The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001: Hunger and Power 9781685852047

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword: Hunger and the New Humanitarianism
Preface
Part I Food Crises: Hunger as a Weapon
Introduction
1 Sierra Leone: Food at the Heart of the Conflict
2 Congo-Brazzaville: A Civilian Population Held Hostage to Militias
3 The Great Lakes: Avoiding an Ethnic Reading
4 Somalia: A Country Without a State, a Conflict Without End
5 Somalia: A Difficult Reconstruction
6 The Conflict in Abkhazia
7 Tajikistan: What Role for Nongovernmental Organizations?
8 Colombia: A People Displaced by Violence
9 Guatemala: Inequality and Food Security
10 Nicaragua: No Way Out of Rural Poverty?
11 Honduras: Supplying Water to Victims of Hurricane Mitch
12 The Tragedy of Kosovo
13 A Survey of Kosovar Refugees in Macedonia, May-June 1999
14 Are There Still "Natural" Famines?
Part 2 Confronting Unjust Food Distribution: Which Strategies for Humanitarian Intervention?
Introduction
15 Humanitarian Action in North Korea: Ostrich Politics
16 Lessons from the Kosovo Tragedy
17 A Code of "Good" Conduct?
18 Standards and Quality Assurance
19 Humanitarianism: A Changing Concept
20 Security: A Key Component of Humanitarian Action
21 Humanitarianism and the International Criminal Justice System: Abandoning Neutrality and Impartiality?
22 Combating Man-Made Famine: Legal Instruments
23 Why Embargoes?
24 The Birth of Responsible Humanitarianism
Part 3 Food Policies to Eradicate Hunger
Introduction
25 Feeding Ten Billion People?
26 Increasing Productive Capacity: A Global Imperative
27 Overcoming Rural Poverty: The Lessons of Asia
28 The Role of Nutrition in Public Health
29 Is Food Aid to Russia Necessary?
30 Food Aid to Russia: Welcome or Unwelcome?
31 Hunger in the United States
32 Food Aid and Grain
33 The Lomé Conventions and Food Security
34 Twenty Years of Struggle Against Hunger: From Voluntarism to the Reality Principle
Index
About the Book
About Action Against Hunger

Citation preview

The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001

THE GEOPOLITICS OF HUNGER, 2000-2001 Hunger and Power ACTION AGAINST HUNGER

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

II O U I. 11 I! R I. O N H O N

Published in the U n i t e d States of America in 2001 by Lynne R i e n n e r Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, C o l o r a d o 80301 www.rienner.com a n d in the U n i t e d Kingdom by Lynne R i e n n e r Publishers, Inc. 3 H e n r i e t t a Street, Covent G a r d e n , L o n d o n WC2E 8LU © 2001 by Action Against H u n g e r - U S A . All rights reserved by the publisher A previous version of this work was p u b l i s h e d in French in 1999 as Géopolitique de la faim, 2000. © 1999 by Presses Universitaires de France, 108, boulevard Saint-Germain, 75006 Paris, France. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data T h e geopolitics of h u n g e r , 2000-2001: H u n g e r a n d power by Action Against H u n g e r , p. cm. Includes bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s a n d index. ISBN 1-55587-925-X (alk. p a p e r ) — I S B N 1-55587-901-2 (pbk. : alk. p a p e r ) 1. Food relief—Political aspects. 2. Hunger—Political aspects. 3. H u m a n i t a r i a n assistance—Political aspects. I. Action Against H u n g e r . HV696.F6G388 2000 363.8'8—dc21 00-042552 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication r e c o r d f o r this b o o k is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed a n d b o u n d in t h e U n i t e d States of America

Q

T h e p a p e r used in this publication meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e American National S t a n d a r d for P e r m a n e n c e of P a p e r for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5

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3

2

1

Contents

Foreword: Hunger and the New Humanitarianism, Barnett R. Rubin Preface, Sir Ronald Grierson and Burton K. Haimes

ix xiii

Part I Food Crises: Hunger as a Weapon 1

2

3

4

5

6

Sierra Leone: Food at the Heart of the Conflict Pascal Lefort

3

Congo-Brazzaville: A Civilian Population Held Hostage to Militias Pascal Lefort

11

The Great Lakes: Avoiding an Ethnic Reading Jean-François Vidal

21

Somalia: A Country Without a State, a Conflict Without End Michel Anglade

35

Somalia: A Difficult Reconstruction Roland Marchai

43

The Conflict in Abkhazia Manuel Sánchez-Montero

51 v

vi

Contents

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Tajikistan: What Role for Nongovernmental Organizations? Jean-Michel Grand, Chris Leather, and Frances Mason

63

Colombia: A People Displaced by Violence Pablo Alcade Subias

79

Guatemala: Inequality and Food Security Carmelo Gallardo

87

Nicaragua: No Way Out of Rural Poverty? Jorge Pereiro Pinon

101

Honduras: Supplying Water to Victims of Hurricane Mitch Eric Drouart

113

The Tragedy of Kosovo Frances Mason and Kathryn Ogden

123

A Survey of Kosovar Refugees in Macedonia, May-June 1999 Michael Brewin

137

Are There Still "Natural" Famines? Sylvie Brunei

149

Part 2 Confronting Unjust Food Distribution: W h i c h Strategies for Humanitarian Intervention? 15

16

17

18

19

Humanitarian Action in North Korea: Ostrich Politics Christophe Reltien

159

Lessons from the Kosovo Tragedy Sylvie Brunei

169

A Code of "Good" Conduct? Daniel Puillet-Breton

179

Standards and Quality Assurance Pierre Perrin

191

Humanitarianism: A Changing Concept Jean-Luc Bodin

197

Contents

20

21

22

23

24

vii

Security: A Key C o m p o n e n t of Humanitarian Action Pierre Gallien

201

Humanitarianism and the International Criminal Justice System: Abandoning Neutrality and Impartiality? Carole Dubrulle

215

Combating Man-Made Famine: Legal Instruments Marìe-Josée Domestici-Met

227

Why Embargoes? Romain Coti and Anne-Laure Wipff

235

The Birth of Responsible Humanitarianism Sylvie Brunei

241

Part 3 Food Policies to Eradicate Hunger 25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

Feeding Ten Billion People? Sylvie Brunei

247

Increasing Productive Capacity: A Global Imperative Sylvie Brunei

251

Overcoming Rural Poverty: The Lessons of Asia Gilbert Etienne

259

The Role of Nutrition in Public Health Claudine Prudhon

269

Is Food Aid to Russia Necessary? Alain Giroux

275

Food Aid to Russia: Welcome or Unwelcome? Jonathan Littell

283

H u n g e r in the United States Trudy Lieberman

303

Food Aid and Grain José Bidegain and Astrid Filliol

313

viii

33

34

Contents

The Lomé Conventions and Food Security Jean-Jacques Gabas

319

Twenty Years of Struggle Against From Voluntarism to the Reality Sylvie Brunei

333

Index About the Book About Action Against Hunger

Hunger: Principle

339 353 354

Foreword: Hunger and the New Humanitarianism Barnett R. Rubin

On 24 J u n e 1859, Jean-Henri Dunant, a Genevan traveling in northe r n Italy, w a t c h e d as t h e a r m i e s of N a p o l e o n III of F r a n c e a n d E m p e r o r Franz Josef of Austria b u t c h e r e d six t h o u s a n d of each o t h e r ' s soldiers. W h e n the Austrians a b a n d o n e d t h e field, b o t h armies left the wounded to die and the dead to rot, while peasants plundered the corpses. Dunant organized the women of the neighboring village of Castiglione to help tend the wounded. His powerful a c c o u n t of his experience, published t h r e e years later, led to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 1 T h e new h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m was b o r n in the ICRC hospitals of Biafra. In September 1968, the French Red Cross Society lent the ICRC a team of five French doctors to care for the victims of the war in Biafra, the n a m e given by leaders of the Ibo e t h n i c g r o u p of Nigeria to the new state they wished to f o u n d t h r o u g h secession f r o m Nigeria. T h e French doctors' team, soon j o i n e d by doctors f r o m other countries, set up two hospitals. In one, in the tradition of Dunant, they treated the war wounded, though they were shocked to find that most of the wounded seemed to be civilians, and notably a large n u m b e r of children. At the other hospital they treated a new kind of war victim: malnourished children, starving not f r o m a natural disaster but from h u n g e r intentionally inflicted on innocents as an act of war against a whole people. Despite the ICRC's code of silence, considered necessary to assure u n i m p e d e d access to all victims, one of the doctors, Bernard Kouchner, asked himself: "What use were doctors if they did not warn the world about the murderous use of a f o o d b l o c k a d e as a w e a p o n of war? If we r e m a i n e d

ix

x

Foreword

silent, we would be accomplices to the systematic massacre of a population.'" 2 Just as classic humanitarianism was f o u n d e d to ensure that soldiers w o u n d e d in battles between states were cared for as h u m a n beings, the new humanitarianism was founded to challenge the use of violence against noncombatants in civil wars. Under the slogan soigner et témoigner (provide care and bear witness), Doctors Without Borders was created in 1972. Other organizations followed suit. This volume, with its extensive testimony drawn f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e of its aid workers in thirty-six countries around the world, shows that Action Against Hunger, f o u n d e d in 1979 to fight h u n g e r worldwide, has upheld and expanded this new movement. In the world in which the ICRC was f o u n d e d , wars pitted uniformed soldiers of recognized states against each other. The business of killing and maiming was pursued without quarter, and cruelty was accepted as the task of warriors, but the carnage was c o n f i n e d to those u n d e r arms. The warrior profession was inspired by a common code of h o n o r , a n d despite their political antipathies, m e n were bound by the profession of arms in a kind of solidarity that transcended borders. The ICRC counted on that code and solidarity and on the recognition of a common interest in humanitarian standards to make its confidential interventions effective. We should not romanticize those days: No code of honor saved the victims of colonial wars and extermination campaigns in Africa, Asia, or the Americas. The Nazi regime abjured the very idea of a common humanity and showed the results of systematic antihumanitarianism. In response, the postwar Geneva Conventions (1948) codified basic humanitarian obligations in wartime and made adherence to its conventions a mark of sovereignty. In the massive violence of postcolonial and post-Cold War civil conflict, however, the worst traditions of total war have r e t u r n e d . Biafra, the first postcolonial war of secession, was only a taste of what was to come. In the immediate postcolonial euphoria, international e f f o r t s a n d postcolonial states focused on " d e v e l o p m e n t " as the means to abolish poverty and hunger, considered as remnants of colonial exploitation. Famine resulted, it seemed, from a combination of natural disasters and mass poverty. Biafra taught otherwise: H u n g e r was a weapon of war. In total wars where the aim is to subordinate, expel, or eliminate a whole population, control of food, as the reports in this book amply demonstrate, becomes the means of choice to impose submission, flight, or death. As a result, even peacetime economic decisions about food production can no longer be considered, alas, solely in the light of

Foreword

xi

economic rationality. An economically rational division of labor that leaves populations d e p e n d e n t on purchased food while they concentrate on cash crops may leave t h e m vulnerable to later assault by those who control roads, ports, or a few marketplaces. Control of food is an aspect of security. Many warriors in today's conflicts recognize no code. Rulers employ private militias to insulate themselves from responsibility. Both they and the rebels may be answerable to no one but the criminal syndicates that market the commodities that f u n d their war, whether these are looted diamonds or illegal drugs. Humanitarian assistance itself is seen only as another weapon of war: supplies to be stolen for their troops or manipulated to starve the "enemy." Self-interest may lead such leaders to allow humanitarian access, but the rising toll among humanitarian workers and journalists bearing witness shows the intentional violation of standards by the new warlords. To expose and oppose such crimes, including those masquerading as natural disasters or poverty, those present in the field have a duty to alert the wider public and call for international action beyond the humanitarian response. As the reports in this book show, these deeply committed workers are better placed than anyone to elucidate the complex ways in which the basic h u m a n need for food can be manipulated to diminish and destroy humanity. In this book, the humanitarians of Action Against Hunger present us, the international community, with overwhelming evidence of how hunger is used as a weapon of war. It is for us now to assume the responsibilities these testimonies have given us.

Notes Barnett R. Rubin was director, Center for Preventive Action, Council o n Foreign Relations. H e now works at the Center for International C o o p e r a t i o n of New York University. 1. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: H e n r y Holt, 1997), pp. 109-124. 2. "A q u o i servaient les m é d e c i n s s'ils n ' a l e r t a i e n t pas le m o n d e sur l'usage assassin d u blocus alimentaire c o m m e a r m e de guerre? Silencieux, nous étions complices d u massacre systématique d ' u n e population." Bernard Kouchner, Le malheur des autres (Paris: A r m a n d Colin, 1993), pp. 57-69.

Preface Sir Ronald Grierson

Burton K. Haimes

Chairman,

Chairman, Action Against

Action Against

Hunger-UK

Hunger-USA

Founded in France some twenty years ago with the aim of combating hunger and advocating the legal right to food (as stated in the United Nations Charter of 1945), Action Against Hunger is now firmly established in Paris, Spain (Madrid), the United Kingdom (London), and the United States (New York). As the twenty-first century begins, hunger is still a reality in many parts of the world. It is indeed a sad state of affairs that we are entering a new century of technology and globalization, a century of the Internet and information, while such deleterious human conditions persist. The end of the Cold War took us all by surprise. In the last ten years we have failed to see the realization of the hopes raised at the beginning of the 1990s. Absent the balance of power or balance of terror, local and regional conflicts have multiplied, and the number of civilian victims is growing. Nevertheless, progress has been made. We are no longer impotent witnesses to remote natural disasters in India, Bangladesh, or China. Droughts, hurricanes, El Nino, and earthquakes continue to claim their share of lives, but not as a result of hunger. "Green Revolutions" and disaster response mechanisms have proven their effectiveness. T h e speed of information sharing and increased global agricultural yields, coupled with the experience and skills of relief organizations, enable us to defeat hunger when a natural disaster occurs. In theory, death by starvation due to natural disasters should not occur. Hunger can no longer be seen merely as the result of natural occurrences. And yet, Action Against Hunger continues to see widespread hunger even as the world produces more than enough food for all. xiii

xiv

Preface

This p a r a d o x is analyzed in this book, o u r s e c o n d r e p o r t o n global issues of h u n g e r . T h e b o o k gathers t o g e t h e r the analyses a n d testim o n i e s of Action Against H u n g e r field-workers with c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m e x p e r t s a n d academics, b u t it is n e i t h e r a d i r e c t o r y of world h u n g e r n o r a country-by-country description of the d i f f e r e n t f o r m s of m a l n u t r i t i o n afflicting each. Rather, in this b o o k we e x p l o r e the use of h u n g e r as a w e a p o n in f o o d crises f r o m Sierra L e o n e to N o r t h Korea; we study the d i f f e r e n t h u m a n i t a r i a n strategies b e i n g used to c o n f r o n t u n j u s t f o o d d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d to avoid m a n i p u l a t i o n in increasingly c o m p l i c a t e d contexts w h e r e neutrality a n d impartiality s h o u l d b e the p e r m a n e n t criteria of h u m a n i t a r i a n action. T h e Kosovo crisis of 1999 showed us that, even when public generosity is c o m b i n e d with the professionalism of h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, we are n o t f r e e of m a n i p u l a t i o n . From the legitimization of war to cynical strategies that use discrimination in the distribution of f o o d to displace p o p u l a t i o n s , t h e Kosovo crisis has h i g h l i g h t e d the n e e d f o r i n d e p e n d e n t h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o n c e r n e d only with the fate of civilian victims n o t to b e h i n d e r e d by any political, military, or strategic a g e n d a . The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001 is divided i n t o t h r e e parts. Part 1 deals with c u r r e n t crises, f r o m the C o n g o to Somalia a n d f r o m N i c a r a g u a to A f g h a n i s t a n a n d Sierra L e o n e . It shows t h a t whoever controls f o o d controls power. In Part 2, we seek an answer to a daily c o n c e r n : how to react w h e n c o n f r o n t e d by criminal regimes. W h a t are the principles to b e respected a n d the c o d e of c o n d u c t to be followed? W h a t is the role of h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations in the p r e s e n t world of international relations? Part 3 analyzes policies that could be i m p l e m e n t e d to secure the right to f o o d . W i t h o u t international recognition of such a right a n d the establ i s h m e n t of policies, laws, a n d m e c h a n i s m s to e n s u r e its application, we are c o n d e m n e d to witness p e o p l e dying of h u n g e r in a world of plenty, a world in which f o o d supplies are m o r e t h a n sufficient b u t distribution r e m a i n s scandalously discriminatory.

PART O N E FOOD CRISES: HUNGER AS A WEAPON

He who controls the food supply wields the power. Hunger remains a weapon throughout the world, and certain populations are the victims of deliberate discriminatory practices that are intended to bring about their subjugation, their departure, or the arrival of the international community. In this sense, great famines are always the consequence of human action, even when the point of departure is a natural catastrophe.

Sierra Leone: Food at the Heart of the Conflict Pascal

Lefort

In Sierra Leone, civilian populations have been the main victims of the civil war that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has been waging since 1991. 1 Food, which has always been used as a political weapon in the country, has gradually become a key factor in the conflict. Used to legitimize the actions of both the government and the rebellion, food also represents a vital resource in the war economy. For its p a r t , the RUF has f r e q u e n t l y used h u n g e r a n d t e r r o r as weapons with which to subjugate populations or force political dialogue.

Food and Terror After b e i n g driven o u t of Freetown by E C O M O G (the Economic C o m m u n i t y of West Africa States [ECOWAS] M o n i t o r i n g G r o u p ) forces in February 1998, RUF fighters and the rebel soldiers of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) took less than two months to reorganize. 2 Still lacking the military means for a direct confrontation with ECOMOG, the rebels fell back on the two weapons of terror and food that they had previously used to subjugate the civilian population and paralyze agricultural production. Starting in April 1998, the rebels, who had r e t r e a t e d to their strongholds in the northeast, launched a campaign of terror in the n o r t h of the country to brutally r e f u t e the government's communiqués announcing victory. ECOMOG had concentrated its efforts on recapturing the towns and controlling the main roadways, thus mak3

4

Food Crises

Chronology 27 April 1961 1968

Sierra Leone achieves independence. Siaka Stevens gains power. Siaka Stevens hands power over to his chief of 1985 staff, General Joseph Momoh. First Revolutionary United Front (RUF) offensive 23 March 1991 in the Kailahun district, Eastern province. Military coup d'état. Captain Valentine Strasser 29 April 1992 takes power at the head of the National People Revolutionary Council. 16 January 1996 Valentine Strasser is "gently" overthrown by General Julius Maada Bio, who promises to set the path for a transition to democracy. 15 March 1996 Ahmad Tehan Kabbah is democratically elected president of Sierra Leone. 26 March 1996 Cease-fire agreement between the RUF and the armed forces of Sierra Leone. 25 May 1997 Military coup d'état. President Kabbah flees to Guinea. Establishment of a military junta, the Armed Forces Ruling Council, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. 28-29 August 1997 Economic Community of West African States summit in Abuja. Embargo imposed on Sierra Leone. 23 October 1997 Conakry Accords (Guinea) provide for the return to power of President Kabbah on 22 April 1998. 6 February 1998 Launch of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group's offensive on Freetown. Flight of junta. Return of President Kabbah to Freetown. 10 March 1998 Revolutionary United Front attacks Freetown. 6 January 1999 Cease-fire agreement between the RUF and the 18 May 1999 Government of Sierra Leone. Signing at Lomé of peace agreement between the 7 July 1999 RUF and the government of Sierra Leone. The peace agreement is de facto broken and the May 2000 RUF holds several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage.

ing the rural areas an ideal target. O r g a n i z e d in small c o m m a n d o units, the c o m b a t a n t s attacked isolated villages, following a well-practiced routine: looting, atrocities, a n d the b u r n i n g of houses, all carried out in such a way as to e n s u r e m a x i m u m effect. They inflicted mutilations, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t left p e r m a n e n t scars o n victims a n d

Sierra Leone

5

their families. For the f a r m i n g p o p u l a t i o n , a p e r s o n ' s loss of o n e or sometimes two h a n d s m e a n t that the victim would n o l o n g e r be able to provide f o r the n e e d s of his or h e r family. To maximize the impact, victims were chosen at r a n d o m , a n d t h e r e was n o hesitation to a m p u tate the limbs of very y o u n g children or to draw lots to d e c i d e which victims would have their limbs a m p u t a t e d . This zone, which includes m u c h of the N o r t h e r n province, is the country's rice granary. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the atrocities c o m m i t t e d were i m m e d i a t e : f a r m i n g ceased, large n u m b e r s of p e o p l e were disp l a c e d (150,000 p e o p l e s o u g h t r e f u g e in G u i n e a to escape t h e savagery a n d h u n g e r ) , a n d the sale of cereals in the villages was restricted in p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the scarce times a h e a d . Within a few weeks the region was paralyzed, a n d the country's stocks of cereal declined precipitously. Because of the insecurity a n d the violence t h a t they h a d s u f f e r e d in the past, h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations c o n f i n e d their activities to the towns a n d to areas along the m a i n roadways that were prot e c t e d by E C O M O G . D u r i n g 1998, access to t h e p o p u l a t i o n diminished as the security situation worsened, even as h u m a n i t a r i a n n e e d s increased. W h e n t h e R U F r e c a p t u r e d t h e m i n i n g t o w n of K o i d u in D e c e m b e r 1998 a n d l a u n c h e d an offensive that took it to Freetown in a few weeks, Action Against H u n g e r teams were f o r c e d to a b a n d o n Makeni, capital of the N o r t h e r n province. At the time, 700 severely m a l n o u r i s h e d children were b e i n g treated in o u r t h e r a p e u t i c nutrition centers. Since J a n u a r y 1999, o n e a n d a half m i l l i o n p e o p l e have b e e n deprived of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance in the rebel-controlled n o r t h e r n h a l f of t h e c o u n t r y . T h e f i r s t e v a l u a t i o n m i s s i o n s l e d by A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r in J u n e 1999 a n d r e p o r t s f r o m p e o p l e w h o h a d r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d f r o m M a k e n i c o n f i r m e d t h e a c u t e s h o r t a g e s of f o o d a n d m e d i c i n e . 3 Because of the shortage of paddy (rice), very little has b e e n p l a n t e d . Only t h e p o p u l a t i o n s living n e a r t h e b o r d e r with G u i n e a have access to f o o d supplies o n a m o r e regular basis. Right u p to the start of peace negotiations in May 1999, the fate of these p o p u l a t i o n s was of little c o n c e r n to either the g o v e r n m e n t or t h e RUF, w h o were less i n t e r e s t e d in m a n a g i n g the territory u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l t h a n in exploiting the wealth that f e d their war economy.

Food in the Service of the W a r Economy T h e d i a m o n d industry a n d the i m p o r t a t i o n of f o o d are closely linked in Sierra L e o n e . T h r o u g h a subtle c o m p e n s a t i o n m e c h a n i s m , these

Food Crises

6

Faranati

• Kabala

GUINEA

• Kamakwie OFarecariah

• Kambia

OForokonia

• Pendembu

Mambolo • Make™ • Foredugu

• Magburaka ^

Sefadu

i

Yebgema

*Ja9fwei

Gueckedou

• Masuri FREETOWN (Kolahun

Vahun

• Kenema

LIBERIA •"maligi

Bonfhe

Area of guerrilla and periodic attacks

Diamond zone

Refugee/ displaced populations

g] "

n

Bandajuma»

Bauxite Rutile Population movement

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone

two activities complement each other, particularly since the development of mining activities has greatly reduced the level of agricultural activity in the prospecting zones. Miners need food, which is provided to them on credit by a merchant who in return is given first preference for the purchase of the stones. The income derived f r o m the export of diamonds is used to pay the food suppliers in foreign currency, while the money earned from sales of rice inside the country provides the cash needed to purchase the stones. The prospectors' profits are modest, whereas at the other end of the chain the annual income from the diamond industry is estimated to be nearly 200 million dollars. 4 Since 1997, the rebels have controlled most areas that bring in annual revenues of approximately 100 million dollars.

Sierra Leone

7

W h e n fighting or u n s a f e r o a d s m a k e it impossible to t r a n s p o r t f o o d f r o m Freetown to the interior of the c o u n t r y or w h e n local prod u c t i o n is i n s u f f i c i e n t , f o o d aid stocks a s s u m e critical i m p o r t a n c e . This f o o d has t h e d o u b l e advantage of b e i n g available close to t h e d i a m o n d - m i n i n g zones a n d of b e i n g less expensive t h a n i m p o r t e d f o o d . T h e f o o d is diverted to the d i a m o n d mines in a variety of ways: r e p u r c h a s e of f o o d distributed to families w h o are in u r g e n t n e e d of m o n e y to c o v e r t h e i r b a s i c n e e d s ; l o o t i n g of t h e w a r e h o u s e s of h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; a n d r e q u i s i t i o n of f o o d f r o m civilian p o p u l a t i o n s . T h u s , w h e n M a k e n i was c a p t u r e d by t h e R U F in D e c e m b e r 1998, the fact that h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations h a d left the town was used as a p r e t e x t f o r seizing their f o o d supplies. Soon afterward, the RUF organized the distribution of o n e sack of b u l g u r (prec o o k e d cracked wheat) p e r family as a way of reassuring the population t h a t r e m a i n e d in the town a n d to e n c o u r a g e o t h e r s to r e t u r n . This was the only time f o o d was distributed. T h e bulk of the supplies was t r a n s p o r t e d to the d i a m o n d - m i n i n g area of Kono. Of course, this source of supply alone could n o t suffice for the n e e d s of the miners. Mechanisms have b e e n p u t into place to b a r t e r u n c u t d i a m o n d s f o r f o o d a n d o t h e r basic p r o d u c t s or f o r material n e e d e d in the mines. This activity took place mainly between Makeni a n d G u i n e a a n d o n the Liberian border.

Food as a Political Weapon O n 6 J a n u a r y 1999, the RUF c o m b a t a n t s j o i n e d forces with the form e r AFRC c o u p plotters a n d attacked Freetown, occupying the presidential residence a n d b u r n i n g a n d looting the city. 5 P r e s i d e n t A h m a d Tejan Kabbah's g o v e r n m e n t wavered f o r the s e c o n d time. Fleeing the a d v a n c i n g r e b e l t r o o p s , nearly 150,000 p e o p l e t o o k r e f u g e in t h e western districts of the city. Citing as justification the withdrawal to G u i n e a of the expatriate h u m a n i t a r i a n p e r s o n n e l in c h a r g e of f o o d aid, t h e Sierra L e o n e a n g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z e d a f o o d d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o g r a m . T h e objective was twofold: first, to r e g r o u p t h e displaced p o p u l a t i o n at a few locations; s e c o n d , above all to reassure p e o p l e a n d forestall a revolt by a p o p u l a t i o n that felt betrayed by the governm e n t ' s inability to d e f e n d the city. A c a m p a i g n to register displaced p e r s o n s was hastily organized, a n d accessible f o o d supplies were requisitioned f o r distribution to residents who h a d fled the eastern suburbs to seek r e f u g e in the western parts of the city, which r e m a i n e d u n d e r E C O M O G control. 6 U n d e r the p r o g r a m , 200,000 rations were distributed within a few days. It m a t t e r e d little that 80 p e r c e n t of the beneficiaries were f r o m the western s u b u r b s a n d that, u p o n verifica-

8

Food Crises

tion, only 17,000 displaced people were actually accommodated in the hastily built makeshift camps. The main purpose was to show that the government was taking care of the population. The same scenario was repeated a few weeks later in the town of Kenema, where the authorities a n n o u n c e d the arrival of displaced persons and, in the absence of international staff, organized within a few days the distribution of food aid for 60,000 people. As the level of the available food supplies dwindled, the official number of displaced persons also declined. Having become useless, the displaced population was then relocated outside the town, sometimes by force. Although aid agencies demanded and managed to regain control of food distribution, the results of the assistance provided over the first six months of 1999 speak for themselves: not a single sack of food went to rebel-held areas. Quite apart from legitimate safety concerns, no attempt was made to deliver food aid to the northern part of the country, which has been the most severely affected by the lack of f o o d . It was n o t until May 1999, the start of p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s between the government and the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, that this question was addressed. P r e s i d e n t K a b b a h ' s g o v e r n m e n t d o e s n o t of c o u r s e have a monopoly over the manipulation of food for political ends. We have seen how, during the capture of Makeni in December 1998, the RUF was also keen to appear generous by arranging for the distribution of food taken from the supplies of humanitarian organizations. William R e n o a n d Paul Richards have shown how each r e g i m e in Sierra Leone, and in particular that of Siaka Stevens, has used food as a means of retaining political support. 7 What is so shocking in the recent history of Sierra Leone is not that a democratically elected president—supported by Great Britain, the Commonwealth, ECOWAS, and the United Nations D e p a r t m e n t of Political Affairs—has taken advantage of humanitarian aid in order to improve his political image and to support the population in the south of the country, which constitutes his electoral base. Rather it is that, faced with a rebellion that will stop at nothing to achieve its ends, priority has been given to a military action that was doomed from the start, given the lack of interest on the part of the international community, which has left ECOWAS to deal with the conflict. In doing so, the government and its allies have deliberately remained silent about the tragic humanitarian situation of more than a million people living in RUFcontrolled zones and have discouraged any humanitarian assistance on the g r o u n d s that it would be used to s u p p o r t t h e r e b e l l i o n . Fearing for the safety of its personnel, no humanitarian organization has agreed to take the risk of involvement in such a confused situa-

Sierra Leone

9

tion, and it is the civilian population, already suffering terribly from this conflict, that has paid the price.

Notes Pascal Lefort is a desk officer at Action Against Hunger. 1. T h e RUF began an a r m e d rebellion in 1991 in Liberia, w h e r e it gained the support of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Charles Taylor is today president of Liberia. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, who had been imprisoned in Freetown, was c o n d e m n e d to death in late 1998 for treason. He was released u n d e r the peace a g r e e m e n t signed between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF on 7 July 1999 at Lomé. 2. ECOMOG was a peacekeeping force established in 1990 by the member countries of the ECOWAS. In February 1998, ECOMOG drove the military j u n t a allied with the RUF from power and reinstated President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. T h e ARFC was a military j u n t a led by Major J o h n n y Paul Koroma; it seized power in the coup of 25 May 1997 that overthrew Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the democratically elected president. 3. In J u n e 1999, taking advantage of the negotiations that began in Lomé between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean government, Action Against H u n g e r approached the RUF for authorization to operate in RUF-controlled areas. 4. This valuation is according to Mbendi, Mining Industry Profile, Sierra Leone, March 1998 and statistics published by the Diamond High Council at Antwerp. On the d i a m o n d economy, see also François Misser a n d Olivier Vallée, Les gemmocraties, l'économie politique du diamant africain (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1997). 5. For more on the brutality to which civilians were subjected during this offensive, see the report of H u m a n Rights Watch, Sierra Leone, Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape (New York: H u m a n Rights Watch, 1999). 6. Officially, the requisitioned food supplies were recorded as borrowed by the World Food Program (WFP) from the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned and made available by the WTP to the local NGOs that organized the distribution u n d e r government supervision. 7. Siaka Stevens was president of Sierra Leone from 1968 to 1985. See William R e n o , Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge University Press, 1995); Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James C u r r e y / H e i n e m a n n , 1996); a n d Action Against Hunger, Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999 (Paris: PUF, 1998), pp. 7-21.

Bibliography H u m a n Rights Watch. Sierra Leone: Getting Away ivith Murder, Mutilation, and Rape. New York: H u m a n Rights Watch, 1999. Misser, François, and Olivier Vallée. Les gemmocraties, l'économie politique du diamant africain. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1997.

10

Food Crises

R e n o , William. Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge University Press, 1995. Richards, Paul. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey/Heinemann, 1996.

2 Congo-Brazzaville: A Civilian Population Held Hostage to Militias Pascal

Lefort

Congo-Brazzaville 1 has b e e n p l u n g e d into a spiral of violence caused by the radicalization of political action that a c c o m p a n i e d the rise of a r m e d militias c o n t r o l l e d by the m a i n political leaders. T h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n is h e l d hostage to the violence. In a c o u n t r y w h e r e petrol e u m r e v e n u e s have e n c o u r a g e d a heavy d e p e n d e n c e o n i m p o r t e d foodstuffs, the growing incidents of atrocities, looting, a n d destruction of c r o p s have left t h e displaced p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h o u t access to f o o d a n d care a n d in a life-threatening situation.

A Heavy Dependence on Imported Food Despite its fertile soils, f o o d p r o d u c t i o n in Congo-Brazzaville covers only two-thirds of t h e c o u n t r y ' s n e e d s . W h i l e f a r m i n g allows r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s a m e a s u r e of self-sufficiency, it does n o t m e e t the n e e d s of a g r o w i n g u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n t h a t d e m a n d s a w i d e r selection of f o o d t h a n t h e traditional saka-saka m a d e f r o m m a n i o c a n d g r o u n d leaves. Faced with the effects of twenty years of a centralized agricultural policy a n d prices fixed at levels that discourage small farmers, t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a s t u r n e d to t h e i m p o r t a t i o n of g o o d s f r o m E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s : cereals (especially w h e a t f l o u r ) , beef, poultry, eggs, a n d dairy p r o d u c t s . It has deliberately r e d u c e d customs duties o n these goods in o r d e r to k e e p prices low a n d forestall public disc o n t e n t . T h i s policy has t h e e f f e c t of m a k i n g f o r e i g n g o o d s m o r e competitive t h a n local p r o d u c t s a n d p r o f o u n d l y c h a n g i n g the eating habits of the u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n . 2 T h e easy m o n e y e a r n e d f r o m the oil 11

12

Chronology 15 August 1960 1968-1991 F e b r u a r y - J u n e 1991

31 August 1992

1993-1994

J a n u a r y 1994

J u n e 1997

25 O c t o b e r 1997

1997-1998

18 D e c e m b e r 1998

Congo-Brazzaville achieves i n d e p e n d e n c e . Marxist-Leninist regime of Denis Sassou N'Guesso in power f r o m 1979 on. Meeting of the Sovereign National C o n f e r e n c e m a n d a t e s a peaceful c h a n g e of regime. Pascal Lissouba elected president by universal suffrage with the s u p p o r t of D. Sassou N'Guesso. T h e following m o n t h , Sassou N'Guesso j o i n s the opposition. Rise of ethnic militias. Violent clashes in Brazzaville between supporters of P. Lissouba a n d opposition militants. Some 2,000 p e o p l e killed a n d 50,000 displaced. Reconciliation between P. Lissouba a n d Bernard Kolelas, who is elected mayor of Brazzaville. Two m o n t h s b e f o r e the presidential elections, civil war erupts in Brazzaville. T h e Congolese A r m e d Forces (FAC) for the most part close ranks with D. Sassou N'Guesso, who is s u p p o r t e d by the Angolan A r m e d Forces. B. Kolelas, who h a d r e m a i n e d o n the sidelines, takes the side of P. Lissouba. Between 5,000 a n d 10,000 persons killed a n d nearly 800,000 displaced. Victory of D. Sassou N'Guesso, who proclaims himself president. T h e Ninja militias retreat with their weapons to the Pool forests a n d the Cocoyes to the forests of Bouenza, Niari, a n d L e k o u m o u . B. Kolelas a n d P. Lissouba go into exile. Failure to disarm the militias leaves t h e m ready to mobilize at a m o m e n t ' s notice. Beginning in August 1998, the Ninjas m o u n t a n u m b e r of attacks in the Pool forests. T h e railway lines between Pointe Noire a n d Brazzaville (the country's economic h u b ) are cut in September. Faced with the Cobra-led repression in the (continues)

Congo-Brazzaville

13

Chronology Continued

18 December 1998 (cont.) Pool forests, the Ninjas infiltrate the southern districts of Brazzaville. Violent reprisals by progovernment forces ensue: Ninjas hunt down and force evacuation of the residents of the southern districts of Brazzaville (Makelekele, Kinsoundi, and Bacongo). Some 200,000 people escape to the Pool forests, and nearly 50,000 flee to the northern suburbs of Brazzaville. Progovernment forces loot the southern suburbs, which remain off-limits to the civilian population. December-January 1999 The Cocoyes militia infiltrates Nkayi (21 December) and Dolisie (January). Progovernment forces counterattack. The towns are evacuated, then sacked and looted by progovernment forces. May 1999 50,000 people return to the southern suburbs of Brazzaville.

boom has convulsed the system by causing hefty price increases. And when the state, weakened by the economic crisis of the 1980s and by poor management of its petroleum resources, f o u n d it increasingly difficult to pay its employees, the situation became intolerable for middle-class citizens. As the country struggled from one crisis to the other, many city dwellers could afford to eat only one full meal a day. In a d d i t i o n to this heavy d e p e n d e n c e o n i m p o r t e d f o o d s , Brazzaville, the c o u n t r y ' s capital city, relies on the s u r r o u n d i n g regions and on the Congo-Ocean railway. Manioc and other staples are supplied mainly by the northern regions of the country. The Pool Prefecture supplies the capital with fresh produce and poultry. Most imported goods arrive at Pointe Noire before being freighted by train to Brazzaville. When the railway line is cut, Brazzaville is strangled. In 1997, fighting in the northern suburbs of the city interrupted the supply of basic goods. Since the end of 1998 and the resumption of military activity in the southern suburbs of Brazzaville and in the Pool Prefecture, fresh produce has been in short supply. Each crisis is thus a further step into poverty for the urban population, which finds it increasingly difficult to secure a daily meal. These difficulties have led to a higher incidence of malnutrition. The growing vulnerability of the poorest sectors of the popula-

14

Food Crises

TRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC r"

CAMEROON

IffiB

Ouésso

irçipfondo.

Areas of clashes between militias (1999) Nibolek Petroleum

KÏÏTÛÎ3

u i u u j Railways

Owando Population movements (December 1998) Return of populations (May 1999) HIGHLANDS

Democratic Republic o f the Congo

Djambala

Doli'sie ;KOUILOU

Pointe Noire

KINSHASA BOUENZA

3 INDA GÓLA) Congo-Brazzaville

tion, whose temptation to respond with violence increases with each new crisis, is also heightened by the specific urban characteristics of Brazzaville itself, whose neighborhoods have long had populations f r o m the same r e g i o n of o r i g i n . Since early in the century, t h e Bacongo suburbs in the south and the Poto Poto suburbs in the north of the city have been divided into zones around the European center of town, which was the seat of the colonial administration. Bacongo received populations arriving f r o m the Pool region and Poto Poto, those migrating from the north of the country. The construction and development of the Congo-Ocean railway and the demand for workers by the railway management and by trading companies encouraged m i g r a t i o n to t h e cities. This u r b a n p h e n o m e n o n has n o t b e e n

Congo-Brazzaville

15

u n m i Railway y Avenues and principal road links to the rest of the country TTPJ Southern districts evacuated V * in December 1998 TALANGAi:

IMSMÜ1

MAKELEKELE iBAKONGOl

Congo

River

POTO-POTO; City Centre

KINSHASA

restricted to Brazzaville, as the growth of the railway spurred the development of the port of Pointe Noire and of the localities along the 500 kilometers of track. This a c c e l e r a t i n g u r b a n s p r e a d a n d the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of Brazzaville in the image of a country divided between north and south explain why, up until 1997, most political struggles and dissident activity were concentrated in the capital. During the three successive crises that developed from 1992 to 1997, previously mixed neighborhoods became more polarized. Fighting between the Ninja and Zulu militias in 1993 led to the forced exchange of populations between the Bacongo and Mfilou suburbs. 3 Bacongo residents from Nibolek, who were suspected of supporting Pascal Lissouba's Zulus, were chased out while the Laris, who formed part of the Ninja militia, were in turn driven out of Mfilou. 4 Progressively cut off from one another with each passing crisis,5 these districts became fertile grounds for the proliferation of the socalled peoples' militias that were originally established to protect certain political leaders. These militias, however, gradually identified with the area under their protection in which they controlled both legitimate trade and trafficking. By 1997, the militias had become genuine fighting forces and had begun to launch murderous punitive

16

Food Crises

attacks against enemy districts. Unsupervised and o p e r a t i n g with impunity, their excesses became a norm. By the e n d of 1998, m o r e t h a n 200,000 p e o p l e h a d fled the Bacongo and Makelekele suburbs to escape the fighting between the heavily armed Ninja militias from the Pool region and government forces. This fighting marked the culmination of the escalation and spread of political violence that had begun with the failure of the transition to democracy that had started in 1991. The Sovereign National Conference convened from February to J u n e 1991 in Brazzaville brought a peaceful end to twenty-eight years of Marxist-Leninist-inspired one-party rule. It failed, however, to bring about the emergence of a younger generation representing the desire for change in political practices that had been expressed during the conference. Three members of the older generation—Pascal Lissouba, Denis Sassou N'Guesso, and Bernard Kolelas—dominated t h e political stage following the p r e s i d e n t i a l elections of 1992. Lissouba, a former prime minister, was elected president in the second r o u n d of voting, with the support of the outgoing president, Sassou N'Guesso. Lissouba defeated Kolelas, a longtime o p p o n e n t of the defunct Marxist regime. Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga interprets this massive return of the old generation, which was so harshly criticized during the Sovereign National Conference, as a sign that a majority of the people of Congo-Brazzaville were ready to accept the use of political violence. 6 The instability that quickly followed the shifting alliances fostered this feeling of insecurity and encouraged two actions: The suburbs closed themselves off, and new forces took control by violent means. Left out of the abortive attempts at democracy and shaken by an economic crisis that no longer guaranteed graduates an automatic right to a plush government post, urban youths found an outlet for their frustrations and a place that society had denied them in the militias that were f o r m e d a r o u n d the three leaders. 7 For the "downwardly mobile" (young school dropouts, delinquents, or victims of the crises) who over the years swelled the ranks of the militias, these organizations have o f t e n proved to be an u n e x p e c t e d source of i n c o m e . Identification with a political struggle or with the defense of a group thus served as a justification for factional activities.

From Militarization of Political Action to Open Conflict The rise of the militia reflected a growing trend toward violence as a means of political action. By reinforcing the isolation of the various

Congo-Brazzaville

17

suburbs, this violence has also lent legitimacy to the regionalist politics of the principal leaders. Sassou N'Guesso called on the population of the north to rally u n d e r his banner for their survival, Lissouba relied on the Nibolek, while Kolelas attempted to unite the Lari population, which was a majority in the southern suburbs of Brazzaville and in the Pool prefecture. The gradual homogenization of the suburbs of Brazzaville and the military clashes that followed the confiscation of oil revenues led to an escalation of violence from the initial clashes in Brazzaville to fighting on a national scale after 1997. The militia groups were now used less for backing political action than for capturing power by force, abandoning any pretext of democracy. In this strategy of countrywide fighting, the financial support of the oil companies and the countries of the region becomes a valuable asset. Denis Sassou N'Guesso has been the most successful in garnering this support. In 1997, with the aid of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and o t h e r combatants, mostly f r o m Chad a n d Rwanda, he gained a decisive advantage over the Cocoyes and Ninja militias. After five months of fighting that ended in his victory, Sassou declared himself president on 25 O c t o b e r 1997. Lissouba and Kolelas fled the country, and the Cocoyes and Ninjas, left to their own devices and without any real contact with their leaders, retreated to their strongholds in the Nibolek a n d Pool regions. T h e f i g h t i n g resulted in between 8,000 and 10,000 deaths, most of them civilians. In t h e s p r i n g of 1998, p r o g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s b e g a n to face renewed rebel activity in the Pool and Bouenza prefectures. Ninja infiltration into the Bacongo and Makelekele suburbs in December 1998 triggered violent reprisals from progovernment forces. They cut off the two suburbs and began systematic searches that, according to the Congolese H u m a n Rights Monitoring Unit (OCDH), soon degenerated into large-scale massacres of u n a r m e d civilians. The Ninjas, for their part, began arbitrarily e x e c u t i n g any person f r o m the Pool region who was suspected of supporting the regime of Denis Sassou N ' G u e s s o . T h e O C D H e s t i m a t e s the total n u m b e r of victims at between 5,000 and 6,000. 8 Eyewitness accounts compiled by Action Against H u n g e r teams f r o m the population that has been slowly returning f r o m the Pool region since May 1999 confirm the atrocities inflicted on the civilian p o p u l a t i o n . Many families were s e p a r a t e d d u r i n g the e x o d u s in December or during the military offensives in the Pool region. Each account is filled with tales of the inhuman behavior of militia members, young men with no supervision, their minds altered by marijuana, committing the worst atrocities with impunity. Numerous stories of executions carried out by p r o g o v e r n m e n t forces against young people suspected of belonging to the Ninja militia were reported.

18

Food Crises

Militia were quoted as saying, "If you have 10,000 or 20,000 [francs CFA], we'll let you go. If not, we'll kill you." O n e m o t h e r saw h e r twenty-year-old son, the father of two children, killed before her eyes. A nineteen-year-old woman, the mother of a month-old baby, related how she has had no news of her husband since he and two friends were detained by the military in Kinkala. She gave birth in Linzozlo before the military took her back to Brazzaville with her child. On the way, they took away two skirts and her sandals. This war has taken a particularly heavy toll on women. The ethnic-based militias regularly use rape as a weapon of war. There is competition to see who can lay claim to having "truly ravaged the Pool women." Many rapes are committed in the villages and on the road to Brazzaville. To obtain a ride in a truck often requires spending the night at an assembly point. At nightfall, alcohol and drugs push the overexcited men over the edge: "Every woman u n d e r the age of forty returning h o m e has been raped," as one old woman reported. "Even us they grope there to see if we are hiding money." O n e woman, who was eight months pregnant, gave an account of how a group of soldiers tried to rape her, forced her to take off her clothes, but then let h e r get dressed again after seeing that she was p r e g n a n t . She was allowed to return to Brazzaville in their company, but they stole her luggage, i n c l u d i n g the c l o t h e s f o r t h e baby she was e x p e c t i n g . Although she had escaped Brazzaville with h e r husband and their seven children, she r e t u r n e d alone. O n 2 April, h e r h u s b a n d was killed in a helicopter attack by the army on the village of Mutampa, and in the ensuing panic she was separated from her children, the eldest of whom was eighteen years old. In all cases, the barbarity of the act stems f r o m a desire to humiliate: "Father and m o t h e r are forced to watch as their daughter's clothes are removed and she is raped." T h e civilian population, in its attempts to escape the fighters, who do not hesitate to use civilians as human shields, has systematically avoided towns and communication hubs that might be considered to be of strategic value, at the risk of dying of h u n g e r or disease. 9 T h o u g h less spectacular, this factor is nonetheless crucial. Half of the people returning to Brazzaville suffer from malnutrition edema as a result of poor nutrition. Since the end of the mango season, the displaced populations have survived on wild roots and ground and fermented manioc leaves. The food shortage has been made worse by the fact that all t h r o u g h 1998 farmers in the Pool region did not plant crops because of the upheaval in the region. Children are the first to suffer from this lack of food and medicine. According to a sur-

Congo-Brazzaville

19

vey of the population returning to Brazzaville in May and June, a quarter of the children under the age of five have perished. 10 Whether or not intended, the terror inflicted on civilians by the militias has plunged more than 200,000 people into famine with no response from the international community. Repeated calls for action from humanitarian and human rights organizations have most often been met with indifference. The trickle of funds for emergency assistance cannot mask the absence of diplomatic initiatives. The increasing distance between the leaders in exile and their militias, which are in danger of further fragmentation, 1 1 and the government's refusal to negotiate, faced as it was with its own internal power struggles, do not presage any improvement in the situation in CongoBrazzaville. The efforts of humanitarian organizations such as Action Against Hunger to help the most vulnerable sectors of the population are inadequate. Barring any new initiatives, the international community's silence and passivity only countenance the militias' continued fighting and their terrorizing of civilians, who are their principal victims.

Notes Pascal Lefort is desk officer at Action Against Hunger. 1. T h e R e p u b l i c of C o n g o is r e f e r r e d to t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k as Congo-Brazzaville to distinguish it from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, or Congo), formerly Zaire. 2. E. Dorier-Apprill, A. Kouvouana, and C. Apprill, Vivre à Brazzaville (Paris: Karthala, 1998), p. 258. 3. T h e Ninja militias in Brazzaville started f o r m i n g in 1993 in t h e southern suburbs of Bacongo and Makelekele to support Bernard Kolelas's Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (MCDDI). Its members are of Lari origin. The Zulus were formed in 1993 by the "movement" supporting President Pascal Lissouba to "secure" the Mfilou district. Not a militia organization like the Cobras and the Ninjas, the Zulus are made u p of different armed groups. 4. N i b o l e k is a n a c r o n y m d e s i g n a t i n g t h e p r e f e c t u r e s of N i a r i , Bouenza, and Kekoumouo, which constitute a fictitious regional entity created by Pascal Lissouba to unite around his person the populations in the south of the country. 5. A study carried out in 1997 by the association Agrisud-Agricongo shows how supplies for each sector of the city are provided through a central m a r k e t a n d how t r a d e b e t w e e n t h e n o r t h e r n a n d s o u t h e r n s u b u r b s is extremely limited. 6. Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, "Milices politiques et b a n d e s armées à Brazzaville: enquêtes sur la violence politique et sociale des j e u n e s déclassés," Les études du CERI, no. 13 (Paris: April 1996).

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7. T h e N i n j a s f o r m e d a r o u n d B e r n a r d K o l e l a s , t h e C o b r a s a r o u n d Denis Sassou N ' G u e s s o , a n d the Aubevillois, Zulus, a n d later the Cocoyes a r o u n d Pascal L i s s o u b a . 8. F I D H / O C D H , Congo-Brazzaville, I'arbitraire de I'Etat, la terreur des milices (Paris: F I D H / O C D H , 1999). 9. F o r s e c u r i t y r e a s o n s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n aid o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e n o t a u t h o r i z e d to o p e r a t e in t h e Pool P r e f e c t u r e . 10. S t u d y t a k e n f r o m t h e results of a p o p u l a t i o n survey in t h e B a c o n g o a n d M a k e l e k e l e s u b u r b s a n d f r o m t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e r e t u r n i n g to Brazzaville. 11. A s p l i t h a s a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d w i t h i n t h e N i n j a m i l i t i a b e t w e e n Kolelas's s u p p o r t e r s a n d t h e m o r e n u m e r o u s N ' S i l u l u , a m y s t i c a l / r e l i g i o u s r a d i c a l g r o u p led by J e a n N ' T o u m i

Bibliography Agir i c i / S u r v i e . " S o m m e t f r a n c o - a f r i c a i n a u L o u v r e : la s é c u r i t é a u s o m m e t , l ' i n s é c u r i t é à la base." Les dossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France, n o . 12. L ' H a r m a t t a n , 1998. A g r i s u d / A g r i c o n g o . Diagnostic du niveau d'approvisionnement des populations de Brazzaville et identification des circuits de distribution des produits alimentaires. Paris: A g r i s u d / A g r i c o n g o , 1997. B a z e n g u i s s a - G a n g a , Rémy. "Milices p o l i t i q u e s e t b a n d e s a r m é e s à Brazzaville: e n q u ê t e s s u r la v i o l e n c e p o l i t i q u e e t sociale d e s j e u n e s déclassées." Les Études d u CERI, n o . 13. April 1996. B a z e n g u i s s a - G a n g a , R é m y . " L a p o p u l a r i s a t i o n d e la v i o l e n c e a u C o n g o . " Politique Africaine, n o . 73. K a r t h a l a , M a r c h 1999. Paris: D o r i e r - A p p r i l l , E., A. K o u v o u a n a , a n d C. A p p r i l l . Vivre à Brazzaville. K a r t h a l a , 1998. F I D H / O C D H . Congo-Brazzaville, l'arbitraire de l'Etat, la terreur des milices. Paris: F I D H / O C D H , 1999. S m i t h , S., a n d A. Glaser. Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, Des réseaux aux lobbies. Paris: C a l m a n n - L é v i , 1997.

3 The Great Lakes: Avoiding an Ethnic Reading Jean-François Vidal

Colonial literature a b o u n d s with racist clichés that, long after the decolonization of the 1960s, linger on in the consciousness and form the basis for the analysis of crises that are the orphan progeny of the Cold War. The Great Lakes region of Africa is a particularly revealing example in which hunger, power, and politics are all closely intertwined.

A Genocide Rooted in Colonial History and Struggles for Power When the first colonial settlers arrived in the Great Lakes area (consisting of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as Kivu), they were surprised to discover societies that had statelike attributes, kingdoms based on systems of well-defined social relationships, with their own laws, justice systems, taxes, and cultures. In short, they discovered other civilizations. This came as quite a shock, since the nineteenth-century colonization was automatically justified in part by the supposed existence of a single world civilization, namely Western civilization, which had the duty to conquer the rest of the world in order to save the souls of those who, not yet Christian, could only be savages. The pseudoscientific theories of the "superior races" advanced by several authors held center stage at the time and were the compost from which the racist theories of the twentieth century emerged. 21

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Forced t h e n to explain away the existence of these societies in the h e a r t of Africa, the G e r m a n a n d later Belgian colonizers discovered a g r o u p of p e o p l e who "could have b e e n white—if they did n o t have black skin." 1 W h o were they? W h e r e did they c o m e from? T h e s e were the questions that anthropologists of the p e r i o d asked themselves. T h e "evidence" was quickly u n e a r t h e d ! T h e y ( t h e Tutsi) c a m e f r o m t h e east, f r o m the m o u n t a i n s of Ethiopia, d e s c e n d a n t s of t h e Q u e e n of Sheba a n d t h e r e f o r e a p e o p l e of the Bible. A n d thus was b o r n the myth. T o g e t h e r with their herds, they h a d b r o u g h t a civilization of biblical origin to the savage Bantu peoples. N o t h i n g in these societies t h e r e f o r e c o n t r a d i c t e d the d o m i n a n t ideology of t h e nineteenth-century colonizers. T h e r e was n o shortage of colonial-era descriptions of the H u t u s as "small, thick-lipped, flat-nosed, tillers of the soil" c o m p a r e d with the "tall, slender, majestic, aquiline nosed" lordly Tutsis. This "scientific e x p l a n a t i o n " led t h e c o l o n i z e r s to use t h e "lordly Tutsis" to assure their d o m i n a t i o n of t h e " H u t u serfs." 2 E d u c a t i o n in colonial Rwanda a n d B u r u n d i was essentially g e a r e d toward the Tutsis, who in t h e 1960s a c c o u n t e d f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 85 p e r c e n t of t h e l i t e r a t e class, a p r o p o r t i o n that was inverse to their n u m e r i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the two countries. Myths die slowly, a n d at the time of decolonization a n u m b e r of E u r o p e a n n e w s p a p e r s h e a d l i n e d t h e "revolt of t h e serfs" a n d t h e "flight of the lords." T h e g e n o c i d e of the Tutsis did n o t begin in 1994. With i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1959, the struggle for power was a c c o m p a n i e d by genocidal massacres that f o r c e d h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of Rwandan Tutsis o u t of the country, mostly into n e i g h b o r i n g U g a n d a . T h e r e f u g e e s settled in the Ankole area a r o u n d Fort Portal, U g a n d a , a n d twenty-five years l a t e r t h e i r d e s c e n d a n t s w o u l d f o r m a m a j o r i t y in t h e U g a n d a n National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in the fight against the second r e g i m e of Milton O b o t e , w h o h a d b e e n reinstated following the expulsion of Idi Amin Dada f r o m U g a n d a by T a n z a n i a n t r o o p s . It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e seizure of p o w e r in U g a n d a by the NRA in 1986 was the first to be achieved by a guerrilla f o r c e in Africa in a military victory, without negotiations. O t h e r s were to follow. Flush with their military victory, the d e s c e n d a n t s of the r e f u g e e s of 1959, w h o h a d b e e n b o r n in U g a n d a a n d e d u c a t e d in English, c o m p r i s e d 80 p e r c e n t of the l e a d e r s h i p u n d e r Museveni, 50 p e r c e n t of the senior officer corps, a n d 35 p e r c e n t of the soldiers. They also controlled 15 p e r c e n t of posts in the civil administration. For the first t i m e since t h e fall of t h e K a b a k a ( k i n g of t h e B u g a n d a ) in 1963, n o r t h e r n U g a n d a n s n o l o n g e r h e l d power.

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Despite the massacres c o m m i t t e d by O b o t e ' s troops f r o m 1983 to 1986 in the Luwero triangle (the triangle of d e a t h ) , fears of NRA retr i b u t i o n did n o t materialize. P r e s i d e n t Museveni k e p t his p r o m i s e s a n d his pledge. H e gradually b e c a m e o n e of the so-called darlings of t h e W o r l d B a n k . W h e n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d (IMF) i m p o s e d its c o n d i t i o n s o n U g a n d a in 1988, most notably a 50 p e r c e n t r e d u c t i o n within six m o n t h s in the n u m b e r of g o v e r n m e n t employees (both civilian a n d military), it was the Tutsis w h o b o r e the b r u n t of the cuts so t h a t Museveni c o u l d r e i n f o r c e his U g a n d a n c r e d e n t i a l s a n d p r e e m p t accusations that h e g a i n e d power with the h e l p of foreigners a n d that h e himself was a "Rwandan." H a r d e n e d by years of victorious g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , t h e d e s c e n d a n t s of t h e 1959 r e f u g e e s c r e a t e d t h e R w a n d a n P a t r i o t i c F r o n t (FPR) a n d d e c i d e d to " r e t u r n h o m e . " In o n e n i g h t in 1990, all the Tutsis in Kampala, t h e capital of U g a n d a , d i s a p p e a r e d . L e d by t h e FPR, they d a s h e d to the f r o n t i e r a n d o n e week later were o n the outskirts of Kigali, t h e c a p i t a l of R w a n d a . I n t e r v e n t i o n by B e l g i a n , F r e n c h , a n d Z a i r i a n t r o o p s f o r c e d t h e m to r e t r e a t to n o r t h e r n Rwanda a n d m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of a guerilla war between the FPR forces a n d the I n t e r a h a m w e militia, which was created, trained, a n d a r m e d f o r this p u r p o s e a n d allied with the R w a n d a n A r m e d Forces (FAR). T h e rest, unfortunately, is all too well known: the p l a n n e d genocide of the Tutsi by H u t u extremists of 1994; c o m p l e t e failure of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Blue H e l m e t s ; seizure of p o w e r by t h e FPR; O p e r a t i o n T u r q u o i s e ; f l i g h t of t h e ex-FAR a n d I n t e r a h a m w e t r o o p s to c a m p s in G o m a a n d Bukavu, Zaire, a n d Ngara, Tanzania, t o g e t h e r with nearly two million Rwandan Hutus; r e g r o u p i n g in camps of the forces that carried out the genocide; and regular incursions into Rwanda a n d g e n o c i d a l attacks against Tutsis in Zaire (most notably d u r i n g the s u m m e r of 1995 in the Masisi a r e a ) . 3 An a r m e d force consisting of officers of the FPR, Zairian Tutsis ( B a n y a m u l e n g e f r o m the s o u t h e r n p a r t of t h e Z a i r e a n p r o v i n c e of Kivu a n d Tutsis f r o m Masisi), a n d Zairian o p p o n e n t s of Marshal M o b u t u Sese Sako was t h e n c r e a t e d , c a l l e d t h e A l l i a n c e of F o r c e s f o r D e m o c r a c y a n d F r e e d o m (AFDL). T h e c a m p s were attacked a n d d i s m a n t l e d in the fall of 1996. T h e r e t h e n followed b o t h a massive r e t u r n of r e f u g e e s to Rwanda a n d the flight of h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of p e o p l e westward, harassed a n d massacred by the troops of the new AFDL. T h e AFDL finally drove o u t M o b u t u , a n d L a u r e n t Désiré Kabila took power in K i n s h a s a , t h e c a p i t a l of Z a i r e , in May 1997. Z a i r e b e c a m e t h e D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o (DRC). As h a d h a p p e n e d in K a m p a l a in 1 9 8 6 a n d K i g a l i in 1 9 9 4 , Kinshasa in 1997 fell u n d e r the control of troops h a r d e n e d by nearly

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fifteen years o f victorious guerrilla warfare. Kabila thus f o u n d h i m s e l f in a situation similar to the o n e in which Museveni had f o u n d h i m s e l f in 1986: accused o f having c o m e to power with the h e l p o f foreigners. In o r d e r to emphasize his C o n g o l e s e legitimacy, h e could n o l o n g e r rely on the Tutsis o f the A F D L , who c o n t r o l l e d the army and occupied key posts in the civilian administration.

Rapid Internationalization of the Second W a r in Kivu In the spring o f 1998, Kinshasa issued instructions for the B a n y a m u l e n g e soldiers to integrate with units o f the new C o n g o l e s e army a n d to a c c e p t d e p l o y m e n t anywhere in the country. T h e first rebellion e r u p t e d in the Uvira area when the B a n y a m u l e n g e refused to redeploy, since they would n o l o n g e r be able to p r o t e c t the highlands. Unwilling to leave the field o p e n to the C o n g o l e s e Maï-Maï militia, w h e t h e r or n o t these were allied with the ex-FAR, I n t e r a h a m w e , o r the B u r u n d i a n opposition Hutus o f the Palipehutu and the F o r c e s p o u r la D e f e n s e de la D é m o c r a t i e (the a r m e d b r a n c h o f the C o m i t é national p o u r la D e f e n s e de la D é m o c r a t i e [ C N D D ] in B u r u n d i ) , the B a n y a m u l e n g e resisted. Kabila's A F D L dispatched r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to Bukavu, and soon the two camps were facing e a c h o t h e r in the Rusisi plain. It r e q u i r e d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f C o m m a n d e r J a m e s ( J a m e s K a b a r e ) , Kabila's c h i e f o f staff and h i m s e l f a Tutsi, to avoid a military c o n f r o n t a t i o n . N e g o t i a t i o n s were h e l d in K a m a n y o l a , D R C , in t h e n o r t h o f t h e Rusisi p l a i n , n e a r to t h e R w a n d a n b o r d e r . W h a t was n e g o t i a t e d at Kamanyola? Was the s e c o n d Kivu war p r o m i s e d to the B a n y a m u l e n g e ? T h e r e was n o o f f i c i a l a n n o u n c e m e n t a b o u t t h e results o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . W h a t e v e r o c c u r r e d , t h e B a n y a m u l e n g e a g r e e d to redeploy. O n e m u s t k e e p in m i n d , however, t h a t in t h e D R C as e l s e w h e r e , i n t e g r a t i n g a s e g m e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o a national army has b e e n o n e way to r e c o g n i z e o r a c q u i r e nationality. O n e o f t h e e a r l i e s t p r o b l e m s e n c o u n t e r e d in t h e G r e a t L a k e s region was that o f the nationality o f the C o n g o l e s e Tutsis, to w h o m Zairian citizenship had b e e n g r a n t e d by M o b u t u in 1 9 7 1 a n d later r e v o k e d in 1 9 8 1 . T h e B a n y a m u l e n g e , t r a u m a t i z e d by t h e R w a n d a g e n o c i d e , first and f o r e m o s t wished to p r o t e c t the S o u t h Kivu highlands that provided shelter for their families and cattle. T h e B a n y a m u l e n g e w e r e n o t f i g h t i n g t h e s a m e b a t t l e as t h e R w a n d a n a u t h o r i t i e s , w h o w e r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d with d e f e n d i n g

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Rwanda's borders f r o m the repeated incursions of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe guerrillas from North Kivu than with defending their Banyamulenge brothers. From J u n e 1998 on, the similarities with the Uganda of 1989 grew even more striking: T h e Kabila government replaced C o m m a n d e r James with a Congolese and in July "foreign soldiers" were asked to r e t u r n h o m e . O n 2 August, a r e b e l l i o n e r u p t e d , U g a n d a n a n d Rwandan troops entered Congo, and war resumed in Kivu. Very soon airplanes were chartered by the forces of the new rebellion, and rebel troops were being flown in from Goma to the lower Congo. The rebels began a march on Kinshasa from Matadi and were finally halted outside the Kinshasa airport by the intervention of troops from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia on the side of Kabila. For the first time in its history, Africa witnessed a war in which opposing guerrillas and regular troops from several different countries fought within the territory of one of its sovereign states. There is some question as to the actual n u m b e r of states involved. Officially, the forces of the DRC, allied with troops f r o m Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad, are fighting against the rebel forces, which in turn are allied with troops from Uganda and Rwanda. T h e involvem e n t of Sudanese contingents fighting on the side of Kabila and troops f r o m Burundi on the side of the rebels has been denied by K h a r t u m a n d B u j u m b u r a , the Sudanese a n d B u r u n d i a n capitals. Libya is thought to be involved, if only in providing financial or even logistical support. It has been confirmed that Kabila's troops have b e e n allowed passage t h r o u g h the C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c to defend Zongo on the Congo River. More than ten African countries are thus involved in the conflict as well as some Israeli and North Korean units, according to witnesses. To this n u m b e r must be a d d e d the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l military participants. These consist of ex-FAR and Interahamwe Rwandans; forces opposed to the regime in Bujumbura (CNDD and Palipehutu); Ugandan armed groups based in the Democratic Republic of Congo o p p o s e d to P r e s i d e n t Museveni; N a t i o n a l U n i o n f o r t h e Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which is opposed to the regime in Luanda; and the Congolese militia known u n d e r the generic name of Mai-Mai' in Kivu. By J u n e 1999, the rebels were in control of half of the DRC but were sharply divided. As further fractures developed within the rebellion, zones of influence emerged that reflected the root causes of the involvement of third parties in the conflict. In the north, units supported by Uganda controlled territory up to Kinsangani; in the center of the rebel country ( n o r t h Kivu), the Rassemblement Congolais

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p o u r la D e m o c r a t i c (RCD), s u p p o r t e d by Rwanda, is based in G o m a ; a n d in t h e s o u t h of Uvira, conflict d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n troops f r o m B u r u n d i (allied with the Banyamulenge) a n d the Mai-Mai, who were openly s u p p o r t e d by t h e Kabila r e g i m e a n d allied with rebel forces from Burundi. By J u n e 1999, t h e Mai-Mai h a d g a i n e d c o n t r o l of a l m o s t t h e entire Fizi region a n d t h r e a t e n e d to attack the city of Uvira. A new wave of r e f u g e e s fled the fighting, h e a d i n g f o r Tanzania a n d B u r u n d i or seeking r e f u g e o n the slopes of the s u r r o u n d i n g hills. T h e fault lines within the rebellion d e e p e n e d with the increase in "bilateral" s u p p o r t f r o m n e i g h b o r i n g countries a n d f r o m the fighting that was taking place within the rebel m o v e m e n t . A split within the RCD c r e a t e d t h e C o n g o l e s e L i b e r a t i o n M o v e m e n t (MLC), o p e n l y s u p p o r t e d by U g a n d a , which withdrew its a r m o r e d cars f r o m Uvira; B u r u n d i a n troops were ferried by helicopter into Baraka, DRC; fighting b r o k e o u t between R w a n d a n a n d B a n y a m u l e n g e troops in Uvira; a n d U g a n d a a n d R w a n d a f o u g h t f o r c o n t r o l of Kisangani t h r o u g h their proxies, the RCD a n d the MLC. A s e c o n d split o c c u r r e d within t h e RCD, which t h e r e a f t e r consisted of two s e p a r a t e factions. T h e B a n y a m u l e n g e j o i n e d the Federalist Republican Forces (FRF). Local, political, strategic, security, a n d e c o n o m i c interests gradually took p r e c e d e n c e over the national rebellion. T h e s e explosions, which were m a r k e d by violence a n d p l u n d e r ing, have r e d u c e d even f u r t h e r the level of h u m a n i t a r i a n activity, a n d civilian p o p u l a t i o n s have b e c o m e increasingly isolated.

Hunger and Malnutrition Used as Weapons In this chaos of a r m e d g r o u p s that lacked any real, unified chain of c o m m a n d , civilian p o p u l a t i o n s f o u n d themselves u s e d by all sides. T r u e motives were o f t e n concealed, while the professed "democratic" motives p r o c l a i m e d by all were o f t e n a camouflage. W h e n f i g h t i n g r e s u m e d in S o u t h Kivu, t h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n fled f o r a s e c o n d time. D u r i n g the clashes in 1996, m o r e t h a n 200,000 p e o p l e h a d already fled south toward the Shaba province of the DRC ( w h i c h h a s s i n c e r e v e r t e d to its o l d n a m e , K a t a n g a ) , a n d n e a r l y 100,000 civilians h a d crossed Lake Tanganyika into Tanzania, w h e r e they h o p e d to find r e f u g e in Kigoma, a p o r t o n Lake Tanganyika in T a n z a n i a . A f t e r several m o n t h s of f o r c e d exile, b o t h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l , t h e relative calm of 1997 allowed d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n s a n d r e f u g e e s to r e t u r n to their homes. Action Against H u n g e r d e v e l o p e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p r o g r a m of

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immediate assistance for their return and began rebuilding the infrastructure that had been destroyed in the fighting. The organization cared for children suffering from malnutrition, repaired water supply systems, protected water sources, distributed seeds and agricultural tools, replaced fishing nets, reopened seventeen health clinics, and curbed a cholera outbreak. T h e population gradually recovered a measure of autonomy. The resumption of the fighting on 2 August 1998 interrupted this cycle of recovery. Villagers hastily harvested their last crop and fled again into the forest. Several thousands of them tried in vain to cross Lake Tanganyika but were turned back by rebel guerrillas more concerned with showing the outside world a population that was not in flight than with respecting the right of those populations to seek asylum and refuge in a neighboring country. Their boats were forced to turn around, and today they are still massed on the shores of the lake, without the possibility of planting enough food to feed themselves. In this example of the use of hunger as a weapon, efforts were made to prevent the movement of populations and to keep them in a situation of internal displacement without any assistance in order to avoid the negative image that always a c c o m p a n i e s an outflow of refugees. Famine denied is famine concealed. No break occurred in the fighting in the Fizi region. Up until the spring of 1999, the coastal road on Lake Tanganyika was controlled by the rebels and the highlands by the Banyamulenge. The Mai-Mai operated between the two, in what is known as the intermediate highlands. Even though the origin of this last-mentioned group of combatants lay in a tradition of ritual initiation, nothing in its recent history can be traced to this tradition. Well-armed and equipped with uniforms, they today constitute a genuine militia that fights against the rebels who are opposed to Kabila and employ a tactic of harassment, which nonetheless includes full control of several dozen villages and even of entire districts. Many eyewitnesses have stated that they are allied with the Burundi rebels, and are said to be directly supported by Kabila's forces. Rebel commanders usually describe the situation in the following terms: "There are three types of populations: those that are hostages of the Mai-Mai, those that support the Mai-Mai, and those that have fled." In all cases, these populations no longer live in their towns and villages and have instead become a mass of tens of thousands of people hiding in the forest and out of reach of any assistance. What is their condition today? Given the complete lack of access to the areas of conflict, it is very difficult to make an estimate. The few h u n d r e d children who manage to reach the Action Against H u n g e r feeding

28

Food Crises

centers in the coastal plain are proof of a catastrophic food situation. The supplies that villagers carried with them during their flight are now exhausted, and farmers no longer have access to their fields. Cholera is now endemic in the region, and the lack of health care due to the shortage of medicine and trained personnel means that any estimate would be grim indeed. Fighting also rages in Katanga province in the DRC. Fanning out from Kalemie and Kindu, rebel forces are aiming for Lubumbashi and Mbuji-Mayi, key centers in the south. The air forces of Kabila's allies regularly bombard rebel-held cities, with civilians being the principal victims. Supply roads have been cut, markets are understocked, and prices are skyrocketing. In September 1998, a particularly poignant event took place: Between ten and twelve thousand Congolese Tutsis living in the Vyura area, some 180 kilometers south of the border with Kivu, sought refuge in Kalemie. T h e RCD requested international assistance to move this population from Katanga to South Kivu and accused the government in Kinshasa and its allies of continuing the Tutsi genocide in Katanga. Kinshasa in turn denounced the resettlement of these displaced persons in the Rusisi plain as an attempt at "Tutsi colonization" of the land in South Kivu. In any event, the refugees, consisting mainly of women and children, were transported by boat to Uvira and herded into makeshift camps while awaiting their resettlement in the plain. In Lubumbashi, the capital of Katanga and the center of mining activity in the DRC, Action Against Hunger conducted a nutritional survey that revealed that 34.6 percent of the population suffered from chronic malnutrition and that 20.8 percent of the acute malnutrition among children under five was linked to high levels of malnutrition in their mothers (about one in five). The lack of personnel to care for severely malnourished children in the region led Action Against Hunger to propose the inclusion of treatment for severe malnutrition in the services provided by hospitals. Also in Katanga, the nutritional situation of the nearly forty thousand Angolan refugees in Kissenge on the Angolan border who had fled the fighting between UNITA and the Luanda government could only be described as disastrous. A nutritional survey conducted in February 1999 revealed catastrophic malnutrition rates (25 percent acute general malnutrition, of which 12.8 percent was severe). These figures were similar to those recorded during the most severe African famines. Food is in short supply in the capital of Kinshasa. T h e World Food Program is considering the massive importation of humanitari-

The Great Lakes

29

an aid. Kivu had been the breadbasket of the capital, but the supply system is now dislocated. Moreover, after years of neglect, the basic infrastructure (health, drinking water) is no longer capable of meeting the basic needs of the population. Action Against Hunger has put a system in place to monitor nutritional levels and has improved sanitary conditions in the markets and increased the availability of drinking water in periurban areas. In Burundi, the government is incapable of controlling its opponents. The civilian population hides in the forest, emerging malnourished and d e p e n d e n t on humanitarian aid. Access to the victims must be continuously negotiated. Action Against H u n g e r has established its largest nutrition program in Burundi. In Uganda, the recent fighting between the forces of Kampala a n d t h e r e b e l s o p e r a t i n g f r o m t h e DRC has d i s p l a c e d a n o t h e r 100,000 persons at Bundibugyo on the Congolese border. These have now j o i n e d t h e 150,000 r e f u g e e s (mostly f r o m S u d a n ) a n d t h e approximately 400,000 persons who have been displaced by the tenyear conflict between the U g a n d a n government and the U g a n d a n rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony, which is now supported by Khartum. Action Against Hunger operates a nutrition program in Uganda and provides clean water for displaced populations (in Gulu and Kitgum). It has also conducted a nutritional survey in the fourteen refugee camps and established a program to settle refugees in the Adjumani district. In Rwanda, finally, several h u n d r e d thousand persons have been displaced in the northwest, victims of the ongoing conflict between government troops and extremist militias, ex-FAR and Interahamwe, based in the DRC.

Redefining International H u m a n i t a r i a n Law: A D a n g e r o u s Trend W h e n fighting resumed in Kivu, all personnel f r o m international humanitarian organizations and United Nations agencies were evacuated. Both Kabila's fleeing troops and troops allied with the RCD c o m m a n d e e r e d vehicles a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e q u i p m e n t f r o m humanitarian organizations and systematically looted homes, offices, and warehouses for food and medical supplies. Similar looting had been witnessed in 1996 in both South and North Kivu. These two incidents of looting have left humanitarian organizations and UN agencies on the defensive. T h e failure to return the stolen goods and the lack of guarantees for the safety of personnel and

30

Food Crises

property have caused the U n i t e d Nations agencies to delay their return in o r d e r to negotiate the conditions for d o i n g so. It was n o t until early in March 1999 that the U N r e o p e n e d an office in Goma, u n d e r the responsibility of the United Nations Children's F u n d (UNICEF). A seco n d b r a n c h office was o p e n e d in Bukavu in J u n e 1999. This p r o l o n g e d process has involved political discussions between the d i f f e r e n t actors. T h e envoy of the U n i t e d Nations secretary-general to t h e r e g i o n , A m b a s s a d o r B e a h a n u Dinka, was first m e t with a r e f u s a l a n d later a c c e p t e d t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e Kabila g o v e r n m e n t . Kabila a g r e e d to p e r m i t h u m a n i t a r i a n aid to be delivered to rebelcontrolled areas, b u t u n d e r n o circumstances was aid to be allowed to pass t h r o u g h the foreign countries involved in the conflict. U g a n d a , B u r u n d i , a n d R w a n d a were specifically n a m e d . A tentative p l a n to deliver aid t h r o u g h Tanzania fell t h r o u g h , a n d supply lines t h r o u g h Zambia were c o n s i d e r e d . Many h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, including Action Against H u n g e r , took u m b r a g e at what they felt a m o u n t e d to the subordination of h u m a n i t a r i a n aid to political considerations. It would r e q u i r e i n t e r v e n t i o n at the highest political level in the U n i t e d Nations system, in essence a rejection of A m b a s s a d o r Dinka's position, f o r the U n i t e d Nations to consider d i s r e g a r d i n g Kabila's wishes a n d basing t h e i r logistical s u p p o r t in n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , which was clearly the most effective solution. T h e U n i t e d Nations must be c o m m e n d e d f o r this new position as o f j a n u a r y 1999, basing s u p p o r t in Rwanda. T h e U n i t e d Nations, however, has m a d e its r e t u r n , reinstallation, a n d thus its h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the signing by b o t h the rebel a n d g o v e r n m e n t authorities of a d o c u m e n t enunciating the applicable "principles" that must b e respected. T h e s e negotiat i o n s a r e over a key issue t h a t c o n c e r n s t h e legal f r a m e w o r k f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n activities. Above a n d b e y o n d the increasing militarization of h u m a n i t a r i a n l a n g u a g e ( " R u l e s of E n g a g e m e n t " in t h e D R C o r " S t r a t e g i c Framework" in Afghanistan a n d elsewhere), t h e r e has b e e n a t r e n d t o w a r d t h e r e d e f i n i n g of i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n law ( G e n e v a Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, Refugee C o n v e n t i o n , C o n v e n t i o n s o n G e n o c i d e , T o r t u r e , a n d so o n ) . Why, a f t e r all, is it necessary to r e d e f i n e a n d n e g o t i a t e f o r each conflict principles that already exist a n d that are e n s h r i n e d in law, if the purpose is n o t to rewrite this law? U n d e r pressure f r o m its m e m b e r states (including t h r e e that are a m o n g the five p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the U n i t e d Nations Security Council) that refuse to sign a n d thus to recognize the validity of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i m i n a l C o u r t , it is f e a r e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s

The Great Lakes

31

might be engaged in a de facto process of rewriting a "law" that would end up being no more than an amalgam of "conventions" or "principles" d e f i n e d in an ad h o c m a n n e r f o r e a c h s e p a r a t e c o n f l i c t . Ignoring the question of the juridical validity of such a "law," which would no longer be universal, would no longer apply to all parties, and would threaten the very idea of a p e r m a n e n t international court in any form whatsoever, we are witnessing the gradual but formal subordination of the principles of humanitarian action and international law to the political and strategic interests of member states. The ethnic lenses through which the conflict in the Great Lakes has b e e n viewed since 1994 act as sunglasses, filtering the reality, soothing the view, and reassuring the viewer but falsifying the analysis of the situation. To view the conflict in the Great Lakes region only as an ethnic rivalry is to fail to understand the situation or to conceive of a permanent solution. The resumption of the war in 1998, the open intervention of n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , a n d the r e c e n t f i g h t i n g b e t w e e n Rwandan Tutsi troops and Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge) were surprising and unexpected because these events were being viewed, often unconsciously, through the colonial prism as an ethnic conflict between the agricultural Bantu, former serfs, and the pastoral Tutsi, their former masters. Such an interpretation of events reflects an oversimplification equaled only by the simplifications of the Cold War. The reference points, which the Cold War provided, have been replaced by another simplification. W h e r e the so-called good guys a n d bad guys were clearly identified during the Cold War, the "good guys" in the Great Lakes region have been, depending on the year and country in question, alternately the Tutsis who were decimated by genocide and the Hutus who were expelled from their farmlands by the Tutsi armies of Burundi or chased into the jungles of what was still Zaire. Gorbachev had warned Reagan to the effect that the USSR was doing a terrible thing: depriving the United States of an enemy. The hesitations or outright silence of the international community when confronted with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or with similar forces in Somalia, Haiti, Chechnya, Kurdistan, and Angola and in the war currently ravaging Ethiopia and Eritrea are perfect illustrations of this. Balkanization is a term that has been used to describe the Great Lakes region. O n e could also speak of the Balkans as having been "Great-Laked." In both cases, the conflicts have been inaccurately described as being "ethnic conflicts," "ancient rivalries," "centuriesold conflicts," or even "conflicts that have gone on for millennia," so much so that President Clinton appeared on a CNN television pro-

32

Food Crises

g r a m d u r i n g the first week of J u n e 1999 to apologize f o r having justified NATO intervention in Kosovo with such clichés. O n the contrary, the Iraqi conflict a n d the r e c e n t war in Kosovo have placed a spotlight o n the political void a n d the absence of any strategic analysis of these crises. T h e d e m o n s of the Cold War have r e e m e r g e d . We have f o u n d o n c e again (at last!) new a n d identifiable "bad guys" a n d thus, by the same token, "good guys." T h e same fallacious r e a s o n i n g can t h e r e f o r e b e f o u n d : T h e e n e m y of my e n e m y is my f r i e n d , whoever h e m i g h t be. We have seen this with Kabila w h e n M o b u t u b e c a m e the n u m b e r o n e e n e m y a n d with the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which was o p p o s e d to Milosevic a n d t h e r e f o r e o u r f r i e n d . We have also seen it with J o s e p h Savimbi of Angola, a n o t h e r M o b u t u who went f r o m b e i n g f r i e n d to enemy, a n d o n e senses it with Museveni in U g a n d a , w h o risks g o i n g f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l d a r l i n g to outlaw. Unlike the situation in Kosovo, the absence of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l response to the conflict in the Great Lakes region a n d to all African conflicts in general may be attributed to the difficulty in d e t e r m i n i n g w h o are the "good guys" a n d the "bad guys" today in the Democratic R e p u b l i c of t h e C o n g o , Congo-Brazzaville, A n g o l a , Sierra L e o n e , Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, or the Comoros. Since t h e Cold War, c o n f l i c t analysis has f o u n d two new buzzwords: ethnicity a n d humanitarianism. T h e r e are t h e r e f o r e humanitaria n crises t h a t r e q u i r e " h u m a n i t a r i a n r e s p o n s e s . " U n f o r t u n a t e l y , h u m a n i t a r i a n crises d o n o t exist! T h e r e a r e only political crises, which have h u m a n i t a r i a n consequences. To seek to provide a h u m a n itarian response to a conflict would t h e r e f o r e b e t a n t a m o u n t to seeking to cure a p a t i e n t s u f f e r i n g f r o m tuberculosis by easing his cough. Similarly, e t h n i c conflicts d o n o t exist. T h e r e are only political conflicts a n d p o w e r struggles t h a t have e t h n i c c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e response t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t be an e t h n i c o n e , a n d any a t t e m p t to use this a p p r o a c h sows the seeds of f u t u r e instability. Action Against H u n g e r has d e n o u n c e d t h e use of h u n g e r as a w e a p o n of war. We have consistently a r g u e d that f a m i n e s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d as political d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d n o t simply as the m e c h a n i cal c o n s e q u e n c e s of n a t u r a l disasters. Because of o u r c o m m i t m e n t to care f o r civilian p o p u l a t i o n s that are victims of a r m e d conflicts, we m u s t d e n o u n c e any analysis of t h e s e c o n f l i c t s as b e i n g e t h n i c o r h u m a n i t a r i a n crises. To describe a war in e t h n i c or h u m a n i t a r i a n terms is to risk justifying violence a n d s u f f e r i n g as a m e a n s of healing o t h e r violence a n d suffering. We must at all costs distance ourselves a n d fight against the grow-

The Great Lakes

33

ing tendency to claim that there are now "just" humanitarian causes in the same way as there are "just" wars. Such thinking undermines the credibility of humanitarian workers and threatens the survival of international humanitarian law and above all the right of victims to assistance and protection.

Notes J e a n - F r a n ç o i s Vidal is e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r , A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r - U S A . 1. J e a n - P i e r r e C h r é t i e n , Afrique des Grands Lacs (Paris: A u b i e r , 1992). 2. F i l i p R e y n t j e n s , L'Afrique des Grand Lacs en Crise ( P a r i s : K a r t h a l a , 1995). 3. A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r , " T h e G r e a t L a k e s T r a g e d y , " Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999 (Paris: PUF, 1998).

4 Somalia: A Country Without a State, a Conflict Without End Michel Anglade

In early 1999, the conflict in Somalia reemerged in its most tragic form: famine. An acute food shortage now threatens over one million people in the south of the country. Drought, poor harvests, but above all war are responsible for this situation. Over the past ten years, the conflict has debilitated the population, brought about the total collapse of the government, and rendered all humanitarian intervention difficult and dangerous.

Conflict W i t h o u t End The conflict in Somalia has lasted for over ten years. The January 1991 fall of Siad Barre, who had led the country since 1969, while certainly a contributing factor, merely hastened the decline of the state and intensified a civil war that had begun in the 1980s. Clashes between opposing Somali militias now rarely gain the attention of the outside world. The failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) between 1992 and 1995 and the country's lack of strategic value offer no incentives for Western countries to reopen the Somali dossier and promote political solutions. For the time being, no end to the conflict is in sight, and the reconstitution of a Somali state is not in the cards. The "top-down" approach, in which large international conferences bring together heads of factions in a foreign capital, has been a complete failure since 1991. T h e most r e c e n t initiatives, t h e C a i r o A c c o r d s of December 1997, which were signed by over thirty factions and which 35

Food Crises

36

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provided for national reconciliation, have been completely ignored in Somalia.

Reasons for Failure Political authority is extremely fragmented, localized, and unstable and is exercised at the village or district level but no further. In a city

Somalia: A Country Without a State

37

like Mogadishu, militias control a few blocks while a hundred meters away another militia's territory begins. Borders are marked by a few scraps o f metal j u n k , which close off the street and are guarded by youngsters armed with submachine guns. T h e borders o f these "territories" may change in a matter o f hours, as alliances are made and broken in a predatory pattern. Faction leaders who sign such peace accords simply do not have the means to then implement them. O n e may well wonder if some o f them even have the necessary will to do so, since they depend upon fear and insecurity for their power. War and a state o f lawlessness make it easy for them to traffic in arms and drugs. T h e young militiamen whom they employ know that a return to peace would marginalize them. T h e extortion in which they engage at checkpoints set up a l o n g t h e r o a d s o f t e n c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r only s o u r c e o f i n c o m e . Furthermore, the militia o f certain warlords illegally occupy territory that is seized by force and exploited for its meager resources, as in the case o f a n u m b e r o f b a n a n a plantations in Lower S h e b e l l e . If peace were restored, they would be obliged to return this property to its rightful owners, and this they have no desire to do. Many interests are therefore aligned against peace, and force o f arms seems incontestable for the time being. Most faction leaders c o n c e i v e o f t h e i r political power only in terms o f control and the appropriation o f e c o n o m i c resources. They show little interest in providing minimum health or education services to the population, which they purport to represent. Divisions exist n o t only between different Somali clans but even within clans. T h e interests o f faction leaders, militia m e m b e r s , religious authorities, a n d b u s i n e s s m e n a r e in c o n f l i c t , a n d e a c h party seeks to assert authority, thereby creating a situation that is often confused and very volatile. During 1998 and the first half o f 1999, Mogadishu was the theater o f sporadic clashes between partisans and o p p o n e n t s o f a new city administration. Interestingly enough, this division was based not on clan loyalties but solely on the c o m p e t i n g interests o f individuals fighting for control o f the city's resources. In addition, certain regional powers, including Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Libya, are indirectly confronting each other on Somali territory by openly supporting with weapons and money o n e or the other faction, which can switch sides in accordance with supply and d e m a n d . This foreign i n t e r f e r e n c e only contributes to the further destabilization o f the country, as the Rahaweyne Resistance Army (RRA) militia, which is strongly backed by Ethiopia, demonstrated during their offensive in the south o f Somalia in J u n e 1999. 1

38

Food Crises

Somalia is t r a p p e d o n c e m o r e in a cycle of violence a n d fighting in which the militias of the principal clans clash over control of new territory f o r p l u n d e r a n d exploitation. Since J a n u a r y 2000, Kismayo, o n e of the m a i n ports in the south of the country, has b e e n the scene of clashes b e t w e e n t h e militia of t h e M a r e h a n a n d c e r t a i n H a b e r Gedir clans o n the o n e h a n d a n d the M a j e r t e e n militia o n the other. T h e Bay a n d B a k o o l r e g i o n s a r e t h e s c e n e s of f r e q u e n t c l a s h e s between the H a b e r Gedir a n d Rahaweyne militias. In the n o r t h e r n part of the country, the self-proclaimed states of Somaliland a n d P u n t l a n d enjoy some d e g r e e of stability, b u t these are fragile entities. T h e majority of Somalis are tired of the war a n d want n o p a r t in it. T h e p o p u l a t i o n suffers f r o m the atrocities of the warlords, b u t people are t r a p p e d by their clan allegiance. While clans have mostly b e e n used as a tool of division a n d m a n i p u l a t i o n that is shamelessly exploited by faction leaders to solidify t h e i r power, allegiance to clan also provides, at present, the only m e a n s of p r o t e c t i o n f r o m the exactions of o t h e r militias, the only f o r m of security, a n d the only way to settle disputes in a collapsed society that lacks any law o t h e r t h a n traditional clan-based dispute s e t t l e m e n t mechanisms.

Civilian Populations as Victims T h e conflict affects the entire Somali p o p u l a t i o n . T h e estimated life expectancy of b e t w e e n forty-one a n d forty-three years d e c r e a s e d in the 1990s. I n f a n t mortality f o r children u n d e r five years is very high at over 210 p e r 1,000. 2 Maternal mortality rates are a m o n g the highest in the world. In o t h e r countries, these statistics would be c o n s i d e r e d a national emergency. But the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the h u m a n i t a r i a n crisis in Somalia m e a n s t h a t only t h e most tragic situations—such as t h e floods of N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1997 or f a m i n e — a r e now c o n s i d e r e d to b e emergencies. T h e civil conflict a n d t h e d e t e r i o r a t i n g h u m a n i t a r i a n situation constitute a vicious cycle. T h e conflict impoverishes the country, a n d t h e d i m i n i s h i n g r e s o u r c e s only e x a c e r b a t e t h e fight f o r c o n t r o l of what is left. F u r t h e r m o r e , f o r many y o u n g Somalis, the militias represent their only potential source of " e m p l o y m e n t " a n d access to a minimal i n c o m e f r o m p l u n d e r i n g a n d exploiting the civilian p o p u l a t i o n . T h e n a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e is d a m a g e d o r s h u t down owing to conflicts of interest. T h e p o r t of Mogadishu, u n u s e d since 1995, is a case in point. T h e rival militias who control it c a n n o t agree u p o n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t its r e o p e n i n g w o u l d g e n e r a t e .

Somalia: A Country Without a State

39

Livestock and farming, the country's main economic activities, are plagued by instability. The intensive and abusive exploitation of the country's natural resources, such as charcoal production (resulting in massive deforestation and thus to desertification) or fishing off the coasts by foreign trawlers in disregard of international law, also poses a serious threat to the country's environment. In the Bay and Bakool regions, villages suspected of supporting o n e or the o t h e r of the warring factions have b e e n razed to the ground, their crops burnt, and livestock seized or slaughtered. Action Against Hunger teams in Mogadishu have compiled testimonies from villagers who were victims of such atrocities and managed to survive only by escaping. T h e terrorized population has no choice but to leave, temporarily or permanently. Hundreds of displaced and completely destitute people regularly arrive in Mogadishu. During the months of December 1998 and January 1999, Action Against Hunger recorded the arrival of more than three thousand persons from the Bay region fleeing the conflict and the shortages of food. Similarly, in J u n e 1999, a n o t h e r wave of several t h o u s a n d f a m i l i e s f l e d to Mogadishu to escape an offensive by the Rahaweyne militia. Some of them eventually returned to their home regions after some time to rebuild their houses and plant their farms until the next r o u n d of atrocities forces them to flee once more. In some regions of southern Somalia, agricultural p r o d u c t i o n has p l u m m e t e d because of the absence of over 50 percent of farmers from their land. A major obstacle to recovery in the agricultural sector is the large n u m b e r of displaced persons (more than 150,000 displaced persons live in Mogadishu in precarious conditions) or refugees living in camps in neighboring countries. The war and recurring crises have also considerably weakened the survival mechanisms of the populations and undermined or destroyed their traditional methods of coping. The collapse of the state and the virtual absence of any civilian structure mean that health services, clean water, supply systems, and education are rare in Somalia. Such services as do exist are private and must be paid for and are inaccessible to the poorest sectors of the population. Private clinics and pharmacies, moreover, c o n c e n t r a t e on the treatment of illnesses and show little concern for preventive action, such as vaccinations or prenatal care. Most Somali doctors have left the country to escape the war. Already far from ideal before 1991, the situation in the health sector has deteriorated markedly, especially in the south of the country. Tuberculosis is widespread, particularly among the displaced populations living in overcrowded and unsani-

40

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tary c o n d i t i o n s . Nearly a t h i r d of t h e severely m a l n o u r i s h e d c h i l d r e n a d m i t t e d to t h e f e e d i n g c e n t e r s o p e r a t e d by Action Against H u n g e r in M o g a d i s h u s u f f e r f r o m tuberculosis. Vaccination coverage is limite d , w i t h o n l y 10 p e r c e n t of c h i l d r e n b e i n g i m m u n i z e d . Access to d r i n k i n g water is l i m i t e d a n d c h o l e r a e p i d e m i c s f r e q u e n t . In 1998, a c h o l e r a e p i d e m i c c l a i m e d nearly t e n t h o u s a n d victims in M o g a d i s h u . Since t h e water supply system was d e s t r o y e d by t h e war, t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n water d r a w n f r o m wells, s o m e of w h i c h a r e very p o l l u t e d . 3 T h e r e is n o g a r b a g e c o l l e c t i o n system, a n d g a r b a g e t h e r e f o r e piles u p in t h e streets. C a m p s f o r d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n s a r e severely o v e r c r o w d e d . 4 In s u c h a n e n v i r o n m e n t , c h o l e r a e p i d e m i c s a n d d i a r r h e a , a s i g n i f i c a n t c a u s e of i n f a n t m a l n u t r i t i o n , p o s e a c o n s t a n t t h r e a t to p u b l i c h e a l t h . O v e r four-fifths of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is illiterate, a n d only o n e child in six a t t e n d s e l e m e n t a r y s c h o o l . T h e s e g r i m statistics d o n o t b o d e well f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s f u t u r e a n d a r e a m a j o r o b s t a c l e to its r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . In M o g a d i s h u , K o r a n i c schools a r e t h e only o n e s t h a t a r e accessible to t h e m o s t - i m p o v e r i s h e d classes a n d a r e p a r t of t h e longt e r m strategy of t h e Islamic o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t a r e g r a d u a l l y t a k i n g r o o t in t h e social a n d e d u c a t i o n a l sectors left v a c a n t by t h e collapse of t h e state.

The Difficulty of Humanitarian Intervention Given t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h e p r e c a r i o u s situation in t h e areas of h e a l t h , n u t r i t i o n , a n d access to water, t h e r o l e of h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d s e e m obvious. It is n o t , however. N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) a r e increasingly r a r e in s o u t h Somalia, where the needs are greatest and most urgent. D u r i n g t h e massive h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e early 1990s, aid was o f t e n d i v e r t e d , m i s a p p r o p r i a t e d , a n d u s e d to s u p p o r t t h e war. T h i s is n o l o n g e r t r u e , however, f o r t h e plain a n d s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t t h e n u m b e r of h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n s in S o m a l i a h a s s i n c e 1 9 9 5 d e c l i n e d m a r k e d l y . Still, h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d r e m a i n s a c o v e t e d e c o n o m i c target. Militias a r e p r e p a r e d to fight in o r d e r to c o n t r o l a n d p r o f i t f r o m s u c h r e s o u r c e s as t h e r e n t a l of cars o r h o u s e s to h u m a n i tarian o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e h i r i n g of Somali p e r s o n n e l is a very sensitive issue, since e a c h clan l e a d e r w o u l d like to see t h e m e m b e r s of his clan e m p l o y e d . H u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e t h u s o f t e n f a c e d with p r o b l e m s of e x t o r t i o n a n d t h r e a t s against w h i c h they a r e singularly helpless. To a r g u e t h e c o m m o n g o o d a n d t h a t aid is b e i n g p r o v i d e d to h e l p t h e p o p u l a t i o n is n o t very effective w h e n d e a l i n g with clan

Somalia: A Country Without a State

41

leaders who show no sympathy for the victims and who are often the ones primarily responsible for their plight. Unfortunately, this state of chaos has often resulted in recent years in the murder or kidnapping of Somali and expatriate staff of humanitarian organizations. These crimes have remained unpunished and are mostly the work of militias resentful at having been excluded from the allocation of resources by the h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s acting in c o n c e r t with the local authorities. T h e f i g h t i n g a n d lack of security are also m a j o r obstacles to progress. The Bay region, one of the most populated and vulnerable parts of the country, receives only very limited assistance, since the fighting taking place t h e r e and the threats against h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations make any intervention and follow-up action very dangerous. 5 Militias are not inclined to recognize any humanitarian law or to grant access to victims. Faction leaders do not really control their militias, and no agreement reached or guarantee given is likely to count for much in the field. In these circumstances, the limits to the principle of the conditionality of aid quickly become apparent. On one hand, those who are against humanitarian aid in Somalia argue that the aid provided by humanitarian organizations is diverted into the war economy and is ultimately counterproductive because it only profits militias and thus helps to p r o l o n g the war. O n the o t h e r h a n d , h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations cannot a b a n d o n e n d a n g e r e d populations whose survival depends entirely on the limited aid provided. To stop supporting the most vulnerable populations would punish the victims and not those who are responsible for the situation. The latter in effect are n o t political leaders, a n d the p o p u l a t i o n ' s a n g e r a n d d i s c o n t e n t would therefore not threaten their power. The suspension of aid is likely to result in increased population movements and thus even greater poverty. Halting aid would also deprive Somalia of the few foreign organizations working in the country, which would have two consequences. First, it would become difficult to prevent crises or even to be aware of them and thus to objectively evaluate them. Second, Somalia would risk being forgotten and would fade once again into a gray area on the fringes of Western consciousness until the next images of famine and torn bodies again attract the world's attention. But then it would be already too late. Despite these conditions, h u m a n i t a r i a n actors still p r e s e n t in Somalia succeed in creating a minimal space for intervention. By including Somalis in the decisionmaking process and by relying on the elders a n d local authorities, h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations can achieve consensus within the community and prevent their staff from

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finding themselves "in the front line" against militia leaders. Precise a n d properly targeted h u m a n i t a r i a n intervention also enables the Somali people to be m o r e closely involved and thus minimizes the risks. T h e conditions necessary to extricate Somalia from its cycle o f r e c u r r e n t crises and create lasting development are not yet present and can be created only if the international community has the will to work toward a political solution to Somalia's problems. H e r e as elsewhere, humanitarian aid could never be an adequate response to a political problem in which the fate of the majority depends on a few irresponsible faction leaders and their militias.

Notes Michel Anglade was formerly Action Against Hunger country director in Somalia. He was then Action Against Hunger country director in North Korea until March 2000, when the organization withdrew from that country. 1. T h e RRA is an armed faction that since 1995 has been waging a guerilla war in the Bay and Bakool regions against the militias of Hussein Aideed, who are considered as occupiers. 2. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1998, c h a p t e r on S o m a l i a (New York: U n i t e d Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme, 1999). 3. Action Against Hunger is rehabilitating wells in Mogadishu in order to improve the quality of water. In addition, during the cholera epidemic, the organization chlorinated three hundred wells to limit the spread of the disease. 4. Action Against Hunger has built latrines in every displaced camp in Mogadishu. 5. In J u n e 1997, a doctor from the organization Doctors Without Borders was murdered in the hospital of Baidoa, capital of the Bay region.

5 Somalia: A Difficult Reconstruction Roland Marchai

Since the outbreak of civil war in 1991, nearly all the political actors in Somalia, at least those with whom humanitarian organizations have been forced to deal, have been factions. A faction is an armed group led by a military or political leader. A faction is supported by a clan or subclan or subsubclan or by some families. Traditional clan leaders (elders or notable persons) are not usually the leader of a faction, although in some cases they are. The same clan can support several opposing factions. To a large extent, however, this situation of dealing with factions is no longer true. In southern Somalia, factions have shown themselves to be weak; in the north, humanitarian organizations currently deal with administrations that d e m a n d to be treated in the same way as the government of a country at peace. This chapter will deal only with the situation in Mogadishu, both because a significant portion of the Somali population lives there and because Action Against H u n g e r has concentrated its efforts in that city. Without going into details, it would be a mistake to believe that the situation in northern Somalia, which is in many ways different and better, does not also raise some very important questions, especially in view of the marked discrepancy between official positions and the reality on the ground.

Breakdown of the Factional Order Factions have been the only interlocutors of the international community for reasons that were at first inescapable. O t h e r potential 43

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interlocutors, namely clan notables a n d i m p o r t a n t businessmen, h a d sworn allegiance to their leaders, a n d w h e r e a faction was n o t directly associated with a h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n p r e s e n t in t h e field, it was simply because o t h e r m o r e powerful i n t e r m e d i a r i e s were already at work. An easy way was s o u g h t in which to maintain a h u m a n i t a r i a n a n d apolitical f a c a d e w i t h o u t always h a v i n g g u a r a n t e e s a b o u t t h e behavior of the locals r e c r u i t e d as guards. It would be futile to dwell h e r e o n 1991 a n d 1992, a p e r i o d that r e m a i n s a very dark o n e , first f o r t h e Somalis themselves, b u t also f o r the ethics of h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations. While i n t e r n a t i o n a l intervention has n o t directly affected the way this system o p e r a t e s , t h e i m p a c t of such i n t e r v e n t i o n has gradually t r a n s f o r m e d the e n v i r o n m e n t in which h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations f u n c t i o n . Even t h o u g h the failure of the U n i t e d Nations O p e r a t i o n in Somalia ( U N O S O M ) has b e e n politically devastating, the i m p a c t of U N O S O M at the social level has b e e n m o r e n u a n c e d . T h e very s t r o n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence, which, it must be recalled, was m o r e military t h a n civilian, did n o t significantly alter the culture of aid that is o n e of the most negative legacies of the pre-civil war period. E n o u g h can never b e said a b o u t the "astonishment" caused by the c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y of S o m a l i n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) , which were small, o f t e n private or family-run e n t e r p r i s e s set u p to c a p t u r e a share of the h u m a n i t a r i a n windfall, incapable of organizing the distribution of a m i n i m u m of aid to the p o p u l a t i o n in n e e d , b u t seeking to m o n o p o l i z e the provision of all the services n e e d e d by the h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations without ever really fulfilling their p r o p e r r o l e . In a n a u d i t of its activities in t h e c a p i t a l , t h e W o r l d F o o d P r o g r a m d i s c o v e r e d in 1994 t h a t it was f e e d i n g m o r e c h i l d r e n in M o g a d i s h u t h a n the total p o p u l a t i o n of the city. N o r were i n t e r n a tional N G O s able to resist the t e m p t a t i o n of easy money. Somali managers, f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d p r o p o s e p r o j e c t s to t h e i r local p a r t n e r s with the sole aim of sharing the b u d g e t , since it would b e they w h o would supervise the project. T h e occasional lack of professionalism o n t h e p a r t of e x p a t r i a t e m a n a g e r s a n d the limitations i n h e r e n t in t h e climate of insecurity, which h a d never really i m p r o v e d , c r e a t e d the conditions f o r the m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n f u n d s . O f t e n in spite of itself, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n has nevertheless b r o u g h t a b o u t m o r e positive changes. Even t h o u g h its i m p a c t was n o t widely felt, it g e n u i n e l y c o n t r i b u t e d over a c e r t a i n p e r i o d to a g r e a t e r sense of security over a large area of the territory in which it o p e r a t e d . T h e f u n d s that were e x p e n d e d , n o t always in a very rational m a n n e r , c o n t r i b u t e d to an initial a c c u m u l a t i o n of capital by small businessmen w h o thus a c q u i r e d a sufficient financial base f r o m which to e x p a n d their activities a n d revive a m a r k e t s p u r r e d by the d e m a n d

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of s o m e eleven t h o u s a n d U N O S O M employees over a p e r i o d of several m o n t h s . Many of t h e m i l i t i a m e n , w h o u n t i l 1993 h a d still b e e n fighting, spontaneously d i s b a n d e d to seek a solution to their poverty in business. T h e d e a t h in J a n u a r y 1994 of Siad Barre, w h o even f r o m his exile in Nigeria r e t a i n e d a political capacity f o r military mobilization, b r o u g h t an e n d to u n d o u b t e d l y the most tragic phase of the civil war that was now drawing to a close. Life in Somalia was obviously still very far f r o m r e t u r n i n g to normalcy, even t h o u g h m u c h of the h a t e that existed between the principal family clans h a d b e e n c o n s u m e d . O t h e r crises have since e r u p t e d , notably the bloody clashes that took place in early 1996 within G e n e r a l Hassan Aideed's clan a n d in late 1997 within the Abgal clan. It must b e said, however, that these clashes did n o t have the same characteristics as earlier clashes. Only the militias were involved, a n d it was easier to distinguish b e t w e e n civilians a n d c o m b a t a n t s t h a n it h a d b e e n at the b e g i n n i n g of the war w h e n every y o u n g m a n over the age of twelve was likely to be f o u n d with a rifle. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d a t t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, which h a d paid the price f o r their mistakes d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 p e r i o d a n d later f o r t h e e r r o r s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n , b e f o r e l o n g l e a r n e d the lessons of those difficult years. T h e y did so with a particular sense of urgency as o t h e r crises (Yugoslavia, Bosnia, R w a n d a , Zaire) raised similar q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the definition of h u m a n i t a r i a n activities a n d the c o n d i t i o n s of access to victims. A m o n g Somali NGOs, finally, the process of weeding o u t was equally rigorous. Only a few of t h e m r e m a i n e d as g e n u i n e p a r t n e r s carrying o u t their tasks with g e n u i n e professionalism. A l t h o u g h the e n d of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n was by n o m e a n s easy to m a n a g e , contrary to some predictions it led n e i t h e r to wides p r e a d u n r e s t n o r to e c o n o m i c collapse. T h e country's political life never saw t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of the promises m a d e by t h e factions. An a g r e e m e n t o n the r e o p e n i n g of the p o r t abruptly unraveled. T h e airp o r t was divided into several zones c o n t r o l l e d by d i f f e r e n t factions a n d H a b e r Gidir subclans. T h e establishment in J u n e 1995 of a gove r n m e n t u n d e r G e n e r a l Aideed proved n o t h i n g b u t a sorry r e p e a t of the surrealistic scene that h a d b e e n played o u t by Ali M a h d i in the fall of 1991 w h e n h e p r o c l a i m e d himself p r e s i d e n t of Somalia even t h o u g h h e controlled only the n o r t h e r n p a r t of Mogadishu, the capital. Worse still, the crisis between the new p r e s i d e n t of the republic a n d o n e of his f o r m e r financial backers, O s m a n Atto, escalated into a n a r m e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n in the capital, even as the n e e d f o r international (or at least Libyan) recognition f o r c e d G e n e r a l Aideed to occupy Baidoa a n d later the Bay a n d Bakool regions. T h e d e a t h of G e n e r a l Aideed in August 1996 was without d o u b t

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o n e of the m a j o r t u r n i n g points in the civil war. It w e a k e n e d his gove r n m e n t , which was already b e i n g widely challenged by its social base, given t h e string of p r o m i s e s t h a t h a d r e m a i n e d u n f u l f i l l e d . It also m a r k e d the e n d of the reign of charisma a n d the b e g i n n i n g of a m o n eymaking p e r i o d in which his two sons, Hussein a n d Hassan, played a p r o m i n e n t role. T h e d e a t h of General Aideed also h a d a n o t h e r cons e q u e n c e : It m a d e possible a m o r e public ( b u t also m o r e violent) expression of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s that existed within the Abgal clan. T h e clan, in fact, h a d to suppress its internal rivalries f o r fear of b e i n g w e a k e n e d in its struggle against a rival who was h a t e d as m u c h as h e was f e a r e d . T h e d e a t h of G e n e r a l Aideed also provided Ethiopia with j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n o n c e a g a i n . I n d e e d , by A u g u s t 1996, Ethiopia h a d b e g u n to intervene in Gedo, a region b o r d e r i n g Kenya a n d Ethiopia. Its intervention took a m o r e political t u r n with the signing of the S o d e r e Accords in J a n u a r y 1997. T h e S o d e r e A c c o r d s failed f o r t h r e e m a i n r e a s o n s . First, they were d e p e n d e n t o n c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g t h e various factions, even t h o u g h such c o o p e r a t i o n was already in serious crisis, especially in t h e M o g a d i s h u area. S e c o n d , they u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the i n f l u e n c e of Ali M a h d i within the Abgal clan b e f o r e the crisis r e a c h e d its peak a n d failed to i n c l u d e those g r o u p s that s u p p o r t e d Hussein Aideed. Above all, they a p p e a r e d to call into question the status of Mogadishu as the country's capital in favor of Bosaso, thus provoking a hostile reaction that t r a n s c e n d e d the factions based in the capital. For b o t h domestic a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a s o n s (Egypt h a s n e v e r s t o p p e d c o n s i d e r i n g Somalia as an Arab c o u n t r y a n d Ethiopia as its principal diplomatic rival in the H o r n of Africa), the accords proved incapable of b r i n g i n g a b o u t such c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d a new c o n f e r e n c e of "reconciliation" was proposed. T h e a g r e e m e n t signed in Cairo in D e c e m b e r 1997 was also unsuccessful, since it was b a s e d o n t h e s a m e o u t d a t e d a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m . In addition to the usual rhetoric, it assigned to the factions b a s e d in t h e capital a key role in resolving t h e crisis a n d b r o u g h t Hussein Aideed a n d his allies back into the i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomatic g a m e . In some ways, the a g r e e m e n t was responsible f o r the specific characteristics of the c u r r e n t situation. A f t e r m a n y m o n t h s of i n t e r n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , n o r t h e a s t e r n S o m a l i a , w h i c h i n c l u d e d two r e g i o n s of S o m a l i l a n d , in J u l y 1998 a n n o u n c e d the f o r m a t i o n of a regional g o v e r n m e n t whose president, A b d u l l a h Yusuf, was n o n e o t h e r t h a n the principal loser u n d e r t h e Cairo a g r e e m e n t . This administration has since u n d e r g o n e a process of institution building n o t very d i f f e r e n t f r o m the o n e that took place in Somaliland a n d may even b e s t r o n g e r in certain respects. It is true

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that its leader received m o r e help f r o m Ethiopia than Somaliland did a n d that a large m e a s u r e of clan h o m o g e n e i t y exists in the region. F u r t h e r m o r e , the civil war u n f o l d e d differently in this area t h a n it had in o t h e r regions of the f o r m e r Somalia. Meanwhile, an a t t e m p t was m a d e in August 1998 to organize a g o v e r n m e n t in the Mogadishu area following protracted negotiations between the factions, whose grassroots s u p p o r t h a d b e c o m e m u c h w e a k e r t h a n it h a d b e e n two years previously. T h e f a i l u r e of this a t t e m p t came as n o surprise and is now manifest. W h e n Ali Mahdi left the Somali capital in April 1999, officially for medical t r e a t m e n t in Cairo, h e was unable to stop his own guards f r o m pillaging his house. Hussein Aideed, who had b e e n forced to give u p his title of president in the spring in o r d e r to reach an a g r e e m e n t on the regional government, resumed the title in the fall of 1998. H e attempted to reconstitute his base with Eritrean and Arab assistance, while importing new weapons and new bank notes to finance his strategy f o r r e c o n q u e s t a n d to t r u m p Ethiopia's allies. T h o s e allies were also receiving substantial military aid, d e s p i t e t h e e m b a r g o o n military e q u i p m e n t i m p o s e d by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s Security C o u n c i l in t h e s p r i n g of 1992.

T o w a r d a Difficult R e c o n s t r u c t i o n T h e reality in Somalia is m u c h m o r e complex and dynamic than the hastily drawn conclusions that apply to only a few h u n d r e d people in Mogadishu a n d to the diplomatic representations of a few countries. Since the b e g i n n i n g of 1998, big businessmen have assumed a role in the life of the capital that they had never played since the outbreak of the civil war. T h e business class in Somalia has too often b e e n described as a creature of h u m a n i t a r i a n aid that exists only because of the aid. It must be acknowledged, however, that a business economy and even a service economy have now developed in the shadow of the factions. This is quite an exceptional situation, since these businessmen are not assisted by any legal or regulatory structure or even by a banking sector, which is absent f r o m today's Somalia. T h e business sector of Somalia may be divided into three quite separate groups. T h e first g r o u p is c o m p o s e d of powerful businessm e n who were able to survive and prosper despite the instability of the market, the second consists of medium-sized and small businessm e n who took great risks d u r i n g the war a n d m a d e c o m m e n s u r a t e p r o f i t s , a n d t h e t h i r d consists of n e w c o m e r s w h o have p r o f i t e d

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immensely f r o m h u m a n i t a r i a n aid or related activities, which provided t h e m with an initial capital base. Of the three, the s e c o n d g r o u p is d o m i n a n t . T h e third includes a n u m b e r of individuals whose n a m e s are associated with certain factional leaders. T h e i r wealth, however real, is also inherently fragile, n o t unlike their easily identifiable political alliances. For r e a s o n s t o o c o m p l e x to e x a m i n e h e r e , t h e s e b u s i n e s s m e n have successfully capitalized on the situation of chaos, even e n c o u r a g ing it at times. T h e i r political ethos is basically n o d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of the factions' partisans, a n d many of t h e m at o n e time or a n o t h e r have s u p p o r t e d the faction of their choice with h a r d cash, because this was the n o r m within their clan a n d because their prestige in the clan was a n d remains an essential e l e m e n t in m a n a g i n g the insecurity. I n d e e d , if a businessman is very p o p u l a r within his clan, any attack against his property is perceived as an attack against his community. This system worked well as long as the clan was u n i t e d b e h i n d a g r o u p of leaders. T h e business sector thus merely reflected the contradictions that existed in the political a r e n a . T h e s e contradictions, however, were already downplayed because of the n e e d to preserve or increase m a r k e t s h a r e or to f o r g e c o m m e r c i a l alliances across clan lines. Such alliances were indispensable in o r d e r to o p e r a t e in a market of any significant size. Taxes were paid, p e r h a p s to the minister closest in kinship in o r d e r to avoid any p a y m e n t of taxes at all if possible, as in the system still in effect in Somaliland. T h e system of factions thus justified itself while m a k i n g it impossible to build a governm e n t or to establish a fiscal policy. In this sense, hardly any d i f f e r e n c e exists b e t w e e n t h e Ali M a h d i g o v e r n m e n t of 1991 a n d t h a t of t h e Aideed family after 1995. T h e s e rules of the g a m e could be seriously c h a l l e n g e d only if the factions were similarly challenged. A d o u b l e c o n t r a d i c t i o n was rapidly e m e r g i n g . O n the o n e h a n d , as a result of political dynamics, which are n o t e x a m i n e d h e r e , the mobilization a n d political centralization of t h e clans have b e e n d e c l i n i n g since 1996. T h i s d e c l i n e may b e traced to individual ambitions, the inability of leaders to fulfil their promises, a n d the traditional t e n d e n c y toward division n o t e d in political o r g a n i z a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g in a f r a g m e n t e d society. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the expansion of t r a d e a n d services could n o t c o m e a b o u t in the absence of certain conditions, f o r e m o s t a m o n g which is the exist e n c e of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d security. Well b e f o r e the r a p p r o c h e m e n t between Hussein Aideed a n d Ali Mahdi in the spring of 1997, the business sector h a d o n several occasions a r g u e d f o r the r e o p e n i n g of t h e p o r t of M o g a d i s h u a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of o r d e r in the vicinity of the principal markets. At that

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49

time, the distrust was too great to p e r m i t any m e a n i n g f u l consensus. Even in the absence of a g r e e m e n t , however, the d e b a t e c o n t i n u e d . A f t e r giving m a n y u n m i s t a k a b l e signals, t h e business sector d e c l a r e d its a u t o n o m y in the spring of 1998. T h e majority of businessm e n r e f u s e d to provide the f u n d i n g f o r the regional administration in M o g a d i s h u o n the g r o u n d s t h a t t h e political process, which was w e l c o m e d by o u t s i d e r s , l a c k e d g e n u i n e g r a s s r o o t s s u p p o r t . It was finally Egypt, Libya, a n d a few wealthy associates of the political leaders t h a t provided the f u n d s . Businessmen also r e f u s e d to pay taxes. A f t e r all, why pay f o r a g o v e r n m e n t t h a t p r o v i d e d n o s e r v i c e s , i m p r o v e d n o roads, a n d failed to provide security in the markets? This attitude was also m o r e t h a n a refusal. At the same time, busin e s s m e n w e r e f u n d i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of I s l a m i c c o u r t s in Mogadishu. It is interesting to n o t e that these courts are organized o n the basis of clan, which m a d e their financing easier b u t r e d u c e d their efficiency. O n e can certainly question the role played by f u n d a m e n talist g r o u p s , if n o t in the creation of the courts, t h e n at least in their m a n a g e m e n t , coordination, and supervision. These groups are i n d e e d p r e s e n t a n d active, even t h o u g h they currently have n o great i n f l u e n c e over day-to-day m a n a g e m e n t of t h e c o u r t s o r over t h e i r i m p o r t a n t decisions. T h e great i m p o r t a n c e of clans was m a d e clear in a n u m b e r of i n c i d e n t s in which t h e c o u r t s ' militias were involved. M o r e i m p o r t a n t today, security in certain areas of the capital is at an acceptable level, a n d markets have b e c o m e safe places. Clearly, in c o m p a r i n g the divisive i n f l u e n c e of the factions with t h e i n f l u e n c e of f u n d a m e n t a l i s t g r o u p s as a n e m e r g i n g a c t o r in Mogadishu, n o a t t e m p t is b e i n g m a d e to d e m o n i z e o n e a n d absolve the other. While the factions with their old m e t h o d s of o p e r a t i n g n o l o n g e r have a n y t h i n g to offer the p o p u l a t i o n , the political parties, as a collective expression, r e m a i n absolutely essential to any resolution of the crisis. It would be an illusion, however, to think that businessm e n who e n t e r into politics would behave any b e t t e r t h a n the politicians w h o have now b e e n somewhat marginalized. If such a developm e n t can be perceived as positive, it is because it penalizes certain m e t h o d s of o p e r a t i o n a n d e n c o u r a g e s r e f o r m . It t h e r e f o r e a p p e a r s that mobilization at the level of the clan will n o t in itself resolve the existing problems. Alliances must b e m a d e o n the basis of c o m m o n , tangible interests a n d n o t o n the basis of kinship. In o r d e r to b e recognized, a g o v e r n m e n t must first of all m e e t the basic n e e d s of the p o p u l a t i o n . Taxes m a k e n o sense unless they are used to solve p r o b l e m s a n d n o t to create new ones. Of course, n o t everyone today fully shares this analysis. T h e hurdles of the past have certainly n o t d i s a p p e a r e d , a n d f o r e i g n interven-

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d o n c o u l d still lead to a return to that past. This is a c h a l l e n g e to which even h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations a n d the international community must rise.

Notes Roland Marchal is a researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research in Paris.

6 The Conflict in Abkhazia Manuel

Sánchez-Montero

Russian rulers have always considered the Caucasus, Russia's southern frontier with the Ottoman and Persian empires, as a bridgehead to the Persian Gulf, a strategic goal of the first importance. This border is also the line of defense for Western interests in the Middle East (Georgia, Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Egypt) against the Islamic countries represented by Iran and the "destabilizing states" (Iraq and Syria). More recently, c o m m o n interests with the Western countries have r e i n f o r c e d this policy: Georgia a n d Azerbaijan have j u s t b e c o m e m e m b e r s of t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) Partnership for Peace, and Georgia has joined the Council of Europe. Since the fall of the Soviet empire and the opening up to international markets of the immense reserves of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and the Caspian Sea region (Azerbaijan), the Caucasus has been the theater of fierce conflict over control of its strategic mineral resources. The United States, the European Union, and Russia are contesting the export routes for these minerals that, because of their quality and quantity, are of vital importance for the economic and military development of the states. This contest is currently reflected in the rehabilitation of Russian infrastructural works (oil pipelines, railways, roads, and navigable waterways) in Siberia, in the Urals, and north of the Caspian Sea and in the development of m u l t i m o d a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n r o u t e s by Western c o u n t r i e s f o r t h e regions of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Black Sea, and Turkey. The conflicts in Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Nagorny Karabakh in the South Caucasus and in Chechnya and Ingushetia in the n o r t h e r n 51

Chronology 1989 1990

1992

1993

1994

1996

1997

1998

1999

Tensions develop between the Abkhazian and Georgian populations over the official use of the Abkhazian language. Georgia declares its independence from the Soviet Union. Zviad Gamsakhurdia is elected president of the republic in the first elections held in an independent Georgia. The State of Georgia refuses to sign the treaty of accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Worsening of troubles in Sukhumi; beginning of conflict in Abkhazia with an offensive by the Georgian army. Dismissal of President Gamsakhurdia; assumption of office by the ex-minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze, supported by a large majority of the population of Georgia and by the Western countries. Beginning of the civil war in Georgia between supporters of the elected president (Zviad Gamsakhurdia) and those of the de facto president (Eduard Shevardnadze). Intervention of the Russian interposition force under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ratification and legitimization of the leadership of Shevardnadze, elected president of the Republic of Georgia. Abkhazian counterattack and fall of Sukhumi (capital of Abkhazia); nearly 250,000 inhabitants of Georgian origin are evacuated to the regions of Mingrelia, Imereti, and Tbilisi. Offensive by supporters of Gamsakhurdia and fall of the city of Poti. Accession of the Republic of Georgia to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Death of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. End of the Abkhazian offensive; establishment of a line of demarcation in the region of Gali, between the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia and the territory of Georgia, which is ruled by the government in Tbilisi. Establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia; dispatch of mediators to find a solution to the conflict. The Commonwealth of Independent States (at the request of the Republic of Georgia) imposes an economic and trade blockade against the territory of Abkhazia. Start of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhazian authorities; talks are envisaged on a plan for the return of the displaced Georgian population to their homes in Abkhazia. Explosion of violence in the region of Gali; Abkhazian militias expel some thirty thousand civilians of Georgian origin to the region of Mingrelia. First breakdown in talks and increasing tensions between the different parties. Abkhazian authorities unilaterally propose return of displaced persons.

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C a u c a s u s a r e r o o t e d in a n e t h n i c mosaic t h a t has e n d u r e d in spite of 100 y e a r s of R u s s i f i c a t i o n a n d s e v e n t y y e a r s of S o v i e t i z a t i o n . T h e s o u t h e r n C a u c a s u s has a p o p u l a t i o n of e i g h t e e n m i l l i o n , w h i c h f o r c e n t u r i e s has b e e n d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g s o m e 100 e t h n i c g r o u p s speaki n g m o r e t h a n eighty d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s a n d s u b s c r i b i n g to at least a d o z e n religious faiths. R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s e p o p u l a t i o n s have varied f r o m alliances of interests to c r u e l conflicts. T h e conflicts t h a t divide t h e r e g i o n , however, a r e n o t r e c e n t . T h e R u s s i a n c o n q u e s t u n i t e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n of A b k h a z i a a n d G e o r g i a within t h e s a m e p r o v i n c e f r o m 1804 to 1917 a n d later in t h e Soviet R e p u b l i c of G e o r g i a f r o m 1917 to 1991. T h e A b k h a z i a n s , native to t h e m o u n t a i n s of Caucasus, lived s e c l u d e d in t h e valleys until t h e e n d of t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, w h e n they b e g a n to d e s c e n d t o w a r d t h e A b k h a z i a n coast, d r a w n by t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e m p l o y m e n t o f f e r e d by t h e n a s c e n t tourist industry. G e o r g i a n s , M i n g r e l i a n s , a n d Svans (originally f r o m t h e plains a n d m o u n t a i n s of w e s t G e o r g i a ) s e t t l e d in A b k h a z i a n l a n d s w i t h t h e Russian c o l o n i z e r s in t h e e i g h t e e n t h a n d early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s . T h e y w e r e j o i n e d by A r m e n i a n s f l e e i n g t h e Turkish g e n o c i d e of 1915 a n d by G r e e k s w h o h a d b e e n p r e s e n t in t h e r e g i o n since t h e p e r i o d of Byzantine r u l e . S t a r t i n g in t h e early years of t h e Soviet era, t h e A b k h a z i a n s , w h o u p u n t i l t h e n h a d b e e n a m i n o r i t y in t h e r e g i o n , s o u g h t u n i o n with t h e Russian Soviet R e p u b l i c a n d d e m a n d e d t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n f r o m t h e Soviet R e p u b l i c of G e o r g i a (1932). T h e S u p r e m e Soviet, c o n t r o l l e d by Stalin (who was of G e o r g i a n o r i g i n ) , f o u n d a c o m p r o m i s e s o l u t i o n by c r e a t i n g t h e A u t o n o m o u s R e p u b l i c of A b k h a z i a within t h e Soviet R e p u b l i c of G e o r g i a . T h i s d e c i s i o n f e d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e 1990s, following t h e collapse of t h e Soviet U n i o n . T h e a u t o n o m o u s status p r o v i d e d a w o r k a b l e s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m in t h e sixty years t h a t followed. D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of perestroika, A b k h a z i a n n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s e m e r g e d a t t h e s a m e t i m e as G e o r g i a n n a t i o n a l i s m was r e a w a k e n i n g (in t h e late 1980s). Following t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e A b k h a z i a n p e o p l e a n d o t h e r R u s s o p h i l e m i n o r i t i e s ( A r m e n i a n s ) , t h e a u t o n o m o u s A b k h a z i a n parl i a m e n t ( c o n t r o l l e d by u n i o n i s t G e o r g i a n s ) p r o c l a i m e d its u n i o n with G e o r g i a . V i o l e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s b r o k e o u t b e t w e e n t h e two c o m m u nities, w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d in t h e first offensive by t h e n e w G e o r g i a n army. Even t h o u g h t h e initial m o n t h s of f i g h t i n g f a v o r e d t h e u n i o n ists, t h e decisive s u p p o r t of Russian t r o o p s tilted t h e b a l a n c e in favor of t h e A b k h a z i a n separatists. T h e c o n f l i c t r e a c h e d a p e a k with t h e disa s t r o u s c o l l a p s e of S u k h u m i in O c t o b e r 1993 a n d t h e e x p u l s i o n of n e a r l y 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 c i v i l i a n s of M i n g r e l i a n o r i g i n t o t h e r e g i o n s of M i n g r e l i a , I m e r e t i , a n d Tbilisi.

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S u p e r i m p o s e d o n the Abkhazian conflict was a m o r e c o n t e m p o rary conflict between the s u p p o r t e r s of the elected president, Zviad G a m s a k h u r d i a (the Zviadistas), a n d the g o v e r n m e n t forces of the d e f a c t o p r e s i d e n t , E d u a r d S h e v a r d n a d z e . T h i s c o n f l i c t , w h i c h was waged in the regions of Mingrelia a n d Imereti, proved a heavy d r a i n o n the resources of Georgia a n d c r e a t e d bitterness a n d mistrust, particularly a m o n g the p o p u l a t i o n of Mingrelia, which even today still s u p p o r t s the unionist a n d a n t i g o v e r n m e n t parties (paradoxically supp o r t e d by Moscow) a n d fosters instability by giving e n c o u r a g e m e n t to a r m e d pro-Zviadista groups.

Displaced Populations: Eradicating the Victims T h e Mingrelia r e g i o n (in west Georgia) is o n e of t h e areas of t h e C a u c a s u s with t h e h i g h e s t density of d i s p l a c e d p o p u l a t i o n s . Since 1994, nearly 250,000 p e o p l e expelled f r o m the territory of Abkhazia have f o u n d r e f u g e in the villages a n d towns of n e i g h b o r i n g regions. Mingrelia was the most seriously affected by these events a n d received nearly 125,000 displaced persons, which increased its p o p u l a t i o n by nearly 27 p e r c e n t in f o u r years. T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s led to radical changes: first, in the socioecon o m i c p a n o r a m a , in which sectors of the p o p u l a t i o n live in conditions of e x t r e m e poverty a n d instability; second, in the growing insecurity a n d instability in the region. T h e displaced p o p u l a t i o n was a c c o m m o d a t e d in c o m m u n i t y centers (schools, factories, w a r e h o u s e s , a n d so o n ) . T h e incapacity to absorb the excess labor that suddenly invaded the region's j o b m a r k e t a n d the obstacles e n c o u n t e r e d by displaced p e r s o n s seeking access to cultivable l a n d m e a n t that this p o p u l a t i o n was e x c l u d e d f r o m local e c o n o m i c activity a n d b e c a m e m o r e d e p e n d e n t o n f o o d aid. M o r e specifically, the displaced p o p u l a t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d inhabitants of Mingrelia, which m e a n s t h a t they c a n n o t enjoy t h e f u n d a m e n t a l civil a n d social r i g h t s to w h i c h all G e o r g i a n s a r e e n t i t l e d (including the right to elect their representatives in p a r l i a m e n t a n d their local representatives, access to health a n d social assistance services, a n d the right to own land b e f o r e c o m p l e t i n g a one-year waiting period). T h e g o v e r n m e n t of G e o r g i a has l o n g used t h e existence of a n e x p e l l e d p o p u l a t i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d a l o n g t h e line of c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Abkhazia as a m e a n s of m a i n t a i n i n g pressure o n the Abkhazian authorities, at b o t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d bilateral levels. T h e guarantee of the r e t u r n of 250,000 persons has b e e n used as a b a r g a i n i n g

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c h i p to j u s t i f y its p o s i t i o n o n t h e t e r r i t o r y of A b k h a z i a . T h u s t h e r e t u r n of the displaced Georgians was p a r t of the strategy to attract i n t e r n a t i o n a l f u n d s (in the f o r m of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance or bilateral structural s u p p o r t in o r d e r to avert any potential crises that may arise f r o m the instability of the situation). Investment, direct or indirect, of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $250 m i l l i o n d u r i n g t h e past f o u r years to address h u m a n i t a r i a n p r o b l e m s a n d to m e e t the social obligations of the Georgian g o v e r n m e n t merely increased the latter's war chest. T h e d e p e n d e n c e of the displaced p o p u l a t i o n o n h u m a n i t a r i a n aid merely r e i n f o r c e d t h e "client" r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the active C o m m i t t e e s f o r the Displaced a n d the Georgian political cause a n d r e d u c e d the i n f l u e n c e of the so-called Abkhazian g o v e r n m e n t in exile; the provision of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance was cleverly justified by the Georgian authorities as consideration f o r effective g o v e r n m e n t a n d the international credibility of its leader, E d u a r d Shevardnadze. T h e Abkhazian g o v e r n m e n t in exile, c o m p r i s i n g unionist leaders, was f o r m e d early in the evacuation of S u k h u m i a n d s u p p l a n t e d the a u t o n o m o u s authority in Abkhazia. In o r d e r to maintain its h o l d o n power, it was necessary f o r t h e g r o u p to p r e v e n t t h e r e t u r n of displaced p e r s o n s to Abkhazia. To achieve that goal, the g o v e r n m e n t in exile has h a d n o hesitation in resorting to attacks against G e o r g i a n r e t u r n e e s in Abkhazian territory (in the Gali b o r d e r region) carried o u t by the t e r r o r i s t / p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p known as the White Legion or by the efficient network of C o m m i t t e e s of the Displaced that controls all activities in the r e c e p t i o n c e n t e r s f o r displaced persons. O n e of t h e i r m a i n f u n c t i o n s is to follow u p h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance, a n d m o r e particularly f o o d aid; by their p r e s e n c e , these c o m m i t t e e s have in e f f e c t established t h e following e q u a t i o n : Displaced p e r s o n n o t u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l m e a n s n o access to security, work, f o o d aid, or m e a n s of f o o d p r o d u c t i o n ; d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l m e a n s p r o t e c t i o n a n d f o o d aid.

Blockading Besieged Populations—A N e w W e a p o n T h e A u t o n o m o u s Republic of Abkhazia h a d b e e n o n e of the most p r i v i l e g e d r e g i o n s d u r i n g t h e Soviet e r a . Its a b u n d a n c e of w a t e r r e s o u r c e s a n d s t a t e i n v e s t m e n t s in i n d u s t r y a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e e n a b l e d the p o p u l a t i o n to have a h i g h e r s t a n d a r d of living t h a n the average in the Soviet U n i o n . T h e collapse of the USSR, t o g e t h e r with the c o n s e q u e n c e s of the conflict with the g o v e r n m e n t of Tbilisi, led to a virtual paralysis of e c o n o m i c activity. T h e e c o n o m i c a n d t r a d e b l o c k a d e i m p o s e d by t h e C o m m o n -

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wealth o f I n d e p e n d e n t States (CIS) further exacerbated the situation after J a n u a r y 1996. As a result, it was n o l o n g e r possible to freely import food products and medicines except through three points of access to the territory: the Inguri bridge in Zugdidi, the frontier post with the Russian Federation at Adler, and the port o f Sukhumi. At these access points goods were subject to inspection by the Georgian authorities, the peacekeeping forces, and the Russian frontier guards, who were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m o n i t o r i n g t h e l i n e o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n between Abkhazia and Georgia and the outer frontiers o f the CIS. Fuel, medical supplies, tools, raw materials for industry, vehicles, industrial goods, and many other products were subjected either to restrictive quotas or to strict control o f their destination and end use by t h e Russian f o r c e s (in m o s t cases, p e r m i s s i o n to i m p o r t was delayed indefinitely or even denied). Even though the collapse of the U S S R and the transfer o f power from the Soviet Union's communist party to the Russian reformers might have weakened Russia's influence in the southern Caucasus, those two events—the collapse and the transfer o f power—did n o t modify the traditional geopolitical lines. Russia does not appear to have at this time the resources to maintain the apparatus that it had used successfully over the past two centuries to control the destinies o f the Transcaucasus. 1 T h e opening up of the cordon sanitaire,2 after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, e n a b l e d the Western powers to gain a f o o t h o l d in an a r e a that i n c l u d e d the f o r m e r Soviet republics. It therefore seems totally unthinkable for Russia to have a strategy o f reconquest, association, or even neocolonization. T h e only possible issue is t h e destabilization o f unruly states, such as G e o r g i a a n d Azerbaijan. In the case o f Georgia, o n e o f the clearest examples o f this strategy is Abkhazia. An Abkhazia in revolt and pro-Russia is o f value as an instrument o f political, economic, and social destabilization. Russian military support in the early stages o f the conflict was pushed into the background when a new dimension was introduced into Russian-Georgian relations with the signing by Georgia in 1993 o f the agreement to j o i n the CIS. T h e e c o n o m i c and trade blockade therefore b e c a m e an integral part o f the new strategy adopted. Its consequences were the following: 1. T h e dramatic decline in the living standards of the Abkhazian population merely exacerbated anti-Georgian sentiment through the unchallenged manipulation o f information by the authorities. This radicalization was largely responsible for the impasse reached in the 1997 negotiations between Georgian and Abkhazian authorities. 3 T h e ongoing mobilization at the grassroots level (forced removal o f the

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p o p u l a t i o n a n d catalyzing of its frustrations) resulted in policy of conflict instead of negotiations. 2. D i f f e r e n c e s in the application of t h e m e a s u r e s i m p o s e d u n d e r t h e b l o c k a d e o n the two f r o n t i e r s (Russia a n d Georgia) resulted in the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of Russian i n f l u e n c e in Abkhazia. T h e Abkhazian p o p u l a t i o n , moreover, f o u n d itself isolated f r o m the slow process of e c o n o m i c recovery e n j o y e d by the rest of t h e region. A g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r such severe restrictions a n d the a b s e n c e of a n official status m a d e it d i f f i c u l t to a t t r a c t capital, i m p o r t e q u i p m e n t , or d e v e l o p local markets. At the same time, however, it led to t h e flight of labor (political a n d e t h n i c r e f u g e e s to G e o r g i a o r e c o n o m i c r e f u g e e s to Russia). T h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t r e m a i n e d was t h u s f o r c e d to survive by e n g a g i n g in m a r g i n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l activities a n d m o s t of its m e m b e r s e x p e r i e n c e d a g r a d u a l slide i n t o poverty (selling t h e i r jewels, c l o t h i n g , m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t , w o r k i n g t o o l s , a n d so o n ) . T h i s p r o c e s s was a c c e l e r a t e d by t h e i n f l a t i o n a r y t r e n d s t h a t p r e v a i l e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e r e g i o n a n d t h a t were particularly a c u t e in Abkhazia. T h e a b s e n c e of m e c h a n i s m s of c o n t r o l (such as a c e n t r a l b a n k to s u p e r v i s e m o n e t a r y policy, s t r u c t u r a l s u p p o r t f r o m a b r o a d , a n d diversification of e c o n o m i c activities a n d m a r k e t s ) is t h e r e a s o n why t h e Russian crisis h a d a particularly severe i m p a c t o n t h e A b k h a z i a n economy.4 C o n t r o l of t h e political or a r m e d forces is p r o p o r t i o n a l to t h e e c o n o m i c resources available. Most of the resources in the territory are g e n e r a t e d f r o m the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d t r a d i n g of g o o d s across the Russian frontier. T h e elite classes a n d the business sector are the m a i n direct beneficiaries of the limited resources g e n e r a t e d f r o m illegal activity, which is regulated by the law of survival of the fittest a n d has resulted in t h e i n e q u i t a b l e distribution of resources. Given the insecurity in the region (the source of their own power), these g r o u p s o p t f o r investments in m o r e lucrative markets (Moscow, Ukraine, or W e s t e r n E u r o p e ) , w h i c h b r i n g n o r e t u r n s to t h e r e s o u r c e - s t a r v e d local economy. 3. T h e lack of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t a n d the steady c o n c e n t r a tion of p o w e r in t h e h a n d s of c e r t a i n p r e s s u r e g r o u p s (mafia-warlords) are reflected in the lack of social d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e b r e a k d o w n of families as a result of f o r c e d d i s p l a c e m e n t (political, ethnic, or econ o m i c ) m a r k e d t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e collapse of t h e e n t i r e social structure that h a d existed b e f o r e . T h e results were tragic: I n a d e q u a t e social welfare networks at the local level left nearly fifty t h o u s a n d elderly a n d physically a n d / o r mentally h a n d i c a p p e d p e r s o n s (one-third of the estimated p o p u l a t i o n of Abkhazia) in a state of a b a n d o n m e n t ,

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d e p e n d e n t o n the h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance provided by international organizations.

The Future: Toward the Conquest of Eurasia T h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Soviet ideal in its s t r u g g l e against the f r e e world e n c o u r a g e d a new t e n d e n c y to discredit n o t only the socialist system b u t also its welfare a n d social assistance comp o n e n t s . T h e c o n c e p t of the liberalization of world markets, mitigated by the "corrective actions" of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance a n d structural s u p p o r t to d i s a d v a n t a g e d c o u n t r i e s , b e c a m e t h e u n c h a l l e n g e d m o d e l that has governed relations between states f o r over a decade. This f r a m e w o r k has b e e n a p p r o v e d by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions, i n c l u d i n g the World T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W T O ) , t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary F u n d , a n d the World Bank. It offers a wide r a n g e of instrum e n t s : first, s u p p o r t o r p e n a l i z e allied o r e n e m y states; s e c o n d , increase political a n d e c o n o m i c i n f l u e n c e in the zones of interest to the powers. T h e political a n d e c o n o m i c strategy of the Western powers has several thrusts, o n e of which is particularly c o n c e r n e d with the f o o d security of the p o p u l a t i o n : structural e c o n o m i c s u p p o r t a n d bilateral f o o d aid programs. T h e p r o d u c t i o n of f o o d staples f o r the Caucasian diet (local varieties of cereal, such as g o l d e n wheat, hatchar, a n d corn) is traditional in c e r t a i n parts of the r e g i o n . T h a t p r o d u c t i o n has e x p e r i e n c e d a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s that have resulted in its lack of competitiveness o n local a n d regional markets. T h e s e p r o b l e m s include a scarcity of factors of agricultural p r o d u c t i o n of a h i g h - e n o u g h quality, obsolescence of the stock of available e q u i p m e n t , unavailability of accessible credit, absence of established markets f o r f o o d products, strong influe n c e of t h e i n t e r e s t s involved in t h e i m p o r t a t i o n of c e r e a l s , a n d absence of a clear legal f r a m e w o r k governing land ownership. To these internal factors must b e a d d e d such external factors as the fall in the value of the ruble (since S e p t e m b e r 1998), which has led to a d r o p in the prices of goods f r o m the Russian Federation. In Armenia, local cereals face c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m the u n c o n t r o l l e d invasion of Russian cereals 5 that cross the b o r d e r s of the CIS with the i n d u l g e n c e of the customs a u t h o r i t i e s a n d t h e c o n n i v a n c e of local authorities. T h e i m p o r t a t i o n of surplus f o o d in the guise of f o o d aid 6 is subj e c t to a n u m b e r of conditions, set by the c o u n t r i e s d o n a t i n g f o o d aid. F o o d p r o d u c t s are i m p o r t e d u n d e r a t a x - e x e m p t r e g i m e , t h e

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quantities sold must cover only deficits in national p r o d u c t i o n , the i n c o m e f r o m the sale must be reinvested in agricultural support programs, a n d , above all, t h e criteria f o r t h e eligibility of beneficiary countries are based n o t only on considerations of food insecurity b u t also on criteria of good neighborliness. 7 O n e t h e r e f o r e finds agricultural surpluses that are difficult to sell on international markets coming u n d e r cooperation budgets; in reality, this constitutes an indirect subsidy to the f a r m e r s of the d o n o r c o u n t r y (thereby violating the principles established by these very states a n d set o u t in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s , such as t h e W T O agreements). In the m e a n t i m e , subsidies to farmers in countries such as Georgia a n d Armenia are penalized. 8 T h e i m m e d i a t e e f f e c t s of this aid policy, s u c h as t e m p o r a r y increases in access to staple foods f o r a part of the population, are positive. T h e long-term impacts are m o r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . T h e s e include changes in local food habits, drops in the prices of cereals o n local markets, a n d a lessening of interest by the local population in the p r o d u c t i o n of cereals. 9

Nongovernmental Organizations in the Caucasus, or How to Run with the Hare and Hunt with the Hounds O b t a i n i n g resources f r o m international agencies a n d s u p p o r t f r o m local actors must be a c c o m p a n i e d by respect for h u m a n rights. T h e framework for the action taken by Action Against H u n g e r in the Caucasus has three main thrusts. T h e first of these is i m m e d i a t e measures. T h e s e include direct s u p p o r t f o r victims t h r o u g h p r o j e c t s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of f o o d a n d / o r tools and the technical assistance n e e d e d to achieve a minim u m degree of food security. T h e second thrust is that of medium-term actions. O n e of these actions is t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e capacity to organize and supervise the activities of local entities. A n o t h e r is the d e v e l o p m e n t of an organized social network that can play an increasingly active role in d e f e n d i n g the interests of victims a n d in ensuring t h e s u s t a i n a b i l i t y of t h e activities u n d e r t a k e n by A c t i o n A g a i n s t Hunger. T h e third thrust is that of long-term actions. By these are m e a n t identification a n d analysis of the h u m a n rights violated in the differe n t conflicts and activities to p r o m o t e awareness and provide information to local and international actors and organizations.

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Notes Manuel Sánchez-Montero is chief of mission for Action Against H u n g e r in the southern Caucasus. 1. Traditionally, the Transcaucasus was the n a m e given by the Russian authorities to the region of the southern Caucasus. 2. This term is understood to mean the system of client states controlled by the U S S R during the Cold War as a means of protecting the territories of Russia itself a n d particularly Mother Russia. 3. T h e maintenance of the economic blockade against Abkhazia was o n e of the principal reasons cited by the Abkhazian authorities for not resuming negotiations. 4. Between August 1998 and J a n u a r y 1999, the cost of the items in an average f o o d basket rose by 280 percent. 5. T h e quantities of cereals imported from Russia are not recorded. T h e C I F (cost, i n s u r a n c e , a n d f r e i g h t ) p r i c e of a ton of Russian wheat f r o m Yerevan is $190. T h e price of the same quantity of Armenian wheat on the local market is $230. 6. Last year, the state of Armenia authorized the acceptance of 300,000 tons of U.S. wheat as f o o d aid for the next thirty years in order to cover the deficit in local production, which is estimated to be 10,000 tons annually. T h e quantity sold on local markets for 1998 alone was 30,000 tons. 7. T h e e x a m p l e may be given of the coverage in f o o d aid for a zone such as N a g o r n o Karabakh in the South Caucasus, while the population of Abkhazia is excluded from this type of aid. 8. T h e structural s u p p o r t m e a s u r e s for the e c o n o m i e s that e m e r g e d f r o m the Soviet system include budgetary control a n d stabilization of the public treasury. In this c o n n e c t i o n , the International Monetary F u n d has d e c i d e d on the assessment of a tax of twenty dollars per ton of cereal prod u c e d / s o l d in Georgia, which in no way helps the competitiveness of local products. 9. T h e CIF price in Yerevan of a ton of U.S. wheat is $125. By way of illustration, in the last few years in the province of Sissian (where Action Against H u n g e r is undertaking f o o d security projects), the area of land devoted to the growing of cereals fell from 22,000 to 4,000 hectares.

7 Tajikistan: What Role for Nongovernmental Organizations? Jean-Michel Grand, Chris Leather, and Frances Mason

T h e kolkhoz (collective f a r m ) provided the basis f o r rural livelihoods in Tajikistan d u r i n g the Soviet era. T h e b r e a k u p of the Soviet U n i o n a n d the s u b s e q u e n t civil war in Tajikistan ultimately led to the collapse of the kolkhoz a n d to the political a n d e c o n o m i c marginalization of poor, rural h o u s e h o l d s . This c h a p t e r analyzes the i m p a c t of the collapse o n the rural p o o r a n d assesses the o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d cons t r a i n t s f o r n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) w o r k i n g to improve the f o o d security of rural households.

Political Turmoil in the Post-Soviet Era Following the disintegration of the Soviet U n i o n in 1991, the indep e n d e n c e of Tajikistan was a destabilizing f a c t o r f o r this c o u n t r y of fewer t h a n six million people. T h e e n d of the Soviet era m a r k e d the o u t b r e a k of a struggle b e t w e e n the five m a i n regionalist g r o u p s in T a j i k i s t a n : L e n i n a b a d i s , G h a r m i s , P a m i r i s , Kulyabis, a n d e t h n i c Uzbeks. T h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s are d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r a r e a of origin. T h e causes of t h e 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 civil war are m u l t i f a r i o u s a n d c o m p l e x , involving ideological, religious, a n d e t h n i c factors. O n e issue, which is given relatively little coverage in the analyses of the conflict, is the e x t e n t to which the conflict was a struggle f o r control of the resources of the c o u n t r y (land, cotton, a n d a l u m i n u m ) a n d f o r c o n t r o l of the g o v e r n m e n t , which r e m a i n s synonymous with p o w e r a n d self-enrichment. T h e war was also motivated by a desire to control the d r u g trafficking network. T h e d r u g t r a d e is a m a j o r source of

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Chronology September 1991

Independence of Tajikistan from the Soviet Union. July 1992-January 1993 Elections. Height of the civil war. May 1995 Introduction of the Tajik rouble. 1995 First presidential decree allocating land for household use. Devaluation of the national currency. August 1995 Decree legalizing the establishment of private June 1996 dekhan farms. June 1997 Signing of the General Agreement for the Establishment of Peace and National Accord. Second presidential decree allocating land 1997 for household use. Late 1999-early 2000 Parliamentary and presidential elections.

wealth in a c o u n t r y that has a low level of d r u g p r o d u c t i o n b u t is the transit r o u t e for p r o d u c e r s in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, a n d so o n a n d an o p e n d o o r to Russia. A brutal civil war e r u p t e d in 1992, leading to the flight of approxi m a t e l y 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e to n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s ( A f g h a n i s t a n , Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, a m o n g others) a n d to the internal disp l a c e m e n t of an e s t i m a t e d 700,000 p e o p l e . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 50,000 p e o p l e were killed f o r b e l o n g i n g (or o n suspicion of b e l o n g i n g ) to o n e of the regionalist groups. Violence between the d i f f e r e n t factions p r e c l u d e d the e m e r g e n c e of a sense of national identity a n d led the c o u n t r y into a p r o l o n g e d regionalist struggle, which has lasted f o r eight years without any decisive military or political solutions having b e e n f o u n d , despite the signing of a peace a g r e e m e n t in J u n e 1997. T h e c u r r e n t status q u o is mainly d u e to pressure f r o m a Contact G r o u p c o n s i s t i n g of U z b e k i s t a n , T u r k m e n i s t a n , A f g h a n i s t a n , P a k i s t a n , I r a n , a n d Russia, w h i c h led to t h e s i g n i n g of t h e p e a c e a g r e e m e n t . This g r o u p , paradoxically, wants to prevent the instability in Tajikistan f r o m s p r e a d i n g to the rest of Central Asia, even t h o u g h the d i v e r g e n t n a t i o n a l interests of the m e m b e r states of the g r o u p also serve to p r o l o n g the instability in Tajikistan. In 1992, Russia a n d Uzbekistan were n o t satisfied with t h e results of the elections in Tajikistan, which h a d given power to a d e m o c r a t i c

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Islamic majority. T h e two c o u n t r i e s were t h e r e f o r e i n s t r u m e n t a l in t h e o u t b r e a k of civil c o n f l i c t a n d w e r e directly involved militarily t h r o u g h t h e i r t r o o p s o n t h e g r o u n d . Russia a n d Uzbekistan c o u l d n o t take t h e risk of allowing a pro-Islamist g o v e r n m e n t to b e c o m e established in Tajikistan, which c o u l d have b e c o m e a backyard f o r U z b e k Islamist o p p o s i t i o n a n d c o u l d have h a d a d o m i n o e f f e c t o n C e n t r a l Asian r e p u b l i c s a n d o n t h e volatile M u s l i m r e p u b l i c s of Russia. Russia's s u p p o r t led to t h e Kulyabi g r o u p ' s c o m i n g to power. Consequently, t h e p r e s e n t g o v e r n m e n t is fully in favor of a p e r m a n e n t Russian military p r e s e n c e o n Tajik territory. As for Uzbekistan, its s u p p o r t e r s were e x c l u d e d f r o m the peace process a n d f r o m gove r n m e n t structures. Uzbekistan is now c o n c e r n e d that its i n f l u e n c e is j e o p a r d i z e d by the Russian military p r e s e n c e . T h e two countries clash t h r o u g h t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r d i f f e r e n t Tajik factions as they j o s t l e f o r power a n d control of a country that is of m a j o r political a n d e c o n o m ic significance in the region. Currently, Tajikistan is still e n g a g e d in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a difficult peace process, which is m a d e all the m o r e fragile by a lack of will to c o m p r o m i s e a n d the t h r e a t of a r e s u m p t i o n of fighting. T h e latter is most likely to be initiated by the parties e x c l u d e d f r o m the p o w e r s t r u c t u r e s a n d f r o m t h e p e a c e p r o c e s s , t h a t is, t h e e t h n i c Uzbek a n d the L e n i n a b a d i populations. T h e c u r r e n t political scene is tripartite in n a t u r e : • •

•

T h e Kulyabis s u p p o r t e d by Russia c o n t r o l t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l structures. T h e e t h n i c Uzbek p o p u l a t i o n a n d the L e n i n a b a d i s are excluded f r o m t h e s e g o v e r n m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d f r o m t h e p e a c e process b u t are s u p p o r t e d by Uzbekistan. A d e m o c r a t i c Islamic opposition, consisting mainly of Gharmis a n d Pamiris, is s u p p o r t e d n e i t h e r by Russia n o r Uzbekistan b u t could play an i n t e r m e d i a r y role if a conflict e m e r g e s between t h e first two parties. This g r o u p also r e p r e s e n t s a significant a r m e d f o r c e in t h e c o u n t r y a n d , f o l l o w i n g t h e 1997 p e a c e a g r e e m e n t , has b e e n progressively involved in the power structures.

This political situation does n o t favor a quick s e t t l e m e n t of the Tajik conflict. T h e c u r r e n t balance r e m a i n s extremely precarious a n d could d e g e n e r a t e into conflict, despite the c o m b i n e d efforts of intern a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h as t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s M i s s i o n of

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Tajikistan

Observers in Tajikistan ( U N M O T ) , the Organization for Security and C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e ( O S C E ) , a n d the C o n t a c t G r o u p , which are all working toward a national and international s e t t l e m e n t o f the conflict. T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n still e x i s t s b u t will r e q u i r e t h e w i l l i n g n e s s to s h a r e t h e p o w e r a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n a l i s t f a c t i o n s . P a r l i a m e n t a r y a n d p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s were h e l d in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 9 a n d February 2 0 0 0 , the first multiparty elections in the history o f the country. Although the parliamentary elections were m o n i t o r e d by t h e O S C E , 1 t h e r e were many c o n c e r n s o f irregularities r e p o r t e d during the campaigns and voting. 2 T h e results showed an a p p a r e n t t u r n o u t o f 9 8 p e r c e n t a n d the i n c u m b e n t presid e n t winning by a 9 6 . 4 p e r c e n t majority. However, the fear that the opposition m e m b e r s might lose their position in the g o v e r n m e n t was at least temporarily lessened, as the president e n s u r e d that their 3 0 p e r c e n t o f seats were r e t a i n e d . Russia has since m a d e it c l e a r that w e r e t h e c o u n t r y to d e s c e n d i n t o p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l o n c e m o r e , Russia's forces would n o t hesitate to u n d e r t a k e a military intervention.

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Collapse of Agriculture and the Food Crisis C o n t i n u i n g military a n d political tensions have served only to exacerbate a n d p r o l o n g t h e e c o n o m i c crisis that has resulted f r o m the collapse of the Soviet e c o n o m i c system a n d the civil war. Tajikistan was a l r e a d y t h e p o o r e s t r e p u b l i c in t h e Soviet U n i o n . T h e e n d of t h e Soviet era resulted in the cessation of subsidies f r o m Moscow a n d of the supply of raw materials a n d inputs f r o m o t h e r Soviet states. T h e rate of u n e m p l o y m e n t soared without any h o p e of social p r o t e c t i o n f r o m the central g o v e r n m e n t . T h e p o s t c o m m u n i s t a n d postwar period d u r i n g which t h e r e has b e e n s o m e m o v e m e n t toward the establ i s h m e n t of d e m o c r a c y a n d a free-market e c o n o m y has failed to live u p to t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , a n d t h e r e is a pervasive sense of nostalgia f o r the previous system, w h e n the state assured the provision of f o o d , access to f r e e health care, e d u c a t i o n , pensions, a n d salaries, even if these were low. T h e civil war led to the f u r t h e r b r e a k d o w n of e c o n o m i c networks, a loss of c o n f i d e n c e by investors, d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e p r o d u c t i v e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , e m i g r a t i o n of professionals, a n d capital flight. T h e absence of c o h e r e n t a n d effective policies to address these p r o b l e m s causes r e s e n t m e n t a m o n g the general p o p u l a t i o n , which sees political l e a d e r s as r u l i n g t h e c o u n t r y in t h e i r own i n t e r e s t a n d t h a t of their region of origin. T h e political a n d e c o n o m i c instability of the c o u n t r y c o m b i n e d with the self-interest of the g o v e r n m e n t has led to k n e e - j e r k r e a c t i o n s in t h e f o r m of p o l i c i e s p r o v i d i n g s h o r t - t e r m responses to long-term p r o b l e m s . This is particularly well illustrated in t h e agricultural sector. P r i o r to t h e b r e a k u p of t h e Soviet U n i o n , t h e m a i n s o u r c e of livelihood f o r rural h o u s e h o l d s was t h e collective f a r m (the kolkhoz) o r t h e state f a r m (the sovkhoz). Workers o n these f a r m s were paid f o r working as m e m b e r s of a brigade, which was responsible f o r a particular tract of land. T h e state told the kolkhoz what s h o u l d be p r o d u c e d a n d in what quantity. T h e workers were paid in relation to p r o d u c t i o n targets set by the f a r m . Until 1995, t h e k o l k h o z were still able to pay t h e i r m e m b e r s a small salary, d e s p i t e t h e f a l l o f f in p r o d u c t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e b r e a k d o w n of the centrally p l a n n e d e c o n o m y a n d the effects of the civil war. However, the devaluation of the currency in that year led to the b a n k r u p t c y of most of t h e state a n d collective farms. Since that time, the farms have b e e n u n a b l e to recover a n d usually have to sell their p r o d u c e in advance to pay off debts. T h e productivity of t h e k o l k h o z has also b e e n a f f e c t e d by t h e same r a n g e of factors, resulting in the collapse of overall e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n . T h e f a r m s have s u f f e r e d in particular f r o m the

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• • • • •

breakdown in the system for the supply of inputs and of distribution channels; destruction, looting, and deterioration of buildings, irrigation systems, and assets; emigration of skilled professionals; control of the input supply and marketing by state monopolies; breakdown of the system for the control and monitoring of production, resulting in increased corruption and the diversion of capital and assets.

By 1995, the collapse of agricultural production combined with the poor harvest of the previous year led to a food supply crisis and to dramatic increases in the price of wheat. At this time, Tajikistan was the only country in the Commonwealth of I n d e p e n d e n t States (CIS) that had a Ministry of Grain responsible for the regulation of the price of b r e a d . Yet even with this regulation, the price of b r e a d increased sixfold in the first six months of 1995. The country needed to import 600,000 metric tons of wheat per year but lacked the financial resources to pay market prices. In a country in which only 7 percent of the land is arable, access to land and food is a sensitive issue, and sound economic policies must be based on careful consideration of the most effective and efficient use of land. Strategies to meet the food requirements of the population are no longer constrained only by the limited availability of cultivable land. The country also urgently requires foreign currency to be able to acquire spare parts, fuel, and raw materials for both the industrial and agricultural sectors in order to increase production and thereby enable the payment of normal wages and the provision of social protection to the population. Cotton and aluminum were the largest foreign exchange earners during the Soviet period and remain a m a j o r source of revenue for the g o v e r n m e n t . In effect, there is a trade-off between food production and foreign currency earned from the export of cotton, since wheat and cotton compete for the limited land available.

Government Responses to the Food Crisis Faced with a food supply crisis in 1995, the government was forced to rapidly introduce policies to address the problem of food shortages in the near to medium term. Primarily, this meant increasing the production of wheat on collective farms and allocating land for the pro-

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d u c t i o n of w h e a t a t t h e h o u s e h o l d level, e v e n if this was a t t h e e x p e n s e of cotton p r o d u c t i o n . In 1995, the first presidential d e c r e e was issued allocating 50,000 hectares of f a r m l a n d f o r h o u s e h o l d use. This was primarily targeted at professionals a n d recipients of state benefits, i n c l u d i n g teachers, doctors, e n g i n e e r s , a n d p e n s i o n e r s . In 1997, a s e c o n d p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c r e e allocated a f u r t h e r 25,000 hectares, this time prioritizing the n e e d s of collective f a r m e r s . T h e d u r a t i o n of use of this so-called Presidential L a n d allocated by the g o v e r n m e n t is o f t e n n o t precisely d e f i n e d a n d is left to the discretion of the kolkhoz leaders. In some instances, the kolkhoz has taken back t h e plot of l a n d a f t e r two or t h r e e harvests a f t e r t h e fertility has i m p r o v e d a n d has allocated an i n f e r i o r plot to the h o u s e h o l d . T h e measures taken by the g o v e r n m e n t following the f o o d crisis of 1995 could be described as short-term decisions m a d e to r e d u c e the f o o d p r o d u c t i o n deficit. More recently, however, the g o v e r n m e n t has started to review its policy of land r e f o r m s a n d wheat p r o d u c t i o n in light of the n e e d f o r foreign currency. T h e c u r r e n t t r e n d in t h e national policy has b e e n to increase or to at least m a i n t a i n levels of cotton p r o d u c t i o n . T h e g o v e r n m e n t still asks the kolkhoz to plant a certain p r o p o r t i o n of their land with cotton (often u p to 60 p e r c e n t ) . T h e r e has also b e e n r e c o g n i t i o n of the n e e d to establish a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e allocation of l a n d to p e r m i t h o u s e h o l d s to m e e t t h e i r f o o d r e q u i r e m e n t s t h r o u g h their own p r o d u c t i o n while e n s u r i n g that f a r m sizes are sufficient to maximize p r o d u c t i o n f o r the p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e . T h e r e is a limit to t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h l a n d r e f o r m c a n involve the f r a g m e n t a t i o n of the land into smaller h o u s e h o l d units. A m a j o r s o u r c e of h a r d c u r r e n c y f o r t h e c o u n t r y is t h e W o r l d Bank, which offers loans o n c o n d i t i o n that the g o v e r n m e n t agrees to i m p l e m e n t t h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s o u t l i n e d by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d (IMF), a m o n g which privatization is, of course, foremost. To d a t e , however, m o s t of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d r e m a i n s t h e p r o p e r t y of the state, a l t h o u g h t h e r e have b e e n significant initiatives to allocate land f o r private use. In J u n e 1996, a d e c r e e legalized the establishment of dehhan or private farms i n d e p e n d e n t of the kolkhoz. A l t h o u g h d e k h a n f a r m e r s d o n o t legally own t h e i r l a n d , they have full h e r e d i t a r y rights, are r e q u i r e d to pay taxes, a n d can m a k e their own decisions r e g a r d i n g cultivation a n d land use. In reality, however, some control has b e e n r e t a i n e d over the use of the land. In fact, the utilization of d e k h a n l a n d is m o n i t o r e d by the Agricultural D e p a r t m e n t of t h e district. If the d e p a r t m e n t considers that the l a n d is n o t b e i n g used efficiently a n d effectively, it can be reclaimed by the kolkhoz. T h e allocation of

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land to private farmers is clearly not in the personal interests of the leaders of the kolkhoz, who would ultimately lose a part of their power, influence, and ability to profit from the diversion of capital and produce. However, a variety of attitudes is apparent among chairmen, ranging f r o m pure self-interest to a genuine concern for the social and economic development of the members of the kolkhoz and their region. Despite pressure from international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, or from donors, such as the European Union and the United States of America, to promote privatization of the land, the government is still reluctant to do so. O n e of the reasons could be the risk of losing control over the economy, especially in cotton production, which is one of the major sources of revenue for the Tajik government. The government is still able to exert firm control over the kolkhoz by determining the levels of cotton production and controlling the supply of inputs and the distribution channels. Government agricultural policy since the end of the civil war may be characterized as short term and lacking in coherence and consistency. To some extent, it has been necessary to address the immediate problem of ensuring an adequate supply of food for the population. However, there has been little progress in implementing the reforms that would enable longer-term increases in agricultural production. T h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s of the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the lack of a c o h e r e n t national economic policy have affected the most vulnerable households in particular. T h e brief analysis presented above reveals the marginalization of the majority of rural households from the benefits of large-scale agricultural production.

Analysis of the Food Security of Rural Households Impact of the Collapse of the Kolkhoz at the Household

Level

The most significant impact of the economic collapse on collective farmers was the low level or nonpayment of salaries. There is no obligation for people to work on the kolkhoz. However, a number of factors "encourage" families to "offer" their labor. These factors vary in the extent to which they can be considered as coercive and verging on forced labor. The kolkhoz do offer various forms of remuneration for work beyond cash payment: for instance, collection of fuel wood

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a n d t h e a l l o c a t i o n of low-quality l a n d . Most o f t e n t h e s e incentives a r e j u s t s u f f i c i e n t to a t t r a c t w o r k e r s while b e i n g k e p t to a m i n i m u m by t h e k o l k h o z to r e d u c e p r o d u c t i o n costs. M a n y w o r k e r s c o n t i n u e t h e i r l a b o r in a n t i c i p a t i o n of f u t u r e p a y m e n t . C i r c u m s t a n c e s h a v e b e e n r e p o r t e d in w h i c h p e o p l e a r e forcibly m a d e to work o n t h e k o l k h o z a n d t h r e a t e n e d if they r e f u s e . Alternative Sources of Cash

Income

T h e possibility of e a r n i n g cash o u t s i d e of t h e k o l k h o z is also severely l i m i t e d . T h e g o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t a f f o r d to pay, o n a r e g u l a r basis, t h e salaries of p u b l i c s e c t o r w o r k e r s o r t h e b e n e f i t s of t h o s e classified as b e i n g v u l n e r a b l e , s u c h as p e n s i o n e r s a n d d i s a b l e d p e o p l e . T h e econ o m i c crisis has h a d t h e s a m e result o n t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r as o n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l sector, r e s u l t i n g in h i g h rates of u n e m p l o y m e n t . T r a d e is c o n t r o l l e d by t h e m a f i a to t h e e x c l u s i o n of small b u s i n e s s p e o p l e . As a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e s e l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s a d o p t c o p i n g strategies s u c h as i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e d r u g t r a d e , migrat i o n to towns a n d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , a n d t e m p o r a r y c o n t r a c t l a b o r in c o n s t r u c t i o n o r as m a r k e t carriers.

Household

Food Production and Its Determinants

In t h e a b s e n c e of i n c o m e f r o m t h e k o l k h o z a n d b e c a u s e of t h e lack of a l t e r n a t i v e i n c o m e e a r n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s , r u r a l h o u s e h o l d s a r e heavily d e p e n d e n t f o r t h e i r f o o d security o n t h e i r own p r o d u c t i o n f r o m s m a l l p l o t s of l a n d . O w i n g t o t h e low l e v e l s of p r o d u c t i o n , t h e a m o u n t of s u r p l u s f o o d available is l i m i t e d . T h e h o u s e h o l d e c o n o m y revolves a r o u n d c o n s t a n t trade-offs b e t w e e n t h e c o n s u m p t i o n of suffic i e n t f o o d a n d t h e sale of p r o d u c e to p u r c h a s e basic necessities s u c h as oil, sugar, salt, m e d i c i n e s , a n d c l o t h i n g . F o o d a n d cash i n c o m e a r e o f t e n i n s u f f i c i e n t to c o v e r all r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h u s t h r e a t e n i n g t h e n u t r i t i o n a l , h e a l t h , a n d e d u c a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e capacity of h o u s e h o l d s to m e e t t h e i r f o o d r e q u i r e m e n t s t h r o u g h t h e i r own p r o d u c t i o n is d e t e r m i n e d by a r a n g e of factors. Access to land. D e s p i t e t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d o n t h e u s e o f P r e s i d e n t i a l L a n d a n d t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of t e n u r e , t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t its a l l o c a t i o n has m a d e a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e to t h e f o o d security of b o t h u r b a n a n d r u r a l h o u s e h o l d s . In t h e a b s e n c e of s u f f i c i e n t cash i n c o m e , s u c h l a n d is o f t e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e of f o o d f o r m a n y families. Ultimately, however, t h e access of h o u s e h o l d s to l a n d f o r t h e i r o w n p r o d u c t i o n is l i m i t e d by t h e lack of c u l t i v a b l e

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l a n d , t h e p r i o r i t i e s of t h e n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y , a n d local political relationships. T h e m e t h o d a n d capacity of i r r i g a t i o n a r e t h e m o s t signific a n t factors a n d may a c c o u n t f o r u p to 50 p e r c e n t of t h e shortfall in p o t e n t i a l yield. I r r i g a t i o n systems h a v e c e a s e d to f u n c t i o n b e c a u s e c h a n n e l s have b e c o m e b r o k e n o r c l o g g e d by s e d i m e n t , p u m p i n g syst e m s have b r o k e n d o w n , a n d capital a n d s p a r e p a r t s to m a k e r e p a i r s a r e lacking. In m a n y cases, t h e system of o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t u s e d to ensure their maintenance and management no longer functions. W i t h o u t irrigation, h o u s e h o l d s a r e u n a b l e to harvest a s e c o n d c r o p of c e r e a l s in t h e s a m e year, t h u s r e d u c i n g significantly t h e q u a n t i t y of f o o d a c q u i r e d f r o m t h e i r own p r o d u c t i o n . Irrigation.

Access to inputs. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r t h a t d e t e r m i n e s h o u s e h o l d o u t p u t is access to i n p u t s , s u c h as high-quality seeds, fertilizers, tools, p e s t i c i d e s , f u e l , a n d s p a r e p a r t s f o r m a c h i n e r y . F a r m m a c h i n e r y is e i t h e r u n a v a i l a b l e , i n o p e r a b l e , o r u n s u i t a b l e f o r u s e by i n d i v i d u a l f a r m e r s o n small plots of l a n d . conditions. C l i m a t e plays a h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e a n d c a n a c c o u n t f o r m a r k e d variations in productivity f r o m year to year, particularly in rain-fed areas. In K h a t l o n O b l a s t in t h e s o u t h w e s t of t h e c o u n t r y , t h e l e n g t h of t h e g r o w i n g s e a s o n d e c r e a s e s by a b o u t o n e m o n t h f r o m west to east, mainly as a result of t h e i n c r e a s e in a l t i t u d e . Climatic

T h e capacity of h o u s e h o l d s to k e e p livestock is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e e x t e n t of t h e i r access to p a s t u r e , f o d d e r , a n d v e t e r i n a r y services. Most h o u s e h o l d s c a n n o t a f f o r d to p u r c h a s e high-quality f e e d f o r t h e i r livestock, w h i c h c o u l d i n c r e a s e m i l k yields a n d i m p r o v e t h e h e a l t h of t h e a n i m a l s a n d h e n c e t h e cash i n c o m e of t h e family. Livestock.

To s o m e e x t e n t , all of t h e a b o v e f a c t o r s a r e influe n c e d by t h e availability of l a b o r w i t h i n t h e family. O v e r t h e p a s t seven to e i g h t years t h a t availability may have b e e n r e d u c e d as result of d e a t h s ( f r o m war o r disease) a n d e c o n o m i c m i g r a t i o n . T h e r e t u r n e e p o p u l a t i o n has b e e n particularly a f f e c t e d in this r e s p e c t . In s o m e " r e t u r n e e villages," over 25 p e r c e n t of h o u s e h o l d s a r e h e a d e d by w o m e n . However, even t h o s e h o u s e h o l d s less directly a f f e c t e d by t h e war may have e x p e r i e n c e d a loss of a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r as m e m b e r s (particularly y o u n g m e n ) have m i g r a t e d to t h e capital, D u s h a n b e , o r to o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in t h e CIS to seek work. T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e n o t only h a s a n i m p a c t o n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y b u t h a s s i g n i f i c a n t social costs d u e to t h e b r e a k u p of t h e family u n i t .

Availability of labor.

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Vulnerabilities and Capacity t o Cope of Poor, Rural Households A final f a c t o r to take into c o n s i d e r a t i o n in analyzing f o o d security is the capacity o f h o u s e h o l d s to c o p e with a d h o c events that f u r t h e r r e d u c e the productivity o f the h o u s e h o l d , such as the d e a t h o f a family m e m b e r o r p o o r rainfall resulting in a p o o r harvest. If in a b a d year the h o u s e h o l d e x p e r i e n c e s a d r o p in f o o d i n c o m e f r o m its own prod u c t i o n , it may b e f o r c e d to sell s o m e o f its assets, notably livestock, in o r d e r to a c q u i r e f o o d a n d o t h e r necessities. T h e risk is that the capacity o f h o u s e h o l d s to withstand the effects o f f u r t h e r setbacks will gradually b e e x h a u s t e d . T h i s is particularly true f o r the r e t u r n e e p o p ulation, which e x p e r i e n c e d a l m o s t total loss o f its capital a n d assets d u r i n g the war. D e s p i t e the fact that the m a j o r i t y o f r e f u g e e s have b e e n resettled in their f o r m e r villages f o r at least two to three years, m o s t have still n o t b e e n a b l e to r e b u i l d sufficient assets a n d capital to s e e t h e m t h r o u g h p e r i o d i c h a r d s h i p without j e o p a r d i z i n g their ability to c o p e in the l o n g e r term.

Geography

as a Determinant

of Vulnerability

Analysis o f g e o g r a p h i c a l variations in the i n f l u e n c e o f s o m e o f these factors s u g g e s t s a p a t t e r n that may b e u s e f u l to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the diff e r e n c e s in the f o o d e c o n o m i e s , risk levels, a n d vulnerability o f differe n t g e o g r a p h i c a l areas. Key characteristics that can b e u s e d to distinguish between differe n t f o o d e c o n o m y a r e a s a r e altitude a n d relief as well as proximity to c o m m o d i t y a n d l a b o r markets. A r e a s may b e divided into f o u r categ o r i e s : (1) m o u n t a i n o u s , (2) a c c e s s i b l e r u r a l l o w l a n d , ( 3 ) r e m o t e rural lowland, a n d (4) u r b a n industrial. T h e p r i n c i p a l e c o n o m i c activities in m o u n t a i n o u s a r e a s a r e animal h u s b a n d r y a n d grain a n d fruit p r o d u c t i o n . Even t h o u g h househ o l d s have b e e n a f f e c t e d by the c o l l a p s e o f the k o l k h o z , they have b e e n a b l e to c o p e m u c h m o r e easily than t h o s e in o t h e r a r e a s owing to fewer restrictions o n a c c e s s to a n d u s e o f l a n d a n d to a g r e a t e r diversity in f o o d s o u r c e s t h r o u g h the sale o f fruits, livestock, a n d wild products. Analysis s u g g e s t s that the m o s t v u l n e r a b l e o f all rural h o u s e h o l d s a r e those in the r e m o t e lowlands that d e p e n d a l m o s t exclusively o n their own p r o d u c t i o n to m e e t their f o o d r e q u i r e m e n t s , which they a r e the least a b l e to satisfy owing to the small size a n d p o o r quality o f their plots, the lack o f irrigation, p o o r access to inputs, a n d low l a b o r

74

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availability within the household. These households are most likely to be f o u n d in remote areas, where cotton is the main product of the kolkhoz and cereal production is low. Where the influence of these economic factors is compounded by the impact of the war on household assets, the highest proportion of vulnerable households is likely to be found. T h e situation of poor families in u r b a n areas is t h o u g h t to be even more desperate than that of rural dwellers. Despite the range of i n c o m e - e a r n i n g activities (e.g., wage labor, petty trade, c o n t r a c t labor) available in the cities, these are accessible only to a minority of people on a temporary and irregular basis. Competition is strong, and returns on labor are low.

Opportunities for and Constraints on Humanitarian Assistance Trends in Humanitarian

Assistance

As might be expected, humanitarian intervention began in Tajikistan to address the effects of the war through the provision of material assistance to meet the urgent basic needs of the population. As the situation has c h a n g e d , the n a t u r e of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance has evolved away from direct relief strategies to approaches that seek to build the capacities of households, civil institutions, and government structures to be more productive and self-sufficient. While this transition takes place, interventions have tended increasingly to address the impact of the economic collapse and transition rather than the consequences of the civil war. It is important to emphasize that it is the breakdown of the previous political and economic system and the structural problems inherent in this change that are the fundamental causes of the poverty of so many households. The civil war was a cons e q u e n c e of these c h a n g e s a n d e x a c e r b a t e d t h e i r effects, b u t it should not be seen as the sole determinant of the economic crisis facing the country. Increasing Household

Food

Production

Beyond the free distribution of material inputs, such as food, to meet the needs of the population for survival, the intervention of Action Against H u n g e r is usually geared toward increasing the capacity of vulnerable h o u s e h o l d s to sustainably p r o d u c e their own f o o d . In Tajikistan, the potential for increasing household agricultural pro-

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75

duction is quickly reached owing to the limited availability of land and inputs. Furthermore, increasing food production at the household level is a short-term strategy and may not be desirable f r o m a macroeconomic perspective. Organizations can work within these constraints to increase production f r o m lands already u n d e r cultivation. Unfortunately, this measure may not be sustainable on a long-term basis, since, apart f r o m the small plots a r o u n d individual houses, land allocated to households could be reclaimed at any time by the kolkhoz. Some organizations that have facilitated the lease of land from kolkhoz to households have already experienced this problem. In these circumstances, it is difficult to encourage a community approach to farming. The objective of any intervention often has to remain the development of farming on individual plots. Improved access to agricultural inputs is an objective that NGOs may be able to achieve. Clearly, many households are unable to afford the cost and overheads of high-quality inputs. However, the constraints are such that, even if inputs were distributed free of charge or at subsidized prices, individual families would still have difficulty in acquiring the products they need. NGOs could therefore encourage cooperative purchases and supply inputs to groups of households. There is still an important role for international NGOs to play in providing direct assistance and in increasing the agricultural output of families. Organizations might try to contribute in the following areas: • Assist family farms and collectivities in increasing their food production, having regard to the macroeconomic and political constraints; • Support private initiatives for the creation of small businesses to supply agricultural inputs and to process and market agricultural produce; • Provide "emergency assistance" for the most vulnerable households during the difficult transition period; • Monitor on an o n g o i n g basis the food security situation of families so as to be able to identify any worsening of their vulnerabilities or loss of their ability to cope and to be able to target assistance with greater accuracy. However, the c u r r e n t situation in Tajikistan is such that food production f r o m family plots cannot be the only resource on which rural dwellers can rely to meet their needs. Investment in large-scale a g r i c u l t u r e a n d i n d u s t r i e s is n e e d e d in o r d e r to create j o b s f o r

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those u n a b l e to p r o d u c e e n o u g h o n t h e i r own plots to m e e t t h e i r needs.

Conclusions Since the b r e a k u p of the Soviet U n i o n , rural h o u s e h o l d s in Tajikistan have b e c o m e increasingly marginalized f r o m the m e a n s of improving their access to f o o d a n d cash i n c o m e . T h e b r e a k d o w n of the f o r m e r e c o n o m i c system has led to high rates of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d to the n o n p a y m e n t of wages without the possibility of receiving any u n e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t s f r o m t h e s t a t e . I n t h e a b s e n c e of a l t e r n a t i v e sources of i n c o m e , the majority of h o u s e h o l d s have b e e n f o r c e d to t u r n to the land in o r d e r to m e e t their f o o d r e q u i r e m e n t s . Yet, their capacity to d o so is limited in a f u n d a m e n t a l way by the scarcity of cult i v a b l e l a n d a n d by p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s o n a c c e s s t o l a n d . D y s f u n c t i o n a l input-supply networks a n d irrigation systems f u r t h e r limit the capacity of h o u s e h o l d s to p r o d u c e sufficient f o o d f o r cons u m p t i o n or m a r k e t e x c h a n g e . T h e g o v e r n m e n t is faced with m a j o r dilemmas if it is c o n c e r n e d with improving the f o o d security of the p o p u l a t i o n t h r o u g h r e f o r m s of the agricultural sector. T h e s e d i l e m m a s r e q u i r e choices or tradeoffs to b e m a d e between • • •

f o o d c r o p or cash c r o p p r o d u c t i o n ; collective or private p r o d u c t i o n ; a n d small-scale or large-scale p r o d u c t i o n .

T h e n a t u r e of g o v e r n m e n t policies will be d e t e r m i n e d by personal, e c o n o m i c , n a t i o n a l , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Currently, c h a n g e is i n f r e q u e n t a n d slowly i m p l e m e n t e d . Agricultural policy a p p e a r s to be c a u g h t in an impasse between liberalization a n d state control, as the apparatchiks seek to h o l d o n to a system in which they have p o w e r f u l vested interests, while concessions are m a d e to free-market r e f o r m in o r d e r to maintain international financial support. It is o f t e n these same apparatchiks who derive the benefits f r o m the liberalization of the e c o n o m y as they utilize their financial power a n d political i n f l u e n c e to increase t h e i r c o n t r o l over t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d the trading networks. It is in this chaotic e c o n o m i c "system" that p o o r rural h o u s e h o l d s b e c o m e increasingly marginalized f r o m access to e c o n o m i c a n d political structures. T h e ability of international NGOs to provide assistance in such a c o n t e x t is c o n s t r a i n e d by m a c r o e c o n o m i c a n d political factors t h a t

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77

t h e y a r e n o t w e l l p l a c e d t o a d d r e s s . H o w e v e r , t h e y d o still h a v e a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e t o p l a y i n i m p r o v i n g h o u s e h o l d f o o d security. T h i s c a n b e a c h i e v e d by p r o m o t i n g h o u s e h o l d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n a n d i n c o m e g e n e r a t i o n w h i l e p r o v i d i n g a s a f e t y n e t f o r v u l n e r a b l e h o u s e h o l d s as t h e c o u n t r y p r o c e e d s t h r o u g h an u n p r e d i c t a b l e a n d c o m p l e x political a n d e c o n o m i c t r a n s i t i o n .

Notes Jean-Michel G r a n d is Action Against H u n g e r ' s h e a d of mission in Tajikistan. Chris L e a t h e r is the Action Against H u n g e r officer in charge of f o o d security in Tajikistan. F r a n c e s Mason is h e a d of t h e N u t r i t i o n a n d F o o d Security D e p a r t m e n t of Action Against H u n g e r - L o n d o n . 1. Organization for the Security a n d C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e . 2. C o n f i r m e d by the J o i n t Election Observation Mission to Tajikistan in a press release issued 27 February 2000 on the parliamentary elections.

8 Colombia: A People Displaced by Violence Pablo Alcade Subías

Paz con hambre no dura. La lucha el pan nos asegura. [Peace with hunger cannot endure. Only by fighting can we survive.]

—Painted in the streets of central Bogotá

Forced internal migration in the aftermath of violent events is the most serious consequence of the present armed conflict in Colombia. Its worrying increase is the result of regular attacks on the civilian population, and its immediate consequence is the victims' loss of citizenship. More than 3 percent of the Colombian population is directly affected by this p h e n o m e n o n , which forces its victims to a b a n d o n their property and their region and, in the majority of cases, to join the expanding belts of poverty around the towns. Some 308,000 people are estimated to have been violently displaced during 1998 by the climate of terror, death, and exodus created by the massacres, assassinations, and threats by the various armed groups. In 1999, approximately eight households per hour were driven from their homes in Colombia. 1 The civilian population is the main victim of this endless situation of crisis. As a general rule, confrontations between factions do not spin out of control. It is rare for these factions to reach the point of actual fighting or to engage in direct clashes. In contrast, they prey with impunity on the innocent population and on the groups of isolated farmers who live in conflict zones. Thus, taking their scorchede a r t h strategy to its h e i g h t , guerillas a n d p a r a m i l i t a r i e s l a u n c h extremely violent attacks on families and their property for no reason other than the fact that they happen to live in areas through which

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Food Crises

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either of the two factions pass. These attacks sometimes take the form of atrocious massacres or selective killings. Anyone who is suspected of having given so much as a glass of water to a combatant finds himself immediately in the line of fire of the enemy. The civilian population has become a military target and must consequently "submit, die, or flee," according to the code imposed by the rule of arms. Carlos Castaño, leader of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, a paramilitary g r o u p that emerged out of the movement f o u n d e d by

Colombia

81

stockbreeders and landowners to protect themselves against guerilla incursions, declares: In t h e p r e s e n t i r r e g u l a r war, a civilian p o p u l a t i o n t h a t finds itself c a u g h t u p in military o p e r a t i o n s necessarily b e c o m e s a p a r t i c i p a n t . T h e d i f f e r e n c e is t h a t t h e a i m of t h e g u e r i l l a g r o u p is to m a k e s u r e t h a t its militancy passes u n n o t i c e d within t h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n so t h a t it c a n c o n c e a l its t e r r o r i s t a c t i o n s . T h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n is t h e r e f o r e d r a g g e d i n t o a c o n f l i c t of w h i c h it is t h e p r i m a r y victim. 2

The book La Guerra Moderna states the following: In modern warfare "it is difficult to define the enemy. ... The dividing line between friends and enemies exists within the nation itself, within the same town and sometimes within the same family. Every individual who in one way or another favors the intentions of the enemy must be considered a traitor and treated as such." 3 Faced with the repression and ruthlessness of the guerillas, paramilitary groups, and even the army, Colombians—approximately one and a half million of them at the present time—have been forced to pack their bags and leave with their families, abandoning crops and homes. 4 T h e path they follow is always the same: They head to the nearest suburbs and settle in a marginal space between the trash cans and the sewers where they set up small makeshift homes known as cambunches, made of cardboard and plastic, from which they h o p e to begin a new life. Most of the time the change from farming a fertile plot of land to existence in this new and hostile environment ends up cutting people off from everything and leads to lives of poverty, smallscale selling, ' prostitution, alcoholism, and family violence. The majority of these migratory flows are concentrated in areas on the fringes of urban centers where people attempt with little success to satisfy their immediate needs for health services, food, and water and later their need for housing and work. T h e fundamental consequences are the rupture of the social fabric, collapse of rural economies, and the breakup of rural communities and family units. T h e population density in the areas on the fringes of Colombian towns continues to rise. These populations do not seek to return to their former lands on which they grew yucca, bananas, or corn, but to survive at all costs in the face of the hardship of the urban environment, which is so hostile to the newcomer from the countryside. The government, however, has repeatedly refused to assume its real responsibilities and deludes itself when it argues that return is the only possible option, the only solution worth considering. It seems unaware that this return means an implicit mortal risk, which few families are willing to take. T h e trauma caused by the sight of

82

Food Crises

razed villages a n d of relatives or o t h e r f a r m e r s w h o have b e e n killed prevents t h e majority of displaced p e r s o n s f r o m r e t u r n i n g to t h e i r land. A few m o n t h s later, the family will a t t e m p t to build a new life with its m a k e s h i f t h o m e a n d its possessions now r e d u c e d to a minimum. In his speech delivered o n 7 J a n u a r y 1999, d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s with the A r m e d Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), President A n d r é s Pastrana d e c l a r e d that "Colombia could n o t c o n t i n u e to b e divided into t h r e e irreconcilable countries of which the first kills, the s e c o n d dies a n d t h e t h i r d , t e r r i f i e d , lowers its h e a d a n d averts its gaze." 6 But, in this speech, the p r e s i d e n t f o r g o t to m e n t i o n a f o u r t h country: this Colombia in flight, the victim of barbarity, which has n o o t h e r o p t i o n t h a n to a b a n d o n everything a n d to w a n d e r in search of shelter. I n d e e d , the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t has paid little a t t e n t i o n to the displaced. Unofficially, f o r a l o n g time, the e x o d u s has always b e e n associated with deliberate disruptions of public order, a n d those involved have b e e n suspected of m a i n t a i n i n g c o n n e c t i o n s a n d supp o r t i n g i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s . T h e C o l o m b i a n state never ceases to p r o v e its inability a n d / o r lack of d e s i r e to find s o l u t i o n s f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g causes, provide h u m a n i t a r i a n aid to t h e displaced, a n d alleviate t h e social c o n s e q u e n c e s of d i s p l a c e m e n t . U n d e r E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s g o v e r n m e n t , legal m e a n s to s u p p o r t the displaced were hesitantly c r e a t e d by m e a n s of Act No. 387 of 1997, which provides f o r p r o t e c t i o n in the case of f o r c e d d i s p l a c e m e n t : s u p p o r t , p r o t e c t i o n , assistance, a n d socioeconomic stability f o r those displaced by violence within the Republic of Colombia. But these provisions are merely theoretical a n d are rarely p u t into practice. Similarly, the creation of a Presidential C o u n c i l f o r the S u p p o r t of Displaced P e r s o n s h a d few achievements d u r i n g the previous presidency a n d has r e m a i n e d inactive u n d e r the new administration.

The Geography ofViolence While the C o l o m b i a n conflict e x t e n d s to the whole country, scenes of war are witnessed mainly in the rural areas, f r o m n o r t h to south a n d f r o m e a s t t o w e s t . F A R C g u e r i l l a s c o n t r o l l a r g e a r e a s of t h e A m a z o n i a n region a n d the O r i n o c o basin as well as its traditional bastions in t h e Urabá, a l o n g t h e A n d e s cordillera, a n d o n the Atlantic Coast. T h e National Liberation Army (ELN), a l t h o u g h w e a k e n e d in r e c e n t times, r e m a i n s active in certain parts of M a g d a l e n a a n d Cauca, in the s o u t h of Bolivar, Santanderes, a n d Arauca. O n the o t h e r h a n d ,

Colombia

83

the Autodefensas and other paramilitary groups are rapidly extending their control to an ever-increasing n u m b e r of regions across the country. Based initially in the northwestern regions, their presence is now stronger all along Magdalena, on the Atlantic coast, and they are steadily advancing toward the principal strongholds of the FARC situated in the east of the country. Meanwhile, the government's army has b e e n on the defensive against relentless a n d skillful guerilla attacks. This conflict area coincides with the geographical location of illicit crops in a country that has become the world's top coca producer a n d o n e of the main p r o d u c e r s of m a r i j u a n a and poppy. T h e armed struggle is very often a struggle for control of these zones of cultivation. In other cases, the fighting conceals a fierce battle for control of regions rich in mineral resources (gold, oil, and emeralds). The sources of Colombia's wealth are the root cause of conflict in one of the most biologically diverse places on the continent. 7 From a socioeconomic perspective, the most striking contrast in Colombia is precisely the very visible gulf between extreme wealth and extreme poverty. Economic differences between social groups, so common in all of the Latin American countries, are particularly glaring in Colombia. Unequal and inequitable distribution of wealth in a fragile state in which for decades governments have relied on patronage, political interests, and corruption creates an explosive cocktail of problems that transforms the road to peace into a painful dead end. As a result of these intractable problems, it is always the same groups of families that are displaced by violence and forced to share space with the poorest classes, the marginalized masses in the poverty belts around the villages and towns. When all is said and done, given the state's incapacity, the displaced are the final link in the chain, which only worsens their situation and sows the seeds of future conflict.

The Geography of Displacement From the geographical location of the conflict, a zone of displacem e n t has emerged that covers the country from one end to the other. Regions such as the south (Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare, Vaupés, and Putumayo), U r u b á (Chocó, d'Antioquia, and C ó r d o b a ) , s o u t h e r n Bolivar, Cesar, and Santander are the scene of confrontations, victims of the State's helplessness and passivity. Floods of terrified emigrants are on the move daily, and the map of displacement currently shows large c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of displaced people in the main Colombian

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towns (particularly Bogotá and Medellin, spilling over into Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Villaviciencio, and Cartagena). Smaller towns s u c h as M o n t e r í a a n d S i n c e l e j o on t h e A t l a n t i c c o a s t , B a r r a n c a b e r m e j a in Magdalena Medio, or smaller municipalities (Magangué, El Carmen, Río Sucio) receive even more new families that arrive silent and unaided, crammed together and melting into the anonymity, poverty, and indifference of the urban environment. Yet other groups remain refugees in administrative centers or small villages near the conflict zones, waiting for a truce that never arrives to allow them to return or at least to recover their property or the remainder of their harvests. O n e of the characteristics of Colombia's displaced population is its individual and silent character. Unlike other exoduses in o t h e r parts of the world that become real movements of wandering crowds, in C o l o m b i a such massive mobilizations are u n u s u a l . T h e r e are important exceptions, some of them significant, but the majority of the displaced are m a d e u p of an endless trickle of lowly families whose fear of violence eventually prevails over their attachment to their land and life's work. For this reason, we do not see large concentrations of these united but isolated populations, despite the overall size of the population movement. In Colombia, few camps are set up for the displaced. On the contrary, those who flee prefer to do so discreetly and anonymously. They avoid forming groups with other displaced persons in order not to leave any trace and to prevent violence from pursuing them in their exile, as has very often occurred. Temporary camps or r e f u g e s are specific examples of exceptions to this rule ( t h o u g h insignificant in terms of the n u m b e r of people they accommodate). T h e b e s t k n o w n a m o n g t h e m is t h a t of P a v a r a n d ó ( U r a b á d'Antioquia), although mention should also be made of the coliseum of Q u i b d o or t h a t of T u r b o , t h e d a n g e r o u s r e f u g e s of Barrancabermeja, and the precarious camp for displaced people at Tierradentro (in the south of Córdoba). The steady exodus to towns and villages has resulted in an inordinate increase in the population density of the suburbs as new resid e n t s j o i n t h e i m p o v e r i s h e d p o p u l a t i o n a l r e a d y living t h e r e . Consequently, large urban areas are converted into "districts of the displaced" where the heavy concentration of people has a great effect on the family groups fleeing the conflict zones. Displaced by violence or poverty, each person struggles to survive in surroundings of general degradation in the new citadels of the displaced such as "Nelson M a n d e l a " in C a r t a g e n a , t h e district of C a n t a c l a r o in M o n t e r í a ,

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C i u d a d Bolivar in Bogotá, the c o m m u n e s of Medellin, a n d many others.

The Arduous Road to Peace It is clear t h a t the solution to t h e tragedy of which a million a n d a half C o l o m b i a n s are victims m u s t be t h r o u g h p e a c e a n d a r e t u r n to n o r m a l c y in t h e vast rural stretches of the country. But p e n d i n g t h e a d v e n t of a p e a c e t h a t will b e difficult to achieve, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , r e g i o n s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d act f o r c e f u l l y . A clear policy of social s u p p o r t a n d an e m e r g e n c y p l a n a r e urgently n e e d e d to relieve t h e dire situation to which these g r o u p s are cond e m n e d . This e f f o r t also r e q u i r e s g r e a t e r sensitivity f r o m C o l o m b i a n citizens, w h o s h o u l d establish p r e s s u r e g r o u p s in r e a c t i o n to t h e state's f a i l u r e to a s s u m e its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . T h e solidarity s h o w n a f t e r the tragic e a r t h q u a k e t h a t o c c u r r e d a l o n g the coffee-growing belt, o r Eje cafetero, o n 25 J a n u a r y 1999 has p r o v e d the capacity of C o l o m b i a n s to h e l p t h e most n e e d y p e o p l e in r u r a l areas. For weeks o n e n d , e a r t h q u a k e victims in the Q u i n d i o r e g i o n a n d in parts of t h e n e i g h b o r i n g r e g i o n s received s u p p o r t f r o m all c o r n e r s of t h e country. A h u m a n i t a r i a n tragedy of such scale a n d severity as t h a t of the displaced population should provoke a greater reaction from t h e society. It is u n a c c e p t a b l e to see t h e relative i n d i f f e r e n c e a n d insensitivity shown by various sectors in C o l o m b i a in t h e face of the t r a g e d y of t h o s e f l e e i n g violence. It is also u n a c c e p t a b l e t h a t this very violence has b e e n historically p r o l o n g e d by t h e fragility of the state a n d by t h e gross n e g l i g e n c e a n d i n c o m p e t e n c e of the political class. A r m e d g r o u p s have taken u p positions with impunity t h r o u g h o u t the national territory a n d are seriously t h r e a t e n i n g the stability a n d f u t u r e of present-day C o l o m b i a n society. T h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n is constantly in t h e i r line of Fire. F o r c e d to p a r t i c i p a t e silently in the war, the rural p o p u l a t i o n is c o n d e m n e d to an u n j u s t a n d brutal destiny of h u n g e r a n d u p r o o t i n g . O n c e again, the p e o p l e ' s h u n g e r is o n e of the motives f o r the fighting. T h e h u n g e r of the displaced, o f t e n stripped of their rich a n d productive lands, is the best p r o o f of the s t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o r e s o l v e a c o n f l i c t t h a t h a s b e e n a f i x t u r e of C o l o m b i a n life f o r decades. F r o m a rich a n d varied diet, displaced f a r m e r s have b e e n r e d u c e d to a bowl of rice, i n f a n t m a l n u t r i t i o n , a n d u n h e a l t h y c o n d i t i o n s n e a r sewers a n d g a r b a g e d u m p s in a c o u n t r y w h e r e vast a n d p r o s p e r o u s cattle farms, f a b u l o u s o r e deposits, a n d

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abundant natural reserves contrast with the daily struggle for survival of a million and a half people. Notes P a b l o Alcade Subias is t h e Action Against H u n g e r h e a d of mission in Colombia. 1. Information System on Forced Displacement and H u m a n Rights in Colombia (Sistema de I n f o r m a c i ó n sobre Desplazamiento Forzado y Derechos Humanos en Colombia; SISDES). 2. Letter from the Autodefensas Campesinas of Córdoba and Urabá to the director of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner f o r H u m a n Rights, Almudena Mazarrasa, dated 23 May 1998. 3. La guerra moderna (Bogotá: Army Library, 1963), pp. 32-33. 4. A c c o r d i n g to t h e b u l l e t i n of t h e Agency f o r H u m a n Rights a n d Displacement (CODHES) of July 1998, the army is the cause of 6 percent of displacements, the guerillas 22 percent, and the paramilitaries 54 percent. 5. T h e resale activity (of water, fruit, a n d vegetables) constitutes the main resource of the informal economy. 6. Release of the Press Agency of the Office of the President of the Republic. 7. Colombia possesses natural sites of exceptional beauty. T h e Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, Choco, Amazonia, the "Llanos Orientales," Sierra de La Macarena, a n d a great variety of national parks are a few examples of Colombia's diversity.

Bibliography Action Against Hunger. Análisis del desplazamiento en la Costa Atlántica. Madrid: Action Against Hunger, 1997. Action Against Hunger. Análisis del desplazamiento en el departamento de Córdoba. Madrid: Action Against Hunger, 1999. Action Against Hunger. El sur de Córdoba y Montería: áreas de conflictos, pobreza y desplazamiento. Revista interacción. Bogotá: Cedial, 1999. Aldana, Walter, et al. Conflictos regionales. Atlántico y pacífico. Bogotá: IEPRI et FESCOL, 1998. Castaño, Berta Lucía, et al. Violencia política y trabajo sicosocial. Bogotá: Corporación AURE, 1998. C o d h e s i n f o r m a . Boletín de la Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (October 1998; December 1998; February 1999). Fundación Revivir. Estudio de la realidad para transformarla. Bogotá: Fundación Revivir, 1995. Memorias del encuentro Colombo-español Paz en conflictos de baja intensidad: el caso colombiano. Bogotá: Colección Ejemplos de Paz, 1996. Negrete, Victor. Los desplazados por la violencia en Colombia. El caso de Córdoba. Antillas: 1995. Negrete, Victor, et al. Urabá, conflictos y educación rural. Bogotá: Corporación Universitaria del Sinú, 1998. Reyes Posada, A l e j a n d r o , et al. Pacificar la paz. Bogotá: C o m m i s s i o n to Combat Violence, 1992.

9 Guatemala: Inequality and Food Security Carmelo Gallardo

Do not expect foreigners to remind you of what you owe them because you must have a conscience and the wisdom to do so. All of your good deeds must come from your own initiative.

—Popol Vuh1

Guatemala is a country of contrasts. I can still r e m e m b e r my first impressions u p o n arriving in Guatemala in January 1999. These were based mainly u p o n amusing visual contrasts: the colorful blouses of the indigenous women contrasting with the sad, monotonous blue of the Pepsi Cola logo that, like a threat, can be seen on school walls and on road signs; the buses, which never stop but which pollute nonstop, loaded with a h o d g e p o d g e of m e r c h a n d i s e and dangerously overtaking the bicycles ridden by the indigenous people of the high plateaus; the numerous, well-stocked supermarkets in all the large municipalities, in particular those of the capital, which c o m p e t e against itinerant street vendors, the most visible part of the country's informal economy. Guatemala is also a country rife with internal divisions. In terms of ethnicity, the indigenous population accounts for 60 percent of the total population. Since the beginning of the Spanish conquest, this g r o u p has been excluded when not exploited by the mixed-blood population. From the ideological point of view, the spirit of confrontation and resistance remains, even though the armed conflict has ended. This was clear in the May 1999 referendum when the constitutional reforms i n t e n d e d to provide a legal structure for the 1996 peace accords were r e j e c t e d . In terms of access to goods a n d services, 87

Chronology 1524

Spanish conquest led by Pedro Alvarado. Twothirds of the indigenous population killed. 15 September 1821 Guatemala achieves independence. 1871 Beginning of the open market period with Justino Barrios. German influence. Land held by the church and indigenous peoples is confiscated and distributed to large property holders for coffee production. 1914-1918 World War I. Decline of German influence and rise of U.S. influence. 1931 Jorge Ubico, a conservative and Nazi sympathizer, is elected president. Laws banning vagrancy are introduced. 1944 Faced with popular opposition, Ubico resigns. A military triumvirate takes power. T h e October revolution introduces democracy. 1950 Jacob Arbenz is elected president. 1951 The Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) is legalized. The Agricultural Reform Law is passed. 1952 1953 Confiscation of uncultivated lands, which are distributed to 100,000 families. 1954 Counterrevolution led by Castillo Armas and supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Installation of a military government. 1962 Birth of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). Talks begin with the guerillas, but the antiguerilla crackdown is rapidly intensified. 1968 Rupture between the PGT and the FAR. 1975 The Poor People's Guerrilla Army (EGP) gains prominence by assassinating the "Tiger of Ixclân," a landowner with a reputation for cruelty. 4 February 1976 Earthquake leaves twenty-five thousand dead. 1979 The People's Armed Organization (ORPA) emerges by assassinating thirty-nine people. 3 January 1980 The police set fire to the Spanish Embassy. November 1981 Beginning of the "scorched earth" policy. 7 February 1982 The PGT, FAR, EGP, and ORPA organize the URNG (the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Union). 23 March 1982 Rios Mont leads a coup d'état and intensifies the scorched earth policy. An estimated 150,000 peasants flee to Chiapas; others form the Popular Resistance Movement (CPR). 14 January 1986 Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democrats is elected president. (continues)

Chronology Continued 30 May 1987 7 O c t o b e r 1987 9 O c t o b e r 1987 27 D e c e m b e r 1987 1990

25 July 1991 8 O c t o b e r 1992 20 J a n u a r y 1993

29 March 1994 1 7 J u n e 1994 2 3 J u n e 1994

31 March 1995 5 O c t o b e r 1995 7 J a n u a r y 1996 6 May 1996 19 N o v e m b e r 1996

4 D e c e m b e r 1996 7 D e c e m b e r 1996 12 D e c e m b e r 1996 29 D e c e m b e r 1996

26 April 1998 25 February 1999

16 May 1999

T h e National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) is f o r m e d . Talks begin between the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the URNG. Talks b r o k e n off at the request of the army. Creation of the CCPP ( P e r m a n e n t Commission for Refugees) in Mexico. Meetings are arranged between the guerillas a n d various sectors of the country in El Escorial (with the political parties), Ottawa (with the business sector) , Quito (with religious leaders), Pepetec (with the workers' union), a n d Atlixo (with scholars, supporters, professionals, a n d small business owners). Conclusion of Framework A g r e e m e n t on Democratization for Peace t h r o u g h Political Means. A g r e e m e n t between the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the CCPP for the r e t u r n of refugees to Guatemala. First organized a n d collective r e t u r n of refugees. T h e c o m m u n i t y of the "January 20th Victory" is founded. Comprehensive A g r e e m e n t o n H u m a n Rights. A g r e e m e n t o n the resettlement of populations u p r o o t e d by the a r m e d conflict. Creation of a commission to investigate h u m a n rights violations a n d acts of violence p e r p e t r a t e d against the Guatemalan population. A g r e e m e n t on the Identity a n d Rights of the I n d i g e n o u s Population. X a m á n massacre: T h e army assassinates eleven peasants. Arzú-Irigoyen is elected president. A g r e e m e n t o n socioeconomic a n d agrarian issues. A g r e e m e n t o n the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of civilian authority a n d on the role of the army in a d e m o cratic society. Definitive cease-fire a g r e e m e n t . A g r e e m e n t o n constitutional r e f o r m a n d the electoral system. A g r e e m e n t to legalize the URNG. A g r e e m e n t for the b r o a d e n i n g , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , a n d fulfillment of the A g r e e m e n t s for a Firm a n d Lasting Peace. Assassination of Monsignor Girardi. Submission of the r e p o r t "Guatemala Report: Memory of Silence" by the Comision de Esclarecimiento Historico (commission investigating the events). R e f e r e n d u m to ratify constitutional reforms.

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Guatemala, like Brazil, has the widest gap in Latin America: Twenty percent of the population is rich and 20 percent poor. This internal division between rich and poor has its roots in the extreme inequalities in consumption levels and above all in land ownership. A mere 2.56 percent of the population owns 65.1 percent of the land. What is the relationship between this inequality in land distribution and the food security of the population? This chapter attempts to provide two responses to this question: •

•

To highlight the inequality in the nutritional standards of the population in a country in which chronic illnesses (diabetes, heart disease) have increased by 100 percent in this decade and are accompanied by nutritional deficiencies and infant malnutrition (INCAP 1998). To show how inequality creates the food insecurity with which the majority of Guatemalans live. Indeed, access to land influences the availability of food resources, while uneven income distribution affects in turn the possibility of access to land.

Widespread Poverty During the period from 1960 to 1996, Guatemala experienced one of the most tragic armed conflicts in Latin America, resulting in more than 100,000 dead, an equal n u m b e r of wounded and maimed, thousands of d i s a p p e a r a n c e s , over a million d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n s , a n d 120,000 refugees. Since the D e c e m b e r 1996 A g r e e m e n t f o r a Firm a n d Lasting Peace, stability has r e t u r n e d to Guatemala. However, even t h o u g h peace has been achieved, it must still be consolidated. Justice and peace must be s t r e n g t h e n e d and r e f u g e e s a n d displaced persons resettled. Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America, with a population estimated in 1996 at 10.92 million. Population density is 100.4 persons per square kilometer, 2 and annual population growth (projected at 2.6 percent for the period 1995-2015) is the highest in Latin America. Sixty-five percent of the population lives in rural areas and 22 percent in the capital. 3 The adult illiteracy rate is 44 percent, the highest in the region. Nicaragua, at 34.3 percent, has the second highest rate; Costa Rica, at 5.2 percent, has the lowest rate. In Guatemala, this lack of education directly or indirectly exacerbates the country's principal problems.

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Persons with little education are more likely to be unemployed, and most of them are poor. Socioeconomic and cultural exclusion sometimes prevents citizens from exercising their civil and political rights in a nation that is in the midst of a transition toward peace. Moreover, the weakening of the institutions that contribute to an individual's emotional stability and identity (school and family) explains much of the crime in Guatemala. Guatemala has the highest mortality rate of any Central American country (6.7 percent per thousand in 1995) d u e to the inadequate health care system and the high crime rate. 4 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has developed multidimensional indexes, such as the H u m a n Development Index (HDI). 5 Of the 174 countries studied, Guatemala ranked 111th in the 1995 HDI (UNDP 1998b). The index of u n m e t basic needs (UBN) is generally used to measure levels of poverty. 6 If a basic need is not met, an individual or family is considered to be poor. Paradoxically, with this method, food is not considered to be essential to the individual. In Central America, thanks to the work of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP), among others, a basket of basic goods and services that provides 100 percent of the calories n e e d e d by the average individual is the m e t h o d most widely used to determine the threshold of extreme poverty. An individual who does not have access to all of these goods is considered to be indigent. Guatemala's National Statistical Institute uses a n o t h e r basket of basic goods and services in which food accounts for 42.25 percent of the total weighting. An individual who lacks access to this b a s k e t of g o o d s a n d services is p l a c e d in t h e c a t e g o r y of p o o r Guatemalans. This m e t h o d of baskets of basic goods and services was used by the World Bank in Guatemala for its 1995 study. T h e main conclusions of that study are as follows: •

Seventy-five percent of the population is poor, meaning that they do not earn enough to purchase essential goods and services. • Fifty-eight percent of the population is indigent, that is to say, below the threshold of extreme poverty. They thus do not have enough buying power to purchase the basket of basic goods to meet their needs.

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•

•

•

In comparison with other countries with identical incomes, Guatemala exhibits a very high level of poverty relative to per capita Gross National Product. Poverty mainly affects rural areas (principally the high plateau regions), the least educated (79 percent of uneducated heads of households are poor as opposed to 48 percent for those with a secondary school education), and the indigenous population (90 percent are poor as opposed to 66 percent for the nonindigenous population). A poor resident of Guatemala City, the capital, has a mean income that is 19 percent below the poverty threshold, whereas a poor person living in a rural area has an income 54 percent below the threshold.

Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala (1985) provides as follows: "The economic and social system of the Republic of Guatemala is based on principles of social justice. It is the obligation of the State to direct national policy in such a way as to make full use of the State's natural resources and human potential, to increase wealth and to try to achieve full employment and equitable distribution of the national income." Seventy-five percent of the population of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua is poor. How is it that Guatemala, with a per capita income twice that of Honduras and Nicaragua, has the same level of poverty? 7 Is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the most important index used to measure economic production, unevenly distributed among the population? The World Bank is clear on this: Of the fortyfour countries used in the comparison with the same per capita GDP (between $2,000 and $4,000 per annum) adjusted to reflect purchasing power, Guatemala is ranked first on the poverty indexes (World Bank 1995). Historically, inequality already existed in Mayan society during the classical period (from 150 A.D. to the tenth century). It was based on a system of classes in which an elite class held religious and political power. Spanish colonization altered the ethnic composition of the hierarchy and raised problems of access to land. These problems were exacerbated by the market-oriented reforms of 1870, which distributed communal and municipal land to coffee producers. A political and social analysis of the current situation reveals inequities in the exercise of civil rights. Indeed, in past elections, no more than 18 percent of registered voters have ever voted. From a geographical point of view, the HDI shows a difference that is more than double between Guatemala City and one of the

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northern departments. 8 Moreover, expenditures are unequal, since Guatemala continues to be one of the countries on the continent with the lowest level of social spending. 9 A graphic illustration of this inequality is the fact that in 1990, the spending on the two largest hospitals in the capital was more than the amount spent on all the other health centers in the country. 10 A comparative analysis of the various official agricultural surveys carried out in Guatemala between 1964 and 1979 (the last year for which figures are available) reveals disturbing trends in land ownership patterns: The size of properties owned has increased by 20 percent. This means that the agricultural frontier has "claimed" 700,000 hectares from the forest in fifteen years. M o r e r e c e n t studies reveal that the distribution o f land is extremely uneven: Some 2.56 percent of landowners own 65.1 percent of the land. In reality, the concentration of land is even more pronounced, because 1,335 farms, or 0.02 percent of landowners, control more than one-third (34.1 percent) of the land (1979 agricultural survey). To support these data, Guatemala's Gini index for agriculture is 0.85, one of the highest in the world 11 (INCAP 1998). T h e agricultural sector contributes over 25 percent of Guatemala's GDP. Rural dwellers account for 60 percent of the total population, and the unemployment rate in rural areas is 47.5 percent. 1 2 A person who has no land, therefore, has to scramble to survive. In short, a consensus exists that the uneven distribution of land is the primary cause of the extreme poverty in the rural areas of Central America (IDB 1998).

Inequality and Food Security The rural population represents 60 percent of Guatemala's total population. The total area under food cultivation is 45 percent of the productive land, and the agricultural sector accounts for 25 percent of GDP. Based on these data, the national agricultural sector should easily meet the population's needs. Over the last twenty years, however, Guatemala has reduced its per capita production of staple grains, while agricultural production for e x p o r t has increased (UNDP 1998a). T h e last national child health survey, which was carried out in 1995, showed that half of all Guatemalan children under the age of five suffer from chronic malnutrition (which made it possible to identify children with stunted growth by comparing the actual size of the child with its age-appropriate size).

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Food Crises

Agriculture has traditionally b e e n the m a i n source of i n c o m e f o r m o s t L a t i n A m e r i c a n e c o n o m i e s . At p r e s e n t , in c o u n t r i e s s u c h as G u a t e m a l a , Bolivia, N i c a r a g u a , a n d Haiti, a g r i c u l t u r e a c c o u n t s f o r m o r e t h a n 25 p e r c e n t of GDP. However, even t h o u g h agriculture in G u a t e m a l a is t h e m a i n c o n t r i b u t o r to GDP, this is n o t necessarily a sign that the sector is thriving. •

C o m m o d i t y exports are subject to fluctuations in i n t e r n a t i o n a l prices, resulting in lower e m p l o y m e n t levels a m o n g the p o p u lation. 1 3 • T h e shift in c o m m o d i t i e s p r o d u c e d f o r e x p o r t over the last few years ( s u g a r c a n e h a s r e p l a c e d c o t t o n ) has m a i n l y a f f e c t e d p o o r peasants employed as day laborers. Mechanized harvesting t e c h n i q u e s used in sugarcane harvesting have r e d u c e d t h e n e e d f o r workers, a n d day l a b o r e r s are f o r c e d to m i g r a t e to the n o r t h e r n agricultural f r o n t i e r or to emigrate. • T h e l i m e s t o n e soils of t h e tropical ecosystems f o u n d in t h e n o r t h e r n l o w l a n d s a r e e x t r e m e l y f r a g i l e a n d v u l n e r a b l e to degradation. They therefore cannot guarantee sustained d e v e l o p m e n t a n d are f a r m e d f o r only a few seasons b e f o r e new land must be f o u n d . L a n d that is n o l o n g e r fit f o r f a r m i n g is, in most cases, b o u g h t by livestock ranchers, w h o use it f o r grazing, thereby p r e c l u d i n g any possibility of forest r e g e n e r a t i o n . T h e e x p a n s i o n of the agricultural f r o n t i e r is t h r e a t e n i n g t h e Mayan biosphere, o n e of the world's great forests. • T h e f a r m e r w h o still f a r m s his small p l o t of l a n d is t e n d i n g m o r e a n d m o r e toward crops that d e p l e t e n a t u r a l resources in an unsustainable way. In many cases, f a r m i n g is increasing in hilly areas that have low productive capacity a n d that are subj e c t to severe erosion. A study carried o u t by Action Against H u n g e r in J u t i a p a a n d J a l a p a has shown t h a t t h e lower t h e land's fertility, the g r e a t e r the family's i n c o m e f r o m activities l i n k e d to m i g r a t i o n o r day l a b o r ( A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r 1999). T h e crisis in the agricultural sector limits access to land a n d to e m p l o y m e n t f o r t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e G u a t e m a l a n p o p u l a t i o n , even t h o u g h increasing n u m b e r s derive their principal source of employm e n t f r o m this very sector. This leads to a vicious circle of poverty, d e f o r e s t a t i o n , l a n d d e g r a d a t i o n , a n d m a l n u t r i t i o n . As l o n g as t h e m o d e l of d e v e l o p m e n t favors e x p o r t c r o p s , c o n s o l i d a t e s t h e b e s t land, a n d offers few o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e m p l o y m e n t , f o o d insecurity

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will continue to be the primary reason for the depletion of the country's natural resources. Traditionally, the diet of the rural population has lacked variety and has consisted mainly of staple grains. This contrasts with the varied dietary intake of the urban population, which has easy access to imported products. The processes of urbanization and advertising for food products alter consumer habits and influence current health and nutritional standards. Throughout Central America, the epidemiological model has changed with death from nontransmissible chronic diseases (diabetes, heart disease), one of the primary causes of mortality, increasing by 100 percent over the last ten years. These diseases, which are typical of industrialized countries, coexist with widespread dietary deficiencies and infant malnutrition (INCAP 1998). It is possible to scientifically calculate the optimum calorie intake for each country. In Guatemala, it is 2,250 calories daily, but studies done by INCAP have revealed that the actual intake was 2,075 calories; that number, moreover, was not attained by all citizens. While physical fitness is becoming fashionable in the capital just as it is in Western countries, with gymnasiums and health-food stores that cater to a minority, women in the high plateau regions expend 700 calories each day, or a third of their total calorie intake, fetching water and performing other necessary household chores. In addition to providing needed calories, the intake of nutrients is necessary for childhood development. Studies done by INCAP b e g i n n i n g in 1969, u n d e r which the typical diet o f a group o f Guatemalan children was supplemented from birth to age seven with calories, protein, vitamins, and minerals, have shown that in adolescence and early childhood, these children were taller, stronger, and more intelligent than those who had not received supplements. Improving nutritional and health conditions represents an effective strategy for the economic and human development of Guatemala. Which noneconomic factors can influence nutrition? In some cases, diet depends on such external factors as the aggressive marketing of soft drinks, which targets the younger generation in particular. These commercial practices explain, for example, why in El Salvador, the red Coca Cola color is found in all the country's cafés, whereas Pepsi Cola's blue predominates in Guatemala. But this aggressive marketing strategy is not only a U.S. phenomenon. Guatemala, as further evidence of its many contrasts, exports franchises of the fast food chain Pollo Campero (Country Chickens) to other Central American countries even though chickens in its own rural areas are dying from a poultry disease.

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G e o g r a p h i c a l frontiers s o m e t i m e s d e t e r m i n e differences in consumption, a l t h o u g h this p h e n o m e n o n may be difficult to explain. F o r e x a m p l e , N i c a r a g u a n s a n d S a l v a d o r a n s c o n s u m e r e d b e a n s , while over the b o r d e r in G u a t e m a l a black b e a n s are p r e f e r r e d . Moreover, even within the country, a large a n d o p a q u e variety o f the same black b e a n is p r e f e r r e d in the h i g h l a n d s while in the east a small, black, shiny variety is cultivated. T h i s c o n c e p t o f taste is n o t frivolous. T h e l a t e s t v a r i e t y o f b e a n d e v e l o p e d by t h e G u a t e m a l a n I n s t i t u t e o f Agrarian S c i e n c e and T e c h n o l o g y (ICTA), called "Icta L i g e r o , " which was d e v e l o p e d to resist disease (in p a r t i c u l a r t h e t o b a c c o m o s a i c virus), is the variety o f seed that was distributed on c r e d i t to a few families in J u t i a p a who had lost their s e c o n d harvest in 1 9 9 8 from the d a m a g e caused by H u r r i c a n e Mitch. In addition to u n d e r g o i n g strict biological a n d a g r o n o m i c a l tests prior to marketing, it u n d e r w e n t a c o o k i n g test for housewives to evaluate its c o o k i n g time and approve its consistency and taste. F o r farmers, f o o d security d e p e n d s on access to land. In Belize, a family wishing to farm receives permission from the state to use the land. O t h e r Central A m e r i c a n countries have l a u n c h e d land redistrib u t i o n a n d land r e f o r m programs. In Guatemala, Central America's m o s t p o p u l o u s country, agricultural r e f o r m s i n t r o d u c e d in 1 9 5 2 by the g o v e r n m e n t o f J a c o b Arbenz, who had b e e n democratically elected with the support o f 6 5 p e r c e n t o f voters, were overturned in 1 9 5 4 by a military c o u p d'état. Nearly all the redistributed land ( 8 8 3 , 6 1 5 h e c t a r e s a m o n g 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o o r f a r m i n g families) was r e t u r n e d to its f o r m e r owners, the large landholders. Moreover, between 1 9 5 5 and 1992, 7 6 5 , 3 9 3 hectares were distributed a m o n g 1 1 6 , 2 3 9 people. A c c o r d i n g to the U n i t e d Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, large l a n d o w n e r s were favored in this distribution a l o n g with high ranking military officers and professionals ( M I N U G U A 1 9 9 8 ) . In G u a t e m a l a , I N C A P s t u d i e s h a v e s h o w n t h a t in 1 9 8 5 o n e h e c t a r e o f land a n d the necessary factors o f p r o d u c t i o n distributed in farming a n d r a n c h i n g regions should p r o d u c e f o o d o f sufficient quality and quantity to provide a b a l a n c e d diet at minimal cost for a family o f five. D u r i n g the 1 9 7 9 census, 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 o f the 6 0 5 , 0 0 0 farms surveyed were less than 0 . 8 h e c t a r e s in size. Most small farmers n e i t h e r possess n o r have access to a h e c t a r e o f cultivable land. I f they do own a h e c t a r e o f land, then its yield is very poor. T h e rural family has t h e r e f o r e b e e n f o r c e d to d e v e l o p c o p i n g s t r a t e g i e s , w h i c h have a l l o w e d it to o v e r c o m e its f o o d insecurity. However, e n v i r o n m e n t a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d b i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s o f an internal nature can weaken the ability o f families to use these c o p i n g

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mechanisms. In Guatemala, this is frequent in regions susceptible to drought (the El Niño p h e n o m e n o n ) , floods (Hurricane Mitch), and the recent experiences of armed violence (INCAP 1998). For families buying f o o d , food security d e p e n d s above all on money income earned in most cases from work in the informal sector. In particular, from the point of view of nutrition, it is important to distinguish between in-kind income (food grown by individuals) and money income. In terms of money income, a minimum wage exists in G u a t e m a l a . 1 4 Its buying power d e t e r m i n e s the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n d food security since, given Guatemala's high rates of u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t , t h e m i n i m u m wage is o f t e n t h e m a x i m u m a m o u n t earned. For a family of 5.38 members, the daily cost of the basic food basket (twenty-six items) was 31.98 quetzales in November 1994. During the same period, the minimum daily agricultural wage was 14.5 quetzales and 16.5 quetzales in the city. The minimum wage bought only half of the basic food basket. In February 1999, the cost of the same basic basket for the same type of family was 38.88 quetzales (INE 1999), and the minimum agricultural wage was 17.86 quetzales compared to 19.71 in the city. The buying power of the minimum wage in Guatemala has t h e r e f o r e not risen since the signing of the Peace Agreements. Even the implementation of the Peace Agreements, which provide for increased social spending and a more equitable redistribution of taxes, will not eliminate poverty from Guatemalan homes. The uneven distribution of national wealth leaves the majority of the population on the brink of food insecurity. This affects mainly the rural population (65 percent of the total population) and unemployed or undeclared workers (47.5 percent of the working population.) This economic gap also creates a cultural gap. Differences in consumption patterns are developing. A minority of the population is consuming increasing amounts of packaged and imported foods (and producing 70.75 percent of the solid wastes) while a majority continues to consume staple crops.

Notes Carmelo Gallardo is Action Against H u n g e r head of mission in Guatemala. 1. T h e Popol Vuh is the sacred book of the Kiche, one of the principal Mayan g r o u p s in t h e c o u n t r y . It is t h e Book of t h e C o u n c i l o r of t h e Community, also known as the Manuscript of Chichicastenango. It was orally transmitted from generation to generation. In the early eighteenth century, a

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copy written in Kitche b u t with Latin c h a r a c t e r s was discovered by t h e Dominican father Francisco Ximenez. Who wrote this copy and when remain a mystery. Ximenez translated it into Spanish, but it was not made available to researchers until 1930. 2. El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba have higher population densities. 3. Statistics in this paragraph and the next paragraph are from UNDP 1998a and UNDP 1998b. 4. In 1995, 66 percent of the population had access to health services and 60 percent to potable water. These rates drop to 25 and 43 percent for the rural population (IDB 1998). In regard to the crime rate, in 1994 the primary cause of death a m o n g Guatemalan teenagers and adults was firearms (UNDP 1998a). 5. T h e HDI is based on the following criteria: longevity (defined as expected life span), level of education (defined as the adult illiteracy rate and school registration rates), and quality of life (defined by per capita Gross Domestic Product). 6. T h e UBN is a weighted index used in Guatemala by various institutions. It permits an evaluation to be made of the level of poverty using six criteria: rate of growth, quality of life, health services, access to drinking water, primary school enrollment levels, and income level. 7. In 1995 the real per capita Gross Domestic Product (that is, PPP, or p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r parity in d o l l a r s ) was as follows: G u a t e m a l a , 3683; Honduras, 1977; Nicaragua, 1837 (UNDP 1998a). 8. T h e internal evaluation of the HDI in 1995-1996 in each district highlighted the glaring inequalities between the district of Guatemala (HDI = 0.829) and the rest of the country (the HDI in Alta Vera Paz was the lowest in the country, at 0.355). This difference in level of development is similar to the difference between Brazil (HDI = 0.809) a n d Tanzania (HDI = 0.358) (UNDP 1998b). 9. During the 1994-1995 period, social spending was 3.7 p e r c e n t of GDP, the lowest in the region. T h e percentages in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica were 5.3 10.6, and 20.8, respectively (IDB 1998). 10. Seventy-two percent of the expenditure of the Ministry of Health was allocated to hospitals and only 19 percent to basic needs centers (World Bank 1995). 11. The Gini index is one of the indexes of equality. It may range from 0 (where land is evenly distributed a m o n g all landowners) to 1 (an extreme case in which one landowner owns all the land). 12. In all Latin America, only Haiti has a lower urbanization rate than Guatemala. This percentage includes both real unemployment and underemployment rates. The main reason for this high percentage is that industrial growth is not rapid enough to absorb surplus agricultural workers. 13. In May 1996, Guatemalan engineers decided to halt production of sugarcane when sugar prices d r o p p e d by 50 percent. Entire fields were left unharvested. 14. A c c o r d i n g to Article 103 of t h e 1971 G u a t e m a l a n L a b o r C o d e , "Every worker has the right to a minimum wage that permits him to meet his material, moral and cultural needs and to discharge his responsibility as head of household."

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References Action Against Hunger. 1999. Study of Food Security in the Departments offutiapa and Jalapa. Madrid. ASC [Assembly o f Civil S o c i e t y ] . 1 9 9 6 . Peace Agreements. G u a t e m a l a : Commission for the National Public-Awareness Campaign. ASC. 1997. Guía para le estudio de los Acuerdos de Paz. Guatemala. Cadesca [Committee for Action and Support for Economic and Social Development in Central America]/CEC [Commission of the European Communities]. 1990. Macro-economic Policy and Its Impact on Agriculture and Food Security—The Case of Guatemala. Panama: Central American Training Programme in Food Security. CEH [Commission for Historical Clarification]. 1999. Guatemala, Memory of Silence. Guatemala: United Nations Operations and Procurement Service. Centro de Estudios de Guatemala. 1995. Así vivimosá: las condiciones de vida en Guatemala. G u a t e m a l a : Nuestra A m é r i c a P u b l i s h e r s , c o l l e c t i o n "Guatemala Hoy." ECLAC [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean]. 1998a. Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y El Caribe, 1998. Santiago, Chile. ECLAC. 1998b. Centroamérica: evolución económica durante 1997. Mexico: ECLAC Regional Office. ECLAC. 1998c. Guatemala: evolución económica durante 1997. Mexico. FAO [United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization], 1996. Food Security and Nutrition. Guatemala. IDB [Inter-American Development Bank], 1998. Las economías deálos países centroamericanos. IDB/IFPRI [International Food Policy Research Institute]. 1998. Agriculture, Environment and Natural Poverty in Latin America. Washington, D.C. INCAP [Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama], 1998. La iniciativa de seguridad alimentaria nutricional en Centroamérica. Guatemala. INE [National Institute of Statistics], 1999. Consumer Price Index. February 1999 Bulletin. Guatemala. INE, MSPYAS [Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social], USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], UNICEF [United Nations International Childrens Emergency Fund], and DHS. 1995. National Maternal and Child Health Survey. Guatemala. INE [National Institute of Statistics]/UNFPA [United Nations Population F u n d ] . 1 9 8 9 . Perfil de la pobreza en Guatemala, Encuesta Nacional Sociodemográfica 1989. INE and UNFPA Guatemala. Laure, J o s e p h . 1996. Minimum Wage, Food Security and Poverty in Central America. Guatemala: INCAP. MAGA [Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Production], 1998. Marco de funcionamiento de políticas. Guatemala: UNDP. Microempresas de Centroamérica. 1999. "Política econmica y problemas sociales en América central." Cortos económicos, no. 24. MINUGUA [United Nations Verification Mission in G u a t e m a l a ] . 1 9 9 8 . Suplemento sobre la verificación del Acuerdo sobre Aspectos Socioeconómicos y Situación Agraria. Guatemala.

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P A H O [ P a n - A m e r i c a n H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n ] . 1998. Health in the Americas. 1998 Edition. G u a t e m a l a . PRISMA [Salvadoran Research P r o g r a m on D e v e l o p m e n t a n d the E n v i r o n m e n t ] . 1997. Evaluación Nacional de la Sostenibilidad. El caso Guatemala. Project "Strengthening the Prospects for Sustainable D e v e l o p m e n t in Central America." G u a t e m a l a : World Wildlife F u n d a n d Central A m e r i c a n Commission o n t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t . S E G E P L A N [ G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r i a t of P l a n n i n g ] . 1994. Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas en la República por Departamentos. G u a t e m a l a . S E G E P L A N / G T Z [Gesellschaft f ü r T e c h n i s c h e Z u s a m m e n a r b e i t ] . N.d. Hacia la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional de la población guatemalteca. Guatemala. S i c h a r , G o n z a l o . 1998. ¿Guatemala: Contrainsurgencia o contra el pueblo! Collection "Gnarus." M a d r i d . Sum, David. 1998. Perfil socioeconómico de Guatemala. San Marcos, G u a t e m a l a : University d e San Carlos d e G u a t e m a l a . Termes, Rafael. 1998. Capitalismo y ética, Web p a g e of Francisco M a r r o q u í n University, G u a t e m a l a . U N D P [ U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m ] . 1998a. Guatemala: los contrastes del desarrollo humano. G u a t e m a l a : U n i t e d N a t i o n s s y s t e m in Guatemala. UNDP. 1998b. Human Development Report 1998. Madrid: Mundi-Prensa Libros. U R N G [ G u a t e m a l a n N a t i o n a l Revolutionary U n i o n ] . 1998. Cumplimiento de los Acuerdos de Paz. Enero-Septiembre 1998. G u a t e m a l a . USAC [University of San Carlos d e G u a t e m a l a ] . Various issues. Economía al día. G u a t e m a l a . World Bank. 1995. Guatemala, An Assessment of Poverty. R e g i o n a l O f f i c e f o r Latin America a n d t h e C a r i b b e a n .

IO Nicaragua: No Way Out of Rural Poverty? Jorge Pereiro

Piñón

Hurricane Mitch caused the most dramatic increase in poverty ever recorded in Nicaragua. It had a negative impact on the food economy of the populations in those villages in which Action Against Hunger administers its programs. The consequences of Hurricane Mitch are closely linked to the current trends toward increasing poverty in the country's rural areas, trends that the hurricane exacerbated but did not create. This fact should therefore be taken into consideration by the government and donor nations (although it is unlikely that it will be) in planning for Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Aftermath of the Disaster— Heightened Social Inequalities During the last week of October 1998, Hurricane Mitch, the century's worst hurricane, reached the coastlines of Nicaragua and Honduras. It passed over the countries from northeast to southwest, and with its intensity diminishing to that of a tropical storm, it headed toward El Salvador and the south and east of Guatemala before spending itself in the Caribbean Sea. The hurricane's impact was severe, and it left the region in chaos in the days following its passage: Homeless families crowded into shelters, there were threats of epidemics, communications were cut, and contradictory statements led to confusion about the scale of damage. As the days went by, the real extent of the damage wrought by the h u r r i c a n e became clear. Although H u r r i c a n e Mitch affected the entire region, not all countries were impacted to 101

102

Chronology 1933-1934

1956

1963

1972

1978

19July 1979

1981

1984

The United States army leaves Nicaragua after twenty-one years of occupation. In February 1934, Anastasio Somoza, head of the national and military guard and an ally of the United States, emerges as the country's strongman after ordering the assassination of his main rival, Augusto César Sandino (commander of the Las Segovias army, who had successfully fought against the American occupation). T h e poet Rigoberto López Pérez assassinates Anastasio Somoza in León. Somoza's sons, Luis (r. 1956-1963) and Anastasio (r. 1967-1979), succeed him. On 13 December, Nicaragua joins the Central American Common Market. Rising agricultural exports bring strong economic growth to Nicaragua. Managua is destroyed by an earthquake on Christmas Day. Much of the international assistance received is diverted by Somoza to himself and his supporters. T h e government begins to lose the support of the middle class. Pedro Joaquim Chamorro, editor of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, is murdered by hit men on the orders of Anastasio Somoza. Chamorro had been a longtime o p p o n e n t of the Somozas' dictatorship and the most brilliant m e m b e r of the "Government of 12." He had been preparing to propose an alternative to Somoza, and his assassination left the guerilla force of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as the sole possible opposition force by strengthening support for the FSLN among moderate parties. T h e Sandinista revolution triumphs. T h e FSLN is integrated into a provisional government composed of various political forces. A few days earlier, the dictator Anastasio Somoza had left the country to seek refuge in Paraguay, where he is assassinated soon after. Break in relations with the United States. T h e provisional government is overthrown, and the FSLN seizes power. T h e LTnited States trains and arms in Honduras the opposition guerilla group known as the Contras. Intensification by the government of the war against the Contras. Nicaragua devotes 40 percent of its economic resources to the war. The United States mines the port of Corinto and declares an economic embargo against Nicaragua. (continues)

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Chronology Continued 1989

1990

1993

1996

26 October 1998

The FSLN loses the presidential elections to a coalition of opposition parties known as the National Opposition Union. Violeta Chamorro (widow of the assassinated journalist) succeeds Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua. Violeta Chamorro signs cease-fire agreement with the national resistance guerilla group, the Contras. However, groups of former Contra members, known as Recontras, and of former members of the FSLN, known as Recompas, remain active in the north and east of the country until 1997. The Nicaraguan government signs the first structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The partial reduction of Nicaragua's foreign debt is made conditional on the achievement of the ESAF targets, and compliance is monitored by the IMF. The Liberal Alliance of Amoldo Alemán narrowly defeats Daniel Ortega's FSLN in presidential elections, which are marred by accusations of massive electoral fraud. Hurricane Mitch (through 1 November).

the same extent. H o n d u r a s a n d Nicaragua were the h a r d e s t hit, w h e r e a s G u a t e m a l a a n d El Salvador were only partially a f f e c t e d . In N i c a r a g u a , t h e d a m a g e c a u s e d by H u r r i c a n e Mitch was s p r e a d over m a n y r e g i o n s . T h e r e w e r e b o t h h u m a n loss (nearly f o u r t h o u s a n d p e r s o n s d i e d or d i s a p p e a r e d ) a n d m a t e r i a l losses: roads, bridges, h o m e s , s c h o o l e q u i p m e n t , partial d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e electrical a n d water supply systems, loss of c r o p s a n d livestock, a n d d a m a g e to a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d a n d forests. A c c o r d i n g to civil security officials, 867,752 p e r s o n s , o r 20 p e r c e n t of t h e c o u n t r y ' s total p o p u l a t i o n , w e r e affected. T h e government and humanitarian organizations described t h e m as disaster victims, b u t p e o p l e in r u r a l areas i n v e n t e d t h e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m huracanados ( h u r r i c a n e victims). T h e e n t i r e w o r l d saw t h e s e huracanados o n television, t r y i n g to survive t h e f l o o d i n g of t h e i r villages or, in m o r e d r a m a t i c cases, as in Posoltega, s e a r c h i n g t h r o u g h t h e m u d f o r t h e b o d i e s of d e a d family m e m b e r s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y in t h e f a c e of t h e s i t u a t i o n in

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HONDURAS

NUEVA SEGOVIA

ZEALAYA NOHTEl

.Ocotal: iSomoto MATAGALPA

CHINANDEGA

Chinandi

Mer des Caraïbes

LEON Boacfl. Juigalpa MANAGUA

Océan Pacifique

Jinotepe CARAZO]

ZELAVA SUR

Massaya . CHONTALES Granada

Areas affected by Hurricane Mitch AAH areas of activity

COSTA

RiCA

Agricultural frontier

Nicaragua

Central America exceeded all expectations and was so strong that it surprised many observers. In Spain, material and financial assistance were collected in u n p r e c e d e n t e d amounts. O t h e r E u r o p e a n countries, such as France, which h a d fewer historical ties to C e n t r a l America but whose citizens were moved by the disaster that occurred, mobilized significant a m o u n t s of donations for h u m a n i t a r i a n aid. Foreign governments and international institutions f u n d e d immediate assistance and began planning for the funding of a reconstruction p r o g r a m f o r the r e g i o n . This was discussed in late May 1999 in Stockholm by the four affected countries and the principal international donors. In examining the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, as in looking at all natural disasters, one can identify immediate consequences of the hurricane's passage and the medium- and long-term consequences.

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T h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s , a n d in particular those of a long-term n a t u r e , relate to the structural poverty in which most of the Nicaraguan population lives. In analyzing t h e i m m e d i a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s , it can b e s e e n t h a t d u r i n g t h e weeks f o l l o w i n g t h e h u r r i c a n e , t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n f o u n d themselves in a n e x t r e m e l y v u l n e r a b l e situation. T h e s e were the homeless families with n o access to c o m m u n i c a t i o n , those h o u s e d in t e m p o r a r y shelters (generally schools or o t h e r community buildings), a n d those without access to p o t a b l e water. T h e first two g r o u p s lost n o t only their h o m e s b u t also the possibility of p u r s u i n g any e c o n o m i c activity (generally agricultural) a n d thus f o u n d themselves d e p e n d e n t on outside assistance to f e e d themselves. It was t h e r e f o r e essential to provide t h e m with water, f o o d , a n d p r o p e r sanitary conditions. T h e p o p u l a t i o n in the third g r o u p lost access to potable water o n a c c o u n t of the destruction of the water systems or wells o n which they relied. This g r o u p was t h e r e f o r e e x p o s e d to t h e risk of e p i d e m i c s , since d e a d animals a n d m u d slides increased pollution of the surface water, their sole source of supply after the h u r r i c a n e . T h e water distrib u t i o n systems f o r these families thus n e e d e d to be r e p a i r e d urgently in o r d e r to p r e v e n t the spread of diseases a n d to provide p r o m p t m e d ical care as a m e a n s of p r e v e n t i n g b o t h the spread a n d risk of fever. T h e m e d i u m - a n d long-term c o n s e q u e n c e s of H u r r i c a n e Mitch were m o r e complex. Villagers in t h e dry n o r t h e r n , central, a n d weste r n areas of the country, w h e r e many huracanados live, comprise the p o o r e s t sector of Nicaragua's p o p u l a t i o n . Since 1996, Action Against H u n g e r has b e e n working with these villagers, developing water a n d f o o d security projects in the districts of Madriz a n d Nueva Segovia. T h e N i c a r a g u a n e c o n o m y has always b e e n d e p e n d e n t o n the agric u l t u r a l sector, w h i c h a c c o u n t s f o r over 25 p e r c e n t of t h e Gross Domestic P r o d u c t (GDP). N o n e t h e l e s s , this sector has always b e e n the country's least developed, b o t h d u r i n g the 1960s a n d the 1970s, w h e n Nicaragua's exports rose thanks to increased agricultural prod u c t i o n levels, a n d later, d u r i n g the Sandinista r e g i m e a n d u n d e r the c u r r e n t n e o l i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s of Violeta C h a m o r r o a n d A m o l d o Alemán. U n d e r t h e r e g i m e of t h e Somozas, n e i t h e r small n o r m e d i u m sized f a r m e r s b e n e f i t e d f r o m t h e i n c o m e g e n e r a t e d by t h e r a p i d e x p a n s i o n of the agricultural sector. 1 T h e wealth e a r n e d in the rural areas was p o c k e t e d by the land-owning m i d d l e class whose ties to the r u l i n g classes a l l o w e d it to b e n e f i t f r o m f a v o r a b l e t r e a t m e n t in e x c h a n g e f o r its political s u p p o r t . Later on, because of e c o n o m i c dif-

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ficulties and the greed of the Somozas, it was impossible to guarantee sufficient distribution of wealth to the middle class, which reacted by supporting the Sandinista revolution. T h e Sandinista government did not consider small farmers to be participants in the nation's economic development. After its victory, agricultural reform policy was based on collectivism, and the government established people's property zones consisting of property that had belonged to Somoza supporters and was now administered by the state. When peasants grew disillusioned by the regulation o f domestic commerce and began to lend support to the guerilla resistance forces (the Contras), the Sandinista government reacted by launching a program of genuine agricultural reform. Some 320,000 hectares of state-owned land were distributed to communal groups of farmers. This second phase of the reform, which provided opportunities to landless farmers and to those with very little land, created the most equitable system o f land ownership in Latin America. Wartime policies, the embargo, and poor management on the part of the government, however, gradually led to a deterioration in the country's economy, which virtually collapsed by the end of the 1980s. All of the above factors contributed to the defeat of the Sandinistas and the victory of Violeta Chamorro in the 1989 elections. Chamorro, supported by loans from multilateral organizations and massive amounts of international aid to finance the revival of the country's economy, swiftly introduced neoliberal policies. Her government, like that of Alemán, who was elected in 1996, based the development of the agricultural sector on a policy o f support for a g r o f o o d industrial c o m p l e x e s ( S e b a c o valley), c o f f e e exports (Matagalpa and Jinotega), and livestock farming (large ranches in Rivas and in the country's dry regions). Small and medium-sized farms did not b e n e f i t from these agricultural support policies, although medium-sized farms, in particular, were the most efficient producers in the rural areas. Eleven years of neoliberalism have not sufficed to launch a process of national development. This is especially true in the rural areas where, on the contrary, neoliberal policies have accentuated social inequalities. Poverty in the rural areas led to continued emigration, not only to urban centers but also abroad (mainly to the United States and Costa Rica) and to the agricultural frontier. Nicaragua's agricultural frontier is located in the area known as the Atlantic coast (administratively, this corresponds to the autonomous districts of the north and south Atlantic and to the Río San Juan district). Although this area covers over 50 percent of the national territory, it contains only 10

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percent of the population. Originally, it was an undeveloped region covered with tropical rain forests, but since the 1940s, it has attracted an increasing n u m b e r of immigrants f r o m Nicaragua's central and western regions. Peasants emigrating to the Atlantic coast were drawn either by the gold mining industry, which thrived in the region until the 1970s, or by the possibility of acquiring more land or owning land if they did not already have any. These immigrants moved onto the land, which until then had been preserved as forest, planted basic seed crops and coffee (in the higher altitudes), and raised livestock. Those who began with some capital obtained good harvests and managed to improve their economic situation. They were thus able to play a m e a n i n g f u l role in the nation's agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t . However, the a b u n d a n t harvests d e p l e t e d the already fragile soil, which was unsuitable for the traditional farming methods used in the dry regions (slash-and-burn techniques). Thus the areas where the first immigrants arrived m o r e than twenty years ago are now completely deforested. The land yields poorer and poorer harvests and is used as p a s t u r e f o r cattle. F a r m e r s who were u n a b l e to a c q u i r e enough land or livestock while yields were good or to settle on land that offered comparative advantages (such as coffee growing) were forced to sell their land and emigrate east to undeveloped land on which they began the process all over again. Poor farmers from the Pacific coast therefore had a chance to improve their situation, but at t h e p r i c e of m o r t g a g i n g t h e r e s o u r c e s of f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s . Moreover, the rate of depletion of undeveloped land is accelerated by the uncontrolled activity of the large lumber companies that, in the absence of political will to protect the area's resources, are destroying the forest much more rapidly than the peasants have done. Small farmers in the central and western regions who did n o t emigrate were forced to become wage earners. Lacking any government support, they were unable to feed their families from the crops they grew. As a result, a farmer's sons cannot survive on their father's subdivided land. The farmer (with no credit, technical assistance, or access to the main markets) is unable to increase his income in order to buy more land or animals, much less to afford to educate his children so that they could enter other economic sectors. The children therefore become wage earners and work as servants or tenant farmers for the large landowners of the region. This worsens their situation and makes it virtually impossible for them to lift themselves out of poverty. At the same time, the land owned by their father falls into the hands of a large landowner. Only those small farmers who are able to compensate for the subdivision of the land by increasing its produc-

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tivity ( m a r k e t g a r d e n crops) are able to escape this process. However, increased productivity is n o t possible unless the p r o d u c e can b e marketed. In view of t h e i n a d e q u a t e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in Nicaragua, many small f a r m e r s d o n o t have this possibility. T h r o u g h the processes of emigration a n d proletarianization, land ownership in the rural areas has b e c o m e increasingly u n e q u a l . More land is c o n c e n t r a t e d in the h a n d s of a smaller n u m b e r of individuals. T h e p o l i c i e s p u r s u e d d u r i n g t h e last few years h a v e n o t c r e a t e d wealth a n d have instead increased the levels of poverty a m o n g p e o p l e in r u r a l areas. Action Against H u n g e r ' s 1997 survey of h o u s e h o l d poverty in the district of Madriz showed how the level of poverty h a d i n c r e a s e d since 1993, w h e n t h e N i c a r a g u a n I n s t i t u t e f o r Statistical Studies (INEC) c o n d u c t e d a survey using the same criteria ( U n m e t Basic Needs I n d e x ) . In contrast, the level of poverty in u r b a n areas has declined. In the country's dry regions, the f o o d e c o n o m y of disaster-stricke n families d e p e n d s o n corn, beans, a n d s o r g h u m , p l a n t e d in small parcels of l a n d (which they own or rent) n o t e x c e e d i n g 4 hectares. T h e crops are p l a n t e d f o r the family's own c o n s u m p t i o n (corn a n d beans) a n d f o r f a r m animals ( s o r g h u m ) . Families s u p p l e m e n t their h o u s e h o l d i n c o m e t h r o u g h sale of t h e surplus p r o d u c t i o n of b e a n s (allowing t h e m to buy cooking oil, salt, coffee, a n d h o u s e h o l d utensils) a n d t h r o u g h seasonal work h a r v e s t i n g c o f f e e o n large f a r m s . T h e s e practices place f a r m e r s o n the e d g e of f o o d insecurity, since they barely cover the daily caloric intake n e e d s f o r o n e family. N o t only d o e s such a m o d e s t e c o n o m y p r e v e n t f a r m e r s f r o m a c q u i r i n g m o r e land or livestock, b u t it is also extremely vulnerable to any d r o p in the family's i n c o m e . T h e h u r r i c a n e caused the loss of a g o o d p a r t of the s e c o n d a n n u al harvest (the last in the year), thereby d e p l e t i n g the f o o d reserves t h a t s h o u l d have e n a b l e d a f f e c t e d families to survive until t h e first harvest of 1999 in July a n d August a n d leaving t h e m without reserves f o r the p l a n t i n g season. T h e loss of their crops is n o t a new p h e n o m e n o n f o r these families. Aware of the precarious n a t u r e of their econ o m i c base, they have developed a n u m b e r of c o p i n g strategies over the years: l e n g t h e n i n g t h e time s p e n t o r increasing t h e n u m b e r of family m e m b e r s who h e l p to harvest the coffee; p e r m a n e n t emigration of some or all family m e m b e r s to Costa Rica, the U n i t e d States, or the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua itself. In addition to these survival strategies used by farmers, the World Food P r o g r a m (WFP) now distributes f o o d aid, seeds, a n d f a r m i n g i m p l e m e n t s t h r o u g h the assistance p r o g r a m s of certain countries or h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations. In the short term, a c o m b i n a t i o n of these solutions has m a d e it possi-

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ble to p r e v e n t the f a m i n e that some had p r e d i c t e d . U p until May 1999, n o significant rise in severe malnutrition rates (as measured by w e i g h t / h e i g h t ratios) had b e e n observed. It is n o t known what the medium- and long-term consequences will be. T h e damage to crops, h o m e s , a n d arable land will accelerate the processes of emigration and proletarianization that, in turn, increase poverty and inequality. T h e question is o n e of how effective the free distribution of food, seeds, a n d o t h e r factors of p r o d u c t i o n will be o n c e the e m e r g e n c y phase is over. Analysis of the situation on which these programs are based takes n o account of the fact that the root cause of the vulnerability of these families is n o t Hurricane Mitch b u t the fragility of their economy. Nor d o these programs take into account the fact that the most serious p r o b l e m created by the hurricane, apart f r o m the loss of h u m a n life, was n o t the risk of famine or epidemics, but the accentuation of the t r e n d toward i m p o v e r i s h m e n t a m o n g farmers, which is b e c o m i n g increasingly difficult to control. T h e s e p r o g r a m s d o n o t address the structural causes that are at the root of this process, but simply replace what Mitch destroyed. T h e disadvantage of these aid programs (free distribution of supplies) is that they work against local initiatives that for years have b e e n trying to improve conditions for small f a r m e r s t h r o u g h loan p r o g r a m s , the g r a d u a l i n t r o d u c t i o n of improved f a r m i n g techniques, or soil protection. Preoccupation with the next harvest leads to m o r e serious problems, namely, a slowdown in the rural development process and lack of motivation on the part of farmers (if food and the factors of production are distributed for free, why n o t take advantage of them?).

A Program of Reconstruction for Nicaragua: Beyond Hurricane Mitch This chapter does n o t claim to offer recipes for the reconstruction of Nicaragua. It will t h e r e f o r e add n o t h i n g very new to what has already b e e n suggested by n u m e r o u s organizations. 2 We would simply like to u n d e r s c o r e certain key factors that should be taken into account in the p l a n n i n g of reconstruction programs. Meeting the Real

Needs

D o n o r countries a n d organizations should n o t accept that the reconstruction p r o g r a m should be limited to simply paying the bills for the damage caused by Mitch without any m a t c h i n g contribution f r o m the Nicaraguan government. The structural adjustment agreements

I 10

Food Crises

signed with the International Monetary Fund appear to be the best policy for development. The role assigned to international aid is limited to covering the costs incurred by Mitch. The Nicaraguan governm e n t has proposed a variety of programs that include much more than a mere long-term reconstruction strategy. However, we have seen how eleven years of massive international aid, provided on the basis of the same criteria (instead of compensating for the shocks caused by Mitch, international aid substituted for the state in the social sector), have not contributed to the m e a n i n g f u l development of the country or given any hope of such development. A sound program of national reconstruction should take account of the failure of previous policies and of the opinions of political parties and civil organizations. It should also facilitate rather than prevent the involvement of all social classes in future development programs. 3 The involvement of the rural sector in these processes and protection of the natural environment should be the highlight of the program. Reduction

of the Foreign

Debt4

The complete cancellation of Nicaragua's foreign debt, or at least its reduction to bring it down to a manageable level, is an indispensable precondition for the country's development. On 31 January 1999, the n o m i n a l value of N i c a r a g u a ' s f o r e i g n d e b t was $6,271 m i l l i o n . C o m p a r e d with other national economic indicators, one sees that Nicaragua's debt is unsustainable relative to its economy. It is among the highest in the world on a per capita basis ($1,315 per capita) and also one of the highest relative to GDP ($280). Moreover, debt servicing in 1998 represented over 60 percent of the value of exports and two-thirds of the government's resources. A large part of international aid funds thus goes toward debt payment, to the detriment of the social sector, which sees money initially earmarked for social programs disappear. Nicaragua's foreign d e b t is t h e r e f o r e the m a j o r obstacle preventing the country from breaking out of the vicious circle of poverty. Cancellation of the debt should not be automatic, however. It should be granted on condition that the extra funds generated by d e b t c a n c e l l a t i o n be u s e d in t h e social s e c t o r to l a u n c h development programs for the benefit of the entire population and in particular the most vulnerable sectors. Rigorous Oversight of the Reconstruction

Program

The planning of a coherent reconstruction program and discussions a b o u t it b e t w e e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d d o n o r c o u n t r i e s are n o t

Nicaragua

II I

e n o u g h to guarantee its implementation. It is imperative to secure the political commitment of the current government and its successors in office to see the program through to completion. During the consultations held in Geneva in 1998, the Nicaraguan government submitted to the donor countries a rural development program that received unanimous support. This program based the country's develo p m e n t on increased production in the agricultural sector, which would be used for either domestic consumption or for export, thereby reversing the trade deficit (one of the causes of Nicaragua's foreign debt). Through loans, technology transfers, and training, small a n d medium-sized farmers were to have b e e n integrated into the process of rural development. However, when the time came to make these loans available to villagers, the government allocated the funds through large national banks. Since these banks do not have branches in certain parts of the country, they are not in contact with this sector of the population and are reluctant to run the risk of working with people who do not have sufficient collateral. Consequently, most of the loans earmarked for small farmers were granted to large agricultural landowners, thereby undermining the initial strategy. In order to avoid such practices, clear follow-up indicators must be established to ensure compliance with reconstruction policies that are put in place in the same way as structural adjustment agreements are m o n i t o r e d . T h e donors must also affirm their c o m m i t m e n t to monitoring compliance with the terms of the agreements. The international community is currently attempting to reach an agreement on the distribution of f u n d i n g by sector of activity (the International D e v e l o p m e n t Bank is f u n d i n g t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of roads; t h e European Union is responsible for health care and education) without supporting any particular intervention strategy. Since the early 1990s, this same scenario has b e e n endlessly repeated ... and has always failed.

Notes Jorge Pereiro Piñón is Action Against Hunger head of mission in Nicaragua. 1. For more on the historical exclusion of the Nicaraguan peasant, see t h e study by M a l d i d i e r a n d d e M a r c h e t t i , Le paysan propriétaire terrien (Managua, Nicaragua: UCA, 1996). 2. For an e x a m p l e , see t h e d o c u m e n t by t h e Civil E m e r g e n c y a n d R e c o n s t r u c t i o n C o o r d i n a t o r , Transforming the Tragedy of Mitch into an Opportunity for Sustainable Human Development in Nicaragua (Managua, 1999). For an overview of the position of the European nongovernmental organizations, see the d o c u m e n t by VOICE, Document de Bruxelles: proposition des ONG

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européennes lors de la réunion de Stockholm pour la reconstruction et le développement de l'Amérique centrale (Brussels: VOICE, 1999). 3. T h e cities of L e ó n a n d Estelí illustrate this strategy f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m was already in place b e f o r e H u r r i c a n e Mitch. T h e o r i g i n a l p l a n has b e e n a d a p t e d to t h e new s i t u a t i o n in o r d e r to i n t e g r a t e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n into t h e long-term strategy f o r t h e cities. 4. Data u s e d h e r e were t a k e n f r o m t h e e c o n o m i c i n d i c e s f o r J a n u a r y 1999, p u b l i s h e d by t h e Central Bank of Nicaragua.

Honduras: Supplying Water to Victims of Hurricane Mitch Eric Drouart

In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Honduras from the Caribbean to the Pacific coast, caused a m a j o r disaster whose scale even today is difficult to evaluate precisely. T h e main figures a n n o u n c e d by the authorities following the hurricane indicate that the damage was enormous: •

in terms of h u m a n cost, the best estimates are 7,070 dead, 12,303 injured, 9,014 missing, 1,960,000 people affected, and 645,201 people living in temporary shelters; • in terms of e c o n o m i c cost, 169 bridges were destroyed, 15 main roads and 60 towns were damaged, one town was totally destroyed, and 15 municipalities were partially destroyed; • in the agricultural sector, the loss of crops was estimated to be between 60 percent and 80 percent of national production (a loss of $600 million in all sectors combined, according to the World Food Program).

Total rainfall over a three-day period was 911 millimeters (mm); normal annual rainfall is between 1,400 and 2,000 mm. The average rate of flow of the Choluteca River, which flows through the towns of Tegucigalpa and Choluteca, is 55.5 cubic meters per second (m 3 /s), with peaks capable of r e a c h i n g 1,000 m 3 / s at times of f l o o d i n g . During Hurricane Mitch, the rate of flow was estimated to be between 5,000 and 6,000 m-Vs. The low-lying town of Choluteca and the villages along the river were s u b m e r g e d by a sheet of water several meters d e e p a n d of 113

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Food

Crises

BELIZEf

Caribbean Sea

Honduras (sta de Roatan lsla.de Guanaja Roatan Isla de titila P u e r t o Castilla Puerto, • f , San Pedro Sulà

La Ceiba

%

Laguna de Caratasca

Puerto Lempira .Santa Rosa de C ò p a n -.

\

¿Gracias

Juticalpa

\La'P La.Pazi a n Z

^'

Sv.-.

/

•TEGUCIGALPA

EL^ALVADÒR iCholuteca Golfo de

NICARAGUA

Pacific Ocean

Honduras

unprecedented violence: bridges and warehouses swept away, river banks eroded over several hundred meters, houses and buildings destroyed, vehicles and containers swept away by water. A warehouse containing drums of pesticide was swept away across the plain by the flood. An evaluation mission was led by a multidisciplinary Action Against Hunger team. The evaluation report established a priority area of operations and identified the major damage done and its medium-term consequences in the context of a difficult economic situation.

Priority Area of Operations Although the whole country was affected by Hurricane Mitch, Action Against Hunger identified a priority area of operations, along the Choluteca River starting from Villa San Francisco (in the department of Francisco Morazan), passing through El Paraiso and up to the mouth of the river in the Gulf of Fonseca (department of Choluteca). The authorities listed several thousand direct victims of the hurri-

Honduras

I 15

Locations of sites: Choluteca plain cane in the d e p a r t m e n t of Choluteca. Some of the affected population described an ordeal lasting several days, which they spent clinging to trees or taking refuge on the roof of a house on solid g r o u n d . In the municipalities of Choluteca and Marcovia (downstream f r o m Choluteca), the most severely affected towns (40 percent of the population), the authorities r e p o r t e d the relocation of 7,797 people in the hurricane's a f t e r m a t h . This area was particularly h a r d hit because of the many rivers and streams that flow into the Choluteca River and the large n u m b e r of villages along its course. It should also be n o t e d that those who were most a f f e c t e d in these villages were primarily the most v u l n e r a b l e (those living in fragile homes) and the owners of small agricultural plots (melons, corn, s o r g h u m , a n d so on) o f t e n situated along the river a n d thus completely destroyed. Not only were crops lost, b u t m u c h of the land was r e n d e r e d unsuitable for any farming at all.

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Damage to Infrastructure and Other Major D a m a g e T h e m a j o r d a m a g e c a u s e d by H u r r i c a n e Mitch in t h e t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s may b e classified as follows: P a r t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n living in isolated areas was b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t h e m a i n roads: in t h e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s of M o r o l i c a , S a n I s i d r o , L i u r e , a n d S o l e d a d in t h e d e p a r t m e n t of C h o l u t e c a ; Trojes, T e u p a s e n t i , a n d Yuscaran in t h e d e p a r t m e n t of El Paraiso; a n d Malaica in t h e d e p a r t m e n t of Francisco M o r a z a n . Road infrastructure and bridges.

centers) and individual homes. B e c a u s e of t h e d e s t r u c t i o n , t h e p o p u l a t i o n h a d to b e a c c o m m o d a t e d in s h e l t e r s . S o m e of t h e s e s h e l t e r s w e r e quickly c l o s e d in s o m e villages, o t h e r s r e m a i n e d o p e n longer, s u c h as t h e o n e in t h e town of C h o l u t e c a t h a t h o u s e d s o m e 6,000 p e o p l e . E m e r g e n c y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s a r e in p r o g r e s s t h a n k s to civil s e c u r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , in c o l l a b o r a t i o n with t h e p o p u l a t i o n a n d with t h e " f o o d f o r work" p r o g r a m s p o n s o r e d by t h e World F o o d P r o g r a m . Public infrastructure (schools, health

and food distribution. D e s t r u c t i o n of u p t o 70 p e r c e n t of c r o p s m e a n t d e p e n d e n c e on food distribution. T h e next planting season was in April-May 1999 a n d t h e n e x t harvest t h e following July-August 1999. Crops

Medium-Term Consequences In t e r m s of n u t r i t i o n , s o m e m o d e r a t e cases of m a l n u t r i t i o n w e r e r e p o r t e d by t h e m o n i t o r i n g system. T h e s e led to f e a r s t h a t t h e situation m i g h t w o r s e n f o r t h e m o s t v u l n e r a b l e g r o u p s , in p a r t i c u l a r child r e n , if t h e g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of f o o d failed to cover all n e e d s in c e r t a i n at-risk zones. T h e risk of a r e g i o n a l e p i d e m i c existed in t h e z o n e a d j o i n i n g t h e F o n s e c a delta, w h e r e 264 cases of leptospirosis were i d e n t i f i e d in t h e p r o v i n c e s ( C h i n a n d e g a a n d Esteli) o n t h e b o r d e r with N i c a r a g u a . In t h e d e p a r t m e n t of El Paraiso, t h e r e was a n i n c r e a s e in cases of diarr h e a , a n illness usually m o s t w i d e s p r e a d d u r i n g t h e rainy season. T h e n u m e r o u s b o d i e s of s t a g n a n t w a t e r a n d t h e c o n t a m i n a t i o n of wells a n d s u r f a c e water led to fears of t h e o u t b r e a k of disease, in p a r t i c u l a r c h o l e r a . A n effective e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l m o n i t o r i n g system was established within t h e h e a l t h services a n d its d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o m m u n i t y network, b u t g r e a t e r vigilance was still n e e d e d . In t h e a r e a of water supply, t h e p r o b l e m s were b o t h t h e serious

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disruptions in the services provided by the small urban water supply systems of the municipalities and the destruction of or damage to wells in rural areas, making rapid action necessary. Work to restore the networks and to provide emergency supplies (purification units, transportation of water by trucks, pumps, and chlorination) was soon in progress but needs were difficult to meet, given the current problems of access. These emergency supplies had to be followed up by m o r e long-term actions focusing on preserving the gains already made. In response, the state, with massive assistance from civilian relief organizations and the national armies of other countries (Mexico, the United States, and some states of the European Union), immediately provided e m e r g e n c y relief: T h e g o v e r n m e n t cleared roads, rebuilt metal bridges (within a few days for the Tegucigalpa bridge), and assisted people in remote areas. This was the first time that we have witnessed on this scale such a mobilization of states whose armies and civil organizations have provided emergency relief. A few months later, the Kosovo crisis confirmed the growing humanitarian involvement of states in certain very visible h u m a n i t a r i a n crises, unfortunately to the detriment of others that were less visible. A few m o n t h s after the disaster, Choluteca was a town u n d e r reconstruction. It was invaded by dust from the silt deposited by the flood and had a displaced population of several thousand residents. They were housed first in schools and public buildings and later in temporary shelters along the road to the airport as they awaited the p e r m a n e n t reconstruction of their homes on a new adjacent plot. A new town, New Choluteca, was rebuilt with international assistance. What will be its future? Its economic viability is questionable. The process of allocating plots of land for rehousing Choluteca families u n d e r the authority of the town council was a long one. Uncontrolled scrambling to obtain a plot came as no surprise, and identifying needy families was very difficult. By early 1999, a story making the rounds in Choluteca testified to the complexity of the situation. According to this story, tents were springing u p like mushrooms along the road leading to New Choluteca, put up by families who claimed to be victims and installed one of their members in the roadside shelters. In this country where land is scarce, one can easily imagine what might be done by unscrupulous speculators in order to rent out later a house that they had acquired through scheming or other arrangement. Farther upstream, the river valley was destroyed. The rare very fertile areas cultivated by the i n h a b i t a n t s were completely e r o d e d . Numerous landslides and mudslides claimed many victims, and here

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too, the material d a m a g e was considerable: roads, homes, water conveyances, water pipes, a n d fittings all swept away (90 p e r c e n t of the installations). Nevertheless, the n u m b e r of victims was m u c h lower, since only 2 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n of the d e p a r t m e n t of El Paraiso were estimated to have b e e n directly affected by the h u r r i c a n e . Action Against H u n g e r c o n c e n t r a t e d its efforts o n providing a n d p r o t e c t i n g water resources a l o n g the Choluteca river valley by develo p i n g t h r e e specific responses: (1) u n d e r t a k i n g long-term rehabilitation of gravity-based d r i n k i n g water supply networks f o r disaster victims in rural areas, (2) drilling d e e p wells in the C h o l u t e c a plain, a n d (3) carrying o u t a h y d r o g e o l o g i c a l analysis of t h e d e p a r t m e n t a n d m o n i t o r i n g water quality. B e f o r e t h e l o n g - t e r m r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of gravity-based d r i n k i n g water supply networks was started, e m e r g e n c y steps to restore water supplies to villages were carried out; in 80 p e r c e n t of the cases these steps were taken immediately a f t e r the h u r r i c a n e by villagers with or without outside help. T h e s e repairs were temporary, however (a plastic hose r e f e r r e d to locally as a manga placed o n the g r o u n d with n o p r o t e c t i o n , l a n d s l i d e s stabilized, s p r i n g s r e d i r e c t e d ) , a n d we proposed long-term solutions that would e n a b l e these villages to regain the same d e g r e e of a u t o n o m y they enjoyed b e f o r e H u r r i c a n e Mitch. Villagers g e n u i n e l y a n d effectively a s s u m e d responsibility f o r this work. A c o m p l e t e rehabilitation of service, f r o m c a t c h m e n t to distrib u t i o n of the water, took between ten a n d fifteen days of c o m m u n i t y work, with a single technician f r o m Action Against H u n g e r o n site. Drilling d e e p wells in the plain will p r o t e c t water supply points f r o m p o l l u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y at r e l o c a t i o n sites f o r disaster victims (New C h o l u t e c a a n d Marcovia). T h e C h o l u t e c a plain s u f f e r e d f r o m water pollution f r o m two sources: agriculture (in an area of intensive c o t t o n f a r m i n g a n d today m e l o n f a r m i n g ) a n d accidents, following the spillage of pesticides f r o m c o n t a i n e r s swept away by the floods. T h e "drilling" o p t i o n that allows p r o t e c t e d , d e e p u n d e r g r o u n d water to b e t a p p e d is all t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e of t h e p o l l u t i o n . Action Against H u n g e r was the only n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organization to p r o p o s e this technical a p p r o a c h , which h a d significant success in alleviating the p r o b l e m . Carrying o u t the hydrogeological analysis of the d e p a r t m e n t a n d the m o n i t o r i n g of water quality involved d e v e l o p m e n t of r e m o t e sensi n g to estimate d a m a g e a n d to evaluate h u r r i c a n e - r e l a t e d risks. In p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h a T h a i c o m p a n y ( P r o m o t i o n of A p p r o p r i a t e T e c h n o l o g i e s ) , Action Against H u n g e r has d e v e l o p e d light percussion a n d rotary drilling e q u i p m e n t able to pierce c o m p a c t a n d o t h e r soil f o r m a t i o n s a n d has gained considerable e x p e r i e n c e in this area

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as well as in the area of water research. The ACF/PAT401 rotor-percussion drill in stock in Paris is a machine that can be transported by pickup truck, thereby permitting quick drilling in any type of aquifer at an exploratory depth of approximately 100 meters. The drilling equipment was transported by priority air freight to Choluteca in late November 1998, after the first test results had been confirmed by the on-site hydrogeologist. In hydrological terms, the potential aquifers of the Choluteca department are the alluvial, somewhat coarse deposits and the fractures in hard volcanic formations. Use of the appropriate tools is vital in the search for subterranean water. These include the development of a structural satellite image, aerial photographs, and geoelectric soundings. A geochemical and hydrogeological analytic capability (piezometric and water-quality maps, extensive p u m p testing) of the Choluteca plain has also been developed. Nearly a d o z e n successful drillings ( o u t p u t of 1 to 30 cubic meters per hour) were initially completed on the relocation sites, and a well was sunk to supply the town of Choluteca, since the p u m p i n g station, located in the main riverbed, was totally submerged by the floods a n d destroyed. These wells are e q u i p p e d with either h a n d pumps or submersible pumps, depending on their characteristics. In addition to the normal bacteriological analyses of the water that were required because of the risk of chemical pollution, caused mainly by a g r i c u l t u r a l activities in t h e plain a n d a g g r a v a t e d by spillage f r o m warehouse stocks, we carried out systematic monthly analyses of o r g a n o p h o s p h a t e and organochloric pesticides at each new drilling. These c h r o m a t o g r a p h i c analyses are p e r f o r m e d by a Tegucigalpa laboratory that is certified by the U.S. government for the export of food. During the hurricane, metal barrels of pesticide from the storage d e p o t were swept away by the floods. Information concerning the n u m b e r of barrels in storage before the hurricane was either unavailable or unclear. Only a list of the types of product in stock was provided by the storage company's officials. A n u m b e r of these barrels were found downstream on the riverbanks and retrieved by villagers. It is highly likely that some of these barrels were carried to the mouth of the river and into the sea during the flood. Others are likely to be buried in the sediment, which is very deep (several meters) in this area. No cases of poisoning were reported in the short run. The major risk was certainly from direct contact when the barrels were f o u n d by the residents just after the hurricane. Public awareness campaigns were carried out on the radio by civil security officials.

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Drillings at four sites revealed the presence of pesticides, all of them organochlorides: lindane, benzene hexachloride, and endosulphates. Drillings at two sites revealed concentrated amounts of pesticides that were above safe drinking levels (endosulphates in one case and benzene hexachloride in the other). T h e test results at Marcovia that revealed a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of endosulphates (1.32 ppm [parts per million]) far above the acceptable norm of 0.01 ppm were reviewed after pumping was done for a longer period and at o t h e r water supply points in the immediate vicinity. For wells containing benzene hexachloride, which is not considered to be a highly toxic chemical, the authorities decided to dilute the water to ensure that it was of acceptable quality for drinking. Given the limited scope of testing and the constant risk of chemical pollution (buried barrels, pesticides), follow-up action on an ongoing basis is essential.

Mapping of Damage and of At-Risk Zones Radar images taken before and after H u r r i c a n e Mitch and a spot image taken after the hurricane were used to identify areas affected by the floods. The first phase of the study was carried out by a geoscience consultancy based in Paris, and a field survey was conducted by on-site Action Against Hunger teams. Images were provided free of cost by Spot Image and by the European Geoscience Space Agency. These images revealed the extent of the flooding and the movement of the river beyond its main bed. Eroded areas and areas where sediment was deposited and cultivable land destroyed were all easily identifiable. Areas that are vulnerable to accidental pollution, such as that caused by pesticide spills, were also easily identifiable. For example, the damage to the town of Marcovia, half of which was u n d e r water, was clearly visible. As part of this study, the geoscience consultancy also showed the erosion of the shore caused by the powerful waves that lashed the Caribbean coast in northern Honduras during the hurricane. T h o u g h limited in scope, this study c o n f i r m e d the n e e d f o r remote sensing equipment in the aftermath of a major natural catastrophe such as Hurricane Mitch in order to assess and identify the main damage caused within a short period of time (about ten days). Honduras, like all of Central America in general, is a region that is very vulnerable to hurricanes. The situation in Honduras continues

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to cause concern. T h e landslides caused by H u r r i c a n e Mitch have not stabilized; the level of riverbeds has b e e n raised in certain areas by deposits of sediment; and the next flood will e n c o u n t e r significantly shallower channels, which is likely to result in extensive overflowing. T h e p o p u l a t i o n residing along the rivers has r e t u r n e d , as might be expected, given the fertile farming land and the shortage of land in the country, a n d at-risk zones t h e r e f o r e c o n t i n u e to be inhabited. It is now urgently necessary to p r e p a r e a precise m a p of the atrisk zones along the Choluteca River a n d to classify t h e m into categories (habitable, crop-farming, or cattle-rearing areas). Such a risk m a p will clearly also be a tool for the development of a land use plan, a n d only the strict a d h e r e n c e to that plan in t h e m e d i u m term will enable H o n d u r a s to limit the loss of h u m a n life and the damage caused by hurricanes like Mitch in this region.

Notes Eric Drouart is a hydrogeologist.

Bibliography Drouart, Eric, and Jean-Michel Vouillamoz. L'Alimentation en eau des populations menacées. Paris: Hermann, 1999.

12 The Tragedy of Kosovo Frances Mason and Kathryn Ogden

T h r o u g h o u t the 1980s, accusations grew within the Serb community in Kosovo of a "physical, political, juridical, and cultural genocide" by the Albanian majority. This gave excuses for the Serb leadership to add f u r t h e r to the repression forced u p o n the Albanian majority. O n e person, Slobodan Milosevic, whose initial interest in Kosovo had been distinctly lacking, knew how to make use of this growing Serb nationalism and used Kosovo as his catapult to power. T h e economic and political sanctions imposed by Belgrade on the Kosovars following their loss of autonomy gradually led to the splintering away of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from the initial nonviolence policies of the Albanians, policies that were led by the president of the Albanian-declared i n d e p e n d e n t Kosovo. H u n g e r was again, as in m a n y c o u n t r i e s , b e i n g u s e d as a w e a p o n . 1 Access to l a n d was reduced, unemployment rose to 70 percent, and the economic sanctions resulting f r o m the Bosnian war imposed by the international community on Serbia and M o n t e n e g r o had detrimental repercussions on the Kosovars; worse was to come. In February 1998, a sudd e n escalation in f i g h t i n g b e g a n , a n d in May 1998, the Serbian authorities b a n n e d twenty-seven of the most essential items (such as flour, meat, vegetables, fuel, and soap) from all Albanian shops. This chapter exposes the ways and methods employed by the authorities in manipulating the food economy as a weapon of repression.

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Chronology Slobodan Milosevic strips Kosovo of its autonomy. February 1990 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sends troops, tanks, warplanes, and 2,000 more police into Kosovo. July 1990 Ethnic Albanian legislators in Kosovo declare independence. Serbia dissolves the Kosovo Assembly. Ibrahim Rugova elected president of the selfMay 1992 proclaimed republic of Kosovo. Serb and ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo October 1992 hold face-to-face peace talks for the first time in three years. A Serbian court sentences sixty-eight ethnic July 1995 Albanians to imprisonment for allegedly setting u p a parallel police force. Serbs settle several h u n d r e d Croatian Serb August 1995 refugees in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army emerges for the first time, claiming responsibility for a series of b o m b attacks. January 1998 An ethnic Serb policeman is killed in retaliation for the reported killing of an ethnic Albanian by the police. February-March 1998 Serbian police operations in Drenica. Dozens are killed, houses burnt, and villages evacuated; protests and street clashes in Pristina. Rugova demands outright independence for Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians vote for a president and a parliament in elections that are considered illegal by Belgrade. Ninety-five percent of Serbs vote against interApril 1998 vention in Kosovo. T h e contact group for the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Russia, agrees to impose new sanctions against Yugoslavia over Kosovo. U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke begins a r o u n d of May 1998 shuttle diplomacy, which results in Milosevic's inviting Rugova for peace talks. T h e fighting continues. 1989

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Demographics: The Key to Power and Economic Strength The birthrate of the Albanian population in Kosovo, despite its apparent reduction since the period following World War II, remains the highest in E u r o p e . Almost half the p o p u l a t i o n (48.2 p e r c e n t ) is u n d e r e i g h t e e n years of age. T h e p o p u l a t i o n density of 200 p e r square kilometer (km 2 ) is twice that of Serbia at 104/km 2 , creating a serious problem of access to land in a province in which more than 60 p e r c e n t of the population live in rural areas. Urban areas have been expanding, moreover, encroaching on rural areas. It has been estimated that between 1960 and 1970, the area of cultivable land diminished by 1,000 hectares per year.

Migration: An Economic Coping Strategy for the Kosovars Social organization within the Albanian community is based on clan and family structures that are maintained by a code of honor. Strong solidarity exists among families of the same or neighboring villages, manifesting itself in economic terms in the form of loans and the sharing of food. In forcing large numbers of Kosovar Albanians abroad, the Serb authorities inadvertently paved the way for an improved coping strategy for those remaining in the province. As is the case with other Muslim communities, many ethnic Albanians from the diaspora contribute a 3 p e r c e n t income tax (the Zakhat), which has helped to f u n d the medical and educational institutions within the province. Sending a m e m b e r of the family abroad has been one of the principal means of survival for many families. The great solidarity between families is such that the m e m b e r abroad will send all the money he (or sometimes she) has available after meeting his or h e r basic needs. The money enters Kosovo with visa holders or through travel agencies that offer a transfer service for a 10 percent commission. The situation was similar in the Serbian areas of Kosovo. With the closure or reduction in output of metallurgical mines in the northern municipalities and other manufacturing industries, there had been an increase in unemployment and a subsequent move into Serbia to seek work, especially by young people. But jobs found in Serbia have generally been low paid, and Serbian workers have faced more difficulties than Kosovar Albanians working in the European Union in sending any money back for relatives.

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A History ofTwo-Way Accusations of Ethnic Cleansing Accusations

by the Kosovo

Albanians

T h e r e is n o t h i n g new in Kosovars having to leave their h o m e l a n d in search of work abroad. In the 1970s, Germany, t h e n suffering f r o m labor shortages, had an a g r e e m e n t with the f o r m e r Yugoslavia as a result of which nearly 15 p e r c e n t of the present-day population were issued with p e r m a n e n t visas allowing f r e e travel b e t w e e n t h e two countries. B e f o r e the mass e x o d u s of r e f u g e e s in March a n d April 1999, those working a n d living abroad could be g r o u p e d into three b r o a d categories: • • •

l o n g - t e r m e m i g r a n t s w h o h a d s p e n t twenty o r m o r e years abroad; those who had left since 1989; those who had left since the mid-1990s.

It is the latter two groups, however, whose d e p a r t u r e f r o m Kosovo was mainly triggered by the imposed economic strife and fear of persecution. T h e Serb policies of the 1990s demonstrated a will to r e n d e r the life of the Albanians so intolerable as to force t h e m to leave. In this they were m o r e than successful: Between 1990 and 1995 an estimated 550,000 Kosovars moved out of the province. 2 Estimates at the e n d of 1998 were that since 1989, 500,000 to 600,000 Albanians had moved as a result of the e c o n o m i c a n d political crisis. 3 F u r t h e r m o r e , the authorities "Serbianized" the province by changing names of streets, imposing the Serb language, suppressing the Albanian media, a n d destroying Albanian cultural institutions. T h e r e are certain m o r e sinister accusations, some say evidence, by t h e A l b a n i a n s of t h e a t t e m p t s to e m p t y Kosovo of its m a j o r i t y Albanian population. In March and April 1990, thousands of children were taken to the hospital with mysterious headaches, stomach pains, a n d n a u s e a . R u m o r s s p r e a d rapidly t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n were b e i n g deliberately poisoned at school. Most observers at the time believed this to be mass hysteria, b u t a UN expert on toxicology argued to the contrary. Tests showed that the substances Sarin and Tabun (used in chemical weapons) were f o u n d in urine a n d blood samples. In 1995, evidence e m e r g e d that the Yugoslav army m a n u f a c t u r e d Sarin. T h e Albanian u p r o a r over this episode gave Serbia an excuse to transfer 25,000 policemen f r o m Serbia to the province.

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In 1990, within a Yugoslav P r o g r a m m e of M e a s u r e s to b e T a k e n in K o s o v o , f a m i l y p l a n n i n g was i n t r o d u c e d f o r t h e A l b a n i a n s . ( A c c o r d i n g to o n e S e r b i a n gynecologist, o u t of every o n e h u n d r e d b a b i e s b o r n in t h e w h o l e of Serbia, sixty-four a r e n o n - S e r b s . It has b e e n p r e d i c t e d t h a t by t h e m i d d l e of t h e n e x t c e n t u r y t h e Serbs will b e a m i n o r i t y in t h e e n t i r e S e r b i a n R e p u b l i c . ) A l b a n i a n s w e r e " e n c o u r a g e d " to seek work in o t h e r p a r t s of Yugoslavia, a n d sales of p r o p e r t y to A l b a n i a n s by d e p a r t i n g Serbs w e r e retroactively a n n u l l e d . A t t e m p t s to c h a n g e t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n Serbs a n d t h e A l b a n i a n m a j o r i t y w e r e also m a n i f e s t e d in a f o r m of " c o l o n i z a t i o n . " In 1991, a law was p a s s e d g i v i n g S e r b s a n d M o n t e n e g r i n s w h o r e t u r n e d t o Kosovo t h e r i g h t to 5 h e c t a r e s of l a n d , to b e s u p p l i e d f r e e of c h a r g e o u t of m u n i c i p a l l a n d h o l d i n g s . F u r t h e r m o r e , d u r i n g t h e B o s n i a n war, S e r b r e f u g e e s w e r e willingly w e l c o m e d by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s in B e l g r a d e to settle in Kosovo. However, b o t h t h e s e a t t e m p t s by t h e S e r b g o v e r n m e n t to c h a n g e t h e Kosovo e t h n i c i m b a l a n c e were u n p o p u l a r with t h e respective S e r b p o p u l a t i o n s in q u e s t i o n . O n e busf u l of S e r b r e f u g e e s leaving Bosnia, o n l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n was Kosovo, h e l d t h e b u s driver at g u n p o i n t a n d d e m a n d e d t h a t they h e a d for Belgrade instead. Accusations by the Kosovo Serbs T h e 1980s saw a n i n c r e a s i n g l y f e r v e n t c a m p a i g n of c o m p l a i n t f r o m t h e Kosovo Serbs, m a n i f e s t i n g itself in several ways. In t h e a u t u m n of 1985, a p e t i t i o n was o r g a n i z e d d e m a n d i n g p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e Kosovo S e r b p o p u l a t i o n a n d c l a i m i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of 300,000 A l b a n i a n s w h o h a d c r o s s e d i n t o Kosovo f r o m A l b a n i a s i n c e 1941 ( t h e i m p l i c a t i o n b e i n g t h a t they s h o u l d all b e s e n t b a c k ) . S e r b n a t i o n a l i s m was clearly g r o w i n g . In 1985, a m e m o r a n d u m was d r a w n u p t h a t c l a i m e d "physical, political, j u r i d i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l g e n o c i d e " of t h e S e r b p o p u l a t i o n ( t h e full text of this was only p u b lished in 1989). However, t h e objective of t h e m e m o r a n d u m was its c l a i m t h a t 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 S e r b s h a d e m i g r a t e d d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s two d e c a d e s a n d its advice t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d establish "objective a n d lasting c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e r e t u r n of [ t h e s e ] exiled p e o p l e . " Seven years later, with t h e l a u n c h i n g of Serbia's war of territorial e x p a n s i o n against Bosnia in April 1992, t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e A l b a n i a n s in Kosovo w o r s e n e d greatly. S e r b i a n n a t i o n a l i s m c o n c e n t r a t e d r h e t o ric o n t h e "Islamic t h r e a t , " a l l u d i n g to t h e Muslims in B o s n i a r i g h t d o w n to t h o s e in Kosovo. However, it is widely r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r o l e of religion in Kosovar politics is negligible (an e x a m p l e of this c a n b e s e e n in t h e f a c t t h a t n o o n e q u e s t i o n s t h e e x i s t e n c e of a

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Christian Democratic party in which the overwhelming majority is Muslim).

Political Upheavals: Kosovo Launches the C a r e e r of Milosevic This rise in nationalism shocked the majority of the senior communists in Belgrade. However, o n e m e m b e r of the Serbian Central Committee, namely Slobodan Milosevic, knew how to use the nationalism to his a d v a n t a g e . In April 1987, his m o m e n t c a m e . Ivan Stambolic, the Serbian party president, was called upon by sixty thousand Serb and Montenegrin activists to give a speech in the town of Kosovo Polje in preparation for a large protest in Belgrade to warn that the Kosovo Serbs could no longer endure the "genocide" being inflicted on their community by Albanian irredentists and to demand the purge of Kosovo's Albanian leadership. Already bruised from past e x p e r i e n c e s (in which he had spoken against Serb nationalism), Stambolic asked his deputy, Slobodan Milosevic, to take his place. Stambolic since recalls that before this moment, Milosevic had shown no interest in Kosovo. Milosevic had once told Stambolic to forget about the provinces and get back to Yugoslavia. However, at the meeting in Kosovo, carefully preplanned fighting broke out between Serbs and the police. Milosevic broke off the meeting and spoke out, "No one should dare to beat you." Fortunately for Milosevic, this was on camera, leading to an eloquent speech on the sacred rights of the Serbs. By the end of 1987, Stambolic was dismissed from power, and Milosevic t o o k over as p r e s i d e n t of t h e S e r b i a n L e a g u e of Communists. In November 1988, Milosevic held a rally of 350,000 in Belgrade in which he declared, "Every nation has a love that eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo."

The Buildup to the Loss of Autonomy for Kosovo Accusations and d e m a n d s f r o m the Serb nationalists c o n t r i b u t e d greatly to Belgrade's review of the status of Kosovo. Early in 1989, the Kosovars detected clear signs of a far greater transfer of power to Serbian control. Kosovo's police, courts, and civil defense were to be put under Serbian control, together with social, economic, and educational policies. Serbia assumed the power to issue "administrative instructions." Rapidly diminishing rights led to a series of protests, strikes, and mass demonstrations by the Albanians. Serbian leaders

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responded by sending in troops to Kosovo and declaring a state of emergency. Final amendments to the constitution were adopted on 28 March 1989, whereby Kosovo's "autonomy" was reduced to a mere token. More protests were answered with more troops and police. Kosovo: "An Equal and Independent Entity Within the Framework of the Yugoslav

Federation"

The reactions of the Albanian members of the Provincial Assembly appeared, initially, to be submission u n d e r pressure. However, in July 1990, 114 of the 123 Albanian members of the assembly met in the street outside the locked assembly building and passed a resolution declaring Kosovo "an equal and i n d e p e n d e n t entity within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation." Intellectual circles were the very core of the Albanian move, which established a party called the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), whose leader was a specialist in literary history and aesthetics, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. In response, the Serbian authorities dissolved the assembly and the government, thus destroying the last threads of Kosovo autonomy. On 24 May 1992, the Kosovars held elections throughout Kosovo, using private houses as polling stations u n d e r the noses of the Serbian authorities, to create a new republican assembly and government. The basic policy of the LDK and Rugova was threefold: to maintain nonviolence, "internationalize" the problem, and systematically deny Serbian rule by boycotting elections and censuses and creating at least the outlines of the state apparatus of a Kosovo Republic. International recognition of the i n d e p e n d e n c e of Croatia and Slovenia in J u n e 1991 gave f u r t h e r hope to the leaders of the LDK that their dreams would become reality. Strict adherence to nonviolence was ordered by the Kosovar leaders, and because of the i m p o r t a n c e of the clan structure a n d the resultant respect for leaders, this order was smoothly followed, at least initially. In order to f u r t h e r understand the a p p a r e n t belief in and optimism about the prospect of independence and of imminent support f r o m the international community, the prevailing political climate must be understood. In 1989, political change through nonviolent means had been demonstrated: The Berlin Wall had fallen; in Poland the strictly nonviolent movement a r o u n d the trade u n i o n Solidarity enjoyed worldwide support and brought down the totalitarian communist regime; previously d e p e n d e n t territories such as the Baltic states were regaining their independence and even imposing their own language on their former master; Czechoslovakia gained a new president—a dissident writer. Hence, within this context, the

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idea appeared plausible that a Kosovo led by an intellectual who advocated nonviolence would become an independent republic. Changes in the Kosovar Strategy of

Nonviolence

The Albanian population increasingly lost faith in Rugova. After his prognosis of the impact of the Bosnia war on Kosovo, Rugova lost credence when the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 left Kosovo in a position that was no different than before. The only recognition it received was the Security Council's decision to continue sanctions against Serbia until its human rights record in Kosovo was reformed. Beyond that, the recognition by the West that Milosovic was a key player in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement only reinforced the Kosovars' enemy. Rugova was criticized within Kosovo for refusing to negotiate with Belgrade. When he eventually began talks with Milosevic, the agreement under which school and university buildings (but not state salaries) would be made available to the Albanian parallel education system was later totally ignored by Milosevic, thus furthering Rugova's loss of face. For years, the Kosovar "terrorism" referred to in the Serb media had been little more than stone throwing. However, the growing discontent within Kosovo resulted in an increase in more serious activities such as bombings and shootings. By the summer of 1997, a spokesman for a body calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army was giving interviews from Switzerland in which he announced, "This is the movement people support now."

Economic Sanctions as a Weapon Despite sizable deposits of lead and zinc in Kosovo (especially in the region of Trepca and in the Kopaonick range) and abundant reserves of lignite and chromate, the province of Kosovo has for many years been considered among the poorest regions in Europe. Even before the current crisis, many sanitary and electricity installations were rudimentary and the unemployment rate extremely high. Agricultural

Subsistence

Economy

Agriculture plays a central role in the economy of Kosovo. However, it is constrained by a number of factors:

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• Access to cultivable land is limited, owing to d e m o g r a p h i c pressure and the scarcity of land. Approximately two-thirds of the land is mountainous and composed of forests and pastureland (on which only limited cereal p r o d u c t i o n is possible). The remainder consists of plains, which are used for growing cereals. • The size of family plots is small, the result of historical circumstances. Unlike many former socialist or communist countries, Tito's Yugoslavia did not have a system of state farms or agricultural cooperative systems. Land privatization started in 1946 a n d q u i c k l y a v e r a g e d 90 p e r c e n t of all a v a i l a b l e l a n d . Originally, families possessed several hectares, b u t over the years demographic pressure has led to subdividing. Today the average family plot is rarely more than 5 hectares (50 percent of plots are between 1 and 5 hectares). • The provision of agricultural inputs is d e p e n d e n t on supplies from Serbia and Vojvodine. • Productivity is low, owing to poor seed quality, lack of access to hybrid varieties that yield better results, o u t d a t e d p l a n t i n g techniques, limited use of fertilizers, p o o r irrigation techniques, and slow harvesting of grains caused by the lack of agricultural machinery. U n d e r "normal" conditions, agricultural and livestock p r o d u c t i o n covers a b o u t two-thirds of the f o o d n e e d s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Kosovo, with the rest being imported, particularly f r o m Serbia and Vojvodine. T h e chronic deficiencies are in wheat (35 percent) and animal protein (30 to 60 percent). Shortfalls in wheat production usually occur in J u n e and July. 1990: Loss of Jobs for 70 Percent of Albanian Kosovars and Prosperity for Serbs

In response to Kosovo's "declaration of independence" in 1990, the Serbian Assembly passed a special law on "labor relations" in Kosovo, which made possible the subsequent expulsion of more than 80,000 Albanians from their jobs. Some 70 percent of Albanian state employees in Kosovo were dismissed from their jobs. The larger food manufacturing factories in Kosovo closed or reduced their capacity. Kosovar unemployment is estimated at 70 percent (the n u m b e r of unemployed having risen by 130,000 since 1990). According to the Kosovar Pristina Economic Institute, earnings from regular employ-

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m e n t a c c o u n t e d f o r 10 p e r c e n t of total Kosovar i n c o m e in 1996, comp a r e d to 49 p e r c e n t in 1988. E m i g r a t i o n is generally viewed as the only way to m a k e a d e c e n t living. Any r e m a i n i n g e m p l o y m e n t f o r the Kosovars is mainly in the service sectors, small businesses, international organizations, a n d black m a r k e t trading. At the same time, a P r o g r a m m e f o r the Realization of Peace a n d P r o s p e r i t y in Kosovo was l a u n c h e d by t h e S e r b a u t h o r i t i e s . T h i s i n c l u d e d the creation of new municipalities f o r the Serb p o p u l a t i o n a n d the b u i l d i n g of new houses for Serbs who r e t u r n e d to Kosovo. Economic Sanctions During the Bosnian War In the 1980s, Kosovo e x p e r i e n c e d an e c o n o m i c b o o m in m i n i n g a n d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n . However, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c sanctions that were eventually imposed o n Serbia a n d M o n t e n e g r o h a d an equally d e t r i m e n t a l effect o n Kosovo, leading to the closing of the KosovoM a c e d o n i a b o r d e r to most f o r m s of direct trade. This c a m e o n top of an already chaotic e c o n o m y (by simply p r i n t i n g m o r e m o n e y to pay his soldiers, Milosevic h a d created a spiral of inflation). However, the f o r c e d reliance of Kosovars o n self-subsistence t h r o u g h a g r i c u l t u r e a n d private t r a d e r e n d e r e d t h e m , in s o m e ways, less v u l n e r a b l e to e c o n o m i c sanctions t h a n were the Serbs, whose i n c o m e was d e p e n d e n t on salaried state e m p l o y m e n t . An additional reason f o r the e c o n o m i c disarray within Serbia was the e m e r g e n c e of Mafia-style gangs that took over the m a r k e t in foreign goods a n d h a r d currency. Economic Strengthening of the Kosovars: Impact of the Fighting and International Interventions Despite the heavy d e p e n d e n c e of h o u s e h o l d s o n m o n e y f r o m family m e m b e r s a b r o a d a n d t h e s u p p o r t of t h e d i a s p o r a f o r t h e parallel Albanian e d u c a t i o n a n d health system, Kosovar authorities have generally h a d p r o b l e m s raising m o n e y in t h e last five years. Since t h e Drenica violence in early 1998, however, the inflow has e x c e e d e d all e x p e c t a t i o n s . S u b s t a n t i a l f u n d s w e r e m o b i l i z e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y in Aachen, Germany. Many Kosovars are choosing to c o n t r i b u t e to the f u n d of the Kosovo Republic r a t h e r t h a n to that of the largest political party, t h e LDK with its g o v e r n m e n t a n d its l e a d e r , P r e s i d e n t Rugova, in exile. Evidence toward the e n d of 1998 showed f u r t h e r m o r e t h a t t h e growing e c o n o m i c strength of the Kosovars could also be a t t r i b u t e d to the p r e s e n c e of the Organization f o r Security a n d C o o p e r a t i o n in

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Europe (OSCE) and, to a certain extent, of humanitarian organizations. Rental prices for properties tripled within a few weeks of the arrival of t h e OSCE, while m a r k e t p r i c e s i n c r e a s e d a n d salary demands far exceeded previous levels. Control of Goods: Using Hunger as a Weapon

Financial resources are of no use if access to goods is prohibited. The greatest effect on the circulation of essential food and nonfood items within Kosovo began with those items whose trade came u n d e r the control of the Serbian authorities just after the start of the present conflict in May 1998. This resulted in Albanian shopkeepers, who are the core of market activity, being refused permission to stock certain basic items in their stores. Initially, twenty-seven items were b a n n e d f r o m sale at Albanian stores. T h e food items to which the population was being d e n i e d access i n c l u d e d f l o u r , t h e key to t h e i r s t a p l e d i e t of b r e a d . R e p l a c e m e n t starches such as rice, pasta, a n d potatoes were also b a n n e d . Salt, sugar, oil, butter, and m a r g a r i n e were b a n n e d , a n d some of the most protein-rich foods, such as meat and fish, were also included in the list. When Action Against Hunger assessed the situation in January 1999, controls had been lifted on milk, yogurt, and cheese. The population was further deprived of an essential source of minerals and vitamins through the inclusion of canned fruit and vegetables on the list of items b a n n e d f r o m Albanian shops. Nonfood items on the list included soap, shampoo, detergent, drugs, sanitary items, engine fuel, diesel, engine oil, and gas. At the b e g i n n i n g of the s u m m e r of 1998, a complete ban was imposed for a three-week period, immediately after which the heavy d e m a n d for certain items resulted in long queues. A crisis ensued until traders began the black market trade, easing the situation but far from addressing the root problem. The remaining items became available only on the black market. Individuals with private cars or warehouse owners with trucks may have attempted to travel outside Kosovo to Serbia and buy the items, f i n d i n g ways a n d t a k i n g severe risks to b r i n g b a c k t h e g o o d s . Suppliers from Serbia with whom they dealt may also have delivered directly, but many warehouse owners preferred to be in direct control of t h e i r goods. Heavy fines or bribes were m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t d e m a n d e d by the border police and at checkpoints to get passage for the goods. Village stores e i t h e r b o u g h t directly f r o m Serbia u s i n g t h e method described above or from a store in the nearest larger town.

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Previously, they would have o b t a i n e d supplies f r o m different towns, b u t since they were subject to stops by police, t h e r e was g r e a t e r risk in traveling and t h e r e f o r e supplies were restricted to goods available in t h e n e a r e s t t o w n . T h e i t e m s w e r e c o n c e a l e d in t h e v e h i c l e a n d b r o u g h t directly to the village shop. D u r i n g the most serious times o f c o n f l i c t in 1998, it was extremely difficult to supply the shops, partly on a c c o u n t o f roadblocks that f o r c e d s o m e to drive tractors t h r o u g h m o u n t a i n roads to get supplies. S o m e shops had to close temporarily while others have never r e o p e n e d . As a result, village stores stocked far fewer items than they h a d b e f o r e the conflict, and with the rise in prices villagers were u n a b l e to afford a wide range o f goods, h e n c e often purchasing only the most essential items n e e d e d for daily use. Certain shops o f f e r e d credit to the customers ( o n e week to t h r e e m o n t h s ) , but others suffered such h u g e losses t h r o u g h this system that it was n o l o n g e r an option for the customer.

Conclusion A few l a n d m a r k s were o f particular i m p o r t a n c e in i n f l u e n c i n g a n d f u r t h e r i n g the cause o f the Kosovars. Initially, the a t m o s p h e r e within E u r o p e in the 1980s suggested that a fight for i n d e p e n d e n c e t h r o u g h n o n v i o l e n t m e a n s m i g h t s u c c e e d . T h e i n c r e a s e d e c o n o m i c support from the diaspora c o u n t e r e d the S e r b objective o f creating such econ o m i c hardships that Kosovars would be f o r c e d o u t o f the province, and the increased insecurity that led to g r e a t e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l awareness o f a n d p r e s e n c e in Kosovo led in turn to a s u d d e n a n d sharp increase in the funds raised by the KLA in 1998. T h i s has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d , however, by escalating t e r r o r against t h e Albanian p o p u l a t i o n : the " S e r b i a n i z a t i o n " o f the province, suppression o f Albanian culture, and denial o f the rights o f Kosovars to their property. Despite the h o p e s o f the Kosovar leaders, the B o s n i a n war did n o t h i n g to support their cause and only b r o u g h t f u r t h e r econ o m i c hardship a n d a missed opportunity for Western mediators to avoid t h e h o r r o r s b e i n g o b s e r v e d today. As g r e a t e r o p p o s i t i o n was shown by t h e A l b a n i a n s , particularly t h r o u g h t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army, so too did the c l a m p d o w n by the S e r b i a n a u t h o r i t i e s i n c r e a s e . T h e m o s t r e c e n t m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f this in econ o m i c terms is perhaps best d e m o n s t r a t e d in the " c o n t r o l on trade," which r e d u c e d the Kosovars to a state o f insecurity in terms o f access to t h e i r basic daily f o o d a n d n o n f o o d n e e d s , to say n o t h i n g o f the deliberate destruction o f assets during the fighting.

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In all this stands a man who only twelve years ago proclaimed a total lack of interest in the province and who has used the land and its peoples to e x p a n d and consolidate his own power. In h u m a n and population terms, Yugoslavia has already lost Kosovo. T h e Serbs who live in Kosovo are a minority. T h e majority of the rest of Serbia has n o wish to j o i n them. T h e whole concept of creating an "ethnic" balance in an area with a population of 200,000 Serbs and nearly two million Albanians remains an illusion.

Notes Frances Mason is h e a d of n u t r i t i o n a n d f o o d security, Action Against H u n g e r . Kathryn O g d e n is a nutritionist at Action Against H u n g e r . 1. See A c t i o n Against H u n g e r , Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999 (Paris: PUF, 1998). 2. Kosovo Spring Report. Brussels: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Crisis G r o u p Kosovo, 1998. 3. I n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e Council f o r H u m a n Rights, Pristina.

Bibliography Economic Activities and Democratic Development of Kosovo, R e s e a r c h r e p o r t . Pristina: Riinvest, 1998. F e r r a n d , Cyril. Agricultural Study: Province of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. L o n d o n : Action Against H u n g e r , 1998-1999. Kosovo Spring Report. Brussels: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Crisis G r o u p Kosovo, 1998. Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. N.p., 1998. O g d e n , K a t h r y n . Food. Security Assessment in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. L o n d o n : Action Against H u n g e r , 1998-1999.

13 A Survey of Kosovar Refugees in Macedonia, May-June 1999 Michael Brewin

Background to A s s e s s m e n t T h e oppression of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, which began when their autonomous status was revoked in 1989, reached a head in 1999, forcing the migration of over 750,000 people from the province. Nearly 222,000 of them sought refuge in Macedonia, where Action Against H u n g e r and o t h e r aid agencies were stationed in anticipation of an influx of refugees. 1 In the weeks that followed the arrival of the first refugees, in addition to carrying out emergency relief programs, Action Against Hunger worked to collate information on the conditions that the refugees had faced in Kosovo prior to their arrival in Macedonia, focusing particularly on issues pertaining to their ability to procure, grow, and harvest food. There were three main reasons for carrying out the survey. First, it was important to get an idea of the extent to which denial of access to food or the means to produce food was used as a tool of war by Serbian forces. We attempted to ascertain whether there was a deliberate attempt by the police and paramilitaries to starve Albanians out or to force them to move and not return through a kind of "scorched earth" policy. Denial of food to civilians contravenes a n u m b e r of human rights conventions, so evidence of such activity is important to the authorities responsible for investigating war crimes. A second area of interest was the coping mechanisms of the refugees during the period of the conflict and the level to which the populations of different areas were prepared for possible food shortages. We t r i e d to b u i l d u p a p i c t u r e of t h e survival s t r a t e g i e s employed by the Kosovars during their displacement. 137

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Third, we were keen to establish what people's priorities would be upon their return home in order to pre-plan Action Against Hunger's strategy when return to Kosovo became possible.

Methodology During May and J u n e 1999, 233 families (a total of 1,675 individuals) living in the Stankovac and Cegrane camps were surveyed, using a combination of interviews, written testimonies, and questionnaires. Refugee families living in camps were chosen in preference to those in host families because they were easier to access. We experienced no difficulty in getting people to answer questions. Indeed, nearly all were thankful that their stories were being recorded. Families to be surveyed were selected on the sole criteria of being farmers as opposed to urban dwellers but were otherwise chosen at random. We focused on farmers for two reasons. First, as was evident when we eventually returned to Kosovo, the people in the rural areas bore the brunt of the persecution; second, most Kosovars depend on farming for a living. Any plans to rebuild the area after the conflict must therefore be based largely on an accurate assessment of the extent to which rural livelihoods have been r e n d e r e d unsustainable. Because the Kosovar refugee population in Macedonia was composed largely of people from only certain regions in Kosovo (see Figure 13.1), for example, Ferizaj, Gjilan, Obiliq, and Gllocovc, it would be inaccurate to claim that the survey is representative of the population of Kosovo as a whole. Other organizations working with refugees in Albania and Montenegro have conducted similar surveys that confirm that the abuses suffered by Macedonia-based Kosovars were by no means unique to them. Most of the data used in this report were gathered using a questionnaire that asked for information in five areas. 1. Respondents were asked for general information, the number of people in their family, and where they were from. 2. Respondents were asked the ways in which families obtained food during the period of the conflict and while they were internally displaced. 3. Questions were asked about damage sustained to food or property used in the production of food, such as tractors. We also asked whether they were prevented from accessing their land, and if so, why. Questions determined whether they had had food stolen or poisoned and whether they had been prevented

Macedonia

Figure 13.1

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Regions of Origin of Surveyed Population

B C D E F G H Key: A. Drenica 1 % B. Ferizaj 19% C. Fushe 3% D. Gjilan 9% E. Gllocovc 11%

F. Kaqanik 3% G.Lipjan 12% H. Obiliq 11% I. Podujeve 9% J. Presheve 0%

I J

K L M N O K. Prishtine 2% L.Shtime 5% M. Skenderaj 4% N. Viti 5% 0 . Vushtrri 5%

f r o m buying food and f r o m farming their land. T h e testimonies given also provide a valuable source of information on this subject. 4. In an attempt to give focus to the planning of future relief activities, respondents were asked to rank their needs u p o n their return in order of priority. 5. Refugees were asked to write down their personal testimonies, d e t a i l i n g t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s a n d giving n a m e s of p e r s o n s responsible for p e r p e t r a t i n g h u m a n rights abuses against them. The main objective here was to collate evidence for use in any judicial proceedings that might ensue from the conflict, but the information given was also useful as a way of illustrating the more quantitative findings of the survey.

Causes and Immediate Effects of Displacement The average time spent as an internally displaced person (IDP) was forty-one days. As is apparent from Figure 13.2, time spent as an IDP ranged from over 301 days to under one day. Some people arrived in Macedonia on the same day on which they left their homes in Kosovo. The testimonies of refugees reveal that many were forced to move from their homes by the police and paramilitary:

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Figure 13.2

Duration of Internal Displacement in Kosovo Before Arrival in Macedonia Key (in days): A. Same Day B. 1 to 7 C. 8 to 14 D. 15 to 21 E. 22 to 28 F. 29 to 35

Q)

G. 36 to 42

A

H. 43 to 49

E

3 z

1.

50 to 100

J. 101 to 150 K. 151 to 200 A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

L. 201 to 250 M. 251 to 300

Days spent internally displaced

N. Over 301

At 6 P.M. on the 5th April 1999, police c a m e f r o m [Serbian] Babush telling us to leave the village because it was d a n g e r o u s as the military were coming. We d i d n ' t want to leave but at a r o u n d 11 P.M. they came to the village shooting a n d shouting so we escaped to the m o u n t a i n s a n d slept t h e r e . ... T h e n e x t m o r n i n g we r e t u r n e d to Crnilla b u t the police c a m e again at a b o u t 10 A.M. a n d told us to leave so we went to Gadime. — F a r m e r f r o m Crnilla, Ferizaj I declare that at about 10 P.M. o n the 24th of May 1999, t h r e e Serbian policemen a n d two paramilitary gypsies, all a r m e d , o r d e r e d us to leave o u r house. ... We h a d to leave o u r h o u s e or else they would have killed us. — F a r m e r f r o m Vodice, Obiliq We left o u r h o u s e o n t h e 27th March b e c a u s e a lot of army came to Millosheve. They took over the school buildings. We stayed with o u r cousins until the 1st of April when the police came with masks a n d snipers a n d gave us two h o u r s to leave the house b e f o r e they set it o n fire. — F a r m e r f r o m Millosheve, Obiliq

In some cases a shortage of food within the household or in the local area was the catalyst for internal migration. Figure 13.3 shows that people's access to food and to the means of producing food was severely affected as a result of the war, although the extent to which destruction or theft of food and property was a deliberate "scorched earth" policy of the Serb forces is unclear. The means of food production (tractors and tools) and livestock were among the most valuable a n d easily t r a n s p o r t a b l e possessions of the f a r m i n g families a n d therefore primary targets for thieves after money and gold had been taken. Indeed, the testimonies collected indicate that gypsies (the Roma minority who make up about 5 percent of the population of

Macedonia Figure 13.3

141

Abuses Suffered by Kosovar Refugees While in Kosovo

90 80

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

0

Key : A. B. C. D. E.

F o o d s t o l e n or d e s t r o y e d Food poisoned S e e d s s t o l e n or d e s t r o y e d T r a c t o r s t o l e n or d e s r o y e d Not a l l o w e d to buy f o o d b e c a u s e of e t h n i c i t y F. W e r e o v e r c h a r g e d f o r f o o d

b e c a u s e of e t h n i c i t y G. W e l l d e s t r o y e d H. L i v e s t o c k s t o l e n or d e s t r o y e d I. T o o l s s t o l e n or d e s t r o y e d

Kosovo) w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a significant a m o u n t of t h e stealing t h a t t o o k place. F o o d was a n inviting target, especially f o r t r o o p s w h o s e s u p p l y l i n e s w e r e b e i n g d i s r u p t e d by N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) a t t a c k s , so it is i m p o r t a n t n o t t o c o n f u s e o p p o r t u n i s m with a d e l i b e r a t e a t t e m p t to starve Kosovar A l b a n i a n s o u t of t h e country. Notwithstanding the need for caution before making accusations of e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , a n d t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e m a n y Schindler's List-type s t o r i e s a b o u t h o w S e r b s t r i e d to h e l p A l b a n i a n s , t h e r e is p l e n t y of e v i d e n c e to suggest t h a t a n A l b a n i a n - f r e e Kosovo was t h e desire of at least s o m e n o n - A l b a n i a n civilians a n d m i l i t a r y / p a r a m i l i tary units. T h e virtual 100 p e r c e n t d e s t r u c t i o n of s o m e towns a n d vill a g e s d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e S e r b s d i d n o t w a n t t h e A l b a n i a n s to r e t u r n . Also, f o r e x a m p l e , m a n y Kosovars r e p o r t e d t h a t n o n - A l b a n i a n s h o p k e e p e r s e i t h e r r e f u s e d to sell t h e m f o o d (55 p e r c e n t of r e s p o n d e n t s ) o r sold t h e m f o o d at a n i n f l a t e d p r i c e o n t h e basis of t h e i r ethnicity (66 p e r c e n t of r e s p o n d e n t s ) . E v i d e n c e of a policy of d e s t r o y i n g t h e m e a n s of survival is also f o u n d in t h e t e s t i m o n i e s of t h o s e surveyed. A f a r m e r f r o m F e r o n i k e l reported: I was prevented from farming my two hectares of land for two years through a combination of my tools being stolen, snipers, and my land being mined. In Feronikel and Gllogovc, there were many police and every day we suffered abuse, rape, robbery and destruction of houses and property. The Serbs killed two cows, destroyed 1,000 kg of flour and 4,000 kg of wheat and burned my animal fod-

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der, stole my Yugo 45 m o t o r car, d e s t r o y e d my h o u s e a n d stole my tractor, p l o u g h , trailer a n d h a r r o w .

Another farmer from the Ferizaj area wrote: We w e r e p u s h e d f r o m o u r h o u s e s ; we w e r e s h o t at a n d s h e l l e d . T h e y killed o u r a n i m a l s a n d a b u s e d us in o u r own h o u s e s . P e o p l e w e a r i n g masks c a m e a n d o u r c h i l d r e n w e r e a f r a i d . T h e y s h o u t e d " G o away f r o m h e r e , this is n o t y o u r place. G o to A l b a n i a , g o to Bill C l i n t o n — h e will give y o u c h o c o l a t e s . " We stayed in t h e m o u n t a i n s f o r o n e w e e k with n o t h i n g to e a t a n d n o t h i n g to d r i n k a n d with small children.

The fact that 30 percent of the respondents reported that their wells had been destroyed or in some way contaminated to prevent their using them is a n o t h e r indication that attempts were made to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. These reports were corroborated when, on return to Kosovo in June, some wells were found to have been contaminated with rubbish and even corpses, and others had been booby trapped or mined. O n e of the biggest p r o b l e m s the Kosovar Albanians faced in obtaining food was access to their land. As Figure 13.4 shows, the threat of being shot by snipers while working in the fields posed an obstacle to growing and harvesting crops for 88 percent of the families interviewed. Mines were also a problem, although these were laid both by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian army. Seventy percent of the population surveyed r e p o r t e d that, even if they did not face the threat of mines and snipers, they still could not

Figure 13.4

Reasons W h y Kosovars C o u l d N o t F a r m T h e i r L a n d

Snipers

Mines

Farmed by other people

No tools

Macedonia

143

have f a r m e d t h e l a n d b e c a u s e t h e i r t o o l s h a d b e e n s t o l e n or destroyed. Although food and the means of p r o d u c i n g f o o d f o r m e d the main focus of our survey, respondents were anxious for us to record the physical abuse and theft of money and jewelry that they had experienced. In many instances, this was as m u c h a reason for leaving Kosovo as the lack of food. Being robbed meant that they no longer h a d t h e m e a n s to buy f o o d if t h e o p p o r t u n i t y arose, a n d s o m e refugees we spoke to said they were extremely worried about how they would provide for themselves in Macedonia without money. They did not realize that food and shelter would be provided to them free of charge. Many of the families we questioned had witnessed beatings or the detention of family members by the police, and nearly all who wrote testimonies had had items of value stolen from them or had had to pay bribes to secure their passage out of Kosovo (although it is probable that the people who had suffered were more likely to write testimonies than those who had not). What is clear, as is illustrated in the quotes that follow, is that the Serbian forces and gypsies were very much aware of the cash economy that had operated in Kosovo since the collapse of the Bank of Yugoslavia and knew that many people would be traveling with all t h e i r wealth in cash ( D e u t s c h m a r k s [DM]), jewelry, or gold. A f t e r t h r e e weeks staying in t h e m o u n t a i n s we traveled to Ferizaj via Mirosala. We were stopped by two soldiers—Serbs in a civilian car—who asked us for money. When I said no they stripped me naked and found 200DM which they took. After that they beat me, shooting near my legs and then released me. —Farmer f r o m Ferizaj T h e police took our money, our gold and all the things from the house and then b u r n e d the house. On the journey to Pristina they stole everything, even shoes; they asked for money while we were on the train and threatened to kill us if we d i d n ' t give it to them. We gave them the money we needed for bread. I can't tell you everything which h a p p e n e d to us in such a short time. —Farmer from Lupe I Eperm, Podujeve The paramilitary group came to our place. I had my daughter 17, some other girl 23, my mother-in-law, the son of my brother in law a n d the others a n d I was so scared. They came swearing a n d shouting in Serbian "Give us money, give us money or I will kill you with this machine gun." I had some money that I had saved, about 300DM and I gave them 100DM. Then he started shouting again saying "more, more" and I had to give him everything. He then insisted on gold and jewelry. I told him I have nothing but said to him take this ring—I took the ring off my finger just to save my life. He then

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turned to the girls—my daughter had some money and she gave it all a n d t h e rest of the w o m e n h a d to do the s a m e — g i v e everything.—Woman from Cirez.

C o p i n g Mechanisms of IDPs in Kosovo Anecdotal evidence suggests that people from certain areas were better prepared for food shortages than others. Urban populations, for example, were often worse prepared than those in rural areas, as they thought that the conflict would not reach the larger towns. Some refugees told us that, prior to their evacuation, the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) warned them to prepare food stocks. This is reflected in Figure 13.5, which shows t h ' 1 4 5 percent of families had put emergency rations of flour aside. (Flour was cooked in ovens that IDPs either took with them if they had transportation or borrowed from other people living in the areas where they were seeking refuge; yeast was cultured locally from existing supplies. Most refugees entering Macedonia had to surrender their vehicles at the border and therefore lost all the domestic equipment they had tried to bring with t h e m — a n o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n for aid delivery to returnees). It was not always possible to mill or bake flour. One respondent reported: "We were eating boiled corn and boiled wheat, we didn't Figure 13.5

Sources of Food for I D P s

Friends

Family

Neighbors

Own Supplies

Bought

Macedonia

145

have mills." Another refugee (a woman from Drenica) told us of people eating raw, unmilled grain and wild edible grasses that they found in the forests when their food supplies had run out. If they were not forced out of their homes under the threat of violence, Kosovar Albanians lived off stocks they had prepared beforehand. However, insecurity or the lack of food often forced Kosovars to move to the urban areas where food could still be bought or to rely on friends, relatives, and neighbors. Figure 13.5 illustrates the fact that often a combination of these survival strategies was used, with people relying on friends, family, and neighbors at different stages. The survey demonstrates the strength of ethnic and family bonds among Kosovar Albanians. In the majority of cases families in hiding together would share any food they had. One refugee in Stankovac II recalls: T h e first time we were in h i d i n g for five days I m a n a g e d to buy 100kg of flour; I took 50kg and left it with the people [with whom I was staying] in case I had to return. ... When I returned I used it for five days. As we were 12 people together, we had to keep the usage as low as possible. T h e n it was finished, but fortunately we had some friends and relatives who really helped us. They b r o u g h t us some buckets full of flour and I must say they really helped us.

It is probable that without the strong sense of Albanian ethnic identity that cut across national boundaries, as evidenced by the support given to the refugees by Macedonian Albanians and the financial support provided by remittances f r o m Kosovars abroad, the food aspect of the emergency would have been far more severe. Food prices rose d u r i n g the crisis—partly because of scarcity b u t also because non-Albanian shopkeepers overcharged Albanians. Hard currency sent by relatives living overseas was an important safety net for many Kosovars, not only through the crisis but during the preceding nine years when many Albanians were unemployed as a result of Serb discrimination.

Priorities for and Actions on Return At the time the survey was executed, it was still unclear how long the r e f u g e e s would r e m a i n in M a c e d o n i a a n d Albania (the U n i t e d Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] was making preparations for winter accommodation), so it was deemed useful to try to identify what the refugees' priorities would be upon their return to Kosovo. This was done by asking them to rank five things in order of

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priority: shelter, food aid, repairs to their wells, new seeds, and new tools. Most refugees indicated that they would not feel safe with anything less than a NATO protection force, many citing the ineffectiveness of UN-led p e a c e k e e p i n g missions in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . Many respondents either did not answer this question or misunderstood the need for ranking; for those who did answer, most refugees saw shelter as their major concern once basic safety issues had been dealt with. Some 69 percent of respondents claimed that they would need their homes rebuilt, with food aid, refurbished wells, new tools, and new seeds following in descending order of importance. It would be wrong to place too much emphasis on this aspect of the survey, for two reasons. First, because of the low response rate we got to this question; second, because some refugees did not fully know what had h a p p e n e d to their property once they left. Some of t h e m based their p e r c e p t i o n of f u t u r e needs on speculation a n d rumors rather than on concrete evidence. W h e n r e f u g e e s did actually start to r e t u r n to Kosovo in J u n e 1999, no longer threatened by snipers, one of the first things they did was to check their houses for booby traps and to de-mine their land, either by hand (after some basic training from the KLA) or by driving livestock across it. T h e next priority was to harvest whatever crops remained and to clear the land for the planting of winter wheat—a task aid agencies were working to assist with through the provision of scythes a n d o t h e r tools. Provision of f o o d aid was vital to t h e returnees' survival. Aid agencies did respond relatively quickly to people's needs, t h o u g h the emergency phase of the operation e n d e d within a few weeks of the start of the refugees return.

Conclusion The Kosovo crisis is the latest in a series of post-Cold War conflicts characterized by internecine hostilities, ethnic cleansing, civilian displacement, and the need for large-scale humanitarian intervention. While it is beyond the scope of this c h a p t e r to go into the issues behind the profusion of these civil-style wars, it is clear that nationalism is emerging along with poverty or disenfranchisement of particular ethnic/political/social groups as the catalyst of conflict in many countries. Often, as in Kosovo, the military and police are controlled by one ethnic group, so abuse of a particular grouping appears to become a state-sanctioned activity. O n e of the principal messages that the Kosovo crisis reinforces is the importance of adding value to traditional humanitarian activities

Macedonia

147

by bearing witness to and recording human rights abuses. It is central to the reconciliation and rebuilding process that victims of h u m a n rights abuses should know that their grievances will be recorded and acted upon. The perpetrators of crimes must also be made aware that the atrocities they commit will not be forgotten or ignored.

Acknowledgments The data on which this report is based could not have been collected without the hard work and dedication of Fatmir Selimi.

Notes Michael Brewin worked with Action Against H u n g e r in Macedonia. 1. S t a t i s t i c s in this s e c t i o n a r e f r o m t h e U N H C R w e b www.UNHCR.org, July 1999.

site,

14 Are There Still "Natural" Famines? Sylvie Brunei

At the end of the twentieth century, do people still die of h u n g e r because of nature? The question is worth asking: Never have natural c a t a s t r o p h e s s e e m e d so n u m e r o u s , f r o m f l o o d s in C h i n a or Bangladesh to Hurricane Mitch in Central America, droughts in the Sahel region, and earthquakes in Colombia. Most catastrophes strike in the tropics. Although natural disasters, including avalanches and floods, do occur in the t e m p e r a t e zone, the m a g n i t u d e of the damage and the violence of the cataclysms seem less severe. Why is this so? Is the tropical world by nature more exposed, more "violent" than the temperate world?

Because It Is Poor, the Tropical World Is Particularly Exposed to Natural Disasters The two principal characteristics of the tropics, which gird the earth straddling both sides of the equator, are the absence of winter and the abundant rainfall. The absence of winter means that there is constant heat throughout the year. The average temperature in the coldest month is at least 18 degrees Centigrade (65 degrees Fahrenheit). The difference in temperature between day and night is greater than the difference in temperature between the coldest day of the year and the hottest. (In climatic terms, the diurnal thermal range is greater than the annual thermal range). Abundant rainfall, greater than 500 millimeters (20 inches) per 149

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year, represents the point at which agriculture is possible without irrigation and rivers flow all year round (in contrast with arid and semiarid zones). Except in the equatorial belt, rain in the tropics falls only during one part of the year, the rainy season, which is characterized by destructive rainstorms, notably in those regions of Asia that are affected by monsoons. On the surface, it would appear as though the tropical world is especially favored: The absence of winter prolongs the period during which plants can grow (the growing season), in contrast with temperate countries. Tropical soils are rich (but they are fragile, because the heat and humidity cause rapid demineralization of the surface humus layer, which is therefore very thin). Yet, nearly the entire humid, tropical region consists of poor and underdeveloped countries. Is this linked to the very nature of the clim a t e , its u n h e a l t h i n e s s , its h e a t that favors the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of insects, its parasites and molds, which together prevent the countries from developing? Such was the view of writers in the past. Montaigne wrote that "hot air relaxes the fibers"; Littre evoked the "furious d e l i r i u m t h a t seized E u r o p e a n s u p o n c o n t a c t with t h e t r o p i c a l world." It is easy to forget that, in reality, there are developed areas in the tropics, such as Florida, parts of Japan and Australia, and the French Antilles. T h e r e the environment is as healthy as that of temperate countries: no malaria, no parasitic or intestinal diseases. The real reason for the unhealthiness of the tropical world stems from the fact that the industrial revolution made its appearance in the temperate world, more precisely in England in the eighteenth century, because of the problem of the overpopulation of limited spaces. At that time, the temperate world was at least as unhealthy as the tropical world today: D r i n k i n g water, o f t e n p o l l u t e d , s p r e a d cholera; epidemics of measles, diphtheria, even of influenza, were deadly; "swamp fevers" decimated children in the most humid areas (which have often kept their old n a m e of "the marshlands"). It is medical and scientific research that has made it possible to clean up the temperate world and improve the health of its inhabitants as standards of living improved (hygiene, vaccination, health regulations, and medical care for the population). But the inhabitants of the tropical world have not benefited from these gains because research has not been (and still is not) directed toward this world, which at the time of the industrial revolution was sparsely populated and viewed as backward. Moreover, the soils of temperate countries have been worked for

Are There Still "Natural" Famines?

151

decades in order to improve their quality and fertility. Thanks to the addition of lime, fertilizers, and all sorts of products, the formerly hardscrabble C h a m p a g n e region has b e c o m e a great agricultural region, and the Landes and Camargue areas have become great producers of wine, fruit, and so on. In contrast, the soils of most tropical countries have not been changed: No one has tried to enrich them. In many cases, the only means of replenishing their fertility is to leave them fallow. Today, as the population increases, the length of the fallow p e r i o d can n o l o n g e r be m a i n t a i n e d , a n d the soil b e c o m e s exhausted. Increased clearing of land for planting allows the rain to wash through the earth, leaving a denuded, demineralized soil that h a r d e n s and becomes unsuitable for cultivation. Many African villages are ringed by "dead" patches of land that have been exhausted f r o m overcultivation, thereby f o r c i n g f a r m e r s — i n reality w o m e n because it is they who produce the food—to go farther and farther away from the village to find fertile land. T h e sudden and rapid population increase in the Third World has thus created problems for many population groups, which have grown rapidly in size while trying to live from the produce of land that has not been improved or that has been degraded by overcultivation. The large populations of today are much more exposed to risks than in the past. Because their density is increasing and their production techniques have remained the same, many of these populations are c o n f r o n t e d with the terrible challenge of having to feed larger numbers of people on less fertile soil. Because of this, they have taken more risks. Traditional societies carefully guarded the memory of natural disasters and learned to live with risk and to guard against it; for example, the villages of the Sahel used policies of collective grain storage as a means of combating drought. The new populations, disorganized by their increasing numbers and lured by city life, which is perceived as more modern and easier, have lost this memory of natural disasters. They settle on high-risk lands in o r d e r to feed themselves, despite the difficulties. These include the slopes of volcanoes or the floors of valleys, where the land is more fertile. In the Sahel, f a r m e r s have g o n e t o o f a r n o r t h i n t o s e m i a r i d z o n e s f o r m e r l y reserved for nomadic livestock farming. In the Andes, they have settled on steep slopes because the best lands were taken over by large landholders, descendants of the colonizers. This increasingly dense settlement of marginal lands has left the populations much more vulnerable. Too many people living in difficult places: All the conditions are in place for tragedies to occur.

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O n l y D e v e l o p e d Societies C a n Effectively Prevent the Risks T h e big difference between rich countries and poor countries as they face risks of natural disasters is that the rich countries have the means and the will to implement disaster-prevention policies. Today, the earth is being continuously surveyed: Satellites study the movement of air masses and oceans and can predict any type of climatic catastrophe (droughts, hurricanes, tidal waves) days or even weeks in advance. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are detected and announced by monitoring stations, large numbers of which are located in all the sensitive parts o f the globe. Global warming, for example, or the hole in the ozone layer are the subjects of detailed analysis, and even if experts disagree a m o n g themselves over the exact causes, they are in agreement about the reality of the natural phenomena registered. In response to these observations, certain societies have the financial means and the will to take effective measures: In earthquakeprone areas, such as in Japan and California, the state enforces compliance with very strict codes for the construction of public buildings. In India, the government keeps up-to-date and very detailed descriptions of the early warning signs of drought and of the methods to be used to prevent them from devastating entire regions. Dikes keep rivers in their beds in China in order to prevent floods. But some states are weak and therefore incapable of putting in place prevention and early-warning mechanisms. In others, governments attach no i m p o r t a n c e to protecting their population from these risks, because they know that those who will suffer in the event of disasters are the poor, who live on marginal lands and have no political influence. When a state lacks the power or the will to truly manage the whole of its territory, it neglects entire regions and populations, which are not taken into account in national land use policies. T h e same hurricane may therefore cause thousands of victims in the poor regions of Central America and only material damage in the rich and protected regions, such as the French Antilles. T h e same drought can ravage the Sahel region of Africa and cause a human tragedy, then hit India, killing only a few heads of cattle. And African families that lose all their possessions in a natural disaster will endure hunger over an extended period, while the Indian families will very quickly receive from their government seeds and cattle to enable them to restock their herds and plant their fields, and so resume a normal life.

Are There Still "Natural"

Famines?

153

The big difference between developed and developing countries is this capacity to conceive, finance, and implement the three components of a risk-management policy: • Disaster prevention through the adoption of measures to strengthen the population's ability to cope; • Protection of the population during the disaster (evacuation plans, organization of food and medical assistance, and so on); • Rapid reconstruction after the disaster to permit a return to normalcy in the shortest possible time. O f course, for such policies to work, there must be at least a minimum of infrastructure: If the country has no roads, if the population is illiterate and therefore cannot read newspapers and does not have radios, if the state's finances are drained by the repayment of excessive debt, then it is impossible to respond effectively to the risk of natural disasters. T h e poorest states therefore do not always have the means to put into place such responses: Prevention, protection, and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e f i n a n c i a l and logistical resources. Sometimes, however, the states also pursue other strategies.

Famines Due to Nature Alone Have Become the Exception Famine never strikes out of the blue. When disaster strikes somewhere on the globe, when a food shortage threatens certain populations, it does not happen from one day to the next. The warning signs of famine are well known: disappearance of food stocks, recourse to gathering or hunting, men abandoning their families, children who begin to show signs of acute malnutrition, and so on. Although it is rare, there are still some regions that are truly isolated from the rest of the world—for example, in certain mountainous regions of central Asia or in the isolated savannas of Africa. There it is possible for drought to cause populations to die because of the total disappearance of food. But such famines have become the exception since, more often than not, aid organizations are alerted by the early warning systems put in place by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and by the governments of the countries concerned, which appeal for emergency aid. Journalists disseminate the terrible images of hunger. Food aid is mobilized to offset the deficit, and food is distributed to

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the stricken population, while children are cared for in feeding centers. From the time that aid organizations intervene to help the victims, it takes only a few weeks to halt a famine: Cared for in a specialized center, a skeletal child can regain normal weight in less than a month, if unaffected by other illnesses. The problem with this food aid is that it sometimes takes time to arrive on the scene: Months can go by from the m o m e n t the governm e n t gives the alert to the m o m e n t when the effective decision is taken to dispatch aid. Humanitarian organizations react more swiftly. But their capacity for action, while very effective, is more limited than that of the United Nations: If famine threatens an entire region, then assistance must be mobilized on a massive scale. But the United Nations is slower to mobilize than are nongovernmental organizations because it is more cumbersome and more subj e c t to o f t e n - c o m p l i c a t e d b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s . T h e U n i t e d Nations sometimes also has difficulty in convincing the donor states of the North that the situation is urgent: Certain states, such as those of the Sahel, for example, appeal for aid every year. How can one identify those years when a disaster will really occur unless massive aid is dispatched as rapidly as possible from those years in which the state needs food aid mainly for resale on the open market or to distribute to its supporters? The problem is that, while donors seek to ascertain whether a request is motivated by a genuine emergency, people are in danger of dying, especially children, who are the most vulnerable sector of the population. Unfortunately, there are situations in which aid does not arrive in time to save the populations suffering from hunger. This is so e i t h e r because the g o v e r n m e n t a p p e a l e d f o r h e l p too late or because the United Nations took too long to react. But sometimes also because, while help did indeed arrive, it was not properly distributed to h u n g e r victims: A portion was diverted for the benefit of other populations closer to the regime than the starving population, a n o t h e r portion was resold to enrich certain merchants, while still another portion was simply distributed to the army. T h e r e f o r e , while the initial disaster was certainly c a u s e d by nature, the famine itself is the result of h u m a n actions: There is nothing "natural" about it since, if the aid had indeed reached the victims, they would never have died of hunger. Unfortunately, for certain governments, a natural disaster is a windfall, as long as it strikes populations that do not count politically in that country: The disaster allows the governments to justify an appeal for massive amounts of emer-

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gency aid. The goal, then, is not to help the starving but to extract a portion for the government's own benefit. When drought struck the nomadic peoples of the northern Sahel in the early 1970s and then again in the early 1980s, the tons of aid dispatched did not reach these people. They were considered secondclass citizens, always in revolt against the power of the states in question, rebels against the sedentary life. Instead, the aid piled up in the cities, where much of it was misappropriated. In the northeast of Brazil, d r o u g h t h e l p e d to consolidate the power of the large landholders, who took the opportunity to make famine victims work on improvement projects on their property in exchange for food aid: The landholders even appeared to be genuine benefactors, since it was they who c o o r d i n a t e d the distribution of food! To e n s u r e that assistance reaches those in n e e d of relief a n d those alone is therefore the challenge that faces the aid agencies if they truly wish to avert famine.

Notes Sylvie Brunei is strategy adviser, Action Against Hunger.

PART T W O CONFRONTING UNJUST FOOD DISTRIBUTION:WHICH STRATEGIES FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? Today, humanitarian organizations realize that they have become pawns of a new geopolitical game that seeks to use them as an instrument, be it in the North or in the South. Therefore they must relentlessly struggle to reaffirm their relief mission, their impartiality, and their independence when confronted by governments trying to make them tools of political interests. How to have efficacy and justice together? How to find a right way to avoid becoming marginalized or becoming a purely technical service provider? How to secure an enhanced protection for the victims both in the short and long term? These are issues and questions raised in Part 2.

15 Humanitarian Action in North Korea: Ostrich Politics Christophe Reltien

Is North Korea b e c o m i n g the grim theater of the most disastrous h u m a n tragedy of the turn of the century while the humanitarian movement remains helpless to respond? As signs of a famine on a scale reminiscent of the worst periods of the Great Leap Forward in China from 1959 to 1961 or in Ukraine in the early 1930s appear with greater frequency, the relevance of the humanitarian aid programs in place in the country poses a number of ethical and practical problems.

Introduction This c h a p t e r was written in t h e fall of 1999. D u r i n g t h e winter m o n t h s , Action Against H u n g e r a t t e m p t e d negotiations with the North Korean authorities in order to gain better direct access to the p o p u l a t i o n . Convinced that h u m a n i t a r i a n aid does not reach the most vulnerable and is completely controlled by the government for its own benefit, Action Against Hunger decided to withdraw from the country in March 2000. A c o m p l e t e r e p o r t as well as a testimony before the U.S. Congress can be f o u n d at www.aah-usa.org.

A Ruined Economy with Serious Humanitarian Consequences North Korea's economy appeared to continue its decline in 1999. In the absence of reliable statistics, it is impossible to determine precise159

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ly the extent of the economic disaster. However, observations made by the Action Against Hunger team during their travels to the country were quite revealing: large factories now abandoned, massive population movements along the roads to collect firewood or gather herbs and roots, hospitals without heat, denuded hillsides, absence of tractors in the fields ... all signs of the country's economic collapse. N o r t h Korea's Gross N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t is e s t i m a t e d to have declined by half since 1996. The abrupt end of the system of preferential trade with the socialist countries, especially the USSR, in the early 1990s was a severe blow to the North Korean economy. This highly industrialized nation f o u n d itself deprived of energy, which inevitably led to a sharp drop in industrial production. Chongjin, a large city in the north of the country, where Action Against Hunger maintains a presence, is a vivid example of this industrial disaster. Economic activity has virtually disappeared f r o m the city, and the great chimneys of the factories no longer belch smoke. The country is also deeply in debt, which it has no means of paying. Foreign countries are therefore very wary of expanding their economic ties. North Korea appears increasingly isolated, cut off from the rest of the world. T h e last foreign airline to serve Pyongyang stopped its flights in April 1999. Two weekly flights by the national carrier Koryo Air between Beijing and Pyongyang are one of the last links to the outside world. The Chinese have closed three of their five border posts along the Sino-Korean border due to the lack of traffic. Despite its economic difficulties, North Korea continues to spend large sums of money on its military in order to maintain a massive army and to pursue its weapons research activities. This situation is evidenced by the firing of a missile in August 1998 and by the nation's attempts to build a nuclear weapon. The country's agricultural potential is limited, since only 20 percent of the land is fit for farming. In the past, this land was intensively cultivated, and fertilizers and pesticides were widely used. The sharp drop in fertilizer production led to a major decline in agricultural production, a process aggravated by farming techniques that damaged the soil. Deforestation is also a major problem, causing serious erosion and making fields even more vulnerable to natural disasters that, like the floods of 1995 and 1996, are frequent in the country. Action Against H u n g e r ' s a g r o n o m i s t s in N o r t h Korea have observed on their regular visits to collective farms how agricultural production remains low owing to the lack of fertilizer and of fuel or tires for tractors and to inefficient farming techniques. Some observers nonetheless claim to see signs of positive developments. The Supreme National Assembly, which was newly elected in

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1998, has introduced constitutional changes and allowed the use of a new vocabulary in official political a n d e c o n o m i c discourse: the notion of the "village market" where private individual produce may be sold and the notion of plots of land for private use. Other developments are also noteworthy, given the country's notorious rigor and isolation. These include s e n d i n g North Korean managers a b r o a d u n d e r the auspices of United Nations programs to study and learn the concept of the free market or the attempts made to approach international financial institutions. These attempts are limited, however, since the country's economic liberalization still faces obvious ideological hurdles. Will the liberalization policy advocated by the South Korean government and supported by some of that country's largest industrial conglomerates lead to significant change? No one can say for sure. Korean officials continue to blame the 1995 and 1996 natural disasters for all of their country's economic difficulties. It is significant to note in this regard that the government body that serves as the liaison for humanitarian organizations is called the Committee to Repair the Damage Caused by the Floods. According to the official Korean line, all of the country's ills are attributable to these floods, since any acknowledgment of economic errors would lead to criticism of the system as a whole, which is unthinkable u n d e r the current Korean regime, based as it is on a highly developed cult of personality. In 1999, North Korea's food deficit was estimated to be approximately 1.3 million tons. 1 This figure no doubt hides conflicting realities. The food shortage has a greater effect on the deficit n o r t h e r n provinces, which have more limited agricultural resources. Traditionally, the surplus from southern provinces was shipped to the northern provinces. This "redistribution" system no longer seems to function, leaving the northern provinces with an acute food deficit. Moreover, urban residents in Korea are much more affected by the shortages than rural dwellers. Factory workers are without doubt the hardest hit, owing to the unemployment that has resulted from factory closings. City dwellers are attempting to make do as best they can. Many families have built hen houses on their balconies or have begun to raise pigs in their apartments. What is more, as we will see later, the government's food distribution program is based on criteria that clearly exclude a sector of the population. This serious food crisis obviously raises the question of whether famine exists in North Korea and to what extent. This is a sensitive and controversial subject. O n e of the characteristics of a totalitarian regime is the lack of transparency, its opaqueness. No one is in a posi-

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tion to confirm or deny the current figures of two to three million deaths since 1996. In May 1999, for the first time, Korean officials verbally acknowledged a significant increase in the mortality rate (from 6.8 per 1,000 in 1993 to 9.3 per 1,000 in 1998), which would mean some 55,000 additional deaths per year, or 220,000 over a four-year period. Still, these figures appear to be conservative. At the end of 1998, a nutritional survey c o n d u c t e d by the U n i t e d Nations C h i l d r e n ' s F u n d (UNICEF), the World Food P r o g r a m (WFP), a n d the E u r o p e a n Union revealed rates of m o d e r a t e malnutrition of 14 p e r c e n t and severe malnutrition of 2 percent a m o n g children aged between six months and seven years old. North Korean refugees accounts paint an even more tragic picture of the situation, of entire families decimated by illness, and of the lack of food. A recent study 2 of these refugees has shown that the mortality rate was very high (42.8 per 1,000) in 1995, 1996, and 1997 and that it was continuing to rise. The study also revealed that gove r n m e n t rations were the main source of food for only 5 percent of the people surveyed and that, for nearly half of the respondents, picking fruits and gathering herbs and roots was their primary source of food. Beyond the debate over numbers, the humanitarian situation in North Korea is undeniably critical, and people are dying of hunger and diseases associated with malnutrition. The complete collapse of the public health system (poorly heated hospitals lacking medicine) renders the country's inhabitants all the more vulnerable.

A R e g i m e T h a t Manipulates H u m a n i t a r i a n A i d with International C o m p l i c i t y Even though the North Korean system constitutes an impediment to efficient humanitarian aid, the use of the term humanitarian as a bargaining tool by certain governments has undercut demands by genuine humanitarian actors for control and freedom of access. The humanitarian programs operating in Korea face numerous obstacles. T h e implementation and success of a program are hampered by the deliberate efforts of the authorities to limit the scope of humanitarian activities by placing restrictions on freedom to evaluate a situation, direct supervision of invested materials, freedom to evaluate the impact of programs, and direct access to beneficiaries. For Koreans, national security and sovereignty are more impor-

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tant than humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian characteristics, even if recognized, are not acknowledged as arguments during negotiations. In the m i n d s of Korean officials, o p e r a t i o n a l principles a n d humanitarian ethics conflict with the notion of national interest. The criteria for intervention and for providing aid to the population are viewed as affairs of state, and the system in place must, in principle, provide complete support to the population. It is also a means of controlling and monitoring the population. Organizations are allowed, or rather tolerated, in the country with suspicion and distrust because they are presumed to be hostile to the regime in place. These organizations have the potential to uncover and reveal the regime's weaknesses and also have the means of reporting the internal situation to the outside world by circumventing the country's strict, voluntary isolation. N o r t h Korean officials have clearly perceived the risk that Action Against H u n g e r may r e p o r t to the outside world what we observe daily on the inside. The authorities view this potential as an essentially political capability. Korean discourse has not changed. The government accepts only aid that it deems to be humanitarian, but only if it is not subject to conditions, which are always considered to be political. Moreover, the testimonials that Action Against H u n g e r is in a position to provide must take Korea's situation into account and moderate the criticisms that may be contained in the testimonials in light of their possible consequences, in order to retain our organization's capacity to bear witness to the situation. O n e of the major constraints is that all humanitarian aid must be channeled through Korea's state distribution system. The regime thus controls the aid and provides aid only to those people whom it wishes to help. These people are not necessarily the same ones that the humanitarian organizations would like to benefit. This situation presents a cruel dilemma and a vicious circle for the humanitarian organizations in Korea. Access to the most vulnerable sectors of the population is a major objective, but one of the reasons for their vulnerability is precisely their exclusion from the system u n d e r which humanitarian aid is distributed. This may explain the coexistence in North Korea of two realities: the world to which humanitarian organizations have access and the world of those who are excluded, a world Action Against Hunger sees without being able to help. According to N o r t h Korean r e f u g e e s accounts, the province of North Hamgyong, in the northern part of the country, is one of the areas most affected by famine, and people

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t h e r e are dying of h u n g e r . T h e r e is no d o u b t that h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations could save these people if they had access to them. Even though statistics concerning North Korea must be treated with caution, the food deficit in 1999 was estimated at 1.3 million tons, as stated earlier. Food aid to North Korea in 1999, however, was just over one million tons! If the food crisis were merely a question of the quantity of food, one could say that the massive amounts of aid received by the country have resolved the problem. Yet famine has continued throughout the year, at least in certain parts of the country. This situation suggests that the problem is more complex than mere availability of food and that aid is probably not reaching those who are most in need. In any case, Action Against Hunger's operational principles are u n d e r daily p r e s s u r e . Because of t h e i r e x t r e m e suspiciousness, Korean officials are constantly seeking ways of preventing the organization from getting an accurate assessment of the humanitarian situation in the country and f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g the way certain state structures, such as the public distribution system (PDS) and collective farms, operate. The key to greater efficiency for the programs of Action Against Hunger lies in understanding how these structures function. But, in K o r e a , answers to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s n e v e r c o m e easily, if at all. Nevertheless, our organization's fundamental principles of intervention must be tirelessly m a i n t a i n e d , e x p l a i n e d , a n d d e f e n d e d to Korean officials; Action Against Hunger should know who the beneficiaries of its aid are, and distribution must take place u n d e r o u r organization's own supervision even within the overall system in place. Too often, international political agendas are cloaked in humanitarian vocabulary and ensnare certain humanitarian organizations that are unaware or unable to avoid them. The initial historical polarity between two blocs (the USSR and the United States) that started the conflict has given way to another polarity between the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies in the region, on the other hand. In this area where tensions between neighboring countries are high and well known and where U.S. and Chinese interests always lurk in the background, satisfactory diplomatic and military solutions are rare and complicated. A peninsular perspective no longer suffices as an approach to a solution to the Korean conflict; its implications and ramifications are regional and directly affect all neighboring countries: South Korea,

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Japan, and China. Russia today is no longer an integral part of the s e a r c h f o r a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n . Given the privileged ties a n d defense agreements between the United States and its allies in the region and concerns about strategic interests and the security of U.S. troops in the region, a purely Korean solution to the conflict seems unlikely. N o r t h Korea, however, has a m u l t i f a c e t e d d i p l o m a t i c a p p r o a c h . It wants to first try to n e g o t i a t e its best deal with the United States alone, since North Korea would no longer be at war with the United States and only with South Korea. Then it envisages a resumption of diplomatic relations with the South. Koreans would like to see an exclusively Korean solution, which would satisfy peninsular nationalism by excluding any other parties. This is true not only because the United States still represents the hereditary enemy, but also because North Koreans do not hide their deep suspicion of their Chinese neighbors. T h e n u c l e a r a r g u m e n t , however, so well employed by N o r t h Korea a n d the U n i t e d States as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l bargaining chip and means of entry into the country, eliminates all possibility of a pan-Korean solution. Recent developments, following the discovery by a U.S. satellite of a large construction site suspected of being a f u t u r e u n d e r g r o u n d nuclear site, have demonstrated the use of the n u c l e a r a r g u m e n t by t h e U n i t e d States a n d N o r t h Korea. T h e Koreans have p u t a price on the authorization of U.S. inspection visits to the site, estimated at $300 million. T h e United States cann o t a g r e e to pay f o r this right; a c c o r d i n g to the a g r e e m e n t on nuclear assistance signed in 1994 by North and South Korea, J a p a n , and the United States, inspectors should have the right to visit the site in o r d e r to verify t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t has b e e n r e s p e c t e d . Nevertheless, the United States does not wish to pass up an opportunity to be able to enter the country and has succeeded in modifying the original terms of the bargain by having the Koreans accept payment for their authorization in the form of food aid (300,000 tons of food aid and agricultural assistance). It is now known that this aid will be c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h the U n i t e d Nations and U.S. international aid organizations. These humanitarian organizations will therefore transform what is really bilateral aid into "humanitarian assistance" in response to military and political objectives that a r e in n o way h u m a n i t a r i a n . T h i s b l u r r i n g of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between the two types of assistance is extremely h a r m f u l to the humanitarian ethic. Viewed in this light, h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance to N o r t h Korea takes on a different perspective:

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The North Korean regime's extortionist policies and its capacity for mischief are being used as leverage to secure more aid that, in fact, helps to reinforce the regime and has little impact on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. U.S. support seeks to make the North Korean regime heavily d e p e n d e n t on U.S. aid while allowing the United States to increase its leverage with North Korea.

T h e a b a n d o n m e n t of all r e q u i r e m e n t s for control by certain United Nations agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose practical approach is to make gifts without any effective control over them, merely encourages Korean officials to reject humanitarian principles of operation. This practice is most certainly detrimental to humanitarian aid as a whole. Large quantities of food are in fact delivered to Korea in the form of gifts. This aid has been integrated into the national distribution system, to be divided up and sent to designated zones and recipients. The permanent presence of expatriate personnel is an essential element in the supervision of this distribution, since it is always very difficult to follow the paths taken by the aid and to ascertain who the beneficiaries will be. During 1998, the organizations working in Korea were split into two groups, one f r o m the E u r o p e a n U n i o n that insisted on strict respect for the humanitarian principles of aid distribution and another, f r o m the United States, that favored "no conditionality," or aid without any conditions attached. It is easy to see behind these two stances the political positions that differentiate the two principal aid donors involved in the Korean crisis. Questions can be raised about the genuineness and bases of the U.S. "no conditions policy" when U.S. aid representatives announce at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e that m a l n o u r i s h e d c h i l d r e n are n o t involved in politics and that U.S. aid will therefore be provided without conditions. Questions can also be raised when it is revealed, moreover, that in return for the authorization for U.S. inspectors to visit a suspected nuclear site, North Korea will receive agricultural assistance for potato farming along with thousands of tons of food aid. The U.S. approach to North Korea is relatively straightforward: zero risk for U.S. soldiers in South Korea, control of nuclear armaments, a n d o n g o i n g efforts to d e f u s e the crisis in a soft l a n d i n g approach by adapting or transforming the current political and economic system. In order to achieve these objectives, a U.S. presence in North Korea is a valuable asset; a link must be established, a sort of indirect diplomacy that could be put in place before a more direct

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r e l a t i o n s h i p is d e v e l o p e d if c i r c u m s t a n c e s so p e r m i t . C e r t a i n U.S. N G O s could fill this role. T h e sums invested by the U n i t e d States in the process of stabilizi n g t h e p e n i n s u l a over t h e past years, especially its i n v e s t m e n t s in f o o d aid, r e p r e s e n t a significant b a r g a i n i n g chip f o r the application of U.S. policy, e i t h e r t h r o u g h the U n i t e d Nations or t h r o u g h NGOs. Will t h e l a r g e s c a l e of t h e a i d p r o v i d e d c r e a t e a N o r t h K o r e a n d e p e n d e n c e o n U.S. aid? N G O s will have to find a way to develop programs in N o r t h Korea while respecting a n d e n s u r i n g respect f o r the general principles of intervention that were a c c e p t e d in 1998 by all of the h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations a n d agencies p r e s e n t in N o r t h Korea a n d that comprise the only d o c u m e n t that is c o m m o n to the entire h u m a n i t a r i a n community, with the exception of aid d o n o r s . More specifically, today certain organizations distribute h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of tons of aid (medical, foodstuffs, agricultural, a n d so o n ) with very l i m i t e d m e a n s of s u p e r v i s i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s m e t h o d of o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e leeway it allows K o r e a n officials f e e d fears that the most vulnerable sectors of the Korean p o p u l a t i o n have little h o p e of b e n e f i t i n g f r o m t h e m a n n a . Action Against H u n g e r , despite the i n t r o d u c t i o n in Korea of the most rigorous logistical protocols possible a n d with n i n e expatriates p e r m a n e n t l y in the field, has g r e a t difficulty in e n s u r i n g that t h e r e is n o diversion of the h u n d r e d s of tons of aid that it ships to the c o u n t r y a n d has d o u b t s a b o u t the possibility at the p r e s e n t time of gaining access to the most vulnerable sectors of the p o p u l a t i o n . O n e can only a d m i r e the U n i t e d Nations agencies that claim that they are certain that the h u n d r e d s of thousands of tons of aid distributed in N o r t h Korea reach those sectors of the p o p u l a t i o n most in n e e d . Admirable b u t d o u b t f u l . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e U.S. a n d E u r o p e a n a p p r o a c h e s could lead to a risk that the Korean authorities will begin to c o m p a r e d i f f e r e n t organizations, their c o n d i t i o n s f o r distribution of aid, a n d their p r o g r a m s a n d t h e n m a k e t h e m c o m p e t e against each o t h e r . O n l y t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e m o s t a d v a n t a g e o u s to t h e Korean system would be a c c e p t e d as the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the distribution of aid in Korea, all with i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t (mainly U.S., given t h e a m o u n t of aid a n d t h e w e i g h t of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s waiting to e n t e r the country), a n d it would t h e n b e c o m e difficult to maintain a strict respect f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n principles. T h e r e can be n o ethically acceptable a n d operationally efficient h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n s in N o r t h K o r e a u n t i l such time as t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y a d a p t s a c o m m o n a n d a g r e e d - u p o n position.

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Notes C h r i s t o p h e R e l t i e n is f o r m e r A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r c h i e f of m i s s i o n in Korea. 1. F A O [ F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i z a t i o n ] / W F P [ W o r l d F o o d P r o g r a m ] , Crop and Food Supply Assessment, 1998. 2. Rising m o r t a l i t y in N o r t h K o r e a n h o u s e h o l d s r e p o r t e d by m i g r a n t s in C h i n a , J o h n s H o p k i n s S c h o o l of H y g i e n e a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h , 1999.

16 Lessons from the Kosovo Tragedy Sylvie

Brunei

N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations (NGOs) have complained loudly, and to no avail, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not acknowledge their true contributions in Kosovo. We must therefore draw lessons from the recent events in the Balkans.

Lack of Appreciation for NGOs* Experience with Crises NATO's failure to achieve the initial goal of its operation, namely, for Slobodan Milosevic to immediately cease his criminal actions against the Albanian "minority" (a minority in political but not in population terms) in Kosovo, should lead us to question the tactic employed. Humanitarians know f r o m their experiences in Sudan, Kurdistan, and Bosnia that aerial b o m b a r d m e n t s have never forced the quick surrender of a dictator if they are not followed up by the deployment of an intervention force on the ground that has a genuine mandate to put an end to the fighting. The aerial bombing gave Milosevic, who expected nothing less, a ready excuse to complete his ethnic cleansing o p e r a t i o n u n d i s t u r b e d and without witnesses, since the O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Security a n d C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e (OSCE) observers and NGO members had been forced out of the territory. Would NATO intervention on the g r o u n d have prevented the "cleansing" of villages and regions suspected of complicity with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or would such intervention on the contrary have led to widespread carnage? It is a question difficult to 169

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answer because Milosevic's behavior has been so unpredictable since the early 1990s. O n e cannot help wondering, however, whether the Western democracies, by limiting themselves to high-altitude bombing, unintentionally initially facilitated the task of a dictator whose aim was to "cleanse" Kosovo. That was obviously the opposite of what they intended. In dealing with NATO, which operated with an almost total lack of transparency, the humanitarians, who were divided and unclear as to their exact role in such circumstances (should they e n t e r the political fray or preserve their sacrosanct "neutrality"?), stood by, powerless, as the chronicle of a tragedy foretold unfolded. While a review of the situation in Somalia and Rwanda confirmed that preliminary consultations had taken place with the military, this time humanitarians have been kept in the dark about decisions taken by NATO states' governments. T h e effect of this was to reduce the effectiveness of the advocacy role that humanitarian organizations have decided to assume in situations where crimes are being committed and only their action in the field can bring a measure of relief to the suffering, though without putting an end to it. In Kosovo, NGOs have certainly played a decisive role in sounding the alarm, but above all they gave NATO a humanitarian justification for prosecuting the war. That led French writer Jean-Christophe Rufin to say that NGOs in Kosovo unwittingly served as the "trigger" for the warmongers.

Weapon of Hunger Used to Eliminate an Unwanted Population O n c e again the weapon of hunger, which we now see being used almost systematically in the new conflicts in the South, has b e e n deliberately used against a political and ethnic "minority." Victims for years of discriminatory practices in access to f o o d , the Albanian Kosovars have seen their crops and stocks of food destroyed or pillaged since the NATO b o m b a r d m e n t s began, and they themselves have been forced into exile. T h r o u g h o u t their deportation they were denied any food assistance, which led to the deaths of the most vulnerable among them—the elderly, young children, and the sick. The survivors arrived at the frontiers exhausted, humiliated, their identity papers and their belongings confiscated. Above all they were psychologically destroyed. T h e destruction of villages and killing of m e n of fighting age, who were suspected by Serb forces of belonging to the KLA, are proof that for Milosevic the process of getting rid of Kosovo's Albanian population is part of a long-term strategy aimed at preventing their subse-

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quent return and at settling the problem of Kosovo once and for all by e l i m i n a t i n g all n o n - S e r b m i n o r i t i e s . While the r e t u r n of the Kosovar refugees after eleven weeks of NATO p o u n d i n g of Serbia shows that this strategy ultimately failed, it has taken a frightful toll in h u m a n lives, as proven by the discovery by the Kosovo Force (KFOR) of mass graves in Albanian villages that had been reduced to piles of rubble.

The Militarization of Humanitarian Operations T h e c o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n military a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s , already c o n d e m n e d in Somalia and Bosnia for its perverse effects, reached its height in the Balkans, with NATO providing the after-sales service, that is, the reception of refugees after the bombardments. Not only has the military reinvented or rather reimprovised the techniques of humanitarian assistance to deal with a much larger influx of people than it had expected, it has also refused to draw u p o n the know-how and experience of the "real" humanitarian agencies, even though this might have spared NATO many difficulties. For example, the military and the authorities of the "host" countries (a term hardly suited to the case of Macedonia) considered NGOs to be undesirables a n d nuisances who s h o u l d be kept at a distance, whereas NATO favored any means that increased the "visibility" of its own humanitarian actions. Each m e m b e r country's army set up at great cost its own m o d e l c a m p (in reality o f t e n erected on unsuitable or u n h e a l t h y sites). In fact, these camps housed few people, since the Albanian community in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania sheltered the bulk of the refugees in their homes, even though they received only a tiny portion of the humanitarian aid. This confusion between military and h u m a n i t a r i a n operations continues to reveal both the limits and the dangers of the technique, exposing humanitarian teams to the risk of marginalization or even reprisals and thereby undermining their effectiveness and calling into question the very concept of operational neutrality that had, until now, protected NGOs f r o m suspicions of partiality. T h e confusion also demonstrates that the army, as in the past, still considers itself much better equipped than civilians to carry out such operations as the building of camps and tents that require prompt and large-scale logistical intervention. Yet, twenty years of a "borderless world" have p e r m i t t e d N G O s to pass f r o m t h e stage w h e r e they warn a b o u t tragedies to the stage where they are also capable of dealing effectively with them.

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Extensive Media Coverage Leads to the Same Incorrect Responses Once again, the media images of hordes of exhausted refugees walking along mountain roads, being driven toward the border both by a r m e d soldiers and by their fear of a n t i p e r s o n n e l mines, which obliged them to follow the paths marked out by their torturers, provoked a vast surge of generosity in a Western public that is anxious to provide aid and to demonstrate solidarity. Yet once again errors were committed or even encouraged: The appeal to individuals to make their contributions in kind in order to relieve the suffering of the refugees and the request for people to mail off their little packets of noodles and sugar from local post offices created great difficulties. Transporting the food thus collected to processing centers, unpacking and then repacking it in an easy-to-use form, then transporting the pallets in cargo vessels and attempting to unload them in clogged ports all create a real logistical nightmare in every sense. It might also be mentioned that the economies of the host countries are collapsing from the massive influx of goods that could have been procured right there much more easily, cheaply, and conveniently. In J u n e 1999, thousands of tons of humanitarian aid, which had not been cleared through customs, were still rotting in the port of Dures in Albania, the object of the covetousness of the Italian-Albanian mafia. Once again, and in spite of repeated warnings by NGOs that have experience in disaster relief and that are constantly suspected of pro domo advocacy, we have witnessed the use of the myth of "the truck to the rescue" that collects any kind of item willy nilly and ships it at great expense in order to distribute it to anybody. How can we be surprised, after such errors, when all kinds of illicit trafficking proliferate on the fertile ground of humanitarian aid? As for the content of what is actually delivered, we must also question the selection: The garbage cans of the camps very quickly overflow with the leftovers of our generosity, which is certainly very great, but also unselective. Kukes thus very quickly became a gigantic public garbage dump. We have also witnessed the scandalous spectacle of convoys of trucks opening wide their rear doors to disgorge in disorder and in a general free-for-all a few miserable parcels to crowds that have stood patiently waiting for hours, only to close their doors again and flee like criminals as soon as the cargo is discharged, for fear of being lynched by those who waited in vain. Unfortunately, this lowest form of humanitarianism continues to bring in contributions in major disasters that become media events, and some journalists themselves do not hesitate to encourage it.

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The Limits of Emergency Disaster Relief in the Balkans A f t e r a shaky b e g i n n i n g m a r k e d by a m a t e u r i s m a n d guesswork, the N G O s like to p r e s e n t themselves now as increasingly effective a n d professional. Yet, what is the lesson of the i m p o t e n c e of the N G O s n o t only in Kosovo itself, b u t also in t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s w h e r e they have b e e n r e s t r a i n e d as m u c h by N A T O forces as by n a t i o n a l armies anxious to stop the floods of u n d e s i r a b l e r e f u g e e s that threate n to d i s r u p t the local e t h n i c a n d political balance? T h e question of access to victims has taken o n a d d e d urgency. This time, n o t only was access to t h e d i s a s t e r a r e a itself, Kosovo, d e n i e d by t h e c r i m i n a l r e g i m e that is the cause of the tragedy, b u t it was also considerably r e s t r i c t e d in M o n t e n e g r o , A l b a n i a , a n d M a c e d o n i a . Even t h o u g h h u m a n i t a r i a n law exists o n paper, it still n e e d s to be e n f o r c e d in practice. As f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n workers themselves, t h e t i m e is l o n g past since they crossed the most tightly sealed b o r d e r s clandestinely a n d illegally: Kosovo at the e n d of the 1990s is n o l o n g e r Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Did a n y o n e t h e n imagine N G O s at t h e f r o n t i e r s of t h e m a r t y r e d c o u n t r y patiently awaiting t h e arrival of r e f u g e e s , as h a p p e n e d f r o m M a r c h to J u n e 1999 d u r i n g t h e N A T O b o m b i n g ? H u m a n i t a r i a n s today have paid too high a price for their f r e e d o m to o p e r a t e in the new conflicts of t h e South a n d East to b e willing to thoughtlessly place in d a n g e r the lives of their volunteers, w h o are now m o r e vulnerable t h a n ever. N G O s have s u f f e r e d twice as many fatalities in the past five years as in the first twenty years of o u r borderless world. Today they are n o l o n g e r b e h i n d the f r o n t lines b u t o n t h e f r o n t line, actively involved in spite of themselves in conflicts w h e r e their involvement is m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n in the past: T h e i r arrival o n the scene is now o n e of the objectives of m o d e r n conflicts, because of the financial b o n a n z a a n d m e d i a coverage that they attract. Never have security c o n c e r n s b e e n so high o n the a g e n d a . It is t r u e t h a t N G O s have c o m p e n s a t e d f o r t h e i r lost audacity with increased efficiency a n d even g r e a t e r professionalism. Yet t h e r e is still room for improvement.

Problems in the Very Nature of the Assistance Rendered For all that h u m a n i t a r i a n agencies are efficient when treating "physical s u f f e r i n g " by supplying survival kits—food, d r i n k i n g water, vac-

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cines and medical care, shelter, and blankets—they are still deficient as far as the other needs and demands of victims are concerned. In Goma, in Somalia, or after the passage of Hurricane Mitch, the NGOs worked wonders because they were providing relief to populations that lacked the bare necessities and were used to living in the most precarious conditions in their regions of origin. On the borders of Kosovo, as in Bosnia or in Kurdistan in 1991, "basic" humanitarian aid very quickly reaches its limits. The similarities in culture and in living standards between victims and their rescuers makes the latter suddenly aware of an underlying need for psychological assistance, which they could afford to ignore elsewhere because it was masked in part by the need to respond to urgent physical needs. In Rwanda, Somalia, or Burundi, the psychological distress of the populations, in a state of shock after what they had just lived through, was just as strong as in Kosovo, but humanitarian workers were often less conscious of it because the means of communication were often more limited. In Kosovo, the people we dealt with were people "like us," with the same level of development and culture. The difference was that they had just lived t h r o u g h a terrible physical and moral trauma. Delivering enriched flour and plastic sheeting may be a response to real needs in the early stages, since refugees cross the border exhausted and starving. But very quickly the victims' demands and the variety of their needs begin to pose serious challenges for their rescuers. The challenges come first of all in the area of food and hygiene; millet, corn, sugar, oil, and salt may be sufficient for food rations in Africa, but the refugees in Kosovo d e m a n d e d rather more varied meals, such as breakfasts consisting of prepared dishes, coffee, and so on. T h e n come the challenges at the moral level; like the Kurds, the Kosovo refugees felt humiliated that their expectations were reduced to simple physiological n e e d s when they h a d j u s t lost their h o m e l a n d . Everything h a p p e n e d as if, once again, their rights as citizens were being denied. Few humanitarian organizations try to relieve the trauma experienced by providing genuine psychological support, a listening ear, or legal and administrative assistance. T h e rare telephones put at the disposal of the Kosovars to enable them to contact their loved ones were more precious to them than the thousands of jars of j a m and sundry items sent by the outside world, most of which ended up in the garbage (in a mismatch of food aid that is regrettably common, we even saw salami being delivered to Muslims!). There was a profoundly shocking contrast between "humanitarian workers" bedecked with u l t r a m o d e r n communications gadgets (even t h o u g h satellite

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phones, unlike cordless phones, did not work well in Albania) that enabled them to stay in touch with their headquarters, their families, and journalists, on the one hand, and the refugees waiting for hours to try to contact their loved ones just to tell them that they were alive, on the other hand. Should not humanitarian aid start there?

Civilians A r e the Real Victims of Modern W a r s Two new concepts—that of "zero fatalities" introduced by Bill Clinton after the Somalia experience, which consists of not risking the lives of U.S. soldiers in foreign theaters of action, and that of the now wides p r e a d tactic of " h u m a n shields" used in Iraq—have o n c e again placed civilian populations at the front line, particularly its most vulnerable sectors. The return home of three U.S. soldiers whose F-17 warplane had been shot down during the Kosovo war seemed to carry an e m o t i o n a l charge m o r e intense t h a n the harrowing ordeal of thousands of unknown families. Everything these days suggests that the lives of a handful of career soldiers were infinitely more precious than those of thousands of women, children, and the elderly. This hierarchy merely signals a return to the rule in force in traditional civilizations, where priority was given to protecting the adult male because it was he who had the capacity to fight and to obtain food for the group. So-called surgical strikes, sophisticated technologies such as those that incapacitate electrical systems, and the imposition of embargoes are all part of the myth of the "clean war" that is, however, just as dirty as traditional war, since all the forces involved claim civilians as their first victims, while the armies themselves are ensconced in the rear with their legions of warriors intact. Will we know one day how many h u m a n lives the Yugoslav army did in fact lose? Without a doubt, the n u m b e r of soldiers killed is derisory compared with the n u m b e r of civilian victims. This refusal to commit troops on the ground even leads to a preference for aerial drops of food, without any precision whatsoever, in the guise of assistance targeted to victims. The practice of "humanitarian drops" already begun in such places as Kurdistan and Sudan is becoming widespread. This is new proof, however unintentional, that part of the West would like to offer charity to those in need, provided that they do not come into contact at all with the victims, perceived as plague-infested, flea-ridden people who must be kept at a distance. Compassion yes, but from a distance; contact, certainly not. On the other side, people rally around a dictator who is now seen as a martyr, and the resentment builds against the bombs descending

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from the sky and indiscriminately striking civilians. "Collateral damage," claims the Western righter of wrongs by way of excuse, a phrase so casual (to say the least) that it stirs up even more resentment. Intensified by clever propaganda, a feeling of profound injustice in the face of an intervention that is perceived as unjust galvanizes the Serbs—as it did the Iraqis, Sudanese, and Afghans—against a smug, self-assured, and domineering West that purports to give lessons to the rest of the world. It only remains for the Saddam Husseins or Milosevics of the world to cultivate hatred of the Other in order to prosper in full impunity in the fertile soil of nationalism, especially since the West has repeatedly shown that it prefers to negotiate with a strong dictator who is in charge of his country rather than risk chaos and the destabilization of entire regions by putting into power opposition groups that are often divided and weak. For humanitarian organizations, there is a real dilemma. They want to relieve the very real suffering of populations subjected to an embargo or to sanctions, even if that suffering is not comparable to the suffering of minorities that are victims of their dictator, such as Kurds and Shiites in Iraq, Albanians in Kosovo, Nubians and the peoples of s o u t h e r n S u d a n , a n d t h e n o n - P u s h t u n m i n o r i t i e s of Afghanistan. The decision to bring aid to those populations, however, is to give the impression of taking sides, to make a choice that may be badly viewed (by donors, journalists, public opinion). T h e Serbs of Kosovo are in turn experiencing their own ordeal of exodus. Aside from some nations such as France, with its well-known Serb affinities, the world hesitates to come to the rescue of these "bad victims." It goes without saying that dictators are skilled at exploiting such aid in order to embellish their propaganda. Slobodan Milosevic's wife thus presides over the Yugoslavia Red Cross. Saddam Hussein, who cultivates Western o p i n i o n m a k e r s in o r d e r to publicize the ravages caused by the embargo to his country, prohibits NGOs (which wish to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people) f r o m intervening in the north of the country, among the Kurds, and in the south, among the Shiites.

Shortcomings of the United Nations Even t h o u g h the NGOs have d o n e everything possible to r e m i n d NATO of their indispensable role in "humanitarian crises," they have n o t b e e n f i r m e n o u g h in c r i t i c i z i n g t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s H i g h Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for its shortcomings. The agency has b e e n o v e r w h e l m e d f r o m all directions, as m u c h by n a t i o n a l

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authorities as by NATO forces. As usual, United Nations agencies were absent when the crisis broke out. As usual, they failed to become operational promptly enough to fulfill their mandate. On the borders of Kosovo, and particularly in Macedonia, families were arbitrarily separated and transferred (deported) to so-called reception areas without first having been registered, which was disastrous to subsequent efforts to reunite them. Given that the United Nations was not consulted before the start of the intervention and that NATO decided to f o r g o the Security Council's approval f o r fear of a Russian or Chinese veto, the United Nations once again discredited itself in the Balkans. Some years earlier in Bosnia, the UN's emissary had distinguished himself by the indulgence shown toward the Serbs who were guilty of a bloody campaign of ethnic purification. What is the long-term plan today for the victims—the Albanian Kosovars returning to Kosovo? They are returning to their country where their homes have been reduced to rubble. The intervention force is likely to be in for a long stay in Kosovo, the new Palestine of Europe. Only a genuine Marshall Plan could rebuild this devastated r e g i o n . It will i n d e e d be l a u n c h e d to give i m p e t u s to a U n i t e d Nations in search of a second wind and to galvanize for a little longer this Europe in search of itself that has f o u n d the soul it lacked in its coalition against a dictator. Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the effort to rebuild a destroyed country, by mobilizing substantial financial investments, will be made once again to the detriment of development aid for the poorest countries, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, which has already been seriously affected by the threat of nonrenewal of the Lomé Convention. Once again, the tragedy of Kosovo shows us that the worst of disasters can h a p p e n at our gates, even in our backyards, without our being capable of anticipating or preventing such disasters, of stopping them, or of relieving suffering. •

We are not capable of anticipating or preventing the disasters. Bosnia, 1992; Rwanda, 1994: Kosovo, 1999—in this trilogy of the worst, tragedy u n f o l d e d live b e f o r e o u r eyes while we, impotent, even involuntary accomplices, c o m m e n t e d on the horror. • We are not capable of stopping the disasters. It is only when the butchers have completed their j o b of cleansing that they finally lay down their weapons to take a breath and to negotiate a c o m p r o m i s e — o n a field of ruins on which they have been able to advance their pawns. • We are n o t capable of relieving the suffering of those who

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have been butchered and of bringing the perpetrators to justice. T h e ad hoc tribunals are overwhelmed by the scale of the task at hand, while the world very quickly opts for a convenient amnesia with the token conviction of a few expiatory perpetrators "to set an example." T h e term humanitarian disaster has often been used loosely where human disaster would have b e e n more correct. For once, however, the terminology was appropriate in the Balkans: Yes, there was definitely a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. It should lead the N G O s to question the relevance of their action in a world where they are systematically used as t o o l s — a new u n a r m e d b r a n c h of the great powers in search of new theaters of action—instead of constantly relying on a mandate for relief that they have conferred u p o n themselves and that they are unable to effectively discharge, in the absence of j o i n t and concerted action, in the so aptly named "humanitarian disasters." Yes, there certainly has been a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. A n d a second one may well occur in the months or years ahead.

Notes Sylvie Brunei is strategy adviser, Action Against Hunger.

17 A Code of " G o o d " Conduct? Daniel

Puillet-Breton

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should be held accountable for their actions to the public, to private and institutional donors, and to the governments of the countries in which they operate. This obvious fact is not a recent invention; NGOs, sometimes from their very inception, have charters with principles of action to ensure transparency. Since 1979, Action Against Hunger has had a charter based on the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. This charter has been adopted by all sister organizations in France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and the United States.

T h e Right to Provide Assistance or the Right to Receive Assistance? In the 1990s, the n u m b e r and activities of humanitarian organizations increased considerably, especially in countries suffering from armed conflicts and crises. The range of different organizations and the diversity of objectives often cloud the perception that they are conducting strictly humanitarian operations. Humanitarian organizations have sometimes unwittingly helped to further complicate situations. 1 In addition, the public and donor governments have increasingly focused on what is sometimes termed the "humanitarian circus" (the media portrayal of victim/savior) that threatens to undermine public support for humanitarian efforts. Linking theory and practice, aca179

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demies who have analyzed the most professional humanitarian organizations describe, and sometimes denounce, the advent of a "humanit a r i a n b u r e a u c r a c y " t h a t creates its own self-sustaining cycle of demand. 2 Although these attacks are sometimes incomplete or off the mark, we must acknowledge that criticism of humanitarian efforts and critical self-examination are constructive and an encouraging sign of maturity. New perspectives integrating war economics provoke organizations to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the c o n f l i c t s in w h i c h they a r e i n v o l v e d a n d t h e i m p a c t of t h e i r programs. 3 This necessary critical analysis is linked to efforts for a better c o o r d i n a t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations whose objective is to establish standards to which they would in theory be held accountable by the public and by the beneficiaries of their programs. In 1994, eight of the oldest and largest humanitarian organizations worldwide met and established a Code of Conduct for disaster relief programs. 4 This action acknowledged that when the organizations s h o u l d have b e e n flexible a n d responsive to h u m a n i t a r i a n "problems" in the 1980s, most of them were still more or less in the process of establishing themselves as institutions. 5 T h e Code of C o n d u c t is a r e f l e c t i o n of this p h e n o m e n o n i n s o f a r as it has remained centered around these eight large organizations. In 1996, over 103 international signatory organizations pledged to follow "principles of behavior" and "guidelines" (recommendations contained in three annexes to the code) for disaster relief operations. 6 The main principles are as follows: 1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. 2. Aid should be given regardless of the race, creed, or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities should be d e t e r m i n e d on the basis of need alone. 3. Aid should not be used to further a particular political or religious viewpoint. 4. H u m a n i t a r i a n organizations must e n d e a v o r n o t to act as instruments of government foreign policy. 5. Local cultures and customs must be respected. 6. Disaster responses must be built on local capacities. 7. Ways must be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of aid relief. 8. Relief assistance must seek both to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster and to meet basic needs. 9. There must be accountability to beneficiaries and donors.

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10. There must be recognition of the dignity of disaster victims in media activities. These principles are "offered as guidance." According to the code, they are not "legally binding, ... nor do we expect Governments and inter-governmental organizations to indicate their acceptance of the guidelines ... although this may be a goal towards which to work in the future." Ultimately, the objective is to create "a spirit of openness and cooperation so that our partners will become aware of the ideal relationship that we seek with them." The Code of Conduct reflects the main goal: the voluntary and unilateral effort (see the "Purpose" section in the preamble to the c o d e ) of i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , above a n d beyond their diversity, to establish the basis for self-regulation in the operational practices of signatory organizations. These principles should guide coordination in the field and help to pressure traditional h u m a n i t a r i a n partners: d o n o r governments, host governments, and the United Nations. It is interesting to note that the principles intended to humanize warfare are defined in the Code of Conduct as principles of "conduct" without mentioning protection; they "will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law" in the case of armed conflict. The code is now being supplemented by Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the rules of the game in some respects) that are to be used to evaluate, define, and conduct humanitarian operations in accordance with internationally recognized professional criteria. The Ombudsman Project will allow the beneficiaries of humanitarian programs to collectively demand accountability of humanitarian organizations. 7 In general, the "international aid industry" should have a system that is no longer based on the right to provide assistance but on the right to receive assistance. Although this international ethic is in the making, there are still a n u m b e r of questions to resolve in the application, enforcement, and respect of the principles by humanitarian partners, since it is a unilateral and voluntary code.

Applying the Rules of G o o d Conduct to Nondisaster Situations T h e definition of a "disaster," when examined closely, is either too restrictive or too universal: The authors of the code defined it as "a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great h u m a n suffering and

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distress and large-scale material damage." In many cases it is difficult to determine the degree of "distress." And what is the threshold for "large-scale" material damage? Does a strict interpretation of "disaster" require all four factors, or can they be taken separately? By what s t a n d a r d s h o u l d we j u d g e "political" disasters, especially if they involve "distress" b u t n o t necessarily serious material d a m a g e or h u m a n s u f f e r i n g ( a s s u m i n g t h e a u t h o r s i n t e n d to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between moral a n d physical suffering)? "Calamitous event" is the most important word in the definition. But to qualify it as a "disaster" requires the subjective measurement of suffering and h u m a n distress, which is the essence of the problem in aid assistance. Recent examples of disaster relief operations demonstrate that the Code of Conduct formalizes the spirit of cooperation and emphasizes the primacy of humanitarian principles. Liberia is an interesting case in this respect; cooperation between organizations led to a Joint Policy of Operations to limit the negative side effects of humanitarian aid in the country. 8 The policy disentangled the economic impact of assistance from the political interest of actors in the conflict (including ECOMOG, the E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y of West African States Monitoring Group) and created a united front in dealing with the United Nations system and donor governments. 9 But why is the code only specifically applicable to disaster assistance? Do not the situations that exist prior to disasters (where do they begin and end?) contain their causes? Considering only natural disasters, one can identify such preexisting vulnerabilities as endemic poverty and the position of minorities in the social, economic, and political spheres. These vulnerabilities are such that they exceed the capacity of potential victims to defend against the impact of disaster (or to prevent disaster). Both a priori and a fortiori, the rules of good conduct are also useful in "development" situations. 10 Too often, emergency aid organizations appear to be responsible for the "perverse" and often surreal character of disaster situations. International organizations, including the United Nations and local development groups, do not exist in a political void created by the magic of development. Far from it, the development and aid policies of donor governments have been frequently castigated for their partiality. How many times have we seen d e v e l o p m e n t programs—in fact, "white elephants"—greedily consume public f u n d s and money f r o m the international community without developing the capacity of communities to effectively defend themselves in the future? Disaster situations often reflect both the failure of development policies and an absence of preparation. The sustainability of development programs should also be measured in term of capacity to prevent disasters.

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As for disasters, why does the code not apply to private companies operating in the country, since these are often used by the parties to the conflict as a means of support or to legitimize their dubious sovereignty. There is no lack of examples: the Taliban and the pipeline business in Afghanistan; Laurent Kabila's new Democratic Republic of Congo and Canadian mining companies; the factions and government of Sierra Leone and De Beers diamond company; the Liberia of Charles Taylor and timber companies; the Khmer Rouge and Thai companies; and so on. Moreover, are the principles of conduct not contradictory when they affirm that "we shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities" without providing for the dissemination and approval of the code by local organizations? 11 Do they have access to the same information as international organizations? Were they consulted in the formulation of these principles, or of any others? Some organizations frequently point out that the code is aimed at the most powerful humanitarian organizations without really taking into account the quality of the work of local organizations. The authors of the code therefore need to devote more attention to this problem in order to clarify the exact scope of its application. It seems to us that the rules elaborated for disaster situations are just as valid for nondisaster situations.

Enforcement Mechanisms Organizations that have subscribed to the Code of Conduct have not yet clearly defined the criteria for its application and enforcement. At present, implementation of the code relies on the good will and selfregulation of participating organizations. A signatory organization that does not respect the code's principles could find its operations rapidly and temporarily marginalized. Operational standards should in theory give more objective substance to the principles that have been established, and where problems arise, a mediator would intervene to establish a fair solution. A number of potential disaster situations, because they were not recognized as disasters, have demonstrated the limitations of the Code of Conduct as regards external or internal mechanisms to monitor compliance and respect for its principles. A case in point was the famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in November 1997. Meetings about that situation were held in several countries in Western Europe and in the United States. In some instances, only humanitarian organizations attended the meetings, while others were

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a t t e n d e d by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ( i n c l u d i n g the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Children's Fund [UNICEF]), humanitarian organizations, pressure groups, and d o n o r governments. 1 2 On a number of occasions during these formal meetings, some organizations presented "excuses" for their lack of data or elaborated u p o n press releases prepared by their public relations departments that were published in the press and aired on television. The problem of famine in North Korea urgently raises the question of professionalism in the evaluation of disaster situations. In September-October 1997, for example, UNICEF announced, without any scientific basis, that eighty thousand Korean children u n d e r the age of five were severely malnourished (UNICEF had at that time only two vehicles in North Korea). A month later, during an informal workshop about Korea in Geneva, a UNICEF representative declared that t h e r e was no famine in the country. In Rome, a World Food Program (WFP) representative acknowledged in September 1997 that the way in which the data collected were processed probably greatly overestimated the food deficit. Regardless of which report was ultimately correct, this example demonstrates how the timing of appeals for f u n d by the United Nations system, rather than professional judgment, can result in statements that contradict each other from one m o n t h to the next. The stakes in the numbers war are high for all humanitarian organizations, since they influence the level of support that will be forthcoming from the public and from donors. If a mediator and operational standards had existed, could these hasty and u n f o u n d e d declarations have been corrected? 1 3 Given the overpoliticization of the debate and operations in North Korea, data and information could have been more effectively m o n i t o r e d and rejected or merely corrected in the light of the operational standards and principles. Even so, this would not prevent an organization from crossing the line by citing figures without any evidence and without fear of general opprobrium or censure. Thus, while the code and its operational standards can be effectively monitored, they do not a priori guarantee proper conduct or a high level of professionalism. Monitoring is thus largely reactive, a posteriori, and d e p e n d e n t on an organization's being able to admit to its peers that it might have committed errors or violated the code. And what a b o u t transparency vis-à-vis the public? Would it n o t be more forthright to explain to donors that there is a need for humanitarian work in North Korea, not because a given organization has an expert knowledge of the situation and is certain of the statistics but precisely because of the absence of reliable figures? All humanitarian organizations recognize that there are serious h u n g e r and health

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problems, but there is no means at present of gauging the extent of the problem. It is precisely this lack of information that is worrying and that justifies, on professional grounds, a humanitarian presence in North Korea. 14 However, this goal of transparency will probably never be fully respected: To date no organization has admitted its errors publicly, and many do not dare to state, in professional terms, the true motivation behind their operations and their presence. Paradoxically, the Code of C o n d u c t is relatively clear on this point: It is best to act according to the rules from the very start. In other words, the code should be observed even before the operation begins, even w h e n it is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r a g e n u i n e disaster has occurred. 1 5 Among the mechanisms of a posteriori monitoring, note should be taken of the efforts of one organization in particular that chose to support the United Nations system in order to work from within the structure of both the United Nations and other organizations or newcomers to the field wishing to monitor and correct the strategies adopted. The humanitarian objectives of the humanitarian organizations represented at this meeting were not all the same. Monitoring mechanisms are still therefore relatively informal and unsatisfactory to the public, to which the code sought to offer an additional guarantee of transparency. In short, the code is relatively superficial because its only means of enforcement is the reputation of organizations a m o n g their peers. However, for the time being, the C o d e of C o n d u c t , O p e r a t i o n a l S t a n d a r d s , a n d the O m b u d s m a n Project are the only mechanisms in place to monitor compliance with the principles of good conduct.

Ensuring Respect for the C o d e In theory, the code has no legal force, even though it sets out the "rules of the game" that, as we know, have customary value and tend to create a legal or juridical effect. 1 6 But the code itself states that "in the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with international humanitarian law." The code's scope is such that, in cases of armed conflict, it is necessary to interpret it in a m a n n e r consistent with international humanitarian law. T h e authors of the code might just as well have omitted the interpretation. The absence from the code of any theoretical legal force reflects the authors' wish to preserve the most homogeneous corpus of law possible for situations of conflict and to recognize the primacy of

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i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n law. This a p p r o a c h tends logically to favor the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), even though the ICRC is now beginning to admit the possibility of closer collaboration with o t h e r h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, particularly "in the evaluation of situations in the field and advocacy in favor of greater respect for legal standards" of protection in time of conflict. 17 This collaboration should therefore be pursued in a concerted m a n n e r in the field. International humanitarian law provides the bases for this consultation, but the Code of Conduct will no doubt facilitate more flexible and certainly easier collaboration. T h e text of the Code of C o n d u c t is in fact m o r e accessible to NGOs as a g r o u p than the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, which, as the ICRC has quite rightly argued, require a staff of legal specialists. However, one of the major problems envisaged in the text is that of the future, when considering that its signing could be "a f u t u r e objective." The recent case of Sierra Leone seems to require an acceleration of the process. The British government, which has been very active on the case, has in fact recently demonstrated that a government could, on the one hand, promote or even demand that NGOs abide by the code and, on the other, conduct its humanitarian aid policy in a way that violates not only the principles of the code but also h u m a n rights and international humanitarian laws. When the newly elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah fell, the British g o v e r n m e n t relied on E C O M O G , whose o p e r a t i o n s were led by Nigeria, and on the United Nations to obtain the imposition of an embargo against Sierra Leone, excluding, in principle, humanitarian supplies. For six months beginning in March 1997, all goods intended for humanitarian programs should have first received an exemption from the United Nations and authorization from ECOMOG to cross t h e Sierra L e o n e - G u i n e a Conakry b o r d e r . T h e j u n t a t h a t deposed Tejan Kabbah found itself in January and February 1998 in political and military difficulties and fled the capital, Freetown. After being a "refugee" u n d e r the protection of ECOMOG in neighboring Liberia, the deposed president returned to power on 10 March 1998 with strong support from the British government. Humanitarian aid policy, contrary to what was officially maintained, changed from one day to the next, and suddenly it was possible to support humanitarian organizations only in "secured" zones u n d e r the indirect control of the president through the intermediary of ECOMOG. This policy was based on a white paper that argued that humanitarian aid should be based no longer on needs but on legality. In this sense, support for the embargo was equated with support for a for-

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eign policy that advocated a return to democracy, specifically by punishing (as the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t does f r o m time to time 1 8 ) forced takeovers, and coups d'état. It was striking to observe in this case how f u n d s i n t e n d e d for h u m a n i t a r i a n aid were completely cut off and restored only in January 1998, when the j u n t a began to show signs of weakness in the field. The active collaboration with ECOMOG, especially u n d e r its Nigerian leadership, raised questions about the consistency of this foreign policy: How can one d e m a n d the restoration of democracy and at the same time rely on a force led by a country whose government is itself u n d e r sanctions for its h u m a n rights abuses? The defenders of the arms embargo against Sierra Leone were themselves later suspected of not observing the e m b a r g o . In May 1998, the British press revealed that Sandline International, a private company based in London that provided the services of mercenaries, might have been allowed to i m p o r t weapons to support the president's return to power under the very nose of the British representative in Sierra Leone. These r e c e n t events d e m o n s t r a t e that the rhetoric of governments has always had a strong tendency to manipulate humanitarian aid, whatever its foreign policy stance. This is nothing new, and it is not confined to one country. Should governments and the United Nations be called u p o n to sign the Code of Conduct, especially if they are considering collaborating with or funding NGOs in the field, based on the latter's observance of the Code of Conduct? In theory, signature of the code promotes respect of its principles. And, above all, if NGOs themselves elaborate a code of conduct and call u p o n governments to respect its principles, why not go further and vigorously disseminate the code so that governments that are most active in foreign policy matters might be gradually persuaded to sign. The authors of the code envisaged signature by governments as a real goal that could become a necessity. As long as governments wish to continue using humanitarian aid as an instrument of foreign policy, this should be d o n e on the basis of a document respected both by NGOs and by the governments themselves, as long as governments contract out humanitarian aid to the NGOs. Otherwise, humanitarian organizations will have to be satisfied with a framework for action that, though ideal, will constrain their operations but not be binding on d o n o r governments and on the United Nations. O n e can draw four main conclusions from these observations: 1. Signature alone does not suffice to guarantee respect for the principles and thus their application.

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2. Failure to sign the Code of Conduct does not mean that an NGO is not behaving in accordance with its principles. 3. Furthermore, the question of the scope of the code's application—that is, should the code be applied even if it is unclear whether a disaster has occurred—remains crucial. The answer is yes, since the best way to apply the principles is still to respect t h e m whatever the situation. This is what the code means, when it declares u n d e r "object" that "implementation depends on the determination of each subscribing organization to respect the norms which it establishes." 4. Last, monitoring remains very weak. Nothing guarantees that the future existence of Operational Standards or of a mediator will correct this situation. Above all, the c o d e is a flexible, n o n b i n d i n g , a n d voluntary reminder that humanitarianism in both foreign and domestic policy remains essential if we are to be consistent and relevant. In any event, humanitarian aid must always be accompanied by protection. Blocking aid often means that those who have the means of providing protection for those most in need are deprived of any possibility of doing so. In the final analysis, we may say that the code is a necessary tool but not sufficient in itself. The tendency toward institutionalization that it represents does not guarantee respect for fundamental humanitarian principles and human rights by NGOs, governments, and the United Nations. T h e m o n i t o r i n g of activities t h r o u g h the O m b u d s m a n Project and the Operational Standards is no substitute for the special and additional effort needed to disseminate the code and to encourage donor governments, and in particular the United Nations, to sign it. Otherwise, humanitarian organizations could find themselves in an aid system b u r d e n e d by onerous constraints, which would give governments and donors even more reason to withhold humanitarian aid while using as a pretext the principles enshrined in the Code of Conduct. We may have to acknowledge in the end that humanitarian principles are not universally perceived in the same way and that, despite the respect they demand, they remain a matter of h u m a n passions— compassion and solidarity—that belong to no one or, quite on the contrary, to everyone. Humanitarian intervention in the field teaches us the enduring lesson that commitment is necessary but never sufficient. And that no government and no institution can claim to arrogate to itself.

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Notes Daniel Puillet-Breton was the executive director of Action Against H u n g e r in London until February 2000. 1. T h e military-humanitarian interventions in Somalia in 1992 are an example. 2. See Mark Duffield's study The Symphony of the Damned (University of Birmingham, 1996). 3. As we know, aid is susceptible to all kinds of evils. Humanitarian aid is often criticized for participating in the economic dynamics of conflicts (how can we deny it?); it can easily fail to protect those it was intended to benefit. It is increasingly politicized and compromised by the growth of military-humanitarian interventions (interventions for humanitarian reasons supported by the United Nations or by NATO). 4. T h e eight organizations were the Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Federation of Red Cross a n d Red Crescent S o c i e t i e s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Save t h e C h i l d r e n A l l i a n c e , L u t h e r a n W o r l d Federation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches. 5. A representative from one of the founding NGOs recently remarked that the Code of Conduct should not negate the diverse mandates of the signatory organizations. He also stated that the code should not p r o m o t e a vision of one single type of humanitarian organization, which he felt was a dangerous notion because it did not guarantee that humanitarian principles would be respected in any case (London, 12 March 1998, Overseas Development Institute conference). 6. Recommendations to the governments of disaster-affected countries (Annex I): 1. Governments should recognize and respect the independent, humanitarian, and impartial actions of humanitarian organizations; 2. Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for humanitarian organizations; 3. Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during disasters; 4. Governments should seek to provide a c o o r d i n a t e d disaster information a n d p l a n n i n g service; 5. Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict. Recommendations to the d o n o r governments (Annex II): 1. Recognize and respect the independent, humanitarian, and impartial actions of humanitarian organizations; 2. Provide f u n d i n g with a g u a r a n t e e of operational i n d e p e n d e n c e ; 3. Use their offices to assist humanitarian organizations in obtaining access to disaster victims. Recommendations to intergovernmental organizations (Annex III): 1. Recognize humanitarian organizations, local and foreign, as valuable partners; 2. Assist host governments in providing an overall coordinating framework for international and local disaster relief; 3. Extend security protection provided for UN organizations to h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations; 4. Provide humanitarian organizations with the same access to relevant information as is granted to UN organizations. 7. T h e operational standards are also called the Sphere Project. T h e O m b u d s m a n Project is Projet Médiateur in French and has been renamed the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAC) 2000. 8. T h e Joint Policy of Operations is an international collective effort of NGOs, including Action Against Hunger, Medecins sans Frontières (MSF),

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Save the C h i l d r e n F u n d ( S C F ) , World Vision I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( W V I ) , Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere (CARE), and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam), to name only a few. 9. This followed the looting of supplies and equipment of practically all the organizations. Action Against Hunger in 1997 luckily escaped warring factions attacks in Monrovia. 10. How should a country's level of development be evaluated? What is the capacity of social and political entities in the country to organize? Even countries that are considered "developed" by Western standards are not necessarily well equipped to manage humanitarian disaster relief. 11. The quotation is from the Principle of Conduct 6. 12. An informal workshop on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was held by UNICEF in Geneva, October 2 0 - 2 1 , 1997. 13. In March 1998, the logistical management of all humanitarian operations in North Korea was in the hands of the government, in particular, the Relief Committee for Flood Damage (RCFD). Only a small portion of aid was possibly considered as humanitarian, thereby preventing monitoring. Food security and nutrition surveys conducted under the aegis of the United Nations were unable to apply the standards necessary for publication that are currently used in the humanitarian profession. 14. T h e famines in northwest China in 1927 (sixty million victims) and in the Ukraine from 1932 to 1934 are evidence o f this p r o b l e m . Many Western visitors did not report these famines because they did not themselves observe them. See the excellent book by J a s p e r Becker, Fantômes affamés (London: J o h n Murray Pub., 1997). 15. Many of the organizations at conferences and meetings on North Korea were not yet operational or had not been able to evaluate the country's needs in a free or reliable fashion in 1997. A number of them published baseless statistics on the number of famine victims without having set foot in North Korea at all; the reports were intended to promote campaigns to fund their future work in the field. The North Korean government was their exclusive source of information and currently continues in this role. 16. T h e Working Environment section of the code specifies that the guidelines are not "legally binding." 17. See Carlo Von Flue and Jean Philippe Lavoyer, Revue du RRN, ODI, ICRC in "Comment les ONG peuvent-ils aider à promouvoir le Droit International Humanitaire?' [How can NGOs help promote international humanitarian law?] November, 1997. 18. However, since 1989, U.S. law prohibits cutting humanitarian aid for political reasons.

18 Standards and Quality Assurance Pierre

Perrin

Quality a s s u r a n c e is a given in all s p h e r e s of activity, b u t t h e definit i o n of quality will d i f f e r f r o m o n e field to a n o t h e r . In t h e field of econ o m i c s , quality is a c o m b i n a t i o n of two e l e m e n t s : c o n s u m e r satisfaction a n d t h e best e c o n o m i c r e t u r n . T h e first s h o u l d lead to t h e s e c o n d , w h i c h is t h e u l t i m a t e goal. In t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n field, success is always m e a s u r e d with r e s p e c t to victims: best possible g u a r a n t e e s of p r o t e c t i o n a n d assistance. Striving f o r t h e m o s t e c o n o m i c a l s o l u t i o n possible s h o u l d b e a c o n c e r n , b u t t h e b l i n d a p p l i c a t i o n of e c o n o m i c laws to h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s risks r u n n i n g c o u n t e r to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s of c o m p a s s i o n a n d i m p a r t i a l i t y . Today, h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n s s e e m to be b a s e d m o r e on c o s t / e f f i c i e n c y c r i t e r i a t h a n o n t h e n e e d s of victims, a n d we m u s t t h e r e f o r e r e m e m b e r this basic p r i n c i p l e w h e n r e f e r r i n g to quality a s s u r a n c e t h a t , in t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n f i e l d , m u s t b e f o c u s e d o n victims.

Bases for an Effective Humanitarian Operation Two e l e m e n t s a r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r a successful h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a tion: f o c u s i n g a c t i o n o n t h e victims a n d following a logical a p p r o a c h .

This article is based on a seminar organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva on 14 December 1998 and published with the kind permission of the ICRC. 191

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The goal of humanitarian intervention should always be to assist those who have the right to humanitarian aid, that is, the victims. The use of a logical approach has long been applied in humanitarian operations in which certain planning and operation elements are present. Planning should include: • An accurate study of the situation, including an analysis of victims' needs; the economic, cultural, and political context; and potential obstacles. The choice of a strategy that is most appropriate to a specific situation at any given time depends upon the depth of the study. • An overall analysis of the needs of victims in order to avoid partial measures that neglect entire aspects of victims' needs. • Definition of overall goals according to the needs of victims. Operations in which the mobilization of resources becomes an end in itself should be avoided. T h e search for effectiveness d u r i n g the operational phase is based upon: • •

Consistency with stated goals; Observance of the implementation procedures decided upon in the planning stage; • Mobilization of adequate resources, ensuring, for example, that the skills of operational personnel match the activities that are to be undertaken; • Refinement of the operation based on regular review of the overall situation, of the data collected during monitoring, and of the results of evaluation exercises. The search for quality must be pursued at all levels. Activities of a very high standard will be irrelevant if the supporting analysis is of poor quality.

C o m p o n e n t s of a S y s t e m of Quality Assurance T h e basic elements for ensuring the quality of an operation are analysis and planning, program implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. A system of quality assurance should go even further,

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however. P l a n n i n g goals a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s should take into account norms that may be international, local, or specific to a particular organization. These will be essential for evaluating o u t c o m e s in o r d e r to p e r m i t useful comparisons to be m a d e . An expert knowledge of these references is a necessary c o m p o n e n t of quality assurance. Evaluations are not only a management tool but also an indispensable e l e m e n t for developing institutional memory. T h a t m e m o r y should not be a passive database but an instrument for the development of institutional policies that combine the necessary evolution of strategies and procedures with the lessons learned in the field. T h e next step will be to ensure that those responsible for the implementation of policies and procedures thoroughly understand them. Training is t h e r e f o r e a n o t h e r key e l e m e n t of any system of quality assurance. Each element of this "quality assurance system" should have its criteria for ensuring quality and the necessary m o n i t o r i n g mechanisms. For example: • • • • • • •

Situational analyses s h o u l d be c o n d u c t e d with rigor using available tools of analysis. Services provided should match the quality criteria identified for this type of service. Mechanisms for the ongoing follow-up of activities should be in place and functioning. Evaluations should be planned. References appropriate to the context should be used. Intervention policies should be regularly reviewed and updated. Training programs should effectively p r e p a r e personnel for future responsibilities.

A system of quality assurance will not be effective unless there is c o o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s c o m p o n e n t s of a p r o g r a m . Mechanisms must be in place so that: •

The results of evaluations are systematically used to reorient activities, feed the institutional memory, develop action policies, and provide a practical basis for training. • Evaluation standards are used at three stages of intervention: planning, implementation, and evaluation. • T r a i n i n g equips staff with the skills n e e d e d to i m p l e m e n t

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p l a n n e d activities, which r e q u i r e s a c o n s t a n t e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n m a n a g e m e n t a n d staff in o r d e r to e n s u r e t h e best possible m a t c h between tasks a n d skills. O n e c a n i m a g i n e a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of possible c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of a q u a l i t y a s s u r a n c e system. E a c h organization is responsible f o r identifying the linkages that it wishes to institutionalize in o r d e r to develop its own system of quality assurance.

Establishment of a System of Quality Assurance at the I C R C By applying this c o n c e p t , the ICRC is able to m o n i t o r the progress m a d e in the search f o r quality within the institution. T h e following are examples of how this takes place: •

•

•

•

•

•

P l a n n i n g f o r Results is a n e w p l a n n i n g t o o l i n t r o d u c e d in S e p t e m b e r 1998. It emphasizes rigorous analysis of h u m a n i t a r ian situations a n d the establishment of goals as a f u n c t i o n of the n e e d s of victims. For m o n i t o r i n g p u r p o s e s , an analytic a c c o u n t i n g system will link each activity to its real cost, thus e n a b l i n g organizations to accurately r e s p o n d to d o n o r s . T h e i n t e n t i o n to carry o u t i m p a c t assessments was stated in t h e ICRC " F u t u r e " p l a n . An assessment policy has b e e n d e f i n e d a n d the structures f o r its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n established. ICRC a c t i o n p o l i c i e s a r e r e g u l a r l y revised a n d d e v e l o p e d . T h e policy of assistance to war w o u n d e d was o n e such program. Training r e m a i n s a priority a n d offers a r a n g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f r o m loyalty to ICRC to specialized courses in i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n law, public health, a n d so o n . O p e r a t i o n s at the m a n a g e m e n t level p e r m i t closer links to b e e s t a b l i s h e d a m o n g o p e r a t i o n a l activities, r e s o u r c e m a n a g e m e n t , evaluations, studies, a n d policy d e v e l o p m e n t .

By using this a p p r o a c h it is possible to p i n p o i n t the role of b e n c h marks within quality assurance systems. Such b e n c h m a r k s are vital to the success of operations, provided that they are i n t e r p r e t e d in a way t h a t takes a c c o u n t of t h e specific characteristics of e a c h situation,

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including constraints, the socioeconomic environment, and cultural criteria. Lastly, one must not forget that, in the humanitarian field, a system of quality assurance seeks above all to ensure that interventions provide an effective response to the needs of victims.

Notes Pierre Perrin is medical director at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.

19 Humanitarianism— A Changing Concept? Jean-Luc Bodin

U n d e r the auspices of the Steering C o m m i t t e e for H u m a n i t a r i a n Response (SCHR), a number of major humanitarian agencies in 1992 established a Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief Operations. T h e code was signed by over 150 organizations. Later it was supplemented by a n u m b e r of initiatives, including: •

T h e Sphere Project, a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Response for humanitarian activities in the field; • People in Aid, a code of best practices to improve the quality and efficiency of aid workers' management; • T h e Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance, a network of research and information for humanitarian organizations; • The Ombudsman Project, a vehicle for managing and monit o r i n g t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of all h u m a n i t a r i a n p r o j e c t s through the intervention of a mediator.

The idea of a universal ethic and a mode of action common to all humanitarian organizations is seductive. Most of the principles posited in the Code of C o n d u c t a n d the h u m a n i t a r i a n c h a r t e r of the S p h e r e Project are incontestable: the right to live in dignity a n d nondiscrimination. No serious humanitarian agency would dispute these basic rights. Action Against Hunger, from its inception, has had a Charter of Principles based on fundamental humanitarian rights, which it strives to respect in all of its operations. Even so, a universal 197

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charter is not valid. Each nongovernmental organization (NGO) represents a commitment by a group of people with their own specific m a n d a t e and their own version of a charter and ethical principles that one should respect. Impartiality may be interpreted as the principle of nondiscrimination in implementing actions, while neutrality comes into play at the operational level and obliges (as far as possible) an agency to intervene regardless of the "side." But as we consider the notions of impartiality/neutrality, it is clear that no one will have the same definition. This would play into the hands of some organizations that would refuse to accept strict a d h e r e n c e to such principles, thereby proving that a common code of ethics would not be practical. A strict universal ethic will not work. Defining operational standards in the areas of nutrition, food security, water, sanitation, health, and victim services led to productive discussions in working groups. No one will contest that this effort resulted in substantial improvements in the coherence and coordination of technical operations in the field. The question that remains is how to apply these principles and standards. There is an obvious risk of imposing excessive uniformity on humanitarian activities. While such an approach could definitely facilitate exchanges between the d i f f e r e n t agencies, thus making them more efficient, it can never replace the goals, ethics, or methods of operation that are unique to each humanitarian actor. Another risk resides in the ambiguity of terms used for the implementation of these principles and standards. Political and economic conditions are not m e n t i o n e d , since the situation is described in ideal, even Utopian terms, yet they constitute one of the primary obstacles to intervention. What will happen when the lack of security and lack of access to victims make it impossible to achieve the stipulated goals of these projects? Should we refuse to act on the grounds that one cannot do enough, or should we continue anyway because o u r primary mission as humanitarians is to be there, even though what we do may never be sufficient? If the objectives of these projects remain as points of reference, that in itself could be a positive thing if the project remains incomplete; but if we adopt a legalistic approach, the danger becomes great. Expressions such as "what the populations have the right to expect from humanitarian assistance" or "develop standards of p e r f o r m a n c e that can be measured" should be quite rightly questioned. Donors would then be authorized to condition their support for a particular mission on its "results," if they do not already do so. This could be an additional argument to reduce the scale of projects.

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As Daniel Puillet-Breton explains in C h a p t e r 17, the legal f r a m e work f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s is still weak. T h e r e is n o real monit o r i n g of the observance of these standards, only a vague a n d u n c l e a r r e f e r e n c e to a mediator. N e i t h e r is t h e r e any real obligation o n the p a r t of states whose first obligation, nevertheless, is to provide assistance to their populations. Before devising a new set of laws f o r b e n e ficiaries, let us d o e v e r y t h i n g possible to e n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e with existing laws, in particular the Geneva Conventions a n d the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights. It would b e d a n g e r o u s f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s to a b a n d o n t h e s e n o r m s , w h e n m e c h a n i s m s f o r m o n i t o r i n g respect f o r f u n d a m e n t a l rights d o n o t f u n c t i o n . Everything d e p e n d s t h e n u p o n the application of these universal standards. Faulty i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would leave the d o o r o p e n f o r actors whose objectives are n o t exclusively h u m a n i t a r i a n . Obviously, N G O s c a n n o t achieve everything based only o n their g o o d will. T h e largest possible n u m b e r of organizations s h o u l d accept these principles a n d s t a n d a r d s , as P i e r r e P e r r i n a r g u e s in C h a p t e r 18. T h e y s h o u l d b e guidelines b u t n o t b e c o m e a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o r m that structures o r even regulates a h u m a n i t a r i a n world t h a t has lost its i n d e p e n d ence. Let us n o t m i s u n d e r s t a n d o u r goals, which are based first a n d f o r e m o s t u p o n h u m a n i t a r i a n principles. In B u r u n d i , f o r e x a m p l e , a study has d e m o n s t r a t e d how technically o r i e n t e d objectives c o u l d b e c o m e a trap. In fact, correctly applying technical s t a n d a r d s d o e s n o t necessarily m e a n achieving h u m a n i t a r i a n goals—taking care of 500 c h i l d r e n is n o t an e n d it itself, w h e n several t h o u s a n d o t h e r child r e n c o n t i n u e to suffer f r o m h u n g e r a few kilometers away. T h e stakes in this question are high: W h a t constitutes h u m a n i t a r i an intervention? Does an organization b e c o m e h u m a n i t a r i a n the m o m e n t it respects the norms? Is it the o p e r a t i o n or the organization t h a t is d e e m e d h u m a n i t a r i a n ? T h e d a n g e r , a s i d e f r o m p o l i t i c a l exploitation, is that new actors in the field may b e h u m a n i t a r i a n in n a m e only. C o n f u s i o n already reigns. D u r i n g the Balkan crisis, we witnessed a perverse f o r m of globalization: NGOs, U n i t e d Nations agencies, the Red Cross, the military, religious organizations, civil society, a n d States were all " h u m a n i t a r i a n , " everything was " h u m a n i t a r i a n , " a n d the general p e r c e p t i o n of others, d o n o r s , victimizers, a n d victims was s u m m a r i z e d in o n e acronym: NATO (the N o r t h Atlantic Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n ) . W h e n impartiality a n d neutrality are n o t r e s p e c t e d , o n e should n o t be surprised if Serbs, b u t also all the o t h e r f o r g o t t e n p o p u l a t i o n s in S u d a n , N o r t h K o r e a , o r e l s e w h e r e , a r e critical of " h u m a n i t a r i a n operations." This is why ethical a n d technical aspects of the question m u s t b e

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appreciated for what they are, namely, points of reference. The priority must continue to be quality and not be obscured by quantitative aspects that draw attention away from the spirit of initiative and solidarity that lies at the heart of humanitarian action.

Notes Jean-Luc Bodin is executive director of Action Against Hunger-France.

20 Security: A Key Component of Humanitarian Action Pierre Gallien

Over the last decade or so, humanitarian assistance operations have had to face increasing difficulties. The situations in which aid organizations are required to intervene are becoming more and more complex. Logistical and administrative constraints have been compounded by political a n d m e d i a - r e l a t e d issues a n d security p r o b l e m s . E n s u r i n g the security of h u m a n i t a r i a n p e r s o n n e l today p r e s e n t s major challenges. T h e dangers faced by relief teams are not only greater but are now directly targeted at their personnel. Violence has become commonplace and is being increasingly used against humanitarian workers to influence their work. In some places, those using violence do not want embarrassing witnesses; in others, control is sought over the distribution of foodstuffs. In yet other places, attempts are made to influence international decisions through, inter alia, death threats, kidnappings, and attacks. No method is excluded, especially since in most cases no serious investigation is undertaken to find and punish the guilty parties. Unfortunately, this violence against humanitarian relief personnel is but a small part of the problem. In many situations, the civilian population is used, manipulated, or oppressed by the parties to the conflict, in violation of the f u n d a m e n t a l principles of international h u m a n i t a r i a n law. H u m a n i t a r i a n teams are then faced with security problems in trying to maintain direct access to victims when the parties to the conflict knowingly and willfully fail to ensure their safety.

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202

Action Against Hunger and Security-Related Incidents I n f o r m a t i o n compiled by Action Against H u n g e r shows that during the late 1990s the organization faced m a j o r security crises each year: •

•

•

•

In 1995, Rudy Mark was k i d n a p p e d in M o g a d i s h u , Somalia, while o n his way to t h e a i r p o r t in a vehicle t h a t was clearly identified as b e l o n g i n g to Action Against H u n g e r . Two Somali staff m e m b e r s were w o u n d e d in this attack, which was really a i m e d at t h e work of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . Thirty-seven days of negotiations a n d the s u p p o r t of the entire h u m a n i t a r i a n relief c o m m u n i t y were necessary b e f o r e Rudy was released. Today, only five organizations are still working in Mogadishu. In 1995, in Gitega, B u r u n d i , g r e n a d e s e x p l o d e d simultaneously in the offices a n d h o m e s of f o u r of t h e five h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations p r e s e n t in the town. Sylvie F e h l b a u m a n d Pierre Gallien were i n j u r e d in t h e explosions ( f o r t u n a t e l y n o t seriously) . In t h e weeks p r i o r to the attack, g o v e r n m e n t a n d rebel t r o o p m o v e m e n t s h a d f o r c e d some of the p o p u l a t i o n to aband o n t h e u r b a n a r e a in o r d e r to e s c a p e t h e atrocities of t h e a r m e d groups. Following this attack, the organizations p r e s e n t in Gitega were f o r c e d to s u s p e n d their o p e r a t i o n s f o r several weeks. In 1996, Michael P e n r o s e a n d F r é d é r i c M a l a r d e a u were kidn a p p e d in Grozny, C h e c h n y a , a n d h e l d f o r twenty-six days while t h e city was s u b j e c t e d to heavy b o m b a r d m e n t by t h e Russian forces. In t h e m o n t h s that followed, the proliferation of k i d n a p p i n g s f o r c e d m o s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s to withdraw f r o m the country. In 1997, Frédéric Michel, Daniel Llorente, a n d five m e m b e r s of o u r A f g h a n staff were a r r e s t e d by t h e Taliban militia a n d a c c u s e d of h a v i n g b e e n p r e s e n t a t t h e p a r t y h e l d t o b i d farewell to the team's medical officer, at which a few w o m e n were also present. Despite intense pressure f r o m the international community, they were c o n d e m n e d to several weeks of i m p r i s o n m e n t . While Frédéric a n d Daniel were especially well t r e a t e d , the A f g h a n staff were subjected to physical abuse. A few m o n t h s later, all of t h e n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s (NGOs) p r e s e n t in Kabul were f o r c e d to withdraw in the face of t h e i n t r a n s i g e n c e of t h e T a l i b a n , w h o wished to i m p o s e

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rules of operation that were contrary to the core principles of humanitarianism. • 1998: In Sierra Leone, the forces of ECOMOG (the Monitoring Group of the m e m b e r countries of ECOWAS, the Economic C o m m u n i t y of West African states) l a u n c h e d a surprise attack on Freetown to restore to power the democratically elected president A h m e d Tejan Kabbah. T h e military j u n t a and the Rebel United Front (RUF), the main rebel movement in Sierra Leone, were then beaten back and retreated in disorder, looting and committing atrocities. All the relief organizations present in the country were surprised by this movement and, in light of the risks they faced and the widespread looting of their o p e r a t i o n s , were f o r c e d to evacuate their workers u n d e r difficult conditions. • In 1999, Eric Courly was kidnapped in Ethiopia while traveling in the south of the country for work-related purposes. Five weeks of negotiations were needed to secure his release. For nearly two years now, the Humanitarian Safety and Protection Network, a comprehensive program undertaken in close collaboration with other European NGOs, has sought to develop the institutional memory of organizations in order to gain greater familiarity with the scope and nature of the dangers faced by their personnel in the field.1 This initiative begun by the Paris Office of Action Against H u n g e r in 1998 was extended to the other members of the Network (Madrid, London, and New York). During these two years, it has highlighted a n u m b e r of important elements. The proposed classification draws a distinction among three groups of incidents, based on their nature and inherent objectives: • Acts of banditry, characterized by the search for short-term economic gain; • Acts of terrorism, attacking the very values of the organization; • Acts of war and police actions, in which the actors identified with the conflict are directly involved. In 1998, t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of t h e m i s s i o n s of A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r that were monitored by the Paris office faced security problems of varying degrees of seriousness. 2 In all, fifty-six situations of insecurity had to be dealt with. Of these, sixteen involved the evacuation of p e r s o n n e l . T h e security-related incidents are detailed in Table 20.1.

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Table 20.1

Security-Related Incidents, 1998 Number

Acts of banditry Acts of terrorism Acts of war a n d police actions

Percentage

15 9 16

37.5 22.5 40

During the first five months of 1999, half of the teams in the field had to face at least one security problem, or thirty-six altogether. Today, 40 percent of heads of mission consider security as a priority element of their work. In the most sensitive situations, this element may account for more than half of their working time. Table 20.2 offers a more detailed analysis of the nature of these problems.

Table 20.2

Security-Related Incidents, 1999

Specific d e a t h threats T h e f t of material Requisition of material Arbitrary d e t e n t i o n Verbal aggression T h r e a t of physical aggression Intrusion by military Murder Kidnapping Bombardment Total

Acts of Banditry

Acts of Terrorism

Acts of War a n d Police Action

2 7

3

5

1 2

2 4 4 2 1

1 1 9

8

1 19

Total 10 7 2 4 5 4 1 1 1 1 36

It has become evident that the violence is aimed directly at the organization. Of the thirty-six incidents reported, only one was due to a nondiscriminating danger resulting from a military action (bombardm e n t ) . The other thirty-five were all directed against the organization, either to seize its property (ten thefts and requisitions of equipment) or to prevent it from carrying out its activities. The n u m b e r of incidents related to banditry and terrorism (nearly half of the incidents) is also notable. This type of incident is now

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becoming more and more violent. Another obvious conclusion is that most incidents reflect a lack of respect for humanitarian action by the parties to the conflict themselves. Unfortunately, this type of situation is true not only for Action Against H u n g e r . All h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, i n c l u d i n g the United Nations and members of the Red Cross, now face similar problems.

Humanitarian Operations in Increasingly Complex Situations These dangers are of course not new and are inherent in the type of humanitarian relief activity to which we are committed: we are as close as possible to the victims of hunger. However, there have been significant changes in certain aspects of our work. It is essential that humanitarian organizations take these changes into account in their operations in order to address them effectively without losing sight of the core principles that govern their actions. It is clear that the nature of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. A review of these structural changes and their effect on the way in which violence is expressed is a necessary but not sufficient phase for understanding the phenomenon as a whole. Humanitarian relief organizations for their part have also changed in terms of the way they operate and of their relations with political and media figures. Their challenge now is to take stock of the situation and come up with new approaches to their work that are perhaps less standardized, more creative, and better adapted to local conditions and constraints. The collapse of the Soviet empire brought about a radical change in the order of international relations. The East-West divide and the fear of recourse to nuclear weapons had made it possible to normalize certain types of situations. The ideology of these two large blocs clashed within zones of influence, with each party relying on its political and e c o n o m i c s u p p o r t f o r friendly regimes or certain rebel groups, as circumstances dictated. In a certain sense, this situation made it possible to control and contain confrontations. It was therefore assumed that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the different rebel movements would gradually fade from lack of financial and technical support. The bitter reality, however, has been that the opposite happened. Over the past ten years, the n u m b e r of conflicts in the world has increased dramatically, often exceeding in horror the limits of our

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u n d e r s t a n d i n g . From Liberian child-soldiers to the b o m b a r d m e n t of Grozny, including a r m e d b a n d s in Somalia a n d the g e n o c i d e of m o r e t h a n 500,000 Tutsis a n d m o d e r a t e H u t u s in Rwanda, these new conflicts seem to be characterized above all by an indescribable chaos in which only the strongest survive a n d w h e r e t h e r e are n o rules. T h e collapse of c o m m u n i s m has indirectly resulted in the emerg e n c e of two r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a . O n t h e o n e h a n d , it h a s c o n tributed to the w e a k e n i n g of a large n u m b e r of states. O n the other, it has p r o m o t e d globalization a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t of the m a r k e t economy. T h e d e c l i n e in aid-flows f r o m m o s t c o u n t r i e s in t h e N o r t h has caused difficulties in many developing countries b u r d e n e d by heavy administrative structures. Many of t h e m have b e e n f o r c e d to comply with the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary F u n d a n d u n d e r t a k e structural r e f o r m s for which t h e r e have b e e n varying degrees of political acceptance. For Béatrice H i b o u , these liberalization r e f o r m s have also h a d " u n e x p e c t e d a n d o f t e n u n d e s i r e d lateral effects: r e d u c t i o n in b u d g e t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e t h a t p l a c e a d m i n i s t r a tions in difficulty, delegitimization of g o v e r n m e n t bodies, decentralization of decision-making authority, emphasis o n external over internal legitimacy, quickness of action over modalities a n d results over means." 3 In k e e p i n g with this new t r e n d toward liberalization, a n u m b e r of state f u n c t i o n s have b e e n privatized. T h e increase in the n u m b e r of N G O s has b e e n a characteristic of this p h e n o m e n o n . In t h e f a c e of this w e a k e n i n g of t h e s t a t e , d e m a n d s f o r t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s , w h i c h h a d b e e n t h r o t t l e d in t h e past, have f o u n d fertile g r o u n d f o r expression. In m a n y c o u n t r i e s , moreover, t h e p h e n o m e n o n of rural e x o d u s has led to t h e collapse of the family u n i t a n d to t h e loss of t h e values a n d r e f e r e n c e s of the r u r a l w o r l d . T h i s n e w u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n , r e l e g a t e d to t h e p o o r n e i g h b o r h o o d s of t h e cities, thus finds itself in c o n t a c t with the values of m o d e r n i t y (especially t h r o u g h television) yet u n a b l e to enjoy its benefits. Faced with poverty a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t , this p o p u l a t i o n provides fertile g r o u n d f o r i n c r e a s e d c r i m e a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of new f o r m s of social protest. A c c o r d i n g to J e a n - C h r i s t o p h e Rufin, far f r o m a loss of t h e ideological values of rebel m o v e m e n t s , we have w i t n e s s e d t h e e m e r g e n c e of n e w f o r m s of d o c t r i n e b a s e d o n t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of local ideological values t h a t have b e e n i n t e g r a t e d i n t o m o r e m o d e r n political constructs. For e x a m p l e , the d o c t r i n e of t h e RUF c o m b i n e s the values of a r e t u r n to sources a n d a base of Marxist o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e survival of old m o v e m e n t s a n d the e m e r g e n c e of new o n e s

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have been possible only to the extent that the economic environment has permitted them to exploit independent resources. The globalization of economic exchanges has seen the rapid development of new operators without any real oversight by state entities. Client networks have been privatized and more specifically internationalized, thanks to unprecedented developments in the communications sector. The mafia and major international organized crime have expanded to the point where their economic weight is greater than the budget of certain countries. Globally, between $750 and 1,000 billion per a n n u m are controlled by the mafia. By way of comparison, the gross domestic product of a country such as Mali, which is among the poorest in the world, is approximately $6 billion. The different rebel movements have rapidly adapted to this new environment and have developed new strategies. They have compensated for the fall-off in international support from states by developing new economic links. In Mogadishu, Somalia, as the country was just emerging from one of the worst famines in its history and the city was controlled by armed bands, it was easy to telephone to the other end of the world using the satellite services of a private company operating in the city. Similar examples have prompted Roland Marchal to write that "Mogadishu is today more closely linked to the world outside than it has ever been for the thirty years of its existence as a State." 4 This situation is not specific to Somalia. In Angola, exports of diamonds have increased sharply over the past five years, providing annual income estimated at more than $500 million for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the main armed movement opposed to the government. In Liberia, exports of exotic woods have never ceased and have even increased during the conflict, thus permitting Charles Taylor to finance his war effort. This new situation has led a n u m b e r of guerrillas to r e d e f i n e their strategies by incorporating an economic dimension into their ideological objectives. T h e r e should be n o mistake a b o u t this. In most cases, theirs are not genuine economic activities that seek to redistribute a part of the benefits to the populations; they are predatory activities based on the reckless exploitation of the country's natural resources. The fields of activity are generally limited and involve mainly the uncontrolled exploitation of mineral resources or control over certain agricultural products. Processing industries that require major investments and stability in order to ensure a return on investment are few and are to be found mainly in particular sectors of activities, such as petroleum resources (Angola, Congo) or drug refining (Colombia, Burma, Afghanistan).

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In this situation, two e l e m e n t s thus assume i m p o r t a n c e : the geographical a n d the h u m a n . T h e fight is over a territory a n d access to a n d control over resources or their m a r k e t i n g routes. W h a t is worse, the civilian p o p u l a t i o n n e e d e d to p r o d u c e these revenues is also at risk. T h e use of v i o l e n c e as a m e a n s to a c q u i r e a n d c o n t r o l h a s b e c o m e w i d e s p r e a d , p a r t i c u l a r l y given t h e p o p u l a r view t h a t t h e international c o m m u n i t y is powerless to p u n i s h such acts. Lastly, alliances a n d fault lines between states have steadily b e e n redrawn a r o u n d new actors and a r o u n d political and e c o n o m i c stakes, which have b e c o m e m o r e r e g i o n a l in c h a r a c t e r . In C o n g o Brazzaville, in 1997, the c o m m i t t i n g of Angolan troops alongside the militia of Denis Sassou N'Guesso was the decisive factor in assuring his accession to power. In the new D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o , t h e i n v o l v e m e n t of c o u n t r i e s such as Angola, Rwanda, U g a n d a , or Zimbabwe is an essential e l e m e n t f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the dynamic of the conflict. Also noteworthy is the role of Nigeria in the conflicts in Liberia a n d Sierra L e o n e or that of Ethiopia in the anarchy that prevails in Somalia. A l t h o u g h p r e d o m i n a n t l y in Africa, these new power plays are also to be f o u n d in o t h e r continents. T h e r e are situations in Afghanistan a n d in Iraq; closer to us is the intervention of the N o r t h Atlantic Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO) in t h e crisis in t h e Balkans. T h e s e situations e n c o u r a g e the d e v e l o p m e n t of microzones that are organized a r o u n d local p o t e n t a t e s whose conflicts a n d violence b e a r only limited c o n n e c t i o n to national frameworks. T h e chaotic f o r m s of c u r r e n t conflicts can t h e r e f o r e be u n d e r stood only t h r o u g h a m u l t i f a c e t e d f r a m e w o r k of analysis t h a t takes full a c c o u n t of the following: • • •

ideological a n d identity-based claims; e c o n o m i c assets, m e a n s of exploitation, a n d m a r k e t i n g channels; interstate dynamics.

Since e a c h of t h e s e e l e m e n t s has its own d y n a m i c a n d its own geographical p a r a m e t e r s , it is possible to find coexisting within a single c o u n t r y parts of the territory that are perfectly p e a c e f u l a n d others that are h u m a n i t a r i a n crisis areas. Similarly, it is clear t h a t t h e d y n a m i c of these conflicts can n o l o n g e r be analyzed within a linear f r a m e w o r k of the type of crisis in which e m e r g e n c y leads to rehabilitation that leads to d e v e l o p m e n t . W h a t is now n e e d e d is a new cyclical a p p r o a c h in which periods of violence are followed by periods of calm.

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Today's Current Humanitarian Responses Faced with these changes in the e n v i r o n m e n t in which they o p e r a t e , h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations have h a d to a d a p t to the new situation. Some of these changes have b e e n the direct results of t h e new constraints that have b e e n identified, while o t h e r s are associated m o r e with t h e b r o a d e r changes taking place in the sector. To some extent, these c h a n g e s have also i n f l u e n c e d the f o r m s of violence with which h u m a n i t a r i a n p e r s o n n e l are c o n f r o n t e d . H u m a n i t a r i a n assistance provided t h r o u g h N G O s has increased largely at the e x p e n s e of bilateral aid. T h e n u m b e r of organizations involved in c u r r e n t areas of crisis, such as the Balkans, far exceeds the n u m b e r that i n t e r v e n e d in Ethiopia in 1985. More t h a n two h u n d r e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s provide assistance to A l b a n i a n r e f u g e e s as c o m p a r e d with only a h a n d f u l fifteen years ago. This proliferation of organizations in crisis situations is a c c o m p a n i e d by a certain f o r m of competit i o n — f o r new f u n d s b u t also to secure sufficient m e d i a coverage or to b u r n i s h the r e p u t a t i o n of the organization. It follows t h e r e f o r e that organizations are implicitly p u s h e d into o p e r a t i n g closer a n d closer to areas of conflict. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the t e r m humanitarian has b e e n m u c h overused d u r i n g the past few years. H u m a n i t a r i a n assistance is p r e s e n t e d to the public as a c o h e r e n t whole, with values, principles of action, a n d m o d e s of o p e r a t i o n that are s h a r e d a n d recognized by all actors. D o n o r s , U n i t e d N a t i o n s agencies, Red Cross m o v e m e n t s , a n d n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e c i t e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . W h i l e this image may b e attractive, it does n o t reflect the reality o n the g r o u n d . T h e h u m a n i t a r i a n family e m b r a c e s a very diverse r a n g e of actors who n o d o u b t share the same aim b u t who are n o t always in a g r e e m e n t o n how to achieve it. T h e attitude of the political authorities in r e c e n t years has only worsened this c o n f u s i o n . More a n d m o r e , they give the impression of wishing to use h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance as an i n s t r u m e n t of f o r e i g n policy. T h e U.S. position o n the f o o d aid provided to N o r t h Korea is p e r h a p s t h e most glaring example. In each m a j o r crisis of the past few years, we have seen in the same t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n h u m a n i t a r i a n a n d military o p e r a t o r s working in c o m p l e t e synergy. This was the case in Somalia a n d Rwanda, a n d we have j u s t e n t e r e d into a new phase with the crisis in Kosovo, where the same actors b o t h wage war a n d c o n d u c t h u m a n i t a r i a n operations. More a n d m o r e , h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations are e n d e a v o r i n g to g o b e y o n d t h e i r r o l e s of m e r e l y d e l i v e r i n g aid. R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t

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humanitarian assistance is nothing but a placebo if unaccompanied by political action to help the conflicting parties reach an agreement, these organizations seek to grab the attention of the political authorities and the public at large by relaying the suffering of the population. Present in the field, they are firsthand witnesses of the reality on the g r o u n d . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the media has amplified to the extreme this activity of witnessing. Pursuing this logic even further, some NGOs have become directly involved in diplomatic peace-building initiatives. The image that results from this situation is particularly confused. The perception of a neutral and impartial humanitarian relief movement is increasingly open to question. In the Balkans crisis, hundreds of organizations were active in Albania and Macedonia, fewer than a dozen were present in Montenegro, and those that were allowed to enter Kosovo could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Did the civil population remaining in Kosovo have so few needs? No, but neither NATO nor the Serbian army could guarantee an adequate level of security, while permitting the organizations to operate independently. The work of humanitarian organizations and their approach to problems have also evolved. T h e programs a n d budgets that they manage sometimes a m o u n t to several million dollars. In recent years, h u m a n i t a r i a n relief organizations have markedly developed their capacity for intervention and rapid deployment. Logistical constraints have been removed. Prepositioned stocks of supplies can be mobilized and used from one day to the next in the event of a major crisis. Supplies themselves have become specialized to fit the specific needs of humanitarian emergency situations. New well-drilling equipment, specific re-nutrition products, and water supply kits are all positioned in such a way as to respond rapidly and effectively to emergency problems. T h e logistics list of Doctors Without Borders is illustrative in this regard: cholera kit, car maintenance kit, and a kit for the restoration of hospital services are all available to provide an immediate humanitarian response. This technical choice of relief organizations also relies on a more professional international staff. Their work in the field is focused on technical expertise and on the supervision and training of national teams. To some extent, this tendency has unfortunately developed at the expense of the quality of the relationship between volunteers and aid beneficiaries. It is not that volunteers no longer have the desire, but rather that they no longer have the time to listen to beneficiaries and to try to better understand the background to the crisis. The volunteers are caught between administrative constraints on the one

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h a n d a n d the n e e d for i m m e d i a t e o p e r a t i o n a l responses on the other. This situation is made worse by the fact that the average time spent by a volunteer on a difficult mission rarely exceeds one year. Rapid rotation of personnel in the field is thus accompanied by a significant loss of mission memory. Serious incidents naturally remain in the collective consciousness of countries, while nearly all "secondary" incidents are forgotten once they have no major consequences. In terms of analysis and of individual behavior, these episodes are particularly important and significant. The perception of insecurity is not always evident. Often problems arise suddenly and surprise relief teams. Knowing that death threats are a common practice in Burundi can no doubt influence the m a n n e r in which problems in that country are a p p r o a c h e d and resolved. This p h e n o m e n o n of amnesia is reinforced by a certain taboo observed by organizations against investigating the causes of each incident and discussing their conclusions with other partners. Last, humanitarian organizations have also had to adapt to the increase in the risks that they face. They have sought to limit the risk of incidents by taking protective measures. The increasing sophistication of their communications systems is illustrative of this trend. The use of radios, walkie-talkies, and satellite telephones is today widespread in sensitive missions. Radio contacts between the different operational centers are often a daily measure that has frequently perm i t t e d d a n g e r o u s situations to be avoided. Travel by convoy has become common, and if access by road is too dangerous, helicopters or small airplanes are used. The use of four-wheel-drive vehicles is today so widespread in the world of humanitarian relief organizations that these vehicles have become their distinguishing characteristic. In most situations, these measures have been required to be able to conduct relief operations, but the almost automatic recourse to them has also created a n u m b e r of paradoxes. Indeed, in certain situations, it is these same measures that can give rise to situations of risk. The excessive use of high-technology equipment or of four-wheel-drive vehicles in environments without structures is never without consequences: Either it provokes greed, or it creates a certain distance between the population and humanitarian relief workers. Some organizations are now seeking to p r o m o t e a centralized a n d collective system of security m a n a g e m e n t in each country by institutionalizing the function of security officer. Others have tried recourse to private organizations to manage all of these problems for them. However seductive these approaches may appear, they can lead only to impasse. By developing security procedures without weighing any other

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factors, humanitarian organizations run the risk of cutting themselves off from their environment and their raison d'être, which is to provide relief and protection to populations in need. More than ever, the management of security must rely on a careful review of the operational context at the local level. It is only at this level that humanitarian organizations can h o p e to understand the nature and dynamics of the situations in which they are involved and thus to identify the risks to which they are exposed. Security management can no longer be conceived of as the mere application of rules and procedures that a nurse is required to follow without understanding their real purpose. Each rule, each decision must involve the individuals and organizations taking them. Moreover, each worker must be able to appreciate the collective aspect of the decision. According to most heads of mission of Action Against Hunger, the difficulty lies not so much in defining procedures as in ensuring their acceptance and implementation by the team as a whole. The notion of security must be integrated at all levels of operation. The definition of programs and communication policies, greater awareness of individual conduct, and assurance that operations are conducted with respect for the local culture are elements that should underpin a comprehensive security strategy. This approach must be p r o m o t e d and encouraged by working within each organization but also by inter-NGO projects designed to approach these problems in a rational way. Today, only a few initiatives seek to promote the integrated management of security within NGOs. The training programs proposed by InterAction, Bioforce, or RedR must be viewed in this light, and t h e a p p l i e d r e s e a r c h u n d e r t a k e n by t h e g r o u p E m e r g e n c y Rehabilitation and D e v e l o p m e n t must seek to highlight this new approach that involves analysis of particular situations. The project Humanitarian Safety and Protection Network is for the m o m e n t the only program that is directly aimed at NGOs to try to develop a comprehensive analysis of the problem based on concrete elements, the idea being to compile reports of security incidents in a computerized database and standardize them as much as possible. The data can be easily stored at the respective headquarters, which will thus retain an institutional memory. The participation of a large number of organizations in this project will make these analyses m o r e m e a n i n g f u l , thanks to a relatively standardized exchange of data and agreement on the conclusions thus elaborated. All of these projects are aimed at assisting organizations to better plan their security management arrangements. They do not propose rigid and theoretical frameworks but try rather to promote a collec-

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tive dynamic. These initiatives are substitutes neither for familiarity with the situation on the g r o u n d n o r for the observance of procedures. Rather, they form part of a broader and more interactive security management system. The security of humanitarian relief personnel today is a collective challenge, which is causing humanitarian organizations to question their very principles of operation. This challenge can be met only if each organization and each individual assumes full and complete responsibility.

Notes P i e r r e Gallien is d i r e c t o r of t h e H u m a n i t a r i a n Safety a n d P r o t e c t i o n Network project. 1. Action Against H u n g e r participates in t h e H u m a n i t a r i a n Safety a n d P r o t e c t i o n Network. It seeks to i m p r o v e a n d s t a n d a r d i z e t h e c o m p i l a t i o n a n d storage of i n f o r m a t i o n related to security i n c i d e n t s with a view to m o r e effective analysis. 2. Missions t h a t are m a n a g e d by t h e Paris office a c c o u n t f o r nearly twothirds of all t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s activities. 3. Béatrice H i b o u , Retreat or Re-Deployment of the State? (n.p., 1999). 4. R o l a n d Marchai, Mogadiscio entre ruine et globalisation (n.p., 1999).

21 Humanitarianism and the International Criminal Justice System: Abandoning Neutrality and Impartiality? Carole Dubrulle

Over the past year, states have made considerable progress in advancing the notion of international criminal justice. T h e driving force behind these advances has often been pressure from nongovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s (NGOs) a n d civic m o v e m e n t s . NGOs have also become involved in the functioning of international judicial bodies, following the example of recent experiences during the Kosovo crisis, when NGOs compiled testimony for forwarding to the International Criminal Court on the former Yugoslavia. Are such activities relevant and desirable for humanitarian organizations?

Historic Indictments for an Emerging System of Justice The 1949 Geneva Conventions, whose fiftieth anniversary was commemorated in 1999, offered considerable hope that the words "never again!" would be given true meaning. Indeed, they established what is known as the principle of universal jurisdiction, by requiring states to seek out, arrest, and try the authors of serious violations of the conventions, wherever they may be and whatever their nationality. "To respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances" is the provision common to article 1 of all four conventions, which have been ratified by 188 states (in other words, by nearly all members of the international community). 215

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However, states have always shown a marked disinclination to implement that provision, as they have been inclined to ignore all the coercive or simply investigatory mechanisms, which have sometimes accompanied later and more specific international legal instruments. By way of example, so far no action has ever been started before the International Fact-Finding Commission established in 1977 u n d e r Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Agreements. In July 1998 the principle of a permanent International Criminal C o u r t (ICC) to try the a u t h o r s of crimes of war, crimes against humanity, and crimes of g e n o c i d e was a d o p t e d in Rome, by 120 states. Numerous political obstacles have severely reduced the truly universal and independent competence that many, including NGOs, would like to see attributed to the court. Nevertheless, the establishment of this court marks a step forward in the campaign to establish an international criminal justice system, following the precedents of the Nürnberg and Tokyo military tribunals and the two ad hoc international criminal courts for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which have recently handed down their first convictions. As if the early prospect of an effective international criminal court had given the starting signal, extraordinary initiatives in the field of international justice have become the focus of media attention. The first such case was that of the proceedings initiated by Judge Baltasar Garzon in Spain against General Augusto Pinochet of Chile, who was arrested in London on 16 October 1998 while on a private visit to England. 1 The Spanish magistrates claimed the right to try Pinochet in Spain for the torture inflicted on his o p p o n e n t s and requested his extradition on those grounds. After a series of rulings and reversals, including the historic ruling on 25 November 1998 not to recognize Pinochet's diplomatic immunity, the seven judges of the Chamber of Lords of the United Kingdom confirmed that ruling on 24 March 1999. Pinochet had enjoyed that immunity for over twenty years u n d e r an amnesty law voted u p o n at his initiative in Chile in 1978 and as a result of his obtaining in March 1998 the status of senator for life. This ruling against a retired head of state could not but encourage other similar demands, such as for the arrest of Suharto, who had ruled Indonesia for more than thirty years. Of even greater significance, however, was the indictment on 26 May 1999 for the first time of a sitting head of state. On that day, Louise Arbour, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, issued a warrant for the arrest of Slobodan Milosevic, p r e s i d e n t of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. T h e "recidivist of t h e Balkans" can n o l o n g e r leave t h e t e r r i t o r y of

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Yugoslavia without risking arrest. It has taken ten years for the prom o t e r of one of the most r e p u g n a n t ideologies, which has several times been translated into deeds, to at last be officially designated as what he is alleged to be, namely, a criminal. T h e rapid progress toward the establishment of an international criminal justice system has produced a sort of euphoria, with numerous scenarios that not long ago appeared improbable or even impossible now becoming achievable: Castro? Kabila? The Kurds? Tibet? And why not an international criminal court for Sierra Leone? And for Cambodia, to try the leaders of the K h m e r Rouge, who were responsible for the mass killings that took place in that country between 1975 and 1979? T h e latter scenario is closest to being realized b u t is c u r r e n t l y t h e s u b j e c t of c o m p l i c a t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s between H u n Sen, the p r e s e n t p r i m e minister of Cambodia, and Kofi Annan, secretary general of the UN. Halfway between "international" and "national" is the alternative concept of a criminal court "of an international character" for Cambodia, which would consist of foreign j u d g e s and prosecutors o p e r a t i n g within a Cambodian court. The purpose of an international criminal justice system is to compensate for the absence of a national response: When a state cannot or will not prosecute h u m a n rights violations committed on its territory, it is for the international justice system (this is the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity in the f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l criminal court) or for a foreign court (in the Pinochet case) to take over. Fortunately, however, there are examples in which victim states dare to take direct charge of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n with their history, and these a m o u n t to victories in the fight against impunity. South Africa established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in D e c e m b e r 1995 to shed light on the crimes of the apartheid regime that held power f r o m 1948 to 1994. The commission, chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, published its report on 30 October 1998. After ruling on whether or not a n u m b e r of cases were deserving of amnesty, it handed over its cases to the South African justice system, which is now responsible for follow-up action. In Argentina, magistrates are prosecuting the former heads of the military juntas during the period of dictatorship (1976-1983), including former president Jorge Videla, who have been accused of the kidnapping of children. This is one of the few crimes, together with economic crimes, not covered by the amnesty laws. The indictments in Argentina would have been impossible without the tenacity of the Association of G r a n d m o t h e r s , the grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who are today internationally recognized and who in 1996 filed a complaint for the illegal appropri-

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ation of the babies of their own detained and "disappeared" children. This tenacity illustrates the involvement and key role often played by civil society in influencing governments, which alone decide on the policies of national institutions.

Citizens' G r o u p s In France, Action Against H u n g e r joined the French Coalition for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the group Article Premier. Article Premier is a group of organizations engaged in humanitarian activities, the defense of h u m a n rights, and the fight against social exclusion in France. It came together on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights in order to m o r e effectively mobilize French public opinion and g o v e r n m e n t authorities to ensure genuine respect for h u m a n rights in both foreign and domestic policy. In 1998, Article Premier was awarded the order of the Grand National Cause. Accession to membership of the French Coalition for the ICC was justified by the pressing need to combat the impunity that still prevails in international relations. The emergence of an international criminal justice system as a new element in the sphere of international public relations is to the credit of states but also of citizens in a sometimes c o m m o n effort to s t r e n g t h e n democracy. At the crossroads between h u m a n rights, h u m a n dignity, therapy, security, and the maintenance of peace, making everyone subject to the law is consistent with a certain line of political morality, and it is hoped that the treaty establishing that morality will not become yet another piece of paper. For that is precisely the weakness of international legal instruments: They proliferate but are rarely implemented. Together with the victims, humanitarian organizations are the first witnesses of this dysfunction. It is true that civil society has succeeded over the years in organizing itself, campaigning, and gaining acceptance for its viewpoint on a number of key issues. It has done so by being on the cutting edge of international law through the establishment of new international conventions (Ottawa Convention on landmines, the Statute of the International Criminal Court). It has also used vigorous campaigns aimed either at combating processes that are underway (stopping the Multilateral A g r e e m e n t on Investment [MAI]) or at the creation of new mechanisms (the introduction of the so-called Tobin tax of 0.5 or 1 percent on all capital movements to put into an international solidarity fund, which is the

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aim of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n p o u r u n e T a x a t i o n d e s T r a n s a c t i o n s Financieres p o u r L'Aide aux Citoyens [ATTAC], an organization established in 1998 that has been gaining increasing international recognition). Nevertheless civil society still remains unsure as to the methods of action that should be employed downstream of international law: how to demand and monitor the full implementation of this law. The experience of recent years shows that in order to be effective it is necessary to pool resources at both the national and international levels using the Internet, a tool that makes it possible to link and coordinate different initiatives at amazing speeds. Cooperation at certain times is also essential, however, between the public and private spheres. In order to move beyond the stage of protest and to achieve the desired goal of codification, coalitions must establish a perman e n t presence within international organizations and states. In the two recent examples of the Ottawa Convention and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, a parallel coalition of states referred to as "pioneers," supported in the Tightness of their cause by the vigorous international campaigns conducted by NGOs, finally took up the cause a n d led it to a successful conclusion. These p i o n e e r states included not only traditionally neutral states, such as Austria and Sweden, but also pillars of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such as Canada and Norway. It should also be noted that the Canadian Federal Parliament, together with the Finnish government, has already voted for the principle of a Tobin tax to put a brake on speculation in exchange markets. This diverse coalition of states and NGOs has been consecrated in black and white in the text itself of the Ottawa Convention, while NGOs are involved in the regulatory functions of the state (armaments, criminal justice) and will have an active role to play in the universalization of the c o n v e n t i o n . Similarly, the statute of the ICC enjoins NGOs to participate in the functioning of the court.

Humanitarian Organizations Associated with the Proper Functioning of the International Criminal Justice System NGOs will be one of the elements that will g u a r a n t e e the relative i n d e p e n d e n c e of the court: T h e power of the prosecutor, who will have the power to initiate criminal proceedings, will in fact rely on information provided by NGOs, a m o n g others. This type of connec-

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d o n already exists for the two ad hoc criminal tribunals f o r Rwanda a n d the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, which were established by resolutions of the U n i t e d Nations Security Council. H u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, because they are p r e s e n t in the field alongside the victims, have the capacity to s o u n d the alarm a n d o f t e n assert in their statutes this role of b e a r i n g witness. But b e y o n d t h e task of establishing the facts, they d o n o t necessarily intervene in the process of identifying the a u t h o r s of crimes against humanity. "Justice is r e n d e r e d in the n a m e of universal values that are non-negotiable," writes Patrick B a u d o u i n , p r e s i d e n t of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Federation of H u m a n Rights Leagues, a n d some organizations have already established the c o n n e c t i o n between h u m a n i t a r i a n action a n d justice. T h e fight against impunity is n o n e o t h e r t h a n a f o r m of relief f o r victims, a n d the n e e d f o r justice is as u r g e n t as the n e e d to eat or to receive m e d i c a l care. D o e s n o t a h u m a n b e i n g w h o is h u n g r y , b e a t e n , or m u t i l a t e d s u f f e r b o t h psychically a n d physically? A n d d o e s n o t t h e therapy that seeks to repair the d a m a g e b o t h individual a n d collective first r e q u i r e that justice b e d o n e ? T h e n o t i o n of h u m a n dignity takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e s e two e l e m e n t s : C a n o n e t h e n claim to b e seeking r e s t o r a t i o n while o m i t t i n g to restore h u m a n k i n d to its full integrity? T h e denial of justice is a serious a f f r o n t , which can only lead to f u r t h e r injustices. T h e w o r s e n i n g lot of civilian p o p u l a t i o n s in conflicts a n d the great frustration of h u m a n i t a r i a n relief volunteers d u e to a feeling of powerlessness in the face of the absence or r a t h e r the n o n a c t i v a d o n of juridical a n d political m e c h a n i s m s to stop the spiral of violence s h o u l d surely p u s h such volunteers to e n s u r e t h a t legal p r o c e e d i n g s are finally initiated against the a u t h o r s of the most serious a n d massive crimes. H u m a n i t a r i a n work has b u t o n e objective: h u m a n k i n d . Merely by e n g a g i n g in the fight f o r m o r e effective justice, o n e finds oneself sliding into the political arena: H u m a n rights? Rule of law? Justice? Democracy? Does n o t the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights proclaim the f r e e d o m of m a n k i n d f r o m "fear a n d want?" Do the volunteers working o n behalf of a h u m a n i t a r i a n organization have to forget, in the n a m e of h u m a n i t a r i a n action, that they are also citizens a n d c o m m i t t e d individuals? Will they themselves n o t lose a p a r t of their own dignity by t u r n i n g their backs o n the n e e d to see justice d o n e , if their assistance is r e q u i r e d f o r it to b e d o n e ? S h o u l d they allow reasons of state to prevent t h e m f r o m d e n o u n c i n g obscenities, while i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n law, to w h i c h they so o f t e n m a k e r e f e r e n c e , a n d m o r e particularly the 1977 Additional Protocols

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to the Geneva Conventions have m a d e states accept the notion that the offer of h u m a n i t a r i a n and impartial aid c a n n o t be construed as i n t e r f e r e n c e in an a r m e d conflict or as a hostile act? In o t h e r words, as soon as h u m a n i t a r i a n workers use testimony gathered f r o m victims of discrimination f o r judicial purposes in a process initiated by the entities that are to establish responsibilities, as has b e e n d o n e d u r i n g the crisis in Kosovo, d o they t h e n b e c o m e the new righters of o u r planet's wrongs?

Consequences of the Visibility of Humanitarian Organizations in Kosovo Even t h o u g h the war in Kosovo may have i n f l u e n c e d the course of history, it still c a n n o t c h a n g e the m e a n i n g of words. Nevertheless, o n e of the consequences of this war is that it has c e m e n t e d the abusive use of the term humanitarian, which has b e c o m e fixed in people's m i n d s as d e s c r i b i n g o p e r a t i o n s t h a t have n o t h i n g to d o with t h e word. T h e term now reinforces a customary use against which some h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations, including Action Against Hunger, have fought. Indeed, a word used as a label seems to automatically c o n f e r respect a n d moral authority on anyone who places himself or herself u n d e r its banner. Humanitarian, a term that has b e e n truly consecrated at this e n d of the century, is now used to describe any event that involves a civilian p o p u l a t i o n . Its highly positive c o n n o t a t i o n , associated with the idea of preserving h u m a n dignity in all circumstances, eclipses at the same time what previously was the accepted province of diplomacy, the military, development, and justice. In the wake of the "humanitarian disaster" of Kosovo, the c o m m o n p l a c e occurrence of militarized h u m a n i t a r i a n action or a r m e d intervention f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n e n d s has r e a c h e d extremes. T h e c o n f u s i o n is total, the u s u r p a t i o n complete, while public opinion is misled a b o u t the ultimate objectives. Must we resign ourselves to this situation? "Humanitarian action has b e c o m e t h e diplomatic f o r m of mystification. O n c e private, it has b e c o m e p u b l i c a n d t h e u n q u e s t i o n a b l e alibi of i n j u s t i c e , " w r o t e J a c q u e s Julliard in 1994, in an essay on the war in Bosnia that in a sense predicted the c u r r e n t crisis in Kosovo. 2 Now this confusion is precisely the kind of juxtaposition that does n o t sit well with h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations. H u m a n i t a r i a n i s m and justice must necessarily go together, a n d the link between the two bears testimony to this. T h e r e is n o i n f r i n g e m e n t of the principles

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h e r e : Action a n d testimony are b o t h p a r t of the h u m a n i t a r i a n vocation. Unfortunately, however, the Kosovo crisis a n d its intense m e d i a c o v e r a g e h a v e l e d to a k i n d of o p p o r t u n i s t i c s h o r t c u t t h a t takes h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations down a slippery slope a n d will lead perhaps to f u r t h e r confusion: H u m a n i t a r i a n organizations are b e c o m i n g in c h a r g e of the proceedings! Because they c a n n o t b e direct witnesses to w h a t is t a k i n g p l a c e inside Kosovo, h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s have r e s o r t e d a l m o s t avidly to g a t h e r i n g eyewitness a c c o u n t s f r o m r e f u g e e s . H u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t are now u n a b l e to play t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e s a r e s p u r r e d o n by e n c o u r a g i n g p r e s s u r e s , notably f r o m d o n o r s , some of w h o m would like to i n c l u d e the mana g e m e n t of h u m a n rights within the scope of h u m a n i t a r i a n activities; e n c o u r a g e d by their r e c e n t successes o b t a i n e d f r o m states in t h e normative field; a n d f r u s t r a t e d also a f t e r so many years of a c c u m u l a t i o n of injustice in this p a r t of E u r o p e . As a result they have d e m a n d e d ( p e r h a p s too publicly) this new legitimacy, which is salutary in that it resembles a lifebuoy, providing f o r some organizations the only way to survive. We are n o l o n g e r sure w h e t h e r these testimonies f r o m r e f u g e e s should serve the cause of justice—in this case the ICC f o r the f o r m e r Yugoslavia (but if so, in o r d e r that the testimonies c o m p i l e d can b e used in the proceedings, t h e r e s h o u l d be n o publicity over t h e m ) — o r serve to mobilize Western public o p i n i o n at the risk of justifying at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e N A T O o p e r a t i o n as a whole. Mobilizing p u b l i c o p i n i o n could also m e a n that observers would draw a n d disseminate hasty conclusions, only to have those conclusions bitterly called into question, as we have seen in o t h e r crises. Justice does n o t c o m e as the a u t o m a t i c c o n s e q u e n c e of the sum of the injustices that are exposed. This kind of ostentatious determination to prove that the action of these new righters of wrongs, which h u m a n i t a r i a n agencies a p p e a r to have b e c o m e , is "protective" d o e s n o t necessarily f u r t h e r the cause of justice: justice h e r e today maybe, b u t what a b o u t justice elsewhere tomorrow? Let t h e r e b e n o mistake a b o u t it: A c t i o n Against H u n g e r has also e n g a g e d in collecting testimony to try to u n d e r s t a n d what has h a p p e n e d inside Kosovo, to listen to what some, i n c l u d i n g Kosovar staff m e m b e r s of Action Against H u n g e r in M a c e d o n i a a n d Albania, h a d e n o u g h trust to s h a r e with us. "Charity w i t h o u t j u s t i c e is f r a u d u lent," J a c q u e s J u l l i a r d f u r t h e r n o t e d in Ce fascisme qui vient. Yes, a n d N G O s are t h e first to p r o c l a i m this quasi-political f o r m of c o m m i t m e n t . But we m u s t b e c a r e f u l lest this role of b e a r i n g witness (quite i m p r u d e n t in its visibility) p r o d u c e s a b o o m e r a n g effect in t h e l o n g

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t e r m a n d in situations in which we will n o l o n g e r b e o n t h e s a m e side as t h e p a r t y with t h e m o s t f i r e p o w e r . T h i s b o o m e r a n g e f f e c t m i g h t b e t h e o p p o s i t e of what we seek to achieve; in o t h e r words, it m i g h t b r i n g a b o u t d e n i a l of access to victims. I n d e e d , Kosovo is t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t p r o v e s t h e r u l e : In m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n f l i c t s t h e r e is n o political will e i t h e r to o p p o s e a process t h a t is u n d e r w a y or to relieve t h e s u f f e r i n g of victims. In certain cases, N G O s are t h e last o n e s to r e m a i n in t h e f i e l d , a f t e r t h e d i p l o m a t s a n d U n i t e d N a t i o n s p e r s o n n e l have b e e n evacuated. It is in such situations t h a t t h e witness of h u m a n i t a r i a n w o r k e r s b e c o m e s vital a n d a c r u c i a l c h a n g e of d i r e c t i o n to b e n e g o t i a t e d f o r N G O s with r e g a r d to t h e role they can h e n c e f o r t h play in t h e field of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l justice. I n d e e d , a n a d d i t i o n a l t h o u g h s e c o n d a r y j u d i c i a l e l e m e n t may have c h a n g e d t h e e q u a t i o n . T h e various e l e m e n t s m u s t b e p u t in t h e i r c o r r e c t places: It is n o t the testimony of expatriates that will b e u s e f u l in a criminal c o u r t b u t r a t h e r t h e testimony of victims as gathe r e d by expatriates w h o are in n o way in c h a r g e of t h e inquiry a n d a r e n o s u b s t i t u t e s f o r t h e c o u r t s ' i n v e s t i g a t o r s . A n d , a b o v e all, h u m a n i t a r i a n agencies take n o position whatsoever o n the p e r s o n a l responsibility of t h e alleged a u t h o r s of t h e atrocities. W h e n N G O s are themselves r e q u i r e d to d e n o u n c e situations of violations of t h e law in t h e i r a r e a s of o p e r a t i o n , they a r e g o i n g m u c h f u r t h e r t h a n they would have by merely collecting testimony f o r the ICC f o r the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. O n the o t h e r h a n d , this m e t h o d may have c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r the p e r c e p t i o n of o t h e r s of what is b e i n g d o n e . I n d e e d , the p r e s e n t o r d e r may b e affected if excessive m e d i a coverage tends to p r e s e n t h u m a n i tarian workers as m o d e r n day "white knights" a n d creates new c o n f u sion, since t h e association between N G O s a n d the d e f e n s e of h u m a n rights would necessarily lie at the e n d of the road. Even if a m e a s u r e of c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y d o e s i n d e e d e x i s t a n d n e e d s t o b e f u r t h e r r e f i n e d , it does n o t a m o u n t to a total identification of o n e with the other. T h e r e has in fact b e e n n o f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e , since, in principle, h u m a n i t a r i a n workers by their very p r e s e n c e are ultimately u n d e sirable witnesses. This is so because witnessing is a n i n h e r e n t p a r t of t h e i r mission. Everything will t h e r e f o r e h i n g e o n how to a d a p t their d i s c o u r s e a n d t r a n s l a t e it at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level, w h i c h a t t h e m o m e n t o f t e n wavers between assistance a n d p r o t e c t i o n without genuinely wishing to closely scrutinize what the t e r m protection actually covers.

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Neutrality and Impartiality: Relevant Criteria for Humanitarian Action? How a relief organization is granted the status of "humanitarian" is d e f i n e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n i t a r i a n law. 3 An organization is humanitarian if it seeks, with complete impartiality, to relieve human suffering. The humanitarian protection provided to victims has first a quantifiable aspect: assistance to enable survival in a desperate situation, for example, temporary refuge for a refugee or access to food and to care for noncombatants during periods of conflict; it has second a legal aspect that derives from legal provisions that grant rights to specific groups: refugees, noncombatants, and so on. Impartiality is the real Hippocratic oath of a humanitarian organization. This is an operational principle that seeks to match relief to need, in situations in which available resources are always limited. Impartiality finds expression in a rule of distribution that is proportional to needs and their urgency, established according to a standard analytical grid. Providing assistance to populations (and not to governments or heads of factions, of course) on both sides of a front line does not mean mathematical equality. The "beneficiaries" are identifiable from evaluations that are objective and not imposed by governments. Impartiality is therefore assured by the principle of nondiscrimination, and it is for states to guarantee these humanitarian principles, in other words, to guarantee the implementation of the Geneva Conventions. In practice, NGOs are subjected daily to pressures and other tensions that violate with complete impunity these principles and reduce even further the protection given to the victim populations. The tools used for the analysis of needs are themselves objective, and an information grid for collecting testimony is not different from a food security questionnaire. Impartiality will consist in having conducted evaluations with the same analytic grid and the same methods on both sides (Serbs and Albanians, for example). Neutrality is not prescribed by international humanitarian law but is set out instead in the charters of n u m e r o u s humanitarian organizations. It characterizes organizations that claim neither political color nor religious membership. It also has an operational and security objective: In the Geneva Conventions, security must be provided for persons and property on humanitarian missions as well as f o r victims. N e u t r a l i t y is also n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Committee of the Red Cross for its mediation activities. This therefore is the definition of neutrality for a humanitarian organization. Indeed, since the vocation of NGOs is to bear witness,

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d e n o u n c i n g atrocities against p r o t e c t e d g r o u p s a m o u n t s to t h e s a m e t h i n g as a c c u s i n g t h e p a r t y t h a t c o m m i t s t h e atrocity. In R w a n d a , Tutsis have b e e n t h e victims of a g e n o c i d e . In Kosovo, A l b a n i a n s have b e e n t h e v i c t i m s of a p o l i c y of e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . I n B u r m a , t h e Rohingyas a r e c o n d e m n e d to f o r c e d labor, p r o h i b i t i o n f r o m traveling, a n d v a r i o u s o t h e r f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . We c a n t h e r e f o r e c i t e c o u n t l e s s e x a m p l e s o n which N G O s have widely r e p o r t e d . Neutrality p u r e a n d s i m p l e , w h i c h consists in r e m a i n i n g s i l e n t a b o u t a c r i m e b e i n g c o m m i t t e d , would a m o u n t to c o n n i v a n c e with t h e oppressor, to b e i n g a n a c c o m p l i c e to t h e i n j u s t i c e c o m m i t t e d . B e a r i n g witness is t h u s also a f o r m of assistance to p o p u l a t i o n s . Publicizing t h e i r fate can also b e a m e a n s of relieving t h e i r s u f f e r i n g , by d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to t h e violations of rights of which they a r e t h e victims. T h e d e b a t e over w h e t h e r testimony is i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with access to victims is an old o n e , which sometimes poses intractable dilemmas within h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Particularly so as this type of d e b a t e inevitably f o c u s e s o n t h e security of h u m a n i t a r i a n p e r s o n n e l o n mission in t h e field a n d o n t h e situation of t h e victim p o p u l a t i o n s . O u r p r e s e n c e in t h e field is t h u s in itself a f o r m of p r o t e c t i o n , a n d yet, in t h e a b s e n c e of a n y m e a n s of c o e r c i o n i n h e r e n t in t h e t e r m protect, we m u s t a c c e p t with all t h e r e q u i r e d humility o u r status as "disposable" h u m a n i t a r i a n workers. B u t this is n o t t h e only f o r m of p r o t e c t i o n : B e a r i n g witness in o r d e r to m o r e effectively p r e v e n t crises, by resolutely r e f u s i n g to let h u m a n i t a r ianism b e u s e d m e r e l y as d r e s s i n g f o r g a p i n g w o u n d s a n d s o m e t i m e s to c o m p l e t e t h e dirty work in situations of an u n a c c e p t a b l e status q u o , illustrates o u r v o c a t i o n to n e v e r r e m a i n n e u t r a l in t h e face of violations, especially w h e n t h e s e a r e massive violations of h u m a n rights.

Notes Carole Dubrulle is head of the H u m a n Rights Project of Action Against Hunger in France. 1. A very similar case arose recently (6 July 2000) when the Belgian authorities issued a warrant against the foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Abolulaye Yerodia, indicting him for crimes under international law. If the minister travels a b r o a d , he could be a r r e s t e d , and Belgium will request his extradition. 2. Jacques Julliard, Ce fascisme qui vient (Paris: Seuil, 1994). Jacques Julliard is a member of the board of directors of Action Against Hunger in France. 3. The argument in the section that follows is taken from Gaelle Fedida, "Emergency Humanitarian NGOs, New Subjects of International Law?" (doctor of law thesis, University of Paris X-Nanterre, 1998, under the supervision of Emmanuel Decaux). Fedida was formerly Action Against Hunger head of the mission in Pristina, Kosovo.

22 Combating Man-Made Famine: Legal Instruments Marie-Josée

Domestici-Met

As I have written earlier, 1 positive law does not at present guarantee any legally enforceable right to food; the primary legal instrument r e m a i n s t h e objective o b l i g a t i o n to act against h u n g e r u s e d as weapon. That instrument applies to everyone in positions of power— the power to make decisions, control information, or exert pressure in a given situation. Efforts are now underway to perfect legal instruments. Strenuous efforts are being made to secure the recognition of a universal right to food, and a code of conduct is emerging. Furthermore, the instrum e n t of positive law that we already have f o r situations in which hunger is used as a weapon seems to be gaining in legal importance.

Recognition of a Universal Right to Food Studies on this subject are based on article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which proclaims "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing" and recognizes in paragraph 2 "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." This article has become part of positive law, since the covenant has been ratified by a large n u m b e r of states. It has more programmatic than operational significance, as indicated in the language of article 2: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 227

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achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Even t h o u g h we no longer believe that only states that have reached a certain level of development should be b o u n d by these obligations and even though the obligation to act arises immediately, its tangible results cannot be felt until after a long period of work. 2 Article 11(2) cited above concludes, moreover, with reference to the adoption of "specific programs." While the United Nations' bodies charged with promoting economic and social progress have made considerable efforts to refine the c o n c e p t , the synergy b e i n g witnessed today t r a n s c e n d s this framework and draws in civil society. This is, of course, a very encouraging sign, even if a n u m b e r of legal problems still remain to be resolved.

Concerted Efforts to Develop a C o d e of C o n d u c t The World Food Conference convened in 1974 resulted in the adoption of a universal declaration on the eradication of all forms of malnutrition. Since then, numerous official documents have deplored the persistence of hunger and malnutrition and insisted on the need for "adequate food." 3 But a difference in ideological approach has characterized this emerging synergy. One approach sought to make the right to adequate food an enforceable human right that, when not respected, gives rise to an o b l i g a t i o n to c o m p e n s a t e . In 1987, a Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities tried this new approach. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was also created in 1987. The other approach, which was officially adopted by the World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996, was geared to needs rather than rights. Its perspective was long term and its content more programmatic than decision driven: Its goal was to reduce by the year 2015 the number of malnourished people to 50 percent of what it had been in 1996. It is a specific, material objective, and any criticism for failing to achieve it would be unjustified. Nevertheless, the Plan of Action adopted at the Rome Summit on 17 November, with its Declaration on World Food Security, consists of seven commitments, some of which include a number of objectives. The one that most directly conc e r n s o u r s u b j e c t is O b j e c t i v e 7.4, which invites t h e H i g h Commissioner for Human Rights, in collaboration with the specialized agencies, the United Nations programs, and various intergovern-

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mental mechanisms, to better define the right to food set out in article 11 of the covenant. Concurrently with the World Food Summit, a meeting of NGOs was held at which the most active representatives debated the fundamental question of a global approach, that is, need versus right. 4 As a result of these extremely productive discussions, groups of NGOs opted for a position based on the "human rights" approach. 5 T h e Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) was the strongest advocate of this a p p r o a c h . In S e p t e m b e r 1997, t o g e t h e r with the I n t e r n a t i o n a l H u m a n Rights Organization f o r the Right to Feed Oneself, the World Alliance for Nutrition and H u m a n Rights, and Il'Istituto Internazionale Jacques Maritain, FIAN established a Code of Conduct for the h u m a n right to adequate food. The NGOs that had opted for this approach participated in the follow-up process organized by the High Commissioner for H u m a n Rights. While this process was taking place, the Commission f o r H u m a n Rights had also advanced the notion of the "right to food." At its fifty-third session, it adopted resolution 1997/8, which reaffirmed that hunger was a violation of h u m a n dignity, and pledged to work for a better definition of the right. The topic remained on its agenda. In 1998, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a comprehensive report to the Commission for H u m a n Rights, which highlighted the following points: 1. While clear rules have been established as regards the meaning of civil and political rights, the m e a n i n g of e c o n o m i c , social, and cultural rights remains vague (point 10); 2. A " h u m a n rights" a p p r o a c h s h o u l d be a d o p t e d d e f i n i n g responsibilities and legal remedies—or rights of substitution— in case of violation (point 11); 3. However, switching f r o m a "needs" a p p r o a c h to a "rights" approach cannot be done from one day to the next. Many issues therefore remain to be resolved.

Remaining Problems A q u o t a t i o n f r o m the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r H u m a n Rights is indicative of the incomplete nature of the project: "The right of a person to adequate food is firmly established in international law, but its operational content and its methods of application are universally misunderstood."

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T h e w o r k t h a t r e m a i n s c o n c e r n s m a i n l y t h e d e f i n i t i o n of (1) a precise c o n t e n t , w i t h o u t which t h e "right to assistance" has n o n o r m a tive value, a n d (2) specific o b l i g o r s c h a r g e d with specific obligations, w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e "right" in q u e s t i o n has n o legal value. The Problem of Content T h e n o t i o n of a r i g h t to a d e q u a t e f o o d is b e g i n n i n g to e m e r g e . B u t w h a t d o e s a d e q u a t e f o o d consist of? Is it s u f f i c i e n t f o o d ? F o o d t h a t is f r e e of h a r m f u l substances, t h a t is culturally a c c e p t a b l e , t h a t satisfies a p e r s o n ' s n u t r i t i o n a l a n d dietary n e e d s ? T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s a p p e a r in t h e C o d e of C o n d u c t of FIAN, w h i c h a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t it o f f e r s only g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of this right. The Problem of the Obligor A g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s s e e m s to have e m e r g e d t h a t e a c h state will have o b l i g a t i o n s toward its own p o p u l a t i o n ; t h e r e is g e n e r a l r e l u c t a n c e to p r o v i d e f o r any c o m m i t m e n t toward t h e p o p u l a t i o n of a t h i r d c o u n try. But w h a t is t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e obligations? The Problem of the Specific Obligations of Obligors Obligations derived from the International Covenant on Economic, Social, a n d C u l t u r a l Rights a r e g r o u p e d in U n i t e d N a t i o n s d o c u m e n t s i n t o f o u r c a t e g o r i e s , w h i c h t h e FIAN C o d e of C o n d u c t a t t e m p t s to clarify: 6 Obligation to respect T h i s is t h e passive o b l i g a t i o n to take n o a c t i o n t h a t violates t h e r i g h t of citizens to f o o d . Article 6 of t h e FIAN c o d e lists various specific rights t h a t m u s t b e r e s p e c t e d : physical a n d e c o n o m i c access to f o o d , a n c e s t r a l r i g h t s to l a n d , a n d t h e r i g h t of w o m e n to b r e a s t - f e e d t h e i r b a b i e s f o r at least six m o n t h s . T h e s e a r e very specific o b l i g a t i o n s , w h i c h w o u l d m a k e c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s p u n i s h a b l e if t h e c o d e b e c a m e positive law. Obligation to protect. T h i s is a n o b l i g a t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n against any k i n d of violation ( i n c l u d i n g violations c o m m i t t e d by private p e r s o n s ) a n d specific provisions f o r p r o t e c t i o n against p u b l i c dist u r b a n c e s (for e x a m p l e , looting, w h i c h violates t h e r i g h t to p r o p e r t y ) . Obligation to promote. T h i s o b l i g a t i o n r e f e r s to t h e e n a c t m e n t of n e w i n t e r n a l legislative provisions a n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t of n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s

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whose p u r p o s e is to facilitate access to f o o d a n d to p r o m o t e h u m a n rights f r o m the perspective of the right to f o o d . Obligation to ensure enjoyment of the right This obligation does n o t necessarily fall u p o n the moral p e r s o n of the state, contrary to the belief popu l a r in t h e 1970s. It is now a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e r i g h t to f o o d is f a c i l i t a t e d t h r o u g h t h e i m p r o v e m e n t of g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which the right to f o o d could b e effectively enjoyed. This is what the r e p o r t of t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r H u m a n R i g h t s t e r m e d t h e "obligation of results," a f o r m u l a that has b e e n criticized by F r e n c h jurists. 7 In t h e FIAN C o d e of C o n d u c t , however, it is n o l o n g e r a question of t h e right to f o o d in general b u t the fight against h u n g e r ' s b e i n g used as a w e a p o n , a n d h e r e the f o r m u l a t i o n is less bold: Food "should n o t b e u s e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t of political a n d e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e " (article 5.5). But m a n - m a d e , deliberate f a m i n e is an easily identifiable p r a c t i c e , a n d t h e guilty p a r t i e s c o u l d b e easily d e n o u n c e d . T h e answer t h e n is n o t t h e C o d e of C o n d u c t , which is n o t prescriptive e n o u g h . O t h e r a p p r o a c h e s must b e used to c o m b a t this scourge.

A Growing Place in the Juridical Order for the Objective Obligation to Fight Against Man-Made Hunger In Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999, we discussed t h e legal f o u n d a tions of this obligation o n t h e p a r t of states, notably by d e m o n s t r a t ing how t h e p e r e m p t o r y n o r m s t h a t g u a r a n t e e the right to life, physical i n t e g r i t y , a n d a m i n i m u m of d i g n i t y i n c l u d e , a m o n g t h e i r g u a r a n t e e m e c h a n i s m s , t h e m e c h a n i s m of o b j e c t i v e o b l i g a t i o n . W h e t h e r o r n o t this is explicitly s t a t e d — A r t i c l e 1 of t h e G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n s 8 — t h e obligation to work f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s is i n t r i n s i c a l l y l i n k e d to t h e q u e s t i o n . We also c i t e d s o m e e x a m p l e s of actions t h a t could fulfill the objective obligation, e i t h e r t h r o u g h m a t e r i a l assistance, m u l t i l a t e r a l o r bilateral diplomacy, or media intervention.9 The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001 emphasizes two strategies that exemplify r e c e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l efforts toward the realization of objective obligations. T h e first c o n c e r n s a modality of action that evokes the objective obligation b u t n o t specifically the p r o b l e m of h u n g e r . T h e s e c o n d is m o r e closely related to the p r o b l e m of h u n g e r b u t in the very specific context of m a n - m a d e h u n g e r justified by law. In the

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first case, we cite t h e c o n f l i c t in Kosovo; in t h e s e c o n d , t h e e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s i m p o s e d in t h e n a m e of p e a c e k e e p i n g . Objective Obligation and Force R e c e n t events lead us to q u e s t i o n t h e possibility of e n f o r c i n g — m a n u militari—an objective o b l i g a t i o n . W h a t e v e r t h e d e b a t e s over t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e Allied Forces in Kosovo a n d t h e m e t h o d s e m p l o y e d — o r m o r e precisely, t h e n o n o b s e r v a n c e of t h e p r o c e d u r e s of t h e U n i t e d Nations, officially t h e only o n e s a u t h o r i z e d f o r coercive action f o r t h e past fifty y e a r s — t h e o p e r a t i o n c r e a t e s a m a j o r p r e c e d e n t f o r c o n t i n u e d h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l society. T h i s t e c h n i q u e was widely u s e d in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d t h e first half of t h e t w e n t i e t h century. In t h e e r a of institutions i n t o w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l society e n t e r e d following the U n i t e d Nations C o n f e r e n c e o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n in San F r a n c i s c o in 1945, only a few s p o r a d i c episodes—Stanleyville-Paulis, E n t e b b e , a n d K o l w e s i — c o u l d b e c i t e d in f a v o r of s u c h a t e c h n i q u e . A n d m a n y o b s e r v e r s viewed t h e s e e p i s o d e s m e r e l y as o p e r a t i o n s to e x t r a c t t h e n a t i o n a l s of t h e p o w e r t a k i n g t h e a c t i o n , a l t h o u g h this view may b e disputed. Even if t h e p r e c e d e n t of Kosovo is far f r o m e n j o y i n g a u n a n i m o u s opinio juris, it at least revives t h e i d e a t h a t a b s o l u t e necessity may prevail over t h e o b s e r v a n c e of p r o c e d u r e s . 1 0 A n d if t h e m a j o r p o w e r s a n d a p a r t of p u b l i c o p i n i o n a r e of t h e view t h a t t h e p r o m p t use of f o r c e was j u s t i f i e d by t h e n e e d to e n f o r c e r e s p e c t f o r t h e rights of m i n o r i ties, it w o u l d n o t s e e m o u t of p l a c e to a d v o c a t e use of t h e s a m e p r o c e d u r e to p u t a n e n d to an o n g o i n g situation of f a m i n e . Objective Obligation and the Legal Challenge to Economic Sanctions T h e p r o b l e m of m a n - m a d e f a m i n e i m p o s e d in t h e n a m e of "peacek e e p i n g , " t h a t is, e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s , is n o w of m a j o r c o n c e r n . A l t h o u g h Article 41 of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h a r t e r was i n c l u d e d in t h e h o p e of m a i n t a i n i n g p e a c e at less h u m a n cost t h a n by f o r c e of a r m s , we n o w k n o w t h a t its a p p l i c a t i o n over a l o n g p e r i o d leads to scarcity. An e m b a r g o , even in its "selective" f o r m , seriously affects t h e h e a l t h status of civilians. T h e case of I r a q is particularly illustrative, p e r h a p s to b e followed by t h a t of Serbia. L e g a l r e s e a r c h a d d r e s s e s this p r o b l e m with a b u n d a n t c a u t i o n , given t h a t t h e c a u s e of m a n - m a d e h u n g e r is n o t — e x c e p t i o n a l l y in

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this case—a violation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Instead, it is a n o r m that supposedly maintains the h i g h e r values of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. M e n t i o n is m a d e in p a r t i c u l a r of t h e c o l l o q u i u m o r g a n i z e d in Geneva, f r o m 23 to 25 J u n e 1999, by t h e Institut Universitaire des H a u t e s Etudes Internationales. T h e c o l l o q u i u m subjected these sanctions to a four-point test of their legality, that is, t h r o u g h the prism of h u m a n i t a r i a n law, h u m a n rights, the U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h a r t e r itself, a n d the m a n d a t e s that p r o t e c t individual rights—whether u n d e r multilateral a g r e e m e n t s or t h r o u g h unilateral decisions—that m i g h t b e invoked to o p p o s e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a Security C o u n c i l decision. T h e exercise was d o m i n a t e d n o t only by the idea of a hierarchy of n o r m s b u t also by the application of the specificity of "moral pers o n s . " I n l i g h t of t h e s e f i n d i n g s , t h e s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s of t h e U n i t e d Nations would n o t have c o m p e t e n c e to agree to abide by decisions taken by the Security Council to impose sanctions. T h e objective obligation would dictate h e r e a certain f o r m of constructive disobedience. T h u s we now find coexisting a r o u n d the legal p r o b l e m s associated with f o o d , a certain militancy in favor of a universal right to f o o d a n d a carefully c o n s t r u c t e d legal a r g u m e n t in favor of an objective obligation to act against m a n - m a d e h u n g e r . T h e first battle is already won: H u n g e r is n o l o n g e r t h e "banal tragedy" d e n o u n c e d by Sylvie Brunei. 1 1

Notes Marie-Josée D o m e s t i c i - M e t is p r o f e s s o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law at t h e Faculty of Law a n d Political S c i e n c e of t h e University of Aix-Marseille III, d i r e c t o r of t h e D i p l ô m e d ' E t u d e s S u p é r i e u r e s et Scientifiques (DESS) " I n t e r n a t i o n a l H u m a n i t a r i a n A i d E m e r g e n c i e s a n d R e h a b i l i t a t i o n , " a n d d i r e c t o r of t h e d i p l o m a of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (field s t u d i e s ) . 1. M a r i e - J o s é e D o m e s t i c i - M e t , " A g a i n s t t h e U s e o f H u n g e r as a W e a p o n — L e g a l I n s t r u m e n t s , " Geopolitics of Hunger 1998-1999 (Paris: PUF, 1998), p p . 1 3 7 - 1 5 4 . 2. T h e i d e a t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s w e r e a l u x u r y t h a t c o u l d b e d e m a n d e d o n l y of t h e d e v e l o p e d states is n o l o n g e r d e f e n d e d officially, e v e n a m o n g t h e least d e v e l o p e d states. T h e L i m b u r g p r i n c i p l e s a d o p t e d by a g r o u p of e x p e r t s a t M a a s t r i c h t in 1986 i n t e r p r e t article 2 to m e a n t h a t all states t h a t a r e parties, w h a t e v e r t h e i r level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , h a v e a n o b l i g a t i o n t o e n s u r e t h a t every o n e e n j o y s t h e r i g h t t o a m i n i m u m level of s u b s i s t e n c e . 3. T h e r e h a v e b e e n specific d e c l a r a t i o n s o n t h e h a n d i c a p p e d ( 1 9 7 5 ) , t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of all f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t w o m e n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , a n d t h e r i g h t to d e v e l o p m e n t . Also a d d r e s s i n g this issue h a v e b e e n t h e final acts of t h e C o n f e r e n c e of V i e n n a o n H u m a n R i g h t s ( 1 9 9 3 ) , t h e C o n f e r e n c e of

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Distribution

C o p e n h a g e n on Social Development and the C o n f e r e n c e of Beijing on Women (1995), and finally the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1985) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 on the employment of indigenous peoples. 4. Nearly one thousand organizations from eighty countries participated in the meeting. Among the most active, mention should be made of the Jacques Maritain Institute, the South African Rights Commission, and the International Council ofjewish Women. 5. Food First Information and Action Network, the World Alliance for Nutrition and Human Rights, and the Global Forum on Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security were involved. These organizations sometimes assist the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and submit communications on violations of the "right to adequate food." 6. Cf. "Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Information Bulletin No. 16, distributed during the United Nations World Public Information Campaign on Human Rights, p. 9. 7. The reference to the "obligation of results" is in Item 5 on the agenda of the commission on Human Rights, 15 January 1998 (Doc. E/CN.4/ 1998/21, p. 4, §15). T h e formula has been criticized even though this formulation also appears in the French version of documents of the same type (cf. "Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Information Bulletin No. 16, distributed during the United Nations World Public Information Campaign on Human Rights, p. 9). It must be noted that this is not the obligation of result that is established in French law, that is to say, the obligation to obtain a certain result from a given activity in time and in space. Here, it is rather a "finality," as stated in the above-mentioned Information Bulletin No. 16, which draws a distinction between obligations "of conduct" (action or inaction) and obligations "of result" (finality). In the French law of obligations, the finality does not serve to categorize obligations, but rather causes them. Consequently, under this law, obligations of result would be classified under obligations of conduct and would form a particularly demanding category: obligations whose discharge must absolutely result in a specified outcome. 8. States have an obligation to respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law in all circumstances. 9. Material assistance is that in the form of delivery of foodstuffs. Diplomacy can consist of submissions to the Security Council and submissions to the various oversight bodies: Commission on Human Rights; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and (why not) the Committee Against Torture, since the infliction of a state of hunger may be considered to be ill treatment. Media intervention can take the form of public campaigns to denounce violations, which may have a powerful effect. Public opinion in Western states, alerted by the press, "decided" in the case of Biafra that, while a government may lawfully put down an attempt at secession, it cannot do so by using famine as a weapon. Under that pressure, the federal government of Nigeria lifted the embargo against deliveries of food. 10. In o t h e r words, it strengthens the b e l i e f that the p r e c e d e n t o f Kosovo is indeed the application of international law, or—to use a formulation that is less typical in legal parlance—a sort of acquiescence to its lawfulness. 11. Brunei, Sylvie, Une tragédie banalisée, La faim dans le monde (Paris: Hachette Pluriel, 1991).

23 Why Embargoes? Romain Coti and Anne-Laure Wipff

Embargoes are ineffective, supporting instead of weakening the very regimes they target. 1 But it is easy to see how embargoes allow the nations that impose them to maintain the illusion that they are taking action against criminal regimes. Recognized as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l sanction by Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, the embargo is an old technique of reprisal that seems relatively simple to apply. The nation imposing the embargo prohibits imports into its territory from the country whose governm e n t it wishes to sanction and even prohibits exports from its own enterprises to the country in question. The flaw in the plan is evident in the very essence of an embargo: It has a political objective, namely, to influence a government or to instigate the fall of a regime, but uses economic constraints. This fundamental distinction between the end pursued and the means employed undermines the legitimacy of this instrument as an effective tool. It should be n o t e d that n o n e of the United Nations Security C o u n c i l e m b a r g o e s — a g a i n s t Haiti, Iraq, Libya, a n d the f o r m e r Yugoslavia—have achieved their goals. All of the regimes in those c o u n t r i e s have r e m a i n e d in power a n d in some cases have even s t r e n g t h e n e d their grip on civil society. In seeking to u n d e r s t a n d the justification for and results of sanctions, we must first question the embargo's effectiveness as a tool for resolving conflicts and ask what real p u r p o s e it serves for those countries that choose to use it. In order to clarify the issues in this debate, we will examine how the embargo has been used in real situations and demonstrate how 235

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this sanction, which is coming u n d e r increasing criticism, has been searching for new legitimacy in recent years.

Limited Effectiveness The desired effect of an embargo is to force a government to change its policies u n d e r pressure from the population or to destabilize the r e g i m e in power. This ideal a n d d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t of how an embargo should function often turns out to be quite naive because the regimes chosen for destabilization are nearly always strong. Two c o n d i t i o n s are necessary in o r d e r f o r the p o p u l a t i o n to play its expected role: First, the regime has to be responsive to popular opinion and concerned about the fate of the population; second, citizens must have the ability to demonstrate their discontent. Furthermore, the economic environment determines the degree of effectiveness of s a n c t i o n s as a f u n c t i o n of t h r e e p a r a m e t e r s : (1) t h e d e g r e e of dependence on the outside world, (2) the weight of the state—a state that is heavily involved in the country's economy would manage the scarcity of resources more successfully—and (3) the key resources u n d e r government control. But even when all of these internal factors—these conditions and p a r a m e t e r s — a r e present, t h e r e is no g u a r a n t e e that an e m b a r g o would succeed; t h e r e are a d d i t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t n a t i o n s i m p o s i n g the e m b a r g o c a n n o t ignore. D u r i n g the first e m b a r g o against Iraq, Jordan did not agree to join the coalition, and its deliveries greatly diminished the effectiveness of the sanctions. It is clear that, in order for an embargo to be successful, a united political commitment is required. Nor must we forget the economic impact of the embargo on the nations imposing it. In order to preserve the political coalition and discourage contraband activities, this economic impact should not be too severe. The high volume of illegal exports from the Dominican Republic to Haiti d u r i n g the 1991-1994 e m b a r g o against Haiti is hardly surprising when one considers the degree to which these two economies are interdependent. Moreover, the embargo on Iraqi oil would have been impossible to enforce if world supplies had not been plentiful. In 1990, Saudi Arabia, u n d e r financial pressure from foreign debt, was producing oil at maximum capacity. Such an embargo would have been unimaginable in 1980. Favorable economic conditions are therefore a requirement if an embargo is to be strategically effective.

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Ineffectiveness and Negative Effects An embargo can have many unwanted side effects that cannot be easily dismissed as "collateral damage," since they fundamentally undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions. The political pressure that results from the economic hardship in the target country depends on two factors that are difficult to control: public opinion and the duration of the embargo. Hopes of a p o p u l a r revolt are often thwarted by the turn of events. In a disrupted economy dominated by criminals and the black market, civil society is also destabilized. Under these conditions, the regime frequently regains some degree of legitimacy. As the only stable authority in an otherwise chaotic situation, the regime may pose as the protector of the national identity through effective propaganda that blames the embargo for all the evils suffered by the people and cultivates the psychosis of the nation as victim. Moreover, the link between the population's discontent and its influence on the government is more tenuous in countries in which the government pursues a political objective that is unrelated to the satisfaction of the broad interests of the public. In truth, an embargo against a democracy would surely be more effective than one against an authoritarian regime. But why should anyone need to decree an embargo against a democracy? Embargoes, moreover, often cause human suffering on a disastrous scale, exacerbating the impoverishment of the most destitute. The case of Iraq is a good example of these tragic effects: a rising infant mortality rate, a prosperous black market, and official denunciations of the embargo as responsible for the country's problems. An embargo must be long term in order to bring about any political change. This creates further problems in terms of the cohesiveness of the nations imposing the sanctions and gives the embargoed country the time to organize its defenses. South Africa, for example, which was under an arms embargo, developed its own arms industry. Moreover, by confiscating humanitarian aid, the regime is able not only to organize corruption and thereby to attract more support but also to regulate supplies to the population. Doing so allows it to favor its supporters and punish its opponents, who have difficulty in organizing themselves for resistance, since their chief concern is to secure the means for their daily subsistence (this is the case of the Kurds today). Alarmist humanitarian assessments could also fuel propaganda and encourage feelings of guilt among the citizens of the sanctioning

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countries. T h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of the e m b a r g o t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e s m o r e difficult, since the countries imposing it are usually d e m o c r a c i e s that are a c c o u n t a b l e to their citizens f o r their actions. Ironically, a n e m b a r g o c a n c o m p l e t e l y r e v e r s e t h e s i t u a t i o n . A l t h o u g h originally it may have sent a clear message, i n f o r m i n g the nation u n d e r sanctions that the e m b a r g o would n o t be lifted until it c h a n g e d its policy, the e m b a r g o can b e c o m e a diplomatic b a r g a i n i n g chip in place of the c h a n g e in policy that is e x p e c t e d . Its lifting may be the p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the r e s u m p t i o n of negotiations. T h e Serbs, f o r e x a m p l e , d e m a n d e d a halt to the N o r t h Atlantic Treaty Organization strikes in April 1999 as a c o n d i t i o n f o r the r e s u m p t i o n of dialogue. Despite the many factors that can cause an e m b a r g o to fail, n o t all e m b a r g o e s are c o m p l e t e failures. T h e e m b a r g o e s against Rhodesia in 1965 a n d against South Africa may be c o n s i d e r e d to have b e e n relatively successful. T h e first s o f t e n e d the white authorities, while the s e c o n d was a symbol of the international c o m m u n i t y ' s s u p p o r t f o r the black liberation m o v e m e n t .

A Legitimacy Called into Question In light of the scant political results of r e c e n t e m b a r g o e s a n d their n u m e r o u s d a m a g i n g effects, we s h o u l d ask why Western c o u n t r i e s have n o t given u p the practice. T h e question is particularly apt since an e m b a r g o is totally u n s u i t e d to cases of i m m i n e n t danger, such as I r a q a n d S e r b i a , b e c a u s e it is e f f e c t i v e o n l y in t h e l o n g t e r m . E m b a r g o e s may also be used in s u p p o r t of military action, as in the case of t h e oil e m b a r g o against Serbia. But this m e a s u r e can have only l i m i t e d i m p a c t if Russia c o n t i n u e s to supply B e l g r a d e ; only a b l o c k a d e , which c o n s t i t u t e s military a c t i o n , w o u l d t h e n m a k e any sense. Moreover, an oil e m b a r g o would deprive M o n t e n e g r o of its oil r e s o u r c e s a n d f u r t h e r weaken its g o v e r n m e n t , which is d o i n g all it can to r e m a i n o u t of the conflict. If the e m b a r g o e s are n o t really used to force certain g o v e r n m e n t s to c h a n g e their policies, as we were initially led to believe, t h e n what is the p o i n t of imposing them? It is because the e m b a r g o also functions as a symbolic c o n d e m n a t i o n , an i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomatic message. This can be seen f r o m the r e c e n t U.S. practice that, to say the least, has b e e n a m b i g u o u s . T h e U n i t e d States uses the e m b a r g o to d e m o n s t r a t e its power in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . Its use also permits the U n i t e d States to test the loyalty of its E u r o p e a n allies, which have repeatedly violated a g r e e m e n t s by selling wheat to the USSR or sup-

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plying a r m s to Bosnia. A c e r t a i n a n t a g o n i s m led to an o p e n crisis between the E u r o p e a n U n i o n a n d the U n i t e d States w h e n the latter e n a c t e d t h e H e l m s - B u r t o n bill in 1996, p r o v i d i n g f o r p e n a l t i e s f o r c o m p a n i e s in any c o u n t r y that h a d business relations with Cuba. This e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y of s a n c t i o n s , a b l a t a n t display of power, was n o t acceptable to E u r o p e a n s . President Clinton was inclined to f o r g o the application of this law, b u t domestic political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r c e d h i m to take a s t r o n g e r stance t h a n h e would have p r e f e r r e d . D o u b t a b o u t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e e m b a r g o a r i s e s l a r g e l y because it is used f o r domestic political ends, i n c l u d i n g at times to gain an advantage at election time. It is a signal a i m e d at domestic p u b l i c o p i n i o n . In t h e 1980s, t h e p u b l i c in t h e U n i t e d States was i m p r e s s e d by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e f f o r t s to p r o m o t e d e m o c r a c y — t h a t is, t h e e m b a r g o against S o u t h A f r i c a — a n d in t h e 1990s it felt p r o t e c t e d by the vigorous a t t e m p t to c o m b a t t e r r o r i s m — t h e e m b a r g o against Libya. T h e s e d o m e s t i c policy m e s s a g e s o f f e r c i t i z e n s t h e i l l u s i o n of action a n d effectiveness. T h e e m b a r g o t h e r e f o r e poses a real ethical p r o b l e m f o r democracies: Can domestic policy considerations justify using an o f t e n inefficient w e a p o n , with d a m a g i n g effects as serious as t h e political s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the target r e g i m e a n d as p a i n f u l as the s u f f e r i n g of the p o p u l a t i o n s of the countries u n d e r e m b a r g o ?

Seeking a C l e a r Conscience In o r d e r to c o u n t e r this criticism, d e m o c r a c i e s have tried in r e c e n t years to take into consideration the h u m a n i t a r i a n p r o b l e m s that are a c o n s e q u e n c e of e m b a r g o e s by i n t r o d u c i n g the n o t i o n of the "selective e m b a r g o . " T h e principle is simple: T h e e m b a r g o prohibits trading in t h e goods necessary f o r the repressive a p p a r a t u s of the embarg o e d state while allowing t r a d e in t h e s u p p l i e s t h a t are absolutely essential f o r the p o p u l a t i o n ' s survival (food, m e d i c i n e , clothing) or h u m a n i t a r i a n items ( m i n i m u m energy supplies, hospital e q u i p m e n t , a n d vehicles such as a m b u l a n c e s ) . This new c o n c e p t was tested during the e m b a r g o against Iraq in 1990. T h e idea seems simple, b u t its application is m o r e difficult. T h e s a n c t i o n s c o m m i t t e e s c r e a t e d to review a p p l i c a t i o n s to e x p o r t to countries u n d e r sanctions are o v e r w h e l m e d with work. They also regularly face ethical d i l e m m a s that are difficult to resolve. D u r i n g a coll o q u i u m organized by Action Against H u n g e r o n 15 O c t o b e r 1996, at the S o r b o n n e , Mario Bettati described the case involving a s h i p m e n t of anesthetic p r o d u c t s to Iraq f o r cesarean operations. Such an item

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s h o u l d n o t , in p r i n c i p l e , have p o s e d t h e slightest p r o b l e m , b u t t h e q u a n t i t y was f a r g r e a t e r t h a n t h e c o u n t r y ' s n e e d s a n d t h e active ingred i e n t c o u l d also have b e e n u s e d f o r m a k i n g c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s . However, sanctions c o m m i t t e e s have now gained m o r e experie n c e in t h e i r w o r k , a n d t h e y u n d e n i a b l y h e l p to m a k e e m b a r g o e s m o r e h u m a n e a n d t o l e r a b l e . T h e r e a l p r o b l e m lies e l s e w h e r e . By diminishing the population's suffering, the embargo jeopardizes the a t t a i n m e n t of its political objective. By k e e p i n g civilians alive, it d o e s n o t p u s h t h e m to t h e limit, w h i c h m i g h t lead to a p o p u l a r u p r i s i n g . Even m o r e serious, in g r a n t i n g t h e r e g i m e in t h e e m b a r g o e d c o u n t r y a m o n o p o l y over t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of basic f o o d items, t h e e m b a r g o gives t h e r e g i m e t h e m o s t reliable m e a n s of g a i n i n g t h e s u p p o r t of c e r t a i n g r o u p s a n d of r e p r e s s i n g its o p p o n e n t s , w h o w o u l d s p e n d t h e i r e n e r g i e s in trying to survive a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t have t h e t i m e to o r g a n i z e t h e m s e l v e s f o r effective political o p p o s i t i o n . T h e political use of f o o d supply is well d o c u m e n t e d : It has p r o v e n its f e a r f u l p o w e r in t h e U k r a i n e ( 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 3 ) a n d in N o r t h K o r e a today. If t h e r e f o r e e m b a r g o e s a r e only rarely effective, h o w can d e m o c racies justify t h e i r use? O t h e r t h a n t h e wish to show t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t s o m e t h i n g is b e i n g d o n e — w i t h o u t t a k i n g t o o m a n y risks—this s a n c t i o n s h o u l d p e r h a p s b e s e e n as o n e m o r e s t e p o n t h e l a d d e r of dissuasion. D e m o c r a c i e s m u s t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t they will n o t stay idle w h e n f a c e d w i t h t h e p r o v o c a t i o n s of c e r t a i n r e g i m e s . E m b a r g o e s o f f e r t h e least costly m e a n s of t a k i n g a c t i o n .

Notes Romain Coti and Anne-Laure Wipff are students at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris in the seminar "The Geopolitics of Hunger," organized by Sylvie Brunei. 1. This text is the result of research conducted by students at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris for the seminar "The Geopolitics of Hunger," organized by Sylvie Brunei.

24 The Birth of Responsible Humanitarianism Sylvie Brunei

Humanitarianism triumphed in the late 1980s. Growing international cooperation and the collapse of the Berlin Wall s e e m e d to herald a g l o r i o u s f u t u r e for h u m a n k i n d , h e n c e f o r t h p e a c e f u l a n d interdep e n d e n t and thus necessarily on the path of further progress. Ten years later, d i s e n c h a n t m e n t h a d set in: H u m a n i t a r i a n i s m would be exploited, used as a tool, and b e c o m e more harmful than useful for some—generally speaking, those who also question even the notion of development. T h e turning point between these two eras can be dated precisely: The U.S. intervention in Somalia, in December 1992, which ended a few months later in a rout, in violence and chaos—from which that country still has not e m e r g e d — s e e m e d to sound the death knell for humanitarian hopes. No, the world is not benefiting from the peace dividend. No, intervention is not putting an end to the tragedies of certain peoples. The so-called global village, far from leveling differences, is in reality widening the g a p that separates n o n c o n s u m e r s from consumers. Today, to cultivate hopelessness, even hatred, for humanitarianism seems to have b e c o m e fashionable a m o n g those who had been its advocates (see several publications written by Rony Brauman, form e r p r e s i d e n t of M e d e c i n s sans F r o n t i è r e s ) . T h e g e n e r a t i o n that gave birth to the notion of a b o r d e r l e s s world, that was the most enthusiastic backer of humanitarianism, even when its methods and choices were still u n d e f i n e d and naive, now turns its back on it and criticizes it at precisely the m o m e n t when it is beginning to play an essential role in international relations. Indeed, j u s t when it might 241

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b e said t h a t h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m is e n t e r i n g i n t o r e s p o n s i b l e a d u l t hood. Never, in fact, has h u m a n i t a r i a n action h a d so many reasons to exist. Never has it h a d such an i m p o r t a n t role to play. This is a time w h e n states are in crisis. F r e n c h writer Jean-François Bayart points to t h e e x t e n t to which they are o v e r p o w e r e d f r o m above, by financial transnationals a n d multinationals; frontally assaulted by i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s with t h e i r d i s a s t r o u s t h e o r i e s of s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t ; a n d a t t a c k e d f r o m w i t h i n by t h e rise of r e g i o n a l i s m , d e m a n d s f o r recognition of distinctive identities, a n d criminalization of the economy. This is also a time w h e n the U n i t e d Nations is b e i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y r e j e c t e d as i n c a p a b l e of e v e n p l a y i n g its r o l e as t h e "interstitial power," to use t h e p h r a s e c o i n e d by G h a s s a n S a l a m e , w h e n the real powers, the U n i t e d States first, b u t also China, d e c i d e the contrary. T h e question, t h e n , is how to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the weight of global c o r p o r a t i o n s , t h e drive f o r p r o f i t , a n d t h e decisions m a d e f o r t h e s h o r t - t e r m financial gain of a h a n d f u l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l speculators. How d o we c o u n t e r the a p p e t i t e of dictators f o r power, dictators w h o know that they face only d e m o c r a c i e s w e a k e n e d by uncertainty a n d indecision? O n l y c i t i z e n s ' m o v e m e n t s , in b o t h t h e N o r t h a n d S o u t h , can erect effective c o u n t e r b a l a n c e s because they are sufficiently i n f o r m e d a n d mobilized to s t r e n g t h e n t h e capacity of t h e political system to resist the power of the lobbies. S o m e r e c e n t e x a m p l e s reveal t h e e x t e n t to which t h e power of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations (NGOs) has grown. Take, f o r example, the failure of the Multilateral A g r e e m e n t o n Investment (MAI) ; the success, r e w a r d e d by a Nobel Peace Prize, of the c a m p a i g n against a n t i p e r s o n n e l l a n d m i n e s ; t h e p r e c a u t i o n s t a k e n by t h e E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t to g u a r d against the i n t r o d u c t i o n of genetically m o d i f i e d o r g a n i s m s i n t o t h e E u r o p e a n m a r k e t ; t h e i n d i c t m e n t of S l o b o d a n Milosevic by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i m i n a l T r i b u n a l f o r t h e f o r m e r Yugoslavia o n the basis, notably, of testimony g a t h e r e d by N G O s f r o m r e f u g e e s f r o m Kosovo (for m o r e o n this subject, see C h a p t e r 21); a n d t h e cancellation of a significant p o r t i o n of the d e b t of the p o o r e s t countries by the G r o u p of 8 in C o l o g n e in J u n e 1999 after worldwide mobilization by NGOs. T h e recognition of e c o n o m i c , social, or e n v i r o n m e n t a l rights or the a d o p t i o n of ethical principles in i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations c o n c e r n ing child labor, f o r e x a m p l e , are thus also to b e credited to the untiring efforts of citizen groups.

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It is because the h u m a n i t a r i a n m o v e m e n t has applied to itself the same m o r a l rigor a n d firmness that it h a d used to d e n o u n c e the ills of the world that it today finds itself in the h o t seat. N o n p r o f i t g r o u p s were t h e first to d e n o u n c e the m a n i p u l a t i o n of which they were victims a n d t h e m o d e s t results that they achieved in m o r e difficult situations. As a result, they have b e e n vilified by those who were waiting f o r an o p p o r t u n i t y to discredit t h e m because the militant activism of n o n p r o f i t g r o u p s thwarted their desire f o r c o n q u e s t or power. Even worse, they have b e e n vilified by certain militants themselves, o f t e n the m o s t idealistic or t h e most radical a m o n g t h e m . T h e s e p e o p l e , having e x p e c t e d too m u c h f r o m h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m , could n o t stand to see their d r e a m s d i s a p p o i n t e d a n d thus violently rejected what they h a d o n c e revered. Yet, it is precisely t h e m o v e m e n t ' s capacity f o r self-criticism a n d its desire f o r t r a n s p a r e n c y that has p u s h e d the h u m a n i t a r i a n movem e n t to publicly air the p r o b l e m s it has e n c o u n t e r e d in o r d e r to b e b e t t e r able to o v e r c o m e t h e m . N G O s have s e e n t h e n e e d f o r i n c r e a s e d efficiency a n d m o n i t o r i n g t h r o u g h a m o r e p r o f e s s i o n a l a p p r o a c h to their activities a n d also the n e e d f o r s t a n d a r d s a n d codes to e n a b l e t h e m to h a r m o n i z e t h e i r m e t h o d s a n d objectives. It is in this area that most of t h e m are focused at this very m o m e n t , precisely to b e able to avoid pitfalls in t h e f u t u r e a n d to b e t t e r target t h e i r interventions. Why d o we seem to b e discovering today s o m e t h i n g that in reality has always existed? T h e n o t i o n of a world without b o r d e r s a p p e a r e d , in fact, at the same time as it b e g a n to b e m a n i p u l a t e d . In Biafra, in t h e early 1970s, G e n e r a l O d u m e g w u O j u k w u deliberately k e p t t h e Ibo p e o p l e in a state of f a m i n e in o r d e r to rally public o p i n i o n to his i n d e p e n d e n c e cause. T h a t was w h e n D o c t o r s W i t h o u t B o r d e r s was born. Today, h o w can we d e l i b e r a t e l y f o r g o h e l p i n g a starving child w h e n we possess the miraculous ability to p r e v e n t his certain d e a t h by i n t e r v e n i n g in time? How can we t u r n o u r backs o n p o p u l a t i o n s t h a t are victims of deliberate oppression a n d u n b e a r a b l e suffering, which are in n o way attributable to fate, o n the p r e t e x t that we risk b e i n g manipulated? It is f o r us, NGOs, to m o u n t o u r best d e f e n s e s so as n o t to fall into the sordid a n d cynical trap of those w h o cause starvation. T h a t is precisely what we are now seeking to do, all of us together, which is why we are the object of such virulent criticism. T h e o n l y t h i n g t h a t is d e a d , n o w t h a t h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m h a s e n t e r e d into a stage of responsible maturity, is the y o u t h f u l illusions:

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•

That it was sufficient to disembark somewhere with the halo of the aid worker's goodwill in order to be welcomed as a benefactor of humanity and also to be useful. • T h a t citizens could by themselves m a k e the world better, bypassing states and politicians, all "thoroughly rotten." On the contrary, it is through the strength of citizen commitment and the translation of that commitment into political action that the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l m o v e m e n t can achieve lasting reforms. • That "Western civilization" had a model of universal progress to offer the rest of the world, transforming itself into an eager propagandist for techniques that it claimed would improve the quality of life sufficiently to spread development. To be sure, the h o p e of t r a n s f o r m i n g the world solely by the strength of its good will, by its generosity and its "kindness," died on the beaches of Mogadishu one day in December 1992. And so much the better: It is ultimately preferable for there to be a return to realism, when the only humanitarianism that can survive is the kind that fulfils its role from within the "global society," without allowing the notion of good and evil to be used as justification for ineffectiveness.

Notes Sylvie B r u n e i is strategy adviser, Action Against H u n g e r .

PART T H R E E FOOD POLICIES TO ERADICATE HUNGER Humanitarian assistance alone cannot pretend to save 800 million people worldwide from malnutrition. However, the role of such assistance also encompasses proposing analysis and solutions to allow for poverty eradication and advocating for efficient food policies. These things should be done not only for North-South cooperation, but also for countries affected by this silent hunger that primarily threatens the most vulnerable segments of the population. In this regard, food aid, the apparently obvious remedy against hunger, is far from being the best solution enabling people to feed themselves.

25 Feeding Ten Billion People? Sylvie Brunei

The six-billionth h u m a n being was born in J u n e 1999, demographers say. They are most probably right: Since the beginning of the 1970s, their predictions have been surprisingly correct. T h e d e m o g r a p h i c curve has followed the path p r e d i c t e d . We were three billion in the 1960s. At the time, the population increase seemed terrifying, since every year the world population increased by 2 percent, or fifty-eight million people—the current population of France. For nearly twenty years, the world has panicked in the face of what some have not hesitated to call "proliferation." Cassandras on all sides spoke with one voice to d e m a n d vigorous birth control measures, which, however, seemed futile in most countries. Kenya became a case in point. In 1967 it became the first country in Africa to adopt a genuine family planning policy, but ten years later, it still held the African record for fertility—an average of nearly eight children for every woman. After having decided that a rapidly increasing population was an asset for their country, many governments, frightened by the endless race between rising birthrates and declining food production and investment in the health and education sectors for which they lacked the resources, decreed and sometimes enforced a pause. In the mid1970s, India l a u n c h e d a vast p r o g r a m for limiting births with the implementation of draconian measures, such as the forced sterilization of women, and in 1979 China adopted the so-called one-child policy. But c e r t a i n s o c i e t i e s s e e m e d r e s i s t a n t : D e m o g r a p h e r s described black Africa and the Near and Middle East as "irreducible." A generation later, the diagnosis must be revised: The most pes247

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simistic predictions have proven themselves to be wrong. We did not know it, but the 2 percent annual growth of the 1960s represented a peak: The present increase in world population is steadily declining year after year. The drop is noticeable: It was +1.5 percent in 1995, +1.4 percent in 1998. It is true that during this interval world population has doubled: from 3 billion to 6 billion, which explains why 1.4 percent still translates into an additional 87 million h u m a n beings each year, much more than in 1960. And the world has more young people than ever: more than a billion fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds. What is r e f e r r e d to as d e m o g r a p h i c m o m e n t u m , that is, the high birthrate associated with this large proportion of young women of r e p r o d u c t i v e age, t h e r e f o r e m e a n s t h a t p o p u l a t i o n growth will remain high, even if on average each of these women has no more than three children in the course of her life, or half the number her mother brought into the world. Of the six billion human beings on the planet, nearly five billion live in the so-called developing countries. The latter account for 90 percent of the current population increase because women in these countries still bear on average 3.5 children (compared with 1.6 in the so-called developed countries). But considerable differences separate South America and Asia, on the one hand, and Africa, on the other. In the first two continents population growth has fallen to 2.6 children per woman (although if China is subtracted from Asia, this figure climbs to 3.5); in Africa, the fertility rate is still 5.3 children per woman. And that is an essential factor: If the peak of population growth is behind us in Latin America (where it was attained in 19651970) and in Asia (where it was attained in 1970-1975), it is also behind us in Africa as well: On that continent too, a significant drop is today being noted in the n u m b e r of children per household, particularly in urban areas, where a third of Africans now live. Projections of population growth have t h e r e f o r e been revised downward: Most demographers now agree that world population will climb to 8 billion people by 2025. After that, opinions differ, depending on whether one adopts a "low" (9 billion people by 2050) or intermediate hypothesis (10 billion people, also by 2050). Nonetheless, experts all agree on one thing: World population will stabilize at around 10 or even 11 billion people by the year 2100, but not more. The current world population of 6 billion will therefore never double. After that, the key question is whether the earth will be able to feed these 10 or even 11 billion h u m a n beings at the e n d of the twenty-first century. This question leads very naturally to questions about two essential factors:

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On the one hand, does the earth have the "technical" capacity to f e e d these 11 billion people? W h a t is the p o t e n t i a l f o r increasing the current agricultural production? In a word, can the world feed the world? • On the other hand, will humanity have the desire, the political will, to feed its own, all of its own? Or will the world want to feed the world? This second question is just as legitimate as the first. Is there not a risk that there will be increasing numbers of people who will not eat when hungry, because they will no longer have access to food that has become scarce and, thus, more contested? This concern is not new: Crises of subsistence, which have resulted in deadly famines, have punctuated the history of humanity. In 1798, Malthus wrote in his "Essay on the Principle of Population" that all populations tend naturally toward a m a x i m u m , which is determ i n e d by the level at which it can subsist. According to him, the excess can be regulated only by the mortality rate. This idea that there must necessarily be "regulators" of population growth continues to be implicitly acknowledged. In the nineteenth century, conf r o n t e d by r e c u r r e n t famines in India, the colonial administration concluded that it was extremely difficult, even futile, to attempt to save an entire section of the population that was composed of the most wretched individuals or those whose status placed them at the very bottom of the social ladder: These "starving sections" were in any case c o n d e m n e d to disappear. They, however, represented 20 percent of the Indian population at the time, or one out of five. O n e cannot help but notice that that is precisely the proportion of malnourished people in today's Third World. The question may well be asked of whether there are still "starving sections" today. These would be the poorest of the poor, social misfits, those marginalized in the wave of liberalism and globalization sweeping the five continents (and particularly black Africa), a kind of surplus population, an excess that some a little too readily resign themselves to letting die of hunger. Saving them, some might feel, would place too heavy a burden on ecosystems rendered increasingly fragile as a result of demographic pressure and on non-renewable resources that are increasingly in demand. Each h u m a n being could easily eat his or her fill if the world food production were equally distributed (enough food is available today to provide 2,700 calories per person per day). Why then does the world seem so resigned to the fact that some 800 million people in the developing countries are malnourished? During its World Summit

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h e l d in R o m e in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 6 , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i z a t i o n p r o c l a i m e d that its goal was to cut in half the n u m b e r o f m a l n o u r i s h e d p e o p l e over the c o u r s e o f the n e x t thirty years. While this g o a l is l a u d a b l e a n d will r e q u i r e e n o r m o u s e f f o r t s to i n c r e a s e agricultural p r o d u c t i o n a n d e n s u r e better distribution o f f o o d s u p p l i e s , is it n o t at the s a m e time a n implicit a d m i s s i o n that t h e r e will still b e 4 0 0 million p e o p l e — a massive "starving s e c t i o n " — f o r w h o m n o t h i n g material will b e d o n e ? C h a p t e r 26 will t h e r e f o r e a d d r e s s two f u n d a m e n t a l issues: 1. P r o d u c t i o n a n d distributive capacities in the c o n t e x t o f globalization, with special e m p h a s i s o n s u b - S a h a r a n Africa. 2. F o o d j u s t i c e a n d its various c o m p o n e n t s : how to g u a r a n t e e the right o f e a c h h u m a n b e i n g to a d e q u a t e a n d sufficient f o o d , a r i g h t e x p l i c i t l y e n s h r i n e d in t h e U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f H u m a n Rights, which was fifty years o l d in D e c e m b e r 1998. Article 3 o f the d e c l a r a t i o n s t i p u l a t e s clearly that " e v e r y o n e has the right to life, liberty a n d security o f p e r s o n . "

Notes Sylvie Brunei is strategy adviser, Action Against Hunger.

26 Increasing Productive Capacity: A Global Imperative Sylvie Brunei

Can the earth feed its inhabitants? Despite the most alarmist predictions—those of Lester Brown in his State of the World published each year by the World Watch Institute of W a s h i n g t o n ; those of Paul E h r l i c h , a u t h o r of The Population Bomb; or those of the Club of Rome—there is no doubt that world food production, if equally distributed a m o n g all the world's peoples, is enough to meet the needs of them all. It is true that the increase in world agricultural production has slowed in recent years, a situation that has led to an immediate flood of alarmist predictions. The world, however, is not heading toward famine. And this is for a n u m b e r of reasons.

T h e Increase in W o r l d Agricultural Production Continues to O u t p a c e Population Growth Only persons who are ill informed or of bad faith can argue that the trend is toward a decline in food production. They may even succeed in proving that claim. It is enough for them to select as the base year one in which harvests were particularly good and a second year in which they declined steeply in order to show a "disturbing" trend. Hervé Kempf demonstrated, for example, how a comparison of 1984 and 1991 would show an increase in cereal production of only 0.7 percent per year, which would be "disturbing," since it is far below the 1.7% annual rate of population increase. 1 By selecting the preceding years, one can show, on the contrary, that world agriculture has never been more productive: A comparison between 1983 and 1990 shows 251

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an increase in cereal p r o d u c t i o n of 2.7 p e r c e n t p e r year. T h e s e two statistics are clearly equally deceptive, a n d J o s e p h K l a t z m a n n , in a r e f r e s h i n g little book, repeatedly w a r n e d against the d a n g e r of blindly trusting statistical data taken o u t of context. 2 If we e x a m i n e world agricultural p r o d u c t i o n over a l o n g p e r i o d , it b e c o m e s clear t h a t the p r o d u c t i o n curve exceeds t h e p o p u l a t i o n growth curve. While world p o p u l a t i o n did i n d e e d d o u b l e in o n e gene r a t i o n , grain p r o d u c t i o n increased m o r e t h a n t h r e e f o l d , f r o m 600 million to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,900 million tons p e r year. E a c h h u m a n b e i n g has available in theory 20 p e r c e n t m o r e f o o d t h a n in the early 1970s, or 2,700 calories p e r p e r s o n p e r day, which is far m o r e t h a n a person's estimated n e e d of between 2,000 a n d 2,200 calories, d e p e n d i n g o n the sources. However, half of t h e c u r r e n t grain p r o d u c t i o n does n o t directly b e n e f i t p e o p l e : Approximately 20 p e r c e n t is used to f e e d cattle, 5 p e r c e n t is kept f o r seeds, a n d the r e m a i n i n g 25 p e r c e n t is q u i t e simply lost as a r e s u l t of p o o r s t o r a g e o r d e s t r u c t i o n by r o d e n t s , insects, a n d so on, especially in d e v e l o p i n g countries. It is t h e r e f o r e n o t the impossibility of increasing agricultural p r o d u c t i o n that t h r e a t e n s m a n k i n d , b u t r a t h e r the way in which this increase is achieved a n d f o r the b e n e f i t of w h o m . I n d e e d , it is in fact n o t in t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e so-called T h i r d World b u t r a t h e r in the developed countries that agricultural p r o d u c t i o n has slowed, in o t h e r w o r d s precisely w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m s of h u n g e r have b e e n overcome. (At least they have b e e n o v e r c o m e in quantitative terms; in qualitative terms, obesity, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d m a l n u t r i t i o n caused by the e c o n o m i c a n d social marginalization of certain categories of persons, o n the other, have b e c o m e real societal problems.) T h e developed countries have chosen to voluntarily limit t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n in o r d e r to a d a p t it to t h e level of d e m a n d at which p r o d u c t i o n would b e profitable, in o t h e r words, to the c o n s u m e r market. T h e fact that t h e r e are s o m e 800 million people suffering f r o m m a l n u t r i t i o n in the world in n o way changes this calculation, since those persons are too p o o r to buy f o o d . T h e r e d u c t i o n or slowdown in the rate of increase in world f o o d p r o d u c t i o n is thus attributable mainly to the developed countries, f o r reasons that have n o t h i n g to d o with ecological limitations. Pierre Le Roy estimates at 20 million tons the r e d u c t i o n in supply that results f r o m E u r o p e ' s policy of limitation of p r o d u c t i o n (land left fallow), a n a m o u n t t h a t r e p r e s e n t s twice t h e total of all f o o d i m p o r t s by subSaharan Africa. 3 F o o d i m p o r t s by t h e T h i r d World are i n d e e d increasing, rising f r o m 20 million tons in 1960, or 2 p e r c e n t of c o n s u m p t i o n , to 120 m i l l i o n t o n s in t h e m i d 1990s, o r 20 p e r c e n t of c o n s u m p t i o n . E c o n o m i c forecasts suggest that this d e p e n d e n c y is likely to increase

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even f u r t h e r in t h e d e c a d e s a h e a d a n d to rise to 160 million tons within two decades. T h e reasons f o r this growing d e p e n d e n c e , which will c r e a t e p r o b l e m s w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t f o r t h e e c o n o m i e s of p o o r c o u n t r i e s t h a t will face increasingly o n e r o u s f o o d i m p o r t bills, are b o t h negative a n d positive. T h e negative factor of c o n t i n u i n g p o p u l a t i o n growth a n d spreading u r b a n i z a t i o n in the countries of the South, w h e r e nearly half the p o p u l a t i o n now lives in cities, explains why m o r e a n d m o r e p e o p l e are c o n s u m i n g f o o d t h a t t h e i r f a r m e r s are i n c a p a b l e of providing. T h e positive factor of the increase in average living s t a n d a r d s in the developing countries a n d the e m e r g e n c e of a m i d d l e class that consumes m o r e m e a t a n d dairy p r o d u c t s places increasing pressure o n the d e m a n d f o r cereals, in particular secondary cereals f o r stock f e e d .

Two-Speed Agricultural Policies Why c a n n o t the T h i r d World f e e d itself, even t h o u g h self-sufficiency in f o o d was the g r a n d slogan of the 1970s a n d 1980s? T h e "technical" impossibility of i n c r e a s i n g agricultural p r o d u c tion in the South is n o t the p r o b l e m : T h e earth is far f r o m r e a c h i n g its m a x i m u m a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l , a n d t h e F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r e Organization (FAO) has p o i n t e d o u t that the useful agricultural surface in d e v e l o p i n g countries (700 million hectares) could b e d o u b l e d w i t h o u t e n c r o a c h i n g o n p r o t e c t e d areas such as forests or areas in which p e o p l e live. Latin America a n d Africa h o l d the greatest potential in this regard. In addition, the potential f o r increased p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h m o r e intensive f a r m i n g m e t h o d s r e m a i n s considerable. Only 11 kilograms of fertilizer are used p e r h e c t a r e in Africa, c o m p a r e d with 66 kilograms in Latin America a n d 139 kilograms in Asia, a n d only 5 p e r c e n t of land is irrigated in Africa (most of this in countries t h a t a r e u n a b l e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of it, s u c h as S u d a n a n d Madagascar), c o m p a r e d to 37 p e r c e n t in Asia a n d 14 p e r c e n t in Latin America. This situation offers t r e m e n d o u s potential f o r growth. But the political a n d e c o n o m i c choices m a d e by the countries of the T h i r d World have thus far b e e n d e t r i m e n t a l to agriculture, a n d in particular to small peasant f a r m i n g . Investments in agriculture have b e e n c o n c e n t r a t e d in regions in which p u r c h a s i n g power is greatest a n d are characterized by a c o n c e r n to p r o t e c t the i n c o m e of farmers, which has b e e n steadily declining. As a result, these investments are m o v i n g in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a t w o - t i e r e d w o r l d t h a t is b e c o m i n g increasingly u n e q u a l in terms of access to f o o d . O n o n e h a n d , the developed countries enjoy rapid growth, a n d despite the fact t h a t f a r m e r s r e p r e s e n t o n average n o m o r e t h a n 3

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p e r c e n t of the active p o p u l a t i o n , their f o o d supply is a b u n d a n t a n d diversified, prices are low, a n d i m p o r t levels are low as a result of the massive s u p p o r t given to the agricultural sector (in t h e mid-1990s, Organization f o r E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (OECD) countries each year spent m o r e t h a n two h u n d r e d billion dollars to s u p p o r t their agricultural sectors). In that part of the world, t h e concern is n o l o n g e r the fear of shortage, b u t r a t h e r the quality of the f o o d c o n s u m e d . T h e a g r o f o o d industry, now p o w e r f u l a f t e r b e i n g f o r c e d to steadily increase its o u t p u t over the past d e c a d e s in o r d e r to k e e p u p with the steadily rising d e m a n d , is today facing a n o t h e r chall e n g e , namely, s h i f t i n g to p r o d u c t i o n m e t h o d s t h a t f o c u s less o n quantity a n d m o r e o n the quality of the inputs used a n d o n the quality of the final p r o d u c t . P r o d u c e r s are also c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the m e t h ods used to satisfy the d e m a n d of consumers, who now want f o o d that is n o t only a b u n d a n t b u t also varied a n d , above all, healthy. T h e successive scandals of mad-cow disease, salmonella p o i s o n i n g in chickens, h o r m o n e - t r e a t e d beef cattle; the rejection by c o n s u m e r g r o u p s of genetically m o d i f i e d plants; animal f e e d t h a t includes m u d f r o m c l e a n i n g stations; a n d the questions raised a b o u t the p r o d u c t i o n of eggs by battery h e n s are indicative of a new era in which insistence o n quality is now a g r e a t e r challenge t h a n the d e m a n d f o r quantity. O n the o t h e r side are the p o o r a n d vulnerable countries, w h e r e m a l n u t r i t i o n is e n d e m i c a n d w h e r e a majority of the p o p u l a t i o n still d e p e n d s o n agriculture. T h e f o o d supply r e m a i n s insufficient, however, because of the p o o r yields that result f r o m the low level of technology used, the absence of incentives to p r o d u c e because of e c o n o m i c policies that discourage agriculture, a n d unfavorable e x c h a n g e rates t h a t m a k e t h e i m p o r t a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l i m p o r t s expensive. It is t h e r e f o r e precisely in those c o u n t r i e s t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n n e e d s to be increased. First, increased p r o d u c t i o n would r e d u c e the cost of f o o d , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e large u r b a n c e n t e r s , a n d t h e r e b y m a k e it accessible to this large sector of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t is too p o o r to eat properly. Second, increased p r o d u c t i o n would r e d u c e t h e f o o d i m p o r t bills of c o u n t r i e s t h a t are increasingly d e p e n d e n t o n imports, mainly f r o m the rich countries.

The Food Supply Is a Regional, Not a Global Problem At the global level, the f o o d supply is increasing for reasons that are b o t h positive a n d negative. O n the positive side, the agricultural sec-

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tor in Eastern E u r o p e , which n e e d e d to b e r e s t r u c t u r e d following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, is now o n the r o a d to recovery. O n the n e g a t i v e side, t h e e c o n o m i c difficulties of East Asia have led to a decline in f o o d i m p o r t s by that region. At t h e r e g i o n a l level, t h e s t r u c t u r a l o v e r p r o d u c t i o n t h a t t h e world has b e e n e x p e r i e n c i n g f o r t h e past twenty years h a r d l y prevents s u b - S a h a r a n Africa a n d S o u t h Asia f r o m e x p e r i e n c i n g h u n g e r . O f t h e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 0 m i l l i o n m a l n o u r i s h e d p e o p l e in t h e world, m o r e t h a n 200 million live in Africa (nearly 40 p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n ) a n d 530 million in S o u t h Asia (or o n e p e r s o n o u t of five). W h a t is t h e r e f o r e responsible f o r this disastrous a n d paradoxical situation at a time w h e n , in o r d e r to r e d u c e the supply of f o o d , rich c o u n t r i e s are d e s t r o y i n g m o u n t a i n s of s u r p l u s f o o d e a c h year a n d f o r c i n g t h e i r f a r m e r s to leave a p o r t i o n of t h e i r l a n d uncultivated, t h r o u g h subsidies f o r land that is left fallow? O n e answer is wars a n d conflicts, particularly in Africa, t h a t disr u p t agricultural p r o d u c t i o n . A second, even m o r e i m p o r t a n t answer is mass poverty, which prevents an entire sector of t h e world's population ( o n e o u t of every five i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e T h i r d W o r l d ) f r o m o b t a i n i n g a d e q u a t e f o o d . T h a t s e c t o r is i n c a p a b l e of p r o d u c i n g e n o u g h f o o d to m e e t its n e e d s a n d lacks t h e m e a n s to p u r c h a s e it, even w h e n the f o o d is available a n d can be b o u g h t . Worldwide, some 1.5 billion p e o p l e live below the poverty level. Mass poverty is all the m o r e serious, as it is always c o m b i n e d with i g n o r a n c e : It is always the p o o r e s t classes t h a t c o m m i t t h e m o s t h a r m f u l e r r o r s of n u t r i t i o n , since they lack the advantage of basic e d u c a t i o n . T h e errors of nutrition c o m m i t t e d by p r e g n a n t w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , who m a k e u p the p r i m a r y g r o u p s at risk of h u n g e r , s h o u l d b e the focus of particular a t t e n t i o n , since t h e s e e r r o r s have disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e f u t u r e of the entire society. A c c o r d i n g to t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h i l d r e n ' s F u n d ( U N I C E F ) , half of the world's m a l n o u r i s h e d c h i l d r e n live in Asia, which has 100 million of the 200 million total, i n c l u d i n g 70 million in India. T h a t c o u n t r y a l o n e has two a n d a half times m o r e m a l n o u r i s h e d children t h a n all of sub-Saharan Africa. W r i t i n g a b o u t S o u t h A s i a i n C h a p t e r 27, G i l b e r t E t i e n n e r e m a r k e d o n t h e e x t e n t to which t h e p r o b l e m of h u n g e r r e m a i n s unresolved because of mass poverty a n d the slowdown in investments in agriculture. This is despite the n o t a b l e progress achieved o n the Asian c o n t i n e n t . T h e case of Africa gives cause f o r even g r e a t e r c o n c e r n :

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1. Unlike the situation in other continents, the rate of malnutrition is not declining. Quite the opposite, in fact, because chronic malnutrition still affects nearly 40 percent of the region's population. 2. T h e high p r o p o r t i o n of young people in the population, a sign of a vigorous population still characterized by high birthrates, has led to a high proportion of unemployed in relation to the number of those who are in a position to contribute to production. The burden on the economies of African countries is therefore particularly heavy, especially since most of these countries suffer from an acute lack of financial resources. 3. The continent's dependency on food from foreign countries is due to the low productivity of its own agriculture and the growing n u m b e r of Africans now living in u r b a n areas (more than one in three compared with one in ten a generation ago). This dependency is effectively addressed neither by imports (9 to 10 million tons per year), because of the lack of a d e q u a t e financial resources, n o r by food aid (approximately 2 million tons), which has been falling drastically for some years now. Consequently, the food needs of Africans are not being satisfied, since the widespread poverty of a sector of the urban population does not permit that sector to obtain food at market prices. At the same time many rural dwellers are unable to provide for themselves during the period between harvests, on account of the low productivity levels and inadequate access to food. 4. A large n u m b e r of people in Africa are affected by war or internal conflict. Even in countries in which the population could, in theory, be properly fed, there is an adverse impact on the food situation of the population because of the insecurity of the economic actors, the weakness of the State, and the destruction or confiscation of crops. In this regard, Africa is by far the continent most affected by conflicts, which also result in massive populations of refugees and displaced persons who depend on international aid for their survival. 5. Poverty and the pressure on land and resources of the high population growth rate are not matched by c o r r e s p o n d i n g investments in agriculture that would bring about increases in yields. Africa is thus the continent in which the problems of deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion are most acute. It is also the continent in which access to drinking water and irrigation is still very limited. T h e situation is n o t d e s p e r a t e , however: Despite the lack of investment in small p e a s a n t f a r m i n g , agricultural p r o d u c t i o n in Africa has risen by 2 percent per year since the early 1960s. Grain production has more than doubled, from 30 million to 66 million tons. This rate of increase is insufficient to meet the needs of a growing

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population (3 percent per year) because of the way in which it has been achieved (mainly by increasing the area of land u n d e r cultivation). Nevertheless it shows that more intensive farming methods are needed in Africa and that this approach has the potential to significantly increase agricultural output. When the FAO states that the "load capacity of the land" in many countries has now been exceeded, it is basing its conclusions on the use of traditional production methods, such as use of the hoe more often than not, lack of fertilizers, lack of irrigation, and use of a diverse range of traditional varieties of grain to compensate for climatic and pedological constraints, with but modest results. The average yield for Africa remains 1,000 kilograms per hectare of millet and corn, which shows how much room f o r i m p r o v e m e n t t h e r e would be if African g o v e r n m e n t s were to decide to treat their farmers a little better and to invest in their agricultural potential. What are some of the ways in which agricultural production can be increased? It is interesting to note that food p r o b l e m s do n o t occur in countries that are at peace, that enjoy democracy, and in which farmers operate u n d e r conditions of relative legal and administrative security, even when these countries are densely populated and located in unfavorable climatic zones. It is better to live in Burkina Faso than in the Democratic Republic of Congo, even though the Congo is infinitely better endowed than Burkina Faso in terms of rainfall and available land. Similarly, the "white revolution" in Mali is revitalizing those regions that produce rice, millet, and cotton and enriching their farmers, even as hunger still plagues Madagascar, the former breadbasket of southern Africa, which has been making error after economic error over the last quarter of a century. In order to bring about peace and security in Africa, a resumption of cooperation is necessary. However, the level of official develo p m e n t assistance has never been lower. Will the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention relaunch the p a r t n e r s h i p between E u r o p e and Africa for the concerted development of agriculture? Jean-Jacques Gabas drew attention in Chapter 33 to the obstacles that have been encountered in the search for food security since the signing of the first agreements in 1975.

Notes Sylvie B r u n e i is strategy adviser, A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r . 1. In La Baleine qui cache la forêt (Paris: La D é c o u v e r t e , 1994). 2. Attention Statistiques! (Paris: La D é c o u v e r t e , 1 9 9 6 ) . See also J o s e p h

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Klatzmann, Nourrir l'humanité, espoirs et inquiétudes (Paris: Inra-Economica, 1991). 3. Agriculture et alimentation mondiales: des raisons d'espérer? (Paris: Crédit Mutuel, 1996).

27 Overcoming Rural Poverty: The Lessons of Asia Gilbert

Etienne

Over the past half century, Asia has redoubled its efforts to overcome poverty, particularly in rural areas, where malnutrition is one of the principal manifestations of poverty. This concern is all the more justified as the continent today, from Pakistan to the Far East, is still heavily rural. With the exception of Japan, South Korea, and the island of Taiwan, the proportion of urban dwellers is between 20 and 35 percent of the total population. Some 50 to 70 percent of active workers are engaged in agriculture, which accounts for 20 to 30 percent of gross domestic product (although in the late 1990s the proportion of active workers engaged in agriculture in China fell below 50 percent). The fight against rural poverty and malnutrition should therefore be placed at the center of any development strategy. In this regard, Asia offers us a series of contrasting lessons, some positive and others negative, depending on the period.

The Golden Age of the Green Revolution In most of Asia, reliance on traditional techniques had run its course by the 1960s. With few exceptions, hardly any undeveloped land still remained, and yields had already reached their limits. At the same time, the increase in the grain deficit and the massive f a m i n e in China (1959-1961) spurred governments to intensify their efforts by turning to new production techniques. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, soon to be supported by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development 259

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(USAID), provided valuable cooperation through high-level experts. The result was a period of research and dissemination of experiences within and outside the continent from 1965 to 1970 and, in China, from 1971 to 1972. (China recovered its seat in the United Nations on 25 October 1971 and resumed relations with the United States.) The Green Revolution—consisting of irrigation, improved seeds, and partial mechanization—in Asia led to a decline in the importation of cereals and at times even to the cessation of imports and their replacement with exports. Visionary political leaders, agronomists, and rural dwellers identified the three points of the triangle that became the foundation of a coherent strategy. Irrigation, the cornerstone of the system, was strongly encouraged. The distribution of new varieties of seed, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides was accompanied by partial m e c h a n i z a t i o n , such as motor-driven p u m p s , tractors, threshing machines, and so on. In contrast to those areas that were characterized by unfavorable physical conditions and thus unsuitable for the Green Revolution (owing to lack of rainfall a n d / o r irrigation), the vast alluvial plains from the Indus basin to the plains of northern China experienced a remarkable transformation during the 1965-1972 period. The marked increase in cereal production, especially that of wheat and rice, was accompanied by improvements in infrastructure, roads, electricity, commerce, and small industries. O t h e r secondary activities, such as cattle farming, fruit and vegetable production, and fish farming also experienced significant growth from the 1980s onward. It was in fact a process of comprehensive rural development characterized by a twofold trend: growth and diversification of the rural agricultural and nonagricultural economy. Large, small, and medium-sized landowners were all swept up by these currents, while large n u m b e r s of landless peasants saw their wages increase together with opportunities for employment both in and out of the agricultural sector. Studies c o n d u c t e d in countries including India, Java, and China (collectivist until 1980) pointed to a clear correlation between agriculture growth and poverty reduction. As J o h n Mellor, one of the most widely recognized U.S. experts on rural Asia, has noted, even accelerated growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors of urban areas has only a limited impact on the reduction of poverty at the national level. On the other hand, strong growth in the agricultural sector accompanied by improved living standards in villages has a greater multiplier effect both in the countryside and in cities, as a result of the expansion of rural markets for the products manufactured by city dwellers: cement, machines, semidurable goods, and common consumer items. Growth and diversifica-

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tion o f the rural e c o n o m y lead to i n c r e a s e d e m p l o y m e n t , often in the f o r m o f part-time j o b s , while at the same time improving the lot o f t h e p o o r e s t s e c t o r s . M e l l o r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e s u p p o r t e d by o t h e r authors. 1

Mistakes and Setbacks T h e early results o f the G r e e n Revolution were o b s c u r e d by the socialist a n d p o p u l i s t c u r r e n t s , in s o m e c a s e s r e i n f o r c e d by M a r x i s m L e n i n i s m , which e m e r g e d in the late 1960s. T h e social i m p a c t o f the G r e e n Revolution was i g n o r e d o r called into question. Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani n a t i o n a l who was at t h e t i m e t h e deputy d i r e c t o r o f t h e F o o d a n d Agricultural O r g a n i z a t i o n , went so far as to write: "In many countries, rapid growth has aggravated the p r o b l e m o f poverty." 2 T h e focus t h e n shifted to ways o f m e e t i n g "basic n e e d s , " attacking poverty directly t h r o u g h p r o g r a m s d e s i g n e d to b e n e f i t t h e m o s t disadvant a g e d sectors, with heavy doses o f subsidies f o r f o o d c o n s u m p t i o n , loans m a d e f r o m grants, measures solely for the b e n e f i t o f the most disadvantaged social classes, a n d an increase in public works to c r e a t e employment. O p p o r t u n i s t i c l e a d e r s , such as I n d i r a G a n d h i in India; e x p e r t s from numerous international organizations, including the World B a n k ; and n u m e r o u s n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations ( N G O s ) , all to d i f f e r e n t degrees, took the same road. T h e result was a d e c l i n e in the level o f t e c h n i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s a l l o c a t e d to those activities that p r o d u c e growth, namely, r e s e a r c h a n d public investments in water supply systems a n d o t h e r rural infrastructural works. T h i s t r e n d was n o t i c e a b l e in several states as was the d e c l i n e in the level o f international c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s direct attack on poverty yielded m i x e d a n d even disappointing results. W h i l e t h e r e were undoubtedly s o m e success stories in a n u m b e r o f Asian c o u n t r i e s , various official reports, i n c l u d i n g those f r o m I n d i a , B a n g l a d e s h , a n d P a k i s t a n , as well as p r i v a t e surveys r e v e a l e d severe leakages in t h e system: m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f funds, w h i c h e n d e d up in t h e p o c k e t s o f t h e rich i n s t e a d o f h e l p i n g t h e p o o r ; the b r i b i n g o f officials in return for subsidized loans; substand a r d p u b l i c works; a n d so o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e s e p r o g r a m s h a d an impact on only a small p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o o r and, when successful, at a high cost in t e r m s o f p r o g r a m support, which p r e c l u d e d t h e i r replication o n a large scale. T h e leftist excesses were c o m p o u n d e d o r r e p l a c e d in the 1980s by rightist excesses. E c o n o m i c liberalization, privatization, and glob-

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alization were all promoted to varying degrees throughout the continent. These new approaches, while generally positive, suffered from a serious weakness. They tended to neglect agriculture while contributing to the reduction in public investments, as if the private sector could meet all of society's needs. In the area of North-South c o o p e r a t i o n , the share in official development assistance has been declining since 1980. The emphasis placed on agriculture by cooperation agencies, which was so noticeable in the early days of the Green Revolution, began to decline. "In U.S. aid programs, the n u m b e r of agricultural experts declined by 80 percent in recent decades. The attitude of European donors underwent a similar change," according to J o h n Mellor. 3 In debates on the Third World held in research institutes in Asia and in Western countries, the emphasis placed on agriculture declined significantly. The subsidies allocated to production deserve special mention. There is no doubt that the start of the Green Revolution was facilitated by such subsidies. But, far from declining subsequently, the overall share of subsidies tended to increase, despite their elimination or reduction in some cases (including in Pakistan and Bangladesh for fertilizers and pesticides). In most countries, fees charged for water for irrigation purposes and the cost of electricity remained at absurdly low levels, which were often insufficient to pay for minimal maintenance of canals and electricity supply systems. Sales of subsidized grain by the state proved burdensome and failed in their stated aim of benefiting only the poor. Subsidies for inputs for agriculture benefited the less poor and the rich, as in the case of electricity for irrigation pumps and fertilizers. However, for reasons of narrow political interest, governments were slow to cut back these subsidies. In some cases, the opposite was true. During the legislative elections held in 1997 in the Indian state of Punjab, the largest food producer in the country with the highest per capita income, the party that emerged victorious carried out its promise to provide free electricity to peasants. A similar trend can be seen in Maharashtra in the period preceding the next elections there. These subsidies are partially responsible for the declining share of productive investments. In India, such investments represent 15 percent of gross domestic product. In India also, the share of public f u n d s allocated to productive activities fell f r o m 60 p e r c e n t of all resources channeled into the rural economy in 1981 to 38 percent in 1994, while antipoverty programs and subsidies increased. Mention should also be made of certain shortcomings that are only too rarely identified, except in the local press: f r a u d and the adulteration of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Examples of this

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abound: in Anhui (China), 2,600 hectares yielded no harvest in 1998 as a result of the poor quality of the seeds planted. As I pointed out in The Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999, the lack of public investments contributes to the failure to develop better varieties of food crops, cotton, and oil-producing plants, trends that were confirmed in 1998 and early 1999, with some variations, depending on weather conditions and natural disasters. In Thailand, the poor state of the water supply system became evident in 1999 when rainfall was insufficient. Vietnam a n d I n d o n e s i a did n o t enjoy favorable weather in 1998, but Indonesia's harvests were better in 1999, thanks to more favorable weather conditions. China and Bangladesh suffered from exceptionally severe floods in 1998. In Pakistan, cotton, a major crop, suffered from excessive rainfall in 1998; the rain, however, was helpful to the rice crops. In 1999, wheat harvests were good in India, but rather poor in Pakistan and reduced in China as a result of the drought experienced by that country. The conclusion that may be drawn here is that improved water supply systems would help to limit the damage caused by the vagaries of the weather. As of early 1999, no major change was foreseen in the export and import patterns of grain. A return to greater awareness of the importance of agriculture, which was noted in 1998, is now taking root in China, India, and Southeast Asia. China is trying to learn the lessons f r o m the disasters of 1998 by improving its dikes, which had long been poorly maintained. Many other measures are needed, however, to expand the area u n d e r irrigation and to promote research and dissemination activities. T h e Indian b u d g e t for the year April 1999March 2000 increased the share of public funds allocated to agriculture. Whether the objectives would be met was questionable, since the government is too weak to reduce subsidies. China and Vietnam are still suffering from the aftershocks of the East Asia crisis and will have difficulty in mobilizing the necessary funds. While operating in a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t , it is d i f f i c u l t to see I n d o n e s i a a n d P a k i s t a n relaunching vigorous agricultural programs, since their financial situation is extremely precarious. A widespread problem in Latin America, Africa, and Asia is the loss incurred during the transport and especially during storage of fruits, vegetables, and cereals. In the prestigious Indian Punjab, it was discovered that stocks of paddy with a value of at least $800 million were rotting either in poorly maintained silos or u n d e r roadside tarpaulins. Some of the grain had been harvested in 1992 and the rest in subsequent years. At the national level, nearly one-third of the stocks will not be fit for consumption. In China, losses are no less heavy at nearly 45 million tons, according to the China Daily of 26 J u n e 1997.

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Even t h o u g h data for o t h e r countries are unavailable, the problem is n o less c o m m o n . Local efforts with outside s u p p o r t would h e l p to r e d u c e this t r e m e n d o u s waste.

Those Excluded from the Green Revolution In the initial stages, g o v e r n m e n t s were correct to focus their efforts on the regions that were most suitable for the Green Revolution, since this was the only way to increase national p r o d u c t i o n of grain within the shortest possible time. This policy, however, favored zones that were already relatively advanced, to the d e t r i m e n t of the populations located in the less geographically advantageous areas. Now, several years later, it is possible to partially correct this a p p r o a c h , thanks to the progress m a d e in the irrigated plains. But, let us n o t deceive ourselves: T h e r e will never be a G r e e n Revolution in the high A f g h a n plateaus, in n u m e r o u s districts of p e n i n s u l a r India, in the plateaus of n o r t h e a s t T h a i l a n d , in n o r t h w e s t C h i n a , o r in m a n y o t h e r r e g i o n s where water is unavailable. Two a p p r o a c h e s may b e u s e d . T h e first is r e c o u r s e to various t e c h n i q u e s of dry f a r m i n g a n d w a t e r s h e d d e v e l o p m e n t to r e d u c e r u n o f f f r o m occasional rainfall, c o m b a t erosion, a n d , w h e r e possible, e n r i c h the soil. T h e f r u i t of these measures, which are relatively costly a n d c o m p l e x , a r e in n o way c o m p a r a b l e to t h o s e of t h e G r e e n Revolution. T h e y are n o t negligible, however, especially since these m e t h o d s p e r m i t b r o a d areas to b e cultivated with a wide variety of crops or to be p u t to o t h e r agricultural uses, including the p l a n t i n g of s o r g h u m , millet, a n d f r u i t trees or use as pasture land. T h e work b e i n g d o n e in this field should be p u r s u e d m o r e vigorously. T h e I n d i a n b u d g e t f o r 1999-2000 provides f o r o n e h u n d r e d districts to be covered over the n e x t t h r e e years. T h e same c o n c e r n s are p r e s e n t in C h i n a a n d V i e t n a m . Will t h e efforts b e i n g m a d e b e a d e q u a t e to the n e e d s that exist? T h e s e c o n d a p p r o a c h to improving the living standards of those w h o c a n n o t b e n e f i t f r o m the G r e e n Revolution is t h r o u g h emigration: f r o m the village to the city, f r o m the village to foreign countries (as in the case of the heavy emigration f r o m Pakistan to the Middle East), a n d f r o m p o o r districts to districts that o f t e n n e e d additional labor f o r large agricultural works. T h e social cost to the families conc e r n e d ( o n e or two m e m b e r s a b r o a d who remit their savings to the village) may b e heavy, especially in the case of unstable migrations. But such solutions—which of course d o n o t exclude all possible local d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s — a r e all t h e m o r e inevitable as p o p u l a t i o n

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pressure increases. In Europe, for example, migration f r o m the Alpine valleys has played an important role in eliminating poverty, even though the rate of population growth in Europe has been lower than in Asia.

Positive Trends Along with these p h e n o m e n a that act as constraints to agriculture, there are other, more favorable trends that are common throughout Asia. Cereals and sometimes other main crops lose ground and are replaced by secondary agricultural activities: cattle raising, fruits, vegetables, fish farming, or even flower cultivation. These activities are much more lucrative than the cultivation of rice or wheat. Profits can be substantial even on a properly prepared plot a quarter of a hectare in area. Many jobs are created in and out of agriculture: The landless untouchable in India, for example, each day transports on his bicycle 50 liters of milk to the milk collection center. All of these products are a response to the increase in demand in both town and country. Some of the production is exported, which brings additional benefits to the economy. These activities all have a further advantage: They are n o t d e p e n d e n t on the state. Examples are a landowner who installs a drip system of irrigation on less than a hectare for his mango and orange trees or a peasant who raises chickens or, in East Asia, pigs. In these conditions, the need to be self-sufficient in grain becomes less urgent. First, it is more profitable to export more valuable products even if it then becomes necessary to import cereals. Also, and this trend is already very pronounced in China, the development of cattle farming makes it necessary to import stock feed that may not be available locally, based on the model observed in developed countries. Account must be taken of the many small innovations about whose origins little is known. In 1992, we were struck in the Punjab region of Pakistan by the appearance of a large number of carts that had wheels equipped with rubber tires and that were pulled by smartly trotting donkeys. Despite the difference in the load carried, this means of transport was faster and less expensive than ox-drawn carts. Eight years later and 500 kilometers from Pakistan, in Uttar Pradesh, the same type of carts are being noted. In 1998, during another visit to Bangladesh, I came upon peasants who had abandoned the system of t h r e s h i n g paddy by b e a t i n g the stalks of grain on a stone—a method that caused huge losses—in favor of a rustic pedal-driven machine. Several years previously, these same peasants had had the

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i d e a of d i v e r t i n g s o m e water f r o m t h e i r h a n d p u m p s , t h e s o u r c e of t h e i r d r i n k i n g w a t e r , t o t h e i r p l o t of v e g e t a b l e s , a p r o c e s s t h a t e n a b l e d t h e m to multiply t h e n u m b e r of c r o p s h a r v e s t e d d u r i n g t h e year. H o w e v e r e n c o u r a g i n g t h e s e t r e n d s may be, they a r e n o t e n o u g h to offset t h e difficulties f a c e d in o r d e r to g r o w t h e p r i n c i p a l c r o p s in places w h e r e , d e s p i t e t h e c o m p l a i n t s of vested interests o n t h e political right, t h e state still plays a m a j o r role. Even t h e m o s t creative peasa n t s c a n n o t r e s t o r e t h e canals t h a t irrigate millions of h e c t a r e s , r e p a i r r o a d s t h a t a r e p o o r l y m a i n t a i n e d , o r i m p r o v e electrical grids t h a t a r e in p i t i f u l c o n d i t i o n . N o r can private initiative a l o n e suffice to carry o u t t h e m u l t i p l e tasks t h a t n e e d to b e d o n e in t h e a r e a of a g r o n o m i cal r e s e a r c h o r e x t e n s i o n services. T h e r e is a n u r g e n t n e e d , f o r e x a m ple, to i m p r o v e t h e d o s a g e s in t h e c o m p o n e n t s of c h e m i c a l fertilizers a n d to c o n d u c t soil analyses, tasks t h a t a r e n o w largely n e g l e c t e d .

What Conclusions Are to Be Drawn? T h e s h o r t c o m i n g s h i g h l i g h t e d above have b e e n k n o w n to t h e e x p e r t s f o r t h e last two o r t h r e e d e c a d e s to n o avail, a n d corrective m e a s u r e s have b e e n slow in c o m i n g . T h e r e t u r n of f a m i n e s a p p e a r s very unlikely ( e x c e p t in special s i t u a t i o n s s u c h as in N o r t h K o r e a ) , given t h e p r o g r e s s a c h i e v e d a n d t h e reserves of g r a i n t h a t have b e e n a c c u m u l a t e d . Diversification of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r d o e s n o t necessarily e x c l u d e t h e i m p o r t a t i o n of cereals, b u t b r i n g s it within c e r t a i n limits. R e c e n t p r o j e c t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t in I n d i a , if t h e d e c l i n e in productivity is n o t reversed fairly s o o n , d e m a n d f o r g r a i n may o u t s t r i p p r o d u c tion by 24 million t o n s by t h e year 2020. If, o n t h e contrary, agricult u r a l policy is s t r e n g t h e n e d , I n d i a will have s o m e 16 million t o n s of g r a i n , rice, a n d w h e a t e a c h year f o r n e t e x p o r t s , 4 even as it i m p o r t s stock f e e d f o r cattle a n d poultry. T h e situation in several o t h e r c o u n tries s h o u l d n o t b e very d i f f e r e n t . M o r e p r o a c t i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l policies a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t places g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n g r o w t h will have a m o r e b e n e f i cial i m p a c t o n t h e p o o r a n d u n d e r n o u r i s h e d t h a n d i r e c t b u t less f o c u s e d a c t i o n against poverty.

Notes Gilbert Etienne is honorary professor at the Institute of Advanced International Studies and the Institute of Development Studies in Geneva.

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1. Cf. J o h n Mellor, Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization (Baltimore, MD: T h e J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1995); M. Ravallion and G. Datt, "How I m p o r t a n t to India's Poor Is the Sectoral Composition of Economic Growth?" World Bank Economic Review 10, no. 1; G. Etienne, with C. Aubert a n d J. L. Maurer, Feeding Asia in the Next Century (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1998). 2. S. Aziz, Learning from China (London, 1976), p. xvi. This work gives a very biased account of Maoist China. 3. In his chapter in C. Auroi and J. L. Maurer (supervisor), Tradition and Modernization of Rural Economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998). 4. R. E. Evenson, C. E. Pray, and M. W. Rosegrant, Agricultural Research and Productivity Growth in India, IFPRI Research Report 109 (Washington D.C.: IFPRI, 1999).

28 The Role of Nutrition in Public Health Claudine Prudhon

Nutrition plays an important role in our daily lives, a fact that we sometimes overlook because it seems so obvious to us. The food that we eat is necessary for life, and we also derive satisfaction from sharing a pleasant meal. Because for most of us eating every day is not a major problem, we too often tend to forget that a balanced diet is indispensable for life. The key role of adequate nutrition is, however, becoming increasingly clear, not only in situations of food shortages but also in industrialized countries in the relationship between a d e q u a t e nutrition and illnesses such as cancer and cardiovascular pathologies. It is now recognized that the individual's nutritional status is at the heart of the general well-being of populations.

Questioning the C o m m o n Wisdom A Starving Individual Can Eat Anything There is a common tendency to believe that individuals who are hungry can eat anything, provided they fill their stomachs. This is completely false. Feeding unsuitable food to an individual who is suffering from malnutrition endangers that person's life. This was widely observed among deportees leaving concentration camps after World War II and m o r e recently a m o n g m a l n o u r i s h e d p o p u l a t i o n s of children a n d adults in Africa. Because a severely malnourished individual suffers 269

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from severe disruptions to his metabolism, feeding must be resumed using a careful balance of nutrients. 1 Malnutrition is a disease, just like a throat infection or a cold, and must be treated as such. The medicine in this case will be a suitable nutritional product, which works in the same way as an antibiotic. T h e same is true for p o p u l a t i o n s that are n o t m a l n o u r i s h e d . People cannot survive an unbalanced diet without causing harm to themselves. They will quickly suffer from numerous deficiencies that will have major repercussions on their health. In Cases of Food Shortages, Only a Section of the Population

Is Affected

Contrary to what is sometimes believed, in cases of severe food shortages, it is the entire population that is affected to different degrees and not only that part of the population that is shown to us most often by the media: the malnourished population. The impact of food scarcity on the nutritional status of a population can take different forms that are m o r e or less visible: loss of weight, appearance of edemas, stunted growth in children, and vitamin and mineral deficiencies that may range from marginal to epidemics of severe deficiencies. These different types of malnutrition will sooner or later all have repercussions on the health of the individual. T h e results of a n t h r o p o m e t r i c nutritional surveys carried out among children under the age of five clearly show that in the event of deterioration of the children's nutritional status, the entire population is affected. Preliminary studies tend to show the same phenomenon among the adult population. For example, in Chad, significant weight loss has been noted in children and their mothers during the "hungry season," the period p r e c e d i n g the harvest, d u r i n g which stocks from the previous harvest are exhausted. However, only a part of this population is considered to be malnourished, measured by thresholds that are more or less arbitrarily defined. W h a t e v e r the type of a l t e r a t i o n of n u t r i t i o n a l status t h a t is observed in cases of food shortages, it will have a significant impact on the health of the individual. People Do Not Die of Hunger

The link between nutritional status and mortality is often underestimated, since the cause of death will be imputed to a medical pathology rather than to the nutritional status of the individual. An individ-

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ual's nutritional state, however, underlies his well-being; an individual who is nutritionally healthy will have a reduced risk of being affected by a disease and if affected runs less risk of having serious consequences. The link between the percentage of individuals affected by malnutrition and the mortality rate in refugee camps is illustrated by the fact that the rate of m a l n u t r i t i o n is followed by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g increase in the rate of mortality. T h e relationship between malnutrition and mortality exists not only a m o n g individuals who are identified as malnourished, but is present as soon as the nutritional status of an individual deteriorates even slightly. Whenever an individual exhibits a nutritional state that is even marginally below the normal range, that individual's risk of dying increases. This is t r u e n o t only in cases of f o o d shortages. It has b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d in F r a n c e t h a t t h e risk of dying a m o n g h o s p i t a l patients increases significantly if these patients suffer f r o m disruptions of their nutritional status.

Toward an Optimal Response to Food Needs In situations of food scarcity, the provision of adequate food to prevent any deterioration of the population's nutritional status and to feed the malnourished population will therefore be crucial in terms of public health, in order to limit the n u m b e r of deaths. T h e provision of adequate food to an entire population is not easy to achieve, given the numerous constraints, and a special effort must be made in this area. Food Needs The needs of a population stricken by disaster are the same as those of any o t h e r population, or even greater if we are to address the underlying deficiencies and increased exposure to diseases. Various references in terms of food needs have been established, including the European, French, and World Health Organization references, and the objective should be to meet these needs. 2 Although the nutritional requirements of a population have long been known, food aid does not always take these needs into account. The emergence of ration standards shows, however, that it is gradually being recognized that a refugee has the same needs as any other individual. Over the years, the minimum energy intake recommended by United

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Nations agencies has increased.3 Vitamin and mineral needs are i n c r e a s i n g l y b e i n g t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t in e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d s f o r rations. Inadequacy of Response Deficiencies in r a t i o n s a r e o f t e n s e e n in t h e field: Follow-up c h e c k s a m o n g families a f t e r r a t i o n s have b e e n d i s t r i b u t e d have s h o w n t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l a m o u n t of t h e r a t i o n to b e d i s t r i b u t e d is o f t e n n o t a c h i e v e d . O v e r t h e last t e n years, n u m e r o u s e p i d e m i c s of v i t a m i n d e f i c i e n c i e s have b e e n n o t e d a m o n g r e f u g e e p o p u l a t i o n s , b e c a u s e f o o d aid did n o t p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e intake, a n d t h e s e p o p u l a t i o n s h a d n o o t h e r m e a n s of o b t a i n i n g t h e missing e l e m e n t s . 4 T h e f o o d r a t i o n d i s t r i b u t e d in A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s consists mainly of cereals, l e g u m e s , a n d oil. A p a r t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t this r a t i o n is m o n o t o n o u s , its analysis has s h o w n t h a t it is less b a l a n c e d t h a n p e t f o o d . 5 S i n c e 1992, v i t a m i n s a n d m i n e r a l s h a v e b e e n i n c r e a s i n g l y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t is a b a l a n c e d r a t i o n . M e e t i n g t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s , however, r e m a i n s difficult. Strategies to Be Implemented in Order to Improve the Response A r a t i o n m u s t b e b a l a n c e d in p r o t e i n s , c a r b o h y d r a t e s , lipids, vitamins, a n d m i n e r a l s . A b a l a n c e in t h e first t h r e e n u t r i e n t s is relatively easy to achieve with staple f o o d s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , an a d e q u a t e i n t a k e of vitamins a n d m i n e r a l s is m o r e difficult, since s o m e of t h e s e e l e m e n t s a r e p r e s e n t m a i n l y in f r e s h p r o d u c e a n d a n i m a l p r o d u c t s t h a t a r e o f t e n difficult, if n o t impossible, to d i s t r i b u t e f o r r e a s o n s of conservation a n d cost. T h e s e s a m e c o n c e r n s a f f e c t p o p u l a t i o n s living in prec a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s in F r a n c e t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s u m e low-cost p r o d u c t s , a r e e x p o s e d to n u t r i t i o n a l deficiencies. D i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h e s may be used to o p t i m i z e f o o d rations. Based o n t h e p r o d u c t s t h a t a r e available in t h e m a r k e t , f o o d s can b e classified a c c o r d i n g to t h e n u t r i e n t s t h a t they c o n t a i n a n d t h e i r cost. T h i s m a k e s it possible to p r e p a r e o p t i m a l r a t i o n s at lower cost, a n a p p r o a c h first a t t e m p t e d by a g r o u p of r e s e a r c h e r s in F r a n c e f o r p o p u l a t i o n s living in p r e c a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s . 6 T h i s a p p r o a c h n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s its l i m i t s , s i n c e , as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , c e r t a i n n u t r i e n t s a r e o b t a i n e d only f r o m f r e s h p r o d u c e o r a n i m a l p r o d u c t s , w h i c h a r e n o t easy to d i s t r i b u t e in t h e field. A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h consists in d e s i g n i n g p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n i n g vitam i n a n d m i n e r a l s u p p l e m e n t s specifically f o r e m e r g e n c y f o o d aid.

The Role of Nutrition

in Public

Health

273

This approach has the disadvantage of being removed from normal food habits and does not address the need for diversification of the rations. It does make it possible, however, to obtain an a d e q u a t e ration more easily and reduce the logistical problems of conservation and distribution. The fortification of food products with vitamins and minerals is increasingly being discussed by nutritionists. Significant progress has been made in the treatment of severe malnutrition. T h e Scientific C o m m i t t e e of A c t i o n A g a i n s t H u n g e r , w h i c h is c o m p o s e d of renowned researchers, has actively participated in the development of specific products supplemented with vitamins and minerals for the treatment of severe malnutrition. These products were perfected in 1994 and are now widely used by other humanitarian agencies and r e c o m m e n d e d by the World H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n . 7 It has b e e n observed that the use of these products has led to improvements in the weight gain of severely malnourished children at a quite negligible additional cost: twelve percent of the total cost of the food. The success of this strategy is due to a set of factors: (1) the pooling of the skills of scientists, humanitarian workers, and nutritionists, which has been instrumental in the development of an effective product, and (2) awareness-promotion and lobbying campaigns targeted to the international community and to donors in order to ensure that the value of the product is recognized and that the funds necessary to purchase it are made available. The fortification with vitamins and minerals of rations consisting of cereals, legumes, and oil, which are intended for distribution to the general population, is more difficult to achieve. The quantities of food to be distributed are considerable, and enrichment should not present a risk of overdosing. Various vectors of fortification have been considered, such as the e n r i c h m e n t of c e r e a l s a n d c o n d i m e n t s a n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of enriched flour. Thus far, n o n e of the strategies that have been tried has proven to be truly effective. Much more remains to be d o n e among humanitarian agencies, scientists, food technologists, and donors to ensure that the skills of some serve the needs of others and that the necessary funds are made available. Last, one of the major constraints we have observed is the constraint of cost, particularly for the countries of the South. The food rations distributed to refugee and displaced populations in the countries of Eastern Europe are much more diversified, include processed products, and cost five times more than the rations distributed in African countries. It is therefore easier to obtain balanced rations.

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T h e n u t r i t i o n a l n e e d s o f all p o p u l a t i o n s a r e s i m i l a r , h o w e v e r , a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f why s u c h g r e a t differences exist m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e p o s e d . A d e q u a t e f o o d m u s t b e s e e n as a n e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r f o r h e a l t h , a n d the basis o f the physical integrity o f the

public

individual.

S t r a t e g i e s a i m e d at p r o v i d i n g p o p u l a t i o n s with satisfying f o o d

must

b e d e v e l o p e d b o t h by t e c h n i c a l m e a s u r e s t o d e f i n e a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g i e s a n d by m a k i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e . W e m u s t a l s o b e c a r e f u l t o e n s u r e t h a t f o o d a i d h a s t h e s a m e q u a l i t y f o r all a n d t h a t t h e s a m e s t r a t e g i e s a r e u s e d f o r t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e S o u t h as f o r t h e countries of the North.

Notes C l a u d i n e P r u d h o n was t h e h e a d o f t h e N u t r i t i o n D e p a r t m e n t o f A c t i o n Against H u n g e r - F r a n c e until J u n e 2 0 0 0 . 1. M . H . N . G o l d e n a n d A. B r i e n d , " T r e a t m e n t o f M a l n u t r i t i o n in R e f u g e e C a m p s , " Lancet 3 4 2 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 2. R e p o r t s o f t h e S c i e n t i f i c C o m m i t t e e f o r F o o d , Brussels: C o m m i s s i o n N u t r i e n t a n d Energy Intakes for the European Community ( o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , 1 9 9 3 ) . H . D u p i n , J . A b r a h a m , a n d I. G i a c h e t t i , Apports nutritionnels conseillés pour la population française ( P a r i s : C e n t r e N a t i o n a l d e la R e c h e r c h e S c i e n t i f i q u e — C e n t r e N a t i o n a l D ' E t u d e s et d e R e c o m m a n d a t i o n s s u r l a N u t r i t i o n e t L ' A l i m e n t a t i o n , 1 9 9 2 ) . Nutritional Requirements in Emergencies ( G e n e v a : W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1 9 9 7 ) . 3. World Food Program/UN High Commission for Refugees Guidelines for Estimating Food and Nutritional Needs in Emergencies (Rome: World Food Program/United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1997). 4 . M . J . T o o l , " M i c r o n u t r i e n t D e f i c i e n c i e s in R e f u g e e s , " Lancet 3 3 9 (1992). 5. C . J . K . H e n r y , " C o m p a r i s o n o f N u t r i e n t C o m p o s i t i o n o f R e f u g e e R a t i o n s a n d P e t F o o d s , " Lancet 3 4 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 6. N. D a r m o n a n d A. B r i e n d , " L e s a l i m e n t s d e b o n s r a p p o r t s q u a l i t é ( n u t r i t i o n n e l l e ) / p r i x , " Alimentation et précarité, n o . 5 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 7. Management of Severe Malnutrition: A Manual for Physicians and Health Workers ( G e n e v a : W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1 9 9 9 ) .

29 Is Food Aid to Russia Necessary? Alain Giroux

Should Russia be given food aid? A review of the country's agrofood situation provides a clear response to this question: Aid first and foremost enables d o n o r countries to resolve their problems of overproduction and does not provide Russia with the s u p p o r t it needs to restructure its agricultural sector. This question can be a p p r o a c h e d f r o m d i f f e r e n t perspectives: that of the United States and the E u r o p e a n Union, which are the principal aid donors; that of the Moscow authorities; that of the Russian entities responsible for distributing the aid; that of Russian agricultural producers; and that of Russian political parties and pressure groups. The responses of the different parties may all be quite different, since their interests do not always coincide. In order to evaluate the need for food aid to Russia, it is necessary to compare and contrast the positions and arguments of the many actors involved and also to ascertain the political motives behind the good intentions.

Why Food Aid? T h e difficulties faced by the agricultural sector in Russia can be traced back not to 1991, the year of the disintegration of the USSR, but to the Soviet era. The fact that 80 percent of agricultural enterprises were in deficit in 1999, as the authorities have acknowledged, can be explained by the inertia of producers, which was the legacy of a long period during which direct state subsidies systematically avert275

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ed the bankruptcy of the kolkhoz a n d sovkhoz. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s have b e e n n u m e r o u s : little or n o interest o n the p a r t of peasants in the final results of their work, high p r o d u c t i o n cost, p o o r quality of products, a n d absence of flexibility in p r o d u c t i o n policies. U n d e r m a r k e t conditions, o t h e r p r o b l e m s have b e e n a d d e d : the disparity in prices between agricultural p r o d u c t s a n d the price of inputs, with the latter b e i n g higher; lack of competitiveness of national products; inability to react rapidly to changes in m a r k e t conditions; a n d the technological backwardness of most enterprises. For m a n y years, a f t e r e a c h b a d c r o p , m a n y W e s t e r n o b s e r v e r s have p r e d i c t e d severe f o o d shortages a n d even f a m i n e at the onset of winter, without those s o m b e r predictions ever having c o m e to pass. T h e s i t u a t i o n in 1998, however, was very d i f f e r e n t , w h e n d r o u g h t severely a f f e c t e d crops. T h e 47.8-million-ton grain harvest was t h e worst since the 1950s a n d was m o r e t h a n 40 million tons less t h a n the 1997 harvest. At the e n d of 1998, the Russian g o v e r n m e n t p r o j e c t e d shortfalls in grain p r o d u c t i o n in a p p r o x i m a t e l y forty of t h e eightyn i n e legal entities of the Russian F e d e r a t i o n (republics, territories, regions) a n d a shortage of seeds f o r the 1999 p l a n t i n g season. Certain p r o d u c e r regions witnessed a r e t u r n to the old reflex toward autarky, with g o v e r n m e n t s p r o h i b i t i n g the s h i p m e n t of grains outside of their territories. In addition, the serious financial crisis faced by Russia in mid-August 1998 led, f r o m S e p t e m b e r onward, to a drastic d r o p in i m p o r t s of f o o d p r o d u c t s o n which Russia is very d e p e n d e n t . Thus, b e c a u s e of t h e steady d e c l i n e in t h e size of livestock, t h e s h a r e of imports of m e a t a n d milk p r o d u c t s rose to 43 p e r c e n t (nearly 90 perc e n t f o r Moscow a n d St. Petersburg). T h e s e factors, c o m b i n e d with t h e s u s p e n s i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l f u n d i n g , led officials to f e a r t h a t they would n o l o n g e r b e able to m e e t the f o o d n e e d s of the p o p u l a t i o n , especially in the regions o n the n o r t h e r n p e r i p h e r y a n d in eastern Siberia, which are p o o r in agricultural p r o d u c t s a n d d e p e n d o n c u m b e r s o m e a n d expensive logistical networks. Russia t h e r e f o r e m a d e a request f o r f o o d a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n aid to w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n r e s p o n d e d in late 1998, with C a n a d a a n d J a p a n also providing bilateral assistance. T h e Red Cross, f o r its part, m a d e p l a n s f o r an e m e r gency p r o g r a m worth seventeen million dollars f o r the r e m o t e n o r t h eastern region of the country. T h e a g r e e m e n t o n f o o d aid t h a t was c o n c l u d e d in N o v e m b e r 1998, a n d finalized in D e c e m b e r with the U n i t e d States, provided f o r t h e d e l i v e r y of 1.7 m i l l i o n t o n s of w h e a t , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s of c o r n , 300,000 tons of soya f o r animal f e e d a n d 200,000 tons for h u m a n cons u m p t i o n , 100,000 tons of rice, 120,000 tons of beef, 50,000 tons of p o r k , 30,000 tons of p o w d e r e d milk, a n d 100,000 tons of miscella-

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n e o u s p r o d u c t s . In a d d i t i o n , it p r o v i d e d f o r a line of credit in the a m o u n t of $600 million f o r the p u r c h a s e of U.S. f o o d products, reimbursable over twenty years at the very favorable rate of 2 p e r c e n t p e r year. For its part, the E u r o p e a n U n i o n p r o p o s e d in 1998 to supply Russia with o n e million tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of rye, 100,000 tons of pork, 150,000 tons of beef, a n d 50,000 tons of p o w d e r e d milk a n d an equal a m o u n t of rice, worth in total approximately $480 million. T h e final a g r e e m e n t was also signed in December. T h e volumes a n d f i n a n c i n g f o r these two p r o g r a m s far e x c e e d e d the f o o d aid g r a n t e d to Moscow in 1992-1993. T h e m e m o r y of t h e massive scale of t h e m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of that aid a n d t h e questions s u r r o u n d i n g the real n e e d s of Russia gave rise to extensive negotiations that were carried o n f o r nearly two m o n t h s b e f o r e a g r e e m e n t was finally r e a c h e d . T h e Americans a n d E u r o p e a n s d e m a n d e d solid g u a r a n t e e s o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d sale of t h e p r o d u c t s . T h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n r e q u e s t e d a m o n t h l y status r e p o r t a n d m o n i t o r i n g of the o p e r a t i o n s by an i n d e p e n d e n t authority. In t h e event of f r a u d , s h i p m e n t s would be s u s p e n d e d . T h e Russian g o v e r n m e n t p l e d g e d to send the aid received to the regions in difficulty ( N o r t h , Siberia, Far East) a n d to e x c l u d e Moscow a n d Saint P e t e r s b u r g f r o m receiving any of t h e aid f r o m E u r o p e . Sale of t h e foodstuffs at Russian m a r k e t prices was to be d o n e t h r o u g h state-controlled agencies, a n d the m o n e y o b t a i n e d (approximately $680 million) was to b e allocated to social welfare f u n d s , with priority b e i n g given to t h e p a y m e n t of a r r e a r s of p e n s i o n , w h i c h a m o u n t e d to twenty-three billion roubles, or nearly $1 billion. Some of the aid was to b e allocated to hospitals, o r p h a n a g e s , a n d prisons. B e f o r e any analysis of the wisdom of this aid to Russia a n d the p r o b l e m s t h a t it c r e a t e s in t h e country, it m u s t b e stated t h a t t h e U n i t e d States a n d E u r o p e a n U n i o n are the principal beneficiaries of t h e o p e r a t i o n . In t h e 1980s Russia p u r c h a s e d m i l l i o n s of t o n s of g r a i n . Since 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 , however, it has b e e n i m p o r t i n g only very small quantities, thereby causing serious p r o b l e m s f o r Western farmers, w h o were f a c e d with a situation of o v e r p r o d u c t i o n a n d conseq u e n t d r o p in prices. B e h i n d this h u m a n i t a r i a n gesture to a c o u n t r y in great difficulty, Americans a n d E u r o p e a n s f o u n d a g o o d o p p o r t u nity b o t h to get rid of u n w a n t e d surpluses a n d to r e c o n q u e r , t h r o u g h the r e t u r n of their products, a Russian m a r k e t f r o m which they h a d practically d i s a p p e a r e d following the Russian e c o n o m i c collapse. 1 It may also be correctly a s s u m e d that the E u r o p e a n U n i o n a n d Washington in particular p u t pressure o n Moscow to accept this aid in e x c h a n g e f o r u s i n g t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s such as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary F u n d to disburse loans to a cashs t r a p p e d Russia.

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While aid to Russia may be considered necessary by Western governments, its provision creates certain problems and has given rise to fierce debates within Russia, which have been picked up by the media. Under the terms of the November 1998 agreement, food aid should have begun to arrive in Russia by the start of 1999, but that date was pushed back to the end of the first quarter. The reasons for this delay were many. First of all, it was only in February that Moscow presented the United States with a plan for the distribution of the U.S. aid to the Russian regions; the U.S. secretary of agriculture termed the plan incomplete and decided to suspend the shipment of pork and beef pending the submission of a more detailed plan. For its part, the European Commission temporarily suspended its aid to Russia on 10 February to protest against administrative bottlenecks. In fact, the commercial operators chosen by Moscow to market the p r o d u c t s m a d e what were c o n s i d e r e d to be u n a c c e p t a b l e demands in the areas of health standards and quality controls. They demanded, for example, that the quality of the products should be the s a m e as that of p r o d u c t s delivered in n o r m a l c o m m e r c i a l exchanges and argued that, according to their standards, meat that had been stored for more than eighteen months in freezers was unfit for human consumption. Russian veterinarians responsible for health controls charged exorbitant fees that were tantamount to racketeering. The fear of diversion of the shipment of food still exists in 2000. The Americans believed that the aid could serve the electoral interests of the governors of Russian regions. With an eye to the legislative elections of December 1999, some of them would receive more aid than had been planned because of their political strength. In addition to the problem of the monitoring of distribution, Western operators feared the reexport of food products. Indeed, since the domestic prices of the products are lower than world prices, the temptation is great for the entities receiving aid to sell it abroad, and we have recently witnessed the resale of oil proteins, flour, and grains. The West therefore imposed on Russia, which accepted it, the suspension of its exports of grain and beef for a period of at least six months.

Q u e s t i o n i n g A i d in Russia Since the end of 1998, the Russian media have given extensive coverage to the debates on Western food aid that have gripped the coun-

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try's agricultural and political sectors and that have focused mainly on the issue of the wisdom of food aid in the form of grains. Each party knows full well that, as far as beef is concerned, it would take several years for Russia to rebuild its livestock sector, despite the increases in 1998 in the production of beef, pork, and chicken. T h e main question concerns the real a m o u n t of grain stocks. Russian officials make the most contradictory statements on this subject. In January 1999, the Russian minister of agriculture and food, Victor Semienov, stated that the country had a grain deficit and that he was placing great hopes on Western aid. Only a month before the deputy prime minister responsible for food-related issues, Gennady Kulik, had declared that food reserves were sufficient for 1999 and that Russia was in no danger of shortages. This declaration, which was no doubt made for political purposes, was clearly intended to reassure a public opinion that was concerned following the very poor harvest and the trauma of the financial crisis. The answer must be sought in the notoriously vague Russian statistics. Analysts who are critical of aid argued that Russia had reserves f r o m its a b u n d a n t harvest of 1997 estimated at 20-25 million tons. When added to the harvest of 1998, which was not as good, this would have enabled the country to cover its needs up until the next harvest. But other experts challenged these figures. For them, it was impossible to locate these "phantom reserves," since the silos were empty. If, as was likely, stocks did exist on farms, they would have been stored u n d e r conditions making t h e m unfit for c o n s u m p t i o n . Data f r o m early 1999, published after two months of polemics and silence on the part of officials, supported the arguments of the second group. For example, as of 1 April 1999, according to the Russian Statistical Committee, the grain company reserves stood at 16.8 million tons, or 51.4 percent less than they had been on the same date in the previous year. Imports would bridge the gap up until the next harvest. T h e Russian Grain Producers Union, for its part, projected for 1999 a deficit of 7 million tons and estimated that in order to meet its consumption and storage needs, Russia would have to harvest 90 million tons of grain, much more than the 68 million tons projected by the minister of agriculture. As a whole, Russian political parties are critical of food aid. The leftist o p p o s i t i o n — c o m m u n i s t s , a g r a r i a n p a r t y — r e g u l a r l y cond e m n e d earlier reformist governments, which they accused of systematic m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . But the o p p o s i t i o n has also consistently sought to exaggerate the bleakness of the agricultural situation in order to show the disaster to which the policies of the reformists have led. Their great fear is that the aid would take away the opportunity

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b e i n g o f f e r e d to the Russian a g r o f o o d sector to b e n e f i t f r o m the crisis a n d f r o m the d r o p in imports in o r d e r to regain f r o m national prod u c t i o n t h e s h a r e of t h e m a r k e t t h a t it h a d a b a n d o n e d to f o r e i g n e x p o r t e r s . For t h e i r p a r t , t h e r e f o r m i s t s insist t h a t r u m o r s of f o o d s h o r t a g e s t e n d to b e e x a g g e r a t e d a n d t h a t t h e s u p p l y d i f f i c u l t i e s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d r a t h e r as p r o b l e m s c o m p a r a b l e to the lack of liquidity a m o n g m u c h of the p o p u l a t i o n , which sometimes does n o t receive salaries f o r m o n t h s at a time, or t h e difficulty of s h i p p i n g p r o d u c t s into certain regions, such as the great N o r t h . Nonetheless, they all share the same o p i n i o n , namely that the West, t h r o u g h its aid, is p u r s u i n g a twofold objective: to r e d u c e its own stocks a n d to maintain a p r e s e n c e o n the Russian f o o d market. This p i c t u r e of t h e dissatisfied would n o t b e c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t m e n t i o n of the Western exporters a n d Russian i m p o r t e r s who fear a restriction a n d d i s r u p t i o n of m a r k e t s because of t h e i m p a c t of this massive aid. N o r should we i g n o r e Russian farmers, w h o are already e x p e r i e n c i n g considerable difficulty in selling their p r o d u c e .

Other Forms of Aid? F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e d o n o r s , t h e r e s p o n s e to t h e q u e s t i o n asked earlier o n in this article is most certainly yes, Russia must b e given f o o d aid. T h e d o n o r s ' position is based o n a calculated h u m a n i tarianism. But, in absolute terms, o n e may say that f o o d aid o n these t e r m s is n o t necessary. T h e r e are e m e r g e n c y situations that r e q u i r e t h e s h i p m e n t of f o o d p r o d u c t s to p o p u l a t i o n s in difficulty that are carefully t a r g e t e d (evaluated by the Red Cross at s o m e 1.7 million p e o p l e ) a n d t h e d o n a t i o n of grains to r e c o n s t i t u t e stocks t h a t are clearly i n a d e q u a t e . But quite a p a r t f r o m these emergencies, g e n u i n e aid to Russia would consist of using the f u n d s disbursed to p u r c h a s e Russian p r o d u c t s f r o m Russian a g r i c u l t u r a l e n t e r p r i s e s a n d t h e n redistribute t h e m to the p o p u l a t i o n g r o u p s affected by the shortages. This a p p r o a c h has b e e n used by C a n a d a with m o r e limited resources (U.S.$1.6 m i l l i o n ) given to t h e R e d Cross to p u r c h a s e f o o d stuffs locally a n d distribute t h e m using its own networks. It is an a p p r o a c h , however, t h a t has d r a w n criticism f r o m t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . T h e real question to be asked is: Are Westerners p r e p a r e d to h e l p Russia by participating in the rehabilitation of its a g r o f o o d sector so that it b e c o m e s m o r e productive a n d capable of meeting the country's needs? T h e response would no d o u b t be a "no."

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Notes Alain Giroux is analyst at the Center for Studies and Documentation on the former USSR, China, and Eastern Europe in Paris. 1. Jean-André Glavany, the French minister of agriculture, expressed satisfaction at this aid, which he saw as holding out hope for a solution to the pork crisis in France, while the president of the Union of Pork Producers of France r e f e r r e d in D e c e m b e r 1998 to the n e e d f o r a " h u m a n i t a r i a n offloading" on Russia.

30 Food Aid to Russia: Welcome or Unwelcome? Jonathan LittelI

Aid ? In late O c t o b e r 1998, two months after the spectacular financial crash of 17 August, Michel Camdessus, director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), asked the European Union to send food aid to Russia "so that hunger will not arrive in that country with winter, so that serious social unrest will not break out." 1 The Russian press i m m e d i a t e l y r e a c t e d r a t h e r badly: " F o o d is a g o o d t h i n g , but Russian authorities expected to get some money." 2 T h e initiative, however, had come from the Russian authorities: On 9 October, at the Moscow summit, Yevgeny Primakov, j u s t recently appointed prime minister, had indeed asked Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, for food aid. T h e question was raised again during the E u r o p e a n U n i o n - R u s s i a summit in V i e n n a in late O c t o b e r , and negotiations started, not only with the E u r o p e a n Union but with the United States as well. T h e negotiations were conducted by Gennady Kulik, vice-prime minister in charge of agriculture. They evolved very quickly: By 6 November, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was announcing that an agreement had been concluded. This agreement, which would hardly be modified from then on, had three parts: 1. Some 1.5 million tons was to be sold under a $600 million "soft loan" at 2 percent interest for twenty years. This allotment provided for the purchase by Russia of 0.5 million tons of maize, 283

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0.5 million tons of soy beans, 120,000 tons of meat and powdered milk, and 200,000 tons of cereals. 2. In addition, 1.5 million tons of wheat were to be given to Russia. From this amount, 1.1 million tons were to be sold in Russia based on a monetization process in which profits were to be transferred to the Pension Fund of Russia, which was in severe deficit. The remaining 400,000 tons were to be distributed free of charge among various social institutions, such as orphanages, hospitals, and old people's homes. 3. One hundred thousand tons of various food products were to be distributed to needy beneficiaries by international humanitarian organizations. 3 The total value of the program was close to $1 billion. The U.S. agreement allowed the negotiations with the European Union, fruitless up to that point, to be concluded. On 12 November, the European Commission announced in turn an agreement bearing on 1.85 million tons of products, valued at 500 million euros, which would be given to Russia to be sold and monetized using a procedure similar to that used for the U.S. 1.1 million tons. Again the profits would be transferred to the Pension Fund and other social programs. 4 All three parties to these agreements described them as a crucial aid for Russia and needy Russians. However, from the very beginning these two programs came under severe criticism, particularly from the press, both international and Russian.

Food Aid: A Long History International food aid has a long and ill-fated history in Russia. In 1921 and 1922, while a terrible famine devastated the Ukraine and European Russia, the United States established the American Relief Administration (ARA) and launched a vast relief operation that was finally able to save some eight million of the thirteen million people affected by the famine. A Moscow Times editorial written on the eve of the 6 November 1998 agreement described the precedent in a positive m a n n e r : " T h e ARA demanded and got complete control o f the process. ... This food aid program was a triumph." 5 Without diminishing the results achieved in 1921, one should look at the details. The same article admitted that "the Soviet Union was quietly exporting grain even as its own citizens starved." 6 But more particularly, as is skillfully demonstrated by J . C. Rufin, the ARA was above all for Lenin

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a n d t h e Bolsheviks t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a gigantic political m a n i p u l a t i o n , t h e first historical m a n i p u l a t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n aid: For the first time aid becomes the subject of large-scale political blackmail. ... The Russians ... lay down draconian conditions for the entry of aid: official recognition of Soviet Russia and exclusive control over the aid which they will distribute. ... The donors, caught, realize that they cannot do anything for the Russian people without recognizing the legitimacy of those imposing their will upon them. To c o n c l u d e : " W h e t h e r o r n o t m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o c c u r r e d is n o t t h e p o i n t . T h e p r o f i t L e n i n d e r i v e d f r o m this a f f a i r was essentially political." 7 T h e t e r r i b l e f a m i n e of 1 9 3 2 - 1 9 3 3 , w h i c h t h e h i s t o r i a n R o b e r t C o n q u e s t called t h e " t e r r o r - f a m i n e , " 8 was c o n c e a l e d f r o m f o r e i g n e r s . N o aid was r e q u e s t e d ; o n t h e contrary, Stalin, as far as possible, aggrav a t e d t h e f a m i n e in o r d e r to s h a t t e r t h e resistance of t h e U k r a i n i a n peasantry. In t h e 1960s, t h e USSR, c o n f r o n t e d with t h e obvious failu r e of its collectivization policy in t e r m s of effectiveness a n d p r o d u c tivity, was finally f o r c e d to r e s o r t to i m p o r t s , to t h e d e l i g h t of U.S. g r a i n p r o d u c e r s . At t h e e n d of t h e 1970s U.S. a g r i c u l t u r e was b o o m i n g b u t h a d b e c o m e very d e p e n d e n t o n t h e s e e x p o r t s . J i m m y C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n in early 1980 to c u t t h e m , in p r o t e s t of t h e Soviet invasion of A f g h a n i s t a n o n 27 D e c e m b e r 1979, l e d to s e r i o u s p r o t e s t . R o n a l d R e a g a n was a b l e to play o n this p o i n t d u r i n g his e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n a few m o n t h s later; t h e hostility of s u c h a p o w e r f u l lobby c o n t r i b u t e d to C a r t e r ' s d e f e a t . O n c e in o f f i c e , R e a g a n , d e s p i t e his l o u d d i a t r i b e s a b o u t t h e Evil E m p i r e , rapidly r e s u m e d e x p o r t s . In 1991 t h e USSR c o l l a p s e d . O v e r n i g h t t h e s i t u a t i o n c h a n g e d , a n d t h e U n i t e d States, o n c e a m a j o r rival, b e c a m e t h e m a i n ally a n d s u p p o r t e r of t h e fifteen new c o u n t r i e s f o r m e d o u t of t h e USSR. T h e c h a o s of t h e first s t a g e of t r a n s i t i o n was a c c o m p a n i e d by a s h a r p e x p l o s i o n of c r i m i n a l i t y a n d i n f l a t i o n a n d by a s l u m p in t h e living s t a n d a r d of Russians. In 1992, p a n i c set in: T h e r e was a g r e a t d e a l of serious talk a b o u t f a m i n e t h e following winter. T h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n o f f e r e d f o o d aid; t h e results w e r e a disaster. To q u o t e a g a i n f r o m t h e Moscow Times e d i t o r i a l of 5 N o v e m b e r 1998, "This t i m e ... t h e Russia b e i n g h e l p e d was n o t in any real d a n g e r of f a m i n e ; t h e subsidized e x p o r t s s m o t h e r e d Russian d o m e s t i c p r o d u c ers; a n d t h e a i d was r i p p e d o f f o n a massive s c a l e . " I n n u m e r a b l e r e p o r t s c r o p p e d u p of bags still s t a m p e d "USA" o r " E u r o p e a n U n i o n " b e i n g sold in local m a r k e t s ; a p a r t of t h e aid was even allegedly f o u n d in I r e l a n d , w h e r e it was b e i n g r e s o l d m o r e c h e a p l y t h a n E u r o p e a n p r o d u c t s . T h e negative i m p r e s s i o n left by this o p e r a t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y

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c o o l e d down t h e d o n o r s . In t h e following years, o p e r a t i o n s of this kind were n o l o n g e r carried out, e x c e p t f o r small local ones. Thus, at t h e b e g i n n i n g of 1996, t h e H u m a n i t a r i a n O f f i c e of t h e E u r o p e a n Commission ( E C H O ) , a c c e p t e d an Action Against H u n g e r proposal to d i s t r i b u t e o n e t h o u s a n d t o n s of f o o d to victims of t h e war in C h e c h n y a . But even such a small o p e r a t i o n s u f f e r e d f r o m perverse distortions: A l t h o u g h f o o d p r o d u c t s f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n c o u l d b e purchased locally at advantageous prices, E C H O insisted that they s h o u l d b e b o u g h t in E u r o p e . D o i n g so a l m o s t d o u b l e d t h e c o s t a n d inevitably entailed considerable delays f o r what s h o u l d have b e e n an emergency operation. Thus, t h e r e were few reasons to b e surprised at the scale of the negative reactions to t h e o p e r a t i o n a n n o u n c e d in N o v e m b e r 1998. But the details of the o p e r a t i o n a n d the criticism expressed—at least in the press—were extremely vague a n d caused n u m e r o u s m i s u n d e r standings.

Is Aid Necessary? Despite n u m e r o u s available d o c u m e n t s , it is very difficult to j u d g e objectively w h e t h e r the cries of alarm h e a r d f r o m the a u t u m n of 1998 onward were well f o u n d e d . As with every sector of the Russian economy, t h e r e are seemingly n o reliable statistics in the field of agriculture. T h e r e are several reasons f o r this. O n e is t h e h u g e c o n f u s i o n a n d lack of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g the various services responsible ( t h e M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , t h e S t a t e S t a t i s t i c a l C o m m i t t e e [Goskomstat], the r e g i o n s ) . A n o t h e r is the fact t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n is c o n c e a l e d by p r o d u c e r s in o r d e r to avoid taxation a n d by regional g o v e r n m e n t s in o r d e r to resell it outside of legal c h a n n e l s — e i t h e r o u t of simple c o r r u p t i o n o r to increase t h e region's b u d g e t while bypassing Moscow. No e x p e r t is able to assess the p r o p o r t i o n of this "gray agriculture," which may a c c o u n t f o r u p to 20 p e r c e n t of total p r o d u c t i o n . Of course, the so-called private production, that is, the p r o d u c t i o n f r o m g a r d e n plots (thanks to which the majority of Russians survive), is n o t completely taken into a c c o u n t either, t h o u g h estimates in this field could be a little m o r e reliable. According to Goskomstat, the p r o p o r t i o n of private plots in Russia's agriculture in 1995 a c c o u n t e d f o r 43 p e r c e n t c o m p a r e d with 55 perc e n t f o r f o r m e r sovkhoz a n d kolkhoz (the r e m a i n i n g 2 p e r c e n t b e i n g the rare private farms established u n d e r the 1990 law). For m o n t h s , e x p e r t s a n d ministries a r g u e d a b o u t t h e n u m b e r s , a n d t h e s e argu-

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ments were further complicated by the political biases of the supporters and opponents of food aid. The question of how 147 million Russians would feed themselves during the winter was asked rhetorically by Le Monde in late October 1998 in an article that quoted n u m e r o u s contradictory statements. O n e was by Primakov, who announced on 6 October that "there are at least enough potatoes and vegetables this winter." 9 On 20 October, the Goskomstat declared that total agricultural production had fallen by 9 percent compared with the previous year. As for cereals, by that date Russia had allegedly harvested only 50 percent of the 1997 production. 1 0 The chorus built: "These are the worst yields since 1953." n This statement quickly snowballed. T h e Emergency Appeal of the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), on behalf of the Far North Territories, particularly impressed the international press. However, as we have pointed out, journalists were generally skeptical. The article in Le Monde quoted "a Western expert" who spoke about "a large-scale disinformation campaign designed to influence world prices." 12 Russian newspapers were usually even more critical. As f o r the Russian g o v e r n m e n t , its official declarations were extremely contradictory. Victor Semionov, minister of agriculture (Kulik's subordinate in the Russian hierarchy), a n n o u n c e d on 29 October that in the coming winter Russia would not suffer from food shortages. 1 3 Kulik, on 12 November, wrote to the European commissioner for foreign affairs, Hans Van Den Broek: "The objective analysis of the situation reveals that there will be real food shortages this winter in Russia." 14 Semionov at first persisted: "Many Russians grow most of their own food," he claimed. "They [will] not go hungry in the winter." 15 "Our problem," he a n n o u n c e d in a n o t h e r interview, quite pertinently, "is not so much to fill shops but rather to make products accessible to consumers whose means have been reduced by the financial crisis" (we shall return to this point later on). 1 6 At last, on 24 November, he a n n o u n c e d frankly: " T h e r e is n o d a n g e r of famine this winter, contrary to statements playing into the hands of food importers and their lobbyists." 17 However, at the same time, his own ministry was pointing out that "Russia needs approximately seven million tons of cereals." 18 In fact, as soon as the foreign aid was agreed to, Kulik himself quickly backed off from his alarming statements of October, afraid, perhaps, of provoking panic: "Russia possesses sufficient food reserves to last t h r o u g h 1999. ... T h e r e won't be any food shortage, to say nothing of famine," he declared on 26 December to a major weekly linked to the Communists. 1 9 Yuri Maslyukov, one of Primakov's first

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d e p u t y p r i m e ministers a n d also a C o m m u n i s t , a d d e d that " d u e to the r a p i d e f f o r t s of t h e C a b i n e t a n d c o n t r a r y to initial a p p r e h e n s i o n s , t h e r e is n o a n d will n o t b e any f a m i n e in Russia." 20 It is difficult to objectively claim, as some p e o p l e have d o n e , that t h e C o m m u n i s t s cried f o r h e l p to receive aid. However, as late as April, Izvestia was headlining: "Why Kulik f r i g h t e n e d the c o u n t r y with [talk a b o u t ] f a m i n e . " 2 1 W h i l e it is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t Kulik a n d S e m i o n o v generally r e p r e s e n t e d c o n f l i c t i n g interests—Kulik b e i n g closely c o n n e c t e d with t h e i m p o r t e r s ' a n d i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ' lobby, while S e m i o n o v , a p r a g m a t i c f o r m e r b u s i n e s s m a n , s u p p o r t e d t h e f a r m i n g lobby—their shifting positions o n the issue of "famine" a n d aid were o f t e n contradictory a n d have evolved over time. 2 2 In the e n d , what a b o u t this so-called famine? First, it s h o u l d be n o t e d that all the t h r e a t e n i n g statements dealt with winter. However, most experts recognize that the most difficult p e r i o d in case of f o o d shortages, f o r p e o p l e living mainly o n their own p r o d u c e (as is o f t e n the case in Russia), is n o t in fact winter b u t the "food gap" that occurs when all stocks are e x h a u s t e d a n d runs until the following harvest. In E u r o p e a n Russia this p e r i o d begins a p p r o x i m a t e l y in AprilMay a n d is c u r b e d only d u r i n g summer, w h e n vegetables c o m e o n t o the m a r k e t in July. 2 3 A prison director w h o m Action Against H u n g e r staff m e t in the Republic of Tyva ( s o u t h e r n Siberia) e x p l a i n e d that d u r i n g winter h e m a n a g e d to m e e t the targets, b u t that this b e c a m e difficult f r o m April until July. By that time his f o o d stocks, which were supplied mainly by prison farms, were down to n o t h i n g . 2 4 By the spring of 1999, the aid h a d only j u s t b e g u n to arrive a n d o n e was f o r c e d to admit, to q u o t e Maslyukov, that t h e r e h a d n o t b e e n a n d would n o t be any f a m i n e . But could o n e still speak of shortages? Even h e r e , it is difficult to s u p p o r t o n e or the o t h e r p o i n t of view. T h e USDA claimed in May: "If you c o u n t o u r aid a n d the E u r o p e a n aid, c u r r e n t f o o d stocks in Russia are at zero; without the aid t h e r e would have b e e n a deficit." 2 5 A World Bank expert, however, believed t h e r e were n o exact figures: "No o n e can say w h e t h e r t h e r e is a deficit or not. Taking into a c c o u n t the p u r c h a s i n g capacity of the p o p u l a t i o n , I p e r s o n a l l y t h i n k t h e r e is n o d e f i c i t : c o n s u m p t i o n is very low— n u t r i t i o n a l l y i n a d e q u a t e — b u t in a n y c a s e l o w e r t h a n s u p p l y . " A c c o r d i n g to this s a m e e x p e r t , t h e e c o n o m i s t s of t h e Ministry of Agriculture s e e m e d to reason in terms of "profiteers" who allegedly withhold stocks in o r d e r to drive prices up. T h e aid, a c c o r d i n g to this logic of the p l a n n e d economy, counteracts such attempts a n d keeps prices down. 2 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , Russia in 1998 e x p o r t e d nearly as m u c h p r o d u c e as it was d u e to receive in foreign aid. Official exports ran to m o r e t h a n

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1.5 million tons, b u t t h e r e were also a considerable a m o u n t of illegal, "black market" exports. Stavropol a n d Krasnodar p r o d u c e r s , in particular, were said to have sold h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of tons t h r o u g h Azerbaijan to Iran a n d Iraq. 2 7 T h e e x p l a n a t i o n is simple: World prices f o r w h e a t in late 1998 were a p p r o x i m a t e l y $100-110 p e r ton, while Russian prices were only $30-35. E x p o r t profits in h a r d currency f r o m Russian w h e a t sold a b r o a d were e n o r m o u s . Despite the d e m a n d s by the U n i t e d States a n d the E u r o p e a n U n i o n that Russian exports cease as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r aid, it is still difficult to speak of a real deficit, at least in overall terms. As f o r r e g i o n a l deficits, as t h e Moscow Times o b s e r v e d , "If t h e U.S. G o v e r n m e n t is so w o r r i e d a b o u t h u n g e r in Russia's r e g i o n s , why d o e s n ' t it give Russia l o a n s to b u y R u s s i a n w h e a t — a t a t h i r d of the price? T h a t would let Russia f e e d t h r e e times as many p e o p l e . It would also let Russia build u p its domestic agriculture sector." But, the editorial c o n c l u d e d , "the last t h i n g Kansas farmers want is f o r the U.S. G o v e r n m e n t to h e l p their competitors." 2 8 In fact, two e l e m e n t s s h o u l d be identified, which has rarely b e e n d o n e d u r i n g these debates. O n e is the "macro" situation of a country's a g r i c u l t u r e , w h i c h is m a i n l y a n e c o n o m i c q u e s t i o n in w h i c h r e d u c t i o n s of stocks lead n o t to a h u m a n i t a r i a n p r o b l e m b u t to price fluctuations, which are always affected by a n u m b e r of o t h e r factors ( d e m a n d , exports, domestic distribution networks, speculation, a n d so o n ) . T h e o t h e r is the p r o b l e m of f o o d security in Russia, which certainly affects a considerable p a r t of the p o p u l a t i o n b u t which is primarily t h e p r o b l e m of t h e accessibility of f o o d , t h a t is, of p e o p l e ' s ability to buy f o o d , at whatever price. We shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t later.

Is Aid Harmful? B e y o n d t h e q u e s t i o n of n e e d s , critics of f o o d aid p l a c e p a r t i c u l a r emphasis o n the h a r m f u l effects of the o p e r a t i o n o n Russian farmers. T h e g e n e r a l situation of the agriculture a n d f o o d industry in Russia c o u l d i n d e e d be d e s c r i b e d as catastrophic. Prior to t h e crisis of 17 A u g u s t 1998, Russia i m p o r t e d l a r g e a m o u n t s of f o o d p r o d u c t s . 2 9 Overnight, with the collapse of the rouble, these products, which h a d d o m i n a t e d the m a r k e t a n d very o f t e n h a d b e e n c h e a p e r t h a n their Russian equivalents, d i s a p p e a r e d f r o m t h e shelves. In the chaos of the e n s u i n g m o n t h s , n u m e r o u s analysts c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e crisis h a d given an u n e x p e c t e d i m p e t u s to t h e Russian a g r i c u l t u r e a n d f o o d industry: Foreign c o m p e t i t o r s h a d b e e n eliminated, a n d r o u b l e prices r e m a i n e d relatively s t a b l e . S u d d e n l y t h e R u s s i a n s c o u l d h o p e to

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i n c r e a s e sales a n d t h u s , t h a n k s to a n i n f l o w of capital, m o d e r n i z e a n d d e v e l o p t h e i r e q u i p m e n t a n d f u t u r e p r o d u c t i v e capacity. T h e case of c h i c k e n is typical: B e f o r e t h e crisis, a c c o r d i n g to t h e USDA, Russia i m p o r t e d m o r e t h a n o n e m i l l i o n t o n s of c h i c k e n f r o m t h e U n i t e d States. T h e d e m a n d was very s t r o n g , as c h i c k e n is a g o o d s o u r c e of p r o t e i n a n d t h e p r i c e was m u c h l o w e r t h a n t h a t of b e e f . B u t local s u p p l y c o u l d n o t m e e t this d e m a n d , m a i n l y o w i n g to a d e a r t h of i n v e s t m e n t to i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i o n a n d to t h e lack of g r a i n a n d f o d d e r . 3 0 A n a r t i c l e i n Libération d e s c r i b e d t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e Z a r e c h n a y a factory, a l a r g e c h i c k e n f a c t o r y in P e n z a , 8 0 0 k i l o m e t e r s f r o m Moscow: Founded in 1986, it became one of the ten best [factories] in its sector in the USSR. ... At its height, it produced 6 million chickens a year. But at the beginning of 1992, the G o v e r n m e n t ... began its "shock therapy." Subsidies were abruptly cut. ... Without the State purchases, the factory no longer had a market. Shortages of eggs, fodder and grain for the chickens began. By 1992, local c h i c k e n cost twenty r o u b l e s p e r kilo c o m p a r e d with five r o u b l e s f o r c h i c k e n f r o m t h e U n i t e d States. From 1995 on, the factory no longer paid its taxes or its social security payments. Wages were paid erratically, whenever a customer paid in cash. ... T h e last chickens were slaughtered on April 1, 1998. T h e workers were placed on "forced holiday" [and] pilfered everything that could still be useful. 3 1 T h i s is j u s t t h e k i n d of b u s i n e s s t h a t will m o s t p r o f i t f r o m t h e cial crisis:

finan-

American chicken disappears. T h e factory, meanwhile, is making good deals: It buys eggs on credit, at pre-devaluation prices, a n d sells its chickens at post-devaluation prices. By the end of September the staff receives its first wages ... and the factory is producing 50 tons of chicken; by December, seven times more. "The meat is sold the day it leaves the factory," the deputy director says happily: "We are still working at only 35 percent to 40 percent of capacity. And we cannot meet the demand." ... However, due to the lack of cash flow, the factory cannot invest in order to achieve "European quality." Its enormous debts—for gas, electricity, etc.—have been "rescheduled," i.e. frozen. ... Zarechnaya could double its production within a year. But with the threat of a return of foreign imports, its future remains uncertain." 3 2 C h i c k e n p r o d u c e r s were n o t the only o n e s w h o f e a r e d aid. In May, M r . Z h u k o v , d i r e c t o r o f t h e R u s s i a n A s s o c i a t i o n o f G r a i n

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Producers, published an open letter to the minister of agriculture on the f r o n t page of a major Russian agricultural journal: "We cannot even sell our own seeds which are cheaper and of better quality. We don't need foreign seeds." 33 Leonid Kholod, former deputy minister of agriculture, thought the same: "Just when Russian farmers have a chance to take advantage of market trends and get off the ground, [the Government] goes and whacks them." 3 4 Andrei Sizov, an expert working for the Russian agricultural consultancy SovEcon, claimed: "From the p o i n t of view of traders, it deprives t h e m of a market. These volumes, 500,000 tons of corn and 250,000 tons of soya beans, are enormous. They're twice Russia's annual imports. ... Traders also stand to suffer if Russia i n t r o d u c e s measures to limit exports, as donors have insisted they do." 35 It should also be mentioned that the German government expressed similar reservations during the negotiations on European aid. Supporters of the food aid, of course, rejected these arguments. As Asif Chaudhry explained, the USDA "selected only those products for which there are deficits; these products will be supplied to specific regions where they are not available. They will therefore not compete with Russian products anywhere." With regard to chicken, he pointed out that the United States was planning to provide Russia, as part of t h e aid p r o g r a m , with only fifty t h o u s a n d tons, an insignificant a m o u n t compared to previous exports. 36 The agricultural attaché of the European Union in Moscow, Tom Wiley, explained that it is the Russian Government that has asked us for aid for winter because there were deficits. Taking into account the duration of the production cycle, in any case, Russian producers could not reduce these deficits till the beginning of the next season. Of course, if the aid lasted for several years, it would reduce incentive to produce; but we hope that by next season Russian farmers will already have produced more. 3 7

Neither Kulik nor Semionov made, as far as we know, any public statements on this subject, though rumors in Moscow pointed to serious internal disagreements.

W h o m Does Aid Profit? T h i s massive aid o p e r a t i o n p r o d u c e d f a r m o r e q u e s t i o n s t h a n answers. The opponents of the aid had just as few hard facts as its supporters. T h e r e were few truly convincing or even completely convinced answers to the critics' questions of whether this aid was really

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necessary or w h e t h e r it would be h a r m f u l to Russian p r o d u c e r s . T h e r e were assertions, but no proof. No one carried out any food security surveys or "vulnerability analysis mapping" that could concretely assess the food needs of the population. In fact, it seems clear that, given that the Russian government had asked for the aid and that for mainly political and economic reasons the request was granted, no one was interested in a genuine debate about these issues. Thus one should perhaps ask the following questions: Why was the aid requested? And why was it granted? On the donors' side, things are clear. The U.S. secretary of agriculture, Dan Glickman, stated quite frankly: "This understanding is good news for the Russian people who might otherwise face the possibility of food shortages this winter and it is good news for America's farmers and ranchers, who are facing economic hardship related to abundant supplies and low prices." 38 The Europeans were more discreet in public, though the stakes were the same. The European aid, as an article in the Guardian Weekly pointed out, came out of surplus stocks that the EU buys from its farmers u n d e r the common agricultural policy (CAP) to keep prices high. [These products] are then stockpiled at considerable cost to taxpayers. T h e grain mountain is currently a r o u n d 17 million tons—about 10% of the EU's annual production—and Europe was delighted at the prospect of Russia taking 1.5 million tons off its hands. Russia was also to take a third of the current stocks of 480.000 tons of beef, and most of the milk powder stocks too. [Furthermore] pork prices have collapsed to the point where farmers are selling the meat for less than the cost of raising a pig. So the European Commission thought it would be a good wheeze to buy pork on the market, thus raising the price, and send it off to Russia." 39

And, in fact, the aid agreement was negotiated by the Commercial Service of the External Relations D e p a r t m e n t of the Commission, and the money to finance it came from the European Fund for the O r i e n t a t i o n and G u a r a n t e e of Agriculture (EFOGA), the b u r e a u within the Direction Générale VI of the European Commission (DG6) that functions as the executive arm of the CAR The fact that these considerations were p r e d o m i n a n t does not m e a n that they were the only ones. "This aid," explained Gilbert Dubois, deputy h e a d of the E u r o p e a n Commission delegation in Russia, "is an important gesture to Russia f r o m the political standpoint. It is a concrete expression of our aid. O u r partner asked us for h e l p a n d we gave it. T h i s was r e i n f o r c e d by t h e s i t u a t i o n in Yugoslavia: The Russian Government was afraid we would cut the aid, but we did not. On the contrary, it enabled us to send a clear message

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that even if t h e r e are local difficulties, we will n o t a b a n d o n Russia." 40 In any event, as the Guardian Weekly observed, "there was precious little else that E u r o p e or the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y could d o to assist Moscow. Because of the Russian default o n its loans last August, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d h a s d e c r e e d t h a t t h e r e will b e n o W e s t e r n l o a n s o r c r e d i t s u n t i l t h e d e b t s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e f a t e of Russian e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s have b e e n settled." 4 1 It is n o accident that o n e of the first Western voices to call f o r aid was that of the IMF. O n t h e R u s s i a n side, t h e stakes, o n t h e c o n t r a r y , w e r e m o r e o b s c u r e . To listen to t h e Russian press, t h e e n t i r e q u e s t i o n simply came down to o n e of these affairs Russia has a c c u s t o m e d us to: Kulik would have l a u n c h e d a n d p u s h e d this p r o g r a m simply to h e l p s o m e of his influential f r i e n d s get richer. This is w h e r e the i n t e r m e d i a r i e s c o m e in: agents a p p o i n t e d by t h e Russian g o v e r n m e n t to carry o u t t h e customs clearance, storage, a n d distribution of the aid. T h e backg r o u n d a n d m e t h o d of selection of these agents are, to say the least, troubling. T h e y were n a m e d in b o t h the U.S. a n d E u r o p e a n agreem e n t s : R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t f o r w h e a t a n d rye, R a z n o i m p o r t f o r rice, a n d Rosmyasomoltorg a n d P r o d i n t o r g f o r m e a t a n d p o w d e r e d milk (the latter two, incidentally, have the same address a n d are conside r e d by s o m e observers to be o n e firm). H o w were these firms selected? Curiously, L e o n i d Cheshinsky, the d i r e c t o r of R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t , was a m e m b e r of the Russian delegation to the first aid negotiations, in O c t o b e r 1998. Immediately after the preliminary a g r e e m e n t with the U n i t e d States, Kulik a n n o u n c e d that R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t a n d t h r e e o t h e r firms h a d b e e n selected by the g o v e r n m e n t to serve as intermediaries—a very lucrative f u n c t i o n , as they were to receive a 3 p e r c e n t commission o n the a m o u n t of goods e n t r u s t e d to t h e m , a m o u n t i n g to r o u g h l y thirty million dollars in k i n d . C r i t i c i s m was i m m e d i a t e . " N e i t h e r P r o d i n t o r g n o r Myasom o l t o r g , " a c c o r d i n g to L e o n i d K h o l o d , "are m a r k e t l e a d e r s in t h e wholesale f o o d t r a d e . " As f o r R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t , its b a d r e p u t a t i o n p r e c e d e d it: It h a d a l r e a d y " o v e r s e e n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of W e s t e r n h u m a n i t a r i a n aid in the early 1990s, when millions of dollars' worth of aid e n d e d u p in the pockets of private c o m p a n i e s linked to c o r r u p t officials." 4 2 At first, Kulik stated that n o o p e n t e n d e r would be held: "A tend e r has to b e a n n o u n c e d o n e m o n t h in advance. T h e process itself will take o n e m o r e m o n t h , a n d t h e n we will have a n o t h e r two m o n t h s of blah-blah." But a c c o r d i n g to a 1996 presidential d e c r e e , this type of federal contract must be p u t u p f o r tender. Kulik answered that "a law c o u l d b e passed to a u t h o r i z e t h e new s c h e m e . " 4 3 A f t e r s t r o n g p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e Ministry of A g r i c u l t u r e , a n d p r o b a b l y f r o m t h e

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A m e r i c a n s a n d t h e E u r o p e a n s , a "closed" t e n d e r was issued, t h e t e r m s a n d p r o c e d u r e s of w h i c h w e r e n o t disclosed: T h e s a m e c o m p a n i e s w e r e selected. 4 4 T h e a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t , in p a r t i c u l a r , s t a r t e d p i l i n g u p in t h e press. Grigory Yavlinsky, l e a d e r of t h e political party Yabloko, publicly a c c u s e d G e n n a d y Kulik of c o r r u p t i o n . T h e t e n d e r also s e e m e d to have b e e n irregular. A c c o r d i n g to Izvestia, "only o r g a n izations t h a t have n o d e b t s to t h e State a r e allowed to t a k e p a r t in s u c h a t e n d e r . ... [However, R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t ] still owes 1.3 billion r o u b l e s to t h e b u d g e t . " 4 5 T h e s a m e article q u o t e d a Newsweek article that, in discussing t h e diversions a n d o t h e r m a n i p u l a t i o n s t h a t overshadowed the 1992-1993 aid p r o g r a m , specifically f i n g e r e d R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t a n d o p p o s e d its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e c u r r e n t o p e r a tion. F o r p a r t of t h e Russian press, t h e r e c o u l d b e n o d o u b t : Kulik c r i e d f a m i n e a n d r e q u e s t e d t h e aid simply in o r d e r to h a n d it over to his f r i e n d C h e s h i n s k y a n d to d r a w a n e n o r m o u s p r o f i t f r o m i t — a t least o n e h u n d r e d million dollars, w i t h o u t even stealing any of it, b u t simply by playing o n p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l s in t h e r e g i o n s . 4 6 Russian j o u r n a l i s t s w e r e n o t t h e only o n e s w h o w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e f a t e of t h e a i d . F o u r days a f t e r s i g n i n g t h e E u r o p e a n a g r e e m e n t , J a c q u e s Santer, p r e s i d e n t of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n , c o n f e s s e d o n L u x e m b u r g television: But I tell you now, as I told the European Council, I cannot guarantee that the food will end up in the right hands. We don't have the staff to do it. With the mess that currently reigns in Russia, I'm sure that the EU Court of Auditors will come back in three or four years, when it makes its report on this, and conclude, "There were irregularities. Santer let it happen again." ... But how do we control that? We cannot guarantee ... that the money won't end up in the hands of the Russian mafia, or the beef we send them won't be exported back to us. How on earth can we control that from Brussels? 47 T h e obsession with diversion, however, s e e m s to us (as J . C. R u f i n n o t e d in his discussion of t h e ARA; see N o t e 7) a false p r o b l e m . It m a t t e r e d little, in fact, t h a t R o s k h l e b p r o d u k t m i g h t sell t h e f o o d a bit m o r e expensively t h a n t h e prices fixed in t h e a g r e e m e n t s a n d p o c k e t t h e p r o f i t s , as l o n g as t h e s u m s a g r e e d u p o n in f a c t r e a c h e d t h e P e n s i o n F u n d . It m a t t e r e d little w h e t h e r C h e s h i n s k y o r e v e n Kulik was c o r r u p t o r n o t , as l o n g as t h e aid a c h i e v e d its goals. We shall see f u r t h e r o n if this is t h e case. T h e p a r a n o i a of t h e Russian m e d i a is q u i t e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , given t h e c u r r e n t c l i m a t e in t h e c o u n t r y . H o w e v e r , it s e e m s d i f f i c u l t t o believe t h a t c o r r u p t i o n was t h e p r i m a r y m o t i v e b e h i n d t h e r e q u e s t

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f o r a i d — a r e q u e s t t h a t , let us n o t f o r g e t , initially c a m e f r o m Primakov, who has never b e e n accused of c o r r u p t i o n by anyone, even if the negotiations were t h e n c o n d u c t e d a n d c o n c l u d e d by Kulik. T h e West, in spite o f — o r p e r h a p s because of—all t h e b l u n d e r s m a d e in Russia, is n o t naive. Yes, the cries a b o u t f a m i n e were grossly exaggerated, b u t the issue of agricultural deficits was real, as was the issue of the aid's effect o n local p r o d u c t i o n . If the aid were truly h a r m f u l , the West m i g h t well think that the Russians would n o t have asked f o r it. It was f o r t h e m , after all, to d e t e r m i n e their needs. It is probably easier to u n d e r s t a n d Kulik's motives if o n e u n d e r stands his logic. "Kulik is n o t a m a n of the m a r k e t , " a World Bank e x p e r t explained, "he is a m a n who still thinks in terms of a p l a n n e d economy. A n d a c c o r d i n g to this logic, ' t h e m o r e you have, the better.' This f o r e i g n f o o d aid policy was simply n o t t h o u g h t t h r o u g h . Kulik has very little knowledge in this field a n d h e was very ill-advised." 48 T h u s , the p r o b l e m of the p r o d u c e r s was n o t seen as a p r o b l e m of the market, b u t simply as a p r o b l e m of lack of the resources that the state s h o u l d provide. For Kulik, as f o r his C o m m u n i s t allies, such an operation could only be profitable. From a p e r s o n a l s t a n d p o i n t , it e n a b l e d Kulik to p e r s o n a l l y p l a n a n d a l l o c a t e massive a m o u n t s of f o o d . It b o o s t e d his image a n d consequently his authority a n d power. All of Russia's governors, in o r d e r to receive a p a r t of the aid, would have to go t h r o u g h him. From a political s t a n d p o i n t , this o p e r a t i o n could b e p r e s e n t e d to t h e e l e c t o r a t e as a g r e a t success of t h e C o m m u n i s t s . N u m e r o u s s o u r c e s c o n f i r m e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , Kulik's first priority was the Pension F u n d , m e a n i n g the m o n e t i z a t i o n of the aid in o r d e r to f e e d the special a c c o u n t o p e n e d f o r this p u r p o s e . 4 9 P e n s i o n e r s , of course, are the m a i n s o u r c e of C o m m u n i s t s u p p o r t . T h e " h u m a n i t a r i a n " a s p e c t of t h e aid c o u l d also b e u s e d by t h e C o m m u n i s t s , who could portray the distribution as a result of their efforts ( a l t h o u g h this seems to have b e e n a lesser priority f o r Kulik t h a n the Pension F u n d ) .

Large Numbers of Vulnerable People As we suggested earlier, over a n d above all these debates, the n e e d s r e m a i n . A n d n e e d s t h e r e are. F o o d insecurity is c o n s i d e r a b l e a n d widespread t h r o u g h o u t Russian society. It is not, of course, a m a t t e r of f a m i n e , like that of 1921-1922 a n d 1932-1933. It is r a t h e r a question of c h r o n i c u n d e r n u t r i t i o n , of deficiencies in m i c r o n u t r i e n t s , a n d so o n . Such p r o b l e m s nationwide can have a serious impact: severe p r o b l e m s of growth a n d d e v e l o p m e n t f o r children; increased vulnera-

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bility of a d u l t s to o p p o r t u n i s t i c i n f e c t i o n s , especially tuberculosis, which has r e a c h e d e p i d e m i c p r o p o r t i o n s in Russia; increased mortality rate f o r elderly people, clearly seen in the a b r u p t d r o p in average life expectancy. W h o i n d e e d are t h e m a i n victims of these p r o b l e m s ? First, t h e elderly, who are strongly d e p e n d e n t o n their pensions. T h e purchasing power of those pensions has collapsed (the average m o n t h l y pension of a b o u t 300 roubles in August 1999 was worth less t h a n fifteen dollars); f u r t h e r m o r e , the pensions are rarely paid o n time. T h e n e x t g r o u p of victims is p e o p l e living in institutions: prisoners ( m o r e t h a n o n e m i l l i o n in R u s s i a ) , o r p h a n s o r a b a n d o n e d c h i l d r e n , i n s a n e patients, a n d others. In hospitals, patients have to provide n o t only t h e i r m e d i c i n e , b u t also t h e i r own f o o d . A n d even w h e n t h e f o o d available in such institutions gives e n o u g h or nearly e n o u g h calories, it lacks variety: n o meat, n o fresh vegetables, n o dairy products, only cabbage, potatoes, a n d kasha (groats of various g r a i n ) . T h e prisons a n d c h i l d r e n ' s institutions s o m e h o w survive, c o p i n g in d i f f e r e n t ways: b a k e r i e s to p r o d u c e g o o d s to sell a n d to p r o d u c e t h e i r own f o o d , p o t a t o f a r m i n g , small b u s i n e s s e s r u n n i n g at 10 p e r c e n t capacity. Worse still is t h e situation of v u l n e r a b l e p e r s o n s living a m o n g t h e general p o p u l a t i o n : millions of sick or isolated elderly p e o p l e without a g a r d e n plot, without a family, without friends. This is to say n o t h i n g of p e o p l e without d o c u m e n t s a n d of homeless p e o p l e , whose situation is catastrophic: Last winter m o r e t h a n 116 of t h e m d i e d of cold in the streets of Moscow, by far the most affected city in the country. T h e f o o d aid p r o g r a m , a c c o r d i n g to Asif C h a u d h r y , h a d two objectives: to h e l p r e d u c e deficits in the regions a n d to build u p the Pension F u n d t h r o u g h monetization. 5 0 We have seen that while the first p u r p o s e r e m a i n e d ambiguous, the second o n e was less so. T h e m a i n criticism in this area c o n c e r n e d the Russian g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to collect the m o n e y a n d the d o n o r s ' ability to m o n i t o r a n d guara n t e e the o p e r a t i o n . T h e most pessimistic, such as Izvestia, went so far as to suggest that most of the m o n e y would b e stolen or s i p h o n e d off by the regions. But the system set u p by the d o n o r s to g u a r a n t e e the t r a n s f e r of t h e m o n e y to t h e two special a c c o u n t s o p e n e d by t h e M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e ( f r o m w h i c h it w o u l d b e t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e P e n s i o n F u n d ) s e e m e d — a s f a r as is possible in a c o u n t r y s u c h as Russia—well t h o u g h t o u t a n d t r a n s p a r e n t . Let us c o n s i d e r t h e U.S. a r r a n g e m e n t (the E u r o p e a n o n e d o e s n o t differ m u c h ) . First, a set price would b e fixed f o r each allotment: T h a t is, f o r a given region a n d a given a m o u n t of f o o d p r o d u c t s , a j o i n t U.S.-Russian c o m m i s s i o n w o u l d fix t h e "value at t h e p o r t of entry," the sum to be t r a n s f e r r e d to the special a c c o u n t . Storage a n d

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t r a n s p o r t a t i o n costs would subsequently b e b e d d e d . T h e final price would be the o n e paid by the "first p u r c h a s e r " in each region, usually a state company, sometimes a wholesaler or a private f o o d processing f a c t o r y . E a c h r e c e i v i n g r e g i o n w o u l d sign a g u a r a n t e e w i t h t h e Ministry of Agriculture, certifying that the m o n e y would be paid back to the special a c c o u n t . In addition, given the n o n p a y m e n t p r o b l e m s that plague Russia, the Ministry of Finance a g r e e d to set a "hook" o n this money: For any region that did n o t pay by a set d e a d l i n e , the sum of the d e b t would be d e d u c t e d f r o m the m o n e y that the Federal gove r n m e n t owed to that region f o r its b u d g e t payments a n d would b e t r a n s f e r r e d directly into the special account. T h e A m e r i c a n Embassy was to check all b a n k transactions, a n d at some p o i n t an i n d e p e n d e n t firm would carry o u t an external audit. A c c o r d i n g to Asif Chaudhry, the first payments were paid into the special a c c o u n t by May 1999. 51 A n d the Russian g o v e r n m e n t s e e m e d so sure of the i n c o m e to be o b t a i n e d u n d e r this system that in May it b o r r o w e d a large s u m f r o m S b e r b a n k to pay p e n s i o n s , a n a m o u n t that would be r e i m b u r s e d f r o m the revenues o b t a i n e d f r o m the f o o d aid. It s e e m e d that the g o v e r n m e n t ' s anxiety over the Pension F u n d was real a n d t h a t t h e system a d o p t e d certainly did n o t rely o n t h e g o o d will of the regions to collect the money. But even the timely p a y m e n t of pensions lagged far b e h i n d the n e e d s . We have a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h e issue of f o o d accessibility: Even with 300 roubles, how can o n e h o p e to survive if a loaf of b r e a d costs 5 roubles a n d a subway ticket is 3 roubles? T h e fact that statistically speaking t h e r e m i g h t b e e n o u g h sugar or p o w d e r e d milk in a given region did n o t m e a n that p e o p l e could buy such products: A third of the p o p u l a t i o n was t h o u g h t to lack the necessary p u r c h a s i n g power. Only direct a n d f r e e aid h e l d o u t any h o p e f o r h e l p i n g these p e o p l e . A n d as far as we are c o n c e r n e d , this r e m a i n s the only criterio n by which o n e can j u d g e the aid operations. T h e U n i t e d States, as we have seen, p l a n n e d f r o m the very start to d i s t r i b u t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e quantity of f r e e f o o d : five h u n d r e d t h o u sand tons in total, twice as m u c h as the aid distributed by the World F o o d P r o g r a m in N o r t h K o r e a , w h e r e a g e n u i n e f a m i n e r a g e d . C o n s i d e r i n g t h e b a d e x p e r i e n c e s of p r e v i o u s aid o p e r a t i o n s , o n e could f e a r the worst for the 400,000-ton a l l o t m e n t to b e distributed d i r e c t l y by t h e g o v e r n m e n t . " W h e n [ t h e p r o d u c t s ] g e t t o t h e r e g i o n s , " said A r k a d y Zloshevsky, t h e d i r e c t o r g e n e r a l of O G O , a m a j o r firm o n the Russian seed market, " t h e r e will be governors who will provide [Western] officials with the d o c u m e n t a t i o n a b o u t the aid distribution. But they will only give t h e m access to select i n f o r m a t i o n . N o Western observer will ever really b e able to ascertain how the aid

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was actually distributed." 5 2 We have also seen J a c q u e s Santer's opinion o n this p o i n t . Finally, as R o m a n Serbyn, a historian at Q u e b e c University, p o i n t e d out: "To reach the needy p o p u l a t i o n , control must b e exercised by t h e d o n a t i n g agency a n d n o t b e left to t h e [local] authorities." 5 3 Yet U.S. officials o f f e r e d assurance t h a t strict c o n t r o l m e c h a n i s m s would be p u t into place, with c o m p l e t e lists of beneficiary institutions a n d U.S. m o n i t o r s w h o would carry o u t spot checks in almost every region c o n c e r n e d . T h e r e m a i n i n g 100,000 tons were to be distributed directly by reliable i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations such as the IFRC. T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n h a d n o t p l a n n e d any direct aid within the f r a m e w o r k of this o p e r a t i o n . Of all the issues raised, this o n e seems to us to be t h e most o p e n to criticism. Why is it that the EU is n o t plann i n g direct aid? In fact, the E u r o p e a n aid a g r e e m e n t s at least conside r e d the possibility of direct aid; 5 4 a n d s o m e E u r o p e a n officials, in p a r t i c u l a r those within t h e E u r o p e a n d e l e g a t i o n in Moscow, would like to have seen a h u m a n i t a r i a n c o m p o n e n t in their o p e r a t i o n . At the b e g i n n i n g of March 1999, the deputy h e a d of delegation went so f a r as to p r o p o s e q u a n t i t i e s of f o o d to a n u m b e r of h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s u c h as t h e IFRC a n d Action Against H u n g e r . T h i s offer was rejected, however, because the E u r o p e a n U n i o n was u n a b l e to pay t h e h i g h costs of t r a n s p o r t , d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d m o n i t o r i n g involved in such a p r o g r a m . T h e p r o b l e m was mainly of a b u r e a u c r a t ic n a t u r e : T h e f o o d aid was m a n a g e d by the DG-6, or m o r e precisely by the EFOGA, which (unlike the USDA, which is s t r u c t u r e d differe n t l y ) h a s n o b u d g e t f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d . E C H O , f o r its p a r t , e x p l a i n e d to t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s that, since DG-6 h a d given Russia so m u c h f o o d , E C H O could n o t d o anything extra. Financing a p r o g r a m to distribute f o o d u n d e r DG-6 control was also impossible. T h e question was raised in mid-March by IFRC a n d Action Against H u n g e r at a m e e t i n g with a E u r o p e a n p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l e g a t i o n in c h a r g e of r e l a t i o n s with Russia: C o n s t a n c e Krehl, a m e m b e r of t h e E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t a n d h e a d of t h e d e l e g a t i o n , p r o m i s e d to try to find a way o u t of the impasse in consultation with Emma Bonino, the t h e n - E u r o p e a n commissioner for humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, the very n e x t day the latter h a d to resign a l o n g with t h e e n t i r e c o m m i s s i o n . This final a t t e m p t t h e r e f o r e r e m a i n e d fruitless. T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n did n o t even try to push the Russians to dist r i b u t e p a r t of t h e a i d t h e m s e l v e s , as t h e A m e r i c a n s h a d d o n e . N e i t h e r t h e h i g h - r a n k i n g E u r o p e a n officials f r o m t h e C o m m e r c i a l Service of t h e E x t e r n a l Relations, w h o n e g o t i a t e d t h e a g r e e m e n t s , n o r t h e DG-6, w h i c h was c o n c e r n e d only with g e t t i n g rid of CAP

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stocks as c h e a p l y as p o s s i b l e a n d a g r e e d t o pay t r a n s p o r t o n l y u p t o t h e Russian border, paid any attention to the question. T h e Russian s i d e also s h o w e d l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t . T h a t is r e g r e t t a b l e . A b a l a n c e d a s s e s s m e n t of this massive a n d costly o p e r a t i o n h a s yet t o b e c a r r i e d o u t a n d will u n d o u b t e d l y t a k e s o m e t i m e . It is still t o o early t o follow in t h e f o o t s t e p s of n u m e r o u s critics a n d to assert t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s of t h e d o n o r s w e r e i n c o m p a t i b l e with g e n u i n e a n d e f f e c t i v e a i d . At this p o i n t we s i m p l y d e p l o r e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , a v i c t i m of its o w n b u r e a u c r a t i c r e s t r i c t i o n s , was u n a b l e t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t n o t o n l y its o w n i n t e r e s t s a n d t h o s e of Yevgeny P r i m a k o v ' s g o v e r n m e n t , b u t also t h o s e of t h e m o s t v u l n e r a b l e a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d p o p u l a t i o n s of Russia.

Notes J o n a t h a n Littell is head of mission, Action Against Hunger-Russia. 1. Kirill Koriukin, "IMF Calls for Food, Cabinet f o r Cash," Moscow Times, 21 October 1998. 2. Quoted in ibid. 3. All U.S. a g r e e m e n t s a r e a v a i l a b l e o n t h e USDA Web site: http://www.usda.gov. 4. T h e two core documents are the M e m o r a n d u m of Understanding on Implementation of Free Delivery of Food Products, dated 20 January 1999 a n d t h e O p e r a t i o n a l M e m o r a n d u m of U n d e r s t a n d i n g C o n c e r n i n g t h e Implementation of Free Delivery of Food Products, dated 19 February 1999, which complements and clarifies the first one. T h e 19 February agreement listed the food products to be given: wheat, 1 million tons; rye, 0.5 million tons; white rice, 50,000 tons; beef, 150,000 tons; pork, 100,000 tons; and dry milk, 50,000 tons. 5. "US Aid Saves Face, Not Russia," Moscow Times, 5 November 1998. 6. Ibid. 7. Jean-Claude Rufin, Le Piège humanitaire (Paris: J. C. Lattes, 1986), pp. 39-40. 8. Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrows (Oxford: N.p., 1985). This is a key book on the history of collectivization and the manipulation of famine in the USSR. 9. François Bonnet, "Moscow Wants to Negotiate Massive Food Imports at Very Low Prices," Le Monde, 29 October 1998. 10. Associated Press dispatch quoted in the Moscow Times, 21 October 1998. 11. Bonnet, "Moscow Wants to Negotiate Massive Food Imports at Very Low Prices." 12. Ibid. 13. Kirill Koriukin, "Minister: Food Will Last Winter," Moscow Times, 30 October 1998. 14. Igor Korolkov, "Zachem Kulik pugal stranu golodom," Izvestia, 12 April 1999.

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15. Koriukin, "Minister: F o o d Will Last Winter." 16. "Russia Rejects t h e D u m p i n g of F o r e i g n F o o d Aid," Agence France Presse, 29 O c t o b e r 1998. 17. " N o D a n g e r of F a m i n e T h i s W i n t e r , A c c o r d i n g t o M i n i s t e r of Agriculture," Agence France Presse, 24 N o v e m b e r 1998. 18. "Russia Lacks 7 Million T o n s of Cereals," Agence France Presse, 30 N o v e m b e r 1998. 19. Declaration in Komsomolskaia Pravda, r e p r i n t e d in "Russia Claims It H a s S u f f i c i e n t F o o d Reserves f o r 1999," Agence France Presse, 26 D e c e m b e r 1998. 20. "No H u n g e r in Russia," Interfax, 2 F e b r u a r y 1999. 21. Korolgov, "Zachem Kulik pugal s t r a n u g o l o d o m . " 22. Personal discussion with a E u r o p e a n U n i o n e x p e r t . Moscow, n.d. 23. D u r i n g t h e g r e a t f a m i n e of 1932-1933, f o r e x a m p l e , peasants only really b e g a n to die o n a mass scale f r o m March 1933 o n w a r d . Cf. C o n q u e s t , The Harvest of Sorrows. 24. Discussion with Ruslan Musaiev, d i r e c t o r of t h e p r e t r i a l d e t e n t i o n c e n t e r of Kyzyl, Mowcow, n.d. 25. Discussion with Asif C h a u d h r y , minister-counselor f o r agriculture of t h e U n i t e d States Embassy in Moscow, Moscow, n.d. 26. Private discussion with a f o o d security e x p e r t of t h e World Bank, Moscow, n.d. In t h e e n d , t h e Russian a u t h o r i t i e s simply fixed t h e prices of basic f o o d items in most regions, driving a n u m b e r of businesses, i n c l u d i n g bakeries, close to bankruptcy. 27. Ibid. 28. " P o o r H u n g r y Russia Sells F o o d to t h e West," Moscow Times, 14 N o v e m b e r 1998. 29. In 1997, Russia i m p o r t e d t h i r t e e n billion dollars worth of f o o d , that is, a t h i r d of t h e total c o n s u m p t i o n of t h e country. See "Does Russia N e e d Food Aid? Even D o n o r s Ask," Reuters, 26 N o v e m b e r 1998. 30. Discussion with Asif C h a u d h r y , USDA. 31. V e r o n i q u e Soule, "La 'cuisse d e B u s h ' d o n n e la c h a i r d e p o u l e , " Libération, 28 D e c e m b e r 1998. 32. Ibid. 33. Q u o t e d in Selskaia Jizn, 5 May 1999. 34. Kirill Koriukin, "Russia Takes U p EU O f f e r of Aid," Moscow Times, 13 N o v e m b e r 1999. 35. "Does Russia N e e d Food Aid? Even D o n o r s Ask." 36. Discussion with Asif C h a u d h r y , USDA. 37. Discussion with T o m Wiley, a g r i c u l t u r a l a t t a c h é , d e l e g a t i o n of t h e E u r o p e a n Commission in Russia, Moscow, n.d. 38. " S t a t e m e n t by Agricultural Secretary D a n Glickman o n Food Aid f o r Russia," Release n o . 0459.98, 6 N o v e m b e r 1998 (press release available o n t h e USDA Web site: h t t p : / / w w w . u s d a . g o v ) . 39. Martin Walker, "EU Aid to Russia Gives Food f o r N o u g h t , " Guardian Weekly, 28 F e b r u a r y 1999. 40. D i s c u s s i o n with G i l b e r t D u b o i s , d e p u t y h e a d of d e l e g a t i o n , E u r o p e a n Commission Delegation in Russia, Moscow, n.d. 41. Walker, "EU Aid to Russia Gives F o o d f o r N o u g h t . " 42. Kirill Koriukin, "US Trusts Russia's Aid Distribution," Moscow Times, 10 N o v e m b e r 1998.

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43. Koriukin, "Russia Takes Up EU Offer o f Aid." 44. Kirill Koriukin, " T e n d e r for Food Aid Picks Insider Trio," Moscow Times, 11 D e c e m b e r 1998. 45. Korolkov, "Zachem Kulik pugal stranu golodom." 46. Ibid. T h e arguments about price differentials are rather complicated and cannot be summed up here. However, considering the system that had b e e n set up for fixing prices ahead of time, such discrepancies should not occur, though a certain profit could still remain theoretically possible. 47. Walker, "EU Aid to Russia Gives Food for Nought." 48. Private discussion with a food security expert o f the World Bank. 49. Discussion with Gilbert Dubois, European Commission Delegation in Russia. 50. Discussion with Asif Chaudhry, USDA. 51. Ibid. 52. Quoted in Yevgenia Borisova, "Devil Is in Details for European Food Aid," Moscow Times, 12 February 1999. 53. Quoted in Leonid Bershidsky, "Russia Agonizes over Accepting Aid," Moscow Times, 22 O c t o b e r 1998. 54. T h e Operational Memorandum o f Understanding C o n c e r n i n g the Implementation o f Free Delivery o f Food Products actually notes in article 3.7 that "in exceptional cases, a portion o f the products may be distributed f r e e o f c h a r g e to t h e m o s t v u l n e r a b l e p a r t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n in t h e s e regions." But no serious measures have been taken to carry out this provision, either on the Russian or the European side.

31 Hunger in the United States Trudy Lieberman

Randall Mueck's j o b at San Francisco's meal c l e a r i n g h o u s e is to decide who will get food and who will wait. H u n d r e d s of the city's h o m e b o u n d elderly are on Mueck's waiting list, and the n u m b e r grows each month. All qualify for a hot, home-delivered meal u n d e r the federal Older Americans Act, but there isn't enough money to feed everyone. Seniors who move up the fastest are those in the custody of adult protective services, the dying, and the very old. Twenty-five percent of the people asking for food are over ninety. "I try to think of all 411 [on the waiting list] and fit someone in accordingly," Mueck explains. "Age is going to b u m p somebody way up." Audrey Baker, age seventy-nine, waited more than four months for food. W h e n she first asked for help, Mueck assigned h e r 750 points out of the 900 or so she needed to qualify for a meal. By the time she r e a c h e d 877, she was almost at the h e a d of the q u e u e . (Each day on the list adds a point.) Baker, a thin woman, is blind, falls a lot, and broke her back. She also has hypertension and diabetes. "I've outlived everybody else in my family," Baker says. "I d o n ' t have any friends." Her only help is an aide who comes for two hours on Friday. Like many seniors, Baker is vague a b o u t what she eats. "It's whatever I can afford," she says. O n e night it was only an apple

This chapter is an adaptation by the author of "Hunger in America" from The Nation (30 March 1998) and "Hunger Watch: America's Elders Are Waiting for Food" from Aging Today (January/February 1999) by Trudy Lieberman. 303

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and some nuts. She had a chicken in the freezer, but no strength to cook it. Food isn't far from her mind, though. On the table beside the a r m c h a i r in h e r tiny living r o o m is a copy of the food magazine Cooking Light, in braille. "She's clearly struggling," says Frank Mitchell, a social worker with San Francisco's Meals on Wheels program. "How do you say, 'I know you're hungry. We'll serve you in three months?'" But that's the reality all across the country. Thousands of elderly m e n and women too infirm to cook or even see the flames of the stove are put on ration lists for food in the most bountiful country in the world. A 1993 study by the Urban Institute found that some five million elderly have no food in the house, or worry about getting enough to eat. They experience what the social service business calls "food insecurity." In Miami alone, two thousand people are waiting. Says J o h n Stokesberry, executive director of Miami's Alliance for Aging, "By the time we clean up the waiting list, some will be dead." Another study, done for the federal Administration on Aging, looked at food programs during the 1993-1995 period and f o u n d that 41 percent of the country's four thousand providers of home-delivered meals to the elderly had waiting lists. Malnutrition among the elderly is commonplace; researchers at Florida International University estimate that 63 p e r c e n t of all older people are at m o d e r a t e or high nutritional risk. Some 88 percent of those receiving home-delivered meals are at similar risk, according to a study by Mathematica Policy Research. In the face of shifting demographics, the picture is not likely to improve. The number of people 60 and older has increased from 31 million in 1973 to 44 million today. And the number of the oldest of the old, those over 85, for whom assistance with meals is crucial, is growing even faster: Nearly 1.5 million people were over 85 in 1970; in 2000, their number will exceed 4 million. The h o m e b o u n d elderly are largely invisible. They are not glamorous, and giving them food is not at the cutting edge of philanthropy. They are the antithesis of the "greedy geezer" who has come to represent all of the elderly in the public mind. They have no lobbyists—the interests of senior organizations lie elsewhere. Politicians neglect them: They do not vote or make campaign contributions. Often their children have moved far from home, leaving them without caregivers, a dilemma more keenly felt by women, who usually live longer than men. In 1970, 56 p e r c e n t of the elderly over age seventy-five lived alone; by 1995, 76 percent were living by themselves. For many, there are no meal lists to get on. In Big Springs, a speck on the Nebraska prairie, 134 of the town's 495 residents are eli-

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gible for a meal. But there is n o money to start a program. Vic Walker, director of the Aging Office of Western Nebraska, does not even have e n o u g h money to feed those outside the city limits of Scottsbluff, the largest town in the area. O n e m a n living on a ranch three miles over the line " n e e d e d a meal so desperately," recalls Irma Walter, Walker's case m a n a g e r . "He was so d e b i l i t a t e d , b u t t h e r e was n o access to food."

The Federal Commitment Thirty-five years ago, in 1965, Congress recognized the l e n g t h e n i n g life span and the infirmities that come with old age and enacted the O l d e r Americans Act to help seniors live out their last days at h o m e with essential support: transportation, h o u s e h o l d help, and personal care. T h e act is n o t a welfare program; anyone over age sixty is eligible for services if t h e r e is room. In his 1972 b u d g e t message, President Nixon n o t e d that a "new c o m m i t m e n t to the aging is long overdue," a n d two n u t r i t i o n prog r a m s were a d d e d that year: (1) centralized, or c o n g r e g a t e , meal sites—now n u m b e r i n g about sixteen t h o u s a n d — w h e r e seniors could eat a h o t lunch and socialize a n d (2) a delivery service to serve a h o t meal to the h o m e b o u n d elderly. Meals p r e p a r e d by a cadre of local churches, social service agencies, and n o n p r o f i t organizations, many with similar n a m e s , were m e a n t to r e a c h m o b i l e s e n i o r s a n d t h e h o m e b o u n d in every nook and cranny of the United States. T h e f o o d p r o g r a m s were s u p p o s e d to p r o m o t e "better h e a l t h " a m o n g the older population "through improved nutrition" and offer "older Americans an opportunity to live their remaining years in dignity." Nixon pledged that the federal c o m m i t m e n t would "help make the last days of o u r older Americans their best days." At the b e g i n n i n g , Nixon tried to m a k e g o o d o n that promise. W h e n t h e O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t a n d B u d g e t t h o u g h t t h e initial f u n d i n g s h o u l d be $40 million, a n d Nixon's adviser o n aging, Dr. A r t h u r Flemming, suggested $60 million, Nixon u p p e d the a m o u n t to $100 million. T h r o u g h o u t the 1970s, f u n d i n g kept pace with need. A f t e r that, however, it did n o t . A d j u s t i n g f o r i n f l a t i o n , p e r capita appropriations for all O l d e r Americans Act programs in 1995 should have b e e n $39. Actual p e r capita f u n d i n g was only $19. A l t h o u g h total a n n u a l s p e n d i n g for services has g o n e f r o m $200 million in 1973 to almost $900 million today, that money n o t only has n o t kept u p with inflation b u t has n o t kept pace with the n u m b e r of people who n e e d help. T h e 1995 appropriations were down by a b o u t 50 percent

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relative to what the government spent in 1973. Money spent on the two food programs shrank by a similar amount. Though payment is not mandatory, three-quarters of the elderly who get a home-delivered meal and almost everyone who eats at the congregate sites contributes, sometimes as little as fifty cents, toward the roughly $5.30 it costs to provide a meal. Half of those receiving home-delivered meals and about one-third of participants eating at c o n g r e g a t e meal sites have a n n u a l i n c o m e s of less t h a n $7,900. "Those least able to pay won't eat unless they put something in," says Larry Ross, the chief fiscal officer for San Francisco's Commission on the Aging.

The Vanishing Commitment By today's standards, Nixon's game of one-upmanship seems so out of place it could have h a p p e n e d in another dimension. If anything, the federal commitment to the elderly has diminished, partly because the antigovernment ideology that has so permeated the public psyche has taken its toll on such basic programs as providing food for old people and partly because no congressional hero has emerged to champion the needs of the elderly. Indeed it is now fashionable to heap scorn on organizations like the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and to address all of the elderly as rich geezers who take money from the public table. So it was hardly surprising that when the deals were cut on the omnibus appropriations bill that went through Congress in the fall of 1998, programs for the elderly came up short. The amount allocated to congregate meals remained at $374 million; the sum for homedelivered meals was $112 million—the same funding levels as the year before. To make matters worse, $390 million was cut from the Social Services Block Grant, on which many local food programs rely in order to feed the h o m e b o u n d elderly. It was a l o n g s h o t t h a t m o r e m o n e y would be c o m i n g . T h e Clinton administration budget did not call for an increase. When the proposed budget for that year was a n n o u n c e d , Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala was asked by a reporter why no increase had been requested for programs aimed at older people, given the growing number of people who need help. Shalala replied: "Obviously we had to make some choices. What we recommend is sufficient for next year." In the meantime, waiting lists have grown longer in some parts of

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the country even though there has been a federal budget surplus of more than seventy million dollars. The budget gave bipartisan rewards to current and former members of Congress. Mitch McConnell, Patrick Leahy, Claiborne Pell, Paul Simon, and Robert Dole received a total of $21 million from taxpayers to preserve their legacies at various libraries and institutes—a sum that would have bought more than four million meals. There was also plenty of money for the military—for instance, the fifty million dollars for parts for a helicopter that the Navy did not request. Programs in Health and H u m a n Services that compete for funding with the food p r o g r a m s got gigantic increases. T h e National Institute of Health got a $2 billion raise, the Head Start budget rose by $300 million, and the Centers for Disease Control received a $200 million increase. Why does research on m u n d a n e subjects like grasshoppers rate h i g h e r t h a n h u n g e r w h e n it c o m e s to c o n g r e s s i o n a l largesse? Probably because if the government pays the research and development costs of finding a new treatment for some disease, or if it helps f a r m e r s grow b e t t e r l e t t u c e , private b u s i n e s s can b e n e f i t f r o m the technology and make money. Nobody profits f r o m feeding the elderly. In the 1999 budget, the Clinton administration asked for a modest $35 million increase in the budget for home-delivered meals. By fall 1999, the Senate had approved the increase, boosting the total allocated to home-delivered meals to $147 million. However, a House appropriations committee r e c o m m e n d e d no increase, leaving the f u n d i n g at the same level as the year before. It is not clear whether m o r e money will be going into home-delivered meals in the final budget bill that passes Congress. Competition for funds in the Labor, E d u c a t i o n , a n d H e a l t h a n d H u m a n Services a p p r o p r i a t i o n s bill (where f u n d i n g for the food programs resides) is tough. Food programs do not have forceful lobbyists or congressional champions; biotechnology firms do. Furthermore, the Older Americans Act itself is in trouble. For the last several years, Congress has refused to reauthorize the act, which provides t h e only f e d e r a l f r a m e w o r k f o r services to t h e elderly. Without the act in place, various programs could be parceled out to the states in the form of block grants, and the states could decide whether or not to f u n d them. Services, however scarce today, could become even scarcer. T h e dispute over reauthorization involves money that goes to organizations such as AARP, Green Thumb, and the National Council

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of S e n i o r Citizens, which a c c e p t f e d e r a l m o n e y to a d m i n i s t e r j o b training p r o g r a m s f o r the elderly. Conservative m e m b e r s of Congress a n d right-wing organizations want to e n d federal grants a n d send the p r o g r a m s to the states. For some of the g r o u p s that receive f u n d s , federal m o n e y is a m a t t e r of survival.

One Meal a Day It is n o t that the elderly who are currently receiving meals are living high o n the hog. In fact, they get only 260 meals a year, or o n e meal a day five days a week (most Americans eat t h r e e meals a day—1,095 a year). Usually n o f o o d is delivered o n weekends or holidays unless a p r o g r a m has raised o u t s i d e f u n d s to provide it. Only 4 p e r c e n t of f o o d providers routinely o f f e r m o r e t h a n o n e meal a day, five days a week, a n d few o f f e r w e e k e n d meals. In San Francisco, s o m e e i g h t h u n d r e d p e o p l e lucky e n o u g h to receive their f o o d f r o m Meals o n Wheels, o n e of the city's n i n e providers, get two meals seven days a week. T h e rest of the city's sixteen h u n d r e d f o o d recipients get only o n e . If the city's C o m m i s s i o n o n the Aging paid f o r two meals p e r p e r s o n , as many as f o u r h u n d r e d p e o p l e now served would n o t get any f o o d . T h e trade-off is c o n s t a n t a n d stark: Do m o r e p e o p l e get fewer meals, or d o fewer p e o p l e get m o r e meals? T h e Salvation Army, which serves the meals in San Francisco's T e n d e r l o i n district, resolves the question in favor of the former, b u t t h e r e is pain whichever way it is answered. Richard Bertolovzi lives in a single-room-occupancy (S.R.O.) hotel. H e is a skinny, b e a r d e d m a n with greasy hair, m i s s i n g f r o n t t e e t h , a n d o n e r e d eye t h a t l o o k s infected. "You d o n ' t deliver tomorrow, d o you?" "Bert" asks the y o u n g w o m a n delivering his n o o n meal of fish, coleslaw, f r u i t cocktail, c o r n b r e a d , a n d milk. A curtain of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t falls over his face, a n d h e looks away in disgust. "I'm hungry," h e says. "I can eat anything. I have a loaf of b r e a d , that's all. That's all I got. And I got some instant coffee." T h e Salvation Army is able to offer him only a can of Ensure, a nutritional drink, to get t h r o u g h the weekend.

The Limits of Philanthropy T h e conventional wisdom these days is that p h i l a n t h r o p y s h o u l d d o m o r e a n d g o v e r n m e n t as little as possible, or, as Heritage F o u n d a t i o n senior fellow Dan Mitchell puts it, "If it's worth doing, the private sector can d o it."

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When it comes to feeding the elderly, private-sector funding works a little bit in a few places, not at all in most others. In San Francisco, Meals on Wheels can raise thousands of dollars each year, thanks in part to fancy dinners cooked by the city's top chefs. Its New York counterpart can raise eight or nine million dollars through direct mail campaigns, social events, grants, and corporate contributions to provide some weekend meals and to whittle down the city's waiting list. Celebrities like Lena H o m e and Diane Sawyer think nothing of plunking down two or three hundred dollars to attend a Meals on Wheels event. But towns like Ramona, California, population thirty thousand, high in the hills northeast of San Diego, have no such benefactors. Chuck Hunt, board president of the town's senior center, tells how he placed ads in the Ramona Sentinel and North County Times asking one thousand people to pledge $100 or two thousand people to give $50. He collected exactly $1,600—twelve people gave $100 and got on the center's "honor roll"; eight donated $50 for a place on the "silver honor roll." Hunt also wrote to Allied Signal Aerospace, where he had worked for twenty-six years, asking for $25,000 to pay down overdue food bills and take care of repairs on the vans that deliver meals. He says he felt "let down" when his old employer said no. Raising private money in places like Ramona or Big Springs or even San Diego is not easy. There are few large corporations and foundations to tap, and if there are any, they have little interest in feeding the elderly. "If you flat-out ask people for food for seniors, you don't get much of a response," said Daniel Laver, who headed the Area Agency on Aging in San Diego. "Private foundations are looking at cutting-edge programs—new and innovative. Basic human needs programs are not as sexy."

State and Local Aid States must contribute at least 15 percent of the total cost of the two federal meal programs. Some states go beyond that. Pennsylvania, for instance, contributes its lottery proceeds to services for the elderly. Local governments sometimes kick in money, and where they do, those funds help keep the food programs afloat. County funds, including a dedicated portion of San Francisco's parking tax, make up about 38 percent of the California budget for home-delivered meals. The city of New York contributes 55 percent of the food program budget. Voters in Cincinnati have twice approved a property tax levy to support a variety of services for the elderly, most recently in

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the fall of 1998 by a margin of 65 to 35 percent. Eighty-three percent of Cincinnati's Council on Aging's $4.1 million budget for homedelivered meals is f u n d e d by the tax levy. "It's a myth that people d o n ' t want to help their elderly," says Bob Logan, director of the council, the agency serving the Cincinnati area. He says the levy "was overwhelmingly s u p p o r t e d by the young, the old, Republicans, Democrats, minorities and nonminorities." But even a generous stream of local money cannot stop waiting lists from mounting: In Cincinnati, local money just means those on the lists do not have to wait as long.

Penny-Wise and Pound-Foolish The United States has no national policy on aging. Instead, an unwritten policy directs resources to the most expensive care in the last places the elderly reside—nursing homes and hospitals. When malnourished seniors go to the hospital, they may end up staying longer and costing more money. The Massachusetts Dietetic Association estimates that for every dollar spent on nutrition programs, $3.25 is saved in hospital costs. A study in Little Rock, Arkansas, compared two groups of hospitalized seniors who were the same age and had the same diagnosis. One group had received home-delivered meals; the other group had not. Patients who got food stayed in the hospital half as long as those who did not. Ronni Chernoff, associate director of geriatric research at the Veterans Administration hospital in Little Rock, who supervised the research, figured that the cost of eight extra days in the hospital—some $4,800 at Little Rock rates—was the equivalent of providing someone with a meal a day for two and a half years. An acute episode, such as breaking a bone, healing a surgical incision, or the flu, makes demands that a poorly nourished body cannot accommodate. "The people I'm not serving but know in my heart of hearts I should are those just coming out of the hospital," says Gail Robillard, a nutritionist with the J e f f e r s o n Council on Aging in Metairie, Louisiana. Without such assistance, they often go back to the hospital, a vicious cycle that Robillard believes can be prevented with good nutrition. Medicare's home health care benefit covers the services of nurses, aides, and a variety of therapies, but not food. Without food, the elderly also go to nursing homes prematurely, adding to what is already a huge national expense. The United States spends about $80 billion a year on nursing home care, nearly half paid by taxpayers through Medicaid. A year in a nursing home aver-

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ages around $40,000; a year's worth of meals, $1,325. Lack of a coherent national policy on a g i n g stems partly f r o m a d e e p collective denial that our population is aging and will need services. We may all need home-delivered meals someday, but it's best not to think about that now. Part of the public's apathy results from a basic lack of sales appeal, important in a country that responds more easily to sound bites than to alleviating human suffering. Sickness caused by hunger does not have the same cachet as sickness caused by disease. That's why research at the National Institute of Health is seen as more glamo r o u s and m o r e worthy than everyday assistance provided by area agencies on aging. It is indeed ironic that the United States is willing to spend billions on treatments to p r o l o n g life but gives short shrift to basic human needs such as food and transportation that make that longer life worth living. In 1963, President Kennedy, quoting the historian Arnold Toynbee, noted in a special message to Congress that "a society's quality and durability can be measured by the 'respect and care given its elderly citizens.'" So far, we are not measuring up.

Notes Trudy Lieberman is director of the Consumers Union's Center for C o n s u m e r Health Choices.

32 Food Aid and Grain José Bidegain and Astrid Filliol

We cannot say we did not know. We cannot say there was nothing we could do. —Action Against H u n g e r Campaign, 1998-1999

Recent events have demonstrated as never before the extent to which food aid remains an essential form of assistance, even in Europe. It is useful to recall this as we note the steady decline in recent years in global food aid (from 17.3 million tons in 1993 to 8 million tons in 1998, with grain accounting for 90 percent of the total) both for economic reasons and as a result of the doubts that have been expressed in some quarters concerning the effectiveness of this instrument. This situation, however, contradicts the results of a survey that ranks hunger in the world as one of the main subjects of concern to French public opinion at the century's end. 1 This ranking is justified, as surveys conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization clearly show: More t h a n 830 million p e o p l e in the world suffer f r o m chronic malnutrition; 30 to 60 million, victims of disasters, suffer from severe hunger. The projected increase in world food needs does not hold out hope for any visible improvement in the situation. Moreover, this malnutrition is not a result of insufficient production, since the food that is available is quite enough, and the planet is perfectly capable of producing more food. Many countries that request aid are also exporters of food products (for instance, Sudan and Burma). We at Action Against Hunger have been taking effective action in the field for some twenty years now to combat the problem of food shortages in forty countries spread across four continents. We are aware of the causes of hunger that are first and foremost man-made:

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war, crises that are predominantly economic, absence of reserves to be used when conditions are temporarily unfavorable, embargoes, and so on. Indeed, food has become the weapon of choice in m o d e r n conflict. In situations of crisis, which require solutions of a political, economic, or social nature, it must be noted that food aid, unfortunately, still remains today the response that is best suited, at least in the short term, if the aim is to limit the consequences of man-made disasters. It remains clear, however, that this i n s t r u m e n t can in n o way replace what must be the principal objective of governments and of the international community: rebuilding the capacity of the populations to feed themselves. In this area, Action Against Hunger, unlike other international organizations specializing in the field of food aid, such as the World Food Program, offers more than a humanitarian logistics network. Indeed, our activities are based on two highly complementary pillars: t r a n s l a t i n g i n t o a c t i o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l ethical p r i n c i p l e s enshrined in our charter and using the technical and professional expertise of o u r technical departments at headquarters and of our teams in the field. Independence, neutrality, and nondiscrimination are the core principles of our demand for free and direct access to victims. The distribution of food products is carried out directly by our teams, which comprise residents of the receiving country u n d e r the supervision of expatriate professionals. We are able to monitor the effectiveness of our work, since we maintain an active presence among the vulnerable populations as we implement our programs. It should be pointed out that this task is carried out with complete transparency, and we are accountable to our donors and partners. Before any intervention, we of course undertake a review of the socioeconomic situation of the country so that our activities would respect the balance that exists; we learn the food and family habits of the populations concerned as well as their coping mechanisms with the aim of s u p p o r t i n g them. This preliminary study enables us to undertake a sound evaluation of needs and to focus accurately on vulnerable populations. T h e p r o g r a m s are based on a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and well-tested methodology that comprises various methods of food distribution, renutrition protocols for at-risk groups, and the use of foods that are specially suited to children and adults most severely affected by malnutrition. Notable among these foods is the therapeutic milk F100, d e v e l o p e d in c o l l a b o r a t i o n with the l a b o r a t o r y Nutriset, by the

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Nutrition Department of Action Against H u n g e r and now used by all organizations throughout the world. There are two types of programs: emergency programs that provide care for crisis victims (residents, displaced persons, refugees) and long-term programs, particularly in the field of agricultural rehabilitation. The latter seek to enable populations living in precarious conditions to reestablish their means of production and regain selfs u f f i c i e n c y ( d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e e d s , i r r i g a t i o n , a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l improvements). While the long-term objectives remain essentially the same, the methods employed can and should be adapted to the particular characteristics and to the n a t u r e of the emergency. O n the o n e h a n d , food aid through local purchases offers the advantage of being totally integrated into the structure of the local market and thus has a spinoff multiplier effect on the e c o n o m i c mechanisms. O n the o t h e r hand, the use of food aid in the form of physical stock is indispensable w h e n local p u r c h a s e s of f o o d are likely to cause u n d e s i r a b l e increases in price, especially in times of severe shortages. This mode of intervention also facilitates the monitoring of rations and permits greater flexibility. Since the e m b a r g o imposed by the U n i t e d Nations on Sierra Leone in 1997, which has prevented the shipment of essential food aid, we have sought to obtain the capacity to c o n d u c t this type of food aid operation by ourselves and in complete independence. We would do so in the form of physical stocks of food for situations in which the World Food Program is subject to very severe political pressures. Given the important role of cereals in food aid, Action Against H u n g e r needed to sensitize grain producers to the food emergency. Cereals, supplemented by rations of oil and proteins, are in effect the key foods that should be provided in emergency situations because of their extraordinary nutritional qualities. Ultimately, it will also be useful to develop technologies for the enrichment of the grains themselves. The conditions u n d e r which grains are transported and stored also determine the effectiveness of distribution arrangements. The know-how is already available in France, a major grain producer, which sees itself as having the "vocation to feed the world" through its substantial exports. It was therefore logical that Action Against H u n g e r should turn toward grain producers to obtain the indispensable support of their undeniable professional and organizational skills. O u r partnership has demonstrated its effectiveness in two quite different types of emergency situations:

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•

t e m p o r a r y or situation-based e m e r g e n c i e s , f o r which it is essential to intervene within a few days, as was the case in Kosovo. • chronic and therefore more predictable emergencies, for which a longer-term response is required, as was the case in Sierra Leone.

Some 740 tons of wheat flour were thus used to supply bread to 50,000 refugees in the camps in Macedonia for one month before the "official" aid arrived; in Sierra Leone, 990 tons of dry rations were supplied to approximately 3,700 families over a three-month period to enable these families to bridge the gap until the next harvest. The d i r e c t o r - g e n e r a l of t h e Grain P r o d u c e r s Association of F r a n c e , Georges-Pierre Malpel, traveled to Kosovo a n d M a c e d o n i a with Action Against Hunger in July 1999. After the twenty-five truckloads of flour supplied on an emergency basis to the affected populations, Kosovo's needs for seeds for the next crop were estimated at some 6,000 tons. The French seed production sector was thus requested to provide, in partnership with Action Against Hunger, rustic varieties, capable of thriving with few inputs and fertilizers. Therein lies the value of the concept of partnership that brings together complementary skills. In this case the partners were an NGO specializing in food distribution that is already on the ground, namely, Action Against Hunger, and a professional group from the French agricultural sector, the Grain Producers Association of France, pledging to commit itself on an ongoing basis to emergency and long-term humanitarian activities. This approach is innovative in France. For the first time, emergency food aid operations and agricultural rehabilitation programs are conceived and organized by an integral chain of solidarity, from the donation to the distribution phase after shipment. What is more, the arrangement has proven itself to be particularly effective because of the coordination that takes place before the crisis erupts. O u r two organizations have b e f o r e h a n d coordinated their know-how and their different areas of competence—nutrition, food security, food collection, packaging, stocking, quality control, transportation, logistics, distribution—and put in place procedures for accelerated action that have greatly reduced the time taken to deliver emergency aid. This integration of food aid, from the producer to the beneficiary, enables us to significantly reduce the risks of loss or inappropriate distribution. It strengthens our capacity to provide appropriate balanced rations on a timely basis in forms that are suited to the tar-

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get populations and that respect local production structures. Such a coordination of efforts is vital to the success of food aid operations, as the experience of humanitarian crises in the past decade has shown. In this spirit, the circle of collaboration that we have established with grain producers will continue to grow and attract other partners, such as local collectivities, transporters, financial institutions, and consultants, so that its beneficial impact would multiply n o t only beyond our frontiers, but also in France, where donors are happy to have the certainty that their gift has yielded the maximum benefit.

Notes José Bidegain was the c h a i r m a n of Action Against H u n g e r - F r a n c e f r o m 1990 u n t i l his tragic d e a t h in t h e fall of 1999. Astrid Filliol is d i r e c t o r of t h e Partnerships D e p a r t m e n t of Action Against Hunger. 1. Cf. Baromètre SOFRES (Paris: SOFRES [a French statistical institute], May 1999).

33 The Lomé Conventions and Food Security Jean-Jacques Gabas

In 1981, the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y p r o p o s e d a Plan of Action to Combat Hunger in the World. In 1984, Edgard Pisani, the European commissioner for development, wrote the following: "The struggle against hunger is the struggle for a new international economic order and the struggle for food aid." 1 Sixteen years later, it is time to assess the developments that have taken place in the area of food security, f r o m its c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n to its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , b o t h t h r o u g h national policies and through the approaches advocated by donors, chief among which is the European Commission. It was only in 1996 that the European Commission finally elaborated its "community program for food security and food aid." Indeed the problem of h u n g e r is still unresolved: Even though the summary indicators of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) show some very slight improvement over a long period, these results must be looked at much more closely than the averages indicate. Situations of famine still exist and cover very different realities. Those related to conflicts (civil wars) are increasing in number, while the means of preventing them remain quite ineffective. Those related to a succession of poor agricultural harvests comp o u n d e d by the exhaustion of the coping strategies of households are better known, and a review of the indicators, which go beyond agricultural and weather-related conditions, sheds greater light on the serious risk of food shortages. Natural disasters (flood, hurricanes, El Niño), for their part, result in chance famines whose scope is very often a result of poor coordination between the many external actors 319

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and national authorities. It should be noted, finally, that local situations of malnutrition are seen in countries that have grain surpluses and that zones of acute food insecurity, in both urban and rural areas, are found in many countries with fragile ecosystems, such as in the Sahel region. 2 There is no longer talk of a new international economic order, as economic globalization takes hold, and food aid is no longer the only response to crises. The very nature and characteristics of aid itself have changed profoundly, and in many situations a variety of tools is available to better predict the occurrence of food crises. W h a t are the political responses of E u r o p e to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states on the question of food security? W h a t m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t s are likely to e m e r g e , a n d how can t h e Commission respond to these constraints?

T h e L o m é Agreements: Notable Changes Since 1975 It is important to recall first of all the spirit of the Lomé Conventions, since the goal of cooperation that inspired them does not ignore the question of f o o d security. Moreover, t h e r e is not a single Lomé Convention but several. Even though they share a common purpose, each of them has had a different focus that gives it a certain specificity. The element that is common to the Lomé Conventions is the dialogue between the European Union and the ACP states as blocs and not as individual countries. It is the regional approach that has been adopted by the conventions. This first characteristic is important, since the interregional economic relations that are established will have at least two consequences: •

the contribution by the European Union to the establishment of regional economic subgroupings within the ACP; • the effects of European agricultural policies on the development process in the ACP States. The second element is the mechanism for financial cooperation, namely, the programming of assistance in phases, which gives a certain predictability to resource flows and reduces the volatility of official development assistance flows that are provided in the form of grants only (which distinguishes the Commission from other donors). The third element is trade and the establishment of a system of

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nonreciprocal trade preferences between the European Union and the ACP that discriminates against non-ACP states, thereby opening up the European market to ACP products and protecting ACP countries from the potential competition of European Union exports to the ACP. This trading a r r a n g e m e n t is based on protocols of agreement on products such as bananas, rum, beef, and sugar. For the ACP countries, which are highly d e p e n d e n t on their export income, any losses due to the instability of world prices are tempered by the triggering of price compensation systems: STABEX for agricultural products and SYSMIN for mineral products. A final major element has been the creation of a complex and original institutional system. The Council of Ministers has the power to amend or to supplement various provisions of the convention, but it is t h e J o i n t Assembly ( a r t i c l e s 29 a n d 32 of t h e L o m é IV C o n v e n t i o n ) , c o m p o s e d of an equal n u m b e r of m e m b e r s of the European Parliament and of parliamentarians designated by the ACP countries, that sets the Lomé system apart. The very existence of this f o r u m for dialogue and discussion of ideas between ACP countries and the European Union is unique. The contractual obligations and the political dialogue to which those obligations give rise are in fact the defining characteristics of all the conventions, together with the search for coherence and coordination between policies (trade and cooperation in particular), even if the latter aspect has been given greater emphasis since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. From these core e l e m e n t s , the c o n v e n t i o n s themselves have evolved in terms of their objectives, the volume of financial resources, and the n u m b e r of ACP partners (initially forty-six, the total is now seventy-one countries). Their objectives have evolved just as the conventions' priorities have changed together with the actors with which the cooperation policy is being pursued. This evolution in the dialogue is interesting insofar as it is closely related to the changing view of what constitutes a "developing economy." This may be seen f r o m the M e m o r a n d u m on the Community Development Policy published in 1982, which states the following: In its development activities, the Community will seek channels of political dialogue that go beyond mere negotiations on projects to be funded. While respecting the sovereignty of the beneficiary count r i e s o v e r t h e use of t h e r e s o u r c e s p r o v i d e d to t h e m by t h e Community, the latter considers that it has the right and the obligation to engage with the Governments of these countries in a dialogue on the effectiveness of the policies that they pursue. Such a dialogue was initially c o n d u c t e d on t h e specific subject of f o o d

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strategies. In order to support the adoption of coherent food strategies, t h e c o m m u n i t y will use means, i n c l u d i n g f o o d aid, which, except in cases of emergency, should be integrated into its development activity instead of being an end in itself.

Economic growth will be achieved through the development of one sector: agriculture. Political dialogue will be tested on the experiences of "food strategies" (to be discussed below) that would later be applied to the strategies of industrialization and energy. This shows the key role played by the agricultural sector in the process of development: a source of wealth through the achievement of gains in productivity, but also the occasion for a new form of political dialogue. An analysis of the relationships of cooperation leads to conclusions that are still valid today: Between the strict conditionalities of f u n d i n g a g e n c i e s a n d t h e i r r e s p o n s i b l e a b s e n c e of c o n d i t i o n s , we m u s t absolutely find channels of a political dialogue between those who provide external resources and local decisionmakers, and this political dialogue should go beyond m e r e haggling over terms or m e r e technical debates on projects to be financed. This focusing of funding resources on the objective of food security, the fundamental role of political dialogue, and better integration of food aid into o t h e r rural d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s were c o m b i n e d with the necessary strengthening of coordination between donors and of harmonization of the different policies of the European Commission. The first conventions contained very few references to regional integration; the m o s t r e c e n t , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , insist o n t h e r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n of economies as a condition for their development. If we analyze the objectives of the Lomé IV bis Convention (an extension of the Lomé IV Convention), we see that the convention puts absolutely no priority on any particular sector, and certainly not on the agricultural sector. There is movement toward other priorities t h a t could be d e s c r i b e d as h o r i z o n t a l , which c o n c e r n m o r e the modalities of aid t h a n priority activities in any given sector. T h e modalities, moreover, are very clearly set out. Strengthening of democratic conditionalities, respect for h u m a n rights, the notion of good governance, and strengthening of the rule of law all become essential criteria for selection. The suspension of cooperation may even take place in the event of serious violation of these principles. 3 Niger after the coup d'état of 27 January 1996 was the first case in which aid from the European Union was suspended. This mid-term revision of the convention introduced programming by phases, which marked a partial departure from the system of automatic allocation of aid in which any aid promised to every ACP state, after the convention was signed, was payable. The "novelty" in the sys-

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tem of Lomé IV bis is thus based on an assistance that is not only f o u n d e d on needs but also on "merit," since the selectivity of aid is m u c h m o r e delicate to i m p l e m e n t t h a n in previous conventions. Because of this additional criterion, 4 the policy dialog between the Direction Generale VIII of the European Commission (DG VIII) and each ACP state is strengthened. Special emphasis is placed on the partnership and on ownership.

From Food Strategy to Food Security: Changing Concepts, Unchanged Practices The European Commission's approach to food strategies outlined in the 1982 m e m o r a n d u m was innovative in at least two areas: It placed development projects in a coherent sectoral policy, and it sought to better integrate food aid into a long-term development policy. The third Lomé Convention, signed in 1984, had as a key element this approach to food strategies. Four ACP countries—Rwanda, Zambia, Kenya, and Mali—by way of experimenting, developed food strategies with the support of the European Community. In Mali, a commission for the development of a food strategy was set up to prepare a study of the following aspects: ecological zoning, agricultural statistics, research and development, processing of materials, logistics, marketing, consumption, health, and nutrition. This strategy covered all the parameters using a systemwide and comprehensive approach. T h e project approach, whose limitations were already generally known, was abandoned. But, f r o m the outset, the food strategy was confused with the technical awareness of the problem and never conceived as the translation of political will. T h e results of these attempts to i m p l e m e n t "food strategies" were modest, for a n u m b e r of reasons, as Serge Coelo points out in the case of Mali. T h e changes a n d r e f o r m s which the strategy requires are politically d a n g e r o u s f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t in place. In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t e m p t a t i o n is great to relegate it to a technical level a n d a sectoral f r a m e w o r k t h a t r e n d e r s it meaningless. In a d d i t i o n , a n u m b e r of d o n o r s c o n t i n u e d to p r e f e r f u n d i n g for highly capital intensive initiatives a n d projects; this m e a n t that the sectors where the strategy was applied did n o t always coincide with the areas c o m m o n l y pref e r r e d by d e v e l o p m e n t practitioners.

The entrenched practices of cooperation agencies were marked not only by the absence of any real dialogue on agricultural and food

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policies between g o v e r n m e n t s a n d d o n o r s as a g r o u p , b u t also by the very c o n c e p t i o n of the f o o d strategy that was still a i m e d at achieving f o o d self-sufficiency ( d e f i n e d as the capacity of a c o u n t r y to provide all of its p o p u l a t i o n with a d e q u a t e f o o d a n d a g o o d nutritional level t h r o u g h national p r o d u c t i o n a l o n e ) . In a n u m b e r of countries, this definition of f o o d self-sufficiency was most frequently u n d e r s t o o d as self-sufficiency in g r a i n p r o d u c t i o n , a c o n c e p t t h a t was even m o r e restrictive. This c o n c e p t that was so n a r r o w in its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that was perceived with many reservations by governments, a n d that d i s r u p t e d the practices of c o o p e r a t i o n agencies gave way in 1985 to the c o n c e p t of f o o d security. T h r e e c o m p o n e n t s describe the f o o d security a p p r o a c h (see Geopolitics of Hunger, 1998-1999): • • •

T h e availability of f o o d ( p r o d u c t i o n , commercial i m p o r t s a n d f o o d aid, stocks); T h e stability of these supplies in time a n d space; T h e access to f o o d f o r all ( d e m a n d that can be m e t ) .

This c o n c e p t of f o o d security, d e f i n e d in terms of the p r o d u c t i o n of f o o d b u t especially in terms of access by the p o p u l a t i o n to f o o d , will be c o m p r e s s e d or even severely watered down by the structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s . T h e s e p r o g r a m s will result in weaker domestic d e m a n d by placing emphasis o n the e c o n o m i c a n d financial balances of the state (balancing of the table of financial operations) a n d by liberalization of the e c o n o m y that c h a n g e s the respective roles of t h e state a n d m a r k e t in the elaboration a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of agricultural policy. T h e m a r k e t plays a central role in the f o o d supply policy. However, d e v e l o p m e n t policies aiming at e c o n o m i c a d j u s t m e n t s have h a d negative effects in a n u m b e r of countries o n the f o o d security of t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s . M o r e specifically, g r a i n d e p a r t m e n t s have s e e n their role d i m i n i s h e d in the m a r k e t i n g of grains, since they n o l o n g e r c o n t r i b u t e to the r e g u l a t i o n of the grain m a r k e t even t h o u g h they c o n t i n u e to m a n a g e t h e n a t i o n a l reserves of g r a i n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , they are responsible f o r the m a n a g e m e n t of i n f o r m a t i o n o n f o o d security (early warning systems, agricultural surveys, m o n i t o r i n g of m a r k e t p r i c e s of g r a i n a n d c a t t l e ) : D u r i n g t h e 1 9 8 0 s , t h e Commission f u n d e d c o n t i n u i n g diagnostic projects in the agricultural sector in the Sahel by providing s u p p o r t f o r agricultural surveys, i n f o r m a t i o n systems o n g r a i n m a r k e t s , o r early w a r n i n g systems, a m o n g others. In March 1994, the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y b e g a n a c o m p r e h e n sive review of the policy of f o o d aid m a n a g e m e n t as an i n s t r u m e n t of

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f o o d security. A m o d e s t balance sheet of the E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' s f o o d aid p r o g r a m s was p r e p a r e d in 1997: limited success of c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s , m o d e s t i m p a c t o n the nutritional status of vulnerable groups, d o u b t f u l cost-effectiveness ratio, a n d so o n . 5 In 1996, the E u r o p e a n Commission established a F o o d Security a n d F o o d Aid P r o g r a m f o r the seventy-one ACP countries. Of these, n i n e t e e n were c o n s i d e r e d high priority a n d c o n s t i t u t e d g r o u p I: t h e least d e v e l o p e d countries, which are heavily d e p e n d e n t o n f o o d aid a n d which have a high i n d e x of f o o d insecurity. 6 T h e ten c o u n t r i e s in g r o u p II a r e c o u n t r i e s in crisis o r p o s t c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s . 7 T h e Commission uses specially tailored i n s t r u m e n t s in d e a l i n g with these groups. For g r o u p I, s u p p o r t is p r o v i d e d f o r sectoral r e f o r m s , security stocks, a n d reserves a n d f o r the p r o d u c t i o n , processing, a n d mark e t i n g of grains. F o o d aid in kind is limited a n d is used only if t h e n e e d s are clearly i d e n t i f i e d . P r o g r a m s are d e s i g n e d f o r t h r e e years r a t h e r t h a n o n a n a n n u a l basis. T h e c o u n t r i e s u n d e r t a k e to elaborate a c o h e r e n t a n d long-term f o o d security policy. For t h e c o u n t r i e s in crisis in g r o u p II, t h e a p p r o a c h u s e d is to p r o v i d e f o o d aid in kind, rehabilitation p r o g r a m s , f u n d i n g f o r i n f o r m a t i o n systems a n d f o o d or cash f o r work o p e r a t i o n s . T h e Commission t h e r e f o r e makes available to states aid i n s t r u m e n t s t h a t are d i f f e r e n t d e p e n d i n g o n the situations: financial or technical assistance f o r t h e r e f o r m of sectoral policies o n p r o d u c t i o n , processing, m a r k e t i n g , or storage; aid f o r t h e i m p o r t a t i o n of b a s i c f o o d p r o d u c t s t h r o u g h f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e facilities; s u p p o r t f o r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of security stocks a n d seed policies. T h e s e m e a s u r e s are a c c o m p a n i e d by efforts to e n s u r e b e t t e r coord i n a t i o n with o t h e r d o n o r s a n d a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f o o d aid f o r the so-called vulnerable groups. Moreover, the Commission's policy is to give p r e f e r e n c e to local purchases or triangular operations, a n d the new regulations r e f o r m i n g the PAA (Regulation 1 2 9 2 / 9 6 ) e n c o u r a g e the private sector by allocating foreign currencies f o r f o o d imports, still within the f r a m e w o r k of national f o o d security strategies. T h i s r e c e n t a p p r o a c h has t h e a d v a n t a g e of existing, of having b e e n formalized, a n d of b e i n g c o h e r e n t . T h e Commission t h e r e f o r e has a f o o d security policy, which was n o t the case a few years ago or which h a d b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d in the 1980s very timidly in a few countries, with a f o o d aid policy based o n transfers in kind. It would b e p r e m a t u r e to make any j u d g m e n t s as to the effectiveness of t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of this policy that has b e e n a d o p t e d . It is a p p a r e n t , however, that o n e should n o t u n d e r e s t i m a t e the m a j o r constraints, or even c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , t h a t t h e C o m m i s s i o n m u s t f a c e in o r d e r f o r the policy to be effective in achieving the established objec-

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tives. At least seven obstacles may b e identified o n which t h e Commission has a relatively wide m a r g i n of m a n e u v e r : 8 1. Reduction in c o m m i t m e n t s to provide aid to the agricultural sector; 2. C o o r d i n a t i o n with o t h e r aid d o n o r s ; 3. Compatibility with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO); 4. T h e instability of the c o m m o d i t i e s markets; 5. Consistency with o t h e r policies; 6. T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the political dialogue; 7. T h e question of a r e d u c t i o n in the level of solvent d e m a n d . T h e t r e n d in aid c o m m i t m e n t s is toward a r e d u c t i o n in official d e v e l o p m e n t assistance f o r agriculture. This r e d u c t i o n is a c c o m p a n i e d by a redirection of aid to o t h e r sectors that are outside the scope of projects (structural a d j u s t m e n t , p r o g r a m assistance) a n d a d r o p in f o o d aid p r o g r a m s g e n e r a t i n g c o u n t e r p a r t f u n d s (since these are u n m a n a g e a b l e in practice). T h e shifts are generally in favor of e m e r g e n c y a n d project assistance b u t include a new strategy of f o o d security in several African countries. 9 T h e evaluation of t h e PAA c o n f i r m s that d o n o r s will have to r e d u c e t h e i r commitm e n t s to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n o n Food Aid in o r d e r to focus o n m o r e efficient f o r m s of aid. In statistical terms, o n e n o t e s a m a r k e d t e n d e n c y toward lower levels of aid f o r i n t e g r a t e d rural d e v e l o p m e n t projects since the mid1980s: sixteen p e r c e n t o n average d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1986-1990 comp a r e d with less t h a n 2 p e r c e n t f o r the p e r i o d 1991-1995. 1 0 T h e same is t r u e of projects in the agricultural sector: a little over 9 p e r c e n t in t h e p e r i o d 1986-1990 c o m p a r e d with 4 p e r c e n t f r o m 1991 to 1995. However, a statistical bias may appear, since t h e d e f i n i t i o n of agricultural aid is c h a n g i n g f r o m year to year in the same way as the develo p m e n t priorities identified by the E u r o p e a n Commission; activities t h a t may indirectly assist rural d e v e l o p m e n t fall u n d e r p r o g r a m s such as "infrastructural d e v e l o p m e n t . " This neglect of t h e agricultural sector is p a r t of the g e n e r a l t r e n d characterized by t h e relative increase of aid f o r structural a d j u s t m e n t , of h u m a n i t a r i a n aid, a n d of e m e r gency f o o d aid, while overall official d e v e l o p m e n t assistance resources ( f r o m all sources) are declining. This r e d u c t i o n of aid f o r a g r i c u l t u r e raises q u e s t i o n s a b o u t e l e m e n t s that m i g h t h e l p to i m p r o v e its effectiveness. 1 1 At t h e same time, t h e C o m m i s s i o n has i d e n t i f i e d priority c o u n t r i e s , w h e t h e r or n o t t h e s e are in crisis, o n Declining aid for the agricultural sector.

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which aid p r o g r a m s will be c o n c e n t r a t e d . H o w will this global allocation b e carried out? Coordination in terms of wishes rather than reality: What leadership?

The

question

of c o o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g d o n o r s has various dimensions. First of all, in t h e field, all d o n o r s d o n o t follow the same policy. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e C o m m i s s i o n is n o t t h e l e a d e r in t h e a r e a of f o o d security even t h o u g h the resources it makes available to its priority countries are c o n s i d e r a b l e . For e x a m p l e , in a n u m b e r of Sahelian c o u n t r i e s , evaluations of the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the f o o d aid c h a r t e r show that several d o n o r s , such as J a p a n or certain m e m b e r s of the Organization of P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s , have t h e i r own f o o d aid policy, which is o f t e n in c o n t r a d i c t i o n to that of the Commission. T h e same is t r u e of t h e U.S. policy f o r E t h i o p i a . T h e s e d i f f e r e n t policies are d e c i d e d u p o n a n d i m p l e m e n t e d without b e i n g p a r t of a m o r e global plan or dynamic. It is well known that these divergences in policies a n d practices are e l e m e n t s of which b e n e f i c i a r y g o v e r n m e n t s take advantage. Any policy that is n o t c o o r d i n a t e d with o t h e r d o n o r s leads to distortions that in fact r e d u c e the effectiveness of t h e measures. In the a r e a of c o o r d i n a t i o n t h a t h a r m o n i z e s f o o d security programs, the Commission plays a role that is still n o t clearly d e f i n e d . It follows p r o g r a m s of liberalization a n d accepts the structural r e f o r m s p r o p o s e d by the B r e t t o n Woods institutions (do we n o t risk seeing m e a s u r e s that c o n t r a d i c t each other?). More i m p o r t a n t , what is the p h i l o s o p h y of t h e C o m m i s s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e respective roles of the state a n d m a r k e t a n d the division between public a n d private? Why, d e s p i t e the substantial r e s o u r c e s allocated by the Commission, does it n o t play this l e a d e r s h i p role? A n o t h e r aspect of n o n c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d n o t the least, is that of the priorities of c o o p e r a t i o n policies. Each d o n o r s h o u l d a n n o u n c e o n a fairly r e g u l a r basis new p r i o r i t i e s of its c o o p e r a t i o n policy. 1 2 Food security today c o m p e t e s with the struggle against poverty. How d o we position these two priorities? Is the struggle against poverty a s u b t h e m e of f o o d security or the reverse? Is a c o m p r e h e n s i v e f r a m e work f o r the struggle against poverty necessary, as t h e World Bank argues? This d e b a t e o n priorities is n o t sterile, since it d e t e r m i n e s the n a t u r e of the resources today mobilized in countries by aid agencies. O n the very c o n c e p t of f o o d security, the divergences are quite prof o u n d between d o n o r s b o t h bilateral a n d multilateral, as well as o n the n o t i o n of vulnerable p o p u l a t i o n , target p o p u l a t i o n , at-risk p o p u lation, a n d so o n . T h e s e semantic differences reflect f u n d a m e n t a l diff e r e n c e s that have n o t b e e n sufficiently expressed. It is a characteristic of a i d in g e n e r a l to u s e c o n c e p t s t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e

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perfectly transparent and applicable to all situations, but that nevertheless conceal very different understandings and interpretations, both between donors and with ACP states or representatives of civil society (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], village associations, and so on). Nor is coordination with NGOs a prospect that is any more immediate. Many of them see a reduction of their activity in this diversification of the instruments of European aid and therefore argue in favor of food aid in kind, even though the agricultural situation and nutritional status do not justify it. 13 O n e of the innovative features of the Lomé system is the existence of nonreciprocal trade preferences in favor of the ACP countries. The trade p e r f o r m a n c e of these states have on the whole been unspectacular. During the period from 1988 to 1997, the increase in the volume of exports from ACP countries to the European Community was less than 4 percent, at a time when other developing countries enjoyed increases in the order of 75 percent. Five countries recorded growth in their export levels that was higher than that achieved by other developing countries on account of the margin of p r e f e r e n c e : Mauritius, Jamaica, and, to a lesser extent, Madagascar in the textile sector; Kenya and Zimbabwe in cut flowers, vegetables, and fruits. In the sector of agricultural products, the margin of preference is significant. Half of all exports no longer benefit from preferences as of the year 2000 (mainly coffee and cocoa); the other half now benefit from preferences in the order of 10 percent. Exports of agricultural products (not including products covered by the protocols) have increased by 60 percent in those sectors in which the margin of preference is higher than 3 percent. The sectors that have enjoyed a sign i f i c a n t m a r g i n of p r e f e r e n c e a n d t h a t have p o s t e d the h i g h e s t growth are flowers (+230 percent), vegetables (+132 percent), fish processing (+110 percent), tobacco (+83 percent), and vegetable and fruit processing (+70 percent). Less than 50 percent of the amounts allocated u n d e r the beef protocol was exported in 1997, compared with nearly 80 percent in 1995. In 1996, European prices were 50 percent higher than world prices, thereby generating additional income for ACP countries of 30 million ecus. As part of its Agenda 2000, the Commission proposed a r e d u c t i o n in the price of beef of approximately 30 p e r c e n t . This would result in a commensurate reduction in export earnings. T h e question has arisen of compatibility with the rules of the WTO. There is a direct relationship with food security in each of the states. The Commission is proposing to enter into regional economic Compatibility with the rules of the WTO.

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p a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s (APER). Is n o t this f r e e t r a d e a r r a n g e m e n t between the E u r o p e a n U n i o n a n d the regions inconsistent with a policy to stimulate national f o o d p r o d u c t i o n ? Is t h e r e n o t a contradict i o n in w i s h i n g to e n t e r i n t o f r e e t r a d e a g r e e m e n t s with E u r o p e , given the risks of r e d u c e d competitiveness f o r several of the region's p r o d u c t s (which is likely to b e the case within the S o u t h e r n African Development Community)?14 The problem of the instability of commodity markets remains unaddressed and unre-

T h e STABEX m e c h a n i s m s f o r t h e stabilization of e a r n i n g s f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s have b e e n t h e o b j e c t of m u c h criticism. Even t h o u g h optimal use has n o t b e e n m a d e of these m e c h a n i s m s to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c diversification, c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s have b e e n favorable. 1 5 Moreover, elimination of the system will leave unresolved the p r o b l e m of m a r k e t instability a n d , in particular, how to deal with the uncertainty over the level of i n c o m e to b e derived f r o m agricultural exports. T h e r e is n o o p p o s i t i o n between f o o d c r o p s a n d cash crops. Decisions a b o u t which c r o p s to p l a n t are very c o m p l e x , a n d f a r m e r s d o n o t c h o o s e b e t w e e n t h e s e two types of crops. In m a n y regions of West Africa, in particular, cotton cultivation, f o r e x a m p l e , has a favorable effect o n crops of millet or s o r g h u m (use of fertilizers), g u a r a n t e e s the i n c o m e of farmers, a n d thus contributes to their f o o d security. solved.

The question of coherence with other policies. D u r i n g the 1990s, the incohere n c e b e t w e e n t h e p r o m o t i o n of cattle f a r m i n g in t h e Sahel r e g i o n a n d the massive s h i p m e n t s of f r o z e n beef f r o m E u r o p e to ports o n the West African coast was widely criticized. 1 6 I m p o r t e d m e a t was sold o n the m a r k e t in Abijan at prices m u c h lower t h a n those at which locally p r o d u c e d m e a t (poultry) or beef f r o m the Sahel region was sold. S o m e progress has b e e n m a d e in h a r m o n i z i n g the aid a n d trade policies of the E u r o p e a n U n i o n , b u t the situation still gives cause f o r c o n c e r n , s i n c e it is l i n k e d t o t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e C o m m o n Agricultural Policy. Little a c c o u n t is taken of the i m p a c t of the latter policy o n o t h e r countries, notably countries of the South.

T h e q u e s t i o n also a r i s e s with r e s p e c t to c o h e r e n c e b e t w e e n i n s t r u m e n t s of aid f o r f o o d security a n d t h e p r o c e s s of m a c r o e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . C o n t r a d i c t i o n s may arise between the o r i e n t a t i o n s of a n a g r i c u l t u r a l policy t h a t seeks to i n t e n s i f y a g r i c u l t u r e a n d t h e m a c r o e c o n o m i c targets t h a t a r e p a r t of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m , since it is precisely the subsidies f o r fertilizers or improved varieties of seeds that can p r o m o t e this intensification. A third level of c o h e r e n c e relates to national a n d regional develo p m e n t p r i o r i t i e s . W h i l e t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h e r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s has b e e n established in t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s d e v e l o p m e n t

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p r o g r a m a n d has also b e e n identified as a priority by states, particularly t h o s e in Africa, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s may n e v e r t h e l e s s a p p e a r , a n d t h e s e m u s t b e resolved. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e objective of d e v e l o p i n g regional cattle t r a d e between the Sahel region a n d the countries o n t h e c o a s t of West A f r i c a may l e a d to i n f l a t i o n i s t p r e s s u r e s in t h e e x p o r t i n g countries because of the r e d u c e d supply that also r e d u c e s access by the most disadvantaged p o p u l a t i o n s a n d thus the satisfaction of their nutritional needs. T h e same is true f o r cereals such as millet a n d maize. Initiation of a political dialogue and of a dialogue on policies.

Even though

the

E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n has d e v e l o p e d a m e c h a n i s m f o r a c t i o n in c o u n t r i e s in crisis, t h e q u e s t i o n a b o u t conflict p r e v e n t i o n r e m a i n s u n a n s w e r e d . H o w can the conflicts that cause f a m i n e b e prevented? W h a t stand should E u r o p e take in these conflicts? T h e political dialogue r e m a i n s delicate, since the h a p p y balance between i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n is n o t easy to achieve. While dialogue o n policies, especially agricultural policy, exists at the level of public statements, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of these policies is n o t without difficulties. How d o g o v e r n m e n t s participate in this exercise f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t of a f o o d security policy? Is it really the expression of a political will or a m e a n s of r e s p o n d i n g to the Commission's d e m a n d that c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d e l a b o r a t e a f o o d security policy as a c o n d i t i o n f o r o b t a i n i n g financial resources? How, moreover, are the " a c t o r s of civil society" ( N G O s , village a s s o c i a t i o n s , c o m m u n e s ) involved in the elaboration a n d f o r m u l a t i o n of policies? The question of the reduction in solvent demand.

Many countries a m o n g

the

n i n e t e e n high-priority states t h a t are eligible are e x p e r i e n c i n g n o t p r o b l e m s of t h e s u p p l y of f o o d p r o d u c t s b u t severe p r o b l e m s of accessibility. In the c o n t e x t of the shrinking p u r c h a s i n g power of popu l a t i o n s in b o t h cities a n d r u r a l areas, c o p i n g strategies are develo p e d t h a t i n c l u d e traditional solidarity networks, diversification of activities, a c h a n g e in p a t t e r n s of c o n s u m p t i o n , a n d so on. 1 7 H o w can external aid i n f l u e n c e a c o m p l e x set of social relations while at the s a m e t i m e s t r e n g t h e n i n g d e m a n d ? H o w can a c c o u n t b e t a k e n of h o u s e h o l d c o p i n g strategies? How does o n e deal with the p r o b l e m of poverty?

Notes J e a n - J a c q u e s G a b a s is p r o f e s s o r at t h e University of Paris XI. 1. E d g a r d Pisani, La Main et I'outil (Paris: R. L a f f o n t , 1984).

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2. J o h n n y Egy ( u n d e r t h e supervision of J e a n - J a c q u e s Gabas), La Prevention des crises alimentaires au Sahel (Paris: O r g a n i s a t i o n p o u r la Cooperation et le Développement Economiques (OCDE)/Sahel Club, 1997). 3. Article 366 bis of the Lomé IV bis Convention, in conjunction with the revision of article 5, identifies the three fundamental elements: democracy, h u m a n rights, a n d rule of law. If o n e party considers that a n o t h e r has failed to live up to its obligation concerning o n e of these elements, the first o n e should begin, except in the case of emergencies, consultations to address the problem. If the consultations fail to remedy the situation, the convention may be suspended. 4. From what m o m e n t does a country no longer respect the processes of democratization and h u m a n rights? T h e assassination of the president of Niger, General Ibrahim Baré Mainassara, did not lead to a suspension of aid from the European Union. T h e holding of elections of doubtful honesty in Togo resulted in no condemnation or even an expression of reservations on the part of the parliamentarians from the ACP countries in the j o i n t EU-ACP Assembly. This shows that the implementation of measures based on merit, while a priori attractive, is rife with serious ambiguities or even impossibilities. 5. Joint Evaluation of the Food, Aid Program of the European Union (Brussels: European Commission, 1997). 6. T h e c o u n t r i e s in g r o u p I are A r m e n i a , Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Faso, Georgia, Haiti, H o n d u r a s , Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, and Yemen. 7. T h e countries of group II are Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, North Korea, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Tajikistan. 8. We will not address the question of drugs in West Africa, but production of illegal drugs has a considerable negative effect on the implementation and impact of agricultural policies and on the food security of populations. Despite the lack of specific data showing the scope of the problem, according to the NGO Geopolitical Unit for the Monitoring of Drugs (Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues; OGD) it appears that in several regions of West Africa in particular (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, and Casamance) the production of cannabis is increasing very rapidly. T h e advantage for the producers is the very high prices it commands; although the consequences have not often been measured, they are not negligible. 9. Deliveries of food aid in the world increased from 14.8 million tons in 1988 to 16.8 million tons in 1993. Since then, deliveries have declined steadily to less than 8 million tons. These deliveries have thus been below the a n n u a l target of 10 million tons established in 1974 by t h e World Food Conference. T h e global distribution has changed markedly. There is a very clear d r o p in program aid (10 million tons in 1993 compared with approximately 3 million tons in 1996), but relative stagnation in project aid a n d emergency assistance. 10. Aidan Cox and An tonique Koning, Inventaire de l'aide fournie par la communauté européenne (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1996). 11. A study conducted at the request of the European Commission on Rural Development Policies in ACP countries is being carried out by the A D E / O D I offices. See the Web site http:Wwww.rurpol.org. 12. J . J . Gabas and A. Sinidzingre, Aid in the Context of Globalization: The Lomé Convention in Question (Paris: Khartala, 1998).

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13. See a n n u a l e v a l u a t i o n s of t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e C h a r t e r of F o o d Aid to t h e S a h e l c o n d u c t e d by C O B E A f o r t h e S a h e l / O E C D C l u b between 1993 a n d 1999. 14. O n r e g i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s in s o u t h e r n Africa, see J e a n Coussy, Quel espace de coopération entre l'Europe et les Etats ACPI (Paris: University of Paris XI, 1999). 15. T h e e x p e r i e n c e s of "citizen regulations" of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e in t h e n a m e of fair t r a d i n g are m u c h too m a r g i n a l to be an alternative to t h e operation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t s a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of o t h e r rules. 16. See t h e work of t h e F r e n c h N G O Solagral at www.SOLAGRAL.org. 17. Ancey V é r o n i q u e , La consommation alimentaire à Ouagadougou (Paris: S a h e l / O E C D Club, 1998) a n d La consommation alimentaire à Niamey (Paris: S a h e l / O E C D Club, 1999).

34 Twenty Years of Struggle Against Hunger: From Voluntarism to the Reality Principle Sylvie Brunei Action Against Hunger was born twenty-one years ago out of a growing awareness of the scandal of hunger. A h a n d f u l of intellectuals refused to accept that scandal and sought to mobilize the maximum n u m b e r of people in France around the need to combat it.

1979—"We Shall Conquer H u n g e r " 1979 was the year of the birth of International Action Against Hunger (Action Internationale Contre la Faim; AICF), the original name of Action Against Hunger. That was a black year for what we now refer to as "humanitarian tragedies." The entry of Vietnamese troops into Cambodia, which had been closed to the outside world for four years, revealed to the world the results of the Khmer Rouge's murderous Utopia. Dreaming of a new society, they had starved, butchered, and d e p o r t e d t h o u s a n d s of p e o p l e , k i l l i n g m o r e t h a n a m i l l i o n . Humanitarians mobilized on the country's border in a great "march for the survival of Cambodia." At the time, no one was afraid of verbal excess. Marco Panella, one of the organization's f o u n d e r s (together with J a c q u e s Attali, Françoise Giroud, Marek Halter, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Guy Sorman, a n d Marc U l l m a n , a m o n g o t h e r s ) , d e n o u n c e d the "fifty million deaths from hunger each year," despite the efforts of demographers to show that the annual n u m b e r of deaths in the world—from all causes—was below that figure. 333

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Be that as it may, o n e billion people, or o n e o u t of every t h r e e p e o p l e in the T h i r d World, still s u f f e r e d f r o m h u n g e r at t h a t time. T h e great f a m i n e in Biafra f r o m 1967 to 1970 a n d the f a m i n e in t h e countries of the Sahel in 1973-1974 were still o n people's minds, particularly since a n o t h e r severe d r o u g h t was l o o m i n g in Africa. For t h e F r e n c h public, h u n g e r has always b e e n t h e greatest tragedy of o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y world. B e r n a r d - H e n r i Levy drew u p a c h a r t e r that m a d e Action Against H u n g e r a g e n u i n e f e d e r a t i o n of local c o m m i t t e e s , c h a r g e d with mobilizing p e o p l e a n d c r e a t i n g public awareness of h u n g e r in t h e world. T h e first field p r o g r a m s were b o r n . At the time, the organization acted o n a m o d e s t scale in p a r t n e r s h i p with local organizations, t h r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s in medical care, water, a n d agronomy as well as i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g activities. T h e premise was that popu l a t i o n s w e a k e n e d by h u n g e r c o u l d only regain t h e i r a u t o n o m y if they were able to e a r n their living a n d n o t d e p e n d o n aid. T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n b e g a n with o n e full-time staff m e m b e r a n d a part-time secretary in a b o r r o w e d r o o m o n the r u e d e Rivoli. As the years passed, it grew slowly. T h e savoir faire of its f o u n d e r s e n a b l e d the organization to enjoy a r e p u t a t i o n that was d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to its real activity. In 1984 the slogan 500 million n o n c o n s u m e r s , accompan i e d by a giant o p e n h a n d a n d a wide-open m o u t h , a p p e a r e d o n the walls of Paris a c c o m p a n i e d by the logo of the organization. F a m i n e h a d again struck the Sahel, a n d AICF issued an a p p e a l f o r aid. Two years later, t h e faces of Michel Drucker, a F r e n c h television sports c o m m e n t a t o r , a n d Isabelle A d j a n i , a F r e n c h movie star, w e r e plast e r e d everywhere in t h e subways a f t e r they h a d a g r e e d to s u p p o r t AICF as goodwill ambassadors. "We shall c o n q u e r hunger," AICF defiantly p r o c l a i m e d , with the word shall written in red above a crossedo u t can.

1989—The Dashed Hopes of Intervention Let us pause a l o n g the way, in 1989. By t h e n , AICF h a d relocated a n d n o w o c c u p i e d a n e n t i r e f l o o r at 34, a v e n u e R e i l l e , in t h e 1 4 t h a r r o n d i s s e m e n t of Paris. It now h a d a b u d g e t of $7 million a n d h a d 85,000 donors, 20 full-time staff m e m b e r s , a n d n o fewer t h a n 50 volu n t e e r s in the field f o r some thirty programs, which were still g e a r e d to the long-term goal of d e v e l o p m e n t . It was a time of optimism. T h e slogan "We shall c o n q u e r h u n g e r " s e e m e d m o r e topical t h a n ever. T h a n k s to voluntary action by t h e m a j o r international d e v e l o p m e n t organizations o n behalf of the p o o r

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a n d t h e agricultural sector, the n u m b e r of m a l n o u r i s h e d p e o p l e in t h e T h i r d World h a d d e c l i n e d significantly to " n o m o r e t h a n " 800 million, or o n e p e r s o n in five, r a t h e r t h a n o n e in three. And yet, popu l a t i o n g r o w t h was at its p e a k : E a c h year, t h e e a r t h ' s p o p u l a t i o n increased by 100 million. For the organization, the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of h u n g e r f r o m the West a n d the fact that all f a m i n e s were h e n c e f o r t h c o n s i d e r e d "political," which m e a n t that they could easily b e overcome, since n e i t h e r overp o p u l a t i o n n o r n a t u r e was involved, raised high expectations. In 1991 AICF p u b l i s h e d its first study of the subject. 1 T h e U n i t e d Nations h a d f o r the first time u n a n i m o u s l y a d o p t e d a resolution o n " h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance to victims of natural disasters a n d similar e m e r g e n c y situations." A new era s e e m e d to be dawning, that of t h e "duty to intervene" to assist victims. W h a t the heads of AICF could n o t have guessed was the e x t e n t to which t h e collapse of t h e I r o n C u r t a i n w o u l d c h a n g e t h e existing order. J u s t w h e n the world believed it would collect t h e "peace divid e n d , " t h e o p p o s i t e h a p p e n e d . Deprived of o u t s i d e s u p p o r t , m a n y regimes collapsed, thereby setting the scene f o r m u r d e r o u s civil wars. Nationalisms t h a t h a d l o n g b e e n s u p p r e s s e d were e x a c e r b a t e d a n d led to fratricidal conflicts a m o n g p e o p l e s w h o until t h e n h a d b e e n c o n s t r a i n e d to live t o g e t h e r peacefully. Official d e v e l o p m e n t assistance, which lost its geopolitical usefulness with the e n d of the Cold War, b e g a n to decline, f o r c i n g warlords to seek new m e a n s of subsistence: trafficking of all kinds, including the most d a n g e r o u s such as drugs; pillaging of civilian populations; securing i n t e r n a t i o n a l aid by o r c h e s t r a t i n g w h a t w e r e b e g i n n i n g to b e c a l l e d " h u m a n i t a r i a n tragedies." T h e Gulf War in 1990 a n d the great e x o d u s of the Kurdish p e o p l e driven i n t o t h e m o u n t a i n s o n the b o r d e r with Turkey u s h e r e d in a new season of h u n g e r . Famines received a t t e n t i o n d e p e n d i n g o n the c o v e r a g e they received in t h e m e d i a , whose selective m o b i l i z a t i o n c h a n n e l e d Western compassion a n d overshadowed o t h e r m o r e silent tragedies. H i g h p o i n t s — K u r d i s t a n in 1991; Bosnia a n d Somalia in 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ; R w a n d a in 1994 a n d a g a i n in 1996, w h e n t h e r e f u g e e camps were e m p t i e d by force; a n d Kosovo in 1999—occurred against the b a c k d r o p of long-term crises: civil war in S u d a n a n d Angola, conflagrations in the Great Lakes region, a n d the slow strangulation of Afghanistan after the Taliban g a i n e d power. "Intervention" b e c a m e a tool m a n i p u l a t e d by t h e g r e a t powers b a s e d o n t h e i r i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l e c o n o m i c a n d political i n t e r e s t s . T h e g r e a t e s t t r a g e d i e s u n f o l d e d with live c o v e r a g e a n d with h u m a n i t a r i a n s u n a b l e to d o m u c h to alter the course of history. T h e U n i t e d Nations, after having

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given the impression at one point that it was a superpower committed to the maintenance or even the restoration of peace everywhere, has had to face up to the fact that it is powerless to stop the tragedies. H u n g e r has now r e t u r n e d to center stage m o r e violently than ever. Famines multiply because hunger, an instrument of control over the population, has also become a weapon of war to enrich oneself, to obtain international recognition, and to benefit from the new manna of conflict—media visibility and its corollary, the outpouring of international compassion. As a consequence of the p h e n o m e n o n of exclusion, rising unemployment, and a new kind of poverty, hunger has reappeared in the developed countries of Europe and the United States and above all in an economically collapsing Russia. Agronomic research into ways of increasing agricultural production for the benefit of the poor is slowing for lack of funds. The world is now divided between "consumers," who capture all the attention and all the privileges, and "the surplus population," which is ignored by the trade networks and which has b e e n the hardest hit by the decline in cooperation activities and official development assistance. T h e size of the m a l n o u r i s h e d population is increasing, rising f r o m 800 million to 830 million according to the United Nations F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i z a t i o n (FAO). At t h e World F o o d Summit held in Rome in 1996, the FAO recognized that it would be difficult for that number to fall below 400 million, even with the willing commitment of all states.

1 9 9 9 — " W e Cannot Say W e Did N o t Know" For specialized humanitarian organizations such as Action Against H u n g e r (the word International was d r o p p e d along the way to illustrate the h a u n t i n g presence of h u n g e r everywhere, even in those countries that had believed they had banished it forever), the challenges to be overcome have multiplied. Emergency interventions have become both more frequent and more difficult to carry out because access to victims is controlled by criminal regimes that use h u m a n i t a r i a n aid as an i n s t r u m e n t of manipulation. Hunger is everywhere, but the resources of charitable organizations are necessarily limited. Thus, since 1989, Action Against Hunger has focused its attention on issues that are directly linked to the treatment of hunger and emergency situations (nutrition, water supply,

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and food aid). Such a focus has been to the detriment of developm e n t programs, which are more difficult to implement and whose results are less obvious because they are indirect. Private donors in Europe, who are themselves subject to numerous solicitations and affected by unemployment and economic difficulties, have become less receptive at the same time that the "market for generosity" has become more and more competitive. For their part, states, following the example of the European Community, are seeking greater visibility in order to play a more important role in these "live" humanitarian activities. Substantial budgets are therefore placed at the disposal of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations that, by accepting them, run the risk of b e c o m i n g "service providers" for states or aid agencies pursuing geopolitical objectives, among which the fate of the starving is not a priority. H u m a n i t a r i a n organizations artificially swollen by the massive amounts of public funds made available to them become enormous machines, difficult to manage and slower to react than in the past. Even if their technical level and logistical capacity are infinitely higher than before, they come up against political constraints that hinder access to the victims. Hunger can therefore exist in a world of abundance, and humanitarian organizations become more effective in their operations without benefiting the hungry as much as they would wish. In 2000, Action Against H u n g e r has become a respectable institution: Its budget has increased tenfold in ten years, as has the number of its volunteers present in the field, augmented by national teams totaling more than four thousand people. Action Against Hunger has certainly lost the federative character that distinguished it at the start, but it has exchanged that for a professionalism of action that sets it a p a r t f r o m the c o n f u s i n g p r o l i f e r a t i o n of local m i c r o p r o g r a m s . Moreover, the nucleus in Paris has expanded, and sister organizations have been established in London, Madrid, and New York. Still, the organization can no longer continue the t r i u m p h a n t talk of its early days. Its latest campaign is drawing to a close in a subd u e d tone that perfectly illustrates its dilemma: "We cannot say we did not know; we cannot say there was nothing we could do." Never has information been so readily available. Never have the means of ending hunger been so numerous and so varied. But while, in principle, we can do something, it is also necessary to have a consensus on the absolute need to aid the starving, because the first among human rights is the right not to die of hunger. Now that is precisely our weakness. We may have the means to conquer hunger, but will we succeed?

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Notes Sylvie B r u n e i is strategy adviser, Action Against H u n g e r . 1. Action Internationale Contre la Faim (AICE), Une tragédie banalisée, la faim dans le monde (Paris: H a c h e t t e , coll. Pluriel, 1991).

Index

Abkhazial, 54map, r>5mnp; Action Against H u n g e r in, 61, 62n9; a u t o n o m o u s status, 53; conflict in, 51-61; displaced persons in, 56-57, 59; distribution of resources in, 59; e c o n o m i c blockade against, 52, 57-60, 62n3; econ o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in, 59; e t h n i c mosaic in, 53; government-inexile, 57; h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance in, 57; infrastructure in, 59; investm e n t in, 59; lack of social developm e n t in, 59; living standards in, 58; N G O s in, 61-62; poverty in, 58, 59; Russian influence in, 58, 59. See also Georgia Action Against H u n g e r , ix, x, xii, 314, 333-336; in Abkhazial, 61, 62n9; in B u r u n d i , 29; C h a r t e r of Principles of, 179, 197; in Chechnya, 286; in CongoBrazzaville, 12, 13, 17; in Democratic Republic of C o n g o , 29; in Great Lakes area, 26-27, 28; in Guatemala, 94; in H o n d u r a s , 114map, 118-119, 120; in Kosovo, 133, 316; in Liberia, 190n9; in Macedonia, 137, 316; in Nicaragua, 101, 105, 108; in N o r t h Korea, 159, 160, 163, 164, 167; Nutrition D e p a r t m e n t , 315; in

Russia, 288, 298; in Rwanda, 29; Science C o m m i t t e e , 273; securityrelated incidents and, 202-205; in Sierra Leone, 5, 9n3; in Somalia, 39, 42n3, 42n4; in Tajikistan, 74-76 Active L e a r n i n g Network f o r Accountability a n d P e r f o r m a n c e , 197 Adjani, Isabelle, 334 AFDL. See Alliance of Forces f o r Democracy a n d F r e e d o m Afghanistan, 30, 64, 183, 202, 206, 285 AFRC. See A r m e d Forces Ruling Council Agriculture: access to credit a n d , 60; cash crop, xiii, 76; centralized policy for, 11; climate and, 72; collective, 69; in Congo-Brazzaville, 11; decline in, 5, 326-327; gray, 286; G r e e n Revolution a n d , 259-261; illicit, 83; i n p u t access, 72, 75; intensive, 253, 257; investment in, 61, 75-76, 253, 256, 263; j o b creation in, 265; kolkhoz a n d , 63; labor availability in, 72; markets for, 60; in N o r t h Korea, 160; policies for, 253-254; positive trends in, 265-266; private, 69, 70; production increases, 251-253; reha-

339

340

Index

bilitation of, 315; self-sufficiency in, 11, 265; in Sierra Leone, 6; in Somalia, 39; subsidies for, 61, 262, 275-276; surplus in, 61; in Tajikistan, 67-68; u r b a n populations and, 11; world p r o d u c t i o n , 251-253 Aideed, Hussein, 4 2 n l , 45, 46, 48 Alemán, A m o l d o , 103, 105 Alliance of Forces f o r Democracy a n d F r e e d o m (AFDL), 23, 24 Alvarado, Pedro, 88 American Association of Retired Persons, 306 American Relief Administration, 283-284 Amin Dada, Idi, 22 Angola, 25, 31, 206; National U n i o n f o r the Total I n d e p e n d e n c e of Angola in, 28, 206 Angolan A r m e d Forces, 12, 17 Arbenz, Jacob, 88, 96 Argentina: Association of G r a n d m o t h e r s in, 217; criminal justice system in, 217 A r m e d Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), 3, 4, 7, 9 n 2 A r m e d Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), 82 Armenia, 60, 62n6 Article Premier, 218 Association p o u r u n e Taxation des Transactions Financières p o u r L'Aide aux Citoyens, 219 Attali, Jacques, 333 Atto, O s m a n , 45 Autodefensas Unidas d e Colombia, 80, 83 Aziz, Sartaj, 261 Balkanization, 31 Baltic states, 129 Bangladesh, 262; floods in, 263 Bantu peoples, 31 Barre, Siad, 45 Barrios, Justino, 88 B a u d o u i n , Patrick, 220 Bayart, Jean-Francois, 242 Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy, 16, 19ra6 Berlin Wall, 129, 241 Bettati, Mario, 239

Biafra, xi, xii, 243; f a m i n e in, 334 Bio, Julius Maada, 4 Bonino, E m m a , 298 Bosnia, 127, 177 B r a u m a n , Rony, 241 Brown, Lester, 251 Burkina Faso, 257 Burma, 206, 225, 313 B u r u n d i , 21, 25, 26, 30; Action Against H u n g e r in, 29; civilian populations in, 29; colonial era in, 22; Comité national p o u r la Defense de la Démocratie in, 24; psychological t r a u m a in, 174; security issues in, 202. See also Great Lakes area Cairo Accords (1997), 35 Cambodia, 31, 217 Canada, 219; h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance to Russia, 276, 280 Candessus, Michel, 283 Carter, Jimmy, 285 Castaño, Carlos, 80 Caucasus region, 51-61 Central African Republic, 25 Central American C o m m o n Market, 102 Cerezo, Vinicio, 88 C h a d , 17, 25, 270 C h a m o r r o , P e d r o J o a q u i m , 102 C h a m o r r o , Violeta, 103, 105, 106 Chaudhry, Asif, 291, 296, 297 Chechnya, 31, 51, 206; Action Against H u n g e r in, 286; security issues in, 202 C h e r n o f f , Ronni, 310 China, 152, 164, 260; d r o u g h t in, 263; family p l a n n i n g in, 247; f a m i n e in, 1 9 0 n l 4 , 259; floods in, 263; G r e e n Revolution in, 260; infrastructure in, 260; poverty r e d u c t i o n in, 260 Cholera, 27, 28, 116 Civilian populations: Abkhazial, 57-60; access to, 199; attacks on, 79; in B u r u n d i , 29; class allegiance a n d , 38; in Colombia, 79; in Congo-Brazzaville, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19; debilitation of, 35; as h u m a n shields, 18, 175; internal displace-

Index

ment of, 27; isolation of, 26; lack of access to, 41; lack of governmental concern for, 5; manipulation of, 199; massacres of, 12, 13, 17, 19, 23, 80; as military targets, 80; property abandonment by, 79; rape as weapon against, 18; requisition of food from, 7; in Rwanda, 21-24; in Sierra Leone, 5; in Somalia, 38-40; victimization by war, 175-176 Clinton, Bill, 31-32, 175, 239, 306, 307 Club of Rome, 251 Cocoyes militia, 12, 13, 17, 20n7 Colombia, 79-86, 80map, 206; Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia in, 82; Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia in, 80, 83; cambunches in, 81; displaced persons in, 79, 81, 82, 83-85, 86n4; distribution of wealth in, 83; drug trade in, 83; food crisis in, 85-86; guerillas in, 79, 82, 83, 86n4; informal economy in, 86n5; lack of governmental responsibility, 81-82; National Liberation Army in, 82; paramilitaries in, 79, 86n4; poverty in, 81, 83; Presidential Council for the Support of Displaced Persons, 82; scorched earth policy in, 79; urbanization in, 84 Colonialism, 21-24; Belgian, 22; in Central America, 92; German, 22 Comité national pour la Defense de la Démocratie, 24 Commander James (James Kabare), 24, 25 Commission on Human Rights, 229, 234n9 Committee Against Torture, 234n9 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 228, 234n5 Commonwealth of Independent States, 52, 58 Conakry Accords (1997), 4 Conflict: analysis, 32; civil, xii, 38; economic dynamics of, 189 n3; ethnic, 31, 32 Congo-Brazzaville, 11-19, 14 map, \5map, 208; Action Against

341

Hunger in, 12, 13, 17; agriculture in, 11; Agrisud-Agricongo in, 19n5; Cobras in, 13, 20n7; Cocoyes in, 12, 13, 17, 2 0 n l ; Congolese Armed Forces in, 12; Congolese Human Rights Monitoring Unit, 12, 13, 17; economic crisis in, 13; elections in, 16; ethnic militias in, 12; imports in, 13; independence, 12; malnutrition in, 13, 18; Ninjas in, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19n3, 20n7, 2 0 n i l ; petroleum resources, 13, 17; poverty in, 13; Sovereign National Conference, 16; universal suffrage in, 12; violence in, 11, 17; Zulus in, 15, 19n3, 20n7 Congolese Armed Forces, 12 Congolese Liberation Movement, 26 Congo-Ocean Railway, 13, 14 Conquest, Robert, 285 Contras, 102, 103 Coping strategies: in Guatemala, 96-97; in Kosovo, 125, 144-145; in Macedonia, 137; in Nicaragua, 108; rural, 73; in Tajikistan, 73 Costa Rica: emigration to, 108; literacy rate, 90 Council of Europe, 51 Courly, Eric, 203 Criminal justice systems, 215-225; citizens' groups, 218-219; indictments of, 215-218; International Criminal Court and, 215-225; International Fact-finding Commission and, 216; progress toward, 217; proper function of, 219-221; purpose of, 217; universal jurisdiction and, 215 Cuba, 239 Currency: devaluations, 64, 67; fluctuations, 60; foreign, 67, 69; hard, 69, 289 Dayton Agreement (1995), 130 Declaration on World Food Security, 228 Deforestation, 39, 94, 107, 160, 256 Dekhan, 69 Democratic League of Kosovo, 129 Democratic Republic of Congo,

342

Index

19ni, 21, 23, 25, 183, 190n9, 206, 208, 225ni, 257; Action Against Hunger in, 29; Congolese Liberation Movement in, 26; humanitarian assistance in, 30; infrastructure in, 29; Mai-Mai militia in, 25, 26. See also Great Lakes area Desertification, 39, 256 Development: assistance, 262; export, 94; rural, 260; sustained, 94; watershed, 264 Diamond industry, 5, 6, 7, 206 Dinka, Beahanu, 30 Disasters, natural: developed societies and, 152-153; drought, ix, 35, 97, 152, 276, 334; earthquakes, 152; famine, xii, 149-155, 319; floods, 38, 97, 113, 152; hurricanes, ix, 101-109; poverty and, 149-151; risk prevention, 152-153; tropical, 149-151 Displaced persons: in Abkhazial, 56-57, 59; in Colombia, 79, 81, 82, 83-85, 86n4; geography of, 83-85; in Guatemala, 90; in Macedonia, 139-144; in Sierra Leone, 8; in Somalia, 39; in Tajikistan, 64 Doctors Without Borders, xii, 42n5, 189wS7, 210, 243 Drought, ix, 35, 97, 276, 334 Drucker, Michel, 334 Drug trade: in Africa, 331 n8; in Colombia, 83; in Tajikistan, 6364 Dubois, Gilbert, 292 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 91 Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), 4, 8, 9n2, 203 Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 3, 4, 5, 7, 9«2, 182, 186, 187, 203 Egypt, 37, 46, 49, 51 Ehrlich, Paul, 251 Embargoes, 4, 47, 103, 186, 187, 232, 234n9, 235-240 Ethiopia, 22, 37, 46, 208; intervention in Somalia, 46, 47; security issues in, 203

Ethnic cleansing, 141, 142, 143, 169, 170, 171, 177, 225; accusations by Albanians, 126-127; accusations by Serbs, 127-128 European Commission, 283, 284; Commercial Service for External Relations, 292; Community Food Security and Food Aid Program, 325; Humanitarian Office, 286 European Fund for the Orientation and Guarantee of Agriculture, 292 European Geoscience Space Agency, 120 European Union: aid to Tajikistan, 70; humanitarian assistance to Russia, 276-278, 283, 298, 299; interest in Caucasus, 51; in Nicaragua, 111 ; Plan of Action to Combat Hunger in the World, 319 Exports: commodity, 94; from Guatemala, 94; illegal, 236 Family planning, 127, 247 Famine, 149-155, 266, 319; in Biafra, 334; in China, 190nl4, 259; combating, 227-233; halting, 154; international community response, 19; man-made, 154—155, 227-233; natural, 149-155; in North Korea, 159, 183-184; official denial of, 27; as political developments, 32; Russian, 285, 287-288; in Somalia, 206; in Ukraine, \90nl4; warning signs of, 153 FAO. See United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization Federalist Republican Forces, 26 Fehlbaum, Sylvie, 202 Flemming, Arthur, 305 Floods, 97, 113; North Korean, 161; Somalian, 38 Food: accessibility of, 324; availability of, 324; demography of, 247; fortification of, 273; importation of, 5, 11, 13, 58, 60, 62n5, 131, 252, 256; inequality of supply, 254; needs, 271-272; need versus right, 229; as political weapon, 7-9; quality of, 254; repurchase of, 7; reserves, 108; as resource in war economy, 3; right to, 227-228, 230; security, 70-74, 87-97, 323-330; self-suffi-

Index

ciency, 265, 324; shortages, 18, 270; stocks of, 7; subsidies, 261; supply stability, 324; terror and, 3-5 Food as weapon, 314; in CongoBrazzaville, 11-19; in Great Lakes area, 26-29; in Kosovo, 133-134; in Sierra Leone, 3-9; in Somalia, 35-42 Food crises: in Colombia, 85-86; in Guatemala, 87-97 Food distribution: in Caucasus, 61; as regional problem, 254-257; in Sierra Leone, 7, 8 Food First Information and Action Network, 229, 234n5 Fources p o u r la defense de la Démocratie, 24 France, 176, 317; citizens' groups in, 218; Grain Producers Association in, 316 FSLN. See Sandinista National Liberation Front Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 52, 56 Gandhi, Indira, 261 Garzon, Baltasar, 216 Geneva Conventions (1949), xii, 30, 186, 199, 215, 221, 224, 225 Genocide, 225; colonialism and, 21-24; in Kosovo, 123; Tutsi, 22, 23, 31, 206 Georgia, 51, 52; civil war in, 52; Committee for the Displaced in, 57; in Council of Europe, 51; investment in, 57; nationalism in, 53; White Legion in, 57 Girardi, Monsignor, 89 Giroud, Françoise, 333 Glavany, Jean-André, 2 8 1 « / Glickman, Dan, 292 Gorvachev, Mikhail, 31 Great Lakes area, 21-33; Action Against H u n g e r in, 26-27, 28; Banyamulenge in, 24, 26, 27, 31; early kingdoms, 21; internationalization of war in, 2 4 26 Green Revolution, ix, 259-261; declining imports and, 260; exclusion f r o m , 264-265; fraud in,

343

262-263; irrigation and, 260; mechanization and, 260; new seed varieties and, 260; setbacks for, 261-264; social impact, 261; socialism and, 261 G r o u p of 8, 242 Guatemala: Action Against H u n g e r in, 94; Agreement for a Firm a n d Lasting Peace, 89, 90; A g r e e m e n t on the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Population in, 89; Agricultural Reform Law, 88; agricultural sector in, 93, 94; class system in, 92; Comprehensive Agreement on H u m a n Rights in, 89; coping strategies in, 96-97; crime rate in, 91, 9Sn4; cultural gap in, 97; depletion of resources in, 95; displaced persons in, 90; distribution of wealth in, 90; elections in, 88; exports, 93; food security in, 87-97; gross domestic p r o d u c t in, 98re7; Guatemalan Labor Party in, 88; Guatemalan Revolutionary National Union, 88, 89; health care in, 91; income in, 97, 98nl4; i n d e p e n d e n c e , 88; indigenous population in, 87, 89; industrial growth, 98nl2; inequality in, 93-97; informal economy in, 87; internal divisions in, 87; January 20th Victory in, 89; land confiscations, 88; land ownership in, 93; literacy rate, 90, 98n5; malnutrition in, 93; military regime in, 88; mortality rates, 91, 95; National Reconciliation Commission in, 89; People's Armed Organization in, 88; P e r m a n e n t Commission for Refugees in, 89; Poor People's Guerrilla Army in, 88; population growth, 90; poverty in, 90-93; Revolutionary Armed Forces in, 88; scorched earth policy in, 88; social spending in, 93, 97, 98n9; u n e m p l o y m e n t in, 91, 93, 98nl2; urbanization in, 98nl2; water supply in, 98n4 Guerrillas, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86n4 Guinea, 5 Gypsies, 140, 143

344

Index

Haiti, 31; agricultural sector in, 94; e m b a r g o on, 235, 236; unemployment a n d urbanization in, 9 8 n l 2 Halter, Marek, 333 Health care: cholera epidemics, 27, 28, 116, 150; drinking water and, 150; in Guatemala, 91; leptospirosis epidemics, 116; in Somalia, 39 Helms-Burton bill (1996), 239 Hibou, Béatrice, 206 Holbrooke, Richard, 124 H o n d u r a s , 1I4map; Action Against H u n g e r in, 114map, 118-119, 120; consequences of disaster, 116-120; f o o d distribution in, 116; gross domestic product in, 98n7; humanitarian assistance in, 117; infrastructure in, 116; malnutrition in, 116; m a p p i n g d a m a g e in, 120-121; natural disasters in, 101, 103, 113-121; poverty in, 92; priority reconstruction areas, 114map, 115; water supply, 113-121; World F o o d Program in, 116 Humanitarian assistance: to Abkhazial, 57; balanced f o o d rations in, 272-274; as business proposition, 47-50; as chance to sell excess production, 277, 291-295; in c o m p l e x situations, 205-208; conditionality of, 166; constitution of, 199-200; criticisms of, 180, 189n5; decline in, 313; in Democratic Republic of C o n g o , 28-29, 30; difficulties of, 40-42; diversion of, 40, 41, 278; as economic target, 40; emergency programs, 315; evaluation of n e e d for, 184; to Georgia, 57; goals of, 192; immediate measures, 61; importation of, 28-29; i n d e p e n d e n c e in, 314; as instrument of foreign policy, 187; lack of psychological assistance, 174; long-term, 61, 315; media coverage of, 172; mediumterm, 61; militarization of, 171; neutrality in, 224-225, 314; nondiscrimination in, 314; in North Korea, 159-168; partnerships in, 316-317; perception of

impartiality of, 210; political action and, 210; political manipulation of, 162-167; p r o b l e m s in, 173-175; quality assurance and, 191-194; reductions during warfare, 26; refusal of, 8; restrictions on, 162; standards for, 191-194; subordination to political considerations, 30; suspension of, 41; in Tajikistan, 74—76; timely arrival of, 154; transparency in, 314; trends in, 74 Humanitarian Charter a n d Minimum Standards for Disaster Response, 197 Humanitarianism: bureaucracy, 180; changing concepts in, 197-200; citizens' groups and, 242; exploitation of, 241; international criminal justice system and, 215-225; law, 29-33, 41; obligations of, xii, 227-233, 234n6; public opinion and, 234w9; reasons for existence of, 242; responsible, 2 4 1 - 2 4 4 Humanitarian organizations: allocation of resources by, 41; capacity for intervention of, 210; C o d e of C o n d u c t for, 180-188, 189n5, 197, 228-229; communication systems for, 211; constraints on, 163; crimininal justice systems and, 219-221; defining activities by, 45; diversity of objectives of, 179, 189w5, 209; effectiveness of advocacy role in Kosovo, 170; enforcem e n t of codes of conduct, 183-185; extortion problems, 40; global corporations and, 242; increased risks for, 211; institutional m e m o r y of, 203, 212; international, 45; J o i n t Policy of Operations, 182; lack of security for, 41; looting of supplies of, 7, 29; mobilization time, 154; monitoring of, 184, 185, 243; moral challenges of, 174; multinationals and, 242; n e e d to a d a p t to new situations, 209-213; neutrality a n d impartiality in, 224-225; O m b u d s m a n Project, 181, 197; Operational Standards for, 181,

Index

189w7; professional staff in, 210; protection for, 5; public support for, 179; rapid deployment of, 210; response to famines, 19; Sphere Project, 189w7, 197; threats against, 40-41; transparency in, 184, 185; violence against staff, 42n5; visibility of, 221-223; as witnesses, 218, 220, 223; working in complex situations, 205-208 H u m a n i t a r i a n Safety and Protection Network, 203, 212, 213rai H u m a n i t a r i a n workers: fear of safety of, 8; security of, 199-213 H u m a n rights: defense of, 218; denial of food and, 137; obligation to work for, 231; organizational responses to famines, 19; violations, 61, 217 H u n t , Chuck, 309 Hurricanes, ix, 101-109 H u t u peoples, 22, 23, 24, 206 ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross Imports: in Abkhazial, 58; in CongoBrazzaville, 11, 13; d e p e n d e n c e on, 13, 252-253, 256; duties, 11; food, 11, 252, 256 India: family p l a n n i n g in, 247; food deficits in, 249; harvests in, 263; poverty reduction in, 260 Indonesia, 216, 263 Informal economy: in Colombia, 86n5; in Guatemala, 87 Infrastructure: in China, 260; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 29; in H o n d u r a s , 116; in Nicaragua, 108; rebuilding, 27; rural, 261; in Russia, 51; in Somalia, 38-39; in Tajikistan, 67 Institute of Nutrition of Central America a n d Panama, 91 Interahamwe militia, 23, 25 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), xi, xii, 186, 189n4, 194, 225, 276, 287 International Covenant on Economic, Social, a n d Cultural Rights, 227, 230

345

International Criminal Court, 30-31, 215-225 International Criminal Tribunal, 242 International Development Bank, 111 International Fact-finding Commission, 216 International Federation of H u m a n Rights Leagues, 220 International H u m a n Rights Organization for the Right to Feed Oneself, 229 International Monetary Fund, 23, 60, 62n8, 69, 70, 103, 110, 206, 277, 283, 293 Iran, 64, 289 Iraq, 32, 51, 175, 208, 289; e m b a r g o on, 232, 235-237 Irrigation, 72, 76, 253, 256, 260, 263 J a p a n , 165; h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance to Russia, 276 J o r d a n , 51, 236 Julliard, Jacques, 221 Justice, 220; humanitarianism and, 221 Kabare, James. See C o m m a n d e r J a m e s Kabbah, A h m a d Tejan, 4, 7, 8, 9n2, 186, 203 Kabila, Laurent, 23-25, 27-30, 32, 183 Katanga, 26, 28 Kempf, Hervé, 251 Kennedy, J o h n F., 311 Kenya, 247; food strategies in, 323 K h m e r Rouge, 31, 183, 333 Kholod, Leonid, 291, 293 Kidnappings, 202, 203, 2 0 4 ^ Klatzmann, J o s e p h , 252 Kolelas, Bernard, 12, 19n3, 20n7, 20 nil Kolkhoz, 63, 67, 69, 70-74, 75, 276, 286 Kony, J o s e p h , 29 Koroma, J o h n n y Paul, 4, 9 n 2 Kosovo, x, 32, 123-135; access to land in, 123, 125, 131; Action Against H u n g e r in, 133, 221, 316; agricultural subsistence economy in, 130-131; cash economy in, 143; contamination of wells in, 142;

346

Index

coping strategies in, 125, 144-145; declaration of independence, 124, 129, 131; Democratic League of Kosovo in, 129; demographics of, 125; effect of economic sanctions on Serbs, 132; emigration from, 125-127, 132, 137-147; ethnic cleansing in, 126-128, 141, 142, 143, 169, 170, 171; family planning in, 127; food as weapon in, 170-171; food crises in, 123, 144—145; humanitarian assistance in, 132-133, 173; Kosovo Liberation Army in, 32, 123, 124, 130, 134, 142, 169; loss of Albanian jobs in, 131-132; loss of autonomy of, 124, 128-130; media coverage in, 172; militarization of humanitarian assistance in, 171; nationalism and, 128; NATO intervention in, 169; NGOs in, 169-178; nonviolence strategy in, 129, 130; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in, 132-133, 144-145, 169; population density, 125; Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity, 132; refugees in Macedonia, 137-147; return of displaced persons, 145-146; scorched earth policy in, 140; "Serbianization" of, 128, 134; Serb nationalism in, 127; Serb repression in, 123; social organization in, 125; transfer of power to Serbs, 128; unemployment in, 123, 125, 130-131; urbanization in, 125; visibility of humanitarian organizations in, 2 2 1 - 2 2 3 Kosovo Force, 171 Kosovo Liberation Army, 32, 123, 130, 134, 142, 169 Krehl, Constance, 298 Kulik, Gennady, 279, 283, 288, 291, 293, 294, 295 Kurdistan, 31, 175 Land: access to, 7 1 - 7 2 , 92, 96, 123, 125, 131; availability of, 75; confiscations, 88; degradation, 94; distribution, 90, 92; marginal, 151; own-

ership, 90, 93; pressure on, 256; privatization, 131; redistribution, 96; reform, 69; rehousing, 117; speculation, 117; underdeveloped, 107 Laver, Daniel, 309 Leptospirosis, 116 LeRoy, Pierre, 252 Lévy, Bernard-Henri, 333, 334 Liberia, 9 n l , 182, 183, 206, 208 Libya, 25, 37, 49; embargo on, 235, 239 Life expectancy: in Guatemala, 98 n5; in Somalia, 38 Limburg principles, 2 3 3 n 2 L'Instituto Internazionale Jacques Maritain, 229 Lissouba, Pascal, 12, 15, 16, 19n3, I9n4

Llorente, Daniel, 202 Logan, Bob, 310 Lolelas, Bernard, 16, 17 Lomé Conventions, 177, 257, 319-330; ACP states and, 320-323; changes in, 3 2 0 - 3 2 3 ; food security and, 319-330; food strategies in, 323-330; mechanism for financial cooperation and, 320; obstacles for, 326; system of trade preferences and, 321; World Trade Organization and, 3 2 8 - 3 3 0 Lopez Pérez, Rigoberto, 102 Lord's Resistance Army, 29 Macedonia, 171, 177, 210; Action Against Hunger in, 137, 316; coping strategies in, 137; displaced persons in, 139-144; refugees in, 137-147, 316 Madagascar, 253, 257 Mahdi, Ali, 4 5 - 4 8 Mai-Mai militia, 25, 26 Malardeau, Frédéric, 202 Mali, 257; food strategies in, 323 Malnutrition, 252, 320; acute, 28; African, 256; in Asia, 259; child, 28, 40, 90, 95, 255, 314; chronic, 28, 313; in Congo-Brazzaville, 13, 18; as disease, 270; edema, 18; among elderly, 304; eradication of, 228; in Guatemala, 93; in

Index

H o n d u r a s , 116; in Nicaragua, 109; in N o r t h Korea, 162; nutrition a n d , 269-271; in Sierra L e o n e , 5; as w e a p o n , 26-29 Malpel, Georges-Pierre, 316 Malthus, T h o m a s , 249 Mark, Rudy, 202 Markets: black, 132, 133, 237, 289; commodity, 329; consumer, 252; free, 161; international, 61; liberalization of, 60; regional, 60; rural, 260; u n d e r s t o c k e d , 28 Maslyukov, Yuri, 287-288 Medicaid, 310 Medicare, 310 Mellor, J o h n , 260, 261, 262 Michel, Frédéric, 202 Milosevic, Slobodan, 32, 123, 124, 128, 130, 132, 169, 170, 176, 216, 242 Mitchell, Dan, 308 Mitchell, Frank, 304 M o b u t u Sese Seko, 23, 24, 32 Momoh, Joseph, 4 Mont, Rios, 88 M o n t e n e g r o , 132, 171, 173, 210 Mortality rates, 249; in Guatemala, 91, 95; infant, 38; malnutrition and, 270-271; maternal, 38; in N o r t h Korea, 162; in Somalia, 38 Mueck, Randall, 303 Multilateral A g r e e m e n t o n Investment, 218, 242 Museveni, Yoweri Kagatu, 22-25, 32 Nationalism, 53, 127, 128, 176 National People's Revolutionary Council, 4 National U n i o n f o r t h e Total I n d e p e n d e n c e of Angola (UNITA), 25, 28, 206 NATO. See N o r t h American Treaty Organization NGOs. See N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations Nicaragua, 104 map; Action Against H u n g e r in, 101, 105, 108; agricultural sector in, 94, 105, 106, 107; in Central American C o m m o n Market, 102; Contras in, 102, 103; c o p i n g strategies in, 108; distribu-

347

tion of wealth in, 106; e c o n o m i c e m b a r g o on, 103; e c o n o m i c growth, 102; effects o n p o p u l a t i o n of disasters, 104-105; emigration f r o m , 106, 108, 109; exports, 105; foreign d e b t of, 103, 110; G o v e r n m e n t of 12 in, 102; gross domestic p r o d u c t in, 9 8 n 7 , 105; h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance in, 104-105; i n c o m e in, 105, 108; infrastructure in, 108; literacy rate, 90; malnutrition in, 109; National Opposition U n i o n in, 103; natural disasters in, 101-109; poverty in, 92, 101-111; R e c o m p a s in, 103; reconstruction of, 109-111; Recontras in, 103; relations with U n i t e d States, 102; Sandinista National Liberation F r o n t in, 102, 103, 106; social inequality in, 101-109; structural a d j u s t m e n t in, 103, 109; urbanization in, 106; World Food P r o g r a m in, 108 Nigeria, 186, 208 Ninja militias, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19n3, 20n7, 2 0 n i l Nixon, Richard, 305 N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations (NGOs), 9 n 6 ; accountability of, 179; authority of, 242; in Caucasus, 61-62; criminal justice systems a n d , 219-221; e m e r g e n c y assistance by, 75; family-run, 44; growth of, 206; J o i n t Policy of Operations, 1 8 9 n # 7 ; i n Kosovo, 169-178; limits of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance of, 173; misappropriation of f u n d s a n d , 44; private, 44; professional a p p r o a c h to activities, 243; r e q u i r e m e n t s for control in, 166; in Somalia, 40-42, 44, 45; in Tajikistan, 6 3 - 7 7 N o r t h American Treaty Organization (NATO), 32, 208, 210, 219; in Kosovo, 141; looting of supplies of, 141; P a r t n e r s h i p f o r Peace, 51; protection forces, 146 N o r t h Korea: Action Against H u n g e r in, 159, 160, 163, 164, 167; agricultural sector in, 160; C o m m i t t e e to Repair t h e D a m a g e Caused by t h e

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Index

Floods in, 161, 190nl3; cult of personality in, 161; dependence on U.S. aid, 166, 167; economic collapse in, 159-162; famine in, 159, 183-184; floods in, 161; food deficit in, 161, 164; food distribution system, 161, 166; foreign debt in, 160; gross national product in, 160; humanitarian assistance in, 159-168, 190nl2; industrial production in, 160; malnutrition in, 162; manipulation of aid in, 162-167; military spending in, 160; mortality rates in, 162; nuclear program in, 160, 165; World Food Program in, 184 Nutrition: balanced rations, 272-274; calorie intake and, 95, 108; food needs, 271-272; illness and, 269; influences on, 95-96; malnutrition and, 269-271; poverty and, 255; role in public health, 269-274; rural, 95; standards of, 90; vitamin deficiencies and, 272; well-being of population and, 269 Obote, Milton, 22, 23 Ojukwu, Odumegwu, 243 Older Americans Act (1965), 303, 305, 307 Ombudsman Project, 181, 197 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 66, 132, 144-145, 169 Ortega, Daniel, 103 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Ottawa Convention on Landmines, 218, 219 Pakistan, 64, 208, 262, 263 Panella, Marco, 333 Paramilitary organizations, 79, 80-81, 86 n4 Pastrana, Andrés, 82 Penrose, Michael, 202 People in Aid, 197 Perrin, Pierre, 191-194, 199 Pinochet, Augusto, 216, 217 Pisani, Edgard, 319 Poor People's Guerrilla Army, 88

Population growth, 247-250, 256 Poverty: in Abkhazial, 58, 59; in Colombia, 81, 83; in CongoBrazzaville, 13; extreme, 91; in Guatemala, 90-93; natural disasters and, 149-151; in Nicaragua, 101-111; overcoming, 259-266; rural, 259-266 Primakov, Yevgeny, 283, 287, 295, 299 Privatization, 69, 70, 131, 206, 261 Production: agricultural, 69, 70, 131, 251-257, 287; cash crop, 76; collective, 76; food, 75, 251-257; household, 71-72; increased capacity for, 251-257; industrial, 71, 160; private, 76, 161, 286; subsidies for, 262 Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo, 132 Rahaweyne Resistance Army, 37, 42nl Rape as weapon, 18 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratic (RCD), 25-26, 29 Reagan, Ronald, 31, 285 Reform: agricultural, 88, 96, 106; constitutional, 87, 89; economic, 69; free-market, 76; land, 69; liberal, 92, 206; structural, 206 Refugees: Angolan, 28; nutrition and, 272; Sierra Leone, 5; Somalian, 39; Sudanese, 29 Reno, William, 8 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 n l , 203 Richards, Paul, 8 Rights: civil, 91, 92; to food, 227-228, 230; of handicapped, 233re5; human, 19, 137, 197, 217, 218, 231, 233n2; political, 91; universal, 227-228; of women, 233n3 Robillard, Gail, 310 Ross, Larry, 306 RUF. See Revolutionary United Front Rufin, Jean-Christophe, 170, 206, 284, 294 Rugova, Ibrahim, 124, 129, 130, 132 Russia, 64, 165; Action Against Hunger in, 288, 298; agricultural sector in, 275, 286, 287; autarky

Index

in, 276; collectivization policy in, 285; crime rate in, 285; diversion of aid in, 278, 293-295; drought in, 276; exports from, 288-289; famine in, 285, 287-288; financial crisis in, 276; fixing prices in, 301 n46; f o o d aid to, 275-280, 283-299; harm done by aid, 289-291; harvests in, 276; humanitarian assistance in, 275-280; imports in, 276, 285, 300rc29; inflation in, 285; infrastructure in, 51; interest in Caucasus, 58; misappropriation of aid in, 277; necessity for, 286-289; political manipulation of aid in, 285; presence in Tajikistan, 65, 66; production policies, 276; question of need for aid in, 278-280; Roskhlebprodukt in, 293, 294; suspension of international funding for, 276; technological backwardness in, 276; vulnerable populations in, 295-299 Rwanda, 17, 21, 25, 30, 170, 206, 220; colonial era in, 22; f o o d strategies in, 323; genocide in, 21-24; independence, 22; Interahamwe militia in, 23, 25; International Criminal Court and, 216; psychological trauma in, 174; refugees in, 23; Rwandan A r m e d Forces in, 23; United Nations peacekeeping mission, 23. See also Great Lakes area Rwandan A r m e d Forces (FAR), 23 Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), 23 Saddam Hussein, 176 Salame, Ghassan, 242 Samper, Ernesto, 82 Sandinista National Liberation Front ( F S L N ) , 102, 103, 106 Sandino, Augusto César, 102 Sankoh, Foday, 9 n l Santer, Jacques, 283, 294, 298 Sassou N'Guesso, Denis, 12, 16, 17, 2 0 n l , 208 Savimbi, Joseph, 32 Security: in Afghanistan, 202; banditry and, 203, 204fig; in Burundi, 202; in Chechnya, 202; as component of humanitarian action,

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201-213; food, 319-330; incidents with Action Against Hunger, 202-205; police actions and, 203, 204/^; in Somalia, 202; terrorism and, 203, 20Afig; war and, 203, 204fig Semionov, Victor, 279, 287, 288, 291 Serbian League of Communists, 128 Serbyn, Roman, 298 Shalala, Donna, 306 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 52, 56, 57 Sierra Leone, 3-9, 6map, 183, 208; Action Against Hunger in, 5, 9n3; agriculture in, 6; A r m e d Forces Ruling Council in, 3, 4, 7, 9n2; atrocities in, 5; diamond industry in, 5, 6, 7; displaced persons on, 8; E C O M O G in, 3, 5, 7, 9n2; ECOWAS in, 8, 9n2; embargo on, 4, 186, 187, 315; f o o d diversions in, 7; humanitarian assistance in, 5, 7, 8; importation of f o o d in, 5-6; independence, 4; malnutrition in, 5; medical shortages, 5; National People's Revolutionary Council in, 4; peacekeeping forces in, 9n2; RUF in, 4, 7, 8, 9 n l , 203; security issues in, 5, 203 Sizov, Andrei, 291 Sodere Accords (1997), 46 Somalia, 31, 35-50, 36map, 170, 175, 206, 208; Action Against Hunger in, 39, 42w3, 42n4; agricultural production in, 39; civil war in, 35-36, 43; clan leadership in, 43, 44, 48, 49; displaced persons in, 39; embargo on, 47; factions in, 37-38, 41, 43-47; famine in, 206; health care in, 39; humanitarian assistance in, 189nl, 241; infrastructure in, 38-39; Islamic fundamentalism in, 49; lack of services in, 37; leaders' need for continuation of war in, 37-38; life expectancy in, 38; military intervention in, 189w7; militias in, 40, 41, 43, 45; mortality rates in, 38; N G O s in, 40-42, 44, 45; political authority in, 36-38; psychological trauma in, 174; Rahaweyne Resistance Army in, 37; regional

350

Index

powers' intervention in, 37; resource exploitation in, 39; security issues in, 202; state collapse in, 39; U.S. intervention in, 241; World Food Program in, 44 Somaliland, 38, 46, 47 Somoza, Anastasio, 102, 105 Somoza, Luis, 102 Sorman, Guy, 333 South Africa, 238; embargo on, 237, 239; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 217 South Korea, 164-165 Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination, 228 Stalin, Josef, 285 Stambolic, Ivan, 128 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 218, 219 Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, 197 Stevens, Siaka, 4, 8, 9n7 Stokesberry, John, 304 Strasser, Valentine, 4 Sudan, 25, 29, 253, 313 Tajikistan, 63-77, 66map; Action Against Hunger in, 74-76; agricultural collapse in, 67-68; cessation of subsidies in, 67; civil war in, 63, 64, 67; Contact Group in, 64, 66; coping strategies of rural poor, 73; displaced persons in, 64; drug trade in, 63-64; economic crisis in, 67-68; elections in, 64, 66; food crisis in, 67-68; General Agreement for the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in, 64; geography and vulnerability in, 73-74; government response to food crisis, 67-70; household food production in, 71-72, 74-76; humanitarian assistance in, 74—76; independence, 64; infrastructure in, 67; irrigation in, 72, 76; Islamic majority in, 65; Joint Election Observation Mission in, 66; "mafia" in, 71; national identity in, 64; national reconciliation in, 66; NGOs in, 63-77; nonpayment of

salaries in, 70; political conflict in, 63-66; post-soviet, 63-66; Presidential Land in, 69, 71; regionalist groups in, 63; rural food security in, 70-74; Russian presence in, 65, 66; sources of income, 71; tripartite political arrangement, 65; unemployment in, 67, 71, 76 Taliban, 183, 202 Tanzania, 26, 30 Taylor, Charles, 9 n l , 183, 206 "Tiger of Ixclän," 88 Tobin tax, 218, 219 Toynbee, Arnold, 311 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 217 Tuberculosis, 39 Tutsi peoples, 22, 23, 24, 31, 206; genocide and, 22 Tutu, Desmond, 217 Ubico, Jorge, 88 Uganda, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 208; Action Against Hunger in, 29; militias in, 22; National Resistance Army in, 22; Tutsis in, 23. See also Great Lakes area Ukraine, \90nl4, 283-284, 285 Ullman, Marc, 333 Unemployment, 256; in Guatemala, 91, 93; in Kosovo, 123, 125, 130-131; in Tajikistan, 67, 71, 76 UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations: Charter, 232, 235; Children's Fund, 30, 162, 184, 190m/2, 255; Conference on International Organization, 232; Department of Political Affairs, 8; Development Programme, 91, 319; embargoes, 235; evacuation of troops of, 29; Food and Agriculture Organization, 91, 153, 250, 253, 261, 313, 319; High Commissioner for H u m a n Rights, 228, 229, 231; High Commission for Refugees, 145, 176-177; humanitarian assistance from, 30; as interstitial power, 242; Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, 65-66;

Index

mobilization time, 154; Observer Mission in Georgia, 52; Operation in Somalia, 35, 44, 45; peacekeeping missions, 23, 146; Security Council, 47, 220, 234n9; shortcomings of, 176-178; Verification Mission in Guatemala, 96 United States, 164; Administration on Aging, 304; aid to Tajikistan, 70; Alliance for Aging in, 304; American Association of Retired Persons, 306; Central Intelligence Agency, 88; Department of Agriculture, 283-284, 288; Department of Health and Human Services, 307; elderly population, 304; federal commitment to aging, 305-308; funding for food aid, 305-311; Head Start program in, 307; humanitarian assistance to Russia, 276-278, 283-284, 296, 297; hunger in, 303-311; local aid for meal programs, 309-310; Meals on Wheels program in, 304, 308, 309; Medicaid and Medicare in, 310; National Institute of Health, 307; philanthropy in, 308-309; policy on aging, 310; relations with Nicaragua, 102; Social Services Block Grants in, 306; state aid for meal programs, 309-310 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 199, 218 Urbanization: in Colombia, 84; in Congo-Brazzaville, 14; food deficits and, 253; in Guatemala, 98nl2; in Haiti, 98nl2; in Kosovo, 125; in Nicaragua, 106 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 259-260 Uzbekistan, 64, 65 Van Den Broek, Hans, 287 Videla, Jorge, 217 Violence: in Colombia, 79-86; in Congo-Brazzaville, 11, 15, 16, 17;

351

geography of, 82-83; against humanitarian organizations, 204; against humanitarian workers, 199; as means to control, 208; political, 16; in Somalia, 38 War: defining the enemy in, 81; economies, 5-7; food as weapon in, 5-7; internationalization of, 24—26; rape as weapon in, 18; territorial, 208 Water supply, 27, 263; access to, 256; in Guatemala, 98n4; in Honduras, 113-121; investment in, 261; pollution and, 150 White Legion, 57 Wiley, Tom, 291 Witnessing, xiii, 218, 220, 223 World Alliance for Nutrition and Human Rights, 229, 234n5 World Bank, 23, 60, 69, 70, 91, 92, 259, 261, 288 World Food Conference (1974), 228 World Food Program, 9n6, 314, 315; in Democratic Republic of Congo, 28-29; in Honduras, 116; in Nicaragua, 108; in North Korea, 184; in Somalia, 44 World Food Summit (1996), 228 World Health Organization, 273 World Trade Organization, 60, 61, 326, 328-330 World Vision International, 189nS7 Yavlinsky, Grigory, 294 Yugoslavia, 220; embargo on, 235; International Criminal Court and, 216; invasion of Kosovo by, 124, 129; sanctions against, 124 Yusuf, Abdullah, 46 Zaire, 23, 24 Zambia, 30, 208; food strategies in, 323 Zloshevsky, Arkady, 297 Zulu militias, 15, 19n3

About the Book

Widespread h u n g e r continues to exist at the turn of the century, despite the efforts of scores of international relief organizations. Why? T h e authors of The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001 draw on both research and their firsthand field experience to explore the use of hunger as a weapon in food crises around the world. They also discuss strategies to counter inequitable food distribution in complex, manipulative situations and review food policies to combat h u n g e r and attain food justice. Founded in 1979 to fight against hunger and advocate for the legal right to food, Action Against Hunger is one of the leading international organizations working to assist victims of man-made famines.

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To Learn More About Action Against Hunger

Visit our Web site: http://www.aah-usa.org You can contact us: In the USA:

Action Against Hunger 875 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10001

phone: (212) 967-7800 e-mail: [email protected]

In the UK:

Action Against H u n g e r 1 Catton Street London WC1R4AB

phone: 0171 831 58 58 e-mail: [email protected]

In France:

Action Contre la Faim 4, Rue Niepce 75014 Paris

phone: 01 43 35 88 88 e-mail: [email protected]

In Spain:

Acción Contra el Hambre C/Caracas 6-1° 28010 Madrid

phone: 91 391 53 00 e-mail: [email protected]

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