The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA 9789814380089

Table of contents :
FOREWORD
Text
APPENDIX I. COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIVE POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, LONDON, 15 – 16 APRIL 1971
APPENDIX II. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, SIGNED AT KUALA LUMPUR, ON 12 OCTOBER 1957

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focussed on the many-faceted problems of modernization and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representative~ from a broad (ange of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists m this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911 and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA Some Observations On The Nature of an Evolving Partnership

by

Chin Kin Wah

Occasional Paper No. 23 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price : $ 3 • 00

FOREWORD

The post-war years in Southeast Asia have witnessed the apawning of a variety of defence agreements and frameworks, with perhaps the loosest of them being the Five Power Defence Arrangements involving Britain, Auatralia, New Zealand, and Malaysia and Singapore. The paper that follows attempts to unravel the nature of this arrangement and trace its evolution from the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) . Mr. Chin Kin Wah's effort is particularly welcome both on account of the topicality of the subject matter and the need for a clearer understanding of what the Let's hope the paper will be Arrangements actually are widely circulated. In the meantime, while wishing Mr. Chin Kin Wah all the best, it is clearly understood that reaponaibility for facta and opinions expressed 1n the work that follow• rests exclusively with Mr. Chin Kin Wah, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the view• or policy of the Institute itself or ita supporter• . 10 July 1974

Kernial Singh Sandhu Director

In considering the Five Power Defence Arrangements certain common misconceptions about its nature require prior explanation. One popular notion has it that in place of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) , which lapsed in November 1971, i~ a military agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) . This view has come about partly because of difficulty encountered in giving a short yet precise definition to what are in effect rather amorphous defence Indeed efforts to devise catchy and pithy arrangements. labels (e.g. the phrase "From AMDA to ANZUK,'fl to depict the transition of one defence framework to another has occasionally produced an elegant juxtaposition of acronyms Such confusion albeit founded on misleading assumptions. has been compounded by direct journalistic references to "the ANZUK Defence Agreement,"2 "The Commonwealth Defence Treaty,"3 and even "The Five Power Defence Arrangement."4 While ANZUK is indeed related to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, it is quite erroneous to assume Strictly that they stand for one and the same thing. apeaking there is no document incorporating "an ANZUK Agreement" p e r se: nor is there a "Five Power Defence Pact" (another popular misnomer), if by that is meant a formal multi-lateral treaty which specifies the rights and obligations of the signatories. What exists is a loose consultative framework arising out of a communique issued at the end of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore held In this communique the Five in London in April 1971. Powers, namely, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malays1a and Singapore, agreed that, "in the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, the1r Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat." To this end provis1on was made for a Joint Consultative

1

David Hawkins, The Defence of MaLaysia and Singapore: f2•om AMDA to ANZUK, U:ndcn, Royal lhited Services Institute for Defence

St,xues, 1972.

2 Straits Times, 22 NoYenber 1973. 3 Editorial in ibid. , 8 June 1972.

•

Sunda~J

Nai t I 8 J\.118 19 72 •

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Council (which would meet alternatively in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore) , to serve as a forum for regular consultation if not policy formulation among the five powers,at senior official level.s ANZUK however, is specifically a three power arrangement within the overall framework of Five Power defence consultation . 6 It refers to the restructured presence (with the demise of AMDA) of land, naval and air forces of Elaborate command, control and the three external powers logistic mechanisms have been devised by the external powers for the deployment and operation of these units . But with the ANZUR forces based on common understandings rather than on any formal treaty commitments between their respect1ve governments, ANZUK as such resembles in many ways the earlier looae ANZAM understand1ng wh1ch underpinned British, Auatralian and New Zealand defence cooperation 1n the Malayan area from 1949 until it was subsumed under AMDA 7 following the attainment of Malayan 1ndependence in 1957 , · Technically, therefore, there is no ANZUK Defence Agreement, but there are two clusters of agreements 1n the form of Letters of Exchange between Malaysia and the three external powers on the one hand and between 8 Singapore and the three external powers on the other .

5

However there were no a.J:Tangemeuts for periodic consultat1on

at ministerial level .

6 It should be d>served that the Five POfler Defence Arrangerrents mfer specifically to the April 1971 camu.mique while the ~izatial of land, sea and a.:1.r forces under the Five PaYer oattext will be referred to Sl.llply as "defence arrangem:mts ., 11

7

In this ocntext ANZll< is roore neaninJfully CCJ1l>Clred to ANZAM 11 th.m to Non\. See the sect1oo, "Fran .ANZAM to ANZUK, in Peter ANZUK ai'd After," ~·s, "Aeorientatia'lS 1.n Southeast As1a: arrangem:mts are ANZAM The Round Table, April 1972, p. 232. quite oatprehensively examined in T.B. Millar,. Austraha's Defence, Melbourne, Melbourne liliversity Press, 1965 .

8

Qxwpare far exarrple, the "Agreerrent beVtA9en the Goverrurent of New zealand and the Govez:nment of Malaysia 00 Assistan03 for the Malaysian Anted Forces and al the Arrangerrents for a ~ lealand Faroe in Malaysia," with the "Agreemant bet"Ween the Go\lamment of Ns-F Zealand and the Governnent of Singapore em Auiatanoe for the Singapore Anted Forces and oo the Aamwewata for a New Zealand Force in Singapore." Wellington, . . , Z.and Gc:Muma'lt Printer, 1971.

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The figure below illustrates these separate sets of arrangements and the way in which they relate to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. :

................................................. ' Malaysia

Singapore ?

~til'

4\

til'~, \

I

I

\

\

\

\

.

Five Power Consultative Franework

'' .~~ ' . .................................................... Australia

New zealand

Fig. I:

united Kingdan

The Five Power Defence System

The two clusters of agreements (which bear a close similarity to the AMDA annexes) regulate the stationing and provide for the rights and status of the ANZUK forces in the two host countries and set out the terms of assistance rendered (mainly in the area of military training and development) by the external powers to the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore. The agreements within each cluster are identical but a subtle difference in style and emphasis reflecting the differing national priorities and susceptabilities of the two host countries This exists between the two broad clusters of agreements. point will be elaborated below. Until the Australian Labor Government began the withdrawal of Australian ground forces from ANZUK in 1973 and the subsequent reorganization of the ANZUK command structure, the forces under the command of ANZUK Headquarters at the former British Naval Base in Singapore consisted of the following:BRITAIN:

1 battalion group (in Singapore), Up to six frigates, Up to four Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 1 squadron of Whirlwind helicopters as well as Combat units, ships and aircraft on visits, and 1 submarine on rotation with Australia.

-

AUSTRALIA:

4 -

2 squadrons of about 40 Mirage fighter aircraft at Butterworth(Headquarters of the Integrated Air Defence System) , 8 Mirages drawn from the 40 are based in Singapore, 1 battalion group in Singapore, 1 destroyer or frigate, and 1 submarine on rotation with the United Kingdom. infantry force of 1 battalion based in Singapore, 1 frigate, transport aircraft and a contribution of headquarters and logistic personnel to the Air Defence System. Occasionall y too, other air units e.g. the A-4C (Skyhawk) Squadron would also be deployed.

NEW ZEALAND:

An

Jungle training for the ANZUK units would be provided for on a bilateral basis by Malaysia at the Ulu Tirarn Jungle Warfare Training Centre in Southern Johore. Ashore and afloat the combined ANZUR Force totalled 7,000 men and about 3,300 of whom were Australians, 2,550 British and 1,150 New Zealanders. These forces were the direct responsibility of the Commander, ANZUK Fo rce who, in turn, was anawerable to the Chiefs of Staff ot the three ANZUK countries in accordance with the directives approved by their qovernments.9 In announcing the withdrawal of Australian Army units from ANZ~, Prime Minister Whitlam had indicated that such action did not mean withdrawal of Australian support from the Five Power Defence Aggrangements. This statement should be viewed in the light of the foregoing distinction made between ANZUK and Five Power Defence although it has been pointed out that in the public mind the two have become so enmeahed that the downgrading of one diminishes the utility of the other. 10 Of the military expressions of the Five Power Defence Arranqements perhaps that which truly reflects a five power involvement and indicates some semblance of a continuing

9

Sea

oo the Five Power Defena! Arrangerrents made by in the New Zealand Parlianent on 1971, Nt~w Zsal-and Parliamentary Debates, 1971,

atilt~t

Prt. M1ni.8ter Holyoalte 4

~r

No. 34, pp. 4321-22. lD Huwy Stockw1n, Far

Eastt~m

Eoonomio Review, 16 July 1973, p. 25.

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automatic commitment is the Integrated Air Defence System (lADS) which links the assigned combat aircraft of the five powers (but principally the Australian Mirages, the Singaporean Hunters and the Malaysian Sabre jets) with the radar cover provided cooperatively by Singapore in the south (Bukit Gombak) and Malaysia in the north (Penang) . The immediate responsibility for the functioning of the IADS including its organization, training and development and operational readiness rests with the ANZUK Air Commander who receives his directives from the Air Defence Council comprising one senior representative from each of the five powers. The functional signif1cance of an lADS was readily recognized by both Malays1a and Singapore at a relatively early stage of the long drawn process of negotiations which culminated in the London agreement of 1971 , The need for an !ADS was acknowledged during the first of the five power conferences in 1968 when an advi.yory group was At that time formed to study proposals for the system. neither Malaysia nor Singapore was prepared to a ~ iow national sensitivities to one another to override their strategic interests which would otherwise have been 12 prejudiced by their obvious weaknesses in air defence . Provision for air defence against intruders appearing suddenly on a radar screen could not necessarily be the outbome of ad hoc consultations given a reaction time gauged in terms of minutes. Such a consideration was pointed up by the smallness of Singapore and its geograph1cal propinquity to the Malaysian Peninsula. For Malaysia, events in 1968 (the year when the first of the f1ve power conference was held) which led to the Ph1l1ppines' "annexation" of Sabah by Act of Congress on 18 September, provided added urgency for a credible air defence umbrella.

11

See para. 8 of the camrunique 1ssued at the end of the Five Power talks held m Kuala LLJT;>ur en 10 and 11 JlU1e 1968, Current Notes, June 1968, Vol . 39, No. 6, p. 249 .

12 '!he functialal argunent has been used to support retenticn of the Five Pa.-.er Defence as cne neans of induc1ng "a pEOOe&& of political reconciliation and cooperative uaociatial between S1ngapore and Malaysia . , . , " For a disCU88ial see Midlael Ie1fer, "Retreat and Reappraisal in Southeast Asia," in Le1fer et . al., Constraints and AdJustments in British ForB~gn Poliay, London, Allen & Unwin, 1972, p. 98.

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The relatively easy cooperation in air defence vhidh has continued (particularly between Malaysia and Singapore but generally also between each host country and guest power) is in part attributable to the fact that psychologically a cooperative air defence component, which is normally out of sight and perchance out of mind of sensitive populations, iS less susceptible to buffetting by erratic nationalist sentiments . Similarly naval cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore has continued on a workmanlike basis with the former still draw1ng heavily on facilities provided by Singapore at the Woodlands Naval Base.l3 What might appear to many to be a rather untldy framework can only be fully evaluated in the l1ght of the underlying redefinition of interests by the f1ve In the loose structure of the F1ve defence partners . Power Defence Arrangements are to be found both pos1t1ve and negative properties - positive 1n the flexlble manner with which the by no means congruent interests of its partners have been accommodated, and negat1ve 1n the resulting weaknesses of ita defensive capab1 11ty Structurally the most significant weakness (from the external pouers' viewpoint) is the absence of any formal linkage between the two clusters of host power-guest The absence of a forma~ bl~ d teral power arrangements. defence arrangement between Malays1a and Singapore is a reflection of the legacy of the defence hiatus follow1ng Singapore's separat1on from Malays1a 1n 1965 and its subsequent withdrawal from the Jo1nt Defence Counc1l which was established in the wake of separat1on for mutual external defence.l4 It is a reflectlon a lso of the sensitive nature of defence relat1onsh1ps be~ween ~hese two partners arising in turn from the popularly a ck r!owledged "psychological barr1ers" that ex1st between them . The history of the1r separate approaches 1n the defen c e sphere since their polltical separation \ One w1th 1ts emphasis on anti-guerllla operat1ons and the other on

~s of the Royal Malaysian Navy 1.5 st.lll at Woodlands althotJ3h it Will eventually be transferred to Lurut oo the west ooast of the Peninsula ~en tile naval base there beCXJteS ~ratlcnal. en the Other hand S~apore c.arbat Lnlts are having t.o go to New Zealand for theu ccmnando ~rclllUJ'lg.

13 '!he

14

See Article V of the Separatl.oo Agreellent, Str.gu:pc r·e Gov el"'1/l'lent Gasetu Eztraordinary, Vol. VII, No. 6, 9 A\X)\.8t. 1965,

pp. 2188-89.

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island defence} has pointed to a clear divisibility in their defence priorities. Different national priorities and different national sensitivities can be detected also in the two clusters of ANZUK-Malaysia, ANZUK-Singapore Letters of Exchange. Those acquainted with the finer points of diplomatic language cannot have missed the Malaysian emphasis on sovereignty in its constant insistence throughout its Letters of Exchange on "consultation," or "consent," on "Malaysian approval," and on "compliance with Malaysian laws and regulations," in the various spheres of host power-external power relations.lS The Singapore set of agreements reflect a more brisk and business-like style with a greater preoccupation with the financial intricacies of land-use v is -a- vi s the external powers. The loose framework represented by the Five Power Arrangements represents a radical departure from the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian) Defence Agreement which was an explicit defence guarantee solely against external attack given by Britain to Malaya (later Malaysia) in return for the right to station forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve "for the fulfilment of Conunonwealth and international obligations" (?.rticle III}. Unlike the Five Power Arrangements which placed both the status and role of the partners on an equal level, AMDA had embraced a hierarchy of roles and reflected a preponderance of power on the side of Britain. As depicted in the figure below, AMDA was a defence framework which held together an anchor power (Britain), two associate powers (Australia and New Zealand through Letters of Exchange with Malaya and later Malaysia) and a major consumer (and with the separation of Singapore, two consumers) of alliance security. This unique alliance partnership functioned within an area of overlapping circles of interests whose points of junction were to shift over time thus stretching the defence framework 1n a way that institutional continuity could no longer be sustained in the face of economic and political changes. The existence of different foci of interests among the alliance members pointed to the separate and particular

15

Exanples abotmd in any of the ANZUK-Malaysia agreerrents. In the ~tters exchanged between New Zealand and Malaysia, see e.g., Sectioo I, paras . b and c; Annex II, Secticn I, para. (1}; Sections II I and IV, etc.

-

8 -

lhi ted Kingdan

r----- ----,

New Zealand _ .J L _________

Australia

Fig. II:

The Anglo Malayan (Malaysian) Defence System

demands made over time, on their respective foreign policies which in turn influenced individual state perceptions and responses to the developments affecting the alliance. But AMDA not only contained the seeds of its own transformation, it was also born of a process of transformation. The treaty, entered into on 12 October 1957 and later extended to cover Malaysia, made formal a series of cooperative engagements which for the nonAsian partners had begun as far back as the end of the AMDA itself began as a redefinition Second World War. of a framework within which defence assistance hitherto rendered by Britain, Australia and New Zealand could be Its function was continued after Malaysia's independence. to assist Malaysia's transition from within a network of uninstitutionaliz ed allied cooperation to that of full subject, if junior, partner of a defence set up, the skeletal forms of which already existed. That AMDA was the product of both defence cooperation and political compromise was manifested in certain ambiguities which permitted the open ventilation of a de fact o divergence of interest&. This was most apparent in the controversy over whether the terms of AMDA involved Malaya in SEATO; an organization whose strategic rationale had been one major determinant in Australian and New Zealand involvement (in association with the United Kingdom) in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) established in what was still British Malaya in 1955. Article III of the treaty reflected the

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wider strategic interests of the Commonwealth partners by stating that in return for the United Kingdom's assistance in external defence (Article I) and in the training and development of the Federation's armed forces (Article II) , the Federation would grant the United Kingdom the right to maintain in Malaya "such naval, land and air forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve ... for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations." To the ANZAM partners there could be little doubt that these "obligations" Yet Article VIII in a referred to SEATO commitments. declared that interests Malayan clear concession to where a threat to the peace or an outbreak of hostilities occurred elsewhere other than Malaya or British dependencies in the Far East (the area of commitment covered in Article VI and VII) prior Malayan agreement had to be obtained before United Kingdom forces could be committed to active operations from Malayan bases. This would appear to have given the Federation a right of veto over the use of the CSR in SEATO operations which was how Date (later Tun) Razak construed it.l6 However, a de facto Malayan association with SEATO can in fact be read into an escape clause in the same article which stipulated that the British right to withdraw forces from the Federation Thus should the need have arisen would not be affected. the forces could be easily withdrawn to and redeployed from Singapore - then a sovereign British base. The extension of AMDA to cover the incorporation of, inter alia, Singapore in the Federation of Malaysia, saw a similar extension of the ambiguity with regards to the use of the Singapore base "for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia."l7 As the endless controversy over the SEATO role of the CSR showed, the essence of AMDA lay in its de facto acknowledgement of an ANZAM strategic imperative while in a de jure sense enabling the Federation to express contrary reservations according to its own political This curious feature arose out of the fact priorities. that AMDA was a treaty between equals in international status but not in stature whilst the particular circumstances in which it was negotiated c~lled for special emphasis on the formal equality. 16

Malayan Legislative Council Debates, 3 October 1957, col. 3350.

17 Fe&raticn of :1alaya, ,Jo·int· D·ta·tmnent· by· the .:rr0ver'nmewt of the · United Kingdom and the Federat-ion of Malaya, amd. 1563, IDndon,

HMSO, 1961.

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Structurally, the alliance was underpinned by the It was therefore most susceptible role of the anchor power . to structural change where any fundamental redefinition of British interests had an effect on Britain's defence relations v i s-~-vis the consumers of alliance security. 18 But until the mid-sixties when the weight of domestic economic circumstances, the pressures exerted by Indonesia's Confrontation and less importantly, an admixture of intraalliance strains provided Britain with the economic and political impetus to a basic revaluation of her means-ends relationship within AMDA, there was no serious questioning of her open-ended commitments as indicated by her East of The policy of maintaining a policing role in Suez role. Southeast Asia was in the v i ew of former British Defence Minister Denis Healey, "an essential and inevitable part of the process of decolonization."l9 Although colonial issues were by no means exempt from partisan controversy, there was, until the major debate which broke out in 1966, a general acceptance of the prevailing East of Suez strategy and its policy It is significant implications for Malaysian defence. that when AMDA was being negotiated, and during the years immediately following Malayan independence there was on the British side, no public questioning in strategic terms, of the British commitment within the treaty. Yet the process of decolonization was paralleled by a process of decline in Britain's capacity to sustain her overseas defence commitments. The trend was already emerging as early as October 1948 when Britain made it clear that the Dominions must shoulder a greatly increased share in Empire defence in view of her economic and manpower difficulties.20 By the time she had run through the Suez crisis, it was quite apparent to Tunku Abdul Rahman who admitted, while he was in London in January 1957 to

18

It may of course be argued that in theory (with dt.E consideration to claims of political sovereignty) either of the ~ signatories had equal right to call for a review of the treaty. The strategic facts of life hCMever, clearly put Malaya in greater det:endence en AMDA.

19

G. Williams and B. Reed, Deni s Healey and the Po li cie s of Power, I.Dndon, Sidgwick and Jackscn, 1971, p. 217.

20

Sydney Morn i ng Herald, 23 January 1949.

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negotiate the package of financial aid with the defence treaty, that "we have come at the wrong time, Britain herself is broke."21 If on the one hand the implications of this decline were yet to be fully appreciated, there was on the other hand, an interest created in Malayan defence by the East of Suez role which had to be sustained in the face of Indonesia's Confrontation policy even though Britain was beginning to feel that the political and economic benefits ~ere being outweighed by political and economic costs towards the end of the conflict. As Healey himself put it, "When you are in the middle of fighting you can't think realistically ... if you are not losing the war you can't say it isn't worth fighting it."22 In this sense Confrontation was probably an inconvenient obstacle to Britain's redefinition of its interests within the alliance. Redefinition of British interests affected not only the consumers of alliance security but also the antipodean states whose secondary role as associate providers of security hinged on British willingness to defend Malaysia and Singapore in the first place. Apart from reflecting the great disparity in military power between Britain on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other, the status of antipodean associateship also expressed the similarity though not complete congruence of their interests with Britain's in the Unlike Britain which tended to relate Malayan area. its Southeast Asian co~.itments primarily to the Malayan area (its involvement in the rest of Southeast Asia being some\-.rhat syr~holic) the antipodean states and in particular Australia, had wider regional preoccupations against which perspectives the question of Malayan defence must be viewed. This is not to deny that in Australian perception, Malaya (Malaysia) and more importantly Singapore, had But any intrinsic significance in a strategic sense. public justification for the dispatch of Australian

21

Straits Times, 5 January 1956.

22

Williams and J:eed, op. eit. , p. 207.

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23 which heralded the qround forces to Malaya in 1955 formation of the CSR tended to emphasize the regional threat from communism. In this sense it may be said that the lingering image of a regional threat implanted by the Japanese advance of 1941-42 assumed a new guise under what later came to be known as "the domino theory" which provided public justificat1on for the reg1onal approach of Australian defence forces in Malaya . Th1s reqional approach however contr1buted to the conflict1ng interpretations of AMDA's relat1on to SEATO when Malaya, on the threshold of evolving its own foreign policy opted for non-membership of SEATO and hence did not fulfii antipodean hopes that SEATO might br1dge the gap between the British-centred Malayan-based system represented by AMDA and the ANZUS system which had formal1zed t.he United States' defence link with Australia and New Zealand since September 195l c24 For the antipodean states Southeast Asia accordingly "failed to become a cohesive region for alliance purposes, remain1ng as 25 two distinct areas, each w1th its own different pulls o"

But quite apart from having to cult1vate separate relations with the two tradit1onal poles of attract1on (i.e. Britain and the United States) Australia in particular had to take account of its 1mmediate Asian neiqhbourhood. Success in all three endeavours was deemed essential to long term secur1ty - the Australian niqhtmare being that "invidious choices" might have to be 23 The post-war projection of Austral1an and New Zealand interests to the Malayan area had ass\lll'ed mater 1al though not substantive fonn by 1950. In September 1949 New Zealand dJ.spatched transport aircraft to assist the RAF m the Malayan Emergency and Austral1a followed suit the follovung year,. But ground forces fran these two countries were not forthcarrdr1g for another five years 24 A mrrber of studies have been made on the Australian failure to involve Britain and the Uhited States m a NATO-type Pac1fic Pact and the later "exclusion" of Britain fran the ANZUS ag1:eerrent. See in particular: Werner Levi, Austi'a. Lia'E> Ott.t l v3•: on As-z.a, Sydney, Angus and Rd:>ertson, 1958, especially pp 90-96; N. D, Harper, "Pacific Security as Seen fran Aust.ral1a," ln ternar t cma ! Organ t z at1~ on, Vol. 17, 1953, pp. 213-228; Fred Alexander, "Australl.d in World Affairs," Austra li an Ou tZ ock, March 1956, pp. 5-19; and D, E. McHenry and R.N. Rosecrance, "The 'Exclus1on' of the U. K. from the ANZUS Pact," Inte'Prlational Organizat 'Z-on, V. 12, 1958, pp .. 320-329 .

25 Ke Jack&al, "New Zealand and Southeast As1a," Jow·· nal of Commonwealth Politiaal Studies, March 1971, pp, 4-5 ,

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26 made between these sectors of Australia's interests. In Australia's Asian calculus the most disturbing factor was Indonesia which, for a substantial part of AMDA's lifespan had contributed to "the growing suspicion that .. . (it) might be a threat to Australian security . "27 Yet geographical propinquity to Indonesia dictated a measure of verbal and diplomatic restraint in the face of Confrontation which was not shared by the more distant New Zealand, and an initial cautious response which did not match the firm and tangible expression of British commitment to the defence of Malaysia. The stretching of the overlapping circles of interests upon which AMDA was superimposed, was however not confined For the consumers of alliance to the external powers. had also an inner decolonization of security the process dynamic which contributed to the transformation of the Independence is at one and the same time the alliance . formal culmination of decolonization and the formal In beginning of the process of national identification. AMDA's case, theculmination of the second process fed back into the alliance which grew out of the first. The process of decolonization which saw the birth of Malaya and Singapore successively into AMDA had the effect of institutionalizing an identity of interests through the emphasis on the indivisibility of Malayan-Singaporean Alliance cohesiveness was undermined however defence. when Singapore and Malaysia themselves became the Not even destabilizing factors in each other's security . Indonesia from threat external an of existence the continued could contain the strains which resulted in the separation of Singapore from Malaysia which was executed without prior consultation with the external powers. The culminating point in the transformation process was reached when i n spite of a series of de fac t o AMDA could no longer "amendments" to the treaty. accommodate the growing divergence of interests arising firstly from British redefinition of her role East of Suez, secondly, by the emergence of separate Malaysian and Singaporean national interests and thirdly by the

26

Gordal Greenwocrl, "Australia's Triangular Foreign Policy," Foreign Affai rs, July 1957, p. 691.

27

J .A.C o Mackie, "Australia and Indalesia 1945-60.,'' in Gordon Greenwood and Nonnan Harper, Australia in World Affai rs: 1956-1960 , Melbourne, 0\eshire, 1963, p. 273.

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reassessmen t of antipodean interests in the light of uncertainty indicated by British and us 1 policies in Southeast Asia. The process of alliance transformat ion was indicated towards the later stages of AMDA's existence by one striking attempt to differentia te interests in the light of the testing of the alliance by Confrontatio n and then by the Philippines ' "annexation " of Sabah. The Australian Prime Minister much to Malaysian discomfitur e, publicly appeared to reserve his country's position over any possible reinvolveme nt in the Borneo territories by differentia ting the defence of West from East Malaysia. The new political and strateg1c configuratio n had made the alliance less than the sum of its parts. The restructurin g of AMDA has been part of the continuing process of role and interest redefinition among the five partners aga1nst the background of their changing perceptions of one another, of the internat1on al environment and of their domestic circumstanc es. The loose Five Power Defence Arrangement s which have limited the "liability" of the defence partners to consult provides precisely that new framework in which the external powers particularl y Britain and Australia, could differentia te their interests (and hence make a reservation of positlon) in those situations where AMDA would have once operated Similarly the restructurin g of ANZUK which automatical ly. has been necessitate d by Australia's withdrawal of ground combat units from S1ngapore reflects th1s continuing adjustment to changing nat1onal priorities. It remains to be seen whether continued recognition will be given by the external powers to the functional role of the lADS (which does not appear to have been affected by the Australian withdrawal) until the host powers have attained at least a credible level of air Uncertainty however has already been cast capability. on the air defence umbrella by the Austral1an Defence Minister Barnard who has announced the intention to review by early 1975 the Australian contributio n of Mirages wh1ch constitute the "teeth" of the lADS. The late Tun Ismail, then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, for h1s part had responded to Mr. Whitlam's 1nitiatives (in a manner perhaps indicative of national assertivene ss) with the remark that by 1976 the Butterworth Air Base might get "a little crowded" owing to the expansion of Malaysia's own air force. Such public express1ons are a reflect1on of the general trans1torin ess of these defence arrangement s. Indeed it might be recalled that even while the Five Power Arrangement s were being negotiated it was quite

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freely acknowledged that the . arrangements were not expected to endure for more than about five years. The "bolts-and-nuts" adjustments which ANZUK has undergone following the Australian withdrawal in 1973 and its subsequent reorganization under separate British and New Zealand national commands, have opened the way to further structural changes within ANZUK28 while the future of the Five Power consultative framework should be seen also against Malaysia's neutralization policy which anticipates the phasing out of defence associations with foreign powers as the policy is phased in. Neither of the host powers (or the former consumers of alliance security) , has misplaced expectations about the Five Power Defence Arrangements as instruments for their national security. Singapore, while showing a greater public support for the Arrangements than Malaysia29 has nevertheless come a long way from her sense of heavy dependence both economically and militarily on the British presence and is unlikely to be too perturbed by a "second withdrawal" under another British Labour Government. For Malaysia, whose espousal of neutralization has meant an increasing public de-emphasis on Five Power Defence,30 an ideal situation could be one in which the pace of - disentanglement from the Commonwealth defence connection corresponds to the pace of gradual evolution towards a new regional order. This is unlikely to be realised as the Australian "withdrawal" has shown and any new British withdrawal is likely to show, that change within the five power partnership is more an immediate function of domestic factors among the guest powers. 28 cne possible developrent cculd be an increasing enphasis rn bilateral defence oooperatirn. 29 The Five PcJNer D9fence Arrangerrents as an instituticnalizatirn of a certain sphere of influence is a useful political reinforcement to the Singapore3.n concept of regirnal stability as a functirn of a balance of countervailing forces. 30 There is much to be said too, for the vastly in'proved external envircnnent since the days of Calfrontation. The external threat factor does not appear to feature highly on Malaysian priorities. Rather her major.· security concern is over the insurgency problem and Five Power intervention in this particular s};tlere has been ruled out by Malaysia herself notwithstanding the obvious reluctance of the external p:Mers over such involvenent.

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Nevertheless the very fluidity of the Five Paver Arrangements has withstood the test of an Austral i an withdrawal of ground combat forces from ANZUK and will probably survive any selective withdrawal of Br iti s h units from Singapore (since it has never done anyone an y harm "to consult") although complete British withdrawa l is likely to put in question the relevance of a c ont inuing Five Power consultative framework without corresponding military expression. As long as the regional environment makes any military expression a luxury rather than a necessity then consultation without serious obligation might be expected to follow. In this sense it may be said that Five Power Defence has spawned a local variant to a popular Clausewitzian dictum - defence cooperat i on amo~g tJ:le five powers has increasingly become "e. cx.ntinuatioo' of politics by an admixture of other means. "

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APPENDIX I COMMUNIQuE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIVE POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, LONDON, 15 - 16 APRIL 1971 Ministers of the Government of Australia, Malaysia, l. New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met ln London on 15th and 16th April 1971, in order to consider matters of common interest to all five Governments relating to the external defence of Malaysia and Slngapore , The Ministers of the five Governments affirmed, as 2. the basic principles of their discussions, their continuing determination to work together for peace and stabillty, their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all countries, and their belief in the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the context of their Governments' determination 3. to continue to cooperate closely in defence arrangements which are based on the need to regard the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible, the Ministers noted with gratification the development of the defence capability of Malaysia and Singapore, to which the other three Governments had given assistance, and the decisions of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which had been welcomed by the other two Governments, to continue to station forces there after the end of 1971. In discussing the contribution which each of the 4. five Governments would make to defence arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore, the Ministers noted the view of the United Kingdom Government that the nature of its commitment under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement required review and that that Agreement should be replaced They declared that their by new political arrange~ents. Governments would continue to cooperate, in accordance with their respective policies, in the field of defence after the termlnation of the Agreement on 1st November 1971. The Ministers also declared, in relation to the 5. external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack externally organlsed or

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supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat. The Mi nisters reviewed the progress made regarding 6. In the establishment of the new defence arrangements. particular: a. They welcomed the practical steps being taken to establish the Integrated Air Defence System for Malaysia and Singapore on 1st September 1971 . b. They agreed to establish an Air Defence Council, comprising one senior representative of each of the five nations, to be responsible for the function i ng of the Integrated Air Defence System, and to provide direction to the Commander of the Integrated Air Defence System on matters affecting the organization, training and development and operational readiness of the System. c . They noted the progress made by the Five Power Naval Advisory Working Group. They decided to set up a Joint Consultative Council d. to provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior official level on matters relating to the defence arrangements. Ministers also noted that further discussion would take place between Governments on the practical arrangements required for the accommodation and facilities for the ANZUK forces to be stationed in the area. They · looked forward to the early and successful conclusion of these discussions as an essential basis for the completion of plans for the new defence arrangements . The Ministers agreed that from time to time it might 7. be appropriate for them to meet to discuss their common It would also be open to any of them the interests. participating Governments to request at any t i me, with due notice, a meet i ng to review these defence arrangements .

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APPENDIX II AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, SIGNED AT KUALA LUMPUR, ON 12 OCTOBER 1957 Extracts Article I The Government of the United Kingdom undertakes to afford to the Government of the Federation of Malaya such assistance as the Government of the Federation of Malaya may require for the external defence of its territory. Article II The Government of the United Kingdom will furnish the Government of the Federation of Malaya ~·lith the assistance ... as may from time to time be agreed between the two Governments for the training and development of the armed forces of the Federation. Article III The Government of the Federation of Malaya will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to maintain in the Federation such naval, land and air forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as are agreed between the two Governments to be necessary for the purposes of Article I of this Agreement and for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations. It is agreed that the forces referred to in this Article may be accompanied by authorised service organisations, and civilian components (of such size as may be agreed between the two Governments to be necessary) and depend a nts. Article IV The Governments of the Federation of Malaya agrees that the Government of the United Kingdom may for the purposes of this Agreement have, maintain and use bases and facilities in the Federation ... and may establish,

-

20 -

maintain and use such additional bases and facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the two Governments. The Government of the United Kingdom shall at the request of the Government of the Federation of Malaya vacate any base or any part thereof; in such event the Government of the Federation of Malaya shall provide at its expense agreed alternative accommodation and facilities. Article VI In the event of a threat of armed attack against any of the territories or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the territories or protectorates of the United Kingdom in the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom within those territories or protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, or other threat to the preservation of peace in the Far S ast, the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom will consult together on the measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest cooperation between them for the purpose of meeting the situation effectively. Article VII In the event of an armed attack against any of the territories or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the territories or protectorates of the United Kingdom in the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom within any of 'those territories or protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate with each other a nd will take such action as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting the situation effectively. Article VIII In the event of a threat to the preservation of peace or the outbreak of hostilit i es elsewhere than in the area covered by Articles VI and VII t he Government of the United Kingdom shall obtain the prior agreement of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before committing United Kingdom forces to active operations involving the use of bases in the Federation of Malaya; but this shall not affect the right of the Government of the United Kingdom to withdraw forces from the Federation of Malaya.

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Article IX The Government of the United Kingdom will consult the Government of the Federation of Malaya when major changes in the character or deployment of the forces maintained in the Federation of Malaya as provided for in accordance with Article III are contemplated. Article X The Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of the United Kingdom will afford each other an adequate opportunity for comment upon any major administrative or legislative proposals which may affect the operation of this Agreement.

INSnTU TE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

SINGAPORE

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Occas ional Paper s 1

Harry J. Benda , Resea rch in South east Asian Studi es in Singapore~ 1970. lOpp. Grati s (Out- of-pr int)

2

P. Lim Pui Huen, Newsp apers publi shed in the Malay sian Area: With a union list of local holdings~ 1970. 42pp. Grati s (Out- of-pr int).

3

Chan Heng Chee, Natio n-Bui lding in South east Asia: The Singa pore Case~ 1971. 19pp. $2.00 (Out- of-pr int).

4

Eva Horak ova, Proble ms of Filip ino 24pp. $2.00 (Out- of-pr int).

5

Moch tar Nairn, Meran tau: Minan gkaba u Volun tary $2.00 (Out- of-pr int).

6

Paul Peder sen, comp. , Youth in South east Asia: A Biblio graph y. Modif ied and Expan ded by Josep h B. $4.00 . Tamne y and other s, 1971. 69pp.

7

J.L.S . Girli ng, Cambo dia and the Sihan ouk 26pp. $2.00 (Out- of-pr int).

8

R.P. Dore, Japan ese Indus triali satio n and the

9.

Devel oping Coun tries: Healt hy Doubt s? 1971.

Settlers~

1971.

Cause s and Effec ts of 19pp. Migration~ 1971.

Model~

18pp.

Myths~

1971.

Warni ng or Sourc e of $3.00 .

Micha el Stens on, The l948 Comm unist Revol t in Malay a: A Note of Histo rical Sourc es and Inter preta tion and A Reply by Geral d de Cruz, 1971. 30 pp. $3.00 .

10.

Riaz Hassa n, Socia l Statu s . and Burea ucrat ic Conta cts Among the Publi c Housi ng Tenan ts in Singapore~ 1971. 16pp. $2.00 .

11.

Youth in South east Asia: Edite d Proce eding s of the Edite d by Josep h Semin ar of 5th - 7th March l97l. B. Tamne y, 1972. 75pp. $4.00 .

12.

A.W. Starq ardt, Proble ms of Neutr ality in South East Asia: 1972.

13.

The Relev ance of the Europ ean 29pp. $3.00 .

Experience~

Willia m R. Roff, Autob iogra phy & Biogr aphy in Malay Histo rical Studies~ 1972. 2lpp. $2.00 .

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Regional Se~u~ity: 20ppe Djaka~ta Conference on Cambodia, 1972. $3.00

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971 - 19?5: A Critique, 1972. 16pp. $3.00

16

Harold E. Wilson, Educational Policy and Performance in Singapore, 1942 - 1945, 1973. 28pp. $3.00

17

Richard L. Schwenk, The Potential for Rural Development in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Preliminary Background Report, 1973. 39pp. $4.00

18

Kunio Yoshihara, Japanese Direct Investment in Southeast Asia, 1973. 18pp. $4.00

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgenc y and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency, 1974. 54pp. $5.00

20

John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China, 1974. 3lpp. $3.00

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethnic Marriage in Singapore: A Study of Interethnic Relations, 1974. 85pp. $6.00

22

Tatsumi Okabe, Revival of Japanese Militarism? 1974. 26pp. $3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership, 1974. 21pp. $3.00

The

Trends in Southeast Asia 1

Trends in Indonesia: Proceedings and Background Paper, 1971. 58pp. $3.00 (Out-of-print)

2

Trends in Malaysia: Proceedings and Background Paper. Edited by Patrick Low, 1971. 120pp. $5.00

3

Edited by Lim Yoon Lin. Trends in the Philippines. (Singapore University Press), 1972. 136pp. $7.00

4

Trends in Indonesia . Edited by Yong Mun Cheong. (Singapore University Press), 1972. 140pp. $7.00

5

Edited by M. Rajaretnam and TPends in Thailand. (Singapore University Press) , 1973. Lim So Jean. 142pp. $10.00

6 ·

Edited by Yong Mun Cheong. Trends in Malaysia. Press), 1974. $10.00 University (Singapore

Field Report Series • Mun Cheong, Conflicts within the Prijaji World 1 Yong of the Parahyangan in West Java, 1914- 192 ? , 1973. $3.00 42pp. 2

Patrick Low and Yeung Yue-man, The Proposed Kra Canal: A Crit i cal Evaluation and Its Impact on Singapore, $ 3 . 00 19 7 3 • 3 9 pp .

3

Robert Fabrikant, Legal Aspects of Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry, 2d Edition, 1973. 235pp. $25.00

4

The Indonesian Petroleum Industry: Miscellaneous Source Materials. Collected by Robert Fabrikant, 516pp. $25.00 1973.

5

C.V . Das and V.P. Pradhan, Some International Law Problems Regarding the Straits of Malacca, 1973. $10.00 95pp.

6

M. Rajaretnam, Politics of Oil in the Philippines, 8lpp. $5.00 1973.

7

Ng Shui Meng, The Population of Indochina: Some Preliminary Observations, 1974. 126pp. $7.00

Current Issues Seminar Series 1

Multinational Corporations and Their Impl i cations for Edited by Eileen Lim Poh Tin, 1973. Southeast Asia. 140pp .. $12.00

2

Econom i c and Political Trends i n Southeast Asia, 1973. 66pp.. $6 . oo

3

Southeast Asia Today: $10.00 llOpp.

4

Japan as an Economic Power and Its Implications for Southeast Asia, (Singapore University Press), 1974. $15.00

Problems and Prospects, 1973.

International Conferences 1

New Directions in the International Relations of (Singapore University 2 vols. Southeast Asia. Press), 1973: Economic Relations. $8.50 135pp~

Edited by Lee Soo Ann.

The Great Powers and Southeast Asia. Lau Teik Soon. 208pp. $10.00

Edited by

library Bulletins 1

Rosalind Quah, Library Resources in Singapore on Contemporary Mainland China, 1971. 11pp. $2.00

2

Quah Swee Lan, comp., Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Bibliography, 1971. 23pp. $2.00

3

P. Lim Pui Huen, comp., Directory of Microfilm Facilities in Southeast Asia, 1972. 24pp. $2.00 (Out-of-print)

4

Checklist of Current Serials in the Library. 1972. 30pp. $3.00

5

Tan Sok Joo, Library Resources on Burma 42pp. $3.00 1972.

6

Quah Swee Lan, comp., Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia: A Bibliography, 1973. 32pp. $3.00

7

P. Lim Pui Huen, comp., Directory of Microfilm Facilities in Southeast Asia, 2d edition, 1973. 32pp. $4.00

8

Ng Shui Meng, comp., Demographic Materials on the Khmer Re~ublic, Laos and Vietnam, 1974. 54pp. $5.00

i~

Singapore,

Southeast Asian Perspectives 1

U Khin Mg. Kyi and Daw Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns in Historical Burma, 1973. 67pp. $3.00

2

Harsja W. Bachtiar, The Indonesian Nation: Some Problems of Integration and Disintegration, 1974. 62pp. $5.00

Oral History Programme Series . 1

Philip Hoalim, Senior, The Malayan Democratic Union: Singapore's First Democratic Political Party, 1973. 26pp. $3.00

2

Andrew Gilmour, My Role in th e Re~abilitation of Singapore: 1946- 195J, 1973. lOOpp. $6.00

3

Mamoru Shinozaki, My Wartime Experiences i n Si ngap o r e , 19 7 3 . 1 2 4 pp . $ 6 . 00

Southeast Asian Studies 1

Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements Java, 1973. 229pp. $30.00

2

Modernization in Southeast Asia. Edited by Hans-Dieter Evers. 1973. 249pp. $35.00

~n

Ru~al

Annual Review Southeast Asian Affairs 19?4.

1974.

350pp.

$15.00

The above publications are available for sale at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Cluny Road, Singapore 10.

Tel:

514211

THE AU1110R Mr. Olin Kin Wah is studying for a Ph .D. degree at the London School of Political Science and Economics and was recentJy a Research Fellow at the Institute ol Southea t Asian Studies. Singapore.