The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria 0714645575, 9780714645575

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction: The Fertile Crescent in World War I
1. Syria and al-Fatat
Faysal's Status in Syria
2. Political Parties in Faysal's Syria
The Independence Party
Other Syrian Parties
Political Groups in the Lebanon
3. The Committee for National Defence
4. The Arab Clubs
Al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Syria
Syrian-Palestinian Relations in Syria
Arab Organizations in Palestine
5. Political Activity Outside Syria
Faysal in Europe
Syrians and Lebanese in Europe and America
The Syrian Union Party in Egypt
The Moderate Syrian Party
The Lebancse Societies in Egypt
6. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and the Syrian Army
Syrian-Iraqi Relations in Syria
Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus I
The Arrest of Yasin al-Hashimi
Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus II
The Syrian Army from its Founding to the Battle of Maysalun
7. From Dayr al-Zur to Tal'afar
Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Aleppo
Dayr al-Zur
The March to Tal'afar
8. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Northern Iraq
9. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Baghdad
10. The Independence Guard
11. The Iraqi Revolt
12. Repatriation
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

The Emergence of the Arab Movements The Arab Movements in World War I

The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq

Eliezer Tauber Bar-Han University

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Croup

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1995 in Great Britain by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN 270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016 Transferred to Digital Printing 2007 Copyright © Eliezer Tauber 1995 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Tauber, Eliezer Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq. I. Title II. Reif, J. A. 956.704 ISBN 0-7146-4105-7 (paper) ISBN 0-7146-4557-5 (cloth) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ta'uber, Eli'ezer. The formation of modern Syria and Iraq / Eliezer Tauber. p. cm. Translated from Hebrew. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-4557-5 (cloth) ISBN 0-7146-4105-7 (paper) 1. Middle East—History—1914-1923. 2. Iraq—History— 1534-1921. 3. Syria—History—20th century. I. Title. DS63.04.T39 1995 956'.03—dc20 94-26159 CIP All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Routledge

Typeset by Vitaset, Paddock Wood, Kent Publisher's Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent

Contents Acknowledgements

vii

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction: The Fertile Crescent in World War I

1

1. Syria and al-Fatat

11

2. Political Parties in Faysal's Syria The Independence Party Other Syrian Parties Political Groups in the Lebanon

49

3. The Committee for National Defence

68

4. The Arab Clubs

79

Faysal's Status in Syria

Al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Syria Syrian-Palestinian Relations in Syria Arab Organizations in Palestine

5. Political Activity Outside Syria Faysal in Europe Syrians and Lebanese in Europe and America The Syrian Union Party in Egypt The Moderate Syrian Party The Lebanese Societies in Egypt

115

6. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and the Syrian Army

173

Syrian-Iraqi Relations in Syria Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus I The Arrest of Yasin al-Hashimi Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus II The Syrian Army from its Founding to the Battle of Maysalun

7. From Dayr al-Zur to Tal'afar Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Aleppo Dayr al-Zur The March to Tal'afar

219

8. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Northern Iraq

261

9. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Baghdad

278

10. The Independence Guard

286

11. The Iraqi Revolt

306

12. Repatriation

318

Conclusion

325

Notes

335

Bibliography

393

Index

403

Acknowledgements I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Dean of my faculty and to the Rector and the Chancellor of Bar-Ilan University, whose financial aid made possible the translation of this book into English. Dr. Joseph A. Reif of the English Department at Bar-Ilan University translated the book from the original Hebrew, and my deep thanks to him are hereby acknowledged. An enlarged version of the second section of chapter 7, dealing with the Dayr al-Zur affair, appeared as "The Struggle for Dayr al-Zur: The Determination of Borders between Syria and Iraq", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23 (1991), pp.361-385. A special note of appreciation goes to my mother, whose devotion has long been a source of strength to me. Eliezer Tauber Nisan 5754 Bar-Ilan, Israel

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Abbreviations Add = The British Library, Additional Manuscript AN = Archives Nationales APO = Assistant Political Officer Arabie = Levant 1918-1929, Arabie-Hedjaz Cab = Cabinet Office CC = Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) CCS = Comité Central Syrien Cd'O = Correspondance d'Orient Cmd = Command CO = Colonial Office CPO = Chief Political Officer CZA = Central Zionist Archives d = despatch DBFP = Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series DMI = Director of Military Intelligence EEF = Egyptian Expeditionary Force FO = Foreign Office FRUS, PPC = Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919 GHQ = General Headquarters GOC = General Officer Commanding GSI = General Staff, Intelligence HA = Hagana Archives HC = High Commissioner IJMES = International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 = India Office ISA = Israel State Archives 1 = letter L/P&S = India Office, Political and Secret Departmental Records MAE = Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres memo = memorandum MG = Ministere de la Guerre MPAI = Mesopotamian Police — Abstract of Intelligence OETA = Occupied Enemy Territory Administration PO = Political Officer r = report SSI = Secretary of State for India

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Syrie-Liban = Levant 1918-1929, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie t = telegram USS = Under Secretary of State WAAP = Weekly Abstracts from the Arab Press WO = War Office

Introduction THE FERTILE CRESCENT IN WORLD WAR I In June 1908 a young officer in Salonika, named Enver, decided to flee to the mountains rather than to go to Istanbul for a "promotion". In his footsteps went another officer by the name of Niyazi. Troops sent to suppress the rebels joined them instead. The army in Macedonia began to demand that Sultan 'Abd alHamid II grant a constitution to the Ottoman Empire. On 24 July the sultan was impelled to respond to the demands and to promulgate the constitution. Thus ended the 30-year dictatorial regime of 'Abd al-Hamid II, and the final decade of the history of the Ottoman Empire began, the decade of the Young Turks' rule. The Committee of Union and Progress was the dominant group within the ranks of the Young Turks, and heading it were personalities such as Enver and Tal'at, who were destined to accompany the Ottoman Empire to its final destruction. However, their path to power was not an easy one. The first challenge they had to face was the counter-revolutionary attempt in April 1909 of the supporters of the old regime, who tried to abrogate the constitutional regime. The attempt at a counterrevolution was suppressed by force, and Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II was deposed from his throne. Muhammad Rashad was appointed sultan but without any practical authority. In September 1911 Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and invaded Libya. While the Committee of Union and Progress was struggling against the external threat, opposing circles in the capital were getting stronger, this time comprising members of the liberal elements of the Young Turks. In November they established the Party of Liberty and Union, in which were united all the opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress won the elections of 1912, using means that were not always fair. However, in July of that year their government was deposed following a military revolt, and the Party of Liberty and Union came to power. Though it succeeded in reaching a peace treaty with Italy, in exchange for ceding Libya, it was immediately faced with a new threat: the Balkan War. The readiness of the Party of Liberty

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

and Union to accede to the territorial demands of the Bulgarians, in order to bring the war to an end, angered the Committee of Union and Progress, and in late January 1913 it returned to power in a military coup. Thenceforth the Committee of Union and Progress ruled the Ottoman Empire without restraint, headed by a dictatorial trimuvirate: Tal'at, interior minister and from 1917 the Grand Vizier; Enver, war minister from early 1914; and Jamal, military governor of Istanbul and later the navy minister. In August 1914 World War I broke out in Europe. The Ottoman Empire declared armed neutrality, but on 2 August it signed a secret treaty with Germany and thus in effect joined the Central Powers. The pro-German position of the Empire was expressed publicly later in the same month when it granted asylum to the two German battleships Goeben and Breslau. These two ships led the German-Ottoman attack on the Black Sea ports of Russia at the end of October, following which Russia, France, and Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Shortly afterwards Sultan Muhammad Rashad declared a jihad against the infidels, the enemies of the Empire. World War I in the Middle East had begun, and with it began a new phase in the history of the Arab countries. The fighting in the Middle East began in Iraq. In early November the British invaded southern Iraq, conquered Basra and began moving towards Baghdad. But their Indian Expeditionary Force was surrounded by the Ottomans at Kut al-'Amara, where it surrendered in April 1916. It was not until early 1917 that the British opened a new offensive, reaching Baghdad in March. Only after the war was over did the British succeed in occupying Mosul. The division of duties among the ruling triumvirate of the Empire put the control of the Levant in the hands of the navy minister, Jamal Pasha, who became the sole ruler of this region from December 1914 until December 1917. His official title was Commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, the army which at the beginning of the war included all the military forces stationed in the Levant, and which numbered 100,000 men in early 1915. The first mission assigned to Jamal Pasha in this post was to organize an expedition to the Suez Canal with the intention of crossing it and conquering Egypt from the hands of the British. With the German staff officer Kress von Kressenstein, Jamal Pasha advanced at the head of a force of 25,000 troops in the direction of the canal and reached it in early February 1915. The attempt to cross the canal failed. The few soldiers who succeeded

INTRODUCTION

3

in reaching the west bank of the canal were captured by the British or were killed. The British forces, mainly Indian, subdued the waves of attackers and destroyed most of their fording equipment. The first Ottoman drive on the Suez Canal was a failure, but it taught the British a lesson in the importance of Palestine and the Suez Canal in the war. On his return from his failed drive on the Suez Canal, Jamal Pasha began to make plans for mounting a second expedition to the canal. These plans came to an end with the Ottoman defeat in the battle of Romani in August 1916, and by the end of that year the British succeeded in clearing the Sinai Peninsula of Ottoman forces. At the beginning of 1917 the British stood at the gates of the south-western border of Palestine, and on 9 January 1917, they took Rafah in a fierce battle in which both sides suffered heavy losses. The natural goal following the capture of Rafah was the town of Gaza. The first British attempt to conquer the town in March 1917 failed, with exceedingly heavy losses for the British. So also did the second attempt to conquer Gaza made in April and in which the British suffered even heavier losses. Following this failure General Edmund Allenby was transferred to the Palestine front. He assumed supreme command and organized the continuation of the British offensive. A sophisticated intelligence deception led the Ottomans to believe that the British were about to attack Gaza for the third time, but Allenby's forces attacked Beersheba on 31 October and captured it. The Palestine front was pierced. When the Ottomans realized the gravity of their situation in Palestine, they decided to transfer there the Yildirim Army Group, which was originally established for the conquest of Baghdad from the British. This Army Group, which included forces from several armies, was only a faint echo of the strength of the Ottoman army at the beginning of the war. The plague of desertion constantly ate away at the Ottoman army. By 1918 about half a million soldiers had deserted from a total of one million that the army had comprised at the peak of its strength. Of the 100,000 soldiers of the Fourth Army, the ruler of the Levant, only 3,500 were left at the end of the war. The Ottoman army collapsed in the face of General Allenby's offensive. In November 1917 his forces advanced rapidly in the coastal plain, crossing the Yarkon on 21 December. Another flank of the British forces turned towards the Judaean Hills, and on 9 December Jerusalem was captured. After another eight months, in the course of which the Ottomans held a defensive line crossing Palestine to the south of Nablus, in September 1918, the autumn

4

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

offensive of the British began which finally broke the Ottoman army (the Battle of Armageddon), and drove it out of all of Palestine. From the north of Palestine the British forces continued towards Damascus, which fell to an Australian brigade on the morning of 1 October 1918. After Damascus came the turn of Horns, Hama, and Aleppo. On 30 October an armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies was signed at the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos. At this stage the entire Levant was already in the hands of the Allied powers. The 400-year-old Ottoman rule over the Levant had come to an end, and with it came the end of the Ottoman Empire itself. In the early period of the war a number of revolts against the Ottomans were planned in Syria and in Mount Lebanon, and also in Iraq. The common feature of all these attempts was their failure. Some did not even reach the point of execution, and the others came to naught soon after they started. These attempts were begun by inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, several of whose activists tried to involve France, Britain, and Greece in an uprising against the Ottomans. The Allies were occupied with more serious problems at the beginning of the war, and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of their governments to assist the Lebanese caused the demise of the plan. Similar plans for an outbreak of revolt in Mount Lebanon and Syria were drawn up in the early part of the war by the Syrian Decentralization Party and the Alliance Libanaise, both in Cairo, but nothing ever came of these plans after the societies failed to reach an understanding with Britain and France. The Decentralization Party did cooperate with the British for a limited time and helped them spread subversive propaganda in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. However, ultimately the reluctance of the British to satisfy the members of the party with official political declarations concerning the future of the Arab provinces caused a break in the contacts between the party and the British. In early 1915 the Syrian officer Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz raised a much more daring plan of revolt — to take control of the entire Syrian coast from Latakia to the north of the Gulf of Iskenderun, exploiting the fact that most of the soldiers in Syria at that time were Arabs. The plan was to be integrated with a British landing at Alexandretta. Since a British invasion of the Gulf of Iskenderun never took place, al-Hafiz's plan failed — although it had already commenced. Another plan to sever the Ottoman transportation routes from Anatolia to Syria and to

INTRODUCTION

5

assist a landing by the Allies was proposed at the same time by the former president of the Arab "Literary Club" in Istanbul, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil. A series of leaks from various sources led to the exposure of the plan by the Ottoman authorities and the capture of its organizers, several of whom paid with their lives. Revolutionary activities in the Levant took place also during the Arab revolt of Sharif Husayn of Mecca. Some of the ideas for revolt were put forward by the sons of Nuri al-Sha'lan, paramount chief of the Ruwalla tribes, whose attitude towards the Arab revolt itself was vague until the final stage of the war. Other attempts and guerrilla activities of various kinds were carried out in Syria and Mount Lebanon, both by the sons of several prominent Syrian and Lebanese families during this period (such as al-Mu'ayyad of Damascus and Haydar of Ba'albek), and by members of bands. Besides the attempts at revolt planned during World War I in the Levant, there were also a small number of plans and attempts at revolt in Iraq. Their initiators were at first Iraqi officers serving in the Ottoman army, and later embittered Shi'ite residents who could no longer bear the yoke of Ottoman oppression. However, the portent of what was to happen in Iraq after the war was the uprising that broke out in Najaf in March 1918 against the British, and which was suppressed by them with force and determination. The Ottoman authorities did not sit idle in the face of these acts by the local residents. Incriminating documents concerning the activities of the Syrian and Lebanese activists fell into the hands of the authorities as the result of a betrayal by the dragoman of the French consulate-general in Beirut. In another act of treachery, one of the activists of the Decentralization Party handed the documents of this party to the authorities. These documents, together with additional information that flowed mainly from informings by locals, constituted sufficient grounds for the arrest of a considerable portion of the Arab activists and members of the clandestine societies that operated in the Levant before and during the war. A number of them were executed in August 1915 and in May 1916. The others were sentenced to prison terms or to exile in Anatolia. But it was not just the fear of arrest, execution, and deportation that distressed the residents of the Levant during the rule of Jamal Pasha. Worse yet was the widespread famine in the Levant during the war, which was especially intense in the vilayet of Beirut and in the sanjaq of Mount Lebanon where many died.

6

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Just as the attempts at revolt planned in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire failed, the process began which was to end in the Arab revolt of Sharif Husayn of Mecca. In early 1915 the clandestine Arab societies al-Fatat and al-'Ahd decided to combine activities and to prepare a joint plan for a general revolt against the Ottomans. The centre of the revolt was to be in Syria, basing itself on the Arab soldiers stationed there at the time. Since the planned revolt was to spread to the Arabian Peninsula, the societies chose Sharif Husayn of Mecca as their partner in it and even as its supreme leader. The messenger who delivered this decision to Husayn received no reaction whatsoever from him, but in March 1915 Husayn sent his son Faysal to Damascus in order to determine the seriousness of the intentions of the societies. The society leaders took him in as one of their members, and after he gave them details of the contacts his father had started with the British for similar purposes, they formulated a list of conditions under which they would agree to cooperate with the British in their war against the Ottomans (the "Damascus Protocol"). It was also agreed that after he had brought his father up to date on the strength and readiness of the conspirators, Faysal would return to Syria at the head of a volunteer army of Hijazis and the revolt, under his leadership, would begin. However, soon after Faysal left Syria the authorities removed all the Arab divisions from the Levant and replaced them with loyal Turkish forces. The planned revolt in Syria could not be carried out. The conditions that the leaders of al-Fatat and al-'Ahd put forward to Faysal became the basis for the letter which Husayn sent in July 1915 to the British high commissioner in Egypt, Arthur Henry McMahon, and in which he detailed his terms for cooperation with the British against the Ottomans. This letter, which initiated the McMahon-Husayn correspondence, was received with reservations by the British, who were deterred by Husayn's demands, especially with regard to the territorial issue. However, the desertion to the British of Iraqi officer and member of al-'Ahd Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi and the false information that he gave them concerning the strength and extent of the Arab movement caused a complete turnaround in their attitude to Husayn. After a short period of wavering, McMahon was authorized to send Husayn a letter of response, in which he informed him that the British government accepted his demands, including those regarding the boundaries of the future Arab state, except for a few territorial reservations. While the McMahon-Husayn correspondence was continuing,

INTRODUCTION

7

Faysal returned to Damascus as agreed during his previous visit there. But when he arrived in the city and learned that all the Arab divisions upon which the planned revolt was based had been removed from Syria, he realized that the revolt would have to break out in the Hijaz alone. Faysal slipped back to the Hijaz, and in June 1916 the Arab revolt broke out. Within less than four months the rebels succeeded in taking Mecca, Jidda, Rabigh, Yanbu', and Ta'if. Medina, on the other hand, was another story. One of the reasons that Medina held out in the early period of the revolt was a lack of enthusiasm by the first commander of the revolt army, 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, to capture it. Al-Misri, who had been the leader of al-'Ahd before the war, still held to the original programme of the society to set up a TurkoArab empire on the Austro-Hungarian model. Therefore, instead of acting faithfully to conquer Medina, he planned to reach an understanding with its Ottoman commander, and together with him to depose Husayn as a first step in realizing the plan of the bi-national empire. 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri was not the only member of the societies to join the Arab revolt. Forty people, who constituted about a third of the members of al-'Ahd and about a quarter of the members of al-Fatat, joined it at various stages. Numerically the members of the societies were a drop in the ocean among those who participated in the Arab revolt. At their height its four armies numbered more than 10,000 regular soldiers and over 30,000 irregulars. Though the Hijazi tribesmen made up the main part of these armies, Iraqi and Syrian prisoners of war, captured by the British on the various fronts, also began to arrive in the Hijaz. They preferred to join the army of the revolt rather than stay in prisoner-of-war camps. There were, however, many Arab prisoners who declined the British offer to join the revolt. A British attempt to organize prisoners of war into a separate military force, under the name of the Arab Legion, failed completely and it was necessary to transfer them to the army of the Arab revolt. In addition to the prisoners of war a small number of deserters joined the revolt, as well as Syrian civilians who had fled Ottoman oppression in Syria. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that several of the most prominent leaders of the Arab movement during this period, such as Yasin alHashimi and 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, did not join the Arab revolt, and continued to serve the Ottoman Empire until the end of the war. The qualitative contribution of the Arab society members to the revolt armies was in striking contrast to their meagre

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

numerical participation. The officer members of al-'Ahd who took part held a considerable proportion of the senior positions in the revolt armies. Furthermore, the Iraqi and Syrian officers in general held practically all the senior and middle rank positions of command. Iraqi officers such as Ja'far al-'Askari, Nuri al-Sa'id, and Mawlud Mukhlis (the latter two being members of al-'Ahd), led almost all the important attacks by the Northern Army of the Arab revolt after the occupation of Aqaba in July 1917. The success of these attacks was, however, only partial, and in fact most of the Ottoman positions in Transjordan held out until the final stage of the war. Relations among the various elements of the Arab revolt army were quite strained. The most difficult situation existed between Iraqi and Syrian officers. The latter felt themselves discriminated against, and quite justly claimed that the Iraqis were taking over all the senior positions. In several instances the disharmony reached the point of blows and the use of pistols. Attempts to mediate between the Iraqis and Syrians came to naught. Husayn himself hated both and never ceased to be suspicious of their intentions. The authority of his sons over the officers was also only partial. The strained relations between Husayn and the officers reached a peak in August 1918 when Husayn publicly insulted Ja'far al-'Askari, the commander of the Northern Army, by denying in the rebels' newspaper, al-Qibla, that al-'Askari was its commander. This incident almost caused the disintegration of the Northern Army, and this on the eve of the great offensive on Syria. Only after much effort were the British able to smooth over the difficulties. The fact that Medina was able to hold out until the end of the war is also explained in great part by what happened within the Southern and Eastern Armies. Not only was the authority of Husayn's sons, 'Ali and 'Abdallah, over the officers limited but several of the Iraqi officers in these armies exhibited open sympathy for the Ottomans and did their best to sabotage the Arab military effort to conquer Medina. While the soldiers of the Northern Army were battling their way north, Syrian and Lebanese political activists living in Egypt were engaged in feverish discussions on the political future of Syria and Mount Lebanon after the war. While the idea of establishing a greater Arab state, of which Syria was to be a part, had begun to gather support after the outbreak of the Arab revolt, towards the end of the war this support began to fade away. The troubled relations between the Syrians and Iraqis in the revolt army, between these two groups and the Hashimite family, and between the Hashimites and some of the Syrian and

INTRODUCTION

9

Lebanese activists in Cairo, strengthened the separatist tendencies among the activists in Cairo. Several of them approached the British in April 1918 with a request that the British clarify their position concerning the future of the Arab countries, with the activists more than hinting that they would prefer that an autonomous regime be established in Syria and that Syria should not be referred to as being of one piece with the Hijaz. The applicants took care to convince the British of the strength and influence of the societies they represented. After a short period of wavering the British decided to accept the appeal, and in June 1918 the "Declaration to the Seven" was issued, in which the British in effect accepted the basic approach of the petitioners. The idea of separating Syria from the Hijaz was also the intention of the Comité Central Syrien, which was founded in Paris in 1917 from entirely different motives. This society did desire the independence of Syria, but under the tight aegis of France. The society was involved in a French attempt to form a legion made up of Armenian and Syrian volunteers which would assist the French war effort on the Palestine front and in Syria. The French Legion d'Orient, whose idea was not a little reminiscent of the Arab Legion that the British were trying to set up, was not much more successful than the Arab Legion, at least as regards its Syrian volunteers. The society's attempts to recruit volunteers for the Légion d'Orient in South America produced very limited results. One of the reasons for the failure of the society's contacts with the Lebanese societies in South America was that the Lebanese activists in the various émigré communities were not satisfied with the separation of the Syrian question from the general Arab one, but insisted also on a separation of the Lebanese question from the Syrian one. The Lebanese societies in South and North America maintained good relations with France, but they wanted a separate Lebanese independence under the aegis of France. The Alliance Libanaise of Cairo went even further in not being prepared to accept anything less than total independence of Mount Lebanon in its original boundaries and under the guarantee of all the Powers. The pre-war dualism, of particularist national movements among the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent existing alongside the general Arab movement, continued during the war. In contrast to the pre-war period, the Arab movement became dominant for a while with the outbreak of the Arab revolt. But towards the end of the war the enthusiasm of the Syrians for the revolt faded

10

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

away, and the Syrian and Lebanese tendencies became stronger, when the liberation of these countries became a reality. Thus, with the end of World War I, the Arab nation split into three main ideological streams: the Arab movement which strove to establish a single greater Arab state in the territories of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire; a Syrian movement which strove to establish a greater Syria which would include Mount Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan; and a Lebanese movement which strove for an independent Lebanon with extended boundaries. Iraq, too, began during this period to seethe with national feelings that were to express themselves in a revolt movement two years later.

Chapter 1 SYRIA AND AL-FATAT Shortly before 7 am on 1 October 1918, the first cavalrymen of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade entered Damascus, by this signalling the approaching end of World War I in the Middle East. On the same day Shukri al-Ayyubi was appointed governor of Damascus but, being incompetent, he was replaced by General 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi two days later. From then on alRikabi functioned as military governor though his official title, as authorized by General Allenby, was Chief Administrator of internal Syria (OETA, East). 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi had served many years in the Ottoman army and had even reached the rank of corps commander. But the suspicions of the Ottoman authorities concerning his nationalist leanings brought about his forced retirement on the eve of the war. Only a few days before the end of the war was he returned to active service. At first he was to stop the British advance on the Tiberian front, and later he was to defend Damascus after the departure of the Turks. Al-Rikabi took advantage of this latter assignment to deliver himself into the hands of the British, not before he had stationed the Ottoman soldiers who were to defend the city in indefensible positions and had arranged the Ottoman artillery in an untenable position due to lack of water. Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the fact that al-Rikabi was one of the prominent members of the secret Arab society, al-Fatat, bore practical results. On his appointment as military governor he began to organize the public order in the city in coordination with the central committee of al-Fatat, which was soon to become the main political power in the short-lived Syrian state of Amir Faysal.1 The Anglo-French declaration of 8 November 1918 gave the society its first chance to express the ideological lines that were to characterize its policy during the next two years. In this declaration Britain and France announced that the goal of the Allies in the war was to free the peoples oppressed by the Turks and to enable them to establish national governments to be chosen freely by themselves. The general reaction in Damascus to this declaration was one of rejoicing, and several notables came to

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

the offices of the British and French liaison officers to express their gratitude. However, al-Fatat was not satisfied. The society could see that the declaration did not include a recognition by the two powers of the full independence of Syria, and therefore issued a resolution: "The country adheres to its absolute independence and unity according to the principles on which the great Arab revolt of Husayn was based." Following a speech by the French foreign minister at the end of December concerning French interests in Syria, the society initiated a letter to the Powers protesting at any foreign intervention in Syria, even in the form of advisers. Opposition to France became from then on one of the principal planks of the society's policy, though in fact it was also opposed to any other European influence in Syria. At a conference organized by the society one of its members defined it thus: "We do not want to be guided by Europe except at a distance . . . just as a lighthouse guides the navigator without touching him." These pronouncements and others by members of the society led a senior British officer to describe the situation in Damascus as follows: "A small party consisting mainly of fanatical Moslems and 'Young Arab' hot heads desires a purely Sherifian Government and displays a certain anti-European sentiment." 2 In December 1918 the leaders of al-Fatat drafted a new constitution for the society. It consisted of 80 articles and was to replace the 1909 constitution which had become irrelevant in the new circumstances. The goal of the society was formulated in the first article as follows: "The goal of the society is complete independence of the Arab countries in all its legal and political senses. Support for this independence would bring the Arab nation into the ranks of living nations." To this was added Article 13: "The first duty of the society is to strengthen Arab consciousness within all strata of the Arab nation." The second article of the new constitution established that: "The society will remain secret for the present, in the light of the general political situation." In this spirit it was decided that every member of the society should be given a fictitious name or have a number assigned to him and that the society should have a password to be changed when necessary (Arts. 55-56). However, despite the decision in principle to continue the secrecy of the society, it was already not the same compact and secret society that it was before the war. Circumstances had changed, and with them also the methods of operation. Article 11 made clear that: "The society will invest efforts to lead the government according to its political line of action." The society held that it had the

SYRIA AND AL-FATAT

13

right also to criticize the government and to call for strikes where the government's policy was not in accord with the principles of the society (Art. 61). Since its remaining secret made it difficult to achieve this goal, the society decided in Article 17: " T h e society shall have a broad, open political party, by means of which it shall direct the general elections and apply its policy." This article was put into action within a short while with the establishment of the Independence Party, Hizb al-Istiqlal (see Chapter 2 for a wider discussion of this party), which was the external and public organ of the society. The person responsible for the party on behalf of the society was its central committee member, Tawfiq al-Natur. The society also decided that any member who belonged to another society must reveal the other society's secrets and also do his best to sway that society towards the goals of al-Fatat (Arts. 3e and 60). Following the expansion in the ranks of the society at this time its leaders decided to divide the members into three groups, according to the date of their joining: those who had joined it before the war, those who had joined it during the war, and those who joined it after the war (Art. 4). The society's central committee was empowered to decide on the promotion of members from one status to a higher one, for various reasons (Art. 24). Eventually, therefore, the members of the society were actually divided into two groups: those who had joined before or during the war, and who were called "the founders" (al-mu'assisun), and those who joined after the war and were called "the regulars" (al-'adiyun). Society members Muhibb alDin al-Khatib and Muhammad al-Shurayqi were later given the task of making a complete register of the members who had joined the society from its founding until the end of the war. The "founders" had the right to know all the members of the society, while the "regulars" would receive society decisions and instructions by messengers in order to maintain some of its former secrecy. They would hold monthly meetings to discuss current affairs, and they also had the right (according to Art. 27) to express, by a two-thirds vote, a lack of confidence in the central committee. Furthermore, the seven members of the central committee, including the secretary-general and the treasurer, could be chosen only from among the "founders" (Arts. 7-8 and 36). The society's central committee was a powerful body, as will be shown below, and according to the constitution (Art. 18) had "the authority to enter into negotiations when necessary, in the name of the society, with representatives of the Powers or the government of the country". The members of the first central

14

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

committee after the capture of Damascus were: Yasin alHashimi, Shukri al-Quwwatli, Rustum Haydar, 'Izzat Darwaza, Rafiq al-Tamimi, Tawfiq al-Natur and Ahmad Qadri. Rafiq alTamimi was elected secretary-general of the society and Tawfiq al-Natur its treasurer. Since Rafiq al-Tamimi went on a mission for the Arab government to Beirut and Rustum Haydar went to Paris as a member of the Arab delegation to the peace conference, it was decided in May 1919 to replace them with Sa'id Haydar and Ahmad Muraywid. Then 'Izzat Darwaza was appointed secretary-general and Shukri al-Quwwatli treasurer. A dominant personality who was not included in this period as a member of the central committee was 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi. He was occupied with senior administrative duties and, in addition, at this time political differences of opinion began to appear between him and the other leaders of the society. These differences were to strain relations between them, as will be described below. Structurally the society was divided into three levels: the general centre in Damascus headed by the central committee, centres in places where there were more than ten society members, and branches in towns where there were more than six members. Some of the branches were affiliated directly to the general centre and some to the local centres. All the local centres and branches were subordinate to the central committee (Arts. 6 and 31-33). From the start of the renewed activity of the society it was decided to set up a branch in Istanbul. Furthermore, society member Bashir al-Qassar was sent to Egypt to establish a branch there, his cover function being commercial representative of the Arab government of Damascus. All this activity required money. The financing of the society came from contributions of its members (several of whom were quite wealthy), from commercial firms established by its members, and from public fund-raising of various kinds such as lotteries (Art. 63). Funds were also provided by Amir Faysal, mainly for the spread of propaganda and the acquisition of supporters, and these were transferred to the society usually through Ahmad Qadri or Yasin al-Hashimi. In accordance with Article 16 of its constitution the society set up a ramified intelligence system the purpose of which was to uncover any activity that would harm the prospects of independence for the country, and it was also supported handsomely by the government. Special sums were allocated for its activity in Beirut and the other areas occupied by the French, and for its activity in Palestine and Egypt.3

SYRIA AND AL-FATAT

15

The society welcomed men of stature who could keep a secret. They had to be intellectuals or men with "experience in life", and not less than 25 years of age (Arts. 3a and 3c). This could be explained by the new range of ages in the society: the young students at the eve of the war were now in their late twenties. However, the society was not satisfied with these criteria. It decided to relax the entry requirements and reached the conclusion that anyone qualified for high office in the state would be suitable for acceptance into the society. In fact, the society wanted all new appointees to government positions to be members. Therefore, when it learned that a certain person was going to be appointed to such a position, the members of the central committee immediately approached him, swore him to allegiance and took him into the society. The result, of course, was that the number of members increased and the membership came to include many men in positions of authority, although not all of the new members were unreservedly loyal to it. Some of the Syrian officers who had previously been members of al-'Ahd also joined.4 A numerical check of the "activists"5 of the society reveals that the number of those joining the society before and during the war reached 115. Of these 13 were hanged by the Ottomans, while three died of other causes. During the 22 months of the existence of FaysaTs state the remaining 99 were joined by 70 more, to produce a total of 169 activists.6 As mentioned above, many government officials in FaysaTs Syria were members of al-Fatat. At the beginning of FaysaTs regime members of the society held the following senior positions: 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi — military governor and in fact head of the temporary government; 'Adil Arslan — assistant to the military governor; Rashid Tali' — mudir (minister) of the interior; Yasin al-Hashimi — chief of the general staff; Muhammad 'Ali al-Tamimi — mudir (director) of the Damascus police; 'Ala' al-Din al-Durubi — wali of Damascus; Shukri al-Quwwatli — secretary to the wali of Damascus; Jalal Zuhdi — president of the Court of Appeal; Ibrahim Hashim — prosecutor-general in the Court of Appeal; Ja'far al-'Askari — governor of Salt and later governor of Aleppo; Jamil al-Ulshi — the Arab government representative in Beirut. Many of those in FaysaTs entourage were members of the society, and in fact Faysal himself was a member, having joined it in 1915. All this caused the historian Amin Sa'id, who was a journalist in Damascus during FaysaTs regime, to remark about the central committee of al-Fatat that: "This committee in effect ruled the government, and its position with respect to it was like the position of the Committee of

16

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Union and Progress with respect to the Turkish government. Nothing would be carried out except according to its instruction and will." This power of the society and the numerous offices held by its members created bitterness towards it in many circles, especially among notables who did not gain such positions and envied the society members who in effect took over the new state.7 In early May 1919 Faysal returned to Damascus from his first visit to Europe (see Chapter 5). In the same period it became known that an international commission of enquiry was to come to Syria on behalf of the League of Nations (eventually only King and Crane came) in order to determine the aspirations and desires of its inhabitants concerning their future. On the initiative of al-Fatat and its Independence Party it was decided to convene a general congress which would represent all parts of Syria and would be able to formulate a unified position before the commission of enquiry. Due to the imminent arrival of the commission the elections to the congress were conducted hastily. Since there was not enough time to arrange for proper general elections, it was decided that the electors from the Ottoman period who were still alive would be the voters. (These electors, who earlier had elected the Syrian representatives to the Ottoman parliament, had at the time been chosen in the ratio of one for every 500 males eligible to vote.) This election procedure stirred up resentment in various circles, with people claiming that the electors from the Ottoman period did not justly represent current public opinion in Syria. During the elections themselves pressures were exerted by various groups, mainly by the diverse political societies that existed at the time, and — as noted by a British observer — "bribery and intimidation by the Arab Independence Party under the aegis of the Arab Administration in Damascus having played their part". It should also be pointed out that not all members of the congress were to be elected; in addition there were tribal chiefs, representatives of religious communities and representatives of Palestine, who were especially invited by Faysal to participate. The congress was to number 85 elected members and 35 invited ones, 120 in all. A compilation from various sources of the names of the members of the congress yields over 130 names, and it seems that there was a certain changing around among them. Of these, 35 were members of al-Fatat (just over one-quarter). However, it is important to note that the number of actual participants was much smaller. For example, the

SYRIA AND AL-FATAT

17

election of the ten representatives of Beirut to the congress was held on 2 July, when the King-Crane commission had already arrived in Syria. Furthermore, even after they were elected the French authorities did not allow them to go to Damascus, just as they did not permit any of the other representatives of the western region that was under their occupation. Only those western region representatives who were in Damascus prior to this were able to participate in the congress. In the same way most of the Palestine representatives were prevented from attending, and only those who had already been staying in Damascus were able to take part. The result was that at the time the King-Crane commission arrived in Damascus only 69 representatives were actually participating, and it appears that the percentage of al-Fatat members among these was even higher than the figures of nominal membership given above would lead one to expect. Heading the congress were to be Muhammad Fawzi al-'Azm as president with 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf as vicepresident. However, they were known to have been in the past, undoubtedly pro-Ottoman, and therefore they were not considered the most suitable persons to preside over the elected body of the new Syrian state. And indeed, as early as at the preliminary session of the congress, a quarrel broke out between them and the nationalist circles, and they were forced to resign. When the first official session of the Syrian Congress was held on 3 June 1919, in the building of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, al-Fatat member Hashim al-Atasi was elected its president.8 On 10 June the King-Crane commission arrived in Jaffa and began to receive local delegations for the purpose of hearing their views concerning the desired future of the region. From statements by the members of the commission the local people learned that the peace conference was of the opinion that a mandatory power should be appointed over Syria. In view of the expected arrival of the commission in Syria the nationalist circles decided that another body must be set up that would fight ideas of this kind. It was decided that an additional congress should be established, alongside the Syrian Congress, to be called the "Congress of the Societies", in which would participate two representatives from each of the parties, societies, and associations that existed in Syria at that time. Participating in this congress were representatives of the Independence Party, the Syrian Union Party, al-'Ahd al-Suri, al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, al-Nahda alFilastiniyya, and many other societies, more than 20 in all. AlFatat member Jamil Mardam was chosen as president. On the agenda of the first session, on 30 June, were five items: " 1 . the

18

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

absolute independence of Syria, without any aegis or mandate whatsoever . . . 2. maintenance of the integrity of Syria . . . 3. a protest against Article 22 [of the League of Nations Covenant, which determined that the Arab provinces that had been liberated from the Ottoman Empire would be placed under a Type A mandate, under which the mandatory power would advise and assist them until they could handle their own affairs] . . . 4. prevention of Zionist immigration to Palestine . . . 5. a demand for the independence of Iraq." In the end, the single substantive action taken by this congress was the sending of a joint petition from all societies that had participated, addressed to Faysal, President Wilson, Lloyd George, the president of the peace conference and to many others (including the members of the commission of enquiry) in which they protested against the statements of the commission concerning a mandate over Syria and declared that they would not be satisfied with anything less than complete independence.9 Opinions in Damascus on the eve of the arrival of the commission were divided, with some demanding absolute independence — members of al-Fatat, al-Nadi al-'Arabi (see Chapter 4); others demanding independence under British aegis — among them Faysal and many government officials; those demanding independence under American aegis; and a minority demanding independence under French aegis (mainly from the al-Jaza'iri family). The first group commenced a propaganda campaign in which it rejected any course other than absolute independence, and denounced those who suggested the other possibilities, Faysal among them. Placards with wording such as "We Demand Absolute Independence" in English and Arabic were displayed in the streets. The second group did not sit idle, and the military governor, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, distributed among all officials of the Arab government a letter setting out guidelines on what to say to the commission of enquiry. The commission arrived in Damascus on 25 June. Damascus was immediately inundated with leaflets which were headed "Independence or Death" and in which Syrians were called upon to rescue their fatherland from the hands of the "two colonizers" (France and Britain). They also recommended that the Syrians make the following demands: "(a) Total independence for all of Syria and for all the Arab countries including Iraq, (b) To oppose any aegis or mandate and to protest forcefully against Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, (c) Complete unity of all of Syria, (d) If experts should be needed, we will acquire their assistance with our own money." On 2 July the

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19

Syrian Congress met to establish a uniform Syrian stand before the commission. The discussions of the congress were summarized in ten resolutions, which were to a certain extent a compromise among the various viewpoints: 1. We demand immediate complete political independence for Syria without protection or tutelage . . . 3. . . . We protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development who stand in need of a mandatory power. 4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest. . . desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American nation is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no policital ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economical assistance from the U.S.A., provided that such assistance does not impair the complete political independence and unity of the country .. . 5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country . . . 6. We do not accept any right claimed by the French Government, in whatever part of our Syrian country and refuse to accept any assistance from her at any time. The resolutions also demanded that Syria become a constitutional monarchy based on broad decentralization and that the king be Faysal (Resolution 2); that the Jews not be allowed to establish a national home "in the southern part of Syria known as Palestine", and that Jewish immigration be forbidden (Resolution 7); that Palestine and the western coast, including the Lebanon, should not be separated from Syria and that its absolute unity be assured (Resolution 8); that Iraq should be granted absolute independence (Resolution 9); annulment of all the secret agreements concerning Syria that were signed by the Allies during the war (Resolution 10). On 3 July a congress delegation consisting of 15 representatives (of whom seven were members of al-Fatat) appeared before the commission and presented the list of resolutions. In a "confidential" appendix that the commission attached to its report on its tour in the Levant — and which was intended for the eyes of the Americans alone — it was pointed out that: "In OETA East there were evidences of considerable pressure exerted by the Government to secure the union of all elements upon one program." Nevertheless, and apparently considering the existing circumstances, the commission declared in its official report that

20

THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

the list of resolutions of the Syrian Congress was "the most substantial document presented to the Commission". The conclusions of the commission and its recommendations bore a considerable resemblance to the resolutions of the Syrian Congress.10 The military governor, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, functioned in effect during these months as a temporary prime minister of internal Syria. On 4 August 1919 Faysal decided to validate this "government" by turning it into a body called the "Council of Directors" (Majlis al-Mudirin) of Syria. This was an additional step towards turning the government of OETA East into a real government, which would be able to deal with political matters, too, and not just administrative ones. This Council of Directors (three of whose seven members were members of al-Fatat) was soon to confront a most serious political crisis, which signalled the approaching end of Faysal's state. On 15 September 1919, Britain and France reached an agreement ("purely temporary and provisional") on the evacuation of the British forces stationed in Syria and Cilicia. According to this agreement the French were to take over the British holdings in Cilicia and the Syrian coast, at the time that the British holdings in internal Syria were to be turned over to the Arab government. The British forces were thus supposed to remain only in Palestine and Iraq. The complex of reasons that caused the British to agree to this is not within the scope of this study, but it is clear that the application of this agreement was to a great extent a step towards the realization of the Sykes-Picot agreement concerning the partition of the Levant between Britain and France. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the British forces exposed the Arabs in Syria to the growing military power of the French in the western region. Faysal was at that time at the beginning of his second visit to Europe (see Chapter 5), with his younger brother Zayd deputizing as Syrian head of state. When the above agreement became known in Syria an atmosphere of unrest and anxiety began to prevail, and the hostility towards the French began to turn to hostility against Europeans in general. The British, who until then had been considered allies, began to be perceived by the Syrians as an unreliable and even a treacherous factor. Armed anti-European demonstrations became a daily occurrence in Damascus. Chief of the General Staff Yasin al-Hashimi announced that he could not accept responsibility for maintaining public order if the British forces did withdraw. The impression was received that this withdrawal would bring in its wake

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21

an unpreventable clash between the Arabs and the French. Zayd began sending anxious telegrams to his brother, in which he dissociated himself from any responsibility for what might happen.11 In late October the Syrian Congress met for a special session to discuss the situation. Muhammad al-Shurayqi, a veteran of al-Fatat, rose and said that it was the duty of the congress to establish a national force that would defend the rights of the people. This motion was seconded by another congress member, Sa'id Tali' (also a member of al-Fatat). At this point al-Shurayqi began an impassioned speech in which he called upon the Syrians to follow the example of D'Annunzio in Fiume in order thereby to impose their view on the peace conference. (He was apparently hinting that the Syrians must conquer the western region from the hands of the French, just as a month earlier D'Annunzio had conquered Fiume on the Adriatic coast, leading a force of irregulars, in order to "annex" it to Italy.) He also called upon the Syrians to imitate the national movement in Egypt and the movement of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. Several days later a manifesto was distributed in the streets of Damascus under the heading ' T h e First Call". Albeit anonymous, its contents were amazingly reminiscent of al-Shurayqi's speech, and thus it would appear to have been the work of al-Fatat. The manifesto warned the "Arab Nation" that "the Colonising Powers wish to enslave the Arabs, to violate their women, to rob their money, to destroy their religion and to annihilate the Arab Nation". It called upon its readers to defend Syria just as Saladin had done against the Crusaders in his time. It summoned them to imitate the resistance movement in Egypt (against the British), the struggle for independence in Morocco (against the French), the Turkish independence movement, D'Annunzio who acted contrary to the decisions of the peace conference and in disregard of the will of the Powers, and if not them then at least the Jews who were then demanding Palestine for themselves and desired "to found a kingdom from nothing". The manifesto summed up by saying that when the call was heard "God is Great, the country is in danger", it would be the obligation of the nation to comply with it.12 The British evacuation began on 1 November and was completed on the 26th. Meanwhile clashes between French forces in the western region and Arab forces had already begun. The central committee of al-Fatat decided that there should be a compulsory mobilization, and with the Committee for National Defence (see Chapter 3) began to despatch armed bands to

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

harass the French on the western border of Syria. These bands were encouraged and secretly equipped, with arms and money, by elements in the Arab government of Damascus. During December clashes occurred between the French and the Arabs in Tall Kalakh, west of Horns, where a French liaison officer was killed and the French forces sent to restore order were defeated. (Among the band leaders in this region were al-Fatat member Salim 'Abd al-Rahman and Sheikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar.) Clashes occurred also near Kuneitra and Marj 'Ayun (led by alFatat members Amir Mahmud al-Fa'ur and Ahmad Muraywid), in the suburbs of Tyre and Sidon, in the region of Lake Hula, and in Rashaya and Hasbaya (activities in the latter region were led by Sa'id 'Ammun, son of the justice mudir Iskandar 'Ammun). However, the most serious incident occurred in the Biqa' region, on the border between OETA East and OETA West. In this region clashes took place between the French and bands organized by the central committee of al-Fatat with the assistance of the Haydar family from Ba'albek. The French liaison officer was forced to leave Ba'albek after repeated threats on his life and, in response, French forces conquered the town several days later. The headquarters of 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, the military governor of the Biqa' on behalf of the Arab government, was at that time in al-Mu'allaqa, and he had 300 soldiers at his disposal. Following combined British-French pressure (and also anxious instructions sent by Faysal from Europe), he was forced to send his soldiers to Rayaq, and immediately thereafter his house was surrounded by French troops armed with machine guns and he himself was forced to evacuate to Rayaq. Further instructions from Damascus compelled him to remove his forces also from Rayaq, and then his headquarters was attacked by 250 armed civilians sent by the French. In the end he was forced to leave the region altogether, which remained from then on in French hands. In northern Syria, too, armed bands began to harass the French, in the Aleppo region led by Ibrahim Hananu and in the Alexandretta region by Subhi Barakat (both members of al-Fatat), but these revolts reached their full scale only at a later period, during 1920.13 The head of the "Council of Directors" (that is, the prime minister), 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, was not pleased by all these events. He maintained that the Syrian army and the General Security Service (al-Amn al-'Amm) should not be involved in any way in the incidents, and this in order to prove that the government in OETA East was capable of maintaining order there. At most he was prepared secretly to support the bands, and even

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this unwillingly, because he was not, in his own words, "such a fool as to attempt to fight all Europe". He received no backing from Zayd. Zayd, aged 21, was certainly not the appropriate man to fill Faysal's place in this period. Gertrude Bell, then visiting Syria, said about him: "His eager ambition is to go to college at Oxford . . . [he is] half ashamed to recognize how much relieved he would be to exchange his very grave cares and his very simple military state for the irresponsible amusements and the unparaded comfort of the Oxford undergraduate." During November reports arriving from Europe that Faysal was about to reach an agreement with the French were added to this delicate situation. The result was that in mid-November al-Rikabi's house was surrounded by armed men, and three of their leaders entered and told him: We have no confidence in you and your work, we have no more hopes of the success of the Sheriff. As you are one of the first men of the Sheriff we instruct you to resign. Tell your Lord that we shall never consent to any strange government and that we want to be free people.

Al-Rikabi did not resign at this stage, but his days in power were numbered. He tried to persuade his comrades in al-Fatat to cancel their decision to announce compulsory military service and start an armed struggle against the French, threatening to resign if his view was not accepted. He tried to explain to them that the great disparity between the military forces of the French and those of the Arabs would lead to disaster. (Al-Fatat member Ahmad Qadri explained later that al-Rikabi was "a military man and an administrator, who was used to checking out the results before going into action".) Among the al-Fatat members there were differences of opinion. Some supported a balanced and practical policy, while the others called for action to achieve complete independence regardless of the results. In the end the supporters of armed struggle and compulsory military service won, despite al-Rikabi's threatened resignation. They claimed that any other decision would amount to abandoning the bands that had already began a revolt. On 10 December al-Rikabi tendered his resignation to Zayd. In his reasons for resigning he pointed out that "the men of al-Fatat and the Istiqlalis [members of the Independence Party] have no standing and represent only themselves. The fatherland does not interest them nor its defence. All that interests them are the aims concealed in their hearts, and they are probably against the Amirate in principle."

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

He announced that he could no longer bear the responsibility for a situation in which "an irresponsible government rules a responsible government". And he added: "I believe that when a government follows the desires of irresponsible people and parties it and the fatherland with it are doomed to destruction." Zayd asked him to retract his resignation, and to this al-Rikabi responded that a further reason for his resignation was the fact that Zayd had not given him any backing. Al-Rikabi's resignation did not calm the situation. On the contrary, he was accused of being a francophile. On 12 December demonstrations were held in Damascus against both Faysal and Zayd, and cries such as "Down with Amir Faysal" were heard. The two brothers were accused of selling the country to its enemies. Zayd was impelled to ask the Druze leader Salim al-Atrash to send a guard of Druze horsemen to protect him. The horsemen arrived on the 14th of the month, and on the same day the position of head of the Council of Directors was given to 'Abd al-Hamid al-Qaltaqji (also a member of al-Fatat). The latter, who was not at all interested in the position, resigned the same morning, and in his place was appointed Mustafa Ni'ma (also a member of al-Fatat). Concurrently appointed to the post of chief of the general staff was Yusuf al-'Azma (in place of Yasin al-Hashimi, who had been arrested by the British before they left Syria — see Chapter 6), a member of al-Fatat identified with the extremist line. On 21 December the Council of Directors decided to pass the law introducing a six months' period of compulsory conscription for all aged between 20 and 40.14 In January 1920 Faysal returned to Syria. When he took stock of the situation he decided to re-establish his authority, and on 25 January he appointed a new Council of Directors with Zayd as its head. Al-Rikabi was returned to the government in the new post of war minister. In order to strengthen the power of the new government Faysal abolished all the posts of military governor except those of Aleppo and Dayr al-Zur. Even though one might think that Faysal would carry out personnel changes in order to replace extremist elements in the government with more moderate ones to his liking, nevertheless, in the end, all members of the new government, except two, were members of al-Fatat. The new appointments to posts of Mutasarrifs of Horns and Hama were from among the members of al-Fatat. On the day of his appointment as head of the Council of Directors Zayd wrote in his diary: "I was appointed governor [that is,

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prime minister] of the eastern region." And he added: "The situation is disturbed. Opinions are confused. Each day there is a new tune. Personal interests. Egotistical aims. No one thinks of the future of the country before he considers his own personal interest, except for a few from among the educated youth." 15 It was in this situation that Faysal had to confront the most decisive political challenge he was to face during his attempts to preserve the existence of the Syrian state. Towards the end of his second visit to Europe Faysal initialled in Paris the draft of a provisional agreement with Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, in which he agreed in effect to a French mandate over Syria under certain conditions. According to this agreement: 1. France undertook to assist the Syrian nation and to guarantee its independence within borders to be determined by the peace conference. 2. Faysal undertook to request from France alone the advisers, instructors, and technical officials required for Syria and its army. These advisers and experts would derive their authority from the French government, and they would participate in preparing the budget and in administering the railways. France would assist in the organization of the Syrian gendarmerie, police, and army, and it would have priority over all other foreign investors in all local economic enterprises. 3. France would administer the foreign affairs of Syria (Syrian representatives were to be posted in the French foreign ministry and in a number of French embassies). 4. Faysal would recognize the independence of the Lebanon under the aegis of France. 5. The Druzes of the Hawran would be organized as a separate unit, in the framework of the Syrian state. 6. Syria would be able to assist the Hijaz, in coordination with France. 7. The Arabic language would be the official language in administration and education in Syria. The French language would be a required language in the schools. 8. Damascus would be the capital of the Syrian state. A French high commissioner would reside in Aleppo as "the representative of the Mandatory Power". It was also agreed that the agreement would remain secret until its final signing, which would take place when Faysal next returned to France. When Faysal returned to Syria, he took with him the draft of the agreement, with the intention of persuading the Syrian people to accept it. Faysal was convinced that by this agreement he had performed a great service to ensure the existence of the Syrian state, and he only intended to stay in Syria for a short time, in order to receive authorization to sign it, and then to return to Europe. Yet he was well aware of the difficulties that would arise

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

in persuading the Syrians to agree to the conditions of the agreement, which he himself described as "distasteful", but also one that he had no choice but to assent to after he had been abandoned by the British. Faysal then opened a propaganda campaign to justify his position. In a speech given in al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Damascus he said: "I have not ceased to be the man whom you have imagined for yourselves . . . I love my fatherland and I have worked on its behalf. I have a single goal, and that is to see my country independent . . . I have no fear of the power of the government nor of the power of the societies. I fear history and the future." In an address that he gave when reviewing the Syrian army he said: "I said before and I repeat now that independence is taken, not given."16 But in order to receive the authorization he needed he had to convince another factor — the central committee of al-Fatat. Among those accompanying Faysal on his second visit to Europe was a member of the central committee of al-Fatat, Ahmad Qadri. Qadri despatched reports to the members of the central committee in Damascus on the progress of negotiations with the French and urged them to oppose the agreement that was taking shape. When Faysal and his retinue returned to Syria, Qadri brought to the committee a copy of the FaysalClemenceau agreement and organized strong opposition to it. The members of al-Fatat, and following them the members of the Independence Party, were of the opinion that the agreement should be rejected and independence declared unilaterally. Faysal, who wanted to persuade the central committee to accept his position, initiated a meeting with the seven members of the committee in Qadri's house. Participating in the meeting were Qadri, Shukri al-Quwwatli, Ahmad Muraywid, Sa'id Haydar, Tawfiq al-Natur, 'Izzat Darwaza, and Rafiq al-Tamimi, who was restored to the committee after the arrest of Yasin al-Hashimi. Faysal tried to explain to them that the terms of the agreement were the best that it was possible to achieve. But the committee persisted in its opposition to it. At that point Faysal warned that the import of their opposition was a declaration of war against France. To this the committee members answered that they were prepared to declare war against France and Britain together, but they would not accept an agreement that would reduce Syria to the status of Tunisia and Morocco. Faysal decided to change his tactics, and the next day he called in the committee members one by one, in order to persuade them individually. The result was the same. Even before the above meeting there were those who advised

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27

Faysal to remove the extremists from the ranks of al-Fatat. Now al-Rikabi advised Faysal to discharge the central committee and replace it with another. Faysal agreed, and a session was held in al-Rikabi's house with the participation of some 50 "founding" members, under the presidency of Zayd and in the presence of the members of the central committee. At this session Faysal severely criticized the committee and the other speakers accused it of damaging the interests of the state and demanded its resignation. (It is interesting that among the speakers were some who claimed that the committee was not sufficiently "nationalist".) At the end of the speeches al-Tamimi rose and announced in the name of the committee members their resignation: "We have done what we could do; now try by yourselves." A vote was held for a new committee and elected were 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, Nasib al-Bakri, Sa'id Haydar, Khalid al-Hakim, As'ad al-Hakim, Muhammad al-Shurayqi, and Jamil Mardam. Al-Shurayqi was chosen as secretary-general and Mardam as treasurer. (The previous treasurer, Shukri al-Quwwatli, at first refused to transfer to him the funds of the society, amounting to 16,000 Egyptian pounds, but eventually consented.) However, if Faysal thought that this committee would confirm the agreement, he was mistaken. The new committee rejected it also, claiming that it was camouflaged imperialism; though to preserve Faysal's honour it did not publicize this opposition. Faysal was forced to accept the view of the society, thus verifying the assessment of another al-Fatat member in that period, Rashid Rida, that the power of the society over Faysal was stronger than his power over the society. A short while later Faysal was already heard to say to a sheikh from Transjordan that "the agreement that I concluded with the French was only temporary. They are fools if they believe me. You can be sure that I would never allow any single foothold in Palestine or Syria to belong to a Christian government."17 With this crisis al-Fatat reached the peak of its power, compelling Faysal to reject the agreement with Clemenceau. However, with this perhaps the last real opportunity for Faysal to come to terms with the French was missed. For the long range the fate of Syria was determined. Faysal did not return to France again. Within a short time he was compelled to see the complete break in Syrian-French relations. Under pressure from al-Fatat and the Independence Party he was forced to convene the Syrian Congress to discuss the possibility of a declaration of independence. The basic idea in

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

the nationalist circles was that it was necessary to present Europe with a "fait accompli". One of Husayn's men later told a British officer that Faysal had sent a letter to his father in which he said that: "the people of Syria were determined to bring matters to a head and had forced the Congress on him against his own opinion which was that it would be better to wait". In any case, on 6 March 1920 the first meeting of the congress session was held in the building of al-Nadi al-'Arabi with Hashim alAtasi presiding and in the presence of Faysal, who also gave an address. Kamil al-Qassab, speaking in the name of the Committee for National Defence, called for the congress to declare a parliamentary, constitutional, and decentralized regime in Syria, under Faysal. A committee of nine members was set up to formulate a draft resolution on the matter. The next day, 7 March, the Syrian Congress decided to declare the absolute independence of Syria "in its natural boundaries", including Palestine. To the Lebanese the congress promised to honour their national aspirations and to preserve the independent administration of Mount Lebanon within its prewar boundaries. Faysal was elected the constitutional monarch of Syria with the title King Faysal I. The congress also decided to abolish the military governments in the three parts of Syria (the eastern, western, and southern), and to replace them with a single representative civilian government, which would be subordinate to this congress until a permanent Syrian parliament should be established. The regions of the new Syrian state would be administered by the method of administrative decentralization. To these resolutions the congress attached another which called for the granting of absolute independence to Iraq and for the creation of a political and economic union between the two states. On 8 March at 3 pm Faysal arrived at the Damascus city hall, and from the balcony of the building the secretary of the congress, 'Izzat Darwaza, declared the independence of Syria and the enthronement of Faysal as the king of the United Syrian Kingdom (Syria, the Lebanon, and Palestine). Britain and France were requested to vacate the south (that is, Palestine) and west (that is, the Lebanon) of Syria. On the same day Faysal sent a telegram to Field Marshal Allenby in which he informed him of the declaration of independence and of his enthronement as king. The reaction of Britain and France was immediate. Allenby was instructed to inform Faysal in the name of the two governments that they regarded the resolutions passed by the Syrian Congress "as null and void".18

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29

In accordance with the resolutions of the congress a new government was established on 9 March, this time with the official title of government, headed by 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi. All the members of the government, except two, were members of alFatat, yet the identity of the prime minister and the assigning of the office of war minister to 'Abd al-Hamid al-Qaltaqji gave the government a quite moderate image. Immediately after the establishment of the government al-Rikabi and the deputy foreign minister, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, sent a long letter to the British foreign minister in which they detailed the circumstances that had led to Syria's declaration of independence and the future lines of action of the new government. In addition to the general statements in regard to assuring Syria's independence and preserving public order and the rights of minorities, this declaration of intentions included a special emphasis on the desire of the government to maintain good relations with Britain and France, and to safeguard their economic interests in the country in particular and the overall peace in the Middle East in general. Indeed, the al-Rikabi government was accused by the leaders of the nationalist bands of neglecting them and of ceasing to supply them with equipment and money. Al-Rikabi's answer was that he had no faith in this method of operation, and besides that he had no weaponry beyond what was needed for the army and he was not prepared to waste it on arming the bands.19 At the San Remo conference, 24-26 April 1920, it was decided to place Syria and Lebanon under a French mandate and Iraq and Palestine under a British one. These decisions caused great anger in Syria, and were quite a heavy blow to the hopes of the Syrian nationalists. When the decisions became known in Syria (along with the rumours that Faysal was about to return to Europe), strikes and violent demonstrations began in Damascus, demanding that the government commence immediate preparations to defend the independence of Syria against France. It was claimed that al-Rikabi was too moderate and that he was not preparing Syria for the struggle with the French. It was also charged against him that his government was allowing the French to transport war material to Cilicia by the Syrian railway, and thus in effect assisting the French to fight the Turkish rebels. Al-Rikabi, on the other hand, was of the opinion that it was beyond Syria's ability to cope with France. The congress began attacking the government, summoning it to explain its plans with respect to the current situation and informing it that the congress was not satisfied with its explanations. The Independence Party also expressed its dissatisfaction with the

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government, and in the end the "founding" members of al-Fatat met in al-Rikabi's home, attacked him harshly and demanded his resignation. Faysal himself, who had apparently before this been subjected to pressures as a result of internal disputes stirred up by al-Rikabi in al-Fatat, was now compelled to ask him to resign. On 3 May 1920 al-Rikabi resigned, ostensibly for reasons of health. On the very same day the task of forming the new government was assigned to the president of the Syrian Congress, Hashim al-Atasi (a member of al-Fatat). His place as president of the congress from then on was taken by Rashid Rida (also a member of al-Fatat). All the members of the new government, except two, were members of al-Fatat. However, its extremist image was created mainly by War Minister Yusuf al-'Azma and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, both considered to be representatives of the extreme anti-French nationalist line. The future policy lines of the government were detailed by al-Shahbandar before the Syrian Congress and included the defence of the absolute independence of Syria, the demand for its unity in its natural boundaries, and opposition to any foreign intervention which would harm the national sovereignty of Syria. Al-Shahbandar ended his speech by saying, "The strength and courage of the people are the best guarantee for the defence of justice."20 During this period, which saw the peak of al-Fatat's power, in which it in effect dictated the course of the Syrian state, there also began its disintegration. The main cause was the political differences of opinion concerning the path that the state should take, with the society divided in effect into two main streams: those identified with the aggressive nationalist line and led by past members of the central committee who had been deposed at the beginning of the year, and those considered more moderate, like al-Rikabi and a number of other members of the new central committee. 'Izzat Darwaza, one of the prominent members of al-Fatat during this period, relates that the disputes were also caused by the very strength of the society and the desire of government officials to weaken it and thereby remove its yoke from their shoulders. The internal confrontations sometimes took on a personal tone, and the society could no longer impose its view on government officials who were members of it but did not obey its decisions. There were even those who openly withdrew from the society. Even the status of "the founders" declined, and in effect the society had no central authority — no leader — who could unite it. During this period and in the

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31

course of the following years the members of the society held key positions in the Arab world, but in the framework of the society no one succeeded in reaching the position of sole leader. Darwaza points out that the fact that al-Fatat included many non-Syrians (Palestinians and Iraqis) was exploited for criticism by various sectors which at the time felt themselves ousted from power and began propaganda with a local Syrian hue. It seems also that the influence of the society's bands was weakened during this period which saw the end of the Syrian state, and in Rashaya, for example, men of the bands were attacked by a united force of local Christians and Druzes, who killed many of them and turned the rest over to the French. Only in northern Syria did the bands continue to hold the upper hand (mainly under the leadership of Hananu and Barakat), and the French garrisons there were compelled to confine themselves in their camps. The deteriorating condition of al-Fatat found clear expression in mid-June, when 40 of its members met in the home of Ahmad Qadri, and in a discussion headed by Rashid Rida dealt with means to repair the situation. It was agreed among those present that the special status of "the founders" should be abolished and that an administrative council of 30 or more members should be elected from among the whole society. This council would then elect, from within, a new central committee of seven members. In another meeting in Qadri's home, presided over by Rida, it was decided that the members who agreed to this proposal should sign a petition to be delivered to the present central committee, and in which they would demand that it convene all the members within a week for a comprehensive discussion on this question. Should the committee not do this then the signatories, in their authority as the majority, would themselves convene the meeting.21 This crisis had no end because of the rapid events that began to unfold in Syria during the following days, events which in any case brought to an end both the state and the society. In early July Faysal sent Nuri al-Sa'id to General Gouraud, the French high commissioner in Beirut, with a request that France recognize the independence of Syria and his kingship. Gouraud answered in the negative and also protested against the hostile attitude of the Damascus government towards the French. Al-Sa'id also asked, in the name of Faysal, for a promise that Gouraud did not intend to invade the interior of Syria. Concerning his answer to al-Sa'id Gouraud reported to the French

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premier as follows: "I gave him a dilatory response in order to gain time." And he added: "It will not be before 20 July that I will be able to employ the column of nine battalions with which I intend to occupy Rayaq and from there to menace Damascus, while a detachment of the same size will occupy Aleppo." Indeed, for some months the French had been increasing their military power in the coastal region at an accelerated pace, with the intention of applying their mandatory right to all of Syria. On 14 July Gouraud sent his famous ultimatum to Faysal, in which he informed him that his forces would take over Syria by force unless the Arab government accepted the French mandate without any reservations, abolished the compulsory conscription and reduced the size of the army, delivered to the French the railway from Rayaq to Aleppo, and punished the band leaders harassing them. The final date for accepting the ultimatum was set for 20 July at midnight (a time which, as mentioned, was convenient for Gouraud from the military standpoint). The terms of the ultimatum were approved ex post facto by the French premier.22 When the ultimatum became known in Damascus stormy debates began on how to react to it. Most of the al-Fatat members held that they should oppose the French at any price and prepare for war. Their view was also held by members of the Independence Party and many of the Syrian Congress. Faysal himself sent Nuri al-Sa'id and 'Adil Arslan on an urgent mission to Haifa to consult with Allenby on how to deal with the ultimatum. Allenby on his part turned to the British Foreign Office, and the foreign minister's answer was: "I am afraid it is impossible for us to interfere", in view of the fact that Syria had been placed under a French mandate at the San Remo conference. In the circumstances, Allenby recommended Faysal to agree to the ultimatum. It was now clear that Syria was standing alone against France. On 16 July Faysal asked Yasin al-Hashimi (who two months earlier had been released from his detention by the British) to take upon himself the post of chief of the general staff. AlHashimi refused on the grounds that the Syrian army did not have the strength to withstand a French attack and that, in fact, the ammunition dumps were empty. These statements by alHashimi brought about an emergency meeting of the government, in which they were vigorously denied by War Minister Yusuf al-'Azma, who claimed that al-Hashimi's statements were made only because of his envy for al-'Azma and the fact that his status in the army had become secondary. Al-'Azma

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33

recommended fighting the French and announced that as war minister he would accept all responsibility for it. As a result of this discord between the two military men Faysal convened the entire Syrian staff and demanded a clear assessment of the army's preparedness for battle. The officers were divided in their opinions, and Faysal asked them for a uniform and decisive answer in writing. The officers and Yasin al-Hashimi left for consultation, in the course of which al-Hashimi made it clear to his colleagues that even if it were possible to halt the French on the Damascus front — and even that did not stand a chance — what would the Arabs do if the French division stationed near Aleppo were sent against them? Some of the officers said to him: "But the question is one of honour, O Pasha." To that alHashimi answered: "Honour is a matter for ministers, not soldiers." After a quarter of an hour the consultation ended. The reply of the officers to Faysal was that the army could hold out for several hours in the case of a non-serious battle and for five minutes in the case of a serious one. At this point Faysal decided to form a new government to be headed by a military man. He offered the post to 'Ali Rida alRikabi, but the latter refused, saying that the young extremists were the ones who had brought about the deterioration of the situation and now they themselves should assume power and bear responsibility for what they had caused. Faysal then decided that Yasin al-Hashimi was the strong personality suited to put together a government, and he asked him to do this. Al-Hashimi hesitated. At first he said that he would agree if the French liaison officers in Damascus would undertake not to interfere in the affairs of internal Syria and waive their demand that the band members be turned over to them. But in the end he, too, refused, saying: "The hole is too big to be patched, and the time has passed." He recommended submitting to the ultimatum. (There are those who are of the opinion that because of al-Hashimi's refusal to help Faysal in this difficult situation, Faysal later refrained from appointing him prime minister in Iraq, except for one time in 1924, following British intervention.) On 18 July the congress convened for an extraordinary session to discuss the situation. On 19 July it announced that if the government were to sign any document whatsoever that was contrary to the resolution of the congress concerning the independence of Syria, the congress would consider it an unlawful government. On 20 July at 9 am Prime Minister Hashim alAtashi and War Minister Yusuf al-'Azma entered the congress building. Al-Atashi announced the suspension of the sessions of

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

congress for a period of two months. Several of the delegates tried to oppose this, but al-'Azma informed them forcefully that they had to leave the building. Faysal decided to submit to the ultimatum.23 On 20 July at 5:50 pm, Faysal handed to Cousse, the French liaison officer in Damascus, a special memorandum in which he announced his acceptance of Gouraud's ultimatum (that is, more than six hours before the ultimatum deadline). The memorandum should have been cabled immediately to Gouraud, but Gouraud received it only on 21 July at 8:00 am. The question as to why the telegram was delayed has become one of the most controversial questions in the story of the end of Faysal's state. There were those who advanced the supposition that the delay was intentional on the part of the French in order that the acceptance of the ultimatum should not arrive in time and thus the French would have the pretext to march on Damascus. A careful reading of the documents of the French war ministry, however, shows clearly that this was not so and that the French had no hand — at least not intentionally — in delaying the cable. It was also claimed that the director-general of the Damascus post office, Hasan al-Hakim, intentionally delayed the telegram until the French had crossed the border. Hasan al-Hakim was indeed a member of al-Fatat, but it would be beyond the bounds of sense to suppose that he tried to push the disintegrating Syrian army (see Chapter 6) into battle against the French by delaying the telegram. Indeed, al-Hakim was put on trial following accusations made against him concerning this, and he was acquitted. The exact chain of events that emerges from a study of the Arab, French, and British sources is as follows: Cousse passed on Faysal's memorandum to the Damascus post office at 7:30 pm. The Damascus telegraph clerks tried to wire it via the Damascus-Beirut telegraph line, but after a half an hour they concluded that the line was severed. (The line had been cut at Zabadani in the Anti-Lebanon, apparently by bedouins or bands.) At that point the clerks tried to send the telegram via the Damascus-Nabak-Homs-the Biqa'-Beirut line (quite a considerable circuit in order to bypass the break in the line). After much difficulty they managed to get through to the al-Mu'allaqa station in the Biqa' (which was in French hands). It was already close to midnight, the time when the ultimatum would expire. They asked the clerk on duty in al-Mu'allaqa to continue the transmission of the telegram to Gouraud. He refused, saying that a French officer had sent through him a telegram from Gouraud

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35

to Cousse and that now he had to wait for Cousse's reply, which should arrive soon. Therefore, he had to keep the line free. (The question remains as to whether the telegram that he was waiting for was the very one accepting the ultimatum, which was supposed to have been sent direct from Damascus but for the cut in the line at Zabadani.) There are those who say that had Faysal's memorandum been sent to Beirut by car it would have arrived in time. In any case, the telegram did not reach its destination in time, and on the morning of 21 July the French forces under the command of General Goybet began to advance and conquered Majdal 'Anjar, northwest of Damascus, about half-way between Beirut and Damascus. When the telegram reached Gouraud, he informed Faysal that "the total acceptance [of the ultimatum] has arrived too late, the troops are already en route and cannot be stopped, and they will continue to Damascus". On this the French premier cabled Gouraud: "I have looked at your [above] telegram with satisfaction, and I ask you to continue to form your line of action in the spirit of my instructions."24 As soon as he had decided to accept the ultimatum Faysal gave instructions to demobilize the army, following the conditions of the ultimatum. The demobilization took place amid disorder and looting of arms and ammunition, and even riots (which will be discussed later). On 21 July the government instructed the governor of Aleppo to discharge the units of the Syrian army stationed there, and the next day the city was captured by the French. In the meantime it became clear in Damascus that the French forces were continuing to move in the direction of the city even though the ultimatum had been accepted. In an atmosphere of dread, an accelerated mobilization of soldiers and civilian volunteers began in order to halt the French. The al-Atasi government submitted its resignation, but Faysal asked it to continue to function. At the same time Faysal sent Education Minister Sati' al-Husri and Jamil al-Ulshi to Gouraud in order to persuade him to halt the French troops. On 22 July Gouraud informed Faysal's delegates that he would agree to stop the advance of the French army if Faysal would accept a new ultimatum, the essence of which was, in effect, unconditional surrender. To this Faysal replied in a telegram the next day: "We do not want war. But acceptance of your last note will certainly expose us to a civil war, with everyone of the government, and I myself personally, exposed to danger." Faysal also sent a telegram to Allenby in which he informed him of his inability to accept the conditions of

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Gouraud's new ultimatum, and said that, in his opinion, Gouraud was not at all interested in reaching an understanding, but only in conquering Damascus. Indeed, Faysal's refusal to comply with the new ultimatum, together with an attack made the day before by Arab soldiers on a French force in Tall Kalakh, gave the French the final pretext for continuing their advance to Damascus. On 23 July, in the morning, the al-Atasi government held its last session. It was clear that there was no chance that the French would stop, and it was decided to go to war. The government then gave instructions to the soldiers and the population to rush to the front, and many of them did so with considerable enthusiasm. At the same time Faysal sent a telegram to Allenby in which he informed him that the Syrian nation "is rushing from all quarters without order or discipline to meet French at gates of Damascus"; the responsibility for the anarchy that was about to occur would fall on the shoulders of the attacking army. Then Faysal asked him to do his best, with the Allied governments, "to prevent this human butchery".25 The "human butchery" was not prevented, and details of the battle at Maysalun on 24 July 1920, between the Arabs and the French, will be described later in the discussion of the Syrian army. On 25 July at 5:00 pm French troops entered Damascus without meeting the slightest resistance. Gouraud received a congratulatory telegram from the French premier on his success in putting an end to FaysaTs "intrigues", making it possible for France to apply its mandate over Syria. Immediately after the entry of the French a mass exodus began of members of the societies and the various political parties, with many fleeing southwards in the direction of Palestine by means of the Hijazi railway. There were also, however, many Syrian politicians who decided to stay, several of whom were to become mainstays of the new Syrian administration and government under the French mandate. Faysal himself left Damascus after the defeat at Maysalun for the village of Kiswa, to the south of city, hoping that if he remained close to the centre of events he would still be able to salvage something from the situation. He sent Nuri al-Sa'id to 'Aleyh to confer with Gouraud, and 'Adil Arslan to Haifa to contact Allenby. During the night of 26 July he even ventured to return to Damascus, but there he received an unequivocal order to leave Syria within 48 hours. On 28 July at 5:00 am Faysal left Damascus for the last time. Then the French began a hunt for the Syrian nationalists,

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37

military men and civilians, but their haul was quite meagre. Most of them managed to escape from Syria or to go underground until the danger was past. On the other hand, a large number of Iraqi officers, over 150, fell into French hands, and they were concentrated in a detention camp on the island of Irwad, opposite the coast of Tartus. These men were in no hurry to escape from Syria, for, to a certain extent, they had nowhere to escape to (as will be explained later). Meanwhile, the French issued an order instructing all natives of Palestine and Iraq to leave Damascus. On 9 August the military court of the French 3rd Division pronounced a death sentence in absentia against a long list of prominent Syrian nationalists and the confiscation of their property. More than half were members of al-Fatat. The death sentences were not carried out because, as mentioned, the activists succeeded in escaping to Transjordan, Palestine, and Egypt. An appeal by the French to the British to hand these people over to them was refused, on the grounds that it was a case of "political offenders" who were seeking asylum in another country.26 On 25 July a new government was formed, headed by 'Ala' al-Din al-Durubi. It was composed of men considered proFrench (or who had become such with the change of circumstances). The basic idea behind the setting up of this government was the attempt to mediate through it between Faysal and the French. But the next morning, at the first meeting of the members of this government with General Goybet, they informed him that they accepted all his conditions, and expressed their sincere desire to cooperate faithfully with the French. The government in effect became a puppet of the French, and on 7 August its prime minister held a reception with many notables at the Damascus railway station for General Gouraud, who was arriving in the city. It is interesting to note that some of the ministers in this government were former members of al-Fatat (though all of them except one had joined it only after the war) who were now changing their attitude in the light of the new circumstances. Thus, for example, the newspaper al-Ahram reported of the new war minister, Jamil al-Ulshi (who had been an al-Fatat member), that he had refused to allow the remnants of Faysal's retinue even to be provided with petrol when they left Damascus. However, the al-Durubi government did not last long. On 20 August the prime minister and two other ministers set out by rail for Dar'a in order to calm the population of the Hawran, where there had been much unrest since the expulsion of Faysal.

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When their train reached Khirbat al-Ghazala station, it was attacked by 200 angry locals, who robbed it and opened fire on its passengers. Al-Durubi and the minister 'Abd al-Rahman alYusuf attempted to escape in the direction of the station buildings. The attackers pursued them, murdered al-Durubi and then beat al-Yusuf and shot him dead, too. A French officer escorting them was also killed, and the number of dead amounted to 12. The French reacted by sending a punitive force to raze three villages close to the scene of the incident. By September, at the head of what was now called the "State of Damascus", there was a new governor, Haqqi al-'Azm, the longtime supporter of the French (whose actions during the period prior to this are recounted in Chapter 5).27 With the collapse of Faysal's state also came the end of alFatat (and it seems that this event was exploited by some to make personal gains at the expense of the society's treasury). The central committee of the society convened with an incomplete membership in Cairo, but without results. A group of members who had fled to Transjordan decided to renew the society's activities there. They elected their own central committee and began to hold meetings and to pass resolutions for the members in the same form as had existed in Damascus. The society operated in the region of Amman, and it was mainly Palestinians and Transjordanians who took part in it. This attempt to revive the society was short-lived and of narrow scope. Most of the veteran members did not participate, and in fact, they did not even know about this final attempt to reactivate the society. According to Rashid Rida (who had remained in Syria), it was al-Fatat's activists who invited Amir 'Abdallah to Transjordan in order to turn this region into the centre of their activity. 'Abdallah arrived in Amman in November 1920 and called for the officers who had served in the Syrian army to join him. The intention was to plan a military action against the French in Syria, but, according to 'Abdallah's testimony, most of these officers informed him that they would agree to join him only if the Hijazi government would guarantee their pension rights, should the operation fail. Al-Fatat member Nabih al-'Azma suggested to 'Abdallah that he should set up an intelligence and propaganda network throughout Syria at a cost of 120,000 Egyptian pounds, but 'Abdallah did not have the necessary funds to carry it out. Apparently, the last spasm of activity for the society occurred in June 1921, when former member Ahmad Muraywid planned to assassinate General Gouraud. Gouraud was then on a visit to Kuneitra, accompanied by Haqqi al-'Azm,

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and Muraywid sent from his place of exile in Irbid a group of five horsemen to eliminate him. Gouraud survived the attack unscathed, but his driver was killed and Haqqi al-'Azm was wounded by three bullets.28 Some of the remnants of al-Fatat who refused to come to terms with French rule in Syria continued to operate within the framework of the Independence Party. With this came the end of 11 years of al-Fatat's existence, a society established secretly in Paris by a small number of Arab students and which had become with the evolution of events the moving force behind Faysal's Syrian state. FAYSAL'S STATUS IN SYRIA

In the accepted literature, Syria between the years 1918 and 1920 is perceived as the state of Amir, and later King, Faysal. These books have titles such as Suriyya wal-'Ahd al-Faysali (Syria and the Faysali Period). It has already been shown above that the moving force behind Faysal's state was in reality the secret society al-Fatat. It reached the point that Faysal would hardly issue an order without consulting its members, who held most of the senior positions of power. Not for nothing was this society defined by contemporary observers — Arab as well as foreign — and also by later writers as the Arab equivalent of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, which was the true ruling power in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire. What remain to be examined are the relationships between Faysal and this society and the other political bodies which operated in Syria during this period, and what was the status of Faysal among the Syrian population in general in the course of the 22 months of his rule. Amir Michel Lutf Allah, the president of the Syrian Union Party, in a conversation with a British officer defined the leaders of the society as "'Camarilla' surrounding Feisal" and added: These men really controlled all appointments in the administration, sought to keep away from the councils of the Emir the leaders of all other parties, and if they could not do that at least endeavoured to discredit their subordinates as being in French pay etc. . . . The Camarilla moreover really controlled public opinion and the press through the Committee of the Arab Independence party, men of straw, who served as their tools.

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Captain William Yale, an American expert in Eastern affairs who assisted the King-Crane commission, wrote about Faysal: "he is a useful instrument of the Young Arab Party in aiding them to secure their aims . . . Should the Emir fail to satisfy the Young Arab Party they would dispense with him . . . Emir Feisal is not a strong personality, he has not enough power to influence the country to make his ideas prevail . . . " Society member Rashid Rida described this succinctly with his statement that the power of the society over Faysal was stronger than the power of Faysal over the society. Damascene scholar Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, whose relations with al-Fatat were not of the best because of his collaboration with Jamal Pasha during the war, described the regime in Damascus during this period as being based on "brainless bandits, most of them boastful political greenhorns who above all looked out for themselves".29 It appears that the long absences of Faysal from Syria (over five months during his first visit to Europe and four months during his second) led to the strengthening of local political societies. His first trip to Europe was accompanied by great hopes for political achievements at the peace conference, leading to independence for Syria. Mark Sykes wrote then: "If Feisal returns to Syria empty handed I anticipate worst consequences." Faysal did not in fact return from Europe with any extraordinary achievements, but, on the other hand, it seemed to the Syrians that he had represented them properly at the peace conference, and likewise their hopes were pinned on the results of the expected visit of the international commission of enquiry. Faysal's situation at this stage was good. When he gave an address in Damascus immediately after his return from Europe, he asked for the nation's confidence. In response, the Druze leader Nasib al-Atrash rose and announced in the name of the Druze tribes their readiness to offer themselves for Faysal. Muhammad Fawzi al-'Azm (one of the conservative Damascus notables) defined himself as a warranty in Faysal's hands. 'Umar al-Atasi from Horns pronounced that all the residents of Horns were prepared to sacrifice their lives for him. Rida al-Sulh from Beirut pledged him the support of the Arab nation; and his son, Riyad al-Sulh, declared that he intended to enlist as a simple soldier in Faysal's army.30 This situation was about to change rapidly. The first sign of this appeared during the visit of the King-Crane commission in Syria. Faysal was in favour of independence under the aegis of Britain, and some believe that he even hoped to reach the status of an independent dominion within the framework of the British

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Empire. When he expressed these views publicly, he was sharply attacked by the advocates of absolute independence. The Independence Party and al-Nadi al-'Arabi began to organize protest demonstrations in the streets, in which he was described as "a traitor to the fatherland", "a sell-out to the British", and "bribed". It became necessary to station machine guns in the streets to maintain order. In the army, too, there were those who expressed bitter feeling towards Faysal, and four officers (among them the veteran officer Shukri al-Ayyubi) were required to resign after they called him a coward and accused him of selling out the country to the British. When the Syrian delegations presented themselves to the commission, there were those who demanded absolute independence for Syria not only without the British and without the French, but also without Faysal. In the end, in order to restore his popularity Faysal was compelled to deliver an impassioned public address in which he demanded absolute independence for Syria with no mandate.31 The serious deterioration in his position began at the time of his second journey to Europe. Immediately after his departure from Syria it became known that Britain and France had reached a temporary agreement on the evacuation of British forces from Syria, and this agreement was perceived by the Syrians as their abandonment by Britain to the French. When reports began to filter from Europe that Faysal was about to reach an understanding with the French, this was too much. Concurrent with the development of anti-European feelings there began to develop also anti-Sharifite sentiments in Damascus. The secretary-general of al-Fatat, 'Izzat Darwaza, published an article in which he expressed his frustration in the face of the ominous telegrams coming from Europe regarding the fate of Syria, and he asked: "Can it be Emir Feisal whom we have heard both here and in Europe declare: ' T h e Arabs will not permit their country to be divided nor share their interests with another who will be in a position to ruin their independence and their unity'?" And he warned: "The quietness which you see amongst the people is the quietness of hope. If hope be lost, this quietness will change." The feeling then was that if indeed it was true that Faysal had reached an agreement with the French, he would be accused of selling out the country. And it was possible that in such a situation the Islamic factions would awaken and make the accusation that, in its activity against the Turks during the war, the Sharifite family had already betrayed Islam in favour of the British. Typical of the views expressed at this time was a speech made by the congress member from Nablus, Ibrahim

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al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi, in which he said: "It is clear that Emir Feisal cannot be our king for he is on too friendly terms with the Christians and the Zionists; he flatters them for private interests . . . the Government must be in the hands of the people themselves." Zayd, Faysal's deputy during this delicate period, asked that Husayn return him to Mecca. The request was denied, and Zayd had to contend with a situation that was beyond his capabilities. Already in November there had been pressure on the head of the "Council of Directors", 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, to resign from his post, among other reasons because "we have no more hopes of the success of the Sheriff". By December the situation had further deteriorated, to the point of demonstrations against Zayd and Faysal together, and their being accused of selling out the country. Cries began to be heard of the type, "Down with Amir Faysal", and Zayd was forced to ask Druze leader Salim alAtrash to send Druze horsemen to protect him. When al-Rikabi tendered his resignation, Zayd hesitated to accept it until there appeared before him representatives of al-Nadi al-'Arabi who demanded that he either accept the resignation or resign himself. Another delegation of nationalists asked him if he was planning to join the nationalist movement or not. If his answer was negative it would be desirable, in the opinion of the Syrians, that he withdraw from affairs of state. Zayd's answer was positive.32 FaysaTs troubles did not only stem from the internal situation in Syria. When his father, Husayn, learned of the agreement that was taking shape between Faysal and the French, he immediately sent him a telegram saying that he would not agree to any accord that would affect the right of Arab countries to absolute independence. (Faysal was considered officially to be Husayn's representative at the peace conference.) Husayn took care to make this telegran known to the press. He sent a similar telegram to Zayd in which he asked him to reiterate these words to Faysal when the latter returned from Europe. On reconsideration, Husayn sent Zayd another telegram in which he said: "Inform all the Syrians of your parts that I will not approve any article, which Feisal may accept, encroaching on the rights of the country." The perplexed Zayd sent a reply to Husayn in which he said that Faysal had not signed any agreement whatsoever with the French. When Faysal returned to Syria he tried to explain himself to his father, claiming that whatever he had done had been in accordance with Husayn's instructions, and trying to convince him that "Unity and independence are the objects of all of us". But in the current difficult situation, in which the

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United States had withdrawn and Britain and France had reached a mutual agreement that annulled all their obligations to the Arabs, it was necessary to adjust to these developments if one did not want to confront the two Powers together: "My political plan is the same as yours, but peaceful." Allenby, who read all the correspondence that passed between Husayn and his sons after the Arab Bureau in Cairo had deciphered it for him, commented dryly on this: "Signs of friction and mutual distrust between King Hussein and Emir Feisal have been observed recently . . ."33 When Faysal returned to Syria he became aware of the intensity of the hostility towards him that had developed during his absence. He was accused of treason to the Arab cause, of weakness and of selling out the freedom of the Arabs to the French. The feeling was that if it was confirmed that he had reached an agreement with the French, he would be replaced. The atmosphere at the reception that was held for him on his return to Damascus was cold. In Aleppo the situation was even worse, and it was reported that attempts would be made on his life should he appear in the city. The prevailing mood in Aleppo was of a Syrian desire to be rid of all foreigners, including Faysal and his Hijazis and Iraqis. In an attempt to restore his prestige and authority he gave an address in the building of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in which he said: "I have not ceased to be the man whom you have imagined for yourselves . . . I love my fatherland and I have worked on its behalf. I have a single goal, and that is to see my country independent." He told his listeners that he was not afraid of the power of the societies and asked them to stop criticizing the government and demanding changes in personnel: "The Government is chosen by the man whom the nation has appointed — myself. The Government is temporary and military, but at present I am responsible and I will allow none to interfere." These were strong words, and they were followed by a change of government three days later. One of Faysal's intimates was then quoted as saying: "What we need now is a new Jamal Pasha, an Arab Jamal Pasha, who will hang, kill, and destroy anyone who dares to go any other way but the one chosen by the government."34 Faysal did not succeed in imposing on Syria a policy of conciliation with the French, nor did he succeed in persuading the nationalist circles to accept the agreement which he had initialled with Clemenceau. The failure of all his attempts to persuade the central committee of al-Fatat to accept the conditions of the agreement have already been described in detail. Even after a

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new central committee was elected its members persisted in opposing the agreement. Without the assent of the society Faysal could not receive authorization from the Syrian people to sign the agreement, and he was compelled to abandon it, in spite of his awareness of the gravity of the matter. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar relates that even after he had arrived in Iraq Faysal was still bemoaning the fate of this agreement. Although he had backed down from the agreement the nationalist circles continued to keep an eye on Faysal. When the impression was received that he intended to renew negotiations with the French, the Independence Party and the Committee for National Defence sent him warning letters. On 16 February 1920 a meeting was held between Faysal and representatives of these two bodies, with the participation of Zayd. They demanded that Faysal should not enter into negotiations except on the basis of the independence and unity of Syria. He was required to not cooperate with foreign powers and to adopt his father's attitude of opposing any pact which impaired the right of the Arab countries to complete and absolute independence. The conversation was conducted in a tense atmosphere, with Faysal alternately threatening to return to the Hijaz or to fight his opponents. Zayd wrote in his diary about this meeting as follows: "After a long argument the amir [Faysal] threatened them in an extraordinary manner and on his face were recognized signs of anger." In the end they reached a measure of understanding, and Faysal informed them that he would not open negotiations without prior coordination with them. Zayd summed up: "I am of the opinion that the quarrels are not over, and in this way they will never be over. This is the path we are taking." Faysal reported afterwards to Allenby that the "political situation in Damascus is very difficult" for him, and the British then concluded that Faysal was "rapidly losing power and control in face of extremist party". 35 The Syrian nationalists were not the only ones curtailing Faysal's activities. The status of the Iraqi officers in Faysal's Syria and the role of the al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi society will be discussed in another chapter. In any case, the fact that over a long period of time the Iraqi officers had been in control of the Syrian army gave them a power that Faysal found it difficult to oppose. The leader of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was Yasin al-Hashimi, who was also chief of the general staff of the Syrian army. This dual role put in his hands very great power in Syria, until in November 1919 it was reported that his influence was greater than that of Faysal and that most of the army and the people were following in his

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footsteps. The British were of the opinion that al-Hashimi was the vital spirit in directing the anti-Sharifite feelings in Syria, and they suspected him and his society of having plans to depose Faysal. Their apprehension that al-Hashimi was planning a coup against Faysal ("whose views he considered too moderate") was one of the reasons for their arresting him when they left Syria. It was reported of the mu'tamad (the official representative) of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus, Muhammad Jamil Lutfi alZubaydi, that he was a sworn opponent of Faysal and at the same time had influence in government circles. The officers of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi complicated Faysal's relations with the British time and again, as will be detailed later on. In late March 1920, in the framework of a plan to invade Iraq from the direction of the town of Dayr al-Zur, they demanded money and arms from Faysal and also that he should place Zayd at their head. Faysal tried to evade this with the claim that it would complicate matters with the British, but the officers persisted and in the end he was compelled to give them 5,000 Egyptian pounds. As against this, he instructed Zayd not to go to Dayr al-Zur and advised him "not to have anything to do with [the] Mesopotamian party". The Iraqi officers in Dayr al-Zur explicitly declared that they did not accept orders from Faysal. And when Faysal arrived in Aleppo and tried to persuade 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi to stop the military preparations in Dayr al-Zur because the British were threatening him with punishment, alAyyubi answered that they were determined to continue with their plans, though they would endeavour not to involve the Syrian government in it.36 In contrast to what might be thought, the coronation of Faysal as king of Syria symbolized nothing but his weakness. From the beginning he tried to persuade the nationalist circles not to convene the Syrian Congress and declare independence. His view was that it was preferable to wait for events to evolve. He also consulted on this subject with the British, who warned him not to take any unauthorized action without the approval of the Allied governments. However, it soon became clear that Faysal could not stand up to the nationalist demands to declare the independence of Syria and to accept for himself the position of Syria's king. He understood that if he refused they would express no confidence in him and he would lose his position as ruler of Syria. And as one of Husayn's men in Cairo commented: "Feisal found public opinion too strong for him and the Syrians had told him that if he did not accede to their demands to convene the Congress and accept the crown, they would find some

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other person for the job." After he was crowned King of Syria his relations worsened not only with the French and the British but also with Husayn. Husayn saw in the "comic opera" of the coronation a certain damage to his own position, since he considered himself "King of the Arab Countries". 37 Faysal believed that after the declaration of independence the congress would be dispersed and a committee would be formed to draw up a constitution for the state. The members of the Independence Party thought otherwise. They decided that the congress would continue to function until a permanent parliament was established to replace it, and that it would be the congress that would write the constitution. At this stage a sharp controversy between the congress and Faysal developed. According to the declaration of independence resolution, the government that would be formed in Syria was to be subordinate to the congress until a parliament should be established. Consequently the congress decided that the government had to present its political programme to the congress for approval and a vote of confidence. The designated prime minister, 'Ali Rida alRikabi, reported this to Faysal, who became angry and announced that the congress had exceeded its authority and that he, Faysal, did not agree that the government would be subordinate to the congress, "most of whose members are inexperienced youngsters, mindless, and of no importance". The congress persisted in its opinion and Faysal persisted in his. Congress member Rashid Rida was sent to mediate between the two sides. To him Faysal claimed that since the congress was not a parliament it did not have the authority to require the government to request its confidence. Rida answered him that this congress stood at a higher level than a parliament. Faysal replied that he had created the congress and that he was not prepared to grant it such authority. Rida answered: "No! The congress created you. Before that, you were only a commander on behalf of Allenby, the supreme commander of the British army, and it was the congress that made you King of Syria." And, in addition to this, the congress met in the name of the nation, which had the supreme authority according to the Islamic shari'a. Furthermore, at the same time that the congress decided to make Faysal king it also decided on subordinating the government to it. Rida also explained to him that if there was already — in the first moment after the declaration of independence — dissension between the congress and the government, they would become a byword, and it would be proof that the Syrians were not qualified for independence. In conclusion, Rida calmed Faysal by saying that in

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any case "most of the members of the congress are of our party [meaning the Independence Party], and the members of the government are also of our party", so there was nothing to worry about. The argument ended with Faysal consenting to permit 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi to present the government programme before the congress, and it received a vote of confidence.38 Faysal's position continued to deteriorate further after he was crowned king. A report on Damascus from an Arab source stated that: "The Arab beduin shaikhs say that they are the rulers, the people of Damascus say that they are the rulers and the Sharif [Faysal] says that he is Amir. None of them has any authority. . . . There is no Government in Syria. Every one is afraid of everyone else." At that time the French were rushing additional military reinforcements to Beirut for the decisive confrontation, and Faysal was accused in proclamations distributed in the streets of Damascus of not having taken any steps to prevent this. The situation was aggravated after the French authorities in Beirut lowered the Syrian flag which was flying over the building of the Arab agency there. Concurrently Gouraud hinted that if he wanted to he could destroy Damascus within two weeks. A delegation headed by Amir Mahmud al-Fa'ur and Ahmad Muraywid came to Faysal and told him that the nation could no longer suffer the contempt that the French were showing it, and therefore if Faysal wanted to keep his position "he must give up peaceful policy with France and give the tribes a free hand". Amir al-Fa'ur expressed his confidence in his ability to conquer Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon, if only he were supplied with the necessary officers.39 When Gouraud's ultimatum arrived, a delegation from the Independence Party, headed by Rashid Rida, came to Faysal, and demanded that he replace the al-Atasi government with one more suited to the new conditions, preferably one headed by Yasin al-Hashimi. Faysal answered them rudely, saying that he would not act according to the opinion of any society or party and not even according to the opinion of the congress. Relates Rida: "I gave him an answer harder and ruder than his answer." Then there also came to Faysal a delegation from the Committee for National Defence, headed by Kamil al-Qassab, and they, too, demanded that he remove the al-Atasi government. AlQassab threatened Faysal, Faysal ordered him to be arrested, and thereafter riots broke out in Damascus (to be reviewed in detail in the Chapter 3). With the decision to accept the ultimatum one began to hear calls to kill Faysal the traitor, and among those saying this were some members of congress. Faysal was

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forced to station Hijazi soldiers to guard his residence. The situation was the eve of a civil war (as Faysal himself described it), and the lives of Faysal and the members of the government were in danger. The perception of the foreign diplomats in Syria was that the "overthrow of Feisal by anti-foreign extremists is declared probable". War Minister Yusuf al-'Azma raised the fear that if the army did not act strictly according to the will of Faysal, then Faysal "will flee to the foreigners". Among several of the members of the Independence Party, on the other hand, there emerged the idea of declaring a dictatorship headed by al-'Azma. The battle of Maysalun on 24 July 1920 turned all these dissensions into history.40 A week later the British civil commissioner in Baghdad suggested that the British government offer Faysal the amirate of Iraq, thereby re-establishing Britain's position in the eyes of the Arab world and erasing the accusation that Britain had abandoned Faysal and the Arabs. The reason he gave for Faysal's suitability for this office is quite interesting: "Feisal alone of all Arabian potentates has any idea of [the] practical difficulties of running a civilised government on Arab lines. . . . He realises [the] danger of relying on an Arab army."41

Chapter 2 POLITICAL PARTIES IN FAYSAL'S SYRIA THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Article 17 of al-Fatat's constitution stated: "The society shall have a broad, open political party, by means of which it shall direct the general elections and apply its policy." As early as December 1918 a manifesto was printed in Damascus which included the basic principles on which this party was later based. The manifesto called for its readers to understand that: "you are Arabs before you are Muslims, before you are Christians, and before you are Jews. The land is your land and the fatherland is your fatherland, and you must join together to defend its independence." It called for the Arabs to be proud of their Arabness just as the Saxons were proud of their Saxon-ness and the French of their Frenchness, and to strive to establish an undivided Syria, which along with its having internal independence would be bound with the other Arab countries. At the end of the manifesto the authors detailed what they called the "Arab Independence Programme" (barnamaj al~istiqlal al-'arabi), which the Arabs were demanding from the Allies and from the peace conference: 1. In the liberated Arab countries there will be established constitutional governments with internal independence, above which shall be a general constitutional government headed by the king. 2. The joint constitution (which shall guarantee the rights of all the communities in their various faiths), and the general ties that shall exist between the governments, shall be established by a general parliament chosen in proportional elections from all the liberated Arab countries, and which shall convene in Damascus, the capital of the kingdom. 3. The interests of states with economic relations with the country shall be honoured, and Great Britain, the friend of the Arabs, shall enjoy a priority in this respect.1

On 5 February 1919 al-Fatat founded the "Arab Independence Party" (Hizb al-lstiqlal al-'Arabi) as the public and

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external organ of the society. An administrative committee, subordinate to and guided by the central committee of al-Fatat, was elected. The members of the first administrative committee of the Independence Party were: Sa'id Haydar, As'ad Daghir, 'Izzat Darwaza, Zaki al-Tamimi, Fawzi al-Bakri, 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, and Fa'iz al-Shihabi. All except Daghir and al-'Azm were also members of al-Fatat, and Darwaza was also a member of the first central committee of the society. Another member of the central committee of al-Fatat, Tawfiq al-Natur, was responsible for coordinating the actions of the party and the society. The gates of the party were opened to the general public, and thus many were able to enter, even those considered unsuitable for the secret society, al-Fatat. Joining the party involved registration, candidacy, taking an oath, and payment of a fee. All the members of al-Fatat (including Faysal and Zayd) joined it, and also notables and people from other strata of society, old and young, civilians and officers, Syrians and also Iraqis. According to As'ad Daghir the number of party members reached 75,000, and this was the number submitted by the party delegation to the King-Crane commission. However, it seems that this number was greatly exaggerated, and Nabih al-'Azma, who was responsible for registering members, related that the number of active members did not exceed 2,500, to which 20,000 supporters should be added. In any case, the fact that this party was the largest in Syria, and that behind it stood al-Fatat, made it the most influential open political body in the eastern region, and its influence went beyond the boundaries of internal Syria. The party dominated public opinion and the press, and it was also represented by its own newspaper, al-Mufid, owned by Yusuf Haydar and Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli. Also Ma'ruf al-Arna'ut, the owner of the newspaper al-Istiqlal al-'Arabi, was connected to the party. Copies of this newspaper were sold for a nominal price, and in fact, hundreds of free copies were distributed every day in Damascus. The goal of the Independence Party was to bring about the independence of the Arab countries and their liberation from all foreign influence. It can be said that this was a pan-Arab party, as it strove for Arab unity and the establishment of a quasi panArab empire, which would include all the Arab countries joined in a federative union. In March-April 1919 the party distributed its platform throughout Syria on a form on the top of which were written the five basic principles of the party while the lower part was for the signatures of its supporters. The basic

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principles were: 1.The liberated Arab countries, united around the same political principle, shall enjoy absolute independence. 2. Constitutional governments shall be instituted in the liberated Arab countries and shall enjoy internal independence. 3. These governments shall be subordinate to a supreme parliamentary government in matters concerning their superior interests. 4. Civil laws, constitutional and federative, which shall guarantee the rights of the various religious communities according to their traditions, and which shall apply to all local governments, shall be elaborated by a general council whose seat shall be Damascus, the capital of the realm, and which shall be formed of delegates of all the governments in equal numbers. 5. For the good of the country and for its development, the general government shall be assisted by specialists from the most advanced nations in the civilized world.2 Members of the Independence Party were among those who initiated the establishment of the Syrian Congress before the arrival of the international commission of enquiry. During the elections to the congress the party members employed "bribery and intimidation", according to a contemporary observer, and it should not be a surprise that eventually a considerable number of congress members were from the party. The party members were also intensively involved in propaganda preceding the coming of the commission. They demanded the independence of Syria, and in accordance with their ideology they also demanded the independence of Iraq. (The raising of this demand by the party was the result also of a request addressed to it by al-'Ahd al-Iraqi — see below.) When they learned that Faysal was in favour of British aegis, they raised a public outcry and staged demonstrations in the streets. The party also sent a protest to Allenby and the American consul about the behaviour of the French, which was in contradiction of the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 concerning the liberty of the local population to elect their own future government. The party accused France of granting large sums of money to men lacking in morality who would testify on its behalf before the commission of enquiry. According to the party the French authorities were using force to prevent any anti-French people appearing before the commission. For this purpose they even stationed guards with machine guns on the roads leading out of the western region. The French forged signatures on their behalf and did their best to prove that the Syrians were not capable of

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governing themselves. The party protested against this "barbarism" by France and expressed the hope that it would be terminated. When the King-Crane commission arrived, a party delegation appeared before it which included Tawfiq al-Natur (secretarygeneral of the party at the time), Sa'id Tali' and As'ad Daghir. The demands made by the delegation were: 1. The granting of absolute political independence to Syria and the establishment of a democratic and independent civil government. 2. That Syria would not be divided in any way, and its natural boundaries would be preserved from the Taurus in the north to Rafah and Aqaba in the south and from the Syrian desert in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. 3. The absolute rejection of French aid and intervention in Syria. 4. The banning of Zionist immigration to southern Syria — "Palestine". 5. That no part of Syria should be severed, since this would harm its political and economic interests. 6. A protest against Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant concerning the subjugation of Syria to a mandatory power. The Syrians were prepared to accept technical and economic assistance from the United States, on condition that such assistance did not impair the independence of the state.3 Preservation of Syria's unity and opposition to France were the principal characteristics of Independence Party activity during the following months. In August the party sent a letter to Georges Clemenceau, in his capacity as president of the Paris peace conference, in which it protested against the declarations of the Maronite patriarch, then visiting Paris, concerning the need to separate the Lebanon from Syria. According to the party, the patriarch had no right to claim that he represented the Lebanese. In November the party secretary-general, Sa'id Haydar, sent letters to the foreign ministers of Britain and France protesting in the name of the party against the temporary agreement of September between Britain and France. The party saw this agreement as injuring the unity of the Arab countries and especially the unity of Syria and as a preparatory step towards their imperialistic occupation in the future. It pointed out that this agreement was contrary to the promises of the Allies to the Arabs, to the resolutions of the peace conference, and to the declarations by President Wilson concerning the rights of nations to self-determination in absolute freedom. Therefore, "the Arab Independence Party places on the shoulders of the Allies and the peace conference, and before history and coming generations, the responsibility for the strife that is bound to result from the

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deprival of the holy rights of the Arabs, and it calls upon them to recognize the independence of the Arabs and their unity". The party also kept a close watch on the behaviour of Faysal in this matter. In February 1920, after it seemed to the party that he was planning to renew his negotiations with France, it sent him a warning letter. Later a delegation of its representatives met with him for a tense discussion, at the end of which Faysal was compelled to promise that he would not enter any negotiations without prior consultation with them. 4 The Independence Party was also among those who obliged Faysal to convene the Syrian Congress in order to discuss the declaration of independence. On the eve of the declaration the party members were meeting every night to discuss the subject of independence and the form of the state after the declaration. They discussed the status of the future Syrian government and the status of the congress, and decided that the congress would continue to exist after the declaration and would be charged with the task of writing the constitution for the new state. The party saw to the summoning of the congress delegates for a debate on the declaration of independence, and when it found out that the representatives from Beirut were refraining from coming to Damascus, party member Rashid Rida was sent there to persuade them to come. An interesting episode, which testifies to the strength of the party to remove people from Syria, occurred in connection with Fu'ad al-Khatib, who had once been editor of the newspaper of the Arab revolt, al-Qibla. Party members suspected that he would betray their plans for independence to the British (accusations were also made against him that he had persuaded Husayn to agree to the Sykes-Picot agreement), and therefore, according to Rida, "we decided to send Fu'ad alKhatib to Mecca, because he could not cause more damage there than he could cause here". Al-Khatib indeed was compelled to leave Syria.5 Towards the end of the existence of the Syrian state there began to be rifts and splits within the Independence Party, parallel to the disintegration that had begun in this period within alFatat. Various people discontinued their membership in the party, and apparently discord also broke out between the party and al-Fatat. (According to Rashid Rida, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi had a hand in causing this dispute.) When Gouraud's ultimatum arrived, there were party members among those who held that it was necessary to fight the French. The party sent a large delegation to Faysal to persuade him to replace the al-Atasi government with one more suited to the new circumstances. The

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meeting ended in raised voices and without results. Following this the delegation went to al-Atasi himself and tried to prevail upon him to resign, again without results. The plan of several party members to declare a dictatorship headed by War Minister Yusuf al-'Azma also came to nothing.6 After the conquest of Syria by the French some of the party activists fled to Transjordan, and within a short while the party was reorganized there. A new administrative committee was formed, consisting of Rashid Tali', 'Adil Arslan, Nabih al-'Azma, Ahmad Muraywid, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Fu'ad Salim, and Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli (all of them except Salim were former members of al-Fatat). Several of the party activists held positions in the Transjordanian government, at the same time directing harassment operations against the French in Syria. In 1924 the British became tired of this and exiled from Transjordan the more problematic activists of the party, who dispersed to various Arab countries.7 OTHER SYRIAN PARTIES

As the extremist nationalist circles in Syria were gaining the upper hand, a counter-reaction began among members of the more conservative and moderate circles — aristocrats, notables, landowners, and businessmen — who had something to lose from the situation of disorder or war which would stem from a deterioration of relations between Syria and France. These groups were also not happy with the actions of the Committee for National Defence (see Chapter 3), which in many cases harmed them. They were less anti-French and, above all, wanted "order and tranquillity'', in the words of a contemporary journalist, and, if possible, also to ensure for themselves a senior position in the Faysal regime. When Faysal returned to Syria from his second journey to Europe and understood how tenuous his position in the state was, he saw these elements in the population as natural allies, who could help him realize his policy of appeasement with the French. He decided to set up a party that would support him and would become a counterweight to alFatat and the Independence Party. Thus, he hoped, he would not stand alone in the political arena in his attempts to persuade the population to accept his agreement with Clemenceau. On 24 January 1920 many notables met in the home of Badi' al-Mu'ayyad in Damascus for a discussion on this subject, and

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the next day there was an official announcement of the establishment of the Syrian National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Suri). The initiator of the founding of the party was Nasib al-Bakri, who was serving as a special adviser to Faysal. Appointed as party secretary was Muhammad al-Shurayqi, and it was decided that there should be an administrative committee of 16 members and an advisory committee of 25 members. Most of the committees' members came from among the socio-economic groups mentioned above, though it is interesting that several of them were also members of al-Fatat, and, indeed, belonged to the aristocratic sector of al-Fatat's members (such as Nasib and Fawzi al-Bakri). The organ of the party was the newspaper al-Urdunn, owned by the future historian Amin Sa'id. The party platform was written at its founding convention, formulated by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, who was a member of the administrative committee. The platform in itself did not testify to the true purpose of the party's establishment — as an adversary of bodies such as the Independence Party and the Committee for National Defence. The goals of the party as detailed in the platform were: 1. To work for the political independence of Syria in its natural boundaries, to demand this and to defend the independence with all effective measures. 2. To strengthen the national (qawmiyya), cultural and economic ties between the Arab peoples in general and in Syria in particular, and to work for the strengthening of scientific thought in the Arab nation in order that it should rise to the level of advanced nations. 3. Equality of civil and political rights for all sons of the Syrian fatherland in their various creeds and origins. 4. To support the principle of democratic monarchy, and this by establishing a parliamentary monarchist government, which would be assembled from the people and be responsible to the people, and headed by Amir Faysal with the title of King of Syria . . . 6. To assist the amir [Faysal] in all that is required for the interest of the country and its independence . . .8

In March 1920 the party was involved in an attempt to reach an understanding with the Zionist movement. A number of noncentral members, from the western region, reached an agreement with a representative of the Zionist organization in Palestine, according to which they were prepared for Palestine to be severed from Syria and for a national home (foyer national in the French version of the agreement and mawtin qawmi in the Arabic version) for the Jewish people to be established there. They

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were also ready to agree to massive Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Zionist organization, for its part, was to undertake not to encroach in the future on the borders of Syria and the Lebanon, not to intervene in the affairs of the Muslim and Christian holy places in Palestine, and to assist financially the development efforts of Syria and the Lebanon. This agreement bore considerable resemblance to the well-known agreement between Faysal and Weizmann of January 1919, and its fate was the same — it remained an archival document without any practical consequences. The initiator of the agreement for the party was the Beiruti Najib Sufayr, a rather dubious personality who in July 1920 was involved in an attempt by the party to persuade the members of the administrative council of the Lebanon to cooperate with the Arab government of Damascus (an affair to be discussed in detail in the next section). In Sufayr's house several members of the council would meet to discuss the subject, and he would regularly report everything that was said in their meetings to the French General Security Service. The result, of course, was that all council members involved in these meetings were arrested by the French.9 Another party which operated in Syria in the years 1919-20 was the Syrian Union Party (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Suri). Its main area of activity was Egypt, and it will be reviewed in detail therefore in Chapter 5, dealing with political activity outside Syria. In late March 1919 a delegation from the party in Egypt arrived in Syria, headed by its president Michel Lutf Allah, its avowed purpose being to supervise the distribution of humanitarian aid in Syria and the Lebanon, on behalf of the party. In fact, the members of the delegation established many political connections in Beirut and Damascus with the idea of setting up a subsidiary party in Syria. Their intention was that this party should represent their views to the international commission of enquiry when it arrived in Syria. In mid-May party supporters in Damascus officially informed the military governor, al-Rikabi, of their decision to establish in Damascus a party called the Syrian Union Party, whose goal was the absolute independence of Syria within its natural boundaries guaranteed by the League of Nations, and that it was to be considered a branch of the party in Egypt. The authorities approved the establishment of the party. Heading it in Damascus was the veteran Syrian nationalist, 'Abd alRahman al-Shahbandar. The organ of the party in Syria was the newspaper al-Difa', owned by Tawfiq al-Yaziji. Like the mother party in Egypt, so also this party's attention was focused only on Syria. Particularistic slogans such as "Syria

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for the Syrians" placed it in opposition to the Independence Party and to al-Fatat, which had an all-Arab viewpoint, at least ideologically. The party's activity in Syria was relatively marginal during the period under discussion. Towards the time of the arrival of the King-Crane commission it published a manifesto in Damascus, in which it detailed its goals as they would be presented to the commission: The party desires the complete and absolute independence of Syria in its natural boundaries — the Taurus mountains in the north, the Khabur and Euphrates in the east, the Arabian desert and Mada'in Salih in the south, and the Red Sea and the Aqaba-RafahMediterranean Sea line in the west. It desires the Syrian government to be civilian, democratic and decentralized, and that the rights of minorities would be preserved. It absolutely rejects any aegis or mandate, especially that of France.

On 3 July 1919 a delegation from the party appeared before the King-Crane commission. It was composed of Michel Lutf Allah, Rafiq al-'Azm, and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, and it demanded independence for all parts of Syria. It expressed itself as being against French or British intervention, yet it was not in favour of Faysal. The regime that it demanded was a type of republic.10 In addition to the parties listed above there were two parliamentary parties in the Syrian Congress: the Progress Party (Hizb al-Taqaddum), which represented al-Fatat and the Independence Party, and in this capacity actually represented the government circles in the congress; and the Democratic Party (al-Hizb alDimuqrati), which was considered the opposition party and unofficially represented the Committee for National Defence. From the very nature of its position the latter party was considered more extreme and more vociferous in its opposition to any foreign intervention. It seems that there was a shift of members from the former party to the latter, and Rashid Rida, who was elected president of the Progress Party, claimed that it was done intentionally in order to influence from within the conduct of the opposition party. In this context it should be pointed out that in May 1920 an attempt was made to set up a "Party of all the Parties", apparently in order to create some coordination among them. This "party" was to include three representatives from each of the Independence Party, the Committee for National Defence, the Syrian Union Party, al-'Ahd al-Suri, the Palestinian Revival, the Progress Party, and the Democratic Party. Nothing is known of any positive outcome of this idea.11

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The history of the Lebanon in the years 1918-20 goes beyond the stated scope of this book, and a number of learned works, based on intensive study of the relevant archives, have already been written about it.12 The purpose of this section is to examine how the various political currents in the Lebanon in the period under discussion dealt with the question of the status of Mount Lebanon in relation to the Syrian state. After the failed attempt of Shukri al-Ayyubi to take over Beirut in the name of the Arab government of Damascus in early October 1918, there remained in the city a reduced representation of the Arab government headed by a liaison officer. The first to fill this post was Jamil al-Ulshi. (He was replaced after the visit of the King-Crane commission by Yusuf al-'Azma, who was succeeded in late 1919 by Ahmad al-Lahham, who was followed by al-Ulshi for a second term after the Syrian declaration of independence. All were members of al-Fatat.) Under the command of al-Ulshi the Arab agency in Beirut became a centre of propaganda for the unity of Syria and the annexation of the Lebanon to it. Partners of the Arab agency in this propaganda were the Muslim notables, Salim 'Ali Salam and Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum. The two, who were at first in favour of British aegis, apparently understood that there was no chance that Britain would hamper the French in the western region, and they soon became ardent supporters of the connection with Syria and opponents of the French mandate. Ties were woven between them and the Arab agency through the mediation of their friend from the days of the pre-war reform movement, Salim Tayyara, who was employed as an adviser in the Arab agency. Also joining the opponents of the French mandate was 'Umar al-Da'uq, the mayor of Beirut. The French, for their part, did not sit idle, and in February 1919 they indicted Salim 'Ali Salam for "profiteering in connection with sale of goods for relief purposes prior to Allied occupation". Salam was not deterred, and he continued in his activity for the annexation of the Lebanon to Syria. When the King-Crane commission arrived in Beirut, on 7 July, a delegation consisting of the mufti and the qadi of Beirut and eight other Muslim notables, among them Salam and Bayhum, appeared before it. They demanded complete independence for all of Syria, from the Rafah-Aqaba line in the south to

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the Taurus mountains in the north, and from the Euphrates in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. This Syria would not be under any aegis or mandate. They emphasized that the Lebanon and Palestine were not to be severed from Syria, and demanded the banning of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Their desired form of government in the future Syria would be a decentralized constitutional monarchy, headed by Faysal. They pointed out that if they should need scientific or economic assistance for a limited period they would prefer to seek it from the United States, but if it did not agree, then from Britain. In response to questions by the commission they rejected entirely the possibility of a French mandate. Half an hour later another Muslim delegation entered, led by Mayor 'Umar al-Da'uq, and it also demanded absolute independence, emphasizing that it backed all the resolutions of the Syrian Congress on the subject. Yet they noted their desire that the united Syrian state should be divided into cantons with administrative autonomy, and Mount Lebanon would, of course, be one of these cantons. In answer to the commission's questions this delegation also expressed its opposition to a French mandate, denouncing the attitude of France to Muslims, both in the Lebanon and in its other colonies. They were prepared to agree to an American aegis. Moreover, at the end of that year, when Gouraud arrived in Beirut, 'Umar al-Da'uq found the courage to tell him that what the Syrians wanted was "Syrian unity, geographically, economically, and politically".13 Besides the pro-Syrian Muslim group in Beirut, there were also, travelling about the western region for propaganda purposes, a number of Lebanese who held official positions in the Arab government in Damascus. The most prominent was Iskandar 'Ammun, the past president of the Alliance Libanaise of Cairo. At that time he held the post of justice mudir (minister) of the Arab government. Yet, despite this senior official position, he went in late May to the western region for the purpose of spreading propaganda in favour of complete independence for Syria and for the Lebanon, following which the two states would open contacts to settle political and economic relations between them. In this spirit he arranged a number of conferences in Mount Lebanon, all characterized by a conspicuous anti-French tendency. At the time of the King-Crane visit he went to Beirut, but immediately on his arrival the French high commissioner, Georges Picot, ordered his expulsion. The British for their part instructed him to cease all political activity in the western region, and when he continued doing this, he was forced to return to

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Damascus under guard. Another activist who spoke out in favour of the connection with Syria was Yusuf al-Hakim, presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals in Damascus, who was active in the Tripoli region. (After the Syrian declaration of independence he was appointed minister of commerce, agriculture, and public works.) It was also reported that the Druze Amir 'Adil Arslan, who was assistant to the military governor of Damascus (al-Rikabi), was sent to the western region at the time of the King-Crane visit, with 25,000 Egyptian pounds at his disposal for propaganda purposes. The French later claimed that he and his cousin Arnin Arslan were members of a Druze committee which organized anti-French propaganda among the Druzes, and even arranged the looting of Maronite villages in order to prove that the French were not capable of maintaining order and thus not qualified for a mandatory role. According to the French this committee was paying five pounds for the head of each Christian.14 However, the most interesting event in the attempts of the Damascus government to create a pro-Syrian Lebanese political force was in connection with the administrative council of Mount Lebanon. In late October 1918 the French reinstated this the council, which had been disbanded by the Ottomans during the war. The council began its new life as the most pro-French political factor in Mount Lebanon. In December 1918 it decided to send a delegation to the Paris peace conference to represent Lebanese demands. The demands as detailed in the council's resolution were: 1. Extension of the present territories of the Lebanon to its historic and geographical boundaries, conforming to its economic needs 2. Confirmation of the autonomy of this country such that its administration and judicial system shall be administered by its citizens. 3. Instituting in Mount Lebanon a representative Chamber, elected by the people in the system of proportional representation, in order to assure the rights of minorities. This Chamber shall have the right to legislate, and shall enjoy all the attributes of parliaments in democratic countries. 4. Assistance by the French government in realizing the above desires, its collaboration with the national administration . . . and also the guarantee of the French government for our independence, in order to protect it against any attack.15 T h e administrative council of M o u n t Lebanon continued with its pro-French policy throughout most of the period under

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discussion, as will be detailed later. However, towards the end of the period its members began to feel that the French authorities were not really exerting themselves to carry out the decisions of the council, and they began to wonder how things would be when the French mandate officially started. In June 1920 contacts began between Sa'id al-Bustani, who had been commandant of the Mount Lebanon gendarmerie and had resigned in protest against the attitude of the French authorities, and the Arab government in Damascus, and apparently also with Faysal. The initiators of these contacts were members of the Syrian Congress, Riyad al-Sulh and 'Arif al-Nu'mani, and also the Druze, Amir Amin Arslan. Several members of the Syrian National Party were also involved. Following these contacts alBustani arranged a meeting between seven members of the administrative council and Jamil al-Ulshi, the Beirut representative of the Arab government. False rumours that were spread about an imminent agreement between the Faysal government and the French only pressed the council members to reach an understanding of their own with Faysal. The interest of the Damascus government in achieving such an agreement was clear. With such an agreement in place, it would be possible to prove that even the Maronites of Mount Lebanon did not want France, but were interested in independence with a connection to Syria. Thus, one of the main arguments for the French right to rule in the region, that is, to protect the Christians of the Lebanon, would be refuted. In any case, in order to help the council members to reach a positive decision, the liaison officer of the Damascus government promised them 40,000 Egyptian pounds (according to another version 10,000), of which 1,500 were paid in advance. The first to be persuaded was the Maronite council member Sulayman Kan'an, and he was followed by another six, among them the vice-president of the council, Sa'd Allah al-Huwayk, who was the brother of the Maronite patriarch. Not party to the secret contacts were the pro-French council president, Habib al-Sa'd, and council member Da'ud 'Ammun, who was the initiator of the pro-French council resolution of December 1918. In any case, the seven council members constituted an absolute majority of the 12 members, and in this capacity they considered themselves to have the right to formulate, on 10 July 1920, a council resolution that included the following principles: 1. Complete independence for Mount Lebanon. 2. The absolute neutrality of Mount Lebanon . . .

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3. Restitution of the territories detached from it in the past, and this by an accord that will be made between it and the government of Syria. 4. Economic questions between the two states will be studied and decided upon by a commission to be composed by both governments. The decisions of the commission will be executed after their approbation by the Lebanese and Syrian parliaments.

The import of this resolution was the abandonment of the Lebanese desire for French aegis, and the exchange of this aegis for close relations with internal Syria. It should be emphasized, however, that what was meant here was absolute and expanded Lebanese independence, which was to be recognized also by the Damascus government. A copy of the resolution was taken by Riyad al-Sulh to Damascus. The seven council members also decided that same day to leave secretly for Damascus in order to continue from there to Haifa, and from there by sea to Paris, where they would be able to present their demands before the peace conference. (They assumed that the French would not let them sail from Beirut for this purpose.) Their intent was to repudiate the French mandate and to demand their absolute independence. Should such independence not be given to them, then at least they would demand that the mandate over the Lebanon be international and not of one Power alone. The French security services were following closely what was happening (as mentioned, Najib Sufayr of the Syrian National Party was reporting to them regularly on developments), and immediately after the departure of the council members, on the night of 10 July, Gouraud sent his Senegalese guards to arrest them as they were about to cross the French lines and bring them to Beirut. In their effects were found the sums of money that had been given to them and a copy of the council resolution, signed by them. Other activists involved in the affair, among them Sa'id alBustani and Amin Arslan, were also arrested. A week later they were brought before a court-martial. They were accused of: "1. Plotting against the occupying government. 2. Receiving bribes. 3. Treason against the Lebanon." The trial ended two days later with sentences of exile, from six to ten years, including deprivation of civil rights, and heavy fines. The prisoners were transferred to the island of Irwad and from there to Corsica. Following pressure by French statesmen and French public opinion several of the exiles were permitted to return to Lebanon after they had signed — as demanded by Gouraud — a

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declaration expressing regret for their deeds. The others, who had refused to sign, remained in exile until the end of 1922, when they were permitted to return following new pressure from members of the French parliament. Although the arrests stirred up bitterness among the Lebanese against the French, it should be emphasized that in principle the act of the council members was viewed unfavourably by many Lebanese, who were not interested in relations with Syria. To Gouraud the council president, Habib al-Sa'd, condemned the conduct of the members of his council, characterizing them as traitors who wanted to sell out their country to the main enemy of the Lebanese people, and he asserted that they had no right or authority to do what they had done. He expressed, in his name and in the name of the other council members, amity towards France. The archbishop of Beirut also denounced the behaviour of the council members. Gouraud for his part decided on 12 July finally to dissolve the administrative council. The French authorities clamped down on anti-French groups, and some of the Beirut newspapers were forced to cease publication.16 All the pro-Syrian groups described above were, in fact, exceptions. The Lebanese in general, especially the Christians, did not want to be annexed to the Syrian state with its Muslim majority. Many of them were also pro-French and gave credit to France for its educational, cultural, and relief projects in the region before the war. In contrast to the Syrians, they were more open to the idea of French aegis. The ideas of Lebanese independence, with or without aegis, and of Lebanese national distinctiveness were during this period — and in the years preceding the war — much stronger than the factions that wanted to be connected with Syria. In June 1919, just before the arrival of the international commission of enquiry, there were many demonstrations by Maronite Lebanese "against the possibility of being connected politically with the proposed Central Government of Syria". When the King-Crane commission arrived in the Lebanon, a delegation appeared before it which included a Maronite, a Druze, a Greek Catholic, and a Greek Orthodox, and it presented a petition in the name of "90 per cent of the Lebanese population", demanding the establishment of a greater Lebanon, in its natural boundaries, and with the assistance of France. A contemporary observer related that at the time of the commission's visit there were in Beirut ten political factions, seven of which demanded complete

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independence for a greater Lebanon, under French aegis for a limited time, one which demanded a greater Lebanon in its natural boundaries without specifying any particular aegis, and only two which wanted annexation of the Lebanon to Syria (one of them on condition that Syria be a republic and not a monarchy). Shortly after the commission's visit the Maronite patriarch left for Paris, at the head of a delegation of bishops and priests, to demand the separation of the Lebanon from Syria.17 When in March 1920 the Syrian Congress declared the independence of Syria, which was to include Mount Lebanon, the administrative council of Mount Lebanon convened and issued a resolution denouncing the decision of the congress. In the resolution, a copy of which was sent to Gouraud, the council protested against the declaration of the congress and asserted that neither it nor the government of any neighbouring country had the right to interfere in the affairs of Mount Lebanon. It considered the decision of the congress to be an attack on the freedom of the mountain and its rights, and it declared in the name of the Lebanese that the Lebanon was absolutely independent, with French assistance. The council was not content with that but also organized a conference at government house in Ba'abda, where it was resolved: 1. To declare the Independence of Greater Lebanon within its historical and natural boundaries, with the help of France. 2. To protest against the "Coronation" of Emir Feisal as King of Syria so far as it affects the independence, freedom and boundaries of Mt. Lebanon. 3. To protest against the Lebanese who are at present in Damascus falsely pretending that they have the right of representing the Lebanon though they have no legal authority to do so . . .

The municipal council of Tripoli also passed a resolution at the same time against the right of the Syrian Congress to represent the inhabitants of Tripoli, and it demanded the establishment of a greater Syria, under the aegis of France.18 Among the political groups that supported the idea of greater Lebanon and were pro-French one should note the Christian Association of Beirut and the Greater Lebanon Society. The Christian Association of Beirut (Le Groupement Chretien de Beyrouth, and in Arabic al-lttihad al-Masihi) was founded in December 1918 at a meeting of many pro-French activists in the mansion of Beirut notable Alfred Sursuq, who was elected its president. The society was limited to Christians alone, on the assumption that most of the Muslims of the Lebanon opposed

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both the idea of the independence of greater Lebanon and a French mandate. The members of the society claimed that they could not acquiesce with the Muslim ideas concerning union with Syria and the other Arab countries such as the Hijaz or Yemen. When the King-Crane commission came to Beirut, the executive committee of the society (which included, besides Sursuq, Petro Tarrad, Michel al-Tuwayni, Philippe de Tarrazi, and four others), appeared before it and demanded: " 1 . The complete independence of the Lebanon. 2. Restitution of the natural, geographical, and historical frontiers . . . with Beirut as its capital. 3. Collaboration with France and not with any other state. 4. Extension of the collaboration with France to the regions constituting Syria, in order to safeguard the economic relations. 5. An accord between the Lebanese people and the mandatory power concerning the terms of the constitution that will be given to the country, and concerning the length and model of the mandate." The society was among those protesting against the resolution of the Syrian Congress on Syria's independence, and it announced that Faysal had no sovereignty over "Greater Lebanon", which was independent to decide its own fate. They announced that they did not recognize Faysal and his royal title, and they asked France to protect the Lebanon and guard its rights. The society also protested against the acts of the members of the Mount Lebanon administrative council in July 1920, described above, and considered this an act of treason against the Lebanese fatherland. In a telegram to Gouraud the society reiterated its loyalty to and love for France. In September 1920 the society was disbanded by the French, precisely because of the establishment of Greater Lebanon and the need to remove from the arena elements spreading dissension between the Christians and Muslims.19 The Greater Lebanon Society (Comité du Grand Liban, Jam'iyyat Lubnan al-Kabir) also presented its list of demands to the King-Crane commission. These were: " 1 . Restitution of the territories robbed from the Lebanon and its expansion to its ancient boundaries. 2. Mamtaining its independence separate from Syria. 3. Organization of its national government with a French mandate." In late 1919 the society protested against the activity of men working for the Damascus government in the regions of Ba'albek, the Biqa', and Hasbaya. It claimed that they were causing anarchy in the entire region, by robbing and persecuting the Christians, and it requested the Comité Central Syrien in Paris to work for the occupation of these regions by French

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troops. The society, of course, also protested sharply against the Syrian Congress' resolution on Syria's independence and Faysal's enthronement, considering this an act of violence against the Lebanon, and it denounced the refusal of the Syrians to accept the assistance of or to cooperate with France. It announced that it did not recognize Faysal as King of Syria, declared the desire of the Lebanon to remain independent, and asked for the protection of its rights by France. The branch of the society in Tripoli also protested against the coronation of Faysal as king over all of Syria, considering this an attack on Lebanese rights, and announced its refusal to accept the Sharifite authority. It demanded the establishment of an autonomous greater Lebanon with the assistance of France. After the decisions of the San Remo conference concerning the placing of Syria and the Lebanon under French mandate became known, the society expressed its overt joy.20 The lines of thought guiding the groups supporting the idea of an independent greater Lebanon were summarized in August 1919 in an article by the Maronite lawyer Bulus Nujaym, who as early as 1908 had in his book, La Question du Liban, called for the restoration to Mount Lebanon of the territories taken from it in 1861, and he spoke about the Lebanese nation that had existed from the dawn of history. In the article, published in the periodical, La Revue Phénicienne, he announced that the Lebanese nation demanded its independence and independent political existence, as befitted its geographical condition and historical past. The essence of this was: "Le Grand Liban". He stressed that the return to the Lebanon of the territories taken from it was more important than the question of the character of the country's regime in the future, since a small Lebanon on the borders of the sanjaq of Mount Lebanon would not be able to maintain itself economically. A greater Lebanon, on the other hand, would be a unit full of life from economic and national viewpoints. He was indeed aware of the fact that the establishment of a greater Lebanon would bring into its boundaries a large Muslim population and would leave, according to him, the Maronites as a minority of 275,000 out of 850,000, but he was not afraid of this. He foresaw a democratic and free Lebanon, and he believed that all the Lebanese constituted one organic unit and a national entity, on the basis of their national historic past, their common tradition and the fact that all of them belonged to the same race.21 The aspirations of Nujaym and of those holding similar views were realized on 1 September 1920 when General Gouraud declared the establishment of "Grand

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Liban", which included besides Mount Lebanon the regions of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, and the Biqa'. The establishment of Greater Lebanon was thus not only to further French interests but also matched the aspirations of most Lebanese. However, now the Lebanese had to confront, for the first time in a long time, a most heterogeneous population from the religious viewpoint. They had now to contend with the question of whether the new Muslim population annexed to Lebanon believed, as they did, that all Lebanese, Muslims and Christians alike, were one nation.

Chapter 3 THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE In April 1919 Sheikh Kamil al-Qassab returned to Syria after an absence of four years. Al-Qassab, an 'alim graduate of al-Azhar, who was the principal of a high school in Damascus, had joined al-Fatat before the war and had been sent on the society's behalf on a mission to Egypt at its outbreak. When he returned to Syria in early 1915 he was arrested by the Ottoman authorities, released, and then immediately left for the Hijaz for fear of further harassment on the part of the authorities. He was staying in Mecca when the Arab revolt broke out, and took part in the consultations that were held several months later about the coronation of Sharif Husayn. His relations with Husayn were not of the best and in late 1917 he left for Egypt, where he stayed until the end of the war. Al-Qassab was one of "the Seven" to whom the British addressed the "Declaration to the Seven", and later was one of the founders of the Syrian Union Party in Egypt. It was not until April 1919 that he managed to return from Egypt to Syria, but within five months he was to lead the most active anti-French group established in Syria during this period. Before Faysal left for his second journey to Europe, in September 1919, he invited a number of leaders, among them Kamil al-Qassab, for a discussion on the country's future. He then said to al-Qassab: "I expect you and your nationalist brethren to rouse a popular movement which will make the nation an armed nation, and which will turn the fatherland into a military barracks." It is plausible to assume that Faysal did not expect his words to be taken as literally as al-Qassab understood them and tried to act upon in the following months, until there was finally an open confrontation with Faysal himself. When several days later the temporary agreement signed by Britain and France and the imminent evacuation of British forces became known, the idea arose of setting up a Committee for National Defence (Lajnat al-Difa' al-Watani), which would recruit volunteers, collect contributions, and assist the government in defending the country against the French. The idea was largely conceived by al-Fatat, which urged al-Qassab to head the new organization because of his rhetorical ability and talent for arousing the

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masses. However, it seems that after a few months relations between al-Fatat and the Committee became strained, perhaps because al-Fatat was felt to be too moderate for the taste of the Committee. A number of gatherings were held, and the Committee began recruitment activity as will be described below. As the date of the British evacuation approached, and after rumours reached Syria about the agreement taking shape between Faysal and the French, it was decided to set up at the head of the Committee a Supreme National Committee (al-Lajna al-Wataniyya al-'Ulya). According to al-Qassab's request, in late October four representatives were chosen from each of the 48 quarters in Damascus, and on 1 November each of these 48 groups chose a single representative to represent them in the elections for the Supreme National Committee. These elections were held on 5 November, and the 48 representatives elected 27 members to form the Supreme National Committee. On 27 November, a day after the British evacuation was completed, the founding convention of the Supreme Committee was held with the participation of those elected ("a mobile popular parliament", in the words of Amin Sa'id), leaders of the various parties and societies, and notables from Jabal al-Duruz. A discussion was held on the subject of the British-French agreement and French operations in the western region, and al-Qassab gave an address on Syria's right to absolute independence. He asked those present to sign a petition opposing any agreement which would impair the independence and sovereignty of Syria (that is, that they in fact opposed the expected agreement between Faysal and Clemenceau). None of those present left without signing the petition. Also approved at the convention was the Supreme National Committee constitution consisting of 16 articles.1 The goals of the Supreme Committee, as formulated in the second article of the constitution, were far-reaching: 1. To employ all means to preserve the unity of Syria and to protect its complete independence. . . . 2. To develop all the country's material and spiritual powers . . . 3. To revive the spirit of Arab nationalism. 4. To strengthen the ties of solidarity and cooperation between individuals, groups, and communities. 5. To support scientific, intellectual, and economic efforts. 6. In summary, to work in any area which will bring this nation to the ranks of the united nations.

According to the constitution the Supreme Committee was to

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have a secretary, an accountant, and a treasurer (Arts. 6-8), but there was not to be a president. At each meeting a temporary president would be chosen for that meeting (Art. 5). Despite this, from the beginning, Kamil al-Qassab was recognized as the president of the Supreme Committee and as the leader of the whole Committee for National Defence. It was quite clear to the members and to outside observers that al-Qassab was the dominant figure in the organization. At its start the Committee for National Defence encompassed various sectors of the population, from all classes, all ages, all occupations, and all levels of education. Participating in it were members of the Syrian Congress, members of parties and societies (among them veterans of al-Fatat such as al-Qassab himself and Jamil Mardam, but also former Ottoman loyalists, such as 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khatib). Since the goals of the Committee as detailed above were quite broad, it was decided that it should be officially assisted by other political bodies that existed in Syria, and to attach to the Supreme Committee two representatives from each of the Syrian parties whose platforms were not contrary to the goals of the Committee (Art. 11). As'ad Daghir relates that he was one of the two representatives of the Independence Party on the Supreme Committee. It was also decided (in the same article) that the Supreme Committee should be assisted by an advisory committee composed of the notables of the country, its leaders and its intellectuals, by an executive committee composed of young intellectual activists, and by temporary committees to be set up for defined purposes when needed. Thus, for example, it was decided in late November to set up subcommittees to collect funds at the rate of 2 per cent of every person's income (and whoever wanted could add to this). However, nothing is known of the establishment of the executive committee of young intellectuals, though in February 1920 an administrative committee for the Committee for National Defence was set up, whose members were not necessarily young (al-Qassab and 11 other activists). Article 9 of the constitution stated: "The funds of the Supreme Committee shall consist of donations from munificent people, one-time or monthly, given by those elected or others; of activities of the [Supreme] Committee which produce legitimate income; and from funds that reach it from the treasuries of the branches." The methods of the Committee for National Defence for collecting money were to stir up against it considerable parts of the population, as will be described below. As for the branches, these were set up in every large town in Syria and also

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in northern Transjordan. Still, the centre of the Committee was in Damascus, and when its administrative committee was elected in February 1920, a special club for it was also set up there. According to the constitution (Arts. 12-14) the members of the Supreme Committee were to meet three nights a week, the representatives of the 48 quarters once a week, and the electoral quartets once in two weeks (the quartets were treated as local branches of the Committee in Damascus itself — Art. 15). In fact, meetings of the Committee and its conventions were held when needed, and not exactly as detailed in the constitution. According to a contemporary observer, in December 1919 about 250 people were already attending them. 2 The first and main activity of the Committee for National Defence was to recruit volunteers for the Syrian army. In early September, even before the Committee was established, a recruitment movement had begun under the slogan of defending the country against any partition. In the second half of the month, after the agreement between Britain and France became known and the Committee was established, the recruitment movement was institutionalized, and the Committee distributed announcements about the obligatory mobilization of 12,000 men for the Syrian army. The British immediately instructed the chief of the general staff, Yasin al-Hashimi, to stop the mobilization and to see to it that the size of the army remained in accordance with the limits set by Allenby. Al-Hashimi denied any involvement in the dissemination of the announcements (but at the same time he distributed 5,000 rifles to the populace for setting up popular forces). The British did not believe his denials, and he was summoned to a meeting with Allenby in Cairo (on this meeting and its results, see Chapter 6). The British also instructed 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, in his capacity as Chief Administrator of OETA East, to cancel immediately the Committee's announcements and also to disperse the Committee itself. It was made clear to him that until the matter was clarified his monetary subsidies would be suspended. Al-Rikabi hastened to announce the cancellation of the mobilization and that the Committee for National Defence had no recognized status or authority. The French in the western region reacted very sharply to the incident, and they demanded both al-Hashimi's arrest and al-Rikabi's dismissal. Their request was rejected at this stage by the British, on the ground that in the current situation it was essential to keep in authority in Damascus someone who could be held responsible for whatever happened. The Committee for National Defence was not dissolved, and

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it even continued with its mobilization plans. At the founding convention of the Supreme National Committee it was decided to recruit 1,000 volunteers at public expense, to equip them and to establish from them a battalion that would be ready for battle when necessary. At a conference of the Committee in early December at which representatives of the various communities participated, it was decided to call all the communities to take part in the defence of the country. At another conference attended by representatives from Aleppo, Hama, the Hawran, and Ba'albek, as well as 'ulama' and bedouin leaders, it was decided to formulate a joint plan of action for all the regions. At a meeting held on 10 December Kamil al-Qassab reported optimistically about the readiness of the people of Damascus to volunteer, and said that a camp would be set up for them in al-Maza. He also pointed out that the inhabitants of Ba'albek and the Biqa' were expected to join the national movement. However, from other reports it emerges that the volunteers were not serious, and their officers were complaining that they were not disciplined and were not showing up for training.3 In addition to the recruitment activity the Committee was also busy with intensive propaganda against the French, and in effect it benefited from complete freedom of operation in this field. The Committee was also a partner of al-Fatat in the despatch of armed bands to harass the French in the western region (see Chapter 1). It was engaged in collecting money and food for the bands in the region of Kuneitra and the Golan, and its branches in Horns and Hama transported arms and ammunition to the rebel leaders in Jabal Ansariyya. All this cost a lot of money, and the Committee men, headed by al-Qassab, persuaded Zayd to contribute 2,000 Egyptian pounds. A vigorous protest by 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi caused Zayd to reconsider, and in the end he contributed only 200 pounds. When Faysal returned from Europe the Committee demanded that he give them all the badal funds (payments for exemption from military service, at the rate of 30-40 gold Turkish liras) he had in his treasury, in order to assist the recruitment for the army and to improve the living conditions of soldiers already mobilized. The Committee was also engaged in public fund drives for national defence, and great success was reported from Horns, where 7,000 Egyptian pounds in cash were collected and pledges received for another 40,000 pounds. Also collected were commodities and grain, and the like. In 'Ajlun in northern Transjordan, a branch of the Committee was set up in order to care for the welfare of recruits. This branch decided to levy a tax on the inhabitants at a rate of

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50 per cent of the Verko tax (real estate property tax). Considerable sums of money were collected, in Egyptian and Turkish currency. Recruiting, on the other hand, did not go very well in this region because of the unpleasant memories the inhabitants had from the time of the Ottoman army. In Amman, in contrast, there were reports of the people's readiness to be mobilized and of the setting up of a military force which was in training every day. The tribal chiefs from the region were invited to Damascus for discussions.4 Another activity in which the Committee was involved was mtimidation. Close to the end of the British evacuation from Syria, the Committee and al-Nadi al-'Arabi (see Chapter 4) prepared a "black list" of people considered to be pro-French or pro-British, and threatened to act against them after the British left. The two bodies opened a campaign of denunciations against the moderate elements in the population and also against the Arab government itself, and accused them of being "sell-outs to France". The situation reached the point that in December Nuri al-Sa'id, then holding the position of political adviser to Faysal, asked the French liaison officer in Damascus if the French were prepared to assist him in using force against these extremist elements. Although, as he pointed out, he realized that it would be desirable for a police action such as this to be carried out by the Arab government alone, he requested the liaison officer to ask the French high commissioner if he would be prepared to send an auxiliary force to assist the Arab soldiers loyal to the government, on condition, of course, that the French force would agree to withdraw immediately when asked to do so by the Arab government. Al-Sa'id also tried to convince the French liaison officer that assistance of this type had been promised by Clemenceau to Faysal. The French themselves knew nothing of any such promise. 5 When Faysal returned from Europe the Committee resolved to fight any attempt on his part to carry out the agreement he had reached with Clemenceau. The Committee preached absolute independence and opposition to the French mandate implied by this agreement. On 27 January 1920 a mass demonstration was held (comprising 100,000 people, according to alQassab), at which complete independence and the unity of Syria were demanded, and also the establishment of an army to serve the country. In the days following, Faysal twice summoned the Committee leaders and informed them that he was not prepared for them to set up an independent government for themselves. He rebuked them for their behaviour and claimed that their

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activities were causing a regression in the international position of Syria. At the time he was working to secure the independence of Syria, European statesmen were saying to him: "Look at what they are doing! Do such people deserve independence?" (The occurrence of these meetings was leaked to the press, and they were immediately denied by al-Mufid, the organ of the Independence Party.) The Committee for National Defence was not impressed by Faysal's claims, and on 9 February it held a demonstration in al-Maza, in order to prove to Faysal that the entire nation demanded absolute independence and nothing less, and was opposed to an agreement to a French mandate. Despite the cold weather and a strong wind blowing, many people came to the demonstration. At its end Faysal arrived and, in reply to an impassioned address by Kamil al-Qassab, announced that he supported the demands of the nation for absolute independence, but, he pointed out, such independence could be achieved only by a strong and well-organized army. The Committee, however, was not satisfied with that. After consultation with its branches in Horns, Hama, Aleppo and other towns, it decided to demand officially from Faysal that he would not enter any negotiations for cooperation with any state that did not agree in advance to recognize the complete independence of Syria, in its natural boundaries, without any reservations. A delegation of the Committee, together with a delegation of the Independence Party, met Faysal on 16 February for a two-hour discussion. A heated and tense debate was held, and it seemed at times that Faysal was losing his temper. He threatened, on the one hand, to return to the Hijaz and, on the other, to fight them; they demanded of him that he follow the path his father had outlined when he declared that he would never sign an agreement impinging on the right of the Arab countries to absolute independence. In the end Faysal was compelled to promise that he would not open any negotiation without prior consultation with them.6 The Committee for National Defence was among those pushing for a declaration of Syria's independence, as a first step in establishing a greater Syria, and among those pressuring Faysal to accept the crown of Syria, to a great extent against his will. At the session of the congress on this subject, on 6 March, Kamil al-Qassab gave an address in the name of the Committee and the nation in which he announced that the resolution the congress was about to pass expressed the national will of Syria. In demanding independence the congress represented faithfully the Syrian nation, which wanted to realize its right to rule itself.

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The nation now expected the congress to declare Syria's complete independence and the enthronement of Faysal as king of Syria — a constitutional monarch conforming to all democratic ideas, who would act in all his deeds according to the principles of representative government. The nation also expected the congress to write a constitution for Syria, to be based on the principles of democratic and decentralized parliamentary monarchy, which would be valid for all of Syria in its natural boundaries. The congress must declare itself to be the constitutional assembly of Syria. Al-Qassab ended his speech by announcing that the nation was preparing its children for the defence of the fatherland, and in order to realize its desire to live a life of honour it would not flinch from making sacrifices.7 The al-Rikabi government that had been appointed after the declaration of independence at first tried to get along peacefully with the Committee for National Defence. It was even reported that al-Rikabi consented to accept the honorary presidency of the Committee. When the Committee arranged a party in honour of Faysal in the city park, the government ministers attended, as did congress members, senior army officers, 'ulama' and others — about a thousand people in all. It seemed then that the Committee was becoming stronger, opening new branches and keeping in constant contact with its large branches in Horns, Hama, and Aleppo. Faysal himself was invited to the club of the administrative committee of the Committee, where al-Qassab delivered a long speech before him. After words of praise for Faysal and Zayd, and general statements about the Arabs being the most democratic people who had taught the world what equality was, al-Qassab noted that "a great revolution in every form of administration, of justice and of taxation is imperative, so that we may be able to say we have entered an era of reform". He explained that guarding independence was much more difficult than declaring it, and therefore advised Faysal that it was his "patriotic duty" to work without delay for expanding the mobilization and to unite all parts of the nation, "so that the nation may form one mass living in unity and dying in unity if there be no escape from death". However, accusations soon began to be cast at the al-Rikabi government that it was too moderate and was not taking steps to expel the French from the western region. A number of actions taken by Gouraud, and perceived as provocative by the nationalist circles (such as taking down the Syrian flag flying over the Arab agency in Beirut), caused a delegation from the Committee to go to Faysal's palace and to make clear that if he

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wanted to preserve his position he had to abandon his policy of appeasing the French. The publication of the decisions of the San Remo conference concerning the division of the mandates only aggravated the situation, and as mentioned, in the end the al-Rikabi government fell. After the al-Atasi government was installed, the Committee sent a sharp protest to the French, in the name of the Syrian nation, opposing the San Remo conference decisions, which violated the statements and promises of the Allies concerning Syria's independence and the principles on which the general peace was based. In the protest the Committee expressed its confidence in the al-Atasi government and in the steps that it would take to secure the independence of Syria. Indeed, in its early days good relations prevailed between the alAtasi government and the Committee, and in fact the government tried to present itself as identifying with the goals of the Committee. At a party the Committee held in honour of the government, no member of the government was absent. However, the Committee together with the congress soon began to denounce this government also as being too moderate for their taste, and to criticize it sharply for its conciliatory attitude towards the Allies. The Committee and the congress began to work towards bringing down the government in order to set up a firmer one, perhaps headed by Yasin al-Hashimi. In fact, the Committee at this stage did not have any faith in the congress either, which seemed to it to be only a forum for debates and speeches.8 In the final weeks of the existence of the Syrian state the character of the Committee became increasingly extremist, and it was the most anti-European body in Damascus. It was composed then mainly of the lower middle class and the lower class of the population, and under the leadership of al-Qassab it was collecting contributions from wealthy Damascus merchants and from landowners in the region by means of threats and extortion. In fact, the wealthy elements in the population set up a "party" of "young men", whose only purpose was to put a stop to the acts of extortion by the Committee. According to a report by the British liaison officer in Damascus, it seems that they were quite successful. The liaison officer also reported on rumours that alQassab had embezzled a large sum of money from the treasury of the Supreme National Committee, and raised the possibility of al-Qassab's having to resign from leadership of the Committee as a result.9 Al-Qassab did not resign, and he continued to lead the Committee until its end, which came with the end of the Syrian state.

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The arrival of Gouraud's ultimatum brought about the most serious confrontation between the Committee and Faysal, a confrontation that reached the point of real uprising. On 18 July the Syrian Congress met to discuss the ultimatum and how to react to it. The Committee arranged a mass demonstration that reached the congress building and expressed its support for the nationalist delegates and its denunciation of all the traitors and conspirators. On the night of 19 July the Committee held a large conference, attended by representatives of the parties and notables, and it decided to arrange a mass demonstration the next day to call on Faysal and the government to defend the country. However, on 20 July Faysal decided to accept the ultimatum. Confrontation was unavoidable. The dismissal of the congress that day and the discharge of the army in the spirit of the conditions of the ultimatum, which was done in a disorderly manner and with looting of arms and ammunition, only increased the confusion. The consent to the ultimatum was received with hostility by many in the populace who preferred to go to war, and several members of the congress even declared publicly that Faysal should be killed. Faysal ordered their arrest. Kamil al-Qassab and a group of his men arrived at Faysal's palace and demanded that he dismiss the al-Atasi government and replace it with one more suited to the situation. Faysal refused. In response alQassab said: "If you do not bring down the government the result will not be good!" Faysal ordered that he and his men be arrested and thrown into the citadel (the Qal'a), When the arrests became known, all the shops in Damascus were closed and riots started. Discharged soldiers were scattered throughout the city and they called for the people to guard the country's independence and to defend it. The masses in the streets began to cry out against Faysal, to accuse him of treason and even to demand his liquidation. An attempt by Faysal to order the city to disarm stood no chance from the beginning. The night between 20 and 21 July was a night of complete anarchy in all quarters of Damascus. During the evening the demonstrators had begun to move in the direction of the citadel, with al-Fatat member 'Uthman Qasim at their head firing his pistol in the air. The demonstrators demanded that they be given arms to defend the country. They attacked the citadel, broke inside, plundered the stores of arms there, and freed al-Qassab and his men as well as the other prisoners held there. Then they started looting. At this juncture Zayd rushed to the place with the regular soldiers he still had after the discharge of the army, and began to put down the revolt using machine guns. He was

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assisted by Yasin al-Hashimi. They opened fire on the demonstrators, in the region of the citadel and in other places in the city, and by dawn on 21 July the streets and alleys were filled with the dead and wounded. The exchange of fire continued all night and into the morning, and in the end the government soldiers prevailed. A group of demonstrators who had begun to move in the direction of the royal palace was also stopped. As to the number of casualties there are differences of opinion. Those who minimize the incident speak of 50-70 dead and 150 wounded on both sides, and those who maximize it speak of 500 casualties.10 On 21 July, after it became known that the French army was cotinuing to advance, despite the acceptance of the ultimatum, an accelerated mobilization effort by the Committee for National Defence began — to replace the army that had been discharged. Kamil al-Qassab and others began to go about the streets of Damascus and to urge the people to engage the French. AlQassab and the commander of the 1st Division, Tahsin al-Faqir, managed to get together 135 soldiers, 54 horsemen, and 1,700 civilian volunteers. To Faysal, al-Qassab reported that there were 10,000 conscripts. To Yasin al-Hashimi, he took a bag full of bullets of various kinds, saying, "See what the enthusiastic people have brought." To this, al-Hashimi said after al-Qassab left: "With arms like this are we going to stop the French?" On 23 July, after it finally became clear that the French would not stop, the government decided that there was no choice but to go to war and ordered the soldiers and the populace to rush to the front. Then Faysal summoned Kamil al-Qassab, in his capacity as president of the Supreme National Committee, and told him: "I and my government complied with the desire that you have always stood for, to encounter the enemy with force. I accept your word that the national forces are prepared to carry out this mission. Now show us your resoluteness, and may Allah bring you success." Al-Qassab and his men immediately began to urge the people to hasten to Maysalun to halt the French. And those who complied indeed hastened there, armed with old rifles, pistols, swords, and even slings.11

Chapter 4 THE ARAB CLUBS AL-NADI AL-'ARABI IN SYRIA

In November 1918, shortly after the armistice, al-Nadi al-'Arabi (the Arab Club) was founded in Damascus. It was intended to fulfil a similar function to that of the Literary Club that had existed in Istanbul before the war. It was supposed to be a literary and social club, and a meeting place for the intelligentsia of Damascus, notables and the young, and also for guests from other Arab countries. When it started, a notice was hung on one of its walls saying: "As the club is scientific and social, politics must not be discussed inside the building, and no more political meetings to be held." However, as a British officer who was staying in Damascus at the time noted: "it would be easier to dam the Falls of Niagara than to stop the Syrians from talking politics", and within a short time the club became a political body in every sense. The political goal of the club was in principle pan-Arab. The final goal was to establish a united independent Arab state, which would include Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. This state, which was to spread from the Hijaz to northern Syria and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf, was to be ruled by Husayn and his sons. However, this goal of the club was only theoretical, and in practice it focused its efforts on ensuring the independence and unity of greater Syria and preventing any foreign aegis on Syrian territory. As a result it formed a sharp antiFrench policy, which became stronger as declarations and statements were heard from the direction of France about its right to spread its aegis over the country.1 The centre of the club was in Damascus, but branches were established throughout Syria. Its activity was mainly in organizing demonstrations, petitions, speeches, and nationalist propaganda. (In November 1918 daily demonstrations were reported in honour of Faysal, "liberator of Syria and hero of absolute Arab independence without supervision".) By means of secret funds that it received from the Arab authorities the club was

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able to influence the Syrian press, calling the public to demonstrations through the press, and was able to look after suitable speakers for these demonstrations, whom it would brief before they carried out their assignment. Participating in the club were members of most of the societies, secret and open, that were active in Syria during this time (Darwaza claims that mainly the influence of al-Fatat on the club was particulary noticeable). As a result, its influence in Syria during 1919 was very great, and it was reported that most of the mukhtars in Damascus obeyed the instructions of its executive committee. It seems that it also had great influence over the police and gendarmerie, several of whose commanders were among its members. The fact that some holders of senior government positions in Damascus were members of the club, at least passive ones, and at least at the beginning of the period under discussion, caused French and British observers to compare its influence to that of the Committee of Union and Progress in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire. (This comparison has already been mentioned above with reference to alFatat, and one might well wonder whether these observers did not confuse the influence of the two bodies in light of the fact that many activists participated in both.) Heading the club was an executive committee of 15 members, several of whom, as mentioned, occupied senior positions in the Arab government. At the beginning the club was supported both by Faysal, who in late 1918 was considered its honorary president, and by the military governor, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, who, according to a number of accounts, was even one of its founders. In any case, in early 1919 he gave the members of the executive committee a free hand to operate as they wished. The chief of the general staff, Yasin al-Hashimi, also supported the activities of the club. The first president of the club was Sheikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, a native of Jaffa. He was replaced by the Damascene Sami al-'Azm before the arrival of the KingCrane commission, but returned to the post several months afterwards only to be replaced again, after the declaration of Syria's independence, by Salim 'Abd al-Rahman from Tul Karm. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, an 'alim who had served during the war as the imam of an Ottoman battalion in Sinai and later as a mufti in the Ottoman Fourth Army, was the outstanding personality in the club. His views were firmly anti-British, and during the war he had claimed that the British had deceived the Arabs and did not intend to keep their promises to them. His proof for this was the attitude of the British to the Palestine question. After the war he continued his propaganda against the

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British, whom he described as the "lowest nation in the world, who never kept their word. They will endanger our lives and the lives of our children, till we get rid of them." 2 The fact that 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, Salim 'Abd alRahman, and several other leaders of the club were natives of Palestine led contemporary observers and also later researchers to the conclusion that the club was first and foremost Palestinian. That is, that it was populated mainly by Palestinians, run by Palestinians, and its goals were the inclusion of Palestine in greater and united Syria and the struggle against the Zionist movement. There is even a claim that the club building in Damascus bore the inscription "Palestinian Club". And indeed reports from early 1919 told of anti-Zionist propaganda run by the club. (Mark Sykes, who visited Damascus at the time, tried to persuade the leaders of the club to stop the propaganda and to open contacts with the Zionists.) However, a complete examination of the club's activities in Syria in 1919-20 shows that its main activity was on behalf of Syria, as will be detailed below, and the special activity for Palestine was only marginal. For their own exclusive activities the Palestinians in Damascus set up their own organizations, like the "Palestinian Revival" society, to be mentioned below. Moreover, the leaders of the club were not necessarily Palestinians, as a number of observers and researchers thought. Alongside the native Palestinian leaders such as alMuzaffar, Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, 'Izzat Darwaza, Rafiq al-Tamimi, and Muhammad 'Ali al-Tamimi, there were also leaders who were natives of Syria, such as Sami al-'Azm, Jamil Mardam, Rida Mardam, 'Uthman Qasim, and Tawfiq al-Yazigi.3 On 29 December 1918 the French foreign minister, Stéphen Pichon, addressed the French parliament concerning the status of France in Syria. He said: "We have [in the Ottoman Empire] incontestable rights to safeguard; we have them in Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia and Palestine. They are based on historical title, on agreements and on contracts." He remarked that France's demands in Syria were based also on the will of the people there, who had had affection for France for a long time. The British, who understood what this declaration would mean to the Syrians, tried to censor reports of the speech (at which censorship the French protested). However, towards the end of January 1919 Pichon's statements were already known in Syria. Al-Nadi al-'Arabi then began an intensive propaganda campaign and initiated waves of protests, in which the great anger of the Syrians against Pichon's words was expressed. On 1 February the first meeting of the club members to discuss this subject

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was held, presided over by Nasib al-Bakri. A protest was drawn up in which it was declared that France had no rights in Syria. However, the club scheduled the main protest demonstration for 20 February. Before the demonstration was held, the club propagandists spread out through Syria persuading the inhabitants to sign protest petitions. The propagandists were assisted by local authorities wherever they operated. In Katana, a small town south-west of Damascus, for example, the local Qa'imaqam put 30 horsemen at the disposal of Sami al-'Azm to help him distribute the petition in the villages of the region. The methods used for getting signatures were varied. In some cases the inhabitants received blank sheets and were forced to sign them. In others, when there was a fear of non-cooperation (mainly in the Druze and Christian villages), the petitions were presented as protests of the inhabitants against expected changes in the system of tax collection. In any event, the very fact that the authorities and their gendarmes sided with the club agents generally sufficed to get the signatures. Where there were especially adamant refusals (mainly among Greek Catholics), the authorities did not shrink from making 24-hour arrests, on various pretexts, in order to break the spirit of the opponents. Another method for persuading the supporters of France to cross the lines was to give wide publicity to letters and telegrams — it not being clear if they were genuine or forged — supposedly received from Faysal, then attending the peace conference in Europe. In these it was stated that it had already been decided that France had absolutely nothing more to look for in Syria. The demonstration against Pichon's speech began on 20 February at 3:00 pm, with the city newspapers devoting their central columns to encouraging the populace to attend, and the mukhtars also urging on the inhabitants. Printed programmes of the demonstration were also distributed. According to the programme the demonstration was to start in front of the Damascus city hall, where the demonstrators were to hear a series of speeches in French, English, and Arabic on the desire of the Syrians for absolute independence. From there delegations were to go to the Allied representatives in Damascus to present to them the petitions collected during the previous days. When the French liaison officer found out about this, he hastened to 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi accompanied by a British officer, and the two stated that they saw no point in receiving such delegations. If the inhabitants wanted to present any kind of document to the Allies, then they should give it to al-Rikabi, and he would forward it officially to the Allied representatives. In a report sent

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afterwards by the French liaison officer to his high commissioner in Beirut he reported that in the end only about 300-400 people participated in the demonstration, all of them Muslims. It ended, according to him, within an hour, and the petitions were indeed given to al-Rikabi, who then transmitted a summary of them to the liaison officer.4 The signing of the petitions did not end with the demonstration. It continued in early March, and according to the British 350 petitions were collected throughout Syria, in which the signatories protested against the declaration of the French foreign minister and the claims of France to rights in the region. They asserted that they did not recognize the right of any nation in their fatherland, and they would not accept any agreement arrived at without their assent. During March a new petition began to be distributed, in which the signatories authorized Faysal to demand at the peace conference absolute independence for Syria. The methods for persuading people to sign the petition were similar to those mentioned above. It was presented to the public by the mukhtars, police inspectors, and the governors of the various districts. Many policemen were placed at the disposal of the club, apparently with the tacit approval of alRikabi. Once again threats were heard, direct and indirect, against those refusing to sign, and those obtaining the signatures on behalf of the club were regarded in effect as representatives of the government. Apparently those getting the signatures had certain difficulties among the Greek Orthodox in southern Damascus, whom the local police inspector had to threaten strongly. In Duma, a village north-east of Damascus, the signatures were collected on blank sheets, with the explanation that the text of the petition would be composed later in Damascus. The central activists in this area were the al-Bakri brothers, and also Sami al-'Azm, who moved around in the region setting up branches of the club. The propagandists of the club were also sent to the coffee houses of Damascus, where they preached in favour of independence and against foreign intervention or supervision. Public and clandestine political meetings also continued, in which club members spoke to those present on the need to organize against "the enemy" in order to win the right to independence. These meetings were held almost daily, and in one of the larger ones, held in early April and attended by 300 people, the speakers recommended their listeners "to denounce immediately to the authorities the agents of France, and when necessary to mete out justice to them themselves".5

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When the Syrian Congress was established just before the arrival of the international commission of enquiry, many of its members were also members of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, at least passively. The first sessions of the congress, in June-July 1919, were held in the club house. The club's position was that it was necessary to demand before the commission complete independence without any aegis or tutelage. The club sent guidance along these lines to various officials and to the Arab government institutions, and it also mounted a propaganda campaign in the press. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar was sent to Palestine to achieve unity of opinion in the demand for complete independence which would include Syria and Palestine. However, Faysal, as mentioned, leaned towards British aegis, and this viewpoint was destined to put an end to the good relations between him and the club that existed at the beginning of this period. Differences of opinion turned into hostility, and epithets such as "traitor to the fatherland", "bribed", and "sell-out to the British" began to be hurled at Faysal by club members. On the day that the KingCrane commission arrived in Damascus the club planned a large demonstration involving school children and the waving of flags. However, at the demand of the government, it eventually contented itself with sending a delegation to greet the commission.6 When the temporary agreement signed by Britain and France and the expected withdrawal southwards of the British forces became known in September 1919, the club began to send threats and protests to Paris. The club members considered this agreement a preface to the partition of Syria between France and Britain. They sent a protest signed by 250 men (the French liaison officer in Damascus advanced the opinion that most of the signatures were forged) to the representatives of Britain, France, the United States, and Italy in Damascus, and also to Zayd, to al-Rikabi, and to The Times and Le Temps newspapers where the clauses of the agreement had been set out. The club announced that up to that point it had relied on the justice of the Allies and on their promises, and therefore it had worked to maintain order and to calm tempers. But now it could no longer be responsible for the events that were liable to occur with the realization of the agreement. Agitators from the club began to go from quarter to quarter calling people to join the Syrian army and to defend the country by force of arms. Hints were heard that if the mandate over Syria should in the end be given to France it would bring about the slaughter of the Christians of Damascus. Despite their efforts, the attempts by club members to organize mass demonstrations were not a great success and

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policemen who were under the influence of the club were directed to find out the reasons for this.7 Towards the end of the British evacuation the members of the executive committee of the club were involved with members of the Committee for National Defence in preparing a "black list" of people thought to be friendly to the French and British, with the intention of taking action against them after the evacuation. The club also decided to convene all the sheikhs of the Syrian desert and to prepare with them a plan of action for the current situation. Several of the club leaders were also involved in the activity of the bands that was becoming stronger towards the end of 1919, and it was reported of Salim 'Abd al-Rahman and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar that they were leading bands between northern Mount Lebanon and Horns. It was also reported that club propaganda had reached Zahla in the middle of the Biqa'. Club members pressed 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi to help the bands, and, in effect, they demanded that he go to war against the French in the western region. Al-Rikabi refused and tried to persuade them of the senselessness of their actions. The result was that the members of the club, together with the members of the Committee for National Defence, began to denounce the government as being "sold out to France", and al-Rikabi was called on to resign. When al-Rikabi resigned, and Zayd hesitated to accept the resignation, messengers of the club hurried to him and demanded that he accept the resignation or resign himself.8 A comparison of the activity of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in 1919 and in 1920 shows that from late 1919 and early 1920 there began a certain decline in the activity of the club and its influence on the course of events weakened. At precisely the same time there began a rise in the influence of the Committee for National Defence. The fields of specialization of the club were mainly in organizing demonstrations, gathering petitions, and spreading propaganda. The Committee for National Defence, on the other hand, focused on encouraging the populace to enlist in the army and on the establishment and strengthening of irregular armed forces. It seems, therefore, that the general national activity that the club carried out was suited to the relatively calm events of 1919 (at least until the British-French agreement of September), while the rapid escalation of events in 1920, which ended in a military confrontation with the French, was met by the more concrete activity of the Committee for National Defence. In January 1920 Faysal returned from his second journey to Europe, and a few days after his return a reception was held in his honour in the club house. The party opened with a series of

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speeches in which the speakers ruled out entirely the idea of reaching an agreement with the French, and claimed that the country must adhere to independence without any mandate or aegis. Especially forceful was 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, who presented himself as representing the feelings of the Syrians, and called for the prevention of any European power from intervening in the affairs of the country. Parts of Faysal's speech in response have already been mentioned above in the context of his status in Syria. What is interesting is that at the beginning of his speech Faysal reminded his listeners that the year before there had been a notice hanging in the club forbidding political discussions in the building. "I no longer see the notice", commented Faysal with irony. He expressed his pain that the club, which was founded for cultural and scientific purposes, had become a stage for political debates. However, he immediately found a mitigating excuse — that political circumstances were to blame for the fact that the young were neglecting their studies and becoming involved in politics. He expressed his understanding that in the current situation the young believed that defence of the fatherland came before science. Yet at the same time he warned that if they continued to abandon science and to occupy themselves in politics, they would lose their future. With this the benefit that the fatherland originally derived from the club would also be lost. And of Dr al-Shahbandar, who pretended to know the feelings of the Syrians, Faysal said: "I say that he should stick to his profession and let politicians attend to theirs." Only if everyone, politician, physician, soldier, or artisan, kept busy in the profession in which he was proficient and did all that was required of him would the nation be able to advance in an orderly manner.9 On 27 February 1920 a "General Palestine Congress" took place in the club house, in which the question of the connection between Palestine and Syria was debated. The participants were not necessarily Palestinians. The congress secretary was indeed 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, but the Damascene Badi' al-Mu'ayyad of the Syrian National Party was elected president. Also participating were representatives of the Syrian Congress, the Independence Party, the Syrian Union Party, the Committee for National Defence, al-'Ahd al-Suri and al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi (for both see Chapter 6), notables and tribal chiefs from the Hawran and Transjordan, clerics, members of the free professions, and students. The first speech was given by 'Izzat Darwaza, who succeeded in gaining a majority vote for the motion that Palestine should

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no longer be called Palestine but be considered part of Syria. Darwish Abu al-'Afiya spoke on the increase in strength of the Zionist movement in Palestine, mainly in Jerusalem — which the Zionists wanted to make their capital. Badi' al-Mu'ayyad discussed the consequences of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Yusuf al-'Isa pointed out that Palestine must belong to Syria just as Alsace-Lorraine belonged to France. A motion was also tabled to change the name of the Committee for National Defence to the "Arab National Defence Committee for Syria and Palestine". At the end of the conference the following resolutions were passed: (a) It has never occurred to the inhabitants of northern and littoral Syria to consider southern Syria (Palestine) a part separated from Syria . . . (b) The inhabitants of northern and littoral Syria have always held, and also hold now, that if the Zionist danger becomes stronger in Palestine, it will swallow up their political existence in the future . . . They oppose making Palestine a national home for the Jews. (c) The inhabitants of northern and littoral Syria vehemently oppose the appointment of a local government in Palestine before the occupying powers recognize the Palestinian demands submitted to the American commission, to the effect that Palestine shall not be separated from Syria and that Zionist immigration shall be prohibited. . . . (d) The national movement in this land demands in all its documents, letters, and resolutions the complete independence for all of Syria in its natural boundaries. Therefore, the inhabitants of northern and littoral Syria resolve that just as the goal of this movement is to drive out the conquerors from the coastal towns, so is its goal to drive out the conquerors from Palestine. A copy of the congress resolutions was sent to the British. However, in this copy the fourth clause was formulated much more generally, and in its conclusion were mentioned only the dangers to public peace resulting from the Zionist actions, and the determination of the national movement to act against anyone who should impair the unity of the country.10 From this point on the club did not carry out any activity of special importance. It was indeed among the supporters of the declaration of Syria's independence and the coronation of Faysal, but its function in this was secondary, as compared to the Independence Party, for example. The French believed that it was the central political force at the time of the al-Rikabi and al-Atasi governments established after the declaration of

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independence, and that it pushed the al-Atasi government to take extremist political stands. Yet in truth the dominant factors in Damascus politics in this period were al-Fatat on the one hand and the Committee for National Defence on the other, as explained above. The club was content with the publication of a proclamation on the fourth anniversary of the hangings of Jamal Pasha (6 May), calling upon the Syrians to follow in the footsteps of those hanged and to defend the independence and unity of Syria, "without which there is no life". The club was among those pushing for the final confrontation with the French, but in this, too, its role was not central. After the battle of Maysalun and the conquest of Syria by the French most of the club's leaders and members fled to Palestine and Egypt. The French on their part sentenced several of its leaders to death in absentia and others to prison sentences. The club itself was closed, and its building in Damascus was turned into a French headquarters.11 The most active branch of al-Nadi al-'Arabi was in Aleppo and the main activist there was Sami al-Sarraj, editor of the newspaper al-'Arab. He was not content with being a member of the club (and also of al-Fatat), but gathered several of his friends into a more clandestine organization, which he called the "Circle of Sacrifice". In January 1919 he mounted a propaganda campaign in his newspaper against French colonialism. Mark Sykes, then visiting Aleppo with Georges Picot, met members of the branch, introduced Picot to them, and advised them to take advantage of the assistance of France. He called upon them to maintain stability and to refrain from discord. But his efforts were in vain. The Muslims of Aleppo wanted independence and no foreign aegis whatsoever. The branch continued its antiFrench propaganda, and even strove to remove from the ranks of government and the army all the pro-French elements and all the Christians. The newspaper al-'Arab also conducted an intense propaganda campaign against the Armenians and against Zionism, a campaign that finally led to its being closed down. In February 1919 al-Sarraj went to Damascus to get instructions from the club leaders there. The day after his return there began in the Aleppo press an extremely hostile propaganda campaign against the Armenians. There were reports in the press about incidents that occurred between Armenians and Arabs in the regions of Adana and Alexandretta. Al-Sarraj issued instructions to ten of his faithful to spread rumours among the populace about massacres committed against Arabs by Armenian soldiers serving in the French Légion d'Orient in Cilicia. The

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military governor of Aleppo on behalf of the Arab government, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, took no steps to restrain the propaganda of the branch. On the 23rd of the month members of the branch met in the presence of the mayor and the miltary governor, and decided to hold a mass popular demonstration against the French, at which the participants would protest against the above-mentioned speech by Pichon and sign a petition in this spirit. The date for the demonstration was set for the 28th of the month. The demonstration of 28 February 1919 turned into widespread pogroms against the Armenian inhabitants of Aleppo. About 50 were killed and 150 to 200 wounded. An examination of the bodies showed that some of them were hit by Mauser bullets used by the Arab army, which raised the suspicion that soldiers, gendarmes, or policemen took part in the slaughter. Testimony from several of the wounded also supported this view. In any case it is clear that the Arab army did not try to prevent the riots nor did it take any significant steps to punish the rioters. In fact, some of the eyewitnesses to the events were arrested by the authorities in order to prevent them giving incriminating testimony.12 The British warned the executive committee of the club that they would consider them personally responsible if there were a repetition of events of this kind. This did not prevent the journalist (later author) Ma'ruf al-Arna'ut from declaring before a full coffee house in Damascus that "one must finish off the Christians. The events of Aleppo were an insufficient lesson which one must recommence in Damascus." Demands from Christian government officials to al-Rikabi that he should make an example of al-Ama'ut by punishing him bore no fruit. The Aleppo branch continued its anti-French activity even after this, and it was reported that there were contacts between its members and the Turkish nationalists then struggling against the French in Cilicia. The ties between it and the centre in Damascus continued, and in May 1920 there was a report about a mission from Damascus that visited Aleppo for consultations on the attitude to be taken towards the French. The discussions ended with a unanimous decision that war was preferable to French aegis.13 At the beginning of the period under discussion an attempt was made to set up a branch of the club in Beirut. The branch kept in regular telephone contact with the centre in Damascus. Nothing is known of any activity carried out by this branch, and it can be assumed that the French did not allow it to last for

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long. An attempt to set up a branch in Amman was, on the other hand, more successful. In February 1919 moves were begun there also to get the populace to sign protest petitions against France and in favour of absolute independence. The Circassian community in the region refrained from joining the movement, and following this one of its leaders was summoned before the military governor of Amman, Rashid al-Madfa'i, who reprimanded him for his apathy and for not working in accord with the will of the government. In a village near Amman the mukhtar was jailed until he agreed to sign. Anyone suspected of propaganda in favour of France was sought out. People suspected of lack of sympathy for the Arab government were kept under tight surveillance and harassed at every opportunity. When the King-Crane commission arrived in the region, a petition was presented to it in the name of the Amman branch in which absolute independence for Syria was demanded and it was declared that the inhabitants did not recognize any rights of the French in Syria. On the other hand, the petition expressed agreement to accepting aid from the United States or Britain.14 SYRIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN SYRIA

Faysal and Zayd were Hijazi anomalies in Syria, and the question of their status there has been discussed above. On one occasion, when Zayd ordered a Palestinian native of Nablus to be expelled from Syria, the latter reacted: "The Hijazis, who want Syria's independence, are keeping from its sons the holiest and most ancient of rights — to stay in it. And what kind of independence is it that advocates the expulsion of Syrians from Damascus so that their place can be taken by bedouins from the Hijaz?"15 This Palestinian clearly considered himself Syrian, but not all the Syrians shared this view. Besides the Syrian inhabitants of the country, there were during the years under discussion, in Damascus in particular and in Syria in general, two additional important elements: the Iraqis and the Palestinians. The question of Syrian-Iraqi relations will be discussed in Chapter 6. The following is a discussion of the status of the Palestinians in Syria during this period. There was a certain number of Palestinian activists in Damascus before the Ottomans left, and after the war other activists joined them. Some had left Palestine of their own accord, either

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assuming that Damascus was the centre of affairs and that there they would be of more influence or because of the very fact that many of them considered themselves Syrians for all purposes, and some were forced into exile in Syria after becoming entangled with the British authorities in Palestine. Many of these Palestinians were employed in government and administrative positions, and several of them reached very senior positions in the Arab government in Syria. In some of the Syrian governments established during this period there were Palestinian representatives, and during one period both the Damascus chief of police and the gendarmerie commandant were natives of Palestine. The participation of the Palestinians in Syria in the government was much greater than their representation in the population deserved. The Palestinians' status in the government aroused the feeling among certain sections of the "original" Syrian population that the Palestinians had become the rulers of Syria (Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, for example, complained directly to al-Rikabi that he was depending on foreigners in government functions and was appointing too many Palestinians to these positions.) It was clear, mainly to the upper classes, that every position held by a Palestinian meant one less position for a Syrian. (Thus, for example, when Nasib al-Bakri took his place again as adviser to Faysal, in June 1919, after an interruption of several weeks, the renewed appointment brought about the dismissal of the Palestinian 'Isa al-'Isa from the post of adviser.) Gertrude Bell, who visited Syria in October 1919, refers to a lack of sympathy among the Syrian notables for the Palestinian "upstarts", who they considered "aliens". The moderate notables complained that the Palestinians were too extremist, and that they were prepared to set all of Syria on fire for the sake of realizing their political ideologies. The slogan "Death rather than the French" did not please these notables, who did not want to die at all. However, even 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, who was considered an extremist nationalist, told Bell at that time that the Palestinians were apathetic to the welfare of the country and that their great extravagance would lead to ruin. He listed a number of Syrians who, in his opinion, were more qualified to hold the positions held by Palestinians. The tension in relations between the Syrians and the Palestinians reached its peak in January 1920, perhaps as part of the tension that prevailed at that time between those who had a positive attitude towards the agreement between Faysal and the French and those who opposed it. (As mentioned, the Syrian

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National Party, which was considered the most moderate of the parties, was founded in this month.) Several of the notables of Damascus, headed by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf (appointed at the end of the month as a member of the advisory council of the Syrian National Party), exerted heavy pressure on the government to dismiss the Palestinian office-holders, and eventually it was decided to order all Palestinians holding posts in the government to leave them and return to Palestine. The reasoning behind this was that if the Arabs of Palestine wanted to be part of Syria, then they should work from inside Palestine to realize this goal and to spread pro-Syrian propaganda there. Syria itself would continue to assist them with money and arms. A society called al-Shabiba al-Suriyya (the Syrian Youth) was founded specifically to work for the removal of Palestinian office-holders. Several of these officials did resign and leave Syria for Palestine, and it seemed that a real split was about to occur between Syrian nationalists and the Palestinians. At this point veteran alFatat member Fakhri al-Barudi intervened and succeeded in effecting a compromise between the Palestinians staying in Syria and the authorities. Several of the Palestinians designated to leave (among them 'Izzat Darwaza and Salim 'Abd al-Rahman) in the end remained in Syria and even continued to hold various senior offices.16 Following the cooling of relations between the Syrians and Palestinians orders were issued from Damascus to cease the recruiting of volunteers from Palestine for the Syrian army. However, it seems that these orders did not cause any great distress to the Arabs of Palestine. Tawfiq Hammad, for example, the head of the Nablus branch of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, did call upon the Arabs of Palestine to assist Faysal in defending the freedom of Syria, but at the same time he was opposed to sending Palestinian volunteers to the Syrian army. He probably believed that these volunteers were needed in Palestine itself. In late 1919 a Jaffa notable commented that the Syrian soldiers were "barefooted and hungry devils", and he added: God knows what will be the end of this poor army; it is so very poor as a church mouse and its supplies are the reminder of the British and Indians who camped for a time in Syria. True the British are still supporting it with arms but sooner or later it will notice that these Bedouins are not to be trusted much . . .17

As for the relations between the Palestinians and the other foreign element that participated in the government in Syria —

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the Iraqis — there is not much information. On the one hand, there is a report from October 1919, in the name of a former al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi member, mentioning quite close relations between the Palestinians and Iraqis, perhaps as a result of these two elements feeling themselves to be undesirable minorities in Syria. On the other hand, when Yasin al-Hashimi and his adjutant were walking in the streets of Jaffa in December 1919 (alHashimi being then in exile in Palestine), his adjutant was quoted as saying to a local Arab policeman who happened to be in their way: "Load your revolver you Arab son of the Palestinians who are dirty and fainthearted dogs. You people are gipsies and not worthy to be named Arabs. God blame you for your treason on your Fatherland." However, it is possible that in this specific case the adjutant was simply angry at the policeman because he was in the service of the British. The Iraqi poet Ma'ruf al-Rusafi, at the time residing in Palestine, declared before a number of Jerusalem notables in March 1920 that in the light of the troubled relations that existed in the triangle of Syrians-Iraqis-Palestinians, "I am glad that I am not a member of the National Movement for it is better to stay aside than to give a hand to such selfish people."18 The position of the Palestinians in the societies and political parties in Syria was much better. Their place in the leadership of al-Nadi al-'Arabi has already been mentioned. The position of secretary-general of al-Fatat was in 1919 held by Palestinians, first Rafiq al-Tamimi and later 'Izzat Darwaza (in 1920 the Syrian Muhammad al-Shurayqi was appointed to this post), and there were a number of Palestinians in the administrative committee of the Independence Party. Nothing is known of any complaints directed against them by their Syrian colleagues because of their Palestinian origin. However, the activity of all these organizations, whether it was pan-Arab or pan-Syrian, was not focused especially on Palestine. After all, the overwhelming majority of their members were Syrians, and what interested them first and foremost was Syria. In fact, all the Palestinians who were members of these organizations were to the last one supporters of the idea of "Greater Syria", and they did not strive for a separate independence for Palestine but to make it an integral part of Syria. "Southern Syria" they called it. But nonetheless the Palestinian activists in Syria felt that alongside their membership in the pan-Arab or pan-Syrian organizations they had to set up also a society of their own, which would work for their interests and special concerns. In early 1919 the "Palestinian Revival" society (al-Nahda

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al-Filastiniyya) was founded in Damascus. The first evidence of its existence is in March 1919 when its first president, Salim alTibi, went to Jerusalem from Damascus. Al-Tibi was a senior officer in the Arab army and the son of the mufti of Tul Karm. He took with him letters and instructions from Damascus for the Arab clubs of Jerusalem and gave a number of impassioned speeches on the subject of Arabs defending themselves to the last drop of blood. Later on he was replaced as president by Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, who was also from Tul Karm (the son of the mayor). Other leaders of the society were 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, 'Izzat Darwaza, and also Rushdi al-Shawa from Gaza, who travelled frequently between Damascus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Gaza, accompanying al-Muzaffar on his trips to Palestine, propagandizing for a revolt against the British and smuggling arms. In October 1919 it was reported that he took from Damascus to Jerusalem 100 pistols for the members of alFida'iyya (see below). Towards the end of 1919, when tension between Syrians and Palestinians was increasing, he was working in Damascus for the achievement of unity between Syrian and Palestinian youth. It was said of the Palestinian Revival society that its purpose was to free Palestine from the British. The evidence shows that its main activity consisted of being a means of communication between Damascus and the Arab clubs and societies in Palestine. Protests against the British and the Jews were transmitted by it from Palestine to Syria, and it also assisted the Arab organizations in Palestine in printing manifestos and delivered various instructions to them from Damascus.19 In early 1920 the society's activity waned. However, after the tension in Syrian-Palestinian relations had calmed down, it was decided to reactivate the society in order to create a channel of liaison and to prevent another possible split between Syria and Palestine. It is probable that the holding of the General Palestine Congress in late February in the al-Nadi al-'Arabi building in Damascus also acted as a sort of proof that the Syrians in general and the societies and political parties in particular had not lost their interest in Palestine and continued to consider it part of greater Syria. The first paragraph of the resolutions of this congress said, as already mentioned: "It has never occurred to the inhabitants of northern and littoral Syria to consider southern Syria (Palestine) a part separated from Syria . . ." Following the riots of April 1920 in Jerusalem at the time of the Nabi Musa festivities, the society passed the following resolution, which was immediately reported to Jerusalem:

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Whereas none of the nations of the world (like the Balkan) have obtained their freedom and independence but by disturbances, gangs of murderers, by murdering the leaders of their opponents, it is necessary that also Palestine should take all these means at this moment. Therefore great and renowned murderers should be brought into the country at once who will organise "gangs of marauders" and will prepare every thing for the revolution.20 A revolt did not break out in Palestine, at least not at this time. Nor did the Palestine Revival society carry out any further significant actions, and it died out during May 1920. However, following the events of April 1920 the Palestinian community in Damascus received reinforcement in the figures of the Hajj Amin al-Husayni and 'Arif al-'Arif, who had fled from Jerusalem. These two, together with Rafiq al-Tamimi, Tzzat Darwaza, Mu'in al-Madi, Ibrahim al-Qasim 'Abd al-Hadi, and Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, became the administrative committee of a new Palestinian body established in Damascus on 31 May 1920 and called the "Arab-Palestinian Society" (al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al-Filastiniyya). 'Arif al-'Arif was elected secretary-general of the new society, Tzzat Darwaza its treasurer, and Amin al-Husayni its official representative. The founding convention was held in the al-Nadi al-'Arabi building in Damascus, and the society's first action was to call upon all the Palestinian societies and clubs to unite. The society sent out letters of protest on the subject of Palestine (including one to the Pope), which principally took a stand against the decisions of the San Remo conference and the appointment of Herbert Samuel as high commissioner of Palestine. It also began to work for the holding of another Palestinian congress in Damascus, but the rapid chain of events at this time brought its plans to nought.21 After the conquest of Syria by the French the Palestinian activists fled back to Palestine. The French issued death sentences in absentia against some of them. ARAB ORGANIZATIONS IN PALESTINE

The history of Palestine in the years 1918-20 goes beyond the stated scope of this book. So also does the beginning of the process of escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the emergence of the Arab national movement in Palestine, about which many books have been written.22 The purpose of this section is to review in brief the Arab organizations that were active in this

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period in Palestine in order to complete the picture of the political organizations operating in the Levant in the two years after the First World War. In the first section of this chapter al-Nadi al-'Arabi and its branches throughout Syria were reviewed, and it was made clear that the club's activity was pan-Syrian and not just on behalf of Palestine. In Palestine, too, there was an organization called alNadi al-'Arabi, and it should be asked what connection there was between the two bodies. It has been mentioned above that Palestinian messengers from Damascus would go on tours in Palestine, bearing instructions, letters and manifestos, and sometimes also smuggling arms. Especially prominent in this activity was 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, who was president of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Syria during part of this period. (In 1923 al-Muzaffar was elected president of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Jerusalem.) It is also known that the club in Damascus supported the newspaper Suriyya al-Janubiyya, which was identified with the al-Nadi al-'Arabi of Jerusalem. (In April 1920 large quantities of paper were reported to have been sent from the club in Damascus to the newspaper's offices.) The members of al-Nadi in Jerusalem apparently considered themselves as belonging to the club in Damascus, for in March 1920, when they tried to persuade the representatives of the other Arab societies in Jerusalem of their right to head the movement, they justified this by saying that they were "a branch of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Damascus, [a society) that had acquired great strength". In April 1920 the president of al-Nadi al-'Arabi of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, and the editor of Suriyya al-Janubiyya, 'Arif al-'Arif, fled to Damascus, and it is possible that a further strengthening of relations between the two organizations occurred then.23 The centre of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Palestine was in Jerusalem, and there also was its leadership, which belonged mostly to the al-Husayni family, or at least was under its influence. This fact caused strained relations with al-Muntada al-Adabi (see below), which was under the influence of the rival Jerusalem family, the al-Nashashibi. In general, al-Nadi al-'Arabi was an organization of young people, though its participants also included clerics (such as the preacher of the Mosque of 'Umar) and heads of educational institutions (the headmaster of the Rawdat al-Ma'arif school and the headmaster of the Muslim orphanage in Jerusalem). In March 1920 its membership was estimated to be 540. An estimate based on data from June 1920 spoke of only 400 members, and apparently this fall in numbers can be tied to the decline in the activity of al-Nadi al-'Arabi after the

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events of April 1920 and the flight of its leader to Damascus. Al-Nadi strove for the unity of Syria and saw Palestine as southern Syria. It vehemently opposed Zionism and Jewish immigration, but its attitude towards the British was quite moderate, some say even pro-British. The reason for this was the fact that members of the al-Husayni family held various senior offices in Jerusalem and therefore were dependent to no small extent on the British authorities. When circumstances changed and the Husaynis lost these positions, al-Nadi became sharply anti-British. The change in circumstances in Syria, that is, its conquest by the French, also brought about the abandonment of the "Syrian" ideology of al-Nadi and its focusing on Palestine alone. Al-Nadi was founded in 1918, but its significant activity began in 1919. It engaged in social and cultural work, but most of its activity was in the political sphere. When it started out al-Nadi cooperated with the parallel society in Jerusalem, al-Muntada al-Adabi, on account of the identity in principle in their national goals. The two societies appeared together before the KingCrane commission when it visited Palestine, and they also organized joint petitions in favour of Syrian unity and against Zionism. Thus, for example, they presented a joint petition to the military governor of Jerusalem in December 1919, in which they declared that "Southern Syria forms a part of the United Syria beginning from Taurus to Rafa, the separation of which we do not tolerate under any circumstances, and we are well prepared to sacrifice ourselves towards its defense with all our powers." This joint activity came to an end in April 1920. Following the riots Musa Kazim al-Husayni was dismissed from his office as mayor of Jerusalem. Raghib al-Nashashibi dared to accept the position in his stead, and a lasting quarrel between the two families began. Another problem with which al-Nadi had to contend in the first months of 1920 was the question of the attitude towards the Christian Arabs. At a joint meeting with representatives of other societies held in March 1920 in Jerusalem, extremely sharp remarks were heard against the Christians. An al-Nadi member, 'Abd al-Samad al-'Alami, said: "I tell you openly to keep away from the Christians, who are greater enemies of ours than the Jews. Indeed, they do have great power which could be of much help to our movement, but we do not need their help if we openly appear in the name of Islam alone. We must appeal to Muslims throughout world and ask their help." Another al-Nadi member, Ishaq Darwish, who presided over this meeting,

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expressed opposition to these views, and ended the discussion with a warning that if the Muslims separated from the Christians there would be a danger that the Christians would join the Jews, and then the situation would be really bad. Ja'far al-'Askari, who visited the al-Nadi house in Jerusalem several days later, urged the members of its executive committee to work for the unity of the people and not to separate from the Christians because such a split would destroy all that they were working for. In May 1920 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar visited al-Nadi in Jerusalem, on one of his many visits, perhaps to encourage its members after the flight of their leader. He explained to them that the country had been conquered by the British only because "the Turks had an internal enemy, the Arabs". Ninety thousand Arab deserters from the Ottoman army and Arab dodging of Ottoman taxes had paved the way for the British conquest. But the British should know that if they fought for three years against the Boers, they would have to fight ten times as long against the Arabs. Despite Muzaffar's impassioned words, the activity of al-Nadi in the second half of 1920 declined. The organization continued to exist until 1923.24 Jerusalem was, as mentioned, the centre of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Palestine. Branches of various sizes were founded in Gaza (existing apparently only in 1919), Hebron, Nablus, Tul Karm, and the Galilee. The Nablus branch appears to have been the most important of them, and in early 1919 it was also the strongest political force there (this status being taken later by the local branch of al-Muntada al-Adabi). The president of the Nablus branch was Tawfiq Hammad, a man with influence over the Arab government officials in the town, an influence he used to gather information on the British administration which he sent to Damascus. He preached revolt against the British, and during the visit of the King-Crane commission he carried out propaganda in favour of an autonomous Palestine under American aegis. The Nablus branch apparently continued to exist even after the disintegration of the centre in Jerusalem. In Tul Karm there was an organization with a similar name, al-Nadi alWatani (the National Club), which worked in coordination with the local branches of both al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada alAdabi (at one period it was annexed to al-Muntada al-Adabi in Jerusalem as a branch). The organization had been founded in 1918 and was headed by an executive committee of four members. Many members participated, most of them young, and it openly disseminated anti-British propaganda in its region. At the time of the visit of the King-Crane commission the organization

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held many public meetings against the British. It was supported by Salim 'Abd al-Rahman, president of the Palestinian Revival society in Damascus and a senior member of al-Nadi al-'Arabi there, who was the son of the mayor of Tul Karm. (When he fled to Palestine after the conquest of Syria by the French, he became one of the leaders of al-Nadi al-Watani.) In early 1920 the organization's activity weakened, and the number of members declined after many of them left Tul Karm to pursue their education. Later on the organization remained the only active political body in Tul Karm, and then changed its name to alNadi al-'Arabi al-Watani (the National Arab Club). The organization died out in the latter half of 1923.25 Parallel to al-Nadi al-'Arabi, as regards manpower, ideology, and influence on the Arab population of Palestine, was alMuntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club). This organization was founded on 28 January 1918 by two rich young men of Jerusalem, Hana Ayyub and Hasan Sidqi al-Dajjani, for purposes that in fact were completely different from those that characterized it in the course of its history. It was called at the beginning Muqtataf al-Durus ("the Selection of Lessons"), and its aim was ostensibly to protect Arab interests in Palestine. However, its secret goal was to serve as a means of spreading pro-French propaganda in the region. French sources gave the new organization a basic grant of 30 Egyptian pounds and promised it a monthly budget for expenses of 15 Egyptian pounds. Al-Dajjani, and another activist named Ahmad al-Khatib, became in effect French agents and received a monthly salary from the French consul in Jerusalem. Within a few months the true goal of the organization was revealed, at which point many members, who had innocently joined it for its avowed goal, left. It seemed that the organization was about to disintegrate, but one of its original members, Yusuf al-Khatib, decided that the only way to save the organization was by reorganizing it and changing its purpose. He gathered a dozen activists, all from the al-Nashashibi family or under its influence, and recommenced activities. Twelve members were elected as an administrative committee, and Fakhri al-Nashashibi was elected its secretary and treasurer and from then on was its chief activist in Jerusalem. It was decided to give up the French financial assistance, and within a short time in its place came aid from the Arab government of Damascus (over 500 Egyptian pounds). The purpose of the organization was changed, and it was decided that it would be a national organization to prepare the Arabs of Palestine for the demand of autonomy and union with Syria. In November 1918 its name

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was changed to al-Muntada al-Adabi (after an Arab national club that had existed in Istanbul before the war), in order to demonstrate its severance from French influence. Hasan Sidqi al-Dajjani and Ahmad al-Khatib secretly continued to be French agents. When this became known to their comrades a few months later, the two were thrown out of the organization. AlDajjani set up the al-Muntada al-Dajjani, a rather inactive organization which served as the national society of the alDajjani family. Al-Muntada al-Adabi in Jerusalem was definitely under the influence of the al-Nashashibi family. Many of its leaders came from the family (Fakhri, Is'af, and others), or from families connected to it (such as the al-Khalidi family). Most of its members were young Muslims. The number of Christians was small. Other participants included several educationists (including the headmaster of the Rashidiyya school) and former army and police officers. In March 1920 its membership was estimated at 635. An estimate based on data from June 1920 spoke of only 110 members. The reasons for this drastic decline will be explained later.26 Al-Muntada al-Adabi had a constitution consisting of 52 articles. The first article indicated that the organization was an Arab and not a religious club, the goal of which was to work for the good of the Arab nation, to revive its greatness, and to propagate unity within it. However, no concrete national goals were indicated. The first article also stated that its purpose was "to establish useful institutions, literary, scientific, artistic, social, agricultural, domestic, commercial, economic, and hygienic". It had a literary committee, whose function was to work for the revival of the Arabic language, to arrange lectures on scientific, literary, artistic, and social subjects, to develop the organization's library and to supervise its reading room (Arts. 10, 31, 42, 48, and 49); a drama committee, whose function was to compose and present plays and to translate plays from foreign languages into Arabic (Arts. 10 and 32); an orchestra committee, whose functions included obtaining musical instruments, developing Arabic music, and disseminating national songs among the people (Arts. 10 and 33); and a gymnastics committee, whose functions were to obtain exercise equipment, to train the youth to exercise, and to organize sports competitions (Arts. 10 and 34). Also mentioned in the constitution was the society's duty to demand that the government further education and schools (Art. 47). It should be noted in this context that the schools in Jerusalem were centres of activity for al-Muntada.

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Yet all the same, al-Muntada al-Adabi was first and foremost a political organization. It strove like al-Nadi al-'Arabi for Syrian unity and saw Palestine as southern Syria. In contrast to alNadi, al-Muntada was from its beginning extremely anti-British, until the upheaval that befell its position in April 1920 when Raghib al-Nashashibi accepted the post of mayor of Jerusalem. (Fakhri was then appointed assistant to the governor of Jerusalem.) From then on the two organizations exchanged positions, with the al-Muntada leaders supporting the British, and the alNadi leaders vehemently opposing them. Like al-Nadi, alMuntada al-Adabi opposed any form of Zionism or Jewish immigration and any promise given to the Zionists concerning Palestine. It also demanded the cancellation of the foreign capitulations in Palestine. In 1919 al-Muntada was considered the strongest propaganda force in Jerusalem. But it was not satisfied with that. It worked to bring the fellahs into the national movement, and some say that it performed a similar activity among the bedouins of Transjordan. By means of the two secret and more violent societies, al-Ikha' wal-'Afaf and al-Fida'iyya, it strove to arm its members with light weapons and tried to persuade policemen and gendarmes to turn over weapons to it, or at least not to oppose it were a revolt to break out in the event that the British decided on a pro-Zionist policy. For this purpose it also tried to concentrate Palestinian officers in Amman, so that they would be ready if needed. It was also reported that the organization (by means of the societies mentioned above) was involved in preparing lists of names and addresses of prominent Jews and pro-Zionist non-Jews, and that the organization made sure that some of its members learned Hebrew in order to be able to monitor the Hebrew press and the conversations of Jews.27 Just before the arrival of the King-Crane commission to Palestine al-Muntada al-Adabi carried out a comprehensive propaganda campaign to persuade the inhabitants to demand the independence of a Syria in which Palestine would be included. Al-Muntada propagandists went from town to town for this purpose. The result was that the Arabs of Palestine firmly rejected Zionism and Jewish immigration, and many of them also expressed opposition to the British occupation. A delegation from al-Muntada appeared before the King-Crane commission together with a delegation from al-Nadi al-'Arabi, but it seems that at the time of the commission's visit it was al-Muntada which had the senior role in spreading national propaganda. Some say that at this time the members of al-Muntada began to

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discuss the possibility of organizing a revolt if their demands were not met. Afterwards Fakhri al-Nashashibi, the dominant figure in the organization, went to Damascus to strengthen the organization's ties with Faysal. Faysal urged him not to strain relations with the British too much, because the Arabs needed British help in their struggle against the Jews. Fakhri followed Faysal's advice in part. Incitement against the British continued, but at the same time the organization's leaders tried to establish cordial relations with senior British office-holders, particularly with Ronald Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem. Article 44 of the al-Muntada constitution stated: "The society strives to strengthen the brotherhood and friendship among Arabs." It appears that the organization did not succeed in this task. In the early months of 1920 young Muslim members began to demand the removal of the Christians and the changing of the base of the movement in Palestine to an Islamic one. This phenomenon existed also in al-Nadi al-'Arabi, but appeared in a more serious form in al-Muntada. The Muslim youths succeeded in ensuring that no Christian was elected to the administrative committee of al-Muntada, and at a meeting in March it was even proposed to remove all Christians from the society ("They report all our secrets to the government"). However, during March the club leadership had to contend with a much more serious danger. The Husaynis, the leaders of al-Nadi al-'Arabi, decided to take over al-Muntada al-Adabi. Their plan was to do this by an internal take-over, which would be accomplished by pro-Husayni youths who were members of both groups. (In fact, al-Nadi al-'Arabi ordered its members to join al-Muntada deliberately in order to carry out this plan.) Thus it happened that within al-Muntada a strong opposition to the Nashashibi leadership emerged and demanded its removal. The events of April 1920, which ended in the dismissal of the Husayni mayor of Jerusalem and his replacement by a Nashashibi mayor, caused the complete and final split between the two families and the paralysis of al-Muntada, many of whose members, it turned out, supported the Husaynis. In late April a letter came to al-Muntada from Damascus (signed by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar and Salim 'Abd alRahman) in which they were asked to keep track of the British authorities in Palestine and to report on them to Damascus. In the letter it was promised that messengers from Damascus would come to Palestine to guide the organization. In May al-Muntada held a meeting, with the participation of members of alFida'iyya, in which it was decided to kill Herbert Samuel when

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he arrived in the country. However, all these happenings were but the last gasps of the organization. In the latter half of 1920 its activity declined. It continued to exist until 1923, but only as a small and inactive organization of the al-Nashashibi family and its supporters. 28 Jerusalem was, as mentioned, the centre of al-Muntada alAdabi. Branches or at least representations were opened in 15 additional towns in Palestine, among them Gaza, Hebron, Ramla, Lydda, Jaffa, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa, Tiberias, and Safed. Heading the Gaza branch in early 1919 was Rushdi al-Shawa, who has already been mentioned as a liaison man between Palestine and Syria. He incited the bedouins in his region against the British, and at the time of the King-Crane visit he carried out propaganda in the region for the removal of the British from Palestine. The Arab government officials in Gaza and the region were giving him information about the British administration, which he would transmit to Damascus. It was also reported that he was smuggling arms into the Gaza region. The Gaza branch disintegrated during the course of 1919 as the result of differences of opinion among the notables who participated in it. The Jaffa branch was apparently the largest of the branches. It was established in early May 1919 with the approval of the governor of the town on condition that it engage only in matters of education and culture and not in anything connected with politics. However, within a short time the branch commenced a widespread propaganda campaign against the British occupation, and it began to lead the nationalist movement in the town. Public meetings were held, signatures were collected on protests against the British administration, and it was also reported that arms were being smuggled into the region. On 18 May a conference was held in the local cinema to draw up a stand regarding the demands to be presented before the international commission that was due to arrive shortly. The participants called openly for Arab independence and the removal of British soldiers from Palestine. Calls of the type, "Down with the British", were made by the leadership. The meeting was dispersed by the military governor, who ordered the closure of the branch the very same day. Fakhri al-Nashashibi was immediately called to the town, and he managed to persuade the governor to allow the reopening of the branch, in exchange for a promise that the members would not become involved in any further anti-British incitement. When the KingCrane commission arrived in town, a delegation of the branch met it and demanded complete independence, without a

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mandate, for a Syria united with Palestine. The delegation also expressed its opposition to Zionism. From a financial viewpoint the branch was in a very bad condition, its leaders having embezzled its funds. Performances which it put on did not improve the situation, and the centre in Jerusalem was obliged to send the branch 25 Egyptian pounds to cover current expenses. The situation was different in the Nablus branch under the leadership of Mayor 'Umar Zu'aytar. Its members came from among the town's notables and rich, and its financial situation was said to be "splendid". This branch was considered in the last months of 1919 to be the strongest political body in Nablus.29 In addition to the two open organizations, al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi, there were also in Palestine two violent secret societies, al-Ikha' wal-'Afaf and al-Fida'iyya, which to a large extent were the ones that carried out the decisions of the first two organizations. The existence of al-lkha' wal-'Afaf ("the Brotherhood and Purity") was already known of in early 1919, and it was then considered to be under the direct orders of alMuntada al-Adabi. In fact, it was reported then that all its leaders were also members of al-Muntada. Later on, when the strength of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Palestine increased, the society apparently became a tool in that organization's hands. The president of the society was Sheikh Sa'id al-Khatib, a headmaster of a school, in whose home in Jerusalem meetings of the society were occasionally held. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar was mentioned as being one of the founders of the society, and there are several testimonies to his connections with this society. The society had an executive committee of 13 members, which included besides the president, a secretary, a treasurer, fund collectors, and some of the founding members. The number of members in early 1919 was estimated at 200, and in June 1920 at 100. (Membership lists of May 1920 contain almost 130 names.) However, what is interesting in the socio-economic composition of the membership is the large number of police officers, policemen, and gendarmes, present or past, who took part in it. Some of these were angry over the loss of income from bribery, a perquisite which had been acceptable in Ottoman times, others had been dismissed from the service by the British following manpower reductions, or had their salary reduced, and all of them were apprehensive about the Arabs being dismissed from the ranks of the police altogether in the event that the ruling power were turned over to the Jews. Most of them were anti-British and were described by the British as violent propagandists and cut-throats. The British, who were perplexed by the mass

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involvement of police in the society, finally decided not to dismiss them from the service, in the assumption that as long as they were employed as policemen it would be possible to keep an eye on them. This decision had lamentable results at the time of the riots of April 1920.30 The society's main activity was in Jerusalem. Its function was to distribute manifestos, to arrange security for meetings and to make sure that the people required would indeed get to these meetings, and also to organize demonstrations. Several of its members had various quantities of weapons, and it seems that the society took part in acts of terror. It was also reported that one of its activists was spreading anti-British propaganda among the bedouins of Transjordan. The fact that many of its members were employed in the Palestine police, several of them in senior ranks of command, contributed to its being kept up-to-date on what was happening in the police. A restaurant near Jaffa Gate was known to serve as a secret meeting place for society messengers and a senior Arab police officer, who updated them daily on what was happening in the Jerusalem police. In the riots against the Jews in the Old City of Jerusalem on 4 April 1920, at the time of the Nabi Musa festivities, several policemen, members of the society, took an active part. It was reported that an officer and three gendarmes did not prevent the robbing of stores and even joined the looters. An officer and a sergeant were reported to have prevented Arabs from slipping away from the scene of the riots, shouting at them, "Go and help your brothers". Six policemen gave out arms to the rioters, and one even gave his personal pistol. Two others did not prevent the murder of a Jew right in front of them. After the riots, two members of the society, one of them a police commander, warned 'Arif al-'Arif of al-Nadi al-'Arabi that the authorities were about to arrest him for inciting the riots. This warning allowed al-'Arif to escape to Damascus. After the authorities arrested those who had assisted al-'Arif to escape the society decided that it had to free them by force. It sent letters to all the other societies demanding that they work for the release of those arrested. Concurrently the society also asked the other societies to include two of its representatives on each of their committees, a demand which testifies to the strength of the society at this time. (As regards relations between the society and the other secret society, al-Fida'iyya, it was reported in June 1919 that the latter was receiving instructions from the former.)31 Al-Fida'iyya ("The Self-Sacrificers") was founded in late February 1919 in Jaffa, under the name al-Kaff al-Sawda' ("The

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Black Hand"), following fears that arose concerning the future of the country as a result of the Paris peace conference. The goal was to unite the Arab youths of Jaffa in a demand for and activity directed towards the removal of the British from the country, bringing it under the rule of the Sharifs and putting an end to Jewish aspirations. During the month of March contacts began between the society and other Arab organizations, and it became a sort of executive arm, carrying out of the decisions and plans of al-Muntada al-Adabi and al-Nadi al-'Arabi. In late May 1919 the name of the society was changed to al-Fida'iyya. Most of its members were Muslims (the most prominent among them being Raghib al-Dajjani and others from the al-Dajjani family, and also many members of the al-Shanti family), but there were also Christians — Greek Orthodox (mainly from the al-'Isa family). The founding nucleus of the society numbered six men, drawn from the notables of Jaffa. In early September the society in Jaffa already had 36 registered members, besides the various underworld characters, among them thieves, robbers, and murderers, whom it paid for the practical execution of its decisions. In March 1920 the number of members in the whole country was already estimated at 300. The principal function of the society was to select and prepare violent young men who showed a readiness to sacrifice themselves for the defence of the country, to be the ones to carry out the various decisions of the society, whatever they might be. They had to take an oath to do whatever they were told, whether to murder people or to start a revolt. It was planned that a revolt should break out if the peace conference decided not to turn over Palestine to the Arabs. In the event of such a decision these youths would start liquidating the Jews and British government officials. Another duty placed on them was to start provocations when needed, especially during demonstrations, in order to create a pretext for entering into confrontation with the Jews and to start riots. In the home of society member Dr Ibrahim Hammami a centre was set up for briefing these youths and for training them in the use of arms. Arms were available to the society in considerable quantities from various sources, Syria among them. (Thus, for example, it was reported in January 1920 that a society member had managed to obtain in Syria dynamite worth 1,200 pounds.) In addition to the above activities the society engaged in propaganda, having a propaganda department which employed agents for the purpose of incitement among the Arab public. The society strove to carry out all these operations with maximum secrecy. Society member

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'Isa al-Sifri devised a cipher for correspondence between society branches, and the letters themselves were sent via special runners, and not by post. It is known that the Jerusalem branch used special methods of identification among its members, such as putting four fingers on a knee when a meeting of members took place during daylight hours, or saying three times "you, you, you" when a meeting occurred at night. The identification signs were changed frequently.32 A study of the society's operations during 1919 provides a clear indication of the nature of its activities, and shows that it was apparently the most violent society among the Arab organizations in Palestine. Its first public action after its founding was to spread a manifesto among the Arabs of Jaffa, in which they were warned to stop the danger before it became strong and to kill the snake while it was still young. The nature of the danger was not explicitly stated in the manifesto, but at the corners of the paper separate letters were scattered, which when put together gave the word ZION (in the original: SaHYUN). When one of the founders left the society in early March, two communications were sent to him in its name. One had on it a Zionist stamp, and attached to it was the question as to whether the one leaving agreed to the existence of this stamp. In the second he was simply threatened with violent death if he should come to the aid of the Zionists. In May several Jaffa notables who were suspected of sympathy towards the British received the following letter: "You are traitors on your Fatherland and have sold your souls to the strangers. Know that your time to live is short for you shall be killed in due course by order of our prophet, who instructed us to exterminate every traitor." The letters were signed "Mount Hell" (Jabal Jahannam), which was one of the signatures of the society. In late July a number of society members toured all the streets of the Jewish settlement, Petach Tikva, probably for intelligence purposes, as a part of preparations for a possible uprising. At a meeting held in the home of Ibrahim Hammami in August, the society decided that if the peace conference should give the mandate over Palestine to the British, and the latter were to grant a special status to the Jews, then a revolution would break out. The revolution would be led by members of the society, and it would be assisted in terms of manpower and money by the Arab government of Damascus. It was also decided that if the British should open the land registry office (and thereby make it possible for Zionists to acquire land), then the society would start riots all over the country. In early September it was decided to try to gain as

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much assistance as possible from the French in the struggle against the British. It was also decided then to locate ten skilled assassins, who would be ready for any operation given to them to do, in exchange for a salary of 30 Egyptian pounds a month and aid for their families in case of an accident. At the end of the month the society members heard a speech by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, in which he spelled out to them that the goals of the Zionists were to pillage the Muslim lands, to enslave thenwives and children, and to strangle and eliminate every one of them.33 Jaffa served as the centre of the al-Fida'iyya society until September 1919. In that month a general convention of society members was held in Nablus, with the participation of representatives of most of the branches, and it was decided that the society centre should move to Nablus. The Nablus branch of the society was considered the strongest, and it excelled in propaganda operations and collection of funds. It was agreed by the branch that any member who betrayed it would be executed by its members. Heading the branch was 'Abd al-Rahman Muhtada and one of its central activists was Munib 'Abd al-Hadi, who was engaged in gathering arms and hiding them in a cave in the region. The latter also sent intelligence information to Damascus about the movements of the British army. At the general conference held in Nablus it was also decided that the Nablus branch would supply 2,500 rifles to the other branches, which it would collect in the Nablus region, or would import from the Hawran. It was also decided to establish regular contact between the centre in Nablus and the other branches and Damascus, and that the centre in Nablus would send ten representatives to any place where riots would break out. In conclusion it was decided that should Zionist leaders come to the country, another conference would be held in Nablus to discuss measures to be taken. A large branch of the society also existed in Jerusalem. Its founder was the gendarme, Mahmud Dabbagh, and several of its other members were policemen or gendarmes. The actual leader of the branch was Mahmud 'Aziz al-Khalidi and its official president was Raghib al-Nashashibi. It is interesting that, despite the participation of a number of members of the al-Nashashibi family in the branch, there were also members from the alHusayni family there. The branch had permanent contact with the other branches, and especially with the Jaffa and Nablus branches. It also planned to create contacts with the nationalist circles in Egypt. The espionage and intelligence department of the society was located in the Jerusalem branch (here, too, there

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were members from the al-Husayni, the al-Nashashibi, and the al-Dajjani families). It was engaged in keeping track of the actions and plans of the Jews and the British. Before the Nabi Musa festivities of 1919 the branch took care to bring to Jerusalem the largest possible number of youths, in the hope of exploiting the event for an attack on the Jews. Those who refrained from coming to Jerusalem were defined by the branch as traitors to their people and their fatherland. Significant branches of the society existed also in Gaza (under the presidency of Rushdi al-Shawa) and in Ramla. It is also known that branches existed in Hebron, Lydda, Tul Karm, and the Galilee. The principal activities of the society took place in 1919 and early 1920, but it appears to have continued to exist, at least in some of its branches, until 1923. During these years the society was under the absolute influence of the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. 34 The Muslim-Christian societies formed in the towns of Palestine in late 1918 were different from all the societies listed above, both in composition and in methods of operation, and also, to a great extent, in ideology. The first of the Muslim-Christian societies was the society of Jaffa, founded in early November 1918 on the initiative of 'Ali al-Mustaqim, who was serving at the time as an agent of the head of British intelligence in Jaffa. Some say that this British officer assisted in founding the society, and it seems that in general the British authorities viewed with favour the establishment of the Muslim-Christian societies because they considered them to be moderate and moderating elements in the population. About a fortnight after the founding of the Jaffa society the one in Jerusalem was founded. The two societies began their public activity by submitting petitions to the British authorities against Zionism and its aspirations. The petitions followed a parade and festivities arranged by the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. The Muslim-Christian societies were an attempt at cooperative work between the Muslims and Christians of Palestine. They were made up of traditional public leaders such as the heads of important families and the religious communities, Muslim and Christian, with the latter having a representation greater than their proportional strength in the population. (It should be pointed out that not in every town did the Christians participate in the society.) The membership was estimated in March 1920 at about 200. A later estimate based on the data from June 1920 spoke of 650 members in the societies in the Galilee, Samaria,

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Jerusalem, Hebron, and Gaza. The difference in the estimates is large, and can perhaps be explained by the fact that the first estimate dated from March, when the al-Nadi al-'Arabi and alMuntada al-Adabi societies reached their peak, while the second estimate was from the period after the events of April when the decline in the activity of these two societies had already begun. The Muslim-Christian societies formulated a joint constitution of 28 articles, according to which the societies would work in two parallel channels, with Jerusalem as the centre for both. On the one hand there was the "Moslem Christian Society in Jerusalem" which focused its interest on the Jerusalem region alone, and on the other hand there was the "Palestine Moslem Christian Society", to which the Muslim-Christian societies of the other towns belonged, and they worked for Palestine in general. Despite the connection between the other societies and the centre in Jerusalem the committees heading them were independent in their decisions and operations. The Jerusalem centre of the General Palestine Society was to be made up of two representatives from each of the Muslim-Christian societies in the towns of Palestine. It was to convene once every three months (Arts. 1-3 and 5). The administrative committee of the Jerusalem society, which was to serve as an example for the committees of the others, was made up of ten Muslims, ten Christians (five Latin and five Greek Orthodox), and 20 representatives from the surrounding villages. It was to meet once a month (Arts. 14 and 19). The administrative committee included four subcommittees: an education committee, a technical and agricultural committee, a committee for commerce and economics, and a committee for general affairs. The last was supposed to deal with all the social, cultural, and poHtical questions connected with the welfare of the country, and also to make peace and to arbitrate between quarrelling residents (Art. 15). Article 4 of the constitution stated: "The object of this society is to look after the interests of Palestine generally . . .", and Article 12 provided: "The purpose of this society is to elevate the interests of the country (Palestine) connected with agriculture, technics, economics and commerce, the revival of science, the education of the youth and the protection of national rights, morally and materially." However, in the end, the MuslimChristian societies in practice engaged in political affairs, and not in social, educational, and economic ones, despite the impression one might get from their constitution. The Muslim members were in favour of independence (to what kind of independence they strove will be explained later), the Latins were pro-French

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(and there are those who say that some of them served as paid propagandists for the French), and the Greek Orthodox were pro-British. All were opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration.35 In early February 1919 the First Palestine Congress was held in Jerusalem. The differences of opinion voiced there indicated the differences between the national conception of the MuslimChristian societies and that of al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi. The congress was to have taken place from 27 January to 7 February, but because of various delays it was actually opened on 1 February, with the participation of 28 delegates from Gaza, Jerusalem, Ramla, Lydda, Jaffa, Nablus and Jama'in, Tul Karm, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa, Tiberias, and Safed. The Muslim 'Arif al-Dajjani (head of the Muslim-Christian Society of Jerusalem) was elected president of the congress, and the vice-president was the Greek Orthodox from Jaffa, Yusuf al-'Isa. The purposes of the congress were to compose a joint resolution concerning the aspirations of the Arab population of Palestine for the political future of the country, to discuss the Zionist question and the attitude towards it, and to choose a delegation to present the resolutions of the congress before the Paris peace conference. On the subject of Zionism there was unanimity of opinion among the participants, and on 3 February a resolution was drawn up to protest before the peace conference against the promise given to the Zionists that they might establish a national home in Palestine, and against Jewish immigration in general. On the subject of the future of the country, on the other hand, sharp differences of opinion became apparent among the various groups. Pressures were exerted on the congress participants by various political sectors. Members of al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi pushed for the passage of a resolution defining Palestine as southern Syria and demanding the absolute independence of all parts of a united Syria. The Jerusalem delegation headed by the congress president 'Arif al-Dajjani opposed the idea of the union of Palestine with Syria and insisted on the formula, "Palestine for the Palestinians". They also displayed a pro-British leaning and were even prepared to agree to British aegis if independence were not achieved. There were also some pro-French delegates in the congress. Other differences of opinion appeared between townsmen and villagers, the latter demanding an Arab empire under Husayn's rule and even threatening to leave the congress. In the end, on 5 February, a list of resolutions was proposed which was intended to satisfy most of

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the participants (except for the pro-French), but it actually aroused many opponents, some of whom refused to sign it. It included a declaration defining Palestine as southern Syria and as an integral part of northern Syria; a demand that Syria (including Palestine) be absolutely independent without any aegis or foreign influence; a protest against the speech of French Foreign Minister Pichon of 29 December 1918 concerning the rights of France in Syria; and an announcement that the government of the country would request Britain to assist it in developing the country, on condition that this assistance would not impair its independence. The article in the resolutions that aroused most opposition was the changing of the name of Palestine to Southern Syria. Leading the protesters were the Jerusalem delegates, and joining them were the delegates from Gaza and Haifa. They published a declaration that they were in favour of an independent Palestine which would be able to administer its own affairs and would be connected to Syria only by a cultural tie. This Palestine would be under the protection of Britain. In fact, all the Jerusalem delegates except one refused to sign the resolutions of the congress. Moreover, the Christian members were in general not happy with the idea that they would be under the absolute rule of Syria, without any outside protection (at one stage the Christian participants of the congress were considering leaving it). On 10-11 February the Muslim-Christian Society of Jerusalem convened and publicly protested against the resolution that Palestine should be called Southern Syria and should be united with Northern Syria. It also forced the Jerusalem delegate who had agreed to sign the resolutions to announce the withdrawal of his signature from them.36 In the First Palestine Congress there thus found expression the two central nationalist streams in Palestine at the time: the stream that strove for union of Palestine with Syria and did not consider Palestine an independent unit — a trend represented by al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi; and the stream that strove for an independent or autonomous Palestine (with the possibility of British aegis) and was represented by the MuslimChristian societies — mainly by the one from Jerusalem. In 1919 and in the first half of 1920 the supporters of the idea of Syria's unity had the upper hand, with the particularists pushed to the sidelines. On the eve of the arrival of the King-Crane commission the Muslim-Christian Society of Jerusalem distributed a petition, by means of which it wanted to receive authorization from the

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inhabitants that it should represent them before the commission. In the petition there was indeed a demand for the absolute independence of all of Syria, from the Taurus mountains in the north to the Red Sea in the south and from the Euphrates in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. But at the same time it was demanded that Palestine (which would be included in the united Syria) should enjoy independent internal government, choose its rulers from among its local inhabitants, and legislate its laws by itself. Complete opposition was also expressed for the idea of a Jewish national home, for Jewish immigration, and for the Zionist movement. When the King-Crane commission arrived in Palestine, a delegation from the Muslim-Christian Society of Jerusalem appeared before it and demanded an independent Syrian government within the boundaries mentioned above, but at the same time, when it was asked its opinion on the rest of Syria, Iraq, and the Hijaz, it answered: "This matter is the concern of the Syrian Congress which will assemble in Damascus." When asked what the Arabs would do if Zionist immigration continued, it answered: "We will throw the Zionists into the sea, or else they will return us to the desert." After the commission left, the Jerusalem society continued to send letters and telegrams to the British authorities and to Europe, in which it protested against the intention of turning Palestine into a Jewish national home. It demanded that the will of millions of inhabitants should not be ignored for the sake of a few Zionists.37 On 27 November 1919 a meeting was held in Haifa of representatives of al-Nadi al-'Arabi of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Tul Karm, al-Muntada al-Adabi of Jerusalem and Jaffa, the MuslimChristian Society of Tiberias, the Muslim Society of Haifa, and a society from Nazareth. It was decided to combine the societies into a single country-wide movement by setting up the Supreme Committee of the Palestinian Societies (al-Lajna al-'Ulya lilJam'iyyat al-Filastiniyya). This Committee had three centres, in Haifa, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and participating in it were representatives of the above-mentioned societies, which were to be subordinate to the Committee. The Committee was to be the coordinating body among the societies, to take care of sources of finance, and to establish contacts with Syria by means of the Palestinian Revival society in Damascus. Its objects were to organize an open struggle against the Zionists, to prepare a revolt against the British if they should act contrary to Arab aspirations (this was to be done by the Nablus centre), and to spread pro-Syrian propaganda among the Arabs of Palestine to

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persuade them that Palestine had no chance of sustaining itself separately from Syria. An attempt by the Committee to recruit Palestinian youths for the Syrian army did not go very well. The fact that the new body was identified as the coordinating framework of the societies striving for Syria's unity constrained the Muslim-Christian societies of Jerusalem and Jaffa, which had particularist tendencies, from participating in it.38 In the first months of 1920 the Muslim-Christian Society of Nablus sent off a number of protests to the peace conference in which it objected to the plans to separate Palestine from Syria. It claimed that these plans were intended "to tear the Arab lands into pieces". The Muslim-Christian societies were at the time in no small straits since Muslim youths had begun to argue that it was necessary to remove the Christians from the national societies and to give the national movement an Islamic slant. There were those who suggested that the Muslim-Christian societies should be completely abolished. It is possible, therefore, that the pro-Syrian tendencies that appeared in the above-mentioned protests were an attempt by the Muslim-Christian societies to integrate into the dominant trend of the time in the Palestinian streets, led by al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi. However, in July 1920 everything changed. The end of the independent Syrian state and the conquest of Syria by the French brought the nationalist circles in Palestine to a moment of reckoning. They understood that they now had to get away from the idea of greater Syria. In late July a joint meeting was held in Jerusalem of representatives of the Muslim-Christian Society, al-Nadi al-'Arabi, and al-Muntada al-Adabi, and after a discussion of the situation it was decided "that the Movement in Palestine must be separated from Syria owing to the abnormal situation there". The societies that supported Syrian unity were forced under the circumstances to abandon this position, and in the course of August-September the view was generally accepted that there was then nothing left for the Palestinians but to focus on Palestine alone. This situation strengthened the MuslimChristian societies which had always comprised the particularist element among the nationalist circles, and weakened al-Nadi al-'Arabi and al-Muntada al-Adabi which were identified with the idea of Syrian unity. The year 1920 ended with the MuslimChristian societies holding the senior position among the Arab political organizations in Palestine.39

Chapter 5 POLITICAL ACTIVITY OUTSIDE SYRIA FAYSAL IN EUROPE

Faysal arrived in Damascus on 3 October 1918 and left it for the last time on 28 July 1920. Of the almost 22 months of his rule in Syria he spent nine months and ten days in Europe. His first visit there was from 22 November 1918 to 30 April 1919, and his second from 12 September 1919 to 14 January 1920. On 11 November 1918 Faysal visited Aleppo for the first time after its liberation from the Ottomans. He added to his retinue Nuri al-Sa'id, chief of staff of the Arab revolt army, which had been a partner in the conquest of the city two weeks earlier, and together with him continued on to Beirut for the purpose of sailing to Paris to take part in the peace conference. Besides Nuri al-Sa'id, a member of al-'Ahd, Faysal's retinue leaving for Paris included four al-Fatat members: Rustum Haydar — his chief of bureau; Ahmad Qadri — his private physician; Tahsin Qadri (Ahmad's brother) — his military attaché; and Fa'iz al-Ghusayn — his special secretary. This delegation was to represent the Hijaz at the peace conference, two of its members being considered the official representatives: Faysal himself, and Rustum Haydar. Despite the fact that it was considered the representative of the Hijaz it was quite clear that its areas of interest went beyond the Hijaz and would focus to no small degree on Syria. On 22 November the delegation sailed from Beirut for Marseille on board a British destroyer. When they reached Paris, Ahmad Qadri succeeded in locating his fellow founding member of al-Fatat, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, who had been in Paris since the outbreak of the war. 'Abd alHadi was added to the Arab delegation as its secretary-general. Later another veteran member of al-Fatat joined the delegation, Jamil Mardam, who had also remained in Paris during the war and had been until then cooperating with the Comité Central Syrien (see below).1 On 1 January 1919 Faysal sent a memorandum to the supreme council of the peace conference, in which he gave in

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detail the views and aspirations of the Arabs, according to his own viewpoint and in his capacity as his father's representative at the peace conference. (It is not clear how much the views presented in the memorandum really reflected those of Husayn.) Faysal introduced himself in the memorandum as "an old member of the Syrian Committee" (meaning al-Fatat) and as the leader of the "Syrian revolt" in which Syrians, Iraqis, and Arabs had taken part. He indeed expressed his confidence and that of his father in the final victory of the idea of Arab unity, but at the same time he emphasized that: "The various provinces of Arab Asia — Syria, Irak, Jezireh, Hejaz, Nejd, Yemen — are very different economically and socially, and it is impossible to constrain them into one frame of government." He explained at length in what ways the various Arab countries differed from each other with respect to their progress, culture, and human composition, and therefore why the desirable future form of government for them should be: self-administration of the internal affairs in Syria, together with paid foreign technical assistance; support with personnel and resources of a foreign power for Iraq, along with the establishment of an Arab government, preferably appointed rather than elected, to focus mainly on the educational plane; absolute independence for the Hijaz, Najd, and Yemen; "the effective super-position of a great trustee" for Palestine, in the light of the complex situation prevailing there from the religious and communal viewpoint, wrhich "so often involved the world with difficulties", along with the establishment of a representative local administration which would see to the progress of the country from the material viewpoint. Faysal concluded his memorandum by calling upon the Powers to think not only of their material interests and their spheres of influence in the region, and not to force their culture on it. If they would allow the countries of the region to develop as best suited them, the Arabs would finally succeed in merging into one people. Possibly Faysal himself felt that he had gone too far in this memorandum, since on 29 January he presented an addendum in which he requested that "the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekr southward to the Indian Ocean, be recognized as independent sovereign peoples, under the guarantee of the League of Nations". Faysal's memorandum was classified "confidential", but parts of it were soon leaked by the French to the newspaper Le Temps, which publicized them widely. The Arab delegation protested against this act before the British delegation to the peace conference. Arnold Toynbee, a junior official in the British delegation, commented with regard

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to this that it would not be wise to bring up the subject with the French because there had already been reverse precedents from the British side. On 6 February 1919 the Arab delegation ("the Hijazi") appeared before the Council of Ten of the peace conference (representatives of the five Great Powers — the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan). The delegation consisted of Faysal, Rustum Haydar, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Nuri al-Sa'id, and T.E. Lawrence. Faysal gave a speech in Arabic in which he reiterated the main points of his written statements, and Lawrence read the English translation (the translation itself was done by Haydar and 'Abd al-Hadi). Then Faysal was asked a number of clarifying questions by Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Pichon. An evaluation of this entire episode — and others like it that occurred during the month of February, several of which will be reviewed below — has been recorded in the quasi-official history of the Paris peace conference: It must be admitted that these statements, though interesting, were in one sense a waste of time. The small States had already been asked to draw up their claims in writing, and these statements were merely a repetition of arguments which could be more easily studied in print. The examination by the statesmen of the Great Powers was perfunctory, and without point, as the claims admitted were immediately referred to Commissions of the Great Powers.

When the League of Nations Covenant was passed by-the plenum of the peace conference on 14 February, Rustum Haydar protested against the principle of mandates and against the Sykes-Picot agreement and the partition of Syria into spheres of influence. No one paid attention to him. In late April Faysal and his entourage returned to Syria in order to receive the international commission of enquiry, while Haydar and 'Abd al-Hadi remained in Paris as representatives of the Hijazi delegation at the peace conference. It was these two who signed the Versailles treaty in June on behalf of the Hijaz.2 On 12 September 1919 Faysal left for Europe for the second time. The retinue accompanying him consisted of 13 this time, six of them from the Lebanon and Beirut (three Muslims, two Maronites, and one Druze), perhaps as a counter-balance to the delegation of the Maronite patriarch then visiting Paris and as a proof that the Lebanese wanted to be annexed to Syria. It is interesting to note that this time only seven members of the delegation were members of al-Fatat, and of those only two, Ahmad Qadri and Tawfiq al-Natur, were veterans of the

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society.3 This fact had an influence on the character of this visit and the way it ended. When Faysal arrived in Paris an unpleasant surprise awaited him. Britain and France had already signed on the 15th of the month a temporary agreement for the evacuation of British forces from Syria. The feelings of Faysal and the other Arabs delegates were bitter. (Later Rustum Haydar said that he was then "possessed with a violent desire to throw bombs at Lloyd George and other British Imperialists".) Then the process began that finally led to the signing of the Faysal-Clemenceau agreement on a French mandate over Syria with certain conditions. Faysal was in a dilemma. It had not previously occurred to him that the agreement with which he would return to Syria would look like this. But Clemenceau warned him that, "I offer you an agreement that you will find no other authorized French statesman after me who would offer you one like it. Think about it well, and I await your reply." (Clemenceau was right. His replacement as premier of France, Alexandre Millerand, was the one in the spirit of whose orders Gouraud occupied Syria.) Faysal could no longer rely on the British, and in effect they urged him to come to an understanding with the French. ("You [the English] have pushed me into the ditch", he later said to a British officer.) When he consulted with the members of his delegation, most of them encouraged him to sign the agreement. The only one who resolutely opposed the agreement was Ahmad Qadri (at least, according to his own testimony). His opposition was so stubborn that another member of the delegation, Amir Amin Arslan, suggested to Faysal that he be removed from the retinue and sent back to Syria. Qadri claimed that France took control of every place in which it signed such an agreement, and the situation in Morocco and Tunisia was proof. He reported to Husayn in Mecca on the course of events, and Husayn's angry reaction to the agreement has already been mentioned in the discussion of Faysal's status in Syria. In fact, at one point Husayn wanted to recall Faysal from Paris and go there himself in order properly to defend the Arab cause. Qadri also reported on the events to the central committee of al-Fatat and asked them to organize popular opposition to the agreement. When Faysal went to sign the agreement, Qadri ran after him, as far as his car, to try to persuade him to accept the agreement only orally, and then to present it for ratification by the people. Nothing availed, and Faysal signed it, albeit only initialling it. The agreement was supposed to remain secret until its full

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signing at the next visit of Faysal to France (a visit that was never to happen). A day after the initialling a correspondent of The Times in Paris reported that "a complete agreement has been reached between the Emir and the French Government" whereby Faysal had agreed to a French mandate over Syria. In mid-January 1920 Faysal returned with his men to Syria, and the reception that awaited him there and the fate of the agreement he reached with Clemenceau have already been discussed in the first chapter of this book. 4 The importance of Faysal's journeys in Europe to the history of his state lay more in his long absences from Syria than in what he accomplished in Europe. These absences contributed at least to a considerable degree to the solidifying of the strength of the local societies and political parties of the type of al-Fatat and the Independence Party, which were the ones that shaped the true character of the Syrian state in the two years following the World War. Faysal's contacts in Europe, on the other hand, were fruitless, and even when he reached an agreement it was cancelled when he returned to Syria. In December 1918 two Iraqi members of al-Fatat, Mawlud Mukhlis and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, were to sail from Beirut for France. Mukhlis was supposedly going for treatment of wounds received during the Arab revolt, and al-Suwaydi was accompanying him. The truth was that the two were planning to use this trip for discussions with the British on the future of Iraq. They had in their possession a proclamation with a pan-Arab tone, according to which Britain was to receive priority economic rights in the Arab countries. Their contacts with anti-French elements in Beirut had brought them to the attention of the French intelligence, and when the fact of the "pro-British" proclamation was revealed, they became undesirables in the eyes of the French. At first it was planned to keep a discreet track of them when they went to France, but after they arrived too late at the dock and missed the boat the French took advantage of this to prevent them from leaving the country on the grounds that there was no alternative vessel to take them to France. Eventually it was another Iraqi, Nuri al-Sa'id, who became the main Arab delegate in Europe besides Faysal. Al-Sa'id was also the most pro-British personality produced by the Arab world in the first half of the twentieth century. (On one occasion he said to As'ad Daghir: "If the Tigris is still flowing in Iraq, it is only thanks to the British.") And it is in this light that one should examine his missions in Europe in the years 1919-20.5

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It has already been mentioned that Nuri al-Sa'id was with Faysal on his first visit to Europe and also participated in the Arab delegation that appeared before the Council of Ten of the peace conference in February 1919. In March al-Sa'id returned to Syria, followed in April by Faysal and the rest of his retinue, except for Rustum Haydar and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, who remained in Paris as representatives of the Hijaz at the peace conference. In May a letter arrived in Damascus from Haydar, in which he argued that it would be a mistake to hold out for complete independence for Syria because the Powers had already decided that there should be a mandate. Since it was clear that the mandate for Iraq would be given to Britain, Faysal and his advisers tried to ensure that the mandate for Syria be given also to Britain, and not to France, and this on the grounds that there should be a joint government for the two countries. Faysal, as noted, was the leader of the supporters of British aegis in Syria on the eve of the arrival of the King-Crane commission. Haydar approached the leader of the British delegation to the peace conference and requested that all Arabic-speaking countries be put under one mandatory power and not be divided between two or three. The senior British official replied that to put all the Arabic-speaking countries under one power would be an impossible yoke to bear. In June 1919 Nuri al-Sa'id went once more to Paris and submitted a memorandum on the Arab question to the British prime minister, Lloyd George, the purpose of which was to convince him of the need to form a united government for Syria and Iraq. His arguments were: (a) the inhabitants of the two countries belonged to one nation, spoke one language, and had one tradition; (b) the two countries were bound to each other geographically, politically, and economically; (c) the commerce of Iraq with Europe passed through Syria; (d) many tribes migrated once or twice a year from Syria to Iraq and vice versa; and (e) the inhabitants of the two countries desired the establishment of a single government, to be composed of a group of united states. His conclusion from all of this was that it was necessary to bring autonomous Syria and Iraq into one federal government. He dismissed the opponents of this programme among the inhabitants of the region as agents of certain colonialist and imperialist factions in Europe, for whom the welfare of the region was of no interest, and he asked that the vital interests of his country and his nation not be sacrificed for such motives. In order to allay the fears which might arise that a state of the type he proposed would become a fanatical Muslim anti-Christian power, he

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suggested incorporating into its constitution the absolute separation of religion and state. The model that he had in mind was the United States, that is, the establishment of a federal government, in the framework of which each state would enjoy the self-government that suited it. This, according to him, would be the only solution to the Arab question which would be acceptable to most of the Arab population.6 In September 1919 Nuri al-Sa'id travelled for the third time to Europe to join Faysal on his second visit there. In October Faysal and his men were in London for discussions with the British concerning the future of Syria (the British made it clear to Faysal that he had to reach an understanding with the French). At the end of the visit al-Sa'id met for a long conversation with Major Young of the Foreign Office, whom he had known from the time of the Arab revolt. The conversation centred on Iraq, and the British officer wanted to learn from him what influence the Iraqi officers of the Syrian army (members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi) had in Iraq. Al-Sa'id, of course, confirmed to him that these officers had great influence there, principally Yasin alHashimi. He also made clear to him that the officers wanted an assurance along the lines of the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 that no form of government would be imposed on Iraq without the prior consent of the inhabitants. They were also opposed to the continuation of the current military administration in Iraq. The feeling of the Iraqi officers was that the current British government considered them enemies and treated the population as incapable, and not ever likely to become capable, of governing itself. Al-Sa'id had an example to illustrate the situation: A woman was carrying a jar of milk in Baghdad. A youth bumped into her and the milk spilt. An argument started. A respectable passer-by chided the youth for his carelessness, and reimbursed the woman for the spilt milk. At that moment a policeman passed by, arrested all three of them, and brought them before a British officer for trial. This gentleman fined the woman two rupees for carelessness in carrying the milk, fined the youth five rupees for spilling the milk, and fined the generous passer-by 30 rupees "for setting himself up as a ruler over the people in matters which are no concern of his!" In Syria, on the other hand, explained al-Sa'id, the British officers allowed the Arabs to manage their affairs themselves and were content with giving friendly advice. The perplexed Major Young told al-Sa'id that he appreciated his sense of humour and asked him if he really took such incidents seriously. Al-Sa'id insisted that such incidents occurred

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daily. Then Young revealed to al-Sa'id that the British government had decided to authorize the establishment of provincial councils in Iraq, which at a later stage would be able to express their view concerning the desired regime in Iraq. Al-Sa'id expressed his appreciation of this. Major Young left the conversation with the impression that the British government in Iraq would have to change its approach to the local population before long. But Young was only a junior official in the British Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office's influence in Iraq was in general minimal (Iraq was under the jurisdiction of the India Office). Only about a year later, and after a bloody revolt, were substantive changes made in the government in Iraq, for the advancement of the country towards self-rule.7 In November 1919 al-Sa'id returned to Syria, and in early March 1920 he left for another mission to Europe, the last in the course of this period. He left shortly before the convening of the Iraqi Congress in Damascus and its declaration of Iraq's independence (see Chapter 6), and therefore he did not participate in this congress. His first stop was in Istanbul (Sharif 'Ali Haydar claimed that he had contacts with the Turkish government), from there continuing on to Paris and from there to London. Apparently Faysal decided to send him to London to explain there why he had agreed to declare Syria's independence and to be its king. In another conversation with Young in early April, al-Sa'id told him that Faysal, too, wanted to come to Europe, but he could not leave Syria in its current situation. Al-Sa'id related that Faysal had tried to persuade the Syrians not to convene the congress and declare Syria's independence, but eventually he had been forced to agree when he saw that if he refused to accept the throne he would lose his position in Syria. Then al-Sa'id explained to Young at length how the Syrian Congress was elected and why it indeed represented Syrian opinions faithfully. At the conclusion of the conversation al-Sa'id pointed out that Faysal would agree to come to Europe if the supreme council of the peace conference would agree to recognize Syria's independence and his kingship over it. Young immediately told him that the Allies could not agree to that. Several days later al-Sa'id sent Young a long letter in which he apprised him of the situation in Iraq, and discussed the convening of the Iraqi Congress in Damascus the month before and its declaration of Iraq's independence and the enthronement of 'Abdallah as its king. He tried to convince him that the members of the Iraqi Congress were interested in reaching harmony with the British and that in fact most of them had fought side by side

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with the British against the Turks. In declaring independence they were sure that this step would win the approval of the British and even their encouragement. Then al-Sa'id explained the process that preceded the convening of the congress and why this congress indeed faithfully represented the view of most of the inhabitants of Iraq. Al-Sa'id also recapitulated the reasons why a barrier should not be erected between Syria and Iraq, reasons that were no different from those detailed in his memorandum of June 1919 (though this time he spoke only of maintaining ties between the two countries and not of a federation). As for the form of the future government in Iraq, he spoke of a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions and made it clear that the independent government of Iraq would maintain good relations with Britain and honour its interests. In conclusion he suggested the immediate setting up of an Anglo-Arab committee, which would visit Iraq, study its needs, and establish a national administration before the end of the British occupation, so that when the country's future was determined and the British army was evacuated this administration would be able to accept full responsibility immediately. In an addendum to this letter submitted a week later, al-Sa'id tried to explain the reasons why the population of Iraq had started to develop hostility towards the British, and he repeated his suggestion of setting up an Anglo-Arab committee and a national administration as a step towards establishing an independent national government. Al-Sa'id's contacts with the British achieved nothing. The British at this stage did not accept his views, and they even felt that they were extremist and that the members of the Iraqi Congress were not entitled to be considered the representatives of public opinion in Iraq. Al-Sa'id also had contacts with the Secretary of State for India, whose office was responsible for Iraq during this period. With groundless optimism he summed up the results of these contacts in a telegram he sent to Zayd: "Achieved understanding with Montagu on matter of Iraq. Inform our lord 'Abdallah that realization of desires is expected soon." 8 Al-Sa'id and Rustum Haydar appeared at the San Remo conference, at which the mandates were divided between Britain and France, and tried to persuade the representatives of the Powers to take into account the views of the local populations in Syria and Iraq concerning the identity of the mandatory power that would rule over them. Al-Sa'id considered himself the representative of Faysal at the conference, but both the British and the

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French ignored the Arab delegates and did not accord them any official status. They were not given any opportunity to express their views officially, and only one of the French officials deigned to meet with them for a few minutes of meaningless conversation. After it had been decided at the conference to give Britain the mandate over Iraq and Palestine and France the mandate over Syria, the Arab delegation protested and asserted that it was a blow to the principle of self-determination. Al-Sa'id returned to London to work there against the possibility of Syria being occupied by the French and for the recognition of 'Abdallah as king of Iraq. In early May he sent another telegram full of groundless optimism, this time to Baghdad, claiming that during his stay in London he became convinced that Britain viewed the Iraqi question with sympathy and that within a few weeks this question would be solved at the peace conference in accordance with Iraqi aspirations, that is, by the establishment of a national government. He therefore asked his addressees to encourage the public to express its gratitude to the British government. Later in the month al-Sa'id returned to Syria. A final attempt to present the Syrian question before the peace conference was made in early July. Faysal informed Allenby, through Ja'far al-'Askari, that he was prepared to send Zayd to be his representative at the peace conference, and accompanying him on this mission would be Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and education minister Sati' alHusri. The British decided not to respond to Faysal's proposal. It was too late.9 A review of Arab activity in Europe shows that it was marginal in its importance compared to what was going on in Syria itself (contrary to the impression one gets from a number of research works dealing with this subject). In Europe it was only what the Europeans were deciding that was of any importance, and not the wanderings of the Arab emissaries. SYRIANS AND LEBANESE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA

Faysal was not the only one to travel from the Levant to the peace conference and appear before the Council of Ten. On 13 February 1919, Howard Bliss, the president of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, appeared before it and requested that a commission of enquiry be sent to Syria and the Lebanon. He had earlier sent a letter to President Wilson in which he

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supported the claims made by Faysal, adding that the Syrians placed their faith in Point 12 of the American president's Fourteen Points (concerning granting autonomy to peoples liberated from the Ottoman yoke). He also cautioned Wilson about the Syrian delegation of the Comite Central Syrien, which was to appear before the peace conference on the same day as Bliss himself, explaining that this delegation was actually being sent by the French and did not really represent Syrian public opinion.10 The Comité Central Syrien (CCS) was founded in Paris in 1917 and was involved during the war in the recruitment of Syrian volunteers in South America for the French Légion d'Orient.11 The society strove for the establishment of a federative Syria from the Taurus to Sinai. The Lebanon was to be autonomous in the framework of this secular, democratic republic. The society was apparently the most pro-French body that operated during this period, and it aspired for the future Syrian federation to be under the aegis of France. Its members were among the first to oppose Faysal's rule in Syria and they contributed by their activity to the development of hostility to him and the Arab movement in French public opinion. Shortly after the Arab revolt army entered Syria Shukri Ghanim, the president of the society, wrote: "The Syrians are not Arabs! They are Phoenicians first of all! They will not obey the rule of bedouins, camel drivers and shepherds!!" Ghanim and the society protested vigorously against the possibility that Syria would be ruled by the Hijaz or a Hijazi. They rejected the claim of the Hashimite family that it had the right to represent the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire. In a report submitted by the society to the peace conference in June 1919 it was stated: "Before all, Syria is clearly and profoundly hostile to Hijazi domination." The Syrians would not agree to be under the primitive control of the Hijazis, who had not advanced since the time of Muhammad. The Hijazis were planning to establish an empire of Arabic speakers to take the place of the Ottoman Empire. But the subjugation of Syria to such a theocratic power would be disastrous. And therefore Syrian public opinion denounced, according to the society, the Hijazi politics, and demanded the independence of integral Syria, guaranteed by its traditional friend, France. While Shukri Ghanim, president of the society, was its main spokesman during 1919-20, the person responsible for putting its ideas in writing was its secretary-general, Georges Samné. In 1919 he published a pamphlet entitled Le Chérifat de la Mecque et l'Unité Syrienne (The Sharifate of Mecca and Syrian Unity),

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in which he discussed the connection, or to be more precise, the lack of connection, between the Hijaz and Syria: The Sharif of Mecca can and should be the Caliph of his realm. . . . That is the reasonable solution to the question of Caliphate. . . . It is not reasonable on his part to pretend to annex Syria-Palestine. . .. The union of Syria with the kingdom of the Hijaz seems the most disastrous and most illogical of all the solutions to the Syrian problem. . . . Syria will be a democracy . . . The government of the Hijaz, on the contrary, is a monarchy based on Muslim tradition and clergy. Satisfying the pan-Arabists would thus mean submitting a country with liberal aspirations to a clerical autocracy. . . . And besides, the Syrians are not Arabs, and it would be paradoxical to consider the inhabitants of Arabia and those of Syria as constituting one coherent nation. . . . The Syrian people has clearly manifested . . . that they desire to form a federation . . . and that in order to organize they count on the assistance of France. In 1920 Samné published a book entitled La Syrie (Syria), in which he portrayed the history of Syria in the first two decades of the twentieth century, according to the viewpoint of the society, of course. He emphasized in his book that "the future Syrian state will be a federal state, or it will not be at all". The (greater) Lebanon would enjoy administrative autonomy in this framework. And also, "The interest of Syria requires a tutor, and one tutor alone. . . . Only France fulfils the conditions for it." There were those who accused the CCS of being the handiwork of the French foreign ministry, colonialist circles, and certain financial elements. Samné strongly rejected this claim and stressed that the goal of the society was and had always been to achieve the independence and unity of Syria. He claimed that there was no such thing called an Arab nation. There was only "a pretended Arab nationality, being the creation of Amir Faysal and the Anglo-Indian agents". As for the Caliphate, Samné had a brilliant idea. He suggested that every Muslim country should have its own Caliph. There would be as many Caliphs as there were Muslim countries. "Thus all the difficulties will disappear. Tradition will be respected; Muslims of each country will obey their own Caliph, and the intimate liaison between religion and civilian life will not be broken."12 Shortly after the liberation of Damascus from the Ottomans, and before the end of the war, Shukri Ghanim approached the French foreign ministry and proposed a series of steps to increase French prestige in the Levant and to neutralize the influence of the liberating British armies. He suggested opening

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an intensive propaganda campaign in Syria, a campaign to be conducted by the CCS in order to prevent tension in relations between the Allies. To realize this goal Ghanim asked the foreign ministry for an initial sum of 500,000 francs. He also recommended close cooperation between the society and the French authorities in the administrative organization of Syria and in the selection of suitable persons to perform this task. Considering the limited advantage the French derived from the society during the war, and its inability to achieve an authoritative status even among the Syrian and Lebanese émigré communities in Europe and America, the foreign ministry decided at this stage that it would not be wise to use the society as a propaganda tool of France in Syria. On the other hand, so as not to disappoint Ghanim and his colleagues, it was decided to grant the society 50,000 francs for distribution among indigent Syrians and the sending of aid to Syrian volunteers wounded in the battles of the Légion d'Orient in Palestine. The society's opposition to British intervention in Syria was linked with its pan-Syrian federative outlook. In October 1918 the society sent a protest to the French foreign minister against the French-British-Russian (Sykes-Picot) agreement about the partition of the Levant. It considered it a disaster for (greater) Syria, because according to it Damascus would be cut off from its main ports on the Syrian coast, from the fertile fields of the Hawran, and from the other important Syrian cities such as Horns and Aleppo, while at the same time part of it would be merged with the Hijaz. But nevertheless the society still expressed its loyalty to France and asked for its help in organizing the future regime of Syria as a federative democracy. In other words, what bothered the society about the Sykes-Picot agreement was not European intervention in the Levant per se, but the fact that two European powers — Britain and France — were to divide the Levant between them while the society wanted only French influence over all of Syria. The Anglo-French declaration of early November 1918, concerning the possibility that the local people would be able to establish governments according to their own wishes, worried the society too, for the same reasons. It was opposed to the very involvement of the British in the affairs of Syria, and feared the establishment of local governments in the various parts of Syria, which would put an end to the idea of Syrian unity. Therefore, immediately after the publication of this declaration, the society explained to the French president, the premier, and the foreign minister that Syria in its present condition was not suited to the establishment of such

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governments. The society authorized its president, Shukri Ghanim, to apprise the French and President Wilson of "the real situation" in Syria, and to seek their intervention in order to realize the desire of the Syrians for "their national unity within the territorial integrity of Syria, and their organization into a democratic federative regime with the amicable collaboration of France". Both the French premier, Clemenceau, and the foreign minister, Pichon, replied to the society with soothing letters in which they made clear that both "the provisional Franco-British [Sykes-Picot] agreement" and the declarations made afterwards were created by force of circumstances, and should be treated as having only a temporary character. The French government did not cease working for the benefit of the oppressed peoples, and it would do its best to protect the interests of Syria before the Allies at the peace conference.13 In the course of his efforts to persuade the French statesmen to support the positions of the society, Shukri Ghanim appeared before the foreign affairs committee of the French parliament in early December 1918. In his speech before the committee he expressed his pain over the 1916 (Sykes-Picot) agreement, which would bring economic destruction and spiritual stagnation to Syria. He emphasized that only France must have influence in Syria and demanded the removal of the Hijazis from there. He asked France to work rapidly for the rehabilitation of its position in Syria, by propaganda and by sending soldiers, lest Syrian public opinion lean towards Britain. And 500,000 francs were needed for the pro-French propaganda in Syria. In addition to financial aid, Ghanim asked that French technicians be sent, but no office-holders. The Syrians could fill the positions themselves, as several of the most senior office-holders in Egypt were Syrian emigres. In answer to a question Ghanim defined Syria as stretching from the Taurus in the north to al-'Arish in the south. He concluded his appearance with a request that the committee place at his disposal the means to convey the demands of his society to President Wilson. Ghanim was assisted not only by sympathetic statesmen from the colonialist circles, but also by commercial firms that had interests in Syria. In early 1919 it was reported that he received payments from companies in the silk trade in Lyon and Marseille which imported most of their raw material from Syria. In a speech he gave in Lyon, Ghanim called upon the French to work for Syria to be under French aegis and not to let the British take over everything. In early January the chamber of commerce of Marseille held a congress on the subject of Syria, with

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the participation of the colonialist circles. Among the speakers at this congress was Ghanim, who called for the establishment of an integral, federative, and autonomous Syria, under the aegis of France. He pointed out that he was speaking in the name of 600,000 Syrian and Lebanese émigrés throughout the world.14 Just before the expected opening of the peace conference in Paris Ghanim wanted to prove that he was indeed the true representative of the Syrian and Lebanese émigré communities throughout the world. As early as the end of 1918 he sent urgent telegrams — with the encouragement and assistance of the French foreign ministry — to various émigré communities in North and South America, in Egypt, and even in Australia. He asked them to authorize him to represent Syria before the peace conference and to demand there that France alone be commissioned to establish an integral, autonomous, and federative Syria. This activity aroused bitterness among anti-French émigré circles in Egypt, who protested against it. The British Foreign Office for its part instructed the British high commissioner in Egypt to hint to these groups that the way was open for them to express their view, by letters to the Powers, to the peace conference, and to the European press. In any case, within a short time Ghanim received many telegrams in reply from Syrian and Lebanese societies in North and South America, West Africa, and Europe, giving him the requested authorization. By 10 January Ghanim was able to send a considerable number of such telegrams to the French president, the premier, and the foreign minister, representing himself then as the spokesman for over 600,000 Syrians and Lebanese from all the places where they were free to express themselves. In the course of January 1919 the society published a pamphlet entitled La Syrie devant la Conférence (Syria before the Conference), in which were quoted all the telegrams of support it had received. The pamphlet was a sort of open letter to the French premier, Georges Clemenceau, as president of the peace conference, and also to the other Allied delegates. In a foreword to the pamphlet the society expressed its opposition both to the connection with the Hijaz and to the unrealistic idea of giving Syria absolute independence in the immediate term. It asked the peace conference to prevent the establishment of an Arab dynasty in Syria, which would be against the interests of the Syrians, and to grant Syria the democratic national regime it deserved. It called for the establishment of an integral, federative Syria composed of provincial autonomies, under the supervision of France. When the day came that Syria could prove that it

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was capable of governing itself, then it would attain complete independence. In addition to these efforts to enhance the reputation of the society and to bring it into the consciousness of the peace conference participants, Ghanim worked to diminish the value and importance of the other delegation also at the time in Paris, which was a competitor to him and his views, the Arab delegation from Syria headed by Faysal. (At first Ghanim tried to persuade Faysal that it would be worthwhile for him to head the Syrian federation according to the CCS programme, with the title of president-for-life.) Ghanim presented this delegation as being under the influence of the British, as having pan-Arab views, and as believing that it would be possible for Syria to achieve absolute independence without foreign intervention. The second Arab delegate to the peace conference, Rustum Haydar, he described to the French as an ignorant, fanatical Muslim, and the secretary of the Arab delegation, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, whom he knew personally, he defined as totally incompetent, a bit unbalanced, a Bolshevik and a francophobe. Faysal protested to the Council of Ten against Ghanim's claims that he had the right to represent the Syrians. He pointed out that Ghanim and most of his society members did not have Syrian citizenship (in fact, they had been absent from Syria for many years), and claimed that the émigré societies that Ghanim purported to represent were but unimportant bodies with a meagre number of people.15 It seems that Ghanim managed to persuade the French, at least to a certain extent, that he and his society were fit to serve as the spokesmen for the Syrian and Lebanese émigré communities. The officials of the French foreign ministry decided to allow Ghanim and his colleagues to appear before the Council of Ten to constitute a counterweight to the appearance of Faysal. The French wanted to prove by means of the society that the Syrians and Lebanese were interested in a French mandate over Syria. They believed that the appearance of a pro-French Syrian of Ghanim's type would make a strong impression on the Americans. Their error was to become apparent very quickly. On 13 February 1919 the CCS delegation appeared before the Council of Ten of the peace conference. Besides Ghanim it included a Greek Catholic (Samné), a Greek Orthodox, a Maronite, a Muslim, and a Jew. The Muslim delegate was Jamil Mardam, one of the al-Fatat veterans. When he heard the content of Ghanim's speech on this occasion — which will be detailed below — he wanted to protest vehemently against it. Since he

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did not get the right to speak, he made do with sending a letter of protest to Ghanim the next day, in which he informed him that he was not a member of Ghanim's society and did not share his opinions. He defined Ghanim's speech as "disgraceful and deplorable and directed against the Muslims" and as an attempt "to fish in troubled waters". He promised to transmit these words of protest to the representatives of the five Great Powers, and forbade Ghanim to use his name any more for his purposes. Afterwards Mardam joined Faysal's delegation. Ghanim's speech before the Council of Ten lasted two and a half hours and was an absolute failure. As soon as he began to read his speech one of the American delegates passed a note to President Wilson in which he apprised him that Ghanim had not been in Syria for the past 35 years, and had spent most of those years in France. From that moment Wilson lost any interest that he might have had in "the long ineffective outpouring of pathetic eloquence which followed", and after a short while he got up from his chair and began wandering around the room gazing through the windows "with his hands in his coat-tails". Clemenceau, who had noticed this behaviour of Wilson's, whispered to Pichon "savagely": "What did you get this fellow here for, anyway?" Pichon spread his hands "in impotent protest" and answered: "Well, I did not know he was going to carry on this way." At one point Ghanim asked politely if he was perhaps speaking too long and a discussion began among those present as to whether to hear the speech to the end. During this discussion Ghanim stood nervously flipping back through the pages of his speech. Finally, Clemenceau said to him that it would be better for him to cut his speech short and finish it. Ghanim collected the pages and started to read again, beginning three pages back and reading them a second time "apparently without knowing the difference". Since in those three pages he said that the Syrians would prefer to die rather than live under British rule, this repeated reading was a test of patience for the British delegates. At the end of the speech the participants were so exhausted that, in contrast to usual procedure, they did not ask the speaker any questions but decided to postpone the continuation of the discussions of the Syrian question to a later date. In the speech itself Ghanim reiterated the known political views of his society. He persisted in the view that the Syrians comprised a nation in itself deserving of a state. Syria had not been liberated from the Turkish yoke in order to be enslaved by the Hijazi yoke. Damascus was 1,500 kilometres from Mecca, and there was no connection between the Syrian urbanite and

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the Hijazi bedouin. It was not possible to subjugate the cultured Syrians to the uncultured Hijazi bedouins. What Syria demanded was that its territorial integrity be preserved in its natural boundaries, and that a constitutional, federal regime be established there. Ghanim pointed out that Syria in its present condition needed foreign assistance from a Great Power. This mandatory power could only be France, which had already shown itself capable of successfully ruling 25 million Muslims in North Africa, and which had close cultural ties with Syria in particular and with the Christian communities in the Middle East in general. Ghanim also stressed the solidarity which he said existed among the Syrians, and he claimed that most of them were opposed to those fanatical Muslims who were demanding a theocratic regime. Such a regime would impair the status of the Christians and Jews, who were perhaps fewer in number than the Muslims but whose cultural and intellectual quality was higher. (Apparently it was this section of his speech that especially angered Mardam, as mentioned above.)16 Two days after the appearance of the CCS delegation a delegation representing the administrative council of Mount Lebanon presented itself before the Council of Ten. In December 1918 the administrative council had decided to send a delegation to the peace conference in order to present the Lebanese demands (for the administrative council decision see Chapter 2). The initiator of this decision was council member Da'ud 'Ammun. The French foreign minister for his part instructed the French high commissioner in Beirut to assist the pro-French elements among the Lebanese population to go to Paris, but without making this assistance public. He recommended that such delegates establish contacts with the CCS, which would be able to help them without the French government being seen to be involved directly in the matter. Thus, on 20 December 1918 the Lebanese delegation sailed from Beirut to the peace conference. Heading it was Da'ud 'Ammun, defined by the French as a staunch devotee of France, and it included another Maronite, a Greek Orthodox, a Sunni, and a Druze. Before it sailed a Greek Catholic and a Shi'ite delegate resigned from it, "for health reasons". The delegation left without authorization from the British commander-in-chief and, apparently, to the displeasure of the British. Therefore, when the ship arrived in Port Said on its way to Marseille, the British delayed the members of the delegation despite their protests, claiming that they were waiting for instructions from London on the subject. Only after three weeks had passed, and after the

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French consul in Port Said had made it clear to the British commander that if the delegation were not allowed to proceed the French government would view it as an "unfriendly act", was it allowed to continue on its way. It arrived in Paris on 25 January 1919 (and remained in France until 10 March). The departure of the Mount Lebanon administrative council delegation aroused many protests in anti-French Lebanese circles. The Alliance Libanaise of Cairo despatched a protest against the council to the representatives of the Powers in that city, claiming that the council did not express the will of the Lebanese people. This society sent an additional protest to the administrative council itself, accusing it of not intending to demand the true independence of Mount Lebanon. Various bodies asked to be permitted to send their own delegations in order to constitue a counterweight to the council delegation, but the British decided not to let any other group go to Paris. In Paris the Lebanese delegation coordinated totally with the CCS, and Da'ud 'Ammun issued a statement in which he expressly admitted this, claiming that the two bodies together represented over 1,200,000 Syrians and Lebanese who wanted independence under French aegis. The delegation was under the patronage of the French foreign ministry, which briefed it on the eve of its appearance at the peace conference. On 15 February 1919 three members of the delegation ('Ammun, the Druze delegate, and the Muslim one) presented themselves before the Council of Ten of the peace conference. All three made speeches, though the main one was that of Da'ud 'Ammun. He began by claiming that the right of the delegation to represent the Lebanese derived from its having been appointed by the administrative council of Mount Lebanon, which was its elected parliament. He emphasized that Mount Lebanon had always been autonomous, and wanted this independence to be recognized by the peace conference and to administer its affairs by itself. He also demanded that the Lebanon's historic and natural boundaries be restored to it (that is, that the regions of 'Akkar, Tripoli, the Biqa', Beirut, Sidon, and Marj 'Ayun be annexed to it), because without these boundaries it could not maintain its commerce and agriculture and its inhabitants would be forced to continue to emigrate. Since the expanded Lebanon would initially need foreign assistance and advice in developing its resources, he was in favour of this being given by France, which had assisted Mount Lebanon in its difficult times and was tied to it by its culture and liberal tradition. This assistance would in no way impair the rights of the

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Lebanese or their independence. 'Ammun noted that he was not authorized to speak on the affairs of the rest of Syria, since he had come only to represent the interests of the Lebanon. However, he made it clear that Syria and the Lebanon had common interests. Syria needed the ports of the Lebanon, and the Lebanon needed the agricultural plains of Syria. An absolute separation between the two states would harm them. But nevertheless, the Lebanon could be tied to Syria — while maintaining its separate identity — only if Syria would likewise agree to accept French assistance. The Lebanon would prefer to remain isolated rather than to be bound to a state that was tied to assistance from another Power. The Lebanon was really interested in being tied to Syria, but it demanded guarantees for Syria's vitality, competence, and tolerance. This could be achieved only by entrusting one Power — France — to supply aid for the two states. Ammun's statements made the Lebanese delegation suspect in the eyes of the Americans, who believed that this delegation, too, was only a tool in the hands of the French.17 Not all the Syrian and Lebanese émigrés in Paris supported the CCS. Opposition to it had been growing in various circles during the war, for ideological and personal reasons. On 5 January 1919 a new rival society was founded in Paris called Comite Libanais de Paris (using the same name as the Lebanese society that operated in Paris before the war). The society numbered 18 people, under the presidency of 'Abbas Bijani, one of the participants of the Arab-Syrian Congress in Paris in 1913. Among the members were Khayrallah Khayrallah (who also participated in the Paris Congress) and Bishop Faris, the representative of the Maronite patriarch in Paris — both of them old political rivals of Shukri Ghanim. In contrast to the pan-Syrian ideas of the CCS, this society strove to achieve the absolute independence of the Lebanon in its natural and historical boundaries. The French considered the society to be unsympathetic to them and to be working against their interests. And indeed, besides being a rival to the CCS, it also protested against the arrival of the proFrench delegation of the Mount Lebanon administrative council, and claimed that it was not genuinely representative of Lebanese opinion. As against this, the society tried to establish contacts with the Alliance Libanaise of Cairo, which was considered antiFrench, and maintained relations with Faysal's delegation. The day after the Lebanese delegation appeared before the conference the Comite Libanais sent a letter to the conference secretary-general pleading that after Faysal had appeared, as the representative of the Hijaz and spokesman for the Arab and

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Syrian questions, and after Shukri Ghanim had appeared, representing the French viewpoint, and after the Lebanese delegation had appeared, it too representing the French viewpoint, the time had come to hear the true Lebanese national viewpoint. That is, the conference should receive a delegation of the society. Khayrallah Khayrallah was the society's candidate for presenting its views before the conference. But no one at the peace conference (except for Arnold Toynbee) treated this appeal seriously. In late February the society attempted a reconciliation with the Lebanese delegation, and planned to hold a party in its honour (on the invitations to the party the delegation was described as one "who represented with dignity" the Lebanon). Da'ud 'Ammun rejected with contempt the possibility of attending such a party. Shukri Ghanim for his part turned to the French foreign ministry and pointed out to it the seriousness of the fact that on French soil there was operating freely a society such as this, whose acts were contrary to French-Syrian interests. The Comité Libanais de Paris was at this time also working to make it possible for Lebanese émigrés in Paris to send aid to their families in the Lebanon, and it asked the foreign ministry to enable Lebanese emigres to return to the Lebanon, or alternatively to bring their families to France. However, for all practical purposes, the society left the political stage. It appeared once more only, towards the end of 1920, when it was working to arouse French public opinion and the parliament against the arrest and deportation of the members of Mount Lebanon's administrative council by Gouraud (see Chapter 2).18 The riots against the Armenians in Aleppo in late February 1919 gave the CCS another pretext to protest against the presence of "the Hijazi soldiers" in Syria. The society sent a letter to Clemenceau, as president of the peace conference, in which it demanded that the transfer of Syria to a French mandate be accelerated. This mandate would establish in Syria a federative democratic regime in accordance with the aspirations of its inhabitants. The society also proposed that the French should enable the local people to participate in the future administration of Syria, in the areas of the economy, finance, and education. In April, just before Faysal's departure for Syria, Ghanim and Samné met him. They spoke to him unctuously, telling him that he was the most suitable person to rule over Syria. Faysal spoke about Syria's right to complete independence, rejected the possibility of a mandate, and asserted that the country could manage its affairs by itself without foreign assistance. The meeting ended with no results or understanding whatsoever.

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After Faysal's return to Syria the CCS renewed its propaganda against him, and with greater force. In a letter to the French foreign minister Ghanim asserted that if they wanted to compensate Faysal for his help to the Allies during the war, then why should they do it at the expense of Syria? There was also Iraq. When Faysal sent a telegram to the peace conference, claiming that he had an authorization from all the parties of Syria to represent their aspirations before the Great Powers, Ghanim sent a letter of protest to Clemenceau, recalling that the aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese émigré communities were opposed to those of Faysal. This had already been proven in his own appearance before the conference, and by that of the Lebanese delegation. What they were asking for was the independence of Syria within its integral boundaries, and its organization in the form of federative provinces with a democratic government consisting of local people, under French aegis. This aegis was a condition for the readiness of the Lebanon to join the Syrian union. Ghanim expressed the Syrian apprehension of the theocratic regime that Faysal was likely to establish if his plans succeeded, and wondered where Faysal obtained the funds he was spreading around, and why he thought that he — the foreigner — had the right to make himself the omnipotent sovereign of Syria, to appoint and to dismiss locals as he wished, and to set up an army whose purpose would be to prevent any opposition to him. Ghanim also cast doubt on the authenticity of Faysal's authorization, in the light of the means known to be taken at the time in Syria to acquire such an authorization.19 However, at this stage Ghanim's stock, and that of his society, were beginning to depreciate in the eyes of the French. The process had begun with his miserable appearance before the Council of Ten. He began to get the feeling that nobody was reading his letters. He complained to the French president that all the letters, reports, and resolutions of the CCS that he was sending to the government authorities were being left unanswered. In spite of his unceasing efforts to persuade France to strengthen its prestige in Syria, in the face of Faysal's actions, not one of the French statesmen was paying attention to him, and France continued to sit idle. The result, according to him, was that the image of France in the eyes of the Easterners was diminishing, and the status of the Hijazi office-holders was more exalted than that of the French representatives in Syria. Ghanim also expressed the fear that in the end perhaps France would be prepared willingly to give up Syria in favour of its ally (as it had in Egypt in 1882). He concluded his appeal to Poincaré by stressing

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that he was at the end of his physical and moral capacity to bear his inability to do anything, or to contend with the scorn with which his protests and views were met. But a man such as Ghanim does not give up hope. The CCS published a new pamphlet called La Question Syrienne exposée par les Syriens (The Syrian Question exposed by the Syrians), at the beginning of which was emphasized the wide backing the society had received from the Syrian and Lebanese émigré societies in America, Africa, and Australia, and even in Syria itself. Ghanim himself continued his campaign against Faysal ("simply a foreign conqueror"), and against the anarchy and troubles that he had brought to Syria. In letters sent to French statesmen, time and again he demanded "justice for Syria", "integral Syria without Faysal". He even tried to convince the French foreign minister that after the French mandate over Syria had been declared, there would not be any Syrian, including the Muslims, who would not cry "Vive la France".20 Another focus for criticism by Shukri Ghanim and the CCS was the King-Crane commission. In letters to the French premier and foreign minister Ghanim wondered what there was for the commission to do in Syria. The enquiry would not succeed. The intrigues and corruption that were widespread in Syria would in any case distort the outcome. The result would therefore be false and would not represent correctly the true aspirations of the inhabitants. In Ghanim's opinion the inhabitants were in any case not fit to govern themselves, and he warned that the arrival of the commission, far from calming the unrest in Syria, would in fact aggravate it and would encourage the frictions and dissensions until massacres could be expected. Ghanim also warned of the intensification of British, American, and Hijazi propaganda as the time for the arrival of the commission neared, contrasting this to the absence of French propaganda. In a letter to the French president he called upon him to repair the situation by sending French military forces to Syria as soon as possible. The CCS angrily protested against the resolution of the Syrian Congress that was submitted to the commission concerning the readiness of the Syrians for an American mandate or, for want of an alternative, a British one, but in no case a French one. When the King-Crane commission had completed its work, the society demanded that no importance be attached to its report. It is noteworthy that the society's hostile attitude to the sending of the commission of enquiry was identical to that of the French.21 When Faysal protested against the understanding that had

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begun to take shape between Britain and France concerning Syria, the CCS protested strongly against his protest, and claimed that he had no right to speak in the name of Syria. However, when this understanding was realized in the temporary British-French agreement of September 1919, the CCS also protested against the agreement, though of course for totally different reasons from those of Faysal. What disturbed the society in this agreement was not the fact that the entire Syrian coast would be given over to the French, but the fact that the interior of the country was to remain in the hands of the Arab government. That is, the society opposed this agreement for the same reasons that it opposed the Sykes-Picot agreement — that it meant the partition of Syria and its not being placed, in its entirety, under the aegis of France. Then there began a process which indicated the approaching end of the society. Faysal arrived for his second visit to Europe and, being aware of his difficult situation, initiated contacts with the French, contacts which ended with the Faysal-Clemenceau agreement. The French no longer needed the services of the CCS, and in fact considered it a nuisance which would endanger their relations with the Muslims of Syria. They decided not to allow Ghanim and those like him to visit Syria because they represented French ties with the non-Muslim elements of Syria. They were afraid that a continuation of support for Ghanim — whose cold relations with Faysal were well known — would be interpreted by the Muslim Syrians as an anti-Muslim French policy. Ghanim, for his part, protested to the French foreign minister that the French were discussing Syria's future with Hijazis and not with Syrians, and expressed his sorrow that the French government had ceased to take advantage of his modest assistance and that of his faithful men. But the foreign ministry stopped paying attention to Ghanim's appeals. (Ghanim to Pichon: "I ask a favour of you, to receive me for five minutes one of these days, between two audiences.") Furthermore, in November the foreign ministry informed Ghanim that the financial support that his society had been receiving from the ministry would be reduced. Up to then it had been receiving 72,000 francs annually, calculated at 4,000 francs monthly for publication of the newspaper al-Mustaqbal, and 2,000 francs monthly for publication of the journal Correspondance d'Orient. (Ghanim received personally another 1,500 francs a month for pro-French articles that he published in the Arab press in Egypt and America.) Then Ghanim was told that al-Mustaqbal would be closed down at the end of 1919, and the

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society would continue to receive only 2,000 francs monthly to continue the publication of Correspondance d'Orient ("which is useful to a certain degree", in the words of the French). Ghanim defined this step by the foreign ministry as "general liquidation", and he saw in it an inclination of the ministry to bring about, in his words, the "kiss of death" of the society. He tried to persuade the ministry of "the important role" played by alMustaqbal, and that stopping its publication would be "disastrous for French prestige", at a time when the pro-Faysal press in Paris (l'Asie Arabe, run by Ibrahim Salim al-Najjar) was getting stronger. In a moving letter to the foreign minister he tried to convince him that the ministry should not cease its cooperation with loyal activists who had collaborated with it in difficult times, sacrificed their time, efforts, and money for it, and rendered it valuable services even while endangering their families and assets in Syria. The task was not yet finished, and there were important matters to deal with among the émigré communities. It was therefore forbidden to cause the "execution" of the society. To the extent that there was a need to make financial cuts in the "fonds spéciaux" of the ministry, he was prepared to find alternative sources of money. And so Ghanim turned to General Gouraud, explained to him the purposes for which the society was founded, and the serious consequences for the morale of the Syrians that its disappearance would cause. He tried to persuade him that its monetary expenses should be financed from then on from the budget of the French high commission in Syria. Later the society appealed also to the French Societe Navale de l'Ouest and asked it to support the society's propaganda in the East. But nothing helped. At the end of 1919 the publication of al-Mustaqbal stopped. In fact, the French foreign minister did not take the trouble even to answer Ghanim's letter to him, and only after a further offended letter did Ghanim get an appointment with one of the senior officials of the ministry. Eventually the foreign minister instructed that 4,000 francs be given to Ghanim as a final compensation for those who had taken part in the publication of the newspaper.22 When the Syrian Congress declared Syria's independence and the enthronement of Faysal as its king, the CCS protested vehemently before the prime ministers of France and Britain. The society requested of the French premier that France should work for the realization of the Syrian aspirations to establish in Syria a union of independent republics relying on a mandatory power, at least in the part in which it could operate according to the

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1916 (Sykes-Picot) agreement, hoping that this arrangement would later include all of Syria. When the decisions of the San Remo conference concerning the division of mandates between France and Britain became known, they were received with satisfaction by the society because it considered them the beginning of the realization of its aspirations. On second thoughts, however, the society described the decisions as a "surgical operation", because the French mandate was applied only to part of Syria (as the society saw it) and not to the whole region from the Taurus in the north to the Suez Canal in the south. The conquest of Syria by Gouraud in late July 1920 was received with open rejoicing by the society, which considered it an "important and happy" event. At last France had taken over a considerable part of Syria ("according to our wishes"), and an end was put to "the Hijazi oppression". Ghanim sent a congratulatory telegram to the French premier, in which he expressed his gratitude and that of the Syrians in Syria and in the countries to which they had emigrated. The society held a special meeting in which it hailed "the brilliant victory" of the French army, which had "liberated" Syria from the Hijazis, and it asked the premier to convey its gratitude to Gouraud and his soldiers for "their heroic action in the cause of justice and civilization". Samné summarized the affair in an article that he published in Correspondance d'Orient: "The Faysali comedy is finished." In a foreword that Ghanim wrote in August 1920 to Samne's book, La Syrie, he envisioned a future Syria comprised of three regions (or four, if Palestine was to be included): Greater Lebanon (which he also called la Phénicie), the Damascus region, and the Aleppo region. These regions would have the status of independent democratic states. When Greater Lebanon was actually established by the French shortly afterwards, Ghanim went over to supporting the idea of Greater Lebanon, and the society also began to advocate Lebanese separatism. In 1921 Ghanim resigned from the presidency of the CCS and that, in effect, brought about its end; it had in any case by then lost any significance whatsoever.23 The two most pro-French émigré societies in North America were the Syria-Mount Lebanon League of Liberation, under the presidency of Ayyub Thabit, and the Lebanon League of Progress, under the presidency of Na'um Mukarzal (both in New York). Although both societies were pro-French, there was great tension between them throughout the period under discussion, because of their substantive differences, both ideologically and

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with regard to the composition of their membership. While Thabit's society worked on behalf of all of Syria and included people from all its communities, Mukarzal's society worked on behalf of Mount Lebanon alone and was made up only of Maronites. Naturally, the views of Thabit and his society brought them close to the CCS in Paris, while between Mukarzal and the CCS tense relations prevailed. As early as December 1918 the Syria-Mount Lebanon League of Liberation had taken a stand in favour of the establishment of an integral and independent Syria, under the aegis of France, and separated from the kingdom of the Hijaz and other Arabicspeaking countries. At the end of that month the League of Liberation received an urgent appeal from Shukri Ghanim, asking it to authorize him to present the demands of the Syrians at the peace conference. The League consented immediately and sent a telegram authorizing him to represent the Syrian émigrés of North America at the conference, and to demand in their name an integral Syria, which would comprise federal autonomous governments associated in a central administration, under a sole protectorate receiving the guidance of France. The League of Liberation sent a telegram in this spirit also to President Wilson, and another one to the French foreign minister, thanking him for his speech before the French parliament on the subject of France's ties with Syria (the same speech that had raised the ire of al-Nadi al-'Arabi in Syria against him). When FaysaTs delegation arrived at the peace conference, the League of Liberation vehemently protested against the possibility that Syria and Palestine would be included in an Arab kingdom. Even the nominal suzerainty of the king of the Hijaz over Syria, "on the unscientifical basis of pan-Arabism", would cause it considerable damage. This was because the Syrians were not Arabs, and the Arab language was imposed on them by the Arab conquest. What the Syrians wanted was the aegis of a democratic power, which naturally could only be France, connected with the region since the events of 1860. In the same spirit the League protested also against the decision of the peace conference to send a commission of enquiry to Syria to hold a plebiscite on its future. The value of this plebiscite, claimed the League, would — in the current situation and with the contradictions and pressures existing in Syria — be zero. The British-French agreement of September 1919 was, on the other hand, received with satisfaction by the League of Liberation. It considered it a step towards the end of the rule of Faysal and his Hijazi "agents" in Syria. Still, the agreement meant

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the delivery of only the Syrian coast into the hands of the French while internal Syria remained in the hands of the Arab government, at least at this stage. Therefore this society asked Clemenceau, in his capacity as president of the peace conference, to ensure that the tranquillity that one part of Syria had achieved should come to the other part, too, that is, that internal Syria should be transferred to French hands. The League again rejected any possibility that Syria should be bound in any kind of bond to the Hashimite family, "the least popular of the Arab princely houses, even in Arabia itself" (and their dispute with Ibn Sa'ud would prove it). It denied the claims that there was a common racial connection between the Syrians and the Arabs. The Syrians were the descendants of the Aramaeans, with whom Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Crusaders had become mixed. In addition to this, the society pointed out that Syria was superior to the Hijaz from the viewpoints of "culture, modernism, and progressiveness", and the involvement of the Hijazis in Syria had only caused the deterioration of relations between the Muslims and the Christians there. Thabit presented his society's views to a senior official of the American State Department, with the encouragement of the French ambassador in Washington (the latter hoping that the fact that both Thabit and the American official were Protestants would facilitate the understanding between them). 24 Ayyub Thabit had been one of the prominent activists of the Reform Society of Beirut before the war and had participated on its behalf in the Arab-Syrian Congress in Paris in 1913. Since he was fervently anti-Turkish, he had preferred not to return to Beirut when the congress was over, but to move to the United States and to start political activity within the Syrian-Lebanese community in New York. From May 1917 he headed the SyriaMount Lebanon League of Liberation, and ran a pronounced pro-French political line till the end of the war. In early 1919 he proposed travelling to Paris in order to demand there a French protectorate for Syria. The French consul-general in New York recommended his foreign minister to accept Thabit's proposal, especially since Thabit knew personally several members of the American delegation to the peace conference. He even suggested financing Thabit's travel to Paris, discreetly, of course, so as not to arouse Syrian anti-French elements. The French foreign minister rejected his consul-general's recommendation at this stage on the grounds that the Syrian question was already on the agenda of the peace conference and that, in any case, pro-French delegations were already due to appear before it. Nevertheless,

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he agreed to budget 20,000 francs for the continuation of Thabit's pro-French propaganda in the United States. The French consul-general did not give up, and in the course of 1919 he kept trying to persuade his foreign minister that Thabit's role in the United States was finished, and he could be of greater benefit to France in his fatherland. The consul pointed out that on his way back to Syria Thabit could, of course, visit the French foreign ministry "to receive directions . . . concerning the attitude he is to take and the role he was expected to play". Furthermore, the deputy to the French high commissioner in Beirut telegraphed Thabit that he should return to Syria as soon as possible. And so, in January 1920 Thabit left New York on his way to Beirut, making a stopover in Paris with a letter of recommendation in his pocket from the French ambassador in Washington ("a great friend of our country"). In his place as president of his society was elected Michel Juraydini, also a "friend" of France. In Paris Thabit joined in the CCS protest against the declaration by the Syrian Congress of the enthronement of Faysal as king of Syria. He also sent a telegram to the American State Department, in which he warned of the dangers of pan-Arabism, in Syria in particular and in the East in general. He explained that it was not the question of French imperialism against Syrian national aspirations for independence, but a Muslim-Arab theocratic monarchy against the aspiration of the Syrian Christians for republican independence. These aspirations of the Syrians would not be achieved without the guidance of a republican mandatory power, that is, France (since the United States had refused to assume this burden). If the "so-called" Arab independence under a monarchical regime should continue, it would accelerate the rate of emigration of Christians from Syria, or would lead to their enslavement. Therefore he asked in the name of humanity and Christianity that President Wilson should work for the removal of Faysal and his Hijazis from Syria, that an independent state separate from the Muslim rule should be established in the Lebanon, and that a single mandate be placed on all the Syrian states, which in the future would reach a national and republican union. The League in New York sent a letter in the same spirit to the American secretary of state.25 Ayyub Thabit returned to Beirut, held various political positions during the following years, and in 1943 was appointed president of Lebanon for several months by the French. The Lebanon League of Progress was founded in 1911, and its president Na'um Mukarzal also participated in the Arab-Syrian

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Congress in Paris in 1913. The goals of the League of Progress after the war, as they were to be presented before the peace conference, were the establishment of an independent constitutional government in the Lebanon, within its historic and natural boundaries (that is, those before 1861), and under the aegis of France. To this the League added the demand that the president of the state and the commander of the army should be French (they would, however, receive Lebanese citizenship), until the Lebanese could govern themselves. The "National Congress", which would be the legislative authority of the state and also the administration, would be made up of Lebanese alone. So also should be all the holders of public offices in the state. Arabic and French would be the official languages. The League suggested that the flag of the new Lebanese state should be identical to that of France, but with a cedar tree at its centre. In the early months of 1919 the League of Progress worked at spreading its views among its branches throughout the United States (and Cuba). It distributed for signing petitions to be sent to the peace conference, in which was demanded the independence of the Lebanon in its ancient boundaries and under French aegis. In February 1919 the president of the League himself arrived in Paris, with a recommendation from the French consul-general in New York ("he has always been devoted to French interests"), in order to demand a French protectorate. In a memorandum he drew up while in Paris he detailed the aspirations of his society (as listed above), and to them he added a number of specific demands: the prosecution and punishment of the Turks and Germans responsible for the hangings and deportations during the war and also for the systematic starvation that was widespread in the country; the prosecution of the Lebanese and Syrians who had collaborated with the Turks, requiring them to return to their victims all the moneys or assets taken from them by illegal means; reparations from Turkey and its allies for all the damage they had caused the Lebanese during the war, and also obliging Turkey to pay all its debts to the Lebanon — including the income it had derived from the territories severed from the Lebanon in 1861. He also demanded that a comprehensive inspection be made of the post-war distribution of relief funds for the inhabitants of the mountain, claiming that wide-ranging acts of corruption and large embezzlements had been carried out, which had enriched a few at the cost of hunger for thousands of women and children. However, the most interesting of the demands he made was that, as the Lebanon could not maintain its inhabitants economically and they were forced

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to emigrate, and since the émigrés constituted the more active part of the population politically, then it should give them the right to participate in the elections to representative institutions to be held in the Lebanon.26 As mentioned above, relations between Mukarzal and Thabit and the CCS were strained. When Mukarzal arrived in Paris he was supposed to be received by a senior official of the foreign ministry. The latter was busy, and in his place Mukarzal was received by a junior official who asked him if he had a recommendation from the CCS. Mukarzal was enraged and erupted with cries that he represented a much larger society than that contemptible one, which he was not prepared even to recognize. The senior official immediately hurried over and calmed Mukarzal down. Since this incident occurred after the miserable speech by Ghanim at the conference, and the French had already begun to comprehend the limited benefit that could be derived from the CCS, the senior official promised that the French were not granting the CCS any preferred status over the other Syrian and Lebanese societies. ("We erred in the past, but now we already recognize our error. We recognize that we were misled by the words of these people.") The publication of an account of the incident in the press did not give Ghanim much satisfaction. Shortly after this episode — and some say as a result of it — Mukarzal participated in a farewell party for Faysal before the latter returned to Syria. Mukarzal gave an unqualified "Arab" speech, "as if he was a bedouin", in which he renounced the ideas he had been preaching till then. Those present were astounded, and some interpreted it as Mukarzal's embracing the idea of complete independence and joining the supporters of Faysal. However, this interpretation was mistaken, and it was only a tactical move on the part of Mukarzal. Some months later he addressed an open letter to Faysal in which he accused him of provoking a quarrel between Britain and France and of being in the past a Turkophile (a claim that was correct in itself). He asked Faysal if it was reasonable that the war of liberation should end without freedom for the Lebanese, and he requested him to leave the Lebanon alone. Mukarzal was also in contact with the Maronite patriarch, on the eve of the latter's visit to Paris, and he asked him to insist on the Lebanese requirements, in the spirit of the views of the League of Progress. In a letter to him he pointed out that the ties between the Lebanon and the neighbouring regions should be only economic. (It is interesting to note that Ayyub Thabit also, in a telegram to the patriarch when the latter was already in Paris,

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asked in the name of his own society that there should be established "the greatest Lebanon, with an interior government distinct from that of the rest of Syria".) When Mukarzal returned to New York he continued to turn to the French foreign ministry with questions such as why Egyptian currency was being used in Syria (and he also supplied an answer: "Because of intrigues". The French promised to deal with the problem. Later on this subject was one of the items in Gouraud's ultimatum to Faysal.) He urged that his society's suggestion for the flag should be adopted, as a proof of the friendship that existed between the large France and the small Lebanon (the French informed him that this flag was indeed acceptable to them). When the Syrian Congress declared the independence of Syria, including Mount Lebanon, and the enthronement of Faysal, Mukarzal sent protest telegrams in the name of his society and in the name of "500,000 Lebanese in America" to the French president and premier. He demanded the independence of the Lebanon under a French mandate only, and rejected any political connection with the "foreigner" Faysal. Many branches of the Lebanon League of Progress throughout the United States joined the protest against the decision of the Syrian Congress, and sent the French premier telegrams denouncing the "impudence" of Faysal "in the face of history and civilization".27 However, not all the émigré societies in North America were pro-French like the two described above. Thus, for example, the Arabs Union Committee of Boston strongly protested in April 1919 to Faysal, in the name of "tens of thousands of Syrian Arabs in America", against an agreement he was supposed to have reached with Clemenceau concerning the separation of Syria from the other Arab countries and its partition. The bewildered Faysal, who at that time had not reached any agreement with Clemenceau, was compelled to deny it. In August the Boston society sent a telegram to Rustum Haydar, the Arab representative at the peace conference, in which it informed him that the Lebanese did not recognize the right of the Maronite patriarch to represent them at the conference. In September 1919 a large congress of Syrian émigrés from various societies was held in Detroit, at which it was decided to adopt the resolutions of the Syrian Congress in Damascus which were presented to the King-Crane commission. After the congress the delegates of the participating societies decided to set up a central organization called L'Union des Sociétés syriennes américaines, the purpose of which was "to work for the unity and integrity of Syria in its

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natura l geographica l boundaries , from Asia Mino r to th e Sina i desert". Thi s Syria was to have, accordin g to th e view of thi s body, an electe d an d democrati c federal government . Accordin g to th e Frenc h thi s ne w organizatio n numbere d in th e en d no mor e tha n ten activists, all Syrian Protestants . In thi s contex t it is noteworth y tha t ther e were also Syrian emigres who desired an America n aegis or mandate . Prominen t in demandin g thi s was th e Ne w Syria Nationa l League, founde d in Ne w York in Decembe r 1918 by Georg e Khayralla h an d th e futur e historia n Phili p Hitti . Thi s bod y was of th e opinio n tha t th e Unite d State s was th e onl y suitable state to administe r Syria unti l th e Syrian s coul d administe r themselves , since th e Unite d State s was th e onl y Powe r withou t interest s in Syria. Therefore , thi s society demande d America n aegis an d guidance , in additio n to its deman d tha t an independen t greater Syria be establishe d from th e Tauru s mountain s to th e Sinai peninsula , an d from th e Mediterranea n Sea to th e Euphrates , to be mad e up of autono mou s province s with a centra l government . Thi s society tried to stir up America n public opinio n an d th e interes t of th e American government , an d it also sent messages in thi s spirit to Syria an d to th e émigré communitie s in Egypt. It s propagand a also reache d Cuba , where it was reporte d tha t it ha d foun d a positive ech o amon g th e Musli m an d Druz e émigrés, but no t amon g th e Maronites . It was also reporte d tha t copie s of its platfor m were distribute d in Morocco . When th e peac e conferenc e dealt with th e Syrian question , th e Ne w Syria Nationa l League sent telegrams to Presiden t Wilson, Clemenceau , an d Lloyd George , demandin g in th e nam e of "the 250,000 Syrians of America " an America n protectorat e over a democrati c Syria. 28 In Sout h Americ a ther e were man y pro-Frenc h émigré societies, mos t of which maintaine d contact s in late 1918 an d early 1919 with th e CC S in Pari s an d authorize d it to represen t the m at th e peac e conference . On e of th e mos t prominen t of th e pro-Frenc h societie s was th e Comit é patriotiqu e Syrien-Libanai s of Sāo Paol o an d Ri o de Janeiro , which had , accordin g to its president , 50 branche s throughou t Brazil. Thi s society authorize d th e CC S to deman d in its nam e at th e peac e conferenc e tha t Franc e be commissione d to establish an integral , independent , an d federal Syria. Thi s Syria was to be divided int o thre e states: Lebanon , Damascus , an d Aleppo , each of which would enjoy indepen denc e as in th e Unite d States . Th e centr e of th e state ha d to be, in th e opinio n of thi s society, in Ba'albek . Othe r societie s in Brazil which strove for similar goals, an d authorize d th e CC S to

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demand them at the peace conference, were in the cities of Pernambuco and Bello Horizonte. Ghanim received similar authorization also from a Syrian society in Rivera, Uruguay. The French minister in Montevideo reported on the general loyalty to France of the Syrian community in Uruguay. The French minister in Paraguay took a more active approach and himself set up a society called Union Syrienne de Paraguay, which sent through him a telegram to Ghanim authorizing him to demand French assistance for Syria. In Chile there were a number of pro-French societies. Two of them had clear Lebanese tendencies: the Comité Central Libanais of Santiago, which demanded complete autonomy for the Lebanon under French aegis; and the Alliance Libanaise of Santiago, which expressed its opposition to the union of the Lebanon with Syria under the Hijazi hegemony. These two societies expressed support for the demands made before the peace conference by the Lebanese delegation headed by Da'ud 'Ammun. Another society in Santiago, with a Syrian tendency, was the Ligue patriotique syrienne, which authorized Ghanim to demand a French protectorate. In Buenos Aires, Argentina, there were two pro-French societies: the Union Syrienne, which authorized Ghanim to demand a French protectorate over independent Syria and Lebanon, and which also defended him against his critics among the Syrian émigrés in Argentina; and the Alliance Libanaise of Buenos Aires, which in March 1920 protested to the French president against the pretensions of Faysal to the Lebanon and demanded its independence under French aegis. In July 1920 its past president, then back in Beirut, protested against the step taken by the members of the Mount Lebanon administrative council (see above), describing it as treason.29 The attitude to France on the part of the most important Lebanese society in Argentina, the Union Libanaise of Buenos Aires, was, on the other hand, much more reserved. This society treated with hostility the CCS mission that arrived in Argentina in late 1917 to recruit volunteers for the French Légion d'Orient, and following this, strained relations prevailed between it and the French legation in Buenos Aires. In January 1919, though, this society informed the French president that it authorized his government to represent it at the peace conference, for the purpose of achieving the independence of the Lebanon in its ancient boundaries (that is, those before 1861), under French aegis. However, at the same time the society also sent a telegram to the British prime minister, demanding absolute independence for the Lebanon, "under no protection" and guaranteed by the

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Allies. It also pointed out to him that the CCS had no right at all to represent the Lebanese. Also in a memorandum which this society drew up a month later to be sent to the peace conference, it insisted that the Lebanon had to be granted complete independence and sovereignty, meaning that it should have the capacity to administer itself, to choose its government, and to draw up its constitution and laws. Guaranteeing this would be the Powers, France, Britain, Italy, and the United States. This memorandum also detailed this body's interpretation of the "natural" boundaries of the Lebanon: al-Nahr al-Kabir in the north, Ra's al-Naqura in the south, the eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon in the east, and the Mediterranean Sea in the west. The Union Libanaise prepared another memorandum, protesting against the British-French agreement of September 1919, which — according to its understanding — reduced the Lebanon to the status of Syria in that the Lebanon was placed under French military occupation just as Syria would be. It claimed in the name of "the 60,000 Lebanese of Argentina" that this agreement contradicted the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 concerning the right of the local people to decide on their own fate, and also Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, according to which the peace conference was to recognize the independence of the Lebanon. It therefore demanded that the Lebanon should not be included in the new British-French agreement as an occupied territory, and that a liberal, democratic government based on liberty, equality, and fraternity should be established in the Lebanon. The society emphasized that the Lebanon had not fought on the side of the Turks during the war, and therefore it should not be treated as an occupied territory but as a liberated region. The orientation of the society to work for the absolute independence of the Lebanon caused it to protest also against the Syrian Congress, in March 1920, when the latter declared the independence of Syria, which was supposed to include the Lebanon too. The French considered this society to be an unreliable element opposed to French aegis, and decided not to give members of the society certificates for passports to return to the Lebanon because their presence there was liable to be damaging to French interests.30 A society which apparently was really hostile to the French was the Partido Patriotico Arabe (the Arab Patriotic Party), also of Buenos Aires. During the war it demonstrated sympathy for the Ottomans and the Germans, and its president at the end of the war even expressed his sorrow over the Allied victory. In late

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February 1919 this society protested against Ghanim's statements at the peace conference, defined them as deceitful, and also claimed that Ghanim was employed by the French "Ministry of Colonies". It announced that the Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians dissociated themselves from the principles advocated by Ghanim and that he had no right to represent them. This society demanded that a plebiscite be held in Syria, the Lebanon, and Palestine, under League of Nations auspices, in order to enable the inhabitants to decide their fate by themselves, in accordance with the principles of President Wilson. In late April 1919 the anti-French Syrian societies in South America planned to hold a congress in Santiago, the capital of Chile, in which absolute independence for Syria would be demanded, or alternatively, an American protectorate. Involved in organizing the congress was the Ligue patriotique syrienne, which earlier had authorized Ghanim to demand a French protectorate, but had now retreated from this approach. (Later the society also sent telegrams to the president of the French parliament and to the British and American foreign ministers, informing them that it was retracting the authorization it had given to Ghanim.) Delegates from Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil were to participate in the congress. In the end, though, the plan to hold the congress was thwarted by a countercampaign waged by the pro-French Lebanese émigrés.31 T H E SYRIAN UNION PARTY IN EGYPT

In the first half of 1918 the particularistic tendencies among the Syrian activists in Cairo began to grow stronger. It became clear that it was precisely the dwelling together of Syrians and Hijazis, following the establishment of the Hashimite government in the Hijaz, that caused the Syrians increasingly to dissociate themselves from the idea that after the war they would be ruled by Husayn. In Cairo a group of activists began to form, which included Kamil al-Qassab, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, Rafiq al-'Azm, Rashid Rida, and others, whose basis for joint activity was the growing dissatisfaction with Husayn because of his being, in their opinion, a stubborn man inconsiderate of the views of others. (This attitude reached the point of revulsion after the cutting off of the arm and leg, in a public ceremony, of a prisoner who had escaped from jail in Mecca.) There were those who feared that Husayn would also agree to the partition

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of Iraq and Syria between Britain and France in order to secure his personal position in the Hijaz. They therefore decided that they had to work for Syria independently of Husayn. It was to several members of this group that the British addressed the "Declaration to the Seven" in June 1918, in which they in effect agreed to the Syrian activists' approach that one should not treat all the Arab countries as one entity. At the same time the quarrels that existed between the Syrian and Iraqi officers in the Arab revolt army also became exacerbated, and attempts by Kamil al-Qassab and others to mediate between the parties did not succeed. All this brought the Syrian activists in Cairo to the conclusion that they had to work for the separation of the Syrian problem from the general Arab one, and to strive for the establishment of an independent Syria appropriate to its degree of development and the will of its inhabitants. The Anglo-French declaration of November 1918, concerning the need to set up local governments according to the wish of the inhabitants in the regions liberated from the Ottomans, was the final incentive for the founding of the Syrian Union Party (Hizb al-lttihad al-Suri) at a public conference held in Cairo on 19 December 1918. Elected as president was Amir Michel Lutf Allah, a member of a very wealthy family of Syrian émigrés (his brother George contributed to the party at its founding the sum of 2,000 Egyptian pounds and also financed the sending of the party's telegrams to Europe and America). Elected as vice-president was the Muslim scholar Rashid Rida, who was known for his pan-Arab views. In his periodical al-Manar he explained several months later why he was a partner in the founding of a particularistic Syrian party of this sort. According to him, this was the only way to bring about cooperation between Muslims and Christians for the independence of Syria, and activity on behalf of the liberation of part of the Arab countries did not contradict the desire to liberate all of them. Yet, Rida admitted on this occasion that not all the articles of the party platform satisfied him. Elected as secretary of the party was the journalist Salim Sarkis. The central committee of the party numbered 21 members, who came from all parts of Syria. Almost half of them, including the president, were Christians. Among the members of the central committee were prominent Syrian activists, with long service in political action, such as Rafiq al-'Azm (the past president of the Decentralization Party), Kamil al-Qassab, and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar. Six of the committee members were addressees of the "Declaration to the Seven".32

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The platform of the party was drafted by its central activists, several of whom were prominent men of letters such as Rafiq al-'Azm and Rashid Rida. Apparently the fact that several of the party leaders and the drafters of its platform were former members of the Decentralization Party considerably influenced the principles of the platform. (The Decentralization Party was a Syrian party which worked before the war ostensibly for administrative decentralization in the Ottoman Empire, but in fact for the decentralized independence of Syria.) Rida, however, relates that prior to the formulation of the party platform there was a prolonged debate between those advocating absolute independence and those interested in receiving foreign aid, at least temporarily. In the end the former partially prevailed, although, Rida points out, not all of the articles of the platform were accepted unanimously, and some of them were approved only by majority vote. At the meeting of the central committee on 6 January 1919 it was decided to present the platform to the British high commissioner and the French minister in Cairo so that they could pass it on to their governments, who in turn would present it before the peace conference. Later Lutf Allah sent the platform directly to the president of the peace conference. The party actually had two platforms: the full one, consisting of 14 articles, and a condensed one, consisting of four, which was intended for study by foreign agents (and this was the one sent to the peace conference). The first two articles (which were common to both versions) stated: 1. Syria in its territorial integrity and in its national unity (wahdatiha al-qawmiyya) shall extend from the Taurus mountains in the north, to the Khabur and Euphrates rivers in the east, to the Arabian Desert and Mada'in Salih in the south, and the Red Sea, Aqaba-Rafah line and the Mediterranean Sea in the west. 2. Syria shall enjoy absolute independence guaranteed by the League of Nations, which shall also guarantee its constitution without prejudicing its independence.

The other articles of the (full) platform established: The Syrian government would be assisted by the League of Nations in selecting foreign advisers to help it at the outset (this article was apparently inserted to satisfy those party members who demanded foreign aid). The regime of the state would be democratic and decentralist; the law would be civil, except for matters of personal status. The state would be divided into provinces which would enjoy internal administrative independence, and be connected to each other as regards their economic interests.

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(Mentioned in this context were Palestine, Mount Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, Dayr al-Zur, the Hawran, the bedouin tribes, and the Nusayris.) Each province would have a provincial council, which would administer its internal affairs and be elected every four years in a procedure that would safeguard the rights of minorities. The state would have a general national assembly, the members of which would be elected by the provincial councils from among their members, and which would meet once a year to discuss general affairs of the state and to pass legislation. At the head of the state there would be a central government, responsible to the national assembly; its seat would be Damascus in summer and Beirut in winter. Each province would mobilize a local police force to maintain internal order. State office-holders would be natives of the country. Education in the state would be uniform, and it would have to meet the needs of the entire population without regard to differences of religion or ritual. Each province would finance its expenses from income derived from internal taxes; general income, from customs, post and telegraph services, and so on, would be submitted to the central government for the benefit of the whole country. In the event that the general national unity (wahda qawmiyya 'amma) of the Arab nation were realized, Syria would join this unity, on condition that this would not impair in any way its particularist national unity (wahdatiha al-qawmiyya alkhassa), or the form of its government. The party sent its platform to Mecca for Husayn's consideration, and it met with an angry reaction. Husayn vehemently opposed the very idea of treating Syria as an independent unit that could determine its own fate. What especially incensed him in this context was the final article of the platform. Husayn was also angered by the boundaries of Syria as defined in the first article, and he "scornfully" drew the attention of the British representative in Jidda to the fact that according to this article all of the northern Hijaz from Mada'in Salih was to be included in Syria. His reply to the party members was that they were "on the wrong track altogether", and that despite his not having any personal ambitions, in his opinion all the Arabs should be under one supreme ruler and not divided. (It is interesting to note that Faysal later wrote to the party leadership that "we agree on the principles".) Husayn's newspaper, al-Qibla, told the party members that "you do not know what you are doing".33 The centre of the party was in Cairo, where it also set up its club. Branches were founded in the other important cities of Egypt, such as Alexandria, Mansura, Tanta, Zaqaziq, Port Said,

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and Fayyum. The party's activity focused on spreading propaganda in Syria and in sending protest letters and telegrams to Europe and the United States. The party would publish articles in the French and English press, buy from the editorial offices hundreds or thousands of copies of the issues in which the articles were published, and distribute them as propaganda in Syria and Palestine. All this cost a lot of money, which was supplied by the Lutf Allah family. (In July 1919 the French reported that the Lutf Allah brothers had already spent 60,000 francs for propaganda purposes.) The party tried to establish ties also with the Syrian émigré communities in North and South America and in other parts of the world where there were large Syrian communities. Thus, for example, a telegram including the principles of the party platform arrived at the Syrian community in Buenos Aires (the French minister there reported that he would do his best to see that the telegram received no reply). The party also asked the British authorities in Egypt, and the president of the peace conference, to allow it to send a delegation to Paris in order to present the Syrian demands to the conference. It claimed that it was the true representative of Syrian aspirations, and not "those well-known Committees, which, pretending to represent Syria, have been allowed to send delegates to Paris". This request of the party was not granted. On the other hand, its request to the British authorities that it be allowed to send representatives to Syria was to be granted.34 In March 1919 the party complained to the British authorities that the relief it was sending to the Lebanon and Syria was not being distributed properly. The authorities decided to allow it to send a commission of enquiry to the Lebanon in order to examine how this assistance was being distributed. Chosen as members of the commission were Michel Lutf Allah, Rafiq al-'Azm, and Jubra'il Taqla (owner of the newspaper al-Ahram). It was made clear to them that the authorization given them to travel about Syria was for the distribution of relief alone, and that if they should engage in politics the authorization would be cancelled. They in fact undertook in writing not to engage in politics. In late March the three left for Beirut, but the expected arrival in Syria of the international commission of enquiry was to bestow an entirely different character on their mission. On their arrival in Beirut Rafiq al-'Azm did announce to the local press that the purpose of their visit was solely philanthropic, to attend to the distribution in Syria of aid collected in Egypt during the war, "and we have no connection with political affairs". However, immediately thereafter the commission

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members established contacts with Muslim and Christian notables in order to sound out their attitude to the idea of absolute independence. It was also reported that Lutf Allah distributed a handbill in Zahla which contained the platform of the party. It appears that in the western region the emissaries did not find any great response to their ideas and, a bit disappointed, they broadened their contacts to Damascus for the purpose of setting up a subsidiary party in Syria. (The activities of this party, which was set up in mid-May, are reviewed in Chapter 2.) On 3 July a party delegation appeared before the King-Crane commission, comprising Michel Lutf Allah, Rafiq al-'Azm, and 'Abd alRahman al-Shahbandar, who had taken upon himself the leadership of the Damascus branch of the party. The delegation demanded independence for all parts of Syria, and it expressed itself against both French and British interference. (Later Lutf Allah said that he was in favour of British aegis over an autonomous Syria, but he felt that publicly one had to oppose any mandate because, since the United States was bound by the Monroe Doctrine and Britain by the Sykes-Picot agreement, the only mandate that could be imposed was a French one.) Neither the French nor the British were pleased with the party emissaries' activities. Allenby made it clear to the French in the western region that if the emissaries continued their political activity they would be expelled from Syria. A warning in these terms was conveyed also to the emissaries themselves. When they continued their activity, Lutf Allah and al-'Azm received an order from Allenby demanding that they return to Egypt immediately. The two stayed in Damascus for several weeks more, and in early August they returned to Egypt. For Rafiq al-'Azm, this was the end of a political career spanning many years. Some say that it was the fact that former pro-Ottoman politicians — his political rivals from before the war — were now full partners in the authority in Syria that brought about his decision to retire from political activity.35 The mission to Syria was not the only one sent by the party to the Levant. In March 1920 three emissaries, Salim Sarkis, Najib Sarkis, and George Lutf Allah, went to Palestine. The purpose of this mission was to strengthen the ties between the activists in Palestine and Syria and the party in Egypt. Lutf Allah continued on to Damascus, Najib Sarkis returned to Egypt, and the burden of propaganda in Palestine was left on the shoulders of Salim Sarkis (the secretary of the party). His attempt to persuade the Iraqi poet, Ma'ruf al-Rusafi, then staying in Jerusalem, to join the national movement did not achieve

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any great success despite his hinting to him that George Lutf Allah was prepared to assist him financially (al-Rusafi later returned to Iraq). Several days later Sarkis spoke at a large gathering in the house of al-Muntada al-Adabi in Jerusalem, which representatives of al-Nadi al-'Arabi also attended. He suggested to those present that they unite with the party, and described it to them as a body that had performed great services to the Arab nation, had a lot of money, and in fact "I would not be exaggerating if I say" that it was the strongest Arab party. His suggestion was received in a positive spirit, but nothing practical ever came of it.36 The party's activity in late 1919 and in the first half of 1920 consisted mostly of sending to the Allied representatives letters and telegrams setting out the party's aspirations, wishes, and protests. In early September 1919 the party appealed to the British in Cairo with demands that the Syrian people be permitted to establish a national government, with the Syrian Congress recognized as the parliament of Syria, to work to hold general elections, and to send a delegation to Paris to present the Syrian demands there. Shortly afterwards the British-French agreement of September 1919, concerning the evacuation of the British from the eastern region and the seizure of the entire western region by the French, became known. The party considered this agreement the beginning of the realization of the Sykes-Picot agreement, and in the protest telegrams it sent to President Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George it demanded that they not be content with the evacuation of the British army but remove all foreign troops from all parts of Syria. It demanded that the rights of the Syrian people, based on its linguistic, racial, and geographical unity, be honoured. On 13 December 1919 the party organized a joint congress in which representatives of the Central Lebanese-Syrian Society and the Moderate Syrian Party participated (for both see below). The outcome was a joint protest telegram of the three organizations against all the agreements between Britain and France whose purport was the partition of Syria (including the SykesPicot and the September 1919 agreements). They demanded that a single and undivided Syria be established, which would preserve its national unity and territorial integrity within the boundaries from the Taurus in the north to the Hijazi kingdom in the south, and from Iraq in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. This Syria would have a constitutional, democratic, and secular regime, based on a federation with administrative decentralization, in which each region would enjoy provincial

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autonomy. They announced that all three organizations were united in these demands and in the demand that Syria should be for the Syrians and only for the Syrians. However, as to the degree of independence for this Syria and the question of the mandate that might or might not be assigned, they pointed out that each of the organizations had its own view. The joint protest telegram was sent to the president of the peace conference, but the Syrian Union Party also sent a copy of it to Faysal, and he presented it to the peace conference as a reinforcement of his own political stand. When this became known to the Lebanese-Syrian Society, which was pro-French, it hastened to protest against Faysal's pretence and against the breach of trust by the Syrian Union Party. According to the society this whole protest was against the involvement of the Hijaz and Faysal in Syrian affairs, a protest with which, it stated, the Syrian Union Party agreed.37 When the decisions of the San Remo conference concerning the division of mandates became known, the party protested sharply. In a telegram sent to the peace conference it pointed out that these decisions meant the partition of Syria and a blow to its political, geographical, and ethnic unity. It also expressed its opposition to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and it described the decisions of the conference as breaking the heart of the Syrian nation and as a disgrace to humanity. It appealed to the conscience of the free nations against the injustice being done to the Syrian people, and it placed upon the Powers the responsibility with regard to history. When Gouraud's ultimatum reached Faysal, the party tried to intervene and prevent the expected confrontation. In an urgent telegram addressed to the French government it tried to explain the negative results that the ultimatum would have, and asked to be allowed to send a delegation to Europe to try to prevent possible hostilities. Michel Lutf Allah also asked the French president to receive him for an urgent interview, in an attempt to reach some kind of understanding. But, as is well known, none of these appeals succeeded, and it was precisely after the battle of Maysalun and the collapse of the Faysal regime in Syria that the activity and importance of the party increased. The party decided then to act as the coordinating body among the various Syrian and Palestinian nationalist organizations, which were suddenly left without backing. The president and vice-president of the party, Michel Lutf Allah and Rashid Rida, were also the president and vice-president of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress which was held by the party in 1921 in Geneva to discuss the new

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situation created in Syria and Palestine. But these events are outside the scope of this book. 38 In the context of the Syrian Union Party and the Lutf Allah family one should also mention the more eccentric personality of this family, Habib Lutf Allah, who served as the representative of the party in Europe during the period under discussion. He lived in exile in Madrid from 1916, and his request in March 1918 to move to Paris was denied. In April 1919 he renewed his request, having been elected as the party representative in Europe. This time he appealed in telegrams to all the Allies, and also to Shukri Ghanim, president of the CCS, whom he asked to intervene in his behalf with Wilson and the other Allied representatives at the peace conference. He promised Ghanim that when he arrived in Paris they would meet "and together we will come to complete agreement", since "we have the same principles". President Wilson actually answered his telegram ("he signed it himself') and asked him what was preventing him from coming to Paris. The preventing factor was actually the French, who suspected that Lutf Allah was connected with the Germans, but eventually he was allowed to go to Paris for a short period, and from there he continued on to London. From London Lutf Allah joined in the protest of the Syrian Union Party against the decisions of the San Remo conference. However, his protest was not confined to the separation of Palestine from Syria but concerned also the separation of Iraq from Syria and Palestine. This strange idea that "by 'Syria' I intend Syria proper, Iraq and Palestine", he repeated in a lecture he gave in June 1920 to a group of senators in Paris. He declared then that the Syrians loved France as their second fatherland, that there was no more than a misunderstanding between France and the Arab world, and that this must be removed. Therefore he proposed that there be established an Arab confederation in integral Syria in its natural boundaries, "that is, comprising Iraq and Palestine", a strong confederation that would be able to help Europe to contend with the red danger of Bolshevism. In his lecture Lutf Allah tried to persuade his listeners that Faysal was indeed a friend of France. A month later he, too, participated in the efforts of the party to prevent a confrontation between Faysal and Gouraud and a war, the results of which, according to him, would be ruinous to world peace. After the collapse of the Faysal state, Husayn appointed Lutf Allah as head of the Hijazi delegation to the peace conference.39

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T H E MODERATE SYRIAN PARTY

In January 1919 another Syrian party was founded in Cairo called the Moderate Syrian Party (al-Hizb al-Suri al-Mu'tadil). Since the party platform (detailed below) was quite similar to that of the Syrian Union Party, except for the party's desire for an American mandate, it seems that its founding only a few weeks after that of the Syrian Union Party was indeed because of the support its founders had for an American mandate, as against the opposition of the Syrian Union Party to any mandate whatsoever. In fact, the Syrian Union Party at its outset also had members who desired foreign assistance, several of whom soon joined the new party. The party did not have a permanent president (at each meeting a different chairman was elected), but the outstanding person in its ranks was the journalist and veteran activist Faris Nimr. Other prominent activists were Sami al-Juraydini, the secretarygeneral of the party, Khalil Khayyat, the head of the Alexandria branch, Ya'qub Sarruf, Nimr's partner in the publication of the newspaper al-Muqattam, Sulayman Nasif, and others. It is worth noting that among the founders of the party there were no Muslims at all. The party's activity was restricted to Egypt, and it did not have any branches or activists in Syria, although according to the French it appears that it sent humanitarian aid to Damascus through the American Red Cross. It also appears that it had contacts with Syrian emigre societies in the United States, which like it advocated the unity of Syria and naturally leaned to the idea of American assistance.40 The party platform consisted of five articles. The first was quite similar to that of the Syrian Union Party: Syria should not be divided and should extend from the Taurus mountains in the north to the Sinai desert in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Arabian desert in the east. The party leader, Faris Nimr, expressed the opinion that the partition of Syria meant its death sentence, and he compared such a possible partition to the partition of Poland. He and his associates protested strongly therefore against the Sykes-Picot agreement. On the other hand, the first article also meant the separation of Syria's fate from that of the Hijaz. I Iowever, it was the second article that stated the purpose of the party's founding: That the Peace Conference should declare the complete independence of Syria and delegate to one of the Powers the task of helping

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its Government until it attains such degree as would enable Syria to preserve and enjoy such independence and that such Power to be the United States of America it being free from any agreement involving the partition of Syria. Other arguments advanced by party members, on other occasions, as to why they wanted specifically an American mandate were: the good treatment that hundreds of thousands of Syrian émigrés had enjoyed in the United States; the educational and philanthropic enterprises that the Americans had founded in Syria; the many sacrifices the American people had made in the war for the principle of freedom and the defence of weak peoples; and the fact that it was the strongest and richest state in the world and at the same time had no colonialist tendencies. However, above all, an American mandate would prevent the partition of Syria between Britain and France and preserve its unity. (In this context Shukri Ghanim expressed his opinion before the French premier that if France would officially undertake that Syria would not be partitioned and that Palestine would not be separated from it, then the party would be prepared to demand French aegis; this, of course, was Ghanim's personal opinion.) The party believed that a unanimous appeal by the Syrians to the Americans to accept a protectorate over them would not be unsuccessful, as it was believed at the time that the United States would agree to accept the protectorate over Armenia. The other articles of the platform demanded that Syria be composed as a "United States", each with internal independence but connected to a single central democratic government; that the Arabic language be the only official language in the whole country; and that religion be absolutely separate from the state, except for matters of personal status. The principles of the platform were transmitted to President Wilson through the American consul-general in Cairo, and were sent also to the foreign ministers of Britain and France so that they would be brought to the attention of the peace conference. Faris Nimr invested all his time and energy in spreading the ideas of the party, and propaganda meetings for this purpose were held in Cairo and Alexandria. At a meeting which he held in Cairo on 2 March 1919, attended by over 300 Syrian émigrés, he stressed the two basic principles of the party: the unity of Syria and an American mandate. His speech aroused opposition both among the supporters of France and among members of the Syrian Union Party who were present. The pro-French activist Alphonse Zayniyya, of the Central Lebanese-Syrian Society,

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expressed his astonishment that anyone should now suggest seeking the help of the United States, after the considerable assistance France and Britain had rendered to Syria during the war. He stated his opinion that there were already enough societies working for the interests of Syria and there was no need for Nimr's new party. Michel Lutf Allah, of the Syrian Union Party, expressed his opposition to American interference, and added that he was convinced that in any case the United States would not accept the mandate over Syria. In a reply to a question from the audience he said that he had heard this from the American representative in Egypt. Zayniyya and another pro-French activist, Rizq Allah Arqash, later set out, in the press, further arguments against the idea of an American mandate. They claimed that the United States had revealed support for Zionism, which was the main obstacle to joining Palestine to Syria. They pointed out that there was no agreement among the Syrians about this idea and added that just saying that the Syrians wanted an American mandate was not enough to persuade the Americans to agree to it.41 While the King-Crane commission was visiting the Levant, Faris Nimr decided to form a joint stand for his party and the Lebanese-Syrian Society. On 21 June a joint meeting was held at his invitation, and after many hours of debate a joint programme was formulated, with each of the two bodies to work for its realization using its own means. The programme focused on three principles: (a) all of Syria, in its integral boundaries, must be free of any foreign rule, Turkish, Hijazi, or other, and absolutely separate from the other Arabic-speaking countries; (b) the government of Syria would be based on modern foundations, without any religious element, and the various regions of the state would enjoy provincial autonomy; (c) it was agreed that in the first stage the country needed the protection of a single Great Power. What was not mentioned in the programme was the identity of this "single Great Power" to which the mandate over Syria should be allocated. On this subject the two organizations were, of course, divided. The Moderate Syrian Party wanted an American mandate, while the Lebanese-Syrian Society supported France. The joint programme was to be presented before the Powers and the peace conference in order to convince them of the need to maintain the unity of Syria. The party also sent a delegation of four members to Beirut to meet the King-Crane commission. On 10 July two members of the delegation, Faris Nimr and Khalil Khayyat, met Crane and detailed to him the demands of the party, as listed in its

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platform. It is worthy of note that although the party had no status in Syria, the idea of American aegis gained currency in Syria during this period, and it was even included, as mentioned, in the resolutions of the Syrian Congress submitted to the KingCrane commission.42 However, in late June 1919 President Wilson left the peace conference, and gradually it became apparent that there was no chance of an American mandate over Syria. In September 1919 Gertrude Bell passed through Cairo, and in conversation with Faris Nimr she found his ideas had changed. He no longer spoke of an American mandate, though he expressed his hope that British assistance would be able to put Syria on the right path. He spoke of his fear of French rule, and told Bell that the French were publishing in Egypt "black lists" of Syrian nationalists whom they would arrest when they took over the country. As for Faysal, Nimr gave his opinion that his authority in Syria rested totally on British support. Should the British leave he would be left without any influence at all. With some despair Nimr told Bell that if the French should occupy Syria he did not expect Britain or the United States to intervene on behalf of the Syrians, and in this case the Syrian struggle against France would have no chance. And he was proved right. At this stage Nimr retired from political activity in the party, and its leadership passed into the hands of men of the second echelon. These latter pulled in different directions, and at one point it seemed that they were abandoning the idea of absolute separation between Syria and the Hijaz and were prepared to support Faysal. In December 1919 the party made a joint protest with the Syrian Union Party and the Central LebaneseSyrian Society against all the agreements between Britain and France concerning the partition of Syria. The protest, the content of which was detailed in the last section, insisted on the national unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the establishment of a democratic secular regime therein. As mentioned above, it was possible also to interpret this as opposition to the involvement of the Hijaz in Syria. It seems that, in order to clarify the party's policy and to preserve its ideological purity, one of the party veterans, Nisim Sayba'a, announced at the end of the month, in a letter to the newspaper al-Muqattam, that the party adhered to its desire for an American mandate, and not a British or French one. Its members were in no way prepared to accept Hijazi rule over them, and they wanted religion to be separate from the state in Syria, as in the other civilized states. But the fact that it was already clear that the United States had no

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interest in what was going on in the Middle East caused the party in effect to be left without supporters and it became an insignificant body. Perhaps this may explain the statement of a French admiral who visited Cairo in May 1920 and reported that at a party in his honour, attended also by several members of the Moderate Liberal Party, he found a general readiness to accept the idea of a French mandate over Syria.43 T H E LEBANESE SOCIETIES IN EGYPT

The oldest Lebanese society in Egypt after the war was the Alliance Libanaise, with a centre in Cairo and branches in Alexandria and Mansura. It was founded in 1909 and in the course of its history it went through a number of ideological developments. At the outbreak of World War I it ceased to be content with the traditional Lebanese demand to preserve the autonomous rights of Mount Lebanon and to expand its territories, and it began to advocate independence for the mountain. A no less important development was the fact that during the war the society abandoned the pro-French policy that had characterized it before the war, and after the first echoes of the Sykes-Picot agreement reached its ears it began to form a definite antiFrench policy. By early 1919 the French had already described it as the most hostile group in Egypt to French influence in Syria. Notable in his hostility to the French was the head of the Alexandria branch, the lawyer Yusuf al-Sawda, who through the newspaper al-Umma ceaselessly attacked French interference in the Lebanon. The president of the society from 1917, Auguste Adib, a former senior official in the Egyptian finance ministry, was less hostile to France, or at least he became so during the period under discussion. (In October 1918 he rejected an invitation from Faysal to join the Arab government in Damascus.) Like Adib, other members of the society held various offices in the British administration in Egypt, and they sometimes took advantage of their positions to further their views. Thus, for example, several of the official censors belonged to the society, and in this capacity tried to prevent the publication of news about the strengthening of the French position in Syria. Moreover, many of the newspapers in Egypt were managed and edited by Lebanese émigrés, and the opinions expressed in them accorded with those of their owners. (For example, the newspaper al-Ahram was

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owned by Jubra'il Taqla, one of the prominent members of the society.) Society members also distributed various documents, such as statements by President Wilson, or the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918, in order to prove to their compatriots that in the end Syria would not be placed under French aegis. The activity of the society was limited to Egypt, though it apparently tried to broaden its influence by sending emissaries to the Lebanon and to Syria.44 The Alliance Libanaise advocated absolute independence for the Lebanon in its expanded boundaries under a guarantee of the Great Powers. The president of the society, Auguste Adib, published in 1919 a book called Le Liban aprés la guerre (The Lebanon after the War), in which he espoused this principle and also detailed the territories to be included in the Lebanon: Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Ba'albek, the Biqa', and Marj 'Ayun. He explained that none of these territories could exist without the water sources of Mount Lebanon, while the expanded Lebanon would be able to supply its own needs and to govern itself. At the head of the new state Adib wanted a representative government. The question of the regime of the future state also occupied Yusuf al-Sawda in Fi Sabil Lubnan (On Behalf of the Lebanon) published in the same year. Al-Sawda spoke of a constitutional regime, at the head of which would stand a local governor elected every seven years. Alongside him would stand a government responsible to a council of representatives. This council would be elected in general elections and would be the supreme authority in the state, especially in matters of finance and legislation. There would also be an independent judiciary. "This government will be called a republic", he stated. Al-Sawda stressed that the Lebanon must enjoy absolute political independence, and that the ties between it and Syria must only be economic; the Syrians must honour the will of their neighbours to maintain their national identity and political independence.45 The society wanted to send a delegate to Europe in order to present its message to the peace conference, but lack of financial means prevented this. In any case, it is doubtful if the British would have allowed their emissary to go to Paris. When the society learned about the decisions of the Mount Lebanon administrative council of December 1918, which were to be presented by its delegation to the peace conference and included a demand for French assistance, it sent a long protest letter to the administrative council against its decisions. (Copies of this letter were also sent to the British high commissioner, the French premier and the American and Italian representatives in Cairo.) The

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society claimed that the council had no right to issue decisions in the political sphere because, according to the réglement organique the term of office of the council members, who had been elected before the war, had already expired. From this viewpoint they no longer had any authority to decide anything. Therefore, the society declared, the council's decisions did not represent the will of the Lebanese people. It accused the council of being ready to be satisfied with autonomy, and as a result of this, it said, the council was being drawn to subjugating the mountain to foreign aegis and was leaving the door open for its inclusion in a Syrian federation. This was not the only time that the society attacked the council. When the council protested against the resolution of the Syrian Congress of March 1920 and reiterated its desire for French assistance, the society announced that the Lebanese wanted independence under an international aegis of the League of Nations. In July 1920, when it became known that the attempt of the council members to go to Damascus involved the receipt of considerable sums of money from the representative of the Arab government in Beirut, the society president at the time, Antun al-Jumayyil, called them traitors who were no different to those selling the Lebanon's independence to the French. As the society could not send its own delegate to Paris it tried to get in touch with the Comité Libanais de Paris so that the latter could represent it at the peace conference. The censor in France intercepted the telegram sent by the society to the Comite on this matter. The society also tried to contact Faysal while he was in Paris, and sent a telegram directly to Clemenceau, the French premier and president of the peace conference, in which it detailed the reparations that, in its opinion, Turkey should have to pay the Lebanon for the damage caused before and during the war ("many tens of millions of francs").46 During 1920 many members of the society began to desert it, apparently because of their reservations concerning its antiFrench policy, which seemed to them unwise, especially after the decisions of the San Remo conference. Also the president of the society, Auguste Adib, retired from his post and was replaced by Antun al-Jumayyil, the founder of the society. (When Greater Lebanon was established, Adib was appointed by the French as director of its treasury department.) In July 1920 the society tried to mount the political stage again by means of a plan to establish a Reconstruction and Renewal Committee, which was to work for the revival of the Lebanon in the economic, industrial, commercial, and scientific spheres. The society hoped to

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collect contributions through this framework to set up schools, improve roads in the Lebanon, and so on, and to bring back Lebanese émigrés to their fatherland. Nothing came of this programme. In late August 1920, when it became clear that the Alliance Libanaise had reached the end of its life, its leaders, Antun Jumayyil, Jubra'il Taqla, and Da'ud Barakat, encouraged the founding of a new party, called the Lebanese National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Lubnani, and in French, Parti National Libanais), as a substitute for the society. They remained, though, behind the scenes, and Habib al-Bustani, who was considered pro-French, was elected president of the new party. The French, however, identified the origins of this new party and treated it with suspicion. The first article of the party platform called for the independence of Greater Lebanon and the restoration of its natural historical boundaries. This article was to become obsolete within a few days, when the French announced the establishment of Greater Lebanon. 47 The French took various steps to curb the influence of the Alliance Libanaise among the Lebanese émigrés in Egypt. The most effective was probably setting up the Lebanese-Syrian Society of Egypt as a counter-balance to the Alliance Libanaise and as the central pro-French body among the Lebanese and Syrian emigre communities in Egypt. The society was founded soon after the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918, and it included a central society in Cairo and a number of regional societies. In January 1919 the membership was said to number over 1,200, according to the society, and about 700, according to the French, with regional societies in Alexandria, Tanta, Mansura, and Port Said. Most of the members were Christians, Maronites, Melchites, or Greek Orthodox, and only a small minority were Muslims. These latter were led by the veteran Damascene activist Haqqi al-'Azm, who during the war had become an ardent supporter of France. It also appears that the society was supported by the Maronite and Melchite clergy in Egypt. The most prominent member of the society was the president of the central society in Cairo, 'Abdallah Sufayr, a former senior official in the Egyptian interior ministry. Haqqi al-'Azm served as vice-president, the secretary was Alphonse Zayniyya, and the treasurer Ni'mat Allah Ghanim, the nephew of Shukri Ghanim, president of the CCS in Paris. Throughout its existence the society maintained good relations with the French representatives in Egypt and especially with the French legation in Cairo. On the other hand, it was reported

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that the society encountered opposition from the British authorities to its dissemination of pro-French propaganda. According to the French the secret police in Alexandria were instructed to gather information on the regional society there, and concluded that the true representative of the Lebanese in Alexandria was the Alliance Libanaise. The French legation in Cairo also advised the society members there to try to maintain a low profile and to avoid confrontations with the British authorities, who, according to it, had revealed a growing sympathy for "panArabism" (that is, for the Arab government in Damascus).48 The political goals of the society were similar to those of the CCS. It strove for the establishment of a Syrian federation, to consist of autonomous provinces, within the framework of which the special autonomous status of Mount Lebanon would be preserved. Heading the federation would be a democratic constitutional government with no religious element. The territorial integrity of Syria and its political unity would be preserved with the responsibility, guidance, and aegis of France. The Syrian question would be completely separated from the Arab one in the light of the substantive differences existing between the Syrians and the Arabs ("the Syrians are not Arabs"). The necessity to separate Syria's affair from those of the Arabian Peninsula was one of the salient aspects in the society's publications. It claimed that "Syria, in spite of its being Arabic-speaking today, is not at all of the Arab race" (the society intimated that the Syrians had Aramaean origins). Furthermore, in the past Syria had been connected with Greco-Roman culture, and now it was open to the culture of the West. The Arabian Peninsula, on the other hand, had always been and still was closed to modern culture. Therefore, it would be a mistake to force on the Syrians the rule of their Arab neighbours, who were so different from them in mentality, culture, and aspirations. What especially worried the society was the possibility that Syria would be subject to a theocratic government ("theocratic states can no longer exist"), and therefore it viewed a Hijazi dominance in Syria as the demise of the country, and demanded the liberation of Syria from Faysal's rule. As against this, the society claimed, Syria would have to be placed at least for a "training period" under the supervision of a tutelary power, France, because the Syrians were not yet capable of governing themselves. They were divided into rival communities, and a feeling of national unity had not yet developed among them. The supervision by the tutelary power would continue until progress had brought the Syrians to forget their differences and to be united in Syrian nationality.

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In the context of the society's ideology it is worth mentioning the memorandum that society member Rizq Allah Arqash presented to the French minister in Cairo in January 1919, under the heading "La vérité sur la question syrienne", in which he professed to represent the views of the non-Muslim population of Syria. He also made it clear that Syria and the Syrians had no connection with the Arabian Peninsula. They adopted the Arabic language only after the Muslim conquest. It was impossible, according to him, to subject a progressive people like the Syrian people to the rule of ignorant and retarded nomads. He insisted that the Muslims were quite unable to maintain the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to Islam, liberty was granted only to Muslims, it was not possible to maintain equality between Muslim and non-Muslim, and fraternity existed only among Muslims. In Muslim states the Muslims were the masters and the non-Muslims were persecuted slaves. Doctrines such as these could not be accepted in the present enlightened century, and therefore to allow a situation in which a Muslim majority would rule and subjugate a non-Muslim minority was prohibited. For this reason it was also forbidden to permit a Muslim prince — Faysal — to be placed over Syria, because his government would be a constant cause of fanaticism. What the Syrians needed was a general governor on behalf of a single European Power which would be responsible for all of Syria. Arqash warned that granting complete independence to Syria in its current condition would mean the subjugation of the minority by the majority, or, in other words, the enslavement of the nonMuslims by the Muslims, and this at a time when the nonMuslims were the intellectual, industrial, commercial, and financial elite of Syria.49 In October 1918 about 200 Lebanese and Syrians, among them all the future heads of the society, had sent a sharp protest to the Allied representatives in Cairo, angrily rejecting the possibility that the primitive Hijazis might rule the progressive Syrians, a situation which would constitute a humiliation and insult to the Syrians. They then demanded that the Syrian question be separated from the Arab one and that an integral and united Syria be absolutely separate and independent from the other Arabic-speaking countries. In January 1919 the society addressed a long memorandum to the Allied representatives at the Paris peace conference, in which it in effect broadened these demands and listed all its ideological principles detailed above. Concurrently the society sent a telegram to the CCS authorizing it to represent it at the conference and to demand in its name that

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France be given the task of establishing an integral and federal Syria, clear of any Arab or religious element. A month later the society sent another telegram to Shukri Ghanim, in which it expressed its increasing concern in the face of the intentions of the Hijazi delegates towards Syria. It asked him to convey this feeling to the peace conference, expressing the hope that its views would be adopted by the Allies, and first and foremost that Syria not be partitioned. Ghanim was also asked to publicize this telegram in the main newspapers of Paris. The society kept close ties with the CCS during the period under discussion. Thus, for example, the society sent a protest to the peace conference, through the CCS, against the BritishFrench agreement of September 1919. It considered this agreement a programme for the partition of Syria contrary to its ethnic and geographical boundaries. The fact that according to this agreement internal Syria would remain, at least temporarily, under an Arab government was intolerable to the society. It demanded that a pure Syrian government be established in Syria, in the boundaries from the Taurus to al-'Arish, and under the aegis of one mandatory power, preferably France. In another telegram that 'Abdallah Sufayr sent then to Shukri Ghanim he wrote simply: "The Syrian people, Christians and Muslims, are racially no more Arab than Egypt." He demanded that the peace conference act according to the spirit of the twentieth century, and see to it that Syria, which had been liberated from the Turkish yoke, should also be liberated from the Hijazi yoke that had replaced it. The society attempted in this context also to prove that Faysal's government in Syria was subordinate to his father's in the Hijaz: "Any assertion that the Syria of Faysal will be independent of the Hijaz is false." The peace conference must not believe it. When the echoes of Husayn's reprimands of Faysal for his agreement with Clemenceau reached the society's ears, it considered this convincing proof of Faysal's submission to Husayn and demanded through Ghanim that all discussions with Faysal on Syria's future be terminated immediately.50 During this period the society was involved in two attempts to formulate a joint programme with other political bodies that were not pro-French. Both attempts ended unsuccessfully because of ideological differences. In June 1919 it met the Moderate Syrian Party, with which it drew up a joint programme concerning the absolute separation of integral Syria from the other Arabic-speaking countries, especially from the Hijazi rule, and its transformation into a modern state without any religious element, the regions of which would enjoy provincial autonomy.

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The programme also included an agreement on the principle that the country needed the aegis of a single Great Power. But the two organizations could not agree on the identity of this Power. In December 1919 the society participated in a tripartite meeting with the Syrian Union Party and the Moderate Syrian Party, the result of which was a joint telegram of protest against all the agreements between Britain and France concerning the partition of Syria, and a demand that one undivided Syria be established in the boundaries from the Taurus in the north to the Hijazi kingdom in the south, and from Iraq in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west. In the view of the three organizations the regime in this Syria would have to be constitutional, democratic, and secular, with the state built as a federation on a basis of administrative decentralization, each region in it enjoying provincial autonomy. In the protest telegram itself it was explicitly clarified that, on the question of the degree of independence for the country, and on the question of a mandate, the organizations differed among themselves. And indeed, when the Syrian Union Party sent a copy of this telegram to Faysal and he immediately submitted it to the peace conference as a document which strengthened his own political stand, the society considered this a breach of trust on the part of the Syrian Union Party. It turned out that, in the eyes of the society, the entire matter of the protest was directed against the involvement of the Hijaz and Faysal in Syria.51 The leading opponent of Hijazi involvement in Syria among the society members was its vice-president, Haqqi al-'Azm. He began a keen press campaign, writing himself in the pages of al~ Mustaqbal, the organ of the CCS, eliciting angry responses from Husayn in the pages of al-Qibla. In an article that appeared in January 1919 al-'Azm called the Arab revolt "the Hijazi revolt", and stated that, but for the help of the Allies, "the sons of the king of the Hijaz could-not have marched even two steps northwards". He attacked the Hashimites for having begun to intervene in the Syrian question for political and religious reasons and emphasized that "we, the Syrians, have an imperative duty not to merge the Syrian question with the Hijazi-Arab question because of the vast differences between the two countries". He also added that, "just as the Zionist domination is a great danger to Syria, the Hijazi domination is an even greater and more comprehensive danger". Husayn reacted by accusing al-'Azm of heresy and Turcophilia, and by pointing out that al-'Azm had lived in security in Egypt while Faysal and his men were fighting the Turks. In another article that appeared in February, al-'Azm

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called for the establishment of a national government in Syria which would have no religious character and no connection to the Hijaz. Al-Qibla reacted by casting aspersions on al-'Azm's mentality and his moral values. Al-'Azm also sent articles in this vein to an Arabic newspaper in Argentina, in which he explained why the Syrians must abandon pan-Arabism and demand the establishment of a greater Syria in line with modern ideas. When the articles appeared, al-Qibla attacked him sharply. Al-'Azm responded with a provocative article in which he proved that he was not the only one who demanded political independence for Syria with no ties at all to the Hijaz and its king. To this alQibla replied that al-'Azm's words were merely "the grinding of water". In early 1919 the society planned to send al-'Azm to Paris to be a counterweight to Faysal at the peace conference, by the very fact of his being a Muslim from Damascus. The idea was acceptable to the French military authorities in the western region, but it seems that the French foreign ministry had decided to content itself with the CCS and Lebanese delegations. Al-'Azm remained in Cairo to the disappointment of the society. Yet the plan for al-'Azm to go to Paris remained on the society's agenda, and it even led to his becoming a target for criticism by opponents of France among the Syrians in Egypt. Al-'Azm responded to this criticism, saying that he would be proud to go to Paris as an emissary of the society to defend the interests of Syria and its prosperity. His hope was to free Syria from the Hijazi yoke, and if he could not realize this at the present time, then at least he would work with his friends for the freedom of what was called "Grand Liban". Later on that year he visited the Lebanon and Beirut, and on Gouraud's arrival he greeted him in the name of the society and expressed his confidence in Gouraud's ability to administer Syria and bring new life to it. When he returned to Cairo in December, he came up with the new idea that a committee of Syrians should be set up in Paris, to be joined by three members of the society (one of them Palestinian), and it would present to the peace conference the aspirations of the Syrians concerning the future boundaries of their country. He asked Shukri Ghanim to present this idea to the French government, and the latter did so, pointing out to the foreign minister that al-'Azm aspired to an exclusive French mandate over all of Syria. The CCS stock was going down at that time, as explained above, and therefore no one took this proposal seriously.52 In any case, al-'Azm's pro-French attitude obtained for him the position of the first governor of the "State

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of Damascus", when this was established by the French after the collapse of Faysal's state. When the Syrian Congress declared Syria's independence and the enthronement of Faysal as its king, the society vehemently protested against this "usurpation" and emphasized that the foreign Hijazis had no right to intervene in Syrian affairs. It asked the Allies to liberate Syria from the Hijazi government, which was only causing trouble, and to establish a national government. In a letter to a member of the French parliament the society's secretary asked that an end be put to "this comedy of Syrian independence" and to the Hijazi government which was terrorizing the Syrian patriots. However, after the publication of the San Remo conference decision regarding the allocation of mandates, which placed Syria in the hands of France, the society concluded that there was no longer any reason for its existence, and on 14 May 1920 it disbanded. It is possible that contributing to this decision was the fact that the French charge d'affaires in Cairo had begun to show impatience at the frequent urgent messages the society was sending through him to Paris, and he started sending them by regular mail rather than by telegraph, claiming that they were only repeating themselves. The charge d'affaires even approved of the disbanding of the society, on the assumption that it would bring about political apathy among the Lebanese and Syrian émigrés in Egypt and a concomitant disbanding of the anti-French organizations. This assumption was not acceptable to Gouraud in Beirut, who expressed open dissatisfaction at the disbanding of the society, and claimed that it could have been of assistance in winning over the émigrés in Egypt to the French mandate in Syria. In late July 1920, immediately after the occupation of Syria by France became known in Cairo, most of the leaders of the society gathered together again and decided to set up a new society, this time with an exclusive Lebanese character, called the League for the Defence of the Rights of Greater Lebanon. This society, too, was presided over by 'Abdallah Sufayr. In its platform, as reported by it to the French premier, were demands for the restoration of the Lebanon to its ancient "natural" boundaries; recognition of its independence vis á vis any neighbouring state or government, but under a French mandate; the establishment of a local democratic government in the Lebanon and the election of a founding national assembly that would prepare its constitution — all this in coordination with France. The society had representatives in Alexandria, Mansura, and Tanta, and like its predecessor it kept in contact with Shukri Ghanim.53

Chapter 6 AL-'AHD AL-'IRAQI AND THE SYRIAN ARMY SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS IN SYRIA

During the Arab revolt serious disputes broke out between the Iraqi and Syrian officers serving in the revolt armies. The hostility between them stemmed mainly from the feeling of discrimination against them that the Syrians experienced because the Iraqis had taken over the senior positions in the revolt armies. This troubled relationship had, of course, an influence on the development of the Arab revolt and its achievements.1 In the Northern Army of the Arab revolt, under the leadership of Faysal, the officers were in effect divided into two separate factions, Iraqi and Syrian, with Faysal forced to stand in the middle as a mediator. The most serious quarrel between the Iraqi and Syrian officers broke out in Aqaba shortly after the end of the war. Most of the Northern Army had gone north, and the post of military governor of Aqaba was held by an Iraqi officer. In mid-December Husayn assigned a new governor to Aqaba, and the latter not only deposed the Iraqi but also began to investigate the truth of rumours of vast embezzlements that the Iraqi had committed. Furthermore, he set up for this purpose an investigating committee consisting of junior Syrian officers, and immediately the confrontation between the Iraqi and Syrian officers erupted with renewed vigour. The Iraqi officer sent a telegram requesting help to the former army commander, Ja'far al-'Askari (who was, of course, also Iraqi), but the British held up the telegram for fear that the confrontation would spread to the entire army. It was also feared that the event would be exploited to begin a movement to remove all Iraqi office-holders from Syria. In the meantime all the Iraqi officers and soldiers in Aqaba demanded to be transferred to Amman, and seven of the officers even offered their resignations. Faysal was then in Europe, and the British, who wanted to bring the quarrel to an end before it got out of control, recommended Zayd to summon the leaders of the two

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parties to Damascus in order that they might present their claims before him. Thus the tension would be relieved in Aqaba itself. Zayd acted as suggested (although in the end only the leader of the Syrians sailed to Damascus), and a new representative of Husayn came to Aqaba, and carried out an objective investigation of the accusations brought against the Iraqi officer. The accusations were indeed proven to be true, but as regards the broader ramifications for Syrian-Iraqi relations, the incident was terminated. A senior official in the British Foreign Office concluded from this affair "that Mesopotamia and Syria have little in common and are unlikely ever to come together in a federation". 2 The Aqaba incident symbolized well both the relationship prevailing between the Syrians and the Iraqis in the Arab revolt army and the relationship that was to prevail between these two elements in Syria during the next two years. These relations found expression first and foremost in the new Syrian army that was then to be established, under the command of (Iraqi) Yasin al-Hashimi. Al-Hashimi ordered the disbanding of the old army, which had taken part in the liberation of Syria from the Ottomans, and the establishment of a new army. Even at the beginning of this process the hostility that characterized the relations between the various elements of the Arab army was evident. A unit of Sharifite soldiers from Yemen, who had received an order to leave their barracks in order to be discharged, refused to do so, claiming that they were not prepared to take orders from a Baghdadi. When 20 gendarmes were sent to the barracks to impose order, the unit opened fire on them. Then 300 gendarmes were sent, and after a battle lasting an hour and a half the mutineers surrendered and were arrested, but not before killing two gendarmes and wounding many others. Al-Hashimi himself was not popular with the Syrians (it was said that Faysal did not take to him either). Many Syrian officers who had returned from Turkey after the disintegration of the Ottoman army complained that they were left without jobs and had become strangers in their own country. Most of the officers of the old army who joined the new army were Iraqis, whereas those officers who were brought in from the Ottoman army were mostly Syrians. The first group accused the second of not having taken part in the Arab revolt, but of having served the Ottoman Empire. The second group considered the first a rabble who had gained their ranks only because of circumstances and who did not have the requisite military and general education for the positions they held. The situation became even more serious

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during the early months of 1919 when Baghdadi officers who had not found their place in Iraq began to infiltrate into Syria with the intention of finding a livelihood in the Syrian army.3 The Iraqi officers, who had accompanied Faysal during the Arab revolt and who constituted the backbone of his Northern Army, now held a large number of senior positions, both in the army and in the government. The local Syrians began to consider them competitors in the struggle for jobs, and also to envy the preference which, according to the Syrians, they were receiving from Faysal. To the Syrians of the upper classes it was clear that every position taken by an Iraqi meant one less position for a Syrian. Moreover, the Iraqis, who felt that Syria had already gained its independence, believed that it was time for them to concentrate on activity for the independence of Iraq. They became a fermenting element in the population, and unsympathetic to the British in the light of their behaviour in Iraq. (Thus, for example, the Iraqi activist Rashid al-Hashimi gave a public address in which he declared that the Tigris would be filled with blood, and the military governor, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, was obliged to throw him in jail for a while.) The fact that they were Iraqis in Syria also caused them to have more pan-Arab tendencies than the local Syrians. The British officer Kirkbride, who visited Damascus in August 1919 and met Nuri al-Sa'id for a talk, relates: Over drinks that evening, Nuri Said startled me by going off into a long tirade damning the Syrians and all their works. Things were undoubtedly going awry. The trouble arose, in part, from a sort of parochialism. Having supported, in principle, the ideal of a revival of the Arabs as a single nation, it was not long after their liberation that the Syrians resented being ordered about by Hejazis and Iraqis.

Gertrude Bell, who visited Syria in October 1919, comments upon the lack of sympathy among the Syrian notables for the Iraqis, whom they considered ''upstarts". They knew quite well that most of the Iraqis were not men of status or wealth in their homeland, and that it was only while serving Faysal that they achieved senior positions. The Syrian notables referred to the Iraqis as "aliens" (on this Bell commented that "at this point the conception of Arab unity becomes obscured"). The moderates among the Syrian notables complained that the Iraqis were too extremist and that for the sake of the slim chance of realizing their political ideology they were ready to set all of Syria on fire. However, even 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, who was

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certainly not in the ranks of the moderates, told Bell that the Iraqis were indifferent to the welfare of the country and that their great extravagance would bring about its ruin. In the final months of 1919 the reports of hostility and differences of opinion between the Syrians and the Iraqis in Syria increased. In fact, there had already in the early part of the year been a general desire among the Syrian population that the Iraqis should return to their country. But now there began to appear in the Syrian press headlines such as "Syria for the Syrians", and propaganda calling for the dismissal of the Iraqis from their offices in Syria began to be spread. In Damascus a society was founded by the name of al-Shabiba al-Suriyya (the Syrian Youth) the function of which was to struggle against the Iraqi office-holders. After the declaration of Syria's independence in 1920 the Syrians considered themselves entitled to take over all the government offices and to push the Iraqis out. A group of prominent Iraqi activists (among them the officers 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi and Jamil al-Madfa'i) then went to Faysal and told him explicitly that they felt "that we are unwanted foreigners" in Syria.4 The situation in northern Syria, in Aleppo, was no better. After Ja'far al-'Askari was appointed military governor of Aleppo, following the February pogroms against the Armenians, all the senior positions in the city were given to natives of Baghdad or Mosul. Al-'Askari's assistant for administrative affairs, and in effect the acting civilian governor, was Naji al-Suwaydi. It had been reported in early 1919 that there was jealousy among the Aleppo notables towards the Iraqis, and an unwillingness on the part of the Aleppans to be ruled by non-Syrians, be they Hijazi or Iraqi. The tension in Syrian-Iraqi relations in this region continued throughout the entire year and into early 1920, and Ja'far al-'Askari ("very downhearted") would complain to the British officers about the difficult times he was going through and that the locals considered him a foreigner and also a traitor. At one point a Syrian officer approached the French liaison officer in Aleppo and told him that 27 of his comrades were prepared to organize a movement to get rid of the Iraqis. He stated that they had in their possession four cannons, 2,500 rifles, and 750 horses. The French officer shied away from the Syrian's initiative and did not encourage him, for fear that it would cause confusion throughout the entire region. In any case, after the declaration of Syria's independence in March 1920 Ja'far al-'Askari and Naji al-Suwaydi resigned their offices (apparently they were requested to do so), and they were

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replaced by 'Abd al-Hamid al-Qaltaqji and Rashid Tali', the first a Syrian and the second a Lebanese.5 The strained relations that prevailed between the Syrians and Iraqis in Syria caused many Iraqi officers to decide to return to their own country at the first available opportunity. But the British in Iraq were not at all enthusiastic about such a course of action, and eventually only a few Iraqi officers were permitted to cross into Iraq, and of those only a few received junior positions from the British. When relations between the Syrians and Iraqis became even worse following the declaration of Syria's independence, the al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi society (see below) instructed the Iraqi officers and soldiers serving in the Syrian army to resign their positions and to go to the town of Dayr al-Zur. Several dozen officers and hundreds of soldiers answered the call. The society's motive for this instruction was to calm the situation. But it actually had an additional aim: the Iraqi officers who felt that they had nothing more to gain in Syria decided then to focus their attention on Iraq and to turn Dayr al-Zur into a rear base for a revolt planned against the British. But even after the retirement of most of the Iraqis from the Syrian army the bad relations between them and the Syrians continued. When Syria was occupied by the French, Iraqi officers began to infiltrate back into Iraq, and they reported that even in the new situation Syrian hostility towards them continued. There were also Syrians who went to the French and turned in the names of the Iraqi officers who had been involved earlier in anti-French activity. These were arrested by the French and imprisoned on the island of Irwad.6 The poor relations between the Iraqi and Syrian officers during the Arab revolt and afterwards also brought to an end the veteran society al-'Ahd, the history of which before and during the World War has been described in previous books. (Eighty per cent of this society's members were officers, and 60 per cent of its members were Iraqis.) The Iraqi and Syrian officers could no longer work in the framework of a single body, and in light of the new circumstances after the war, that is, the partition of the Arab countries and the separation of the Iraqi question from the Syrian one, the veterans of the society decided to split into two societies: al-'Ahd al-'lraqi and al-'Ahd al-Suri. Each society would work independently for the liberation of its country and they would try to assist one another. After the signing of the armistice al-'Ahd published a special manifesto on this subject, in which it was stated:

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The Allies do not agree to establish a [single] independent Arab state. Therefore the members of the al-'Ahd society have decided to divide into two parts, each of which will invest its efforts on behalf of the liberation of the country to which it belongs.7 Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was the more important society of the two, and most of this chapter will deal with it. The following lines will be devoted to al-'Ahd al-Suri. In its early days al-'Ahd al-Suri was composed mainly of Syrian officers, both those who participated in the Arab revolt and those who served in the Ottoman army and returned to Syria at the end of the war. Later civilians also joined the society, several of whom were from the important families of Syria. The members of the administrative committee of the society were: the officers Muhammad Isma'il al-Tabbakh, Lutfi al-Rifa'i, and 'Arif al-Tawwam, and the civilians Husni al-Barazi, Rashid Baqdunis, Hasan al-Hakim, and Fu'ad al-Shihabi. The president of the society in mid-1919 was the former officer Sa'd al-Din Radwan. The administrative committee acted in coordination with alFatat, and in fact a considerable proportion of the society's members, mainly the civilians, were also members of al-Fatat. The society's relations with al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi were, on the other hand, more problematical. At first the two factions cooperated. But during 1919 several of the officer members resigned from the Syrian army as a result of the feelings of inferiority they experienced with regard to the Iraqi officers and their envy of the senior positions that the latter held. The society then joined in the calls of "Syria for the Syrians", and from then on it was considered as being in opposition to al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi. The views held by the leadership of the society found expression in a declaration that its delegation submitted to the KingCrane commission in July 1919. What was interesting in this declaration was that the society rejected the possibility that Syria would receive absolute independence; it preferred instead independence under a French protectorate. It believed that an Arab government would not be able to administer Syria without outside help. The society explained that "this demand of ours is not made out of hatred for the Arabs, because we, the Syrians, are also Arabs. But we are before everything searching for the interest of the country." Concurrently the society accused Faysal in its statement of having bought the support of many with gifts of money, a deed contrary to "the principles of civilization". It is doubtful if views such as these were acceptable to all members of the society (in fact, many of its members were known to

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advocate absolute independence), and they certainly were not generally popular in Syria at this period. Indeed, al-'Ahd al-Suri remained an unimportant, marginal society, and those in it who demanded independence found more resolute societies to join. At all events, the society continued to exist until the collapse of Faysal's state, and then it, too, disintegrated. Those in it who demanded independence then fled Syria and the French, as did many other Syrian nationalists.8 AL-'AHD AL-'IRAQI IN DAMASCUS I

The 1913 platform of al-'Ahd became irrelevant in the new circumstances. Therefore, when al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was founded in late 1918, it was decided to write a new constitution for it, one which would suit the new conditions. After various vacillations in early 1919 the society leadership in Damascus formulated a text of 43 articles, but even this was not the last word in defining the society's goals. The basic goal of the society, as formulated in the first article, was: "Complete independence for Iraq, in the framework of the Arab unity, and in its natural boundaries." These "natural boundaries" extended, according to the society's definition, from the Persian Gulf in the south, through the Euphrates and Tigris valley, up to the bank of the Euphrates next to Dayr al-Zur in the north-west and the bank of the Tigris next to Diarbakr in the north. The goal of the society found expression also in the oath taken by those joining it (Art. 31): "I swear by Allah and in the name of truth and honour that I have dedicated myself to serve the society of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, which strives for the complete independence of Iraq and to assist the Arab nation in the framework of its overall unity." The question of general Arab unity and the attitude of Iraq towards the other Arab countries was discussed in later publications of the society. In a proclamation distributed several months later it spoke of an independent Iraq under the amirate of one of the sons of Husayn, and this independent amirate would be included in a general constitutional government under the rule of "the king of the Arabs", that is, Husayn. The constitution of Iraq and the character of its relations with the other Arab states included in this federation would be determined by a general council of representatives of all the states of the federation and would be approved by the League of Nations. It was also stated in the proclamation that the people of Iraq would

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assist the other Arab countries to attain their independence. In an abbreviated list of goals of the society, consisting of six articles and formulated towards the end of 1919, it was stated: "We demand the complete independence of Iraq and that its ruler shall be one of the sons of the king of Hijaz, Husein Ibn Ali." According to reports by British observers the society strove in this period to bring about a close union of Iraq and Syria, both being equally independent and under a ruler of the Hashimite family. It is interesting to note that in Article 31 of the constitution it was said that any "Arab or Iraqi" aged 20 and over might join the society. However, it seems that the purpose of this was to encourage the entry not of non-Iraqi Arabs, but of non-Arab Iraqis, such as Kurds. And indeed in the abbreviated list of the society's goals it was stated that any Iraqi not employed by a foreign government might join the society. The first article of the society's constitution originally stated: "Iraq shall be free to choose any progressive nation it desires in order to be assisted by it in technical and economic matters if necessary, and on condition that this assistance shall not impair its complete independence." However, with the consolidation of the text of the constitution in early 1919 the leaders of the society decided that the formulation of this sub-article should be as follows: "The al-'Ahd society finds it proper to ask for technical and economic assistance from Great Britain, on condition that this assistance shall be of value and not impair the complete independence of Iraq." (British assistance that would not impair independence was mentioned also in the proclamation distributed by the society several months later.) It should be pointed out that this formulation was determined by the society leaders in Syria, who at this stage did not consider the British to be hostile. Society members within Iraq, who were living under British rule, found it more difficult to digest this sub-article. Furthermore, because of this sub-article a dispute broke out between the society members in Baghdad and the members of the "Independence Guard" society, which opposed any British assistance (see Chapter 10), and the society's leadership in Damascus had to send emissaries to Iraq to effect a compromise between the disputants. Later on, when relations between the society and the British became strained, the society began to think about American assistance, since the United States was regarded as being free of imperialist ambitions in the region, and it decided to make a request in this spirit before the international commission of enquiry. In the abbreviated list of society goals, formulated as mentioned in late 1919, it was stated: "If it is not possible to

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send delegates to Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway, and ask assistance from their Governments, we shall be able to ask for the protection of America."9 The activity of the society in Syria was carried out openly, while its activity in Iraq was done secretly due to the circumstances. Several articles in the constitution referred to the necessity of working secretly when needed (Arts. 15, 19, 26, 31b, and 41c). The society was composed of a general centre, branches, and sub-branches (Art. 2). The general centre was to have seven members, with no president (at the beginning of each meeting a chairman for that meeting was to be chosen). From among the members of the general centre there were to be chosen a "representative" (mu'tamad), a secretary, and an accountant. The "representative" was to represent the society in all its official correspondence with outside bodies and to sign its letters with the society seal (Arts. 3, 7, 10, and 11). Despite the fact that the society was not supposed to have a president, its indisputable leader during 1919 was the Iraqi officer Yasin al-Hashimi. (The "representative" at that time was Muhammad Jamil Lutfi alZubaydi, al-Hashimi's cousin.) The number of members of the general centre was changed in late 1919 to 12. As for the location of the general centre — from the very beginning there were two centres, one in Damascus and one in Aleppo. The authors of the constitution had decided that the general centre should be in Damascus, but despite their decision the Aleppo branch continued to function as a centre for all purposes, for the region of northern Syria, in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. All branches of the society were to be subordinate to the general centre (the centre had a membership register, in which were recorded the names and necessary details of all members in the centre, branches, and sub-branches). The branches were not to approach outside bodies without the consent of the general centre. On the other hand, the branches would be permitted to correspond with each other. At the head of each branch would be an administrative committee of five members, from whom were to be chosen a "representative", a secretary, and an accountant. Subordinate to the branches would be the sub-branches in their region (Arts. 8, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, and 25). In the early months of 1919 the centre in Damascus was busy organizing its contacts with the branches in Iraq. Emissaries, generally officers who went to Iraq as if on leave, would take manifestos, letters and instructions, spread propaganda, and get people to sign petitions. The contact between the centre and the branches proceeded quite regularly, and at times the centre would provide branches

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with financial aid. The revenues of the society were derived (according to Arts. 35 and 36) from the monthly dues of its members (which were no less than ten piastres per month), from voluntary contributions, and from income from educational and economic activities.10 Most of the al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi members in Syria were officers, though there were also some civilians. Some of the officers were former members of the pre-war al-'Ahd, whether they had been in the Arab revolt army or had remained in the Ottoman army till the end of the war. However, the majority of the officers were new members. Most of the Iraqi officers who had taken part in the Arab revolt, but had not previously been members of al-'Ahd, joined the society at this time. Many Iraqi officers who had been discharged from the Ottoman army also joined. The officer members came from families not of the upper class, as was frequent in the officer corps in this period, and only among civilian members were there several from notable families (such as the al-Suwaydi family). Almost all members were Sunni Muslims. The British estimated the number of members in Syria at around 300. The society stated its membership as over 385, but it seems that this also included the members in Transjordan (mainly in Amman) and those still in the Hijaz (mainly in Medina). The leader of the society was, as mentioned, Yasin alHashimi, chief of the general staff of the Syrian army. He had served in the Ottoman army until the end of the war and had great influence over the officers discharged from the Ottoman army. He led the society from the division of al-'Ahd until his arrest by the British in November 1919 (see below), using his senior status in the army to build a most powerful position of strength in the Syrian state. Because of his position he had available to him considerable sums of money, which he used among other things for running the propaganda of the society (according to Bell, "reserving a heavy percentage for his own pocket"). During this period there began to take form the long-lasting rivalry between al-Hashimi and two other prominent members of the society — brothers-in-law Ja'far al-'Askari and Nuri al-Sa'id. The former had been commander of the Northern Army and the latter its chief of staff. When the new Syrian army was established after the war, these two officers were pushed aside. Al-'Askari was appointed governor of Salt and later governor of Aleppo, and al-Sa'id served as Faysal's political adviser. The fact that al-Hashimi had supplanted them in the army, together with the fact that the two were profoundly pro-British

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at a time when al-Hashimi's attitude towards the British ranged from reserved to hostile, caused tense relations between them and apparently even hostility. Other prominent society members included Mawlud Mukhlis (a division commander), Isma'il Haqqi (a division commander and later head of the technical services of the army), Tahsin 'Ali (a brigade commander), Jamil al-Madfa'i (commander of the Damascus garrison), 'Abdallah al-Dulaymi (commander of the Damascus garrison after al-Madfa'i), (Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi (for a while commander of the general security service; Taha alHashimi, Yasin's brother, also held this position for a short period), and Rashid al-Madfa'i (the military governor of Amman). There were those who believed that all the Iraqi officers in the Syrian army were members of the society. In any case, it is clear that the members constituted in 1919, according to the British, the "backbone" of the army. They held all the senior positions in the Syrian army and in this capacity had supervision over all the Iraqi officers in this army, and in effect dominated the entire army. The British received the impression that the society was "a strong and determined body of men, who absolutely control the army and probably the gendarmerie". However, it is important to point out that in spite of the key functions that the society members fulfilled in the Syrian army in particular and in Faysal's regime in general, its main interest was directed towards Iraq. And in this state of affairs Faysal could not restrain its activity at all.11 In its early days the society concentrated on solving the problems that remained from the war. It dealt with the release of Arab activists who remained in prison camps. It dealt with the return of Arab officers from Istanbul and Asia Minor, where they had been transferred to from the Arab provinces during the war. It likewise tracked down persons who were identified with the Young Turks and had collaborated with Jamal Pasha during the war, and who had now reached administrative positions in Syria, the Lebanon, and Palestine despite their past. In February 1919 the organ of the centre in Damascus, al-'Uqab, was founded by As'ad Daghir (who was actually a native of Mount Lebanon). The newspaper started out as a semi-weekly, and from May 1920 it became a daily newspaper. It treated the British government in Iraq with open hostility, and about a fortnight after its founding it called upon the inhabitants of Baghdad to rise up and cast off the yoke of oppression. Since the newspaper was slipped into Iraq via India, the British authorities in Iraq

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asked the Indian government to prevent its dissemination, indicating that they would not allow its entry into Iraq. It seems that despite the British objection the newspaper continued to be circulated in Iraq by means of the society branches there.12 The society's main activity in the early months of 1919 focused on correspondence with foreign factors concerning the future of Iraq and the behaviour of the British there. In midJanuary it sent a petition to President Wilson demanding that an American or international commission of enquiry be sent to the Arab countries. In late January four members submitted a declaration of intent to the British political officer in Damascus concerning the future status of Iraq according to the society's view. The declaration included five principles: (a) Iraq should be a principality under one of the sons of Husayn. Its laws should be passed in accordance with the will of its population. The country should be connected with a general constitutional government headed by the king of the Arabs, Husayn. (b) The connection between the government of Iraq and the other independent and constitutional Arab governments should be maintained by means of a general council, the members of which should be chosen equally from all the governments. The institution of the general council, however, should not impair the rights of the local Arab governments. The League of Nations should ensure the carrying out of this arrangement and guarantee it. (c) Iraq should be assisted by Britain, without this assistance impairing its independence. (d) The inhabitants of Iraq and the other Arab countries should devote their efforts to securing this independence, (e) Iraq should include the region between the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Arabic-speaking regions on both sides of these rivers. In a conversation with the British officer the writers added that in their opinion Husayn's rule must be "only shadowy suzerainty without real power". The society announced that it considered Faysal to be its representative at the peace conference in Paris. Iraqi officers were sent to Iraq in order to organize petitions by which Faysal would be authorized to represent the Iraqi people at the conference and to demand in their name the establishment of an independent Arab government in Iraq. During February-March 1919 a considerable number of such petitions arrived from Iraq, signed by Iraqis from all classes, demanding the establishment of an Arab government in Iraq under one of the sons of Husayn. The centre in Damascus collected all these petitions to send on to Faysal when needed. The centre itself sent a telegram in late February to Faysal officially authorizing him to represent the

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society at the peace conference. In early March the society representative in Istanbul, Rashid al-Khawja, sent a letter to the British high commissioner in that city informing him that the Arab community in Istanbul supported the demands raised by Faysal at the peace conference. He also protested against the statements made at the conference by Shukri Ghanim and Da'ud 'Ammun, who had no right to speak in the name of the Arabs. He expressed his confidence that the international commission of enquiry that was coming to the region would surely realize this. Despite the fact that the society leadership was to no small extent anti-French, it was not deterred from submitting complaints to the French concerning the behaviour of the British in Iraq. Thus, for example, in late June and early July it submitted two petitions to the French liaison officer in Damascus, asking him to send them on to the French government for consideration. In the first it demanded the establishment of a national government in Iraq, even before the arrival of the King-Crane commission to the region. (It was prepared, though, that part of the British occupation force should remain, but on condition that it be subject to the national government.) It also demanded the return of all political exiles, the assurance of continued post and telegraph services between Iraq and the other Arab countries, freedom of movement between Iraq and Syria, and assurances that the society would be able to send representatives to Iraq without their being harassed or arrested by the occupaying authorities. In the second petition the society detailed a long list of iniquities and oppressive acts carried out by the British occupation authorities in Iraq (the banning of assemblies, infringing the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, arrests, deportations, threats against nationalist activists, and so on). On another occasion the society protested before all the foreign representatives in Damascus against the idea raised in The Times concerning the immigration of three million Indians to Iraq.13 The society's appeals to the British and others (reviewed above and below) placed the British in a dilemma. Following the society's memorandum of January 1919 Major Young of the British Foreign Office had pointed out that the Iraqi officers pinned great hopes on the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 and considered it an indication that the British did not intend to place Iraq under direct rule. Therefore, in order to maintain their disposition towards the British as it had been during the Arab revolt, and to persuade them to prefer Britain over France as the "tutelary Power", it would be worthwhile to promise them that the British government would act in the spirit

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of the Anglo-French declaration. To this George Kidston, a senior official in the Foreign Office, responded: Better give no promises or assurances. Our experience of doing so in the past has not been encouraging. We have generally found that such promises either conflict with something that has been promised to somebody else or that subsequent developments make it impossible to fulfil them. Curzon, the acting British foreign minister, believed that it would not be wise to ignore completely the appeals of the society concerning Britain's policy towards Iraq. He suggested replying to them that the British were aware of the problems existing in Iraq, and they were about to take a number of steps, such as setting up municipal and divisional councils, to let the Iraqis participate in the running of the country. And also, if and when Britain should receive the mandate over the country, it would consult with the local people concerning the form of its future government. Wilson, the British civil commissioner in Iraq, opposed such a reply and believed that the British government did not have to take the Iraqi officers into consideration at all. Finally, and taking Wilson's reservations into account, the British reply to the officers was that, at the present time, before the peace conference had decided which Power would be given the mandate over Iraq, it was too early to start constitutional experiments in Iraq. Nonetheless, if the members of the society should visit Iraq, "as they are welcome to do", they would discover that a number of steps towards bringing the populace into the administration of the country had already been taken.14 This answer, of course, did not satisfy the members of the society and in the second half of 1919 they took an entirely different course of action. However, in September Mawlud Mukhlis, one of the senior members of the society, sent a further, final appeal of this kind to both the secretary-general of the British delegation to the peace conference and the French premier, who was also serving as president of the conference. In his letter Mukhlis presented the society as the representative of all the inhabitants of Iraq. He stressed that the Iraqis had during the war devoted all their energies to realizing their national aspirations, and they had hoped that the Allies would help them in this. Without the promises made by the Allies, the advance of Allied forces in Iraq during the war would not have been as easy as it actually was, there being no opposition at all from the local population. Moreover, the local people had assisted as best they

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could to make the conquest of Iraq by the Allied troops easier. Also the initiators of the Arab revolt and all the officers of the Arab revolt army were Iraqis. But now, despite the AngloFrench declaration of November 1918 concerning the establishment of national governments in Syria and Iraq, Iraq continued to be under the yoke of military occupation, more oppressive than that of the Turks. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant granted the oppressed peoples independence under mandates. Yet despite this, Iraq continued to be administered like a colony. Therefore, in the name of humanity and justice, and in view of the promises of the Allies, Mukhlis, in the name of the society, demanded: 1. Independence for Iraq in accordance with Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. 2. The immediate establishment of a local national government in Iraq. 3. The immediate despatch to Iraq, as was done for Syria, of an international or American commission of enquiry, which would organize a free referendum on the following two questions: a. Do you want the establishment of an independent Iraqi state? b. Which nation would you choose as a mandatory power?15

This letter was sent, among other reasons, because the KingCrane commission failed to visit Iraq as expected. In the early months of 1919, when the expected arrival of the commission became known in Damascus, the society leaders hurried to inform the nationalist activists in Iraq about it. Yasin al-Hashimi sent a letter to the nationalist al-'Alam society in Mosul and to the tribal chiefs in northern Iraq directing them what to say to the commission when it arrived in Iraq. His demands at this stage were definitely of a pan-Arab hue: independence for all the Arab countries; assurance of Arab unity; the Arab countries should be able to choose freely the Power that would assist them in technical and economic matters, provided that there would be one Power for all the Arab countries and that its assistance would not impair the independence of these countries. He called on all the Arabs to stand united before the commission, and to dissociate themselves from religious and communal differences of opinion, for the sake of the national goal. Later Mosul received instructions from Syria that technical assistance for the future Arab government in Iraq should be sought from the United States. One of the manifestos sent from the centre in Damascus to al-'Alam included all the demands that the society members in Damascus were to present before the commission.

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Another letter from Damascus required the inhabitants of Mosul to display Arab flags on their houses when the commission came. Manifestos from Syria also reached Baghdad. These demanded independence for Iraq, on the basis of President Wilson's declaration concerning the granting of absolute independence to the oppressed peoples. They called upon the Iraqis to arise and to march to freedom and independence, without differences of religion, rite, or party. It is also known that a manifesto was sent from Syria to the central Shi'ite activists in Karbala (the circle of Mirza Muhammad Rida). The delegate of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in the "Congress of Societies", set up before the arrival of the King-Crane commission in Syria (see Chapter 1), ensured that this body would also demand the independence of Iraq and the prevention of economic and political barriers between Syria and Iraq. The society also ensured that the resolutions of the Syrian Congress presented to the commission demanded the independence of Iraq, and in reciprocation for this, the demands of the society presented to the commission included a demand for Syria's independence also. In late June a delegation from the general centre of the society headed by Yasin al-Hashimi met with the commission of enquiry, submitted to it a memorandum on the history of the society and its actions, and listed the demands of the inhabitants of Iraq, according to its viewpoint: 1. Independence for Iraq from Diarbakr to the Persian Gulf, in its natural boundaries. 2. The establishment of a constitutional, civilian, and monarchical government in Iraq, under the rule of 'Abdallah or his brother, Zayd. 3. A vehement protest against the paragraph concerning the mandates in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, and the absolute denial of any political, economic, or historical rights in the Arab countries of any foreign state whatsoever. 4. Technical and economic assistance should, in the society's opinion, be received from the United States, on condition /that this assistance did not impair the absolute independence of the country. 5. Opposition to the immigration of foreign elements, such as Indians and Jews, to the Arab countries. 6. A demand for the absolute independence of Syria and the removal of all political and economic barriers between Syria and Iraq, barriers which impaired Arab unity. In addition to these demands the society's delegation protested before the commission against the British military occupation administration in Iraq. As mentioned above, in the end the King-Crane commission did not go to Iraq, as a result of advice from the British that they could not guarantee its safety on the way there. When the

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commission arrived in Istanbul, the society's branch there had already received instructions from the general centre to speak with it. The members of the branch tried to persuade the commission to travel to Iraq in order to see the situation for itself. All the commission could do was explain to them how the British had prevented it visiting Iraq.16 One of the central problems that troubled relations between the Iraqi officers and the British during 1919 and increased the suspicion of the former concerning British policy towards Iraq was the question of the return of Iraqi officers to Iraq. There were among the Iraqi officers in Syria those who wanted to return to their native country after the prolonged absence forced on them because of the war. This desire increased with the worsening of relations between them and the local Syrian population. Those who had fought in the ranks of the Arab revolt, on the side of the Allies and against the Ottoman Empire, saw it as only natural that the British should enable them to return to their homes. But since the Iraqi officers also advocated the view that there should be established in Iraq an Arab government headed by 'Abdallah, which would be at least as independent as the one in Syria, the British in general, and the British government officials in Iraq in particular, had serious reservations about the possibility of allowing these officers to return to Iraq. In April 1919 Faysal approached Lawrence (both were then in Paris) and requested of him that the British should enable the officers to return to Iraq. He explained that the officers were mainly pro-British and that if they were detained in Syria for long it would arouse their suspicions. He promised also that if these officers on their return to Iraq should express themselves in favour of the establishment of a government headed by 'Abdallah, this would not be on the initiative of the Arab government of Damascus. The British civil commissioner in Baghdad, Arnold Wilson, who was also in Paris, announced that he would not oppose the return of the officers and would even allow them to express their views privately. He would not allow them, though, to engage in organized propaganda throughout the country in the cause of 'Abdallah or anyone else. Wilson asked that each officer who wanted to return to Iraq should be supplied with "credentials" by the British in Syria, and an evaluation of his qualifications and political tendencies would also be desirable. Wilson was also in favour of the officers returning to Iraq one by one. Following this, Lawrence informed Faysal (who had already returned to Syria) that the British government

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agreed to the return of the officers to Iraq. They would be able to do there as they wished "as long as it is not contrary to police regulations. They should not have any message from you to the people there, or any official status." At this point it was expected that Faysal would give the British a list of the officers interested in returning, and that after the required evaluations had been received in Baghdad they would be permitted to return. However, in the meantime, Wilson returned to Iraq and his opinion of the problem changed completely. Various Baghdadi notables came to him and told him that messages were being received from Syria from prominent Iraqi officers like Ja'far al-'Askari, Nuri al-Sa'id, and Mawlud Mukhlis, saying that they were about to come to Iraq to run a propaganda campaign for the establishment of an independent Arab government along the lines of the Syrian government. The Baghdadi notables viewed this negatively and considered it no more than an expression of the personal ambitions of the Hashimite family and its supporters. They therefore asked Wilson if these officers were coming with the official permission of the British, and they urged him to prevent their coming. Then Wilson expressed the fear that if the officers returned to Iraq with British permission there would be those who would interpret it as an approval by the British government to a union of Syria and Iraq, and this was liable to undermine stability in Iraq. Wilson reported this to Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, within whose jurisdiction Iraq was, pointing out that the supporters of Britain among the population were interested in the British making clear their objection to any involvement by Faysal and his supporters in the affairs of Iraq. He therefore asked that the officers should not be permitted to return to Iraq. Following this Montagu turned to the Foreign Office with a demand that no officer be allowed to return to Iraq without Wilson's permission. He explained that since Wilson had given his qualified consent to their return the circumstances had changed, and now their return would encourage Sharifite propaganda in Iraq and undermine stability there. The officials of the British Foreign Office tried to explain that if they were now to inform Faysal of this turnaround it would arouse his suspicions of the British government and its intentions. And besides, there was doubt about the extent to which preventing the return of the officers would detract from the effectiveness of the propaganda on behalf of 'Abdallah in Iraq. However, the acting British foreign minister, Curzon, finally decided to accept Montagu's approach, and he instructed his men in Cairo not to permit the

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return of any Iraqi to Iraq without Wilson's prior approval. Still, the Foreign Office continued to press the India Office to find a solution to the problem, and in August Wilson consented to Iraqi officers being permitted to return to Iraq on condition that they were warned beforehand not to engage in political propaganda, and that it was made clear to them that if they did so they would be returned to Syria to stand disciplinary trial. It was also agreed that the officers would be forbidden to wear their uniforms in Iraq and that their names would be given to Wilson before they returned.17 Wilson himself had an opportunity to meet the leadership of the society when he visited Damascus on his journey from Europe to Iraq in early May 1919. He met Yasin al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Sa'id, and Naji al-Suwaydi, who put forward their views concerning the future of Iraq. He tried to convince them that the rumours about the stern steps being taken by the British government in Iraq were baseless, but their statements about an independent Arab government in Iraq he defined — according to Bell — as "moonshine". He explained that his opinion was that first the local people must be content with running municipal councils and only afterwards could they think about getting senior offices. These statements of his were, of course, not to the liking of the three Iraqis, who at that time held senior offices in Syria. When Wilson expressed his opinion that Iraq lacked local people of stature who could assist the British in repairing the defects that possibly existed in the government, al-Hashimi hastened to suggest sending a representative on their behalf to Iraq, who would make suggestions for the solution of various problems connected with the government there. Wilson took up the challenge, and the result was the sending of Naji al-Suwaydi to Iraq. Al-Suwaydi's mission to Iraq (to be reviewed at length in Chapter 7) ended in failure. Wilson's contempt for the qualifications of the Iraqis, as expressed at this meeting, together with the failure of al-Suwaydi's mission, gave the society's leaders the despairing impression that the British in general, and Wilson in particular, had no intention of establishing institutions made up of locals. Thereafter the Iraqi officers in Syria reached the conclusion that the British in Iraq considered them "active enemies", and that there was no chance that they would be allowed to administer the affairs of Iraq by themselves.18 The society's activity with regard to the British was from then on to take a new track. Following a directive by Yasin al-Hashimi the society began an intensive dissemination of anti-British propaganda in Iraq

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and among the tribes of the Syrian desert. Letters intercepted by the British showed that the society's propaganda had reached as far south as Bahrain. There were also plans to send propagandists to the chiefs of the Muntafik tribes, to Ibn Rashid, to Ibn Sa'ud, and some say even to Yemen. The society's propaganda called for the complete independence of Iraq and incited the tribes against the British. Documents bearing the society's seal, a five-pointed star with the society's name in the centre, were discovered in various places in Iraq. Officers of the society infiltrated Iraq on propaganda missions, like that of 'Abd al-Rahman Sharaf who reached Baghdad, or 'Abd al-Ghafur alBadri who was sent by al-Hashimi with manifestos and a large sum of money. He was not alone in bringing sums of money from Syria for propaganda purposes. The most important mission in this respect was that of Jamil al-Madfa'i, which will be reviewed later. He was sent to the society's branches in Iraq on al-Hashimi's instructions, carrying large sums of money and also letters to distribute among the tribes. However, within a short time the society was no longer content with propaganda activities. When it saw that the British in Iraq were not especially perturbed by its activity and that the transfer of the reins of government to the local people was still not visible on the horizon, its militancy increased and it began to consider the possibility of using arms. Apparently the society's members at this stage did not believe that they could win a total military victory over the British. They planned rather to damage British lines of communication and to carry out sporadic attacks, which would exhaust the British and perhaps bring about the intervention of other European states with a call to solve the problem by granting Iraq independence. It is clear, at any rate, that in the final months of 1919 the society had already decided to start a revolt against the British authorities in Iraq, a revolt which would cause the outside world at last to be aware of the Iraqis' outcry and their demands. Apparently it was the AngloFrench agreement of September 1919 that drove the society to make this decision. This agreement indeed exposed Syria to the French, but to the society's officers it also meant that Syria would be free of British forces. The town of Dayr al-Zur, in a no-man's land between Syria and Iraq, was chosen as a suitable place for starting a revolt. The town was then in British hands, and the society's general centre in Damascus decided to turn it into a base for the planned uprising. Society member Ramadan al-Shallash, who had been sent to the region to lead the attack on the town, announced his readiness to attack it immediately,

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but the centre asked him to postpone the attack until the British left Syria. In November, when the British evacuation was at its height, the general centre informed the branch in Mosul that it had been decided to achieve the goal by using all means, including "opening a military revolt in all of Iraq in the near future".19 The leader of the society, Yasin al-Hashimi, was not satisfied during this period with activity only against the British in Iraq. The French intelligence service in the western region managed in September 1919 to get hold of a plan signed by al-Hashimi for a general attack on the French in that region. According to the plan, made earlier that month, two regular divisions of Druzes and bedouins were to attack Beirut, a third division was to attack Alexandretta in the north, and the 6th Brigade of the Syrian army was to attack Tripoli, assisted by volunteers from Ba'albek under the command of 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. In the second half of September the Committee for National Defence began to distribute announcements of the conscription of 12,000 men for the Syrian army. It was also known that there were present in Damascus, besides al-Hashimi, Ja'far al-'Askari (the military governor of Aleppo), Rashid al-Madfa'i (the military governor of Amman), Rushdi al-Safadi (a division commander), and Mawlud Mukhlis, all of them members of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi Their frequent meetings gave the British the impression that they were planning a wide-ranging uprising. Al-Hashimi was then urgently summoned to Cairo to provide explanations, and on the 21st of the month he met Allenby, who reprimanded him severely for his plans against the French. The French representative in Beirut pressed the British to arrest al-Hashimi and to dismiss him from his office in the army. But at this stage the British felt that it would not be wise to take such a drastic step and that it would be better if there remained in Damascus people capable of taking responsibility for what might happen. Allenby was therefore content this time with demanding that alHashimi halt the non-authorized mobilization immediately, and warning him that he was considered responsible for keeping the army within the size limits fixed by Allenby. Al-Hashimi promised to comply and also denied any involvement in the distribution of mobilization announcements. When he returned to Damascus, he pretended that his meeting with Allenby had ended on a positive note, but all the same the mobilization actions were stopped for a while.20 Not all members of the society held the same views as alHashimi. According to the British there was a "moderate" wing in the society that consisted of about 30 members (about one

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tenth of the membership in Syria, or even less), the most prominent of whom was the senior officer, Isma'il Haqqi. In October 1919 Gertrude Bell visited Syria and met several members of the society, among them the leaders of the moderate faction. The latter expressed their regret at the hostility existing towards the British in Iraq, and they agreed that Iraq could not develop without British assistance and aegis. In fact, they were prepared to accept a British mandate over Iraq, on condition that there should be a measure of self-government for the inhabitants. They suggested that they themselves should be sent to Iraq to mediate between the population and the British, of course with their receiving appropriate positions from the British. The British concluded that these Iraqis were simply desirous of getting top posts in the government in Iraq. They also correctly judged that the "moderate" wing of the society had no influence in Baghdad and certainly had no substantive weight within the society itself. On the other hand there was in the society another wing, which was distinguished by its anti-Europeanism. It had many more members, among them the civilian brothers Rashid and Muhammad al-Hashimi. Rashid, who was at the time Yasin al-Hashimi's secretary, predicted in a public speech that the Tigris would fill up with blood, meaning the blood of the British. Yasin al-Hashimi himself met with Bell when she visited Syria and spoke with her at length about his plans for the future of Iraq. He expressed his opinion that Iraq could develop and progress easily and quickly, and rejected the assumption that the local people were not capable of implementing his plans. According to him an Arab amir should be set up in Iraq, and 'Abdallah was the most suitable candidate for this post. However, al-Hashimi agreed that alongside 'Abdallah, Percy Cox should be installed as high commissioner. Under the amir there should be an advisory council, appointed by the amir, to include British advisers and also competent local Arabs. The ministers of the state should all be Arabs, and they should be appointed by the amir in consultation with the council. The state should not have representative institutions because it was not yet ready for this. If there were a shortage of talented people to perform all the functions necessary for the state, then people could be brought in from outside, that is, from among the Iraqis in Syria. And, in general, it was vital that there should be close relations and even administrative union between Iraq and Syria, and it was desirable that they should have similar educational and judicial systems. Al-Hashimi admitted to Bell that during the next

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ten years Iraq would need foreign guidance, and that the natural candidate to provide this was Britain. But he insisted that for the good of the two countries both Iraq and Syria should be placed under one mandatory state. He also expressed his agreement to the stationing of a British army in Iraq in the first phase, on condition that this army did not impinge on the sovereignty of the Arabs. However, within six months an Arab army could be established to replace the British troops. Al-Hashimi placed special emphasis on the development of a progressive educational system (including an academic college) without which "in fifty years time we shall be no further forward in obtaining a class of highly educated men fit to take over the government of the country".21 Bell characterized al-Hashimi's words as "sound and reasonable". Indeed, these words were not much different from those of the society moderates. Therefore, one may doubt whether these statements, especially those concerning a British mandate over Iraq, reflected his true views. These views certainly did not match the anti-British propaganda that the society carried out in Iraq under his direction, nor the still embryonic plans of the society to commence a revolt against the British in Iraq. The British, for their part, were at this juncture about to take an unprecedented step to curb anti-European activity in Syria. T H E ARREST OF YASIN AL-HASHIMI

As early as 21 August 1919 the British authorities in Egypt recommended their Foreign Office "to persuade Yasin Pasha away from Damascus as soon as possible as he is a dangerous man". On the same day a similar telegram was sent from the British GHQ in Egypt to the War Office, stressing the necessity of removing Yasin al-Hashimi from Syria for the next few months. This telegram also contained the suggestion that alHashimi be invited to Britain to tour military institutions and the like. Discussions held in the Foreign and War Offices came to the conclusion that in view of the delicate state of relations between Britain and France at the time, an invitation to alHashimi to visit Britain was undesirable. But an alternative proposal for removing al-Hashimi from Syria was made — that he should be invited to visit Iraq. The British civil commissioner in Iraq reacted to this, however, by saying that, as al-Hashimi was the leader of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi which was striving for complete

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independence for Iraq — to be achieved through an uprising against the British — he did not wish him to come to Iraq. In September, as mentioned above, al-Hashimi was involved in the plan to attack the French in the western region and in starting extensive conscription for the Syrian army. The British refused to comply with the French request that al-Hashimi be arrested, and Allenby merely reprimanded him. Al-Hashimi was in fact prepared to join Faysal in Europe to advise him about the size of the Syrian army if the British did evacuate Syria, and the British authorities in Egypt were also interested in a solution of this kind. But, as mentioned, this proposal had already been rejected by London. Moreover, while at this time Allenby was dealing with al-Hashimi with moderation, especially in view of Faysal's absence from Syria, the approach of the War Office was totally different. In a letter sent to the Foreign Office it said: "The Army Council consider that it is obviously desirable that Yasin Pasha should be got out of Syria immediately." Towards the end of October, when it was already clear that the British forces would evacuate Syria according to the temporary agreement between Britain and France, al-Hashimi announced that he refused to accept the responsibility for mamtaining public order if the British were to withdraw. Cousse, the French liaison officer in Damascus, continued to demand that the British authorities take steps against al-Hashimi, "the moving spirit of the resistance to any foreign intervention". The die was cast.22 On 22 November 1919, four days before the British evacuation from Syria was finished, al-Hashimi was invited to a tea party at the British headquarters in al-Maza. When he arrived he was arrested and informed that he had to leave Syria immediately. He was put into an armoured car and transferred hastily to Haifa under a guard of additional armoured cars, all according to explicit instructions from Allenby. The head of the "Council of Directors" (that is, the prime minister), 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, was informed by the British that al-Hashimi had been arrested because he was acting contrary to the orders of the British headquarters. (The reference was apparently to his refusal to obey a British order to withdraw his troops from the Biqa'.) Allenby summarized the affair in a telegram he sent to the War Office: "Owing to open defiance of my orders and authority by Yasin, Chief of Staff, Arab Army, I have ordered his removal under escort from Damascus and detention at Haifa for the present."23 The pretext for al-Hashimi's arrest was, as mentioned, his activity contrary to the orders of the British headquarters. But what were the deeper reasons for this drastic step? From the

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British viewpoint he was a nuisance, to a certain extent liable to become a danger to their rule and to public order in Iraq. They knew that he was the leader of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, and they were well aware of the anti-British propaganda activity that the society was conducting in Iraq and also of its more far-reaching plans in this context. Apparently they also disliked his ideas about a possible union of Iraq and Syria. In the weeks preceding his arrest the society's activity in the Dayr al-Zur area increased, as a preparatory step to capturing it from the British and turning it into a forward base for a revolt in Iraq. (The town was eventually captured by the Arabs, but only after alHashimi's arrest, as will be described in Chapter 7.) The British were aware that he stood behind these plans and that it was he who had sent society member Ramadan al-Shallash to the region. Another reason was the fear that al-Hashimi was liable to try to sabotage the British evacuation from Syria, and perhaps also to attack the British forces in Dar'a during their withdrawal. The French, for their part, were convinced that al-Hashimi was one of the leaders of anti-French propaganda in Syria. They also believed — according to the evidence, justifiably — that he was preparing to take military steps against them, either an active attack on the western region or a defence against a French advance into the interior of the country. There was a fear that he would attack the French forces when they entered the Biqa'. Al-Hashimi dealt with the organization and enlargement of the Syrian army, for obvious purposes, and he was also assisting the activity of the bands in the western region within the framework of his membership in the central committee of al-Fatat. The result of all this was that the French authorities in Beirut asked the British time and again to arrest him and remove him from Syria. There are those who believe that it was Gouraud himself who asked the British to do this. A senior British officer later said explicitly to Gouraud "that it was because of Yasin's antiFrench proclivities, resulting in disobedience of Lord Allenby's orders, that he was arrested". Also, Major-General Thwaites, the British Director of Military Intelligence, wrote shortly after the arrest that the main reason for it was "that he was conducting active anti-French propaganda and making military preparations to resist French occupation of the Blue Area". The British, for their part, genuinely believed that anti-French propaganda in the western region diminished with the arrest of al-Hashimi, an assumption which was, of course, quite inaccurate. In any case, it is clear that the British and French had a common interest in removing Yasin al-Hashimi from Syria.

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Another reason mentioned in connection with al-Hashimi's arrest was the contacts he was suspected of having with the Kemalist Turks. Both the British and the French feared that he was going to reach an agreement with Kemalist Turkey, or at least to cooperate with the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia. There were those who believed that he was planning to undertake a coordinated military operation with Mustafa Kemal after the termination of the British evacuation from Syria, and there were those who went even further and claimed that he intended to return Turkish rule to Syria. A stranger claim brought against him was that he was a communist. A British officer believed that his arrest prevented "the outbreak of a religious-bolshevist revolution on the 26th November" (the final day of the British evacuation from Syria). Gouraud defined him as a "pan-Arab Bolshevik". When Faysal, who was then in Paris, asked why al-Hashimi had been arrested, he was told that al-Hashimi had set up a republican party in Syria and was preparing to carry out a military coup. Reports from the period preceding the arrest do indeed show that his influence in Syria at that time exceeded that of Faysal, certainly within the army. This situation gave the impression that al-Hashimi would try to remove the moderate elements of the Sharifite government, or even to remove Faysal himself, whose views he considered too moderate. It is also known that tense relations existed between al-Hashimi and 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, the head of the "Council of Directors", as a result of their different approaches towards the French. Some claim — and it has not been proven — that al-Rikabi had a hand in al-Hashimi's arrest. The Syrian Congress, in any case, did send a notice of censure to al-Rikabi for his apathy over the arrest.24 The arrest of Yasin al-Hashimi, and the way it was carried out, aroused great anger against the British and the French. A few hours after it became known the bazaars and stores of Damascus were closed, and the inhabitants took part in a mass demonstration. The next day the local newspapers came out with black borders, in the centre of which was a protest by the Syrian people against the arrest. A protest in the name of the nationalist organizations against the behaviour of the British was delivered to representatives of the foreign states in Damascus. The Supreme National Committee, which convened a few days after the arrest for its founding convention, also unanimously expressed its disgust with the behaviour of the British. The demonstrations in Damascus continued during the next few days and

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spread to other towns in Syria. Al-Muntada al-Adabi and alNadi al-'Arabi in Jerusalem sent a joint petition to the military governor of the city, in which — in addition to their regular demand for the unity of Syria including Palestine — they expressed their sorrow over the sudden arrest of al-Hashimi. They explained that their sorrow was especially great in light of the fact that this was done by Britain, the ally of the Arabs. They demanded that al-Hashimi be restored to his position "in honour and dignity". Since the arrest preceded the end of the British evacuation by several days, threats began to be heard from the locals to arrest Allied officers who happened to be in Damascus. There were plans to kidnap a British political officer and to hold him as a hostage to exchange for al-Hashimi. Four British officers who arrived in Damascus from Iraq just at the end of the evacuation were detained by the Arab authorities for a while, and there was a fear that they would be held as hostages. Zayd, then deputizing for Faysal in Syria, informed his father of the arrest and the hostility towards the British, and asked him to work for alHashimi's release. He sent a similar request to Allenby. Allenby rejected Zayd's request because of Gouraud's opposition. Husayn, for his part, sent an urgent telegram to Faysal asking him to act promptly. 25 Not until early December did Faysal learn of the arrest. He was stunned. He had expected that an incident of this kind would be reported to him immediately by Zayd, but until he received his father's telegram, another one from Michel Lutf Allah, and Arabic newspapers covering the story, he knew nothing at all about it. He suspected that telegrams sent to him were being intercepted or held up by the French or British. Immediately, he sent a telegram to Zayd asking for more information, and concurrently lodged a sharp protest with the British, claiming that since, after the British evacuation, Allenby was no longer the commander-in-chief of the region he had no right to order al-Hashimi's arrest. It was possible that al-Hashimi had indeed committed improper acts, but in the present situation the only authority in Damascus was Faysal himself, and only he had the right to judge him. The British replied that the arrest was made while they were still in Damascus, and therefore Allenby had acted with full authority when he ordered it. Yet, the British themselves were not at ease with their reply. They were to no small extent perplexed by Faysal's insistence that al-Hashimi must be returned to Damascus, even if he did constitute a danger to him by the force of his personality, and they understood

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that for Faysal it was a question of principle and prestige. Faysal himself sent a telegram to Damascus in an attempt to calm tempers and the hostility towards the British and the French. He instructed Ja'far al-'Askari to go to Palestine to persuade the British to release al-Hashimi. This was rather a bad choice, in view of the troubled relations between al-'Askari and al-Hashirni. And indeed, al-'Askari not only did not bring about al-Hashimi's release, but he even told the British that al-Hashirni was pro-Turkish. When Faysal returned to Syria in mid-January 1920, he himself demanded from the British that they release alHashirni. In a speech he gave in the al-Nadi al-'Arabi building in Damascus he announced that "El Hashimi is as my own person", and he promised to do his best for him.26 The British saw as "justifiable and reasonable" Faysal's view that it was his right to deal by himself with al-Hashirni. But all the same, they were apprehensive of taking any unilateral step to solve the problem without the agreement of the French. At this point a tiring series of discussions began between the British and the French on the question of al-Hashimi's future. The British were interested in solving the problem as soon as possible, while the French, for obvious reasons, were less eager. The British rejected outright the possibility of turning him over directly to the French, or trying him themselves. They suggested setting up in Paris a committee, comprising a British, a French, and an Arab representative, to discuss the solution to the problem while looking after the interests of all the parties. The preferred solution of the British War Office was the return of al-Hashirni to Faysal, together with various commitments from Faysal, such as dismissing al-Hashirni from the army, limiting his movements, and keeping him under supervision. Gouraud rejected these suggestions entirely. He believed that al-Hashirni was too dangerous a person to allow his return. He also pointed out that if the suggested committee included a Frenchman this would strengthen the impression that al-Hashimi's arrest by the British was done as a result of French pressure. Gouraud properly formulated the policy that guided the French in this question: "We have an interest in not facilitating a measure of clemency, but to the same extent in not taking evident responsibility for a measure of rigour." The British suggested to Faysal that he should meet a representative of the French war ministry and reach an agreement with him on this matter. But the French foreign ministry told the war ministry that it was preferable for al-Hashirni to be handed over to Gouraud. Allenby asked the French if they would be satisfied with sending al-Hashimi to Iraq or to Europe.

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At this stage Dayr al-Zur was captured by Ramadan alShallash, and the British there were taken prisoner. The British War Office immediately ordered that al-Hashimi be considered a hostage for their safety. To this Allenby replied that this meant that when the British in Dayr al-Zur were released, then they would have to release al-Hashimi, too. He added that it was not possible to continue to hold al-Hashimi under arrest just because Gouraud wanted it. Here Gouraud reminded them that al-Hashimi had been arrested on British initiative. Yet, he again expressed his opinion that the return of al-Hashimi to Damascus would constitute a danger, and he asked his foreign ministry to support his approach. In a conversation with a British officer Gouraud claimed that al-Hashimi was a British problem, and that if they solved it by returning him to Damascus this would damage French interests. The British officer could only remind him that al-Hashimi's anti-French proclivities had played a considerable part in the decision to arrest him, and in a report on the conversation he noted that the French were apparently trying to place all the responsibility for the affair on the shoulders of the British. The detainees in Dayr al-Zur were released, and the British began to reveal a growing unreadiness to continue to keep alHashimi under arrest. The British War Office pressed for an early solution, lest the affair be exploited for spreading antiBritish propaganda in the Levant and Egypt. Gouraud continued stubbornly to oppose al-Hashimi's release, and the British began to wonder if it would not be worthwhile to release him — in Egypt — despite Gouraud's opposition. In late January 1920 the British came up with a new suggestion. Since it was planned that Faysal was to go on another journey to Europe — a journey that, as will be remembered, never took place — it was suggested that al-Hashimi be allowed to go to Paris to accompany Faysal. Gouraud opposed the idea, and especially the suggestion that al-Hashimi be returned to Damascus and from there be obligated to accompany Faysal to Paris. Instead, Gouraud suggested that al-Hashimi be transferred to the Hijaz. To his aid there now came an unexpected factor, Faysal himself, who also opposed sending al-Hashimi to Paris, for fear that this was part of a French plot to try him there. The British were prepared to accept Gouraud's proposal, but stressed that they would not be responsible for al-Hashimi's movements in the Hijaz. Marshal Foch, visiting London at the time, suggested solving the problem by handing over al-Hashimi directly to Gouraud, "who should arrange for his disposal". The French foreign

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ministry had a better suggestion — that he should be sent to Malta. They were against his coming to Paris, lest he disturb the planned contacts between Faysal and the French government. They also opposed sending him to Egypt or to Iraq. Gouraud enthusiastically adopted the suggestion of his foreign ministry, stressing that Malta was the best solution, certainly better than the Hijaz, from where al-Hashimi could return to Damascus. But the British refused to send him to Malta, just as they refused to continue keeping him under arrest in Palestine or Egypt, that is, in an area under their rule. Given this, the French decided to agree to al-Hashimi's coming to France, and Gouraud received instructions to arrange his transfer to Paris. Gouraud announced that he refused to accept the instructions of his government. He warned that any involvement of France in the al-Hashimi affair would increase hostility towards it in Damascus. He repeated his suggestion that al-Hashimi be transferred to the Hijaz, pointing out that this solution would free France of all responsibility for the affair and would leave all responsibility on the shoulders of Britain. The French foreign ministry rejected Gouraud's proposal because from the Hijaz al-Hashimi could return to Damascus. The British suggested bypassing Gouraud's opposition by sending al-Hashimi to Britain and from there transferring him to France. At this juncture, in late March 1920, Gouraud announced that "after examining all aspects of the question", he had reached the conclusion that the least inconvenience for France in the current situation would be if al-Hashimi were "simply" allowed to return to Damascus. He again stressed that the French must keep away from any involvement in the affair, and must also clarify this to the British. Gouraud attached one condition to this — that al-Hashimi must not pass through Beirut on his way back to Damascus because this might cause demonstrations there. Following this the French foreign ministry informed the British that France had removed its opposition to al-Hashimi's release. In early May, after further correspondence between the British and the French, the British War Office informed the British GHQ in Egypt that al-Hashimi could be released.27 Al-Hashimi's first place of detention had been Haifa. In early December 1919 he was transferred to Ramla, where he spent most of his detention, except for a period when he was hospitali zed because of a deterioration in his health. Apparently the conditions of his custody were not especially difficult. Two British officers were responsible for guarding him, but their function was also to take care of his needs. A sentry guarded the house

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where he lived (at night four sentries), but from time to time he was allowed to leave Ramla and to visit other places, accompanied by his adjutant and a British officer. During the period of his detention he also managed to learn English. In April 1920 he was transferred to Sarafand, where he remained until the end of his detention. On 15 May 1920, almost six months after he was arrested, Yasin al-Hashimi was freed. In accordance with the requirement of the French he was not allowed to return to Damascus via the port of Beirut, but was taken to Semakh, south of the Sea of Galilee, where he was handed over to representatives of Faysal, among them his brother, Taha al-Hashimi. The day after his release he arrived in Damascus and was accorded a hero's welcome. In a speech he gave several days later at a party held in his honour in the al-Nadi al-'Arabi building he said: "If you want to defend your fatherland and your absolute freedom, abandon speeches." But the Yasin al-Hashimi who returned from Palestine was not the same dominant person---ty who had been abducted six months earlier. As'ad Daghir relates that he had become an introvert and had lost his militaristic traits to a certain extent. The fact is, at any rate, that he did not return to his position as chief of the general staff of the army, and in fact he refused to accept any office at all in the army or the government until the crisis of July 1920.28 AL-'AHD AL-'IRAQI IN DAMASCUS II

Yasin al-Hashimi's departure from the Syrian arena in late 1919 left al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi without a single, dominant leader, but it definitely did not cause a cessation in the society's activity. Soon after his arrest the society's members met in Damascus in Tahsin 'Ali's house and decided to increase the anti-British propaganda among the tribes of Iraq and to work for the liberation of Iraq at any price. At this meeting a number of people were elected to posts of authority ("patron" — Nuri al-Sa'id, president — Naji al-Suwaydi, and others), but, in fact, the society's activities during the next few months were led by a group of dominant officers, among them Jamil al-Madfa'i, 'AH Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Tahsin 'Ali, and Mawlud Mukhlis. The sessions of the society were held regularly every Monday and Friday in the homes of several of its members. 29 The society was now getting ready for its last great enterprise in Damascus: the Iraqi Congress. At the same time as the Syrian Congress began its

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preparations to declare independence for Syria, the Iraqi officers decided to hold a parallel Iraqi congress which would declare the independence of Iraq. The society elected a committee of four who met Faysal to discuss of this topic. Faysal, who was not at all happy with the preparations being made by the Syrian Congress, consented on the other hand to the Iraqis' appeal and promised them all the material assistance they required when they held their congress. Following this the general centre of the society assigned a number of activists to start preparing for the congress. Since Iraq was under British occupation, it was clear that the participants would have to be limited to Iraqis in Syria — either Iraqis who had authorization from urban or tribal sectors in Iraq or those who were elected by the majority vote of the Iraqi community in Damascus. For this purpose Iraqi activists from Aleppo and other Syrian towns came to Damascus, and a number of authorizations arrived from Mosul and Baghdad. Twenty-nine delegates were chosen, of whom 20 were members of the society. About two-thirds of the delegates were from Baghdad and central Iraq and about a third from Mosul and northern Iraq. About two-thirds were officers or at least former officers, and the rest were lawyers, merchants, and writers. Twenty-seven were Sunnis, one was a Christian (Thabit 'Abd al-Nur), and only one was a Shi'ite (Muhammad Rida alShabibi, who was a member of the "Independence Guard" society). Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was elected president of the congress. Also elected were five members to coordinate with the Independence Party the parallel contents of the resolutions of the two congresses, the Iraqi and the Syrian. It was decided that the declaration of independence of Iraq would be made simultaneously with that of Syria. On 8 March 1920, the day of the declaration of Syria's independence, the members of the Iraqi Congress met in Nuri al-Sa'id's house in Damascus (al-Sa'id himself had left shortly before on a mission to Europe), and decided on the independence of Iraq, in the boundaries from north of the vilayet of Mosul to the Persian Gulf, under the kingship of 'Abdallah. Zayd was chosen as regent until 'Abdallah's arrival. The Iraqi Congress expressed its support for the resolution of the Syrian Congress on the independence of Syria, and it stressed that Iraq and Syria must be united politically and economically. A few minutes after 'Izzat Darwaza announced from the balcony of the Damascus city hall the resolutions of the Syrian Congress concerning the independence of Syria, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi

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announced from the very same spot the resolutions of the Iraqi Congress concerning the independence of Iraq.30 The reaction of Britain was prompt. Immediately after the matter became known Allenby was asked to inform Damascus that "the right of any body at Damascus to decide the future of Mesopotamia or Mosul is one that cannot be admitted in any circumstances". By another telegram Allenby was asked to inform Husayn and 'Abdallah that the British government did not consider the 29 members of the Iraqi Congress in Damascus as having any authority whatsoever to speak in the name of Iraq. 'Abdallah himself learned of his being made king of Iraq from a message that he received from the president of the congress, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. In addition to this three members of the congress went to Zayd's residence and took him to the city hall, from where he sent a telegram to 'Abdallah informing him of his being made king. Later Zayd reported to 'Abdallah the details of the declaration of independence, explaining to him that he — Zayd — was appointed regent until 'Abdallah arrived in Iraq, and therefore asking him to hurry to Syria and to the borders of Iraq "and accept my resignation from the Regency". Zayd sent another telegram to Husayn imploring him that "His Majesty the King of Iraq, your son Abdullah" should hasten to Iraq. 'Abdallah received many congratulatory telegrams on the event, but, in the words of one of the officials of the Hijazi agency in Cairo, he remained "quite cold". Apparently the British reaction made more of an impression on him. He thanked those who enthroned him for the honour which he was awarded, but noted that there were reasons preventing him from coming at this stage. He promised to come "at the first suitable opportunity". As for the reactions of the Iraqi populace to the declaration of independence, the organ of the society, al-'Uqab, reported: "The news of the declaration of independence made a tremendous impression throughout the country especially in the large towns where enthusiastic demonstrations were made displaying the two-starred Mesopotamian flag." The British civil commissioner in Iraq reported, on the other hand, that the news from Damascus was discussed by the populace "with mingled amusement and resentment". In a conversation between the military governor of Baghdad and the Naqib of the city, the Naqib said that he was "very bitter about the Syrian attempt to force an Amir on this country". 31 It seems that the reports from neither side were accurate. In Iraq there began at this time a process which was to bring about the outbreak of the Iraqi revolt some three

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months later, not quite on the initiative of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi. This process will be described at length later. After the declaration of independence the society decided to move its general centre to Dayr al-Zur in order to be closer to the Iraqi border and to facilitate communication with society members in northern Iraq, in preparation for the planned revolt against the British. It is interesting to note that one of the society's prominent activists, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, informed Gouraud of the Iraqi officers' plan to leave the Syrian army and to begin activities against the British in Iraq, and also asked if the French government would agree to assist them, either politically or by sending arms to the Iraqi rebels. Gouraud, who considered this appeal an Arab attempt to sow discord between the French and the British, told him diplomatically that this subject exceeded his authority. In any case, several days after the declaration of independence of Syria and Iraq, al-Ayyubi, Jamil alMadfa'i, and Thabit 'Abd al-Nur went to Faysal and told him about the bad feeling of the Iraqis in Syria. They explained to him that they had not fought in the Arab revolt just for the liberation of Syria, but also for their own fatherland. However, the attempts of Iraqi officers to return to Iraq had been met with a British threat to send them to prison camps in India; Yasin alHashimi had been abducted by the British; and they themselves felt they were "unwanted foreigners" in Syria. They wanted therefore to go to Dayr al-Zur and to work for the liberation of Iraq from the yoke of the British, who had betrayed the Arabs. Faysal tried to persuade them not to do this, so that he would not have to face the British and the French together. But the society members persisted and presented him with three demands: (a) that he put his brother Zayd at their head as a symbol for the revolt; (b) that he give them money to support the officers and soldiers who would take part in the operation; (c) that he place at their disposal part of the arms that he had at his disposal, which were stored in depots in Damascus. Faysal answered that he did not agree to Zayd's joining them because it was tantamount to an open declaration of war against the British, and he could not allow himself to do this in light of his situation with the French. (As a matter of fact, he explicitly ordered Zayd not to go to Dayr al-Zur, and he also advised him "not to have anything to do with [the] Mesopotamian party".) On the other hand, he agreed to give them 3,000 Egyptian pounds (according to another version, 5,000 pounds, and according to still another version it was Zayd who gave them this sum). As

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for the arms, Faysal hesitated, and then al-Ayyubi and alMadfa'i decided to get the arms themselves from an arsenal in Damascus that was guarded by members of the society. Then most of the society's members in Damascus gathered in the home of Ja'far al-'Askari and discussed the plan to transfer all the Iraqi officers and soldiers to Dayr al-Zur. After deliberations the plan gained the agreement of most of those present. Leading the planned journey would be a "national committee" (al-Hay'a al-Wataniyya) of three officers: 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Jamil al-Madfa'i, and Tahsin 'AH. One of the arsenals in Damascus was broken into, and some of the arms were taken out and loaded onto wagons. A caravan of society activists left for Aleppo, on a long trek that was to end near Mosul, in the heart of northern Iraq.32 From then on the activity of the society in Damascus became marginal. When the decisions of the San Remo conference concerning the allocation of the mandates became known, and it was revealed that Britain had received the mandate over Iraq, the society issued a manifesto denouncing the decisions and stated that this was not the freedom for which the Arabs had fought. The society called on the inhabitants of Iraq to rise up against foreign rule. Society member Nuri al-Sa'id, on the other hand, telegraphed in early May 1920 from London to a number of Arab officials in Baghdad and told them that during his stay in London he had become convinced that Britain viewed the Iraqi cause with sympathy. Within a few weeks the Iraqi problem would be settled at the peace conference in accordance with the aspirations of the Iraqi people, that is, by establishing a national government. He asked them, therefore, to address the Iraqi public and ask them to express their gratitude to the British government. In response to this evidence of al-Sa'id's proBritish tendencies, in late June the members of the Iraqi Congress who were still in Damascus sent a letter to the chiefs of the al-Shamiyya tribes in Najaf warning them against the British tactics to win over certain Iraqis. They claimed that the British had imposed on al-Sa'id to go to Iraq, ostensibly to discuss with the inhabitants their desires and feelings, but actually to make them false promises and to intensify the rule of occupation. Therefore they asked of them that if "this man" should come from Syria to Iraq, they should keep track of his movements, warn people of his plots, and thwart his efforts. Also, if he should say that he came in the name of Husayn, Faysal, 'Abdallah, the Iraqi Congress, or of any other society, they should know that he had no authorization for this.33

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

When the French occupied Syria, they jailed more than 150 Iraqi officers on the island of Irwad. Many of these had fallen into French hands following information provided by Syrians concerning their involvement in anti-French activities in the past. The condition of the Iraqi officers who were not arrested by the French was no better, and it was reported that, they were obliged to sell their belongings and to peddle goods in order to support themselves. The society's leaders who remained in Syria were an exception to this. It was reported that their economic situation had — surprisingly — improved, along with, or perhaps as a result of, the relations they had begun to develop with the French liaison officer in Damascus. It seems that the French had their own reasons for encouraging anti-British elements like the society's members, who had completely given up any interest in the fate of Syria and whose whole attention was then directed towards Iraq.34 T H E SYRIAN ARMY FROM ITS FOUNDING TO THE BATTLE OF MAYSALUN

When the Northern Army of the Arab revolt reached Damascus, several of the leaders of al-'Ahd and al-Fatat managed to locate Yasin al-Hashimi, who had served in the Ottoman army till the end of the war and was at this time wounded and hiding in one of the houses in the Maydan quarter. Al-Hashimi, the uncrowned leader of al-'Ahd in the early period of the war, was also one of the most senior Arab officers to have served in the Ottoman army. Nuri al-Sa'id, who was chief of staff of the Northern Army which entered Syria, offered his post to alHashimi. Al-Hashimi refused it. At first he served as the chief of staff of the military governor of Damascus, 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, but within a short time he was appointed by Faysal as chief of the general staff of the new Syrian army that was then about to be established. With the end of the war and the disintegration of the Ottoman army many Syrian officers began to return from Turkey and the prison camps to Syria. On the other hand, many of the Hijazi and Transjordanian soldiers of the Arab revolt army wanted to return to their families in the Hijaz and in Transjordan. The Northern Army was also mainly an army trained in irregular guerrilla warfare and was not suited to the new situation. Many of its officers who had reached high ranks during the Arab revolt

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lacked suitable military education. Therefore, al-Hashimi decided to disband the Northern Army and to set up a new army based on modern principles. This army would be made up of the Syrian officers discharged from the Ottoman army (who were, in effect, unemployed on their return to Syria, a problem that much worried the al-Rikabi government), of non-Syrian officers who had served in the Arab revolt army and had chosen to remain in Syria and who would be found suitable for remobilization into the Syrian army, and also of Syrians who would decide to volunteer for the new army. Schools were also established for officers and non-commissioned officers in order to produce new cadres to fill the ranks of the army. The disbanding of the Northern Army, which had been a partner in the liberation of Syria from the Ottomans, stunned the officers of the revolt army and aroused criticism among its veterans, who saw new officers taking over their places. They felt that it was not fair to break up an army built with blood and to give preference to officers who had fought in the ranks of the Ottoman army till the end of the war. Within a short time all the Hijazi elements which had taken part in the Arab revolt army disappeared from Syria, and in fact also the tribes of the Syrian desert, which had accompanied this army in its march on Damascus, did not join the new army. On the other hand, many of the Iraqi officers who had served in the Arab revolt army joined the new army, taking key positions to be described below. But there was a problem in that the Syrian officers who came from the Ottoman army or who were freed from the prison camps were in part men of advanced military education, and included staff officers who had graduated from higher military academies in the Ottoman Empire and even in Germany. They also had real battle experience in the campaigns of the Empire during the World War, and they considered the officers who had graduated from the Arab revolt army as unfit for their ranks, which they had achieved only due to circumstances. On the other hand, the officers of the Arab revolt army, mostly Iraqis, who held the senior offices in the Syrian army, held against them the fact that they had remained loyal to the Ottomans and had not participated in the Arab revolt. Such circumstances did not bode well for the new Syrian army.35 The structure of the Syrian army during the years 1919 and 1920 is set out in the following diagrams, which include also the names of the senior commanders, their origin, and their society affiliation. The information provided here has been obtained and verified from a large number of varied sources.

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THE FORMATION OF MODERN SYRIA AND IRAQ

1919 The General Staff CGS: Yasin al-Hashimi (Iraqi, 'AHd 'Iraqi) Mustafa Ni'ma [from November] (Syrian, Fatat) Head, Administration & Quartermaster: 'Abd al-Hamid al-Qaltaqji(Syr.,Fatat) Head, Ordnance Administration: 'Arif al-Tawwam (Syr., 'AHd Suri) Head, Technical Services: Isma'il Haqqi [from October] (Ir., 'AHd 'Iraqi)

Brig. 1 Inf.

Division 1 Damascus.

Division 2 Dar'a

Division 3 Aleppo

Isma'il Haqqi (Ir., 'AHd 'Iraqi) YAHya Hayati [from October] (Syr., Fatat)

Mustafa Ni'ma (Syr., Fatat) Isma'il al-Saffar [from November] (Ir., 'AHd 'Iraqi)

Mawlud Mukhlis (Ir., 'AHd 'Iraqi) Rushdi al-Safadi [from October] (Ir., 'AHd 'Iraqi)

Brig. 2 Cav.

Brig, 3 Art.

Brig. 1 Inf.

Brig. 2 Cav.

Brig. 3 Art.

Brig. 1 Inf.

Brig. 2 Inf.

Brig. 3 Cav.

Brig. 4 Art.

Notes: 1. Each infantry brigade consisted of three infantry battAHons and a machinegun regiment. 2. Each cavalry brigade consisted of three cavalry squadrons and a machine-gun regiment. 3. Artillery brigade of Division 1 consisted of three batteries. Other artillery brigades consisted of two batteries.

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1920 The General Staff CGS: Yusuf al-'Azma [from May, war minister] (Syr., Fatat) [War Ministry Adviser: Mustafa Ni'ma [in July] (Syr., Fatat)] Head, General Staff Administration: AHmad al-LAHham (Syr., Fatat) DMO: Mustafa Wasfi (Syr., Fatat, 'AHd Suri) DMI: Sharif al-Hajjar (Lebanese?, 'AHd Suri) Head, Administration and Organization: Hasan YAHya al-Sabban Head, Ordnance Administration: 'Arif al-Tawwam (Syr., 'AHd Suri) Horns-Hama Region [in July]

Division 1 Damascus

Division 2 Dar'a

Division 3 Aleppo

YAHya Hayati (Syr., Fatat)

YAHya Hayati Isma'il al-Saffar Muhammad Isma'il al-Tabbakh (Ir.,'AHd 'Iraqi) (Syr., Fatat, 'AHd Suri) (Syr., Fatat) TAHsin al-Faqir [in July]

Brig. 1 Inf.

Brig. 2 Inf.

Brig. 3 Inf.

Brig. 1 Inf.

Art. Brig.

Cav. Art. Brig. [