The General Doctrine of Creation in the 13th Century

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THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF CREATION IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON MATTHEW OF AQUAS PARTA

BY

P. DR. ZACHARY HAYES, 0. F. M.

1964 MUNCHEN . PADERBORN · WIEN VERLAG FERDINAND SCHONINGH

Imprimi potest S. Ludovici, in conventu ad S. Antonium, die 30 m. Maii a. 1964

Fr. Dominic Limacher, O.F.M., Min. Provls. Imprimatur, Coloniae, die 9 m. Junii a. 1964 Jr. Nr. 46 307 I/64 Teusch vie. glis. All rights reserved © by Ferdinand Schoningh at Paderborn, 1964 Printed in Germany

DEDICATED IN GRATEFUL APPRECIATION TO MY MOTHER

CONTENTS Introduction . . . . . . . . .

ix

CHAPTER I: THE HIERARCHY OF BEING. §

1. The I) II) III) IV) V)

First Principle of Being . . . . Neo-Platonism and St. Augustine Anselm to the Victorines . . . . Early Franciscans to Bonaventure Development of Christian Aristotelianism Interplay of Augustinianism and Aristotelianism

1 2 3 5 8

10

§

2. The Relation of Creatures to God I) Causality . . . . . . . . . 1) Efficient . . . . . . 2) Formal-Exemplary 3) Final II) Eminence . . . .

19 20 21 23 31 33

§

3. Dualism and the Problem of Evil . . . . . . . I) Dualism II) Nature of evil III) Origin of evil

37 37 43 45

CHAPTER II: THE CREATIVE ACT AND THE CREATURE. 1. Creation ex nihilo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I) Reason and Faith II) Ex nihilo . . . . . III) God and omnipotence

52 54 56 59

§

2. The I) II) III)

63 64 68 72

§

3. Creation a divine prerogative . . . I) Principal cause and creation . II) Instrumental cause and creation

§

One and the Many . . . . . . . . . . Scholastics' rejection of Intermediaries God's nature and manner of operation Universe as an ordered whole . . . .

74 74 80

CHAPTER III: THE CREATOR. §

1. Trinity and Creation . . . . . . . . . . . I) Scholastic Trinitarian speculation II) The nature of the productive principle III) The nature of the creature and the role of reason IV) Manner of production . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86 87 . 90 93 96 vii

§ 2. The Immutable Creator . . . . . I) Immutability of the Godhead . II) Change and God's manner of . . III) Change and the creature § 3. Creation and Eternity III) Time and infinity . . . . . II) Denial of an eternal world III) Thomas' position . . . . .

. . . . . . operation . . . . .

97 97

100 102 105

106

107

114

Conclusion

118

Sources

122

Literature

124

Abbreviations

130

Index

131

viii

INTRODUCTION The one fact that stands as the foundation for all true religion is the f�ct of creation. This is a truth which, when grasped in its full implica­ tions, deals a shattering blow to all human pretensions. It is God from Whom all things take their origin; it is God "Who created all things, Who stretched out the heavens alone; Who spread out the earth." (Is. 44, 24.) God is; and through His creative will, He has given existence to creatures, calling them into existence from the abyss of nothingness. That was the beginning. 1 Outside the realm of Divine Revelation the mystery of the cosmos has challenged the ingenuity of the human mind since the dawn of history. 2 How is man to understand the universe in which he lives; and how is he to explain its existence? Why does a universe of limited and imperfect beings exist at all? Where does it come from; what is its goal? Is it merely the product of blind chance; or is man forced, for intellectual reasons, to posit the existence of some transcendent first principle, some deity, as the explanation of the world of our experience? If we admit the existence of a deity as the origin of the cosmos, what is his relation to it? Is he a sort of pantheistic god, enmeshed in the web of the universe; or is he a trans­ cendent principle who stands essentially above all else? If he is a trans­ cendent being of limitless perfection, how is it possible to explain the ex­ istence of evil in the universe? Or does the existence of evil force us to posit a dual principle of being - one of good and one of evil? What is the true nature of the Creator, and what that of the creature? This is the complex of questions in which the Scholastics worked out their doctrine of creation, working against the background of the basic problems of the relation of the doctrine of creation to the ontological study of reality and the relation of faith to reason. In the early centuries of Christian thought, the doctrine of creation was treated above all in the totality of the history of salvation. 3 But in 1

2

3

For the exegetical problem concerning the meaning of the text of Genesis 1, 1 confer: Henricus Renckens, U·rgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte, (Mainz, 1959) p. 74ss. The book of Genesis gives a positive, dynamic statement of the doc­ trine of creation. God's creative act is the source of the totality of creation. The concept of production ex nihilo is a negative statement, most likely arising in the Scriptures through the influence of Greek thought. The Book of Wisdom (11, 18) describes creation from "formless matter," which is most likely to be understood as an importation of terminology from the Platonists and Stoics. The second Book of the Maccabees (II Mace. 1, 28) uses the ex­ pression "out of nothing." These two books are dated in the second and first century before Christ respectively; that is, at a time in which Greek thought was exercising considerable influence among the Jews. Cfr. Catholic Com­ mentary (Westminster, 1951) p. 136; 388ss; 559; Echter Bibel (Wilrzburg, 1949ss.) Genesis, Introd.; Weisheit, p. 5-7; Mace., p. 85. J. Baikie, History of Egypt (New York, 1929) p. 359; I. Brady, History of Ancient Philosophy (Milwaukee, 1959) p. 35; E. Gilson, Der Geist der Mittel­ alterlichen Philosophie (Wien, 1949) tr. R. Schmucker, p. 50; R. Honigswald, Vom erkenntnistheoretischen Gehalt alter Schopfungserziihlungen (Stuttgart, 1957) p. 13ss., and 49ss.; W. Jaeger, Die Theologie des friihen griechischen Denkens (Stuttgart, 1933) p. 9-69.; C. Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought (New York, 1960) p. 4. L. Scheffczyk, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, herausg. M. Schmaus and A. Grillmeier, Bd. II, Fasz. 2a: Schopfung und Vorsehung (Freiburg, 1963) p. 30-70.

ix

well Augustine already we find a strong rational-o�t�logical c�ara_cter as ssed as the religious-ethical element,4 and the Christian doctri�e 1s expre ht with many elements of neo-Platonic philosophy. For centuries the thoug logy, the rn Weste ated domin ? of Augustine with its neo-Platonic elements m the and its influence reached far into the thirteenth century, above all early theologians of the Mendicant Orders, and in. the case of the Fra1:cis­ cans, up to the time of Bonaventure and beyond.a Among those doctrines which are generally seen as Augustinian and which are of importance in the doctrine of creation are: 1) The Trinitarian cause of creation and the connection between the Trinity and creation; 2) the importance of the Divine Ideas; 3) the doctrine of Illumination; 4) the impossibility of an eternal world; 5) the conviction that the soul has an immediate intuitive knowledge of itself.n But in the Golden Age of Scholasticism, we are confronted with the attempt to achieve a more systematic, rational penetration of the content •

6

X

1

ibid., p. 62. Concerning the Augustinianism of Bonaventure, there are several view­ points. Ehrle writes that Bonaventure is Augustinian in the sense that he belonged to a traditional Augustinian stream. Cfr. F. Ehrle, Beitrage zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik, II: "Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts", ALKG V (1889) p. 603-635. J. Auer sees in Bonaventure an outstanding champion of the Augustinian tradition whose work reflects a strenuous effort to minimize the growing influence of Aristotelianism. Cfr. J. Auer, Die En.twicklung der Gnadenlehre, I, (Freiburg, 1942) p. 26-27. Gilson views Bona\1 enture as the great Augustinian, who lived and breathed the spirit of the great African Doctor. Cfr. E. Gilson, Der heilige Bonaventura, (Jakob Hegner in Hellerau, 1921) p. 501-528. Van Steenberghen, on the other hand, has proposed the theory that Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle in his earlier works is essentially no different from that of the other great theologians of his time; he retained many Aristotelian elements. It was only later in his life, says Van Steenberghen, that Bonaventure turned to Platonism, having found Aristotelianism to be in tragic error. Cfr. F. Van Steenberghen, The Philoso­ phical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1955). M. Schmaus has indicated that there are basic Aristotelian elements in so central a theme as the Bonaventurian doctrine on the Trinity. He points out further that Aristotelianism and Augustinianism in the thirteenth centurv were not two entirely distinct worlds of thought; that the thinkers of the ·period felt free to turn for truth where ever they thought it was present. Cfr. M. Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehr­ unterschiede zwischen Thomas van Aquin und Duns Scotus II. Teil. Beitriige zur Geschichte der Phil. 1md Theol. d. Mittelalters (Mu�ster, 1930) Bd. X�IX, p. 654. T�e whole discussion points out the danger of trying to categorize any one of the great Scholastics as belonging exclusively to one particul�r school of thought. Whatever the truth of the matter may be concer?-mg Bonaventure, one thing is certain, namely, that at least in his later llfe _he had a strong tendency against Aristotelianism. His writings are c�ara�tenzed by many Augustinian elements; and while he is not Augusti­ man m_ t_he �ense that he merely copied Augustine, he may be said to be �ug1:1sti:1ian m the sense that many basic concepts and attitudes take their 1r:ispirat10n f�om Augustine. The same may be said of a number of his dis­ c1p�es, espec1a�ly of Matthew of Aquasparta. Cfr. J. Ratzinger, Die Ge­ schichtstheologie des hl. Bonaventura (Mi.inchen, 1959) p. 121-143. J. Hirschberger, Gesch'ichte der Philosophic, Vol. I, (Freiburg i. Br., 1961) p. 449.

of Revelation. 7 This attempt included, of course, a broadening of the tools of scientific research. But it did not remain on the surface of things. It brought with it an enrichment and a deepening in the scientific handling of the content of Faith, a deepening which was possible, in the final analysis, because of the use of philosophy. Through the tools of philosophy, the Scholastics arrived at an organic, systematic understanding of the doctrine of creation; a view which saw creation not only in its theological context, but in its ontological aspects as well. The scientific ideal of this movement was the ideal of Aristotle. A stream of neo-Platonic and Augustinian elements runs through the early Middle Ages, 8 but Aristotle was known and used in the West as early as the sixth century. Boethius (480-524) passed on many basic Platonic thoughts, especially the concept of God as the Highest Good; 9 but at the same time, he introduced the terminology of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics into medieval thought, thus repre­ senting an important source of Aristotelianism for the period prior to the thirteenth century. 10 In the early twelfth century, the entire Organon be­ came available in the West through the translation of James of Spain, 11 and by the beginning of the thirteenth century, the influence of Aristotle had grown greatly. In 1210, the Provincial Council of Paris banned the Philosopher's natural philosophy; and in 1215, the bann was confirmed and extended by Robert of Courson. 12 All this is nothing but a symptom of the fact that the work of the thirteenth century was largely an inter­ action between the heritage of neo-Platonic Augustinianism and the scientific ideal of Aristotle. But it was not only the influence of Aristotle hin.1.self that played such a great role in the thirteenth century. There was also the problem of the Platonically-colored Aristotle of the Arabs, bringing in its wake such problematic views as the immanentism of Avicenna and the Averroistic doctrine of the eternal matter and the Intelligences. These problems become almost standard themes in the treatment of creation by the Scholastics. 1 3 Thus, the rise of philosophy brought with it not only the fundamental question of the relationship of faith and reason, but also the struggle between immanentism and the concept of a transcendent Creator. As a point of departure for the present study of the doctrine of creation in the thirteenth century, we have used the Quaestiones disputatae de productione rerum of Matthew of Aquasparta (1237-1302), 14 a collection M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der kathol. TheoLogie (Freiburg i. Br., 1933) p. 47. s M. Grabmann, MitteLaLterLiches GeistesLeben, II, (Mi.inc�en, 1936) p. lss. ; M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Schol. Methode, II (Fre1burg, 1909; Darmstadt, 1956) p. 55. n Boethius De cons. phil., III, 2. (PL 63, 724) (CC, XCIV, p. 38) "Omnium summum bo:iorum cunctaque intra se bona continens." 10 Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 375-377. 11 F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. II (London, 1950), p. 205. 12 Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 436. 1 3 Brady, op. cit., p. 193-217; Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 428. 14 Auer, op. cit., Intr., p. 3-26; Sr. Helen Marie Beha, O.S.F., Matthew of Aquasparta's Theory of Cognition, in: Franc. �tud., 20 (1960) p. . 161-204; Copleston, op. cit., p. 250ss.; F. Ehrle, Das Stu�nl71!' d�r Handschriften der mitteLalterLichen SchoLasti.k mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der SchuLe des i

xi

of questions that reflects the various elements present in the theology of the thirteenth century. Parallel sections of his Commentary have been consulted as well, but for the most part they indicate nothing essentially different from the views expressed by him in his later Quaestiones. Aquasparta was a disciple of Bonaventure and an heir of his master's Augustinian traits which reach back to the early Franciscan school, where we find a strong influence of Augustine and of the Victorine school, which was heavily indebted to Pseudo-Dionysius for its neo-Platonic character­ istics as well as for its leaning toward mysticism. 1 5 Outstanding among the early Franciscans, and the master of Bonaventure, was the figure of Alexander of Hales. 16 The Summa attributed to him stands as a com­ pendium of the teachings of the early Franciscan school, and the works which are cited in it show clearly the influence of Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm, and the Victorines. 17 More accurate sources of Alexander's own thought are his Glossa, and his Quaestiones disputatae. Alexander certainly knew Aristotle, but he leans strongly in the direction of Augustinianism, as is evident, for example, in his preoccupation with the concept of the Highest Good. 1 8 Contemporaneous with Bonaventure was Thomas Aquinas, the disciple of Albert the Great. Albert's work had shown a very extensive use of Aristotle, even though he retained many neo-Platonic elements. 1 9 Thomas carried the spirit of Albert much further, employing the newly translated Aristotelian texts in a thorough-going manner in the development of his synthesis. The spirit of Bonaventure, with its emphasis on piety and affective theology, influenced Aquasparta to a great extent ; while the direction of Peter Olivi tends more in the direction of Scotus. Though the entire hl. Bonaventura, in : Zeitschrift fur kath. Theol. , 7 (Innsbruck) , 1 883, p. 1 -5 1 ; P. Glorieux, La suite des maitres franciscains de Paris au XJJie sielce, in : Arch. Franc. Hist. , 26 ( 1933) p. 257-28 1 ; Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 457 ; E. Longpre, Matthieu d' Acquasparta des freres mineurs, phiLosophe et theologien, in : Diet. Theol. Cath., 1 0 (Paris, 1 928), 357-389 ; -Oberweg, G�'!-'-11:drij3 der Geschichte der Phil.osophie (II. Teil), herausg. Geyer (Tubingen, 1951) p. 480 ; from the series BibLiotheca Franciscana Scholastica I (Qll:aracchi, 1903) ; II (Quaracchi, 1 91 4) ; XI (Quaracchi, 1 935) ; XVII (Qua� racch1, 1956) ; XVIII (Quaracchi, 1 959) . 1 5 Hirsch.berger, op. cit., p . 423 ; Copleston, op. cit., p . 1 76, 1 6 Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 451 ; Copleston, op. cit., p. 232-239 ; Grabmann, Die Gesch. der kath. TheoL., p. 63ss. 1 7 We will not attempt a solution to the difficult problem as to the authorship of the Summa. The question as to whether it is the work of Alexander does not detract . from the fact that it represents the spirit and teaching of the early Fra � c1scans such as John Rupella and Alexander. Cfr. Summa Fratris Alexan� ri, I (Quarac�hi, 1924) Prolog. XXVIII ; and IV ( Quaracchi, 1 948) . Prolog. , Grab r:n ann, MittelaLterLiches GeistesLeben, I (Milnchen, 1 926), p. 6 1 -63 ; Grabmann, Die G� sch. der kath. Theol., p. 63 ; V. Doucet, A New Source of the Sum_ma Frntris ALexandri, in : Franc. St. 6 ( 1 946) p. 403-41 7 ; K. Lynch, A Terminus ante Quem for the Conimentary of Alexander of Hales, in : Fran�. St. 10 (1950) p. 46. We will distinguish in this work between the teaching ?f the S� mma and the teaching of Alexander as found in works known with certainty to be his . 1 8 Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 45 1 ; Copleston, op. cit., p. 232-239 . rn -Oberweg, op. cit., p. 40 1 -4 1 6 ; Copleston, op. cit., p. 293.

xii

Commentary of Olivi is no longer extant, certain of his Quaestiones provide interesting samples of his thinking, which tends to be more critical than that of Bonaventure or of Aquasparta and contains more Aristotelian elements. Peter of Trabes was a contemporary of Olivi, and has left a Commentary showing considerable Aristotelian influence. 20 Richard of Mediavilla also carried on the Augustinian tradition after Bonaventure. William of Ware, the teacher of Scotus, shows many Aristotelian traits. 21 In the work of Scotus, Franciscan theology reaches a new high point of development. Scotus shows many elements of Augustinianism, though his thought is very sharp and his methodology is rigidly scientific. 22 This was the age in which Aquasparta lived and worked, and his thought reflects the varied streams of activity of the thirteenth century. In order to understand and evaluate the work of any thinker, we must try to see him in the setting of his own age. We must attempt to understand the world of thought in which he moved; and to attain some realization of the historical streams that merge in his work; for no philosopher or theologian stands alone in the landscape of history. Each has been influenced by his predecessors as well as by his con­ temporaries; each has had to meet the demands of problems peculiar to his own times. Only by studying a man's thought in its historical development can we come to a fuller and deeper realization of what he taught and why he taught it. 20

21

22

The exact relationship that existed between Olivi and Peter of Trabes is not clear. Concerning Peter of Trabes, we have very little i:pformation to work with. The manuscripts always designate him as "de Trabibus," in­ dicating Trabes as his place of birth. Some authors suppose this to be in southern France, making Trabes a compatriot of Olivi. Others view the name as a reference to a Franciscan convent "de Trabe Bonantis" in the custody of Camerino in Italy. The close relation in teaching between Olivi and Trabes has led scholars such as Ehrle to see in Trabes a faithful dis­ ciple of Olivi . But the problem is not easily solved since Olivi and Trabes were about the same age and were active as Lectors at the same time. Cfr. F. Delorme, Pierre de Trabibus et la distinction forrnelle, in : La France Franciscaine, 7 ( 1924) p. 255ss. ; V. Doucet, De operibus nianuscriptis Fr. Petri Joannis Olivi in bibliotheca Univ. Patavina asservatis, in : Arch. Franc. Hist. , 28 (1935) p. 156-197; 408-442 ; F. Ehrle, Petrns Johannis Olivi, sein Leben, seine Schriften, in : ALKG., 3 (1887) , p. 459-552 ; G. Gal, Commentarium Petri de Trabibus in IV librum Sententiarum Petro de Tarantasia falso inscriptum, in: Arch. Franc. Hist., 45 (1952) , p. 241-278; P. F. Gallaey, Olieu ou Olivi, Pierre de Jean, in: Diet. Theol. Cath., 11/1 (1931), 982-991; V. Heynck, Die Sentenzenkommentare d. P. Joh. Olivi und d. Petrus d e Trabibus, in : Franz . Stud. , 38 (1956) p. 37 1 -398 ; J. Koch, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus Johannis Olivi, in : Rech. Th. Anc. Med. , 2 (1930) p. 290-310; E . Longpre, Pietro de Trabibus. Un discepolo de Pier Giovanni Olivi, in: Studi Francescani, 8 (1922) p. 267-290 ; A. Teetaert, Pierre de Trabibus, in: Diet. Theol. Cath. , 12/2, 2049ss. ; B. Jansen, Petrus de Trabibus. Seine spekulative Eigenart oder sein Verhiiltnis zu Olivi, in: Ab­ handlungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, Munster, 1923, p. 243-254. A. G. Little, The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, in: Arch. Franc. Hist. , 19 (1926), p. 803-874 ; E. Longpre, Guil laume de Ware, in : La France Franciscaine, 11 (1928), p. 79 -81. J . Auer, Der theologische Genius des Johannes Duns Scotus, in : Wissen. u. Weish. , 17 (1954), p. 161-175 ; Hirschberger, op. cit., p. 537 .

xiii

In Aquasparta's questions concerning creation we find a very ex­ tensive complex of problems ; problems which concern the hierarchy of being itself, the nature of the act of creation, and the nature of the Creator. Within this general schema, there are many p roblems which at first sight may seem to be only distantly related to the doctrine of creation ' but which for the medieval mind were tied up into the systematic consideration of creation. Thus, we find that Aquasparta treats such problems as the nature of a relation, the problem of the Divine Ideas, the relation of the inner-trinitarian processions to the act of creation, the relation of primary to secondary causes, and many other questions in the course of his considerations on the meaning of creation. Because of the extent and richness of the material to be covered, many problems can be merely indicated. An explicit treatment of each question concerned would extend beyond the limits of this study, since any number of the problems would deserve an entire study for themselves. We hope to present here the general outlines of the problems concerning creation as seen by the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century and the place of Aquasparta in this great stream of philosophical and theolo­ gical activity, realizing that any such attempt must be deficient in many respects, and feeling nonetheless, that despite the deficiencies that this work shows, the presentation of the doctrine of creation in its broad context, in its relation to ontology, in its relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, in its relationship to the question of faith and reason, and in the manifold other aspects which will appear in the course of this study is of value in itself, even though the treatment of individual problems must at times be cursory. The detailed considera­ tion of many points must remain for the day when a true history of the development of the understanding and treatment of the doctrine of creation is worked out in its full dimensions. It remains to express my gratitude to those who have made the writing of this work possible. My religious superior, Very Reverend Father Provincial Dominic Limacher, O.F.M. , has been very generous in allowing me ample time and freedom necessary for such a proj ect. For the actual writing of this study, I am greatly indebted to Herr Professor Johann Auer, professor of dogmatic theology at the University of Bonn, who has been must generous with his time and guidance. I feel, likewise, a debt of thanks to the Catholic theological faculty of the University of Bonn for the recognition of this work as a doctoral dissertation. And a final word of thanks is in order to the personnel of the American Embassy in Bad Godesberg whose generosity has made the p rinting of this work possible.

xiv

CHAPTER I THE HIERARCHY OF BEING

§ 1 The First Principle of Being The existence of God is not merely one truth among other truths, j ust as the being of God is not a particular being with its place among others as the first of a series. God is not the first link in a chain, but essentially transcends all being other than Himself. God is that reality which envelops and dominates our thought. His reality must be recognized, and His transcendence must be acknowledged with all its implications. It is the teaching of the Church that man may arrive at the knowledge of a principle of being transcending the world of change, and this not only from the founts of Revelation but by means of the natural light of human reason as well. 1 That is, with the same intellect with which m a n seeks to know and understand the material world about him, he can also come to a certain knowledge of the existence of a being distinct from and superior to the world, a b eing who is Maker and Lord of the uni verse. The history of Western thought is replete with the efforts of men who have attempted to probe deep into the capability of man's intel­ lect to cope with this problem. Problematic it is ; for, as St. Augustine points out, God is both hidden and manifest ; He has hidden Himself in creation, and He manifests Himself through creation. 2 Among the pillars on which man's speculations have been built are the ever-present phenomena of movement, contingence, causality, finality, and moral obligation . These are ever at hand ; they are as real and as present as man and his thought; but they are skeletal in their native state, and consequently they have been invested with a degree of elaboration to fit the needs of each particular age. But the conclusion to which they lead is always and everywhere the same. The universe, for all its mystery and splendor, is at root a created universe; above it and transcending it is a first principle of all being, which is at once perfect and immutable. This is the question with which Matthew of Aquasparta opens his dis­ cussion of the problem of creation : Is it necessary to posit a first principle or cause of all thingst3 We might reword the question in this way : What is the necessary ontological antecedent for the world of our everyday ex­ perience? We live in a universe of limited, imperfect b eings ; a world whose very substance s eems, at ti mes, to be essentially change. 4 If it is 1

2 3

4

Denz. 1806 ; 2145; 2305. Augustine, Confess., I, 4. (PL 32, 662). Deus simul dicitur absconditus et manifes tus, in creaturis se abcondit, et ex creaturis se manifestat. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de productione rerum, BFS XVII (Quaracchi, 1956), p. 3. E. Whittaker, Space and Spirit (Hinsdale, 1948) ; E. Whittaker . The Beginning and the End of the World (Oxford, 1955); Ronald Knox, God and the Atom (New York, 1945).

1

true that the existence of the univers e is not meaningless, then it foll� ws that there must be a sufficient reas on for its existence, an ont� log1c � l antecedent a transcendent cause that has brought it into existence.a In his treatment �f this question , Matthew remains basically within the wo rld of _ Augustinianism with its neo-Platonic overtones ; and an understandmg of his solution presupposes a knowledge of his predecessors.

I) Nea-P latonism and Augustine Plato had envisioned a universe composed of grades of b eing. 6 Some b eings have a greater share of pure b eing than others . Those things which have the character of the unchanging, immortal, and true are more noble than those which are merely variable and mortal.7 And above this world of material b eings is the world of true reality, the world of the Ideas, in which are to be found the forms of all existent b eings. 8 Variations of the Platonic vision were to b e found in the work of the neo-Platonists ; and especially through the works of Plotinus, v arious Platonic elements found their way into the thought of Augustine and thus into Christianity. Plotinus held that there are three principles in the universe : s oul, mind, and the One. The flight from matter is to lead to the goal of life union with the One. 9 The One is the first principle, the fountain of life, the source of Intelligence, the cause of Good, the origin of Being. 1 0 Augustine's thought must b e viewed against this b ackground. 1 1 To Augustine, the first principle that the Greek philosophers were s eeking is the God of Christianity. In answer to the question as to whether w e must posit the existence o f a first principle, his ans w er would b e that the entire make-up of man and all his d esire and yearnings cry out the existence of God. He strongly favored a line of reasoning b ased on psycho­ logical experience, leaning more to the nature of religious experience 5

6 7 8 9

10

11

2

The philosophical problem involved here concerning the origin and mean­ ing of the universe and its relation to modern science is a question of pro­ found interest. While Plato and Aristotle and the Scholastics saw order and design, the modern emphasis is on the prominence of chance, accident, and blind necessity. Cfr. James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (New York, 1932), p. 3-6. Here Jeans, after describing the apparent, deep-running chaos of the universe, writes : "Into such a universe we have stumbled, if not exactly by mistake, at least as the result of what may properly be described as an accident." The treatment of this problem belongs properly to the field of the philosophy of the nature. E. Gilson, Being and some Philosophers (Toronto, 1949) p. 16. Plato, Republic, 585. Plato, Republic, 517B. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, IX, 11. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, IX, 9. Martin Grabmann, Die Gesch. der Schol . Meth., Bd. II, p. 55 for d>cussion of P �atonism in the Fathers. For general studies of Augustine' s though :·_ cfr. E. � 1lson, _ Introduction a l' etude de S. Augustin (Paris, 1949); J. Hessen, T)ie Phil_osophie �es hl. Augustinus (Nilrnberg, 1949); R. Schwarz, Die leil • ­ seelische Existenz bei Aurelius Augustinus, in : Phil : Jahr., 6 3 (1954), p. 323-360 ; K. Adam, Die geistige Entwicklung des hl. Augu stimts (Darm­ stadt, 1954).

than to philosophical speculation. His reasoning rests on man's desire for happiness and truth ; and on the necessity and immutability of our ideas. 1 2 The starting point is the mind's apprehension of necessary and changeless truths, " of a truth which you cannot call yours, or mine, or any man's; but which is present to all and gives itself to all alike. " 1 :1 This truth is superior to the mind, it transcends and rules thought . " Hence, if truth is neither inferior nor equal to our minds, nothing remains but that it should be superior and more excellent. " 1 4 The argument leads, in this manner of thinking, to a first principle in whom resides the eternal and necessary Truth. This first principle is the source of all truth and goodness, through whom all other beings are good and true. 1 5 The method of investigation by working with the consciousness of man is clearly nee-Platonic, as are the concepts of the sovereign truth and good­ ness, and the exaggerated distinction b etween body and soul. 1 6 Exemplar­ ism and the doctrine of Ideas play an important role, though they undergo a radical change at his hand.17 Augustine saw the universe as a splendid order, reflecting in itself the glories of its Creator; 18 but he never develops elaborate proofs based on these facts. His main interest was always centered on the intimations of God's existence within the inner world of man's conciousness. True knowledge of God is a religious matter to be achieved by a purification of heart; Augustine views the question from the world of a theologian and a pastor of souls rather than from that of a philosopher. 1 9

II) Ans elm to t he Victorines To Anselm has fallen the lot of having written a paragraph which, perhaps more than any other paragraph in Western theological literature, h as b een a subj ect of discussion in every ensuing age, namely, the so­ called 'ontological' proof of the Proslogion. 20 Anselm, like Augustine before him, is moving in the world of religious experience; and it is his conviction that the phenomenon of human religious experience demands the existence of God. 2 1 Anselm is moving in the Augustinian tendency with Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosop hy, I (London, 1951), p. 88. 1 a Augustine, De lib. arbit., II, 12, 33 (PL 32, 1259). 1 4 ibid. 1s Augustine, De vera relig., 31, n. 57 ; De Trinit., VIII, 2, n. 3 (PL 34, 147) (PL 42, 948). 1 6 De Wulf, op. cit. , p. 82. 1 1 ibid, p. 89. 18 ibid., p. 82. . . rn E. Gilson Der heilige Augustin, p. 35ss., for a discuss10n of the way of the soul t� God and the role of reason in man's search for God. 20 Anselm Proslogio n, c. 2 (PL 158, 227), (Schmitt, I, p. 101) ; Grabmann, Gesch. theol. der Sch�l. Meth., p. 258 ; A. Landgraf,Einfiihrung in die Geschichte der 51. p. 1948) sburg, Literatur der Frilhscholastik (Regen 21 Anselm' s 'proof' has been subj ected to much criticism, both positive and negative . In all too many instances the citation is taken out of the c ?ntext, e. where in the original work, it appears as a part of a prayer for gmdanc It is n�ither purely philosophical nor purely theological in the sense that we 12

3

its distrust of purely metaphysical speculation concerning the existence of God. Truly meaningful knowledge of God is at root a �eligious experi: ence requiring inner dispositions of soul and inner reflect10ns on oneself. 2Anselm's Proslogion argument presupposes an intimate and living presence of God in the soul. In his Monologion he gives a proof for God's existence based on the degrees of perfection found in creatures. 23 While the p roof is based on empirical observation and is consequently a posteriori, it is radically Platonic in inspiration, being based on the concepts of good­ ness and greatness, proceeding from limited goodness to absolute good­ ness.2� The Victorine school with its mystical orientation viewed the question from well within the limits of the work of Augustine and Anselm. Thus Hugh of St. Victor develops a proof from the analysis of the experiential fact of self-consciousness. 23 Yet there is a greater emphasis in the Victorines on the proof from external reality. Hugh of St. Victor gives a proof for God's existence based on the fact of change; and while the argu­ ment is basically the same as that based on the analysis of internal change, both arguments represent an unwillingness to work merely with the analysis of a concept. With Richard of St. Victor, the proof from external reality comes first, although the universe of Richard is basically that of Anselm. 2 (i

22 23 24 25

26

4

use the terms today ; but it combines elements of philosophical and theological thinking together with religious experience. Hence, it is, in reality, a much more complex text than many ·writers would lead one to think. There is a rich literature on the topic , from which we cite the following : A. Daniels, Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizeh nten Jahrhundert, in : Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 8 (Munster, 1 909); K. Barth, Fides quaerens inteUectum. Anselms Beweis der Existen:: Gottes im Zu­ sammenhang seines theologischen Programms, in : Forsch. zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus, 4. R. 3. Bde. (Miinchen, 1 93 1 ) 1 03; E. Gilson, Sens et nature de l'argument de Saint Anselme, in : Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M. A. 9 ( 1 934) 5-51 ; A. Stolz, Das Proslogion des hl. Anselm, in : Revue benedictine, 47 ( 1 935) 331 -347 ; A. Kolping, Anselms Proslogion- Beweis der Existenz Gottes (Bonn, 1 939); De Wulf, op. c it., 1 62ss.; G. Sohngen , Die Einheit . in der Theologie (Miinchen, 1 952) 26-52, 1 45ss.; D. Henrich, Der ? ntologisch_e Gottesb eweis (Tiibingen, 1960) ; V. Warnach, Zum Argument im Proslogwn Anselms von Canterbury, in: Einsicht und Glaube, herausg. Ratzinger & Fries (Freiburg i. Br., 1 962) 337ss. De �ulf, op . cit., p. 1 62ss. ; Gilson, Der heilige Bonaventura (Hellerau, 1 929) passim ; A. Stolz, Anselm von Canterbury (Miinchen, 1 937) , p. 45. Anselm, Monologion, c. 1 -4, (PL 1 58, 1 44- 1 50), (Schmitt, I, p. 1 3) . Copleston, op . cit., p. 1 56ss. Hugh of St. Victor, De Sac r., III, 7 (PL 1 76, 219). Hugh argues that sinc e the soul � as not always been concious o f its own existence, there must have be � n a tur� e at which it did not exist. Since it could not have given itself existence, it must owe its existence to another, and ultimately to God. R� chard of St. Victor, De Trin., I, 5 (PL 1 96, 894) ; I, 1 1 (PL 1 96, 895-6) . Richard ap proaches the prnblem from three ways, the first being based on the experience of external reality. For "We ought to begin with that class of things ? f which we can have no manner of doubt, and by means of those . th ! ngs which � e know by experience, to conclude rationally what we must thmk concernmg the obj ects which transcend experience." Cfr. Copleston, _ op. cit., p. 1 76ss.; Grabmann , Gesch. der Schol. Meth., Bd. II, p. 229; Land­ graf, op. cit., p. 73.

III)

Early Francis cans to Bonav enture

The thought of Augustine was to have a deep influence on the Franciscan theologians, and in particular, those of the earlier school. The Summa Hale nsis presents a summary of the thought of Augustine, Anselm, and the Victorines with little development over what had been done before, at least as regards the proofs for God's existence. 2 7 The Summa raises the question as to whether the knowledge of God's existence is self-evident to man. After distinguishing between cognitio in habitu and cognitio in actu, the Summa goes on to say that while, in certain circumstances, it is possible for man to lack actual knowledge of God's existence, it is impossible for a rational being to exist without the cognitio in habitu. 28 The early Franciscan school centered its teaching around the concept of God as the Summum B onum , which is the first principle of all being. Creatures arise from this Bonum , and tend toward it as toward their goal. They possess goodness in a double sense; namely, the goodness of being in 27

28

The Summa points out five different avenues of approach. These proceed: 1) From the concept of being and its disjunctive attributes, 2) from change and causality, and from the soul's consciousness of itself, 3) from the con­ cept of truth, 4) from the concept of optimum, 5) from the concept of pre­ eminence. The sources for these five ways are Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo­ Dionysius, Anselm, and the Victorines. The influence of Augustinianism is clear. None of the proofs based on the external world are exploited sys­ tematically ; the weight of the approach from within is more important. On this question, the Summa shows considerable dependence on William of Auxerre, who listed four main proofs for God's existence : Primo per habitudinem causae ad causatum ; secundo quia aliquid est incausabile ; tertio quia aliquid est optimum ; quarto quia aliquid est quo majus cogitari non potest. (Summa Aure a, Palis, 1518, Bd. I, p. 10-2r.) ; cfr. also E. Bettoni, II problema della cognoscibilita di Dio nella scuola francescana: Alessandro d'Hales, S. Bonaventura, Duns Scoto( II pensiero medioevale, ser. I, 1), Padua, 1950. The question is based on Damascene' s cognitio inserta. The teaching of the Summa (I, n. 26, sub Res., p. 43) may be reduced to the following : Cognitio Dei In actu

In habitu

I

Habitus naturaliter impressus

Secundum partem superiorem rationis

Secundum partem inferiorem

Non potest ignorari

et Simili tudinern primae veritatis superiori parte rationis impressam, eo modo quo recolit suum principium per hoc quod videt se non esse a se.

quae est ad contemplandas creaturas

I

Hoc modo potest non cognoscere Deum esse.

I

Hoc modo impossible est non cognoscere Deum esse.

5

All created themselves, and goodness in relation to the rest of the universe. 29 that play a a Summ being is signed with goodness. The elements from the t of t e determining role in the later Franciscan theologian� are ? concep the first principle as Summum Bonum and the quest10n of mnate knowl edge and its meaning . This becomes clear in the G lossa of Alexander of Hales. To Alexander, it is impossible to be ignorant of God's existence. God is the highest Good, Truth, and Unity; but none of these qualities can be known through the medium of sense knowledge. They can be known only through a type of innate knowledge. 30 God's existence may also be known through creatures ' since God has revealed Himself in the world; the first approach is from the existence of movable beings, the existence of which leads to 31 the existence of a highest immovable principle. But in the final analysis, the God with whom Alexander is concerned is the Summum B onum. This Highest Good tends to diffuse itself without losing anything of itself, and from this tendency arises creation. Thus we can say , because the Good exists, creatures exist. 32 For Bonaventure, the existence of God is an indubitable truth. All of man's nature; his yearning for truth, goodness, and happiness; his knowledge of his own limitations and imperfections cry out the existence of that perfect Truth and Goodness which is God. It is a truth that arises from the existence of every creature, and which is naturally imprinted on the human mind in such a way that it is the most certain of all truths. There is an implicit awareness in man of God's existence, an implicit knowledge which may become explicit through interior reflection on the part of man. God is not only the beginning and the end of creation, but is also the ratio e:remplaris. The universe is filled with God; every The teaching of the Summa on this point has a very Augustinian orientation. In Summa, I, n. 10, ad 1, we read that Aristotle ' s thought was defective in that he never arrived at the concept of God as the Summum Bonum. In fact, the reason why pagans never arrived at a knowledge of the Trinity was that they never arrived at a full understanding of goodness and its effects - the incarnation and the redemption. Cfr. also Summa, I, n. 79, ad 4; n. 79, ad 10 . . . duplex bonitas in omni creatura habetur : bonitas entis in se et in ordine universi: n. 106, ad obj . . . . . omnes creaturae . . . . bona pa � ticipata ; n. 115, sol. Bonum creatum dicitur quia a bono, quia in bono, qma ad bonum . . . . ; n. 116, ad 2. Omne creatum, etiam materia prima, bonitate signatum est ; n. 273, ad. 6. Origo et tota dispositio rerum a summo bono causaliter et exemplariter. ao Glossa, I, d. 3, n. 4. Summa veritas, bonitas et unitas non cognoscitur mediante sensu . . . Ergo cognitio bonitatis est impressa nobis per naturam. ai ibid., I, d. 3, n. 1- 10. Alexander's first concern is with the notion of the Summum Bonum. In n. 7 he writes : Ponuntur hie aliae rationes ad ostendum Deum esse. Prima est : omne mobile, in quantum tale, reducitur ad aliquod principium immobile summum ; aliter est procedere in infinitum. Alexander is obviously conversant with the Aristotelian proof from motion, which proof does not occur in the Summa. a 2 ibid., I, d. 1, n. 36. Bonum enim est ratio per quam res exeunt ab eo : sum­ mum bonum est, quod est diffusivum esse sine sui diminutione. . . . Et cum dicitur : qui_a bonus est, sumus, notatur ratio fieri, secundum quod finis movet effic1entem. Sources for Alexander's thought are to be found in : Pseudo-Dionysius, De cael, hier., c. 4, n. 1; De div . nom., c. 4, n. 1 (PG 3 l 78C, 694B) .

29

6

creature proclaims His existence. Bonaventure's proofs indicate a strong p reference for the mystic element over the rational ; they are stages in the soul's ascent to God; they are exercises of the spirit.:i3 Can God's exist­ ence be known by creatures? God is the highest Light ; and at the same time, the most perfect object of knowledge. As the perfect Light, He il­ lumines our minds.34 His existence is summe cognoscibilis to man, for we meet Him first within the world of our own consciousness. Unfortunately, sin and its effects present an impediment to a deeper knowledge of God on the part of man. This is a defect which can be removed completely only in heaven_:n The indubitable knowledge of God's existence is the foundation for all human certainty. 3 But, though God's existence in itself is indubitable, doubts may arise from the part of the subject knowing by reason of defects in the act of comprehension and reasoning. 3 ; The God (l

=1 3 S ent., I , d. 3, p. 1 , q. 2. In speaking of the various grades of ascent, Bonaven­ ture writes : Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum pra esentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in consideratione in­ visibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis ; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia imago ab ipsa, veritate formatur et Deo immediate conj ungi­ tur. De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 2, ad 12. Hoc verum non indiget probatione propter defectum evidentiae ex parte sua, sed propter defectum considera­ tionis ex parte nostra . Unde huj usmodi ratiocinationes potiu s sunt quaedam exercitationes intellectus, quam rationes dantes evidentiam et manifestantes i psum verum probatum . Bonaventure does give proofs from the world of sense experience, but not in the same way nor for the same reason as does St. Thomas . For Bonaventure, the personal relation of man to God is al­ ways foremost. To him the existence of God is so evident to the soul through reflection on self, that extra-mental creation serves principally to remind us of it. For reasons which will be treated later, Thomas viewed the question with considerable difference of emphasis ; and in consequence, practically reversed the procedure of Bonaventure. Copleston, op. cit., p. 450ss. ; Grabmann, Geschichte der kath. Theol., p. 66. 34 Bonaventure's doctrine of Illumination is basic to a full understanding of his views on this question. The role of the divine illumination in the various steps of human knowledge is a fundamental principle underlying all he says concerning man's knowledge of God. Cfr. Bonaventure, De scientia Christi, q. 4 (Tome V) ; E. Gilson, Der heilige Bonaventura, p. 469ss . ; E. Longpre, " Bonav enture", in : Diet. d'Histoire et de Geo gr. eccl., 9 (Paris, 1 937) ; G. Scheltens, Kritische Wiirdigung der Illuminationslehre des hl. Bonav . , in : Wissen. u n d Weish., 2 4 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , p . 1 67-181 ; J . Beumer, Die Aufgab e .der Vernunft in der Theologi.e des hl. Bonav entura, in : Franz. Stud., 38 ( 1 956), p. 129-149. a5 Sent., I, d. 3, p. 1 , art. unicus, q. 1. Here Bonave nture describes God as the " summa lux'' and " summe cognoscibilis . " God is "in se summe cognoscibilis, " and : Esset summe cognoscibilis etiam no bis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis ; qui quidem non tollitu r perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. :r n De Myst. Trin., In trod. : In setting forth the problem to be treated in this work Bonaventur e writes : Duo praemittimu s tanquam praeambula ; quoru m prim�m e s t fundamentu m omnis cognitionis certitudinal is ; s � cundum � st fundament um omnis cognitionis fl.delis : 1) Utrum Deum esse sit verum m­ dubitabile, 2) Utrum Deum esse tr � num sit ver_u � credibi] e. Thus, as th,e truth o f the Trinity is the foundation for our faith , so the truth of God s existenc e is the basis for what we know. 3 , De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1. God's existence considered in itself is indL� bitable in that : 1) non deficit ei ratio evidentiae in se, 2) nee in comparabo ne ad medium probans, 3) nee in comparatione ad i_ntellectum a� p: ehe � sivum. Doubt can arise on the part of the person knowmg : 1) ob defec Lum m actu appre hendi, e . g. when the meaning of the word " God" is not fully under-

7

g, " quo nihil maj us with which Bonaventure is concerned is that Bein for it is i n:1pressed cogitari potest. " God's existence is indubitably true; of creation; and all naturally upon the human mind; it is expressed by Can God be know n it is so certain and so evident that it cannot be doubted. the wisdo m of through creatures? The created unive rse is a reflection of and as eve 1:Y God; it points to God as every effect points to its cause , 38 s God m know man sin, of se work of art points to the artist. But becau 39 this life as through a mirror and in a confused way. • • ly Augustmian The teaching of the early Franciscans, with its strong 40 the character reaches its high point in Bonaventure. Here God is ­ relation l persona a in stands Man love. Summurr: B on um, the most perfect toward d directe is it so God, ship to God. As creation has come forth from God. In the Summu m B onum alone can man realize the fulfillment of his yearnings. Man has a type of implicit knowledge of the existence of the Summum Bonum ' a fact that is clarified more from a religious-psychol og41 ical viewpoint rather than from a rational viewpoint.

IV) D e v e l opm ent of Ch ristian Aristote lian-ism Albert the Great appears on the stage of Christian theology and philosophy as the first great exponent of Aristotle. 4 2 Though he had a strong sympathy for the Augustinian tradition, he nonetheless in­ corporated many Aristotelian elements into his work. He viewed the perfect philosophy as a blending of both Aristotle and Plato, 4 3 and el­ ements of both are evident in his work. For him, God is the first, unmoved Mover, Pure Act, self-knowing Intellect. He admits that the proposition "God exists",1-1 may well be evident to cultivated minds, but hardly to the stood. 2) Ob defectum in actu conferendi , e.g. when the j udgment is made from incomplete evidence. 3) Ob defectum in actu resolvendi, e.g. when the intellect does not resolve sensible objects beyond the first sensible cause. 3 8 Sent., I, d. 3, p. 1, art. unicus, q. 2 . . . . ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur. Also, In Hexaemeron, 5, 29 (Tome V) where we find a reference to Aristotle's Prime Mover, "q_uia mobile reduci­ tur ad immobile" . Bonaventure sees the universe from the Franciscan viewpoint which sees the presen ce of God in nature. He writes : Deum esse clamat omnis creatura. (De M1,1 st. Trin., q. 1, a. 1) Cfr. Gilson, Der heHige Bonaventura, p. 181. 3 11 Sent., I, d. 3, q. 3, art. unicus. In the state of innocence, man knew God "per speculum clarum"; in the fallen state "per speculum et aenigma". 40 The teaching of Scotus on this point must be viewed from a different angle, as will become clear later in this work. 41 9- . Leff, Bradwardine and the Pel,a gians (Cambridge, 1957), Introd., p. 1-20 . 42 -Oberweg, op. cit., p. 409; Grabmann, Gesch. d. kath. Theol., p. 73 ; Hirsch­ berger, op. cit., p. 458ss. 4 :1 Met., 1, I, tr. 5, c. 15. Et scias quod non perficitur homo in philosophia nisi ex scientia duarum philosopharum Aristotelis et Platonis. 4 ,1 S. Th., I, tr. 4, q. 18; and De Wulf, op. cit., p. 163. The question of proving God's existence takes on more importance in Albert than it had in the Augustinian approach. Albert writes that the best approach to the problem is through a demonstration ad impossibile. Albert the Great, op. cit., q. 17 : Dicimus ergo quod demonstratione ostensiva non est demonstrabile Deum 8

uneducated."·• Aquinas critizes many of the basic principles of Augus­ tinianism.40 The question of an Illumination is reduced to nothing more than the general concursus divinus; 47 and for his own theory of knowledge, he draws from Aristotle. 48 As for the knowledge of God's existence being per se nota, Thomas gives greater precision to the teaching of Albert. He distinguishes between that which is per se nota in se and that which is per se nota quoad nos. Since God is identical with His esse, His existence is per se nota in se ; but since man does not have knowledge of God's essence, the proposition is not per se nota quoad nos. God's existence must be demonstrated. While it is true that the desire for truth and happiness implies some sort of knowledge, this is still far from knowing that the goal of this desire is God. 49 God's existence is not the prirnum cognitum ; 50 and the natural way for man to arrive at the knowledge of something beyond his sense knowledge is to proceed through the world of sense ex­ perience.51 In view of the many false concepts of God's nature, it can hardly be tenable that man immediately knows God to be " id quo maj us cogitari non potest." Such a concept arises from the things a man is taught to believe in childhood . ., 2 And granted that a man understands God to be esse. . . . Sed demonstratione ad impossibile demonstrabile est Deum esse, sicut Aristoteles in IV primae philosophiae demonstrat principia demon­ strationum contra Heraclitum. Si enim detur Deum non esse, multa sequun­ tur impossibila. -1 ., S. Th., I , tr. 4, q. 19. 6 Thomas ' was a fight against the errnrs of Averroism . His solution to the -1 problem of his time, which involved the incorporation of so much of Aristotle, led to misunderstandings even in his own time. While he makes extensive use of Aristotelian principles and definitions, he never entirely leaves the world of the older tradition. A recent study states : "St. Thomas ,vas the man who, more than an:v other, effected the incorporation of Aristotle into Christian thought, avoiding the extremes of Averroistic canonization as well as Augustinian condemnation. In fact, the older histories of philosophy presented him as a Christian theologian who slavishly took over the philosophy of Aristotle and forced it into the frame of Christian revelation. This highly simplified and indeed false picture o f the position o f St. Thomas has now been largely abandoned, but the precise nature of his achievement and especially his relationship to previous thinkers is still under discussion." R. Henle, St. Thomas a nd Platonisrn., ( The Hague, 1956), p. XVI. 4 • SCG, I, 11, n. 7. He writes that God is that by which all things are known, not in the sense that they are not knov,rn unless He is known, but because all our kno\vledge is caused in us through His influence. 48 S. Th., I, 84, 5 ; 85, 1; 88, 3; De verit., VIII, 7. Here Thomas discusses the problems of the origin of knowledge, taking his principles from Aristotle and rejecting Illumination. -1 !1 s. Th., I, q. 2, a. 1. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est : quia praedicntum est idem cum subjecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos. As regards man's desire for happiness, he writes : "Hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venicntem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens. For similar treatment, cfr. Sent., I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2; SCG I, 11 and 12. 50 S. Th., I, 88, 3. 51 S. Th., I, 1, 9; Sent. , I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3. . . . . ;; 2 SCG, I, 11. Here he writes that what the mmd 1s steeped m f rom childhood _ it clings to firmly, as something known naturally and self-evidently.

9

such a being, it can hardly be argued that such knowledge � s sufficient to conclud e to God's existence. One must first posit the true existence of such a b eing, and it is precisely this which is denie ? by those who deny God's existence. Thus it is possible to know what is meant by the term God without knowing whether such a b eing truly exists. 33 Thomas' most positive treatment is contained in his five ways, 5·1 in whic� the argument from mo tion plays the leading role. The s ame argument 1s developed at length in the Summa contra Gentiles. 35 For Thomas, God's existence can _ and must b e demonstrated. In his attempt to do so, he has implanted the thought-p rocess of Aristotle into Christian theology. 56 The note of ex­ istence is of necessity included in the concept of God ; and the understand­ ing of the concept includes the understanding of God's existence. But as for man in his concrete existence, with his darkened intellect, the ex­ istence of God is by no means self-evident. There is a natural tendency to God and to knowledge of His existence which can be and must be clarified by intellectual proofs . 5 7

V)

Interplay of Augustinianism and Aristotelianism

The views of Bonaventure and Thomas stand as high points of em­ phasis ; the one stressing more Augustinian elements, the other giving greater weight to Aristotelianism . These two tendencies play together in the work of other Scholastics . The Dominican, Peter of T arantasia , consid­ ers God's existence from three aspects, and shows a strong sympathy for the Bonaventurian direction. God's existence is, as it were, a light - the root of all knowledge, the cause of the knowability of all that is knowable. It may also be considered in so far as it is the conclusion of a demonstra­ tion, and as an article of faith. 58 To be knowable h as several me anings . Viewing God in Himself and in His proper nature, His existence is per se

a S. Th., I, q. 2, a. 1. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine 'Deus' significans hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo majus cogitari non potest, non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura ; sed in apprehensione tantum. Nee potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re quidquid quo majus cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse. s4 S. Th., I, q. 2, a. 3. 55 SCG, I, 13. 56 Physics, VII and VIII; SCG, I, 1 0- 13 ; S. Th., I, q. 2, a. 1. It is necessary to study all of these sections to arrive at a comprehensive and clear notion of Thomas' approach to the proof of God's existence, and the nature of man's knowledge of God. 5 7 Sent., I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3; SGC, I, 10 ; S. Th., I, q. 2, a. 1; Also J. Bendiek, Die essentielLe Ursachenordnung bei St. Thomas von Aquin und in der Neuscholastik, in : Franz. Stud., 40 (1958), p. 1-19 ; J. Bendiek, Ober ein Argument der natiirlichen Theologie, in : Franz. Stud., 40 (1958) , p. 294-312 ; 41 (1959), p. 1-18, p. 241-267 ; 42 (1960), p. 130- 152 ; A. Rohner, Das Schopfungs­ problem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus M agnus und Thornas von Aquin (Milnster, 1923). 5 � Sent., I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2. Deum esse, uno modo est quasi lux, et causa cognos­ cibilitatis omnium cognoscibilium sive principiorum sive conclusionum '· altero modo conclusio demonstrationis ; altero modo articulus fidei. 5

notum . 50 Viewing the question, however , in relation to man, we are forced to distinguish. We may consider God in ratione generali, in so far as He shines through creatures as Truth and Goodness ; and in this sense His existence is per se notum . 00 We may also consider Him in ratione propr ia, in s o far as H e is the Summum Bonum. B ecause of His distance from the senses , He is not knowable with the immediacy of analytical proposi­ tions, 6 1 yet we may arrive at a knowledge of His existence by rising from the effects to the cause; or we may simply assent to it by an act of faith.6 :! Any question of innate knowledge, however, must be understood in a general and confused sense ; in so far as the notion of truth and the love of goodnes s is inborn, we may speak of an inborn knowledge of and tendency toward God. 63 As proofs for God's existence, Tarantasia gives one from the existence of eternal truth, which is God ; and the Proslogion proof of Anselm. Between these he places two proofs based on Aristotle : the ar­ gument from moved to mover, and that from potency to act. 04 Among those who held firmly to the Bonaventurian view was Matthew of Aquasparta . He b elieved that the knowledge of God's existence was in reality the first truth , a truth which is in some way implanted in the human min d ; and preci s ely because it is the firs t truth, it is so fundamental that it is either accepted or rej ected, but it cannot be proved a priori. 65 Matthew held that the concept of a first principle, than which none greater could be conceived, arises in man as a result of the natural functioning of the human intellect ; and once the concept has been formed, the intellect assents to it. 66 In this s tatement, Matthew gives us his interpretation of the cognitio inserta,6 7 which is not to be understood as an actual knowledge of God implanted in the mind at birth, but rather as the product of the n atural functioning of the intellect. If it is true that this concept is s o native t o t h e human spirit, i t i s also true that a n analysis o f the concept itself demands the existence of God ; for the concept of a first and highest b eing implies that such a being is als o the most actual and complete of b eings. Its p erfect actuality and completeness necessarily includes the note of existence. 6 8 59

loc. cit. loc. cit. 61 loc. cit. 62 loc. cit. 63 Sent., I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, ad I. Cognitio haec inserta dicitur esse confuse et in generali inquantum inserta est notio veri, et amor boni, unde et omnia bonum appetunt, et sic dicuntur appetere Deum, non in propria ratione. 6 4 Sent., I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2. o.-; Sent. , I, d. 2, a. 1 (Tuderti, Bibi. commun., cod. 122, f. 12a) Respondeo : dicendum quod Deus est. Et hoc ostendit ipsa vox, quae statim cum auditur concipitur et cogitatur aliquid quo maj us cogitari non possit, ut dicit A�selmus, Proslogio n, c. 2. Sed quia ista veritas prima est, a priori probari non potest. 66 Qu aes. Disp ., p. 1 1 . Primo autem hoc probat et convincit communis animo­ rum conceptio et naturalis intellectus impressio, propter quod statim cum audimus istam vocem 'ens primum et summum, entium universorum prin­ cipum' statim intellectus concipit et assentit sic esse. 01 loc . cit ., et ideo dicit Damascenus, I Libro, c. 3, quod cognitio existendi Deum natura liter nobis inserta est. 6 8 loc. cit. , In ratione enim primi et summi ens clauditur esse . . . ita neces­ sario sequitur 'si primum et summum ens est primum et summum ens, 60

11

In this treatment we see many of the elements of Bonaventure's work and that of the earlier Franciscans synthesized in a very orderly and concise treatment. God is considered as the Highest Good rather than as the Prime Mover; His existence is the first truth, which is so native to the human mind that it can be denied only by someone who refuses to acknowledge something so basic to his nature. But Matthew does not stop with this. Admitting that God's existence is not capable of a priori proof, 69 he holds that it is necessary to approach the question from the realm of empirical observation, and to determine whether, in this area, it might be possible to find data which would lead the mind to conclude, from a posteriori reasoning,the existence of that first principle which it already knows from a priori grounds.i 0 In his early Com,mentary, Matthew had cited as the foundation of his argumentation the facts of origin, multitude, disposition, order, distinction, change, and imperfection.n His approach in his later Quaestiones remains basically the same. Fundamental to the development is the neo-Platonic Weltbild, which visualizes a One, Highest, Best, First Principle, from which all other beings spring, to which all other beings are ordered, in whose perfections all other beings participate, the degree of their participation determining their place in the graded order of created being.1 2 The first being is the Highest Good, which is desired by all and toward which all other beings tend; He is the point of origin and the point of return for all other being; n He is the Alpha and the Omega; the beginning and the end.7 -i Peter Olivi , while not holding God's existence to be self-evident, retains a considerable number of Augustinian traits. He attempts to j ustify necessario sequitur quod primum et summum ens sit', quia primu m et summum est actualissimum et completissimum, ac per hoc est in actu, quia esse est de ratione primi et summi entis, immo est id ipsum. Matthew uses the example of the 'optimum ' to clarify his argumentation. "Necessario sequitur 'si optimum est optimum, optimum est', quia optimum dicit ens actualissimum et completissimum : ac per hoc actu ens." Matthew retains the theory of Illumination whereby the basic ground for man's certitude concerning any truth is the connection with the Divine light. The natural light of the intellect is a secondary efficient cause, the primary cause being the Divine light. Cfr. Quaes. D'isp. de cogn itione (Quaracchi 1957 ' 2nd edi' tion). BFS , I, p. 157-294. ,rn Cfr. note 65 above. 70 Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1. (Tuderti, Bibl. comm., cod. 122, f. 12a). Propterea, sicut possumus, a posteriori conandum est hoc aliqualiter demonstrare . . . Since the editors of the BFS have included the response of the Conimentary to this problem, we will not give the entire text here. Cfr. BFS XVII, p. 11-18. n Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1. (cod. cit.) Apparet hoc autem si consideremus creaturarum originem, multitudinem, dispositionem et ordinem ' distinctionem ' mutationem, imperfectionem. 7 2 It is interesting to note that nowhere in his own solution does Matthew adopt the argument of the Prime Mover, though he clearly was aware of it. In the Quaes. Disp. de prod. (p. 10) he lists it among the arguments of those who hold the ne�essity of the existence of a first principle, but he gives no commentary on 1t, and he does not use it himself. His o,vn treatment is taken mainly from the works of Augustine,· Anselm ' and the Victorines ' with an occasional reference to Aristotle. 7 :i Quaes. ,!)isp., p. 1� . . . r.i.ecesse est ponere aliquod summum bonum quod est ab_ 0�1r1:1bus appe�1tum, m�entum, et desideratum . . . idem enim est primum prmc1pmm et ult1mus fl.ms omnium. i-t Apocalypse, 22, 13.

12

Anselm's argument by indicating the contradiction involved if the ar­ gument be false. If the God of Anselm does not exist in reality, then there is a supreme contradiction both in the act of thought and in the object of thought. This is not the same as falsely attributing existence to contingent things. In the case at hand, it is a question of being mistaken about neces­ sary being; it is a case in which the organ of knowledge and human truth is mistaken about the highest truth. Both the thought and the object of thought would be summe falsa and de surnmo falso. But it is unthinkable that in the very act of thinking the highest truth, the intellect should be led into the greatest error. 75 To Olivi, the arguments from the nature of composed and limited beings are not convincing unless we first show that absolute perfection, simplicity, and unicity are the attributes of ens a se alone; and that any being which lacks these attributes must be ab alio and incapable of existence unless there is a first and highest cause. 7 6 Even the Thomistic argument from motion comes under his scrutiny. It is in no way evident that the Prime Mover is God. We must first prove that the Prime Mover is at the same time the Summum Bonum. 7 7 As for the cognitio ins erta, to Olivi this is to be understood as the power of the in­ tellect, by which we can arrive at a knowledge of God's existence. Since the intellective power is part of man's nature, we might say that the knowledge of God's existence is inborn, in that sense in which an effect is said to be in its cause. 7 8 Richard of Mediavilla considers God's existence to be per se notum in so far as we speak of attributes analogically common to God and crea­ tures. 7 9 But in considering God from the aspect of those things proper to Him, we must say that while God, being purely spiritual, is per se knowable, He is not properly speaking known by us per se. Though God is in the highest sense knowable, and though one may even speak of a type of innate knowledge, yet we are not forced to conclude the reliability of our knowledge with the same necessity with which we conclude to the truth of analytical propositions such as are found in mathematics and 15

Qu ae s. in II Lib . Sent. : Quaestiones de Deo eognoseendo (Quaraeehi, 1926)

BFS, V I, q. 3, ad 7. Si enim illud quo majus eogitari nequit non sit in re, sed sit solum obj eetum intelleetum ,tune in aetu intelleetus quo huj usmodi obj eetum eogitatur et in ipso obj eeto, in quantum est obj eetum intelleetus, implieabitur summa eontradietio, et major quam in eogitando "quid est lapis" eogitarem ipsum esse asinum. Quod enim in ratione alieujus obj eeti non existentis in re actu eadat neeessitas essendi seu neeessario et aeter­ naliter aetu esse, majus est impossibile quam in ratione albi eadat ratio nigri. Tune enim in non ente aetu cadit neeessario esse aetu, et tune quan­ doeumque eogitarem id quod signifieatur per summum verum aut per sum­ mum ens, tam eogitatum quam eogitatus essent summe falsa et de summo falso. Huie autem sane ratio apertissime contradicit. Impossible enim est quod cogitando significatum aut rationem summi veri cogitem summum falsum. i 6 op. cit., q. 3 ; S. Breton, L'esse in et l'esse ad dans la metaphysique de la relation, (Rome, 195 1) ; A. Horvath, Metaphysi k der Relationen, (Graz, 1914). 7 7 loc. cit. 78 loc. cit. 79 Sent., I, d. 3, a. 1, q. 2. Respondeo Deum esse, nobis esse per se notum dupliciter potest intelligi, scilicet aut quantum ad conditiones sibi, et creaturae commun es, non eommunitate univocationis, sed analogiae quae sunt ens, unurn, bonum, verum.

13

ce by a demo nstra ­ geom etry. 80 And though we cannot prove God's _ existe ? As areas of proof ia. q 0n : tion propt er quid, we can do so by a demon strat1 _ � _ 0usn �s s , consc1 ur w1thm law al natur a of ience � exper the Richa rd gives posses s10n the realiza tion that our desire s are never fulfilled m the proof of created goods . To thes e very Augus tinian approa ches, he adds the 81 from motion to the Prime Mover. critiqu e of Anselm 's Giles of Rome does not fully accept the Thomi stic 82 is proof. Giles s ees it as valuabl e, at least for the wise. God's existen ce per se notum in so far as the predicat e of the prop osition is containe d under the subj ect. Furtherm ore, His existenc e is a truth which no one can deny directly ; and which all approve of once it has been presente d to them 83 for considera tion. From these aspects, it may be called p er se notum. Giles sees the proof from motion as an importan t aspect of the scientific approach through reason. 8" Using terminology very similar to that of Aquinas , William of Ware distinguish es between proposition s that are majus p er se nota and those which are minus per se nota. The proposition " God exists " is to b e classi­ fied among the propositions which are minus p er se nota; man cannot know 85 it nisi cum magno labore. It is hardly per se nota quoad nos. William, 80

81

82 83

84

85

14

lac. cit. Sent., I, d. 3, a. 1, q. 3. Demonstratio propter quid, qua demonstratur passio

de subjecto per causam. Of this type of demonstration Richard writes : non possumus demonstrare Deum esse, quia esse Dei causam non habet per quam possimus ipsum demonstrare de Deo. Demonstratio quia, in qua demonstratur causa per effectum . . . sic dico quod possumus demonstrare Deum esse multipliciter. Richard lists proofs from the existence of natural law, the realization of the imperfect fulfillment of our desires, and the phenomenon of motion. E. Bettoni,Le doctrine filosofiche de Pier de Giov. Olivi, (Milan, 1959), p. 160-244; G. Martin, Wilhelm van Ockham, (Berlin, 1949),p. 110-139; A. Maurer, Esse Diminutivum, in : Medieval Studies, 12 (1950). Sent., I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, M. In speaking of the Anselmian argument, he writes that it is meaningful "saltem sapientibus". lac. cit. Notandum autem tria dicuntur de propositione per se nota, quae verificantur de ista propositione 'Deus est' ; quia praedicatum 'Deum esse' de ratione subjecti : et hoc inuit Philosophus . . . cum dicit principia cognosci­ mus cum terminos cognoscimus. Hoc autem invenitur in propositione dicta. Secundo : est aliquid per se notum, quia directe negari non potest . . . Ita nullus directe negat Deum esse ; et si negat, hoc est indirecte, quia non apprehendit quid est quidditas Dei per hoc nomen 'Deus' . . . Tertium quod dicitur de propositione per se nota : est quod quilibet earn probat auditam, ut dicit Boethius quod non est intelligendum nisi prae­ supposita significatione nominum; et quicumque intelligeret quod est, quod dicitur per hoc nomen 'Deus' : statim istam propositionem probaret auditam, sc. Deum esse. Sent., I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, A. His entire treatment of the problem, includes the approach per excellentiam, per causalitatem, and per remotionem. It is in the approach per causalitatem that the argument of motion assumes its im­ portance. The whole of Giles' presentation shows the intellectualistic development that arose out of Aristotelianism. Daniels, and Uberweg following Daniels, place William among those who hold fast to the ontological argument. Uberweg writes : Dagegen halt Wilhelm bei seinen Untersuchungen Uber die Gottesbeweise, bei welcher Gelegenheit interessante Bemerkungen Uber die analytischen und die geometrischen Urteile eingeflochten werden, mit der ilberwiegenden Mehr­ heit seiner Ordensgenossen . . . an der Beweiskraft des ontologischen Argu-

however, unlike Thomas, does not favor the argument from motion. He is of the opinion that the approach through the order of causes is more force­ ful.86 To Scotus, the cognitio inserta of Damascene may be interpreted in two ways. It may be taken to mean a very general knowledge through common concepts that are predicated most properly of God ; or it may be understood as the knowledge of God's existence achieved through the knowledge of creatures. But in itself, knowledge of God's existence is not self-evident.87 ments Anselms fest. (op. cit., p. 490.) Dberweg bases his statement on Daniels' edition of a section of William's Commentary : Sic in propositionibus per se notis est dare aliquam propositionem per se notam in suo potissimo esse, quando scilicet significata terminorum sensibiliter et experimentaliter sciuntur sine la bore: sicut patet de terminis hujus propositionis : omne totum est etc. Sensibiliter enim scit homo quid totum et quid pars. Et illa pro­ positio est minus per se nota, quando significata terminorum non sciuntur sensibiliter, sed cum magno labore. Et quia sic est de significatis hujus pro­ positionis : Deus est, quia homo nescit nisi cum magno labore : ideo ista pro­ positio non est nota per se quia prima. (Daniels, Quellenbeitr. und Unters. zur Gesch. des Gottesbew., in: Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 8 (1909), p. 98-104. Gedeon Gal, 0. F. M., in a more recent study, clarifies William's position more accurately in the light of other sections of his Commentary. Gal writes : Intentio Gulielmi ita intelligenda videtur : haec propositio 'Deus est', cum sit judicium analyticum in cujus subjecto includitur praedicatum, de j ure per se nota est, et restat talis etiam si aliqui de facto relationem praedicati ad subjectum perspicere non valent. Hoc sensu resolvitur quastio ad partem af:firmativam, et etiam argumentum Proslogii nonnisi hoc sensu valet, scilicet si aliquis ita sapiens est ut illud penitus perspiciat. Sed nos communes mortales de lege communi, - et hoc est quod ad praesens nostra interest, -- Deum esse nonnisi cum magno labore, id est per demonstrationem scimus ; quod idem valet ac dicere: "ista propositio non est per se nota . . . quoad nos." Gedeon Gal, Gulielmi d e Ware, Doc trina Philosophica per summa c apita proposita, in: Franc. St., 14 (1954), p. 155- 180 ; 265-292. 8 6 Sent., I, Florentiae, in Bihl. Laurentiana, Plut. 33, d. 1 (membr. mm, 347236 ff., 222), q. 15, f. 12v. William's argumentation divides into six parts : 1) from motion, 2) from causality, 3) from the rules and order of the universe, 4) from the imperfection of creatures, 5) from contingence, 6) the noological approach of Augustine. Among William's sources are Anselm's Mono iogion, and Richard of St. Victor's De Trinitate. Anselm's ontological argument is not to be found among William's arguments. Concerning the proof from motion, he writes : Sed ista via prob an di Deum esse infirmior est om­ nibus aliis, quia secundum istam viam angelus non posset movere se de loco ad locum, nee voluntas posset seipsam movere. The argument from the order of causality is better : Hoc est causatum ab aliquo, et illud ab alio ; et non est ire in infinitum in causis essentialiter ordinatis : ergo erit dare unam causam primam omnium, quae non sit ab alia causa ; quia si non est dare primum, nee aliquod posterius. 01 Lectura I d. 2, p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Vatican, 1950). Oportet igitur quod dictum suum (Da�asceni) glossetur. . . Ideo potest dici quod ejus cognitio omnibus est inserta non in particulari, sed in universali et secundum conceptus com­ munes qui propriissime Deo conveniunt. . . Vel aliter potest dici quod cogni­ tio Dei omnibus est inserta per cognitionem creaturarum, ex qua devenitur in cognitionem Dei, licet ejus cognitio secundum se non sit per se nota. Concerning Anselm's definition of God, Scotus says that Anselm's intention was not to show that God's existence is per se nota, but rather to show that God truly exists. Lectura, I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 35. Dico quod Anselmus non elicit istam propositionem esse per se notam. Scotus distinguishes various types of knowledge of God's existence. Intuitive knowledge of God's ex­ istence and essence is not possible for man in this life. (Ordin., I, d. 3, q. 2,

15

ience The starting point for any valid proof must come from 1:1a�\; exper s, Scotu For ori. osten a be � of reality. To be demonstrative the proof must holds s Scotu y. ctor as for William, the argument from motion is not satisfa _ that the argument, of itself, does not transcend the �h�sical_ orde : . The the first mover is the cause of movement; it is not necess arily identic al with cause of being, but it is a necessary hypothesis to explai n the fact of � o­ aspect of causality. tion. Like William, Scotus works mainly from the 89 , From the proposi tion "aliqua natura est effecta" which is immedi ately first be­ inferred from experien ce, Scotus proves the triple primacy of the 90 is 7 in the order of efficiency, of finality, and of eminence . While ino-b l that Scotus' work is an admirable piece of Aristotel ian logic, there is nonetheless the neo-Platonic Weltbild in the background, esp ecially as regards the concept of God and the notion and importance of eminence. The Anselmian proof appears in his work; but it is in a " colored" form, and it is used as a persuasive proof for the infinity of God rather than for His existence. 91 For Scotus, God is not the primum cognitum, for all human

88

89 90

n. 6 (Vatican). Innate knowledge can only refer to the natural ability to achieve knowledge of God through creatures. (Ordin., I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 8). The causal knowledge of God is of basic importance and forms the founda­ tion of Scotus' proof for God's existence. (Ordin., I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 15). Cfr. T. Barth, Zur Grundl.egung der Go ttes erkenntni.s . Pro blemvergl eich ende B etrachtung von T homas iiber Scotus bis h eute, in : Wissen. und Weish., 6 (1939), p. 245-263 ; T. Barth, Duns Scotus und die ontologische Grundlage unserer Verstandeserkenntnis, in: Franz. St., 30 (1951), p. 348-384. Ordin., I, d. 2, q. 1, n. 30. Ad primam quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione propter quid quantum ad nos, licet ex natura terminorum propositio est demonstrabile propter quid. Sed quantum ad nos bene propositio est demonstrabilis de­ monstratione quia ex creaturis. ibid., d. 2, q. 2, n. 15. Ordin., I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1, n. 41. Primo ergo ostendam quod aliquid est in ef­ fectu inter entia quod est simpliciter primum secundum efficientiam, et aliquid est quod etiam est simpliciter primum secundum rationem finis, et aliquid quod est simpliciter primum secundum eminentiam. Secundo ostendo quod illud quod est primum secundum unam rationem primitatis, idem est primum secundum alias primitates, et tertio ostendo quod illa triplex primitas uni soli naturae convenit ita quod non pluribus naturis differenti­ bus specie vel quidditative. He goes further to prove the infinity and the unicity of God. Schematically his proof is this : Efficient causality Final causality

Eminence

91

16

I __..

P rt�:� m __.. Infinity __.. Unicity

Cfr. De primo principio and Ordinatio, I , d. 2, qq. 1-3, for Scotus' entire proof. We cite the De primo principio as the work of Scotus since there seems to be relatively little doubt that the book represents his thought faithfully even though there remains some lack of clarity concerning the ':1 uthorship. C. Balic, De critica textuali Scholasticorum scriptis accomo data, m: Ant. 20 (1945), p. 167ss. maintains the authorship of Scotus in the sense that Scotus prepared and began the work which was later finished by an­ other. Often Vitalis de Furno is considered to be the compiler of the tract. Cfr. Vital du Four, Diet. Theol. Cath. 1 5/2 (1950) , 3109. De primo principio, c. 4, ad concl. 9; Ordin., I, d. 2, p. 1 , q. 1 , n. 137-1 38. Anselm' s definition must be understood in this way, "God is that than which, having been thought without contradiction, a greater cannot be

knowledge arises from the senses. 92 He criticizes Thomas' distinction be­ tween in se and quoad nos, for a p roposition is not said to b e per se evident b ecause it is known per se by some intellect. I f it is per se evident, it is s o because of evidence contained in the v ery terms of the proposition . Such a p roposition is not less evident because we do not know and under­ stand it fully. It is and remains per se evident even though the created in­ tellect does not know it, for the evidence rests in the terms themselves. 93 While Scotus criticized Thomas, he was also much concerned with the teaching of Henry of Ghent, who had adopted a modified form of Illumina­ tion by virtue of which he saw God as the proper and adequate obj ect of the intellect. 94 For Henry, God's existence is in se the most evident truth , b ut b ecause of the w eakness of the human intellect, it is not known in its full clarity and necessity. 95 Absolutely speaking, God's existence is an obj ect of knowledge to man, one which is both per se evident, and one which can be demonstrated. 9 6 As for the manner of demonstration, all

92 93

!l-1

95

!1 6

thought without contradiction " . The intellect has as its object ens ; and it finds no repugnance between ens and infinite. If these notes were in­ compatible, the intellect should be aware of it, just as the ear is aware of dissonance in sound. The unicity of God is demonstrated in seven arguments : ex infinito intellectu, ex infinita voluntate, ex infinita bonitate, ex ratione infinitae potentiae, ex ratione infiniti absolute, ex ratione necesse esse, ex rati one omnipotentiae. (Ordin., I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 3, n. 1 65.) P. Minges, Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica, Vol. II, Quaracchi, 1930), p. 9ss. Ordin., I, d. 3, p. 1 , q. 1 -2, n. 6 1 . Dico quod ista, quae cognoscuntur de Deo, cognoscuntur per species creaturarum. Ordin. I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1 -2, n. 22, 23. Nam propositio non dicitur per se nota , quia ab aliquo intellectu per se cognoscitur (tune enim si nullus intellectus actu cognosceret, nulla propositio esset per se nota) sed dicitur per se nota, quia quantum est de natura terminorum, nata est habere evidentem veritatem contentam in terminis. . . Si tamen aliquis intellectus non concipiet terminos et ita non concipiat propositionem, non minus est per se nota . . . Ex hoc etiam patet, quod nulla est distinctio de per se nota in se et naturae et in nobis, quia quaecumque est in se per se nota, cuicumque intellectui, licet non a ctu cognita, tamen quantum est ex terminis, est evidenter vera et nota si termini concipiantur. Cfr. also Minges, op. cit., p. 5ss. Ordin., I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4. Here Scotus discusses the question whether man, in this life, can ha ve true and certain knowledge without the special illumination of uncreated light. His discussion is aimed against the illumi­ nation of Henry of Ghent, Cfr. also Allan Wolter, Transcendentals and their Function in t h e Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (New York, 1 946), p. 32 ; Oberweg, op. cit., p . 394 ; Grabmann: Gesch. d. kath. Theol., p. 90. Summae Quaestionum (Paris, 1 520) , Art. 22, c. VI, Fo. 1 29, q. 2. Henry distinguishes between knowing God as the absolute being, and knowing Him as some very excellent nature. When speaking of God in the first sense we are dealing with an analytic proposition, which is per se no ta, and �hich is known as such at least by the wise. In Art. 22, q. 4 Henry writes of the knowledge of God's existence that is evident in itself : cum sit manifestissimus in suo esse secundum se : sed ex debilitate intellectus nostri qui eum intueri non potest ut est in se ; ut ideo oporteat earn certit�dinem de eo quod Deus est : ex sibi notis circa creatura s ratiocinando elicere · et sic Deum esse demonstrare. ibid., �- 1 . . . . dicendum