The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition [1st ed.] 9783030608934, 9783030608941

This book argues that the defeat of the main French Centre Right party in the 2017 presidential and legislative election

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The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition [1st ed.]
 9783030608934, 9783030608941

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xiii
Introduction (William Rispin)....Pages 1-13
A Changing French Society and the Rise and Fall of Consensus (c.1981–2012) (William Rispin)....Pages 15-40
Parties, Party Systems and the Electorate (William Rispin)....Pages 41-61
Divisions Within the Centre Right over Identity: 2012–2017 (William Rispin)....Pages 63-90
The Centre Right and the Challenges of Economic Reform (William Rispin)....Pages 91-130
Europe and the Realignment of the French Party System (William Rispin)....Pages 131-166
In Search of a Leader: The Centre Right and Its Leadership Crisis, 2012–2017 (William Rispin)....Pages 167-208
Conclusion (William Rispin)....Pages 209-230
Back Matter ....Pages 231-245

Citation preview

FRENCH POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition William Rispin

French Politics, Society and Culture

Series Editor Jocelyn Evans School of Politics & International Studies University of Leeds Leeds, UK

This series examines all aspects of French politics, society and culture. In so doing it focuses on the changing nature of the French system as well as the established patterns of political, social and cultural life. Contributors to the series are encouraged to present new and innovative arguments so that the informed reader can learn and understand more about one of the most beguiling and compelling of European countries.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14991

William Rispin

The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition

William Rispin Hessle, UK

French Politics, Society and Culture ISBN 978-3-030-60893-4 ISBN 978-3-030-60894-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: AG photographe/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book grew out of my Ph.D. research. I would like to thank Professor Nick Hewlett and Dr. Jessica Wardhaugh, who acted as supervisors for both this thesis and my M.A. by Research, and who offered many very useful comments on numerous drafts of the chapters. My two examiners, Professor Andrew Knapp and Professor Jeremy Ahearne also provided helpful suggestions as to how to transform my work into a book. I am also particularly thankful to my parents, for their love, support and encouragement throughout the whole process.

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Contents

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Introduction Defining the ‘Centre Right’ Understanding the Problems Faced by the Centre Right Through a New Model References A Changing French Society and the Rise and Fall of Consensus (c.1981–2012) Introduction The Decline in Voter Identification with Parties The Evolution of the Party System The Impact of Globalisation The Importance of the Cultural Element of Globalisation in the Rise of ‘Populism’: The Issue of Cultural Insecurity Triggering a Realignment The Decline of Political Parties and the Rise of Individualism Conclusion: The Emergence of a New Model References Parties, Party Systems and the Electorate Introduction The Impact of the Fifth Republic’s Institutions on the French Party System

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15 15 16 20 22 24 28 29 33 36 41 41 43 vii

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Theoretical Approaches to Party System Realignments The Decline in Allegiance to Traditional Ideologies Conclusion References 4

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Divisions Within the Centre Right over Identity: 2012–2017 Introduction Cultural Insecurity: A Key Divide in French Politics Cultural Insecurity and Sarkozy’s 2012 Presidential Election Campaign Cultural Insecurity and the Centre Right Under the Hollande Presidency I. The Debate over Assimilation Vs Integration II. The Question of Responses to Terrorism III. Divisions Caused by Social Liberalism IV. Anti-elitism and the Primary of the Right and Centre V. The Importance of Personality in the Debate Over Identity Cultural Insecurity and the 2017 Presidential Elections Conclusion References The Centre Right and the Challenges of Economic Reform Introduction Long-Standing French Concerns About Liberalism Under the Fifth Republic The Evolution of Attitudes Towards the French Economy: A Rise in Demand for Liberalism The Decline of Traditional Ideological Conflicts, and the ‘Consensus of Government’ Over Economic Policy The Weakening of Traditional Ideological Attachments and the Growing Move Towards Reform The General Consensus Within Les Républicains over Economic Policy I. Reducing the Size of the State II. Improving Competitiveness

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63 63 64 68 69 70 75 76 78 80 82 84 87

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CONTENTS

Les Républicains and the Realignment of the French Party System François Fillon as Anti-French Conclusion References 6

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Europe and the Realignment of the French Party System Introduction Europe: A Key Divide in the New Party System Nuancing the ‘Winners Vs Losers of Globalisation’ Analysis: The Importance of the Questions of Sovereignty and Identity in Relation to Europe The New Divide Over Europe Europe and the Right I. A Right-Wing Vision of Europe II. Two Approaches to Europe: Federalism vs Nation States Europe: A Key Factor That Divided Members of Les Républicains I. Disagreement Within Les Républicains Concerning Europe as a Way of Maximising French Influence II. Conflicting Ideals on the Right: Europe vs The Nation State III. Europe as a Cultural Area Beyond Left and Right: Emmanuel Macron and Europe Conclusion References In Search of a Leader: The Centre Right and Its Leadership Crisis, 2012–2017 Introduction Leadership: A Crucial Factor During the Hollande Presidency I. The Institutions of the Fifth Republic II. The Decline in Allegiance to Political Parties The Changing Dynamics of Competition Within Parties Defining Leadership I. The Personality of the Leader in the Modern French Political System

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110 117 119 123 131 131 133

134 137 138 139 143 149 150 152 153 155 158 162

167 167 168 169 169 173 174 175

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II. Representation: The Other Side of Political Leadership The Importance of Leadership for the Centre Right The Centre Right and the Decline of Political Parties The Importance of Personality in Explaining the Fortunes of Les Républicains Emmanuel Macron and the Leadership Criteria The Right Under the Macron Presidency, and the Eclipse of Les Républicains Emmanuel Macron and the Transformation of the French Party System Conclusion References

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Conclusion What Future for Les Républicains? References

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Appendix: The Results of the 2012 and 2017 Presidential and Legislative Elections

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Index

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Abbreviations

EELV FN LR LREM MoDem OECD OFCE PCF PS RN RPR UDF UDI UMP

Europe Ecologie—Les Verts Front National Les Républicains La République En Marche Mouvement Démocrate Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques Parti Communiste Français Parti Socialiste Rassemblement National Rassemblement pour la République Union pour la Démocratie Française Union des Démocrates et Indépendents Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (except during 2002 elections when this acronym stood for Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle)

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List of Tables

Table A.1 Table A.2 Table A.3 Table A.4 Table A.5 Table A.6 Table A.7 Table A.8

2012 presidential elections: First round 2012 presidential elections: Second round 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level): First round 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level): Second round 2017 presidential elections: First round 2017 presidential elections: Second round 2017 legislative elections (results at national level): First round 2017 legislative elections (results at national level): Second round

231 232 233 234 235 235 236 237

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The French presidential elections of April and May 2017 seemed to mark a moment of rupture in the history of the Fifth Republic. The representatives of Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste, the two parties representing the political currents of Centre Right and Centre Left that have formed a majority of the governments since 1958, were both eliminated in the first round. The candidate who received the most votes on 23 April 2017, and who would go on to be elected president, Emmanuel Macron, had only been made a minister in the Hollande government in 2014, and had created his own movement in April 2016. He claimed to be neither of the Right nor of the Left, and promised a new approach to politics, that would look to move beyond the historical dividing lines within the traditional party system. As the outgoing Socialist government had been deeply unpopular, the PS candidate had long been expected to be eliminated in the first round, but it had been widely assumed that this would be to the benefit of the Centre Right, and so the failure of Les Républicains to be represented in the second round was even more surprising. The defeat of Les Républicains has largely been attributed to the Penelopegate scandal. On 27 January 2017, the Canard enchaîné newspaper published allegations that Fillon had used public funds to employ his wife as his parliamentary assistant, for which she had received 680 380 euros according to the Nouvel Obs, when there was little evidence © The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_1

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of her having carried out much, if any, work in this role. Fillon’s defence was undermined by the fact that his wife had given an interview to the British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, in 2007, in which she had explicitly stated that she had never been his assistant. Le Canard enchaîné also claimed that she had been paid to produce articles for the journal La Revue des Deux Mondes, again with scant proof that she had done so. Further allegations followed, regarding Fillon’s employment of his children using public funds when he had been a senator between 2007 and 2012, when they were only students, and his acceptance of designer suits from businessman, Robert Bourgi. The scandal was certainly a major factor in alienating potential voters. Throughout his political career, Fillon had developed a reputation for integrity, which had been crucial to his success in being chosen as the candidate of Les Républicains in the Primary of the Right and Centre of 2016. Furthermore, as Piar (2017) has demonstrated, coverage of the revelations, with new allegations emerging on a regular basis, dominated news coverage and distracted attention from Fillon’s political message. Figures within Les Républicains emphasised the importance of ‘Penelopegate’ in explaining Fillon’s defeat. In the aftermath of Macron’s victory, and before the legislative elections of June 2017, it suited politicians on the Centre Right to blame their presidential candidate for the party’s predicament. Laurent Wauquiez, who would be elected party leader in December 2017, claimed that the defeat of the party in the presidential elections was due to a rejection of Fillon, rather than a lack of support for the Centre Right and its ideas. However, the ongoing decline in the party’s fortunes following the May 2017 presidential elections challenges this analysis. Immediately upon taking office, Macron named Edouard Philippe, and Bruno Le Maire, both members of Les Républicains, as Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy, respectively. In the June legislative elections of that year, Les Républicains gained 112 seats, 73 fewer than it had won in 2012 under its previous incarnation, the UMP. Following the election, more figures from the Centre Right were named in the Macron government, while a number of Les Républicains députés, calling themselves Les Constructifs, chose to sit separately from their colleagues in the National Assembly and pledged to support the new administration from the outside. This group would later transform itself into a new party, Agir. In addition to losing members to Macron and En Marche, Les Républicains was further undermined by internal disagreements. A significant

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number of the party’s supporters were alienated by the election of Laurent Wauquiez, known for favouring a tough approach to immigration, and for being something of a Eurosceptic, as party leader in December 2017. It therefore seems clear that the problems of the PS government had masked the Centre Right’s own inability to respond to the political realignment that was occurring in France. This book seeks to understand the divisions that emerged within Les Républicains during the Hollande presidency, which were crucial to its defeat in the presidential and legislative elections of 2017, and its subsequent disintegration into several separate entities. It examines the evolution of voters’ attitudes towards political parties, leaders and institutions, how this undermined the long-standing party system, and continued and reinforced a political realignment. It examines how such change provoked quarrels within the Centre Right, which would fatally weaken its political power. The difficulties faced by the Centre Right in France during the Hollande presidency are of particular interest, as they reflect a wider development in the Western world, where voters would appear to have become disillusioned with traditional politics and representative institutions. In Britain in 2016, the Leave campaign won the referendum on membership of the European Union, despite the leaders of all major political parties supporting a Remain vote—marking an abandonment of traditional party loyalties that the 2019 General Election would show even more clearly. Populist movements were gaining strength in Italy, Germany, Spain and elsewhere in Europe. Party systems that had been based on the alternation in power of the Centre Left and Centre Right were coming under strain. Not only are voters more distrustful of traditional parties than in the past, but they also adopt a more personalised approach to political activity. As Perrineau (2012) has argued, whereas previously many voters had strongly identified with a particular class, a factor which influenced their voting habits, this is less likely to be the case nowadays. As a result, the Left/Right divide that had been underpinned by class differences has been undermined, and it could be claimed that traditional ideologies that are related to this split have a weaker appeal for much of the electorate. As some such as Brochet (2017) have noted, voters no longer adopt a single coherent worldview, but rather pick and choose (often contradictory) policies from across the political spectrum, which makes them less likely to support the parties of government with which they previously

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identified, and more likely to be open to new, and often more radical, movements. While much attention has been paid to the problems of the Centre Left in this context, there has been less focus on the issues facing the Centre Right. Parties of the mainstream Right in many Western countries faced significant problems during the period between 2012 and 2017, including the Conservative Party, which saw splits emerge following the Brexit referendum, the German Christian Democrats who were challenged by Alternative für Deutschland, and the mainstream of the Republican Party, who were not able to prevent the maverick Donald Trump from securing the party’s nomination as its candidate for the 2016 presidential elections. In France, the Centre Right was not only split internally, but was challenged by ‘unconventional’ parties from the outside, first by the FN, and then by En Marche. The French experience can therefore be seen to reflect a much wider phenomenon. This book will focus on the difficulties encountered by the Centre Right within the French political system during the Hollande presidency. Under the Fifth Republic, Centre Right movements had produced a majority of the presidents and of the governments in the National Assembly, but by 2017, the party had fallen into disarray, and it was difficult to see how its various currents could come together and win elections. The downfall of Les Républicains was not simply a political accident but was part of a more general trend in the evolution of the French party system. During the Fifth Republic the Right had often been split between various parties but by the early 2000s many believed that it was necessary to bring together its disparate elements into a single movement—the UMP—in order to win elections. Unity would be maintained through allegiance to a single leader, the then president, Jacques Chirac, and by the common aim of obtaining and retaining power, rather than by agreement over a particular programme. The UMP strategy was initially successful, and, in 2007, survived the transition from Chirac to Sarkozy, but the latter’s defeat in 2012 heralded a new stage in the party’s history, for two reasons. Firstly, the years 2012–2017 were the first during which the UMP held neither the presidency nor a majority in the National Assembly, and as a result the party was now faced with a period of at least five years in opposition. Some députés had been uneasy with Sarkozy’s campaign in the 2012 presidential elections, and in particular his hard-line stance on

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immigration and identity. Without the necessity to present a united front, as when in government, debates over strategy would become a source of contention, as the party tried to define a programme for the 2017 elections, and would reveal the significantly different positions of its members that would threaten the very existence of the movement. Secondly, following Sarkozy’s resignation, the UMP found itself without a leader, and with no obvious candidate to replace him. The question of who should succeed the former president would remain unresolved throughout the Hollande presidency. Centre Right parties had often united around a leader capable of gaining power, as was seen under de Gaulle, Chirac and Sarkozy. Without a single, accepted figure at its head, one of the key features that had ensured the cohesion and stability of the Centre Right, and had preserved unity and harmony, was no longer present. It was often thought that the problem of unifying the Centre Right could be solved if the appropriate leadership candidate could be identified, but finding a solution to this issue was made more complicated by the realignment of the party system that had been underway for some time. Since the decision of François Mitterrand, the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic, to move away from the dramatic expansion of the public sector that had been promised in his manifesto, towards a programme that gave a greater role to private enterprise, many voters have believed the Left/Right bipolar divide has been losing its relevance (Hayward 1994; Perrineau 2012; Sainte-Marie 2015; Behrent 2017). The similar policies enacted by governments of the Centre Left and Centre Right caused an increasing number of voters to feel disenfranchised, and to either transfer their support to the Far Left or Far Right, or to abstain. This trend accelerated during the Hollande presidency. The need to react to the growth of more extreme movements provoked debates and splits within both the Centre Left and Centre Right. Whoever replaced Sarkozy would need to have not only a programme acceptable to their party, but also one that would be capable of winning support from outside the movement. Les Républicains looked to resolve debate over leadership by holding a primary to choose their representative for the 2017 presidential elections. Both Les Républicains and the PS felt that they had to organise primaries in an attempt to broaden their support beyond their party membership. Previously, the candidates of the two established parties of government had been almost certain to be present in the second round. However, the decline in faith in traditional political movements,

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and the rise of alternatives on the political extremes and in the Centre meant that this was no longer the case during the Hollande presidency. The decision to designate a leader in this way was also influenced by the success of the primary held by the Parti Socialiste in 2011, which had dominated media coverage, and which had enabled party members to rally behind the winner, François Hollande. The aftermath of Fillon’s victory in the primary of November 2016 revealed how the link between voters and parties had evolved. Although it had been expected that all party members and supporters would rally behind him, many of the supporters of his defeated opponents, both within the party and among the general public, seemed to feel a greater loyalty to the candidate for whom they had voted in the primary than to the party itself. Some defected to En Marche before the elections, while others did so following Macron’s victory. The travails of Fillon therefore provide further evidence of the decline in the electorate’s ties to traditional movements and ideologies, and its adoption of a more individualist and volatile attitude to voting. In order to understand the divisions within Les Républicains, it is important to consider the long-term political realignments, which intensified during the Hollande presidency. Several different models have been proposed to explain this (Fourquet 2017; Bherer 2017; Gougou and Persico 2017; Martin 2017), but none provide a comprehensive analysis of the situation. Some argue that society is now divided between the winners and losers of globalisation—a view supported by both Macron (2016) and Marine Le Pen (Barbarit 2017)—largely ignore the fact that globalisation is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, involving several different economic, cultural and political elements. Amalgamating the different reasons for opposition to globalisation obscures the fact that it is possible for voters to support certain elements, while being wary of others. Those models that consider several elements separately, rather than grouping them together as part of globalisation, have often overlooked the role of division over Europe, despite Macron making his positive vision of the EU a key aspect of his campaign, and one which would enable him to reach out to voters across the Left/Right divide. Others fail to recognise the complexity of the problems facing the Centre Right. Martin (2017) argues that there are two major axes of conflict. One concerns socially liberal opinions vs socially conservative views, while the other opposes liberal economic policies to a more

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protectionist stance. His argument that this has created three blocs: ‘protectionist environmentalist’, ‘liberal pro-globalisation’ and ‘conservativeidentarian’ does not represent the position of Les Républicains, many of whose representatives and supporters favoured liberal economic policies alongside a more traditionalist approach to national identity. The issues raised by the divisions within Les Républicains are worthy of study not only because the Centre Right has been (along with the Centre Left) one of the two currents that have dominated politics under the Fifth Republic, but also because they can help us to identify broader political trends that occurred between 2012 and 2017. In terms of the study of the evolution of the Right in France, it is crucial to understand the problems faced by the UMP (and later Les Républicains) and why the union formed in 2002 fell apart in 2017. To achieve this, a new model is required to explain the evolution of the French party system—one that takes into account the key areas of identity and economic liberalism considered by others, but which also gives the issue of Europe its proper place. Such an analysis must also recognise the multifaceted nature of globalisation, and how different policy areas affected the Centre Right in different ways.

Defining the ‘Centre Right’ The focus of this book is on the party, which from 2002 was called the UMP, before being renamed Les Républicains by Sarkozy in 2015, following his re-election as party leader. In order to make observations about the evolution of this movement both throughout the course of the Hollande presidency, and also during the wider period from 2002, the term ‘Centre Right’ will be used to refer to both parties.1 MoDem and the UDI, which some might class as being part of the Centre Right, will be referred to as the Independent Centre parties. This highlights their desire to have greater freedom of action, as could be seen when both parties chose to form a separate list from Les Républicains for the European elections, and by their decision not to present candidates in the Primary of the Right and Centre of 2016. MoDem, in particular, was more a party of the Centre than one of the Centre Right. In the 2012 presidential elections, Bayrou supported Hollande rather than Sarkozy, and in 2017, he rallied behind Macron rather than Fillon. Surveys showed that MoDem voters often found themselves politically caught between the PS and the Centre Right. In the 2015 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey, 51% of MoDem supporters agreed with the statement

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‘To establish social justice, it would be necessary to take from the rich in order to give to the poor’, compared with 72% of those close to the PS, and 30% of those close to the UMP (Teinturier and Zumsteeg 2015; 32). On social issues that were less related to the economy, MoDem supporters were close to the Centre Left in some cases, but had more in common with supporters of the Centre Right in others. For example, 53% of MoDem supporters felt that anti-white racism was a relatively rare phenomenon in France, compared with 70% of those of the PS, and 47% of those from the UMP (Teinturier and Zumsteeg 2015; 69). The situation was reversed on some questions concerning the integration of immigrant communities. While 60% of MoDem supporters felt that immigrants made an effort to integrate, and 63% of those from the PS shared this view, 29% of UMP supporters agreed with this statement (Teinturier and Zumsteeg 2015; 67). For this reason, MoDem is better classified as an Independent Centre party. The term ‘Centre Right’ will also exclude Macron and his party, En Marche. During the presidential elections, Macron stressed that he was ‘neither of the Right, nor of the Left’, situating himself above the bipolar divide. Commentators have offered slightly different interpretations of his position within the political landscape. Jaffré (2017) has argued that the leader of En Marche was a ‘Centre Left candidate and is now a Centre Right president’ while for Elgie (2017; 25): LREM can be interpreted as a combination of moderate right and moderate left députés that has won some support from moderate right and moderate left députés in the Assemblée and that has been systematically opposed there by both the extreme right and what we can interpret as the extreme left in the context of the contemporary French party system.

That Macron had been a minister in the Hollande government (without being a member of the PS) and that, once elected president, he appointed a former member of Les Républicains as his prime minister reinforces the view that he is best characterised as being both of the Right and of the Left, and so will not be considered as part of the Centre Right.

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Understanding the Problems Faced by the Centre Right Through a New Model In this book, we will argue that the fractures within Les Républicains and the disintegration of the party following the 2017 presidential and legislative elections were due, in a large part, to its failure to respond to an ongoing political realignment that reached its culmination during the Hollande presidency. We will demonstrate how the Left/Right divide that had long dominated the French party system had been weakened, as citizens became less attached to traditional ideologies, and would pick and choose policies from across the political spectrum. The political scene had evolved and was structured by different dynamics. Rather than being based on a single divide, such as Left/Right or pro- and anti-globalisation, we will show that parties were arranged on three axes, according to their policies relating to identity, economic liberalism and France’s relationship with the European Union. As we shall see these axes were not considered of equal importance for all voters and in all contexts. Each one of these areas posed different challenges for Les Républicains. In Chapter 2, we will demonstrate how the party system that had long existed under the Fifth Republic, based on a division between the Left and the Right, had already come under increasing strain prior to the 2012 presidential and legislative elections. Sociological and political factors that had developed from around the early 1980s caused a blurring of the class divides that had underpinned the arrangement of parties. As Centre Left and Centre Right governments pursued similar policies in their competition for the support of the middle classes, an increasing number of voters felt disenfranchised and turned to more radical alternatives—particularly to the FN. In addition, a series of crises that emerged from 2008 seriously reduced the confidence of the electorate in their political representatives. The combined effect of a sense of political alienation and a growing mistrust of the political class was that the bipolar party system based on a division between the Left and the Right had been significantly weakened by the start of the Hollande presidency in 2012. Chapter 3 sets discussion of the political realignment during the Hollande presidency in the broader context of political change in France since 1958, and examines some of the existing theory that will underpin the chapters that follow by considering what constitutes a party system, and a political realignment. We shall see how the Hollande presidency (2012–2017) constituted a period when large sections of the electorate

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were less attracted to traditional ideologies than in the past, and that many voters were now inclined to select policies from across the political spectrum in order to create their own worldview, a factor that made their voting behaviour particularly volatile. The following three chapters will each discuss an area of policy that forms part of our new model in order to explain the problems faced by the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency. Chapter 4 examines the debate over identity. The defeat of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, whose campaign for re-election had focused on a hardline stance on immigration and integration left his party divided. Some thought that his strategy had avoided an even worse result and should be continued, while others felt that a more liberal approach would be required to win over voters from the Centre and the Left. These opposing positions would endure throughout the Hollande presidency, and would be exacerbated by further conflicts that emerged over issues such as gay marriage and how to respond to the threat of terrorism. Les Républicains would split into two camps—socially conservative Traditionalists and socially liberal Modernists. Fillon’s ability to win over the Traditionalists would ensure his victory in the primary, but his socially conservative programme would also be an important factor in his subsequent defeat in the presidential elections of 2017. Chapter 5 considers the issue of economic liberalism. Against the background of significant support among the French population for interventionist policies, there has often been a ‘consensus of government’, as parties of both the Centre Left and the Centre Right in France have implemented economic programmes when in power that have put emphasis on liberal measures. During the Hollande presidency, French voters as a whole became more receptive to the idea of giving support to private enterprise and to reducing the size of the state. At the same time, many voters still wanted to preserve some protective elements. The 2017 elections were, to a certain extent, a contest to see which candidate and party could offer the programme that was best able to balance liberal economic reform of the capitalist system with the preservation of elements of state protection. While the radical reforms proposed by Fillon were popular on the Centre Right, his emphasis on a rapid liberalisation of the economy, meant that he was unable to widen his support much beyond his party base. In Chapter 6, we will explore the question of Europe. The impact of the issue of French membership of the European Union in influencing

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voters during the 2017 presidential election campaign has often been overlooked, despite it playing an important role in Macron’s success. His pro-European federalist agenda revitalised what had been a traditional dividing line between the Right and the Centre, which also ran through Les Républicains. It would persuade a significant number of the supporters of the Independent Centre parties and of those who had voted for Juppé in the primary of the Right and Centre—who had been expected to rally behind the Right—to support the candidate of En Marche. Having considered policy issues in the preceding three chapters, Chapter 7 discusses how these were closely entwined with the question of how to select an appropriate leader. Although leadership has always been important under the Fifth Republic, particularly for the Centre Right, the decline in allegiance to traditional ideologies and the parties that represented them gave it an even greater emphasis. Many voters who struggled to identify with a party now looked for a figure in whom they could have confidence. The head of a party must balance questions of personality and representation, in seeking the support of members and of the wider electorate in order to be successful. Fillon was able to better respond to the expectations in this area of participants in the primary of 2016, but would fail to appeal to a broader section of voters in the presidential elections. This response to the challenges of the issue of leadership would be a determining factor in both Fillon’s defeat and the Macron’s victory. This book will therefore explain how many of the phenomena that have been observed in political systems throughout the Western world, such as the decline in allegiance to traditional parties, citizens’ adoption of a more independent and volatile approach to voting, and the rise of new and also more radical movements, were witnessed in France during the Hollande presidency. It will show how these factors contributed to and reinforced a process of political realignment, which was fundamental to the problems faced by Les Républicains in the presidential and legislative elections of 2017. Through analysis of the Centre Right, it seeks to demonstrate the political evolution taking place within the Fifth Republic, and to understand why the defeat of Les Républicains in 2017 did not mark the end of its struggles, but rather suggested that a long period of difficulty for the party lay ahead.

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Note 1. The only exception to this rule will be in Chapter 5, where we will examine Europe as a key area of division between the UMP/Les Républicains, and the Independent Centre parties of the UDI and MoDem. In order to avoid any confusion that might arise from referring to the ‘Centre’, and ‘Centre Right’, in this chapter alone, we will use ‘the Right’ to refer to the UMP/Les Républicains. The FN shall always be distinguished by being referred to either by its name, or by the terms ‘the Far Right’ or ‘the Radical Right’.

References Barbarit, Simon. 2017. «Patriotes» contre «mondialistes», Marine Le Pen lance sa campagne à Lyon. publicsenat.fr, February 5. https://www.publicsenat. fr/article/politique/patriotes-contre-mondialistes-marine-le-pen-lance-sa-cam pagne-a-lyon-54258. Accessed 13 February 2018. Behrent, Michael C. 2017. Twilight of the Political? On the Ideological Disarray of French Politics. Modern & Contemporary France 25 (1): 75–81. Bherer, Marc-Olivier. 2017. Christophe Guilluy «Macron le candidat des métropoles mondialisées». Le Monde, April 26. http://www.lemonde.fr/ idees/article/2017/04/26/christophe-guilluy-m-macron-est-le-candidatdes-metropolesmondialisees_5117791_3232.html#kSTwwMi2vemASbXC.99. Accessed 13 February 2018. Brochet, Francis. 2017. Démocratie smartphone: Le populisme numérique de Trump à Macron. Paris: Editions François Bourin. Elgie, Robert. 2017. The Election of Emmanuel Macron and the New French Party System: A Return to the éternel marais ? Modern & Contemporary France 26 (1): 15–29. Fourquet, Jérôme. 2017. Un nouveau clivage: Perdants versus gagnants de la mondialisation. Commentaire 158 (2): 265–270. Gougou, Florent, and Simon Persico. 2017. A New Party System in the Making? The 2017 French Presidential Election. French Politics 15: 303–321. Hayward, Jack. 1994. Ideological Change: The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Impetus. In Developments in French Politics, ed. Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward, and Howard Machin, 15–32. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Jaffré, Jérôme. 2017. Jérôme Jaffré: «Macron était un candidat du centre gauche, c’est un président du centre droit». Le Figaro, December 18. http:// www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2017/12/18/31001-20171218ARTFIG0 0241-jerome-jaffre-macron-etait-un-candidat-de-centre-gauche-c-est-un-pre sident-de-centre-droit.php. Accessed 14 September 2018. Macron, Emmanuel. 2016. Révolution. Paris: XO Editions.

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Martin, Pierre. 2017. Un séisme politique: L’élection présidentielle de 2017. Commentaire 158 (2): 249–264. Perrineau, Pascal. 2012. Le choix de Marianne: Pourquoi et pour qui votons-nous?. Paris: Fayard. Piar, Christophe. 2017. La présidentielle vue par les JT. In Le vote disruptif: Les élections présidentielles et législatives de 2017 , ed. Pascal Perrineau, 73–99. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Sainte-Marie, Jérôme. 2015. Le nouvel ordre démocratique. Paris: Editions du Moment. Teinturier, Brice, and Stephane Zumsteeg. 2015. Fractures françaises Vague 3: Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour Le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po. Data collected between 22–27 April 2015 from a sample of 1000 people representative of the French population aged 18 or over. https://jeanjaures.org/nos-productions/fractures-francaises-edition-2015. Accessed 22 November 2020

CHAPTER 2

A Changing French Society and the Rise and Fall of Consensus (c.1981–2012)

Introduction French politics under the Fifth Republic has long represented a conflict between the Left and the Right.1 By the 1970s, this took the form of a four-way contest between the PCF and PS on the Left, and the UDF and RPR on the Right. The decline of the PCF and UDF in the 1980s and 1990s produced a new arrangement, and by the time of Sarkozy’s election as president, Grunberg and Haegel (2007) could argue that French Politics was now not only bipolar, but increasingly bipartisan, based on the relationship between the PS and the UMP. As Hewlett (1998) has argued, from the 1980s, the differences in the policies supported by members and supporters of the Centre Left and Centre Right declined, creating a form of political consensus. Yet by 2012, this established party system was already under strain, as was revealed by the success of the FN in the presidential elections of that year, when Marine Le Pen came third in the first round with 17.9% of the vote (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012c). The question of how to respond to the rise of the Front National would prove to be an important area of discussion within the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency. This debate was already present under Sarkozy’s leadership of the UMP. He had managed to secure the support of many FN voters, which contributed to his winning the presidential elections of 2007 (see, for example, Hewlett 2007; Mayer 2007). When faced with poor approval ratings as president, he turned further to the © The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_2

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Right, notably in the Discours de Grenoble in 2010, in which he explicitly linked the issue of crime to those relating to integration and immigration (see Guerrier 2014). The election of Marine Le Pen as leader of the FN, and the increase in support enjoyed by the Far Right, further encouraged this move, and Sarkozy’s 2012 presidential election campaign was firmly based on an appeal to FN voters. The FN claimed to be ‘neither of the Right, nor of the Left - French !’ (Shields 2007; 274), and its relative success in 2012 significantly undermined the bipolar and near bipartisan arrangement of parties. This chapter will examine both the long-term and short-term factors that had destabilised the traditional party system, based on a Left/Right divide, in the period before Hollande came to power.

The Decline in Voter Identification with Parties A key factor in destabilising the traditional Right/Left divide was the decline in the number of voters identifying strongly with the established parties of government which had historically represented them—a development which had been in progress since the 1970s. Perrineau notes that in the second round of the 1974 presidential election, 74% of manual labourers voted for Mitterrand, while 66% of those in upper management and the liberal professions chose Giscard d’Estaing. By 2007, this social divide was no longer reflected in voting patterns. Nicolas Sarkozy received 52% of the votes of blue-collar workers and 57% of those in upper management and the liberal professions (Perrineau 2012; 67). This leads Perrineau to conclude that: the idea of “class warfare” between the bourgeoisie and the working class is somewhat dated. Nowadays, middle class employees are often more Leftwing than the blue-collar working class – upper management and those in the intellectual professions are much more likely to describe themselves as Left-wing (38% in the Ifop survey of September 2010) than blue-collar workers (33%), among whom the most popular response is that they are “neither of the Left nor of the Right” (37%)

The evolution of voting patterns might be explained by the increased importance of cultural rather than economic criteria in defining notions of Left and Right. Following the conversion of the Parti Socialiste to a more moderate approach in the early 1980s, the established parties of government from both sides of the political divide often proposed similar liberal

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economic policies, as for example, in 1984, when Mitterrand reduced the taxation imposed on businesses. This trend of the Left moving closer to the Centre continued under the Jospin government of 1997–2002, which privatised sections of some state-owned businesses. By 2012, it was easier to distinguish between parties of the Left and Right by their positions concerning cultural values, such as attitudes regarding gay rights, than by those related to economic issues. As Bouvet (2012; 219) recognises, those from more economically disadvantaged backgrounds were often more socially conservative, and so less likely to identify as left-wing than those in upper management and the intellectual professions, who tended to be more socially liberal. The evolution of the political Left was driven by the shrinking and fragmentation of the working-class, which had in the past formed a major part of its core electorate, and this was particularly the case for the PCF. As Dalton (2008; 7) notes, from the 1970s there was a decline in heavy industry, while the service sector greatly expanded. This shift in the structure of the French economy reduced the size of the blue-collar working class and increased the divisions within this socio-economic group. As a result, Perrineau (2012; 72) observes that working-class voters were now found in greater numbers in smaller businesses in the service sector than in heavy industry, a feature that weakened the ability to create a specific class identity. New dividing lines emerged, which meant that, by 2012, workers often saw their identity in a more fragmented way than they had in the past. Whereas in the legislative elections of 1978, 69% of the blue-collar working class voted for candidates of the Left (Gougou 2007; 18), this had fallen to 40% by the presidential elections of 2012 (Fleurot 2012). Bouvet (2012; 143) dates the rise of a more individualist approach to the years following 1968, and, as Perrineau (2012; 72) has shown, the fragmentation of the working class into different categories accelerated from the 1980s. Those with secure jobs had different expectations from those with unstable or marginal positions. French workers had different requirements from their foreign counterparts, and young workers had different expectations from those of older generations. For example, Aunis (2012) notes that younger workers, who had become used to periods of economic crisis, were keen to protect their employment, but did not see their work as a vocation, unlike many of their older counterparts who entered the job market at times of economic growth. Younger workers were also more supportive of moves to increase the flexibility

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of the workforce. To these differences, Mayer (2009; 176) adds those between workers in the private and public sector. The former were much more affected by the continuing high level of unemployment, and came to consider those working in the public sector as privileged, because their jobs were protected and they received better pensions. Class solidarity was much weakened (Bouvet 2012). This fragmentation of class identity was recognised by political parties. Whereas Socialist parties in the past had often sought to emphasise the importance of the working class as a coherent whole, sharing similar aspirations, the PS noted in its programme Un nouvel horizon published in 1991: The Socialists, who have for too long been taken for proponents of collectivism, reaffirm that individual autonomy, the right of every woman and every man to happiness are the goals that they set themselves. […] From this perspective, society can be seen as a huge cluster of relations between individuals.

A further indication of the decline of class divisions can be seen in changes in the way people have chosen to identify themselves in sociological terms over time. In 1966, of those French people who identified as being members of a particular socio-economic group, 39% felt that they belonged to the working class, and 21% to the middle class. By 2006, this relationship had reversed, with 75% identifying as middle class and 16% as working class (Perrineau 2012; 74). Even among those who, according to sociological statisticians, formed part of the working class, 64% felt that they were middle class (Perrineau 2012; 74). Guilluy (2010; 78) argues that many were keen to identify as middle class as it was a way of differentiating themselves from those who lived in the banlieues and allowed those falling down the social ladder to claim that they still maintained cultural links with their former status. As many voters tried to emphasise that they belonged to the same social group, rather than focusing on the specificity of their own class as distinct from other sections of society, the class divide was further reduced. Class convergence was also favoured by the narrowing of the standard of living between the working and middle classes. As Mendras (1988; 37) argued: The quality of life for blue-collar workers has rapidly improved […] despite taking longer than other social categories, today, just like the

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rest of the French population, almost all blue-collar households possess a fridge, television, washing machine etc. […] According to Michel Verret (1979): “The conclusion is clear: no matter how it is measured […] the working class has, in an extraordinarily short period of time, reduced the extraordinarily large gap between its living conditions and those of other classes”

The shrinking of the gap between the working and middle classes did not only occur during the 1980s. Between 1996 and 2007, average wealth in France increased by 16.7%. For those in the lowest decile the increase was 21%, whereas it was 14.7% for those in the highest decile (Perrineau 2012; 76). The reduction in the difference between classes was not solely based on material factors. Cultural changes also played a role. As Guilluy (2015; 23) states, ‘Jean Viard notes correctly that we have all become urban, we all watch the same television news and we shop in the same supermarkets’. While it might be objected that people of different backgrounds bought different products, many often still mixed in the same spaces, and enjoyed similar cultural experiences. This evolution led to the weakening of what was once a strong particular working-class culture, and parties that used to rely on this, particularly the Parti Communiste, now struggled in elections. While the social conditions of the blue-collar working class improved, convergence also occurred through the reduction in living standards of certain sections of the middle class. Dalton (2008; 151), writing about evolutions in the Western world, notes that: the expanding ranks of low-paid and low-status white collar employees and the growth of white-collar unions are producing a proletarianization of part of the middle class. Few individuals now possess exclusively middle-class or working-class social characteristics, and the amount of class overlap is growing over time. In sum, the convergence of life conditions may contribute to the convergence of class voting patterns.

In France, between 1995 and 2010, house prices increased 2.5 times, while wages only rose by 1.6 times their starting level (Guilluy 2010; 79). Sections of the lower middle class were faced with the prospect that they would never be able to own their own home, and, due to rising property prices and rents in big cities, many were forced to move into the smaller towns, where there were fewer opportunities, and therefore

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found themselves marginalised. Whereas previous generations could aspire to be more prosperous than their forebears, by the time of the Hollande presidency, around a quarter of 30–40 year olds were poorer and located lower down the economic social scale than their parents (Guilluy 2010; 82). Class divisions were therefore no longer as clear as they had been, and the close identification between sections of society and particular parties historically considered to represent them had diminished.

The Evolution of the Party System Changes in the social structure of French society further undermined the traditional Left/Right bipolar divide, by encouraging convergence in the policies pursued by the parties of government of both Left and Right from the 1980s, as both sides sought to win over the expanding middle classes. However, voters disappointed with one of the established parties of government, finding that its rival did not offer a significant alternative, would therefore turn to more radical movements. Parties were generally unable to rely on the support of a specific class or section of society, and had to try to broaden their appeal as far as possible. As Dalton (2008; 151) states: [o]ver the latter half of the twentieth century, many political parties tried to broaden their electoral appeal to attract new middle-class voters. This outreach led parties to moderate their positions on traditional class-based issues. Socialist parties in Europe […] adopted more moderate domestic and foreign policy goals. Conservative parties also tempered their views and accepted the basic social programs proposed by the Left. Socialist parties vied for the votes of the new middle class, and conservative parties sought votes from the working class.

The evolution of the Parti Socialiste provides an example of this development. In 1971, Mitterrand had talked of ‘a break with capitalist society’ (Grunberg 2011), and in his 1981 programme he had proposed to expand the public sector through the nationalisation of nine industrial groups (Le Monde diplomatique 2012). However, once in power, he soon abandoned his more statist approach as the difficult economic situation, made worse by international competition, forced him to perform a U-turn. He justified his change in policy in an interview in 1983, when he stated: ‘the French people are beginning to understand that it is business

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that creates wealth, business that creates jobs, business that determines our standard of living and our place in the global hierarchy’ (Mitterrand 1983). This was seen as a key moment in the evolution of the PS’s approach to economic policy, and an event that increased convergence between the parties of government on the Left and on the Right. The support by the PS for more liberal policies did not end with Mitterrand. As Behrent (2017) argues, in economic terms, the Jospin government (1997–2002) combined measures that followed socialist principles, such as the 35-hour week, with more liberal ones such as the privatisation of state industry. Mitterrand’s turn towards economic liberalism was therefore not merely a short-term adaptation intended to respond to particular problems, but rather the start of a more definitive shift in the direction of the PS. As the Left moved rightwards on economic policy, the Right moved leftwards on questions of social values. For Raymond (2016), this process had already started in the 1970s under Giscard d’Estaing, whose government legalised abortion and lowered the age of majority to 18. Attitudes on the Right would continue to develop in a more liberal direction, reflecting the changing views of the electorate. To take the example of the death penalty, whereas in 2000, 54% of Right-wing voters supported its reintroduction (Duhamel and Lecerf 2016; 185), by January 2012, only 46% were in favour of such a measure (TNS-Sofrès 2012; 6). This convergence in both policy and attitudes between both the parties of the Centre Left and Centre Right, and also in the attitudes of their supporters, would cause Sainte-Marie (2015; 23) to state, that ‘in France the Left/Right divide has been under severe strain for some time’. The change he describes was already evident before 2012, and an OpinionWay poll in 2011 found that 59% agreed that the idea that Left and Right no longer had any meaning (Perrineau 2012; 19). As Touchard (1981 16) argues, ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ are not essential values, but rather ‘the truth is that Left and the Right can only be defined in relation to the period in question and to each other, according to the problems faced at a specific period, according also to the character of the Right or Left of that particular period that they oppose’. Under the Hollande presidency, Sainte-Marie (2015; 19) would argue that ‘in the long term, the only viable criteria by which to measure this dichotomy is to go by what people say: he who says he is of the Left, or accepts to be described in such a way, is of the Left, and the same is true of the Right’. Such was the convergence between the parties of government of the Left and the Right

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that when trying to distinguish them, the best way to do so was to ask voters how they defined themselves. Although Left and Right remained terms in the political debate, as Martin (2000; 18) notes, this was because the political system imposes an adversarial arrangement between a government and an opposition. In Parliament, parties must either support or oppose laws, and parties struggling for power must choose between siding with or opposing the government. Yet this adversarial relationship, imposed by the logic of the institutions, was not reflected in policies supported by the Centre Left and Centre Right. The evolution of the PS and Centre Right in relation to one another further weakened the traditional arrangement of the party system. In the words of Sainte-Marie (2015; 22): If issues that are judged to be a cause of disagreement by public opinion are treated as areas of consensus by the main leaders of the Left and the Right […], or if the actual policies pursued by both sides when in government appear to be similar […] then the established system comes under strain.

As both the PS and the UMP were targeting the same middle-class sections of the electorate, certain groups, such as the blue-collar working class, felt excluded and sought representation elsewhere, particularly from the political extremes. In 2012, both Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon were arguably able to benefit from the feeling that, unlike the established parties of government, they offered a real alternative, and claimed to take into account the concerns of those who felt ignored by other political movements. An Ifop-Fiducial poll concerning the 2012 presidential elections showed that 61% of those who voted for the Front de Gauche candidate did so because he represented change, and 46% of Le Pen voters justified their own decision in the same way (Ifop-Fiducial 2012; 24).

The Impact of Globalisation A final important, long-term factor which was influential in reshaping the French party system was globalisation, a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, that Heywood (2012; 11) defines as ‘the emergence of a web of interconnectedness which means that our lives are shaped increasingly by events that occur, and decisions that are made, at a great distance from us, thus giving rise to “supraterritorial connections between

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people.”’ He identifies three separate, if interrelated, elements. The first is economic globalisation, which is ‘the process through which national economies have, to a greater or lesser extent, been absorbed into a single global economy’. The second element is cultural globalisation, which is ‘the process whereby information, commodities and images produced in one part of the world have entered into a global flow that tends to flatten out cultural differences worldwide’. Finally, there is political globalisation, ‘the process through which policy-making responsibilities have been passed from national governments to international organisations’. Heywood’s definition is useful, but incomplete. As regards cultural globalisation, Giddens (2002; xxii), like Heywood, argues that ‘cultural standardisation is an intrinsic part of this process’, but he also notes that ‘a more profound effect of globalisation is to produce greater local cultural diversity, not homogeneity’. This is a crucial feature that will be essential to our argument, particularly in Chapter 4. Some commentators have focused on economic globalisation in their explanation of the rise of populist movements on the political extremes in the early part of the new millennium. More and more businesses operated at an international level, which led not only to freer movement of capital around the world, but also to the transfer of businesses to areas where production costs were lower and to the migration of workers to areas where salaries were higher. The decline of blue-collar jobs in industry hit the white working class particularly hard. Goodliffe (2013; 97) argues that the success of the FN: suggest[s] that the break-up of the Fordist economic and social model has had a profound impact on France […] Capitalising on the fears and uncertainties raised by the new post-Fordist economic realities, the FN has succeeded in combining the extreme right’s age-old appeal among petits indépendants with a politics of ‘welfare chauvinism’ directed to the working class.

He adds that continued economic globalisation will probably perpetuate this trend and that ‘the extreme right is likely to remain the principal refuge for the losers of globalisation in France for the time to come’. Economic factors were certainly important in encouraging some voters to turn to the radical parties by 2012. As Guilluy (2014; 11) argues, in France, globalisation produced new divisions, between the big cities, where jobs and investment were concentrated, and ‘rural areas, small and

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medium-sized towns, certain peri-urban areas where 80% of the working classes live today’. Yet the insecurity created by globalisation transcended the class divide, as the ‘poorest, including blue-collar workers, whitecollar workers, small farmers, small independents, young people, those in work, the unemployed and pensioners’ were all concerned by the geographical changes brought about by globalisation (Guilluy 2014; 19). As Guilluy (2014; 19) notes, ‘despite having opposing interests in the past, they now share the same fate […] the disappearance of traditional categorisations between blue-collar and white-collar workers, between the secondary and tertiary sectors contributes to the structuring of the new working classes’. It is these groups that suffered most from the closure of factories outside major cities, as French manufacturing faced increased competition from Eastern Europe and Asia, where production costs were cheaper. Guilluy (2014; 56) argues that the wider public was often unaware of most factory closures and industrial job losses, as they happened in small towns and received little media attention, despite the fact that their impact on the local economy was considerable. These areas suffered economically from globalisation, and, by 2012, the inhabitants had in many cases turned away from the traditional parties of Right and Left to the FN. As we have seen, there were many long-standing issues which undermined the traditional Left/Right divide. To these were added several more short-term crises, which emerged during the Sarkozy presidency, and would contribute to the collapse of an already weakened party system.

The Importance of the Cultural Element of Globalisation in the Rise of ‘Populism’: The Issue of Cultural Insecurity One of the most important shorter-term factors that weakened the established party system concerned the rise of parties on the political extremes. As Bouvet (2015; 7) observes, ‘the rise of populist movements, in France, as elsewhere in Europe, is the most striking evidence of the deep political crisis that is affecting the country and the continent’. Part of the explanation for the disengagement of sections of the electorate from their traditional allegiances is related to economic issues. Bouvet states that the success of the parties of the Far Right and Far Left ‘is a worried and apparently inescapable reaction to the symptoms of

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a society overwhelmed by persistent unemployment, growing inequality, a generalised feeling of downward social mobility, the visible rise of poverty or even for a growing number of citizens being forced to move to more disadvantaged areas’. However, events such as the rise of the Front National cannot simply be explained by economic changes but must also take into account the impact of cultural globalisation. Bouvet considers that cultural insecurity is also a key factor. He identifies various social issues, in particular that some elements of the white working class feel that their way of life and national identity are under threat from immigration and the rise of a more visible presence of Islam within the Republic. It is this that caused many to turn towards the FN. This phenomenon became more relevant following the attacks on America on 11 September 2001, and its influence was reinforced by the emergence of terrorist movements from the Arab Spring. As Bouvet (2015; 138) argues, were economic globalisation the sole factor behind the disillusionment of sections of society with traditional parties, then one might expect to see the Front de Gauche perform as well as the FN, as both parties share a similar opposition to globalised capitalism. However, in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen received 6% more of the vote than Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012a). In the following legislative elections in the 11ème circonscription du Pas de Calais (a Northern area significantly affected by the decline of heavy industry and mining, where both Le Pen and Mélenchon were candidates) the FN leader gained 42.26% of the vote, almost double that of her counterpart from the Front de Gauche, who received 21.46% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012b). As Bouvet notes, it could be argued that part of the explanation of the success of the FN was that it was better at appealing to blue-collar workers affected by issues covered by the term cultural insecurity. Whereas opposition to immigration had been based, in part at least, on concerns about certain ethnic groups, by 2012 it had become focused particularly on Islam. Bouvet (2015; 25) notes that, ‘opposition to immigration is now based above all on a suspicion, or even hostility towards Islam and Muslims. Ethnic criteria and attacks on “Arabs” or “Africans” are clearly of less significance than religion – specifically Islam’. The focus of concerns about immigration is now ‘cultural’, and while objections to the economic threat of globalisation still exist, it can be argued that they are often of secondary importance. This could be seen in the years

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preceding the Hollande presidency. In 2010, an Ifop poll found that 42% saw Islam as a threat to French identity, almost twice as many as those who considered that it enriched French culture (22%) (Ifop pour le Figaro 2012; 5). Fears relating to immigration and Islam would feature prominently in Marine Le Pen’s 2012 campaign, such as her claim that all meat in Paris was halal (See Le Pen 2012; Le Parisien 2012). The question of cultural insecurity is frequently linked to that of antielitism, as certain parts of the electorate feel ignored by the traditional parties which they consider to represent a privileged and powerful group that dominates the social scene. Some analysts claim that this sense of division became visible not only over the issue of identity but could also be seen in responses to political globalisation, and in the evolution of attitudes of different sections of society towards the European Union. Hooghe and Marks (2009) have argued that Europe became a feature of debate particularly following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. They claim that, whereas the creation of the single market was considered to be something that had little impact on the general public, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty ‘opened a complex elite bargain to public inspection, and precipitated referendums and a series of national debates that alerted publics to the fact that European integration was diluting national sovereignty’. The effect of this was to reveal a difference in appreciation of Europe between the elite and the wider population, which had a more sceptical outlook (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 21), and to provoke splits within the established parties of government and their support groups. Once again, these divisions concern several different elements of globalisation, one relating to economic aspects and others which are ‘cultural’ and, as we have seen above, political. As Bouvet (2015; 19) notes, ‘the European Union is widely seen as a Trojan Horse promoting a destructive form of globalisation, rather than as an effective rampart against its effects’. He identifies the cultural element in the feeling among sections of the working class that there exists an elite which gives preference to the demands of minorities on issues such as open borders, free movement of people and the deregulation of markets (Bouvet 2015; 73). Nor is the elite solely represented by political parties in the eyes of this section of the electorate; it also includes the media and big business. In 2005, the editor of left-leaning Libération, Serge July, raged against the workers and those politicians on the Left who had voted against the European Constitution in the referendum. In an article entitled ‘Masochistic masterpiece’, he

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argued that the ‘No’ vote represented ‘a general disaster and an epidemic of populism’. It might be argued that the word ‘populism’ could often be seen as a way by which some groups and politicians stigmatise those who do not subscribe to their own values. As Delsol (2015; 7) notes, ‘the term “populism” is above all an insult: it is used to describe those parties or political movements that are considered to be made up of idiots, fools and even nutters’. Mouffe offers a similar analysis, arguing that ‘It is very convenient for parties of the Centrist consensus to use the term populist to disqualify their opponents. The “populism” accusation is particularly useful for the so-called left-wing parties, as it allows them to avoid selfcriticism, and any recognition that, having abandoned the defence of the popular classes, they are to a large extent responsible for the crisis of representation that is the underlying cause of the emergence of a wide-range of “anti-establishment” parties’ (Errejón and Mouffe 2016; 96). This crisis of representation contributed greatly to the rise of the Front National, due to its programme based on the rejection of the ‘establishment’ and the way in which it attacked the parties of government which seemed to be defending a broken system. Marine Le Pen would refer frequently to the UMPS, claiming that Left and Right both proposed the same failing policies. The sense that there was an opposition between ‘an elite’ and ‘the people’ did not merely arise because voters have turned against certain political parties, but also because some parties rejected those sections of society that used to form part of their core electorate. As Bouvet (2012) observes, whereas in the past, the working class was seen as admirable, and praised by many on the Left, since 1968, the attitude towards the workers, particularly from sections of the Left, has become hostile. He argues that many sections of the working class fail to recognise themselves in the more liberal social values incarnated by political parties, and so have been seen as an obstacle, resistant to change, rather than a means of bringing it about. He claims that in popular culture, a ‘prolophobia’ emerged, where the white, working-class man, who had been celebrated in the 1930s as incarnated by Jean Gabin, became a figure of fun, to be mocked and looked down on. Bouvet argues that this further reinforced the alienation of the workers from traditional parties, seen as representing an elite, and made them more likely to turn to the extreme parties which claimed to listen to their views.

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The decision by sections of the Left to seek new electorates, and to give less priority to winning over working-class support could be seen in a report published in 2011 by the Left-wing think tank Terra Nova for the Parti Socialiste, which argued: It is no longer possible today for the Left to try and reconstruct its historic class coalition : the blue-collar working class is no longer the core electorate of the Left, it no longer shares all its values, it can no longer be, as it was in the past, the motor driving the creation of an electoral majority of the Left. (Jeanbart et al. 2012; 13)

Rather than looking for support in its traditional constituencies, the report argued that the Left should seek to bring together those who shared its progressive values.

Triggering a Realignment Although the presence of cultural issues linked to economic concerns were an essential element in destabilising the French party system based on the traditional Left/Right divide, their effect was compounded by the economic and political crises that emerged after 2008. The rise in support for the Front National, a party which arguably sat outside the traditional Left-Right arrangement, was one of the early indications that a realignment would take place. In 2012, the FN proposed a programme that combined elements of both the Left and the Right, arguing in favour of tougher measures to reduce immigration, which was closer to the policies proposed by the Centre Right, while also supporting more state intervention in the economy, which placed it closer to the Left (see Le Pen 2012). In this way, the Far Right was not simply an extension of the Right, but often brought together a coalition of those who were opposed to the current political system, if for different reasons. The failure of Sarkozy and of his government, to deal with the economic recession further contributed to the rise of the FN. As Cole et al. (2013; 9) argue, ‘[b]y 2012, the ongoing and highly unpredictable economic crisis had sapped the popularity of most incoming governments, including of the French’. This loss of confidence, not just in parties but also in politicians themselves, can be seen in the changes in the popularity ratings of Sarkozy during his presidential term. When he came to power in 2007, 63% of French people had confidence in him, a percentage

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which fell to 20% by May 2011, before rising slightly to 37% in May 2012 (Kantar TNS). Although this loss of public support was due to a range of factors, a TNS Sofres report on the evolution of the public’s faith in the president noted that, from 2009, ‘the economic and social problems that have arisen from the crisis are weighing down on public confidence, due to the constant rise of unemployment’ (TNS-Sofres 2011a; 11). In addition to economic concerns, fears about terrorism and the refugee crisis caused a rise in support for the Front National. Concerns about terrorism increased following the attacks by Mohamed Merah in Toulouse in 2012. Marine Le Pen linked these to the arrival of migrants, when she stated during the 2012 presidential election campaign, ‘How many Mohamed Merahs are there in the boats and aeroplanes that arrive in France every day?’ (L’Obs avec AFP 2012).

The Decline of Political Parties and the Rise of Individualism One of the most important consequences of the long-term decline in ideological attachments, of reactions to globalisation and of more shortterm destabilising events such as the economic and migration crises, was the loosening of traditional attachments to political parties and the creation of a more individualised approach among the electorate. The fact that many voters were no longer able to identify strongly with a particular party was another factor which weakened the traditional Left/Right bipolar system and created a more volatile party system. As Rouban (2013; 3) would observe, ‘it is possible to demonstrate that more and more voters are deciding who to support based on personal factors, and fewer and fewer are doing so according to their class, group identity or even their professional situation’. This more individualised approach to politics could be seen in the decline in the number of people joining political parties. As Duhamel notes, party membership has gradually fallen since the end of the Second World War. Whereas there once were mass movements—the Gaullist Rassemblement du peuple français had around 400,000 members and the Communists over 500 000 during the period that followed the Liberation (see Charlot 1983; 88; Boulland 2018; 39)—in 2012, both the PS and the UMP (the dominant parties of this period) each claimed to have around 200,000 militants (see Bruckert 2016; Gaboulaud 2012).

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The disassociation between parties and their membership size was driven by two different major dynamics. On the one hand, many voters ceased to identify with political parties. On the other, as Duhamel notes, the parties placed less emphasis on enlarging membership and now focused more on voters rather than members (Bruckert 2016). Lefebvre (2016) argues that as since 1988, parties receive most of their funding from the State, there is no longer such an incentive to seek members. The time of mass membership of parties appears to be largely over, at least in France. The ‘rise in individualism’ is also confirmed by the decline of other representative institutions, such as the reduction in the number of people joining trade unions. In the immediate post-war period, over a quarter of all workers were members of a union (Amossé and Pignoni 2006; 405), a percentage which had fallen to around 8% by 2011 (Perrin 2011). Not only has the number of unionised workers fallen, but so has the faith of the public in trade unions. Whereas in the 1970s, 60% of salaried employees had confidence in unions, and this figure was 54% in 2004 (Andolfatto and Labbé 2006; 292), by 2012, more people had more faith in big business (42.6%) than in trade unions (35.2%) (Chanvril 2017). The growth of information media has also transformed the way that citizens interact with politics, and helped to drive the development of a more individualised approach to politics by voters. Politicians are now able to contact the public directly, independently of party structures, without having to pass through the traditional media channels. The importance of the Internet and social media to campaigns and its impact on party membership is recognised by Duhamel. He argues that: Political campaigns now take place in the media and on social networks. Political parties have lost their role […] Outside major election campaigns, members have no contribution to make. They are aware of this and so fewer and fewer are joining. (Bruckert 2016)

While the role of social media in politics has developed greatly since 2012, before this date, politicians were already making use of the opportunities that it offered. Pages were set up on Facebook to support political figures, and campaign teams were able to communicate the details of their meetings directly to the public. The meetings themselves were streamed over the Internet to reach all voters, not just those able to be present on the ground. For many voters, the advantages they might gain from being

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a member of a particular party were now less clear, and so fewer were prepared to join a political movement. The rise of new media has also changed the way in which the electorate interacts with political parties. YouTube allows politicians to reach out to voters directly. This was used by all main parties during the 2012 presidential campaign to spread their ideas and directly attack the proposals made by their rivals. The Internet also allows voters to contact their elected representatives, and to discuss policies and their implications with people from across the country and across the world. In such a context, people are less willing to accept parties or groups that seek to set an agenda without consulting their members. By 2012, there was already a proliferation of independent websites beyond the control of parties, able to participate in debates, and to influence the electorate. When an IfopFiducial poll asked voters which media sources had been most useful in helping them to decide whom to vote for in the presidential elections of that year, 15% gave the Internet as one of their answers, which placed it in joint fourth place behind politics programmes on television, television news and the radio (Ifop-Fiducial 2012; 51). This evolution in the relationship between political movements and their members would have important consequences in determining the outcome of the 2012 presidential elections, and through this, on the PS government that was formed. This was first seen in the decision of the Parti Socialiste to hold an open primary in 2011 to choose its candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. This proved a great success, as it allowed the candidates to develop their ideas for the 2012 campaign in public, before the campaign itself started. Comment on the PS dominated the news agenda, and the first-round debate on 15 September 2011 was the most watched programme on television that night (lefigaro.fr 2011). In the hope of emulating this success, Les Républicains would decide to follow suit and hold their own primary in 2016, but, as we shall see, this would play a decisive role in the demise of the party. Further proof of the electorate’s dissatisfaction with political parties was visible in the rise in abstention in legislative elections. Participation in the first round fell from 81% in 1973 to 57% in 2012 (de Boissieu). Between 1997 (the last election before the reduction of the presidential term from 7 to 5 years, which ensured that presidential and legislative elections would be held in the same year) and 2012, participation in the first round fell by just over 10% (de Boissieu). This can in part be explained by the fact that the result of the presidential elections strongly

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influences that of the legislative elections, as voters look to avoid cohabitation which would limit the ability of the new president to implement their programme. However, the evidence that participation fell by a further 7% between 2002 and 2012 also suggests that there was a growing feeling of disillusionment with politics. The loss of faith in politicians in general was further shown by a TNS Sofres poll in 2011, where 72% said that they felt that French politicians were ‘rather corrupt’ (TNS-Sofres 2011b; 4), a figure which had risen from 32% in 1977, and from 58% in 2002 (Grunberg and Mayer 2003; 217). As Gaffney (2015) argues, scandal has played an important role in determining public appreciation of politicians. Both sides of the political spectrum have been affected, and have had a history of using public funds for party political purposes. Notable examples from the 1980s include the Urba affaire for the PS, and the RPR’s use of fake jobs when Chirac was Mayor of Paris. As regards Sarkozy, by 2012 he was linked to a significant number of scandals, including allegations that his 2007 presidential campaign had in part been funded by the Libyan government, and that his party had received substantial illegal donations from the L’Oréal heiress, Liliane Bettencourt. In 2012, allegations of political corruption were therefore prominent in the mind of the public. The fall in public confidence in political parties and in their representatives was a crucial part of the undermining of the traditional Left/Right divide. Dalton (2008; 186) recognises that, ‘as long-term party and social-group cues are losing importance, the decision-making process shifts toward the issues and candidates of specific campaigns’. The focus on candidates rather than parties observed by Dalton could be seen in France in relation to Sarkozy. His ‘omniprésident’ governing style, where he sought to focus media attention largely on himself and his own personality was widely criticised. The 2012 presidential elections witnessed a backlash, and the result has been characterised more as a vote against Sarkozy than one in favour of Hollande. Cole et al. (2013; 4) talk of the presidential elections as ‘an anti-Sarkozy referendum’, while Gaffney (2012; 349) argues that ‘Sarkozy’s defeat was […] a passionate disavowing of the personality and character of the President’. Perhaps even more significant than the decline in public confidence in politicians was that many people had also lost faith in the institutions. Whereas in 2000, a Cevipof study found that 72% of those questioned were satisfied with the way the Assemblée Nationale functioned (Grunberg and Mayer 2003), this had fallen to 38% in a similar survey in 2009,

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which also showed that 33% had confidence in the presidency, and 42% in the EU (Le Monde 2013). These values continued to fall, and by the time the same study was repeated in December 2012, only 31% had confidence in the presidency, and 28% in the Assemblée nationale. There was disaffection not only with national, but also international bodies, as only 33% of French citizens had faith in the European Union (Le Monde 2013). The distrust towards politicians and political institutions that existed at the end of the Sarkozy presidency was not improved by the arrival of a new government in power, and the failure of the Hollande administration to reverse this trend would further undermine the bipolar French party system. Voters arguably seemed not only unconvinced that politicians could resolve their problems, but also felt that the institutions of government were no longer fit for purpose.

Conclusion: The Emergence of a New Model The first round of the 2012 presidential elections, in which Marine Le Pen came third with 18% of the vote, demonstrated that the established arrangement of the party system, that had long been dominated by the Parti Socialiste and the Centre Right, was under threat, with both the Far Left and the Far Right gaining support from those who were disillusioned with the established parties of government. Many of the causes of this realignment could be traced back to the early 1980s. Whereas in the past, there had been close links between parties and certain sections of the electorate, such as between the Parti Communiste and the blue-collar working class, changes in French society had undermined these traditional relationships. This evolution was in part driven by economic factors. The general trend of the French population benefitting from a growing economy from the 1960s to the 1980s had already reduced the difference in living conditions between the middle and working classes. The number of jobs in industry had declined between the 1980s and 2012, and more working-class people now found employment in the service sector. The reduction in mass factory employment weakened the power of workers to organise, along with the ability of parties to appeal to them as a single group. As a result, among the working class, identity became fractured and attitudes more individualist. The class divide was also undermined by the problems faced by certain sections of the middle class. Following the end of the Trente Glorieuses, over a number of years, wages stagnated and living standards declined. In

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this context, the economic gap between part of the middle class and the working class narrowed, and further disturbed traditional conceptions of class divisions. However the changes were not solely linked to economic factors. In cultural terms, there was a blurring of aspects of the workingclass and middle-class identities. As Guilluy (2010) has noted, sections of the working class who had fallen down the social ladder continued to identify as middle class so as to distinguish themselves from those who lived in the banlieues. The effect of economic and social change was exacerbated by the strategies of parties of the Centre Left and Centre Right, which adapted to win over the support of the expanding middle class. In the 1980s, the Parti Socialiste moved closer to the Centre, with the adoption of more liberal economic policies. From the 1990s, the Centre Right embraced more liberal social policies, again reducing the gap between the established parties of government on both Left and Right. While this produced a greater sense of political stability, as changes of government were not followed by major shifts in policy, it left significant sections of society feeling unrepresented, many of whom turned to the radical parties of Left and Right. The crises that emerged after 2008—both the economic recession, and later the migrant crisis—further weakened confidence in the traditional parties that had alternated in power since 1981. The inability of the Sarkozy government to respond effectively to the economic crisis further undermined the political system, and favoured the rise of the radical parties that criticised neoliberal capitalism. The emergence of the refugee crisis, and the rise in terrorist incidents, heightened fears that France and its identity was under threat, and increased calls for a tougher approach to immigration and to the integration of migrants. The perceived failure of successive governments to address these questions caused sections of the electorate to turn to the FN. In seeking to explain the decline in public confidence in politicians, analysts have emphasised the importance of economic globalisation. This certainly played a role, as manufacturing jobs been shifted to countries where wages and production costs were lower, while services were concentrated in the major cities. Small former industrial towns found themselves isolated from areas of high employment, and with few amenities for their population. The inhabitants of such towns felt abandoned by traditional politicians and political institutions.

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Yet while economic factors were important, the key explanation for the weakening of the traditional party system was the change in attitudes among the electorate. Traditional group identities were undermined. This extended to the relationship to both political parties and trade unions, membership of which declined, partly because citizens adopted a more individualist approach to political activity. The problem was not just that there seemed to be no significant ideological differences between the established parties of government, but there was also the feeling that there was a growing gap between the parties (which seemed to be part of a separate social, political and economic elite) and the electorate they no longer seemed to represent. As Bouvet (2012) has shown, working-class voters did not recognise themselves in the more liberal social values and economic policies promoted by both the Centre Left and Centre Right. It is therefore clear that even prior to the election of François Hollande in 2012, the traditional alignment of the French party system had been fundamentally weakened. The rise of a more individualist approach meant that voters became more preoccupied with specific issues which they prioritised such as unemployment, terrorism and border control, rather than with allegiance to a particular vision incarnated by traditional party ideologies. As large sections of the electorate became more likely to shift their allegiance from one election to the next, the arrangement of political parties that had been established under the Fifth Republic came under significant strain. The crises from 2008 brought three concerns to the fore: identity, economic liberalism and Europe. These became the axes that structured the French party system during the Hollande presidency. Each one represented a collection of wider issues, with both social and economic elements. The complexity of the interaction between these axes made traditional party policymaking more difficult, and in several areas the political differences between the PS and Les Républicains were greatly diminished. We shall now consider in more detail the effects that the political realignment had on the Centre Right.

Note 1. Although the Parti Socialiste would only gain power in 1981, the Left/Right divide still structured political competition, such as when de Gaulle faced Mitterrand in the second round of presidential elections of

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1965, and in the 1974 and 1981 presidential elections, where the run-off was between Mitterrand and Giscard d’Estaing.

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CHAPTER 3

Parties, Party Systems and the Electorate

Introduction We have seen in the previous chapter how, by 2012, political and sociological changes in France had already undermined the established arrangement of the party system based on an opposition between Left and Right by 2012. Before looking in detail at the issues that were particular factors of division during the Hollande presidency, we must first consider some of the theory regarding party systems and political realignments, that will provide an analytical framework for the discussion in later chapters. In this chapter, we follow Ware (1995, 7), who defines a party system as ‘patterns of competition and cooperation between the different parties in that system’. Knapp and Wright (2006, 252) expand on this, arguing that: A party system in any democratic state consists of three sets of relationships. The first of these concerns the parties themselves. How many parties are there? Are there extreme parties of Right and Left, or is the ideological distance between the various parties small? And is there a pattern of alliances between parties? Secondly, a party system is shaped by the relations between parties and society – by levels of membership, by public attitudes towards parties, but above all by levels of electoral support. A third aspect is the relationship of parties to government. Which party or parties govern? Do they do so alone or in coalition? And is there © The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_3

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regular alternation in power, or does a single party or coalition monopolise governmental office over an extended period?

This chapter will focus particularly on the relationship between parties and society; the ‘ideological distance between parties’ and the relationship of parties both to government, and to the extremes will be covered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, where we analyse the policy debates that occurred within Les Républicains. In the case of the Fifth Republic, the constitution and the political institutions played a major role in shaping competition between parties. The presidency was made a central part of the new regime in 1958, but its influence was greatly extended by the reforms of 1962 and 2000. The first of these established that the president would be elected by universal suffrage. The second reduced the presidential term of office from seven to five years, and provided that henceforth the presidential and legislative elections would be held in the same year, with the head of state being chosen before the composition of the new parliament would be decided. In addition to being shaped by the French political institutions, the realignment of the party system that occurred during the Hollande presidency would also be driven by significant changes in the relationship of voters to politics. As we shall see in this chapter, a major feature that undermined the long-standing arrangement of parties was the decline in the allegiance of large sections of the electorate to the traditional ideologies of Left and Right. Voters became more likely to pick and choose policies and candidates from across the political spectrum. This change in attitudes was a significant shift, and not merely a short-term anomaly. In order to demonstrate the extent of this evolution, we will compare the situation during the Hollande presidency, and particularly the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, to those in the 2002 electoral period, and to 2007, when commentators such as Grunberg and Haegel (2007), argue that the party system was bipolar, and becoming increasingly bipartisan. This chapter will therefore explain the dynamics that led to the realignment of the party system during the Hollande presidency. These would play an essential role in enabling the election of Macron as president, and would also determine the fortunes of the Centre Right—which we will analyse in detail in the following chapters.

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The Impact of the Fifth Republic’s Institutions on the French Party System In order to understand the French party system, we must consider the political institutions (particularly the figure of the president), which play a major part in determining the interactions between parties. The central role occupied by the head of state has been at the heart of interpretations of the constitution of the Fifth Republic since its application in 1958, and have been reinforced by the way in which each incumbent has exercised power and by a series of constitutional reforms. As Berstein (1989, 18) notes, the greater importance of the presidency in the Fifth Republic, compared to previous French regimes is suggested by the way in which the role is presented in the constitution, in which it is the second heading after that on sovereignty, rather than sixth, as had been the case in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. The position of president was reinforced by the granting of powers that had not been available under the Third and Fourth Republics. As Berstein (1989, 19) points out, the head of state could now call referenda on laws that dealt with the organisation of public authorities, and dissolve the National Assembly, following discussions with the prime minister and the presidents of the two chambers. The president also was to be granted exceptional powers when: the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, its territorial integrity or the execution of its international engagements were directly threatened in a serious way and the normal functioning of the constitutional public authorities was interrupted. (Conseil-constitutionel.fr n.d.)

However, the influence of the president in the Fifth Republic is not predominantly due to the powers the head of state is granted by the constitution. As Berstein (1989, 19) states: even if it is expressed with greater emphasis, the definition of the role differs little from the tradition of the Third and Fourth Republics: guarantor of the continuity of the State, of national independence and of territorial integrity, the president makes sure that the constitution is respected, and ensures, through their arbitration, that the public authorities function correctly.

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This ambiguity concerning the powers of the president has been noted on many occasions. Writing in 1958, Jean Rivero, a law professor at Paris, argued that, according to one reading of the constitution, the head of state was a passive symbol like his predecessors of the Third and Fourth Republics, during normal times, but acted, during more troubled periods, like a ‘lifeboat that is brought out of its shed when the force of the waves threatens to wash everything away’ (Rivero 1958, 263). However, he also recognised that there was another possible interpretation that gave more political control to the head of state in relation to the National Assembly, according to which ‘the prime minister will be the figure necessary to execute the policies of the president’ (264). This led him to conclude: The Constitution of 1958, the main lines of which are broadly defined, is the reflection of complimentary but opposing aspirations regarding the effective exercise of power and respect for the republican tradition. It has the potential, more than any other perhaps, to give birth to a number of possible regimes. Men will decide its destiny. (Rivero, 264).

Those writing later have also argued that the constitution is particularly unclear, when it comes to deciding whether power should lie primarily with the parliament or with the president. For Ardant (1987, 47): In truth, the Constitution of 1958 created a dyarchy, and in this dyarchy, if the government does not have the nobler role, it is the one that actually exercises power […] From this emerges a conception of the role of president according to which the head of state is in charge of several key areas in which, moreover, he does not possess discretionary power. He is a classic head of a parliamentary state who cannot, as a result, seriously challenge the action of the government.

Duhamel (2008, 38) supports this view, arguing that ‘we only possess a partial constitution, in that it does not really determine who [out of the president or the prime minister] is in charge of conducting the affairs of the country’. As Gaffney (2015, 44) has observed, rather than the constitution itself, it was de Gaulle’s interpretation of his role that ensured that the Fifth Republic would be predominantly a presidential regime, and the manner in which he exercised power set public expectations for the way in which his successors ought to behave. De Gaulle believed that the head of state

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should be ‘placed above parties’ (de Gaulle 1946), and he readily used the special powers allotted to him by the constitution to determine foreign and defence policy, which the Gaullist député Chaban-Delmas in 1959 described as the ‘reserved domain’ (Knapp and Wright 2006 60). Here again, de Gaulle’s own interpretation of his role was decisive, as, in the words of Knapp and Wright (2006, 60) ‘[d]evoid of any official place in the texts, the domaine réservé has still acquired quasi-constitutional status as a shorthand for foreign and defence concerns at the heart of the president’s policymaking role’. The General himself defined the position of president in a press conference on 31 January 1964, when he stated that: The president is the man who incarnates the nation, who is chosen by her to safeguard her destiny, the president is the one who appoints the government, and in particular the prime minister, and who can dismiss him, when he feels that the task he was appointed to achieve is complete, or were he to find that they were no longer able to work together. The president determines the decisions taken in the councils, promulgates laws and negotiates and signs treaties, who decides whether or not to validate the measures proposed to him, who is the head of the armed forces, who appoints people to public jobs, I am reciting the constitution to you. In times of danger, the president must take it upon himself to do everything necessary, the president is naturally the only one to hold the authority of the state.

In many cases, the role that de Gaulle performed was much more active than a strict interpretation of the constitution might suggest. For Ardant (1987 52), ‘all the presidents of the Fifth Republic have in fact violated the Constitution’, focusing on what they can achieve in light of the balance of power between political factions, and, rather than seeking to limit their powers, have sought to increase them. The role of president has been reinforced since 1958 by a series of reforms. In 1962, the public voted in a referendum in favour of the proposal that the head of state should be elected by universal suffrage. As Berstein (1989 114) argues, this amendment was decisive in overcoming the lack of clarity in the constitution, and determining that the new regime would be a presidential one, as de Gaulle had envisaged, and not a parliamentary one, as the dominant parties of the Fourth Republic had intended. As the only political figure to be elected in a contest

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involving all eligible voters, the president now enjoyed greater prestige and legitimacy than any other politician in France. The president’s power was further strengthened in 2000 by the decision to reduce the presidential term from seven years to five, aligning the calendar of the presidential elections with that of the National Assembly, coupled with the decision that, from 2002 onwards, the president would be elected before the parliament. This was in fact exactly what Chirac, who promoted the law, intended, and Levy and Skach (2008, 121) note that ‘the most important reason for the quinquennat reform was […] to bolster the power of the president’. As voters wish to give the new head of state a mandate to govern, the parliamentary elections are heavily determined by the outcome of the presidential elections. Any party that wants to win power therefore needs to find a candidate capable of gaining the presidency, making the question of leadership even more decisive. This is likely to remain the case, as long as the Fifth Republic lasts, as, even were the president to die in office, the successor could use the power to dissolve the Assembly, granted by the constitution, in order to gain a majority to govern, thus preserving the order of presidential and parliamentary elections. In the words of Knapp and Wright, now ‘the return of cohabitation is technically possible but politically improbable’ (2006, 63), and as the parliamentary majority is generally from the president’s party, it serves him, rather than challenging him, as had had happened during periods of cohabitation. Furthermore, as Grunberg and Haegel (2007, 21) have argued, the introduction of the quinquennat has given the president greater control over the parliament, as the order of the elections has increased his power over the party he represents, since a significant number of députés know that they owe their election in part to the victory of their party’s presidential candidate. De Gaulle’s vision of a strong president, directing the affairs of state has been influential because it became accepted across the political spectrum. Although the Socialist, François Mitterrand, attacked the Fifth Republic, and particularly its strong presidency, as a ‘permanent coup d’Etat’ in 1964 (Mitterrand 1964), following his victory in the 1981 presidential elections, he stated ‘The institutions were not made by me, but they are well made for me’ (elysée.fr). Most of the presidents since de Gaulle have sought to be strong figures, and, as we shall see in Chapter 7, Hollande’s attempt to be a ‘normal president’ would be a key reason for his unpopularity.

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The detailed examination of the presidency of the Fifth Republic is important because, as we shall see in Chapter 7, this institution would play a major role in the political realignment between 2012 and 2017. Before the Hollande presidency, the French party system was arranged in a bipolar fashion, and the second round of the presidential elections generally saw a contest between representatives of the Left and the Right. Even in 1969 and 2002, when the candidate of the Left was not present in the run-off, the contest was won by the representative of the Right, rather than by the candidate who was not from the established parties of government. This dominance was also seen in parliament, where, from 1981, governments of the Centre Left and Centre Right alternated in power. The defeat of the candidates of both the PS and Les Républicains in 2017 was therefore unprecedented in the history of the Fifth Republic, and was facilitated by the fact that the presidential elections are a contest between different political figures as much as a choice between parties. Three of the four candidates that received the largest number of votes in the first round of the presidential elections of 2017 were figures who were more popular and influential than the party they represented (Macron, Le Pen and Mélenchon). In the case of Macron, rather than being chosen by a party as its candidate, he had only created his own movement, En Marche, in April 2016. His party was dependent on him for its success because many of its candidates were unknown to the public, and so would have struggled without the impetus provided by the election of their party’s candidate as president. The quinquennat reform was arguably a decisive element in his success, as, if the legislative elections had been held first, it is unlikely that En Marche would have gained a majority in the National Assembly, and therefore equally unlikely that Macron would have been elected president. As we have seen, the presidency is a feature that has long had a decisive impact in shaping competition between parties under the Fifth Republic, and was particularly important in deciding the evolutions that occurred between 2012 and 2017. Given the institutional structure of the republic and the role of the president within that structure, the second major feature that we must consider is the political realignment that occurred during the Hollande presidency.

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Theoretical Approaches to Party System Realignments In Comprendre les évolutions électorales, Martin (2000, 15) offers a definition of a political realignment, stating: An electoral realignment is characterised by a sudden, major and enduring change in electoral equilibria. But it is not just electoral equilibria that are affected, but also the party system, the functioning of the political system, public policies and the relationship between the political elite and the electorate.

He adds that whether a realignment occurs depends on how great the challenge to the party system is, and whether the latter is able to resist, arguing that: A weakened party system, where voters’ allegiances to particular parties have been undermined, where the legitimacy of political elites is particularly contested, and where the ability of politicians to take action has been reduced will be more likely to undergo a realignment, when one or more events happen that destabilise the system. (Martin 2000, 15)

In considering the nature of such events, it is helpful to consider the work of Sundquist (1973, 26–36), who outlines five factors that are favourable to a realignment. These are summarised by Martin (2000, 53) as follows: 1. When a new issue or group of issues, important to a large section of the electorate, creates a deep and enduring split, to which voters expect the government to respond, and provides a clear moral divide. 2. When the new issue, or group of issues creates irreconcilable divisions between parties. 3. When challenges by alternative leaders seeking to exploit the situation make a realignment more likely. 4. When the issue or group of issues creates divisions within the main parties. 5. Where traditional alliances and voter allegiances that have already been weakened, these are most likely to be undermined by the new issue or group of issues.

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We can see each of these factors represented in the political situation in France between 2012 and 2017. The deep splits emerged over the issues of identity, economic liberalism and Europe, which were not new but assumed a new importance. For each of these axes, it was clear that the government had an important role to play. As we have seen in the previous chapter, voters looked to the government and to the European Union to respond to the economic recession and the migrant crisis, and the failure to do so effectively undermined public confidence in these institutions. In each case, as we shall see later in this book, what was being contested was not just differing opinions concerning which policies would be most effective, but visions and principles surrounding the national community, the role of the state in shaping the economy, and France’s position in Europe, to all of which voters were particularly emotionally attached. All three issues of ‘identity’, ‘liberal economic policy’ and ‘Europe’ satisfy Sundquist’s criterion of producing divisions between parties, and we shall analyse these in greater detail in the following chapters. Identity came close to preserving the Left/Right divide, as the FN and many in Les Républicains favoured a traditional policy of assimilation, and emphasised France’s Christian heritage, while those on the Left of the PS, and supporters of La France Insoumise had a more open vision of France and French identity, that celebrated difference and diversity. In between these two positions, there was a group, that included PS members close to Valls, and many of those on the Right who chose to support Juppé in the primary of 2016. In terms of economic policy, as we shall see, Les Républicains were particularly liberal, and the Right of the PS, while not going as far as the Centre Right, also favoured policies that gave a greater role to private enterprise. In contrast, the FN, La France Insoumise and the Left of the PS wanted to increase state intervention. On the issue of Europe, the Hollande government and Centre Right wanted to develop its role, whereas La France Insoumise and the FN wanted to reduce its power. As regards the third factor identified by Sundquist, voters’ confidence in political leaders was already low by 2012 and would continue to decline during the Hollande presidency. We have already seen that Sarkozy was a particularly unpopular president, due both to his policies and his personality. His policies failed to reduce unemployment, and

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his hard-line approach to identity alienated many Centrists. His personality was judged too confrontational, and unpresidential, and tarnished by a large number of political scandals. As shall be considered in detail in Chapter 7, the two factors of policy and presidential persona also explain why his successor, Hollande, was even less popular, and so unable to restore voters’ trust in the political system. In light of the struggles of the government, alternative leaders, including Le Pen and Mélenchon, attracted growing support from those disillusioned with the established parties of government. All three axes of identity, economic liberalism and Europe would cause important divisions to develop within political parties. Mack (2010, 264) has argued that voters are more likely to abandon their traditional allegiances over issues that ‘affect their fundamental conception of the country’s national identity’. As we shall see in Chapter 4, identity was the most important of the three structuring axes in determining the fortunes of Les Républicains. Not only did it divide party members, encouraging supporters of Juppé to turn to Macron following the Mayor of Bordeaux’s defeat in the primary. It also separated Fillon’s core electorate in the 2017 presidential elections from potential allies within the Independent Centre parties. While less significant, the axis of Europe would provoke significant conflict between supporters of Les Républicains—a feature that Macron was able to exploit with his positive vision of European integration. While there was greater consensus on the Centre Right over the need for more economic liberalism, economic policy would be particularly divisive within the PS, with many of its supporters who wanted a greater role for private enterprise choosing Macron in 2017—the effects of which we shall discuss in chapter 5. As we have seen already, traditional links between sections of the electorate, and the parties they had long supported had come under increasing strain before 2012. The expansion of the middle classes encouraged the Centre Left and Centre Right to target the same sections of the electorate, leaving many of those in the blue-collar working class feeling abandoned. A significant number turned to the FN and La France Insoumise, both of whom appealed to voters who held concerns relating to the economic crisis and to Europe. It is therefore clear that all the criteria that Sundquist identifies as factors that undermine a party system were present during the Hollande

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presidency. One major feature, linked to the undermining of longstanding allegiances between sections of the electorate and particular political movements was that many voters were wary of the ideologies that underpinned the arrangement of parties according to a Left/Right divide. The emergence of more volatile voting behaviour would be an important factor that would weaken the Centre Right and aid the election of Macron.

The Decline in Allegiance to Traditional Ideologies A key factor that undermined the Left/Right divide and drove the political realignment was that much of the electorate has become less attached to traditional ideologies, and now adopts a more individualised approach to political activity. This is not to say that ideologies have ceased to exist, but rather that voters identify less readily with traditional allencompassing visions, and instead prefer to pick and choose policies from across the political spectrum. This can be observed in several different political and societal evolutions. We have considered the fall of the Communist Party in Chapter 2, and a similar decline can also be seen in the membership of the established parties of government. In 1980, the RPR had 500,000 members, but in 2016, its equivalent, Les Républicains had only 238,208 members. In the PS, there were 196,500 members in May 1981, but only 86,171 in January 2016 (Le Parisien 2016). Nor was this decline in the number of people adhering to a defined worldview solely linked to political ideologies. A similar phenomenon could also be observed in other areas such as the fall in the number of practising Catholics in France. Whereas 87% of French people declared themselves to be Catholics in 1972, this number had fallen to 65% by 2010, and the proportion of the French population attending Mass at least once a month had fallen from 20% in 1972 to 4.5% in 2010 (AFP 2016). Arguably, as Giddens (1994, 7) suggests, in modern society, individuals have access to a much greater range of information than before, and prefer to refer to this, rather than to depend on traditional ideological systems, to guide their political choices. This decline in identification with ideologies as a block was also recognised by Manuel Valls, who once argued that the name ‘Parti Socialiste’ should be dropped, as its ideological connotations were no longer

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reflected in the policies pursued by the party. He stated, ‘Parti socialiste is an outdated term. It no longer means anything. Socialism was a wonderful idea, a splendid utopia. But it was a utopia invented against 19th Century capitalism !’ (Chaffanjan 2014) He therefore accepted that PS had ceased to be socialist in traditional terms, and instead sought to manage capitalism in a particular fashion. Most voters today select their values from a range of different traditions, and support the candidate whom they feel best represents their views, rather than according to the party he or she represents. As Finchelstein (2016, 84) notes: More educated, more individualist and more sceptical than in the past, citizens now choose the elections that they participate in and are less and less likely to vote for the same party from one election to another: they behave like consumers in the electoral market. Each and every one constructs his or her own ideology and feels naturally on the Left on one issue and on the Right on another.

This analysis is supported by Garrigues (2018), who claims that: We have become a society of consumers who treat the political class as though it were an object with built-in obsolescence. Voters no longer believe in ideologies, they consume and reject their elected representatives, including the president of the Republic.

While defined ideologies continue to exist, insufficient numbers of voters are influenced by them to make them decisive in electoral terms. As Perrineau (2012, 26) states: The citizen-individual constructs his political choices more and more according to his personal situation and the interaction that develops between himself and a constantly changing political scene. The great ideological references, that used to constitute the many backdrops against which individuals decided their political outlook still exist, but they no longer have the same force or hold on society.

This could be seen in both the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, where in each case the candidate who was elected, to a large extent, as a rejection of the other candidates rather than because he represented a

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particular ideology (see Cole et al. 2013; Gaffney 2012; Perrineau 2016; Biseau 2017). While in some cases there were similar dynamics in both the 2012 and 2017 elections, which both saw a fall in allegiance to traditional ideologies, loyalty to defined visions was even weaker in the latter case. In the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, 52% of all voters had struggled to decide whom to vote for, and those who changed their mind during the campaign often transferred their support between candidates who were close to each other on the Left/Right divide. Among Hollande voters, 35% had considered voting for Mélenchon, and 15% for Bayrou, while of those who chose Mélenchon, 31% had thought of supporting Hollande, and 5% Bayrou (Ifop-Fiducial 2012, 13). On the Centre Right, 17% of Sarkozy voters had considered supporting Bayrou, and 20% Le Pen (Ifop-Fiducial 2012, 13). In contrast, before the first round of the 2017 presidential elections, the number of voters who hesitated over whom to vote for was higher at 60% (Brochet 2017, 173). In 2017, significant sections of the electorate struggled to decide between candidates who offered radically different programmes. 21% of those who voted for Mélenchon, who campaigned for greater state intervention in the economy, had been tempted to vote for Macron, who argued for many liberal economic measures (Brochet 2017, 174). The same percentage of Macron voters had considered supporting Mélenchon (Brochet 2017, 174). Were allegiance to traditional ideologies to have persisted, one would have expected many fewer to switch their vote between candidates promoting incompatible policies. In the light of such evidence, we can therefore agree with Brochet (2017, 171) that: ‘the digital voter choses his values in the same way as he chooses his tribes on the Internet. He picks them here and there, according to his own personal logic. He does not seek to follow a coherent approach defined by an ideology or a school of thought – he is the one who provides the coherence’. The argument that people no longer identify strongly with traditional parties and the world views that they represent is also supported by the high number of voters who declined to participate in the presidential and legislative elections in 2017. In the first round of the presidential elections, the abstention rate stood at 22.23% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017a), which was above those recorded for 2012 and 2007 (20.52% and 16.23% respectively) (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2007, 2012).

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In addition to the 2012 presidential and legislative elections, other useful points of comparison, that show the evolution of voters’ attitudes to traditional parties and ideologies, are the presidential and legislative elections of 2002 and 2007. The first saw the candidates of one of the two traditional parties of government fail to reach the second round. However, in 2002 the elimination of the PS candidate, Lionel Jospin, was an accident rather than evidence of the disappearance of the bipolar division. Many voters on the Left failed to support him in the first round simply because they felt that he was certain to be present in the second (Gaffney 2004; Ysmal 2004). However, during the Hollande presidency, polls had long predicted that the PS representative would be defeated in the first round of the presidential elections, and by March, it seemed likely that Fillon would suffer the same fate. That the candidates of the Centre Left and Centre Right should both be eliminated in the first round, and that this event had been foreseen as a possible outcome prior to the election, demonstrated the loss of confidence in traditional parties. A comparison of the results of the legislative elections in 2002 and 2017 confirms this view. The Left/Right split survived Jospin’s elimination from the presidential elections on 21 April 2002, and Ysmal (2004, 57) notes that the ‘legislative elections were characterised by a re-bipolarisation of the party system around the classic left/right distinction’. Furthermore, when compared with the presidential elections ‘[t]he abstention rate fell from 27 per cent to 20 per cent. All those who had been on holiday, or had ignored the campaign, or else had decided to teach the left a lesson by just waiting for round two to vote begrudgingly for Jospin, seemed to deeply regret their apathy’ (2004, 70). This no longer applied in 2017, when the desire to defend the parties of Centre Left and Centre Right that had long dominated the Fifth Republic no longer prevailed in 2017 had become seriously weakened, as shown by the fact that abstention in the legislative elections was over 30% higher than in the presidential elections, at 51.30% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017b). It was the collapse of the bipolarised approach that gave an absolute majority to En Marche. The profound nature of the bipolar arrangement was confirmed in 2007 by commentators such as Grunberg and Haegel (2007), who drew attention to the fact that it had become increasingly bipartisan, dominated by the PS on the Left and the UMP on the Right. The radical change in the structure of the party system is therefore highlighted by the fact that,

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in 2017, Fillon of Les Républicains and Hamon of the PS were both eliminated in the first round, whereas in 2007 the candidates of the Centre Left and Centre Right were both present in the second round. Yet more significant changes could be seen in the strategies that parties adopted. Whereas 2007 had highlighted the importance of political parties to presidential strategy, in 2017 much more attention was paid to political figures. In 2007, Grunberg and Haegel (2007, 27) noted that all presidents of the Fifth Republic, and all candidates present in the second round run-off (apart from Poher in 1969), had received the support of a party represented in the National Assembly. The candidate who was elected president in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, had won the leadership of his own party in 2004, as part of his strategy to ensure that he was chosen to represent the UMP in the next presidential elections. As Charaudeau (2008 12) notes ‘Nicolas Sarkozy’s aim was to gain control over the membership and finances of the UMP, just as Mitterrand had done over 10 years with the PS’. During the Hollande presidency, Sarkozy tried to repeat the same approach, and when he returned to politics in 2014, he achieved re-election as leader of the UMP. However, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 7, this strategy would prove unsuccessful, due to the results of the decision that had already been taken that the presidential candidate of the Centre Right for 2017 would be chosen through a primary open to party supporters, and not just members. This measure was implemented as the party understood that loyalty to the established parties of government was weaker than in the past and faced an increasing challenge from the extremes. In such a context, candidates could not wait until the second round of the presidential elections to broaden their appeal but had to build a wide coalition of supporters before the first round. The effect of taking the power to nominate a presidential candidate away from party elites and members, and giving it to the wider category of supporters, was that Sarkozy’s strategy of seeking control over the party failed to prevent him from being eliminated in the first round of the primary. The election of Emmanuel Macron as president provides further evidence of the transformation of the relationship between voters and parties. Rather than representing a political party with a particular ideology, he created a vehicle to support his personal campaign, the name of which came from his own initials. En Marche, founded in April 2016, as a movement rather than a party, which cost nothing to join, and only required that those who wanted to do so provide an e-mail address. Rather than uniting to formulate an agenda to present to the

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electorate, once he had announced the creation of En Marche, Macron and his supporters spent time gathering data on voters’ opinions. He did not release a full programme until March 2017, but his movement shared information on what he had said about various issues. This was a complete reversal of the usual relationship between party, policy and the electorate.

Conclusion In the previous chapter, we saw how political and sociological changes undermined the established structure of the French party system. In addition to these developments, political evolutions during the Hollande presidency were also influenced by the political institutions of the Fifth Republic, and changes in the relationship between the electorate and political engagement. The institutions of the Fifth Republic have played an important role in determining the way in which competition and cooperation between parties occurs since the creation of the regime in 1958. Most important has been the emphasis that has been placed on the figure of the president. In part, the head of state’s influence derives from the constitution, where the position is more prominent than in the texts of previous regimes, and is granted several new powers. However, more significant has been the influence of de Gaulle’s actions between 1958 and 1969, as a strong figure, with special powers in the realms of foreign and defence policy, which set public expectations regarding presidential performance. The role of the president has been reinforced by several constitutional reforms. The 1962 referendum provided that the head of state should be elected by universal suffrage. This ensured that incumbents would have greater legitimacy than any other political figure, being the only one to have been chosen in a contest in which all eligible voters could participate. The 2000 quinquennat reform further increased the president’s power. By reducing the term in office from seven to five years, and holding presidential elections before those for the National Assembly, the choice of president would determine which party would win the legislative elections, and reduce the likelihood of periods of cohabitation. It also increased his power over his party, as a significant number of députés were aware that they owed their position to the success of their presidential candidate. Before 2017, these institutions operated within a bipolar system. Although the Left did not come to power until 1981, the second round

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of every presidential election, apart from those of 1969 and 2002, had always been a contest between a candidate of the Left and one of the Right. The bipolar nature was reinforced by Mitterrand’s victory in 1981. From this point on, Left and Right alternated in power. By 2007, as Haegel and Grunberg note, the system seemed not only bipolar, but also becoming bipartisan, dominated the PS on the Centre Left and the UMP on the Right. This would be challenged in 2012, when Marine Le Pen of the FN, a party that combined a statist economic policy closer to those parties on the Left with a hard-line approach to immigration which went further than the Centre Right, received 17.9% of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections. The presidential elections of 2017 marked a further stage in the breakdown of the bipolar system. The representatives of both the established parties of government were eliminated in the first round. The second round saw a contest between Marine Le Pen of the FN, and Emmanuel Macron, who had created his own movement, En Marche, claiming to be ‘neither of the Left, nor of the Right’. That he was able to do so was in part due to the institutions of the Fifth Republic that favour strong leaders over political parties. The institutions played a major role in enabling the success of Macron and En Marche in the 2017 presidential and legislative elections. As the president was chosen before the composition of the National Assembly was decided, Macron was able to come to power by exploiting his personal popularity, despite not having a well-established party. Once elected president, the impetus that he and his movement gained, and the desire to avoid cohabitation, ensured that En Marche received a majority in the National Assembly, despite the fact that many of the party’s candidates were unknown to the general public. In addition to the institutions, another major factor that drove the evolution of the political system was that large sections of the electorate no longer identified with traditional ideologies of Left and Right. Voting habits had become more volatile, as more and more citizens selected their values from across the political spectrum, rather than choosing to follow a ready-defined vision. The relationship of political movements to each other became defined by questions relating to three axes: identity, liberal economic policy and Europe. These would not only distinguish parties from one another, but would also produce significant divisions within the traditional parties of government.

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Having lost faith in parties, many voters became more attached to political leaders, and the emphasis that the Fifth Republic’s institutions put on the presidency meant that Macron, Le Pen and Mélenchon, all of whom were more popular than their parties, were able to gain significant support, and mount a serious challenge to the Centre Left and Centre Right. The changes affected both the established parties of government. The problems faced by the PS were obvious throughout the Hollande presidency, and it had long been predicted that the party’s presidential candidate, whoever it might be, would be eliminated in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. It had been presumed that Les Républicains would benefit from this situation, but as we shall now see, problems, related to policy and leadership, created by the realignment of the French party system were present within the Centre Right, and would lead to its defeat and disintegration in 2017.

References AFP. 2016. L’Eglise catholique de France en chiffres. L’Obs, July 26. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20160726.AFP2844/l-eglisecatholique-de-france-en-chiffres.html. Accessed 6 September 2017. Ardant, Philippe. 1987. L’article 5 et la fonction présidentielle. Pouvoirs 41: 37–62. Berstein, Serge. 1989. La France de l’expansion: 1. La République gaullienne (1958–1962). Paris: Seuil. Biseau, Grégoire. 2017. La France de Macron, un vote par défaut. Libération, April 25. http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2017/04/25/la-francede-macron-un-vote-par-defaut_1565365. Accessed 21 September 2017. Brochet, Francis. 2017. Démocratie smartphone: Le populisme numérique de Trump à Macron. Paris: Editions François Bourin. Chaffanjan, Charlotte. 2014. L’heure de gloire de Manuel Valls. Le Point. March 31. http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/remaniement-l-heure-de-gloire-de-man uel-valls-31-03-2014-1807701_20.php. Accessed 25 July 2015. Charaudeau, Patrick. 2008. Entre populisme et peopolisme: Comment Sarkozy a gagné!. Paris: Vuibert. Cole, Alistair, and Sophie Meunier, Vincent Tiberj. 2013. From Sarkozy to Hollande: The New Normal? In Developments in French Politics Five, ed. Alistair Cole, Sophie Meunier, Vincent Tiberj, 1–18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Conseil-constitutionel.fr. Texte intégral de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 en vigueur. https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/le-bloc-de-constitutionnal

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ite/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur. Accessed 15 November 2020. de Gaulle, Charles. 1946. Discours de Bayeux. charles-de-gaulle.org. http:// www.charles-de-gaulle.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Discours-de-Bay eux-16-juin-1946.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2020. Duhamel, Alain. 2008. Le quinquennat. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. ELABE. 2016. Baromètre ELABE pour Les Echos et Radio Classique. Data Collected Online Between 2–3 August 2016 from a Sample of 1000 People Representative of the French Population Aged 18 and Over. August 4. https://elabe.fr/barometre-politique-aout-2016/. Accessed 28 April 2020. ELABE. 2017. Les Français et l’image des candidats à l’élection présidentielle: Sondage ELABE pour BFMTV. Data Collected Online Between 11–12 April 2017 from a Sample of 1010 People Representative of the French Population Aged 18 and Over. April 12. https://elabe.fr/limage-candidats-a-lelectionpresidentielle/. Accessed 28 April 2020. elysée.fr. Interview accordée par M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République au journal “Le Monde” notamment sur les institutions, le projet de loi sur la décentralisation, l’entrée des ministres communistes au gouvernement, les relations franco-américaines, Paris, Palais de l’Elysée, Jeudi 2 juillet 1981. https://www.elysee.fr/francois-mitterrand/1981/07/02/int erview-accordee-par-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-au-jou rnal-le-monde-notamment-sur-les-institutions-le-projet-de-loi-sur-la-decentral isation-lentree-des-ministres-communistes-au-gouvernement-les-relations-fra nco-americain. Accessed 21 November 2020. Finchelstein, Gilles. 2016. Piège d’identité: Réflexions (inquiètes) sur la gauche, la droite et la démocratie. Paris: Fayard. Gaffney, John. 2004. The 2002 Elections in Institutional and Comparative Perspective. In The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002, ed. John Gaffney, 1–15. Aldershot: Ashgate. Gaffney, John. 2012. Leadership and Style in the French Fifth Republic: Nicolas Sarkozy’s Presidency in Historical and Cultural Perspective. French Politics 10 (4): 345–363. Gaffney, John. 2015. France in the Hollande Presidency. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Garrigues, Jean, interview with Henri Vernet. 2018. Crise à l’Elysée: « Le quinquennat est une grossière erreur, Le Parisien, October 7. http://www. leparisien.fr/politique/crise-a-l-elysee-le-quinquennat-est-une-grossiere-err eur-07-10-2018-7912854.php. Accessed 7 October 2018. Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Grunberg, Gérard, and Florence Haegel. 2007. La France vers le bipartisme? La présidentialisation du PS et de l’UMP. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

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Ifop-Fiducial. 2017. Le profil des électeurs et les clefs du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle: 23 avril 2017 . Data Collected Online on 23 April 2017 Between 11am and 6 pm from a Sample of 3668 People Representative of the Population of Mainland France Aged 18 and Over. April 23. https://www. ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/3749-1-study_file.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2020. Ifop-Fiducial pour Le Monde, Paris Match et Public Sénat. 2012. Premier tour de l’élection présidentielle 2012: profil des électeurs et clés du scrutin: Sondage Jour de vote 22 avril 2012. Data Collected Online on 22 April 2012 from a Sample of 3509 People Representative of the French Population Aged 18 and Over Listed on the Electoral Roll. https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/upl oads/2018/03/1848-1-study_file.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2020. Knapp, Andrew, and Vincent Wright. 2006. The Government and Politics of France, 5th ed. Abingdon: Routledge. Le Parisien Service politique. 2016. Militantisme: les partis sont à l’agonie. Le Parisien, avril 23. http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/militantisme-les-partissont-a-l-agonie-23-04-2016-5739365.php. Accessed 11 September 2017. Levy, Jonah D., and Cindy Skach. 2008. The Return to a Strong Presidency. In Developments in French Politics 4, ed. Alistair Cole et al., 111–126. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mack, Charles S. 2010. When Political Parties Die: A Cross-National Analysis of Disalignment and Realignment. Santa Barbara: Praeger. Martin, Pierre. 2000. Comprendre les évolutions électorales: La théorie des réalignements revisitée. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2007. Résultats de l’élection présidentielle de 2007. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecre sult__presidentielle_2007/(path)/presidentielle_2007/FE.html. Accessed 22 October 2018. Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2012. Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2012. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecre sult__PR2012/(path)/PR2012/FE.html. Accessed 27 February 2018. Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2017a. Résultats de l’élection présidentielle de 2017. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecre sult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html. Accessed 3 June 2019. Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2017b. Résultats des élections législatives 2017. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Legislatives/elecre sult__legislatives-2017/(path)/legislatives-2017//FE.html. Accessed 22 October 2018. Mitterrand, François. 1964. Le Coup d’Etat permanent. Paris: Plon. Perrineau, Pascal. 2012. Le choix de Marianne: Pourquoi et pour qui votons-nous?. Paris: Fayard.

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Perrineau, Pascal. 2016. Introduction. In The 2012 French Election: How the Electorate Decided, ed. Pascal Perrineau, 1–8. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rivero, Jean. 1958. Regard sur les institutions de la Ve République. In Recueil Dalloz, 260–264. Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey. Sundquist, James L. 1973. Dynamics of the Party System. Washington: The Brookings Institution. Ware, Alan. 1995. Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ysmal, Colette. 2004. The Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002: An Analysis of the Results. In The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002, ed. John Gaffney, 57–82. Aldershot: Ashgate.

CHAPTER 4

Divisions Within the Centre Right over Identity: 2012–2017

Introduction In the previous chapters, we have considered how the traditional party system, based on a division between Left and Right, that had dominated relations between political movements under the Fifth Republic, had already been significantly undermined prior to the presidential elections of April–May 2012. In this chapter, and the two that follow, we will consider the policy areas in which political movements interacted with one another and with the electorate, and by which they can be seen as identifying their position within the party system, which we will call axes. Three of these would be central to the political realignment that occurred during the Hollande presidency—those of identity, liberal economic policy and Europe. The first axis that will be considered is that of identity, which will include debates pertaining to immigration and integration, as well as those concerning social values such as gay rights. These issues had been crucial in determining the fortunes of the French Centre Right before the Hollande presidency. As Bussi and Fourquet (2007), Hewlett (2007) and Mayer (2007) have shown, one of the reasons why Nicolas Sarkozy had been elected president in 2007 was because he successfully appealed to traditional FN voters with a hard-line approach to immigration and identity. However, his actions as president failed to convince many of them

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that he truly represented their position, and a significant number would support Marine Le Pen in 2012. Sarkozy’s defeat in the presidential elections would open a long period of debate and disagreement within Les Républicains, and identity would be at the heart of this. Drawing on the concept of cultural insecurity, developed by Bouvet (2015) and Guilluy (2010, 2014), and Goodhart’s (2017) analysis of divisions within contemporary Britain in the aftermath of the Brexit vote in 2016, we shall see how questions concerning the role of identity placed Les Républicains in such difficulty during the Hollande presidency. We will consider how the issues of whether immigrants should be integrated or assimilated, whether to support the spread of socially liberal values or defend traditional beliefs, and how to respond to terrorism, split the party into two camps—socially conservative Traditionalists and socially liberal Modernists. This divide would be exacerbated by accusations of elitism made by both sides, and therefore play a significant role in the failure of the party to return to power. Fillon’s victory in the primary in 2016 was in large part due to his ability to win the support of Traditionalists, who were in the majority among supporters of Les Républicains. However, his policies would fail to appeal to a wide range of voters among the general electorate, many of whom shared a more Modernist approach, and who turned to the more socially liberal Macron. Identity would therefore be a major reason for the defeat of Centre Right in the 2017 presidential elections.

Cultural Insecurity: A Key Divide in French Politics As Goodhart (2017) and Goodwin and Eatwell (2018) have noted, debate over identity has been seen to have had a decisive effect during the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump as US president in 2016. In his analysis of the 2019 UK General Election, Goodwin (2019) argues that: We are all now living through a partial realignment of our politics; a new cultural divide is gradually replacing the older ‘left versus right’ economic divide. Not only in Britain but across much of the West new questions about national identity, belonging, borders and security are crosscutting older debates about economic redistribution, and the relationship between the market and the state.

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France has been no exception to this trend. In his examination of the evolution of the term ‘cultural insecurity’, Ahearne (2017) notes that this concept originated in the Anglophone world, but due notably to the work of Christophe Guilluy (2010, 2015) and Laurent Bouvet (2015), has become a matter of debate in French politics since 2012. Guilluy seeks to use this concept as part of his analysis of the divide between, what he calls, ‘peripheral France’ and metropolitan centres; to describe the feelings of those left behind by the cultural effects of economic globalisation. Bouvet considers it to be a factor that helps explain the fall in support for the Left among working-class voters. Of the different types of cultural insecurity described by Ahearne, one is the ‘anthropological-political’ sense, which ‘refers to the anxieties produced by immigration, economic globalisation, and post-traditional values among populations which had hitherto been the core electorates of left-wing governing parties, but who were now being pulled into the orbit of far-right populist parties’ (Ahearne 2017; 268). Although this definition focuses on the interaction between the Left and the Far Right, we argue in this chapter that, during the Hollande presidency, the fears referred to by the term cultural insecurity affected a much broader part of the French electorate than solely the sections of the working classes that had historically supported the Left. Rather than being limited to the Left, cultural insecurity is an important phenomenon affecting the current French political system as a whole. Bouvet defines it as ‘the expression of a confused and multifaceted fear when faced with an environment that appears chaotic and unintelligible, but which is still a real feature of daily life’ (Bouvet 2015; 15). He pays particular attention to concerns among certain elements of the electorate that France is losing its national identity. Some of these fears relate to the impact of mass immigration, where some groups, particularly ‘those who call themselves “French of French birth” or “disadvantaged whites”’, feel that their way of life is threatened by the presence of both cultural differences that stem from immigration and also by the rise of a more visible presence of Islam. In addition to the effect of immigration, it is argued that cultural insecurity is also affected by the state’s promotion of socially liberal values (Bouvet 2015). This was of increasing importance during the period 2012–2017, due to the decision of the Hollande government to legalise same-sex marriage and adoption for same-sex couples, which provoked protests from socially conservative groups, particularly Catholics.1

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Examination of the treatment of cultural insecurity by academics studying other Western countries can help deepen our understanding of this concept. Goodhart, writing on the impact of cultural values on British politics, has spoken of the ‘Anywhere/Somewhere’ divide. ‘Somewheres’: do not generally welcome change and older Somewheres are nostalgic for a lost [past]; they place a high value on security and familiarity, and have strong group attachments, local and national; Somewheres, especially young ones, accept the equality revolution but still value traditional family forms and are suspicious of ‘anything goes’ attitudes. They are not Hard Authoritarians […] but regret the passing of a more structured and tradition-bound world. (Goodhart 2017; 24)

In contrast, ‘Anywheres’: broadly welcome change and are not nostalgic for a lost [past]; they fully embrace egalitarian and meritocratic attitudes on race, sexuality and gender…and think that we need to push on further; they do not in the main embrace a borderless world but they are individualists and internationalists who are not strongly attached to larger group identities, including national ones; they value autonomy and self-realisation before stability, community and tradition. (Goodhart 2017; 24)

While his work focuses on Britain, as we shall see in this chapter, the same divide also existed in France during the Hollande presidency, and posed a particular challenge to the Centre Right. While accepting much of Goodhart’s analysis, we will use the terms ‘Modernists’ and ‘Traditionalists’, mirroring Goodhart’s ‘Anywheres’ and ‘Somewheres’, to highlight the divisions within the UMP and Les Républicains. Much of the scholarship on cultural insecurity has sought to explain why large sections of the working class are no longer voting for Left-wing parties. When Guilluy (2015) extends his analysis to the Centre Right, by considering Sarkozy’s 2007 campaign and its attempt to respond to cultural insecurity, his focus is again on blue-collar workers. However, those who benefit from economic globalisation can also be concerned by its cultural impact. This can be seen in the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey, which found that 49% of those in managerial positions agreed that they no longer felt as at home in France as in the past, and 47% believed that anti-white racism was an important phenomenon (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016).

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Further evidence that cultural insecurity was not limited to a class divide, and was not automatically combined with opposition to liberal economic policies, could be seen in the responses of pensioners to the same survey from 2016. Within this age-based, rather than class-based, group, 62% believed that, ‘To encourage growth, we must limit the role of the state in the French economy as far as we are able, and give businesses as much freedom as possible’ (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016). This was the highest level of support for this statement expressed by any social category. At the same time, 69% of pensioners agreed that, ‘Nowadays one does not feel as at home in France as in the past’ (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016). It is therefore clear that cultural insecurity was not solely tied to concerns about economic globalisation and a desire for greater economic protectionism and regulation. Once again, discussion of cultural insecurity in other Western countries can help us to gain a better understanding of its impact within France. Goodhart (2017) argues that the Anywhere/Somewhere division is not based on differences in economic situation or political position between the Left and the Right. This was also true in France during the Hollande presidency, as many on the Centre Right felt ill at ease in a changing society. According to the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey, among supporters of Les Républicains, 76% felt that there were too many foreigners in France, 73% no longer felt as at home in France as in the past, 69% believed that immigrants did not do enough to integrate, and only 35% felt that Islam was compatible with the Republic. It is also notable that attitudes towards liberal cultural values are not simply tied to economic issues, but are also related to personal beliefs. It has long been recognised in France that practising Catholics form a key part of the Centre Right electorate, and so it is not surprising to see that debate over cultural issues formed a key part of the debate in the primary, and divided voters within the Centre Right. It is therefore clear that, whether based on fact or prejudice, fears contained within the term cultural insecurity did exist in France during the Hollande presidency, and that were not confined to supporters of the FN or members of the working class, but extended to potential supporters of Les Républicains.

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Cultural Insecurity and Sarkozy’s 2012 Presidential Election Campaign In part the divisions that emerged within the Centre Right over identity during the Hollande presidency developed from disagreements over the UMP’s 2012 presidential election campaign. As we have mentioned above, one of the reasons that Sarkozy had been elected in 2007 was because he had secured the votes of FN supporters, and this was a strategy that he attempted to repeat in 2012. A major feature of his approach was an attempt to convince those who felt ill at ease in a society which was changing, due to the effects of immigration and the development of more liberal values, that he understood their concerns and was best placed to respond. In a speech ahead of the second round, he summarised his argument: This programme is nothing other than the dream of a united French nation, proud of its values, of its identity, that has confidence in its way of life, and is reassured in its desire to remain different. Yes, we, the French people, are different and wish to remain so. (Sarkozy 2012b)

He added later in his speech: ‘we do not want cultural differences to disappear across the world. We want to keep our language, our literature, our music, our cinema’ (Sarkozy 2012b). The reaction to Sarkozy’s strategy provided evidence of the tensions that would undermine the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency, and distance the party from potential allies in the Centre. Having been eliminated in the first round, Bayrou declared his support for Hollande, and made it clear that Sarkozy’s position on identity had been an important factor in influencing his decision: The strategy that Nicolas Sarkozy has chosen ahead of the second round is a violent one, which contradicts our values – not only my own, nor solely those of the political current that I represent, but also the values of Gaullism, and of the republican Right. (Veron and Lesaffre 2012)

Like their leader, many MoDem voters also rejected Sarkozy’s position. As Jaffré (2016a) argues, ‘Bayrou voters who transferred their vote to Hollande did not expect much of him. However, 67% of them did not agree with Sarkozy’s proposals on immigration [and] 71% of them said that “since the first round”, Sarkozy did not appeal to them’. Although

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slightly more Bayrou voters chose Sarkozy over Hollande in the second round, the difference was not large enough to secure his election (Jaffré 2016a; 204). Not only did Sarkozy’s campaign alienate those from the Independent Centre parties, but it also divided the Centre Right. Writing after Hollande’s election, Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2013; 26) spoke for many Modernists, when he claimed that Sarkozy’s strategy had increased division, and that such a campaign ‘could not be victorious because bringing people together is the very essence of the role of president’. In contrast, Guillaume Peltier (2013) represented the views of many Traditionalists within the UMP, when he argued that Sarkozy’s campaign had successfully reduced the margin of Hollande’s victory, at a time when circumstances were unfavourable to the UMP, with Sarkozy himself being personally unpopular and France suffering from an economic crisis. These divisions would become entrenched as they came to be represented by different figures on the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency.

Cultural Insecurity and the Centre Right Under the Hollande Presidency The cultural insecurity debate within the Centre Right was based around key practical issues. Three will be examined here: firstly, that concerning integration of people from different cultures into French society; secondly, responses to terrorism and finally social values as represented by the issue of same-sex marriage. The Centre Right was split between a droite décomplexée (unashamedly right-wing) vision, which we will call ‘Traditionalist’, and which corresponds to the Somewhere position recognised by Goodhart, and a more open, ‘progressive’ Centrist group, which we will refer to as ‘Modernist’. We shall see how the positions adopted by Sarkozy, Juppé and Fillon represented the divisions within the party which were a major factor in its subsequent electoral defeat. Debate over policy did not lead to the reconciliation of opposing groups within Les Républicains around a common view, but instead exacerbated the differences that already existed. It also frequently reinforced the position of the Traditionalists within the Centre Right, shifting the party away from Centrist voters whose support would have been needed to regain power.

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I. The Debate over Assimilation Vs Integration One of the major issues relating to identity that divided the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency was whether people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds should be brought fully into French society through a policy of assimilation (where immigrants were supposed to adopt the culture of France in place of that of their country of origin) or through one of integration (where immigrants were to create a new identity, based on acceptance of French values but without totally rejecting their original culture). Of these positions, Traditionalists supported assimilation, while Modernists argued that such an approach was ill-suited to contemporary society where greater connections exist between countries, and so they favoured integration. Much of the debate between the two sides would concern the place of Islam within the Republic, which, as Bouvet (2015; 22, 25) has noted, has overtaken the previous focus on ethnic criteria or questions of economic competition, in discussion of immigration. Conflict between Traditionalists and Modernists, that, as we have seen, was present following the 2012 presidential elections, would be important on the Centre Right throughout the Hollande presidency. The party faced the problem that, such were the divisions provoked by this debate, that whichever position was adopted, it would alienate some voters who would otherwise have supported its candidate in the 2017 presidential elections. The Traditionalist position, which had been formed part of Sarkozy’s 2012 campaign, survived the president’s defeat, and remained popular among UMP members. When Jean-François Copé stood to become party leader in the Autumn of 2012, he built on its presidential election strategy and argued for a droite décomplexée. During his campaign, Copé claimed that a group of Muslim men had taken a pain au chocolat away from a non-Muslim schoolboy, because it was Ramadan. This story encapsulated the fears of those who believed certain Muslims with a hard-line view of their religion were imposing their own rules in France, and threatening national identity. The results of the leadership election confirmed that such an approach was popular among certain sections of the Centre Right. Opinion polls had predicted that Fillon would be elected leader with over 60% of the vote. However, these had been conducted by using a sample representative of people who classed themselves as supporters of the UMP, rather than just party members who were the only ones permitted to take part in the vote, and the official final result showed

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a narrow victory for Copé. Fillon had defended assimilation, but had also argued that many of the problems linked to immigration could be solved by improving the French economy. His rival’s more hard-line approach convinced some voters that he better reflected their concerns, and reinforced the Traditionalist policies within the party. Although Copé’s success in being elected party leader suggests that his stance was a popular one among party members, the reaction of some within the UMP to his anecdote demonstrated that not all its elected representatives were comfortable with his approach. Alain Juppé argued that ‘the nature of election campaigns means that candidates are encouraged to harden their rhetoric […] these statements are not a step in the right direction’ (Huff Post 2012), while another more Centrist-leaning député within the UMP, Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, stated ‘There are provocative attitudes during Ramadan. But these are very much in the minority, and so a single example should not be taken as representing the norm’ (Huff Post 2012). Although there was no question at this time of any of these figures leaving the UMP, the controversy over the pain au chocolat incident confirmed that a Modernist section did exist within the Centre Right, and that the Traditionalist line on immigration and identity risked alienating it. Division between the Modernists and the Traditionalists would develop further following Copé’s victory. Numerous irregularities meant that the result was not accepted by the party as a whole. The conflict between the two camps therefore remained, and was exacerbated when the Mayor of Bordeaux and former prime minister, Alain Juppé, was brought back to frontline politics in order to act as a mediator. This would have a decisive effect on the debate, as Juppé would provide a figurehead behind whom Modernists could come together. Juppé’s policy of integration and his aim to create a ‘happy identity’ gave a voice to Modernist voters within the Centre Right who had objected to Sarkozy’s approach, and brought into the open their conflict with supporters of assimilation. This would intensify the differences between these positions to such an extent that they would threaten the existence of the party. The mayor of Bordeaux challenged the idea that French identity was under threat from new arrivals. Linked to his policy of integration, he celebrated diversity. In a speech in Strasbourg in 2016, he stated that ‘French identity is unique, it is the result of a creative tension, of a dialogue between the diversity of our backgrounds and the unity of our nation’ (Juppé 2016). To illustrate this, he pointed to Alsace

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where ‘because the inhabitants of Alsace have been torn for too long between two powers that claimed to represent different cultures, whereas they represented a combination of both of them, they have played an irreplaceable role in inspiring the European project, that is to say the transformation of identities from a cause of conflict to a source of reconciliation, bringing together differences in order to expand the family, rather than standardise it’ (Juppé 2016). Although surveys found that Juppé was the most popular politician in France at the time (see Jeantet 2015, 2016), his Modernist position was not in keeping with the views of a majority of the members of Les Républicains, among whom attitudes towards immigration and identity were hardening. This trend was reinforced following the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris, carried out by French citizens of North African heritage, which raised concerns about how the state had failed to integrate new arrivals and their descendants. In a 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria poll, 58% of voters felt that immigrants did not do enough to integrate, and 80% agreed that ‘one can never be too careful when dealing with other people’. Supporters of Les Républicains and the FN approved these statements in the greatest numbers (62 and 92%, respectively, agreeing with the first and 82 and 91% the second) (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 57, 19). Survey questions relating to aspects of cultural insecurity further demonstrated that Juppé’s positions might appeal to those on the Left, who were disappointed with Hollande, but not to the Traditionalists, who would form the core electorate of the Primary of the Right and Centre. When the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria poll, that we have mentioned above, asked voters for their views on the statement ‘one no longer feels at home in France as in the past’, 73% of Les Républicains supporters and 98% of those of the FN agreed with it, compared to 41% of PS supporters. Similarly, 69% of Les Républicains voters and 84% of those of the FN believed that anti-white racism was a widespread phenomenon, while only 42% of those of the PS did so (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016). The Mayor of Bordeaux’s celebration of diversity could therefore win support from the Left, but would not persuade the core electorate of the Centre Right or regain the votes of those who had turned to the FN. The difficulty that Juppé faced as a Modernist in a largely Traditionalist party deepened as those controlling its agenda promoted tougher policies on immigration in an attempt to win over voters who had left the UMP since 2012. Analyses showed that those who had supported Sarkozy in 2012, only to turn to the FN in subsequent elections, still shared many

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beliefs with the Centre Right, and had chosen the FN for a harder line on immigration. Jaffré noted in January 2016 that: Among former Sarkozy voters who have switched to supporting the FN [we see] a hardening of attitudes, which contradicts their more measured position on the Left-Right scale. This hardening is clear on immigration, the perception of Islam and the feeling of hatred following the 13th November terrorist attacks. There is also the feeling that French society is deteriorating year on year and a rejection of political representatives. In all of these areas, their responses are very close to those of loyal FN voters, who had already supported the party in 2012. Differences exist between the latter and former Sarkozystes, principally over Europe (whether or not to reduce the participation of France in the Union) and the approach to inequality (whether to take from the rich to give to the poor – a measure rejected by the majority of Sarkozystes of whatever current allegiance). (Jaffré 2016b; 4)

The decision of some former Centre Right supporters to turn to the FN heightened divisions between the Modernists and Traditionalists by encouraging the latter to harden their position in order to appeal to voters on the Far Right. When Sarkozy returned to frontline politics, as president of the UMP, in November 2014, he pursued a very similar strategy to that of his 2012 presidential election campaign, focusing on traditional values and responding to cultural insecurity. However, this reinforced division within the party, by promoting an approach with which Modernists were uncomfortable. Division over integration between the Modernists who supported Juppé, and the Traditionalists, whose views were represented by Sarkozy and Fillon, would be a major feature of the 2016 Primary of the Right and Centre. Although conceived as a way of resolving the differences between factions and uniting the party around a single candidate, the primary accentuated the division between the Modernists and the Traditionalists, to the point that it became difficult to achieve the party unity that was needed to win the 2017 presidential elections. The hard-line approach that Sarkozy adopted in the primary in order to reach out to Traditionalist voters exacerbated the split within the party. In a speech in 2016, he attacked ‘the tyranny of minorities’ and argued: We have told those who wish to enter our country: we will take you as you are. We are the ones who will adapt to you. Integration now means that the

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majority adapts to the minorities, accepts their languages, their values, their customs, and apologises for possessing its own identity. (Sarkozy 2016a)

This strategy weakened the former president, as it not only alienated Modernists within Les Républicains, but also those outside the party, who were reminded of his actions as president and decided to vote in the primary in order to make sure that he could not return to power. This could be seen in that 17% of those who participated in the primary were supporters of the Left, of whom less than one in 10 voted for the former president (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 21). Like Sarkozy, Fillon sought to appeal to Traditionalist voters and to emphasise the importance of immigrants assimilating into French society, but he did so in a more measured way. As part of his strategy, he reached out to Catholics who felt alienated by the Hollande government’s promotion of more liberal cultural values and also threatened by radical Islam (most notably in the murder of Father Jacques Hamel at Saint-Etiennedu-Rouvray in July 2016). Fillon’s approach could be seen in a speech he gave in August 2016, where he rejected the idea of responding to the threat posed by radical Islamism by reinforcing laïcité, which would have an impact on all religions. He stated: I do not speak about fighting against the demands of religious groups in order to avoid talking about the problem that we have with Islam. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists and Sikhs do not threaten the unity of the nation. Let us therefore stop pretending that we have to harden the rules on secularism, which would come at the cost of unacceptable attacks on freedom of religion when only the rise of extremism in the Muslim world is a threat to our society.

Fillon wanted to ‘impose on French Muslims the common rules that have been accepted, often after a long period of conflict, by Christians and Jews’ (Fillon 2016). Although Sarkozy adopted a similar position on this issue, Fillon presented a more comprehensive vision that Catholics felt represented them, and so, as we shall see later in this chapter, he was more successful than his rival in gaining their support.

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II. The Question of Responses to Terrorism Opinion polls showed that the terrorist attacks carried out in France during 2015 and 2016 ensured that terrorism overtook unemployment to become the main concern of French voters in the run up to the Primary of the Right and Centre (L’Express avec AFP 2016). That the attacks were carried out by French nationals of North African heritage meant that the debate was intimately linked to that concerning integration and assimilation. The question of how to react to the terrorist threat was not a major source of policy difference between the candidates for the primary on the Centre Right, nor did it play an important role in the relationship between the Centre Right and the Centre. This was the same for the presidential elections, as the focus became redirected towards the debate over whether integration or assimilation was more effective. Yet it did have an important impact on the way that candidates’ personalities were perceived. In this area Sarkozy’s ideas were seen as posturing and impractical, such as his proposal to imprison all those suspected of having been radicalised. In contrast, Fillon put forward policies that were seen as both hard-line and effective, and which made him appear a more authentic candidate to represent the Centre Right in 2017. He attacked the measures of Sarkozy and others as a ‘competition to see who can come up with the most stupid and idiotic measures, supposedly aimed at fighting terrorism’ (Fillon 2016). He accused Sarkozy of ignoring the practical aspects to use it solely as an electoral tool. He declared: Let us be frank, it is not enough to jump up and down on one’s chair like a goat shouting ‘Identity!’ ‘Identity!’ to define what France is. Let us also say, at the risk of offending some people, but I do not think that now is a time to debate this issue […] There is a time for agitation and a time for action.

Fillon’s approach to the question of how to respond to terrorism was an important factor in creating the dynamic in his favour that emerged during the primary. As Fourquet and Le Bras (2017; 44) point out, this was particularly clear during the television debates, during which: when asked about the approach to adopt as regards French jihadists fighting in the Middle East, he clearly distinguished himself from his rivals

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by declaring that he would take measures to ensure that as many as possible could not return to France, which implied an agreement with Turkey to stop them at its border, but also military action to eliminate them. These proposals, hard-line in their content, but expressed in a measured way, were welcomed by the core electorate of the Right, which started to change its opinion of François Fillon.

At a time when many French people felt under threat from terrorism, the more measured but still strict line adopted by Fillon seemed the most considered response to this major issue. III. Divisions Caused by Social Liberalism As Bouvet (2015; 28) has observed, in addition to concerns relating to immigration and integration, another major aspect of cultural insecurity is the reaction to the promotion of social liberalism within society. This is reflected in the Modernist/Traditionalist divide, as Modernists support the spread of liberal values, while Traditionalists look to defend traditional beliefs. During the Hollande presidency, debate in this area would be focused particularly around the government’s decision to legalise samesex marriage. This policy was put forward early in the presidential term, in part as a way of trying to unite the PS around a common belief in cultural liberalism (a 2013 CSA poll for Terrafemina showed that 70% of Leftwing supporters were in favour of the legalisation of same-sex marriage) (L’Express avec AFP 2013), to distract attention from the disagreements over economic policy. The unity on the Left over social values was not matched within the Centre Right, which contained both social liberals and social conservatives, with many of the latter either participating in or at least approving of the mass demonstrations in opposition to the law. As we shall see below, key figures within Les Républicains, along with a significant section of party members and supporters, did not see the passing of the law as definitive as they hoped to modify it if the Centre Right returned to power. The hope of changing the law would increase the importance of cultural insecurity in debate on the Centre Right, and the role of the Traditionalists in formulating policy. This development was further encouraged by the formation of Sens commun, a political group which brought together opponents of same-sex marriage, once the law had been passed, with the intention of shaping the policies of the Centre Right. As

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Raison du Cleuziou (2018) notes, this movement was seen as a significant lobby group, which would have an important effect on the outcome of the primary. It would alienate many of the Juppéistes, who saw it as a radical conservative body, and it would contribute to the channelling of Traditionalist support from Sarkozy to Fillon (Raison du Cleuziou 2018). Although the law on same-sex marriage was passed in Spring 2013, the debate on this issue continued within the Centre Right. Modernists believed that the party should accept the change, and move on, with Juppé stating ‘same-sex marriage has entered our laws and our customs and I will not change it’ (Leclair 2016). In contrast, Sarkozy and Fillon wanted to amend the law, and their position was shared by a majority of voters on the Right. An Opinionway poll, in June 2016, of those who claimed that they were certain to vote in the Primary of the Right and Centre found that 40% wanted to re-write the law on same-sex marriage to restrict adoption to heterosexual couples, 28% wanted to repeal the law altogether and only 31% supported it (de Boissieu 2016). In the competition to obtain the support of the Traditionalists, as Richard (2017; 542) notes, Fillon appeared to be much more committed representative of socially conservative, and particularly, Catholic voters, who formed an important part of the electorate in the primary. In terms of the policies he proposed, he pledged to ‘put the family back at the heart of our political programme’, and to ‘re-write the law on filiation in order to protect the rights of the child’ (Fillon 2016). His promises seemed to be supported by his actions, since, as Richard (2017; 536) has pointed out, he was the only key figure from Les Républicains present at the last demonstration of La Manif pour Tous in October 2016. The success of Fillon’s approach was seen when he was endorsed by the leadership of Sens commun in September 2016, and in the primary itself, when he received 59% of the votes of practising Catholic supporters of Les Républicains (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017). Debate in the primary emphasised the differences in the programmes supported by the Traditionalists and the Modernists. As we shall now see, the divisions between the two camps were further reinforced by the way the candidates presented their policies, and the strategies they employed to try and discredit their opponents in the eyes of voters.

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IV. Anti-elitism and the Primary of the Right and Centre The animosity between factions within the Centre Right was deepened by accusations of elitism, arising from issues linked to cultural insecurity. In their attempts to win the support of a majority of voters in the primary, the two sides of the Traditionalist/Modernist divide sought to portray the other not simply as a rival, but as an opponent who represented a social elite, and who either ignored the concerns of voters, or sought to exploit their fears and manipulate them. So bitter did this conflict become that, once their candidate had been defeated in the primary, many Juppéistes felt little desire to actively campaign for Fillon in the presidential elections. Anti-elitism has become important on the Centre Right in part because of the breakdown of class voting habits that we have examined in Chapter 2. As sections of the Left have sought to attract the votes of the middle classes, they have moved away from the blue-collar working class that they had traditionally represented. The Centre Right has sought to appeal to those who feel abandoned by the parties that they used to support. Part of this approach has involved portraying the liberal social values promoted by the Left as the beliefs of the privileged, and the opposite of those of ordinary workers. The issue of anti-elitism on the Centre Right became part of the internal divide between Modernists and Traditionalists. In part, this is because, in wider society, those who share the Modernist viewpoint are traditionally seen as more economically successful than those who have a more Traditionalist outlook, although this ignores the presence, particularly on the Centre Right, of voters who support economic globalisation but are opposed to cultural change. The Modernists are often labelled in journalistic Anglophone critiques as the ‘Liberal, metropolitan elite’ by those in the Traditionalist camp, and are accused of being out of touch. Similar views could also be found in France during this period. Both Sarkozy and Fillon claimed to speak for those whose views were looked down on by an elite, with the former president criticising in 2015 ‘the liberal elite view that calls you petit-bourgeois when you talk about family, Islamophobic when you talk about Islam, reactionary when you talk about identity and French values’ (Oriot 2015) and Fillon declaring his support in 2016 for ‘subjects that are a source of amusement for the metropolitan elite’ (Liabot 2016).

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This debate was important during the primary, where both Sarkozy and Fillon looked to secure the votes of Traditionalists with their criticism of a Modernist elite. Sarkozy cast Juppé as a member of an out-of-touch elite, focusing on his promotion of a ‘happy identity’ at a time when France was under attack from French-born terrorists. He stated ‘There is no happy identity, when thousands of French people born in France come to detest their country. There is no happy identity, when the rules of the Republic are flouted to such an extent’ (Sarkozy 2016b; 17). He criticised Juppé’s proposals that he suggested would lead to the rise of separate communities within France, arguing that: There is no happy identity, when we accept “reasonable” adjustments in a supposed attempt to avoid conflict. There is no happy national identity when the political programme that is implemented means that there is no longer a single nation, but a mix of communities, of different identities, where the right to express one’s difference becomes more important than belonging to one national community. (Sarkozy 2016b; 17)

According to his opponents, Juppé’s more liberal views did not allow him to understand the dangers that France faced, and the fears of large sections of the population, and was therefore not suitable to be president at a time when the country had to respond to significant threats. Fillon claimed to represent the views of ordinary voters, which he argued were ignored by an elite. He stated: ‘I have values and I make no apologies for having values. I believe in family, in the authority of the state, in work. These are values that make the metropolitan elite laugh, but which are, in contrast, set firmly in the hearts of the French’ (Fillon 2016). Fillon’s message was therefore that anyone from the Modernist camp would be unable to represent the Traditionalists properly. As we have seen above, Traditionalist voters were often concerned that society’s values were changing rapidly, and that their views were being attacked by a progressive elite. One of the ways that Fillon sought to gain their support was through defending France’s past. He attacked the Left for looking down on French history, stating ‘France was not born in 1789, and she did not move from the darkness into the light in 1981!’ (Fillon 2016). He defended the French Empire, arguing, ‘France should not be condemned for having wanted to share her culture with the peoples of Africa, Asia and North America (Fillon 2016). He attempted

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to relativize the place of the slave trade in France’s history, by stating ‘France did not invent slavery’ (Fillon 2016). He supported the view that France and its history could be celebrated, and should not be a constant source of shame. Modernists would in turn use accusations of ‘elitism’ to attack their opponents. Juppé argued that cultural insecurity was an invented political strategy, used by a nationalist elite, to stoke fears among, and manipulate, ordinary voters. He stated: ‘What is striking today is this fatalism, I would even say this complacency that one finds among certain political or intellectual elites. For them […] France is condemned to be afraid. Afraid of herself. Afraid of the future. Afraid of the Other’ (Juppé 2016). However, with Traditionalists forming a majority on the Centre Right, his arguments were unlikely to convince the electorate of the primary. V. The Importance of Personality in the Debate Over Identity We have seen above that two groups existed within the Centre Right regarding the debate over identity—a socially conservative Traditionalist one, that was wary of immigration, and a socially liberal Modernist one that embraced diversity—and that these groups came to be represented by different politicians, with Sarkozy and Fillon seeking the votes of Traditionalists, and Juppé appealing to Modernists. Many polls throughout the primary campaign had predicted that Fillon would be eliminated in the first round, leaving his two rivals to contest the nomination for the presidential candidate. However, it would be Sarkozy who was rejected in the first round, allowing Fillon to gain the majority of Traditionalist votes, and thereafter to defeat Juppé in the second round. An important reason for Fillon being preferred to Sarkozy success was that he was judged the more committed to the policies for which they had argued. The question of sincerity was important in all of the areas that we have examined in this chapter. We have already seen above how Fillon’s proposals regarding how best to respond to terrorism appeared more effective than those of Sarkozy, and the same was true regarding debate over assimilation. As Fourquet states: As was the case during the 2012 presidential election, it seems that the tone and style of the former president reactivated a feeling of having been misled and a desire to punish him, among a significant part of the electorate that had been won over by Sarkozy in 2007 by his speeches that promised

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a new hard-line approach to fighting crime, reducing unemployment and affirming French identity and who were left disappointed at the end of his presidency. (Fourquet 2016)

A similar analysis is shared by Eric Zemmour, who argues: One might have thought that the most hard-line sections of the Rightwing electorate would choose Sarkozy in order to block the way for Juppé. But that barrier is giving way. The former president’s approach to identity appears too much like an unsubtle strategy […] one that shows a lack of conviction. Therefore, in order to defeat Juppé and his ‘happy identity’, many have chosen to back Fillon, not because he is the best candidate, but because he is the least worst. (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 24)

Fillon’s promotion of conservative social values was also well-received among Traditionalist voters on the Centre Right, as it seemed in keeping with his image and character. Bouthours argues that: For practising Catholics, Fillon is one of them. He represents the paternal figure, very much in keeping with the traditional image of a Catholic father with a large family, who has authority, maintains a certain distance from people, and who does not try to change to keep up with the latest trends. (Fourquet 2018; 111)

This view is supported by Fourquet, who argues that Fillon’s ‘image and his own career, a local politician and then one on the national stage, from a Catholic family from the West of France, allowed [the practising Catholic electorate] to identify with him or at least see some of themselves in him’ (Fourquet 2018; 111). Fillon deliberately put himself forward not just as a representative of the views of Traditionalist, but as someone who shared their values and outlook. He claimed that his role models were ‘my primary school teacher from Cérans-Foulletourte, my biology teacher at secondary school, Father Dubois, the founders of the largest poultry business in France “LDC” who only had their primary school diploma or the cattle farmer from Notre-Dame-du-Pé’ (Fillon 2016). He contrasted the common sense of ordinary voters with the declarations of members of an intellectual elite, stating ‘when brilliant economists try to convince me that negative interest rates generated by the monetary policy of the European Central Bank will last for a long time, I cannot help thinking that a Sarthois farmer

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knows, without needing a doctorate, that there is no such thing as free money and that the bill will have to be paid sooner or later’ (Fillon 2016). The success of Fillon’s campaign in appealing to the socially conservative electorate can be seen in in the primary, where he won a significantly greater proportion than Sarkozy of the votes from groups that Bouvet has argued are particularly affected by the fears related to cultural insecurity. In the first round, 59% practising Catholics chose Fillon while 27% voted for Sarkozy (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 98), and the former prime minister also outperformed the former president among FN supporters (43%/32%) (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 21) and among those over 65 (53%/16%) (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 54). Fillon’s ability to appeal to these groups was crucial in enabling him to receive the largest share of the vote in the first round, and to receive 44.1% of all votes, significantly ahead of Juppé (28.6%) and Sarkozy (20.7%) (La rédaction de LCI 2016). Given the dominance of Traditionalists within the core Centre Right electorate that we have observed in this chapter, the result of the first round suggested that it was unlikely that Juppé would be chosen as the presidential candidate. The strategy that he adopted did not aid his cause, as he chose to attack the socially conservative values that Fillon defended. As Fourquet and Le Bras (2017; 119) note, this approach alienated Sarkozy stes and FN voters, while failing to gain much support from other sections of the primary electorate. Many Centrist and Left-wing voters, who had participated in the first round of the primary, in order to prevent Sarkozy from becoming the representative of Les Républicains in the 2017 presidential elections, and who might have been more receptive to Juppé’s arguments, chose not to vote in the following round, having already achieved their main objective. Juppé’s approach therefore only served to increase the margin of Fillon’s victory.

Cultural Insecurity and the 2017 Presidential Elections The primary decided debate over cultural insecurity in favour of the Traditionalists. However, rather than rallying behind the candidate of Les Républicains for the presidential elections, many Modernists had been so alienated by the attacks made on them and their beliefs by members of their own party, that they were encouraged to seek an alternative figure outside the party who could represent their views.

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The decision of Modernists to abandon their support for Les Républicains was encouraged by Fillon’s decision to make the defence of Traditionalist values, that had been central to his victory in the primary, an important part of his presidential election campaign. In several speeches, he chose to focus on responding to cultural insecurity. In terms of immigration, he argued that French values: are not the aggregation of everyone’s specific features. France and its diverse society can only be a single nation, if everyone accepts that there is a collective entity that pre-exists their own identity. There can be no France without people making the effort to want to be French, to call themselves French and to think that they are French. (Fillon 2017)

He defended the assimilationist French model, stating: ‘We are a nation based on integration. And integration means that he who comes legally to France adopts France, and then, France adopts him as one of her own’ (Fillon 2017). In light of their disagreement with the values that Fillon promoted, a significant number of Modernists turned to Macron, whom they felt shared their views. Whereas Fillon had promoted a traditional, white, Christian image of French identity, the candidate of En Marche promoted diversity. This was demonstrated in a speech in Spring 2017 in Marseille, where he celebrated the multicultural aspect of the city produced by the presence of numerous nationalities (Macron 2017a). While Fillon had celebrated the French Empire, Macron recognised the more negative aspects of French History, claiming that colonialism had been a crime against humanity (Le Point.fr 2017). The position of the leader of En Marche on these issues was close to that of Juppé, as were his proposals regarding immigration. Instead of emphasising the need for new arrivals to assimilate, as Fillon had done, Macron argued that the State also had responsibilities to facilitate integration. Macron’s policies regarding identity appealed to many of those who had supported Juppé in the primary. Aurore Bergé, who had formed part of the Mayor of Bordeaux’s campaign team, left Les Républicains soon after his defeat, arguing that Fillon’s views were incompatible with her own. She said ‘I am still of the Right, but the party founded in 2002 by Alain Juppé and then modernised by Nicolas Sarkozy between 2004 and 2007 is different from that which has chosen François Fillon as its candidate. Ending the state’s coverage of the cost of abortions, un-marrying

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gay couples, making a pact with Putin: that is not “my” Right’ (Levain 2017). Bergé described herself as ‘liberal, progressive, European, feminist’ (Levain 2017), which was very much in keeping with the Modernist profile, at a time when Fillon was trying to attract voters who were concerned by the spread of progressive, liberal values. Later, in March 2017, over 100 members of Les Jeunes avec Juppé gave their support to Macron, citing the ‘radicalisation’ of Fillon’s programme as one of the reasons for their decision, and stating that ‘We do not recognise ourselves in this Right that has chosen to adopt the policies of Sens commun’ (Patrier-Leitus et al. 2016). Such a reaction was not confined to Les Républicains, but could also be seen among sections of the Independent Centre parties, which had been expected to rally behind Fillon. Immediately following the primary, 130 members of the youth branch of the UDI signed a letter outlining their support for Macron, notably because they felt he represented ‘a form of liberalism with a human face and the opening of our world to modernity, both in terms of economic and social policy’ (Libération.fr 2016). Macron’s ability to attract voters, who might have supported Les Républicains, but who were alienated by the socially conservative programme of Fillon was an important factor in his success in the 2017 presidential elections. However, his victory would not put an end to the divisions within the Centre Right that have been observed in this chapter, which would continue to undermine Les Républicains during the Macron presidency.

Conclusion As has been seen in elections in many Western countries, issues relating to identity were decisive in determining the fortunes of the Centre Right between 2012 and 2017. In many cases, the divisions that would undermine Les Républicains grew out of the Sarkozy presidency, and particularly his campaign for the 2012 presidential elections. He had put great emphasis on a hard-line approach to immigration and national identity, in an attempt to win over FN voters. Although he was defeated by François Hollande, the close result convinced many on the Centre Right that his strategy had been the correct one. The failure of Sarkozy to be re-elected, and his resignation as party leader, opened a debate over how to deal with questions related to

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identity that continued throughout the Hollande presidency. The 2012 leadership contest did not produce a decisive result, and so ensured that the issue of what programme the UMP should adopt for the 2017 presidential elections remained unresolved. The party became split between two camps: a Modernist wing which accepted the changes in society, and wanted to go further in some cases, and a Traditionalist wing, which looked to respond to the concerns of those affected by cultural insecurity, particularly by protecting traditional values. The Traditionalist position was much stronger within the party than among the French people as a whole, and was reinforced by external events. The emergence of opposition movements to Hollande’s decision to legalise same-sex marriage, and the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 carried out by French nationals of North African heritage encouraged Traditionalists to believe that their approach to identity was the one that would allow the Centre Right to regain power. This strengthening of the Traditionalist position harmed the prospects of those who might have been best placed to gather support beyond party members. This was the case for Alain Juppé, who had emerged as the figurehead of the Modernist faction within the Centre Right. His views in support of integration rather than assimilation, his desire to create a ‘happy identity’ and his pledge not to modify the law on same-sex marriage were popular with the general electorate. However, this position was held by a minority on the Centre Right. Therefore, although in the primary he was widely seen as the candidate most likely to win the presidential elections, he was not regarded as the one who best reflected the views of supporters of Les Républicains. While Juppé came to represent the Modernists, Sarkozy and Fillon competed to appeal to Traditionalists. The former president had been expected by many to win the votes of those who wanted a more socially conservative approach, but he was eliminated in the first round. His campaign was seen by many as one that sought to provoke his opponents rather than to propose practical solutions to the problems facing France, and as Fourquet (2016) and Zemmour (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017) have noted, many of those who had abandoned the UMP in 2012 for the FN were reminded of why they had previously rejected Sarkozy. Fillon gained the support of Traditionalists by putting emphasis on the need to appeal to those affected by cultural insecurity. He defended assimilation rather than integration, and stressed the need for Muslim citizens to accept laïcité, rather than seeking to reinforce the law on laïcité

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itself, and by doing so avoided alienating Catholics. His proposals to fight terrorism seemed potentially more effective than those of Sarkozy. In terms of social values, he was perceived not merely to be a defender of Traditionalist views, but also as someone who deeply believed in them, rather than having adopted them as a political strategy. His apparent authenticity seemed a guarantee that he would actually implement the policies for which he was campaigning. These features allowed him to win over large numbers of Traditionalist voters and to overtake Sarkozy and Juppé to receive the largest share of the vote in the first round with 44%. The absence of Sarkozy in the second round suggested that the victory of the Traditionalists under Fillon was assured, and it was indeed confirmed a week later, when he gained 67% of the vote in the second round. The victory of Fillon highlighted and reinforced, rather than resolved, divisions over cultural insecurity. The margin of his victory over Juppé showed the Modernists that they were very much in the minority within the membership of Les Républicains. Should they decide to remain within the party, they would be forced to abandon their own project in favour of one with which they profoundly disagreed. The emergence of Emmanuel Macron would turn division over cultural insecurity into a factor that would threaten the very existence of the Centre Right. He represented an open, Modernist alternative for those who felt uncomfortable with a party moving ever further in a Traditionalist direction. Not only did his socially liberal policies appeal to some of those who had supported Juppé in the primary, but they also almost certainly encouraged former Hollande voters, who might have supported Les Républicains had the Mayor of Bordeaux been the party’s presidential candidate, to back the candidate of En Marche instead. Although the hope of winning power discouraged defections on the Centre Right until after the presidential elections, the Macron’s victory led to the appointment of several Modernists from Les Républicains to the government, including Edouard Philippe, who became Prime Minister, and Aurore Bergé who was made a spokesperson for En Marche, while others formed a separate parliamentary group, Les Constructifs, to support the actions of the government. The issue of cultural insecurity was therefore one that would continue to threaten the existence of Les Républicains beyond 2017.

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Note 1. While Bouvetacknowledges that other religious groups, including Muslims, can be alienated by the promotion of liberal social values, this chapter will generally focus on Catholics, as practising Catholics have often formed a key section of the Centre Right electorate.

References Ahearne, Jeremy. 2017. Cultural Insecurity and Its Discursive Crystallisation in Contemporary France. Modern & Contemporary France 25 (3): 265–280. Bouvet, Laurent. 2015. L’insécurité culturelle. Paris: Fayard. Bussi, Michel and Jérôme Fourquet. 2007. Election présidentielle 2007: neuf cartes pour comprendre. Revue française de science politique 57 (3): 411–428. de Boissieu, Laurent. 2016. Les électeurs de droite veulent réécrire la loi Taubira. La Croix, June 6. Fillon, François. 2016. «Je veux faire pour les Français» Discours à Sablé sur Sarthe, August 28. http://fillon2017lacollesurloup.fr/index.php/2016/08/ 28/je-veux-faire-pour-les-francais-discours-de-sable-sur-sarthe/. Accessed 15 October 2017. Fillon, François. 2017. Discours de François Fillon au Puy-en-Velay: “Je suis venu parler de l’identité de notre nation, je suis venu parler de la France”, April. https://www.republicains.fr/actualites_discours_francois_f illon_puy_en_velay_20170415. Accessed 22 September 2017. Fourquet, Jérôme. 2016. Primaire de la droite: les frontistes ont préféré Fillon. Fondation Jean Jaurès. https://jean-jaures.org/blog/primaire-de-la-droiteles-frontistes-ont-prefere-fillon. Fourquet, Jérôme. 2018. A la droite de Dieu. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf. Fourquet, Jérôme, and Hervé Le Bras. 2017. La Guerre des trois: La primaire de la droite et du centre. Paris: Editions Fondation Jean Jaurès. Jaurès. 25 November. Accessed 7 September 2017. Goodhart, David. 2017. The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics. London: Hurst & Company. Goodwin, Matthew. 2019. Brexit Election Tracker: The Result. E-mail. Goodwin, Matthew, and Roger Eatwell. 2018. National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. London: Penguin Random House. Guilluy, Christophe. 2010. Fractures françaises. Paris: François Bourin Editeur. Guilluy, Christophe. 2015. La France périphérique: Comment on a sacrifié les classes populaires. Paris: Flammarion. Hewlett, Nick. 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy and the Legacy of Bonapartism: The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of 2007. Modern & Contemporary France 15 (4): 405–422.

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Jaffré, Jérôme. 2016a. Narrowing the Gap in the Second Round or the ‘Referenda’ of May 6 2012. In The 2012 French Election: How the Electorate Decided, ed. Pascal Perrineau, 189–206. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Jaffré, Jérôme. 2016b. L’Enquête électorale française: Comprendre 2017: LA NOTE/#7/vague 1: Janvier 2016: Les nouveaux électeurs du Front National. CEVIPOF. January 2016. Jeantet, Jérémy. 2015. Juppé et Bayrou restent les hommes politiques les plus populaires. Sudradio.fr. October 13. https://www.sudradio.fr/politique/ juppe-et-bayrou-restent-les-hommes-politiques-les-plus-populaires/. Accessed 7 June 2016. Jeantet, Jérémy. 2016. Sondage: Alain Juppé reste l’homme politique préféré des Français. Sudradio.fr, April 12. https://www.sudradio.fr/politique/ sondage-alain-juppe-reste-lhomme-politique-prefere-des-francais/. Accessed 7 June 2016. Juppé, Alain. 2016. [Vidéo] Discours d’Alain Juppé sur l’identité de la France, September 13. http://www.alainjuppe2017.fr/discours-alain-juppestrasbourg. Accessed 14 June 2017. La rédaction de LCI. 2016. Primaire à droite: les résultats définitifs du premier tour enfin connus. lci.fr. November 23. https://www.lci.fr/primaire-dro ite/primaire-a-droite-les-resultats-definitifs-du-premier-tour-enfin-connus-201 3991.html. Accessed 5 June 2020. Leclair, Agnès. 2016. Le mariage pour tous, sujet de divergences entre François Fillon et Alain Juppé. Le Figaro, November 23. http://www.lefigaro.fr/electi ons/presidentielles/primaires-droite/2016/11/23/35004-20161123ARTF IG00352-le-mariage-pour-tous-sujet-de-frictions-entre-francois-fillon-et-alainjuppe.php. Accessed 22 October 2018. Le Huff Post. 2012. Pain au chocolat de Copé: Morano, Estrosi, Borloo, NKM, Ciotti, Juppé, Baroin et Ayrault réagissent. Huff Post, October 10. http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2012/10/10/pain-au-chocolat-cope-rea ctions-politiques_n_1953515.html. Accessed 5 September 2017. Le Point.fr. 2017. Emmanuel Macron: “Le colonialisme est un crime contre l’humanité”. Le Point, February 15. https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/ emmanuel-macron-la-colonisation-est-un-crime-contre-l-humanite-15-022017-2105177_3121.php. Accessed 5 April 2019. Levain, Myriam. 2017. Aurore Bergé, la militante féministe qui a quitté Les Républicains pour Macron. Cheek Magazine, February 17. http://cheekm agazine.fr/societe/aurore-berge-republicains-macron-feministe/. Accessed 7 September 2017. L’Express.fr avec AFP. 2013. Sondage: les Français favorables au mariage pour tous et non pas à l’adoption. L’Express, April 4. https://www.lexpress.fr/act ualite/societe/sondage-les-francais-favorables-au-mariage-pour-tous-et-nonpas-a-l-adoption_1237239.html. Accessed 22 October 2018.

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L’Express.fr avec AFP. 2016. La lutte contre le terrorisme devenue la préoccupation principale des Français. L’Express, July 27. https://www.lexpress.fr/ actualite/societe/la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-devenue-la-preoccupation-pri ncipale-des-francais_1816386.html. Accessed 22 October 2018. Liabot, Thomas. 2016 Après Sarkozy, Fillon s’attaque à son tour aux élites. Le JDD, November 24. http://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/Apres-Sarkozy-Fillon-sattaque-a-son-tour-aux-elites-827122. Accessed 14 September 2017. Libération.fr. 2016. Des jeunes de l’UDI vers Macron. Libération, November 28. https://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/des-jeunes-de-ludivers-macron_52896/. Accessed 29 April 2020. Macron, Emmanuel. 2017a. Rassemblement à Marseille, Discours d’Emmanuel Macron, 1er avril 2017. https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-mac ron-marseille-discours. Accessed 5 April 2019. Macron, Emmanuel. 2017b. Emmanuel Macron président:«Retrouver notre esprit de conquête pour bâtir une France nouvelle»: Programme. Mayer, Nonna. 2007. Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l’électorat Le Pen. Revue française de science politique 57 (3): 429–445. Oriot, Xavier. 2015. A Rouen, Sarkozy s’en prend à la bien-pensance. Ouest France, December 2. http://www.ouest-france.fr/elections/region ales/rouen-sarkozy-sen-prend-la-bien-pensance-3885156. Patrier-Leitus, Jérémie et al. 2016. 100 membres des Jeunes avec Juppé apportent leur soutien à Emmanuel Macron. L’Obs, March 13. https://www.nou velobs.com/presidentielle-2017/20170313.OBS6485/100-membres-des-jeu nes-avec-juppe-apportent-leur-soutien-a-emmanuel-macron.html. Accessed 5 April 2019. Peltier, Guillaume. 2013. Nicolas Sarkozy a-t-il fait la meilleure campagne possible? In L’Etat de l’Opinion 13, ed. Olivier Duhamel and Edouard Lecerf, 31–47. Paris: Seuil. Raffarin, Jean-Pierre. 2013. Sarkozy: les cinq occasions manquées. In L’Etat de l’Opinion 13, ed. Olivier Duhamel and Edouard Lecerf, 21–30. Paris: Seuil. Raison du Cleuziou, Yann. 2018. Sens commun: un combat conservateur entre deux fronts. Le Débat 199 (2): 105–199. Richard, Gilles. 2017. Histoire des droites en France. Paris: Perrin. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2012a. Discours de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, candidat à l’élection présidentielle, notamment sur la Nation et la frontière, à Toulouse le 29 mai 2012. http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/123000880.html. Accessed 23 May 2017. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2012b. Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy: Place du Trocadéro, Paris – mardi 1er mai 2012. http://palimpsestes.fr/quinquennat/interlude/ sarkozy_discours/mai_discours_trocadero.pdf. Accessed 4 June 2020.

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Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2016a. Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Saint-André-lez-Lille, June 11. http://www.lesrepublicains53.fr/2016/06/11/discours-de-nicolassarkozy-a-saint-andre-lez-lille/. Accessed 3 June 2020. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2016b. Tout pour la France. Paris: Plon. Teinturier, Brice, and Vincent Dusseaux. 2016. Fractures françaises 2016 Vague 4: Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po. Data collected online between 15 and–19 April 2016 from a sample of 1013 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/fractures-francaises-2016-repli-et-def iance-au-plus-haut. Accessed 22 November 2020. Veron, Michel, and Philippe Lesaffre. 2012. Bayrou vote Hollande sans donner de consigne: les dessous d’une décision historique. L’Express, May 3. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/bayrou-vote-hollande-lesdessous-d-une-decision-historique_1111038.html. Accessed 23 May 2017.

CHAPTER 5

The Centre Right and the Challenges of Economic Reform

Introduction In the previous chapter, we saw how debate around the axis of identity destroyed the unity of Les Républicains, undermined its alliance with Centrist movements, and threatened the continued existence of the party as a significant force in French politics. In this chapter, we will show how economic liberalism provided another of the axes that structured the new alignment of parties. While this issue was less divisive that of identity within Les Républicains, it was equally decisive in the party’s defeat in the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, and the subsequent disintegration of the movement that followed. Analyses of the attitudes of the French towards capitalism in contemporary society, such as those of Waters (2012) and Jennings (2006), have focused on the population’s suspicion of liberal policies. However, opinions had been evolving since the 1980s, and belief in the need for liberal measures among voters grew during the Hollande presidency. Traditional ideological divisions were weakening in this area, as many were willing to consider what they felt might be practical solutions to improve the French economic situation. A large proportion of the electorate was now more open to pro-business measures, and keen for a balance between liberal economic reform and state protection. The reduction in traditional ideological differences applied not just to the electorate but also to political parties, among which there existed a © The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_5

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‘consensus of government’. Since 1982–1983, when Mitterrand decided to abandon the policies to expand the state, that he had promised in his manifesto, in favour of an approach that gave a greater role to private enterprise, the Centre Left and Centre Right had often enacted similar liberal economic measures when in power. Following the inability of the PS to respond effectively to the economic crisis during the Hollande presidency, it had been predicted that Les Républicains would win the presidential elections of 2017. One of the main reasons that the Centre Right failed to do so was that it lost its role as the party best able to represent the ‘consensus of government’ over liberal economic policy. It was Emmanuel Macron and En Marche who came to represent the growing reformist trend, by offering a programme that balanced liberal economic policies with the preservation of some elements of state protection. Many on the Centre Right overestimated the change in public attitudes, and put forward programmes that involved a major reduction of the role of the state in the economy. This was particularly the case for Fillon. While he would win the Primary of the Right and Centre thanks, in part, to his particularly liberal economic programme, his policies would be attacked by rivals in the presidential elections as ‘brutal’, and they would alienate a significant number of voters, who considered his programme to be too radical. This loss of support started several months before Le Canard Enchaîné published its allegations relating to what became known as the Penelopegate scandal. The effects of the economic aspect of the reorientation of the party system would not end with the presidential and legislative elections of 2017, but would continue to represent a threat to the future of Les Républicains as a united political force during the Macron presidency.

Long-Standing French Concerns About Liberalism Under the Fifth Republic Under the Fifth Republic, many parties and voters in France of both the Centre Left and the Centre Right had long supported stateinterventionist policies, and been wary of any increase in the role of the private sector. Even those who had looked to introduce some liberal reform had often done so cautiously and in the face of widespread opposition from the general population.

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Part of the explanation for this attachment to the state is that as the Trente Glorieuses period of rapid growth and the development of the social security system occurred at a time when the government played a major role in directing the economy, many had come to associate a strong public sector with a model which produced both economic growth and protected its citizens. As Gordon and Meunier (Smith 2004; 72) note: Because the 1950s and 60s saw a large increase in state benefits, like social security and generous health care and pension benefits, many French people remember dirigisme fondly […] This favourable judgement – in contrast, for example, to Great Britain, where many people had judged their interventionist state a failure by the 1980s – would later contribute to France’s difficulty in adapting to the requirements of globalisation. Why, many French people felt (and continue to feel), fix something that is not fundamentally broken?

Voters were attached to a state-driven approach not only because they considered it to be economically successful and beneficial for its citizens, but also because they saw it as being part of French national identity. As Smith (2004; 2) states, one reason why state spending is seen as positive by many sections of the population is that it is considered to represent the second part of the Republican triptyque, égalité, as being a means to reduce inequality. This view is shared by Waters (2012; 8), who writes, ‘In France, identity is bound with a conception of the state which protects its citizens, redistributes wealth and guarantees equality’. It is supported by an Ipsos poll conducted in December 2016. Although 58% of all voters surveyed (including 76% of supporters of Les Républicains and the UDI) thought that the role of the state in the economy should be reduced, a majority considered that ‘The State does not intervene enough in the economy to reduce social inequality’, with 74% of all voters and 57% of the supporters of Les Républicains and the UDI agreeing with this statement (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016b; 10). It is therefore clear that the view that the state should play a greater role in reducing inequality was shared even by some of those favourable to liberal economic reform. While a large public sector was believed to be an element of French identity, in contrast, liberal economic policies were often considered to be part of a foreign, Anglo-Saxon system. Hayward (1994) and Jennings (2006) both note that historically, French identity was in part defined against an English, and later British and American ‘other’, often

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grouped together under the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’. Now that military conflict between these nations belongs to the past, much of the opposition within France to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ practices refers to economic policy. As Jennings (2006; 538) states, ‘the “Anglo-Saxon model” is a coded allusion to a whole series of things that are adjudged to be at once foreign and dangerous, most notably the “neo-liberal” market economy, globalization, and Atlanticism’. An example of this could be seen in 2009, when Sarkozy claimed that ‘the crisis arose from a problem with an AngloSaxon model, I want the world to see the victory of a European model that has nothing to do with the excesses of financial capitalism’ (P.A. 2009). This perception that liberal reform is ‘Anglo-Saxon’ rather than French has encouraged resistance to economic policies aimed at making the economy more competitive. As Fougier recognises, ‘What the French reject are the inequalities of a society entirely dominated by market forces, which demand continuous adaptation to improve the performances of the economic machine’ (Waters 2012; 19). Under the Fifth Republic, this view had historically been shared by those on both the Left and the Right, and was the case even among those who argued most strongly for liberal economic policies. For example, Sarkozy had promised ‘a peaceful break’ (L’Express 2006) when he was candidate for the 2007 presidential elections, that would involve in part changes in economic policy. However, as Waters (2012; 42) notes, ‘[h]e saw the Republic as the pioneer of a new moral order that would overcome the excesses of Anglo-Saxon liberalism’. These views heightened opposition to economic reform within France, because, as Smith (2004; 15) observes, ‘since labour market reforms originated in Thatcher’s UK, change is associated with an unpopular foreign model’. As we shall see later, this was a problem that Fillon would encounter during his campaign for the presidential elections, when his radical economic policies were often seen as foreign and alien to France and French traditions. In addition to these long-standing attitudes towards state intervention, the evolution of the French economy from the 1970s, which moved away from manufacturing towards a larger services sector, also increased hostility to liberal reforms, and distanced sections of the electorate from the traditional parties of government. As we have seen in the first chapter, Guilluy (2014; 87) has demonstrated that new divisions have appeared among the French population, which cut across traditional class divides.

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Many former industrial towns have suffered from the loss of manufacturing jobs, particularly due to competition from countries where labour is cheaper, and in an increasingly globalised economy, employment is now concentrated in large metropolitan centres. Sections of the blue-collar working class and lower middle class have suffered the consequences of this and feel increasingly alienated from parties of both the Centre Left and the Centre Right, both of which advocate liberal measures. Many members of these social groups have turned to the FN, which offers a more protectionist, state-driven approach. This opposition to the effects of globalisation and liberal economic policies would prove particularly difficult for Fillon, as while voters from the Far Right might support his policies on national identity and social values, many would be alienated by his economic proposals. Political parties had often hesitated to abandon a state-driven approach because a significant section of the electorate had been particularly wary of any liberal economic alternative. In 2009, a BBC World Service Globescan/PIPA poll, carried out in 27 countries, found that France had the largest minority opposed to free-market capitalism, with 43% believing that a new economic system was needed (Perrineau 2012; 148). France was also the country with the third highest proportion of respondents wanting greater state intervention in business regulation, behind Brazil and Chile, with 76% in favour, compared with 73% of those from Spain, 56% of those from Britain and 45% of those from Germany (Perrineau 2012; 148). This position was confirmed by the finding that 57% of the French wanted greater state control of businesses (Perrineau 2012; 148). Policies of state intervention therefore not only represented an ideological position adopted by political parties, but also reflected the wishes of significant sections of the electorate. Another reason why parties had been wary of reshaping the economy was that previous attempts by the Right to do so had been politically disastrous. Schweisguth (2003; 401) argues that Chirac’s decision to stand on a platform of economic liberalism was largely responsible for his defeat by Mitterrand in the presidential elections of 1988. Later, in 1995, after Chirac had won the presidential election with a campaign based on the ‘social fracture’, his reforms to reduce the size of the public sector, and particularly his pension reform measures, led to the RPR losing the legislative elections called in 1997 (Amable and Palombarini 2017; 46). Similar opposition to liberal measures could also be seen under the Sarkozy presidency, where although he had been elected following a

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campaign in which he had insisted on breaking with traditional practices (Hewlett 2011; 2), a series of strikes and demonstrations, combined with the economic crisis that started in 2008, meant that most of the promised reforms were either abandoned or emptied of much of their more radical content. As Grant and Wilson (2012; 174) have noted: [Sarkozy] won election in 2007 on a campaign platform as close to market liberalism – or the “Anglo Saxon model of capitalism” – as imaginable for a French presidential candidate. But once the crisis hit, he changed his discourse entirely, becoming the champion of renewed “state capitalism” through calls for greater interventionism at the national level and his push for coordinated state regulation at the international level. In the end, he produced neither the extreme market liberalism of his campaign promises nor the old-fashioned state dirigisme of his initial crisis discourse, although he did produce both liberalizing reforms and statist actions.

Despite the economic crisis, calls for budget discipline within the Eurozone, and his own campaign promises, state spending rose under Sarkozy’s presidency, from 52.2% of GDP in 2007 to 56.8% of GDP in 2012 (Ifrap 2017; 8). The opposition that economic reforms had often produced, particularly when they had come from the Right, and his own past experience of the mass demonstrations against pension reforms when he was president, may go some way to explain why Sarkozy was less radical than Fillon in his economic proposals during the campaign for the Primary of the Right and Centre in 2016. All the factors above suggested that candidates proposing wide-ranging reform in the 2017 elections might struggle to win over an electorate traditionally suspicious of liberal measures, yet the fact that an increasing number of people considered that a reduction in the size of the state was necessary to improve the performance of the French economy would encourage them to do so.

The Evolution of Attitudes Towards the French Economy: A Rise in Demand for Liberalism Although large sections of French society have traditionally been attached to state intervention, attitudes had been changing for some time and changed rapidly during the Hollande presidency. The continuing

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economic crisis from 2008, the failure of successive governments to overcome unemployment through interventionist methods, and the decline in French economic performance in relation to other countries, particularly Germany, meant that increasing numbers of voters were willing to accept that some kind of liberal reform might be required. This evolution of attitudes towards the economy is revealed in a series of opinion polls. In the Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises polls, in response to the statement: ‘To revive growth, it is necessary to limit the role of the State in the economy as much as possible and to give businesses as much freedom as possible’ 50% said that they agreed in January 2014, rising to 57% in April 2016 (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016a; 56). The change was characterised by de Montvalon and Courtois (2015), responding to the 2015 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey, as ‘Socialist supporters are moving to the Right’. Similar support for liberal measures was found by a Kantar Sofres poll for the Banque de France in November 2016, according to which 59% of those surveyed were in favour of policies to ‘further liberalise French economic activity, for example by privatising certain public services or by opening certain sectors of the economy to competition’ (Kantar Sofrès 2016; 20). The popularity of Emmanuel Macron, who was named Economy Minister in the Valls government in August 2014, and became particularly associated with the decision to adopt more economically liberal policies, provides further evidence of the shift in public opinion away from support for traditional statist solutions. 59% approved of his actions in a poll in April 2016. Of these, not only was there a large section of supporters of the Right who had a favourable opinion of him (79%), but 63% of PS supporters were also satisfied (AFP 2016a). Such figures demonstrate the widespread support among the potential voters of both established parties of government for measures to reduce state regulation of businesses. One of the key reasons for this development concerned the failure of successive governments to lower the unemployment rate, which had not fallen below 7% since 1983 (Tirole 2016; 326). This became a central issue during the Hollande presidency. The President had promised in September 2013 to reduce unemployment within a year, but the percentage of the active population out of work rose from its level of 9.7%, when Hollande entered office in 2012, to 10.2%, in the third quarter of 2015, before falling back to 9.3% by the first quarter of 2017 (Pommiers and Delrue 2017).

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In addition to the level of unemployment, a fall in the competitiveness of the French economy on the world stage also encouraged support for reform. France had run a budget deficit since 1974 (Pedder 2012; 28), and by 2012, it was the highest in the Eurozone (Baverez 2012; 94). Whereas France has historically considered itself to be the joint leader of Europe, with Germany, during the Hollande presidency the great difference in economic performance between the two countries challenged this perception (Hau 2014; 62). According to the OECD’s calculations, in 2013, GDP per capita in France was 14% lower than that in Germany (Hau 2014; 65). In the same year, France had an overall trade deficit of 61 billion euros, whereas Germany had an overall trade surplus of 199 billion euros (Hau 2014; 77). Although both countries’ share of global exports had fallen between 1998 and 2012, for France the decline was steeper, by 4.2% per year, compared with 1.4% for Germany (Hau 2014; 76). In light of these differences, it was difficult for France to claim to be an equal partner in Europe, and losing this status was no doubt one reason why an increasing number of French people felt that their country was in decline. Surveys provide further evidence that French economic performance in comparison to other countries was not only a concern for the government, but also for the population as a whole. In 2014, an Ifop poll for L’Opinion found that 75% of French people felt that their country was poorly placed to compete with other nations in the global economy, a figure that had risen by 25 points since 2006 (Bertrand 2015; 94). 73% believed that France had not done enough to remain competitive when faced with globalisation (Bertrand 2015; 94). A majority felt that France was in decline, with 86% agreeing with this idea in April 2016 (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2017; 9). These surveys show that many voters agreed with the principle that liberal economic reform had to be carried out, even if they disagreed on the precise measures that should be implemented. The failure of traditional methods to improve economic performance through state intervention is another feature that explains the rise in support for an increased role for the private sector in the French economy. The view that large tax increases hindered, rather than helped, French economic recovery is supported by a report by the Commission des finances, which noted, ‘according to the estimates of the Insee, during the period 2012-2014, the fiscal measures affecting both businesses and households had a negative impact on growth by an average of 0.9 points per year’ (de Montgolfier 2016; 13). The report also stated that

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‘the executive faced growing discontent among taxpayers. The early rise of opposition in Autumn 2012, symbolised by the “mouvement des Pigeons” gave way to a generalised feeling of discontent with the taxation measures’ (de Montgolfier 2016; 8). While other countries saw a significant increase in the proportion of their population in work, with unemployment at 4.7% in Germany and 5.6% in the UK in 2015, high taxes in France arguably undermined steps to reduce its unemployment rate, which stood at 10.2% in June 2015 (Eurostat Press Office, June 2015), with the OFCE concluding ‘the size of the fiscal shock at the start of the [Hollande] presidency […] would not allow a fall in unemployment during the first half of the term in office’ (OFCE 2016). We can therefore argue more generally that, rather than protecting the traditional French social model, increased taxation had worsened the economic situation, and encouraged a growing number of voters to accept the idea of liberal reform. Many began to lose faith in proposals for state intervention, which they thought were unrealistic during a period of economic crisis. As Sylvestre notes, summarising the responses of voters in opinion polls during the 2017 presidential election campaign: In this presidential election campaign, no candidate escapes from the drift towards populism. All of them promise once again spending plans that will never be funded. What is new today, and this is demonstrated by studies, is that the public listens to the promises, and may even support them for a brief time, as can be seen in opinion polls, but what is important is that those who listen to the promises no longer consider them to be credible. (Sylvestre 2017)

The change noted by Sylvestre could be seen in the public’s reaction to the Parti Socialiste presidential candidate Benoît Hamon’s proposal to create a universal income. 73% opposed this measure on the grounds that it would cost too much to implement and require massive tax rises— a view which cut across social classes. While a majority of those in the poorest sections of society approved a universal income in principle, 66% opposed it, considering it to be a ‘utopian idea’ (Ifop-Fiducial pour Sud Radio 2017; 6). Rather than spending being increased, many voters thought that it should be reduced. This was shown in an Ipsos poll in 2016, where 61% of all voters believed that spending cuts were the most important measure needed to lower the deficit (supported by a majority

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from all parts of the political spectrum, apart from the Far Left [Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016b; 21]). It is therefore clear that the attitudes of a significant section of French society towards economic policy had evolved, and that many voters wanted a new balance between the public sector and private enterprise that reduced the level of state intervention in the economy. Any candidate who wished to be successful in the presidential elections of 2017 would have to find a way of achieving this, while at the same time managing concerns relating to the place of the private sector in the French economy. The challenge would prove particularly difficult for the Centre Right. Fillon, as the presidential candidate of Les Républicains, paid little attention to traditional attachments to the state and emphasised on the need for change. Macron would offer an alternative programme, which, for many voters, seemed to offer a better balance between reform and protection.

The Decline of Traditional Ideological Conflicts, and the ‘Consensus of Government’ Over Economic Policy The increasing desire for liberal reform during the Hollande presidency demonstrates how economic policy is an area where there are many signs that might point to what could be called a ‘consensus of government’. This is not to say that all policy differences in this area have disappeared, but that French governments of both Centre Left and Centre Right have implemented similar policies designed to make the economy more competitive. In many cases, it has been the Left that has been able to go further in this area than the Right (for example, see Hewlett 1998; 88). This convergence has not only concerned political parties, but also the electorate, as supporters of the Centre Left and Centre Right have both supported liberal reform. As Schweisguth (2003; 402) notes, ‘in the ideological conflict, where everyone designates their enemy in order to disqualify him, the opposition between capitalism and collectivism prior to 1980 has been replaced by that between statism and economic liberalism’. Although he is writing before the Hollande presidency, he identifies a trend, that, as we have seen in this chapter, would intensify after 2012.

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Under Hollande, as the Socialist government introduced measures to encourage the growth of the private sector, the convergence in the policies supported by the established parties of government continued. As we have seen in Chapter 2, although Mitterrand had talked of a break with capitalism in the 1970s (Grunberg 2011; 100), and had won the 1981 elections on a manifesto that promised a significant expansion of the public sector through a programme of nationalisations (Le Monde diplomatique 2012), France’s economic difficulties forced him into a U-turn with the promotion of private enterprise. A similar, if much less drastic, evolution took place during the Hollande presidency. During the 2012 campaign, Hollande had hardened his rhetoric on economic policy in order to appeal to those on the Left, who might be tempted to vote for Mélenchon. In his Discours du Bourget, Hollande stated: I will tell you who my enemy, my real enemy is. It has no name, no face, no party, it will never stand for election, it will therefore never be elected, and yet it governs all the same. This enemy is the world of finance. (Hollande 2012)

He went on to describe the world of finance as an ‘empire’ (Hollande 2012), and later that month, pledged to tax those whose annual income was over 1 million euros at 75%. Yet, in 2014, the government changed direction. In January, plans were announced for the Pacte de Responsabilité, whereby the contributions paid by businesses would be reduced in return for employing more workers. Further signs of this change in attitude were given by government reshuffles. Following the Ayrault government’s failure to reduce unemployment, Manuel Valls, then a popular figure from the Right of the Socialist party, became Prime Minister in March 2014. At the summer conference of the MEDEF employers’ union, he announced, ‘I love business’ (franceinfo 2014), a phrase which echoed that of Mitterrand in 1984, namely, ‘It is business that creates wealth’ (Mitterrand 1983). The previous day, Emmanuel Macron, a former Rothschild banker, who was at that point not a member of any party, had been appointed Minister for the Economy. This was part of a reshuffle following the departure of three key figures of the Left of the PS, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît Hamon and Aurélie Filipetti, who had disagreed with the Prime Minister over the move away from the emphasis on the role of the state as presented in the 2012 PS manifesto.

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The party itself split over this issue, when from March 2014 a Frondeur group was formed in the National Assembly to argue in favour of state intervention, and to oppose the policies of Valls and his ministers. However, from 2014, economic policy was in the hands of those more supportive of liberal measures, thereby placing the government closer to the Centre Right opposition, which also recognised this trend. In 2015, Nicolas Sarkozy, then party leader, said that if ‘Monsieur Macron believes what he says […] then in that case he must leave the government in all haste and join us, because we believe the same thing’ (BFMTV 2015). This convergence was not only visible in the choice of ministers, but also in the policies that were implemented. For example, among the measures included in the Loi Macron, passed in 2015, the number of Sundays when large shops could open was raised to 12, previously protected professions (particularly in the legal sector) were opened to competition, employment tribunal practices were simplified and a cap on redundancy payments was introduced (LOI no 2015-990). In 2017, the Loi Travail made further changes to the law governing redundancy, in the hope that businesses would be more willing to take on workers, if they knew that they could more easily make them redundant, should the economic situation worsen. This law also allowed employees to work up to 60 hours a week in exceptional circumstances (Ministère du Travail 2016). In many cases, the response of the Centre Right to the Loi Macron and the Loi Travail was not to argue that the measures proposed were wrong, but rather that they did not go far enough, further demonstrating the convergence between the Centre Left and Centre Right in this area (see Berretta 2016; Waintraub 2014). During the debate concerning the Loi Macron, Fillon objected that ‘All this represents good intentions, that I do not wish to mock, but it is not enough to deal with the situation!’ (Assemblée Nationale 2015). The Centre Right reacted in a similar fashion in 2016, in relation to the Loi Travail . Copé claimed that ‘we were tempted to vote in favour of this reform’ (Assemblée Nationale 2016), and praised certain aspects, stating: ‘Of course, the original draft went even further. It was right to want to develop direct social dialogue within businesses. It was right to want to limit employment tribunal awards based on a scale. It was right to want to simplify the rules governing apprenticeships’ (Assemblée Nationale 2016). The only reason for his refusal to vote for the law was that many of the more radical measures it had originally proposed had been abandoned by the government (Assemblée Nationale 2016).

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To argue that there is a near consensus between parties of government over economic policy does not mean that there exists agreement across the whole of the political system. The parties of the Far Right and Far Left both criticised the policies pursued under Hollande, and argued for a greater role for the state. In response to the Loi Macron, Marine Le Pen reflected traditional concerns seen earlier in the chapter. She claimed that the law represented the imposition of a foreign model decided by global institutions, which would threaten traditional protective measures. She stated: This text is in fact a summary of all the demands expressed by Brussels over many years: deregulation of professions to benefit big corporations over small businesses, waves of privatisations, the Americanisation of our society through Sunday trading… There is nothing to be expected from these outdated formulae, neither growth nor job-creation. This is all the more true as all the taboos of the European Union have been deliberately excluded, whether that is the monetary question, protectionism or economic patriotism. However, these are the very measures that need to be considered in order to revive the economy and industry. (Le Pen 2015)

The Front de Gauche voiced a similar critique, stating: Behind its formally disorganised and sectorial character, this text has a clear and general message based on a coherent doctrine: one that calls into question the social State through the application of old, neoliberal measures. (Asensi et al. 2015)

While the radical parties of Left and Right continued to disagree with those in the Centre over economic policy, they also provided some evidence that differences between the Centre and the Extremes were being reduced, even if for pragmatic, rather than ideological reasons. During the 2017 presidential election campaign, Marine Le Pen dropped her commitment to leave the euro, when signing a pact with Nicolas Dupont-Aignan. While the FN remained opposed to French membership of the European Union, the party realised that many voters believed that a withdrawal from the euro would create deep economic problems, and so moderated its position, in order to widen its electoral appeal. A similar development could be seen on the Far Left. While 75% of Front de Gauche supporters supported a universal income, 51% believed

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that this was a ‘utopian’ idea, because the cost of implementing it would be too high and involve large tax rises (Ifop-Fiducial pour Sud Radio 2017; 5). More surprisingly, 49% of Front de Gauche supporters believed that a universal income would encourage people to rely on the state and reduce the value of work (Ifop-Fiducial pour Sud Radio 2017; 5). While criticising the liberal economic system, the radical parties also recognised that they would have to obey some of its constraints. There appeared to be a further weakening of economic divisions between the parties of government and the Centre electorate of both Left and Right within France during the Hollande presidency, and a widespread acceptance of the need to work within the constraints of the global capitalist system. As we shall see later, the changes in the attitudes of both political parties and a large number of voters towards liberal capitalism would ensure that one of the key contests between political movements in 2017 would be over who could best respond to the growing acceptance of the need for liberal measures.

The Weakening of Traditional Ideological Attachments and the Growing Move Towards Reform Following the reduction in ideological differences between the established parties of government, which we examined in the first two chapters and above, there has been a decline in voters’ attachment to particular parties that used to be considered as representing the interests of their class. Voting has become more a matter of individual choice rather than the expression of a class identity. As Schweisguth (2003; 381) notes, there has been, ‘an evolution towards the valorisation of the individual over the social group to which he or she belongs’. This could in part be seen in evolutions in the structure of the French economy. By contrast with the situation in the past, where blue-collar jobs in particular conferred a sense of community on sections of the industrial working class, the expansion of employment in the white-collar sector, and particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises, mean that it is more difficult for workers to organise in a communal fashion (Perrineau 2012; 72). We have also seen in the first chapter, as Perrineau (2012; 73) argues, that rather than sharing a single class identity, members of the working class became increasingly divided into different groups with different

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desires, according to factors such as age, employment status and national origin, and that this has encouraged the development of individualist attitudes. This was not only a change that affected debate over questions of national identity and social values, but also one that concerned economics. In this context, voters were more concerned with the impact they perceived that proposed economic measures would have on their own lives than with a desire to express a class identity. The importance of individualism in influencing voting habits regarding economic issues was clearly seen in the 2012 presidential elections. Reynié (2016; 186) argues that one of the reasons for Hollande’s success was that ‘[v]oters seemed to believe that, although Sarkozy was the best candidate to lead France, Hollande was better than him when it came to improving people’s lives […] The electorate seemed to separate the question of the role of France in the new global economy from the question of their standard of living’. This was one of the features that would undermine Fillon in 2017, as his goal, to ‘make France the primary European power within 10 years’ (Fillon 2017b), seemed to come at the expense of the economic wellbeing of many French citizens. An Odoxa-Guibor poll from April 2017 showed that 60% felt that Fillon’s proposals would have a negative impact on their own economic situation, the same number who feared that Le Pen’s policies would be harmful for them personally, and far behind Mélenchon, who was thought to have the best programme for the French people, with 38% believing that his victory would have a positive impact on their lives economically (Furbury 2017). The situation in 2017 differed from that in 2012, in that while voters’ consideration of what the impact of each presidential candidate’s policies would be on them personally remained important in influencing their choice of candidate, it was less of a concern than the need for a president who would be able to resolve the economic problems facing France. Fillon was also unable to convince voters in this area, and his failure to do so worked to the advantage of Macron. While the leader of En Marche was rated behind Mélenchon when people were asked which candidate’s policies would benefit them most, he was ahead of all candidates when people were asked who had the best economic policies for France (Furbury 2017). The choice of Macron as president (despite the attraction many felt for Mélenchon’s programme) showed that voters seemed to accept that they would have to work within the constraints of the global economy.

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Having argued that there was a growing consensus of government concerning economic questions, the next part of this chapter will consider the effects of debate over economic policy on the Centre Right, and the role of economic policy in the defeat of Fillon in 2017.

The General Consensus Within Les Républicains over Economic Policy We have seen in the previous chapter how debate over national identity and social values split Les Républicains into two camps: the Traditionalists and the Modernists. This divide was not present in discussion over economic policy, where all candidates agreed in principle on the need for a reduction in the size of the state sector. While such programmes were presented in varying ways, the actual difference between the measures each candidate proposed was one of degree, and mostly concerned the pace of reform, with Fillon placing more emphasis on the need for more rapid change than his rivals. While this enabled him to win support among the Centre Right electorate during the primary, the difference between his policies and those of Sarkozy and Juppé was not so great as to cause major fractures within Les Républicains or to prevent the party rallying behind him following his selection as the presidential candidate. The difference in approach to economic policy between the three main candidates could be seen in the language that they used when discussing their proposals, and, to some extent, differences in the programmes were exaggerated by the rhetoric chosen by each candidate. Fillon spoke of the need to ‘break the mould’ (casser la baraque) (BFMTV.com 2016). In contrast, Sarkozy and Juppé talked more of finding a balance between the public and private sectors. Sarkozy emphasised the need to reform at a more measured pace. While he recognised that France had to become more competitive economically, unlike Fillon he also stressed the importance of protecting the French model where possible, arguing that ‘this does not mean at all that we should sacrifice our way of life or even reconsider all of our basic social rights’ (Sarkozy 2016a; 216). Later, he emphasised the need for gradual reform, and stated: ‘It is often necessary to coerce public opinion, but one must never break the thread of dialogue. Because, once this is broken, not only is the necessary reform halted, but things start going backwards’ (Sarkozy 2016a; 235). Whereas, as we shall see later in the chapter, Fillon was often likened by both his supporters and his opponents to Margaret Thatcher, Sarkozy was keen

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to distance himself from such comparisons, claiming that following the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ strategies of the 1980s would not work in an era of mass communication. He stated: ‘The age of Margaret Thatcher or of Ronald Reagan is the equivalent of the Middle Ages in the lifetime of the media. The importance of social media, of 24-hour news channels, the immediacy of information and its universality have completely changed the rules. One must now hold firm without breaking anything. One must move forward without being destructive’ (Sarkozy 2016a; 235). He also looked to calm French fears about liberal capitalism by arguing, ‘I have never been a die-hard supporter of liberal economics’ (Sarkozy 2016b; 117). Juppé, while advocating economic reform, also argued that he had no deep ideological attachment to economic liberalism, stating, ‘I am a liberal out of pragmatism’ (Juppé 2016; 50), and claimed that he wanted to ‘create a new balance in relations between the State, French society and the French economy’ (Juppé 2016; 64). We can see that while all three candidates proposed similar measures, Fillon emphasised the need for a particularly fast transformation of the French economy, while Sarkozy and Juppé looked to respond to traditional French fears about liberal reform, promising a more measured pace of change. Although Fillon’s rhetoric was more radical, his programme shared common principles with those of Sarkozy and Juppé. The difference between them concerned mostly the manner of their implementation. I. Reducing the Size of the State Sarkozy, Juppé and Fillon agreed that the size of the French state should be reduced, that greater priority should be given to the private sector, and that there should be large cuts in public spending. There was little disagreement over the principle or the amount by which spending should decrease. Juppé (2016; 217) proposed that a reduction of between 85 and 100 billion euros should be made, while Sarkozy argued that the figure should be 100 billion euros (Bensoussan 2016), and Fillon 110 billion euros (Schaeffer and Ficek 2014). There were some differences in the manner in which they proposed to achieve this aim. While all agreed in principle that the number of public sector workers needed to be reduced, they disagreed on how many jobs should be cut. Juppé (2016; 219) argued for a reduction of 250,000– 300,000 people working in the public sector, Sarkozy believed that this number should be 300,000 (Sarkozy 2016b; 46), while once again Fillon

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was the most radical, arguing that there should be 500,000 fewer jobs in the state sector (Pommier 2016). This divergence could also be seen in the proposals concerning the pension age, where once again Fillon argued for a more rapid pace of reform than his rivals. Both Fillon (Fillon 2015; 107) and Juppé (2016; 122) were in favour of raising the pension age to 65, although Fillon proposed that this change should take place by 2022 (Lemarié 2016; 9), while Juppé (2016; 122) argued that it should rise more gradually. Sarkozy, perhaps influenced by the protests against his decision to raise it from 60 to 62 during his presidency, proposed a more gradual rise to 63 by 2020, then 64 by 2025 (Sarkozy 2016b; 32). He argued that reforming in this way would reduce the number of protests against the measure, and therefore save more money (Sarkozy 2016b; 32). II. Improving Competitiveness As well as seeking to reduce the size of the public sector, the candidates also agreed on the need to make the French economy more competitive by reducing the number of regulations and employer costs. Sarkozy, Juppé and Fillon all believed that the French economy was being restricted by over-regulation and excessive taxation, and promised to reduce the pressures on businesses in order to encourage them to increase employment (see Juppé 2016; 27, 207; Sarkozy 2016b; 99–100, 106; Fillon 2015; 120, 125). Among the other measures debated concerning the competitiveness of the French economy, a relaxation of the provisions of the law on the 35-hour week was a key area, where all three main candidates argued for reform. While this law, passed by the Jospin government in 2000, had aimed to reduce unemployment by limiting the number of hours employees could work, thereby forcing employers to take on more staff, many believed that it had a negative impact on the French economy overall. Hau (2014 83) argues that: this measure provoked a negative competitivity shock in the French economy. From 1999, the hourly cost of labour in the manufacturing industry rose twice as rapidly as in Germany. Those most affected were export companies, which lost markets […] The profit margin of French businesses plunged to 22% for industrial businesses, whereas it rose beyond 40% in Germany.

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The effect of this, it was argued, had been to make France less competitive than its European rivals. While labour cost 34.80 euros per hour in France, it cost 30.90 euros per hour in Germany, 26.60 euros per hour in Italy and 20.90 euros per hour in Spain (Borey et al. 2015; 56). Rather than improving the French economic situation, the 35-hour week had arguably worsened it. All three leading candidates proposed giving more flexibility to businesses to define the length of their own working week. Sarkozy argued that businesses wishing to end observance of the 35-hour week could do so with the support of their employees. Should no agreement be reached, then workers would vote on the matter in a referendum (Sarkozy 2016b; 21). Alain Juppé held a similar view, stating that negotiations should be opened within businesses to decide the length of the working week, with the maximum set at 39 hours (Juppé 2016; 73). Both candidates agreed that in return, salaries would be increased to match the increase in working hours (Juppé 2016; 73; Sarkozy 2016b; 29). Once again, Fillon went further than his rivals, arguing that the 35-hour week should be completely abandoned, and the maximum length of the working week would be fixed in French law at the European limit of 48 hours (Fillon 2015; 119). Questions such as salary increases, and rules on overtime would be left to businesses and their employees to negotiate (Fillon 2015; 119). A similar pattern could be observed in the proposals for the public sector. Sarkozy (2016b; 45) argued in favour of increasing the working week to 37 hours with a comparable rise in salary, while Juppé (2016; 75) put forward a similar approach to the one he proposed for the private sector—negotiations between employers and employees over the number of hours that should be worked, while salaries would rise in proportion to the increase in productivity that would be achieved. Once again, Fillon (2015; 120) favoured a more stringent approach, stating that the working week should be set at 39 hours in the public sector, with targeted salary increases based on the savings made by increasing efficiency. Nonetheless, there was general agreement between Sarkozy, Fillon and Juppé over the nature of the economic reforms required by France. Their solutions were based on similar principles, even if there were differences of degree. In this way, economic liberalism did not pose a problem of troubling internal party unity, unlike the other two axes of the new model. Fillon’s slightly more radical proposals encouraged voters to support him in the primary, since, as we have seen above, a large majority

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of supporters of Les Républicains favoured increased liberal economic reform. 33% of those who voted for Fillon stated that they had done so because ‘he really wants to change things’ (ELABE 2016a; 23). While Fillon was only one point ahead of Sarkozy in this area, it is notable that voters for these two candidates prioritised different issues. Those who chose the former prime minister emphasised the importance of economic factors in making their decision, with 58% stating that Fillon’s position on ‘the economic situation’ had determined their choice, and 40% were particularly convinced by his approach to public spending. In contrast, Sarkozy voters chose their candidate’s position on ‘security’ (55%) and ‘immigration’ (53%) as the most decisive factors in convincing them to support the former president (ELABE 2016a; 28). It was clear that Fillon represented a general desire for rapid liberal economic reform among the core electorate of Les Républicains, with a key emphasis on breaking away from many of the traditions of French economic policy based on a large state. However, the presidential elections would demonstrate that this position would prevent him from winning the support of many floating voters, as a large section of the French electorate was still keen on finding a softer compromise between state intervention and reform. What had been one of Fillon’s strengths in the primary would become a weakness in the presidential elections. To understand how the Centre Right found itself in difficulty in May 2017, we must compare its proposals to those of other parties, and to do this, we need to consider a new model of party alignment.

Les Républicains and the Realignment of the French Party System We have seen that under the Hollande presidency, while a significant section of the population still remained attached to substantial state intervention in the economy, a growing number believed in the need to relax some of the regulations governing businesses. It would be necessary for candidates in the 2017 presidential elections to be able to put forward a programme that would satisfy those in favour of reform without alienating other potential voters. In order to explain why Fillon was successful in the primary, but then failed to win the presidential elections (in part because of fears among the electorate concerning his economic proposals), we must first consider the realignment of the French party system, that developed further during the Hollande presidency. This realignment affected

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parties in different ways, depending on which issue was discussed. We have already seen how the question of national identity and social values divided Les Républicains into two camps, the Modernists and the Traditionalists, with the Modernists closer to the Centre and the Left, while the Traditionalists sought to attract FN voters. Yet, we have also seen that while this division was valid for the question of identity, it was not for the issue of economic liberalism. In the presidential elections of 2017, the question of economic liberalism split parties into two main groups: those in favour of liberal reform and others which opposed it. This did not mirror a Left/Right divide, as the extremes of Left and Right, and the PS candidate Benoît Hamon, put emphasis on protecting the role of the state, while Les Républicains and En Marche supported its reduction. The realignment according to separate axes, rather than the traditional bipolar arrangement, created problems for the Centre Right, as its position on economic reform risked alienating voters who supported its policies on identity. The demand for state intervention by sections of the FN electorate has been recognised by Perrineau, who has devised the term ‘gaucholepénisme’ (‘left-lepenism’) (Perrineau 2017; 13). Rather than simply being an extension of the Right, the FN rejects liberal capitalism. This has enabled the party to partially take over the role of representing significant sections of the working classes, formerly held by the Communists (Perrineau 2017; 64). The phenomenon of ‘gaucho-lepénisme’ is clearly linked to the realignment of parties that we have observed in this book. As Perrineau notes, under the Fifth Republic, whereas there was, until the mid to late 1970s, a clear class divide between the blue-collar working class which supported the Left and upper management which voted for the Right, nowadays ‘Left-wing parties do noticeably better among those at the top of the social pyramid than among those at the bottom’ (Perrineau 2017; 57). As we saw in Chapter 2, from the early 1980s, the PS adopted a programme based on reconciling liberal capitalism with liberal social values. This appealed to the middle classes, but distanced many members of the bluecollar working class, who had once formed a bastion of support for the Centre Left (Perrineau 2017; 57). Some of these turned to the FN, with 30% voting for Marine Le Pen in the presidential elections of 2012 (Perrineau 2017; 57), and 39% doing so in 2017 (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 20).

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Fillon’s failure to win over many blue-collar working-class voters would be important in his defeat in the presidential elections. It is true that this section of society is smaller than in the past (representing only 20% of the working population in 2016, compared with 30% between 1982 and 1984.) (see Beck and Vidalenc 2017; 2; Châteauneuf-Malclès 2017; 2) However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, one of the reasons for Sarkozy’s success in the 2007 presidential elections was that he had been able to win the votes of a significant proportion of blue-collar voters. Fillon’s economic programme would alienate this section of the electorate, and undermine his chances of being elected president. The issues that Perrineau identifies as driving blue-collar workers to support the Far Right were at odds with those represented by the candidate of Les Républicains. It was opposition to liberal economic policies that were decisive in this area. Perrineau notes that ‘the denunciation […] of the injustice created by ultraliberalism and globalisation, the call for a State responsible for protectionist and redistributionist measures, and one which will lead reindustrialisation, are all ideas that are well received by blue- and white-collar workers’ (Perrineau 2017; 66) While Fillon aimed to introduce liberal measures to make France more competitive in the global market, Marine Le Pen had attacked such policies in her first speech as party leader in 2011, criticising ‘the dogma of ultraliberalism and of laisser-fairism of the good pupils of globalisation’ (Perrineau 2017; 67). In contrast to the Centre Right, which believed that intervention by the state needed to be reduced, Le Pen wanted to increase its role, stating ‘the State is the key. We must rediscover the State by putting it in the service of the people […] the State has become the backbone of the France we love’ (Perrineau 2017; 67). This difference was demonstrated in the measures proposed by FN, which were the direct opposite of those defended by Fillon. While the Centre Right wanted to repeal the law on the 35-hour week (Fillon 2017a; 7), the FN pledged to maintain it (Le Pen 2017; 9). In contrast to Fillon, who wanted to raise the retirement age (Fillon 2017a; 10), the FN supported lowering it to 60 (Le Pen 2017; 8). As Perrineau notes, ‘In 2017, two thirds of the economic measures advocated by the Front National are still borrowed from the Left’ (Perrineau 2017; 68). Fillon’s programme, therefore, was not one that would appeal to a significant section of the FN electorate. The rejection of Fillon’s programme by a large number of those who shared the FN’s views on economic policy could be seen in opinion polls.

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Analysts have shown that there are different FN electorates. Fourquet (2013) claims that one of these can be seen in former industrial towns in the North, where voters are looking for greater state control of the economy, and another in the South, more drawn to the Far Right’s policies on immigration, with a more liberal stance on economic matters. Perrineau (2014; 51) sees three divisions—between supporters of the party who come from a bourgeois right background, and others who have more working-class origins and are much less right wing; between people from former industrial areas in the East, and others, who are often older, from the West, and finally, between rural voters and those in urban areas. In both analyses, we can see that those who are wary of liberal economic policies make up an important proportion of the Far Right electorate. This can be seen in the results of the presidential elections. While 39% of blue-collar workers voted for Marine Le Pen, only 6% chose Fillon (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 20)—far behind the score achieved by Sarkozy in the first round of the 2007 presidential elections, when he had won 26% of the votes of this group (Strudel and Le Hay 2007), and less than half that in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, when Sarkozy received 14% from the same section of society (Ifop-Fiducial 2012; 10). The economic programme of Les Républicains for the presidential elections was therefore a major factor in alienating one of the sections of the electorate whose support would have been needed for the Centre Right to be successful. While in 2017, Les Républicains’ economic policy cut them off from many of the voters on the Far Right, who wanted a more statist approach, the party also failed to win the support of voters in the Centre, and others close to the Right wing of the Socialist Party (whose views were represented in the National Assembly by figures such as Manuel Valls), who wanted liberal economic reform and so were unable to support Hamon. In previous elections under the Fifth Republic, the economic failure of a government of the Left had always been followed by the victory of the Right and vice versa. It had been predicted that this would be the case in 2017. A Cevipof study in 2016 found that, if the candidates for the PS and Les Républicains were to be Hollande and Juppé, respectively, then 17% of those who had voted for the PS candidate in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections would support the Les Républicains Mayor of Bordeaux in 2017 (Foucault 2016; 4). The failure of Juppé to win the Primary of the Right and the Centre and the emergence of Emmanuel Macron changed this dynamic, as this

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meant that Les Républicains ceased to be the sole alternative to the PS for those wanting liberal reform. Macron’s candidacy brought a decisive change since the need to resolve the economic problems facing France dominated voters’ concerns, as could be seen in an Ipsos/Sopra Steria poll concerning those who said they were certain to vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. This showed that purchasing power was cited by 27% as the main factor that influenced their choice of candidate, while unemployment was the third most decisive factor with 25% mentioning this (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 12). As we shall see later, many voters, particularly those who classed themselves as supporters of the Centre or close to the Right of the PS, who, in view of the struggles of Hollande and the Socialist government to reduce unemployment, might have been expected to vote for the candidate of Les Républicains, instead rallied behind the candidate of En Marche (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 13). Macron would occupy a significant amount of the territory that had previously been the preserve of the Centre Right. Rather than supporting Fillon’s more hard-line programme, large numbers of voters in favour of liberal economic reform preferred Emmanuel Macron, who appeared to strike a balance between giving more freedom to businesses, while at the same time recognising that the state had a role to play in the French economy. His position was strengthened when many supporters of the PS, who wanted economic reforms, did not share the more statist vision of Hamon, and turned to the candidate of En Marche (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 13). The role that Fillon’s economic proposals played in his failure in the 2017 presidential elections can be seen in surveys carried out before the Penelopegate scandal. Following his success in the Primary of the Right and Centre in November 2016, he was predicted to receive the highest score of any candidate in the first round, with around 30% of the vote, ahead of Marine Le Pen with around 24% of the vote and Macron between 14 and 17% (figures which assumed that Bayrou would stand) (ELABE 2016b). By the 5 January 2017, Fillon’s predicted score had fallen to 23–25% of the vote (assuming Bayrou would stand), while Macron gained 3–4% and the estimation of those who would vote for Le Pen did not change (ELABE 2017; 12). When the hypothesis that Bayrou would not stand and that Hamon would be the PS candidate was tested, Fillon was predicted to receive 26%, Le Pen 24% and Macron 23% (ELABE 2017; 12). Fillon was, therefore, already losing support before

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the Penelopegate scandal broke. The ELABE survey of 5 January 2017 put forward the reasons for this as: The post-primary momentum measured at the end of November seems […] to be waning, the debate over the elements of [Fillon’s] programme relating to health and social protection probably contributing to this. As a reminder, in an Elabe survey for Les Echos and l’Institut Montaigne, dated 8 December 2016, 90% of French voters considered that reducing public expenditure on health was “not acceptable”. (ELABE 2017; 7)

As Fillon’s position weakened, so Macron’s improved. Not only did his projected share of the vote increase, but so did his popularity in relation to Fillon. An Odoxa poll from December 2016 found that, given a choice between Macron and Fillon, 55% felt that the candidate of En Marche would make the better president, compared with 39% who chose the representative of Les Républicains (6% did not express a preference) (Odoxa 2016; 16). By January, it seemed as though Macron was already very close to qualifying for the second round, and that, should he be present in the run-off, he would have a reasonable chance of being elected president, ahead of Fillon. Rather than being the sole or main reason for Fillon’s failure to be elected president, Penelopegate would accentuate a trend that was already occurring, and which was driven, at least in part, by fears concerning the economic programme of the candidate of Les Républicains. Macron was able to benefit from Fillon’s struggles, as he offered a balance between liberal reform and protection. He stated in his programme: ‘The society that I want will be at the same time freed from constraints and blockages and protective of the most vulnerable’ (Macron 2017a; 4). While he planned to reduce public expenditure, he proposed to make 60 billion euros worth of cuts (Challenges.fr 2017), rather than the 110 billion supported by Fillon. This balance was also visible in the measures proposed to improve competitivity. Macron promised to reduce charges on employers to encourage them to hire more workers (Macron 2017a; 8), but to increase the taxes on those who only engaged employees on short-term contracts (Macron 2017a; 8). In this way, Macron pledged to reform at a gentler pace than Fillon. While the differences between Fillon and his rivals in the primary had been a question of degree, in the presidential elections of 2017, Macron and Fillon disagreed over principles as well. The candidate of En Marche’s emphasis that liberal

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economic reforms should be accompanied by some protective measures was generally absent from debate on the Centre Right. Unlike Fillon, who argued that the French model was unsustainable, Macron’s programme protected many key elements of the existing system. The pension age would not be raised (Macron 2017a; 15), and the law on the 35-hour week would be made more flexible (Maligorne 2017), but not repealed. Unlike Fillon, he accepted that some concessions would have to be made to those who were attached to a protective state. Macron’s rhetoric was also gentler than that of Fillon, as in his speech following the results of the first round, when he pledged to be ‘a president who protects, who transforms and who builds’ (Macron 2017b). This language contrasted with that of Fillon, who, as we have seen, promised a much deeper and more rapid transformation of the French economy. The reaction of the electorate to the positions of the candidate of En Marche and that of Les Républicains could be seen in polls. An Ipsos/Sopra Steria poll of those who said they were certain to participate in the first round of the presidential elections found that 55% considered Fillon’s programme to be worrying, while only 39% felt the same about Macron’s proposals (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 17). Although the question addressed each candidate’s programme as a whole, without identifying particular policy areas, given the long-standing suspicion of liberal economic reform among certain sections of the electorate, and the drop in support for Fillon that occurred when some of his economic proposals were debated after the primary, it seems almost certain that the economic policies of the candidate of the Centre Right were a significant factor in making his programme a cause of concern for these voters. The success of Macron’s balanced approach in winning support for reformist measures has been shown in analyses of the voting behaviour of different socio-economic groups. While, as might be expected, he won 37% of the vote of those in managerial positions, he also received 15% of the votes of blue-collar workers, the third highest percentage behind Le Pen (39%) and Mélenchon (25%) but far ahead of the score achieved among this group by his other rivals (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 20). Analyses of voting behaviour also showed how Macron was able to overcome a traditionally bipolar system and position himself as the candidate of reform to appeal across the party divide. He won 29% of the votes of UDI supporters, and 43% of PS supporters (Ifop-Fiducial 2017; 21), who might otherwise have voted for the candidate of the Right, particularly if this had been Juppé (Foucault 2016; 4). It was Macron gaining the

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support of these groups, who would have been expected to vote for the candidate of Les Républicains, that was a crucial factor in Fillon’s defeat. Macron’s ability to present himself as the candidate capable of reforming the French economy, while at the same time acknowledging the desire for protection on the part of certain sections of the electorate, was aided by Fillon’s particularly radical proposals which alienated many voters. As we shall now see, Fillon’s programme was characterised, by his opponents both in the primary and in the presidential elections, as ‘brutal’ and against French traditions—an electoral strategy which resonated with many voters.

François Fillon as Anti-French We have seen how Fillon’s programme based on key liberal reforms enabled him to win the primary, but failed to garner much support from beyond the traditional Centre Right electorate. In the case of FN supporters, this was because many were looking for more protectionist measures and opposed further liberalisation of the economy, whereas many voters in the Centre, in favour of liberal economic reform, were concerned that Fillon’s proposals went too far. Fillon’s opponents cast his economic programme as ‘brutal’ and anti-French, heightening the fears of many sections of the population about its radical nature, and preventing him from building a broad coalition of support. The success of the use of the term ‘brutal’ to describe Fillon’s programme demonstrates the difference between voters on the Centre Right and those supporting other parties. While there was widespread acceptance among the established parties of government that a liberalisation of the French economy was needed, Les Républicains argued for much greater change than did its rivals. In the second round of the primary, Alain Juppé said that Fillon’s programme was ‘very brutal in terms of social policy’ (franceinfo 2016). As we have discussed in the previous chapter, during this contest, Juppé received a significant amount of support from supporters of parties of the Left, who wanted to stop Sarkozy becoming the candidate (Fourquet and Le Bras 2017; 119). Calling Fillon’s proposals ‘brutal’ was part of Juppé’s strategy of exaggerating the differences between their economic programmes, even though these were more of emphasis than substance and concerned the pace of change rather than principle (and the Mayor of Bordeaux was keen to outline that his own proposals were ‘just as bold […] but realistic’

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[franceinfo 2016]). This was the same approach that, as Fourquet and Le Bras explain, Juppé used when he tried to frighten Modernist voters by claiming that Fillon’s programme on identity was a threat to their vision of society, a feature that we have also analysed in Chapter 4. This strategy failed in the primary because, on the one hand, it did not convince many on the Centre Right, and on the other hand, as Fourquet and Le Bras (2017; 119) note, many Left-wing supporters who had voted in the first round did not participate in the second round, their aim to eliminate Sarkozy having already been achieved. Juppé’s criticisms would have little impact on the primary, but would subsequently undermine Fillon during the presidential election campaign. While the accusation that Fillon’s programme was ‘brutal’ failed to have an effect on those on the Centre Right, it was soon picked up by rivals from other parties, and used to reinforce the idea that he represented a danger to the French model. Macron talked of Fillon ‘recycling the old recipes’ (Herreros 2017) and supporting ‘an extraordinarily brutal and unjust programme’ (Herreros 2017). The same criticism was also made by Marine Le Pen’s campaign manager, David Rachline, who spoke of Fillon’s ‘crazy economic programme’ (AFP 2016b) in November 2016. The FN leader herself stated, during the presidential election campaign, that Fillon had ‘an extremely brutal programme for the French people’ (Haddad 2017). Whereas these criticisms had not been successful when made by Juppé, they were much more damaging coming from the opponents of Les Républicains, and when addressed to the wider electorate of the presidential elections, as we shall see below. Fillon’s rivals in the presidential elections of 2017 also exploited traditional concerns about liberal economic policies being ‘Anglo Saxon’ and not French, to dissuade the electorate from voting for him. As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, liberal economic policies have often been considered to be those of America or Britain, and the opposite of a French model designed to protect its citizens from extreme capitalism. Fillon himself encouraged comparisons between his policies and those of Britain in particular, stating, ‘I would like to leave as great a mark on history as that of Mrs Thatcher’ (Pecnard 2016). Such comparisons with Britain were not limited to the 1980s. Fillon’s own micro-party, Force Républicaine, defended his programme, in the face of those who said that it was impossible to implement, by stating ‘Under Cameron, the UK reduced the number of people working in the public sector by 500 000,

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unemployment fell from 8.3 to 5.4% and 1.8 million jobs were created. Yes, François Fillon’s programme is possible!’ (Force Républicaine 2017) While such comparisons were seen as positive by those on the Centre Right, his rivals in the presidential elections used them as a weapon against him. The Left-leaning newspaper, Libération, placed a photograph of Fillon’s face on an image of Margaret Thatcher, calling his programme ‘ultraconservative’ and ‘ultraliberal’ (Libération 2016). For the FN, the regional councillor Bertrand Dutheil de la Rochère claimed that the candidate of the Right represented the combination of Thatcher and Reagan (AFP 2016b). In the Centre, Emmanuel Macron criticised his rivals Fillon, Mélenchon and Le Pen as representing ‘a choice between Mrs Thatcher or Trotsky, Fidel Castro or Maurras’ (Baralon 2017). Fillon’s rivals sought to portray his programme as particularly un-French, and the fact that, as we have seen above, many voters found his proposals worrying, suggests that they were successful. The extent to which these criticisms of Fillon’s proposals were shared by the French population as a whole was revealed in polls. An Ipsos/Sopra Steria survey found that while the candidate of Les Républicains received 36% of the votes of pensioners, he only managed to attract 8% of whitecollar workers (24% fewer than Marine Le Pen, and 11% fewer than Macron, 5% of blue-collar workers (32% fewer than Le Pen, and 11% fewer than Macron and 13% of mid-level professionals (6% fewer than Marine Le Pen and 13% fewer than Macron) (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 5). Although he did better among those in management, receiving 20% of votes cast by this group, he was only 1% ahead of Mélenchon and 13% behind Macron (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 5). Fillon’s economic programme was therefore certainly one of the key factors that contributed to his defeat.

Conclusion The problems encountered by François Fillon during the presidential elections of 2017 stemmed in part from a failure by the Centre Right to respond effectively to the realignment of the French party system over economic policy, and to adapt to the concerns of the electorate relating to economic liberalism. Under the Fifth Republic, French governments have historically supported the existence of a strong, interventionist state, and this has been popular with the French people. They have seen dirigisme not

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merely as key to creating a successful economy, but have also traditionally believed a protective state to be part of their national identity. In contrast to more economically liberal countries, such as Britain and the USA, which are seen as promoting untamed capitalism and the ‘survival of the fittest’, the French model was believed to be protective of its citizens and to promote equality. This view was still held by a significant section of the population during the Hollande presidency. The French economy continued to be characterised by a large state sector, and polls consistently showed that France was one of the European countries where the population was most sceptical about liberal capitalism. However, the attitudes of a growing number of French citizens towards the economy were beginning to evolve, as successive governments had failed to resolve long-standing problems, and there was a growing acceptance of the case for some level of liberal reform. In domestic terms, many were concerned that, rather than promoting equality, the existing system was protecting those in state jobs at the expense of the rest of the population. The failure to resolve the issue of unemployment, which had remained high for decades, also encouraged a change of attitude. On the international stage, whereas France had liked to consider itself a leader in Europe, its poor economic performance clearly showed that it was now Germany which had the most influence within the EU. In order for France to improve its economic position, it was generally agreed by those in the Centre that the role of the state would have to be reduced. The increasing turn towards liberal economic policies has been part of the process of a wider decline in traditional ideological divisions between parties. As we saw in the first chapter, historic links between socio-economic groups and parties had been in decline since the 1970s. Mitterrand’s abandonment of the Socialist experiment in favour of a greater role for business in the economy in the early 1980s started a period of convergence between the Centre Left and Centre Right over economic policy. Following Mitterrand’s U-turn in the 1980s, politicians from both sides of the divide often enacted similar economic policies when in power, and so we might talk of a ‘consensus of government’ in this area. This was also seen during the Hollande presidency, particularly with the appointment of Emmanuel Macron as Minister of the Economy, who was responsible for the introduction of several liberal economic measures. There was a wide acceptance by parties and voters across the Centre Left and Centre Right of the need to reduce the role

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of the state and give support to private enterprise. Under the Hollande presidency, economic policy was not a Left/Right issue but one where a large number of voters in the Centre were looking for a candidate who would offer a balance between liberal reform and state protection. Whereas on the other two axes of our model, the Centre Left and Centre Right adopted different positions, it was their proximity on the economic axis that was the cause of problems for Les Républicains. The realignment over economic policy was symbolised by the emergence of Emmanuel Macron, who benefitted from divisions within the Parti Socialiste to present himself as an alternative to the Centre Right in representing the ‘consensus of government’ in favour of liberal economic reform. The PS was split between those who supported liberal policies and the Frondeurs who remained favourable to state intervention. Hollande’s inability to reduce unemployment was a key factor in his decline in popularity and was a major reason for his decision not to stand for reelection. However, the inability of the Socialist government to resolve the economic problems that faced the country did not discredit the move towards liberal policies that had occurred during his presidency. Many voters believed that it was the failure to implement these effectively, rather than the measures themselves, that was responsible for the continued poor performance of the French economy. This can be seen by the fact that Macron was able to win the presidential elections, despite having been the Economy Minister between 2014 and 2016. The radical parties which continued to resist the liberalisation of the French economy also provide evidence to support the idea that there had been a weakening of traditional ideological divisions over economic issues. The FN, while opposed to French membership of the European Union, found that its stance on the euro alienated many voters who might have considered supporting the party, including those who shared its position on the EU in general, as they feared that returning to the franc would cause deep economic problems. Among supporters of La France Insoumise, while many believed in the principle of a universal income, they felt that this measure would be impossible to implement in the prevailing economic climate. In 2017, it was clear that a significant number of voters from all sides were placing pragmatism ahead of ideological preferences. Approaching the new direction of French party politics with reference to a model containing three axes not only helps to explain the relationship between parties, but also helps to highlight the effect that different issues

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have had within political movements. Convergence of opinion in support of liberal economic reform was particularly strong within Les Républicains. In contrast to the question of identity, there was much agreement on the Centre Right that measures needed to be introduced to reduce the size of the state and make France more competitive in the global economy. Juppé, Sarkozy and Fillon all agreed that state spending should be cut, that the pension age needed to be raised, that the law on the 35-hour week needed to be made more flexible and that business contributions should be reduced. They shared the same overall approach to the nature and mechanics of economic reform. The differences between their policies were a question of pace, rather than principle. Fillon, as the most radical, was able to secure support for his programme among a Centre Right electorate that was increasingly keen on a rapid economic transformation. Nor did it seem as though he would struggle to unite his party behind his economic programme. Yet, Fillon’s insistence on the need for a rapid liberalisation of the French economy, which had contributed to his victory in the primary, proved to be a handicap, when it came to gathering support beyond the Centre Right, and played a significant role in his defeat in the 2017 presidential elections. Although, as we have seen, there had been a rise in demand for liberal economic reform, there was still much attachment to a strong state. Many among the wider electorate wanted a balance between these elements that Fillon’s programme did not provide. While some FN supporters may have been wary of certain aspects of the Far Right’s economic policy, such as the return to the franc, a significant number still supported its proposals to increase state intervention, and were opposed to deep cuts in the public sector. Fillon was therefore unable to win support from many within this group. The struggle to win votes from the Far Right further demonstrated the problems posed to Les Républicains by the reconfiguration of the French party system, problems which have been highlighted by our new model. While FN voters might be in favour of Fillon’s identity proposals, they would not support him because of differences over approaches to economic issues. In a multidimensional system, where parties were aligned differently on different axes, transfers of allegiance became much less predictable. Fillon’s presidential hopes were further hindered by the new alignment of parties. He was not only rejected by those on the Far Right, who did not share his vision of the reforms needed to improve the

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French economy, but was also unable to win over those in the Centre, and beyond, who were disappointed with Hollande, and wanted more freedom for businesses. These voters turned instead to Macron, who challenged the position of Les Républicains to be the sole representative of liberal economic reform. His programme also proposed liberal measures, but ones that were less extreme than those defended by Fillon. A decisive number of reformist voters preferred the policies of the candidate of En Marche, who promised change, but in a way that would be more in keeping with French traditions. Macron’s programme recognised the importance of maintaining some protective measures, a feature which was absent from that of his rival on the Centre Right. That a significant proportion of the electorate chose to transfer their support from Fillon to Macron, after the primary but before the Penelopegate scandal, at a time when Fillon’s economic programme was becoming a focus of debate, confirms the impact of the realignment of the political system over the question of economic policy on the failure of the Centre Right in 2017. The effects of the realignment continued beyond May 2017. In Edouard Philippe’s government, appointed after the legislative elections, many of the key economic positions were given to former members of Les Républicains. The Centre Right therefore found itself in a position where it could only oppose Macron by arguing that he was not going far enough in modernising the French economy—the very stance that had undermined them during the 2017 elections. As Macron had won the presidency by presenting himself as the candidate with the programme of liberal economic reform that seemed best suited to French society, the consequences of the defeat of Les Républicains would not end in May 2017, but would remain an unresolved challenge for the future of the Centre Right.

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Hau, Michel. 2014. France-Allemagne: chronologie d’un décrochage. Revue française d’histoire économique 2 (2): 62–84. Hayward, Jack. 1994. Ideological Change: The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Impetus. In Developments in French Politics, ed. Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward, and Howard Machin, 15–32. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Herreros, Romain. 2017. Pour Emmanuel Macron, François Fillon veut “réaliser le rêve de Patrick Buisson”. HuffPost, April 3. http://www.huffingtonpost. fr/2017/04/03/pour-emmanuel-macron-francois-fillon-veut-realiser-le-revede_a_22023373/. Accessed 2 December 2017. Hewlett, Nick. 1998. Modern French Politics: Analysing Conflict and Consensus since 1945. Oxford: Polity Press. Hewlett, Nick. 2011. The Sarkozy Phenomenon. Exeter: Societas Imprint Academic. Hollande, François. 2012. L’intégralité du discours de François Hollande. Le JDD, January 22. http://www.lejdd.fr/Election-presidentielle-2012/Act ualite/L-integralite-du-discours-de-Francois-Hollande-au-Bourget-467953. Accessed 25 November 2017. Ifop-Fiducial. 2017. Le profil des électeurs et les clefs du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle: 23 avril 2017, April 23. Data collected online on 23 April 2017 between 11 am and 6 pm from a sample of 3668 people representative of the population of mainland France aged 18 and over. https://www.ifop.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/3749-1-study_file.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2020. Ifop-Fiducial pour Le Monde, Paris Match et Public Sénat. 2012. Premier tour de l’élection présidentielle 2012: profil des électeurs et clés du scrutin: Sondage Jour de vote 22 avril 2012. Data collected on 22 April 2012 online from a sample of 3509 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over listed on the electoral roll. https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/03/1848-1-study_file.pdf. Accessed 15 November 2020. Ifop-Fiducial pour Sud Radio. 2017. Les Français et le revenu universel, January 25. Data collected online between 18 and 20 January from a sample of 1503 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-francais-et-le-revenu-universel/. Accessed 1 January 2019. Ifrap. 2017. Société civile: Le Mensuel de la Fondation Ifrap: Bilan 2007–2017 fiscalité, dette, dépenses publiques, chômage, February 16. https://www.ifrap. org/budget-et-fiscalite/bilan-2007-2017-fiscalite-dette-depenses-publiqueschomage. Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour francetélévisions, radiofrance, LCP Public Sénat, rfi, France 24, Le Point et Le Monde. 2017. 2017 élection présidentielle: 1er tour présidentiel: Comprendre le vote des Français. Data collected online between 19 and 22 June from a sample of 4698 people representative of the French

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population aged 18 and over. https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/1er-tour-presid entielle-2017-comprendre-le-vote-des-francais. Accessed 30 April 2020. Jennings, Jeremy. 2006. France and the “Anglo-Saxon” Model: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. European Review 14 (4): 537–544. Juppé, Alain. 2016. Cinq ans pour l’emploi. Paris: JC Lattès. Kantar Sofres. 2016. Les Français et l’économie: Une étude Kantar Sofres réalisée par KANTAR PUBLIC pour la Banque de France, November. Data collected by telephone interviews between 13 and 15 October 2016 from a sample of 1009 people aged 18 or over. https://www.citeco.fr/sites/default/files/doc uments/Enquête%20Kantar%20Sofres%20JECO%202016.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2018. Lemarié, Alexandre. 2016. Economie: ce que proposent les prétendants à droite. Le Monde, September 2. Le Monde diplomatique. 2012. 110 propositions pour la France : Programme de gouvernement préparé par le Parti Socialiste (PS) pour l’élection présidentielle d’avril-mai 1981. Le Monde diplomatique. https://www.monde-diplomatique. fr/mav/124/A/51865. Accessed 17 November 2018. Le Pen, Marine. 2015. Loi Macron: L’UMP et Bruxelles en rêvaient, le PS le fait ! Communiqué de Presse de Marine Le Pen, Présidente du Front National. frontnational.com, January 28. www.frontnational.com/2015/ 01/loi-macron-lump-et-bruxelles-en-revaient-le-ps-le-fait/. Accessed 25 November 2017. Le Pen, Marine. 2017. 144 engagements présidentielles. L’Express.fr. 2006. Sarkozy promet une”rupture tranquille” L’Express.fr, November 30. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/sarkozy-prometune-rupture-tranquille_461571.html. Accessed 3 December 2017. Libération. 2016. Moi Président. Libération, November 22. Macron, Emmanuel. 2017a. Emmanuel Macron président: «Retrouver notre esprit de conquête pour bâtir une France nouvelle»: Programme. Macron, Emmanuel. 2017b. Soirée électorale du 1er tour - Discours d’Emmanuel Macron, April 23. https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/declar ation-emmanuel-macron-23-avril-2017. Accessed 2 December 2017. Maligorne, Clémentine. 2017. Retraites, chômage, 35 heures…Macron détaille son programme. Le Figaro, March 2. http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/ 2017/03/02/20002-20170302ARTFIG00076-retraites-assurance-chomagemacron-detaille-son-programme.php. Accessed 2 December 2017. Ministère du Travail. 2016. Loi Travail 2016. https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/arc hives/archives-courantes/loi-travail-2016/. Accessed 31 December 2018. Mitterrand, François. 1983. Réponses de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, au questionnaire de la revue “Challenge”, Paris, décembre 1983. https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/134566-rep

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onses-de-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-au-quest. Accessed 15 November 2020. Odoxa. 2016. Le grand débrief: François Fillon: levée d’embargo vendredi 23 décembre à 6H: Sondage Odoxa pour franceinfo, December. Data collected online between 21 and 22 December 2016 from a sample of 1015 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. http://www.odoxa.fr/sondage/desormais-francais-pensent-macron-fer ait-meilleur-president-fillon/. Accessed 30 April 2020. OFCE. 2016. Le quinquennat de François Hollande: enlisement ou rétablissement, September 5. https://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/pbrief/2016/pbr ief02.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2017. P.A. 2009. Nicolas Sarkozy ne veut pas d’une «politique de rigueur». lefigaro.fr, December 1. http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2009/12/01/04016-200 91201ARTFIG00440-nicolas-.php. Accessed 6 January 2019. Pecnard, Jules. 2016. Primaire à droite: l’admiration de François Fillon à Margaret Thatcher. L’Express, November 21. https://www.lexpress.fr/actual ite/politique/primaire-a-droite-les-declarations-d-amour-de-francois-fillon-amargaret-thatcher_1852519.html. Accessed 2 December 2017. Pedder, Sophie. 2012. Le déni français: les derniers enfants gâtés de l’Europe. Paris: JC Lattès. Perrineau, Pascal. 2012. Le choix de Marianne: Pourquoi et pour qui votons-nous?. Paris: Fayard. Perrineau, Pascal. 2014. La France au front. Paris: Fayard. Perrineau, Pascal. 2017. Cette France de gauche qui vote FN . Paris: Seuil. Pommiers, Eléa, and Maxime Delrue. 2017. Emploi: Les modestes résultats du quinquennat Hollande. Le Monde, April 27. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-dec odeurs/article/2017/04/27/emploi-et-chomage-le-mediocre-bilan-du-qui nquennat-hollande_5118948_4355770.html. Accessed 24 December 2018. Pommier, Sébastien. 2016. Fillon et Juppé peuvent-ils supprimer autant de postes de fonctionnaires? L’Express, November 22. https://www.lexpress.fr/ actualite/politique/elections/fillon-et-juppe-peuvent-ils-supprimer-autant-depostes-de-fonctionnaires_1853015.html. Accessed 14 November 2018. Reynié, Dominique. 2016. The Impact of Issues on Electoral Choice. In The 2012 French Election: How the Electorate Decided, ed. Pascal Perrineau, 169– 187. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2016a. La France pour la vie. Paris: Plon. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2016b. Tout pour la France. Paris: Plon. Schaeffer, Frédéric, and Isabelle Ficek. 2014. François Fillon «La France est à la veille d’un accident financier grave». Les Echos.fr, September 30. https:// www.lesechos.fr/30/09/2014/lesechos.fr/0203820061512_francois-fillon —la-france-est-a-la-veille-d-un-accident-financier-grave-.htm. Accessed 30 December 2018.

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Schweisguth, Etienne. 2003. Déclin et recomposition des cultures politiques. In Les Cultures politiques en France, ed. Serge Berstein, 377–414. Paris: Seuil. Smith, Timothy B. 2004. France in Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strudel, Sylvie avec la collaboration de Viviane Le Hay. 2007. Le Panel Electoral Français CEVIPOF Enquête post-électorale présidentielle 2007: Nicolas Sarkozy Analyse sociodémographique et politique des votes. Sylvestre, Jean-Marc. 2017. Fillon, Macron: les candidats de la crédibilité économique face à ceux des promesses irréalisables. Atlantico, March 14. http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/fillon-macron-candidats-credibiliteeconomique-face-ceux-promesses-irrealisables-2990072.html/page/0/1. Accessed 28 November 2017. Teinturier, Brice, and Vincent Dusseaux. 2016a. Fractures françaises 2016 Vague 4: Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po. Data collected online between 15 and 19 April 2016 from a sample of 1013 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://www.soprasteria.com/docs/librariesprovider29/Publicati ons-Ipsos/fractures-francaises-vague4-ipsos-soprasteria.pdf?sfvrsn=4. Accessed 22 November 2020. Teinturier, Brice, and Vincent Dusseaux. 2016b. Les Français, l’économie et la réforme de l’Etat: Sondage préparé pour la 18 ième édition du livre d’économie. Ipsos, December. Data collected online between 28 November and 5 December 2016 from a sample of 1000 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ files-fr-fr/doc_associe/la_journee_et_le_prix_du_livre_deconomie_2016_vdef. pdf. Accessed 22 November 2020. Teinturier, Brice and Vincent Dusseaux. 2017. Fractures françaises 2017 Vague 5: Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour le Monde, la Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po «Programme Viepol». Data collected online between 21 and 27 June 2017 from a sample of 1000 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://jean-jaures.org/sites/default/files/fractures_ francaises_2017.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2020. Tirole, Jean. 2016. L’économie du bien commun. Paris: PUF. Waintraub, Judith. 2014. Loi Macron: L’UMP et l’UDI concentrent leurs critiques sur la méthode Le Figaro, December 9. http://www.lefigaro.fr/pol itique/2014/12/09/01002-20141209ARTFIG00357-loi-macron-l-ump-etl-udi-concentrent-leurs-critiques-sur-la-methode.php. Accessed 18 November 2018. Waters, Sarah. 2012. Between Republic and Market: Globalization and Identity in Contemporary France. London: Continuum.

CHAPTER 6

Europe and the Realignment of the French Party System

Introduction In this chapter we will examine how Europe formed the third axis of the new party system, and combined with both the others, to cause some supporters of Les Républicains, and many of those of the Independent Centre parties to vote for Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 presidential elections, at the expense of the candidate of the Right.1 There has been much disagreement between scholars over the importance of Europe in the realignment of the French party system during the Hollande presidency. Some, such as Gougou and Persico (2017) and Martin (2017), overlook Europe as an issue, while others, such as Fourquet (2017) and Schön-Quinlivan (2017), subsume it into their analysis of a new divide in French society between the winners and losers of globalisation. Yet debate over France’s place in Europe was not simply a matter of economic issues. As we shall see, a significant number of those on the Right, who supported liberal economic policies, were at the same time concerned about the cultural and political consequences of globalisation that might result from a more federal and integrated Europe. As a result, as Grunberg (2015) and Perrineau (2012) have demonstrated, European issues must be understood in their own right, and not merely as an extension of other debates, particularly those concerning economic globalisation.

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Since 1945, questions relating to France’s position within Europe had been particularly divisive for the Right and had often brought it into conflict with potential allies in the Centre. These two political traditions agreed over several matters of principle: that a European project was a way of maximising French power, that it should be independent of other superpowers and should represent not only an economic union but also a cultural community. What they disagreed upon was how to achieve these aims. Those on the Gaullist Right, who saw the nation as an ideal community, had often supported a Europe of Nation States, feeling that this structure could enable France to maintain control of its own destiny, while maximising its influence on the world stage. In contrast, many in the Centre believed that a federal structure would best enable France to fulfil these goals and had an idealised vision of Europe. The historical divisions between the Right and the Centre that had existed since 1945 were mirrored by those within Les Républicains. During the Hollande presidency, there was still a crucial divide on the Right between those who were particularly federalist, and others who wanted to maintain a strong role for nations. Debate was not simply about different policies but involved opposing visions of what type of Europe should be created, to which both politicians and voters were emotionally attached. Juppé and many of his supporters would be alienated by the position taken by Fillon, who, wary of certain aspects of integration, wanted greater priority to be given to the role of nation states within the Union. Questions relating to sovereignty and federalism, which had long caused division within the Right, would be crucial in undermining unity within Les Républicains. It was the presence of Emmanuel Macron on the political scene that caused Europe to become a factor that threatened both Les Républicains’ chances of regaining power and also the continued existence of the party as a united entity. This is the reason why much of this chapter focuses on the 2017 elections. Previously, the UDI and MoDem had lacked a leader capable of rallying sufficient public support to win elections, and so, while retaining their independence, they had often concluded electoral alliances with the Right. In 2017, the vision of the candidate of En Marche was very close to that of the Independent Centre parties, and so, to many of their supporters, he appeared to be a leader who best represented their position on this issue. Macron’s appeal was not restricted to Centrists, as he also attracted the support of pro-European politicians and voters from both the Right and the Left. Juppé istes, who were alienated

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by Fillon’s stance on identity and who wanted a more positive approach to Europe, as well as those from the Left, unwilling to support Hamon, favoured Macron’s position. Prior to the first round of the presidential elections, a sufficient number of supporters of the UDI and Les Républicains switched their vote to Macron to allow the candidate of En Marche to gain the largest section of the vote in the first round and prevent Fillon from being present in the second round. Europe was not the crucial issue that decided the outcome of the election, and, in terms of the axes of our new model, it was less important than both identity and economic liberalism. However, it reinforced the effect of these to encourage further support for Macron. The realignment of the party system continued beyond the presidential elections, as the divisions over the issue of Europe that were revealed within Les Républicains during the election campaign were not ended by Fillon’s defeat, and continued to destabilise the party.

Europe: A Key Divide in the New Party System There has been much debate concerning the importance of differences of opinion over Europe within the French party system during the Hollande presidency. Some see this as being a key issue that divides voters and political movements in modern France and claim it was crucial during the 2017 presidential elections (see Costa 2017). Others ignore Europe as a factor of division in its own right, seeing it only as part of the broader issue of globalisation (see Fourquet 2017; Schön-Quinlivan 2017). The truth lies somewhere in between these two positions. Europe was not as important as questions of identity and economic policy in determining the result of the election. However, it did play an important role in the defeat of Les Républicains, by contributing to the rise of Emmanuel Macron, who was able to attract voters with a positive vision of Europe, and by undermining the alliance between Les Républicains and the UDI. Among those who have questioned the role of Europe in the elections of 2017, Gougou and Persico (2017, 314) argue that ‘the political space at the 2017 presidential election is hence shaped by two cleavages. The most important conflict dimension […] opposes anti-immigration authoritarian and socially conservative views to pro-immigration and culturally liberal opinions […] The second conflict dimension[…]features neoliberal, pro-globalization, productivist opinions on the one hand, and

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anti-globalization, ecologist stands on the other’. A similar approach is shared by Martin (2017). Analysis of the factors that determined voters’ choices in 2017 lends support to those who do not consider Europe as constituting a third axis. In the Ipsos/Sopra Steria survey of which three issues had most influenced their vote in the first round of the presidential elections, only 18% stated ‘European questions’, placing it well behind the main three reasons which were purchasing power (mentioned by 27%), immigration (26%) and unemployment (24%) (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017, 12). However, although European questions were not particularly important for a large number of voters, they did have an influence on some in determining their choice of candidate. When asked to name the factors that had convinced them to support him in the first round of the presidential elections, voters for Emmanuel Macron placed European issues in third place,—25% of them stating that Europe was important to them, compared to unemployment (32%) and spending power (30%) (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017, 14). The emergence of a strong, proEuropean, Centrist pole should therefore be considered important, as it enabled Macron to gain support, and also divided the traditional parties of government on the Left and Right.

Nuancing the ‘Winners Vs Losers of Globalisation’ Analysis: The Importance of the Questions of Sovereignty and Identity in Relation to Europe Some analyses have seen Europe as an issue that was of little importance in determining the result of the 2017 elections and the realignment of the French party system. Others have placed greater emphasis on its influence, but have reduced it to being a manifestation of a wider division between the winners and losers of globalisation. However, we have already seen in Chapter 4 that globalisation is a multifaceted concept, which does not solely divide voters and parties according to their attitudes towards economic issues. Several commentators have analysed Europe in the context of this new division between the winners and losers of globalisation. Jérôme Fourquet (2017, 265) refers to the Brexit referendum, the election of Donald Trump and the victory of Emmanuel Macron to argue that ‘these

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three electoral contests have shown the rise of an extremely powerful division, that which opposes, in short, the winners and the losers of globalisation’. Schön-Quinlivan (2017 300) claims that during the 2017 presidential election ‘[t]he line of fracture was between the ones in favour of an open, Europeanised and globalised France versus those wanting a closed, outside of the EU and protectionist France’. This position is shared by Guilluy, who states that ‘the political recomposition that we are witnessing is the result of a long process, that of the adaptation of French society to the norms of a globalised economic and territorial model. As in all developed countries, it reveals the new divide between winners and losers of globalisation’ (Bhérer 2017). This split has also been recognised by politicians, with Emmanuel Macron (2016a, 230) arguing that ‘the divide is between supporters of an open society and those who want a closed society’ while Marine Le Pen talked of ‘globalists’ and ‘patriots’ (Barbarit 2017). Some evidence to support this analysis can be found in the results of various elections held during the Hollande presidency. An Ipsos/Steria survey, carried out during the 2014 European elections, found that 43% of blue-collar workers voted for the FN, along with 38% of white-collar workers. In both cases, the Far Right was well ahead of its nearest rivals in terms of support from these social groups, with the UMP receiving 17% of the manual worker vote and the PS gaining 16% of votes cast by whitecollar workers (Ipsos/Steria 2014, 4). The 2017 presidential elections, which saw Le Pen and Macron face each other in the second round are also taken as indicative of this new division. However, the new party system is not solely structured according to attitudes towards economic policy, and the role of globalisation is more complicated than the discussion concerning the division between winners and losers might suggest. We have seen in Chapter 4 that those who benefit economically from globalisation may be have concerns about its effects on national identity. A similar set of reactions can be seen in debate concerning Europe. Hooghe and Marks (2009, 1) argue that ‘identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe’. They go on to note that: the European Union is more than a means to lower economic transaction costs. It is part of a system of multi-level governance which facilitates social interaction across national boundaries, increases immigration and undermines national sovereignty. Economic losers are more prone than economic

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winners to feel culturally threatened, but the fit is loose. (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 11)

That economic issues were not the only concern that affected French citizens’ views on Europe was shown in the Eurobarometer polls. In the Spring 2017 edition, French voters felt that terrorism and immigration were the most important issues facing the EU (with 44% citing terrorism and 38% immigration), ahead of the state of the economy, which was far behind on 18% (EU Directorate General for Communication 2017, 2). Where issues other than economic questions shaped public attitudes to the European Union, these did not show a strong class division, as there was general suspicion about further European integration during the Hollande presidency. While a 2013 BVA poll showed that those with higher incomes were around twice as likely as those on low incomes, and four times as likely as blue-collar workers, to have faith in Europe (39% compared with 21 and 9%, respectively), a majority had lost confidence in the EU (BVA 2013, 7). Further evidence that there was growing wariness of the EU across all sections of society could be seen in an Ifop poll for Le Figaro in May 2015. A majority from all socio-economic groups wanted to reform the Schengen area, including 52% of those in the upper socio-professional categories and 64% of those in the lower socio-professional categories (Ifop 2015, 14). Furthermore, 55% from the higher categories and 68% from the lower categories hoped for less political and economic integration (Ifop 2015, 17). We have seen in previous chapters how the positions adopted by Les Républicains challenge the division of the party system between winners and losers of globalisation, in that the party supported liberal economic policies (which would put them in the open section), while defending a traditional vision of French identity (which would place them with those who shared a closed vision). Similarly, on the question of Europe, Les Républicains supported French membership, but were concerned that France was losing control over its freedom of action, as more powers were transferred to the EU. François Fillon’s position as regards globalisation combined elements of both sides of the new divide, and that he should come within 1.3 percentage points of qualification for the second round suggests that the split is not as clear as has been suggested.

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While it might be argued that the division between both an open and closed society, and the winners and losers of globalisation, was confirmed in the second round of the 2017 presidential elections, when Macron faced Le Pen, this ignores the fact that the scores of the top four candidates in the first round were within four and a half points of each other, and that Macron only received 24.01% of all votes cast (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017). If the split between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ really had been the determining factor, one would have expected Macron and Le Pen, who epitomised the different sides of this divide, to score much more highly than their rivals. That they failed to do so, and that both received a lower percentage of the vote than candidates qualifying for the second round of the previous presidential elections (where Hollande received 28.63% of the vote and Sarkozy 27.18%), (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012) as well as there being a higher abstention rate (22.23% in 2017 compared to 20.52% in 2012) (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012, 2017), suggests that several factors were influencing voters’ choices, and that these issues cannot be explained by a single divide.

The New Divide Over Europe It is particularly important to focus on Europe as an issue in its own right as it was one of the elements that disrupted the traditional Left/Right divide, and alliances between parties, and had a damaging effect particularly on the Right’s chances of winning the 2017 presidential elections. Both Perrineau and Grunberg recognise that Europe is a complex, multidimensional axis that upsets traditional divisions. Perrineau, writing just before the 2012 elections, notes that: Europe is an issue that stretches across and blurs very strongly the Left/Right divide. It brings to the fore a series of cultural oppositions concerning visions of the future, openness to others, confidence in change or even the relationship to the state. Europe, which is more a constantly developing project than a territory with well-defined borders, causes not only the fragmentation of the old territorial bastions of the Left and the Right, but also calls into question the idea that the nation-state is the only place in which political conflicts can be expressed and broadcast. Deep down, the issue of Europe accentuates the weakening of allegiances to ideological, social and territorial groups that is taking place within society and within the French political system. (Perrineau 2012, 114)

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Grunberg (2015) shares a similar analysis, arguing: This division runs perpendicularly to that between the Left and the Right. It creates or reactivates deep divisions within both the Right and the Left, separating the radicals from the moderates. The parties of the Radical Left and the Radical Right disagree with the parties of government of Left and Right over the European question, which has become a major political issue around which the European political space is being reorganised. On the Right, debate in this area has focused on the issues of immigration and national identity. Europe is accused of both favouring immigration and of undermining national sovereignty and national identity.

These analyses are more helpful than those that we have discussed previously, as they take account of how features other than economic policy have influenced debate over Europe. Most notably, they highlight the importance of cultural issues, and that of sovereignty, which, as Grunberg notes, have been particularly influential in debate on the Right. This more multidimensional approach can be developed further in order to explain the role played by attitudes to Europe in the realignment of the French party system, and in influencing the 2017 presidential and legislative elections. In focusing on how Europe has weakened the Left/Right divide, and created a new arrangement of political movements, where the radical parties have more in common with each other than with one of the established parties of government, both Grunberg and Perrineau were writing before the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as a presidential candidate. They therefore fail to mention another consequence of the new divide caused by Europe, which is the rise of the independent Centre. This is an important omission because the Centre has historically been much more attached to the European project in its original form than has the Right, but has often lacked a recognised leader, who could enable it to gain widespread electoral support. This would change with the emergence of Emmanuel Macron, who would undermine the traditional Left/Right divide and reignite traditional ideological divisions between the Right and the Centre.

Europe and the Right French membership of the European Union was a key issue that divided the Right between 2012 and 2017. In many cases, the differences between various factions can be traced back to historical divisions that

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have existed throughout the development of the European Community, since the end of the Second World War. Two main visions came to dominate discussion on the Right, one that foresaw the creation of a federal Europe, and another which gave preference to the role of nation states. These differences structured debate both between the Right and the Centre, and within Les Républicains as a party, during the Hollande presidency. Macron was able to win over some of those who had supported Juppé in the primary of 2016, and voters from the Independent Centre parties (which had often allied with the Right), with his positive, federal vision. I. A Right-Wing Vision of Europe It is difficult to define a single Right-wing vision of Europe, as the European Community is one that has undergone several stages of development, and parties have changed their policies to react to this, as well as having to adapt to new challenges on the wider international stage. Some elements of de Gaulle’s vision, such as a Europe based firmly on nation states, that was particularly resistant to moves towards greater integration, are now only strongly defended by the Far Right. However, some key principles that have often brought movements of the Right together could still be observed in 2017, such as: Europe as a power multiplier for France; Europe as an independent pole in relation to rival powers and Europe as a ‘civilisation’. In defining these aspects, we must also bear in mind that the structure of the Right itself has evolved, and that the creation of the UMP brought some Centrist elements together with those who represented the Gaullist tradition. One of the major ideas that has often driven French policy and support for the European Community is that by uniting various countries in a broader institution, Europe can act as a power multiplier for France, enabling it to maintain influence in a world dominated by larger nations. This was something recognised by Monnet. In Les Etats-Unis d’Europe ont commencé, he noted that the international stage was dominated by: Two great powers, which organise their industry and productivity according to different systems and which possess vast territories and huge markets, with many consumers. (Monnet 1955, 27)

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He later concludes that ‘Europe is not longer in step with the world’ (Monnet 1955, 27). His solution to this problem is that for France, and Europe, to compete with the superpowers, they must pool their resources in a large, supranational organisation (Monnet 1955, 39). This view was also expressed by Robert Schuman, who claimed, ‘It is important that everyone shares the belief that we need one another, irrespective of the rank or power that we hold’ (Schuman 1963, 26). This same attitude was held by members of the Gaullist Right, who, although they did not share Monnet’s vision of a federal system, still saw Europe as a way of increasing French influence. As Petitfils notes, one of the reasons why de Gaulle supported the development of the European community was that it was ‘a means for France, taking the head of this “European Europe”, independent from both blocs, to affirm her international grandeur and rayonnement ’ (Knapp 1994, 417). His successor as President of the Republic, Pompidou, shared this view, stating in 1972, ‘In the age of superpowers, a nation such as France can only fully preserve its political, economic and monetary existence by closely allying with its neighbours’ (INA 1972). While the dynamics of European cooperation would change, with a more integrated structure being developed following the creation of the European Union in 1992, this principle would survive, and in 2013, a UMP document outlining the party’s position on Europe lamented that ‘Europe no longer acts as a power-multiplier for France’ (Copé et al. 2013, 7). Although this was a criticism of the Hollande government, it showed the continued ambition on the Right for Europe to increase French influence on the world stage. It would be repeated by Fillon during his presidential campaign in 2017, where he argued for ‘A Europe that is clear about its economic interests, that dares to practice a policy of European preference to defend its interests in the face of China and the United States’ (Les Républicains 2017). Although France’s rivals had changed, with China seen as a bigger threat in some respects than Russia, European cooperation remained the solution that would allow France to maintain an important role in the world. There was also agreement over a second principle, that Europe must constitute an independent pole, free from alternative blocs dominated by the superpowers, which was seen as essential, if France were to achieve its primary aim of maximising its influence. It was for this reason that de Gaulle had been opposed to a federal Europe, which he feared would fall under the control of the USA. He stated:

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We have therefore seen several, very often reasonable and sincere, figures imagine for Europe not an independent policy, which, in truth, they do not believe possible, but rather an organisation incapable of having such a policy, and instead following in this area, as in those of defence and the economy, an Atlantic system, that is to say an American system, and subordinated, as a result, to what the US calls its “leadership”. (INA 1964)

This idea of an independent Europe was also supported by those leaders on the Right who came after de Gaulle. For example, in 1978, Chirac stated: Yes, we are fully in favour of the organisation of Europe. We want, just as much as others, for Europe to be created. But a European Europe, where France fulfils its destiny as a great nation. We reject the idea of France as a vassal-state in a merchant empire, and also that France should abandon its responsibilities today before being eclipsed tomorrow. We will not compromise in these areas, because what is at stake is France, its independence and its future, and Europe, its cohesion and its will. (Chirac 1978)

Once again, this principle maintained its importance in debate on the Right in 2017. Fillon would argue that the euro should become a reserve currency, so as to prevent France becoming a ‘vassal’ of the USA, which controlled the dollar (Fillon 2016b)—a position which echoed that of de Gaulle in the 1960s. The third element that underpinned the Right’s vision of Europe during the Fifth Republic was the idea of Europe as a community that possessed a particular identity, although their interpretation of this would prove problematic, particularly over the division between those who supported an approach based on nation states, and others who wanted a federalist structure. Historically, cultural differences have often been used to justify opposition to federalism. For example, in his memoirs, de Gaulle argued: To what depth of illusion or prejudice would one have to descend to believe that European nations, forged throughout the centuries by an innumerable series of struggles and pains, each having its own geography, its own history, its own language, its own traditions, its own institutions, could cease to be themselves and henceforth form only a single entity? (de Gaulle 2016, 736)

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A similar view was presented in the UMP manifesto for the 2014 European elections, which talked of ‘uncertainty surrounding the identity of Europe and its borders’ (UMP 2014, 5). It continued: By refusing to talk about the nations that make up Europe, and their specific features (history, culture…), by wanting to rapidly expand without really thinking of the new political project that we were able to implement as a group of 28, we have created the conditions for a Europe without character, without borders and without culture. This has brought about a feeling of doubt and uncertainty among our fellow citizens. (UMP 2014, 5)

This position would be adopted by Fillon in his 2017 presidential campaign, as he stated ‘the situation is critical, if we do not want the dream of Europe’s founders, that of a democratic European civilisation open to the world, to turn into a nightmare’ (Fillon 2017, 1). However, it must be acknowledged that those who favoured a more integrationist approach also saw Europe as having a particular cultural identity. For example, Robert Schuman believed that ‘Europe, before being a military alliance or an economic entity must be a cultural community’ (Schuman 1963, 35). Unlike those who shared a vision similar to de Gaulle, Schuman was wary of nationalism. He believed that European nations should emphasise their similarities and common interests, and that history books should talk less of glorious events in the history of the nation, and more about the absurdity of war (Schuman 1963, 50). As we shall discuss later, some of these principles could be seen in the discourse of Juppé. These three key principles have remained important for the Right throughout the Fifth Republic. In many cases, under the Hollande presidency, they were also shared with the parties of the Centre. For example, in their manifesto for the 2014 European elections, the UDI and MoDem argued that Europe was: A necessity, because the world is plunged into a violent and universal competition, that requires those countries that are not powerful enough to stand up to the superpowers to come together and unite. (UDI and MoDem 2014, 4)

The Independent Centre parties also believed in Europe as a cultural community, and talked of the need for the EU to ‘reaffirm its common

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values’ (UDI and MoDem 2014, 4), and to ‘defend European culture’ (UDI and MoDem 2014, 4). II. Two Approaches to Europe: Federalism vs Nation States While the Right and Centre had a similar view of the goals of European cooperation, they were divided over whether to support a union based on nation states or a more federal structure. Historically, Gaullist parties had been supportive of the first, and the Centrist parties the second. However, their positions would evolve as European cooperation developed. As Knapp (1994, 422) notes: De Gaulle had sought a Europe that would allow France to maintain her rank in the world without paying a price in terms of lost sovereignty. The demands of greater European integration and liberalized world trade made such a vision less and less attainable; to remain as an international player of any importance, France would have to accept constraints on sovereignty and especially on economic policy-making that would have been almost inconceivable a generation earlier.

The development of a more integrated Europe from 1992, and the union of several Right-wing parties in the UMP in 2002, complicated this distinction between the Right and Centre. While there remained issues that split a majority of supporters of the Right from their counterparts in the Centre, under the Hollande presidency, many of these same issues would also divide Les Républicains from within. We will now outline these two different approaches, starting with that based on a Europe of nation states. In some cases, politicians have switched their support from one vision to another during their political career. However, our aim is to show the continued existence of two particular conceptions of Europe on the Right, rather than to claim that those whom we quote maintained a consistent approach. Enacting Principles Through a Europe of Nation States One of the key visions of Europe that has been influential on the Right since 1945 is that of a Europe of nation states. This had been particularly important for de Gaulle, who, had believed that, rather than allowing France to increase its power on the world stage through an independent bloc, a federalist structure would weaken the country and ensure that

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Europe would fall under the sway of the USA. As Pozzi (2014, 138) notes, ‘de Gaulle’s Europe is one that must give France the means to preserve its independence and affirm its greatness on the world stage’. He adds that, for de Gaulle, ‘the importance placed on national sovereignty is consubstantial with the notion of national independence, of which de Gaulle had always presented himself as an ardent defender’ (Pozzi 2014, 138). Although the Right-wing party leaders following de Gaulle’s presidency accepted increased European integration (as could be seen when Chirac supported the Maastricht Treaty), this idea retained its importance. In 2000, a survey found that around 75% of RPR députés wanted a Europe of nation states, only 19% felt that Europe did not pose a threat to sovereignty, and none supported a federalist structure (Startin 2005, 61). Although the situation would evolve slightly, with the merger of several right-wing parties in the UMP in 2002, and further institutional integration, there remained much support for nation states. In a 2013 CSA poll for Terrafemina, supporters of the UMP wished that more power be given to nation states, with only 19% in favour of further integration, while 43% wished it to be reduced (28% supported the status quo, and 10% did not express an opinion) (CSA pour Terrafemina 2013, 7). A similar trend was observed by an Ifop poll in May 2015, which found that 58% of UMP supporters desired less integration, and 42% hoped for more (Ifop 2015, 17) (The difference between these results and those from the CSA study may in part be explained by the fact that the Ifop excluded ‘don’t know’ and the status quo, offering a choice between more integration or less integration.) This position was not only represented by the views of its members, but also in the party’s programmes. In 2014, the Right looked to protect national voices in Europe, and its manifesto for the European elections stated: ‘We can be proud to see ourselves as the descendants both of the founding fathers as well as of de Gaulle, who ensured the development of Europe whilst also being firm about what it should achieve’ (UMP 2014, 2), and argued in favour of ‘a true ambition for France’s future, which is also an ambition for Europe’s future, a united but not uniform Europe’ (UMP 2014, 3). The focus on protecting the influence of nation states was also clear in the party’s policy of different levels of cooperation within the EU, rather than simply calling for more integration. The UMP’s manifesto demanded:

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A new, innovative and original European structure must be devised, based on different levels of cooperation in order to allow those countries that wish to move forward further and more quickly to be able to do so. For example: cooperation among Northern Mediterranean states over immigration issues, cooperation over nuclear questions with the UK and Finland, cooperation with Germany and the Nordic countries over the development of electronic and communication industries […] different forms of cooperation regarding defence. (UMP 2014, 7)

A key reason why the Right supported the idea of multiple levels of cooperation between countries was because they believed that France’s influence on the international stage was in decline. There was a growing feeling among French voters that their country had lost its voice within the EU, and that Germany had become the most influential nation. An Odoxa poll from 2015 found that, when asked which European figure had the most influence over decision-making, 67% chose Angela Merkel, ahead of Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, on 14%, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, on 10%, In contrast, only 2% cited François Hollande (Odoxa 2015, 8). In this context, the development of a much more integrated and federal structure risked forcing France to accept rules it did not support, whereas a multi-tier Europe, based on different levels of cooperation, would better allow the nation to retain more control over decision-making, and increase its influence over global affairs. A Europe of nation states was not only considered the best way of preserving French influence and independence, but also reflected the fact that many on the Right saw the nation as an ideal community. This is something that could be seen throughout the Fifth Republic. As Knapp (1994, 3) has argued, a sentimental attachment to the nation has always been a crucial part of Gaullism. He states: Gaullism is as much emotion as ideology. In itself, the assertion that “France cannot be France without greatness” is a fairly ordinary piece of nationalist rhetoric. But de Gaulle illustrates it, at the opening of his War Memoirs, by invoking princesses in fairy tales, Madonnas in medieval frescoes, the Arc de Triomphe in the sunshine, Notre Dame at dusk, his mother hearing the news of France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. The use of such imagery, rather than any argument, are what give the presentation of his “certain idea of France” a mystical, romantic intensity. “Sentiment”, he admits, “inspires it in me as much as reason.”

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This element was certainly important, and de Gaulle himself noted in a press conference in 1962 that ‘it is true that the motherland is a human, sentimental concept’ (INA 1962). This strong emotional attachment to France on the Right lasted well beyond the de Gaulle presidency, and became important in debates over Europe. In 1992, speaking in the National Assembly to oppose the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Philippe Séguin argued that: The nation […] is something that possesses a spiritual and emotional dimension. It is the result of an achievement, the product of a mysterious metamorphosis by which a people becomes more than a united community, almost a body and a soul. (Garrigues 2007, 140)

He gave further evidence of his strong belief in the idea of the nation, when he stated: The nation is not a clan, it is not a race, it is not a tribe. The nation is even stronger than the idea of the motherland, stronger than patriotism, that noble reflex according to which one defends one’s native land, one’s field, one’s tombs. National sentiment is what turns us into citizens, what allows us to accede to that supreme dignity of free men that is called citizenship! (Garrigues 2007, 141)

This ideal would be important for Fillon during the presidential election campaign, when he would make reference to his personal links to Séguin, when setting out his own policies on Europe. Despite the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the continued move towards more integration within the EU, there remained many on the Right who continued to support the idea of the nation as the ideal community, and to see this as being threatened on occasions by the development of Europe. In 2013, a group of seven députés from the UMP wrote an open letter in favour of a reorientation of European policy away from federalism, and opened by stating that they were ‘députés of the Nation’ (Aubert et al. 2013), reinforcing their faith in the idea of France. A similar approach could also be seen when Geoffroy Didier (2015, 93), one of the founders of the Droite forte courant, which looked to win over voters from the FN, wrote, ‘It is no longer enough to declare naively “Strength through unity!” Today we must above all construct strong

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nations in Europe. As Jean Jaurès warned “the nation is the only possession of the poor”’. As we shall see later, Sarkozy and Fillon would both support this view of the nation in the primary of 2016. We have seen how those in the Right and in the Centre shared an idea of Europe as an area with a particular cultural identity. Yet while this principle was shared, there was again disagreement over how this cultural community should be constructed. For those who believed in a structure based on nation states, national cultures needed to be protected, and were crucial in defining the identity of Europe as a whole. As we have demonstrated above, de Gaulle felt that federalism posed a threat to national cultures, and this is an element that brought him into conflict with those in the Centre. In 1962, during a press conference, he stated: I do not believe that Europe can be a functioning reality if it does not include France and the French, Germany and the Germans, Italy and the Italians etc. Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand belong to all Europe, precisely because they were respectively and eminently Italian, German and French. They would not have really helped the cause of Europe if they had been stateless, and if they had thought and written in some sort of integrated Esperanto or Volapuk. (INA 1962)

Members of the Centrist MRP then resigned from the government in protest at the president’s stance. Similar concerns about a federal Europe weakening national identities and cultures could also be found during the Hollande presidency. As we have seen above, the UMP manifesto for the 2014 European Parliament elections argued that ignoring the histories and cultures of the individual nations that were members of the EU would lead to the creation of a characterless organisation, unable to gain the respect of its citizens (UMP 2014, 5). Although, throughout the history of the Right, the nation state had been considered particularly important as a means of preserving French power and influence within Europe, the alternative conception of a more federal structure had always received significant support from Centrists, as well as, during the Hollande presidency, from certain members of the Right.

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Enacting Principles Through a Federal Europe The alternative federalist solution to maintaining European influence and prosperity was set out by Monnet in Les Etats-Unis d’Europe ont commencé, in which he wrote: Vast resources must be made accessible in order to create a prosperous people with confidence in themselves, in the twentieth century. This can only be achieved through huge economic regions and through unified policies. The increasingly developed sentiment that that is the essential condition for a future of dynamic progress, pushes Europeans to unite. (Monnet 1955, 40)

As we have seen, he contrasted the weakness of divided European nations with the strength of the federations represented by the USA and USSR. Historically, this federalist vision had been supported by certain sections of the Centre, but at the time of the Hollande presidency, it would also be favoured by some within Les Républicains. This view could be seen in the statutes of the UDI, which stated: Inspired by the European ideal of the founding fathers, [the UDI] works for the construction of a federal Europe, the only one able to promote its model of society and defend its interests and values in a globalised world. (UDI 2015)

In contrast to members of the Gaullist Right, those who supported the UDF and later the parties of the Centre were often very favourable towards further integration. In the same survey from 2000 that we have cited above for the RPR, only 12% of the UDF representatives wanted a Europe of nation states, while 62% supported a federal structure (Startin 2005, 61). 72% of UDF députés believed that Europe did not pose a threat to French sovereignty (Startin 2005, 61). A similar situation could be found during the Hollande presidency. Concerning the future of the EU, a 2013 CSA poll for Terrafemina found that the largest group of UDI voters wanted more integration, with 42% in favour, 12% against and 26% defending the status quo, with 11% holding no strong opinion (CSA pour Terrafemina 2013, 7). This was confirmed by an Ifop poll in May 2015, which found 64% of UDI supporters in favour of more integration, and 36% seeking its reduction (Ifop 2015, 17). There were therefore still significant differences in the way voters from the Centre and

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those from the Right believed that France would best be able to maximise its global influence through its relationship with the EU. One reason for these differences was that the Centre saw the European Community itself in more idealistic terms. As Hazareesingh (2015, 218) has argued, Monnet believed that war could be avoided, and freedom and progress promoted, by people working together, in a context where the general interest would take precedence over the national one. This conception of Europe has remained influential among Centrists. In 2014, the UDI and MoDem’s manifesto for the European elections stated ‘for us, the parties of the Centre, Europe is an ideal as much as an necessity’ (UDI-MoDem 2014, 4). The Centre also had a vision of Europe as a cultural space, but it was one which differed from that of the Right. Whereas de Gaulle and others had seen federalism as a threat to national cultures, Centrist politicians were keen to build a European culture, and believed that this could be achieved alongside the development of a more integrated political structure. We have seen how, while they shared many of the same objectives, the Right and the Centre had often possessed different visions of the nature of the European community needed to attain them. We shall now examine how these different visions also ran through Les Républicains, ensuring that Europe was an issue that weakened the party both by splitting it off from potential allies, and also by dividing the Right from within.

Europe: A Key Factor That Divided Members of Les Républicains The two opposing visions, which had historically dominated debate over Europe within the Right and the Centre, would still be clear during the 2016 primary, and would provoke a crucial division between Sarkozy stes and Fillon istes on one side, and Juppé istes on the other. A Juppé victory, which many expected, would strengthen the alliance between the Right and the Centre. However, were Sarkozy or Fillon to be chosen as the candidate, this would not only endanger that alliance, but also open the possibility of a wider realignment of the party system with the emergence of a Centrist movement under Macron. It was therefore the outcome of the primary that gave Europe an important role in the presidential elections of 2017.

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I. Disagreement Within Les Républicains Concerning Europe as a Way of Maximising French Influence A similar division to that between the Right and the Centre over how France should achieve her goals in Europe could be observed within Les Républicains, with Sarkozy and Fillon putting emphasis on the need for an important role for nation states, while Juppé supported a more federalist approach. Since debate over the Maastricht Treaty had put an end to what has been called the ‘permissive consensus’ over Europe, as what had been an organisation based on discussion and agreement between elites, to which public opinion had paid little attention, was now to be influenced by the votes of electorates (see Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2), the question of sovereignty has been one that has divided political parties in France, both from each other and also internally. This could be seen in the case of Les Républicains, where the Juppé istes took a separate approach from others in the party. This was because the two sides prioritised different aspects of France’s relationship with Europe. Whereas the Juppé istes were close to Monnet in believing that France could only have influence on the world stage by working closely with other countries in a more integrated structure, a majority in the party adopted a more Gaullist position, as they felt that the most important factor was for France to be able to decide its own policies, and that integration should be limited where possible. Their differences over the question of how France could best increase its influence on the international stage could be observed in the debate over how to define ‘sovereignty’. Juppé disagreed with other members of Les Républicains as, like Monnet in the 1950s, he argued that in a world of rising superpowers (with China and Russia gaining strength, and the USA already powerful) ‘France, like other countries, wants to be and must remain a sovereign state, but sovereignty, in the century of globalisation, is the power to choose one’s closest partners and the terms of interdependence, which has itself become unavoidable’ (Juppé 2016). This was a position close to that of the Centre, who were keen on alliances to protect French influence. His main rivals maintained that pooling more powers within Europe would undermine rather than promote French influence. Fillon argued that ‘Europe must be a tool and not a religion. That is why I am one of the only ones to have campaigned against the Maastricht Treaty alongside Philippe Séguin’ (Fillon 2017b). Just as de Gaulle had feared that

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a federal Europe would fall under American control, so Fillon believed that, were integration taken too far, then both Europe and France would lose influence in world affairs. He was particularly critical of the EU for following the lead of America rather than charting an independent path. He stated: Our alignment with American foreign policy, our disappearance from the international stage, our submission to the pernicious European decisionmaking process, that produces mediocre little compromises, are not compatible with the aspirations of the French and the place that France continues to occupy in the hearts of numerous peoples around the world. (Fillon 2016a)

Without a strong voice for individual nations, Europe would continue to move away from France’s interests. For Fillon, France found itself having to follow Europe’s direction on the international stage, which, rather than projecting French power and influence, was forcing the nation to accept laws and principles that it did not support. He raised the possibility that the European Court of Human Rights might object to his immigration measures, but argued that it was not the role of this institution to tell a government whom it should allow into its country (Fillon 2016b). Fillon’s position brought him into direct conflict with Juppé. Fillon claimed, ‘Since we need a word to describe who we are, I prefer the beautiful word “sovereignty”. Because, yes, faced with dark times, it is this sovereignty that we need to regain’ (Fillon 2016a). His focus on the national was also clear in his response to the Brexit referendum, when he claimed to recognise the feelings of Leave voters, stating: ‘I have heard the message of British voters who are proud of their national identity and who fear losing control of their destiny’ (Fillon 2016b). Sarkozy also represented those on the Right who continued to follow a Gaullist approach, believing that the importance of nations was a reality, rather than something open to debate. He stated: If General de Gaulle was right to say that politics must be based on reality, and this reality must include historical, cultural, geographical and demographic elements…, Europe’s major error, from the 1980s to the present day, has been to want to construct itself in opposition to this reality. (Sarkozy 2015)

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The historical question of whether French influence was better preserved through a Europe of nation states or one based on a federal structure was therefore a divisive one within Les Républicains, and was made more significant as both sides held conflicting ideals, as had their historical predecessors. II. Conflicting Ideals on the Right: Europe vs The Nation State As with the division between the Right and the Centre, the two sides we have observed within Les Républicains often differed over the ideals that they supported and this led to increasing conflict and alienation, when Europe became a matter for debate, particularly during the primary. Just as in the Centre, there were those on the Right who were strongly attached to the idea of Europe, and this was particularly evident among Juppé and his supporters. The Mayor of Bordeaux spoke in an emotional and affectionate way of the European project. In 2014, he stated that ‘I believe, more than ever, in Europe, and I do all that I can for her’ (Leparmentier and Lemarié 2014). On 22 April 2014, he wrote a blog post entitled ‘Love letter to Europe’, where he addressed a personified Europe, expressing his love for her and his distress that she was blamed for many things for which she was not responsible (Juppé 2014). At a time when many both in France and elsewhere were criticising the way the EU functioned, Juppé argued, ‘I continue to believe that one must talk of Europe in an emotional and not in an institutional way, by reaffirming that Europe is an opportunity for us and for our children’ (Leparmentier and Lemarié 2014). As the UDI and MoDem had done during the European elections, Juppé stressed his support for Europe as an ideal. In 2016, he spoke of ‘the European miracle’, which was ‘a family of nations cured of nationalism, and proud to share the same values of civilisation’. In response to the Brexit vote of that year, he spoke of the need to re-engage voters with Europe, because ‘above all, we need to define what makes our common heritage, an ideal that speaks to the hearts of Europeans, to reinvigorate the desire for Europe’ (Chapuis and Lemarié 2016). Juppé’s positive vision of Europe was one that allowed him to rally Centrists to his cause, but his stance was one that was the subject of virulent attacks from both Fillon and Sarkozy. The former president argued that moves which ignored the existence of nations put the EU in danger of collapse. He stated ‘I am a European, and I will die a European but for

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too long now we have dreamt of this ideal Europe and we have woken up suddenly with another, so determined to erase a large part of European history that it has succeeded in resuscitating the old nationalist demons that it was supposed to prevent from returning’ (Sarkozy 2015). In his view, Federalists were so enthusiastic in support of their vision that they were blind to the difficulties within the European Union, and unable to react effectively: ‘Every time there is a crisis, we cry Europe! Europe! As if this were some sort of magic formula able on its own to resolve the situation’ (Sarkozy 2015). He believed that, although the Schengen agreement, sanctions against Russia, discussions over Turkish membership of Europe and European enlargement posed fundamental problems, these were being ignored. Fillon adopted the same line as Sarkozy, arguing that ‘we must stop posturing, stop jumping up and down in our seats like a goat repeating “Europe, Europe, Europe,” as if it were enough to say “Long Live Europe” for Europe to really live’ (Fillon 2016b). Fillon, like his Gaullist predecessors was much more attached to the nation rather than to Europe as an ideal. As he would later state during his presidential election campaign, he felt that ‘we are not just a country, we are a nation and a civilisation’ (Fillon 2017). As this was not simply a debate over how to implement an agreed policy, but a contest between two strongly supported but conflicting ideals, argument over Europe became particularly divisive for Les Républicains. The choice of Fillon as the party’s presidential candidate would therefore not only weaken the possibility of him winning support of those from the Independent Centre parties, but would also alienate some Juppé istes, whose vision had been viscerally attacked by the Sarkozy stes and the Fillon istes. III. Europe as a Cultural Area There had historically been a disagreement between the Centre and the Right over what form a European identity might take, with the Right insisting on the recognition of national traditions, and the distinct values of individual countries, which could be threatened by further integration. Although, as we have acknowledged, the context had changed by the time of the Hollande presidency, the primary revealed that this important division existed within the Right. Sarkozy and Fillon emphasised national characteristics, while others, such as Juppé, argued for a more open vision

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of Europe and its heritage, that recognised the contributions made by religions other than Christianity and by cultures from other parts of the world. Fillon echoed de Gaulle when he explained why, in his view, a federal structure was unworkable, by emphasising cultural differences between nations. He argued that ‘We will never be a federal state. We are too different for that to happen. Our histories, our cultures, our languages and our customs are too ancient to disappear and be replaced by a set of uniform rules’ (Fillon 2016b). This was very similar to the statement of de Gaulle about how Dante, Goethe and Chateaubriand only served the European cause by representing the culture of their own nations, and which, as we have seen, was found particularly provocative by the Centrists. Sarkozy shared a similar view to Fillon and supported the importance of national cultures within Europe. As had de Gaulle, he emphasised the importance of protecting traditional identities, in the face of continued integration. He argued that: [Europe] was conceived as necessarily leading to the creation of the new man: the European man. There clearly is a European civilisation. It is Greek, it is Roman, it is Christian, it came from Antiquity, from the Holy Roman Empire, from the Renaissance, the Enlightenment. But nations emerged across the old continent with their own histories and identities. Yet there is in the European “ideology”, born from the commendable concern to ensure that the wars of the past were never repeated, the ridiculous project of erasing these specific histories and identities. To avoid the risk of nationalism, the idea was to bury nations and to beware of borders!’ (Sarkozy 2016; 146)

The positions of Fillon and Sarkozy were at odds with Juppé’s more open vision of European identity, in which he talked of ‘Europeans, that is to say the heirs of the fusion of Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultures, enriched in the Middle Ages through dialogue with Arab thought and knowledge, renewed by the humanism of the Renaissance and the spirit of the Enlightenment’ (Juppé 2016). By recognising that Europe was made up of a mixture of cultures, he moved away from the traditional position of the Right offered by Sarkozy and Fillon, and closer to that of the Centre. The problems posed to Les Républicains by the debate over the nature of Europe as a cultural entity were exacerbated, as they became linked to

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the discussion over the wider issue of cultural insecurity, which, as we have seen, was particularly divisive for the Centre Right. As can be seen in the statements above, both Sarkozy and Fillon argued in favour of a Traditionalist view of Europe. The cultures and influences that they referred to were generally white, European and Christian, and they presented an image of European identity constructed solely by Europeans, without great outside influence. In contrast, Juppé noted the role that interaction with the Arab world had played in defining Europe. In this way, the Traditionalist and Modernist camps that we identified in Chapter 4, that could be seen in debate over identity, were reproduced in the Europe axis. Once again, the Traditionalists reached out to FN voters, while the Modernists sought to attract those from the Centre. The important differences that separated the members of the Right in debate over Europe would make reconciliation difficult, once the primary had been decided. Such a task was made even more complicated by the breakdown of the traditional Left/Right divide and the emergence of Macron, who could attract elements from the Left, the Right and the Centre with a positive vision for Europe.

Beyond Left and Right: Emmanuel Macron and Europe As we have seen, the issue of Europe divided sections of the Right from potential allies in the Centre, as well as provoking conflict within Les Républicains. However, the party might still have held together, had it not been for the emergence of an alternative represented by Macron. Had the choice been between Les Républicains, the PS, the FN and La France Insoumise, then it would have been likely that, Penelopegate notwithstanding, Fillon would have won the presidential elections of 2017. The FN was still not accepted as a party like any other, while the PS was virtually disqualified by the failures of the Hollande government, particularly in the management of the economy. In a context where, as we have seen, there was a growing, albeit in some quarters reluctant, belief that some level of liberal economic reform would have to be implemented, it was unlikely that Mélenchon could win sufficient votes to be elected president, particularly as he was competing with Marine Le Pen for the support of those opposed to more pro-business reform. It was the emergence of Macron in the Centre that would ensure the downfall of Fillon. This was not only because he promoted a liberal economic outlook, and

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an open approach to national identity and social values, but also because of his positive vision of Europe, which exploited fracture lines within Les Républicains and also between the Right and the Centre, and allowed him to win support. He deliberately positioned himself as the pro-Europe candidate, stating: No, I promise you, no-one is talking about Europe anymore! And when I look at all the candidates for the presidential elections, or those in the primaries that have been talked about so much, there are only antiEuropeans, Eurosceptics, or those barely converted from Euroscepticism. We, my friends, we love Europe! We want Europe! (Macron 2016b)

As we have seen above, an Ipsos/Sopra Steria poll that examined voting behaviour in the first round of the election found that, for Macron voters, European issues were the third most important factor in influencing their choice (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017, 14). Macron’s position aligned with many who had supported Juppé in the primary—both those who were political representatives and supporters of the Centrist parties and other supporters of Les Républicains—dismayed by Fillon’s success in becoming the candidate of the Right, and offered them an alternative way of achieving their political project. Macron shared their belief that in a world of superpowers, France could only compete as part of Europe. He claimed that ‘Europe is our best form of protection, it is our best shield in a globalised world’ (Macron 2016b). In the debate over the nation state and Europe as ideals, he was particularly proEuropean, stating ‘Europe […] is our opportunity, it is our diversity, our unity’ (Macron 2016b), and, as regards the debate over sovereignty, he argued that ‘because Europe is what makes us stronger in this open world, as I often say, in many areas our real sovereignty lies at the European level’ (Macron 2017a). He also shared the fears of those alienated by nationalism and emphasised the need to identify as a European. He declared: ‘Europe is also our identity, what makes us who we are, our shared dream. And in this crazy world, I say once again, I think back to the words of François Mitterrand, from around thirty years ago, when he said that nationalism is war. Yes, only Europe can save us from barbarism, only Europe can stop us going backwards’ (Macron 2016b). In this way, he was able to appeal to voters in the Centre and on the Right who wanted a positive vision for Europe.

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Following Juppé’s defeat in the primary, which led certain members of Les Républicains and Centrists chose to support Macron, Europe was often an important feature that motivated their decision. For example, Aurore Bergé, who had been a member of Juppé’s campaign team for the primary of 2016, left Les Républicains to join En Marche, and stated that she was ‘liberal, progressive, European, feminist’ (Levain 2017), highlighting the importance of Europe as part of her identity. Following the second round of the primary, some members of the Jeunes UDI announced their support for Macron, citing his stance on Europe as a reason for doing so. They argued: Emmanuel Macron has a vision for our society. He is the guarantee of a measured presidency without false promises based on a strong Europe, liberalism with a human face and an openess to the modernity of the world we live in, both in economic and social terms […] Europe, our DNA, is more than a partner for Emmanuel Macron, it is a goal to work towards. “More Europe” and “a better Europe” is the sole solution for France in order to control the flows of migrants, to fight terrorism and new threats and to protect our jobs from global competition, a rampart against poverty which is still as present in France in 2016. (Reuteurs 2016)

A similar stance was adopted by a group of UDI Senateurs during the presidential election campaign. Among their reasons for supporting Macron, in spite of the alliance between the UDI and Les Républicains, was that: Emmanuel Macron is the only candidate to declare clearly, and strongly, that France’s destiny is closely tied to that of Europe. To be a patriot today is not about wanting a France that withdraws into itself, it is about creating, once again, a strong France in a strong Europe, in order to speak on equal terms with Mr Trump’s USA and Mr Putin’s Russia. The France that we want must, alongside Germany, lead Europe in this direction. (Aïchi et al. 2017)

The transfer of voters both from the Centre and Les Républicains to Macron before the first round of the presidential elections was a key factor in his success. An Ifop-Fiducial poll for the first round of the 2017 presidential elections found that while 56% of UDI supporters voted for Fillon,

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a significant number cast a ballot for Macron, with 29% of UDI supporters choosing the leader of En Marche (Ifop-Fiducial 2017, 21). While Macron’s ability to win over some members of the UDI and Les Républicains was a key factor in Fillon’s defeat, his success was also determined by the ability to reach across the Left/Right divide and gain the support of those Socialist supporters who also wanted a deeper relationship with Europe. Macron shared with Hamon a vision of Europe as crucial in a world of superpowers, and a desire to move away from a Europe made up of nation states. Hamon’s manifesto stated ‘Faced with the challenges that Europeans must respond to, the solution cannot […] from a return to divided nation states’ (Hamon 2017, 31). He argued in favour of ‘a power that declares its values and defends its interests in a regulated globalised system’ (Hamon 2017, 31). While he disagreed with Macron over economic policy, and favoured more statist measures, those Socialists who wanted a more liberal approach on economics were also encouraged to switch to Macron because of their similar approaches to Europe. The decision by 43% of those who considered themselves to be PS supporters to choose Macron in the first round of the presidential elections was crucial to his success in making the run-off and then being elected president (IfopFiducial 2017, 21). Europe was therefore a factor that enabled Macron to transcend the traditional Left/Right cleavage, as well as allowing him to divide the Right.

Conclusion Debate over France’s relationship with the European Union was an important feature of the 2017 election campaign. It divided Les Républicains from within, and distanced them from traditional allies, enabling Emmanuel Macron’s victory on a programme based on a very proEuropean platform, which won support from the Centre and across the Left/Right divide. It is important to recognise the role played by European issues because they influenced both the electorate and also the realignment of political parties. As regards its effect on voters, although Fourquet (2017), Guilluy (Bherer 2017), and Schön-Quinlivan (2017), consider Europe as part of a broader divide between winners and losers of globalisation, this approach ignores the fact that, as we have seen in previous chapters, globalisation

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is made up of many elements, including economic, cultural and political phenomena. Those who may consider themselves to be winners in one area may feel disadvantaged in another. For example, many of those to whom Fillon was reaching out to on the Right supported increased economic liberalism, but feared the loss of French traditions and identity. As regards political globalisation, issues relating to sovereignty can affect both those who win and those who lose out from the current economic system, and play a central role in determining attitudes towards Europe. In addition to recognising its direct effect on the electorate, we must consider the divisions that Europe caused within the French party system, as this area shows how the traditional split between Left and Right, which, as we saw in Chapter 2 had been weakening for some time, was further undermined during the elections of 2017. Both Grunberg and Perrineau have noted that Europe unites elements of the established parties of government on one side of the debate, and sections of the radical parties of Left and Right on the other, and this remained true during the period 2012–2017 (Grunberg 2015; Perrineau 2012). The question of Europe was one which also reactivated ideological divisions between the Right and the Centre, and undermined potential alliances between these two groups. Both sides agreed on several key principles: that France must play an important role within the EU in order to have influence on the world stage, that Europe should represent an independent pole unaligned with any of the superpowers, and that it should be a cultural, as well as political community. However, the Right and the Centre disagreed over how to achieve this goal. The Gaullist view was that only a Europe of nation states would allow France to increase its influence, while remaining independent from the superpowers, and, despite moves towards closer integration, many on the Right still looked to protect national sovereignty. This was not only because the Right approved of ensuring an important role for nation states in practical terms, but also because they saw the nation as an ideal community, to which they were emotionally attached. This vision was challenged by many Centrists who favoured an alternative federalist approach. For Jean Monnet, only a federation of European nations would allow France to compete in a world of superpowers. The Independent Centre parties saw the European Community as an ideal, where nations would work together, pooling sovereignty in the common interest, and to which they were particularly attached, and remained

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wary of a Europe of nations, which they feared might lead to nationalist tensions. Despite these long-standing differences, there was still the possibility that the Right and Centre could have forged a successful alliance prior to the 2017 presidential elections, as, due to the primary, the debate over who would be the candidate of Les Républicains in the presidential elections would not be decided until 2016, and, as Perrineau (2012) has noted, the Right itself was divided over European questions. Juppé believed in a more federal approach, similar to that of the Independent Centre parties, that would allow Europe to compete with other nations on the world stage, and he shared their view of the European project as an ideal. On the question of European culture, he had a much more open vision than many of his rivals, which recognised the contribution made by other civilisations outside Europe to its development. In contrast, both Fillon and Sarkozy were wary of transferring sovereignty and were keen to preserve an important role for individual countries within a Europe of nation states. Unlike those who placed their faith squarely in the European project, the Fillon istes and Sarkozy stes adopted a more Gaullist conception of the French nation. The victory of Fillon in the primary therefore both exacerbated a split within the Right, and also threatened the alliance with the Centre. Many Centrists who had been happy to ally with the Right, when it seemed likely that Juppé would be the candidate, were alienated by Fillon’s stance and started to look for an alternative candidate who better represented their position on Europe. The emergence of Emmanuel Macron played a crucial role as it both crystallised and accentuated divisions over Europe within Les Républicains and between the Right and the Centre. By emphasising his vision of the European ideal and the need for an integrated EU as a protection against globalisation and superpowers, he appealed to Centrists and Juppéistes, who felt alienated by Fillon’s approach. Yet Macron could not have won the presidential elections solely by gaining support from the Right. He also needed to gain votes from the Left, and once again his position on Europe helped him to do so. On both the Left and the Right, his vision of the EU appealed to those who were already ill at ease with aspects of their party’s programme. While the contentious issue on the Right was identity, for the Centre Left, it was Hamon’s decision to repudiate many of the Hollande government’s economic policies that were the underlying factor

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of disagreement. Macron’s opposition to nationalist measures and preference for a federal approach to Europe, made him more acceptable to those former supporters of the PS who wanted a candidate favourable to liberal economic reforms. He was therefore able to attract support from across the Left/Right divide, and to defeat both established parties of government. However, while we must recognise the contribution of issues concerning the Europe axis to the defeat of Les Républicains and the election of Macron as president in 2017, it was less important than the axes that we have studied in the two previous chapters. Its significance arose from the way that it accentuated the divisions produced by the other axes. Without Macron’s economic programme, which, for many voters, offered a better balance between liberal reform and protection than the measures proposed by other candidates, it is unlikely that he could have attracted the level of support required to win the presidency. Similarly, had debate within Les Républicains over the issue of cultural insecurity not alienated the Juppéistes and divided the Right, it seems unlikely that Macron could have won. While the failure of the Right in the 2017 presidential and legislative elections was in part due to the political realignment exacerbated by Macron’s ability to win over voters from both the Left and the Right with a positive vision of the EU, his success did not end debate, but rather amplified division in this area. The matter remained unresolved with the election of Laurent Wauquiez, known for being particularly critical of the EU, as leader of Les Républicains in December 2017. As we have seen, our new model helps to explain the internal divisions within the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency, and why it largely failed to widen its support beyond its core vote in the presidential and legislative elections of 2017. In Chapter 7, we shall see how the absence of an accepted leader, following Sarkozy’s resignation in May 2012, was crucial in allowing these divisions to emerge and develop, and how the three axes themselves influenced the debate over who should be the party’s presidential candidate.

Note 1. As differences of opinion between Les Républicains and the Independent Centre parties are crucial in this chapter, to avoid confusion, we shall refer to the Centre and the Right. In this context, the Right should be understood as meaning the Gaullist movement, and later the UMP and Les

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Républicains. Where the FN is not referred to by name, it will always be called the Far Right (or the Radical Right).

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CHAPTER 7

In Search of a Leader: The Centre Right and Its Leadership Crisis, 2012–2017

Introduction In this chapter, we will explain the impact of the question of leadership on the fortunes of Les Républicains, and how the absence of an accepted leader, following Sarkozy’s defeat in the 2012 presidential elections, exacerbated the differences over policy that we have examined in previous chapters. While, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the figure of the president has always been central to the Fifth Republic, a greater emphasis was placed on leadership during the Hollande presidency due to the decline in allegiance to political parties and traditional ideologies. The development of the Internet, and 24-hour news media, allowing greater coverage of political events and direct interaction between the electorate and their representatives, together with the rise of more independently minded voters, all contributed to the weakening of the link between parties and the people. Many voters found it easier to identify with individual politicians than with political movements. Between 2012 and 2017, the question of leadership was of particular importance for the Centre Right, which had often united behind a personality, rather than a particular project, with political factions putting aside their differences in order to ensure electoral success. The defeat of Sarkozy in May 2012, and his resignation as party leader, left the UMP

© The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_7

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without a figure able to impose a political programme before the primary of 2016—a factor which enabled the divisions over policy to deepen. Drawing on ideas from Max Weber (2013) and from John Gaffney (2015), we will establish a new analytical framework, based on the two elements of ‘personality’ and ‘representation’, which will explain why Fillon was able to defeat both Sarkozy and Juppé in the primary in 2016, but also why he lost the 2017 presidential elections to Macron. Fillon’s policies more closely reflected the views of the voters who participated in the primary, than did those of his rivals. He was also preferred in terms of his personality. Juppé was seen by many members of Les Républicains as weak and conciliatory, while Sarkozy was considered too provocative, and both the Mayor of Bordeaux, and the former president were tarnished by being linked to either previous or current judicial investigations. However, during the presidential elections, Fillon failed to meet the expectations of the wider electorate in both these areas. On the question of personality, he lost his reputation for integrity following the revelation of the Penelopegate scandal. Furthermore, his programme was seen as too radical, and unrepresentative of a broad section of public opinion. This worked to the benefit of Emmanuel Macron, who was able to appear as a more presidential figure, as someone who seemed dynamic, and who had a programme that appealed to a broader swathe of the electorate. The problems facing Les Républicains concerning leadership would continue beyond the defeat and resignation of Fillon in 2017. His replacement, Laurent Wauquiez, would prove even more unpopular, and would himself step down following the party’s poor performance in the 2019 European elections.

Leadership: A Crucial Factor During the Hollande Presidency Leadership was a major issue during the Hollande presidency due to several factors. Some of these arose out of the nature of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, which put emphasis on the role of the president, while others arose from the decline in voters’ identification with political parties. Both of these elements ensured that parties on the Right felt that the search for a presidential candidate capable of gaining power was of paramount importance.

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I. The Institutions of the Fifth Republic One of the reasons why leadership was crucial between 2012 and 2017 was that parties needed to find a candidate whose personality would enable them to command the support of a wide section of French society, because, as we have seen in Chapter 3, since the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the role of the president has been central in the French political system, and its importance has been reinforced by the reforms of 1962 and 2000. The legitimacy of the presidency did not arise just from its central place in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, but also from the public’s support for the manner in which it was interpreted. As Gaffney (2015; 38) states, ‘[t]he presidency became instantly the most popular and influential office in the republic, and the presidential elections of 1965, 1969, 1974, 1981, 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2012 became and remain by far the most popular moments of the electoral cycle and the central political and symbolic act in the Fifth Republic’. Abstention levels in the presidential elections and legislative elections illustrated how this remained true in 2017. While the abstention rate for the first round of the presidential elections was 22.23% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017a), that for the first round of the legislative elections was 51.30% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017b). II. The Decline in Allegiance to Political Parties A further reason for the particular significance of leadership during the Hollande presidency was the decline of engagement between the electorate and political parties. Whereas in 1981 the PS had 214,000 members and the RPR 500,000, in 2016 these figures had fallen to 135,000 for the PS and 238,208 for Les Républicains (Bruckert 2016). Parties were generally held in low esteem, with only 8% of French citizens expressing confidence in them, in the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016). As Lefebvre (2016; 319) notes, nowadays ‘support for the leader takes priority over support for the party’. This was shown in the 2017 elections, where of the four candidates who received the highest scores in the first round, three were people who had built their party around themselves: Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The explanation for the fall in standing of political parties can be attributed to three issues: the rise of new media offering an alternative

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means of political engagement, the decline in allegiance to traditional ideologies and a general loss of confidence in politicians. The Rise in New Media One of the explanations for the decline in the status of political parties is the rise of new media, allowing voters to find information more easily than in the past, and to interact more directly with politicians. As Martin (2000; 103) and Hanley (2013; 35) have noted, this has changed the relationship between voters and parties. Martin argues that technological advances have often influenced politics, and points out that the development of radio and then television had already modified links between party leaders and voters. Rather than having to rely on traditional networks such as party members or trade unions to spread their message to the people, party leaders could use these new technologies to speak directly to the electorate (Martin 2000; 103). The situation has developed further following the rise of the Internet and social media. Now not only can the public find out instantly the views and policies of politicians, without having to rely on intermediaries, they can also interact directly with their political representatives. We can see that this affects the relationship in both directions. Voters no longer need parties to construct their political agenda, and leaders do not need parties to establish a link with the people, or, at least not to the same degree as they did in the past. As will be discussed later, the candidates in the primary sought to respond to this situation, and created websites, blogs and Facebook pages to allow them to interact more directly with potential voters. Brochet (2017; 50) notes that these media allow people to express themselves more widely and easily than through political parties, which remain hierarchical and institutionalised, at a time when faith in many traditional institutions is in decline. This direct contact with the electorate has made leaders less dependent than in the past on their political parties, as was shown in the 2017 presidential elections. Emmanuel Macron founded his own political movement, En Marche, online. No subscription fee was required to join, and members could also belong to another political party. In many cases, En Marche, at least in its early days, was more like a mailing list than a traditional party. Once the website had been launched, visitors could only see the homepage and had to register to view any further content.

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Registration gave the party an e-mail address to which it could send political material directly, thereby ensuring that it had a line of contact with potential voters. Internet and social media have undermined the established parties of government by giving greater opportunities for new movements to challenge them. This was not limited to En Marche as the extreme parties of both Left and Right also used the possibilities offered by new technology to reach out to voters. As Brochet (2017; 28) argues, both Le Pen and Mélenchon used the Internet as a way of bypassing the traditional media that they considered to be biased against them. The impact of the rise in new media in emphasising the importance of leadership would be reinforced as it combined with the decline in allegiance to traditional ideologies to further weaken political parties. The Weakening of Traditional Ideologies As we have argued in previous chapters, the weakening of allegiance to traditional ideologies, and the rise of more independently minded voters has undermined the links that used to exist between political parties and certain sections of the electorate, and, as we have seen in Chapter 3, in the 2017 presidential elections, significant sections of the electorate were often torn between candidates who represented markedly different policies. The ‘pick and choose’ logic identified by Brochet, that we have examined in Chapter 3, extended beyond questions of ideology to the question of leadership. As Schwartzenberg (2009; 277) has argued, the figure of the leader, and in particular their personal qualities have become more important in influencing voting behaviour. He characterises this change by claiming that ‘imagery supplants ideology’. This could be seen in the case of Macron, whose election in 2017 was in part based on him being seen as new, young and dynamic, even without him having a detailed programme. The presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 support Schwartzenberg’s argument since, as we shall see, in both cases, the personalities of the candidates were crucial in determining the result. The Rejection of Politicians Added to the impact of the rise of new media and the decline in attachment to traditional ideologies, another factor that has reinforced the importance of leadership has been the fall in reputation of politicians.

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In the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey (the last to be carried out before the 2017 presidential and legislative elections), only 21% of the population had a favourable view of députés (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 6), and 72% felt that the majority of politicians were corrupt (a figure which had risen by 10 points since January 2013, and by 14 points since 2002) (see Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 23 and Grunberg and Mayer 2003; 217). Voters were likely to look favourably on politicians who seemed new and different, even if their programme was not well developed. The focus on personality was already clear in 2012, when the issue of Sarkozy’s character dominated the debate. Cole, Meunier and Tiberj (2013; 7) argue that ‘[t]he 2012 presidential election was in many ways an anti-Sarkozy referendum and a repudiation as much of the man as of his policies’. They add (2013; 16) that ‘The vote was more a verdict against Sarkozy than a mandate for Hollande’, while Gaffney (2015; 55) argues that, ‘Hollande won in 2012 partly because no-one knew who he was’. This focus on the personal qualities of candidates would become even more important in 2017. Among Macron and Le Pen voters ‘He/she represents renewal’ was the most important factor in driving their vote, with 64% of those who chose the candidate of En Marche, and 65% of those who supported the leader of the FN mentioning this as a reason for having done so (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 11). In contrast, fewer of their supporters cited enthusiasm for their political programme as the determining factor for their choice. 37% of Macron supporters and 34% of those who voted for Le Pen chose ‘He/she has a good programme’ to explain their vote (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 11). Personality was therefore key to the success of these candidates. It is also interesting to consider the gilets jaunes protests, which, although the movement started over a year after the presidential elections of 2017, can be seen as representing a development of the trends in political engagement that we have discussed above. Having lost confidence in parties, and placed their faith in particular leaders in 2017, many demonstrators had been disappointed by the performance of these figures as well, and wanted more power to be placed in the hands of the electorate. This crisis of confidence could be seen in the fall of Macron’s approval ratings (from 66% in May 2017 to 23% in December 2018) (Ifop-Fiducial 2018; 8), and the failure of opposition leaders such as Marine Le Pen or Mélenchon to channel the protestors’ anger towards support for their

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parties (as shown by an Ipsos poll for Le JDD from December 2018, which found that the scores of the Rassemblement National and La France Insoumise in the European elections would both fall by 3% if they faced competition from a gilets jaunes list) (Rédaction JDD 2018). As Perrineau notes, the gilets jaunes can be characterised as a ‘a very modern movement marked by […] the rejection of politics and suspicion regarding all long-term and stable forms of delegation of power or representation’ (Perrineau 2018; 19). This was demonstrated by calls from the protestors for the use of a ‘citizen’s initiative referendum’ to allow the electorate to intervene directly in political decision-making, and a HarrisInteractive poll from January 2019 found that 80% of all French voters felt that referenda should be able to be used to propose legislation (Bost and Douet 2019). Further suspicion of politicians and representative institutions could be seen in their other demands. These included abolishing the Senate, reducing the number of deputies to 2 per département and returning the presidential term to seven years, so as to allow voters to pass judgement on a president’s action before the end of his mandate through voting in legislative elections (Cloris et al. 2018). While the gilets jaunes movement is a complex and disparate one, whose participants have many different and often conflicting demands, and struggle to unite around a single programme, it represents a further evolution in the relationship between voters, political parties and politicians, that we have analysed above, as citizens looked to take back more power into their own hands.

The Changing Dynamics of Competition Within Parties Another development that has increased the importance of leadership has been the change in the way traditional parties have selected their representative for presidential elections. In the past, the party leader would normally have stood as the candidate, and the second round would generally have involved a run-off between one from the Centre Left and one from the Centre Right. This situation has changed for two reasons. The decline in party membership has meant that the members of the established parties of government are even less representative of society as a whole than in the past. In addition, the growth in strength of radical movements, such as the FN and La France Insoumise, has reduced the likelihood of the

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established parties of government automatically qualifying for the second round of the presidential elections. To increase their chances of success, such parties must now open discussion over the choice of candidate beyond their members to non-affiliated supporters, a process which can favour politicians seen as ‘outsiders’. Prior to the 2017 presidential elections, both the PS and Les Républicains organised open primaries. In both cases, candidates designated as the favourites by commentators were defeated by those given little hope of success. On the Right, François Fillon was chosen ahead of both Alain Juppé and Nicolas Sarkozy, who had long been considered the two figures most likely to represent the party in 2017. On the Left, Benoît Hamon was also considered an outsider, in a contest that included former prime minister, Manuel Valls, and Arnaud Montebourg, who had come third in the 2011 primary. The rejection of the more established figures showed that it is no longer the case that ‘it is unlikely that [the president] would ever be in the Elysée in the first place without having become de facto if not de jure leader of his party’ (Hanley 2013; 28). The decision to hold primaries was both an acceptance that adherence to political parties had declined, and, in inviting voters to choose between candidates, a factor which put further emphasis on leadership issues. In light of the importance of the presidency under the Fifth Republic, and the decline of political parties and politicians, the question of what a leader should be became of greater importance in the five years running up to 2017, and we must now examine the mechanics of leadership in more detail, to understand what voters’ expectations were in this area.

Defining Leadership In modern Western democracies there has been much debate over what characteristics a leader must possess. Weber and Hoffmann have emphasised the need for qualities that place him or her above other citizens, what they call ‘charismatic leadership’ (Weber 2013; 245) or ‘heroic leadership’ (Hoffmann 1974; 77). Others, such as Schwartzenberg (2009; 8), argue that, in light of new information and communications technology, politics has been reduced to a sort of talent contest, where personality dominates all. Finally, Gaffney (2015) has outlined his own model of the characteristics of leadership in the Fifth Republic. In this part of the chapter, we will discuss all of these models, and nuance them in order to establish criteria against which we can judge the three main candidates of the Primary of

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the Right and Centre and also Macron. This will allow us to consider the factors which led each of the representatives of Les Républicains to fail over questions of leadership, and why the candidate of En Marche was successful. I. The Personality of the Leader in the Modern French Political System In the modern political system, those who aspire to lead must demonstrate that they have particular personal qualities that make them suited to this role—what has historically been described as charisma. Yet, while this remains important, traditional analyses need to be revised to make them more relevant to the present day. Weber (2013; 245) outlines the charismatic leader by noting that: the ‘natural’ leaders – in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress – have been neither officeholders nor incumbents of an ‘occupation’ in the present sense of the word, that is, men who have acquired expert knowledge and who serve for remuneration. The natural leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody.

Hoffmann (1974; 77) has outlined a similar framework in a French context, talking about ‘heroic leadership’, where an outsider who has not been involved in the political system governs through the force of his own character. He argues that heroic leaders come to power ‘when change can no longer be delayed’ (1974; 77). Under such a figure, ‘citizens […] are led to respond with support, but without participation’ (1974; 77). Like Weber, Hoffman (1974; 81) sees heroic leadership as ‘connected with a cataclysmic sense of emergency and with the notion of “total” transformation’. In their response to such a situation, heroic leaders, before their arrival in power, have often been ‘rebels against the prevalent order of things or the prevalent ideas’ (1974; 82). In light of these analyses, the Hollande presidency could be seen as favouring the emergence of a charismatic figure. As we have argued above, 2017 might be considered to be what Weber (2013; 245) describes as a ‘period of political distress’. Not only were there the continuing effects of the economic crisis, which the governments of neither Sarkozy nor of Hollande seemed able to mitigate, but there was also the rise of the terrorist threat within France.

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However, we must adapt traditional interpretations in order to make them relevant for the Hollande presidency. While the characterisation of leadership as ‘heroic’ could be applied to de Gaulle, who had led the Resistance during the Second World War, and then returned to power during the Algerian War, it seems ill-suited to a peacetime context, where many of the problems that leaders must face are related to somewhat less weighty matters. Furthermore, it must be recognised that society has changed greatly since the periods on which both Weber and Hoffmann base their analysis. As we have seen in Chapter 2, class identities have been weakened since the 1960s, and there is also much less deference towards authority. In this context, it is much more difficult for any political figure to generate and maintain a significant amount of personal support. Nonetheless, charisma remains a useful feature for analysis of leadership in the Fifth Republic. As Weber recognised, in a system where a leader is legitimised by election, those who wish to become head of a party or head of state must show that they stand apart from their fellow citizens. The problems that emerge, when politicians fail to demonstrate these attributes, could be recognised during the Hollande presidency. As we have seen, in the 2012 presidential elections, the candidate of the Parti Socialiste was chosen rather because he was not Sarkozy, than because of any particular character traits that he possessed. Indeed he deliberately sought to emphasise this contrast by claiming that he would be a ‘normal president’ (Soudan and Perier 2011). Rather than claiming that he had extraordinary gifts, as Weber’s charismatic leader must do, Hollande sought to appear representative of the ordinary voter. This became a problem, once in government, due to the challenges that the president soon faced on both the domestic and international scene. As Gaffney (2015; 29) notes, ‘the nature of the Fifth Republic is such that these developments would almost automatically trigger a call for a less normal type of leadership style, and if it did not come from the president, he would be seen as inadequate’. Following his defeat in 2017, Hollande acknowledged that he had made a mistake in describing his presidential style as ‘normal’. He stated: This concept was formulated during the 2012 campaign, and was later criticised. […] As regards the concentration of powers, and the role that the president of the Republic is suspected to fulfil […] a presidency that can be defined as “normal” is needed. But […] I would no longer express this in the same way. Nowadays, I would say “human”. (Dusseaulx 2018)

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One factor that defines the charismatic leader is the ability to take decisive action. De Gaulle had moved rapidly in 1958 to install the Fifth Republic, and more recently, Sarkozy had pushed through many reforms in the first hundred days of his presidency. This was another feature that was lacking from the Hollande presidency. In part, this was because, as we have seen, Hollande defined himself as the antithesis of Sarkozy, who had been known as the omniprésident. Rather than cultivating a distance between himself and the policies of the government, as his predecessors had done, Sarkozy sought to exercise control, to the point that he referred to François Fillon, his prime minister, as his ‘partner’. Although this ensured that any mistakes made by the government rebounded on the president, when Hollande adopted the reverse approach, he was attacked for his lack of action. As Gaffney (2015; 70) states: “normalcy” and the slow pace of presidential action were Hollande’s first demonstrative steps in rejecting Sarkozy’s flamboyance, but the need to react immediately stemmed from a quite different source. Sarkozy’s “hyperactivity” from 2007 had masked the fact that “action” had become an exigency upon rather than a choice of the presidency. The illusion was that perceptions of Sarkozy’s character made him appear over-reactive, but swift responses and initiatives had in fact become normative.

In addition to the need to take decisive action, a leader must also be assertive. The authority of de Gaulle and Mitterrand, for example, had been respected, as the public accepted that a strong figure was required as head of state. Opinion polls showed that this remained a key part of voters’ appreciation of how the role of president should be performed. Over the course of the Hollande presidency, the Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises surveys analysed responses to the statement ‘We need a real leader to re-establish order’. 88% of those surveyed in 2016 felt that this was important, and it was seen as particularly relevant by supporters of Les Républicains, 99% of whom agreed with this idea. Such a view was not confined to the Right, as 76% of PS voters and 56% of those of La France Insoumise also wanted a strong leader (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 13). While the French public had long expected that any president should be a decisive and assertive leader, this feeling intensified during the Hollande presidency, due to the actions of the head of state. As Gaffney has argued, Hollande appeared weak, for example, when he resisted

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sacking Economy Minister, Arnaud Montebourg, despite the latter’s regular criticism of the government’s adoption of more liberal economic policies, but did remove Delphine Batho from her position, when she complained about the lack of resources allocated to her Environment Ministry, as she did not have the support base that Montebourg possessed (Gaffney 2015; 149). This view of Hollande was reinforced by his behaviour in his private life. During the campaign for the 2012 legislative elections, his partner, Valérie Trierweiler, tweeted in favour of Olivier Falorni, who was standing against Ségolène Royal, the mother of Hollande’s children and the official PS candidate, to whom the president had personally pledged his support. As Gaffney notes, this led to Hollande being characterised as, ‘an indecisive man who had failed to respond to the whole issue’ (Gaffney 2015; 93). Hollande had already been criticised during the PS Primary of 2011 by Martine Aubry, who claimed that he represented ‘la Gauche molle’ (“Soft Left”) (Gaffney 2015; 93). This criticism that he was weak would reoccur during his presidency, as when an article in Le Point referred to him as ‘Le grand méchant mou’ (‘The big, bad softie’, but a play on ‘Le grand méchant loup’ ‘the big, bad wolf) (Schiffer 2013). As the polls quoted above demonstrate, Hollande’s own failings in this area only served to reinforce the hopes among the electorate that his successor would be a stronger personality, and the non-partisan nature of this attitude would be confirmed when it would harm Juppé during his campaign to be the candidate of the Right in the 2017 elections. While decisive action is required from a president, it must also be effective, and therefore, as Hanley notes, competence is a crucial skill that politicians hoping to lead the country must possess (Hanley 2013; 27). The experience of the Hollande presidency further reinforced the desire for a political leader who displayed this trait, as the president’s failure to deal with unemployment further undermined confidence in both him and his government. Although Hollande announced on 9 September 2012, that the number out of work would fall within a year, it continued to rise until the third quarter of 2015. The government’s decision to comment every month on the figures highlighted its own inability to deal with the situation. Leaders are not only legitimised by their ability to successfully enact policy, but also through other criteria relating to their personality, one of which is honesty. This has become particularly important within recent

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years. Gaffney (2015; 12) states that ‘Trivia, scandals, and gossip and so on become integral to the president’s status and the regime’s stability’, and, as Bell (2000; 245) argues, ‘probity in political leaders is demanded by public opinion’. Previous presidents had been implicated in scandals, such as Giscard d’Estaing’s acceptance of diamonds from Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic, accusations that the RPR had created a series of fake jobs to enable public funds to be diverted to the party, when Chirac was Mayor of Paris, and the accusation made in 1987 that some of the money gained from illicit arms deals between France and Iran had been used to fund the PS. As Cole notes, such incidents were exploited by opposition parties, as when Mitterrand attacked Giscard and ‘easy money’ in the run up to the 1981 presidential elections, or in 1988, when the Right looked to profit from accusations made against the Socialists (Bell 2000; 245). Although political scandals have been common during the Fifth Republic, as Gaffney (2015; 12) notes, their impact has increased with the development of digital media. Under the Hollande presidency there was a loss of confidence in all politicians and in the 2016 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises survey, 72% of all voters felt that ‘The majority of politicians are corrupt’, a figure which had risen from 62% in 2013 (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 23). When asked, during the 2017 presidential election campaign, what qualities they looked for in a presidential candidate, 65% chose honesty, which was far ahead of determination, which was the second most sought value, which 34% considered to be important (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 4). One of the reasons why honesty had become such an important issue was the number of scandals that had affected both Right and Left. Sarkozy’s campaign team for the 2012 presidential elections was accused of having set up a system to produce fake receipts to enable him to overspend his permitted electoral budget by 17 million euros (known as the Bygmalion scandal). While this damaged the Centre Right in opposition, the government itself was weakened when the Budget Minister, Jérôme Cahuzac, was revealed to have hidden undeclared assets in a Swiss bank account. Any candidate aiming to gain the presidency in 2017 would have to demonstrate their honesty, and the question of probity was one of the defining features of the presidential election campaign. As we shall see, like other politicians before him, Macron would position himself as a contrast to his rivals, Le Pen and particularly Fillon, who were both linked to scandals, so as to emphasise his own probity.

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The loss of confidence of the public in politicians in general was accompanied by a rise in the popularity of figures who could be considered as outsiders. As we have seen, this was one of the features observed by those, such as Hoffmann, who have analysed charismatic leadership. While neither Sarkozy nor Hollande managed to deal with the problem of unemployment, the popularity of more radical candidates, such as Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon rose. This phenomenon was not confined to parties on the political extremes. Among supporters of both the established parties of government, there was a rejection of the most prominent figures in favour of others who seemed untarnished by the problems that these movements were facing. This could be seen in the results of the primaries, where Fillon beat both of the favourites, Juppé and Sarkozy, to become the candidate in 2017, and when Benoît Hamon, who had strongly criticised the actions of the Hollande government, won the contest to represent the PS. As we will demonstrate later, Macron’s ability to cast himself as a relative outsider was an important factor in his success. The relevance of the character traits that we have outlined in this section have been recognised by politicians. In the debate between Sarkozy and Hollande before the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, the outgoing president emphasised the importance of strong leadership when he stated: I think that a president of the Republic is someone, especially under the quinquennat , who takes responsibility, who makes decisions, who learns from his experiences and the crises he has had to face, it is without doubt the most difficult job there is. (Le Télégramme 2012)

This assessment was shared by Sarkozy’s rivals in the Primary of the Right and Centre. In a speech at Lyon in September 2016, Juppé (2016) outlined his vision of the necessary qualities that a president should possess: A true leader, a leader worthy of the name, is a president who governs with authority, with courage, with dignity, who sets the direction of travel, and who follows it, who sets out the general outline of governmental policies, who makes the major decisions, those which he will have presented in a measured way (‘sans démagogie’) during the campaign, and who ensures that they will be enacted rapidly and effectively.

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Similarly, when Fillon launched his campaign for the Primary in August 2016 at Sablé-sur-Sarthe, he stated that his political role-model was de Gaulle, and outlined his vision of the role of president thus: The president must place himself above day to day political debates. He must ensure the safety and security of the French people, and the correct functioning of the institutions. He must set the direction of travel and the outlines of policies and allow the prime minister and the government to exercise all the powers granted to them by the Constitution. Yes, I will fulfil the role of president in the way that de Gaulle wished it to be fulfilled. With dignity, with greatness but also with rigour. (Fillon 2016)

Probity was another major issue during both the Primary of the Right and Centre and the 2017 presidential election campaign. It was one emphasised by Fillon in 2016 when he argued that: Having a high opinion of politics means that those who ask voters to place their confidence in them must be worthy of receiving it. Those who do not respect the laws of the Republic should not be able to stand for election. It is no use talking about authority if one is not beyond reproach oneself. (Fillon 2016)

Sarkozy and Juppé’s failure to convince the electorate of the primary that they had the necessary qualities to be president would play a key role in their defeat in November 2016, while, despite his victory in the primary, Fillon would not persuade voters outside Les Républicains that he would make an appropriate head of state. II. Representation: The Other Side of Political Leadership Candidates seeking to be elected president must not only prove that they have the necessary personal qualities, but must also represent a vision or a programme that reaches beyond its party base. This would prove to be a particular challenge in the presidential elections of 2017. In the past, parties would focus on rallying their own supporters in the first round before targeting a wider electorate in the second. However, as Lefebvre (2016; 81) points out, the high scores achieved by the FN in local and European elections, and polls showing that Marine Le Pen was likely to

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go through to the second round, made it essential for Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste to find a presidential candidate capable of representing as broad a sway of public opinion as possible (particularly in light of the events of 2002, when the proliferation of candidates on the Left had split the vote and allowed Jean-Marie Le Pen to be present in the second round of the presidential elections.). This meant that although a party’s candidate had previously been chosen by party members, during the Hollande presidency, this process would be open to those willing to pay a small contribution and sign a document stating that they supported the values of the party in question. This strategy failed, both for the Centre Right and the Centre Left, since rather than selecting candidates who were representative of a large proportion of the electorate, the primaries saw figures chosen who were more popular inside the party than outside. In the case of the Primary of the Right and Centre, this was in part because, although the opportunity to vote was open to all, participation was dominated by the core electorate of Les Républicains. As Teinturier (2017; 38) notes, ‘the sociological composition of the electorate [of the primary] is […] very stereotypical, very far from being representative of that of the country or even of a good part of that of the Right and Centre’. Although those over 65 make up 23% of the French population, they formed 46% of the electorate for the primary, while under-35s represented only 14% of the voters in the primary, despite 25% of French citizens belonging to this group. In terms of socio-economic background, blue-collar workers were 6% of voters in the primary, but 17% of the overall population, while 44% of voters in the November 2016 contest earned over 3500 euros a month in contrast to 26% of the population (Teinturier 2017; 38). In its failure to represent the wider French electorate, the primary created problems for Les Républicains, rather than resolving them. The same could be seen with the PS, which chose Benoît Hamon, whose views were much more representative of those of PS members than of the general public, as was demonstrated by his score of 6% in the presidential elections. The failure of the primary strategy was underlined by the fact that three of the four highest scoring candidates in the presidential elections did not go through a primary. In part, the votes obtained by Macron, Le Pen and Mélenchon can be explained by their ability to represent those who were alienated by the current political system, and who wanted to change or to register a protest, and because these candidates were considered to

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be more representative of the views of the electorate than those from the established parties of government. Having argued that leadership was becoming increasingly important during the Hollande presidency, and having examined the qualities that voters looked for in candidates who wished to become head of state, we will now consider the evolution of the Centre Right.

The Importance of Leadership for the Centre Right Leadership was a key issue for all parties between 2012 and 2017, but particularly for the Centre Right. Part of the explanation for this lies in traditional approaches to party politics on the Right, while other elements relate to the problems the UMP and then Les Républicains faced during the Hollande presidency. An historical suspicion of political parties as sources of division ensured that the Centre Right often built movements around leaders rather than programmes. De Gaulle was particularly influential in this respect. He notably set out his vision of parties when he stated in an interview with Michel Droit during the 1965 presidential election campaign: France includes everything at the same time, it includes all the French. France is not just the Left! France is not just the Right! Naturally, the French people have always felt the presence of certain currents of opinion within themselves. […] To claim to make France with a certain section, is a serious error, and to claim to represent France in the name of a certain section, is an unforgiveable national error. (INA 1965)

The leaders and movements on the Centre Right which succeeded de Gaulle generally continued to prioritise unity rather than ideology. As Fougier (2012; 220) states, ‘Before Nicolas Sarkozy became leader of the main French right-wing party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), in 2004, no leader of the French right wing like Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing or Jacques Chirac identified himself as purely conservative’. The names of political organisations also showed this suspicion of parties. Unlike on the Left, the word ‘party’ was avoided and instead movements preferred terms such as Rally (as in Chirac’s Rally for the Republic) or Union, as in the Union for a Popular Movement (Haegel 2012; 65).

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Leadership was therefore particularly important on the Right, which always tended to place emphasis on a particular figure, rather than on a programme. As Hanley (2013; 35) recognises, ‘Culturally, the Right has always been attracted by a clear model of authority, in which a leader, once duly legitimised, gives a clear political direction and is at the origin of policymaking’. An example of this could be seen in the early 2000s, when several Right-wing parties came together in the UMP. Jérôme Monod, one of the key architects of this new party, recalled that Chirac had told him: ‘Genghis Khan had a large number of Asiatic tribes and one day he told them the following: “If, individually, each tribe […] is unable to stand up to anything, if we bind them together with an oath, from then on, no-one will be able to stop them.” I want to do the same thing with the parties that made up my former parliamentary majority’ (Monod 2015). Much as the tribes had come together around Genghis Khan, so Chirac would be the focal point for the new movement. The emphasis on the figure of the leader as the unifying factor was also demonstrated by the name originally given to the new party, which was the Union for the Presidential Majority. The importance of the leader within the UMP was reinforced by the decision not to establish the mouvements provided for in the statutes, when the party was formed. These were intended to be groups that would represent a particular current of political opinion present on the Centre Right, and which were supposed to reassure smaller parties by demonstrating that their voices would be heard in the new, unified organisation. Whereas the PS followed a policy of allowing the existence of equivalent motions, many within the UMP feared that these would merely become elements of division. The absence of mouvements before 2012 meant that there was little internal discussion of policy, and that it was down to the leader to provide direction. Haegel (2015a; 63) has noted that the UMP was ‘weakly institutionalized’, and that there was a ‘lack of any real democratic tradition within the party’ (Haegel 2015a; 71). This was deliberate, so as to ensure that the focus remained the leader, rather than policy debate, which might create internal splits and weaken cohesion. The problems that this might cause the Centre Right would not become obvious for some time, as before 2012 the question of who was the legitimate representative of the party did not arise. While Chirac was president, he was the undisputed leader of the Centre Right, and in 2007, Sarkozy was unopposed when he stood to be the candidate of the UMP. As Hanley (2013; 34) notes:

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Sarkozy emerged as the front-runner because of his action in government (he spent much time in 2002-7 trying to distinguish himself from his colleagues in what became a terminally unpopular administration), and because he conquered the Union pour un movement populaire (UMP) from the older generation of Gaullists after a decade of purposeful and energetic struggle, and left them with a fait accompli by the time the presidential election was due.

Sarkozy was the obvious candidate, and it seemed in the best interests of the party to rally around him. Sarkozy himself reinforced the power of the leader within the UMP, but in doing so would create many of the problems that would confront the party from 2012. On becoming president of France, he did not abandon his position as party leader. The party argued that ‘Since the president of the UMP is now in the Elysée, our movement has no need to choose a new leader’ (lefigaro.fr avec AFP 2007). The position of party leader was left open, and the party was managed by a secretary general and two deputy secretary generals. As Haegel (2015a; 64) states, ‘as long as Nicolas Sarkozy was president of the republic, the party’s centre of gravity was firmly located at the Elysée Palace’. Furthermore, those who were appointed to key positions within the party at a national level were all Sarkozy loyalists. Although this strengthened the UMP in the short term, by preventing the emergence of rivals to the president, in the long term it weakened the party, as it ensured that there was no obvious candidate to succeed Sarkozy when he stepped down in 2012. The failure to resolve the leadership question allowed differences of policy to become particularly divisive. Following Sarkozy’s resignation in May 2012, leadership elections were scheduled for November of that year. These would be between François Fillon, the prime minister between 2007 and 2012, and Jean-François Copé, who had become Secretary General of the UMP in November 2010. Rather than deciding the issue, the elections led to a stalemate when both candidates received around 50% of the vote. Although Copé was declared the winner, it was later discovered that some of the votes of overseas territories had been ignored, and that had these been included, Fillon would have been the victor. Fillon reacted by setting up an alternative parliamentary group, the Rassemblement UMP. A compromise was eventually found, whereby Copé would remain as party leader but every other post in the hierarchy would be held jointly between one Copéiste and one Filloniste. This response allowed

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the divisions to continue, as, without a single, recognised figure able to rally support, disputes over policy multiplied. A strong leader had been crucial to the success of Right-wing movements in France, and the absence of such a figure posed key problems for the Centre Right between 2012 and 2017. As we will now see, the fortunes of this movement, during the Hollande presidency, illustrate the way in which the political landscape had evolved, in the manner discussed above.

The Centre Right and the Decline of Political Parties One of the most important decisions taken on the Centre Right was to hold an open primary in 2016 to choose the presidential candidate for the 2017 elections, which was seen as a way of resolving the quarrels that had been opened by the bitter leadership contest of November 2012. The failure of Sarkozy to win the primary was evidence of the decline in influence of traditional political movements, as he had planned to secure control of the party, to ensure that he became the representative of the Centre Right in 2017. As we have seen, this was the strategy that had worked for him between 2004 and 2007, but this time the same approach would prove unsuccessful. The weakness of Sarkozy’s approach was that the leadership of the party had been deprived of its presidential nature following the decision that the Centre Right’s presidential candidate would be chosen by an open primary in 2016. Although he received 64.5% of the vote in the 2014 UMP leadership election, his main rivals, Juppé and Fillon, had not stood against him (Le Monde 2014), as they knew that the real contest was still to come. As Sarkozy was much more popular within the UMP than among the electorate as a whole, they were happy to leave control of the party to the former president, believing that this would not put him in an unassailable position. The confidence of Juppé and Fillon that Sarkozy’s victory in the leadership election was no barrier to them being chosen as the Centre Right’s presidential candidate stemmed from the fact that it would be the primary, which would be open to all and not just to party members, which would decide who that candidate would be, rather than the party hierarchy. Juppé, who was the most popular politician in France according to opinion polls, stated in an interview given to Le Monde in June 2015,

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‘Nicolas Sarkozy has control of the party, I for the moment have the support of public opinion’ (Darmon et al. 2015; 13). Representatives of other candidates also sought to downplay Sarkozy’s success in 2014. Franck Riester, who supported Bruno Le Maire, argued that ‘Having control of the party does not place Nicolas Sarkozy in an unassailable position, because the primary completely changes the situation. All French voters will be able to participate and not just party members’ (Lefebvre 2016; 94). On being re-elected leader in 2014, the former president of France aimed to increase the size of the party from 213,000 to 500,000 members by 2016. He exploited his control over the party to pass new statutes to ensure that local party heads would be elected by the militants, and charged with expanding the membership. Yet this attempt to reinforce his own position failed, since, as Caroline Vasnier pointed out, choosing the candidate for the presidential elections through a primary had removed one of the main incentives to join the party (Lefebvre 2016; 96). Sarkozy’s control over the party was of much less significance than he had hoped. 4.27 million people took part in the primary (Rédaction Europe 1 avec AFP 2016) (a figure much greater than the total membership of Les Républicains). While 46% were supporters of the party, 8% favoured the UDI and 6% MoDem, 15% were from the Left, 14% had no political allegiance and 8% supported the FN (ELABE pour BFMTV 2016; 12). The primary showed that the party leader had lost his power to produce and impose a particular programme. Sarkozy had argued in March 2015 that all candidates in the primary would have to support a common set of measures that would be submitted to the membership for approval. He produced several surveys on various issues that were put to party members, trying to reinforce his legitimacy by demonstrating that he had their support. This initiative was opposed by both Fillon and Juppé, who were keen to make the primary a debate about policy and not just personality, and they and other potential candidates sought ways to challenge Sarkozy’s consultations. When the questionnaire on immigration was produced, Juppé (2015) posted a long response on the website for his 2016 primary campaign, where he criticised some of the proposals and put forward his own alternative suggestions. The lack of impact of the party in this area would also be demonstrated by the fact that the programme produced during Sarkozy’s time as party leader was ignored

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by Fillon when he won the primary, as he argued that his victory had legitimised his own policies. The greater focus on leadership on the Centre Right at the expense of the party could be seen in the way that Juppé, Fillon, Le Maire and Bertrand all created their own micro-parties for the primary (Lefebvre 2016; 99). This enabled them to bypass the main party and present proposals directly to the general public. In the case of Fillon , at the inaugural meeting of his own movement, Force Républicaine, in Paris on 26 February 2013, he announced that it would bring together députés and other elected representatives, along with party militants, and have a local branch in every département. Yet, while Fillon claimed that this microparty had been created to serve the aims of the UMP, Force Républicaine was chiefly a vehicle to enable him build support ahead of the primary, and L’Express noted that ‘it is to become his spearhead between now and 2016’ (L’Express avec AFP 2013). The role of the micro-party as a support group for Fillon outside the traditional party structures became even clearer following the primary, where the money which it raised was not placed in the hands of a body within Les Républicains, but instead paid to Force Républicaine. All these factors exacerbated the fragmentation of the Centre Right, as voters’ loyalty to individual leadership candidates took precedence over their support for the party. As Haegel notes, ‘the primary and the internal campaign that accompanied it place debate over the programme at the heart of discussion within the party. Whereas, historically, production of the programme was less important for the Right than for the Left’ (Haegel 2015b; 13). The support for particular candidates and their programmes, rather than for Les Républicains as a whole, would become crucial both in the aftermath of the primary and during the presidential election campaign itself, when some Juppéistes felt unrepresented by Fillon’s policies, and so switched their support to Macron. Having considered the ways in which the fortunes of the Centre Right demonstrated the renewed importance of personality over policy during the Hollande presidency, we must now consider the three main candidates who stood in the 2016 primary, Sarkozy, Juppé and Fillon, in order to show that their inability to meet the expectations of the electorate, as set out by the framework we outlined earlier, can explain the failure of Les Républicains and the success of Macron.

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The Importance of Personality in Explaining the Fortunes of Les Républicains As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, one of the most important personal qualities that the public wanted in a president was an assertive character, capable of taking decisive action. This was particularly the case on the Right, where a very large majority felt that France needed ‘a real leader to re-establish order’ (Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 13). Failure to meet these criteria was a key factor in explaining the defeat of both Sarkozy and Juppé in the primary, even if each was unsuccessful for different reasons. Sarkozy’s problems stemmed from the fact that he was often perceived as being not only assertive, but also aggressive and confrontational, contrary to the popular image of what a president should be. During a visit to the Salon de l’Agriculture in 2008, when a member of the public refused to shake his hand, Sarkozy responded with the words ‘Sod off then, you bloody idiot’ (Cosnay 2012). As his assertiveness was a key part of his appeal among certain sections of the electorate, he was unwilling to drastically modify this aspect of his persona. Gaffney (2012; 350) notes that, even before his presidency, ‘Sarkozy was not “just” liked or disliked, but liked or disliked intensely and in equal measure’, and this remained the case during the Hollande presidency. On his return to politics in 2014, the former president himself recognised that this aspect of his personality had been influential in making him so unpopular, and insisted that he had changed. He tried to present himself as a calmer, more statesmanlike figure, stating in an interview on France 2 in September 2014, ‘age brings with it perhaps a little less energy, but more wisdom and perspective’ (T.L.G. 2015). This move was seen as unconvincing by many, and Les Guignols de l’Info mocked him with the slogan ‘Nicolas Sarkozy really has changed. He is worse than before’ (Les Guignols de l’Info 2015). Furthermore, in order to hold onto his electorate, he continued to be provocative, and as we have seen in Chapter 4, sought to be particularly uncompromising on questions of identity. In many cases, this reminded sections of the electorate why they disliked him. As the primary was open to all, some on the Left chose to participate in order to ensure that the former president would not be a candidate in May 2017 (Piquet and Quinault-Maupoil 2016). Sarkozy’s assertive and aggressive personality thus played a key role in his defeat.

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The question of personality also contributed to Juppé’s defeat in the primary, but for contrasting reasons. Although polls showed that he was the most popular politician in France, large sections of the Right-wing electorate saw his desire to play the role of moderator as a sign of weakness. His proximity to François Bayrou, the leader of MoDem, who had supported Hollande in the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, was seen as a further demonstration of this, and was seized on by his rivals. Sarkozy stated: ‘Having had a powerless president, I do not want another weak figure to replace him’ (Longuet 2016), while François Baroin accused the mayor of Bordeaux of representing ‘a presidency of the status quo’ (Longuet 2016). These attacks were encouraged by the strategy adopted by Juppé during the debates of the primary campaign, where his attempts to portray himself as presidential and above the melee made it seem that he lacked the assertive qualities that many on the Right were looking for. As Teinturier notes, when Juppé tried to modify his approach in the second round, and be more critical of Fillon, he did further damage to his cause, as his attacks on his rival’s ‘radical’ and ‘brutal’ programme made him appear a timid reformer in comparison (Teinturier 2017; 39). The Right-wing electorate’s search for a determined figure was therefore a key reason why Juppé was rejected. Although Fillon was not considered a particularly charismatic and assertive figure, he benefitted from the failings of his rivals. He was not helped by the fact that, when he had been prime minister, Sarkozy had called him his ‘partner’, thereby reinforcing the image of him as a follower rather than a leader. However, during the campaign for the primary, his image improved, as he appealed to Traditionalists on identity questions, and benefitted from his apparent sincerity in comparison to Sarkozy in this area. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the measures that Fillon proposed, such as those in response to the threat of terrorism, made him seem much more assertive and determined than his previous reputation had suggested. Another aspect of personality crucial to presidential performance was the question of competence, and once again this gave Fillon an advantage. Sarkozy’s ‘omnipresidential’ style had ensured that the president, rather than his prime minister, was blamed for the failings of the 2007– 2012 presidency. Similarly, Juppé’s image had suffered from his period as prime minister between 1995 and 1997, when his economic policies had led to widespread strikes and ended in defeat in the early election

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called in 1997. In contrast to the two candidates who had initially been the favourites to be selected as the presidential candidate, Fillon remained relatively untarnished from his previous time in power. Fillon also benefitted from being considered an outsider. As we have seen, this is often an advantage in presidential elections, and its impact on Fillon was further developed by the actions of Sarkozy and Juppé. As Teinturier states, the primary was presented in the media as a duel between the former president of France and the Mayor of Bordeaux, a perspective which they both reinforced by concentrating their attacks on one another. In contrast, Fillon, who polls in October 2016 had suggested would only receive 10% of the vote (Caro 2016), avoided much attention (Teinturier 2017; 35), and benefitted from the fighting of his rivals, which led to a fall particularly in support for Alain Juppé. Issues of personality also contain a moral element. As Gaffney (2015; 12) and Bell (2000; 245) have argued, scandal has often occupied a significant place in French political life, and was also influential in the 2016 primary. Sarkozy was linked to 11 criminal investigations, while Juppé had been convicted of corruption in 2004. In contrast, Fillon’s general reputation for honesty and integrity helped make up for other elements of his personality, such as his lack of assertiveness. He deliberately sought to contrast himself with his rivals, notably declaring at a meeting at Sablésur-Sarthe ‘Who can imagine for one moment General de Gaulle being the subject of a criminal investigation?’ (Fillon 2016), which was a deliberate attempt to show the contrast between Sarkozy and the founder of the Fifth Republic, seen as a model of presidential conduct. This strategy succeeded during the primary, as when his supporters were asked why they had voted for Fillon in the first round of the primary, the second most popular reason was ‘He is the most honest’, with 53% giving this to explain their choice (ELABE 2016). The role of past and present political scandals was therefore a determining factor in Fillon’s success. Questions of personality contributed to Fillon’s victory in the primary, but this was also aided by the fact that, as we have seen in previous chapters, his emphasis on traditional social attitudes and economically liberal reforms was representative of the older, wealthier electorate, which formed a major section of those who took part in the vote. As Fillon received 66.5% of the vote in the second round to beat his rival Alain Juppé, in a contest in which over 4 million voters had taken part (Le Monde 2016), it appeared that he had been given a mandate and that the problems of leadership that the Centre Right had been

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facing since Sarkozy’s defeat in the 2012 presidential elections had been resolved. However, the issues both of personality and representation that had played a role in Fillon’s victory in the primary would re-emerge during the presidential elections, but to different effect. The first problem to arise would be that of representation, as the perspective of those who had participated in the November 2016 contest did not reflect that of the electorate as a whole, nor even that of Centre Right supporters in general. This was demonstrated rapidly when, having climbed ahead of Marine Le Pen in the polls, immediately after his success in the primary, Fillon soon fell back into second place, when concerns emerged about his economic programme. As we have discussed in Chapter 5, this was considered too radical for many sections of the electorate, and particularly those on lower incomes, who had been under-represented in the primary. The number of socially liberal voters was also much greater outside the core Centre Right electorate, and Fillon’s programme failed to appeal to these groups. Rather than ensuring that the candidate of Les Républicains would be able to reach out to a broad section of voters, as had been intended, the primary had the opposite effect. Fillon also failed to satisfy the wider electorate on the issue of personality, even before the emergence of the Penelopegate scandal. This became clear immediately following the primary, as, in the words of Foucault and Chanvril-Ligneel (2017; 227): François Fillon never managed to achieve a link with voters based on his personality during the months of December 2016 and January 2017, even before the news of the scandals broke. The vote in favour of the candidate of the Right reached a ceiling which prevented him from convincing undecided voters on the Right right up to the last minute. This same unfavourable judgment had a knock-on effect on other characteristics linked to competence, empathy, efficiency or even presidential stature.

These feelings were reinforced by the nature of Fillon’s economic programme. As we have seen in Chapter 5, this had been described by Juppé as ‘brutal’ (a characterisation which would be adopted by rivals from other parties), and a significant portion of the electorate seemed to share this judgement. Fillon’s emphasis on the speed and extent of the economic change he proposed seemed to ignore the effect this might have on people’s lives. An example of this could be seen when he met employees during a visit to a

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care home. They told him that they already worked 39 hours a week, and needed the current rules on the 35 hour week limiting the time which they could be compelled to work. Fillon responded by asking ‘Do you want me to create additional debt?’ (Bourdeau 2017). The emphasis on the need to solve France’s economic problems, whatever the impact of his policies on certain sections of society, gave the impression that he failed to see the human consequences of the changes he proposed. This could be seen even among his electorate, where only 55% rated their sympathy towards him at greater than or equal to 8 (on a scale of 0–10), while 11% gave a value of less than 5 (Foucault and Chanvril-Ligneel 2017; 227). This contrasted with Sarkozy in 2012, for whom 67% of his supporters had rated their warmth for him at 8 or above (Foucault and ChanvrilLigneel 2017; 227). This inability to be seen as a sympathetic character would contribute to Fillon’s loss of support when he faced allegations of impropriety. The assessment of Fillon’s personality became a major reason for his defeat, when his probity was questioned following the emergence of the Penelopegate scandal. On 25 January 2017, Le Canard Enchaîné claimed that Fillon’s wife had been paid significant sums as his parliamentary assistant, despite there being little evidence that she had done much, if any, work for her husband in this role. This scandal, and further revelations over the following weeks, destroyed Fillon’s reputation for honesty, which had been a key part of his appeal to voters on the Right, and would have an impact on the way he was perceived even among his core electorate. Whereas in the primary, 53% of those participating had seen Fillon as the most honest candidate, a survey carried out just before the 2017 presidential elections found that among those who planned to vote for him, only 2% gave his probity as a reason for their choice (Ipsos/Sopra Steria 2017; 11). The development of the Internet and 24-hour news channels meant that, once the scandal had been revealed, it was given great attention by the media. Piar demonstrates that Fillon dominated media coverage during the 2017 campaign, with 299 minutes of the evening news of TF1 being devoted to him, ahead of Macron, who was the subject of 121 minutes of reporting. However, much of the focus on Fillon was negative, with 174 minutes covering the Penelopegate scandal (Piar 2017; 86). The need to defend himself against these attacks meant that Fillon was unable to maintain attention on his programme.

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In the absence of major policy debates, honesty became a key issue of the presidential campaign. This was exploited by other candidates, in particular by Macron, who proposed to restore confidence in politics by promising to create ‘more responsible elites’ (En Marche 2017), as he argued that ‘the main danger to democracy is the persistence of immoral actions committed by political representatives, whose behaviour is unworthy of a representative of the people’ (En Marche 2017). He would repeat this tactic, by announcing his proposed reforms in detail, on 2 March 2017, the day after Fillon had confirmed that he would continue his campaign, despite being summoned to appear before the judges investigating the Penelopegate scandal.

Emmanuel Macron and the Leadership Criteria The decline in Fillon’s fortunes gave Emmanuel Macron the opportunity to establish his own position in the presidential race, and would enable him to receive the largest share of the vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. In part, his success can be explained by his ability to meet the criteria that we have outlined in the early part of this chapter, relating to both personality and representation. Macron benefitted from his status as someone who transcended traditional party politics. Although he had been appointed Economy Minister by Hollande in 2014, when he was not a member of any party. During the presidential election campaign, he deliberately positioned himself against the party system, claiming that he was neither of the Right nor of the Left, and arguing that he represented a broad category of ‘Progressives’, in a new divide between ‘Progressives’ and ‘Conservatives’. His success in presenting himself as an outsider could be seen in a poll in November 2016, where 61% felt that he represented ‘renewal’ (L’Express.fr 2016), even when much of his programme, based on liberal economic policies and social liberalism, shared important aspects with those of many governments since the Mitterrand presidency. On the question of honesty, which, as we have shown, became a crucial factor in debate in 2017, in a poll from February 2017, 30% judged Macron to be honest, second only to Hamon with 33%. However, the candidate of En Marche was well ahead of Marine Le Pen (25%) and particularly Fillon (17%) (Furbury 2017). Another crucial aspect that we have defined as being part of presidential character is that of being affirmative and of taking decisive action, and

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Macron was rated highly in some of these areas, with a poll in April 2017 finding that 68% of voters felt that he was determined, although only 39% thought that he was authoritative (Michelon 2017). In addition to convincing voters that he possessed the personal qualities required of a president (or at least doing so to a greater extent than his rivals), Macron also appeared to represent the views of a larger section of the electorate than did the candidates of the established parties of government. The primaries held by Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste elected candidates who reflected the views of party members, but who would struggle to broaden their support among supporters of other movements or undecided voters. Macron was able to gain support in part despite or arguably because of his deliberately ambiguous campaign. As Taguieff notes, ‘the different positions he adopts are like those of a demagogue keen to adapt to the expectations of his audience’ (Taguieff 2017; 74). This could be seen in his stance on colonialism. In Le Point in November 2016, he defended the French occupation of Algeria, arguing that, while he recognised that torture had taken place, the French had also contributed to the development of the country’s infrastructure and wealth, and allowed the emergence of a middle class. Yet, in an interview given to Algerian television in February 2017, he stated that colonialisation was a crime against humanity (Taguieff 2017; 74). His approach reflected a deliberate strategy to widen his appeal among the electorate, and matched other features of his campaign. Delaying the launch of his programme until early March allowed him to benefit from the decline in Fillon’s popularity. He sought to maintain this appeal with the phrase ‘at the same time’, which became an identifying feature of his campaign, enabling him to put emphasis on reforming the country economically, while maintaining some traditional protective measures. Due to the fluid nature of his programme, Macron was able to attract votes from supporters of both established parties of government, who would focus on different features of his campaign. Those on the Left would see him as a socially liberal candidate, while for those on the Right, he would be viewed as someone willing to enact liberal economic reforms. Although Macron did not show great evidence of all the qualities required by the public to be a suitable president, he seemed to satisfy the criteria of personality and representation to a greater degree than any of his rivals. Both Fillon and Le Pen declined in popularity, because they were believed to be too radical, but also because both were implicated in

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scandals, which cast doubt on their integrity. On the Left, Hamon was not representative of the broad current of opinion that wanted a continuation of the liberal economic policies of the Hollande presidency, and he was also not a particularly charismatic figure. Rather than being seen as a rival for Macron, he found himself in competition with Mélenchon over who best represented those who sought greater state intervention in the economy. The personality of the candidate of En Marche, and the programme that enabled him to exploit divisions within both Les Républicains and the PS, allowed him to gain enough support to be elected president in 2017.

The Right Under the Macron Presidency, and the Eclipse of Les Républicains The defeat of Fillon in the presidential elections of 2017 and his resignation left Les Républicains still facing major divisions. As we have seen, on the Centre Right, a recognised leader had always been crucial to maintaining party unity and ensuring success, and now the absence of such a figure allowed disagreements to continue to develop. The problems that we have examined in this chapter, relating to the questions of personality, and on the need to agree on a programme capable of representing a wide section of the population, were not resolved by either the primary or the presidential elections but continued to undermine the party. These issues go back to the previous defeat of Sarkozy in the presidential elections of 2012. The period in opposition is often a time for a party to rebuild and allow a new set of politicians to garner support both within the party and without. However, following the Copé/Fillon fiasco, Sarkozy’s return as party leader in 2014 and the struggle over who would be the candidate for the 2017 elections prevented the emergence of many important new figures. The party remained identified with Sarkozy and Juppé, and then later, on Fillon, at the expense of younger candidates. The difficulties that this would pose for the party would become clear, when Laurent Wauquiez struggled to impose his authority, following his election as president of Les Républicains in December 2017. Throughout his time as party leader, he remained unpopular among the electorate as a whole, and was less popular, with those who had voted for Fillon

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in 2017, than were many of his rivals on the Centre Right. The challenges he faced could be seen in polls, which showed that many voters considered the radical parties of the Rassemblement National (RN) and La France Insoumise as the real opposition to the government, rather than Les Républicains. An Ifop-Fiducial poll from January 2019 found that, when asked which party they thought best represented opposition to Macron, 35% of French people cited the RN, 30% La France Insoumise and only 23% Les Républicains (Ifop-Fiducial 2019; 31). This was a longterm trend, as at no point since the 2017 presidential elections have Les Républicains been regarded as the main party of opposition. Although, as we have seen in this chapter, politicians on the Centre Right have often come together behind a leader, but Wauquiez’s unpopularity and his struggle to impose himself on the national stage, prevented him from being a figure around which the party could unite. His position was further weakened because, as had happened during Sarkozy’s leadership of the party between 2014 and 2016, others who hoped to represent the Centre Right in the 2022 presidential elections adopted vehicles for building support for themselves rather than for the party. Valérie Pécresse founded Libres, and Bruno Retailleau took over Fillon’s micro-party, Force Républicaine. It is clear that in the new party system, control of the party machine is no longer the key to success. Whereas in 2002, the mouvements were supposed to be a way of integrating different sections of the Right and Centre within a single party, the micro-parties have become a source of division, rather than a means of uniting the movement. All of the features discussed above proved important in preventing Wauquiez from establishing himself as an effective party leader, and led to his resignation following the 2019 European elections, when Les Républicains’ list received only 8.48% of the vote, and came fourth behind La République En Marche, the Rassemblement National and Europe Ecologie Les Verts (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2019). The search to find a leader who would enable Les Républicains to regain power remained open following Wauquiez’s departure. Although Christian Jacob was chosen as his successor in October 2019, he promised that he would not be a candidate for the 2022 presidential elections. The question of leadership therefore remains unresolved. Les Républicains not only have a leadership problem, they also lack a common project, as the party itself is still struggling with internal divisions, particularly over identity and Europe. The splits that had emerged

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during the Hollande presidency caused defections from Les Républicains to Macron and the creation of a new Centre Right party, Agir, and these divisions will probably continue. The European elections in May 2019 underlined the challenge that the party faces, as many groups that had traditionally supported the Centre Right rallied to the list of LREM. 37% of practising Catholics chose Macron’s party, while only 22% voted for Les Républicains (Gorce 2019). Of those who had voted for Fillon in the 2017 presidential elections, 27% gave their support to En Marche (Ipsos/Sopra-Steria 2019). Without a leader or a common project, the Centre Right is struggling to maintain the support of even those who have traditionally formed the party’s core electorate.

Emmanuel Macron and the Transformation of the French Party System The problems facing Les Républicains pose a significant threat to its future as a united movement, following the weakening of the traditional Left/Right divide. Macron’s programme contained policies on all three of the axes of our new model: identity, economic liberalism and Europe that appealed to sections of the traditional Centre Right electorate. Since La République en Marche has been in power, it has been difficult for Les Républicains to present itself as an effective opposition party, when many of the government’s policies are ones that the Centre Right itself has argued for. The axis of economic liberalism has been that which has posed the greatest number of problems. As we have seen in Chapter 5, one of the reasons for Macron’s election victory was that he promised a balance between liberal economic reform and state protection, that appealed to supporters of both the PS and Les Républicains. Since his election, he has placed greater emphasis on the need for liberalisation. This could be seen in his decision to reform the SNCF in 2018. The law that was passed put an end to employment rules that allowed train drivers to retire at 52, and other employees at 57 and also opened certain lines to competition from private providers. Members of Les Républicains were reported as saying ‘We are in favour of this reform. It is therefore difficult to attack it, and claim the opposite’ (Beaumont 2018), while the Les Républicains député, Damien Abad, stated ‘We have to support this reform, because it

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was the Right that started negotiations to open certain lines to competition. It is a question of credibility’ (Beaumont 2018). The backing from political representatives of Les Républicains was mirrored by that of party supporters. An Odoxa-Dentsu Consulting poll from October 2019 found that 85% of Les Républicains’ supporters were in favour of putting an end to the special advantages enjoyed by those working for the SNCF (Odoxa-Dentsu Consulting 2019; 15). A similar problem was presented by the government’s pension reforms, which proposed to abolish a large number of different schemes, each with different rules and advantages, in favour of a single, points-based system, and without raising the retirement age. An ELABE survey from January 2020 found that 70% of Les Républicains supporters were in favour of this reform, 27% were opposed to it and 3% did not express an opinion (ELABE 2020; 17). While in this case, the party could put forward alternative proposals, these included measures such as raising the retirement age from 64, (and for it to continue to rise alongside life expectancy), and aligning public sector pensions with those offered in the private sector (Les Républicains 2019). These were likely to prove equally, if not more unpopular, than the government’s measures, which were themselves facing significant opposition in the form of strikes and public demonstrations. The future of Les Républicains, and the Centre Right as a whole is therefore particularly uncertain. While a number of prominent figures left the party in 2017, the situation worsened following further defections in 2019. After the disastrous result in the European elections, Valérie Pécresse announced that she was quitting the party. She was followed by Robin Réda, a député for Les Républicains, Florence Portelli, mayor of Taverny and a regional councillor and Maël de Calan, a departmental councillor. Pécresse stated in a letter to members and supporters of Les Républicains, ‘we must recreate a Right that is proud of its values and well-suited to the contemporary period’, and added ‘my approach fits naturally with Gérard Larcher’s initiative for the Right and Centre, which goes well beyond parties’ (Pécresse 2019). Whether she or one of the other potential presidential candidates for 2022 will be able to rally significant support, whether Les Républicains’ fortunes can improve, or whether the Centre Right as a whole now will enter a long period of opposition remains to be seen, and will depend to a certain extent on factors beyond their control, such as the fortunes of Macron.

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Conclusion The question of leadership has been central to the Fifth Republic ever since its creation in 1958. However, its importance was reinforced during the Hollande presidency by several factors. One of the reasons for this was the decline in allegiance to political parties, which has meant that voters often put greater faith in a particular figure whom they feel represents their views, than in a political movement. This could be seen in the second round of the 2017 presidential elections, in which allegiance to Macron and Le Pen was greater than that to their respective parties. This development is a product of the fact that citizens are now more likely to create their own political value sets, than to follow traditional ideologies. The failure of successive governments to deal successfully with unemployment and the increasing mediatisation of political scandals has meant that voters have increasingly lost confidence in politicians. Political figures are able to rally support based on their own personality, which has in many respects become even more important than their political programmes. As parties look to widen their appeal by holding open primaries to choose their candidates for the presidential elections, this process has increased the importance of personality in politics. Over the course of the Fifth Republic, it has become clear that voters expect a president to display certain qualities, that combine to form a political personality’s charisma. While some of these have changed in line with a general evolution of society (the fall in deference to authority has weakened to some extent the power of what Hoffmann describes as ‘heroic leadership’), others have largely remained constant. To be successful, a presidential candidate must be seen to be assertive and capable of taking decisive action, and be competent and honest. These features were rendered all the more important in 2017 by the failure of President Hollande to live up to such expectations. In addition to possessing the required personal characteristics, a leader must also show that they are representative of a broad sway of public opinion. It was to ensure that this criterion was met that both the established parties of government decided to hold primaries to choose their candidate for the presidential election. As we have seen, this strategy backfired. The candidates who were selected were in general more representative of the hard-core party electorate than of voters in general, which restricted their potential electorate, rather than expanding it.

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The question of leadership was particularly important for both Les Républicains and its supporters. Historically, the Centre Right movement had been wary of parties, seeing them as creating division, and both politicians and their electorate had tended to unite around a leader. This remained the case in the contemporary period, when the UMP was founded as a way of gathering parties of the Centre and Centre Right around Chirac The importance of the role of leader was reinforced from 2004, when Sarkozy was elected head of the party. He turned it into a vehicle for his own ambitions and used his position to become the presidential candidate of the UMP in 2007. Once elected president, he maintained his control of the party, and ensured that all key positions were held by his supporters. While this reinforced his position in the short term, it weakened the party in the longer term as, when Sarkozy resigned, following his defeat in the 2012 presidential elections, there was no obvious candidate to replace him. The void was maintained as the 2012 party leadership elections failed to produce a decisive result. With no leader around whom to unite, splits over political questions, which we have seen in the previous chapters, became greater. The fortunes of the UMP during the Hollande presidency further demonstrated the continued decline of political parties and the growth in the importance of leadership. The decision to hold a primary to choose the candidate for the 2017 elections weakened the role of the party, by giving influence to non-members and was the reason why, despite Sarkozy regaining the leadership in 2014, he was unable to establish himself as the presidential candidate. Although he sought to reinforce his control by seeking to increase the number of members and by drawing up a programme that was validated by the membership, these measures also failed, as it was recognised that ultimately it would be the primary that would decide both the leader and the programme. The primary itself demonstrated the importance of candidates fulfilling the two criteria of personality and representation. Fillon was successful in this contest because he seemed more assertive than Juppé, more competent than Sarkozy, and in particular, more honest than both of his rivals (one of whom had a criminal conviction, while the other was under investigation in a large number of political scandals). As we have seen in other chapters, Fillon’s programme, based on traditional Catholic values and deep liberal economic reform, was representative of the core electorate of the Centre Right, which was the focus of the primary. He also benefitted

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from his status as an outsider. This meant that he was largely unscathed in the debates before the first round, where Sarkozy and Juppé focused their attacks on each other, leading to their mutual destruction. While Fillon satisfied these criteria within the context of the primary, he failed in both areas during the presidential election campaign. Although his policies were representative of large numbers of Les Républicains voters, his proposed economic reforms were considered too draconian by large swathes of the electorate as a whole. His position on various social issues also struggled to gain significant support beyond the Centre Right. In terms of his personal qualities, the revelation of the Penelopegate scandal destroyed his reputation for honesty and integrity, and its dominance of the media coverage of his campaign also prevented Fillon from focusing attention on his policies. Macron was able to exploit Fillon’s difficulties, to present himself as the candidate who best fulfilled the requirements relating to personality and representation. He was seen as young, dynamic and determined, and, in a context where many voters had lost faith in politicians, benefitted from not being a member of a traditional party. In terms of representation, he took advantage of the decision by voters in the primaries on both Left and Right to choose those candidates who were more representative of the core party views, and seized the Centre ground. In his presentation, he was deliberately ambiguous, and at times defended conflicting points of view, in order to appeal across the political divide. The defeat of Fillon in the presidential elections ensured that the problem of leadership for Les Républicains remained unresolved, and the party found itself once again divided, with no figure capable of providing the personality and representative qualities around whom the party could unite. Several members decided to leave. Some put their faith in the new president from En Marche, while others left to form a new movement, Agir. The election of Laurent Wauquiez further split those who had remained, and in response to his hardening of the party line, Valérie Pécresse founded her own political think tank, Libres, which was in many respects designed to promote her aims to be a candidate in the 2022 presidential elections. Following Les Républicains’ disastrous performance in the 2019 European elections, Wauquiez resigned, while Pécresse quit the party. The situation was far more dangerous than in 2012, as many of the best known and most influential politicians on the Right stepped down from

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frontline politics, following the 2017 presidential election. It was unclear who would or could replace them, and with what programme. As we have seen in previous chapters, it was in part because he was able to gain support from voters on the Centre Right that Macron was elected president. Once in office, his economic policies, in particular, continued to be judged favourably by many voters, who classed themselves as supporters of Les Républicains. Debate and conflict over leadership have therefore continued to affect the Centre Right, and the party’s future role within the Republic remains uncertain.

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Piquet, Caroline, and Tristan Quinault-Maupoil. 2016. Primaire à droite: ils sont de gauche et ont voté dimanche. Le Figaro, November 20. http://www.lef igaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/primaires-droite/2016/11/20/35004-201 61120ARTFIG00084-primaire-de-la-droite-ils-sont-de-gauche-et-ont-votedimanche.php. Accessed 10 April 2019. Rédaction JDD. 2018. SONDAGE. Une liste Gilets jaunes aux européennes affaiblirait Le Pen et Mélenchon. Le Journal du Dimanche, December 8. https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/sondage-les-gilets-jaunes-a-12-aux-europe ennes-en-cas-de-candidature-3816677. Accessed 10 April 2019. Schiffer, Daniel Salvatore. 2013. Hollande, le grand méchant mou. Le Point, July 9. http://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/daniel-salvatore-schiffer/hol lande-le-grand-mechant-mou-09-07-2013-1702206_1446.php. Accessed 5 April 2018. Schwartzenberg, Roger-Gérard. 2009. L’Etat spectacle 2: Politique, casting et médias. Paris: Plon. Soudan, François, and Laurent de Saint Perier. 2011. François Hollande: «Je serai un président normal, pas un président ordinaire». Jeune Afrique, August 15. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/190510/politique/fran-ois-hol lande-je-serai-un-pr-sident-normal-pas-un-pr-sident-ordinaire/. Accessed 31 January 2019. T.L.G. 2015. Vidéo «J’ai changé» ou les sempiternelles métamorphoses de Nicolas Sarkozy. 20 Minutes, September 18. https://www.20minutes.fr/pol itique/1689983-20150918-video-change-sempiternelles-metamorphoses-nic olas-sarkozy. Accessed 10 April 2018. Taguieff, Pierre-André. 2017. Macron: Miracle ou mirage?. Paris: Editions de l’Observatoire. Teinturier, Brice. 2017. L’inédite (et dernière?) primaire de la droite et du centre? In Le vote disruptif: Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2012, ed. Pascal Perrineau, 25–41. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Teinturier, Brice et Vincent Dusseaux. 2016. Fractures françaises 2016 Vague 4 : Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po. Data collected online between 15–19 April 2016 from a sample of 1013 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over. https://www.soprasteria.com/docs/librariesprovider29/Publicati ons-Ipsos/fractures-francaises-vague4-ipsos-soprasteria.pdf?sfvrsn=4. Accessed 22 November 2020. Le Télégramme. 2012. Présidentielle. Nicolas Sarkozy: sa vision de la présidence. Dailymotion. https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x16brp0. Accessed 25 March 2019. Weber, Max. 2013. IX. The Sociology of Charismatic Authority. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The 2017 presidential and legislative elections marked a rupture in the history of the Fifth Republic. The party system which had been based on a division between the Left and Right, that had existed since the foundation of the regime in 1958, disintegrated, giving way to what Jakubyszyn described, as ‘a political landscape scattered like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle’ (LCI.fr 2017). Macron and En Marche, claiming to be neither of the Right nor of the Left (Raulin 2017), won the presidency and a majority in the National Assembly. The parties representing the Centre Left and Centre Right were undermined by major internal divisions, and were both eliminated in the first round of the presidential elections. Macron’s victory led key figures from both the PS and Les Républicains to defect to En Marche prior to the legislative elections. The radical parties of both Left and Right also benefitted from this political transformation. Marine Le Pen had gained 33.90% of the vote in the second round of the presidential elections (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017), and, in the first round, Jean-Luc Mélenchon had come fourth with 19.58% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2017). Both the FN and La France Insoumise would also increase the number of seats they held in the National Assembly during the legislative elections of June 2017. As Perrineau (2012; 67) and Sainte-Marie (2015; 23) recognise that the established arrangement had been coming under increasing strain for a long time, and Martin (2000) and Sundquist (1973) have argued that a © The Author(s) 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_8

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weakened party system, where political elites are contested, and traditional loyalties are undermined is particularly likely to undergo a realignment. The weakening of the Left/Right divide was a gradual process, driven by a combination of different factors, many of which had developed over several decades, particularly from around the early 1980s. As Hayward (1994; 30) noted, a poll in 1985 showed that 49% of French voters felt that the Left/Right divide was losing its power, which he explained was due to the electorate having become ‘less ideologically rooted, and more volatile’ (Hayward 1994; 32). While there were many reasons for this, one of the most important was the lessening of the differences in the policies proposed by the Centre Left and Centre Right. Although Mitterrand had talked of a break with capitalism in 1971 and was elected in 1981 on a programme that proposed a significant expansion of the public sector, his Socialist experiment was rapidly abandoned in favour of an approach that recognised that private enterprise had an important role to play in the economy. On social issues, the Right moved closer to the Left, for example in its abandonment of support for the death penalty. The Left/Right split which had been defined by an opposition on economic and social questions was therefore blurred. Social and economic evolutions contributed to the convergence of policy between the two main parties of government. The decline in heavy industry, and technological advances generally, reduced the size of the blue-collar working class. This development, along with the much discussed ‘rise of the middle classes’ between the 1960s and the 1980s (see Mendras 1988; 37), encouraged the Socialists to adopt policies more likely to appeal to middle-class voters. One result of this change in the PS’ strategy was that significant sections of the working class came to feel ignored, and unrepresented by the liberal economic and social programmes promoted by both established parties of government. As Guilluy (2014; 11) notes, this community was also relegated geographically to towns outside metropolitan centres, which were suffering from high unemployment following the fall in the number of jobs in industry. As Bouvet has argued (2012; 164), such communities also felt that politicians paid little attention to their views. As a result, many blue-collar workers turned away from the established parties of government in search of alternative representation, and particularly towards the FN. The possibility of a realignment of the political scene was increased by the series of crises that developed from around 2008, which further

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undermined an already fragile system. The failure of both the Sarkozy and the Hollande governments to respond effectively to the economic crisis increased the public’s loss of faith in politicians. This situation was exacerbated by a similar inability to propose solutions to the migrant crisis, following the conflict in the Middle East and the Arab Spring. In this political climate, those parties from the Far Left and Far Right which claimed to offer an alternative approach to these issues were particularly attractive to voters. Disillusionment with traditional parties, and the weakening of the Left/Right divide was already clear at the end of the Sarkozy presidency. The FN achieved its highest ever share of the vote to date in the 2012 presidential elections, on a programme that combined statist economic policies, close to the Left, with a hard-line approach to immigration and identity, which in its desire to reduce the number of immigrants and to preserve ‘traditional’ French values, went further than the Centre Right. Although the Left/Right divide emerged weakened from the 2012 presidential elections, it was not yet obvious that a significant political realignment would occur. The candidates of the established parties of government received the highest scores in the first round of the presidential elections in 2012, and both gained around 10% more votes than the FN, their nearest challenger. In light of this, when the ability of the Hollande governments to handle these various challenges came into question, many expected, as had been the case in the past, that it would be the Centre Right which would benefit and return to power in 2017. However, the changes that the party system was undergoing meant that this was far from inevitable. One of the major factors driving the crisis in both parties of government was the decline in the electorate’s faith in traditional ideologies. Whereas in the past, questions of class and background had played a major role in determining citizens’ voting behaviour (Perrineau 2012; 67), these became less important from the 1980s—a trend that continued up to and beyond the Hollande presidency, with the electorate becoming much more independent. As Brochet (2017; 171) has noted, rather than identifying with any particular party, voters were more inclined to pick and choose between different policies from across the political spectrum. This made voting behaviour much more volatile, as large sections of the electorate became less and less likely to support the established parties of government, and were open to alternatives from either the radical fringes or the Centre.

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In addition to sociological changes, the political institutions of the Fifth Republic played a significant role in enabling a realignment of the established party system. The figure of president has always been an essential element of the Fifth Republic, and its prominence within the political system was reinforced by the constitutional reforms of 1962 and 2000. Identification with individual politicians increased as the leaders and traditional parties of Left and Right were both judged to have failed, particularly as regards responding to the ongoing economic crisis. As the focus of the presidential elections was on a contest between specific candidates, the backing of a well-established movement was less important than the question of personality. This could be seen in the way that Le Pen and Mélenchon gained significant support in 2012, and, 5 years later, increased their share of the vote further, but most significantly, in the election of Macron as president in 2017. Several commentators have recognised that the traditional arrangement of the party system underwent a realignment during the Hollande presidency, but there has been much debate over what has replaced it. Some, such as Fourquet (2017) and Schön-Quinlivan (2017; 300), have argued that parties and voters are now divided between the winners and losers of globalisation; an opposition between those who favour an open vision, and those who have a more closed view of society. However, this single dividing line fails to recognise that globalisation is a multifaceted phenomenon, and comprises cultural, economic and political strands. As we have seen in this book, particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, examination of the Centre Right in light of this assessment challenges the more widely accepted analysis of the new party system outlined above. For example, Fillon supported traditional Catholic values, and an assimilationist approach to immigration, which would place him among those who lose out from cultural globalisation, while his liberal economic policies represented those who were the winners of economic globalisation. In international terms, he supported the further development of European cooperation, as did those who were considered ‘winners’, while at the same time stressing the importance of strong nation states, a principle which was shared with some of those who were classed as ‘losers’. The arrangement of the party system during the Hollande presidency was therefore much more complex than analyses of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ suggest, and explains why the transformation posed so many difficulties for the established parties of government.

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The difficulties faced by Les Républicains during the Hollande presidency, the failure of Fillon to win the 2017 presidential elections, and the broader overall relationship between voters, political parties and politicians, are better understood using a more multidimensional model than one based on a Left/Right axis or support or opposition to globalisation. Debate between parties became dominated by three key areas: identity, liberal economic policy and French membership of the European Union, which divided political movements and the electorate in different ways. The axis concerning identity would prove to be the most divisive and damaging for Les Républicains. In this context, the concept of cultural insecurity developed by Bouvet (2015; 15) and Guilluy (2010; 177), and the division between socially conservative Somewheres and socially liberal Anywheres, outlined by Goodhart (2017) (examining British society), can be used to understand the situation in France. The issue of how cultural insecurity helps explain the problems of the Centre Right has been largely overlooked, but played a major role in dividing the party during the Hollande presidency. A significant section of society was worried about the development of a more multicultural society, and the continuous move towards socially liberal policies. These fears were heightened by the migrant crisis, and the terrorist attacks carried out in France by French nationals of North African heritage, and also by the social measures of the Hollande government such as the legalisation of gay marriage. The question of how to respond to these developments split the Centre Right into two camps: the Traditionalists, who favoured assimilation and more socially conservative values, and the Modernists, who supported integration and more socially liberal policies. In 2012, Sarkozy’s strategy to target to Traditionalists from the FN alienated Bayrou and many Modernists in the Centre, who chose to support Hollande in the second round of the presidential elections. Following the defeat of their candidate, members of the UMP were divided between those such as Raffarin who believed that Sarkozy’s strategy had been responsible for the party’s failure, and others such as Copé and Peltier, who felt that, had the campaign lasted a little longer, the Right would have been successful. That many within the party favoured a hard-line approach was shown by Copé’s success in the 2012 UMP leadership election, where he campaigned on a platform that promised a ‘droite décomplexée’ (a Right that was proud of its values).

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Differences over policy hardened as they became incarnated by political figures. Allegations of cheating, and the revelation that certain votes had not been counted, ensured that the 2012 leadership elections did not decide who should be appointed head of the party. They did, however, have a significant, if unforeseen, effect on the future of the UMP, when Juppé, having been brought into mediate between the rival factions, took the opportunity to relaunch his career in frontline politics. Juppé favoured an ‘identité heureuse’ (happy identity) that was more open to diversity, and was also more favourable towards socially liberal values. He therefore came to represent Modernist voters on the Right and in the Centre, in contrast to both Fillon and Sarkozy, who sought to capture the support of Traditionalists. In this battle, Fillon, who emphasised his traditional Catholic social values was believed to be a more authentic representative of this position than Sarkozy, whose attempts to appear the toughest on immigration and social conservative measures were often considered by voters to be more of an electoral strategy rather than an expression of his actual beliefs. Although Traditionalists were in the minority among the French population as a whole, they were in the majority among supporters of Les Républicains. Their vote in the primary would lead to Fillon being preferred to Sarkozy in the first round, and to the defeat of Juppé in the second, thereby determining the party’s position on the issue of identity in the approach to the elections of 2017. The second axis that came to structure the party system, which we discussed in Chapter 5, concerned economic liberalism. While many analysts, such as Smith (2004), Hayward (1994), Jennings (2006), and Waters (2012), have focused on France’s historic hostility towards liberal economic measures, these became tempered during the Hollande presidency. Traditional ideological differences between both parties and voters on the Left and the Right had already been weakened in the 1980s, due to the evolution of the Parti Socialiste. This was demonstrated by Mitterrand’s decision to move away from his initial approach of increasing the size of the state sector towards one which gave greater emphasis to the role of private enterprise. Such convergence would increase between 2012 and 2017. Despite Hollande’s rhetoric during the 2012 presidential election campaign about finance being his ‘enemy’ (see Hollande 2012), in 2014, he announced a move towards more pro-business economic policies—a change in strategy which was confirmed in August of that year by the appointment of Emmanuel Macron, a former Rothschild banker,

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as Economy Minister. Surveys showed that many voters were becoming more supportive of a liberalisation of the French economy as well as of the idea of reducing the size of the state (see Teinturier and Dusseaux 2016; 13; Kantar Sofrès 2016; 20), and revealed Macron, who represented this position, to be popular among both the Centre Left and Centre Right electorates (BVA 2016; 3). This shift in opinion could be explained by several factors, such as the continuing economic crisis, the persistent high unemployment rate, and the difference in the underperformance of the French economy compared with that of Germany. Fears about liberal economic policies being part of an alien, Anglo-Saxon model were reduced as private enterprise was seen to have a crucial role in resolving the problem of high unemployment. Although the evolution of attitudes towards economic policy had been expected to favour Les Républicains, it would actually play a significant role in the failure of its candidate in the presidential elections of 2017. Economic issues played an important role in Fillon’s success in the primary. He campaigned for a significant reduction in the size of the state and a liberalisation of the French economy, designed to make France the leading European economic power in 10 years, which appealed to those on the Centre Right who favoured radical measures. However, in the context of the presidential elections, it soon became evident that Fillon’s position did not appeal to many, outside the core vote of Les Républicains, who wanted a greater balance between economic reform and protectionist policies. On the one hand, a significant number of FN voters, who might have been attracted to Fillon’s defence of traditional Catholic values and assimilation, also supported a strong interventionist state, and so would not vote for the candidate of Les Républicains. On the other, many of those in the Centre, who wanted liberal economic reform, felt that Fillon’s position was too extreme. The radical nature of his programme reawakened fears of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. During the primary, Juppé described it as ‘very brutal in terms of social policy’ (franceinfo 2016)—a charge which would be adopted by opposition candidates in the presidential elections. Many of those who wanted liberal reform turned to Macron, who seemed to offer policies that promoted change, while preserving the protective role of the state. This enabled the leader of En Marche to present himself as the most acceptable representative of liberal economic reform, which was the position that had been expected to be held by Les Républicains, and so fundamentally weakened the Centre Right.

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The third axis that structured the French party system during the Hollande presidency concerned French attitudes towards membership of the European Union. This is largely ignored by Gougou and Persico (2017) and Martin (2017) in their analyses of the realignment of the French party system. Others, such as Fourquet (2017), Schön-Quinlivan (2017) and Guilluy (Bherer 2017), have seen divisions over Europe as representing a divide between winners and losers of globalisation. Although France’s relationship with the EU was not the main focus of debate during the presidential elections, it did play a role in Macron’s success. His positive vision of a more federal Europe allowed him to win over voters from the Independent Centre, who had often previously supported the Centre Right, particularly in the second round of presidential elections. Unlike the other two axes, that relating to Europe saw the continuation of many issues that had traditionally divided political parties. Under the Fifth Republic, the Right and Centre had generally seen Europe in similar terms, with three areas of particular importance: Europe as a way of maximising French influence in the world, Europe as a bloc independent from other superpowers, and Europe’s significance as a cultural area. Despite sharing similar objectives, the two sides often disagreed over how they might be achieved. The Right generally saw Europe as a tool to increase and project French power on the world stage through a structure based on nation states, placed emphasis on the importance of individual national interests, and defended a more white, Christian vision of the European community. In contrast, the Centre believed that a federal structure was necessary to protect French interests in a world dominated by superpowers, and it was particularly supportive of the European ideal, outlined by Jean Monnet, and was more favourable towards cultural diversity. The question of Europe further contributed to the disintegration of the traditional divide. Divisions between Les Républicains and the Independent Centre parties mirrored differences within Les Républicians themselves, and so increased the threat to party unity. In some cases, concerns relating to the European axis overlapped with others pertaining to that of identity, yet each had a different focus. The issue of identity was about how voters saw France, and divisions within the nation, whereas that of Europe concerned the role that voters believed that France should play on the world stage.

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Like those in the Centre, the Juppéistes were supportive of a federal Europe. They shared Monnet’s European ideal and had a more open vision of Europe’s cultural identity, which recognised the contributions made by cultures from other parts of the world. In contrast, Sarkozy and Fillon were keen to protect the role of the nation state, and promoted a vision of Europe that placed emphasis on its Christian heritage. In contrast to the Centrists and Juppéistes, Sarkozy stes and Fillon istes saw the nation state as an ideal community. The victory of Fillon in the primary was also the triumph of a particular perspective on Europe. In the same way as in the axis of identity, many voters who had supported Juppé in the primary, and supporters and representatives of the Independent Centre parties were alienated by the position of Les Républicains, and sought an alternative means of pursuing their programme for the 2017 elections. They found the opportunity to do so in Macron. He was an enthusiastic supporter of a federal Europe, both as a way of maximising French influence and as an ideal in itself. This position enabled him to attract voters from across the Left/Right divide, not only supporters of Les Républicains who had voted for Juppé in the 2016 primary, and the Independent Centre parties, but also from the PS. As well as explaining the challenges faced by Les Républicains in formulating policies that could gain widespread support, the axes must also be understood in order to explain leadership battles and their outcomes. Previously, the Centre Right had put aside differences over policy to rally behind a leader in whom they had confidence. However, this became difficult between 2012 and 2017, as debate over who should be the candidate of Les Républicains in the presidential elections became entwined with the three axes outlined in our new model. These played a decisive role in the selection of Fillon and defeat of Juppé in the primary. Rather than bringing the Centre Right together, Fillon’s victory in 2016, and the programme he represented, alienated many whose support would have been necessary to win the presidential elections. Leadership played a central role during the Hollande presidency, and posed problems for both of the established parties of government. In addition to the effect of the institutions, that had influenced the French political system since the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, many other factors combined to increase the focus on the importance of the leader between 2012 and 2017. The decline in voters’ identification with traditional ideologies and the established parties of government

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which represented them meant that an increasing number were willing to support candidates other than those of the PS and the Centre Right. The rise of new media allowed alternative parties on the extremes of the political spectrum and in the Centre to build a profile, bypass traditional media and engage with the people directly. In light of these developments, voters often felt greater allegiance to political figures than to parties. When trying to win over voters, political leaders needed to address two important areas: personality and representation. While society has changed since the time of Max Weber (2013) in the early twentieth century, and indeed since Hoffmann (1974) was writing, so that terms such as ‘charismatic’ or ‘heroic’ leadership are less relevant, the electorate still has certain expectations of the characteristics a leader should possess. Such a figure needed to be decisive, and capable of taking the effective action needed to solve France’s problems, particularly in light of the worsening economic situation in France. These expectations were reinforced between 2012 and 2017, as Hollande’s presidential style failed to satisfy them. The issue of leadership was of major significance for Les Républicains. Under the Fifth Republic, the Right had often united behind a particular figure, such as de Gaulle or Chirac, rather than in support of a political programme. The importance of the leader had been further increased when, during his own presidency, Sarkozy had sought to reduce challenges from within his own party, by ensuring that no one was appointed to replace him as head of the UMP. While this strengthened the party in the short term, it meant that there was no obvious successor once Sarkozy had been defeated in the 2012 presidential elections. The failure of the 2012 leadership contest, between Fillon and Copé, to resolve this issue left a void at the top of the party, which gave free rein for divisions over policy to develop. The decision to hold a primary to designate the candidate for the 2017 presidential elections made the question of leadership more influential, and this would be to the detriment of the party. It was recognised that only the vote in November 2016 would be decisive, and so many important figures chose not to challenge Sarkozy when he stood in the 2014 leadership contest. In order to rally support ahead of the primary, many chose to set up their own micro-parties, which further emphasised that their supporters’ loyalty was to them personally, rather than to Les Républicains. For a significant number of Juppéistes, once their candidate had

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been defeated, they would not feel obliged to support the winner, but instead turned to Macron. Fillon’s victory in the primary of November 2016 was due to his ability to satisfy both criteria of personality and representation better than his rivals. As we have discussed above, his programme, focusing on traditional Catholic values and a particularly liberal approach to economic policy was popular on the Right. In terms of personality, he was more assertive than Juppé, who often appeared too moderate and conciliatory in the eyes of the core Right electorate. Fillon was judged to be more competent than Sarkozy, and the most honest of the three candidates. He was also greatly assisted by his position as an outsider since the primary had always been seen as a contest to decide which of Sarkozy or Juppé would be the presidential candidate. As a result, Sarkozy and Juppé concentrated their attacks on each other, while Fillon was largely ignored, until his unexpected victory in the first round. The size of the vote in his favour (44.1%) (La rédaction de LCI 2016), left little opportunity for Juppé to recover the lost ground. While Fillon successfully responded to the issues of personality and representation in the primary, he failed to do so in the presidential elections. As regards representation, we have seen in Chapter 4, that key aspects of his economic policies alienated many voters, who considered it to be too extreme. On the question of identity, socially liberal voters, who represented a greater proportion of the electorate outside Les Républicains were alienated by Fillon’s programme which was aimed at social conservatives. He failed to meet expectations concerning personality, when the Penelopegate scandal destroyed his reputation for integrity. In both cases, the elements which had been essential to his success in the primary became a major reason for his defeat in the presidential elections. The effect of Fillon’s failure to fulfil the key expectations of a leader was compounded by the arrival of Macron. The candidate of En Marche was seen as young and dynamic, and, having created his own movement, did not suffer from the unpopularity attached to the established parties of government. In terms of his programme, he was deliberately ambiguous, and occasionally defended conflicting points of view, allowing voters to make their own interpretation of his position. He was able to appeal to voters from both Right and Left, who had been alienated by the decision of both traditional parties to choose candidates who appealed to their core support, rather than to the electorate as a whole. This allowed Macron to seize the centre ground, and the place in the second round of the

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presidential elections, which it had been expected would be taken by the candidate of Les Républicains. Les Républicains’ defeat in the 2017 presidential election therefore stemmed from an inability to respond to a changing political landscape, and a failure to overcome internal divisions in order to unite the party behind a leader and a programme that would not only win support from the core Centre Right electorate, but also from many outside the party. Both aspects were intimately related to the reconfiguration of French politics around three axes. Attempts to respond effectively to the problems faced by the party were hindered by the realignment of the political system, and the rise in the number of voters tempted by the FN, which encouraged Fillon and Sarkozy to radicalise their programmes, and move further away from historic allies in the Centre. Before considering what the future holds for Les Républicains, we must answer two key questions. Firstly, to what extent was the primary a factor in the defeat of Les Républicains, and secondly, what role did the Penelopegate scandal play? The primary was designed to overcome internal quarrels over the choice of candidate for Les Républicains in the 2017 presidential elections, and to build momentum behind the party’s campaign. It was influenced by the PS primary of 2011, which had generated a great deal of media attention and given impetus to the Socialists’ presidential campaign. The Centre Right hoped to produce the same effect for their own party’s electoral prospects in 2017. The primary appeared initially to have been a success. Fillon’s comfortable victory seemed to resolve the leadership question that had troubled the party since 2012, and Les Républicains had raised 17.2 million euros. This sum not only covered the costs of the exercise but also provided 10 million euros profit, of which 4.5 million became a campaign fund for Fillon in the 2017 presidential elections. However, while the primary initially had a positive impact on the Right, it would later play an important role in the subsequent disintegration of Les Républicains. As we have seen in Chapter 6, rather than being representative of a broad swathe of society, as had been hoped, those who voted in the primary were particularly reflective of Les Républicains’ core electorate. As a result, Fillon was chosen, as he best represented the views of party members, and Juppé was defeated, despite being far better placed to gain the support from outside the party needed to win the presidential elections.

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This strategic problem was compounded as Fillon saw his victory as an endorsement of his policies, and feared that any attempt to adapt them, in order to appeal to the broader electorate of the presidential elections, would risk alienating key supporters. As a result, he constructed a programme that was ill-suited to winning the votes of key constituencies, such as many supporters of the Independent Centre, and those Hollande voters from 2012, who were disappointed with the PS, and felt that some more moderate liberal economic reform was necessary. The primary also damaged Les Républicains by placing emphasis on division and confrontation rather than reconciliation. Several leading Juppéistes were alienated by the attacks made against their candidate during the campaign. Some, such as Aurore Bergé, defected to En Marche following the primary, while Juppé himself again withdrew from frontline politics and did not renew his party membership. The divisive nature of the primary would have further impact in 2017, when, following the revelation of the Penelopegate scandal, Juppé rejected proposals to replace Fillon as the presidential candidate, as he did not feel that he could represent the more firmly right-wing electorate that had been revealed by the November 2016 vote. Finally, the organisation and rules of the primary would prove to be a major problem for Les Républicains in the Spring of 2017. The statutes made no provision as to a way of identifying a replacement should the winner be seriously weakened or prevented from standing. This enabled Fillon to maintain his position as the presidential candidate, since despite the allegations made against him, the party feared that any move to designate an alternative figure would alienate large numbers of those who had paid to participate in the primary. While it is clear that the manner in which the primary was fought created problems for the Right, it was Les Républicains’ continuing failure to solve its internal divisions over policy and leadership during the Hollande presidency that was the main reason they lost the 2017 presidential elections. It was precisely these problems that had encouraged the holding of a primary, which was seen as a way of resolving them, as well as being a strategy to build support for Les Républicains. Polls suggested that the FN was almost certain to make the second round of the presidential elections, ensuring that the other parties would be competing to supply the opposing candidate. This meant it was not possible for more than one figure from Les Républicains to stand,

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allowing the first round of the presidential elections to identify the candidate the electorate preferred, as this would split the vote, leading all of them to be eliminated. The primary had seemed a way of resolving the matter, but internal divisions were too great for the whole party to rally behind one candidate and one programme. In this context, the Penelopegate scandal itself was not the decisive factor in the defeat of Les Républicains but merely exacerbated the wider crisis faced by the Centre Right. The scandal destroyed Fillon’s reputation for integrity, and encouraged defections to rival candidates, and to Macron in particular. Piar (2017; 86) has demonstrated how the intense media attention given to this prevented Fillon from being able to run his campaign effectively. In this way, it played an important role in preventing Les Républicains from returning to power in 2017. However, when considered in the broader context of the political realignment and divisions within the electorate as a whole and within Les Républicains in particular, Penelopegate can be seen as the trigger rather than the cause of the disintegration of the party. As we have seen, there were deep divisions within the Centre Right, particularly over questions relating to identity and to France’s role in the EU, and, as we have discussed in Chapter 4, Fillon’s economic programme caused him to lose support from the wider electorate even before the scandal was reported in Le Canard Enchaîné. Both Penelopegate and the rise of Macron gave those uncomfortable with Fillon’s programme further encouragement to defect, but many who did so had already felt ill at ease for some time, and the scandal did not itself provoke any significant new divisions over policy. That Les Républicains disintegrated so quickly in the Spring of 2017 can be seen as further evidence that the problems that led to the party’s downfall were longterm issues. Those who lost confidence in Fillon as candidate saw little point in remaining loyal to the party. While a Juppé victory in the primary would probably have seen the Centre Right return to power, it would not have ended the disagreements, but merely delayed any reckoning, perhaps until he stepped down at the end of his five year period in office as he had promised.

What Future for Les Républicains? As we have seen in Chapter 6, following Fillon’s defeat in the 2017 presidential elections and his subsequent resignation Les Républicains were unable to unite as the disagreements over policy and leadership continued

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during the Macron presidency. Although Wauquiez was elected party leader in December 2017, he failed to impose his authority. He was forced to resign following the disastrous performance of Les Républicains in the 2019 European elections, after which the party fragmented further with the departure of several Centrist members. The struggles of Les Républicains cannot be blamed solely on Wauquiez’s personal unpopularity, and the political programme that he supported, but were also the result of Macron’s success in enacting policies that had traditionally been the preserve of the Centre Right. The early part of his presidency was dominated by reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state in the French economy. As a result, it was difficult for the party to criticise the government’s proposals in principal, and, due to long-standing concerns about liberal economic policies, arguments that the measures did not go far enough also stood little chance of gaining widespread support. The divisions within the Centre Right that emerged during the Hollande presidency have remained unresolved since 2017. Identity is still a contentious issue, as could be seen in the response to the government’s decision to legalise IVF for single women and lesbian couples. While 119 Les Républicains senators signed a letter outlining their opposition to this law, other figures within the party, such as Guillaume Peltier, JeanFrançois Copé and Geoffroy Didier supported it, with Peltier and Copé claiming ‘We cannot be against offering IVF [to all women]. Otherwise, it will look like we are stuck in the past’ (Haddad 2019). Another axis that has remained divisive is that relating to Europe, which has led to the party losing support to both the Far Right and the Centre. In December 2018, two former Les Républicains députés, Thierry Mariani and Jean-Paul Garraud, announced that they were joining the Rassemblement National to stand to become MEPs. In March 2019, Jean-Pierre Raffarin pledged his support to La République En Marche for the European elections, while at the same time stating that he would remain a member of Les Républicains, although he eventually left in the autumn of that year. In addition to disagreements between elected representatives, Les Républicains also face the problem of creating a programme that will appeal both to party members and to floating voters. This is even more challenging as the party’s core electorate still adopts the same positions on the three axes as in 2017, when Fillon failed to gain enough votes to be present in the second round of the presidential elections. For example,

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as regards the axis of identity, the 2019 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises surveys found that Les Républicains supporters were the only group opposed to granting single women access to IVF treatment, with 68% against this measure, compared with 46% of RN voters, and 22% of those of LREM, the PS and La France Insoumise (Teinturier et al. 2019; 41). Similarly, in response to the question of whether IVF should be available to lesbian couples, 76% of Les Républicains supporters disagreed, compared with 45% of those of the RN, 28% of those of LREM, 31% of those of the PS and 11% of those of La France Insoumise (Teinturier et al. 2019; 41). Examining the other aspect of cultural insecurity, that concerning immigration, particularly attitudes towards the place of Islam within the Republic, shows that the axis of identity poses a significant problem for Les Républicains in its attempts to win the votes of the Centrist electorate. While only 28% of LR voters and 17% of those of the RN supported the statement that the way that Islam was practised in France was compatible to the values of the Republic, 51% of those of LREM agreed (Teinturier et al. 2019; 53). It is particularly important to note the continuing divide between the Right and Centre over issues relating to identity because, as we have seen in this book, in 2017, it was Fillon’s policies in this area that alienated many Centrist voters, who then turned to Macron. Regaining the support of this group will be necessary if the party is to recover from its defeat. We have seen in Chapter 4 how Les Républicains’ economic policies were seen as too radical by many voters outside the party, and a key difference in this area remains between the supporters of Les Républicains and the general electorate. In response to the statement ‘To revive growth, it is necessary to limit the role of the State in the French economy and give businesses as much freedom as possible’ 71% of LR supporters agreed, compared with 56% of those of the RN, 48% of those of LREM, 42% of those of the PS and 20% of those of La France Insoumise (Teinturier et al. 2019; 64). Finally, as we have seen in Chapter 5, Macron’s positive vision of Europe that argued for much greater integration allowed him to appeal successfully to a significant number of the supporters of the Independent Centre parties, who had been expected to vote for the Right. As we have discussed, this trend continued during the Macron presidency, when sections of the core Centre and Right electorates voted for La République en Marche during the 2019 European elections campaign. It is therefore

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clear that the same problems that Les Républicains remain faced with the same problems as in 2017. However, despite the challenges that Les Républicains face at a national level, the results of the first round of the 2020 municipal elections give the party some grounds for optimism that the party may be able to recover from its defeat in 2017. Although it is difficult to draw many lessons, due to the high level of abstention (55.34%) (Roger 2020) caused by many voters choosing to stay at home due to the coronavirus pandemic, the results do suggest that La République en Marche has not yet had a significant impact on local politics. Macron’s party failed to win any major town in the first round, while its candidate for the Mayor of Paris, Agnès Buzyn, gained only the third largest share of the vote, 12.07% behind the PS representative, Anne Hidalgo, who received the largest percentage (29.33%) (Le Monde 2020). Elections in smaller towns were dominated by Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste. Leadership will prove crucial to Les Républicains’ hopes of returning to power, particularly in light of the continuing decline of the electorate’s faith in political institutions and in national elected representatives. The 2019 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures françaises surveys showed that the percentage of the population expressing confidence in députés had fallen from 33% in June 2017 to 25% in September 2019 (Teinturier et al. 2019; 13), while those with a positive view of political parties had fallen further from 12 to 10% over the same period (Teinturier et al. 2019; 13). As we have seen in Chapter 6, in 2017, many voters preferred to place confidence in a leader, rather than a political party. This trend had been present among the Centre Right throughout the history of the Fifth Republic, where political movements had often put aside differences over policy to unite around a figure able to win the confidence of the electorate. This would also seem to be the best way of reviving the party’s fortunes at the current time. Much will depend on Macron’s ability to satisfy the expectations of the electorate. Recent presidents have often been elected as much because of voters’ rejection of their predecessor or their opponents were as because of support for their own personality and programme. As we have seen in Chapter 6, Sarkozy benefitted from promising a break with the Chirac years; Hollande won the 2012 elections in large part because of a rejection of Sarkozy, and Macron was successful in 2017 because he represented neither the traditional parties of government, that were judged to be ineffective (and, in the case of Les Républicains, tarnished by scandal),

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nor the political extremes, whose policies could not command a majority of support from the public. Being elected for want of something better does not provide a particularly stable platform for government. Once in power, Sarkozy and Hollande rapidly lost much of the authority that came with their election victory. Not only were they judged to have failed to respond effectively to the problems facing France, but their personalities were also considered ill-suited to the position they occupied. In the early years of his presidency, Macron seemed to be following a similar trajectory. The percentage of voters who had confidence in him fell from 57% in June 2017 to 21% in December 2018 (Kantar 2020). However, unlike his predecessors, Macron was able to partially reverse this trend, and in a poll in September 2019, 32% expressed confidence in him, although this would fall to 28% by March 2020 (Kantar 2020). Voters seemed to have a particularly mixed view of the president. An ELABE survey from September 2019 found that, when asked which words best described his personality, 72% said ‘arrogant’ and 69% ‘authoritarian’, however the next two most popular terms were ‘dynamic’ (64%) and ‘courageous’ (60%) (Perrineau 2019). Future events will determine whether the positive or the negative perception of Macron proves to be the most widespread, and this will itself have a major impact on the electoral prospects of the Centre Right. The weakness of La République en Marche as a political movement also provides the possibility that the traditional Centre Right may be able to reassert itself in the future. Although Macron is a president with a large parliamentary majority, his party depends on him rather than vice versa. Cole (2019; 63) notes that LREM is ‘a personal rally, where one individual makes all the real decisions’. He points out that it lacks heavyweight figures and voices in the media outside the government (63). Evans (2018; 100) has also noted the movement’s vulnerability, stating: LREM lacks a solid infrastructure, anchored in local communities to ensure that [the support it received in 2017] lasts over the long term. “New” parties, such as the FN have learnt to their cost that the absence of local networks is an obstacle to success at the local and regional level, and that there are ramifications in a system, where the local level continues to represent a base for support at the national level. What happens to LREM’s local networks in the future will have an impact on the ability of the party to repeat its performance of 2017.

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All these factors mean that, should Macron fail to be re-elected in 2022, or lose the confidence of the electorate during his second term, the question will arise as to whether LREM will remain as a party of government, or whether it will fragment. Should it continue to lack significant local bastions and implantation throughout the country, then its fragmentation will appear more likely. While LREM is a party dependent on its leadership, Les Républicains find themselves in the reverse position, where they are unable to find a leader behind whom they can unite. An element that is essential to resolve this problem is to be able to establish a common programme on which they can agree. Macron and En Marche won the 2017 presidential and legislative elections in part because the policies they proposed on the three axes of identity, economic policy and Europe appealed to a significant section of the electorate across the Left/Right divide. In contrast, Les Républicains’ programme was particularly popular among the party’s core voters, but failed to garner much support from other groups. It remains to be seen whether the Centre Right is able to achieve this goal. Its success will also be partially determined by the fortunes of Macron. Should he succeed in reducing unemployment and improving overall economic performance, then Les Républicains are likely to remain in opposition for the foreseeable future. If he fails, then the Centre Right may appear as a credible alternative. However, it is also possible that, having elected a president in 2017 who promised a certain liberalisation of the French economy, voters might turn instead to a candidate offering a more statist approach, including perhaps one from the political extremes. It is therefore clear that the political realignment is yet to fully reshape politics at all levels, and this opens the possibility that an alternative to Macron from the Centre Right may emerge from either national or local politics. Nevertheless, it remains the case that whether Les Républicains’ fortunes improve more generally, whether the traditional Centre Right now enters a long period of opposition, or whether its place in the French party system is occupied by La République en Marche is largely unpredictable, and will depend to a certain extent on factors beyond their control.

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Appendix: The Results of the 2012 and 2017 Presidential and Legislative Elections

2012 Presidential Elections First Round See Table A.1. Table A.1 2012 presidential elections: First round

Candidate name

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Eva Joly Marine Le Pen Nicolas Sarkozy Jean-Luc Mélenchon Philippe Poutou Nathalie Arthaud Jacques Cheminade François Bayrou Nicolas Dupont-Aignan François Hollande

2.31 17.90 27.18 11.10 1.15 0.56 0.25 9.13 1.79 28.63

Abstention: 20.52% Spoiled Ballots: 1.92%

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1

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APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

Second Round See Table A.2. Table A.2 2012 presidential elections: Second round

Candidate name

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

François Hollande Nicolas Sarkozy

51.64 48.36

Abstention: 19.65% Spoiled Ballots: 5.82% All results taken from Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2012. Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2012. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Electi ons/Lesresultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__PR2012/(path)/PR2 012/FE.html. Accessed 27 February 2018

2012 Legislative Elections (Results at the National Level) First Round See Table A.3.

APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

Table A.3 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level): First round

233

Political Classification

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Far Left Front de Gauche Socialist Radical de Gauche Other Left Europe-Ecologie-Les Verts Regionalist Ecologist Others Le Centre pour la France Alliance centriste Parti radical Nouveau Centre Union pour un Mouvement Populaire Other Right Front National Far Right

0.98 6.91 29.35 1.65 3.40 5.46 0.56 0.96 0.52 1.77 0.60 1.24 2.20 27.12

Abstention: 42.78% Spoiled Ballots: 1.58%

3.51 13.60 0.19

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APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

Second Round See Table A.4. Table A.4 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level): Second round

Political Classification

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Front de Gauche Socialist Radical de Gauche Other Left Europe-Ecologie-Les Verts Regionalist Le Centre pour la France Alliance centriste Parti radical Nouveau Centre Union pour un Mouvement Populaire Other Right Front National Far Right

1.08 40.91 2.34 3.08 3.60 0.59 0.49 0.53 1.35 2.47 37.95 1.81 3.66 0.13

Abstention: 44.60% Spoiled Ballots: 3.85% All results taken from Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2012. Résultats des élections législatives 2012. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Ele ctions/Les-resultats/Legislatives/elecresult__LG2012/(path)/LG2 012/FE.html. Accessed 3 March 2019

APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

235

2017 Presidential Elections First Round See Table A.5. Table A.5 2017 presidential elections: First round

Candidate name

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Emmanuel Macron Marine Le Pen François Fillon Jean-Luc Mélenchon Benoît Hamon Nicolas Dupont-Aignan Jean Lassalle Philippe Poutou François Asselineau Nathalie Arthaud Jacques Cheminade

24.01 21.30 20.01 19.58 6.36 4.70 1.21 1.09 0.92 0.64 0.18

Abstention: 22.23% Spoiled Ballots: 2.56%

Second Round See Table A.6. Table A.6 2017 presidential elections: Second round

Candidate name

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Emmanuel Macron Marine Le Pen

66.10 33.90

Abstention: 25.44% Spoiled Ballots: 11.52% All results taken from Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2017. Résultats de l’élection présidentielle de 2017. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Ele ctions/Lesresultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/ (path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html. Accessed 3 March 2019

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APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

2017 Legislative Elections (Results at National Level) First Round See Table A.7. Table A.7 2017 legislative elections (results at national level): First round

Political classification

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Far Left Parti Communiste Français La France Insoumise Parti Socialiste Parti Radical de Gauche Other Left Ecologist Other Regionalist La République En Marche MoDem Union des Démocrates et Indépendants Les Républicains Other Right Debout la France Front National Far Right

0.77 2.72 11.03 7.44 0.47 1.60 4.30 2.21 0.90 28.21 4.12 3.03

Abstention: 51.30% Spoiled Ballots: 2.21%

15.77 2.76 1.17 13.20 0.30

APPENDIX: THE RESULTS OF THE 2012 AND 2017 …

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Second Round See Table A.8. Table A.8 2017 legislative elections (results at national level): Second round

Political classification

Votes received (as percentage of valid votes cast)

Parti Communiste Français La France Insoumise Parti Socialiste Parti Radical de Gauche Other Left Ecologist Other Regionalist La République En Marche MoDem Union des Démocrates et Indépendants Les Républicains Other Right Debout la France Front National Far Right

1.20 4.86 5.68 0.36 1.45 0.13 0.55 0.76 43.06 6.06 3.04 22.23 1.68 0.10 8.75 0.10

Abstention: 57.36% Spoiled Ballots: 9.86% All results taken from Ministère de l’Intérieur. 2017. Résultats des élections législatives 2017. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Ele ctions/Les-resultats/Legislatives/elecresult__legislatives-2017/(pat h)/legislatives-2017//FE.html. Accessed 22 October 2018

Index

A Abad, Damien, 198 Agir, 2, 198, 202 B Bayrou, François, 53, 114 and Juppé, 190 support for Hollande in 2012, 7, 68, 69, 213 support for Macron in 2017, 7 Bergé, Aurore, 83, 84, 86, 157, 221 Bouvet, Laurent, 17, 27, 35, 65, 210 and cultural insecurity, 24–26, 64, 65, 70, 76, 82, 87, 213 Brexit, 4, 64, 134, 151, 152 Buzyn, Agnès, 225 Bygmalion scandal, 179 C Charisma. See Weber, Max Chirac, Jacques, 4, 5, 46, 183, 184, 225

creation of UMP, 4, 184, 201, 218 economic policy, 95 scandals involving, 32, 179 vision of Europe, 141, 144 Communists, 19, 29, 33, 111 Constitutional reforms, 43, 56, 212. See also Quinquennat Constitution of Fifth Republic, 43–47, 56, 169, 181 Copé, Jean-François, 102, 185, 213, 223 and 2012 UMP leadership election, 70, 71, 185, 196, 213, 218

D de Calan, Mael, 199 de Gaulle, Charles, 35, 46, 56, 145, 146, 181, 191 dislike of parties, 183 as leader, 5, 176, 177, 218 vision of Europe, 139–144, 147, 149–151, 154

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1

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INDEX

vision of presidency, 44–46, 181 Didier, Geoffroy, 146, 223 Dupont-Aignan, Nicolas, 103

E En Marche, 4, 54, 171, 221. See also La République En Marche (LREM); Macron, Emmanuel and economic policy, 111

F Far Left. See Front de Gauche; Mélenchon, Jean-Luc; La France Insoumise Filipetti, Aurélie, 101 Fillon, François, 2, 186, 194, 196–198, 217, 221, 222. See also Force Républicaine; Penelopegate; Sens commun and 2012 UMP leadership election, 70, 71, 185, 196, 218 and 2017 elections, 2, 54, 55, 82–84, 100, 105, 106, 110, 112–119, 122, 123, 133, 140–142, 146, 155, 157, 181, 192, 193, 195, 196, 202, 213, 215, 219, 223 and 2017 presidential elections, 78 and anti-elitism, 78, 79 appeals to Catholics, 74, 77, 81, 82, 201, 214 attacks federal Europe, 152, 153 blamed by Wauquiez for defeat, 2 and cultural insecurity, 10, 50, 64, 69, 73–76, 80–85, 133, 202, 214, 219, 220, 224 and economic policy, 10, 92, 94–96, 100, 102, 105–110, 112–117, 119, 122, 123, 192, 201, 202, 215

economic programme described as ‘brutal’, 92, 117, 215 and FN voters, 95, 110–113, 122, 215 and globalisation, 136, 159, 212 judged sincere, 80–82 as leader, 11, 188, 190–193, 201, 202, 219 and legalisation of same-sex marriage, 77 likened to Thatcher, 106, 118–119 loses support to Macron, 6, 7, 50, 83, 84, 114–117, 122, 123, 133, 155–158, 160, 188, 194, 195, 202, 215, 217, 224 and Penelopegate, 1, 202 and Primary of the Right and Centre, 10, 75, 76, 80–82, 86, 92, 96, 110, 115, 117, 118, 122, 174, 180, 181, 186–188, 190–192, 201, 214, 215, 217, 219–221 as prime minister, 177 reputation for honesty, 2, 191, 194, 219 and scandal, 179 supporters and Europe, 149 supporters feeling towards, 193 vision of Europe, 132, 140–142, 146, 147, 149–151, 153–155, 160, 217 vision of leadership, 181 Force Républicaine, 118, 188, 197 Front de Gauche, 5, 33, 211 and cultural insecurity, 24, 25 importance of Mélenchon as leader, 22 and Loi Macron, 103 and universal income, 103, 104 Front National (FN), 4, 9, 12, 15, 25, 27, 28, 34, 50, 155, 173, 220, 226

INDEX

and and and and

2012 elections, 15, 211, 213 2014 European elections, 135 2017 elections, 57, 209, 221 blue-collar working class, 111, 210 criticism of Fillon’s economic programme, 119 and cultural insecurity, 25, 49, 67, 111, 224 different FN electorates, 113 and economic globalisation, 23, 24 and economic policy, 95, 111, 112, 122, 224 and euro, 103, 121, 122 and Europe, 49, 155 during Macron presidency, 173, 197, 223, 224 as ‘neither Right nor Left’, 16, 28, 57 reasons for voters switching from UMP, 72 supporters and Fillon’s economic policy, 117, 215 supporters and rejection of Sarkozy, 85 supporters and the Primary of the Right and Centre, 82, 187

G Gilets jaunes , 172, 173 Goodhart, David, 64, 66, 67, 69, 213 Guilluy, Christophe, 18–20, 23, 24, 34, 94, 135, 158, 210, 216 and cultural insecurity, 64–66, 213 H Hamon, Benoît, 55, 101, 114, 174, 180, 182 and economic policy, 99, 111, 114, 160 and Europe, 133, 158

241

as leader, 196 Happy identity. See Juppé, Alain Hidalgo, Anne, 225 Hollande, François, 72, 86, 113, 123, 226 and 2011 PS primary, 6 and 2012 elections, 53, 68, 69, 84, 105, 137 economic difficulties, 97, 114, 121, 175 and economic policy, 101, 103 elected due to rejection of Sarkozy, 32, 172, 225 as European leader, 145 finance as enemy, 101, 214 and legalisation of same-sex marriage, 76 legalisation of same-sex marriage, 85 as ‘normal president’, 46, 176–178, 200, 218 supported by Bayrou, 7, 190, 213 unpopularity, 50 I Identité heureuse. See Juppé, Alain J Juppé, Alain, 113, 116, 186, 196 attacked as representative of an elite, 79 attacked as weak, 168, 178, 190 attacks Fillon as ‘brutal’, 117–118, 192, 215 and criminal conviction, 191 criticises nationalist elite, 80 criticism of Sarkozy’s 2012 campaign, 71 declines to replace Fillon, 221 and economic policy, 106–109, 122 gains support from Left, 113

242

INDEX

and happy identity, 49, 50, 69, 71–73, 79–81, 83, 85, 214 as leader, 168, 181, 186, 188–190, 201, 219 and legalisation of same-sex marriage, 77 and Primary of the Right and Centre, 82, 174, 180, 181, 186–189, 191, 201, 202, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222 as prime minister, 190 return to frontline politics, 71, 214 supporters and Primary of the Right and Centre, 86 supporters turn to Macron, 11, 50, 78, 83, 86, 132, 139, 156, 157, 160, 161, 188, 217, 218, 221 vision of Europe, 132, 142, 149–155, 160, 217 vision of leadership, 180 and voting in the Primary of the Right and Centre, 80, 81 K Kosciusko-Morizet, Nathalie, 71 L La France Insoumise, 173 and 2017 elections, 209 and cultural insecurity, 49 and economic policy, 49, 100, 121 and Europe, 49 and gilets jaunes , 173 and leadership, 177 during Macron presidency, 197, 224 Larcher, Gérard, 199 La République En Marche (LREM), 223. See also En Marche; Macron, Emmanuel

and economic policy, 224 and issues concerning identity, 224 Le Maire, Bruno, 2, 187, 188 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 182 Le Pen, Marine, 16, 22, 27, 33, 53, 57, 64, 111, 114, 118, 119, 171, 179–182, 192, 194, 195 and 2012 elections, 15 and 2017 elections, 113, 116, 119, 209 attacks Fillon as ‘brutal’, 118 and cultural insecurity, 25, 26 and economic policy, 103, 105, 112, 155 and gilets jaunes , 172 globalists vs patriots, 6, 135 importance as leader, 22, 47, 50, 58, 169, 172, 200, 212 and migrant crisis, 29 winners vs losers of globalisation divide, 135, 137 Les Constructifs, 2, 86 Loi Macron, 102, 103 Loi Travail , 102

M Maastricht Treaty, 26, 144, 146, 150 Macron, Emmanuel, 1, 2, 6, 50, 51, 149, 168, 180, 182, 188, 193, 203, 219, 222. See also En Marche; La République En Marche (LREM); Loi Macron and 2017 elections, 83, 84, 119, 161, 209, 222 and 2019 European elections, 197, 198 attacks Fillon’s economic programme, 118, 119 choice of ministers, 2 and cultural insecurity, 64, 83, 84, 86

INDEX

and decline of Left/Right divide, 102 and decline of traditional ideologies, 53, 55, 56 and economic policy, 92, 100, 105, 113–117, 114, 123, 215 as Economy Minister, 97, 101, 120, 121, 194, 215 and En Marche, 47, 170 and Europe, 50, 131–134, 138, 139, 155, 158, 160, 161, 216 and future of Les Républicains, 92, 198–199, 203, 223–227 importance of political institutions in success, 47, 57, 58 as leader, 11, 115, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 179, 180, 194–196, 200, 202, 212, 219 and LREM, 226 and moralisation of political life, 194 political positioning of, 1, 8 as president, 172, 198–199, 203 presidential character of, 226 supported by Bayrou, 7 vision of Europe, 6, 11, 155–158, 160, 161, 217 winners vs losers of globalisation, 6, 134, 135, 137 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 22, 53, 101, 116, 119, 171, 180, 182, 196 and 2017 elections, 209 and cultural insecurity, 25 and economic policy, 105, 155 and gilets jaunes , 172 importance as leader, 47, 50, 58, 169, 212 Mitterrand, François, 16, 35, 36, 46, 55, 57, 95, 156, 177, 179, 194 and economic policy, 5, 17, 20, 21, 92, 101, 120, 210, 214

243

MoDem, 12, 187, 190. See also Bayrou, François and Europe, 132, 142, 149, 152 political positioning of, 7–8 and Sarkozy’s 2012 campaign, 68 Monnet, Jean, 139, 140, 148–150, 159, 216, 217 Montebourg, Arnaud, 101, 174, 178

P Parti Communiste. See Communists Parti Socialiste (PS), 1, 3, 7, 8, 15, 18, 22, 33, 35, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 101, 121, 135, 176, 178, 179, 182, 184, 195, 218, 225. See also Hamon, Benoît; Hollande, François; Mitterrand, François; Valls, Manuel and 2002 elections, 54 and 2017 elections, 1, 47, 54, 55, 111, 113, 114, 116, 155, 158, 209, 221 and blue-collar working class, 18, 22, 28, 210 and economic policy, 8, 16, 20, 21, 34, 49, 50, 52, 92, 97, 99, 111, 114, 121, 214, 221, 224 and identity, 8, 49, 72, 224 membership, 29, 51, 169 and primary of 2011, 6, 31, 178, 220 and primary of 2017, 5, 174, 180, 182 and scandal, 32 supporters and leadership, 177 supporters and Macron, 97, 114, 116, 161, 196, 198, 217 Pécresse, Valérie, 197, 199, 202 Peltier, Guillaume, 69, 213, 223 Penelopegate

244

INDEX

role in Fillon’s defeat, 2, 92, 114, 115, 123, 155, 168, 192–194, 202, 219–222 Philippe, Edouard, 2, 86, 123 Pompidou, Georges, 140, 183 Populism, 24, 27, 99 Portelli, Florence, 199 Primary, 2, 7, 10, 11, 50, 55, 64, 67, 72–75, 77–79, 81, 83–85, 92, 106, 202, 221, 222. See also Fillon, François; Hamon, Benoît; Hollande, François; Juppé, Alain; Parti Socialiste (PS); Sarkozy, Nicolas role in defeat of Les Républicains, 220–222 PS. See Parti Socialiste

Q Quinquennat , 46, 47, 56, 180

R Raffarin, Jean-Pierre, 69, 213, 223 Rassemblement National (RN). See Front National (FN) Réda, Robin, 199 Retailleau, Bruno, 197 RPR, 15, 32, 51, 95, 144, 169, 179

S Sarkozy, Nicolas, 5, 7, 185, 192, 196 and 2012 campaign, 10, 16, 68, 69, 84, 213 and 2012 elections, 7, 68, 69, 84, 105, 113, 137, 167, 180, 193, 196, 201, 213 and 2014 UMP leadership election, 55, 73, 186, 196, 201, 218 and anti-elitism, 78, 79 attacked by Fillon, 191

attacks federal Europe, 152, 153 attacks Juppé as weak, 190 criticised for 2012 campaign, 4, 68, 69, 213 and cultural insecurity, 10, 16, 68, 71, 73–75, 80, 84–86, 110, 213, 214, 220 and the decline in influence of traditional parties, 186–188 and economic policy, 94–96, 102, 106–109, 122 elected president in 2007, 15, 16, 63, 68, 112, 113, 225 identifies as of the Right, 183 judged insincere, 80, 81, 190, 214 as leader, 168, 188, 189, 201 and legalisation of same-sex marriage, 77 as party leader, 4, 5, 15, 55, 83, 161, 184–187, 196, 197, 201, 218 personality of, 189, 219 as presidential candidate in 2007, 184, 185 as president of France, 24, 28, 32, 34, 49, 84, 95, 96, 175, 177, 180, 185, 190, 211, 225, 226 and Primary of the Right and Centre, 55, 80, 82, 86, 110, 117, 118, 174, 180, 181, 187, 189, 191, 201, 202, 214, 219 rejection of in 2012 elections, 32, 172, 176, 225 scandals related to, 32, 179, 191 supporters and 2012 elections, 53 supporters and Europe, 149 supporters feeling towards, 193 supporters turn to FN, 72–73 vision of Europe, 147, 149–151, 153–155, 160, 217 vision of leadership, 180

INDEX

Scandal, 32, 50, 179, 191, 196, 200, 201, 225. See also Bygmalion; Chirac; Penelopegate Schuman, Robert, 140, 142 Séguin, Philippe, 146, 150 Sens commun, 76, 77. See also Fillon, François T Trierweiler, Valérie, 178 Trump, Donald, 4, 64, 134, 157 U UDF, 15, 148

245

UDI, 12, 93, 116, 187 and Europe, 132, 133, 142, 148, 149, 152, 157, 158 political positioning of, 7–8

V Valls, Manuel, 49, 51, 97, 101, 102, 113, 174

W Wauquiez, Laurent, 2, 3, 161, 168, 196, 197, 202, 223 Weber, Max, 168, 174–176, 218