The Future of Portuguese Timor 9789814376655

Table of contents :
FOREWORD
Introduction

Citation preview

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars· and ~ther speciali.sts concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's ~:esearch interest is focussed on the many-faceted problems of modernization and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, a$ well. as representatives ((Om a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

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The Position of Timor Island Inset: Portugues e Timor

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The Futur e of Portu guese Timor Dilemmas and Oppo rtuni ties

by

J. Steph en Hoad ley

Occa siona l Paper No. 27 Insti tute of South east Asian Studi es Prioe a

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FOREWORD

Tiny, remote Portuguese Timor has been much in the news lately as it moves in fits and starts towards some sort of decolonizatio n in the wake of radical shifts in Portugal's policy towards its overseas possessions . However, despite such developments and the obvious concern of the several actors in the drama, inc luding Indonesia and Australia, the reality of the polit ical situation in Portuguese Timor is far from clear. In this liqht, Dr. J. Stephen Hoadley's paper on "The Future of Portuguese Timor" is all the more welcome . It is an attempt to assess the costs and benefits that are likely to accrue to each of the several parties as a result of actions they might take to influence the political future of the territory . Let's hope Dr. Hoadley analysis would clarify the issues involved. In the meantime, while wishing Dr. Stephen Hoadley all the best, it is clearly understood that the responsibili ty for facts and opinions expressed in the study that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Hoadley, and his interpretatio ns and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute itself or its supporters. 13 March 19 75

Kernial Singh Sandhu Direct o r

Introdu ction Portugu ese Timor is situated in the Nusaten ggara (Lesser Sunda ) Archipe lago, east of Java and north of It sha res the island of Timo r (or Timur) Austral ia. with Indones ia, occupyin g half of the i sland's 30,000 Its 650 , 000 i nhabitan ts are square kilomet res. predomin an tly of proto-M alay stock with a Melane sian Interma rriage with Portugu ese traders, admixt ure. soldier s, adminis trators, and deportee s has resulted in a signific ant number of half-cas te "B lack Portugu ese" who tend to li ve in u r ban areas and enjoy highe r status than pure Timore s e. The Portugu ese Crown assumed respons ibility for the territor y in the early 1700 's after 200 years of penetra tion by mission ar i es and me rchan ts and governed it as a colony from Macao until the late nineteen th century whe n Timor got a residen t In the early 1950's Timor ceased to be a Governo r. col ony and became an overseas province of Portuga l . There was a Briti sh i nter.r~_gnum in the early 1800's, but the Portugu ese half of the i sland was never occupied by the Dutch and the succeed ing Indo nesian Republi c has never claimed sovereig nty over this Portugue se possess ion. Portugu es e is the officia l languag e, but it i s spoken by only about 5% of the populat ion; the most widely spoken language outside officia l circle s i s Tetum, a distant relati v e of Eastern Indones ian language s . The territor y is one of the poorest in Southea st Asia, even mo re so than the Indo nes1an half of the island . With the exce ption of coffee, which p r ovides 90% of expo rt earning s, agricult ure is undevelo ped a nd slash and burn cultiva tion is prevale nt. The sandalwo od which attracte d the origina l traders is exhauste d. There is no modern industry and even handicr afts are in a rudimen tary state. Neverth eless Timor is not devoid of economi c resource s; it possesse s signific ant quantit ies of oil , gold, mangane se , chrom1um , and possibly i r o n, and h as the potentia l for rubber and palm oil plantati ons, t imber farming , cattle and sheep ranches , and smallho lder agricult ure and animal husband ry. Tourism o ffers some potenti al, particu larl y if the new Dili jet strip attracts stop overs by ai r lines flying the Sydney-S ingapo re route. The labour force is as yet unskille d and virtuall y illiterat e, but in time , under favourab le condit ions , could become a valuable

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Un fortun ate ly at presen t s oc1 a l servi ces resour ce. such as ed uc ati o n an d heal th c are are a t a low sta nd ar d and will req ui re substa nt1a l lnves tment 1 n the co~ing years. Physic al lnfras tructu re, too, is poor l y de v e loped . The Three Ont ions In the months follow ing the change o f government in Lisbon on 25 April 197 4 , a nd the s ~sequent declar atlons by spokesm en of the Arned For ces :1oveme nt that Portug al would s urr ender her overse as t e rr it orl es, a great deal of specul at1on h as ar1sen a bout t h e : u ture In broad terms this specu l at i o n of Portug uese Tlmor. has focused on three mutual ly exc lusive ~ c ssi bl l :t i es: 1 ) Timor' s contlnu ed ass oci at 1on with Pcrtug a l ; 2 ) Timor' s emerge nce as an 1ndepe ndent state; and 3 ) Timor' s amalga mati on wit h ne1ghb o ur1ng Indone s1a. The specul ation is far from ldie, f o r a number of politic ally lntere sted p arties have a d1rect stake o r a strong intere st in Timor' s future status . These actors includ e a h alf-a-do ze n pollt ic a l gr ouplng s ln Timor ltself , and the govern ments o ! Por tuga l , Indone sia, In additio n, the govern ments of the and Austra lia. ASEAN countr ies, of Papua New Gu1nea and ~ew Zealan d, and of the Republ ic of Ch1na tTa1wan> an d t h e Pe opl e's Republ ic of China have reas o n to pay close attent ion to develop ments in Timor that may affect the stab1l 1ty of Southe ast Asia and the fate of overse as Chlnes e therein . Finall y, the 1ssues as they unfold 1n terms o f t h e ideals of decolo nizat1o n, se l f-deter mlnatl on o f people s, and hurnan ltarian lsm prom1s e t o t ouch the consc1 ences of a wide variety of groups a nd lndivid uals thro~g hou t the world. The observ atlon t h at Timo r h as three po ssible futures does not mean that each 1s equally desira ble, feasib le, or JUSt, or that the forces favour1 ng one Rather , each or the other are cons~ant or balanc ed. s, disadv antage s partie some r o f ages advant future promis es the balanc e And . others still for risks for others and o~~ er the or one oward t Timor of forces 1nc l 1n1ng ~o p redict not 1s ere h task ny So aolutlo n is dyn~~1c. benef1~s and costs the assess to the outcom e but rather l partle s severa the of each to that are likely to accrue t ~ a~ ~ence l 1nf to take ght m1 y e aa a res ul t of act 1on s t h at h t tcone ou an of tlon sugges and to offer ny outcom e, al polltlc il a for ages advant the I ~ elieve would maxim1 ze actors .

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Timor's Politic al Grouping s Directly involved in the debate on Timor ' s future are five new Timo rese politica l parties. Three of these parties came into existenc e within a few weeks of the change of governm ent in Lisbon in response to an explici t invitati on from Portuga l's new leaders. The first to form up was the Uniao Democra tica Timoren se, known as the UDT. In its first communi que dated 11 May 1974, the UDT stated among its b asic objectiv es the achievem ent of "progre ssive autonomy " and "increas ed particip ation of Timores e in all sectors of public 1 adminis tration" but "always under the Portugu ese flag." Some of the UDT's founder s, for example Mario Carasca laon, son of a Portugu ese deportee and a Timores e mother , had been associa ted with the Portugu ese Nationa l Union, the single legal party of the former Caetano r~gime . This fact, plus the fact that the UDT immedia tely received the backing of the governm ent in the form of a cash subsidy and governm ent radio time , earned the UDT the n ickname "the pro-Port uguese party," and there has been specula tion that its leaders , many of mi xed Timores e-Portug uese •ancestr y, were origina lly brought forward by the Portugu ese as their heirs apparen t. The party continue s to receive quasi- o fficial encoura gement of a materia l nature . Indeed, this party symboli zed the first future of Timor mention ed above, continue d associa tion with Portuga l . Its closest £Qllowe rs come from the higher civil servant s, the native chiefs who serve as petty territo rial officer s, village rs who regard the Portugu ese flag as a mystica l symbol, some Chinese business men, and of course, the Portugu ese commun ity. But it has attracte d the opprobri um of radical Timores e and also of the Indones ians across the border wh.o labelled it "neocol onial. " The second party to emerge in public , in mid-Hay 1974, was the grouping t hat came to be known as Fretilin , an acronym for Frente Revoluc ion&ria de Timor Leste Indepen dente.2 Its or1g1na l manifes to asserted the

1

Qooted fran UDI' ' s manifesto dated 11 May 1974 , DilL

2 Fretilin started its life under a different narre, Associac;ao Social ~ata Tinnrense , but soon dlanged its narre to make it distincti vely different .

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"right to indepe ndence " and called for "immed iate partic ipatio n of compet ent Timore se in the local admin istratio n and govern ment" and "rejec tion of 3 coloni alism and active preven tion of neocol on1alis m." Fretil in found suppor t among low status civil servan ts, teache rs, studen ts, and recent migran ts from the hills to the towns of Timor' s north coast. Its delibe rate adopti on of a name to resemb le that of Mozam bique's guerri lla movem ent, Frelim o, the fiery rhetor ic of its leader s, especi ally of the young and energe tic Ramos Horta, and its promis e to declar e 1mmed iate indepe ndence and to drasti cally change the coloni al admin istrati ve struct ure when it gained power, gave it a reputa tion as a radica l party in the eyes of conser vative Timore se, local Chines e, and many Indone sians. Conser vative oppone nts for a time believ ed that Fretil in's emerge nce in May was the result of prior prepar ation, possib ly by commu nist infiltr ators. The facts have not borne this out, for Fretil in did not spring into existen ce as a full blown replic a of a commu nist party but rather evolve d over a period of months as a result of delibe ration s and activi ties of a group of ideali stic young Dili men, with pragm atic adjustm ents being made when necess ary . No credib le eviden ce of commu nist associ ation has been made public by Fretil in's critic s, who only point to some revolu tionary rhetor ic, ignorin g the fact that such rhetor ic is commo nplace amongs t young ideali sts throug hout the world. Financ ially the party is suppor ted by contri bution s by its membe rs, by volunt ary work by suppo rters, and by a govern ment subsid y that Fretil in got, matchi ng that earlie r receiv ed by UDT; there have been no extrav agant expend itures either by the party . or any of its leader s sugges ting outsid e or clande stine fundin g. Fretil in's enthus iasm has got it into diffic ulties , though ·; in early Decemb er its leader s were reprim anded by the court for over zealou s campai gn activi ties withou t a proper permit and the govern ment threate ned to revoke the party' s radio privile ges.4

3 Q\X>ted fran the origina l manifes to. 4 Benta :tw:Jha (Jakart a), 2 Deoenbe r 1974 .

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The t hird Timorese party emerged at t he end of May 1974. Its init~al man1festo t ook note o f Timo r ' s immaturity in polit~ca l and economic affa~rs, the "traditional mysticis m o f our Timo rese ances tors, " a nd the "unchanged T ~morese geo-po l i t ica l s itua tion , " th at is, Timor's ethnologica l , c ul t ural , and geographi c a l contiguity t o Indones i a, and declared as its f i rst demand the righ t t o " an a ut o nomous inte grat1on into the Republic o f Indones 1 a 1n acco rdance with international law. "5 The s our ce o f s upport f o r this party , known as Apodet~ ( Ass o c i a~o Popula r Democrati c & Timore nse ) ~s somewhat l e ss c l ear t han t h at o f th e other two parties . It i s said that T1mores e near the border want to be reun~te d w1th v1 l lagers o f t he s ame ethnic group on t he I ndon es ian s i de, and t h at Timo rese Catholics want t o have closer connections with t he i r Indonesian co-re li g ion~ s t s . 6 Al s o , 250 Arab families living in Timor are repo rted t o be "ve ry loyal t o Indonesia" because o f t he t i es o f Is l am. 7 There is t he mo re s ubstant1al att r act~on o f mone y : Apodeti leaders admit t o recei vi ng funds from t he Indonesian side o f the i s l and , fr om pri va t e unn ame d sources; there are scho l a r ships and consu l t ative t rips to Indonesia f o r Apo det ~ act~vis t s ; and the re is t he lure of annual subsidy o f US$100 mi l l ion th a t Adam Malik h as sa1d wou l d be made avai l ab l e f o r Timo r's development i f it becomes part o f Indon es ia . In Timo rese eyes Indones1a is see n as a country o f r e l a tive

5 Quoted fran Ap::>deti' s 27 May 1974 manifesto. See A Vo a de 'l'i mor (Dill.) , 7 J une 1974, for teXt in Portu;uese . 6 According t o Peter Hast1ngs , "'!he party ' s main s trength denves fran cat.holl.c clen .cal and l ay supporters who have cl ose camect~cns with catholl.cs 1n Kuparq where the Bishop and clergy are arta'lg the rrost act:1Ve i rredent1sts oo the 1sland. " Quot.ed fran p. 17 of his unpti:>ll.shed paper p repared for a senu.nar at the Strategic and Defence St\Xhes Centre, Rese ardl Sdlool of Pao.fic Studies 1 Aust ralian Nat~ooal lhl.versity , canberra, 16 Decenber 1974 1 entit l ed, "The Tilror Problem. " 7

New Standa.Ni (Jakarta) , 28 Sept.errber

1974.

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wealth and opportunity. 8 Indonesia's presence is already felt in Timor in the forms of radio broadcasts from Kupang, distribution of cheap transistor rad ios and batik tee-shirts, and the well-staffed Indonesia Consulate General in Dili. Finally, there is the attraction of power and status : the Indonesians would replace the present administrators with Apodeti loyalists, or reward the pro-Indonesia party's workers in other suitable ways, according to the Apodeti plan. Apodeti refused to accept a proffered Timorese Government subs1dy, leading one to the conclusion that its activities are almost entire l y dependent on Indonesian support . Did the Indonesians first approach loca l men to start the Apodeti in May, or did Arnaldo and Osorio , Apodeti's f ounder and Secretary General, respectively, approach the Indones1ans? No clear evidence exists on wh1ch to b ase an answer. It is plausible that Apodeti's leading members were motivated by a complex mixture o f sincere conviction, a hard-headed assessment of political realities, and opportunism, and so· made the first move, as they claim . In any event, the fortunes of the party decl ined significantly when it became known that Indonesia would not grant autonomous status to Timor, but would integrate it as a province. This means that possibly Indonesians, not Apodeti followers, would get all the important pol1t1cal and administrative posts; Apodeti's ab1lity to promise patronage h as been cr1ppled . Timor's three main parties differed in several other respects in the first months of their existence, notably on the timing and mechanisms of the advocated const1tutional changes, and on the preferred national l anguage . The UDT favou red a measured pace towards i nternal self-government under Portuguese tutelage, but involving an e l ecto ral process. Fretil1n has consistent ly fa voured a direct transfer of aut nor1ty to itself as a precondition of sweep1ng 1nternal

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Indanes1ans V1Siting Dill are identif1able by their br1ght clothes and well-fed ~arano: . Dil1 merdlants travel over 100 k1lanetres to the Indones1an bo.rcEr to buy cons~r goods fran the better-suwl1ed Indcnesian merchants . Indcrlesia has plao:d several develcprent projects near the border, further he1ghtening the oontrast between the two sides. Indonesian Observer er 1974 .

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And Apodeti favoured a transfer of sovereignty reforms . to Indonesia coupled with internal elect1ons with the end in view of Timor becoming an autonomous province of Correspondingly, the three parties favoured Indonesia . Portuguese, Tetum (the majority ethn1 c language spoken by about 60% of the rural people>, and Indonesian , respectively, as the official language. There were s1mi1ar1ties between the parties ' platforms, too . All three parties enunc1ated the desire to protect bas1c human rights and liberties; to maintain a free enterprise economic system with appropriate safeguards to assure socio-economic JUstice; to a void d1scr1m1nat1on aga inst resident Chinese while at the same time encourag1ng business part1cipation by ethnic Timorese; to encourage balanced foreign trade, aid, and 1nvestrnent; and to combat al l forms of imperialism and neocolon1alism . the Two other part1es emerged in late 1974: Monarch1st Party ( Assoc1a~ao Popular Monarqu1ca T1morense) and the Labour Party (Assoc1ac,ao Trabalhadores ) . The Monarchist Party was formed by an 1 ndividual who traces h1s ancestry b ack to s1xteen T1morese warrior sultans who 1n earlier times agreed to cooperate w1th the Portuguese 1n collect1ng taxes from their SubJects in return for protect1on, status, and a share of the revenue ( a patte rn of dual rule that continues today) . 10 This party would like the Portuguese to create a constitut1onal mona r chy in T1mor, the monarch to be chosen from among descendants of the original sultans , who in turn would be constituted as a council of rulers along the l1nes of the Malaysian precedent . The monarch and counc1l o f rulers would foLmal1y preside over an elected parliament , cabinet, and prime m1nister.

9

The "Il\l..IU.I!ll.l prc::qramre" cal.ls for "recogru.tion of Fretilill as the only leg1tl.ITiate representat1 ve of the people o f TlJ'OO.r."

See Fret 1-t1-n:

Man:..a l e Pr·ograma Polit1-.::oe

Fret.1l.m, n . d ) , p . 23 , author ' s translat1on pr1nted ill both Portuguese and Tetllll. 10

(01ll :

Th1s was

Interv1ew wHh Tanas D1as Xl.em=nes, SecLetary General of the M:>nardust Party , D1b, 19 December 19 7 4 . Also see mterv1ew report ill A Vo z d.£ T1-mo r, 14 Decerrber 19 74 , and Indonesuzn Observer , 17 January 19 75

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The founder members of this p art y are a handful o f men ( less than 100) who f o rmer ly s upported Apodeti in hopes that Indonesia would res to re th e traditi o na l rulers to power; they broke away whe n they l earned fr o~ Indonesian spokesmen t h a t Indonesia did not intend to recoqni ze a ny more s ultans . The Labour Party was p r oclaime d b y a nan living Its 1n Ossu, one of Timo r 's sma ll er municipa litles. platform i s based on genera l denands f o r i ndependen c e, democra cy , and s oci a l JUStice , and it attempts to appeal to urban wo r ki ng pe ople. But 1ts organ1 ~a t1on remains rudimentary and its a ctivities s cattere d and bare ly vis ible , as y e t . Estimat1nq Party Popularity In trying t o estimate the degree o f s uppor enJ oyed by Timor's f ive part1 es severa l considerations must be F1rst , no de t ailed census o f the taken into account vot1ng population h as been conducted re cent l y, s o one cannot work f rom accur a te baseline data . Se cond, Timo r's for a deputy t o Lisbon , t h e party former e l e ctions elect ed provincial Legis lative Council , and the twelve Municipa l Councils - are little h e lp in extra pol ating Th ey were conducted in a one- party future trends. context under a fran chise limi te d to Por t uguese citi ze ns In who could read and wr1 te the Portuguese l ang uage th e capital city o f Dili, f or example , only about 2, 000 persons were el1g1ble to vote in the last elrctlon , an d The new only 200 bothered to actually cast b al lo ts . part y polltlcal r o f om freed more allows law e l ectoral a dults . l 2 nt de i res ll a ly v1rtual nfranchises e nd a act1 vi ty ormed transf the ctorate, e l e So the vastly 1ncreased nature o f the pol1t1cal part y system, and t he t otal ly new s et of 1 s s ues an1matin g p ol ~t1ca l l1 fe make the past a poor gu1de to th e f uture

11

F1gures proVl.ded to the author by

~ to

Cesar da Costa

M:>usl.Ilho , Mayor of DilL

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At present pol1ucal acuVl.cy LS governed by a provlS Lcnal decree and LS SWJect. t o elaborauCJ'l and o ff1aal prooulgauCJ'l. legally , no polltLcal pan.1.es are regl.St.e.red in TlJlX)r, cnly "asSOCJ..auons."

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Th1rd , no publ 1 c op1n1on polls have been conduct ed to assess the re lative popular 1ty of the part1es . Fourth, even 1f conduct ed th e ir validity might be question ed on the grounds of the lack of soph1st1 cation, 1nforma t1on , and exper1e nce of the average respond ent; and many people haven't y e t made up their m1nds as to which party they And f1fth , the stateme nts would favour 1n an election . of the pol1tic al par t y l eaders themsel ves tend to be inflated , thus further confoun ding attempt s to assess For example , 1n Decembe r 1974 relat1ve popular ity and Fret1lin were each cla1min g UDT the t he l eaders o f support ers on the grounds that and about 200,000 members members hip cards and now 000 , 200 each had pr1nted up Of course , many T~morese have they were al l gone accepte d members hip cards f rom both p a rties, to be on In fairness 1t should be added that UDT the safe s1de . leaders are aware of th1s and are attempt ing to conduct a census of UDT membe rship t o gain more accurat e 1nforma t1on.l3 Apodeti for lts part has consist ently claimed the support. of 70% of the populat1 on . Ne verthel ess, knowledgeable observe rs, among whom must be counted gove r nment adrnin1s~rato rs With contact s in the outly1n g are as, can p1ece toge~he r a rough p1cture of wh1ch part1es are getting ou~ into the small towns with the1r campaig n act1v1t1 es and party branche s , and what their receptio n is by the l ocal people . These observe rs concur on a rank1ng of party popular 1ty . They ag ree ~hat UDT and F re t1l1n attract the l1on's share of suppo rt through out the territor y. At f 1rst UDT , led by establis hment. figures such as che Mayor of 0111 , and Wl t.h the as s1st.anc e of the authori ties , seemed to b e ahead , but more recent ly , Wlth the arr1val o f a new g overnor who has a~ temp te d to be 1mpart1 al a nd a vo1d the r1s k of be1ng seen to meddle 1n part y af fai rs . and w~th the more Vigorou s campa1g n1ng of F r anc1sco Xav1er and Ramos Horta and the1r youthfu l supporters~ Fret1l1 n appear s to have caught up and some observe rs thlnk , forged ahead Apodet1 1s beh1nd UDT and Fretllin , runn1ng a The Mona r ch1st Par ~y clear thl rd, by all account s In 1s ranked fourth; and the Labour Party flftn two r la~te f act , there iS some questio n whet.he! the because are qua l1 f1ed to reg1ste r as polltic al p a rt.1es

13 The rrerrbersh1 p cer,sus was to nave been conduct.ed 1975 The r esul't.S are not_ yet known .

1n

early

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of the1.r s mall number of member• and party branchea . They have not y et s ucceeded in perauading the government to extend to them the subsidy received by the other two parties. So i t is not inappropriate to speak only of T1.mor's three major parties and ignore the two small ones for the time being. The Chinese i n Timor Two other groupings deserve mention, the Chinese and the Portuguese . Estimates of the number of Chinese resident s i n Timor vary from 1 4,000 to 30,000, with consensus in Timor centering on 15, 000 to 20,ooo.l4 The maJority carry Ta1.wanese p assports and the rest are Portuguese Cltizens: many have business or family ties with the Ch1nese of Macao. Chinese entrepreneurs run four of Dill's seven hotels, conduct all the import trade not monopolized by the quasi-official corporation SAPT, and run virtually 100% of the retail and transportation e nterprises throughout the province. Chinese students enter Timor's aingle academic high school in numbers higher than their proportion of the population and have in addition a Chinese •chool which they can attend. Ch1nese polit1cal inclinations are not manifest yet, and upon questioning they profess to stay out of politics, but they are thought to favour UDT's moderation, to be suspicious of Fret1lin's populistic s~yle, and to be uneasy about Apodeti and the prospect of coming under the control of the Indonesians. All Timorese parties have publicly stated a policy of nondiscrimination and commercial freedom f or the Chinese , but privately one hears from Timorese that of course the indigenous people will have to be assisted by the new government so they can compete for a fa i r share of national wealth with the more experienced and entrenched Chinese. One thinks of what this policy means in Malaysia and Indonesia. Nevertheless a large Chinese (local and Macao) financed hotel and off1.ce comp le x

14 01inese in a leuters/ NZPA story in the Atcekl.a:nd Star , 18 Noverrber 1974. Hastings, op , cit . , SlJ3gests a fiqme of 14,CXX>. 'nle need for an ethnic census is keenly felt hem.

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is unde r c o nstruction in Dili, a s ign that the Chinese investors in the project still have confidence in the future . No evidence of communist o r revolutionary a ctivity , or o f tie s with or sympathy for the People's Republic of China, is visible; the Chinese are represented only by the Republi c o f China (T aiwan ) Consul General . But if Portugal extends diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China , and Peking in turn demands that it be a llowed t o t ake ove r the Taiwan Consul General's office, as has happened i n other countries , a tense si tuatiOn could arise, for the Indones i an Consul a te Gener al is J US t around the corner. The Portuguese in T1mo r The P o rt uguese community numbers o nly a few hundred civilians, ma inly in the coffee growing and exporting corpo rati on and in g overnment, and 2 , 000 s oldie rs, mostly An interestlng additi on to the Por tuguese conacrlpts. conununit y has b een "the fifteen maJors," a group o f me n diapatched by the Armed Forces ~ovement t o manage the decolonizati on proces s . Th ese majors are now making the real dec1sions from the vantage points of the Governor's o ffi c e, t h e key mi nistries, the coffee cor poration , and the editorlal o ff ices o f the two government newspapers , even though the former ministers and managers remain i n place . Thes e men work closely with the new Govern or, Lemos P1res, in encouraging the development o f the two l eading political parties, in drafting th e laws necessary to regularize political a c tivity a nd prepare for eventual e l e ctions; 1n administering the funds Portugal iS sending to pay for the F i ve Year Plan: and in re cru1ting Timorese into the htgher rank s of the ci v1l service. It must be added that the latte r two trends were under way eve n b efore the cnange o f gov ernmen t t n That 1s, Portuga l had made attempts t o upgrade Lisbon . p o rt , ro ad, communicatio ns, healLh , and ed uc at1onal fac1litl es Slnce the 1 96 0 's, With some ViSib l e success , and the Five Year P l an 1974- 19 78 . whi ch will cost Po rtuga l a t ota l o f 500 mil l1 o n Escudo s o r US $20 mtll ion, was drafted bef o re the co ~p d ' eta t 15 The civtl se r vice

15

In addtti oo, Port.LJ;al h as made up the def1c1t betWeen the budget e>cpenditures and .revenues 11l the terruo.ry , underwrit l.I\9 between Turor, ts not a pro£1 table 25% and 50\ of the annual bl.rl}et tern wcy for t.he Port L¥JUE!&e netropOl .

- 12 -

had always depende d on local recruit s for the lower ranking posts, with Portugu ese only in top and critica l posts . At the end of 1974, 85% of adminis trative class officer s were Timores e; 164 out of 175 officer s of the importa nt Departm ent of Civil Admini stration (that is, territo rial adminis tration) were Timores e; and 11 out of the 12 adminis tradors (distric t officer s) were locally recruit ed men or from other oy~rseas territo ries of The two lowest levels Portuga l such as Cape Verdes. of the terrlto rial adminis trative system is entirel y T1mores e , be1ng com~osed of heredit ary sultans , chiefs, or local notable s.l As mention ed before, the Portugu ese commun ity tends to favour ~he UDT . The Portugu ese majors admit to having given prefere ntial assistan ce to the UOT at first, because they knew its leaders and apprec1 ated their pro-Por tuguese sentime nts. As time passed and the l eadersh ip of the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon passed from General Spinola to General de Costa Gomes, and decolon ization was speeded up in Africa, the Portugu ese became incline d to support any Timores e politic al party that has substan tial public support , with the end in view of handing power as smoothl y and expedit 1ous ly as possibl e. In practic e this worked to the advanta ge of Fretili n primari ly, for Apodeti refuses Portugu ese assistan ce and the other two parties are st ill ins igni ficantly small.

16

F1gums supplied by the Director of Informat ion and Tourism, D1l1, 16 Decerrber , 1974. Hastmgs , op cit . , p. 14, citing the Bureau of Planru..ng , states that cnly four out of twelve adtu.n.ist.rcd::>rs are Ti.m:>rese.

17

'!he "chefes de

or local du.efs still ass~st the Finance I:e~t in collectin g a head tax of 190 Esetrl:>s I about US$6. 00) fran every adult m their axea bet:v~een 17 and 60 years of age . For clus and SUCX)6"

other services they reoe1ve a rern1t.tanoe of 25% of the tax take, saoo of wtu-:=h nust be pa1d to t.he "regulo" (sultan) of th~ fustr1ct Nel.ther chiefs nor sultanS are salar1ed official s, but. both are Vl.tal elemmts of the terri~onal adnllu.st rative system .

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Convergence and Co a li tion The Portuguese acceptance o f Fre ti 1in was fa cilitated by Fretil in' a own shift towards th e centre o f the politica l spectrum in t he last month s o f 197 4, and by UOT' s s hi ft towards a simi la r point, a lmos t t o convergen c e . By ~id ­ December, when I ~nt er viewe d Franci s co xavier, Pres ident of Fre tilin, and Domigos de Ol i ve i ra, Se cretary General of UDT , I f ound th e i r posit ion s v irt ua lly ide ntical. Fretilin was now prepared to accept Portuguese as the o ff ici a l language, and was wi lling t o l e a v e t he territ ori a l administrative structure inta ct so long as e l e cted advis ory councils were created to guide th e burea ucrats. More ~mportant, t h e c a l l f or immediate independe nce h a d become a call for eventua l ~nde pe nde nce within fi v e t o ten years , after t h e Po rtuguese h ad h ad time to build up the territory's i nfrastru ctu re s o t h at Tinor could b e cone Oomi g os Ol iveira, f o r UDT 's economicall y self - suffici en t. o ta l inde pendenc e f o r t t ou ab part , was also speaking Timor, after a fi ve t o ten year p er iod o f tute l age and assistance , and also favoured local e l ected c o uncils. About the only po int o f d i ffere nce was tha t Francisco Xavier continued to arg ue f o r di re ct transfer o f interna l self-govern i ng p owers to a g overning council dominated by Fret ~lin , on th e grounds that Portuguese f avou ritism for UDT would render an ele ction inval~d , while Domigos O live~ra st~ll wanted an election f o r a constituent assemb ly to dec1de the 1ssue s o f wh1ch party would predominate . gap was c l osed o n 22 Jan uary 1975 when the two pa r t~es announced the1r f ormat1on of a coal1t1on claiming the exclus1ve r 1ght t o negotlate Wlth the Po rt uguese o n the terms of se lf -government and eventual independen ce 18 The1r commun1que proposed t hat an adhoc comm1tte e composed o f e q~al numbers of UDT and Fret1l1n representat1ves be 1mmed1ately empowered t o manage the conduc t o f all po l 1t1cal act1 v 1t1 es 1n the territ o ry , includ1ng the all ocat1o n o f rad1o t1me and the d1ssem1nat1 o n o f o ff1c1a l pol1 t 1cal 1nfocmat1 0 n No ment1on was made 1n d ur~ ng the trans1t1o n pe r 1od the f ormat10n vf a or the commun1que o f an elect10n cons t1tuent assembly . Th~s

18 The teXt of the a:rmuru..que sources .

Wd.S

shewn to the author by d..p....cr.auc

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The real significance of the announcement seems to be the claim by the leaders of the two parti es to exclusive representation of the Timorese people during the transltion period. This is borne out by the coalition's explicit repudiation of Apodeti, the only significant rival, and rejection of the idea of Timor's integration with any other nation, especially with Indonesia.l9 However, the message was phrased in such a way as to allow other parties who wish to cooperate wlth UDT and Fretilin to join the coalition, leaving the door open to the two minor parties and any new· ones that might be formed in the coming months . The Portuguese Problem These events seem to simplify the task of the Portuguese in accomplishing a graceful exit from Timor. The UDT-Fretilin coalition clearly appears to command more popular support than any other possible combination of political groups, unlike the three-way split the Portuguese faced until recently in Angola. The new coalition's bid for exclusive r~presentation invokes the . precedent already set in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, wi th which the Portuguese have experi ence . The acceptance by the coalition of a period of tutelage squares with the opinion of the Minister for Overseas Territories, Antonio Almeida Santos, expressed i n Jakarta in October and at the UN in November, that Timor is not yet ready for independence. This allows the Portuguese to continue to underwrite the F1ve Year Plan in a period of relative stability, but does not involve them in an open ended commitment, as would the option of Timor 's permanent assoc1ation with Portugal, or in the hazards of a prolonged period of local ele ctoral campa1gning with uncerta1n outcomes . Once the Portuguese accepc the coal 1tion as the spokesmen of the Timorese (and the st1ll unanswered ques t1 on 1s whether the Portuguese engineered the coali t1on from oehind the scenes ) , the

19 The feelings of the Mayor of Dili, one of the coalit ion 's UDT representatives , are clear, "'!'hey [ t:he Indones1ans] broadcast across the border, accusing us of beulg neocolcnialists, and Fretilin of bemg camu.mis ts. '!hat's interference . . . . We chl't want to jom those • • • peopl e . This is our country . . .. Why dal' t they leave tE alone." Indones1,an Obser ve 1•, 17 January 1975.

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Portuguese can virtually choose their moment of departure to suit their interests, either lingering benevolently if conditions are favourable and not too costly, or abruptly leaving the problema in the hands of the Timorese if things go wrong . Correspondingly, the burden of responsibility falls heavily on the inexperienced leaders of the new coalition, for once they become the government-designate they will be blamed if they fail to meet the ris1ng expectations that usually attend progress towards independence. Certa1nly the Portuguese will be criticized if they accept the coalition and fail to insist on elections, as they have done in Africa. Repeatedly, eloquently, and publicly, spokesmen of the new Portuguese Government have emphasized the ldeals of self-determination of peoples. This is usually taken to mean the holding of a reasonably free and ~ocratic election to decide the issue. Although other means of self-determination can be conceived, and have been conducted, the electoral process is still preferable in spite of its practical pitfalls . In Africa the Portuguese, by accepting groups who claim, without passing an electoral test, to represent their countrymen, lay themselves open to the charge that they are transferring power to illegitimate parties o This serves the short run interests of both the Portuguese Government of the day and the parties receiving power . But it does not serve the long run interests of either. Rather, 1t leaves Portuguese actions looking cynical and hasty in the light of history and the newly empowered parties tainted as Portuguese puppets, vulnerable to challenge by domestic and foreign opponents . One may understand and even sympathize with Portugal's course of action when Portuguese lives were being lost in a colonial war. But even th1s rationale i ~ flawed, for a hasty transfer of power t o a party or coalition that is not yet consolidated or legitim1zed does not end the war, it merely allows the Portuguese to back away from it. This course of action would be doubly dubious in · the case of Timor . There, pressure for quick i ndependence is alight; there i s ample time to draft implementing legislation and conduct elect1ons for a constituent assembly, then for a legislat1ve assembly. An additional referendum on the modal1ties of independence would be highly desirable even though the out come might be decided in advance, for it would give the Timorese addit1onal experience with the ballot and clearly show the international community where the Timorese people 1 s

- 16 -

sentime nts lie. But further and even more importa nt, election s may foresta ll misperc eptions and precipi tatous actions by Timor's neighbo urs . Here one must ~e aware of current Indones ian thinking on the Timor problem . The Indones ian View The relevan t general policy has been enuncia ted by Indones ian leaders on innumer able occasio ns: opposit ion to colonia lism and imperia lism; support for self-det erminat ion of peoples ; opposit ion to outside interfer ence; and friendly relation s with all countri es. More to the point, Foreign Min~ster Adam Malik in mid-Jun e 1974 stated: We Will support Portugu ese Timor if its own people want to obtain their independ ence •••• Indones ia will give guarant ees of not interfer ing in the determi nation of the future of Portugu ese Timor.2 0 But stateme nts such as this must be seen in the context of Indones ia's overrid ing desire to maintai n security and stabilit y in areas on her borders . Timor is not seen by Indones ia as an area of security and stabilit y now, but rather the reverse . It is instruc tive to dwell on this point for a moment and ask, what image o f Timor does the politic ally informe d member of the Indones ian public have in his mind? Short of conduct ing a public opinion poll on this questio n one may attempt a rough answer by consult ing the Indones ian press reports on the assumpt ion that most people gain their first impress ions of new events by reading about them in their daily newspap er. I was recently able to read through a clipping file of several of the most promine nt Jakarta newspap ers for the year 1974. These press reports , in both Indones ian and English , reveale d a view of the situatio n in Timor that differs in emphasi s from the impressi ons one gets in Dili. For example , featured promine ntly were items on politic al rallies by Fretilin , with

20 Sinar Harapan. (Jakarta) , 17 June 1974. This and follcwing Indcnesia n news item; translate d by the author.

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headlines auggea~ing ~hat Fretilin waa a communist front, or at bea~ a group of rowdies. •rretilin Movement Supported and F1nanced by Communist Chin•••," asserted one s~nar Barapan (J akarta) headline on 2 October 1974 . The story did not indicate the source of ita informat1on and was not corroborated by subsequent ator1ea. Another newspaper told readers, Repeatedl¥ 1n the pol1ti cal campaign the [Fret ilin J leaders openly intimidated Timorese to choose Fret llin . \'lh i l e showing a picture o f Mao Tse - t ung to s upporters o f Apodeti, the pr o-In donesian party , the leaders said, "Mao ia our champion. Don't choose Indonesi a . " 21 The Jakarta newspaper reader i a alao led to believe that Timor 1s a target for infilt r ation by communist inf luences. The a l leged ave nues are the local Chlneae and young Portuguese Communi st Party members coming to T1mor . One paper s~ate d unequivocally, "The Portuguese authorities are ve ry stri ct with communism . Therefore the Chinese disguise ~he maelvea as qood Taiwanese Citizens, whe reas 1nwardly the y are staunch fol l owers of Peking . "22 Another, repor~1ng on the court reprimand of Fretil i n' s leaders , adde d , "Bes ides the main leaders, also receiving senten ces were se veral Lisbon University s t udents of communist 1n c l1n at 2 ~ n who had returned to Ti mor to spread Mao1sm there . " Instability 1s another recurrent ~heme in the "Political Atmo sphere is Deter1orat i ng in headlin~~: Jakarta readers are a lso told that Apodet 1 , Ti mor." the pro-Indonesian party, i s popular and tha t ~he movement to JOin Indonesia 1s strongly suppo rted 1n Timor . One newspaper reviewing the situation state d, "The largest party, wh1ch has ~he support of 70% of the

21

Be n t a Yudha , 2

~cerrber

19 74 .

~ere 1.n

'' l.nt:i.nu.dat1cn'' descn.bed. 22

NllW Standa.rd, 2 8 Sept.ercber 19 74 •

23

Be~ta

24

I ndones1-an Obu. rver , 6 Der is far fran being the world's smalles t territo ry, for at least 25 others, many newly indepen dent natl.oos , have smal ler populat ialS. Tim:>r's eCXl!'Y:lll\ic resourc es are suffi cient t o feed her populat ion even at the present lCM l.evel of develop rent.

Gm nea Bissau or Fiji.

Tim:>r is oerta1n ly as viable as

-

27 -

be found in coordinat ed efforts in aid, trade and I have in mind a joint Indonesia ninvestmen t. Australian -Portugue se economic cooperatio n consortium , perhaps along the lines of the Inter-Gov ernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which could pool economic and technical aid from the three countries and assist the Timorese in utilizing it efficient ly . Certainly the list of developme nt projects that could benefit by cap ital and technical assistanc e is extensive : reading and bridging, water conservan cy and manageme nt, animal husbandry , agricultu ral diversific ation , fishe ries storage and distribut ion, basic rural preventiv e . medicine, better housing , basic vocation al education , and so on. Australia has decades of experienc e with such programme s in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Portugal knows the proble.ms of Timor and is a lready committed to helping until 1978. And the Indonesia ns might be intrigued by the thought of giving aid rathe r than perpetual ly receiving it. particula rly if that aid promised to enhance national security. The very fact of setting up and operating this consortium would have other impl ications of a political It would project Australia into a working nature. relations hip with Indonesia , supplemen ting ties already establish ed. It would help Portugal discharge her burden of colonial quilt . The c ooperative effort would create a framework wherein other nat ions could be drawn into Timor i n a controlle d fashi o n for i nvestment and trade, with no single country being allowed to predomina te . The joint protectio n of Timor by her three patrons would not only attract outside investo rs but would als o deter involveme nt by unwelcome outside powers, fulfilling a fundament al foreign policy objective of both Indo nesia It is possible that the consortium and Australia . experienc e would lead to realizatio n of the mooted Indonesia -Australia -New Zealand-P apua New Guinea cooperati ve organizat ion, with one addit ional tnembe r, Timor. There is every reason to believe that many of the Timorese party leaders, certainly those of the UDTFretilin coalition , would welcome the growth of economic and later political ties as suggested here, for their professed objective is friendly relations with all nations but dominatio n by none. They want to have foreign aid, trade, and investmen t, but in a balanced, controlle d fashion to avoid depen dence on any one donor,

-

~0

-

ess partn er, o r i nves tor . The one obsta cle is their war1n of Indon esia.3 7 The Timo rese must be convi nced that Indon esia must be given a say 1n the futur e of Timo r, for if not given it , she will take i t, with l ess happy conse quenc es . So a cons ortlu m as sugge sted here , comm itted to an indep enden t and econo mical ly viabl e Timo r, might be the midd le groun d pol1 tical ly most accep table t o all parti es - and a way out of the gilem mas now faced by Portu gal, Indon esia, and Aust ralla .3

37 '!he 22 Janua ry 1975 cx:mnunique by the rtEM coalit ion 1nvite s es the tN to superv:1.se decolo ru.zati on, but spec1f ically exclud y ssaril unnece 1s Indcne sia fran partiC1patic n. In my Vlf!N this 1pate part1e pmvoc at1ve to lndcn esia. InVltl.Ilg Inckn esia to would preve nt msund erstan dings and gn"e In