillan (2019): 13. 9 Menashri, 155.

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of the Supreme Leader. The Islamic Republic’s geostrategic approach toward the United States has also followed these trends. The following section specifically looks at the U.S. role in Iran’s geostrategic decisionmaking calculus since 1979, with a particular focus on the variance in Tehran’s approach toward Washington in the 42-year time period.

3

The U.S. Role in Iran’s Geostrategic Decision-Making Calculus

As with any country in a realist perspective, regime survival is paramount in any geostrategic decision. If we consider that the Islamic Republic’s general threat perception has core and flexible attributes, the core of these threats is undoubtedly the ever-present possibility of a U.S.-led regime change in Iran. This was the case in the early days after the revolution, which exponentially increased after the hostage crisis, and has been fluctuated in the four decades since. Thus, it can be argued that the United States is the most important country in Iran’s geostrategic decision-making calculus. Moreover, the importance given to the U.S. is not limited to its characterization as the Islamic Republic’s arch adversary, but also as the main source of threat to its survival, as well as the main impediment in its efforts to enhance relations with countries in the region and elsewhere. The 1979 Revolution was a turning point in Iran’s geostrategic and foreign policy decision-making calculus in general, and toward the United States in particular. More specifically, Iran’s post-revolution approach toward the United States is strictly tied to Iran–U.S. relations in the prerevolution period. Until February 1979, Iran was positioned as a regional power, part of Washington’s “twin pillars” strategic doctrine, in addition to being recognized as “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.”10 It was indeed the closeness between the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and Washington that led to the policy shifts after the revolution. The revolution itself, however, was not a cause for severing diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington. Diplomatic relations continued from February to November 1979, albeit in a staggeringly different and downgraded manner. The storming of the U.S. 10 The quote is by Jimmy Carter, former president of the United States, during his visit to Tehran in December 1977. See Andrew Glass, Carter lauds shah of Iran, December 31, 1977, Politico, December 30, 2018.

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Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis that lasted for 444 days, was the turning point in Iran–U.S. relations. The hostage crisis started partly in response to President Carter’s decision to allow the Shah to undergo medical treatment in the United States. This decision by the White House at the time further augmented the fears inside Iran that the United States was planning to overthrow the Islamic Republic—a concern that has persisted to this day. The U.S. did in fact take the military option with Operation Eagle Claw in its attempt to rescue the hostages. However, the American forces encountered difficulties on route which resulted in a tragic accident in the Iranian desert of Tabas, killing eight servicemen. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States took military action against Iran initiated an all-around geostrategic recalibration to increase its defensive capabilities, if not raise the costs for the United States in case of any military engagement. The Iran–Iraq War started in the midst of the hostage crisis in September 1980 and, unsurprisingly, the negative consequences of the Iran–U.S. spat inhibited Tehran from gaining much support from the international community. Arguably, the legitimacy and recognition that Iran had gained over centuries (if not millennia) was challenged and damaged following the hostage crisis. Iraq was using the latest American (and other Western and Soviet) weaponry against Iran, while, on the other hand, Iran was using its at-the-time state-of-the-art equipment without accessing support or even spare parts. Interestingly, however, Iran and the United States (during the Reagan Administration) engaged in covert negotiations which ultimately led to arms sales to Iran after the hostage crisis. The sale of American weapons and spare parts to Iran occurred through Israel in exchange for funds that were used to support the Contras in Nicaragua. Another issue that is often linked to this socalled Iran–Contra scandal is the issue of freeing American hostages held in Lebanon by Hezbollah.11 Reagan, himself, admitted during a televised interview in 1987, that “what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.”12 Iran did not release the American hostages that were held in Tehran until Ronald Reagan’s inauguration in January 1981. The Iranian

11 Micah Zenko, Revisiting President Reagan’s Iran Arms-for-Hostages Imitative, Council on Foreign Relations, August 3, 2016. 12 Ibid.

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geostrategic calculations at the time envisioned the betterment of relations with the United States during the Reagan Administration, and evident by Reagan’s speech, the United States seemed to be willing to move past the hostage crisis. The covert arms sales by the U.S. and Iran’s assistance in freeing American hostages and providing funds for U.S. operations in Nicaragua illustrated that pragmatic and transactional agreements are possible, despite deep animosities. Nevertheless, with the Iran–Contra scandal taking over headlines in the United States in 1987, and the accidental shooting down of an Iranian passenger airplane by the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, Iran–U.S. relations once again took a downward turn. Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, came to power around the same time as the 1989 transitions in Iran. Once again, hopes for an Iran– U.S. rapprochement increased in the post-Khomeini era. H. W. Bush even made a public gesture to Iran and addressed Iranian officials in his inauguration speech by saying “goodwill begets goodwill.”13 Once again, however, tensions between Iran and the United States grew following the growing presence of American forces in the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. This augmented U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf has been an omnipresent factor in Iran’s geostrategic decision-making calculus ever since. Bill Clinton also failed to take advantage of the overtures made by Khatami in Iran. While Iran’s overall geostrategy was open to the idea of a détente with the United States, the Clinton Administration adopted the dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, which essentially balanced the regional balance of power away from having a dominant power in the region. As Gregory Gause argues, however, the strategy was flawed. He wrote in 1994 that “containment of Iran requires a relatively strong and unified Iraq on its long western border.14 Otherwise, Iraq becomes an ideal area for Iran to try to break out of its regional isolation.” In other words, he said that “a weak Iraq is an inviting target for an Iran contained and isolated.”15 What is obvious since 2003 is that his prediction is in fact the reality of Iraq today, and reflects the continuously growing status of Iran–Iraq relations in the post-Saddam Hussein era (see Sect. 4.2).

13 Gregory Gause, The Illogic of Dual Containment, Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 59. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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Khatami was still in office when George W. Bush ascended to the White House in 2001, and once again his outreach and efforts for reconciliation went unnoticed by the United States. While Iran reached a resolution with European powers on the nuclear issue, was one of the first Muslim countries to condemn the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and was instrumental in the U.S. “War on Terror” strategy in the post-Taliban Afghanistan (see Sect. 4.1.), the Bush Administration decided to label Iran in the “Axis of Evil” next to North Korea and Iraq. The foreign policy and geostrategic shift by Ahmadinejad shortly after were in part, directly a result of the impasse with the United States. Not only were relations not enhanced, but they also continued to deteriorate with Iran redoubling its efforts to revive the decades-long, U.S.-established, nuclear program.16 Differences in the foreign policy conduct of President Khatami and President Ahmadinejad were the starkest. Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations was “replaced by an eventual clash of civilizations”; the pragmatic foreign policy approach of the reformists movement “gave way to growing conservatism,” and the policy of reconciliation with Arab and Western countries was replaced by growing tensions regionally and internationally.17 Ahmadinejad brought the revolutionary and ideological discourse of the Islamic Republic back to the fore. On the other hand, Barack Obama came to office in 2009 by seeking a more serious approach toward Iran—one that would lead to an outcome. He used a carrot and stick approach which included the most intense sanctions regime imposed on a country in world history. The sanctions imposed on Iran by the Obama Administration had unprecedented negative impacts on the country, both economically and politically. At the same time, Obama dropped the unilateral American “rogue rubric” by instead characterizing the Islamic Republic as an “outlier—a state violating established international norms.”18 This change in U.S. geostrategic calculation toward Iran allowed for secret talks to take place in 2012, and for an interim nuclear agreement to be announced the following year (see Sect. 5).

16 The Iranian nuclear program was established in 1954 in response to the Atoms for Peace initiative by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and the first operating reactor in Iran was built with U.S. technology and assistance. 17 Menashri, 153. 18 Robert Litwak, Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: A Deal, Not a Grand Bargain, Wilson

Center, July 2015.

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It is argued, thus, that the 2013 presidential election in Iran was “a referendum on the cost of idealism in Iranian foreign policy.”19 Rouhani’s foreign policy mandate was, according to Zarif, tied to a sober critique of the previous eight years and to implement a “major overhaul of the country’s Foreign policy and to “restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy.”20 Zarif explains that the new approach is based on six goals, including deepening bilateral and multilateral relations, support the cause of oppressed people across the world, defeating the international anti-Iranian campaign, diffusing external threats by resolving outstanding issues with the rest of the world, and prudently manage relations with the United States. The recognition of the latter as a foreign policy goal was in and by itself another turning point in Iran–U.S. relations. Section 5 delves deeper into the geostrategic consequences and opportunities of the 2015 nuclear deal, to further assess Iran’s geostrategic approach toward the United States in the 2013–2021 period. Iran’s geostrategic decision-making calculus toward the United States has, thus, core and flexible attributes itself. While the core attribute is the ever-present threat of regime change which inhibits actual strategic cooperation, there exists a flexibility that has allowed for constructive engagement to advance national interests. The following section looks at three examples in which Iran–U.S. geostrategic interests aligned: Collaborating to help establish democratic governments in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2005) as well as coordinating in the fight against terrorism in the Levant (since 2011).

4

Where Interests Align: Iran–U.S. Cooperation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Fight Against Terrorism in the Levant This section looks at three examples in which Iran–U.S. geostrategic interests aligned in the 2001–2016 period. These include collaborating to help form democratic governments in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2005) as well as coordinating in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Syria (since 2011).

19 Rezaei, 16. 20 Zarif, 7.

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4.1

Afghanistan

The 9/11 attacks on the United States opened doors for collaborations between Tehran and Washington on mutual interests in Afghanistan. The common enemy was in Afghanistan–the Islamic fundamentalist group Taliban, who controlled around 90% of the country’s territory since 1996.21 Moreover, the Taliban harbored other extremist groups such as Al-Qaida and Sepah-e-Sahaba, which all had a long history of terrorist attacks against Iranians and Americans. In October 2001, following the Taliban’s rejection to hand over the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, President George Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom with objectives of removing the Taliban regime from power, destroying and dismantling the Al-Qaeda network, and preventing Afghanistan from continuing to be a safe haven for Islamic terrorist organizations.22 These three objectives aligned perfectly with Iran’s geostrategic interests in Afghanistan where the Taliban and its affiliate extremist operatives posed a serious threat to Iran’s national security, particularly around its eastern border. With a 900-km border with Afghanistan and strong ties to anti-Taliban opposition groups such as the Afghan Northern Alliance, Iran was best positioned to provide the U.S with the military and intelligence assistance needed on the ground to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. Considering the lack of a direct channel of communication between Tehran and Washington, the two sides held their bilateral meetings secretly and within the UN-convened “Six Plus Two” group on Afghanistan.23 This multi-state coalition was formed among the six neighbors of Afghanistan—China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—plus Russia and the United States, to address the civil war and political future of that country. On the military front, the U.S. also joined an existing coalition consisting of Iran, India, Russia, and the Northern Alliance that had been working to topple the Taliban since the mid-1990s. After the Taliban was formally overthrown in 2001, the UN convened a ten-day conference that included countries in the Six Plus Two group as

21 Lindsay Maizland, What Is the Taliban?, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021. 22 Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Opera-

tions, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 2011. 23 Barnett Rubin and Sara Batmanglich, The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry, MIT Center for International Studies, October 2008, 2.

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well as major Afghan opposition groups to negotiate on an interim constitution and a new government in Afghanistan. Despite major differences on other issues in the region, Tehran and Washington found common ground and mutual interests to work together on Afghanistan, which was clearly reflected in the Bonn Declaration that became the principal foundation for the interim constitution of Afghanistan. For instance, they both agreed that the new coalition government must commit to representing diverse voices of opposition groups, holding democratic elections, and cooperating against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Bonn Agreement was formally adopted by choosing Hamid Karzai as the head of the new government, thanks to Iran’s extensive lobbying with the Northern Alliance representative, Younis Qanooni, to allocate some ministerial posts to other opposition factions in the government. The United States also supported Karzai.24 The formation of the interim Afghan government marked the first successful collaboration between Tehran and Washington in the postrevolution era, cementing a fragile foundation for further cooperation between the two nations. Importantly, President Khatami played a significant role in convincing and harmonizing domestic forces across the Islamic Republic’s security and military circles to test such mutual cooperation and even possible detente with the U.S. Considering the preliminary success at the Bonn conference, the Khatami government signaled its willingness to further cooperate with the U.S at the 2002 Tokyo International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, where it pledged $540 million in financial assistance to the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, almost double of what the U.S. had pledged.25 Nevertheless, the level of distrust accumulated between Iran and the U.S. since the revolution coupled with the initial success of the American neoconservatives in their military campaign in Afghanistan granted the Bush administration the justification to squander the opportunity of further cooperation with Iran. In this vein, President Bush, a year after the fall of the Taliban, delivered his first State of Union address in which he

24 James Dobbins, Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience, The Washington Quarterly 33, no.1 (2010): 153 (149–162). 25 Afghanistan: Donors Pledge $4.5 Billion in Tokyo, United Nations Development Project, January 2002.

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included Iran in the so-called “Axis of Evil.” 26 This came as a major blow to Tehran, particularly to President Khatami, who had gambled his political future in convincing the Iranian establishment to de-escalate tensions with Washington. Including Iran in the “Axis of Evil” transformed Iran’s policy toward the United States and instilled greater mistrust and more serious concerns over the long-term deployment of American forces on its eastern and western borders. 4.2

Iraq

In 2003, the U.S.-led coalition, without the support of the UN Security Council, invaded Iraq on what came to be based on a false premise that Baghdad possessed weapons of mass destruction. Similar to Afghanistan, this was both good and bad news for Iran. For the Islamic Republic that single-handedly fought the bloody eight-year war against Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, toppling of the Ba’athist regime was welcomed. It also provided Iran with the window of opportunity to exert its highest influence in the majority-Shia country and help install the long-exiled and Iranian-trained Shia political and paramilitary groups into power in Iraq. From a national security standpoint, it was vital for Iran to ensure that its neighbor will never re-emerge as a regional rival or a threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic. Despite mutual interests, Iran’s bitter experience with the U.S. in Afghanistan had made Iranian leaders more cynical about the prospect of cooperation with the Americans in Iraq. In addition, Iran remained quite concerned about the U.S. military presence on its eastern and western borders, as well as the ever-present possibility of U.S.-led regime change in Tehran. This fear largely stemmed from Bush’s “freedom agenda” which pushed for greater political opening in Iran through presidential speeches, Persian language broadcasts and aid to civil society groups. In a small, yet significant example, the Bush Administration played a crucial role in garnering bipartisan support in Congress for the Iran Freedom Support Act that dedicated $10 million to the President of the

26 Text of President George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address. The Washington Post. January 29, 2002.

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United States to invest in pro-democracy groups opposed to the Iranian government.27 Iran strategically gave a green light to the Iran-backed Iraqi opposition groups and militias, such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) with its militant branch, the Badr Brigade and the Islamic Dawa Party to cooperate with the U.S. in toppling Saddam’s regime.28 Having Iraq’s demographic and sectarian makeup in its favor, Iran has been quite influential in consecutively guaranteeing that a Tehran-friendly government is in power in Baghdad. In the past years, Iran has propped up and supported key individuals associated with Dawah and SCIRI, in the Iraqi parliamentary elections. All of Iraq’s post-war prime ministers—Nouri Al-Maliki (2006–2014), Heider al-Abadi (2014–2018), Adil Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020), and Mustafa al-Kadhimi (2020–Present)— invariably secured a compromised support from both Iran and the U.S. in spite of their continuous tensions and varying long-term interests in Iraq and the broader region. The Iran–U.S. divide widened further after Bush ignored Khatami’s comprehensive rapprochement proposal known as the “grand bargain,” which was delivered to the U.S. State Department via the Swiss embassy in Iran a few weeks into the U.S. invasion of Iraq. According to Flynt Leverett, former Middle East Director at the U.S. National Security Council, the proposal was “an agenda for the diplomatic process to resolve all of the outstanding bilateral differences between the United States and Iran.”29 As part of the deal, Iran would address the main U.S. concerns, ranging from Tehran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, to the Iranian nuclear program, and Tehran’s position on the Arab–Israeli peace process. The U.S., in exchange, would have removed its sanctions on Iran and cease its regime change efforts against the Islamic Republic.30 With swift military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. was filled with confidence to dismiss all Iranian offers including such an unprecedented “grand bargain” coming from an anxious Islamic Republic 27 President Applauds Congress for Passage of Iran Freedom, White House Archives, September 2006. 28 Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.” New York: Bloomsbury (2014): 195. 29 Analysis—The “Grand Bargain” Fax—A Missed Opportunity? Frontline —Public Broadcasting Service, October 2007. 30 Mousavian and Shahidsaless, 198.

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that found itself the next possible target of the broader U.S. regime change agenda in the region. Iran soon adapted to the reality of the Bush administration having no interest in any form of detente with the country and, thus, took a hardline approach toward the U.S., which mainly included undermining U.S. interests and presence in Iraq as well as expanding the Iranian nuclear program. Expectedly, Khatami’s successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, once again put more weight on the Islamic Republic’s ideological approach toward the United States and its overall geostrategic decision-making calculus. After the defeat of the reformist camp in the 2005 elections and the rise of ultra-conservatives to power under Ahmadinejad, the Iran nuclear doctrine pursued an escalation strategy where cooperation and diplomatic talks were replaced with disengagement and political posturing against the West. Moreover, Iran ramped up its own form of pressure on the U.S. via its proxies and militias in Iraq to counter the U.S.-led international pressure campaign. According to a report by the Institute for the Study of War, Iran was roughly responsible for half of the attacks on coalition forces, which was orchestrated by the “special groups” or “secret cells” that were formed, trained, armed, and funded by Iran and Hezbollah.31 The U.S. forces also continuously pushed back against Iran and its proxies in Iraq using both diplomatic and military means. Since 2005, this tit for tat trend defined U.S.–Iran engagement in Iraq until the emergence of the Islamic State in the Levant which caused concerns about the very existence of Iraq as a sovereign state for all stakeholders, including Iran and the U.S. It was only then when Washington and Tehran reached an unclaimed truce and focused on the common enemy that threatened the entirety of their long-term investment in Iraq and the broader Middle East. 4.3

Fight Against Terrorism in the Levant

With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the Iranian security establishment re-examined its long-held position in Iraq, coming to a conclusion that this phenomenon posed, and continues to pose, a serious and imminent threat to Iran’s security both inside and outside the country. For Tehran, it was vital to protect the political, 31 Kimberly Kagan, Iraq Report VI: Iran’s proxy war against the U.S. in Iraq, The Weekly Standard, August 2007.

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military, and economic investments it had made in Iraq and Syria that ensured Iran-friendly and Iran-dependent governments remained in place. In addition, ISIS viewed the majority Shia population of Iran to be among its top enemies and it planned a series of failed and successful terrorist attacks against the country. Thus, Iran found it in its strategic interest to temporarily halt its standoff with the U.S.-led coalition forces, and even engage in indirect tactical cooperation with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism and extremism around the region. After the terrorists made significant advances in Iraq, the common goal of the anti-ISIS coalition was to form an inclusive Iraqi government composed of both Sunnis and Shias in order to create a united national front against ISIS. This was a political objective heavily supported by Tehran and Washington, fearing the possibility of another failed state in the region. When Prime Minister Maliki consistently resisted to the idea of an inclusive government, Iran sided with the United States in calling for his resignation in 2014. Eventually, Maliki was succeeded by Al-Abadi who did not only manage to simultaneously cooperate with the two countries but also acted as a mediator for coordination between Tehran and Washington in the fight against ISIS. Soon after, the U.S. announced the formation of the International Coalition to Defeat ISIS to carry out President Obama’s four-point plan, which was to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS.32 This plan included airstrikes against ISIS targets, increased support to local forces on the ground, continuation of counterterrorism efforts to prevent future attacks, and humanitarian assistance to non-combatants in the region.33 Iran was, however, never invited to join the international coalition. Nevertheless, and regardless of the anti-American rhetoric, Iranian officials indirectly welcomed American airstrikes against ISIS targets by refraining from strong condemnation of U.S.’ re-involvement in Iraq. This approach by Iran is illustrative of the pragmatic considerations in its geostrategic decision-making calculus. Moreover, these airstrikes assisted Iran with its proxy operations on the ground to prevent ISIS from gaining control of more territories in Iraq. Iranians also understood that they nor the Iraqis possessed a capable air force that could effectively counter ISIS. Consequently, Iran implemented its “leading from behind” strategy in

32 Statement by the President on ISIL, White House Archives, September 10, 2014. 33 Ibid.

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Iraq,34 where Iran never involved itself directly in the conflict through troops deployment, but instead, sent its military advisors to establish, organize, and strengthen forces that could advance Tehran’s interests abroad. In Iraq, as well as in Syria, Iran’s justification for its strategic involvement was closely tied to religious belief, defining it in the context of the Islamic Republic’s moral mandate to protect Shia shrines and sacred sites in Iraq and Syria. On the one hand, the U.S. strongly opposed Iran’s involvement in Syria under the guise of fighting against ISIS, discerning that Iran’s priority was to keep the Assad regime in power, which was indeed emboldened and further consolidated by the advent of ISIS in the country. On the other hand, the U.S. supported Iran’s counterterrorism efforts in Iraq as it correctly grasped the scope of Iranian power and influence on the ground, particularly after the top Shia spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s fatwa that called upon Shias to unite and join the battle against ISIS. With such a formal decree from the highest Shia religious authority, Iran played a leading role in forming the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), also known as Hashd al-Shaabi to fight ISIS. The PMU, with political, financial, and military support from Iran, incorporated a wide array of ideological militias from Shias and Sunnis to Christians and Yazidis, and were critical in Iraq’s efforts to reclaim its lost territories. Until the end of Obama’s presidency, Iranians and Americans, to some extent, complemented each other in the fight against ISIS in Iraq, where neither airstrikes nor ground operations alone could achieve the common objective of destroying ISIS and retaking the full control of the lost territories. In other words, they have followed separate counterterrorism strategies to fight the common enemy. The best examples were the indirect tactical cooperation in breaking the siege of Amerli in August 2014 and operations in Tikrit in 2015, which resulted in recapturing these cities from ISIS.35 It is also important to note that there was even a slim opening for tactical and political cooperation on the Syrian conflict when Secretary of State John Kerry, for the first time, invited the Iranians to the “Syria talks” in Vienna. This diplomatic engagement was believed to 34 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Iran’s ISIS Policy, International Affairs 91, no. 1 (January 2015): 8. 35 Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary, Cooperating with Iran to Combat ISIS in Iraq, The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 3 (2017): 138 (129–146).

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be the byproduct of the historic Iran Nuclear Deal that was reached a few months earlier. The election of Donald Trump and his administration’s policy of maximum pressure campaign against Iran shut the door closed on any form of cooperation between Tehran and Washington. Furthermore, it placed both countries on the pathway toward military confrontation that finally happened in a limited form with the U.S. assassination of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Ghassem Soleimani and Iraqi popular commander of the PMU, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in Baghdad. In response, Iran fired missiles at the American air bases in Iraq and pushed the Iraqi Prime Minister and members of the parliament to support and pass a motion demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. As a result, the counterterrorism efforts against ISIS and other extremist groups have been heavily impacted with no actors, including the Iraqi government, capable of acting as a mediator between the two countries. Hopes for further engagements, however, have once again resurfaced with Joe Biden’s overhaul of the policies of his predecessor. 4.4

Summary

This section presented a series of short-term engagements between Iran and the United States in the 2001–2015 period. Tehran and Washington found it in their geostrategic interests to engage with one another to achieve common objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the fight against terrorism and extremism in the Levant. While Iran, under President Khatami, was more receptive to the idea of cooperation with the U.S. on regional matters, President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil” seriously weakened his reformist camp as the advocate of further engagement with the U.S. Afterward, Iran–U.S. engagement was mainly confined to Iraq and became more limited and indirect. The advent of ISIS, however, led to an “unofficial, ceasefire” between Iran and the United States, and once again brought about an area for collaboration to advance mutual interests.

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5 Geostrategic Opportunities and Consequences of the 2015 Nuclear Deal The Nuclear Deal was a result of Iran’s global engagement efforts that were put in force following the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013. The new administration’s foreign policy, led by Zarif, pursued a path that was unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic. Iran, for the first time since the 1979 revolution, engaged in direct official talks with the United States on an Iranian issue, as all past interactions were related to alignment of interests on issues in other countries. Moreover, the nuclear talks complemented Iran’s more than a decade-long dialogue with European powers. As a major diplomatic achievement for all parties involved, the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, and its adoption by the Security Council, resolved years of concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and ended Iran’s isolation by removing nuclear-related sanctions and facilitating its reentry back into the international community, albeit briefly. The telephone conversation between President Hassan Rouhani and President Barack Obama in September 2013, the numerous tête-à-têtes between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Javad Zarif on the sidelines of the negotiations over the JCPOA, “demolished many taboos in regard to direct contact between Iran and the U.S.”36 For Obama, engaging Iran meant to “signal that the era of George W. Bush had ended,” a “renewed reliance on diplomacy had begun,” and the U.S. had stepped “out of the rut of history.”37 Moreover, as Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite argue, the JCPOA reflects “U.S. appreciation of some important global and Middle East realities of the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century.”38 Some of those realities that had become apparent to the Obama Administration included Iran becoming the “uncontested regional power” after the fall of Saddam Hussein, U.S. “war fatigue,” American’s energy independence, and the growing alignment of interests in the fight against “Sunni extremism.”39 36 Mehran Haghirian, Why Iran and the United States Should Negotiate, Atlantic Council, August 8, 2018. 37 David Sanger, Obama’s Leap of Faith, The New York Times, July 14, 2015. 38 Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite, Seven Realities That Made an Iran Deal Almost

Inevitable, The National Interest, July 21, 2015. 39 Ibid.

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With the resolution of the nuclear issue in sight in 2013, some countries, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, undertook various tactics to hamper and derail the talks. Stated reasons for opposing the agreement were that the JCPOA did not address Iran’s missile program or regional activities.40 However, it was clear that the unstated objective of obstructing the progress of the negotiations was the fear that a rapprochement between Iran and the United States will alter the latter country’s relationships with its traditional partners as well as change the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor. The possibility of a rapprochement between Iran and the United States led to an uneasy situation for the majority of Arab states in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East.41 As Aras and Yorulmazlar argue, the possibility of a détente between Tehran and Washington was “perceived by most of the region’s leaders as a major threat to the existing regional power equations,”42 and according to Mazhar and Goraya, “they don’t want Iran as a player in the region. They want Iran isolated and out of the picture.”43 The Obama Administration was mindful of the concerns put forward by some GCC states and attempted to reassure these countries during a Camp David summit months before the JCPOA was finalized.44 The United States proposed increased military cooperation, which was hailed by all GCC countries, and in turn, all six member states welcomed and recognized the JCPOA. At the Summit, President Obama also aspired for dialogue and negotiations between the GCC states and Iran and stated that the “purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any longterm confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran,” arguing that “a key purpose of bolstering the capacity of our GCC partners is to ensure

40 David Kenner, Why Saudi Arabia Hates the Iran Deal, Foreign Policy, November 14, 2013. 41 Mahjoob Zweiri and Majed Al-Ansari, Competing Radicalisms: A Comparison of Saudi and Iranian Foreign Policies After 2015, in “The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach,” ed. Mahjoob Zweiri et al., Springer Nature (2021): 236. 42 Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, Turkey and Iran After the Arab Spring, Middle

East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014). 43 Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Naheed Goraya, Geneva Deal: Beginning of a New Era Between Iran–U.S. Relations, South Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (2014). 44 Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian, Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–U.S. Relations, in “Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term,” ed. Luciano Zaccara, Palgrave Macmillan (2020): 64.

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that our partners can deal with Iran politically, diplomatically, from a position of confidence and strength.”45 Similarly, Obama also suggested to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states that they should “share” the region with Iran.46 This newfound and inclusive U.S. approach toward the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East was undoubtedly welcomed by Iran. Moreover, the nuclear deal was meant as a first step toward a broader agreement. On the day that the JCPOA was announced, Zarif made a statement via Twitter and said that the “Iran deal is not a ceiling but a solid foundation. We must now begin to build on it.”47 In the short time period that the deal was being implemented fully by all involved parties, the trajectory seemed to be on a path for further engagements on the regional and international levels. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration’s time in office expired just over a year into the JCPOA’s implementation, and the succeeding U.S. government circled back the U.S.’ approach toward Iran to that of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ policies to contain and counter Iran. As soon as Trump took office, his team was quick to alter President Obama’s post-JCPOA approach toward the Islamic Republic and implemented a policy of “maximum pressure.” Furthermore, Trump’s decision to travel to Saudi Arabia as his first foreign trip in May 2017 signaled that the United States is no longer interested in promoting an inclusive regional security framework and is keen on pitting the Arab countries against Iran. Ever since the Trump Administration assumed the White House, and more so after it officially withdrew from the JCPOA, there was an effort to establish an “Arab NATO” to directly deal with Iran. With its official proposed name of Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), the United States invested much diplomatic capital in establishing this organization. For example, Secretary Mike Pompeo met with his counterparts from the six GCC countries, plus Egypt and Jordan at the sidelines of the 2018 United Nations General Assembly in New York to promote MESA’s establishment. The State Department issued a statement following the meeting stating that “all participants agreed on the need to confront 45 Remarks by President Barack Obama at A Press Conference after Meeting with GCC Leaders, Camp David, United States, May 14, 2015. 46 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, The Atlantic, April 2016. 47 Tweet by Mohammad Javad Zarif, July 14, 2015. https://twitter.com/jzarif/status/

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threats from Iran directed at the region and the United States,” and explained that MESA will be “anchored by a united GCC, to advance prosperity, security, and stability in the region.”48 While the statement ignores the realities that GCC unity is a myth, especially with regard to uniting military activities and policies toward Iran, the United States was determined to present a “unified Arab” front unwavering in its commitment to counter Iran. At the same time, the Trump Administration was adamantly pursuing a path to normalize relations between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Israel, which resulted in the UAE and Bahrain establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Tel Aviv. The perception that an increasingly emboldened Iran is exerting power across the Middle East after the nuclear agreement presented an opening for cooperation between Arabs and Israelis against a seemingly mutual enemy.49 Nevertheless, the anti-Iran hype that was created during the Trump years was muted after Biden’s victory in the November 2020 elections and the subsequent wave of geopolitical shifts that were unleashed around the world, especially in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, it is relatively clear that Iran’s geostrategic relations in the region prohibited a unified military front against Tehran. Oman, Qatar, and likely Kuwait have been wary to join military arrangements against Iran, illustrated by their opposition to form a unified military force within the GCC on several occasions, sparce participation in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, not normalizing relations with Israel, and minimal participation in Trump’s anti-Iran agenda.50 There is little doubt that Iran “is a revisionist revolutionary state keen on challenging the status quo of American domination in global politics and countering its influence in the Middle East.”51 Moreover, Iran “envisions a region banded together to resist imperial domination, with itself as the preeminent power.”52 It can be argued that Iran does not consider 48 Readout of the GCC + 2 Ministerial, Office of the Spokesperson, United States Department of State, September 28, 2018. 49 Mehran Haghirian, “Arab States of the Persian Gulf Must Choose Between Paths Proposed by Iran and Israel,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2017. 50 Dahlia Kholaif, Oman: No Gulf Wide Union for Us, Al Jazeera, December 15, 2013. 51 Zweiri and Al-Ansari, 231. 52 Paul Salem, Building Cooperation in the Eastern Middle East, Carnegie Papers 24

(June 2010): 3.

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Israel or Saudi Arabia as directly threatening its survival, nor does it view them as equals. When it comes to its threat perception, Iran is, and has been, fixated on the United States. Iran is aware that its largely home built or outdated military infrastructure is incomparable to the military might of the United States. Yet, Iran has been preparing for a potential strike by the United States since the early days after the hostage crisis and has continuously enhanced and augmented its deterrence plans in the more than four decades since. Iran’s deterrence options include the activation of numerous proxy groups around the Middle East, and beyond, including in Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. As such, its support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine must also be viewed in this context. In the broader regional context, the expansion of relations with countries in Eurasia has become paramount in Iran’s geostrategic calculations. In Iran, there exists two different foreign policy camps, according to Abdolreza Farajirad—one group which seeks to expand relations with the EU as well as with China and Russia, and on the other hand, a more powerful and influential group that is vary of the EU and emphasizes the expansion of relations with countries in the East of Eurasia, nominally with Russia, China, and India.53 As the majority in the Iranian decision-making circles favor an Eastward approach, China and Russia have cemented their roles as Iran’s primary geostrategic partners after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran.54 Iran and Russia have significantly expanded their strategic, military, and economic cooperation in the past decade. As importantly, Iran and China have also expanded their strategic partnerships across a variety of fields in direct opposition to the United States—as both countries, as well as Russia, are countering U.S. hegemonic actions, as well as U.S. unilateral sanctions and tariffs. Since 2019, Iran has been actively seeking to sign long-term strategic agreements with both Russia and China. At the same time, Iran has been expanding its relations with European countries as well. The signing of the JCPOA and the removal of some sanctions on Iran “paved the way for the EU, especially the powerful E3 -France, Germany, and the United Kingdom- to normalize ties with Iran and

53 Mehran Haghirian, The Rivalry Between Iran and the GCC States in the Eurasian Context, in “Iran’s Bilateral Relations in the New Eurasian Context,” ed. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Middle East Institute—Insights (July 2020): 7. 54 Ibid., 14.

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develop them in a way that had been inconceivable before.”55 During the Trump years, the European countries, particularly the E3, stood opposed to the United States on various issues and in numerous fora, and often on Iran’s side. Iran and the United States came close to a full-scale military conflict in the 2017–2021 period. At the same time, Iran effectuated a remarkable geostrategic patience that allowed for the JCPOA to continue being implemented, albeit minimally. It was indeed Iran’s resistance during the Trump Administration that allows for another chance at diplomacy between Tehran and Washington in the post-Trump era. It is expected that, once again, the United States will return to compliance with its JCPOA commitments and, at the least, Iran–U.S. relations will return back to how they were during the latter years of the Obama Administration. Nevertheless, Iran’s geostrategic approach toward the United States, in particular, and its foreign policy, in general, will undergo a significant shift in August 2021, when President Rouhani’s eight years in office comes to an end and Ebrahim Raisi ascends to power in Tehran. Undoubtedly, Iran–U.S. relations will continue to play a significant role in Iran’s geostrategic decision-making calculus in the next four years and years to come.

6 Conclusion: Trajectory of Iran–U.S. Relations in the Post-Trump and Rouhani Era This chapter attempted to present the core and flexible attributes of Iran’s geostrategic decision-making calculus in general, and toward the United States in particular. It is argued that the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the United States has experienced peaks and valleys since 1979, despite the fact that there have been no official diplomatic relations and animosities have persisted throughout the forty-two years. Moreover, the United States has, undoubtedly, topped the Islamic Republic’s threat perception, and this has been an underlying factor in Iran’s overall geostrategic policies and approaches. Indeed, Iran’s fixation on the United States has both advanced and constrained Iran’s foreign policy objectives and its bilateral relations with countries in its immediate vicinity and elsewhere.

55 Ibid., 10.

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At the same time, Iranian public opinion has also influenced Iran’s geostrategic decision-making process. As Mohsen Milani argued in 2013, “poll after poll has shown that a large majority of the Iranian population favors normal relations with the United States. It is no exaggeration to suggest that America is more popular in Iran today than it is in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt, the three major American strategic allies in the region.”56 At its best, the favorability ratings of the United States among Iranians was 31.2% (with 66.6% unfavorable ratings) in August 2015, soon after the JCPOA was signed. This was reflective of the rapprochement that culminated in the 2015 nuclear deal. Five years later, however, unfavorable views against the United States increased to their highest point in recent history, when in October 2020, 88.2% of Iranians had an unfavorable view toward the United States, while only 12.3% had favorable views.57 This was also illustrative of the general mood in Iran during the Trump years, which further supported the government’s defiance of Washington. There are once again hopes for constructive engagements between Tehran and Washington in 2021. There have already been some positive steps taken by the Biden administration to undo the previous administration’s policies toward Iran and the broader Middle East. In March 2021, for example, the new Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, sent a letter to Afghanistan’s President, Ashraf Ghani, presenting a roadmap for the Afghan peace process. In this letter, there was a direct mention of Iran’s direct involvement, along with other regional and global powers, to discuss a united front in supporting peace in Afghanistan.58 Such openings for engagement in multilateral formats have been previously welcomed by Iran. Moreover, Tehran has time and again shown that it realizes that a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan may lead to another failed state harboring terrorist networks that threaten Iran’s

56 Mohsen Milani, Is U.S.–Iran Detente Possible? Current History 112, no. 758 (December 1 2013): 347. 57 Iranian Public Opinion at the Start of the Biden Administration, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and IranPoll, March 2021. 58 Colm Quinn, Blinken Threatens May 1 Afghan Troop Withdrawal, Foreign Policy, March 8, 2021.

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national security.59 Moreover, there are other areas for further engagements, including in the continued fight against terrorism and extremism in the region, as well as on finding paths for a sustainable resolution to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The transition of power in Iran and the United States has been desynchronized since 1993. This seemingly unimportant observation has arguably been amongst the main factors inhibiting a detente in the past three decades. In August 2021, it will be the first time since 1989 that both the Iranian and American presidents enter the presidential office in the same year. The June 2021 presidential elections in Iran has already had an impact on the future trajectory of Iran–U.S. relations, and it is clear that Ebrahim Raisi will alter the Rouhani Administration’s global engagement efforts. Nevertheless, it is expected that the established geostrategic decision-making calculus will continue to consider the United States through both its core and flexible tenets.

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59 Younes Zangiabadi, Biden Must Revive “Six Plus Two Group” to Successfully Exit Afghanistan, The National Interest, February 27, 2021.

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Iran’s Understanding of Strategic Stability: In the Light of Relations with the U.S. in the Middle East Kayhan Barzegar

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Introduction

What is Iran’s understanding of “strategic stability” in the Middle East? How has it changed and evolved in the country’s contemporary history? What are Iran’s strategies for attaining strategic stability? The traditional concept of strategic stability relates to nuclear deterrence between great powers during the Cold War (For more information see www.Posse.edu). Yet due to the dynamism of international security issues in the last two decades, issues such as asymmetric threats and deterrence, development of non-Western warfare, regional powers’ independent political-security policies, increased roles of non-state actors, expansion of new terrorism (ISIS), the failed-state issues, etc., have been added to the concept of strategic stability. Needless to say that the way to looking at this concept is distinct by individual state, based on their national, historical, and geopolitical characteristics. Iran’s understanding of strategic stability (in Persian: Sebat e Rahbordi) in the region has related to its view of the strategic postures of great powers, especially the United States in recent decades, in the region and

K. Barzegar (B) Science and Research Branch of the Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_8

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their relations with Iran’s regional geopolitical rivals. At the same time, new threats emanating from the growth of rival Sunni radicalism and terrorism as identical threats to the state of Iran have affected this understanding. In this context, strategic issues in Iran’s foreign policy calculus, such as relations with great powers, establishing political coalitions with friendly political forces and states in the region, adopting deterrence policies, arms control issues, economic, and energy development policies, cultural–societal integration with the neighborhood region, and even the country’s nuclear activities have been formed. In the Shah’s time, strategic stability was primarily perceived as to counter the political-security and ideological threats posed by the Soviet Union and its regional allies such as the Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the Communist Dhofar movement in Oman. In this context, Iran defined the preservation of its geopolitical interests and national security in establishing close and comprehensive economic, political, and military relations with the Western bloc, especially with the United States and its regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. This strategy was reversed after the 1979 Islamic revolution and Iran-defined strategic stability in moving away from the Western and Eastern blocs, focusing on its own independent political-security and economic approaches, as well as increased relations with neighboring Muslim countries and the Islamic World at large. This strategy has evolved in the course of the time, based on Iran’s geopolitical and geo-economics realities on the one hand and the country’s strategic constraints in dealing with great powers on the other. At present, Iran gives more priority to the value of regionalization to advance and increase its economic and political-security goals. Accordingly, “regional multilateralism” has become the center of Iran’s foreign policy orientation in preserving strategic strategy. In both of the above-mentioned cases, before and after the Islamic revolution, playing an active role aimed at increasing “relative security” was defined as a constant in Iran’s understanding of stability in the region. This belief has been related to both Iran’s view of the precarious implications of regional instability on the survival of the state, as well as to the definition of its position as an important regional actor, subsequently having the right and responsibility to form the regional political-security architecture and solve regional problems. Iran’s engagements with the Dhofar War (1962–1976), regional crises in Afghanistan (2011), Iraq (2003), and Syria (since 2011), battle against ISIS (since 2014), etc., or its assertive defense strategy in the Strait of Hormoz, its efforts to advance

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its missile program capability as a matter of strengthening its deterrent power, although with distinct characteristics, all fall within this context. This issue becomes more significant when one notes that a dominant view in Iran’s policy circles believes that the real strategic goal of the Western bloc and especially the United States is to diminish the country’s increased role in the regional politics; and therefore, the best policy to preserve the country’s national interests and security is to follow policies which initially seek the main foreign rival player that is the U.S. to move away from the regional affairs. Iran believes that the Trump–Netanyahu–Mohammed bin Salman’s regional coalition against Iran, based on “maximum pressure” policy, was formed to weaken Iran from inside, leading subsequently to the collapse of the state of Iran. Confronting this policy, therefore, Iran responded with a “maximum resistance” policy. At present and with Trump out of the U.S. power, one needs to wait and see how the Joe Biden administration would manage to meet with Iran’s sense of insecurity. Barak Obama’s administration perceived rightly that the best way to manage Iran’s policy was to participate the country in the regional affairs commensurate with its vast sources of power. The dominant view in Tehran is that any possible change in the Iran–US relations to much extent depended on how the Biden administration would succeed to reverse the Trump’s policy and start a new phase in mutual relations, apparently by lifting economic sanctions and accepting Iran’s regional role as a constructive first step gesture.

2

Conceptual Framework: Geographical Centrality and Identical Values

The two factors of “geographical centrality” and “identical values” have been significant in shaping Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the region (Barzegar, June 22, 2013). The first factor gives Iran the sense of being at the center of instability and insecurity in different regional political-security sub-systems, i.e., in the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Central Asia and the Caucuses, the Levant and Arab Peninsula, and even Egypt and North Africa in which increased Takfiri activities, regional crises, and presence of foreign actors, endanger strategic stability in the broader region. From this perspective, playing an active or passive role will, respectively, bring about stability or instability for Iran’s national interests and security. From a realistic perspective, ignoring the role of an emerging regional power such as Iran is against the regional power equations,

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resulting in turn to further instability through inter-states rivalries. In this respect, Iran believes that strategic stability can only be achieved through collective efforts and increased regional cooperation, despite all the existing differences between regional countries on managing the existing geopolitical and ideological problems. The second element that is “identical values” relates more to Iran’s sense of having the right and responsibility for establishing a strong state, bolstering the states’ principles and values (national-Islamic) in the course of creating strategic stability in the region. From a realistic perspective again, this belief is a testament of “particularism” in Iran’s foreign policy behavior, rooted in Iran’s distinct perception in preserving its national interests and security (Barzegar, June 22, 2013). Indeed, the role of culture, values, and generally state’s principles are significant in forming Iran’s regional policy, (Naghibzadeh, Winter, 1996) demonstrating that Iran’s interests and values have evolved and adjusted at historical turning points, such as the post-Arab Spring developments. While Iran has historically been cautious of the presence of a foreign power in its sphere of influence in the neighborhood zone, it welcomed Russia’s military presence in the Syrian crisis on the fight against terrorism, despite the fact that the two states have political–ideological differences on handling this crisis. In this context, the two concepts of “strategic benefit” which relates to the factor of geographical centrality, and “strategic value” which relates to the factor of identical values will become prominent in Iran’s understanding of strategic stability. The first concept focuses on the significance of building relations at level of states, striving to signal to the world community that Iran could be a reliable and constructive partner in the region, and cooperation with the country will benefit strategic stability in the region and thus the international security. The second concept focuses more on the Iranian traditional state-centric characteristics, its cultural and societal commonalities with neighboring nations, as well as the relations with friendly political movements that are mainly global antihegemonic trends, echoing a kind of particularism. In other words, Iran strives to conduct its foreign policy with a combination of hard and soft power. Experience shows that both concepts are strong and have historical roots and backgrounds in Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the region. The current trend toward focusing on regionalism in Iranian foreign policy conducts shows a great deal of considering both geographic and

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identical aspects of pursuing its foreign policy goals. The growing popular movement to redefine the “Middle East” region as to “West Asia” region in Iran’s academic and policy circles is more aimed at illustrating the potentials and national characteristics of the state of Iran in a developmental and prospers manner, moving away from the traditional Western political–ideological definition (Firoozabadi et al., 2016). Indeed, what is called today the Arab Middle East, subsequently bringing about the argument in the West and the U.S. or by some Arab countries, that Iran is pursuing an expansionist policy in the Arab geography, is called by Iran as “the region” with its own specific problems, inter-linked with the country’s geopolitical interests and national security concerns. Saddam’s war against Iran, ISIS attacks, sectarian wars, and numerous U.S. military bases across Iran’s immediate borders, etc., are among these problems. In terms of policy implications, this understanding of strategic stability has led to two foreign policy approaches in the course of the time: first, an assertive or active policy and second, an accommodative foreign policy, followed by Iranian governments in different manners (Barzegar, 2010, pp.173–189). For instance, the Shah’s policy was a combination of both approaches, though distinct from one regional state to another. During the time of the Islamic republic, President Rafsanjani and Khatami followed an accommodative policy, perceiving strategic stability in the line with detente policy at the regional and international levels. President Ahmadinejad rather favored an assertive policy, building on increased relations with political movements and friendly states in the region. Yet, again President Rouhani’s foreign policy, which is based on the theme of “moderation,” has followed an accommodative policy with the neighboring countries, trying to decrease tensions with major Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, perceiving it a prerequisite to accommodate Iran’s international interactions. His government introduced the concept of a “strong region” as a path toward peace and prosperity, thus strategic stability in the region (Ashena, 2016, pp. 173–189). In contrast, the conventional wisdom among Iran’s policy circles is that establishing strategic stability requires a “strong Iran” in the region (Mottaghi, January 15, 2019).

3

Strategic Stability in Historical Perspective

In Iran’s contemporary history, there are five turning points in changing and evolving the country’s perspective toward strategic Stability in the region.

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First, the Shah’s era: Under his reign, strategic stability was defined more in the context of Iran’s relations with great powers and based on the Cold War situations. In those years, Iran perceived regional stability in building close relations with the Western block, while preserving its minimal relations with the Eastern bloc as a necessity to balance its regional and international relations. Proximity with the West had somehow affected Iran’s regional relations too. The conventional wisdom was that Iran’s increased significance among Western countries and especially the United States would ultimately enhance Iran’s international and regional status. Consequently, regional key players such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq sought increased relations with Iran, welcoming Iran’s regional role to solve regional disputes. Consequently, Iran solved its territorial dispute with Iraq in 1975 by signing the Algiers Treaty. Prior to this and during 1962–1976, Iran engaged in the Dhofar War to tackle the growing threats of communist forces in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite some suspicions on the Shah’s regional ambitious plans, Saudi Arabia somehow accepted Iran’s role in the Arab affairs. In this respect, President Nixon’s two-pillar policy in the 1970s dedicated the duty of preserving the stability and security in the Persian Gulf region to both Iran and Saudi Arabia as the military-security pillar and the financial pillar, respectively (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006, pp.12–14). In those years, Iran took a pioneer lead in the OPEC to increase the oil price in order to enhance its military and economic power. Iran also tried to affect the regional trends in order to frame its relations with great powers, especially with the United States. Second, the advent of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution: The transform of Iran’s political structure and ruling political elites as the result of the Islamic revolution, dramatically changed Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the region. Soon the anti-hegemonic nature of the Islamic revolution dominated Iran’s foreign policy conducts and international relations, consequently redefining the necessity of increased relations with the neighborhood region and Islamic world in enhancing Iran’s sources of national power and regional status. Subsequently, Iran defined its national strength and enhanced regional status, thereby establishing strategic stability, in having close relations with political and anti-hegemonic movements on the one hand, and distancing from the West and especially the U.S. on the other. In this era, Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy conduct toward the U.S. were greatly affected by the thoughts of the founder of the Islamic Republic, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who believed that Iran’s interests could only be preserved

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if the country kept away from the United States and Western bloc. Although one should accept that the nature of the 1979 Islamic revolution was in many ways in ideological conflict with the American hegemonic worldview and Western liberalism, this belief was not necessarily echoed in absolute anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiment in Iran’s foreign policy. Rather it was testament to a new philosophy in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, establishing that Iran would follow its own, independent political, security, and economic trends in regional and global equations, which would inevitably be in contradiction with U.S.’ hegemonic aims in the Middle East region. To this end, it was necessary for Iran to define strategic stability for itself in the region through divorcing its domestic politics and foreign policy from those of Western dominant trends and especially America. Third, the post 1980–1988 Iraq–Iran war: Entering the era of construction under late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and gaining first-hand experience from the eight-year war in encountering the great powers, the U.S. and the Soviets and their regional allies, especially those of the Arab conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf, who altogether acted against Iran, has evolved Iran’s understanding of strategic stability. The war showed Iran’s complex relations with the Arab world at the regional level and that Iran is alone at the international level and has no choice than to count on its own domestic resources for economic development and enhancing its military and defense strength. Accordingly, Iran’s perspective toward strategic stability was further centered on international interactions on the one hand and post-war domestic issues such as establishing economic advancement, political stability, and security on the other. Under President Rafsanjani, the main theme of stability was “construction” and “development” through adopting an accommodative diplomacy and détente at the regional and international level. The main factor affecting such an understanding was Iran’s needs to high technology and the flow of foreign investments to process Iran’s economic development and growth, especially in the energy section. In this context, the country’s 20-Year Vision was ratified, which accordingly Iran should become the most economically developed country within 2025. In fact, with a developmental and interactive approach at the regional and international level, the Vision is focusing on economic growth and security, energy, and political and social development in order to acquire strategic stability (1404 Vision Document). This way of understanding was dominant during the Rafsanjani’s era until the reformist President Mohammad

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Khatami era that resorting to political reform became the main theme of stability at the domestic and regional level. Fourth, regional developments in post-September 11 events: The U.S.’ direct military presence in the region as the result of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 events has increased the sense of strategic instability from the United States and its regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel in the region among the Iranian politicalsecurity elites. President George W. Bush dubbed Iran as a member of “axis of evil” state (Glass, January 29, 2002). Iran felt it was encircled by its adversaries and this situation evolved Iran’s perspective toward strategic stability, shifting to conduct a more assertive approach in the region. Iran adopted a two-pronged policy: First, playing an active role in regional politics through strengthening coalition with friendly political forces and states in the region. Second, it tried to prevent any institutionalization of the U.S.’ political-security role by opposing with the ratification of strategic political-security treaty with these newly established states in Afghanistan and Iraq (ESPA between US and IRA, 2012). Iran’s justification was that the intense presence of the U.S. in the regional affairs will itself be the main source of strategic instability in the region. Indeed, Iran believes that waging wars and the presence of foreign forces is the main reason behind the emergence and expansion of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, as it provides the justification for recruiting new forces by these groups in order to fight the occupation forces in their sacred lands. During this era, which was coincided with Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s security-military elites, who had good experience from the eight-year war and familiarity with the regional affairs, played a key role in shaping Iran’s regional policy. They enhanced this notion that the best way to confront the U.S. forces is to boost the role and strength of local friendly forces. Some Western analysts believe that this change in Iran’s strategic calculus was due to the failure of U.S. military intervention in achieving its strategic goals, consequently the emergence of a power vacuum especially in Iraq, that led Iran to take advantage of its geopolitical superiority and cultural–religious commonality with the neighborhood region, thereby increasing its levers of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Nasr, January 4, 2020). Fifth, the conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015: The process of the nuclear negotiations which concluded in July 2015 by signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA) between Iran and world powers has also affected Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the

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region. The domestic tendency was that for developing its economy, thereby strengthening its regional status, Iran needs to solve its strategic discrepancy with the U.S. and the West at large in order to lift international economic sanctions. Iran’s pragmatic President Hassan Rouhani could manage to win the presidential elections with this slogan that, “centrifuges should spin, but so should people’s lives” (Bozorgmehr, April 3, 2015). This somehow refers to the significance of economic development in the light of creating stability in the region, as well as the necessity to interact with foreign powers by avoiding tension. By this approach, President Rouhani convinced the Iranian voters of the necessity to balance between strategy and resources in order to make Iran’s foreign policy more rational. In this era, the developments related to the nuclear negotiations and the positive outlook of lifting sanctions on Iran’s economy greatly affected Iran’s perspective. In other words, the effect of economic sanctions and political change in the country has made it possible to bring the issue of strategic stability in the political and economic discourses of domestic politics, subsequently enhancing public propensity to the necessity of economic and political interaction with outside world. Rouhani’s administration chooses to follow a third way of politics in Iran that is “moderation” (out of the two traditional reformist and conservative trends) as the base of domestic and foreign policy conducts. He defined strategic stability as the interaction with the region and the world in the context of a “win–win” diplomacy (Dahghnapisheh, February 11, 2015). The new situation as the result of the nuclear deal and an interactive approach with outside world has also changed the Western view, especially the European countries, toward Iran convincing them that Iran’s regional role, as a significant player, for battling terrorism and solving the existing regional problems should be taken more into consideration for establishing regional stability. Although the nuclear deal has not solved the sense of strategic insecurity between Iran and America, it decreased the danger of conflict between the two rivals to the least possible situation. By the time, this significant development to some extent changed Iran’s sense of distrust from the U.S. regional policies, which during past decades were based on the regime change policy and introducing Iran as the main source of instability in the region. This of course changed soon by coming to power of Donald Trump in the U.S. and his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reframing the so-called Iran’s threat to the regional security in a new manner. Indeed, with the nuclear deal and the relative decrease of

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tension in the Iran–U.S. relations at least for a while, the issue of strategic stability in Iran’s understanding has more centered on the necessity of enhancing multilateralism and collective efforts for solving the regional problems such as terrorism and the crises in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran even at some point proposed indirect regional cooperation with the U.S., provided that the principles of the nuclear deal were completely implemented (Rozen, September 27, 2015). This shows that Iran at some point was ready to accept a gradual change of strategy and adjustment to its understanding of strategic stability in the context of regional issues and the U.S.’ role.

4

Strategic Stability in the Light of Containment and Deterrence

During the last decade, Iran’s perspective on strategic stability has been based on the two elements of “containment” and “deterrence.” First, the issue of containing the threats is a dynamic policy with an ability to adjust itself with the regional political-security environment. This policy aims to minimize the potential threats through an increased relation with friendly regional political forces, as well as economic-cultural integration with the neighborhood zone. Second, the element of “deterrence” is further related to the conventional military aspect of Iran’s strength, especially enhancing Iran’s precision-guided missile systems’ capabilities on the one hand, and full readiness for conducting asymmetric wars through mobilizing friendly forces in the time of insecurity on the other. In the course of time and during recent years, the issue of deterrence has evolved in Iran’s strategic calculus and further linked to the concept of “preemption” of the threats from the region (Nasr, April 1, 2018). Based on this logic, Iran engaged in war with Takfiri forces and ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Iran has also enforced its navy forces in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, these two elements have somehow linked with the political and military components of Iran’s perspective toward strategic stability. Iran believes that an increased regional role and assertive policy will benefit the state to preempt the perceived national security threats. At the same time, enforcing the country’s conventional arm forces will help to develop this strategy. The result of such a perspective is the formation of a “defensive deterrence” strategy in Iran’s national security doctrine, a combination of political and military elements. First and at the political level, this doctrine relates to the concept of the necessity of preserving

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stability in the region as a historical responsibility of the state of Iran, giving the perceived legitimacy to the country’s political-security elites to conduct an assertive policy in the region only in the time of crisis and insecurity that is pointed to the survival of the state. For instance, Iran’s policy in Syria for supporting the Bashar Al Assad’s government is due to the fact that Damascus has been Tehran’s geostrategic partner in an insecure neighborhood and that losing Syria will endanger Iran’s geopolitical interests in the border regional politics. Indeed, this way of understanding strategic stability has led Iran to link its national security with its foreign policy goals and legitimize its conducts in Syria in the domestic politics for years. Second and at the military level, such perspective relates to tackling the threats through military deterrence. In recent years, this perspective has intensely expanded and evolved in Iran’s military and national security doctrine. In terms of policy implications, this strategy of containment and deterrence can be categorized at three levels: First, at the level of regional crises: Iran’s engagement in the Dhofar war (1962–1976) was mainly aimed at containing the increasing power of communist forces and tackling any perceived threat to the regional stability, especially the security of energy flow to world free markets. In this respect, Iran saw a historical responsibility for itself to practice its deterrent power to tackle the threat. Iran’s active presence in Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003 was more aimed at containing the U.S.’ threat to its national security. At present, Iran’s presence in Syria, as mentioned above, beyond supporting a strategic ally in the region and issues related to the Hezbollah resistant movement and the Israeli threats in the domain of deterrence, is rather related to contain the U.S.’ military threats. Based on this strategic logic, the Iran–Russia relations are evolving and forming rapidly to contain a combination of diverse symmetric and asymmetric threats. In this respect, battles against hostile conventional forces in Syrian and ISIS in Iraq and Syria have somehow linked with the concept of “preemption” of national security threats outside of Iran’s national borders. Second, Persian Gulf security: At present, Iran’s strategy in the Persian Gulf, especially at the Strait of Hormuz, is also based on containment and deterrence of the possible threat, based on its geopolitical superiority in the region. Preserving the security of this region both in terms of economic and political-security aspects is in the domain of Iran’s vital national interests and security. Accordingly, Iran believes that

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its active presence is among its rights and responsibilities. Warning the US navy forces by all means such as speed boats, which occurred many times in the Obama era, continued during the Trump’s administration, and is likely to continue in the Biden era, indicates this deterrent strategy that Iran in any circumstances is prepared to defend its national interests and security and beyond that shows its strength. From Iran’s perspective, it is the U.S. forces that are the real source of instability in the region. The U.S. has many military bases in the region and its drones gather intelligence from Iran. One of these drones targeted Iran’s Major General Qasem Solimani in early January 2020, consequently leading Iran to attack the American Ain Al-Asad air bases in Iraq (Kube et al., January 8, 2020). This line of thinking which was several times stressed by both Iran’s defense minister and foreign minister indicates that the U.S. presence in the region is the main source of insecurity in the country’s strategic thinking and must be contained. The issue becomes more significant while one considers that despite Iran’s vital economic interests from exporting energy, as well as exports and imports of goods through its ports in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormoz, Iran has simultaneously announced that it will resort to deterrent actions and block the Strait at the time of imposed threat to its economic security and hostile actions by rival countries and their regional allies, who also benefit from trade and energy exports from the Strait. President Hassan Rohani also stressed that if Iran won’t be able to export its energy, the others won’t be too (Reuters, December 4, 2018). In a slightly different manner, this defense strategy had even existed at the time of the Shah. Third, developing Iran’s missile capabilities: This issue has also direct relation to the issue of deterring threats from adversary states or in other words to balance the threat through posing threat. Based on this logic, negotiation on Iran’s missile program was defined as a red line during the nuclear talks and in the final agreement known as the JCPOA. For Iran, the issue of missiles has both identical and technical logic. First and as a matter of the survival of the state, preserving the country’s missile capabilities is the demand of military forces. Second, there is a strong public request to preserve and advance these capabilities as a matter of national accomplishment and pride which have been achieved with vast indigenous efforts during the past decades. From a technical point of view, there is this understanding that no country will negotiate on its conventional deterring forces and the fact that the missile issues are beyond any nuclear deal. Based on this logic, Iran has continued

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its missile tests and evolved it to an advanced and precision guided stage. During the last decade, Iran successfully tested almost 2000 kilometer long-rage missiles such as Emad, Shahab-3, and Khoramshar. In its latest test, Qasem (named after Commander Qasem Soliemani) was successfully tested in September 2020 (Motamedi, January 16, 2021).

5

Nuclear Program and Strategic Stability

There are different perspectives in Iran regarding the country’s nuclear program and its link with strategic stability and the issue of deterrence and containment in the region. First, strategic instability: A dominant perspective in Iran believes that acquiring nuclear weapons cause the country to lose its superior conventional military status in the region through encouraging other players such as Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons, and this situation will bring about insecurity and strategic instability for Iran (Zarif, Summer 2007). On the other hand, any effort for acquiring such a weapon will increase the sense of insecurity among the regional and trans-regional players from Iran’s regional policy, consequently adding to the existing zero sum game in the region justifying the policy of containing Iran’s increased regional role and power at the international level. From this perspective, any thoughts on weaponizing Iran’s nuclear activities would be detrimental and costly to Iran’s national security and interests (Hadian et al., 2010, pp.189–194). This situation will be a driving force for giving enough pretext to the U.S. and its regional allies to continue their anti-Iranian position in the region (Zahrani, April 4, 2017). From this perspective, therefore, securitizing Iran’s nuclear program will itself be resulting in Iran’s insecurity. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif during the nuclear negotiations with 5 + 1 group focused on transparency and de-securitization of Iran’s nuclear dossier. Following this approach, Iran wanted to break the Western view which so far considered Iran’s nuclear program as the main threat to the regional and international peace and security. Indeed, the JCPOA agreement in July 2015 was a turning point in this regard. Second, nuclear program and regional role: The second view believes that preserving an independent uranium enrichment cycle in Iran’s nuclear program will strengthen the sources of Iran’s national power at the regional and international levels, providing a significant base for the country’s security deterrence. On the one hand, it avoids the rival

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and adversary players in engaging at any possible military actions. On the other, it produces an invaluable leverage of negotiation for Iran in handling other mutual issues of strategic significance such as regional and missiles issues with the West, especially with the U.S. from an equal position (Mottaghi, 2017, pp. 31–35). This situation itself will be a source of strategic stability for the country. From this perspective, Iran’s relation with the West is beyond the nuclear program, pertaining to other significant strategic issues such as the U.S.’ long attempts to change the regime in Iran. Therefore, Iran must strengthen its deterrent power and leverages for tackling the greater threat to its national security. This perspective has had a pessimistic view toward the aims and intentions of the U.S. regarding the full implementation of the JCPOA’s principles, linking the issue more to the political-identical matters, rather than the nuclear issue itself (Dolatyar, 2017, p. 275). With the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, and subsequently the incapability of the European powers to implement their own commitments under the Deal’s principles without the U.S. presence, the entire entity of the JCPOA has gone under challenge. Although the Biden administration announced that the U.S. is willing to return to the JCPOA, at present Iran’s government and public, as a result of Trump’s maximum pressure policy and imposing economic hardships on the nation, are extremely skeptical about the U.S.’ intentions. As a result, Iran insistently asks the Biden administration to take the first step and lift all the economic sanctions (Vahdat, February 7, 2021). Iran’s parliament also passed a law obligating the government to halt implementing the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on February 23, 2021 (Masterson et al., December 10, 2020). Third, nuclear geopolitics and stability: The third perspective, linked with the containment and deterrence issues, believes in the significance of nuclear geopolitics in Iran’s understanding of strategic stability. From this perspective, Iran’s nuclear potential capabilities, postured at the level of a “nuclear threshold” can create stability and security for Iran. The origin of this perspective is more rooted at the intellectual and academic circle focusing on the concept of creating sustainable security for the state of Iran which has been the subject of threats and enmity by foreign states in the course of the time. The belief here is that any comfort in Iran’s security vulnerabilities in an indefinite manner and leading the country to an advanced and strengthening position at the regional and international level requires the country to continue its nuclear program in a

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stand-by stage. This situation would be advantageous for Iran both from technology and military aspects. The discussions linked to the necessity of withdrawing from the NPT are related to this perspective (Brojerdi and Zarif, January 20, 2020). The main argument is that the Treaty is a production of the Cold War and a compromise between nuclear powers imposing many obligations to Iran without giving any advantages to the country. Some even believe that the West and U.S.’ hard push to deprive Iran from its conventional deterrent and missiles capabilities might pose the risk of Iran’s resorting to nuclear weapons (Nima, February 9, 2021). This line of thinking of course has no place in Iran’s official nuclear posture.

6

Approaches to Strategic Stability

During the contemporary history, Iran has employed distinct strategies to achieve strategic stability in the region. First, coalition with the West: This strategy, implied mostly during the Shah’s era and before the 1979 Islamic revolution, perceived that enforcing Iran’s national power and also its role in stabilizing the region would be achieved through increased and close relations with the Western block, especially the United States. In those times, Iran’s statecrafts believed that the country’s strategic value was to have a comprehensive political-security, economic, and even cultural relations with the West. Under the Shah, Iran improved its relations with the U.S. and its allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Israel and tried to strengthen its military capabilities in the light of good political ties with the West. Through this strategy, Iran solved some of its regional issues, as mentioned above, and enhanced its regional status among the western countries. Of course during this process, intensified arms race emerged between Iran and Iraq with the sponsorship of the U.S. and the Soviet, and one should note this as one of the main reasons behind starting and prolonging the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war. Second, regional cooperation: After the advent of the Islamic revolution, and especially after the 2003 Iraq war that led to the installation of a Shiite state in Iraq, Iran defines strategic stability through increased regional cooperation and expanded relations with friendly political forces such as Hezbollah and Al Bader force in Lebanon and Iraq empowering its inter-states relations with Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. During this time that continues until today, Iran defines its strategic value at the

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international level through increasing its regional role and expanding comprehensive political, economic, and cultural relations with the neighborhood region. In this era, distancing from the West and the U.S. has been the base for establishing stability and security for Iran, and the country has simultaneously attempted to develop and evolve its own independent political-security and economic strategies. Accordingly, Iran has strived to increase relations with regional friendly political movements and suppressed nations, especially the Shiite factions. Yet this process, antagonized some conservative states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. In this regard, the Arab Spring developments, as well as the conclusion of the nuclear deal (the JCPOA) between Iran and world powers in 2015, have been two turning points in increasing rivalry and enmity between Iran and some conservative Arab regimes in the region leading them to seek the U.S. and Western countries’ supports in containing Iran’s regional role in different fronts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Third, multilateralism: This strategy is based on the necessity of adjusting Iran’s geopolitical interests and foreign policy aims with the regional environment and global issues by implementing an accommodative policy at the regional and international levels. This strategy has appeared in Iran’s foreign policy conduct with coming to the office of the moderate government of Hassan Rouhani, who perceives that strategic stability in the region is in a situation that Iran is not to sit between the region and the West, rather it should benefit from the political and economic potentials of both sides and increase its regional role in a constructive manner. In this era, Iran attempted to stress on the value and significance of its strategic role in bringing about stability and security through engaging with peace negotiations such as the Astana Process (with Russia and Turkey) for resolving the Syrian crisis or fighting with ISIS in Iraq. Resorting to win–win multilateral diplomacy has been the constant of Iran’s foreign policy after the June 2015 nuclear deal. Yet, with the Trump’s administration and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and its so-called “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, the entire logic of this strategy has come under question in Iran’s domestic politics, leading the country to count on itself by an “inward looking” economic approach and resistance policy. This situation has led Iran to resort a new strategy of developing relations with the neighborhood zone, based on “regional multilateralism” (Barzegar, December 23, 2019). This strategy focuses on the advantages of Iran’s geopolitics as a

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crossroad of different main regional sub-systems, which centers more on the value of regionalism in Iran’s foreign policy conduct.

7

Conclusion

The concept of strategic stability has been a dynamic element in Iran’s strategic understanding toward the Middle East developments that have gained political, security, and economic aspects in the course of the time to adjust itself with a balancing and evolving level. In the last decade, Iran’s approach of preserving strategic stability has been based on how to tackle geopolitical threats of hostile countries and extremist forces such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS. Iran has tried to adjust its foreign policy conducts based on the level of threats in the region and over time focused more of preserving its geopolitical and national security threats. In this respect, the U.S.’ positions and policies against Iran such as “regime change policy,” building “anti-Iran coalition” with the support of its regional allies, and finally the “maximum pressure” policy during the Trump’s era in order to minimize Iran’s regional role have significant impacts on Iran’s changing behavior. Responding to the U.S. threats, Iran maintains that the only way for establishing strategic stability is to expel the U.S. forces from the region and preventing the institutionalization of the political-security role in the broader Middle East region. This Iran’s policy has become more significant after the assassination of Major General Qasem Soliemani, when Iran announced it will take a “hard revenge” and that is the dismissal of the U.S. forces from the region. Indeed, with its policies of regimes changes, military presence across Iran’s borders, and efforts to create anti-Iranian coalitions in the region, Washington has had the most significant impact on Tehran’s understanding toward the issues of containment and deterrent. Most of Iran’s defensive strategies have been strategized to contain the U.S.’ threats and its anti-Iran regional policy. Meanwhile, the two main allies of the U.S. in the region that are Saudi Arabia and Israel have also affected Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the region. The Saudis’ policy of intensifying ideological and geopolitical rivalry with Iran on the regional issues in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and forming an anti-Iranian coalition in the region with the help of other conservative Arab regimes and Israel, especially after the JCPOA, has led Iran to adjust its defense strategy with the new political-security realities

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in the region. As a result, Iran has mobilized and enhanced the positions of its friendly forces and adopted a more assertive policy to confront the Saudis’ endeavor. The Saudi’s new doctrine, known as the “Salman Doctrine” overtly seeks to confront Iran’s regional role and at some point allied with the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy to weaken Iran from inside, ultimately leading to the collapse of the state of Iran. Yet, despite all these Saudi’s confronting measures, Iran believes that an increased relation with Saudi Arabia in the context of bi-lateral and regional multilateral levels benefits Iran’s geopolitical interests and will be in favor of establishing strategic stability in the region. Finally, Israel’s military threat to Iran’s nuclear facilities and its occasional air attacks on Iranian field positions in Syria and Iraq has impacted Iran’s understanding of strategic stability in the region, leading the country to count more on containment and deterrent policy. In response to Israeli threats, Iran resorted to a “balance of threat” strategy, adopting a “massive retaliation” tactic by counting on its conventional and precision-guided missiles, and at the same time enhancing the positions of Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, Hashd al Shaabi (PMF) in Iraq, the Ansarullah forces in Yemen, who are loyal to Iran and have the common interests of attacking Israel. These forces pose vast conventional and guided missiles capable of targeting Israeli territories. They have also overtly announced that they will not hesitate to target Israel at any time in case of insecurity for Iran.

References Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin, (2006). The International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Routledge, pp. 12–14. Ashena, Hesamoddin (2016). Competent States in Stronger Region: A Moderate Approach in Iran’s Regional Policy (in Persian language), Journal of Strategic Studies on Public Policy, Issue 20, pp. 220–223. Barzegar, Kayhan (2010). Iran Foreign Policy After Saddam. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, Issue 1, pp. 173–189. Barzegar, Kayhan (2013). The Role of Regional Actors in the Syrian Crisis in the Light Classic Realism and Constructivism, Iranian Diplomacy (in Persian language), June 22. Barzegar, Kayhan (2019). Regional Multilateralism to Better Serve Peace and Security in Middle East, IFP News, December 23. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https://ifpnews.com/regional-multilateralism-to-betterserve-peace-and-security-in-middle-east.

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Bozorgmehr, Najmeh (2015). Iran Celebrates yet Challenges Remain for Rouhani, Financial Times, April 3. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https:// www.ft.com/content/aadb9d2a-d9e7-11e4-9b1c-00144feab7de. Brojerdi, Alloddin (Iranian MP) (2021). Iran Threatens to Withdraw the NPT, Trend News.Com, Retrieved in April 2021, from: http://fa. trend.az/news/nuclearp/2136588.html. See also Zarif, Mohammad Javad (2020). Iran to Quit NPT if Its Nuclear Programme Referred to UN: Zarif, Al Jazeera.com, 20 January. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/20/iran-to-quit-npt-if-itsnuclear-programme-referred-to-un-zarif. Dehghani Firoozabadi, Seyed Jalal, and Ahmadi Laforaki, Behzad (2016). Security Order in West Asia, (in Persian), Tehran: Abrar Moaser Publication. Dehghanpisheh, Babak (2015). Iran’s Rouhani Says Goal of Nuclear Negotiations Is ‘Win-Win’ Outcome, Reuters, February 11. Retrieved in January 2021, from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-politics/iransrouhani-says-goal-of-nuclear-negotiations-is-win-win-outcome-idUSKBN0L F1L120150211. Dolatyar, Mostafa (2017). Continuity and Change in the Positions of Great Powers and Nuclear Diplomacy, in: Kayhan Barzegar and Ali Esmaeli Ardakani (2017). Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy (in Persian language) Allameh Tabatabai University Publication, p. 275. Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Retrieved in February 2021, from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u. s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf. For Further Academic Studies About Strategic Stability Refer To: The Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE), Retrieved in February 2021, from: http://posse.gatech.edu/; www.dolat.ir/pdf/20years.pdf. Glass, Andrew (2002). President Bush Cites ‘Axis of Evil’, Politico, January 29. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/ 29/bush-axis-of-evil-2002-1127725. Hadian, Naser and Hormozi, Shani (2010). Iran Nuclear Program: Strategic Capabilities (in Persian language). Political Science Research Journal, Summer, pp. 189–194. Kube, Courtney and Madani, Doha (2020). Iran retaliates for Gen. Soleimani’s Killing by Firing Missiles at U.S. Forces in Iraq, nbcnews.com, January 8. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-sbase-iraq-comes-under-attack-missiles-iran-claims-n1112171. Masterson, Julia, and Davenport, Kelsey (2020). Iran Passes Nuclear Law, Arms Control Association, December 10. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2020-12/p4-1-iran-nuclear-deal-alert.

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Motamedi, Maziar (2021). Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Tests Long-Range Missiles, Drones, Al Jazeera.com, 16 January. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/irans-revolutio nary-guards-test-long-range-missiles-drones. Mottaghi, Ebrahim (2017). Model and Process in Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy, in: Kayhan Barzegar and Ali Esmaeli Ardakani (2017). Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy (in Persian language) Allameh Tabatabai University Publication, pp. 31–35. Mottaghi, Ebrahim (2019). Analyzing Iran’s Forty-Year Islamic Revolution, Mashraegh News, January 15. Retrieved in April 2021, from: https://www. mashreghnews.ir/tag. Naghibzadeh, Ahmad (1996). Studying Iran’s Regional Status (in Persian language), Middle East Studies Quarterly, Issue 1, Winter. Nasr, Vali (2018). Iran Among the Ruins, Tehran’s Advantage in a Turbulent Middle East, Foreign Affairs, March/April. Nasr, Vali (2020). Hard-Line U.S. Policy Tips Iran Toward Belligerence: Vali Nasr, Bloomberg View, January 4. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-01-05/hard-line-us-policy-tips-iran-toward-belligerence-vali-nasr. Nima, Adena (2021). Intelligence Minister Says Iran Can Make Nukes Despite Khamenei’s Fatwa, Iran News Wire, February 9. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://irannewswire.org/intelligence-minister-saysiran-can-make-nukes-despite-khameneis-fatwa/. Reuters Staff (2018). If Iran Can’t Export Oil from Gulf, No Other Country Can, Iran’s President Says, Reuters, December 4. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-iran-idUSKBN1O30MI. Rozen, Luara (2015). Rouhani’s Chief of Staff: More US-Iran Antiterrorism Cooperation Possible, Al-Monitor, September 27. Retrieved in February 2021, from: www.al-monitor.com/.../mohammad-nahavandian-int erview-iran-hassan-rouhani.html. Vahdat, Amir (2021). Iran: US Must Lift Sanctions Before It Lives Up to Nuke Deal, Associated Press, February 7. Retrieved in February 2021, from: https://ifpnews.com/regional-multilateralism-to-better-servepeace-and-security-in-middle-east. Zahrani, Mostafa (2017). Political Solution Is Best to Sole the Syrian Crisis, Iranian Diplomacy, April 4. Zarif, Mohammad Javad (2007). Tackling The IRAN-U.S. Crisis: The Need for a Paradigm Shift, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 2, Spring/Summer.

Controversial Efficiency? The Experience of the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran Petr Kortunov

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and Ivan Timofeev

Introduction

For some time now, the U.S. Government has used economic sanctions as one of the main tools of exporting the country’s influence abroad, aiming to force other actors to change their policies to facilitate American interests. This has largely been possible thanks to the importance of the U.S. economy, which has allowed Washington to intimidate other countries and companies into changing their policies in return for continued access to the U.S. market. This “soft power” has enabled Washington to weaponize the country’s economy in order to export its influence abroad and put economic pressure on certain governments to see their policies changed. A number of countries have been the target of U.S. sanctions over the years (to various degrees), sometimes at the initiative of Washington itself, and sometimes at the behest of the United Nations. Today, some 30 countries are under various degrees of U.S. economic restrictions. However, despite the sanctions being one of the most used tools of coercive policies by the United States, their effectiveness is often called into question.

P. Kortunov · I. Timofeev (B) Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_9

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This chapter proceeds from the hypothesis that the economic sanctions currently implemented by the Trump administration against the Islamic Republic of Iran, while certainly damaging to the country’s economy, are not particularly effective. Moreover, the maximum pressure campaign, supposedly employed to force the country to make concessions to the U.S. Government, is not likely to bear any fruit in the foreseeable future. The sanctions regime has been in place for one and a half years now, achieving precisely the opposite of what was intended—instead of forcing Iran to negotiate a new version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it has created further incentives for Tehran to resist Washington’s demands, despite the economic damage. The U.S. pressure campaign against Iran is twofold—it consists of economic pressure applied in order to create an unfavourable economic situation in the country, and the informal threat of using military force. The idea is to compel Iran to be more cooperative and discourage attempts to escalate the situation. Even though these measures have been in place for some time now, neither is likely to be successful in the long run. Despite the predictions of the Trump administration, the economic sanctions on their own have failed to bring Iran to the negotiating table, let alone force the country to accept Washington’s demands. The country has taken an unflinching position towards negotiations with the United States; in spite of the pressure and the constant threat of military action, Iran has refused to concede to Washington’s demands. What is more, the maximum pressure campaign pursued by the Trump administration will likely ease off when Trump leaves office in January 2021 and Joe Biden takes over. While reviving the JCPOA is a difficult task, even with the good will of both Iran and the U.S. administration, it is reasonable to expect that the sanctions regime will be significantly curtailed to ease the tensions in the Middle East and build an atmosphere for reconciliation between the two countries. We can thus expect some changes to be made to the sanctions regime in the near future as Washington and Tehran try to mitigate the damage done by Trump’s campaign.

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Literature Review

The subject of sanctions has received a great deal of attention in academic circles in recent years, as the United States has noticeably stepped up its use of economic restrictions as a means of pressuring its rivals over the past three decades. Numerous works have been published covering the

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legislative grounds for maintaining economic sanctions, the amount of damage they can inflict upon the economies of the target countries, the degree to which they successfully force the target countries to concede, etc. Despite extensive research, there is still no consensus among scholars as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, as their success is rarely evident and in many cases cannot be attributed to sanctions alone, but is rather the result of other factors that overshadow the role of sanctions, per se. In order to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions regime imposed by the United States, we must first have a clear understanding of what is generally meant by the term “economic sanctions.” With governments having an array of measures at their disposal to influence other countries, it is not uncommon to see other tools identified as sanctions. Economic sanctions are often confused with such tools as economic warfare and trade wars, which are closely related, but nevertheless differ greatly from one another. Economic sanctions are usually defined as economic measures that are aimed at making the economy of the target country deteriorate to such an extent that the government has to amend its policies. The idea is to inflict such damage on a country’s economy that it is no longer worth it for that country to continue its undesired conduct, thus forcing it to seek a compromise or accept the demands of the initiating state or states in their entirety. The sanction can influence the target government either directly, by demonstrating that maintaining the same policies will result in prolonged pressure on the economy, or indirectly, by making the population of the country so dissatisfied with the economic situation that social unrest will practically force the government to amend its policies. Although trade restrictions can in many cases be a part of the general pressure campaign, they are not the primary tools of sanctions regimes and are mostly used to inflict additional damage to the country’s economy or demonstrate the consequences of the target country’s failure to comply with the demands. The main objective of economic sanctions is to damage the gross national product as much as possible in order to force the government to agree to change certain policies. Economic warfare is in many ways similar to economic sanctions, yet it ultimately pursues different objectives. The concept of economic warfare centres around imposing certain limitations on the target country’s economy (such as boycotts, embargos, etc.) in order to weaken it economically and subsequently curtail its political and, most importantly,

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military capabilities. Such measures are often used if there is an ongoing standoff between two countries, with the idea being that damage to the economy will inevitably affect the country’s ability to enhance its military sector. Unlike economic sanctions, economic warfare does not seek to make the target country agree to concessions. Instead, its main objective is to damage the target country’s economy to such an extent that certain military or political objectives are simply unattainable. Another somewhat similar measure sometimes mistaken for economic sanctions is a trade war, which despite being used primarily to force the target state make certain concessions, is nevertheless quite different from a sanctions regime. Economic sanctions seek to influence the policies of the target country, for example, forcing it to abandon aggressive policies towards other entities or compelling it to respect human rights. Trade wars, on the other hand, while also aiming to influence the conduct of the target country, are about changing economic relations between the target and the initiator. Such wars usually happen between trade partners that have long-established economic relations, where one party is seeking to change the balance in its favour. The effectiveness of sanctions has been a widely disputed topic for decades and remains so today. There has never been a consensus on the success rate of economic sanctions, mainly because it is not always easy to determine the factors that had the greatest effect on the decision to change policies in the target country. The general narrative fluctuates between considering sanctions a relatively effective tool in politics and strongly questioning their efficacy. The foundation for research into the effectiveness of sanctions was laid by Gary Hufbauer et al. (1985) whose research aimed to analyze the success rates of the sanctions regimes imposed from 1914 to 1990. The study concludes that sanctions are a very effective foreign policy tool that could very well serve as an alternative for warfare in the future (Hufbauer et al. 1985). These findings were later challenged by Robert A. Pape, who contested that the study was not extensive enough and was too optimistic in attributing the success of all the cases analyzed to sanctions (Pape 1997). According to him, sanctions on their own are not a very effective tool when it comes to coercing target countries, and in most cases end up failing if they are not backed up by the threat of military action. Danial W. Drezner (2003) also questioned the method of measuring the effectiveness of sanctions employed by Hufbauer et al. Drezner noted that Hufbauer’s work did not take into account cases where the threat

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of sanctions was enough to bring about the desired result. And this, he argued, that sanctions are most effective, as target countries often back down at the threat of sanctions without escalating the situation (Drezner 2003). The Hufbauer study fails to account for a number of such cases and thus cannot be considered entirely credible. Navin A. Bapat (2013) further elaborated on the topic of the effectiveness of sanctions, attempting to uncover which factors are crucial to the success of sanctions regimes. He highlights two main factors that usually determine the outcome of the sanctions: (1) the economic costs inflicted on the country’s economy; and (2) the involvement of international institutions in the sanctions regime (Bapat 2013). Other factors such as dependence on the sender country’s economy or the political system of either state can play a significant role, but statistics show that they are not a determining factor. A more recent study conducted by Elizabeth Rosenberg et al. (2016) notes the costs that sanctions in the twenty-first century have had on target countries and compares them to their ultimate effectiveness. The researchers are rather sceptical about the effectiveness of the sanctions, believing that they do not always significantly decrease the GDP of the target state, despite the significant negative effect on investments in the target country. Moreover, while undoubtedly inflicting a certain amount of damage on the country’s economy, they come at a cost for the people of the sanctioned nation. Statistics show that sanctions regimes in the twenty-first century have contributed significantly to an increase in corruption in the target state, thus forcing the governments to become more autocratic in the long run and negatively affecting that country’s ranking on the UN’s Human Development Index (Rosenberg et al. 2016). The efficacy of the sanctions campaign against Iran has also been studied in great detail. Sajjad Faraji Dizaji and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk (2013) use the Hufbauer (2008) dataset to conclude that the success of sanctions regimes is usually directly tied to how long they are implemented. The first two years of sanctions are in most cases crucial to their success. It is during this time that the economy of the target country deteriorates significantly and the push for a more democratic society is most visible. The likelihood of sanctions being successful diminishes after the first two years or so (Dizaji and Bergeijk 2013). This is certainly true of Iran, whose economy was greatly damaged by the sanctions during the initial period and which saw an abrupt increase of unrest in the country.

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However, having withstood the initial stages of the sanctions regime, Iran has bounced back, as it were, and it is looking increasingly unlikely that the economic sanctions will have a positive effect in the long run. Nikolay A. Kozhanov and Leonid M. Issaev (2019) are also quite sceptical about the future of the U.S. economic sanctions against Iran and do not anticipate any meaningful change in the country’s domestic affairs in the near future. Their research concludes that, despite the sanctions having a profound negative impact on the state’s economy and generating some unrest in the country, the situation is not nearly drastic enough to expect any revolutionary movements in the Islamic Republic that might force the government to amend its policies. According to their study, the government of Iran is still very capable of preventing an economic collapse, and the country is not facing the immediate threat of a revolution (Kozhanov and Issaev 2019). In order to evaluate the success or failure of sanctions, we first need a certain standard of success, which would allow us to determine whether a given sanctions regime was the deciding factor in the target country changing its policy. According to Robert A. Pape (1997), economic sanctions have to meet certain criteria before they can be deemed a success. First, the target regime has to concede to all or at the very least most of the key demands of the sanctioning country. Second, the economic sanctions should be applied to the target country before the desired policy change has been made. And third, there cannot be any other credible grounds for the target country to have changed its policies. In order for the Iran sanctions regime to be deemed effective, it has to satisfy all the aforementioned criteria. For the time being, it is hard to apply this standard to the sanctions against Iran, as, formally, the process of bringing the government to the negotiating table continues. However, even with the continued pressure on Iran, one and a half years of sanctions have made it possible to determine whether such conditions are likely to be met in the near future. So far, the sanctions regime has failed to meet nearly all the criteria mentioned. It is thus extremely unlikely that the sanctions regime will succeed on its own. First, the sanctions have been in place for 18 months now, causing tremendous damage to the Iranian economy, yet they have nevertheless failed to force Iran to even engage in negotiations with the United States, let alone agree to make any concessions. Iran has taken a very firm stance on the issue, declaring that sanctions themselves are the key obstacle to starting negotiations and that Tehran will not even

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negotiate under pressure from its rivals. Seeing how determined Iran is to continue its policies despite the sanctions, it is reasonable to assume that, unless there is an immediate military threat from the United States or the situation changes drastically, Tehran has no intention of compromising with the United States and will maintain the same position, despite the economic pressure. Second, even if Iran does eventually give in to pressure from the United States and make some concessions, this can hardly be attributed to the sanctions regime itself, as the main concern of the Iranian government is to avoid military action from either the United States or Israel, which would will practically force the Islamic Republic into a full-scale confrontation with the former. Since the sanctions regime alone has thus far failed to force Iran to seek a new compromise with the United States, it is reasonable to assume that if Iran does make certain concessions, this will be a result of the increased threat of military action, as the intensity of the sanctions has remained more or less the same since Trump announced the end of sanctions waivers for Iranian oil exports, which turned out to be a turning point in the pressure campaign.

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Historical Perspective

Despite the current sanctions regime arguably being the most extensive that Washington has ever unilaterally imposed against Iran, economic sanctions in one form or another have been part and parcel of the U.S. policy on Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the imposition of Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of the young Islamic Republic. The Revolution succeeded in dethroning the U.S.-backed Shah and effectively installing a theocratic anti-American government. On top of the coup being very damaging to U.S. political and economic interests in the Middle East, a crucial part of the Revolution was centred around young insurgents capturing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and holding its diplomatic personnel there hostage, demanding that Washington extradite the former Shah back to the Islamic Republic to face trial and most likely execution for his crimes against the Iranian people. Faced with hostile actions from the Iranian rebels, President of the United States James Carter issued Executive Order 12170 (U.S. President 1979), which forced U.S. banks to freeze all Iranian assets in retaliation for the hostage situation and pressure the new government to negotiate. Despite heavy pressure from the U.S. government, which culminated in

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a failed military operation to rescue the hostages, the crisis would not be resolved for 444 days, with an eventual peace agreement being brokered by the Algerian government. The sides agreed to a compromise, with the United States agreeing to unfreeze Iranian assets and refrain from interfering in the country’s internal affairs in exchange for the release of the hostages. Despite the eventual peaceful conclusion, the crisis demonstrated a certain pattern in the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions, especially when applied to Iran. Sanctions on their own proved to be minimally effective when it came to coercing Iran to release the hostages and negotiating a settlement. Instead, the fledgling Iranian government managed to adapt quite well to the embargo, which profoundly affected the country’s main source of revenue—the petroleum sector. But it was the military factor, rather than economic pressure, that contributed most to the resolution of the crisis (Timofeev 2018). The increasing efforts of the United States to free the hostages via military operations and the onset of the war with Iraq played a key role in making Tehran give in to Washington’s demands and settle for a compromise. This was the first time that U.S. sanctions against Tehran showed that, despite the damage the U.S. economy could inflict on Iran, the young Republic nevertheless managed to assert itself as an independent sovereign nation, and it only submitted to compromise when the military factor came into play from both the United States and Iraq. Moreover, Executive Order 12170 is a sanctions regime unilaterally pioneered by the United States, and it has not managed to find much support in the United Nations or among the majority of the world community. Subsequently, economic and political isolation did not prove to be sufficient enough to actually influence the decisions of the Islamic Republic, thus rendering them ineffective. The next time the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions against Iran followed more or less the same pattern. The second round of sanctions was imposed by the Raegan administration for the prolonged hostile actions of the Iranian naval forces in the Persian Gulf. After the sanctions under Executive Order 12170 were repealed, Tehran was frequently accused of harassing U.S. and other shipping vessels in the Persian Gulf, as well as of supporting terrorism as an instrument of the state’s policy. Executive Order 12613 (U.S. President 1987) effectively prohibited the import of Iranian goods into the United States, but as trade between the two countries was rather scarce prior to the new sanctions, the regime did little to strain the country’s economy. As in the previous case, the

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failure to achieve success with economic sanctions, the U.S. administration resorted to the military option and prepared a naval operation in the Persian Gulf to curtail Iran’s activities. Following the success of Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S. Navy managed to achieve what economic sanctions could not and forced Iran to cease its hostile activities in the Persian Gulf. Despite the relative ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions and the undeniable success of military pressure, the United States nevertheless avoided using the latter in the new round of sanctions, choosing instead to gradually increase economic pressure over a prolonged period of time. The next round of sanctions was introduced under the Clinton administration, with Washington accusing Tehran of covertly developing its nuclear program and supporting organizations designated as “terrorist” under U.S. legislation such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. Bill Clinton issued a number of Executive Orders (including Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959 and Executive Order 13059 (U.S. President 1995a, b, c), which effectively imposed a full trade embargo on all goods originating from Iran, with an exception for the media. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress adopted the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996” (U.S. Congress 1996), also known as the “Iran Sanctions Act,” which formalized the unyielding intention of the United States to restrict both Iran’s ability to finance international terrorism and its desire to develop nuclear weapons. The main emphasis was on the country’s main source of revenue, namely, the petroleum sector, which was cut off from U.S. investments. The Iranian petroleum sector played a key role in the country’s economy, generating approximately 20% of the Republic’s GDP. Moreover, it was generally believed that much of the country’s petroleum infrastructure was either in dire need of modernization or was not developed enough to extract sufficient resources. Cutting Iran off from valuable U.S. investments was expected to significantly damage the country’s aging infrastructure and subsequently diminish its ability to support international terrorism and develop its nuclear program. However, despite increasing U.S. pressure on the Iranian economy, the sanctions regimes have almost always been introduced unilaterally, with no support from the United Nations or the majority of the international community. The unilateral nature of the sanctions and the unwillingness of the world to support the United States in its desire to curtail Iran’s actions allowed the latter to effectively mitigate the effect of the sanctions and continue to diversify its petroleum exports. The U.S. government

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realized the importance of taking on a universal approach to applying pressure on Tehran and started to actively seek international support for its efforts to influence Iran’s policies. In 2006, the UN Security Council confirmed that Iran was engaged in illegal activities and subsequently adopted UNSC Resolution 1737 (UNSC 2006) (followed by Resolution 1747 (UNSC 2007), Resolution 1803 (UNSC 2008a), Resolution 1835 (UNSC 2008b) and Resolution 1887 (UNSC 2009) in a move to curtail Iran’s nuclear program, which violated the non-proliferation regime. Unlike the U.S. sanctions, the limitations imposed by the United Nations dealt mainly with putting an end to Tehran’s nuclear aspirations, while practically ignoring its alleged support of terrorism in the Middle East and across the world. Later on, in 2010, having verified that Iran had failed to comply with the demands on the United Nations, the Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1929 (UNSC 2010), which introduced a more comprehensive sanctions regime against Iran. With the adoption of the new resolution by the Security Council and the shift in the global paradigm towards continuing international pressure on Iran, U.S. Congress adopted one of the most important acts in connection with the sanctions against Iran, the “Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010” (CISADA) (U.S. Congress 2010). The act reinforced the existing U.S. sanctions against Iran with the respect to its petroleum industry, while at the same time creating new sanctions options for the United States to retaliate against Iran should it engage in certain transactions. The new sanctions significantly limited Iran’s economic capabilities and stunted its nuclear program. As part of the sanctions, the UN member states were to freeze all Iranian assets associated with its nuclear program and cease the transfer of products that could be used by Tehran to enrich uranium. In order for the sanctions to be lifted, the Iranian government would have to comply with the UN demands, which effectively consisted of halting the country’s nuclear program and granting the International Atomic Energy Agency access to the Iranian nuclear sites to ensure their peaceful nature. This “international” approach to putting pressure on Iran proved to be much more effective than the unilateral method utilized by the United States and actually managed to cause significant damage to the country’s economy. The country’s GDP has shrunk by 15–20% since the sanctions were introduced in 2006, and Iran’s oil exports are no longer financed by hard currency. Moreover, the further restrictions imposed in 2012, which

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included an additional freeze of Iranian assets, financial restrictions and travel bans damaged the country’s economy even more. With the UN sanctions taking their toll on the economy and the country’s increasing political isolation, Iran was forced to suspend its nuclear activities and engage in negotiations with the international community. Subsequently, in 2015, after three years of intense talks, the parties managed to agree on a compromise that would later come to be known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement effectively represented a brokered compromise between the sides, with Iran agreeing to certain limitations of its nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of the crippling economic sanctions. However, despite agreeing to put certain limitations on its right to the peaceful use of nuclear power, Iran managed to secure the conditional, but unquestionable right to enhance its nuclear sphere on its own. Moreover, the country practically was more or less given free hand in conducting its domestic and foreign policies, thus allowing Tehran to continue reshaping the architecture of the Middle East in its own image, primary via the support of proxy forces and its military presence in Syria and Iraq. Ultimately, however, the internationally pioneered sanctions worked—Iran was forced to abandon its nuclear ambitions and the United Nations had an effective mechanism of both monitoring and curtailing Iran’s nuclear activities should the Islamic Republic decide to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon again. However, having agreed to limit the sanctions pressure on Iran in exchange for Tehran abandoning its nuclear program, U.S. Congress adopted an act that came to be known as the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015” (U.S. Congress 2015), which created a legal pathway for Congress to review any agreement concerning Iran and its nuclear aspirations reached under the P5+1 negotiations with the country. The idea behind the act was to create an additional level of security for the United States to guarantee that Iran would continue to fulfil its obligations under the JCPOA. According to the provisions of the act, the President of the United States is obliged to determine every 90 days whether he is able to certify that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA and whether the sanctions relief provided by the United States is proportionate to the actions undertaken by Iran in order to terminate its illegal nuclear program. Moreover, the Act specified that, despite the suspension of the nuclear-related sanctions, the JCPOA did not oblige the United States to provide any sanctions relief when it comes to Tehran’s other illegal activities. Even though the United States had relieved Iran from the

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nuclear sanctions, those relating to support for international terrorism, the development of the ballistic program and human rights abuses were to remain in place until these activities had been properly addressed.

4 Assessing Washington’s Demands and Expectations However, arguably the biggest shift in the U.S. sanctions regime came after the election of Donald Trump and his subsequent withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, coupled with the reintroduction of the crippling economic sanctions. The President maintained the view that the deal agreed upon by the United States and the rest of the JCPOA members was “the worst deal ever negotiated” as it effectively removed most of the sanctions against Iran, while failing to address Tehran’s efforts to create a nuclear weapon and its “destabilizing” policies in the region. On August 6, 2018, President Trump signed Executive Order 13846 (U.S. President 2018), which effectively withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and started the process of sanctions being reintroduced against Iran. The initial round of sanctions was limited to the country’s automotive sector, the national currency and trading in gold and precious metals, and also touched upon a number of other spheres. However, the pressure campaign accelerated rapidly, with Executive Order 13871 (U.S. President 2019a) adding the iron, steel, copper and aluminium sectors to the sanctions list, and Executive Order 13876 (U.S. President 2019b) introducing restrictions against the Supreme Leader of Iran and his office. Later on, the sanctions regime was further modified by the Executive Order 13902 (U.S. President 2020a), which restricted the operation of some of Iran’s most important banks, and Executive Order 13949 (U.S. President 2020b), which provided the United States with additional sanction options to curtail Iran’s conventional arms activities. Simultaneously, the Trump administration announced a list of demands that were deemed to be a necessary prerequisite for the sanctions to be lifted. During a speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo listed the 12 demands (later 13) Iran would have to comply with to obtain sanction relief from Washington: (1) declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity; (2) stop enrichment of and never pursue plutonium reprocessing, including

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closing its heavy water reactor; (3) provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country; (4) end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems; (5) release all U.S. citizens as well as citizens of U.S. partners and allies; (6) end support to Middle East “terrorist” groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad; (7) respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilization and reintegration of Shia militias; (8) end its threatening aggressive behaviour against its neighbours, and threats to international shipping and destructive cyberattacks; (9) withdraw all forces under Iran’s command throughout the entirety of Syria; (10) end support for terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the region and cease harbouring senior al-Qaeda leaders; (11) end the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for “terrorists” and “militant” partners around the world; and (12) end its support for the Houthi rebels. Later, on October 15, 2018, Pompeo gave a speech in which he updated the list of the demands to include a calling for Iran to correct its human rights. Given the nature and sheer volume of the demands, it is difficult to regard them as anything other than a demand for Iran’s surrender. Accommodating all (or even most) of the aforementioned demands would be utterly impossible for Iran, as it would not only ruin the ruling party politically and roll back the entirety of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, but it would also effectively leave the country defenceless against the military capacities of its rivals in the region. One possible explanation for the Trump administration putting forward such strict demands is that the United States is completely unwilling to compromise with Iran unless the latter effectively gives in to the pressure. In this case, the United States has purposely made the demands unrealistic and impossible to agree to as a way to keep the sanctions regime in place and to continue crippling the Iranian economy and its ability to project influence into the Middle East. The desired outcome of the sanctions regime would thus not be to achieve a compromise between the parties, but rather to bring about a forceful change of the political regime in the country to one that is more favourable from the point of view of the United States. However, this approach is also extremely risky, as Iran is likely to make its policies even more radical if pushed into a corner with no option for compromise. Realizing that the United States is not willing to tolerate its existence as an independent

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theocracy, Iran is much more likely to take risky steps, such as actually reigniting its nuclear program and developing a weapon of mass destruction. Seeing how Iran has so far managed to maintain internal stability despite numerous protests from its population and the crippling effect of the economic sanctions, it is rather doubtful that this approach will bring about the desired results in the near future. Alternatively, it is possible that the exhaustive list of demands put forward by the Trump administration is intended to win bargaining power in the expected future negotiations. In this case, the Trump administration does not see meeting all the demands as a prerequisite for sanctions relief and merely regards them as a blueprint that can be negotiated on later. Trump is likely to have highlighted several key demands that absolutely have to be met for any new deal to be signed, with the rest being bargaining points that can either be discarded altogether or fulfilled only partially. In this case, the task is to identify which demands the Trump administration may see as crucial to sanctions relief and which demands are either secondary or insignificant from a practical standpoint to the successful outcome of the negotiations. For almost three decades, the key issue of the sanctions regime against Iran has been the country’s nuclear program and its alleged plans to develop a nuclear weapon of their own. Therefore, any deal with the United States must necessarily contain provisions on Iran significantly curtailing its nuclear capabilities. However, despite the reasons given by the Trump administration for pulling out of the JCPOA, the curtailing of Iran’s nuclear potential is not the only concession Washington is expecting from the Islamic Republic. Ensuring that Iran does not develop a nuclear device is a universal goal pursued not only by the United States. In addition, Washington has other own interests in the region, mostly tied to the stability of the Middle East and minimizing the danger to its regional allies. Even if the Iranian nuclear threat is completely eradicated, or at the very least minimized, the United States will still face the problem of dealing with Iran’s ambitions in the region. Failing to address Iran’s regional policies was one of the key reasons for Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. And by satisfying the demands of the global community to keep Iran denuclearized, Tehran has been given a relatively free hand to spread its influence in the Middle East, usually at the expense of the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Subsequently, the objective of curtailing Iran’s ability to project influence into

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the region both through its military strength and with the help of the proxy entities is of utmost importance to Washington. In this regard, there are a number of issues that the United States must address. First, Washington has to contend with what is perhaps the biggest threat to its interests in the Middle East, namely, the presence of the Iranian military in the region, mainly in Iraq and Syria, which links Iran with important strategic locations such as the border between Lebanon and Israel and the Mediterranean. Having established the “Shia Crescent,” Iran has managed to secure a strategic corridor used to supply Lebanese Hezbollah with weapons, as well as to reinforce and entrench the military forces in Syria. This position not only threatens U.S. allies in the region, but also aims to redress the balance of power in the Middle East completely. Second, the United States and its allies are committed to forcing Iran to either completely abandon or at the very least minimize its support of the various proxy forces in the region, which are a part of Iran’s desired architecture of the Middle East. Third, one of the biggest problems for Washington’s interests in the Middle East is the much-touted Iranian ballistic missile program. The United States views the development of the program as a threat to its allies in the region. Iran’s ballistic missiles serve a double purpose—they are a key part of the country’s defence strategy, ready to be launched at key military and non-military targets of the United States’ allies should a full-scale war break out, and they can be used to transport nuclear weapons, should Iran manage to develop them. However, despite the obvious economic disadvantages caused by the sanctions regime, it is still difficult to gauge to extent to which the restrictive measures have actually managed to achieve the objectives of the United States and its allies, or if there are any grounds for believing that this is likely to happen in the near future. Moreover, the sanctions may very well fail to achieve their main objectives, while at the same time creating some undesired circumstances that could make the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East even more serious.

5 The Damage That the Sanctions Regimes Have Caused to the Reconciliation Process The Iranian government has been uncompromising in its stance towards the sanctions ever since they were first introduced, declaring that the country will not enter negotiations under pressure from a hostile foreign

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government. In Tehran, opening negotiations with the United States, which has subjected the country to heavy economic limitations, is seen as tantamount to admitting the country’s economy inability to withstand the sanctions, and thus a major political defeat. This is why the government of Iran announced the lifting of sanctions as a prerequisite for negotiations to take place with the United States. The U.S. government has duly refused to provide any sanctions relief, even temporary, which further discourages Iran from engaging in negotiations. As far as the Trump administration sees it, the lack of progress in achieving a compromise is not a sign of the strategy’s failure to get Iran to curtail its activities, but rather a logical part of a long-term process that is supposed to force Iran to sit down at the negotiating table, or alternatively make the living conditions of the country’s population so unbearable that they will forcibly overthrow the theocratic government. However, for the time being, U.S. economic pressure is having a negative impact on Iran’s willingness to negotiate as well as on the prospect of any political change taking place in the country. 5.1

Violation of the Non-proliferation Regime

Perhaps the biggest threat associated with continuing the sanctions regime is the Iranian nuclear program and the possible development of a nuclear weapon. The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the subsequent reintroduction of the sanctions against Iran have put the Iranian government in a rather complicated situation. On the one hand, U.S. extra-territorial sanctions have caused tremendous damage to the Iranian economy and practically isolated the country from some of the most valuable trading partners, restricting the access of most foreign corporations to the Iranian market. However, at the same time, as Iran is still a party to the JCPOA, it is obliged to respect the nuclear restrictions contained therein if it does not want to lose the support of the remaining signatories and if it hopes to have the UN weapons embargo lifted in the near future. With no other option but to try and intimidate the world community into pushing the United States into easing its uncompromising sanctions policy, Iran has adopted a strategy of gradually abandoning their JCPOA obligations, threatening to go as far as enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. Iran has been gradually rolling back its obligations under the JCPOA over the past year, starting with restricting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access to certain

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nuclear sites and introducing cutting-edge centrifuges to enrich uranium faster and more efficiently. Since then, the gradual rollback of obligations under the deal has put the non-proliferation regime in severe jeopardy, although not to the extent that the global community has started to suspect the country of actively trying to build a nuclear bomb. Iran has not yet reached the point where it could develop a nuclear device within less than 3.5 months, so the global community remains more or less confident that Tehran is not pursuing a weapon of mass destruction right now. However, with the U.S. sanctions still in place and the negotiation process not moving forward, the Iranian government may eventually become so dissatisfied with the benefits of the JCPOA that it could abandon the deal altogether and recommence its nuclear program. The aggressive policies adopted by the United States towards Iran also increase the risk that Iran might start developing its own nuclear weapon. The assassination of top Iranian general Qassim Suleimani served as a lesson for the Iranian government on how Washington deals with states that possess nuclear weapons compared to how it deals with those that do not. Despite the long-standing confrontation with the North Korea, the United States has never used military measures against the country. This is largely because North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction, which threaten both the United States and its regional allies. When it comes to countries that lack nuclear capabilities, Washington is far more inclined to use military force, even if this could lead to an open military conflict. This fact alone sends an important message to the Iranian leadership that the United States does not fully respect the sovereignty of its rivals unless they possess nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. Should Iran decide to return to its nuclear program in spite of the economic and political pressure, the world community will be faced with a difficult choice. The first option would be to allow Iran to proceed with its program and develop a nuclear device, which would threaten the global non-proliferation regime and risk igniting another crisis in the Middle East with unpredictable consequences. The second option would be to force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions either through a full-scale military operation or with limited pin-point attacks on important nuclear facilities. In the latter scenario, the situation nevertheless is likely to escalate into a much larger conflict, as Iran would hardly let any attack on its territory, let alone on its military and nuclear infrastructure, go unanswered. Such developments would undoubtedly be catastrophic for the entire Middle East and prove highly costly for all the parties involved.

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Thus, as of right now, we can say that the sanctions regime has not only failed to achieve its main objective of forcing Iran to the negotiating table, but has also created an additional incentive for the country to continue the development of a nuclear arsenal. 5.2

Unrest in Iran and the Consolidation of Power

Given the sheer volume of demands the United States has made of Iran and their uncompromising nature, it could be argued that the main idea behind the sanctions is not to force the Islamic Republic into negotiations, but rather to cause so much damage to the country’s economy that the people can longer tolerate the regime. And despite Trump repeatedly stating that the United States does not seek a regime change in Tehran, his actions would suggest otherwise. During the violent demonstrations that swept through Iran in 2019–2020, the U.S. President expressed his full support for the people of Iran and sympathy with their struggle for freedom. However, despite the economic damage caused by the sanctions and the protests they sparked, Tehran nevertheless managed to crack down on the protestors and stabilize the situation in the country. Such developments are likely to worsen the situation for the Iranian people and harm the chances of Iran finding a compromise with Washington. Having experienced a wave of unrest in the country, the government of Iran is much more likely to turn up the pressure on the population, further cracking down on the freedom of speech and arresting the opposition, thus preserving the authoritarian regime. 5.3

The Widening Gap Between Washington and Tehran

The very existence of the sanctions regime against Iran damages the prospects for reconciliation between Tehran and Washington in the future. When the first steps towards negotiating the peace plan that would later become known as the JCPOA were made, it was seen as a very controversial decision on the part of the Iranian leadership. Before the deal was signed in 2015, Iran had been under strict long-term sanctions led by the United Nations, which created a united front against the country’s nuclear aspirations. Of course, Iran saw the introduction of sanctions as nothing than an infringement on the country’s sovereignty and an attempt to curtail its right to develop a peaceful nuclear program. The

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hard-line government forces insisted that there was no point engaging in negotiations with their opponents, let alone acquiesce to some of their demands. They believed that negotiating under the pressure of sanctions would not only demonstrate the inability of the country’s economy to sustain itself, but also eventually backfire as Western powers never keep their promises and will demand more and more concessions, having sensed its weakness. Despite violent opposition from the hard-line parties, the moderates led by President Hassan Rouhani decided to take their chances and risk working out a compromising deal with the United Nations, agreeing to certain concessions regarding their nuclear sovereignty in exchange for sanctions relief. However, the risk did not pan out, as the United States withdrew from the deal that its representatives had negotiated and then started to issue fresh demands from Iran. Subsequently, the current radical powers in the Iranian government harbour a deep mistrust of the country that abandoned its promises just two years ago, and thus have little to no motivation to engage in negotiations once again, let alone agree to additional limitations on the country’s sovereign rights. 5.4

Escalating Tensions in the Middle East

The fallout of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reintroduction of sanctions has had a disastrous effect on the already very unstable and unpredictable situation in the Middle East. Ever since the Arab Spring triggered a wave of revolutions throughout the MENA region, the Middle East has been plagued by endless conflicts and shifts in the regional balance of power. However, despite the ongoing confrontations between Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and their satellites, the regional rivals have for the most part respected each other’s red lines to avoid escalation into a full-scale armed confrontation that would likely engulf the entire Middle East and force certain extra-regional players to get involved. The reintroduction of the sanctions by the Trump administration forced Iran to change its strategy in the region, simultaneously provoking all other regional actors to adopt different strategies as well. Having been denied access to the markets of most countries, Iran opted for a strategy that would make it as inconvenient as possible for the United States to maintain its presence in the region and prolong the economic sanctions against the Iranian economy. The Iranian leadership understood that war was a last resort for the Trump administration

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and thus chose to carefully (and sometimes rather recklessly) test the bounds of what the United States would allow, seeing how much they could harass Washington’s interests in the region without escalating the situation to an open conflict. Subsequently, Iran started to expand its presence in the region, increasing its support for proxy groups in the Middle East, harassing the tankers in the Hormuz Strait, and occasionally carrying out covert attacks on some of the United States’ allies. Such actions from the Iranian side as shooting down a U.S. drone in the country’s airspace and carrying out an attack on the biggest oil refinery in Iran have demonstrated that Tehran is more than willing to risk escalating tensions in order to show Washington that withdrawing from the JCPOA has consequences. The United States, on the other hand, did not sit idle as Iran continued to take aggressive actions in the region and went as far to assassinate the country’s top general, a very risky move that could have triggered a new war in the Middle East. Although Iran limited its retaliation to an attack on a U.S. base, which left no casualties, it could have triggered a domino effect and caused another regionwide crisis with unpredictable consequences. For as long as the sanctions regime remains in place and both Iran and the United States refuse to make mutual concessions to start negotiations, Tehran and Washington will continue treading dangerously close to each other’s “red lines” and while neither side seeks a military confrontation, any careless action could trigger another war in the region.

6

Damage to the Iranian Economy

However, despite the damage that the sanctions have done to the negotiation process and the de-escalation of the crisis in the Middle East, it is very hard to deny their effectiveness from the economic point of view. As damaging as it was from the diplomatic perspective, the sanctions regime has succeeded in isolating the Iranian economy from its main trading partners and significantly curtail the country’s ability to export its influence abroad. The sanctions regime has affected practically all the main branches of the Iranian economy: Iranian assets in banks under U.S. jurisdiction have been frozen; U.S. and international companies have been prohibited from trading with Iran; Iran has been banned from attracting foreign investments, which severely limits the country’s ability to purchase

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components that could be used to enhance the country’s military capabilities; and practically every single industry in Iran has been sanctioned, including the energy sector. In spite of the fact that the United States is the only country to unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear deal, a move that was strongly condemned by the remaining parties of the JCPOA, large non-U.S. companies have been forced to comply with the demands of Washington and opted to restrict their business with Iran so as not to invoke penalties from the American side. Most major European banks, including Germany’s DZ Bank and Allianz, Austria’s Oberbank France’s Banque Wormser Frères, have announced their intention to leave the Iranian market because of the newly introduced sanctions. Not a single EU member country has purchased oil from Iran since the sanctions were reintroduced. In addition, they have pulled significant investments from Iranian oil projects, dealing a substantial amount of damage to the most important sector of the country’s economy. Threatened by the possibility of U.S. sanctions, the Brussels-based SWIFT electronic payments system has restricted Iranian banks from utilizing it. Practically all the major companies and banks in the EU-member states have complied with the U.S. sanctions in full, thus putting under question the practicability of Tehran remaining a party to the JCPOA. In order to ease the tensions and provide Iran with at least some sort of economic relief, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and China agreed to launch joint project to facilitate trade among the parties to the JCPOA that does not use the U.S. currency, thus avoiding the sanctions. The project is called INSTEX and was supposed to provide Iran with additional incentives to remain a party to the nuclear deal. However, little has actually been done since the announcement of INSTEX’s launch to provide Iran with significant relief from the sanctions. For now, the system allows Iran to trade medical supplies and food with Europe, a sphere that has never been subjected to the U.S. sanctions regime. Iran has claimed that INSTEX is “a fancy car with no fuel” and can never provide Iran with any meaningful relief if it does not cover the energy sector. Additionally, the President of France Emanuel Macron announced his intentions at the 2019 G7 Summit to open a 15-billion-dollar credit line to Iran, which could later be repaid via oil deliveries to France. However, little to no progress has been made in this direction since the announcement and the chances of Iran ever seeing this credit line opened are rather slim. All in all, Iran’s leadership is strongly dissatisfied with the European response to

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the U.S. sanctions and has repeatedly claimed that Europe is not doing nearly enough to preserve the JCPOA. As for China and Russia, their compliance with the U.S. sanctions is more complicated than that of Europe. While Russia has never maintained extensive trade with the Iran, focusing mainly on services in the nuclear sphere and selling military equipment to the country, China views the country as a very important trading partner, and one which it is not ready to abandon even under the threat of economic sanctions. Before the sanctions regime was reinstated in 2018, China was purchasing 435,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran. There is no way to reduce this number without serious consequences. As a result, China has formally complied with the sanctions, significantly reducing its oil purchases from Iran. However, it has not ceased bilateral business activities with the country entirely. China has frequently been suspected of secretly shipping oil from Iran in violation of the U.S. sanctions. Moreover, Beijing has not stopped investing in the Iranian economy, and it plans to include Iran in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Negotiations are currently under way between Tehran and Beijing, with the latter planning to invest as much as 280 billion dollars into the development of Iran’s energy sector and approximately 120 billion dollars in upgrading the country’s transport and manufacturing infrastructure. However, for the most part, China’s continuing to do business with Iran, albeit in part, has done little to offer Tehran relief from the economic sanctions and is not enough to drag the country’s economy out of its abrupt decline. Even though not all countries comply with the U.S. sanctions, these developments have been a disaster to the Iranian economy, which heavily relies on petroleum exports for generating revenue. Before the sanctions, Iran produced around 3.8 million barrels of oil per day, 2.3 million of which were exported abroad. After withdrawing from the JCPOA, the Trump administration set out to damage the Iranian energy sector, concentrating its efforts on minimizing the country’s oil trade. After the sanctions regime was put back in place, exports fell from 2.3 million to just 1 million barrels a day, starving the Iranian economy of its petroleum revenue. Additionally, after the sanctions waivers for Iranian oil exports were cancelled, Washington set itself the goal of bringing Iranian exports to zero. To this end, blanket bans were issued on the purchase of Iranian petroleum products by any country. Most of Iran’s business partners complied, and the country’s daily oil exports shrank to just 260,000 barrels per day, not nearly enough to support the country’s economy.

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As expected, Iran’s effective economic isolation from the rest of the world has led to the national currency, the rial, fall sharply. And it will be extremely difficult for it to recover with the sanctions in place. So far, the rial has lost more than 70% of its value relative to the U.S. dollar, and despite the Iranian leadership investing hundreds of millions of dollars into stabilizing the currency market, the currency continues to decline with each passing month. Currently the official exchange rate is fixed by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 42,000 rials to the dollar. The reintroduction of the sanctions has led the Iranian economy into a deep recession, which shrank by as much as 4.6% in the 2018/2019 fiscal year, despite the fact that it demonstrated steady growth the previous year.

7

Conclusion

The Iranian economy has been under severe economic sanctions from the United States for nearly two years now. However, the sanctions regime has not yet brought about the desired result, whether it be bringing Iran to the negotiating table or forcing the Iranian population to overthrow the existing regime. From the economic perspective, the sanctions have been a tremendous success, forcing nearly all large economies around the world to effectively cease trading with and investing into Iran, starving the export-dependent economy of access to foreign markets. The significance of the U.S. economy has played a pivotal role in forcing the world, including most of the JCPOA members, to effectively abandon Iran as a business partner, causing its economy to dive into a deep recession. And despite Washington’s failure to create an international coalition to support its pressure campaign against Iran, the significance of the U.S., economy coupled with the exterritorial nature of the sanctions has effectively forced most of Iran’s trade partners to abandon it in favour of the U.S. market. However, despite the colossal economic damage inflicted upon the Iranian economy, the sanctions have thus far proved ineffective while also creating new obstacles to a future rapprochement between Iran and the United States. The expected result of forcing Iran to engage in negotiations by inflicting damage on its economy has not come appeared. Instead, Iran has been forced to assert an uncompromising stand on the negotiation process, declaring it will not engage the United States while under sanctions. Despite the unrest in the country caused by the authoritarian regime and the tanking economy, Tehran has managed to crack

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down on the protestors and get the situation under its control. Moreover, seeing Washington’s unwillingness to engage in another unpredictable and potentially very costly war in the Middle East, the threat of a U.S. military operation is not obvious enough to play a pivotal role in forcing Tehran to concede. On the contrary, the sanctions and the pressure campaign that followed only served to widen the gap between the United States and Iran, increasing the threat of a new military confrontation in the Middle East and creating additional incentives for Iran to reignite its nuclear program. However, with the Democratic victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, the sanctions regime is likely to be significantly modified in the near future. Throughout Trump’s presidency, the Democratic opposition was vocally critical of the way he handled the JCPOA, and of his aggressive stance towards Iran in general. While Joe Biden is firm on the issue of keeping Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, he has declared his willingness to have the United States return to the provisions of the JCPOA should Iran start to comply with them in full. Several obstacles stand in the way of potential reconciliation between the countries. In order for the United States to become a party to the JCPOA once again, the agreement would have to obtain the approval of Congress. This might prove to be a challenge, as many members were hesitant to approve the controversial deal back when it was signed in 2015. Secondly, while obviously eager to receive the much needed sanctions relief, Iran might be reluctant to accept the same terms of the agreement without reliable guarantees that the United States will not abandon its promises again. Some Iranian officials have even said that the United States and Europe should be forced to compensate Iran for some of the damage that the failure of the JCPOA caused to the country’s economy. Thus, it is evident that it will not be easy to repair the nuclear deal without making significant changes to its terms or at least going through tough negotiations. However, the general willingness of the two parties to reconcile relations and return to some version of the “nuclear deal” is likely to create favourable grounds for the sanctions regime installed by the Trump administration to be softened in order to both prevent Iran from further accelerating its nuclear program and make the first step towards concluding negotiations with Tehran about the future of the JCPOA. It is clear that the road to repairing the deal will not be smooth, but regardless of direction it takes, Trump’s sanctions regime, having failed to coerce Iran into submission, will not be a part of it.

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Iran–China Relations: A Game Changer in the Eastern World Flavius Caba-Maria

1

Introduction

To begin with, China’s political relations are modeling a new paradigm (compared to the Westphalian system) driven by the international milieu. In this context, the People’s Republic of China chose to focus on partnerships rather than alliances. Its economic relations framework revolves around the vision of a community with a shared future for humankind. The frameworks merge with the objectives and goals announced by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—though the Chinese version is named One Belt, One Road—the main foreign policy objective of China. In the Chinese leadership’s understanding, it is considered a strategy at the domestic level and an initiative for the foreign agenda (Li, 2017, p. 13). Beijing approaches BRI from within as a strategy considering China needs it for its socio-economic development, and as an initiative that prompts multilateralism and more international engagement. It was launched in 2013, with the aim to create pan-global connectivity. Initially, it was entitled One Belt, One Road as a symbol for

F. Caba-Maria (B) Middle East Political and Economic Institute‚ Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_10

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connecting territorial and maritime roads. Li argues that One Belt, One Road, and Belts and Roads converge, even though they can be considered antipodes that are tied in together (Li, 2017, p. 17). The Belt (the Silk Road Economic Belt) stretches from Western China to Europe via Central Asia. The Road (the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road) links China to Europe via the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea. According to Dorsey (2019), China’s Maritime Silk Road and the “string of pearls”—a phrase acknowledged by defense consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton in 2004 in a report to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld—(Macdonald et al., 2004), consists of ports across the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean covering a vast surface of global petroleum transits. Thus, the connectivity projects linking Europe coupled with the ports stretching from the South China Sea along the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea into the Mediterranean are remodeling Eurasia. In the wake of the United States of America (U.S.) slowing the globalization patterns and the West showing financial fatigue, China is the one that proposes integrative connectivity methods for the Middle East. First, the global arena is experiencing a diminishing role of the United States in the Middle East area, leaving space for regional actors and new power games alike (Caba-Maria & Mus, etescu, 2020, pp. 40–41). The American attention moved toward Asia allowing other powers to fill in a military or political vacuum: the European Union and China advancing primarily an economic agenda in the Middle East, and Russia cementing key routes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This broader global context pushes regional actors from the Middle East to exert new powers. This is especially true in the post-2011 environment. Thus, in the post-Arab Spring era, there are four regional powers qualifying for greater influence: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran (Kamrava, 2018). The chapter explores why China developed a growing interest in the Middle East. We can name several reasons for China’s expanding involvement, namely energy, noting the importance of oil and gas resources in the region; stability in its Asia-Pacific neighborhood; expanding its influence in what China perceives as a lynchpin area between Europe and Asia; while asserting China’s global power and ambitions. China is searching for energy supplies for its expanding economy. Moreover, China is looking to gain new spheres of influence, the Middle East included. This means that China’s relations with resource-rich Persian Gulf states have intensified, while Beijing has become more pragmatic in its approach to the region (Wakefield, 2011, p. 2). The bilateral

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economic relationship has known a boost since the 1990s (Janardhan, 2011) and energy represents the paramount aspect of the strategy (Liao, 2015). Energy partnerships are important for China, in the wake of the U.S. and Europe’s need for traditional energy sources reaching a plateau (Horesh, 2016). Thus, “between 2000 and 2014, Sino-Middle East trade volume increased 17-fold from $18 billion to $312 billion” (Ehteshami, 2018). In the year 2010, China replaced the U.S. as the region’s largest trading partner. The relations of China with the Middle East are surrounded by the energy needs at stake for its giant industry, thus it ensured its supply by signing bilateral memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with all major oil-producing countries in the region. The MoUs come accompanied by other arrangements (in terms of supplies, appliances) with Chinese companies, surrounding this sector (Hornschild, 2016, p. 1). The Middle East becomes obviously a hub with prominent role in the greater plan of BRI. On the other hand, South and East Asia are the economic powerhouses keeping the oil stocks in demand (Chu, 2017). In addition, the chapter highlights that China and the Islamic Republic share a sense of traditional political values and a certain level of antagonism with Western powers. The chapter details how the relation with Iran represents a game changer in the Middle East and in the broader context of the international environment. Not least, China’s strategy for foreign policy regarding all corners of Asia should be read in line with continuous international developments and China’s domestic approaches that tangle between “continual tension in the dual-identity of China rising power and at the same time a developing country” (Zhao, 2013). China felt marginalized for a long time by the Western powers and this explains developing new initiatives in the quest of pursuing more international engagement. The chapter further details the Chinese reasons for involvement in the Middle East and Iran’s increasing interest to look East/Far Asia. Second, it is of the opinion that China is creating new leverages in the relationship with Iran and the broader Middle East via the framework of comprehensive partnerships. Third, it notes the limits of Iran–China relations. Fourth, the wideranging implications of the partnership are influenced by a global context, with a global outbreak (COVID-19) and its consequences unfolding.

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2

Why the Middle East?

The Middle East represents the lynchpin between Europe and Asia and it extends from Iran to Turkey, with the Arab States in the middle. It is not only a key global crossroads, with an impact on China’s energy strategy and security, neighborly relations, as it needs to appease the nationalist and Islamist ethos in some domestic provinces (Dorsey, 2019), but also the arena for global power games. Kamrava argues there are four reasons for this transformation and reinforcement of Chinese presence (Kamrava, 2018). First, it is viewed as an arena of great power competition, thus China should take part in it, asserting its growing global status. Second, the Middle East fuels literally the Chinese industry. Third, the region has become an extension of China’s immediate neighborhood via ethnoreligious linkages, Saudi Arabia being the custodian of the Islamic holiest shrines. Fourth, the Middle East is appreciated to be a key crossroads in the projection of the grand plans of BRI (Kamrava, 2018). One should note that in the Middle East, China has skillfully managed to remain a friend to all and the enemy of no one, being quite a remarkable achievement in an ever-volatile environment like the Middle East. If one thinks of the Gulf region, China maintains important relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which just like Saudi Arabia, is an important source of oil for China. Saudi Arabia is one powerful connection of China to the Gulf region. China’s relations with Middle Eastern countries, especially Persian Gulf States (namely Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), place energy at their core. The hydrocarbon-rich Gulf is almost oil-lubricating China’s rise. China is interested in particular in developing Iran’s petroleum and gas infrastructure. In addition, Iran plays the role of key nodal point in the BRI and thereby is important for the geo-economics of the region. This is coupled with Beijing’s plan to go out, meaning Chinese enterprises are offered incentives to invest overseas. Tanchum argued that to determine the balance of power in the energy sector in Eurasia and establish the BRI as support for Eurasia’s energy architecture, China would need to position itself as the main receiver of Iranian and Turkmen gas (Tanchum, 2015). One can add China’s increasing economic influence in Central Asia, Caucasus, reaching to Eastern Mediterranean. These elements resulted in China’s playing the leading role in Iran’s upstream oil sector, which was

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affected by sanctions (Caba-Maria, 2021) and lack of cooperation with Western powers for technological updates and industrialization. Calabrese (2018, p. 181) explains Iran’s geostrategic importance for China since it represents easy access to open waters, “and the only East– West and North–South intersection for Central Asian trade.” Given its unique geography, Iran becomes a critical pathway in the BRI plan. Furthermore, from an energy security perspective, Iran is projected to remain key in China’s future, as a major long-term source of supply (feature cemented by the recent comprehensive agreement). In addition, strong ties with Iran validate a geopolitical asset for China, being a counterbalance to the American presence in the Middle East and ties with oil-rich countries. The U.S. was the pivot power in the Middle East, but during the Obama mandate that American priorities changed. Thus, the U.S.’s attention moved from the Middle East to Asia-Pacific, new relations being prioritized in the name of America’s new interests (Alenazi, 2020). China sees Iran as a strategic and opportune partner, being less concerned about its nuclear program than the U.S. and the West. China actually supported nuclear and military programs (Dorsey, 2019), resisting a U.S. preference for regime change. The Chinese President became the first world leader to visit Iran after the completion of the deal on Iran’s nuclear program—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 14, 2015, made possible also with China’s help. Great momentum was created, since it synchronized with the optimism in the aftermath of sealing the deal. President Xi Jinping’s arrival was preceded with articles in the Iranian press about the legendary Silk Road and the fruitful longstanding cooperation between Iran and China. President Xi launched the invitation for Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional political, economic, and security group, meant to upgrade its status from observer to full member (yet to be fulfilled). On the very occasion of this visit to Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei erased any cast of doubt about Iran’s inclinations in terms of strategic plans: “Iran is the most reliable country in the region for energy since its energy policies will never be affected by foreigners” (Reuters, 2016). The comprehensive partnership first proposed by Xi Jinping to Iran in January 2016 was approved by President Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet in June 2020. During the initial visit, the two presidents proceeded to sign 17 agreements, committing to increasing trade dimension up to $600

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billion over the coming decade, and enounced the idea of “comprehensive strategic partnership” (China Daily, 2016). The negotiations over a strategic cooperation framework have been ongoing (mostly in secrecy). These talks have resulted in an 18-page document entitled “Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” (www.tabnak.ir, 2020). The agreement was signed by the two foreign ministers, respectively, Javad Zarif and Wang Yi, in Tehran on 27 March. Even though more details were not revealed yet, it seems the content remained similar to the draft of 2020. The agreement is equivalent to Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure and assurance for supplies of Iranian oil and gas at concessional rates. The deal whose details have been published in the New York Times (2020), estimates that Iran is to become the recipient of Chinese investment worth $400 billion in the future quarter of century (Dorsey, 2020). The cooperation pegs the corners of BRI and covers the needs of Iranian infrastructure. However, the partnership document is drafted in nonbinding terms similar to stating the intent of cooperation in various sectors. Iran mentioned the agreement was a “road map for future cooperation” between the two sides (New York Times, 2020). The Middle East Institute quoted an Iranian source that mentioned the agreement is like the course of Iran’s current foreign policy strategy, aligning to Iran’s official discourse, namely: “Look East Policy, suggesting Iran’s inclination for Asian countries, noting China and India as two friendly countries” (MEPEI, 2020), promising that India still ranks high among foreign relations’ priorities. The affairs left dormant for four years were reshuffled in 2020 and this is not a coincidence. The revival of the cooperation concept coincides with heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing over a series of issues, ranging from the crisis management of COVID-19 pandemic, claims of China in the South China Sea, problems regarding protests and security law in Hong Kong, and the marginalization of Muslims in a certain Chinese province. China could use the Iranian case in order to adjust the negotiations with the U.S. This strategy forged by China and Iran does not come without confrontation in the arena of great powers. The U.S. reacted decisively against the deal, keeping a constant tendency to maximize pressure on Iran after withdrawing from the JCPOA in May 2018.

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3 Iran and China Relations: A Game Changer for the Middle East Iran has traditionally looked west toward Europe for picking up trade and investment partners. In the recent years, it has grown frustrated with European countries that have not opposed President Trump’s policy of maximum pressure, implicitly abandoning the deals that the nuclear agreement once promised. In fact, Chinese entities felt slightly disappointed that in the aftermath of the nuclear deal, Iran went at large to attract Western companies. In 2018, when the Trump administration suddenly withdrew from the nuclear agreement and reimposed secondary sanctions on Iran, the interest returned to China (ECFR, 2020). In the era of maximum pressure resulting in a peak of sanctions regime (Caba-Maria, 2021), China allowed a potential safeguard for the Iranian economy and industry. Additionally, Iran is needing China as the main destination for its oil exports, and increasingly for economic, industrial, and diplomatic support (Calabrese, 2018). Thus, Iran remained in China’s orbit, as China was a promoter of JCPoA and made lobby to preserve the nuclear deal, providing crucial support. Concomitantly, China would not allow the Iranian issue to endanger its talks with the U.S. regarding trade. Ali Gholizadeh, an energy expert, supports the claim that both Iran and China are the U.S.’s contenders and they are ready to be allies (New York Times, 2020). On the other hand, Iran fully understands the implications of China’s swift rise as a global power. China, meanwhile, understands that Iran is a major regional power located at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, an area deemed paramount for the Belt and Road Initiative. Although the approach is relatively recent, the connection Iran–China has a long history. The recent partnership’s preamble states that: “Two ancient Asian cultures, two partners in the sectors of trade, economy, politics, culture, and security with a similar outlook and many mutual bilateral and multilateral interests will consider one another strategic partners” (New York Times, 2020). Iran and China have quietly crafted their way into an agreement worth millions of dollars, translated into a Chinese important presence in banking, in many infrastructure projects that help Iran get outside the isolation produced by the duress of sanctions blocking the Iranian government. China is pursuing Iran’s loyalty to raise its influence in the

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Middle East, through the agreement, while helping the Iranian economy to thrive. However, an enforced alliance is received with raised eyebrows on the American side. The U.S. State Department’s reply to the intent of China–Iran increased cooperation was that it would pursue interdictions on Chinese companies that aid Iran, considering Iran a main sponsor of state terrorism (New York Times, 2020). If the agreement comes into effect as it was conceived (maybe in the second part of 2021), the partnership would create new contentious points in the already strenuous relationship between China and the United States. At the beginning of February 2021, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif declared that the strategic agreement with China will be finalized soon, good news being in sight in that respect. The agreement is already being formalized, as on March 27, 2021, it was signed in Tehran by the foreign ministries of the two States. Announcing the agreement has already had an impact on Trump administration’s aggressive policy toward Iran (New York Times, 2020) since abandoning the nuclear deal. The Chinese investments in Iran would amount to high sums. In exchange, China would receive a regular concessional supply of Iranian oil over 25-year time span. The various projects under this umbrella (amounting to one hundred) are very much in line with BRI strategy and China’s foreign policy strategy under Xi Jinping. The projects, including building airports, high-speed transportation links are meant to produce positive results for Iran, while ensuring needed oil and influence for China. “China would develop free-trade zones in Maku, in northwestern Iran; in Abadan, where the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) river flows into the Persian Gulf, and on the gulf island Qeshm” (New York Times, 2020). The agreement comprises features regarding 5G telecommunications network (Chinese Global Positioning System, Beidou), and presumes a similar use of China’s Great Firewall, which would employ more control on Iranian critical cybernetic networks. It seems such technological steps have the highest chance for materialization. However, access to Iran’s market may not be automatic for another reason. Iranian businessmen might not be happy with a high amount of Chinese cheaper goods on the market. Yet, Iranian supporters of the deal think of the limited options the country has in front of the harsh sanctions regime applied by the U.S., the only remaining alternative being China (ECFR, 2019).

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Beyond the obvious economic benefits, Brookings Institute experts note that in the long term the military sector is paramount: “The roots of the economic relationship between China and Iran are in fact in the military arena” (New York Times, 2020).

4

Reasons to Look East

For the past century or more, the Middle East has looked Westward in all regards. Culture, economics, security, and politics in the Middle East have been applied according to Western standards. West Asian countries have not previously looked further East, because of a lack of cultural affinities. However, globalization accelerated the exchange and commercial ties. For instance, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries looked at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the regional format of cooperation (Ehteshami, July 2020). The post-Western world is living an accelerated shift of economic activity to Asia (Dicken, 2007) together with moving the center of economic activity eastwards (Hawksworth & Tiwari, 2011). In sum, China leads a new globalization wave. China is the one country that transformed Asia and prompted reprioritizing industry and financial activity eastwards (Ehteshami & Bahgat, 2019). This is an era of change during which the Middle East can cultivate a positive relationship with Asia, without losing Western markets. Ehteshami framed the term “Asianisation” referring to a process during which the Middle Eastern States engage in strategic relationships with Asian powers, largely based on economic calculations (Ehteshami & Bahgat, 2019, p. 23). It is believed that China is the key driver of “Asianisation” in the Middle East since it has accelerated the interest in doing business in the East. China has become a key commercial partner for numerous Middle Eastern countries (in 2020, China was the main trade partner for 11 states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia), leaving an important significant mark symbolizing the partnerships between the Gulf and East Asia. One of the main drivers of “Asianisation” is that energy patterns have modified, the necessity being increasing high in the Eastern world, compared to North America (the U.S. and Canada) that has become self-sufficient, through fracking processes. Renewed American sanctions pushed Iran further to China. Particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, this has been the driver for engagement with Asian

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partners and Europeans (that have not responded so quickly to Iranian calls to their disappointment). In order to guarantee an economic lifeline, Iran needs Chinese money and investments. Iran has witnessed a severe cut down of oil production, while it needs an estimated 8.5 million barrels a day in order to keep its position in the energy market (New York Times, 2020). Therefore, China is desired as a top consumer of energy. On the background of Iran’s disappointment with the West, there was renewed interest in Asianisation (Ehteshami & Bahgat, 2019, p. 23). For Iran it was discouraging that the three European states initiating INSTEX (the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) in January 2019 for the very reasons of maintaining a trade line with Iran have not been able to operationalize it and thus the JCPOA promises sunk down. On the other hand, from a geostrategic perspective, it is recommended that Iran have the support of the European Union (EU), along with China and Russia in the nuclear agreement. Thus, at present, a change of approach can be seen in Iran’s foreign policy by adjusting it to regional and international realities, given its integration more with the policy of neighboring states (paying more attention to relations with neighboring states), and at the same time it is a pronounced “look East” orientation. The Eastern reorientation does not have an ideological significance, but emphasizes the dimensions of economic development and prosperity for Iran, based on the geographical and historical determinants of Iran. Thus, the priority of Iran’s foreign policy is regional multilateralism. When a state is under economic sanctions, it naturally goes to the states that support it. Currently, the Iranian authorities consider that relations with the Western side (U.S. and Western Europe) are not as important as they were before the signing of the nuclear agreement, giving priority to other areas such as Eastern Europe, regional/neighboring states—with a focus on Afghanistan. In addition, one can highlight an increased prominence for Iranian relation with the states of the Caucasus and the states of East Asia, and in the alternative the states of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Global South). The Iranian movements are not detached from global tendencies. For instance, the Asianisation happened in a global context, where the center of the world economy gravitates toward Asia. “In 2008 the world’s economic center of gravity had moved close to Izmir, thus having been pulled 4,800 km (75 percent of the Earth’s radius) eastward across the surface of the planet.” The calculation takes into account all the gross domestic products generated globally. Thus, an estimated calculus for

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Fig. 1 Center of world economy moving East (Source: India Post News Paper, 2018, May 5)

2050 indicates that the center moves further East, somewhere between India and China (Quah, 2011). This is how a mutual benefit relationship started between the Middle East and China (as between supplier and distributor), along the lines of energy and economics (Fig. 1).

5

Energy Prevalence in the Bilateral Ties

Energy is the dominant driver of China’s expanding relationship with the Middle East. China sees the Middle East as a key energy source (being the net oil exporter since the 1990s) and an important market for its own exports (ECFR, 2020). For their part, Middle Eastern oil producers also see China, as the net consumer for their energy reserves, given the U.S. shift in energy policies. For instance, Iran finds itself in a particular situation compared to other Middle Eastern counterparts. Iran is highly affected by sanctions and needs exports; thus, China is an ideal partner that requires oil for fueling its expanding industries. China gets approximately 75% of its oil from abroad, being the largest importer (www.eia.gov, 2020), at more than 10 million barrels a day in 2019 (see Fig. 2). According to scholars, one could envisage an axis of oil comprised of Russia (a major producer), China (an avid consumer), and oil-producing

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Fig. 2 China’s crude oil imports (Source https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ detail.php?id=43216)

states (Iran as a major producer) (Dorraj & Currier, 2008). As their interests converge, they can challenge the U.S. presence and targets. This is exactly the political and strategic dimension of the Sino-Iranian approach.

6

The Political Dimension of the Partnership

The Sino-Iranian deal features a large political dimension. Pursuing the partnership is about the power games between China–U.S., as well. Iran was acknowledging that U.S.–China rivalry is here to stay. Iran’s negotiations with China have garnered Western attention, hoping to raise the bar for potential negotiations, Iran being seen in Western capitals as a mediating point between Moscow and Beijing. Concomitantly, Iran is taking part in the activities of regional formats, such as the SCO, the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and of course China’s Belt and Road Initiative in a quest to develop its Asianisation strategy as a counterbalance to U.S. constant pressure (Ehteshami & Bahgat, 2019, p. 21). Iran has developed a framework agreement within the format of the EAEU and pursues becoming a full member in order to diversify its

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options for cooperation (mainly for economic security), in absence of a détente with the West. Teheran contemplates the EAEU’s markets opportunities and better connections to Central Asia. This is part of the “look East” strategy. Its success, however, remains unclear given Iran’s limited possibilities in the current context to face Asia’s complex power politics, together with the Asian powers have limited options to favor Iran, with the exception of China. This makes the partnership of Iran–China potentially more important than any other power axes in the Middle East. In fact, the Sino-Iranian deal combined with Russian’s interests to join the trio for strategic and determined goals (only when interests converge) raises Iran’s regional profile. Iranian domestic policies have influenced the inclination toward Asia, after the disappointment with the West in the aftermath of JCPOA undelivered promises. Initially, President Hassan Rouhani was attracted by an opening with the West, without neglecting integration with Asian economies, including Japan and South Korea. However, facing the decline of JCPOA terms, Iran reinforced its Eastern approach. In addition, former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a mentor for president Rouhani thought it would be beneficial for Iran to design its economy in the manner Deng Xiaoping modeled China (ECFR, 2020). China has become engaging in multilateral forums to push an agenda for Iran—for instance, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in June 2020 resisted against a European-led resolution against Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a long-time outcast of the international community, being the recipient/target of a long-lived sanctions program from the part of/pushed by the U.S. In the series of these restrictions, in 2007 the UN imposed a formal arms embargo, over suspicions and tensions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. An international conventional arms embargo on Iran, imposed 13 years ago by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), ended in October 2020. In May, the U.S. announced that it wanted the UNSC to continue the ban on Iranian access to acquire conventional weapons. The UNSC Resolution 2231 was adopted in July 2015 by consensus to endorse the JCPOA, comprising a five-year restriction on Iran’s importing conventional weapons that ended on October 18, 2020. In mid-August 2020, the U.S. introduced a resolution to extend the arms embargo without a deadline (Jakes & Sanger, 2020), faced with a clear rejection. Finally, it was found that the proposed resolution had no legal basis. Even though the U.S. unilaterally quit the JCPOA, it was threatening to invoke the automatic reinstatement of

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sanctions provisions of JCPOA. The United Kingdom (UK) and France have criticized this step. Russia and Iran opposed the extension of the embargo. It means Iran will be legally able to buy and sell conventional arms, including small arms, missiles, helicopters, and tanks. This enables a momentum for the increase of the political and security dimension of the Sino-Iranian relations.

7

The Security Dimension of the Partnership

The partnership between China and Iran calls for military cooperation, potentially giving China leverage in a region dominated by the U.S., challenging Biden’s Administration priorities. It includes various aspects of military collaboration and intelligence sharing, framed under the name of fighting terrorism and illicit substances traffic. If China is willing to step up its permanent military presence in the Middle East in the proximity of the U.S. this would be a game changer. But again, are the Middle Eastern states wiling to engage with China on such basis? From a strategic point of view, we note that Iran benefits from a crucial position for geopolitics, including access to Persian Gulf waters. The potential to have an easy entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, the gate to the Persian Gulf, would give the Chinese a strategic advantage on the waters through which much of the world’s oil transits. The U.S. considers the passage equally important as it has stationed its Fifth fleet in the same waters. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has begun military exercises in 2014. The most recent and significant was in December 2019, when a Chinese ammunition destroyer—the Xining—joined a naval exercise with the Russian and Iranian navies in the Gulf of Oman. Iran, China, and Russia considered the joint exercises the runner-ups of unprecedented cooperation (Reuters, 2019). It was the first time that such drills were being held in such a format, given the friendly ties between the trio. All three countries took a bold step (Reuters, 2019) of conducting joint drills in a time of evident antimony with the U.S. Thus, one could argue that it was China that wanted to raise flashes to the U.S., rather than purely cooperation with Iran (ECFR, 2019). Officially, China declared it was a “normal military exchange” between the three-armed forces, not necessarily connected to the developments in the region (China Daily, 2019). The regional waters were tensioned because of the strains between Riyadh and Tehran. Moreover, the events of January 2020, namely the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary

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Guard’s elite Quds Force, added increased pressure and anxiety in the area (Barzegar, 2020). It also fueled anti-American sentiments among Iranian citizens (Barzegar, 2020). However, it has not turned the course of Iranian regional influence as U.S. might have expected. Several attacks followed these tensions in the Gulf waters (May–June 2020), impacting Saudi tankers, which the United States blamed on Iran that denied the accusations. Beyond the regional turmoil, one should note that Iran is part of ongoing international tensions ever since January 2020, with the United States exerting pressure and sanctioning exports of Iran and other trade ties of different international partners. American warships already collided in the Persian Gulf waters. In addition, the U.S. is disputing China’s claims in the South China Sea (New York Times, 2018), while China is considered an enemy in American military strategies. While China was not evident in projecting hard power, it can now challenge American military supremacy in the places that matter most to it: in the Pacific Area. The U.S. was an undisputed hegemon in the Pacific area and becomes once again contested territory, given the Chinese presence. China invested significantly and developed rapidly radar and satellite communications. It is also rapidly expanding its naval forces in order to deploy a “blue water” navy that would allow defending its interests globally, beyond the coastline of China (New York Times, 2018). The Chinese military, traditionally a land force, is projecting new power into the “blue waters” of the world to protect China’s expanding economic and diplomatic interests, from the Pacific to the Atlantic (New York Times, 2018), the very same region where America is prioritizing interests. As part of the deal negotiated with Beijing, China is to be allowed access to a number of Iranian ports, including Chabahar. The reports go further by advancing the possibility of building a new military base in the vicinity of the port (www.gatestoneinstitute.org, 2020). Such a construction would interfere with the presence of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which is permanently deployed in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial international sea passage (www.ocnus.net, 2020). Any expansion in Iranian and Chinese military activity in the region would affect the joint U.S.–UK base on the island of Diego Garcia, a crucial asset in the region. As part of the new era of cooperation between Tehran and Beijing, Western countries fear the potential of Sino-Iranian presence in the Indian Ocean, a challenge for the American dominance in the Gulf region and beyond (www.ocnus.net).

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Notwithstanding, it is unlikely that Beijing would deploy troops on the Iranian territory, given the Iranian Constitution’s provisions (Article 1461 bans any foreign military base establishment on Iran’s territory), unless an amendment is to be issued. The concept of competition of the great powers became important under the Trump administration because it prioritized it in the foreign affairs strategy, pointing at the fact that Russia and China are the revisionist powers in the region and that attention should be paid to their actions. According to this concept, the Middle East is a region in which the U.S. should also focus on the actions of China and Russia. This U.S. vision of the competition of the great powers generates tensions in the regional reality manifested by the competition of Russia–China/China– U.S./Russia–U.S. relations in the region. At the same time, Iran hopes that U.S. elections may bring about a change in the White House with more leeway for dialogue and appeasement, including some relief of the sanction’s regime. Even if the Biden Administration repeals the act by which the U.S. was withdrawn from the nuclear agreement and returns to the legal framework of the agreement, the President will face two important challenges: the existence of sanctions initially imposed by the U.S. and which have not been removed in 2015, as well as the sanctions imposed by President Trump. In this context, one should recall Article 29 within the JCPOA.2 As a matter of fact, even during Obama mandate sanctions were still an active policy instrument for the U.S., the talks of lifting them were merely happening for a diplomatic manifestation. Thus, it is unlikely that President Biden will pursue a different course of action than that of his predecessors—Presidents Obama and Trump. In addition, the campaign for Iran’s June 2021 presidential election has begun, and anti-American slogans are considered very popular. The Iranian side is also following the Biden administration’s relations with China with interest, considering them factors of additional worry.

1 Article 146. The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, is forbidden. 2 Article 29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.

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In terms of stabilization so much needed in the Middle East, one should aim for a more comprehensive so-called power competition in the Middle East region, including not only the great powers, but also the regional powers. The modifications brought to the international milieu prompted regional powers to boost their presence in different manners. Turkey and Russia are the main players in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is not a great power competition, such as the classic EU, U.S., or China, etc., but also includes Turkey as a regional power and Russia as a great power. It is a new phenomenon, it has become the norm in Syria, where the main players are Turkey, Russia, Israel, and Iran. One should mention that Turkey is also currently pursuing cementing its relations with China, provoking the American manner of looking at the Middle East. China is building bridges and connections where the U.S. has partially withdrawn, although for the moment it has not played a major role in Syria. As well, not everyone inside Iran is happy with the new strategic plans. Hardliners have accused Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of secrecy in the negotiations with China. Thus, rumors spread that China may be taking over Kish Island and that Chinese troops would be stationed in Iran for securing their investments (www.al-monitor.com, 2020). But at the same time, there are the hardliners that plead for Iran’s looking East/implementing Asianisation. This idea emerged partly because Iran understood, after the invasion of Iraq, that it could not have any strategic alliance with anyone, lacking reliable partners to trust. For strategic issues, meaning war and security, Iran must rely on itself, this is why it developed a missile program.

8

Bilateral Relations Perspectives

Iran–China relations mean long-term economic cooperation, similar to what Iran aims to obtain from various other states. Tehran and Beijing share a pragmatic orientation, setting aside ideologies, in the name of common goals. Both Iran and China pursue mutual benefits from a relational framework that organizes their bilateral relations. A comprehensive deal has the potential to enhance many aspects of cooperation; however, it is yet unlikely to develop into a full strategic alliance as it would be influenced by external circumstances. The root of the cooperation draws upon a glorious past. Both symbolize rich civilizations with imperial past, Iran and China share

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psychological identification (Dorraj & Currier, 2008). They both act long term, strategically, showing resilience in their battles. This unique sense of national pride and appreciation for the past is connected to the revolutions both China and Iran came across in the twentieth century in which anti-imperialism and national pride were recurrent themes. “The historical ties and encounters between the Chinese and Persian empires go back to the contacts between the Hans and the Parthians in 139 BCE” (Dorraj & Currier, 2008). The Silk Road made the contacts more frequent during the Middle Age. In the twentieth century, diplomatic contacts and trade relations have known a considerable expansion. Initially, after the Chinese revolution of 1949, there were strenuous relations that began to improve by the 1960s. Iran was on the side of the United States during the Cold War for condemnation of communism (for political calculations). In the period after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Chinese leadership acknowledged the new government rapidly. During the 1980s, Iran’s foreign policy was standing under the slogan “neither East nor West” opposing both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two grand powers of the time. This policy suited the Chinese government. At the end of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, China participated in the reconstruction process and sold arms and technology for Iran. Iran, being under sanctions, accepted this offer. This is also the period when China’s economy began to grow rapidly, China being energy-hungry for development, while Iran needed a reliable buyer for its oil and gas (one that could provide technology and its weaponry was even better). This marked the first steps of a mutually beneficial relationship. After the mid-1990s, relations enter an ascendant pace which escalated in the 2000s. During his rule in 2016, President Xi Jinping presented Sino-Iranian perspective relations as a continuation of the history of the two former empires that “made an important contribution to opening the Silk Road and promoting exchanges between Eastern and Western civilizations” (China Daily, 2016). There is a common denominator between the two countries that have to balance the American presence (Iran regionally, China on a global level). China looks at Iran from a strategic perspective, not just seeing the potential of a market. Equally, China has not perceived Iran as a provider of goods and merchandise only. That is why this 25-year partnership plan gives the Chinese and Iran confidence. On the other hand, China knows that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and other states in the Middle East

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are in U.S.’s orbit. Iran is not, which is an important contribution to their calculation, as Iran would not gravitate toward the U.S.’s orbit. However, China is not spared from the dilemma rising from the expansion of relations with Iran. It needs to balance the necessities of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), economic partners of China in the vicinity of Iran. Tehran has an important role in stabilizing the region, having influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, but also the ability to destabilize the region, if decides so. China also wants a stabilization of the region and its security, in order to have a security of energy resources. In the coming period, one should expect developments. In reality and in practice, China has the means to act as a key player in stabilizing and securing the region for the foreseeable future, as it is in its interest, being much more dependent on the region than the U.S. or Russia. However, it remains unclear whether China’s commercial and banking sectors are willing to engage with Iran under the threat of U.S. sanctions. Moreover, the extent to which Beijing and Tehran develops this partnership is highly dependent on Washington’s signals to both parties. Both Beijing and Tehran are cautious planners with a tendency to wait and see approach, without rushing to swift changes of strategies in terms of foreign and military policies. China is cautious not to endanger any of its important commercial relations in the Gulf region by being a best friend to Iran, whereas Iran is wary of trusting any foreign power exceedingly. On the 3rd of September 2020, Mohammad Sadr, a member of the Iranian Maslehat Council (https://jahanesanat.ir, 2020), stated that, in the absence of the adoption of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, the 25-year agreement with China will not be operational. The argument is that Chinese banks do not currently make transfers with Iranian banks. The situation is the same with regard to cooperation with Russian banks. The president of the Iranian–Chinese Chamber of Commerce also said that Chinese banks are no longer trading in Iran (https://jahanesanat.ir, 2020). This is especially important in the context of the lifting (October 18, 2020) of the arms embargo for Iran, as it seems there will be no rush yet into arms trading. A military and technological exchange in weaponry would enhance the security dimension of China–Iran relations. Steps are made in the direction of formalizing the agreement and enforcing it, but in a world altered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the precarious situation of finances is another obstacle to the fulfillment of prospective projects.

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9

COVID-19 Impact

The economic repercussions of COVID-19 represent a tipping point for the global economy. The pandemic, combined with the increasing interconnectedness of a globalized world, has shed light on the significance of sanitary safety. Iran was among the countries most affected in the MENA region, becoming the first Middle Eastern epicenter of the epidemic, while China appears to be in control of the situation, pursuing a public diplomacy plan in that sense. Moreover, it has the means to project soft power by offering aid throughout the Middle East. It was assessed that China had emerged stronger from the pandemic, while the U.S. has weakened relatively. The U.S. practiced some protectionist measures, tried to renationalize industries, with a specific target on Chinese companies (Christensen, 2020). During the pandemic, the U.S. pulled out from international institutions and was increasingly wary against Chinese activities, and continued its pressure policy on Iran. At the macroeconomic level, one should assess the damage resulted from the COVID-19 in relation to indicators, namely the gross domestic product (GDP). The GDP is specific to each country, according to the structure of the economy. The Chinese GDP consists of more than two-thirds of tangible and solid production and construction of infrastructure, housing, transport, energy, and so on (www.globalresearch.ca, 2020). World Bank projects a U.S.$440 billion GDP for the Iranian calendar year 2019/2020 (www.worldbank.org, 2020). Iran’s economy relies on hydrocarbon resources, agriculture, services, and manufacturing. China’s economy is expected to grow by 1.3% (IMF) in 2020 and by China’s own estimate up to 3.5% (www.globalresearch.ca, 2020). Against all odds, China’s economy plays an increasingly central role in the world system being simultaneously very vast, with rapid growth (Kemp, 2020). The COVID-19 highlighted that China is the engine of manufacturing around the world, despite Western countries’ maneuvers for renationalizing industries. China’s growing internal market also has implications that will last far beyond the coronavirus epidemic, shaping the global balance of power maybe for the decades to come. Given the financial stability, there is increased interest for yuan (the Chinese currency) reserves, which have the potential to surge in 2021 (www.globalresear ch.ca, 2020). Also, we note the increased preference for trading with yuan, in the detriment of the U.S. dollar (www.globalresearch.ca, 2020). However, the correct manner in which the yuan would top the dollar

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would be the trading externally and reform of the financial systems, as the currency growth is driven by the market. One recent incentive could be the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region—(signed on November 16, 2020) an opportunity for the internationalization of the yuan. We expect that COVID-19 would affect the global economy worse than the 2008–2009 crisis, a crisis that was only resolved temporarily by adding a considerable (albeit unstainable) amount of debt, through bailouts and stimulus plans (www.valdaiclub.com, 2020). All in all, COVID-19 has affected Iran and many countries around the globe, while Beijing seemed to do better in crisis management than the U.S. and Europe. But it also made the global environment more strenuous and the U.S.–Chinese tensions will likely affect the Middle East, resulting in more hurdles for Iran–China’s relations. Thus, the global outbreak is not only about the health crisis, but it represents a costly pandemic, with geo-economic implications.

10

Conclusion

Until recently, China was not actively present in the Middle East, beyond the usual diplomacy, since the Middle East has been, and to a large extent remains, focused on its own problems and engaged mostly with the Western world (notably with the U.S.). Nonetheless, the situation has modified in recent years, as the tremendous growth of the Chinese economy has created a corresponding demand for energy and the United States has diminished its presence in the Middle East, given the reduction in external energy needs and reshuffling world priorities. Even though it is advancing its agenda in the Middle East, China is still wary of the Middle East turmoil. For instance, though afraid of the Daesh/Islamic State spread rapidly, it was not motivated to mingle directly with the hot waters of Middle Eastern conflicts. China tries to be a smart power, as the former vice-president at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a government research institute believes that: “The Middle East is the graveyard of great powers” (New York Times, 2016). Thus, China bases its positions on a set of foreign and defense policy principles in opposition of the U.S., meant to ensure that China avoids what it considers the U.S. did faultily. Moreover, China’s insistence that its primary focus is the development of mutually beneficial “win–win,” economic and commercial relations

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becomes more difficult to achieve in practice (Dorsey, 2017). China’s balancing act is moreover increasingly compromised by its effort to be a friend to all, an undertaking that becomes more and more difficult as the greater Middle East is fighting with transitions that started in 2011 with the popular Arab revolts and the change of power is likely to last for the years to come (Dorsey, 2019). Finding the right balance in a troubled region is almost unattainable. China and its new foreign policy principles are further driven by the fact that China’s key interests in the greater Middle East and North Africa have expanded significantly beyond the narrow focus of energy and dependence on the region for half of its oil imports (www.eia.gov). For the moment, China is concentrating on buying and selling in the Middle East, both in Saudi Arabia and Iran, leaving the strenuous security aspects to the U.S. There are still many win–win aspects and beneficial features in China’s relations to the Middle East. For instance, countries in the Gulf that lead the world in petroleum reserves, production, and exports, for a mid-term future, see China as an important (currently their single largest) market. China’s deep economic interests in the Middle East carry little of the historical overlay of the empire building and alliance shaping of the European powers. China was feeble when Europeans developed a colonial structure in the Middle East (New York Times, 2016). Iran and China share the aversion for the colonial past shaped by Western powers. China revived its policy in the Middle East, the core of it is happening in the Persian Gulf, either with Iran or Saudi Arabia. China is like dancing on a tight rope in order to keep its policy running and making no enemies. However, the intricacies of the region are ultimately likely to affect China. It is not recommended to discuss a security arrangement only between Iran and Saudi Arabia, without including Russia, China, and other regional states. Russia has proposed a security architecture similar to Iran, and China has its own regional approach to implementing stability. China has not always refrained from taking sides, but acted precautious most of the time. China was a major supplier of arms to Tehran during the Iran–Iraq war when the United States and Europe imposed an arms embargo. That military relationship is likely to be revived as the arms embargo is lifted, though it takes time since Iran’s finances are not at their best level and persistent insecurity with regard to revenues is expected after the shock created by COVID-19.

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China views Iran as an important hub, a key part of the overall effort to export its industrial overcapacity and bolster its energy security over the long term. Iran wants to build a partnership that would bring Asia closer, but it is wary that China might not fulfill all the engagements, because of the global strains imposed on Iran. Thus, the chapter estimates that the agreement between China and Iran would be very circumstantial, according to international developments, hereby including the lines of the American foreign policy. We note that both China and Iran signaled their interest for a relation encompassing a lot of prospects. It remains unclear how far China’s commercial and banking sectors will be willing to engage with Iran under the threat of U.S. sanctions. In fact, the extent of the partnership between China and Iran is tied to the development of both countries’ relations with the U.S. There is a wait and see approach regarding the newly elected U.S. Administration. The Iranian authorities are currently analyzing the U.S.– China relationship in order to help them identify the real intentions of the U.S. A factor that could change the triangle of China–U.S.–Iran is an appeasement of U.S.–Iran relations. However, Iranian decision-makers act with maximum precaution after the experience of JCPOA and unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. Equally, if U.S.–China solve some of their tensions, it might be that China slows down expanding its presence in the Middle East, in order to please the U.S. The findings of the chapter are that despite the improvements and enhancement of a Chinese—–ran partnership, the breakthroughs are yet to come, given various circumstances. It is not necessary that the terms of the agreement are enforced immediately or it would remain a grand sketch for plans that shake the power games in the Middle East. For instance, because of the extreme pressure exerted by a punitive economic sanctions regime, Iran does not afford to make order for Chinese weaponry and new military technology. For the same reasons of sanctions, financing Chinese projects in Iran is not that simple. Iran needs a bargaining tool to raise the stakes for negotiations with the U.S. in order to ease sanctions and the diplomatic support of China might prove crucial. In addition, there are hurdles for some strategic projects— establishing transportation links, seaports, as the Iranian public perception has to become accustomed to a foreign partner’ s strategic involvement. However, given the resilience of both Chinese and Iranian policies, the deals are in the making for the mid-term. The new approaches in alliances of China are increasingly important in a world that moved its economic

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center eastward and gravitates toward Asian production engines. In the end, this represents a pragmatic partnership that would be influenced also by the U.S. approaches to the Middle East, and should be read in a broader context. President Trump’s policy of supporting Saudi Arabia and Israel has also forced Iran to identify other dialogue partners. The world is still coping with the prospective paradigm shifts. Currently, there are adjustments derived from the Iranian–Chinese partnership, although several factors do not play into the favor of its full materialization. Both Iran and China relate to an interconnected world experiencing changes. For instance, the Europeans hope the United States is coming back to the Middle East, though we are witnesses of an Asianisation tendency, reaching full speed. The Europeans do not favor China’s presence in Iran, as they fear it is sending Iran into China’s orbit. Nonetheless, there is a real alternative to the economic pole formerly established along the Euro-Atlantic shores to be found in Asia. Competition between states is evident in the Middle East, in which in fact they do not act militarily against each other or do not actively compete with each other, yet show defensive competition for their own interests. In terms of political influence, neither Russia nor China is trying to impose its ideological model on the Middle East. In addition, the alternative to diplomacy could well be the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, which the JCPOA meant to avoid at all means. If one means to turn to renegotiation, the diplomatic talks with Iran require Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who have both deepened ties with Iran over the past four years. Both China and Russia brought Iran to the talks of several regional formats, such as the SCO, the EAEU, which Iran accepted, according to its “look East” orientation. As a matter of fact, the EU can also return to engaging to Iran once it receives the green light emerging from consensus within the bloc or/and from the engagement with the other great powers. On top of these challenges, the world is reeling from the COVID19 pandemic, another external unexpected factor that brings more austerity and less global engagement (though the opposite was expected). However, we note that Asia remained stronger in the times of the pandemic, while the West eroded its capacity to plan and contain, turning instead to high levels of debt (which sooner or later become unsustainable). In conclusion, the chapter admits its limits, since the external factors mentioned can always influence/accelerate existing trends and also the materialization of the Sino-Iranian partnership. Thus, further

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research is recommended in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and of the emergence of Biden blueprints for politics (to be different from the predecessor) that could establish new lines for the American foreign policy.

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Iran and Russia Relations: Conceptions of Cooperations Davood Kiani

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Introduction

One of the varieties of the Iranian–Russian interactions is that the current ties between the two players are out of proportion with their historical relations. Historically, Russia has inflicted damage to the Iranian territorial integrity and national pride more than any other Western powers. Since the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828—by which Iran lost its main areas in South Caucasus to Russia—to the end of the Cold War in 1989, this great power had always been an irritating neighbor and as a source of considerable concern and fear for Iran, irrespective of the governance: Qajari Dynasty, Pahlavi Monarchy and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fear forced Iran into an alliance with Western powers to counterbalance the irrepressible influence of its northern neighbor. Finally, the Collapse of the Soviet Union, pushing Russia out of Iran’s neighborhood, not only relieved Iran from this historic fear but also opened a quite new chapter for more balanced bilateral relations based on mutual respect. The three decades of relations indicate that unlike turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran has never pursued geopolitical or ideological ambitions in Central Asia and South Caucasus at the expense of Russian interests.

D. Kiani (B) Islamic Azad University of Qom, Qom, Iran © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_11

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Furthermore, Iran has geographically and politically been the closest partner for the Russian growing involvement in the Middle East, despite other regional players’ reluctance. However, there are some ambiguities in the Iranian–Russian engagement. Moscow is concerned about Iran’s potential access to nuclear weapons, though not as much as the West. Even though Russia voted for all six UNSC resolutions against Tehran’s nuclear activities between 2006 and 2010, it reached an agreement with Iran in 2014 to build two new nuclear reactors for Iran at Bushehr power plant and 6 more in the long run and in the context of developing Iran’s nuclear industry. Besides, while one-seventh of the Russian population is Sunni Muslim, and prone to some Saudis radical thoughts, Moscow has cautiously kept going on its political and to some extent strategic ties with Tehran. Although Moscow has traditionally enjoyed a special relationship with Tel Aviv and the Israel’s security has been one of its top priorities in the Middle East, it stood by Tehran and Hezbollah to defeat ISIS in Syria which laid the ground for Iran and its proxies to prop up their positions in southern Syria. Disregarding Israel’s disagreements, Russia did not only deliver the S300 missile system to Iran in 2015 but also voted against the U.S. draft resolution to extend arms embargo due to its expiration in October 2020. On the Iranian side, as this chapter indicates, the political system has been under constant criticism by pro-Western political circles for closing its eyes on Russia playing game with Iran. Despite these understandable concerns, it seems that both actors have determined to continue their interactions. Most presumably, the possibility of rapprochement with the West by one of the two parties is the main reason that both oblige themselves to give more incentives to the other. Since the pillars of this cooperation have been consistently based on countering regional crises or common enemies rather than defining long-term common interests, and various joint security and economic projects have been politically motivated, the two players have never had this opportunity to experience a sustainably strategic partnership. The main argument of this chapter is that as far as the ideological ends of Iran and geopolitical goals of Russia at the global levels coincide, both players will have strong incentives to manage their bilateral and regional differences, though the scope of their strategic cooperation would remain limited.

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Russia in Iranian Politics: Ally or Rival?

Societal relations between Tehran and Moscow are not as warm as government-to-government interactions. Despite the past three decades of an upswing in their political ties, instigated by the then Speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’ trip to Moscow on 21 June 1989, the Iranian society in its various political, economic and cultural layers has not yet sympathized with the Iran’s Russia policy. The zenith of total bilateral trade between the two countries reached $1.74 billion in 2018. Iran with 533-million-dollar import from Russia only ranks 54th among Russia’s most important trading partners (Parliament Research Center of Islamic Republic of Iran 2020, 10). To compare, the bilateral trade between Iran and Turkey with the same size in population amounted to $9.30 billion in 2018. However, the economic infrastructures of both countries are heavily dependent on exporting raw materials as well as oil and gas. Iranian economic and financial system is deeply hit by international sanctions and high transport cost due to the weakness of logistic infrastructures is among key obstacle in the bilateral economic relations. Cultural ties which have been deeply overshadowed by the negative Iranian historic image of Russia do not represent official discourse. These are the historical pieces of evidence that have long formed Iranian conceptions of Russia. In the history textbooks for the Iranian primary/secondary education system as well as for the higher education, Russia has been known for its continuous interventions in Iranian domestic politics, separation of some parts of Iranian territories, especially South Caucasus, occupation of northern Iran and intriguing to depart them and sabotaging the economic development processes over the past two centuries. Regarding social communications, there have been poor records of educational and tourism exchanges. Russia is not among the top ten destinations for Iranian students and tourists. On the Russian side, the situation is much worse. In the ranking of the nationality of incoming tourists to Iran, out of 2,159,882 incoming tourists to Iran from April to August of 2017, only 7858 Russian tourists entered Iran, which accounts for 0.36% of the total incoming tourists to Iran. On the Iranian side, over the same period, 50,871 out of 3,474,692 Iranian tourists chose Russia as their first destination which is equal to 1.5% of Iran’s total outgoing tourists (Amirahmadian 2018).

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Despite modest cultural and economic relations between Iran and Russia which is partially because of repellent effects of divergent historical attitudes and lack of requirements for providing positive grounds in facilitating economic interactions, there are contradictory concepts of the Russian role in Iranian foreign policy across political parties and wings. In general, these views can be characterized in two main approaches: the first approach, which has been highly reflected by Reformists and Moderates, depicts Russia as an unreliable and competitive state which has always used Iran as a bargaining chip for rapprochement with the U.S. Among Reformists’ numerous statements, reformist politician and former deputy of foreign minister in Khatami cabinet Mohsen Aminzadeh argued: ‘If there is a close friendship between the U.S. and Russia, we may be harmed. The Russians see us as a regional rival’ (Aminzadeh 2016). For Reformists and to some extent Moderates, Russia is more rival than a partner. Moscow would not allow Iran to pursue its interests in Central Asia and South Caucasus. In the global energy market, thanks to the international sanctions, Russia has become the absolute winner of Iranian absence in the European market. That is why Moscow has no interests in the possibly lift of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Behind this argument, there is an unstated concern that growing political ties between Tehran and Moscow, yields leverage to Iran to shore up its resilience against international sanctions, and thus strengthens the ideological fabric of Iran’s political system. Therefore, Iran being backed indirectly by Russia has greatly empowered Tehran to easily suppress domestic opposition and survive its middle-class, long-running discourse for change in its foreign policy course. The Green Movement erupted after the controversial presidential election in June 2009 was a famous landmark in public emotional expressions against Iran’s ideological approach in foreign policy, as demonstrators began shouting ‘Death to Russia.’ The Picture of Russia in the mirror of Conservatives, security circles and deep state in Iran thinks quite different; Russia is a strategic partner whose political support is needed for driving the unipolar world toward multipolarity. In conservative political discourse, Iran’s foreign policy may advance better through establishing broadly political and security relations with Russia. Despite some potential and practical differences between Tehran and Moscow, this approach has dominated Iran’s strategic mindset since the end of the Cold War. This logic vividly explains the continuity rather than a change in Iran’s Russia policy for the past and foreseeable

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future. Iran’s penchant for defining strategic cooperation with Russia has been based on two considerations: First, Iran should not be depicted as a threat or challenger for Russian interests in Central Asia and South Caucasus. Over the past three decades, Iran’s political behavior in the region has been driven by respecting the Russian historical influence. Tehran has never defined ideological goals in Eurasia, despite its different course in foreign policy in the Middle East. In this context, Tehran avoided backing the party of Islamic revival led by Abdullah Noori in Tajikistan during the political crisis between 1992 and 1997 and struggled to mediate between president of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon and its oppositions which led to a peace agreement in 1997. Iran’s involvement was highly appreciated by Russia. As a Russian expert argued ‘during the second Chechen war, between 1999 and 2009, the dialogue with Tehran yielded important results for Moscow. In 1999, the Iranian authorities not only refused to support the separatists but also used their country’s position as the chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to adopt a pro-Russian resolution at a summit meeting’ (Kozhanov 2015, 8). Tehran and Moscow took the same stance in their joint support of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. As Kozhanov puts it, ‘Russia’s political elites also remember that as opposed to Turkey, the Islamic Republic did not use the fall of the Soviet Union to aggressively spread its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia by propagating the ideas of the Islamic Revolution or funding local nationalist and radical religious movements (ibid.). Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran’s former foreign minister (1981–1997) and top advisor to Supreme Leader, briefly explained the general guideline of Iran Foreign policy in Central Asia and South Caucasus: ‘Iran’s foreign policy toward Certain Asia and South Caucasus passes through Russian gate’. Second, Iran has sought for strategic partnership rather than an alliance with Russia. Due to the ideological discourse pervaded its foreign policy, this country cannot enter into a strategic alliance with any great powers. In all three very important sessions held between the Iranian Supreme leader and Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2015, 2017, and 2018, Ayatollah Khamenei never called for an alliance with Russia. The only thing that he wanted was a kind of strategic cooperation at bilateral and global levels: ‘one of the cases where the two sides can have cooperation is containing the U.S. because the U.S. is a danger to humanity and it is possible to restrain it is possible to restrain it’ (Khamenei, 7 September 2018).

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The alliance involves interests and commitments and is reliant on a hierarchical structure. Iranians are very sensitive about their independence. As Homeira Moshirzadeh puts it, ‘the most significant behavioral feature of Iran’s foreign policy in the past three decades had been countering hegemonism or anti-imperialism which led to the formation of a particular role identity in Iran’s foreign policy: Iran as an independent state’ (Moshirzadeh 2007, 529). Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in his first meeting with President Putin, reminded him that ‘a sovereign Iran is in the interest of Russia. At the same time, a powerful Russia is in the interest of Iran’ (Khamenei, 16 October 2007). Despite Iran’s repeated requests to get full membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), this membership, for some Iranian observers, could contravene Iran’s Constitution. If Iran becomes a full member to the SCO, the Russian and Chinese military forces may want to use military bases in Iran, which is unconstitutional. Article 146 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (adopted on 24 October 1979) reads: ‘the establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran even for peaceful purposes is forbidden’. One of the helpful instances which proves better the sensitivity of public opinion about the national independence goes back to Russia’s use of Noje airbase in Hamedan on 16 August 2016 to bomb Syrian radical groups. In the aftermath of the operation, Russia immediately made it public and disclosed it unilaterally. Reformist-led highly influential mass media managed to make a good meal out of this event and used it as a pretext to arouse partially public opinion against Conservatives and security circles. Finally, the government had to step back. While criticizing Russian mishandling of the situation and regarded it ungentlemanly to flaunt its superiority, Iran’s then minister of defence Hossein Dehghan announced: ‘under no circumstances will we ever provide Russians with a military base. When the Minister was asked about the reason Iran initially kept silence over Russian presence in Noje airbase, General Dehghan replied: “Russians are interested to show that they are the superpower, and have this capability to impact on security dynamics. On the other hand, Russia wants to prove that it is a key player in the Syrian theater and therefore can negotiate with the U.S. and guarantee their share in the political future of Syria” (Dehghan, 21 August 2016). Iranian reaction surprised its tactical ally in Syria. Moscow did not expect such a reaction. Although, the state media in a coordinated way decided not to trumpet the content of the interview,

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it could be regarded as the first harsh criticism from the Iranian security circles against Russia. Tehran and Moscow undoubtedly have a shared global perspective. Both have long opposed a unipolar world led by the U.S. and this is the most important driver of three decades of strategic cooperation between them. Preserving the political and territorial integrity of states in Central Asia, South Caucasus, and the Middle East and fighting against terrorism in the context of religious radicalism are their two political common goals. Russia and Iran have pursued shoulder to shoulder these two objectives during the Syrian crisis for almost one decade. However, it is quite clear that Tehran and Moscow are two fellow travelers who are walking on the same road with different destinations. Since this road is hard to pass, they have to concentrate more on the present than the future. From this point of view, the Russian–Iranian relation rests on an antipathy to the Western-led international order and thus suffers from a lack of strategic vision. They have vague conceptions of multi-polar world order. ‘It is widely believed in Russia that the West’s policy to some extent corresponds with Russian interests, as it creates additional incentives for the development of a special relationship between Moscow and Tehran. This belief is not only wrong but even dangerous. The Russia-Iran strategic partnership should not be built upon political considerations. This is an extremely fragile foundation (Topychkanov 2016, 31). Although the pillars of this relation are not reliant on the alliance, for Iran these interactions have a strategic character. Hossein Malaek, a former Iranian diplomat who served a tenure as an Iranian ambassador to China, argues that ‘in Iranian post-revolution discourse, the term “strategic” as adjective, has been usually applied when a given state meets part of Iran’s most urgent needs, whether it is weaponry items or facilitates, even though this interaction is ‘considered by that party as a regular relation or simple trade’ (Malaek 2018, 9–10). According to this argument in circumstances when no great power had the penchant for developing the nuclear industry, Russia despite U.S. and Israel’s objections, started to rebuild Bushehr power plant. Russia also provided Iran with some military materials including MiG fighters, strike aircraft, and Kilo-class submarines. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1995 to 2005, more than 70% of Iran’s arms imports were supplied by Russia (Suchkov and Vasilenko 2019, 65). The vigilant cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in tackling ISIS and pulling back the U.S. and other regional players from Syria which highly strengthened Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ has given noticeable credit to this argument.

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3 Iran and Russia in the Middle East: (Dis)Integration of Interests Since the end of the Cold War, Iran has been waiting for a motivated and determined Russia for defining a solid front against the U.S. and its Arab allies in the Middle East. Four years of inconclusive relations under the Reset Policy between Washington and Moscow from 2008 to 2012, laid the ground for Putin to review Russia’s foreign policy when he retook presidential power in 2012. According to a Russian expert, ‘growing confrontation with the West has pushed Moscow to be more active in the Middle East and Asia to compensate for the negative political and economic implications of tensions with the U.S. and the European Union (EU), to avoid international isolation, and to curtail possible security threats to the Kremlin in non-European parts of Eurasia. These factors, in return, have led the Russians to intensify their contract with Tehran’ (Kozhanov ibid., 3). The rise of religious radicalism based on reviving the Khalifa political system in the Muslim world led by ISIS, was an inherent enemy for Iran and Russia. Such a threat could destabilize the Muslim populated areas of Russia and stoke an anti-Shia movement across the Middle East. Thus, ISIS soon became an immediate threat for Moscow and Tehran which inevitably paved the way for the first joint military campaign in the history of the Iranian–Russia relations. While some argue that intensification of tensions between Russia and the West over the Crimean crisis which led to the entanglement of the Russian economy into the European sanctions and the final agreement (known as JCPOA) between Iran and the p5+1 over Iran’s nuclear standoff, have provided fertile ground for such a landmark cooperation in Syria, Russia would with or without these drivers welcome any proposal from Iran for such a joint campaign, provided that Tehran pledged to secure military forces on the Syrian soil. Preserving Syrian integrity, keeping Assad in power, and wiping out ISIS’s growing influence were paramount fruits of the Russian-Iranian cooperation over the Syrian crisis. While this coalition finally helped Iran to expand and strengthen its resistance axis from Iraq to Lebanon, it paved the ground for Russia to position itself as a new security provider in the Middle East and North Africa (Hatahet 2019, 5). The seriousness and urgency of developments in Syria and the potential danger of losing Assad in 2015 were in such a density that both parties did

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not go further to discuss their future concerns and differences over postISIS Syria and the Middle East. Before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the Iranian–Russian engagement was limited to the feeble bilateral relations and relatively symbolic opposition to the U.S. unilateralism. Therefore, the joint effort of the two partners in managing the crisis has been considered the first and most important manifestation of the RussianIranian strategic partnership (Shoori 2016a, 59). Whether or not, this crisis management helped Tehran uphold its geopolitical interests with a minimum cost. In fact, for Iran, the Syrian crisis—since its outbreak— had been a massive threat that soon turned into a strategic opportunity, though the Syrian crisis has enormously cost billions of dollars for the Iranian weak economy. Among different figures declared from Iranian domestic sources and international circles, the estimated total amount mentioned by Heshmatolah Falahatpisheh, a former reformist lawmaker and member of National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament is closer to reality. On 20 May 2020, Mr. Falahatpisheh said in an interview with reformist Ete’mad Daily: ‘Iran has spent between $20 to $30 billion in Syria to prop up President Bashar Al-Assad and fight Islamic State. We have to take it back’ (Shahla 2020). Without Russian involvement, the death toll and money expenditure for Iran under the severe international sanctions in Syria would have been more crippling. The shared military campaign between these two states brought about two strategic and political achievements for Iran. First, Tehran with having access to a geographical depth between Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon through the land corridor of Alqaem to Albukamal which is called in Iranian political literature as the geopolitics of resistance, managed to shore up its asymmetric deterrence capability in the Middle East. Second, the Astana Format formed in 2017 to settle the differences between Russia, Turkey, and Iran over their divergent interests in Syria, has had a defining role in defusing tensions over the Syrian crisis, preventing them from harsh confrontations and neutering U.S.-led Western political agenda for Syria. The years between 2015 and 2018 should be regarded as the peak of engagements between the countries. During this period, Russia finally acquiesced to deliver the S-300 air defence missile system to Iran in April 2015. It had left a serious wound in bilateral relations between Moscow and Tehran since Russia signed the deal in 2007 but denied to export this surface-to-air missile system on a rickety pretext of UNSC resolutions. The second meaningful act of Moscow was its consent to Iran’s request for full membership to the SCO. For years, Russia was reluctant

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to accept this request. The reason was clear. Russians are not willing to see a member with a high tension with the West. Now, they removed their objection. This decision was made in a joint statement after the meeting between both presidents of Russia and Iran in Moscow on 28 March 2017. Just a few days later, the Russian president’s envoy on SCO affairs, Bakhtiyar Khakimov said in an interview with Kommersant business daily: ‘Russia firmly supports vesting Iran with full-fledged membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but some other partners oppose the idea’ (Tass News Agency 2017). It was not difficult to realize that he meant Tajikistan. However, according to an Iranian diplomat, while it is an important positive change in Moscow’s policy, Russia could have convinced Tajikistan to remove its opposition votes. Another new and constructive development that happened in this period was Iran’s engagement in Eurasian economic integration. Following the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015, Iran became one of the first non-Eurasian states which with Russia’s backing invited to cooperate with this new body. Later, in May 2018, Iran signed a deal with the Eurasian Economic Union members (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) under the Free Trade Zone which was in fact, a preferential trade agreement. Finally, the agreement between Iran and EAEU as a precondition and contemporary mechanism for 3 years took effect on 27 October 2019. According to this agreement, about 862 commodity items were subjected to preferential tariffs. If anything goes well after 3 years from the starting date, the preferential agreement will turn into a Free Trade Zone. The figures show poor economic relations between Iran and the members of this Union. The total volume of trade between Iran and the EAEU in 2014 and 2015 was $1.08 and $2.4 billion, respectively, which comprised only 2% of Iran’s total trade (Parliament Research Center of Islamic Republic of Iran ibid., 1). However, for some Iranian experts, this agreement can be a practice for Iran in the sense that pave the way for the country to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the long run, If Iran abides by the rules, standards, and obligation of the deal. At present, Iran has only six free trade and preferential agreements with Turkey, Pakistan, Cuba, Tunisia, Syria, and Uzbekistan which only cover a total of 1000 commodities for preferential tariffs (Center for Strategic Studies 2019, 3). To Esfandiar Omidbakhsh who served years as a supervisor for Iran’s plenipotentiary trade office in WTO,’ Iran has no alternative. Iran-EU negotiations over free trade failed between 1997 and 2005 and now Iran

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needs to move to Eurasia. Therefore, Iran’s preferential agreement with the EAEU is based on a political imperative rather than an economic choice. If it wasn’t for Russia, there wouldn’t have been any agreement’ (Omidbakhsh ibid.). However, the two main drivers which pushed Tehran and Moscow to closer security and political cooperation in 2015, namely, the sign of the nuclear deal and the rise of ISIS, three years later in 2018 turned into wedge drivers. In fact, during the years 2018–2020, Russia’s high engagement policy with Iran has given way to the policy of gradual distancing itself from Iran in Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab states’ favor. It seems that the starting point of this relative disengagement goes back to the defeat of ISIS in Syria. At the time, Commander of Iran’s Quds Force Major General Qasem Soleimani, wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei on 21 November 2017, and announced the end of ISIS in Syria. A few days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared victory against terrorists in Syria on December 11 during an unexpected visit to a Russian military base in that county, where he also announced a partial withdrawal of Russian troops. In other words, the Raison d’être which pushed them toward strategic cooperation in Syria boiled down to political processes in resolving Syria’s political future in the form of its new draft Constitution. This emotional separation for such a “Marriage of Convenience”, a funny expression first coined by Nicolay Kozhanov in describing the nature of Russia–Iran relations (Kozhanov 2016), was not so unpredictable for Iran. As one of Iranian senior experts put it,’ Russia is with a limited investment looking for huge achievements in Syria. This issue would increase the risks for other key players including Iran in the Middle East. Plus, Moscow seeks to settle its differences with the West or at least marginalize them through this crisis. Despite the fact that in the beginning Russia desperately needed Iran’s help, it is conceivable that Russia would be gradually less dependent on Iran (Shoori 2016b, 160). Regarding the paramilitary forces, the Russian-Iranian ties in Syria ran into some difficulties. Russia in post-ISIS Syria has been more explicit about the necessity of all foreign forces and proxies’ withdrawal from the Syrian soil. It was first triggered by Putin in his meeting with Bashar alAssad in Sochi in May 2018, in which he called on all foreign troops to leave Syria. Later, the Russian president’s envoy for Syria said that Putin’s stance included Iranian proxies. It was immediately rejected by Iranian officials and Russia had to modify its position. This debate proves that

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while Russia has some reservations regarding Iran’s paramilitary troops in Syria, its leverage was not strong enough to convince its partner. The second serious concern of Moscow regarding Iran’s military involvement in Syria goes back to growing tensions between Iran and Israel. Russia has repeatedly announced its commitment to the security of Israel and Iran’s security dynamics near the Israeli borders have brought about a complicated dilemma for Russian officials. Russia only managed to convince Iran to keep its forces 85 km away from Israel’s northern border. It is obvious that Iran reluctantly acquiesced to this proposal. One of Iranian top diplomat told to the writer ‘It is not expedient that Russia dictates the term for us in Southern Syria’. This helps understand why Russia can’t impose more pressures on Iran. Instead, Moscow has tried to keep its silence toward numerous Israel strikes against Iranian forces in Syria. This silence has been interpreted differently by Tehran and Tel Aviv. While this is quite understandable that Israel did its utmost to take advantage of Russian tacit support, Iran has preferred not to engage Moscow into this question. Iran stayed away from quarrels between Russia and Turkey in northern Syria and now it has decided to approach its security challenges with Israel in southern Syria apart from its overall policy toward Russia. Iranian security officials most presumably know that Israeli raids on their positions in Syria could not happen without Russian knowledge. On the other side, it seems that Russia can reach two goals regarding Israeli airstrikes in Southern Syria. First, it can quell Israeli security concerns over the growing role of Iran in this war-torn country. With this permission, Russian can prove their commitment to Israel’s security. Second, the Israeli airstrikes can act as a counterbalance to Iran’s growing influence in Syria. Beyond the developments in Syria, Russian responses to the escalation of tensions between Tehran and Washington have not met Iranian expectations. At least two times U.S. and Iran were on the brink of war. First was when Iran shot down an American surveillance drone entered into its territory and the U.S. president ordered a military strike in retaliation, a decision called off just a couple of hours before the attack. The second event goes back to the killing of Maj. Gen. Soleimani by the U.S. drone strike near the Baghdad Airport. It left no choice for Iran but to retaliate. Among various options, Tehran decided to launch a missile attack on U.S. forces in Iraqi Ayn Al-Asad Airbase in January 2020. In both crises, Iran felt itself alone without even minimal support from Moscow. Russian

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officials just preferred to express their concerns over the intensification of tensions. Two players have divergent interests in the Persian Gulf. Even though Russia in response to U.S. provocative policy against Iran in the region decided to launch a four-day joint military exercise with Iran and China in the Gulf of Oman and Northern area of the Indian Ocean in December 2019, it can’t be regarded as a signal for a new political rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran in the Persian Gulf. The real political message which Russia sent to Iran and other Persian Gulf states was its proposal for a new Persian Gulf security initiative. The proposal is based on a collective security model, aimed at the creation of an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf like OSCE in Europe. This initiative was faced with U.S. rejection and Iran’s silence. Iran’s position was understandable. It had its own initiative called Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE), proposed to the U.N General Assembly in September 2019, just two months after Russia distributed his own “Concept of Collective Security in the Persian Gulf” to the U.N Security Council. Although both documents have the same language regarding the participation of all littoral states of the Persian Gulf, Tehran and Moscow have different long-term goals. While Russia has sought to preserve the status quo in the Persian Gulf since the end of the Cold War (Katz 2019), Iran has long pursued a strategic objective to act as a guarantor of Persian Gulf security without military presence of any great power, not to mention that it has been historical national demand of Iran since the Safavid Empire in the sixteenth century. Russia has two overall considerations in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East: sitting aside from sectarian conflicts between Shia and Sunni, and countering supremacy of any regional power other than Israel. The latter explains why Iran is cautious to Russian involvement in the Middle East and why Russia voted to all six UNSC resolutions, stepped away from tough tensions between the U.S. and Iran in the Persian Gulf since the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and opening up Israel hand in striking Iran-backed forces in Syria. Any of these two reasons is enough to indicate the divergent interests of Moscow and Tehran in the region. Russia’s stance is clear and understandable. After the joint successful handling of the Syrian crisis, Iran’s strategic depth has enlarged from Iraq to Lebanon via Syria coupled with a stronghold in Yemen. Such geopolitics could change the balance of power at the expense of Arab states in the

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Persian Gulf and to some extent Israel. Besides, it would be an obstacle for Russian mediation power. Since Iran’s Syrian policy has been backed by Russia, the responsibility of Iran’s potential adventurism in the Middle East could fall on Moscow and consequently irksome wrath among Sunni Arab states against Russia, a concern that Russian have never hesitated to mention it. ‘Russia needs to prevent its role in Syria from being perceived as support for Shia Iran in a sectarian battle with the Sunni world, as this could have serious consequences at home. If Russia wants to be a meaningful actor in the Middle East, it needs a working relationship with all the significant local actors, not just Iran’ (Geranmayeh and Liik 2016, 8). So, Russian Middle Eastern policy driven by political, security, and economic objectives at some points conflicted with Iran’s overall policy in the region. Considering Moscow’s political limitations in the Middle East, Tehran decided to accelerate its political and economic closeness to China. The proposed 25-year strategic agreement which is about to be signed by both parties can be regarded both as Iran’s disappointment with the West and its awareness of Russia’s highly calculated and cautious policy in the Middle East.

4

Conclusion

There are some similarities in the Iranian and Russian conceptions of the West in the domain of international politics. Both are determined to show that they have ‘independent’ foreign policy from the West and want to neutralize the Western states’ attempts to limit or weaken the roles of the two actors in their regions, Eurasia and the Middle East. The way that the West has encountered Iran and Russia, has had a pivotal role in driving these two countries closer to each other. Therefore, Iran needs Russia as much as Russia needs Iran. This has been an overarching rule that dominated their relations over the past three decades. It can be argued that the divergent interests between Tehran and Moscow are not strong as their convergent ones. As far as Russia’s geopolitical interests and Iran’s ideological goals coincide, both sides have strong motives to advance their strategic cooperation in some special areas including constructing power plants, arms trade, and pushing back against those regional challenges which target their shared security and interests. Whether or not, both have contributed to the expansion of one another’s sphere of influence. There is no exaggeration if it is claimed that Russia wouldn’t have been a key player in the Middle East without its security engagement with Iran

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especially following the Arab uprisings in the region. Further, Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has managed to systematically maximize American security costs in the region, a policy that has had partially a role in the U.S. relative diversion of interest from Eurasia under the prevailing role of Russia to the Middle East. On the other side, no state other than Russia has been able and eager to meet Iran’s strategic needs. So, for these two players, all the potential and practical differences at bilateral and regional levels can be handled as far as both would remain committed to this strategic cooperation. However, looking at the background of the Iran-Russia partnership shows that whenever a window of opportunity for each of the two actors has been opened up for a new beginning with the West, both have been ready to turn their back on concerns of their partner. Gore-Chernomyrdin deal on suspending the sales of conventional weapons in June 1995 and Kremlin’s ban on the delivery of the S-300 missile system to Iran in 2010 under Medvedev presidency in Russia are two known examples of the Russian side. Both bans were removed when confrontation returned to Russia and West relations. In Iran, Khatami and Rouhani governments disregarding Russian concerns struggled to acquire a foothold in the European gas market. It can be argued that in any normal circumstances Iran’s natural choice for economic partnership would be Europe. Russian constant criticism has always been Iran only wants our weapons, not our commodities.

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EU–Iran Relations: Deciphering the Limits of Strategic Engagement Łukasz K. Przybyszewski

1

Introduction

Since the 45th U.S. President, Donald Trump, left the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) in May 2018, the new elected leader’s promise to return to the JCPoA remains, as of time of writing, unfulfilled. This paradoxical situation left the European Union (EU) out in a position which is difficult to maintain—honoring an agreement de iure, but not de facto. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), on its side, tries to exert as much pressure on the remaining JCPoA signatories as possible, leveraging its position by retreating from its obligations set under the agreement, by deterring an enemy strike on its territory through staging extensive military drills and developing the capabilities of its armed forces and by benefitting from some support it is still receiving from the Russian Federation (RF) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The EU’s diplomatic flexibility in regard to Iran policy is currently still constrained by the decision-making process in Washington. Ever since D. Trump made the United States leave the JCPoA, the effectiveness of the European position towards the JCPoA and indeed the very credibility

Ł. K. Przybyszewski (B) War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_12

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of EU diplomacy efforts and sovereignty were questioned, especially by the IRI’s authorities. The first part of this chapter will focus on the dynamics of Europe– Iran relations after the Islamic Revolution, leading to the main research problem attempted to be solved in this chapter, namely the question: how the E3/EU Iran policy could be characterized? The second part will analyze E3/EU engagement with Iran through Jack Donnelly’s notion of heterarchy, in the variant developed by Ruth Hanau Santini which combines heterarchy with Buzan’s and Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory. It will be addressed how the E3/EU defined and arranged its Iran policy priorities in regard to the developments in the Gulf, Levant and Maghreb subcomplexes. The Heterarchy-RSCT amalgamation will be utilized in the third part of this chapter to refine its theoretical framework by blending it with George F. Kennan’s Theory of Containment, so it can be applied to the E3/EU Iran policy. By putting E3/EU Iran policy into a new perspective it will be argued that although the individual position of any of the EU member states might differ in narrative nuances as how to properly, and if, reframe the JCPoA into a more comprehensive agreement, the E3 members and the EU in general adopted an approach which serves to maintain Europe’s strategic flexibility: the limited heterarchical containment method. The final part of the chapter will focus on the questions and conclusions arising from the theoretical combination in regard to the limits of strategic nature to E3/EU Iran policy. The purpose of this chapter is to set a debating point about the future of the E3/EU Iran policy and about the limits of strategic engagement in terms of policy flexibility.

2

Dynamics of European Engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

At the beginning of the 1990s the strategic balance in IRI’s immediate neighborhood altered significantly after the United States launched Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm targeting Iraq, IRI’s rival. Saddam Hussein’s war machine was broken, and its deterrence capability crippled. The new situation delivered a politically more comfortable context for the newly formed EU and IRI to engage in dialogue, especially since the EU decided to lift its sanctions on Iran and proceed to normalize relations as early as October 1990, during Operation Desert

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Shield. Although Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs were still a risk factor for IRI’s authorities, it nevertheless wasn’t at that point an immediate danger, but a potentially looming one. At that time the European Council decided in December 1992 during a meeting in Edinburgh to engage Iran in a discussion about its behaviour, especially addressing human rights (Reissner et al., 2006, p.117). Thus, the EU initiated the “critical dialogue” with the IRI which was supposed to compensate the postponed free trade agreement negotiations with the aim to reach a certain level of political and economic normalization: Given Iran’s importance in the region, the European Council reaffirms its belief that a dialogue should be maintained with the Iranian Government. This should be a critical dialogue which reflects concern about Iranian behaviour and calls for improvement in a number of areas, particularly human rights, the death sentence pronounced by a Fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini against the author Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law, and terrorism. Improvement in these areas will be important in determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence can be developed. (European Council, 1992, p. 96)

By adopting the “critical dialogue” in 1992, the EU intended to apply the priorities set in the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The topics for discussion were of mutual interest and embedded in a regional context. These covered the problems of respect for human rights, terrorism, WMD proliferation, the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. As many critics of the IRI and members of opposing groups fled the IRI to seek refuge i.a. in Europe, the EU treated human rights as a dominant priority which was to determine its relations with Iran). The concern was that Iran might pursue and eliminate its political and ideological enemies on European soil. This problem became more pressing especially after one of the murderers of Shapour Bakhtiar, Iran’s former Prime Minister, was captured in August 1991. In regard to other operations the evidence was inconclusive, but Iranian agents were suspected. Scepticism towards the future trajectory of EU–Iran relations grew after the assassination of three Iranian-Kurdish high-rank opposition group members in the “Mykonos” restaurant in Berlin in September 1992 and when it became clear that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie will not be lifted (Struwe, 1998, pp. 14–23). At that time proof for Iran’s complicity in this assassination wasn’t conclusive, but the upholding of the fatwa

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against Rushdie turned Iran’s role in the murders into an open secret. Yet, there were no cases of further Iranian complicity in assassinations in Europe for a few years after March 1993, when a former Iranian diplomat and opposition member was murdered in Rome. Iran’s domestic human rights abuses were effectively beyond EU control, but a critical stance towards this problem was preserved. Equally disturbing for the EU were Iran’s relations with Hezbollah and Hamas—a delegation of the latter visited Tehran in October 1992, a sign that IRI will not disengage from actively supporting proxy forces in the region from threatening Israel. This gave little hope for a will on the Iranian side to support the Middle East Peace Process and limiting support for terrorism. A less pressing problem was Iran’s nuclear program which arguably—as CIA concluded—could allow Tehran to construct nuclear weapons by around the year 2000. This perspective seemed realistic, although probably as a worst-case scenario. Iranian authorities rightfully diagnosed that it has to lessen the pressure on its nuclear program to avoid further sanctioning in order to help the post-war economy to recover and thus admitted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who concluded IRI’s compliance with peaceful use. Nevertheless, aside of encouraging Iran to respect international norms, the EU could do little, and the dialogue seemed to be unproductive. In the background, the EU–Iran relations between 1995 were endangered by the Russian–Iranian nuclear cooperation which gained pace after a contract was signed with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to complete the construction of the reactors at Bushehr. The United States decided to act by Clinton’s Executive Order 12,956 and 12,959 which abruptly disengaged the United States in 19,954 from any trade with Iran. By adopting the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Washington effectively discouraged also any European investment in Iran’s hydrocarbon sector exceeding $40 million, with few exceptions, under the threat of secondary sanctions. In the beginning, Europe declined to follow Washington’s lead, but in 1996, after a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, the EU was forced to put an equal emphasis to the problem of terrorism as to human rights and the “Mykonos”-trial was restarted (Rudolf, 1996, p. 18). Finally, the court’s verdict declaring the Iranian leadership role as crucial leading to the “Mykonos” assassination and resulted in the suspension of the “critical dialogue” (Clawson, 1997). After the election of Mohammad Khatami as IRI’s new president in 1997, who was regarded as a reformist, the United States decided to

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ease sanctions and the EU regained confidence in continuing diplomatic engagement with Iran which could potentially, if IRI would meet EU’s expectations regarding political and economic reforms, allow the EU to subsequently agree on a trade and cooperation agreement. Consequently, Brussels decided in 1998 to resume the previous process as the “comprehensive dialogue”, a term coined in opposition to Clinton’s “comprehensive trade-embargo” (E.O. 12,956 and 12,959). The intention behind the re-engagement was to broaden the scope of the “critical dialogue” and add new measures to ensure a more cooperative approach on the side of Iran. The EU therefore formulated the “comprehensive dialogue” as a more extended and engaged process by adding supportive institutional arrangements in which the European Commission’s (EC) role became the main driver of talks. The EC was to: (1) hold E3 meetings with Iran twice a year and (2) establish working groups with Iran on energy, trade, and investment; and (3) was to hold recurring meetings of experts to convene on issues of refugees and drug trafficking. In spring 1998 the United States clearly signalled that Washington will not lift hydrocarbon-related sanctions on Iran but will allow European investment in Iranian oil and gas projects. For Iran, fearing an economic downturn due to lack of foreign investments and mounting demographic pressure created by the first wave of a post-revolutionary generation coming to working age (Cincotta & Sadjadpour, 2017), this might have been a development it hoped to achieve. Addressing Iran’s problematic neighbourship with Afghanistan, where the Taliban controlled in 1998 almost the entire country, by including periodic meetings of experts to discuss the problems of refugees and drug trafficking, was also a security subject of significant importance to Tehran, as for the most of the 1990s Iran and Saudi Arabia were engaged in a low-intensity proxy conflict. Nonetheless Saudi Arabia became one of the first countries for Khatami to visit in 1999 and was widely regarded as a potential breakthrough in the dual-track relations between Riyadh and Tehran pursued for the most of the 1990s. This, as well as other gestures and declarations coming from Khatami, was seen as a beginning of creating more substance to Iran’s diplomatic efforts towards a détente with its neighbors and the West. Soon, after the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi visited Iran in 1997 and 1998, also an opening with Europe was materializing: Khatami visited Italy and France and received the Presidents of Austria and Greece in 1999. Less than a year later, in mid-July 2000 Khatami departed for Germany, where he chaired the Islamic Centre in Hamburg between 1978

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and 1980. The main aim of the détente with Europe for Iran was to break the wide-ranging isolation it faced: “(t)he political elite of the IRI realized from the beginning that for security, political, and economic reasons it could not afford to confront both Europe and the US at the same time” (Rakel, 2008, p. 189). The reason behind normalizing Iran’s relations with Europe came from the fact that “(…) especially West Germany, Italy, France and Britain had good economic relations with Iran before the Islamic revolution, they had not been so deeply involved in Iran’s political and military affairs like the US except for Britain” (Rakel, 2008, pp. 188–189) and because Europe “did not view the revolution from a Cold War zero-sum perspective - like the US. That means they did not consider the success of the revolution as a ‘loss’ of Iran to the West” (Rakel, 2008, p.189). Another development which allowed for reconciliation between the IRI and United Kingdom was the mutually acceptable solution to the fatwa against Rushdie, despite the contradictory messages coming from the Iranian diplomatic apparatus and the clerical establishment. Nevertheless, the fatwa was declared by Khatami as a bygone affair and this issue wasn’t raised later, although the fatwa remained technically still valid. The oil price recovery caused by the OPEC production cut in 1999 allowed Iran to gain more flexibility in economic terms. Still, there was much scepticism on both sides, despite the applaud in Western media for Iran’s pursuit of a détente. Moshaver (2003, pp. 283–284) defined the Iran–EU relations as a “functional accommodation” rooted in mutual economic interests influenced by, i.e. U.S. sanctions. Yet, the European Commission communication “EU Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (7 February 2001) to the European Parliament and the Council noted a condition to the future of EU–Iran relations which stipulated: “Provided that the reform process continues, it is clear from the preceding analysis that it is in the mutual interest of the EU and Iran to develop closer ties (…)”. Given the political power residing with the wide spectrum of conservative factions in Iran, there was for Khatami little room to maneuver, especially since the EC communication amalgamated within the concept of “reform” all of the problems addressed in the Comprehensive Dialogue: human rights, terrorism, the Middle East Peace Process, missile-related security and economic issues. Although IRI’s leadership remained cautious about overstretching the appeasement policy towards the EU, Iran was set to continue at least the economic reforms which were to serve creating a better atmosphere and environment for attracting European investment.

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Despite all the progress made, EU–Iran relations since 2001 were slowly heading for obstructions—some of which were predictable, and some were less likely to foresee. Although Khatami’s reelection in June 2001 was in the EU considered as a positive signal for future dialogue, the first visit of an Iranian foreign minister visit to the EU in Brussels on September 10, 2001 was eclipsed the day after by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. 9/11 imposed a necessity on the EU to pursue dialogue with Iran within the framework of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) negotiations while also simultaneously addressing political issues as well as terrorism (European Commission, 2002). As the EC declared on December 11, 2002 to launch TCA negotiations, the initiative “suffered a serious setback” (Posch, 2015) after the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) revealed a day later that Iran was engaged in construction of undeclared facilities, putting IRI’s nuclear program into spotlight and thus becoming the most pressing concern of in EU– Iran relations. Despite the symbolic handshake between Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi at the U.N. in New York, the U.S. 43rd President George W. Bush declared in the January 2002 State of the Union speech Iran as being part of an “axis of evil”. The EU nonetheless continued the policy of dialogue with Iran which in the context of IRI’s view of encirclement by U.S. forces in the region, now also operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, proved to be at least partially successful: Tehran signed the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) mid-2004 allowing for more reliable inspections of its nuclear program what was a more decisive move towards transparency, given the many controversies concerning discrepancies in Iran’s reporting. Although Additional Protocol was not ratified by IRI’s parliament (Majlis), the E3 persisted in upholding the dialogue and this finally led to conclude the “Paris Agreement” and to Iran’s temporary suspension of its activities related to enrichment in return for cooperation with the EU on economic, technological, and nuclear grounds (Coville, 2014). Also, since autumn 2004 the E3 negotiations were conducted together with the participation of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—then Javier Solana—which lead to the establishment of a E3/EU format. As Alcaro (2018) notes: Paris Agreement between the E3/EU and Iran was supposed to restore confidence in Iran’s ultimate objectives. While it was not sufficient to

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dispel suspicions about Iran’s plans, the agreement represented a significant breakthrough, not least because it lent credibility to the notion that the nuclear dispute could be resolved diplomatically. International observers praised the work done by the Europeans. The British, French and Germans started and ran the whole process. For countries that just over a year earlier had spearheaded opposite camps within the European Union over the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, such display of unity—between themselves as well as within the Union - was no minor achievement.

Iran however started viewing its negotiating position towards the EU differently after signing a nuclear fuel supply agreement with Russia in February 2005 and becoming convinced that the E3 is pressed by the United States to force Tehran to ultimately abandon any enrichment activities altogether (Meier, 2013, pp. 6–7). Yet, taking into account IRI’s cooperation with Russia in i.a. developing the Bushehr reactors it could be argued that Iran considered the negotiations with E3 as potentially endangering Tehran’s relationship with Moscow. The “Framework for a Long-Term Agreement” presented by the E3 to the IAEA and Iran’s new government formed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 clearly indicated that Iran should consider a diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers (IAEA, 2005, pp. 16–17). Having to choose between sides, Iran decided to reactivate the uranium conversion setting the course for future indigenous enrichment and further negotiations were halted (Davenport, 2021) and this action made the IAEA to adopt a resolution stating Iran’s noncompliance fell under the scope of the UN Security Council. The IAEA referred the case to the IAEA in February 2006. The IRI responded by voluntarily stopping the implementation of the Additional Protocol and other procedures. Because of this the E3 and the EU chose to follow the U.S. and UNSC lead in imposing sanctions on Iran. Between 2006 and 2013, the EU negotiating efforts continued despite the increasing pressure of multilateral sanctions on Iran and Tehran’s unwillingness to halt its nuclear program. Additional, although unconvincing for Iran’s leadership, reassuring gesture came from U.S. 44th president, Barack Obama through the administration which declared in 2009 that the United States will fully participate in the P5+1 (E3+3) talks with Iran before IRI meets UNSC demands. It nevertheless seems that neither United States declaratively softer approach to the problem nor EU’s tougher position changed Iran’s stance, but rather factors as:

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(1) Iran’s poor economic performance, which began adapting to the sanction regime in 2010-mid-2011 only to collapse under new U.S. and EU sanctions in 2012 and stabilize in 2013 (Dubowitz, 2014); and (2) the commencement of Bushehr’s first reactor operation in 2011, delivered to service by the Russian Atomstroyexport. The transatlantic cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue resulted also in a coherent EU Iran policy (Meier, 2013, pp. 8–11), albeit rather due to the fact that the UNSC endorsed sanctioning Iran for its insufficient compliance. In the background, since the end of 2010 until 2013/2014 the “Arab Spring” shook the MENA region, altering United States’, EU’s and Iran’s strategic calculus. Finally, this had led to signing of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) at the end of 2013 and which was implemented late January 2014. During 2013, the destabilization of the borderlands of Syria and Iraq allowed the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant through the merger of the al-Nusra Front with the Islamic State of Iraq. The sunni tribes in the Anbar province rebelled almost simultaneously with the acceptance of JPA and its implementation. The negotiations over a broader agreement were from then on held on a frequent basis which has led the E3+3 (P5+1) to adopt the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) on July 14, 2015, just a few months before Russia decided to intervene in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad. Once it was becoming clear that the ISIL is losing control over the seized territory in 2016, the U.S. elections brought the U.S. 45th President, Donald Trump, who underlined during his campaign that he will bring the United States to leave the JCPoA and seek a better agreement with Iran. This has led EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to consult the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn as well as members of Congress. Mogherini clearly indicated the geopolitical aspect of the JCPoA by stating that Europe is in greater geographic proximity to Iran than the United States and thus the deal is vital for its security. The Arab Spring and especially the rise of ISIL resulted in a change of optics, leading the EU to view not only Iran’s nuclear program as a security concern to the international order, but also political stability in Iran. The securitization of EU’s Iran policy became thus broader, as it opposed the idea of inducing regime change through renewed multilateral sanctions. The EU resistance to following the U.S. lead in reintroducing sanctions did not alter Washington’s new policy outset and first moves towards leaving the JCPoA

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began to show in 2017. Even after Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPoA and the introduction of “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran on May 8, 2018, Mogherini reassured that the EU would stay committed to the JCPoA, if Iran continues to respect its own obligations as well. The European Commission responded to the White House’s endeavour to reimpose the multilateral sanctions regime on Tehran by declaring that the EU is launching the process of activating the Blocking Statue which “forbids EU persons from complying with US exterritorial sanctions, allows companies to recover damages arising from such sanctions from the person causing them, and nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court judgements based on them” (European Commission, 2018). One of the measures to deliver this promise was the establishment of a special purpose vehicle Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in January 2019 “to facilitate payments related to Iran’s export (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran” (Davenport, 2021). Iran in turn established a mirror institution, the Special Trade and Finance Instrument (STFI). Due to U.S. pressure, INSTEX-STFI remained an unused mechanism until March 2020, when the E3 declared that it used the vehicle to facilitate medical deliveries from Germany worth 500,000 Euro to combat COVID-19 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020; Bassiri Tabrizi & Parsi 2020). Nevertheless, as of February 2021, the European Commission is still exploring on how to strengthen EU-resilience to secondary sanctions and solutions which will bolster the implementation and enforcement of the EU sanctions (European Commission, 2021). Yet, throughout the time since the U.S. administration under Trump left the JCPoA in mid-2018, Iran criticized the EU for not fulfilling its part of the deal, as Europe did not, according to the IRI’s officials, defy U.S. unilateral actions which deprived the JCPoA from its “security function” (Divsallar & Otte, 2019) by forcing Iran to take steps bringing the country away from compliance to the deal (IRNA, 2021). At the time of writing, it seems that neither of the signatories remaining in the deal (E3+2), and the United States, and the IRI, expect the JCPoA to be revived and functional any time soon. The dynamics of EU–Iran relations do not offer an immediate answer to the question how EU’s Iran policy might be characterized. From one side the EU seems to have pursued a strategy of engagement for more than a decade. On the other hand, some of the developments, especially the U.S. changing approach, made the EU to seek containment of Iran

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only to push back to more diplomatic, multilateral efforts which resulted in adopting the JCPoA. Currently, the pendulum of the engagementcontainment policy spectrum hovers over the undefined middle. This raises the question about the factors causing such a dynamic and whether it is reactive or proactive. In order to understand this, it is argued that a theoretical framework might give part of an answer.

3

Engagement---Heterarchy and the RSCT

The RSCT defines the security complex as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concern are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al., 1997, p. 12). As Santini (2017) noted, the Middle East complex is shaped since 2003 by conflicts which hurled MENA after an unipolar military engagement of the United States into a “New Regional Cold War” with blocs based on “two competing logics: on the one hand, the politicisation of sectarianism opposing a Saudi-led Sunni bloc against an Iran-led Shia bloc and, on the other, an intraSunni cleavage (…)”. Santini argues that the conflicts in the MENA were increasingly interconnecting the regional subcomplexes (North Africa / Maghreb, Levant, Gulf), especially the Gulf with the Levant subcomplex. The spill-over effect of the “Arab Spring” and rivalry between the states of the Gulf and Levant region has, arguably, also linked these two subcomplexes with the subcomplex of Maghreb. Because of the growing interdependency and—as Santini notes—“interpenetration” created by multiple and diversified power centres transcending the subcomplexes, the regional security complex theory (RSC) was refined by Santini by adding Donnely’s notion of heterarchy and applying it to the International Relations theory, which allowed to escape the binary paradigm of hierarchy-anarchy principles’ opposition. This theoretically refined framework will be thus applied to resolve the problem of a qualitative definition of EU’s Iran policy. In this chapter Santini’s perspective will be applied yet not as an explanatory tool for internal relations within a state or the Middle East region as a whole, but for refining the understanding of Europe–Iran relations in a regional context. Thus, this chapter is an attempt to deliver a characteristic defining the EU’s Iran policy, based upon a rationale revealed by the blending of Santini’s heterarchical approach to RSCT, without discarding the hierarchy notion, with George F. Kennan’s containment strategy (Fig. 1).

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Fig. 1 The Middle East security complex map (Source Buzan and Wæver [2003, p. 187])

Throughout the 1990s the EU’s approach towards Tehran was mostly dictated by the question as to how to engage a post-revolutionary state which seeks to eliminate opposition members and dissidents abroad, including European territory, as well as being in conflict with Israel and sponsoring, arguably, organizations resorting to terror operations. By choosing diplomacy, the dialogue resulted in a temporary halt of assassinations, albeit Iran’s position on Israel and supporting controversial proxy groups remained an unresolved issue. Still, with the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, it became clear that Iran will become for Europe part of a wider, regional problem which transcends the MENA subcomplexes, also affecting EU’s energy security and strategic calculus. The pursuit of a broader engagement with Iran was affected by U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the economic relations did not falter until it became clear that the number of American troops in these countries will eventually have to be reduced, and thus George W. Bush Administration began to deliver proofs concerning the controversial discrepancies in Iran’s reporting about its nuclear program. This in turn proved to be a successful tactic which brought the EU in line with the U.S. interest

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to secure the troop withdrawal from 2007, as Europe began to impose sanctions on Iran since 2006 onwards. The recalculation of strategic interests of the EU started with the Arab Spring which coalesced with the nearly completed U.S. military forces withdrawal from Iraq. Nevertheless, the transatlantic partnership’s goals did not seem to be negatively affected, as the pullout of mostly American troops most probably was expected to create new tensions, especially in the sunni-dominated western provinces of Iraq, although only three EU member states (France, Italy UK) took part in the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. The instability in the MENA region, particularly in Egypt and also Syria, constituting the northern part of the Levant subcomplex, and the Syrian-Iraqi borderland linking the Levant and Gulf subcomplexes together was threatening not only to EU’s energy security, but also in socio-economic terms due to the influx of refugees. It could be argued that Iran was seen as one of the potentially stabilizing forces in that area, because the rise of ISIL was interpreted in Tehran as a threat to Iran’s “strategic depth” and—if ISIL succeeded at least in leaving a sunniled Syria and Iraq as a legacy—could force Iranian authorities to seriously consider pursuing a nuclear weapon rather sooner than later. It is therefore clear that the negotiations which lead to the adoption of the JPA and JCPoA were conducted within a more complex, security-related set of challenges requiring a multilateral—and by this, also a heterarchical— approach. The implementation of the JCPoA was also part of a wider set of actions and processes which the EU supported and promoted to restore stability and start rebuilding a hierarchical order in the destabilized parts of MENA to exert more control over this environment and circumvent unfavourable to EU’s interests transregional heterarchical incursions defying set limitations and rearrange these in a new form, because, as Rózsa (2018) noted, in the Maghreb and Levant subcomplexes the EU’s position was historically the strongest: (…) within the Mediterranean region where the EU is still considered a global actor, in spite of the fact that expectations have been running high that it will take on a bigger role, especially in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, this region also poses several interrelated challenges, including migration and the eventual spillover of conflicts to the EU. This is clearly reflected in the expansion of EU strategic thinking first of the Mediterranean including the Middle East, manifest in the complex set of relations with the region (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European

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Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean), followed by the Global Strategy of 2016, which expands Europe’s geopolitical and security neighbourhood beyond the MENA region.

The Gulf subcomplex was formed by a different set of power balances, although the developments in this particular area were much more predictable. Prior to the JCPoA, the IRI was “excluded from all regional dialogue frameworks relating to security issues, an aspect that prevented Iran from normalising its relations with Persian Gulf states or key international actors” (Zaccara, 2019). Yet, the Gulf subcomplex which is as much vital to the stabilization process as the Levant and Maghreb subcomplex is, as Santini observes, constantly creating new challenges to EU’s efforts in diplomatically engaging Iran: The evolution of the New Regional Cold War has displayed a trend toward a regional heterarchical configuration, characterised by multiple power rankings, multiple actors and multiple levels of governance. Much of the GCC’s identification of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the major threat to domestic and Gulf stability has failed to drive Arab Gulf states’ foreign policies consistently, as other cleavages, notably over the norms of political Islam, have increased their salience and produced shift s in threat perception and subsequent balancing behaviour. (…) The New Regional Cold War gradually evolved in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war, a conflict created by an extra-regional power which was intended to lead to regime change, and which, by doing so, further fragmented the existing regional order. First, it caused a split in the Arab League: Gulf powers tacitly agreed with US military deployments, while Syria publicly criticised the attack, thereby fracturing hard-won Arab unity. Th e fragmentation of the regional order worsened in the post-conflict phase: the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the refashioning of the political system profoundly destabilized the country and the regional balance of threat. (…) The New Regional Cold War reached an apex in 2006 with the sectarian turn of the civil war in Iraq and the Hezbollah-Israeli war in the summer of that year. The two events attest to the double nature of the NRCW: on the one hand, the stronger regime-society dimension as exemplifi ed by the victory over Israel of a non-state actor belonging to the ‘radical bloc’, as is Hezbollah, powerfully vindicating the norm of political Arabism in a trans-sectarian way, 38 on the other, the sectarianization of the Iraq civil war epitomised by Iranian and Saudi attempts to balance each other off in an increasingly heterarchic Iraqi context. (Santini, 2017)

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Another challenge to EU’s engagement efforts was the U.S. containment policy which led the EU to produce an approach towards Iran which became similar and complementary to Washington’s. Since 2002 every U.S. administration viewed Iranian nuclear program’s progress as detrimental to its containment efforts. The U.S. containment policy became since the Arab Spring even more problematic, as the destabilization in all three of the Middle East RSC provoked proxy conflict between regional actors. This in turn did not only notlead to the emergence of a consistent foreign policy among the Arab states of the Gulf, as Santini observed, but also effectively allowed to expand Iran’s reach to its proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The destabilization motivated also Turkey to secure its southern borders, support cooperative proxies and political currents in the Maghreb (Libya), Levant (Syria) and Gulf (Iraq, Qatar) subcomplexes. Needless to say, other states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar also intervened in the destabilized areas. In sum, the perspective from Brussel on the intensively heterarchical balancing, as Santini (2017) summarized it, in the Middle East RSC inevitably was also a challenge for the future of EU’s Iran policy: The presence of heterarchic features speaks to the inability of any single power to order the region, and to the lack of a single ranking principle (material capabilities, power projection, identity norms, soft power) that is widely considered the decisive one. The absence of agreement over the relative importance of one ranking over others will likely result in further diplomatic crises, bickering, rifts, and an overall fragmentation of a regional order that suffers from centrifugal tendencies.

From the time when the Gulf, Levant and Maghreb security subcomplexes became intertwined, the EU was postured to counterbalance the anarchic disorder followed by heterarchical ordering through hierarchical interventionism, i.e. exerting control, in the Maghreb (Libya–Italy, France, United Kingdom) and Levant (Syria–France, United Kingdom) subcomplexes, despite the earlier consensus that a heterarchical approach is “better equipped to manage the existing levels of Mediterranean complexity” (Tsinisizelis & Xenakis, 2006, p. 95). Yet since the E3/EU Iran containment policy followed the U.S. approach, it became clear that the Gulf is a too distant subcomplex to be stabilized by strategic (military) means in only by either a typically hierarchical or heterarchical manner of containment. Thus the hierarchical and heterarchical approaches for the

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E3/EU towards Iran are bound by limitations, whereas the heterarchical offers more flexibility, but less control. This is visible not only on the level of shifts in arms exports policy to this subcomplex, but also due to EU’s near-consensual agreement as to by what means European interests ought to be in the Gulf subcomplex secured. The growing insecurity caused partially by Iran’s escalatory actions, resulting from U.S.–Iran tensions, motivated Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal to launch in 2020 a European-led Maritime Awareness surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) to protect mainly the hydrocarbon shipping routes from Iranian attacks and seizures of tankers, but also other cargo vessels (Alahmad, 2020). Nevertheless, the EMASoH is not a mission which is designed to deliver security without a complementing typically heterarchical approach, i.e., coordination with Gulf Cooperation Countries’ naval forces and through diplomatic efforts supplementing Washington’s “carrot and stick” (Pollack, 2010) Iran containment policy.

4

Containment---Balancing EU and U.S. Interests

Taking into account the EU’s continuing political support for the JCPoA and calls for Iran’s adherence to the obligations resulting from the agreement, as well as the EMASoH mission, it can be also determined that EU’s Iran policy at present evolves into a hybrid of engagement in diplomatic and military aspects, which will serve the containment function. As Fathollah-Nejad (2018) observed “containing the Iran nuclear program would help prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East (…) maintaining the JCPOA ensures that the EU will retain leverage over Iran, which would otherwise dissipate if the deal completely falls apart”. Although containment is from a transatlantic and U.S. perspective a “minimalist strategy” (Pollack, 2010), from the EU point of view it becomes increasingly expansionist. On the other side, European Iran policy is potentially more flexible, because in contrast to the United States, the EU containment strategy is not “a default position when engagement at any level is blocked”, because the EU is able to directly negotiate with Tehran, but inevitably Brussels does share Washington’s position that in case of Iran “warfare is too costly or unattractive” (Pollack, 2010). The E3 and the EU as a whole most probably prefers to contain Iran’s escalatory balancing acts not by means of deterrence or confrontation, but the prospect of engagement—attracting Tehran to seek developing

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economic ties with Europe. However, despite this hybrid approach, the EU is indirectly supporting the heterarchical engagement of the United States within the Saudi-led block which arguably aims to set a new hierarchical order of alliances in opposition to Iran, as well as Russian and Chinese initiatives and arms sales. Although the U.S.-led Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) initiative which was to include the United States, the six members of the GCC, Jordan and Egypt (Alahmad, 2020) did not yet fully materialize, the U.S.-led Abraham Accords adoption delivered the normalization of relations between the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco with Israel, and the United States shifted Israel from the “U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)” (Montgomery & Orion, 2021) after securing the start of defusing the Gulf crisis, i.e. the blockade of Qatar. The EMASoH mission, the MESA initiative, the Abraham Accords, the moving of Israel under CENTCOM altogether form part of an effort to deter Iran by conventional means which could also be alternatively described as policy of containment by confrontation. This follows the line of Kennan’s policy of containment applied to the Gulf-Levant subcomplexes, as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan lead to destabilization in the Middle East RSC and thus increased the need to deliver new security arrangements which are substantiated by linking U.S. and European interests with those of partner Arab states in the Gulf. The question about the possibility of creating an integrated defence architecture for the region is still inconclusive and a containment regime based on GCC might be ineffective (Goldman & Rapp-Hooper, 2013). It could be yet argued that the GCC states could be more open to accept new arrangements weaved into the yet unintegrated but coordinated security design in the Gulf subcomplex as long, as Iran is, as Zaccara (2019) observed, excluded from participating in discussions about any Gulf-centred security framework with the GCC and simultaneously escalates its conventional provocative deterrence measures while also tests regional and global reactions to suggestions and questions about Iran’s future nuclear weapon capability. Trump’s pullout from the JCPoA and the “Maximum Pressue” campaign did force the EU to tolerate the agreement being deprived of what was described by Divsallar and Otte (2019) as its “security function”, i.e., convincing Iran not to pursue a nuclear weapon in return for economic and political incentives. It must be yet noted that Iran challenged the EU on one of the core European values, namely human rights,

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after allegedly Iranian assassin squads have been arrested in Germany (January 2018) and Albania (March 2018) which led to further arrests in Germany, Belgium and France, including one alleged assassin based at Iran’s embassy in Austria, in Denmark and in 2019 in the Netherlands (Katzman, 2021). JCPoA was part of a multilateral, limited heterarchical approach which aimed at modifying Iran’s threat perceptions and calculus in the region by firstly reaching a settlement on the nuclear dossier, build trust and provide a foundation for addressing Iran’s missile program and regional security (Bassiri Tabrizi & Parsi, 2020). Yet it proved that if Iran is facing a prospect of a multilateral sanction regime snapping back, it escalates tensions swiftly in order to decouple EU and U.S. interests. Nevertheless, this initiative did not substitute U.S. containment strategy, as the United States also set a base of its own qualified and conditional engagement requirements before the JCPoA was adopted, as well as afterwards, also during Trump’s tenure. EU’s Iran policy seems therefore to deserve an analysis from a containment theory perspective in the 1990– 2006 perspective. The consensual conclusion about EU’s approach to Iran in this timeframe is that the E3 decided to engage Iran through diplomacy. Yet, if the U.S. standpoint is also taken into account, it seems to be beyond debate that the U.S. perspective on the Middle East RSC and Washington’s actions to contain Iran were the most decisive factor shaping EU’s Iran policy. Despite the differences resulting from the EU’s pursuit of hydrocarbon imports from Iran in return for investment, the main shared transatlantic goal was reached—IRI could not count on any legal arms trade with Europe and the EU remained wary of Iran’s support for proxies in the Levant and Gulf subcomplexes. After 2002 EU’s and U.S. approach towards Iran became more aligned, as the Iranian nuclear program supported by Russia’s expertise was gaining trace and a potential nuclear arms race in the Middle East RSC was also a potential threat to Europe’s security in the Mediterranean. As it was noted in the previous section, the EU tried to reassure Iran by negotiating the TCA, while upholding its demands related to human rights and countering terrorism. After 2003 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the EU observed Iran’s effort to deliver more transparency in regard to its nuclear program and Tehran also agreed to temporarily halt its nuclear-related activities. As the first post-Saddam parliamentary elections in Iraq (January 2005) neared, Tehran was confronted by a European offer (“Paris Agreement”) on nuclear technology and, shortly after the aforementioned elections,

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by a Russian (February 2005) and European (August 2005) proposal concerning nuclear fuel deliveries. EU’s offer seemed to be unconvincing to Tehran as it would prospectively put its relations with Russia at risk, and thus Iran chose to continue its cooperation with Russian nuclear technology company while pursuing its own nuclear program. This, as it was noted before, led the EU to emulate U.S’. Iran containment policy and to continue negotiating on an agreement which could be adopted when the circumstances in the region dictated reaching it. Yet, as it was previously stated, the EU approach towards Iran was throughout 1990–2006 and 2006–2020 mostly reactive to that of the United States and this in itself is a sufficient proof that the transatlantic partnership is a decisive factor for the EU’s Iran policy formulation. Taking into account the characteristic of the Middle East RSC in the 1990s, it might be argued that European limited heterarchical policy towards Iran is a policy of containment through direct engagement and indirect confrontation, whereas the United States pursues a policy of containment through indirect engagement and direct confrontation. Both are hybrid approaches which taken together are oscillating between containment and engagement but seen separately differ in regard to the aspect of engagement and confrontation. The purpose of the U.S. and EU versions to contain Iran and this allows to conclude that EU’s strategy on Iran is constructed on the idea of a limited heterarchical type of containment strategy.

5

Conclusion

Although the interconnectedness of the Levant, Maghreb and Gulf MENA region subcomplexes has risen for the last few decades, the EU exerts a controlled hierarchical type of containment strategy in the first two subcomplexes and a limited heterarchical type in the third and thus towards Iran as well. European heterarchical containment policy endures since the 1990s, albeit oscillating between engagement and confrontation. It is still unknown whether the limited heterarchical containment strategy will prove to be sustainable and effective in the coming years. It is nevertheless a form of dual, EU-U.S., search for hegemony in the MENA RSC, seeking legitimacy in the international institution of the UNSC. Even less is certain about the possibility of a JCPoA-revival. Although historical analogy is often misleading new formulations of EU’s Iran policy, the past record of European diplomacy towards IRI proves that the EU, despite many internal and external constraints it has to

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endure, indeed chose a form of strategic duality oscillating between engagement and containment which allows tactical and operational recalibration without sacrificing the most important security interests of the European community. It is rather improbable that the EU will abandon its flexibility in this regard nor leave Iran’s human rights record, its missile program and regional security unaddressed. Giving consideration to the depth of transatlantic partnership, it is also doubtful that the EU will— unless forced to—adopt an absolutely contradictory stance towards U.S. interests in the Middle East RSC and towards Iran, if there will be no compensating security arrangements and European capability for power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although MESA is still an investigated idea of creating a new form of a regional security framework and the EMASoH mission gave a new example for European presence in the Gulf, these precedents are not advanced enough in order to give convincing premise about the future direction of their development. EU’s strategic engagement in the Gulf is currently not declared as against Iran, but if security in the Gulf will deteriorate, a broader rotational deployment of naval forces or deeper cooperation with regional partners could be considered as warranted. Although whether the United States will return to the JCPoA is still a disputed subject and neither Washington, nor Tehran intends for the time being to give in to the “Maximum Pressure” policy which is still in place, nor to the “Maximum Resistance” developed by Iran in response to Trump’s administration approach, the current paradoxical situation might in fact endure longer than expected. If so, this might convince Tehran to abandon pursuing nuclear weapons and search for developing its conventional military capabilities. Economic and political engagement with Europe is for Iran still an important objective, but the EU’s “Green Deal” which aims to reduce the European carbon-footprint and so also the reliance on hydrocarbons in essence means that there will probably be less interest in Iranian oil and gas than Tehran anticipated for a short period of time after JCPoA was adopted. The main challenge for the European limited heterarchical containment strategy is how Iran will respond to its combination with the U.S. variant. It might be well assumed that facing a scenario of inevitable rise of the confrontational aspect of the U.S.-EU containment policy, Iran will accept the isolation and crisis it faced for most of the time since the Islamic Revolution but will also turn to Russia and China for support in return for becoming an asset in the great power brokering for influence in

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the Middle East RSC. Yet regardless of the fact whether IRI will pursue developing further its conventional forces or indeed turn to constructing nuclear weapons with a capable delivery system, Tehran will surely face Russia and China’s reluctance to deliver any weapon systems which would turn the balance in the Gulf and even more so in the Levant subcomplex to Iran’s favour. The major question arising from the definition of EU’s Iran policy of limited heterarchical containment is whether the dysfunctional JCPoA might be reinvigorated or if it might become a stepstone in the future for a new and more comprehensive agreement. Until the U.S. returns to the JCPoA or a new deal will be brokered, the region will probably face the continuation of New Regional Cold War resulting also in a conventional arms race. This will set new limits and challenges for any prospective EU strategic engagement in the Gulf subcomplex and also raises questions, e.g. will the EMASoH be continued or expanded? Will a more multipolar strategic security arrangement emerge in the Gulf? Will the nuclear proliferation in the Gulf be averted? Will a revived or expanded nuclear agreement with Iran be a lasting one? Although historical analogy is often misleading, it must be also kept in mind that once Iran was cornered in 2005/2006, Tehran did not consider any negotiations as constructive until the first reactor in Bushehr became operational and before IRI saw geostrategic benefits stemming from a proxy conflict. It could be thus at least assumed that Iran will exercise strategic patience until the next two reactors at Bushehr are completed (2024 and 2026), unless internal turmoil or regional or global developments prove otherwise.

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Iran and the EU: The Role of Geostrategic Factors in the Post-JCPOA Era Roxana Niknami

1

Introduction

EU–Iran relations have been called political, economic, and cultural relations since the foundation of the Union. These relations have always been accompanied by many vicissitudes. After the Islamic Revolution, various factors have affected these relations: the occupation of the U.S. embassy, the clashes of embassies, especially in Paris and London, the war with Iraq, the fatwa on the assassination of Salman Rushdie, the killing of Iranian dissidents in Europe, the nuclear issue, Palestine, the Holocaust, etc. In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear program had a special place. An agreement in which it was clear that the two sides had abandoned part of their ideals. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was not just a success for both sides of the Atlantic, but a collective effort to quell a global challenge. The formation of the post-JCPOA sphere created a situation where Iran and the European Union (EU), based on their mutual and new needs, once again took steps to revive relations. Increasing trips by officials of both sides and President Rouhani’s travels to Italy and France showed the seriousness of both sides to make up for the past.

R. Niknami (B) University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_13

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Geostrategic components are critical in the relationship between these two actors. Many analysts in relations between the two countries stress this. According to Collins, today the national strategic framework, the overall political strategy, the economic strategy, and the military strategy are included in the geostrategic issues (Minai, 2007, p. 49). Lacoste also believes that the term geostrategy intensifies the importance of regional and transregional forms of power (Lacoste, 1998, p. 161). Therefore, it can conclude that geostrategic components should be considered in power relations and not in a vacuum. Based on this, the factors affecting the concerns resulting from geostrategic elements can divide into two categories of geopolitical factors that have a fixed nature, such as the position of a country or its resources (energy resources and regional position) and specific factors (nuclear issue and economic ties) which depends on the case (Ezati, 1994, p. 9). In the paper, an attempt made to examine these two categories of geostrategic components in the relations between Iran and the European Union. Iran is vital for this Union because it is a suitable market for European goods and services, as well as various energy sources in the Middle East. According to the Kemp and Harkavy theory, Iran is strategically oval in Hartland between the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf (Kemp and Harkavy, 1997). The membership of Iran in this system provides it with many opportunities while creating lots of obstacles. Iran’s geopolitical and geostrategic position and its absence in the backyard of the tremendous and rival powers, on the one hand, and its large market, which is an opportunity for the economic crisis in Europe, on the other, have caused Europe to balance its power with the United States. The United States, Russia, and China need to expand ties with the Middle East and even Central Asia. The expanding relations with Europe for Iran are also precious. The EU and its member states, with their high economic potential and diplomatic power, are essential levers in the international system and can play a balancing role in Iran’s foreign policy toward the United States, Russia, and China. Understanding this status has a unique role in ensuring the interests and national security of the country. Iran needs to take advantage of the EU’s economic influence, use its political power to resolve international conflicts and crises, and attract foreign investment and technology. An essential issue in Iran– EU relations is the vital need to balance power with the three major players Russia, China, and the United States. The United States has always

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been the most crucial factor in shaping and directing Iran–Europe relations. The ideological conflict between Iran and the United States has also hurt Iran–Europe relations. Due to Europe’s strategic dependence and economic entanglement with the United States, the possibility of establishing a lasting relationship with Iran has ruled out. As a result, relations with Europe are strained whenever U.S. policies occur; Iran is more attracted to the eastern actors. This tendency will be very harmful to both parties. On the one hand, it pushes Europe further into isolation in the Middle East, and on the other hand, it places Iran in a strategic weakness position. This can see in the critical geostrategic indicators mentioned above, namely energy, economic ties, nuclear case, and regional issues. The effectiveness of these three countries in the bilateral relations between Iran–EU has not been equal. In the energy sector, for example, Russia is the most important factor. The following conceptual model can reach in the explanation of geostrategic relations between Iran and Europe after JCPOA. The United States is retreating from its international leadership, China is playing a more significant role in geopolitics, and Europe is Seeking a more cohesive projection of its power (Fig. 1). In other words, the two actors need each other to balance their foreign relations with China, Russia, and the United States, and increasing the importance of the strategic dimension of relations. That is to say in the

Fig. 1 Conceptual model (Source The Author)

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post-JCPOA era, the EU continues to pursue fixed strategic priorities with Iran, which include keeping Iran out of its nuclear program, preventing war in the Middle East, and demonstrating the EU’s ability to act effectively on the world stage. It is common knowledge that JCPOA was a great victory for the EU and its global position; But now the EU’s regional policy has failed. The mistake that the EU has made in regulating its relations with Iran has repeated throughout history. It never took the power struggle in the Middle East seriously, and as a result of what was achieved in 2015, gone with the wind today. To examine this issue, this chapter divide into four general sections: Iran’s nuclear program, economic relations, energy, and regional issues. The most critical influential players in these areas are the United States, China, Russia, and the US-Russia, respectively. Therefore, to promote reasonable relations in each of these areas, Iran and Europe have no choice but to expand relations to balance. Competitors better than these two actors understand the importance of this issue.

2

Specific Factors in Iran–EU Relations 2.1

The Iran Nuclear Dossier

The EU‘s interests in Iran have remained the same for a long time, focusing on nuclear dossier and peace in the region. The history of Iran’s nuclear case dates back to 2003. As the conflict began, relations soured. In November 2004, E3 signed the Paris Agreement with Iran, under which Iran accepted a suspension of uranium enrichment (Alcaro and Bassiri Tabrizi, 2014, p. 16). In August 2005, E3 proposed new negotiations aimed to alleviate Iran’s concerns about the Bush administration’s policies. Iran’s emphasis on unconditional enrichment and the issue of the Arak heavy water facility was a point of contention. As a result, the IAEA issued two resolutions against Iran. Until late 2006, Europe sought to mediate between Iran and the United States. In June 2006, the United States, China, and Russia joined E3 to form the 5 + 1 group (Alcaro and Bassiri Tabrizi, 2014, p. 17). In October, the EU for the first time defended the referral of the nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council. As a result, Resolution 1737 was issued against Iran. This was followed in March 2007 by Resolution 1747. In 2012, the EU began to impose sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. From this year,

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relations were at their worst level after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Due to the dependence of Iran’s economy on Europe, fatal blows dealt with the country’s economy. In 2013, the Rouhani administration prioritized resolving the nuclear dossier and lifting international sanctions, de-escalating tensions, and developing foreign relations as the most central path to resolving Iran’s economic problems and restoring Iran’s international prestige. The 2015 nuclear deal between the 5 + 1 and Iran was an outstanding achievement for multilateralism in international relations. The UN Security Council ratified UNSCR 2231. Shortly after the agreement, Mogherini established the Iran Task Force in the European External Action Service (EEAS), which aims to coordinate the different standards of action of all Iran related issues, in particular the implementation of the JCPOA, the development of bilateral relations, including the establishment of an EU representation, and exploring ways for a more cooperative regional framework (European Parliament, 2015). This Task Force was very successful in 2015–2018. These include increasing meetings between Iranian and European officials, discussing human rights issues, bilateral ties, and the development of regional relations (Parsi and Bassiri Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2 ). In fact, JCPOA was the culmination of the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and even the world. The EU has been able to achieve some of its most important foreign and security policy priorities through the UN Security Council, namely the strengthening of the global arms control regime, in particular the NPT, and the reduction of tensions in the Middle East. The EU’s support for JCPOA is based on the premise that its maintenance is directly linked to the EU’s security, economic, and normative interests. As a result, the collapse is directly related to Europe’s security interests (Colombo and Dessì, 2019, p. 115). But since 2017 and the withdrawal of the United States from the UN Security Council, the situation has deteriorated. In May 2018, Trump announced that would the United States withdraw from the UN Security Council, rather, all sanctions against Iran will return. From this time on, the policy of maximum U.S. pressure against Iran began. In 2019, it became clear that Trump’s goal was not to defend the disarmament regime but to overthrow Iran. The U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA has had a profound effect on the EU’s strategic thinking. Hellman (2020) argued that this has led to a sense of frustration, a sense of vulnerability among European leaders, and a need to inject realism into European strategic thinking (Hellman, 2020, p. 65). As Cronberg

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suggested that the Iran deal is also about Europe and its role in the world (Cronberg, 2019). After leaving the JCPOA, the United States pursued a policy of maximum pressure, and accordingly, with the aim of crippling Iran’s economy, imposed heavy sanctions on this country. The United States blocked all trade between Iran and the EU and pressured the Belgian company the Global Provider of Secure Financial Messaging Services (SWIFT) to block Iran’s access to the financial messaging system and closed all Iranian access channels to international financial markets. Re-imposition of secondary sanctions on Iran caused severe damage to the country’s economy. Significantly, the divergence of the United States and Europe over Iran is not new. It seems that since 1979, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the regional security system created by the United States has collapsed; Washington followed the containment policy toward Iran. In contrast, the EU already started a period of Iran–Europe dialogue with a constructive engagement policy in the late 1990s. Since 1992, the critical dialogue has begun. The U.S. response to these talks was an active containment policy through widespread sanctions against Iran (Dryburgh, 2009). The extraterritoriality aspect of these sanctions caused a rift in transatlantic relations. In 1997 and Khatami’s victory in the presidential election, the second round of talks with Iran began, entitled Comprehensive Dialogue in various fields (Alcaro and Bassiri Tabrizi, 2014, p. 16). Thus, American policies have always acted as an obstacle. It is now clear that in the case of Iran, Europe cannot act against the will of the United States because: – U.S. domination of the international financial system and the intertwined economic relations between Europe and the U.S. Sovereign over the dollar has allowed the U.S. to prohibit Iranian Transactions in it and currencies linked to it, effectively excluding Iran from global trade and finance except as approved by Washington (Freeman, 2015, p. 5). – The U.S. and Europe are both pessimistic about Iran’s behavior in the Middle East (Fathollahnejad, 2018, p. 4). But JCPOA’s destruction inflicted irreparable damage on bilateral interests between Iran and Europe. The EU and Iran, for example, had signed a e 10 million contract in civil nuclear cooperation. Still the U.S. decision undermined the EU’s ability to ensure the safety of Iran’s nuclear

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activities (Lechner, 2019, p. 3). The dilemma of JCPOA remains a rift in EU–U.S. relations. The EU should convince European investors of its ability to maintain existing trade channels with its Iranian counterparts. If the European have no capacity or political weight to engage with Iranians more fully in the economic sphere, the Asian partners, namely China and Russia, will replace them. Many European companies and financial institutions have been forced to halt their Iran activities while the Iranian national currency spirals downward (Fathollahnejad, 2018, p. 2). Yet Europe tried to manage the situation through several innovations. The EU’s response to this radical U.S. strategic policy was to maintain order and engage more with Iran. The EU response can summarize in Fig 2. None of the EU’s innovations worked. The result of this inefficiency was the end of Iran’s strategic patience and the beginning of maximum resistance. One of Europe’s most important efforts to save JCPOA was the innovation presented by Macron. The most significant feature of this innovation was allocating of a $15 billion credit line to provide the necessary capital for Iran during the U.S. sanctions. By doing so, Macron hoped to encourage Iran to implement JCPOA fully. Besides, this credit line can breathe new life into the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchange (INSTEX) body. So far, 4 million transactions have been

UpdaƟng EU Blocking Statute

Addresing to All US Sanc ons against Iran

Protec on from EU Companies

Fig. 2

Issuing EIB Extension: External Lending Mandate (for Investment in iran)

EU Commission Package

CreaƟng A Barter Mechanism

18 Million Euro Protect Iranian Small and Mediumsized Enterprise Environmental Projects An Drug Trafficking

Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV)

Instrument for Suppor ng Trade Exchange (INSTEX)

The EU initiatives vs. U.S. sanctions on Iran. (Source The Author)

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made through INSTEX because the United States has threatened to sanction any individual and company that uses these transaction channels. As Office for Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) only allows humanitarian transport in medicine and food; in practice, European companies have not been able to use it. This tool has been used only once, related to the sale of a drug worth 500,000 Euros by a German pharmaceutical company during the first wave of the Covid-19 outbreak in Iran (Tabatabai, 2019, p. 26). Despite the difficult situation in Iran, the EU pledged 20 million euros in aid to Iran, and also backed a request for a U.S. $5 billion emergency loan from the IMF. But all of this was suffocated by the United States (Emmott, 2020). As mentioned, this initiative so far lacks a clear vision of how these four points can be sequenced. Another important issue that has always been important for Europe, along with the nuclear dossier, has been mentioned in the negotiations and has been a point of contention in the post-JCPOA era; is Iran’s missile power. The Europeans are continually talking about the Iranian missile capability. But there is no talk about why Iran moves toward missile capability. This issue is entirely affected by Iran’s geopolitical challenges. Jalilvand (2019) assumes that five factors have contributed to Iran’s move toward a missile program: Iran’s strategic loneliness, low military cost of Iran compared to other countries in the region, Iran’s limited access to technology compared to other countries in the region, non-membership in institutional security and military agreements, and continuous invasion of this country from the nineteenth century (Jalilvand, 2019, p. 57). Geranmayeh (2018) also points to this issue in his article, arguing that two geopolitical challenges, namely the threat of terrorism due to insecurity in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq on the one hand, and the hostile policies of the United States and Israel on the other, have led Iran to strengthen its missile capability and use asymmetric tactics to advance its policies in the region through its regional allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the militias in Syria and Iraq (Geranmayeh, 2018). In a joint article, Divasalar and August argue that Europeans’ inability to confront U.S. policies has prevented Iran from depriving its military allies of fears of a possible U.S. and allied attack on their country (Divsallar and Otte, 2019). Thus, Europe’s perspective on the nuclear dossier and the issue of Iran’s arms control overshadowed by the United States, and in some areas, such as the missile issue, is onesided, regardless of Iran’s historical constraints and circumstances. This

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issue has caused the frustration of the Iranian authorities with the EU and its members. 2.2

Iran–EU Economic Relations

In addition to overshadowing Iran’s nuclear program and the EU’s disarmament regime, the U.S. position on reinstating sanctions against Iran has also damaged Iran–Europe economic relations. After the Lifting of sanctions, European companies such as Airbus, Nestle, Total, Siemens, etc., entered into trade and investment negotiations with Iran. This led to a 30% growth in trade relations between Iran and the EU in 2016–2017. Airbus, for example, signed a contract with Iran under which Iran Air purchased one hundred aircraft to renew its ailing fleet (Csicsmann, 2019, p. 4). In April 2018, Iran’s oil exports reached the highest level after the implementing of JCPOA, 2.68 million barrels per day. But at the end of 2018, it fell to one million barrels per day (Vakhshouri, 2018). Trade between Iran and the EU in the first quarter of 2019 was about $1.63 billion. In other words, it has decreased by 69% compared to the same period in the previous year. This means that the EU does not have the appropriate tools to influence Tehran’s policies (Divsallar and Otte, 2019, p. 5). Also, Iran has lost confidence in the EU as an influential player. Iran–Europe trade relations have deteriorated twice in the last decade: – The global financial crisis in which the number of goods exported from Iran to Europe increased from 16 billion euros in 2008 to less than 10 billion euros in 2009. – Iran’s nuclear program and the start of sanctions, which reduced the value of goods exported from Iran to the European Union to less than 6 billion euros in 2012 (Fig. 3).

Year 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 3

Trade-in Goods Trade-in Services FDI (billions €) (billions €) (billions €) EU EU EU EU Inward Outward Balance Balance Balance Import Export Import Export Stock Stock 10.1 10.6 0.5 0.9 1.2 0.3 9.4 8.7 -0.7 1.2 1.7 0.5 2.3 3 0.6 0.7 4.4 3.7 1.2 1.4 0.3 -

EU-Iran economic relations (2017–2019) (Source EC [2020a])

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As far as the Iranian economy is concerned, the EU‘s commitment to maintaining a trade link with Iran is not enough to preserve the 2016 growth rate. The main problem is the low intensity of trade between EU countries and Iran. China has already taken its first steps toward having the yuan replace the dollar as the world’s oil trading currency. Iran is one of its largest oil suppliers. If Iran agrees to yuan transactions, it will boost the Chinese currency’s liquidity in the global market (Vatanka and Mammadov, 2018). The withdrawal of the United Statesfrom the JCPOA and the start of sanctions led to a decline in economic growth, a devaluation of the Rial, and an increase Iran’s inflation. Iran’s economy needs to open its doors to the world economy and attract foreign capital to pull these problems off. Not to mention that the economic relations with Iran are worthlessness for the EU. For this reason, the European business community is more concerned with maintaining the large U.S. market than with Iran and fears U.S. retaliation. Therefore, the EU must first convince European companies that it can deal with Iran. However, after the severe economic crisis, the EU needs Iran’s enormous market to improve its economic indicators and get out of the crisis completely. Therefore, mutual economic needs can be a good platform for the proximity of Iran and the EU. Interestingly, in the EU survey of European companies conducted in 2020; The role of these three variables in European geostrategy and the geopolitical threat of the continent is well-reflected. The main question in this survey was what the geopolitical threats are affecting the interests of European companies? As shown in the table below, the issues related to United States, Russia, and China are among the most essential threats (Fig. 4). The EU–Iran relations can also balance Iran’s relationship with the East. China and Russia indeed helped Iran a lot during the sanctions. Notwithstanding, they gained the most economical and political benefit from the space created by the sanctions by defining an unequal and onesided relationship. It hoped that opening up the Europeans and creating a competitive atmosphere would balance Iran’s relationship with the two actors. U.S. economic sanctions against Iran pose a public threat to EU interests. This procrastination in Europe has caused Eastern rivals to seize the opportunity and fill the gap in Iran. Yet for the EU doing business has an ideological touch. They follow change via trade. U.S. aim is regime change but the EU aim is to change the character of the regime. This is according to Ostpolitic Policy. Recently Iran growing dependence

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The geopolitical threats affecting the interests of European companies The Role of U.S. in International System Europe Stability after Brexit U.S.-China Relations The Role of China in International System Brexit The Role of Russia in the International System Transatlantic Relations The Stability of the Korea Peninsula Indo-Pakistan Relations Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations

45% 42% 41% 26% 16% 12% 12% 10% 06% 05%

Fig. 4 The geopolitical threats affecting the interests of European companies (Source Geostrategy in Practice 2020 [2020, p. 5])

on China both as a market and as a source of consumer and industrial goods have been increased. As shown below cooperation between Iran andRussia/China will hurt EU interests (Fig. 5). While Iranians generally prefer European suppliers, they are adapting. They are likely to continue to do so as long as demand remains vital for Iran‘s oil and natural gas (Slavin, 2011, p. 1). Iran has increased economic ties with China while albeit diminished trade with the EU. U.S. sanctions have pushed European corporations and banks to quit Iran or curtail new business (Slavin, 2011, p. 7). The opening of the EU trade office in Tehran in 2017 made a significant step toward structural economic ties. European Banks are still worried about establishing bank exchanges with Iran. However, if authorities in Brussels have autonomy of will, their concerns are no longer justified. In 2018, Iran pursued the expansion Iran Eastern Cooperation

Fig. 5

Iran Eastern cooperation (Source Author)

Military Cooperation

Syria

Anti U.S. Cooperation

Iran Energy Resources

Russia 25 Years Agreement Bases

Memoranda of Understanding (2016)

Iran Market

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2016)

China

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of relations to the east. The EU is now a second-rate economic partner for Iran, and even worse, Iran is the EU’s sixtieth largest trading partner. With the gap created, economic and trade cooperation with Iran becomes a strategy for both sides. In the new strategic agenda for the EU for 2019– 2024 adopted for the European Council in June 2019, Borrell reiterated that “the EU needs to pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously to safeguard its interests, uphold its value and way of life, and help shape the global future (European Parliament, 2019).”

3

Geopolitical Components 3.1

Energy

Iran holds some of the world’s largest proved crude oil reserves and natural gas reserves. In energy field in Iran and relations with Europe, gas resources are much more strategic than oil. Because the possibility of creating interdependence on the pipeline is more excellent than oil, and it should be given a higher priority by Iran. Iran’s geopolitical position in the Middle East and its connection to the subsystems of the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, Anatolia, and the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus have made it a potential player in world energy security. The geo-economic situation has also placed Iran in a strategic alliance between Russia and China on the one hand and the United States and Europe on the other (Ahmadian and Ghanbari, 2013, p. 30). But at the moment, Iran is in a situation where it has an influential role and not an influential one. In the field of energy, Iran was one of the leading partners of the EU. Before JCPOA, Iranian oil exports to Europe were severely restricted due to EU sanctions. The implementation of JCPOA led to the establishing of relations and Iran became the eleventh oil exporter to the EU (Perteghella, 2019, p. 112). Iran in particular has been one of the most important sources of energy supply for France, Spain, Greece, and Italy since 2017. Iran could be an alternative route to diversify Europe’s energy portfolio. The primary sources of Iranian energy are South Pars, Azadegan-Majnoon (joint with Iraq), Anaran (joint with Iraq), and Azadegan (it is tough to exploit due to the minefield). Other significant natural gas fields in Iran include Kish, North Pars, Sardar-eJangal, Forouz-B, Aghar, Golshan, and Kangan. These fields and others also hold large amounts of condensate reserves. About 80% of Iran’s

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natural gas reserves are non-associated (EIA, 2019, p. 11). Iran can meet the energy needs of Europe. Yet, Iran’s energy sector is undeveloped and requires foreign investment, to support oil and gas extraction. However, U.S. pressure to limit this significant economic cooperation with Iran has caused European companies to exercise caution when investing in Iran (Beheshtipour, 2018, p. 7). In the field of energy cooperation between Iran and the EU, so far, the National Gas Export Company has chosen two routes for gas exports to Europe: – Northern route: Armenia-Georgia-Ukraine – Southern rout: Turkey-Bulgaria-Central Europe. Russia is a traditional issue in European foreign policy and is increasingly moving aggressively on international matters. By 2030, the EU’s dependence on energy imports will be 50–70%. Strategic cooperation in energy has been one of the main elements of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which has included both energy security and security transfer (Lannon and Gstöhl, 2018, p. 13). In this regard, the ENP review document states that the EU is strongly dependent on its neighborhood for the production and transport of safe and predictable energy. That dialogue should be held with partner countries on energy security and sustainable security. Strengthen (EC, 2015). imports of musk in 2018 reached $16.4 billion. From this point of view, Iran can lead to the diversification of European gas suppliers (Perteghella, 2019, p. 112). So far, Russia has endangered energy security by cutting off European gas supplies in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2014. Consequently, European interests in trade and investment in Iran are all the greater because the EU now seeks more than ever to reduce its energy dependence on Russia (Freeman, 2015, p. 4). The European gas market is the central competing region of Iran and Russia. In the Caspian region, Iran and Russia also disagree over the ownership of seabed resources. Russia is benefiting by absorbing the oil market share lost by Iran due to U.S. sanctions. As Vatanka (2020) points indeed the energy sector is a sensitive policy area. This is particularly the case with upstream investments and foreign ownership of oil and gas fields, which is constitutionally forbidden in Iran. And yet, energy remains both a priority for Tehran and a field where Russia is best placed to compete with Western players like Shell and Total. Among the critical political factions in Tehran, some

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politicians see greater Russian participation in the Iranian economy as a way to check President Rouhani’s Western-centric foreign investment agenda (Vatanka, 2020). For Europe to reduce its dependency on Russia, complex solutions such as designing new pipeline projects, enhancing the LNG usage rate, developing non-conventional resources, and favoring alternative energy resources will also be needed (Shokri Kalehsar and Telli, 2017, p. 167). This is a point that Iran pays less attention to, but the Russians are using it well to weaken Iran. Whereas Iran and Russia are in a strategic alliance; Moscow has also stonewalled queries about TehranBrussels relations, which will probably be the most important in the gas export debate. To give an illustration, although the 2005 agreement concluded between Iran and Ukraine, it has not yet taken operational form due to the passage of part of the pipeline through Russian territory (Keypour and Izadi, 2010, p. 153). On the southern route, there are two major export lines, including Nabucco and the EGL sales project to Switzerland. However, despite Iran’s political and economic constraints, all of these projects have been challenged. The Nabucco pipeline was a project that, if realized, could meet Iran’s goals. But Russia is sabotaging its implementation (Łoskot-Strachota, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, to keep Iran out of the European market, Russia is trying to draw Iran’s attention to the Eastern market. Shokri Kalehsar and Telli (2017) argue that Iran can just as quickly expand into the Asian market, where the rates are higher and it is on better terms with many partners than with players in the European market (Shokri Kalehsar and Telli, 2017, p. 168). The Kremlin sees Iran as an integral component of its energy security strategy. Moscow’s influence over Tehran’s energy policies gives it added leverage in global commodity markets. This is particularly true of Iran’s commitment to the OPEC deal. Russia, which is Europe’s largest oil supplier, has no interest in strengthening Iran’s energy industry to the point that it becomes a formidable competitor for the European market. It would just as soon see Iran’s export capacity decline. Russian energy companies are likely to interest in non-oil projects in Iran—like nuclear deals—or engaging in oil swap agreements that generate sales in markets that Russia has yet to conquer. Meanwhile, Russian companies, particularly Rosneft, are likely to seize any Iranian energy export decreases to bolster their sales in China and India (Vatanka and Mammadov, 2018). In a nutshell, the Russian sabotage, along with U.S. sanctions, has delayed investment in Iran’s oil and gas fields (Fig. 6).

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Iran Energy Constrains for European Union

Internal Iran Energy Constrains

External

Fig. 6

Lack of producon surplus in Iran Disagreement over gas exports Lack of confidence in EU Lack of comprehensive energy strategy in Iran Weak infrastructure Possibility of access to the eastern markets U.S. variable Sancons Iran containment Russia stonewalling

Iran energy constrains for EU. (Source Author)

3.2

Regional Matters

Resolving the Middle East crisis and stabilizing the region is vital to the EU, particularly in the wake of the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Paris. But the EU’s efforts to work with Iraq and Pakistan to resolve the Syrian crisis and fight ISIS have failed. The entry of refugees from Turkey into Europe as a lever of pressure and Saudi support for terrorist and takfiri groups that cause many terrorist attacks in Europe; has led European officials to engage more with post-conflict Iran than ever before. At the same time, Iran’s astonishing influence and activism in the Middle East and its essential role in resolving regional crises have increased the status of Iran’s balancing role in the region for the EU. Iran’s regional environment is increasingly hostile to Iranian interests. The geopolitical proximity of the Middle East, Iran‘s Strategic Position as well as its security and stability are of great to Europe. Factors influencing the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East include the Arab-Israeli war in 2003, which led to the rise of Hezbollah in the region, the second Persian Gulf War in 2003, the Shia victory in the Arab elections, and the start of the Syrian crisis in 2015 and Iran’s rise to power with the support of the Assad government and eventually the Saudi invasion of Yemen. The rise of Iran’s regional power, as well as its geopolitical and geostrategic position in the Middle East, has made Iran’s in the canon of the new European security environment. For example, after Iraq invasion in 2003, the power of the Shia majority in Iraq increased. As a result, like Lebanon, Iran has the ability to exercise

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soft power in that country. Over time, Tehran’s influence on the security apparatus in Iraq increased and sufficiently to put it on the apparition with the United States (Jalabi, 2017). In Syria, Iran has a long history of allying with the Assad government. During the conflict, and especially after the arrival of the Russian Air Force and Navy in Syria in 2015, Iran and Hezbollah gained double influence in the country. The divergence between the EU and the United States over Iran stems from differences in perceptions about the Middle East’s stability. The U.S. approach to security in the Middle East is based on the integration of its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and the isolation of Iran, on the other. In contrast, the EU approach is based on Iran’s involvement in the Middle East. According to RPA, Iran is an important player in the region and there is no solution without considering the role of Iran (Perteghella, 2019, p. 109). Due to concerns over Iran‘s strengthening regional and international position, as well as the normalization of its relations with the United States and EU as a result of JCPOA, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab nations have fought hard to prevent JCPOA‘s implementation (Beheshtipour, 2018, p. 2). Despite the fact that their divergent positions on concepts such as human rights and terrorism Iran and the EU have, to some extent, been able to find common ground through negotiation. The catalyst for this was the rise of ISIS, seen as a significant threat by the United States, EU, and Iran and thereby enabling a shared understanding on the issues of terrorism in Iraq and Syria. Iran stands firmly and is located in the territory of a single country, which is regarded as a matter of EU security. Iran also matters to Europe‘s relations with the broader Mediterranean region through its considerable influence, stretching from Iraq over Syria to Lebanon (Jalilvand, 2019, p. 55). In Fig. 7, the most important regional capabilities of Iran are mentioned. From the European perspective, the relationship with Iran is influenced by security considerations, which require security in the region. The situation in the Middle East is not very satisfactory for Europeans. Yemen and Syria have military conflicts, and Iraq and Lebanon are facing political tensions. Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan will play an important role in the success of EU policy in the region. Iran also plays an important role in combating drug transit and migration from Afghanistan (Pafkar, 2011, p. 10). In connection with the Persian Gulf

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Possession Of A Militant Network In Lebanon, Yemen, Syria And Iraq Possession Of Defense Produc on Technology And Ballis c Missiles

Iran So Power

Iran Regional CapabiliƟes It Has A Long Coastline On The Southern Edge Of The Persian Gulf And The Sea Of Oman

Extended Borders

Energy Resources

Fig. 7

Iran Regional capabilities (Source Author)

issue, The EU Global Strategy was published in 2016. This document states: The EU will continue to cooperate with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries. Building on the Iran nuclear deal and its implementation, it will also gradually engage. Iran on areas such as trade, research, environment, energy It will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights, and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crisis and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy. (A Global Strategy for the European, 2016, p. 38)

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Yet, through the nuclear deal, Iran has affected European thinking in a much broader sense. As Hellman noted, Iran has been at the center of the shifting European worldwide outlined in this document (Hellman, 2020, p. 68). The refuge crises can be seen as an illustration. The issue of asylum seekers is a major crisis in the EU. Iran has an important role to play in preventing this crisis from deepening. Iran is one of the main routes for Afghans to migrate to the EU. The withdrawal of the United Statesfrom JCPOA and the fall in currency price have made life in Iran no longer economical for Afghans. As a result, they have started migrating from Iran to Europe. Iran alone has accepted about 3 million Afghan refugees. Up to 1 million are registered refugees or Amayesh cardholders, while around 2.5 million are passport holders and undocumented. 450,000 Afghan passport holders have issued Iranian visas to work or study there. In 2019, the country moved toward reducing statelessness, allowing children of Iranian mothers and non-Iranian fathers to obtain Iranian nationality. 97% of the Afghan refugees live in host communities, with less than 3% in refugee settlements (EC, 2020a). Syrian and Afghan were the top 2 citizenships of asylum seekers in the EU (Eurostat, 2020). The EU has always allocated funds to help Afghan refugees in the framework of humanitarian aid. The European Commission has been providing humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Iran since 2002, amounting to around e10.5 million from 2002 to 2015. But in 2019, this figure fell sharply to 1.2 million euros. EU humanitarian aid funds the provision of vital assistance to the most vulnerable Afghan refugees and host communities in the country, their protection, and access to basic services (EC, 2020a). Moreover, with increasing economic pressures and fears of military conflict, a flood of Iranian immigrants has flowed to Europe. According to the latest statistics in 2018, Iranians who hold refugee residency in the EU have the largest number (over 56,000 refugees), and the second one in this regard is family residence holders (42,000). The next belongs to holders of study residence with 21,000 individuals and labor residence with about 18,000 individuals in the EU (Salavati, 2020, p. 33). In 2019, Iran, with 23,195 applications, became the fifth country in Europe to seek asylum. Due to the Covid-19 outbreak, and the related introduction of movement restrictions and border closures, some countries have applied specific administrative measures (e.g. temporary closure of asylum authorities, suspension of asylum interviews, suspension of lodging applications), which resulted in a drop in the number of asylum applications as well as in the number of decisions issued starting from

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March 2020. The substantial relative decrease in the number of asylum applicants in the EU in the third quarter of 2020 compared with the same quarter of 2019 was recorded for Iranians (68% fewer) (EC, 2020b, c). Different expectations and preconditions mean that Europe and Iran risk mutual disappointment in their effort to improve relations. Tehran wants European capitals to do much more to encourage economic exchange, resolve the complex banking deadlock, and oppose Trump’s attacks on the JCPOA. Similarly, European governments want to see signs of good faith from beyond the nuclear issue, such as less Iranian support to non-state across and militia groups in the region, more tremendous Iranian pressure on Assad to accept political transition, and less frequent of Iranian Ballistic missiles (Granmayeh, 2017, p. 3). Iran has the same enemies in the region as the EU, if not the same friends.

4

Conclusion

Assessing the relationship between Iran and the EU shows many challenges and obstacles to this relationship. These challenges have become more pronounced in recent years. Iran’s nuclear dossier is one of the most critical issues that have strongly affected the relations between the two sides. Apart from political relations, it has also overshadowed other aspects of relations. No phenomenon in Europe has changed the strategic thinking of the EU as much as the Nuclear Agreement with Iran. For European leaders, the JCPOA symbolizes the victory of multilateralism, diplomacy, and dialogue rather than the use of force in the management of international crises. Furthermore, the JCPOA revitalizes the EU to make its relations with Iran. From the European point of view, this agreement and its preservation is something beyond a singular deal. There are two important factors add that add to the importance of maintaining EU– Iran relations based on the agreement reached in 2015: first, preventing an arms race in the Middle East, and second, balancing Europe’s role in the region. European advantages for participation in Iran compared to other actors includes modernization of Iran’s industrial infrastructure, improving Iran’s image in the international system, and meeting the needs of Iran. This relation has many mutual advantages. Interests of Iran–Europe relations based on the principle of balancing: establishing stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, ensuring energy security, preventing the refugees’ movement from the Middle East to Europe, and finally

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access to the broad Iranian market. By contrast, the Impact of the failure of the JCPOA on European policy leads to European leaders face the need to reconsider the transatlantic relationship. The United States remains Europe’s most important strategic partner, but this new approach has created tensions in bilateral relations. The elements of strategic relations between Iran and the EU contradict each other and various EU institutions prioritize different aspects. For example, Parliament’s stress on human rights or EEAS points to regional policy. Despite the pressure that the Trump administration has applied, almost all the European leaders have expressed their willingness to uphold JCPOA. Iran demonstrated its commitment to maintaining comprehensive relations with the EU, as long as the EU avoids undue political influence from the United States (Fig. 8). We should notice that EUs theoretical support for JCPOA has been stalwart, yet concrete action has been less apparent. Iran looks at Europe

•For Previn ng Further Refugee Crisis

•For Addresing Weak EUropean Growth Rate

•For Reducing Energy Dependence on Russia

Resolving Conflicts

Diversifying Energy Supplies

BoosƟng the Export to Iran

Stability in the Persian Gulf

•For Energy Security

Fig. 8 The strategic interests of the EU in relations with Iran in the postJCPOA era (Source Author)

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with mixed feelings. Generally, Iran sees its ties as inherently trouble, in that Tehran considers Europe to be, by and large part of the broader US-led western camp. With Iran’s exclusion from the list of European partners and vice versa, the cost to the two sides of pursuing their foreign policy will be much higher and at the same timeless effective. If Europe is not present in Iran; both in politics and in the economy, other actors like China and Russia will fill the void. Instead of pursuing a passive policy, Europe should focus more on its geostrategic position in the Middle East. To that end, Iran has not to put all eggs in one basket. Excessive proximity to Russia and Russia leads to a reduction in Iran’s international bargaining power and a threat to its national resources. Therefore, the most important result of the close relations between Armenia and Iran will be the establishing of a balance in foreign policy.

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Iran and Neighbourhood

Iran–UAE Relations and Disputes Over the Sovereignty of Abu Musa and Tunbs Mohammad Eslami

1

and Saba Sotoudehfar

Introduction

Disputes between Iran and the United Arab Emirate (UAE) over the islands of the Persian Gulf have always been at the center of controversy over the last decades (Yucesoy, 2019). On one hand, Iran claims that the UAE occupied two Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, Ariana and Zarkooh (Eskaf, 2017). On the other hand, the UAE claims that Iran seized Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa and three other UAE Islands (Ram, 1996). This long-standing issue that goes back to 1971 has been associated with constant calls on behalf of the UAE and some Arab countries to put an end to Iran’s occupation (Kaddorah, 2018). The conflict started only a few days after the creation of the independent UAE in 1970 (Taryam,

M. Eslami (B) Research Centre for Political Science, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] S. Sotoudehfar University of Nova Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_14

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2019) and two days before Britain withdrew from the three islands.1 Iran– UAE’s relations were overshadowed and exacerbated due to the conflict, with some events such as the Iranian occupation of the Mubarak oil field in the Persian Gulf, pull down the flag of UAE in Arab parts of Abu Musa by Iran, the visit of the former president Mahmud Ahmadinejad to Abu Musa in April 2012, and the contribution of UAE in the Yemen War. Therefore, the decision to change these three islands into residential areas can be classified as Iran’s most provocative act in the last five decades (Anonymous, 2020, Fars-news ). Given the fact that Iran has used the islands strictly for economic and military purposes, their potential as residential property has never been seriously considered. Consequently, both Tunbs islands are non-residential and Abu Musa has just 5000 residents which include 300 Emiratis citizens. The political tensions between Iran and EUA have not only led to a wide range of legal challenges but have also influenced various academic debates (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). As a revisionist actor, Iran has always been considered the biggest threat to the UAE’s ambitions (Telci & Horoz, 2018). Throughout the years, the geostrategic and economic location of these three islands has gone beyond boundaries and extended into international diplomatic issues. These three islands enable Iran’s supervision of the Strait of Hormuz which is one of the most important economic and military corridors in the world (Mossalanejad, 2014). The Persian Gulf is not a deep sea, but the deepest part of this sea which is suitable for shipping and transportations of the large ships is located in the area of the three islands (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2013). Therefore, Iranian authorities dominate the Persian Gulf by possessing these islands. These sentiments were expressed in a statement made by Admiral Mansoor Rooh Al-Amin, the leader of the Iranian navy forces. He argued that “Each of these islands is a strong warship which would never sinks” (Rooh Al-Amin, 2018) (Picture 1). Aiming to understand the purpose of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s decision to turn these three military islands into residential areas, the study addresses the various strategic and legal aspects of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which are key sources of dispute between

1 In 1971, Britain, as a mediator between Iran and the UAE, persuaded the Iranian authorities to recognize Bahrain’s independence in order to regain ownership of the three islands. On the other hand, Britain convinced Sharjah to return to the three islands in exchange for accepting Bahrain’s independence from Iran. As a result, both parties agreed on this exchange.

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Picture 1 The map demonstrates the location of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian islands which gives Iran the opportunity of controlling maritime transport in the Persian Gulf

Iran and the UAE. Therefore, this research conducted a survey to test the factors that led to Iran’s decision. In the initial literature review, 35 indicators were extracted and during the first stages of the survey, this number was reduced to 18 indicators by academic respondents. In the second stage of the survey a total of 96 academics, military and political experts answered the questionnaire (see Table 1). In this regard, the study analyzes the factors that led to Iran’s political decision and investigates the consequences from the respondents’ point Table 1 Demography of the population of interest

1 2 3

Academic experts Political experts Military experts Total

Source Authors

Frequency

Percentage

67 14 13 94

71.27 14.89 13.82 100.0

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of view. Therefore, our main argument is that although the primary motivation of Iran for turning the three islands into residential areas is to settle the disputes over the sovereignty of the listed islands and preserve its territorial integrity, the latter aims to increase its domination over the Persian Gulf and extend its influence in the region. The result of our analysis demonstrates that the geopolitical factors are the most important drivers that led to this strategic decision. The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief history of the three islands and recounts their historical ownership. The following section discusses the conflicts and legal disputes over the three islands that led to Iran’s reoccupation of them, sourced from existing diplomatic documents. The third section mentions the geopolitical significance of the three islands and their role in the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, it provides an analysis of Iran’s military activities on the islands for the consolidation of its sovereignty over them. The final section focuses on Iran’s recent decision to inhabit the islands by analyzing the data collected through the survey. This contribution is also based on semi-structured interviews with one of Iran’s senior officials of Abu Musa conducted by the authors in May 2020.

2

Historical Background of the Three Islands

Existing tensions in the Persian Gulf are rooted in the history of colonization. It began when the western colonialist countries such as Portugal and Britain occupied different parts of the countries around the Persian Gulf including the strategic islands nearby the Strait of Hormuz. In 1602, the Safavid Kingdom defeated the Portuguese troops and established Iranian rule over the Persian Gulf and its islands. This rule lasted until 1720 (Yue, 1978). After the Safavids, there was a lot of turmoil on the borders of Iran, especially in the Persian Gulf, but Iran’s sovereignty stabilized once again with the emergence of Karim Khan Zand (Axworthy, 2015). With the rise of powers such as the Soviet Union, Britain and France throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the weakness and incompetence of Iran’s kings (Ahmadi, 2008), the country was never legally able to prove its rights on its borders and the islands of the Persian Gulf (Salehi, n.d.). Thus, Iran’s government neglected its authority over the three islands. Consequently, Britain occupied the islands based on unclaimed-land rules (Tabarsa, 2005). However, the neglect of authorities cannot be considered the abundance of nations’ interests and territory

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(Caldwell, 1996). As a result, Iranian authorities have always been arguing that neither the British nor the Sharjah Sheikhs had the right to occupy the three islands under the unclaimed lands rules (Tabarsa, 2005). In 1887, Britain claimed sovereignty over the islands for the first time. In 1903, following concerns over Soviet Union influence in the region, Britain ceded the islands to Sheikh Ghasemi without informing the Iranian government. Indeed, Britain played a contradictory role in the disputes between Iran and the UAE (Mobley, 2003). On one hand, Britain acknowledged Iran’s sovereignty over the islands since they originally belonged to Iran. On the other hand, the country granted the sovereignty of these islands to Sharjah Sheikhs based on the concept of “Arabism” that is the way of life of the inhabitants, and “religious interests” (Ahmad, 2016). However, Arabism cannot be considered as a legal basis that recognizes the legal “reality” and “sovereignty” of Sharjah Sheikhs and Ras al-Khaimah (Al-Alkim, 2002). Therefore, Iranian forces continued to treat the islands as part of the country’s territory. A good instance is the seizure of an Arabian boat in Abu Musa waters in 1927 during a periodic visit to the islands (Al Roken, 2001). In 1928, the Iranian government complained to the League of Nations and demanded the return of the islands and then occupied the three islands at the end of the year. This act was met with protests from Britain, but Iran stated it was in line with international regulation (Ulrichsen, 2016). In 1929, Iran threatened Britain and Sharjeh Sheikhs to take ownership of the islands to the United Nations again, but the United Kingdom refused. A year later, the Iranian Ministry of War announced that the British flag had been hoisted at the three islands again (Al Roken, 2001).

3 Iran’s Ownership Over the Three Islands in the Pahlavi Era In 1968, during a meeting between British ambassador Dennis Wright and the Iranian government, both countries agreed that “in case of independence of Bahrain, the three islands will definitely be given to Iran” (Onley, 2009). In 1968, the British government announced that if the security of the Persian Gulf was transferred to regional governments, then Britain would withdraw its forces from the Eastern Suez (Mobley, 2003). Therefore, on May 8, 1971, “[Iranian] warships have been ordered to

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shoot down any foreign aircrafts over the islands” (Gause, 2010). Something that led to protest of Britain regarding the threat for its flights (Savory, 2019). However, it did not take long for Iran and Sharjah Sheikh to reach an agreement about Abu Musa, so the disputes over the islands have been silent for a while. According to the agreement signed between Iran and Sharjah, Iran accepted to give financial assistance to Sharjah and the distribution of oil revenues between the two governments, while the sheikhs of Sharjah agreed to have a joint ruling of Abu Musa2 . It can be considered as the best solution at that time to settle the conflicts between Iran and Sharjah (Ghalibaf & Mirzadeh Kuhneshani, 2009). The capture of the three islands by the Iranian forces has been met with a dismissive attitude by some countries in the region. As a result, many countries have complained about Iran to the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council convened on December 9, 1971 to resolve the complaints of Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Algeria concerning Iran’s occupation of the islands (Mirsanjari, 2009). After the plaintiffs’ address, Iran declared that “the occupation of these islands is a domestic issue” (Mahmoodi, 2012) and refused the lawsuit. Finally, Somalia’s Abi Farah proposed that the case should be settled. Therefore, with the consent of the majority of the council members, the claim and complaint remained silent until 1992 (Mahmoodi, 2012). Only forty-eight hours after the signing of the agreement between Iran and Sharjah Sheikhs, the United Arab Emirates became independent and Sharjah turned out to be a member of the UAE Community. The main difference between the occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs is related to the agreement between Iran and Sharjah on Abu Musa and the lack of an agreement between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah on the two Tunbs. Therefore, the ownership of the two Tunbs remained uncertain which has provoked the current disputes between Iran and the UAE (Hojatzadeh, n.d.).

2 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran, Britain and Sheikh of Sharjah was signed between 18 and 26 November 1971.

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Geopolitical Significance: Islands’ Role in Survival of Islamic Republic of Iran

The dispute between Iran and the UAE regarding the sovereignty of these three islands can be separated into two distinct phases of before and after the year 1992 (Schifferle, 2019). During the first era, following the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and the partnership of some Arab countries throughout the war, the conflict between Iran and the UAE over the three islands remained dormant (Eslami, 2021). Although the UAE’s official complaint against Iran remained silent until 1991, international tensions over ownership of the islands continued (Buderi & Ricart, 2018). When Saddam invaded Iran in 1980, the Ba’athist party’s first statement against Iran claimed that they had three reasons for attacking. Firstly, Iraq demanded the “return of the three occupied islands” to the Arab nation in addition to the independence of Khuzestan, and finally, full sovereignty of Shatt al-Arab or Arvandrud (Walsh, 2016). Undoubtedly, the Iran–Iraq War with around 300,000 victims and one million injured can be considered one of the worst strategic experiences of Iran (Eslami & Vieira, 2020; Eslami, 2021). Therefore, the three islands as a reason for aggression against Iran has become an important part of the Iranian national identity. Iran has been routinely taking advantage of the geopolitical situation of the three islands during the Iran–Iraq war. According to International Law “regulating war zones at seas” (Henderson, 2008), Iranian authorities declared the Persian Gulf as a war zone in September of 1980. In this vein, the strategic importance of these islands had been realized during the Iran–Iraq war more than ever (Akbari Moghaddam, 2017). Iran has employed the islands in marine wars and especially the so-called “War of Tankers.”3 After four years of war, Iran reluctantly gave in to the War of Tankers in 1984. Regarding the consecutive successes of the Iranian armed forces in repossessing key parts of their occupied territories within a variety of major operations, Iraq has started attempts to discontinue the export of Iranian oil to keep Iran away from having the necessary financial resources to continue the war (Sayyari, 2015). However, the Iranian Navy

3 During the Iran–Iraq War, the western countries imposed sanctions on Iran’s oil. In addition, Saddam Hussein started attacking Iranian tankers and oil companies. Therefore, Iran officially declared that the country would prevent the export of oil from the Persian Gulf.

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did not impose any limitations or threats on foreign ships in the Strait of Hormuz, with the exception of Iraq, which was at war with Iran (Hiro, 1993). Indeed, Iran would only be able to handle the War of Tankers by relying on its military presence on the islands. While the war proceeded, not only were Iraqi ships targeted, but Panamanian and American ships were also damaged by Iranian mines (Arian, 2017). This increased the U.S presence in the Persian Gulf and its attempts to internationalize the administration of the region. In addition to the Iran–Iraq War, the military value of Iran’s sovereignty over the three islands within sanctions against Iran has once again been revealed to the authorities. Therefore, after the end of the war in 1988, the country invested heavily in the islands and transformed them into three powerful military bases that control the Strait of Hormuz, alongside three other islands including Qeshm, Hormuz, and Larak (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006). Thus, the Iranian Archipelago in the Persian Gulf and especially the Strait of Hormuz plays an important role in the security of Iran as a country fighting for its survival.

5 Messages and Ambitions: Iran’s Approach Toward the Three Islands In 2010, a plan was proposed to establish a new province containing the Iranian islands near the Strait of Hormuz under the administration of Abu Musa as the capital of the province (Mohammadi, 2010). The province’s name was expected to be the Persian Gulf. Although the project was not seriously pursued, a large number of infrastructure projects were launched on the three islands, such as constructing an international airport in two Tunbs or providing more than 50 breakwaters, schools and universities, sports facilities and other official institutions (Boroomand, 2019), which are the initial stages of inhabiting the islands. While Iran states that its sovereignty over the three islands is non-negotiable and those islands are an inseparable part of Iran’s soil which plays a significant role in the region’s security (Mehmanparast, 2012), the UAE official, on the other hand, has claimed that this ongoing issue will threaten the international peace (“Ahmadinejad visiting of Abu Musa,” 2012). In April 2020, concerning the direct order of Iran’s Supreme Leader “Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,”IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri declared that the three islands of Abu Musa, the Lesser Tunb and the Great Tunb must be converted into residential properties to illustrate that Iran is

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pursuing stability in the area (Anonymous, 2020). This decision conveys four messages which will be investigated as follows; first, Iran will never negotiate the sovereignty of the three islands, as it is a historical part of the country rooted in Iran’s national identity. Therefore, Iran is seeking to confirm its ownership of the islands by inhabiting them (Shayan, 2013). Second, by converting the islands into residential property the country seeks to pave the way for Iran’s more active presence in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz particularly for military purposes (Alterman, 2010) as well as nullifying the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States which are known as “maximum pressure campaign.” Third, by attracting foreign investments and enjoying the natural resources of the Persian Gulf, Iran aims to maximize its economic benefits (Bahgat, 2000). Finally, having more residents demonstrates that Iran is not interested in increasing the tensions and conflicts in the Persian Gulf especially among the neighboring countries (Koch, 2009). By the time these islands were reoccupied, both Tunbs were nonresidential, and Abu Musa was semi-residential. It can also be considered that, as a result of the demographic inequality in Abu Musa, Iran has been seeking to boost the demographic balance gradually in its favor since 1971 (Koch, 2009). According to reports, only 41 Emirate families were living on the island in 2015 (Al-Mazrouei ). However, the IRGC neither allows them to build new buildings nor to renovate their buildings. In addition, there are some complicated protocols for emigrants to receive a residency permit in Abu Musa (Ghalibaf & Mirzadeh Kuhneshani, 2009). After the UAE claimed sovereignty over the islands in 1992, Iran put more practical measures on the agenda to further strengthen Iran’s control over the three islands. Therefore, it can be declared that one of the intentions behind residing Iranian citizens on the islands is to stabilize the name of the Persian Gulf by accommodating more Iranians than those of the Emirate (Rodriguez, 2011), so that the population of that region would gradually increase in favor of Iran. As a result, Iran could easily assert its sovereignty and possession of the three islands in international fora (Mclachlan, 2016). It is worth noting that, apart from preserving territorial integrity, geopolitical and military, the economic dimensions of the three islands are integral to Iran’s security and survival. The three islands have considerable economic value from extracting oil resources (Nahyan, 2013), increasing tourism, fishing, investing in the seafaring industry (Nahyan, 2013), as well as imposing a tax system on all ships sailing from Hormuz

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(Harmer, 2013) are Iran’s main economic ambitions for the future of these three islands, which can only be accomplished by more Persian people living in the area and by gaining full control of the three islands (Shapland, 2020). Therefore, the economic aspect of the possession of these islands is considered to be as important as military factors for Iran. However, a better understanding of Iran’s reasons behind the decision for changing the three mentioned islands into residential areas would be only possible by analyzing the data collected through a scientific survey that is responded to by experts in the field.

6 Exploratory Analysis: Assessing the Driving Factors Behind This Decision In order to investigate the factors affecting Iran’s decision on changing the islands into residential areas and also summarize a large number of variables in a limited number of factors, exploratory factor analysis was applied to this research. The population of interest of the study includes 94 academics, military, and political experts all with more than 10 years of experience in their field. The validity of the questionnaire was examined by a panel of experts and the necessary corrections were made.4 The reliability of the questionnaire was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha test, which obtained a coefficient of 0.84 (the value above 0.7 is considered reliable). The scale used in the questionnaire was a numerical scale from zero to five. Data analysis was performed using SPSS software. The statistical methods used in this study include descriptive statistics and exploratory factor analysis in order to identify the components that affected Iran’s decision for changing Abu Musa and the Tunbs into residential areas. This analysis attempts to identify the basic factors in order to explain the correlation between the observed variables. In other words, factor analysis is one of the multivariate methods that examines the internal correlation of a large number of variables that finally categorizes them in the form of factors in this study. 18 components that affected Iran’s

4 This research includes a specific population of interest which contains a number of political and military high officials. In this vein, the questionnaire was designed in a way that not only is it concise and efficient but also it is shrink to obtain precise responses due to time constraints of the population.

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Table 2

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KMO and Bartlett’s Test

KMO and Bartlett’s Test Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity

Approx. Chi-Square Df Sig

0.784 1237.715 190 0.000

decision from the respondent’s points of view were extracted from a literature review and the analysis of the official and semi-official documents about the reasons behind Iran’s decision to change the three islands to residential areas. The KMO and BARTLET tests show that the data collected has a proper initial correlation for doing factor analysis. Based on the findings of analysis, the value of KMO was 0.784, which shows a remarkable correlation among the factors and makes the data suitable to perform a factor analysis. Moreover, the amount of Bartlett statistics is equal to 1237 which is significant at the level of 0.01 (Table 2). Within the past few years, both countries have relied on distinct historical and legal documents to prove their sovereignty and possession over the three islands. However, Iran and UAE still have not reached an agreement on this ongoing issue. Therefore, Iran’s decision to inhabit the islands could end this dispute and Iran could have a chance to assert its sovereignty more conveniently. The result of our analysis demonstrates that Iran’s strategic decision over the islands is based on four main factors with some sub-elements in each factor; the main factors are divided into geopolitical, economic, national identity, and legal-political factors. According to the data in Table 3, the results of prioritizing the factors affecting Iran’s decision illustrate that geopolitical and economic factors are the first and second priorities and national identity and legal-political factors are the last priorities. This indicates that issues such as confrontation with the U.S military bases in the region, controlling the presence of foreign troops in the Persian Gulf, consolidation of defense infrastructures, and political-military competition with Israel and Arab nations of the Persian Gulf have been the primary motivations for Iran’s decision. Something that highlights the importance of the Persian Gulf security challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Table 3

Reasons behind Iran’s decision for inhabiting people in the islands

Component Geopolitical factors

Statements

Controlling the Hormuz Strait as one of the most important commercial highways in the word Economic competition with the oil producer countries Consolidation of defence infrastructures Deterrence Confrontation with the U.S military bases in the region Controlling the presence of foreign troops in Persian Gulf Political-military competition with the U.S, Israel, and Arab nations of Persian Gulf Economic factors Access to oil resources of Persian Gulf Increasing the tourism capabilities Creating free trade zones Increasing the production and trade of fish as well as developing seafaring industries

Factor loading 0.524

% of variance explain

Eigenvalues

22.58

4.52

20.55

4.11

0.593

0.820

0.742 0.901

0.869

0.824

0.506

0.903 0.786 0.807

(continued)

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Table 3

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(continued)

Component

Statements

Identity factors

Consolidation of national identity through the ownership of islands To maximize the number of Persians in the region (demographic imbalance) To confirm its ownership relying on the historical and ethnical background To extent the Shi’ite region in Persian Gulf Relying on Int. Law to end the legal dispute over sovereignty of islands Securitization of the Persian Gulf region Preserving territorial integrity

Legal and political factors

Factor loading 0.615

% of variance explain

Eigenvalues

16.28

3.26

8.20

1.64

0.788

0.791

0.833

0.718

0.676

0.513

Source Survey

Furthermore, the Iran–Iraq War was strategically one of the most important military conflicts of the contemporary era, which illustrated the significant role of the three islands for Iran (Ahmadi, 2010). Iran’s rule over these islands during the war challenged almost all the states’ interests and had a significant effect on the countries with the largest oil reserves in the world (Nahyan, 2013). During the war, it was proved that either Iran or Iraq’s victory would shift the stability and balance of power in the region. Therefore, the worlds’ powers tried to prevent either country from winning (Ahmadi, 2010). It can be concluded that inhabiting these

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areas will allow Iran to fully control the area without the interference of any other countries. While acknowledging the importance of these islands to Iran’s military ambitions such as the consolidation of defense power, deterrence, and confronting the foreign troops in the region, controlling the Strait of Hormuz as a vital line to the world’s economy has become more important than ever during recent years. Consequently, if Iran is subjected to any kind of pressure by the international community, the country would threaten the passage of the foreign oil tankers from the Strait of Hormuz. Preserving territorial integrity as a legal-political factor is affecting Iran’s current decision for changing Abu Musa and both Tunbs to residential areas. Moreover, over the last years Iran’s government has tried to illustrate that they play an essential role in protecting the Middle East by securitizing the Persian Gulf region. In addition, residing more people changes the demographic balance of this area in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran which will lead to a better approval of Iran’s ownership over the islands and will end the dispute between Iran–UAE relying on international law. While the Shia community has always been a minority in the Persian Gulf region, Iran is trying to boost the number and role of this minority. The more Shia/Persian people living in the Persian Gulf zone, the more legitimacy Iran has to end the tensions for its own sake. In fact, Iran plans to draw on its historical background in order to establish a cultural association between the region and the Iranians. It is notable that approval of the name of the Persian Gulf, which is a matter of another dispute between Iran and the other Arab countries, will be easier after residing a great number of Persians in the islands. Last but not least, is the construction of these islands which is one of the most critical and possible strategic decisions for the establishment of ownership and the legitimization of sovereignty over the three islands. It is much simpler to claim possession of a country’s residential and industrial areas than semi-inhabited islands.

7

Conclusion

Aiming to understand the purpose of the Islamic Republic of Iran to change the three military islands into residential areas, the current contribution addressed the disputes between Iran and the UAE over Abu Musa and The Tunbs. The legal and political history of disputes between Arab

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countries, UAE, and Iran looked in to gain a better understanding of the current situation. This chapter in its first stage focused on the claims of both Iran and the Emirate’s governments about the ownership of the three islands and therefore sovereignty over them. In addition, the legal and military processes of Iran’s ownership over the three mentioned islands were addressed. As the second step, fifty years of military presence of Iran in the three islands has been investigated. We have argued that although since 1971 the tensions between these two countries has been expanded, Iran has utilized its military power as an effective means to consolidate its sovereignty over the islands. As a result, it could handle the Iran–Iraq War and international sanctions in recent years by controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the latter has always had this power to threaten its so-called “enemies” for blocking the Strait of Hormuz and crashing the economy of the world. By holding on to the possession of the three islands as well as three other islands in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran could access a great number of oil fields in the Persian Gulf. This is something that easily saved the Islamic Republic of Iran from hydrocarbon economic competition with the Arab nations around the Persian Gulf as well as the sanctions imposed by the U.S and other international actors during these years. The findings of our research demonstrate that the most important driving factors behind this strategic decision are geopolitical and economic factors. These are rooted in the sensitive situation of Iran in the region due to the presence of the U.S, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the region as well as imposing economic sanctions by the international community on Iran. This so-called “maximum pressure campaign” consolidates Iran’s anti-western ideology which pushes the country to confront interference of any international actor in the Persian Gulf’s affair. In this vein, sovereignty over the islands of the Persian Gulf is a vital issue for Iran, and the country will never give up its control over this strategic area. Moreover, national identity and legal political factors were recognized as two important driving factors that affected Iran’s decision for turning the three islands into residential properties. Therefore, we have argued that apart from consolidating Iran’s sovereignty through military activities, the country seeks to stabilize its right of ownership. The authorities intend to alter the three islands into residential areas and provide facilities for inhabitants of these regions. It can be considered as a new step with a view of changing the regional

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demographic balance in favor of Iran. This decision will have manifold implications for Iran, for UAE, and for the other countries of the Persian Gulf. In a nutshell, the settlement of the three islands could turn Iran’s claim of sovereignty into its inalienable right and put pressure on the UAE to withdraw the claim. Additionally, this decision can be interpreted as the retreat of Iran from its militarism approach toward the three islands. In the end it is clear that the growing presence of Iran will lead to a reduction of western countries’ domination. This legal reorganization settling will have great geopolitical importance for Iran and for other Persian Gulf countries as well as all states that depend on the Strait of Hormuz.

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Shia Geopolitics or Religious Tourism? Political Convergence of Iran and Iraq in the Light of Arbaeen Pilgrimage Mohammad Eslami , Morteza Bazrafshan , and Maryam Sedaghat

1

Introduction

Relations of Iran and Iraq Muslim countries with a Shia majority have always been at the center of both political and academic debates. Although their relations were extremely overshadowed and exacerbated due to the Iran and Iraq war in 1980–1988 but the U.S. military invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam’s regime in March 2003 (Gause, 2009) provided a new opportunity for revival of Iran’s strategic relations with Iraq. Iran, therefore utilized the new evolutions in Iraq after the collapse of Saddam Hussein, Arab spring, and emergence of ISIS. Iraq has an important position in Iran’s political, security, territorial integrity,

M. Eslami (B) Research Centre Political Science, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] M. Bazrafshan Tourism and Hospitality Department, Higher Education Complex of Bam, Bam, Iran M. Sedaghat Tourism Department, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_15

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and countering terrorism due to its geopolitical conditions. Also, culturalreligious commonalities (harmonies), and economic exchanges play a vital role in Iran’s survival (Razoux, 2015). Iran increased its military and economic presence in Iraq in order to consolidate its position in the region. Therefore, two countries sought to expand their relations in religious, political, economic, technological, and security spheres (Kechichian, 2016) and a number of social-political movements including “Arbaeen Procession.” Arbaeen means forty and in Islamic terms, it refers to the 20th of Safar (the second lunar month), the fortieth day after Hussein (the third Imam of Shiites) was killed in Karbala 14 centuries ago. Nowadays, Karbala to Shiites is a matter of political convergence of Iran and Iraq and an important element in formation of Shia geopolitics. Cooperation in the field of religious tourism has been raised more specifically after the Arab Spring (Husein, 2018) (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 The red flag linking Iran and Iraq flags during Arbaeen pilgrimage conveys the message that: “Love of Imam Hussein brings us (Iran and Iraq) together” (ISNA 2019)

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Some believe that there is a link between political convergence and tourism development (Heydari Chianeh & Rezatab-Azgomi, 2012) which in case of Iran and Iraq has been projected in “Arbaeen Procession” between Najaf and Karbala in Iraq with a population of 15 million pilgrims from different countries. Arbaeen Pilgrimage is one of the most important dimensions of Shia influence in the region that can be analyzed from the lenses of Shia geopolitics theory and demonstrates the importance of Shia nations’ integration. In general, Shia geopolitics is a concept which demonstrates the geographic importance of Shia inhabitation areas in the world. The adherents of this theory claim that the control of Shia nations over the two main geostrategic highways including the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Bab Al Mandab on the one hand, and inhabitation of Shia groups in the main energy sources of the world on the other hand, clean the surface for Iran and its allies to challenge the security of the world. The Houthis attack on the biggest oil factory in the world in Saudi Arabia (Aramco), Shooting down of the U.S. military drone (RQ4) in Persian Gulf by Iran, several attacks on the embassy of U.S. by Hashd Al-Shabi in Iraq, seize of the British oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, Iran’s attack on the U.S. military bases in Iraq, and several rocket attacks of Hezbollah on Israel can be considered as a number of upright instances for security challenges that the Shia bloc countries made for the neighboring countries (Eslami & Vieira, 2020; Eslami, 2021). While affirming the role of Arbaeen pilgrimage in the empowerment of Shia countries, the present contribution argues that “Arbaeen Procession” is not a typical religious tourist event which might take place annually in several points of the world but it is also a matter of changing geopolitical equations in the Middle East and bring the Shia countries together in order to counter the U.S. and Israel to change the distribution of power in the Middle East (Nikjoo et al., 2020a). Aiming to understand how “Arbaeen Procession” led to Iran and Iraq political convergence and evaluating the implications of this political convergence to the Shia Geopolitics, the present study draws on a unique survey to examine the motivations (pull and push factors or in other words political-led and religious-led factors) of Iranian for participating in Arbaeen pilgrimage.

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2 Shia Geopolitics: A Dangerous Reality or a Misinterpretation Leading to Shia-Phobia? Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the leaders of the two top branches of Islam (Majin, 2017). Shiites are the minority of Muslims and most of them (around 80 million) live in Iran. Sunnis form the dominant population of the Islamic world. About 85% of the 1.6 billion people in the Muslim world are Sunnis, who mostly live in Southeast Asia and the Arab world. While only 1% of this population lives in Saudi Arabia, the country considers itself as the main leader of Sunnis world (Alishah, 2020). Saudi leadership over the Sunni world does not merely mean consensus with other Sunni countries. This internal disagreement among Sunni countries is the key difference with the Shiite bloc. Almost all Shias have accepted Iran’s leadership in various areas of the Shia world (Corboz, 2015). Nowadays, one of the challenges of the Western countries is the utmost presence of Shiites in the oil-rich regions of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East (Hoogeveen & Perlot, 2007). This issue can be considered as the adaptation of “energy geopolitics” with “Shia geopolitics” (Mervin et al., 2013). In this vein, convergence of Shia countries including Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon has raised the concept of Shia geopolitics among the scholars again (Norton, 2015). In fact, there is a close relationship between the oil and gas resources of the Middle East and the Shia areas, so that 2% of the native population of the Persian Gulf are Shia, while three quarters of the world’s oil reserves are in this region. A review of the world’s oil-rich regions shows that the Middle East accounts for 23% of the world’s population (Mervin et al., 2013); It contains 30% of the world’s mineral resources, 74% of the world’s crude oil reserves and 50% of the discovered natural gas reserves (Naderi, 2015). In Saudi Arabia, for example, Shia people live in the country’s largest oil field in the eastern region, including Qatif and al-Ahsa, and Shiites actually do most of the oil work. In addition to Saudi Arabia, Shia Muslims in Oman, Iraq, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar live in areas that are among the region’s most important oil-producing centers (Luomi, 2008). Something that can put the U.S. and Western countries’ national interests in danger. In December 2004, when the Iranian nuclear crisis was at its height and Iraq was on the verge of civil war, the King of Jordan claimed:

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The main reason for the war in Iraq was the formation of an Iraniandominated “Shia crescent” in the region especially between the East Mediterranean and Persian Gulf (Makiya, 2006). The Sunni conservatives in the region are concerned about increasing the influence of Shiites, especially in Iran, and the other Shia regimes as well as the empowerment of Shia paramilitary groups. Since this anticipates the emergence, consolidation, and effectiveness of “Shia Crescent” in the region. Both concepts of Shia geopolitics and the Shia Crescent are constructed by the opponents of Shia empowerment in the region and the world (Black, 2007). It seems to be the ultimate goal of the spread of Shia phobia in both concepts (Menashri, 2001). However, Shia geopolitics is an undeniable fact of the regional power of the Shiites in the Middle East, which was undeniable even if the Western world did not build and represent it (Byman et al., 2001). The concept of Shia geopolitics has been released by Thual (1995). He claims that geopolitics of human constructions are based on the religions, ethnics, cultures, and politics. To Thual (1995) Shia has a geopolitical nature. He argues that historical background and population dispersion play a significant geopolitical role (Thual, 1995). Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, Mediterranean Sea, and the Strait of Bab Al Mandab are some of the geopolitical areas controlling by Shia nations (Luomi, 2008). While Shia regimes are known as revolutionary regimes (Fuller & Francke, 2001), Shia habitations in sensitive and important points of the world has been attracting the attention of the world countries especially the western countries (Alhadeff, 2016; Douglass & Hays, 2008). In general, the scholars of Shia geopolitics present a geopolitical image of the Shia, by showing the presence of Shia nations in conflicts and crises. They use the term Shiism to denote the rise and resurgence of Shiism, which evokes a kind of threat to the Sunni world. In addition, they distinguish between Iranian and non-Iranian Shiism, by giving a guiding role to Iranian Shiism (Alhadeff, 2016). One of the most important elements that the scholars of Shia geopolitics consider is the fact that Sunnis and Westerners are a common rival to Shiism; therefore, they include Shiism as a geopolitical arena, and compare it with communism to introduce Shiism as an alternative to communism in the global geopolitical arena (Naderi, 2015). Something that presents a dangerous image of Shia and Shiism in the world which threatens humanity in the near future.

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Some scholars have considered Shia geopolitics as the extension of Shia political geography in different Middle Eastern countries with the centrality of Iran as a “heartland” (Thual, 1995). In this research we claim that presence of Iranian people in Iraq for Arbaeen pilgrimage is one of the dimensions of Shia geopolitics which leads to political convergence of the two countries and consequently leads to empowerment of Shia regimes in the region. Iran, as a country, does not focus only on its religious interests in international politics; rather, it’s plans for achieving a set of economic, political, and cultural interests. Something that approves the idea of Shia geopolitics in Iran and Iraq relations as well as their relationship with Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and the South part of Saudi Arabia. Since apart from the religious and cultural relation both countries have common economic, security, and political interests.

3 Hostility Versus Hospitality: History of Iran and Iraq Relations Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Iraqi government in western Iran, the policies adopted by the Iraqi government have always been a source of threat to Iran’s national security (Murray & Woods, 2014). Therefore, it has rarely had friendly relations with Iran. Territorial and border disputes, along with religious issues such as discrimination against Shiites in Iraq and ethnic and racial issues such as the Arab-Ajam conflict, the presence of Kurds on both sides of the Iran and Iraq border, and the expansionist nature of Baghdad rulers are the key causes of tension or conflict between the two countries in the last century (Chubin, 2019). Contrary to the 1970s and 1980s, today Iran is considered as one of the most important allies of Iraq that plays a vital role in security and economy of the country (Swearingen, 1988). Before the 1979 revolution, Iran was known as a gendarme of the Middle East. Therefore, it had a military and cultural influence on the region. Something that was not acceptable for Saddam Hussein, as the political rival of Iran in the Middle East. While the conditions changed after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Islamic revolution in Iran can be considered as one of the most important turning points in the relations of Iran and Iraq (Takeyh, 2010). Both leaders of Iran and Iraq had ambitions more than their borders. Ayatollah Khomeini had always wanted to export Shia revolution to other Muslim countries and Saddam had thought that the first step to make an Arab

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superpower in the world is victory over Iran. Therefore, Saddam Hussein started a very long and bloody war against Iran (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006; Murray & Woods, 2014). Undoubtedly, the Iran and Iraq war with about 300,000 victims and one million injured can be considered as one of the worse strategic experiences of Iran (Eslami & Vieira, 2020; Eslami, 2021). The invasion to Iran was due only to the profound annoyance of Iraq from the political and cultural influence of Iran in the Persian Gulf (McNaugher, 1990). Iraq wanted to legitimize its role as the leader of the Arab World (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006; Eslami, 2021). Moreover, Saddam as a Sunnite Leader wanted to decrease the influence of Shia religion in the region (Eslami & Vieira, 2020). The U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 opened a new chapter in the relations of the two Shia countries. The ethnic-religious as well as socio-cultural rifts that followed the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (Strauss, 2002; Eslami, 2021), created a very favorable environment for militant groups fighting the central government. The elimination of the Ba’athist regime and the presence of Shiites and Kurds in the Iraqi power structure have created new opportunities for expanding cooperation between the two countries (Fuller, 2003). In addition, some new political developments including the formation and expansion of the Takfiri-Salafi terrorist groups have taken place and had the greatest impact on Iran’s security and national interests. It subsequently pushed Iran to get closer to Iraq and increase its official and semi-official activities in the soil of Iraq (Cordesman, 2017; Eriksson & Khaleel, 2018). Something that is strongly projected in Iran’s military presence in Iraq for fighting ISIS as well as military and financial support of Shia military groups including Hashd al Shabi and Kataeb Hezbollah (Duman & Sönmez, 2018). Iran’s presence in Iraq has not been limited to security and political issues. Iranian authorities also found religious tourism as a panacea for development of political relationships. As religious tourism is determinant of human behaviors (Nyaupane et al., 2015), they could have their impressions on the people (of two countries). Both countries’ life style is mostly directed by holy book of Quran (Husein, 2018) and there are different verses of the Book endorsing traveling with the aim of achieving spiritual, physical and social-political goal such as maintaining Muslims brotherhood and union of Muslims against enemies (Ghanbarian Barzian, 2017; Zamani-Farahani & Henderson, 2010).

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4

Religious Tourism in Islam: A Cultural Background

The importance of tourism as a catalyst for expanding the economic, social, cultural, and political relations of countries have increased in recent years (Alavi & Yasin, 2000; Sharpley & Telfer, 2015). Tourism is considered not only as a tool for economic development (it encompasses about 10% of world GDP and one job out of every ten (UNWTO, 2019), but also as a factor for political, social, and environmental sustainability (Goeldner & Ritchie, 2011). Besides the economic impacts, the governments consider it for the development of their political relations. Depending on the socio-cultural and political context of the governments and the type of relations they want to establish, the dominant type(s) of tourism in each country is determined. In this regard, religious tourism is one of the oldest and most frequent ones which holds a direct relationship between tourism and religion (Henderson, 2003). It occupies a remarkable part of the tourism economy in the world (Vukonic, 2002). Search of truth, enlightenment, and acquisition of valuable experiences mixed with divine and sacred things lead people to travel to holy places that are far beyond their worldly and ordinary life (in terms of worship) (Raj & Morpeth, 2007). Therefore, religious tourism can have a dual purpose; a tool for tourism development and enjoying its impacts, especially the economic ones, and a political excuse for developing the relations of the countries. In case of Iran and Iraq, religious tourism shows itself in forms of pilgrimage, foot pilgrimage and Arbaeen walking seems to have the same mission (Nikjoo et al., 2020a, b). In Islam, as in other religions, religious travel and pilgrimage to holy places have always been common. As a good instance, Hajj is one of the principles of Islam which dates back to early Islam era. The mentioned event is considered as the symbol of alliance (union) and brings the Muslim of the different countries together (Durán-Sánchez et al., 2018). One of the subcategories of religious pilgrimage is foot pilgrimage which entails walking to sacred places (Husein, 2018) as an organized group activity (Bremborg, 2013). “Arbaeen” is the most special religious event in Shi’ite Islam, which came back to fashion due to Iran–Iraq political convergence especially following Arab spring. In this regard, the word “pilgrimage” usually refers to those (pilgrims) who traveled long and difficult distances around the world for the purpose

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of sacred shrines. Pilgrimage with a long history is a general feature of Islam. The Holy Kaaba in Mecca and the Holy Shrine of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina in Saudi Arabia are pilgrimage destinations that are officially accepted by all Muslims. In addition to these shrines, there are other places that are considered sacred by Shiites, which are located in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Similarly, in the Middle East, there are abundant of religious attractions such as holy shrines and cities, religious buildings, and ceremonies that can be called pull factors for Muslim tourists (Khaksari et al., 2014). The most important ones related to current research are Karbala, Najaf, Kadhimiya, and Samarra in Iraq and Mashhad and Qom in Iran (especially for Shia Muslims). In addition, there were some of the most important Shia sites in Saudi Arabia; but the mentioned sites have been destroyed by the government of Saudi Arabia, something that made a hostility between Wahhabis and Shia Muslims (Nasr, 2007). In addition to holy places, there are many ceremonies and celebrations in the Shiite belief. Shiite religious months, days, and holidays play an important role in religious events and ceremonies. The most important months are Muharram and Ramadan. The anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and 72 of his companions is the most significant religious event in Muharram. This ceremony is held every year on Tasua (ninth of Muharram) and Ashura (tenth of Muharram) and ends on Arbaeen (fortieth day) (Rolston, 2020). Imam Hussein is the third Imam of Shiites and the son of Imam Ali and Fatima and the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad (Stanley, 2006). According to Persian legend, the daughter of the last Sassanid king of Iran, who was captured by the Muslims, married Imam Hussein. This issue is considered as one of the reasons for the popularity of Imam Hussein in Iranian culture. “Arbaeen” is one of the special religious events in Shi’ite Islam, which is not only held as the ceremony of Imam Hussein but rather as a symbol of faith, belief, and political convergence of Shia nations (Bremborg, 2013). Arbaeen, “Mega-Event” is one of the largest and most important events in the field of religious tourism (pilgrimage), which takes place every year with the presence of millions of people from all over the world in Karbala (in line with religious beliefs).

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5 Geopolitical Pilgrimage: Implications of Arbaeen Walk to the World’s Politics In the modern era, the first spark of Shiism and democratic revolutions began with the Iranian revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, and was struck with the victory of the Shiites of Iraq (2003) and Hezbollah of Lebanon (2006). Subsequently, the Shiism continues its ups and downs in the struggle of regional revolutions in the Middle East (Arab Spring) and then with victories in Syria and Iraq (2017) as the core of resistance. The success of Shia candidates in the Iraq elections, the pivotal role of Lebanese Hezbollah in mobilizing pro-Syrian demonstrations, Hezbollah’s victorious war against Israel and the activation of various Shiite movements and their call for political reform in Yemen as well as other developments in the region, including Egypt, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan reflect the fact that the Shia political identity in the region is forming. To understand the real Shia power and its geopolitical significance, we should investigate the source of its power. In this research we argue that it is the inner potential of Shia and the internal factors of this religion that have facilitated its hegemonic grounds in the Middle East. Therefore, Shia geopolitics is meaningless, regardless of its ideas and symbols that its ideology creates. The current chapter addresses one of the most powerful (soft) sources of Shia geopolitics. The great peaceful march of Arbaeen pilgrimage as one of the high spiritual and empowering Shia values. In short, today, Karbala, as a holy center of gravity for the gathering of loving Shia nations from all over the world, can lead to unity and strengthen the spirit of jihad and martyrdom among the Shia Muslims. It can unite the Shia ideals regardless of ethnic and regional constraints that follow Shia geopolitics. Knowing the motivations that stimulate millions of people (pilgrims) to travel to sacred places is of high importance for both tourism authorities and politicians, especially in the case of Iran and Iraq with a challenging geopolitical background. Reviewing the related literature shows that there are different intrinsic and extrinsic reasons that trigger people to travel to different destinations. In tourism, the most relevant motivation theories and models belong to Stanley Plog (1987) and Pearce (1988, 1992) and a large number of researches are focused on push and pull factor model. Push factors refer to internal stimuli that motivate people to travel, to experience and fulfill their needs and desires (Husein, 2018), among them are mostly recreation, escaping the daily life (relaxation) (Bogari

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et al., 2003; Crompton, 1979), interactions (Crompton, 1979), pleasure, learning new and interesting things (Crompton 1979), fulfilling the dreams of visiting a foreign country, prestige (Crompton, 1979), achieving religious belief (Liro, 2020; Wang et al., 2016), etc. Pull factors are external ones related to attractiveness of the destination and encompass attributes such as holy sites (Husein, 2018; Liro, 2020), novelty (Crompton, 1979), climate, marketing incentives (Aghajani & Farahanifard, 2015), physical amenities (Aghajani & Farahanifard 2015), safety and easy access to the destination (Aghajani & Farahanifard, 2015; Bogari et al. 2003), hospitality (Zamani-Farahani & Henderson, 2010), etc., that attracts tourists (Crompton, 1979; Wang et al., 2016). In this contribution, we argue that political factors also have been of importance in development of Arbaeen pilgrimage. Something that can be considered as non-religious motivators (Kana, 2011). In this regard, as the push and pull factors in Arbaeen pilgrimage demands, there are different factors of high importance for this movement of people from Iran to Iraq. Reviewing the push and pull factors of religious tourism destinations, demonstrates that most of the factors (please see Table 1) were determined by prominent scholars of tourism studies cannot be considered as influential factors that influence the participation of Iranian citizens in Arbaeen. The trend of the Arbaeen movement in the last years, as well as experts’ points of view, were examined. The results more specifically by considering the two time periods of 2014–2015, the widespread presence of ISIS in the region, and the widespread of the Coronavirus in 2020, showed that push and pull factors, in this case, are somehow different from the other religious destinations. Many pilgrims participated in Arbaeen walking pilgrimage despite unsafety, lack of amenities, and even governments’ unwillingness. In other words, factors such as transportation or ease of access, rituals and ceremonies, safety and security, costs, etc., are not as influencing as they are in the other religious destinations. This is something that makes Arbaeen Pilgrimage a special case of religious tourism with different pull and push factors. Recently, Arbaeen Procession has been changed to a religious-political event which takes place in all of the cities of Iran by the people who could not travel to Iraq to participate in the original Arbaeen pilgrimage. This event which is popular as the “Arbaeen Remnants’ Procession” is projected in national media of both countries as an event which leads to

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Table 1

Measurement model quality

Factors

Variables

CV-COM

CV-Red

Pull

Imam Hussein as symbol of resistance and sacrifice Iraqi’s hospitality Religious ceremony (Arbaeen Pilgrimage) Religious commonalities (Shia Majority) Religious sites as the center of gravity in Shia world Commemoration of Arbaeen Government willingness and political propaganda Confronting foreign interference in the region Support of Mustazafin (Yemen and Palestine) Showing Shia pacifism to the world Spiritual experience (achieving religious belief) Personal religious tendencies (praying) Consolidating Iran-Iraq brotherhood Legitimizing Shia regimes in Iran and Iraq Shia union against others (Salafism, Zionism, imperialism) Boasting Shia’s soft power Total average

0.192

–

Push

Political convergence

– – – – 0.405

– – – – – – –

0.206

0.352

0.327

0.295 0.391

0.267

0.272 –

political convergence of the two countries. Moreover, two popular hashtags of “Hussein’s Love gathers us” and “the divergence of Iran-Iraq is impossible” have been trended in social media (tweeter and Instagram) by the people of the two countries. As it was mentioned above, pilgrimage motivations were localized according to the evidence from the previous trends, especially those of crises and asking the experts’ points of view. On the other hand, it was mentioned that pilgrimage is considered as a political instrument for geopolitical goals.

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375

Methodology

The study was done in 2020 as the Corona Virus had its highest negative impact on tourism and pilgrimage. In other words, CoronaVirus threatened the Arbaeen pilgrims and somehow influenced the findings of this study as well. To understand the relationship between pull and push factors and political convergence of Iraq and Iran, the related literature was examined and some 19 variables on pull and push factors and 12 variables on political convergence were determined. The research experts then summarized and modified the variables into 5 pull variables, 7 push variables, and 4 political convergence variables. The variables were used in formulating the research questionnaire. The reliability and validity of the questionnaire is shown in Table 2. 79. Respondents familiar with both tourism (pilgrimage) and policy, filled the questionnaire with a Likert scale (five options for each question, from completely disagree to completely agree). Then to test the mentioned relations, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was done by use of SmartPLS (v.3.3.2). Due to the small number of respondents, little available theory and with no assumptions about data distribution, SmartPLS software was used (Wong, 2013). The data was used to determine the Structural Equation Model (SEM) (Fig. 2) and the validity and reliability of the structure by Crinbach’s alpha, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), and Maximum Shared Squared Variance (MSV).

7

Data Analysis and Discussion

The results of SEM in the following figure confirms the variables of pull and push factors, that of political convergence and the relations of pull and push factors with political convergence of Iran and Iraq. The factor loadings are evident in the model and as they are upper than 0.4, it can be declared that they are significant at the confidence level of 95%. Table 1 also shows the convergent validity and reliability of the model. Regarding the reliability, Cronbach’s alpha and Composite Reliability (CR) are both higher than the optimal value (0.7) and confirm the reliability of the model. All values of factor loadings and t-values are also higher than 0.4 and 1.98 respectively. Factor loadings are used for prioritizing the variables and t-values are also for confirming the hypothesis.

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Table 2 Factors

Pull

Push

Convergent validity and reliability of the model Variables

Imam Hussein as symbol of resistance and sacrifice Iraqi’s hospitality Religious ceremony (Arbaeen Pilgrimage) Religious commonalities (Shia Majority) Religious sites as the center of gravity in Shia world Commemoration of Arbaeen Government willingness and political propaganda Confronting foreign interference in the region Support of Mustazafin (Yemen and Palestine) Showing Shia pacifism to the world Spiritual experience (achieving religious belief)

Convergent validity

Reliability

Factor loadings

t-values

AVE

Composite Reliability (CR)

Cronbach’s alpha

0.795

14.382

0.457

0.805

0.913

0.589 0.692

5.739 10.270

0.552

4.877

0.722

11.457

0.684

9.963

0.548

0.893

0.611

6.145

0.828

29.620

0.707

13.557

0.875

32.183

0.801

21.303

(continued)

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Table 2

377

(continued)

Factors

Variables

Convergent validity Factor loadings

Political convergence

Personal religious tendencies (praying) Consolidating Iran-Iraq brotherhood Legitimizing Shia regimes in Iran and Iraq Shia union against others (Salafism, Zionism, Imperialism) Boasting Shai’s soft power

t-values

0.635

6.672

0.728

12.616

0.594

7.432

0.794

13.801

0.753

8.421

Reliability AVE

Composite Reliability (CR)

0.520

0.811

Cronbach’s alpha

The above table shows Cross Validated Community (CV-COM) and Cross Validated Redundancy (CV-Red) which are obtained by predicting data points using latent variable score and by predicting the questionable blocks using the latent variables used for prediction respectively. As the CV-COM values are positive, it means that the measurement model has the required quality and as they are higher than 0.15, it means that they are of medium quality for measurement of the model. The results are the same for the CV-Red values, as they are positive it can be declared that the structural model has the optimal ability for predicting as it is higher than 0.15, it is of medium quality for predicting the structural model. Another index for fitness of model is R2 . It indicates the impact that an exogenous variable has on an endogenous variable. R2 is 0.710 for this model which shows a strong impact (values higher than 0.67 are strong). According to Table 2, in religious-led factors (pull factor), the highest priority or importance is related to “Imam Hussein as symbol of resistance and sacrifice” (β = 0.795). It means that what intrinsically motivates people of Iran mostly to leave their country for pilgrimage is Imam Hussein, as they consider him as the symbol of resistance and sacrifice.

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Fig. 2 Structural model of Iran and Iraq’s political convergence

Some authors consider it as “saint love for Imam” which is the main motivation for undertaking the pilgrimage (Husein, 2018; Moufahim & Lichrou, 2019). Then pilgrims are pulled toward “Religious sites as the center of gravity in Shia world” (β = 0.722). Visiting holy sites is what is mostly known as Ziyara. Destinations with religious sites have the potential of attracting both religious and non-religious tourists in the case of promoting their area. “Religious Ceremony of Arbaeen” (β = 0.692) is of third importance to Iranian people who go to Iraq as the pilgrims. Arbaeen with its ups and downs in the recent years has been severely linked to political conditions of Iraq and has grown after the removal of some obstacles and we witnessed the presence of some followers from the other countries and religions as well. This huge presence of people in Arbaeen to renew the covenant with Imam Hussein not only results in religious unity and deepen pilgrims’ prudence but also makes a political unity. Pilgrims are motivated to do the Arbaeen as a religious ceremony while Iraqi people show great hospitality to them. “Iraqi’s hospitality” (β = 0.589) is

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evident during the walking experience in the form of offering and serving food and beverages to pilgrims and shows an aspect of Islamic hospitality (Husein, 2018). This kind of hospitality is sometimes surprising to the Iranians, especially as they understand that many of the hosts are poor (Nikjoo et al., 2020b). Hospitality of Iraqi people and their good relations with Iranian pilgrims projects this issue that the hostility of eight years’ war is completely forgotten and there is a strong tendency for more engagement between the two nations. And the last important motivational pull factor is “Religious commonalities (Shia Majority)” (β = 0.552). On the other hand, the priority of politically lead factors which pushed people to the Iraq are as follow; The Emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as several terrorist attacks in Western countries, have made a sense of Islam phobia in the world. Attempts to fade it, shows itself as the first important variable of politically led factors. “Showing Shia pacifism to the world” (β = 0.875), as a variable of push factors, is of highest importance to the respondents. The result of data analysis demonstrates that showing Shia pacifism to the world and demonstration of the difference between Shia discourses with Takfirists and Islamic fundamental groups is the most important factor that pushes Iranian and Iraqi nations to participate in Arbaeen Procession. “Confronting foreign interference in the region” (β = 0.828) is another variable that motivates Iranian people to visit Iraq during the Arbaeen period. Historical experiences of the two countries show that the presence of international powers in the region is the main source of destruction and non-development of the two countries. In this vein, they refer to western countries and more especially the U.S. as arrogant (mostakber) or the powerful minority who want to exploit the poor people. Something that is strongly linked with the concept of fighting global arrogance and support of Mustazafin as two important principles in Iranian ideological context. “Spiritual experience (achieving religious belief)” (β = 0.801) as well as “Commemoration of Arbaeen” (β = 0.684) and “Personal Religious Tendencies” (β=0.635) are among the push factors that motivates Iranian people to participate in Arbaeen pilgrimage. “Support of Mustazafin (Yemen and Palestine)” (β = 0.707) also pushed people of Iran to Iraq while “Personal religious tendencies (praying)” (β = 0.635) and “Government willingness and political propaganda” (β = 0.611) were the last two push factors. While it was expected

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that the source of this political movement and the most important push factor that motivates Iranian nation to participate in Arbaeen pilgrimage, the result of our analysis shows that the government willingness is the less influential variable of this research. Something that confirms that this “mega event” arises from the political culture of both nations which is rooted in Shia ideology. Moreover, the factor loadings and t-values of pull factors (β = 0.403 and t = 4.151) and push factors (β = 0.478 and t = 5.123) confirm their impacts on political convergence of Iran and Iraq and show that push factors are more influential than pull factors. In the other words, Arbaeen as a huge communicational ritual and one of the largest human convergence with a global reflection can develop a cultural, social, and political meaning (Hashjin & Khanghahi, 2020) and lead to political convergence, especially with widespread reflection and political interpretation of it in the media. Referring to the results of the analysis and existing literature, it can be mentioned that Arbaeen has different religious and political impacts in which it has led to consolidation of Shia political ideology in order to confront the so-called “enemies of Shiites” and increased the soft power of Shia in the region. In addition, this spiritual experience shaped a new brotherhood between Shia nations and allowed the people of Iran and Iraq to forget the ungraceful experiences of the war. The mentioned process in a way paved the way for the legitimization of Shia regimes in the two countries.

8 Conclusion: Political Convergence and Shia Geopolitics In this research, the geopolitical importance of the two countries as the main Shia states in the world was discussed. At the first section, we discussed the concept of Shai geopolitics and we investigated how this concept is linked with the concept of energy geopolitics. Something that approves the idea that the inhabitation of Shia nations in the main oil resources in the world gives them this power to establish their political role in the international system. The second section addressed the war between Iran and Iraq as well as their alliance after the collapse of Ba’thist regime in Iraq. In addition, we mentioned that the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 opened a room for maneuver for Iran to consolidate its relations with Iraq as a “friend and brother country.”

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In the third section we discussed religious tourism in the two countries as well as importance of pilgrimages in Islam and especially in Shia religion. Consequently, in the fourth section we addressed one of the most important dimensions of Shia geopolitics which is projected in political convergence. We claimed that Arbaeen pilgrimage is the most important variable that brings the two countries together to show their brotherhood and their alliance to the world. This great spiritual march has created a form of unity and solidarity of the Shia Muslims, so that Arbaeen pilgrimage has become the international day of the unity of Muslims against imperialism and Takfiri currents. The important point is that every year, the number of participants, as well as the number of other countries and religions in this ceremony, is increasing; This has led to unity and a symbol of world peace between Sunnite Muslims, Shia Muslims, and even other religions such as Christians, Hindus, etc.1 Something that is considered as one of the dimensions of Shia soft power in the region and a special factor which empowers Iran to confront the U.S. or any other rival in the Middle East. Due to the lack or absence of an appropriate method to measure the motivation of Iranian people for presence in Arbaeen pilgrimage, we claim a better understanding that the most influential motivations would only be possible by analyzing the data collected through a unique scientific survey that is responded to by experts in the field. The result of data analysis demonstrates that the influence rate of the religious-led factors is less than political-led factors. However, apart from the motivations that attract Iranians to visit Iraq for Arbaeen pilgrimage, the result of this human gathering is more political than religious. That is why we claim that this pilgrimage is a highly political event that brings two nations together in order to achieve their political goals including Shia union against others, bolstering Shia soft power, consolidation of Iran and Iraq brotherhood and finally legitimization of Shia regimes in both countries. This is exactly what we present as the concept of Shia geopolitics. Something that can challenge the national interests of the U.S., Western countries, Israel and other Arab countries around the Persian Gulf.

1 During the past years, a remarkable number of Christians (from Syria, Iraq, Georgia, and Armenia) and Hindus (from India and Pakistan) participated in Arbaeen pilgrimage.

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De-Coding Fabric of Iran-Israeli Hostility in the Regional Context Alexey Khlebnikov

1

and Nikita Smagin

Introduction

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution Israel and Islamic Republic of Iran have become severe rivals. The substance of confrontation between them largely lies in ideological and geopolitical realms. Anti-Israeli rhetoric is an integral part of Iran’s anti-imperialist and anti-American narrative which views Israel as a provider of U.S. interests, contributor to its domination in the region, and a threat to Iran’s security. Together with that Iran’s profound history and a “besieged fortress” mentality, makes its leadership view country’s survival and security through a geopolitical lens which requires to be rather realist and pragmatic than ideology-driven. As a result, on the one hand, it makes, both states quite pragmatic in their actions and policies which prevents them from waging a large-scale hot war against each other, while on the other hand, it brings their rhetoric to a new level of hostility which persistently supports existing enemy image inside the two countries. Although the confrontation between Iran and Israel did not yet go into the hot war, it constantly risks to deteriorate if not to blow up the regional security. Degree of hostility between the two

A. Khlebnikov (B) · N. Smagin Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_16

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states largely defines degree of stability/instability in the region which makes interactions between them crucial to Middle East security. Although Iran and Israel do not have diplomatic relations the two interact indirectly on wide range of issues which concern both countries’ security. Before analyzing those areas, the authors will first look at the changing global and regional environment and security architecture which significantly affected and, in many ways, formed today’s Iran’s and Israel’s regional policies. After that, in order to understand the complexity and logic of the existing Iran–Israeli interaction and hostility, the authors will look at key areas which define the logic of confrontation and degree of hostility between the two states. They will analyze the set of factors that largely define degree of current Iran–Israeli confrontation and examine what role they play in two countries’ hostility. Those include: – How the two countries use “enemy image” of each other in domestic and foreign politics; – Nuclear weapons issue (Israeli nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear program); – Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Palestinian issue (Iran’s support for the Palestinian resistance and exploitation of Palestinian cause in its foreign policy rhetoric); – Iranian activities in Syria and Lebanon; – And U.S. regional policies and their influence on Iran–Israeli confrontation. These areas are chosen by authors as the major driving forces of IranIsraeli hostility which predominantly define degree of confrontation between the two countries and their state of relations. The authors argue that despite existing hostility and ideological animosity between Iran and Israel, pragmatism dominates conduct of their policies toward each other and doesn’t allow above-mentioned factors to drive the two states into a large-scale conflict.

2

Changing Global and Regional Context

Since the end of the Cold War and formation of the unipolar world order, global and regional security systems started to change, including the one in the Middle East, which greatly influenced regional actors’ behavior

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and role they play. Apparently, Iran is not excluded from the ongoing transformation as it has always been among the key actors in the Middle East and its regional policies are naturally affected by regional processes and developments. In order to understand factors that affect Iran’s foreign policy, including its relations with Israel, it is important to recognize and single out regional changes which seriously affected logic and reasoning of all major regional actors’ foreign policies. In order to do that, let’s take a brief look at the security system in the Middle East and how it evolved over the last 70 years. After the World War II Middle East security system centered around three major Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Syri—and traditional non-Arab actors—Iran, Turkey and Israel. In addition, that regional security architecture had three main characteristics. First—the lack of unity among the Arab states and their inability to set up strong regional alliance. Second— the balancing partnerships between them and non-Arab regional actors which, on the one hand, helped them to survive, and on the other, prevented from forming a cohesive Arab bloc. And third—involvement of global powers in the region, that supported different actors contributing to the existing fragmentation. Such system provided the Middle East with relatively simple and more or less working system of checks and balances. Also, non-Arab actors played quite a marginal role in the regional affairs (except Israel) if compared to the current situation. With U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003, and Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria in 2011–2012 this system ceased to be functional. With the decline of the above-mentioned traditional Arab powers, Saudi Arabia emerged as a new Arab power broker in the region and started to fill the vacuum left by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. At the same time, Iran and Turkey significantly increased their influence and activity in the region. They also started to exploit regional turbulence and transformation to their advantage expanding the influence. As a result, today, when almost entire territory between Turkey, Iran and the Gulf is seriously destabilized, Ankara, Riyadh, and Tehran aim at using this moment to improve their positions in the region. The ongoing volatility triggered largely by the Arab Uprising in 2010– 2011 accelerated Middle East transformation. Major regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) as well as the global ones (the U.S. and Russia) are looking for original policy solutions that consider new regional realities while also safeguarding their own interests. Together with that, they try to

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search for a new formula and mechanism which can bring relative stability to the region. After the dissolution of the USSR the world entered a new reality. Different scholars and politicians called it differently: Francis Fukuyama called it “the end of history,” others called it unipolar world, and some argued that it is a transition period which would ultimately result in formation of the new multipolar or polycentric world order. Almost three decades after the end of the Cold War the world proved to be neither “the end of the history,” nor unipolar. It is undergoing through slow but irreversible transformation process which will result in the new global security architecture where regional actors will play a greater role than previously. There are several key global trends which characterize the current stage of transformation. 1. Gradual decline of the “unipolar world” and rising of multiple centers of power: China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, etc.; 2. Regionalization of global politics which envisages growing activity and importance of regional powers, regional institutions, and security alliances (CSTO, SCO, BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union, One Belt —One Road Initiative, Asian International Investment Bank, BRICS bank, etc.); 3. Rise of the non-state actors in the political, economic, and social processes: Islamic State and its affiliates across the globe, Al-Qaeda, rebel/opposition movements/groups, ethnic and religious minorities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya (Kurds, Houthis, Libyan tribes, etc.); 4. Another wave of political and social transformations which underlined necessity for a new social contract between the people and ruling elites in the region. These major trends seriously affected policies of regional actors, including Iran. 2.1

Regional Transformation

As the Arab Uprising accelerated regional transformation the regional powers were forced to adapt to a new reality and promote their own

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agendas and policy solutions that safeguard their own national interests. This is why it is very important to understand current regional trends which influence global regional actors’ behavior. Today the entire Middle East is undergoing through a serious transformation process which already has its own peculiarities and characteristics. We tend to single out several most important regional trends. 1. Continued important role of energy All key regional players—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey (big importer), UAE, Iraq, etc.—heavily depend on oil and gas production, its exports and prices. Moreover, existing dependency is nowhere to go in the coming years and even decades, although it might slightly decrease. As a result, it makes regional elites understand that consistent economic and political development is only possible when stability and security are provided in the Persian Gulf and broader region. Another aspect in the energy factor is security of energy supply routes—Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Suez Canal. However, existing grievances between the regional actors—Iran vs Saudi Arabia, Iran vs Israel, KSA/UAE vs Qatar/Turkey—makes it extremely hard to create lasting security arrangement in the region as polarization and level of distrust is high among the key actors. 2. Regional actors aspire to diversify their external partnerships There are several factors which contributed to this trend to appear and to rise in its importance. The first one is the Arab Uprising. Back then Washington did not support its long-time allies—Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian Leader Zine El Abidine ben Ali—in fact, betraying them. Other regional U.S. allies—KSA, UAE, Qatar, etc.—started to doubt U.S. commitment to their security. The second is 2015 Iran nuclear deal also known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA). Rivalry and animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel were already there and Barack Obama’s policy of engagement with Iran added even more suspicion on Saudi, Emirati, and Israeli side. Third factor is shale revolution which led to sharp increase in U.S. oil production and 2014–2015 oil prices fall. Since 2008 the U.S. oil output rose from 5,000 bd to 11,000 bpd in 2018 while oil imports

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fell by 24% from 13,000 bpd to 9,900 bpd1 (EIA 2019) (Fig. 1). Oil imports from the Gulf region also dropped almost two-fold2 that made the U.S. less reliant on oil supplies from the region clearly reducing its strategic importance for Washington. This factor also contributed to diversification of partnerships of regional countries that for many decades focused exclusively on the U.S. Therefore, strategic importance of the Middle East for the U.S. began to decrease which made its traditional allies to look for alternative partners. This is not to say that the U.S. is leaving the region, but to underline that regional actors clearly see U.S. reluctance to focus on their region. 3. Common threats Radicalization of religious and ethnic groups, and rise of nonstate actors (uz Zaman, 2015)3 (ISIS, Houthis, armed opposition groups in Syria, YPG, Hasd ash-Sha’abi, etc.), threats of popular uprisings (demand for a new social contract between the state and

1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2019. Retrieved on 22 June, 2020, from https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/. 2 U.S. Energy Information Administration, data. Retrieved on 22 June, 2020, from https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRIMUSPG2&f=A. 3 Shams uz Zaman, “Rise of the Non-State Actors in Middle East: Regional Dimensions,” IPRI Journal XV, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 51–65.

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society), volatility in the oil price market, lack of economic development, water scarcity, etc.—are the main common threats to the region. In this context, over-reliance on the U.S. in order to address all these threats and continued fragmentation of Arab states cannot help regional actors to cope with those challenges. The nature and character of those threats require building and developing broader network of partners together with whom each country has more chances to address existing threats. The recent Abraham Accords well testify to this argument as UAE and Bahrain will significantly benefit economically and technologically from developing ties with Israel. 4. Middle East ceased to be a top priority for the U.S. and EU The Middle East ceased to be a top priority for the U.S. and EU who are currently preoccupied with their own domestic issues. As a result, the region has become less relevant to Americans and Europeans which created more space for other global actors to increase their involvement in the area. Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and India are becoming more and more important actors in the region. As a result, the regional dynamic has changed: the role of nonArab powers—Iran and Turkey—in the regional affairs has increased, the U.S. desire to be involved in the region diminished (the new U.S. administration will continue the politics of limited involvement into the region). Consequently, traditional foreign relations of the core regional states started to transform, which initiated creation of a new system.

3

Enemy Image

Iran and Israel have been in an open confrontation for many years. At the same time, both countries have developed a stable image of an enemy in relation to each other. Although some elements of the enemy image construction may coincide, the basic reasons for this process differ distinctly from each other. Both countries are striving to create a certain image of an “absolute evil” toward each other. At the same time, the accusatory speeches of the politicians of the two states are radically different in style. First of all, this is due to the fact that the politicians of Israel and Iran address their messages to different audiences. In the case of the Islamic Republic, it

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is primarily about the so-called “Arab street.” The leaders of the Jewish state mainly address their Iran-related messages to its own citizens or the elites of Western and Arab countries. A common feature of the geopolitical alignment in the region for Iran and Israel is that both states are surrounded by Arab states with a predominantly Sunni population and that both states have mentality of “besieged fortress.” Until 1979, Tehran and Tel Aviv were allies and tried to confront the common Arab threat together (Porter, 2015, p. 43). After the Islamic Revolution, the allies turned into enemies, who, however, did not block the channels for cooperation in case of an urgent need. One of the tasks for both states was to attract the Arabs to their side (Maher, 2020). For this reason, Iran prefers populist rhetoric aimed at the broad masses of Muslims, while Israel is building relations with the leaders of Arab states who share its fears of Iran’s regional policies. In addition, Israel largely feels like a part of the Western world, which should help it confront key threats. In this vein, the task of Israeli politicians is to equate threats to the Jewish state with threats to the entire Western civilization. Iran, in turn, seeks to present Israel as the enemy of the entire Muslim world. 3.1

Israel as an Ideological Adversary

Anti-Israel rhetoric has become one of Iran’s hallmarks since the founding of the Islamic Republic. The slogan “Death to America, death to Israel” has become one of the key ideological foundations of the Islamic revolution. These slogans continue to be actively replicated in the country up to the present day. At the same time, the defense of the Palestinians against Zionism is becoming one of the key components of the idea of resistance to Western imperialism (Holliday, 2020, p. 7). In general, after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran’s foreign policy has significantly lost its ideological content. Iran’s international orientation has undergone a consistent transformation toward pragmatism. One of the few exceptions was Tehran’s line toward Israel (Takeyh, 2003). Iran has turned the issue of the liberation of Palestine into a religious issue (Menashri, 2001, p. 261). Tehran calls Israel the main threat to the Muslim world, does not recognize its statehood, boycotts the country on international platforms, calls for its destruction, and comes to the point of denying the Holocaust (Ziabari, 2020).

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If the revolutionary slogan “Death to America” was largely aimed at the internal audience, then the opposition to Israel in Iran has become an exclusively foreign policy concept. Today, in the speeches and statements of Hassan Rouhani’s government addressed to the population of the country, the Israeli–Palestinian agenda is almost absent. At the same time, anti-American statements are encountered regularly. At the same time, anti-Israeli rhetoric dominates in the speeches of representatives of non-elected government institutions. This topic is regularly raised by the current spiritual leader Ali Khamenei and his administration (Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran), as well as representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. For example, 75 posts are devoted to the topic of Palestine or opposition to Zionism on Khamenei Twitter in English for 11 months of 2020. At the same time, during the same period of time on Rouhani Twitter there was no entry on this topic at all. In addition, there are no such posts in 2020 on the official page of the current President of Iran on Instagram. Tehran continuously tries to portray Israel as an enemy of the Islamic world in order to bolster its own legitimacy and image in the region (Sachs, 2014). The predominantly Sunni population of Muslim countries of the region is clearly distrustful of the Shiite project of the Islamic revolution. In these conditions, the slogan “Death to Israel” is aimed at softening the hostility of the Arabs toward Iran and creating a stratum loyal to Tehran in Muslim countries around the world. Moreover, this ideological concept helps to create a special identity for the Iranian political system. Anti-Israel viewpoint remains an area in which the regime can affirm to be principled and unique (Chubin, 1994, p. 60). In today’s Iranian political system, the slogan “Death to Israel” along with the slogan “Death to America” remains an unshakable part of the legacy of the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini. These concepts are not subject to revision. Furthermore, these slogans may seem extreme in reality but the policies of the state are fairly flexible and adaptive to the ideologies it presents, and the situation it finds itself in. In other words, while the slogans “death to Israel and America” may seem extreme this in fact is more of a distant goal rather than a guiding plan of action in the short time. Thus, the final goal of Iran’s struggle against Zionism is proclaimed to be the liberation of Jerusalem. At the same time, during the confrontation with Iraq of Saddam there appeared an additional concept. The IRGC proclaimed that a “greater victory”—the liberation of Jerusalem—can

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only be achieved through a “lesser victory”—the destruction of Saddam’s regime and the liberation of Iraq’s Shiite shrines in Najaf and Karbala (Ostovar, 2016, pp. 109–110). Moreover, the achievement of these goals is not limited in time. In this logic, Iran has already coped with the minimum task: Saddam’s regime has been defeated, and Najaf and Karbala annually receive millions of Shiite pilgrims, many of whom come from Iran. It took over 20 years to achieve the “lesser victory.” The liberation of Jerusalem remains a real challenge that could take many years to complete. Today’s presence of Iranian forces in Syria on the border with Israel can also be seen as another step toward achieving a “greater victory.” However, this does not mean at all that the IRGC should immediately (or in the future) speed up its achievement. At the same time, history shows that anti-Israeli slogans did not interfere with Iran’s cooperation with the Jewish state in some episodes. The most striking example was Israel’s supply of American weapons to Tehran in the mid-1980s, known as the Iran-Contra affair (Green, 2018). In general, it can be stated that the reasons for Iran’s hostility toward Israel lie in the area of key ideological concepts of the Islamic Republic, which the current political elites do not intend to revise. At the same time, to achieve their goals, the authorities use a rational approach and proceed from pragmatic attitudes when making important decisions. Thus, Iran deliberately does not aggravate the situation on the border with Israel in Syria and in the event of strikes by the Jewish state, the actions of the Iranian military are rather symbolic. The slogan “Death to Israel” is not only replicated by Iranian propaganda, but also perceived as a real task for a part of the military-political elite. However, the Iranian leadership adequately assesses its capabilities and is well aware of the potential consequences of a direct clash with Israel (Sachs, 2014). The anti-Israel position is becoming one of the most replicated symbols of the Islamic Republic. Iran does not abandon the slogan “Death to Israel” despite a number of negative consequences associated with it. This position is damaging Iran’s image in the West and makes it difficult for the country to come out of political isolation. In many respects, it was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s statements about the need to “eliminate” Israel (Charbonneau, 2012) that caused the consensus perception of Iran by Europe and the U.S. as a global threat in the early 2010s. It led to the imposition of sanctions against Tehran by the UN Security Council, which

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even Russia and China tacitly supported. Iran continues to struggle with the consequences of this decision even to this day. 3.2

Iran and the Existential Threat

In the first years after the Islamic Revolution, despite Tehran’s new rhetoric, Israel still viewed Iran as a possible partner in the fight against enemy Arab states. However, since the early 1990s, a stable image of Iran has begun to take shape as an existential threat to the existence of the Jewish state. On the one hand, this was facilitated by changes in the alignment of forces in the region and the growing military-technical base of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, constructing the image of an enemy in the face of Iran for Israeli politicians serves as a way to achieve their political goals on domestic and international arena (Porter, 2015, pp. 43–44). First of all, the situation has seriously changed after two wars initiated by the U.S. against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Today Iraq no longer threatens Israel, and Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia are seeking to resolve issues with Tel Aviv through diplomacy. In this situation, Iran appears to be the only remaining country in the region with sufficient offensive potential to threaten Israel (Parsi, 2005, pp. 265–268). Since 1992, all Israeli governments have declared the Islamic Republic as the primary threat to the security of the state (Maher, 2020). The development of its nuclear and missile programs as well as support of anti-Israeli organizations in Lebanon and Palestine, played a significant role in promoting the image of Iran as an existential threat to Israel (Maher, 2020). At the same time, there are serious differences of opinion regarding Tehran on the part of the political and security establishment of Israel. The latter does not regard Iran as a real threat to the existence of the state, although they share concerns about some elements of its policy, such as the missile and nuclear program, support for Hezbollah and radical movements in the Gaza Strip (Shavit, 2012). In turn, the current Israeli leadership represented by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is promoting the image of Iran as an existential threat. In his speeches, the politician seeks to show that Tehran poses a danger not only to the Jewish state, but to the whole world (Netanyahu, 2015). Netanyahu has repeatedly accused Iran of preparing a new Holocaust (Leslie, 2017, pp. 78–79). This technique is used by a politician in order

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to win over the sympathy of both voters within the country and the international community. Netanyahu himself, according to one of his former advisers, in this vein appears as a “messianic figure,” called upon to save the Jewish people from a new Holocaust (Moughty, 2016). Finally, the prime minister justifies the violation of human rights in Israel, referring to the fact that Iran or other Muslim countries are doing much worse in this regard (Keinon, 2015). In general, it can be argued that the image of a threat from Iran has developed in Israel as a response to Tehran’s anti-Zionist ideological lines. Tel Aviv’s fears intensified as Iran strengthened its position in the region and developed its military-technical capabilities. At the same time, the image of an existential threat in the face of the Shiite theocracy has become a convenient tool for the political leadership of Israel to fight for power in the country and advance its interests in the international arena. The results of promoting enemy image both by Israel and Iran of each other are rather uncertain for either side, but so far it looks that this doing may be a better match for the interests of Israel and its politicians than it might be for the interests of Iran. At the same time, it cannot be said that Israel initiated this enemization race in Iranian–Israeli confrontation. Despite all the negative consequences and modest success, the main reason for the hostility of the two countries to each other remains Tehran’s unchanging ideological line in shaping policy toward the Jewish state. At the same time, ideology remains an important factor in forming long-term goals for Iran with regard to Israel, but its real actions are largely determined by the current balance of power in the region and Iran’s rational and sober assessment of its power and capabilities.

4

Nuclear Issue for Iran and Israel

When in the early 1990s Iran tried to restart its nuclear program, Israel did not regard it as a serious security threat. It was obvious that the Islamic Republic suffered a lot during the Iran-Iraq war and for this reason the Israeli politicians thought that it might take many years before Tehran could get nuclear weapon capabilities. In addition, Iranian authorities were concentrated much on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as their main regional enemy. Israel assumed that the regime in Iran could change before the country achieved noticeable success in the development of its nuclear program (Inbar, 1999, pp. 138–141).

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To a large extent, the assessment of the Iran’s nuclear threat began to change with the development of the Iranian missile program. In the mid1990s, Israeli analysts already had assumed that by 1999 Teheran could get a missile capable of reaching Jerusalem, and by 2005 the country would be able to produce a nuclear bomb (Parsi, 2007, p. 195). Later on, these fears only intensified more. Today Iran manufactures ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. At the same time, in recent years Teheran has demonstrated its missile potential in combat conditions many times (Missile Defense Project, 2018). Over the past years, Israel has devoted much of its public criticism of Iran to the nuclear program. Israeli experts are convinced that the country tends to develop its nuclear industry to a degree that exceeds the needs of the peace program (Sachs, 2014). Iran officially declares that it isn’t pursuing nuclear weapon capabilities (Khamenei, 2015). Regardless of this rhetoric, Iran’s nuclear program in its current form brings the Islamic Republic closer to becoming a threshold state. Despite extremely tough statements of Netanyahu’s government on Iran’s nuclear program and a consensus that it is an issue which is necessary to impede, a number of experts and officials express the idea that it is not an existential threat (Shavit, 2012). First, Israel has an advanced missile defense system. Second, in case of an attack, Israel is capable of a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapon that it is believed to possess (Hans & Robert, 2014, pp. 97–115). Therefore, there is a belief that Tehran will never dare to take such a step. That said, the main concern remains that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to its bolder behavior in the region. In addition, Tehran’s development of its nuclear program could bring its regional rivals to follow up on the same lead of acquiring nuclear capabilities (Inbar, 2012, p. 43). The attitude of Israeli experts and politicians to the Iranian nuclear program determines the state’s approach to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA). Israeli authorities have strongly disagreed with it. Netanyahu called the nuclear deal a “historic mistake” and noted that Israel would not accept the agreement, “because Iran continues to seek its destruction” (Ravid, 2015). Although, Israeli experts, including intelligence services, strongly believed that the deal could have been a better one, even in its current form it makes sense (Shimoni Stoil,2015). For example, the former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate Amos Yadlin noted that the agreement has positive aspects in the short term although it secures Iran’s status as

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a threshold state (Yadlin, 2015). As a result, during the presidency of Barak Obama Israeli leadership actually accepted the nuclear deal as a fait accompli (Opall-Rome, 2015), recognizing it as a working deterrent against Iran, although not ideal. Since then Israel has largely begun to focus on threats from Tehran’s regional policies, including consolidation of Iranian forces in Syria. The mood changed when Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal. After that Israel has come to a consensus that destruction of the JCPOA, together with pressure from the U.S., are effective tools to contain Tehran (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 8). That was the reason why Israeli experts and political leaders supported U.S. actions. According to Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, the deal “succeeded in breaking the security consensus against Iran, which had been erected and sustained between 2005 and 2013” (Zarif, 2019). Therefore, from a political point of view, maintaining the agreement made sense even after the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. since the other participants of the JCPOA did not support its actions. Notably, international organizations have not found any serious violations of the deal by Iran. Netanyahu’s attempts to influence the situation by disclosing “secret files” about Tehran’s alleged violations did not produce expected reaction from the international community (Liebermann, 2018). Another factor to consider is Israel’s own nuclear program and its position of non-acceptance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even before the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Iran and Egypt came up with an initiative to create a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) in 1974. However, Israel didn’t support this initiative (Bahgat, 2015, pp. 27–35). Since 1979 Iranian politicians have repeatedly stated that they are in favor of the creation of such a zone (Zarif, 2015). Meanwhile Tehran is actively criticizing Israeli nuclear monopoly, which, according to the Iranian side, sabotages the initiative to create a MENWFZ because of its possession of nuclear weapons (Zarif, 2020). In this context, Israel strives to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, since it guarantees its security. Therefore, Israeli official position dictates firstly, to achieve stable peace in the region and to establish diplomatic relations with all Middle Eastern countries, and only then to follow the path of creating MENWFZ (Bahgat, 2015, pp. 27–35). Nevertheless, Israel did not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and since the early 1970s has not allowed international inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities (Cohen, 1995, pp. 49–69).

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As for Tehran, it treats Israel’s undeclared nuclear status as a dangerous military asymmetry that threatens security of the entire region. This is why, Iran views Western stance on this issue as a double standard approach which puts Tehran under unprecedented international pressure for a nonmilitary nuclear program, while the Jewish state actually possesses nuclear weapon (Bahgat, 2015, pp. 27–35). For Israel, an important aspect of the nuclear issue is a possibility of a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. In fact, Israel considered such an option at least three times from 2009 to 2012 but did not realize it either due to the lack of military operational capacity or due to disagreements between members of Netanyahu’s cabinet (Rajiv, 2016, p. 52). The Israeli leadership and the public were well aware of the serious consequences of a unilateral military action against Iran. In case of an intervention, there was a possibility of a missile campaign on Israeli cities by Iran and its allies in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, or attacks on Israeli targets abroad. As a result, Israeli government was divided on the question of whether to attack Iran or not (Sachs, 2012). The key restraining factor was that under Obama the U.S. was not willing to participate in a military strike, as it preferred a rather diplomatic solution to the problem (Harel, 2015). Despite withdrawing from the nuclear deal, Trump also did not express readiness to solve the nuclear problem by military means. Remarkably, in 2019 discussions about the possibility of a unilateral strike started in Israel (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 19). In addition, in the summer of 2020, a massive explosion occurred at Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, which is believed to have been organized by Israeli security forces (Bob, 2020). In recent years, the situation around Iran’s nuclear deal showed that both Iran and Israel can demonstrate some flexibility. Tehran has already made certain concessions when agreed to sign 2015 nuclear deal and it seems that it believes that bigger or more concessions are not needed at this point. It certainly believes that it’s important to implement the already existing JCPOA agreement before any new agreement is to be considered. It is important to note that Israel does not entirely oppose the JCPOA, but in fact it insists on a new agreement based on new terms. Moreover, the Israeli leadership is ready to accept the current version of the JCPOA under certain circumstances. Together with that, Israeli politicians are in favor of preserving all possibilities to confront Iran’s nuclear program, including both diplomatic and military ones. In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear program remains the central topic of Israel’s foreign policy

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to create a public image of Iran as a global threat. It successfully exploits the global fear of a nuclear war and the desire of the great powers to limit the spread of atomic technologies among non-nuclear states. In general, the nuclear deal remains a central topic in Israel’s public confrontation to the Iranian threat. In recent years, Israeli forces have launched several cyberattacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and are most likely considered to be behind the 2020 Natanz explosion. However, a closer look shows that under certain conditions Iran’s nuclear program can develop under international supervision even with the Israeli approval. In general, Iran’s nuclear threat is greatly exaggerated by the Israeli politicians, and to gain a more balanced assessment of the country’s nuclear capabilities one should follow Israel’s intelligence services. As a result, it is fair to conclude, that Iran’s nuclear issue remains one of the major triggers which could lead to an Israeli military action against Tehran that risks to elevate confrontation between the two state on the higher level. The recent assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh by Israel well testifies to this argument.

5

Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Many regional actors, including Iran, view Israeli–Palestinian conflict as one of the key unsettled regional issues which contributes to the ongoing instability in the Middle East. Apparently, this is not how Israel treats this problem. As a result, Palestinian issue remains an important dispute ground for the two states and deepens their animosity toward each other. Importantly, today Iran and Israel prioritize this problem differently which defines its importance to the countries’ leadership. For the former, it is among the key issues in its foreign policy as it serves a convenient tool to appeal to the Arab audience, promoting itself as a Palestinian resistance supporter, shoring up its credibility among the Arab states and preserving proxy capabilities. While for the latter it has become a rather domestic problem which is losing its previous importance. Israel constantly tries to lower importance of the unsettled Palestinian issues and unresolved Middle East conflict. At the same time, it exploits growing Iranian presence in areas around Israel and its involvement in support of the resistance movement in Gaza and Lebanon (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah) to showcase Tehran’s aggressive behavior in the region which needs to be curbed.

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Back in 1980s, after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982, Iran decided to accelerate establishment of Hezbollah (Kaye et al., 2011). Over the next decades Tehran developed strong ties with two major resistance movements—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah—that conveniently fit in the Iranian forward-defense strategy and asymmetric warfare doctrine (Bahgat, 2018) which prescribe moving possible warfare front as far as possible from Iran’s borders while preserving capacity to attack enemies. Iran’s ability to establish and maintain partnerships with states (Syria, Iraq) and non-state actors (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Houthis) in the region is one of its key strategic advantages which allows Tehran to remain a dangerous adversary and be capable of responding asymmetrically. Consequently, Israel started to treat Iran with increased caution exactly when it saw strengthening of Iranian ties with non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah which threatened Israeli security and stability of the neighboring areas. As Israel fought wars with Iranian partners (Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008), Tehran’s support to them deepened Israeli concerns over the Iranian threat which started to dominate Israeli security agenda. Tel Aviv started to push for and develop a narrative which was making Iranian issue more important than settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian issue. In other words, Israel promotes an idea that the settlement of the Palestinian issue has lost its relevance and importance to the regional stability and security, while Iran’s malign and aggressive behavior has become the most important threat to the region’s stability. Today, it looks increasingly like Israel has succeeded in promoting this idea. The fact that Israel struck peace deals with UAE and Bahrain in September 2020, and in general formed a trend on reconciliation with the Arab states (partly based on anti-Iranian rhetoric) showcases its success. Israeli leadership started to see confronting Iran and curbing its influence in the region as an important component of their attempt to partner with Arab neighbors and to de-prioritize Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Palestinian issue. Basically, Tel Aviv managed to lower importance of the Palestinian issue for the Arab states, thus, degrading its usefulness and utility to Iran. According to the Zogby Research Services (Zogby, 2019) polls, Arabs, when asked to rank concerns the Arab World must address going forward, rated justice for Palestinians/Palestinian issue as the least important concern in the list of nine issues covered in the survey. The poll also found a substantial number of respondents in Arab countries saying that normalization with Israel would be desirable even if there were no

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Israeli–Palestinian peace (Zogby, 2019). In addition to that, according to another opinion poll (Zogby, 2018) conducted in Arab countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, UAE) the majority of respondents in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE have unfavorable attitudes toward Iran which is well exploited by Israel in its regional policies. In general, since 2006 Iran’s favorability ratings in Arab states have been decreasing (Zogby, 2016, 2018). To a large extent, we are witnessing a process opposite to Iran’s intentions: there is a process of the Arab countries and Israel unification against the Iranian threat. And first of all, this is true for the Gulf countries—the latest signal for Tehran was in September 2020 when UAE and Bahrain established diplomatic relations with Israel. As a result, Iran did not succeed in exploiting Palestinian issue and was not able to convert it into the strategic dividends. Marketing itself as the only consistent champion of the Palestinian cause and a sponsor of the only Arab armed group (Hezbollah) which successfully liberated Arab lands from Israel, Tehran did not produce any solid and sustained favorable attitude toward itself in the Arab world over the last decade. As a result, Arab opinion remains a highly unstable strategic commodity for Iranian foreign policy (Wehrey et al., 2009). That said, it would not be a mistake to say that the Palestinian issue and ongoing Israeli– Palestinian conflict still remain highly ideological topics in Iran’s foreign policy discourse, despite its inability to put those issues at its service effectively. Also, the Palestinian issue being connected to Iranian geopolitical and strategic policies—such as support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and to the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad—remains increasingly unproductive and doesn’t help Iran to reap strategic benefits. In addition to that, Tehran seems to be not ready to give up on its support to the Palestinian cause and its Palestine-related anti-Israeli rhetoric as it provides it with a legitimate cause to continue support to proxy groups in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. In the end, today this issue is anyway dominated by both countries pragmatic approach to each other and can hardly trigger a military confrontation between Iran and Israel. At the same time, the growing number of the Arab states making peace agreements with Israel leaves Iran with fewer opportunities and reasons to continue exploiting Palestinian issue for the purposes of appealing to the Arab street. Thus far, Iran uses Palestinian-Israeli conflict partly to justify its support to Hamas

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and Hezbollah that continue their resistance as oppose to the growing number of the Arab states that strike peace agreements with Israel.

6

Syria and Lebanon as a Key Area for Iran’s Security

Being a traditional regional power Iran’s security is deeply dependent on the regional stability. This is why at a time of volatility and instability Iran increases its regional activities,4 including through its proxy, in an attempt to secure some buffer and avoid any instability at home. Tehran believes that U.S. military presence in the region brings strategic instability and insecurity which threatens Iran’s own survival. As a result, the more instability U.S. presence creates, the more Iran intends to increase its influence in the region to counter-balance it. Consequently, influence and presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq is viewed as crucial in Tehran. In such context, the fact that Israel occupies an important place in Iranian security discourse as it is viewed as a key U.S. partner, makes Israeli neighbors—Lebanon and Syria—crucial for Tehran’s security calculations. In current regional geopolitical reality Iran’s strategic culture continues utilizing two major approaches—the so-called forward-defense strategy and asymmetric warfare doctrine (Bahgat, 2018) which materialize in maintaining strong strategic ties with political and military entities throughout the region (state and non-state actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, etc.) and in presence of its own forces on the ground. This regional network is called by Iranian leadership the “axis of resistance.” The whole idea behind Iran’s approach is to push a potential military front as far as possible from its borders, deter the enemy from the distance, and to preserve ability to threaten, attack, and engage its rivals (Israel, Saudi Arabia, the U.S.) asymmetrically through its proxies outside Iran. Over the last decade, Iran was quite successful in increasing its presence and influence throughout the region (IISS, 2020): it got deeper military entrenchment in Syria, increased support to Hezbollah and amplified influence in Iraq. All these changes raised Israeli security concerns about Iran’s boosted capabilities to use its proxies and their territories for potential attacks on Israel.

4 ECFR: Middle East’s new battle lines: Iran. Retrieved on November 1, 2020 from https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/iran.

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Iran’s support to Hezbollah started in 1982 after Israeli invasion to Lebanon. Since then, the group proved to be Israel’s most fightingcapable enemy in the region. Iran supplied the group with money, training, and weapons, which helped to utilize the main strategic goal of deterring5 —an attack and engagement of the enemy outside Iran. As oppose to the armies of the Arab states, Hezbollah managed to fight costly 34-day war in 2006 with Israel demonstrating its fighting capabilities. With Iran-supplied missiles Hezbollah sent a message to Israel: fighting with either Tehran or the Lebanese militia will inflict a heavy toll on Israeli home front. In other words, Iran through Hezbollah managed to bridge the gap between itself and Israel that possesses technologically superior fighting capabilities. This is why Iranian leadership views Lebanon and Hezbollah strategically important to their own country’s security. It helps to utilize Tehran’s forward-defense strategy and to deter potential enemies. Iran’s alliance with Syria serves quite similar goals. It dates back to the time of Iran–Iraqi war when both countries shared their animosity toward Saddam Hussain. Since the very beginning of the civil war in Syria until today Tehran has been supporting the government of Bashar al-Assad. Iran has vested interest in a friendly-government in Damascus which is sensitive to its interests which are to preserve supply routes to Hezbollah, and to keep Syria a part of its “axis of resistance” as it is a crucial member of it. Iranian leadership perceives necessity to support Syria in order to protect its own domestic stability and security. They argue, if Iran did not got to Syria it would spent much more money on its national security and borders control fighting with consequences of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and with Sunni extremists.6 Iran views Syria as an important stability factor in the region and its survival as a functioning state serves Iran’s long-term interests and ability to utilize its forward-defense doctrine.7 In

5 Brookings: Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran’s most successful export. Retrieved on November 5, 2020 from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionaryirans-most-successful-export/. 6 An author’s interviews with Iranian academics and experts conducted in 2018 and 2020 in Iran. 7 VOA: Iran Strengthens Military Presence in Eastern Syria. Retrieved on November 4, 2020 from https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/iran-strengthens-military-pre sence-eastern-syria.

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other words, survival of the Syrian regime is crucial for Iran’s own security and survival. As a result, over the last decade Iran reached its highest point of influence in the region through its increased entrenchment in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (IISS, 2020). Exactly because of Iran’s continuous support to Hezbollah, increased presence and influence in Syria (and also Iraq), Israel started to view presence of pro-Iranian armed groups and/or Iranian military close to its borders in Syria and Lebanon as the major challenge to its national security (together with the Iranian nuclear program). Today, the so-called “northern front” (Syria, Iraq and Lebanon) dominates Israeli security agenda and is viewed as the most important strategic challenge and concern. In general, Israel formulates the challenge as how to address Iranian strive for regional hegemony, while working to form a Shiite crescent around Israel and strengthen its proxies.8 As a result, increased presence of Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria and Iraq, including close to the Israeli border, is treated in Israel as a legitimate cause to launch air attacks on Iranian targets in Syria and even in Iraq. Since 2011 Tehran provided military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Syria worth billions of dollars,9 deployed its IRGC advisors and forces to Syria which numbers fluctuated from several hundreds to low thousands,10 and mobilized around 20,000 fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to fight in Syria.11 Iran also established its presence and influence inside the Syrian Arab Army and local militias (National Defense Forces, and Local Defense Forces were formed and

8 An author’s interviews and discussions with Israeli experts, and military officials during annual INSS security conference in January 2020 in Tel Aviv. 9 IDF: Iran’s Economic Gains in Syria. Retrieved on August 21, 2020, from https:// www.idf.il/en/minisites/iran/iran-in-syria/irans-economic-gains-in-syria/. 10 United States Institute of Peace: Report: Iranian Entrenchment in Syria. Retrieved on August 23, 2020 from https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/27/report-iranianentrenchment-syria. 11 United States Institute of Peace: Iran’s Confrontation with Israel over Four Decades. Retrieved on August 25, 2020, from https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/21/ira n’s-confrontation-israel-over-four-decades.

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trained with Iranian guidance and support).12 Such set of tactics—using a combination of local, foreign militias, and its own military—allowed Tehran to significantly increase its presence and influence in Syria. It consequently raised Israeli security concerns. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria Israel conducted hundreds of air and missile attacks on objects inside Syria, targeting Iranian and Hezbollah forces13 which greatly increased risk of escalation. Although Syrian government denies presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces in the country, Israel considers Damascus responsible for their deployment. As long as those militias and Iranian forces are present in Syria and have a chance to threaten Israeli security, Israel considers violating Syrian sovereignty and attacking military targets inside the country as a legitimate act. Although Israeli security concerns vis-à-vis Iran are quite legit, Iran’s actions in the region and rationale are largely misunderstood which leads to ongoing and even intensifying circle of hostility between the two states. Iranian entrenchment in Syria must not be viewed exclusively from antiIsraeli optics. Undoubtedly, anti-Israeli rhetoric and policy of Tehran plays role here, but it has rather secondary importance for Iran if compared with broader regional security challenges and threats. Iran is forced to use every single opportunity to utilize its forward-defense strategy (by increasing its influence where it is possible through proxies and own increased presence) responding to the mounting pressure coming primarily from the U.S. and its regional allies. As a result, by and large, there is a lack of understanding in Israel of reasons which drive Iranian regional behavior. It contributes to the alarmist anti-Iranian rhetoric which raises the level of hostility. Understanding of strategic reasons of Iranian increased presence in Syria is fundamental to avoid excessive hysteria in two countries’ confrontation.

12 Russian International Affairs Council: Evolution of the Syrian Military: Main Trends and Challenges. Retrieved on September 1, 2020 from https://russiancouncil.ru/en/ analytics-and-comments/analytics/evolution-of-the-syrian-military-main-trends-and-challe nges/. 13 “Syrian media: Israel attacks southern Damascus,” Aljazeera, November 25, 2020,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/25/israel-strikes-southern-damascusfrom-occupied-golan-heights.

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7 The Role of the United States in the Iranian-Israeli Confrontation At the moment, the U.S. can be called the main adversary of Iran. Israel’s role as a key ally of Washington largely shapes the nature of the IranianIsraeli confrontation. Iran’s defense doctrine is based on two key concepts: asymmetrical warfare and forward-defense doctrine (Bahgat, 2015, p. 69). In developing the first strategy, Tehran proceeds from the fact that the combined military potential of the U.S. and its allies in the region is much higher than its own. This forces Iran to abandon the idea of confrontation in all key defense areas and instead focus on the weaknesses that exist in the enemy’s defense. The second strategic line envisages the fight against outgoing threats at distant bounds, pushing a possible military front farther from its borders. On the basis of these strategic approaches, Tehran has developed the tactics of creating an “axis of resistance,” which includes a number of allied organizations and movements of Iran in different parts of the region. At the same time, the ability to forge partnerships with non-state formations in neighboring countries and the creation of allied structures such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Al-Hashd Al-Sha’bi in Iraq is a strong feature of the Iranian policy (Mcinnis, 2016). Tehran understands that Washington can deliver a painful blow to Iran, in which case the Iranian armed forces will be unable to reach U.S. territory. Therefore, American forces located in the Middle East, as well as U.S. allies, are selected as potential targets for attacks. Therefore, in the view of the Iranian military, the possibility of attacking Israel is one of the important factors in containing the American threat. Lebanese Hezbollah, radical Palestinian groups, the government of Bashar al-Assad, as well as parts of the IRGC and pro-Iranian armed groups located in Syria serve these purposes. To be more specific the highly developed defense mechanism of the Jewish state remains largely difficult to infiltrate. Therefore, if necessary, a strike is much more likely on Saudi Arabia, a weaker regional ally of the U.S. In the case of Israel, the Iranian strategy is always coordinated with the U.S.. Moreover, in the early 1990s, Israeli politicians hailed Tehran as a key security threat in many ways to please Washington. At that time, the threat from Iran had not yet seemed so obvious to Israel, but the Islamic

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Republic was the main Middle Eastern adversary of the U.S. (Porter, 2015, p. 45). The situation largely turned around during the Barack Obama period, when the U.S. was seeking a dialogue with Iran in order to reach an agreement on its nuclear program, and Israel insisted on a tougher approach. For example, officials from Washington dissuaded Netanyahu from launching a unilateral military strike on Iranian territory that would endanger Israel’s security (Obama, 2015). Largely because of the U.S. position, Israeli politicians ultimately abandoned the idea. It is important to understand that even during this period, despite serious disagreements on the Iranian direction, there was a constant flow of coordination between Israel and the U.S. at a high level (Maher, 2020). Moreover, U.S. President Donald Trump surrounded himself with a dense pro-Israel lobby since he came to power (Kelemen, 2018). In this regard, Israel had all the chances for escalation with respect to Iran but Netanyahu proceeded with caution at first. However, an additional factor for him was how, after Trump’s inauguration, the leaders of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf actively advocated an aggressive line toward Iran (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 15). The turning point was U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran in May 2018. After that Netanyahu no longer had doubts about the consistent anti-Iranian course of the new American administration. At the same time, a few days before Washington’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Israeli prime minister presented “secret files” allegedly exposing the Iranian nuclear program. This step was apparently coordinated with U.S. administration (Halbfinger et al., 2018). At the same time, his task was to convince Europe and the rest of the world that withdrawal from the JCPOA is the right decision. This attempt was unsuccessful, and almost all Western countries, as well as Russia and China, continued to support the nuclear deal with Iran (Liebermann, 2018). While Israel favored U.S. policy of maximum pressure on Iran, Netanyahu decided to supplement the pressure strategy of economic sanctions with military force (Yadlin and Orion 2019). Until mid-2018, Israel did not directly attack the Iranian military forces in Syria. Instead, it focused on striking the targets that supply Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Following U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the initiation of a maximum pressure policy, the Israeli campaign expanded to direct attacks on Iranian forces in Syria. Israel’s traditional position that it does not take

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responsibility for attacks on Syrian targets has also given way to a more open admission of its involvement in attacks on Iranian forces (Stephens, 2019). By 2019, Israel expanded the geography of its attacks on Iranian targets to Iraq, which at first was not welcome by the U.S.. However, the Trump administration felt that such an approach could bear fruit, as it increased pressure on Tehran (Kaye, 2019). Another attempt of pressure could be considered the explosion at the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz in the summer of 2020, which is believed to have been organized by Israeli intelligence services (Bob, 2020). Many experts believe that Netanyahu’s strategy under Trump was to provoke Tehran to take steps that would force a strike on Iran by Washington (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 18). However, despite the clear antiIranian rhetoric, military resolution of conflicts has not become a hallmark of the 45th U.S. president. The more surprising was the decision to assassinate Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, which Israel regarded as an unexpected gift. According to the Israeli version, the killing of one of the key Iranian military person will force Iran to be more restrained, since now Tehran can no longer predict U.S. response to its regional policy (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 18). There has been a consensus in Israel in recent years that the policy of maximum pressure, combined with strikes on Iranian targets in Syria and Iraq and the assassination of Soleimani, effectively limits Tehran’s opportunities in the region (Kaye & Efron, 2020, pp. 8–9). Perceptions of the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability have intensified further since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Israel believes that the pandemic and rising pressure could force Iran to withdraw its troops from Syria (Caspit, 2020), or even lead to a regime change in Tehran (Kaye & Efron, 2020, p. 8). Such assessments strengthen Israel’s support for continued pressure on Iran, despite calls for an easing of economic sanctions during the pandemic (Yadlin & Heistein, 2020).

8

Conclusion

In general, it can be said that the positions of Iran and Israel toward each other have remained practically unchanged over the past years. However, U.S. policy largely determines the specific tactics that are chosen by the parties in relation to each other over a certain period of time. To a greater

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extent, this applies to Israel, which constantly coordinates its actions visà-vis Iran with the U.S. In this direction, Iran is more likely to be reactive rather than pro-active, since it is forced to adjust to the changing actions of its opponents. In fact, the Iranian–Israeli relations represent a signal game in which neither side is ready to go for an open escalation, but makes the other understand its capabilities in case of a conflict. This is especially true for the Iranian side, which is well aware of the superiority of the enemy. Moreover, by creating an opportunity to strike at Israeli territory, Tehran is sending a signal not only to the Jewish state, but also to the U.S. and its regional Arab allies. Thus, Iran seeks to push the front of the possible confrontation away from its borders. Israel also understands that direct confrontation with Iran is fraught with serious consequences, so it seeks to engage in clashes with U.S. support or to secure Washington’s guarantees. At the same time, attempts of Israeli politicians to provoke the U.S. into a full-fledged strike on Iran have not yet been crowned with success. Moreover, given that the new U.S. administration is inclined to re-engage with Iran, and reach a new nuclear deal, Israel may have a difficult time trying to push for a harsher stance on Iran.

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Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Realpolitik? Yip Fu Faustina

1 1.1

Introduction

History of the Shiism-Sunni Dichotomy: Iran and Saudi Arabia

In a region rife with tension, a major force driving this instability is the deep-rooted historical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two powerhouses respectively representing the Shia and Sunni sects of Islam who are locked in a rift. Underlying this Shia-Sunni schism and each side’s claim of religious legitimacy is the irrefutable fact that both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been vying for hegemony in the region. As the region continues to transform, as it has throughout history, both intra- and inter-regime relations and their developments have been riddled with tumult and have increasingly embroiled neighbouring states, often with devastating consequences. The antagonistic split between the Shiites and Sunnis dates back to the early days of Prophet Mohammad and the struggle for succession after his death (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 48), originating from the Battle of Karbala in 680 when the direct descendant of the Prophet, Hussein (representing the Shia sect) was defeated by the Umayyad Caliph (Behravesh, 2019). This defeat and subsequent persecution of Shia

Y. F. Faustina (B) University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_17

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Muslims by the Sunnis have culminated in the Shiites becoming a discriminated sect. In Iran’s interpretation of Islam, the Twelver branch of Shia Islam are controlled by a clergy who has much higher authority than the political faction, therefore despite Hassan Rouhani having won the presidency through election, it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei who wields influence on the affairs of Iran (Behravesh, 2019). In contrast, the history of Saudi Arabia tells of a different narrative, one that is based on the 1744 alliance between the political force of Ibn Saud and the religious force of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose subsequent influence has forced a fragmented region to unify and become the autocratic regime seen in the present (Alhussein, 2019, p. 3). This has resulted in the development of an absolutist monarchy whose regime emphasises literal interpretation of its religious doctrine, Wahhabism, an extreme form of Sunni Islam (Behravesh, 2019). These differences ensued further issues as both Iran and Saudi Arabia hold and claim religious significance for their branch of Islam. Both nation-states’ regimes, conflicts, and policies have been increasingly sectarian, with Iran positioned as a Shia and Saudi Arabia a Sunni power (Mabon, 2018). Iran’s focus has come to be sympathetic towards Shia grievances, while the Kingdom’s interpretation of Islam is anti-Shia, even going as far as deeming it illegitimate. As post-independence nationstates in the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Iran share the common trait of using religious beliefs for political purposes, especially given the current political climate where hard power and interventionist policies are often condemned by the new international order. A case in point is the 2016 order given by Riyadh to execute its critic, the Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr, which has since evolved into another round of volatility, with tensions escalating into hostility and violence (Behravesh, 2019; Karim, 2017, p. 80). 1.2

Religious Legitimacy and Islam in the Changing Geopolitical Landscape

As the geopolitical landscape changes, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia evolves accordingly with the changing rhetoric. History has demonstrated that nation-states have often been nervous about the shifting balance of power, and complementing such anxiety have been miscalculations and hostility (Nye, 1990, p. 153). With Iran and Saudi Arabia facing growing international pressure to reform, the balance of

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power between these two major religious factions becomes increasingly fragile. Faith and its uses have become an instrument of power for leaders and authorities to wield influence (Behravesh, 2019). This is especially true for authoritarian regimes whose survival is very much interdependent on and tied to religious legitimacy, as are the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 3). The projection of soft power as an extension of culture has been known to attract certain communities of people (Nye, 2004, p. 41). Nye suggests that creating meanings in a set of shared values, experiences, and practices increases the probability of attaining outcomes that are meant to be achieved by other already established relationships. This trend is exemplified particularly in the emergence of extremist groups, whose rise is further attributed to technological and ideological evolutions (Nye, 2004, p. 52).

2

Background and Significance 2.1

Literature Review

Past scholarship has focused much on Islam’s interplay within social movements, state and non-state actors, and militant groups, but there has been less literature on how Islam has been integrated into the broader context of foreign policy-making as these processes see a paradigm shift away from using pure hard power to assert influence (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 1). With the Iranian–Saudi rivalry deeply rooted in religious dimensions, this relationship and its relations in the region serve as an opportunity to examine how outreach strategies have evolved in the geopolitical environment. Mandaville and Hamid (2018) look at religious soft power through a non-reductionist lens, examining how specific, alternative forms of power have become instrumental to conserving society’s vitality and functionality, as well as regime stability, with particular focus on the extent to which Iran and Saudi Arabia use religion to their advantage. Despite individual countries’ behaviour to align with acts of extremism, the promotion of a more moderate form of Islam has been used to appeal to the West to secure its place within the rhetoric of the international world order (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 2). Another reason to study religion is its ability to reveal the domestic forces at play in the political and social scene (p. 3). In recent years, the topic of religion and its more extreme form have been studied in the context

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of international relations. Haynes (2010) has investigated this notion— the operations of religion and how it has extended beyond its boundaries and the private sphere—and looked into how various governments have reacted and responded to the dichotomy between extremist and moderate Islam. Through globalisation, increased communication and dialogue have given opportunities for actors to respond rapidly (Haynes, 2010). In the case of Iran, Haynes (2010) further examines the regime’s significance in the political order particularly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as he seeks to analyse Iran’s potential to unleash violence when its interests are threatened. As with most Gulf countries, legitimacy is inextricably tied to religion. Facing Iran is its geopolitical rival, Saudi Arabia, an absolutist monarchical regime whose legitimacy is very much dependent on religion. Since the ascension of Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making processes have deviated from the traditional consensual policy-making used by the ruling family. Karim (2017) highlights such structural changes in its hierarchical institutions and delves deeper into how dynamics within the ruling family will influence policies, as attempts are made to protect Saudi interests, especially concerning security against threats from Iran. In the case of the Kingdom, a centralisation of power could instead shake its foreign policy-making’s future trajectory. With power concentrated within the hands of a limited number of people, the decision-making process will become narrow since the decentralisation of a governance that is needed for liberal institutional development will be absent (Karim, 2017, p. 85). Van den Berg (2017) reiterates this shifting paradigm of Saudi’s policy-making, citing MBS’s announcement of Vision 2030 to develop and restructure a Saudi economy that is less dependent on oil (p. 4). Through reforms such as cuts in government subsidies, reduction of religious police force, and an initial public offering of the largest oil company in the world, Aramco, Saudi Arabia is indeed well aware of the precarious position it is in within its domestic and regional spheres of influence (Van den Berg, 2017, p. 4). The time is ripe for the Kingdom to use its soft power to its absolute advantage to secure its ambitions.

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Concept of Soft Power: Religion

The American political scientist Joseph Nye, who pioneered the concept of soft power, has given deeper meaning to the decision-making of nationstates as they evolve their policy-making processes. Nye illustrates how the universality of American culture and its appeal have reached further than hard power, changing the way we decipher inter-relations between different groups of people. As a complement to using hard power and coercion, attraction and persuasion offer a more harmless alternative to project influence (Nye, 2004, p. 34). The concept of soft power refers to the ability to achieve objectives and its operation of religion involves a multi-faceted approach towards garnering support. Actors and organisations have, over decades, used this concept to advance their causes and to gain more followers. Nye’s 1990 analysis of power in the post– World War II political order has shown the reality of declining Soviet and Japanese influence and a transition towards a new order no longer reliant on hard power. Although it is known that military power is the most powerful form of assertion, it has become increasingly difficult to be transferred and justified freely in an environment that still values structure, order, and hierarchy (p. 157). In a political order that is fragmented but interdependent on each other, paradigms have been constantly shifting across the use of diplomacy and coercion with broader policy implications (pp. 159–167). Soft power comes from a country’s culture, ideas, and policies— successful nation-states have had a history of combining the use of soft and hard power to persuade others in order to help themselves achieve any far-reaching socio-political goals (Nye, 2004, p. 37). In this interdependent relationship between soft power and regime survival, policies seen as legitimate at the global stage helps to project soft power (p. 34). Haynes (2010) supports this notion—the shared experiences, values, and beliefs involving a vast set of people are more appealing, as they use persuasion instead of force and threats. In the usage of religious soft power, this concept has been extended to involve non-state actors, often with unpredictable outcome that differs from hard power. As a case in point: Israel’s use of military hard power has bolstered rather than worn down Hezbollah’s soft power and legitimacy as an elite force capable of gaining traction in the region (Haynes, 2010). Religious soft power can fill the void left behind by the declining pan-Arab and socialist power. Mandaville and Hamid (2018) highlight

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the importance of Islam in matters concerning national security: If state authorities are unable to fill this “ideological vacuum”, then the ruling regime will inevitably face challenges (p. 3). In a rivalry that has since been expanded into violent proxy conflicts, the transformation of sectarian differences and the use of religious soft power are even more pronounced. Rabi and Mueller (2018) explore the implications that proxy conflicts have brought to Yemen, Iraq, and Syria: in heavily sectarian-based conflicts, they have become vessels bound by ideological differences and similarities, grievances, historical memories, and insecurity (p. 46). Paunic (2016) further explores the Iranian tactic of combining hard power and soft power. Its export of revolutionary ideas and culture, engagement with the West, and its role as the protector of a Shiite community have given rise to a new socio-political cultural narrative whose political undertones still have their basis in religion. Saudi Arabia is similar; it differs only in its approach in wielding soft power. Investigating the anti-Shia rhetoric that Saudi Arabia has emphasised, Wehrey et al. (2009) note that underlying the supposedly great sectarian divide is a calculated political motivation driving the Kingdom’s foreign policies.

3 3.1

The Iranian–Saudi Arabian Struggle Sectarian Differences and Struggle for Dominance in the Region

Iranian–Saudi hostility dates back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. As religion and ideology have come to serve a predominantly political purpose, sectarian struggle mixed with political forces have split these countries, which are capable of retaliating against each other to protect their presence within the region. In a world dominated by Sunni Muslims, Shia communities have historically been oppressed by Sunni states (Faksh, 1988, p. 121), and Iran has declared itself a defender of this discriminated community against corrupt regimes (Paunic, 2016, p. 74). As rivalry deepens, religious and political forces become more obviously mixed and integrated into policies. History has told us that Iran and Saudi Arabia, divided by sectarianism, have been committed to a nationalistic and aggressive type of policy-making (Dupont, 2019, p. 1). Values of the family, region, and loyalty are often associated with their sectarian beliefs in which the protection of holy sites is particularly important. In a region where geopolitics could change in an

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instant, the attainment of any sort of influence could turn the tide and tip the balance of power in anyone’s favour (p. 2). With political and religious elites in the Shia-Sunni dichotomy fuelling this sectarian divide, consolidation of their power becomes increasingly solidified as they exploit the anxieties of the majority (p. 8). Iranian–Saudi communication in the 1990s veered for the better with increasingly high-profile meetings, but there remained underlying tensions (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 17). The turning point in these relations came in 1979 during the Iranian Revolution and the siege of Mecca. This seizure of one of Islam’s holiest sites by Iran gave enough reason for Saudi Arabia to retaliate against Iran in the name of religion (Dupont, 2019, p. 5). To contest against Iran, the Kingdom emphasised that Iranian policies were connected to broader ambitions for regional domination rather than protectorship of the Shia communities (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 27). As Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries became threatened by the possibility of an export of Iran’s revolutionary ideas, the fear of Iran’s imposing influence prompted the Kingdom to exert control over its domestic policies under the veneer of religion (Dupont, 2019, p. 5). It is prudent of them to have such wariness, as, despite lacking military power, Iran’s soft power influence is not to be underestimated. Its persistent cultivation of a cultural, spiritual, and political link to project power with other marginalised Shiite populations in the region could encourage a “religious-revolutionary contagion”, especially in states whose power is either weak or is collapsing (Haynes, 2010; Paunic, 2016, p. 79). Iranian–Saudi rivalry has oscillated between tensions of varying degrees. In its recent development, the failure of the 2011 Arab Spring to tear down the existing structures of authoritarian regimes and its promotion of pan-Arabism have resulted in a fragmented Sunni bloc. Taking advantage of this rift, Iran has asserted its influence on Shia communities (Paunic, 2016, p. 76). By exploiting the instability created by the revolts, Iran has been pursuing its geo-strategic objectives through da’wa (Islamic propagation) and initiation of cooperation between state and non-state actors (whose socio-political statuses are worthy of transnational influence) (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 17). Iran’s determination to establish deeper ties with other Shia populations serves as a reminder that undermines Saudi’s religious authority and legitimacy, with the regime pressuring the Kingdom through proxy conflicts and fundamentalism (Faksh, 1988, p. 122; Faksh & Faris, 1993, p. 282). The role that Iran has played herein has given its policy-making multiple dimensions involving

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multiple aspects of society (Paunic, 2016, p. 79). The transformation of ideology and sectarianism into calculated tools for engaging with policies in state and deep societal values has inevitably been integrated into the decision-making processes (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 11).

4 4.1

Developments in Iran

Broad-Based Approach in the Export of Shiism and Changing Domestic Attitudes Towards Saudi Arabia

Since the Iran-Iraq war, tensions between Iran and the rest of the Arab world have intensified to a point that has seen Iran developing a massive nuclear weapons programme to create a force that would match the Gulf countries (Cordesman, 2018). The deployment of soft power through the revolutionary ideas of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, its role as defender of Shia Islam, and growing cultural, religious, social, and political relations with other regional Shia communities have given its export of ideology another political and military dimension, creating a duality of soft and hard power of different proportions according to its objectives (Paunic, 2016, p. 71; Wehrey & Sadjadpour, 2014). The appeal of aligning with Iran has oftentimes been geared towards the rhetoric of yearning (a common trait among decolonised nation-states), which is seen as an antiimperialist narrative that serves as an “alternative to U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 16). The creation of the Islamic Culture and Communication Organization (ICRO) serves as an all-encompassing example to connect Shiites with Iran (Paunic, 2016, p. 83). Iran’s defining feature of being flexible with its soft power rivals the strategy of Saudi-backed actors who have been promoting a narrative to oppose Iran and a return to pan-Arabism (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 18). Sheikh Nimr’s execution and Iran’s response of setting fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran have seen this rivalry extending beyond its borders to involve other allies and regional neighbours—the severance of diplomatic ties between Bahrain and Iran, the further rise of a religious extremism where both Sunnis and Shiites attack each other, and proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria, all escalating to a point that sees little to no hope for reconciliation (Behravesh, 2019; Cordesman, 2018). However, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, reforms have been undertaken to modernise Iran and steps have been taken to reinvent an image of a

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more moderate Islam (Paunic, 2016, p. 74). Nevertheless, uncertainty regarding Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader MBS and Iran’s flexibility to amend its policies could still amalgamate to deescalate tensions between the two countries (Cerioli, 2018, p. 311). 4.2

COVID-19 and the Regime: Strengthening or Threatening?

Since the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020, the global society has been disrupted in every aspect (World Health Organization, 2020). As a result, most countries have plunged into social, political, and economic crises. Iran, the epicentre of the coronavirus in the region, has not been spared from the devastating consequences of the pandemic. Vakil (2020) indicates that with the country already vulnerable due to a heavily sanctioned economy, the pandemic has put further psychological burden onto its people, making the political and social fissures more obvious in its regime. Although the country’s elites have been affected, official response to the crisis has been slow and poorly managed, and attempts have been made to undermine the impact of the virus (Behravesh, 2020; Vakil, 2020). To appease public outrage, the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, accused the U.S. of biological terrorism (Vakil, 2020). This rhetoric has further deteriorated relations between Iran and the U.S., as Iranians feel a sense of abandonment amidst one of the worst crises since the Great Depression in the 1930s (Vakil, 2020). The impact on Iranian society has been substantial, but how this has affected the regime remains to be seen. At the urge of Rouhani, Ali Khamenei appealed to the Europeans to adjure the U.S. to lift economic sanctions, but there has been no response (Fathollah-Nejad & Naeni, 2020). The inflexibility of the U.S. to relax sanctions on an already immensely vulnerable Iranian economy has produced several “nationalist and independent impulses” in the Iranians that could fortify the resilience of civil society (Vakil, 2020). In this pandemic, there is a hope that a restructuring of infrastructure could result in a new world order that could challenge the position of U.S. power at the global level (Fathollah-Nejad & Naeni, 2020). Simultaneously, the pandemic has had significant impact on religious practices, a core component that makes up the ritual of daily lives not just in Saudi Arabia but also in Iran. In accordance with global infection measures issued by the WHO, Shia shrines in Iran have closed and the annual Hajj to Mecca in Saudi Arabia has been cancelled. With many

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viewing these restrictions on religious practices as a form of oppression, there have been increasing concerns that these measures could be politicised and used as justification to further clamp down on religious expression (Abdo & Jacobs, 2020). Historically, the Shia population has been demoted to de facto second-class citizens. Home to a significant minority Shia population of about 500,000, Saudi Arabia has sealed off the Eastern Qatif Province as part of its necessary public health measures, making it the only province in the country to impose such restrictions (Abdo & Jacobs, 2020). Long-term consequences in the Iranian regime remain unpredictable. As analysts attempt to dissect the tensions, murky relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the major role that the U.S. has played in the policies of Iran during COVID-19 have demonstrated two different perspectives that could either jeopardise or strengthen the Iranian regime. However, highlighted here is the irrefutability of the U.S.’s stringent and unsympathetic sanctions on the Iranian economy during a public health crisis. Relations between Iran and the U.S. have intensified into hostility as a result. However, this has also presented an opportunity for Saudi Arabia, to act as a mediator to assuage tensions in the region. If the Kingdom could take the lead in peace negotiations, it could alternatively pave the way towards peace and reconciliation between the two different factions, ultimately strengthening relations between both nation-states.

5 5.1

Developments in Saudi Arabia

Functionalities of Wahhabism and its Transformation

The export of Wahhabism, its interpretations, and functionalities have been a topic of debate for various analysts and scholars over decades, particularly for the West whose interests could be threatened given the recent rise of extremist groups. Legitimacy of the regime and monarchy lies with the close relationship between the House of Saud and the religious elite, the Ulema, with its origins traceable back to the 1744 pact between al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud. The foundations of the ruling Saudi monarchy and its legitimacy have relied on the political aggression of Ibn Saud to enforce the strict, conservative form of Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula and two of Islam’s holiest sites, Medina and Mecca (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 48). This long-standing agreement between these two factions will come to constitute the very pillar that holds the

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regime together (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 48). As the Peninsula came to be unified and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932, continuation of legitimacy has herein rested with the agreement between the House of Saud and the Ulema where its influence in the judiciary and education is used to sway public opinion (Van den Berg, 2017, p. 2). The issuance of fatwas (formal rulings of Islamic law) has since been used to give legitimacy to the ruling family and subsequent policies, granted by the privileged religious and spiritual role as guardian of Medina and Mecca (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 9; Van den Berg, 2017, p. 2). In a country whose religious core lies with Sunnism, with a significantly discriminated Shia minority amounting to 13% of the total population, there is fear that relations between the Sunnis and Shia could turn increasingly violent (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 48). The Kingdom’s tenacity in exporting this ideology goes back to the 1960s when it was used as a response to Egypt’s rise under Nasser towards secular nationalism, and Saudi Arabia had considered Egypt its geopolitical rival (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 9). Moreover, its expansion could be attributed to this period in history, which coincided with the Cold War, when the U.S. aligned with the Kingdom to counterbalance impending Soviet influence and the 1979 Iranian Revolution (p. 9). The Revolution marked the beginning of how the Kingdom would come to diversify the use of its soft power to project influence beyond its borders. Due to the insecurity that its Shia population had caused, Saudi funding in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa had the Kingdom building religious infrastructure (public spaces such as mosques, and education) to counter oppositions that could threaten its way to disseminating influence (p. 10). The propagated uses of state and non-state actors through the formations of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Dawa and Guidance, Muslim World League, World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Islamic University of Medicine, al-Haramain Foundation, International Organization for Relief, Welfare and Development, and al-Waqf al-Islami with masses of migrant workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and other Arab countries have created a network of integrated and structured systems, showing resilience of engagement with soft power (p. 11). In some countries whose socio-political dynamics are especially conservative, religious education could be a validation needed to boost religious legitimacy among the clergy (p. 13). As Mandaville and Hamid (2018) state, in some instances, these societies have been capable of integrating a locally

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adapted form of Wahhabism that has not disrupted the local structures (p. 13). 5.2

Reorientation of Policies and Goals: The Rise of Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and Its Implications

The rise of MBS as Crown Prince and as de facto leader of Saudi Arabia has given the Kingdom’s foreign policies a duality: his approach towards political structures has been deemed conservative, while economic and social developments have been liberal. The implications are obvious— these policies do not threaten his power, but rather consolidate it, ensuring regime survival. Basing its stability further on the religious elite the Ulema, solidification of religious legitimacy lies with Wahhabism, wherein the Ulema could support governmental decision through its interpretation of religious scriptures (Karim, 2017, p. 74). Despite having reformist tendencies, MBS’s decisions in executing foreign policies have been radical, namely, in its involvement with Yemen that sees no end, and the blockade in Qatar (Hincks, 2020). Saudi Arabia’s history as a complex entity consisting of various tribal and sectarian identities bound by a forced homogenised narrative based on a religious-political partnership established in the eighteenth century has had its influence permeating all aspects of the public and private spheres (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 32). Subsequent centralisation of MBS’s power in office has amounted to a shift away from traditional Saudi policy-making of pragmatism and cautiousness to strengthen and balance relations with its allies, giving rise to concerns on future Saudi policy-making (Karim, 2017, p. 72). Despite the regime’s image as an absolutist autocratic power, foreign policy decisions have relied much on consensus between different parties (Karim, 2017, p. 75). This is because of the ascension of MBS and his growing influence that a shift towards an aggressive military approach to pursue security objectives could be seen (p. 76). His control over the foreign affairs, defense, finance, and petroleum ministries has reshaped and centralised the decision-making processes in ways not seen in previous Saudi foreign policies (p. 78). The Kingdom’s direct involvement in the civil wars in Yemen and Syria, the creation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, and the blockade of Qatar have given the monarchy a sense of insecurity—rightly so, as foreign policy-making is a reflection of its domestic relations (Van den Berg, 2017, p. 1).

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Proxy Conflicts: External Developments 6.1

The Yemeni Variable: The Houthi Movement

The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is complex not only because the two differ in modus operandi, as exemplified in earlier parts of this chapter, but also because their rivalry is more than bilateral—it is multilateral, involving various actors entangled in proxy conflicts. In Yemen, the proxy conflict is a civil war that has devastated the country, causing one of the worst humanitarian disasters, leaving a long, steep road to recovery. The civil war is fought between two factions: The Houthi rebels, supposedly backed by Iran and belonging to the Shia sect, and the central government, backed by the Saudis. The Saudis in fact has—since launching Operation Decisive Storm in 2015—committed to restoring the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and destroying the Houthi movement (Darwich, 2018, p. 125). However, Yemen had been tumultuous long before; tensions within the country had never been completely resolved since the war broke out in 2004 (Hincks, 2020). The current conflict has many implications on the involvement of Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, Iran as well, as both regimes strive to attain multiple political and social objectives: On one hand, the conflict is seen as a struggle for regional influence; on the other hand, it is “statusseeking behaviour”, as some literature has called it (Darwich, 2018, p. 127). Support for Saudi presence in Yemen has been justified by Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sudan, and Morocco. In the name of diplomatic and logistical support, the U.S., UK, and France have also supported the Saudi-backed government (p. 128). For Iran, although Darwich plays down its role in Yemen (p. 129), she upholds the possibility of the conflict changing the power dynamics in the region. The Kingdom has traditionally relied on soft power to maintain its position as the epicentre of Sunni Islam, but this conflict serves as an opportunity to solidify its desire to become a dominant regional power (p. 126). Historically, Iran’s presence and influence in Yemen have been marginal; Iran has had a lack of presence in providing humanitarian aid and limited leverage in Yemeni internal affairs (Ramani, 2019). But the civil war, which was supposedly rooted in sectarian differences, has now evolved into a war driven by political factors (Juneau, 2016, p. 647), of which, most notably, is Iran’s expansionist policy to intervene in collapsing or failed states and fill the ensuing vacuum of power (Hincks,

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2020). As this intervention gained momentum, it changed the geopolitical landscape of the country, leaving the Houthis and central government to aggressively vie for dominance (Zweiri, 2016, p. 5). A mixture of politics and religion now takes a central role in the civil war, and with Iran’s marginalised presence in the country, Yemen has become leverage for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to reinforce their ideological and political goals (Dupont, 2019, p. 7; Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016, p. 167). In the midst of all this, MBS’s image has been tarnished (Hincks, 2020). The literature cited above has downplayed the significance of Iranian presence in Yemen, but it would be imprudent to underestimate this presence. Evidence has shown that there is a relationship between Iranian authorities and the founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein Badr alDin. Moreover, Iran’s moral, weapon, and training support aligns with Iran’s foreign policy to expand its presence (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 59). Nevertheless, although Iranian presence is evident, it might not be as significant or as direct, and the implications it carries could also mean that Iran is not as dependent on Yemen as it is on Syria and Lebanon to expand its influence. On this front, we see the Kingdom and Iran’s willingness to compromise on this stance, due to the relatively unimportant position that Yemen has been placed in Iranian policies (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2016, p. 167). 6.2

The Israeli Variable

Relations between Iran and Israel are not only multi-faceted but perhaps also most antagonistic of all within the Middle East—struggles are not confined between the two but also involve neighbouring nation-states. Iranian-Israeli relations have not always been hostile; they had enjoyed a strong military and strategic alliance until the overthrow of the Shah in the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Bermant, 2020). Ever since, driven by hostility in engaging in proxy conflicts, an insistence on protectionism through nuclear weapons development, and as a backer of the Palestinian cause, Iran has continuously denied Israeli legitimacy. On this front, Saudi Arabia, as an absolutist regime driven by a mutual fear of Iran, would most likely want peace with Israel, but, due to its support for a Palestinian state, it too would not recognise the Israeli state. Nevertheless, despite differences and disagreements between the Kingdom and Israel, a mutual anxiety over Iran and its foreign policies have been driving

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Israeli cooperation with the Gulf states (Bermant, 2020). With the official normalisation of ties between Israel and two major allies of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain, the political climate and its implications have shifted once again. It is yet uncertain how both Saudi Arabia and Iran will respond to these normalisation agreements, which cite Iranian influence as a factor, but, surely, Saudi Arabia—mindful and driven by the Trump administration’s attitude towards Iran—has propelled itself as the U.S.’s greatest ally, which could bring about a possible regime change in Iran (Fassihi & Hubbard, 2019). Over the years, the Israeli-Palestinian issue may have acquired a “significant ideological sensitivity” and brought various regional allies into the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia (the UAE, however, has remained peripheral to the conflict) (Hincks, 2020; Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 23), and MBS’s rise to power has certainly added a touch of uncertainty to this multilateral relationship, as evidenced by his recent policies. Historically, Palestinian statehood has been interwoven in the Kingdom’s identity, and the pursuit of a normalised relationship with Israel could impact Saudi Arabia more heavily than it does other Gulf allies. This is even more so when the Saudi monarch has a vested interest in alAqsa in Jerusalem—Sunni Islam’s third holiest site (Hincks, 2020). Other Gulf Arab rulers have meanwhile been pursuing cooperation with the Israeli state—the increasing “public engagement” could imply that the Kingdom and its allies are prioritising social, economic, and political goals over sectarian differences (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 64), in addition to the fact that both Israel and the Kingdom share a similar interest to leverage U.S. presence in the region to contain Iran. Moreover, Bahrain’s signing of the accords serves as a reminder that it has acquired Saudi Arabia’s blessing for cooperation (Hincks, 2020). All these recent developments have come to demonstrate the Kingdom’s willingness to warm to Israel. With an agreement focusing on tourism, trade, technology, and non-military areas, Saudi-Israeli relationships could reinforce commerce, benefitting MBS’s Vision 2030 and helping to rehabilitate his international image as a “modernising reformer” (Hincks, 2020; Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 62). Evidence has shown that countries in the Middle East are willing to compromise for the benefit of regime stability and regional influence, and the Kingdom’s major allies in the region could also imply, by proxy, its willingness to establish a platform for regional cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has managed to present further opportunities,

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as exemplified by the two shipments of humanitarian aid to Iran from the UAE (Azodi, 2020). 6.3

The Lebanese Variable: Hezbollah

Hezbollah was born in the 1980s with the purpose to represent the Shia minority in a country dominated by Christian and Sunni elites and to defend against Israel’s invasion (Juneau, 2016, p. 648; TRT World, 2019). As Hezbollah is one of Iran’s strong principal allies, Iran’s influence in Lebanon’s Hezbollah is already a reality—the organisation is already acting under Iranian policies to achieve its geo-strategic objectives (Zisser, 2011, p. 3). As the main monetary force behind Hezbollah, Iran’s pumping of its resources has successfully turned the organisation into a pillar of Lebanese Shia society and a powerful proxy force capable of political and military interference in the Middle East (Mandaville & Hamid, 2018, p. 16). Moreover, Hezbollah’s position is somewhat ambiguous— it is not entirely under the authority of Lebanon, but the organisation has participated in state affairs by occupying seats in the parliament and opposing actors that had sought to overthrow the state (Juneau, 2016, p. 648). Meanwhile, one of Iran’s foreign policy-making has always been to align with communities that are dissatisfied or marginalised, using both state and non-state actors to project its influence and presence in order to confront Israel and Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2016, p. 649). Partnership between Lebanon and Iran dates back to the sixteenth century, where both agreed to establish relations based on culture, history, and religion (Hitti, 1993, p. 181). The 2006 Hezbollah crossborder raid involving the Israeli military was, however, a turning point, giving Saudi Arabia an opportunity to align its interests with Iran (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 24). Although this was a Shia-backed organisation that defeated the Israeli Defense Forces, the mutual interest in opposing Israel showed that the Kingdom was willing to compromise and set aside its differences with Iran in pursuit of a pan-Arab leadership (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 24). This paradoxical aspect of the Saudi foreign policy, whose basis is beyond sectarian differences, shows “political solidarity with the winning sect”, with Iran showing capabilities of being a power that could challenge Israeli influence in the region (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 26).

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The Syrian Variable

The 2011 Syrian uprising has become a full-fledged civil war that has torn the country apart along deep sectarian lines (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 58). The current president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad is an Alawite belonging to the Shia sect, and while he is backed by Iran, Syria’s opposition forces are backed by Saudi Arabia. With relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran deeply entangled with historical and ideological differences, they have continued to try and use soft power to shape the geopolitical landscape in their favour (Berti & Guzansky, 2014, p. 25). Particularly obvious is Iran’s efforts in Syria—cultural exchanges and scholarships have softened the impact of Iranian hard power, allowing Iran’s support for the Assad regime to appear as one motivated by kinship instead of by geopolitical ambitions (Paunic, 2016, p. 82). Further, despite relationships between Syrians and Iranians being insubstantial, engagement between the two states remains strong (von Maltzahn, 2013, p. 149), as evidenced by Syria letting Iran use its airspace to send support and supplies to Hezbollah (Juneau, 2016, p. 650). Ultimately, however, as the civil war rages on and international attention continues to pour in, Syria has become a platform of “proxy confrontation”, where Iran and Saudi Arabia (Barnes-Dacey, 2018) grapple with each other to contain one another, giving the conflict a Shiites-versus-Sunnis dynamism (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 46). The continuing conflict in Syria has also resulted in a power vacuum, which jihadi organisations have taken advantage of, leading to the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the resurgence of al-Qaeda, and sectarianism, driving tensions towards an all-time high (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p. 58). Riyadh’s response to this rise of extremism has been to play a delicate game of balancing the interests of actors and concerns from the West—to leverage U.S. involvement to curb the Assad regime—albeit with meagre success. In light of growing conflicts particularly with Yemen and Qatar and the rise of MBS, the Kingdom has been left with little choice but to steadily withdraw from the conflict in Syria (Barnes-Dacey, 2018).

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7

Assessment: Constructing a Peace Agreement and Its Feasibility

Recent policies in Iran and Saudi Arabia have manifested in growing hostility towards each other, driving them to the brink of war. Proxy conflicts in the region, namely, in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have seen neighbouring countries and allies treading carefully to avoid further aggravating the tension. In a time where political strategies are opting out of interventionist, military policies, a peaceful approach is needed for reconciliation. The possibility of opening an Iranian–Saudi dialogue driven by the discord, fragility of the balance of power, and an especially unpredictable U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration has gone back and forth. With tensions at a tipping point, both Iran and Saudi Arabia need to take the initiative to acknowledge and transcend sectarian differences in order to find common ground and ensure regional stability. As history has shown, the idea of mediation is not a foreign concept—in 1997 when tensions reached an all-time high, then Crown Prince Abdullah, despite being recognised as one of the most antiIranian members of the Saudi family, invited Iranian President Ali Akbat Hasehmi Rafsanjani to a pilgrimage to Medina and Mecca in a gesture of friendliness (Harvey, 2020). As another show of goodwill, Abdullah then travelled to Tehran to mediate the dialogue that was commencing between Iran and the U.S. (Harvey, 2020). Despite lingering bilateral differences and sectarian tensions, this illustrates that rapprochement is possible at least in the symbolic sense (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 42). Iran’s long self-isolationist policy and tense relations with other nation-states may be advantageous for the Saudi regime: Saudi Arabia can assume the role of moderator to repair its international image by showing willingness to pursue peace, especially given MBS’s recent aggressive policies to roll back Iranian influence and establish itself as a regional powerhouse. The time is ripe; the Iranian Quds Force Commander, Major General Qasem Soleimani has been slain by the U.S. (Harvey, 2020). Nevertheless, feasibility towards peace is multi-layered: it involves considerations of security threats, military threats, retaliation, containment, balancing regional and ally concerns, and both internal and external power struggles. Dynamics in the region is fluid, but religion-based soft power does allow for such fluidity, giving the pursuit of peace and added glimmer of hope. Under the Trump administration, the U.S.’s decision to “decertify” the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and reaction towards

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Iran’s COVID-19 crisis implies that the U.S. would respond assertively to curb any Iranian influence. It would be to the benefit of all if relations between the U.S. and Iran could improve soon—by focusing on diplomacy and de-escalating the hegemonic struggle. It would also benefit the Kingdom, as it seeks to transform its economic structure through Vision 2030 (Van den Berg, 2017, p. 6). Even with the normalisation of Israeli ties with the UAE and Bahrain, the shifting geopolitical landscape could push both Iran and Saudi Arabia towards making compromises to improve relations, not just with each other but also with other regional nation-states. As this chapter has demonstrated, while both sides have implemented assertive policies to serve individual purposes, there have been instances of compromise.

8

Conclusion

Religion in its uses as a soft power and engagement tool is just another part of its broader foreign policy designs and outreach. It has evolved into a multi-faceted and complex entity that has seen both Iran and Saudi Arabia adapting to their environments to ensure regime stability and regional supremacy. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially when involving other regional neighbours, have often been paradoxical, as exemplified by proxy conflicts. Their differences have often been attributed to sectarianism, but such association would be reductionist. In an ever-changing political world order, both sides often change their stance in foreign policies, which reflects their broader geopolitical ambitions and continued desires to expand influence. What this chapter has demonstrated is that though hard power can reinforce state legitimacy, soft power has more fluidity and flexibility to achieve longer-term geostrategic objectives. The Shia-Sunni schism may be an important factor in the Iranian–Saudi relationship, but it is not the only determinant in explaining their hostility (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 43). In the development of religion (with its subsequent ideology) and integration into regimes, it has become a utility to serve broader geopolitical aims. Doctrine interpretations by the Iranian and Saudi regimes have oftentimes been a battle in balancing domestic and foreign interests and goals, so that both could continue to assert their influence. Consequently, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s narratives have further diverged, in terms of their references to Islam, and have reached beyond their respective borders. For Iran, its ambiguous, changing foreign policies reflect its desire to strike a

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balance in exerting both hard and soft power, projecting an image of a benevolent regional power capable of militant intervention if necessary, which is further reinforced by the political and economic isolationism that Iran has historically practiced. For Saudi Arabia, it mostly exercises caution when implementing its foreign policies to appease the U.S, so that the regime can continue to reap benefits. This has been notably defined in its stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue (Wehrey et al., 2009, p. 43). In the end, however, despite their different modi operandi, their desired outcomes align with each other.

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Iran’s National Security and Afghanistan Politics Carlos Branco

1

Introduction

This chapter is about Iran’s foreign policy responses to political and security developments in Afghanistan, from the Soviet intervention in 1979 until February 2020, when an agreement was signed between the U.S. and Taliban officials. We want to understand the rationale of Teheran’s foreign policy choices to face changes of political regime in Afghanistan. What was/is the purpose of increasing political influence in Afghanistan? To export the Islamic revolution and found theocratic regimes in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia? Or to preserve the country’s security and regime survival? Or both? What were the strategic options followed by Tehran to reach its goals? This study follows the principles of the neorealist school of International Relations as its theoretical framework of reference. Iran is considered a rational and pragmatic actor whose relations with Afghanistan aimed, first and foremost, at ensuring its security. We argue that its reactions to events in Afghanistan, fully in line with the goals set in Iran’s Grand Strategy, intend to enhance the country’s security, i.e. to acquire “the ability to thwart its adversaries’ ability to overturn its regime or

C. Branco (B) National Defence Institute, University of Nova Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_18

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invade Iran militarily” (Soufan Center, 2019), and to “preserve the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity, as well as keeping the country free from foreign interference, especially American’s” (Soufan Center, 2019). Iran authorities strongly believe that a politically stable Afghanistan with a Government that does not run against its interests is crucial for its own national security.1 Pragmatically, Teheran has done its best to stabilise Afghanistan politically, changing allies according to the political forces prevailing in Kabul, regardless of their ethnic and political background. On certain occasions, Tehran has supported the Tajik or Afghan Shia parties,2 on others, the Taliban, and sometimes both, as they may suit its interests. Often, against the interests of the Afghan Shia communities. As Ehteshami (2002, p. 284) put it, Tehran’s “foreign policy choices are accordingly based on a calculus of risk and opportunities”, designed “to promote [its] national interests in a rather harsh international setting. And survival is the primary goal” (Akbarzadeh, 2014, p. 65). Teheran has always defended a democratic and multi-ethnic regime for Afghanistan based on moderate Islamic values, without being neither “extremely reliant on Washington…, nor… ruled by the Taliban or Sunni extremists with the blessings of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan” (Sarkar, 2019, p. 4). The Afghan Shia parties have been a tool of Teheran’s strategy, but neither a decisive one nor a springboard to achieve a hegemonic position. Teheran preferred to cultivate cooperative relations with Kabul rather than influencing the country from within. As Vatanka (2017, p. 4) has underlined “Tehran’s involvement in Afghanistan […] aimed at influencing the highest level of Afghan’s political elite irrespective of background”. Teheran also sees Afghanistan as a ground for geostrategic confrontation with its adversaries—the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—, as it happens in the Levant and Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen), although not so contentious and not comparable with the one it plays in those regions. Tehran’s policies are fundamentally driven to limiting its opponents’ influence over the Afghan elites

1 We adopted in this article the conventional concept of security between states, which relates to the organised instruments for applying force—military in the first instance (Muller, 2010, p. 369). 2 The terms “Shia” or “Shiite” are used use indifferently and with the same meaning throughout this text.

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and reduce the threat those countries may pose to Iran’s national security. Beyond the cultural, civilisational, and economic aspects that connect both countries, “Iranian approach toward Afghanistan remains overwhelmingly security-centric and intrinsically a secondary consideration in Tehran’s broader regional quest for influence” (Vatanka, 2017, p. 1).3 As underlined by Toscano, many in “Western political circles and in the media [believe] that the Islamic Republic is bent on exporting and expanding its religious and revolutionary model—if not messianically attracted by a cleansing Armageddon as an introduction to the return of the Hidden Imam”.4 We argue otherwise. Iran has neither a hegemonic ambition in Afghanistan nor wants to export a political ideology throughout the region by following a sectarian approach and using its perceived leverage upon Shia groups. On the contrary, Iran’s exercise of influence, reaching out to the elites of all ethnic parties, aims to preserve its national security. This chapter is organised into seven sections. The first is dedicated to introductory remarks where we identify the research questions and arguments. In the second, we present the methodology that binds the work. In the next four sections we examine, by chronological order, Tehran’s behaviour towards the upheavals in the Afghan political order and the consequent political rearrangement of forces In Kabul. The third section of the chapter covers the period from the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan through the 1980s until 1989, when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan; the fourth focusses on Najibullah’s presidency until the fall of Kabul at the hands of the Taliban in 1996; the fifth reports on the Taliban regime until its defeat in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent American invasion of the country in October 2001;

3 We acknowledge that Iran has interests to protect in other domains, such as safeguarding the security of its eastern border, preserving the flow of water from Afghanistan, fighting narcotics traffic coming from Afghanistan and crossing Iran, dealing with the Afghan refugees on its soil, and maintaining and developing economic and trade relations with Afghanistan with different impact on Iran’s security. But parsimony imposes discipline in the choice of the themes to address. 4 Toscano makes an important differentiation between “state security” (priority number one for any state) and “regime security”, i.e. its survival. The two concepts are different but intertwined. The conceptual overlap and the subtle distinction between them allow us to treat them as equivalent.

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the sixth deals with the events occurred in 19 years of insurgency culminating with the February 2020 agreement signed between the U.S. and Taliban officials. The seventh and last section is dedicated to concluding considerations. For each of the periods, the study takes into account Teheran’s relations with three different groups of players: The Afghan authorities, the Afghan opposition groups (political and military), and the foreign powers with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and with an active involvement therein, namely the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, and Russia, notwithstanding the political faction holding power in Teheran. We deliberately do not address the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant— Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) because it has not become a relevant player yet. It certainly can carry out high-profile attacks in various parts of the country, but it does not have a nationwide expression. It is operationally confined to its stronghold in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces, in the border region of eastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, where it has suffered severe setbacks.

2

Setting the Stage

This section is dedicated to the presentation of the methodology followed in the study. Our goal is to understand how Teheran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has evolved vis a vis the power holders in Kabul (the political correlation of forces they represented), the Afghan opposition groups (political and military), and the foreign powers with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and with an active involvement therein, in the four periods studied, along three dimensions: “Iran’s political influence”, “export of the Islamic revolution”, and “preservation of Iran’s national security”. Although related, they can be studied autonomously. 2.1

Dimensions of Study

“Iran’s political Influence” means Tehran’s ability to mould the behaviour and consequently the decision making of the different actors (Afghan authorities, opposition groups, and foreign powers) involved in Afghanistan politics, in favour of its political goals. It signifies the leverage that Teheran exerts over the decisions of those parties. Among them, we are particularly concerned with Tehran’s influence on the Shia Hazarat

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party (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami),5 to understand whether it has been used by Iran as a tool of its “expansionist project” in Afghanistan, and in Central Asia. “Export revolution”, either to Afghanistan or Central Asia, means the initiatives carried out by Tehran to promote the foundation of theocratic regimes in those countries, politically and ideologically aligned with Teheran, no matter the tools used (historical and cultural roots, and/or linguistic affinities). It is important to understand whether some initiatives (support to proxy groups, economic relations, cooperation on religious matters, neighbourhood agreements) aim at increasing Iran’s influence or are related to regime change, either in Afghanistan or in neighbour countries. In line with the concept of security adopted in this work, we consider “preservation of Iran’s national security” all the measures taken by Teheran, domestically and internationally, to reduce existential threats and physical attacks to the state. Afghanistan is also important for Iran national security (in a broader concept of security) due to other reasons: water resources (rivers that feed Iran’s most eastern regions bordering Afghanistan rise in Afghanistan and run east west),6 the long-term presence of Afghan refugees running from the wars in Afghanistan,7 economic

5 We use indifferently either “Hizb-e” or “Hezb-e”. For the sake of simplicity, whenever possible we shortened “Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami” (Party of the Islamic Unity) into “Hizb-e Wahdat”. 6 A system of rivers comprising the Helmand, Farah, Khash and Harut rivers flowing from the highlands of Afghanistan converge into the Sistan basin, an internal drainage system encompassing parts of southwestern Afghanistan and southeastern Iran. It is one of the driest regions in the world, where water is a source of dispute. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Glinski (2020). 7 Iran has been sheltering Afghans running away from successive cycles of war for more than four decades. According to “UNHCR Iran”, referring to last Iran’s official government estimates relating to the Amayesh IX, in 2014, 951,142 Afghan refugees and 28,268 Iraqi refugees reside in Iran. Approximately 97% of the refugees live in urban and semi-urban areas, while the remaining 3% reside in 20 refugee settlements. In addition to the refugees, around 2.5 million Afghans are residing in Iran, inclusive of passport holders and undocumented Afghans. “450,000 Afghan passport holders who were previously undocumented or Amayesh cardholders have been issued Iranian visas that allow them to live, work or study in the country”.

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and trade matters,8 the fight against narcotics trafficking,9 energy and the Baluch insurgency.10 The implications of these issues on Iran’s national security have already been comprehensively studied, and literature on them is abundant. Thus, we decided to follow a more restrictive approach and study only Iran’s relations with political and military actors (governmental authorities, Afghan parties’ elites, major and regional powers) engaged in Afghanistan politics and competing for power. This exercise, covering all the period from the 1979 Islamic Revolution until February 2020, provides a better view of Teheran’s foreign policy decision making towards Afghanistan, allowing more robust findings.

8 As argued throughout this article, political stability in Afghanistan is important for Iran because, among other reasons, it opens Afghan and Central and South Asia markets to Iranian goods and offers Afghanistan the fastest and cheapest export route to larger markets. Nearly 70% of Afghanistan exports is shipped through Chabahar, an Iranian port on the coast of the Gulf of Oman (an alternative to the Pakistani port of Gwadar as a point of access to the sea). According to Rasanah (2020), despite the reimposition of U.S. sanctions against Iran in May 2018, Tehran remained a top exporter and trade partner to Afghanistan. According to “Trading Economics”, in 2017, Iran exported goods worth over $2.79 billion to Afghanistan, while only $930 million to Pakistan. In February 2019, Afghanistan sent its first export containers to India through Chabahar. “According to Afghan experts, the real Import figures from Iran were higher, given the lack of border controls and frequent trafficking of goods” (Rasanah 2020). Still according to Rasanah (2020), in August 2019, Iran and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding to provide electricity exchange options between the two neighbouring countries. In 2019, Afghanistan also imported from Iran oil and oil derivatives (kerosene, mazut, and dissolvents) and cement. 9 Iran has become a transit route for smugglers from Afghanistan to consuming markets.

“Almost half of Afghanistan’s opiates cross into Iran. About 15% of which is absorbed by Iranian abusers” (Laipson, 2012, p. 17), creating an addiction problem in Iran. It also “had a corrupting effect on security forces responsible for monitoring cross-border trade” (Laipson, 2012, p. 3). According to Luzianin (2009), in the Iran-Afghan border drug traffic dropped significantly [as of 2009] “as a result of a series of administrative, law enforcement, and financial measures adopted by the Iranian authorities to strengthen the border, and in some cases, they were stopped entirely”. 10 “Iran has always avoided entering the to count on Islamabad’s cooperation on of violent separatism operating across the Pakistani government whose cooperation it

open conflict with Pakistan, due to the need the Baluchistan question. Facing the threat border, Tehran cannot afford alienating the badly needs” (Toscano, 2012, p. 7).

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Research Obstacles

The evaluation of Teheran’s foreign policy decision making towards Afghanistan along the four mentioned periods is not an easy exercise, because most of the topics we are studying now are not new. There is a line of continuation with the past. They are strongly connected with ancient events. Therefore, monitoring their evolution and changes is a meticulous job that requires caution, to separate what is new from what is a continuation of previous practices. The identification of new trends requires strong empirical evidence. It is challenging to evaluate the political influence that Iran exerts in certain regions of Afghanistan and Central Asia. We cannot turn a blind eye to the common history binding those regions for ages, translated into culture, language, and long-standing economic relations. Persian influence in what is today Afghanistan goes back centuries. Dari, or Farsi, the idiom spoken in the northern half of Afghanistan, “an Afghan dialect of the Persian language, is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages and is used by intellectuals and the elite” (Milani, 2011). Not surprisingly, people in Iran and Afghanistan “consume much of the same literature, television, and music” (Abedin, 2019). Open for. The region of Herat in western Afghanistan was part of Iran until mid-nineteenth century, when it was chopped off by the British and incorporated by force in what is today Afghanistan.11 Not surprisingly, Iran’s current influence in Afghanistan is stronger in the northwest due to geographic proximity and shared culture, and almost inexistent in the southern Pashtun regions, subject to other allegiances.12 Therefore, we must bear in mind the impact of those aspects when studying Iran’s relations with the Afghan political and military actors. It might be a risky endeavour to consider Iran’s influence and presence in western regions of Afghanistan close to Iran as part of an expansionist project. The identification of new features in current developments requires a permanent comparative exercise. 11 “After Iran and Britain signed the Paris Treaty of 1857 Iran abandoned its claim— although it reserved the right to send forces to Afghanistan if its frontier [was] violated” (Milani, 2011). 12 Pashtuns live in a continuous territory spreading across southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Although they are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and constitute around 42% of the population, most Pashtuns live in Pakistan, where they are the second largest ethnic group, representing 15% of the population.

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A similar situation occurs with Tajikistan and other Central Asia countries where Iran’s cultural influence is felt. How to read Tehran’s interactions with those countries? Only as a market for Iranian goods, or as a way to circumvent the blockade imposed by the U.S.? Do those relations fit in the promotion of a good neighbourhood or are part of an expansionist project? We must also take into account that Afghanistan is a field of competition among major and regional powers, who do their best to have a friendly government in Kabul supportive of its interests. Beyond the geopolitical dispute between the U.S. and Russia, Afghanistan became a theatre of operations for Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Pakistan, where they play out their strategic rivalries. Riad eagerly promotes proxies that can facilitate its hard-line Salafi proselytism and penetration in Central Asia, making Teheran’s life difficult; India engages Pakistan, and both, like Saudi Arabia, promote their proxies to contain each other. Pakistan would like to see a government in Kabul that, in the case of an Indo-Pakistani armed confrontation, would permit Pakistan to use Afghan territory, increasing its strategic deepness, an obsession that dominates Pakistani strategists’ thinking. This explains why Islamabad has been providing support to Pashtun groups, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. Iranian authorities follow a similar rationale, trying to impede the establishment in Kabul of a government sympathetic or aligned with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

3

The “first Afghan Civil War” (1979–1989)

Two major events characterised this period: the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in early 1979, responsible for a tremendous political and social cataclysm that swept the country; and the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Afghanistan by the end of that year, answering a request made by the Afghan authorities. The Islamic Revolution marked the beginning of a long confrontation with the United States that has lasted until today, with Washington trying to isolate and to ostracise Tehran in the regional and international arena, and Tehran doing its best to minimise the effects of that animosity and to get the international recognition that Washington is hindering and undermining. Despite the complex situation (internal and external) the country was living in those days, Tehran was the first state condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

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The initial reaction of Iran authorities to the war in Afghanistan was largely conditioned by the bloody and devastatingly aggressive war it was compelled to fight with Iraq, from 1980 through 1988, which drained the resources of the country. During this period, Iran was more focussed on its survival than on moulding events in Afghanistan, which did not represent an existential threat. The war in Afghanistan, fought in the context of the Cold War, affected Iran in many ways: from the early 1980s, with the arrival of Afghan refugees escaping the war, trade and economic relations with Afghanistan were dramatically affected. During this period Iran did not develop contacts with the Afghan authorities. The role played by Iran in this “first Afghan civil war” was close to irrelevancy. Within its limited assets and capabilities, Iran backed Shiite and Hazara militias by providing them with training and equipment. But Hazara groups were too divided and lacked political leadership to influence the course of the events in Afghanistan,13 despite Iran’s attempts to convince them “to set aside factionalism and unite” (Mousavi, 1998, p. 183). “The first serious coalition of Hazara and Shia parties was formed in 1987 by the eight groups based in Iran, in part as a result of pressure put by the Iranian authorities, and in part, in response to the destructive infighting between the different groups inside the Hazarat” (Mousavi, 1998).14 This coalition formed the core that led to the foundation of the Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami, two years later, in Bamiyan (Central Afghanistan). According to Mousavi (1998), it was a group “totally Afghanistan, in both control and objectives”.15 In this period, Tehran encouraged the Shia factions “to support a political rather than military solution to Afghanistan’s conflict”, supporting a multi-ethnic solution for the government.

13 Mousavi (1998) classified these groups into three main categories, according to the political Islamic ideology they professed: non-clerics, progressive clerics (followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, formed in Iran), and the reactionary Shia clerics. The Iranian authorities’ hostility towards the groups belonging to the first and the third categories forced them to leave Iran. Only the second group was under the direct influence of Iran. 14 Hazarat is a mountainous region in the central highlands of Afghanistan that is considered the homeland of the Hazara people who make up most of its population. 15 This view is challenged by several authors, such as Koepke (2013) who argues that Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party), was a union of all Khomeinist factions under the leadership of Abdul Ali Mazari.

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However, Tehran’s capacity to shape military and political developments in Afghanistan was minimal. Ironically, the official recognition of the Hazara as a people with the same rights as other Afghan ethnic groups, integrating Hazaras into the socio-political life of Afghanistan, was done by the communist regime, without any interference or pressure from Tehran.16 With the Soviet intervention coming to a close, the terms of its departure were negotiated and agreed by the Geneva Accords signed by representatives of the USSR, the U.S., Pakistan, and the Republic of Afghanistan (thus renamed in 1987), on 14 April 1988.17 Reflecting Iran’s irrelevance, Tehran was neither invited to participate in the negotiations nor was included in the list of signatories. It was left sitting on the bench. In the late 1980s the groundwork for the post-communist takeover was laid down. “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the USA—the backers of the Peshawar Alliance, a group of seven Sunni mujahideen factions—made preparations to instal only Sunni leaders in the future interim government” (Koepke, 2013). “In 1988, the Peshawar Alliance had announced a ‘government-in-exile’ comprised exclusively of Sunnis” (Koepke 2013).18

4

The “Second Afghan Civil War” (1990–1996)

This period is divided into two moments. The first, corresponding to the communist government of Mohammad Najibullah that lasted until 1992. Despite the withdrawal of its troops, the Soviet Union continued backing Najibullah until its implosion in December 1991. Moscow did its best to establish bridges between Najibullah’s government and the rebel factions, an effort that turned out inconsequent and fruitless. The second, from 1992, when the Northern Alliance took over through two interim governments, until being defeated by the Taliban in 1996.

16 For the first time in 250 years, Hazaras held “the posts of Prime Minister and

Deputy Prime Minister, as well as other minor government posts. Ironically, the Hazara were treated much more justly by the PDPA regime” (Mousavi, 1998). The PDPA— People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan—was the ruling Marxist-Leninist political party in Afghanistan. 17 For more detailed information on the Geneva Accords, see Klass (1988). 18 Koepke, quoting Olesen (1995, p. 291).

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With the end of the war with Iraq and the departure of the Soviet troops, Iran changed its low-key engagement in Afghanistan.19 It felt freer to dedicate more attention and resources to the turmoil its eastern neighbour was experiencing. This became particularly evident after the fall of Mohammad Najibullah’s government, in April 1992. Tehran did not recognise Najibullah’s government and backed the Tadjik, Uzbek, and Hazara parties, which allied to fight the forces supporting Najibullah’s government. In 1992, these groups founded the first iteration of the Northern Alliance (pro-Tajik Jamiat-e Islami, pro-Uzbek Junbish-e Melli, and pro-Shia Hezb-e Wahdat). Despite the significant role that the Northern Alliance played in Najibullah’s fall, it had an ephemeral existence, ending soon after taking over Kabul, with the exclusion of the Hazara party. The negotiations to set up a coalition government continued during and after the fall of Najibullah. On 24 April 1992, it was agreed to set up an interim government (the Peshawar Accord) with a broader ethnic representation, including the Hezb-e Wahdat.20 The most important ministries were assigned to the stronger parties. But the Leadership Council “also determine[d] Ministries for Hezb-e Wahdat… and other brothers” (§11 of the Peshawar Accord) without specifying which ones, showing the second-class status credited to the Hazara. Despite the energies spent to have the Peshawar Accord up and running, it was not signed by all Afghan mujahideen parties, who disagreed over the distribution of the ministerial portfolios. The Peshawar Accord was a real power-sharing solution, but it was never implemented. Koepke argues that the inclusion of Hazaras in that grand coalition was a victory of Iran, who opposed attempts by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to instal a Pashtun-dominated government that, on the one hand, would satisfy Islamabad demands and guarantee the “strategic depth” to absorb an attack from India; and on the other, would permit Riyadh to “use Afghanistan as a springboard to spread its version of Islam throughout Central Asia” (Milani, 2010). Even if Tehran had been the mastermind of the inclusion of the Hazara in the Government, it was a pyrrhic victory, because “in the two interim 19 For a deep analysis of Iran’s changed perception on its role in Afghanistan following the Soviet Union disintegration, see Mishra (2012). 20 Peshawar Accord: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Pes hawar_Accord_%28April_1992%29.pdf.

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governments nominated and elected by the Peshawar-based groups in 1988, and later in 1989… the Shia groups were given no say, nor were they allocated a single ministry out of the twenty-odd negotiated between the former groups” (Mousavi, 1998, p. 183), showing Iran’s little or no leverage upon the Afghan Pashtun parties. Despite all the controversies and disagreements, there were several attempts to put the Peshawar Accord in motion. “The United Nations sponsored a conference for a political resolution to transfer power to Afghan Interim Government”.21 As planned, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi of the Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (National Liberation Front) was appointed interim Afghan president until June 1992, and then, also according to plan, he was replaced by Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-e Islami). Hekmatyar was one of the major spoilers of the Peshawar Accord. He stepped down from the Interim Government and, backed by Pakistan, marched on Kabul with its troops, convinced it would be easy prey. The saga to find a power-sharing solution to stop the chaos the country had plunged into continued. On 7 March 1993, the Afghan parties signed the Islamabad Accord, which met the same destiny as its predecessor, due to Hekmatyar’s stubbornness, who continued shelling Kabul. Despite the Shia parties’ exclusion from governmental positions, Tehran backed the governments of Mojaddadi and Rabbani from the beginning. It was noticeable in those days that “Iran was highly concerned about the internal turmoil in Afghanistan and was trying to bring about internal compromise among various Afghani groups through planning and holding several meetings and conferences among them” (Haji-Yousefi, 2012, pp. 66–67). Despite Tehran’s efforts to reach a compromise among Mujahideen, the civil war continued relentlessly. The well-intentioned provisions of the Geneva Accord stipulating the non-international interference in Afghanistan’s future, in practical terms, opened the door for the fratricide war that transformed the country into the battleground for a proxy war among the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. In the war that followed, Tehran was on Rabbani’s government side, providing him with food and resources, and leaving Shia groups on their own. The “Hizb-e Wahdat found itself unwillingly involved in consecutive battles against the forces of the Interim Government” (Mousavi 1998,

21 Gohel (2010, p. 14), quoting Emadi (1997, p. 381).

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p. 197). The massacre of Hazara in the West of Kabul, on 11 February 1993, and the attack to Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami’s headquarters in Kabul carried out by “government forces, under the direct order of President Rabbani and his chief commander Masoud” (Mousavi, 1998, p. 198) did not, however, stop Iran from supporting Rabbani’s government and its policy of alliances. By the early 1990s, it was already clear that Tehran authorities were more concerned with the preservation of the regime and state security than with defending Hazara or exporting Khomeini’s Islamic revolution or Shiite ideology to the word. “Geopolitical considerations played [and still play] a prominent role in the formulation of [Iran’s] foreign policies” (Mishra, 2012, p. 91). The massacre of the Hazara in Kabul encouraged Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami to make a sui generis “alliance with the Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar against the ruling Tajiks, the common enemy” (Mousavi, 1998, p. 199). Exhausted after three years of war with Rabbani forces and without support from Tehran “Mazari [the charismatic Hazara leader of the Hizbe Wahdat] made a fatal move agreeing to a peace deal with the emerging Taliban” (Gohel, 2010, p. 14)22 that ended with Hizb-i-Wahdat surrendering its arms and relinquishing its territory to the Taliban.23 The Iran-Afghan Shia groups’ relations were always difficult but got worst from then on. Tehran always put its interests above the promotion of the Afghan Shia’s. As Laipson (2012, p. 16) pointed out, “The Hazara… are aware that Iranian patronage is not always in their interest. Throughout the years of conflict, Iran sustained Hazara militias, but also fought against them”. According to Laipson (2012, p. 17), “the Hazara are neither immune to Iran’s influence nor a pawn for the Islamic republic”. The permanent fights of all against all drove Afghanistan to an unbearable state of chaos that opened the door to the emergence of the Taliban, whose control of the country increased by the day. “Since the Taliban started its military campaign in 1994, the U.S. had provided indications

22 Gohel (2010, p. 14) quoting Emadi (1997, p. 383). 23 Abdul Ali Mazari and other Hizb-i-Wahdat high-ranking officials were taken hostage

and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.

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of positive support to the campaign” (Mishra, 2012, p. 81).24 “For much of the 1990s the U.S. supported the Taliban’s rise to power, both by encouraging the involvement of U.S. oil companies and by implicitly tolerating Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, two of its key regional allies, in their direct financial and military support for the Taliban” (Tanter, 2001). In late 1996, after defeating its competitors, the Taliban became “the most powerful military and politically force in Afghanistan” (Mousavi, 1998, p. 200). Its impressive advance towards Kabul culminated with the defeat of the government forces led by the Jamiat-e Islami. The failure to get a broad coalition to fight the Taliban gave them space to rise, to a point that nobody could stop them. During this period, Iran sponsored the anti-Taliban factions, no matter their contradictions and enmities. “It supported the Kabul government, but also covered its bets by supporting Shias who worked both for and against the regime. It also backed rival warlords, including Ismail Khan from Herat, a Tajik; General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek; and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun” (Milani, 2010).

5 The “Third Civil War”: The Taliban Period (1996–2001) This period starts in late 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul on 26 September 1996, and declared the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Iran never recognised the new government-backed by Islamabad. Taliban’s take over was frontally against Iran’s national security interests. It represented a victory of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., and was felt “as one of the most important post-revolution threats to its national security, as well as one of the major challenges to Iranian foreign policy making system” (Yousefi, 2012, p. 67). Rabbani and his government were forced into exile, and their interests moved closer to India, Iran, and Russia. Not surprisingly, to cope with this adverse situation, Tehran chose the sedition of the Taliban regime as one of its most important foreign policy goals. On the one hand, trying to unite all Taliban’s foes and to 24 The United States “saw nothing objectionable about the version of Islamic law the Taliban have imposed in the areas under their control. The Taliban should be ‘acknowledged’ as an ‘indigenous’ movement which has ‘demonstrated staying power’, and that when ‘you get to know them [the Taliban] you find they really have a great sense of humour’”, Mishra (2012), quoting Tarock (1999).

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coordinate their actions, a task facilitated by the linguistic, cultural, and religious bonds with the “northern” parties; on the other hand, participating in regional and international initiatives aiming at the resolution for the Afghan conflict. “Iran’s opposition to the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan also constituted an indirect opposition to the greater American role in the region” (Mishra, 2012). Against all odds, shortly after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the nonPashtun factions—Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and a few Pashtun—allied again and resurrected the Northern Alliance of 1992, now with the official name of United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, creating a military front against the Taliban25 supported by Iran, India, and Russia. During this period Iran supported and “encouraged all Dari-speakers and non-Pashtuns to form a united front” (Milani, 2010) against the Taliban. Thanks to this strategy, the Taliban never controlled the northern regions of Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan. “Together with Russia and India, Iran had armed and funded the Northern Alliance at a time when the United States was turning a blind eye to the Taliban’s human rights violations and its support for terror” (Parsi, 2007, p. 226). In 1998, the U.S. relations with the Taliban deteriorated and the flirt between them finished, shattering the hope of transforming Afghanistan into an energy hub and putting an end to the dream of constructing a gas pipeline from the Caspian region through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. The Taliban were transformed into foes almost overnight.26 After cutting relations with the Taliban, Washington approached Ahmad Masoud and co-opted him and the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban. Masoud did not resist embracing such a “high value” sponsorship. Masoud’s choice meant the end of the cooperation with Iran. Tehran was now in a difficult situation without a proxy Afghan group to oppose the Taliban. The Hazara militias were neither a convincing nor enough asset to fight the Taliban. Tehran decided to host Hekmatyar, who escaped to Iran in 1997. In 1994, with the Taliban on the rise, 25 The “Alliance” comprised several groups, and its membership was frequently changing. In the “core group”, if we can use this word, were included the Islamic State (Jamiat-e Islami), the National Islamic Movement (Junbish-e Milli), the Islamic Unity Party (Hezb-e Wahdat Islami), the Islamic Movement (Harakat-e Islami), the Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami), and the Council of the East (Shura-e Mashriqi). 26 In December 1997, senior officials of the U.S. Department of Energy met in Washington with Taliban ministers, and in August of 1998, the U.S. bombed Bin Laden’s Afghanistan camps. On this issue, see Tanter (2001).

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Islamabad abandoned Hekmatyar and shifted its support to the Taliban. Replaced by the Taliban, Hekmatyar was not useful anymore either for Pakistan or for Saudi Arabia. During the Taliban regime, Tehran neither approached nor tried any political accommodation with Kabul. The relations between them got extremely sour when the Taliban massacred Shia Hazaras in the Bamiyan province and murdered eleven Iranian diplomats at the Iran consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, in August 1998.27 On the international front where the Afghanistan issues were discussed, Iran moved from irrelevancy to meaningfulness, thus becoming an unavoidable actor. Tehran used these stages and the visibility they provided to break the ostracisation imposed by the U.S. and to demonstrate to the world its importance in solving any problem related to Afghanistan and to the region. Iran was a founding member, jointly with Turkey and Pakistan, of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a cooperative forum for development, trade, and investment, aiming at establishing a single market for goods and services,28 created long before the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan only joined the ECO in 1992. Despite not being an Afghanistan-oriented organisation, it is one of the regional platforms used by Tehran to cooperate with Afghanistan on economic-related matters and to break its isolation. One key international forum where Iran actively participated was the “Six plus Two Group on Afghanistan”, initiated by Uzbekistan and sponsored by the United Nations. It was an informal platform of the six nations bordering Afghanistan29 plus the U.S. and Russia, created in 1997 to assist in the creation of a multi-ethnic and broadly representative government in Afghanistan. Through this forum, American and Iranian officials met face-to-face for the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution and held indirect talks. It was “an important venue for U.S.-Iran

27 These events caused a tremendous fury in Iran. With the argument of assisting the Shia and Persian-speaking populations, the National Security Council “voted to invade and seize Herat—but the invasion never happened” (Abedin, 2019). 28 The Organisation was created as Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. It was renamed “ECO” in 1985. For more information on the Economic Cooperation Organization, see http://www.eco.int. 29 China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, plus the United States and Russia.

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interaction in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. Both countries used the meetings to send signals to each other” (Slavin, 2020).30 Iran also tried to complement the discussions on a political solution for the Afghan conflict held in multilateral forums with its own unilateral initiatives. Tehran authorities always defended intra-Afghan negotiations to restore peace in Afghanistan and repudiated the military solution. “In December 1997, Iran’s MFA invited key Afghan resistance envoys to a conference in Esfahan” (Koepke, 2013, p. 7), and encouraged participants “to form a broad-based government with the participation of all parties” (Koepke, 2013, p. 8). Like before, also during the Taliban’s “tenure”, Afghanistan continued to be a stage of confrontation among major and regional powers, with two camps clearly identified: on the one side, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan supporting the Taliban, on the other side, India, Iran, and Russia backing the Northern Alliance. “Russia is [was] working (with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) to funnel arms and supplies to the Northern Alliance. Russia aligned its interests with those of India and Iran” (Oliker, 2004, p. 31).

6 The “Fourth Afghan Civil War”: The Democratic Regime (2001–2020) This last period begins with the U.S. military operation in October 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, that pushed the Taliban out of Afghanistan and instituted a new political regime and consequently a new correlation of ethnic-political forces in Kabul. The Taliban rushed into the protection given by their safe havens in Pakistan and metamorphosed into an insurgent group. With the Taliban out of Kabul, Pakistan’s influence over Afghan politics, and consequently Saudi Arabia’s, diminished significantly. The rather large number of soldiers that started arriving in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the U.S. attack were perceived in Tehran as a threat to its security. The sense of insecurity increased in 2003, when an international coalition led by the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Iran became squeezed in the middle of two sizable American contingents.31 30 According to Slavin (2020), Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even attended a session in 1998. 31 Excluding the strength of private security companies, in 2010, the number of U.S. soldiers deployed in Iraq reached nearly 100,000, while the overall number of foreign

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Iran authorities were quick to condemn the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the U.S. Despite all security concerns, Mohammad Khatami, then President of Iran, loudly expressed Iran’s availability to cooperate with the United States in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban32 Animosity was not an obstacle to contacts between both countries, which took place in “multilateral meetings [that] morphed into unadvertised bilateral U.S.-Iran talks about how to stabilise Afghanistan, deal with alQaeda detainees, and, finally, discuss the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. More than a dozen meetings were held from the fall of 2001 to May 2003” (Slavin, 2020). Despite the Iran-U.S. strained relations, “the Iranians gave extensive assistance to the United States in the war” (Parsi, 2007). Iran provided intelligence and support to the American counterterrorist “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.33 “Members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps cooperated with the CIA and the U.S. Special Operations Forces in supplying and funding the commanders of the Northern Alliance (Mishra, 2012, p. 82). “The Iranians were eager to offer their help to Washington and show America the strategic benefits of cooperation with Iran” (Parsi, 2007, p. 226).34 Iran continued collaborating with the U.S. troops after the overthrow of the Taliban, and its help cannot be considered negligible. At the “Bonn Conference on Afghanistan”, held in December 2001 to choose the leader of the Afghan interim authority, Iran endorsed the “internationallybacked government of Hamid Karzai and the interventionist role of the UN and the United States in the country” (Saikal, 2016).

troops in Afghanistan stood at 150,000. In 2007, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq was around 170,000 soldiers. 32 Khatami’s behaviour reminds us of Atabak, the governor of Shiraz, who opened the city gates to Genghis Khan’s troops rather than battling them and offered them an exquisite banquet, thus saving his and the life of the city’s inhabitants. 33 “Operation Enduring Freedom” was the name given by the U.S. Government to the Global War on Terrorism. It primarily refers to the counterterrorist war in Afghanistan, but it is also associated with counterterrorism operations held by the U.S. in other countries within the context of the Global War on Terror. 34 According to Parsi (2007, p. 227), quoting Porter (2006), “as the United States was beginning its military operations in Afghanistan, State Department and National Security Council officials began meeting secretly with Iranian diplomats in Paris and Geneva in October 2001, under the sponsorship of Lakhdar Brahimi, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan”.

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Iran played a constructive role in the discussions on possible political arrangements for Afghanistan and sponsored the solution for a Transitional Administration of national unity. “Tehran encouraged Shia and non-Pashtun ethnic groups to recognize and join the government led by Hamid Karzai” (Akbarzadeh, 2014, p. 68), an ethnic Pashtun. As Mishra (2012, p. 84) explains, Iranian pressure on the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance leadership, reluctant to share power with Karzai, was decisive in the Bonn Conference. It was tough to convince the Northern Alliance and the Jamiat-e Islami to relinquish, who considered themselves the major responsible for the defeat of the Taliban. “The Northern Alliance insisted that, as the winner of the war, the spoils should be theirs” (Parsi 2007).35 But “Iran’s political clout with the various warring Afghan groups proved to be crucial. It was Iran’s influence over the Afghans and not America’s threats and promises that moved the negotiations forward” (Parsi, 2007, p. 229).36 This cooperative posture was always present in the whole normalisation process that started with the Transitional Administration, went through the preparation of the Constitution, and culminated with the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004. “Tehran not only helped the U.S. with legitimizing its military intervention and set the trends in motion for a post-Taliban order in Afghanistan, but also pledged substantial financial assistance to the country’s reconstruction at the January 2002 Tokyo Conference and subsequent relevant forums on Afghanistan” (Saikal, 2016).37 In 2002, Hekmatyar, still exiled in Iran, started preparing a force to oppose the interim government headed by Hamid Karzai. But because Hekmatyar activities were not tuned with Tehran official policy supportive of Karzai, Iran invited him in February 2002 to leave the country, and “Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) offices were disbanded following a 35 Though they represented about 40% of the country, they wanted to occupy eighteen of the twenty-four ministries. 36 According to Parsi (2007, p. 229), it was the Iranian delegation and not Ambassador James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s special envoy for Afghanistan in the months following the 9/11 attacks, who pointed out that the draft of the Bonn Declaration contained no language on democracy or any commitment on behalf of Afghanistan to help fight international terrorism. For a different explanation of the events in the Bonn Conference see Fields and Ahmed (2011). 37 On the amount of Iranian aid pledged and reimbursed between 2002 and 2010, see Saikal (2016).

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George W. Bush Administration decree stating that countries that shelter terrorists would be considered legitimate targets in the Global War on Terror” (Aftanas, 2014).38 But Tehran’s collaborative behaviour was not rewarded, and “Washington failed to reciprocate Iranian goodwill” (Parsi, 2007, p. 236). On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush used for the first time the term “axis of evil”, including Iran in the group of the countries dubbed evil, thus, making the 2001 U.S.– Iran collaboration a tabula rasa. “Tehran was shocked. Khatami’s policy of détente and the help Iran provided the United States in Afghanistan was for naught” (Parsi, 2007, p. 205). Tehran expected that its cooperative behaviour could help to fix the Iranian–U.S. impasse. “Tehran’s wider objective was to entice the United States to moderate its behaviour towards Iran for better relations” (Saikal, 2016). Despite all efforts to please Washington, Iranian’s expectations were not fulfilled. Washington did not change its stance. The possibility of overcoming past experiences and coming to terms with Washington soon vanished in Tehran. “Washington therefore not only failed to respond positively to Tehran’s gestures, but actually hardened its policy and attitude towards Iran” (Saikal, 2016). In 2003, in the preparation of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, Washington knocked again on the door of Tehran asking for assistance. “Despite the fact that Tehran opposed the American war against Iraq, once it was clear that it was going to happen, Iran concluded that moderate support for the American effort was the lesser of two evils” (Parsi, 2007, p. 242).39 Even acknowledging the danger that represented the presence of American troops close to its western borders, Tehran did not create difficulties to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

38 Aftanas (2014), quoting “Hizb-i-Islami”, IHS Jane’s: World Insurgency and Terrorism (2012, p. 300). 39 “Iran ended up playing a very helpful role in the Iraqi invasion, particularly in the reconstruction phase immediately following the Iraqi army’s collapse. Among other things, Iran instructed its influential Shia proxy groups in Iraq after the war to participate in reconstruction rather than resist the American occupation. And when Iran could have created havoc for the United States, it chose not to. “If the Iranians wanted to create chaos in Iraq [after Saddam’s fall], they could have easily done so in the darkest days after the war, and the United States was fortunate that they did not” Pollack (2004). For more details on the Iranian reasons to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, see Parsi (2007, pp. 241–244).

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The Washington hostile posture made Tehran think that, after the invasion of Iraq, Iran could be the next on the list of countries to be invaded. The sense of threat and insecurity increased in Tehran. In 2003 the U.S. decided to use and upgrade the former Soviet airbase at Shindand, in western Afghanistan, close to its border.40 Iran was compelled to dedicate more resources and attention to its eastern border, especially when it became clear that the U.S. troops were there to stay. The encirclement of the country by the U.S. troops was perceived in Tehran as a serious existential threat. In addition to this, in the southern shore of the Persian Gulf Iran had/has to deal with Saudi Arabia, its Sunni archenemy. Tehran authorities dealt with a wide variety of actors with extreme slyness. Their strategy was above all of a defensive nature. If we want to summarise its generic approach to these players we could use Steele’s (2012, p. 383) words: “Tehran’s strategy has been to maintain contacts with, and put money on, every horse in the Afghan race, including the Taliban. Iran is attempting to advance multiple goals—to build influence in the U.S.-backed Afghan government, as well as develop leverage against the United States. This strategy has led Iran to, in some cases, support actors that are inimical to Iran’s Shia-based ideology and, it can be argued, have posed a threat to Iran’s national interests. Iran’s willingness to undertake such risks—by supporting Taliban-related militants—demonstrates Iran’s imperative of keeping the United States military under pressure in areas near Iran’s borders” (Soufan Center, 2019). The hostile relationship with the U.S. did not stop Iran from supporting Karzai’s U.S.-backed governments. From the very beginning Tehran forged “close relations with some powerful government figures, including President Hamid Karzai, who received substantial periodic Iranian cash payments for ‘meeting the expenses of his office’41 , enabling Tehran to gain influence at the highest level of government in Afghanistan” (Saikal, 2016, p. 153).42

40 In 2010, the base suffered a considerable upgrade to support all military aircraft, including the C-17 Globemaster, and facilities were constructed to shelter MQ-1B Predator systems. 41 Saikal (2016), quoting Guardian (2010). 42 Concerning the bribing of Governmental authorities, Iran was competing with the

U.S.

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Iran supported Karzai’s candidacy in the 2004 October presidential race with concrete deeds. “Tehran refused to encourage Ismail Khan, the Herat’s governor/warlord and its former patron, to resist his removal by Karzai in 2004 from his power base to a ministry in Kabul” (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 12). Moreover, “like Russia and India, Iran tried unsuccessfully to convince Younis Qanuni, a Tajik prominent figure, not to enter the race for the presidency, not standing against Karzai and to strike a deal with him before the election” (Soufan Center, 2019). Iran’s leverage on non-Pashtun actors was not always effective. And “after the election, Iran weighed in with the Hazara Shiite candidate to accept the results of the election and also convinced Qanuni to do the same” (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 12). The new regime born in 2001 brought marginalised ethnic groups, at least the largest ones (Tadjik and Hazara), into the political mainstream.43 The new Constitution “ensured Hazara opportunities for socio-political advancement and increased political representation” (Semple, 2011). The allocation to Hazara, in all Presidential elections since 2001, one of the two Vice-Presidential positions, helped “preserving the essential political logic of the Bonn deal and signifying the inclusion of the country’s top three ethnic groups” (Semple, 2011).44 “The rise of the Hazaras since 2001 could be thought of as the collateral ‘advantage’ of the international intervention” (Semple, 2011) through an arrangement of elite political strategy. The stronger role 43 The new Afghan Constitution adopted in 2004 recognised 14 ethnic groups (Article Four). While considering all citizens equal (“equality between all peoples and tribes”— Article Six), it provided minority groups with an opportunity to overcome their “historical exclusion”. 44 In the arrangement of political forces that emerged after Taliban’s departure and the approval of the new Afghan Constitution (2004), Hazara always had a representative in the Vice President position: Sima Samar (22 December 2001–2019 June 2002); Mohammad Mohaqiq, Vice president and Minister of Planning in the interim government (22 December 2001–2019 June 2002). After 2004, Second Vice Presidents were elected on the same ticket as the President. Karim Khalili (19 June 2002–7 December 2004/7 December 2004–9 September 2014) as Second Vice President of Afghanistan on the same ticket as President Hamid Karzai. Interesting to note that in the 2009 presidential election, Mohaqiq chose to back President Karzai against his main challenger Abdullah Abdullah. Muhammad Sarwar Danish (September 2014–) ran on the ticket of Ashraf Ghani. “The ministries allocated to the Hazaras tend to be ‘nation-building’ ministries rather than ‘power’ ministries i.e. Hazaras have held the portfolio for Higher Education, Transport, Planning, and Public Works but not for Interior or Defense” (Semple, 2011, p. 5). “Each cabinet has included a slate of Hazara ministers” (Semple, 2011, p. 5).

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played by Hazara in national politics and their inclusion in the political system meant their involvement in multiple aspects of public life, such as participating in elite deals, and occupying leadership positions in the police and the army. But this power-brokerage formula was possible because Hazara had participated in the anti-Taliban armed resistance, not due to Tehran’s inducement, lobbying, or patronage. In 2005, Iran and American relations on Afghanistan deteriorated even more, with consequences in Tehran’s relations with Kabul. Karzai signed with Washington a “Memorandum of Understanding” celebrating a “strategic partnership” under which the U.S. could establish permanent military bases close to the Iranian border. “The possibility of the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in western Afghanistan naturally made Iran nervous since it would position them within easy striking distance of strategic targets inside Iran” (Weinbaum„ 2006). Also, in those days, under U.S. pressure, Kabul admitted the possibility of recognising the Israel state, something very disturbing for Tehran.45 Iran reacted to these “less constructive” developments triggered by the United States. It became clear that “Tehran [was] in favour of some destabilisation of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] presence in Afghanistan, but it [did] not want to see a collapse of the Karzai government and the return of a Taliban emirate. It, therefore, [wanted] an American withdrawal but not a precipitate, destabilising one that would create chaos on its Eastern border and a re-Talibanization of Afghanistan” (Toscano, 2012, p. 3). The middle ground between these two antagonist positions was not easy to achieve. Thus, Tehran’s engagement with the Taliban must be seen from two different perspectives. On the one hand, using the Taliban as a tool to frustrate the U.S. plans for Afghanistan avoiding their military victory. On the other hand, creating empathy with the Taliban, and capitalising for future cooperation. Tehran was aware that “some Taliban factions do harbour animosities against Shiite Afghans and Iran. But other factions of the Taliban are willing to establish better relations with Tehran” (Abedin, 2019). Iran’s authorities did everything they could to keep

45 The same concern was evident when nearly 10 years later, in September 2014, Kabul signed with the U.S. a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that allowed the United States to maintain troops in Afghanistan after 2014, despite the caveat included, partly at Iran’s behest: the U.S. was prohibited from launching military action against other countries from Afghanistan (Soufan Center, 2019).

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“the most hardcore elements of the Taliban often close to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia… far from power in a new central government” (Clarke and Tabatabai, 2020).46 “Any future Afghanistan with a ruling body over which Riyadh and Washington may have uncontested leverage is a dire concern for Tehran” (Sarkar, 2019). Coherently with that strategy, “while providing open political and economic support to the Karzai government, Iran was giving undercover and clandestine military assistance to some components of the Taliban insurgency” (Toscano, 2012). “Iran has been widely assessed as providing materiel support, including rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire” (Soufan Center, 2019),47 the very same Taliban who massacred the Hazara population and killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif, in 1997. But “unlike Pakistan, Iran never served as a safe haven for any insurgent movement either against Soviet occupiers or the Taliban” (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 12). Iran’s co-option of anti-Shia groups was not an ethical problem. As underlined by Nader (2014), Tehran “has not allowed religious and ideological issues to interfere with political expediency… it… does not use sect as a decisive factor in its political calculations”.48 The survival of the regime justified all means. This precarious game did not include so far any kind of political dialogue with the Taliban. But this stance would change in the future. Some argue that Tehran’s support for those groups is “evidence that Iran prefers the ongoing insurgency to real peace” (Laipson, 2012). But

46 “Pakistan depends on aid from Saudi Arabia and channels Saudi interests in the region by sponsoring hard-line Salafi groups, offering clandestine support to violent insurgents operating in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan and, perhaps most important, by inflaming anti-Iranian factions within the Taliban” (Abedin, 2019). 47 Soufan Center (2019) quoting Gohel (2010). Despite the reporting indicating the likelihood of a relationship between Iranian Intelligence agencies and the Taliban, there is no clear-cut evidence that the Government of Iran was directly involved. Some branches of the Iranian intelligence services may provide limited support to Insurgents, which would include weapons shipments. For additional information on Iranian’s support to insurgents, see Kagan et al. (2012, p. 41). 48 Although Iran maintains close ties to Shia and related groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah (and the Alawite regime in Syria), Tehran has historically worked with non-Shia groups throughout the Middle East and Muslim world (RAND 2014).

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as counter-argued by Laipson (2012), “these demonstrations of lowintensity, proxy warfare against foreign troops do not represent all of Iran’s long-term interests”. They are short-term expediencies to disturb the U.S. and provoke their departure by exhaustion. In the meantime, Tehran realised that “President Hamid Karzai, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all have opened… channels of communications with the Taliban” (Milani, 2011). All were speaking with the Taliban. “If Iran [wanted] to remain relevant in the country and minimise Pakistani influence, it must also court the Taliban” (Abedin, 2019). When in 2011, President Barack Obama announced the intention to start a progressive reduction of forces from Afghanistan culminating with a handover of security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2014,49 Iranian authorities immediately started planning with that in mind, fine-tuning their alliances’ policy. “Although Iran views the Tajik and Hazara as being its best interlocutors in Afghanistan, it nevertheless views the Pashtun and even the Taliban as important to its overall strategy” (Nader, 2014).50 Foreign policy decision-makers in Tehran internalised that the Taliban were going to be part of the political solution (whatever it will be) and a relevant actor in Afghan politics after the departure of the U.S. troops. It would not be wise to alienate them. Therefore, it made sense to open a channel of communication with them, rather than relying exclusively on Tajiks and Shias. As Vatanka (2017) put it, “to continue to ignore the potential of the Taliban as a lasting political force in Afghanistan is to

49 31 December 2014 marked the end of ISAF. It was replaced by “Operation Resolute Support”, a training mission, rather than by a combat force. 50 In this article we do not elaborate on the political fragmentation that affected the Hazarat political establishment in early 2009 and led to the implosion of the Hezb-e Wahdat. That fragmentation has its roots in the 2004 presidential elections, when the two most prominent Hazara politicians (Karim Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqeq) ran on competing tickets. This rivalry resulted in the fragmentation of the party into four organisations (Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan, led by Karim Khalili; Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan, led by Muhammad Mohaqeq; Hezb-e Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan, led by Muhammad Akbari; and Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Millat-e Afghanistan, led by Qurban Ali Erfani). This split had negative effects on the power-brokerage role played by Hazara in Afghan politics and resembled to a certain extent a return to the past.

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weaken Iran’s hand in the policy-making process in Kabul”51 . This stance represented a pragmatic evolution. Tehran was able to put behind past traumatic experiences and transform “its adversarial relationship with the Afghan Taliban into a cooperative partnership” (Sarkar, 2019). Tehran opened its own secret channels of communication with the Taliban. In 2011, Tehran invited a Taliban delegation to attend a panIslamic conference in Tehran (Vatanka, 2017, 4)52 and organised a meeting with former President Rabbani, chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council, representing northern Afghan groups, and Taliban delegates.53 “Tehran recognized that the Taliban were an integral component of the Afghan society that could not be ignored” (Milani, 2011). They were not going to disappear and would continue being major players in Afghan politics. “Ironically, the strategic interests of Tehran and Taliban have converged” (Milani, 2011). For different reasons, both “oppose the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and demand their immediate and unconditional withdrawal” (Milani, 2011). In the early 2010s, the U.S. and the Taliban were not yet close to a peace deal. Taliban’s place in the future Afghan political scenario was very far from being set. The options were not easy for Tehran, who wanted the departure of the U.S. troops but, as underlined before, did not want them replaced by a radical Sunni regime aligned with Islamabad and sponsored by the Riyadh Wahhabi regime. The announcement of the U.S. progressive disengagement and withdrawal from Afghanistan was good news for Iran but it was not the end of the story. Equally important was the political solution to be implemented after the American departure and the new correlation of forces coming out of it. Many queries remained unanswered, especially the future role of the Taliban in the government. The bilateral security agreement (BSA) signed by President Ashraf Ghani with the U.S., in September 2014, a few months after being elected, ensured a U.S./NATO troops presence in Afghanistan beyond 51 Interview with Mousavi (2017). 52 Vatanka (2017), quoting Londoño (2011). 53 Saudi Arabia was ahead of Iran. According to Vatanka (2017), quoting Robertson

(2008), in October 2008, the Saudis had hosted peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. For Tehran, any successful Saudi initiative in Afghanistan meant a corresponding decrease in Iranian influence.

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2014. The frown on Tehran’s faces clearly showed they were not happy at all with the BSA. But Ghani tried to calm them down by stating that the BSA did not constitute a threat to Iran and assuring that “Afghanistan [would] never become a staging ground for any intervention against Iran” (Vatanka, 2017, p. 9). Cordial and cooperative relationships with Kabul, first with Hamid Karzai and, after 2014, with his successor Ashraf Ghani54 did not impede Tehran’s engagement with the Taliban through track two diplomatic initiatives. Those relations were carefully crafted. Tehran had no official relations with the Taliban, “nor [did] the Taliban have an office or a representative in Tehran, as [did] many non-state actors, such as HAMAS” (Milani, 2011). Like ten years before, in the preparation of the 2001 Transitional Administration, Tehran continued defending an ethnically balanced government with the inclusion of all ethnic groups with political representation, thus avoiding a Pashtun prevalence more prone to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s influence. Iran was and is particularly interested in how a political settlement in Afghanistan may look like. A solution favourable to Iran’s interests requires a compromise in the non-Pashtun camp and an accommodative formula with the Taliban, which also suits the United States’ interests. Without a political settlement looming at the end of the tunnel, Tehran’s engagement with the Taliban increased from 2015, when they started holding private meetings and talks. Tehran’s major goal was to extend and solidify its leverage over Afghanistan’s government and the Taliban, to assure that the government in Kabul after the U.S. departure is neither pro-U.S. nor controlled by the Taliban, and the latter is not “under the influence of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan” (Sarkar, 2019).55 “Tehran is attempting to bring the Taliban out of the shadow of their Pakistani and Gulf support base and give them incentives such as working together to target their common enemy in return for Taliban guarantees to not let Afghanistan be used for attacks in Iran” (Sarkar, 2019). President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017 brought expectations of change. But if he was committed to end the Afghan war and bring U.S.

54 Ashraf Ghani won the 2014 presidential election running against Abdullah Abdullah, backed by Tehran. 55 On the Saudi Arabia influence in Afghanistan, see Vatanka (2017, pp. 4–5).

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soldiers home, there was no clarity on his political solution to solve the Afghan conundrum. President Trump intensified the peace negotiations in Doha with the Taliban, but with one leg of the trilogy missing56 : The Afghan government was not included in the talks. Kabul would engage with the Taliban in a subsequent phase, after the U.S. had sorted out its issues with them. While talking with Kabul, Tehran continued its homework with the Taliban. According to Abedin (2019), there is plenty of evidence that political ties between Iran and the Taliban improved in the late 2010s. There are reports that, in coordination with the Afghan authorities, Iran held talks with the Taliban (December 2018) in Tehran. “The talks were reportedly to set parameters for negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government” (Sarkar, 2019, p. 4).57 “Significantly, these meetings overlapped with direct negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban after the appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad as the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, in October 2018” (Akbarzadeh and Ibrahimi, 2020). “Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif prompted the outrage of the Ghani government when he insisted on Indian TV, in January 2019, that the Taliban must play a role in any future political configuration in Afghanistan” (Abedin, 2019). Notwithstanding that “outrage”, Ghani sent a representative to Tehran in mid-March asking for support (Bhadrakumara, 2019). After the collapse of the U.S.-Taliban talks in September 2019, and after visiting Moscow, the Taliban delegation went to Tehran for talks with Iranian officials, to discuss the Afghan peace deal and explain why talks with the U.S. broke down. Iran has been very much implicated in the exchanges between Kabul and the Taliban by using communication-facilitation and procedural

56 “Saudi Arabia’s harsh measures against Qatar, where the Taliban have their political office, and Doha’s improved ties with Tehran, helped clear the clouds of mistrust and misunderstanding between Iran and the Taliban” (Hussain, 2020). 57 In December 2018, “Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, confirmed that Iran had begun holding talks with the Taliban— in coordination with the government in Kabul—to address ‘rampant insecurity’ in Afghanistan” (Abedin, 2019). “The Taliban also confirmed that during that meeting, their representatives discussed Afghanistan’s ‘post-occupation situation’ with Iranian officials”, Akbarzadeh and Ibrahimi (2020, 769), quoting AFP, “Afghan Taliban Says ‘Post-Occupation’ Discussed”.

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strategies of mediation,58 thus preventing the recalcitrant elements on both sides from taking the lead of the process. “Lingering distrust of the Taliban informs Iranian thinking about the outcome of the intra-Afghan discussions at this stage [mid-2020]. Tehran fears the most hardcore elements of the Taliban and wants these factions, which are often close to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to remain far from power in a new central government” (Clarke & Tabatabai, 2020), and to not play a leading role. “The Taliban are not monolithic, and it is not clear which faction Iran is seeking to establish relations” (Milani, 2011). On the other hand, Iran had been instrumental in convincing squabbling factions in Afghanistan’s government to reach an agreement on a joint committee to negotiate with the Taliban. Finally, in February 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban were able to sign an “agreement for bringing peace” to Afghanistan after more than 18 years of conflict, which included a road map for the withdrawal of the American troops. Iran enhanced its role in the Afghanistan endgame, due to its increased leverage on the Taliban (or at least on certain Taliban). The meetings held in 2020 by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Afghan officials to discuss peace and stability in the agenda (Iran daily, 2020) were an attempt to overcome the mess created by the simultaneous presidential inaugurations with Abdullah and Ghani, both claiming victory in the 2019 presidential election. With a change of the political correlation of forces looming on the horizon, alliances are being reformulated, with Iranians and Russians supporting the old Taliban’s demand that foreign military forces must leave Afghanistan. 6.1

The International and Regional Front

Iran’s participation in international and regional forums on Afghanistan in this period served three major purposes: to defend the regional approach to solve Afghanistan issues, to break out its own international marginalisation, and to campaign for the withdrawal of the international troops from Afghanistan. It soon became obvious that the Iranian presence in those initiatives was indispensable. Iran attended most of the “International

58 For comprehensive information on these two concepts, see Bercovitch (2007, pp. 174–177).

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Conferences on Afghanistan” to discuss the future of the country.59 The general tone of Iran representatives at those conferences was constructive (with very few exceptions60 ), declaring its readiness to participate in the development and reconstruction of the country. Iran has also been an important player in certain regional forums, where Afghanistan issues have been discussed.61 We have already mentioned Iran membership to the “Six plus Two Group on Afghanistan”, created to find a political solution for the war that could include the participation of the Northern Alliance, which became anachronic after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In November 2001, representatives of the “Six plus Two Group on Afghanistan” pledged in a joint declaration “their continued support to efforts of the Afghan people to find a political solution to the Afghan crisis, and… agreed that there should be the establishment in Afghanistan of a broad-based multi-ethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen Afghan administration representative of their aspirations and at peace with its neighbours” (The New Humanitarian, 2001). The content of this declaration fully meets Iran’s political objectives for Afghanistan. On 22 December 2002, commemorating the first anniversary of the formation of the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan, the six neighbouring countries of Afghanistan plus the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan signed in Kabul the “Kabul Declaration of good-neighbourly relations” (UNSC, 2002), where they “reaffirmed their commitment to constructive and supportive bilateral relationships based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual respect, friendly relations, cooperation and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” (UNSC, 2002). These six countries continued using this format to discuss

59 Among others Bonn 2001, Tokyo 2002, Belin 2004, London 2006, Rome 2007 (on Rule of Law in Afghanistan), Paris 2008, Moscow 2009, Hague 2009, London 2010, Kabul 2010, Bonn 2011, Tokyo 2012, London 2014. Iran did not attend all conferences. 60 Tehran missed the Paris (2008) and London (2010) international conferences on Afghanistan. In the case of London, Tehran reacted with harsh criticism denouncing the negative role that “the British government [was] playing in the efforts to resolve the problems of Afghanistan, especially in the issue of drug smuggling and Britain’s proposal to compromise with the extremists” (Tehran Times, 2010). 61 We selected only regional platforms where Iran plays a relevant role. We did not consider, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) where Afghanistan’s security matters are also discussed, but Iran does not shape the agenda.

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Afghan issues following the regional approach as put forward by Tehran authorities. Tehran’s foreign policy towards Central Asia and regions with cultural and linguistic ties is another unavoidable topic in this study. The attitudes in the region towards Iranian ideas of cultural kinship “range from indifferent-negative (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), to competitivenegative (Uzbekistan is positioning itself as a regional cultural centre). Turkmenistan, despite its proximity officially proclaimed ‘Aryan idea’, is also very indifferent to Persian culture” (Luzianin, 2009).62 “The most significant bilateral model in the region is Tajikistan, which is the only country in the region where Iranian ideas and projects have found fertile ground. A common Persian culture and history is at work here [Tajikistan]” (Luzianin, 2009, p. 5).63 After several high-level meetings, the Presidents of Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan met in July 2006, in Dushanbe, “where they discussed issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, new opportunities for increased cooperation in energy and transportation, and increased cultural exchanges, as well as rebuilding Afghanistan” (Joharifard, 2010, p. 73). They also agree to create a cultural cooperation commission. Originally conceived on the basis of common historical and cultural background, the project of a Persian-Speaking Union soon evolved into the integration in the field of economy and culture. The ambition was high. In 2008, the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan “met and signed an agreement to establish the Economic Council of the Persian-Speaking Union” (Joharifard, 2010).64 In June 2009, Iran and Tajikistan announced they were “working on creating a joint Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Literature, to expand these ties”. The three countries also discussed the establishment of a joint bank, which they claim would “lessen the effects of global economic instability in the region” (Joharifard, 2010, p. 75).65 Joharifard (2010, p. 7) put forward several interpretations of Iran’s motives for creating the Persian-speaking Union, which complement each 62 Luzianin (2009), quoting Kazantsev (2008, p. 211) “Bolxa igpa” c neizvectnymi ppavilami: mipova politika i Centpalna Azi. 63 For comprehensive information on Iran-Tajikistan relations see Joharifard (2008). 64 Joharifard (2010), quoting Luzianin, “Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian Factors of

Influence on the Central Asian Region”. 65 Joharifard (2010, p. 75), quoting Fars News Agency (2009).

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other: increase influence in Tajikistan and Afghanistan; act as a counterbalance to TÜRKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture) and the League of Arab States; prevent the increasing dominance of Russia in Tajikistan; alleviating the consequences of the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan; and increase trade and find new economic partners in the wake of the external sanctions due to its nuclear plans (Joharifard, 2010, p. 7).66 All these motives seem legitimate and are defensive in nature. In 2011, Iran joined the “Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process”, a forum created under the aegis of Turkey with all Afghanistan’s neighbours to discuss regional issues, most notably cooperation among Afghanistan and its neighbours, building on the “Kabul Declaration of Good Neighbourly Relations” (UNSC, 2002),67 where the U.S. only enjoyed the status of “supporting country”. Since its inception, Iran has used this forum to address its “legitimate security interests on its eastern frontier, as well as its broader economic and political interests in Afghan stability” (Laipson, 2012). But Iran has also used this forum to support “the regionalization of efforts to help Afghanistan and sees the regional approach as a stark alternative to an international approach that includes donors and security partners from western countries” (Laipson, 2012, X). In the inaugural session in Istanbul (November 2011), “Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi reiterated his opposition to a strategic agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan, calling instead for increased security assistance from neighbouring countries” (Houk, 2011, p. 23). As mentioned before, Iran was a founder of the “Economic Cooperation Organization”, a cooperative forum for development, trade, and investment created in 1985.68 In 1992, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and six former Soviet 66 On the Persian-speaking Association see Joharifard (2010, pp. 72–81). On the competition between Turkey and Iran see Rahimi and Heydari (2020). 67 The “Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process” comprised five participating countries, 16 supporting countries and 12 supporting regional and international organisations. See https://www.hoa.gov.af. 68 Under this umbrella, “in December 2019, Tehran hosted two Joint Economic Commissions with delegations from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, a third was held in Tashkent. Regular direct flights from Iran to four Central Asian cities—Almaty, Tashkent, Dushanbe, and Bishkek—resumed at the beginning of 2020 after intermittent interruptions” (Rahimi & Heydari, 2020).

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Republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) joined the Organisation. ECO is not a forum to discuss Afghanistan future, but it is a privileged platform where Iran can develop economic relations with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the other Central Asia republics.69 But Iran has been using it as a tool to escape the ostracisation and marginalisation imposed by the U.S., not to proselyte about the Iranian revolution or stimulating regime changes in those countries. This behaviour also applies to other regional arrangements, used by Tehran to voice its security concerns. As Luzianin (2009) pointed out, the “bilateral models of Iran’s relations with the countries of Central Asia Iran do not fall outside the general rules of inter-state partnership and do not pursue the goal of implementing any special ‘Islamic projects’ aimed at destabilising the region or intensifying other threats and risks”.

7

Conclusion

The main objective of the chapter is to explain the rationale supporting Teheran’s foreign policy responses to changes in the political regime in Afghanistan, after the 1979 Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan, until February 2020. We concluded that Iran’s primordial foreign policy decisions regarding Afghanistan had always in mind the preservation of its national security. They were bounded by geopolitical considerations, in the classic way states act to guarantee their existence. Those decisions materialised a strategic defensive posture pragmatically implemented through a careful selection of partners and alliances, to balance power with its competitors. Iran’s foreign policy choices on Afghanistan (and other places) were neither ideological nor inspired by religious reasons.70 They were oriented to ensure first and foremost its national security. 69 Within the ECO framework the “ECO Trade and Development Bank” was established in 2005 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the founding members of the ECO, oriented to financing development programs and projects. Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan have recently become members. For more information on the “ECO Trade and Development Bank”, see http://www.etdb.org/index.htm. 70 This strategic option may represent the most striking example of pragmatism shown by the Iranian authorities. As Toscano (2012, p. 6) underlined “In Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic—being realistically aware of the fact that an Islamic Afghanistan would be Sunni and not Shia—is not in fact in favour of an Islamic regime, but rather, would prefer a secular one”, otherwise the risk of becoming a Sunni theocracy was too high.

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Teheran used its political influence upon the elites of the Afghan parties to encourage them to accept ethnic-balanced Administrations because it was the best way to ensure they were not going to be subordinated to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or the United States, and the north Afghan parties (Shia and Sunni Dari speakers) with whom Iran shared cultural and linguistic affinities would have a say in those Administrations that would limit the influence of its competitors in Afghanistan. Political influence was used in the service of security. As clearly shown in the text, the Afghan Shia and Hazara groups were never part of a (non-existent) plan to export Shia ideology. Iran elites were lucidly cognizant that a Shia regime in Afghanistan would never prevail. They were aware of the limits of their influence on those groups. It was not possible to establish with them a proxy relation comparable with the one that Tehran enjoys with Hezbollah, or Islamabad has developed with the Taliban. Iran has demonstrated an extreme ability to explore the contradictions dividing the different actors engaged in the Afghan conflict. Pragmatism leads Tehran when deemed necessary, even to support enemies of Iran’s Shia. That explains the complex network of political influence that Iran kept with those groups, abandoned when convenient or their defence was a stake too high. The enhancement of the Hazara’s social and political status in Afghanistan (during the communist and post-2001 democratic regimes) did not result from an Iran push or campaign. Iran’s relationship with them was determined by realpolitik. As Toscano (2012) put it, “Afghan Shia are considered only in the light of Iranian national interest, rather than religious affinity and solidarity”. This logic prevailed when Tehran started supporting the Taliban—in a measured manner—and, after 2011, entered into dialogue with them. Iran’s influence on the Taliban was carried out first via dual track initiatives and later by openly promoting the inter-Afghan dialogue—filling a gap left open by the U.S. Administration—, joining ranks with the less radical factions, less controllable by Saudi Arabia. Past disagreements were put aside, and once again pragmatism prevailed. Their strategic objectives coincided. Both wanted to see the U.S. military and international troops out of Afghanistan. Moreover, Tehran realised that the Taliban were not going to disappear. They were an unavoidable interlocutor. Even from this perspective security prevailed as the rationale to developing that rapprochement.

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Afghanistan was important for Iran because it represented an opportunity to overcome its political isolation. Iran used the participation in international and regional forums and initiatives on Afghanistan, to show its regional relevance and to advance its own security agenda. It was a chance to deal with the international community on converging interests, demonstrating it was not a pariah. The foreign policy goal of exporting Shia ideology that prevailed in the 1980s among Iranian political elites was soon replaced by geopolitical considerations, after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989. It is difficult to correlate Iran’s engagement in regional arrangements or initiatives oriented to Central Asia and Farsi speaking countries with a strategy to export the Islamic revolution. There is a strong geopolitical justification to explain those moves, especially Iran’s eagerness to pierce the U.S. blockage imposed on it. The cooperation with those countries falls in the scope of the normal procedures of cooperation among states.

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Not All Plain Sailing: The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa Tiziana Corda

1

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Horn of Africa, by exploring the rationale behind its involvement there, the various dimensions this effort has been channelled into, and eventually also the implications that some recent regional events will have for the future of this relationship. The analysis of Iran’s Horn policy is an enriching and original contribution to the field as it helps expand the geography of the existing scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy to neglected yet strategic regions at a time when, understandably, most of the literature focuses either on Iran’s more immediate neighbourhood or on its relations with global powers. This mainstream literature, albeit broad, tends to overlook the Islamic Republic’s projection towards other areas which, apart from being less proximate from a geographic perspective, are admittedly for the most part non-Shia or even non-Muslim, and for that reason regarded as less relevant. Iran’s foreign policy towards Africa and its subregions is a case in point. For various academic generations it has remained a largely under-researched area, as has been Africa’s

T. Corda (B) Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_19

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relationship to West Asia in general, despite few Red Sea scholars’ calls for such recognition (de Waal, 2019a, 2019b, 2020; Mazrui, 1986, pp. 28– 29). This is because all too often Iran and Africa have been deemed as too diverse and far apart to command the attention of scholars and policymakers alike. Yet the truth is that, in the past few decades, these two entities have gone through a quite discreet yet very tangible history of courtships, confrontations, and sudden about-turns too. It is the inherent geostrategic relevance of the area that facilitated such interactions in the past and, as this chapter aims to show, is likely to continue doing so in the future too. Iran scholars tend to focus on Tehran’s more immediate neighbourhood because they know that long-distance power projections to further-off places are, in general, more demanding in terms of required capacity and capabilities. But this perspective fails to grasp the strategic significance of the encirclement strategy Tehran seeks to pursue against its rival regional powers precisely by trying to maintain a constant presence in the Horn. This is, in the end, just another declination of Iran’s forward defence. A pillar of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy orientation, the concept of forward defence or strategic depth is generally used to describe Tehran’s security approach based on the use of proxies and the creation of strategic hotspots abroad in order to offset its enemies’ conventional military advantages and to keep major threats as far away as possible from its borders (Tabatabai, 2020, pp. 253-ff.; Vakil, 2018). The Horn of Africa, precisely because of its collocation in the backyard of Iran’s rival Gulf monarchies, is one of those highly valued hotspots. Sanctions, as well as other forms of international isolation to which the Islamic Republic has often been subjected, have long constrained its power projection capabilities especially in these less immediate areas. This has been all the more true in the past few years. A glance at the region today shows a very bleak picture that contrasts with the rosier situation Iran was faced with in earlier years. Nonetheless, the current difficulties do not belittle per se the intrinsic significance of the Horn region for Tehran, which is instead poised to become even more important in the near future as a result of the intensification of security and economic interconnections between the two shores of the Red Sea (Mahmood, 2019), and which are quite difficult to undo, absent radical shifts in the area. Such recently growing interconnections between West Asia and the Horn of Africa have eventually brought to the latter a belated, but long-deserved, academic attention, although not particularly among Iran

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scholars. This chapter aims to contribute to this debate by shedding light on how complex and dynamic the specific ties between Iran and the Horn have been since 1979. In some instances, in fact, they just remained cautious acquaintances. In others, instead, ties were successfully transformed into confident, albeit not always long-lasting, proper friendships. Indeed, the one between Iran and the Horn has been a relationship of highs and lows. To convey such complexity, the chapter is divided into different parts. After this short introduction which also offers the theoretical keys to read Iran’s foreign policy in the region, thus anticipating some factors that need to be taken into consideration in the later empirical parts, the first part of the chapter provides a brief overview of the Horn of Africa itself, needed to outline its boundaries and explain its overall inherent relevance. In the second, longer part, instead, two interlinked sections address, firstly, the main dimensions of Iran’s approach to the region, and, secondly, the chronological empirical evidence of its Horn strategy, overviewing Tehran’s actions in the region and also the major challenges met by succeeding Iranian governments in their Horn policymaking. In the end, some conclusive remarks reflect on what changes regarding Iran’s Horn policy can reasonably be expected in the coming years. All these parts, to a greater or lesser extent, show that Iran’s Horn actions are indeed the result of the interaction of local and international factors, as theorised by complex realism. In a way not too different from better-known neo-classical realism (Rose, 1998) and theories of intermestic politics (Korany, 1999), complex realism is a quite recent approach developed by Professors Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushirvan Ehteshami (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2014, 2016) to understand and examine specifically the MENA region. According to this approach, diverse factors shape the foreign policies of states, including external environments—both international and regional—and domestic policy processes. It is a framework which, by nesting different theoretical traditions inside each other, can capture better than others the ebbs and flows of the Iranian presence in the Horn of Africa. Regarding international and regional systemic dynamics, it captures the importance U.S. actions have on Iran’s and other Gulf actors’ moves in the region. Sometimes they can constrain, albeit not always as much as intended, a targeted country’s room of manoeuvre by means of sanctions; other times, they can instead unleash more aggressive behaviour. The perceived U.S. retrenchment from the Gulf in 2015 was a case in point (Krieg,

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2016), as it set in motion shifts in regional powers’ security strategies leading to repercussions for Iran’s Horn presence too. But it also shows the similarly crucial role of the Horn’s shifting internal dynamics themselves and of the domestic changes that have often occurred inside the Iranian and Gulf leaderships and in their subjective perception of security threats.

2 The Horn of Africa: Defining the Region and Its Inherent Value Called after its distinctive geographical shape, the Horn of Africa refers to the peninsula in north-east Africa projected towards the Arabian Peninsula, from which it is separated only by the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden. Washed also by the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean from Somalia southwards, this region is a natural crossroads between Africa and Asia at large. Because of this, for thousands of years that Africa subregion has attracted all kinds of comers, from ancient Roman and Greek merchants to Modern-era European explorers and religious missionaries, not to mention Arab, Persian, and Indian seafarers too. Toponymy itself offers a link to this rich past, as the region abounds with placenames rooted in Greek, Roman, Portuguese, Arabic, Persian, and Italian words, among others. An example of this is the name that used to be given to the whole area itself by ancient Greeks and Romans, “regio aromatica” (Jaenen, 1957, p. 147), because of the aromatic plants present there and the spices traded along the sea routes nearby. Already by the early centuries AD, then, the region had assumed considerable importance for maritime trade. Yet, this inevitably also brought challenges, one of them being the threat of piracy. Precisely its peculiar geographical position, as the southern gateway to the Red Sea which gives access to the Indian Ocean via the Bab el-Mandeb strait, has since made the Horn relevant not only to global traders but to pirates too. Far from being just a problem of our present times, naval engagements between local pirates and foreign commercial navies in the Gulf of Aden have been common since ancient times and became particularly tense in the late middle ages and beginning of sixteenth century (Boot, 2009), at the apogee of the Portuguese’s and others’ maritime empires in the Indian Ocean. Today, a good part of the Horn of Africa’s geostrategic relevance remains solidly tied to the wealth of the maritime trade routes passing by the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. Currently, that strait passes all the seaborne oil going from

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the Persian Gulf to Europe, Turkey, and the Arab Levant. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, that amounted to 6 million barrels of oil per day in 2019, nearly 9% of the total seaborne oil trade of that year (EIA, 2019). That is why trade disruptions in the area can have a truly global impact. Among the numerous potential sources of disruption, the seizure of foreign vessels by local pirates has remained a major threat against safe shipping, especially for smaller vessels unable to adopt tight security measures to protect themselves, although it is no longer as serious as in 2007–2012, when piracy peaked and international military operations started being deployed in the area precisely with the objective to fight it (EPRS, 2019, p. 6). But equally threatening has recently been the menace of missile attacks by non-state groups in the region, especially in Yemen, as well as the presence of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen (AQAP) and al-Shabaab in Somalia. To a lower degree, also the illegal cross-border flows of people and arms, often in the hand of criminal networks, have remained a disruptive force in the area and a source of tension among regional countries (Calabrese, 2020). Over the centuries, the political landscape of the region has evolved swiftly, with numerous African kingdoms and empires coming one after the other, until the rise of modern states, in a process which probably has not concluded yet. The region, indeed, is still evolving. Just ten years ago it saw the birth of the youngest internationally recognised state of the international community, South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan in 2011, and today it still hosts several other entities such as Somaliland which have not fully abandoned their dreams of independence yet. In fairness, today the Horn still lacks an unequivocal political demarcation, as there is no consensus on which countries are to be considered part of it. In academic and diplomatic circles alike, demarcations vary from the narrowest one which includes only Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Clapham, 2017), to much broader ones, which instead make use of demarcations local states gave themselves when in 1986 they set up the regional economic community “Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development” (since 1996 renamed Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD), hence adding Kenya, Sudan (including South Sudan since 2011), and Uganda to those previously mentioned. This chapter takes the middle ground, focussing on Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Because of the historical evidence of the high degree of security interdependence among them, these five countries can be considered as part of a unique regional security

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complex of its own, where primary security concerns are “so interlinked that [they] cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, 2003, pp. 140–141; Buzan & Weaver, 2003). The region thus defined has witnessed forms of external interference at different stages of history, as a good number of European and Asian powers sooner or later tried to establish commercial outposts in the area, if not colonial dependencies proper. During the final years of the Cold War, namely after the 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan definitely brought these two countries outside the U.S. sphere of influence, for Washington the Horn became the middle point of an emerging new arc of instability stretching from the Maghreb to Afghanistan (Schraeder & Rosati, 1987). But instead of commanding attention, after the end of the Cold War and the failure of the international community’s intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s (Schraeder, 1993; Verhoeven, 2009), foreign powers adopted a gradual, “cynical disengagement” (Clough 1992, p. 193) from the Horn of Africa. It was only at the turn of the millennium that emerging and traditional powers alike embarked on a new competition for political spheres of influence in the no-more-neglected continent (Carmody, 2011) in order to exploit natural resources and set strategic outposts for further political and commercial expansion, among other things. At first, this new scramble for Africa saw the primary role of China (Alden, 2007), then also other actors rediscovered the practical value of the Horn in particular, be it for broad power projection and commercial aims, in the case of Gulf and other Asian actors, or specifically for the war on terror in the case of the U.S.. The latter was not a surprise, considering that the region had long been characterised by politically weak and fragile states, prone to conflicts and military seizures of power (Bereketeab, 2013; Carbone & Pellegata, 2020, pp. 121-ff.). Although with varying degrees, still today the leaders of Horn countries can exert only a rough control of their territory and borders, facilitating the emergence of insurgencies and transnational terrorism. Never since 1991, when Siad Barre was overthrown by rebel forces, has Somalia had a properly functioning government, having rather been held up as an archetype of failed and fragile states ever since. But even a more stable and richer country like Ethiopia, who has been recording GDP annual growth rates among the highest in the world for ten years now, has been constantly shaken by domestic ethnic tensions and political violence (Lyons, 2019; Addis et al., 2020). This very inability of Horn states to safeguard their own regimes

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and security interests eventually makes them a space open to foreign influence and competition (Clapham, 2017). This became even more so after the 2011 Arab Springs and the 2015 war in Yemen. These two events contributed to bringing back to the Horn of Africa greater political attention especially from powers of the Persian Gulf subregion, including Iran.

3

The Dimensions of Iran’s Presence in the Region

The previous section revealed the numerous factors which made and still make the Horn of Africa a very coveted spot for many foreign powers. Iran is no exception, as the following examination of its sophisticated Horn strategy reveals. Among the experts in the field, Tehran’s approach to the region is often known as “southern strategy” (Ameliot & Gardet, 2011) or, less frequently, “Irafrique” (Korinman, 2010, p. 13). Whichever the name, it came under the spotlight especially in the past two decades as a result of Ahmadinejad’s much-hyped Africa push but, in a more subtle way, had been very active for much longer. Shortly after the revolution, Iran began projecting its power abroad in order to break the feeling of isolation and otherness it came to experience even more than before after it became an Islamic Republic. Encircling the rival Gulf monarchies and developing its own influence in Africa and beyond has since been devised as a way to mitigate the long-standing strategic loneliness derived from its very peculiar political, ideological, and religious configuration which made it unique in the West Asia region. Hype aside, it effectively gained definitive momentum after 2005, during Ahmadinejad’s years of stark confrontation with Western powers on nuclear enrichment rights, with the establishment of new partnerships and a more intense maritime presence in the Horn region. Overall, Iran’s Horn strategy can be described as comprising four dimensions and related objectives, all to some degree useful to break the overall feeling of isolation Iran has long been grappling with. First, it is a strategy which works towards building political partnerships proper, by reaching out especially to countries holding seats and votes in international fora and which can be aptly leveraged to get much-needed support in regional and international diplomatic contexts, mainly but not only for Tehran’s nuclear programme (Rubin, 2013). Such Iranian effort was definitely facilitated by the fact Tehran did not use to attach human

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rights-related political strings to its partnerships. It is no coincidence that Iran’s most significant inroads abroad happened specifically in authoritarian states similarly marginalised by the international community (the Horn is a case in point, especially its “pariah” countries under terrorismrelated sanctions such as Eritrea and Sudan), as they themselves prefer dealing with foreign powers which do not condition their relations on sensitive political pre-conditions. Second, another dimension of Iran’s Horn strategy is related to the establishment of a military presence at sea and on land, in order to monitor the lucrative trade flows passing through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, to provide military support to local affiliated groups, and to contain and deter the rival monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. The Horn is indeed the perfect logistical hub to preside over the flux of weapons Iran smuggles towards aligned state and non-state forces in the region and beyond (Leff & LeBrun, 2014, p. 58), but also to disrupt its rivals’ own flows (Korinman 2010). Third, besides political and military influence, Iran’s Horn strategy also consists of investing in cultural, scientific, and humanitarian cooperation, by means of scholarships, specialised education institutes, cultural and religious centres, as well as humanitarian organisations (Jones & Newlee, 2019, pp. 5–6). These soft power instruments, just like hard power’s coercion and economic inducements, are eventually employed to create a suitable ground for gaining influence and access to markets, but differently from others they can also facilitate the penetration of Tehran’s revolutionary principles in the region, in the name of a common struggle against colonialism and imperialism. This is especially the aim of educational, cultural, and religious events organised by the Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation and its cultural centres abroad, but more indirectly it is also a side-objective of charitable foundations’ humanitarian activities (ivi, p. 5). Despite the fact that later other dimensions would take on a more central position in Iran’s Horn strategy, these soft power efforts are still being expended today in many African regions, mostly through the cultural and relief centres Iran manages on the continent and which has quietly kept expanding also as of late (State House of Uganda, 2017). It is indeed quite clear that the medical and social services provided by the Iranian Red Crescent and other relief organisations through hospitals, schools, and religious centres have ultimately earned the Islamic Republic “approval and praise” in several African countries (Lefebvre, 2019, p. 147). However, in the Horn especially, the exploitation of this

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religious-ideological dimension as a tool to facilitate or legitimise its intervention has always been more constrained than in other African regions, partly because of the very demography of these local countries, quite unfavourable to receiving Iran’s Shia doctrine and revolutionary principles. After all, in the Horn, anti-imperialist principles can at most strike a significant chord only with some groups in similarly isolated and revolutionary regimes such as 1990s’ Sudan. But, most importantly, it is the absence of significant Shia communities among the local Muslim population (Momen, 1987, p. 280; Pew Research Centre, 2009), where Sunni Maliki and Shafi’i schools prevail, that makes the region largely alien to extreme sectarian narratives at all, to the detriment of Iran’s ideological penetration. It is indeed extremely difficult to replicate the more successful model of West Africa, where Lebanese communities who populate that area have often been used by Hezbollah cells close to Iran to penetrate in the region (Jones & Newlee, 2019). This does not mean, though, that leaders in the Horn have never played the sectarian card in order to jockey external political support—as Sudan and Somalia did in the mid-2010s, when they closed the Iranian embassies and cultural centres hosted in their capitals. Finally, along a fourth, economic dimension, Iran’s Horn strategy also aims to develop stronger trade relations with local partners, as a way to find new, promising markets where to promote its economic-commercial interests especially at times in which its exports are severely affected by Western-led sanctions. While in other African subregions some countries have also been approached by Iran specifically for their uranium resources (Rubin, 2013), this is hardly the case for Horn countries which, lacking such valuable nuclear-related resources, have rather always been net importers (including of crude oil) in the bilateral trade with Iran (Unctad, 2020). Moreover, linking the economic and the security dimensions, it remains crucial for Iran to maintain a foothold in a region which is the transit point of all the oil tankers and cargos, Iranians and not, sailing between Europe and Asia. As this cursory overview of the strategy’s dimensions and related objectives shows, Iran’s projection in the Horn is indeed a complex and sophisticated strategy where state, state-affiliated, and non-governmental entities have been involved, and multiple instruments used. As some scholars have pointed out (Lob, 2016), development aid supplied by the Jahad-i Sazandegi, what would later become the Iranian Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (ivi, p. 326), and religious charity organisations in sectors

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such as agriculture, education, and healthcare has been a constant tool of Iran’s Africa agenda, whereas military assistance and trade have been more prone to severe fluctuations because of sanctions and other international constraints. The following empirical analysis of Iran’s presence in the Horn is arranged precisely in a chronological order to appreciate the evolution in the use of these instruments across successive Iranian presidencies.

4 Taking the Broader View: Before the Revolution The history of Iran’s presence in the Horn began in earnest during the Achaemenid era (550–330 BC), expanded slightly during the Sasanian Empire (224–651 AD), and eventually blossomed after some Persian seafarers, the so-called Shirazi people, settled in East Africa around the tenth century AD (Arabahmadi, 2018). Today the cultural legacy of such historical connections is still visible in the language and lifestyle of some East African communities. It is the case of some East African countries’ custom to celebrate the Persian new year (Nowruz), which coincides with the beginning of spring, and of the presence of Persian-rooted words in the Swahili vocabulary and in local toponyms such as Zanzibar (‘coast of the blacks’ in ancient Persian), Benadir (‘port’), and Mogadishu (‘throne of the shah’, according to some etymological interpretations. Cf. Unruh, 2018). Moving to contemporary times, relations with African countries have kept a special place in Iran’s foreign policy both before and after the 1979 revolution which gave rise to the Islamic Republic. Although the focus of this chapter is on the period after the 1979 revolution, a general review of the Shah Reza Pahlavi’s Africa policy in the last years before his ousting remains crucial to understand some obstacles the Islamic Republic would face few years later. The Shah’s Africa policy was a clear exhibition of the anti-communist containment attitude adopted by several Cold War’s U.S. allies (Lefebvre, 2019). In this context, the Shah’s Iran was one of the countries which took part in the Safari Club, the then secret regional alliance created with the blessing of the U.S. to avert the “common Soviet danger” emerging in Africa in those years (Mamdani,2005, p. 85). Thanks to higher oil exports and revenues resulting from the increase in oil production (Razavi, 1983), in the 1970s the Shah could increase Iran’s economic and military assistance to many countries of the Africa

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continent, both to prove that he was a faithful U.S. ally and also to gain a strategic foothold there. The focus was especially on South Africa and the Horn. In the latter, the Shah managed to carve out a flourish relationship with Sudan’s President Jaafar Nimeiry based on several bilateral agreements of economic assistance; he maintained excellent relations with the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974), motivated also by the common threat posed by Egyptian president Nasser’s pan-Arabism to non-Arab regional competitors like them; and, finally, once Somalia’s Siad Barre broke up with the Soviet Union in 1977, he also provided military support to his troops involved in the Ogaden war against the Derg, Ethiopia’s new communist military regime (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 175ff.). The Shah’s activities on the continent were not always met with widespread approval. Iran’s “disturbing” intervention in the Ogaden war was publicly criticised by the Organisation of the African Unity (OUA), the precursor of the African Union (ivi, p. 138). In those years the Shah received OUA’s criticism also for the economic support given to South Africa’s apartheid regime, as by the early 1970s Iran had become its largest oil supplier (Chehabi, 2016). After the fall of the monarchy, Africa and the Horn would remain an important foreign policy adventure for the Islamic Republic too, albeit in a much broader and varied way in terms of objectives and instruments than the Shah’s oil-funded transactional approach (FRUS, 1974).

5

Early Post-1979 Revolutionary Connections

In the first years after the revolution, the Islamic Republic’s Africa policy yielded mixed results. Because of domestic power struggles, Iran had no resources to keep up, let alone expand, its foreign policy to regions beyond its more proximate neighbourhood. The change of regime and the complete turnaround of relations with the U.S. caused the immediate breakdown of the most important relationships Iran had established with African countries at the time of the Shah. Iran ended its support to the apartheid regime in South Africa and began supporting Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress as well as Ethiopia’s new Derg regime (Arabahmadi, 2018), at least initially. With the outbreak of the war with Iraq (1980–1988), while most of the international community took Saddam Hussein’s side, one of the few countries in the world which eventually sold few combat aircraft to Iran during the war was precisely Ethiopia,

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much in need of extra revenue in a context of domestic economic difficulties (Razoux, 2015, p. 555). In those years also the relationship with Sudan, which very soon afterwards would yet become the major pivot of the Islamic Republic’s projection into the Horn and beyond, broke down, at least at the highest diplomatic level. After all, Sudan’s president Nimeiry was still a pro-West leader who collaborated with the Shah and supported Iraq during the war. He had no interest in forging anything special with a new Islamic Republic which could rather become a source of inspiration for uprisings at home. Unsurprisingly, then, in the early 1980s, on the basis of a secret but consolidated partnership which had already seen several Israeli covert operations carried out on the Sudanese soil to rescue Ethiopian Jews, Nimeiry did not reject the Israelis’ request to use his territory in their plots against Khomeini’s regime (Melman, 2020). Iran resumed decisively its activities abroad and in Africa only after the spring of 1982, once the war against Iraq entered a phase of deadlock. At that point in time, the Africa policy of the recently established Islamic Republic was mostly driven by the need to find supporters for the war with Iraq and to acquire international recognition, including in the form of formal diplomatic ties. Tehran also worked towards raising awareness about its revolutionary ideology, so to see it succeed in other countries as well. Yet Africa did not offer a fertile ground for the diffusion of such revolutionary principles, considering the scarcity of Islamist governments at the time on the continent and the low compatibility of the more moderate African Muslim population with such radical principles (CIA, 1984). Of course, there were exceptions, including in the Horn, as demonstrated by the enthusiasm the Iranian revolution did generate among many young Islamists in Sudan. Little did they know then that their originally low-level connections between Khartoum’s and Qom’s religious centres would evolve into one of the Horn of Africa’s longest and most problematic state-to-state partnerships of recent decades. In 1983 Sudan itself became officially an Islamic Republic, having Nimeiry imposed by his own autonomous decision the sharia, the Islamic law, in all the country. The move was politically astute and potentially beneficial in his opinion, as it occurred at a time in which Islamism was advancing, apart from in Iran, also in Sadat’s Egypt and other Muslim countries (Warburg, 1990, p. 628). Nimeiry feared those examples could inspire an Islamist insurgency at home, considering that a delegation of young Islamist led by Hassan al-Turabi—the elusive leader of the

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National Islamic Front (NIF) who, in the following years under Omar al-Bashir’s rule would become the co-master of the Sudanese political sphere (Ronen, 2014; Young, 2019)—went to Tehran to congratulate Khomeini and seek support for his own domestic cause (Burr and Collins 2003, pp. 30-ff.). So, while he did introduce the sharia in the country, he also ordered the police to suppress any demonstration supportive of the Iranian revolution (Musso, 2016, p. 72). The time was not ripe yet for taking a step forward, so official ties between Iran and Sudan were established only after Nimeiry was ousted with a bloodless coup d’état in 1985 and the new Sudanese Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986– 1989), went on an official visit to Tehran. But, considering al-Mahdi’s proximity to Israel too (Melman, 2020), ties would eventually get solid only after Bashir took power in an Islamist-supported coup in 1989. And so, while until 1989 the Islamic Republic had not managed yet to create any special relationship with African countries, the advent of Bashir’s regime in Sudan (1989–2019) could finally turn the tide. To be clear, although he worked towards normalising Sudan’s ties with the Islamic Republic, Bashir did not ultimately craft an exclusive partnership with Tehran, but rather astutely opted to keep cordial relations also with Iraq and other Gulf countries, to name a few major neighbours of both. Sudan’s ties with Iran were maintained robust especially by the Sudanese Islamist movement of the NIF which was then backing Bashir’s presidency and which had already established good working relations with the Iranian Islamic Republic in the early post-revolutionary years. Several members of the NIF’s security apparatus had even been to Iran to get training from the intelligence services of Khomeini’s regime (Marchal, 1992, p. 68; Marchal, 1995, p. 24) while other recruits, especially those making up Sudan’s secret paramilitaries called al-Nizham al-Khass (“secret organization” in Arabic), had been dispatched abroad to learn guerrilla techniques from the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well Gaddafi in Libya in the 70s and early 80s (Musso, 2016, pp. 106-ff.). So, overall, at the end of the 1980s Iran’s presence in Africa was slightly rosier than in the first revolutionary years. Iran had 18 embassies in sub-Saharan Africa (CIA, 1984) and some good, albeit non-exclusive, working relations, based not only on oil contracts, as the Shah largely did, but also on developmental assistance and ideological connections. In the latter regard, Iran tried to develop ties with groups of young Islamists also in other Horn countries, such as Somalia and neighbouring Kenya, two regional countries providing military facilities to the U.S. (Lefebvre,

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1991, pp. 175-ff.). But it was especially with Khartoum that the potential for a comprehensive relationship emerged more clearly.

6

Raising the Stakes

Facing the need to rebuild the economy after the ruinous war with Iraq (1980–1988), in the early 1990s under the leadership of the new president Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and the new Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who replaced Khomeini after his death in 1989) the Islamic Republic embarked on a much more pragmatic foreign policy, largely stripped of its original ideological zeal, and instead more focussed on political dialogue in the region and beyond (Marschall, 2003, pp. 55ff.). This did not mean, of course, that Iran renounced the activities of the Jahad-i Sazandegi (Lob 2016). Such activities, which included aid to agricultural local enterprises, training courses, and, when appropriate, depending on the country’s demographic profile, also the establishment of cultural and religious centres, remained a major tool for advancing Iran’s Horn strategy. Ethiopia was a case in point. In those years, it was, besides Sudan, the major Horn country Iran tried to develop significant and multi-faceted relations with, taking advantage of its long presence there through its embassy, established back in the 1960s, and more recently also through its cultural centre. Ethiopia’s dire economic conditions in the early 1990s urged Addis Ababa’s transitioning government to look for economic help from wherever it may be secured (Alemu, 2020), including from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was itself emerging from a conflict-driven economic downturn. Initially, their relationship grew stronger, so much that in 1992 Ethiopia even opened an embassy in Tehran (Arabahmadi, 2018). Yet, Addis was soon forced to close it down because of the few commercial benefits it was able to reap from it. Against this backdrop of quite unsuccessful attempts to courting other regional countries, Iran’s closest ally in Africa and the Horn in the 1990s remained, by far, Sudan. With the rise of a new military-Islamists ruling élite at the end of the 1980s, exemplified by the duopoly of Bashir and Turabi (Moorcraft 2015, pp. 95 ff.), and the isolation derived from the 1993 anti-terrorism sanctions the United States imposed on its government, Sudan found to have a lot of common ground with Iran, and this could not but help consolidate an even closer partnership between the two, despite the apparent religious Sunni-Shia divide between them. Despite the international isolation both were suffering from, each had

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something to gain from the other. Constrained by Washington’s new sanctions, Sudan had to secure new sources of financial and military aid, and, despite the distress of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran could provide military training and facilitate the purchase of weapons from China and North Korea (Musso, 2016, p. 113). For Tehran, instead, the major benefit from Sudan came from its strategic geographical position, where it intended to establish a military foothold. The fact that Sudan was at the time the only African country ruled by an Islamist regime clearly facilitated the strengthening of the relationship but, apart from the effective ideological inspiration some Sudanese Islamists found in the new Iranian project, their bilateral relationship in those years stood out not exactly for their religious cooperation but rather for the growing military connections between their security forces. In December 1991, reciprocating Bashir’s visit made to Tehran two years before (Burr & Collins, 2003, p. 32), Rafsanjani visited Khartoum heading a 200-member delegation which included the head of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and of the intelligence (Makinda, 1993, p. 110). Hard on the heels of the visit came a wave of agreements involving especially the energy and military sectors. Tehran began supplying Sudan with oil, military vehicles, and $300 m Chinese-made weapons, and reportedly also sent 800 IRGC forces to train the Sudanese troops in special camps of the country (Makinda, 1993, p. 110). Even more, Karthoum’s decision to institutionalise the so-called Popular Defence Forces closely resembled what Iran did with the creation of paramilitary militias and forces such as the bassij and the IRGC (Musso, 2016, pp. 96–98). Just like them, this Sudanese praetorian corps, ideologically linked to Turabi’s Islamist élite, was a powerful channel of indoctrination and of self-immolation on the frontline—those killed were officially recognised as shuhada, martyrs (Marchal & Ahmed, 2010, pp. 201–202)—with a size nearly twice the forces of the regular army (Salih 1998, pp. 76–77). Some politicians and commentators of the time began drawing parallels between Iran’s involvement in Sudan and the older Iranian presence in Lebanon (ivi, p. 111). The comparison was actually quite extravagant, considering the many differences between the Lebanese and Sudanese leaderships and populations, but Washington grew increasingly concerned over Sudan’s linkages with Iran and Iranianbacked radical groups nonetheless (Prunier, 1998). It did not take long before such growing ties—together with the arrival in Sudan of terrorist

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groups and personalities such as al-Qaida’s Osama bin Laden (1991– 1996) (Wright, 2006, pp. 145-ff.) and the emergence of new, albeit quite fragmentary, evidence about a tripartite agreement among Turabi’s NIF, Bin Laden, and Iran (CIA, 1997)—eventually convinced the Clinton administration to impose sanctions on Khartoum (O’Sullivan, 2003, pp. 236-ff.). In August 1993, the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher designated Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism for its aggressive expansion of Political Islam and the support given to international terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal Organisation, Palestine’s Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah (U.S. Department of State, 2019, p. 200), other than the above-mentioned al-Qaida. The decision was taken despite the opposition of the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Khartoum Donald Petterson (Petterson, 2003) and, ultimately, contrary to what Washington had wished for, it just ended up strengthening the partnership between Sudan and Iran even further. Far from giving up, in 1996 the U.S. took the lead on a UN resolution to impose also multilateral sanctions on Sudan and relocated its diplomatic personnel away from Khartoum, to further isolate Sudan. But, again, this just persuaded its leadership to expand its security ties also with other non-U.S. aligned powers such as China and Russia (Gallopin & Manek, 2020). Only in the final years of the 1990s, Iran’s relation which Sudan suffered a setback. On the one hand, this was partly the result of Iran’s domestic changes due to the election of a new, reformist president, Mohammad Khatami (1997–2004), whose agenda focussed on tying new relations with the West, especially the European Union, on the basis of a much-needed “dialogue among civilizations” (Petito, 2004), which in the specific case of the EU in 1998 formally became the Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran (EU Commission, 2001). On the other hand, this was also driven by Sudan’s own domestic reshuffles. Bashir had grown more willing to repair ties with the international community and thus embarked on a process aimed at isolating some Islamist forces he had been sharing power with. The first signals of a potential reorientation of Bashir’s foreign alignments emerged when Bashir reset the leadership at the Interior and Intelligence ministry, replacing some NIF key members with military officials more loyal to him (Musso, 2016, p. 118). But the most crucial breakthrough for Sudan’s foreign and domestic politics came a couple of years later. After the two al-Qaida attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es-Salaam (Tanzania) in

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August 1998, the U.S. retaliated by destroying the al-Shifah pharmaceutical factory on the outskirts of Khartoum—then mistakenly thought to be used by Bin Laden to produce nerve gas (Croddy, 2002)—and tightened even more unilateral sanctions against the African country. Those U.S. moves did not go unnoticed and rather convinced Bashir to mend his ties with Washington (Marchal, 2004a). That entailed not only to definitely marginalise Turabi and his reckless Islamist foreign policy but also to distance the country from countries such as Iran which, during the second half of the 1990s, became itself the object of a tougher round of U.S. sanctions under Clinton’s dual containment policy in the Persian Gulf (OFAC, 2018). In early 2001 Turabi was arrested on security charges (it was not the first time, though) and, later that year, Sudan’s intelligence services became a valued partner with the CIA for 9/11 counterterrorism efforts. Yet, Washington’s cool reaction towards Bashir’s signs of opening eventually put his plans on hold and, what is more, ended up drawing Khartoum and Tehran closer together again. As shown below, all this was also facilitated by the election of a new president in Iran, the ultra-radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

7

Sparking Mayhem: Ahmadinejad’s Africa Push

The relaunch of Iran’s Horn strategy around the mid-2000s was indeed the result of several major factors, including the election of Ahmadinejad namely a staunch promoter of a more assertive Africa policy, and the disposition of local Horn leaders not to resist it. Among these leaders was also Bashir, who, as anticipated above, was still viewed with suspicion by the West. The outbreak of the Darfur civil war in the east of Sudan in 2003 definitely could not help him win their hearts and minds, but he still believed to have done enough to achieve a major breakthrough in their relationships. A signal in this direction arrived in May 2004 when, on the basis of Sudan’s support given to the CIA for 9/11 counter-terrorism intelligence, the U.S. certified “that five countries [were] not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria” (Department of State, 2004), hence excluding Sudan from that list of non-cooperative countries in counterterrorism efforts for the first time since 1993. Yet, despite these improvements, Washington did not remove Sudan from the much more grievous list of States Sponsors of Terrorism (it would do so only in October 2020. Cf. White House, 2020). Disappointed with this choice, Sudan decided to move even closer to Iran.

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Although Bashir was initially reluctant to host Iranian missiles on its territory (Ameliot and Gardet, 2011, p. 451), in 2008 Tehran and Khartoum crowned decades of security collaboration by finally signing a full-fledged military cooperation agreement, which consisted in the supply of Iranian arms and drones (Leff & Lebrun, 2014, p. 63), training activities, and the access to local facilities and warehouses (Fick, 2012). On the Iranian side, the rise of an ultra-radical and third-worldist president like Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005 had given way to a new political phase marked both by the rhetorical return to original revolutionary values and by a major activism in foreign policy, including in Africa. Both ideologically and pragmatically, African countries were seen as helpful partners in breaking the tighter international isolation caused by new nuclear-related sanctions imposed by a large part of the international community in those years, including in terms of alternative trade markets, but also in terms of diplomatic support in multilateral fora. Eloquent symbols of all these efforts, 2008 was defined the year of the expansion of Iran-Africa ties while 2010 stood out for the organisation of the first (and so far only) Iran-Africa forum, a meeting rife with antiimperialism sentiment which saw the participation of representatives of 40 African countries (Tehran Times, 2010), including some heads of state and foreign ministers. On top of this, in 2011, Tehran was also enlisted as an observing member of the African Union (Lefebvre, 2019). But another signal of the growing Iranian focus on the African continent and specifically its Horn region was the intensification of Iranian officials’ state visits to those countries. During his two terms, Ahmadinejad himself travelled to more than ten African countries, including Djibouti and Sudan in the Horn, and sent his ministers to many others. Concurrently, Iran also approved the opening of four new embassies in Africa, three of which in the Horn (in Djibouti, Somalia, and the newly born South Sudan. Cf. DefenceWeb, 2012). In these years, apart from the above-mentioned consolidation of military ties with Sudan, which the then Minister of Defence Najjar and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki defined as the cornerstone of strategic and economic relations with Africa (ISNA, 2010; Rasanah, 2016), also came the strengthening of relations between Iran and another country of the Horn of Africa, Eritrea. These two countries too entered into military cooperation in the mid-2000s (UNSC, 2011). Even before achieving independence, the Eritrean movement, represented by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (Connell, 2019, p. 218), had in Iran

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a discreet supporter. In this regard, in the 1980s, for a while Tehran even hosted one of its few representative offices abroad (Arabahmadi, 2018). But once it achieved independence in 1993, Eritrea decided to side with the U.S.-aligned group of regional states in the Horn, at least until 1998, when the war with Ethiopia—fought until 2000 but eventually solved only in 2018 after nearly two decades of low-level skirmishes (Woldemariam, 2019)—pushed Eritrea into great international isolation. The relation between Eritrea and the international community grew increasingly tense until the point in which, in 2006, a UN report (UNSC, 2006) began accusing Asmara of supporting armed groups in Somalia, both by facilitating weapons transfers to those groups, which included the Islamic Courts Union from which the al-Shabaab movement would split off in late 2006, and by hosting some of their key figures on its soil. Three years later these accusations would turn into a multilateral sanction regime against the Eritrean government (UNSC, 2009). Just like Sudan in the early 1990s, for the isolated regime of Asmara it became necessary to begin approaching Iran, a country until then antagonised for its islamisation policies in the region (Connell, 2019, p. 312; Lefebvre, 2012). Inquiries about the possibility to forge diplomatic links and get military support had already been initiated in 2002. Then, after 2006, in a very short time Eritrea moved from zero diplomatic relations with Tehran to, first, appointing non-resident ambassadors, and, secondly, offering Iran the possibility to use its ports in exchange for financial assistance (UNSC, 2011). No sooner said than done, Iran accepted and, in 2009, Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki granted Iranian navies access to its naval base in the port of Assab. Under the coordination of Amr al-Musawi, Iran’s reference point for Eritrea in those years and former cultural attaché at the Iranian embassy in Khartoum (ibidem), the country signed several agreements with Tehran, officially for civilian purposes but also including some relevant military activities. This new partnership with Iran initially gave Asmara the illusion to be able to counterbalance the alliance between the U.S. and Ethiopia and break its international isolation (Connell, 2019, p. 314). But, just like what Sudan would begin doing shortly after, as soon as Asmara perceived a change in the regional context, it did not care to abruptly shift allegiances. After all, Eritrea’s rapprochement with Tehran had been driven by purely pragmatic reasons, and in fact while allowing Tehran to use its naval base Asmara also made similar military concessions to Israel which, concerned with the expansion of Iran’s area of operations in the Red Sea, allegedly established “listening posts” on

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mount Amba Sawara and in the Dahlak archipelago (Stratfor, 2012). The inability of Tehran to anchor this relationship on ideological tenets and support it with finance and investment flows eventually induced Eritrea to return to its “Arabian friends” (Plaut, 2019, p. 81), as evocatively shown by the two-day visit Isaias paid to Riyadh in April 2015. In addition to the above-mentioned cases of Sudan and Eritrea, in the years of Ahmadinejad’s Africa push Tehran also strengthened links with several other East African countries, including Somalia, seen more in detail in a later section, and Djibouti (AsiaNews, 2011). With the latter, some first signals of rapprochement actually came at the end of the 1990s, but economic and political cooperation did substantially increase only under Ahmadinejad’s presidency from 2005 onwards when the two countries signed several cooperation protocols related to trade exchanges, credit lines, and energy and infrastructure developments (Farrar-Wellman, 2009). Djibouti’s President Guelleh also promised diplomatic support to Tehran’s nuclear enrichment programme and a stronger military relationship. As a result, numerous high-level diplomatic visits took place between the two countries, Iranian vessels were allowed to dock in Djibouti’s ports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016), economic links improved, and, in light of Tehran’s then flourishing ties with both, the then Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki was even asked to mediate in the just-erupted border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea (Tehran Times, 2008). Against this background, then, it is clear that under Ahmadinejad Iran succeeded in increasing its penetration in the Horn, forging new partnerships around the Arabian Peninsula, and intensifying its naval presence off its coast and near the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The commercial and humanitarian nature of some of these initiatives, definitely boosted by the rise in oil prices in 2005–2013, should not obscure Tehran’s ultimate aim to obtain political and military collaboration. In 2006 Iran eventually became an object of UN nuclear-related sanctions, those which were strongly advocated by Washington after the revelation of a secret enrichment programme in 2002, and which would remain in place until Iran’s historic nuclear deal (JCPOA) was reached in 2015. To counter the growing West-driven pressure, Ahmadinejad decided to embark on a more assertive southern strategy which saw in Africa and the Horn a pool of votes to be leveraged in international fora in support of his nuclear programme. But the rise in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden around 2007 also offered the president valid justification to increase its military naval presence too (IRNA, 2012b). Piracy was indeed touted by Iranian

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authorities as the official reason behind their growing dispatch of vessels to the area since November 2008, namely when Somali pirates hijacked the Iranian cargo MV Delight off the coast of Yemen (Reuters, 2009). However, it also offered a convenient cover-up for its more questionable activities such as arms trafficking (Abu Amer, 2020) directed either to other countries within the African continent or to the north, through the Sinai, to its regional partners in Lebanon and Gaza, where in 2007 Hamas took power. The establishment of such military networks was made possible by the above-mentioned series of visits and bilateral agreements reached in 2008–2009 with Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan. Iran’s navy paid numerous visits to their Red Sea ports (Ahmad Al-Nour, 2012) while its Revolutionary Guards of the Qods Force’s Africa Corps (Modell & Asher, 2013) oversaw the ground operations on the continent. However, Horn countries never embraced Iran’s revolutionary principles without reservation, as they remained unwilling to jeopardise existing or potential investments from other extra-regional powers. Even those already isolated by the international community and sympathetic to Iran’s anti-Americanism never accommodated Iran for ideological reasons. As a result, Iran’s relationships with Horn countries could hardly ever result in long-time, stable partnerships. Problematic issues and intrinsic weaknesses eventually came to the fore, even more so after the counter-offensive launched by Iran’s rival powers in the Horn from the late 2000s onwards. Already during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s rising influence in the Horn piqued the interest of its regional competitors, mostly Israel and Saudi Arabia, which have since embarked on a more assertive Horn agenda themselves. Indeed, Iran’s growing presence in the Horn was perceived as a serious threat by the monarchies of the Gulf and Israel too. Until the mid-2010s, much noisier than Riyadh’s was actually Tel Aviv, which launched a series of military actions aimed at the containment, if not rollback proper, of the Islamic Republic’s activities in the Horn. Just like in other regional scenarios, in the Horn Israel never hesitated to intervene directly when its interests were under threat. Several reasons, both international (Tehran’s more assertive presence in the Horn) and domestic (changes in Israeli politics), eventually urged Israel to act. Iran used to be an important partner of Israel immediately after the latter’s creation, but relations worsened after 1979, when the new Islamic Republic began supporting Hamas and Hezbollah to counter Israel’s occupation of their territories. It was only after 2009, the year in which Benjamin Netanyahu came back to

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power, that the tensions between the two countries would take centre stage in the Horn dynamics. Sudan’s regime itself did no longer pose a direct threat to the international community as Osama Bin Laden had been expelled in 1996 and Turabi arrested in 2001, but the Sudanese territory continued being a safe haven for arms smugglers. That was one of the reasons why in those years an updated version of Israel’s old “periphery strategy”, aiming at establishing partnerships with countries in the region and the world, re-emerged in East Africa too (Gidron, 2020, pp. 60-ff.). Together with the threat of the Arab Spring, Iran’s growing presence in the Red Sea had to be actively countered. Although it never admitted its involvement and the news itself became public only months later, in January and February 2009 Israel reportedly ordered airstrikes against a convoy of dozens of trucks in the Sudanese desert near Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2009) and, according to more contentious reports, also against an Iranian ship in the Red Sea (Haaretz, 2009) after concluding they were involved in the transfer of weapons and rockets to Hamas, which also had close ties with Bashir in those years (Miller, 2014). Anti-Iranian attacks in Sudan continued also in the following years, despite Sudanese authorities’ frequent hesitation about disclosing information related to the perpetrators and the events themselves (Fick, 2012; Miller, 2014). First, in April 2011 a suspected Israeli raid hit a car with an alleged Hamas member in the area of Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2011). Then, several reports concluded that Israel was behind both the explosion which hit the Yarmouk weapons complex outside Khartoum in October 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012) and the airstrike against an ammunition warehouse of a military training camp in al-Gaili, near the capital, in July 2014 (Miller, 2014). Additionally, in March 2014, in the Red Sea waters between Eritrea and Sudan, Israeli naval commandos hijacked the Klos-C, a Panamanian-flagged civilian ship directed to Port Sudan but suspected of smuggling Iranian rockets to Gaza. While hijackings were definitely not an original modus operandi, as Israel’s record of Iranian-linked ship seizures in the Red Sea dated back to 2002 with the Karine-A affair (Whitaker, 2002), that specific event forced Sudan to publicly distance itself from Iran’s smuggling activities (Sudan Tribune, 2014) which had long been carried out through Sudan’s desert areas near the Egyptian border and which stopped only when Bashir broke with Tehran in 2014–2016. Precisely in those years, also thanks to the emergence of young, assertive figures domestically, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE too

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began exhibiting a new dynamism in their engagement in Horn issues, albeit often taking opposite sides. These powers had long followed a “riyalpolitik” approach to the region (Meester et al., 2018), a form of monetised engagement consisting of investments and financial help but also Islamic education and training in the local countries (ICG, 2019, pp. 10-ff.). Yet, the magnitude of a series of threatening events that shook the region between 2011 and 2015 was such as to convince especially Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to embark on a more assertive approach (Dentice & Donelli, 2020).

8

Widening the Gulf

Since 2014, Iran’s foreign policy agenda towards Africa has seen a remarkable degree of retrenchment. This was the result of a broad range of reasons—domestic, regional, and extra-regional. Starting with the latter, previous rounds of international sanctions did not always result in less Iranian regional activism (Nephew, 2017; Katzman, 2020), but especially the latest imposed by the Obama and Trump administrations together with Tehran’s deployment of forces abroad in order to fight growing neighbouring jihadist threats in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (Juneau, 2016; Ardemagni, 2019; Saban, 2020) have clearly drained Iran of lots of human and economic resources, to the detriment of its Africa agenda too (Melvin, 2019a). Yet, domestic choices made by the incoming presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) played a crucial role too, and so did East African countries’ reorientations of their foreign alignments and the growing power competition in the region, as detailed below. Part of the responsibility for Iran’s retrenchment from the Horn is indeed related to Rouhani’s change of political priorities (Zweiri & Manjang, 2020). Because that was the task the Iranian voters entrusted to him in the 2013 elections, Rouhani decided to focus much of his agenda on the commitment to reaching a nuclear deal with Western powers and to rebuilding solid economic and political relations with them. This inevitably entailed a change in language and discourse, definitely much less ideological and confrontational than Ahmadinejad’s, but also fewer investments and trade flows towards Africa and other Third World areas. As a result, while in Ahmadinejad’s years Iran’s yearly trade with Horn countries had increased by almost 300% (Unctad, 2020), reaching a peak of $207 million in 2011, in each of the six subsequent years it stagnated around $127 million, just to rebound above $200 million in 2018–2019, precisely when unilateral

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U.S. sanctions were re-imposed on Iran with severe secondary effects especially on trade with Europe. Rouhani’s Western distraction did not mean the Horn had lost its strategic relevance to Iran, though. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei reminded that Africa, along with other Third World regions, had to maintain “a suitable share of Iran’s foreign policy” (Aslani, 2016) and Foreign Minister Zarif (2013–2021) did his best to sustain the momentum of Iran’s diplomatic outreach to the continent. He visited more than 20 African countries during his two terms, and often renewed calls for an expansion of diplomatic relations with sub-Saharan Africa. So, at least diplomatically, also Rouhani’s presidency acted to safeguard its relations with Africa and the Horn. Also from a military point of view, despite Iran’s current wait-and-see approach, non-combat forces aimed at naval patrolling have still been deployed and military connections have been maintained informally by top officials who have a soft spot for the region. Commander Mohammad Bagheri, nominated Chief of Staff of Armed Forces in 2016, is a long-time supporter of the opening of military bases in littoral states of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (Asr Iran, 2016) and also the new Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani, who replaced General Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, was reported to have been responsible for overseeing weapons shipments to African states (Modell & Asher, 2013, p. 19) and is reportedly still in touch with resistance groups in Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan (ANA, 2020; Behravesh, 2020, pp. 15–16). Despite the current three-year-long lull in pirate attacks (IMO, 2020) and the recent release of the last Iranian fishermen still held in captivity (Hassan & Houreld, 2020), the preservation of anti-piracy deployments and informal military contacts remains crucial to maintain at least a semblance of deterrence capability in the region against rival powers (AP, 2019), in 2020 as well as in the years ahead. Domestic choices aside, Iran’s Horn retrenchment was also the result of shifting dynamics in that very African subregion, both in terms of local countries’ changing preferences and of growing regional powers’ competition. As anticipated above, a bit later than Israel, Gulf monarchies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, also decided to step up their involvement in the Horn to contain the expansionism of Iran and of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood which had been revitalised by the Arab Spring uprisings (Badawi & Al-Sayyad, 2019). The 2011 protests in the Arab world, the signing of the nuclear deal between Iran and major world powers in 2015, the beginning of the war in Yemen in the same year, and finally the outbreak of the Qatar crisis in

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2017, together contributed to raising Gulf monarchies’ concerns about the stability of the West Asia and North Africa regions, including their very own backyard, the Horn of Africa (Verhoeven, 2018). As a result, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in particular intensified their fight against such threats by trying to create a network of reliable, aligned partners along the African shores of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, forcing them to move away from Iran and Political Islam. With the growing perception in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that the Obama administration would be increasingly less willing to intervene directly in the region in their favour, they had to take the initiative and do it on their own (Bahi, 2017; Bianco, 2020). In addition to partnering with local actors in the Horn, that also entailed enlarging the sectors of intervention, going beyond the traditional quest for stronger trade ties and investment opportunities, especially in agribusiness, infrastructure, and religious education, to include also military cooperation. As some scholars framed it (Donelli, 2020), since 2011 and even more so since 2015, the Horn has therefore become not just a new front of Gulf powers’ confrontations, including the one between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but a truly integral part of the so-called Greater Middle East security complex. The first scenario for Saudi Arabia and the UAE where to apply their anti-Iran strategies was Yemen. Upon launching the military intervention against the Iran-aligned Houthis who had just ousted the internationally recognised president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Saudi Arabia looked for support to its anti-Houthi coalition among Horn countries as well. In the previous years, by allowing Iranian navies to access their ports, Djibouti and Eritrea had facilitated Iran’s arms smuggling to the Houthis (Stratfor, 2012). It was therefore necessary for Riyadh to complement its anti-Houthi naval security belt at the southern entrance of the Red Sea by convincing the other littoral states in the area to do the same (Plaut, 2019, p. 81). And it succeeded in this endeavour, given that throughout 2015 Djibouti, Eritrea, Somaliland, and Sudan all eventually ended up offering some kind of support to the Saudi coalition in Yemen. Djibouti did so by denying port access to Iranian vessels (Stratfor, 2015) while Eritrea put an immediate end to its partnership with Tehran, expelled the Houthi mission hosted in Asmara, and even offered the use of its military base of Assab to the Saudis and to the Emiratis, granting the latter also the concession to renew it. It was a much-needed move after Djibouti, which still let the UAE and Saudi Arabia use its bases, authorised only the latter’s

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request to open its own base there (the project has since remained unfulfilled, though. Cf. Melvin, 2019b), rejecting together with the UAE’s also Russia’s demand (FPRI, 2016). Later in 2017, Djibouti would also strip the UAE’s DP World company of its concession to develop the commercial port of Doraleh. Out of all the Horn countries, the most cooperative was Sudan. At the end of an originally domestically driven process of rapprochement with the Gulf monarchies and the U.S. which is shown more in detail later in the chapter, Bashir decided not only to send up to 5,000 troops to Yemen to fight in the anti-Houthi Saudiled coalition, but also ditched Iranians’ technical expertise and military training it had been benefitting for long in order to facilitate a comprehensive realignment with the Gulf powers’ axis which could help improve economic conditions at home (Gallopin, 2020). Finally, in 2017 Somalia’s quasi-independent northern state of Somaliland granted the UAE the right to update and use its port of Berbera (Ahmed & Stepputat, 2019), allegedly also for military purposes despite some later denials (Reuters, 2019), whereas in 2016 Somalia’s federal government did not let them use its own ports but accepted to cut ties with Iran. At the beginning of that year, the effects of the killing of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia’s region of Qatif and the resulting attacks against two Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad quickly spilled over into the Horn too. As a sign of solidarity with Riyadh, Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan announced the end of their diplomatic ties with Tehran. Differently from Djibouti and Sudan though, Somalia’s distancing from Iran had not been anticipated by other clear anti-Iranian measures in the preceding year. It is true that Somalia had never been particularly close to Tehran in the previous decades and never let it have military footholds in the country (Lefebvre, 2012), nonetheless until 2016 the two countries had managed to maintain a productive working relationship, though not without its problems. Somalia has one of the richest coasts in the world, abounding with fish and numerous varieties of sea food, but because of its post-civil war state fragility and corruption which make it both unable to protect its waters and prone to sell fishing licences very easily, many foreign actors compete in its waters, often disrespecting any regulation (Verhoeven, 2009). The result was that many Somali fishermen, being deprived of their means of subsistence by the presence of foreign ships, ended up being involved in piracy activities (Lucas, 2013). Modern-day piracy in the region was indeed a product of the collapse first, and malfunctioning later, of the

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Somali state since 1991. And precisely because of acts of piracy along the prosperous trade routes off the Somali coast against oil tankers or other commercial vessels, from 2008 onwards several regional and global powers, by themselves or within multilateral task forces, stepped up their maritime anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia (UNSC, 2012). Iran too dispatched its own fleet after some of its vessels had been attacked by pirates (Reuters, 2009). After all, various Iranian vessels had long been present in the Gulf of Aden for commercial purposes or for fishing, albeit often illegally. In 2013, authorities of Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region estimated nearly 200 Iranian vessels were fishing illegally in its waters (UNSC, 2013) and have since detained many of them, making the issue a frequent source of tension between Iran and Somalia. Besides this, however, the most notable crisis hotspot between the two countries since 2015 has been related to the presence of dhows and other sailing vessels originating from Iran and involved in arms smuggling (UNSC, 2017). Iran has always denied such allegations, shifting the blame on private citizens engaged in those activities. What relevant UN reports actually found was that some arms shipments originating from Iran and intercepted in Somali waters were bound to Yemen as their final destination. Yet, none of these reports produced evidence of any recent direct involvement of Iranian private or state actors in arming groups inside Somalia itself, including al-Shabaab. This is worth stressing as there have been allegations—first put forward in 2006 by a UN report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia—that, for few times in 2006, Iran did send arms and medical aid to the Islamic Court Union (ICU) (UNSC, 2006), a movement of neighbourhood shariah courts emerged in Mogadishu in 2004 and out of which in 2006 emerged a fundamentalist faction called Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin (in short, al-Shabaab, the youth. Cf. Maruf & Joseph, 2018, Chapter 1) which was mostly constituted by militant remnants of an older local Wahhabi organisation (Wise, 2011). Javad Zarif, back then the Iranian representative at the UN, officially denied any accusation (UNSC, 2006, Annex XI). Even if those 2006 claims were accurate, however, evidence of any Iranian material or financial support to the ICU would only consist of three flights which took place in the period before the actual emergence of al-Shabaab, which was triggered by the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 2006. Ever since, no report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has recorded any other such actions. As a result, any claim that Iran has ever directly funded al-Shaabab from 2017 onwards (Fraser-Rahim & Fatah, 2020)

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is, in actual fact, unsubstantiated. Today, concrete evidence of Iran’s linkages to Somali non-state security actors only amounts to reports about the presence of Iranian weapons in the hands of arms dealers in Somalia (GITOC, 2020) and the involvement of Iranian vessels in Somali charcoal smuggling (UNSC, 2019), but with two caveats. With regard to the former, the reports actually show that Iran’s arms supplies intended for the Houthis in Yemen have subsequently been diverted by local Yemeni arms dealers to their counterparts in Somalia. Whom those arms are then directed to remains obscure but, in any case, it is no longer a situation of direct Iranian liability in the strictest sense. With regard to the latter, instead, the illegal trade of charcoal is widely known to be a source of funding for criminal and terrorist Somali groups, including al-Shabaab (UNSC, 2012). It was found that some Iranian private entities have been involved in the transshipment of charcoal not only to Iran but also to other Persian Gulf countries, mostly the UAE and Iraq, falsifying their certificates of origin (Maritime Executive, 2019). But, also in this case, no documented evidence has so far been found of any direct involvement of Iranian state authorities themselves, which have rather been cooperative on this matter but disclaim direct responsibility, blaming private criminal entrepreneurs for such wrongdoings. Because of these diverse sources of tension, Iran’s political ties with Mogadishu never developed into a real close partnership, yet they still blossomed under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The symbol of their rapprochement was the re-opening of the Iranian embassy in Mogadishu in November 2012. In that occasion, which marked the end of his tour in the region, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Salehi also inaugurated an Iranian Red Crescent building in the country (IRNA, 2012a). Iran was showing its readiness to supply the famine-hit country with much-needed humanitarian aid. Iran tried to expand its influence even to other sectors, by discussing the opening of mosques and educational centres, as well as by obtaining more fishing licences for Iranian vessels (Garowe, 2015). However, the rapprochement came to an abrupt end in 2016, when, as anticipated above, on the same day it received a pledge of aid from the Saudi Development Fund (Reuters, 2016), Somalia cut relations with Iran, officially on security grounds. Mogadishu ordered Iranian diplomats to leave the embassy whereas the Somali Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) took over the humanitarian centre operated by the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation in the capital city (Dalsan Radio, 2016). It

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is not clear to what extent the Saudi pledge of aid influenced that decision. Somalia had close ties with Saudi Arabia (Marchal, 2004b), but even closer ones with its regional competitors Turkey and Qatar. What is indisputable, though, is that Somalia’s relations with Iran have since remained quite cold. The picture emerging from these past few years is then one of a region which is significantly distancing itself from Iran. Most countries have indeed taken this path, albeit with more or less conviction. Ethiopia, however, has been quite an exception. It has so far kept open both the Iranian embassy and the cultural centre hosted in its capital, the only Horn country doing so. While it is true that under its current leader, Abiy Ahmed Ali, Ethiopia’s ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have grown stronger—consider their major role played as facilitators behind the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal in 2018 and the concurrent $3 billion aid package allocated to Addis—rival Turkish and Qatari interests and investments in the country have remained high too (Benaim, 2019; Mosley, 2020), with Ethiopia being Ankara’s first investment destination in the whole Africa. Ethiopia is indeed a country which, in its long history, both as an empire and as a state, has staunchly fought for preserving its independence, resist international pressure, and avoid excessive foreign interference. This, as shown below in the conclusions, can be both a blessing and a challenge for Iran’s power projection in the country. Ethiopia aside, though, in a couple of years Saudi Arabia succeeded in gaining strong political if not military support from all the Horn states. In exchange of substantial economic donations in the form of direct investments and development aid, it requested and obtained that they discarded their ties with Tehran. However, the growing competition among rival Gulf powers in the Horn should not downplay the agency of the local actors behind these choices. While it is true that the relations between Horn and foreign powers remain asymmetric, even when those foreign powers are not global but only regional powers such as West Asian countries, the events of the past few years reveal that the countries of the Horn are not complete passive actors. Take Somalia which, while it did cave in to Saudi pressure to break diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016, it did not when, one year later, it was asked by Riyadh to do the same with Qatar (Maru, 2017). Something similar happened in Djibouti, where president Guelleh accommodated Riyadh’s requests but stood firm with Abu Dhabi’s and Moscow’s. And again, in Sudan, it was also because of domestic weaknesses that Bashir decided to change his

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posture in the greater regional balance of power, seeking patronage from Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Gallopin & Manek, 2020, p. 9). Having just lost its oil-richest lands with the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan entered into a harsher economic situation than the one which had already been going through since the imposition of U.S. anti-terrorism sanctions in 1993 (de Waal 2019b). Bashir had long managed to bypass the sanctions-induced international isolation by strengthening ties with Iran. Tehran contributed to the development of the Sudanese military industry which eventually became Africa’s third largest arms producer (Small Arms Survey, 2014) and a preferential target of Israeli raids, as shown earlier in the chapter. However, with the worsening of the economic conditions, Bashir broke new ground and decided to sacrifice his ties with Iran, which could not provide any more financial help, to consolidate instead his comprehensive relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The main aim of this charming offensive was precisely to get their intercession for the removal of U.S. sanctions, if not their direct financial help proper, in order to improve the economic situation at home (Knopf & Feltman, 2020). The role of originally domestic motivations in the breakdown of Sudan-Iran ties should not, however, downplay the subsequent role of external actors’ pressures. It was after a sustained Saudi campaign with financial incentives (Vertin, 2019, note 5) that, in September 2014, Bashir ordered the closure of the Iranian cultural centres in the country because of allegations that they were propagating Shia Islam. Then, in April 2015, Sudan decided to join the Saudi-led war in Yemen, sending warplanes and also troops. Signals of a growing Saudi-Sudanese military cooperation already emerged in February 2013, when the two countries carried out a joint naval exercise in Port Sudan and when Sudan started selling weapons to pro-Saudi Syrian rebels (Sudan Tribune, 2013). In the same year in which Sudan joined the Yemen war, Riyadh deposited $1 billion in Sudan’s central bank and pledged other billions of dollars more of investments in the country (Abdelaziz, 2016). Khartoum’s definitive rapprochement with the Sunni neighbours materialised at the beginning of the following year, in January 2016, when Bashir complied with Riyadh’s request to severe all the remaining diplomatic ties with Iran due to the above-mentioned al-Nimr accident. Despite the sectarian flavour it was given to emphasise the common Sunni Islamic identity between Khartoum and Riyadh, Bashir’s choice was a pragmatic one, and his Saudi alignment neither ideological nor absolute. Indeed, Bashir severed

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ties with Iran but, just like Somalia, kept cultivating those with Qatar and Turkey, namely supporters of Islamist movements Riyadh resolutely opposed. In 2017, barely a year after Bashir’s Saudi embrace, he turned down Saudi Arabia’s request to cut ties with Qatar (Maru, 2017). Only Sudan’s regime change in 2019, with the fall of Bashir and the rise of a half-military half-civilian regime (Corda, 2020), would eventually cement the ties between Khartoum and Riyadh to the detriment of Iran and Islamist groups alike (Dentice & Donelli, 2020). Albeit limited, a certain degree of autonomy in local countries’ actions is then beyond dispute.

9

Conclusion: It Is Not All Gloom and Doom

When looking at the overall picture, the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy in the Horn suggests some key take-aways. All of them refer directly or indirectly to the theoretical principles of complex realism presented at the beginning of this chapter, hence acknowledging that Iran’s conduct in the Horn of Africa has been the result of the interaction of the external environment and the intra-state level, where the former has often determined Iran’s challenges but, on its own, cannot fully account for Tehran’s responses to them. First, international sanctions have recently prevented Tehran from competing on a more equal footing with other foreign powers in the scramble for influence in the Horn, just as global oil prices did instead favour its activism in the past. But shifts in its Horn policy over the past 40 years cannot be fully explained by looking at such global structural factors only, without taking into account the Iranian domestic political arena. Iran’s Africa policy blossomed in the years when the hardliners were in power (2005–2012), boosted by oil revenues but also by their ideological views which, contrary to Rouhani’s, prioritised third-world regions to the detriment of the West. Second, the analysis of a foreign actor’s power projection in the Horn cannot be completely detached from that of others, nor from local countries’ own considerations themselves. Indeed, if today Iran’s Horn policy is on the back foot it is also because of Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s manoeuvres which succeeded in wooing local actors away from Tehran, exploiting their economic and political needs of the moment. Nothing actually prevents Iran from teaming up with some of these regional competitors. In the Horn, Iran, Qatar, and Turkey share multiple political objectives, especially with a view to resisting the expansion of Saudi and Emirati areas of influence. But this is still unchartered territory. Third, with an eye to the

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future, it is not all gloom and doom for Tehran’s Horn policy after all. Iran can still pull it back together by restoring, as soon as newly available resources allow, productive working relations with many Horn countries thanks to three factors: local agency and opportunism; local transitions underway; and the evolving international situation. Starting from the first, it is worth noting again that Horn countries’ shifts in their own international alignments were opportunistic choices made partly because of changing domestic needs and partly because of pressure deriving from the growing competition among extra-regional powers in the region. Before this negative escalation, they actually enjoyed good working relations with Tehran. They never evolved into something as solid and comprehensive as some relations Iran enjoys with more proximate actors, also because of the lack of common ideological roots. But precisely because Horn countries are pragmatic and opportunistic, there have never been ideological reasons for them not to engage with Iran either. This reassures about the possibility of re-engagements in the future, definitely in terms of humanitarian aid (pandemic aside, there is no shortage of health and food crises in Africa) and trade, but possibly also on security grounds, renewing contacts already initiated decades ago. Ethiopia could well be Iran’s platform of choice for relaunching its Horn policy, once the recent conflict between the central government and the Tigray region is settled and stability restored. This could be the case because the only working embassy and cultural centre Iran has in the Horn in 2020 are those in Addis Ababa, with whom it also maintains stable commercial ties, mostly amounting to manufactured exports and agricultural imports. The maintenance of such ties has been facilitated by Ethiopia’s aversion to exclusive alignments with external actors and by its current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ability to balance foreign rival powers. After taking power, he quickly embraced Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s political and financial support, yet he never closed the political and economic doors to Saudi competitors either. Politically, for an aspiring, though imperfect, hegemon of the Horn region (Bereketeab, 2013, pp. 50–53; Le Gouriellec, 2018), it is not appropriate to pledge full allegiance to other powers of the broader neighbourhood. Economically, Ethiopia remains open to various investors; so far, the major investments in the country have been China’s and Turkey’s, with those from the Gulf faring high but still behind (Meester et al., 2018; Young, 2020). While

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this approach could well be a limit for those looking for exclusive partnerships in the country, it could also be a vital lifeline for Iran, knowing that in Ethiopia it would hardly find all doors closed. Other Horn countries may instead be more problematic to re-engage because of the transitions underway, but not necessarily. Sudan, especially, which is going through a critical period of democratic transition since Bashir’s fall in April 2019, remains an open question. A post-transition Sudan may take a decisive shift towards Iran’s rival regional powers such as the U.S., Gulf monarchies, and Israel, as suggested by Khartoum’s normalisation with Tel Aviv in October 2020 (Knopf & Feltman, 2020). Or it may rather decide to play the same script as Bashir, a grandmaster of balancing rival powers, as suggested by the draft agreement allowing Moscow to build a naval base in Sudan (PRAVO, 2020). At a time many foreign powers are seeking to influence Khartoum’s future, it is really difficult to predict which road it will take. Besides local opportunism and transitions, it is finally important to look also at the shifting global landscape. Because of the election of Joe Biden as U.S. president and his opposition to American unilateralism, this could well mean that Tehran may soon get some degree of sanctions relief and recover at least a certain amount of legitimate external trade, also with African countries. China’s rise in the Horn (USIP, 2020) should also facilitate Iran’s moves there, at least more than if the region were under U.S. influence. But even in case of removal of short-term barriers related to sanctions-driven economic woes, Iran’s reach towards the region and the threat it poses to it should not be exaggerated as will always remain constrained by other longer-term barriers, which include first and foremost the very demography of the local societies, in greatest majority alien, if not downright recalcitrant, to extreme religious doctrines such as those professed by the Islamic Republic. In other words, even if Iran’s scramble for the Horn recovered in the future, this would not mean Tehran would dominate the region. In conclusion, then, the flexibility of this constantly changing African subregion suggests that, even if Iran’s current Horn power projection is on pause, local actors’ interests and policies can rapidly evolve in the future and Iran may once again assume an important role in the region. So, while lately the media coverage of this complex relationship has dimmed significantly, in part for good reasons, the ties between Iran and the Horn of Africa still deserve continued attention. Also because there is still much to bring to light, as shown by the recent revelations

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concerning the whereabouts of Abu Muhammad Al-Masri, the organiser of al-Qaida cells in Sudan and the alleged mastermind of the 1998 bombings in East Africa, who was reportedly living in Tehran before being killed by Israeli operatives on August 7, 2020, on the very anniversary of those attacks (Goldman et al., 2020). It was often suggested by terrorism experts (Lahoud, 2018; Loidolt, 2020) that keeping al-Qaida officials in Tehran might provide some insurance against their operations inside Iran, so we should not read too much into this. Yet, it suggests this field of research is nowhere close to saturation yet, and rather holds much promise for the future too.

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Tehran Times. (2008, November 5). Djibouti asks Iran to mediate in talks with Eritrea. Retrieved from https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/181665/ Djibouti-asks-Iran-to-mediate-in-talks-with-Eritrea. Tehran Times. (2010, September 14). Iran, Africa vow to strengthen ties. Retrieved from https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/226641/Iran-Afr ica-vow-to-strengthen-ties. Unctad. (2020). Merchandise Trade Matrix, Imports and Exports. Data retrieved for Iran, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia in September 2020. https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. Unruh, J. (2018). Mogadishu City. In M. Ember (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Urban Cultures Set: Cities and Cultures Around the World, Danbury, CT: Grolier. UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2006, November 22). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), S/2006/913. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/S/200 6/913. UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2009, December 23). Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Eritrea over Its Role in Somalia, Refusal to Withdraw Troops Following Conflict with Djibouti, SC/9833. Retrieved from https:// www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm. UNSC–United Nations Security Council.(2011, July 18). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), S/2011/433. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/S/201 1/433. UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2012, July 13). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), S/2012/544. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/S/201 2/544. UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2013, July 12). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, S/2013/413. Retrieved from https://www.undocs. org/S/2013/413. UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2017, November 2). Letter dated 2 November 2017 from the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, S/2017/924. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/S/2017/924 UNSC–United Nations Security Council. (2019, November 1). Letter dated 27 September 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, S/2019/858. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/2019/858.

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US Department of State. (2019). Country Reports on Terrorism 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cou ntry-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2.pdf. USIP–United States Institute of Peace. (2020). China’s Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena. USIP Senior Study Group Final Report, no. 3. Vakil, S. (2018). Understanding Tehran’s Long Game in the Levant. Uluslararası ˙ skiler/International Relations, 15(60), pp. 105–120. Ili¸ Verhoeven, H. (2009). The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 3(3), pp. 405–425. Verhoeven, H. (2018). The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order, Civil Wars, 1–25. Vertin, Z. (2019). Toward a Red Sea Forum: The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, & Architecture for a New Regional Order. Brookings Doha Centre, Report No. 27. Warburg, G. R. (1990). The Sharia in Sudan: Implementation and Repercussions, 1983–1989. Middle East Journal, 44(4), pp. 624–637. Whitaker, B. (2002, January 21). The Strange Affair of Karine A. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/21/israel1. White House. (2020, October 23). Statement from the Press Secretary on Sudan. Statements & Releases. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefi ngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-sudan/. Wise, R. (2011). Al Shabaab. CSIS–Center for Strategic & International Studies, Case Study 2, pp. 1–13. Woldemariam, M. (2019). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Thaw and Its Regional Impact, Current History, 118(808), pp. 181–187. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/ curh.2019.118.808.181. Wright, L. (2006). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Young, K. (2020, August 13). Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment: Report and Tracker. American Enterprise Institute. Retrieved from https://www.aei. org/multimedia/fadi-tracker/. Young, A. (2019). The spectre of Hasan al-Turabi and political Islam in Sudan [Review]. The Journal of the International African Institute, 89(2), pp. 398– 401. Zweiri, M., & Manjang, A. (2020). From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Iran’s Presence in Africa. In L. Zaccara (Ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 177–203).

Iran-India Relations Before and After the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal and the Consequent Sanctions Erzsébet Rózsa

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Introduction

“Few people have been more closely related in origin and throughout history than the people of India and the people of Iran.” (Nehru, 1980, 148) The origins of Indo-Iranian relations go back for millennia: ethnic and linguistic common roots, the Indo-Aryan (Iranian) heritage, the Persian-language culture of Mughal India, etc. have been frequently quoted points of reference. Nevertheless, people-to-people relations seem to be very limited. While the Parsis (‘Persians’, the descendants of Zoroastrians who left the Iranian Plateau to escape the Islamic conquest), who in historical terms may be considered as natural contacts, are still present in India, their number is rapidly decreasing: according to the 2011 census there were 57,264 Parsis in India, which number is expected to have gone under 30,000 by now. There are even fewer Indians in Iran, and even these are either the descendants of Indian Parsis, who returned to Iran in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to revive the Zoroastrian faith and community there; or Indian students, fishermen, and workers, from different parts of India (Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Gujarat, Kashmir and

E. Rózsa (B) National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_20

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Ladakh).1 (The Hindu, 2020) The latter hit the news following the outbreak of the pandemic in Iran as people who were stuck in Iran due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and for whose return to India the Indian government organized rescue missions both by air and on sea. An obvious field of people-to-people contact would be the Shia minority in India, with their pilgrimage to the Shiite holy sites in Iran providing a continuous link, even if the number of Indian pilgrims to Iran seems not to be very high. The Shia make up approximately 15% of the Indian Muslim community, i. e. approx. 28 million.2 (CIA World Factbook; Pew, 2009) They constitute the second/third largest Shia community after the Iranian Shia, and represent approx. 15% of the global Shia community. While many of them are active and hold prominent positions in Indian political and economic life, some may cause security problems for India: the Kashmiri Shia especially is a case in point.3 Indian authorities have maintained that in Kashmir the Shia community has become increasingly vocal in their demand of political rights and self-determination. Thus the Shia Muharram/Ashoura processions have especially become the focal point of clashes between the Shia and the Indian authorities there, with some suggesting that Iran provides support for Shia political mobilization (Al-Jazeera, 2020; Nader et al., 2014; Iwanek, 2020). Consequently, “there is the impression that such references [to the common past and heritage] are mostly used to hide or compensate for the manifold disagreements and tensions which may arise between the two states.” (Kutty, 2020) India’s position toward Iran is much more defined by such factors as its position as an emerging global power, reflected in its

1 “A status report filed by the Ministry of External Affairs in the Supreme Court said there were 6,000 Indian nationals in various provinces of Iran. They included 1100 pilgrims mainly from the Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir and the State of Maharashtra, 300 students primarily from J&K, and over 1000 fishermen from Tamil Nadu (744), Kerala (70) and Gujarat (215)” (The Hindu, 2020). 2 Calculated on the basis of the figures in the CIA World Factbook since in the Indian census there is no question related to “sects.” The PEW Research Center provided similar figures in its study in 2009: 10–15% of the Muslims in India are Shia, making up approx. 9–14% of the global Shia community (Pew, 2009). 3 The Shia population has taken part in the struggles for the independence of Kashmir ever since the 1930s, in many cases together with the Sunni Muslims. However, due to sectarian violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan “their involvement in the armed rebellion was reduced to almost nil by the early 2000s” (Al-Jazeera, 2020).

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pursuit of permanent membership in the UN Security Council (Mishra, 2006; NDTV, 2018) and its nuclear arsenal (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016); its “strategic autonomy”; its plan to counter the Chinese expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); its threat perceptions from its direct neighborhood as well as the presence of its Muslim minorities; and finally, its economic needs. As an emerging global power, so far India has tried to maintain its “strategic autonomy” and balance in its relations with the United States, the Arab Gulf States, and Israel on the one hand, and Iran on the other— regardless of their eventual animosity toward each other. Although none of these are satisfied with the Indian policies, so far India could successfully avoid taking sides.4 While it did give in to pressure in many cases (Indian votes on Iran in the IAEA), it also stood its ground firmly: U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit to India (The White House, 2006) was a clear example: despite putting forward the U.S.-Indian (civilian) nuclear deal, Bush could not make the Indian leaders distance themselves from Iran and terminate such project negotiations as the India-Pakistan-Iran pipeline for example. In the same vein, Iran also has to accept that India has a specific interest in the Arab Gulf states, as more than eight million Indians work there (Calabrese, 2020) and the Arab Gulf states have an increasing share in Indian oil and natural gas import—and Israel, with which India has a robust defense and technological cooperation. Both sides look upon the New Delhi Declaration (2003) as the beginning of a new “strategic partnership” between India and Iran, based on the shared interests in security, energy, trade, technology, and transit. For Iran, closer cooperation with one Asian great power provided a way out of the U.S. containment, while for India cooperation with Iran was based on shared concerns relating to Afghanistan and the block Pakistan set to prevent its access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Later on this was complemented by the circumvention of the emerging Chinese BRI. India’s isolation “by the emergence of a new axis, comprised of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan,” (Kumar, 2015) can only be circumvented by Iran by providing access to Central Asia and thus refusing, or at least limiting Pakistan an undisturbed “strategic depth.”

4 “The Indians are emerging from their non-aligned status and becoming a global power, and they have to begin to think about their responsibilities. They have to make a basic choice” (Rajghatta, 2005).

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2

The Historical Setting

Although throughout history the preceding empires of the two states had often shared common “borders” or neighborhoods, or even may have conquered parts of each other’s territory temporarily, today they are not direct neighbors. Nevertheless, the two states lying between them— Pakistan and Afghanistan—provide as many reasons to cooperate as to compete with each other. India-Iran relations during the Cold War was determined, on the one hand, by the historical experience of both: Iran’s taking the side of the United States was determined by its exposure to Czarist Russia, then the Soviet Union pushing forward to the south, deep into Iranian sphere of influence and even territory. This, combined with the threat of spreading communism made Iran an ally of the United States. India’s position, also shaped by its historical—colonial—past and experience made it come closer to the Soviet Union, however, the standing up to great power influence and hegemonic endeavors made it observe a non-aligned status and become the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). On the other hand, their relationship was also formed by their stance on the “in-between” states, especially Pakistan. While Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan after it achieved independence in 1947, it established diplomatic relations with India soon afterward (in 1950). Iran’s membership in the CENTO did not only mean its alliance with the United States, but also to Pakistan within the same organization. India’s closeness to the Soviet Union and its controversy and wars with Pakistan seemed to keep Iran and India apart. The factors that finally changed Iran-India relations were the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 (practically coinciding with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), in which India saw Iran standing up to U.S. hegemony, and the end of the Cold War, which resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, followed by the dissolution and disappearance of the Soviet Union (Nader et al., 2014). The Islamic Revolution and Iran’s consequent change in its foreign policy changed the regional balance of power for India dramatically. The Islamic Republic’s “neither East, nor West” policy and its antiimperialist stance brought it closer to the Non-Aligned Movement. Yet, the “export of the Islamic revolution,” especially that it was welcomed by the Muslim communities in India, caused concern in the Indian government. Another source of concern for India was Iran’s relations with Pakistan. Although after the Islamic Revolution the Islamic Republic

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distanced itself from U.S. ally Pakistan for several reasons,5 there were shared concerns between the two, which made cooperation unavoidable: Baluchi separatism, radical Sunni Islamist movements, or drug trafficking (from Afghanistan) are cases in point. The end of the Cold War was an even greater game-changer in the regional dynamic for both India and Iran: Preceded by the end of the Iraq-Iran war (1988), followed by a more pragmatic stance in Iranian foreign policy (with the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani), the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought India and Iran closer. Not only because of “the unipolar moment” of the United States, a concern for both former Soviet-friendly India and U.S. target Iran, but also due to the emergence of a series of new states in Central Asia. With the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan (2001) and of Saddam Hussein (2003) in Iraq, instability in the region became the main threat. From both Iran’s and India’s perspective this was aggravated by the increasing military presence of the United States in both the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. However, the room for maneuver for Iran increased, and Iran started to develop relations to wider regions and continents: its strategic orientation shifted toward the East. The new “look to the East” policy (Saghafi-Ameri & Ahadi, 2008) was in a way also the reflection and the attraction of the emerging Asian economies, complemented by the fact that several Asian countries were ready to cooperate with Iran. This coincided with the launch of the Indian “look West” policy formalized in 2005, which aimed at securing Indian strategic and economic interests. In this, Iran—due to its specific geostrategic location—came to play a role. The change initiated by these events was first reflected by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Tehran in 1993, to be followed by the “vision of a strategic partnership” as put forward in the April 2001 Tehran Declaration, and even more so by the New Delhi Declaration issued during Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s visit to India in January 2003. Although the Declaration referred to “the vast potential in the political, economic, transit, transport, energy, industries, science and technology and agricultural fields” in general, the aim of “a strong economic relationship, including greater trade and investment flows,” is emphasized 5 Ayatollah Khomeini and General Zia ul-Haq didn’t get along; Pakistan introduced laws that were seen as anti-Shia and apparently Khomeini eventually pressured Zia to exempt Shias from paying zakat. Also, the Shi’a were the prime target of rising Sunni militancy in PK (some of them were supported by the state).

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in a separate paragraph (New Delhi Declaration, 2003). While security and the threat of terrorism, as well as the stability of Afghanistan are also mentioned, for Iran by drawing India into a “strategic partnership” India’s main asset was that it was another contact through which it could escape international sanctions. This calculation on the Iranian side is an important element even if Iran has been disappointed several times by India abiding by the U.S. unilateral sanctions especially those passed by the Trump government.

3

Bilateral Relations: Energy and Else

The New Delhi Declaration put forward the “complementarity of interests in the energy sector” as “as a strategic area” underlying the relationship of the two countries, including “investment in upstream and downstream activities in the oil sector, LNG/natural gas tie-ups and secure modes of transport.” (New Delhi Declaration, 2003, para 11) However, the UN sanctions, followed by the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the secondary U.S. sanctions hit India-Iran bilateral trade very hard. Since bilateral trade was dominated by crude oil, it was very much imbalanced, in favor of Iran, with oil accounting for about 90% of Indian imports from Iran (Verma, 2019). In spite of the fact that India (with five other states) received a waiver from President Trump for its crude oil import from Iran, the waiver was for 180 days only, and it did not cover the shipping companies and shipping insurance. Consequently, international shippers did not carry Iranian cargo, and the Iranian shipping capabilities were limited. In spite of the fact that Iran offered free shipping and extended credit periods to India, since the waiver was not lengthened (although India was negotiating hard for its renewal) Indian oil import from Iran stopped by 2020. India has become the third largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products by 2019 (after the United States and China) with its oil import reaching 4.4 million b/d. Approximately 59% of this crude oil was originating from the Persian Gulf, mostly from Iraq (22% of India’s oil import total) and Saudi Arabia. While Iran used to be the third largest oil supplier to India (11% in 2018), making India Iran’s top oil buyer with 20–25 million b/d in the same year, by 2020 under the re-imposed U.S. sanctions India’s oil import from Iran fell to zero, with other Middle Eastern/Gulf oil exporters substituting for the Iranian oil (EIA, 2020).

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Although Indian natural gas consumption is relatively small (mostly industry and power generation), with coal making up the biggest share still (45%), “a major growth is expected.” India started to import gas in 2003, since it can cover only half of its gas demand from domestic production.6 (IEA India, 2020) India has increasingly turned to LNG and has invested in developing LNG capabilities. LNG import from Iran to India has been on the agenda—on and off—since 2005, when a deal was drawn up for an amount of USD 22 billion for a period of 25 years, (Ashwarya, 2017, 174–175) but the Iranian LNG production in general has been lagging behind and the construction of an LNG terminal in Iran has been suspended due to the new U.S. sanctions. Besides shipping LNG from Iran to India, at some point a 1,300-km undersea pipeline from Iran, avoiding Pakistani waters was also foreseen7 as an alternative to the IranPakistan-India pipeline (IPI).8 In 2009, however, India pulled out of the project “citing security and commercial concerns” (Mint, 2017). Besides looking for import of hydrocarbons to meet rapidly increasing domestic demand, India also tried to secure oil and gas opportunities abroad. Thus, Indian companies explored oil and gas in the Persian Gulf as well. The Farzad B field was discovered in 2008 by an Indian firm ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), the foreign investment arm of India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. It is estimated to hold more than 500 billion cubic meters of in-place gas reserves, of which 370 billion cubic meters

6 Its main source of gas import is Qatar (approx. 50%). 7 The undersea pipeline is a later initiative of a private company—SAGE (South Asian

Gas Enterprise). This provides for an undersea pipeline carrying Iranian gas from a point in Oman to the Indian coast at Kutch. (The Iranian gas would reach Oman through an undersea pipeline across the Gulf.) Though this proposal is still mentioned on the seminar circuit by its promoters, it has not been seen as viable and has never had serious government attention. The view in Delhi is to get Iranian gas to India as LNG, either from Iran itself or Oman … after the sanctions have been relaxed. 8 The 2,700 km long Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI) had been on the table since the mid-1990s and was remarkably successful (despite U.S. opposition) between 2004 and 2008. (India presented it as a confidence building measure with Pakistan.) There was agreement on routing and pricing; the only item left was the additional price of the gas at the Indian border due to enhanced security facilities to be installed by Pakistan. In 2009, however, India withdrew from the $7.6 billion project due to the fall of General Musharraf and the Mumbai attack (November 2008). But the project faced other challenges as well, such as the low quantity of gas it would have to carry, the critical security situation in Baluchistan, and the U.S. backing for another gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI).

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are recoverable. However, India was to abandon the project after a series of negotiations due to the UNSC sanctions on Iran. Negotiations were re-started after the conclusion of the JCPOA, and in 2015 a consortium of Indian companies reached an initial agreement with Iranian officials to develop the Farzad B gas field under a three billion dollars contract (first development phase) (Financial Tribune, 2020). However, by the end of 2019 the two parties were blaming each other for continuously changing the conditions, thus the Iranians started to develop the Farzad B stating that Indian companies may join later. The development of the Farzad B gas field has thus become the symbol of all the problems related to energy resources problems in the still strategic energy-based bilateral relations between Iran and India. Besides bilateral disagreements, changing conditions, shifting political will etc., the Farzad B project as well as other bilateral commercial, development, and investment relations were also heavily impacted by first the international, then the U.S. sanctions on the banks and bank transfers. Although they tried to avoid these sanctions by settling oil-trade through an Indian government-owned bank, UCO Bank, in the Indian currency, thus not subject to the secondary U.S. sanctions. India also exempted rupee payments made to the National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC) for crude oil imports from tax, thus enabling Indian refineries to settle their accounts with Iran. (Reuters, December 2018) Yet, with Indian oil imports from Iran dropping to zero, UCO Bank’s role also lessened.9 With the introduction, by President Trump, of further sanctions targeting the bank sector, the bank announced that it “had decided to stop working with Iran’s banks … due to the fresh U.S. sanctions against the banking sector. However, given the results of the U.S. vote the lender may rethink” (Financial Times, 2020).

4

The Regional Environment: Connectivity

Geographical location is a key element in the India-Iran relationship, as they have partly different, partly overlapping strategic neighborhoods. Iran has the Persian Gulf as its direct neighborhood, and has established a strategic depth in the “resistance front” (however limited that may be depending on the presence of other actors, especially Russia and Turkey 9 The UCO Bank arrangement worked well during the Obama presidency, when the U.S. had only sought a “significant decrease” in oil imports from Iran (about 25%).

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in Syria). For India due to their rivalry, China is the most decisive neighborhood. Where the interests of both Iran and India meet or clash is the two countries lying in-between: Pakistan and Afghanistan, and, in a wider context, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. All these, however, fit into an even wider regional environment where India and Iran meet: Eurasia. In the past few decades, based on and initiated by the economic developments in East Asia, and last but not least China, the narrative of an Asian identity (or in its Russian counterpart Eurasian identity) has come to symbolize a set of relationships in which external powers, even the United States, could not much interfere. The resulting “connectivity” plans, programs, and cooperation, however, have had a long pre-history in Asia since political, military, trade, and cultural contacts had been continuous among the ancient centers of civilization and empires. Many ancient military campaigns took place in the space between the Mediterranean and the Indus River; the Silk Road connected China to Europe, while Buddhism reached China through Inner Asia, just to mention a few examples. The age of discoveries and colonization, but especially globalization and the possibilities offered by modern technology have significantly expanded the meaning of connectivity with—among others—access to and use of energy resources, or the connection between digital systems, etc. (Connecting Europe and Asia. The EU Strategy, 2019) Geographical reach, proximity and access have, nevertheless, remained of strategic importance. In the ambitious plans connecting different parts of Asia to Europe, Iran has a strategic position: practically all plans of connectivity build on Iran—either land or sea, or both -, most of all the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the International North-South Transitional Corridor (INSTC), put forward by Russia and India, not to mention the several, more regionally constrained plans, which, however, are mostly planned to connect with either (or both) the Chinese or the Indian connectivity grids. While the Chinese BRI launched in 2013 have been much more visible and “palpable” to the world at large, the Indian thinking and plans of connectivity may have well preceded it. The INSTC, a multimodal transportation project agreed by Russia, India, and Iran in 2000 connecting South Asia and Europe through Iran, the Caspian Sea, and Russia, and the already referred to New Delhi Declaration of 2003 proves that. Consequently, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made regional connectivity a primary foreign policy goal for India, certain

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elements of any such project had already been outlined, namely, the development of a connection to Afghanistan and Central Asia (access to which for India was denied by Pakistan), and, on a wider scale, a “North South transit arrangement” reaching through Russia to Europe. While such cooperation between Iran and India did have security dimensions (threat of “the re-emergence of terrorist forces and the spread of narcotics from Afghanistan”), its main aim still was to facilitate regional trade and to enhance regional economic cooperation (New Delhi Declaration, 2003, paragraphs 11–12). However, while Indian plans were lagging behind in execution, China pushed forward with its BRI projects gaining increasing influence even in territories which India looked upon as its own sphere of influence. Especially the Chinese infrastructure development projects coupled with China’s so far mostly economic diplomacy, strengthened the perception in India of being encircled by China,10 which made it revive or step up the realization of its connectivity plans. In consequence, in May 2016 the trilateral Chabahar agreement was signed in Tehran by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani with an MoU (between an Iranian and an Indian company) to construct a railway line between the Chabahar port and Zahedan, close to the Iranian-Afghan border. The railway was foreseen to be lengthened at a later stage to Zaranj and to Delaram in Afghanistan, with the development of the existing road infrastructure as well. The INSTC and the Chahbahar port are not only the most secure, but also the closest inland way for India to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chahbahar is close to Western Indian ports (Kandla, Mundra and Mumbai), and by being located well outside the Strait of Hormuz, it provides the opportunity for Iran to be a player in the regional strategic competition on a par with the emerging giants and to keep in check— at least to a certain extent—Saudi Arabia, which has been forging an increasingly close alliance with Pakistan. With the Chahbahar project Iran is signaling to Saudi Arabia that it is a regional power not only in the Persian Gulf, but also outside of it, and especially on the high seas and maritime routes leading to the Gulf. But the port is important for Iran for 10 India’s concerns related mainly to the deepening China-Pakistan nexus, including China-Pakistan Economic Corridor/CPEC, but also their political, military and economic ties.

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economic and financial reasons as well. Chabahar is Iran’s first deep-sea port, which makes the former practice of the use of UAE ports to transfer cargo to smaller ships unnecessary. The Chabahar-Zahedan-Zaranj connection, when completed, therefore, would be linked to the INSTC, and as such has a specific significance not only for the three “participants” (Iran, India, Afghanistan), but also for the realization of the INSTC as such. Yet, the project has suffered serious setbacks, it has practically been stalled in the past three years to the extent that instead of grand-scale vigorous developments the already existing elements of the infrastructure are being used. The reasons are manifold with obstacles arising in different fields and on different scales. The project itself can be broken down into two main components: the Chabahar port and the connecting infrastructure. India was to be involved in both, yet problems have arisen in both aspects. Although the Chabahar port itself was granted exemption from the U.S. sanctions on Iran following the U.S. withdrawal with the JCPOA, the complementing projects were not. Neither was the investment in the Chabahar-Zahedan railway, over which significant delays were reported on the Indian side, both in the initiating of the project and the funding thereof—to the effect that the Iranian government started to proceed on its own. The project was expected to be completed by March 2022, with the estimated cost of $400 million. This led to protracted delays from India, as well as non-delivery by European and other suppliers of equipment to the port and the railway fearing U.S. sanctions. The Indian hesitation was also marked by the fact that “India has not spent any of its allocated funds for Chabahar since 2017… [and the government] has allocated a significantly lower” amount for 2019. “As per Iran’s original four-phase development plan, India was to invest USD 85 million to upgrade, equip, and operate two terminals on a ten-year lease. Iran upgraded existing port infrastructure as per their agreed first phase of development. This upgraded port was inaugurated in December 2017 with great fanfare. The following year, India took over operations of the port but not much else went according to plan. The Chabahar project calls for a private Indian firm to come on board as a strategic partner to manage, operate and maintain the port for ten years.” Yet, no agreement could be reached with the Indian firm, selected for this task. “A second task was to equip the port. European firms were Iran’s first preference but predictably after Trump’s win, they showed little-tono interest in equipment bids. This left India with no choice but to work

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with Chinese firms. … A third aspect is the larger regional project on connectivity between India, Iran, and Afghanistan. As things stand, all parties are working with existing port infrastructure, roadways, and operational capacity on this transit project. The route was tested successfully in October 2017 when Indian shipments of wheat arrived at Chabahar from Kandla (Gujarat) and made their way into Afghanistan. … Three years on, Chabahar’s progress does not match India’s original expectations and Trump’s exemption has proven to be inadequate” (Kutty, 2019). Iran’s dissatisfaction with India has been increasing together with the Iranian perception that India was not the independent geopolitical actor it considered itself to be, realizing that for India the U.S. connection is still much more important. This perception was further strengthened by the fact that under the threat of U.S. sanctions India, as noted above, reduced its oil import from Iran to zero by mid-2020 (Kutty, 2020). The Iranian stance was further complemented by the strategic calculation and wish not to alienate Pakistan or China, and thus Iran stated that “it would like to invite more players, including China and Pakistan” to participate in the Chabahar project (Ramachandran, 2019). India’s interest in Chabahar, the first foreign port development project by India, was from the beginning complemented with the Indian perception that “China’s ultimate plan is the encirclement of India with the acquisition of these ports.” Thus, in a recent development—in reaction to China’s appearance and involvement in Chabahar (Chinese interest was first shown by the visit of the Chinese ambassador to Chabahar late 2015), as well as plans to connect Gwadar and Chabahar (Xinhuanet, 2019)— in mid-2020 India seemed to return to the project. The announcement of the 25-year Iran–China deal most probably gave a further impetus to renewed Indian engagement in/with Iran, as reflected by the two ministerial visits (Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Minister of Foreign Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar) to Tehran in September 2020. Among the declared aims was to give “a push to connectivity projects … and to keep up the momentum in their partnership” (Chaudhury, 2020).

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5 On the Global Agenda: Nuclear Programs: Both Ways Nuclear non-proliferation is as old as the (eventual) use of nuclear weapons, or maybe even a bit older.11 The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and by now has become almost universal, with India (as well as Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) not being parties to it. While India has been involved in nuclear non-proliferation issues on the international agenda, it has consistently claimed and maintained that the NPT is discriminative in nature when it “allows” (accepts) that some states are in possession of nuclear weapons (NPT, 1968, Article 1), which others are demanded to give up (NPT, 1968, Article 2). While the drafters of the Treaty meant this duality to be of a transitory phase only, India claims that this is (has been) a “nuclear apartheid.” Iran signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1970, concluded the full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and at times has even observed the Additional Protocol, providing unlimited access for the IAEA inspectors. Iran and India both see themselves as responsible powers acting for the benefit of all in the international arena. Both have a history related to both aspects of the dual-use nuclear energy and technology: the civilian—both are in the possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle, and the military— whether a declared capability (India), or international sanctions to prevent it from obtaining such a capability (Iran). Iran has been severely sanctioned over its nuclear program to prevent it from stepping over the nuclear threshold in spite of its declarations on the civilian nature of its nuclear program and Ayatollah Khamenei’s nuclear fatwa prohibiting the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in the Islamic Republic of Iran. India declared its military nuclear capability in 1998 with a series of nuclear explosions. By now both are in possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle and share—at least partly—a neighborhood with legally acknowledged and non-acknowledged nuclearweapon states: Russia, China, and the U.S. (by its presence in the Persian

11 Scientists in the Manhattan Program had a debate among them if the nuclear weapons should be used at all. Politicians had no concern and did not hesitate. The first move against the use and further spread of the new weapons category was also started by scientists, which developed into the Pugwash … The Pugwash received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1995.

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Gulf and the Indian Ocean), as well as Israel and Pakistan. Both are against the spread of nuclear weapons and call for nuclear disarmament, while both champion the right to the civilian use of nuclear energy12 (New Delhi Declaration, paragraph 14). The main incentive for India to start on a nuclear program in earnest was the declaration of the Chinese nuclear capability in 1964: the first ever Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 code-named “Smiling Buddha” was a response, but at the same time was announced to be a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” The chain reaction which the Indian test initiated, especially in Pakistan, but giving the idea to Iraq and Iran, made India develop not only a civilian, but also a military program, culminating in the series of nuclear tests in 1998. Although India has announced and maintained a no-first-use commitment ever since,13 it had to face serious sanctions by the Clinton administration, which only came to be dissolved through a long series of negotiations. Amelioration of relations to the United States was given a boost with the War on Terror, in the framework of which the U.S. saw an indispensable potential ally in India to the extent that a cooperation agreement was signed in 2005—among others—on cooperation on nuclear energy. Under the deal India separated its civilian and military nuclear facilities and put the former ones under IAEA inspection. The U.S. in return lifted its decades-long moratorium on nuclear trade with India. The agreement was still seen highly problematic by many in the international community as providing (civilian) nuclear technology to a state outside the NPT and in possession of nuclear-weapon capability was seen contradictory to the non-proliferation regime. Yet, after a long debate in the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (the export control regime for nuclear related titles) the U.S.-Indian deal was 12 “The two sides reiterated their commitment to commence multi-lateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament under effective international control. They expressed their concern about restrictions imposed on the export of materials, technology and equipment to developing countries and acknowledged the right of these countries to research, production and use of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes.” 13 Following the test India and Pakistan announced that they would not carry out further nuclear tests. In 1954 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed the “standstill” for nuclear tests, which was the beginning of the process leading to the total ban of nuclear tests under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. India was actively participating in the negotiating process, however, has not yet signed it as it (India) demanded a timetable from the nuclear-weapon states of their nuclear disarmament. For details of the Indian nuclear program see https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-nuc lear-chronology/.

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accepted: India received a waiver and has become the only country in possession of nuclear weapons and outside the NPT, with which civilian nuclear trade is allowed in the international community (with implementation, however, still lagging behind). Having been exposed to sanctions and a nuclear embargo itself, India is fully aware of the consequences, although being a much bigger country and the sanctions against it fewer, not so comprehensive and proving temporary, it was not as much affected as Iran has been. India’s stance on the Iranian nuclear program, consequently, can be defined as the vector of the Indian experience in the nuclear-related policies of the international community (the differentiation between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, sanctions, rejection of free access to nuclear technology), the Indian self-perception (an emerging responsible global power) Indian national interests (the maintenance of the nuclear capability and deterrence, regional balance of power) and the Indian doctrine of “strategic autonomy” and non-alignment. Taken Indian rejection of the discriminatory character of the nonproliferation regime and with the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal finally accepted, in the Indian understanding India has been accepted as a nuclear-weapon state, in spite of the fact that the NPT puts forward a clear definition.14 Nevertheless, India would not like to see other nuclear-weapon states emerging either in its neighborhood or farther away. Consequently, India would not support or accept a military component in Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, India does not see an eventual Iranian nuclear weapons capability as an imminent possibility due to Iran’s lack of a political decision on the matter15 and the technology gap still existing. At the same time India is also “deeply sceptical that the United States can (or should) roll back Tehran’s nuclear program” (Ashwarya, 2017, 17). The sanctions regime that has been built against Iran comprises of manifold sanctions over a wide range of actors and issues, nuclear-related sanctions being just one thematic among them. When the obligatory 14 “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.” (NPT, 1968, Art. IX, para 3). 15 While many analysts think that the nuclear fatwa could be withdrawn by Ayatollah Khamenei, giving the chance for the development of a military program, this author considers it highly improbable, almost impossible, due to two main reasons: the legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih model and the readiness of the international community to pass stringent sanctions on Iran.

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sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program by the UN Security Council were suspended based on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), India supported it and had great expectations as it made it possible to re-engage with Iran on India’s priority issues, energy resources, and financial transactions, as well as get involved in construction and connectivity projects, clearing outstanding financial debts, etc.16 Consequently, the U.S. withdrawal and the introduction of unilateral sanctions on the basis of U.S. domestic law (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, CISADA) was a blow not just to Iran, but the international community as well. The unilateral U.S. sanctions have an extraterritorial element, which—when enforced, as the Trump administration has done—has had a more stringent impact on global economic and financial relations than the U.S. Security Council sanctions ever had. India noted that it should have to carefully nuance its policies, and it was expected to scale down Indian investment ambitions in Iran. The withdrawal had three direct consequences for India: First, India (and some others) protested: Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swaraj stated “India follows only U.N. sanctions, and not unilateral sanctions by any country”17 (Reuters, May 2018). Second, although India (and some others) received a waiver for six months from President Trump, in spite of intense lobbying in Washington by Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Jaishankar and other Indian officials, the waiver was not extended. Third, India very reluctantly, temporarily gave in, stopped oil import from Iran and suspended its participation in Iranian projects,18 including the development of the Chabahar port complex. This, in spite of the fact

16 India owed Iran about 8.8 million USD for oil which it could not clear due to the sanctions. Though it tried to use Turkish banks and other alternate means, under the U.S. pressure trade had to be suspended until the nuclear deal was agreed (Khan, 2015). 17 “India has implemented the Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran, but has generally been reluctant about complying with the extraterritorial or third party sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. … third party sanctions are domestic laws of individual countries. They do not have the legitimacy of multilateralism and are not products of international consensus… New Delhi does not want to implement sanctions formulated without its input to the debate …” (Ashwarya, 2017, 162). 18 Several Indian companies were effected, among them those which are partly or entirely owned by foreign companies, including some partly owned by Iranian firms. E.g., 15.4% of the shares of the Chennai Petroleum are owned by the Naftiran Intertrade, while Nayara Energy is mostly owned by the Russian Rosneft.

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that the main elements of the port development were exempted by President Trump from the sanctions, yet, complementing projects (e.g. port equipment, etc.) were not, making it impossible for Indian and foreign companies to participate and deliver. Consequently, in spite of Indian misgivings about sanctions in general—they are ineffective, hurting the population instead of making the targeted regime comply—India reluctantly though, but seemed to accept the U.S. dictate and put most of its Iranian relations on hold. However, late summer 2020 two events changed the Indian analysis. On the one hand, armed clashes took place along the short ChineseIndia border. On the other, a 25-year lucrative deal of $400 billion was announced between China and Iran covering political, economic, and military cooperation. The subsequent visits to Tehran by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Jaishankar, though coinciding with the confrontation with China at the northern border and in spite of the burgeoning Indian political and military ties with the U.S., reflected on the one hand that India’s alliance with the U.S. has its limits, and on the other, that India’s calculations of a strategic-security partnership with the United States may be shifting.19 While alignment with the U.S. is an important asset to rely on (in spite of dissatisfaction by certain fractions in Indian domestic policy) against the emerging power of China, India may have come to the conclusion that in its direct neighborhood it has to counter-maneuvre China on its own initiative, too.20 Letting Iran go would threaten India’s plans of connectivity, the first priority on the Indian foreign policy agenda (Kutty, 2020).

19 The defense minister arrived in Tehran in early September from Moscow, where he had attended the meeting of SCO defense ministers. The external affairs minister came to Tehran a few days later, en route to Moscow. Comment in Indian media has been very limited. The defense minister’s visit was placed in the context of the deteriorating security situation in the Gulf and possible threats to shipping, while the external affairs minister’s visit was projected as addressing apparent Indian disinterest in Chabahar and the slow progress in India meeting its commitments. 20 To this the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) may serve as a further forum, yet, it would exceed the limits of this study to discuss the developments there.

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From the Iranian perspective, in spite of the disappointments caused by the Indian votes in the IAEA21 and the strategic cooperation and partnership with the United States, India is still a potential partner in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, a prospective buyer of Iranian petrochemicals (in spite of the present zero oil import and suspension of gas projects), and a potential cooperator in connectivity developments. As an emerging global power India may also provide international support to Iran, even if under the “maximum pressure” policy by the Trump administration India has also—it seems temporarily—backed down. While Iran is painfully aware that for India (as for other great powers as well) relations to the United States will always be more important than the Iranian contacts, it has also noted that India prides itself in its “strategic autonomy” and does not accept an eventual U.S. dictate—although it “may opt for a short-term policy of alliance to preserve its foreign policy independence and cope with the pressures of containment” (Ashwarya, 2017, 15).

6

Conclusion

Iran and India share a common historical past and a present with converging and diverging interests. These, however, have been in a continuous shift: first, such historical watersheds as the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as the expanded and protracted U.S. military presence in both countries’ direct neighborhood seemed to provide a more favorable environment to their bilateral relations. Recently, however, the international (UN Security Council), and even more recently the unilateral (United States) sanctions and the “maximum pressure” policy of the Trump administration on Iran have added further ups-and-downs in the India-Iran relations. Indian-Iranian relations have several different levels, from the bilateral to the closer neighborhood, from the extended region to the global. While all these are closely interrelated, the supply of energy resources (and the safe passage thereof), connectivity (within the closer and the wider 21 India voted against Iran in the IAEA (2005, 2006, 2009), in spite of the fact that the government was criticized domestically for “selling out” to the U.S., with whom India’s agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation was negotiated, and there were news that the deal was conditional on Indian support to the U.S. on the Iran issue. “As far as Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions are concerned I have stated it unambiguously on several occasions that we don’t support nuclear ambitions of Iran.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (The Hindu, 2009; Rajghatta, 2005).

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region) as well as the Iranian nuclear capability and the JCPOA (a title on and off the international agenda) seem to be the most outstanding topics reflecting the comprehensive nature of the relationship. At the end of 2020 all three seemed to be dictated by the Trump administration’s anti-Iran policy and rhetoric. Yet, President Donald Trump was leaving office soon, with President Biden taking over, who, according to his declarations, would have a different approach to Iran. Iran itself is preparing for presidential elections in June 2021, with as yet unforeseeable outcomes and consequences. For India, which has in the past few years become increasingly close to the United States, not only the U.S.-Iran, but even more importantly the evolution of the U.S.China relations will be decisive. At the same time, India’s relations within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and to other West Asian regional actors (Saudi Arabia, Israel) also have to be taken into account. Nevertheless, Iran’s geostrategic location makes it an essential and practically unavoidable partner for India in its connectivity plans. Yet, with the increasing Chinese presence in Iran and the China-Iran deal announced, India may realize that it has a main competitor there, with Iran seizing the opportunity and balancing between the two. Still, Iran is aware that India (as well as the other great Asian powers, Russia and China) would not let their relationship to the United States be threatened or even overshadowed by the Iran connection. Finally, in an Asia home to two acknowledged and four nonacknowledged nuclear-weapon states, India does not want to see one more emerging. Consequently, when Iran emphasizes the civilian character of its nuclear program it suits Indian interests and the Indian perception of the balance of power. Iranian threats to withdraw not only from the JCPOA, but also from the NPT is seen by India as a last case scenario, and has not been taken seriously… so far. Indian regional and global interests are connected to the future of the JCPOA (or an eventual JCPOA 2.0), which will be embedded in the much wider context of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. With the multilateral leaning of the future Biden administration such issues may come back into the focus of international attention, especially with the 2020 NPT Review Conference being postponed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While it seems that the spread of the civilian uses of nuclear energy cannot be stopped, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Ban Treaty) entered into force two days after Biden’s inauguration.

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New Development of Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism Yang Chen

1

Introduction

Since the birth of modern society, the world has been divided into two parts, the west and the rest. For those declining great empires like Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Safavid Dynasty which have always been faced with the choices between the East and the West, Asia and Europe, secularity and religion, learning from the West and adopting Westernization is a necessity. However, when the nation-states were established in the ruins of the empires, to explore the path of national development and search for the country’s national position was still a difficult problem to solve. Take the Middle East countries as example, they were still unable to control their own destiny after one hundred years since the WWI. However, this situation has undergone tremendous changes in twentyfirst century, especially with the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, the influence of Western powers in the world has gradually weakened, and the strength of non-Western developing countries has continued to rise. This trend is “a major change unseen in centuries.” Take the Eurasian continent as an example, the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of

Y. Chen (B) Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_21

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major powers has been filled by Russia, Turkey, Iran, and other regional countries and their willingness of seeking independence has also increased. By this trend, the used-to-be popular ideology of “Eurasianism” in the 1920s is once again reappeared and became an important inspiration for these countries’ diplomatic practices. Turkey is not an exception. Since the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, Turkey has experienced a diplomatic transformation, moving from a traditional pro-Western policy to an active, independent, and East-oriented policy due to the hopelessness of joining the European Union and its constant conflicts with the United States. By actively participating in the Palestine-Israel Issue, the Iranian Nuclear Issue, the Syrian Crisis, the Libya Crisis, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflicts, etc., and strengthening economic and social exchanges with the Gulf countries, Turkey has become an important player in the grand chessboard in regional and even global affairs. Under this context, Eurasianism with Turkish characteristics is being mentioned, discussed, and even adopted by Turkish academicians and officers.

2 “Eurasianism” in Russia: From Classical Eurasianism to Neo-Euraisanism Belong to the East or the West is an eternal issue in the history of Russia and the questions like “Who are we?” and “Where are we going?” have continually been asked by generations of Russian thinkers and philosophers. In general, the historians agreed that Russia has experienced six major transformations in history, including the baptism of Ross, the invasion and rule of the Mongol-Tatars, the reforms of Peter the Great, the October Revolution, the founding of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Fang 2010). Among them, there have been three waves of Westernization in Russia’s history of more than a thousand years. The first wave of Westernization was from the tenth to the seventeenth century. Its starting point is in 988 AD when Grand Duke Vladimir accepted Christianity as the state religion through the Byzantine Eastern Church and then Russia became a member of the Christian world. However, with the emergence of the “Moscow-Third Rome” concept, there were serious oppositions between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Western Europe.

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The second wave of Westernization was from the reforms of Peter the Great to the establishment of the superpower Soviet Union. Although the reforms of this period opened a window for Russia to observe Europe, it also promoted the historical and cultural consciousness of the Russian nation, sparking discussions about “Atlanticism” and “Slavism” and whether it should follow the road of total Westernization or preserve the characteristics of national culture. Finally, when Marxism, which is also an ideologue from Western faction, became the orthodox, a small number of unsatisfied Russian intellectuals were forced to migrate Western Europe, claiming to be “Eurasianists” in the 1920–1930s, but the result of it was being suppressed (Ye 2018). The third wave of Westernization lasted from the mid-1980s until President Vladimir Putin came to power. Especially during Boris Yeltsin’s period, Russia implemented shock therapy economically according to the recommendations of American experts, copied Western democracy politically, and “leaned to one side” toward the West in diplomacy, but eventually led to the dissatisfaction of the Russian people, and the “Atlanticism” became notorious (Shan 2003). The core idea of Eurasianism is to question both the West and the Bolsheviks. In their views, Russia’s path in the future is neither to follow the Western constitutional democracy, nor to open up a brand new one through class reconstruction and global proletarian revolution. It aims to develop a unique civilization system, create a new power center and civilization center that is different from Europe and Asia, but at the same time contains the characteristics of both. The Eurasianists believe that the West will eventually decline and Russia will become a new model for the world (Yuan 2015). It is conceivable that Eurasianism will not be accommodated by the Soviet Union controlled by the Bolsheviks, so it disappeared in 1930s until the late 1980s, when the Soviet regime was in crisis, carry out a series of pro-Western reforms but even though leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Based on dissatisfaction with reforms, an anti-Western and anti-liberal political movement spawned in Russia, and the Neo-Eurasianism has become an independent political force and entered the stage of history again, with Alexander Dugin as its initiator. With the emergence of Neo-Eurasianism, the previous Eurasianism was also called Classical Eurasianism. In the geopolitical imagination of Alexander Dugin, he described world history as a desperate struggle between land power and sea power,

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land civilization and ocean civilization, and the victory of either side meant the end of history. He divided the world into three major zones: Euro-Africa meridian zone, Russian-Central Asian Meridian Zone, Pacific Meridian Zone, and built Eurasian Union with Russia as the center, and Turkey and Iran as the core countries of Russia-Central Asia (Dugin 2014). Alexander Dugin’s thoughts like anti-Western, especially antiU.S. grand strategy and ideology, and the use of the Eurasian Union to integrate Eurasia have been demonstrated in the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. No wonder the media believes that he is the “brain” of President Putin and the source of Russian expansionist ideology.

3 “Eurasianism” in Turkey: Kemalist Eurasianism with Turkish Characteristics Similar to Russia, Turkey is also an important country on the Eurasian continent with the characteristics of two continents, Europe and Asia. Although Turkey does not have a Judeo-Christian cultural tradition and the Arab Islamic culture, European civilization has always been an important factor in the development of Turkish culture. In the late Ottoman Empire, it was called the “Sick Man of Europe” rather than the “Sick Man of Asia,” which shows that Turkey has been recognized as a European country as an important player of the balance of power. There were also three waves of large-scale encounters between Turkey and the West. The Ottoman Empire began its first attempt to Westernize in the early eighteenth century after two defeats and humiliations by Austria and Tsarist Russia, and the signing of the Treaty of Karlovitz (1699) and the Treaty of Passarowicz (1718). After this, the Ottoman elites initiated the Tanzimat reform and three trends of thoughts emerged accordingly: Ottomanism was the ideal of young Ottomans, which mainly emphasized the unity of different groups in the empire around the Ottoman Kingship (Davison 1963); (Pan-)Islamism seeks to achieve unity within the Islamic community (Karpat 2001); and (Pan-)Turkism seeks to achieve the unity of all Turkic nations under the banner of Ottoman (Akturk 2009). Occidentalism has always existed in these ideologies, and the difference lies in their respective ways and degrees of westernization. Although Ottomanism and Islamism are not opposed to borrowing European

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scientific and technological ideas, they hope that these ideas can be consistent with Islamic principles, thereby protecting imperial society from the negative influence of Western culture. Their debate focused on how to “modernize while maintaining themselves.” Westernizers are the main group in the young Turkish movement, and they have successfully implemented many reforms that originated in the West, but they could not save the empire from its decline. With the victory of the Kemalist Westernizers, this debate stopped for a while but never end. Thus, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey opened the second wave of large-scale contacts between Turkey and the West. As Turkey joined NATO after World War II and became a member of the Western camp, the third wave of large-scale contacts between Turkey and the West began. Although Turkey has joined alomost all the European organizations, its application for the membership of the EU was constantly rejected in 1980s, which aroused a great debate of Turkey’s national identity between Westernizers and Islamists. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the rise of five new Central Asian republics, Turkey suddenly found an excellent opportunity to become the leader of Turkic civilization (Bozdaglioglu 2003). Since then, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism have once again emerged. After the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has paid more attention to the affairs in the Middle East and even the World. However, with the increasing role of Asian economies in the World, the less possibility of Turkey to join the European Union, and the resignation of Ahmet Davotoglu and his Neo-Ottomanism, the Eurasianism has been advocated by more intellectuals and officers, especially the Turkish Patriotic Party (Hai & Jian 2019), which is a left-wing socialist party that adheres to Kemalism and Eurasianism, and proposed the unity of Russia, China, Iran and countries in Eurasia and organized many activities and conferences (Akcali & Perincek 2009) to promote Eurasianism in Turkey.

4

Turkey-Iran Relations in History

Turkey and Iran are both countries with a long history. Since the sixteenth century, the two countries have been enemies and friends due to geography, religion, and the game of great powers. Some of the iconic events of their relations are the Ottoman Empire—the Safavid Dynasty War; the First World War; the Islamic Revolution; the end of the Cold War

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and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the Justice and Development Party was in power. Correspondingly, the relationship between the two countries can also be divided into the following five stages. The first stage: the period of Ottoman-Safavid opposition (sixteenth to early twentieth century). Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Safavid Dynasty, which adhered to the expansion policy, started to compete with the Ottoman Empire, which was in its heyday, in the Middle East. The Safavid Dynasty adopted Shiites as the state religion, so it supported the kizilbas or red-headed rebel tribes in the Ottoman Empire. In 1514, the two sides fought at Calderland with the victory of the Ottoman Empire, and then the red-headed rebellion disappeared later. However, the confrontation between the two did not disappear until five more wars were fought in the next hundred years, and the Zuhaba Treaty was signed in 1639 (Finkel 2019). Later, as the two empires weakened, Britain and Russia began to frequently intervene in the struggle for Anatolia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and finally established dominance in the Middle East. The second stage: after the First World War (1920–1970s). In the 1920s, Turkey and Iran achieved independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Pahlavi respectively. Since the two leaders were both from military and committed to leading the country on the path of modernization and secularization, the relationship between Turkey and Iran has developed well, and the disputes between religious factions and geopolitics have not brought much influence. In July 1937, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan signed the Saadabad Treaty. In 1955, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom established the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), also known as the Baghdad Treaty, with the purpose of checking and balancing the power of the Soviet Union. However, with Iraq’s withdrawal in 1958, the organization changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization based in Ankara. In July 1964, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan established the Regional Cooperation and Development Organization (RCD). In the 1970s, Turkey was sanctioned by the United States because of the Cyprus problem, while Iran’s status greatly increased due to its important role in the 1973 oil crisis. Since then, Iran has played an increasingly important role in the Middle East. The third stage: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979–1989). After the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the common

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worldview and strategic position shared by Turkey and Iran quickly disappeared. Turkey sees the Islamic regime in Iran as the greatest threat to the secular regime model. In the 1980s, Turkey continuously accused the Iranian government of kidnapping and assassinating religious moderate forces exiled to Turkey. In addition, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Iran also expressed support for Islamic terrorist organizations to go to Turkey to assassinate Saudi and Israeli diplomats. In 1989, Turkey expelled Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s ambassador to Turkey, causing a serious deterioration in relations between the two countries (Jun 2011). However, during the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey also sold weapons to Iran and Iraq at the same time. The fourth stage: the end of the Cold War and the rise of the Welfare Party in Turkey (1990s). After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was a vacuum in Central Asia. In order to enhance its strategic position, Turkey competed with Iran in Central Asia, but finally gained greater influence by relying on the advantages of Turkic culture. The Islamist Welfare Party (WP) won the national election in 1995. During its short term in power in the next two years, it tried to change Turkey’s foreign policy. For example, Erbakan’s first foreign visit is Iran, and the two countries signed a natural gas import agreement worth 20 billion U.S. dollars. In December 1996, he ordered the Turkish delegation to the United Nations to join North Korea, China, Cuba, and Libya to oppose a resolution condemning Iran’s human rights violations. The Welfare Party officials are also constantly reiterating the possibility of establishing bilateral defense cooperation between Iran and Turkey (Jenkins 2008). At the same time, Erbakan also formed the Group of Developing-8 Countries, including Iran, as a replacement for the G8. However, with the outbreak of the February 28th “soft coup,” the Turkish military came to power again, and the foreign policy has also undergone tremendous changes. In particular, the relationship between Turkey and Iran has been more affected. The fifth stage: the Era of the Justice and Development Party (since the twenty-first century). After the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, the Middle East has become a new direction of Turkish diplomacy. The relationship between Turkey and Iran has also developed rapidly from competition to cooperation, and the high-level exchange of visits between the two countries has continued to increase (Gang & Chen 2015). Their relationship in the 20 years has also been divided into three stages. Prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Turkey pursued a

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zero problem foreign policy with neighboring countries. The two countries continued to increase trade and investment. Turkey even participated in mediating the Iranian nuclear issue and achieved success. After the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East has undergone a major change, and it is tit-for-tat against Iran on the Syrian issue (Kuru 2015). However, after the failed coup of July 15 in 2016, Iran was the first to express its support for the Erdogan government, thus heating up the two countries relationship and relaxing their positions on the Syrian issue with the establishment of Astana Process by the joint efforts of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Generally speaking, during this period, the political, economic, and security interests of Turkey-Iran relations have been more firmly bound, especially when the United States exerts “extreme pressure.” Both of Iran and Turkey have to face the United States, the Syrian civil war, the Iranian nuclear deal, and other issues. By this way, the mutual support and dependence, and the tacit understanding between each other are stronger than before.

5 Turkey-Iran Relations from the Perspective of Eurasianism Regarding the relationship between Turkey and Iran, the disadvantages that scholars often talk about are the following five points (Larrabee & Nader 2013). First, the dispute over geopolitical interests. After the end of the Cold War, the rivalry between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus began to intensify, each pursuing its own model. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year, Turkey and Iran were on opposite sides; in the Syrian crisis, they were also on opposite sides, which added distrust between the two sides invisibly. Second, the different political models. The foundation of Turkey’s Republic is the secular democratic system, while Iran implements a theocratic political system integrating religion and secularism, and has a solid foundation of Shia doctrine and belief. Therefore, Turkey claims to be a model of secularization and modernization in the Muslim world, while Iran advertises itself as a model of Islamism. Especially after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the political model dispute has become a structural contradiction between the two countries (Jun 2018). Third, the dispute over the Kurdish issue. Both Turkey and Iran regard the Kurdish issue as a core issue involving the national security and territorial integrity of the two countries. Before the twenty-first century, the two

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sides constrained each other on the Kurdish issue, but with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis and the U.S.’s support for the Kurds, Turkey and Iran began to have a unified view of fighting against the Kurds together, but the future still does not rule out policy uncertainty. Fourth, different views on hot issues. Turkey and Iran’s position in the Syrian crisis is still antagonistic and supports different forces. Also, the two sides have serious differences on the Iraq issue, and both are striving for greater influence in Iraq. Fifth, Turkey uses Iran to seek to strengthen its strategic role in relations with Europe and the United States. Turkey’s close relationship with Iran makes it an important platform for communication between the EU and Iran, and Turkey can also use this to increase its influence in the EU. This makes the development of relations between the two countries also instrumental. However, in fact, through the above review and analysis of the historical exchanges between Turkey and Iran, we can also draw several conclusions. First, in the past four hundred years, the territorial border between Turkey and Iran has been basically stable. There has never been any war between the two. The two countries have a deep understanding of each other’s strength and bottom line. Second, Turkey and Iran are big countries with a long history, and both have a great power complex. One has the dream of “rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire” and the other has the dream of “rebuilding the Persian Empire.” Both have a strong desire to get rid of the control of external forces and seek independence. Third, after entering the twentieth century, Turkey and Iran have established alliances with the support of the West, and both have acted as the pivotal countries of the United States in the Middle East. Fourth, although Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all seek leadership in the Islamic world, the religious conflicts between Turkey and Iran are not as strong as those between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Relations between Turkey and Iran can usher in greater development when Islamists (ProIslamist) came into power (Sula 2018). Fifth, no matter how the international situation and regional situation changes, the economies of Turkey and Iran are highly complementary. Turkey needs to rely on Iranian oil, and Iran needs Turkey to open up channels of communication with the outside world (Ehteshami & Elik 2011).

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Sixth, the Kurdish issue and the Azerbaijan issue are the most critical factors related to the core interests of Turkey-Iran relations. Once mutual understanding and respect can be achieved on these two core issues, cooperation between Turkey and Iran will make substantial progress. The above factors can be regarded as positive factors that can further enhance the relationship between Turkey and Iran, but the more important thing is that the two countries are facing severe pressure from the West, and this pressure is a huge threat to the current regimes of both Turkey and Iran. From the perspective of Turkey, the attempted military coup in 2016 was a plot of the West to subvert Erdogan’s regime, which has greatly deteriorated Turkey’s relations with the West. Regarding Turkish-U.S. relations, after the coup, Erdogan immediately identified Fethullah Gulen as the man behind the coup, and requested the U.S. to extradite him but was rejected. This has planted the seeds for the deterioration of TurkishU.S. relations. In addition, the United States continues to support the Kurdish forces in Syria, which involves the core interest of Turkey. Regarding the relationship between Turkey and the EU, Europe has already had a lot of conflicts with Turkey on the refugee issue. Besides, the EU has frequently accused the Turkish government of violating values such as democracy and human rights. More importantly, the EU has temporarily terminated Turkey’s accession process, which further aggravated the contradiction between the two sides (Chen 2020). From the perspective of Iran, since the beginning of the new century, the U.S.-led international forces have defeated and overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam regime in Iraq. The “Arab Spring” also led to a sharp drop in the regional influence of many Arab countries, which has made Iran’s regional strategic position in the Middle East improved significantly. But this improvement is relative, for it does not mean that Iran’s economic and military strength has increased greatly in the past 20 years. And Iran is still facing the suppression of the United States, the hostility of regional rivalries, and the dilemma of domestic development (Da 2020). First, for example, after the Trump administration came to power, the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 to exert “extreme pressure” on Iran. In the early morning of January 3, 2020, Major General Soleimani, commander of the “Quds Brigade” of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was targeted for removal by U.S. drones, leading to escalation of the conflict between the United

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States and Iran (Chun 2020). On November 27, 2020, Iran’s top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated 40 miles northeast of the capital Tehran. The two assassinations from the beginning of the year to the end of the year undoubtedly showed the ambition of the evil backstage manipulator to suppress Iran (Rui 2020). Secondly, at the regional level, the current four major regional powers in the Middle East, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, among which Iran’s security situation is the most severe, and the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran has even risen to the main conflict in the Middle East. The logic is like this: Saudi Arabia can tolerate some Arab countries to establish normal relations with Israel; Israel regards Iran as the biggest security risk; so only Turkey and Iran have room for relaxation. Finally, under the “extreme pressure” of the United States, Turkey’s economic development has been severely hit, especially under the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. When the people’s living standards are getting worse and worse, they will blame the responsibility to the Erdogan government. The same is true to Iran government. Two large-scale public protests broke out in Iran in 2018 and 2019, which all sounded a wake-up call to the Iranian government. Against this background, Iran has a strong desire to ease relations between Turkey and Iran and strengthen relations with Turkey, Russia, and China. After all, regime stability is the most important issue of the current Iranian government. So now it is not only necessary but also full of possibilities for Turkey and Iran to strengthen ties and improve their relations. From the perspective of Eurasianism, the Middle East order as a “world island” has undergone very significant changes after the Arab Spring. This mainly includes the following aspects. First, the ability and willingness of major powers, especially the United States, to control the Middle East have reduced quite a lot, so they adopt a policy of partiality to Israel, and try to intensify the opposition and conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran so as to have more manipulations. Second, after weakening of major powers, regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have played a more active role and the autonomy of them has continued to strengthen, which is a phenomenon that has not been seen in the past 100 years. Third, Russia entered Syria directly through military means with the moral high ground, and strengthened coordination with Turkey and Iran through the Astana process, thereby gaining a firm foothold in Syria. In a word, Russia, Turkey, and Iran are playing an increasingly important role in the new order of the Middle East.

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From a larger perspective, the world is undergoing “great changes unseen in a century.” New changes or new trends in international politics and economics have played a role in promoting the continuous entry of Turkey and Iran. For one thing, a new international pattern is taking shape. The past 500 years is the history of West dominance. However, after entering the twenty-first century, problems of democracy, economy, demographic structure, party struggle, and the gap between the rich and the poor have emerged one after another in the West. The rise of some non-Western countries like China, Turkey, Iran, etc. has promoted the transition of the international order from Western dominance to a balanced East–West relations. For another thing, the mass rise of nonWestern countries in Eurasia is actually the rise of land-powered countries, which is bound to bring about a new global governance model. In the past, global governance model was only meant to be Western style globalization. But nowadays the former world leader, the United States, has emerged against the trend of globalization with the slogan of “America First” but wishes to maintain its supremacy in the Middle East at the same time. For the U.S., this is hard to achieve since the unity of the vast Eurasian countries will contribute more opportunities and power to the global governance.

6

Conclusion

Judging from the reality of development, Europe and the United States are promoting the development of the “central-peripheral” structure. They believe that the peripheral can only develop through the absorption of European and American political and economic systems. However, Asian, African, and Latin American countries find that their development is lagging far behind the central developed countries, falling into prolonged poverty, recession, and being plundered even following the Western model. This situation is typical for Eurasia countries which have not achieved significant development after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The assistance provided by developed countries is far below expectations, and its economic growth cannot even be compared with African and Latin American countries. If these Eurasian countries can unite together to transcend the traditional thinking of sea power versus land power, and create a new global production system with infrastructure interconnection and industrial chain cooperation and development, then this will be a new inclusive developmentalism and globalism, which will

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definitely contribute to the construction of a new international political and economic new order. Since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has experienced a hundred years of history, but in fact none of the problems of “peace” and “development” have been resolved. The Arabism advocated by Arabs as the main ethnic group in the Middle East is gradually declining. While the once marginal peoples like Turkey, Iran, and Israel begin to play a more important role. The hot issues like Yemen issue, Syria issue, Iran nuclear issue, and other issues are still trapped in geopolitical and sectarian conflicts. Based on the current historical, geographic, and political contradictions in the Middle East, it is hoped that Eurasian countries such as Turkey and Iran will unite. During this process, a strong external force is still needed, that is if the trend of “rising in the east and falling in the west” continues, the golden age of Turkey-Iran relations will become a reality sooner or later. Acknowledgment This chapter was supported by “Key Projects of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education of China” (17JZD036) and “Youth Program of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Shanghai Municipality” (2017EGJ004).

Bibliography Akcali, E. & Perincek, M. (2009). Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey. Geopolitics. 14 (3): 561–563. Akturk, S. (2009). Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood. Middle Eastern Studies. 45 (6): 893. Bozdaglioglu, Y. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach. Routledge, New York and London, pp. 7–9. Chen, Y. (2020). Developments in China-Turkey Relations: A View From China. Critical Sociology. 46 (4–5): 779–782. Chun, W. S. (2020). Iran Confirms Soleimani’s Death, Vows Revenge. Observer.com. https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2020_01_03_530348. shtml. Accessed 3 January 2020. Da, F. H. (2020). Iran’s Strategies and Prospects for Improving Regional Strategic Position. Contemporary World. 2: 4–10. Davison, R. (1963). Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876. Princeton University Press, Princeton and New Jersey, p. 106.

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The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Middle East Region: Iran’s Policy of Strategic Retreat and the Dangers of a New Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus Valentina Pegolo

1

Introduction

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war saw Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in the most significant military confrontation since the 1994 ceasefire brought to a halt six years of war. The crux of the conflict is the status of the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Fig. 1 shows, Nagorno-Karabakh is a separatist enclave of ethnic Armenians inside of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised borders. Stepanakert, the de facto capital of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, has governed the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh with Russian and Armenian support since declaring its independence in 1991. No sovereign country, including Armenia, has recognised Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, and the international community unanimously recognises Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has evolved into a Reconquista campaign for Azerbaijan, who, according to the 10th

V. Pegolo (B) Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9_22

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Fig. 1 Map of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring countries (Map credits Aivazovsky—Azerbaijan districts numbered.png, ArmeniaNumbered.png, Ggmap.png, and Iran map.png, Public Domain. Retrieved from: https://commons. wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1476455)

of November ceasefire agreement, has regained control of seven regions that had been under the control of Armenia’s army since 1994, as well as part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Nagorno-Karabakh had been a frozen conflict since the 1994 ceasefire. The latest round (2020) of fighting has been the most devastating one in 30 years. The conflict itself is not new: almost two centuries of imperial arm-wrestling and misguided colonial policies have contributed to the seemingly unsolvable entrenchment of the dispute. However, the current evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ought to be observed closely because of the presence of a new regional and international realpolitik dimension to the strife. While international mediation has been present since the outbreak of the war in 1988, the scope of external interference and the stakes it brought within 2020 represents a new and worrisome development. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has brought about a sudden shift in the political dynamics of a turbulent region. The South Caucasus is a territory with great geopolitical importance, laying at the crossroad between Eurasia, South Asia, and the Middle East; this region has been for over a century the theatre of wars between the Tsarist, Ottoman, and

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Persian Empire. With the voluntary disengagement of the United States (U.S.) from the Middle East under the Trump presidency, and the seemingly weakening of Russia’s tight grip on its ‘near abroad’, the Caucasus has become once again fertile ground for the geopolitical ambitions of middle powers who are racing to fill the void of a post-U.S. regional order. Iran has found itself involved in a race for the control of its ‘backyard’ that it did not wish for. Caught in between economic and health crises at home and political encirclement in the wider Middle East, Tehran has tried to work against the tide to secure its regional standing, accepting a temporary demotion of its diplomatic and political influence in exchange for the security of its northern flank. It is imperative for observers not to mistake the new postbellum status quo as permanent: the current balance of power in the South Caucasus represents the start of a renewed geopolitical rivalry between Turkey, Russia, and Iran that has the potential to expand beyond the confines of Nagorno-Karabakh. All three of the major regional power involved consider the South Caucasus as their historical sphere of influence and have taken an active role in the 2020 conflict with the aim of augmenting or safeguarding their presence in the strategic crossroad. The newly emerging balance of power is rendered more fragile by the intervention of other external players such as Pakistan and Israel, as well as by the ambiguous relationship between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Now more than ever, it is crucial to remember that strategic conflict cooperation should not be confused with long-term political cooperation, and that the alignments we see at the end of the conflict are all but permanent alliances. While the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has turned out to be an important testing ground for regional powers, their very involvement in what is otherwise a matter of self-determination vs. territorial integrity has nested the Nagorno-Karabakh war within a wider web of rivalries spanning across the Eurasian continent. Iran will have eventually to adapt and respond to increasing Turkish preponderance in the region, but it may choose, as it has done to date, to temporarily cede the battle on the northern front to tend to more pressing concerns knocking on its other fronts. The Nagorno-Karabakh war has represented an orderly, strategic retreat on the part of Iran, and not an all-out military catastrophe. The country is undergoing a period of internal realignment in the wake of the devastating

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COVID-19 emergency,1 as well as in the light of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The loss of the battle for influence over the Caucasus should not be mistaken for the loss of the war for hegemony in the Middle East. The domestic ethnic balance of the Islamic Republic further complicates Iran’s position in the conflict. Iranian Azerbaijanis constitute by all estimates the largest minority in Iran. The exact demographics of the Iranian Azeri people are the object of contention; official Iranian sources usually estimated the total number of Iranian Azerbaijanis at 12– 15 million, about 15% of the total population (Turkdiaspora, 2015), while Azeri activists claim their number is closer to 35% of Iran’s total population (The Other Way to Think, 2012). Part of the discrepancy may be explained by the fact that Azerbaijanis constitute only one of several other Turkic minorities in Iran; nevertheless, the topic remains highly politicised. Iranian Azerbaijanis mostly live in four provinces (West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan) which constitute Iran’s northwestern corner and its border with Azerbaijan. There are also sizable communities of Iranian Azeris in the cities of Tabriz, Tehran, and Qom.

2

Background

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is often presented as the result of primordial hatred and ethnic mistrust (Gamaghelyan, 2010, pp. 35–36). It is true that there exist profound grievances in the Armenian and Azerbaijan communities, which are based on the difficult living conditions engendered by the 1994 war (ACAPS, 2020b), and are nested within an imaginary of mythical patriotism dating back centuries, if not millennia. However, rather than fuelling the conflict, radical nationalism is best seen as a product of the entrenchment of a war that has been on-going since 1988. In 2005, International Crisis Group noted: ‘nothing has been done to restore the rights of war victims, and if more years pass, the memories of cohabitation will fade and with them prospects for dialogue 1 COVID-19 is an acute contagious respiratory and vascular illness in humans caused by a coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), capable of producing severe symptoms and in some cases death. It was originally identified in 2019 and became pandemic in 2020. ‘CO’ stands for corona, ‘VI’ for virus, and ‘D’ for disease. Formerly, this disease was referred to as ‘2019 novel coronavirus’ or ‘2019-nCoV.’ (‘COVID-19 and vascular disease’. EBioMedicine. 58: 102,966. 2020. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ebiom.2020.102966. Retrieved from: https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7438984/).

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and restoration of trust’ (Crisis Group 2005, p. 29). Issues of identity and mistrust do matter on the ground, and ought to be addressed in any conflict resolution plan; but it is the international dimension of the conflict that has taken over in the 2020 war (Kaleji et al., 2020). The leaders of the parties at conflict are currently caught in a double spiral: that of the reification of inimical identities after forty years of state propaganda; and that of increasing dependency on foreign backers, who in turn increase their influence and stakes in the conflict. Both of these dynamics are the result of political choices made since 1988; however, the seeds of this conflict have been sawn for the past two centuries. The current crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh is not the result of an ancient civilisational clash, but rather the product of the modern forces of colonisation and national self-determination. The impact of the Tsarist Empire in the nineteenth century and the Soviet policies in the twentieth have shaped profoundly the demographic, economy, and legal status of the region. This has set the ground for the current dispute. 2.1

Colonial Legacies: Geopolitical Conflict of Interests at the Roots of the Conflict

The Caucasus region had been under the influence of the Persian Safavid Empire since the sixteenth century. With the weakening of the Safavid Empire in the eighteenth century, other powers set their eyes on the region, but it was the Tsarist Empire who managed to gain a lasting foothold there. Between 1805 and 1828, Russia conquered all of the territories of modern Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it only took possession of the northern part of historical Azeri territory, leaving the southern part to Iran (the provinces of West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan). According to the old divide et impera principle, Tsarist officials purposefully disregarded ethnic and historical territorial division when imposing new district boundaries. Karabakh was aggregated to another Azeri district, increasing the economic ties between the heartland of modern Azerbaijan and the contested region; at the same time, Tsarist officials encouraged the settlement of Armenians in Karabakh, and favoured the Armenian bourgeoisie over the local Azeri elite (Geukjian, 2012). This strategy accentuated the ethnic divide between Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples, leading to the first ethnic clashes in 1905–1906. Tsarist officials saw in Christian Armenians a potential ally against the

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Muslim nations of the empire who were being mobilised under the banner of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. This historical favouritism determines the modern perception of Russia as Armenia’s ally, in spite of the fact that Russia has been selling weapons to both sides of the conflict (Russell, 2020). The decisive developments for the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute took place between 1915 and 1923. In 1915, after demanding independence, the Armenian minority under the Ottoman Empire was subjected to killings and forced deportations which resulted in the death of 1.5 million people. Today, thirty-two countries, including the U.S. and Russia, recognise this event as the 1915 Armenian genocide. The Turkish government has disputed the use of the word ‘genocide’ to refer to the events. The events which led to the death of 1.5 million Armenians are associated in Yerevan with the on-going conflict against Azerbaijan as part of a national mythology of primordial ethnic hatred. This has left a long-lasting fear of annihilation in the Armenian nation, reinforcing Yerevan’s fear of encirclement in the light of the current Turkish-Azerbaijani military entente. After World War I, Nagorno-Karabakh emerged as one of the central geopolitical nodes in Central Asia. Turkey and Britain were competing for influence in the region: Turkey’s aim was to establish Nagorno-Karabakh as a land bridge connecting Turkey and Azerbaijan, and potentially all Turkish-speaking people beyond the Caspian Sea. Britain’s interest in the Caucasus was part of its ‘aggressive defence’ posture on India: through the control of the crucial land corridor, they hoped to prevent spillovers of the Russian civil war from compromising the stability of the Indian protectorate. London adopted an instrumental pro-Baku policy but refused to settle the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. In doing so, London effectively prevented the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (Geukjian, 2012, pp. 54–57). After the withdrawal of British forces in 1919, ethnic clashes between the two factions ensued, escalating into open warfare in 1920. Soon after, the Red Army invaded the Caucasus. Nagorno-Karabakh remained under direct Soviet rule until it was formally annexed to Azerbaijan in 1923. This decision came within the context of a temporary Russo-Turkish geopolitical rapprochement, irrespective of the demands of people on the ground. This final territorial delimitation contributed to maximising Moscow’s influence in the region.

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The Anatomy of the Current Conflict: 1988 to 2020

The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh remained silent until 1987. In both Armenia and in Azerbaijan, ethnic identification became a useful tool of national mobilisation for anti-Soviet elites. 1988 saw a crescendo of demonstration which escalated into violent clashes after local elites requested the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia. The ethnic clashes of 18 September 1988 resulted in the displacement of approximately 30,000 Armenians and 55,000 Azeris, kick-starting the present refugee crisis (Malkasian, 1996). This, in turn, precipitated Moscow’s intervention: like in 1920, Nagorno-Karabakh was transferred under direct central rule. The move exacerbated tensions and Moscow was forced to return Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani rule on 28 November 1989. This prompted Armenia to declare the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh on 1 December 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the two internationally recognised sovereign countries to face off over the disputed area. On 2 September 1991, Stepanakert declared the independence of NagornoKarabakh from Azerbaijan, diverging from Yerevan’s annexation line. This policy difference continues to date. Early mediation attempts by Russia and Iran failed, and by 1992 the clashes had turned into open warfare. The Minsk Group was established in this year by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a forum for conflict resolutions; its plans for the settlement of the dispute have to date failed to encounter the approval of all three of the interested parties. A bloody conflict ensured, which claimed over 30,000 casualties. The fighting ceased only with the Russian-brokered armistice on 12 May 1994 known as the Bishkek Protocol. The matter was eventually settled as a Soviet-internal affair, and the Minsk Group had little influence on the negotiations. Armenia remained in control of the seven Azerbaijani territories that it had militarily occupied during the conflict and established them as buffer zones around Nagorno-Karabakh. The line of contact cut Azerbaijan off from its region of Nakhchivan and sanctioned the loss of 20% of Baku’s territory to Armenian and Stepanakert. The 1994 agreements also saw the establishment of the strategically vital Lanchin Corridor. This is a narrow strip of land under Stepanakert’s direct control which connects the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenian land. This status quo has remained unchanged until September 2020. Open warfare did break out in 2016, however, the warring parties resolved to

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Fig. 2 Map of the seven Azerbaijani districts (Note (1) Kalbajar, (2) Lachin, (3) Qubadli, (4) Zangilan, (5) Jabrayil, (6) Fuzuli, and (7) Agdam—occupied by Armenian forces between 1994 and 2020, where the Republic of Artsakh is depicted in pink and post-2016 Azerbaijani-held territory in yellow. Map credits CuriousGolden—Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0. Retrieved from: https://commons. wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=95220616)

cease all hostilities within four days. The April War may not have altered the politico-military balance of power on the ground, but it did lay the foundation for the adoption of means of war that have resulted in much higher casualties and destruction.2 Figure 2 shows the territory that Baku

2 Use of cluster bombs and drones was reported for the first time; the size of land lost by the Republic of Artsakh to Azerbaijan was disputed at the time, as well as its alleged strategic importance in the defence of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory.

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regained control of after 2016 in yellow, and the remaining territory under Armenian control in red.

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Major Players in the Conflict 3.1

Regional Players

The Republic of Armenia Yerevan is Nagorno-Karabakh’s main ally; its main goal is preventing Azerbaijan from regaining possession of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is seen as Armenian ancestral land. Armenia’s official policy has oscillated since 1989 on whether it backs independence or annexation of NagornoKarabakh. Armenia considers a guarantee of the self-determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a prerequisite for negotiations. The Republic of Azerbaijan Baku sees Nagorno-Karabakh as an internal dispute; it claims that the war in Nagorno-Karabakh is an interstate conflict in which Armenia is the occupier. Azerbaijan’s goal in the conflict is the uncompromising reunification of break-away Nagorno-Karabakh, which is seen as an integral part of Azeri’s homeland. It considers the guarantee of territorial integrity as a prerequisite for negotiations. The Islamic Republic of Iran Iran has maintained an official position of neutrality, emphasising both the right to the territorial integrity of Baku and the right to safety and cultural authenticity of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. While it may seem natural for Iran as a Shi’a majority country to support fellow Shi’a Azerbaijan, the relationship between the two has been rocky at best since the latter’s independence. This is due to Azerbaijan’s fear of Iran’s ideological export; likewise, Iran is wary of Baku’s potential influence on its Azeri minority. For these reasons, Iran has cultivated stronger ties with Armenia. Reports of military equipment being transferred from Iran to Nagorno-Karabakh emerged soon after the first clashes (IRNA English, 2020b); other sources claim Iran has facilitated the passage of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters into Armenia (Middle East Monitor, 2020). Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) This is the de facto ruling government of Nagorno-Karabakh; internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, it has been in control of the enclave since 1991. Its de facto capital is Stepanakert. It is militarily and

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economically dependent on Russia and Armenia for its survival. The goal of Stepanakert’s ruling elite is independence through self-determination; for this reason, they have been vetoing all peace plans that do not set a referendum on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition for peace. The Republic of Artsakh is not recognised as a party of negotiation by Azerbaijan, who considers it an offshoot of the Armenian government. The Russian Federation Russia has been historically allied with Armenia and has economically and logistically supported Nagorno-Karabakh. In the latest conflict, it assumed an official position of neutrality and poised itself as a broker. Moscow declared that its military commitments to Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) do not extent to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been reports of Russiasponsored mercenary troops supporting Armenian troops. Russia has also been rumoured to have sold weapons to both sides of the conflict. Moscow’s main interest lies in keeping the conflict frozen and maintaining its influence in the Caucasus; its short-term security goals are containing Turkish influence in the region and containing the spread of jihadism. The Republic of Turkey Turkey is a formal ally of Azerbaijan in the conflict; it has provided logistical and military support during the war; a number of media sources have alleged that Ankara has facilitated the transfer of foreign fighter troops from Libya and Syria to Azerbaijan (Kaleji, 2020). Ankara aims to increase its influence in the region, reinforce the Azeri-Turkish entente, retain influence over crucial oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russia and provide energy to the European Union (EU), and diplomatically isolate Armenia. 3.2

Extra-Regional Players

The People’s Republic of China In view of its considerable economic and strategic interests in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Beijing assumed an official position of neutrality on the 2020 war, despite previous support for Baku’s right of territorial integrity. China sees an analogy between its claim over Taiwan and part of the South China Sea territory, and Azerbaijan’s claim over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the economic dimension of its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan has diffused a pro-Azeri clear stance.

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Two projects are of great importance in China’s strategic plan that reiterates a modern Silk Road (the Belt and Road Initiative): the first is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, part of the wider Trans-Caspian International Transit Route; the second is the North–South highway, part of a larger Persian Gulf-Black Sea trade corridor (Silk Road Briefing, 2017). While China’s impact on the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been negligible, its presence in the region is increasingly important alongside its economic and strategic stakes. Beijing has so far observed a strict policy of neutrality in its economic expansions in the Middle East and in Central Asia, aiming to work across political divides, an exercise similar to tight rope walking in the current context. Nonetheless, Beijing is aiming to maintain this approach with regard to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The European Union (and Minsk Group) The EU maintained an official position of neutrality on the conflict. It recognises the principle of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as the basis for a political solution. The EU’s main goal is stability in the region, as an escalation of the conflict could endanger energy supplies (Najjar et al., 2020). It has mostly left the direct negotiating effort to the Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, Russia, and the U.S.). The EU has expressed support for the 2018 Armenian ‘Velvet revolution’, hoping that the new elite would assume a softer stance on Nagorno-Karabakh. This did not materialise, as Armenia called for unification with Nagorno-Karabakh in 2019 (Kucera 2019). The State of Israel Israel has maintained an official position of neutrality in the conflict. The Middle Eastern state has had a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan since at least the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994 (Rod, 2020). The relation between the two states is based on the mutual interest in containing Iran and is strengthened by the trade of Azeri oil for Israeli weapons and capital (Weinglass, 2020). There have been numerous reports of Azeri use of sophisticate Israeli weapons to target civilians, including Israel Aerospace Industries Harop loitering munitions (McKernan, 2020). According to Bloomberg, Israeli authorities have distanced themselves from any responsibility for the use of these weapons, claiming that they only had a duty to stop further purchases under international law (Chafets, 2020). Israel’s role in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has reportedly increased global sales of Israel Aerospace Industries

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Harop (Frantzman, 2021). There have also been reports of Israeli Azerbaijani and Armenia communities engaging in riots as a response to Israel’s involvement in the conflict (Breiner, 2020). The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamabad is the only other player aside from Turkey who has taken Azerbaijan’s side in the conflict without reservations. There have been reports of Pakistani troops fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh war (The Eurasian Times, 2020), which have been denied by Khan’s government (IRNA English, 2020c). While Pakistan may not have a direct territorial interest in the Caucasus, it has become involved in the war both due to its religious affinity with Azerbaijan and its strategic cooperation with Turkey to resize Iran’s regional standing. Moreover, Islamabad has important domestic motives to side with Baku: many perceive a crucial affinity between Azerbaijan’s struggle to regain control over Armenia-occupied territories, and Pakistan’s struggle in Kashmir, as well as Palestine’s struggle, which Pakistan has historically backed (Goraya, 2021). Islamabad’s support for Azerbaijan has also driven Turkey and Pakistan to engage in further military and civilian cooperation (TRT World, 2021). Turkey was also among the countries that expressed support for Kashmir during the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Contact Group of February 2021 (The Nation, 2021). The United States of America Albeit not recognising the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, in 1998 the U.S. became the only country in the world after Armenia to provide direct governmental assistance to the Republic of Artsakh (Crisis Group, 2005‚ 2020). The Armenian diaspora has a strong community in the U.S., but Washington also has economic interests in the flourishing oil industry in Azerbaijan. It has been speculated that the contradictory pull of these interests is behind Washington’s relative disengagement from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war (Dalloul, 2020).

4

Iran’s Interests in the Caucasus

• Domestic stability: Iran’s long-standing concern with NagornoKarabakh’s conflict has been its potential impact on the Azeri Iranian minority living in the north-west of the country (West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan provinces). Authorities fear that the conflict may ignite stronger nationalistic feeling and perhaps even an appetite for greater autonomy or independence. While the

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weighting of the domestic question in determining Iran’s overall strategy should not be overstated, it is important to understand that on this issue Tehran’s official line will be calibrated not to alienate its domestic audience much more than to signal its intention to an international audience. Border security: A short-term interest arising from the outbreak of the conflict is the safeguarding of Iran’s border security. While this will not have as many lasting consequences on Iran’s strategic approach to the Caucasus, it has had a significant impact on Iran’s position during the 2020 conflict. The accidental shelling of Iranian villages, as well as growing concern for the presence of foreign fighters and Israeli-made drones close to the Iranian border meant that the longer the conflict would have continued, the more Tehran had to lose. Freezing the conflict again has been prioritised over maintaining a stronghold on the region. Trade and commerce: Iran has an interest in maintaining strong commercial ties with states in the Caucasus both for purely economic reasons and for political reasons. With the U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal in May 2018 from the 2015-Iranian nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Europe’s inability to overcome new rounds of sanctions, Iran has seen a new period of economic isolation. This has been aggravated by the current COVID-19 crisis. Iran also has a strong interest in maintaining good economic relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan to increase its status as an impartial, amicable power. After the ceasefire was signed, Iran has signalled its availability to partake in the economic and material reconstruction of Nagorno-Karabakh. This has created another point of tension between Tehran and Ankara. Energy: Iran’s relationship with Azerbaijan is complicated by competing for energy interests. Azerbaijan is a competitor for Iran in terms of energy exports and energy transportation; the new Southern Gas Corridor is designed to cut off both Iran and Russia from a strategically vital pipeline connecting Europe to the Caspian Basin. Iran, however, also needs to maintain amicable relations with Azerbaijan on energy issues in order to advance its preferred territorial demarcation of the Caspian Sea’s seabed in the on-going dispute between the five littoral countries (BBC News 2018). Status: Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus has not been forwardlooking in the last decade; while Tehran was busy trying to project

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its power westward, stretching the limits of its military and political capabilities, it has overlooked its own ‘backyard’. The fact that Tehran was side-lined by Ankara and Moscow on the matter has affected its regional prestige. Iran has a strong interest in being an integral part of the South Caucasus’s regional architecture moving forward. For these reasons, Iran has overlooked disagreements with Pakistan and Russia to focus on countering Turkey’s strategic dominance in Azerbaijan. • Geopolitics: Iran has become increasingly isolated in the wider Middle Eastern region; a number of developments in 2020, such as the establishment of diplomatic relationship between some Arab countries and Israel, the resolution of the Qatar Blockade, and the on-going crisis in Beirut have contributed to further isolate Tehran. Having lost terrain to its traditional Middle Eastern rivals, losing influence in the Caucasus to Turkey is a considerable blow for Iran’s regional standing, especially given Turkey’s increased profile in the East Mediterranean region. Iran has thus an interest in regaining a foothold in the Caucasus to compensate for the tighter encirclement it is experiencing on its western and southern borders.

5

Iran’s Position During the Conflict

Understanding Iran’s reaction to the war is a matter of great urgency for policymakers. Disentangling the nuances of the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric vis-à-vis its evolving policy is necessary to envision a proportionate response. Some analyses that have followed the November 10th ceasefire agreement have claimed that Iran’s position on the conflict has shifted from one of guarded neutrality to a pro-Azerbaijani one by the end of the conflict (Basar, 2020). This, it is maintained, shows that Iran was forced to compromise out of necessity. Contrary to these statements, a media analysis of Iranian official sources offers evidence of a consistent official position. Tehran’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not substantially changed between September and November 2020. Rather, the core tenants of its position—the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, the need for a political solution, and the safeguard of the rights of Armenian minorities—have remained unchanged since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994.

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Signalling to Its Domestic vs. International Audience

Since the first serious border clash between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces on 14 July 2020, Iran has maintained the need to de-escalate and implement a political solution. Stressing the need for respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries and use peaceful means to settle the dispute, Foreign Ministry spokesman (at that moment) Abbas Mousavi, later designated as the Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan, stated ‘we believe these two neighbouring countries should resolve their disputes peacefully, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has always announced its readiness to help resolve the issue’ (IRNA English, 2020a). This nomination in itself shows that Azerbaijan ranks highly on Iran’s foreign policy agenda. On 5f October 2020, the new spokesman of the Foreign Ministry Saeed Khatibzadeh declared that the Islamic Republic of Iran has its own mediation plan for the conflict (Iranian Diplomacy, 2020). The principles guiding this plan were stated as follow: • There is no military solution to the conflict. • Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity must be respected, and the occupation forces must withdraw. • Iran remains available to resort to all political and diplomatic means in order to facilitate the dialogue between the parties. On 6 October 2020, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, recommended containment and dialogue in a conversation with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev. Rouhani added that he sustains every step that would lead to the soothing the conflict, which would take into account ‘the international law and the internationally recognised borders of the two states.’ He also conveyed concern about the meddling of external powers in the conflict (President.ir, 2020b). The President of the Islamic Republic communicated similar sentiments to his Armenian counterpart, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, on 30 September 2020 (President.ir, 2020a). Confirming this position, on 6 October 2020, the government spokesman Ali Rabiei declared that Iran officially recognises the contested territory as belonging to Azerbaijan (Khabar, 2020). On the same day, the advisor of the Supreme Leader of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati declared that according to both international law and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council

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Armenia must leave the Azeri territory that it occupies. On 5 October 2020, Keyhan, a newspaper close to the Supreme Leader’s positions, reinstated this position. In contrast to these more guarded statements, on 1 October 2020 four representatives of the Supreme Leader in the Iranian provinces that have an Azeri-majority—Eastern Azerbaijan, Western Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan—issued a statement in support of Azerbaijan (RFE/RL, 2020). This came after other religious leaders had already taken a pro-Azerbaijan stance and amidst unconfirmed reports of riots in Azerimajority provinces (Radio Farda, 2020). The reported unrest took place following the surfacing of allegations that Tehran had facilitated the transport of Russian military equipment and personnel to Armenia (IRNA English, 2020b). The apparent inconsistency between these statements can be explained by looking at their intended audiences. The latter pro-Azerbaijani positions were not conveyed as part of Iran’s official position, but rather as a means to appease its domestic audience. The Iranian Azeri population represents a potential security threat to Iran’s domestic stability and territorial unity not only for its size, but also for its geographical concentration in north-western Iran and, most importantly, for its track record of separatism. In contrast, Iranian Armenians constitute a smaller but well integrate minority of approximately 120,000. For these reasons, the general sentiment of Persian-speaking Iranians during the conflict remained pro-Armenia. This distinction between international and domestic signalling in crucial for interpreting Iran’s behaviour, and it also applies to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement in favour of the immediate liberation of the Azeri territory occupied by Armenia on 3 November 2020, in which Khamenei also stressed the importance of protecting ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. While the urgency of the language of the Supreme Leader may have been new, the content of his message is consistent with the broader position of the Iranian government. This urgency should be explained in the context of Iran’s increasing border insecurity caused by the presence of external state and non-state actors in Nagorno-Karabakh: in the same speech Khamenei affirmed, ‘terrorists must not be permitted to settle at our border. We must respond if they would put in danger our security’ (Khamenei.ir, 2020). As a consequence of Khamenei’s statement, on 3 November 2020, Abbas Mousavi, the new ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Azerbaijan, stated that Khalaf Khalafov Aly

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Oglu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, had expressed gratitude regarding the ‘important and just position’ expressed by the Supreme Leader (Mousavi, 2020). 5.2

Iran’s Diplomatic and Political Engagements

Official positions must be correctly analysed in the context of a state’s actual diplomatic overtures. Iran’s behaviour confirms that behind the official position of neutrality laid the need to settle the conflict regardless of the effect such settlement may have on its allies or its own regional standing. Iran’s greatest diplomatic effort during the conflict took place during the regional tour of the Foreign Minister’s special envoy to the region, Abbas Araghchi. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, personally entrusted Araghchi with presenting Tehran’s peace plan to all parties to the conflict. Few details of the plan have been revealed to the press; Tehran has been keen, however, to stress that unlike other proposals, which it described as ‘short-term’, its own plan was meant to be a longterm, permanent political settlement of the dispute within a regional framework. Araghchi was originally meant to present the plan to officials from Baku, Moscow, and Yerevan (Sharifi, 2020), but on 27 October 2020, the spokesman of the Iranian foreign affairs minister Saeed Khatibzadeh declared that Ankara was also on the destinations list (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). It is important to stress that Iran’s main aim was the creation of a broad agreement on the necessity of an immediate ceasefire among all regional players; the hoped result of this diplomatic move was the exclusion of ‘extra-regional’ and ‘hostile’ players. Iran was worried about a Turkeyaided advancement of Israeli and Pakistani presence in the Caucasus: firstly, after meeting with Azeri President Ilham Aliev, Araghchi stated that Iran had proposed that ‘key countries of the region, like Russia, should play a role in solving the crisis’ (IRNA English, 2020f); and secondly, after meeting with his counterpart in Ankara, Zarif’s special envoy also commented that ‘Iran and Turkey are two major players with undeniable role in peace and stability of the region’ (IRNA English, 2020g). Iran was looking for a broad entente between itself, Moscow, and Ankara, which it considered the two most influent and, crucially, legitimate players in the conflict. This interpretation is supported by Araghchi’s own description of Iran’s initiative as ‘regional realism’, as well as his continued concern for

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‘interference beyond the region and interference from those who don’t want peace in the region’ (IRNA English, 2020h). 5.3

Iran’s Military Manoeuvres During the Conflict

Iran’s most immediate concern with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the threat it posed to its border security. There have been numerous reports of accidental shelling of Iranian villages near the border (IRNA English, 2020d). A second source of concern came from the potential use of Israeli and Turkish drones for border reconnaissance. Lastly, the latent threat of outbreaks of Azeri separatist sentiment was also weighted seriously. To counter this changing security landscape, Iran has deployed an array of military tactics, though it has stopped short of directly intervening in the conflict. The main aim of this military mobilisation was signalling Iran’s red lines to the parties involved in the conflict. Since to date, there have been no reports of a significant deterioration in the security of north-western Iran, it can be said that Tehran has been successful in respecting its red lines. On 6 October 2020, it was reported that over 10 munitions had hit the villages of Sharafah, Mohammad Salehloo, Hamrahlu, and Gholi Beglu (IRNA English, 2020e). On the 7th of October, it was communicated to the press that the Foreign Ministry has filed an official complaint against aggressions to its territory. After further reports of violations of Iran’s territorial integrity by both warring parties, on 25 October 2020 the commander of the land forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, declared that the forces under his command had strengthened their capabilities at the frontier with Nagorno-Karabakh. This measure concerned the brigade Ashura of the land forces of IRGC in Tabriz. Emphasising Iran’s red line, he warned, ‘we will give an answer to each action that puts in danger the physical and psychological security of the Iranian people’ (IRNA News Agency, 2020). On 27 October 2020, the commander of the anti-aircraft defence forces of Artesh (conventional military), General Mayor Abdolrahim Mousavi, declared that he had taken measures for the consolidation of the anti-aircraft defence forces in the north-western part of Iran. He also reaffirmed that Iran would not accept the presence of ‘terrorist or Zionist elements’ at its borders, as he warned that the armed forces would respond if the security of Iran was in danger (Tasnim, 2020).

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6 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: New Transnational and International Dimensions The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war broke out on 27th September; signs that the parties of conflict were gearing up for an all-out confrontation had been evident since July. Following a controversial border clash, several reports of troop movements in and around the contested region started to circulate. After six weeks of relentless fighting, Azerbaijan took back seven regions occupied by Armenia in 1994 (see Fig. 3). The military victory was possible thanks to Azerbaijan’s reliance on tactically superior weaponry, as well as direct support from Turkey and Pakistan. The use of unmanned planes, such as Israeli drones, proved fundamental in breaking enemy lines (Zurutuza, 2020). It is imperative that this conflict be assessed within the wider regional power dynamics. If we consider only the interstate dimension of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the outcome of the 10th of November ceasefire is a clear overturning of the post-1994 status quo. The outcome of the conflict reflects directly the changes in the absolute balance of power between Baku and Yerevan in the last thirty years. Following the exploitation of its energy resources, Baku has been able to increase its military budget from around 300 million U.S.D in 2005 to short of 3.4 billion U.S.D in almost ten years (the highest peak was in 2014). The Azerbaijani military budget reported in 2019 decreased to 2.5 times that of Armenia, which, however, recorded a slight increase (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS. MIL.XPND.CD?end=2019&locations=AM-AZ&start=1995). Figure 4 shows the staggering increase in Azerbaijani’s yearly military expenditure compared to Yerevan’s over a period of 15 years. However, Azerbaijan’s victory, though militarily significant, has not seen the conflict to an end. The vast majority of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remains under Stepanakert’s control, and the presence of around 2000 Russian peacekeepers along the new line of contact may prove hostile for Baku’s aspirations. While the outcome of the conflict has a clear winner and a clear loser among the two warring parties, the war’s effect on the wider regional dynamics is much more complex. Some analysts have insisted that the post-war equilibrium sees Turkey as a net winner, and Iran and Russia as net losers. This view exaggerates Iran’s strategic loss in the conflict: Iran’s position in the region has not been affected to the extent alleged by these

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Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was ceased to Baku with the November 10 agreement

the Republic of Artsakh

Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was military conquered prior to November 10

the Lanchin Corridor

Fig. 3 Map of Nagorno-Karabakh before and after the November 10 ceasefire (Note The orange area is the Republic of Artsakh; the blue is Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was military conquered prior to November 10; the dark green area is Azerbaijani territory under Armenia occupation that was ceased to Baku with the November 10 agreement. The map shows in indigo the territory of the Lanchin Corridor, which, after the ceasefire, is the only land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Map credits Kalj, based on File: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war map.png by User: CuriousGolden—See File: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war map.png, CC BY-SA 3.0. Retrieved from: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=99452389)

claims. Rather, the Islamic Republic’s conduct in the conflict has allowed Tehran to successfully defend its core interests in the Caucasus. The question of how the war in Nagorno-Karabakh has affected regional balance is nevertheless rendered more uncertain by the looming threat of long-term instability. This threat comes firstly from the danger of the internationalisation of the conflict: Tehran has been particularly worried about the outbreak of a regional war that would see the external

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Fig. 4 Chart showing the exponential different in Azerbaijan’s increase in military expenditure compared to Armenia

backers of Armenia and Azerbaijan face each other directly. A second source of danger for the region comes from a potential transnational evolution of the conflict, spilling into other separatist enclaves and fuelling ethnic and religious minorities’ grievances. Several of the developments that have taken place during the 2020 conflict unfortunately increase, rather than diminish, the long-term risk of even bloodier conflicts, and perhaps even the devolution of the region into an ungovernable territory. Regional players have to be extremely vigilant not to hedge the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict into a greater security risk right across their borders. 6.1

New Reality on Ground Level: The Risk of Ethno-Nationalist Spill-Over and the Presence of Foreign Fighters

One of the factors that could contribute to long-term instability is the presence of Russian peacekeepers. While in the short term, the presence of Russian forces on the line of conflict should prevent the outbreak of a new war, in the long term they can represent a security threat to both Iranian and Turkish objectives. Iran is wary of the presence of Russian soldiers right across its border; likewise, Turkey’s efforts to strengthen its presence and grip in Baku are likely to be frustrated. The presence of peacekeeping forces may also be counterproductive for the stability of Nagorno-Karabakh in the long-term. New research argues that the

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presence of peacekeepers may lead to greater consolidation in the political power and authority that separatist forced hold in the enclave (Florea, 2020). This would lead to an even further increase in the stakes placed on the territorial control of Nagorno-Karabakh, decisively consolidating the status of the dispute as a zero-sum conflict and negating any prospect of cohabitation between the Armenian and Azeri communities. A second factor that could change drastically the landscape of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is the reported presence of mercenary troops from Syria and Libya (Kaleji, 2020). Iran has been particularly wary of both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s deployment of these forces near its borders and responded with the mobilisation of its own forces. Russia should also be wary of importing foreign fighters in close proximity to the separatist enclaves of Chechnya and Dagestan. The presence of these forces further complicates the map of the conflict, adding a transnational dimension to the already identified interstate and regional dimensions. It is difficult to obtain reliable reports on the fate of these foreign fighters after the ceasefire. The danger of radicalisation should neither be overblown nor understated: it is known from several reports that most fighters joined the Nagorno-Karabakh war out of economic necessity, and that many were sent to die on the front line of the conflict and requested early discharge (Kaleji, 2020). It is yet to be ascertained, though less probable, whether among the recruits there were some with the operational knowledge and the political will to establish new jihadist cells in the region. While the presence of Russian peacekeepers may to some extent suggest that it would be extremely difficult for any foreign fighters left behind to establish radicalised cells within Nagorno-Karabakh, it is less certain how easily these fighters could have crossed borders to more welcoming hosting communities. The looming threat of frequent armed clashes closer to civilian settlements are also contributing to further the long-term instability of the Caucasus. The change in the means of war since the first conflict in 1994 has brought about a drastic increase in casualties. Nearly 150 civilians have been killed in the first six weeks of conflict; Armenia reported that over 2,000 soldiers have died in the conflict and Azerbaijan has recently reported on the death of 2,800 soldiers (ACAPS, 2020a). The use of outlawed cluster bombs has been reported (Amnesty International, 2020a), as well as the targeting of civilian infrastructure and heavy shelling of densely populated areas by both sides (United Nations Human Rights

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Council, 2020; Human Rights Ombudsman 2021). Amnesty International has called for an urgent investigation on war crimes committed on both sides after reviewing footage of executions of prisoners of war (Amnesty International, 2020b). The brutality of the conflict has exacerbated the existing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) crisis. Early estimates claim that 100,000 people have been displaced from NagornoKarabakh, approximately 60% of the total population of the enclave; in addition, 40,000 people have been displaced within Azerbaijan (ACAPS, 2020a; Human Rights Watch, 2020; Al Jazeera, 2021a). While there have been reports of returns (UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2020), it is doubtful whether many will be able to settle in their homes again. One outstanding concern is the safety of the territories hit by intense aerial bombardment; many areas are yet to be cleared of landmines and unexploded bombs. A second concern is Azerbaijan’s position towards Armenian internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the Russiabrokered ceasefire, Azerbaijani citizens that have been displaced since 1994 have the right to return to the territories of which Baku has regained control. The agreement is silent on the fate of Armenian IDPs (Hauer, 2020), but Baku refuses to recognise them the right to return as it considers them illegal settlers (France 24, 2020). This policy is in line with the effort of both countries to establish a mono-ethnic nation state and raises pressing fears of further ethnic cleansing. The outbreak of COVID-19 has further worsened the humanitarian crisis on the ground. Armenia was for several months among the countries with highest prevalence of COVID-19 cases, and the second country in the world with the highest number of daily diagnosis per person (Kazaryan et al., 2020). Conflict and health crises have worsened the humanitarian condition on the ground in landlocked Armenia, raising fears of food shortages (World Food Programme, 2020). 6.2

Iran’s Strategy: Tactical Retreat to Ensure Maximum Damage Control at the Cost of Influence in the Caucasus

There is disagreement in the analyst community on what the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh meant for Iran. Some have boasted that Iran has been the big loser from the conflict (Coffey 2020; Basar, 2020). According to this assessment, Iran’s teetering in between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been deleterious for its regional influence, resulting in

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a decisive win for the Turkish-Azerbaijan entente. Others have emphasised the severe constraints through which Iran has been operating. Among the latter, Eldar Mamedov, political adviser of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, argues that Iran’s policy in Nagorno-Karabakh needs to be assessed against the fundamental aims advanced by Iranian elites (Mamedov, 2020). Looking at Iran’s political and military manoeuvres in the region during October 2020, its fundamental security objectives were: • Safeguarding Iran’s borders from conflict spill-over. • Preventing the escalation of the conflict into a full-blown regional war. • Preventing Nagorno-Karabakh from becoming a safe haven for foreign fighters. • Maintaining a façade of international neutrality without alienating Iranian Azeris. It is important to recognise that according to these goals; Tehran finds itself in better shape now than if it had chosen a different course of action: the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has not represented a military defeat for Iran. If we consider the minimalist position from which Iranian authorities started, Iran’s strategy has been effective in achieving most of the country’s fundamental security objectives by the end of the conflict. Iran’s overall posture has been one of damage control. Iran is the only country among regional players that shares a border with NagornoKarabakh; for this reason, it is more directly threatened by any security spill-overs and by the potential entrenchment of the conflict compared to other regional players such as Russia and Turkey. On the other hand, both Tehran and Moscow would have been negatively affected by the spiralling of the conflict into an all-out regional war. Both Iran and Russia also faced the greatest potential loss of influence in the region from a definitive settlement of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 10th of November ceasefire thus represented a significant strategic victory for Iran regardless of the part that Tehran effectively played in the final negotiations, because it allowed the country to fulfil its basic security needs without excessive human, military or political cost. Although Iran proposed its own mediation plan in the negotiations, it resorted to effectively backing Russia’s efforts. This was a dangerous

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gamble: with Turkey’s assuming a realist and pragmatic posture in the region, Iran risked being perceived as a politically less attractive partner. The logic of Iran’s gamble is best understood as minimising the cost and energy Tehran had to invest to achieve its minimum defensive objectives. Iranian elites essentially counted on their converging interests with Moscow in containing and re-freezing the conflict. This cost-saving approach is best understood in the context of Iran’s current strategic retreat caused by its regional overstretch. Iran has been playing a game of ‘Hare and Hounds’ with its rivals in the Caucasus: by maintaining the lowest possible profile during the initial stage of the conflict, Tehran sought to maintain the greatest possible number of potential paths open, were the conflict to escalate in an all-out regional war. It should also be noted that such an ambiguous and defiled stance on the war was the best possible compromise for Iranian elites: there exist profound divisions in Iran’s domestic debate on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with position ranging from unconditional support for Azerbaijan on the basis of religious and historical ties, to advocates of pro-Armenia military intervention who see it as a downtrodden nation victim of Turkish imperialism. Besides these fundamental security objectives, Iran has attempted to advance other secondary objectives through the conflict. These were: • Maintaining its regional standing and diplomatic power. • Preventing Turkey from establishing a military foothold on its borders. • Preventing the creation of a new regional axis of which it was not part. On this front, Iran’s tactic has a mixed track record; it was much less effective in executing proactive strategic manoeuvres than it had been in securing defensive objectives. Overall, Iran’s regional standing has been negatively affected by the war and its stance as a diplomatic broker and powerhouse has been diminished, though not as much as it could have, had Tehran not adopted a policy of guarded neutrality. Tehran was relatively more successful in preventing Turkey from establishing a military foothold in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the ceasefire agreement stipulates that only Russian peacekeepers shall be deployed in the contested region. This victory was only partial, however, as Russia has invited Turkey to partake

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in the military peacekeeping operations but not Iran. Lastly, Iran has failed in preventing the creation of a new regional entente: Baku and Ankara’s ties are stronger than ever, and for now, the tides are moving in favour of this alignment. On the other hand, Iran has not meekly given up its position in Azerbaijan and has been clashing with Turkey since the ceasefire. Firstly, as discussed above, Iran engaged in a comprehensive regional tour a week before the signing of the ceasefire, ostensibly to promote its peace plan, and possibly to broker Russia’s ceasefire proposal. Two things suggest this: firstly, Tehran had been maintaining that Moscow’s plan was closely aligned with its own; secondly, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Araghchi took great pain in highlighting Iran’s desire for a top-down solution that set Turkey, Russia, and Iran on an equal footing as regional powers (IRNA English, 2020f, g). After the ceasefire, Azerbaijan revealed its vision for a new regional architecture; this plan envisions a five-way regional partnership between Iran, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and potentially Armenia, if it were to meet certain conditions (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2020). Iran’s inclusion shows that whatever damage its diplomatic reputation may have taken in the short term, in the long-term Baku recognises that material factors still anchor Tehran as a fundamental player in the Caucasus. Secondly, Iran and Turkey have engaged in a heated diplomatic face off in December following President Erdogan’s recital of a controversial poem on the reunification of historical Azerbaijan (IRNA English, 2020i). As it was previously explained, historical Azerbaijan was partitioned between the Tsarist and Persian Empire in the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay; modern Azerbaijan is coterminous with the Russian-annexed part of historical Azerbaijan. Erdogan’s intervention was perceived as blaming Tehran for the partition; the comment came at a sensitive time for the Iranian Azeri community, who has been vocally demonstrating for more direct support of Baku in the conflict (Ziabari, 2020). Turkey’s proactive posture shows that Ankara is still worried about Tehran’s comeback in the Caucasus and fears its competition in Baku. The latest development of Tehran and Ankara’s feud over Baku’s partnership unfolded between the 25th and 29th of January 2021. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, visited Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey (Eghtesad, 2021). Zarif’s tour aimed to advance Iran’s political, economic, and military position. Politically, Iran wants to play a proactive role in the proposed ‘3 + 3 post-war regional integration platform’ (comprising of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Russia, and

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Iran). During this tour, Zarif congratulated Azerbaijan for regaining the Azeri territories in the last armed conflict in the region, marking the abandonment of Tehran’s ostensive neutrality in the conflict. In support of Armenia, Zarif promised Yerevan that the territorial integrity of Armenia represents a red line for Iran. Economically, Zarif restated Iran’s availability to contribute to the reconstruction process in the area affected by the conflict and commented on Iran’s intention to act as a bridge between the South Caucasus and the Persian Gulf. 6.3

Turkey’s Blow to Iran’s Economic and Energy Policy and the Role of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

In spite of the mobilization of Tehran’s diplomatic machine after war broke out in September 2020, Iranian officials found themselves years behind Ankara’s political manoeuvres in the Caucasus. Their unpreparedness in the region, born of a decade of low political engagement, have caused Iran to experience significant economic setbacks. While economic interests appear less urgent than security ones when confronted with the possibility of a regional conflict, these losses are set to bite into Iran’s regional influence and domestic stability in the coming months, and perhaps even longer. The country’s economy has been ravaged by the new round of U.S. sanctions since 2018 and has now seen a spiralling shrinking in trade during the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. This situation has been worsened by Turkey’s prolonged economic disengagement and obstructionism towards Tehran. Iran’s trade has significantly deteriorated in the last year. In 2020, Iran exported goods worth $796 million to Russia, a 36% increase compared to 2019. Imports from Russia were $1.42 billion, diminished by 7%. In 2020, Iran’s share of Russia’s foreign trade was 0.40% (Radio Farda, 2021b). Russia is the only country in which Iran exported more in 2020 than in 2019. Exports to Turkey fell by 67%, from $3.6 billion to $1.19 billion (going further in 2018, it was $7 billion). The main causes of declining imports are the complete cessation of oil purchases and the significant decline in gas acquisitions from Iran. In 2020, imports from Turkey amounted to $2.45 billion, down 10% than in 2019. For the first time, Turkish exports to Iran exceeded its imports (Radio Farda, 2021a). Alex Vatanka, Director of the Iran Program and Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, has stressed the direness of Iran’s economic prospects. Iran’s unpreparedness in the South Caucasus stands in sharp

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contrast with year-long manoeuvring on Turkey’s part, he argues. There has been a widespread belief in Tehran’s political circles that Turkey ‘used American sanctions on Iran as a pretext to reduce trade’ (Vatanka, 2021a). Trade by land between the two countries has almost completely halted with pandemic-induced border closure, but it is in the strategically vital energy sector that Iran has lost the most ground to its regional rival. Turkey first signalled its willingness to cut off Iran from the energy market at the start of 2020, when Ankara refused Tehran’s offer to collaborate on the reconstruction of the Iran-Turkey pipeline damaged by Kurdish attacks. Analysts interpreted the move as an attempt to both pander to Washington and induce Tehran to lower its prices (O’Byrne, 2020). The most significant blow to Iran’s energy market has come on 31 December 2020 with the completion of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). Figure 5 shows the 3,500 km of pipelines, which transports gas from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field via Georgia and Turkey to Italy. Ankara supported this strategic energy pipeline project and helped Baku to secure European political and financial support. This move is part of Turkey’s wider energy recalibration strategy, which aims to both diversify its energy sources and establish the country as a

Fig. 5 Map of Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) pipeline linking Azerbaijan with Europe (Source Retrieved from: https://bankwatch.org/press_release/eu-omb udsman-launches-investigation-into-financing-of-europe-s-largest-fossil-fuels-pro ject)

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strategic hub for westward energy transports, marginalising Russia, and Iran’s access to European markets. The Southern Caucasus, however, has become in recent years a strategic infrastructure node for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), too. China has considerable economic and strategic interests in both Armenia and Azerbaijan which have prompted Beijing to assume an official position of neutrality on the 2020 war, in contrast with its previous vocal support of Baku’s right of territorial integrity. Much like in the case of Pakistan, China perceives an important logical affinity between its claim over Taiwan and part of the South China Sea territory, and Azerbaijan’s claim over Nagorno-Karabakh; its defiled diplomatic stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in 2020 appears even more uncharacteristic given the recent heightening of tensions between Taipei and the mainland. Beijing has increased its trade with both Armenia and Azerbaijan in recent years as part of a wider manoeuvre to expand the necessary infrastructures to complete the New Silk Road, a vision for a unified trade route extending from Beijing to the heart of Europe and beyond. Two projects are of great importance in this vision: the first is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, part of the wider Trans-Caspian International Transit Route; the second is the North–South highway, part of a larger Persian Gulf-Black Sea trade corridor. In 2016 China has invested U.S.$600 million through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in the completion of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which, as Fig. 5 shows above, is the central link in the Southern Gas Corridor stretching from the Caspian to the Adriatic Sea (AIIB 2016). The Trans-Caspian International Transit Route, of which Baku is a pivotal node, represents an even more ambitious transit route development aiming to connect Southeast Asia to Europe via China. However, Baku-Beijing cooperation had significantly slowed down at the start of 2020 as some accused China of ‘using the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process to leverage interest towards the Belt and Road Initiative’. Chinese officials’ request of market access had also been met with discontent in Azerbaijan (South China Morning Post, 2020). The Trans-Caspian International Transit Route is important to China not only because it would significantly decrease the shipping time for goods in between Europe and China, but also because it would cut out Russia. China’s interest in Armenia on the other hand is sparked by its strategic location along the proposed Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor, which would connect Iran’s warm-water port of Chabahar through Armenia and Georgia with the Black Sea basin (Silk

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Road Briefing, 2017). This project, though still in its infancy, can be considered as China’s response to Russia’s backed International North– South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting India and Russia via Iran. Talks on the Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridor have resurfaced in recent weeks between Iranian and Armenian officials. While China’s impact on the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has been negligible, its presence in the region is set to increase alongside its economic and strategic stakes. Beijing has so far observed a strict policy of neutrality in its economic expansions in the Middle East and in Central Asia, aiming to work across political divides, as it is intending to do with Armenia and Azerbaijan. As China’s presence and influence in the region grows, the extent to which it can hope to remain aloof from regional disputes between Turkey, Iran, and Russia while actively trying to commercially bypass some or all of these regional players is uncertain (Vatanka, 2021b). What is certain, on the other hand, is that Beijing pundits have taken notice of the role played by drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and have voiced concern over China’s tactical unpreparedness for this new development, especially give continued tensions between Indian and Chinese forces along the disputed border (Huang, 2020).

7

Conclusion

Iran’s stance in South Caucasus needs to be evaluated in the context of the increased hostility of its regional environment. Tehran has been balancing a delicate negotiating act with the new Biden administration where the potential road to the reinstatement of the Iranian nuclear deal is still uncertain; Biden’s perceived overture to Tehran has led Israel to threaten retaliation to Iran’s further nuclearization (Motamedi, 2021). Preventing Israel’s logistical access to the South Caucasus is thus more important than ever for Iran, and freezing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as soon as possible was the cornerstone of this objective. There are seven possible scenarios for the short-term evolution of geopolitical rivalries in the Caucasus; some of these foresee the tightening of connections between the different arena of confrontations in which Iran, Turkey, and Russia are engaged. Ultimately, what scenario will play out depends on whether the main regional player will be able to compartmentalise their rivalries in different arenas and cooperate across the board, or whether they will spiral into zero-sum mentalities across the geopolitical chessboard. This choice in turn will be highly dependent, especially

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in the short term, on domestic mood swings, as well as elite perception of threats and opportunities. 1. Turkey may stabilise itself as a preponderant player in the Caucasus. Iran and Russia will accept its predominance, if only temporarily. A fragile modus vivendi may be reached, with some possibility for superficial regional engagement, especially in the economic sector. 2. Turkey-Iran rivalry may light up. Possible areas of confrontations beyond the Caucasus will be Iraq and Syria. Russia is likely to take a backseat and regain its tight grip on Baku. 3. Turkey-Russia rivalry may light up. Possible areas of confrontations beyond the Caucasus will be Syria, Libya, and the Black Sea basin. Iran may decide to lay low and let its rivals fight out, or strategically support Russia to recover lost terrain in the Caucasus. 4. Turkey, Russia and Iran may get entrenched in a war of position in the Caucasus. Other regional rivals may take advantage of this situation to make further gains in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Israel are best positioned for this. 5. Turkey and Russia may reach a modus vivendi in the Caucasus at the expense of Iran. Tehran will have to rethink its regional strategy as it will be essentially encircled by hostile powers. 6. Turkey may temporarily shift its attention away from the Caucasus. Now that Ankara has stabilised its ties with Baku, it may shift its attention to its rivalry with Greece in the East Mediterranean. A greater focus on the EU will cool its rivalry with Iran and Russia. 7. Turkey may set its eyes on the Caucasus with even more conviction. Ankara may interpret the recent victory as a sign of weakness on part of Tehran and Moscow. It will try to further cut off Russia and Iran from Baku. Turkey may try to reinforce the Ankara-BakuIslamabad alignment, or even try and extend its influence beyond the Caspian Sea. Iran may need to compete with Turkey for influence in Central Asia, too. The relationship of the two contenders to economic powerhouses India and China will play a decisive role in their potential bid for influence in Central Asia. As of February 2021, it is clear that Tehran and Ankara have already set on the path of strategic confrontation in the Caucasus. Russia’s position in this dispute is still to be ascertained. It remains to be seen whether this

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will be just another cooling period in the rocky Turkish-Iranian relations, or it will represent the start of a more lasting rivalry that is set to radically reshape the political landscape of the Middle East and Caucasus. What is certain is that we are extremely likely to see a fundamental recalibration of Iran’s foreign policy objectives across the board. While it is still possible that this shift will bring Iran closer to the EU and the West if the JCPOA is reinstated and sanctions are lifted again, it is more likely that Iran will temporarily disengage from the Middle East region to focus on strengthening its Eurasian position; we have already seen some indication of this with the recent joint Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Indian military exercised (Mehdi and Dursun, 2021), as well as Turkey’s tentative overture towards the Biden administration (Al Jazeera, 2021b). Ultimately, decision-makers on all sides remain in control of how widely this rift will affect geopolitical alliances, more specifically whether it will remain contained to the South Caucasus, or whether it will contribute to drawing new alignment across the whole of Eurasia.

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Index

A Afghan conflict, 457, 459, 476 Africa, 3, 13, 20, 38, 85, 121, 188, 197, 254, 266, 282, 303, 390, 429, 485–488, 490, 491, 493–498, 501, 502, 504–509, 513–518, 556 Alliance, 22, 25, 26, 30, 42, 43, 47, 53, 56, 62, 64–67, 76, 146, 176, 177, 186, 245, 252, 261, 266, 267, 275, 279–281, 309, 328, 330, 370, 380, 381, 389, 390, 406, 420, 430, 432, 452, 453, 455, 457, 459–461, 467, 471, 472, 475, 494, 503, 534, 540, 547, 548, 561, 569, 598 Antifragility, 9, 126–128, 130, 132, 134–136 Arbaeen pilgrimage, 12, 364, 365, 368, 372, 373, 379–381 Asia, 3, 4, 6, 18, 20, 29, 31, 51, 143, 146, 197, 246–249, 251, 253, 254, 257, 265, 267, 268, 275, 278, 279, 281, 282, 318, 328,

366, 429, 443, 447–450, 453, 473–475, 477, 488, 493, 533, 535, 539, 540, 549, 553, 555, 556, 558–560, 568, 572, 577, 595–597 Asianisation, 253, 254, 256, 261, 268

B Balancing power, 318, 475 Basij, 125, 128

C Caucasus, 3, 5, 14, 22, 23, 29–31, 51, 143, 248, 254, 275, 277–279, 281, 328, 558, 560, 568–572, 576, 578–580, 583, 586, 588, 589, 591–593, 595–598 China, 2–4, 8, 10, 14, 18, 29, 31, 53–56, 68, 73–75, 85, 117, 130, 152, 176, 188, 235, 236, 245– 268, 281, 287, 288, 293, 312, 313, 318–320, 323, 326–328, 330, 337, 390, 393, 397, 410,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. J. B. S. Leandro et al. (eds.), The Geopolitics of Iran, Studies in Iranian Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3564-9

607

608

INDEX

458, 490, 499, 500, 516, 517, 533, 536, 539, 540, 542, 543, 547, 549, 557, 559, 563, 564, 576, 577, 593, 595–597 Cold War, 3, 8, 18, 34, 40, 54, 65, 165, 195, 200, 209, 262, 275, 278, 282, 287, 298, 303, 306, 313, 388, 390, 429, 451, 490, 494, 534, 535, 548, 557, 559, 560 Conflict, 5, 7, 12, 14, 18, 24, 25, 30, 31, 34, 46, 48, 54, 69, 120, 127, 128, 132, 169, 182, 189, 201, 203, 231, 233, 234, 265, 287, 295, 297, 303, 305–307, 313, 318–320, 331, 332, 334, 343, 344, 346, 348, 349, 351, 355, 367, 368, 388, 402–404, 411, 412, 420, 424–426, 431–433, 435–437, 446, 448, 451, 455, 471, 490, 498, 504, 516, 554, 560–563, 565, 567–573, 575–593, 596 Connectivity, 5, 245, 246, 539, 540, 542, 546–549 Containment, 10, 11, 67, 173, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 212, 294, 302, 303, 307–313, 322, 436, 494, 501, 505, 533, 548, 581 Convergent interests, 288

D Deterrent, 49, 75, 197, 205, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 400 Divergent interests, 283, 287, 288

E Economic sanctions, 46, 47, 49, 155, 197, 203, 208, 215–218, 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 228, 233,

236, 237, 254, 267, 326, 357, 410, 411, 427 Energy, 5, 6, 10, 13, 49, 50, 53, 54, 68, 75, 118, 150, 152, 169, 184, 196, 201, 205, 206, 224, 226, 230, 235, 236, 246–249, 251, 253–255, 257, 262–266, 278, 296, 297, 318–320, 328–331, 365, 366, 380, 391, 448, 453, 457, 473, 489, 499, 504, 533, 535, 536, 538, 539, 543, 544, 546, 548, 549, 576, 577, 579, 585, 591, 593–595 Energy security, 249, 267, 305, 328–330, 335 Eurasia, 31, 54, 85, 188, 246, 248, 279, 282, 285, 288, 289, 539, 556, 557, 564, 568, 598 Eurasianism, 13, 554, 555, 557, 560, 563 European Union (EU), 8, 11, 68, 73–76, 117, 120, 126, 152, 153, 188, 235, 246, 254, 261, 268, 282, 284, 293–313, 317–329, 331–336, 393, 500, 539, 546, 554, 557, 561, 562, 576, 577, 597, 598 F Financing for development, 144, 149, 152, 475, 538 Foreign policy, 8, 9, 17, 43, 51, 61, 62, 64–69, 71, 73–77, 106, 109, 114, 118, 121, 124–126, 132, 136, 145, 165–167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 184, 188, 189, 196, 198–201, 203, 205, 210, 211, 218, 225, 245, 247, 250, 252, 254, 262, 266, 267, 269, 278–280, 282, 283, 288, 306, 307, 318, 329, 337, 388, 389, 394, 395, 401, 402, 404, 421,

INDEX

422, 424, 430, 432, 434, 437, 438, 443, 444, 446, 448, 449, 455, 456, 467, 473, 475, 477, 485–487, 494, 495, 498, 501, 502, 507, 508, 515, 539, 547, 548, 559, 560, 581, 598 Foreign policy change, 534 G Geopolitics, 1, 4, 13, 14, 136, 208, 210, 258, 283, 287, 319, 366, 367, 380, 424, 558, 580 Geostrategy, 9, 165, 169, 173, 318, 326 Global, 10, 11, 13, 18, 34, 53–55, 68, 69, 72, 73, 76, 104, 118, 120, 124, 144, 145, 155, 165–167, 169, 184, 187, 190, 198, 201, 210, 224, 228, 231, 245–248, 251, 252, 254, 262, 264, 265, 267, 268, 276, 278, 279, 281, 305, 306, 309, 313, 317, 320–322, 325, 326, 328, 330, 333, 367, 379, 380, 388–391, 393, 396, 402, 423, 427, 460, 462, 473, 485, 488, 489, 511, 513, 515, 517, 532, 533, 543, 545, 546, 548, 549, 554, 555, 564, 577 Great Game, 31, 54 Great power relations, 196, 200, 548 Gulf of Aden, 488, 504, 508, 509, 511 H Hegemonic clergy, 9, 84, 93, 113 Heterarchy, 11, 294, 303 Hezbollah, 49, 128, 172, 180, 188, 205, 209, 212, 223, 227, 229, 276, 296, 306, 324, 331, 332, 365, 369, 372, 397, 402–410,

609

423, 434, 435, 466, 476, 493, 497, 500, 505 History, 4, 19, 31, 54, 56, 62, 64, 65, 67, 72, 76, 174, 176, 184, 190, 195, 199, 209, 251, 262, 277, 282, 320, 332, 346, 356, 368, 371, 387, 390, 396, 419, 420, 423, 424, 429, 430, 434, 436, 449, 473, 486, 490, 494, 513, 531, 534, 539, 543, 554–557, 561, 564, 565 Horn, 13, 485–498, 501–510, 513, 515–517 I Ideology, 13, 94, 126, 127, 135, 170, 261, 357, 372, 380, 387, 395, 398, 424, 426, 429, 437, 445, 451, 455, 463, 476, 477, 496, 554, 556 International balancing, 62, 68, 200 International Financial Institutions (IFI), 9, 144–150, 152–160 Inward looking, 210 Iran, 1–14, 17–56, 61–77, 84–91, 96–98, 101–110, 113, 114, 117–120, 122–136, 143–160, 165–191, 195–212, 216, 219–238, 246–268, 275–289, 293–303, 305–313, 317–337, 343–358, 363–375, 377–381, 387–391, 393–412, 419–422, 424–428, 431–438, 443–477, 485–488, 490–518, 531–549, 554, 556–565, 569–571, 573, 575, 577–585, 587–598 Iran-EU relations, 295, 296, 298, 299, 302, 317, 318, 326, 335 Iranian foreign policy, 120, 168, 175, 198, 201, 278, 404, 456, 535 Iran-Israel confrontation, 233, 387, 388, 393, 398, 404, 412

610

INDEX

Iran military, 14, 26, 30, 63, 64, 133, 205, 286, 346, 356, 369, 444, 584 Iran nuclear deal, 183, 391, 562 Iran security, 5, 17, 55, 180, 202, 208, 286, 369, 387, 405, 445, 563 Iran-UAE relations, 11 Iran-U.S. relations, 66, 67, 166, 171–173, 175, 189, 191, 204 Islam, 19, 22, 31, 45, 49, 51, 54, 56, 86, 87, 90, 92, 96, 101–103, 110, 126, 170, 306, 366, 370, 371, 379, 381, 419–422, 424–428, 431, 433, 437, 453, 500, 509, 514 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), 50, 70, 108, 109, 112, 118, 119, 124, 125, 127–129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 183, 227, 350, 351, 395, 396, 407, 409, 499, 562, 584 Israel, 2, 7, 8, 14, 18, 43, 44, 48–52, 54, 85, 87, 121, 130, 134, 136, 154, 172, 185, 187, 188, 196, 202, 209, 211, 212, 221, 229, 233, 246, 261, 263, 268, 276, 281, 285–288, 296, 306, 309, 324, 332, 353, 354, 357, 365, 372, 381, 387–389, 391, 393–412, 423, 432–434, 465, 497, 503, 505, 506, 508, 517, 533, 543, 544, 549, 554, 563, 565, 569, 577, 578, 580, 596, 597 J Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 8, 11, 14, 54, 62, 68, 70–77, 88, 117, 118, 126, 131, 152, 184–186, 188–190, 202, 203, 206–208, 210, 211,

216, 225, 226, 228, 230–238, 249–251, 253, 254, 257, 258, 260, 267, 268, 282, 287, 293, 294, 301–303, 305, 306, 308–313, 317, 319–326, 328, 332, 334–336, 391, 399–401, 410, 504, 536, 538, 541, 546, 549, 579, 598 Justice and Development Party (AKP), 13, 554, 557–559

M Middle East, 2–4, 6–10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 34, 38, 39, 43, 48, 53, 55, 62, 66, 67, 70, 71, 88, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 179, 180, 184–188, 190, 195, 199, 201, 211, 216, 221, 224, 225, 227–229, 231, 233, 234, 238, 246–253, 255, 257, 258, 260–262, 264–268, 276, 279, 281–283, 285, 287–289, 296, 298, 303–305, 307–313, 318– 322, 328, 331, 332, 335, 337, 356, 365–368, 371, 372, 381, 388, 389, 391–393, 400, 402, 409, 420, 432–434, 444, 466, 509, 553, 557–565, 568–570, 575, 577, 593, 596–598 Musa, Abu, 12, 343, 344, 346–348, 350, 351, 352, 356

N Nuclear program, 18, 52, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 132, 150, 152, 174, 180, 184, 207, 208, 223–226, 228, 230–232, 238, 249, 296, 299–301, 307, 308, 310, 311, 317, 320, 325, 388, 397–402, 407, 410, 543–546, 549

INDEX

P Palestine, 18, 21, 85, 134, 188, 223, 317, 374, 376, 379, 394, 395, 397, 404, 444, 500, 554, 578 Partnership, 10, 49, 62, 73, 188, 245, 247, 249–253, 256–258, 262, 263, 265, 267, 268, 276, 279, 281, 283, 289, 305, 311, 312, 349, 389, 392, 403, 409, 430, 434, 465, 468, 475, 491, 492, 496–498, 500, 503–506, 509, 512, 517, 533, 535, 536, 542, 547, 548, 577, 592 Peace agreement, 30, 222, 279, 404, 405, 436 Persian Gulf, 3, 4, 6, 12, 26, 37, 39, 52, 63, 65, 70, 85, 89, 136, 143, 173, 185–187, 197, 200, 201, 204–206, 222, 223, 246, 248, 252, 258, 259, 266, 285, 287, 288, 306, 318, 328, 331, 332, 335, 343–347, 349–351, 353–358, 365–367, 369, 381, 391, 410, 463, 489, 491, 501, 512, 535–538, 540, 544, 577, 593, 595, 596 Political convergence of Iran and Iraq, 364, 375, 380 Political system, 3, 9, 83, 84, 90, 93–96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 106–109, 112–114, 219, 276, 278, 282, 306, 395, 465, 560 Proxy war, 14, 49, 454

R Red Sea, 85, 246, 486, 488, 503, 505, 506, 508, 509 Regional matters, 183, 331 Regional multilateralism, 196, 210, 254 Religious hegemony, 12

611

Religious tourism, 364, 369–371, 373, 381

S Sanctions efficiency, 10 Sectarian divide, 424, 425 Shia geopolitics, 12, 364–368, 372, 381 Soft power, 3, 9, 10, 12, 132, 134, 136, 145, 146, 198, 215, 264, 307, 332, 374, 377, 380, 381, 421–426, 429, 431, 435–438, 492 Sovereignty, 2, 6, 8, 12, 13, 29, 30, 55, 63, 76, 84, 89, 92–94, 96, 108, 114, 227, 231–233, 294, 346, 347, 349–351, 353, 355–358, 408, 444, 581 Strategic perspective, 262 Strategic stability, 10, 195–205, 207–212 Syrian crisis, 10, 70, 198, 210, 281–283, 287, 331, 554, 560, 561

T Taliban, 13, 47, 174, 176, 177, 211, 297, 443–446, 450, 452, 455–461, 463–471, 476, 535, 562 Terrorism, 4, 9, 87, 118, 120, 122, 145, 166, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 191, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 222–224, 226, 252, 258, 281, 295, 296, 298, 299, 310, 324, 332, 364, 427, 430, 460–462, 473, 490, 492, 498, 500, 501, 514, 518, 536 Theocratic contractualism, 93, 114, 115

612

INDEX

Triple islands, 12, 344, 346–353, 355–358 Tunbs, 12, 343, 344, 348, 350–352, 356 Turkey, 2, 5, 13, 14, 27, 31, 43, 85, 86, 156–159, 185, 190, 210, 233, 246, 248, 261, 275, 277, 279, 283, 284, 286, 307, 329, 331, 389, 391, 393, 458, 474, 475, 489, 513, 515, 516, 538, 554, 556–565, 569, 572, 576, 578, 580, 583, 585, 587, 590–594, 596–598 Turkey-Iran relations, 557, 560

U U.S. financial statecraft, 145 U.S. foreign policy, 53, 119, 120, 122–124, 135, 436 U.S. sanctions, 67, 69, 75, 145, 152, 153, 159, 188, 215, 222, 224, 226, 231, 235, 236, 263, 267, 278, 298, 323, 327, 329, 330, 448, 501, 508, 514, 536–538, 541, 542, 546, 593 W West Asia, 3, 4, 70, 199, 486, 491, 509