The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Plates
List of Maps and Plans
Preface
Abbreviations
I Persia in late Safavï Times
II The Reasons for the Decline of the Safavï Dynasty
III The Accession and Character of Shah Sultan Husain
IV The Internal Situation in Persia from 1694 to 1709
V Persia’s Foreign Relations during the Early Years of Husain’s Reign
VI The Revival of Shi‘ism and its Effect upon Religious Minorities
VII The Revolt of the Ghalzai Afghans
VIII The Revolt of the Abdâlïs
IX Volynsky’s Mission and the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1717
X Mahmud of Qandahär Takes the Offensive for the First Time
XI The Gathering Storm
XII Mahmûd Returns to the Attack and Wins the Battle of Gulnäbäd
XIII The Siege of Isfahän
XIV The Abdication of Husain and the Accession of Mahmud
XV Peter the Great’s Invasion of Persia
XVI The Reign of Mahmud Shah
XVII The Turco-Russian Partition of Persia
XVIII Further Russian Operations in Northern Persia
XIX The Turkish Invasion of Persia
XX Ashraf’s Early Reign and his Struggle with Tahmâsp
XXI Ashraf’s Wars with Turkey and Russia
XXII The State of the Persian People during Ashraf’s Reign
XXIII The Turn of the Tide
XXIV The Clash between Tahmâsp and Nädir
XXV The Campaign against the Abdâlï Afghans
XXVI The Restoration of the Safavï Monarchy
XXVII Tahmâsp’s Relations with Turkey and Russia from 1725 to 1730
XXVIII Russo-Turkish Relations in regard to Persia from 1725 to 1730
XXIX The Early Relations of the English and Dutch East India Companies with Persia
XXX The Factories of the English and Dutch East India Companies at Gombroon and Isfahän
XXXI The Activities of the English and Dutch East India Companies from 1694 to 1722
XXXII The Experiences of the English and Dutch East India Companies during the Siege of Isfahan
XXXIII The Experiences of the English and Dutch East India Companies during the Afghan Occupation
XXXIV France’s Relations with Persia up to 1706
XXV The Fabre-Michel Mission and the Franco-Persian Treaty of 1708
XXXVI Franco-Persian Relations from 1708 to 1715
XXXVII Franco-Persian Relations from 1716 to 1730
Appendix III The City of Isfahan in the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century
Appendix IV Art and Literature in the Late Safavî Period
Appendix V Notes on the Maps
Appendix VI Notes on the Sources
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

THE FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY AND THE AFGHAN OCCUPATION OF PERSIA

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Nadir Shah Famous Cities of Iran

PLATE I

Portrait of Shah Sultän Husain, by Cornelius de Bruyn.

THE FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY AND THE AFGHAN OCCUPATION OF PERSIA BY

LAURENCE LOCKHART M.A. (Cantab.), Ph.D. (London)

CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1958

PUBLISHED BY

THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London, N.W. 1 American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.Y. ©

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1958

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge (Brooke Crutchley, University Printer)

CONTENTS List of Plates

page ix

List of Maps and Plans

x xi

Preface

xiii

Abbreviations

I Persia in late Safavï Times

i

II The Reasons for the Decline of the Safavï Dynasty

16

III The Accession and Character of Shah Sultan Husain 35 IV The Internal Situation in Persia from 1694 to 1709 44 V Persia’s Foreign Relations during the Early Years of Husain’s Reign

51

VI The Revival of Shi‘ism and its Effect upon Religious Minorities

70

VII The Revolt of the Ghalzai Afghans VIII The Revolt of the Abdâlïs IX Volynsky’s Mission and theRusso-Persian Treaty of 1717 X Mahmud of Qandahär Takes the Offensive for the First Time

XI The Gathering Storm XII Mahmûd Returns to the Attack and Wins the Battle of Gulnäbäd XIII The Siege of Isfahän

v

80

95 103

109 114 130

144

CONTENTS

XIV

The Abdication of Husain and the Accession of Mahmud page 171

Peter the Great’s Invasion of Persia

176

The Reign of Mahmud Shah

190

The Turco-Russian Partition of Persia

212

Further Russian Operations in Northern Persia

238

The Turkish Invasion of Persia

251

Ashraf’s Early Reign and his Struggle with Tahmâsp

274

Ashraf’s Wars with Turkey and Russia

282

The State of the Persian People during Ashraf’s Reign

298

XXIII

The Turn of the Tide

304

XXIV

The Clash between Tahmâsp and Nädir

3T3

XV

XVI XVII

XVIII

XIX

XX

XXI XXII

XXV The Campaign against the Abdâlï Afghans

321

The Restoration of the Safavï Monarchy

328

Tahmâsp’s Relations with Turkey and Russia from 1725 to 1730

341

Russo-Turkish Relations in regard to Persia from 1725 to 1730

351

XXIX The Early Relations of the English and Dutch East India Companies with Persia

360

XXVI

XXVII XXVIII

XXX

XXXI

The Factories of the English and Dutch East India Companies at Gombroon and Isfahän

372

The Activities of the English and Dutch East India Companies from 1694 to 1722

388

vi

CONTENTS

XXXII

XXXIII

The Experiences of the English and Dutch East India Companies during the Siege of Isfahan page 408

The Experiences of the English and Dutch East India Companies during the Afghan Occupation

412

France’s Relations with Persia up to 1706

426

The Fabre-Michel Mission and the FrancoPersian Treaty of 1708

437

XXXVI

Franco-Persian Relations from 1708 to 1715

453

XXXVII

Franco-Persian Relations from 1716 to 1730

463

XXXIV XXV

Appendix I

Genealogical Table of the Safavl Dynasty, with particular reference to its concluding period facing page 472

Appendix IIk,

Genealogical Table of the Ghalzai Rulers of Persia fating page 473

Appendix ZZB.

Wakhtang V of Kartli and his Descendants facing page 473

Appendix III The City of Isfahan in the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century pag( « 473 Appendix IV Art and Literature in the Late Safavî Period

486

Appendix V Notes on the Maps

493

Appendix VI Notes on the Sources

497

Bibliography

545

Index

565 vii

LIST OF PLATES I

Shah Sultan Husain

frontispiece

From Cornelius de Bruyn*s Travels, vol. I, plate 85

II The tomb of Mir Wais at Qandahâr

facing page 92

Photograph by the late G. T. Swann

III Ashraf Teppeh

328

Photograph by the author

IV View of Shahristân village and bridge from Ashraf Teppeh 329 Photograph by the author

V Panorama of Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbas) as it was in 1705 378 From the painting by Cornelius de Bruyn, by kind permission of the Algemeen Rijksarchief at The Hague

VI The courtyard of the Timcha-yi-Firangi-hä at Isfahan 380 Photograph by the author

VII The walls of the Tabarak citadel as they were in 1927

477

Photograph by the author

VIII The courtyard and dome of the Madrasa-yi-Mädari-Shâh at Isfahan 480 Photograph by the author

IX The ruins of the palace buildings at Farahäbäd

482

Photograph by the author

X The Nau Rûz presentation ceremony From the painting by Muhammad ‘All, by kind permission of the British Museum

ix

489

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS Sketch plans of the Battle of Gulnäbäd, 8 March 1722 page Approximate positions of the Persian and Afghan armies before the action began 139 The opening phases 140 The beginning of the Persian rout 141 Map showing the outward and homeward routes followed by Peter the Great in his invasion of Persia in 1722

181

Sketch map of Isfahan as it was in the early eighteenth century

475

Map of Persia in the eighteenth century

end of book

PREFACE The idea of writing this book came to me when I was collecting material for my biography of Nädir Shah. I necessarily had to make some study of the period immediately preceding Nädir’s rise to fame, and, in so doing, I came across far more material than I could possibly use in my introductory chapter. As it seemed to me that much of this surplus material was of decided interest, I determined that I would, one day, endeavour to embody it in a separate work. Accordingly, after I had finished my book on Nädir Shäh, 1 began seriously to add to my data on the reigns of Shäh Sultän Husain and the two Afghan usurpers. Taking advantage of a brief visit to Paris in 1938, I made some interesting discoveries in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères and in the Bibliothèque Nationale. I welcome this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the officials at the Quai d’Orsay. As my time in Paris was limited and as there seemed no likelihood of my being able to return there in the near future, they most kindly allowed me to consult the archives there, although the reading room was at that time closed to the general public. The Second World War broke out before I had made much progress with my researches, and I had to put all thought of them aside for nearly six years. When at length peace came, I found it by no means easy to pick up the threads again, particularly as I had to pay two lengthy visits to Persia on business of an entirely different character. Nevertheless, I did make some progress from time to time, but it was not until early in 1954 that I was in a position to complete my researches and to begin writing the book. As in the case of my Nadir Shah, I have endeavoured to base my narrative as far as possible on purely contemporary sources, both eastern and western. I am acutely conscious of the fact that there is much ground that I have been unable to cover in archives and libraries abroad, particularly in Russia. I hope, however, that what I have done may serve as a basis for a more accurate and complete study of this most interesting, but intensely tragic, period of Persian history. The present book overlaps to some extent with my Nadir Shah, xi

PREFACE

but, in the first place, the treatment is more general, and, secondly, I have been able to utilise some material that has become available since the publication of my earlier work. In gathering my material, I have been greatly helped by a number of friends both in this country and abroad. I must make special mention here of the invaluable assistance that I have been given by Dr C. O. Minasian, of Isfahân, Mr David Dunlop, of Amsterdam, Dr D. M. Lang, of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Professor Levy and Professor Minorsky. I have also to thank Mrs Arnold Gomme for her excellent work on the maps. Furthermore, I am under a great obligation to the staff of the Cambridge University Press for their help and guidance in the preparation of this book for publication. Other acknowledgments, of which there are many, will be found in the text. For all the faults and shortcomings in this book I must, however, accept full responsibility. In conclusion, I must express my gratitude to my wife, not only for her constant encouragement, but also for reading through the draft of the book and making many valuable suggestions.

L. L. CAMBRIDGE

6th February 1958

xii

ABBREVIATIONS AEP

Affaires Etrangères, Perse, archives in the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. Tadhkirat-i-Ahwäl of Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Hazin. Ahwâl BM British Museum. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies BSOAS (present title). Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies (original BSOS title). ’ Chirac Louis-André de La Mamie de Clairac. Encyclopaedia of Islam. EI Geographical Journal. GJ Histoire de la Géorgie, by M. F. Brosset. H. de la G. Royal Central Asian Journal. RCAJ Royal Asiatic Society. RAS State Papers 91 and 97. Public Record Office. SP Tadhkirat al-Mulük. TM Tarikh-i-Nädiriy by Mirzä Muhammad Mahdi, of TN Astaräbäd. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. ZDMG “Zubdat al-Tawärikh”, by Muhammad Muhsin. ZT

xiii

CHAPTER I

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVl TIMES I. THE AREA OF THE COUNTRY

Hajjî Mîrzâ Hasan Fasâ’ï, in his work the Färs-Näma-yi-Näsiri, stated that Persia in the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain extended: °. . .from the Amu Daryä [Oxus] and Qandahar to Sulaimânïya [in] Kurdistän and from the frontier of Däghistän and Georgia to the shore of the Sea of ‘Oman and the island[s] of Bahrain”.1 Persia was, in fact, very much larger in the closing years of the seventeenth century than she is today, as she covered approximately one million square miles as against 628,000. The main differences, in the geographical sense, between the Persia of those days and of the present time, were in the north-west and the east and north­ east, where there was much additional territory. Except for Baghdad and parts of eastern Mesopotamia and Anatolia which Shäh Safi (1629-42) had lost, she covered substantially the same area as she had done at the death of Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great in 1629. These lost territories had not been ethnically part of Persia, and their retention, had that been possible, would have been a potential source of danger both from without and from within. In this connection, it must be pointed out that some of the territories which still formed part of Persia were inhabited by peoples of different races and forms of belief, a fact which, for reasons that will be given later, was to have disastrous consequences for the dynasty and the country. 2. THE FRONTIERS

In the extreme north-west, the long frontier with Turkey began in the Caucasus range a short distance to the west of the peak of Kazbek ; from this starting-point it ran at first mainly south-west, separating the two Georgian provinces or kingdoms of Imeretia and Kartli, the former being in the possession of Turkey and the latter in that of Persia. Turning to the south-east, the frontier then formed the border between the Turkish province of Akhalt1 I

Tehran lithographed edition, 1313 (1895/6), p. 160. I

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

sikh and Kartli and Somkheti. Further to the south, it separated the provinces of Qärs and Van on the one hand from those of Chukhür-i-Sa‘d (Erivan) and Adharbaijân on the other. The frontier then proceeded southwards to form the western boundary of the Persian provinces of Kurdistan, Kirmänshäh, Luristän and part of ‘Arabistän (Khüzistän). For the last 50 miles or so before reaching the head of the Persian Gulf, the left bank of the Shatt al-‘Arab, the joint stream of the Tigris and Euphrates, formed the frontier between the two empires. Except that this western frontier now begins on the eastern slopes of Mount Ararat, owing to the loss of Chukhur-i-Sa‘d or Erivan to Russia, and that some minor adjustments were made in it in 1913-14 by the TurcoPersian Frontier Commission, it has undergone little change since the conclusion of the treaty of Zuhäb in 1639. From the mouth of the Shatt al-‘Arab the frontier, after skirting the head of the Gulf, ran along its south-eastern side to where it merges with the Gulf of ‘Oman at the Straits of Hormuz ;T it then continued along the eastern shore of the Gulf of ‘Omän to Jäsk where, once again following the coast, it ran eastwards until it reached the western limit of the Mughal empire. We are unable to fix with certainty the position of the meeting-point between the Persian and Mughal empires, but it was probably about midway between Gwadar and Karachi, near the town or village of Ormara. The Perso-Mughal frontier, starting from this somewhat debatable point on the coast, traversed, in a north-north-easterly direction, the country inhabited by wild and turbulent Balüchï and Brahoi tribesmen over whom neither Persia nor India could then exercise effective control. Further to the north-east, the line passed slightly to the east of Mustang and Pishïn and the region inhabited by the Kâkarï tribe. We know from Muhammad Khalil’s Majma‘ alTawärikh2 that the frontier at this time lay between two and three stages or some 50 miles to the east of Qal‘at-i-Ghalzai, whence it ran first north and then north-north-west up to the Küh-i-Bäbä range, keeping probably just to the east of the headwaters of the Tarnäk, Arghandâb and Helmand rivers.3 1 Qishm and the other islands that lie off the eastern side of the Gulf were also included in Persia, as was likewise the Bahrain group of islands. 2 Tehran (1949), p. 3. 8 The country on the eastern side of the frontier here was then inhabited mainly by independent Pathan tribes.

2

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVÏ TIMES

The northern frontier of Persia probably followed the crest of the Küh-i-Bäbä westwards and then crossed into the valley of the upper Harï-rüd. At some now unknown point, possibly some 30 miles to the west of Daulat-Yär, it crossed the eastern part of the Paropamisus range near or by the Gul Pass into the upper Murghäb valley. In the time of Shäh ‘Abbas I, the frontier turned north-east above Bälä Murghäb and reached the Oxus; it then followed that river downstream to Chahâr-Jüï or just beyond, whence it cut across Qarä Qum desert between Khwärazm (Khiva) and the Merv oasis to the Caspian Sea somewhere to the north of the Atrak river. By the closing years of the seventeenth century, however, the actual limits of Persian power fell short of the Oxus, and probably extended no further than the east side of the Murghäb valley and the north-eastern fringe of the Merv oasis. From the northern limits of that oasis, the boundary ran westwards to the Kopet Dägh range immediately to the north of Abivard, leaving all the country to the north and north-east of those mountains in the hands of the Turcomans.1 The frontier line then ran along the crest of the range or along its southern slopes to the Atrak valley and thence to the Caspian near Hasan Quli. On the western side of the Caspian Sea, the frontier began just to the north of the important town of Darband. It ran inland westward for a very short distance and then turned to the south­ east and continued approximately parallel with the coast along the lower slopes of the Däghistän mountains to the Samur river. It turned to the west-south-west along the valley of that river and then continued along the slopes of the high mountains that formed the southern limits of the wild tribes of the Ghâzï Qumüqs and other Lezgis.2 The frontier then veered to the north-west and followed the main Caucasus range westwards to Kazbek and thence to the point where the Turkish frontier began. It must not be imagined from what has been said above that the frontiers described, except where they followed natural boundaries such as coasts, rivers and mountains, were at all definite in the 1 According to the Tadhkirat al-Mulük, p. 103, the districts of Abivard, Nasä and Durün formed part of the province of Mashhad, but, as Professor Minorsky has pointed out in his commentary (p. 168), Persia had then no control over this area. 2 Some of the Lezgis, however, had formed colonies south of the range at Jar and Tala in the fertile Qäniq (Alazan) valley.

3

1-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

sense that frontiers are definite today. None of them had been demarcated1 and their alignment was in many cases only vaguely known. Moreover, some of the country traversed was inhabited by nomadic tribes which even to this day pay little or no regard to such artificial barriers as a frontier line. 3. THE PROVINCES

We are most fortunate in having, in the Tadhkirat al-Multik? a most detailed description of the Persian provinces and of the manner in which they were administered in late Safavï times. Furthermore, Professor Minorsky has, in his admirable commen­ tary on this interesting book, not only cleared up a number of obscurities, but has also added much valuable information. In view of all the data readily available in this work and in Professor Minorsky’s commentary thereon, it is unnecessary to deal at great length with the subject here. In the north-west of the country, in the angle formed by the Caucasus range and the Turkish frontier, was the Persian part of Georgia, consisting of the kingdom of Kartli in the north-west and that of Kakheti in the south-east. In view of its situation and importance, Persian Georgia was governed by one of the four Valis or Viceroys of Persia ; this post having for long been hereditary in the Bagratid royal line. Sometimes the Väli belonged to the Kartlian branch and sometimes to the Kakhetian. The capital of Persian Georgia and also of Kartli was Tiflis (Tbilisi). To the south and south-east of Georgia was the vast province of Adharbaijän. In those days it was very much larger than it is now, because it contained a number of smaller provinces and districts, such as Chukhür-i-Sa'd or Erivan, Nakhichivän and Qaräbägh, all of which, like Georgia, were lost to Russia in the disastrous wars in the early part of the nineteenth century. Tabriz was, as it is today, the capital of Adharbaijän, and the residence of the Beglarbegi or Governor-General of the province. Other important 1 It was not until 1727 that an attempt was made to demarcate a frontier in these parts. This was the artificial frontier laid down in Persia by Russia and Turkey in virtue of the Partition Treaty of 1724. Even then, it was not found possible to demarcate the whole of it (see p. 355 below). 2 As numerous references will be made to this book, it will be designated in

future by the letters TM.

4

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVl TIMES

centres of population in Adharbaijân were Erivan, Ganja and Ardabïl. Erivan,1 the capital of Chukhur-i-Sa^, was the seat of government of a Beglarbegï and the chief town of Persian Armenia. Ganja, the birthplace of the poet Nizami, was likewise the seat of government of a Beglarbegï who exercised jurisdiction also over the adjoining district of Qaràbâgh. Ardabïl was the town with which the Safavi dynasty was closely connected and where Shaikh Safi and many of his descendants were buried. To the south of Adharbaijân lay the province of Kurdistan or Ardalän, which was governed by a Väli\ his seat of government was at Sinandij. The Persian Kurds, like their countrymen in Turkey, were Sunnis. Kurdistan was bordered on the south by the province of Kirmänshäh, the capital of which was the town of the same name. The main route from Baghdad to Qazvin, Tehran and Khurasan ran through this province, as it still does. To the east of Kurdistan and Kirmänshäh lay the great central province of (Persian) ‘Iràq, which was known in former times as al-Jibäl. ‘Iräq, besides containing the special mahall or metro­ politan district of Isfahän, also included the province of Qalamrau‘Ali-Shakar or Hamadän and the districts of Qazvin,2 Tehran, Qum, Säva, Käshän, Natanz, Näyin, Ardistän, Abarqüh, Qümisha (now Shahreza), Chahär Mahall (in the Bakhtiäri country), Khünsär, Gulpäigän, Dilijän and the Mahallät. South-east of Kirmänshäh was the mountainous province of Luristän ; it was governed by a Väli whose seat of government was the town of Khurramäbäd, in the country of the Faili Lurs. Adjoining Luristän on the south-east was ‘Arabistän (or Khüzistän)3 which, like the former, was under a Väli. As in the case of Georgia, the post of Väli of this province had become hereditary in one family, namely, the Musha‘sha‘,4 the members 1 Echmiadzin, the chief religious centre of the Armenians, is 12 miles to the west-south-west of Erivan. 2 Both Qalamrau-‘Ali-Shakar and Qazvin were under Beglarbegls. 3 Earlier known as Khüzistän, “ the country of the Khüzïs”. As this province was known as ‘Arabistän in Safavi times, this term is employed here. The older name has been revived in recent years. 4 The founder of the Arab dynasty of the Musha‘sha‘ was a sayyid or descendant of the Prophet at Madina who migrated to Wäsi{ about the beginning of the fourteenth century a.d. One of his descendants, Sayyid Muhammad by name, left Wäsit and crossed into Persia and established himself in ‘Arabistän

5

FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

of which claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad through Müsâ al-Käzim, the seventh Imam.1 The author of the Tadhkirat al-Mulük states that the Vâlï of ‘Arabistän was of higher rank than his fellow- Vâlïs because of his descent, his valour and the number of his tribes. The Musha‘sha‘ sayyids, like the majority of their Arab tribesmen, were Sunnis. In the mountainous north-eastern and eastern part of the province was (and still is) the country of the great Bakhtiän tribe, whose chief, while not actually holding the position of Väli, was regarded in late Safavi times as ranking next in importance to the Vâlï of Georgia. Wedged in between the Bakhtiän country to the north-west and Färs to the south-east was the very wild and mountainous country of the Kûhgïlû.2 It was governed by a Beglarbegi. The great province of Färs, which was almost a kingdom in itself, extended from the head of the Persian Gulf to its entrance near Bandar ‘Abbäs and the Straits of Hormuz. Its capital, then as now, was Shïrâz. Formerly under a Beglarbegi, like the other important provinces, Färs was at this time administered by the Khässa or royal demesnes. The chief port of Färs and, indeed, of the whole of Persia then was Bandar ‘Abbäs or “Gombroon” as the representatives of the English East India Company used to call it;3 the English and Dutch East India Companies and, at times, the French Compagnie des Indes had establishments there. East and south-east of Färs was the province of Kirmän, the ancient Carmania, with its capital of the same name. It also was governed by a Beglarbegi, and was of considerable commercial importance in those times because of the high quality of its wool. Kirmän was bordered on the east by the grim desert of the during the reign of Shäh Ismä‘11 I. His son Sayyid Haidar built the castle of Hawïza on an island in one of the branches of the Karkha (Hawïza is 38 miles west by north of Ahwäz). By degrees the Musha‘sha‘ family increased sufficiently in importance for the post of Vail of ‘Arabistän to become hereditary in it. For further details regarding the Musha‘sha‘, see Professor Minorsky’s article thereon in the EI. 1 The sovereigns of the Safavi dynasty likewise traced their descent from the Prophet through ‘Ali and Müsâ al-Käzim. 2 For a description of the Kühgïlü country, see J. V. Harrison’s article “Kuhgalu”, in Geographical Journal (GJ) vol. lxxxviii, no. 1 (July 1936). 8 For the origin of this name, see pp. 372-3. 6

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVÏ TIMES

Dasht-i-Lüt, which separated it from the province of Sîstân (see below). South-east of Kirmân and extending eastwards to the western borders of Balüchistän was Makrän, which was inhabited by war­ like and predatory tribesmen, many of whom were Balüchïs. Balüchistän lay in between Makrän on the west and the Mughal empire on the east. Its inhabitants were the wild Baluchi and Brahoi tribesmen. The Shäh’s writ could not be said to run very far (if, indeed, it ran at all) in either Makrän or Balüchistän. Covering the east and north-east of Persia was the then enormous province of Khuräsän. Like Adharbaijàn in the north-west, it was in those days much larger than it is at the present time, as it contained the two big provinces of Qandahär and Herat (each of which was under a Beglarbegl or Governor-General) and the small province or district of Merv in addition to the area that is now known as Khuräsän. According to the Tadhkirat al-Mulük, it also included Slstän and Balüchistän.1 The chief cities of Khuräsän were Mashhad, Herat and Qandahär. For administrative purposes the province was partly under the Mamâlik or state and partly under the Khâssa or royal demesnes. To the north-west, separating Khuräsän from the Caspian, was the province of Astaräbäd, with its capital of the same name.1 2 This province, which was under a Beglarbegl was inhabited for the most part by Turcomans or tribes of Turcoman origin ; in the first category were the Göklän and the Yamüt, and in the second the Äshäghlbäshl and Yüqäribäshl3 clans of the powerful Qàjàr tribe and the Jaläyir. To the west of Astaräbäd stretched the long and narrow coastal province of Màzandaràn, occupying the fertile strip of land between the Elburz range and the Caspian.4* It consisted mostly of forest, and had then, as now, a sub-tropical climate. Adjoining Mäzandarän to the west was Gïlân, which had similar physical and climatic conditions. Resht was, as it still is, the chief city. The best silk in Persia came from the Lähijän district, which 1 P. 103. 8 The name has been changed in recent times to Gorgan. 3 Respectively, the ‘‘lower*’ and “upper” clans, so called because of the position of their pastures. 4 Père Sanson, a French missionary who was in Persia from 1683 to 1692, stated that Mäzandarän was under a Väli in his time. See his Voyage ou Relation de VEtat présent du Royaume de Perse, p. 45. It appears, however, that it was shortly afterwards absorbed by the Kha^a.

1

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

lies to the east-south-east of Resht. By the end of the seventeenth century Gïlân had come under the control of the Khässa.1 Separated from the northern limits of Gïlân by the district of Tälish and the Mughân steppe, both of which formed part of Adharbaijän, was the province of Shïrvân. It was under a Beglarbegï whose seat of government was at Shamakhi. This province then included the comparatively small part of Däghistän that lay within the borders of Persia proper; in this area was the strongly fortified fortress town of Darband, which was under a Governor. To the north of Darband, along the coastal strip, the authority of Persia grew progressively more shadowy as one proceeded northwards. Lezgis and other mountain tribes acknow­ ledged no jurisdiction by Persia. 4. THE PEOPLES OF PERSIA

In late Safavi times, as at the present day, the inhabitants of Persia were of diverse races and differed also in regard to language and modes of life. On the one hand, there were the settled popula­ tion in the towns and villages, and, on the other, there were the nomadic tribes. The most numerous and widespread of all these elements were of Tajik or Aryan descent, amongst whom the Kurds must be included. There were also very considerable numbers of Turkish, Turcoman, Arab, Balûchï, Brahoi, Afghan, Georgian and Armenian elements, as well as small communities of Jews and Sabaeans. Many of the Turks and Turcomans were the descendants of those tribesmen who, coming largely from the Ottoman empire, had espoused the cause of Shäh Ismä‘Il I, the founder of the Safavi dynasty. Others of Turkish race were descended from those who had entered Persia before the Safavi era, such as the Afshärs and Qashqäis. In the Caucasus there were many different races ; in addi­ tion to the wild Lezgi and other tribes which inhabited the mountain regions of Däghistän, there were the Georgians and Armenians. The Georgians were, naturally enough, mainly to be found in their own countries of Kartli and Kakheti, but many had enrolled in the Persian army and so had become widely scattered in the country. Furthermore, since so many slaves had been taken from Georgia in the past, there was Georgian blood in the royal family 1 Sanson, op. cit. p. 45, stated that a Vazlr of the Khässa was stationed at Resht.

8

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVÏ TIMES

and amongst the ruling classes. The Georgians were Christians, the vast majority being Orthodox. The members of their ruling classes often showed little reluctance to embrace Islam when it suited their interests to do so, that is, when they were offered a post under the Shäh, and they could as easily revert to their former faith. The Armenians belonged to the Gregorian Church, which had separated from the Orthodox fold in consequence of the decisions taken at the Council of Chalcedon. The Armenians were for the most part in the province of Chukhür-i-Sa‘d, but there was an important colony of them in (New) Julfa, a suburb of Isfahan, while there were smaller communities of them at Hamadan and other towns. Only comparatively small numbers of the Lezgls, and other Dâghistânï tribesmen (who were, almost without exception, Sunnis) were actually Persian subjects. Nominally in Persia, however, were the Qaitâq and Qaräqaitäq tribes, under their Usmi, and the Qumûq, under their Shamkhâl. Formerly the Qumûq had been incorporated in the very powerful Ghâzï Qumûq tribe, which had for long occupied the region, partly mountain and partly plain, which runs north-eastwards from the Ghâzï Qumûq Qoisû (river) to the Caspian coast a little to the south of Buinaq, and thence northwards to a point north of the town of Tarkhû; their territory lay to the west and north-west of that of the Qaräqaitäq. In 1578 the tribe split into two halves which gradually became independent of each other; one half, which retained the name of Ghâzï Qumûq, remained in the mountainous inland region, while the other, the Qumûq, occupied the low country bordering on the Caspian. The lowland portion of the tribe was ruled by the Shamkhâl,1 who had his capital at Tarkhû. 1 While I was in Kirmänshäh in 1946, I had an interesting conversation on the subject of this title with Prince T. Shamkhâl, who is a direct descendant of the Shamkhâls of Tarkhû. He informed me that the family tradition is that the word is derived from Shahba‘l ibn ‘Abdillah ibn ‘Abbäs, of the tribe of the Quraish, who was the first ruler of Däghistän after its conquest by Maslama ibn ‘Abd al-Malik in the second century of the Hijra. He said that, in course of time, Shahba‘l became changed into Shamkhâl. The late Professor Barthold, however, has pointed out, in his article on Däghistän in the EI, that the Arabic origin of this title, like that of the Usmi (which means “renowned”), is merely an invention. See also J. G. Gärber, “ Nachrichten von denen an der westlichen Seite der Caspischen See zwischen Astrachan und dem Flusse Kur befindlichen Völkern und Landschaften, und von derselben Zustande in dem Jahre 1728”, in Müller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. iv, p. 13. For the genealogy of the Shamkhâls, see I.N.Berezin, Puteshestviye po Dagestanu iZakavkaz’yUfp.

9

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

The Qaitâq and Qaräqaitäq tribes occupied the country to the north of the district of Tabarsarân; their neighbours to the west were the Ghâzï Qumûq, while to the north they were the Qumûq. The chief of these tribesmen was known as the Great Usmi.1 The Kurds were, of course, mainly in Kurdistan, but there were colonies of them in Adharbaijân and also in Khurasan and elsewhere. Shäh ‘Abbas the Great had adopted this policy of splitting up certain tribes partly in order to prevent them from growing too powerful and partly in order that they might protect certain frontier districts where there was often danger of raids by Turcomans and other predatory peoples.2 In the south of the country, the Arab tribes inhabited the lowlying parts of ‘Arabistan (hence the name), the littoral of the Persian Gulf and the islands lying off the coast. They were almost entirely Sunnis. The most powerful tribes in the east of Persia were the Ghalzais and the Abdâlïs. The former inhabited the country round Qandahär, while the latter were in the province of Herat.3 These two tribes were Sunnis, but the Hazaras, who were of Mongolian origin and who inhabited the mountainous country to the north and west of the valleys of the Helmand and Tarnâk, were Shi‘i. The Hazäras spoke Persian, but their neighbours to the west, the Chahär Aimäq, spoke Turki and were, like the Ghalzais and Abdâlïs, Sunnis.4 The Zoroastrians were centred mainly in Yazd and Kirmän, but there were communities of them in other cities. In Isfahan a special district was assigned to them on the south side of the Zâyanda-rud, just below the Khwäjü bridge. The Jews were comparatively few in number; they lived for the most part in the larger cities, such as Isfahan, where, like the 1 He was called the “Great Usmï” to distinguish him from the “Little Usml”, the chief of the Lezgl tribesmen in the Kakh and Qäniq districts to the south of the main mountain range. The chief of the Avars was also known as the UsiriL See Gärber, loc. cit. pp. 84 and 154. 2 The Qäjär and Afshär tribes had been split up and scattered in this way for the same reasons. 8 For further particulars of these two important tribes, see ch. vn and vui. 4 Professor Gunnar Jarring, in his paper entitled On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan, p. 81, expresses doubt as to the correctness of this state­ ment regarding the language and religion of the Chahär Aimäq. IO

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVl TIMES

Zoroastrians, they had a special quarter, the Jubâra.1 There were also communities of Jews in Hamadan and Käshän. The Sabaeans or Mandaeans lived in ‘Arabistän, close to their compatriots in Mesopotamia. As one would expect with so many different races, there was much diversity of language. Persian was, of course, very widely spoken, but so were various forms of Turk! (a dialect of which was the language of the court).2 Kurdish, Arabic, Georgian, Armenian and Pashtu were amongst the other languages spoken. Despite the fact that Shäh Ismäll I had decreed that the Ithna ‘Ashanya form of Shiism (i.e. that of the “Twelvers” or followers of the Twelve Imams) was to be the state religion, there was nearly as much diversity of creed as there was of language. The bulk of the population belonged to the Ithna ‘Ashanya branch of the Shi‘a, but, as we have already seen above, the Kurds, Afghans (except for the Hazaras), the majority of the Arabs and the non­ Christian elements in Caucasia and Transcaucasia were Sunnis. Although, if we regard the country as a whole, the Sunnis were much in a minority, in certain regions they were in the majority; moreover, they were, almost without exception, very robust and war-like peoples, particularly the Ghalzai and Abdâli Afghans and, far away to the north-west, the Lezgi mountain tribes. The full significance of this point will become apparent later. Since the information at our disposal regarding the numbers of the different peoples who made up the population of Persia towards the close of the seventeenth century is very scanty, no definite figure can be given for the aggregate number.3 This figure may have amounted to between eight and ten millions, but this is mere conjecture. 1 A description of Isfahan as it was at the end of the seventeenth century will be found in appendix m. 2 Thévenot, Travels into the Levant (London, 1686), part n, p. 90, said: “At the Court of Persia, they speak nothing but Turkish, but a Dialect of Turkish so different from what is spoken at Constantinople, that (one may say), it is quite a different Language?’ See also Chardin, Voyages, vol. iv, p. 238. 8 Even in the case of Isfahan, where the information at our disposal is very much fuller, no accurate figure can be given for its population. In this connec­ tion, see appendix in.

II

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

5. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Although the Safavî state had at first been organised on theocratic lines, it had gradually developed into an absolute monarchy following the usual eastern pattern. The Shah was, in theory at least, omnipotent, but in practice he might, if he were of weak character or disinclined to interest himself in affairs of state, become completely subservient to the will of his ministers, advisers or favourites. But no matter whether the Shäh was strong or weak, Curzon, when writing of the Persian system of government nearly two centuries later, was fully justified in saying: “The government of Persia is little else than the arbitrary exercise of authority by a series of units in a descending scale from the sovereign to the headman of a petty village.”1 Theodore Parker’s definition of democracy and the idea of freedom as “a government of all the people, by all the people, for all the people”2 would have fallen on deaf or uncomprehending ears if it had been uttered at the Safavî court. In an absolute monarchy such as Persia then was, the character of the sovereign was obviously a matter of the highest importance. If he were able and strong, like ‘Abbas the Great, all would probably be well in times of crisis, but if he were weak and incompetent, the reverse would almost certainly be the case. When we consider what the governmental “series of units in a descending order” consisted of in Persia in the closing years of the seventeenth century, we are immediately confronted with certain difficulties. In the first place, there are discrepancies in the descriptions given by the various authorities; these discrepancies can be explained as having been due in some measure to the fact that the system was not static (we know, in fact, that it underwent some changes as time went on). Secondly, in the very elaborate bureaucratic machinery which was evolved in the Safavî era, there 1 Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 1, p. 391. R. G. Watson, in his History of Persia from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Year 1858 (London, 1865), p. 37, quoted the following passage from the Mémoires de Perse (Amsterdam, 1749): “ L’autorité des Sophis est sans bornes; ils ont droit de vie et de mort sur leurs sujets, et il n’est point de souverains qui soient si absolument et si promptement obéis.” 2 Given in a speech to an anti-slavery convention at Boston, Mass., on 29 May 1850. Abraham Lincoln, in his famous address at Gettysburg 13 years later, expressed the same idea in almost identical terms.

12

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVÏ TIMES

was much sharing or partial sharing of authority by the ministers and officials which was designed to prevent any one of them from becoming too powerful. Even the Ftimäd al-Daula (literally “the Support of the State”) or Grand Vizier found that his power was curtailed on certain occasions by his having to act jointly with lesser functionaries. Thirdly, in the course of the reign of Shäh Sulaiman (1666-94), the actual control of affairs had passed almost entirely to the court eunuchs.1 The Ftimäd al-Daula was the Shah’s principal minister and chief adviser, as well as being the main agent for the carrying out of his commands. He presided over the Council of State, a body which consisted of the chief religious, civil and military authorities. He was also responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, con­ firmed all official appointments, was the head of the administration of the Mamälik or state provinces, and he, jointly with the Mustaufi al-Mamälik, the treasurer of those provinces, was in charge of their finances. Ranking immediately after the Ftimäd al-Daula were the four great amirs or military leaders, namely, the Qurchi-bäshi, the Qullar-äqäsi, the Tufangchï-bâshï and the Tüpchi-bäshi. In the religious sphere, the Shaikh al-Isläm was supreme until early in the reign of Shäh Sultan Husain, when the post of Mullä-bäshi or chief mullä was created. Over the admini­ stration of the law was the Divän-begi or Lord Chief Justice, but in certain cases he had to act in conjunction with other high functionaries. Other offices of importance were those of the Mustaufi alMamälik, to whom brief reference has been made above, the Näzir al-Buyütät, or superintendent of the royal workshops, the Mustaufiyi-Khässa, or treasurer of the royal demesnes, and the Eshikäqäsi-bäshi or “Head of the Masters of the Threshold”, who was in charge of the aides-de-camp, the guards and door-keepers, and who acted as grand master of the ceremonies.1 2 The Mihmändärbäshi, “the chief host”, had to meet foreign ambassadors and envoys on their arrival at the capital, look after them there and present them to the Shäh. 1 See Professor Minorsky’s commentary on that invaluable manual of Safavi administration, TM, p. in. 2 TM, pp. 47 and 118.

*3

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Directly under the rtimäd al-Daula, in his capacity as head of the administration of the Mamälik or state provinces, was another important category of officials. These were, in order of importance, the Välis or Viceroys, the Beglarbegis (°Lords of Lords”) or Governors-General, and the more numerous Qolbegïs (“SupportLords”), khäns and sultäns, who were in charge of smaller districts and towns. The Välis were classed as amirs of the marches (sarhadd), a position similar to that of the marzubän of earlier times. In order of precedence, they were (i) the Väli of ‘Arabistän, (ii) the Väli of Luristân, (iii) the Väli of Georgia, and (iv) the Väli of Ardalän or Kurdistan.1 Although not actually given the rank of Väli, the chief of the powerful Bakhtiârï tribe ranked immediately after the Väli Qi Ardalän. At the time of which we are writing, the Mamälik or state provinces covered only a portion of the kingdom, while the remainder consisted of the Khässa or royal demesnes. The Khässa areas had for long been on the increase, and by the close of the seventeenth century they had seriously encroached on the Mamälik. In general, these lands were situated in areas that were considered as being reasonably safe from enemy attack. They were under the administrative control of the Näzir or Superintendent, while their finances were controlled mainly by the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa or Treasurer of the Khässa.2 Under these two important officials were the Vazirs or Intendants, who held positions analogous to those of the Beglarbegis and lesser functionaries in the parallel administration of the Mamälik? Enough has, it is hoped, been said in the above survey, in­ complete though it admittedly is, to show that Persia contained, towards the close of the seventeenth century, certain elements of population which, unless handled with great care and under1 More will be said later of the Vâlïs. 2 According to Professor Minorsky, TM, p. 25, the Mustaufl-yi-Khässa “to some extent.. . seems to have been subordinated to the Mustaufï al-Mamälik, and consequently to the Grand Vazir, but in fact the whole of the Khä^a was controlled by the prevailing Nazir”. 3 The above account of the administration of the country is admittedly brief, much detail having been omitted. It is felt that it would have added unduly to the length of this chapter to have described it at greater length; moreover, a wealth of information on the subject is readily available in the TM and in Professor Minorsky’s admirable commentary thereon.

U

PERSIA IN LATE SAFAVl TIMES

standing, might well prove disruptive. Moreover, there were by this time signs of increasing weakness in the fabric of the state. It was tragic alike for Persia and for the Safavî dynasty that those who were responsible for the government of the country not only were blind to these dangers, but were also to show themselves incapable of dealing with them when the need to do so arose.

CHAPTER II

THE REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY It is regrettable that no authoritative and detailed history of the whole Safavï period of Persian history has so far been written. For this reason, it is not yet possible to set out, with proper emphasis, all the diverse causes of the decline and ultimate fall of the dynasty. The Safavï dynasty reached its apogee under Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great (1587-1629), but when he died the downward trend began. Sir John Chardin, looking back after half a century on this event, said: “Dès que ce grand et bon prince eut cessé de vivre, la Perse cessa de prospérer.”1 There is undoubtedly much truth in this statement, but it should, nevertheless, be qualified. Although Shäh ‘Abbas revived in such remarkable fashion the ancient grandeur and glory of his country, he also, by certain of his actions, sowed some of the seeds of disaster. For a number of years after Shäh ‘Abbas’s death, the process of decline was so slow as to be almost imperceptible, a fact to which the late Professor Browne referred in the following terms :

There is a well-known tradition of the Muhammadans that Solomon died standing, supported by the staff on which he leaned, and that his death remained unknown to the Jinn, who laboured at his command in the construction of the Temple, for a year, until the wood-worm ate through the staff and the body fell to the ground. This legend may well serve as a parable of the century of Safavï rule which followed the death of Shah ‘Abbas the Great, who, by his strength and wisdom, gave to Persia a period of peace and outward prosperity which for nearly a hundred years protected his successors from the results of their incompetence.12

It is of interest to compare this point of view with that of a Persian historian of the mid-nineteenth century. Ridâ Qulï Khän Hidäyat, in his continuation of Mirkhwänd’s Raudat al-Safä, when dealing with the decline and fall of the Safavï dynasty, 1 Voyages, vol. in, p. 291. 2 Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. in. 16

REASONS FOR DECLINE

anticipated Herbert Spencer1 and Oswald Spengler2 by stating that dynasties resemble human beings in that they go through stages in the course of their existence which correspond to youth, adolescence and old age in man. In Ridâ Qulî Khan’s view, the Safavï dynasty was, as it were, in the stage of childhood under Shäh Ismail I and his immediate successors, under Shäh ‘Abbas I it attained maturity, while the phase of senility or decline set in thereafter. He concluded by saying that, after the accession of Shäh Sultan Husain in 1694, “the signs of decline [inhùât], nay, rather, of extinction \inqiräd\ of the life of the dynasty became from day to day [more] manifest”.3 Although there is some superficial resemblance between the foundation, rise to power and eventual decline of a dynasty such as that of the Safavis, and the birth, adolescence and old age of human beings, it is obviously insufficient to ascribe the decline and end of the former merely to the senescence of the body politic; in point of fact, we have to go a great deal further than that, because, as already indicated, the causes of the decline of the Safavï dynasty were manifold and complex. In the introduction to his translation of the Tadhkirat al-Mulûky Professor Minorsky summed up as follows what were, in his view, the chief factors that were responsible for the fall of the Safavï state :

(i) The complete disappearance of the basic theocratic nucleus round which Shäh Ismäll had built up his state, without the substitution of some other dynamic ideology. (ii) The great opposition between the old and new elements in the Persian military classes. (iii) The disturbance of the equilibrium between the Mamâlïk and the Khassa, the undue expansion of the latter having diminished the interest of the service classes in the cause which they were supporting. (iv) (0) The irresponsible character of the “shadow government” represented by the Queen Mother and the eunuchs, and (b) The degeneration of the dynasty whose scions were brought up in the atmosphere of the harem, in complete ignorance of the outside world.4 1 Principles of Sociology (London, 1876), vol. 1, pp. 514-15. 2 Der Untergang des Abendlandes; Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte (Munich, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 150-1. A very similar view has recently been expressed by Professor Sorokin in his Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3 Raudat al-Safä yi-Näsin (Tehran, 1853-6), vol. vm (as the pages of this volume are not numbered, no more precise reference can be given). 4 TM, pp. 23-4.

2

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

We must now examine these causes of decline, amplifying and explaining them wherever necessary, and adding certain con­ tributory causes.

I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THEOCRATIC SYSTEM IN PERSIA AND SUBSEQUENT RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

It is of interest to observe how the religious order which Shaikh Safi established at the beginning of the fourteenth century at Ardabil developed into a miniature theocracy and how, two hundred years later, his descendant Shäh Ismä‘il I applied the same form of government to the whole of Persia. In view of the fact that so many of his descendants were fanatical Shï‘ïs, it is interesting that Shaikh Safi himself was a Sunni. He was a man of great sanctity and influence, for not only could he claim descent from the Prophet through ‘Ali and Müsä al-Käzim, the seventh of the Shi‘i Imams1, but also, because of his supernatural achievements (karämät)12 and his devout mode of life, he was made the head (pir) of an order of Sufis, a title which became hereditary in his family. The members of this order were essentially non-violent at the outset. Shaikh Safi’s grandson, Khwâja ‘Ali, was the first of his family to give unmistakable evidence that he was a Shi‘i, but his views as such and those of his followers remained of a tolerant and non-violent nature. Khwâja ‘Ali died in Palestine in 1427, while on his way back from Mecca. Soon after his death the order became imbued with extreme Shi‘i beliefs, and some of its members even regarded their leader as an emanation of God. Moreover, the Shaikhs themselves abandoned the idea of non-violence and began to wage a jihäd or holy war against all who held different religious views, particularly the Sunnis. Shaikh Junaid, the grandson of Khwâja ‘Ali, was killed in Tabarsarân in 1455, in the first battle to be fought by his line in the cause of religion. 1 For his descent, see Shaikh Husain ibn Shaikh Abdäl Zähidi’s Silsilat aLNasab-i-Safavlya (Berlin, 1924), pp. 10-11 (it is also given, but in abbreviated form, in appendix 1 of this book). 2 Karämät may be described as minor miracles; Professor Browne defined them as “gifts.. .vouchsafed by God to his saints for their greater honour”; see his Persian Literature in Modem Times, p. 40 n.

18

REASONS FOR DECLINE

Shaikh Haidar, who succeeded his father Shaikh Junaid, gave to his Süfï partisans, who were all Shil Turcomans, the famous scarlet cap (täj) with twelve scallops or gores (one for each of the Imäms) which earned for them the name of Qizilbäsh(“ Red Head ”). Haidar, who was as militant as his father, fell in battle in 1488, when his son Ismail, the future Shäh, was only one year old. Ismail spent his early years in hiding and had several narrow escapes from death at the hands of his enemies, but he was recognised by the order of Süfîs as their spiritual leader, and it was with their help that he achieved a number of military successes whilst still a stripling. By means of skilful propaganda, resembling that of Abu Muslim in Persia on behalf of the ‘Abbäsids over seven centuries earlier, Ismail was able to attract to his banner many Shïl Turcomans from Asia Minor, Cilicia and Syria. In the campaign which led to his being enthroned as Shäh of Adharbaijân at Tabriz at the beginning of 907 (July 1501), he owed his success largely, if not entirely, to the military support of the great Turcoman tribes of the Täkkälü, Dhu’l-Qadar,1 Shämlü, Rümlü, Ustäjlü, Afshâr, Qäjär and Varsäq. In return for their services, Shäh Ismäll rewarded the chiefs of these tribes with grants of land, thereby laying the basis of a feudal system. Those leaders who had come, with their followers, from the Ottoman dominions, were thus given a stake in Persia; moreover, after the terrible massacre of their co-religionists in Asia Minor by Sultän Salïm in 1514 (of which more will be said below), these Turcomans, being unable to return to their former homes in Turkey, adopted Persia as their country. Having gained his throne (though as yet he reigned over only a comparatively small portion of Persia), Shäh Ismäll resolved that the Ithna ‘Ashariya form of Shiism should be the only one in his realm (he had even wider ambitions, but his defeat at Chaldirän in 1514 by Sultän Salïm, the great champion of the Sunnis, forced him to restrict his aims).12 Shäh Ismail’s decision aroused opposition even from some of the Shïl divines, who pointed out 1 As Professor Minorsky has pointed out in the TM (p. 194), Dhu’l-Qadar is the arabicised form of the Turkish Dulghadir. 2 Eugène Aubin, “Le Chi’isme et la Nationalité Persane”, in the Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. iv, no. 2 (March 1908), pp. 458, 467-8.

19

2-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

that the Sunnis were in a majority in Tabriz and other towns. Nevertheless, in the end the Shah succeeded in making Shiism the faith of Persia, over the whole of which he gradually extended his sway. Religious unification was to prove an important factor in bringing about national unity. Although Shäh Ismäll established a kind of feudal aristocracy by his grants of land to tribal chiefs, these leaders did not owe fealty to him as their sovereign or overlord, but revered him as their spiritual head,1 while some of his followers even regarded him as a god, a belief which he himself shared, as is evident from some of his Turkish poems.12*8What therefore developed in Persia was an extension, on a nation-wide scale, of the small theocratic state over which his predecessors had ruled at Ardabll. When in times of crisis the Shäh found himself in need of military aid, he would invoke the principle of shähi-sevan? Although his crushing defeat at Chaldirän prevented him from realising his ambition of extending Shl'ism beyond the borders of his kingdom, Shäh Ismä‘11 and his son and successor Shäh Tahmäsp I (1524-76) maintained its supremacy in Persia. Turkey was then at the zenith of her power, and it was therefore 1 One of the war-cries of the Qizilbäsh was Qurhän oldygym ve sadaqa oldygym plrum mürshidim, “ My spiritual lord and master, I am thy sacrifice and alms!” See the anonymous and untitled history of Shäh Ismä‘il in the Cambridge University Library, MS. Add. 200, fol. 41 a. See also H. R. Roemer, "Die Safawiden”, in Saeculum, vol. IV, p. 35. 2 As Professor Browne has pointed out in his Persian Literature in Modern Times, pp. 12-13, it is a curious fact that, while Shäh Ismä‘il (using the takhallus or pen-name of Khatä’i (“sinner”), wrote his poems for the most part in Turkish (i.e. the Turcoman dialect used in Adharbaijän with some admixture of Chagatay), his great adversary Sul^än Salim used Persian as the medium for his poems. As Professor Minorsky has shown in his article “ The Poetry of Shah Ismail”, BSOS, vol. x, p. 1007, their aims were entirely different. Whereas Sulçân Salim wrote merely for his own pleasure and amusement, Shäh Ismä‘il composed his poetry with the definite object of ensuring the support of the Turcoman tribes; it was for this reason that he wrote in their dialect of Turkish. 8 Owing, apparently, to his mis-reading one of his authorities, Sir John Malcolm, in his History of Persia, vol. I, p. 556, stated that Shäh ‘Abbäs I, in order to counteract the power and influence of the great Qizilbäsh tribes, formed a composite tribe entitled the " Shäh Sevund”. However, as Professor Minorsky has explained in his article “ Shäh-Sewan” in the EI, the origin of the term goes back to the early days of the dynasty, when it was used as a means of rallying the sovereign’s supporters in times of danger. At the invitation of Shäh ‘Abbas, however, a tribe entitled Shäh-Sevan came from Asia Minor and settled at Ardabil (their summer pastures are still near that town).

20

REASONS FOR DECLINE

no small achievement that Shah Ismâ‘îl and Shah Tahmâsp were able to keep her at bay during their reigns. Nevertheless, the troubled period that followed the death of Shah Tahmâsp in 1576 revealed certain grave defects and weak­ nesses in the governmental system of the country. Shah Tahmäsp’s successor was his eldest son Ismä‘11, who was a cruel and blood­ thirsty tyrant; he died either of poison or of drink after a reign of only eighteen months.1 The death of Ismäll II brought to the throne his brother Muhammad Khudäbanda who was neither a tyrant nor a libertine, but was purblind and of weak character. While the debaucheries of Ismail detracted from the spiritual authority of the monarch, the Qizilbäsh tribal chiefs were quick to take advantage of the lack of firmness and leadership shown by Muhammad Khudäbanda. It was in vain that that unfortunate monarch invoked the shähl-sevan principle when his realm was invaded by the Ottoman Turks and the özbegs. In consequence of the refusal of the tribal chiefs to rally to the Shäh’s support and of their quarrels amongst themselves, Turkey was able to make extensive conquests in Adharbaijän and Georgia, while the özbegs captured Herat and laid waste other parts of Khurasan. In 1587 Muhammad Khudäbanda abdicated in favour of his son ‘Abbäs, who was then 16 years old. By his extraordinary efforts and his good leadership, Shäh ‘Abbäs not only crushed the özbegs and later drove the Turks from his territories, but also broke the military monopoly which the Turcoman tribal chiefs had for so long enjoyed. He achieved his ends partly by his courage, tenacity and statesmanship, and partly by his thorough reorganisation of the army, whose feudal levies were largely (but not entirely) replaced by trained troops who were paid by, and were under the control of, the sovereign. Although religion still played a part in the struggle between Persia and Turkey during Shäh ‘Abbäs’s reign, its role was no longer a dominant one. In fact, Persia, under him, ceased to be a theocratic state, becoming instead an absolute monarchy on 1 Muhammad Muhsin, in his “Zubdat al-Tawärikh” (Persian MS. no. G. 15 in the Browne Collection in the Cambridge University Library), fol. 193 a, stated that Ismâ‘ïl II was poisoned in retribution for his massacre of many of the royal princes (as this work will be referred to very frequently hereafter, it will be designated by the letters ZT). Malcolm, on the other hand, states in his History of Persia, vol. I, pp. 516—17, that Ismä'il II died of drink.

21

FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

normal oriental lines. Shah ‘Abbas, however, remained head of the order of Sûfïs, and was much venerated by his subjects, many of whom credited him with supernatural powers.1 Shäh ‘Abbäs’s successors, by their incompetence and apathy and by their neglect of the army, gravely weakened the country.12 Although there was a religious revival towards the end of the century, it was on rigid, formalistic lines, and took place in very different circumstances from those which had obtained in earlier times.3 It failed signally to arouse enthusiasm and to rally the people to the defence of their country when danger threatened. In fact, instead of acting as a unifying agent, it served as a wedge to drive the people apart and to promote unrest and rebellion.

2. THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW ELEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN ARMY

Professor Minorsky is certainly justified in regarding the rivalry and ill-feeling between the old and new elements in the Persian army as being one of the causes of the decline of the Safavi state. An even more serious reason for this decline and also for the ultimate disaster was the progressive demoralisation of the army after the death of Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great. This demoralisation was due to several causes of which the most serious were, first, the neglect and indifference of subsequent monarchs to which reference has been made above (with the partial exception of Shäh ‘Abbäs II who, towards the close of his reign, made an attempt to restore the army to its former efficiency), and, secondly, the long years of peace which ensued after the Turkish wars came to an end in 1639. 1 Sir J. Malcolm, in his History of Persia, vol. 1, p. 543, relates the following curious story: “If we are to believe Persian writers, veneration for the holy character of the king was not confined to animated nature : it was imparted to substances which are the least susceptible of such impressions. We are gravely told, that on Abbas entering his kitchen at Ardebil, the lid of one of the pots that he approached raised itself twice (four inches each time), as if in respect to his royal person.. 2 We may to some extent except Shäh ‘Abbäs II from these charges. 8 See ch. vi.

22

REASONS FOR DECLINE

3. THE DISTURBANCE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE ^AMALIE* AND THE ‘KHÄSSA’

The disturbance of the equilibrium between the provinces of the Mamalik and those of the Khässa was certainly another cause of weakness in the fabric of the state. The creation and subsequent un­ due expansion of the Khässa were due, primarily, to financial reasons. It was Shah ‘Abbäs I who was, indirectly, responsible. When he created his new corps of the Qullar and the Tufangchls and re­ organised the artillery, the cost of maintaining these corps had to be met out of the revenues accruing to the royal household; this cost was, moreover, quite considerable. Shäh Safi, Shäh ‘Abbas’s un­ worthy successor, found the burden of maintaining these corps very heavy. Towards the end of his reign, when the country was at peace, his able and astute Grand Vizier Särü Taqi (“Red-haired Taqï”)1 suggested an ingenious means of increasing the royal revenue. He pointed out to the Shah that his grandfather, having been so em­ broiled in wars during his reign, had had to maintain governors in all the provinces who used much of the revenue therefrom to pay the troops who were stationed in them for their defence. Sârü Taqî went on to say that, as there was then no war or any intention of waging one, the Shäh could dispense with many of these governors, each of whom kept a court as large as that of the monarch, and then divert revenues of their provinces into the royal coffers. Shäh Safi approved this tempting proposal, and made a start by transferring the important province of Färs from the Mamälik to the Khässa, Shäh ‘Abbäs II, who ascended the throne on the death of Shäh Safi in 1642, carried the process further by giving the Khässa control over the district of Qazvin and the provinces of Gilän, Mäzandarän, Yazd and Kirmän, as well as parts of Adharbaijän and Khuräsän.2 1 For an account of the career of this interesting man, see Chardin, Voyages, vol. vn, pp. 302-15. See also Professor Naçrullah Falsafi’s “ Sarguzasht-i-Särü Taqï** in the monthly edition of the Tehran newspaper Ittila'ät, no. 2 (26), Urdibihisht, 1329 (April/May 1950). Särü Taqi’s fine caravanserai, which was not completed until after his death, is still in existence in Içfahân. 2 As stated in ch. 1, most of the territories taken over by the Khâçça were those which were deemed to be safe from enemy attack. When, however, Stenka Râzin and his Cossacks ravaged the Caspian coastal regions of Persia and established themselves for some months on the Ashurada peninsula in 1668-9, governors were hurriedly appointed and sent to the districts affected; see Chardin, vol. v, p. 252. For the reason for Stenka Räzin’s action, see ch. iv.

23

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

The substitution of the Mamälik by the Khässa over so much of the country resulted in great public dissatisfaction. Although the provincial governors had not scrupled to enrich themselves during their terms of office, they had not been so extortionate as the vazïrs or intendants of the Khässa proved to be. As Chardin has said: Les Persans trouvent cette politique fort mauvaise, disant que les intendans sont des sangsues insatiables, qui épuisent les sujets pour remplir le trésor royal, et qui, pour cet effet, négligent les plaintes des peuples sur l’oppression qui leur est faite, prétendant que l’intérêt du roi ne leur permet pas d’y avoir égard, comme ils le voudroient, quoiqu’en effet ils ne pillent que pour s’enrichir eux-mêmes; au lieu que les gouverneurs, regardant la province comme si c’étoit un royaume qui leur appartînt, ils y consument ce qu’ils y lèvent, en entretenant quantité d’officiers et une nombreuse cour. Les Persans disent de plus, que cette conduite-là énerve et affaiblit l’empire, parce qu’elle empêche qu’il ne s’y élève plus tant de bons soldats, et qu’il n’y ait plus tant de grands seigneurs entretenus, parmi lesquels on trouvoit dans le besoin de braves chefs, et bien instruits dans la discipline militaire ; ce qui est exposer le royaume aux premières incursions de leurs ennemis ; au lieu que les gouverneurs en étoient la défense et la force. Enfin, ils disent que cette conduite nouvelle appauvrit aussi le royaume, parce qu’elle porte dans les coffres du roi l’argent qui devroit circuler dans tout le pays... ?

Chardin went on to say that while the province of Fars was under a governor, it was worth a kingdom, and that Shïrâz was as beautiful, rich and populous as a capital city. Under the control of the intendants of the Khässa, however, its population had much diminished.1 2 There can be no doubt that this great expansion of the Khässa adversely affected the country in a number of ways, not only making the régime unpopular, but also causing financial and military weakness. 1 Voyages, vol. v, pp. 252-3. 2 Ibid, pp. 253-4.

24

REASONS FOR DECLINE

4. («) THE IRRESPONSIBLE CHARACTER OF THE “SHADOW GOVERNMENT” REPRESENTED BY THE QUEEN MOTHER AND THE EUNUCHS, AND (Ô) THE DEGENERATION OF THE DYNASTY WHOSE SCIONS WERE BROUGHT UP IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE HAREM, IN COMPLETE IGNORANCE OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD

As the first of these two causes was largely the direct consequence of the second, they can conveniently be considered together. It is obvious that, with a strong monarch like Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great on the throne, there was no risk of the influence of the Queen Mother or of the eunuchs assuming undue proportions. However, the way was opened for such influences to prevail when the throne was occupied by a drunken sot like Sulaiman or by a harem-bred fainéant like Shäh Sultan Husain and there were no powerful ministers, nobles or military leaders to assume control. Although, as we have seen, Shäh ‘Abbäs unquestionably rendered very great services to his country, he must, nevertheless, be held responsible for one of the most serious of the causes of the decline and fall of his dynasty. It was he who, through fear and jealousy of his own sons,1 initiated the pernicious practice of keeping the heir to the throne (together with the other royal princes) immured in the harem until the moment came when he was called upon to take the reins of government in his totally inexperienced hands. A brief survey of the reigns of Shäh ‘Abbäs’s successors will show how unfortunate were the effects of such an upbringing on the characters of the princes concerned. This survey will also show how an undue addiction to drink and pleasure on the part of these sovereigns had unfortunate consequences not only for themselves, but also for the dynasty and the nation. Sir John Malcolm has aptly and concisely summed up the evils of the practice of bringing up the royal princes in the harem in the following terms : A monarch, who was never permitted to leave this prison (i.e. the harem) till he ascended the throne, was likely to be effeminate and inefficient. It was hardly possible that he could resist the intoxication 1 Fearing that his eldest son Safi Mirza had designs on his life, he put him to death. For the same reason, he later blinded his two remaining sons, one of whom, Khudäbanda, afterwards committed suicide.

25

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

of absolute power. The unlimited indulgence of his passions seemed almost the certain consequence of his former privations, and his entire want of experience.1 If we look back across the ages to the Achaemenian period, we can find an exact parallel to the above practice and also to its consequences. While, on the one hand, both Cyrus and Darius had had, when young, a hard training and proved most successful sovereigns and military leaders, on the other hand, Cambyses and Xerxes, both of whom were born and brought up in the luxury of the harem, were the reverse. As Plato remarked in his Laws2 after the Persian monarchs allowed their sons to have this per­ nicious form of upbringing, none of them was worthy of the title of “Great King”. At the Achaemenian court the Queen Mother had, behind the scenes, great authority and power,3 and she had much influence over the king, especially if he was of weak character. In later Achaemenian times, the court eunuchs acquired, as Rawlinson has stated:

.. .a vast political authority, and appear to have then filled all the chief offices of state. They were the king’s advisers in the palace, and his generals in the field. They superintended the education of the young princes, and found it easy to make them their tools. The plots and conspiracies, the executions and assassinations, which disfigure the later portions of the Persian annals, may be traced chiefly to their intrigues and ambition.4 The above passage might well have been written in regard to the later Safavï period. When Shäh ‘Abbäs breathed his last in January 1629, two °f his sons being dead and the third debarred by blindness from ruling, the crown devolved upon Sâm Mirza, the son of the unfortunate Safi Mirzä. Säm Mirza, who was then a youth of 18, was brought out from the harem and placed on the vacant throne; he thereupon took his father’s name of Safi. 1 History of Persia, vol. 1, pp. 576-7. 2 m, 695. 8 Herodotus, vn, 114. 4 The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World, vol. iv, pp. 175-6. Eunuchs also acquired great influence over the weak Emperor Constantius II. Gibbon, after mentioning this fact, stated, in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London, 1838), vol. 11, p. 38on: “If we examine the general history of Persia, India and China, we shall find that the power of the eunuchs has uniformly marked the decline and fall of every dynasty.”

26

REASONS FOR DECLINE

Shah Safi soon showed that he had inherited none of the greatness of his grandfather. Not long after his accession, he became a victim to the besetting vices of the later Safavîs, namely, intemperance and unbridled indulgence in the pleasures of the harem. As time went on, he showed complete indifference to the affairs of state, the control of which he allowed to pass more and more to the hands of his ministers.1 He was also violent, cruel and bloodthirsty.2 Amongst the many eminent persons whom he put to death was Imam Qulï Khan, the famous Governor-General of Färs.3 A number of other military leaders also died at his hands. The resulting dearth of commanders of ability and experience was one of the reasons why, when war broke out with Turkey, it took a disastrous course, culminating in the loss of Baghdad in 1638 (Qandahär had fallen to the Mughal Emperor Shâhjahân in the previous year). The treaty of Zuhäb, which was concluded in 1639, brought to a close the long series of wars with Turkey. The peaceful conditions which ensued and which were destined to last for over eighty years made it possible for Shäh Safi to put into effect Särü TaqI’s proposal to increase the lands of the Khässa at the expense of those of the Mamälik* As already pointed out, another consequence of the long years of peace after 1639 was that the Persian army was allowed to become more and more demoralised, undisciplined and inefficient as time went on. Although Shäh Safi was, in general, violent and cruel, he was kind and tolerant to Christians, a fact which explains why the 1 Krusinski, in his History of the Revolution of Persia, p. 33, said: “He meddled very little with Affairs of the Government, passing his whole Life with his Bottle, his Wives, or in Hunting, so that had it not been for his numerous Cruelties, which stained his Reign with Blood, it would have been scarce perceivable that he was ever King.” Jonas Hanway’s similar statement, in vol. in, p. 20, of his Travels, is obviously based on this passage. 2 See in particular Krusinski, pp. 30-3, and L. Langles, “Notice Chrono­ logique de la Perse”, in vol. x, pp. 197-8, of his edition of Chardin’s Voyages. Tavernier also gives a number of instances of his cruel ways ; see his Voyages, pp. 168-71. The late H. Dunlop, who had an intimate knowledge of the contemporary records of the Dutch East India Company, described Shah Safi, in his Perzie, p. 229, as “een wree daardig dronkard en woesteling” (“a cruel drunkard and violent person”). 3 According to Tavernier, Voyages, p. 165, it was largely due to the influence of the Queen Mother that Imäm Quli Khän was put to death (his sons were likewise killed on this occasion). 4 See p. 23 above.

27

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

missionaries who were in Persia during his reign gave him a far better character than he really deserved.1 Shah Safi, who died of the effects of drink or poison in 1642, was succeeded by his son ‘Abbäs, who was then only in his tenth year. ‘Abbas’s deliverance at this tender age from the trammels of the harem may be one of the reasons why he was subsequently able to show that he had in him something of the greatness of his great-grandfather and namesake. In 1648 Shäh ‘Abbas’s forces recovered Qandahär from the Mughals. Later in his reign, he attempted to restore the army to its former strength and efficiency, but death intervened before much could be done. Although he could be cruel at times, he governed on the whole justly and well, and became very much loved by his subjects. Like so many of his line, he frequently indulged in debauchery, but nevertheless did not allow the reins of government to slip from his grasp. Sir John Malcolm said of him: The love of wine, in which this prince often indulged to excess, was the cause of all the evils of his reign. It was in his moments of intoxica­ tion alone that he was capricious, cruel and unjust : but the danger from these excesses was in a great degree limited to the circle of his court; the country at large only knew this prince as one of the most generous and just rulers that ever reigned in Persia. To the public officers of government he was severe, but to the poor mild and lenient; and the lives and property of his subjects were efficiently protected. He was as tolerant to all religions as his great ancestor, whose name he had taken. To Christians, indeed, he always showed the most marked favour.2 1 See A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, pp. 314-16. 2 History of Persia, vol. 1, pp. 582-3. Krusinski also praised his character and his tolerance in religious matters. On the other hand, the versified Hebrew chronicle of Babai b. Lutf and Babai b. Farhad makes mention of much persecution of the Jews and of their forcible conversion to Isläm during the reign of Shah ‘Abbas II; see W. Bacher’s French translation entitled “ Les Juifs de Perse au XVIIe et au XVIIIe Siècle”, in Revue des Etudes Juives, vol. lit, pp. 78, 79, 81-4, 86 and 88-90. One cannot help feeling that these Jewish authors took advantage of their poetic licence to exaggerate the persecution to which the Jews in Persia were subjected in the time of Shäh ‘Abbäs II. According to Chardin’s Voyages, vol. v, pp. 132-3, both Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great and Shäh ‘Abbäs II used to give money to Jews to induce them to turn Muhammadan. When, however, Shäh ‘Abbäs II discovered that these Jews were still practising their own religion in secret, he stopped his endeavours to convert them to Isläm by this or more forcible means. Tavernier, in his Voyages, pp. 68-9, gives a slightly different account of the matter.

28

REASONS FOR DECLINE

To sum up, we may regard the reign of Shah cAbbâs II as the “ Indian summer” of the Safavi era. Had he been more temperate, he would undoubtedly have lived longer, and he might in that case have arrested the decline of the dynasty which had begun during his father’s terrible reign. When Shäh ‘Abbäs II died, at the early age of 33, he was succeeded by his son Safi, who was then aged 18. Owing to an illness and to some unfortunate occurrences soon after his accession (one of which was the irruption of Stenka Razin and his Cossacks into the Caspian provinces),1 Safi changed his name to Sulaimän and was re-crowned as such in 1669. Brought up from infancy in the harem, where he had for long been kept in close confinement, he was naturally completely ignorant of the art of government when he succeeded his father. He was of an amiable disposition, and was by no means devoid of ability, but, as was to be expected, he had, during his incarceration in the harem, come greatly under the influence of the palace eunuchs, and he had insufficient strength of character to free himself from their power after his accession. His failure in this respect was largely due to the fact that he soon followed the evil practice of his predecessors of becoming addicted to drink and pleasure. Unlike his father, he did not, when drunk (as he usually was), vent his rage only on his immediate circle, but entered upon a wholesale series of executions amongst the nobility, court officials and military leaders.2 Consequently the palace eunuchs were able to take advantage of the vacuum thus formed to seize complete control of the affairs of state. The Shäh had, it is true, his Ftimad al-Daula and other ministers, but they were mere figure-heads. Père Sanson,3 who had excellent opportunities to observe the state of affairs at the court, has described the stranglehold which the eunuchs had established in the following terms, which recall Rawlinson’s comments on the powers of the eunuchs in later Achaemenian times :

Quelque discussion qui se fasse des affaires de l’Etat dans le Conseil du Roy, on n’y decide rien, on n’y traite que des moyens: mais leur 1 For the reason for this raid see p. 58 below. 2 Muhammad Muhsin, in his ZT, fol. 203 a, stated that for most of the time Shäh Sulaimän was occupied with the drinking of wine and other debaucheries (fusüq), and that he put to death all (sic) the amirs and pillars of the state. 3 Voyage ou Relation de l’Etat du Royaume de Perse, pp. 144-5« See also J. Fryer, A New Account of East-India and Persia^ pp. 353-4.

29

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

application est reservée au Conseil Privé, qui est composé des principaux Eunuques. Dans ce Conseil sont décidées les affaires les plus impor­ tantes à l’Etat. Le premier Ministre et les autres Seigneurs ne sçavent rien de ce qui s’y passe.... Le Gouverneur des Princes est un Eunuque, leurs Précepteurs sont des Eunuques, les affaires du Royaume sont entre les mains d’un Eunuque, c’est un Eunuque qui va choisir celuy des enfans qui doit succéder au Roy, qui le met sur le Trône, et le fait reconnoitre après sa mort : enfin ce sont ces Eunuques qui ont le maniement de tout dans la Maison du Roy.1

It is unfortunate that the Shäh, although he possessed absolute power, never utilised it during his brief periods of sobriety. Like Shah Safi, he was entirely indifferent to state affairs, being content to leave the control of them to the eunuchs. It has been said of him:

He thought so little like a King, that when it was represented to him what Danger he was in from the Turks, who when they had made peace with the Christians, would come and attack his finest provinces, if he did not put himself in a Condition to repel them, he answer’d in­ differently, that he did not care, provided they left him Isfahan.12 Fortunately for Sulaiman and his country, the Turks at that time were too much involved in war with the European powers to attack Persia. When ambassadors from these powers came to Isfahän to urge Shäh Sulaimän to ally his country with theirs and make war on Turkey, they tried to persuade him to agree by pointing out that he would have an excellent opportunity to recover Baghdäd and the other cities and territories that Persia had lost.3 He was unmoved by this argument and said that he preferred to preserve the treaty with the Sultan of Turkey and live in peace with him.4 There can be no doubt that, in view of the state of inefficiency of the army and its low morale at that time, this was a wise decision, but it was probably actuated merely by sloth and apathy, and not by motives of expediency. As the years went by, Shäh Sulaimän shut himself up more and 1 See p. 26 above. 2 Krusinski, op, cit. p. 40. 8 Turkish pressure on the western powers was very severe at this time (Vienna was besieged by the Turks in 1683). * Sanson, op, cit, p. 141.

30

REASONS FOR DECLINE

more in the harem,1 and became, if possible, even more of a drunkard. Chardin, who, like Père Sanson, had close personal knowledge of him, said: “on ne peut croire la force de ce prince à porter le vin; il n’y a Suisse ni Allemand qui lui tînt tête”.2 In another passage,3 he stated that the Shäh was: “...presque toujours ivre, et cependant si absolu, que tout ce qu’il prononce, même en dormant, sont des ordres qu’il faut exécuter sur-le-champ, tout dût-il périr”. Not content with getting inebriated himself, he used to make his nobles also drink to excess; in so doing, he often had, however, a definite object in view, as we learn from Père Sanson: “Le vin tire de leur bouche bien des veritez qu’ils luy cachent quand ils sont sobres. Il le fait aussi pour se divertir, car son plus grand divertissement est de les voir emporter hors du festin comme des corps morts.”4 With such a king—one cannot say “ruler”—on the throne, it was inevitable that the process of decay should become more manifest. Chardin, who lived in Persia during the earlier part of Shäh Sulaimän’s reign, was well aware of the change for the worse that had occurred: Les conquêtes d’Abas-le-Grand, un des derniers rois de Perse, sur tous les peuples voisins, sans le secours d’aucunes troupes étrangères, font voir que la Perse est capable de faire de grands progrès par la puissance et par le courage de son peuple; mais la longue paix dont elle jouit depuis la mort de ce grand roi... et le gouvernement san­ guinaire de ses successeurs, ont fort abâtardi ce courage, et presqu’ anéanti cette puissance. Le luxe, la sensualité et l’oisiveté, d’une part; l’étude et les lettres, de l’autre, ont été aussi des moyens pour efféminer les Persans.. ..6

As the reign went on, religious persecution became more and more severe. Unlike Shäh Safi, Shäh Sulaimän took no steps to 1 Muhammad Muhsin stated (ZT, fol. 203 a) that Shäh Sulaiman spent seven years in the harem without once emerging: see also Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. I, pp. 591-2. 2 Voyages, vol. ix, p. 330. 8 Ibid. p. 332. 4 Op. cit. p. 68. It may be of some interest to compare what François de Callières, a near contemporary French diplomat and writer, has to say on the subject. In his book De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains (Brussels, 1716), p. 78, he stressed the importance for an ambassador always to keep a good table, especially if negotiations are in progress, because “.. .c’est le propre de la bonne chère de concilier les esprits, de faire naître de la familiarité et de l’ouverture de coeur entre les convives, et la chaleur du vin fait souvent découvrir des secrets importans”. Truly, in vino veritas ! 6 Voyages, vol. v, pp. 294-5.

31

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

protect the Christians in his realm when they were subjected to ill-treatment, though it does not appear that he himself was a bigot» Writing from Isfahan on i October 1672 a Carmelite stated: Since this king (came to the throne), Persia has been a country where tyranny, opprobrium and persecution are the lot of Christians; would to God this were, to be exact, in odio fidei (in hatred of the Faith); but it is mainly from motives of avarice, and of rage against our uncleanness (as they call it), without alleging or making enquiry into the reasons why we are “ unclean ”.... The chief Armenian archimandrites have been put into dungeons with irons on their legs, and the churches in Julfa have been condemned to pay 400 tomans every year.1

The Carmelite concluded his letter by expressing thankfulness that the Shäh’s ° chief minister, the cruel persecutor of Christians, has been recently disgraced”. The eunuchs of the court, who, as has been seen, had become extremely powerful, were also, in part, responsible for the troubles of the Christians.1 2 However, although avarice may have been the main motive for persecution in a number of cases, it was not the sole one. In May 1678, certain Muhammadan zealots, on the pretext that the Jews and Armenian Christians had, “by the unbounded licence of their tenets”, caused harm to the Muham­ madan faith, obtained from the Shah, when he was under the influence of drink, an order for the execution of several members of each of these religious communities. On the strength of this order, several Jewish rabbis were most cruelly put to death in Isfahan, but the Armenians and some of the other Jews who had also been sentenced to death managed to escape execution by lavish bribes.3 It so happened that events such as this took place at a time when, largely through the power and influence of an erudite, but extremely bigoted mujtahid named Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisî,4 1 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, pp. 406-7. 2 Krusinski, Revolution, p. 24. Compare Paul Lucas’s account of the treatment of Christians at Tabriz, in his Voyages, vol. II, p. 45: “...les Chrétiens ne sortent point quand il pleut, parce que les Persans ne le veulent pas. Ils croyent que si un Chrétien mouillé touchoit un Persan, il le rendroit immonde. ” 8 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, p. 408. 4 Muhammad Bâqir became Shaikh al-Islam during the reign of Shah Sulaiman. More will be said of him and his activities in ch. iv.

32

REASONS FOR DECLINE

a revival of ShVism was in progress in Persia. We have no definite proof, but it seems highly probable that it was this fanatical religious leader who was responsible for this increase in persecution in so far as religious motives and not mere avarice were the cause of it. From the point of view of the well-being of the state and the dynasty, the extension of the campaign to include the Sunnis was a far more serious matter than was the persecution of the other religious minorities in the country or the ill-treatment of the Catholic missionaries. As we have seen in the first chapter of this book, the Sunni elements of the population were for the most part very robust and virile, so that any attempt to interfere with them on religious grounds would be likely to cause serious trouble. As, however, this anti-Sunni campaign did not assume significant proportions until the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain, no more need be said on the subject at this particular juncture. As he grew older, Shäh Sulaimän refused to curtail his drinking bouts or his other forms of self-indulgence, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his physicians, with the inevitable result that his health, which had for long been impaired by his debaucheries, became so undermined that he died, at the comparatively early age of 47, on 29 July 1694.1 No one can have regretted his passing. Knowing what we do of his character and of those of his pre­ decessors and successor, we can aptly apply to him Horace’s lines:

Aetas parentum peior avis tulit Nos nequiores, mox datums Progeniem vitiosiorem.2 As we survey the course of events during the sixty-five years that elapsed between the death of Shäh ‘Abbäs I and that of Shäh Sulaimän in 1694, we can see that the process of decline, which was at first so slow as to be scarcely noticeable, gradually increased its tempo as the years went by, except for a temporary slackening 1 It is remarkable how comparatively young Shäh Safi, Shäh *Abbäs II and Shäh Sulaimän were when they died, the first-named being 31 or 32, the second 33 and the last 47. In all three cases, debauchery was the cause. 1 Odes, in, vi, 46: The age of our sires was worse than that of our grandsires. We, their sons, are more worthless than they. Soon we, in our turn, shall give [the world] a progeny Yet more corrupt.

3

33

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

or stoppage under Shäh ‘Abbas IL In certain features of this process there was, as we have seen, a close parallel with the later Achaemenian empire. Such, however, was the imposing edifice of state which Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great had erected, that, in 1694, it seemed to be still impressive, strong and durable. There were, however, ominous cracks and subsidences developing, and the process of disintegration was to be speeded up during the next reign to such an extent that a conqueror of far less eminence than Alexander the Great was to be needed to give the regime its coup de grace.

34

CHAPTER III

THE ACCESSION AND CHARACTER OF SHAH SULTAN HUSAIN Shah Sulaiman is said to have had seven sons, but whether all of these were living at the time of his death is uncertain.1 There seems but little doubt that Sultan Husain Mïrzâ was the eldest son, and that Abbas Mïrzâ came next in order of seniority. These two princes, who were then aged 262 and 23 respectively, were extraordinarily different in both character and appearance. Sultan Husain Mirza, who was by nature quiet, studious and inclined to austerity, was of a very humane and kindly disposition. He was at that time so pious and unworldly that he was nick-named “Mullä Husain”. It is said that he took no interest in manly sports and that he could not even ride at the time of his accession.3 Having been shut up all his life in the seclusion of the harem, like his predecessors from the time of Shäh ‘Abbäs’s death in 1629, he was naturally quite ignorant of the outside world. He was superstitious, extremely credulous and very easily influenced. Though he had a handsome face and well-formed body, he had the misfortune to have bow legs and splay feet. In short, he had few, if any, of the mental and physical attributes of a sovereign. His younger brother ‘Abbas, on the other hand, although equally ignorant of the world at large, was of a virile and martial 1 See the list of the sons of Shäh Sulaiman in the ZT, fol. 219 b. Père Sanson (Voyage ou Relation de VEtat du Royaume de Perse, p. 128) related a rather improbable story to the effect that one of the Shäh’s sons was put to death for alleged complicity in a plot to seize the throne, while another son, with the connivance of his mother, fled from the palace in order to escape a similar fate and was never seen again. 2 According to Muhammad ‘Ali ibn Muhammad Sädiq, “Mirât al-Safâ”, British Museum MSS. Add. 6539 and 6540, section viii, fol. 166a, Shäh Sulfän Husain was born in 1089 (1678/9), but this date is several years too late. Most of the sources concur in stating that he was aged about 26 when he ascended the throne in 1694. 3 The Italian traveller Giovanni Gemelli-Careri, who was in Içfahân at the time of Shäh Sultan LJusain’s accession, claimed to have seen the young Shäh learning to ride in one of the palace gardens. See his “ Voyage round the world ”, in J. Churchill’s A Collection of Voyages (London, 1704), vol. iv, p. 144.

35

3’2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

nature, and was endowed with much common sense and savoir-

faire. Shäh Sulaiman failed to indicate which of his two elder sons he wished to succeed to the throne. It is possible that, although he hesitated to nominate his first-born because of his mental and physical shortcomings, he was loath to pass him over in favour of his younger brother. The story goes that, as the Shäh lay dying, he addressed those of his ministers who were gathered at his bedside in the following terms: “If you want peace and ease, choose as your sovereign Sultän Husain Mlrzä, but if, on the other hand, you wish the power of the monarchy to increase and the kingdom to expand, select ‘Abbäs Mirzä instead.”1 Soon after uttering these words, Shäh Sulaimän breathed his last. His death was discovered by his aunt, Maryam Begum.2 Sultän Husain Mirzä was her favourite great-nephew, and she was determined that he should succeed to the throne; she accordingly, being of strong character and independent ways, summoned the court eunuchs, informed them of the death of the Shäh, and expressed her wish that they should choose Sultän Husain as their new sovereign.3 These eunuchs, whose chief aim was to retain their power, considered that they would be far more likely to succeed in so doing if they placed the weak and pliable Sultän Husain on the throne rather than if they chose his more vigorous brother. They consequently needed little or no persuasion from Maryam Begum, with the result that Sultän Husain Mirzä was enthroned on the 14th, Dhu’l-Hijja 1105 (6 August 1694)? The ceremony, according to 1 This story is given, with slight variations, in many sources. See, in particular, Muhammad Mahdi ibn Muhammad Ridä, of Isfahan, “Ni§f-i-Jahän fi Ta‘nf-i-I§fahän” (Browne MS. I, 3 (9), fol. 124a); Ridä Quli Khan Hidäyat, Raudat al-Safä-yi-Nä$iri, vol. vin; Hajjï Mirzä Hasan “Fasä’i”, Färs-Nämayi-Nä$irl, p. 155, Malcolm’s History of Persia, vol. 1, p. 594. 2 ZT, fol. 203 b. According to Père Sanson (op. cit. p. 125), Maryam Begum, some time after the death of her husband, the Sadr, had a love affair with Särü Khän, the Qurchi-bäshi. The affair was discovered by Shäh Sulaimän, who had the unfortunate man beheaded. 8 ZT, fol. 203 b. 4 This is the date usually given in Persian sources, and it is confirmed by Gemelli-Careri and by the Dutch traveller C. de Bruyn, Travels into Muscovy, Persia and Parts of the East-Indies, vol. 1, p. 210. On the other hand, the Carmelite Fr Elias of St Albert is quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. I, p. 470, as stating: “Today, 7th August, at the second hour after midnight, his [Shah Sulaiman’s] elder son Sultan Husain, aged 26 years and 7 months, was proclaimed Shah.”

36

SHÄH SÜLTÄN ÇUSAIN

Muhammad Ibrâhîm ibn Zain al-‘Abidin, took place in the Äyina-khäna, a building in the style of the Chihil Sutün on the south bank of the Zäyanda-rüd close to the Sa‘ädatäbäd palace.1 According to Père (afterwards Abbé) Martin Gaudereau, a French missionary who was in Isfahän at that time, the Shah’s coronation was made the occasion for great public rejoicings and displays. The Maidän-i-Shäh or royal square and the extensive bazaars of the city were lavishly illuminated throughout the night, while the lions, leopards, elephants and other beasts of the royal menagerie were paraded in the square, to the accompaniment of the ceaseless beating of drums and the blaring of trumpets. Gaudereau went on to say: “To judge from this display, it seems that they expect much of him.”2 Such expectations were soon, alas! to be disappointed; in fact, a more disastrous choice of sovereign could hardly have been made. It must, however, be regarded as doubtful whether ‘Abbâs Mirza, had he been made Shäh, would have been able to arrest the process of decline and to avert or surmount the many calamities that were in store. Although the possession of even a modicum of tact and common sense by the Shäh and his ministers would have sufficed to avoid some of the blunders that were subsequently made, the concatenation of disasters and misfortunes that ensued might well have proved too much for even the most gifted and capable of sovereigns. The court eunuchs, having secured the succession of the monarch of their choice, intended, as an additional safeguard for their own selfish interests, to induce him to abandon his pious and austere mode of life, and to give himself up instead to drink and voluptuous enjoyment. They knew that several of his predecessors 1 “Dastür-i-Shahriyârân” (BM. MS. Rieu Suppl. 62), fol. 14b. For details of the Äyina-khäna, see Appendix in. 2 Relation de la Mort de Schah Soliman Roy de Perse et du Couronnement de Sultan Ussain son fils, avec plusieurs Particularitez touchant l'état présent des affaires de la Perse (Paris, 1696) (referred to hereafter as Relation I), pp. 35 and 45-7. Gaudereau, who was a good Persian scholar, spent in all eighteen years as a missionary in Turkey, Persia, Arabia and India. He later became Directeur de la Maison des Nouveaux Catholiques in Paris and Interprète du Roy pour les Langues Orientales. In 1698 he was appointed Vicar-General to the Archbishop of Ancyra and wrote the official account of his mission to the Persian Court (reference to this work will be made later). He was also the author of the Relation des Différentes Espèces de Peste que reconnoisent les Orientaux (Paris, 1721). He could speak from personal experience of the plague, because he nearly died from it in 1704.

37

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

had been only too ready, after ascending the throne, to become addicted to such pleasures, and it would suit them to perfection if Shah Sultan Husain could be made to fall a victim to the family failings. They feared that, with a sober king on the throne, they would not have a free hand to pursue their own selfish and ignoble aims. They soon discovered, however, that they were not going to have matters all their own way. Whilst he was still in the harem, Sultän Husain had, like his father, come under the influence of that remarkably strong and vigorous personality, the great ShVî theologian and mujtahid Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisi, whom Shäh Sulaiman had made Shaikh al-Isläm some years before his death.1 It is said that during the coronation ceremony Sultan Husain refused to let the Süfïs gird him with the sword of state in the customary manner, and called upon the Shaikh al-Isläm to do so instead. After the ceremony was over, the Shah asked Muhammad Bâqir what recompense he would like for the performance of this service. Muhammad Bâqir replied that he wished the Shäh to issue royal decrees forbidding the drinking of wine, the practice of faction­ fighting, and the seemingly innocent sport of pigeon-flying. The Shäh willingly agreed, and issued the decrees immediately.12 He was also induced to sign a further decree for the expulsion of all Süfïs from the city, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Shäh, was head of the order of Süfïs and that his 200 life-guards all belonged to it (it does not appear that this decree applied in the case of these men).3 The decree prohibiting the drinking of wine also ordered all wine-shops to be destroyed and all bottles and jars containing wine to be broken. As an example to his subjects, the Shäh gave orders for the 6000 bottles of Shïrâz and Georgian wine that were stored in the royal cellars to be brought out and broken in public.4 On 1 More will be said subsequently of the character and achievements of 2 Gaudereau’s Relation I, pp. 47-9. Muhammad Bâqir. 3 According to Sanson, op. cit. pp. 41-2, the order had by his time acquired a very bad reputation. 4 Gaudereau, op. cit. p. 49; see also J. F. Gemelli-Careri, loc. cit. p. 149. The French botanist J. Pitton de Toumefort, who visited Georgia in the summer of 1701 in company with a French painter named Aubriet and a German doctor called Gundelsheimer, thus described Georgian wine: “The white Wine of Georgia is tolerably good ; that which they send to the Court of Persia is a red Wine that has somewhat of the taste of Côte-rôtie, but it is stronger and more heavy.” See his A Voyage into the Levant (London, 1741), vol. in, p. 151.

38

SHÄH SULTÄN HUSAIN

the following day, two men who were caught drinking wine were very severely beaten in the Maidän-i-Shäh. There was certainly much to be said in favour of the decree directed against faction-fighting. This practice, which is said to have been introduced by Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great on the principle of divide et impera, frequently resulted in broken limbs and heads and even loss of life, although the contestants were armed only with sticks and stones. Father Krusinski stated that in 1714 (by which time the decree had been rescinded) so bad an outbreak of this fighting occurred in the capital that the troops called in to quell the disturbance had to put 300 of the combatants to the sword.1 The decree against pigeon-flying, on the other hand, was nothing more than Puritanical interference.12 The rigid enforcement of the decree prohibiting the drinking of wine aroused widespread resentment and anger, particularly in court circles. One of those who were adversely affected by this decree was Maryam Begum, the Shäh’s great-aunt. The court eunuchs were naturally annoyed at this development, because it would prevent them from putting into execution their plan to make the Shäh take to drink in order to distract his attention from their conduct of affairs. Knowing of Maryam Begum’s liking for wine, and feeling that she was under an obligation to them for putting her favourite on the throne, the eunuchs approached her and had no difficulty in persuading her to enter into a plot for bringing about the withdrawal of the obnoxious decree. It was arranged that she was to feign illness and to inform the Shäh (who was devoted to her) that, in the opinion of her physicians, the only means of saving her life was to allow her to drink a little wine. The story of how this plot succeeded is best told in the words of Father Krusinski: The King, alarmed at the pretended dangerous Condition of his Grandmother [sic], was so sway’d by Pity, that, although it was Midnight, he sent an Express immediately to the Armenians of Zulfa (Julfa) for some Wine. These Wine Merchants thinking it was a Bait laid for them, declared, that as they had not dared to keep any since the 1 Krusinski, p. 68. 2 Gaudereau, in his Relation I (pp. 48-9) referred to the pigeon-flyers as . .les Caftarbaz, c’est-à-dire, certaines Gens qui passent leur vie à faire voler les Pigeons”.

39

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

severe Prohibition laid upon them by the King, they had not a Drop left at his Service. As they knew not where to have any, and as the Persons who had saved any, were far from owning it, for fear that such a Piece of Complaisance, how well taken soever it might be at that Juncture, might hurt them another Day, it was hinted to the King, that perhaps he might find some at the Polish Envoy’s, who was then at Court, and whose Character exempted him from observing the Law. It happened accordingly, and the King pouring it out into a Cup, presented it with his own Hands to his Grandmother. This cunning Lady, who knew her Lesson, refused at first to take the Cup, saying, that she could not resolve with herself to drink Wine if the King himself would not taste it first; and when the Prince excused himself from the Precept of the Alcoran, she very readily told him that the Character with which he was vested, put him above all Manner of Laws; for ’tis a Maxim among the Persians, that Kings are subject to no Law; and that whatever they do, they commit no Sin. She then put him in mind that all his Ancestors and Predecessors had not only drunk Wine, but also permitted the Use of it to all their Courtiers ; and really, continued she, how could they possibly, without such a Support, have born the whole Weight of the Affairs of so vast an Empire ? And how could he bear up under the Fatigues and Disquietudes of Government, if he did not dulcify the Bitterness of it by the Use of that dear generous Liquor ? She added, that for her Part, she was very sensible nothing but Wine could prolong her Days; but that, were it to save her Life, she would never make Use of it, if he himself was not the first to set her an Example. The King could not stand against so pressing a Solicitation, and drank a large Cup of it, which inspired him with a certain Briskness that he had no Notion of before; and he took such a Fancy to it after­ wards, that it was rare to find him sober, and capable of attending to the minutest Affair of Government.1

The successful outcome of this conspiracy was certainly a triumph for the eunuchs, but it was by no means a complete victory for them, since they were not strong enough to oust Muhammad Bäqir and the other Shî‘ï divines from the footing that they had gained at the court. The consequence was that intense rivalry developed between the eunuchs and these divines. Moreover, the nobility resented their exclusion from power and influence, and so added to the discord and strife that prevailed. In addition, the eunuchs themselves were not united (except when 1 Pp. 55-6.

40

SHÄH SULTÄN FUSAIN

their interests as a whole were affected), as there was a bitter feud between the black and white members of their community.1 When all these discordant elements were not quarrelling amongst themselves, they used to discuss “books, poetry and food, and paid no attention to the arrangement of the affairs of the kingdom ”.12 As for the Shäh himself, he not only took to drinking im­ moderately, but he also became very uxorious. He revived the cruel practice of Shäh Sulaimän of having good-looking women and girls in any part of the kingdom seized and sent to his harem, which he maintained on such a scale and with such magnificence that it became before long a serious drain on his exchequer.34 In other respects, however, the Shäh was humane and mild. He was most averse to bloodshed, and always refused to allow evil-doers to suffer capital punishment (for many offences fines were inflicted, a practice which the eunuchs encouraged, because most, if not all, of the money thus obtained found its way into their capacious pockets). The Shäh had an abhorrence of shedding even the blood of animals and birds. He used often, when in the palace garden, to fire a pistol over a pond where a number of ducks were swimming, merely in order to make them take to the air. One day, in so doing, he accidently wounded some of the birds, whereat, as Father Krusinski has related: . .he himself was as much terrified as if he had really committed Murder, and made the same Exclamation as is customary in Persia upon the shedding of human Blood, by saying, Kanluoldumf i.e. I am polluted with Blood; and that very Instant, he caused two hundred Tomans to be given to the Poor, as an Atonement for what he thought a great Sin.”5 Like his father, Shäh Sultän Husain was indifferent to affairs of state, and was content to leave their management to the eunuchs. Whenever a proposal was, purely as a matter of form, submitted to him for 1 Krusinski, pp. 72-3. Interesting details of the eunuchs are given in TAf, p. 56. It is curious to note that the chief of the black eunuchs bore the not very appropriate title of Rïsh-i-Safïd (“White Beard”; this title is not, of course, to be taken in its literal sense, but as meaning “senior” or “chief”). 3 ZT, fol. 203 a. 3 Krusinski, pp. 87-9. See also de la Forest de Bourgon, Relation de Perse, où Von voit l'état de la Religion dans la plus grande Partie de l'Orient (Angers, 1710), P- 34. 4 Qânlu oldum. 8 The History of the Revolution of Persia, p. 77; see also Muhammad Mahdi, “ Ni§f-i-Jahân fi ta'rif-i-Isfahan”, Browne MS. no. G. 1. 3, fol. 124b.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

approval, he would invariably say: “ Yakhshidir” (“It is good”); for this reason, he was nicknamed Yakhshi dir.1 Alexander Hamilton has given the following account of the Shah’s behaviour when news of a serious özbeg attack on Khurasan was brought to him.2 He stated that the Shäh happened at that time to be: at Play with a young Cat, that hunted a Feather that he kept in Motion with a Thread. One of the Pages acquainted him, that a Messenger was come in great Haste from Muschet with Letters to the Vizier, who was at the Chamber Door, to know what his Majesty would please to order in that Juncture. He answered, that as soon as he had done playing with his Cat, he would send for the Vizier, and consult of that Minister ; but he never thought more of it.3

One other illustration may be given here of the Shäh’s character and behaviour. On the night of 12 January 1706 he was dining in sumptuous fashion with his courtiers in the Chihil Sutün at Isfahan. Suddenly one of the lofty wooden columns of the palace caught fire, and the conflagration soon spread to some of the other columns and part of the roof. The Shäh is said to have refused to allow anyone to attempt to put the fire out, saying: “That as it is the Will of the Lord that his Salon should be burnt, he would not oppose it.”4 Notwithstanding this fatalistic attitude on the Shäh’s part, the building, though severely damaged, was not completely destroyed as has sometimes been stated.5 Moreover, he did not scruple to allow the Chihil Sutün to be repaired. 1 Muhammad Khalil Mar‘ashï, Majmcf al-Tawârïkh, p. 48. The same author (p. 31) described the Shäh as “simple in disposition, fond of quiet and without knowledge of, and share in, the management of affairs of state and kingship”. 2 Hamilton has given no date, but this anecdote may refer to the incursion made by Shir Ghazi Khän of Urganj in 1129 (1716-17). 8 A New Account of the East Indies, pp. 104-5. 4 Krusinski, pp. 91-2. 6 See, for example, the account given by the Dominican Fr Peter Martyr which is quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, p. 473. For estimates of the actual extent of the damage done on this occasion, see (i) Professor Upham Pope’s “Islamic Architecture; Safavid Period”, in A Survey of Persian Art, vol. 11, p. 1193, and (ii) M. André Godard’s article entitled “Isfahan” in the Athar-é Iran (1937), vol. 11, fasc. 1, p. 120. M. Godard stated therein: “J’ai.. .trouvé moi-même, au cours de réparations exécutées dans la partie supérieure du monument, des poutres calcinées qui confirment le récit du Père Krusinski mais prouvent aussi que, jusqu’à sa partie supérieure, le monument actuel est encore celui de Shah Abbas I. Il fut seulement réparé à la suite du sinistre.”

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SHÄH SULTÄN HUSAIN

More examples of the ineptitude of Shäh Sultan Husain and his ministers and courtiers will be given subsequently, but enough has already been said to show that he and they were alike unfitted to administer a great kingdom even in time of peace; when it came to rebellion and war, the rottenness of the whole structure of the state manifested itself by utter and complete collapse. No one could say that Shäh Sultan Husain began his reign under favourable auspices.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN PERSIA FROM 1694 TO 1709 Although, superficially, all seemed quiet in Persia when Shah Sultan Husain began his reign, the forces of revolt were gathering strength and the internal condition of the country continued to deteriorate in the years that followed. The new Shäh was, as we have seen, mild and humane, but he was as little interested in governmental affairs as his father had been, and he was soon to show that he was even more prone to come under the influence of stronger characters. At the court itself, all was in confusion owing to the intrigues and quarrels of the eunuchs. Their principal rivals for control over the weak monarch were the mujtahids or chief exponents of the religious law, of whom the most important and influential was Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisî. The army, except in some of the frontier areas, continued to be neglected, and it was soon reduced to such a state that it could not be relied upon to meet any serious challenge to the Shah’s authority. The government exercised little or no control over the remoter provinces, where the governors and lesser functionaries had as their main object the desire not only to recoup themselves as quickly as possible for the bribes which they had been obliged to give in order to obtain their posts, but also to amass a fortune before they were, in their turn, displaced by others with more influence or money. A symptom of the gradual weakening of the royal authority was the increasing insecurity on the roads or rather caravan routes (for there were no roads in the modern sense). Whereas the French traveller André Daulier-Deslandes (who was in Persia during the last two years of the reign of Shäh ‘Abbas II) remarked upon their wonderful security,1 later European visitors had a different tale to tell. There were, it is true, the räh-därs (toll-gatherers and road guards), but they were often insolent, and if it so happened that they were in greater strength than a body of travellers, they would 1 Les Beautez de la Perse (Paris, 1673), p. 8.

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INTERNAL SITUATION, 1694-1709

frequently rob and ill-treat the very people whom they were supposed to protect. Paul Lucas, who was in Persia in 1700 and 1701, complained of their cruelty, and said: “Il y faut toujours avoir les injures à la bouche et les armes à la main, si on ne veut point recevoir d’affront.”1 The same traveller related that the Shäh maintained bodies of troops whose duty it was to pursue robbers and kill them. After they had killed a number, they would take the heads to the Shäh in order to claim a reward. They also obtained money under false pretences by digging up recently-buried corpses, whose heads they cut off and brought to the Shäh, claiming that they were the heads of robbers. The fraud was dis­ covered when one of the heads thus brought to the court was found to be that of a negro who had been in the service of a Frenchman named Jourde, who was the Shäh’s jeweller. The man responsible for the deception received the bastinado.1 2 The measures taken to keep the robbers in check were, however, quite inadequate. Shäh Sultän Husain had been on the throne only a few months when trouble broke out in Georgia. In 1688 Shäh Sulaimän had deposed Giorgi XI (or Shäh Naväz Khän III,3 to give him his Muhammadan title), the King of Kartli and Väli or Viceroy of Georgia. The Shäh reinstated him in 1691, but Giorgi lost his throne again four years later, owing to an intrigue. Soon, however, Shäh Sultän Husain relented, summoned Giorgi to court and partially restored him to favour, but not to his kingdom.4* Giorgi, who belonged to the Mukhranian branch of the royal line of the Bagratids, was at that time (1697) in the prime of life. He was ambitious, brave and a good fighter, but, as a commander, he sometimes failed owing to his impetuosity. A French eighteenth­ century writer said of him:6 “Il montra combien le courage est dangereux quand il n’est pas accompagné de la prudence.” As an administrator, he was harsh and sometimes brutal in his methods. To achieve his ends, he favoured violent means rather than 1 Voyage de Sieur Paul Lucas au Levant, vol. 11, p. 45. 2 Ibid, p. in. 8 Persian historians invariably call him Gurgln Khän. 4 Letter from Père Ricard, S.J., dated 7 August 1697, in Nouveaux Mémoires des Missions, vol. ni, p. 262. Père Ricard cured Giorgi of an illness and became friendly with him. 6 C. C. de Peyssonnel, Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Géorgie (Paris, 1754), p. 53.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

diplomacy or finesse. Compared, however, to the mass of in­ competent nonentities at the Persian court, Giorgi seemed the very man to quell disturbances should any arise. It was not long before his services were required. In the winter of 1698-9, a strong force of Baluchi tribesmen under Mir Khusrau Shäh entered the province of Kirmän and ravaged it far and wide. Some of the tribesmen pressed on nearly as far as Yazd, while others turned south-west and threatened Bandar ‘Abbas. Faced with this situation, the Shäh asked Giorgi to march against the marauders, but he, wishing to return to his native Kartli, refused. Once more, while at a banquet, the Shäh pressed him to go to Kirmän. Eventually, when both the monarch and he were quite drunk, Giorgi gave way.1 Having given his consent, Giorgi was made Governor-General of Kirmän and began preparations for the campaign. In November 1699 he sent his brother Levan (or Leon) in advance with a force of Georgians. Levan and his men reached Kirmän in twenty days and were well received by the inhabitants. Soon afterwards came the first clash with the Baluchis who, though numerically much stronger, were defeated.1 2 Giorgi himself, with an additional body of Georgian troops, arrived in May 1700, and marched against the Baluchis. During a severe engagement Giorgi and his men routed the enemy and inflicted heavy losses upon them. Having achieved this success, Giorgi sent Levan back to Isfahän with the heads of the slain Baluchis as trophies.3 Shäh Sultän Husain richly rewarded Levan for the part that he had played, and subsequently appointed him Divän-begi of Isfahän.4 As there was 1 Tsarevich Wakhusht, “Histoire de Kartli”, in Brossefs Histoire de la Géorgie, vol. 11, part 1, p. 98, and Sekhnia Chkheidze, “Chronique”, in Brosset’s H. de la G. vol. n, part n, p. 16. This manner of transacting affairs reminds one of the curious custom of the ancient Persians who, as Herodotus has related {History, 1, 133), were wont to deliberate on even the gravest matters first when they were drunk and then when they were sober or vice versa, before they took a decision. 2 The Georgian chronicler Sekhnia Chkheidze accompanied Levan on this expedition. He claimed to have killed three of the enemy with his lance in this engagement. See his “Chronique”, in H. de la G. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 16-20. 8 This was the customary procedure at that time. 4 Levan had several sons of whom Wakhtang and Kai Khusrau held high office under Shäh Sultän IJusain, as will be seen later. Levan himself, after becoming a Roman Catholic, died in Isfahän in 1709. He was a person of only mediocre abilities.

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still some danger to be feared from the Baluchis, despite their defeats, Giorgi stayed at his post in Kirmän. There he remained until the early summer of 1704, when, on the Baluchis making a serious attack on Qandahâr, he was sent thither with his troops to expel them. Whilst the Baluchis were raiding the provinces of Kirmän and Yazd, a revolt broke out in Kurdistan, owing to the tyrannous behaviour of Hasan ‘All Khan, the Governor-General of Ardalân. Besides being a fanatical Shi‘i, he often extorted money from those who were unfortunate enough to be under his jurisdiction. 1 Although the forceful Giorgi and his troops were not available to deal with this outbreak, being fully employed elsewhere, the Shah’s forces managed to quell it without difficulty. Père Gaudereau, who was in Isfahän when the news was received of this success, said that there were great public rejoicings. When the soldiers returned from Kurdistan, they carried through the streets, with loud shouts, between 500 and 600 heads fixed on poles.2 By the end of the seventeenth century Shäh Sultän Husain had been on the throne for nearly six years. During that time, he had, as we have seen, given up his former abstinent ways and become a libertine. Although he was not of a violent nature like his father, he would drink to excess for several days at a time, paying no attention to the administration of his kingdom. Even when he was sober, he showed little or no inclination to attend to important matters.3 As we have already pointed out, it was an easy matter for the eunuchs and mujtahids at the court to obtain an ascendancy over such a monarch. The result was that the ministers and grandees had every opportunity to enrich themselves and their friends and relations. In the provinces, the governors followed their pernicious example, extorting money by force from those unfortunate enough to be under their authority. The Shäh took an inordinate pride in his harem, and spared no expense to enlarge and embellish it. His eunuchs would roam 1 He was Governor-General of Ardalân from 1703/4 to 1706/7. See B. Nikitine, “ Les Valis d’Ardelan”, in the Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. xux (1922), p. 85. See also p. 72 below. 8 Gaudereau ; Relation d'une Mission faite nouvellement par M. VArchevesque d'Ancyre à Ispahan en Perse pour la Réunion des Arméniens à V Eglise catholique, Paris, 1702 (hereafter referred to as Relation II), p. 38. 8 De Bruyn, Travels, vol. I, pp. 203 and 211.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

the streets of Julfa and, whenever they saw a good-looking woman or girl, they would abduct her for the Shäh. On one occasion the Shäh seized a good-looking nun whom he shut up in his harem. At the end of fifteen days, however, his grandmother induced him to release her, saying that a curse would fall upon him if he did the least harm to a woman who had dedicated herself to God by a special vow.1 When the Dutch artist Cornelius de Bruyn reached Isfahän at the end of 1703, he soon became acquainted with the state of affairs there. He said of the Shäh: This Prince is so given to women that he knows no bounds of his lewd practices, and is quite careless of the welfare of the state, and his evil example is the cause that justice is ill administered in his great Empire, where licence reigns, and vice is unpunished. And hence it is that the high roads, which were once so well secured, are now so full of robbers.2 After describing how the eunuchs and mulläs had established an ascendancy over the Shäh and giving some examples of his weakness, he said that the monarch: “...so exposes himself to the contempt of all his subjects that they publicly say, They have nothing of a King but the name”.3 Besides lavishing large sums on his harem, the Shäh also spent a great deal of money on building. About the beginning of the eighteenth century, work was started on the construction of the huge palace and garden of Farahäbäd, just to the south-west of Julfa, which, when it was finished, may be described as a Persian Versailles.4 He was responsible for the erection of a number of mosques and for the repair and restoration of many others. The most beautiful building dating from his reign, which was erected by his pious mother, was the Madrasa-yiMädar-i-Shah in the Chahär-Bägh which happily still stands.5 1 Gaudereau, Relation II, p. 96. It is far more likely that it was the Shah’s great-aunt Maryam Begum and not his grandmother who was responsible for the release of this nun. Krusinski is consistently wrong in referring to Maryam Begum as the Shah’s grandmother. 8 Travels, vol. 1, p. 211. 8 Ibid, p. 212. 4 The outside walls, evidently still unfinished, of the Farahäbäd garden can be seen on the extreme left of de Bruyn’s fine panorama of Isfahän which forms plate 74 in the first volume of his Travels. On p. 194 of that volume he referred to it as "the new royal garden, which I saw begun; it is of great extent”. 5 A description of the Madrasa and other buildings in Isfahan will be found in Appendix in.

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On 28 August 1706 the Shäh, with his harem, the chief nobles and courtiers and an escort of no less than 60,000 men, left Isfahan to visit the shrine of Fatima al-Ma‘süma and the mausoleum of the Safavï kings at Qum. So numerous were the Shah’s retinue and escort that, when they halted, their pavilions and tents covered over two leagues of the countryside.1 Having accomplished his object at Qum, the Shäh, attended by the same huge numbers, went on the pilgrimage to Mashhad, a distance of some 600 miles. The cost of this pilgrimage was so prodigious that, in the words of Krusihski, it “...not only compleatly drein’d his Exchequer, but also ruin’d all the Provinces through which he pass’d... .Half the Sum that his Journey cost him would have defray’d the Charge of all the Expeditions against the Rebels of Candahar.”12 The Shäh and his court remained for nearly a year in Mashhad. Whilst he was there, news reached him in June 1707 that the inhabitants of Isfahän, being ex­ asperated by a severe famine,3 had risen in revolt. Large numbers gathered in the Maidän-i-Shäh, threw stones at the doors of the ‘All Qäpü, and demanded the release of ‘Abbàs Mïrzâ, the Shäh’s brother, with the intention of placing him on the throne.4 As the local forces could not restore order, Shäh Sultän Husain sent the Georgian prince Kai Khusrau, a son of Levan and nephew of Giorgi XI, from Mashhad to the capital to deal with the situation. Kai Khusrau, who was, like most Georgians, a brave and capable military leader, speedily put down the revolt. This attempt to replace Shäh Sultän Husain by his brother was the first of several that were made during the reign; it is very much to the credit of the Shäh that he would never allow ‘Abbäs Mïrzâ to be blinded in order to render him incapable of reigning.5 The Shäh and his enormous retinue returned to Isfahän early 1 Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, p. 472, quoting from a letter from the Dominican Fr Peter Martyr, from Julfa, dated 30 October 1706. 2 Krusinski, p. 92. 3 It is possible that this was an artificial famine. Krusinski, p. 95, stated that the big landowners would often prevent others from transporting corn to Isfahan in order to create a scarcity there and thus enable them to get a higher price for their own com. 4 Sekhnia Chkheidze, “Chronique”, H. de la G. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 26-7. 5 According to Krusinski, p. 49, the two brothers, while their father was still alive and the question of the succession was undecided, vowed that whichever of them became Shäh would not allow the other to be blinded. 4

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LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

in 1708, to find that all was quiet there. It was, no doubt, in appreciation of the services of Kai Khusrau in quelling the revolt in the previous year that the Shäh made him Därügha or Governor of the capital. Meanwhile, trouble had arisen in the north-west, where the ever-turbulent Lezgïs had carried out an extensive raid in Georgia in 1706. One of the reasons for their unrest was that the subsidy which the Persian government had for long been paying them on condition that they kept the peace had not been reaching them regularly, owing to the dishonesty of the officials through whose hands it had to pass. Furthermore, early in 1709, a serious revolt occurred in Shïrvân, at the head of which was one of the Persian commanders, a man named Lutf ‘All Khan.1 Elsewhere in the country, all seemed quiet, but it was merely the calm before the storm. 1 Letter from Israel Ori, from Shamâkhï to Prince Petr Matveivich Gagarin, dated 20 September/1 October 1709, quoted by G. A. Ezov, in his Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armiyanskim Narodom, pp. 248-9.

50

CHAPTER V

PERSIA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF HUSAIN’S REIGN When Shäh Sultan Husain ascended the throne in 1694, Persia was at peace with all her neighbours. It was only in the Persian Gulf and its approaches that conditions were at all troubled ; in those waters the piratical activities of the Muscat Arabs had for a number of years been a frequent cause of annoyance and loss to Persia.1 To judge from the number of foreign envoys who were to be seen at the Persian court, the European and other countries which they represented must have regarded Persia as being still an important power. When, at the end of April 1699, the Archbishop of Ancyra arrived in Isfahän on a mission from the Pope, the Emperor, the Republic of Venice and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, he and his suite were much struck with this fact. Père Gaudereau (of whom mention has already been made), who had been appointed Vicar-General to the Archbishop whilst the latter was in Persia, stated in this connection:

On peut dire qu’il n’y a point de Cour qui envoie moins et reçoive plus d’Ambassadeurs. On y en a vû depuis en même temps non seulement de Constantinople, de Moscovie, du Mogol et des autres Peuples voisins, tels que les Arabes, les Tartares, les Calmouques et Yusbecs, mais encore de Siam et d’Ethiopie.1 2 In addition to the envoys mentioned by Gaudereau, ambassadors from both Sweden and Poland had recently been at the Persian court. The Swedish envoy Ludvig Fabritius,3 who was in Isfahän 1 More will be said later in this chapter of the activities of the Muscat Arabs. 8 Relation II, pp. 2-3. 3 The main source of information regarding Fabritius’s career is Johan Kempe’s Kongl. Swenska Envoijen Ludwich Fabritii Lefwerne, but this is not, apparently, available outside Sweden. A short notice of him is given in the Biographiskt Lexicon ofver Namnunnige Svenska Man (Uppsala, 1837), vol. iv; Professor S. Konovalov gives some interesting details of his adventures in his ; article entitled “ Ludvig Fabritius’s Account of the Razin Rebellion”, in the r Oxford Slavonic Papers, vol. vi (1955), pp. 72-101.

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4-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

in 1697/8, had already been on missions to Persia in 1679 and 1682. The knowledge of the country that he had acquired in the course of his various journeys was later of value to the celebrated French geographer and cartographer Guillaume Delisle.1 The envoy from Poland, who was a Catholic Armenian from Shamâkhï named Zurabek, had been in Isfahân in the autumn of 1698, in company with Père Jean-Baptiste de la Maze, the Superior of the Jesuit Mission at Shamakhi12 It must be pointed out that all those who arrived in Persia bearing letters from European sovereigns were not diplomats; such letters were usually given to missionaries and also, in certain cases, to lay travellers in order to afford them protection on their journeys. Missionaries travelling in this way always wore secular garb.3 Whether they were diplomats or not, the bearers of these letters, on crossing the Persian frontier, were given a daily allowance from the Shäh,4 and, in certain cases, received other privileges as well. I. TURKEY

Although it had appeared at the outset of Shäh Sultän Husain’s reign that the long peace with Turkey was likely to continue undisturbed, an incident occurred shortly afterwards which slightly strained Turco-Persian relations for a time. This incident was the Persian occupation of the city and part of the vilayet of Basra. It was by a strange irony of fate that the forces of that most unwarlike of monarchs, Shäh Sultän Husain, were able to occupy Basra, a prize that in later years was to elude the grasp of Nädir Shäh and his well-trained army. In the last decade of the seventeenth century, the hold of the 1 Fabritius’s first visit to Persia was in 1671, when he escaped there after having been held captive by Stenka Râzin. See Professor Konovalov, op. cit. P- 732 For details of this mission, see Père de la Maze’s “Journal” in Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, vol. iv, pp. 53-112. 3 Baudelot de Dairval, Voyage du Sieur Paul Lucas au Levant, vol. n, p. 103. 4 In practice, owing to the dishonesty of some governors and officials, travellers did not always receive their allowances in full and sometimes failed to get any payment at all. For example, the Archbishop of Ancyra, although such an important personage, was able to obtain only a part of what he should have been given. See Gaudereau, Relation II, p. 152.

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Turks over the Basra vilayet, which was one of their remoter provinces, had been weakened by a number of factors. In the first place, there were their heavy commitments in their European wars; secondly, a series of local revolts occurred in southern Mesopotamia in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and, lastly, there was an exceptionally severe outbreak of plague in Basra in 1690 which decimated the Turkish garrison and officials, besides carrying off many thousands of the inhabitants.1 Taking advantage of this situation, Shaikh Män? ibn Mughamis, the chief of the powerful Muntafiq tribe (whose members had suffered less from the ravages of the disease than the Turks and the people of Basra) seized the city in 1694. A temporary Turkish reoccupation followed, but in the spring of 1695 Shaikh Man? once more seized the city which he held for eighteen months. He would probably have held it for much longer had he not interfered with the affairs of the very influential Musha‘sha‘ family of Hawiza,1 2 in the Persian province of ‘Arabistan. His interference took the form of taking sides with Sayyid ‘All, a prominent member of the family, in a quarrel between him and his brother Sayyid Farajullah, the then Vail of the province.3 In consequence of Shaikh Mani°s interference, Sayyid Fara­ jullah asked for and obtained permission from Hasan Pasha, the Governor of Baghdäd, to expel the Shaikh from Basra; the Sayyid likewise obtained a farmän from Shäh Sultän Husain to take this action. Having raised a powerful force, Sayyid Farajullah set out from Hawiza in March 1697, easily defeated Shaikh Man? and his tribesmen and drove him not only out of Basra, but also out of Qurna.4* Having successfully accomplished his task, Sayyid Farajullah dispatched the keys of the city to his sovereign, who sent them on, with magnificent presents, to the Sultan of Turkey.6 1 The death-roll in the city was 500 a day; see Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, p. 119. According to Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, vol. 1, p. 83, 80,000 persons died in Basra from the plague (he is in error, however, in stating that the outbreak occurred in 1691). 2 See p. 5 above. 3 Sayyid Ahmad Kasravï, Tâ'rïkh-i-Pan-sad Sâla-yi-Khüzistân, p. 95. 4 Ahmad Kasravi, op. cit. p. 95. See also A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 11, pp. 1170-1. 8 Longrigg, op. cit. p. 121; see also the letter from the Sultan of Turkey to : Shäh Sultän Husain regarding affairs in Baçra in 1109 (1697/8) in the BM. 1 Turkish MS. Àdd. 7857, fol* 99^.

53

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

Notwithstanding this recognition of Turkish sovereignty, the Persians remained in control of Basra, presumably because the Turks could not muster enough men to take the city and district over from them. Later in 1697 the Persian government recalled Sayyid Farajullah to Isfahân, and replaced him by ‘Ali Mardän Khän. The latter was, apparently, the Faili Lur chieftain who afterwards became Väli of Luristän and was wounded at the battle of Gulnäbäd in 1722. ‘Ali Mardän Khän proved to be a capable and just ruler, but he was also recalled to Isfahän, being succeeded by a certain Ibrähim Khän, who also ruled Basra well.1 In January 1700, Shaikh Mäni‘ attempted to recapture the town, and very nearly succeeded in so doing. Ibrähim Khän, however, at length gained the upper hand and drove him and his Arabs off. In the following September the Persian government was unwise enough to remove Ibrähim Khän from his post and to replace him by an incapable craven named Dä’üd Khän. Meanwhile, the Turks had been watching developments in Basra; as they had by now recovered their strength, they were determined to re-establish their authority there. When, in March 1701, a strong Turkish force reached the outskirts of the town, Dä’üd Khän, the Persian Governor, attempted to fly, but died, it is said, of sheer fright. The Turks thereupon entered Basra without meeting with any resistance from the Persians.1 2 The Persian occupation of Basra thus ended without any armed clash with Turkey, and the incident hardly disturbed the relations between that country and Persia. For a good many years to come, Turkey was to be too much concerned with her enemy Austria to be able, had she been willing, to pay any serious attention to Persia, and no further incidents occurred that were of a nature to threaten the long peace. It was not, in fact, until after the con­ clusion of the treaty of Passarovitz with Austria and Venice in 1718 that Turkey was sufficiently freed from her commitments in Europe to be in a position to interfere in Persia. 1 According to Hamilton, op, cit. vol. 1, pp. 82-3, trade flourished in Basra during the Persian occupation. 2 A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 11, p. 1171.

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RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING POWERS

2. RUSSIA

Until well into the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725), Russia had seemed to the rulers of Persia a relatively remote and not very important nation. There had been interchanges of diplomatic missions from time to time, some trade on a small scale, and now and again a minor act of a hostile nature by Russia, but it never occurred to the Persians of those days that she was, or was likely to become, more than a second-rate power. It must have appeared to them that the Caspian Sea and the vast territories, partly mountainous and partly steppe, that lay between Persia and Russia, constituted such a barrier as to preclude any close contact, friendly or otherwise. Nevertheless, the southward and south­ eastward expansion of Russia from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards progressively narrowed the gap between the two countries. Shäh Tahmâsp I (1524-76) was a contemporary of Ivan the Terrible of Russia,1 but there do not appear to have been any direct relations between the two rulers; on the other hand, there were certain developments during this period which were destined to influence subsequent events. The first of these developments was the Russian annexation of Astrakhan in 1556, an event which probably passed unnoticed in Persia at the time. The possession of this important town not only gave Russia control over the lower reaches of the Volga, but also provided her with a port for the Caspian trade. The possession of Astrakhan was, moreover, destined to pave the way for Russian aggression against Persia over a century and a half later. Another development that was to have important consequences for Russia in later times was the southward flight of Cossacks from the Ryazan and other central provinces of Muscovy because they had incurred the wrath of the Tsar. These Cossacks, who by degrees penetrated as far south as the valley of the Terek, were given the name of Grebentsi because they had established them­ selves on a ridge2 to the south of the river Terek at the time when they sent a deputation to Ivan the Terrible to ask for pardon. 1 Ivan the Terrible became Duke of Muscovy in 1533; in 1547 he proclaimed himself Tsar of Russia and ruled as such until his death in 1584. a Greben is the Russian for “ridge”.

55

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

A third occurrence of some interest during the reign of Ivan the Terrible was the migration of Russian merchants to Shamakhi, the capital of the Persian province of Shirvan.1 It would be going too far to suggest that any of these develop­ ments formed part of a preconceived policy of Russian penetration into Persia.12 There is no evidence to show that Ivan the Terrible harboured any idea of using Astrakhan as a base for military opera­ tions against Persia. As for the Grebentsi Cossacks, their action was nothing more than a spontaneous move ; in any case, the valley of the Terek lay some distance to the north of the Persian frontier. The Russian merchants who settled in Shamakhi may have been inspired by the activities of Anthony Jenkinson and other mem­ bers of the Russia Company in opening up a trade route between England and Persia through Russia, but this is mere conjecture. A presage of things to come was the appeal, in 1586, by the Christian ruler Alexander II of the Georgian kingdom of Kakheti for help against the Shamkhâl of the Qumuq. As Alexander could expect no help from the weak and purblind Shäh Muhammad Khudäbanda, it was natural that he should turn to his co­ religionists in the north for military assistance against a Muslim foe. The Russians responded by sending, somewhat tardily, a force under the Boyar Andrei Khvorostin to his relief. Khvorostin succeeded in taking Tarkhu, the Shamkhäl’s capital, but the Qumüqs then counter-attacked and annihilated the Russians. Russian attempts to avenge this defeat were made in 1599 and 1604, but both were unsuccessful.3 In the meanwhile, the situation in Persia had undergone a change for the better with the abdication of Khudäbanda and the accession of his son ‘Abbäs. Shäh ‘Abbäs effectively cowed the Georgians for a time by the manner in which he quelled a revolt 1 Dorn, “Geschichte Schirwans unter den Statthaltern und Chanen von 1538-1820”, Mémoires de PAcadémie Impériale des Sciences (St Petersburg, 1841), p. 406. 2 This remark applies with equal force to the raids which from early times the Russians had carried out on the Caspian provinces of Persia. See Dorn’s “Caspia, ueber die Einfälle der alten Russen in Tabaristan”, op. cit. (St Petersburg, 1875), 7th series, vol. xxm. 3 Although the Russian forces under Buturlin and Pleshchev captured Tarkhü in 1604 and made the Shamkhâl Andi take refuge in the mountains of Däghistän, the warlike Qumüqs rallied and once again routed the Russians, who were, as before, annihilated.

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RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING POWERS

in Kakheti in 1615. His conduct on that occasion was so ferocious that he is, even to this day, referred to there as “the accursed”. Pietro della Valle, who was in Persia at that time, prophesied that the extraordinary measures to which Shäh ‘Abbas resorted for the conservation of his empire would one day bring about the ruin of his house.1 Although the eventual fall of the Safavî empire was due in the main to other causes, Shäh ‘Abbäs’s conduct in Georgia undoubtedly had some influence on the course of events there and in Persia a century later. On the other hand, there were no immediate repercussions in Russia, because that country was then going through its “Time of Troubles”. However, after Mikhail Feodorovich, the first of the Romanov dynasty, had consolidated his position (he reigned from 1613 to 1645), there was some interchange of envoys between Russia and Georgia, and in 1639 King T’eimuraz of Kakheti even took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar. This renewal of contact between the two countries led to the migration to Russia in 1649 of a number of Georgians who established a colony just to the north of Moscow.1 2 This develop­ ment was to have important consequences half a century later. In 1664 a Russian mission consisting of two ambassadors and no less than 800 followers reached Isfahän bearing letters and presents from the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich for Shäh ‘Abbäs II. Although the Russian envoys’ credentials were genuine, the Persians soon discovered that their real object in coming to their country was to use their diplomatic status to enable them to escape paying duty on the large quantity of goods that they had brought with them for 1 Viaggi (Brighton, 1843), vol. 11, p. 148. A most serious blot on Shäh ‘Abbas’s character was his inhuman treatment of Queen Ketevan, the mother of King T’eimuraz of Kakheti. At his orders, the unfortunate queen was tortured and then put to death in 1624. Her tragic story inspired a German dramatist, Andreas Gryphius, to write a tragedy entitled Catharina von Georgien in 1658. The account by the Augustinians in Persia of the queen’s martyrdom is quoted by D. M. Lang in his Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints (London, 1956), pp. 171-2. 2 N. Berdzenishvili, I. Javakhishvili and S. Janasha, Istoriya Gruzii (Tiflis, 1946), vol. i, p. 397 (I have to thank D. M. Lang for this reference). This colony was still in existence when John Bell of Antermony, the Scottish surgeon who accompanied the Russian ambassador Volynsky to Persia, travelled across Russia in 1715 on his way to Isfahan. See pp. 9-10 of his “Journey from St Petersburg in Russia to Ispahan in Persia with an Embassy from his Imperial Majesty Peter the First to the Sophy of Persia, Shach Hussein”, in vol. 1 of his Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to Diverse Parts of Asia (London, 1764).

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

sale. This discovery caused much annoyance at the Persian court, which was also prejudiced against the Russians because of the mean and sordid manner in which they lived. As Chardin said: “C’est pourquoi les Perse tiennent aujourd’huy cette nation des Moscovites pour la plus basse et la plus infâme qui soit entre les chrétiens.”1 Shah ‘Abbâs gave vent to his displeasure by subjecting the Russian ambassadors to some ill-treatment, in the course of which one of them died; he then gave the surviving envoy and his multitude of followers their congé. When the Tsar heard of the treatment accorded to this mission he was greatly angered, but, as he did not want to go so far as to declare war on Persia, he took his revenge in a less direct manner. At his instigation, the notorious robber chief Stenka (Stephan) Razin, who had for long terrorised merchants and travellers on the Volga, with 500 Cossacks of the Don made extensive raids on Mäzandarän and established himself and his men for some time on the Ashurada peninsula, in the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea.1 2 The episode of the mission and the depredations of Stenka Razin and his Cossacks combined to make the Persians fear and detest the Russians, but the Russian merchants in Shamäkhl were, nevertheless, allowed to continue their trading activities. Their trade became, indeed, so important that a Russian consul was appointed to Shamakhi late in the seven­ teenth century in order to look after their interests. They were mainly concerned with the silk trade, but they also sent to Russia cloths of various kinds, rice, pepper3 and naphtha;4 some of these goods were sent on to Siberia.5 In 1696 two Russian merchants named Semeon Malinky and Andrei Semenov travelled to Isfahan and thence to Bandar ‘Abbas, where they took ship to India.6 1 “ Le Couronnement de Soleïmaan” (in vol. x, p. 113, of Chardin’s Voyages). 2 This was not the first appearance of Stenka Râzin and his Cossacks on Persian soil. As far back as 1636 they had landed at Enzeli and sacked Resht. It must have been a matter of satisfaction to those Persians who were in Moscow in 1671 when they were invited to attend the brigand’s execution. 3 The pepper was doubtless obtained from the Dutch East India Company either direct or through Armenian merchants. 4 The naphtha came from Baku. 6 G. F. Müller, Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. in, p. 489. 6 This was not the first occasion on which a Russian merchant had travelled to India and back through Persia, as Athanase Nikitine had performed this journey in 1466-72; see V. V. Barthold, La Découverte de l'Asie, p. 202.

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The bulk of the trade between Russia and Persia was, however, in the hands of the Armenians; besides handling all the goods mentioned above, they exported many diamonds and other precious stones, as well as pearls, to Russia.1 It was that dynamic personality Peter the Great who first evolved a definite policy for his country in regard to Persia and the Caspian Sea. Unlike the mass of his subjects, he had a great love of, and aptitude for, the sea. As is well-known, he worked for a time as a shipwright in Holland and England and so acquired a sound knowledge of shipbuilding, while his association with English and Dutch seamen and merchants opened his eyes to the great importance of sea power and of the desirability of improving his country’s overseas trade. Although Peter was so greatly concerned with the Baltic and Black Seas for most of his reign, he by no means neglected the Caspian,2 which he wished to link with them and with central Russia by means of the Russian river system and a series of canals. To him the Caspian Sea was of great importance because it could provide him with a means of communication not only with Persia and the Persian Gulf, but also with Trans-Caspia and Central Asia, and also, possibly, with India. His aims were at first purely commercial, as he wished to divert through his own country the rich transit trade in silk and other commodities between Persia and the West through Aleppo and Smyrna. He was also anxious to obtain cotton from Türkistan for his newly founded industries. The idea of establishing a trading corridor through Central Asia to India was not a new one. The possibility of finding such a route had been explored in 1670-2 when the mission of the two Pazukhin brothers was at Khwärazm and Bukhärä. They had sent their 1 Interesting details of this trade, together with the times taken in transit, the duties payable at Astrakhan, etc., are given in a memorandum in the archives of the French Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, AEP, vol. v, fols. 184^-191 a. The name of the author is not given, but it was probably Jean Billon de Cansevilles, a merchant of Marseilles who was in Persia from 1698 to 1704 and again in 1707. 2 S. Platonov, in his Histoire de la Russie des Origines à 1918 (Paris, 1929), p. 230, has drawn attention to the fact that all Peter’s wars were waged for the purpose of gaining and maintaining access to the coasts of the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, as he was far-sighted enough to realise the importance of the open sea in regard to international intercourse and the progress of civilisation. Peter, it has been said, wished to disprove the Russian saying: “ Where there is much water, there you may expect disaster. ”

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interpreter Medvediev from Bukhärä to India through Balkh, Hinjan and Kabul, who returned in due course by the same route and reported favourably on it.1 Peter had obtained his information on Persia from a number of sources. His lifelong friend Prince Alexander Archilovich (who was a grandson of Wakhtang V of Kartli) and other members of the Georgian colony near Moscow made him conversant with the affairs of their country,2 while the Consul at Shamakhi and the Russian merchants there, as well as Englishmen in the employ of the Russia Company, gave him information on commercial matters. An excellent trait in Peter’s character was his wish to champion the cause of the Christian minorities in Persia,3 of whose trials and tribulations he had doubtless heard much from Alexander Archilovich and other Georgians, as well as from Armenians; it is probable that this desire did not take definite shape until early in the eighteenth century. When Peter returned from England to Russia in 1698, he took with him Captain John Perry, an ex-Naval officer and hydraulic engineer, whom he employed for some years on the construction of the Volga-Don canal4 and also as an adviser on, and superviser of, shipbuilding. In the account of his experiences in Russia, Perry stated: “The Czar.. .has Intentions to send Ships to search out the Easternmost Ports of the Caspian Sea and establish there some Port to encourage a Trade with Great Tartary.”5 Perry said that many large rivers were believed to flow into the Caspian Sea, but he added that “the Russes, who have hitherto been very dull Mariners”, had taken no proper note of them. It was in order to atone for this neglect that Prince Galitzin, in 1699, ordered a Danish surveyor named Sheltrup to make a map of the coasts of 1 The Pazukhin brothers sent another interpreter named Semeon Ismä’il, who was a native of Bukhärä, with Medvediev to India, but he elected to remain in that country. See V. V. Barthold, La Découverte de l'Asie, pp. 207-8. 2 N. Berdzenishvili, I. Javakhishvili and S. Janasha, Istoriya Gruzii, p. 397. 8 Peter pursued the same policy respecting the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and Poland. 4 The project of the Volga-Don canal was by no means new in the time of Peter the Great, as it had been a bone of contention between Turkey and Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in the earlier days, the Turks had been the sponsors. See Dr Halil Inalcik’s article “Osmanli-Rus Rekabetinin Meçei ve Don-Volga Kanali Teçebüsü”, Betteten, no. xn (Ankara, 1948), PP- 349-402. 5 The State of Russia under the present Czar, p. 141.

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the Caspian and to show which rivers flowed into it. After Perry had instructed Sheltrup where he should take soundings,1 the Dane began his task, but he had carried out but little of it when he was captured and thrown into prison by the Persians; here the unfortunate man died of fever whilst the order for his release was on its way from Isfahan. Peter the Great’s interest in the Caspian Sea and the regions that lay beyond it was stimulated when he received the allegiance of the Khan of Khiva (Khwärazm) in 1700, and again, some years later, when reports reached him that gold was to be found in the sands of the Amü Daryä or Oxus. Because, however, of his preoccupations elsewhere, it was not until 1716 that he could send an expedition to Trans-Caspia to investigate the matter ; the tragic outcome of this expedition will be mentioned briefly later. Meanwhile, some incidents had occurred which adversely affected Russo-Persian relations. Late in 1697 a Russian ambassador arrived in Isfahan in order to present a note to the Persian Government in which it was alleged that Lezgl, Circassian and other Caucasian tribesmen, all of whom were described as Persian subjects, had given help to the Turks whilst the siege of Azov was in progress.2 This note also stated that Russia wished Persia to declare war on Turkey and to repay a sum of 300,000 tomans which, it was claimed, had been owing to Russia since the reign of Shäh Safi. When the Russian ambassador went to the palace to present his letters of credence and to deliver the note from his government, he refused to follow the customary procedure of handing the docu­ ments to the rtimäd al-Daula for transmission to the Shäh, claiming that he had to present them personally. As neither the ambassador nor the court officials would give way, a deadlock 1 Perry stated, no doubt correctly, that Anthony Jenkinson and his companions were probably the first to take soundings in the Caspian. See his State of Russia, p. 163. Christopher Burrough (or Borough), Arthur Edwards and other members of the Russia Company also took soundings when crossing the Caspian a few years later, in 1579, on their way to Persia. See Müller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. vn, pp. 476-8. 2 Gaudereau, Relation II, pp. 21-2. If Turkey had, in fact, received help from these tribesmen, it would have been impossible to prove which of them were, in fact, Persian subjects. It would be of interest to know whether there is any confirmation of this incident in the Moscow archives.

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ensued.1 The Persians feared that the ambassador’s behaviour was merely a Russian device to bring about a break in the relations between the two countries. In their alarmed state, they cast the unfortunate envoy into prison and determined to keep him there until they received a satisfactory reply from Moscow in regard to his behaviour. He was still in prison in the early summer of 1699, and it was only through the good offices of the Archbishop of Ancyra that he was released soon after.2 It does not appear to be recorded whether Russia repeated her protest regarding the alleged help by Persian subjects to the Turks or renewed her request for war to be declared on Turkey and for the repayment of the 300,000 tomans. By the end of the seventeenth century Russia had a number of ships on the Caspian Sea. In 1700 Captain Meyer, the commander of a Russian squadron, demanded free entry for his ships into the port of Baku. The Persian authorities rejected this demand, and, realising that Baku was then defenceless, proceeded to fortify it. When Cornelius de Bruyn was at Shamakhi in 1707, on his way back to Europe, he found that the Persians, besides persecuting the Jesuit missionaries in the town, were also ill-treating the Russian merchants there, who, he stated: ... are yet perpetually representing the easy manner in which the Czar might revenge the injustice they sustain, by invading that part of the country ; to which the others reply, that such a revolution would not be displeasing to them, since they would be more happy under the government of the Czar, than under that of their natural prince. They even made no scruple to declare, that they would attempt nothing in their own defence, but pray to Mohammed that this may be the event ; and it is certain, that it would be no difficulty for the Czar to accom­ plish it.3 Such talk of Russian invasion and conquest was, however, premature. Boundless though his energy and ambitions were, Peter had by now become so involved in other directions that he could spare neither the time nor the resources for enterprise and adventure beyond the Caucasus and the Caspian. In 1700 the long war with Sweden had begun, which was destined to drag on until 1721. 1 Gaudereau, Relation II, pp. 21-2. a Ibid. 3 Travels, vol. 11, p. 163. On the same page, de Bruyn referred to the “commodious haven” of Baku, adding that it would be a most useful “acquisi­ tion to his Czarian majesty, since it lies contiguous to his dominions and is very advantageous to those of his subjects who traffic there for any considerable time ”.

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Furthermore, a series of revolts broke out early in the eighteenth century, at Astrakhan, in Bashkiria and on the Don. Of these revolts, the one in Bashkiria was the most serious; it lasted until 1711. In 1709 the struggle with Sweden was to take on a new phase, culminating in Peter’s victory at Poltava, and two years afterwards he was again at war with the Turks, at whose hands he suffered defeat and acute humiliation at Stanileshte, near the river Pruth, in July 1711. In view of all these developments, it was clearly impossible for Peter to pursue an active policy in regard to Persia, and he had to content himself for some years merely with the furtherance of Russian trade there. As subsequent events were to show, however, he by no means abandoned his more ambitious designs on that country. In the autumn of 1708 the Persian court was much disturbed by the news that a Russian ambassador named Israel Ori (or Orii) had reached Shamakhi with a very large retinue, on his way to Isfahän. Rumours were soon current that Ori claimed to be descended from the ancient kings of Armenia and that he had publicly stated at Shamakhi that he would not abandon his rights. The Persians were by no means alone in being alarmed, for the Catholic missionaries received word that Ori was threatening to get them expelled from Persia. European commercial establishments in Isfahän were also made apprehensive, because they feared that one of the objects of Ori’s mission might be the furtherance of Russian trade at their expense; they therefore combined in an endeavour to magnify the danger, in order to dissuade the Shäh from receiving the Russian mission. There was, it was alleged, an ancient prophecy of the Armenians that their kingdom would one day be revived with the aid of the Russians, and Michel, a French envoy who had recently concluded a treaty with Persia for the expansion of French trade and the protection of the Catholic missions in Persia,1 is said to have pointed out to the Persian ministers that the letters in Israel Ori’s name very significantly formed the words il sera roi? The result was that the alarm of the Persians was greatly intensified, 1 See ch. xxxv below for particulars of this treaty. 2 Krusinski, p. 129. Michel himself, in his official account of his mission, does not confirm this particular statement, but he admits that he did his utmost to warn the Persian ministers of Ori’s reputedly evil designs. See his “ Mémoire du Sieur Michel sur le Voyage qu’il a fait en Perse en qualité d’Envoyé extra­ ordinaire de Sa Majesté dans les années 1706, i7°7> i7°& et I7°9”> PP* 210-11.

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as they feared that the Tsar had some secret and sinister design in sending the mission. Another person at the court who, for very different motives, sought to frighten the Persians still further was the astute Ghalzai chieftain Mir Wais.1 Notwithstanding their fears and the efforts that were sedulously made in various quarters to increase them, the Shäh and his ministers, deeming that they could not risk affronting the Tsar by brusquely refusing to receive his envoy, sent orders to the Governor of Shamäkhl to allow Ori and his retinue to proceed. When, early in November, Ori was four stages to the north of Isfahan, Michel, travelling in the opposite direction on his return to France, reached the same halting-place. Ori sent a messenger, with an escort of Russian and German cavalry, to Michel asking for an interview, but the Frenchman refused, and thereupon sent a further warning to the Ftimäd al-Daula.12 On Ori’s arrival at Isfahän it was found that the fears that he had inspired were almost entirely groundless. Besides having letters of credence from the Tsar, he had genuine letters from the Emperor and the Pope. Ori proved to be far more of a merchant than a diplomat,3 and most of his followers (who had been much reduced in numbers before they reached Isfahän) were traders who were using their diplomatic privilege to avoid paying duty on the goods that they had brought with them for disposal. Although Ori was at that time a “schismatic” Armenian,4 he made no attempt to 1 How Mïr Wais was able to turn this situation to his advantage will be described in ch. VII. 3 Michel, op, cit, p. 211. 3 Krusinski, p. 128. Ori, who had been born in Armenia, had been for some years in the service of the Emperor before transferring to that of Peter the Great. He had made himself useful to Peter in various ways, and had, as a reward, been allowed to go as ambassador to Persia “ as the most proper means he could think of to enrich himself in a little Time, because as the Ambassadors pay no Customs in Persia, he proposed to carry with him, which he did, a great Quantity of Merchandize, by which there was vast Gain to be made, considering the Exemption from the ordinary Duties” (Krusinski, pp. 127-8). See also the Correspondance du Marquis de Ferriol, Ambassadeur de Louis XIV à Constanti­ nople, avec une introduction par M. Emile Varenbergh, pp. 270 and 305. A number of letters from Ori to Archbishop Minas and others have been published by G. A. Ezov in his Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armiyanskim Narodom (St Peters­ burg, 1898); see also A. Joanisian, Israel Ory und die armenische Befreiungsidee (Munich, 1913), and J. de Morgan, Histoire du Peuple Arménien depuis les Temps les plus Reculés jusqu'à nos Jours (Paris, 1919), pp. 247-8. 4 Ori later became a Catholic “ to the Mortification of the Bishops of his own Country”, as Krusinski said on p. 130 of his Revolution of Persia,

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harm the Catholic missions whilst at Isfahän, so the fears of the missionaries also turned out to be baseless. It is to be noted that Peter made no attempt either through Ori or by any other means to take Persia to task for a Lezgi raid on the settlements of the Grebentsi Cossacks in the Terek valley; the explanation is that he was at that time fully occupied with the serious revolt that occurred in the Don country under Bulavin in 1707-8 and with the increased tempo of the war with Sweden. A number of years, in fact, were to elapse before Peter could give further thought to his aims in respect to Persia and the Caspian Sea.1

3. THE MUGHAL EMPIRE When Shäh Sultän Husain mounted the throne in 1694, Persia had been at peace with the Mughal Empire for just over 40 years. The Mughal dynasty, like that of the Safavis, had already entered upon its decline, and it was no longer so formidable as it had formerly been. For this reason, although Qandahär, which Persia had recovered in 1648 and had held ever since,12 was still a bone of contention, it was not likely to prove a casus belli. Previous to the accession of Shäh Sultän Husain, the relations between the two empires had been, on the whole, friendly, though there had been some friction when, in 1682, Muhammad Akbar, Aurangzïb’s fourth son, who had risen in rebellion in the previous year, took refuge in Persia, where he subsequently died.3 Early in the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain some further friction developed. Shäh ‘Alam (or Mu‘azzam, as he was originally named), the Emperor’s second son, had recently been appointed Governor of the province of Käbul. Soon after he had assumed this office, he began to intrigue with the Ghalzai Afghans, the powerful tribe which inhabited much of the province of Qandahär, in the hope of inducing them to revolt against the Shäh and so make it possible for the Emperor to recover the lost territory. Although the attempt 1 These aims and the manner in which Peter endeavoured to carry them out will be described in ch. ix. 2 The then youthful Aurangzib had endeavoured to recapture it in 1649 and 1652, and his younger brother Därä Shuküh made a further attempt in the following year, but all three attempts were unsuccessful. 3 He was given a passage from India to Muscat in an English ship, and later went on to Bushire in another of the same nationality.

5

65

LSD

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failed, the Mughal Emperor never gave up hope of achieving his end and, in fact, just before the end of the seventeenth century, he sent an embassy to Isfahan to ask for the return of Qandahär. To this demand the Shäh returned a negative answer. When, in 1709, the Ghalzais rose in revolt, it was not because of any pressure or persuasion from Delhi, but for quite different reasons.1 Moreover, although the rebellion proved successful, it brought no benefit to the Mughal Empire, because the Ghalzais gained their independence and maintained it until Nadir Shäh reduced them to obedience in 1738. For the rest of Shäh Sultän Husain’s reign, the relations between Persia and the Mughal Empire remained friendly and call for no special comment.

4. ‘OMÄN

The foundation of the maritime strength of the Arabs of ‘Oman was laid when the Imäm Sultän ibn Saif wrested Muscat, with its fine harbour, from the Portuguese in January 1650. During the remaining twenty years or so1 2 of the lifetime of the Imäm, ‘Omän became prosperous and a powerful fleet was built up, mainly with the object of combating the Portuguese.3 It was after the accession of the Imäm Saif ibn Sultän in 1679 (he reigned until 1711), under whom ‘Omän became yet more prosperous, that the Muscat Arabs (as his subjects were usually called) began their piratical attacks on ports on the Persian side of the Gulf and its approaches and on local shipping. Without naval aid from the Portuguese or other European powers, the Persians could do nothing to protect themselves, except by means of such ineffective shore defences as they then possessed. They had no warships, and such merchant shipping as they had was manned by 1 See ch. vn. 2 There is much uncertainty as to the actual year of his death, the dates given by various authorities ranging from 1668 to 1679; in this connection, see Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf vol. 1, p. 214. 3 Père Raphaël du Mans, the well-known Capuchin missionary, who resided in Isfahan from 1644 to his death there in 1696, reported to Colbert in 1670 that the Portuguese were then being much troubled by the Arabs of Muscat, “ qui, avec les navires qu’ils ont pris sur eux, en diverses rencontres, se sont rendus puissants et fascheux sur mer”. See C. Schefer’s edition of Père R. du Mans’s Estât de la Perse en 1660, Appendix xvm.

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the Huwala and other Arabs from the Persian side of the Gulf. These Arabs, though nominally Persian subjects, were not likely to show any enthusiasm in fighting against their fellow Arabs from the opposite coast. Moreover, the majority of the Arabs of the Persian littoral were Sunnis of the Shäfil school, and were therefore not in sympathy with their Shï‘ï overlords. In so far as seafaring was concerned, the Persians of the Safavï era had sadly degenerated since the later Säsänian and early Muslim periods, when Persia had possessed a large and flourishing merchant fleet. The Persian of the time of Shah Sulaiman or Shäh Sultän Husain would doubtless have agreed whole-heartedly with ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, who, on being consulted by the Caliph ‘Omar in regard to a proposed naval expedition, said of the ocean: “Trust it little, fear it much. Man at sea is an insect on a splinter, now engulfed, now scared to death.”1 Père Sanson had the following to say regarding the Persian attitude to seafaring in the time of Shäh Sulaimän:2 “Les Persans n’aiment pas la Navigation, ils en ont tant d’horreur, qu’ils appellent Nacoda, c’est à dire Athées, ceux qui exposent leurs vies sur un Element si peu sûr.” Correct though he undoubtedly was regarding the Persians’ dislike of navigation, the worthy priest went astray over the meaning of the word nacoda, or rather näkhkudä, which is an abbreviation of näv-khudä(“shipmaster” or “captain”) and is not to be confused with nä-Khudä or “atheist”. On the other hand, the Arabs on both sides of the Persian Gulf took readily to the sea, and in Muscat the Imäms of ‘Omän possessed one of the three great ports of Arabia. Between 1693 and 1695 the Muscat Arabs fought a number of engagements with the Portuguese in the Gulf; although the Portuguese had rather the better of these naval encounters, they were not strong enough decisively to defeat their foes. In January 1695 the Arabs, taking advantage of the absence of the Portuguese fleet, attacked and pillaged the town of Kong and seized a richly laden Armenian ship which was anchored off the town. On this occasion they are said to have obtained booty to the value of 1 Quoted by Sir William Muir, in his book The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline and Fall (London, 1924), p. 205. In this connection, one can also cite Sa‘dî’s lines in the Gulistan, ch. 1, 16: Unlimited riches are upon the ocean, but if thou dost desire safety, it is upon the shore. a Voyage ou Relation de l’Etat present du Royaume de Perse, p. 108.

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5-2

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60,000 tomans or some £ 198,000? After this highly successful raid the Imam of ‘Oman wrote to the Shäh demanding equal rights with the Portuguese at Kong,1 2 and threatening to sack Bandar ‘Abbas if this demand were not complied with.3 The Shäh was so terrified at this threat that he asked both the English and Dutch East India Companies for naval assistance against the Arabs. Failing to get help from this quarter, he turned to the French for aid, but nothing came of that request.4 The Portuguese, however, then came to the rescue, but in a half­ hearted manner. The drastic and effective manner in which the Muscat Arabs retaliated will be described in a later chapter.5 Captain Charles Lockyer, who visited Muscat in May 1706, said that the town had been: “.. .so well improved by the Arabs since they got it out of the hands of the Portuguese, that it is become a Terrour to all the trading People in India.”6* In all, Lockyer reported, they had fourteen warships and twenty merchantmen; one of the former had seventy guns and none had less than twenty. Powder, however, was very scarce, but the Arabs “.. .are the profusest People in the World in wasting it on all Occasions.... Their Colours are red, which they display in Streamers and Pendants at every Yard-Arm and made a pretty Appearance at our first Entry into the Harbour.” The Imäm Saif ibn Sultän I died at his capital city of Rustäq on 4 October 1711. His successor Sultän ibn Saif II went even further than he had done in strengthening the fleet and in taking aggressive action. In so doing, he not only spent all the money that his predecessors had saved, but also large sums that he had borrowed from mosques and pious endowments (auqäf)? He was a most 1 Bruce’s Annals of the Honorable East-India Company, vol. in, p. 169. 2 Kong was the chief Portuguese settlement in Persia. It is a small port 31 miles to the north-east of the now much larger and more flourishing port of Linga. Shäh ‘Abbas the Great, in order to compensate the Portuguese in some measure for their expulsion from Hormuz in 1622, allowed them to set up a factory (i.e. a trading establishment) at Kong and granted them half the customs receipts of the port. The Portuguese retained their position at Kong until 1711, by which time their naval strength in the Gulf had greatly deteriorated. 8 Gaudereau, Relation I, p. 89. 4 The reasons for this failure are given on p. 116. 5 See p. 392 below. 8 An Account of Trade in India, pp. 206-7. 7 C. Guillain, Documents sur VHistoire et le Commerce de l'Afrique Orientale (Paris, 1855), pt. 1, p. 526.

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determined foe of the Portuguese and the Persians. Captain Alexander Hamilton, who had personal knowledge of Muscat, gave the following description of the fleet there as it was during the reign of Sultan ibn Saif IL

In Anno 1715 the Arabian Fleet consisted of one Ship of 74 Guns, two of 60, one of 50, and 18 small Ships from 32 to 12 Guns each, and some Trankies or rowing Vessels from 4 to 8 Guns each, with which Sea Forces they keep all the Sea-coasts in Aw, from Cape Comerin to the Red Sea. They often made Descents on the Portugueze Colonies on the Coast of India, destroying their Villages and Farms, but sparing the Churches.... They kill none in cold Blood, but use their Captives courteously.... Ever since the Portugueze left Muscat to the Arabs, there has been continual War, but in the main the Arabs have been the Gainers, yet they have been obliged to buy Ships of Force to confront the Portugueze at Sea, and to keep their Coasts free from Insults. Their Fleets have often met, and had some engagements, but few Ships have been taken or sunk on either Side, but Merchant Ships of both Sides have been taken. The Portugueze use their Captives with great Severity, making them labour hard, inure them to the Discipline by the Whip ; but the Arabs use theirs with very much Humanity, only making them Prisoners at Large, without putting them to hard Labour, and allow them as much Diet Money as their own Soldiers receive.... And if any of the Portugueze are Artificers or Mechanicks, they may freely work at their Trade, to earn Money to redeem themselves.1 It is thus not surprising that the Persians greatly feared these formidable Arabs, at whose hands they suffered repeatedly.1 2 1 A New Account of the East Indies (Edinburgh, 1727), vol. I, pp. 74-5. 2 In ch. xi an account will be given of the Arabs* seizure of the islands of Bahrain, Qishm and Lârak and of their serious threat to Bandar ‘Abbäs and Hormuz.

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CHAPTER VI

THE REVIVAL OF SHÏTSM AND ITS EFFECT UPON RELIGIOUS MINORITIES It will be recalled that Shäh Sultän Husain had, whilst still in the harem, come under the influence of that remarkable theologian, Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisî. It was Muhammad Bâqir who, more than anyone else, was responsible for the revival of ShVism which characterised the latter years of the Safavi dynasty. He was the son of an almost equally famous theologian named Muhammad Taqï al-Majlisï, who is said to have been the first scholar to undertake the huge task of collecting the Shi‘i Traditions. Muhammad TaqI, who was born in 1003 (1594/5), was a man of wide and tolerant views; he showed some interest in, and even sympathy with, the Sufis, but whether he actually became one himself has not been definitely established.1 He died in 1070 (1659/60). His son Muhammad Bäqir, who was born in 1037 (1627/8), was a man of very different stamp. Although he was as assiduous as his father in collecting the Shi‘i Traditions, he was a rigid and fanatical formalist. He was violently opposed to the Sunnis, of whom he is said to have converted no less than 70,000. Although no doubt Muhammad Bäqir’s voluminous writings were responsible for many of these conversions, it is highly probable that many others were brought about by the use of more forceful measures. He disliked the Süfis as much as the Sunnis ; he objected to the former not only because of their pantheism, but also because so many eminent Süfis had been Sunnis. He also fiercely denounced Aristotelian and Platonist philosophers as being “followers of an infidel Greek”.1 2 1 His fanatical son Muhammad Bäqir found it necessary to make excuses for this tolerance towards the Süfis. See Professor Browne, Persian Literature in Modern Times, pp. 403-4. 2 See the “Risälat li-Muhammad Taqï al-Majlisi”, an Arabic tract by him, which is in the Browne collection of MSS. in the University Library at Cam­ bridge, no. c. 17(7).

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The religious campaign which Muhammad Bäqir initiated and which his successor Mir Muhammad Husain continued took the form of denunciation, and often persecution, of all who did not follow the strait and narrow path of his own choosing. As this campaign was conducted in a period of profound peace, it could not be directed against external Sunni foes such as the Ottoman Turks, and it therefore failed to arouse that widespread, fiery enthusiasm which a combination of religious fervour and intense national feeling can produce. The campaign had, therefore, to be waged within Persia’s own borders, with the unfortunate result that, instead of uniting the nation as the religious movement under the earlier Safavls had done, it had precisely the opposite effect. It was the cause of widespread anger and unrest amongst the Sunni elements of the population which, although relatively small in numbers as compared with the ShI‘I, were of excellent fighting quality. Moreover, when the moment of supreme national crisis came in 1722, religion failed to inspire the Persian Shl'Is with any real martial spirit. The unfortunate consequences of this ill-timed and ill-conceived campaign will be described later. After Muhammad Bäqir’s death, which occurred on 27 Ramadan mo (29 March 1699), his admirers, as Professor Browne has pointed out, drew attention to the fact that his death...was followed in a short time by the troubles which culminated in the supreme disaster of 1722, and suggest that the disappearance of so saintly a personage left Persia exposed to perils which more critical minds may be inclined to ascribe in part to the narrow intolerance so largely fostered by him and his congeners.1 Muhammad Bäqir was a most voluminous writer, having been credited by Muhammad ibn Sulaimän TunakäbunI with the incredible daily output of 1000 baits or 50,000 words.2 Even if we divide this figure by ten, we get a total which makes Anthony Trollope’s daily average of 3000 words seem paltry. Muhammad Bäqir’s greatest work, which was written in Arabic, is entitled the Bihär al-Anwär (“Oceans of the Lights”); it is an immense compilation of the Shl‘I Traditions. When Professor Browne was in Persia in 1887-8, he found that it was still regarded there as the 1 Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. 120. 8 Qi?a$ al-Ulamä (Lucknaw, 1306 (1888/9)), p. 216.

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most authoritative work on the subject.1 His works are still, in fact, being read to some extent in that country. Muhammad Bäqir did not confine himself to Arabic, the language of the learned, but wrote a number of Shï‘î theological works in Persian, in a simple and straightforward style, in order to make them readily intelligible to as many as possible of his own countrymen.2 There can be no doubt that he was not only in his own day, but also for a long time afterwards, of great influence in Persia. Although he suffered a rebuff when the decree prohibiting the drinking of wine had to be rescinded, he nevertheless retained much influence over the Shäh, who showed his appreciation by promoting him to the specially created post of Mullä-bäshl or Head of the Mulläs? When Muhammad Bäqir died, he was succeeded as Mulläbäshi by his grandson Mir Muhammad Husain, who inherited much of his influence and also, unfortunately, his fanaticism.4 Muhammad Husain was one of those in the court circle who, in later years, exercised an evil influence over the weak Shäh. I.

THE ZOROASTRIANS

Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisi and Muhammad Husain and their associates behaved in a particularly brutal manner to the Zoroas­ trians in Persia. The persecution of these unfortunate people had 1 Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. 36611. 2 For a complete list of Muhammad Bäqir’s works, see the Kashf al-Hujub zua’l-Astär *an Asma al-Kutub ua'1-Asfär (Calcutta, 1912), passim, by Sayyid I‘jäz Husain al-Naisâbürï al-Kanturi. (I am indebted to Professor Levy for this reference.) A biography of him, in fulsome and exaggerated terms, was written by Muhammad Bäqir Khwânsârî, a later member of his family, in his Raudät al-Jannät fi Ahwäl al-Ulama zucil-Sädät (Tehran, 1306 (1888/9)), pp. 118-23. 3 The anonymous author of the Tadhkirat al-Mulük (who showed a marked bias against Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisî and other members of his family), falls into error when asserting (p. 41) that this step was taken “towards the end of Shäh Sultän Husayn’s time”, because Muhammad Bäqir died in 1699, whereas the Shäh did not abdicate until 1722. He was likewise incorrect in saying that Muhammad Bäqir “ in view of his friendly relations with the King, founded the madrasa of Chahär-Bägh and became mudarris [teacher] in it”. The building of this beautiful madrasa and of the adjoining caravanserai is attributed to the pious mother of the Shäh, and in any case it was not completed until a number of years after Muhammad Bäqir’s death. 4 It was probably at the instigation of Muhammad Husain that Hasan ‘All Khan, who was Governor-General of Ardalän from 1116 to 1118 (1703/4-1706/7), greatly oppressed the Kurds (who were Sunnis), as related on p. 47 above.

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often been serious enough during earlier reigns, but it became greatly accentuated under Shäh Sultän Husain. Not long after his accession, he was induced to sign a decree for the forcible con­ version of the Zoroastrians to Islam. In 1699 the Archbishop of Ancyra was himself a witness of the terrible measures that were then being taken to enforce this decree, particularly in Hasanäbäd, the Zoroastrian quarter of Isfahän, where large numbers were compelled to turn Muhammadan. Their temple was destroyed, and a mosque and a school were erected on its site. Before this action was taken, however, the Zoroastrian priests had managed to save the sacred fire from profanation, and to take it to Kirmän, where the persecution was less severe.1 Even in Kirmän, however, the treatment of the Zoroastrians was such that, when the Sunni Ghalzais, under Mahmüd, entered the city in 1719, they looked upon the invaders as liberators rather than as enemies. 2. THE JEWS

The Jews of Persia had, like the Zoroastrians, suffered greatly at times during previous reigns. After the accession of Shäh Sultän Husain, the Shî‘ï revivalists2 directed their energies against the Jews as well as against the Zoroastrians, forcing many of each religious community to embrace Islam.3 Religious motives were not, however, the sole cause of the persecution of the Jews. They were sometimes accused of practising magic,4 and they also suffered materially by the application of the unjust law whereby, if a Jew or a Christian turned Muslim, he could claim the property of his relatives.6 1 Gaudereau, Relation II, pp. 134-9. 2 It is not apparently recorded to what extent Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisï was himself responsible for this persecution of the Jews. Professor Browne, in his Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. 404, has related the following curious story regarding him: “One saw him [i.e. Muhammad Bäqir] in a dream after his death and asked of him ‘ How fares it with you in that world, and how have they dealt with you ? ’ He answered, ‘ None of my actions profited me at all, except that one day I gave an apple to a Jew, and that saved me’.” 3 For an account by a Persian Jew of this persecution, see the ** Livre de la Persécution Religieuse”, a French translation by W. Bacher of a versified chronicle in Hebrew by Babai b. Lutf of Käshän. It was published in the Revue des Etudes Juives, vol. lii, pp. 77-97 and 234-71, and vol. lui, pp. 85-110. 4 Chardin, Voyages, vol. vi, p. 133. 5 This law was passed by the usually tolerant Shäh ‘Abbas I. It was re­ enacted by Shäh ‘Abbäs II. As will be seen, it affected the Christians in Persia even more than it did the Jews.

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So severe, in fact, were the sufferings of the Jews in the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain that a modern authority has expressed the view that: “Only the downfall of the Safavid dynasty, through the successful invasion of the Afghans and the subsequent rise of a new tolerant ruler, Nädir Shäh.. .saved the Jews of Isfahän and the Jews of Persia as a whole from complete annihilation.”1 3. THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

Possibly the largest of the Christian communities in Persia in Safavi times was that of the Gregorian Church, the members of which were of Armenian race. The Patriarch had his see at Ech­ miadzin,1 2 in what was then the Persian province of Chukhûr-i-Sa'd. It is estimated that nearly half the total Armenian population of Persia in those days was concentrated in Julfa, the suburb of Isfahän, but there were many Armenian merchants in Tabriz, Hamadän and other large towns. As the population of Julfa at that time was between 30,000 and 35,000, there must have been some 70,000 Armenians in the whole of Persia. Of this total, a few thousand were Catholics. Shäh ‘Abbäs I had granted the Armenians of Julfa many privileges, including complete freedom of worship and the right to build and maintain their own churches. By the beginning of the eighteenth century they still, in the main, possessed these privileges,3 but they suffered sometimes from sporadic outbreaks of Shï‘î fanaticism and also, occasionally, from the enforcement of the unjust law which enabled a renegade to claim the property of his relatives. The Shfl mujtahids and mulläs were, however, less harsh in their treatment of the Armenians than of the Zoroastrians and Jews. In Persian Georgia, that is, in Kartli and Kakheti, the vast majority of the inhabitants were Christians. They had their own Church, the Catholicos of which had his see at Mtskhet, some 1 Professor W. J. Fischel, “ Isfahan, the Story of a Jewish Community in Persia”, in The Josua Starr Memorial Volume (New York, 1953), p. 126. 2 For a description of Echmiadzin as it was at the beginning of the eighteenth century, see J. Pitton de Toumefort’s A Voyage into the Levant, vol. in, pp. 169-72. A view of Echmiadzin, with Mount Ararat behind, is given opposite p. 177 of the same volume. 8 They had for long, however, been taxed very heavily.

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20 miles to the north-north-west of Tiflis. The Georgian Church had formerly been in close relationship with the Greek Orthodox Church, but, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, it had drifted somewhat apart, and had gradually declined in efficiency and influence. Although the peasantry remained on the whole steadfast, some of the princes and nobles and even a number of the bishops became very lax, a fact which serves in part to explain how it was that the Georgian leaders in Persia were often so ready to turn Muhammadan when it suited them to do so.1 It must not be thought, however, that all the members of the Georgian royal houses and the nobility held their Christian beliefs so lightly; there were in fact a number of devout Christians amongst them, such as Prince Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani, a brother-in-law of Giorgi XI, who was a monk of the Order of St Basil.1 2 Although many Georgians, with memories of the appalling cruelties of Shäh ‘Abbäs I in Kakheti and the martyrdom of Queen Ketevan, had good reason to hate Persia, there were always some who were willing to enter the Shah’s service, although it meant that they had to turn Muhammadan before they could take office. Even some of the rank and file in the Georgian contingents in the Persian army were renegades,3 though the majority retained their Christian faith. These conversions to Islam were thus purely voluntary and in many cases they were merely nominal. They were certainly not caused by persecution or the threat of a Muslim jihäd or holy war. When, in 1699, the Archbishop of Ancyra4 was on his way to Isfahan to negotiate for the renewal of the privileges of the missions 1 Toumefort, op. cit. vol. nr, p. 147, stated: “The Prince of Georgia, who in reality is no more than Governor of the Country, must be a Mahometan; for the King of Persia will not give this Government to a Man of a Religion different from his own. The name of the Prince of Teflis was Heraclea (Erekle of Kakheti), while we were there; he was of the Greek Rite, but they oblig’d him to be circumcis’d. They say this Wretch profess’d both Religions, for he went to the Mosque, and came to Mass too at the Church of the Capuchins.” 2 He became a Catholic later in life. 3 G. Gemelli-Careri, “A Voyage round the World”, in Churchill’s Collection of Voyages and Travels (London, 1704), p. 125. 4 He was the Carmelite Pietro Paolo of St Francis. Before entering the religious life he was Don Ferrante Palma d’Artois, 5th Duke of St Elia Palma d’Artois. In 1696 he was appointed Archbishop of Ancyra and Vicar Apostolic to the Mughal, the Deccan and Golconda. See A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 11, pp. 975-6.

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of the various Catholic Orders in Persia,1 he feared that he would meet with great opposition because of the Shäh’s fanaticism. He had heard of the influence which Muhammad Bàqir and other religious leaders had established over him, and imagined that he was in consequence:2 “.. .si zélé pour sa Secte qu’il se fait appeller Dinprur,3 c’est-à-dire, Protecteur de la Foy, et porté naturellement à diminuer plutôt qu’à augmenter les Privilèges des Chrestiens.” However, when the Archbishop reached the Persian capital, he found that the Shäh was very well disposed towards the Christians, with the result that he had no difficulty in obtaining the desired decrees, together with an assurance of protection for the missions. It was thus clear that the Shäh, if left to himself, was no bigot, despite his upbringing. In fact, some years later, when he was examining a watch that Jacob Rousseau, his chief clock-maker,4 had made for him, he remarked: “I observe that the Franks are better Workmen than ours. I am very much afraid, that as they out-do us in Arts, they also excel us in Points of Religion.”5 Unfortunately, although the Shäh was by nature kindly, humane and tolerant, he was so weak that he could never refuse to carry out the wishes of such determined men as Muhammad Bäqir6 or Muhammad Husain. Thus it was that, although he would often grant or renew the privileges of the Christian missions and promise, doubtless in all sincerity, to protect them, he could be made, almost immediately afterwards, to issue fresh decrees in a completely contrary sense. It was not for nothing that he was given the nickname of Yakhshi-dir.1 Such action by the Shäh was, it must be admitted, sometimes taken at the behest of the Orthodox Patriarch or one or other of his bishops, who strongly resented what they, not unnaturally, regarded 1 The raqams or decrees which conferred these privileges always had to be renewed when a sovereign died and a new one succeeded. 2 Gaudereau, Relation II, p. 6. 3 Dln-paruar, or Defender of the Faith. This title appears on coins struck during the reign of Shah Sultan Husain. See H. L. Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Persia, p. 92. 4 For brief details of his origin and career, see p. 433 below. 5 Krusinski, p. 95. 6 It is perhaps a judgment on this mujtahid that his charming house in Isfahan (which is in the Khiäbän-i-Shaikh Baha'i, some 400 yards to the west of the Chahär Bägh) is now a school for girls under the administration of French nuns of the Order of St Vincent de Paul. The adjoining rauza-khâna, where Muhammad Bäqir was wont to pray, is now a chapel. 7 See p. 42 above.

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as the intrusion of the Catholic missionaries into their own sphere of spiritual influence. It so happened that these Catholic missionaries, being unable to make any appreciable number of converts from Islam,1 spent much of their time and energies in proselytising amongst the Gregorian Armenians. In these en­ deavours they met with some success. Hence it was that great bitterness arose between the two Christian communities.2 What was also unfortunate was that, only too often, there were Persian officials who were willing, in return for a bribe, to create difficulties for, and even to persecute, the missionaries. The Armenians sometimes suffered from the law which enabled a renegade to claim his relatives’ property. A particularly bad case was the one involving the rich Shariman family of Julfa at the close of the seventeenth century; in order to save something of their wealth, two of the family apostatised.3 The motive in such cases was not, however, religious, but was mere cupidity. 1 B. Nikitine, in a note on p. 137 of his translation of V. V. Barthold’s book La Découverte de UAsie, Histoire de V Orientalisme en Europe et en Russie (Paris, 1947), drew attention to the fact that a Polish writer, T. L. Kowalski, in his Na Szlakach Islamu (Krakdw, 1935), pp. 82-102, has dealt at some length with the reasons for this difficulty. M. Nikitine stated: “ L’idée maîtresse de l’auteur est que l’Islam s’est immunisé à l’égard de la pensée chrétienne pour avoir grandi dans son ambiance... aux yeux des Musulmans, le chrétienisme est ainsi une forme imparfaite, périmée, dépassée par l’Islam.” 2 For a very detailed account of these troubles, written from the Catholic point of view, see A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, passim. It is pleasant to record that relations between the two Christian communities were not always hostile. In fact, towards the close of the seventeenth century there seemed a likelihood of a reunion, and it was largely in order to bring this about that the Archbishop of Ancyra was sent on his mission to Persia. He held the view that if he could win over the Julfa Armenians to the Catholic faith, all the rest in Persia, including the Patriarch at Echmiadzin, would follow. He succeeded in reaching agreement with the Archbishop Alexander at Julfa, but the union did not last long. See Gaudereau, Relation II, passim. There were also individual acts of kindness by the members of one community to those of the other. For example, when the French envoy Pierre Victor Michel was in Erivan in 1706-7, he induced the Governor to restore to the Gregorian Armenians there the bells of their church which a local Muslim bigot had caused to be removed from the belfry. See the “Mémoire du Sr. Michel”, p. 59. 8 In 1675 a young Armenian from Persia arrived in France where he styled himself the Comte de Zagly and claimed princely descent. No one questioned his statements, and he was in consequence well received at the French court and was given a commission in the army. He married a niece of Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, but subsequently deserted her and fled to Sweden, leaving many bills unpaid. In Stockholm he obtained 2000 écus from the French Minister there on false pretences, and then went to Turkey via Germany and Poland. On

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Although the Persian Shï‘ï were often willing to enter into arguments on philosophical and religious topics and even to listen to the missionaries’ teaching, it was, as already pointed out, very rare for any of them to be converted to Christianity. On the other hand, the parents of sick children often brought them to the missionaries (many of whom had some medical knowledge) in the hope that they might be cured. Moreover, they did not, in many cases, object to the children being baptised. A Carmelite is said to have baptised over 3000 Persian children in this way.1 The Protestants in Persia were far fewer even than the Catholics. They consisted for the most part of the employees of the English and Dutch East India Companies, each of which usually had a chaplain attached to its headquarters at Isfahan. There were a few Calvinists, such as Jacob Rousseau of Geneva, and occasionally a French Huguenot, who were in the Shäh’s service. There was no antagonism on religious grounds between the small Protestant community and the other Christians in Persia; in fact, they seem to have been on good terms with one another.2 So reaching Turkey, he became a Sunni Muhammadan and pretended to be an ambassador. The Turks, however, were not taken in, so de Zagly decided to return to Persia. On reaching Erivan, he changed from the Sunni to the Shi‘i form of belief, and went to Isfahan. He thereupon took proceedings in a Persian court against the Sharimans, claiming, by means of forged documents, that he, as heir to Tavernier, was entitled to some 28,000 tomans which, he alleged, the French traveller had deposited with the Sharimans at interest some thirty years earlier. So strongly was this case pressed that two of the Sharimans, as stated above, turned Muhammadan. See the accounts given by Michel (Mémoire, pp. 50-1), Voyage du Sieur Paul Lucas, vol. 11, pp. 95-7, A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. I, pp. 484-6. 1 “The History of the Missions of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus established in Persia by the Reverend Father Alexander of Rhodes” (translated by Sir Arnold Wilson), in BSOS, vol. in, part iv, p. 13. According to the same source (p. 14), infantile mortality in Persia was terribly high at that time (1655-66), as many as 40,000 dying in Isfahan alone in one year. It is clear from A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 11, p. 1039, that these children were baptised only when at the point of death and that none survived. 2 As the Catholic missionaries and secular priests in Persia were often in financial straits owing to the long delays in the arrival of funds from Europe, they had sometimes to obtain loans from the English and Dutch companies. Moreover, an Italian Carmelite, Fr Urban, while at Bandar ‘Abbas, was the guest of the English merchants there, who made him many gifts. This did not prevent him from drawing attention to the immoderate style of living of the English and Dutch at that place, which, together with the excessive heat there, “sets their blood on fire and dispatches them to hell”. See A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 11, pp. 1016 and 1099.

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far as can be gathered, the English and Dutch chaplains did not undertake any missionary work, but confined their attention solely to their own countrymen. Although both the English and Dutch Companies often had to complain of their treatment at the hands of the Persian Government and its officials, there is nothing on record to show that they, any more than the other Christians in the country, were the victims of a religious campaign such as was waged against the Persian Sunnis, Zoroastrians and Jews.

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CHAPTER VII

THE REVOLT OF THE GHALZAI AFGHANS The origin of the great Ghalzai tribe has for long been the subject of controversy. While some maintain that they are descended from the Khalaj, a Turkish tribe, others as stoutly affirm that they are of Afghan origin. The Ghalzais themselves, like many another tribe, have traced out for themselves a long, but extremely fanciful, pedigree, claiming descent from Noah through the Persian usurper Zahäk. The story goes that when the hero Farîdûn overthrew Zahäk and suspended him by the feet over a pit on the summit of Demavend, he gave orders for the tyrant’s offspring to be exter­ minated. Zahäk’s family, however, managed to escape from the hero’s clutches, and fled to the wild and mountainous region of Ghür (the modern Hazaristan), between the Helmand valley and Herat, where they settled. Some centuries later, a certain Shäh Husain, who was forty-ninth in descent from Zahäk, left his homeland, and migrated to the Kasi Ghar mountain country, near the Takht-i-Sulaimän. There he was befriended by Shaikh Bitin (or Bait or Batu), a holy man who claimed to be a descendant of an Israelite1 named Qais who, on his conversion to Islam, had taken 1 On the supposed descent of the Ghalzai and other Afghans from the Israelites, see, amongst others, Ni'matullah ibn Habib Allah, “ Tâ’rïkh-i-KhânJahän u Makhzan-i-Afghani ”, BM. MS. Egerton 696, Bâb (chapter) 1 (Dorn’s English translation, History of the Afghans (London, 1836), pp. 23-5); Hafiz Rahmat Khan, “Khulâçat al-Ansäb”, BM. MS. Egerton 1104, fols. 29a et seq.; an untitled MS. by Sa'ädat Yär Khan, Hâfiz Rahmat Khan’s grandson, in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (no. R. 13. 97); and the anonymous “Risäla-yi-Afghänän”, Ethé 579. Amongst European sources there are: *‘A Letter from the late Henry Vansittart to the President” (of the Asiatic Society of Bengal), Asiatic Researches, vol. 11, pp. 67-75; Sir William Jones’s presidential address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 24 February 1791 (in which he referred to Vansittart’s letter and adduced views of his own in favour of the belief), Asiatic Researches, vol. m ; the Rev. Joseph Wolff, Researches and Missionary Labours amongst the Jews, Mohammedans and other Sects (London, 1835), pp. 228, 229, 238; and the Rev. Charles Forster, The One Primeval Language (London, 1854), vol. in of which contains a lengthy dissertation entitled “A New Key for the Recovery of the Lost Ten Tribes”. Wolff was the only one of the above to express grave doubts as to the soundness of the belief.

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the name of ‘Abd al-Rashïd. (Qais is said to have gone to Khurasan during the caliphate of ‘Uthmän, that is, between the years a.d. 644-55). Shäh Husain lived with Shaikh Bitin and his family, and in course of time had an affair with his daughter Matü. When the girl’s parents discovered the intrigue, they refused to let Shah Husain wed her, and the Shaikh and his sons even considered putting him to death. Matti’s mother, however, made diligent inquiries as to Shäh Husain’s antecedents, and, having established the fact that he was of noble birth, persuaded her husband to agree to his marriage to Matti. Not long after the ceremony, Matü gave birth to a son, to whom the grandparents gave the name of Ghilzai (or Ghalzai), îxomghil “thief” and zai “son”, on account of his irregular origin. Ghalzai had a son named Tular whose eldest son Baro was the father of TokhI and Hötak, the eponymous ancestors of the two chief clans of the Ghalzais.1 Bellew sought to identify the Ghalzais with the Turkish tribe known as the Khalaj (or Khalj),12 but this view was later opposed by Raverty3 and, later still, by Longworth-Dames. In more recent times, however, Barthold and Minorsky, after making extensive researches, have made out a very strong case for the Khalaj theory. Briefly stated, the chain of events appears to have been as follows. Some fourteen centuries ago, the Khalaj formed part of the great Khallukh (or Qarluq) confederacy which then occupied the country to the south and west of lake Issik Kul. In course of time, the Khalaj broke away from the Khallukh confederacy and migrated to the west and south-west. When, in 982/3 the unknown 1 This purely apocryphal story occurs in many works with some variations in matters of detail. See in particular the “ Makhzan-i-Afghânï ” of Ni‘matullah, the historiographer (väqia-navls) of Shäh Jahân (Bernhard Dorn’s English translation entitled History of the Afghans, part 11, pp 47-8); the Tä'rikh-iSultânï, by Muhammad Khan ibn Müsä Khân Durrani ; Bellew’s The Races of Afghanistan, pp. 97-9; and Raverty’s Notes on Afghanistan, pp. 58-64. 2 The Races of Afghanistan, pp. 100-1. Bellew’s support of this theory is not strong, however, as he suggested in his Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghani­ stan, p. 141, that “ Ghiji” might be a corruption of the Rajput term “ Keruch” or alternatively of “Kiliki” (Cilician). 8 Notes on Afghanistan, p. 69 of the appendix. Although in general so categorical in regard to the non-Turkish origin of the Ghalzais, Raverty admits, on p. 490 of his above-mentioned work, that the Nâ§ir and Kharoti Ghalzais seem “to have been descended from one of the several Turk tribes located on the western frontiers of the Ghaznin kingdom towards the Afghanistan, by the Turk feudatories under the Samanids and the Turk Sultans of Ghaznin”. 6

8l

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

author of the Hudüd al-Alam compiled his work, there were already Khalaj tribesmen in the Ghazna region, as well as in Balkh, Tukhäristän, Bust and Guzganän. As time went on, the “Afghanisation” of the Ghazna Khalaj became so thorough that they not only lost their Turki speech, but also all memory of their real origin.1 In this connection, it is of interest to note that when Jaläl al-Dîn Fïrüz Khalajï (or Khaljî), who belonged either to this or to some other branch of the Khalaj, seized the throne of Delhi in a.d. 1290 and founded his short-lived dynasty, the Turkish nobles and many of the citizens were opposed to him on the grounds that he was an Afghan and therefore a barbarian.1 2 Other sub-sections of the Khalaj migrated further to the west, some occupying the area in Persian ‘Iraq that for long was known as Khalajistän, while others moved southwards and became the ancestors of two at least of the divisions of the great Qashqäi tribe, namely, the Färsl-madän(“ not knowing Persian”, so called because they spoke Turki and not Persian) and the Shish-Bulûkï. Other Khalaj descendants are to be found near Dehbid and in Kirmân. The name, but nothing more, survives at Gach Khalaj, 14 miles east of Shushtar. Although the Khalaj of Ghazna, unlike their collaterals in Persia, shed most of their Turkish characteristics, they retained their nomadic habits and their unruly ways. It was not until the reign of Shäh ‘Abbas the Great that the Ghalzais as such first came into prominence. When the Abdâlî Afghans, in consequence of continued pressure from the Ghalzais, moved from the neighbourhood of Qandahär to the province of Herat, the latter tribe, freed from the restraint imposed upon them by their formidable rivals, became relatively much more powerful in Zamindävar and Qandahär. The frequency with which the city and province of Qandahär changed hands between Mughal India and Persia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries3 gave the 1 See in particular Professor Minorsky’s article entitled “The Turkish Dialect of the Khalaj”, BSOS, vol. x, part 2, pp. 426-35, and his translation of, and commentary on, the Ifudïld al-Alam (London, 1937), pp. in, 347 and 348. 2 The Cambridge Shorter History of India, p. 220. 3 Tahniâsp I took Qandahär from the Mughals in 1556; it was retaken by Akbar in 1594; Shäh ‘Abbäs I recovered it from Jahângîr in 1622, but the latter took it back again sixteen years later; Shäh ‘Abbäs II recovered it in 1648, after which time it never again formed part of the Mughal dominions.

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Ghalzais an opportunity to play off one power against the other. Nevertheless, they, like the Abdàlîs, for long showed a preference for Persian rule, despite the fact that they were staunch Sunnis. One reason for this preference was the tolerant and liberal attitude of Shäh ‘Abbas I ; another was the Afghans’ fear lest, under the Mughals, they would have to be subordinate to the Hindus or Balûchïs, two races which they despised. In 1653, when Därä Shuküh made his unsuccessful attempt to retake Qandahär from the Safavïs, the Ghalzais supported the latter and harried the Mughal forces when they had to withdraw to their own country. In the closing years of the seventeenth century, Shäh Sultän Husain was unwise enough to depart from the tolerant religious policy of Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great, and took no steps to prevent the greedy and rapacious governors from Isfahän from waxing rich at the expense of the unfortunate people under them. In 1698/9 the Shäh appointed a certain ‘Abdullah Khän as GovernorGeneral of Qandahär.1 This man, who was of an intensely grasping disposition, exacted far more from the Ghalzais than any of his predecessors had done. When they sent petitions to the court to complain of ‘Abdullah Khän’s behaviour, his friends there took pains to discredit them, with the result that there was no redress. Feeling that they had nothing to hope for from the Safavïs and that they might, after all, be better off under the Mughals, they listened to the overtures which Shäh ‘Alam, Aurangzib’s second son, who was then Governor of Käbul, made to them,1 2 but they did not actually revolt against Persia nor did the Mughal Emperor venture to intervene actively on their behalf. Instead, he sent an embassy to Isfahän to reassert his claim to the province of Qandahär. The Shäh, although alarmed at this move by the Mughals, rejected the claim. 1 According to an anonymous and untitled Turkish memorandum in the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, AEP vol. vi, fol. 242 a, this ‘Abdullah Khän was called “the Georgian”. If this is correct, he must have been a renegade who had taken the name of ‘Abdullah on apostatising. According to this source, the Shäh appointed him Governor-General of Qandahär in mo (1698/9). r 2 See p. 65 above. He succeeded his father in 1707, when he took the title of Bahädur Shäh.

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6-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Matters were in this state when, late in 1703, a strong Balüchï force under a chieftain called Mir Samandar1 entered and ravaged the province. Mir Samandar’s force was sufficiently powerful to defeat the troops which the Governor-General sent against them, killing their commander (who was the Governor-General ’s son), and forcing the Persians to retreat and take refuge in the citadel of Qandahär. When this alarming news reached Isfahan, the Shäh, mindful of the good services rendered by Giorgi XI and his men against the other Baluchis in Kirmän, sent orders to him to march at once to the relief of Qandahär, while, at the same time, he appointed him commander-in-chief. It was all the more necessary to have a capable and experienced commander there, because of the possibility that the Mughals might take advantage of the situation to attempt once more to recover the province. Giorgi at first refused to go, but he was at length induced to agree on condition that his nephew Wakhtang was made Väli of Georgia in place of Erekle of Kakheti.2 No king was, however, appointed to Kartli until 1711, when Wakhtang was given the crown of that country, taking the title of Wakhtang VI or Husain Qulï Khän (as he was known to the Persians).3 Giorgi, having been appointed Governor-General of Qandahär, set out with his troops from Kirmän at the beginning of May 1704; when crossing the grim desert of the Dasht-i-Lüt, they all suffered severely from the heat.4 On reaching Qandahär after a march of just over seven weeks, Giorgi soon obtained the submission of Mir Samandar and his Baluchis, who realised that they could not hope to contend against so stern and capable a commander. Giorgi found that the most influential man amongst the Ghalzais 1 Mir Samandar was the successor of Mir Ahmad Khän, a well-known Baluchi chief of the mid-seventeenth century ; it has been stated, but on doubtful authority, that Mir Samandar once captured Karachi (see M. LongworthDames, “Balochistan”, in EI). 2 Tsarevich Wakhusht, in H. de la G. vol. n, part 1, p. 99. Wakhtang was one of Levan’s sons; he was bom in 1675. Erekle, whose Muhammadan name was Nazar ‘Ali Khän, professed both Christianity and Islam simultaneously according to Toumefort (see p. 75 above). 3 For a list of the kings of Kartli, see A. Gugushvili, “The ChronologicalGenealogical Table of the Kings of Georgia”, in Georgica, vol. 1, nos. 2 and 3, pp. 133-4. See also appendix 11 of this book. 4 Sehknia Chkheidze, “Chronique”, H. de la G. vol. 11, part 1, pp. 24-5. Sekhnia Chkheidze stated that when Giorgi put out his hand to pick up a pair of scissors, he found he could not hold them.

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was a certain Mir Wais (or Uwais)1 ibn Shäh ‘Älam, the Kaläntar or mayor of Qandahär. Mir Wais, who was the chief of the Hôtakî clan,12 was a man of great wealth, which he had amassed through trading with India. At this time, the Ghalzais are said to have consisted of some 50,000 families or 250,000 souls.3 Although Mir Wais showed a submissive and even a co-operative spirit, Giorgi came to the conclusion that he was a dangerous man because of his ambitious nature, his great influence over the Ghalzais and his wealth. Probably as a test of his loyalty, Giorgi sent him on a punitive expedition against a section of the Hazara tribe which had rebelled. Mïr Wais, however, accomplished his mission entirely to the Governor-General’s satisfaction. Ever since their arrival in Qandahär, the Georgian troops had be­ haved with great brutality to the Ghalzais, while Giorgi himself, who always believed in the use of force rather than tact, treated them with exceptional severity.4 The result was that the Ghalzais were at length goaded into rebellion. Giorgi’s early suspicions of Mïr Wais were fully justified when the Ghalzai chief put himself at the head of the insurgents. Although the Ghalzais were good fighters, Giorgi and his strong garrison of veteran Georgians were able to crush them without difficulty. Giorgi then arrested Mïr Wais and sent him under guard to Isfahän, with a strongly worded warning to the Persian court that, as he was a dangerous man, he should be kept in custody, for were he allowed his liberty, much harm would result.5 1 Most of the authorities give the name as Wais, but Muhammad Khalil, in his Majma' al-Tawârïkh, gives it as Uwais throughout. 2 Mahmüd al-Müsâvî, “ Kitäb-i-tahqiq u ta‘däd-i-Aqwäm u Firqa-hä-yiAfâghina”, BM. MS. OR. 1861 ; fol. 29 a, stated that the Ghalzais were divided into thirteen clans. Elphinstone, in his Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, stated that the principal leader of the tribe always belonged to the Hôtakî clan. 8 Mahmüd al-Müsâvî, op. cit. fol. 29 a. 4 Muhammad Mahdi, TN, p. 4. Peyssonnel, Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Georgie, p. 98. The Georgian historians Wakhusht and Sekhnia Chkheidze naturally make no mention of Giorgi’s brutality to the Ghalzais, although the former writer admitted that he was at times “emporté”. 5 Sekhnia Chkheidze, op. cit. in H. de la G. vol. 11, part 11, p. 26. According to Wakhusht, there was no Ghalzai revolt at that juncture. Giorgi, being suspicious of Mir Wais, sent him to Isfahan after he had subdued the Hazara, ostensibly to give news of that event, but in reality to warn the Persian court of his dangerous character. See H. de la G. vol. 1, part 1, p. 101. See also Krusihski, p. 113, and Muhammad Khalil, Majma1 al-Tawârïkh, p. 4. On the whole, Sekhnia Chkheidze seems more likely to be correct. All the sources agree that Mir Wais was an astute, able man and that he bitterly resented Giorgi’s high-handed ways.

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When he reached the Persian capital, Mïr Wais was soon able, by means of flattery and judicious bribes,1 not only to regain his liberty, but also to be received in audience by the Shah. Being a very intelligent man, he saw at once how chaotic was the state of affairs at the court, and he soon discovered that there were many enemies of Giorgi there. He complained bitterly to the Shäh and his ministers of the injustice and brutality of Giorgi and his men, drawing attention to the fact that he (Giorgi) had been in revolt against the Shäh some years previously. As for himself, he said, he was innocent of any evil intentions against Persia; it was Giorgi and not himself who harboured treasonable designs. By these means and by his tact and the judicious use of his wealth, Mir Wais so ingratiated himself at the court that he became very much a persona grata with the simple Shäh and his ministers. Having obtained such a favourable position at Isfahän, he ... thought that nothing could contribute more to confirm the good Opinion there entertain’d of him, than some popular Act of Goodness, which might give him an Air of Devotion, and make him esteem’d as a Man zealous for his Religion and Salvation. A Pilgrimage to Mecca was very proper to produce that Effect, and to conceal still greater Designs... .2

Mïr Wais therefore sought, and had no difficulty in obtaining, permission to make the pilgrimage. On reaching Mecca, he threw aside all pretence, and asked the leading 'ulamä there if it would be lawful for him and his oppressed people, who were all Sunnis, to break their oath of allegiance to the heretical Shäh. Having received zfatwä or pronouncement of the sacred law in the desired sense, he returned to Isfahän, which he reached in the summer of 1708. It was at this juncture that Israel Ori, with his large retinue, reached Shamàkhï on his way to the Persian court, causing widespread alarm not only there, but also amongst the European missionaries and in commercial circles.3 Mir Wais was quick to turn the situation to his advantage. By artful suggestions and insinuations, he played upon and increased 1 Joseph Apisalaimian, in his ‘‘Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 264 b, stated that Mir Wais disbursed 600,000 écus in this manner. * Krusinski, pp. 116-17. 8 See pp. 63 and 64 above.

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the fears of the court, alleging that Peter the Great was about to invade Persia and annex Georgia and Armenia and that Giorgi intended to join him with all his Georgian troops. He also made play with the fact that Giorgi’s brother Archil had long been resident in Russia.1 So skilful were Mïr Wais’s machinations that he was not only given a robe of honour, but was allowed to return to Qandahär in order that he might act as a check upon Giorgi. Giorgi was naturally furious when his enemy returned to his native city not only a free man, but also loaded with honours. He was, however, powerless to take any action against Mïr Wais as he had lost most of his influence at Isfahän. The clever Ghalzai chief, moreover, gave him no opening, being most careful to commit no overt act of hostility. In secret, however, he informed his chief adherents of the true situation in Isfahän, and made them swear a solemn oath to spare neither their wealth nor their lives until they had slain the hated Georgian. The opportunity came in April 1709, when the majority of the Georgian troops, under Giorgi’s nephew Alexander, were absent from Qandahär on a punitive expedition against the Kâkarï tribe.1 2 The precise manner in which Georgi met his end is difficult to determine, as such conflicting accounts are given by the authorities (even the two main Georgian sources do not agree with each other). The main fact, however, is plain enough; Mïr Wais and his followers, taking advantage of the temporary absence of so many of the Georgian troops, were able to take Giorgi by surprise at a village called Deh-i-Shaikh, some 40 miles from Qandahär and kill him and most if not all of the Georgians who were with him.3 1 He might have added that Domenti, Giorgi’s nephew and Wakhtang’s brother, had recently been in Moscow. 2 Muhammad Khalil, Majma 'al-Tawärlkh, p. 6. Wakhusht, loc. cit. p. 101; Sekhnia Chkheidze, Chronique, p. 29. Mirza Mahdi, in the TN, p. 4, said that when Giorgi was on his way to punish the Käkari tribe, Mir Wais succeeded in capturing him and ordered a certain Muräd Khan to slay him. This account is clearly incorrect. 3 Wakhusht, loc. cit. p. 102, said that Mir Wais, by tricking the Abdâlïs who were with Giorgi, gained access to the Governor-General’s tent. By pulling it down on top of him, they prevented him from defending himself or escaping and then killed him. Sekhnia Chkheidze, Chronique, pp. 29-30, also spoke of a surprise, but stated that Giorgi defended himself very bravely and killed several of his adversaries before he was overcome. Krusihski, p. 132, merely stated that Mir Wais assassinated Giorgi, but gave no details. Muhammad Khalil, op. cit. pp. 6-7, said that Mir Wais and his men went at midnight one

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When Alexander and his troops returned from their expedition against the Kakar! and discovered what had happened to Giorgi, severe fighting broke out between them and the Ghalzais. Although greatly outnumbered, the Georgians managed to cut their way through their foes and escape to Girishk. When the news of the death of Giorgi reached Isfahân, the Shah took the futile course of merely sending an emissary to Qandahär to protest.1 Mir Wais threw the envoy into prison and treated a second emissary in the same way. It was only then that the court realised that action of a drastic nature was necessary. Giorgi’s nephew Kai Khusrau2 was at that time the Därügha or Governor of Isfahan; as he was, like his uncle, a good military leader, he was placed in command of a force consisting of 12,000 Qizilbäsh and a strong contingent of Georgians.3 Like so many Georgians who had accepted office under the Shahs, though outwardly a Muslim, he was at heart a Christian; in fact, if Krusinski is to be believed,4 he was preparing to abjure Islam and to have a cross placed on his standard. When he and his army left Isfahan for Qandahär in November 1709, amongst his retinue were a Carmelite friar named Basil of St Charles,5 two Capuchins and an Italian surgeon called Giuseppi Frescurati Veronese.6 When Kai Khusrau and his army reached Herat, they were joined by the Abdäli chief ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai7 and a number night to Giorgi’s harem and that Muräd Khän, an Afghan, seized him as he emerged and killed him. The Ghalzais then slew all the other Georgians who were encamped nearby. Donning their clothing, they pretended to be Georgians and were thus able to enter the citadel of Qandahär and, taking the small garrison by surprise, killed them all and made themselves masters of the city. According to Joseph Apisalaimian, “Mémoire sur la Guerre de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 265 a, Mir Wais invited Giorgi to a feast and then treacherously put him to death. Other versions of how Giorgi met his end are given by Soimonov, in his “Auszug aus dem Tage-Buch”, in Müller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. vu, p. 299, and by Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa in the Tä'rikh-i-Saiyyäh, p. 27 b. (This is his Turkish version of du Cerceau’s recension of Krusinski’s memoirs.) 1 Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 80-3. 2 Kai Khusrau was one of Levan’s sons. 8 Muhammad Muhsin, ZT, fol. 203 a. 4 Krusinski, p. 144. 6 Fr Basil of St Charles had a good knowledge of Persian. In the previous year he had assisted Michel, the French envoy, and had translated into Persian the treaty which Michel had concluded. An account of his career is given in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 11, pp. 812-13. 6 Frescurati was one of Clairac’s sources for this expedition. 7 ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai had, like many of his family, long been resident in Multän. Particulars of him will be given in the next chapter.

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of his tribesmen who at that time were hostile to the Ghalzais. Progress thereafter was extremely slow, and it was not until November 1710 that the army arrived at Farah, a town 225 miles west by north of Qandahär. The reasons for this slow progress were partly Kai Khusrau’s difficulty in raising funds for the campaign, and partly friction between him and the Persian commander of the Qizilbäsh troops. The fact was that the same faction at the court which had opposed Giorgi was now doing everything in its power to thwart his nephew;1 moreover, the Persian treasury officials showed much ill-will towards the Georgian troops by withholding or greatly delaying their pay and supporting those Persian officers who disliked having to serve under a Christian (or rather quasi-Christian) commander.1 2 It never seemed to occur to any of them that, by taking such action, they were really injuring their country’s interests. Not long after his arrival at Faräh, Kai Khusrau entered into a truce with Mir Wais, but it does not seem to be recorded why this truce was arranged or whether it had been preceded by any fighting. In the summer of 1711, this truce came to an end, and Kai Khusrau resumed his advance on Qandahär. Mir Wais and his Ghalzais set forth to meet him, but the Afghan leader soon had to divide his force into two, and march with one part of it to oppose some Abdälis who were on their way to reinforce Kai Khusrau;3 the remainder of the Ghalzais continued in the direction of the advancing Persians and took up a position on the bank of a river (presumably the Helmand). When Kai Khusrau and his men reached this river, they forded it and attacked the weakened Ghalzai force with such impetuosity that it broke and fled back to Qandahär. Meanwhile, although Mir Wais had defeated the Abdälis, he and his men returned to the city in order to strengthen the garrison, it having proved impossible for him to prevent the defeat of the Ghalzais opposing Kai Khusrau. Kai Khusrau made no attempt to take Qandahär by assault, as it was very strongly fortified and garrisoned by brave and resolute troops. He therefore contented himself with siege tactics, 1 Krusinski, pp. 138-9. 2 Ibid. pp. 139-40. See also Wakhusht, in the H. de la G. vol. 11, part 1, p. 104. 3 Majma'al-Tawâflkh, p. 9.

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and by the end of two months he had so reduced the garrison that they offered to surrender on terms. Kai Khusrau was unwise enough to reject this offer, saying that the surrender must be unconditional, with the result that the Ghalzais decided to continue the struggle. Meanwhile, Mir Wais had asked the Baluchi tribes from the country to the south of Qandahär to come to his aid. They responded to his appeal, but avoided a pitched battle with the Persians and Georgians. No doubt at the instigation of the cunning Mir Wais, they adopted harassing tactics and ravaged the country far and wide round Qandahär, thus depriving the besieging force of its supplies. To make matters worse, dysentery broke out in the Persian camp, and, on 27 September, Alexander, Kai Khusrau’s cousin, and a number of his men were killed in a skirmish.1 Realising that he had missed his opportunity and that his position was rapidly becoming untenable, Kai Khusrau gave the order for retreat on 26 October. As his men began to withdraw, the Afghans under Mir Wais, in accordance with their practice of attacking a retreating foe, emerged from Qandahär and made a fierce attack on the Georgian rearguard, which was under the command of Kai Khusrau himself. The Georgians fought with their usual bravery and so did the Abdälis under ‘Abdullah Khän, but their Persian comrades, weakened by hunger, fled from the field. Amongst those who ran away was Kai Khusrau’s brother Yésé.2 Kai Khusrau might have been able to extricate himself and those with him, but his horse unfortunately stumbled when crossing a canal and threw him. Before he could regain the saddle, the Ghalzais came up with him and killed him.3 The Carmelite Friar Basil of St Charles also lost his life in this action, but the Italian surgeon Frescurati Veronese survived.4 The Ghalzais hotly pursued the fleeing Persians, many of whom they slew, but the surviving Georgians and Abdälis beat them off 1 Sekhnia Chkheidze, “Chronique”, H. de la G, vol. 11, part n, p. 31. Brosset, H, de la G, vol. 11, part 1, p. 107. 2 Brosset, H. de la G, vol. 11, part 11, p. 108. Brosset described Yésé as a “ très chaud mahométan, fort assidu aux pratiques musulmanes, riche et insolent”. 8 Sekhnia Chkheidze, op. cit, p. 31. 4 A copy of a letter from Frescurati to the Georgian prince, Sulkhan Saba, dated 20 September 1714, is preserved in the French archives (AEP, vol. iv, fols. 92b-93b).

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and made good their escape. It was, however, a crushing defeat; not only were many hundreds of the Shah’s forces killed, but all their baggage and cannon fell into the rebels’ hands.1 It was the first real test to which the Persian army had been put for many years. The lessons to be learnt from the result should have been obvious to the government, namely, that it was worse than useless to send untrained and completely inexperienced men—apart from the Georgians and Abdälis—against such good fighters as the Ghalzais. The trouble was not with the men themselves, but with their lack of discipline and training, and, above all, with the dearth of capable and courageous officers. Kai Khusrau and his Georgian officers were of good quality as leaders, but they were not numerous enough; moreover, as has been seen, there was a strong dis­ inclination on the part of many of the Persians to serve either under them or with them. Another fifteen years were to elapse before Nadr Quli Beg, the future Nädir Shäh, saw where the root of the trouble lay, and set about to remove it. The news of the death of Kai Khusrau and the total defeat of his army caused great alarm in Isfahän.2 After lengthy, and for the most part futile, discussions, the Shäh and his ministers despatched another force, under the aged Qurchi-bäshi, Muhammad Zamän Khän, against the rebels. Muhammad Zamän Khän, like Kai Khusrau, marched very slowly, and it was long before he and his men reached Mashhad. Further delay occurred there owing to his illness. Eventually, he recovered sufficiently to go on to Herat, but there he fell ill again and died.3 Deprived of their general, the troops dispersed without ever coming within measurable distance of the Ghalzais. The Persian government was slow to take any further steps to crush the Ghalzai rebels. What with the length of time taken by Muhammad Zamän Khän on his abortive expedition and the long period of inaction that ensued, Mir Wais was able to spend the last few years of his life undisturbed. Although he extended his authority over the whole of the province of Qandahär and governed 1 ZT, fol. 203 b; TN, p. 4. 2 ZT, fol. 203 b. 3 TN, p. 4. (Mïrzâ Mahdi could not resist a pun at the expense of the defunct general, saying that Muhammad Zamän took so much time (zamän) on the march that he died before he could reach his objective.) See also the Majma1 al-Tawärlkh, p. 18.

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as a sovereign ruler, he, like Karim Khan half a century later, was content with the title of Wakil or Regent. Mir Wais was undoubtedly a most remarkable man. He was by no means lacking in bravery, but preferred guile and cunning to the use of force. If he had to strike, he usually waited until he could do so with a good chance of success (his only failure was on the occasion of the premature rising in 1706, but his hand was then forced by his tribesmen).1 We do not know for certain whether Mir Wais ever entertained the idea of marching on Isfahan himself and of supplanting the Shäh.1 2 He was fully aware of the feebleness and corruption that prevailed in the capital, and he no doubt felt that a bold raid might be carried out with every chance of success. On the other hand, he may have been far-sighted enough to realise that, although a mere raid might succeed, an actual occupation of Persia for any considerable time might be attended with grave risks. If he did indeed consider taking any such action, it was probably the weight of advancing years which deterred him from such a course. However that may be, he had enabled his tribe to cast off the shackles of the Safavls, and he may be regarded as having been, perhaps quite unconsciously, the pioneer of Afghan independence. When Mir Wais died in 1715, he was buried in a simple tomb on the outskirts of Qandahär. This building is still standing, and 1 For an excellent summing-up of Mir Wais’s character, see C. C. Peyssonnel, Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Géorgie, pp. 52-3. Voltaire was hardly fair to Mir Wais when he wrote, in his Deuxième Discours de la Liberté (Oeuvres (Paris, 1829), vol. xn, p. 58): L’oppresseur insolent, l’usurpateur avare, Cartouche, Miriwits, ou tel autre barbare.

Some years after Mir Wais’s death, when his exploits and those of his son Mahmüd became widely known in Europe, they caused a great sensation. Much, mostly of a garbled and confused nature, was written about him. The most curious book on the subject is entitled The Persian Cromwell, by an author who wisely chose to remain anonymous ; a brief account of this spurious book will be found in appendix vi. 2 According to Joseph Apisalaimian (as quoted by Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 135-6), Mir Wais had intended to make himself master of the whole of Persia, and had, when dying, left instructions to his successor to this effect. While this statement may be correct, it is by no means certain that it was so, because Joseph, as will be seen in note 2, p. 93 below, was by no means an infallible authority in regard to events that occurred at some distance from him.

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PLATE II

The tomb of Mir Wais on the outskirts of Qandahâr.

THE REVOLT OF THE GHALZAI AFGHANS

the local people often resort to it in order to be cured of illness; on the other hand, his memory has been overshadowed by that of Ahmad Shäh Durrânî.1 ‘Abd al-‘Azîz,12 Mïr Wais’s brother and successor, was a man of very different temperament and ideas. He was peace-loving and cautious to the point of timidity. After ‘Abd al-‘Aziz had ruled for some eighteen months, he proposed, much against the wishes of his people, to submit to Shäh Sultän Husain. As he persisted in this design, despite their protests, the other chiefs incited Mir Mahmud, the elder son of Mir Wais, who was then aged eighteen, to murder his uncle and rule in his place in order to preserve their independence. Mahmüd, who was not burdened with scruples, did as they wished, and thus became the leader of the tribe. Mahmüd, unlike his uncle, was vigorous and warlike, but he lacked the subtlety and, of course, the experience of his father. He also showed at times a lack of resolution. It was fortunate for the Ghalzais in general and for Mahmüd in particular that the revolt of the Abdälis of Herat, which had broken out during the short tenure of office of ‘Abd al-‘Azïz, effectively distracted the attention of the Persian court from Qandahär. Although a number of expeditionary forces were collected together and despatched from Isfahän with the double object of crushing first the Abdälis and then the Ghalzais, the former tribe invariably proved more than a match for them.3 Mahmüd was thus enabled to carry out his coup d'état and after­ wards to consolidate his position without any interference by the Persians. As events were to prove, Mahmüd was of an ambitious nature, and he was to show himself both willing and able to take the offensive, instead of being content with the passive role of defence. Despite his youth and his lack of knowledge of affairs, he realised 1 I had supposed that this would be the case, but, in order to make sure, I asked my friend Mr Oliver de Baer, the leader of the Cambridge Expedition to Afghanistan in 1955, to make inquiries whilst in Qandahär. He very kindly did so, and verified my supposition. 2 According to contemporary Persian sources the name is unquestionably ‘Abd al-‘Azïz. It was Joseph Apisalaimian who erroneously gave it as ‘Abdullah, and thus misled Clairac and, through him, Hanway and more recent writers. 8 For details, see the next chapter.

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that he must build up his strength before attempting any major venture. Furthermore, he may have been aware that delay was advantageous for another reason. The Safavi edifice of state, imposing though it still appeared when viewed from a distance, was already crumbling at various points.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLT OF THE

ABDÄLIS The powerful tribe of the Abdâlïs (or Durranis as they are now called),1 unlike their Ghalzai rivals, are of true Afghan stock, as they belong to the Sarbani branch of that race. According to their own tradition, they derived their name from a certain Abdäl (or Avdäl) ibn Tarin ibn Sharkhbün ibn Sarban ibn Qais.2 Abdäl is said to have been so called because he was in the service of an abdal or saint named Khwäja Abu Ahmad, of the Chistiyya Order.3 Although little or no reliance can be placed on this tradition, it does not appear so far-fetched as Bellew’s derivation of Abdäli from Abtila (Hun), from the Arabic word Haital (plural Hayâtila).4 Although there is a possible connection between the Ghalzais and the Ephthalite Huns, there is, so far as is known, no relationship whatsoever between the latter and the Abdâlïs. The Abdälis had for long inhabited the province of Qandahär, but in the early part of the reign of Shäh ‘Abbäs I they moved to the neighbouring province of Herat because of pressure from the Ghalzais.5 In 1006 a.h. (1597/8) Shäh ‘Abbäs raised a certain 1 From “ Durr-i-Durrän ” (“Pearl of Pearls”), as Ahmad Khän Sadözai, the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan, styled himself after he became the ruler of the country in 1747. This title is said to have been revealed to him in a dream. 2 Qais was, presumably, also the putative ancestor of Shaikh Bitin or Bait (see p. 81 above). 3 See my revision of Longworth Dames’s article on the Abdâlïs in the new edition of the EI. 4 An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan, p. 158. One may compare this view with the theory, mentioned by Sharon Turner in his History of the Anglo-Saxons (London, 1823), vol. 1, p. 247, that the Anglo-Saxons were descended from the Sacasenae or Sakae I 6 H. G. Raverty, in his article “The Independent Afghan or Patan Tribes” in Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol. vji, p. 326, stated: “The Durranis from the time of their conquest and occupation of Herat in 1713 and their long dependence upon Persia previously, acquired some of the polish of that nation, but lost a good deal of the Afghan sturdiness.” Raverty’s opinion is rather too sweeping, because the Abdâlïs retained their fighting qualities ; their chief weakness was their propensity to quarrel amongst themselves.

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Sadö, of the Popalzai clan, to the headship of his tribe, giving him the title of Mir-i-Afäghina (“ Leader of the Afghans”); this action by the Shäh enabled Sadö to free his tribe from Ghalzai pre­ dominance. The Abdâlïs showed their gratitude to the Shäh by assisting him when he besieged and took Qandahär from the Mughal Emperor Jahângïr in March 1622. Shäh ‘Abbäs rewarded Sadö by giving him the title of Sultän. As has been already pointed out, the Abdâlïs, as well as the Ghalzais, preferred to be under the tolerant, but heretical, rulers of Persia than under the orthodox Mughals; this preference continued until the time of Shäh Sultän Husain, when the rapacity of the provincial officials brought about a change. In the early years of the eighteenth century the Abdâlïs were said to be rather more numerous than the Ghalzais. Muhammad Mahdi estimated that they then consisted of 60,000 families,1 while the Armenian Joseph Apisalaimian, Gardane’s interpreter­ secretary, gave the number as 53,000? At that time, the two principal clans of the Abdâlïs were the Popalzai and the Bärakzai (the present ruling family of Afghanistan belong to the latter). Of the Popalzai the leading family was that of the Sadözai or “sons of Sadö”, the chieftain referred to above. ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai, a descendant of Khidr, the fifth son of Sadö, who had led the Abdâlï contingent in the disastrous expedition of Kai Khusrau,3 had been rewarded by the Shäh for his services with the chieftain­ ship of the tribe. When Muhammad Zamän Khän Shämlü died at Herat, he was succeeded as Beglarbegi by ‘Abbäs Qulï Khän, a member of the same family. On learning of the success achieved by the Ghalzais of Qandahär, ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai and his son Asadullah4 are said to have been inspired to emulate them and shake off the Persian yoke. Being suspicious, however, of this intention, ‘Abbäs Quli Khän arrested the father and son and threw them into prison. Shortly afterwards, a mutiny of the Qizilbäsh garrison of Herat took place, and, in the resulting confusion, ‘Abdullah and Asadullah escaped. The mutineers then seized ‘Abbäs Qulï Khän 1 TN, p. 4. See also the Majma1 al-Tau'ârïkh, p. 19 and ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Alavl, Tâ'rïkh-i-Ahmad, p. 4. 2 “Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 262b. 8 See p. 88 above. 4 Muhammad Muhsin erroneously calls him Sa‘dullah throughout.

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“because of his evil ways”,1 and sent to Isfahan to ask for him to be replaced. While ‘Abdullah and his son Asadullah were gathering together their tribesmen, Ja‘far Khan Ustäjlü (or Hätiml),2 the new general whom the Persian court had appointed to subdue the Abdälls and Ghalzais, arrived at Herat. When the rebel Abdâlïs under Asadullah approached the city, Ja‘far Khan Ustäjlü led his men out to meet them, but suffered a shattering defeat, being either killed or captured himself, while his forces were dispersed.3 On learning of this disaster, Mansur Khan Shäh-sevan, the Governor-General of Mashhad, set out for Herat with part of his garrison, but he and his men were routed by Asadullah at Ghuriän. When the news of Mansur Khan’s defeat reached the Persian court, the Shäh and his ministers dismissed him from his post and appointed Fath ‘Ali Khän Turkman, the Mir Shikär-bäshi, as commander-in-chief of a fresh force, and sent him to Khurâsàn. Unfortunately, all these various armies which the government despatched to quell the rebels consisted of totally untrained men, while their generals were incompetent. On arrival at Mashhad in September 1716 Fath ‘All Khän Turk­ man had many of the ornaments of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä melted down and made into coins in order to provide pay for the troops.4 When all the preparations had been made, Fath ‘ Alï Khän in his turn set out for Herat. He and his men met the Abdälis under Asadullah at Kusüya, a village three stages from Herat, and gained an initial success. Being totally inexperienced, Fath ‘Ali Khän was then rash enough to pursue Asadullah with a force of only 1000 men. Asadullah was quick to perceive his adversary’s error. Having encouraged his men, he fiercely attacked Fath ‘Ali Khän and his small force, killing the general and most of his men. Thereupon, the rest of the Qizilbäsh army fled from the field, leaving all their cannon and baggage to the Abdâlïs. 1 Majmcf al-Tawârlkh, p. 20. According to Chirac, vol. 1, p. 114, the actual cause of the Abdäli revolt was the behaviour of the Governor-General of Herat, who had mortally offended Asadullah. He gave the name of the GovernorGeneral as Muhammad Zamän Khän, but this is erroneous. 2 TN, p. 5, Majma' al-Tawänkh, p. 20. Muhammad Muhsin, in the ZT, fol. 203 b, gives the new general’s name as Ja'far Qulï Khän Hätimi (who was said to be a descendant of Hätim Tayy)8 ZT, fol. 203b, TN, p. 5. 4 ZT, fol. 204a. 7

97

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Asadullah then adopted the offensive, and marched to Mashhad, which he besieged. Although the defenders were but few and were ill-equipped, they successfully withstood a siege which lasted for two months. By “the miraculous aid of the Imam Rida”1 all the onslaughts of the Abdâlïs were repulsed, and in the end the enemy raised the siege and set off in the direction of Nïshâpür. On reaching Qadam-Gâh, they wrecked the fort that stood on the hill overlooking the shrine and then withdrew to Herat.12 The next general to be sent from Isfahän to deal with the situation in Khuräsän was Safi Quli Khän Turkistän-oghlu, the Därügha of Isfahän. After collecting a large number of men and many cannon and munitions, he set out for Khuräsän. At this juncture, Shir Ghâzï Khän, of Urganj, invaded Khuräsän with his özbegs, and was soon joined by the Teke3 and Yamut Turcomans. On learning of this new development, Safi Quli Khän turned north and encountered and routed the Özbegs and Turcomans near the turquoise mines at Bar-i-Maidän, in the mountains to the north-west of Nïshâpür. In this battle, several thousand özbegs and their allies were killed, 1500 were captured, and only 700 suc­ ceeded in regaining Urganj. As the Chamishgazak Kurds, who had joined the royal forces shortly before, behaved in a cowardly manner in the battle, Safi Quli Khän put a number of them to death.4 Safi Quli Khän thereupon marched in triumph to Mashhad, where he halted for a time to complete his preparations for the campaign against the Abdâlïs. When at length he and his men set out from Mashhad, news of their impending attack had reached 1 ZT, fol. 204b. In his account of this siege of Mashhad, Muhammad Hasan Khän, in his Kitäb-i-Muntazam-i-Näsiri, vol. 11, p. 230, makes two mistakes. In the first place, he states that the siege took place in 1135 (1722/3), which is at least four years too late ; secondly, he states that it was Zamän Khan (presumably, he meant Muhammad Zamän Khän Sadözai) who was in command of the Abdâlïs who were besieging Mashhad. 2 ZT, fol. 204 b. This fort was subsequently rebuilt and is still in existence. 3 Teke is the spelling adopted by Professor Gunnar Jarring in his book On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan: an Attempt at a preliminary Classification, p. 47; in so doing, he states that he has followed the practice of G. Karpo vin his Turkmeniya i Turkmeni and O. Tumanovich in his Turk­ menistan i Turkmeni (Materiali k Izucheniu istorii i etnografii), 4 ZT, fol. 204b. According to the Majma* al-Tauârïkh, p. 24, some of the Qäjär tribe, who had joined Safi Quli Khän before the battle, fought very bravely, but were accused by him of cowardice. He then punished them, thereby causing unrest in his army.

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THE REVOLT OF THE ABDÂLÏS

Asadullah. As he had done before, the Abdâlï leader decided to meet the Persian force en route, and advanced as far as Kafir QaFa (a village two miles to the west of the Hari-Rud, on the road connecting Herat with Mashhad),1 where he posted his men behind the walls of the numerous gardens surrounding the village. When the Persian troops drew near, the Abdâlï marksmen took a heavy toll from behind the protecting walls. Nevertheless, the issue of the battle was for some time in doubt, and the Persians might have been victorious but for the carelessness of their artillerymen, who opened fire on some of their own infantry and so threw them into confusion. The Abdâlïs thereupon attacked vigorously and routed their foes. Seeing that the day was irretrievably lost, Safï Qulï Khan, preferring death to disgrace, mounted on a powder barrel and blew himself up.2 These humiliating reverses, coupled with the loss of the Bahrain and other islands in the Persian Gulf,3 so stirred that now very aged, but still resolute and outspoken person, Maryam Begum, that she bitterly reproached the Shäh for his indolence and indifference. She herself gave a large sum of money to go towards the cost of a further expedition against the rebels, and the Shäh was constrained to follow her example. In order to supervise the raising of more troops in the north­ west, the Shäh moved his court from Isfahän to Qazvïn in the winter of 1717/18. However, this move was nothing more than a flash in the pan, because, on reaching Qazvïn, the ministers resumed their bickerings and squabbles, with the result that nothing whatever was done. In the words of the contemporary Persian historian, Muhammad Muhsin: The leaders and pillars of the state, each one by reason of his vain personal interests and hypocrisy against the others, veiled his eyes to what was expedient for the state. Whenever anyone wished to move [against the enemy], each [of the others] would make an excuse and prevent anything from being done. They postponed their departure and occupied themselves with pleasures. For three years they remained in Qazvïn, practising the selling of offices and the receiving (of bribes).4 1 ZT, fol. 204b. a Käfir Qal'a (which has recently had the stigma of infidelity removed by being renamed Islam Qafa) is the Persian customs post on the main road from Mashhad to Herat. 8 ZT, fol. 205a. 4 See p. no below. 6 ZT, fol. 205 a.

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7-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

Another contemporary authority, the Scotsman, John Bell of Antermony, who, as a member of the mission of the Russian ambassador Artemii Petrovich Volynsky, was in Persia from the autumn of 1716 to the beginning of 1718, said that the Persian ministers . neglected and despised these rebels (i.e. the Afghans), threatening, in their stile (szr), to send some troops to cut them all to pieces. Time hath shown the vanity of these high words. I must observe that they wanted neither men nor money; but their soldiers were undisciplined; and, above all, they had no officers of sufficient abilities to command them.1

During the whole of this period the Shäh and his ministers left the Abdâlïs and the Ghalzais entirely to their own devices. Immediately the two tribes were freed from any danger from Persia they went to war with each other. Asadullah, whom his father had appointed Governor of Faräh, formed the ambitious design of taking Qandahär, which had been in the possession of his tribe until the early part of the reign of Shäh ‘Abbäs.2 Having received warning beforehand of Asadullah’s intentions, Mahmüd of Qandahär, who by this time had made himself the undisputed chief of the Ghalzais, set out to give battle to Asadullah. The two armies met at Diläräm, a small town on the route between Faräh and Zamïndâvar. In this engagement, the Abdâlïs were heavily defeated and Asadullah was amongst the slain. Mahmüd, who had inherited some of his father’s cunning, cut off Asadullah’s head and those of many of his fallen followers, and sent them to Shäh Sultän Husain with a feigned profession of submission and obedience.3 He then said that he had taken the field against Asadullah out of loyalty to the Persian throne. The simple monarch was, as usual, completely deceived, and rewarded Mahmüd by sending him a robe of honour, by appointing him 1 A Journey from St Petersburg in Russia to Ispahan in Persia with an Embassy from His Imperial Majesty Peter the First (London, 1764), vol. 1, p. 92. For particulars of this embassy, see the following chapter. 8 See p. 82 above. 8 Mirza Mahdi stated (TN, p. 5) that Mahmüd went to Qazvin (where the Shäh then was), but this seems improbable. The wits of Qazvin composed the following chronogram with regard to Mahmud’s victory over Asadullah: Asad-rä sag-i-Shäh-i-Irän darïd, meaning, “ The Dog of the Shäh of Persia has tom the Lion [asad] ”. This line gives the date, viz. 1332 (equivalent to 1719/20). See the Majma* al-Tawârtkht p. 53. IOO

THE REVOLT OF THE ABDÄLIS

Governor-General of Qandahär and by giving him the title of Husain Qulî Khân.1 In the meantime, the Abdâlïs were taking advantage of their newly won independence to squabble amongst themselves, and a most bewildering series of internal disputes and intrigues broke out which lasted for several years. ‘Abdullah Khân Sadôzai, the father of the late Asadullah, was attacked, captured and put to death by a kinsman named Muhammad Zamän Khän Sadözai. The new chieftain was, however, soon superseded by Muhammad Khân Afghan, another member of the Sadôzai family, who, like ‘Abdullah, had come from Multän. Muhammad Khän turned out to be such a tyrant that the tribesmen deposed him and made Dhu’l-Fiqär, the elder son of Muhammad Zamän Khän, chief in his place.2 Dhu’l-Fiqär was soon challenged by Rahmän Khän, another son of the late ‘Abdullah Khän, who had come from Multän in 1137 (1725/6) for the express purpose of avenging his father. Realising at last that these internecine struggles were greatly weakening the tribe, the majority of the Abdâlïs put an end to them, and exiled Dhu’l-Fiqär to Bäkharz and his rival to Faräh. Eventually, Allah-Yär Khän, a brother of Muhammad Khän Afghan, assumed the leadership of the tribe, but his authority was speedily challenged by Dhu’l-Fiqär who, with the support of a zealous partisan, had left Bäkharz in order to attempt to recover the coveted chieftainship. As before, however, the Abdâlïs them­ selves put an end to the struggle for power, exiling Allah-Yär Khän to Marüchäq and Dhu’l-Fiqär to Faräh.3 It was typical of the inept government that it made no effort while it still had the means to take advantage of this internal strife amongst the Abdâlïs to step in and crush them. The time when this could have been done soon passed. The preoccupation of the Abdâlïs with their own quarrels and rivalries undoubtedly influenced the course of events in Persia, since Mahmud, the young Ghalzai leader, felt that he no longer had anything to fear from Herat. 1 ZT, fol. 205 a. 2 Dhu’l-Fiqär’s younger brother was Ahmad Khän, the future Ahmad Shäh Durrani. 8 These details have been taken from Mahmud al-Müsävfs Kitâb-i-Tahqlq va Ta*däd-i-Aqwäm va Fivqa~hâ-yi-Afâghinat fols. 6 b—7 a. See also Muhammad Hasan Khän, Kitâb-i-Muntazam-i~Nâ^irît p. 230. IOI

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

By 1716-17 both the Ghalzais and the Abdâlïs had succeeded in shaking off the Persian yoke, but there is no evidence to show that either of them was then aiming at anything more than tribal independence. The idea of a united and independent Afghan nation was not to come for another thirty years ; the man responsible for conceiving this idea and putting it into effect was Ahmad Khän, the younger brother of Dhu’l-Fiqar.

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CHAPTER IX

VOLYNSKY’S MISSION AND THE RUSSO-PERSIAN TREATY OF 1717 Some years elapsed after Israel Ori’s mission to Persia before Peter the Great made any further move in regard to that country. This inaction was not due to any loss of interest on Peter’s part but was caused solely by his heavy commitments elsewhere. He continued to receive information on the state of Persia, particularly in the parts inhabited by the Georgians and Armenians.1 By 1715 Peter felt sufficiently free to send another mission to Persia, but this time it was on purely official lines. He chose as his envoy one of his most promising young officials, Artemii Petrovich Volynsky by name, who, unlike some of his other protégés, such as Yagushinsky and Menshikov, was of good family. Volynsky was at that time only 28 years old.12 Peter’s instructions to Volynsky were to the following effect:

(i) He was to conclude a commercial treaty with Persia. (ii) He was to endeavour to persuade the Shäh and his ministers (if necessary by bribing the latter) to divert through Russia the considerable trade in raw silk which the Armenian merchants in Persia had for so long carried on with Europe through Syria and Turkey. In so doing, Volynsky was to stress to the Persians the great advantages of river and 1 Peter received his data from a number of sources, such as Alexander Archilovich and other Georgians on the one hand, and Armenians like Israel Ori on the other (for Ori’s letters to Gagarin and others, see Ezov, Snosheniya Petra Velikago s Armyanskim Narodom, and P. T. Arutunian, Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye Armyanskogo Naroda v pervoi Chetverti XVIII Veka). As is clear from a number of sources, particularly P. T. Arutunian’s article entitled “Borba Armyanskogo i Azerbaidzhanskogo Narodov v 20-kh Godakh XVIII Veka za Prisoedineniye k Rossii”, in Ucheniye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya, vol. in, pp. 108-38, there was a definite movement in Armenia and parts of Adharbaijan for union, or at any rate close association, with Russia in the first twenty years of the eighteenth century. 2 One of Volynsky’s ancestors, Dimitri Ivanovich Volynsky, had held a high military command in the time of Boris Godunov, see Müller, Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. v, p. 108. Some twenty years later, Claudius Rondeau, the British Resident at St Petersburg, was on friendly terms with Volynsky, whom he described as “ a very ingenious Man, and [he] has often been employed in Affairs of importance”; SP. 91, vol. xxn. I°3

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

canal communications in Russia as compared with the lengthy overland route through Aleppo and Smyrna. (iii) In the event of failure to persuade the Persians to agree to this diversion, means must be found to put obstacles in the way of the transit trade through Aleppo and Smyrna (it was characteristic of Peter that he added in his own handwriting the words: “Is it possible to impede the Smyrna and Aleppo trade? Where and how?”). (iv) He was to collect full information on the resources, conditions and communications of Persia; such information was to include particulars of the rivers flowing into the Caspian Sea, what countries they traversed and whether any of them came from India. (v) He was to glean as much information as possible respecting Persia’s military strength.1

Peter’s addition to (iii) above is alone sufficient to demonstrate the spurious nature of his so-called “Political Testament”. In article 8 of what purports to be a résumé of this document, by C. L. Lesur, an official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1 2 it is stated that Peter the Great recommended to his successors, inter alia, that the transit trade through Syria should be re-established, which is precisely the opposite of what we know’ he had in mind. While it is certainly possible that Peter may have conceived the idea of concluding a commercial treaty with Persia from the example set by France in 1708, it is evident from the concluding part of his instructions to Volynsky that his aims were of a wider nature. 1 Soloviev, Istoriya Rossii, vol. xvin, pp. 27-8; Butkov, Material! dlya novoy Istorii Kavkaza, vol. 1, p. 4 (the latter authority is wrong in stating that Peter on this occasion instructed Volynsky to obtain satisfaction from the Shah for the losses sustained by Russian merchants at Shamakhi during the sack of that town by the Lezgis in 1712, because this incident did not take place until 1721. For a suggested explanation as to how this mistake in the date arose, see n. i on p. 128 below. 2 This résumé is on pp. 177-9 of Lesur’s book Des Progrès de la Puissance Russe depuis son Origine jusqu'au Commencement du XIXe Siècle (Paris, 1812). It is believed that this book was written at Napoleon’s orders for the express purpose of depicting Russia and her rulers in as unfavourable a light as possible. It is certainly curious that no mention is to be found of this so-called “ Political Testament” at an earlier date than 1812 (even Lesur’s earlier book on Russia De la Politique et des Progrès de la Puissance Russe, which appeared in 1807, does not mention it). F. Gaillardet, in his Mémoires du Chevalier d'Eon (Paris, 1836) stated that the Chevalier discovered the “Political Testament” in the archives at Peterhof in 1757, but he seems to have been unaware that the Chevalier knew no Russian and that there were no archives there.

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THE RUSSO-PERSIAN TREATY OF 1717

We are fortunate in possessing a detailed account of the Volynsky mission by its surgeon, John Bell of Antermony.1 The mission left St Petersburg on 29 July 1715, but progress was very slow, and all but a year elapsed before it reached Astrakhan. The party sailed from Astrakhan on 16 August 1716, but, owing to the absence of wind, it did not arrive at Niäzäbäd2 until 9 September. They reached Shamakhi, the capital of Shirvan,3 a month later and made a long halt there, largely owing to a dispute between the ambassador and the governor regarding the amount of the former’s allowance. Leaving Shamakhi in mid-December, the mission travelled via Tabriz, Miäna, Zanjân, Qum (where the ambassador and some of his retinue were allowed to visit the shrine of Fätima al-Ma‘süma, the sister of the Imäm Ridä), Käshän and Natanz to Isfahan, where they arrived on 25 March 1717. Volynsky and his suite were received with fitting ceremony by the Persian authorities and were sumptuously lodged in one of the Shah’s palaces. At first all went well with Volynsky and his negotiations, but the demeanour of the Persian ministers changed when they heard of the construction of forts by the Russian expedition under Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky4 on the 1 Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to Diverse Parts of Asia, vol. 1, pp. 1-129. 2 The Russian form of this name is Nisovoi or Nisovaya. The roadstead (it can hardly be called a port) is 40 miles to the north-east of Shamakhi. See de Bruyn’s Travels, vol. 11, p. 164 and pls. 240 and 241. 3 Bell (op. cit. p. 56) described Shamakhi as standing “on the declivity of a hill, inclining to the south, and rises towards the top in form of an amphitheatre. The place is large, but the houses are meanly built; excepting those of the governor, the chief magistrates, and a few rich merchants. The streets are narrow and irregular. The greater part of the inhabitants are Persians. There is also a considerable number of Georgians and Armenians. The vulgar language is Turkish, but the people of distinction speak Persian. The air is more healthy than at places nearer to the Caspian sea. ” Bell might have added that four-fifths of the population of the town were Sunnis, but he may have been unaware of the distinction between them and the Shi'is. For a view of the town as it was in the early eighteenth century, see pl. 38 in vol. 1 of de Bruyn’s Travels. * Peter’s reasons for sending Bekovich on this expedition were twofold. In the first place, he had for long cherished the idea of opening up a safe traderoute from Russia to India across the Caspian sea and thence overland either through Persia or Khiva and Bukhärä. He had studied Medvediev’s favourable report (see p. 60 above), and by 1716 he had also seen the reports furnished by Semeon Malinky and Andrei Semenov who had recently returned from their long sojourn in India. Secondly, he had heard, through a Turcoman named Hajji Nafas of the reported existence of gold in the sands of the Oxus. Bekovich, who had alarmed the Khan of Khiva (as well as the Persians) by his construction of forts on the Caspian coast, met with opposition from the Khan,

!O5

FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

Caspian coast at the former mouth of the Amü-Daryä or Oxus. Soon afterwards, the news was received of the murder of Bekovich and the virtual annihilation of his force by the Khlvans. Thence­ forward for some time Volynsky and the members of his mission were confined to their quarters and no progress with the negotia­ tions was possible. However, the Persians later modified their attitude, with the result that Volynsky was able to conclude the treaty in an eminently satisfactory manner. By its terms, Russian merchants were allowed to trade freely throughout Persia and to make unrestricted purchases of raw silk. Moreover, the Persian government undertook to protect Russian subjects from robbery and violence.1 It had taken nearly six months to achieve this result, but the time thus spent had by no means been wasted, because, apart altogether from the successful conclusion of the treaty, Volynsky had ample opportunity to study at first hand the principal personages at the Persian court and the state of affairs there and in the country generally. He had very naturally been angered by his treatment at the hands of the Shah and his ministers. Of the Shäh and Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäm he formed a most unfavourable opinion:

Here [in Persia] there is now such a head that he is not over his subjects, but is the subject of his subjects, and I am certain that it is rare to find such a fool even amongst ordinary people, not to say crowned heads. For that reason, he never transacts any business himself, but passes everything on to his Ekhtma-Devlet (Ptimäd al-Daula, i.e. Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäm), who is stupider than an ox, but is nevertheless such a favourite that the Shäh pays attention to everything that he says and does whatever he bids.2 but defeated his forces in a battle outside Khiva. The Khän then submitted, but Bekovich foolishly allowed his men, at the Khan’s suggestion, to be split into small parties and billeted in the town. Practically the whole force was then murdered, Bekovich himself being flayed alive. Of 800 Grebentsi Cossacks who took part in this expedition, only two returned alive. For Russia’s relations with Khiva and Bukhärä in the time of Peter the Great, see A. N. Popov, Snosheniya Rossii s Khivoyu i Bukharoyu pri Petre Velikom (St Petersburg, 1853). 1 Soloviev, vol. xvm, pp. 29-30; Butkov, vol. 1, p. 4. 2 Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 29. Although Volynsky was fully justified in saying what he did about the Shäh, he underestimated the abilities of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäni. Some allowance must, no doubt, be made for his treatment in Içfahân.

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THE RUSSO-PERSIAN TREATY OF 1717

Volynsky went on to prophesy the speedy fall of the Safavï dynasty unless the Shah were replaced by a ruler with better qualifications, and he advocated the annexation by Russia of the provinces bordering the Caspian Sea lest they should be overrun by the Afghan rebels.1 He went on to say that, when a revolt broke out in Shîrvân, the authorities had the greatest difficulty in raising even 500 men to send against the rebels. There were, he said, rebels everywhere. So disturbed was the general situation12 and so demoralised and inefficient had the Persian forces become that, in his view, Russia would require only a small army to conquer the country if war were to break out.3 John Bell, evidently writing before the crisis that preceded the signing of the treaty, described the Shäh in rather more favourable terms than Volynsky had done, but he said that he was

little acquainted with the world, and leaves the management of the empire wholly to his ministers: in them he places an entire confidence : and they, in their turn, persuade him, that it is below his dignity to attend to any public affairs whatever. At this very time there was a formidable rebellion begun at Chandahar, a strong town on the borders of India, by Mery-Mahmut, an enterprising and powerful chief, who took advantage of the weakness of the present administration.4 Volynsky and his suite left Isfahän for Russia on 1/12 September 1717, taking with them a number of gifts from the Shäh for Peter the Great. These gifts included two lions and a large elephant (the latter had been one of six which J. J. Ketelaar, the envoy from the Dutch East India Company, had recently presented to the Shäh).6 1 Butkov, vol. I, p. 4. Just over three years later, the Turkish envoy Durrï Efendi was to make a similar prophecy. 2 In Isfahan the economic conditions were nearly as bad as they had been in 1707 (see p. 49 above). Amongst the escort of Ketelaar, the Dutch envoy, was an observant German soldier named Worms who afterwards put his experiences and impressions into writing. He said that poverty was widespread in Isfahän. Bread was so scarce that the poor people used to devour dead camels, horses and mules. Once, when a horse died in the Dutch compound, its body was thrown into the street; within an hour, all the flesh had been picked from the bones. (See Worms’s Ost-Indien- und Persianische Reisen, oder zehnjährige auf GrossJava, Bengala, und im Gefolge Herrn Joan Josua Kötelär, Holländischen Abgesandtens an den Sophi in Persien... (Dresden and Leipzig, 1737), p. 293-) 3 P. T. Arutunian, Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye (on the authority of E. Zevakin, Azerbaidzhan v Nachale XVII veka, p. 131, which is based partly on Volynsky’s journal). 4 Travels, vol. 1, pp. 91-2. 6 Ibid. p. 99. See also p. 402 below.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

On their way northwards they found much evidence that the plague had been raging, although the epidemic was then, very fortunately, subsiding. One member of the mission contracted the disease at Qazvïn and died there. Owing to the advent of winter, the mission remained for six months at Shamakhi. Whilst Volynsky was there he received a visit from a Georgian named Forsadan Beg, who brought him a message from Wakhtang. In this message Wakhtang requested help from Russia and offered to co-operate with her forces in the event of their invading Persia.1 Wakhtang held no official position at that time, having been deposed from the throne of Kartli in favour of his disreputable brother Yésé, as he had refused to turn Muslim; for the same reason, he had also been deprived of his viceregal post. Leaving Shamakhi in June 1718, the ambassador and the surviving members of his mission (no less than twenty-two of whom had died in Persia)2 reached St Petersburg at the beginning of 1719.3 Although Peter the Great was at first angry with Volynsky because of the great length of time that he had taken on his mission, he changed his mind when he learnt of the difficulties that had been surmounted and of the valuable information that had been obtained. Peter showed his appreciation of Volynsky’s services by allowing him to marry his first cousin, the Princess Naryshkin. The Tsar then appointed him Governor of Astrakhan in order that he might be able to keep a close watch on developments in Persia. 1 Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 31. 8 Bell, Travels, vol. 1, p. 119. 3 On reaching Niäzäbäd, whence the ambassador and those with him w’ere to sail for Astrakhan, one of the mission, named Lopuchin, was sent via Darband and Tarkhû to Russia with the elephant and all the horses. Lopuchin had an escort of thirty Russian soldiers. On passing through the Shamkhäl’s territory, the party was attacked by some hundreds of tribesmen who killed one of the Russian soldiers and wounded several others, as well as the elephant. They were then, however, driven off with heavy loss. See Bell, op. cit. p. 118.

IO8

CHAPTER X

MAHMUD OF QANDAHÄR TAKES THE OFFENSIVE FOR THE FIRST TIME There was an interval of two years between Mahmud’s seizure of power at Qandahär in 1717 and his first trial of strength with the Safavi state. In that time his position grew progressively stronger both internally and externally. In his own sphere, Mahmud not only gained unquestioned authority over his own tribe, but he also subdued and gained the support of the Hazaras. He had nothing to fear from the Abdälis, as they were too intent on their own quarrels to think of attacking him again. To the east, the decline of the Mughal empire was proceeding apace. The process of disintegration had set in before the death of the aged Aurangzib in 1717, largely because he had ceased to follow the tolerant policy that the great Akbar had inaugurated. In the twelve years that followed Aurangzib’s death, the rate of decline was accelerated by the almost ceaseless struggles between rival claimants for the imperial throne. Although this period of strife and confusion ceased when the Sayyid brothers placed Raushan Akhtar, the great-grandson of Aurangzib, on the throne in 1719, he, like his contemporary Shäh Sultän Husain, was not a man of sufficient calibre to revive the waning powers of the dynasty. It soon became apparent that the new Emperor, who took the title of Muhammad Shäh, was unlikely to make a bid to recover Qandahär. In Persia, as in India, the power of the dynasty was noticeably weakening, and there also religious toleration had for some time ceased to be practised. Partly for this reason and partly because of the rapacity of many of the provincial governors and officials, the country was seething with discontent. Moreover, the lack of security on the roads was having a most harmful effect on trade. It was, no doubt, due to religious persecution that another revolt of the Kurds took place.1 On this occasion they captured 1 For the previous revolt and its causes, see pp. 47 and 72, n. 4 above.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

Hamadän and raided the country as far as the outskirts of Isfahän. In the north-west of the country the Lezgîs were more than usually restive, partly on account of religious persecution and partly because of the delays in the receipt of their subsidies from the government.1 Moreover, religious elements in Turkey were by now disturbed by the appeals for help which were being received there from the oppressed Sunnis of Shirvan and Däghistän. It was in order to obtain first-hand information on the state of affairs of Persia that the Sultän Ahmad III, late in 1720, sent Durri Efendi on an official mission to Tehran, where the Shäh and his court were in residence.12 Moreover, Peter the Great, with the long northern war then nearing its end, was taking a keen interest in happenings in Persia. In the Persian Gulf, the Muscat Arabs and their allies were actively raiding and pillaging. As they had the command of the sea, they were able to capture the Bahrain islands and also Qishm and Lärak.3 To the south and south-east, the Balüchïs were again very active, raiding the districts of Bam and Kirmän. In ‘Arabistän, the situation was very disturbed because of the ceaseless struggles between rival members of the Musha‘sha‘ family for the coveted post of Vali of the province.4 While danger thus loomed on every side, Persia’s ability to defend herself grew progressively less and less. The Shäh, who was as usual entirely engrossed in his pleasures, gave no thought to serious matters, and the courtiers and nobles paid far more attention to their own petty jealousies and quarrels than they did to the good of their country. The army, once so formidable, was strong only on paper; with a few notable exceptions, the officers and men were alike inexperienced and, indeed, unfit for serious warfare. Although Mahmud of Qandahär may not have been fully aware of the general situation in Persia, he must have known enough about it to feel that conditions there were becoming increasingly favourable for anyone bold enough to make a determined attack. It is possible that he may have already conceived the scheme of advancing into the heart of Persia, overthrowing the Shäh’s forces 1 2 3 4

As regards the delay or non-receipt of the subsidies, see p. 50 above. For details of Durrï Efendi’s mission and its results, see ch. xi. See p. 115 below. For details, see Kasravï’s Tâ'rïkh-i-Pan Sad Säla-yi-Khüzistän, pp. 96-105. IIO

MAHMÜD OF QANDAHÄR

and seizing the throne. It has been said that Mir Wais, who was a very shrewd and ambitious man, had entertained this idea and had passed it on to his son.1 This may, indeed, have been the case, but to judge from Mahmud’s subsequent behaviour, it seems likely that he intended to carry out merely a preliminary foray in order, first, to probe the Safavi defences, secondly to establish his reputation as a leader (it must be remembered that he was no more than 19 or 20 years of age), and, thirdly, to give his men experience of campaigning so far from their homes. The fact that the main attack was not made until nearly two years later lends support to this supposition. Having made the necessary arrangements for the government of Qandahär,1 2 Mahmüd set out westwards from there in the late summer of 1719 with a force some 11,000 strong. In order to avert suspicion and alarm for as long as possible, he pretended that he was about to attack the Abdâlïs again. However, when he reached Sïstân, instead of striking northwards towards Herat, he marched his men south-westwards across the desert of the Dasht-i-Lüt, where, owing to the great heat and the lack of water, he lost many men and animals. In due course Mahmud and his men entered the province of Kirmän and approached the city of that name. The GovernorGeneral of Kirmän, who had scarcely any troops, hurriedly with­ drew from the city just before the arrival of the Ghalzais; he was accompanied on his retreat by three English merchants whom the English East India Company had stationed there to buy goats’ wool and to sell the Company’s cloth and other goods.3 In consequence of the Governor-General’s withdrawal, Mahmüd entered the city practically unopposed; his entry is said to have been facilitated by the local Zoroastrians, who had suffered severely at the hands of the bigoted Shî‘ï mulläs. Mahmüd made no attempt to advance beyond Kirmän, and stayed in the city for nine months. Despite the fact that he had met with no opposition from the Kirmânïs, he treated them with great brutality, forcing them to pay him large sums of money and to furnish supplies for his army. 1 See n. 2, p. 92 above. 3 See p. 112. 3 Clairac, vol. 1, p. 138. Ill

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

It is impossible to say how long Mahmud would have remained inactive in Kirmän or what his next step would have been had he been able to retain the initiative. There is much divergence between the authorities as to why he had hurriedly to evacuate Kirmän and return to Qandahär. Most of the European sources, including Krusihski,1 state that Lutf ‘All Khän, the nephew of Fath ‘Ali Khän, the Ftimäd al-Daula, having collected a large army with which to invade ‘Omän (with the co-operation of the Portuguese fleet),2 was suddenly ordered to march instead against Mahmüd at Kirmän and that he so signally defeated the Afghans that they had to retire in haste to Qandahär with the Persians in hot pursuit. When, however, we examine the contemporary and near-contemporary Persian sources, we find no confirmation of this alleged exploit by Lutf ‘All Khän and his men. Instead, we learn from Mirza Mahdi that the real reason for Mahmüd’s hasty return was because a revolt had broken out in Qandahär.3 According to Muhammad Khalil,4 Mahmüd, before leaving Qandahär, placed a Lezgi chief named Bijan Sultän (who was, like Mahmud, a Sunni) in command of the garrison there; Mahmüd’s brother Husain was, it appears, still too young to be placed in so responsible a position. During Mahmüd’s absence in Kirmän, Bijan Sultän endeavoured to supplant him altogether. Although he released a number of Persian captives who had been placed in his charge, in order that they might support him, he was not strong enough to withstand an attack by the local Ghalzais, who captured him and put him to death. Mahmüd, on hearing of this attempted coup, abruptly left Kirmän for his home city. Lutf ‘Ali Khän thus played no part in the matter, though he had sent a force of some 9000 men under a commander named Muhammad Quli Beg Qazvini against Mahmüd at Kirmän. This force, being quite inadequate, was easily defeated.5 Lutf ‘Ali Khän is usually represented as being a capable and courageous general, but Muhammad Khalil describes him as being proud, injudicious, quick-tempered and cowardly. Where the 1 Pp. 295-6 of the French edition of 1728 (the numbering of the corresponding pages of the Dublin edition is incorrect). 2 See p. 115 below for particulars of this project. 8 TN, p. 8. Muhammad Muhsin is completely silent on the subject. 4 Majmcf al-Tawärlkh, pp. 53-5. 5 Ibid. pp. 53-4.

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MAHMÜD OF QANDAHÄR

truth really lies it is hard to say, but such facts as we have seem to support Muhammad Khalil’s opinion.1 As soon as Mahmud and his men had evacuated Kirmän, the Shäh’s forces reoccupied it, and the new Governor-General, Rustam Muhammad Sa'dlü, took the wise precaution of strength­ ening the defences of the citadel. It was not long before these defences were put to the test. 1 Even if Muhammad Khalil was biased against Lutf ‘Ali Khan, the evidence seems convincing that it was not the latter who was responsible for Mahmud’s hurried withdrawal from Kirmän. After the fall of Fath ‘Ali Khän Dâghistânî (see the next chapter) and the consequent disgrace of Lutf ‘Ali Khän, the latter attempted to justify himself by greatly exaggerating his services, especially over the recovery of Kirmän.

CHAPTER XI

THE GATHERING STORM There was an interval of nearly two years between Mahmüd’s first and second expeditions against central Persia. During that space of time no attempt whatever was made to interfere with him. It was to prove a tragedy for the nation and fatal to the dynasty that he was thus left unmolested and so enabled to gather strength for his second and, as it was to prove, his main attack. Fath ‘Ali Khan Däghistäni, the Ftimäd al-Daula, who was by no means such a fool as the Russian ambassador Volynsky supposed,1 was certainly aware of the danger from the Ghalzais, but for some time he looked upon the Muscat Arabs as an even greater menace. For this reason such little action as was taken was directed against Muscat rather than Qandahär. It had been almost impossible for some time for any consistent line of action to be adopted by the court. If Fath ‘All Khän proposed anything, it was at once vetoed by the other ministers, while he blocked any proposals that they might make.12 As for the Shäh, in­ stead of resolving the differences between his ministers, he merely replied yakhshi dir (“it is well”) to whatever was said to him. A French missionary, the Capuchin Père Bernard de Bourges, writing from Tabriz on 26 February 1713, described the existing situation in Persia in the following gloomy terms : La Perse est dans la dernière desolation, point de justice, chacun vivant à sa manière et faisant tous les maux qu’ils peuvent sans punition. Le Mirviz [wc] avance ses conquêtes de plus en plus sans oposition, le Sophi n’aiant ni honneur ni argent pour s’y oposer, les grands estant tous oposés les uns aux autres, et le Prince sans jugement ne songe qu’à consenter ses passions et faire un trafic de ses ragams.3*

The truly lamentable state of affairs and the absence of any attempt to remedy it led to a number of manifestations of public 1 See p. 106 above. 2 Muhammad Muhsin was consistently outspoken in condemning the conduct of the ministers and court officials, as were also a number of other writers such as Muhammad ‘All Hazin and Muhammad Khalil. The Shäh too was much blamed. 8 AEP, vol. 11, fol. 37 a.

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dissatisfaction. In 1715 there was, according to Alexander Hamilton,1 a conspiracy to replace the Shah by his more competent brother ‘Abbäs, but it came to nothing. In October 1719, there was another conspiracy with the same object, but it was discovered in time by that remarkable woman Maryam Begum, the Shah’s great-aunt, who was then at least 80 years of age. She urged the Shäh to open his eyes to the pitiable state of his country and to go as soon as possible to Isfahän to calm the populace there. He, however, remained quite unmoved by her exhortation.2 He had likewise disregarded the pleadings, a few years earlier, of an eloquent preacher named Shaikh Bahä’ullah, though apparently moved by him at the time.3 We must now turn to the situation in the Persian Gulf. In 1717 Sultän ibn Saif II, the Imäm of ‘Omän, with some help from the Jawâsmï4 and Qatar Arabs, had captured the islands of Bahrain, Qishm and Làrak and had laid siege to, and nearly taken, Hormuz. There were fears lest these Arabs might establish themselves permanently at Bandar ‘Abbas and so deprive the government of its valuable customs dues, besides dealing another crippling blow at Persian trade. In order to deal with this situation, Fath ‘All Khän Däghistäni had arranged for his nephew Lutf ‘All Khän, the Governor-General of Färs, to collect a strong army and to come to terms with the Portuguese for the use of their fleet to transport the army to the other side of the Gulf. Much haggling ensued between the Persians and the Portuguese as to the payment of the expenses of the naval part of the expedition. The Portuguese stood out for a large sum of money (50,000 tomans according to Muhammad Khalil), which included their claim for their share of the Kong customs receipts in respect of which they had received nothing for twenty years.5 Lutf ‘Ali Khän endeavoured to reach a compromise, 1 A New Account of the East Indies, vol. 11, p. 105. 2 Padery’s despatch from Shamakhi to Paris, dated 5 January 1720, in AEP, vol. i, fols. 41b and 42 a. 8 Majma* al-Tawärikh, pp. 24-5. 4 The Jawâsmï (or Jawäsim) were mainly to be found in the neighbourhood of Sharja, on the Arabian side of the Gulf, but some were settled on the Persian side near Bandar ‘Abbas; they were akin to the Huwala Arabs. Jawäsim is a corruption of Qawäsim, this branch of the tribe having taken its name from the Qäsiml Shaikh of the district of Sharja. See Sir A. T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 200. 5 Majma' cd-Tawänkh, pp. 43-4.

115

8-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

but his enemies at the court made difficulties over raising the sum required; in so doing they were encouraged by the intrigues of Etienne Padery,1 the French consul at Shiraz, who was doing his utmost to arrange for a Franco-Persian alliance against Muscat.2 The consequence was that the negotiations with the Portuguese fell through, while no naval help was forthcoming from France.3 Lutf ‘All Khän, however, was able, by means of bribery, to persuade the Imam of Muscat to restore Bahrain to Persia.4 Meanwhile, Lutf ‘Ali Khan had quartered his men on the properties of the political rivals of his uncle and himself, and freely requisitioned all the provisions, baggage animals and arms that they needed. Although this action served its immediate purpose of providing for the requirements of his army, it aroused great resentment amongst the owners of these properties. It was probably in the summer of 1720 that Fath ‘All Khan decided to postpone all thought of the Muscat expedition until after the Afghan menace had been dealt with and to make a determined effort to restore Persian sovereignty in the provinces of Herat and Qandahär. His plan was for the court and all the forces available to proceed by easy stages to Khurasan and for Lutf ‘Ali Khän and his army to join them somewhere en route. Fath ‘Ali Khän’s plan for the entire court to accompany the army to Khuräsän in order to supervise the operations against the Afghan rebels met with strong opposition from the other ministers, notably his particular enemies Muhammad Husain, the Mulläbäshi, and Rahim Khän, the Hakïm-bâshîï Muhammad Husain, 1 Etienne Padery, although he styled himself an Athenian, was in reality a Levantine Greek. He entered the service of the French Embassy as an interpreter early in the eighteenth century, and became a naturalised Frenchman. He was an able and resourceful man, and spoke Greek, French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese, as well as Turkish, Persian and Arabic. See his Négociations en Perse, fol. 29 a, in the Papiers de Paderi [wc], AF, iv, 1686, 4e dossier, Archives Nationales, Paris. 2 See ch. xxxvu. 8 Ibid. 4 Persia was not destined to maintain effective control over Bahrain for long, since Shaikh Jabbara Kaukânï of Tähiri, the chief of the Huwala Arabs, soon afterwards seized the islands and ruled them until Nadir Shäh expelled him in 1736. The Huwala Arabs were nominally Persian subjects, but their chiefs had for long performed only lip-service to the government. 6 Whilst he was in Içfahân with the Volynsky mission, John Bell of Antermony had a long interview with Rahim Khän, whom he described as “ an elderly man, of a grave deportment, and [who] might pass for a doctor anywhere”. See his Travels, vol. 1, p. 93.

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who had inherited in full measure the narrowness and intolerance of his more famous grandfather and predecessor, Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisï, disliked Fath ‘Ali Khän Dâghistânî mainly because he was a Sunni. Fath ‘All Khan belonged, moreover, to one of the principal families of the Lezgïs, a fact of which his enemies took full advantage, alleging that he was in league with the rebellious members of that tribe.1 Lastly, there were the nobles and other landowners whom his nephew Lutf ‘All Khän had so angered by quartering his men on their properties in Fàrs. In consequence of this opposition, Fath ‘All Khän failed to induce the Shäh to leave Qazvïn until the beginning of October 1720, and even then the court went no farther than Tehran, less than a hundred miles to the east. Attention must now be drawn to events in the north and north­ west of the country. In 1719 occurred one of the periodical incursions of the turbulent Lezgïs from southern Däghistän into Shïrvân. As was usually the case, this incursion was accompanied by a rising of the Lezgïs of Jar and Tala, in the Qäniq valley.12 The combined forces burnt a number of villages and ravaged much of the country. When Hasan ‘Alï Khän, the Governor of Shïrvân, led his troops against the Lezgïs, he was totally defeated, he and many of his men being killed.3 The Lezgïs then turned their attention to Georgia, much of which they likewise laid waste. This action on their part aroused the wrath of a far more formidable personage than the unfortunate Hasan ‘Alï Khän; this was Wakhtang VI. As he had at last agreed 1 As will be seen below, there was a serious Lezgl rising in 1719/20. 2 These two Lezgl colonies were situated in the Qäniq valley between the river of that name and the Caucasus range, just under 100 miles to the east of Tiflis. The country there is fertile and well-watered. For a description of the Jar district at that time, see Major J. G. Gärber, “Nachrichten von denen an der westlichen Seite der Caspischen See zwischen Astrachan und dem Flusse Kur befindlichen Völkern und Landschaften, und von derselben Zustande in dem Jahre 1728”, in Müller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. iv, pp. 66-8. 3 TN, p. 6. See also the despatch from Etienne Padery, the French consuldesignate at Shîrâz, which he sent from Shamâkhî to Paris on 5 January 1720. Padery, who was on his way out from France to take up his consular and other duties, was detained for many months at Shamâkhî owing to the disturbed state of the country; he did not reach Qazvïn until October 1720. See AEP, vol. v, fol. 258b.

II7

FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

to embrace Islam, the Shäh had reinstated him in 1719 as King of Kartli and Vâlï of Georgia in place of his son Bakar.1 Enraged at the depredations of the Lezgis, Wakhtang, in the summer of 1720, collected 60,000 Georgian troops with the intention of attacking and, if possible, extirpating the tribesmen during the winter months, when the extreme cold and deep snow in the high mountain valleys forced them to descend to their qishlâq or winter quarters in the milder climate of the Qäniq valley. Wakhtang knew that it would be extremely difficult to attack these mountaineers in their almost impassable country during the summer months (Nädir Shäh and, later, the Russians, were to find to their cost how difficult and costly military operations were in such terrain). When word of his intentions reached the court the Shäh’s evil geniuses, the Mullä-bäshi and Hakïm-bâshï, greatly feared that if Wakhtang succeeded, as he probably would, in crushing the Lezgis with his large army, he would be a potential danger to them, as they were then planning the overthrow of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäm, the rtimäd al-Daula. They also scented danger in the fact that Wakhtang’s half-brother Rustam Khän,2 the Qullar-âqâsï, had married one of his daughters. They therefore represented to the Shäh that if Wakhtang were allowed to extirpate the Lezgis, he would be in a very strong position and that he might well, on getting aid from Russia, be able to attack Persia whenever he liked. They therefore earnestly begged the Shäh to make terms with the Lezgis and to order Wakhtang to disband his army and return to Tiflis. The Shäh was, as usual, deceived by these specious words, and sent orders to Wakhtang in peremptory terms to stay his hand and to return to his capital. These orders reached Wakhtang when he was on the point of launching his attack on the Lezgis. He was naturally furious to receive such a command just when he had his enemies in his power. He dared not disobey, fearing that, if he failed to carry out the Shäh’s behests, his enemies at the court might cause certain of his supporters to desert him and that he might suffer a fate similar to 1 As stated on p. 108 above, Wakhtang had lost both the throne of Kartli and the post of Vâlï of Georgia in 1714 because he had refused to turn Muslim. He had been succeeded by his brother Yésé who, in turn, had been replaced in 1716 by Wakhtang’s son Bakar. a Rustam’s mother was one of Levan’s concubines.

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that of his uncle Giorgi. Summoning the Shäh’s envoy into his presence, he bade him inform the sovereign that he would obey him, but that he had vowed that he would never again draw his sword in his defence.1 At that juncture, neither Wakhtang nor anyone else realised how soon the Shäh would appeal to him for help or how fatal for the monarch and the dynasty his refusal to listen to this appeal would prove. As for the Lezgïs, their relief and joy were unbounded at this unlooked for deliverance from almost certain destruction, but, owing to the fall and disgrace of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäni, they had no feelings of gratitude towards Shäh Sultän Husain. The fall of Fath ‘Ali Khän was brought about in the following way. After the Shäh and his court had reached Tehran in the autumn of 1720, the ministers, as usual, quarrelled amongst themselves, wasting valuable time in futile arguments, bickerings and intrigues. Their behaviour led Muhammad Muhsin to say: “Allah has decreed the fate of the kingdom.” 2 While the ministers failed to agree on a common course of action that would be for the benefit of the realm, they were, however, united in their detestation of Fath ‘Ali Khän and they therefore determined to get rid of him. They feared that if he succeeded in making the Shäh go to Khuräsän and if, as seemed possible, his nephew Lutf ‘Ali Khän were to go with them and subdue the Afghans, his power and that of his uncle would be unlimited. They therefore resolved to ruin both, regardless of the fact that, by so doing, they would be gravely imperilling the country. They realised that their first act must be to remove the major obstacle in their path, namely Fath ‘Ali Khän. At this time, the Ftimäd al-Daula was reputed to be the richest man in the kingdom. It was said that he had amassed during his five years of office seven times as much wealth as the Shäh possessed.3 Hope of laying hands on this vast fortune was another cogent reason why there were so many persons who wished to bring about his fall. 1 Krusinski, pp. 180-4. See also Brosset, H. de la G. vol. 11, part 1, p. 577, and Sekhnia Chkheidze, Chronique, p. 35. 2 ZT, fol. 205 a. 3 See Padery’s report from Shamakhi, dated 5 January 1720, in AEP, vol. v, fols. 258 b and 261b. This may seem an exaggerated statement, but it must be remembered that Shäh Sultan ITusain was very extravagant, as he lavished vast sums on his harem and on his palaces and gardens, notably Farahäbäd. II9

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

Muhammad Husain, the Mullä-bäshi, and Rahim Khan, the Hakim-bäshi, were the ring-leaders in the conspiracy which was then formed against Fath ‘All Khän; they showed great ingenuity in the plan which they evolved for the overthrow of their enemy. On the night of 7 Safar 1133 (8 December 1720) Muhammad Husain and Rahim Khän took the almost unprecedented step of entering the room in the palace in which the Shäh was sleeping. Rousing the monarch, they told him that they had discovered a plot by Fath ‘Ali Khän to seize the crown, and said that his life was in immediate danger. They substantiated their words by producing a letter bearing what purported to be Fath ‘All Khän’s seal. This letter, which was addressed to a Kurdish chief (who, like the Ftimäd al-Daula, was a Sunni), contained a request for the despatch of 3000 Kurdish cavalry, with whose aid the coup d'état was to be carried out.1 The conspirators also alleged that Lutf ‘All Khän was privy to the plot and that he was going to march with his army from Färs to the capital, where he was to seize and put to death all the members of the royal family who were in the city. Convinced of the genuineness of this letter and of the charges against the rtimäd al-Daula, the credulous Shäh, after holding a hurried meeting of his council, ordered Muhammad Qull Khän Shämlü, the Qurchï-bâshï (who was also in the plot), to go at once to Fath Khän’s house and to bring back his severed head. Muham­ mad Qull Khän accordingly hastened to the rtimäd al-Daula's house, but, instead of beheading him, he put him under arrest on charges of high treason, of being in league with his compatriots the Lezgls,1 2 and of showing undue favour to them and the other Sunnis in the kingdom. Another charge brought against him was that he had released Mir Wais from captivity. In this manner the conspirators got their chief enemy into their power; they did not, however, put him to death, but deprived him of his sight. In sparing his life, they were not actuated by com­ passion or by any humanitarian feelings (of which they were singularly deficient), but by their intention to torture him in order 1 As the Kurds had recently been in rebellion, an additional air of verisimili­ tude was given to these charges. 2 There had been some serious raiding by the Lezgis in Shirvan some twelve months earlier.

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to make him disclose where he had hidden his vast wealth. The unfortunate man was then subjected to this further ordeal.1 When the news of the alleged plot and of its outcome was made public, there were great rejoicings by the populace at the preserva­ tion of the Shäh’s life. The whole city was illuminated, and prayers were offered up for the welfare of the monarch. The next step to be taken was the issue of an order for the immediate arrest of LutfiAll Khän, whose property, together with that of his uncle, was declared to be confiscated. As Lutf ‘All Khan was still with his army at Shïrâz, it would obviously have been impracticable to arrest him there. He was therefore summoned urgently to Tehran, ostensibly for the purpose of consultation. As Lutf ‘Ali Khän had not yet heard of his uncle’s fate, he suspected nothing and set out for Tehran. Padery, the French consul at Shïrâz, who was travelling from Isfahän to take up his post, met Lutf ‘Ali Khän midway between these two cities.2 On the following day the unfortunate general was arrested at Yazdikhäst and taken to Isfahän. Before he and his guards entered the city, he was clad in women’s garments and mounted, facing backwards, on a cow. The roughs of Isfahän then staged a mock istiqbâl. After this ignominious entry, he was thrown into prison.3 He was not blinded, but was deprived of his governorship and his army command. The reason for this comparative leniency was that the Shäh was beginning to have doubts as to the genuineness of the “plot”. Soon afterwards, Fath ‘Ali Khän was closely questioned as to his actions, and put up a good defence. With regard to the letter which he was alleged to have written to the Kurdish chief, he submitted that it was a palpable forgery. If he had written this letter (which he stoutly denied), how could it have been possible 1 The main authorities are in general agreement in regard to the fall of Fath ‘All Khan, though there are slight differences over points of detail. See Clairac, vol. i, pp. 142-6, Du Cerceau, pp. 152-6, ZT, fols. 205 b and 206a, de Gardane’s “Nouvelles de Perse”, dated 2 January 1721, in AEP, vol. vi, fols. 11b to 13b. (This last source accepts as true the story of the “ plot”, but there seems little or no doubt that the charges against Fath ‘Ali Khän were trumped up.) 2 See the “Compte au Roi par le Chevalier Padery”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 406a. 8 Majma1 al-Tawârlkh, p. 50. Compare the treatment of Muhammad Taql Khän Shlräzl after his capture, following upon his revolt against Nädir. Muhammad Käzim’s “Älam-ärä‘yi Nädiri”, part ni, p. 132, contains an illustration of the mock istiqbâl which was staged when Taql Khän and his captors entered Isfahän in 1744. This illustration is reproduced opposite p. 242 of my Nadir Shah,

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

for it to have reached the Kurdish chieftain and for him to have mustered his men, travelled all the way from Kurdistan and carried out the coup d'état that very night?1 There can be no doubt at all that the plot was a complete fabrication, and that Fath ‘All Khän was not guilty of treason or of complicity in the last Lezgî rising. The action of the conspirators in blinding the sole minister of any ability and imprisoning the leader of the only formidable army in the country at a time of grave danger may be compared with the Emperor Honorius’s execution of Stilicho in 408, two years before the Gothic leader Alaric sacked Rome. Less than that space of time was to elapse before Mahmud of Qandahär rode in triumph through the streets of Isfahän. When the news of Lutf ‘Ali Khän’s imprisonment reached Shïrâz, many of his soldiers deserted and went off to their homes. The general chosen to take Lutf ‘Alï Khän’s place was a certain Ismâ‘ïl Khän, of whom Muhammad Muhsin had a most unfavour­ able opinion.12 Although the Shäh’s ministers had given up all thought of going to Khuräsän themselves after the fall of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäni, they nevertheless, in 1132 (1719/20), placed Ismâ‘ïl Khän in command of the remnants of Lutf ‘All Khän’s army and bade him march against the Afghans. Not only did the ministers fail to choose a capable commander, but they also took no steps to ensure that troops of good quality were sent on this expedition. When Ismä‘11 Khän and his depleted and ill-trained force reached Mashhad, he quarrelled with the Governor, ‘All Qulï Khän, and put him in gaol. Soon afterwards, the rabble of the town rose and imprisoned Ismä‘il Khän in his own house.3 When, after some little time, Ismä‘il Khän secured his release, he placed all his available forces under the command of Fath ‘Alï Khän, the chief of the Âshâghïbâshï Qäjärs of Astaräbäd4 and a 1 Krusinski, p. 161. This authority on pp. 160-4 records what purport to be Fath ‘All Khan’s ipsissima verba on this occasion. a ZT, fol. 220 b. 3 For Ismâ‘îl Khän’s vicissitudes of fortune, see the ZT, fols. 220b and 221 a. See also Muhammad Hasan Khän, Kitäb-i-Matlal al-Shams, vol. 11, p. 337. 4 The Qäjär tribe is of Turcoman origin. Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great split the tribe up into three main sections because it had grown too powerful. Because of the excellent fighting qualities of the Qäjärs, he settled these sections in various

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former Governor of Mashhad, and sent him to attack and subdue Malik Mahmüd Sïstânï, the ambitious Governor of Tun, who had for some time been in revolt. Malik Mahmüd claimed descent (but on doubtful grounds) not only from the Saffärids, but also from the ancient Kayânï line. In the fighting between the forces of Fath ‘Ali Khân Qâjâr and Malik Mahmüd, those of the latter more than held their own. Fath ‘All Khan, on receiving a wound in the foot, withdrew with his surviving men to Mashhad.1 Thereafter Malik Mahmüd was practically independent and was thus able gradually to extend his authority. Whilst the plot against Fath ‘Alï Khân Dâghistânï was in process of being carried out, a Turkish envoy was on his way from Constantinople to Tehran. The Sultan of Turkey had for some time been receiving disquieting reports regarding Persia, and was anxious to obtain some reliable information on the subject. It so happened that, just at that juncture, the Austrian ambassador to the Porte had asked for a competent Turkish official named Durri Efendi to be sent to Persia to complete the arrangements provided for in article 19 of the treaty of commerce and navigation which had been concluded at Passarovitz on 27 July 1718, a week after the signing of the peace treaty between Austria, Venice and Turkey.2 The Sultan therefore sent Durri Efendi to Tehran with the double object of completing the said arrangements and of bringing back a full account of the state of affairs in Persia. When the news that a Turkish envoy was on the way to Tehran reached the Persian court, the timorous ministers were greatly alarmed. Having no knowledge as yet of the official reason for Durri Efendi’s mission, they feared that he would demand the cession of some frontier districts to Turkey. For the purpose of preserving peace, they were fully prepared to cede to the Sultan part of Chukhür-i-Sa‘d (Erivan) or some territory farther south. Durri Efendi did not reach Tehran until the middle of January frontier districts as a protective measure. One section was sent to Ganja and Erivan, another to the Merv oasis, while the third, which consisted of the Äshäghibäshi and Yüqârîbâshï clans, was settled in and around Astaräbäd. See Sir H. Brydges Jones’s translation of ‘Abd al-Razzäq’s Ma'äthir-i-Sultämya, entitled The Dynasty of the Kajars, p. 3, and H. L. Rabino’s Mazandaran and Astarabad, p. 86. 1 TN, pp. 6-7. 2 For the text of this article, see Noradounghian, Recueil dyActes Inter­ nationaux de VEmpire Ottoman (Paris, 1897), vol. 1, p. 226.

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by which time the new Ftimäd al-Daula, Muhammad Qulï Khan, had been in office for a month. Durrï Efendi later reported that Muhammad Qulï Khân received him in a very peculiar way, obviously fearing that he was about to announce Turkey’s intention to declare war on Persia. Durrï Efendi was able to reassure him on this point. At the end of January the Shäh received the ambassador in state. On either side of the monarch were ranged members of the nobility, numbering in all some 300; there were also thirty Qizilbäsh guards who were superbly garbed and armed. When Durri Efendi handed the Shäh, through the Ftimäd al-Daula, a letter from Hasan Päshä, of Baghdäd, the Shäh expatiated on the Päshä’s fine qualities, saying that he was a good man and excellent neighbour and that he had always well treated Persians making the pilgrimage to the tomb of ‘Ali at Najaf.1 At a later audience, Durri Efendi noticed a group of eighty-four persons of uncouth and poverty-stricken appearance. He learnt that each one represented one of the tribes of Däghistän. Observing his interest, the Shäh afterwards said to Durrï Efendi: Those whom you have seen are my subjects. These people are so poor that Shäh ‘Abbäs II, one of my ancestors, filled with compassion at the sight of their misery, arranged for an annual subsistence allowance to be paid to each tribe. They never fail to come to me each year to render homage, and I solace them by giving them their pension.12 Durrï Efendi soon found that the Shäh had not told him the whole truth, which was that the payments were made to the Däghistänis in order to keep them from raiding Persian villages and taking away captives and booty. The Lezgis, however, continued their sporadic raiding since, owing to the dishonesty of the Shäh’s officials, the promised payments did not always reach them. After some discussion with the Ftimäd al-Daula on frontier questions, Durri Efendi took his leave and started on his homeward journey in the middle of April. In his subsequent report to the Sultan, he showed himself to have been an acute observer of the 1 Relation de Dourry Efendy, pp. 5-18. This French version of Durrï Efendfs Relation was made by M. de Fienne at Constantinople in 1745 and annotated by L. Langlès before publication in 1810. 2 Ibid. pp. 32-4.

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Persian situation. He said that, while there were on the one hand many merchants and rich people in the towns, where large numbers were engaged on the manufacture of silk, satins and other stuffs, there were, on the other hand, but few agricultural workers. In consequence, the cost of wheat, barley and also of provisions in general was double what it was in Turkey.1 Most interesting was his summing up of the general situation. The régime was, he said, apparently near its end. It is of no benefit to a state if it is rich when there are no men capable of governing it. In Persia, there was a great lack of men of intelligence; this dearth was the root cause of all the troubles and confusion and the reason why the tottering empire was being assailed on all sides. It also explained how it was that the Persians could not repel their foes and why their troops always ran away. If, he continued, one spoke to any of the Shäh’s ministers regarding Mir Wais’s son, they would reply with their usual arrogance that he would soon have to submit humbly to the Shäh and that all would then be peaceful once more. Such statements were completely false, as Mahmüd was their mortal foe.2 It is of interest to observe that the reports of both Volynsky and Durri Efendi3 were in agreement in prophesying the approaching fall of the Safavi state, owing to the lack of men of intelligence at the head of it. Later in the year the Shäh sent Murtadä Quli Khän, a welleducated and highly cultured man, as ambassador to Turkey, in return for the mission of Durri Efendi. He was destined to be the last envoy from Shäh Sultàn Husain to Turkey.4 The Sultan of Turkey was not the only ruler who was taking a keen interest in developments in Persia. Peter the Great, whose protracted war with Sweden was by now almost at an end, had for long turned his inquiring gaze on that country. Ever since he had received Volynsky’s report of his mission he had had a shrewd idea as to what was likely to happen there. In order to keep up to date in his knowledge of the trend of events in Persia, he had sent Semeon Avramov,6 the Russian consul at Resht, to Tehran to 1 Durri Efendi’s Relation, pp. 49-50. 2 Ibid. pp. 54-5. 3 The effect of this illuminating report on the Turkish government will be described in ch. xvu. 4 See p. 215 below. 5 See p. 177 below for particulars of Avramov’s appointment.

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report on the situation, which was rumoured to be deteriorating so rapidly that the regime was on the point of collapse.1 Meanwhile the ministers who had brought about the downfall of Fath ‘All Khän and his nephew had been busy appropriating their property. Muhammad Qulï Khän Shämlü, the Qurchîbäshi, was rewarded for his part in the carrying out of the plot against Fath ‘Ali Khän by being made Ftimäd al-Daula in his stead. Since there was no longer any question of the Shäh and his ministers going to Khuräsän,2 they set out for Isfahän in the spring of 1721. When, on 29 April, the Shäh reached the outskirts of his capital, almost the entire population, accompanied by the majority of the foreign residents, went out to perform the istiqbäl or official greeting. There were great public rejoicings in Isfahän at the monarch’s return, and at night the city was gaily illuminated.3 Apparently, there was no longer any thought of replacing Shäh Sultän Husain by his brother. The Shäh did not remain in his capital, but hastened on to his favourite resort of Farahäbäd, there to devote all his energy and much of his wealth to its further embellishment. He was so delighted with Farahäbäd that he intended to abandon Isfahän and to live permanently at his new palace, which he re-named Shahr-iNau or “New Town”.4 Muhammad Muhsin thus commented on the Shäh’s extraordinary zest for extending and improving Farahäbäd and his complete indifference to the dangers that were threatening his country: “ One would have thought that Qandahär, Herat and the Afghans had never existed.”5 Whilst Shäh Sultän Husain was thus disporting himself in his fool’s paradise, the storm clouds were massing in ever more menacing fashion; moreover, they were no longer confined to the east, but were extending to the north and west. In the north, the Lezgïs, furious at the cruel treatment of their 1 Butkov, Materiali dlya novoy Istorii Kavkaza, 1722-1803, vol. 1, p. 6. According to the same source, Peter had at the same time sent Captain Alexis Baskakov secretly to Gilän to make a military report on the terrain. For further details, see ch. xv. 8 See p. 99 above. 3 “Nouvelles de Perse °, 1 May 1721, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 56b. This document was either written by or sent through the intermediary of Ange de Gardane, the French consul at I§fahän. 4 ZT, fol. 206b. For a description of Farabäbäd, see appendix in. 6 ZT, fol. 206b.

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compatriot and co-religionist Fath ‘All Khân Dâghistânî and having no longer anything to fear from Wakhtang and his Georgians, revolted again. They were joined by the oppressed Sunnis of Shirvän under a popular leader known as the Mudarris Hajji Dä’üd. These unfortunate Sunnis had been suffering severely at the hands of the Shi‘i zealots, who had profaned their mosques by turning them into stables, murdered many of their preachers, and burnt their religious books. Because of this fierce persecution, they had for some time past been sending appeals for help to Turkey.1 Also taking part in the rising were Ahmad Khän, the Usmi of the Qaitäq and Qaräqaitäq tribes, who was a crafty and unscrupulous man, Choläq Surkhai Khän, the ambitious and quarrelsome chief of the formidable Ghäzi Qumüq tribe, and another Lezgi leader named Ibrähim Sultän. Having mustered some 15,000 tribesmen, these chiefs laid siege to Shamâkhï, the capital of Shirvän, on 15 August 1721. On 9 September, after the siege had lasted for twenty-five days, the Sunni members of the population, who greatly outnumbered the Shï‘ïs, opened the gates to the Lezgïs. The tribesmen thereupon rushed into the town, brandishing their weapons and uttering loud cries. A terrible scene of carnage ensued, in the course of which between 4000 and 5000 of the Shï‘ï inhabitants perished. The governor, Husain Khän and his son, after being seized, were put to the torture to make them reveal where they had hidden the treasure which the Lezgïs believed they possessed. They were then put to death and their bodies were thrown to the dogs. Although the rebel leaders had promised not to harm the Russian and other European residents in the town, their men speedily got out of control. They broke into the Jesuits’ church, looking for the gold ornaments that usually stood upon the altar, but the missionaries had so carefully hidden them that they could not be found. The Lezgïs then entered the houses of the Jesuits and also the shops of the Russian merchants; they did them no bodily harm, but robbed them all. One Russian merchant named Matvei Gregoriev Yevreinov2 lost goods to the value of 170,000 1 J. von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de ÏEmpire Ottoman depuis son Origine jusqu'à nos Jours (French trans, by J. J. Heilert), vol. xiv, p. 87. 2 He is not to be confused with his namesake and contemporary Ivan Yevreinov, the well-known geographer and geodetic expert, whom Peter sent to the Far East to explore Kamchatka and the Kurile islands.

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roubles and was totally ruined. The Russians sustained losses amounting in the aggregate to half a million roubles.1 After sacking Shamäkhl and overrunning the whole province, the rebel leaders once more appealed to Turkey for protection. The Sultan responded by accepting them as Turkish subjects and he subsequently sent an envoy to Shamäkhl to invest the Mudarris Hajjï Dä’üd as governor of Shïrvân.2 Henceforward Hajjï Dä’üd was known as Dä’üd Beg. In this manner the dismemberment of the Safavi empire was carried a stage further. Volynsky, who was at this time governor of Astrakhan,3 lost no time in reporting this serious incident to Peter the Great, pointing out that, although Persia had undertaken in the treaty of 1717 to protect Russian nationals, she was now obviously unable to fulfil 1 The chief authority for the capture and sack of Shamakhi in 1721 is Père Louis Bachoud, a Jesuit missionary who was there at the time. His account of the incident is contained in the “Lettre du Père Bachoud, Missionnaire de la Compagnie de Jésus en Perse, écrite de Chamakié le 25 septembre 1721 ”, in the Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, vol. iv, pp. 113-24. See also M. F. Brosset’s French translation of Esai Hasan Jalaliantz’s “Histoire d’Agovanie” in his Collection d'Historiens Arméniens, pp. 210-n. The details regarding the losses of the Russian merchants are taken from Soloviev, vol. xviii, p. 37. In the manifesto which Peter the Great had drawn up at Astrakhan on the eve of his invasion of Persia, the total losses of these merchants was put at 4 million roubles, but this w'as a gross exaggeration. Other sources have stated that 300 Russian merchants lost their lives on this occasion, but it is clear from Père Bachoud’s account and also from Soloviev, that no Russians lost their lives. The date of this incident has been given by Butkov (vol. I, p. 4) and others as 1712, but this is clearly a mistake for 1721. If there had been an incident of this gravity in 1712, it is inconceivable that Russia would have done nothing about it or that Volynsky and Bell would have failed to mention the matter when they were in Shamakhi. Independent proof of the correctness of 1721 is provided by Etienne Padery in his despatch to Paris of 20 December 1721, in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 118b. Soimonov corroborates this date on p. 246 of his “Tage-Buch”, but he, curiously enough, gives it as 171200 p. 186 of the same book and also on p. 37 of his Torgakh za Kaspiyskoe More. It is therefore small wonder that Butkov, Barthold and others should have been misled by this error. The mistake apparently arose by the accidental trans­ position of the last two numerals in “ 1721 ” either in the original draft of the manifesto which Peter the Great issued just before embarking on his Persian expedition (see p. 179 below) or in Demetrius Cantemir’s translations of it into Persian and Turkish. It could not have been merely a typographical error, because the correct Hijra equivalent (1124) of 1712 was given. 2 B. Dorn, Geschichte Shirwans unter den Statthaltern und Chanen von 1538-1820, p. 408. Further details are given on page 218 below. 8 As explained on p. 108 above, Peter had given this appointment to Volynsky for the express purpose of enabling him to keep a close watch on developments in Persia.

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this obligation. He went on to say that Russia could now invade Persia on the pretext of attacking her enemies and maintaining order. He estimated that ten regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, together with 3000 specially selected Cossacks of the Don would be sufficient for the purpose, especially as some help could be expected from the Georgians and other Christian peoples of the Caucasus.1 How Peter reacted will be described in ch. xv. By 1720 conditions in the south and south-west of Persia had become chaotic. In the Persian Gulf and its approaches the Sanganian2 pirates had become very active. On land, the Jawasmï Arabs and Baluchi tribes continued their depredations unchecked.3 Even the Isfahän district had become insecure, as bands of Baluchis and “Ophgoons” (Afghans) were ravaging “...the Country even within Sight of Spahaun and many Times carry away both Goods and Merchants, to the great Detriment of Trade.”4 There was, however, a temporary respite from the attacks by the Muscat Arabs, owing to the strife which broke out in ‘Oman between the rival Hinawi and Ghâfiri factions on the death of the Imam Sultan ibn Saif in 1719. On 10 January 1722 Bishop Barnabas Fedeli wrote to the Cardinal Prefect at Rome in pessimistic strain, saying: “Affairs in this country are always going from bad to worse, because it is troubled in many directions by enemies, rebels and traitors. Here too some surprise is feared. The Lord God help us!”5 The Bishop’s apprehensions were fully justified; although he was ignorant as yet of the fact, Mahmud the Ghalzai was again at Kirmän and was about to begin his march on Isfahän. 1 Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 38. Volynsky underestimated the military strength required. He attached too much importance to the amount of help that would be forthcoming from the Georgians and Armenians. What he naturally did not envisage then was that Peter would be unable to penetrate into either Georgia or Armenia. Furthermore, he imagined that the state of the Persian army was even worse than it actually was. 8 The Sanganians inhabited the coastal region of Kathiawar and Cutch. 8 The Baluchis did, however, more than meet their match when they were rash enough to attack the English and Dutch factories at Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbäs) in December 1720; see pp. 405-6 below. 4 Extract from a report from the senior merchant of the English East India Company at Gombroon dated 15/26 September 1721, in the Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv. 6 Quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 1, p. 572.

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CHAPTER XII

MAHMÜD RETURNS TO THE ATTACK AND WINS THE BATTLE OF GULNÄBÄD The date of Mahmud’s departure from Qandahâr on his second expedition against Persia has not been recorded, but, if we can take as correct Muhammad Muhsin’s statement that he reached Kirmän on i Muharram 1134 (22 October 1721)1 and, secondly, if we allow a little over seven weeks for the arduous march from Qandahâr to Kirmän, it would follow that he must have set out about the end of August. The weather was still very hot, and the march across the dreaded Dasht-i-Lüt caused, as before, much suffering and loss to both men and animals. There is an extraordinary diversity amongst the authorities as to the strength of Mahmüd’s army on this occasion, the estimates ranging from as low as 5000 to the impossible figure of 100,000. This wide discrepancy is partly explained by the fact that some of the sources merely gave the total of the Ghalzais themselves, while others included their auxiliaries, and others again gave a figure that also comprised the camp-followers. It seems improbable that the combatant Ghalzais numbered more than 10,000 at the outset. They were accompanied by a few thousand Hazäras, and they were joined en route by a number of Balüchïs. It is unlikely that the force consisted of more than 18,000 combatant troops in all. This may seem a modest total for a force that was about to advance right into the heart of a hostile country, but it must be remembered that what this army lacked in numbers, it more than made up for in courage, fighting experience and religious enthusiasm.12 Moreover, Mahmud and his commanders were by this time well aware of the corruption and inefficiency prevailing in Isfahän and of the sad state of the Persian army. 1 ZT, fol. 206 b (too much reliance must not, however, be placed on Muhammad Muhsin’s dates). It will be recalled that it took Giorgi XI this length of time to do this march in the opposite direction under similar climatic conditions. 2 This remark does not, of course, apply to the Hazäras, who were Shî‘ï.

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The Ghalzais and their auxiliaries reached Kirmän, as already stated, on 22 October 1721, and although they had no difficulty in making themselves masters of the town, they could not take the citadel, as it had been greatly strengthened by the GovernorGeneral, Rustam Muhammad Sa4dlü; it had, moreover, been amply garrisoned. Mahmüd, who was, it must be remembered, young and inexperienced, was rash enough to order his men to make a frontal assault on the citadel, but they were repulsed with the loss of 1500 killed.1 This was a loss which he, with his limited numbers of experienced men, could ill afford. Not wishing to incur further casualties by attacking the citadel and having no artillery more formidable than zanburaks or swivel-guns,12*4he had to content himself with a blockade. The garrison, however, had been well-provisioned, and Rustam Muhammad Sa4dlü was a brave and resolute man. By the end of January 1722 the Ghalzais, being unused to siege tactics, began to murmur and some even deserted and made their way back to Qandahär. Fortunately for Mahmüd, it was at this juncture that Rustam Muhammad died. His successor, who was cast in a less heroic mould, offered Mahmüd a large sum of money if he would raise the siege and march away. This offer, coming as it did at a moment when Mahmüd was in difficulties, enabled him to withdraw his men without losing4 4 face ’ ’ ? He thereupon set out for Yazd. We have no details of Mahmüd’s march from Kirmän to Yazd, but it seems safe to assume that he followed the usual route through Bahrämäbäd and Anär.4 As it would take a fortnight to cover the distance between the two towns, he must have reached the outskirts of Yazd about the middle of February 1722. When the Yazdis saw the Afghans and their allies approaching, they shut 1 ZT, fol. 206b. 2 Zanburak means literally “little wasp”. These guns were usually mounted on camels, which were trained to lie down when the weapons were to be discharged. 8 Clairac, vol. 1, p. 218 gives the amount as 2500 tomans. Friar Alexander of Malabar, in his " Story of the Sack of Isfahän by the Afghans in 1722” (the late H. Dunlop’s English translation of the Friar’s “ Kort Narigt van de seer droevig ondergang der residentie-stad Spahan”), RCAJ, vol. xxm (October 1936), p. 646, raises the amount to 10,000 tomans, while Ferrier, in his History of the Afghans, p. 43, puts it as high as 18,000. 4 Muhammad Khalil, in his Majma' al-Tawârïkh, p. 56, stated that Mahmüd marched to Içfahân via Sirjän, but this is unlikely.

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the gates and prepared for a siege. The impetuous Afghans attempted to force their way through the defences, but were driven back with some loss. As Mahmûd did not wish to lose more of his men in futile assaults and as he had no heavy artillery, he left the city unsubdued, and instead marched boldly on Isfahan. Information is scanty regarding Mahmüd’s route westwards from Yazd, but we do know from several sources that he passed through Varzäna, a village on the north bank of the Zäyanda-rüd 64 miles east by south of Isfahän. It was at this village that, according to Joseph Apisalaimian, a messenger from the Shäh offered him 600 purses of silver if he would stay his advance.1 Rightly regarding this offer as a sign of weakness on the part of the Shäh, he rejected it and pressed on. A second offer was treated in the same way. As we know that Mahmud eventually reached the main YazdIsfahän road some miles to the east of the small village of Muhammadäbäd (18 miles east of Isfahän), he probably left the Zäyandarüd at or near Varzäna and marched west-north-west to Sagzi, a village on the main road 7 miles east of Muhammadäbäd. By the time that he reached Sagzi, he must have heard that a strong Persian force was on its way from Isfahän to contest his passage. It was doubtless for this reason that he elected to await the oncoming Persians near Muhammadäbäd. So far as can be ascertained from an examination of the terrain,1 2 Mahmüd took up his position with his right flank just athwart the main road half a mile to the south-west of the village, where the remains of trenches are still to be seen. He probably stationed his centre on three slight eminences which are situated to the south of the main road, while his left wing was on the level ground still further to the south. From these slight eminences, the Afghans could look down on the plain extending westwards for 2| miles to the cultivated area surrounding Gulnäbäd (the village itself lay 1 See Professor T. H. Weir’s translation of his Turkish memorandum, in A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E. G. Browne, p. 486. In his French memorandum (AEP, vol. vi, fol. 276 b), Joseph gave the amount as 30,000 écus. 2 I am greatly indebted to my friend Dr Minasian, of Isfahan, in whose company I examined the country between Gulnäbäd and Muhammadäbäd in May 1954 (he had previously visited this area on my behalf, with M. Sumbat Keureghian, in order to gather the necessary topographical data).

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immediately to the south of the main road).1 Between Gulnâbâd and Muhammadäbäd and some 1200 yards east of the former the Burzün canal runs across the plain in a N.N.W.-S.S.E. direction; as will be seen below, this canal existed in 1722. It seems unlikely that Mahmüd advanced beyond the position described above, because it lent itself to defence better than the open plain to the west; also, he would have had a sufficient supply of water there. Moreover, by remaining near Muhammadäbäd he would have been able to protect his right wing to some extent by stationing a small force in the Qal‘a Nairn, the ruins of which are immediately to the north-west of the village. The tidings that Mahmüd had again reached Kirmän caused consternation and alarm in the Persian capital. It was only then, as we learn from Muhammad Muhsin, that “the contemptible ministers”12 took any steps to prepare for the defence of the realm. When it became known that Mahmüd had left Yazd unsubdued and that he was advancing on Isfahän, the feelings of alarm became intensified. In a state bordering on panic, the Shäh convened a meeting of his council in order to decide on a plan of action. As was usual at such gatherings, there were sharp differences of opinion. Muhammad Qulï Khän, the Ftimäd al-Daula^ was an arrant coward, but he had had, whilst he was Qurchi-bäshi, some slight experience of military matters, and he realised that the available troops, although far more numerous than the enemy, were almost entirely untrained and unused to war. He was there­ fore fully justified in contending that they were unfitted to face such bold and experienced warriors as the Ghalzais in the open field. For this reason, he advocated the retention of the army within the defences of Isfahän until a sufficiently strong force could be raised elsewhere and brought to the relief of the capital; battle could then be joined with every hope of success. This was undoubtedly sound advice, but the Shäh preferred to listen to the counsels of Muhammad Qulï Khän’s enemies, who urged immediate offensive action. The Shäh was strengthened in his resolve to take a bolder course by a letter which he received from Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the Vâlitâ ‘Arabistän, who was then at Qümisha,3 1 The ruins of this village, which are very extensive, are still to be seen. 2 ZT, fol. 206b. 3 Qümisha was renamed Shahrezä during the reign of the late Reza Shah.

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a town two days’ march to the south of Isfahân. There has been much controversy as to the identity of this Vâlï, some maintaining that he was Sayyid Muhammad, while others claimed that he was Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the father of Sayyid Muhammad.1 Although Sayyid Muhammad had certainly been Väli in 1719, there is good reason to suppose that he was soon dispossessed by his father, who was very forceful and ambitious. Sayyid ‘Abdullah had previously occupied the post of Vâlï, but had been superseded by his cousin Sayyid ‘Ah, the family historian.12 Sayyid ‘Abdullah was in certain respects the antithesis of Muhammad Qulï Khän, being as rash and impetuous as the latter was timid and it was inevitable that differences should arise between them. The Vâlï had acquired much influence over the weak Shäh and had as a rule little or no difficulty in inducing him to follow his advice. Unfortunately, his advice was not always sound; he was, moreover, of a treacherous disposition. Sayyid ‘Abdullah doubtless knew what the Ftimäd al-Daula had proposed, and it was probably partly for that reason and partly because of his impatient temperament that he warmly supported the plan for taking the offensive. He pressed the Shäh to arrange for an immediate advance, and promised to join him with his Arab cavalry as soon as he had mustered them.3 The consequence was that immediate steps were taken to gather the troops together, and proclamations were issued to each village in the neighbourhood 1 We do not know which name, if any, Krusinski used in the original text of his memoirs. In Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa’s Turkish translation, the Tä'rlkh-iSayyäh, he refers throughout to the “ Khân-i-Hawîza”, giving no personal name. It is possible that Krusinski may have given the name as Muhammad, because in du Cerceau’s recension of Krusinski’s memoirs, the name appears invariably as Machmet (Mahammad). On the other hand, Muhammad Muhsin, when dealing with events at a slightly later date, gives the name as ‘Abdullah (ZT, fol. 208 a), as do also the Carmelite Friar Alexander of Malabar, in his Kort Narigt, and the representatives of the Dutch East India Company in their Dagregister, which is a day-to-day record of events from 1 March to 31 August 1722. It is for these reasons that I have taken ‘Abdullah to be the correct name, although Sayyid Ahmad Kasravï, in his Tärikh-i-Pan-Sad Säla-yi-Khüzistän, p. 102, was inclined to believe this to be erroneous. 2 It was no uncommon thing for members of the Musha‘sha‘ family to quarrel and even to go to war with one another for the coveted post of Vâlï of ‘Arabistän. Sayyid Farajullah, the captor of Baçra, and his son Sayyid ‘Abdullah had more than once taken the field against each other for this reason. See Kasravï, op. cit. p. 98. 8 See the entry for 1 March 1722 in the Dagregister.

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of the capital promising six months’ remission of taxes to all who would enroll. By these means, a large number of men were got together, but many of them were peasants and traders who had never borne arms in their lives before,1 while some had no weapons other than sticks and staves.1 2 On the other hand, there were some seasoned troops amongst them, clad in gorgeous uniforms and extremely well-armed, such as the corps of the Qullar, under the command of the Georgian prince Rustam. Other men of good fighting quality were the tribal levies under ‘Ali Mardän Khän, the Väli of Luristän, who was a good leader and a most courageous man.3 On 3 March Muhammad Quli Khän, the Ftimäd al-Daula, set out from Isfahän to meet the foe at the head of some 30,000 men who were of a very mixed quality as fighters. Accompanying them were the artillery corps, with twenty-four cannon; although nominally under Ahmad Khän, the Tûpchï-bâshï, this corps was actually under the supervision of a French master-gunner named Philippe Colombe. This man, who was a native of Paris, had served for some years in the Russian army, but had left it to go to Persia. Such skilled supervision was essential, as Ahmad Khän was a mere figure-head, and there were no Persian artillerymen of any experience whatsoever; Krusinski said of them: One may judge of the Skill of the Persian Engineers, by a Question of the Topli-baszy [$w], or Great Master of the Ordnance, who when the Rebels arriv’d at Giulnabat, ask’d the English at Ispahan, if there were any Cannon in Europe that would carry twelve Miles ; and if they thought there were any Guns among his, that would carry as far as Giulnabat?4

On the same day that the Ftimäd al-Daula left Isfahän with his army, the Väli of ‘Arabistän, having mustered 12,000 of his Arab cavalry, left Qûmisha, and joined the main force two days later some miles to the east of Isfahän. The total strength of the Persian army was thus in the neighbourhood of 42,000, and outnumbered 1 TN, p. 8. 2 Dagregister, 3 March 1722. 3 Krusinski (p. 75) called him “the greatest Captain of that Time in Persia”, and Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Hazin, in his Ahwäl, p. 126, stated that he was “in truth, one of the bravest and most accomplished men of the age”. 4 Krusinski, p. 253.

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Mahmud’s men by more than two to one.1 On the Persian side the supreme command was divided between the Ftimäd al-Daula and the Vali of ‘Arabistän. A divided command is always bad in principle, and it was the height of folly to appoint two such men as Muhammad Qulï Khän and his bitter enemy, the Väli? Previous to the departure of the army, the Shäh had given orders for the cannon at Farahäbäd to be brought to the city and placed in position outside his palace, but these orders were, unfortunately, not carried out. The Persian forces went no further than the suburb of Shahristäna, on the south-eastern outskirts of the city, on the first day of their march. On 4 March they turned to the north-east, following the main road from Isfahän to Yazd. As they approached the Khuraskän ridge, which runs from north to south some 8 miles to the east of Isfahän, they wheeled to the right and went through the Gavart defile. On the further side of the ridge, they debouched on to the plain on which the villages of Gulnäbäd and Muhammadäbäd are situated. The Persians could have entrenched themselves in the defile, but in that case they would have had to send troops 1 The following table shows how widely the estimates of the various sources differ not only as to the strength of the Persian forces, but also as to that of their opponents : Authority No. of Persians No. of Afghans TN, p. 8 Not given 8,000 ZT, fol. 206 b Nearly 80,000 9,000 Majma( al-Tawârïkh, p. 56 40,000 80,000 Gardane, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 148 b 45,000 to 50,000 10,000 Joseph Apisalaimian*s French 50,000 10,000 memorandum Joseph Apisalaimian*s Turkish 52,000 14,000 memorandum Dagregister, 3 March 50,000 12,000 Krusinski 50,000 40,000 Gilanentz*s Journal, vm 30,000 12,000 Padery, AEP, vol. VI, fol. 160 b 30,000 10,000 Père Jérome 60,000 30,000 It appears that only Krusinski and Muhammad Khalil (in the Majma( alTawârïkh) included the Ghalzais* auxiliaries. 2 The Romans sometimes divided the command between two generals, but when this was done, the generals commanded on alternate days. For example, Paulus and Varro were joint commanders of the army which Hannibal so signally defeated at Cannae in 216 B.c. On that occasion, the inexperienced and impetuous Varro, whose turn it was to command, insisted, against the advice of his colleague, on giving battle under most unfavourable conditions.

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southwards to hold the other low passes through the Khuraskän ridge in order to avoid being outflanked and cut off. The Persian commanders no doubt preferred to go on to the open country, so as to deploy their superior numbers to better advantage. On 7 March the Persians passed through the village of Gulnäbäd and crossed the Burzün canal 1000 yards beyond it; they then took up their position about one mile to the west of the Ghalzais’ line. Except for a skirmish, in which ‘Alï Mardän Khan’s Lurs routed a small party of marauding Afghans,1 no engagement took place on that day, the reason being that the Shäh’s astrologers had said that the stars would not be favourable until 8 March. As for Mahmud and his men, they seemed somewhat overawed by the great numerical superiority of the Persians, and they therefore remained inactive. The superstitious and credulous Shäh, not content with the prediction of his astrologers, gave orders for his troops to be given a magic broth that night. One of his generals had assured him that, if his men partook of this broth, they would be rendered invisible, and so would have an enormous advantage over the enemy. This broth was to be prepared in bowls each of which was to contain two legs of a he-goat, boiled with 325 pea-pods in water over which a virgin had repeated the Muhammadan profession of faith 325 times.2 These orders were duly carried out. When the sun rose on the following morning, the fateful 8 March, the two armies took careful stock of each other. The contrast between them was, indeed, extraordinary. Not only did the Persians greatly outnumber the Afghans, but the uniforms and equipment of many of their troops were as magnificent as those of their adversaries were drab and travel-stained. The late Professor Browne has drawn attention to the remarkable similarity between the battle of Gulnäbäd3 and those between the Säsänian Persians and the Muslim Arabs at Qâdisïya in a.d. 635 and between the forces of the Caliph Musta‘sim billah and the Mongols outside Baghdäd in a.d. 1258. In each of these three cases, there was to be noted “the splendour and apparent strength of the defenders and 1 Dagregister, 8 March. 2 Ferrier’s History of the Afghans, pp. 43-4. 3 Although the battle was fought nearer to Muhammadäbäd than to Gulnäbäd, it seems preferable to call it by the latter name, since the authorities always refer to it as such.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

the squalor and seeming weakness of their assailants”.1 At the battle of Qâdisîya, according to Gibbon,1 2 the odds were four to one in favour of the Persians, but only one-quarter of their men were fully trained. In the battle outside Baghdad, there was not quite the same disparity in numbers between the Caliph’s army and that of the Mongols, but the contrast in the appearance of the two hosts was truly remarkable.3 In all these three cases, experience, courage and determination more than made up for the inferiority in numbers, weapons and equipment. Owing to disagreement between certain of the contemporary authorities, some difficulty has been experienced in determining the order of battle of the opposing forces. So far as can be gathered, the Persian forces were arranged in the following manner: On the extreme right was the Väli of ‘Arabistän, with his Arab cavalry. Next to him, in the right centre, was the gallant Georgian Rustam Khän, the Qullar-âqâsï, who, besides being in command of a large body of the Qullar, had under him a contingent of the royal guards, a real corps d'élite consisting of 400 brave and well-trained Georgians. On Rustam Khän’s left, that is, in the left centre of the Persian line, were 15,000 men under Muhammad Quli Khän, the Ftimäd al-Daula. The left wing consisted of two contingents of tribal cavalry, one being under ‘All Mardän Khän Failï, the Vâlï of Luristän, and the other under ‘All Ridä Khän, of Kühgilû. The Persian commanders, taking advantage of their larger numbers, had extended their line some distance to the south, so as to be able to attack the enemy in the flank when battle was joined.4 The Afghan army was in three divisions. The right wing was entrusted to Amänullah Sultän, a very experienced and capable leader. Mahmüd himself commanded the centre, while a Sïstânï Zoroastrian named Nasrullah56was in command of the left wing. 1 Persian Literature in Modem Times, p. 127. 2 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London, 1838), vol. vi, p. 391. 8 Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, Kitab al-Fakhrl (Cairo, 1317 (1897 8)), p. 97. 4 ‘‘Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 149 a. 6 It says much for the character and military prowess of this man that he was able to overcome the religious prejudice of the Afghans sufficiently to rise to high command under them. Krusinski, p. 274, said of him : “ He was pretty tall, but otherwise ill shap’d enough. He was a great friend to the Armenians, and their declar’d Protector. He was term’d Kior-Sultan, or the blind Lord, because he us’d to keep one of his Eyes shut. He learnt the Trade of War by robbing.”

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For the greater part of the day neither side showed any eagerness to attack. The Ftimäd al-Daula, with his customary timidity and caution, was loath to make the first move, and wished, in fact, to remain on the defensive. The Afghans still seemed overawed by the numbers of their foes and by the magnificent appearance of their troops.

Sketch-plan of the Battle of Gulnâbâd, 8 March 1722, showing the approximate positions of the Persian and Afghan armies before the action began.

It was not until four o’clock in the afternoon that the decisive step was taken. Tired of the long period of inaction, Rustam Khän and his men fiercely attacked the Afghan left wing, hurling it back in confusion. Almost simultaneously, the Väli of ‘Arabistän and his cavalry swept round in a wide arc over the open country to the south of the Afghan line. However, instead of attacking the already harassed left wing of the enemy from the rear and so completing its destruction, as had been planned, the Väli and his men rode round it and seized the enemy’s camp, which they calmly proceeded to pillage. It is said that when Mahmud saw his left wing yielding to Rustam Khän’s fierce onslaught, he thought that the day was lost 139

FALL OF THE ÇAFAVÏ DYNASTY

and contemplated immediate flight.1 He was, however, restrained by Amänullah, who urged him not only to stand fast, but also to go to the assistance of the hard-pressed Nasrullah and his men. Mahmud thereupon pulled himself together and acted upon his general’s sound advice. Had the Ftimäd al-Daula, with his 15,000 men, attacked while Mahmüd was thinking of flight and had the Vâlï and his Arab cavalry simultaneously charged the enemy from the rear, the

The Battle of Gulnäbäd: the opening phases.

Afghans would inevitably have lost the day. However, Muhammad Qulï Khän and his strong body of troops, like the French left wing at Oudenarde, remained passive in their lines instead of supporting Rustam Khän, while the Vâlï took no heed of repeated appeals for help. The consequence was that Mahmüd was able to give strong support to Nasrullah, and between them they soon cut off Rustam and his troops from the main body of the Persian army. Realising the danger in which he stood, and seeing no sign of any assistance from the other commanders, he endeavoured to fall back and rejoin them, but the attempt was made too late because by this time the whole Persian line was in retreat and on the point of breaking. Although hemmed in and assailed on all sides, the Georgians and their leader grimly fought their way back to the Burzün canal. Rustam urged his horse to leap it, but it missed its footing and fell, throwing him off. Before he could extricate it from the muddy bed of the canal and remount, a number of Ghalzais set upon him, one of them stunning him with a blow from 1 Krusinski, p. 203.

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THE BATTLE OF GULNÄBÄD

his mace, while the others transfixed him with their lances. Rustam thus perished in precisely the same way as his half­ brother Kai Khusrau had done eleven years earlier, also whilst fighting the Ghalzais.1 Somewhat earlier in the engagement, at the northern end of the battle front, ‘Ali Mardän Khän and his tribal cavalry, supported by the Kühgilû contingent, had charged the Afghan right wing. The Ghalzais, in true Parthian fashion, feigned flight, some

The Battle of Gulnäbäd : the beginning of the Persian rout.

swerving to the right and some to the left, thereby leaving a clear field of fire to the zanburaks, which had been placed in position in their rear. These weapons were then discharged at point blank range with devastating effect. ‘Alî Mardän Khan’s brother was amongst the many killed, while he himself was wounded. So severe was the fire and so heavy the casualties that the surviving tribesmen wheeled round and fled, taking their wounded leader with them. Meanwhile, in the centre, Muhammad Qull Khän, when he saw that Rustam and his men were in serious difficulties, gave his men the order to retire, although they had hardly made contact with the enemy.1 2 Seeing the Persians yielding at all points, the Afghans 1 See p. 90 above. 2 Krusinski (p. 204) in fact said that Muhammad Qulï Khän “turned his Back and fled before the Enemy had struck a Stroke ”. He quoted the Afghans as saying afterwards that had the Ftimäd al-Daula stood his ground even a quarter of an hour longer, they would have lost the day. In the entry in the Dagregister on 9 March, it was then being generally said in Isfahan that Muhammad Qulï Khän was the first to retreat, thus throwing the Persian line into disorder.

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attacked impetuously, and speedily converted the retreat of the former into a disorderly flight. Finding that Muhammad Qulî Khän had left the artillery unprotected, the Afghans swept forward so vigorously to the attack that Philippe Colombe had time only to discharge three of his pieces before he and his men were trampled under foot and slain. Ahmad Khän, the Tupchï-bâshï, also lost his life at this juncture. The Persians were by now too demoralised to attempt to recapture the lost cannon, and they were so panic-stricken that they made no stand in the Gavart defile, but dashed on in terror towards Isfahän. So terrified, indeed, were they that they did not even pause to close the gates of the city behind them. In Isfahän itself, all was in chaos, and there can be no doubt that if Mahmüd had followed up his victory by an immediate advance, he could have entered it unopposed. Night, however, was approaching, and he feared that he might fall into an ambush if he were to push forward in the darkness.1 It is impossible to estimate at all accurately the losses of the two sides in this battle, as the authorities give such widely differing totals. Joseph Apisalaimian, in his Turkish memorandum, stated that the Persians and Afghans lost, respectively, 5000 and 500 men killed.1 2 Chirac, relying mainly on Joseph, stated that the Persians lost 6000 killed and the Afghans 700.3 The Dagregister,4 gave the number of Persian dead as between 4000 and 5000, but was silent regarding the Afghans. Muhammad Muhsin merely said that the Persian losses were heavy. Krusinski5 stated that both sides lost 2000 killed, while Gilanentz6 put the Persian and Afghan dead at, respectively, 1700 and 130. It is obvious that both Krusinski and Gilanentz underestimated the Persian casualties, and that the latter source also put the Afghans’ losses too low. The probability is that the Persians lost some 5000 men killed, while the Afghans and their allies lost about one-tenth of that number. 1 The above account of the battle is based on a number of contemporary and near-contemporary sources, particularly the ZT, fol. 207a; Gardane’s “Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans”, in AEP, vol. vi, fols. 147b-!50a; the Dutch Dagregister, for 8 and 9 March; Friar Alexander of Malabar; Gilanentz, sections xn-xv; Krusinski, pp. 203-4; and Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 227-42. 2 A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E, G. Brozone, p. 488. 8 Vol. I, p. 245. 4 Entry on 8 March 1722. 5 P. 204. 6 Section xv.

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The Persians lost this battle because of the divided command, the lack of training of their troops, and, above all, the astonishing behaviour of the Ftimäd al-Daula and the Väli Qi ‘Arabistän. Muhammad Muhsin, after paying a well-deserved tribute to the gallantry of Rustam Khän and his fellow-Georgians, summed up the matter as follows:1 “If the other leaders had not acted as cowards and if they had supported the Qullar-âqâsï, they would have driven the Afghans off the field, (but) by the decree of Fate... it came about that there was a major defeat.” Muhammad ‘All Hazïn, who was also at Isfahän at this time, referred in the following terms to the jealousies and differences of the Persian leaders: One of the causes of the fatal events that followed was that over an army composed of so many persons, no two of them, from the reckless­ ness to which they had abandoned themselves, and the insincerity of their minds, could be brought to agree, that one should be Amir, or Commander, and the other the Sardar or Leader.2 On the Afghan side, Mahmüd showed irresolution, if not panic at a critical stage of the battle, but, with the experienced Amänullah to guide him, he soon atoned for this lapse (it must be remembered that he was only twenty years of age). He and his commanders were not divided by personal feuds or jealousies, and his men fought with their usual bravery and tenacity. 1 ZT, 207a.

2 Ahwâl, pp. 116-17.

H3

CHAPTER XIII

THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN The news of the disaster at Gulnäbäd reached Isfahän about 9 o’clock on the evening of 8 March, causing general alarm. Soon afterwards, the flood of fugitives from the battlefield began to pour into the city, communicating their panic to those within. In the swift contagion of panic all was soon in chaos and confusion ; it was feared that nothing could now prevent Mahmüd from entering the city and seizing the throne.1 Rumours were soon current that the disaster was even worse than it actually was, and at midnight crowds of terrified women rushed screaming through the streets and lanes of the city to seek asylum in the Tabarak citadel. When day dawned on 9 March, and there was no sign of the dreaded foe, there was a slight relaxation of the tension and fear. The Shah and his ministers took advantage of this unexpected respite to do what was possible to protect the city. Soldiers were hurriedly sent to the walls and other defences, special care being taken to guard the bridges over the Zâyanda-rûd.12 At that time, the river was so swollen with the spring rains and the melting snows of the Zagros that it could not be forded anywhere. So long as the river continued in this state, it constituted by far the strongest line of defence, and the possession of the bridges was obviously a matter of the highest importance. Despite these defensive measures and the non-appearance of the enemy, panic was still widespread in the city, and a portent of things to come was a sharp rise in the price of bread. During the day, the Väli of ‘Arabistän and his men returned to Isfahän, ostentatiously bringing with them a number of baggage 1 Dagregister, 8 March. Hier alles in allarm is, en vreesen dat Mhamoet nog meester van alles worden sal. 2 Gardane reported to Paris on 19 March that, despite the large numbers of men capable of bearing arms, only 500 regular troops were available for the defence of the city. He went on to say: “Sur mille habitants on n’en voit pas dix armés, tout est dans la confusion, et je vous avoue, Monseigneur, que je crains que Dieu ne veuille humilier ce royaume, auquel cas les 10,000 arrevans [Afghans] sont plus que suffisants.” AEP, vol. vi, fols. 147a and 147b.

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animals laden with the spoils of the Afghan camp. It was said that Sayyid ‘Abdullah acted in this manner so as to make the Persians believe that he had not been secretly in touch with Mahmud.1 The fact that he considered it necessary to take such action is of interest. It is abundantly clear from his subsequent behaviour that he became a traitor, and he may already have been harbouring treasonable designs.2 On the other hand, it seems unlikely that he could have had a clandestine meeting with Mahmud on the night after the battle; had he done so, it is most improbable that the Afghan leader would have shown such irresolution during the next two or three days. At a meeting of the Shah’s council, the ever-timorous Muhammad Qull Khan urged him to abandon the city and to go elsewhere to raise fresh troops with which to defeat the Afghans. Muhammad ‘Alï Hazïn pleaded with some of the Shäh’s confidential advisers to persuade him to follow the same course while it was still possible to escape from the city without much risk. He went on to say: The liberation of Isfahän itself was included in my scheme ; for, after the departure of the Shäh, the enemy would have had no leisure to pursue his designs and efforts against that capital, but must have looked to his own safety : and the citizens would have employed every method to remove him from a situation to annoy them ; so that he would have been compelled either to.. .return.. .by the same road which he had come ; or to prepare himself for battles with a powerful Soltan. In every point of view this plan of conduct was advantageous ; and its adoption would have saved that immense population from perishing by misery and famine. But this was unsuitable to the fixed decree of fate; and certain persons of inconsiderate minds interfered to prevent it.. ..3

These “persons of inconsiderate minds” were, as we know from other sources, Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the Hakïm-bâshï and certain other important personages, all of whom had great influence over the Shah. Having thus decided to remain in Isfahän, the Shäh appointed Sayyid ‘Abdullah commander-in-chief, and sent off messengers 1 Fr Alexander, RCAJ, vol. xxm, p. 647. 2 It must be remembered that Sayyid ‘Abdullah, like Mahmud, was a Sunni, and that, although he was a subject of the Shäh and held very high office in his service, he was not of Persian race. Moreover, some of his compatriots in the Persian Gulf littoral were already in revolt. 8 Ahwalt pp. 118-19.

10

145

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

with all speed to Wakhtang VI, the Vâlï of Georgia, ‘Alï Mardân Khän, the Vâlï of Luristän (whose men, as he had been wounded in the battle, had taken him direct to his own country without entering Isfahän), Qäsim Khän, the chief of the Bakhtiän tribe, and other prominent leaders ordering them to collect their men and march as soon as possible to reinforce the garrison of Isfahän. There can be no shadow of doubt that if these leaders, particularly Wakhtang, had responded at once to this appeal, the situation would have been saved. The Afghans had had a wholesome fear of the Georgians ever since Kai Khusrau had so nearly taken Qandahär in 1711, and were wont to say: “The Persians wrere but Women compar’d with Afghans, and the Afghans but Women compar’d with the Georgians.”1 Wakhtang, however, was still enraged at his treatment by the Shäh, and refused to break the oath that he had taken not to draw his sword in his defence. ‘Alï Mardän Khän sent word to the Shäh that he would remain in his own country until his wound was healed and that he would then come to his assistance.2 The other leaders likewise promised to give their aid, but no concerted plan of action was made. Amongst those whom the Shäh consulted was Lutf ‘All Khän Däghistäm, who was brought from his prison to the palace. He is said to have advised the Shäh (i) to reward liberally all those who would serve him well, (ii) to give orders for ample supplies of foodstuffs to be collected and brought into the city, and (iii) to behead all those leaders who had disgraced themselves during the battle of Gulnäbäd. Although the Shäh followed his advice to some extent in regard to the first two suggestions, he took no action at all over the third.3 Moreover, instead of releasing Lutf ‘All Khän, he sent him back to languish in prison.4 In so doing, the Shäh doubtless acted on the advice of Sayyid ‘Abdullah and the Hakïm-bâshï. Etienne Padery, the French consul at Shïrâz, who was in 1 Krusinski, p. 144. Gaudereau, in his Relation de Perse, écrite par un Missionnaire à un de ses Amis en France, p. 52, described the Georgians as “...sans contestation, les plus braves hommes de TOrient”. See also Père Philippe Avril, Voyage en divers Etats d'Europe et d'Asie, entrepris pour découvrir un nouveau chemin à la Chine (Paris, 1693), P* 60. 8 Dagregister, 11 March 1722. 8 Had he taken this advice, he would have had few leaders left ! * Dagregister, 10 March.

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Isfahan at this time, reported to Paris that he had advised the rtimäd al-Daula to endeavour to make terms with the Afghans. According to his account of the matter, Muhammad Qulï Khän approved this course, and then asked him whether, if the Shäh gave his consent, he (Padery) would act as intermediary. At this stage, however, some fresh troops arrived in Isfahän, an event which raised the spirits of the Shäh and his ministers to such an extent that they decided not to negotiate with Mahmud.1 On io March the Shäh brought his eldest son, Mahmüd Mïrzâ, who was then aged 25, out of the harem and appointed him his deputy. His plan was to send the young man out of Isfahän in order to collect a sufficiently strong army to relieve it, it being thought that men would join this force more readily if a royal prince were in command.2 As the young man had spent all his life in the seclusion of the harem and so knew nothing of military affairs, the Shäh appointed the Väli of ‘Arabistän as his adviser. On the afternoon of the following day, the prince presided at a majlis or gathering in the Chahär Bägh. Amongst those present on this occasion was Ahmad Äghä, a white eunuch, who had been appointed to succeed the late Rustam Khän as Qullar-äqäsi? On the afternoon of 12 March the Shäh sent Mahmüd Mïrzâ back to the harem. The official explanation was that the young prince, who had been accustomed to lead a life of complete seclusion, had become alarmed at the sight of so many people at his majlis, and had himself asked to be allowed to return to the harem. It is believed, however, that the real reason for his removal from office was that he had spoken in harsh terms of the Mulläbäshi and Hakîm-bâshï and had asked the Shäh to dismiss them from the council of state. He had also, it was said, adopted a menacing attitude towards those nobles who had failed to distinguish themselves at Gulnäbäd. The consequence was that all those 1 Padery’s undated despatch to Paris in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 426 b. (Padery’s despatches have to be read with some caution ; owing to his rivalry with Ange de Gardane, the French consul at Isfahän, he was always apt to exaggerate the part that he had played in his dealings with the Persian government.) 2 ZT, fol. 210a. See also the Dagregister, 10 March, and the (Anonymous 9) “ Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans ”, in AEP, vol. vi, fols. 1 soa-b. 3 Muhammad Muhsin stated (ZT, fol. 205 b) that Ahmad Äghä, who was very much respected, had had a military command in the time of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistänl, but he had been dismissed and arrested and had had all his property confiscated.

*47

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

whom the prince had thus antagonised, although usually engaged in quarrelling amongst themselves, united against him. They went to the Shäh and informed him that Mahmud Mirzä was of a most ambitious nature and that, if he were left at the head of an army, he would endeavour to usurp the throne.1 If the foolish Shäh had only listened to his son instead of paying heed to the false charges of the Mullä-bäshi and his other evil counsellors, the situation might yet have been saved. But Shäh Sultän Husain was fated always to take the wrong course. On 14 March the Shäh took his second son, Safi Mirzä, who was then 23 years of age, out of the harem, and invested him with similar powers to those which he had conferred upon his elder brother.1 2 It seems, however, that the control of the army was not entrusted to him, but to the Vali of ‘Arabistän. In the meanwhile Mahmud, who had remained strangely inactive for some days after his great victory, had decided to carry on with his enterprise. As Mahmüd had no confidential väqianavis or recorder of events with him, we have no means of ascertaining what thoughts were in his mind during the two days after the battle. Did he consider for a time withdrawing his forces to Kirmän in order to reduce the citadel there? And was he induced to give up this idea and to resume his advance on Isfahän because he construed as an act of weakness a peace offer which the Shäh is said to have made to him soon after the battle?3 It is possible that Mahmud did seriously consider withdrawing, but changed his mind when he received this peace offer, although a more rational explanation of his conduct is that he was at first dazed by the magnitude of his success and that he found himself unable for a time to decide on his next step. Should he be content with the considerable amount of booty that he had already got4*and return with it to Qandahär, or should he take the bolder course of attempting to capture Isfahän and wrest the crown from Shäh 1 Padery’s report to Paris, dated 30 March 1722, in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 161a. See also the Dagregister, 12 March, and the “Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans ”, loc. cit. fol. 150 b (in this “ Relation ” the Prince is erroneously called Sulfan Hamid). 2 Dagregister, 14 March. 8 Krusinski, p. 207. 4 Clairac, vol. 1, p. 45, stated, on the authority of a letter from Isfahan, that the Persians left treasure to the value of 12,000 tomans on the battlefield, together with all their tents, equipment and cannon.

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Sultan Husain? He must have been acutely conscious of the smallness of his forces and of his great distance from his homeland. His men were many times outnumbered even by the troops in Isfahän (although these would be in no fit state for fighting for some days to come), and he could not fail to realise that large forces would be raised in other parts of the kingdom and brought to the relief of the Shäh. The Georgians alone would have been able to defeat him, but he did not, of course, then know that Wakhtang would keep his vow. Had Mahmüd known at the outset how thoroughly demoralised the Persians were after their crushing defeat, he would almost certainly have resumed his advance on the day following the battle. Had he done so, he would have encountered little or no opposition. In that event, the people of Isfahän would have been spared the terrible sufferings and appalling death-roll from hunger and disease that were to be their lot during the siege. It seems reasonable to conjecture that what finally made Mahmüd decide to continue his enterprise was the encouraging nature of the reports which he soon began to receive of the state of affairs in Isfahän. These reports emanated not only from his own spies, but also from traitors amongst the Shäh’s entourage. It has been alleged that one of those who were early in communication with Mahmüd was the blinded Fath ‘All Khän Däghistäni, who, like the Afghan leader, was a Sunni. Another possible traitor was the Väli of ‘Arabistän. It was probably on n March that Mahmüd and his men resumed their advance on the Persian capital. From their camp at Muhammadäbäd several routes were open to them. There was the main road via the Gavart defile, which was the most direct, and there were alternative ways through the Khuraskän ridge by the Firüzäbäd, Juzün and Käj passes. Lastly, there was the road or rather track which ran south-south-west from the Afghan camp through Aminäbäd, QaFa Zainabiya and Juzün to Käj, and thence round the southern tip of the ridge to the village of Sarashbadarän. This village is on the north bank of the Zäyanda-rüd; from it a road runs north-westwards parallel with the river through the Kararaj district until it joins the main Isfahän-Yazd road two and a half miles east of the suburb of Shahristäna; approximately half-way along this road is a turning to the left (west) which leads 149

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

to the Chum bridge over the river. In Mahmüd’s day another road branched off at Sarashbadarän and crossed the river by the Dashti bridge, which now no longer exists.1 We do not know which of these various routes Mahmüd chose to follow, but it seems probable that he took the one via Sarashbadarän for a number of reasons. First, since it was throughout in open country, there would have been but little risk of a surprise attack by the Persians. Secondly, it would have brought the Afghans to the river far more quickly, thus assuring their water supply. Last, but not least, the prompt possession of the Dashti and Chüm bridges at a time when the river was not fordable was of prime importance. We know from several sources that Mahmud succeeded in getting part of his forces across the Zäyanda-rüd during the first few days following his departure from Muhammadäbäd, and it is therefore obvious that he must have used either or both of these bridges, since the use of those at Isfahän was denied to him. We can therefore conjecture that Mahmüd, having reached Sarash­ badarän, sent some of his men across to the south bank by the Dashti bridge, while he with the remainder marched along the river bank through the Kararaj district to the main road. He probably transferred more of his men to the south bank by the Chüm bridge as he passed. Towards the evening of n March, there was a desultory exchange of shots between an Afghan patrol and the Persian defenders of the Shahristän bridge.2 Either then or on the next day, the Afghans camped in strength near that bridge. From this position they launched a number of probing attacks on the Shahristäna quarter, but the gallant eunuch Ahmad Äghä, the newly appointed Qullar-äqäsi, with a force of 200 veteran troops, beat them off with heavy loss. This success, together with the arrival of some hundreds of fresh troops from the provinces, did much to revive the Persian morale. In the meantime, Mahmüd’s scouts had been active. They reported to him that there were no Persian troops in Julfa and that Farahäbäd had apparently been abandoned. Smarting from 1 My friend Dr. Minasian has informed me that local legend ascribes the destruction of the Dashti bridge to the Afghans. a “Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 150b.

*50

THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

his failure to penetrate the defences at Shahristäna, Mahmüd began to concentrate his men for an assault on Julfa. Seeing that an Afghan attack was impending, the Armenian inhabitants sent an urgent appeal for help to Isfahan. They were, indeed, in sore straits, because the Persians, with incredible folly, had deprived them of most of their arms, fearing that they might make common cause with the Afghans. Before the battle of Gulnâbâd, the mayor and elders of Julfa had, at the Persians’ request, sent 300 of their young men, all fully armed, to guard the Shah’s palaces in Isfahan whilst the regular guards were away. When these young Armenians arrived, the Persians bade them put down their weapons and return to Julfa, saying that they would summon them if they were needed.1 The unfortunate Armenians received no reassuring message in reply to their appeal, and when the Afghans, on the night of the 16/17 March, delivered their expected assault, no Persians came to their aid. An attempt had, however, been made to come to their relief. The young prince Safi Mirzä put himself at the head of a body of cavalry and was about to lead them to Julfa when he was stopped and turned back by the Vâlï of ‘Arabistän, on the pretext that it was not right for the heir to the throne to expose himself to danger in such manner.12 Deserted by the Persians and not having enough weapons to go round, the Armenians nevertheless resisted with great determina­ tion, calling each other by Persian names so as to make the Afghans believe that there were Persian troops there. Such an unequal struggle could, however, have only one end, and it was not long before the Afghans gained possession of the suburb. From Julfa it was only a short distance to Farahäbäd. Mahmüd found that his scouts’ reports that it had been abandoned were correct. It is quite incomprehensible, unless treason is the explanation, why the Persian high command abandoned Farahäbäd immediately on hearing that Mahmüd had resumed his advance. With its strong walls and towers, it could easily have been defended for some time against a foe without heavy artillery.3 It seems 1 Gilanentz, section x. See also Clairac, vol. 1, p. 272. 2 Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 273-4. 3 As will be seen later, Mahmüd had neglected to remove the twenty-four cannon which the Persians had left on the battlefield,

I5I

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

extraordinary that Shäh Sultän Husain, who had lavished such huge sums on its construction and had derived such pleasure from being there, decided to give it up without making the slightest attempt at resistance. If Ahmad Äghä and some of his seasoned troops had been left in Farahäbäd, not only could they have beaten off any assault on it, but they could also have made Mahmüd’s capture of Julfa much more difficult, besides interfering with his subsequent operations against the capital itself. Moreover, the possession of Farahäbäd by the enemy gave him a secure and convenient base of operations within easy striking distance of Isfahän. In fact, Krusinski was probably not exaggerating when he said that the Afghans would never have ventured to undertake the siege of Isfahän if they had not got possession of Farahäbäd.1 Mahmüd was thus able to occupy Farahäbäd without firing a shot. As it suited his requirements admirably, he immediately made it his headquarters.2 He found that the Persians had even neglected to remove the heavy cannon from it : although they had been ordered to take them to Isfahän, they had merely buried them in the ground, where they were later discovered and put to good use by the Afghans. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Julfa were undergoing much ill-treatment at the hands of the Afghans. Although none was put to death, their houses were broken into and ransacked, while Mahmüd levied an indemnity of 70,000 tomans on the town. Part of this large sum was to be paid at once, and the balance later. Anyone who was slow in making his contribution to this levy was bastinadoed. The most grievous blow of all was Mahmüd’s seizure of about fifty Armenian girls.3 He kept the best-looking for himself, and handed the others over to his officers.4 So terrible was the grief of these unfortunate girls and their distracted parents that the hearts of even the stern Afghans were melted, with the 1 Krusinski, p. 98. 2 According to the colophon on an Armenian MS. in the possession of Dr Minasian, of Isfahan, Mahmüd occupied Farahäbäd on 21 Nirhan, in the year 107 of the Little Calendar (this is equivalent to 18 March 1722). According to the “Relation”, however, he did not enter Farahäbäd until 23 March (AEP, vol. vi, fol. 153 a). I am inclined to think that the date given in the Armenian MS. is more likely to be correct. 3 Dagregister, 25 March; Gilanentz, section xxi; Clairac, vol. 1, p. 277. The numbers of the girls seized are variously given, ranging from forty to sixty-two. 4 Gardane’s Journal, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 207 b.

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THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

result that many were allowed to return to their homes. Some Armenians, who later escaped to Isfahan, said that Mahmud had given orders for the return of these girls, “...disant que leur enlevement étoit la cause qu’il n’avoit pas encore pris Ispahan. Les Prêtres Arméniens ont rebaptisé la plupart de ces filles, et estimé qu’un second baptême devoit rétablir leur première pureté”.1 The Afghans appeared intent on stripping Julfa of its wealth and the belief gained ground in Isfahän that they were collecting their loot as quickly as possible in order to withdraw with it to Kirmän in the event of a strong relieving force appearing. On 18 March all the Europeans in Isfahän were summoned to attend a majlis held by Safi Mirzä in the Chahär Bägh. The young prince, after thanking the Europeans for coming, asked them whether they had any relations with the people of Julfa, saying that they had fallen into disgrace because of their failure to defend themselves against the Afghans. The Europeans made no definite reply to this question, which caused them considerable embarrass­ ment. They well knew, as did the prince, that the citizens of Julfa, having received no help from Isfahän, had had no alternative but to yield to greatly superior force.12 Flushed with his success in taking Julfa and with his bloodless occupation of Farahäbäd, Mahmûd made his first assault on Isfahän itself on 20 March. He massed many of his troops along the south bank of the Zäyanda-rüd, but the river overflowed its banks on that particular day and thus proved even more of an obstacle than usual. At most points all that his men could do was to engage in a fruitless exchange of shots with the defenders on the north bank. Only at one spot did the opposing forces actually come to grips. This was at the southern end of the Pul-i-Marnän, the most westerly of the Isfahän bridges.3 Mahmüd no doubt singled out this bridge for attack because it had only a low parapet and no bridgehead fortifications. The Afghans, after engaging the Persians guarding the southern end of the bridge, feigned flight and drew the Persians after them. The Afghans then turned on their foes and fought with great tenacity, but were unable to gain 1 2 fol. 3

Ibid. “Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans”, AEP, vol. vi, 152 a. For a description of Isfahan as it was at this time, see appendix in.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

a foothold on the bridge. On both sides the casualties were heavy, but, as a result of this action, the Persians regained some of their lost confidence.1 On the following day, the Persian Nau Rûz or New Year’s Day, the Afghans pillaged certain of the villages in the vicinity of the capital. Many of the survivors from these villages fled to the city, thus making the question of food supplies more difficult. The problem of feeding the people was further aggravated by the government’s decree that no one was to leave the city.2 Had as many non-combatants as possible been induced to leave Isfahan before it was completely surrounded, the food situation would have been greatly eased. On the other hand, numbers of men went out to the north and west, where there were as yet no Afghans, to collect and bring back supplies. Moreover, as the roads to the north and west were still open, several thousand troops arrived during March and April to strengthen the garrison. Evidence of the improvement in the Persian morale resulting from the failure of the Afghan attack on the Pul-i-Marnän on 20 March and from the arrival of reinforcements was furnished by a bold and successful venture on the night of 21 /22 of that month, when a number of Persians left the city for Gulnäbäd, taking nine carts with them. They managed to elude the Afghan patrols, and reached the scene of the battle in safety. There they loaded eighteen of the twenty-four cannon that had been left on the battlefield on to their carts, placing two in each, and buried the remaining six. Having done so, they returned without incident to the city. It is said that Mahmud was greatly angered when he heard of this highly successful exploit, particularly as he had just given orders for these cannon to be brought from Gulnäbäd for use against the city defences.3 Realising as clearly as the Persians the supreme importance of the bridges at Isfahän so long as the river was in flood, Mahmud decided to make a further attempt to capture one of them. Having been foiled over the Pul-i-Marnän, and deeming the Allahverdi 1 Krusinski, p. 227 (he referred to the Pul-i-Marnän as the Abusabat (‘Abbäsäbäd) bridge, because the suburb on the north bank of the river there is called by that name). • Clairac, vol. 1, p. 263. 8 Dagregister, 22 March.

T54

THE SIEGE OF ISFAHAN

and Khwäjü bridges too strong, he detailed some picked troops to attack the Shahristän bridge on 23 March. The Afghans, attacking with great fury, overpowered the defenders of the post at the southern end of the bridge, and temporarily gained posses­ sion of the whole of it. They then, however, came under heavy and very accurate fire from some cannon on the relatively high ground on the north bank which were directed by a Courlander named Jacob.1 A wheelwright by profession, Jacob had shown such aptitude for the handling of artillery that he had been appointed to succeed the ill-fated Frenchman Philippe Colombe. The Afghans were compelled to fall back by this well-directed fire; they were then charged by Ahmad Äghä and his men and would have been completely routed if the Vâlï of ‘Arabistän and his Arabs, who were nearby, had co-operated with the Persians. There can be no doubt that the Vâlï was by now in league with Mahmud, and it was being openly said of him that he would do nothing to shorten the war since he was, as commander-in-chief, drawing 50 tomans per day as pay.2 The Shäh, however, apparently suspected nothing and continued to repose confidence in him. The repeated failure of the Persian high command to make proper use of the large forces at its disposal and to follow up such successes as had been obtained caused much anger and discontent in the city. Amongst those who harboured such feelings was the youthful Safi Mïrzâ. Although he was nominally in a position of great authority, he found himself, as his elder brother had done, thwarted at every turn by the Vâlï of ‘Arabistân and also by the Mullä-bäshi and Hakïm-bâshï. Matters came to a head three days after the fight for the Shahristän bridge, when the prince remon­ strated very strongly with his father. He said that he would not rule unless he were given real authority, that he was not content to be a mere figure-head and that, unless he were given full powers, he would rather return to the seclusion of the harem. Shäh Sultän Husain, influenced as usual by his evil geniuses, whom the prince had antagonised by his show of spirit and initiative, promptly sent him back to the harem, on the grounds that he had 1 Krusinski, p. 230. Quite devoid of foundation is the extraordinary statement by Père Reynal that Jacob had gone over to the Afghans during this engagement (see his Relation historique du Détrônement du Roy de Perse et des Revolutions arrivées pendant les Années 1722, 1723, 1724 et 1725 (Paris, 1727), P- 5>2 Krusinski, p. 230.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

fallen sick.1 On the same day (26 March), the Shäh replaced him by his third son, Tahmäsp Mirzä, who was then 18 years of age. The consequences of this step were destined to be disastrous both for the dynasty and the country. Tahmäsp, unlike his two elder brothers, had the same weaknesses as his father, being addicted to idleness and pleasure; he was also very easily influenced. If he ever took the initiative, which he rarely did, he almost invariably took the wrong course. His selection as heir-apparent was, for these very reasons, popular with Muhammad Husain and his colleagues, as they felt that he would be a mere tool in their hands. Popular discontent, doubtless aggravated by the fate of Safi Mirzä, led, on 2 April, to an abortive attempt to depose Shäh Sultän Husain in favour of his more vigorous brother ‘Abbäs Mirzä. At the same time, the refugees from the surrounding villages demonstrated outside the houses of Muhammad Husain and Rahim Khän, breaking down the doors and shouting that they were to blame for all the troubles that were besetting Persia.2 The Shäh’s forces, however, succeeded in restoring order. One cannot help wondering what the outcome would have been if ‘Abbäs Mirzä could have become Shäh at that juncture. Mahmüd’s spies and other informants in Isfahän kept him well informed regarding the dissensions amongst the Shäh’s generals and advisers. According to the Dagregister,3 he wrote at this time to Shaikh ‘Ali Khän, the Qurchi-bäshif and to the Väli of ‘Arabistän; in his letter to the former, he said that it was foolish of the Persians to ask the Arabs to help them to defend the city. He wrote, as one would expect, in very different terms to the Väli, saying that he could not understand why he preferred to serve “Mullä” Husain; since he himself was a Sunni, it would surely be more agreeable to him if one of his own religious views were on the throne. Although Mahmüd was encouraged by the fact that there were serious dissensions amongst the Persian leaders and that some of them were secretly acting in his favour, he was, on the other hand, 1 Dagregister, 26 March; ZT, fol. 210a. See also Krusinski, pp. 242-3 (he erroneously stated that Safi Mirzä was the eldest son). 2 Dagregister, 2 April. 3 Ibid. 4 He had succeeded *Ali Quli Khän Zangana, who had been killed or captured at Gulnäbäd. Shaikh ‘Ali Khän was later found to be in league with Mahmüd.

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chagrined at his failure to force his way through the defences of the city. He was also disturbed at the number of reinforcements who were reaching Isfahän. In order to offset the effect on Persian morale of the arrival of these fresh troops, he sent between 200 and 300 of his men secretly one night to Gulnäbäd, with orders to return to Farahäbäd on the next day with drums beating and trumpets sounding, so as to make it appear that they were reinforcements from Qandahâr.1 It was at or about this time that Mahmud sent one of his principal officers to Isfahän under a flag of truce in order to make proposals for peace. He offered, it is said,2 to raise the siege and return to Qandahâr if the Shäh would give him one of his daughters in marriage with a dowry of 50,000 tomans and would recognise him as the ruler of Qandahâr, Kirmän and Khuràsàn. The Shäh, however, rejected these proposals, and hostilities began afresh.2 Mahmud’s main desire was still to capture one or more of the Isfahän bridges. It would, he knew, be some little time before the level of the river fell sufficiently for his men to be able to ford it in safety; whilst waiting for that to happen strong relieving forces might appear. Until he could get an appreciable number of his men across to the north bank, he could not complete the encircle­ ment of the city and so prevent reinforcements from entering and parties of men from going out to collect supplies from the surrounding district. On the night of 6 April, Mahmud had an extraordinary stroke of good fortune. As the Persians rightly deemed the Pul-i-Marnän to be the most vulnerable of all the bridges, they had entrusted its defence to some Georgian troops. On this night spies brought word to Farahäbäd that these Georgians, having indulged in a drunken orgy, were all lying asleep at their posts. Mahmüd immediately ordered an attack on the bridge, and bade his men take pieces of timber with them with which to cover the gap caused by a broken arch (the Persians had very wisely broken one of the arches in each of the bridges). The attack, which was made at dawn, was completely successful, as the Georgians were all slaughtered as they lay helpless on the ground. The Afghans then pressed on rapidly into the ‘Abbäsäbäd quarter, but they were soon counter-attacked by the ever-vigilant Ahmad Äghä and his 1 Dagregister, 2 April. a Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 290-1. Ï57

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

well-trained men. Although the Afghans were forced to give up much of the ground that they had won on the north bank, they managed to retain the bridge itself, together with a small area immediately to the north of it. As the month wore on, they were able gradually to extend their territory on the north bank, and ultimately to join up with their forces which had worked their way round the eastern and northern defences of the city.1 Since the Afghans and their allies were not numerous enough to form a continuous line round the very considerable perimeter of the city, they set up strong posts at intervals and detailed bodies of horse to patrol frequently between these posts.2 Although it was sometimes possible to elude these patrols, it nevertheless became very dangerous to attempt to enter or leave Isfahän after the end of April. The consequence was that few reinforcements could now break through the enemy’s cordon, and it likewise became almost impossible for the foraging parties to go out to collect supplies. There was therefore a marked increase in the price of bread at the end of April, and it was feared, with good reason, that famine would shortly ensue. During April fighting was by no means confined to the Pul-iMarnän bridgehead and ‘Abbäsäbäd. On 13 April the Afghans captured two posts in the Hazârjarïb garden that the Persians had, up till then, retained; they then set up there three of the large cannon that they had dug up at Farahäbäd. Two days later, they made a further attack on the Shahristän bridge, but they were repulsed. As April wore on, there was increasing public dissatisfaction at the faint-hearted manner in which the defence was being con­ ducted. On the 27th, refugees from the surrounding villages, who showed more spirit than the citizens of Isfahän, once again demonstrated in the Maidän-i-Shäh, threatening to go over to the Afghans unless a sortie were made. The Shäh, in panic, closed the gates of his palace, but gave orders for an attack to be made on the enemy. Accordingly, a mixed force of Persians and Arabs under the command of Ahmad Äghä left the Tauqchl gate on 30 April in order to attack the posts that the Afghans had set up to the north of the city so as to prevent any ingress or egress by that route. 1 Dagregister, 7 April; Gardane’s Journal, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 17613-1773. 2 Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Hazin, Ahwäl, p. 121.

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Unknown to the Persian command, the enemy had just been reinforced in that quarter, but the attack might nevertheless have succeeded had not most of the Arab troops run away. The defection of these men threw the rest of Ahmad Äghä’s force into confusion and compelled him to retreat; as he did so, however, he killed some of the fugitive Arabs.1 When the surviving Arabs reached the city, they complained to Sayyid ‘Abdullah and also to the Shäh, with the result that the faithful Ahmad Äghä was accused of aspiring to supplant the Väli, and was summarily dismissed and disgraced. Although he was afterwards reinstated for a time, he never recovered from the blow to his prestige and good name.2 Early in May a large relieving force approached Isfahän from the north, but it was attacked and routed by the Afghans near the village of Gaz, 9 miles to the north-north-west of the city.3 A few days later the spirits of the defenders were raised by a report that ‘All Mardän Khän, the Vali of Luristän, had, with another relieving force, reached Gulpälgän, a town 140 miles to the north-west of the capital. On 13 May, the Shäh received a letter from ‘All Mardän Khän in which he complained of the conduct of the Vali of ‘Arabistän who, he alleged, had long been drawing high pay for doing nothing at all. ‘All Mardän Khän then asked to be appointed commander-in-chief in his place. Shäh Sultän Husain, who always preferred bad advice to good, allowed himself to be influenced in this matter by Mlrzä Rahim, the Hakim-bäshi, who was a close friend and ally of the Väli of ‘Arabistän. The conse­ quence was that he rejected ‘All Mardän’s request and allowed the Väli to continue his treasonable activities.4 On 3 June, it was rumoured in the city that Wakhtang, the Väli of Georgia, having heavily defeated the Lezgïs, was sending 12,000 of his men to its relief.5 This rumour turned out to have some basis of fact, because Bakar, Wakhtang’s son, had actually set out in May with a force to relieve Isfahän, but he had gone only a short distance when he was recalled by his father in order to be ready to co-operate with the Russian army under Peter the Great, whose arrival on Persian soil was expected very soon.6 Had Bakar 1 Gardane’s Journal, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 1783-6; Dagregister, 30 April. a Dagregister, 30 April. 3 Ibid. 6 May. * Ibid. 13 May. 5 Ibid. 3 June; Gardane’s Journal, 16 June, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 193a. 6 Sekhnia Chkheidze’s “Chronique”, H. de la G. vol. 11, part 11, p. 36 (this matter will be dealt with at greater length in ch. xv).

*59

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

been allowed to proceed and to act in conjunction with ‘All Mardän Khän and his Lurs, the Afghans would almost certainly have been forced to raise the siege. There was still, however, a possibility that the city might be saved, despite the refusal of the Georgians to relieve it. Two or three days after the report that the Georgians were on their way to Isfahän, the Shäh received a further letter from ‘All Mardän Khän. In this letter, the Vâlï in the first place urged the Shäh to abdicate in favour of his brother, as it was felt that it would be more fitting for him to rule the country while it was beset with such difficulties and dangers. ‘Ali Mardän Khän then went on to ask for the most capable of the Shäh’s sons to be sent to him in order that he might act as general of the relieving force. ‘Ali Mardän Khän concluded his letter by complaining that the Shäh would listen to no advice save that of the Hakim-bäshi and Mullä-bäshi, both of whom had abused their influence and power by depriving innocent people of their posts (this was no doubt an allusion to the shameful treatment of Ahmad Äghä).1 Shäh Sultän Husain paid no attention to ‘Ali Mardän Khän’s request that he should abdicate, but it was possibly in consequence of his second demand that, on the night of 7/8 June, he sent his third son Tahmäsp, with a strong escort, out of the city.2 When Tahmäsp and his men were nearly through the danger zone, they were noticed by an Afghan patrol under the command of Mahmüd’s cousin Ashraf. The Afghans at once gave chase, but Tahmäsp and his escort eventually eluded them in the darkness and reached Käshän in safety. When the news of Tahmäsp’s successful evasion reached Mahmüd, he was so furious that he placed Ashraf under arrest. There was, in fact, no love lost between the cousins, for Mahmüd had murdered Ashraf’s father ‘Abd al-‘Azïz in 1717, in order to secure the headship of the Ghalzais. Ashraf was a capable 1 Dagregister, 7 June. * There is some divergence between the various authorities as to the date on which Tahmäsp made his escape: Dagregister, entry on 8 June: “...ende gepasseerde nagt” (i.e. the night of 7/8 June). Padery, “Compte au Roi”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 429a: Night of 8 June. Gardane, Journal, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 180b: Night of 9 June. ZT, fol. 210a: Night of 27 Sha‘bän (12 June). TN, p. 9: Night of 3 Ramadän (17 June). In view of the explicit wording in the Dagregister, there can, however, be no doubt that the night of 7/8 June is correct.

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commander and was much loved by his men, who resented his punishment which they rightly regarded as unjust. So great indeed was Ashraf’s popularity that Mahmud was compelled to release him unpunished; the incident, however, served to exacerbate their relations still further. If Tahmäsp had had any common sense, he would, on reaching safety, have taken immediate steps to join forces with the strongest and most capable of the Shah’s supporters outside the beleaguered capital. Since the Georgians had refused their aid, Tahmäsp should have joined ‘Ali Mardän Khän, who had, in fact, asked for his co-operation. Although Tahmäsp was to prove useless as a leader, his mere presence with the Vâlï of Luristän would have encouraged recruiting and raised the morale of his men. Tahmäsp, however, had inherited his father’s fatal propensity to take the wrong course. Instead of hastening to join ‘Ali Mardän Khän, he and his men went northwards from Käshän to Qazvin. On reaching the latter town, Tahmäsp made some half-hearted attempts to raise troops, but soon gave himself up to pleasure instead.1 In this way another chance of relieving the capital was thrown away. By the middle of June, Isfahän was really in the grip of the famine. In consequence of the growing scarcity, bread and other foodstuffs were rising rapidly in price, and there were already a number of deaths and much suffering amongst the poorer in­ habitants. Driven desperate by hunger, several hundred citizens tried to collect supplies of food outside the walls, but nearly all were either killed or captured by the Afghans.2 Both sides suspended military operations during the month of Ramadän, which lasted from mid-June to mid-July. Mahmud, however, sent his men to burn all the ripening crops in the surrounding country, so as to exclude all possibility of the besieged gathering any of the corn. On 30 June, the city was covered with a thick pall of smoke from the fires raging to the west of it.3 Although there was no fighting around Isfahän during Ramadän, a force of some 8000 Bakhtiäris, under Qäsim Khän, advanced to the relief of the capital from the direction of Najafäbäd, a small 1 ZT, fol. 209b. * Dagregister, 2 July. 3 Dagregister, 29 June. See also Gardane’s Journal, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 207 a.

II

l6l

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

town 17 miles to the west. Simultaneously, a large convoy of provisions was approaching the city from the north. This was encouraging news. The morale of the besieged was also strengthened by reports that Malik Mahmüd, the Governor of Tun and Tabas, was marching with 10,000 men to their relief.1 Faced with the threat from the Bakhtiäris, Mahmüd detached 4000 of his scanty force to bar their passage. If Tahmäsp could have been with ‘Ali Mardän Khän at this juncture, and if the Väli and his Lurs could have co-operated with the Bakhtiäris, and also perhaps with Malik Mahmüd, not only would the convoy of provisions have got through, but the siege might have been raised. However, it was not to be. No one would co-operate with anyone else. ‘All Mardän Khän tried his best, but the others, through jealousy, would do nothing to help him, or, indeed, each other, with the result that all failed.1 2 The Bakhtiäris, however, caused Mahmüd much anxiety; on one occasion they defeated his men and captured an officer of high rank. On the other hand, he succeeded in preventing them from forcing their way through to Isfahän. As for Malik Mahmüd, he was an ambitious and unscrupulous man, and his main aim at this time was to turn to his own advantage the troubled situation in Persia. His loyalty to the Shäh was certainly questionable, as he had been in revolt only two years previously. At this juncture, he showed no disposition to hasten to the relief of his sovereign, probably because he was uncertain whether Shäh Sultän Husain or Mahmüd would prove the victor. With every day that passed the plight of the inhabitants of Isfahän grew worse. Writing to London on 6 July 1722, the agent and other representatives of the English East India Company stated: What Transactions have happen’d since the date of our last [letter] here are only an Aggravation of our Calamities by the Increase of the Famine and Alternate Reports of Succours and Battles not to be credited. The unexpected Continuance of these Troubles has given us great Uneasiness, in regard to the Tragical End we have Reason to fear will 1 Dagregister 6 and 9 July. 2 Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Hazïn, Ahwäl, p. 126. According to Krusinski, p. 236, even ‘All Mardän Khän’s brother proved a traitor to him.

IÔ2

THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

befall Us, as well as the Intire [sic] loss of Your Estate and Trade in this Place, the Scarcity of all sorts of Provisions has Rais’d them to an Incredible Price. Bread and Flower [sic], which used to be sold at two Shahees and four goz being now sold for 50 Shahees per Maund Shaw,1 Rice 65, Barley 24, Wheat 42, Butter 170, Mutton 48, Beef 40. In so much as it has almost exhausted our Cash. The Stores we laid in upon the first Coming of the Enemy were Sufficient for three Months, a much Longer Date than it was thought this Affair would last, but that being Expended and we still besieged, not only we but all our European Neighbours and the City also, are Deceived, who in such a Concourse of Accedents [sic] as they may have seen before [sic] Never could have imagined the Crown of Persia would have been so easily sacrificed and fall by the hands of 5000 of its own Subjects; after the many Glorious Wars it has maintained against the formidable Turk. We have several Times Consulted the most necessary and prudent Measures.1 2

The writers went on to say that they had originally expressed the wish to go to Shiraz, but that the Ftimäd al-Daula had refused to allow them to do so, “so that, when the City falls, which we think, as Matters are, is hardly a Supposition, we shall have the Favour to be the last Destroyed and Crushed in the Ruines of this Monarchy”. They concluded by stating that they were now selling their horses in order “to retrench that Prodigious Charge of Barley”, but they assured the directors of the Company that they would be “as economical as Circumstances permit”. The French agent and consul, Ange de Gardane, writing in his Journal at much the same time, also laid stress on the tremendous rise in the cost of foodstuffs, and concluded his entry with the words “on commence à tout craindre”.3 In Julfa, on the other hand, food was both abundant and cheap.4 When the month of Ramadän came to an end on 15 July, the populace renewed their outcry for more energetic measures against the enemy. The authorities made a show of compliance by ordering the Väli of ‘ Arabistän to lead his men against the Afghans. Although Sayyid ‘Abdullah did, on several occasions, march his 1 There were 20 shähls in each qran (now vial), and 10 qâz in each shâhï. One shahman was equivalent to 13*09 lb. 2 “Persia and the Persian Gulf Records”, vol. xiv. 3 AEP, vol. vi, fol. 207 a. See also Gilanentz, section xxvni, and the Dag­ register, 24 July. 4 Gilanentz, section xxvni.

163

11-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

men out of the city, he invariably found some pretext for leading them back again before they could engage the enemy. On one occasion the brave Ahmad Äghä made a sortie which might have proved successful if, at the critical moment, he had been supported by the Väli. The Carmelite Friar Alexander stated that by such action:1 “This malicious Abdullah caused more people to perish from famine than from Mahmùd’s sword. This rebel prevented all provisions from reaching the town, either by money or by the sword.” The Friar added that Mahmüd had promised the Väli great rewards if he (Mahmüd) became Shah. The unfortunate Ahmad Äghä was so cast down by the turn that events were taking and by his constant thwarting by the treacherous Väli that he fell gravely ill ; having no wish to recover, he died on 30 August.2 Thus perished the only Persian leader who had distinguished himself during the siege. On 6 August Mahmüd sent a mullä under a flag of truce to the Persian fortifications at the southern end of the Shahristän bridge; this mullä asked for two persons of rank to be sent to meet him to discuss a proposal of peace. When this request was reported to the Shäh and the Ftimäd al-Daula, they deputed Mustafä Quli Khän, the newly appointed Qurchi-bäshi, and Mirzä Zaki, a protector of the Armenians, to ascertain what proposals Mahmüd had to make. The negotiations lasted for some days, but were broken off when it was found that Mahmüd’s terms were unacceptable to the Persians. The exact nature of Mahmüd’s demands was not divulged, but they were believed to include the hand of one of the Shäh’s daughters in marriage and the cession of the provinces of Qandahär, Sistän, Kirmän and most of Khuräsän.3 They were thus rather more far-reaching than those that he had made at the beginning of April.4 On the night of 8 August, Etienne Padery, in company with two Jesuits, two Greeks, two Indian banians and a Persian escort, tried to escape from Isfahän. All went well at first, but when they had reached a point farsakhs or 5 J miles from the city, they were intercepted by an Afghan patrol. On the approach of the enemy, the entire Persian escort fled without making the slightest attempt to defend Padery and his companions. The result was that all except 1 RCAJ, vol. xxin, p. 648. 3 Dagregister, 6 August.

8 Dagregister, 30 August. 4 See p. 157 above.

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Padery were killed, while he received a sabre-cut on the head. Notwithstanding his wound, he managed to elude the Afghans and, after many adventures, reached Shiräz on 21 September.1 Although most of the villages in the Isfahän district had fallen an easy prey to the Afghans, the inhabitants of Ben Isfahän, a village 5 miles west-by-north of the city,12 aided by some stout­ hearted refugees from other villages in the vicinity, succeeded in foiling all Mahmud’s attempts to subjugate them. Despite the desperate plight of Isfahän, the valiant villagers maintained their high morale, and on 13 August they beat off a heavy Afghan attack, killing 300 of the assailants and taking many prisoners; some of the captured Afghans were of high rank, and others were kinsmen of Mahmüd. Since the Afghans had barbarously put so many innocent villagers to the sword, the people of Ben Isfahän announced their intention of retaliating by slaughtering their Afghan captives. When this news reached Mahmüd, he sent a message to Shäh Sultän Husain, begging him to intervene and to order the prisoners to be spared. The Shäh complied, but by the time his messenger had reached Ben Isfahän, he found that all the captives had been put to death.3 Had the citizens of Isfahän itself been imbued with the same courageous spirit as the men of Ben Isfahän, the story of the siege might well have been very different. By this time, however, the sufferings of the citizens were such that the striking achievement of the people of Ben Isfahän went almost unnoticed. Towards the end of August, mutton was no longer obtainable even by the rich, and in the few shops that remained open, only horse-flesh and asses’ meat could be bought and then only at the most exorbitant prices. Dogs and cats were savagely hunted and eagerly devoured when caught, and even mice were not despised as food.45 As one Persian historian put it, ‘‘people who were clad in silk, ate leaves like the silk-worm”.6 The poorer people were reduced to collecting and eating old shoes, 1 Padery’s despatch from Shiraz dated 9 December 1722, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 222 a-b. Dagregister, 8 and 9 August 1722. 2 Ben Isfahan (the correct form of which is Venisfädarän) now forms part of the large village of Sehdeh. The village of Gaz likewise resisted the Afghans and was not taken by them until 1723. 8 Krusihski, pp. 236-7. Dagregister, 14 August. 4 Krusinski, pp. 250-1. 5 Muhammad Khalil, Majma* al-Tawarikh, p. 58.

165

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

rotting skins and hides, the bark of trees and even horse-dung, with the result that many fell ill and died from the combined effects of unsuitable diet and under-nourishment. Friar Alexander stated that before the end of the month “.. .the sword of hunger was sharpened so much, that not only when a person died, two or three men at once cut off pieces of the warm flesh, eating it without any pepper with great relish, but even young men and girls were enticed into houses and killed there to appease hunger.ni Moreover, human flesh was often sold in the shops, but under another name. Even the Shäh was reduced to eating the flesh of camels and horses. At length it became impossible for even the rich to satisfy their needs, as there was no food left to buy, with the result that money ceased to have any value. When a rich man died, nobody could be induced to bury him. One day, not long before the end of the siege, when Muhammad Muhsin, the author of the Zubdat al-Tazüärikh, was, with some companions, making a house-tohouse search for secret hoards of food, he found in the cellars of a rich merchant fourteen sacks each weighing 100 Tabriz! mann (654 lb.). Muhammad Muhsin and those with him eagerly slit the sacks open, but found that they contained not corn, but newly minted ‘abbâsïs? Bitterly disappointed, they left the sacks and their contents lying where they had found them, and continued their search elsewhere.3 Muhammad ‘Alï Hazin, who escaped from Isfahan a few days before its fall, has given the following account of his own experiences : Except my library, scarcely anything remained unsold in my house. Though of little or no utility in those circumstances, I distributed near 2000 of my books (which had totalled 8000); the remainder of my collection became the plunder of the Afghans. During the latter days of the siege I was attacked by severe illness, and my two brothers, my grandmother, and the whole of the dwellers in my house died, so that my mansion was emptied of all but two or three infirm old womenservants, who attended me until my disorder began to abate.4 1 RCAJ, vol. xxiii, pp. 648-9. See also the Dagregister, 24 August; Gilanentz, section xxvin; Padery’s despatch from Shiraz, of 9 December 1722, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 223 b; and the letters from Père Jérome Francis of St Joseph and Père Joseph de Reuilly, which were published in the Mercure de France on, respectively, September 1726 and January 1727. 8 An 'abbäsi weighed one mithqäl\ there were 50 'abbäsls in one toman. 8 ZT, fol. 208b. 4 Ahwäl> p. 123.

166

THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

As the siege dragged on, the conditions became, if possible, even more terrible. The streets were piled high with decomposing corpses which no one would—or could—bury; but for the fact that the climate of Isfahän is so salubrious, the deaths from pestilence would have been even more severe than they were.1 Although Isfahän was thus reduced to such appalling straits, it seemed for a short while that, even at the eleventh hour, deliverance was at hand. At the end of September or the beginning of October, news reached the capital that Malik Mahmüd was at last marching to its relief. When these tidings reached Mahmud, he determined to do everything possible to avoid further casualties, while at the same time preventing Malik Mahmüd from snatching the prize from him when it was practically in his grasp. The only course open to Mahmüd was therefore to negotiate. He sent his general Nasrullah, who, like Malik Mahmüd, was a Sîstânî, to endeavour to come to terms with him. Nasrullah met Malik Mahmüd at Gulnäbäd; after delivering to him some costly presents, he stated that Isfahän was on the point of yielding and that the Safavl dynasty was about to fall. He therefore urged Malik Mahmüd to abandon all idea of relieving the city, and pressed him to ally himself with the Ghalzais, for, with their help, he could set himself up as an independent ruler in Khuräsän. Malik Mahmüd was so impressed with Nasrullah’s arguments that he at once returned to Khuräsän, leaving Isfahän and the dynasty to their now inevitable fate.2 Deprived of this last hope of deliverance, the inhabitants were plunged into even more profound despair than before. The mortality rate rose alarmingly, and so many bodies were cast into the Zäyanda-rüd that its waters were polluted for months after­ wards. It is small wonder that many Persians preferred to risk a sudden death at the hands of an Afghan patrol to the slower and far more painful one through starvation or disease. A few, like Padery and Muhammad ‘Alï Hazln, were fortunate enough to run the gauntlet successfully, but several thousands perished in making a vain bid for life and liberty. In a letter from Isfahän dated 20/31 October 1722, the agent of the English East India Company said that so many persons had perished in this way that “.. .all 1 Krusinski, p. 251. 2 Clairac (mainly on the authority of Joseph Apisalaimian), vol. I, pp. 327-31.

167

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Circumjacent Gardens are spread with Corpses as Barbarous Trophies.”1 He went on to say that, at the end of the siege, the soldiers manning the walls were more fitted to be in hospital than at their posts. For some considerable time the Shäh had been finding it increasingly difficult to get enough money to pay the garrison. Besides debasing the currency, he had had to borrow large sums from the Dutch East India Company and to a lesser extent from the English Company as well, giving some of the crown jewels as security. Towards the end of the siege the daily pay of a simple soldier was at the rate of 2 ashrafîs or sequins. Money, how­ ever, ceased to have any value as the siege drew to its terrible close.1 2 Early in October, Isfahän was practically at its last gasp. In consequence, the Shäh, mindful of the sufferings of the populace, offered to surrender. The haughty Afghan, being now confident of victory, was, however, in no hurry to negotiate, so the ordeal of the inhabitants had to continue a little longer. To quote once more from the agent of the English East India Company: This Bloody Scene continued till the beginning of this Month,3 when all Hopes of Succours being giv’n over, and the greatest part of the City either Dead or Deserted, a Treaty was set on foot in order to obtain Peace, but whether the Articles were not advantageous enough or so acceptable as the Possession of the Crown, the Congress was very Short and the Terms Arrogant and Positive which required the King to ride to the Enemy’s Camp and there trust to his (i.e. Mahmüd’s) Will and Pleasure for the Conditions of his Life and Crown. They were compelled to yield to this Imperious and Hard Demand, and on the 12th inst.,4*in the morning the Mighty Persian Monarch Mounted at his Palace Gate and without the least Pomp or Regal Ornaments, Dressed like a Desponding and Miserable Man from whence he was attended with so Melancholy a Retinue, as made it appear a solemn Obsequies to his Crown and Majesty.6 1 “Persia and the Persian Gulf Records”, vol. xiv. Two junior members on the staff of the company lost their lives in this way; see p. 411 below. 2 See p. 166 above. 3 As the English East India Company used Old Style dates, this corresponds to 11 October 1722. 4 23 October. 6 Letter of 20/31 October 1722, “Persia and the Persian Gulf Records”, vol. xiv.

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THE SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

No more than a handful of people were waiting at the gates of the royal palace when the unfortunate Shah set out on his sad ride to meet his conqueror. They consisted of the Rev. John Frost, the chaplain of the English East India Company, Mattheus van Leijpzig, the accountant of the Dutch Company, and a few Persians. Before leaving the city, the Shäh had his three remaining camels slaughtered and distributed their flesh to the starving people. He then said his prayers, weeping as he did so.1 In such fashion ended the siege of Isfahän; if we take it as having begun when the city was completely invested towards the end of April 1722, it had lasted for six months.12 How many perished by the sword or from hunger and disease cannot be stated with accuracy. It seems that not more than 20,000 were killed by enemy action, but that at least four times that number died from starvation and pestilence.3 Isfahän has never fully recovered from its terrible ordeal at the hands of the Ghalzais. Its population, which had been about 650,000 in its brilliant heyday under the great Safavi Shàhs, was greatly depleted not only by deaths during the siege, but also by subsequent migration. Soon after the brief interlude of Afghan rule, Nädir Shäh removed the seat of government to Mashhad, and Isfahän, despite its central situation, its good climate and other advantages, has never since been the capital of Persia. James Morier, who visited the city early in the nineteenth century, found that it had shrunk so from its former size that4 .. .one might suppose that God’s curse had extended over parts of this city, as it did over Babylon. Houses, bazars, mosques, palaces, whole streets, are to be seen in total abandonment ; and I have rode for miles among its ruins, without meeting any living creature, except perhaps a jackal peeping over a wall, or a fox running to his hole. In a large tract of ruins, where houses in different stages of decay are to be seen, now and then an inhabited house may be discovered, the 1 Gilanentz, section xxxm. 2 According to Muhammad Muhsin (ZT, fol. 207 b), the siege lasted for seven months and twenty days, but this would mean that the siege began on 10 March, which, strictly speaking, is too early. 3 Muhammad Muhsin (ZT, fol. 207 b), estimated the number of deaths at 80,000. 4 A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor (London, 1818), P- 134.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

owner of which may be assimilated to Job’s forlorn man, “dwelling in desolate cities, and in houses which no man inhabiteth, which are ready to become heaps”.1

Happily, none of the architectural treasures of Isfahän suffered during the siege or in the troubled period that followed it. More­ over, in recent times, the city has made a partial recovery, but its population is still only a third of what it was in its prime. 1 Job xv. 28.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ABDICATION OF HUSAIN AND THE ACCESSION OF MAHMUD Utterly cast down and dejected, the unfortunate Shäh rode slowly through the corpse-littered streets of his capital mounted on a horse that Mahmüd had lent him (all those in the royal stables having been eaten). Few of the inhabitants saw him and his scanty retinue pass by; those who did preserved a mournful silence which, as a contemporary authority asserted, “.. .express’d more Sorrow, and was more moving than their loud Laments. And in their wond’ring, ghastly Looks one might see that such Astonish­ ment, Pity, Consternation, and Despair had seiz’d their Hearts, as stifled all Complaints”.1 Though grief was in every heart, it was nevertheless hoped that Mahmud would refuse the crown.2 Having crossed the Zäyanda-rüd, the Shäh and his followers, turning to their right, rode slowly westwards towards Farahäbäd. Little could he have thought, when he was lavishing such care and expending so much wealth on its construction that he would one day approach it in this sad and ignominious fashion. A further humiliation was soon to befall him. When he reached the foot of the Küh-i-Suffa, he received a curt message from Farahäbäd that Mahmud was asleep. After keeping him and his companions waiting in the sun for half an hour, the Afghans deigned to allow them to proceed? We are fortunate in having an authentic first-hand account, by a competent observer, of the manner in which Mahmud received Shäh Sultän Husain and of what occurred during their fateful meeting. On 20 October, when it was clear that the city might fall at any moment, the French consul, Ange de Gardane, had ordered Joseph Apisalaimian, his Armenian interpreter and secretary, to go to Farahäbäd to intercede with Mahmüd in the interests of the French nationals in Isfahän. At the risk of his life, Joseph had made his way through the Persian and Afghan lines and had been conducted to Mahmüd. The Afghan leader received 1 Krusinski, p. 255.

2 ZT, fol. 208 a.

171

3 Chirac, vol. I, p. 342.

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

him very courteously, and promised to comply with Gardane’s request. The Afghan master of the ceremonies made Joseph remain with him in Farahäbäd, and, three days later, took him into the audience hall just before Shäh Sultan Husain was ushered into Mahmüd’s presence. Joseph was consequently able to witness the meeting between them and to report what they said.1 Mahmüd was seated in one of the corners of the room, leaning on a cushion covered with cloth of gold. The Shäh, on being brought in, was taken to another corner where he sat down.12 After they had exchanged greetings, Shäh Sultän Husain said: ° My son, since the Supreme Being does not wish me to reign, and the moment has come which he has decreed for you to ascend the throne, I cede my empire to you with all my heart, and I wish that you may rule it in all prosperity.” As he uttered these words, the Shäh took from his turban thejfÿâ or emblem of royalty 3 and gave it to Amänullah to hand to Mahmüd. Seeing, however, that Mahmüd was annoyed at this, he took it back from Amänullah, advanced to Mahmüd (who was still seated) and placed it on his head with his own hands, bidding him reign in peace. The ex-Shäh (as he must now be termed) thereupon returned to his corner of the room and sat down. Coffee and tea were then served. At this juncture, Mahmüd evidently felt pity for Sultän Husain, for he addressed him as follows :

Let not grief take up its abode in your heart. Such is the mutability of human grandeur. Allah, who disposes of empires as he wishes, causes authority (over them) to pass from hand to hand and from one nation to another, as it pleases him. However, I promise to look upon you always as my own father and to undertake nothing in the future without taking your advice.4 1 Clairac, vol. I, p. 344. See also the “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Revolution de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 358a (this memorandum, like Chirac’s account, is based on information supplied by Joseph). 2 Gilanentz, section xxxiv, stated that the ex-Shäh was given “ a lower place” (and therefore one of less dignity and importance). 3 The jïqa was an aigrette or plume of heron’s feathers set with precious stones. It was worn by the sovereign on the right side of his turban, as can be seen from the portrait of Shäh Sultän Husain by the talented Dutch artist and traveller Cornelius de Bruyn (see frontispiece). See also the footnote on p. 4 of vol. I of Hanway’s Travels, 4 Joseph’s Turkish memorandum as translated by Professor Weir, Volume of Oriental Studies, p. 489, and Clairac, vol. 1, pp. 344-5.

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A Balüchî chieftain who was with Mahmüd then approached the ex-Shäh and said: “My Shäh, whatever business is being done here, we, being your servants, now make ourselves servants to the Afghan.”1 Sultan Husain, alluding to what Mahmüd had said, replied: “The rule is Allah’s.” Sultan Husain was then conducted from Mahmüd’s presence to the room which had been assigned to him. In such sad and ignominious fashion ended the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain and the long period of Safavï rule. That same evening Amänullah, at Mahmüd’s orders, entered Isfahän at the head of 3,000 men. He sealed the doors of the royal palace, removed the Persian sentries, and posted his own men as guards in their place.1 2 While this action was being taken, the women and children in the ex-Shäh’s harem wailed and screamed so loudly that they could be heard throughout the city.3 On the next day Mahmüd gave directions for the streets of the city to be cleared of corpses, partly because of the danger of pestilence, but mainly in order to prepare for his forthcoming triumphal entry. At the same time, he arranged for large quantities of food to be brought into the city to be distributed to the starving inhabitants. On the morning of 24 October, the agent and other representa­ tives of the English East India Company called on Amänullah at the royal palace. He received them very graciously, giving them “full Assurances of all the Encouragement to our Affairs we could desire”.4 Unfortunately, this promise of good treatment was not destined to be kept. Bythe i4Muharram(25 October), the preparations for Mahmüd’s state entry into Isfahän having been completed, he set out in great state from Farahäbäd. As a precautionary measure, Amänullah had posted well-armed men on the roofs of lofty buildings and on the minarets of mosques along the route that was to be followed, 1 According to Gilanentz, section xxxiv, this Balüchî chieftain reproached the ex-Shäh for having brought disaster upon them all. I prefer to follow Joseph’s own account. 2 ZT, fol. 208 a. 3 Gilanentz, section xxxv. This is confirmed by Friar Alexander of Malabar, RCAJ, vol. xxiii, p. 650. 4 Letter from Isfahan, dated 20/31 October 1722, in “Persia and the Persian Gulf Records ”, vol. xiv.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

but the populace proved to be so cowed and stunned by the disaster that had overtaken them and also so weakened by hunger and disease that no disturbances took place. Joseph Apisalaimian, if he did not actually march or ride in the procession itself, must have been a spectator of it. He gave a detailed description of it to Clairac1 and a very much curtailed one to Petros di Sargis Gilanentz.1 2 The following is Hanway’s English rendering of Chirac’s account:

The procession was opened by ten officers on horse-back, and about 2000 cavalry, among whom were several lords of the court of Persia. Next came the master of the horse to the Afghan prince, at the head of fifteen led horses magnificently caparisoned ; he was followed by some musqueteers on foot, and these by 1000 common infantry. Immediately after came the grand master of the ceremonies, in the midst of 300 negroes dressed in scarlet cloth. These negroes had been chosen from among the slaves of Isfahan, to compose the conqueror’s guard. Forty paces from thence was Maghmud, mounted on a horse, of which the Vali of Arabia had made him a present, on the day of the abdication. The unfortunate Husein rode on his left side. These princes were followed by about 300 pages on horse-back. The Mufti, and Aman ola, whom Maghmud had appointed his grand vizier; Mullah Safran, and Nazr Ulla, one of his generals; Moula Moussa his high treasurer, and Mahommed Aga steward of his household, succeeded next ; after these came the Athemat Doulet, and the principal officers of the dethroned monarch, mixed with the crowd of Afghan officers. The whole was closed by 100 camels, each loaded with one of the harquebuses already mentioned, preceded by 600 musicians, and followed by near 6000 horse. As soon as they had passed over the bridge of Shirass,3 Shah Hussein was conducted cross [szr] the gardens of the palace, to the place of his confinement.4 Maghmud seemed to think it impolitic to lead the conquer’d king in triumph, but continued his march, and soon arrived 1 Vol. 11, pp. 14-17. 2 Section xxxvi. 3 This must have been the Khwäjü bridge ; it was often called “ the bridge of Shiraz”. 4 Whilst Joseph Apisalaimian, Krusinski, Friar Alexander and most of the other sources agree that the ex-Shâh was imprisoned in part of his own palace, Muhammad Muhsin (fol. 208 a) states that he was sent to the Ayina-khäna (a building similar to, but smaller than, the Chihîl Sutün; it adjoined the Sa‘ädatäbäd palace on the south side of the river). ‘Abd al-Wahhâb, in his “Shams al-Tawârïkh” (Browne MSS. no. G. 17), fol. 187b, gives the RakibKhäna as his place of confinement. (I have been unable to identify this building.) The sources first quoted seem more likely to be correct.

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THE ACCESSION OF MAHMÜD

at the gates of the town. The inhabitants notwithstanding their grief, felt a relief from their misery, in this change, in hopes of supporting their lives; which induced them to give some external marks of respect to their new master. They laid rich stuffs under his horse’s feet, and filled the air with perfumes. The guns on the camels backs were often fired, as they marched along ; and in the intervals, the ten Afghans who walked [nc] at the head of the procession, pronounced loud imprecations against the followers of Ali.1

When Mahmüd reached the royal palace and made his state entry, his troops gave a great cry of “Allah ! ” Muhammad Mahdï, when referring to this event, stated that Mahmüd entered Isfahän “with the pomp of Pharaoh and the injustice of Shaddâd”.1 2 After passing through the gate of the palace (where de Gardane and other members of the French community had stationed themselves to pay their respects), Mahmüd went to the audience hall and seated himself on the throne. He was then acknowledged as sovereign for the second time by the luckless Sultan Husain (who had been temporarily brought from his prison apartment for this purpose), and afterwards received the oath of allegiance and the homage of the ministers, nobles and other leading personages. A few moments later the cannon in the city and also in the citadel were fired to make known this event to the public. The ceremonies were concluded by an entertainment which Mahmüd gave to all who had come to acknowledge his authority.3 In such fashion the period of Afghan rule began. 1 Travels, vol. in, pp. 148-9. Hanway, as usual, gave no acknowledgment to Clairac, and suppressed the latter’s reference to Joseph Apisalaimian as his main source. 2 ZT, p. 10: “.. .bâ farr-i-Fara'ünî va bî-dâd-i-Shaddâdï. ” It is impossible to reproduce the punning in the Persian wording. The Shaddâd referred to was presumably Shaddâd ibn al-Aswad al-Laithi, a Meccan idolater who was an outspoken opponent of the Prophet Muhammad. There was a contemporary Balüchï chief named Shaddâd, but it is unlikely that Mirza Mahdi would have mentioned him in this context. 3 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 17.

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CHAPTER XV

PETER THE GREAT’S INVASION OF PERSIA It is impossible to determine exactly when Peter the Great conceived the idea of invading Persia. As we have seen,1 he had had for many years before his invasion took place the threefold plan for (i) establishing a safe trading route between Russia and India by way of the Caspian Sea and thence either through Khiva and Bukhärä or through Persia, (ii) obtaining complete control of the Persian silk trade, and (iii) achieving supremacy over the waters of the Caspian (this last was a necessary preliminary for the accomplishment of the first two objects). It is clear that at least as early as 1715, when he gave Volynsky his instructions regarding the mission to Isfahän, plans for this invasion were already in his mind.2 It is also obvious that he knew that he could not carry out this scheme until after he had freed himself from his commitments in the north. When he received Volynsky’s report on his mission and heard from him, at first hand, how seriously the situation in Persia was deteriorating, his determination to put his plan into operation was greatly strengthened. As previously related, Peter had appointed Volynsky Governor of Astrakhan in order that he could keep a close watch on events in Persia. He further instructed him to pay special attention to the collection of information on the Caspian coast and on military communications in the northern provinces of Persia. Moreover, not only had Peter received an offer of co-operation from Wakhtang in 1718,3 but in the following year he was further encouraged in his aims when the Shamkhäl ‘Adil Girai of Tarkhü took the oath of allegiance to him.4 Volynsky took up his duties as Governor of Astrakhan in September 1720; before he had done so, however, a Russian naval 1 See p. 60 above. 2 See pp. 103-4 above. 8 See p. 108 above. 4 Butkov, Materiali dlya novoy Istorii Kavkaza, vol. I, p. 10. For ‘Ädil Girai’s genealogy, see I. N. Berezin, Puteshestvie po Dagestanu i Zakavkaz’yu, p. 77.

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officer named Feodor Ivanovich Soimonov1 and Captain Carl van Verden, a man of Dutch extraction serving in the Russian navy, had begun a detailed survey of the Caspian Sea and coasts. In 1721 they produced by far the most accurate map of those regions that had ever been made.2 Whilst Soimonov and van Verden were engaged on their task, a Russian army officer named Alexis Baskakov was examining and reporting on military routes in Gilän. Moreover, late in 1719 the Russian government appointed Semeon Avramov consul at Resht and sent him to Persia to secure the ratification of Volynsky’s treaty. He was detained at Shamâkhï for some months, first by reason of the disturbed state of the country due to the Lezgïs’ incursions and later because the Persian court was for a time not disposed to receive him.3 However, he reached Qazvïn (where the court still was) in October 1720, and was still there when the Turkish envoy Durr! Efendi arrived.4 Avramov, it is almost needless to add, had been instructed to glean further information regarding Persia, as alarming reports of the deteriorating situation there were being received in Russia. In 1721 two events occurred which greatly facilitated the carrying out of Peter the Great’s Persian projects. In the first place, the peace negotiations with Sweden, which began at Nystad, a small town in Finland, in May of that year, reached a successful conclusion on 10 September (it is believed that Peter gave orders for these negotiations to be speeded up in order that he could put his Persian plan into operation before the Afghans or the Turks could forestall him).5 He was thus at long last freed from his entanglement in the north. Secondly, as already related,6 on 15 August the Lezgïs and their allies, under the leadership of the Mudarris Hajjï Dä’üd, Ahmad Khän, the Great Usmï of the Qaitäqs and Qaraqaitäqs, and Choläq Surkhai Khan, the ruler of the Ghâzï Qumüqs, sacked the town of Shamâkhï and, at the same 1 Soimonov was another of Peter the Great’s young protégés. He, like Volynsky, was of good family, being related to the Golovkins and Naryshkins. 2 K. E. von Baer, “ Peter’s des Grossen Verdienste um die Erweiterung der geographischer Kenntnisse”, Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angrenzenden Länder Asiens (St Petersburg, 1872), pp. 241-2. 8 Despatch from Ange de Gardane, the French consul at Isfahän, dated 18 February 1720, AEP, vol. v, fol. 262 a. 4 See p. 125 above. 6 Butkov, Material^ vol. 1, p. 9. 8 See p. 127 above. 12

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time, looted the shops of the Russian merchants there, thus giving Peter a pretext for his invasion. Volynsky immediately passed on the news of this incident at Shamakhi to Peter the Great, pointing out that he could now invade Persia ostensibly for the purpose of helping her to maintain order and repel her enemies, and giving an estimate of the military strength that would be required.1 In his reply to Volynsky, Peter stated that this was the very occasion

...for which you were ordered to prepare. As to what you say regarding the Prince of Georgia2 and the other Christians, if any of these should be required in regard to this matter, give them hopes, but on account of the habitual rashness of these people, begin nothing until the arrival of our troops, when we shall act in accordance with the best counsels.3

An interesting feature of Peter’s reply to Volynsky is that he clearly placed but little reliance on the Caucasian Christians. Peter had not, it seems,4 intended to launch his attack on Persia until 1723, no doubt in order to give him plenty of time to recover from the Swedish war and to make adequate preparations for the expedition. However, the growing interest shown by Turkey in Persian affairs and the news of Mahmud’s second invasion of Persia caused him to put his plans into execution in 1722. Peter ordered Avramov to go to Isfahän to complain not only of the Shamâkhî outrage, but also of an özbeg attack on a Russian caravan whilst it was on its way from China to Russia. Avramov was unable to reach the Persian court as the siege of Isfahän was already in progress. He went instead to the headquarters at Farahäbäd and delivered his complaint to Mahmüd. The latter, in reply, was fully justified in pointing out that he could not be held responsible for any acts by either the Lezgïs or the özbegs, as they were neither his friends nor his subjects. He stressed, however, his desire to be on friendly terms with Russia.5 1 See p. 129 above; as pointed out there, Volynsky’s estimate was too low. When Peter the Great carried out his invasion of Persia, his military strength was far greater. 2 I.e. Wakhtang. Having at length agreed to turn Muslim, he was reinstated as King of Kartli and Vali of Georgia in 1719, as stated on p. 118 above. 8 Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 38. 4 Butkov, Material^ vol. 1, p. 10. 5 Clairac, vol. II, pp. 34-5.

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Meanwhile, Peter was feverishly preparing for his Persian venture. He reached Astrakhan towards the end of June, and spent the next four weeks supervising the final arrangements. Whilst at Astrakhan, he had a manifesto drawn up in grandiloquent terms which proclaimed to the Shäh and his subjects that the Russians were coming as their friends in order to assist them against their Afghan and Lezgi foes.1 It is significant that this manifesto also contained an assurance of protection for Turkish subjects and their interests. This document was translated by Demetrius Cantemir, the ex-Hospodar of Moldavia,12 into Persian, Ottoman Turkish and Turki. Before leaving Astrakhan, Peter sent Prince Boris Turkistanov to Wakhtang, the Väli of Georgia, to inform him of his early arrival in Persia and to warn him to avoid hostilities with the Turks.3 All being at length ready, Peter and the bulk of his army embarked at Astrakhan on 18/29 Juty *722. The fleet, which consisted of 274 vessels, was under the command of High Admiral Apraxin.4 The Russian forces comprised 22,000 infantry (practically all of whom were veterans of the Swedish war), 20,000 Cossacks (mostly from the Terek valley), 22,000 Qalmuqs, 30,000 Tatars and 5000 sailors. Some little time before the fleet sailed, 9000 regular cavalry and a number of Cossacks under the command of General Veterani had been sent overland.56 Six days later, the fleet anchored off Terki, a fortified town on 1 A German translation of this manifesto is given in Soimonov’s “TageBuch”, Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. vu, pp. 215-20. It was in the text of this manifesto that the date of the Shamakhi incident was given as 1712 instead of 1721 (see p. 128 above). 2 Demetrius Cantemir had thrown in his lot with Peter in 1711. 8 Brosset, H. de la G. vol. II, part 1, p. 577; Butkov, vol. 1, p. 15. 4 Feodor Matveivich Apraxin had been made High Admiral in 1705. Although he had not any knowledge of naval matters then, he soon acquired it by his good sense and powers of application. He had distinguished himself during the Swedish war, particularly at the naval battle off Hangö on 7 August 1714. See General Alexander Gordon, History of Peter the Great (Aberdeen, 1755), vol. 11, p. 284. 6 Peter the Great’s Journal. A German translation of this Journal and other contemporary sources is contained in the Neueste ausführliche Historische und Geographische Beschreibung des Caspischen Meeres, Daria-Stroms, und der übrigen da herum liegenden Länder, Städte und Völker nebst denen von Ihr. Russisch-Kays. Majest. ertheilen Nachrichten von dero gethanen March von Astracan bis Derbent (Danzig, 1723). The particulars of the Russian fleet are given on p. 93 of the German text. See also Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 41.

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the delta of the Terek, a few miles north-west of the entrance to the long and narrow inlet known as Agrakhan Bay. Terki was at that time the most southerly place held by Russia on or near the Caspian coast. From this point messengers were sent off with copies of the Tsar’s manifesto to the Shamkhäl ‘Ädil Girai and the Governors of Darband, Baku and Shamakhi. On 27 July/17 August, the fleet sailed from the roads off Terki up Agrakhan Bay and anchored off the spot which Soimonov (who had been sent on in advance) had chosen for landing the troops and stores. It was on the long spit of land which forms the eastern side of the bay, some 8 miles from its head. The fact that this day was the anniversary of the Russian naval victory off Hangö eight years earlier was regarded as a good augury for the campaign. The landing of the troops and stores, which began on the following day, was attended with much difficulty, for the ships, owing to the shallow water, could not get close to the shore. The men consequently had to wade ashore, carrying their arms, ammunition, baggage and supplies on their backs; this was necessarily a lengthy and arduous process.1 When everything had been landed, the vessels themselves were hauled up on the shore and a strong entrenched camp was made. Peter detailed 600 men to remain in the fort as garrison; they were later reinforced by 1000 Cossacks from General Veterani’s force.2 Whilst waiting for all the work to be completed, Peter made a very significant remark to Soimonov. Pointing to the mountains which could be seen in the distance, he said: Have you ever been in the gulf of Astarâbâd? You must know that these mountains extend to Astarâbâd and that from there to Balkh, Bukhärä and Badakhshän it is only 12 days’ journey with camels. Bukhärä is the commercial centre of those parts, and on that road to India no one can interfere with us.3

All at length being ready, the southward advance began on 4/15 August. The heat was stifling, and the unfortunate men, who were unused to such conditions, suffered severely, many dying of heat-stroke.4 By nightfall they reached the north bank of the 1 Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, p. 316. 8 Ibid. 8 Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 48. 4 Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, p. 316.

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MAP SHOWING THE OUTWARD AND HOMEWARD ROUTES FOLLOWED BY PETER THE GREAT IN HIS INVASION OF PERSIA IN 1722

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Sülâq river, a distance of over 16 miles. On the next day they had to march ten miles upstream before they could find a suitable place for crossing the river. Whilst Peter and his men were at this point, the Shamkhäl ‘Adil Girai arrived with a large retinue to welcome him and to offer him all the assistance in his power. He greatly eased the Russians’ transport problem by giving them a number of oxen and waggons.1 As the crossing of the Sülâq (which was effected by boats) was slow and difficult,2 the advance was not resumed until 11 /22 August. By this time, General Veterani’s force had joined the main army. The march from Astrakhan had been arduous, but Veterani and his men had been able to make a detour and successfully attack the recalcitrant Chechens of Enderi (Andreyeva), a large village some 44 miles to the south-west of the head of Agrakhan Bay. The march on 11 /22 August was as trying as the one from the camp at Agrakhan to the Sülâq ; in fact, for many of the officers, it was even more arduous and unpleasant because of Peter’s zeal for discipline. To quote Bruce: When we halted in the middle of the day, we discovered great numbers of armed men on horseback, riding on the sides of the mountains; his majesty was at that time in the rear, and riding along the army, enquired of the men if their pieces were loaded; and being informed that they were not, he gave orders himself to load them, ordering, at the same time, all the officers of his own division to meet at the head of the grenadier company, where having met, he reprimanded us severely for neglect of duty ; we were then disarmed, and our swords, (viz. the field-officers, who were at the same time generals and all captains) were put all together into a waggon; the field-officers were ordered to march on foot in one rank, and the captains were formed in three ranks behind them, and every officer was loaded with four muskets on his shoulders; in this posture we marched near two hours, in the most intolerable heat, when the empress being informed of our miserable situation, came up in her chariot with the utmost haste, and pleaded so effectually in our favour, that we were relieved from our heavy burdens, had our swords restored, and were admitted to kiss his majesty’s hand, who told us, that he had only punished the officers of 1 Ibid. p. 317; Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 244. According to Soimonov, it was only an envoy and not the Shamkhäl himself who met Peter at this point. Bruce, however, seems better informed in this respect. 8 Delay was also caused by a storm, which caused the river to rise.

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his own guards, because they ought to give a good example to all the rest of the army. This was discipline with a vengeance—the poor captain of the grenadiers died the next day of the fatigue being a corpulent man ; and several others sickened, some of whom died also.1 It must have been with much relief that the army reached the town of Tarkhü,12 the Shamkhäl’s capital, on 12/23 August. ‘Adil Girai (who had gone on in advance from the Süläq) received Peter in a very friendly manner, while the Empress Catherine entertained his ladies in her tent. Later in the evening, Peter and the Empress dined with ‘Adil Girai in his palace. Before he left Tarkhü, Peter received a letter from the DeputyGovernor of Darband stating that the manifesto had been received with great joy there and that he and the other inhabitants would gladly put themselves under his protection. The army set out from Tarkhü on 16/27 August, reaching the Manas river that evening and the town of Old Buinaq on that of the 28th. The weather was still extremely hot; the heat and the clouds of dust raised by the marching troops made conditions very trying. From Old Buinaq Peter despatched three Cossacks with a guide to Ahmad Khän, the Usmi of the Qaitäq and Qaräqaitäq tribes, inviting him to send envoys to a conference and asking him to supply baggage animals for the march to Darband. Without waiting for a reply, the army went on southwards on 18/29 August, and soon entered the Usmi’s territory. Shortly afterwards, the guide returned alone, having had his nose and ears cut off and bringing the news that the unfortunate Cossacks had been brutally murdered.3 The Usmî sent a truculent message that any of the Emperor’s men who fell into his hands would be treated in the same way. That evening the army camped by the river Inji. On the next day a large force of tribesmen under the Usmi and Sultan Mahmüd of Utemish approached the Russians. In the battle that ensued, the enemy were heavily defeated, losing between 600 and 700 killed and many prisoners. Enraged at the 1 Bruce, Memoirs, p. 319. 2 For a description of this town, see Bruce, Memoirs, pp. 321-2; John Bell of Antermony, “A Succinct Relation of a Journey to Derbent”, in his Travels, vol. II, p. 326. 8 Bruce, Memoirs, p. 328.

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cruel treatment of their comrades, the Cossacks, in company with a number of dragoons, pursued the enemy right into Utemish, where they put some 3000 men to the sword. The Russians were much struck with the peculiar manner in which these tribesmen fought. They did not put up much resistance when in a large body, but if isolated and pursued individually they would fight with desperate bravery.1 While Admiral Apraxin was questioning prisoners 1 2 after the battle, one of them suddenly seized a sword from a Russian officer and rushed at the Admiral, who would have been killed had not the man been bayoneted by two sentries before he could reach him. When Peter heard of this incident, he remarked that if these people understood the art of war, it would be impossible for any nation to deal with them.3 On 20/31 August, the Russians burnt six villages in the neigh­ bourhood; in the course of the day they found the mutilated bodies of the murdered Cossacks. Subsequently, twenty-one of the enemy prisoners were executed in revenge.4 With the object of keeping these dangerous tribesmen in check, Peter, before breaking camp, gave orders for a fort to be erected on the banks of the river Inji and for some regular troops and Cossacks to be left behind to hold it. On 21 August/1 September, Peter and his men resumed their march, reaching the Bugan river that night. They crossed this river by means of two bridges of boats the next day, and advanced as far as the Durbakh5 river, which marked the northern limit of the district of Darband. Here Peter received an emissary from Baku who brought him a message couched in similar terms to the one from the Deputy-Governor of Darband.6 The Russian army was by now nearly at the end of its long and trying march, and on the afternoon of the following day (23 August/ 3 September) it was approaching Darband. When Peter and his men were still a mile from the northern gate, they were met by 1 Ibid. pp. 329-30; see also Soloviev, vol. xvm, p. 43. 2 One of the prisoners, a mullä, informed Apraxin that the three Cossacks had been murdered in reprisal for the slaughter of the Tatars of Enderi. 3 Bruce, Memoirs, p. 333. 4 Peter the Great’s Journal, loc. cit. p. 103. 5 I have been unable to find any river of this name on the maps that I have consulted; it is apparently identical with the Dyrvan-chai. 6 Peter’s Journal, p. 104.

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Imâm Qulï Beg, the Deputy-Governor,1 who, together with all the dignitaries of the town, had come out to perform the istiqbal (ceremonious reception) in the Emperor’s honour. Going down on his knees in front of Peter, Imam Qulï Beg handed him the silver keys of the town and made a short speech of welcome.2 Peter thereupon arranged his troops in processional order and, having placed himself at their head, rode on to the gate. As he neared it, there was a slight earthquake shock which might have been regarded as an evil omen had he not, with great presence of mind, turned the situation to his advantage by exclaiming: “Lo! Nature herself gives me a solemn welcome and makes the very walls tremble at my approach!”3 Peter marched with his men right through the town, and camped on level ground a short distance beyond it, close to the shore. Having detailed a strong force to occupy the citadel on the heights overlooking Darband, he entered the town again and made a thorough inspection of the defences, in the course of which he found a large number of old cannon and much ammunition. Imam Qulï Beg, who was very friendly,4 offered Peter the use of the Governor’s house, and said that accommodation could be found for the troops in the town. Being mindful perhaps of the fate of Bekovich and his men at Khïva, Peter refused this offer, on the grounds that he did not wish to inconvenience the inhabitants.5 That evening he returned to the camp. At this juncture a fleet of thirteen supply ships under the command of Captain van Verden arrived from Astrakhan. Instead of anchoring off Darband (where the roads were very exposed and the holding-ground was bad),6 the ships went on to the mouth of the river Malakent, io£ miles to the south-east, and anchored there. At Peter’s orders, the army moved to the village of Malakent, on 24 August/4 September. On the following day, before the ships could be unloaded, a furious gale sprang up from the north­ east which drove all the vessels ashore and caused them to break 1 The Governor of the town had left some time before to summon help. 2 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, pp. 250-1; Bell, Travels, vol. 11, p. 332. 3 Quoted by J. F. Baddeley in his book The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, p. 27. 4 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 248. 6 Bell, Relation, p. 333. e Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 247.

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up. Fortunately, no lives were lost, but the greater part of the much-needed stores was lost.1 Peter’s intention had been to continue his advance down the Caspian coast,1 2 but he realised that he could not do so without further supplies and that it was too late in the season for more stores to be despatched from Astrakhan. With great reluctance he therefore abandoned his plan of proceeding further. He was, no doubt, influenced in taking this painful decision by the arrival at Malakent of a Turkish envoy. Dämäd Ibrâhîm, the Grand Vizier, had sent this envoy to warn Peter not to advance inland into Shîrvân and so to avoid coming into collision with the Turks and their new subjects.3 Peter had also intended, on the conclusion of his southward advance, to return to Russia through Georgia, in order to effect a junction with Wakhtang and his other adherents in those regions, but he likewise gave up this plan in favour of returning by the coastal route by which he had come in consequence of his wish to avoid war with Turkey. This decision proved disastrous for Wakhtang, whose misadventures will be described in ch. xvn, as will also the course of Turco-Russian relations in so far as they were affected by Peter’s Persian campaign and by the situation in Persia itself. Before Peter left Darband for Russia he received letters from the people of Baku4 and Shamâkhî asking for his help against Dä’üd Beg, and an envoy arrived from Tahmâsp Mïrzâ (who was then at Qazvïn) with a similar request and offering to cede to Russia in return the cities of Resht, Shamâkhî and Baku. Owing, however, to the situation in which he was then placed, he could not accede to these requests. Leaving a strong garrison not only in Darband itself, but also in 1 Bell, Relation, p. 334; Bruce, Memoirs, p. 341; Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 255: Peter the Great’s letter to the Senate (in the Neueste ausführliche Historische und Geographische Beschreibung, p. 97; in this source it was stated that there were supplies only for one month left). 2 Peter’s letter to the Senate, loc. cit. p. 98; Bell, Relation, p. 334. 3 Bruce, on p. 343 of his Memoirs, stated that Peter was on the point of setting out southwards from Darband when the Turkish envoy arrived, threatening war if he did not withdraw his forces. This statement is not borne out by the other authorities. 4 Peter sent a Russian officer with a message to Baku in reply, but the citizens refused to admit him; see Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 252.

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the new fort at Malakent,1 Peter started northwards with his army on the 6/17 September. The heat was no longer excessive in the middle of the day, but the nights had by this time become very cold. The march was without incident as far as the fort on the Inji river, which was reached on the 11/22 September; there, Peter received word that the Usmi and his allies were preparing to attack him. In consequence, he gave orders for the men to stand to all night, with the result that they had little or no sleep. When day dawned, the enemy were seen hovering round, but they fled whenever an attempt was made to engage them. The enemy used these tactics until 15/26 September, when the Russians were within sight of Tarkhû. By this time all the officers and men were in an exhausted state, owing to the necessity of standing to every night in the cold. Two trumpeters and two Cossacks were sent on in advance to announce the arrival of the army to the Shamkhâl. When the army came near to the town, they found the bodies of these men lying on the road. Peter later upbraided the Shamkhâl for their murder, but he disclaimed responsibility, saying that his brother and two of his sons, who were in revolt against him, had done the deed. These men were thereupon arrested and sent on as prisoners to Astrakhan.1 2 The onward march from Tarkhû was unattended with incident, except for the treacherous conduct of a guide who led the army into a marsh from which it was extricated with difficulty. After the first day, the route taken lay somewhat to the west of the southward one, and on 18/29 September, the Russians reached the Sûlâq where the Agrakhan river branches off from it. Between the two rivers the ground was level, with good pasturage and plenty of trees. Here Peter gave orders for a strong fortress to be built in order to keep in check the Däghistän! tribesmen. This fortress, which Bruce (who was an engineer officer) designed, was called the Krepost Svyatogo Kresta (“Holy Cross Fort”).3 1 For a brief description of this fort, see Bruce, op. cit. p. 343. 2 Bruce, Memoirs, pp. 347-8. 3 Ibid. p. 349; Soimonov, "Tage-Buch”, pp. 259-60. For a brief description of this fortress, see Wolf, “ Beschreibung der an der Caspischen See von Gilan bis Astrachan liegenden Provinzen mittheilen” in Dr J. J. Lerch’s “Reise nach Persien” in Büsching’s Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie, vol. X, p. 472.

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During Peter’s halt at Svyatoi Krest, a messenger arrived from Darband bringing the tidings that the Usmï Ahmad Khän and Sultän Mahmüd of Utemish, having mustered 10,000 men, had attacked the Russian forts at Inji and Malakent. Though repulsed with heavy loss at Malakent, these tribesmen had captured the Inji fort and killed all the garrison. Greatly angered at this news, Peter immediately sent a strong punitive force consisting of Don Cossacks and Qalmuqs against the enemy. Travelling swiftly, they took the tribesmen completely by surprise, killing many of them and capturing 350 prisoners, 11,000 cattle and much booty.1 Ahmad Khän and Sultän Mahmüd narrowly escaped capture. As winter was by now approaching, Peter did not stay at Svyatoi Krest2 until it was completed, but left after a halt of a few days with the bulk of his army for the entrenched camp at Agrakhan; there they embarked for Astrakhan, which they reached on 15/26 October. So far as Peter himself was concerned, the Persian venture was over. When we examine the results of this campaign, we see that its results fell short of Peter’s expectations. He had, it is true, made a remarkable show of naval strength on the Caspian Sea, and, more important still, he had occupied the highly important Persian frontier town of Darband before the Turks could get there; moreover, he had extended his hold3 over the Caspian littoral for 150 miles as the crow flies from Terki. On the other hand, Peter had barely touched the fringe of Persia itself, and he had, so far, failed to give any support either to the Shäh or to Wakhtang and the other Christian leaders in Transcaucasia. Furthermore, he had strained relations with Turkey almost to breaking-point. Lastly, the cost in manpower of the expedition had proved exceedingly heavy, approximately onethird of his entire force or some 33,000 men having succumbed.4 Disease had inflicted a far heavier toll on the Russians than had the Qaitäq and other hostile tribesmen. 1 Peter’s letter to the Senate, loc. cit, p. 246 ; Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 261. 8 He left 18,000 men under General Veterani at the fortress to complete its construction and to serve as its garrison; see Bruce, Memoirs y p. 349. 8 This hold was, however, very weak at certain points, as the storming of the fort at Inji had shown. * Bruce, Memoirs, p. 356.

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For Wakhtang of Georgia, Peter’s failure to enter that country had most unfortunate results. On learning that the Tsar had started on his expedition against Persia, Wakhtang left Tiflis for Ganja where he was to await his arrival and also to make contact with representatives of the Armenians of Erivan and Adharbaijän with a view to taking concerted action against the Lezgis.1 Co-operation with the Russian forces when they arrived was also, doubtless, to be discussed, as there had been a movement in Persian Armenia in favour of union with Russia ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century.12 Wakhtang waited for some time in Tiflis without receiving any word from Peter the Great. As his men were getting short of food, he sent a messenger to the Tsar asking for news and inquiring how much longer he would have to wait in Ganja. When at length it became obvious that Peter could not advance beyond Darband or penetrate inland for any distance without coming into conflict with Turkey, Wakhtang was deeply disappointed and started on his homeward march. Not long afterwards, the Shäh dismissed him from his post, and, after a series of adventures and mis­ adventures, he was obliged to leave his own country and seek refuge in Russia.3 1 P. T. Arutunian, Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye, p. 169. 2 More will be said in ch. xix of this Armenian national movement for union with Russia. 8 See p. 257 below.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE REIGN OF MAHMUD SHÄH In appearance, Mahmud, the new ruler of Persia,1 was neither impressive nor prepossessing. Father Krusinski, who had frequent opportunities of seeing him, described him in the following unflattering terms: He was middle-siz’d, and pretty squat: His Face broad, his Nose flatfish, his Eyes blue and squinting a little, his Look fierce. His Physiognomy had something rough and disagreeable in it, discovering a Cruelty in his Nature. His Neck was so monstrously short, that his Head seem’d to grow to his Shoulders. He had scarce any Beard ; and what he had was carotty. His Eyes were generally down-cast, and he look’d always as if he was musing. Every Morning he exercised himself in wrestling half an hour with some of the most robust of his Officers ; and spent the rest of the Day in other Exercises proper to harden and strengthen his Body. Five Sheep were brought him daily with their Feet ty’d, for him to cut them in two with his Sabre. He was very dexterous at flinging a little Javelin, call’d Girid in Persia, and never fail’d of striking the Mark he aim’d at. He was so nimble in mounting his Horse, that without a Stirrup, he would lay hold of the Horse’s Mane with his left Hand, and clapping his right on his Back, would leap into the Saddle. He slept very little, and never made use of Mattresses in a Campaign. He went the Rounds himself, accompanied with some of his most trusty Friends, to visit the Centinels in the Night, not only in the Camp, but in Ispahan itself. He was very sober in his Diet and Drink, contenting himself with what he found : and as an Effect of his Sobriety, he was so exactly continent, that he never had Commerce with any Woman but his Wife, Schah-Hussein’s Daughter, by whom he had a Son.. ..1 2 The new monarch was thus no more regal in appearance than his predecessor. In his character and mode of life, he was very different from the ex-Shäh. Whereas the latter was indolent, pleasure-loving and humane, Mahmud was energetic and hardy, 1 Mahmud was never in effective control of more than a relatively small part of the country, but, since he was in possession of the capital and had usurped the throne, it is convenient to refer to him in this way. 2 Krusinski, pp. 297-8. IÇO

THE REIGN OF MAHMUD SHÄH

austere in his ways, and, as he had already shown by the murder of his uncle, utterly unscrupulous and cruel. Uncouth and un­ polished, he was far more fitted to be the chief of an obscure tribe than to be the occupant of the Persian throne. However, during the early months of his reign, Mahmüd carefully hid the cruel streak in his character, and governed with a surprising degree of moderation and efficiency. He had enough common sense to realise how utterly inexperienced his own Ghalzai leaders were in the art of government, and to see that they were incapable of taking over immediately the highly complicated administrative machinery of the Safavis.1 He therefore retained his predecessor’s ministers and high officials in their posts, but appointed one of his own men to act jointly with each. By this means the Afghans were given the opportunity of learning to govern, and they also performed the useful function of acting as a check on their Persian colleagues, who were not allowed to continue with their corrupt ways. The consequence was that, during the first few months of Mahmud’s reign, the country enjoyed better government than it had had for over half a century. One of Mahmud’s first acts as sovereign was the humane one of bringing food to the starving citizens of Isfahän. He also made a good impression by seizing and executing those Persians who had betrayed their country during the siege; he made, however, an exception in the case of Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the Väli of ‘Arabistän, possibly because of his lineage and the fact that he was a Sunni. He merely imprisoned him, after confiscating his property.1 2 According to Krusinski, Mahmüd openly declared: “...that there was no Good to be expected from Men who had betray’d their King; and that they would betray him in his Turn, if Opportunity offer’d.”3 For reasons of security, Mahmüd imprisoned all the royal princes (with the exception of Tahmäsp, who had escaped). For these unfortunate men, Mahmud’s action amounted to no more 1 The Tadhkirat al-Mulük was written for the express purpose of providing the Afghans with detailed information of this machinery; it was not, however, completed until the beginning of Ashraf’s reign; see Professor Minorsky’s introduction on p. io of that book. 2 As will be shown in ch. xxxm, Sayyid ‘Abdullah was released by Ashraf and appointed Governor-General of Kirmän in 1727. 8 Krusinski, op. cit. pp. 258 and 259.

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than a change of gaolers, because, with the exception of the brief periods during the siege of Isfahän when Shäh Sultän Husain had brought out his sons Mahmüd Mlrzä and Safi Mirzä from the harem and invested them with a show of authority, they had always been prisoners. Mahmud also kept the ex-Shäh in prison, but treated him with some deference and even consulted him at times. On the other hand, he deprived him of all except his lawful wives and a handful of women slaves; the rest he distributed amongst his officers, while he himself, as already stated,1 married one of the royal princesses. One of Mahmüd’s early acts was to seize the royal treasury, but Muhammad Muhsin was exaggerating when he asserted that “the accumulated riches of 200 years” were then taken.2 As Shäh Sultän Husain had been very extravagant and as he had been obliged, during the siege, to make further inroads on his treasury in order to pay his troops, there could have been but little left in it when Mahmüd took it over. It was doubtless for this reason that Mahmüd not only extorted more money from the Armenians of Julfa,3 but also levied a heavy contribution on Isfahän. Further­ more, the Afghans broke into and looted the houses of all the citizens who had died or had fled; the booty thus obtained was divided between Mahmüd and his men.4 Another victim of Mahmud’s avaricious zeal was Rahim Khän, the Hakim-bâshïy who was made to part with 20,000 tomans of his ill-gotten riches.5 At the beginning of his reign, Mahmüd’s position was extremely precarious. Although he had signally defeated the main Persian army and had taken the capital and mounted the throne, he was, so far, in effective control of only the district of Isfahän and parts of Kirmän and Slstän. He and his men were hated by the Persians, who regarded them as rude barbarians who had overthrown their monarch and detested them as Sunnis. They were, moreover, greatly outnumbered by the citizens of Isfahän alone, but such was the shock that the latter had suffered that nothing was to be feared from them for some time. On the other hand, there were still in the provinces many who were loyal to the Safavi line ; in the south 1 See the quotation from Krusinski on p. 190 above. 8 ZT, fol. 208 a. 8 Gilanentz, section lxv. * Fr Alexander of Malabar, RCAJ, vol. xxm, pt. iv, pp. 650-1. 6 Mahmüd’s endeavours to extort money from the European community will be described in ch. xxxin.

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and south-west there were the Lurs under ‘All Mardän Khän, the Bakhtiäris and the Kûhgilü tribes, as well as many others in Färs, while there were also numbers of faithful adherents in the north and north-west. All that was needed was a capable and experienced leader who could weld these heterogeneous loyal elements together, smooth over the petty jealousies of their chiefs and lead them against the Afghans, whose defeat would then be assured. This was the role that Tahmäsp should have played, but he was not, alas! resolute, capable or experienced. Another probable source of danger for Mahmüd was from Russia. At the moment when Mahmud mounted his throne, Peter the Great was already on his way back to Moscow, having occupied the important city of Darband; moreover, he was about to send troops to Gïlân. Peter had declared, as has been seen, that he had invaded Persia in order to support Shäh Sultän Husain, which, if taken literally, could only mean that sooner or later his troops would come into collision with Mahmüd’s forces. However, to judge from a conversation some months later between Amänullah, Mahmüd’s commander-in-chief and Ftimäd al-Daula, and Joseph Apisalaimian,1 the Afghans were ignorant of Russia’s potentialities and did not regard her as a serious menace. There were indications that Turkey might soon intervene in Persia, but it could not have been clear to Mahmud then on whose side she would be if she did so. Would she support him as a fellow-Sunm? Or would she espouse the cause of the heretical Tahmäsp and his Russian allies ? If Mahmüd had any such thoughts as these in his mind at all, they were soon driven out by Tahmäsp’s action in proclaiming himself Shäh at Qazvïn on 30 Muharram 1135 (10 November 1722).2 He took this action on learning of the fall of Isfahän and the abdication of his father. He also had coins struck in his name 1 Gilanentz, in section lxxxvi of his Journal, stated: Amänullah asked Joseph: “What sort of men are these Russians? Are they Franks? If not, what are they?” Joseph answered that they had a great empire on the other side of the Sea of Gïlân. Amänullah further asked whether they had any troops. Joseph informed him that they could raise 200,000 men and that they were fierce fighters. Amänullah said : “ Let us rest awhile ; then we shall be able to think of dealing with your Franks.” 2 TN, p. 10. See also the Majma' al-Tawârïkh, p. 59, where the chronogram “Äkhir-i-mäh-i-muharram'' (end of the month of Muharram) gives the number 1135. This date is wrongly given in the ZT, fol. 210b. 13

193

LSD

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and sent out letters patent or decrees (arqäm) to all parts of the country to announce his accession.1 This was a challenge that Mahmud could not ignore. Tahmäsp, he well knew, was in a position, with his royal blood and his claim to sovereignty, to act as the unifying element for all the scattered bodies of loyalists in the kingdom. Mahmüd consequently lost no time in sending Amänullah to attack him at Qazvïn. Amänullah set out with 3000 Ghalzais and 1000 Qizilbäsh troops; one of Amänullah’s commanders was Ashraf, Mahmüd’s cousin. Tahmäsp, however, was in no condition to meet this menace. He had been so saddened by the fall of Isfahän and the unhappy plight of his father that a well-meaning, but foolish courtier had induced him to seek solace in the drinking of wine and other pleasures.2 He speedily showed that he had inherited the family weakness for such things, with the result that, as Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Hazïn has said: “.. .in a little time, as play and laughter have a peculiar hold on the temper of young men, his bent that way passed every bound of temperance. ”3 The Shaikh then quoted the following quatrain by Nür al-Dïn Nasâwï, the secretary and historiographer of the gallant Jalâl al-Dïn, the last of the Khwärazmshähs :

O King ! from heavy draughts of wine what result will ensue ? And from unceasing drunkenness what result will ensue ? With an intoxicated king, a world in confusion, and enemies before and behind— It is evident from this what result will ensue.4

Unfortunately, Tahmäsp’s ministers and courtiers were no better than he was, so there was no one to restrain him from these excesses. Instead of urging him to desist from his pleasures and to concentrate on the task of defeating the Afghans and rescuing his father and the other members of his family, they encouraged him in his excesses, in which they acted as his boon-companions. In the words of Muhammad Muhsin :5 “They gave themselves up 1 ZT, fol. 210 b. 2 Ahwal, p. 132. 8 Ibid. 4 Ibid. Neither Shaikh Hazin nor his translator F. C. Belfour gives the name of the author of this quatrain, but it is supplied by M. ‘Abbas Iqbal, on p. 64 of his edition of the Majma* al-Tawänkh. 6 ZT, fol. 210b.

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to pleasure and had no thought of retaking Isfahän or (the defeat of) the Afghans.” Tahmäsp was so oblivious of his duty that he had not only taken no adequate steps to raise an army, but he had disbanded such few men as were under arms in the mistaken belief that, as winter was coming on, he would be safe from attack.1 Consequently, when the Afghans under Amänullah approached Qazvïn, he and his companions had to fly in ignominious haste to Zanjän12 and thence to Tabriz.3 Deserted by Tahmäsp, the people of Qazvïn submitted to the Afghans without a fight. Feeling that he had nothing to fear from them, Amänullah sent off some of his men in pursuit of Tahmäsp4 and detailed others to occupy Tehran. Amänullah was an extremely avaricious man, and he proceeded to extort large sums of money from the Qazvinïs, while his men behaved to them with great brutality. In so doing, Amänullah and his Afghans ignored the fact that the Qazvïnïs come of good fighting stock. In the past, their ancestors had had to withstand the attacks of the fierce Dailamites and, somewhat later, those of the Assassins, whose headquarters at Älamüt was less than 40 miles to the north-east of the town. Furious at their harsh treatment, the Qazvïnïs decided to rise against their oppressors on the evening of 8 January 1723.5 On the afternoon of that day, they saw that the Afghans were taking what appeared to be unusual precautions for their safety. Fearing that their secret had been discovered, the citizens put their plan into execution without waiting for nightfall. Those 1 The cold is very severe in the Qazvïn district in mid-winter. 2 Muhammad Muhsin stated (fol. 210b): “The perfidious leaders, having become afraid, saw expediency in flight.” 3 According to P. T. Arutunian, Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye, an Armenian merchant named Ilya Musheg wrote from Tabriz on 28 December 1723 (O.S.) that, at the end of 1723 (sic) there was an organised plot against Tahmäsp (obviously, the end of 1722 is intended). Tahmäsp’s rtimäd al-Daula began negotiating with the Afghans and offered to disperse the prince’s forces and hand him over to Mahmüd, if some Ghalzai troops could be sent. Mahmud agreed, and sent a force under two young Persians who, instead of acting as had been intended, warned Tahmäsp of this plot, whereupon he left Qazvïn hurriedly for Tabriz. This story, which is not corroborated by Persian sources, seems most improbable. 4 They pursued Tahmäsp and his followers as far as Sul^äniya. 6 This is the date given by Joseph Apisalaimian in his “Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 290a. Ï95

13-2

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Afghans who were in their billets in the town were at once set upon and slain, while a huge crowd fiercely attacked those who were in the streets. The Afghans were taken completely by surprise ; overborne by weight of numbers and by the fury of their assailants, they were on the point of precipitate flight when Amänullah, although wounded by a musket shot in the shoulder, rallied them sufficiently to enable them to take refuge in the Shah’s palace, where they were besieged for three days. Realising that there was no hope of relief and that he had no supplies left, Amänullah then made his men fight their way through the besiegers and begin the long march to Isfahan.1 Their escape from the Qazvïnïs had been facilitated in some measure by the brother of the Persian Ftimäd al-Daula, who was one of the leaders of the Qizilbäsh contingent which had accompanied the Afghans on the march to Qazvïn. So hurried was their departure that they were obliged to leave behind not only all their baggage, but also the money and valuables (worth, it is said, 30,000 tomans)2 that they had extorted from the Qazvïnïs. Furthermore, they had to abandon a large number of Persian prisoners, who thereby regained their liberty. The number of Afghans who were killed in this highly successful rising is estimated at 1200.3 This was a loss which Mahmüd could ill afford, but the moral effect on the Persians of the rout of Amänullah and his army was even more serious. As soon as Amänullah had got clear of the Qazvïnïs, he sent a messenger on ahead to Isfahän to inform Mahmüd of the disaster. Demoralised by their rout and suffering severely from the cold, the Afghans fled rather than marched back to Isfahän. Sympto­ matic of the change in Persian morale was the refusal of the people of Käshän to admit them to the town. If only Tahmäsp could have been in the vicinity with a body of seasoned troops, he might have annihilated the remnants of Amänullah’s force, by now numbering only some 600 men, and could then have advanced on 1 This account of the rising at Qazvïn is taken mainly from Muhammad Muhsin, ZT, fol. 211 a. He makes the mistake, however, of stating that the Afghan commander was Muhammad Saidäl Khän. This man, who was a well-known Ghalzai leader, may well have been there, but it was Amänullah and not he who was in command. 2 Gilanentz, section liv. 3 Ibid, Krusiriski, p. 261, gave the number of Afghans killed as 4000, but this is obviously a gross exaggeration, since the whole force, including the 1000 Qizilbäsh troops, amounted to no more than that figure.

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Isfahan with good prospects of defeating Mahmüd and recovering the throne.1 Before Amänullah reached the capital, Ashraf and a number of his cavalry broke away and set out for Qandahär. Ashraf had previously, soon after the fall of Isfahän, endeavoured to dissociate himself from his hated cousin, and it had only been with the greatest difficulty that Mahmüd had been able to induce him to return. On this second occasion, Ashraf and those with him got so long a start that Mahmüd could not intercept them and endeavour to make Ashraf change his mind. When Amänullah’s messenger informed Mahmüd of the catastrophe at Qazvïn, he feared lest these tidings would, when they became generally known, encourage the people of Isfahän to act as the stout-hearted Qazvînïs had done. He therefore issued a false report that Amänullah had won a great victory over Tahmäsp and had taken him prisoner; he then ordered public rejoicings to be held and the city to be illuminated.1 2 When, at noon on 24 January, Amänullah and the dispirited remains of his force entered Isfahän, it was abundantly plain to the citizens that defeat and not victory had been their lot. There was therefore grave risk of a public rising. In order to prevent this occurring, Mahmüd decided to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabitants. On the evening of the same day he summoned the Persian ministers and nobles to meet him on the pretext that he wished to discuss the opening of peace negotiations with Tahmäsp.3 Completely unsuspecting, they responded to the summons, whereupon all were slain except Muhammad Qulï Khän, the rtimäd al-Daula. He would have shared the fate of the others had not two Ghalzai officers pleaded earnestly with Mahmüd to spare him, because his brother had helped a number of Afghans to 1 If we can believe Gilanentz (section Liv of his Journal), this dejected body of men suddenly came upon a force of some 4000 Persians whilst on their retreat to Isfahan. The Persians were so dismayed at this unexpected encounter that they immediately fled without firing a shot, leaving all their baggage and supplies to the Afghans. This was indeed fortunate for the Afghans, who would doubtless have fled themselves if the Persians had shown the least sign of fighting. 2 Chirac, vol. 11, p. 57. 8 Gilanentz, section lvii; Chirac, vol. n, p. 60. Krusinski, p. 263, stated that Mahmüd invited the ministers and nobles to a banquet, but this seems less likely to be correct.

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escape the fury of the mob at Qazvln. Mahmüd not only granted their request, but allowed Muhammad Qulî Khän to retain his post. Friar Alexander of Malabar was at the Dutch factory, about half a mile to the north of the palace quarter, when the massacre took place. He said that it caused a frightful tumult and pitiful screaming, which I heard as I happened to be with the Dutch in the garden of their factory ; we were nearly dumb, not knowing what it meant, although such screams had sometimes been heard at night, as the Afghans now and then broke into people’s houses and murdered them. The next morning the murdered grandees and King’s slaves were laid out naked on their backs in the forecourt of the palace, so that everyone could see what bloody revenge the tyrant Mahmüd had taken.1 How many perished on this occasion cannot be ascertained with any degree of accuracy, as the numbers given by the authorities vary greatly.12 Not content with this slaughter, Mahmüd then had the sons of the victims murdered as well, and afterwards put to death some 3000 Qizilbâsh guards.3 These terrible measures effectively cowed the populace, none of whom ventured to appear in the streets for some time. As the gates had all been closed and strongly guarded, nobody could enter or leave the city; even those bringing supplies of food were denied entrance. The consequence was that famine conditions soon reappeared. The conqueror had now shown himself in his true colours and it was abundantly clear that he would go to any lengths, no matter how dreadful, to maintain himself on the throne. 1 RCAJ, vol. xxni, pt. iv, p. 651. The agent of the English East India Company, in a letter to London dated 20 June/i July 1723 (the first that he had been able to write for some time) thus reported the massacre: “The night Amâ Noolah [sw] returned from Casbin, His Majesty summoned all the Persian Omrahs [umarä] and others of Note to a General Muster, when he cut off all their Heads, seized on their Estates and made their Families Slaves. The Armenians and Banians have likewise been robb’d of all they had. In short, no Person in the City has escaped the Fury of these Monsters of Cruelty.” 2 Gilanentz, section lvii, put the total at 148, but Krusinski, p. 263, gave it as 300. 3 Krusinski, p. 264.

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On 27 January, the last day of these appalling massacres, an emissary named ‘Osmän (‘Uthmän) Äqä from Hasan Päshä of Baghdad reached Isfahän.The Päshä, ever watchful of the interests of his territory, had sent this man ostensibly as an envoy, but really as a spy to report on Mahmud’s military strength, character and aims. Mahmüd, who was not lacking in shrewdness, provided him with a guard of 200 men who had strict orders to prevent him from being in contact or communicating with anyone.1 Some days later, Mahmüd received ‘Osmän Äqä in audience, and was convinced from what the envoy said that he was really a spy. Mahmüd wished to put him to death, but his ministers dissuaded him, saying that an envoy’s person was sacred. Mahmüd later showed the man kindness, sending him a present and a coat of honour. Strangely enough, he even allowed ‘Osmän Äqä to see Joseph Apisalaimian (whom he had known previously) on two occasions. On the first occasion, ‘Osmän Äqä asked a number of questions respecting Isfahän, to which Joseph (according to his own account)1 2 replied evasively. In the course of the second meeting, ‘Osmän Äqä inquired about the revenue from the customs at Bandar ‘Abbäs. Joseph replied that it had amounted to some 15,000 tomans a year, but that now it was much less, as the port was closed and all the ships were diverted to Basra instead.3 According to Joseph Apisalaimian, ‘Osmän Äqä was not at all impressed with the strength of the Ghalzais; Joseph reported him as saying: “When I return to Istanbul, I shall ask the Sultän for 16,000 men to come to Isfahän and to proceed from here to occupy [the country] as far as Qandahär. The Afghans are not men 1 “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Révolution de Perse jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1724” (this “Mémoire”, which was based on memoranda by Joseph Apisalai­ mian, was sent to Paris by the Comte d’Andrezel, the French Ambassador at Constantinople). 2 Gilanentz, section lix. 3 Joseph afterwards informed Gilanentz that he had answered to this effect, but he added that he had heard from the French that the total dues some years previously had amounted to 40,000 tomans. When he (Joseph) was at Bandar ‘Abbas in 1721, the customs had been farmed out for 17,000 tomans (it must not be overlooked that, in theory at any rate, the English East India Company was entitled to a half share of the customs at Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbas), in virtue of the agreement that it had made with Shäh ‘Abbäs respecting the joint operations against the Portuguese at Hormuz; the English were to receive this share in return for their naval services. More will be said on this subject in ch. xxix.

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of any importance.”1 Rather surprisingly, the ambassador was allowed to visit the ex-Shäh in prison, but he did not see him alone, as some Afghans were present. It was afterwards reported that Sultän Husain denied that Tahmäsp was his son.2 On 15 February, when ‘Osmän Äqä was given leave to return to Turkey, Mahmüd issued strict orders that he was not to take any male or female Persian slaves away with him. As the ambassador left the city, he found an Afghan yüzbâshï (captain) and some troops waiting at the gate, who searched his baggage and that of his retinue. A similar search was carried out 3 miles from the city. The result of these searches was that the Afghans discovered twelve male Persians, whom they immediately beheaded. They also found two female slaves hidden in chests, and these they likewise put to death.3 On his return to Turkey, ‘Osmän Äqä must have given a very unfavourable account of his treatment by the Afghans. To judge by his remark to Joseph Apisalaimian, his report on Mahmüd’s position must also have been adverse.4 The ambassador did not, however, get back to his own country without further misadventure. When he reached Hamadän, the Governor had him arrested as a suspicious character, and kept him in prison until he received authority from Tahmäsp for his release over six weeks later.6 It was galling to Mahmüd to reflect that, although he had made himself master of Isfahän and had become Shäh, the neighbouring places of Gaz, Ben Isfahän and Qümisha were still holding out against him. He therefore sent his general Zabardast Khän to subdue them. This general, who was a native of Isfahän, had been captured by the Afghans when a child and had been brought up amongst them.6 By dint of his ability and military prowess, he had 1 Gilanentz, section lix. 2 “Mémoire sur la Dernière Révolution de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 363b. 3 Clairac (following Joseph Apisalaimian), vol. il, p. 66. 4 For Turkey’s attitude towards developments in Persia at this juncture, see the ensuing chapter. 6 Gilanentz, section lxi. 6 “ Rüz-Näma ” of Muhammad Shirazi, p. 4. (This reference is to a typescript copy of the original MS. which Professor Sa‘id Naficy of Tehran has been kind enough to give me.) According to the ZT, fol. 211 b, Zabardast Khan’s real name was Muhammad Khän Afghan. Daniel Moginié, in his book L'Illustre Paisan (Lausanne, 1754), p. 71, stated that Zabardast Khän spoke Portuguese well and that he was learning French. This statement is possibly correct, but Moginié is in general a most unreliable source.

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not only won his freedom, but had also risen to high rank in their army. Since the Afghans were ill-provided with artillery, such walled villages and towns as Gaz and Ben Isfahan proved almost im­ pregnable unless they could be starved out. The large village of Gaz, which is situated just over 9 miles north-by-west of Isfahän (it is 4 miles to the east of the present road from Isfahän to Tehran), had withstood a number of attempts to take it by storm. Zabardast Khän, after making another fruitless assault on it, ordered a muqanni or maker of qanäts (underground water-conduits) 1 to make a tunnel under the walls to the centre of the village. When this tunnel was finished, the Afghans entered Gaz by means of it and thus surprised and overcame the brave villagers. Zabardast Khän then turned his attention to Ben Isfahän. After the fall of the capital, the valiant people of this village had not only continued to resist the Afghans, but had repeatedly urged the Isfahänis to rise in revolt, especially after Amänullah’s disaster at Qazvin; so stunned and cowed were the Isfahänis, however, that these appeals had had no effect. When Gaz was taken, the men of Ben Isfahän began to doubt whether they could continue to resist so persistent an enemy, especially as there was no prospect of their receiving any help from Tahmäsp. Therefore, when Zabardast Khän, whom they knew to be an honourable man, offered them reasonable terms if they would surrender, they agreed to do so if he would give them an undertaking that they would not be penalised for the heavy losses which they had inflicted on the Afghans. Zabardast Khän gave them this under­ taking and, what is more, insisted on its being observed. Thereafter, the people of Ben Isfahän proved faithful to the Afghans and even delivered up to them several emissaries whom Tahmäsp had sent to them. Furthermore, if we can believe Krusinski,2 when Lutf ‘All Khän Däghistäm escaped from his prison and sought refuge in Ben Isfahän, the villagers handed him over to the Afghans; on his being taken before Mahmud, the latter rushed at him in a frenzy and hacked him to pieces with his sword. 1 Ever since they were mentioned by Polybius (Book x, 28) over 2000 years ago, Western writers have frequently commented on this system of irrigation. 2 P. 176. This story is of doubtful authenticity, because, according to Gilanentz, section LV, Lutf ‘Ali Khän Däghistänl was one of the victims of the massacre on the night of 24 January 1723.

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When, at the beginning of July 1723, Qümisha surrendered to Zabardast Khän,1 Mahmüd was at last in full control of the country round his capital. Whilst Zabardast Khän had been engaged on these operations in the vicinity of Isfahän, Nasrullah, “the Blind Sultan”, was sent, with a force of 3000 men, to collect provisions from the country to the north-west of Isfahän, as there was a great shortage of food in the city. Save at Hamadän where he was repulsed, Nasrullah met with no resistance on this expedition. He collected a vast quantity of provisions, and, in the district to the east-north-east of Hamadän, he persuaded 4000 families of the Sunni Dargazin tribe1 2 to go with him to Isfahän and settle there. The object of bringing these Dargazins to Isfahän was that Mahmüd, being still distrustful of the inhabitants, wished to replace them, so far as he could, by people in whom he had more confidence. In order to reduce the number of Isfahänis, he issued a proclamation whereby any who wished to leave could do so; a number accordingly left the city. In addition, Mahmüd sent to Qandahär for the families of many of his officers and men to come and settle in Isfahän. Amongst those who came from Qandahär was Mahmüd’s own mother, who

...arriv’d at Ispahan, mounted on a Camel which, except Scarlet Housing, had nothing to distinguish it from the rest. She had no Women, no Officers, no Servants with her when she cross’d the Meidan, and came to the principal Gate of the new King’s Palace half naked, and what Cloaths she had all in Tatters, ravenously gnawing a great Rhadish she held in her Hand, more like a Witch than the Mother of a great King.3 Mahmüd’s object in bringing the families of his men from Qandahär to Isfahän was not only to re-people that city with more reliable elements, but more particularly to prevent his men from deserting, since large numbers had escaped in order to rejoin their households in Qandahär. As time went on, Mahmüd found it increasingly hard to get recruits from his home country, as rumours 1 Letter from the agent of the English East India Company dated 20 June/ i July 1723. 2 For an account of the Dargazin country, see H. L. Rabino, “Hamadan”, in the Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. xlih, p. 225. 8 Krusinski, p. 269.

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were current there that he had become grasping and avaricious, and that he had neglected his best men. Mahmüd’s next enterprise of importance was his endeavour to subdue the province of Fârs. As emissaries whom he had sent to Shiraz had been treated with ignominy, he resolved to reduce that city to obedience, and in the late summer of 1723 he sent his general Nasrullah with a mixed force of Afghans and Dargazin tribesmen against it. Nasrullah met with no resistance on his march south, but, on reaching Shiräz, the Governor rejected his summons to yield. Nasrullah thereupon put himself at the head of his men and led them to the attack. To the grief and consternation of the Afghans, Nasrullah, although popularly supposed to bear a charmed life, was amongst the first to fall. His death was a very serious loss for Mahmüd, as he was the most successful of his generals. The Armenians and, in particular, the Zoroastrians mourned his death, feeling that they had lost a strong protector. Even the Persians regretted his passing, as they had always found him tolerant and humane.1 On the other hand, his death naturally encouraged the Shîrâzïs, and it also led to the revolt of those towns and villages that had submitted to Nasrullah on his march from Isfahän, thus illustrating very clearly that the Afghan hold over the country depended on force alone. When Mahmud heard of Nasrullah’s death, he sent Zabardast Khän to replace him; the siege of Shiräz was then continued with vigour. The garrison, however, put up a strong resistance, and might have succeeded in holding out if the Governor had had the foresight to lay in a sufficient stock of provisions before the siege began. Nevertheless, the city held out for nine months before famine compelled its defenders to surrender. It is said that upwards of 100,000 persons perished during the siege, but this seems an exaggerated figure.1 2 1 Being a Zoroastrian, he was a most tolerant man. Krusihski (pp. 273-4) stated that when Nasrullah discovered that some Georgians in Persia had been obliged to embrace Islam on entering the Shäh’s service, he allowed them to revert to their own religion, even sending a Georgian priest to them from Isfahan. Krusinski added, however, that he did this “ less out of Affection to Christianity, than out of Hatred to the Sect of RafT (i.e. the Shl‘a) ”. 2 Muhammad Shîrâzï, “Rüz-Nâma”, p. 4; Hasan ibn Hasan Fasä’i, FürsNäma, p. 161.

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When the city yielded, Zabardast Khan is said to have shown “towards the people the way of courtesy and goodness” because of his Persian origin.1 Before rejoining Mahmüd, Zabardast Khan sent a small force through Lär to Bandar ‘Abbas. The Persians who lived there and in the vicinity all retired to the island of Hormuz, while the English and Dutch closed the doors of their factories in the faces of the Afghans. Mindful perhaps of the fate that had attended the Baluchis in December, 1720,12 they made no attempt to force an entry, and soon returned to the main force with numbers con­ siderably diminished by sickness. Meanwhile, Mahmüd himself marched against and laid siege to the town of Gulpäigän, 100 miles to the north-west of Isfahän. Tahmâsp, on learning of this development, roused himself from his inertia, and sent a small force under Farîdûn Khän to relieve the town, but Mahmüd defeated him with ease. Faridün Khän, angered because Tahmâsp had unjustly blamed him for his failure, shortly afterwards deserted to the Turks with what was left of his force.3 Gulpäigän did not hold out long after the defeat of Faridün Khän, and Mahmüd was likewise successful in taking Khwänsär, a town some 10 miles to the south, on the north­ eastern flanks of the Zagros range. He also reasserted his authority over Käshän, which had revolted after Amänullah’s expulsion from Qazvïn. Although successful in these comparatively minor enterprises, Mahmüd had now to face a serious crisis. It appears that he and Amänullah, before leaving Qandahâr in 1721, had made a pact whereby the latter was to have a half-share in all that Mahmüd might obtain in Persia. As sovereignty in Isfahän could not be shared, Mahmüd had promised Amänullah dominion over Qazvïn 1 Muhammad Shiräzi, op. cit. p. 4. This statement by a writer who went through the siege (though he was only a child at the time) disproves Krusinski’s assertion that the Afghans not only attacked and surprised the citizens whilst the surrender terms were being discussed, but afterwards behaved with great brutality towards them. There appears to be no first-hand European account of this siege either from religious or lay sources. Padery, the French consul, had left Shïrâz in the previous March, having appointed a French missionary, the Abbé Rebuffa, as vice-consul. The Abbé was, unfortunately, killed during the siege. See AEP, vol. VI, fol. 429 a; see also p. 47 below. 2 See pp. 405-6. 8 The Turks had by this time invaded Persia; see ch. xix.

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and its district, but the latter’s attempt to set himself up in that town had, as we have seen, failed ignominiously. Late in 1723, Amânullah, feeling that Mahmud had not fully carried out his undertaking in the pact, suddenly left Isfahän apparently for Qandahär, taking the royal crown with him. Soon after leaving Isfahän, he wheeled round to the north, with the intention, it seems, of joining Tahmäsp.1 Mahmüd was so alarmed at this news that he hastened after Amânullah, whom he persuaded, after much argument, to return with him to the capital. But, though they were outwardly reconciled, a rift nevertheless remained between them, and neither could thenceforward fully trust the other. The fall of Shïrâz served largely to dissipate Mahmüd’s worries; in fact, it encouraged him sufficiently to set out, in June 1724, at the head of some 30,000 men to subdue the Kühgilü tribesmen. Their country, which is very mountainous and difficult of access, is bordered on the north-west by the territories of the Bakhtiäri. The tribesmen, knowing every inch of the terrain, carefully avoided any large-scale engagement, but constantly harassed the Afghans and their Dargazin allies, cutting off stragglers and preventing them from obtaining adequate supplies. Mahmüd penetrated as far as Behbehän, which he besieged. Here, however, the unhealthy climate caused many deaths amongst his men. Seeing that he could never get to grips with his elusive foes, and that he was merely frittering his strength away fruitlessly, he had to return discomfited to Isfahän, having lost half his force.12 This costly failure more than offset Mahmüd’s joy at the capture of Shïrâz, as he had suffered heavy losses and had gained nothing whatsoever in return. Attention has already been drawn to Mahmüd’s long and very insecure lines of communication with Qandahär. He could never feel sure that, so long as the city of Yazd remained unsubdued, his convoys and batches of recruits could get through in comparative safety. In fact, in the latter part of 1724, the Yazdis had attacked 1 Krusinski, pp. 282-3. According to this source, Amänullah’s wife, who was one of Shäh Sultan ïjusain’s daughters, greatly influenced him against Mahmüd. 2 Krusinski, p. 284; Färs-Näma, p. 162. Writing from Isfahän on 28 June/ 9 July 1726, the agent of the English East India Company stated that Mahmud, after paying siege to “Bauboon” (Behbehän), found himself so hemmed in by hostile Arabs and other tribesmen that he and his army would have been lost had not one of the Bakhtiäri Khäns shown him a way of escape over the mountains.

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and annihilated 2000 Afghan recruits who were on their way to Isfahän. Mahmüd also harboured resentment against the city because of his repulse there in February 1722.1 For these two reasons, he set out on 20 November 1724 to attack it. He felt confident of success because he had made a secret arrangement with the Zoroastrians of Yazd whereby they would rise in his favour immediately he and his men made their attack. Unfortunately for Mahmüd, the Yazdls discovered this plot just before the Afghan army appeared before the walls. Consequently, when the Afghans made their assault, they received no help from within, and were thrown back with serious loss. Subsequent assaults met with the same fate. By this time the Afghans were suffering not only from the wintry conditions, but also from lack of provisions. When Mahmüd had sent out many of his men in search of food, the Yazdls took the opportunity to make a sortie and attack his camp. This sortie proved most successful, as the Yazdïs, besides inflicting heavy loss on Mahmüd’s men, captured practically the whole of their baggage. Mahmüd himself was nearly captured, and when he had collected the scattered remnants of his forces, he was compelled to abandon his attempt to take the city. In the words of the agent of the English East India Company, he had been

shamefully beaten, himself hardly escaping with life by hiding' in an Acqueduc [ric]. He afterwards march’d two Stages farther towards Carmania, where he proposed going to Candahar, and to return in 50 days with 50,000 Men, but his Officers refusing to let him go, he came back again on the 7th January following, having lost Abundance of his Men, and left some Forces to block up Yezd at a distance.1 2

To add to Mahmüd’s troubles, his army was by now in a state bordering on mutiny. His soldiers, whom he blamed for their failure to take Yazd, retaliated by alleging that their defeat had been occasioned by his not only having adopted the manners and luxurious mode of life of the Persians, but also of having secretly become a Shï‘ï.3 Feeling ran so high amongst his men that when 1 See p. 132 above. 2 This letter was amongst those published in the Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol. n, July-October 1886, under the title “The Afghan Conquest of Persia; Unpublished Contemporary Correspondence”, p. 189. 8 Sir J. Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. 11, p. 14.

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they demanded the recall of Ashraf from Qandahär, Mahmüd was forced, very much against his will, to send for his cousin. Thus, when Ashraf arrived in Isfahan, Mahmüd had, in him and Amänullah, two high-ranking Afghans whom he both hated and feared and who, in return, had no love for him. Mahmüd’s worries preyed upon his mind to such an extent that he became increasingly suspicious of those around him, particularly of Ashraf. Although he had greeted his cousin with an outward show of cordiality on his arrival from Qandahär, he soon deemed it expedient to place him in the royal palace under strong guard, fearing that he might head a rising of the discontented soldiery. Feeling that his troubles were now of such a magnitude that he could surmount them only with divine guidance, Mahmüd had recourse to what Sir John Malcolm termed1 “the usage of Tapassa,2 or abstraction of the soul from the contemplation of all sublunary objects till it becomes absorbed in the Divinity”. He therefore descended into a vault or grotto where he remained, practically without sustenance and entirely alone, for forty days. When at length he emerged, looking pale, emaciated and almost ghost-like, it became clear that his mind, which had never been very stable, was now quite unbalanced. He was restless, intensely suspicious and quarrelsome, and he suffered from attacks of melancholia. It was while he was in one of his fits of extreme despondency that the Persians, perhaps out of malice aforethought, circulated a report that Safi Mirzä, the ex-Shäh’s second son, had managed to evade his guards and escape to the Bakhtiäri country. Without attempting to verify this report (which was certainly false), Mahmüd worked himself up into one of his frenzies and resolved to put to death all the imprisoned Safavi princes, with the sole exception of Sultän Husain. This dreadful resolution was put into effect in the afternoon of 7 or 8 February 1725. Mahmüd had all the princes taken into a courtyard of the palace, where their hands were tied behind their backs with their girdles. He and two 1 History of Persia, vol. 11, p. 16. 2 The correct form of this term is tapasya, which Sri Krishna Prem, in his book The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita (1948), p. 222, defines as: “religious austerities”, adding that “the word tapas means heat, or glow, and was used of the severe penances performed by Hindu ascetics. In the Gita it stands for self-discipline. ”

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of his followers then hacked them to death with their swords. Sultan Husain, on hearing their cries, hastened into the courtyard. As he entered it, the only two princes who still survived, both of whom were mere children, rushed into their father’s arms for protection. Mahmüd ran after them with his sword uplifted to strike. As he drew near, Sultän Husain raised his arm to ward off the blow from his children and was himself wounded in so doing. The sight of the ex-Shäh’s blood served to bring back some of Mahmud’s scanty wits, and he desisted from further slaughter.1 How many of the royal princes perished on this dreadful occasion cannot be stated with certainty, as the numbers given by the different authorities range from over 180 to no more than eighteen.12 All that one can say for certain is that all the ex-Shäh’s brothers and all his sons, with the exception of Tahmäsp and the two young princes, were slaughtered. According to the English East India Company,3 Rahim Khän, the chief physician of the ex-Shäh, also lost his life at this time; no one could have regretted his execution. The effect of this dreadful deed on Mahmüd himself was terrible, as it destroyed the last vestiges of his sanity. Krusihski, who was in Isfahän at the time, relates that extraordinary measures were taken to restore his reason. After the Afghans’ physicians had tried all their remedies in vain, they ... had Recourse to the Armenian Clergy, to rehearse that Part of the Gospel over the Head of the Usurper, which they term the Red Gospel ;4 a Custom in vogue among the Persians, who pretend that several Cures 1 Krusinski, p. 291. 2 The agent of the English East India Company, in his letter dated 28 June/ 9 July 1726, stated that Mahmüd “on the Night between the 28th and 29th January (8th/9th February), slew 24 of Shah Sultan Hussain’s sons, 3 of his Brothers and their Children, in all, as some say, to the number of 54, others to 85, and others to 107”. Krusinski, p. 291, acknowledges uncertainty, stating “ Some say one hundred and five ; others a hundred and eighty ; and others more than that”. Muhammad Muhsin, in his ZT, fol. 219b, stated that twelve sons of the ex-Shah and six of his brothers were killed (elsewhere, on fol. 219 b, he gave the names of the six brothers and those of ten of the sons). On the whole, I feel inclined to accept Shaikh Muhammad ‘All Hazin’s total of thirty-nine (Ahwâl, p. 139) as being probably not far wrong. Mirzä Mahdi, in his TN, p. 10, stated that it was Mahmud’s diabolical and carnal inspiration (waswasa-yi-nafsânï) which caused him to perform this terrible deed. 8 Letter from Isfahan dated 28 June/9 July 1726. 4 So called because it is written in red ink.

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have been done by it, on Persons disturb’d in their Minds, with the same Symptoms of Madness as Maghmud had. The Armenian Clergy came to the Palace in solemn Procession, wearing their sacerdotal Habits, and bearing lighted Wax Candles in their Hands. They were honourably receiv’d there by the Courtiers rang’d on each Side, whose Looks modest and religious, and their great Silence and Respect shew’d their Veneration for these Christian Priests. After the Ceremony was over, they were reconducted to Zulfa in the same Order, by a Crowd of Court Lords.1 Whether it was in consequence of this strange ceremony or from some other cause, Mahmüd had a lucid interval shortly afterwards, during which he made a handsome donation to the Armenians in gratitude for what they had done, and he also repaid the English and Dutch East India Companies some of the money that he had extorted from them.1 2 Meanwhile Ashraf was languishing in prison. Notwithstanding his confinement, he was able, through the intermediary of the few surviving Persian notables, to get secretly into touch with Tahmâsp. Ashraf urged Tahmâsp to take advantage of the confusion reigning in Isfahän on account of Mahmud’s illness to march on the capital, assuring him that as soon as he appeared, he (Ashraf) would be liberated by his friends and that they would then immediately join with Tahmâsp’s forces and overthrow Mahmüd. All that he asked for himself and his Afghan supporters was that their lives should be spared and their lands and possessions left intact.3 The Persian notables also wrote to Tahmâsp urging him to act upon Ashraf’s advice. 1 Krusihski, p. 292. Voltaire, with his usual anti-clericalism, stated, in his Histoire de VEmpire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand (London, 1825), vol. 11, p. 236 : “ Ces Contes persans ont été débité par nos moines, et imprimés à Paris.” There is not, however, the slightest reason to doubt Krusinski’s accuracy in this respect. My friend Dr Minasian has informed me that it is not uncommon, even at the present time, for the Armenian clergy in Persia to read what are known as the “healing chapters” of the Gospels over sick persons. These chapters are: St Matthew xv. 21-8 (for mental disorders), St Mark viii. 31-7 (for the deaf and dumb), St Luke ix. 37-42 (for epileptics), and St John iv. 46-54 (for those in extremis). 2 Krusinski, p. 292. This authority added that Ashraf, after his accession, annulled these payments on the grounds that they were “the Effects of a disorder’d Brain”. 3 Krusinski, pp. 306-7. In the light of Ashraf’s subsequent behaviour, it may well be doubted whether he was sincere in making these proposals.

14

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LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

When Tahmäsp received these letters, he replied that he would gladly co-operate, and pledged himself to observe the stipulated conditions. Before Tahmäsp could take any action, however, the situation was completely altered by reason of the change for the worse in Mahmud’s condition and the consequences that ensued therefrom. The improvement in Mahmûd’s mental condition had not lasted long, and he soon became afflicted with terrible physical sufferings as well. He hurled abuse at anyone who ventured near him, and he bit and tore at his own flesh in his agony. The precise nature of his illness is hard to determine, as some say that he was stricken with leprosy,1 while others maintain that he became paralysed.12 However that may be, it was now abundantly clear that there was no hope of his recovery. It was at this juncture that news reached Isfahän that Tahmäsp’s forces had defeated an Afghan contingent under Muhammad Saidäl Khän near Qum.3 As Mahmüd was manifestly incapable of ruling the country, particularly in a time of crisis, the leading Afghans decided that he must be replaced by someone else. As it was felt that it would take too long for Mahmûd’s brother Husain to be brought from Qandahär and placed on the throne, they decided to release Ashraf from prison and offer the crown to him. Accordingly, on the afternoon of 22 April, Amänullah and another commander freed Ashraf and then, at the head of between 700 and 800 men, marched to the Maidän-i-Shäh. On entering the Maidän, they attacked the royal palace, the entrance to which was defended by Mahmûd’s guards. The struggle was too unequal to last long, and Ashraf was soon in possession of the building. Three days later Mahmüd either died of his illness or was put to death.4 On the following day Ashraf was proclaimed Shäh. 1 Père Reynal, Relation historique, p. 13; Krusinski, p. 293. 2 Mirza Mahdi, TN, p. 10; Ridä, Raudat al-Safâ-yi-Nâsirï, vol. vm. 3 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 217. This action had, apparently, no connection with the proposed arrangement between Ashraf and Tahmäsp. 4 See the letter from the representative of the English East India Company at Isfahan dated 28 June/9 July 1726. According to this letter, Ashraf had Mahmüd strangled. According to Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Hazin (Ahwäl, p. 139), Mahmüd died a natural death, but Muhammad Muhsin (ZT, fol. 209 a) stated that he was suffocated, while both Krusinski (p. 296) and Père Reynal (Relation historique, p. 13) maintained that he was beheaded. Krusinski agrees with the East India Company as to 22 April being the date of Ashraf’s coup d'état. The

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Thus ended the brief, but bloody, reign of the first of the Afghan usurpers, who died or was killed at the early age of 26. When we examine Mahmud’s record, first as an Afghan leader and later as Shäh of Persia, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover any redeeming features, but we must remember, in so doing, that nearly all our information concerning him comes from hostile sources. There seems no shadow of doubt, however, that he was nothing more than a bloodthirsty tyrant who achieved his remarkable successes partly by force and terror and partly through the mistakes and ineptitude of the Persian court. Although possessed at first of a certain shrewdness, he soon allowed his thirst for blood to gain a mastery over him. It is not without interest to conjecture how the Afghans might have fared had Mahmüd inherited a fair measure of the subtlety and astuteness of his father Mir Wais. Would he in that case have been able to establish the Ghalzai rule in Persia on a more lasting basis? When we consider what happened in Ashraf’s reign, the answer to this hypothetical question would seem to be in the negative. evidence in favour of suffocation seems the strongest, as the statement by Muhammad Muhsin (usually a very reliable source) is confirmed by (i) Stepanos Eretz, “Meditations on Past and Present Events”, fol. 100 (this MS. is in the Cathedral Library at Julfa), and (ii) Khachatur, History of Persia (Vagarshapat, 1905), pp. 239-40. I am indebted to Dr Minasian for these two references.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN PARTITION OF PERSIA In earlier chapters of this book we have seen how Turkey, after the conclusion of the treaty of Zuhäb in 1639, ceased to be the traditional enemy of Persia and how the religious factor, for so long a powerful and menacing element, became dormant. Even the strange Basra episode at the turn of the century did no more than cause a temporary ruffling of the waters. When calm was once more restored, there seemed no reason to suppose that any untoward incident would disturb the peaceful relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, before the first quarter of the eighteenth century ended, three events occurred which were destined adversely to affect the situation. The first of these events was the signature of the treaty of Passarovitz between Turkey, Austria and Venice in July 1718. This treaty, by bringing to an end Turkey’s struggle with Austria, left her free to indulge in adventure in the east, should an oppor­ tunity present itself and should she wish to take advantage of it. In brief, the treaty of Passarovitz was, in a sense, to Turkey what the treaty of Nystad was to be to Russia three years later. Secondly, the religious question once more became a live issue when the Shl‘I zealots, under the misguided promptings of Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisï and his successor Mir Muhammad Husain, began to persecute the Sunni inhabitants of Shïrvân and Däghistän. Just as the tormented Christians in Georgia and Armenia tended to look northwards to the rising power of Russia for help, so the oppressed Sunnis in north-western Persia cast their eyes in the direction of Turkey. Lastly, there was the worsening situation in Persia. When Durr! Efendi returned to Constantinople in 1721, he was able to confirm the alarming reports that had been already received by the Turkish government of the likelihood of an early collapse of the Safavl regime. This news gave encouragement to those chauvinistic irredentists who wished to recover those parts of north-western 212

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN PARTITION

Persia which had, until just over a century earlier, been for some time in Turkish hands. Moreover, there was a disposition in these circles also to seek compensation in the east for the territorial losses which Turkey had sustained in the west. On the other hand, neither the Sultan Ahmad III nor his most capable and enlightened Grand Vizier Dämäd Ibrâhîm was in the least martially inclined. The Sultan was in favour of peace partly because he feared the uncertainties and vicissitudes of war, and partly because, being very avaricious, he abhorred the expense which it entailed. Dämäd Ibrâhîm, on the other hand, wished for peace in order that his country might recover from the combined effects of the misrule of the Grand Vizier Dämäd ‘Alî (who, fortunately for Dämäd Ibrâhîm, had been killed at the battle of Peterwardein in 1716)1 and of the disastrous war with Austria. One of Dämäd Ibrâhïm’s first acts as Grand Vizier was to sign, on behalf of his country, the treaty of Passarovitz. His period of office, which lasted from 1718 to 1730, was one of the most brilliant in the history of Turkey. He had great influence over the Sultan, whose melancholy temperament he gradually moulded, trans­ forming him from a morose miser into a lover of luxury and magnificence, a great builder of kiosks and pavilions, a layer-out of beautiful gardens and an organiser of brilliant fêtes and pageants.2 Dämäd Ibrâhîm himself was a most lavish patron of literature, founding and endowing libraries, organising teams of scholars to translate Arabic and Persian classics into Turkish and encouraging the production of original works in that language. It was in consequence an era of great literary activity in Turkey. Moreover, it was with the active encouragement of Dämäd Ibrâhîm that a Hungarian renegade who had taken the name of Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa set up the first printing-press in Constanti­ nople. Curiously enough, one of the first books to be printed there (in 1729) was the Tarïkh-i-Saiyâh or “Chronicles of a Traveller”, the Turkish version of Krusinski’s memoirs. Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa, who had a good knowledge of French and Italian, was the translator.3 1 Dâmâd Ibrâhïm’s name was amongst those in the long list of persons whom Dämäd ‘All had intended to put to death. 2 E. J. W. Gibb, A History of Ottoman Poetry, vol. iv, p. 11. 3 For an account of Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa, see the article on him by T. Halasi Kun in Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. xlix, pp. 896-900.

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In regard to foreign affairs, Dàmâd Ibrahim’s policy was to maintain friendly relations with all the European powers, including Russia. It was largely due to him that the temporary peace (for twenty-five years) with Russia, which had been established by the treaty of Adrianople in 1713, was converted into a perpetual one by the treaty of Constantinople of 16 November 1720. Since a cynic might say that treaties are made only to be broken, what was, perhaps a more important feature of this treaty was that it restored to Russia the right to have diplomatic representation at Con­ stantinople (she had first acquired this right in 1700, only to lose it eleven years later, after Peter’s disaster on the Pruth). Machinery was thus provided for the prevention or removal, by diplomatic means, of misunderstandings between the two countries which might otherwise have had serious consequences. At the same time, it put Russia on the same footing in Turkey with France, Austria, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Venice.1 Dämäd Ibrâhïm’s attitude towards Persia was for long one of friendship and non-interference, and he would assuredly have retained this to the end had not the pressure of events forced him to make a radical change. Although the post of Grand Vizier was always attended with danger, Dâmâd Ibrâhïm’s position was, through his outstanding abilities and his influence over the Sultan, for long one of great power.12 Despite the fact that this was a period of such brilliance in so far as the arts and culture were concerned, Turkey was already, in a military sense, on the decline. Nevertheless, the process of decay had not proceeded far, and she was still a most formidable military power.3* 8 1 B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire, p. 59. 2 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu was certainly exaggerating when she wrote : “When a minister here displeases the people, in 3 hours time he is dragged even from his master’s arms. They cut off hands, head and feet, and throw them before the palace gates.” See The Letters and Works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (London, 1837), vol. 1, p. 365. There was, however, an element of truth in what she said, because Dämäd Ibrâhîm eventually lost his life and Ahmad III his throne at the hands of the mutinous Janissaries in 1730. 8 B. H. Sumner, in his Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 10-11, has well said : “ If the organisation of power in Constantinople was rotting, it was a slow rot. The bark of the great tree had not been ringed. The Anatolian sap still rose, even if with increasing difficulty.”

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Having given this outline of Turkey as she was in 1720, we must now turn for a time to her relations with Persia during the con­ cluding years of the reign of Shah Sultan Husain. Late in 1721 Murtadâ Qulï Khän reached Constantinople on a diplomatic mission from the Shäh, in return for the visit of Durrï Efendi earlier in the year. He was received with almost un­ precedented honours, and, except on one occasion,1 was treated throughout his visit with the utmost courtesy. His knowledge of literature and his skill in making apt quotations particularly appealed to Dämäd Ibrâhîm. Abraham Stanyan, the British Resident at Constantinople at that time,2 in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Southern Department dated 19 February/2 March 1722, stated that Murtadä Qulï Khän had been sent

... to cultivate a good Understanding between the two Empires, especially at this Juncture when there is a considerable Rebellion in Persia. And, the more to oblige the Port [w], he had brought with him the King of Persia’s leave for the Emperor’s Subjects to come to Persia through the Turkish Dominions in Order to Traffic there, which Leave was demanded by the Port, pursuant to the Treaty of Passarovitz,3 though probably it will never be used by the Germans. The Persians are the more complaisant to the Turks at this Time least [wr] the Grand Signior should give Succour to the Chief of the Rebels in Persia on account of his being of the Mahometan Sect;4 and if he should demand the Protection of the Port, as it is said he will, they will be puzzled how to behave themselves, since their Religion will not allow them openly to refuse it, nor their Interest to grant it. For if the Port should take him under their Protection, it might not only involve them in a war with Persia, but perhaps with Muscovy too, on account of a late Accident ; for the Port has received Advice that this Rebell has sack’d a City called Schamachie situated on the Caspian Sea... where there was the chief Settlement of the Muscovites who trade with Persia; and that he has not only plundered the Muscovite Merchants of their Effects to the 1 When the well-known poet Sayyid Wehbï made an ill-judged witticism at his expense; see von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 84. 2 Stanyan was Resident from April 1718 to May 1729; see B. Spuler, “Europäische Diplomaten in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Belgrad (1739) ”, in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (Breslau, 1936), vol. xxiv, p. 255. 3 Article xix of the commercial treaty, which was signed on 27 July 1718. See Noradounghian, Recueil d'Actes Internationaux, vol. I, p. 226. 4 The word “same” should have been inserted between “the” and “Maho­ metan”.

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Value of loo m £ Sterling, but also put above 200 of them to the Sword.1 The Muscovite Resident has already complained to the Port of this Hostility.12 After stating that the Grand Vizier had said that this affair was none of Turkey’s business, Stanyan referred to the peaceful aims of Dämäd Ibrâhîm, who ... it is supposed.. .will avoid entering into Measures that may draw the Port into a War with Persia or Muscovy, tho’ they are much more afraid of one with the latter than with the former”.3 In a further despatch dated 8/19 March, Stanyan reported that the Persian ambassador and his suite were being very civilly treated by the Turkish authorities, but that, on the other hand, “the Common People seem to hate them ”.4 It was thus obvious that by this time the Shî'î persecution of Sunnis in Persia was arousing religious feeling in Turkey. In the following month, Murtadä Quli Khän had his farewell audience with the Sultan and soon after started on his journey back to Persia. By the time he reached his native soil, the fall of Isfahän and of the Safavi monarchy was not far off. Scarcely had the Persian ambassador left the Turkish capital when four envoys from the Mudarris Hajjï Dä’üd and his allies arrived there. Being greatly alarmed at the reports of vast military preparations at Astrakhan, these Lezgi and Shîrvânî leaders had decided once more to appeal to the Sultan for aid and protection. Hajjï Dä’üd, moreover, asked to be not only given Turkish nationality, but also to be appointed Governor of the province of Shîrvân. These requests by the rebels placed the peace-loving Grand Vizier in a quandary. If he granted them, he would, on the one hand, be taking advantage of the growing confusion in Persia to appropriate one of her provinces, and, on the other, he would almost certainly give umbrage to Russia. He therefore refrained from giving the envoys a definite answer, and sent them back with nothing more than some vague promises. By this time, however, news had been received in Turkey of 1 Stanyan has confused Mahmüd the Ghalzai with the Mudarris Hajjl Dä’üd. He has also grossly exaggerated the gravity of the Shamâkhï incident. As already pointed out, no Russian lives were lost on that occasion. 2 Public Record Office, SP 97, vol. xxiv, fols. 408^4093. 8 SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 409 b. 4 SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 409 b.

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Mahmud’s great victory at Gulnâbâd and of his subsequent investment of Isfahän. When Dâmâd Ibrâhîm convened a special Dïvân or meeting of the council in May to consider this news, some of the päshäs present urged him to take advantage of the situation to recover those provinces which had previously been held by Turkey and, at the same time, to prevent the Afghans, although they were Sunnis like themselves, from seizing any more of Persia. The Grand Vizier replied that it would be . .neither just nor honourable to take Advantage of the Difficulties the King of Persia, his good Friend, was under.”1 He nevertheless gave orders for the garrisons on the Persian frontier to be strengthened and for protection to be given to any Persian subjects who might ask for it. Meanwhile, the same disquieting rumours that had so alarmed the Shïrvânï rebels and the Däghistänl chieftains concerning the Tsar’s military and naval preparations at Astrakhan had filtered through to Constantinople. Moreover, the Khän of the Crimea had reported that the Tsar was inciting against him the chiefs in Kabardä, the district north of the main Caucasus range and west of the Terek, and added that he had been constructing forts in the Terek valley.1 2 Nepluyev, the Russian Resident, had no difficulty in proving that the Khän’s reports were without foundation, but he was to be faced with a far more difficult problem when confirmation reached Turkey of Peter’s Persian enterprise. Turkish suspicions of Peter’s intentions respecting the Caspian Sea had been aroused some time before by Peter’s action in sending Soimonov and van Verden to explore and map its coasts and harbours.3 In June 1722 more definite information reached the Turkish government of Peter’s extensive preparations at Astrakhan, thus adding to their fears and suspicions. Nepluyev, however, en­ deavoured to reassure the Grand Vizier by stating that the Tsar was not contemplating an attack on Turkish territory. 1 Stanyan’s despatch of 12/23 May 1722, in SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 429a. Giovanni Emo, the Venetian Bailo (Resident) at Constantinople, also sent a report of this Divän to his government but he exaggerated the military prepara­ tions that the Turks were then making. See M. L. Shay, The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734 as revealed in the despatches of the Venetian Baili (Urbana, 1944), P- 91. 2 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 89. 9 Giovanni Emo, quoted by M. L. Shay, loc. cit. p. 89.

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The reports from Persia continued to be vague and often conflicting in character. Towards the end of July, Stanyan informed London that Turkey was still not seeking to take advantage of the troubled state of Persia, but added that he had written to the agent of the East India Company at Isfahän “...to allarm him and the Court of Persia about the Czar’s Designs towards the Caspian Sea which, if true, can have no other View than to turn the Course of Persian Trade in Silks from Turkey to Muscovy.”1 In the same despatch he stated that the Porte was sending an envoy to Persia who was to endeavour to mediate between the Shäh and the chief of the rebels.12 Dämäd Ibrâhîm and the Sultan were naturally perturbed at the course that events were taking. Some time before, Nepluyev had protested to the Porte regarding the Shamâkhï outrage, presumably because Peter had heard of the rebels’ appeal for Turkish aid and protection. In reply, Dämäd Ibrâhîm had, as Mahmud had done, disclaimed all responsibility for what had occurred. Nepluyev had then stated that, as Russia was now unlikely to obtain any redress from Persia, she would demand it from the rebels themselves. To add to the Grand Vizier’s worries, the visit of the rebels’ envoys to Constantinople earlier in the year, with their tales of Shï‘ï atrocities, had so inflamed religious feeling in Turkey that, much against his will, he had eventually to discard his principle of non-interference in Persia to the extent of sending a special envoy, Dervîsh Muhammad Äqä by name, to Shamâkhï to accept Hajjï Dä’üd as a Turkish subject and to invest him in office as Governor of Shïrvân.3 As he was most anxious to avoid a conflict with Russia, he sent Nishii Muhammad Äqä, the Qapiji-bashi (Head Door-keeper), to explain his action to the Tsar. Whatever his ultimate aims may have been, Peter had not, at this stage of his career at any rate, any desire to renew the struggle with Turkey.4 Having freed himself from the constraints imposed 1 SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 435 a. 2 This envoy was ‘Osmän Aqä, of whose experiences and misadventures in Persia mention has been made on pp. 199-200 above. 8 See also p. 128 above. 4 Had Peter lived longer, it is possible that he might have endeavoured to avenge his humiliation on the Pruth and realise his aspirations respecting the Black Sea. However, it seems clear from his warning to Wakhtang that he did not at that time wish to go to war with Turkey.

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by the Swedish war, he was now resolved to put into execution his long-cherished plan of expansion beyond the Caspian. The upheaval in Persia gave him his opportunity, while the Shamâkhî outrage had already provided him with the pretext. The dangerous feature of the situation was that the troubles in Persia had also, as we have seen, revived the aspirations of the more hot-headed and irrendentist Turks, whilst the fanaticism of the Persian Shï‘ïs had awakened the long latent anger of the Turkish Sunnis. Whilst there was thus the risk of a clash between Russia and Turkey over Persia, there were, nevertheless, a number of restraining influences at work. Peter himself was anxious to do everything possible to avoid war, short of abandoning his Persian venture. His Resident at Constantinople, Ivan Ivanovich Nepluyev, although new to diplomacy, was to prove himself to be worthy of his post. He, like Volynsky and Soimonov, was one of Peter’s “fledglings” and he was, perhaps, the most successful of them all.1 On the Turkish side, Dämäd Ibrâhîm and the Sultan were both strongly in favour of peace. In the third place, a strong influence against the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Russia was France. This policy of Louis XV’s ministers was not based upon any altruistic attachment to peace in the abstract, but was purely Machiavellian in character. France wished to keep Turkey strong merely in order that she might act as an effective counterpoise to her enemy Austria.2 When that very gifted diplomat the Marquis de Bonnac took up his post as ambassador to Turkey in 1716, his instructions were to do all that he could to ensure that Turkey was always a cause of fear to Austria. Furthermore, he was to endeavour to prolong the then existing state of war between those countries, lest, it was said “.. .le retour de la paix ne mît ce prince [i.e. the Emperor Charles VI] à même de troubler le repos de la France. ”3 De Bonnac had long considered that a close alliance between his country and Russia was to be desired, but, although this idea was repugnant to Cardinal Dubois (who strongly disliked de Bonnac), he was nevertheless in favour of maintaining good relations with that country. He, likewise, for the reason already given, wished to 1 loc. 2 the 3

For an outline of Nepluyev’s career, see Sumner, op. cit. pp. 74-5 ; Spuler, cit, p. 438. Guignard, Mémoires sur VAmbassade de France en Turquie, p. 118. See also opening part of A. Vandal’s Louis XV et Elizabeth de Russie (Paris, 1882). Saint-Priest, Mémoires, p. 118.

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prevent Turkey from becoming embroiled with Russia, but, despite repeated requests by de Bonnac, he would give him no instructions in writing to use his powers to that end.1 The ambassador, however, needed no official sanction to do what he could to keep Turkey strong by improving her relations with Russia, and he used his rapidly growing influence with the Turkish ministers to expedite the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1720. Consequently, when the Russo-Turkish crisis over Persia began, de Bonnac had made himself greatly liked and respected by Damâd Ibrâhîm and his colleagues. Moreover, through his friendship with Fonseca, the Sultan’s Jewish physician, he was in close touch with the innermost circles of the court.2 The rapidly mounting tension between Turkey and Russia was naturally a matter of grave concern to de Bonnac, and he therefore did his best to pour oil on the troubled waters. He assured Nepluyev at the very outset that if the Tsar confined his attentions to Persia’s Caspian provinces and made no attempt to strike inland in the direction of the Turkish frontier, the Porte would remain in­ different; it might even, he said, annex some Persian territory itself. While there were thus powerful interests in favour of the maintenance of peace, there were others which were working in the opposite direction. Of such influences in Turkey we have already spoken. Outside Turkey, Austria was, as one would expect, always ready to provoke or aggravate any quarrel or misunderstanding between the two powers. For entirely different reasons, Great Britain was likewise in favour of fostering hostile relations between Turkey and her northern neighbour. The explanation lies in the fact that George I, in his capacity of Elector of Hanover, had become fearful lest Peter the Great might endanger his possessions in Germany. His alarm and hostility had been caused by Peter’s action in marrying his niece Catherine to the Duke of Mecklenburg and in his subsequently sending Russian troops to garrison the Duchy; these feelings were accentuated 1 On one occasion the Cardinal kept de Bonnac waiting for nearly two years for instructions; see Schefer’s introduction to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, p. xlvi. When overwhelmed with a mass of unanswered letters and despatches, the Cardinal would sometimes dispose of them by throwing them all into the fire, “ appelant cela 1 se mettre au courant * ”. See Flassan, Histoire Générale et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie française, vol. v, p. 5. 8 Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire, p. 71.

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when Peter also began to concern himself with Holstein. Further­ more, Peter’s overthrow of the balance of power in the Baltic greatly perturbed George in his capacity of King of Great Britain. George therefore considered that, if Turkey could once more be involved in war with Russia, it would divert Peter’s attention sufficiently to make him bring his unwelcome intrusion in Germany to an end and curb his activities in the Baltic.1 It is against this very complicated background that we have to trace the troubled course of Turkey’s relations with Russia in so far as they were affected by happenings in Persia and by their respective policies towards that unhappy country. Turkey’s uncertainty as to the Tsar’s real intentions did not last for long, as definite news was soon received of his landing at Agrakhan bay and of his southward march from there. Alarm at this news was heightened by reports, which were subsequently found to be incorrect, that he had not only invaded Persian Georgia, but was about to enter those parts of it which were under Turkey. When the Turks learnt that Peter was approaching Darband, they feared that he might advance inland from there towards Shamâkhï. They therefore sent the envoy who, as we have seen, met the Tsar at Malakent and warned him not to enter Shîrvân, as it was now a Turkish province.2 Although Peter left a strong garrison in Darband, his departure for Astrakhan had a soothing effect when it became known in Constantinople, and the tension was further eased when word was brought that he had left Astrakhan for Moscow. Attention must now be turned for a time to Nishii Muhammad Äqä’s mission to Russia. On reaching the Crimea, the ambassador learnt from the Khän that Peter was about to embark on his Persian expedition. He therefore set out for Astrakhan in the hope of intercepting the Tsar there. However, when he reached the Russian frontier an over-zealous Russian commander refused to allow him to proceed without express authorisation from his government. By the time that this authorisation was received, and Nishii Muhammad was allowed to continue his journey, Peter was 1 B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia, p. 94. J. F. Chance, in his article “ George I and Peter the Great after the Peace of Nystad ”, in the English Historical Review, vol. xxvi, pp. 278-309, gives a useful summary of Anglo-Russian relations at this time. 1 See p. 186 above.

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already on his way back to Moscow. The ambassador therefore hastened after him, and arrived in Moscow on 6 February 1723. The Tsar received Nishii Muhammad with the usual honours on the 13 th of the month, when the envoy handed him a letter from the Sultan and a long memorandum. The Sultan’s letter, which was couched in strong, but not exactly threatening terms, was to the effect that the Tsar’s resentment against the Lezgïs had by now been carried far enough, and that, as these people were Sunnis and were now under the protection of Turkey, he (the Sultan) could not allow them to come under Christian domination. Moreover, if the Tsar desired peace, he must give up his conquests in Däghistän, abandon Darband and demolish the Svyatoi Krest (Holy Cross) fortress. Nishii Muhammad argued verbally to the same effect, but Peter reduced him to silence by showing him the letters which he had received from the inhabitants of Darband and Baku.1 As the ambassador had been ordered to carry out his mission with the utmost expedition, he pressed for an early reply. However, as Peter had, in the meanwhile, received somewhat more reassuring news from Nepluyev as to the attitude of the Turks, he was in no hurry to give his answer. Finally, at the beginning of March, he gave the ambassador his congé, after charging him to inform the Sultan that the best course for both countries was to come to an agreement together as to what conquests each should make in Persia, and so avoid all risk of a collision. He assured the Sultan that he had no intention of breaking the peace which had been concluded with Turkey, but that, if that country attempted to oppose him, he would take action to thwart any designs that it might have on the country between the Black Sea and the Caspian.2 There can be no doubt that, if international ethics can be disregarded, the Tsar’s suggestion of a division of the Persian spoils was a practical one, as it would have avoided the risk of war and have given each country the areas that it coveted. The Turks, however, were then in no mood to consider it, and they were even 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 89. 2 Clairac (on the authority of a memorandum which the Marquis de Bonnac had prepared for him). This memorandum, which was evidently an abridgment of his Mémoire historique, was of much use to Clairac ; it was entitled “ Mémoire abrégé de ce qui s’est passé dans la négociation du Traité conclu à Constantinople, entre les Moscovites et les Turcs, sur les affaires de Perse”.

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less inclined to do so when they learnt of the Russian occupation of Gïlân,1 and then of the Afghan capture of Isfahän and of the fall of the Safavl dynasty. As to the areas that Russia had occupied, they listened unmoved to Nepluyev’s oft-repeated argument that, since Russia had established unquestionable supremacy over the Caspian Sea, she had thereby acquired a right to the possession of its coastal areas.1 2 In a letter to Nepluyev,3 the Grand Vizier referred to the Tsar’s suggested modus vivendi, but added that, in the first place, the Lezgis, who were of the same true Muhammadan faith as the Turks, had conquered the province of Shlrvän and had been taken under Turkish protection. Secondly, Mir Wais’s son Mahmud had now taken Isfahän. Mahmüd, like the Lezgis, was of the true (Sunni) faith, and he had, moreover, acknowledged the Sultan’s authority.45 It therefore followed that Persia’s troubles were at an end, and that all the areas occupied by Mahmüd and Dä’üd Beg were under Turkish protection. Dämäd Ibrähim concluded by expressing the hope that the Tsar would abide by the terms of the treaty of perpetual peace (of 1720), and would abandon all his enterprises and projects in regard to Persia. As these were strong terms for the usually pacific Grand Vizier to use, he must have been subjected to great pressure by the extremists. He may also have been swayed to some extent by the specious arguments of Stanyan, who was always seeking to sow dissension between Turkey and Russia. On 9/20 February 1723 Stanyan had reported to London:

I lay hold of every Pretence of all that can incite the Vizier at this Juncture, grounding my Representations upon the Prejudice that is likely to accrue to our Trade by the Czar’s new Conquests, and insinuating to him, as far as is proper, under the notion of Friendship to the Port, the Danger that Empire is exposed to from them, which he takes in good Part.6 1 For particulars of this, see the next chapter. 2 Giovanni Emo reported to Venice on 6 August 1723 : Il Residente moscovita sostiene il litorale del Caspio come una conseguenza del dominio dclle acque. 3 A French translation of this letter forms appendix xm to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, 4 This was a misconception on the Grand Vizier’s part; he had not at that time received ‘Osman Aqâ’s report on his treatment by Mahmüd. 5 SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 459 b.

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Peter the Great had often heard through Nepluyev of the helpful attitude of de Bonnac and of his excellent standing with the Turks. Consequently, when he received Nepluyev’s reports of the ominous turn that events were taking, he asked Campredon, the French ambassador at his court, to write to de Bonnac and invite him to act as mediator between his Resident and the Turkish government. Campredon acted as requested; when de Bonnac received Campredon’s letter, he accepted with alacrity, as this was a task after his own heart.1 He had, in fact, been anxious to act in this capacity for some months past.12 He had already some influence over Nepluyev, who was only 29 years of age and a mere beginner in the tortuous game of diplomacy, and who often turned for advice to an older and vastly more experienced man.3 When the French ambassador approached the Turkish ministers and asked for their consent to his suggested mediation, they hesitated at first, but agreed after the Sultan had given his authorisation. They then invited de Bonnac to attend the con­ ferences which were to be held with the Russian Resident, even though de Bonnac had to admit that he had neither full powers nor even instructions from his own government;4* 6 he there­ fore said that he would have to act merely in his ambassadorial capacity? Whilst the menace of war between Russia and Turkey thus receded to some extent, the obstacles in the way of a peaceful settlement of their differences over Persia, which had been already 1 De Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, p. 146. 2 Stanyan’s despatch of 15 October 1722 in SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 449b. 8 Stanyan was no doubt exaggerating when he referred to de Bonnac as Nepluyev’s “ Councellour or rather Governor ” ; see his despatch of 9/20 February I723> 4 Cardinal Dubois did not wish France to be too closely involved. As he would not communicate direct with de Bonnac, he inserted this warning in a letter to Camprodon dated 5 March 1723: “Mais quelque parti que le Czar prenne, vous devez avoir une attention particulière à ne pas exposer l’ambassadeur du roi à la Porte au reproche d’avoir voulu abuser les Turcs, par l’assurance des dispositions des Russes à la paix, pendant qu’en effet ils n’auroient eu l’intention que de gagner le temps nécessaire, pour faire de nouveaux préparatifs de guerre, et c’est à vous, qui êtes sur les lieux, à ne rien laisser ignorer à M. de Bonnac de ce qui peut servir à régler ses démarches en cette occasion.” See C. Schefer’s introduction to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, p. Ivi. 6 De Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, p. 146.

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formidable enough, were nevertheless increased by Turkey’s declaration of war on Tahmäsp and by her subsequent invasion of Persian Georgia in the north and of the provinces of Kirmänshäh and Hamadän in the west.1 The Russian capture of Baku in July 17232 was another complicating factor. The Turkish representatives at the conferences to be held were Muhammad Efendi, the Rais-Efendï (the Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Hajji Mustafa. The latter, who was a very able and eloquent man, had formerly been Daftardär or Finance Minister, but had recently given up that post for the less arduous one of Daftâr-amïnï or Intendant of Finance.3 Two long conferences were held on 17 and 29 July 1723, but the results were inconclusive. Nepluyev opened by reiterating the Tsar’s desire for the continuance of peace, of which he had given evidence by refraining from further action against the Lezgis. Nepluyev then repeated his arguments regarding Russia’s conquests on the Caspian coast. She could not, he said, brook the presence of any other power, particularly Turkey, there. He asked for a suspension of arms on both sides. Turkey should cease her advance into Persian territory, especially in Georgia, in order to avoid the danger of a conflict. The Turkish delegates responded by also declaring their desire for the maintenance of peace, but they could not accept Russia’s claim to retain her conquests, it being abhorrent for them that a Christian power should exercise sovereignty over peoples of the true Muhammadan faith. As to suspending their operations in Georgia, by what right did Russia demand this? She had never been in possession of that country. Persia they regarded as being now an abandoned country, without a ruler. The most notable feature of the Turkish case was the changed attitude in regard to Mahmüd, due doubtless to ‘Osman Aqä’s report. The Turks no longer looked upon him as being under the Sultan’s protection. He was a man, they said, whose name even had been unknown until recently. He had, with a troup of brigands rather than of soldiers, overthrown a prince whose family had reigned in Persia for over two centuries. He was, it was true, 1 See ch. xix. 8 See ch. xvm. 3 De Bonnac’s “ Relation abrégé de la conférence tenue le dimanche 25 juillet 1723 this document is appendix xiv to his Mémoire historique. 15

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of the same faith as themselves, but he was all the more dangerous on that account. They would certainly resist any further advance by him in Persia, particularly if it were towards Tabriz. De Bonnac, as usual, exercised a moderating influence, saying towards the close of the second conference that if the Turks examined closely all that had been said, they would see that the Tsar attached much importance to being able to act in concert with them. Nepluyev, after confirming de Bonnac’s statement, said that he would have to send a report by courier to the Tsar. The Turks also affirmed that they must report to the Grand Vizier and that they would communicate his views at a further conference.1 Thus, although no definite result had been arrived at, the door was left open for further discussion. One of the chief difficulties yet to be surmounted was the question of Tahmäsp. The Turks knew that Peter was in touch with him, although they were not as yet aware how far his negotia­ tions with him had gone. Peter’s intention was to help Tahmäsp provided that he would, in return, formally cede to him the provinces that he had already seized and those that he still intended to occupy. The Turks, however, did not recognise Tahmäsp as having a claim to the throne, and they were, moreover, in a state of war with him. It would manifestly be difficult for them not only to make peace with him, but also to join with Russia in placing him on the throne of Persia. Such action would almost certainly involve them in war with Mahmüd; although they had no love for him, they felt that public opinion in Turkey would be outraged if she entered into an alliance with a Christian power on the side of a heretic and against a Sunni. Nevertheless, in the autumn of October 1723 an envoy from Tahmäsp named Murtadä Quli Beg (he is not to be confused with Murtadä Quli Khän, Shäh Sultän Husain’s last ambassador) reached the borders of Turkey, and was allowed to proceed to Constantinople, although a previous envoy, Barkhudar Khän, had been detained at Erzurum. When Murtadä Quli Beg was received by Dämäd Ibrâhîm, he implored him to ask the Sultan for his assistance. The Grand Vizier replied that if Tahmäsp would freely 1 De Bonnac’s very long and detailed account of these two conferences forms appendices xiv and xv of his Mémoire historique, pp. 201-12.

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cede to Turkey those provinces which she claimed, she would help him to get possession of the rest of Persia.1 It will thus be seen that the Turkish attitude towards Tahmâsp was now precisely the same as that of Peter the Great, except that there was no idea of joint action with Russia. Meanwhile de Bonnac’s position had been strengthened, as his enemy Cardinal Dubois had died on io August from the combined effects of a fall from his horse and long years of debauchery.2 On 31 October 1723 King Louis XV wrote to de Bonnac to inform him that he would be replaced in the following year by the Vicomte d’Andrezel, but that, in the meantime, he must try to keep the peace between the Tsar and the Sultan and to exert all his ability to prevent the latter from making his aggrandisement at the expense of Persia. ... un objet si capital que cela l’engage à porter de ce côté-là toutes ses forces, parce qu’en se livrant à l’attrait de quelques conquêtes en Asie dont la conservation seroit très incertaine, on cesseroit de faire attention à lui, et l’Empereur, délivré des inquiétudes que lui donnent les forces de l’Empire Ottoman, tant qu’elles ne sont point occupées à des entreprises éloignées, en deviendroit plus difficile sur ce qui reste à faire pour consolider la tranquilité publique.3

Louis XV went on to say that he approved of all that de Bonnac had done to maintain the peace between Russia and Turkey and that he was to continue to strive to that end. He refused, however, to give him full powers as mediator, as it would be advisable for his actions and his part in the conferences to continue, in appearance at any rate, to be based upon the requests by the two powers for his mediation. It would, he added, be awkward if the representa­ tives of the other European Powers at Constantinople heard (as assuredly they would) that he (Louis) was in reality acting as mediator between the Tsar and the Sultan. 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 99; Emo, quoted by M. L. Shay, The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734> P- 108. 2 St Simon, who had no love for Dubois, said of him that: “tous les vices combattaient en lui à qui en demeurerait le maître”. There is a scathing account of Dubois’s character in Flassan’s Histoire Générale et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française, vol. v, pp. 3-5. Duclos also has some interesting comments to make in his Mémoires secrets sur les règnes de Louis XIV et de Louis XV (Paris, 1791), vol. II, pp. 269-70. 3 The text of this letter forms appendix xvi to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, pp. 212-14.

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On 16 December a courier arrived from Russia bringing Nepluyev his instructions and giving him authority to reopen the discussions with the Turks and de Bonnac. At the meetings which ensued, Nepluyev conveyed fresh assurances from the Tsar of his desire for peace, but reaffirmed that he must retain his conquests on the coasts of the Caspian Sea. Matters had progressed little further than this when, on 23 December, a new and very serious crisis arose. On that day some copies of a Viennese gazette, printed in Italian, and containing a full translation, from the St Petersburg papers, of the text of the treaty between Russia and Persia of 23 September, reached the Turkish capital and fell into the hands of the Turkish ministers and leading members of the public. By an unfortunate mischance, the copy of this treaty which Peter had sent to Nepluyev to pass on to the Turks was delayed in transit, and the news accordingly reached them in this roundabout manner.1 Nepluyev himself was dumbfounded at the news. As the situation was extremely critical, de Bonnac hastened to the Turkish ministers and explained that this treaty was not in reality what it appeared to be, and that, if they would examine it carefully, they would see not only that the Tsar was at liberty to conclude such an instrument, but also that it contained nothing that was really detrimental to Turkey. He added that the article which declared the enemies of Persia to be also the enemies of Russia was to be taken as applying to the Afghan rebels and not to the Turks. Furthermore, there was no reference in the treaty to Georgia, Erivan or any of the other Persian provinces which Turkey had occupied or was in process of conquering. The Turkish ministers were sufficiently impressed by these arguments to agree to suspend military preparations and hold a further conference. At this conference, which was held a day or two later, Nepluyev made the following points:

(i) The Tsar, as he had often before declared, would not agree to any other power, particularly Turkey, occupying any of the Caspian coast. 1 De Bonnac’s letter to the Comte de Morville, dated 14 January 1724 (this letter forms appendix XIX to the former’s Mémoire historique, pp. 216-24). De Bonnac had heard from Campredon that the treaty had been signed, but it had never occurred to him that the Tsar would authorise its publication before he informed the Turks of its conclusion and contents. See also Stanyan’s despatch of 4/15 February 1724, SP 97, vol. xxv. For the manner in which this Perso-Russian treaty was concluded, see pp. 246-7 below.

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(ii) The Tsar, having concluded a treaty with Tahmâsp Shah, as the legitimate sovereign of Persia after the death or detention of his father, proposed to the Porte that it should join with him to deal with the affairs of Persia; alternatively, the Porte could, if it wished, deal separately with them. (iii) Dä’üd Beg, the Prince of the Dâghistânîs, who had placed himself under Turkish protection, should remain master of Shamakhi, provided that that town was not fortified by the Turks and that it had no Turkish commander or garrison. The river Kura should serve as the boundary between the new acquisitions of the two countries. (iv) The Turks would make no further advance in Persia and would send no more troops there.1

It is not surprising that the Turks found these points totally unacceptable. When they asked Nepluyev to modify the Russian demands, he replied that he had no power to do so. To this the Turks retorted that the Tsar was merely playing with them and that it was useless to have any further discussions. Once more, the threat of war loomed large. Stanyan, obeying his instructions to fan the flames whenever he could, had an interview with the Grand Vizier on n January (N.S.), in the course of which he ... represented to him very plainly the Danger of this new Alliance (between the Tsar and Tahmâsp) by the loss of the Persian Trade, and the Czar’s ambitious Views which perhaps might reach to his setting himself upon the Throne of Persia.. .if he should succeed, he might occasion the Ruin of this Empire. I omitted no Hint proper to allarm and inflame him, wherein tho’ he agreed with me, yet I am still of opinion, if a War ensue, it will be against his Will and must be deter­ mined by a great Council.1 2 Stanyan concluded his despatch with the following words in cipher: “As this is the Critical Moment for deciding Peace or War, I have made some promises of Money where I think they will be of use on condition of a Rupture.”3 The tension continued for 1 Letter dated 14 January 1724, from the Marquis de Bonnac to the Comte de Morville, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs; it forms appendix xix to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique. 2 Despatch of 4/15 January 1724, SP 97, vol. xxv, fol. 6 a. 8 De Bonnac was well aware of Stanyan’s efforts to sow dissension; see his letter to the Comte de Morville of 25 June 1724, in appendix xxvm to the Mémoire historique, p. 265.

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several days. The Turks remained adamant in their opposition to the Tsar’s proposals, and when Nepluyev declared that he could alter nothing unless he had the Tsar’s authority to do so, they retorted that they had no patience left. The Grand Vizier thereupon notified Nepluyev that he would not imprison him, but would allow him to choose one of three courses, namely, to remain in Constantinople, to return to Russia or to accompany the Turkish army when it left the capital. Realising that the position was becoming desperate, de Bonnac had a lengthy interview with Gregorio Ghika, the Chief Dragoman of the Porte, early on 15 January. Speaking with unaccustomed vehemence, the ambassador pointed out that the Tsar’s proposals, hard though some of them were, carried no threat of war if they were not accepted. In fact, the Russian Resident had offered to refer back for reconsideration those points which the Turkish commissioners could not accept. The Tsar, he said, had made his treaty with Tahmäsp because he wanted a legitimate title for his conquests in Persia. It was no more to his advantage than it was to that of the Turks to go to war over that country. Finally, he offered to suggest to the Tsar that he should try to persuade Tahmäsp to seek the friendship of Turkey and to conclude an alliance with her similar to that with Russia. Ghika thereupon hastened off to report to the Grand Vizier. That same morning Dämäd Ibrâhîm was presiding at a council which had been convened for the express purpose of deciding whether there was to be peace or war with Russia. It was attended by some 400 persons, including the ministers, the principal 'ulamä and the chief military leaders. Very strong views were expressed, and, despite the efforts of the Grand Vizier, those present unanimously voted for war. The prayer which terminates such councils was just about to begin when Ghika entered the hall. Seeing him come in, the Grand Vizier asked him why he had come. Ghika then gave him the gist of his interview with de Bonnac. When he had finished, Dämäd Ibrâhîm bade him repeat to the assembly all that he had said. His words made such an impression that the decision to declare war was rescinded and it was agreed that negotiations should be resumed. The council then broke up, and Dämäd Ibrâhîm, in company with a number of eminent people, went with Ghika to see the Sultan. Ghika repeated to him 230

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN PARTITION

what he had just told the assembly. After listening attentively, the Sultan asked a number of questions. Finally, he said that he would never break voluntarily with Russia.1 This favourable outcome of the crisis, achieved literally at the last moment, was a great personal triumph for de Bonnac. When the conferences were resumed, de Bonnac repeated what he had said to Ghika. He pointed out, moreover, that Nepluyev’s instructions were not clear enough, and that it was essential for him to receive fresh orders after the situation had been carefully and fully explained to the Tsar. He suggested that his kinsman, M. d’Usson d’Alion, who was a member of his staff, should go to Russia for this purpose, and bring back the Tsar’s considered views. He concluded by suggesting that a final decision should be deferred until after d’Alion’s return, which would be in about three months; he could not, he said, see any harm in delaying matters to that extent. In any case, if it was to be war, campaigning could not start until the spring. The Turks agreed somewhat reluctantly to de Bonnac’s proposal, but stated that, as the Tsar had massed troops in such menacing fashion in the Ukraine, they must continue their military pre­ parations. A discussion then ensued as to the manner in which the dividing line should be drawn between the Russian and Turkish conquests. The Grand Vizier, in vivid words, describing the Shah as the friend of both Russia and Turkey, said that he could therefore be regarded as their father. He had left three children, namely, Turkey, the Tsar and Tahmäsp. It was now a question of how to divide up his property between the three heirs. In carrying out this task, the French ambassador would be the Qassäm (the magistrate who divides up property amongst orphans), but, the Grand Vizier laughingly added, he would not be entitled to the customary fee of 10 per cent.2 It is of interest to observe the change in the Turkish attitude towards Tahmäsp during the preceding nine months. In the spring of 1723 Turkey had branded him as a heretic and had 1 This summarised account of what occurred is based on de Bonnac’s own “Relation de ce qui s’est passé le 15 janvier 1724”, in appendix xx of his Mémoire historique, 2 De Bonnac’s letter to the Comte de Morville dated 22 January 1724* This letter forms appendix xxi to his Mémoire historique.

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declared war on him. By the following autumn, when Murtadä Quli Beg was in Constantinople, she had, as we have seen, expressed willingness to assist him, if he would cede to her all the territory that she wanted. Now Turkey had gone a stage further. She had recognised TTahmäsp as the legitimate heir to the throne of Persia, and she was prepared to co-operate with Russia in placing him on it. This change was due largely to two factors. One was Mahmûd’s unfriendly attitude and his supposed threat to the provinces which Turkey claimed. The second was Turkey’s fear that Tahmäsp would come to terms with Russia if she herself would not treat with him; as we have seen, this fear was realised. It had taken much time to effect this change; for long it had seemed impossible that the Turkish ‘ulamä and public would agree to enter into an alliance with a Christian power for the purpose of dispossessing a Sunni ruler of his throne in favour of a heretic. In virtue of the agreement reached, d’Alion left Constantinople for Russia almost immediately, taking with him a draft of the proposed treaty1 and a letter from de Bonnac to Campredon to the effect that he (de Bonnac) would withdraw his services as mediator if the Tsar did not explain himself clearly and endeavoured to delay matters still further. D’Alion, who was delayed by the severity of the weather on his journey to Russia, fulfilled his mission satisfactorily, and arrived back in Constantinople on 13 May. The conferences were at once resumed, but, despite the assurances of good will by both sides with which they opened, progress was very slow. The chief difficulty was the tracing of the dividing lines between the Russian and Turkish zones, especially in Shirvän. The complication here was that, on the one hand, Tahmäsp had ceded much of the province to Russia, while, on the other, the Sultan had incorporated it into Turkey and had appointed the Mudarris Hajj! Dä’üd as Governor. Another diffi­ culty arose over Russia’s wish to allocate Tabriz to Tahmäsp, on the grounds that he would otherwise have no city of any size in his realm. The Turks strongly objected to this proposal, saying that Tahmäsp had Ardabîl, Qazvïn and Sultäniya and that these were sufficient. 1 What may be a revision of this draft treaty is a document written in Moscow and dated 22 April 1724; it is entitled “ Conditions de Paix entre la Porte et le Czar”. It is in the Public Record Office, SP 91, vol. ix, fols. 3853-63.

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THE TURCO-RUSSIAN PARTITION

The lack of progress in the negotiations exasperated the Grand Vizier to such an extent that he threatened to replace the two Turkish commissioners and to ask the Tsar to appoint a substitute for Nepluyev. Eventually, Nepluyev gave way over the allocation of Tabriz to Tahmäsp, while both he and the Turks induced de Bonnac to draw the dividing line in Däghistän and Shirvan, leaving Shamäkhi well within the Turkish zone, while at the same time giving Russia a reasonably wide coastal corridor. Ramadan began (23 May) before the finishing touches could be given to the treaty. Some further details were settled during an all-night session, but it was not until 1 Shawwäl (23 June 1724) that the final sessions could be held. Even then a dispute flared up over Nepluyev’s desire to have Peter’s recently acquired title of Emperor inserted in the treaty. The Turks maintained that, while they would doubtless recognise that title in due course, they could not accept it then. Nepluyev thereupon withdrew his request, and he and the Grand Vizier, on 2 Shawwäl (24 June) signed the treaty on behalf of their respective countries.1 On 8 July de Bonnac signed the treaty in his capacity as mediator,1 2 and copies were exchanged between Nepluyev and the Grand Vizier. The treaty consisted of a preamble and six articles, which may be summarised as follows: Preamble, As Mahmüd had captured Isfahän and imprisoned the Shäh, great troubles had occurred in Persia, and Turkey had had to send an army to occupy such territories as she deemed necessary. The Tsar, “the friend of the Sublime Porte” (amico della Fulgida Porta), had occupied the towns of Darband, Baku and others. He had by treaty with Tahmäsp secured the cession of these towns and also of the provinces of GÜän, Mäzandarän and Astarâbâd. The Tsar had arranged with the Porte to assist Tahmäsp, and he would use his good 1 The above account of the concluding stage of the negotiations is based mainly on letters and documents in de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique. Other sources consulted were Clairac’s Histoire, vol. II» book vu, von Hammer’s Histoire de VEmpire Ottoman, vol. xiv, Stanyan’s despatches and M. L. Shay’s The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734, as revealed in the despatches of the Venetian Baili, 2 According to von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 109, de Bonnac would not sign the treaty himself until 8 July, as he had made his signature conditional on the Turks, in return for his good offices, paying damages in respect of the seizure by corsairs from Africa of two French ships, and giving permission for the erection of chapels for the French consulates at Candia and Chios.

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offices to ensure that Tahmäsp ceded to it the provinces that it claimed. The Marquis de Bonnac had been nominated by both Russia and Turkey as mediator. Article 1. The Russo-Turkish frontier was to begin at a point 22 hours’ ride inland from Darband. From a mark placed there, it was to run to another mark that was situated one-third of the way from the town of Shamâkhî to the Caspian Sea. From this second point a line was to be drawn direct to the confluence of the rivers Kura and Aras. Both Russia and Turkey had the right to build forts near this last point, but they must be three leagues from the frontier. The delimitation was to be carried out by the commissioners of the two contracting parties and by another commissioner who was to be appointed by the Emperor of France. Both the contracting parties could construct fortresses and maintain garrisons in their respective zones, but the fortresses must not be nearer than three hours’ ride from the frontier. Article 2. Shamâkhî was to be the place of residence of the Khän or Governor of the Turkish portion of Shïrvân, but it was not to be fortified or to have a Turkish garrison. Turkish troops could be sent there only in the event of rebellion. Article 3. The Turco-Persian frontier was to begin where the RussoTurkish frontier ended, that is, at the confluence of the Kura and Aras. From this point, a line was to be drawn to another situated one hours’ ride to the west of the town of Ardabïl, leaving all the country to the west of that line to Turkey. From the point one hour’s ride to the west of Ardabil, a line was to be drawn direct to Hamadän and another from there to Kirmänshäh.1 Article 4. The Tsar, by virtue of the treaties which he had concluded with Tahmäsp, undertook to use his good offices with the latter to secure the cession by him to the Porte of all the provinces mentioned in article 3. If, however, Tahmäsp refused to conform to this treaty, both Russia and Turkey would take joint action to conquer all the territory allocated to them. The remainder of Persia, after being pacified, would be handed over to whatever Persian they deemed most worthy of reigning over it. This person would have full sovereignty and be independent. Article 5. If Tahmäsp, through the mediation of the Tsar, ceded voluntarily to Turkey the provinces mentioned in article 3, that country would recognise him as Shäh of Persia and give him every assistance. The Tsar, in conformity with his treaty with Tahmäsp, would send him effective help and carry out his undertakings in order that he might as 1 Though not expressly stated, the towns of Kirmänshäh and Hamadän were both included in the territory assigned to Turkey by the treaty.

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THE TURCO-RUSSIAN PARTITION

the lawful heir wrest the Empire of Persia and Isfahän from the usurper Mahmüd. If Mahmüd, in this event, attacked Turkey, the latter would act against him and help to expel him from Persia. Turkey and Russia would act jointly, in conformity with this treaty, to place Tahmäsp on the throne of Persia. Article 6. If Tahmäsp refused to hand over the provinces to Turkey, that country and Russia would first take all the portions belonging to them, and, having pacified the country, would hand over the govern­ ment to a Persian-born individual who would be completely in­ dependent; they would secure him on the throne and neither would listen to any representations by Mahmüd or make any arrangement with him. In order to ensure that the provinces allocated to Turkey and Russia remained always in their possession and that Persia may be re-established and strengthened, this treaty was to be inviolably observed in order that the perpetual peace might be made more assured. After receiving the Tsar’s ratification, the Sultan would likewise ratify the treaty.1

When we consider the effects of this treaty and the advantages which it conferred on the countries concerned, we see that

(i) It settled without recourse to the arbitrament of war the division of a large area of Persia between Turkey and Russia. (ii) It therefore satisfied the aspirations of the Turkish irredentists on the one hand, while on the other, it gave a new lease of life to the brilliant era of Ahmad III and Dämäd Ibrâhîm. It gave to Peter the Great his much-coveted control of the Caspian littoral and thereby prevented Turkey from reaching that sea. (iii) Tahmäsp was to be helped to gain his throne and be recognised as the lawful Shäh, but only if he voluntarily ceded all the territories referred to in (i). (iv) France had achieved her great object in preserving the peace between Russia and Turkey, so that the last-mentioned power could help to keep Austria in check. 1 The Turkish text and Ghika’s Italian translation of it are in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, “ Turquie ”, vol. lxvi, fols. 22oa-8b. They are dated n July 1724 and were doubtless sent by de Bonnac himself. For a French translation, see Noradounghian, Recueil d*Actes Internationaux de VEmpire Ottoman, vol. I, pp. 233-8. De Koch’s French translation in his Histoire abrégée des Traités de Paix entre les Puissances de VEurope depuis la Paix de Westphalie (Brussels, 1838), vol. iv, pp. 302-11, leaves something to be desired; it was made from the German text in Major J. G. Garber’s Journal von der Commission wegen der Grenzscheidung in Persien.

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(v) While France’s prestige had certainly been enhanced by de Bonnac’s clever diplomacy, it was, on the other hand, likely that the treaty would adversely affect her commercial interests in Persia (this was a point which de Bonnac appears to have overlooked).1

Although this treaty appeared to be favourable from the Russian and Turkish points of view, the judgment to be passed on it when we regard it from the Persian angle and also from that of inter­ national morality is very different.2 Both Russia and Turkey had enforced their claims by armed might on a distracted and practically defenceless country, much of which was already in the hands of a cruel and barbarous usurper. What the treaty really did was to give a specious appearance of legality to the callous dismemberment by Russia and Turkey of the already prostrate body of Persia. As for the frontiers which it laid down, they followed no natural boundaries such as mountain ranges, lakes or rivers and they took no account whatsoever of race or religion. Anomalous in the extreme was the fact that, while the Christian Tsar was given a large number of Muhammadan subjects in Däghistän and Shirvän, the Sultan of Turkey, who was also the Caliph of Islam, was given domination of the Christian inhabitants of those parts of Georgia and Armenia which had, until then, formed part of the Persian Empire. The treaty was, in fact, an iniquitous one, and it may be regarded as the forerunner of the equally wrongful partitions of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century.3 Peter the Great, who had for long wished to annex Persia’s Caspian provinces, must bear the major share of the blame, while the Turkish irredentists and religious zealots must bear the remainder. It would not be fair to stigmatise either Dâmâd Ibrâhîm or the Sultan Ahmad III for the part that they had played, because they had both been compelled to act as they did 1 As early as March 1723 Abraham Stanyan expressed the view that de Bonnac’s conduct in endeavouring to mediate between Russia and Turkey would eventually prove prejudicial to his own country’s interests, since, if Russia got the whole of Persia’s silk trade into her hands, French trade, as well as British trade, would be bound to suffer. See Stanyan’s despatch of 12/23 March 1723 in SP 97, vol. xxiv, fol. 462 b. 2 K. F. Neumann, in his “Persien seit dem Niedergang der Sefi”, p. 456, aptly described this treaty as “ ein Vertrag zur Beruhigung, d.h. zur Berauberung Persiens ”. 3 Peter himself envisaged the partition of Poland at one time ; see B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia, pp. 181-2.

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against their will and against their better judgment. The part played by France also cannot escape censure. In order to keep her enemy Austria in check, she had deliberately acquiesced in and, in fact, supported, the cutting up of Persia. Neither the French government nor de Bonnac appeared to give any thought to the moral aspect of the matter. It was certainly a judgment on both Russia and Turkey that the advantages which the treaty conferred on them were not to prove lasting. Russia, after Peter’s death early in 1725, lost most of her desire for expansion, while the lethal climate of the Caspian provinces took such a terrible toll of her unfortunate troops there that she was thankful to relinquish all claim to them only a few years later. As for Turkey, she was forced to give up all her territorial gains by the sharp sword of Nadir Shäh. In Turkey, the treaty aroused no enthusiasm. Despite the façade of friendliness and the frequent references to the “ perpetual peace” with Russia, Turkish distrust of that country and of Peter’s ambitious designs continued. Gritti, the new Venetian Bailo, reported soon after the conclusion of the treaty that Dämäd Ibrâhîm received but little applause for what he had done. The Grand Vizier, indifferent to criticism, continued to distract the Sultan with constant diversions.1 Nevertheless, when Peter’s special envoy, Major-General Aleksander Ivanovich Rumyantsev, reached Constantinople at the beginning of 1725 with the Tsar’s ratification of the treaty, the Turkish government also ratified it. Only a month later, Peter died. Before leaving St Petersburg, Rumyantsev had been ordered to act as chief Russian representative on the commission which was to delimit the frontier between Russia and Turkey in Däghistän and Shïrvân in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. It had been agreed, after the conclusion of the negotiations, that d’Usson d’Alion, the kinsman of the Marquis de Bonnac, was to serve on this commission as a mediator. Rumyantsev pressed for a start to be made at once with the work of delimitation, but the Turks were in no hurry to begin, and when the news arrived of Peter’s death they were even less inclined to do so. 1 Quoted by Shay, op. cit. p. 119.

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CHAPTER XVIII

FURTHER RUSSIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN PERSIA As already pointed out,1 Peter had barely touched the fringes of Persia in the course of his expedition to Darband, and much therefore remained to be done if he was to realise his aims. The loss of his transports in a gale and the danger of war with Turkey had prevented him, at any rate for a time, from continuing his southwards march from Darband and also from accomplishing the liberation of Persian Georgia and Armenia from Muslim domina­ tion. The first of these adverse factors could be easily overcome, but the danger of embroilment with Turkey remained. Neverthe­ less, it seemed possible that he might, without grave risk of war with the Turks, achieve part of his aspirations by capturing the important town and port of Baku (which would give him a really safe harbour on the Caspian coast) and occupying Persia’s Caspian provinces of Gilän, Mäzandarän and Astaräbäd. It happened very opportunely for Peter that, before he left Astrakhan for the north, he received an urgent message from the Governor of Gïlân imploring him to send a Russian garrison to occupy Resht, the capital of that province, as it was threatened with capture by the Afghans. Despite the lateness of the season, this was too good an oppor­ tunity to be missed. At the Tsar’s orders, Soimonov and other Russian officers conferred with Matvei Gregoriev Yevreinov and Andrei Semeonov, both of whom had an extensive knowledge of Gïlân. They also consulted a prominent Indian merchant named Amburan respecting the silk trade in that province. Amburan stated that, before the outbreak of the troubles in Persia, the exports of silk from Gilän to Turkey and beyond had amounted annually to 5000 bales each weighing from 7 to 9 puds (from 252 to 324 lbs.); each pud was worth from 70 to 90 roubles.2 1 See p. 188 above. 2 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 267. In Chardin’s day, half a century earlier, Gïlân had produced double this quantity of silk; see his Voyages, vol. iv, p. 163. Chardin’s figures related, however, to exports to all countries; there was probably little difference in the total actually produced.

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Whilst these discussions were in progress, a man arrived in Astrakhan who had a considerable knowledge of Georgian trade and who was also familiar with the town of Tiflis. Peter, who was deeply interested in what this man had to say, remarked that the river Kura could be used for the transport of goods from the Caspian to Tiflis and vice versa1 (Peter had for many years been engaged in developing water transport in Russia by means of rivers and canals). He thereupon conceived the idea of founding a large town at or near the mouth of the Kura which would serve as the entrepot not only for Georgian trade with Russia, but also for that with Persia and other countries to the east and south-east. The heavy casualties of the Russian troops through sickness during the Darband expedition and the difficulties of transport by land had convinced Peter that sea transport on the Caspian should in future be used as much as possible despite the maritime hazards involved. He therefore ordered two battalions of regular troops, under the command of Colonel Shipov, to sail for Gïlân in vessels under Soimonov’s command. When it was questioned whether two battalions would be sufficient to take and hold Gïlân, Peter replied in characteristic fashion “Why not? Was not Stenka Razin able to maintain himself there with 500 Cossacks ? And you have two battalions of regular troops and have doubts! ”2 In due course all the preparations for the expedition were completed, and the Tsar and his principal officers witnessed the sailing of the small fleet from Astrakhan on 6/17 November 1722. After making a landfall off the Apsheron peninsula, Soimonov set his course for the mouth of the Kura, in order to choose a suitable site for a commercial centre. After taking soundings in the various channels through which the Kura flowed into the sea, Soimonov chose a suitable site 30 miles upstream at Salyan, and then set sail for Enzelï, where he arrived a few days later. Colonel Shipov sent one of his officers ashore in advance, to inform Avramov and the Governor of Gïlân of the arrival of the troops and to ask for horses to be sent to Pir-i-Bazâr, a village on a creek on the east side of the Murdäb lagoon; these horses were to transport the Russians’ baggage to Resht, which lay 6 miles to the east of Pïr-i-Bazâr. Soon afterwards, an interpreter of Greek nationality named Petrichi arrived from Resht. He informed Shipov that he was 2 Ibid. p. 267.

1 Ibid. p. 266.

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accompanying Ismâ'îl Beg, an envoy to whom Tahmäsp had given full powers to conclude a treaty with the Tsar. Ismä^l Beg, he added, wished to be given a passage across the Caspian in one of the Russian ships, in order to avoid the long and hazardous land journey through Gïlân, Shïrvân and Däghistän.1 On the following day, the Russian officer returned from Resht with a messenger from the Governor that the Russian troops were not to land without the Shah’s knowledge and consent. The Governor replied that they must therefore remain on board; if they did not, they would be opposed.2 What had evidently happened was that the Governor had come to the conclusion that there was now less danger from the Afghans than from the Russians. It must be borne in mind that news of Peter’s occupation of Darband had already reached Persia. Moreover, the inhabitants of her northern provinces had no cause to love the Russians, at whose rude hands they had so often suffered in the past (Resht had twice been sacked by Stenka Razin and his Cossacks in the previous century). Shipov sent a terse message in reply, expressing surprise at the Governor’s attitude and stating that he and his men had come in response to the appeal for their assistance. He added that he must obey the Tsar’s orders and land his men. After some delay, the Governor unwillingly gave his consent, whereupon the Russians disembarked.3 Leaving two companies of his men in Pïr-i-Bazâr to guard the transports, Shipov marched with the rest to Resht,4 where they took up their quarters in a large stone caravanserai on the outskirts of the town, in which the Russian merchants stored their goods. This caravanserai was very strongly built and was therefore well suited for defence. Avramov emphasised to Shipov and Soimonov the importance of Ismâ'ïl Beg’s mission. The Tsar had informed him some time 1 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 273; Butkov, Materiali, vol. I, p. 40. 3 Soimonov, loc, cit, pp. 273-4. 3 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, pp. 274-5. See also the TN, p. 11. (Mirza Mahdi’s chronology is very faulty, as he places this event after the conclusion of the Russo-Persian treaty of 23 September 1723.) 4 For a description of Resht as it was in 1717, see J. Bell’s Travels, vol. I, pp. 112-13. Bell laid stress on the unhealthiness of the climate, stating that several members of Volynsky’s mission were seized with agues there, though none died.

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previously that he wished to conclude a treaty with Tahmäsp on the basis that Russia would assist him against the Afghans if he would cede to her the Caspian provinces in return. It so happened that Shäh Sultän Husain, soon after the disaster at Gulnäbäd, had wished to send Ismä‘il Beg to Russia to appeal for help, but, owing to the siege of Isfahän, he could not do so. Soon after the fall of Isfahän, Avramov had persuaded Tahmäsp to give Ismä‘il Beg full powers to conclude a treaty with Russia. Shipov and Soimonov naturally appreciated the importance of arranging for Ismä‘11 Beg’s transport to Russia, but as it was now nearly mid-winter and the Volga was already ice-bound, there seemed no immediate urgency in the matter. At the end of December, however, Avramov received word that a messenger from Tahmäsp (who was then at Tabriz) was approaching Resht with orders for the recall of Ismä‘11 Beg; Tahmäsp had, no doubt, changed his mind on hearing from the Governor of Gilän that Shipov and his troops had landed there. Realising that there was not a moment to be lost, Avramov intercepted Tahmäsp’s courier and delayed him by entertaining him lavishly.1 Moreover, he sent an urgent message to Shipov and Soimonov to put Ismä‘il Beg on board ship immediately and to despatch the vessel before the courier could deliver his message. Soimonov, on receiving this message, urged Ismä‘il Beg to embark at once in a ship which was anchored in the Pïr-i-Bazâr creek, but the envoy was reluctant to do so in such haste. Soimonov, who knew that Ismâ‘ïl Beg had a profound belief in astrology, assured him that at midnight that very night there would be a conjunction of the stars most favourable for the success of his mission. The envoy’s scruples having been overcome by these questionable means, he boarded the vessel, which sailed im­ mediately.1 2 As it was then the beginning of January, Ismä'il Beg was delayed on his journey by wintry conditions, and he con­ sequently did not reach St Petersburg until 21 August 1723.3 When the Governor of Gilän discovered the Russians’ trickery, he was much angered,4 and it was doubtless in consequence of his 1 2 3 4

16

Butkov, Material^ vol. I, p. 41. Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, pp. 281-2. How Ismä‘11 Beg fared will be described later in this chapter. Butkov, op. cit. p. 41.

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report that Tahmäsp, in February, ordered him to demand the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from Persian soil. On receiving this request, Shipov categorically refused to with­ draw, whereupon the Persians began to make preparations for war. With the co-operation of the governors of Gaskar1 and Astärä, the Governor of Gilân raised a force of some 20,000 men, but the majority were merely peasants armed with swords. Only a few possessed firearms and none had had any real military training. At the same time, the Persians set up a battery at Enzelï to command the entrance to the Murdäb, in order to prevent the Russian ships from entering or leaving the lagoon. On 18/29 March 1723, the Governor of Gîlân, having massed the bulk of his men around the Russian caravanserai, opened fire on it with small arms and four small cannon. At midnight that night, Shipov detailed one of his officers and a company of grenadiers to slip very quietly out by the gate at the back of the caravanserai, while he, with another two companies, went out through the front gate and assailed the enemy from there. Taken completely by surprise and caught between two fires, the raw untrained Persian levies almost instantly broke and fled, leaving a thousand of their number dead and wounded behind. Meanwhile, no less than 5000 Persians had attacked the Russians, numbering only a hundred, who had been posted at Pïr-i-Bazâr to protect the transports lying in the creek there. Although so outnumbered, the Russians fought with such courage that they routed the enemy. At the same time, the Russian warships in the Murdäb bombarded and soon silenced the Persian battery at Enzelï.2 These striking successes showed what a few well-trained, resolute men can do against a foe vastly superior in numbers, but lacking training, discipline, good weapons and efficient leadership. Thereafter, the Persians in Resht and its surroundings made no further attempt to dislodge the Russians by force of arms. Shortly after these engagements, when Brigadier Levashov arrived from Russia, bringing with him four more battalions of regular troops, he took over the command from Shipov.3 In order to reduce the danger of ambushes and to hamper 1 The district of Gaskar lies to the south of the Murdäb lagoon. At that time the chief town of the district was Güräb-i-Gaskar. 8 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, pp. 290-1. 3 Ibid, pp. 292-3.

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guerrilla operations, should any be attempted, the Russians cut down the forests for some distance round Resht; by so doing, they provided themselves with ample supplies of fuel. The sullen Persian peasants grumbled at the sight of their trees being felled, saying1 “Our forests serve to pay the Shäh’s taxes.” With the advent of Levashov and his troops, the Russian strength in Gïlân was raised to six battalions. However, when we consider the extremely difficult nature of the terrain in the Caspian provinces, it is clear that this was by no means an adequate force to subdue so large a tract of country and to ensure safe communi­ cations. Here we may with advantage quote from James Baillie Fraser’s excellent account of this part of Persia, through which he travelled just under a century later.

Certainly I never saw, nor can I imagine, a stronger or more im­ practicable country, in a military point of view, than these provinces. Roads, that is, made roads, there are none, except the great Causeway made of old by Shah Abbas, and this has now so nearly disappeared that it requires a guide to find it; and even when found it would be useless for military purposes, from the numerous breaks and gaps in its course, and from the impenetrable jungle which surrounds it on all sides, and affords cover for all sorts of ambuscades and surprises. The surface where not cultivated, consists of natural or artificial swamps, overgrown with forest trees and thorns, particularly bramble bushes of incredible luxuriance, and perfectly impervious. Indeed, these brambles are called by the inhabitants the “Pehlewanha Mazunde ranee”, that is the heroes or guardians (lit. wrestlers) of Mazunderan, and well do they deserve the appellation.2 Fraser’s description, though relating mainly to Mâzandarân, can be applied equally well to the province of Gïlân and parts of Astaräbäd. We must now turn for a time from events in Gïlân to the Russian attack on Baku in the summer of 1723. Baku ranked very high in the list of Peter’s Persian objectives. In the first place, he wished to forestall the Turks, from whom with their new vassal Dâ’üd Beg now installed in Shamâkhï, there was increased danger. Secondly, Baku harbour was the only really safe 1 Soloviev, Istoriya Rossii, vol. xvm, p. 48. 8 A Winter’s Journey from Constantinople to Tehran: with Travels through various Parts of Persia (London, 1838), vol. 11, p. 468.

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one on the western side of the Caspian; Darband, as he had good reason to know, had no harbour at all, while Niäzäbäd, the port for Shamakhi, was only a roadstead. Peter’s extraordinary attention to detail is well illustrated by the interest which he took in the Baku oil-springs.1 Having heard from Soimonov and others of its existence and qualities, he gave orders for samples of the oil to be sent to Russia after the capture of the town and district. Cornelius de Bruyn has given the following account of Baku as it was at the beginning of the eighteenth century:

The town of Baku, which has a very fine port, has been lately fortify’d by the Persians, which was owing to the misconduct of Captain Meyer.... He took it into his head to demand free entrance into this port, for the ships and vessels of his Czarian Majesty, which gave such umbrage to the Persians, and instilled them with such a jealousy, that they immediately resolved to fortify this place. As the Muscovites had, time out of mind, had free admission into this port, he was advised not to take so false a step, but the advice was thrown away upon him. Before this it had been an easy matter to have seized it with an handful of men, and with it to have seized on the whole country quite to the Kur and Araxes, and to have secured it by proper fortifications... for the inhabitants were in no condition to have made a defence, and this had proved a most advantageous article to his Czarian Majesty. This town of Baku stands in the western part of Persia, in the country of Shirwan, upon the Caspian sea, and still preserves its ancient walls. This part produces the best nut oyl in the world, both brown and white, the first of which is carried into Gilan, and an hundred leagues beyond into Persia, and the white they send to all parts. They assured me, that at the distance of two or three leagues from that town, the land burns continually, because of the abundance of saltpetre [rir] it is impregnated with.2 1 For accounts by early and medieval travellers of Baku oil, see my article entitled “Histoire du Pétrole en Perse jusqu’au Début du XXe. Siècle”, in Revue Pétrolifère (Paris), no. 810, 4 and 11 November 1938. Soimonov, in his “Tage-Buch”, pp. 332-3, stated that some Parsis from India, who had settled in Baku, had erected a fire-temple at Surakhani, ten miles to the north-north­ east, over a spot where petroleum gas escaped from the ground, in order to utilise this gas for their sacred fire. Though Soimonov was ignorant of the fact, these Parsis had revived the practice of the ancient Persians, who called the fire thus obtained axvarishnik, meaning “requiring no food”, and regarded it as miraculous. The fire-temple at Surakhani was in use until 1880 or the following year, when the completion of a refinery near-by necessitated it being shut down. 2 Travels, vol. 1, p. 150.

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In his second volume, de Bruyn gave the following additional information:

The governors of this province never fail to enrich themselves in a short time, and it would certainly prove a very commodious acquisition to his Czarian majesty, since it lies contiguous to his dominions, and is very advantageous to those of his subjects who traffic there for any considerable time. It might likewise be preserved without any difficulty, after it had once been conquered, by erecting forts there.1 Although the inhabitants of Baku had, like those of Darband and Resht, asked for Russian aid,12 they had soon repented of their action, and had refused to admit the envoy whom Peter had sent to them from Darband.3 Peter therefore determined to take the city by force, but he had to defer such action until well into 1723. When he was on his way northwards from Astrakhan, he gave orders for thirty large transports to be built at Kazan and Nizhni Novgorod which were to be sailed down the Volga to the firstmentioned town as soon as the ice cleared in the spring. In due course, these transports reached Astrakhan where, in the meanwhile, the 3000 men who were to take part in the expedition had been assembled; these men were under the command of Major-General Matyushkin. On 20 June/i July 1723 the Russian force sailed from Astrakhan and arrived off Baku seventeen days later. Before leaving Astrakhan, Matyushkin had obtained a letter from Ismä‘il Beg to the inhabitants of Baku in which the Persian envoy urged them to put themselves under the Tsar’s protection.4 Matyushkin sent one of his officers ashore with this letter and a verbal message that the Tsar, notwithstanding the attitude of the people of Baku, had graciously sent him with troops and ammuni­ tion for their defence, and also with provisions for their sustenance. They should therefore, he added, follow Ismä‘11 Beg’s advice. The Governor of Baku and his advisers were quite unmoved by Ismâ'ïl Beg’s letter and Matyushkin’s message. They sent the Russian officer back with a verbal message to the effect that, being 1 Ibid. vol. 11, p. 163. 2 They had asked for aid against Dâ’ûd Beg, not the Afghans (from whom they had little or nothing to fear). 8 See p. 186 above. 4 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 321. See also J. Mottley, The History of Peter I, Emperor of Russia, vol. in, p. 270.

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the subjects of the Shäh, they had no need of Russian assistance and that they were in no way bound to follow Ismail Beg’s counsel. Seeing that peaceful methods were of no avail, Matyushkin began his preparations for attack. He ordered Major Gärber,1 who was in command of the artillery, to open fire from the two galliots on board which the cannon were carried, and bade his other officers prepare to land four battalions. On the morning of 21 July/i August, the bombardment began, while the Russian troops landed without opposition. The cannonade was kept up without intermission so as to prevent the defenders from repairing the damage caused by the cannon-fire. Notwith­ standing the heavy bombardment, the Persians defended themselves bravely for four days. At the end of that time Matyushkin sent a further message to the defenders pressing them to surrender in order to avoid further loss. In reply, the Persians hoisted the white flag, and allowed the Russians to enter the city; it was fortunate for the latter that the siege ended when it did, as the Russians were by then getting very short of ammunition.2 When Peter received the news of the capture of Baku, he was extremely pleased, remarking that it was the key to all his affairs. The Russian troops left as garrison in Baku were quartered in two large stone-built caravanserais, similar to the one at Resht, where they could remain in perfect safety. During the Russian occupation of the town, each officer and man of the garrison received a daily ration of oil from the local wells. The remainder was sold for the benefit of the Russian crown, which derived therefrom an annual revenue of over 20,000 roubles.3 As already related, Tahmäsp’s emissary Ismä‘11 Beg did not reach St Petersburg until 21 August 1723. He was received there with the customary honours, and the importance which Peter 1 Major (later Colonel) Johann Gustav Gärber was afterwards one of the Russian representatives on the Turco-Russian boundary commission. He was the author of the interesting and valuable “Nachrichten von denen an der westlichen Seite der Caspischen See zwischen Astrachan und dem Flusse Kur befindlichen Völkern und Landschaften und von derselben Zustande in dem Jahre 1728”, in vol. iv of Müller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte. 2 This account of the siege and capture of Baku is based mainly on Soimonov’s description in his “Tage-Buch”, pp. 321-6, but Butkov, Soloviev, Clairac and Mottley have also been consulted. 8 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 335.

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attached to his mission is evidenced by the fact that he received him in audience only four days later. After Ismä‘11 Beg had presented Tahmäsp’s letter to Golovkin, the Chancellor, and had kissed the hem of the Tsar’s robe, Peter inquired after the health of the ex-Shäh. Ismä‘11 Beg, who believed that Shäh Sultän Husain had been murdered by Mahmüd, was so overcome by emotion that he burst into tears and was rendered incapable of speech. The negotiations for the Russo-Persian treaty began almost immediately after this audience. On the Russian side, Ostermann, that capable Westphalian, played the principal part. The un­ fortunate Persian ambassador was in such a weak position that he had to agree to practically all the Russian demands; it did not therefore take long for the discussions to be brought to an end, and the instrument was signed on 12/23 September 1723. It contained a preamble and five articles, and may be summarised as follows: Article 1. The Tsar promised to help Tahmäsp and to enter into an alliance with him against the rebels in his kingdom. He further under­ took to send troops to Persia who would pursue the rebels until they were totally destroyed. Article 2. In return, Tahmäsp agreed to cede in perpetuity the cities of Darband and Baku with their dependencies and the three provinces of Gilän, Mäzandarän and Astaräbäd. Article 3. As it was impossible for Russia to send supplies and horses for her troops in Persia, arrangements were to be made there for their purchase at fair prices. Article 4. There was to be constant friendship and understanding between the two countries, and the inhabitants of each one were to have complete liberty to enter, re-enter and reside in the territories of the other whenever and as often as they wished. There was to be freedom of trade between Persia and Russia. Article Persia and Russia were to regard as friends and enemies respectively the friends and enemies of each other.1 1 For the Russian text of this treaty, see T. Yuzefovich, Dogovori Rossii s Vostokom, pp. 185-9. A French translation is given by J. Dumont in his Corps universel diplomatique du Droit des Gens (Amsterdam, 1731), vol. II, pp. 75-6. It has been well summarised by John Mottley in English (op. cit. vol. in, pp. 271-5) and by Clairac in French (vol. II, p. 129); J. Hanway has included an English translation of Chirac’s summary (as usual without acknowledgment) in vol. in, p. 181 of his An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea.

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There can be no doubt that Ismail Beg signed this treaty under duress. As, however, he had full powers from Tahmâsp to negotiate and sign a treaty with Russia, the signature of this instrument gave a thin veneer of legality to Peter’s aggressive course of action in northern Persia.1 For this reason, he was well satisfied when it was concluded. When Ismäll Beg returned to Gîlân, he found not only that Tahmâsp would not accept the treaty, but that he himself was regarded as a traitor.2 Fearing for his life, he at once put himself under Russian protection and subsequently went to Astrakhan, where he lived as a pensioner of the Russian government until his death some twenty years later. Some months after the signature of the treaty, Peter sent Prince Boris Mescherski on a mission to Tahmâsp in order to obtain its ratification. This mission was completely unsuccessful, and attempts were made on Mescherski’s life on both his outward and homeward journeys in Persia. In the meanwhile, Peter had appointed Levashov as Governor of Gîlân without waiting for the treaty to be ratified. Subsequently, in 1724, Avramov went to see Tahmâsp in Ardabll in order to persuade him to ratify the treaty, but he was likewise unsuccessful.3 The attitude of the Persians in Gîlân became so threatening in consequence of the feeling aroused by the signature of the treaty that General Matyushkin was sent there with reinforcements after the capture of Baku. The Governor of Astärä, who had mustered some 20,000 men, using the forests as cover, harassed the Russians for some time, but Matyushkin’s forces eventually gained the mastery. Meanwhile, some of the Persian inhabitants of Baku had been plotting with Dä’üd Beg, the Governor of Shîrvân, to drive the Russians out. On an appointed day Dä’üd Beg, with a large number of his best troops, was to approach Baku ; the Qizilbäsh within the town would then rise, join forces with him and massacre the 1 This was not the only occasion on which Russia has taken advantage of Persia’s weakness to impose her will on that country. Modern times afford us a parallel. In 1946/47 the Soviet government used methods strangely reminiscent of those of Peter the Great to make the Persian government sign the PersoSoviet Oil Agreement. It is not without interest to note that Persia likewise repudiated this agreement. See Professor G. Lenczowski’s Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca, New York, 1949), pp. 296-300 and 309-12. 2 Soimonov, loc. cit. p. 360; Butkov, Materiali, vol. 1, p. 55; see also Basil Batatzes, IRpoucà, p. 52, • Butkov, vol. 1, p. 55.

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entire Russian garrison. Fortunately for the Russians, the plot was discovered in time for them to take effective counter-measures.1 Notwithstanding the troubled conditions prevailing in Gilän, many Armenians and Georgians had settled there. When General Aleksander Rumyanstev reached Constantinople with the ratified copy of the partition treaty with Turkey, he took the opportunity to inform the Porte that Peter had promised to allow Armenians and other Christians to settle in his new dominions, as it was his duty, as a Christian ruler, to afford them protection and grant them asylum. According to Butkov, Peter’s aim was to encourage Armenians to settle in Gïlân, promising that, if they went in sufficient numbers, he would have the Persian inhabitants sent elsewhere.2 Peter, no doubt, felt bound to take such action because he had been obliged to leave Persian Georgia and Armenia under Muslim rule. It may be regarded as certain that Peter intended to people his commercial centre at Salyän, on the Kura, with Christians from those countries. When Matyushkin had crushed the Persians in Gïlân, he began to build a fort at Salyan, a task which was com­ pleted by Shipov a year or two later. Some 5000 Tatars had been collected at Baku and Resht who were to be sent to Salyän to begin the construction of the town there, but at Easter time in 1725, the news came that Peter the Great had died. It was decided to await orders from St Petersburg before this work was begun, but these orders never came.3 Another project that came to nothing owing to Peter’s death was that of reviving British trade with Persia across Russia. Some months before his death, Peter requested an English merchant named Richard Mainwaring, who was on the point of leaving for England, to take the matter up with his colleagues in London. Jonas Hanway, after making this statement, said4 But this prince [Peter] did not foresee all the difficulties attending the undertaking, though he was sensible of many of them. His death, however, put an end to the inquiry at that time ; and the apprehensions 1 Gärber, “ Nachrichten ”,p.132; Wolf, “ Beschreibung der an der Caspischen See von Gilan bis Astrachan liegenden Provinzen mittheilen ”, in A. F. Büsching’s Magazin, vol. x, p. 467; Butkov, Materiali, vol. I, pp. 69-70. 2 Butkov, op. cit. p. 62. 8 Soimonov, “Tage-Buch”, p. 367. 4 Hanway’s Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea, vol. I, p. 13.

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the British merchants then conceived of the dangers which the trade would be exposed to, proved a hindrance to the attempt, till the year 1738, when an unexpected incident happened, which opened a new scene of commercial adventures.1

After Peter’s death, the great Russian ship still moved forward for a time, but it did so with ever-decreasing speed in proportion as the propelling impulse died away. Although Russia, as will be shown later, retained her hold on much of northern Persia for some years to come, she had lost her aggressive spirit, and was content to leave it to her rivals the Turks to take the initiative. 1 Hanway’s reference here is to the efforts made by that remarkable English­ man John Elton to revive this trade. The way to do so had been opened by the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 1734, in which provision was made for British merchants to send their goods in transit through Russia to Persia or vice versa on payment of a duty of 3 % ad valorem (see Hanway, vol. 1, pp. 47-8).

25°

CHAPTER XIX

THE TURKISH INVASION OF PERSIA Attention has already been drawn, in ch. xvii, to the conflict of views between the Sultan Ahmad III and his Grand Vizier Dämäd Ibrâhîm on the one hand and certain of the military and religious leaders and members of the general public on the other respecting the policy to be pursued in regard to Persia. It has been shown that although Dämäd Ibrâhîm was strongly in favour of maintaining peace with that country, his prudent counsels were eventually disregarded. What finally turned the scales in favour of war with Persia was the very strong feeling aroused in Turkey by the stories —which doubtless lost nothing in the telling—of the atrocities committed by the Shî‘ï fanatics on the Sunni inhabitants of the former country. As it was deemed desirable to obtain the sanction of the Mufti, the chief exponent of the religious law in Turkey, the government asked him to issue fatwäs or rulings in regard to the following three questions: First Question*. If, with the permission of the heretic (Tahmäsp) who claims the title of Shäh, some heretics fight against Muslims,1 is the peace of the Imâm of the Muslims, the Sultän of Sultäns, thereby violated ? To this question the Mufti replied: Yes, particularly as it is the duty of believers to exterminate these accursed ones, and as any peace with them must be regarded as nothing more than a truce, it is the duty of true believers to break it as soon as they have sufficient strength. Second Question : Are we to consider as an enemy country the realm ruled by the descendants of Shäh Ismä'll and inhabited by heretics, who curse the first three Caliphs and A‘isha the Chaste, calling the former apostates and the latter a fallen woman,1 2 interpret the verse of the 1 I.e. Sunnis. 2 A'isha was the favourite wife of the Prophet. No doubt some of the Persian Shfls had been casting aspersions upon her because of her hostility to ‘All. They probably referred to her accidental meeting with Çafwân ibn al-Mu‘aftal on the occasion when she, having left her necklace behind at a halting place, got down from her camel to retrieve it and was then left behind herself by the caravan. See Ibn Hisham’s recension of Ibn Isfräq’s Sîratu RasülVUah, ed. Wüstenfeld (Göttingen, 1859), vol. 11, p. 732.

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Qur'an according to their sophistical opinions, preach the killing of Sunnis and declare it to be just and lawful to co-habit with women who have been taken away by force ? The Mufti replied as follows to the second question : It is an enemy country and its inhabitants must be treated as apostates. Third Question : How then must action be taken against the heretics of this country (i.e. the Persian Shï‘Is) and those of its inhabitants who are by origin infidels (i.e. the Georgian and Armenian Christians) ? To this last question the Mufti answered : As regards the heretics, the men must be exterminated by the sword. The male children and the women are to be reduced to slavery and their property is to become the booty of the conqueror. The women and male children must be converted to Islam by other means than the sword, but it is not permissible to cohabit with these women before they have embraced Islam.1 As to the unbelievers, the women and male children are to be reduced to slavery and their property is to be given up to the conqueror. Their women and children are not to be forced to embrace Islam, but it is permissible to cohabit with the women, even when they do not wish to become Muslims.12 As von Hammer has rightly pointed out, this principle of Ottoman religious law was less favourable to a Shï‘ï woman than it was to a Christian one, since the latter was not to be forcibly converted. However, on the other hand, the Christian woman could be handed over legally to the first Muslim who claimed her.3 Having thus obtained religious sanction for the war and held a general council, the Turkish government gave orders for the invasion of Persia. Before describing the Turkish campaigns in north-western and western Persia, something must be said not only of Tahmäsp’s position, but also of the conditions prevailing in Georgia and Armenia at this critical juncture. Tahmäsp, after his flight from Qazvin late in 1722, set up his small court at Tabriz, in the mistaken belief that he would be safe from his enemies there. He had apparently forgotten, or had at 1 I.e. the Sunni form of Islam. 2 For the Turkish text, see Chelebî-zâda’s continuation of the Ta'ftkh-iRäshid, fols. lôb-iya. Copies of these questions and fatwäs were later sent to the Lezgis of Jar and Tala; see von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. rom. 3 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 93.

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any rate disregarded, the fact that his ancestor and namesake Shah Tahmâsp I had transferred his court from Tabriz to Qazvln in 955 a.h. (1548/9), because of the dangerous proximity of the former city to the Turkish frontier. Possibly, the long peace with Turkey had lulled Tahmâsp into a feeling of false security. Another matter that he did not take into account was that Tabriz had, in 1721, experienced such a severe earthquake that the walls had been almost entirely destroyed (it was said that no less than 80,000 of the inhabitants had perished on this occasion).1 As events were shortly to show, instead of going to Tabriz when the Afghans forced him to fly from Qazvln late in 1722, he would have been far better advised to go to Luristän and seek refuge there with his loyal supporter and capable military leader, ‘All Mardän Khän Fail!. Indeed, this was the step that he should have taken when he made his escape from Isfahân in June 1722.2 At the beginning of 1723, the outlook for Tahmâsp was certainly a gloomy one. The usurper Mahmüd was in possession of the throne and of the capital, together with the surrounding district, while Peter the Great had occupied Darband and part of Gïlân, and was shortly to seize Baku and extend his hold on the Caspian provinces. Worse was to come, for the Ottoman Turks were soon to begin their invasion of Persia. Tahmâsp had, it is true, troops of good quality as garrisons in Tabriz, Erivan and other large and important towns in the north­ west, but he still had no army of any size under his command to act as a strategic reserve or, indeed, to protect his own person. Situated as he was, he should have done his utmost to build up his military strength and to promote unity and good feeling in those parts of the country which were not as yet in the grip of rebels or invaders. However, as he had no judgment of his own and as he was surrounded by sycophants, intriguers and fools, he was, like his unfortunate father, almost always fated to take wrong decisions. Instead of endeavouring to placate Wakhtang, he antagonised him still further, and, when he was informed that Wakhtang had been in correspondence with Peter the Great, he listened to the specious arguments and promises of Constantine III (Muhammad Qull Khän) of Kakheti, who was then at his court. The result was that he dismissed Wakhtang from his posts and appointed his rival 1 Krusinski, p. 186.

2 See pp. 160 and 161 above.

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Constantine in his stead.1 It was not long before the unfortunate consequences of this action became manifest. Tahmäsp also behaved foolishly in regard to the Armenians— particularly the warlike inhabitants of Qapänät,2 a mountainous district to the north of Ordübäd. He exacted such large sums from these people that they revolted.3 After Constantine’s appointment as King of Kartli and Väli of Georgia, he set out from Tabriz to take up his duties. Wakhtang, who was determined not to submit tamely, attacked Constantine at Kazakh, a small town on the Aqstafa River 55 miles to the south-east of Tiflis. The action was indecisive, and Wakhtang, followed closely by Constantine and his men, returned to the capital. Through the treachery of the Qizilbäsh garrison, Constan­ tine succeeded in taking possession of the city, whereupon Wakhtang, feeling it useless to turn to the Russians4 or to Tahmäsp for aid, appealed in despair to the Turks. His appeal was favourably received in Constantinople (it happened to arrive there at a very opportune moment), and the Grand Vizier despatched Dervish Muhammad Äqä (who had been sent to Shamâkhî in the previous year to invest Dä’üd Beg with the insignia of office) with a message promising him prompt and effective assistance. Encouraged by the Turkish response to his appeal, Wakhtang, having gathered together reinforcements, attacked Tiflis in April 1723 and succeeded in driving Constantine out. Constantine, knowing of the feud between Wakhtang and the Lezgîs, thereupon appealed to the latter for help. Overjoyed at the prospect of settling old scores with the man whom they regarded as their arch-enemy, some 7000 Lezgis joined Constantine and marched with him to Tiflis, which they captured on 8 May 1723. Wakhtang 1 For the intrigues against Wakhtang at Tahmäsp’s court, see Sekhnia Chkheidze, H, de la G. vol. n, part 11, p. 37; Esai Hasan Jalaliantz, “Histoire d’Aghovanie” (in Brosset’s Collection d’Historiens Arméniens), p. 218; Gilanentz, sections 119-20, and Peyssonnel, Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et Géorgie, p. 63. 2 So called from the Armenian word ffwu^u/b (kapari), meaning “defile*’. 3 As we shall see later, there was already a movement in Persian Armenia for union with Russia. At first opposed to Safavï rule, the leaders of this movement transferred their opposition to the Turks when they invaded north-western Persia in 1723. 4 Peter wrote to Wakhtang on 16/27 February 1723, that he could not help him until he had made himself master of the whole Caspian coast, particularly Baku; see Brosset, H. de la G. vol. 11, part 1, p. 585.

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and his entourage escaped from their clutches, but the wild tribesmen sacked the city, causing great loss of life and damage.1 Wakhtang then renewed his appeal to the Turks, and on hearing that they were already on the march from Qârs to the Persian frontier, set out to meet them with his son Bakar and his brother Yésé. I. THE TURKISH CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH-WEST

The command of the Turkish forces that were to operate in Georgia was entrusted to Ibrâhîm Päshä, the Governor of Erzurum, who was an avaricious and corrupt man. Owing to the strife between Wakhtang and Constantine, Ibrâhîm Pâshâ met with no opposition when he crossed the frontier between the Turkish and Persian parts of Georgia. Not long afterwards, he met Wakhtang, Bakar and Yésé, whom he received kindly, and took them with him on his advance eastwards. Despite the fact that the Turks had promised him their aid, by which he had understood that they would help him to recover not only his capital, but also his former positions, Wakhtang soon discovered that Dervîsh Muhammad Âqâ was in communication with Constantine. Hoping that Peter, in spite of his avowal of inability to assist, might nevertheless help him to prevent Tiflis from falling into the hands of the Turks, Wakhtang sent off an urgent message to the Tsar, but it was already too late. When, on io June, the Turkish army halted under the walls of Tiflis, Constantine emerged from the gate and handed over the keys of the city to Ibrâhîm Pâshâ. In order further to ingratiate himself with the Turks and thereby to secure his reinstatement, he offered them a large sum of money and also promised to arrange for the surrender to them of the fortresses of Ganja and Erivan. Delighted at thus gaining so important an objective without fighting and with the prospect of similarly gaining possession of Ganja and Erivan, Ibrâhîm Pâshâ disregarded his previous undertaking to Wakhtang, and accepted Constantine’s offer. Realising that his appeal to Russia was useless, Wakhtang once more turned to the Turks, and offered Ibrâhîm an even larger 1 Wakhtang’s son, the historian Wakhusht, thus referred to this event : Hélas ! Combien de saintes femmes et de religieuses furent souillées par les méchants, combien de sang innocent coula sous les mains des infidèles en 411 (1723). See H. de la G. vol. n, part 1, p. 118.

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bribe than Constantine had done if he would secure his reinstate­ ment.1 This offer proved irresistible to the avaricious Ibrâhîm, who thereupon, at Bakar’s instigation, arrested Constantine and imprisoned him in the citadel. It was then Wakhtang’s turn to be disappointed, for Ibrâhîm Pâshâ made his reinstatement conditional on his embracing Islam again. It is much to Wakhtang’s credit that he refused to accept the throne of Kartli on such conditions. Ibrâhîm Päshä then offered the throne to Bakar, who, being less burdened with religious scruples, accepted it, turned Muslim and took the title of Ibrahim Päshä. Yésé likewise became a Sunni,1 2 and was called Mustafä Päshä by the Turks. By his constant exactions and extortions, Ibrähim Päshä soon made himself detested by the people of Tiflis and the surrounding country, who began to look back with regret on the Persian regime. It was not long before Bakar also became profoundly dissatisfied with his position, which he found to be merely nominal, as Ibrähim Päshä kept all the real power in his own hands. Consequently, when Constantine appealed to Bakar to help him to escape from prison, Bakar made the necessary arrangements for him to do so.3 Shortly afterwards, Bakar left the city on the pretext of going on a hunting expedition. He and his followers then took to the forests and began making guerrilla attacks on the Turks; in so doing, they were joined by Constantine who thenceforward showed himself to be an implacable foe of Turkey. In the fighting that ensued, Bakar proved less successful than his new ally Constantine, for he was heavily defeated and had to escape to Russia through Ossetia.4 Constantine, although also defeated, made his escape and continued to harass the Turks for a number of years. Realising that he could expect nothing from Turkey, Wakhtang 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 96. The Georgian historians naturally make no mention of this bribery. 2 Although Yésé had been for long a fervent Shï‘î, he had reverted to Christianity during a term of imprisonment. See Wakhusht, loc. cit. p. 124. 8 The window of Constantine’s cell in the citadel overlooked the Kura. According to Gilanentz, section cxxxn, he let himself down by a rope and escaped in a boat which had, at Bakar’s orders, been moored below. See also Wakhusht, loc, cit, p. 123. 4 Sekhnia Chkheidze, loc. cit. p. 39. Brosset, Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la Géorgie, p. 213. It is noteworthy that Yésé not only remained faithful to his new religion, but actively assisted the Turks in their operations against Bakar. He remained a Sunni until his death in Tiflis in 1727.

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also made his escape from Tiflis, without attempting to attack the Turkish forces. Instead, he accepted an invitation from Peter the Great to take refuge in his dominions, and, in company with some 1400 followers who included some members of his own family and many ecclesiastical and other dignitaries, he arrived in Russia in August 1724.1 Except for serving with the Russian forces in Gilän from 1726 to 1728, he remained in Russia until his death there in 1737. Thus passed, sad and frustrated, from the Persian scene the one man, who, if he had been treated with tact and understanding, could certainly have saved the Safavi dynasty from its fate. Although his relations with Peter the Great amounted to treason against his lawful sovereign, Shäh Sultän Husain, it must be borne in mind that he had ample cause to revile and contemn him and his ministers. If we can believe Wakhtang’s son Wakhusht,1 2 his motive in deciding to throw in his lot with Peter was entirely religious. Despite the fact that he had, like so many of his line, found it expedient to apostatise in order to gain his crown and his viceregal status, he was always at heart a Christian, and he soon reverted to that faith. The fanatical development of Shfism in Persia under Shäh Sultän Husain must have filled him with disgust, and made him realise that he had nothing to hope for from Isfahän. Furthermore, it is possible that, when he was treated with such contumely and arrogance by the Persian court, he may well, in his bitterness of heart, have recalled the memories of the brutal behaviour of Shäh Sultän Husain’s ancestor, Shäh ‘Abbäs I, in Georgia just a century earlier. What was most unfortunate for Wakhtang was that, having “burnt his boats” in so far as Persia was concerned, he found that Peter was unable to carry out his plans in their entirety, and so rendered his (Wakhtang’s) position in Georgia an impossible one. As for his overtures to Turkey, these were merely due to despair, and he speedily regretted ever having made them. 1 Wakhusht, loc. cit. pp. 124-5; see also Evgeny (Metropolitan of Kiev), Georgient oder historisches Gemälde von Grusien (F. Schmidt’s German trans­ lation, Riga, 1804), p. 57. Amongst those who accompanied Wakhtang to Russia was Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani, his maternal uncle and former tutor. See Dr D. M. Lang, ‘“Wisdom and Lies’: Variations on A Georgian Literary Theme”, BSOAS (1956), vol. xvm, pt. 3, p. 437* 2 H. de la G. vol. 11, pt. 1, p. 118.

17

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LSD

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It is very probable that, had fate been kinder, Wakhtang, with his excellent qualities and engaging disposition, would have done much for his own people as well as for Persia. After Wakhtang’s death, his followers were given the option of remaining in Russia or of returning to Georgia (which by then had been recovered by Persia), but only a few elected to go back. The migration of so many of her intelligentsia to Russia was a most serious loss to Georgia.1 Meanwhile, after a period of complete inactivity in Tiflis, Ibrâhîm Pâshâ, having joined forces with Mustafa Päshä of Qärs, and Ishäq Pâshâ of Childir, had marched against the town of Ganja. Whilst the Turks were endeavouring to force their way through the defences, a rumour was spread that Constantine of Kakheti and his men had seized their camp. This rumour, which turned out to be false, threw the Turkish soldiery into such confusion that the Persian defenders routed them, capturing all their artillery and baggage. Although the Turks rallied on the following day and recaptured their cannon, they did not carry on the siege with their accustomed vigour, and Mustafâ Pâshâ wasted valuable time in futile negotiations with the local Armenians and with the Persian commander. Meanwhile, the Turkish government, having received very unfavourable reports of Ibrâhîm Pâshâ’s conduct at Tiflis, had dismissed him and appointed in his stead ‘Arif Ahmad Pâshâ, of Raqqa, who was a favourite of Dämäd Ibrâhîm. When a report (which was also found to be false) was received in the Turkish camp that the new Sar‘askar had appointed Constantine Governor of Ganja, Mustafâ Pâshâ and his colleagues raised the siege and returned to Tiflis. It says much for the reputation that Constantine had acquired as a fighter that these reports should have so affected the Turks. Except in the west of Persia, where the aged Hasan Pâshâ took Kirmânshâh and began preparations for the capture of Hamadân,2 there was little further Turkish military activity in Persia until the opening of the campaigning season in 1724. Notwithstanding the fact that hostilities had been in progress for some time, the Turkish government, as we have already seen,3 allowed Tahmäsp’s envoy Murtadâ Qulï Beg to go to Constanti1 Dr D. M. Lang very kindly drew my attention to this point. 2 See pp. 268 and 269 below. 8 See p. 226 above.

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nople in October 1723 and be received by the Grand Vizier. Nothing, however, came of this mission, as the envoy was unable to agree to the Turks’ demands, namely, that Tahmäsp must cede to them all the provinces that they claimed in return for their military assistance against the Afghans. In 1724 the two main Turkish objectives in north-west Persia were the highly important cities of Tabriz and Erivan; of these, the latter was the stronger, as the fortifications of Tabriz had suffered so severely in the great earthquake of 1721. Both cities were garrisoned by troops of good quality. Tahmäsp had left Tabriz for Ardabil in July 1723, when the Turkish menace was assuming dangerous proportions.1 This move was, perhaps, a wise one. Although, if he had remained in Adharbaijän, he might have succeeded in encouraging certain sections of the population, which were hostile to the Turks, to oppose them, he was as devoid of military ability as he was of statesmanship, and it is very doubtful whether he could have held together these very heterogeneous elements and maintained himself for any length of time in the field against so powerful and well-organised an enemy. If he had fallen into the hands of the Turks, it would naturally have been disastrous for his cause. Nevertheless, although Tahmäsp left the north-western parts of his country to their fate, the behaviour of the invading Turkish armies to the inhabitants was so brutal that the Georgian and Armenian Christians joined with Shî'ï Muslims in attacking them. Constantine of Kakheti had already been conducting a guerrilla campaign against the Turks for some little time, and his example was soon followed by a number of Armenian leaders, of whom the bravest and most outstanding were David Beg in the district of Qapän1 2 1 Gilanentz, section cxxm. According to Leo, History of Armenia (Erivan, 1946), vol. in, p. 645, Tahmäsp did not leave Adharbaijän until the siege of Erivan was in progress. He then set out eastwards from Tabriz, taking his whole force of 6000 men for his own protection, thus leaving Adharbaijän to its fate. As regards the approximate date of Tahmäsp's departure from Tabriz, Gilanentz seems more likely to be correct. 2 For his exploits, see Stepanos Shahumian, Histoire choisie de Davith-Beg, des Combats des Arméniens de Khapan contre les Turks, ayant eu lieu de notre temps.. .(translated into French by M. F. Brosset and included by him in his Collection d'Historiens Arméniens, vol. n, pp. 221-56; see also James Issaverdens, Armenia and the Armenians (Venice, 1878), pp. 385-91.

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and Avan Yüzbâshï1 in the mountainous area to the south­ west of Shusha in the province of Qaräbägh. For his part in resisting the Turks, Avan received the title of Khan from Tahmäsp, but he, like many other Armenians, looked to Russia rather than to Persia for deliverance; in fact, as already indicated, there had been since the beginning of the century a movement in Armenia for union with Russia. Neither David Beg nor Avan was strong enough to withstand the Turks in open warfare, so, following the example of Constan­ tine, they adopted harassing tactics. Avan was one of those Armenian leaders who were responsible for establishing the strongholds known as sighnakhs2 in almost inaccessible mountain country. It is significant that certain of the Shî‘ï people of Adharbaijän in Rajab 1136 (26 March to 24 April 1724) signed jointly with the representatives of the Christian inhabitants of Ganja, Qaräbägh and Adharbaijän a document which they sent to Peter the Great pledging themselves to resist the Turks.3 Evidently by this time even the Persian Shï‘ï in the north-west had given up hope of receiving any adequate measure of help from Tahmäsp. In June 1724 ‘Ärif Ahmad Päshä set out from Qärs with 35,000 men and adequate artillery to attack Erivan. In order to strike terror into the inhabitants of the province, they behaved with great brutality on the march, enslaving thousands of people, including many Armenians.4 ‘Ärif Ahmad Päshä’s forces began the siege of Erivan with a 1 The name Avan is said to be a diminutive of Hovannes in the Qaräbägh dialect of Armenian (I am indebted to Dr C. O. Minasian for this information). 2 The word sighnakh, meaning “shelter” or “place of refuge”, is of Turkish origin. In Ottoman Turkish it takes the form of sigtnak, from sigvnmak, “to take shelter”. There is a town named Signakh in Kakheti, on the main road from Tiflis to Byelokani and Zakatali, and there are other places of the same name in Qaräbägh. There was formerly a town called Sü(gh)näkh in Kashgaria, as we learn from the ffudüd al-Älam, pp. 119 and 358. 3 There were 115 signatories. See Arutunian, “Borba Armyanskogo i Azerbaidzhanskogo Narodov”, pp. 124-5. There was also an agreement between the Armenians and the people of Adharbaijän for mutual assistance, because Arutunian, in the excellent bibliography in his Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniya Armyanskogo Naroda, p. 291, refers to a work in Armenian by A. Abrahamian to which he has given the Russian title “ Dogovor’i 1724 goda o vzaimopomoshchi mezhdu Armiyanami i Azerbaidzhantsami ” ; he states that it is to be found in Izvestiya AN Arm. SSR, 1951, no. 12. 4 For the sufferings of the Armenians, see Arutunian, “Borba”, p. 133.

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vigorous bombardment of the walls and bastions. In addition, mining operations were carried out under the direction of a Spanish engineer named Cardozo.1 After several breaches in the defences had been made by these means, the Turks attacked with great gallantry, but were hurled back time after time by the equally courageous defenders. So many Turks perished in these vain assaults that ‘Ärif Ahmad Päshä had to ask for a truce to enable him to bury his dead. At this critical stage of the siege, the drooping spirits of the Turks were raised by the arrival of reinforcements under the Päshä of Kütahya, with the result that they made a further assault of a most determined nature on 6 September. Once again, however, it ended in failure, and, aghast at their losses, some of the Turkish troops mutinied. ‘Arif Ahmad Päshä, however, had positive orders from the Sultan to take Erivan at any price. Fortunately for him, two events occurred at this juncture to revive the ardour of his men. The first was the opportune arrival of further reinforcements, while the second was the news of the capture of Nakhichivän and Ordübäd by another Turkish army under Abdullah Köprülü Päshä, of Vän.2 Meanwhile, supplies of foodstuffs and munitions were running short in the city, and there were no signs of the appearance of any relieving force.3 For these cogent reasons, the Persian commander entered into negotiations with the Turks, with the result that he surrendered the town on 9 Muharram 1137 (28 September 1724), but he and the survivors of the garrison were allowed to march out with the honours of war.4 The capture of Erivan was a major success for the Turks, but it had been dearly bought, since over 20,000 of their men had fallen during the siege, while many more had died of disease. On the Persian side, the losses were even heavier. The fall of Erivan became known in Constantinople on 19 October, a month after the news of the capture of Hamadän6 had been received. These tidings aroused much enthusiasm and 1 Stanyan, 30 August/10 September, SP 97, vol. xxv. 2 See p. 263 below. 3 Constantine of Kakheti had gathered an army for the relief of Erivan, but he was defeated by Rajab Päshä, the Governor of Tiflis, before he could get near the besieged city. 4 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 128. 5 See p. 271 below.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

there were great public rejoicings.1 The spirits of the Turks were raised still further when it was learnt that Constantine of Kakheti had been defeated again. The news of these events had naturally the opposite effect in Persia, but the morale of the people of the north-west was by no means broken. As another Turkish army had, in the summer of 1724, been sent against Tabriz, it seemed that, by the end of the campaigning season that year, the Turks would have conquered practically all the territory that had been assigned to them by the Russo-Persian partition treaty. They, however, were not destined to have matters entirely their own way, since Constantine, although defeated, had escaped capture and was to prove a thorn in their side for some time to come, as were also such Armenian leaders as David Beg and Avan Yüzbâshî. More serious from the Turkish point of view was the costly failure of their first attempt to take Tabriz. This city was an objective of equal, if not greater, importance than Erivan, and the task of taking it was entrusted to ‘Abdullah Köprülü Päshä, of Van. Crossing the frontier in the spring of 1724, he laid siege to Khoi, a town 80 miles to the west-north-west of Tabriz. The garrison resisted so strongly that the town did not fall until 12 May, when the 3000 survivors, including their gallant commander Shähbäz Khän, were all put to the sword. The Persian losses are said to have amounted to 8000 men in all.1 2 Deeming that his forces were not sufficiently strong to take Tabriz, ‘Abdullah Köprülü waited until reinforcements reached him at the beginning of August before he resumed his eastward advance. Shortly before he set out from Khoi, he detailed a force consisting mainly of Kurds to subdue the district of Nakhichivän. This force successfully carried out its task.3 1 See Chirac’s account (he was in Constantinople at the time), in his second volume, pp. 179-80. 2 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 102 ; Stanyan, 29 May/9 June 1724, SP 97, vol. xxv. 3 Chirac, vol. 1, pp. 160-1, on the authority of Joseph Apisalaimian, makes the surprising statements, first, that ‘Abdullah Köprülü took this action after receiving a deputation of Armenians from Nakhichivän asking him to undertake the conquest of their district, and secondly, that when the Turks and their Kurdish auxiliaries arrived, the Armenians of Nakhichivän and Ordübäd co-operated with them in overcoming such Persian opposition as there was. In view of the hostile attitude of the Armenians to the Turks in other parts of the country, one must regard these statements as being improbable.

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With an army consisting of some 25,000 men, ‘Abdullah Köprülü, instead of following the more direct route to Tabriz through Marand, took the more southerly road through Tasüj, a village four miles to the north of the shore of Lake Urmia. Here an engagement took place between the Turkish advance guard and a force which had been sent from Tabriz to block its passage; in this battle, the Turks were victorious. ‘Abdullah Köprülü then continued his advance through the small town of Shabistar1 to the outskirts of Tabriz; at the same time, a Turkish detachment occupied the town of Marand. After repulsing a further Persian attempt to bar his progress, ‘Abdullah Köprülü took up his position just to the north of the city, on the spot where, 210 years before, Sultän Salim had pitched his camp previous to his successful attack on it. Since, owing to the earthquake, there was so little left of the fortifications, the Persian defenders, under Mustafä Khän, made special efforts to entrench themselves strongly, particularly round Ghäzän Khän’s mausoleum in the western suburb of Shanb (or Shäm). ‘Abdullah Köprülü began the siege by making an attack in great strength. His men forced their way through the ranks of the defenders into one of the quarters of the city, but they were then counter-attacked with such fury that 4000 were cut off and killed to a man, while the remainder broke and fled back to their camp. Although the Persians later made a sortie and unsuccessfully endeavoured to intercept a body of Turkish reinforcements, ‘Abdullah Köprülü did not feel strong enough to make another assault. In fact, so weakened was he by his losses in the first action that, on hearing that the defenders were about to make a night attack, he quietly withdrew his forces as soon as darkness fell, leaving their tents standing with lights burning as though they were still occupied. When, some hours later, the Persians made their sortie, they found no one there to oppose them. Thus the first Turkish attempt on Tabriz ended in ignominious failure.2 1 Shabistar was the birthplace of the well-known mystic Shaikh Sa‘d al-Din Mahmüd Shabistar!, the author of the Gulshän-i-Räz. 2 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, pp. 130-1 ; Chirac, vol. 11, pp. 162-3. Du Cerceau, in his recension of Krusiriski’s book, wrongly ascribed this failure as being due to Tahmäsp’s generalship. According to him (p. 285), Tahmâsp, having collected a large force consisting partly of the Armenians of Qapän, himself

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After his raising of the siege of Tabriz (which occurred on 30 September 1724), ‘Abdullah Köprülü retired to the neighbour­ hood of Tasuj, where his men went into winter quarters. According to information furnished by Joseph Apisalaimian, the Turks behaved so cruelly to the people of these parts that the Tabrizïs rushed out from their city, took the enemy by surprise and drove them back as far as Khoi;1 this, however, is not corroborated by other sources, and must be regarded as an exaggeration. However that may be, the exploit of the people of Tabriz was a most remarkable one. Stanyan, in reporting the Turkish failure there to London, very rightly remarked

It is observable that the Persians, who made but little resistance either against Mirveis’s Army or the Muscovites, defend themselves against the Turks with the utmost Fury and Obstinacy, which is attributable to the Indignation they have conceived against them for entering into Measures with a Christian Prince for dividing a Mahometan Kingdom.2

The striking morale of the Persians when they were pitted against the Turks is attributable to a number of other causes besides the one mentioned by Abraham Stanyan. In the first place, they were enraged by the Turks’ barbarous behaviour to the inhabitants of the districts through which their armies passed. Secondly, there was doubtless a rekindling not only of religious animosity, but also of the antipathy dating from the time of Shäh Ismä‘11. Furthermore, it is not too fanciful to suppose that the descendants of his doughty warriors in the north-west had inherited in no small measure the grim fighting spirit which he had so assiduously instilled some two centuries earlier. Lastly, there was the fact that, however much the Persian army had degenerated under the later Safavi sovereigns, some effort had nevertheless been made to maintain efficient forces along the Turkish frontier. When the campaigning season opened in the spring of 1725, ‘Abdullah Köprülü was determined to leave nothing to chance. marched to the relief of Tabriz, and, in a great battle, put the Turks to flight with the loss of 20,000 men. So far as is known, Tahmâsp remained in Ardabil all this time. It is true, however, that he did collect troops for the relief of Tabriz, but this force was diverted to meet a threatened attack by the Afghans; in this connection, see Mitford’s version of Krusinski, pp. 155-6. 1 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 164; see also Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. 11, p. 23. 8 Despatch dated 14/25 November 1724, SP 97, vol. xxv.

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Before he could launch his second attack on Tabriz, his forces had to reoccupy both Marand and Shabistar. More important still, it was essential to capture the strong fortress of Diza, which was situated on the outskirts of the town of Zunüz, miles to the north of Marand. Lying so close to the Turkish lines of communi­ cations, it constituted a serious danger to the Turks so long as it remained in Persian hands. A strong force of Janissaries was detailed to reduce this stronghold, which they succeeded in doing on 23 May 1725. Having been reinforced by 11,000 Tatars, ‘Abdullah Köprülü left Tasüj in mid-July with an army numbering some 70,000 men;1 this formidable host reached the environs of Tabriz twelve days later. Taking note of the Prophet’s saying “God blesses the Saturday and the Thursday”,1 2 the Turks began their second siege of the city on Saturday 17 Dhu’l-Qa‘da 1137 (28 July 1725). The struggle that ensued was short, but bloody. The Turkish troops soon penetrated the Persian lines, but they then encountered the most obstinate resistance in the narrow streets and lanes of the city. For four days desperate hand-to-hand fighting went on, in the course of which both sides suffered severely, particularly the Persians. The fighting ceased after ‘Abdullah Päshä had issued a proclamation promising to allow the Persian garrison to retire with the honours of war and to take with them their families and belongings. In the words of Shaikh Muhammad ‘All Hazin: About 5000 persons,3 who were all that survived of an innumerable population, with their swords in one hand, and the trembling hands of their consorts grasped in the other, marched out from the town through the midst of the Turkish army. Such undaunted bravery has seldom been witnessed in the ordinary inhabitants of any city, since time has been.4

With the fall, on 1 August 1725, of Tabriz, the chief bastion in the defences of Adharbaijän, the Turks had little difficulty in 1 For details of the composition of the Turkish army, see Chelebî-zâda, fols, ôçb-yoa. 2 A traditional saying quoted by Chelebï-zâda, fol. 70 b. 3 According to Turkish sources, the number of persons who thus left Tabriz was 20,000, which seems a more probable figure. 4 Ahwäl) pp. 166-7.

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overrunning the rest of the province. Ganja, which had success­ fully withstood the half-hearted onslaught of Mustafä Päshä and Ibrahim Päshä two years before, fell at the end of August after a siege lasting only two days. Thus it was not long before the Turkish forces reached the boundary defined by the partition treaty of 1724. As Russia’s enthusiasm for conquest in Persia had cooled off since the death of Peter the Great, the Turks pushed on across this boundary into the area that had been reserved for Tahmâsp, and occupied the town of Ardabil, from which that unfortunate prince had had to retreat hurriedly to Qazvin and Tehran.1 In order to excuse their action, the Turks speciously explained that they had temporarily occupied Ardabil in order to prevent it from falling into rebel hands. By the late summer of 1725 the Turks were in occupation of all Georgia, Armenia, Adharbaijän and Shirvàn, except for the comparatively small portion of the two last-mentioned provinces which were in Russian hands and the mountainous areas that were held partly by Constantine and partly by Armenian patriotic leaders and others who were hostile to Turkey. It is not surprising that Turkey’s action in going beyond the limits imposed by the 1724 treaty should have aroused some protest by Russia, although the Turks had in no instance en­ croached on her portion of the seized territory (except for some isolated raiding by Choläq Surkhai Khän, the Lezgî leader).12 The Turks had not been slow to notice the change in Russia’s attitude after Peter’s death, and they began to taunt her with her luke­ warmness over Persia. The success achieved by the Turkish forces in Persia affected Turkey’s relations with Russia in another way. For some little time the Turkish government had been thinking of denouncing the partition treaty, and it was partly for this reason that it refused for so long to delimit the frontier as had been agreed in that instrument.3 It will be recalled that on Rumyantsev’s arrival in Constantinople with the ratified copy of the treaty, he had asked for a Turkish commissioner to be appointed without delay for undertaking in conjunction with him the task of delimitation, but 1 TN, p. 12; Butkov, Materiali, vol. 1, p. 84. For Tahmâsp’s subsequent adventures, see ch. xx. 2 See p. 357 below. 8 See p. 234 above.

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the Turks had refused to be hurried,1 and they were now less inclined than ever to perform this task. Although generally successful in their military operations, the Turks were faced with a serious situation in Shirvän, the first part of Persia to be occupied by them. When they appointed Dä’üd Beg Governor of their portion of Shirvän, Choläq Surkhai Khän was bitterly disappointed, as he considered that he was far better fitted to be Governor than his former ally. The consequence was that Surkhai and his followers rose in revolt against the Turks, and killed no less than 500 of them in an engagement. He became so strong that the Turks were compelled to make terms with him, making him a “Päshä of two tails”, and giving him an allowance equivalent to 3000 roubles per annum and the district of Kabardä to rule over.12 Although thus placated by the Turks, Surkhai’s feud with Dä’üd Beg still continued. As Dä’üd Beg refused to desist from attacking him, the Turks eventually, in May 1728, dismissed him from his post and appointed Surkhai in his place.3 Surkhai and his men thenceforward proved faithful allies of the Turks, and even carried out raids into the Russian-held territory bordering on the Caspian Sea.4 2. THE TURKISH CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN PERSIA

When the Turkish government, early in 1723, declared war on Persia, the command of the army that was to invade it from the west was given to Hasan Päshä, the Governor of the Päshäliq of Baghdäd. He had been appointed to that post in 1704 and had proved to be a most successful administrator, as well as a capable general (he had to put down a series of tribal revolts, some of which, such as those by the Muntafiq Arabs and the Bilbäs Kurds, had been of a dangerous nature).5 Practically from the time of his appointment, he had looked with an unfriendly and suspicious eye on Safavi Persia, no doubt 1 See p. 237 above. 2 Butkov, Material^ vol. 1, p. 88. 8 Ibid. p. 89. 4 Ibid. It is noteworthy that Russia too had her problems, as the Shamkhäl *Ädil Giray rebelled in 1725 and had to be subdued and exiled; see p. 356 below. 5 For a sound analysis of Hasan Pasha’s career and achievements, see Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modem Iraqt pp. 123--8.

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because he, being a pious Sunni, felt outraged by the religious campaign in that country which owed its inception to the fanatical mujtahid, Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisi. It must therefore have been with satisfaction that Hasan Päshä, having gathered his forces together, set out for the Persian frontier, which he crossed near Khänaqin. He had already been in touch for some time with Husain ‘Ali Beg, the Deputy Governor of Kirmânshâh, who consequently submitted to him without offering any resistance.1 Hasan Päshä had also established relations with ‘Alï Qulï Khän, the Governor of Ardalän. Although ‘Alï Qulï Khän was soon replaced by ‘Abbäs Qulï Khän,2 the son of Muhammad Khän,3 the latter submitted to the Turks, who appointed Khäna Päshä Bäbän, the son of Sulaimän Päshä,4 in his stead. Preparations were now complete for the reduction of the important city of Hamadän, but Hasan Päshä was not destined to be its conqueror, as death claimed him during the winter of 1723/4. The command and also the Baghdäd Päshäliq passed to his able son Ahmad.5 With an imposing force,6 Ahmad Päshä arrived before the walls of Hamadän on 7 Shawwäl 1136 (29 June 1724). The town had at that time very strong fortifications, consisting of a deep moat or ditch behind which was a double wall, strengthened with bastions and towers at intervals. There were, moreover, two citadels: one on the hill known as the Musallä, on the east side of the town,7 and the other, the Qal‘a-yi-Kuhna,8 on the south-west. 1 Mirza Muhammad Rida Tabriz! and ‘Abd al-Karim, “ Zainat al-Tawärikh ”, BM MS. Add. 25515, fol. 696a. 2 ‘Ali Qulï Khan was dismissed in consequence of a palace intrigue; see Muhammad Sharif ibn Mustafa Shaikh al-Islâm, “Zubdat al-Tawârïkh-iSinandiji”, Browne MS. G. 18 (9), Cambridge University Library, fol. 204a. 3 ‘Abbäs Qulï Khän had previously been Governor of Ardalän, but had been dismissed by Shäh Sultän Husain, who had appointed ‘Alï Qulï Khän in his place ; see B. Nikitine, “ Les Valis d’Ardelan ”, in the Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. XLix (March, 1922), p. 86. 4 Zubdat al-Tawärlkh-i-Sinandijl, fol. 204 b. For the genealogy of the Bäbän family, see Longrigg, op. cit. p. 348. 6 Ahmad Päshä was then aged 39; for his early life, see Longrigg, op. cit. p. 127. • For details, see Chelebï-zâda, fols. 45 a-45 b. 7 This citadel was demolished by Äghä Muhammad Shäh, but a few traces of it still remain. 8 The enclosure is now occupied by a secondary school, a grain silo and a prison.

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Besides entrenching themselves strongly round the city, the Turks built a strong rampart of faggots opposite the highest of the bastions. The Persians thereupon made a sortie and endeavoured to capture this rampart, but they were driven back with the loss of 5000 men. Nothing daunted, they attacked again, but were once more repulsed. Meanwhile, the Turkish engineers, under the direction of a German renegade, had exploded a number of mines under the outer wall of the city. The Turkish troops then forced their way through the breaches thus made and took up their position in the space between the inner and outer walls. In order to protect themselves from the fire of the defenders, they erected a wooden shield or canopy over their heads. The Persians repeatedly endeavoured to set this canopy on fire by throwing on to it pieces of rag that they had steeped in oil and then ignited,1 but the Turks, by means of hooks, removed the pieces of burning cloth before they could set the canopy alight. The Persian defenders were gravely handicapped through their total lack of artillery. In order to remedy this defect, they asked Fr Jean Joseph, a French Carmelite, who had been for a number of years resident in Hamadan, to cast a bronze cannon for them. He tried to refuse, saying that he had no knowledge of such matters, but they insisted and even threatened to ill-treat him. Another Carmelite, Fr Leandro di Santa Cecilia, has thus described what ensued: So he had a great bar of iron made, wrapped it up well in paper and, having made a mould from beaten clay, fitted the bar inside it; then, having got the molten metal ready, he had it poured inside. From the exterior the cannon seemed very well made, but they could never extract the bar from the inside, although they worked on it for days : and, then, the paper catching fire, the metal became joined to the iron, so that it could never be extracted. If this operation had succeeded, perhaps the Turks would not have taken the town, seeing that, when about that time there was fired against them a single shot of grape from a wooden 1 This was by no means the first time that the Persians had used burning oil in warfare. The troops of Shäpür II, when fighting against the Romans under Julian the Apostate, fired at their foes arrows that they had steeped in “ Median oil” (oleum Medicum) and then ignited immediately before discharging them. See Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, book xiii, and B. Brissonius, De Regio Persarum principatu (Paris, 1599), pp. 431 -2.

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cannon, which was well hooped with iron but burst into a hundred pieces, it caused the whole Turkish army to retire a distance of more than an hour from the walls... J When we reflect upon the large number of cannon in the hands of the Turks and their great numerical superiority, we cannot help doubting whether the Friar’s cannon would have turned the scales in the Persians’ favour if it could have been made to fire. However that may be, the siege went on, both sides fighting with great courage. Tahmäsp, hearing of the investment of Hamadän, sent a force under one of his generals12 to its relief, but it was defeated and put to flight. Although this general was not to blame for his lack of success on this occasion, Tahmäsp afterwards treated him with such contumely that he and 400 of his men deserted to Mahmüd. By means of the mining operations of the German engineer, a large breach was eventually made in the inner wall of the town through which the Turkish troops poured. Desperate hand-tohand fighting then ensued in the streets, and in particular on the slopes of the Musallä hill.3 Though they contested every yard with the utmost valour, the Persians were gradually forced back, and a terrible slaughter ensued. Finally, Ahmad Päshä mercifully opened one of the gates, giving orders for the fighting and the looting to cease and any Persians who wished to be allowed to leave the city. Thus, on 1 September 1724, the Turks made themselves masters of the most important town in western Persia. The casualties on both sides were very heavy, particularly on that of the Persians; in the words of Shaikh Muhammad ‘All Hazïn: “The number of the (Persian) slain is known only to the great master of secrets; for to guess even the number of noble lords, and eminent men, and grandees, who at that time lost their lives, would be difficult; how much more so that of the common people?”4 1 Persia ovvero Secondo Viaggio.. .delVOriente (Rome, 1757), vol. 11, pp. 25-6. The above quotation is from the English translation of this passage in A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia^ vol. 1, p. 579. 2 Krusinski, p. 286, gave this general’s name as Flagella Khan, which may be a corruption of Farajullah Khan. I have been unable to find any confirmation in Persian sources of this attempt to relieve Hamadän. 8 Chelebï-zâda, fols. 4Ôb~47a; von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 124. * Ahwält p. 151.

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As for Fr Jean Joseph, he had hidden in the cellar of a house during the later stages of the siege. On emerging from his refuge after the fall of the city, he was made captive by a Turk, but was then ransomed by a Catholic who gave his horse in exchange for him. Ahmad Päshä, on being informed of the matter, ordered all his belongings to be restored to him and allowed him to resume possession of his house and church.1 The news of the capture of Hamadän reached Constantinople three weeks later and was naturally greeted with great popular acclamation.12 The Sultan, in token of his satisfaction, sent Ahmad Päshä an autograph letter, praising his services and his successful conduct of the siege. Turkey was thus in possession of Hamadän, but the boundary line imposed by the 1724 partition treaty passed immediately to the east of it before changing its alignment to Kirmänshäh, thus cutting the province in two. Ahmad Päshä, however, paid no heed to this arbitrary restriction on his movements; having appointed Qarä Mustafä Päshä, of Shahrizur, Governor of Hamadän, he sent out an army under Ibrähim Päshä and Khäna Päshä Bäbän to bring the Dargazîn district and other parts of the eastern half of the province under his sway. In this and also in subsequent operations, the Turks met with some opposition, but, as usual, it was not co-ordinated and therefore was much less effective than it would otherwise have been. To the south of Hamadän, the Turks took the town of Nihävand and by degrees obtained control over the whole province. They were, however, harassed for a time by Subhän Verdi Khän, the son of Abu’l-Qäsim Khän, a former Governor of Hamadän, who, like Constantine of Kakheti, adopted guerrilla tactics. Eventually the Turks tricked Subhän Verdi Khän into submission and then put him to death. In August 1724 a small Persian force under the command of Latif Mïrzâ, who was the son of one of Shäh Sultän Husain’s sisters, was advancing on the town of Hamadän. Latif Mïrzâ, like Ismâ‘ïl Beg, was a great believer in astrology, and he had implicit 1 A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 1, p. 579. 2 Chelebï-zâda, fol. 47 a. Clairac stated (vol. 11, p. 16711.) that the capture of Hamadän was announced in Constantinople by the firing of cannon on 22 September 1724.

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faith in his astrologers when they said that the stars were favourable for his entry into Hamadan. He accordingly led his scanty force to the attack, but it was easily defeated and dispersed, leaving him a prisoner in the hands of the Turks. He then entered Hamadan as had, indeed, been predicted, but not at all in the manner which he had been led to expect.1 In the following year Ahmad Päshä detailed a force to occupy the province of Luristän, despite the fact that no part of it had been assigned to Turkey by the partition treaty. ‘Ali Mardän Khän, the Persian commander there, was, as we have seen, a brave and patriotic man, but he was enough of a realist to appreciate that with no more than 15,000 men at his disposal he could not hope to withstand so powerful a foe. He therefore prudently withdrew with his men to a remote part of the province and later to ‘Arabistän.2 In this way the town of Khurramäbäd fell into the hands of the Turks without bloodshed. Burüjird, which was also occupied, subsequently revolted, and had to be occupied afresh.3 Another Turkish army, under the command of the Governor of Mosul, traversed the wild Bakhtiârï country and emerged on to the central plateau only a few days’ march from Isfahän. There they met, but did not clash with, a force of Ghalzai Afghans who informed them that the Lurs had risen in their rear and had joined with dissident Arabs in an invasion of Mesopotamia. The Turks thereupon recrossed the Zagros mountains and returned to Hamadän, having suffered heavily from the harassing tactics of the Bakhtiârîs en route. By this time the situation in Mesopotamia had grown so serious that Ahmad Päshä was obliged to leave Persia so as to restore order there. Despite the unfruitful Bakhtiârï expedition, Turkey had not only conquered all the provinces in the west that she had been assigned by the 1724 treaty, but had gone far beyond its artificial limits. Although, by so doing, she had incurred the displeasure of Russia, there was no real danger of war from that quarter. There 1 Thomas, “Sommaire des principaux événements arrivés en Perse depuis le mois d’Octobre 1724 jusqu’au mois d’Avril 1727” (quoted by Clairac, vol. 11, pp. 268-9). See also Chelebî-zâda, fol. 82 b. a Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Idazïn, Ahwâl, p. 147. 8 Ahwâl, p. 164.

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was likewise little to be feared from Tahmäsp, whose fortunes, as will be seen later, were at a lower ebb than ever» Very different, however, was the position in regard to the Ghalzai Afghans who, under their new leader, the able and astute Ashraf, were far more formidable than the luckless Tahmäsp and his adherents. In the coming trial of strength, the Turks were to find that religion, far from being a help, was to prove a serious hindrance, because Ashraf and his Ghalzais were Sunnis like themselves.

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CHAPTER XX

ASHRAF’S EARLY REIGN AND HIS STRUGGLE WITH TAHMÄSP As already related in ch. xvi, Ashraf, the eldest son of ‘Abd al‘Azïz, ascended the Persian throne on 26 April 1725. In honour of the event, gold coins were struck at Käshän and silver ones at Isfahan, Käshän, Mashhad, Astaräbäd, Qazvïn, Tabriz, Shamâkhï and Resht.1 The date of Ashraf’s birth does not appear to have been recorded, but we may assume that, as he was much the same age as his cousin Mahmüd, he must have been 26 or 27 years old at the time of his accession. Although still so young a man, he was already an experienced campaigner and had shown himself to be a capable leader. Mahmud had been respected by his men because of his undoubted courage, but he had inspired fear rather than affection. Ashraf, on the other hand, while looked upon as fully as brave as his cousin, was greatly loved by his troops. He was shrewder than Mahmüd, and therefore less impetuous, and, if it was possible to do so, he was always ready to gain his ends by guile or stratagem as an alternative to fighting. Ashraf certainly had need of all his good qualities, for his position was in reality more insecure than Mahmud’s had been. The main reason for this was that, owing to the circumstances of Mahmud’s death, Ashraf could expect no help from Qandahär. In the second place, the rapid advance of the Turkish armies made inevitable a clash with them sooner or later. On the other hand, there seemed at that time but little to fear either from Russia or from Tahmäsp. At the time of his accession, Ashraf found himself in possession of the capital and most of Persian ‘Iräq, Färs, Kirmän, Sîstàn, Qümis, and the western portion of western Khuräsän, but even 1 H. L. Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran, pp. 47-8. It must be pointed out, however, that, as the Afghans were not in possession of Resht, Shamâkhï, Tabriz or Mashhad, the coins bearing the names of these towns must have been struck somewhere in the area under Ashraf’s authority, probably at Isfahan.

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in this comparatively small area his control was, in the main, limited to the towns and the lines of communication. In the remoter areas his hold was insecure, as was shown by the number of armed risings, most of which were led by pretenders to the Safavi throne.1 Ashraf’s first act as sovereign was to put to death all Mahmüd’s guards and also those ministers, courtiers and others who had been in his confidence and who might seek to revenge themselves upon the new ruler. Of all Mahmud’s adherents the most faithful had been Almäs,1 2 his Qullar-äqäsL Feeling that he could expect no quarter from Ashraf, Almäs attempted to save himself by flight, but he was pursued and captured. Although he had always disdained riches and had refused to accept the presents that were usually offered to anyone in his position, he was suspected of having amassed considerable wealth, and he was put to the torture to make him disclose where he had hidden it. Having no such disclosure to make, he bore his torment bravely, and when the torturers desisted, he killed his wife and put an end to his own life. As he had had much influence over Mahmüd and had always used it to restrain him from his barbarous ways, his tragic fate met with general regret, even amongst the Afghans. The Europeans in Persia had particular occasion to mourn his death, as he had always done his best to protect them.3 Soon after his accession, Ashraf went to see the ex-Shäh in his prison. Affecting regret at Mahmüd’s treatment of him, he offered Sultän Husain the throne, which, he said, no one else could lawfully ascend.4 Although usually so credulous, Sultän Husain realised the specious nature of this offer and rejected it, saying that

... he preferr’d the Quiet he enjoy’d, to all the Glitterings of a Diadem : That he look’d on the Event which oblig’d him to abdicate his Throne, as a Decree of Providence : That from the very Moment of his Abdication, he never had the least Temptation to recover it, and should think he acted contrary to the Orders of Heaven, if he did but so much 1 According to Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali liazin’s Ahwäl, pp. 135-6, there were in all no less than eighteen of these pretenders. 2 The name Almäs (“ Diamond ”) suggests that he was a negro or that he had at any rate much negro blood. 8 Clairac, vol. 11, pp. 227-9. 4 Krusinski, p. 300. This offer of the crown is confirmed by Muhammad Muhsin, ZT, fol. 220 a.

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as listen to the Proposal. However, he complain’d very movingly of Maghmud’s Cruelty towards the Princes his Children, and all his Family, and the little Regard he had had to his Person and Wants; adding that he promis’d himself from the Humanity of Aszraff, that he should be better us’d and that he would make such Provision for him, as might enable him to pass the rest of his Days in Peace. He clos’d what he had to say, with offering him one of his Daughters, and inviting him to marry her.1

After listening to this discourse, Ashraf allowed himself to be persuaded to assume the crown (which he had intended to do all along), and agreed to marry the ex-Shäh’s daughter. He showed his sympathy with Sultän Husain by quadrupling his allowance, and by placing him in charge of all the building operations within the palace area.12 Furthermore, he expressed great regret at the barbarous acts of his predecessor, and gave orders for the bodies of the unfortunate princes whom he had slaughtered to be taken from the palace yard where they still lay, and to be placed in coffins.3 The bodies were then sent with much pomp and circum­ stance by caravan to Qum, where they were interred in the royal mausoleum. These acts were naturally gratifying to the Persians and gave them (as was doubtless the intention) some confidence in the new regime. They were also pleased when Ashraf put to death those Afghans who had plotted to place him on the throne, as some of the conspirators had behaved very cruelly to them. Ashraf’s motive in putting these men to death was not so much a desire to please the Persians as to rid himself of possible rivals and opponents. Amongst the victims was Amänullah whose claims to the throne had caused Mahmüd such trouble. Another advantage that Ashraf reaped from these executions was that he was able to confiscate the wealth that these men had accumulated during Mahmüd’s reign; in the case of Amänullah the sum was so con­ 1 Krusinski, p. 300; see also Clairac, vol. 11, p. 229. 2 Krusinski, p. 302. Ashraf knew, of course, of the ex-Shäh’s passion for building. Krusinski added: “The Buildings were like to be the more perfect for it, since no body understood that Art or had a better Taste in it, than Schah-Hussein, who, indeed, hardly understood any thing else.” 8 Krusinski, p. 301. This authority also stated that Ashraf forced Mahmud’s mother to spend a whole night in the courtyard of the palace where the bodies of the murdered princes were still lying.

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siderable that it was said to have equalled Mahmud’s fortune. Ashraf’s greed for riches was such that he confiscated all the wealth of Miangi, Mahmüd’s adviser and former tutor. Miangi had taken no part in the conspiracy against Mahmüd, and it may have been for this reason that Ashraf spared his life. After stripping him of his possessions, Ashraf sent him back to India.1 Another person to suffer from the change of regime was Ashraf’s younger brother, whom Krusinski described as “a lively young Man”.2 Imitating the pernicious Safavî practice, in order to ensure that he was no longer a potential danger, Ashraf had him blinded and then shut him up in the harem. Alone amongst the high-ranking officers of the Afghan army to escape death or disgrace were Zabardast Khän, the conqueror of Shiraz, Muhammad Saidäl Khän3 and Muhammad Nishän, who had formerly been Mahmüd’s mace-bearer. It will be recalled that Ashraf, whilst in prison, had been secretly in touch with Tahmâsp and had undertaken to assist him to gain the throne. The death of Mahmüd and Ashraf’s liberation and accession naturally changed the situation completely, but Ashraf nevertheless determined to follow the matter up in order that he might, by a subterfuge, get Tahmâsp into his power. He therefore sent an envoy to the prince urging him to meet him at a point between Tehran and Qum. He asked Tahmâsp to come with only a few followers, saying that he would do likewise. By some means, the twenty-five Persian notables who had previously acted as intermediaries between Ashraf and Tahmâsp now discovered the real intentions of the former, and secretly sent a letter by courier to the prince to warn him. Unfortunately for them, the messenger bearing this letter fell into the hands of Saidäl Khän when he was retreating southwards after his defeat by Tahmäsp’s adherents. The letter was discovered, and, when Saidäl reached Isfahàn, he at once brought it to Ashraf’s notice.4 1 Krusinski, p. 305. Miangi, however, returned to Persia later in Ashraf’s reign: see p. 337 below. 2 Ibid. p. 305. According to Krusinski, p. 298, Ashraf either put to death or blinded Mahmüd’s infant son. 3 Muhammad Saidäl was a Nâçir! Powinda; see Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan, p. 490 and the TN, p. 12. The Näsirls had for at least two hundred years been closely connected with the Ghalzais and had been incorporated in the Hötakl clan. 4 This was the reason why Ashraf did not put this commander to death.

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Furious at the action that these patriotic men had taken, Ashraf invited them to Farahäbäd, ostensibly to take part in a hunting expedition. Suspecting nothing, they went to Farahäbäd, where they were immediately put to death. Ashraf thereupon set out for the rendezvous at the head of a large number of troops. When Tahmäsp and his followers were close to the meeting-place, one of his scouts fortunately brought word that Ashraf was approaching with a powerful force, with the result that the prince and those with him were able to escape from the trap. It is uncertain whether there was any actual fighting on this occasion.1 However that may be, the forces of Ashraf and Tahmäsp came into conflict in December 1725 near Shäh ‘Abd al-‘Azim.2 Tahmäsp’s men, having taken no precautions against surprise, were heavily defeated, and their commander was captured. Tahmäsp, with only a few followers, fled from the battlefield. Being almost encircled by hostile forces, the un­ fortunate prince had to take the only escape route that remained open to him, namely, the way through Shimrän (which is now a suburb of Tehran) and the Elburz mountains to Mäzandarän.3 Even in Mäzandarän and in the neighbouring province of Astaräbäd Tahmäsp could not regard himself as safe, because both were claimed by Russia on the strength of the treaty of 1723. The outlook for Tahmäsp at this juncture was exceedingly ominous. Not only were the Afghans, Turks and Russians in occupation of the greater part of the country, but even in some of the few areas that remained faithful to him there were risings led 1 Krusinski, pp. 309-10, relates an improbable story to the effect that Tahmäsp’s followers consisted of a body of Qäjär tribesmen and a number of Qizilbäsh troops and that Tahmäsp, emboldened by the recent success of his men against the Afghans under Saidäl, wished to attack despite his inferiority in numbers. The Qäjärs agreed to stand by him if he would, in return, appoint one of them (whom Krusinski did not name) as his I'timad al-Daula. The Qizilbäsh, however, refused to agree to such an appointment (in KrusinskiMitford, p. 171, it is said that the Qizilbäsh objected because the Qäjär chief was a Sunni), and Tahmäsp, being unable to reconcile the contending parties, had to give up his project of attack and beat a retreat. Some of his forces, however, came into conflict with Ashraf’s men, and were soon defeated. 2 Shäh ‘Abd al-‘Azim, which is now known as Rayy because of its proximity to the ruins of that ancient city, is 6 miles south-south-east of Tehran. 8 Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Hazin, Ahuäl, p. 172. The Shaikh does not mention the route which Tahmäsp took through the mountains, but it was probably through the Afcheh or Imämzäda-yi-Häshim pass and thence by the Harhäz valley to Amul. See Nürullah Lärüdi, Zindigänl-yi-Nädir Shah, p. 25.

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by rebels a number of whom claimed to be members of the royal family who had managed to escape from their prison in Isfahän before Mahmüd’s wholesale slaughter of the Safavï princes in February 1725.1 To make matters even worse, the plague was then raging in Mäzandarän, and it carried off so many of Tahmàsp’s scanty following that he had no more than a handful of adherents left when the epidemic ceased.2 Khuräsän was barred to Tahmäsp as the Herat district was in the hands of the Abdäli Afghans, while Qandahär was in those of Husain, Mahmud’s brother; the western part of the province was under Malik Mahmüd Sïstânï. Malik Mahmüd had, as we have seen, experienced little or no difficulty in countering the feeble attempts by the fatuous Ismâ'ïl Khän, the Safavï commander-in-chief in Mashhad, to overthrow him,3 and had been steadily consolidating his power. Having made his pact with Mahmüd the Ghalzai just before the fall of Isfahän, he retraced his steps to Khuräsän and easily overcame Ismà^l Khän and entered Mashhad in triumph on 6 Jumâdï II 1135 (14 March 1723).4 Not long afterwards, he extended his power to Nïshâpür. Through his spies, he received detailed information of Tahmäsp’s affairs in the north-west. This information was of so encouraging a nature that it led him “to erect the building of sovereignty and to put on the hat of possession”.5 He was then enthroned in state in Mashhad, having what he termed the Kayânï crown placed on his head, and he had coins struck in his name.6 In March 1724 one of Tahmäsp’s generals named Ridä Qulï Khän Ghuläm attempted to drive Malik Mahmüd out of Mashhad, but he failed after scoring an initial success. Thereafter Malik Mahmüd came into conflict with Muhammad Khän Turkman, Ridä Qulï Khän’s successor, who, in conjunction with Nadr Qulï Beg, the future Nädir Shah, won a victory over him. This success could not be followed up, because Nadr Qulï Beg had to leave in order to put down a Turcoman revolt to the north-east of Abivard. 1 See p. 208 above. 2 Ahwäly p. 172. 8 See p. 122 above. 4 ZT, fol. 222 b. Muhammad Hasan Khän, in his Kitäb-i-Matla* al-Shams, vol. 11, p. 337, states that Malik Mahmüd established his authority over Mashhad in 1122 (1710/11), which is clearly erroneous. 6 ZT, fol. 222 b. 6 Matla* al-Shams, vol. 11, p. 337.

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On a number of occasions thereafter Nadr Qulï Beg and Malik Mahmüd were in conflict, but the former was not yet strong enough to gain the upper hand.1 Malik Mahmüd was thus able to maintain himself as ruler of western Khurasan. In the neighbouring province of Astaräbäd the most influential personage was Fath ‘All Khän Qäjär, the chief of the Ashâghîbâshî branch of the powerful Qäjär tribe;2 at the time of which we are writing he was aged about 40.3 Owing, on the one hand, to the bias in his favour shown by certain historians of the Qäjär period,4 and, on the other, to the contrary bias on the part of Mirzä Mahdi (who was a native of Astaräbäd himself), it is sometimes hard to ascertain the facts regarding his behaviour; an impartial survey of the contemporary sources5 shows, however, that he was able and ambitious, but also completely unscrupulous. One can hardly regard as credible the story told by Muhammad Khän Sipihr,6 of how Fath ‘Ali Khän and a number of his tribes­ men went to the relief of Isfahän during the siege and how, owing to the usual palace intrigues, the Shäh’s courtiers poisoned his mind against him, with the result that he and his followers left the capital in disgust and returned to Astaräbäd. Except during the first few weeks of the siege, it would have been difficult for a force of only moderate size to penetrate the Afghan lines and enter the city, and it would have been still more hazardous for it to leave Isfahän somewhat later. Moreover, had this incident occurred, there would certainly have been some mention of it by purely contemporary sources, such as Ange de Gardane, the authors of the Dagregister, Krusinski, Muhammad Muhsin and Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Hazin. Furthermore, the Qäjär historian Ridä 1 TN, pp. 20-32; a summary will be found on pp. 22-4 of my Nadir Shah. 2 See p. 122 above. 3 The date of Fath ‘All Khan’s birth is variously given as 1097 (1685/6) and 1104 (1692/3). I am inclined to accept the earlier date. 4 E.g. Muhammad Taqî Sipihr Kâshânï, the author of the Näsikh alTazvärlkh (Tehran, 1304, (1886-7)), vol- ix, and ‘Abd al-Razzâq, who wrote the “ Ma’âthir-i-Sultânîya”. 6 Especially the ZT, and N. D. Miklukho-Maklai’s annotated edition of Semeon Avramov’s Zapiski, which he published in the Ucheniye Zapiski\ Istoriya Philologiya Stran Vostoka (Leningrad, 1952). The full title of this interesting and valuable work is: “Zapiski*’ 5. Avramova ob Irane kak istoricheskii Istochnik. Avramov was at this time and for the next two and a half years in almost constant contact with Tahmâsp, in the capacity of Russian secretary. 6 Näsikh al-Tawârïkh, p. 8.

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Qulï Khân Hidâyat states that Fath ‘Ali Khan was “independent” at the time of the siege.1 After Tahmäsp’s defeat at Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim, he sent an urgent message to Fath ‘Alï Khän Qâjâr, whom he had appointed Governor of Samnän, to go to the relief of Tehran.1 2 The Qäjär chief responded, but, after fighting an inconclusive battle with the Afghans, near Varämin, he decided to follow Tahmäsp to Màzandarän, leaving Tehran to its fate.3 He felt, no doubt, that his forces were too scanty to enable him to attack Zabardast Khän with any hope of success; it is, moreover, highly probable that he was already contemplating revolt. However that may be, Fath ‘Alï Khän failed to join the prince in Mäzandarän; instead he and his men marched to Dämghän, probably via Astaràbàd and Bastäm, where he besieged one of Tahmäsp’s leaders named Dhu’l-Fiqär, who had been endeavouring to raise recruits in the Qûmis district. Probably because he was short of provisions and unable to withstand a long siege, Dhu’l-Fiqär and his men emerged from the town, broke through the Qäjär lines and made their escape. Fath ‘Alï Khän thereupon took possession of Dämghän, but soon afterwards crossed the Elburz mountains into Mäzandarän. At the end of May 1726 he met with and defeated Tahmäsp and his adherents at Ashraf.4 1 Raudat al-Safä, vol. VIII. 2 TN, p. 12. Muhammad Taql states, in his Näsikh al-Tawârlkh, p. 8, that it was in response to an appeal for help by the people of Rayy that Fath ‘All Khän marched to the relief of Tehran, but that he abandoned the attempt after an engagement with the Afghans at Ibrähimäbäd, near Varämin. Muhammad TaqI’s chronology of this period is very faulty. 8 TN, p. 12. 4 Avramov’s Zapiski, p. 91.

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CHAPTER XXI

ASHRAF’S WARS WITH TURKEY AND RUSSIA I. THE WAR WITH TURKEY

In view of the vast amount of Persian territory in the hands of the Turks and the danger of their further advancing eastwards, Ashraf considered it to be essential to reach a settlement with them as soon as possible either by peaceful means or by the sword. Although he had obviously more to fear from the Turks than from the Russians or, as it then seemed, from Tahmäsp, he was in no mood to treat with them as a suppliant for favours. Soon after his accession, Ashraf chose as his ambassador to the Porte an ex-muleteer named ‘Abd al-‘Azïz who had, by his merits, risen from that humble station to be commander of the garrison in Julfa. Realising, however, that his envoy would not have either the experience or the skill necessary for such a mission, Ashraf sent with him, as secretary, Emmanuel Shariman, a member of the well-known Armenian family of that name in Julfa.1 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who left Isfahän early in June 1725, took with him three letters; the first was from Ashraf to the Sultan, the second was from Ashraf’s Ftimäd al-Daula to the Turkish Grand Vizier, while the third, which was written in Arabic, and bore the signatures of nineteen of the Afghan 'ulama, was addressed to ‘Abdullah, the Mufti of Turkey and other dignitaries of the religious law in that country. Owing to the fact that he was detained by the Turkish authorities twice en route, ‘Abd al-‘Azïz did not reach Uskudar (Scutari) until 20 January 1726? The Afghan envoy’s arrival on the shores of the Bosphorus aroused mixed feelings amongst the Turks. Whilst Dämäd Ibrâhîm and the other high-ranking ministers had doubtless been warned by Ahmad Päshä as to the real purport of the messages brought by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the general public experienced a feeling 1 Krusinski, p. 316 (Krusinski himself travelled to Turkey with this mission). For details of the Shariman family, see A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 11, pp. 1358-62. 1 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 296.

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of relief. This feeling was based on the comforting (but quite erroneous) belief that these messages contained not only Ashraf’s acknowledgment of the Sultan’s supremacy, but also his under­ taking to yield up to Turkey all the Persian territory in his occupation in return for being confirmed as ruler of Qandahär (it was not generally realised in Turkey at that time that Husain, Ashraf’s cousin and enemy, was supreme there). In view of the provisions of the treaty of 1724 with Russia, the Turkish government was conscious of the fact that it could not grant full ambassadorial status to the Afghan envoy without giving umbrage to that power. On the other hand, it could not refuse to receive ‘Abd al-‘Azïz and take cognisance of the letters which he had brought with him. Dämäd Ibrâhîm thereupon summoned Nepluyev, the Russian Resident, and the Vicomte d’Andrezel, the French ambassador, to an audience, when he explained to them that his government would receive ‘Abd al-‘Azïz merely as the bearer of despatches from a ruler who was of the same religion as the Turks. He went on to assure Nepluyev and d’Andrezel that, while the Turkish government was bound to listen to what the envoy had to say, it would do nothing that would be prejudicial to the treaty of 1724.1 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was naturally angered not only at being refused ambassadorial status, but also at being detained for some days at Uskudar. However, by feigning illness and demanding medical attention in Constantinople, he made the Turkish authorities allow him to cross the Bosphorus and enter the capital, but they provided him with only a gondola instead of a galley for this purpose, since they did not recognise him as an ambassador.2 At the end of January, ‘Abd al-‘Azïz had his first audience with the Grand Vizier. By the magnificence of the reception which he accorded to the Afghan envoy, he atoned in some measure for his government’s refusal to treat him as an ambassador.3 After ‘Abd al-‘Aziz had handed to the Grand Vizier the letter from the Afghan Ftimäd al-Daula, Chelebî-zâda, the official historiographer, 4 read it aloud to the assembly. By the time that 1 Stanyan’s despatch of 27 January/7 February, 1726, SP 97, vol. xxvi; see also Clairac, vol. n, p. 297. 2 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 298. 8 For details, see von Hammer, vol. xiv, pp. 143-5, Chelebî-zâda, fols. 87a-b, and Clairac, vol. II, pp. 298-300. 4 He was also the author of the continuation of the Tä'rlkh-i-Räshid.

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he had finished, all doubts as to Ashraf’s real intentions were completely dissipated. This letter made it abundantly clear that Ashraf, far from offering to hand over any territory to Turkey, was demanding the cession by the latter of all the Persian provinces that she had conquered. The letter ended with a somewhat vaguelyworded Persian distich in which a note of menace might be detected.1 Chelebï-zâda then read the letter from the nineteen Afghan 'ulamä. When he had finished, ‘Abd al-‘Azïz was requested to hand over the letter from Ashraf to the Sultan, but he refused, saying that he must deliver it personally. As he persisted in his refusal, the letter had to be taken from him by force.2 The contents of these letters and the haughty tone in which they were written gave grave umbrage to the Turks. In the discussions which ensued, ‘Abd al-‘Azïz maintained the same uncompromising attitude. He laid great stress on religion, and chided the Turks for not completing the overthrow of the heretical Persians. Although he was quite willing to concede that the Sultan of Turkey was entitled to be considered the Imam or spiritual head of his own people, there was nothing, he said, to prevent Ashraf from being the Imäm in his own territories. He went on to claim that Ashraf, having been recognised as the conqueror of Persia by its inhabitants, had the right to claim as its legitimate sovereign all the provinces which the Turks and Russians had annexed.3 1 The Persian text as given by Chelebï-zâda, fol. 88 a, is as follows : Khudâ kashtl änjä kih khwâhad barad; Agar nâkhudâ [or nä-khudä], jâma bar tan darad. It may be translated as follows : God takes the vessel wherever He wills, Although the captain (or atheist, if one reads nä-khudä) tears the clothes on (his) body. The sense that these lines were intended to convey was, apparently, that, while God could do whatever He pleased, the captain or atheist (namely, the Sultan of Turkey) tore his clothes because he was helpless. Von Hammer’s translation of this distich is incorrect. See his vol. xiv, p. 145 n. 2 Chirac, vol. 11, p. 301 ; von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 146. Dämäd Ibrâhîm, no doubt fearing complications with Russia, refused to let ‘Abd al-‘Azîz see the Sultan. 3 See Stanyan’s despatch of 27 January/7 February 1726. Stanyan said, inter alia, that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s “Errand, by what appears hitherto, is very different from the Port’s Expectations”. Stanyan then went on to describe the claims made by the Afghan envoy on behalf of Ashraf. See also Chirac, vol. 11, PP- 33-4> and Muhammad Hasan Khän, Kitâb-i-Tarïkh~Munta?am-i~Nâ^irïy vol. Il, p. 232.

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The Turks held a series of conferences in order to decide on their course of action and on the nature of the reply to be sent to Ashraf. They had good reason to be anxious, as they received word at this juncture from Ahmad Päshä to the effect that Ashraf’s propagandists were busily at work amongst the Turkish soldiery with the result that they were beginning to ask whether it would be lawful for them to make war on fellow-Sunnis. It was also learnt that Ashraf had had manifestos distributed in Marägha and else­ where in which he urged the inhabitants to recognise him as their sovereign. The Turks came to a final decision on their line of action at a general meeting of the ‘ulamä, at which ‘Abdullah, the Mufti of Turkey, the chief judges of Mecca and Madina and many other eminent exponents of the religious law were present. At this meeting, the Mufti was asked to deliver a/atod or official judgment on two questions which were put to him. The first question was whether it was lawful for true believers to obey two Imams simultaneously. Of the second, which was very lengthy, the general purport was as follows: After the united Muslims had recognised the Sultan of Turkey as their Imam, what was the right course for them to pursue with regard to a certain personage who had unjustly and by violence seized the country round Isfahän, who had dared to demand the cession by Turkey of the territories which she had delivered from the yoke of the heretical Persians, and who attributed to himself the dignity and powers of an Imäm P1 In answer to the first question, the Mufti said that it was the unanimous view of the authorities of the religious law that two Imäms could not reign simultaneously unless their territories were separated by some natural line of demarcation, such as the Indian Ocean. The implication in this reply was that there was no such line of demarcation between the Sultan’s dominions and those of Ashraf. The Mufti replied to the second question that the person referred to was a rebel who had to be subdued, but added that, if he accepted with good grace the authority of him who was the shadow of God on earth (namely, the Sultan of Turkey), all would be well. If, on the other hand, he persisted in his disobedience, his fate was pronounced in the Qur'an, which said: “ If one of them (i.e. of two 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 147.

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Muslims) wrongs the other, then wage war upon him who does the wrong, until he returns to the order of God.”1 Chelebï-zâda then read to the assembly the replies which had been drafted to the letters from Ashraf’s Ftimäd al-Daula and the nineteen Afghan 'ulamä. When those present had approved these drafts, they, together with the two fatwäs, were copied by a famous calligraphist. The letter from the Turkish 'ulama to their Afghan counterparts and the two fatwäs were signed by the Mufti ‘Abdullah, all the chief judges and a large number of other ‘ulamä, shaikhs and teachers. Ashraf having thus been declared a rebel, Turkey officially declared war against him. According to Stanyan,2 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was greatly surprised at the Turkish declaration of war. In Stanyan’s opinion, the two main reasons why the Turks took this course were (i) Ashraf’s popularity, as a strict Sunni, amongst the Sultan’s subjects, and (ii) Turkey’s inability to join forces with Ashraf without breaking with Russia.3 At the end of March 1726 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was given his farewell audience, and a few days later he started on his journey to Isfahän. Hostilities between the Turks and Afghans began in the north­ west of Persia in May 1726 but the main forces of the two con­ testants did not become involved until the autumn of that year, Ahmad Päshä having received orders not to march against the enemy until the summer heat was over. In the north-western theatre, the war was in some cases merely a prolongation of the struggle against Tahmäsp’s adherents, since some of the latter rose against the Turks; others, on the other hand, joined the Afghans against the common foe. The first battle of the campaign was fought against the Shaqâqï and Shäh-Sevan tribes who, angered at the Turkish occupation of Ardabïl, had risen in order to drive them out of the town.4 ‘Abd al-Rahmän Päshä, the son of ‘Abdullah Köprülü Päshä, left Ardabïl at the head of some 20,000 men and fought a desperate battle with these tribesmen on 8 May.5 The Turks were eventually 1 Chelebï-zâda, fol. 89 b. The quotation is from Sura xlix, 9 of the Qu'rän. 8 Despatch of 8/19 February 1726, SP 97, vol. xxvi. 8 Ibid. 4 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 322. 5 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 149. According to Clairac, vol. 11, p. 322, ‘Abd al-Rahmän Päshä had only 10,000 men.

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victorious, while the defeated tribesmen fled to the Mughän steppe where they were again defeated and dispersed. Sharp fighting also occurred to the north of Marand, in north­ western Adharbaijân, where Shäh Qulï Khän, a former Governor of Marägha under Shäh Sultän Husain who had entered Ashraf’s service and had several thousand Afghans under his command,1 had succeeded in recapturing a number of strongholds including the castle of Diza, which the Janissaries had taken in the previous year.12 ‘Ali Päshä, the successor of ‘Abdullah Köprülü (who had given up his command at his own request), sent a force against Shäh Qulï Khän which took Diza and two other strongholds by assault and put all the surviving defenders to the sword. Some 15,000 Afghans, Afshärs and Kurds of the Muqaddam and Usalü tribes perished in this way.3 The Turks still had to contend with the Georgian and Armenian guerrilla leaders who, though they had nothing in common with the Afghans, continued to harass them. By their rapidity of movement and their intimate knowledge of the country, they inflicted considerable losses on the Turks. Although hard-pressed and very nearly captured on more than one occasion,4 David Beg of Qapän, as before, led the resistance movement in that area, until his death from natural causes at Halitzor in September 1727. Further to the east, the Armenians under Avan Yüzbâshï and other leaders were so hard-pressed by the Turks that some of them were forced to submit. However, on being joined by the Qaràchorlü Kurds56*and some of the Shäh-Sevan tribe of Ardabil, they again 1 Chelebï-zâda, fols. 1 i4a-b. He heads his account of this fighting as follows: “ The Appearance of Shäh Qulï Khän and the Suppression of the Sedition of that faithless heretic.” 2 See p. 265 above. 8 Chelebï-zâda, fols. ii4a-b. 4 Shahumian, Histoire choisie de Davith-Beg, pp. 248-51. According to this source (pp. 248-9), David Beg, in 1727, sent TahmasP a number of heads of Turks whom his men had killed in combat. Evidently by this time David Beg had decided to resume his allegiance to the Safavï state. Issaverdens, in his Armenia and the Armenians (Venice, 1878), p. 390, relates how David Beg, when besieged in his fortress of Halitzor by vastly superior Turkish forces in 1726, let loose one night a number of mares amongst their stallions, thus causing great uproar and confusion in their camp. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, David Beg and his men made a sortie and drove the Turks off, killing a large number in the process and capturing all their camp equipment and baggage. 6 Part of this warlike Kurdish tribe was settled in the Khabüshän (Qüchän) district to the north of Mashhad.

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rose against the Turks in September 1726, but were defeated by Hajjî Mustafâ Pâshâ. Constantine of Kakheti, like the Armenians, continued his attacks on the Turks, but in 1729 he was tricked into surrender by them and then put to death.1 Although his conduct in regard to Wakhtang might be open to question, he had shown himself afterwards to be a genuine patriot and a very courageous man. As the Turkish government had ordered Ahmad Päshä to postpone his attack on Ashraf until the heat of the summer was over, the Afghan ruler was given plenty of time to complete his preparations for the coming trial of strength. His first idea was to remain on the defensive in Isfahän ; with this end in view, he had a strong wall with bastions at intervals built inside the city to enclose all the principal buildings. Gardane thus described this extensive fortification: “Ce château n’est autre chose qu’une enceinte de murailles de terre au milieu de la ville, avec des tours de douze en douze pas de même matière. Il renferme la vieille citadelle, la grande place, la maison du Roi, et peut avoir une bonne lieue de circuit.”2 Ashraf was much heartened when he learnt that the Qazvïnîs, true to their martial tradition, had expelled the troops that the Turks had left there as garrison, and he hastened to send out manifestos to the citizens of other towns3 in the zone occupied by Turkey urging them to follow the Qazvïnîs’ example. When, in the late autumn of 1726, Ashraf received word that Ahmad Päshä had at last set out from Hamadän at the head of a vast host and was advancing on Isfahän by way of Khurramäbäd, he set out with his scanty forces to oppose him. At the most, his army numbered 17,000 men; it consisted of Afghans, Dargazïns and some Persians.4 Except for some zanburaks or swivel-guns, he had no artillery. Ahmad Päshä, on the other hand, had between 70,000 and 80,000 men under his command;5 of these the majority were 1 Peyssonnel, Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Géorgie, pp. 68-9. a Quoted by Clairac, vol. 11, p. 32711. 8 E.g. Marâgha (see p. 285 above). 4 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 152. Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his Persia ovvero Secondo Viaggio, p. 27, puts Ashraf’s numbers at between 11,000 and 13,000. He makes the mistake of stating that Ahmad Päshä began his advance in May 1726. 8 See von Hammer (who follows Chelebl-zäda), vol. xiv, p. 152.

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Turks, but there was a fairly large Kurdish contingent. In regard to artillery, Ahmad Pâshâ had an overwhelming superiority. Soon after setting out from Hamadan, Ahmad Pâshâ sent an insulting message to Ashraf stating that the Afghans were a miserable and unworthy race who had unjustly deprived a legitimate ruler of his sovereignty and that he (Ahmad Pâshâ) was coming to reinstate the ruler in question.1 This message so enraged Ashraf that he sent his groom Farhâd (who had previously served Shäh Sultän Husain in that capacity) with two Afghans post-haste to Isfahän with orders to kill the ex-Shäh. On reaching the capital Farhäd and his Afghan com­ panions cut off the unfortunate Sultän Husain’s head2 and brought it to Ashraf. The Afghan ruler immediately sent the gory head on to Ahmad Päshä, saying that he would give him his answer with the point of his sword.3 Ahmad Päshä, who was extremely shocked and angered at Ashraf’s barbarous action and insulting message, continued his advance even more determined than ever to defeat him. When the Turkish army had advanced some 80 miles from Hamadän, their scouts brought word that they had sighted the Afghans. Ahmad Päshä thereupon halted his troops, and Ashraf did the same when he found that he was some 12 miles from the Turks. For some days the two armies remained where they had halted. Ashraf took advantage of this lull to send out agents to work amongst the Turks’ Kurdish auxiliaries ; these men distributed lavish bribes and promised the Kurdish chiefs speedy promotion to the rank of khän if they would change their allegiance. Whilst the Afghan agents were so employed, Ahmad Päshä sent out 6000 of his men to reconnoitre the enemy position. This force, having been led astray by the guides, was surrounded and cut to pieces by the Afghans. Ahmad Päshä was surprised and angered at this blow, but a worse one was in store for him. 1 TN, p. 12. The reason why the Turks were now taking a more positive attitude towards the restoration of the Safavï monarchy will be explained in the next chapter. 2 The small room or cell in the Chahär Bägh Madrasa in which the ex-Shäh is said to have spent the night before his execution is still pointed out to visitors. It is on the north side of the courtyard, close to its western end. 3 TN, p. 13. See also the ZT, fol. 220a; Muhammad Muhsin confirms the killing of the ex-Shäh, but does not mention the sending of his head to Ahmad Päshä. 19

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Suddenly there appeared before him, in the very midst of the Turkish camp, four venerable Afghan ‘ulamä\ these men, by reason of their saintly appearance and their calling, had succeeded in penetrating the Turkish lines and reaching the Sar'askar. The eldest of the 'ulamä informed Ahmad Pâshâ that his sovereign had sent him and his colleagues to urge the Turks to abstain from any further fighting against their fellow-believers and to combine instead in the jihäd or holy war against the heretical Persians. Ashraf, he said, was astonished at the Turks' action in allying themselves with a Christian power in order to wrest from him a kingdom to which he had every right, through being not only of the same religion of the Turks, but also a descendant of the Prophet. The venerable speaker concluded by stating that Ashraf would deplore the effusion of the blood of fellow-Sunnis that would ensue if Ahmad Päshä persisted in his design of attacking him. These words had a great effect upon all who were within earshot. Whilst Ahmad Pâshâ was arguing with the Afghan spokesman, the call to pray was heard. Immediately the Afghan 'ularnä joined with the Turks in responding to it, thus once more demonstrating their common faith. When the prayer was over, the Afghan leader again urged that no more blood should be shed, and he and his three colleagues thereupon went back to their own camp, followed by a number of Turkish deserters.1 Feeling that immediate action was the only way of neutralising Ashraf’s skilful propaganda, Ahmad Pâshâ ordered an immediate attack on the enemy. It was then, and only then, that the full effects of Ashraf’s tactics became manifest. Not only did most of the Turkish army refuse to advance to the attack, but 20,000 Kurdish cavalry, under their leader Bebek Sulaimân Oglu, deserted to the enemy. Having reformed and reinforced his right wing, Ahmad Pâshâ succeeded in making it attack the Afghans, but it was thrown back, while the rest of his forces remained inactive. On two further occasions the Turkish right wing assaulted the enemy, but met with failure each time. Realising 1 Chirac, vol. 11, pp. 333-5. Chirac’s account is based on letters received from d’Alion and Thomas, both of whom were in a good position to obtain reliable information.

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that it was impossible to continue the battle under such conditions, Ahmad Päshä and his men retired in disorder to their camp, leaving 12,000 dead on the field. His defeat would have been complete if Ashraf had followed up his victory by an immediate offensive, but the Afghan ruler had other plans in mind. That night many of the Kurds who had not deserted caused a panic in the Turkish camp by crying out that, as so many men had gone over to the Afghans, they should all retire immediately if they wished to escape annihilation. The Kurds took advantage of the resulting confusion to pillage the Turkish camp, which Ahmad Päshä and his troops hastily evacuated. In this way, all the Turkish artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the Afghans and Kurds, while Ahmad Päshä and his troops fell back first to Hamadän and thence to Kirmänshäh and Baghdäd.1 Although Ahmad Päshä justly laid much of the blame for this disaster on the Kurds, he also held ‘Abd al-‘Azïz Päshä, the Governor of Marägha, responsible.2 When Ashraf learnt that the Turks were in full retreat, he and his men followed or rather accompanied them3 on their march. By his show of moderation immediately after the battle and now on this occasion, he hoped, with good reason, to increase thereby the disinclination of the Turkish soldiery to continue the war; he followed up this action by returning those Turks whom he had captured. The news of this disaster, which reached Constantinople in December 1726, caused great consternation there. In the vain hope of countering the astute Afghan propaganda, the government stated that Ashraf had embraced Shï‘ism and declared him to be a heretic. Stanyan, in reporting this development to London, sagely remarked that it was . .only a politick Invention, to set the Minds of their Peoples against him [Ashraf], and to prevent their going over to him”.4 Anxious to recover his prestige, Ahmad Päshä wished to continue the war, and so for a time did the Turkish government. Endeavours were made to recruit fresh 1 This account of the battle, which took place on 20 November 1726, is based mainly on Clairac, vol. 11, pp. 338-40 and von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 153. 2 ‘Abd al-‘Azïz was killed a few weeks later by Farrukh Päshä; see Chelebizäda, fol. 113 b. 8 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 340; Hanway, vol. in, p. 249. 4 Despatch of 27 December 1726/7 January 1727, SP 97, vol. xxvi.

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troops from the European provinces of Turkey, as it was thought that these men would prove less susceptible to Ashraf’s propaganda. As to Ahmad Päshä, the government found itself on the horns of a dilemma, as it could neither trust him fully nor dismiss him from his command.1 Situated as it was, it could not do otherwise than maintain him in his position, and send him reinforcements. In this way, by the end of the summer of 1727, Ahmad Päshä had some 60,000 men under him when he once more passed through Kirmänshäh. No clash of arms with the Afghans ensued, however, because Ashraf, feeling that he had far more to gain from peace than from war, on 15 Safar 1140 (2 October 1727) sent his envoy Ismä‘il to the Turkish Sar'askar with proposals for peace. By this time, the Turkish government had also decided to end the war, largely because of its ever-growing unpopularity in Turkey1 2 and partly because of the great expense which its continuance would involve. Ten days of negotiations ensued between Ismä‘ll on the one side and Ahmad Päshä and ‘Ubaidullah Efendi,3 the judge of Adrianople and Aleppo, on the other. The treaty contained twelve articles in all. The Sultan of Turkey was acknowledged to be the head of the Muslim world, and Turkey was allocated in perpetuity Kirmänshäh, Hamadän, the district of Sinandij, Ardalän, Nihävand, Khurramäbäd, Luristän, Mukrï, Marägha, Khoi, Tabriz, and part of Adharbaijän, Ganja, Qaräbägh, Erivan, Ordübäd, Nakhichivän, Tiflis, all the province of Georgia, the Shamâkhï district, Hawiza, as well as a number of places such as Abhar and Tärim which the Turks had occupied in the previous year.4 As for Ashraf, he was acknowledged as Shäh of Persia and his right to have his name in the khutba and on his coins was 1 On 24 January/4 February, Stanyan reported that the Turkish government ° attribute the Loss of this Battle to the Imprudence of Achmet Pasha, and would gladly shew their Resentment by cutting off his Head, but he is so powerfull in those Parts, that they dare not meddle with him”. 2 Nepluyev reported to his government that the mulläs were saying that it was useless to continue the war against Ashraf, as Allah was clearly on his side. The Grand Vizier therefore made peace. Sec Soloviev, Istoriya Rossii, vol. xix, p. i18. 3 Clairac, vol. 11, p. 353, wrongly gives his name as Richidi-Effendi ; he no doubt confused him with Muhammad Rashid Efendi who, as will be seen, was sent later to ratify the treaty. 4 Chelebî-zâda, fol. 129 b.

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recognised. Furthermore, he was authorised to send a caravan each year to Mecca and to appoint his own Amir al-Hajj or leader for it.1 Although the treaty was necessarily a compromise, it was undoubtedly very satisfactory from Ashraf’s point of view. His success was due entirely to his consummate statesmanship and skill. In August 1728 Muhammad (Mehmet) Rashid Efendi was sent to Isfahän for the purpose of ratifying the treaty on the part of Turkey.1 2 An interesting extract from a letter written by Muhammad Rashid Efendi describing his experiences in Isfahän has been preserved in the archives at the Quai d’Orsay.3 The letter was dated 7 April 1729. When Muhammad Räshid was within three days’ march of Isfahän on his outward journey, he was met by Ashraf’s mihmändär, who received him politely. When they reached the outskirts of the capital, Muhammad Räshid was not allowed to enter it, but was conducted to a palace called the ° Sirdji Seray”4 which was situated outside the perimeter. Muhammad Räshid and his attendants were well treated, but they were kept virtual prisoners and were not able to make contact with anyone except Ashraf’s officials. There was still, he said, hatred in Persia for the Ottoman Turks, but he did not specify whether he was speaking of the Afghans or the Persians or both. On 27 March 1729 Ashraf’s Ftimäd al-Daula officially received Muhammad Räshid. The Afghan minister then explained that Ashraf was about to set out to attack the Persians near Mashhad and that this was the reason why he (Muhammad Räshid) could not be treated with the customary magnificence and courtesy. Shortly afterwards, Muhammad Räshid was given an audience by Ashraf in the Chihil Sutûn. The Afghan sovereign was seated on the jewel-encrusted throne of the Persian kings, wearing the 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 1560, rightly draws attention to the fact that Chelebl-zäda omitted all reference to this portion of the treaty. 2 Chelebi-zäda, fol. 149 b. For particulars of Muhammad Räshid, see M. Cavid Baysun, “Müverrih Raçid efendi’nin Iran elçiligi”, in Türkiyat Mecmuasi, 195b PP- 145-50. 8 AEP, vol. vu, fols. 89b-92b. 4 Serçe saray (“Sparrow-house”), in modem Ottoman Turkish; I have been unable to identify this building.

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crown of Shäh Sultan Husain. Surrounding Ashraf were the grandees of the court who were all Qizilbäsh or, as Muhammad Räshid termed them, “ Persian schismatics”. When the ambassador presented the Sultan’s letter to Ashraf, he received it standing up ; after kissing the letter and placing it for a moment on his head, he laid it down on a kind of cornice from which hung a piece of superb material richly ornamented with precious stones. After Ashraf had asked after the “Emperor of the Universe”, and Muhammad Räshid had suitably replied, the audience came to an end. Muhammad Räshid stated that the mediocre nature of the presents that were given to him was symbolic of the state of misery to which Persia was reduced. There were, he said, many people dying of starvation in the streets of Isfahän, where the citizens lived in fear of being expelled from their houses and put to death. It was partly in order to hide the sad state of the people there that he and those with him were not allowed to enter the city and go about as they pleased. As already stated, Ashraf was about to leave Isfahän to fight Tahmäsp’s forces, and there were fears that the city would have to undergo a second siege.1 After Muhammad Räshid had received his farewell audience on 6 April 1728, he returned to Turkey. On the Persian side, the envoy sent to Constantinople to ratify the peace treaty was Muhammad Khän Balûch, the Governor of Shïrâz. He did not reach the Turkish capital until after the return of Muhammad Räshid Efendi; in view of the latter’s treatment in Isfahän, the Turkish government determined to hamper the Persian envoy’s movements in similar fashion. Nevertheless, in order to impress him with the power and magnificence of Turkey, it went to extraordinary lengths. All the houses along the route which he was to follow on his state entry were repaired and freshly white-washed, a fact which led to him being nicknamed the Khan stvaci (“the Plasterer Khan”).2 As the ambassador crossed the Bosphorus from Uskudar, the Turkish warships fired salutes in his honour and he was received with great pomp and ceremony when he landed on the European side. However, the 1 For the measures which Ashraf took to meet this danger, see ch. xxvi. a Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 204.

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impression produced by the ambassador’s suite on the crowds lining the route was anything but favourable. According to a European onlooker, the uncouth and unkempt appearance of the Afghans and their ill-assorted and tattered garments made them look like a troupe of gipsies.1 When Dämäd Ibrâhîm received Muhammad Khän Balüch in audience, even more than the usual magnificence was displayed.1 2 The Grand Vizier, however, reproached the ambassador because he had brought no letter from Ashraf’s Ftimäd al-Daula, who had also omitted to send him a letter by the hand of Muhammad Räshid Efendi. In a despatch to London, Stanyan stated that Muhammad Khän Balüch’s “Behaviour is stiff and reserv’d, without seeming to court the Ministers here or to cultivate the Friendship of the Port.”3 Writing again to London on 31 August/11 September 1729, Stanyan recorded that Muhammad Khän Baluch had left for Persia four days previously “.. .without having made any new Treaty, or taking any Steps towards strengthening his Master’s Friendship with the Port, otherwise than by Verbal Assurances mutually given.” Whilst Muhammad Khän Baluch was on his way back to Isfahän, he received word of Ashraf’s overthrow and flight,4 with the result that he eventually, after some hesitation, handed over to Nädir the letters with which he had been entrusted. In this manner ended the relations between Ashraf and the Turks. 2. THE WAR WITH RUSSIA

The story of Ashraf’s war with Russia is soon told, as it was on a much smaller scale than his struggle with Turkey. It will be recalled that Ashraf, in his arrogant messages to the Turks, claimed all the territories that they and the Russians had 1 See the Abbé Sevin’s letter to the Comte de Caylus dated 14 August 1729, in the Lettres sur Constantinople, de M. LAbbé Sevin (Paris, 1802), pp. 11-12. 2 For details, see Chelebï-zâda, fols. is6a-8b; see also Stanyan’s despatch referred to below. 3 This despatch was dated 15/26 July 1729, SP 97, vol. xxv. 4 See pp. 333-8 below.

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seized in Persia. We have seen how his persistence in this attitude involved him in war with Turkey, and it was inevitable that it would also lead to war between him and the Russians. Apart from some minor engagements, which were no more than skirmishes, the only clash between the Afghans and Russians took place between Rüd-i-Sar and the village of Timijän at the end of 1727.1 The Afghans were under Muhammad Saidäl Khän, who was, as we have seen, one of Ashraf’s principal commanders. The Russian force, which General Levashov had sent from Resht to oppose the Afghans, was commanded by a Major Urlov.12 In the battle that ensued, Muhammad Saidäl was wounded, and he and his men were not only forced to retire from the field, but also to evacuate Gïlân. A few days after the battle, General Levashov went to Qazvïn, which was then in the possession of the Afghans, and found them in a tractable mood, with the result that, by mutual consent, a truce was made. This change in the Afghans’ attitude was due to the rapidly increasing threat by Tahmäsp and his supporters to their supremacy. This truce was converted into a peace by the treaty which General Levashov and Muhammad Saidäl signed at Resht on 13/24 February 1729.3 It was agreed in this treaty that peace was to be concluded, ambassadors were to be exchanged, all quarrels between the subjects of the two nations were to be ended, refugees were to be allowed to return to their own countries, trade was to be carried on freely except for the 1 Approximately 8 miles east-south-east of Langarüd. 2 Butkov, Materiali, vol. 1, p. 99; see also L. Brosset’s chronological addition in vol. in, p. 35. The Greek traveller Basil Batatzes, in his ncpoucà, pp. 138-9, asserts that the Russian troops on this occasion were commanded by a Swedish officer named Carl Sein (d t&v *Pd>acra)v KdpXos Sccv XiXtap/oç). As I was unable to discover any Swedish officer with a name even remotely resembling Sein in reference books such as H. Hofberg’s Svenskt Biografiskt Handlexicon or the Biographiskt Lexicon öfver Namnkunnige Svenska Man, I consulted Herr Erik Gren, the Assistant Librarian at the University Library at Uppsala. Herr Gren, in reply, has been kind enough to point out that the correct Greek word for “ Swede ” is SovtjSos, but he admits that Batatzes may have used in that sense. He states that the terms “ Swede” and “ Swedish” were used for a long time as referring to citizens of the former Swedish dependencies in the Baltic states, and that it is therefore possible that Carl Sein was of Baltic German origin. Herr Gren adds that there are some grounds for making this suggestion, as a Baltic German named Frans Albert Aleksandrovich Seyn was appointed Governor-General of Finland in 1909. 3 For the Russian text of this treaty, see T. Yuzefovich, Dogovori Rossii s Vostokom, pp. 189-93.

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usual taxes, and Russian subjects were to be allowed to reside in (Afghan) Persia, to have warehouses and shops there, and to have free access for their caravans that were in transit to or from India. Persians in Russia were to have similar rights.1 This treaty was, however, soon to become a dead letter because of the sensational developments in Persia which took place very soon after its conclusion. 1 Butkov, vol. I, p.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE STATE OF THE PERSIAN PEOPLE DURING ASHRAFS REIGN Generally speaking, the condition of the Persian people during the four and a half years of Ashraf’s tenure of the throne was terrible. With their numbers decimated by wars, rebellions, famine and pestilence, their women and children often sold as slaves (in the Turkish-occupied territory, the Turkish soldiery were allowed to sell the Persian women and children as slaves until this cruel practice was stopped by an edict issued on 5 December 1725),1 their homes in many cases destroyed and their means of livelihood taken away, their lot was certainly a most unhappy one. By reason of the wars, the division of the country into separate zones and the large numbers of brigands and robbers who infested the roads, trade was almost completely at a standstill. In all the occupied territories the Persian people longed for liberation. In the Afghan zone, the populace loathed their conquerors on racial and religious grounds, and also on account of their injustice and cruelty. As already related,2 when the Turkish ambassador Muhammad Räshid was in Isfahän3 in the spring of 1729, he reported that people were dying of starvation in the city; the inhabitants were in a most pitiable state, as they lived in continual fear of having their houses broken into, pillaged and burnt, while they themselves would be put to the sword. Although Ashraf had at first made some show of treating the Persian element of the population with justice and humanity, he later revealed his hatred and contempt for them in an edict which he issued and had distributed throughout his realm. In this edict, he divided the inhabitants racially into seven categories. In the first category, he naturally placed the Ghalzais, who were followed, rather surprisingly, by the Armenians. Then came the Dargazms 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 137. 2 See p. 294 above. 3 Actually, he was not allowed to enter the city except when he was received in audience.

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who, like the Afghans, were Sunnis and who had provided the latter with a welcome addition of military strength. In the fourth category were the Indians from Multan, between whom and the Ghalzais (and also the Abdalis) there had for long been a close connection; it was for this reason that many Multänis had followed the Ghalzais to Persia after their successful invasion in 1722. The Zoroastrians ranked fifth in the list. Under the two Afghan usurpers they were, in theory at least, allowed freedom of worship. Detailed and authentic information as to their actual treatment under those rulers is lacking, but it may safely be said that their conditions were no worse, and may conceivably have been very much better, than they had been under Shäh Sultan Husain, who had supinely allowed the Shï‘ï zealots a free hand to persecute them. The same remarks may be applied to the Jews, who came sixth in Ashraf’s list. Last of all came the unfortunate Persians, who were by far the most numerous of the various peoples inhabiting the country.1 It must also be remembered that Ashraf, besides putting to death the Persian notables who had been in touch with Tahmâsp, had also been responsible for the execution of the ex-Shäh. Shaikh Muhammad ‘All Hazln cannot be accused of exaggera­ tion in the following description which he gave of the conditions prevailing in Persia at this time: ... the whole empire was in a state of ruin, and the royal ordinances and statutes during these few years of interregnum had been broken and scattered to the four winds. There was wanted a king of power, with prudence and judgment, who should occupy himself a length of time with the affairs of each town and village, and with downright severity bring the country to amendment. But in this short space nothing of the kind had yet been effected; and, by the decrees of heaven, in these times there is not to be found on the whole surface of the earth a chief who possesses the proper qualities for governing; on the contrary, at the present moment each of the Soltans, and Chiefs, and Commanders throughout the universe is, as far as my opinion goes, and to speak of them as I have found them, of meaner worth and more without rule than any or most of their subjects;12 except some of the rulers of the Frank kingdoms, who in the institutes and ways of life, and in the 1 Krusinski, pp. 323-5; Chirac, vol. in, pp. 5-6. 2 Compare Volynsky’s opinion of Shäh Sultän Husain, as quoted on p. 106.

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government and regulation of their states, are strong and constant. From them, however, by reason of their immense distance, little or no advantage is derived towards the condition of the people who inhabit the coasts and regions of other climates.1 Symptomatic of these very troubled times in Persia was the series of risings led by persons who, for the most part, claimed to be sons or relatives of Shäh Sultän Husain; these men, with the single exception of Sayyid Ahmad,2 were impostors. The ease with which these individuals induced the people to flock to their banners and to accept without criticism their claims to the crown was a measure of the longing for salvation which pervaded the nation. The luckless inhabitants would clutch at any straw in the hope that they might thereby be able to shake off the intolerable yoke of their oppressors. It was indeed a tragedy for the Persian people that so many of them perished in these vain attempts; if only their efforts could have been concentrated and co-ordinated under Tahmäsp, and if that prince had possessed the necessary qualities of military leadership and statesmanship, their salvation might have been achieved appreciably earlier and with far less suffering and loss of life. Unfortunately, Tahmäsp did not possess these qualities, and it was only when he had at his disposal someone (namely Nädir) who did possess them that he was able to achieve this end. Unlike the other claimants to the throne, Sayyid Ahmad was of genuine Safavi descent, though in the female line. His paternal grandfather Mïrzâ Dä’üd, the mutawallï or administrator of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä at Mashhad, had married Shahribänü Begum, the eldest daughter of Shäh Sulaimän.3 Sayyid Ahmad had at first been one of Tahmäsp’s supporters. It is said that the prince’s debauchery and his refusal to listen to Sayyid Ahmad’s advice caused the latter to break with him and to set up as an independent ruler in Kirmän, where he was enthroned as Shäh on or about 8 November 1726. He subsequently came into conflict with both Tahmäsp’s forces and those of Ashraf. After experiencing 1 Ahwäl, pp. 214-15. 2 Sayyid Ahmad was a great-grandson of Shäh Sulaimän through the female line. For his pedigree, see appendix I. 3 Majma' al-Tauârïkh, p. 59. According to Muhammad Hasan Khän, Matla* al-Shams, vol. 11, p. 327, Mïrzâ Dä’üd was appointed mutazoalli of the shrine in 1109 (1697/8).

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many vicissitudes of fortune, he was finally captured and put to death by Ashraf at the end of 1140 (July/August 1728).1 In the high Bakhtiârï country a man from the village of Garrâ’ï12 appeared who claimed first that he was Ma’süm Mïrzâ and later styled himself Safi Mïrzâ. Some verisimilitude was given to this second claim because, as will be remembered, a rumour was current in Isfahän early in 1725 that Safï Mïrzâ had escaped from captivity.3 From the Bakhtiârï country the self-styled Safï Mïrzâ went to Shüshtar where he was regarded as genuine by the governor and populace, and his name was given in the khutba in the mosques immediately after that of Tahmâsp (‘Arabistân was at that time for the most part free from Turks and Afghans). Although denounced by Tahmâsp as an impostor and deprived for a time of his position, he imposed sufficiently on his credulous supporters to regain his influence and he was not suppressed and slain until 1140 (1727/8). In Muharram 1142 (July/August 1729) another pretender claiming to be Safi Mïrzâ reached Shüshtar; his real name was Muhammad ‘Alï Rafsinjânï. The populace, credulous as ever, said: “His eyes are, in our opinion, like those of Safï Mïrzâ”, and accepted him just as they had done his predecessor.4 The Governor of Shüshtar, however, refused to be taken in and forced the pretender to fly. “Safi Mïrzâ II” thereupon escaped to Mesopo­ tamia where the Turkish authorities, thinking that his presence at Constantinople might be of use, sent him to that city.5 A further pretender, who claimed to be Sultän Mahmüd Mïrzâ, the eldest son of the ex-Shäh, was for a time in possession of part of the coastal area between Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbäs) and the northern boundary of Makrân.6 A rising which caused trouble to Tahmäsp and considerably 1 Majma* al-Tawärikh, p. 74. For a detailed account of his adventurous career, see the same source, pp. 59-74, and Muhammad Hashim, “Tadhkirati-Äl-i-Dä’üd”, British Museum MS. Or. 154, fols. 37a-$oa (Muhammad Hashim has borrowed much of his material from the Majma* al-Tawärikh). 2 Garrâ’ï, as explained by Ahmad Kasravï, Tä'rlkh-i-Pan-sad, Säla-yiKhüzistän, p. 106, is a place near Shüshtar. 3 See p. 207 above. This unfounded rumour was the main cause of the massacre of the royal princes. 3 TNt p. 14. 6 For details of his reception there, see pp. 344 below. 6 See p. 419 below.

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more to Russia and Turkey was the one led by a qalandar or wandering dervish named Zainal ibn Ibrâhîm, a native of Lähijän. He gave himself out to be Ismâ‘ïl Mirzä, another of the sons of Shäh Sultän Husain, and, like the other pretenders, he alleged that he had escaped from captivity before Mahmüd’s massacre of the princes.1 He was joined by many of the hardy and warlike mountaineers from Dailam. Zainal and his followers, after fighting with Tahmäsp’s adherents, came into collision with the Russians in Gïlân. The Russian troops proved far too strong and soon drove Zainal and his men into Turkish-occupied territory, where, for a time, they met with great success. They joined forces with a rebel Turk named ‘Abd al-Razzäq and a number of ShähSevan and Shaqâqï tribesmen who, between them, seriously harassed the Turks. In the summer of 1728 the rebels besieged the Turkish garrison in Ardabîl for a fortnight, but the Turks ultimately got the upper hand, captured Zainal and put him to death.2 Two other impostors besides Zainal claimed to be Ismâ'ïl Mirzä. The first of these led a rising in the Bakhtiârî country, but it was soon suppressed. The second appeared at Tahmäsp’s court after his accession in Isfahän, and succeeded in convincing the monarch of the genuine nature of his claim. Tahmäsp, however, put the man to death soon afterwards, on finding that he wras plotting to seize the throne. Despite the Shäh’s acceptance of this claim, it must be regarded as extremely doubtful. Yet another pretender, who assumed the name of Muhammad Mirzä, found some support in Balüchistän. He was nicknamed the Shähzäda-yi-khar-savär or “The Donkey-riding Prince”, apparently because of his habit of riding a donkey. He came into conflict with Sayyid Ahmad, whom he defeated, but he was eventually subdued by Ashraf and was then forced to escape to India.3 In addition to the claimants and pretenders named above, there were a number of others,4 but no details of them appear to have been preserved.6 1 TN, pp. 15-16. 2 TN, p. 16. Von Hammer is certainly in error in stating (vol. xiv, p. 176) that this man had been captain of Tahmäsp’s bodyguard. 8 TN, p. 15. 4 See p. 275 above. 5 Except in the case of Säm Mirza, of whom brief mention will be made on p. 344 below.

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It will be abundantly clear that, owing to the Afghan usurpation, the Russian and Turkish invasions and the activities of rebels such as Malik Mahmud Sîstânï and these numerous pretenders, the whole country was reduced to an almost unprecedented state of misery and chaos. How fervently the peace-loving, patient inhabitants of Persia must have prayed for deliverance from all their trials and tribulations! Although there was for long no sign of an answer to their prayers, the tide did eventually turn.

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE TURN OF THE TIDE When Tahmâsp suffered his defeat at Ashraf in Mäzandarän at the hands of Fath ‘Ali Khan Qäjär, it must have seemed to him that his darkest hour had come, as he was now hemmed in by enemies in every direction, all of whom were vastly superior to him in military strength. He could, no doubt, have sought sanctuary with the Russians, but he was most reluctant to take that course. For once in his career, Tahmâsp showed some spirit after his defeat by Fath ‘Ali Khän. He and his followers fell back from Ashraf to Barfurüsh, whence he sent his Qullar-äqäsi Muhammad ‘Alî Khän and another military leader to seek help from the Turcoman tribes inhabiting the region to the north-east of Astaräbäd; by way of an inducement, Tahmâsp gave ‘Alî Qulï Khàn the sum of 40,000 roubles for distribution to these tribes.1 Doubtless fearing an attack from this quarter, Fath ‘Alî Khän abruptly changed his tactics as soon as he heard of Tahmäsp’s action. Instead of continuing his revolt, he went in apparent humbleness to meet Tahmâsp at Sârî (which was then the capital of Mäzandarän), with his sabre hanging from his neck in token of submission and holding a Qur’än in his hand.2 Having made his peace with Tahmäsp, Fath ‘Ali Khän persuaded the prince and his followers to accompany him to Astaräbäd, 80 miles to the east-north-east of Säri. On arrival there, Tahmäsp was housed in a palace in the Bägh-i-Shäh quarter.3 It was not long before Fath ‘Alî Khän, who had a most forceful and dominant personality, obtained complete control over the weak and pliable prince. Semeon Avramov, who had an audience 1 See M. Miklukho-Maklai’s Zapiski S. Avramova ob Irane kak istoricheskii istochnik, p. 91. This action by Tahmâsp is not mentioned by any of the Persian historians, but there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. 2 Ibid. p. 91. Muhammad Muhsin, in his ZT, fol. 211b, gives a slightly different version of this event. He states that Fath ‘Alî Khän and some other Qâjar chiefs went to Tahmäsp at Sari “with swords in their belts and Qur’äns in their hands ”. After pointing out that the prince’s generals had been unworthy, Fath ‘Ali Khän craved forgiveness for his previous behaviour and offered his services and those of his tribesmen to the prince. 8 ZT, fol. 211 b.

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with Tahmäsp on 29 May/9 June 1726, described his position as already pitiable, as he was virtually a prisoner. Among those at the audience were Fath ‘All Khän in his capacity as Governor of Astaräbäd, ‘Alï Qulï Khän Qäjär, a former Governor of the province, Muhammad Mirzä, a nephew of Muhammad Qulï Khän (Constantine III) of Kakheti and Mirzä ‘Abdullah, Tahmäsp’s rtimäd al-Daula. Avramov noticed that Fath ‘Ali Khän was richly dressed; he had, apparently donned clothing which he had purloined from Tahmäsp’s baggage after the battle at Ashraf. Avramov himself was treated with discourtesy, his papers being rudely snatched from his grasp, and he was hardly allowed to speak.1 Ambition and self-interest were, without a doubt, the dominant motives in Fath ‘Alï Khän’s mind at this juncture. He had only 2000 followers, whereas Malik Mahmüd’s military strength was vastly greater, while Ashraf’s forces were still more numerous and formidable. By throwing in his lot with Tahmäsp, he could naturally expect no immediate accretion of military strength, as the prince’s forces were negligible, but, on the other hand, Tahmäsp’s position as the sole surviving son of the ex-Shäh made him the only possible rallying point for all those of his countrymen who retained any feelings of loyalty to the Safavï dynasty. Fath ‘Alï Khän, who was a man of intelligence and foresight, must have realised the value from this point of view of a close association with the prince. He probably knew, before he joined him, that with his much stronger personality, he could soon gain an ascendancy over him, and so, in due course, become the real head of affairs. He doubtless saw that there were at last some signs of improvement in Tahmäsp’s situation, or rather of deterioration in that of his foes. In March 1726, Ashraf’s arrogant pretensions had involved him in war with Turkey, and for that reason neither he nor the Turks would be in a position to pay much, if any, attention to Tahmäsp for some time to come, while the effects of this war would certainly weaken both the combatants, particularly the Ghalzais. Ashraf could ill afford to lose men, as he was ruling by force of arms a people who greatly outnumbered his followers and who detested the Ghalzais on both racial and religious grounds. Moreover, Ashraf’s murder of Mahmud had occasioned a feud 1 Avramov’s Zapiski, loc. cit. p. 91.

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between him and Husain, Mahmüd’s brother, who had made himself supreme at Qandahär; in consequence, Ashraf could expect no reinforcements from that quarter. Russia, as has been seen, had become much less aggressive after the death of Peter the Great. The Abdâlïs remained unsubdued, but they had been seriously weakened by internal dissensions,1 and were not likely to take any offensive action for some time to come. Lastly, there was Malik Mahmüd, but he was less formidable than the others, and Fath ‘Ali Khän must have felt that he would be unable to resist any popular movement on a big scale in favour of the reinstatement of the Safavï line. Although he must have known that there were a number of serious obstacles to be surmounted before this aim could be realised, he doubtless felt that he was the man who was best fitted to take advantage of the disunion in the ranks of the country’s enemies in order to effect its deliverance. What probably weighed more with him than any feelings of loyalty and patriotism was the opportunity that this would provide for his own aggrandise­ ment. He was not, however, destined to play such a role, as he was shortly to be displaced by an even more ambitious and powerful rival.12 Having carefully reviewed the general situation, Fath ‘All Khän and Tahmäsp decided to leave Astaräbäd for Khuräsän in order to prepare for the struggle with Malik Mahmüd Sîstânï, who was, as we have seen, the weakest of Tahmäsp’s foes. Accordingly, after raising as many recruits as possible locally in June 1726, they set out for Dàmghàn en route for Khabüshän (Qüchän), where they hoped to obtain more substantial reinforcements. It was while on this march that Fath ‘Alï Khän showed in unmistakable fashion the extent of his hold over Tahmäsp. On 3/14 July, he made the prince appoint him Wakil al-Daula (“Deputy of the State” or “Vicegerent of the State”), and give posts of lesser importance to other Qäjär chiefs.3 Although these positions were little more than sinecures at that particular juncture, they would certainly become much more important in the event of any considerable upward trend in Tahmäsp’s fortunes. 1 See ch. vm. 8 The above passage has been taken, in somewhat modified form, from my Nadir Shah, pp. 15-16. 3 Avramov’s Zapiski, p. 92; see also the ZT, fol. 211 b.

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From Dämghän Tahmäsp and Fath ‘Alï Khän set out for Khabüshän via Shährüd and Bastäm, deeming it prudent, however, to halt for a time at Jäjarm, a town in the Arghiyän district near the western end of the great Isfaräyin plain, for they had received word at Bastäm that Malik Mahmüd was aware of their march, and had left Mashhad and camped with a strong force four stages to the east of them on the Isfaräyin plain. Malik Mahmüd, however, soon fell back to his capital, the reason being, according to Mirzä Mahdi, that he had learnt that Nädir (who was still known by his original name of Nadr Quli Beg), having quelled a disturbance in Merv,1 was marching direct on Mashhad.1 2 At or about this time, Tahmäsp sent Hasan ‘Ali Beg, his Mu'ayyir al-Mamälik or Chief Assayer,3 to Nädir to ask for his assistance. Some months previously, whilst he was still roaming the forests of Mäzandarän, Tahmäsp, having heard of the military prowess of Nädir, had sent this same Hasan ‘Ali Beg to see what manner of man he was. Even at that time, Nädir’s fame as a military leader had become widespread in northern Persia, and it is probable that Tahmäsp may have received information regarding him from his general Muhammad Khän Turkman, with whom Nädir had co-operated for a time against Malik Mahmüd.4 Hasan ‘Alï Khän had evidently been favourably impressed by Nädir on this previous occasion, because, acting on Tahmäsp’s behalf, he appointed him Deputy Governor of Abïvard. Nädir had at that time urged Tahmäsp, through Hasan ‘Ali Beg, to bring his army to Khuräsän, but the prince had not done so. There can be no doubt that the main reason for Hasan ‘Alï Beg’s second mission was to obtain Nädir’s help against Malik Mahmüd, but it is also possible that Tahmäsp wished to have Nädir with him as a counterpoise to the forceful Fath ‘Ali Khän. As soon as Nädir received Tahmäsp’s message through Hasan ‘Ali Beg, he abandoned the idea of advancing on Mashhad, and marched instead to Khabüshän which he reached on 8/19 September, 1 For particulars of this disturbance, see the TN, p. 31. 2 TN, p. 35. Muhammad Muhsin, in his ZT, fol. 212a gives the much less convincing reason for Malik Mafrmüd’s retreat that he hastened back to Mashhad because a strong gust of wind blew down all his tents; this he took to be a bad omen. 3 For the functions of this important official, see the TM, p. 58. 4 See p. 279 above.

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some time after the arrival there of the prince and his entourage.1 Nadir had with him a force of 5000 comparatively well-trained and seasoned Afshär and Kurdish levies. His contingent thus considerably outnumbered that of Fath ‘Ali Khän Qäjär.2 Nädir at that time was in the prime of life, being 37 years of age. Though of humble origin, he had already made a name for himself as an intrepid military leader; for a time he had been a successful freebooter, though his activities had been for the most part of a more legitimate nature.3 When Nädir was conducted into Tahmäsp’s presence, he knelt down and humbly kissed the prince’s feet. Tahmäsp, who was naturally pleased to have such a welcome addition to his strength, received Nädir with honour and gave him the title of Tahmäsp Qulï Khän.4 Almost immediately afterwards, Tahmäsp, in company with Fath ‘Ali Khän and Nädir and their respective contingents, left Khabüshän to attack Malik Mahmüd, and on 2 Safar 1139 (29 September 1726) they pitched their camp near the mausoleum of Khwàja Rabï‘,5 3 miles to the north of Mashhad.6 In the days that followed, Nädir led the royal troops repeatedly to the attack, but, owing to their lack of artillery and the obstinacy of Malik Mahmüd’s forces- they were unable to penetrate the defences. Whilst this military trial of strength was in progress, another of a different nature was taking place in the royal camp. Fath ‘All Khän was quick to recognise in Nädir a most dangerous obstacle to the realisation of his ambitious aims, whilst Nädir could not fail to notice the hold which the Qäjär chief had obtained over the 1 This important date is given by Avramov, in his Zapiski, p. 93. 2 This date and the figure of 5000 men are given by Avramov in his Zapiski^ p. 93. In the ZT, fol. 212 a, no date is given and Nadir’s strength is put at only 2000. 3 I have refrained from burdening the narrative with a detailed account of Nadir’s origin and early career, as this will be found in ch. 11 of my Nadir Shah, 4 Avramov, loc, cit, p. 93. 6 Khwâja Rabi‘, who was a contemporary and friend of ‘Ali, is looked upon as the patron saint of the Sunnis in Khurasan. The existing mausoleum was built by Shäh ‘Abbäs I during the period 1617-21. There is an excellent photograph of this mausoleum by the late Robert Byron in the Survey of Persian Art (Oxford, 1938), vol. iv, plate 487 (since this photograph was taken, the dome has been repaired). 6 TNt p. 36.

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unfortunate Tahmâsp. The prince’s courtiers, quick to combine when anyone from outside threatened their supremacy, had viewed with alarm the rapid growth of Fath ‘Ali Khän’s influence; consequently when Nadir appeared on the scene, they decided to support him in order thereby to undermine Fath ‘Ali Khän’s position. Thus the stage was set for a struggle between the two rivals. There can be no doubt that it was because Fath ‘Aß Khän realised that Nädir would prove too strong for him that he decided, early in October, to abandon Tahmâsp and throw in his lot with Malik Mahmüd. On 29 September/10 October Nädir intercepted one of Fath ‘Ali Khän’s men who was bearing a letter from his master to Malik Mahmüd in which he proposed to betray Tahmâsp.1 On the following day Nädir communicated this letter to Tahmâsp who, in a rage, summoned Fath ‘Ali Khän to his presence and asked him to justify himself. This the Qäjär chief was unable to do, with the result that he was arrested and confined in a tent in Nädir’s camp. Tahmâsp wished to execute Fath ‘Ali Khän immediately, but Nädir, no doubt fearing the effect that this action would have on the Qäjärs, suggested that his life should be spared and that he should be incarcerated in the great natural fortress of Kalät-i-Nädiri until the fall of Mashhad, when he could be set at liberty.2 Tahmâsp appeared to acquiesce in this course, but later in the day, whilst Nädir was absent at a council meeting, he sent a Qäjär named Mahdi and another man, who both had suffered at Fath ‘Ali Khän’s hands, to Nädir’s camp to put the chief to death. Nädir’s guards, thinking that the men had come from their master, allowed them to enter the tent in which Fath ‘Ali Khän was confined and to cut off his head. Thus perished the man who, if he had lived, would have been Nädir’s most serious rival. The manner in which this ambitious Qäjär chieftain met his death has long been a matter of controversy. The historians of the Qäjär period naturally tried to prove that he was a martyr, having been done to death through the calumnies of his rival Nädir.3 1 Avramov, loc. cit. p. 94. See also Muhammad Muhsin, ZT, fols. 212 b and 223 b. a Avramov, loc. cit. p. 94; TN, p. 37. 3 Rida Qull Khan, Raudat al-Safä, vol. vm. ‘Abd al-Razzâq, as quoted by Sir Harford Jones Brydges in The Dynasty of the Kajars, p. 5, said: “ Nadir Shah Afshar. . .who had already taken some hostile steps and endeavoured to grasp the regal crown, also joined Shah Tahmasp. He soon discovered that Faty [sic]

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

It is, however, abundantly clear, both from Avramov’s journal,1 and Muhammad Muhsin’s narrative,2 that the real reason for Fath * Ali Khan’s disgrace and death was the discovery of his incriminating letter to Malik Mahmüd and that Nädir was not responsible for the removal of his rival from his path. Avramov’s statement is all the more valuable because he had obviously “no axe to grind” and his testimony can therefore be looked upon as strictly impartial. What is most curious is that Mîrzâ Mahdï, Nädir’s own historio­ grapher, makes no mention at all of Fath ‘AH Khan’s treasonable correspondence with Malik Mahmüd, merely stating that the Qäjär chief, having met with some unpleasantness at the hands of Tahmäsp’s ministers, expressed a wish to return to Astaräbäd, ostensibly for the purpose of raising more troops. This request was not pleasing to the ministers who, not daring to take any action themselves, had the matter brought to Tahmäsp’s notice when Nadir was present. Mîrzâ Mahdï then went on to say, probably correctly, that Nädir counselled moderation, but that Tahmäsp, after apparently agreeing, sent his two emissaries to slay Fath ‘Ali Khän when Nädir was out of the way at a council meeting.3 The news of Fath ‘Ali Khän’s execution caused consternation, particularly, of course, in the Qäjär camp, but, in the resulting confusion, Muhammad Hasan Khän,4 Fath ‘All Khän’s eldest son, who was then a boy of u, escaped and took refuge with the Yamüt Turcomans.5 As a precautionary measure, a number of Fath ‘All Khän’s leading Qäjär supporters had been arrested at the time of his fall, but neither Tahmäsp nor Nädir had any wish further to antagonise this powerful tribe, and so treated them leniently. On 4/15 October, they were all forgiven, although some were fined.6 Aly Khan was an obstacle to his designs, and therefore lay in wait to disgrace and calumniate this excellent person. At last, Shah Tahmasp, having assented to the suggestions of his insane nobles, made Faty Ali Khan swallow the draught of martyrdom, on the 14th Safar in the year 1139” (11 October 1726, which is the correct date). 1 Zapiski, p. 94. 2 ZT, fols. 212 b and 223 b. 3 TAT, p. 37. For the probable reason for this omission, see p. 513 below. 4 Muhammad Hasan Khän’s son, Äghä Muhammad Khän, the founder of the Qäjär dynasty, was crowned as Shäh in 1796, the year before his wellmerited assassination. 6 ZT, fol. 223 a; Raudat al-Safäy l-yi-Nâsirï, vol. vm. 6 Avramov, Zapiski, loc. cit. p. 94; he stated that these Qäjärs were fined 100,000 roubles in all.

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THE TURN OF THE TIDE

The news of Fath ‘Alï Khan’s death was welcomed by Malik Mahmud, who believed that it would greatly weaken the attacking force. Having successfully withstood Nâdir in the past, he had no fear of him now.1 On the other hand, Tahmäsp, rejoicing at having got rid of his Qäjär taskmaster, showed great favour to Nädir, giving him almost complete control over military affairs and appointing him Qurchi-bäshi2 The siege of Mashhad was continued with unabated energy, but met with no success, except that, on one occasion when Malik Mahmüd made a sortie in force, he and his men were driven back with heavy loss. However, although the defenders were standing their ground so well, Pir Muhammad, Malik Mahmud’s commander-in-chief, at last despaired of ultimate success. He secretly sent word to Nadir that on the night (i.e. the eve) of 16 Rabî‘ 13 he would open one of the gates and allow the royal troops to enter the city. On the night in question, Nädir and his troops took up their position as close to this gate as possible. Pïr Muhammad, true to his undertaking, as soon as night fell, killed the guards who were on duty, threw their bodies down outside the walls and opened the gate. Nädir and his troops immediately rushed through and took possession of much of the city. On the following morning Malik Mahmud launched two fierce attacks, but they both failed; he thereupon retired with what remained of his forces to the citadel, leaving Nädir in possession of the rest of Mashhad.4 This important event, which was the first step towards the re-establishment of the royal authority in Persia and which Muhammad Muhsin described as “the sunrise of His Majesty’s [i.e. Nädir’s] reign”,5 took place on n November 1726.6 1 TN, p. 37. 2 ZT, fol. 223 b. Shaikh Muhammad ‘All IJazin, in his Ahwäl, pp. 174-5, stated: “By degrees he [Nädir] became the object on which the royal favours centred, and by the aid of fortune obtained the powerful and illustrious situation of Corchi Bashi Gari, and the title of Tahmasp Coli Khan.’* According to Avramov, Tahmäsp conferred this title on Nädir at Khabüshän. 8 10 November 1726. 4 TN, p. 38; ZT, fols. 212b and 223 b; see also Avramov, loc. cit. p. 95, who confirms the statement by Mirza Mahdi and Muhammad Muhsin that the town was taken by treachery from within. 6 ZT, fol. 223 a. 6 The chronology of the Persian authorities is very faulty here, and it is only through Avramov, who states that Mashhad fell “at the beginning of November” (O.S.), that we can solve the problem. Mirzä Mahdi states (TN, p. 38) that the

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Soon afterwards, Malik Mahmud, realising the futility of further resistance, came humbly to Nädir, plucked the jiqa or emblem of royalty from his turban, and retired to a cell in the shrine of the Imäm Ridä, where for some time he lived the life of a qalandar or dervish. In order to fulfil a vow that he had made previously, Nadir gave orders for the shrine to be repaired, for the dome over the tomb­ chamber of the Imam to be gilded afresh and for a minaret, also embellished with gold, to be erected close to this dome.1 gate of the city was opened on the night (or rather eve) of 16 Rabi' II, which corresponds to the night of io/ii December 1726. Muhammad Muhsin, in his ZT, first (fol. 212b) gives the date as Rabï‘ I, 1138, omitting the day of the month and getting the year wrong; later (fol. 223 b) he gives it, as Mirzä Mahdi did, as 16 Rabi' II, but he again gets the year wrong. What appears to have happened is that either Mirzä Mahdi himself or a copyist erroneously gave the month as Rabi' II, whereas it should be Rabi' I, 1139, the 16th of which is 11 November 1726, a date which is in agreement with Avramov’s statement. 1 TN, p. 39. For Nadir’s probable motives for taking this action, see my Nadir Shah, p. 27.

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE CLASH BETWEEN TAHMÄSP AND NADIR The capture of Mashhad and the overthrow of Malik Mahmüd were the first outward and visible signs that the tide had at last turned in Tahmâsp’s favour, but a great deal had yet to be done. Malik Mahmud, powerful though he had been, was the least formidable of the foes who had to be subdued before the prince could ascend the throne of his fathers in Isfahän. The one man who, it seemed, possessed the requisite qualities for carrying out this lengthy and exceedingly difficult and dangerous task was Tahmâsp’s new ally Nadir, but even he could not hope to succeed unless there were a close understanding and unity of purpose between him and the prince. Unfortunately, Tahmâsp’s ministers did not view the matter in this light at all. Thinking only of their own sordid and ignoble aims, they soon came to regard Nädir not as the potential deliverer of their country, but merely as an even greater obstacle to their interests than Fath ‘All Khän Qäjär had been. When they saw to what an extent Nädir had won favour with Tahmâsp, they immediately set to work to poison the prince’s mind against him, while Tahmâsp, in Muhammad Muhsin’s words,1 “by reason of his youth and his reliance upon them, believed their baseless statements”. The situation in which Nädir thus found himself when the bulk of his task was yet to be done can be better appreciated if we now give some further consideration to Tahmâsp’s character and behaviour. Fortunately for our purpose, we now have, in Avramov’s Zapiski, by far the fullest and most vivid account of Tahmâsp as he was at this juncture that has come down to us. Avramov confirms and greatly amplifies the somewhat brief comments by Muhammad Muhsin and Mirzä Mahdi to which some reference has been made. As will be seen below, he shows how the prince, especially when under the influence of drink, could change his mood from ferocity to gaiety and back again almost in a matter of seconds. On 23 October/3 November 1726, just over a week before the * ZT, fol, zizb; see also Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alî Hazin, Ahwäl, p. 175.

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fall of Mashhad, Avramov stated in his journal that Tahmäsp ordered a Georgian prince named Husain Qulï Beg1 to bring him some strong Caucasian spirit called chikhir12 Husain Qulï Beg replied that there was none available, whereupon Tahmäsp worked himself up into a rage and shouted that he must bring some. The Georgian, after reflecting a moment, said that the Russian envoy (Avramov) had some chikhir, but added that he would not part with it. Tahmäsp, who was still in a fury, then said that he would have Avramov’s head cut off, and set off immediately to the Russian camp, calling out that all the Russians were to be robbed and beheaded. Tahmäsp’s emissaries rushed into Avramov’s tent and took him, clad only in a shirt, before the prince; they did not even allow him time to put his boots on. Avramov, thinking that his last moments had come, flung himself at Tahmäsp’s feet and asked for mercy. “You must be afraid of me”, said Tahmäsp. “How can I not be afraid of Your Majesty?” Avramov replied. To this Tahmäsp rejoined: “Then, if you really are afraid of me, why don’t you bring me some chikhir?” Avramov, still clad only in his shirt, was then taken to Tahmäsp’s house. On arrival, he saw that Tahmäsp was covered with mud, as he had fallen into a ditch or stream on the way. Tahmäsp, who was in a very bad humour because he had had to go in search of Avramov, said angrily to him: “I am very dirty, and it is all your fault!” Avramov immediately went to his tent and returned with some chikhir, whereupon Tahmäsp’s mood suddenly changed. He ordered a feast to be prepared and bade his musicians play the balalaika. As they played, he clapped with his hands in time with the music. After he had told some stories of a very salacious nature, his mood again suddenly changed. Turning to Avramov, he said: “You and Ismä‘il Beg3 are responsible for the loss of my kingdom ! ’ ’ 1 I have been unable to identify this Georgian prince. He may have been a relative of Constantine of Kakheti. Constantine’s nephew, Muhammad Mirzä, was also a member of Tahmäsp’s entourage at this time. 2 This word is possibly of Circassian origin. Chikhir was a raw spirit con­ taining a fairly high percentage of alcohol. 3 The envoy who went to Russia and signed the treaty of 23 September 1723 ; see pp. 246-8 above.

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Poor Avramov was once more overcome with terror, and attempted to justify himself, but Tahmäsp interrupted him, saying: “Stop! Don’t let us talk any more business. Let us be gay instead!” He then ordered the musicians to play again, and had chikhir, hors d’œuvres (zakuska) and apples handed round. When the bottles of chikhir were empty, Tahmäsp asked Avramov whether he had any more; when Avramov replied in the affirmative, he had the bottles filled again. Later, he asked Avramov whether he could keep some chikhir for him, and bade him prepare more of it and also some vodka for his use.1 It is clear from Avramov’s record that Tahmäsp often spent his time in this way, and frequent requests for vodka are mentioned in his journal. After his trying experience at Khwäja Rabî‘, Avramov used to send the vodka without protest. Nevertheless, he was once again, shortly before his return to Russia, given a great fright when a drunken official came to his house at midnight, saying that Tahmäsp was very angry with him and that he must send some vodka at once. At the beginning of 1729, when Avramov asked the Mihmândâr-bâshï why he was not allowed to go back to Russia, the latter replied that he had heard that Tahmäsp wanted some more vodka and that, if Avramov would provide it, he would then be allowed to go. In the end, Avramov managed to satisfy the prince in this way, and returned to his own country.2 In his comments on this part of Avramov’s journal, M. MiklukhoMaklai states that it is clear that Tahmäsp was not stupid by nature, but that he had no will of his own, and that, through his harem upbringing, he had fallen into drunken and debauched habits. Those of his officials who were honest and well-meaning were very pessimistic. On one occasion the Mihmândâr-bâshi told Avramov that, so far as he could see, the Shäh (as he termed Tahmäsp)3 1 Zapiski, pp. 95-6. 2 Ibid. p. 97. 3 Tahmäsp was always addressed as such by his adherents, as he had pro­ claimed himself Shah at Qazvin immediately after hearing of the fall of Isfahan and the abdication of his father. As, however, the real power in Persia was in the hands first of Mafrmud and then of Ashraf, they had a better claim than Tahmäsp to the title, at any rate in a de facto capacity. In order to avoid confusion, I have therefore referred to Tahmäsp either by name or as “the prince” until he was able to mount the throne in Içfahân in November 1729.

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would never succeed in his life, because he was always drunk and no one dared to take him to task about it.1 It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast in personality than that between this degenerate descendant of Shäh ‘Abbäs I and Nadir. Nadir, in fact, was everything that poor Tahmäsp was not. He was supremely confident in his own abilities and very strongwilled; although he liked his pleasures at times, he never allowed them to interfere with the realisation of his aims. His ambition was unlimited and his energy truly astonishing. Very soon after the fall of Mashhad the effects of the campaign which Tahmäsp’s ministers were so sedulously conducting against Nàdir became apparent. Relations between the prince and Nädir speedily became strained, and early in February the breach was so complete that Tahmäsp and his courtiers left Mashhad for Khabüshän, where they proceeded to stir up the Kurds and other fickle tribesmen against Nädir. It is said that Tahmäsp went so far as to try to win over Malik Mahmüd in his endeavours to over­ throw Nädir. Malik Mahmüd, however, informed Nädir that he had done so.2 But although he was unsuccessful in the case of Malik Mahmüd, Tahmäsp met with almost immediate success with the fickle Kurdish and other tribes of northern Khuräsän, with the result that revolts broke out in various places and Nädir’s work of unification was speedily undone. Prompted by his ministers, Tahmäsp sent manifestos to the Astaräbäd and Mäzandarän and the Girailï districts denouncing Nädir as a traitor.3 Malik Mahmüd, repenting of his rapprochement with Nädir and perhaps tired already of the life of a qalandar, incited the Tatars of Merv to revolt again.4 The situation was serious for Nädir, as he could depend with certainty only on part of his own tribe, the Afshärs, and on the Jaläyirs, under his faithful follower Tahmäsp Khän Wakïl (who was also known as Tahmäsp Khän Jaläyir). It was not in Nädir’s nature to hesitate in moments of danger. He immediately seized Tahmäsp’s treasure and all his belongings that he had left behind, and handed over to his army the prince’s horses and camels. All Tahmäsp’s adherents in Mashhad, no matter how exalted, were placed under strong guard, and the 1 Zapiski, p. 97. 8 Avramov’s Zapiski, p. 98; see also the TN, p. 40.

316

2 TN, p. 40. 4 TN, p. 45.

THE CLASH BETWEEN TAHMÄSP AND NÄDIR

royal palace, the government offices and the residences of Tahmäsp’s rtimäd al-Daula and Qullar-äqäsi were sealed and guards were placed at their doors.1 Leaving his brother Ibrâhîm Khän in command in Mashhad, Nädir hastened north-westwards with all the troops that could be spared. On his way he met with and defeated some of the rebellious Kurds, and then marched to Khabüshän, where Tahmäsp still was, and laid siege to it. Nädir’s vigorous measures took the prince and his supporters by surprise. Not having expected a siege, they had laid in only a small stock of provisions, and were soon in great straits. Early in March, as we learn from Avramov,2 Tahmäsp sent the Mulläbäshi (Mir Muhammad Husain) to Nädir’s camp. When Avramov asked one of Nädir’s officers why Mir Muhammad Husain had come, the officer replied that he had come on behalf of the prince to negotiate for peace. On the day before (5 March), this officer added, Nädir had had a long talk with the Mullä-bäshi. When Nädir said that he feared that Tahmäsp would kill him, Mir Muhammad Husain replied that the prince had sworn by God that he would not harm him. To this, Nädir answered ironically: “ Oh, I know the Shäh very well. He is so reliable and truthful. He swore [to protect] Fath ‘All Khän in the morning, and in the evening he gave orders for his head to be cut off!” Nevertheless, although Nädir, with good reason, could place no reliance on Tahmäsp’s word, he decided to make peace with him, as it was necessary for him to have the prince at least nominally on his side in order to be able to carry out his plans. Tahmäsp and Nädir thereupon came to terms, and the former agreed to go to Mashhad. It was a complete victory for Nädir. Meanwhile, Malik Mahmüd’s endeavours to incite the Tatars in Merv to rebel having been discovered, he was put to death, in company with his brother Malik Muhammad ‘Ali, and his nephew Malik Ishäq, on 27 February/10 March.3 Nädir preceded Tahmäsp to Mashhad by a few days and made great preparations for his reception, which took place on Nau Rüz. x Avramov, Zapiski, p. 98. 8 Ibid, p. 99. 3 ZT, fol. 213a; see also Avramov’s Zapiski, p. 95, where the date of this event is given.

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Nadir received Tahmäsp with great manifestations of honour and had the shrine of the Imäm Ridä and the main thoroughfares illuminated at night. For several days the Nau Rüz celebrations continued, and it seemed that peaceful relations between Nädir and Tahmäsp were restored.1 However, Nädir knew full well that he could not trust Tahmäsp, while the latter, though forced for the time being to co-operate, was merely biding his time until he could once more openly resist. Hardly were these celebrations over when a series of risings took place in various parts of Khuräsän and also in Merv, forcing Nädir to hasten off to quell them. No sooner had he put down a revolt in one district than another broke out somewhere else, thus seriously interfering with his preparations for the major trial of strength with the formidable Abdâlï and Ghalzai Afghans. The chief offenders were certain of the Turcoman tribes12 and the Chamishgazak, Shädillü and Qarächorlü3 Kurds, whose word, to quote Mïrzâ Mahdi, was “like water”. Knowing full well where the responsibility for some of these outbreaks lay, Nädir, in the course of an audience with Tahmäsp on 17/28 April 1727, peremptorily bade the prince dismiss his Qullar-äqäsi, and other leaders and ministers, and also his eunuchs. Having no alternative, Tahmäsp agreed to do so. On the following day, feeling that he had gone too far, Nädir had a further audience, when he asked Tahmäsp to cancel the dismissal orders on certain conditions. Nädir then bluntly informed the prince that he had no confidence in him. As before, Tahmäsp had to acquiesce, so Nädir was again the victor in the unequal contest.4 It is clear from what Avramov and other authorities recorded that Tahmäsp’s state was every bit as pitiable as it had been when he was dominated by Fath ‘All Khän Qäjär. Another serious crisis in the relations between Tahmäsp and Nädir occurred on 12/23 October 1727 at Sabzavär, when Nädir’s 1 ZT, fol. 213b. 2 TN, p. 43. Mïrzâ Mahdi gives a very detailed account of these widespread and long-continued disturbances in the TN, pp. 39-44; for a summary, see my Nadir Shah, pp. 28-30. 3 Mirza Mahdi, in his TN, p. 41, spoke highly of the fighting qualities of this tribe. 4 Avramov, Zapiski, p. ico. Avramov’s informant was one of the Georgian princes who were with Tahmäsp.

318

THE CLASH BETWEEN TAHMÄSP AND NÄDIR

forces defeated those of the prince and took the latter prisoner. That night Tahmäsp, on the pretext that he wanted to wash his hands, left his tent and escaped. He had covered about a mile from the camp when Nadir discovered what had happened. Hastening after him quite alone, Nadir soon came up with him. Poor Tahmäsp was in such terrible distress that he attempted to kill himself with a knife, but Nädir wrenched it from him. He then took the prince back to the camp and later sent him, under strong escort, to Mashhad, accompanied by only two of his servants. Thereafter Nädir kept Tahmäsp’s seal in his possession and used it to issue decrees and orders in the prince’s name.1 It is impossible not to sympathise with the luckless Tahmäsp in his sufferings and humiliation, but it must be borne in mind that, by reason of his intrigues against Nädir, he brought part at any rate of his troubles on himself. From Nädir’s point of view, it was galling in the extreme to have to postpone repeatedly his pre­ parations for the Afghan and other major campaigns that lay ahead in order to attain unity of purpose in his own camp. Notwithstanding all Nädir’s precautionary measures, Tahmäsp succeeded in inciting his commander in Persian Träq, Muhammad ‘Alï Khän by name, to revolt. This man was responsible for quite a serious rising in northern Khuräsän in which, as was almost always the case, the turbulent Qarächorlü, Chamishgazak and other Kurdish tribes joined. However, by the summer of 1728, Nädir and Tahmäsp were, outwardly at any rate, on sufficiently good terms to embark on an expedition against the Abdâlï Afghans. As will be related in the next chapter, they returned to Mashhad in August, having achieved no decisive results. In the following October the alarming news reached Mashhad that Dhu’l-Fiqär Khän, a cousin1 2 or nephew3 of Muhammad ‘All Khän, had collected some 8000 Qäjärs and Turcomans and had taken Astaräbäd. He was then said to be marching to rescue Tahmäsp from Nädir. On the day that this news arrived (18/29 October 1728), as we 1 Avramov, Zapiski, p. 101 ; see also the ZT, fol. 213 b. 2 TN, p. 54. This DhuT-Fiqär may have been identical with the leader of that name mentioned on p. 281 above. 3 ZT, fol. 214a.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

learn from Avramov, Nadir went to see Tahmäsp and reproached him bitterly, saying:1 ‘‘How long are you going on being so foolish? You are only intriguing against your own people, and so are giving the enemy more time; they are only too glad.” Tahmäsp replied: “I was not aware of that and I did not give Dhu’l-Fiqär permission to revolt.” To this Nädir rejoined: “I know for certain that you sent orders to Dhu’l-Fiqär!”2 However, after this argument had been progressing for some time, the matter was smoothed over, and Tahmäsp appears to have co-operated with Nädir in the stern measures which he took against Dhu’l-Fiqär.3 These measures resulted in the rebel’s capture and execution.4 Thereafter Tahmäsp realised that he could not deflect Nädir by intrigue and so must perforce co-operate with him in the real trial of strength with the Abdâlïs. 1 Avramov’s Zapiski, p. 102. 2 It appears from the TN, pp. 53-4, that Muhammad ‘Ali Khân had induced Dhu’l-Fiqär to rebel. There seems no doubt that Tahmäsp was directly or indirectly responsible. 3 ZT, fol. 214 a. 4 For a detailed account, see the TN, pp. 53-5. Mirzä Mahdi said of Dhu’lFiqär that he had “ the pride of a lion and the courage of a mouse ” (TN, p. 55).

320

CHAPTER XXV

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABDÂLÏ AFGHANS As we have seen in the last chapter, the struggle for supremacy between Tahmäsp and his all-powerful henchman Nädir had resulted at Sabzavär in a complete victory for the latter. Thence­ forward, there was an uneasy and unequal partnership between them. Tahmäsp was now practically powerless1 and had to do whatever Nädir wished. In the military sense, he was useless; nevertheless, as the only surviving son of Shäh Sultän Husain and the one person who had a legitimate claim to the throne of Persia, he was essential to Nädir. This was a fact of great importance, as it made a very strong appeal to the innate loyalty of the Persian people. Nädir’s plan was to attack and subdue the Abdâlï Afghans before embarking on the still more difficult and dangerous task of crushing the Ghalzais and restoring the Safavî monarchy. There is no doubt that this was sound strategy. Although the Abdâlïs had been, as we have seen, weakened by their internal dissensions, they were still a very powerful and warlike tribe. It is true that they did not appear to be a menace at that particular time, and that there was but little likelihood of their taking concerted action in order to support the Ghalzais (whom they disliked). There was, however, always the possibility that they might take advantage of the absence of Tahmäsp and Nädir and their forces from western Khuräsän to invade it and take Mashhad, thus striking what might well prove to be a fatal blow at the movement for the liberation of Persia. Although Nädir had unlimited confidence in his powers of leadership, he was already experienced enough to realise that he still had a great deal to do to weld the manpower at his disposal into a formidable fighting unit. The long series of defeats under the incompetent Safavî generals had so impaired the morale of the 1 However, as Nädir was to find, some of Tahmäsp’s supporters were to prove a source of trouble to him. 21

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LSD

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Persians that, save in some exceptional cases,1 the mere sight of an Afghan was almost enough to make them fly in terror. Confidence in their leaders and also in their own fighting qualities had to be restored; proper military training and discipline had also to be inculcated. There was, in fact, so much leeway to be made up that any one less determined and ambitious than Nädir might well have abandoned the task in despair. Although the numerous risings by the Turcomans, Kurds, and other recalcitrant elements diverted Nadir’s energies from his main project and caused regrettable delays, they nevertheless served to give his raw troops their baptism of fire, as well as some measure of training and experience. In the summer of 1727 Nädir set out at the head of some 8000 men with the dual object of subduing a Sïstânî chief named Husain Sultän and of attacking and crushing the Afghans of Sangän and Behdädin.2 Husain Sultän had been induced to rebel by the late Malik Mahmud, and a brother of the latter named Malik Kalb ‘Ali and his son Malik Lutf ‘Ali were amongst his supporters. As for the Afghans of Sangän and Behdädin, they were a branch of the Abdälis of Herat. Nädir speedily reduced Husain Sultän to obedience, but he failed to capture Malik Kalb ‘Ali and his son, who made their escape and joined Ashraf at Isfahän.3 The Afghans of Sangän submitted without resistance, but those of Behdädin held out in the citadel of that town for days. The Afghan chief then surrendered, promising to keep the peace. Meanwhile, however, the Sangäni Afghans rose in revolt in Nädir’s rear. Sending hurriedly to Mashhad for some heavy cannon, Nädir marched to Sangän and laid siege to it. After the cannon arrived and had begun the bombardment of the town, Nädir had a very narrow escape from death whilst training his artillerymen. Fortunately for him, he had stepped backward several paces just before one of the cannon was fired. The cannon then burst, killing several officers and men.4 1 E.g. the brave inhabitants of Qazvîn and Ben Içfahân. 2 These two towns are situated in the southern part of the Khwäf district. Sangän is 62 miles south by west of Turbat-i-Shaikh Jam and 40 miles west of the present Perso-Afghan frontier. Behdädin, which is now known as Behdävin, is 17 miles south by west of Sangän. 3 TN, p. 46. 4 TN, p. 47.

322

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABDÂLÏS

Soon afterwards Nadir took Sangän by assault and put all the garrison to the sword because they had merely feigned submission. Whilst this siege was in progress, the Afghans of Behdâdin also revolted and sent an urgent appeal for aid to Herat. In response, between 7000 and 8000 Abdâlïs marched to their assistance, and then set out to attack Nadir and his army. The two forces met near Sangän. In view of the lack of experience of many of his men, Nadir placed the major portion of his force in trenches, while he and his well-trained cavalry, who were some 500 strong, repeatedly charged the Afghans. Although the men in the trenches also wished to take part in the fighting, Nädir refused to let them do so. After four days of fighting and skirmishing, the Abdâlïs, in the words of Mirza Mahdi, “exchanged fight for flight”1 and retired to Herat. Feeling very strongly that there was still need for caution, Nädir refrained from pursuit and returned to Mashhad. Tahmäsp, it is said, repeatedly asked Nädir to march on Isfahän, but he always refused to do so, saying that it would be most unwise to take such action so long as the nearer enemy, namely the Abdâlïs, remained unsubdued.2 It was then agreed between Nädir and Tahmäsp that they should make a joint expedition against the Abdälis. Nädir was to start from Mashhad and Tahmäsp from Nishäpür, and they were to join forces at Sultänäbäd, a town in the Turshïz district 40 miles to the west of Turbat-i-Haidarï. Nädir duly set out, but Tahmäsp’s ministers persuaded him to give up the project and go to Mäzan­ darän instead. Tahmäsp, however, asked Nädir to continue the advance on Herat alone. Nädir thereupon set out, but he had not gone far when he heard that the prince’s ministers were again busily plotting against him and were sowing disaffection in the royal forces. Nädir immediately gave up all thought of the Herat expedition and hastened back to Mashhad. Soon afterwards the crisis at Sabzavär between him and Tahmäsp occurred, as related in the last chapter. According to Avramov, but to no other source, Nädir and Tahmäsp embarked on a joint expedition against Herat in the summer of 1728, but it led to no conclusive result. Avramov gives no details of the campaign; all that can be said is that if any fighting 1 TN, p. 48; Mirzä Mahdi’s play upon words runs: harb-râ bi-harb badal säkhta. 1 TN, p. 49.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

occurred, it must have been indecisive in character. Nädir and Tahmäsp arrived back in Mashhad in August.1 That Nädir was under no illusions as to the magnitude of the task before him is clear from a conversation which he had with Avramov some little time afterwards. When Avramov complained to him that he was still being detained in Persia, Nädir said to him: I shall tell you the whole truth why you are being detained. We are going to attack nearly 500,000 Abdâlî Afghans. If we win, you will be a witness of the fact, and you will then be allowed to go and tell your Russian brothers, so that they may return to their ships and sail away. But if we should lose, you must know that that would be the end of the Persian state, and you would have to take care of yourself... .12

The Abdälis, having had ample warning of the threatened attack, set about composing their differences.3 The chief rivals for power at this time were Allah-Yär Khän, a brother of Muhammad Khän Afghan, of Multän, and Dhu’l-Fiqär Khän, the elder son of Muhammad Zamän Khän.4 Allah-Yär Khän was made Governor of Herat and placed in command of the main Abdäll forces, whilst his former rival Dhu’l Fiqär was appointed Governor of Faräh. It was not until 4 Shawwäl 1141 (3 May 1729) that Nädir, having completed his preparations and having reached what appeared to be a lasting modus vivendi with Tahmäsp, set out from Mashhad in company with him and marched southwards through Jäm, Farmandäbäd (now known as Farmanäbäd) and Käriz.5 Simul­ taneously, the Abdäll forces, under Allah-Yär Khän, advanced north-westwards from Herat. The opposing armies confronted each other near Käfir QaFa,6* where the Abdälis, under Muhammad Zamän Khän, had so signally defeated the Persians under Safi Qulï Khän ten years earlier. 1 Zapiski, p. 101. It is very curious that there is no mention of this expedition in the TN, or any other Persian source. Were it not for the fact that Avramov is such a reliable authority, one would be inclined to doubt whether it really took place. 8 Zapiski, p. 101. 8 See p. 101 above for details. 4 Muhammad Zaman Khan’s younger son was Ahmad Khän, the future Ahmad Shäh Durrani ; he was about 6 years old at this time. 6 Käriz, a small town 15 miles west of the Harï-rüd, was the birth-place of al-Muqanna‘, the “Veiled Prophet of Khuräsän”. 6 Now known as Islam Qal‘a.

324

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABDÄLIS

Nadir pursued the same cautious policy that he had adopted when fighting against the Abdâlïs in 1727. Restraining the ardour of his troops, he surrounded his infantry with his artillery and posted his cavalry on one of the flanks. The Abdälis were the first to attack and desperate fighting took place. A severe Abdäli charge threw the Persian infantry into confusion and broke through their ranks, but Nädir retrieved the fortunes of the day by a furious cavalry charge, and himself cut down one of the Afghan leaders; in the process he received a lance-thrust in the right foot,1 but the wound was not serious. It has been said that the man who wounded him was an Abdäli named Hajji Mishkin, who had sworn to kill him or die in the attempt.12 Night was by now coming on, and both sides withdrew to their respective lines. On the next day the Abdälis retired to the Hari-rüd, with Nädir’s forces in pursuit. The Afghans managed, however, to cross the river and take up a position outside the town of Kusüya, 60 miles west by north of Herat. Here another severe battle was fought, in which the Afghans suffered a heavy defeat, being forced to retreat in such haste to Herat that they left all their artillery, tents and baggage in the hands of the victorious Persians. Mirzä Mahdi, in his comments on this striking success, quoted the words from the Quv'äir. “That God may separate the wicked from the good.”3 After suffering this severe reverse, the Abdälis fell back preci­ pitately on Herat, where, however, they rallied, and advanced once more to meet the Persians. The two armies encountered each other near the village of Ribät-i-Pariän, 15 miles west-north-west of Herat and six miles north of the Hari-rüd. The battle which, like the two previous engagements, was hotly contested, lasted the whole day. The Abdälis then withdrew from the field having lost over a thousand men killed. A dust storm, lasting for 48 hours, effectively prevented any resumption of the fighting. When it was over, Allah-Yär Khän sent a messenger to the Persian camp with proposals for peace, but Nädir refused to listen to them unless Allah-Yär Khän and his

1 TN, p. 57. 2 ‘Abd al-Karîm ‘Alavî, Tä’rlkh-i-Ahmad (Lucknow, 1850), p. 4. See also Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahmän, “ Tä’rikh-i-Ahmad Shäh Durrani”. 3 Qur'än, vin, 38.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

fellow-chiefs came in person to make them. Allah-Yär Khan was about to comply when he received word that Dhu’l-Fiqär was advancing from Farah to his relief. Nädir, after detaching part of his force to repel Dhu’l-Fiqär, encamped with the bulk of his army at Shäkibän, 25 miles to the west of Herat. Dhu’l-Fiqär and his troops managed to elude the force which Nädir had sent against him, and hid in ambush near Shäkibän. Allah-Yär Khän thereupon attacked Nädir from the east, while Dhu’l-Fiqär and his men fell upon the Persian camp and began to plunder it. Detaching enough troops to beat off Dhu’l-Fiqär, Nädir, with the remainder, kept Allah-Yär Khän’s force at bay. On the following day the battle was continued, and Nädir and his forces eventually drove the Abdälls from the field. Once more, Allah-Yär Khän sent a messenger to Nädir with proposals for peace, but Nädir returned the same answer as before. Some of the Abdâlî chiefs thereupon came in person to Nädir; after offering excuses for their conduct, they offered not only to submit, but also to help the Persians against the Ghalzais. Although Tahmäsp and his ministers were opposed to accepting this offer, Nädir decided to do so. On the following day, a large number of Abdâlî chiefs came to the camp bearing presents, and were rewarded with robes of honour. Several of the more important chiefs then entered Tahmäsp’s service, and Allah-Yär Khän, having also submitted, was officially appointed Governor of Herat.1 Having accomplished their object, Nädir and Tahmäsp started on their homeward march soon afterwards, and reached Mashhad on 4 Dhu’l-Hijja 1141 (1 July 1729). This campaign did not completely shatter the power of the Abdâlïs and it did not prevent them from revolting in the following year, when Nädir was waging war on the Ottoman Turks.1 2 On the other hand, it was of the utmost value as it showed in conclusive fashion that the Afghans were by no means invincible and that the Persian army, as reorganised by the strong hand of Nädir, was once more a real fighting force. Moreover, it was fast learning to have confidence not only in its able leader, but also in itself. In this brief, but severe, campaign, the first of the really formidable 1 TN, p. 60. 2 The leader of this revolt was not Allah-Yär Khän, who proved faithful, but his rival Dhu’l-Fiqär. See my Nadir Shah, pp. 51-4.

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABDÂLÏS

foes on Persian soil had been worsted, and the auguries for the future were therefore distinctly encouraging.1 A point of interest is that by this time Tahmäsp had at last learnt how important it was for action against the formidable Ghalzais to be co-ordinated. In a letter written in Dhu’l-Hijja 1141 (JuneJuly 1729),2 Tahmäsp bade Husain Qulï Khân Zangana,3 the Amir Äkhur-bäshi (Master of the Royal Stables), refrain from marching with his Qizilbäsh troops against Isfahän at that juncture, as he (Tahmäsp) was then making active preparations to do in the near future in conjunction with the Sardär (Nädir). 1 This account of the campaign, which is based mainly on Mïrzâ Mahdi, has been taken, with some modifications, from my Nadir Shahy pp. 32-4. 2 This letter is in the possession of Dr Minasian, of Içfahân, who has very kindly given me a typescript copy of it. 3 This name is corrupt, but this is the most probable reading.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE RESTORATION OF THE SAFAVÎ MONARCHY For some time after Ashraf’s unsuccessful attempt to entrap Tahmâsp in December 17251 he had given little or no thought to him, his attention being entirely taken by the war with the Ottoman Turks and other important matters. When, after the advent of Nädir and the capture of Mashhad, reports reached Isfahän of Tahmâsp’s growing strength and of the prince’s intention to attack the Ghalzais, Ashraf affected to treat him with contempt, while his troops, in derision, called him Sag-zäda or “son of a dog”. Ashraf himself boasted that he would be very glad if Tahmâsp would venture forth and attack him, as it would save him the trouble of going to seek him out in his mountain retreats.2 However, by the early spring of 1729 it was obvious that Ashraf was seriously alarmed at the growing threat from Tahmâsp and his successful general. Muhammad Räshid Efendi, the Turkish envoy who was on his mission to Ashraf at this time,3 stated that that ruler was already planning to set forth from Isfahän to attack Tahmâsp. Ashraf appeared to be none too hopeful of success, for he was busily engaged in strengthening the defences of the city. In order to encourage those who were carrying out this work, he went amongst them so simply clad that anyone would think that he was a simple workman rather than the conqueror of the throne and the treasures of Persia.4 1 See p. 278 above. 2 François de Gardane, quoted by Clairac, vol. in, pp. 33-4. 8 See p. 293 above. 4 See the French translation of an extract from a letter from Muhammad Râshid Efendï, from Isfahan, dated 7 April 1729, in AEP, vol. vn, fol. 92 b. Ashraf had already, when faced with attack by the Ottoman Turks, very considerably extended the Tabarak citadel (see p. 288). Either then or some­ what later, he had built or restored the fort on the low hill between the Yazd road and the Zâyanda-rüd a few hundred yards to the west of Shahristän bridge ; this hill is still known as Ashraf-teppeh. See also the anonymous Suite des Revolutions de Perse'. Extrait d'une lettre d'Ispahan, du i May, 1729 (Paris, 1729).

328

PLATE III

Ashraf Teppeh.

PLATE IV

View of Shahristän village and bridge from Ashraf Teppeh. In the distance is the southern part of the Khuraskän ridge.

RESTORATION OF THE SAFAVl MONARCHY

It is of interest to compare the Turkish ambassador’s statements with those of the agent of the English East India Company at Gombroon who, in a long report to Bombay dated 2/13 April 1731, said In May 1729 various reports were spread that the Persian Prince had assembled a large Body of Forces at Mushat and Hyerat... in order to make a Push for the Kingdom, which for a While the Ophgoons gave little or No Credit to, but by the easy and unaccountable Conquests they had made over them with such Inferior Numbers were lulled into such Security of their own Strength and Safety, as well as of the Cowardice of the others, that they made not the least Preparation, which happily for the Prince gave him Leisure to sound how all Parts of the Kingdom stood affected to him.1 These reports, the agent added, together with a rumour that Husain, Mahmüd’s brother, was advancing from Qandahär,12 at last roused Ashraf. The rumour that Husain was advancing to attack Ashraf turned out to be baseless, but it was succeeded by reports that Tahmäsp and Nädir, having subdued the Abdâlï Afghans, had actually begun their advance on Isfahän. At last thoroughly alarmed, Ashraf hurriedly despatched troops to reinforce the Afghan garrison in Qazvin, and then, as reported by William Cockell, the Resident of the English East India Company at Isfahän, and his assistant John Geekie:

.. .the King [Ashraf] with a Train of Artillery and all the Troops he could raise set out of Spahaune on the 2nd August and marched with great Precipitation till he came to Tyroon [Tehran], where he remained till the Cawns of the adjacent Provinces had join’d him with their Soldiers, and then proceeded to Seingoun [ PSangän] in the Province of Corrosoon [jic].... According to Fraser, Ashraf’s army on this occasion numbered 30,000 men.3 One cannot help wondering why Ashraf delayed so long in setting out to attack Nädir and Tahmäsp. If he could have 1 Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xv. 2 Gombroon Diary, 13/24 October. 3 Nadir Shah, p. 95. Shaikh Hazïn, op. cit. p. 191, merely says that Ashraf set out “with a great retinue and an immense army”.

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marched on Mashhad whilst the Herat campaign was in progress, he would have placed his foes in a very dangerous situation. The news of Ashraf’s advance from Isfahän reached Mashhad some two months after Tahmäsp and Nädir had returned there from Herat. Nädir lost no time in collecting troops and supplies for the vitally important campaign that was about to begin. According to Muhammad Muhsin, before Tahmäsp and Nädir left Mashhad, they entered into an agreement whereby the former undertook, in return for Nädir’s services, to grant him in fief the provinces of Khuräsän, Kirmän and Mäzandarän,1 after Isfahän had been retaken and the Ghalzais had been driven from Persia.2 There is no mention of this agreement in Mirzä Mahdi’s Tarïkh-i-Nâdirî, but there seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of Muhammad Muhsin’s statement. On 18 Safar 1142 (12 September 1729) Nädir and Tahmäsp left Mashhad at the head of their forces and marched through Nishäpür and Sabzavär in order to relieve Samnän which Ashraf was then besieging.3 Ashraf, for his part, having detached some of his troops to continue the siege of Samnän, advanced eastwards to meet the royal army. The Ghalzai advance guard, under Muhammad Saidäl Khän, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Nädir’s artillery near Bastäm. Saidäl and his men then fell back as far as the village of Mihmändüst, u| miles to the east-north-east of Dämghän, where he was joined by Ashraf with the main part of the army.4 Nädir and Tahmäsp continued to advance westwards until they reached the small river or stream of Mihmändüst, just to the east of the village of that name. Here, on the morning of 6 Rabî‘ I (29 September), the first onslaught between the Ghalzais and Nädir’s army took place. Nädir had formed his men into one body, encircled by his musketeers and artillery, and he had given strict orders that no one was to move or fire until he gave the command. The Afghans, following their usual practice, were in three divisions. They impetuously charged the Persian centre and then attacked the flanks. Nädir waited until the enemy were within close range 1 It is evident from the inclusion of Mäzandarän in this fief that Tahmäsp no longer attached any importance to Russia’s claim to that province. 2 ZT, fol. 215 a. 3 TN, p. 61. See also Muhammad ‘Ali Hazïn’s Ahwâl, pp. 191-2. • TN, p. 61.

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RESTORATION OF THE SAFAVÏ MONARCHY

before he gave the order to fire. Although many Afghans fell, the rest pressed on, but they found, to their surprise, that the Persians, far from yielding to the shock of their impact, were able to take the offensive. Much havoc was then caused by the Persian artillery, which, besides destroying the Afghan zanburaks or swivel-guns, inflicted heavy casualties.1 When a cannon-shot killed Ashraf’s standard-bearer, the Ghalzais broke and fled. Elated with their victory over so formidable a foe, the Persian troops wished to pursue them, but Nädir, feeling that they were not as yet sufficiently experienced, held them back.2 Neither Mïrzâ Mahdi nor Muhammad Muhsin gives the numbers of the opposing forces or the extent of their losses. Otter gives the strength of the Afghans as 50,000,® a figure which seems very much on the high side, while Hanway estimates the Persian strength at 25,000.* Cockell put the Afghan losses at 12,000 and those of the Persians at 4000.5 Nädir undoubtedly deserved great praise for this remarkable achievement; indeed, to some, the metamorphosis of the Persian army in so short a time must have seemed little short of miraculous. But praise must also be bestowed on the gallant men whom he had so carefully trained and inured to the rigours of war. Nädir showed that, given good leadership, proper training and strict discipline, the Persian can and does make an excellent soldier.6 Having rested the troops after their ordeal, Nädir and Tahmäsp went on to Dämghän. Not long after the resumption of the march to the west, another serious crisis occurred between Nädir and Tahmäsp, in the course of which the former indulged in such plain speaking that the prince refused for a while to proceed; eventually, however, Tahmäsp, having “erased the dust of anger”,7 came to Nädir and offered 1 TN, p. 62. 2 Ibid. 8 Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, vol. ï, p. 307. 4 Travels, vol. iv, p. 27. 6 James Fraser’s Nadir Shah, p. 96. Shaikh Hazîn (who had remained at a very safe distance in the rear whilst the battle was in progress) stated» in his Ahwâl, p. 193, that the only Persian casualties were two men wounded! 6 Morier’s strictures on pp. 305-6 of his The Adventures of Hajji Baba (London, 1897) on the behaviour of the Persian soldier in action are really most unfair. ’ TN, p. 63.

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excuses for his behaviour. The march against the Afghans was then resumed. Meanwhile, Ashraf and his troops had fallen back towards Varâmïn, and he had sent for reinforcements to be sent from Tehran. When these reinforcements arrived, Ashraf prepared an elaborate ambush in a narrow defile in the Khwär valley, some miles to the east of Varâmïn through which the Persian army would have to pass. Nädir, having received warning of this ambush from his scouts, sent out strong bodies of musketeers to attack the enemy from the rear, while he marched straight against them. These tactics resulted in the enemy being caught unawares, and were completely successful. Once more the Ghalzais were routed, leaving their cannon and baggage behind, whilst they retired in hot haste to Isfahan.1 Before advancing further, Nadir persuaded Tahmäsp to go to Tehran, which the Afghans had evacuated, in order, as Mïrzâ Mahdï termed it, “to settle important affairs of the kingdom there”.12 This statement really meant that Nädir wished the prince to be out of the way, so that he might have an absolutely free hand in the critical struggle that lay ahead. Ashraf, on reaching Isfahän after his series of defeats, feared a rising there, and had no less than 3000 of the 'ulamä and other prominent inhabitants put to death, while his men plundered and set fire to the bazaars. Afraid lest the employees of the English and Dutch East India Companies should escape to Nädir, he had them stripped and thrown into prison, where they remained for seventeen days.3 Ahmad Päshä, of Baghdäd, in response to an appeal for help from Ashraf, sent him some troops and artillery.4* 6 Ashraf there­ upon left Isfahän with all the troops that he could muster, and marched to the village of Murchakhur, 35 miles north by west of the city.0 1 TN. p. 64. 2 Ibid. 3 For further details see p. 423 below. 4 Mirza Mahdi (TN, p. 65) states that Ahmad Päshä sent “several Päshäs and a fitting number of men”, but this may be an exaggeration. Shaikh Hazin, Ahwäl, p. 107, said that, as Ashraf had made peace with the Turks, Ahmad Päshä, at his request, sent “a whole brigade” of artillerymen to his assistance. 6 Murchakhur is a large village on the present I§fahän-Tehran road immediately south of the point where the road from Käshän and Natanz joins it.

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Meanwhile, Nädir, after being relieved of the presence of Tahmäsp, had marched towards Isfahän through Käshän and Natanz (this route, though longer than the one through Quhrud, was practicable for artillery, whereas the other, owing to its mountainous nature, was not). Nädir and his army were only a few miles to the east of Murchakhûr at the time of Ashraf’s arrival there. He did not venture to attack the Afghans, as they had taken up a defensive position near the village; instead, he made a feint of marching direct to Isfahän in the hope of luring Ashraf and his men from their position. The ruse succeeded, as Ashraf immediately left the village with his men whom, in imitation of Nädir’s tactics at Mihmändüst, he formed into one body, with his artillery on the flanks. The Persians wheeled round to face the oncoming Ghalzais and attacked, their musketeers forming the front line. Their onslaught was so fierce that they were able to seize many of the Afghan cannon. Severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which the Persians were victorious, despite furious flank and rear attacks by the enemy. The Persians pressed home their advantage to such effect that they captured the remainder of the Afghan artillery and took many prisoners amongst whom were some of the Turks whom Ahmad Päshä had sent to Ashraf’s assistance.1 Seeing that the day was lost, Ashraf and what was left of his army retired in haste to Isfahän.1 2 On reaching the capital, Ashraf immediately made preparations for flight. Having pressed every available animal into service for the transport of the women, children and treasures, Ashraf and his followers left for Shlräz on 13 November.3 No sooner had Ashraf and his followers departed than the rabble of the city and people from the outlying villages began to pillage the abandoned houses and even some of those that were still occupied. This outbreak of licentiousness was abruptly terminated when Nädir and his army entered the city on 1 Mirzä Mahdi (TN, p. 67) states that Nadir treated these Turks kindly and set them free. 2 Gombroon Diary, 24 December 1729/4 January 1730 (on the authority of letters from Cockell and Geekie dated 4/15 December). Mirza Mahdi states (TN, p. 67, and the Durra-yi-Nädira, pp. 75-6), that Ashraf left Isfahan on the same night that he arrived from Murchakhûr. As Cockell and Geekie were on the spot, their testimony is to be preferred. 8 Gombroon Diary, 24 December/4 January.

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16 November. Nadir immediately posted guards at all the gates and round the royal palace. He then instituted a search for those Afghans who had remained in hiding. All who were found were put to death save those who had behaved in a humane manner during the period of the occupation ; these were pardoned and set at liberty. The spirit of revenge being still strong amongst the citizens, Nädir allowed them to pull down Mahmûd’s mausoleum and desecrate his tomb.1 Having collected such treasure as the Afghans had left behind, Nadir distributed it amongst his soldiers to reward them for their gallant service. He then sent a messenger to Tahmäsp to inform him of the recapture of Isfahän and to press him to come there and ascend the throne. On receipt of Nädir’s message, Tahmäsp set out from Tehran and reached the village of Gaz, 9 miles to the north-north-west of Isfahän on 9 December 1729.1 2 Nädir rode out to Gaz to perform the ceremony of istiqbäl, and greeted Tahmäsp in a respectful manner, whereupon the Shäh (as Tahmäsp may now be termed, since Ashraf had abandoned the throne) congratulated him on his further victory over Ashraf and his recapture of the capital. They then rode together at the head of the troops to Isfahän.3 All but seven and a half years had elapsed since Tahmäsp had left Isfahän at dead of night during the siege. Now, on his return, he was given a rapturous welcome by the sadly depleted populace, but his joy at regaining his capital was tempered so by sorrow at seeing such evidence of destruction and decay there that he burst 1 François de Gardane, as quoted by Clairac, vol. in, pp. 47-55. 2 Ibid. vol. in, p. 53. The same date is given by the Gombroon Diary of 24 December/4 January, and by Bishop Barnabas Fedeli (see A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 1, p. 582 n.). 3 François de Gardane (who was probably an eye-witness) in Clairac, vol. ill, PP- 53~5- In the anonymous “Relation des Derniers Evénements arrivés en Perse” in AEP, vol. vi, fols. 95 b-çça, the truly astonishing statements are made that more than half of Tahmäsp’s army of 35,000 men consisted of Russians and that the Muscovite commanders seized Isfahän and held it for several days in the Tsar’s name, being then forced to give it up and withdraw their troops either by reason of the famine in the city or by the Persian threat of an appeal to Turkey. The same “Relation”, under a somewhat different title, was in­ cluded by Clairac, with some misgivings, in his third volume, pp. 90-105. The only occasion on which the Russians are known to have given military aid to Persia in those days was when Nädir was besieging the Turks in Ardabll in 1730.

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into tears.1 When he reached his palace and entered the harem, it is said that

.. .an old woman threw her arms about his neck in great transports of joy ; as he knew that Ashreff had carried away his sisters and other relations, he was the more surprized to find this person to be his mother. This lady had, ever since the invasion of the Afghans, disguised herself in the habit of a slave, and submitted to all the offices of drudgery, which are ordinarily imposed on persons in that situation.1 2

The citizens of Isfahän, like Tahmäsp, found that their joyful feelings were short-lived. Scarcely had the royal forces entered the city when, at Nädir’s behest “.. .money.. .was ordered to be collected from all sorts of People to pay the naked and hungry Soldiery, which [money] has been raised in so violent and despotic a Manner that severall have been Drub’d to death and others are quite ruin’d.”3 The troops, in fact, behaved in a most cruel manner to the citizens, plundering their houses and even selling some of the inmates as slaves. Soon they began to feel that they had been better off under the hated Afghans.4 Tahmäsp is said to have been enthroned for the second time5 shortly after his arrival in Isfahän, but the date has not apparently been recorded. Nädir showed no desire to hasten in pursuit of Ashraf, although Tahmäsp is said to have urged him to do so. A perfectly legitimate reason for delay was that Nädir wished to rest his troops after their long and trying march from Khuräsän; moreover, as it was now nearly mid-winter, the season was not favourable for campaigning. Another, and probably more cogent, reason for the delay was Nädir’s desire to take full advantage of his undoubtedly great services to consolidate his own interests. For one thing, he intended to hold Tahmäsp to the promise which he had made 1 When Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alï Hazin returned to Içfahân soon after its liberation, he stated (Ahwäl, p. 205) that he “. . . beheld that great city, not­ withstanding the presence of the king, in utter ruin and desertion. Of all that population and of my friends scarcely any one remained”. 8 This extract from Hanway’s Travels, vol. IV, p. 35, is a somewhat free translation of the account given by François de Gardane and quoted by Clairac in his vol. in, pp. 56-7. 8 Gombroon Diary, 14/25 February 1730. 4 Ibid. 5/16 July 1730. 6 The first occasion was on 10 November 1722, at Qazvin: see p. 193 above.

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before they had left Mashhad to grant him the provinces of Khurasan, Kirmän and Mäzandarän in fief. Tahmâsp not only had to make this grant now by means of a ni‘mat-näma or deed of grace, but also to give Nadir the right to wear the jïqa or emblem of royalty on the right side of the head.1 Thus what he had demanded and now obtained practically amounted to sovereignty over the three provinces. Nor was this all. Nädir pretended that his only wish was an immediate return to Khuräsän. As the Shäh and his ministers realised that they could not undertake the final campaign against Ashraf and then drive out the Turks and Russians without Nadir’s help, they pressed him to change his mind and complete the rout of the enemy. Nadir yielded, but only when he was given the right to levy taxes in order to pay his soldiery.2 Thus, another of the royal prerogatives had to be granted to him. Having obtained all that he wanted from the unfortunate Tahmäsp, Nädir mustered his troops and left Isfahän for Färs on 24 December. Marching via Abarqüh and Mashhad-i-Mädar-iSulaimän (Pasargadae), he and his army reached Zarqän, 20 miles north-east of Shiräz, where he found Ashraf awaiting him with 20,000 men. An obstinate battle ensued, in which, despite Ashraf’s considerable tactical skill, his forces were again defeated, and retired in disorder to Shiräz.3 On the following day, Muhammad Saidäl and two other Afghan leaders named Mia Sadiq and Mullä Za‘faran came to Nädir to ask for quarter. He replied that he would grant it and receive Ashraf’s submission if he would, in the first place, deliver up the few remaining members of the family of the late Shäh who were still prisoners in his hands. The Afghans duly handed over these persons (who were, apparently, all females), but Ashraf himself, 1 ZT, fol. 215 a. 2 Fraser, on the authority of Cockell, stated on p. 100 of his Nadir Shah> that Nädir informed Tahmäsp that he would refuse to command the army to be sent in pursuit of Ashraf unless he were granted this power of raising money for the pay of his troops. Tahmäsp was averse to this proposal, but he could find no one else who could take Nadir’s place. On consulting some of his officers, “ he found them of Opinion, that it was better to comply with Kuli Khan’s Humour for the present, and shew a proper Resentment of his insolence when there was less Occasion for his Service; adding, that the Soldiers, at this Juncture, would be unwilling to serve under any other General”. 8 According to Mïrzâ Muhammad Shïrâzï, “Rüz-Nâma”, p. 6, 10,000 Afghans were captured. See also the IJasan ibn Hasan Fasä’i, Färs-Näma-yiNâçirl' p. 167.

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acting on Saidäl’s advice, fled from Shlräz with the remnant of his army in the hope of escaping in the direction of Qandahär.1 When Nädir saw the dust raised by the Afghans, he realised that he had been deceived, and started in pursuit. His advance guard, consisting of some 500 Afshärs and Qarächorlü Kurds, came up with the Afghan rear guard at Pul-i-Fasä, ten miles to the south­ east of Shlräz. In the ensuing fight a number of Afghans were captured, while many were driven into the river and drowned. Ashraf and a number of his men, however, made good their escape and fled to Lär. Nädir pursued the fugitives for several favsakhs, but was unable to overtake them; he thereupon returned to Shlräz and issued orders for every route to be closed.2 Amongst the prisoners taken by Nädir’s forces in these engage­ ments were some prominent Afghans, of whom Miangi, who had been Mahmüd’s spiritual director, and Mullä Za‘farän were the most important. Mullä Za‘farän was drowned while trying to escape from his guards, while Miangi and a number of other nobles were later put to death.3 Ashraf remained for nine days at Lär. Every day numbers of Afghans slipped away, intent on escape, but nearly all were intercepted and killed by the tribesmen and peasants in the mountains. Ashraf ordered his brother4 and a number of troops to set out for the coast with his remaining treasure and there take ship for Basra, where he was to appeal to the Turks for assistance. They duly left Lär, but were all intercepted and slain. Ashraf had imprisoned twenty-five of the grandees (cfyäri) of Lär in the castle there, but they overpowered and slaughtered their guards, barred the doors and denied access to the Afghans.6 Seeing that he could achieve nothing by waiting further in Lär, where his forces were swiftly melting away, Ashraf and some of those who remained faithful to him fled in the direction of Sïstàn and Qandahär. A certain number of these Afghans who had 1 TN, p. 70. 2 For the measures taken at Gombroon and the part played therein by the representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies, see p. 424. 3 TN, pp. 70-2. 4 Shaikh yazîn, Ahwäl, p. 200. This was presumably not the brother whom Ashraf had blinded at the beginning of his reign (see p. 277 above). According to Shaikh Idazîn, Ashraf had several brothers, but he did not record any of their names. 6 Shaikh Hazln, Ahwäl, p. 201.

22

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LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

headed towards the Persian Gulf succeeded in reaching its shores, where they embarked for the Arabian coast. Several of the vessels in which they sailed foundered with all hands, while of the few who succeeded in reaching the other side, the majority were captured and enslaved by the Arabs. Shaikh Hazln records their fate as follows: When I arrived some time subsequently on the coast of Omman, I saw in the city of Mascat the son of one of the brothers of Ashraf, who was about 20 years of age, and Khodadad Khan, who had been governor of Lar, and was one of the great lords of the Afghans, both with leather sacks on their shoulders carrying water for their living from house to house. Having sent for them, I put to them some questions and had a long conversation with them. An Afghan named Sarvar Khan, one of their princes, was also there. I was told that he worked in the clay-pits for hire. They brought him also to me, and I asked him about his health and circumstances.1

Meanwhile Ashraf and his companions were pursuing their difficult and hazardous way eastwards. About the middle of February, they passed through the Sirjän district12 and went on to the east, ever dwindling in numbers. How Ashraf actually met his end is a matter of some controversy, but the best substantiated account of it is that of his cousin Husain Sultan, of Qandahär, who subsequently informed Nädir that, on hearing of Ashraf’s eastward flight, he had sent out a force to intercept him. As Husain Sultän had heard that Ashraf, in order to avoid Qandahär, had taken a more southerly route, this force marched southwards and came up with the fugitives. In the running fight which ensued, Ashraf was shot through the head and killed.3 Thus perished, like an outlaw, the man who for four and a half 1 Ibid. p. 202. 2 Gombroon Diary, 17/28 February 1730, on the authority of a messenger of the Company who met them there. 3 TN, p. 78; Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan, Geo­ graphical and Historical, p. 609. This claim, besides being accepted by Mirza Mahdi, is supported by a report which Martin French, the Basra representative of the English East India Company, sent to London on 9/20 September 1730 (see vol. xv of the Persia and the Persian Gulf Records). According to Shaikh Hazïn (Ahwâl, p. 203), Ashraf was killed in Balüchistän or on the borders of Sistän by a Brahoi chieftain named ‘Abdullah Khän; see also M. Longworth Dames in the EI, vol. 1, p. 637. I find fusain Sul{än’s account more worthy of credence.

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RESTORATION OF THE SAFAVl MONARCHY

years had ruled the greater part of Persia by force of arms and had defied and defeated the formidable Ottoman Turks. At the time of his death, Ashraf was no more than 29 or 30 years old. He had proved himself to be decidedly more able and somewhat less brutal than his cousin and predecessor Mahmüd. His position as Shah rested, as we have seen, on a very insecure basis. A kingdom can be held by force alone only so long as that force is superior to all others that can be brought against it. Ashraf’s regime was bound to collapse once a leader emerged from amongst the Persians who had sufficient strength of character and military ability to overcome the petty jealousies and quarrels of the various dissident and discordant elements in the country and weld them all into a disciplined and well-trained whole. As Nädir had proved in conclusive fashion, victory over the Ghalzais was then only a matter of time.1 By means of Nädir’s extraordinary military ability, Tahmâsp had now not only recovered his capital and the throne of his fathers, but had also witnessed the humbling of the Abdâlîs and the extirpation of the Ghalzais. The greater part of his patrimony was now under his sway. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Tahmâsp had been compelled to part with some of his royal prerogatives to his all-powerful supporter, whom he was unable, for the reasons already given,2 either to dismiss or degrade. The Shäh must therefore have had considerable misgivings in regard to the future. Such misgivings, if they existed, were certainly justified, for Nädir, just over two and a half years after Tahmâsp had mounted the throne, forced him to abdicate in favour of his infant son ‘Abbäs, after his disastrous campaign against the Turks, in the course of which he had had to yield most of the territory which Nädir had recovered from them in 1730.3 Tahmâsp, who was by reason of his temperament fitted only to rule (if, indeed, to rule at all) some petty principality in times of peace, was utterly unsuited to play the exceedingly difficult part which had been assigned to him by force of circumstances. 1 Lavisse and Rambaud, in their Histoire Générale du IVe. Siècle à nos Jours, vol. vu, p. 106, have expressed the view that Ashraf might have succeeded in establishing a dynasty had it not been for, first, the existence of Tahmâsp as the rightful heir to the throne, and, secondly, the Russian and Turkish invasions. 2 See p. 336 above. 3 For details, see my Nadir Shah, pp. 55-62.

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Whether Mahmud Mirza or Safi Mirzâ would have proved more successful, had one or other been allowed to continue as heir apparent, is a matter of conjecture. Tahmäsp spent the remainder of his unhappy and frustrated life in captivity. In 1736 he was joined by his son ‘Abbas III, when Nädir deposed him and mounted the throne himself. Four years later, Tahmäsp and his two sons ‘Abbäs and Ismä‘il were put to death at the orders of Ridä Quli Mirzä, Nädir’s eldest son.1 1 By far the fullest and most authentic account of this tragedy is given by Muhammad Käzim in his Kitâb-i-Nâdirï, pp. 484-8; an abridged version is given in my Nadir Shaht p. 177.

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CHAPTER XXVII

TAHMÄSP’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND RUSSIA FROM 1725 TO 1730 The story of the restoration of the Safavï monarchy and the expulsion of the Ghalzai Afghans has now been told, but something remains to be said first on the subject of Tahmäsp’s relations with Turkey and Russia from the death of Peter the Great up to the end of the Afghan era, and secondly on that of Russo-Turkish relations in so far as Persia was concerned during the same period of time.1 During the period from the death of Peter the Great to Ashraf’s defeat and death in the winter of 1729-30, Tahmäsp’s relations with Turkey and Russia underwent definite fluctuations in proportion as the tide of his fortunes flowed, ebbed and finally flowed again. So long as his prospects seemed favourable, he was adamant in his refusal to make any formal cession of territory to either of those powers in return for his recognition as Shäh and for military aid against the Afghans, but, when his fortunes declined, as they did at the close of 1725, he became inclined to negotiate. Later, when his star was once more in the ascendant, and particularly after the advent of Nädir, his attitude to Turkey and Russia stiffened once more. i. tahmäsp’s relations with turkey

Tahmäsp’s relations with Turkey were affected not only by the varying trend of his own fortunes, but also by Turkey’s war with the Ghalzai Afghans and her subsequent rapprochement with them. Furthermore, as we shall see, the attitude of Russia to both Turkey and Tahmäsp was by no means a negligible factor. Whilst their armies were so successful in the field against Tahmäsp’s supporters, the Turks were in no mood to come to terms with him. Their attitude to him, however, underwent a change when it became clear that a clash between them and Ashraf was inevitable. 1 The first of these topics will be dealt with in the present chapter, while the second will form the subject of ch. xxvin.

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Early in 1726, when his fortunes were at their lowest, Tahmâsp wrote to ‘Abdullah Köprülü Päshä asking him to inform his government that he had sent an envoy to Russia to negotiate with her. He complained that Turkey had taken advantage of the rebellion by some Afghan tribes, whom he described as “the vilest of his subjects”, to attack him. He could, he said, easily suppress these rebels if the Sultan would suspend his operations against him and grant him his friendship. Why had the Turks not attacked the Afghans instead of him ? The Russians, he went on to say, had offered their help, but he had no wish to accept assistance from a nation which was hostile to Islam. He therefore appealed to the Sultan to grant him a truce for three years in order to enable him to punish the rebels; if the Sultan would grant this, he would cede to him permanently all the territories which were then in Turkish hands.1 When this letter reached the Turkish government, it hesitated at first what to do. It did not care to reject Tahmäsp’s request outright for fear lest this might throw him into the arms of Russia. Moreover, by this time, hostilities were just about to break out between Turkey and Ashraf. Having regard to these considera­ tions, the government sent a capable and experienced man named Mustafä Efendi to enter into negotiations with Tahmâsp. The Grand Vizier informed Nepluyev of this action, and suggested that a Russian envoy might also be sent to negotiate jointly with Mustafä Efendi and Tahmäsp’s representatives at Shamäkhi or some other suitable place. Nothing came of these negotiations, if indeed they took place at all, apparently because the Turkish failure to defeat Ashraf led them to think that a treaty with Tahmâsp would be of little or no value so long as the former was in possession of the greater part of Persia.2 In 1728 Tahmâsp sent an envoy to the Turkish government, but he was prevented from going beyond Tabriz. Stanyan, in reporting this development, said that the Turks would “only shuffle with him till they see what Success his Master meets with ”.3 1 Chirac (on the authority of a letter from d’Usson d’Alion), vol. 11, pp. 324-5 ; Stanyan, 5/16 July 1726, SP 97, vol. xxv; von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 149. 2 Stanyan’s despatches of 17/28 March and 28 March/8 April 1727, SP 97, vol. xxv. 8 Ibid, 27 June/8 July 1728, SP 97, vol. xxv.

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Two months later, Stanyan stated that the Turkish government had sent commissioners to Tabriz to confer with this envoy, but that they had been ordered “.. .not to enter into any particular Engagements with him or give him any Assurance contrary to the Treaty with Eshreff, at least till his Affairs shall be in a more flourishing condition.”1 In the same despatch, Stanyan said that the Grand Vizier had informed Nepluyev that the Porte had spent so much on the wars in Persia that ...it would now lie quiet till the Quarrel between the two Rivals (Tahmäsp and Ashraf) was decided and then to take their Measures according to their Success. This Declaration of the Vizier’s agrees so well with all his Conduct that there is reason to believe he for once spoke what he thought and intends.

In other words, Turkey was merely marking time until she knew which of the two rivals would be the victor in the now imminent contest. In so far as Tahmäsp’s relations with Turkey were concerned, nothing further of importance occurred until the end of October 1729, when an envoy from the former reached Constantinople. He was courteously treated by the Grand Vizier in a private audience, but he was not received with the usual elaborate ceremonial for fear of giving umbrage to Ashraf (it was not yet known in the Turkish capital how critical Ashraf’s position had already become). Stanyan reported to London on 24 November/ 5 December 1729, when news of Ashraf’s worsening position had come through, that the Turkish authorities

... begin to caress him [the envoy] more than they did at first, and if We may believe the news he spreads We may soon expect to hear of another Revolution in Persia, for he pretends to have receiv’d Advice that his Master has beaten Eshreff in two Battles, after which he took Kazvin and was marching on Isfahan. In the middle of January 1730 rumours reached Constantinople of the fall of Isfahän, and early in February these rumours were found to be correct. In virtue of this development Tahmäsp’s position vis-à-vis Turkey took on an entirely different aspect. No longer could he be regarded as a fugitive who had to beg favours from his powerful neighbours as a mere suppliant. 1 Ibid. 20/31 August 1728.

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It was at this juncture that the impostor Muhammad ‘All Rafsinjäni, who gave himself out to be Safï Mïrzâ, arrived in Constantinople, claiming to be Tahmäsp’s elder brother (which the real Safï Mïrzâ had been).1 Stanyan, in reporting this man’s arrival, said:12 “It is thought that the Port will make some Use of him in the Adjustment of Matters with whosoever shall remain King of Persia.” Although denounced as an impostor by Tahmäsp’s ambassador, “Safï Mïrzâ II” lived in comfort in Turkey for a number of years, and was, as I have related elsewhere,3 utilised by the Turks during their wars with Nädir. At this point we come to what is, strictly speaking, the end of the period covered by this book, but for convenience of reference, a brief description is given below of Turco-Persian relations until the conclusion of the treaty between Ahmad Pâshâ and Nädir on 19 December 1733. Tahmäsp, in a letter to the Sultan of Turkey informing him of the recapture of Isfahän, took the opportunity, no doubt at Nâdir’s instigation, to request the return of the provinces which his troops had occupied. Soon afterwards, Tahmäsp sent an envoy named Ridä Qulï Khän Shämlü to Constantinople, who repeated the demand for the return of the occupied territory and threatened war in the event of a refusal. Ridä Quli Khän succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Turks which provided for the restitution of these provinces and for the payment by Persia to Turkey of an annual sum to reimburse the latter for the expense to which she had been put. Nädir, who always preferred the sword to the pen, did not wait for the signature of this treaty, but made a surprise attack on the Turks at Nihävand in April 1730, almost immediately after the successful conclusion of the campaign against the Ghalzais. In the course of the campaign that followed, Nädir recovered all western Persia and the greater part of Adharbaijân. He would, no doubt, have completed the expulsion of the Turks had not a revolt by the Abdâlïs of Herat distracted his attention and forced him to break off the fighting in order to go to Khuräsän to put down this rising. 1 See p. 301 above. 2 Despatch of 6/17 February 1730, SP 97, vol. xxvi. 3 See my Nadir Shah, pp. 231 and 247. The Turks made similar use of another impostor who styled himself Sâm Mïrzâ.

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tahmäsp’s relations WITH TURKEY AND RUSSIA

In his absence, the foolish Tahmäsp was rash enough to attack the Turks, but he sustained a disastrous defeat and had to conclude peace on ignominious terms. Nädir, however, on his return from Khuräsän, denounced this treaty, attacked the Turks again, retrieved the lost ground and completed the liberation of Adharbaijän, despite a serious reverse in Mesopotamia. By the treaty which he concluded with Ahmad Päshä on 19 December 1733, Turkey gave up all claim to the territory that she had seized and agreed to revert to the frontier laid down by the treaty of Zuhäb in 1639. 2. TAHMÄSP’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA FROM 1725 TO 1730

At the beginning of this period, Tahmäsp was still firm in his refusal to ratify Ismâ‘ïl Beg’s treaty of 1723, and he took no notice of the assurances that Russia made more than once that he would be received with honour if he were forced to take refuge in her territory. Furthermore, he appears to have taken no notice when, in October 1725, General Levashov wrote to him promising military assistance against the Turks if they were to advance in force beyond Ardabîl.1 However, Tahmäsp’s shattering defeat by Ashraf in December 1725 chastened him to such an extent that, in March 1726, he decided to send an envoy to Russia to negotiate a settlement of the questions at issue. This envoy got no further than Gïlân, as he was detained there by Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Persia, in order to treat with him; he took this action on the strength of instructions from St Petersburg.2 Meanwhile, the Russian government had, for various reasons, modified its views in regard to Persia. The Empress Catherine, who had a kind heart, had been appalled at the news which reached her of the sufferings of the Russian troops in Gïlân and of their terrible death-rate. She therefore instructed Dolgoruki to offer to surrender all claim to Gïlân, Mäzandarän and Astaräbäd if Tahmäsp would satisfy her demands, one of which was the recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over her portion of Shïrvân and Däghistän. This offer was presumably made to Tahmäsp through the envoy whom Dolgoruki had detained. In token of her 1 Butkov, Material^ vol. 1, p. 85.

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2 Clairac, vol. 11, pp. 326-7.

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good faith, Russia agreed to cease her military operations in northern Persia.1 Partly, no doubt, in consequence of Catherine’s death in the spring of 1727, and partly because of Tahmäsp’s improving fortunes, no agreement between him and Russia was reached on this occasion. On the other hand, close contact was maintained through the appointment of Semeon Avramov, the Russian consul at Resht, as Russian secretary to the prince; in that capacity, Avramov was almost constantly in attendance on Tahmäsp until January 1729, when he returned to Russia. Once the tide began to flow unmistakably in Tahmäsp’s favour, he became more disinclined than ever to make any cession of territory to Russia, however moderate. Nevertheless, relations between him and Russia continued to be on a friendly basis. On 4/15 January 1727 Avramov made an interesting entry in his “Zapiski”.1 2 He stated that one of the Georgian princes in Tahmäsp’s suite (Muhammad Mïrzâ or Husain Qulï Beg) had informed him that at a meeting of the prince’s council on the previous evening the question of Avramov’s position and of the possibility of a treaty with Russia had been discussed. Nädir was present at this meeting and is reported as having said to Tahmäsp : “Who are these Russians? If you will give me the order, I shall kill them all.”3 Tahmäsp, with a surprising amount of common sense and firmness (it must have been during one of his periods of sobriety), replied: “That is not your business. You must keep to your own affairs.” In 1728, when Tahmäsp went to Mäzandarän, he sent a coat of honour to General Levashov, together with an assurance that he would remain on friendly terms with Russia. Somewhat later in that year, Nädir, according to Mirzä Mahdi, sent a message in Tahmäsp’s name to the Russian court demanding the evacuation 1 Notwithstanding the improvement in Russo-Persian relations, when Soimonov went on a voyage of inspection along the coasts of Mäzandarän and Astaräbäd in the summer of 1726, tribesmen fired on his vessel, and he was obliged to land some of his men and take hostages. See Butkov, Material^ vol. I, p. 88. 8 “Zapiski”, loc. cit. p. 98. 3 Compare Amänullah’s conversation with Joseph Apisalaimian on the subject of the Russians, as quoted by Gilanentz, section lxxxvi ; see p. 193 n. above.

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of Gïlân.1 Stanyan was to prove himself a true prophet when he said, in a despatch to London dated 31 October/11 November 1728 ... whenever that Kingdom [Persia] shall be peaceably united under one Prince again, there is no doubt but his first Thoughts will be to retake the Russian Conquests and drive the Abomination of Hats and Periwigs, as their saying is, out of that part of Asia, which they look upon as the Mussulman’s true Patrimony.2 Nevertheless Nädir was, for some time at least, prepared to let the Russians remain in Gïlân. It will be recalled that, in 1728, he informed Avramov that, in the event of the expedition against the Abdâlï Afghans being successful, the Russians on Persian soil could embark in their vessels and return to their own country.3 After Nädir had uttered these words, he felt that he had gone too far, for he then said to Avramov:4 “The Russians are, in fact, friendly to us, so I wonder why we should quarrel with them. Gïlân has been for 300 years in the hands of our rulers, but it may now be possible for it to remain in Russian hands, as they have held it for several years. Let them stay.” Avramov had naturally seen how complete a hold Nädir had obtained over Tahmäsp. In January 1729, just before Avramov returned to Russia, he asked Tahmäsp’s Ftimâd al-Daula why the prince did not appeal to Russia for help against his enemies. The Minister replied that if Tahmäsp did so, Nädir would leave him and then do all in his power to weaken him.6 Nädir never felt the same animosity against the Russians as he did against the Turks; for this, the more conciliatory attitude of the Russians was, no doubt, largely responsible, and, in the end, their withdrawal from their Persian conquests, unlike that of the Turks (which was at the point of the sword), was accomplished without bloodshed, although the process took some time. Although it means going beyond the limits prescribed for this book, the manner in which the Russian withdrawal was carried out is as follows: General Levashov, who was, as we have seen, on terms of 1 TN, p. 55. 2 SP 97, vol. xxv. 8 See p. 324 above. 4 “Zapiski”, loc. cit, p. ioi. 6 Ibid. p. 103. This was, in fact, the last entry in Avramov’s journal.

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friendship with Tahmäsp and who, in the summer of 1730, gave some unofficial aid to the Persian forces which were then besieging the Turks in Ardabil,1 was empowered by the Empress Anna Ivanovna to conclude a treaty with the Shäh for the return to Persia of the provinces of Gilän, Mäzandarän and Astaräbäd.12 On 7/18 October 1730, in a letter to Tahmäsp to congratulate him on his recovery of the throne, the Empress pointed out that, as Gilän was now free from danger from the Turks, she could withdraw her troops, which, she said, had been sent there and to the other provinces to protect them from the Turks and Afghans. The negotiations that ensued ended with the conclusion of the treaty of Resht on 1 February 1732. Under the terms of this treaty, Russia agreed to return to Persia all the territories that she had seized south of the river Kura. By the subsequent treaty of Ganja, which was signed on 21 May 1735, Russia surrendered Baku, Darband and all the territory south of the Süläq.3 Not long afterwards, she was back at the line of the Terek. With a strong Persia once more in possession of the Caspian provinces, Russia could feel that the Turks were effectively barred from access to that sea. When we look back on Peter the Great’s Persian policy, we see that it was premature and, in a number of respects, ill-conceived and impracticable. Peter failed to take sufficiently into account the difficulties arising out of so extended a line of communications and, more particularly, of the climate. Although his Persian adventure achieved his main purpose of barring the Turks from the Caspian Sea, it was accomplished only at a terrible cost of human life and suffering. During the thirteen years of Russia’s occupation of northern Persia, her unfortunate troops proved quite unable to acclimatise themselves, with the result that, especially in Gilän, they “died like flies”.4 In all, some 130,000 of them perished in Persia during those years.5 As Russia had maintained a garrison of 30,000 men there, practically one-third 1 Brief reference has already been made to this; see p. 334n. above. 2 Butkov, vol. I, p. 106. 3 For the Russian texts of the second treaty of Resht and the treaty of Ganja, see T. Yuzefovich, Dogovori Rossii s Vostokom, pp. 197-207. 4 Manstein’s Mémoires, vol. I, p. 95. 6 Butkov, vol. i, p. 141, estimated the number of the Russian dead at between 130,000 and 200,000.

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of these troops died of sickness every year; it was a truly appalling wastage rate.1 The other aims which Peter had had in view were in some cases partially and temporarily fulfilled, and in other cases not at all. His attempt to make Russia instead of Turkey the channel for the overland trade between Persia and Europe was only partially successful, whilst his scheme of promoting a trade connection with India by way of Persia came to nothing; had he lived longer, the results might perhaps have been different—that is, if he could have remained on peaceful terms with Nadir. Likewise unsuccessful was Peter’s praiseworthy attempt to champion the Christian inhabitants of Transcaucasia, except in so far as these peoples migrated into Russia herself or into those parts of Gïlân, Shîrvân and Däghistän as were in Russian occupation. Heavy though the cost of Peter’s adventure was in terms of human life, Russia nevertheless paid less dearly for it than either the Ghalzais or Turks did for their invasions of Persia. The Ghalzais were, as we have seen, almost exterminated, only a small fraction of them being able to regain their home country, while the Turkish losses, which were incurred mainly in battle, were very much heavier than those of the Russians.12 Yet by far the greatest sufferers from these invasions and the other disturbances which afflicted Persia during the troubled years from 1722 to 1730 were the unfortunate people of that country. How many hundreds of thousands, nay, millions of them lost their lives from war, murder, famine and pestilence will never be 1 Manstein’s Mémoires, vol. 1, p. 95. A sad reminder of the fate of a number of these Russian soldiers is furnished by the Qabristân-i-Urüsî-hâ or “Cemetery of the Russians”, which is situated just outside the small town of Güräb-iGaskar, in Gïlân. See H. L. Rabino, “Les Provinces Caspiennes de la Perse: le Guilan”, in Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. xxxn, pp. 154-5. 2 Although the advantages accruing from Peter’s actions in Caucasia and Persia would seem to be outweighed by the disadvantages, a more favourable view of them is taken by Emile Bourgeois in his Manuel historique de Politique étrangère (Paris, 1897), vol. 1, p. 287. After briefly reviewing Peter’s efforts to spread Russia’s influence and develop her trade in Central Asia and elsewhere in the east, he stated : “ Les dernières expéditions de Pierre le Grand autour de la Caspienne, à Derbent, à Bakou, son intervention en Perse [1722-3], n’étaient pas les délassements d’un conquérant inoccupé. Il faut y voir le couronnement, et pour ainsi dire la justification, de l’oeuvre qu’il avait accomplie, bouleversant l’équilibre de l’Europe, pour répandre en Asie son commerce, son influence et ses idées; général et diplomate à l’ouest, pionnier à l’est....”

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known. The material damage, too, was on a vast scale. It was, indeed, hard for these much-tried people that when, as it seemed, an era of deliverance dawned with the advent of Nädir, they were to be subjected to a further series of tribulations and suffering owing to his ceaseless exactions for the purpose of providing men, funds and supplies for his almost continual wars. His achievement in raising his country from the state of ignominy and humiliation into which it had fallen under the later Safavis was certainly a most remarkable one, but it was effected at a terrible price.

35

CHAPTER XXVIII

RUSSO-TURKISH RELATIONS IN REGARD TO PERSIA FROM 1725 TO 1730 As already pointed out,1 the death of Peter the Great had a profound effect on Russia’s policy towards Persia and her relations with Turkey in regard to Persian affairs. Whilst the Russian expansionist movement quickly lost momentum after Peter’s death, the Turks, on the other hand, intensified their campaign in Persia until their drive to the east brought them into conflict with Ashraf. I. THE DELIMITATION OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH FRONTIER IN DÄGHISTÄN AND SHÎRVÂN

Peter’s death and the striking successes of the Turkish armies in Persia in 1725 combined to make Turkey far less apprehensive of Russia. This development was clearly shown in the Turks’ treatment of Major-General Aleksander Rumyantsev, the special envoy whom Peter had sent to Constantinople at the close of 1724 for the double purpose of exchanging the ratified copies of the parti­ tion treaty and of delimiting the frontier between the territories in northern Persia which that treaty had allocated to Russia and Turkey. Rumyantsev had been given full powers for his duties as Commissioner for the delimitation of this frontier on 31 August/ 11 September 1724, shortly before he set out on his journey to Constantinople.2 On the same date Lieut.-Colonel von Lucke, an infantry officer, and Major Johann Gustav Gärber, who had been in command of the Russian artillery at the siege of Baku in the previous year,3 also received their full powers as commissioners.4 Rumyantsev experienced no difficulty in performing the first part of his duties, namely, effecting the exchange of the ratified 1 See pp. 237, 249 and 266 above. 2 De Koch, Histoire abrégée des Traités de Paix, vol. xiv, p. 311. 3 See p. 246 above. For particulars of Gärber’s career, see G. F. Müller’s introduction to the former’s “ Nachrichten ” on pp. 2-4 of vol. iv of the Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, and Professor Polievktov’s Evropeiskie Puteshestvenniki (Tiflis, 1935), PP« m-14. 4 De Koch, op, cit, p. 311.

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copies of the partition treaty, no doubt because Peter the Great was still alive, but when he subsequently urged the Turks to begin immediately with the delimitation of the frontier in Däghistän and Shirvan, they did nothing but procrastinate. Their reluctance to carry out the work of delimitation was, it is true, due in part to the troubled conditions that prevailed in much of the territory concerned, and there was some delay on one occasion because of the failure of the Russians to send the escort for the commissioners as promptly as they should have done,1 but the main reason for the Turkish reluctance to proceed with the work was the phenomenal success of their arms in Persia on the one hand, and the obvious slowing up of the Russian operations in that country on the other. These two factors combined to make the Turks feel that the limits that had been imposed by the partition treaty were in need of revision in their favour. Despite periodical protests by Rumyantsev and Nepluyev, the matter remained in abeyance for many months in 1725. In September that year, a conference was held in Constantinople between the Grand Vizier, the Rais-Efendl, Nepluyev and the French ambassador, the Vicomte d’Andrezel. When Nepluyev complained of the delay and pressed for the work of delimitation to be begun at once, the Rais-Efendî asserted that this could not be done so long as the Turkish armies were in the frontier regions, adding that, even if it were possible to allow the Russian com­ missioners to go there, the Turkish authorities would be unable to accept responsibility for their safety. He went on to say that the Russians had done nothing to help the Turks to conquer Persia, and that they were, apparently, incapable even of occupying the whole of Gilän. As Russia had thus failed to carry out her obligations under the treaty, Turkey now looked upon it as null and void; she was, however, willing to conclude a new treaty which would take the changed circumstances into account. As for Rumyantsev, he was at liberty to return to Russia with a letter of congratulation to the Empress Catherine on her becoming sole ruler of that country. Nepluyev replied that this development was so unexpected that he would have to ask for fresh instructions from his government.2 1 Stanyan’s despatch of 29 September/10 October 1725, SP 97, vol. xxv. 8 Stanyan, 3/14 October 1725, SP 97, vol. xxv.

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Tension between Russia and Turkey was further increased when it was learnt that the Turks had occupied Ardabil, which, though not in the Russian zone, was beyond the limits prescribed by the treaty.1 By December 1725 the Turks were seriously thinking not only of denouncing the partition treaty, but also of demanding the cession of Gîlân from Russia.12 Nevertheless, the possibility of Tahmâsp at last accepting both the Russian and Turkish demands, and Turkey’s embroilment with the Ghalzai Afghans, led to a détente. In January 1726, when the Grand Vizier informed Nepluyev and the Vicomte d’Andrezel of his government’s decision to receive Ashraf’s envoy ‘Abd al-‘Azïz merely as the bearer of messages from one Sunnï ruler to another, he promised that, in his dealings with the Afghans, he would do nothing that would be prejudicial to the treaty with Russia.3 He complained again, how­ ever, of Russia’s inactivity in Persia. Nepluyev, in reply, admitted that his country had not carried on the war there with the same vigour as that of the Turks, but he explained that this was because Russia’s treaty with Tahmâsp precluded such action. Dâmâd Ibrâhîm thereupon said that Russia must either bring Tahmâsp to terms or provide an army for joint offensive action in Persia.4 Although both Stanyan5 and d’Andrezel did all that they could to impede matters, Rumyantsev was at last able to leave Con­ stantinople for the frontier region in company with the Mîr‘âlam Dervish Muhammad Äqä, the Turkish commissioner, in April 1726. D’Andrezel, in pursuance, doubtless, of France’s new policy towards Russia and Turkey,6 refused to allow d’Usson 1 See p. 266 above. 2 Stanyan, 3/14 December 1725. 8 See p. 283 above. 4 Stanyan, 27 January/6 February 1726. 6 England was still endeavouring to embroil Russia with Turkey, partly because the Empress Catherine was, it was considered, endangering the Hanoverian possessions by her policy over Schleswig-Holstein and partly because she was said to be encouraging the Jacobites. See the Duke of New­ castle’s letter to Stanyan of 15/26 January 1726 (SP 97, vol. xxv) in which he said that, for these reasons, he (Stanyan) was to continue to ° induce the Turks to carry on their Designs against Russia in Persia and by that means find her some Diversion in those Parts ”. 6 France had become an ally of England by her signature of the treaty of Hanover of 3 September 1725 as a counter-measure to the Austro-Spanish alliance and the rumours of a pact between Austria and Russia (which later turned out to be well-founded). For these reasons, the French ambassador in Constantinople now followed the same policy as Stanyan in regard to Russia and Turkey. See von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 157. 23

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LSD

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d’Alion, de Bonnac’s kinsman, to accompany Rumyantsev and Dervish Muhammad Äqä as mediating commissioner, on the grounds that his services were required for another purpose. Unfortunately for Rumyantsev, he and his Turkish colleague got no further than Erzurum on this occasion, as Dervish Muhammad Äqä was suddenly recalled to Constantinople on some other matter of importance; an additional delay was caused when the Turkish commissioner had to take part in the military opera­ tions againstthe Shäh-Sevan and Shaqäqi tribesmen.1 In September 1726, just when the commissioners were at last about to begin their work in the field, the inhabitants of Shamäkhi addressed an urgent petition to the Turkish government in which they protested vehemently at the fixing of the Turco-Russian frontier so close to their town. As the inhabitants showed signs of revolt, the Sar'askar of Ganja, Hajji Mustafä Päshä, was called in to suppress them. When calm had been restored, Rumyantsev, who had been joined by von Lucke and Garber, at last began the task of de­ limitation in company with Dervish Muhammad Äqä. In accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1724, they set out from Shamäkhi towards the Caspian coast and made their first fixed point at the village of Mabûr, 17 miles to the east; this was approximately one-third of the distance from Shamäkhi to the Caspian Sea.2 A large mound was erected at Mabür. On the following day, in company with Hajji Mustafä Päshä, the Russian and Turkish commissioners rode northwards to Darband, which they reached eight days later. On arrival in Däghistän, the commissioners experienced such serious difficulties that reference had to be made to Constantinople, and further delay was occasioned because Hajji Mustafä Päshä had to leave the commissioners and take part in the campaign against the sighnakh Armenians.3 When, finally, these difficulties had been overcome and a fresh start could be made, the commissioners soon found that it was one thing to trace a line on a map in a conference room in Constantinople and quite another thing to endeavour to follow that same line over the actual ground. Under the terms of the treaty, they had to ride inland from Darband for 22 hours and then make their first fixed point in the north, but when they had ridden for 18 hours the 1 See p. 286 above.

2 See p. 234 above.

354

8 See p. 260 above.

RUSSO-TURKISH RELATIONS WITH PERSIA

terrain became so difficult that they could proceed no further. They were therefore compelled to ride south to the Samur river and begin the delimited line at a point in the khanate of Qubba that was a 22-hours* ride inland from the coast. Thenceforward their task was comparatively easy, and it was completed when they reached Mabür in December 1727. When the Russian and Turkish commissioners began to draft the text of the delimitation agreement, a dispute arose over the most northerly portion of the line, which they had been unable to follow on the ground and therefore to demarcate. The Russian commissioners, quite rightly, maintained that this portion of the line should be described in the agreement as “undetermined”,1 but Dervish Muhammad Äqä refused to allow this word to appear in the Turkish text; unknown to him, however, the Russians inserted it in the Russian text which he also signed. This agreement was signed on 12/23 December 1727.2 The map which accompanied this agreement was the work of Major Garber;3 in the course of his work on the frontier commission, he acquired that extensive knowledge of the country which enabled him to compile his valuable “Nachrichten”. In this manner, the long-drawn-out question of the RussoTurkish frontier on Däghistän and Shïrvân was at last disposed of. However, for reasons which were as yet unforeseen by both Russians and Turks, this agreement was not destined to remain effective for long. 2. THE REVOLT OF THE SHAMKHÄL ‘ÄDIL GIRAI

The loyalty of the Shamkhäl ‘Adil Girai to Russia had never been more than skin-deep. Although he had received Peter the Great so hospitably and with such demonstrations of friendship at Tarkhù in August 1722, his attitude to the Russians some months 1 The word used in Klaproth’s German translation is ungeendiget\ see his “ Russisch-Persisch-Türkische Gränzbestimmung im Jahre 1727 ” in Fundgruben des Orients, vol. vi, p. 357. 2 I have been unable to get access to the Russian or Turkish text of this agreement. I have utilised Klaproth’s text mentioned above and a French version by de Koch in his Histoire abrégée des Traités de Paix, vol. xiv, pp. 312-14. 8 I have unfortunately failed to trace a copy of this map (which Müller described as a zuverlässige Landcarte in vol. iv of his Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, p. 3).

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later, when Peter was on his homeward march from Darband, was, to say the least of it, equivocal.1 Soon afterwards, he was much angered at the construction of the Svyatoi Krest fortress on what he rightly considered to be his territory. The existence of this fortress, with its strong Russian garrison, proved such a grievance that ‘Adil Girai, having been joined by some other Däghistäni chieftains, rose in revolt. The revolt, however, was short-lived, for the Russian generals Sheremotov and Kropotov, with a force of 15,000 regular troops, won a complete victory over the rebels on 26 September/7 October 1725. One of ‘Adil Girai’s allies and several thousands of the tribesmen perished in the battle, while he himself had to take refuge in the almost impenetrable recesses of the Däghistän mountains, just as his ancestor the Shamkhâl Andi had been compelled to do, after his defeat by the Russians under Buturlin and Pleshkov in 1604.12 ‘Adil Girai was subsequently captured by the Russians who sent him as an exile to Kola, in Lappland, where he died some years later. The victorious Russians burnt Tarkhü and a number of villages in the neighbourhood and abolished the Shamkhâlate3 in reprisal for the rebellion. 3. CHOLÄQ SURKHAI KHAn’S ATTACKS ON THE RUSSIANS AND ARMENIANS

Reference has already been made to the feud between Cholâq Surkhai Khân, the turbulent chief of the Ghâzï Qumüqs, and Dä’üd Beg, whom the Turks had installed as Governor of their portion of Shîrvân.4 After Surkhai had made his peace with the Turks, he turned his attention to the Russians, although he had at one time been inclined to join them against the former. On more than one occasion Surkhai and his men made raids into Russian-occupied 1 See p. 187 above. 2 Chirac, vol. 11, p. 292. I. N. Berezin, Puteshestvie po Dagestanu i Zakavkaz'yu, p. 77. J. de Missy, Mémoires du Règne de Catherine, Impératrice de toute la Russie, pp. 251-2 (this source must be used with great care, as it contains many inaccuracies). 3 Nädir revived the Shamkhâlate in 1734; see my Nadir Shah, p. 84. 4 See p. 267 above.

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territory and returned with much booty (on one of these incursions they stole 60,000 sheep).1 He was enraged with the Russians when they gave sanctuary in their fort at Salyän to some Shäh-Sevan tribesmen whom he had been pursuing. Another reason for his animosity against Russia was his claim to the Kurali (or Guralinski) region, a small tract of land on the north bank of the Samur river close to its mouth.2 On one occasion, when he and his followers entered this region, the Russians had to drive them out by force.3 It is impossible to say to what extent, if at all, the Turks encouraged Surkhai to bait the Russians in this way. So turbulent was he by nature that he probably needed no inducement by the Turks to embark on his raids on Russian-occupied territory. In later years Surkhai was to prove a thorn in Nadir’s side.4 Surkhai also attacked at times the Armenians under Avan YüzbäshI; Avan frequently appealed to the Russians for military aid, since he feared that Surkhai and the Turks between them might overrun the Armenian sighnakhs (mountain strongholds) and completely crush his people. Rumyantsev, to whom these appeals were addressed and who was at that time engaged upon the delimitation of the Turco-Russian frontier in Däghistän and Shïrvân, looked upon Avan as a man of limited intelligence and grew annoyed at his reiterated appeals for help. Prince Dolgoruki and other Russian military commanders, however, were more sympathetic, as they considered Surkhai to be a serious danger, but they could do nothing material to help Avan and his Armenians without contravening the terms of the 1724 partition treaty; this was a step that they were not prepared to take.5 They could take action against Surkhai only when he entered Russian territory. 1 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 201. 2 For a description of this region, see Gärber’s “Nachrichten”, loc. cit. PP- 75“78 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 214. 4 See my Nadir Shah, pp. 83, 84, 94 and 95. 5 P. T. Arutunian, Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie, p. 237. As this writer states (p. 238), the most critical days for these Armenians were at the end of 1726, when many had to yield to the Turks. Avan, however, was one of the few who continued to resist them. He wrote to the Patriarch Esai Hasan Jalaliantz that he and those with him remained faithful to the Armenian national movement and that they would go on fighting until they could serve the Tsar. He concluded : “We may all die, but we shall not leave any Christians in the hands of the Muslims.”

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4. ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF RUSSO-TURKISH FRICTION OVER THE OCCUPIED PROVINCES OF PERSIA

Surkhai’s hostility to Russia and his incursions into her territory were by no means the sole causes of friction between her and Turkey. The Turkish occupation of Ardabil in 1725, although carried out ostensibly for the purpose of preventing the town from falling into rebel hands, elicited a sharp protest by Russia. Her reason for lodging this protest was not that she was championing Tahmäsp’s cause, except, perhaps, in appearance, but because the presence of a Turkish garrison in Ardabil threatened the security of her adjoining territories. Her apprehensions were certainly well-founded, for, early in 1726, a thousand Turkish troops carried out an “unofficial” raid into Gïlân. When Nepluyev complained of this incursion to the Grand Vizier, he replied that he disapproved the action and said that the Russians should eject the intruders by force.1 There can be little doubt that this specious answer was not a truthful one,2 and that the raid had been prompted by the Turkish government with the object of probing the Russian defences in that region. It was well known that the Russian occupation of Gïlân and their control over the silk trade there (which had, however, declined by reason of the wars and disturbances) were a source of annoyance and chagrin to Turkey.3 Russia’s reaction to Turkey’s threat to her Persian territories took a twofold form. In the first place, she strengthened her defences, building forts at Astärä4 and elsewhere. Secondly, in the summer of 1726, the Russian government sent Wakhtang to Gïlân ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating with Tahmäsp,5 but in reality to conduct a propaganda campaign in that province against the Turks.6 Wakhtang, who reached Gïlân in September 1 Chirac, vol. n, p. 321, on the authority of a letter from d’Usson d’Alion. 2 In another connection, Stanyan once said of the Grand Vizier that he “ was as full of Tricks and Cunning as the Muscovites with which he pretends to outwit them”. See his despatch of 2/13 April 1726, SP 97, vol. xxv. 8 Clairac, vol. 11, pp. 321-2. 4 The fort at Astärä was completed in the autumn of 1727; see Butkov, Materiali, vol. I, p. 86. 6 As will be seen below, Tahmäsp was at this time showing a disposition to negotiate with Russia and Turkey. 6 Soloviev, Istoriya Rossii, vol. xix, p. 1116.

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1726,1 found that the Persians had been angered and alarmed by the Turkish seizure of Ardabll and by the subsequent “unofficial” raid; thus, although they were still unfriendly towards the Russians, they could nevertheless be expected to co-operate with the latter in the event of any large-scale hostile move by the Turks. Another cause of friction between Turkey and Russia was the success of the latter’s policy of attracting Armenians and Georgians to her newly won territories. It was much to the credit of Peter the Great that he was genuinely anxious to help the Christian populations in Georgia and Armenia. Since it had proved impossible for him to liberate these peoples by force of arms, he had, faute de mieux, embarked on the policy of encouraging them to leave their homes in Turkish and Turkish-occupied territory and to settle in Gïlân and elsewhere in the Russian zone of Persia. This policy was continued by his successors. Writing to London on 13/24 May 1729 Stanyan reported that “Another Matter of Disquiet [to the Turks] is that the Russians draw great Numbers of Christians from Georgia and Armenia into their new Conquests, by which means the Turkish Frontiers are almost become desert.” 2 He went on to say that this development, together with the intensely strong anti-Russian feeling amongst the inhabitants in the parts of Däghistän which had been apportioned to Russia by the partition treaty of 1724 and the frontier delimitation agreement of 1727, would necessarily lead to war between the two countries if there were a change of government in Turkey. In the following month, deputies from Däghistän reached Constantinople who, to quote Stanyan again, made “.. .loud Complaints of the Prejudice they receive from the Neighbourhood of the Russians in Persia, and do what they can to embroil the Port with the Czar.”3 However, this and the other causes of friction between Russia and Turkey in so far as their territories in Persia were concerned were soon to become dead issues owing to the meteoric revival of Persian power by Nädir. 1 M. F. Brosset, Matériaux pour servir à Vhistoire de la Géorgie, p. 214. Wakhtang returned to Russia in 1728. 2 SP 97, vol. xxv. 8 Despatch of 19/30 June 1729, SP 97, vol. xxv.

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THE EARLY RELATIONS OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES WITH PERSIA The pioneers of the English East India Company’s long connection with Persia were Richard Steele, John Crowther and Edward Connock. Steele, when travelling across Persia to India in 1614, had been much struck with the favourable openings for trade which appeared to exist there. He noticed, amongst other things, that, as the winters were very cold, the inhabitants were much in need of cloth. On reaching Surat, he made a full report of all that he had seen in Persia. It so happened that the Company was having difficulty in disposing of all its stocks of cloth in India, so, in the following year, it sent Steele, together with John Crowther, to Isfahän to examine the possibilities not only of disposing of the surplus cloth, but also of opening trade of a general nature with Persia. Steele and Crowther obtained a farmän from Shäh ‘Abbäs whereby his subjects “of whatsoever degree” were “to kindly receive and entertain the English Frankes or Nation who might present themselves”.1 Steele and Crowther, after examining a number of ports, chose Jäsk as being the most suitable, largely because they regarded it as being less exposed than the others to attacks by the Portuguese. Notwithstanding opposition by Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador at the court of the Mughal emperor,12 the Company’s factors at Surat sent a mission under Edward Connock in the James to Persia in December 1616. Despite an attempt at intercep­ tion by the Portuguese, the James landed her cargo safely at Jäsk early in 1617, and Connock travelled overland to Shiräz, where he opened a factory, and then went on to Isfahän. As the Shäh was absent, waging war against the Turks, there was some delay in Connock obtaining an audience, but when he did so, it proved 1 Purchas his Pilgrimes (London, 1625), pt. 1, p. 524. 2 See his letter to the East India Company from Ajmir, dated 24 November 1616, in Churchill’s Voyages f vol. 1, p. 807.

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highly satisfactory. Shäh ‘Abbas gave him another fannän couched in more explicit terms than the former one, whereby the Company was granted the right to trade freely throughout the country. An English ambassador was to be allowed to reside permanently at the Persian court, and he was to have the power to appoint agents and factors wherever he deemed fit. Moreover, the Englishmen employed in Persia were to be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and, in the event of their becoming involved in criminal cases, they were to be under the jurisdiction of their ambassador. In the same year (1617) a factory was opened in Isfahan and another was established at Jäsk two years later. In addition to giving Connock this farmän, Shäh ‘Abbas promised to supply the Company with between 1000 and 3000 bales of silk every year at between 6$. and 6s, 6d, per pound; this silk was to be shipped from Jäsk free of duty. In this auspicious manner the long trading connection of the East India Company with Persia began.1 In 1622 the Company’s representatives agreed somewhat reluctantly to allow its ships to co-operate with the forces of Shäh ‘Abbäs in ousting the Portuguese from their stronghold and emporium on the island of Hormuz and also from Qishm.12 The part played by the Company on this occasion earned for it the lasting hatred of the Portuguese, and a well-known authority on the Persian Gulf expressed the view that “It is difficult to discover what material gain came to it therefrom.”3 This is too extreme a view. As Professor Boxer has pointed out,4 the English 1 In the above account and elsewhere in this chapter only an outline of events has been given. The subject has been very adequately and exhaustively dealt with in a number of works, such as John Bruce’s Annals of the Honourable East India Company, Sir W. Foster’s Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East (London, 1896), the same author’s The English Factories in India (Oxford, 1906-27), and his England's Quest of Eastern Trade (London, 1933), Sir W. W. Hunter’s A History of British India, Sir A. Khan’s The East India Trade in the XVIIth Century and Sir A. T. Wilson’s The Persian Gulf. 2 The Persian authorities put pressure on the Company by holding up a valuable convoy of silk which was on its way to Jäsk until it agreed to co-operate. See F. C. Danvers, “ The Persian Gulf Route and Commerce ”, in The Asiatic Quarterly Review (April 1888), p. 392. 8 Sir A. T. Wilson’s The Persian Gulf, p. 149. 4 See p. xliii of his introduction to his English translation of the Commentaries do Grande Capitam Ruy Freyre de Andrada (London, 1930).

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would never have succeeded in breaking the power of the Por­ tuguese in the Persian Gulf unless they had acted as they did on this occasion, since their establishments on its coast, besides being always exposed to attack by them, would never have been able to compete with the flourishing Portuguese entrepot at Hormuz. Furthermore, it is undeniable that the Company did obtain some valuable concessions from Shäh ‘Abbäs in return for its naval assistance. Before the combined assault on Hormuz was launched, the Shäh had agreed that the Company, as a quid pro quo, was to be permanently customs-free at Hormuz and that it was also to receive half of the total customs receipts there.1 The Company, for its part, undertook to maintain two ships of war in the Persian Gulf in order to guard against any retaliatory action by Portugal. After the capture of Hormuz, it was decided to discontinue its use as a port and to utilise instead the small town of Gamru or Gumru, which was situated on the mainland io miles to the north­ west. Although not so sheltered as Hormuz, Gamru had a good anchorage. Up till that time it had been used as the port on the mainland through which all goods in transit to or from Hormuz had to pass ; now, however, no trans-shipment would be necessary. Shäh ‘Abbäs decided to make Gamru the chief port in his realm and gave it the name of Bandar ‘Abbäs (“The Port of ‘Abbäs”). He then took the more practical step of giving the East India Company the same rights there that it would have enjoyed at Hormuz. The Company thereupon moved its factory from Jäsk to Bandar ‘Abbäs; its employees always called the latter port “Gombroon”, a corruption of Gamru.12 The high hopes with which the East India Company had embarked upon its trading connection with Persia were soon to be, in large measure, disappointed. Hardly had it opened its factory at Gombroon in 1623 when the Dutch East India Company (the Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Compagnie), following close on its heels, set up a larger factory immediately to the east. It was the 1 There was an ad valorem duty of io % on imports, whilst on exports it was 5 %. Elsewhere, except at Kong (where the rates were the same as at Hormuz), the duties levied were per load (camel, mule, ox or donkey). See Chardin, Voyages, vol. vm, p. 518. Shah ‘Abbas, in order to compensate the Portuguese in some measure for the loss of Hormuz, gave them the same rights at Kong as the English were to have enjoyed at the former place. 2 A description of Gombroon will be given in ch. xxx.

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year of the Amboyna massacre,1 when relations between England and Holland were very strained, and the agent of the English East India Company at Gombroon had good reason to feel alarmed at the advent of so formidable a rival. Nevertheless, when the Portuguese attempted to interfere with English shipping in the Gulf, the Dutch joined in the struggle against the common foe. The Dutch East India Company differed very materially from its English counterpart in a number of respects. Faced with the truly formidable task of establishing and carrying on trade in the East in opposition to the combined might of Spain and Portugal (which were united from 1580 to 1640), the Dutch realised sooner than the English the truth of the maxim Eendracht maakt macht (“Unity makes strength”).1 2 In 1602, two years after the formation of the English East India Company, the States-General brought about the fusion into one compact and extremely powerful organisation all the groups in the Netherlands which were interested in trading with the East. Each of these groups was represented on the board of directors of the new company, and all the inhabitants of the United Provinces had the right to take shares in it. It was amply provided with funds; moreover, the Republic granted it the right to make treaties with eastern potentates in the name of the States-General, to make war or to conclude peace, to build forts, to levy troops and to appoint the generals to command them. It was thus, unlike the English company, a truly national institution, and it had vastly greater resources and powers.3 1 The Amboyna massacre was long remembered in England. Fifty years later, when England was, for the third time in twenty years, at war with Holland, Dryden produced his tragedy entitled Amboyna, of which the following lines from the epilogue may serve as a specimen: With an ill Grace the Dutch their Mischief do, They’ve both ill Nature and ill Manners too. 8 These words formed the motto of the Transvaal Republic. 3 For a description of the constitution, powers and resources of the Dutch East India Company, see the Mémoire sur le Commerce des Hollandais (Amsterdam, 1718), p. 166 (this anonymous work is attributed to Pierre-Daniel Huet, the Bishop of Avranches, who may have written it as a continuation of his Histoire du Commerce des Anciens). P. Bonnassieux’s Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce, pp. 40-68, and Sir W. W. Hunter’s A History of British India, should also be consulted. Most valuable data regarding the early activities of the Dutch East India Company in Persia are to be found in the late H. Dunlop’s Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië (s’Gravenhage, 1930),

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The Dutch had had to struggle very hard to gain and maintain their freedom at home ; theirs was a clear case of Sieg oder Nieder­ gang. When they decided to engage in the eastern trade, they brought the same indomitable spirit and concentrated effort to bear on the task. Although they were no more powerful as a nation than the English of that time, they were ready to make far greater sacrifices to gain their ends. While the Dutch East India Company had the full authority and support of the States-General and the nation behind it, the English East India Company, on the other hand, was a mere private concern which seldom received any help or support from the Crown. When, late in 1607, a Dutch fleet appeared for the first time off Hormuz, Shäh "Abbas, thinking that he might be able to enlist the naval aid of Holland against the Portuguese, was delighted.1 He sent an envoy named Zain al-‘Âbidïn Khän Shämlü2 to Holland to negotiate, but nothing tangible resulted. It was not until 1623, as we have seen, that the Dutch East India Company entered the Persian field, where it speedily made its presence felt. Taking advantage of the fact that Shäh "Abbàs was then deeply involved in his war with Turkey, it made a great show of naval force in the Persian Gulf, and then bluntly refused to pay any customs dues at Gombroon (thus adversely affecting the English company’s right to a half share thereof), and it also succeeded in securing a substantial share of the silk trade. Moreover, by reason of its interests in the East Indies, it soon gained what was practically a monopoly of the spice trade in Persia and the Persian Gulf. It is not in the least surprising that, although the Dutch East India Company did not establish itself in Persia until six years after the English company had done so, it speedily outstripped it. When one considers the immense advantages of the Dutch over their English rivals, the wonder is that they did not succeed vol. I, and in Dr F. W. Stapel’s edition of Pieter van Dam’s Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie (s’Gravenhage, 1939), book 11, vol. 11 (these two books are, respectively, vols. 72 and 83 of the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publication). 1 See the narrative of Fr Paul Simon quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. I, p. 130. 2 Ibid. vol. i, pp. 169-70. Zain al-*Abidin had already been on a mission to the emperor; see Sir E. D. Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (London, 1933), p. 60n. A portrait of Zain al-‘Abidin (or Zainal, as he was often called) by E. Sadeler, of Prague, is reproduced in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, opposite p. 169 in vol. 1.

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in ousting them from Persia altogether, as they did in the East Indies. It says much for the courage and tenacity of the agents and staff of the English company that it was able to retain a foothold in the country in the face of such odds. Just as Holland was at the zenith of her power in the middle of the seventeenth century, so was the Dutch East India Company at its strongest in Persia at that time. Rendered impatient by the difficulties and delays which always occurred when negotiations with the Persian government were undertaken,1 in 1645 they determined to use force in order to make their position in Persia unassailable. Massing their ships at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, they landed troops on the island of Qishm, where they laid siege to the Governor’s castle. This action so alarmed the Persian government that it offered very favourable terms to the Dutch if they would cease hostilities. The Dutch commander, Commodore Block, thereupon went to Isfahän, where he was well received by the Shah. He succeeded in obtaining a licence to buy silk in any part of Persia and to export it without payment of customs dues in return for bringing the state of war to an end.1 2 This successful move by the Dutch further depressed the trade of the English company.3 The paramount position of the Dutch was further enhanced by the expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat by the Imam of ‘Omän in January 1650; this disaster finally broke the power of the Portuguese in the Gulf.4 The English East India Company had to contend with a number of difficulties that were not occasioned by the Dutch. Although it remained duty-free at Gombroon, its share of the customs dues there was much in arrears even as early as 1638. The failure of the Persians to make these payments became an almost 1 The Dutch evidently shared the views expressed by Huet( ?) in Mémoire sur le Commerce des Hollandais, who stated on p. 210: “Il est certain que ceux qui penseroient arracher quelque avantage des Orientaux Mahométans dans les négociations et les contrats qu’ils feront avec eux auront à se lever de bon matin.” 2 Bruce’s Annals of the Honourable East India Company, vol. 1, p. 414. See also Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, p. 295. 3 The Dutch followed up their success at Qishm by attacking and severely damaging the English East India Company’s factory at Basra, to which its property at Gombroon had been moved as a precautionary measure. See Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 164. 4 See pp. 1 and li of Professor Boxer’s introduction to the Commentarios do Grande Capitam Ruy Freyre de Andrada.

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perennial cause of complaint; eventually, in 1676, the Company reached a compromise with them whereby it was in future to receive a fixed sum of 1000 tomans annually in lieu of the half share of the dues, but even this greatly reduced amount was also soon in arrears. When the Company complained, the Persian govern­ ment retorted that it had failed to carry out its undertaking to maintain two warships in the Gulf. The English Company suffered, moreover, from the con­ sequences of the Civil War. The Puritans’ dislike of silk lessened the demand for it in England, and the Company’s consequent failure to take up its full quota led to serious friction with the Persian government. Moreover, in 1655, Cromwell’s support of the Merchant Adventurers resulted in much harmful competition with the Company until amalgamation took place. The “Inter­ lopers” or “free lance” traders were another source of annoyance and loss to the Company,1 and it also had to contend with much rancour and opposition from the Levant Company which complained, not without reason, that it was seriously affecting its Persian trade. A further complication in the second half of the century, which also affected the Dutch, was the endeavour of the Compagnie Française des Indes to gain a foothold in Persia; its efforts, however, were not well sustained, and it was long before its rivalry assumed serious proportions.2 When Chardin was at Gombroon in 1674 he noticed with what vigour the Dutch celebrated the news of a French defeat in Holland. Their ships lying in the roads were all illuminated with lanterns and their guns fired continually throughout the night, a procedure which greatly impressed the Persians. Chardin went on to say: C’est une chose étrange que la prevention des Orientaux en leur faveur. Les Persans et les Indiens, raisonnant sur le pied de leur 1 Bonnassieux, in his Grandes Compagnies de Commerce, p. 484n., quotes the following extract from a Mémoire sur le Commerce des Hollandais jusqu'en 1669, which is in the Archives Nationales, carton K 1349, cahier no. 32, fol. 15 b: “... en Angleterre les interlopes ou aventuriers font le commerce dans les mêmes lieux où les compagnies anglaises le peuvent faire”, tandis qu’en France et en Hollande, contrairement à ce qui se pratique en Angleterre, lors de l’établissement des Compagnies, “on défend ordinairement aux marchands particuliers sous de rigoureuses peines de faire le commerce aux lieux de leur concession 8 For the aims and activities of this Company, see ch. vu.

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commerce qu’ils voient toujours fleurir, tandis que celui des autres nations ne fait que ramper pour ainsi dire, croient qu’ils sont les rois de l’Europe; c’est ce que disoit le gouverneur du Bander au chef du commerce de la compagnie française: “Vous dites que votre roi a pris le pays des Hollandais ; cependant voilà sept navires qui leur viennent, et à vous, et aux Anglais, il n’en vient pas un.”1 In 1679 the Company’s prospects in Persia seemed so bad that it seriously considered abandoning its connection with that country,2 but black though the outlook then was, influences were already at work to redress the balance between it and the Dutch and to pave the way for its eventual supremacy. In the first place, the three Anglo-Dutch wars between 1652 and 1674 sapped the strength of the Dutch, while their later struggles with France further drained their resources. The aggressive policy of Louis XIV, which threatened England and Holland alike, eventually forced them to compose their differences and combine against the common foe. Moreover, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 resulted in the deposition of James II and the accession of his daughter Mary and her husband William of Orange as joint sovereigns, thus temporarily uniting England and Holland. Seven years before this last development took place, the Dutch had succeeded in driving the factors of the English East India Company from Bantam, their last foothold in Java. Although the complete loss of the Javanese trade was looked upon in England as a calamity at the time, it was, in so far as her interests in India (and, to a lesser extent, in Persia) were concerned, to prove a blessing. The Dutch East India Company, immensely strong though it still was, could not maintain supremacy simultaneously in both the East Indies and India. As the Dutch chose to concentrate on the East Indies, the way was opened for the English East India Company to obtain a predominant position in India, a development which favourably affected its standing in Persia.3 Nevertheless, although the East India Company soon became a political organisation as well as a commercial enterprise in India, in Persia it always confined its activities to trade. 1 Voyages, vol. ix, pp. 71 and 72. L. Langlès, in a footnote on p. 72, remarked : “ Ces observations sont d’une grande justesse et méritent une attention toute particulière.” 8 F. C. Danvers, loc. cit. p. 396. 8 Sir S. A. Khan, op. cit. p. 135.

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In 1682, when the fortunes of the English East India Company were still very low, two remarkable brothers, Sir Josiah Childe in London and Sir John in India, obtained a large measure of control over its affairs, and it was mainly through their joint efforts that a period of expansion set in. In so far as Persia was concerned, endeavours were made to persuade the Armenian merchants there to send their goods to Europe via Bombay, whereby, it was maintained, they would receive more profit than if they continued to use the overland route through Aleppo.1 Naturally enough, this move led to renewed friction with the Levant Company. The East India Company’s large importations of Indian manufactured goods into England aroused protests from the manufacturers of similar goods at home, thus adding to its worries.1 2 Sir Josiah Childe was unmoved by the remonstrances of the Levant merchants, and strove to increase the sales of English cloth in Persia, maintaining that sea freights being low, and the Company being duty-free at Gombroon, it could undersell the Levant Company’s cloth which had to reach the Persian market by the overland route. Instructions were accordingly sent in 1691 to the agent at Gombroon to do everything possible to sell more cloth, and shortly afterwards a large consignment was shipped there, and the agent was instructed to go in person to Isfahän to arrange for its disposal. He was also ordered to find accommodation there for some young men who had been sent out from England so that they might “acquire a knowledge of the Persian and Armenian languages, to qualify them to conduct the Company’s commercial concerns in that kingdom”.3 Not without great difficulty, Sir Josiah Childe managed to obtain a new charter from the Crown in October 1693 which, while confirming all the former privileges of the Company, made 1 Bruce’s Annals t vol. 11, p. 618. In addition to the higher cost of transport by the Aleppo route, there were also the profits of the middlemen to be taken into account. It is noteworthy that the cost of spices sent to Europe by the Cape of Good Hope was only one-third of the cost via Aleppo. 2 Some 9 years later, there was still strong feeling amongst the manufacturers of such goods in England. Petitions and counter-petitions were submitted to Parliament with such headings as: “Reasons against the Prohibiting the Wearing of East India and Persia wrought Silks”, and “A Reply to a Paper intituled, Reasons against the Wearing of East India and Persian wrought Silks in England”. A number of these documents dating from about 1700 are preserved in the British Museum. 3 Bruce’s Annals t vol. in, p. 108.

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it obligatory for it to export English manufactured goods (chiefly cloth) to the annual value of £150,000. As it was manifestly impossible to dispose of so large a quantity of goods in the Indian market, arrangements had to be made to sell quite a large pro­ portion in Persia. The Company’s policy of expansion in Persia had received a further stimulus in 1693, when the news was received of the destruction of the Smyrna fleet by the French. The Levant Company’s losses on this occasion amounted to £600,000/ while those of the Dutch were even heavier. It was believed that, in consequence of this disaster, no cloth belonging to the Levant Company would reach Persia by the overland route that year, thus providing the East India Company with a good opportunity to sell its own cloth.2 A further consequence of the destruction of the Smyrna fleet was that the East India Company was encouraged to increase its own shipping. In the same year, the Court of the East India Company sent explicit instructions to Surat and Bombay for the promotion of the Persian trade. In the first place, the agent in Persia was to collect as much silk and Kirmän wool as possible, partly by barter. Secondly, in order to facilitate matters, the Company’s establish­ ment in Persia was to be increased, so as to consist of the agent, four factors and four writers. Thirdly, the Isfahän factory was to be in permanent, instead of intermittent, occupation. Fourthly, the agent was to have the option of remaining at Gombroon or of transferring his headquarters to Isfahän, it being left to his discretion to decide which would be the better centre for carrying out the new policy of the Company.3 1 Sir Josiah Childe was greatly pleased at this disaster to the Turkey merchants who, to use his own words, “had assaulted and battered perpetually at the Company”. He hoped that the Levant Company would be displaced from its privileged position in Turkey and that the East India Company would be able to take its place. See Sir A. Khan, op. cit. p. 248. The loss of so many ships with their valuable cargoes, however, caused great public dissatisfaction with the Admiralty and Navy. Bishop Burnet, in his History of his Own Times (London, 1818), vol. in, p. 138, said that “our want of intelligence [i.e. naval intelligence] was much complained of; the instructions that the admirals, who commanded the fleet, had received from the cabinet council, were thought ill given, and yet worse executed”. 2 As will be explained in ch. xxxi, this disaster did not prevent some of the Levant Company’s cloth from reaching I$fahän. 3 Bruce’s Annalst vol. in, p. 140.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

In order to enable the Company’s staff to fulfil their duties better, the writers were to live in the homes of Armenian merchants in Julfa, so as to study their language and also to get to know their ways of conducting business.1 Then followed detailed instructions as to the purchase of cloth from the Armenians and the method to be employed for disposing of the cloth. The Company subsequently expressed the hope that, if the trade were conducted with ability, it might1 2 ... divert the long established course of the silk trade between Persia and Aleppo, and render Ispahan the centre of it, where it might be exchanged, by barter, for the English cloths ; the silks procured at this capital must be sent to Gombroon, to be loaded on the Company’s ships for Europe, which would render the East-India trade the means of increasing both the navigation, and the revenue of England :—every facility, therefore, must be given to the sale of woollen cloths, to enable the Court to send out another large stock to Persia, in the following year, and fulfil the commercial obligations entered into, on obtaining their late Charter.

When these instructions reached Persia early in 1695, the agent decided to move his headquarters to Isfahän, so as to be in closer touch with the Armenian merchants in Julfa through whom he hoped to be able to sell the Company’s cloth. An additional advantage, the importance of which was soon to become apparent, was that the agent was also placed in closer contact with the officials of the Persian government. Before Captain Benjamin Brangwin left Gombroon for Isfahan, he was given the following very detailed instructions:

(i) He was to entrust the sale of cloth to five Armenian merchants (whose names were given). 1 Bruce’s Annals, pp. 140 and 141. It seems very doubtful whether this idea of quartering young Englishmen in Armenian households in order to enable them to learn both the language and the business methods of their hosts was ever put into practice. The same remark probably also applies to the slightly earlier scheme for these young men to learn Persian as well as Armenian (see p. 368 above). To judge by the truly astonishing manner in which the Company’s employees mutilated Persian personal names, place names and commercial terms, it is clear that very few of them indeed can have attained any proficiency in that language. 2 Ibid. p. 161, on the authority of letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Persia, dated 30 March and 6 June 1694 and 8 March 1695 (O.S.). It is to be noted that Peter the Great also wanted to divert this trade, but his aim was to make it go across Russia. See p. 103 above.

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(ii) He was to pay particular attention in regard to farmons, “they being of great consequence”. (iii) In view of the great expense of maintaining two factories, he was to be “as frugall as possible”. (iv) In pursuance of this policy of economy, he was not, while on his way to Isfahän, “ to accept of any presents from the Viziers because if so they expect large returns, therefore take no notice of it and excuse it ye best way you can and tell them you have no money to acknowledge their favours”.1

There was a further admonition, which was in regard to the messengers and servants of the Dutch East India Company: Pray have a care and deliver no pacquets to any Dutch Shotters1 2 or Servants, and give them as few Visits as may be, because they are very expensive ; whatever outward show of friendship they may pretend to its only from the teeth outwards for in heart they are as great enemies to our Rt. Hon. Masters’ prosperity as any be in the World.

However, before these instructions could reach Brangwin, an event occurred which curtailed for a time the activities of both the English and Dutch East India Companies in Persia. This event was the death of Shäh Sulaimän on 29 July 1694. 1 Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. L, letter no. 5993, dated 20/31 March 1694. Brangwin did not go to Isfahän until some time in 1695. 2 I.e. shätirs, literally “outrunners” or those who ran before the Shäh or persons of great importance. The term was used here in the sense of messenger or courier.

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CHAPTER XXX

THE FACTORIES OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES AT GOMBROON AND ISFAHAN I. GOMBROON (BANDAR ‘ABBÄs)

When Affonso de Albuquerque seized the island of Hormuz in 1514, he also took possession of the coastal strip on the mainland to the north on which the small town of Gamrü was situated, and for a century the Portuguese made use of this town for the trans-shipment of goods to or from Hormuz. It remained, however, a place of little importance, being quite overshadowed by its far larger neighbour. John Newberie was probably the first Englishman to visit “ Bender Gomrow”, as he termed it. He gave no description of it beyond saying that it had formerly belonged to the kings of Lâr and, later, to those of Hormuz, and that “the Portugals keepe a Castle with seuen or eight Souldiers within it”.1 In 1614 Dâ’üd Khan, the brother of Imâm Qulï Khän, the celebrated Governor-General of Fars, wrested Gamrü and its coastal strip from the Portuguese. Two years later Edward Connock visited Gamrü or Gombroon, as he called it. He was so impressed with its potentialities that he expressed the hope that it might be possible for the East India Company “to settle another year in the Portugals’ bosom in that hopeful and glorious port of Gombroon”, adding that it was “the best port in all Persia where ships of any burthen may be under the command of a strong fort ”.2 Six years later came the fall of Hormuz, after which, as we have seen, the East India Company, having been granted the same rights at Gombroon that it would have enjoyed at Hormuz, transferred its factory from Jäsk to the former place. The name occurs in documents and books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in an extraordinary number of forms, such as Gamrü, Gombroon, Gombron, Gamron, Gumrun, Komron, Komoron, Combru, Cambarao and Comaräo. Chardin 1 Purchas his Pilgrimes, pt. II, p. 414. 8 Calendar of State Papers, East Indies, 1513-1616, p. 485.

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and some other writers imagined that the name was a corruption of the Turkish word gümrük or “customs”,1 but this is not the case. Also erroneous is the attempted derivation from camaräo^ the Portuguese for “shrimp”. Captain Alexander Hamilton, who often called at Gombroon with his ship, said that it was “.. .formerly a Fishing Town, and, when Shaw Abbas began to build it, had its Appelation from the Portugueze in Derision, because it was a good Place for catching Prawns or Shrimps”.2 The correct etymology of the name is believed to be as follows: from the tenth century to the beginning of the fourteenth the city of Hormuz, which was then situated at the head of a creek near the still-existing town of Minäb, 47 miles to the east of Bandar ‘Abbas, was the great emporium of eastern trade. By 1300, however, the incursions of marauding tribes had become so frequent that the king of Hormuz abandoned the site and moved with all the inhabitants to the small island of Jirün (also spelled Jarün and Jarrun), which lies just over 4 miles to the south of the mainland and 40 miles to the west of Minâb. A good harbour was constructed on the sheltered northern end of the island, and it was not long before a very flourishing town came into being there. This town was called New Hormuz, but the word “ new” gradually dropped out, and both the town and the island were thenceforward known as “Hormuz”. Curiously enough, the name Jirün or Jarün, which had up till then been applied to the island, was given to the small town or village of Surü or Shahrü on the mainland 10 miles to the north-west. Gamru, Gombroon and the other forms in which the name occurs are all said to be corruptions of Jarün or Jirün.3 Many of the buildings that were erected at Gombroon after the abandonment of Hormuz were constructed with material taken from demolished houses on that island.4 1 Gümrük itself is said to be a corruption of the Greek kov^kI. 2 A New Account of the East Indies, vol. 1, p. 92. De Bruyn, in his Travels, vol. 11, p. 73, endeavoured to derive the name from gamberi, a small crayfish which abounds in the sea off Gombroon. 3 M. Streck, “ Bender ‘Abbas”, in the EI, vol. 1. As G. Ie Strange has pointed out in his Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge, 1930), p. 319, Hajji Khalifa, in the Jahän-Namä, referred to the town as “Gumru, the port of Hurmuz, whence to the city of Lär.. .it is four to five days* march”. 4 John Nieuhoff, “Voyages and Travels into Brasil and the East-Indies”, in Churchill’s Voyages, vol. 11, p. 228.

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For commercial purposes, Gombroon had a number of advan­ tages over Jäsk. It had a more sheltered anchorage, and it was much nearer to Shiraz and Isfahan. Moreover, the caravan routes connecting those cities with Gombroon, besides being much shorter, were less exposed to attack by predatory tribes than the long route from Jäsk. Caravans usually took just over a month to cover the distance between Gombroon and Isfahan, but couriers, travelling light, could perform the journey in ten days. Another caravan route linked Gombroon with Kirmän, whence the English and, later, the Dutch obtained their greatly prized supplies of goats* wool. Gombroon thus had some decided advantages, but it would have taken far more than these to have made the Europeans residing in or frequenting the town apply to it the enthusiastic Connock’s epithets of “hopeful and glorious”. The great draw­ back to it was its unpleasant and very unhealthy summer climate (in the winter, on the other hand, it was agreeable and even bracing). Another serious disadvantage was the bad quality of the local water (except for the supply from Tsin, a village ten miles to the north-north-west of the town, close to the lower slopes of the Küh-i-Ginau).1 It was through drinking the bad water from the wells in or near the town that the inhabitants were so troubled by Guinea-worms which, as de Bruyn has said, “.. .eat into the arms and legs of persons, and which are not drawn out without their being exposed to apparent danger, by breaking them in the flesh ”.1 2 It would take an undue amount of space to record here the strictures of the many Europeans who described Gombroon after having lived in or visited the town in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it will be sufficient to mention only a few. John Nieuhoff, who was at Gombroon in 1662, expressed himself as follows: ... such Ships as are obliged to stay here in the Summer Season, must be covered all over with Sails, otherwise the Planks would split 1 The Küh-i-Ginau is a striking landmark as one approaches Bandar ‘Abbäs from the south. It dominates the landscape there much as Tö Châl does to the north of Tehran. 2 Travels, vol. 11, p. 74. See also Thévenot, Travels into the Levant (London, 1687), part 11, p. 137, who explains that if any part of the worm is left in the flesh, the consequences are serious, and the arm or leg, as the case may be, has to be opened up in order to remove it.

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FACTORIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

asunder, the Pitch and Tar rising up in Bubbles as it were a Boiling; so that no Body dare Walk barefooted upon the Deck. Those who venture to continue during the hot Season at Gamron, commonly get for their Pains an Ague of a very malicious Nature, which if it does not kill, at least seldom quits them, but leaves such Relicks behind, as at last brings them to the Grave.1

Chardin, who was at Gombroon some years later, said of its climate and lethal effects: Quant à Fair qu’on y respire, je ne pense pas qu’il y en ait au monde plus méchant et plus malsain, surtout depuis la fin d’avril jusqu’à la fin de septembre ; il faut dire même qu’il est mortel, surtout aux étrangers, qui n’y sauroient faire de long séjour, mourant tous au bout de peu d’années, et sinon tous, du moins neuf de dix, dans l’espace de dix ans ; car c’est le compte que l’on fait d’ordinaire.2 Dr John Fryer, who visited Gombroon much about the same time, said that the English sailors who landed there “stigmatized this Place for the Excessive Heat, with the Sarcastical Saying, that there was but an Inch-Deal betwixt Gombroon and Hell”.3 De Bruyn, who had a severe attack of fever whilst at Gombroon in the autumn of 1705, referred to the high mortality there. After describing the prevalence of the Guinea-worm trouble, he said

One could not find a more rigorous punishment for malefactors than confining them in a place like this. One, however, seldom fails of finding some people of merit and distinction here ; whom interest, and the hopes of raising a great fortune, have drawn thither, and whom death often snatches away before they have attained to the height of their desires.4 Very similar were the views expressed by Alexander Hamilton, who stated that Gombroon was “.. .ill-seated, and wants almost every Thing that contributes to the Support of human Life, except Fish and Mutton; yet, for many years, it has been well peopled by reason of its Trade, which has filled the Pockets of 1 Loc. cit. p. 229. 2 Voyages, vol. vm, pp. 511-12. Gaudereau, in his Relation de Différentes Espèces de Peste que reconnaissent les Orientaux, pp. 18-19, went so far as to say that there was a place near Bandar Abbäs where a stay of only three hours was fatal. For this reason, this place was given the sinister name of Goribasirgon (Gür-i-Bäzärgän, “the grave of the merchant”). 3 A New Account of the East Indies and Persia, p. 224. 4 Travels, vol. 11, p. 74.

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many Merchants, who, at their first settling there, were very empty”.1 More philosophical in his outlook was Thévenot, who was of opinion that “.. .the best way to preserve ones Health at BenderAbassi, is to keep a very regular Diet, eating so moderately that one hath always an Appetite: to quench a red hot Iron in the Water, to strain it afterwards through a Linnen-Cloath, and to be always chearful”.1 2 There can be no doubt that there was an element of exaggeration in most of the passages quoted above,3 but it must be borne in mind that, in those days, medical science was not in a position to deal very successfully with such illnesses and disorders as occurred in places like Gombroon. Furthermore, many of the Europeans who resided in those parts did not take proper pre­ cautions to preserve their health. There were but few amenities at Gombroon, and it is small wonder that some of the Europeans there endeavoured to seek solace in drink, punch being the favourite beverage.4*The Dutch traveller Jan Struys, who passed through Gombroon in 1671, said that there were many persons there .. .who destroy themselves with drinking a Liquor much in use there called Pale Punshen.. .which is so bewitching that they cannot refrain from drinking it if they once come to taste it, being very delicious and tempting. It occasions a Giddiness in the Head, Feavers and Fluxes, and is so corrosive that some who have drunk immoderately of it have died.6

Hamilton likewise mentioned the danger of over-indulgence in drink at Gombroon, saying, “The Europeans often hasten Death sooner than he would come of his own Accord, by Intemperance 1 Op. cit. vol. I, p. 92. 8 Travels, part 11, p. 137. 3 Compare the following extract from The Persian Gulf Pilot (7th ed.), p. 167: " The climate of Bandar Abbas is not unhealthy, and from October to April, in­ clusive, is extremely pleasant. In winter, when the mountains to the northward are covered with snow, the air is dry, clear and bracing. In summer, however, these rocky masses reflect heat on to the plain below, and the climate is damp, hot, and relaxing, but is not such as to render it by any means insupportable to a European who is comfortably lodged, and the land and sea breezes, which are then fairly regular, do much to mitigate the heat. The prevailing diseases are malarial fever and diseases of the skin ; other diseases seldom exist in epidemic form. ” 4 Some information on the early use of punch in India and on its ingredients at that timewill be found on pp. io8-9of my FamousCities of Iran (Brentford, 1939). 6 The Voiages and Travels of John Struys (London, 1684), p. 350.

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FACTORIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

and Debauchery of several Kinds; and they have a Burial-place pretty near the Town, well-stored with Tombs.”1 Charles Lockyer, who was in Gombroon in 1705, spoke with evident appreciation of the lavish entertainments given there by the Dutch, which were “in the best Manner; and ’tis a Miracle if they part sober”.2 The Gombroon records of the English and Dutch East India Companies often make sad reading, as there are frequent references to the deaths, generally at a comparatively early age, of members of their staffs; there can be little doubt that a number of these fatalities were occasioned by intemperance.3 Fortunately for their health, all the employees of the two Companies did not have to spend the whole of their time in Persia in insalubrious Gombroon, as their duties often took them to Shiräz, Isfahän, Kirmän and elsewhere, where the climate was relatively much healthier. As the seventeenth century wore on, Gombroon grew in size and importance, so that Shäh ‘Abbäs’s dream of making it the chief port of his kingdom was fully realised. A wharf one mile in length was built along the sea-front, but large vessels, such as East Indiamen, could not berth alongside, owing to the shallow water. Such vessels had to lie off in the roads, where they were loaded or unloaded by means of small craft called sanbûqsï Some protection had been given to the town on the landward side by a stone wall, but by 1662, when John Nieuhoff was there, it was already in such a bad state of repair that it was of little use. There were four forts, two large and two small, but only one of these was well provided with cannon, while all were in a crumbling state in the closing years of the century.6 1 Op, cit. vol. I, p. 95. 8 An Account of Trade in India, p. 230. 3 The management of the Dutch East India Company in India were evidently alive to this danger, as they encouraged the drinking of tea as an alternative. In this, as Ovington said, they were more successful than the English; in fact, in their establishments “the teapot’s seldom off the fire”. See Rawlinson’s edition of Ovington’s Voyage to Surat in 1689 (Oxford, 1929), p. 180. 4 Called chiambok or chiambox by the Dutch. The sanbüq is really a pearling boat. It has a square stern, and, with its short keel, it can be turned very quickly by means of oars. See Colonel H. R. P. Dickson’s drawing and description of a sanbüq in his book The Arab of the Desert (London, 1949), p. 477« 6 F. Valentijn, “Keurlike Beschryving van Choromandel, Pegu, Arrakan, Bengale, Mocha, van’t Nederlansch Comptoir in Persien”, in his Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, vol. v, p. 202.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

In Chardin’s day there were between 1400 and 1500 houses in the town; the number was probably rather larger some twenty years later. The larger houses were all provided with projections on the roof called bâd-gïrs (literally, “wind-takers”), which served to catch whatever breeze there was and convey it into the interiors. Some of these bâd-gïrs were large enough to contain recesses in which people could sleep in the hot weather.1 The factory of the English East India Company was situated on the sea-front near the western limits of the town (which in those days extended much further to the west than it does at present). No contemporary description of it appears to exist,1 23but, so far as one can judge from de Bruyn’s painting of Gombroon (Plate 5), it was a fair-sized building, with a large doorway leading on to the beach. From the centre of the roof rose a large bâd-gïr. Inside there was doubtless a spacious courtyard where the baggage animals could be loaded or unloaded. Near-by was a small creek where sanbüqs could take cargo on board or be discharged in smooth water. The original Dutch factory stood immediately to the east of the English one. It was a much larger building, with high, crenellated walls and a lofty bâd-gïr? In 1698 Jacobus Hoogkamer,4 the then director56of the Dutch Company, laid the foundation stone of an even larger and more imposing establishment on what was then 1 Nieuhoff, loc, cit, p. 228. 2 In October 1759 a French squadron under the Comte d’Estaing appeared off Gombroon. At high water one of the smaller vessels was hauled to within 400 yards of the English factory, which she proceeded to bombard. After a heavy cannonade, the French landed and forced the defenders of the factory to surrender. Having placed explosives inside, the French set fire to the building, which was almost completely destroyed. J. B. Fraser, in his Narrative of a Journey into Khorasän in the Years 1821 and 1822 (London, 1825), p. 44, said, . .almost overhanging the surf, stand the remains of the English factory; an extensive mass, so completely gone to decay, that it is difficult to trace the original plan of the buildings. The ruins of one or two tanks still exist, and long suites of sirdâbs or subterraneous apartments to retire into during the hot weather. ” 3 This building is shown on the extreme right of de Bruyn’s painting. 4 Hoogkamer was Director at Gombroon from 1698 to 1701. W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, in his book De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare Buiten-Comptoiren in Azië, pp. 249-50, gives an outline of Hoogkamer’s career. 6 The position of Directeur (occasionally the term Bestierder was used instead) corresponded to that of the Agent of the English Company.

378

PLATE V

Panorama of Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbas) as it was in 1705. No. 2 is the Governor’s house, no. 4 the French factory, no. 5 the English factory and no. 10 the new Dutch factory.

FACTORIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

the eastern fringe of the town. De Bruyn thus described the new building:

The house which belongs to our company, is the most beautiful structure in the city, and is built on the edge of it toward the east.... It is very large, and furnished with fine magazines ; the chambers too are handsome, and of a considerable height. There is likewise a very magnificent and beautiful hall in the middle of the apartments above, whose windows, as well as those of the director’s lodgings, have a prospect to the sea, from whence these apartments are refreshed with the most agreeable air in the world ; but this house is not finished as yet.1

The director of the Dutch Company had another residence in the village of Naiband, on the outskirts of the town, where there were (and still are) groves of date-palms. It is not known whether the English agent also had a house outside Gombroon, but the Company owned a large garden at Tsin which had the reputation of being the best-kept one in the district. It was from the wells at Tsïn that, as already stated, the best drinking water for Gombroon was obtained. The French factory, which was situated a short distance to the west of the English one, was the least impressive of the three establishments. At the time of Charles Lockyer’s visit to Gombroon (in 1705) it was unoccupied.2

2.

THE FACTORIES OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES AT ISFAHÄN

A. The English Factory When Shäh ‘Abbas I allowed the English East India Company to open a factory in 1617, he gave its representatives the choice of several buildings belonging to the Crown. Their choice fell on a palace which was situated just to the west of the Qaisarlya bazaar. Chardin, who knew this building well, has given the following description of it: ... la maison de la compagnie anglaise, qui est un grand et spacieux palais, ayant trois corps de logis, avec un beau jardin et de beaux bassins d’eau; mais, à dire le vrai, tout cela tombe en ruine, la compagnie 1 Travels, vol. 11, pp. 73-4.

2 An Account of Trade in India, p. 230.

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n’ayant plus à present, à beaucoup près, ni le même négoce, ni le même monde à Ispahan, que lorsque ce palais lui fut donné, il y a quatrevingt-dix ans. Depuis environ trente ans, ce beau logis ne sert plus à la compagnie que de maison de campagne, où quelques facteurs viennent passer quatre ou cinq mois de l’année tout au plus, et puis ils s’en retournent à Gombron.... C’est dommage de la ruine de ce palais ; car les plafonds, la dorure et la peinture en étoient admirables. Il fut bâti par un yartchi bachi,1 c’est-à-dire, chef des crieurs publics, qui est une charge considérable, lequel étant tombé dans la disgrâce d’Abas-leGrand, à la fin du seizième siècle, ses biens furent confisqués à la manière orientale ; et comme la compagnie anglaise envoya peu de temps après des députés à la cour, et demanda un établissement dans la ville capitale, dans un des palais du roi, on leur donna à choisir entre plusieurs, et la compagnie choisit celui-ci, parce qu’il étoit dans le lieu le plus marchand de la ville, et le plus proche de la cour.1 2

Nothing now remains of this fine mansion and garden, but the name of the small caravanserai which now occupies their site still retains a faint echo of the days when the representatives of the East India Company lived and worked there. This caravanserai, which is now known as the Timcha-yi-Firangï-hâ or “Little Caravanserai of the Franks”, is at the end of an alley that runs off westwards from the main part of the Qaisariya bazaar, some 300 yards to the north of the entrance at the northern end of the Maidän-i-Shäh. The ramshackle buildings that surround the central courtyard are occupied by dyers and also by the stampers of qalam-kärs (cotton fabrics that are stamped with designs in various colours), whose wares are to be seen drying in the sun in the courtyard.3 Chardin was fully justified in stressing the advantageous position of this mansion. It seems that life in the Isfahän factory was, on the whole, conducted in more circumspect fashion than was the case at Gombroon. Nevertheless, R. Jefferis, who was one of the Company’s employees at Isfahän, related in August 1620 that the 1 This is intended for the Turkish term jarchï-bâshï\ Chardin’s translation of it is correct. 2 Voyages, vol. vn, pp. 403-4. 3 I am greatly indebted to my friend Mr V. L. Walter, formerly the Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank of Iran, and to Aqai Akbarzädeh, of Isfahan, without whose help I would not have been able to discover the Timcha-yiFirangï-hâ and to connect it with the former headquarters of the East India Company.

380

PLATE VI

The courtyard of the Timcha-yi-Firangi-hä, on the site of the factory of the English East India Company, Isfahän.

FACTORIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

doorkeeper “and two Runnawayes from the ffleet” once drank so much that one of them, “whom Wyne bereaued of ffootmanship”, had to be carried away by his slightly more sober companions.1

B. The Dutch Factory The headquarters of the Dutch East India Company in Isfahän was situated a short distance to the north of the English factory. No trace whatever of it remains, and it was a matter of some difficulty to determine even its approximate position. Chardin provided a valuable clue by stating that the building adjoined a college which he called the Medrezé sephivie;12 this college no longer exists, but some years ago another called the Madrasa-yiShähzäda-hä or “College of the Princes” was erected on its site. The Dutch property lay immediately to the north, in an area which is now partly waste ground and partly covered by modern houses and gardens.3 The Dutch mansion and factory were not so well situated as the English establishment, as they were further from the main commercial centre of the city and from the court; moreover, they abutted on to a district of ill-fame.4 Chardin has given a curious account of how Huybert Visnich, one of the pioneers of the Dutch East India Company in Persia, acquired this mansion for himself, and of how it passed into the possession of the Company after his disgrace and flight.5 Cornelius de Bruyn, when he was in Isfahan in 1704, made drawings of the house and its garden.6 In addition he has given the following description of them in his book:

Let us say a word of our India company’s house, the residence of our director, and the other officers belonging to the company. It is sur­ rounded with a high wall of earth, the gate of which is large and lofty, and from thence you proceed between two walls, to the stables, but the horses are often tied to racks without. You leave the stables and garden on the left hand, to go to the house itself, in the midst of the court of which is a canal which runs on the side of the place, where they receive strangers; behind which is a fine apartment, spread with carpets and 1 the 2 3 4 6

Quoted by Sir H. Yule, in his article “Some Little Known Travellers in East”, in The Asiatic Quarterly Review (1888), vol. v, p. 327. This should read Madrasa-yi-Çafavïya. Aqai Akbarzädeh was kind enough to guide me to this spot. Chardin, Voyages, vol. vn, p. 416. 6 Ibid. pp. 415-16. See plates 107 and 108 in the first volume of de Bruyn’s Travels.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

full of cushions to sit and rest upon, after the manner of the country. On one side are the apartments and office of the director’s deputy, and other of the company’s servants. From thence you go to the part belonging to the director himself, passing through a small passage to it, and it consists of three or four apartments, without reckoning the hall, where they dine, which looks upon this part.... It has a very agreeable garden, in the midst of which is a Talael1 of wood, and a fine fountain with jets of water which, from thence, flows into a canal, and serves to water the garden, by the means of a machine, which conveys it to every part. Here also are great numbers of sena’s and fruit trees, flowers and plants.2

One can readily imagine how relieved and delighted the em­ ployees of the Dutch and English Companies must have been when, after having endured not only the heat of Gombroon, but also the fatigue, discomforts and often hazards of the long journey up to Isfahän, they arrived at their fine houses and cool and shady gardens. Even in Persia at the present time, in these days of rapid transport and comparative comfort, it is always a joy to come, at the end of a long and dusty journey, to such a haven of peace and quiet, where one can relax and listen to the soothing sound of running water. Both the English and the Dutch had factories at Shiraz, and they had, at any rate, intermittent representation at Kirmän. Furthermore, the Dutch maintained a small factory at Lär. No details of any of these establishments appear to have been preserved. 3. THE EMOLUMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES AND STAFFS OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES IN PERSIA

Even when we take into account the much greater purchasing power of money in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the rates of pay of the representatives of the two East India Companies in Persia seem ridiculously low. 1 Presumably a tälär or covered balcony. 2 Travels, vol. 1, pp. 243-4. Pieter van Dam, in his Beschryvinge, stated that the Dutch Company “has a large, beautiful house with two gardens, full of various fruit trees”. An earlier reference is that of Nicolaes Jacobsz Overschie, in a letter to the Directors of the Company at Amsterdam dated 8 May 1633 ; he stated that the Company’s house was very large and that it had an excellent (treffelycken) garden. See also the extract given by H. Dunlop, in his Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzie, p. 424.

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FACTORIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

Charles Lockyer, describing the hardships of life at Gombroon, said: “What with the Danger1 in the Spring, violent Heats in the Summer, and Lingering Sickness in the Winter, poor Factors and Writers at £15 and £5 per Annum, have a hard Bargain with the Company/’1 2 He went on to say that there was, however, the opportunity of growing rich there sooner than at healthier places, because it was possible for members of the staff to inherit, by agreement, the estates of their colleagues. He did not give the salaries of the agent or of other senior officials, but it is known that, in 1736, the scale was as follows:

The agent: £150 per annum. Two senior merchants: £40 per annum. Senior factor : £30 per annum. Junior employees: £5 per annum. Lockyer might have amplified his remarks on the possibility of employees growing rich by stating that much money could be made by private trading. Employees could export or import their goods through the intermediary of the Company and so escape the payment of customs dues.3 Notwithstanding this privilege, many of the staff who died at Gombroon or elsewhere in Persia were in debt to the Company or to their colleagues at the time of their death. We do not appear to have any record of the salaries of the representatives and employees of the Dutch Company in Persia, but it seems safe to assume that they did not differ appreciably, if at all, from the scale applied in India. Taking as our basis the figures given in the case of J. J. Ketelaar,4 they were as follows: Guilders per mensem 75 65 40 30 20

Rank Senior merchant Merchant Junior merchant Accountant Assistant

1 I.e. of illness. a Op. cit. pp. 217-18. 3 It was only with extreme reluctance that the Company granted this privilege. Moreover, its employees were not allowed to interfere with any branch of trade which the Company had expressly reserved for itself. See The Cambridge Shorter History of India, pp. 526-7. 4 Dr J. Ph. Vogel, “Joan Josua Ketelaar of Elbing, Author of the First Hindustani Grammar”, in BSOS, vol. vm, pp. 817-18. For particulars of Ketelaar’s service in Persia, see pp. 402-4 below.

383

FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

Thus, while the pay of a Dutch senior merchant was practically the same as that of the agent of the English Company in Persia, the emoluments of their subordinates were on a rather more lavish scale than those of the English in corresponding positions. The higher scale for the Dutch may have been applied because they were, in theory at least, strictly forbidden to do any private trading. In practice, however, few, if any, of the employees of the Dutch Company observed this rule. We learn from a Dutch source1 that, to make up for the many inconveniences of living in Gombroon, the Dutch Director there “has the opportunity of making a vast fortune in a short time, so that, in general, in 4 or 5 years, he has no further occasion to concern himself with commerce ' ’. 4. THE NATURE OF THE TRADE OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES WITH PERSIA

A. The English East India Company2 (i) Exports from Persia. By the end of the seventeenth century Persian silk, owing to its high price as compared with that of Indian silk, was no longer the Company’s most important export from Persia, the first place having been taken by goats’ wool from the district of Râvar, which lies some 70 miles to the north of the town of Kirmän. This commodity was greatly sought after by certain English manufacturers, particularly hatters.3 This wool has been 1 “Voyage round the World, by Commodore Roggewein, in 1721-1723”, in Robert Kerr’s A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels (Edinburgh, 1814), vol. xi, p. 158. 2 The particulars given here have been gleaned from a number of sources, the most important being a memorandum in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris (AEP, vol. v, fols. 184 b-! 91 a). This memorandum, which is entitled “Commerce des Anglois en Perse” and is dated 15 July 1718, also contains valuable information on the trade of the Dutch East India Company and on that of the Persian Armenians. The name of the author is not given, but he was undoubtedly Jean Billon de Cansevilles, an able merchant of Marseilles, of whom more will be said later. C. Schefer also included a similar memorandum, likewise unsigned, but evidently written by the same author some 12 years later, as appendix 1 to his edition of Père Raphaël du Mans’s Estât de la Perse en 1660. See also the Abbé Raynal, The Philosophical and Political History of the Settle­ ments and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies, vol. I, pp. 255-6. Much information on trade in general with Persia is contained in the memoranda of earlier date which Schefer also included in that work, as appendices xlv, XLvii and xlviii. 3 Lockyer, in his Account of Trade in India, p. 218, said of Kirmän wool, “which, I am told, our Hatters cannot well be without”.

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described as being “as soft as silk, curiously curled, of a mixed colour, blue and white, inclining to grey”.1 Other exports included gold brocade, tapestry, carpets, cloths, leather work, shagreen, pistachios, almonds, dried fruits, bezoar,12 asafoetida, gum ammoniac, nut-gall, orpiment, bdellium, Indian red (oxide of iron from the island of Hormuz), turquoises, lapis lazuli, mother of pearl, rose water, Shïrâz wine and spirits. The above goods were exported mainly to England, but some were sent to India, particularly the Shïrâz wine and spirits. (ii) Imports into Persia from England. Persian imports from England included English cloth in various colours and patterns, serge, lead, tin, clocks, basins, cups, saucers, plates, cochineal and piastres. (iii) Imports into Persia from India. The most important of these imports were sandal-wood, ebony, coconut oil, sugar3, Indian muslins and cotton goods. Surplus quantities of English cloth were also imported at times, in order to avoid flooding the Indian market. (iv) Miscellaneous. The English East India Company made a considerable profit by chartering its ships to Persian, Armenian and Indian merchants for the transport of their goods between India and Persia.4 1 W. Millbum, Oriental Commerce: or the East India Trader's Complete Guide, p. 135. Raynal, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 255, stated that this wool “nearly resembles that of the Vicuna. It is of great use in the manufacture of hats, and of some stuffs. It is a remarkable circumstance in the goats which supply it, that in the month of May the fleece falls off of itself.” According to a French memorandum (possibly by de Cansevilles) on trade in Persia which was written in 1716, a profit of 100 % was made on sales of this wool ; AEP, vol. 1, fol. 35 a. G. A. Olivier, in his Voyage dans VEmpire Othoman, l'Egypte et la Perse, vol. 11, p. 185, also gives some information of interest on the subject of this goats’ wool. 2 The word “bezoar” is a corruption of the Persian pad-zahr or “guardian (against) poison " ; it was so called because it was believed to be a most efficacious antidote. Olivier, op. cit. vol. in, p. 191, stated that it was much in demand in the east, and that the Persians esteemed it greatly, as they considered it to be “sudorifique, excitant, cordial, alexipharmaque”. 3 The large imports of sugar by the English into Persia were for long a sore point with the Dutch, since they spoilt the latter’s market. 4 “Commerce des Anglois en Perse”, AEP, vol. V, fol. 186a. According to Lockyer, op. cit. pp. 252-3, passengers of Persian, Armenian or other nationalities could also be taken. The “great cabin” of a ship could be hired for 1000 rupees (presumably from Gombroon to Surat or vice versa).

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B. The Dutch East India Company (i) Exports from Persia. The Dutch exports from Persia were much the same as those of the English. The Persian Government was obliged by the terms of a contract concluded in 1701 to deliver annually to the Company 100 bales of silk, “each bale containing 408 pounds of Dutch weight”.1 Persian silk was of various qualities, the best being what was termed in contracts kedgodapessend (kadkhudä-pasand, or “pleasing to the kadkhudä or headman”).12 Next came legie or legia silk which, although also of good quality, was less fine than the kedgoda-pessend. This legie silk came from the Lâhïjân district (hence the name legie or legia) in Gïlân. Last was the Ardasse3 variety, which came from Shïrvân and which was much coarser than either of the other kinds. Other Dutch exports from Persia included:4*woollen carpets, (mainly to Malabar and Ceylon), and more expensive goldthreaded carpets, velvet, goats’ wool (from the Rävar district), amber, asafoetidia, Persian 'abbâsïs* gold and silver,678 red and white wine from Shiraz (mainly to Batavia), pistachios, almonds, rompent ruinas* shellac and various kinds of indigo.9 (ii) Imports into Persia. These included cloth of various qualities (similar to those of the English Company), damasks, ivory, 1 De Bruyn, Travels, vol. I, p. 223. 2 See Dr F. W. Stapel’s glossary in his edition of Pieter van Dam’s Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, p. 609. 3 As Dr Stapel has explained in his glossary in the above-mentioned book (p. 600), ardasse is the Portuguese word for the coarse silk from Shïrvân. Compare the French term ardassine, a fabric made from this kind of silk. I am indebted to my friend Mr David Dunlop for drawing my attention to these various kinds of silk. 4 Many of these goods were re-exports from India or further east. 6 There were 50 'abbâsïs in one toman. The silver content of an 'abbäsl varied from 71 to 83 grains; see the TM, pp. 130-1. See also Etienne Padery’s "Mémoire sur les Monoyes de Perse” in AEP, vol. v, fol. 209b. 8 Gold and silver were exported mainly to the Cape of Good Hope. Both the English and Dutch Companies exported large quantities of gold and silver in bullion or in coin. 7 Rompen, an inferior kind of Muscat nuts, constituted an important export (I have to thank Mr David Dunlop for this information). 8 Ruinas is a corruption of the Persian word rünäs, meaning madder. 9 For indigo de Biana, indigo-chirches and other varieties, see Dr Stapel’s glossary in his edition of Pieter van Dam’s Beschryvinge, p. 609.

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benzoin, zinc, perfumes, pepper, cardamon and other spices, sugar and china root.1 As perfumes and spices were in great demand in Persia and as the Dutch had by this time almost the entire supply in their hands, they were able to charge high prices for these goods and so reap a very handsome profit.2 (iii) Miscellaneous. Like the English, the Dutch made much money by the transportation not only of passengers, but also of the goods of Persian, Armenian and Indian merchants between Persia and India. 1 In Dutch called either radix china or radix syna\ it is the root of smilax china, a plant akin to sarsaparilla. 2 Gaudereau, in his Relation I, pp. 3-4, stressed the great importance to the Dutch of their spice trade in Persia.

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CHAPTER XXXI

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES FROM 1694 TO 1722 Since all the rights and privileges of the English and Dutch East India Companies in Persia depended on decrees (arqäm)1 and not upon treaties, these were regarded as having lapsed when Shäh Sulaiman died in July 1694. In Bruce’s words:2 “.. .in Persia, the obligations of the King, in such inferior matters as commercial privileges,3 were held to terminate at his death ; and hence, the new Sovereign was to be solicited to re-grant or to extend them.” It was, therefore, a fortunate thing for the English Company that its agent was permanently stationed in the capital soon after the death of Shäh Sulaimän and so was able to conduct the difficult negotia­ tions in person for the issue of the new decrees. Notwithstanding his continued efforts, it was not until June 1697 that he succeeded in obtaining the twenty-one decrees required. These decrees provided, inter alia, for (i) The retention of the Company’s house in Isfahän. (ii) The restitution by the Governor of Shiräz of the Company’s house in that city (he had seized it and had given the Company an inferior one in its place). (iii) Exemption from road tax. (iv) The right to export up to twelve horses annually. (v) The purchase of as much Kirmän (Rävar) wool as required. (vi) The right to make and export wine. (vii) The payment of the arrears of the Company’s share of the Gombroon customs. (viii) “ For Civil Usage to be shown ye Eng. Chiefs and their People in all Parts.” (ix) The provision of guards for all the Company’s caravans travelling in dangerous areas. (x) The restitution of goods seized by robbers on the roads. 1 Arqäm is the plural of raqam, 2 Annals, vol. in, p. 168. 3 The Catholic missionaries in Persia likewise had to get their rights and privileges renewed on these occasions; in this connection, see ch. xxxv below.

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(xi) “Thatt no Governor of Gombroon use any Force upon ye English in taking any part of ye Goods att his Price, but would buy and pay ready Money as any other Merchant.”1

When the decree in respect of the Gombroon customs was issued, these payments had been in arrears for four years. The Shahbandar or chief customs officer (to whom the customs were usually farmed) was therefore ordered to pay the Company what was due.1 2 Ever since his arrival in Isfahan, the agent had experienced much difficulty in disposing of the large quantities of cloth which kept arriving from Gombroon. In the first place, the hopes of the Company that the disaster to the Smyrna fleet in 1693 would prevent any of the Levant Company’s cloth from reaching Persia for some time were largely disappointed. Moreover, the agent soon discovered that certain of the Armenian merchants through whom he had hoped to dispose of large stocks of cloth had for long been committed to the rival company and refused to forsake it. The consequence was that there was soon a glut of cloth, which resulted in the Company’s stocks having to be sold at greatly reduced prices. In pursuance of its campaign to expand the sales of cloth, the English Company sent factors named, respectively, William Lee and Thomas Major to Mashhad and Tabriz in 1696. On the 9/20 October 1696, Lee wrote to the agent from Mashhad, saying that it was “a large City and very popelous of People”. After a brief description of the shrine of the Imam Ridä (whom he termed “ye Persian Profitt”), Lee went on to say: Here’s all sorts of fruit and Provisions Extraordinary good and cheap, the air as farr as I have seen of itt is much like Europe : ye trade of this place most relies upon India, from whence comes all sorts of Cloth, Chints, Shawls, Indigo, etc., as ye Mogull’s Dominion is but a months travell from Ys. place. From Ispahan comes gruss [wc] goods as Sugar Candy, Coffee, etc.... The road to India at present is Spoilt, soe that no Caphila has come or gone from hence.... A sort of People called Usbeags whose Dominions are between this place and India have a civill warr, which is the reason merchants will not venture to send their concerns. 1 List of Rogoms or Phirmaunds, Içfahân, 15/26 July 1697, document no. 6411 in Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. lui. 2 Document no. 6412 in Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. LIU.

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From hence goes great quantities of Broad Cloth which the Armenians bring from Europe ; here is now in the citty... near 300 bales, Designed for a place call’d Caubull in the Mogull’s Dominions. Trading is soe unsettled at present I cannot give you a true account of the prices of goods now.1 Lee continued that he had not as yet been able to sell much of the Company’s cloth, but that he hoped that conditions would improve as soon as the route to India was reopened. He concluded with the following words: “Here I am forst to ware the Persian habitt, for if [I] did not [I] should not be able to sturr out of doors, for the country people here who never saw a frangee in their lives, think him to be a strange sort of person.”12 Thomas Major, who reached Tabriz at the beginning of March 1696, also wrote to Isfahän soon after his arrival, but his letter contains nothing of interest.3 It has not been recorded how long Lee remained in Mashhad or whether anyone was sent to replace him when he left, but the Company kept a series of representatives at Tabriz for some twenty years for the purpose of selling cloth and also for forwarding valuable goods to England by the overland route through Turkey. This representative was given the local rank of vice-consul.4 The troubles of the agent at Isfahän were by no means confined to the granting of raqams, the recovery of the Company’s share of the Gombroon customs or the sale of English cloth. In addition, he had to give close attention to the silk trade, partly because the Armenians of Julfa had obtained a virtual monopoly of it; also, the interruption of the Turkey trade owing to the war with France had caused a steep rise in the price of silk. Moreover, the Persian government greatly restricted the supply in 1698, allowing only the Dutch to obtain their full quota. Another troublesome matter was the repeated request by the Persians for naval aid against the Muscat Arabs.5 1 Letter no. 6285 in Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. lii. 2 Compare the statement by Johann Jacob Saar, who was at Gombroon in 1649, that both the Dutch and English there at that time “müssen in Persischen Habit und Kleidung gehen”. See his “Reise von Java, Banda, Ceylon und Persien, 1644-1660”, in vol. 1, p. 114 of the Reisebeschreibung von Deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten im Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 1601-1797 (The Hague, 1930). 3 Major’s letter is no. 6375 in Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. LIU. 4 “Commerce des Anglois en Perse”, AEP, vol. v, fol. 185b. 8 More will be said on this subject later.

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Unlike the English Company, the Dutch East India Company did not transfer its headquarters from Gombroon to Isfahän, although it maintained a factory in the latter city. It did not have to go to such lengths as the English to dispose of its cloth, and it had far less difficulty over its supplies of silk (in fact, a dispute was soon to arise between it and the Persian government because it was not taking its full annual quota). Furthermore, the Dutch representatives were not so hampered as those of the English Company as regards local expenditure, and they were consequently able to keep their factories in better repair, a fact which caused the English to “lose face” in the eyes of the Persians. Generally speaking, the Dutch had less trouble than the English with the Persian government, not only because of their more forceful methods and greater power,1 but also because they were more lavish in the giving of presents or bribes to important officials. As described in ch. v,12 ‘Oman, under the Imäm Saif ibn Sultän I (1679-1711), became extremely prosperous, while the Imäm himself amassed a large fortune, much of which he spent on his already formidable fleet. It was during his reign that the Muscat Arabs, besides continuing their war against the Portuguese, first embarked upon piracy. In January 1695 they attacked and sacked Kong and captured a richly laden Armenian ship that was anchored off that port. Fears were entertained that the Arabs were about to despoil Gombroon, and the Governor thereupon hastened to Captain Brangwin, the agent (who had not yet left for Isfahän), saying that, as the English and Persians were allies (this was presumably an allusion to the joint operations against Hormuz in 1622), it was only fitting that the former should now lend their ships to assist in beating off the Arabs if they attacked. Brangwin was unmoved by this argument, and tersely informed the Governor that the payments of the Company’s share of the Gombroon customs were still three years in arrears. The Bombay Council of the Company approved this action, although it was alive to the danger that the Dutch might give naval assistance to the Persians in return for further privileges, saying that it failed to see the expediency of interfering, since the Arabs had so far made no 1 The Qishm incident and the mission of Commodore Block to I§fahän half a century earlier had by no means been forgotten. 2 See p. 66 above.

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attempt to molest English shipping. By the close of 1695 the Arabs were still interfering with Persian trade, and Brangwin predicted that they “would prove as great a plague in India, as the Algerines were in Europe”.1 The Dutch proved as unwilling as the English to help the Persians against the Arabs. The Portuguese gave some assistance, but it was on too small a scale to be effective. The Arabs, neverthe­ less, were so incensed at this action by the Portuguese that they decided to retaliate. Dividing their fleet in two, they sent one part of it to the East African coast and the other to India. The first of these squadrons landed troops near Mombasa, which they captured after a siege lasting two years,12 while the other portion of the fleet attacked and burnt the Portuguese factory at Mangalore. Notwithstanding the refusal of the English Company to interfere, the Persian government again approached the agent at Isfahän, promising that, if the Company would send a fleet and some troops to co-operate in the reduction of Muscat, it would, on the fall of that place, give the Company a half share of the spoils and also grant it the same privileges there that it had at Gombroon. As the English Company had neither the shipping nor the troops to spare for such a venture at that time, the agent gave an evasive reply.3 In consequence of the refusal by the English and Dutch to assist and of the failure of the Portuguese to give effectual aid, the Persians turned to the French.4 To return to the affairs of the English and Dutch Companies in Persia. In the years 1695-6, the situation was so bad that Bruce remarked

The information from Gombroon and Ispahan, during this season, furnished another example of the uncertainty of commercial speculation, 1 Bruce’s Annals, vol. in, p. 198. That there was some substance in Brangwin’s prediction was shown in April 1697, when the Muscat Arabs captured an English (non-Company) ship called the London, and forced her crew to assist them in their operations against the Portuguese. See Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (London, 1920), vol. I, p. 220. 2 Bruce’s Annals, vol. in, p. 216. According to C. Guillain, Documents sur VHistoire, la Géographie et le Commerce de VAfrique orientale (Paris, 1855), part 1, p. 521, the citadel of Mombasa fell on 13 December 1698. This was the second time in the seventeenth century that the Muscat Arabs had captured Mombasa. 8 Bruce’s Annals, vol. in, p. 216. 4 For the consequences, see ch. xxxiv.

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in a country where the administration of the government is shifting and arbitrary, and of the danger of entrusting the management of such speculations to any, but to the immediate servants of the merchants interested in their success.1 However, the affairs of the Company soon improved, and, as we have seen, in the summer of 1697 it at last obtained the issue of all its decrees. Two years later, the Company was able to gain the Shah’s favour in marked degree, much to the discomforture of the Dutch. Whilst passing the English factory in Isfahän one day, the Shäh had been greatly struck with its appearance (despite that it was in need of repair), and expressed his intention of visiting it if such a step could be taken without harming his dignity. This difficulty was overcome when it was found that Shäh ‘Abbäs I had established a precedent by visiting the factory some eighty years earlier, and the Shäh and his harem duly arrived there on the morning of 24 July/ 4 August 1699. Bruce has thus described the Shàh’s visit and the elaborate preparations that had preceded it:

Every preparation was made that was practicable, under the inspection of Persian officers, to have the great room fitted up, and a throne erected with suitable magnificence: the passages and garden-walks were covered with rich carpets and the finest English cloth: and a collation of fruits and rich wines prepared: the English then retired from the Factory, and left the charge of it to women, with instructions to receive, with all possible solemnity, the Monarch, and the Ladies of his Haram, by whom he was attended, leaving only three petitions, one apologising for the inadequate pomp, with which they could receive the Monarch ; another praying directions might be given to the eunuchs, to prevent persons attempting, by means of holes in the buildings, to look at the King and his attendants; and a third, that as, on so honourable an occasion, they could not disturb his Majesty with their requests, he would be pleased to order the Ettiman Doulut [Ftimad al-Dauld] to receive them. The King was not only gratified with his reception, and the presents of fruit and wines offered for his acceptance, but intimated his intention to visit the factory a second time. Though the expenses of this visit amounted to 400 tomands, or above £1,200 sterling, the Agent informed the Court that they were unavoidable, and might be attended with 1 Annals, vol. in, p. 196.

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consequences, which would amply repay the Company, by placing their trade and privileges on a more certain basis, than any on which they had, hitherto, rested.1 The agent was well pleased with the results of this visit, costly though it had been. The Shähbandar of Gombroon, doubtless at the command of the Shäh, promptly paid the Company 1000 tomans, the total for one year, and promised to pay another 2000 in the following March. It was also apparent that the English were now in high favour with the Shah, whereas the Dutch were not. When the Dutch asked for permission to build a fort at Gombroon, their request was brusquely refused. The Dutch, as was natural, were incensed at the success of their rivals, and went to great lengths to induce the Shäh to visit their factory in Isfahän, “representing the English Company, and nation, as inferior to their own, their Stadtholder being King of England”.12 Bruce, the English agent, countered this assertion by describing the Dutch as

... the servants of Merchants only, who had no King, that could render them worthy of the notice of the Persian Monarch ; the request of the King’s visit to the Dutch Factory was, therefore, refused ; and though his second visit to the English Factory did not take place, the Agent received, from the King, on the 2nd. September, 1699, “the Khelaut”, or vest of honour, a rich sword, and a horse; these favourable appearances induced him to inform the Court, that he had the firmest reliance on the Company’s privileges being confirmed, and their trade protected.3 Although this episode of the Shäh’s visit to the English factory caused for a time some bitterness between the English and Dutch in Isfahän, its effects were not lasting. Holland was by this time 1 Ibid, vol. in, pp. 315-16. Alexander Hamilton (who, it must be remembered, was an Interloper for part of his career in the East and was therefore at times hostile to the Company) referred in less favourable terms to the Shäh’s visit. In his New Account of the East Indies, vol. 1, p. 112, he said: “Mr Bruce, the Company’s Agent.. .magnifies the Honours done to his Masters, above what the Dutch could ever obtain. He relates how he and all the Factory, great and small, were ordered to leave their House, and Chamber Doors and Warehouses all open, for his Majesty and his Seraglio Companions to ramble thro’, and take such Things as best pleased him and his Minions... I believe the Company was not very ambitious of having such Honours conferred on them, since they were obliged to pay for them.’* 2 Bruce, Annals, vol. in, p. 317. 8 Ibid, pp. 317-18.

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already feeling the effects of half a century of almost continual war, and the Dutch East India Company, although still very strong, was no longer quite so forceful and vigorous as it had been.1 In addition, as already pointed out, the aggressive designs of Louis XIV had drawn the English and Dutch together under William of Orange. Meanwhile, in England and elsewhere, things had not been going well for the English East India Company. In 1695 it had lost five ships, valued in the aggregate at £1,000,000, in two almost simultaneous engagements with the French. As in the case of the disaster to the Smyrna fleet two years earlier, there was, as Bishop Burnet said2 “...great occasion of discontent in the city of London. They complained, that neither the Admiralty, nor the government, took the care that was necessary for preserving the wealth of the nation.” The Company was also suffering from increased activity by the Interlopers3 who, in 1691, had formed the Dowgate association. Three years later, the House of Commons had declared that “all the subjects of England have equal rights to trade to the East Indies unless prohibited by Act of Parliament”. This declaration led, in 1698, to the formation of a new East India Company, which, in return for a loan of £2,000,000, received the support of the government. The ensuing struggle between the two Companies, besides being most injurious to their trade, became a political matter, the Whigs supporting the new company and the Tories the old.4 1 That the Dutch Company was still strong is clear from Huet’s Mémoire sur le Commerce des Hollandais, p. 166. 2 History of his Own Times (London, 1818), vol. in, p. 171. 3 The Interlopers were active in Persia as well as in India (where they were encouraged by the Dutch). In a letter (No. 6086 in Original Correspondence, India Office, vol. lii) the agent, who by then was at Isfahän, complained of the activities of some English private traders from India, who, “ by refusing to land their goods at the Company’s Factory at Gombroon, and to pay Customs there, had impaired the reputation of the Company in the eyes of the Persians and also given them information how, as well as opportunity, to impose upon the Company and all other Englishmen”. 4 The partisan spirit of the times is well illustrated by some lines quoted by Macaulay, in his History of England from the Accession of fames IIt from The Biter, an unsuccessful play by Nicholas Rowe, who made an old man harangue his daughter as follows: “Thou hast been brought up like a virtuous and a sober maiden ; and wouldst thou take the part of a profane wretch who sold his stock out of the Old East India Company?”

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In so far as the Persian trade was concerned, this unfortunate competition between the old and new companies soon undid the good that the Shäh’s visit to the former’s Isfahän factory had done. The Dutch naturally benefited greatly, and were able to enlarge their Isfahän factory and to make it almost into a fortress. The English factory there, on the other hand, was now old and even more in need of repair than ever. The failure of the English to improve its appearance led the Persian Government and merchants to believe that they did not intend to revive or increase their trade in the city or elsewhere in the country.1 Fortunately for English interests in the East, the adverse effect on them of the competition between the old and the new East India Companies was speedily recognised, and in 1702 an Act of Parliament was passed which amalgamated them. Three years later, on 20 August 1705, the “Old” or “London” East India Company received a quaintly worded pardon, granted under the Great Seal, for all the crimes and misdemeanours committed by it “from the beginning of the world”.2 By the Godolphin Award, on 29 September 1708, the union of the “London” and the “English” Companies was completed, and “The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies” was estab­ lished. Under the terms of this award, the Company was to lend another £1,200,000 to the State, and, on the repayment of its loans at the end of three years, it was to relinquish all its exclusive rights. The Government, however, found the Company too useful a source of revenue for it to be allowed to go out of business, so it renewed its charter regularly in the years to come. The Persian occupation of Basra, which lasted from 1697 to 1701,3 proved very beneficial to the trade of the town, including that of the English East India Company through its factory there.4 On the other hand, the Company suffered some loss when one of its ships, which had carried ammunition and provisions to Basra shortly before the end of the Persian occupation, was detained there so long by the Deputy Governor that she missed the monsoon. In September, 1706, the agent sent in a claim to the Ftimäd al1 Bruce’s Annals, vol. 111» p. 573. It was a clear case of loss of “ face ” resulting from excessive economy. This was a mistake that the Dutch never made in Persia. 2 East India Company Parchment Record no. 62, India Office Library. 8 See pp. 53-4 above. * Hamilton, op, cit, vol. 1, p. 82.

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Daula for damages amounting to some £230 and also for the payment of the Company’s share of the Gombroon customs, which again was much in arrears.1 Meanwhile, the Dutch had been having trouble over certain of their rights and privileges and also over their supplies of silk. In some years, owing to the high price of silk, they had not taken up their full annual quota, thus, as the Persian government complained, depriving it of revenue. In 1695 the government refused to supply the Dutch with any silk at all, although they then wanted it, on the grounds that it had become very scarce. The Dutch knew, however, that a large quantity had been sent to Russia. As all the matters at issue could not be settled by the chief representative at Isfahän, Jacobus Hoogkamer, the Director at Gombroon, was sent to the capital with the rank of ambassador, in the spring of 1701. After rather protracted and by no means easy negotiations, Hoogkamer concluded a treaty with the Persian government on satisfactory terms. With regard to silk, it was agreed that the Dutch were to take annually 100 bales at 44 tomans per bale; in the event of their not taking their full quota, they were nevertheless to pay the Persian government for 100 bales.12 Although the Dutch were pleased with the result of Hoogkamer’s mission, it was not very long before they discovered that the improvements that it led to were not of a lasting nature. As we have seen above, the English East India Company had lost some “face ” at Isfahän by reason of the dilapidated appearance of its factory there. More serious, however, in their effect on Persian opinion were first, the capture, after a stiff fight, of one of the Company’s own ships by the Muscat Arabs;3 and second, the knowledge that the officials of the Mughal Government were persistently obstructing the Company’s trade in India. The agent 1 Document no. 8454, Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vol. lxii. In 1704, the Company, exasperated at the continued delay in the payment of its share of the Gombroon customs, sent a man named Prescott to succeed Edward Owen as agent and to press the Government to pay what was due. However, when Prescott reached Persia, he found that Owen was already dead, and he himself died soon after, without having accomplished anything. 2 Valentijn’s Beschryving, vol. v, p. 270. 8 Lockyer, Account of Trade in India, p. 209. Hamilton, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 63, incorrectly stated that this vessel, which was under the command of Captain Murvil, offered no resistance. This was the first occasion on which one of the Company’s ships was attacked.

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reported that, unless the Company took strong measures to restore its waning prestige, its power and resources must decline still further.1 The Court of Directors of the Company was already fully alive to the danger of attack by the Arabs, and at the beginning of 1705 it informed the Bombay President that the existing war in Europe

...alone prevented them obtaining men of war to clear the Indian seas of the pirates or sending soldiers for the Bombay garrison. They should employ every effort, when peace should be restored, not merely to render that garrison respectable, but to equip armed ships to clear the seas, and to root out that nest of pirates, the Muscat Arabs.12 Notwithstanding the Arabs* capture of Captain Murvil’s ship, Charles Lockyer was able to visit Muscat in the following year (1706); his description of the town and of the Imäm’s fleet has already been quoted.3 Although the Muscat Arabs continued their attacks on Persian and Portuguese shipping, they seem to have refrained from any further interference with the ships of the English East India Company thereafter, and there is no record of their having attacked any Dutch vessels. Moreover, when the treaty of Utrecht put an end to the war with France, both the English and the Dutch were in a position to provide more protection for their shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of ‘Omän. In 1716, the English East India Company had two small frigates or “grabs”4 built at Surat for service in the Persian Gulf and its approaches. These ships were the Britannia, which mounted 18 guns and carried 140 men, and the Fame, which had 16 guns and carried 120 men.56* We must now return to the affairs of the English East India Company in Persia. After the deaths in quick succession of 1 Bruce’s Annals, vol. in, p. 572. 2 Ibid, p. 557. 8 See p. 68 above. 4 “Grab” is a corruption of the Arabic word ghuräb (literally, “crow”); the term was originally applied to a galley propelled by oars, but it was later used to denote any swift, well-armed sailing vessel (see Sir W. Foster’s note on p. 10 of his edition of C. Downing’s A History of the Indian Wars). 6 The particulars of the armament and crew of the Britannia and Fame are taken from Downing’s book, p. 14. From the Bombay Consultations of 13 August 1776, we learn that the Britannia was 121 ft. long with a beam of 34 ft. ; she was of 495 tons burden and cost Rs. 1,01,000 to build. Orders for her to be rebuilt were issued in 1776.

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Edward Owen1 and Prescott, John Lock was appointed agent. By the beginning of 1707, he had succeeded in recovering most of the payments due in respect of the Gombroon customs. He found that the Company’s cloth trade was subject to varying fortunes; while in 1706 it had made a profit of 16 per cent on its sales of this commodity, in the following year it could sell it only at a loss.2 In May 1707 an English merchant named John Scattergood, in company with another called Peter Curgenwen,3 travelled from Gombroon to Isfahän, where they remained for several months before returning to the Gulf. During his journey, Scattergood kept a diary which has been preserved, but it is disappointingly meagre as regards information of interest. Sir William Foster, in his introduction to The Scattergoods and the East India Company* has aptly described this diary as: . .the journal.. .of an un­ romantic business man. No vivid descriptions of scenery, no pen-paintings of the persons encountered or of dangers escaped. Only a sober record of the events of each day.” It is a matter for regret that, with the exception of William Cockell (who supplied James Fraser of Reelig with much valuable material for his biography of Nädir Shäh),5 no member of the staff of the English East India Company in Persia in the late seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries has made any appreciable contribution to our knowledge of that country during that period or has shown any signs of having mastered the language. It must be confessed that in the matter of scholarship the employees of the Dutch East India Company in Persia made a better showing. The most noteworthy scholar in the service of either Company during the period from 1694 to 1730 was undoubtedly Joan Josua Ketelaar.6 He had acquired a fair knowledge of Persian, but his chief claim to distinction lay in the fact that he was the author of the first Hindustani grammar of which there is any record, 1 De Bruyn, who was in Içfahân at the time of Owen’s death in 1704, described him as “a man of worth and honour, and very much esteemed by every body”; see his Travels, vol. I, p. 263. Owen was an intimate friend of Frans Castelijn, the Chief Merchant of the Dutch factory at Isfahan at that time. * Bruce, Annals, vol. in, p. 622. 3 Peter Curgenwen may have been identical with the shipowner of that name who was afterwards a prisoner in the hands of the Marathas for ten years. 4 Published in Calcutta in 1935. 6 See my Nadir Shah, p. 305. 6 An account of Ketelaar’s mission to Isfahan will be given later in this chapter.

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antedating Schulz’s work by some thirty years.1 However, if we go back a quarter of a century before the opening of our period, we find that even Ketelaar’s fame is eclipsed by that of Herbert de Jager, of whom Chardin, his contemporary and friend, said

Je contractai, à Ispahan, Tan 1666, une amitié particulière avec le chef du commerce des Hollandais, qui étoit un très savant homme, nommé Herbert de Jager. Il me suffira de dire, pour donner une idée de son mérite, que Golius, ce fameux professeur des langues orientales, lejugeoit le plus digne de tous ses disciples de remplir sa chaire et de lui succéder.2 Early in 1706 news must have reached the English and Dutch representatives in Isfahän of the arrival of the French envoy Jean-Baptiste Fabre at Erivan, but his death soon afterwards and the subsequent escapades of his mistress Marie Petit no doubt made them feel that this French attempt to re-establish a trading connection with Persia did not need to be taken seriously. The matter took a different turn when Pierre Victor Michel, whom de Ferriol, the French ambassador at Constantinople, had sent in haste to take charge of the mission, appeared on the scene and who, after sending Marie Petit back to France, began to negotiate in Isfahän for a treaty. Michel, despite the most strenuous efforts by the English and Dutch to thwart him, succeeded in concluding this treaty in 1708.3 France, however, made no attempt for a number of years to avail herself of the commercial advantages which this treaty conferred upon her. When the English and Dutch representatives at Isfahän heard of the arrival at Shamâkhï of Israel Ori and his numerous retinue, they were as active as Michel in their endeavours to dissuade the Persian government from allowing this Russian mission to proceed further. However, for reasons that have already been given,4 their arguments proved of no avail. Although Ori’s mission did reach 1 Ketelaar, whose name was originally Kettler, was a native of Elbing in Prussia, but he changed both his name and his nationality on entering the service of the Dutch East India Company in 1682. For details of his distinguished career, see Professor J. Ph. Vogel, “Joan Josua Ketelaar of Elbing, author of the First Hindustani Grammar”, in the BSOS, vol. vm, pp. 817-22. 2 Voyages, vol. vu, pp. 287-8. Chardin and de Jager both spent much time collecting information regarding Isfahän, but, although the former’s data were included in his Voyages, the results of the latter’s investigations do not seem to have been preserved. On the other hand, de Jager’s description of Persepolis is to be found in Valentijn’s Beschryving, vol. v, pp. 221-4. 8 See ch. xxxiv below. 4 See p. 63 above.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

the Persian capital, it led to no appreciable increase in the volume of Russo-Persian trade, since the very unsettled conditions in the north-western provinces proved a serious deterrent to commercial expansion for a number of years to come. We learn from a French source1 that the English and Dutch in Isfahän in 1712 were “toujours fort Embarrassez” and that the former had had to pay large sums to the Shäh and to certain other persons: in order to raise the money, they had had to borrow it through their Indian brokers.2 As for the Dutch, they were unable to recover 14,000 tomans which they had “très imprudemment avancez”. Whether the two Companies ever recovered these sums does not appear to have been recorded. We have no further information respecting the English East India Company for some time, as the records for this period are extremely fragmentary. With regard to the Dutch, however, we have rather more information. In the spring of 1715 a Persian envoy named Muhammad Ja‘far Beg reached Batavia with directions from the Shäh for the conduct of the Company’s business in Persia. These directions proved unacceptable to the Company, and as it appeared that Muhammad Ja‘far had no authority to agree to any modification in them, it was decided to send an official embassy to Isfahän in order to negotiate a settlement. The person chosen to fulfil this mission was Joan Josua Ketelaar, of whose scholastic attainments mention has already been made. Ketelaar, who was one of the most senior of the representatives of the Dutch East India Company in India, had given evidence, three years before, of his skill as a negotiator in the course of his mission to Bahädur Shäh.3 1 The Capuchin Père Bernard de Bourges, in a letter from Tabriz dated 26 February 1713, in AEP, vol. in, fol. 41b. 2 These brokers came for the most part from Multän. 3 For a full account of this mission, see the Joumaal van J. J. Ketelaar*s Hofreis naar den Groot Mogol te Lahore, 1711-1713, edited and annotated by Professor J. Ph. Vogel and published by the Linschoten-Vereeniging, The Hague, 1937. Mrs D. Kuenen-Wicksteed made an English translation of this Journal, which was published, with annotations by Professor Vogel, in the Journal of the Panjab Historical Society, vol. x, part 1, pp. 1-94. Unfortunately, the sudden death of Bahädur Shäh in February 1712 and the ensuing war between his brothers for the succession rendered nugatory the results of Ketelaar’s negotiations; for this he was for a time most unjustly blamed. In this connection see Professor Vogel’s article in the BSOS to which attention has already been drawn. 26

4OI

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Ketelaar reached Gombroon at the beginning of October 1716 with a number of other employees of the Company in his suite? The mission had to remain at Gombroon until the arrival of a ship from Ceylon which brought six elephants that were to be presented to the Shäh. On 5 April 1717 Ketelaar and the other members of his mission set out for Isfahän; they travelled by easy stages and did not reach the capital until 30 May. With the soldiers of the escort in their scarlet uniforms12 and the members of the mission wearing magnificent clothes, Ketelaar’s entry into the city was no less magnificent than that of his embassy to Lahore. John Bell of Antermony, who was in Isfahän at that time, stated : The Dutch commissary Myn-heer Vonkettler, made his publick entry at Ispahan, as envoy from the government of Batavia to the Shach of Persia. He was preceded by six elephants, sent as a present to the King by the governor. He had a numerous retinue ; and was attended by several gentlemen, and made as grand an appearance as if he had been a minister from any court of Europe. He took up his lodgings at the Dutch factory. Mr Kettler told me, that he was born in Courland [«c]; that, in his youth, he inlisted as a soldier in the service of the Dutch East-India company; by his uncommon abilities he had raised himself, from that low situation, to the honourable place he now held.3 On 12 June Ketelaar, accompanied by the members of his mission, was received in audience by the Shäh. The gifts from the Company were then presented: when the six elephants were brought forward, the largest salaamed to the Shäh.4 Ketelaar was received by the Shäh again on 7 July; four days later he began the real business of his mission with a series of discussions, first with 1 The suite consisted of Johannes Gerlag, a junior merchant, Willem van Beeck, the guastoshouder or accountant (“guastos” is a corruption of the Portuguese “ gastos ” or “ costs ”), Tobias Zeebot, the chief clerk of the Gombroon office, Joan van Dinter, the secretary of the mission (he kept a dagregister or journal of the mission, the MS. of which is included in the Overgecomen Brieven 1719, Boek 3 in the Rijks Koloniaal Archief at The Hague, bündel 1793, fols. 975-1209), Samuel Gruttner and Pieter van Vlierden, two assistants, Godfried de Groot, the surgeon, and an escort of twelve soldiers. 2 One of these soldiers, a German named Johann Gottlieb Worms, also wrote an account of the mission which he included in his book Ost-Indian- und Persianische Reisen, oder zehenjährige auf Gross-Java, Bengala, und im Gefolge Herrn Joann Josuä Kotelar, Holländischen Abgesandtens an den Sophi in Persien, geleistete Kriegs-Dienste (Dresden and Leipzig, 1737). 8 Travels, vol. 1, p. 94. 4 See Professor Vogel’s introduction to Ketelaar’s Journaal, p. 112.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

the Ftimäd al-Daula, Fath ‘Ali Khän Dâghistânï, and later with him and the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa. Ketelaar asked for the renewal of the rights and privileges that had been granted to Hoogkamer sixteen years previously, but Fath ‘All Khan replied that they had lapsed. Difficulties then arose over two large sums of money1 that Pieter Macaré, a former Director of the Company,2 had lent to the Shäh. In these discussions the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa was most obstructive. Nevertheless, on 29 August Ketelaar succeeded in obtaining five farmäns which, besides granting practically all the privileges which the Company wanted, withdrew the obnoxious conditions for trade which Muhammad Ja‘far had put forward in Batavia. Ketelaar showed his gratitude by making handsome gifts to Fath ‘Ali Khän and the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa. During this time, there had been contact of a friendly nature between the members of Ketelaar’s mission and those in that of Volynsky. Before the Russian mission left Isfahän, the Shah handed over to Volynsky, as a gift to the Tsar, the largest of the elephants that he had received from the Dutch. Although Ketelaar had now attained his main objective, the Persians had not yet achieved theirs. Their demand, which they had already made repeatedly to the English, Dutch, French and Portuguese, was for naval help against the Muscat Arabs, who had recently taken Bahrain and were then threatening Gombroon. Fath ‘Ali Khän summoned Ketelaar and asked him to arrange for two of the Dutch Company’s ships to assist in the recovery of Bahrain. To this demand Ketelaar replied politely but firmly that he had no authority to take such action. Although the Shäh gave Ketelaar his farewell audience on 29 October, Fath ‘Ali Khän again summoned him on 17 November and repeated his demand. Ketelaar, who was by this time in a poor state of health, persisted in his refusal to comply. Despite the disagreement over the question of naval aid, and his bad state of health, Ketelaar, accompanied by his suite, left Isfahän for Gombroon at the end of November. Whilst they were on their way, word reached them that the Arabs had landed on 1 These may have been the sums mentioned by Père Bernard de Bourges ; see p. 401 above. 2 Pieter Macaré had been Senior Merchant at Isfahän from 1708 to 1712, when he was appointed Director in Persia. He left for Batavia in 1713. See Wijnaendts van Resandt, De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie, p. 252.

403

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

the island of Hormuz and that they were besieging the castle; moreover, fears were entertained that an attack on Gombroon was imminent. Despite the continuing deterioration in Ketelaar’s health, he and his party hastened to Gombroon, where they arrived on 19 January 1718. A Dutch ship named the Haringtuyn was lying in the roads, waiting to take Ketelaar to Batavia. The ambassador was not, however, destined to board the vessel. On his arrival, the commander of the Persian garrison peremptorily demanded the loan of the ship for operations against the Arabs. When this demand was rejected, the Persians surrounded the Dutch factory and cut off all supplies. Two days later poor Ketelaar was seized with a high fever from which he died soon afterwards. When the news of his death became known, the Persians raised the siege of the factory and allowed the Dutch to take the body of the ambassador to the burial ground outside the town, where it was solemnly interred. A pyramid 30 cubits in height was then erected over the grave.1 Thus ended in tragedy the mission which Ketelaar had so successfully accomplished. The Persian government had certainly grounds for alarm over the situation in the Persian Gulf. In 1717 the Muscat Arabs and their allies the Jawâsmî had seized the Bahrain islands, Qishm and Lärak, and, as we have seen above, they had laid siege to the castle on Hormuz. Successful though they had been over the other islands, they failed to take Hormuz castle, although they besieged it for seven months.1 2 Notwithstanding the very unsettled conditions in the Gulf and its approaches, many Dutch and English ships continued to call at Gombroon; in 1720 between eighteen and twenty English ships visited the port.3 1 Ketelaar’s monument was amongst those mentioned by J. B. Fraser when describing his visit to Bandar ‘Abbas in 1821. As there were no longer any inscriptions on the tombs, Fraser wrongly assumed that they were all of English­ men (see his Narrative of a Journey into Khorasän in the Years 1821 and 1822, London, 1825, p. 44). This monument is probably the second from the right in the sketch which A. W. Stiffe made when he visited this cemetery nearly eighty years later (see his article on Bandar ‘Abbas in the Geographical Journal, vol. xvi, p. 212). A few years afterwards, all the monuments were demolished in order to make way for an extension of the town. 2 Nouvelles de Perse, 15 September 1718, AEP, vol. v, fol. 193 b. 8 Gardane’s despatch of 15 October 1720, AEP, vol. v, fol. 311b.

404

ACTIVITIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

In Persia generally, the process of decline was gathering speed and rendering trading conditions more and more unfavourable as the years went by. When Mahmüd the Ghalzai leader made his first attack on Kirmän late in 1719, the English were forced to vacate their factory there, but after Mahmud’s hurried withdrawal to Qandahâr in the following spring, they were able to return.1 Encouraged by the evident inability of the Persian government to subdue the Abdäli and Ghalzai rebels, the Baluchi tribes renewed their raids on a bigger scale than ever and ranged over much larger tracts of country. Taking advantage of the removal from the Gulf coast of the army which Lutf ‘All Khän Däghistän!, the nephew of the Ftimâd al-Daula, had collected for the invasion of ‘Omän, the Balüchïs, in the early winter of 1720, penetrated as far as Lär, where they plundered the town and attacked the Dutch factory there. The twelve Dutchmen in the factory defended themselves so stoutly that they beat off the raiders with the loss of eighty killed. The Baluchi raiders then turned their attention to Gombroon, which 4000 of them entered on 14/25 December. Captain Alexander Hamilton was in Gombroon at the time, and he and a number of British seamen helped the employees of the English East India Company to defend their factory; the defenders numbered about fifty in all. What ensued can best be told in Hamilton’s own words: We heard of their Design about ten Days before they came, and so we and the Dutch fortified our Factories as well as possibly we could, placing little Falconets on the Tops of our Walls in Swivels and beating Ports in our Walls, to ply great Guns, to scour the Avenues to our Factories. Mean while the Persian Governor fired Guns every Night to let the Enemy know he was a brave Fellow. However, they had a Mind to see, and on the 15th. December2 they approached the Town, on a swift march towards it, which scared the Governor so much that, though there was an high Mud Wall between them and him, he got on Horseback and fled to a Fort on the Sea-Shore, leaving a few Guns, loaded as they were, to the Enemy. The Ballowches first came to the West quarter of the Town, where our Factory stands, and soon made Passages through the Mud Walls. 1 Ibid, dated 20 June 1720, AEP, vol. v, fol. 289 b. 2 According to the Gombroon Diary, the date was 14/25 December, which seems more likely to be correct.

405

FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

They hewed down all that came in their Way, particularly old People and Children, and came in a confused Haste to attack our Factory, down some Lanes; but we gave them a warm Welcome with our great Guns and small Shot. They soon found their Mistake, and retired in as great Haste as they came.... They held a Consultation next Day after their Repulse, how they might make another Attack ; but none would under­ take to lead their men on, and so the Day after the Consultation, they went to attack the Dutch who were three times stronger than we, and they met with the same kind Reception we gave them; but they had a Ware­ house within a Pistol-shot of their Factory, with Goods to the Value of £20,000 sterling in it, which the Ballowches broke into and plundered. The Dutch lost twelve Men and had eight or ten wounded. They continued in our Neighbourhood, with their Plunder, about a Month, I suppose, till they received new Orders how to dispose of themselves.1

The Gombroon Diary adds that the Dutch, in repelling the attack on their factory, killed the Baluchi leader and many of his men. The same source states that the Persian garrison made practically no resistance, and allowed the raiders to carry off a number of captives and a great many cattle. The morale of the Persians had by this time reached a very low ebb, after the long series of defeats which they had sustained at the hands of the Abdâlïs and Ghalzais and after the confusion and alarm caused by the disgrace and blinding of Fath ‘Ali Khän Dâghistânï on 8 December. The fall of Fath ‘Ali Khan was followed soon after by the arrest of his nephew Lutf ‘Ali Khän and by the disbanding of the bulk of his army, thus removing the sole bulwark against revolt and aggression in the south and south-west of the country. The next entry in the Gombroon Diary, on 15/26 September 1721, mentions frequent incursions of Balüchïs and “Ophgoons” (Afghans) “who ravage the country even within sight of Spahaun and many times carry away both Goods and Merchants, [and] have very considerably reduc’d the Trade of Persia in general”. The Diary went on to say that Isfahän was the best market for broad­ cloth, but added that the expenses of the factory there were very high, amounting to 175,000 shâhïs1 2 (approximately £3000) per 1 A New Account of the East Indies^ vol. 1, pp. 68-9. 2 The accounts of the Company v ere always kept in shâhïs, one shâhï being reckoned as the equivalent of ^d. (there were 200 shâhïs in a toman). The exchange rate at Bombay at that time was 27 rupees per toman.

406

ACTIVITIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES

annum. The agent endeavoured to justify this heavy expenditure by stating “...but then ’tis to be considered ’tis seated in a populous Inland City amidst a haughty Luxuriant [$w] People, so that a handsome Appearance among Them is Indispensably necessary for the Rt. honble. Company’s Reputation”.1 After a brief reference to the Kirmân factory and the supplies of wool therefrom, the agent stated that he had written to the new Ftimad al-Daula (Muhammad Qulï Khän Shämlü) in the hope of obtaining improved conditions for trade. He added bitterly: “There is not any one Grant or Privilege the Rt. Honble. Co. ever obtained of the King of Persia but what have been violated and most of them have been renewed by repeated Rogoms [raqams] which have lasted only a few Months.” What reply, if any, the agent received is not recorded. In the light of what was so soon to happen, the matter was really of no consequence (although the agent could not realise this at the time), for the second Ghalzai advance into Persia occurred very shortly afterwards and threw the whole country into chaos. 1 Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv.

407

CHAPTER XXXII

THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING THE SIEGE OF ISFAHAN When it became evident at the beginning of March 1722 that Mahmüd and his forces were advancing on Isfahän and that a siege of the city was probable, both Owen Phillipps, the English agent, and Nicolaus Schorer, the Dutch chief merchant, had the foresight to lay in considerable stocks of provisions for themselves and their staffs.1 For the defence of the factory, the English had some European and Armenian2 soldiers under the command of a Captain Smith. The Dutch had no troops at all, but they made up for this deficiency by engaging, on 4 March, thirty well-armed Armenians,3 whom they posted at each corner of their property. Besides laying in supplies of food, the Dutch bought gunpowder and shot, as well as fourteen broadswords (houwerklingen)* 1 So far as can be ascertained, the European staffs of the two Companies in Isfahan at this time were as follows : i . The English East India Company: Owen Phillipps, the agent, Isaac Houssaye and John Home, senior merchants or factors, Charles Savage, junior merchant or writer, the Rev. John Frost, the chaplain, John Myngs and Caesar Devaux, junior members of the staff. There was also Captain Smith, the commander of the Company’s soldiers. 2 . The Dutch East India Company: Nicolaus Schorer, the chief merchant, Selmer Laan, the deputy chief merchant, Mattheus van Leipzig, the book keeper and accountant {Boek en Guastos houder), Joan Frederik Gobius, the secretary, and G. E. Clerq, an assistant. Friar Alexander of Malabar, in his Kort Narigt, erroneously described van Leipzig as a dispenser (dispencier). The interpreters of the English and Dutch Companies were, respectively, Stephen Marcor, an Armenian, and Elias Sahid (or Sa‘id), who was probably Jewish. 2 For the recruitment of Armenian soldiers for the protection of the Company’s factory at Isfahan, see the communication from the Court of Directors to the deputy and Council at Bombay, dated 26 February 1692, as quoted by W. Bolts in his Considerations of Indian Affairs (London, 1782), vol. m, pp. 196-7. 3 These Armenians were paid at the rate of 4 mahmüdïs each per day ; as each mahmüdï contained two shähis, this was equivalent to 8rf. per day in English money. As a mahmüdï contained 100 dinars, it was sometimes termed a sad-chnär. For particulars of the mahmüdï and other Persian coins, see Padery’s “ Mémoire sur les Monoyes de Perse” in AEP, vol. v, fol. 209b. 4 Dagregister, 4 March 1722. The Dutch word houwerkling was doubtless used to denote the Persian ghaddâra or “broadsword”.

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EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

The news of the Persian disaster at Gulnäbäd on 8 March reached the Dutch factory at 9 o’clock that evening, and caused general alarm in the city. On the following day there was still panic in Isfahän, where the wildest rumours were current. On that day the Munshi al-mamalik, or Chief Secretary, called on Phillipps and informed him that the English must befriend the Shäh and help in the defence of the city. Phillipps replied that they were incapable of rendering such aid.1 When Phillipps and his Council fully realised the extreme gravity of the situation, they decided, after long consideration, to leave the threatened city and go to Shiräz or some other town. The rtimäd al-Daula, however, refused to allow them to leave.2 As both the English and Dutch communities could remain immured in their well-guarded factories, they were reasonably safe from attack, but, as the siege went on and famine and pestilence made their appearance in the city, there was grave risk of infection. However, no member of either community seems to have con­ tracted any disease. Anxiety as to their ultimate fate was naturally ever-present in their minds ; this is clear from the Dutch Dagregister, which contains a number of entries containing such phrases as “God [alone] knows how long these troubles will last”.3 By the middle of June, when the siege had been in progress for three months, the Shäh was already in need of money to pay his troops. On the 15th of that month the Master of the Mint (the Darräbi-bäshi) asked Nicolaus Schorer, in the Shäh’s name, for a loan of between 2000 and 3000 tomans \ at the same time, Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the rapacious Vali of ‘Arabistän, demanded an advance of 1000 tomans. Schorer refused both these requests. On 6/17 July, Owen Phillips and his Council wrote to the Company’s representatives at Gombroon a long and gloomily worded letter in which they stressed the peril in which they stood and the high and ever-increasing price of provisions in the beleaguered city. Even at that date they regarded the fall of the monarchy as inevitable.4 1 Dagregister, 9 March 1722. 2 Letter from Phillipps and his Council to Gombroon dated 6/17 July 1722, in the Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv. 3 God bekend is, hoe lange deese Troubelen nog duuren sullen. 4 Extracts from this letter have been given in the chapter on the siege of I§fahân; see pp. 162-3 above.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

As was only to be expected, the Shah’s need of money for the pay of the garrison grew progressively greater as the siege dragged on. On 24 August, Mirza Rafi‘, the Munshi al-Mamälik, informed Schorer that the Shäh had given orders for Dutch, English and Gujerati stuffs to the value of 1500 tomans to be sold to the Dutch Company in order to raise money for the troops. At the same time, Schorer received a request through the Malik al-Tujjar or chief merchant of Isfahän for a loan of 800 tomans. Schorer replied to these and similar requests that he could lend money to nobody without authority from the director at Gombroon.1 The Shäh’s need of money was, however, so pressing that, at the end of August, he sent word to the Dutch that they must advance him no less than 70,000 tomans. At a meeting of the Council, it was agreed that no more than 20,000 tomans could be lent; Schorer, however, was able to reduce this amount to 17,000 tomans.2 The English also received demands for loans on a number of occasions, but they truthfully replied that they had had to spend so much on food for themselves, that they had little or nothing over ; it is believed that they did not advance more than 4000 tomans in all. As for the French, they advanced far less even than the English.3 At the end of September, when the cost of foodstuffs had risen to a prodigious height, the English agent had to pay 32 tomans (over £100) for a small cow. Writing shortly after the siege, Phillipps, after giving harrowing details of the terrible scenes in the city just before it fell, said that the Company would thereby be convinced that

.. .we have Endured our Share and severely felt the Hardships of so prodigious a Dearth.... Thank God, we have escaped by a timely Precaution, but by a vast Expence of Cash for which we cannot tax our Conduct with Imprudence... .We hope no one who hears our Conduct will want Humanity enough to approve the Purchase of our Lives on the Terms we submitted to.. ..4 x Dagregister, 29 August 1722. 2 See Schorer’s letter, dated 18 November 1722; it is quoted in H. Dunlop’s Pevzië Voorheen en Thans, p. 258. 8 See ch. xxxvn. 4 Letter of 30 November/11 December 1722, in the Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv.

410

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING SIEGE OF ISFAHÄN

So far as can be ascertained, no members of the Dutch com­ munity lost their lives during the siege or suffered any permanent ill effects therefrom. The English, however, were not so fortunate, because, on 23 October, the day on which Shäh Sultän Husain surrendered his crown to Mahmüd at Farahäbäd, John Myngs and Caesar Devaux, the two junior members of the staff of the Company, endeavoured to escape from the city. They were never seen again. An Afghan, who was afterwards seen to be wearing Myngs’s clothes, said that he had been killed, and there can be little or no doubt that his companion had also paid for his rashness with his life. Nevertheless, when one considers the appalling mortality amongst the inhabitants of Isfahän, the Dutch and the English, as well as the other Europeans there, were fortunate to escape as lightly as they did.

411

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING THE AFGHAN OCCUPATION For the representatives and employees of the English and Dutch East India Companies alike, the Afghan period of domination in Persia was one of frustration, hardship and frequently danger. Trade was almost at a standstill, because of the ceaseless wars and revolts and the general insecurity. Such contemporary records as exist (for there are a number of gaps) therefore make melancholy reading for the most part. Nevertheless, it seemed at the outset as though the European commercial interests in the country would be, at any rate, no worse off under the new régime than they had been under Shah Sultan Husain. After the Afghan general Amânullah and his men had taken possession of strategic points in Isfahän, Owen Phillipps and Nicolaus Schorer and their respective subordinates went in person to pay their respects to him. Phillipps afterwards reported that Amânullah had received him very graciously and had given him “full Assurances of all the Encouragement to our Affairs we could desire”.1 On the following day (25 October 1722), when Mahmüd made his state entry into the capital, Phillipps reported: “We went to meet him, and paid our Respects in the usual Manner, and were recommended to his Notice as the English Merchants, come to pay him a Compliment. We expect shortly to be called to a Mageless [majlis], and there, by the Interest and Favour we have in his Athamadoulot [Ftimäd al-Daula] We hope to have a favourable Reception.”2 Through the good offices of Khwâja Marcor, a brother of Stephen Marcor, the interpreter of the Company, the English suffered no molestation when the Afghans entered the city. 1 Letter from Isfahän dated 20/31 October 1722, in Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv. This letter and a number of others from Isfahän and Gombroon that were written during the Afghan occupation were published in the Asiatic Quarterly Review (London, 1886), vol. 11, pp. 156-210. 2 Ibid,

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EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

As for the Dutch, Mahmüd, according to Friar Alexander of Malabar, received them “politely, but with a false heart, accepting their presents and favouring them with dresses of honour”.1 By means of lavish gifts, Schorer was soon afterwards received in audience by Mahmüd, but the latter refused to see Phillipps because the English Company was by this time so short of money that it could not offer him and his underlings what they considered to be enough. The outlook thus appeared to be more favourable for the Dutch than for the English, but complete disillusionment for both was soon to come. Greatly exaggerated reports of the wealth of the two Companies had aroused the cupidity of Mahmüd and his leaders. It was rumoured, inter alia, that the Dutch had made enormous profits during the siege by selling sugar, of which they had laid in large stocks, at very high prices.1 2 On the strength of these reports, Mahmüd sent his mace-bearer, a brutal man named Muhammad Nishän, to the Dutch factory to demand an exorbitant sum. On arrival, Muhammad Nishän threatened Schorer that, in the event of refusal, he (Schorer) would lose his head and all his employees would be bastinadoed. In the words of Friar Alexander: The Dutch chief... replied courageously that the Company was powerful enough to revenge his death, which he did not fear, adding that there was no money left (for Muhammad Nishan asked 40,000 tomans from the Company). Nishan replied “Before tomorrow thou must supply the money, otherwise we shall see how the cudgels shall dance on the Dutch backs” (for this Muhammad Nishan was a beastly tyrant and he enticed Mahmud to all evil works). Thereupon the Hollanders took refuge with Miansi,3 who treated them well, sending his secretary to Mahmud to inform him of Nishan’s action, so the King excused himself, saying the Hollanders were his guests, and Miansi sent one of his men as “salve guarde” instructing him if any of Nishan’s men came to the factory, to cleave their heads. And so they were safe and well satisfied, and when next day Nishan’s men came, they had to retire with empty bags.4 1 Fr Alexander, “Kort Narigt”, trans. H. Dunlop, RCAJ, vol. xxin, p. 650. 2 “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Révolution de Perse jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1724”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 364b. 3 Miangi (as the name is usually given) was an Indian who had been Mahmüd’s tutor and had much influence over him. See p. 277 above. 4 Loc. cit. pp. 650-1.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

Notwithstanding Miangi’s intercession, the Dutch in Isfahan were forced to pay the Afghans, on various occasions, some 23,000 tomans in the aggregate. Although Amänullah had, as we have seen, received the English with civility at the outset, he soon showed himself in his true colours. In a letter dated 30 November/11 December 1722, Phillipps, after a further reference to the hardships that he and his staff had undergone during the siege, said that Amänullah was really ... a Villain of the first Magnitude, subtle, haughty and tyrannical in his Temper, join’d to an invincible Thirst to all Degrees of Persecu­ tion that are vile and cruel.... We have had to pay him a Visit, and received Abundance of outward Civility; we were scarce returned to the Factory, but he gave us Reason to find the Viper’s Promises like the previous Tears of the Crocodile—a sort of Grace before Mischieff.1

Phillipps then went on to say that the Afghans, having seized from the Armenians some bonds relating to sums which the Company had borrowed from them, came “roring” [wc] into the factory, demanding immediate payment and beating the interpreter and servants. Just as they reached the agent’s apartments, the Armenian Khwäja Marcor fortunately entered the factory and persuaded the intruders to withdraw. Amänullah soon afterwards informed Phillipps that if he wanted his protection, he would have to make him a handsome present. Being almost destitute of funds, Phillipps broke open a sealed packet containing jewels to the value of several thousand tomans which the ex-Shäh had deposited with the Company as security for a loan, and took out a fine diamond to give to Amänullah. As it was necessary to have the packet officially sealed again, Phillipps took it to Muhammad Qulï Khän, the former rtimäd al-Daula, who was in favour with the Afghans and who had promised to protect the interests of the English so far as he could. To Phillipps’s consternation, Muhammad Qulï Khän, before affixing his seal to the packet, opened it and removed jewels to the value of 2000 tomans, on the pretext that they were really his property. Poor Phillipps was obliged to acquiesce.12 1 Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv. 2 Ibid. Letter dated 20 June/i July 1723.

414

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

Not long after, Muhammad Nishän, having succeeded in extorting money from the Dutch, turned his attention to the English and forced them to hand over all the jewels that the ex-Shäh had pawned. Furthermore, Amänullah, not being satisfied with his diamond, demanded a gift of 150 tomans. As Phillipps by now had no money left, he was obliged to borrow this sum from his interpreter Stephen Marcor. He found that it was useless to offer piece goods instead of cash.1 Being placated for the time being, Amänullah gave the Company permission to send the chaplain, the Rev. John Frost, Captain Smith and the remaining European soldiers to Gombroon.2 Friar Alexander of Malabar accompanied the party, which left Isfahän early in April 1723. Phillipps had been obliged to arrange for Frost, Smith and the soldiers to leave Isfahän because, as prices were still very high, he could not afford to buy enough food for so large a number in the factory. At Gombroon, however, conditions were easier. Scarcely had this party left Isfahän when the Afghans broke into and completely destroyed the Dutch factory there, and maltreated Schorer and his staff. Amongst the articles which they looted from the ruins of the factory was the silverware of the Carmelite missionaries, which had been deposited with the Dutch Company as security for a loan to enable the missionaries to buy food.3 Owing to the chaotic state of the country during Mahmüd’s reign, it became increasingly difficult as time went on for the Europeans in Isfahän to maintain contact with the outside world. Letters, if they got through at all, were always greatly delayed; for example, Phillipps’s letter to London of 20 June/i July 1723 did not reach its destination until nearly two years later. In this letter Phillipps reported that hardly any business was being done because of the troubles. He continued: ’Tis almost impossible to represent to your Honours the amazing Difficulties we have laboured under for Want of Money to procure 1 Içfahân letter no. 2336 of 26 June/i July 1723. 8 Fr Alexander, loc. cit. p. 652. 3 A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. n, pp. 1082-3. The missionaries were reduced to great financial straits by the cessation of remittances from Rome and the very high cost of living in Isfahan. The Carmelites were by no means the only sufferers in this respect.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

Subsistence and satisfy the greedy Demands that have been made on us. But we thank God we have hitherto waded through them all, tho’ with anxiety and trouble enough to ourselves, as well as Detriment and Loss to your Honours, and from the Divine Blessing and Assistance we still hope for a happy Deliverance out of all our Afflictions, and that your Honours will not impute to our ill Conduct but the Necessity of the Times, the Methods we have been obliged to pursue for our Support.1

It was, perhaps, with a tinge of satisfaction that Phillipps was able to add that the Dutch had been “deeper dipt” than the English had. We must now turn for a time to events at Gombroon, which was still in the hands of Tahmäsp’s supporters. In November 1723 an incident involving very serious con­ sequences occurred in the town. Two of the soldiers of the English East India Company, having drunk too much, went into the bazaar and created a disturbance. In the course of the brawling that ensued, one of these soldiers was killed and the other wounded. Henry Fowler, who was then the chief merchant at Gombroon, immediately took the matter up with the Shahbandar, but they failed to come to an amicable settlement, with the result that fighting broke out between the English and the Shahbandar's men. At Fowler’s orders, the frigate Britannia, which was then anchored off the town, opened fire on the Shahbandar's house, knocking down a wall. The Shahbandar thereupon offered to punish those who had been responsible for the death of the English soldier and the wounding of his companion if the Britannia would cease her bombardment, but Fowler rashly refused to agree. The fighting went on for a fortnight, in the course of which the Shahbandar and 200 of his men were killed, while the English, who had numbered sixty-eight at the outset, had twenty-eight killed and many wounded. As the factory was closely invested by the Persians, no supplies of food or water could be brought in, and the defenders had only salt water mixed with wine to drink. In consequence, most of them fell ill and were in no condition to continue the struggle. At this juncture, the Dutch mediated and brought the fighting to a close. The matter was settled when Fowler had paid a fine of 1000 tomans.1 2 1 Letter no. 2336, in Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. xiv. 2 Letter no. 2330 of 2/13 March 1724.

416

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

It was not until the autumn of 1724, some months after the fall of Shiraz, that Mahmûd’s forces captured Lar. The general in command, whose name was Khudädäd, then sent a detachment to the coast to subdue Gombroon. When the news of the approach of this force reached that town, most of the inhabitants fled in panic to the island of Hormuz. When the Afghans entered Gombroon on 3 November 1724, the officer in command called on Fowler and asked his advice as to the appointment of a Shähbandar. After Fowler had suggested the deputy Shähbandar as a suitable person, the Afghans asked both the English and Dutch to procure the release from Hormuz of a certain Khusrau Beg, a man who had long been a partisan of theirs, so that they could make him Governor of Gombroon. Fowler then made strenuous efforts to induce Khusrau Beg to embark in an English vessel, The Duke of York, while Pieter’t Lam, the Dutch Director, tried his utmost to make him choose a Dutch vessel instead. In the end, Fowler’s endeavours prevailed. He then received a message from General Khudädäd from Lär to do his best to persuade the Persian merchants who had fled to Hormuz to return to Gombroon, as he was anxious for trade to be resumed. Fowler complied to the best of his ability, and by degrees most of the fugitives returned.1 The Afghan hold over Gombroon proved to be a tenuous one, and their troops had to be withdrawn for some time after Mahmûd’s disastrous expedition to ‘Arabistän and the Kühgilü country.1 2 The narrative of events at Isfahän must now be resumed. The slight disturbances which Ashraf’s seizure of the throne and Mahmûd’s subsequent execution (or death from natural causes) occasioned in Isfahän had no adverse effect on either the English or the Dutch communities there, such fighting as there was being confined to the palace area.3 Ashraf showed that he was more open to reason and also more aware of the importance of fostering trade than his predecessor had been. Although he began by demanding 4000 tomans from the English, he soon reduced this sum by half, and then, on being convinced that they had no ready money, he waived his demand 1 Letter from Gombroon of 6/17 February 1725. 2 See p. 205 above. How the Afghans subsequently re-established their authority in the Gombroon district will be described later in this chapter. 8 See p. 210 above.

27

4*7

LSD

FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

altogether. His ministers asked the Company for the surrender of the decrees for all its privileges, saying that it must obtain new ones, but the money that they demanded for the new raqams was not excessive. The agent therefore deemed it prudent to comply, difficult though it was to raise the sum required. In a lengthy letter to London, dated 28 June/9 July 1726, the agent said, inter alia, Since what we have already mention’d to your Honours, we have had little or no Disturbance from the present Government, and it seems as if Shaw Ashroff had something of a Desire to set Trade on its Wheels again, for he likewise sent Rogoms both to your Honours and the Dutch Factories at Gombroon, to secure them, as we suppose, from all Insults, tho’ the Particulars of them we do not know. Unfortunately for trading prospects, the more favourable attitude of the new government was of only limited value. Not only was a great part of the country by now in Russian and Turkish hands, but in the parts that were nominally subject to Ashraf a number of pretenders to the throne kept making their appearance and endeavouring by force of arms to assert their claims? Further­ more, the limited forces at Ashraf’s disposal were unable to prevent frequent raids by Baluchi and other predatory tribesmen. One of the pretenders to the throne, who claimed to be Sultan Mahmüd Mïrzâ, the eldest son of the ex-Shäh, appeared in the Gulf littoral towards the close of 1725. In an entry in the Gombroon Diary on 12/23 December, it was stated that the selfstyled prince was endeavouring to raise a force to oppose the Afghans (who had by this time withdrawn from those parts) and to assert his claims. On that day, one of the ‘‘prince’s” leaders (to whom the Company’s representatives gave the pleasant name of “Sherry Arry”)1 2 entered Gombroon at the head of 700 men “ as a Reinforcement for this Citty and to Act under the Governor”. Under the same date it was stated that the Company’s share of the Gombroon customs was three years in arrears, but that, on inquiry being made, it was found that trade was so bad that the total 1 See pp. 300-3 above. 2 This was how he was styled by the Company. The name was probably a corruption of Shahrïâr or Shahriârï. With this we may compare “ Sherry and Water” and “ Sir Roger Dowler”, as the British soldiers in India at a later date termed Shekhavati and Siräj al-Daula respectively.

418

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

receipts for the port amounted to much less even than the 1000 tomans a year to which the Company was entitled. One of the reasons for the almost complete stoppage of trade there was the conduct of Shaikh Rashid of Basidü,1 who was diverting ships bound for Gombroon to his own port and forcing them to pay dues there. He went so far as to attack the Britannia when she visited Basidü, after which the Company would not allow any of its ships to call there. Shaikh Rashid also levied contributions far and wide in the Gulf; on the other hand, he had sufficient humanity to allow a number of Persians and Armenians to seek refuge at Basidü from the Afghans.2 Late in December 1726 it was rumoured in Gombroon that the people of the district of Jahrum, to the south-east of Shiraz, had revolted against the Afghans. Soon afterwards, a caravan from Kirmän brought the news that Sayyid Ahmad, another claimant to the Persian throne, had been crowned there,3 and that he was planning to attack the so-called Sultan Mahmüd Mirzä at Minäb. Except for the fact that Sayyid Ahmad had been crowned at Kirmän, there was no truth in these rumours. We must now turn for a time to the affairs of the Dutch East India Company. When Johannes de Croeze, the Director at Gombroon, died there in 1724, the title of the chief representative of the Company in Persia was changed from Directeur to Gezaghebber or “ President”.4 The first to bear the new title was Pieter’t Lam. Pieter’t Lam, in a letter to Amsterdam dated 16 June 1727,6 stated that the Company’s total payments to the ex-Shäh and the Afghan rulers amounted to 1,721,060 guilders, a sum equivalent 1 Basidü is situated on the point of that name at the western end of Qishm. Shaikh Rashid was closely connected with the Huwala and Jawasmi Arabs. 2 D’Anville, “Recherches géographiques sur le Golfe persique et sur les Bouches de l’Euphrate et du Tigre”, in the Mémoires de Littérature, tirés des Registres de VAcadémie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (Paris, 1764), vol. xxx, p. 151. D’Anville stated that he had obtained this information in 1729 from a Spaniard in the Portuguese service named Don Alvaro Joseph Marques de Cardozo y Cienfuegos, who had then recently returned from East Africa and who had frequently been in the Persian Gulf (D’Anville gave his name wrongly, and I am indebted to Professor Boxer for correcting it). 8 See p. 300 above. 4 W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie^ p. 254. 8 Quoted by H. Dunlop in his Perzië, p. 258.

419

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

to some 40,000 tomans.1 As there seemed to be no prospect of recovering this large sum, Pieter’t Lam urged the Company to send four strongly armed and well-equipped ships from Batavia to the Persian Gulf for the purpose of seizing the island and castle of Hormuz and to hold them as security for this money. He further suggested that the factory should be transferred from Gombroon to Hormuz. He then referred to a letter from Amsterdam in which there was a bitter complaint against the members of the Isfahän factory for their ° incomparable faithlessness”1 2 in “dis­ sipating” 17 tons of gold. ’T Lam pointed out that the Isfahän staff could not be blamed for the loss of this bullion. Finally, he asked for a “changement” because of his precarious state of health. Without allowing enough time for an answer to reach him, the impatient ’t Lam determined to get possession of Hormuz by bribery rather than by force. In October 1728 he sent two of his assistants to the island to offer the officials in charge a large sum of money if they would surrender the castle to him. The officials refused to give formal possession of the building, but they com­ promised by agreeing to allow the Dutch flag to be flown from it. When the news of this arrangement reached Isfahän, which it probably did in exaggerated form, Ashraf was enraged. Not long before, he had appointed the notorious Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the former Vâlï of ‘ Arabistän, commander-in-chief of his forces in the Garmsirät or hot country bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of ‘Omän. He now sent orders to Sayyid ‘Abdullah to hasten to Gombroon and to recover Hormuz from the Dutch. At the same time, he sent word to Barüd Khän, the recently appointed Governor of Gombroon,3 to seize the Dutch President and some of his subordinates and to send them under guard to Isfahän. On receipt of these orders, Barüd Khän seized Pieter’t Lam, a merchant named Molengraaf, and Michielse, the head of the Dutch factory at Basra, who happened to be in Gombroon at that time. On hearing of the arrest of the Dutch, the English agent attempted to intercede, but Barüd Khän would brook no interference, pointing out that his orders were explicit. 1 As stated on pp. 411 and 414 above, this total was made up of 17,000 tomans to the ex-Shâh and 23,000 to the two Afghan rulers. 2 Weergaloose trouwloosheyt. 8 He had succeeded Khusrau Khän.

420

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

Almost immediately afterwards, Sayyid ‘Abdullah with a force of some 1400 men reached Gombroon. He went to see’t Lam in his prison, abused him, and had him and his companions put in irons. He then demanded an enormous ransom,1 and thereupon turned to the English and asked for their advice and assistance in recovering Hormuz (which, it seems, the Dutch had occupied in the meantime). The English agent offered to help and suggested besieging the castle, but before any definite arrangement could be made, a Dutch lieutenant named van Slingelandt and a mixed force of grenadiers and Balinese troops over 150 strong attacked the Governor’s house in which ’t Lam and his two companions were imprisoned. As soon as this assault was delivered, the men guarding the prisoners stabbed them and fled. When van Slingelandt and his men reached the prisoners’ room, Molengraaf, who was holding a pistol in each hand, cried: “Friends, be welcome, we are wounded.”12 They found that Michielse was already dead, while Pieter’t Lam, like Molengraaf, was wounded and had fallen to the ground in a faint. The rescue party then took the two wounded men to the Dutch factory. In so doing, they were under fire the whole time from Sayyid ‘Abdullah’s troops, and poor Molengraaf was wounded again. He and’t Lam died later the same day.3 Thus, in tragic fashion, ’t Lam obtained his “changement”. It was most unfortunate for’t Lam that matters came to a head when they did, because his successor, Leendert de Cleen (or de Kleene), had arrived in Gombroon only a few days before, but had not formally taken over from him.4 As fighting was still in progress, Sayyid ‘Abdullah asked the English to help him against the Dutch, but they excused them­ selves. Then, at the invitation of the Dutch, the English mediated, and hostilities ceased on the Dutch giving up all claim to Hormuz.56 On 2/13 February 1729 a messenger arrived from Isfahan with 1 He asked for 2 million guilders. See H. Dunlop, op. cit. p. 260. 2 Dunlop, op. cit. p. 260. Molengraaf’s words were: Vrunden syt wellekom, wy syn gequetst. 8 Ibid. See also the entries in the Gombroon Diary between 4 and 29 December 1728 (O.S.). 4 His appointment was dated 23 July 1728 (when he was still in Batavia). See W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, op. cit. p. 254. 6 Gombroon Diary, 11 and 23 January 1729 (O.S.).

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

a letter from William Cockell, the chief representative of the English East India Company there,1 saying that Ashraf was very pleased with the services which the Company had rendered him over the Hormuz affair. On the other hand, this unfortunate incident, which seriously harmed Dutch prestige, marked the beginning of the decline of their power in Persia.1 2 We must now go back for a little over two years in order to pick up the threads in regard to the English East India Company. On 30 November/11 December 1726 John Horne, the English agent at Isfahän, wrote to Gombroon giving the news of Ashraf’s triumph over Ahmad Päshä, adding that ... before the King set out on this Enterprise, he commanded all the Europeans to get ready to accompany him, and tho’ they excused themselves in the best Manner they could, yet they were obliged to give a Present of 40 Tomands to the Athamadoulet to have a Tallygaw (permit) of Leave, for they consider to appear in arms against the Turks might prove of very bad Consequences.

Not long after, Ashraf ordered the English to transfer their factory from Isfahän to Julfa, but they successfully appealed against this command, pleading that he had previously issued decrees confirming all their privileges.3 At the beginning of January 1729, however, John Horne transferred his headquarters to Gombroon. We may assume that the reason for this move was the almost complete stagnation of trade in the centre of the country owing to the widespread revolts and disturbances. In the summer of 1729 the tyrannous behaviour of the Afghans provoked a serious rising in the Rävar district of Kirmän, whence the English and Dutch Companies obtained their supplies of goats’ wool. Rebellions also took place in other parts of that province, but these, unlike the revolt in Rävar, were easily suppressed.4 Ashraf had for long affected to despise Tahmâsp and to regard the possibility of any challenge from him as remote. In May 1729, 1 John Home, the agent, had moved his headquarters from Isfahän to Gombroon in the previous month. 2 Dunlop, op. cit. pp. 260-1. 3 Letter from Isfahän to Gombroon dated 19/30 January 1727. 4 Report from William Cordeux, the English Company’s representative at Kirmän, quoted in the Gombroon Diary on 6 and 30 September 1729 (O.S.). Cordeux stated that the people of Rävar were so incensed against the Afghans that they were determined to resist to the last.

422

EAST INDIA COMPANIES DURING AFGHAN OCCUPATION

however, we learn from Gombroon that the Afghan ruler was at last becoming seriously perturbed at Tahmäsp’s increasing strength. As the story of how the prince’s forces, under the able general­ ship of Nädir, effected the downfall of the Afghans and the restoration of the Safavï monarchy has already been told, the concluding portion of this chapter will be limited to a description of the experiences of the English and Dutch Companies in Persia whilst the liberation campaign was in progress. For the English and Dutch, and also, of course, for the French,1 the situation was fraught with great danger at times, and all concerned had many anxious moments, whilst some members of the two Companies had exceedingly unpleasant and alarming experiences. Fortunately, however, there was no loss of life. When, on 15/26 October 1729,1 2 Ashraf returned to Isfahän after his serious defeats at Mihmändüst and in the Khwär valley, he was in a state of panic. Fearing lest the English in the city would try to escape and join the approaching Persian forces, Ashraf had them all stripped and incarcerated in a large caravanserai near the royal palace, where they remained for seventeen days. During that time, Ashraf made his abortive attempt at Murchakhür to stem the Persian advance, but he was again defeated and driven back to Isfahän with heavy loss. Many of his troops were now thoroughly out of hand, and began plundering and setting fire to the bazaars and slaughtering the citizens. Finally, on 13 November, the day on which Ashraf abandoned his throne and fled from the capital, the English bribed their guards and regained their liberty. They found to their relief that their factory was intact, but that the Dutch factory had been broken into and ransacked (it is probable that the Dutch, like the English, were imprisoned, but confirmation of this is lacking). At Gombroon, owing to the long time that it took to get news of what was happening in Isfahän, great uncertainty and anxiety prevailed for some time as to the fate of the English and Dutch communities in the latter place. On 14/25 November both John Horne and de Cleen received 1 See ch. xxxvn. 2 Gombroon letter to Bombay, dated 2 April 1731 (O.S.), in The Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, vol. XV.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVl DYNASTY

messages from Ashraf requesting them to assist him in case of need. Just over a week later, when the news of Ashraf’s flight from the capital arrived, Horne resolved to forestall the Dutch by informing the inhabitants of Hormuz of this event and thus inducing them to declare for Tahmäsp.1 On 16 December a Persian force occupied Gombroon, whereupon the Afghan garrison retired to one of the forts, where they were then besieged. A few days later, some Persian adherents of the Afghans (presumably Dargazlns) reached the outskirts of Gombroon, whereupon the Persians there beat a hurried retreat and the Afghans and their allies took possession of the town. However, on 9 January 1730, the Afghan commander and his men left in haste for Shlräz, and Gombroon reverted to Persian control, this time permanently. Meanwhile, Horne had received letters from Cockell and Geekie from Isfahän giving the news of their safety and of the occupation of the city by the Persians. He also received a letter from Nädir requesting him to take measures to prevent the Afghans from escaping by sea and appointing him Governor and Skähbandar of Gombroon until Persian officials could be sent to fill those posts. Horne replied to Nädir’s letter, “assuring him of our Readiness to serve his Majesty and Magnifying the Assistance We have given to that Party who appeared in his Favour here”. He concluded by requesting Nädir to use his good offices to secure compensation for the losses sustained by the Company.2 In writing as he did, Horne had hopes of obtaining fair treatment since he had been more co-operative with the Persian authorities at Gombroon than the Dutch had been. In due course a Persian named Kalb ‘All arrived to take over the post of Governor from Horne; the latter was also, doubtless, soon able to hand over to another official his duties as Shahbandar. Both the English and Dutch in Gombroon escaped injury during this period, while their factories were neither damaged nor pillaged. Trade had, however, been brought to a standstill by the extremely troubled state of the country. Less fortunate than their colleagues at Gombroon were the English and Dutch at Shïràz. In the disturbances that broke out in the city after the expulsion of the Afghans from Isfahän, both 1 Gombroon Diary, 3/14 December 1729. 2 Ibid. 2,"] December 1729/7 January 1730.

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the English and Dutch factories were looted; in the case of the English factory, the losses amounted to 7000 tomans.1 The Afghans then seized and stripped the unfortunate employees of the two Companies and beat the senior English representative. Some Armenians who had escaped the fate of the majority of their compatriots in the city were also seized and stripped. The English and Dutch, together with these Armenians, thereupon escaped to the neighbouring hills, but, since they had been unable to take any food with them, they were obliged to go down to the valley at night and beg for supplies in the nearest village. Fortunately, none of the English or Dutch suffered serious injury during this trying and anxious time.12 At the end of January, Horne heard from Khusrau, the Company’s representative at Kirmän, that the factory there had not been damaged, although fighting had taken place in the town between ‘Abdullah Khan’s3 troops and the inhabitants. Thus, while no members of the staffs of the English and Dutch East India Companies lost their lives, many of them had suffered great indignities and undergone much hardship. As to the interests of the two Companies, their losses through looting were serious but not crippling. What was far more harmful was the almost complete stoppage of trade owing to the war between the Persians and the Afghans; it took a long time to recover from the effects of this struggle. Moreover, the early hopes of the two Companies of better treatment by the Persian authorities and of improved trading conditions under the new regime were soon largely dispelled by Nädir’s arbitrary conduct and his heavy exactions for the purpose of financing his almost continuous wars. 1 Gombroon Diary, 21 December 1729/1 January 1730. 2 Ibid, 3/14 December 1729. 3 Presumably Sayyid ‘Abdullah, the former Vail of ‘Arabistän.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

FRANCE’S RELATIONS WITH PERSIA UP TO 1706 In comparison with Portugal, England and Holland, France was slow in establishing direct relations with Persia. Apart from an occasional interchange of letters between the sovereigns (such as the one which Shäh ‘Abbäs I sent to Henri IV by the hand of Sir Anthony Sherley in 1599),1 there had been no connection at all between the two countries in the sixteenth century, and it was not until the second quarter of the succeeding one that real contact was made. Despite the work of Barnabe Brisson (Brissonius),2 to the Frenchman of those days Persia was merely a name, and a vague one at that. This point is well illustrated by a quotation from La Comédie des Proverbes, a comic play by Adrien de Montluc, the Comte de Cramail:3 “Il ne vous connoist non plus que le grand Sophy de Perse.” Before the seventeenth century closed, however, a great trans­ formation took place. In both the religious and the cultural spheres France out-distanced all rivals, her achievements therein being truly remarkable. It was only in the commercial field that she continued to lag behind England and Holland, despite her efforts to catch up with them. When we consider France’s eastern policy in the seventeenth century, two figures stand out very prominently. The first of these is the Capuchin Père Joseph de Paris, the celebrated “Eminence Grise”;4 the second, who inherited many of Père Joseph’s aims, was Jean-Baptiste Colbert. It was Père Joseph who, far more than 1 Sir E. D. Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (London, I933)> P- 22. It is of interest that Sherley’s major-domo on his visit to Persia was a Frenchman named Abel Pinçon. Although Pinçon wrote an account of his experiences in Persia, it was not published until 1651, when C. N. Morisot included it in his Relations Véritables et Curieuses, under the title of “ Relation d’un Voyage faict es Années 1598 et 1599”. 2 His book De Regio Persarum principatu was published in Paris for the first time in 1580; it was reprinted there in 1590 and 1591, and at Heidelberg in 1595. 8 Act in, sc. vii. This play was produced for the first time in 1616. 4 Born in 1577, he was called François Leclerc du Tremblay until he entered the Capuchin Order in 1599.

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Richelieu, was responsible for the opening up of direct relations between France and Persia. He held most strongly that France should not rest content with being merely a European power, and that, in order to be really great, she must have overseas interests, commercial and otherwise. India was to be the main objective, but, as it was so far away, it was necessary to have a steppingstone. Such a stepping-stone was Persia. Hence it was that France decided to establish relations with Persia as a necessary preliminary.1 It was at Père Joseph’s instigation that Richelieu sent Louis des Hayes, the Baron de Courmenin, as ambassador to Persia in 1626 with the triple object of forming an alliance, protecting the Christians there and establishing commercial relations. Owing, however, to Turkish obstruction, des Hayes got no further than Constantinople. Three years later des Hayes was sent to Moscow to negotiate for the opening up of a trade route between France and Persia by the Baltic, Russia and the Caspian Sea, but his mission led to no tangible results.2 Meanwhile another, and this time a successful, endeavour had been made to get into direct touch with Persia. Père Joseph and Richelieu, being aware of the preponderance of Spaniards and Italians in the Carmelite missions in Persia and of the exclusively Portuguese character of the Augustinians3 there (the Superior of the latter Order represented the kings of Spain and Portugal at the Persian court),4 had decided to open, if possible, a Capuchin mission in Isfahän, the members of which were to be exclusively 1 H. Castonnet des Fosses, “Les Relations de la France avec la Perse”, in the Bulletin de la Société de Géographie de Tours (Angers, 1889), pp. 9-10. 2 P. Margry, using the original records in the archives of the French Ministries of Marine and the Colonies, stated that it was Shäh ‘Abbäs who suggested using the northern route through Russia, because he did not wish his enemies the Turks to enrich themselves from the transit trade through their dominions. There was no difference in the cost of transport. See Margry’s Relations et Mémoires inédits pour servir à VHistoire de la France dans les Pays d'Outre-Mert tirés des archives du Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies (Paris, 1887), p. 85. See also Octave Noel’s Histoire du Commerce du Monde depuis les Temps les plus reculés (Paris, 1894), pp. 209-10. 3 The first Augustinian mission in Isfahän was founded in 1599. See Padre Antonio Lourenço Farinha, A Expansäo da Fe no Oriente (Lisbon, 1943), vol. 11, p. 187. According to the same source (vol. n, p. 192), the Portuguese Consuls in Isfahän throughout the eighteenth century were Augustinians. 4 C. Schefer’s introduction to Père Raphaël du Mans’s Estât de la Perse en 1660, p. xli. 427

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French. Their motive in taking this decision was thus at least as much political as it was religious. Accordingly in 1627 the Capuchin Père Pacifique de Provins set out from France bearing letters from Louis XIII for Shäh iAbbas I. On reaching Isfahän in 1628, he was given ambassadorial status, and went on shortly afterwards to Qazvïn, where the Shäh then was. Shäh ‘Abbäs received him graciously, and gave him leave to open missions at Isfahän and Baghdäd (which was then in Persian possession). Père Pacifique was made Superior of the Isfahän mission. In view of the fact that he had travelled to Persia as an ambassador, he and his successors at that mission were regarded for many years as representing the king of France. By far the best known and most influential of the Capuchins in Persia was Père Raphaël du Mans. Jacques Dutertre, as he was originally known, was born at Le Mans in 1612; he took the name of Raphaël du Mans on entering the Capuchin Order. In 1644 he accompanied the French traveller Jean-Baptiste Tavernier to Isfahän, where he joined the Capuchin mission, of which he later became the Superior. As Père Raphaël was a skilled mathema­ tician, he was welcomed at the Persian court, and he became greatly esteemed by Shäh ‘Abbäs II and, later, by Shäh Sulaimän. He by no means confined himself to religious duties, but spent much time studying not only the Persian language, but also the country and its inhabitants. Whenever the Shäh received a Frenchman in audience, Père Raphaël acted as interpreter, and he took it upon himself to act as adviser to his countrymen. By so doing, he caused some friction, as there were at times other Frenchmen in Isfahän who were as well qualified as he was to play such a role.1 Despite his assertiveness in this respect, he was always ready to help others in a disinterested way. Tavernier, Thévenot and Chardin2 were all much indebted to him for assisting them to compile their books on Persia. Furthermore, 1 For example, Chardin and Louis Guilherme de FEstoile (more will be said later in regard to the latter). See in this connection the Abbé Barthélemy Carré’s Travels (Hakluyt Society edition), vol. in, p. 108. It is of interest to note that when Carré was at St Thomé, in Golconda, in 1674, he found that Père Ambrose de Prévilly, the Superior of the Capuchins there, was even more influential and far more arbitrary than Père Raphaël du Mans; see his Travels, vol. in, pp. 776, 777 and 785. 2 Chardin gratefully acknowledged his indebtedness to Père Raphaël; see vol. Vin, p. 109 of his Voyages.

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when the young orientalist François Pétis de La Croix1 arrived in Isfahan to study Persian and to collect manuscripts, Père Raphaël was of great assistance to him, carefully tending him during a serious illness, and afterwards helping him with his studies. Père Raphaël did not confine his attentions to his own countrymen or to his co-religionists, but was often of service to the members of the English and Dutch communities in Isfahän.2 Besides generously providing others with material for their books on Persia, Père Raphaël was himself an author. He wrote his Estat de la Perse en 1660 specially for the information of Colbert, when the latter was collecting information on that country previous to the formation of the Compagnie Française des Indes. Particulars of other books by Père Raphaël are given by Schefer in his introduction to the Estât de la Perse? Mention must also be made of another French Capuchin, Père Gabriel de Chinon, who was a contemporary of Père Raphaël. Although overshadowed by his more eminent Superior, he had a good knowledge of Persia and was often of assistance to French travellers there. The Jesuits, the last of the Catholic Orders to establish them­ selves in Persia, had, like the Capuchins, a Frenchman for their pioneer. Père Rigordi, S. J., founded the Jesuit mission in Isfahän in 1653. In later years many French Jesuits served in Persia, but there were also some of other nationalities.4 Frenchmen were likewise well represented not only in the Carmelite Order, but also 1 Bom in 1653, he was the son of François Pétis, the first holder of the post of secretary-interpreter to the king for Arabic and Turkish. In 1670 Colbert, who had inherited Père Joseph’s policy of fostering France’s connections overseas, sent young François to the Levant to study Arabic, Turkish and Persian and also to collect manuscripts in those languages for the Bibliothèque du Roi. Carré, who met François in Baghdad in 1674, was much struck by his wonderful aptitude for Oriental languages (see his Travels, vol. ill, p. 860). François returned to France in 1680, having acquired a thorough knowledge not only of the languages mentioned, as well as Armenian, but also of the diplomatic ways of the East. When his father died in 1695, he succeeded him as Professor of Arabic at the Collège du Roi in Paris. More will be said of him later in this book. 2 See the letter of 10 April 1696 from Père François Jean-Baptiste, of the Capuchin mission in Içfahân, to the agent of the English East India Company, announcing the death of Père Raphaël on the first of that month. This letter is no. 6207 in Original Correspondence, India Office Library. 8 See Schefer’s introduction to the Estât de la Perse, p. cxii. 4 Notably the Polish Jesuit Père Juda Tadeusz Krusinski, whose Histoire de la Dernière Révolution de Perse is one of the principal sources of this book.

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in the ranks of the secular clergy. Frequent reference has been made in this book to the works of Pères Sanson and Gaudereau ; more exalted in station were Mgr François Picquet, the Bishop of Babylon (Baghdad)1 and his successor, Mgr Pidou de St Olon. The last-mentioned, who was appointed to his see in 1687, was later invested with consular authority. It will thus be clear that Frenchmen played a great part in the missionary work in Persia in those times, and that some of them, notably Père Raphaël du Mans, notwithstanding their ecclesiastical duties, often took action to improve Franco-Persian relations and to further the interests of their own country. When we turn to commercial matters, the picture is a different one. Although Père Joseph and Richelieu attempted to develop French trade with Persia and India in 1626-9, over thirty years elapsed before any further effort to do so was made, apart from some individual ventures, such as that of Tavernier from 1644 onwards. The reasons for this long delay in following up the initial steps by Père Joseph and Richelieu are to be found in the state of affairs in Europe. In France, the Fronde rebellion effectively diverted attention from external to internal matters. Secondly, the war with Spain had to be concluded before France could look once more to the East. By 1661, however, peace and settled conditions had returned, and Louis XIV, freed from the tutelage of Mazarin, was able to take the reins of government into his own hands. With the aid of his able Minister of Finance, Colbert, Louis decided to revive the project of establishing overseas trade. At first he had the idea of trading on his own account, as the kings of Spain and Portugal had done, but he soon abandoned that plan, and decided to form a trading company instead.2 It was probably Colbert who induced Louis to make this change, as he had been greatly impressed with the large profits made by the English and Dutch East India Companies, and he doubtless thought that it would be in the best interests of France to proceed on similar lines in order to develop a lucrative trade with India and Persia. As regards the latter 1 For the areas covered by the sees of Babylon and Isfahan and for the reasons why the Bishop of the former had so often to reside in Persia, see A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 1, pp. 300, 301, 346, 402 and 428-30. 2 L. Pauliat, Louis XIV et la Compagnie des Indes Orientales de 1664 (Paris, 1886), pp. 57-8.

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country, Colbert derived much useful information from Père Raphaël du Mans’s Estât de la Perse when he was pursuing his inquiries. In 1664 the Compagnie des Indes Orientales was formed,1 and in the same year a mission consisting of five persons was sent to Persia to negotiate on its behalf. Three of the members of this mission, namely Dupont, Beber and Mariage, represented the Company, while the other two, Nicolas Claude de Lalain and de la Boullaye Le Gouz, were accredited by Louis to the Shäh. The members of this mission reached Isfahän in November 1665, but scarcely had they arrived when Beber and his two colleagues refused to recognise de Lalain as the leader of the mission. To make matters worse, de Lalain quarrelled with de la Boullaye Le Gouz. It was only with the utmost difficulty that Père Raphael du Mans was able to patch up the differences sufficiently for the members of the mission to open their negotiations with the Persian government. Notwithstanding the very unfavourable impression which these unfortunate quarrels had produced,2 the Shäh agreed to grant the Company a decree exempting it from tolls and customs dues for three years, together with the same trading rights as those that had been already granted or that might be granted to other foreigners. The Shäh promised that, as soon as suitable presents were forthcoming, either from Louis XIV or from the Company, he would conclude a formal treaty of commerce with France. The Compagnie des Indes thereupon opened a factory at Gombroon,3 and began to trade with Persia, but neither Louis XIV 1 See Jules Sottas, Histoire de la Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales, 1664-1719 (Paris, 1905), pp. 10-13. 2 The Compagnie des Indes suffered greatly because of such bickerings between members of its staff. Carré, in his Travels (London, 1947-8), vol. 11, p. 381, thus expressed himself regarding its Indian trade: “But, alas! with the usual fatality of our nation, hardly had we begun to make progress than the unfortunate French nature asserted itself. I mean that the discords, quarrels, disobedience and fights one against the other, were so great that the other European companies, who had begun to feel jealous of our establishment, conceived a firm hope that our fine enterprise would not last long. They said openly that it was not necessary to oppose our trade, as we were destroying it ourselves by the disagreement and disorders that had arisen amongst us.” Carré, on the other hand, greatly praised the employees of the English East India Company, who put its interests above all personal considerations. In this connection, see his Travels, vol. 1, pp. 157-9, and vol. in, pp. 680, 681, 708 and 783. 3 The French factory was situated a little to the west of the English one.

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nor the Company sent any presents to the Shah or attempted to negotiate for a treaty. It was not therefore surprising that the Shäh and his ministers took umbrage at this neglect, and threatened to put a complete stop to the Company’s activities in Persia. Alarmed at this situation, Louis Guilherme de 1’Estoile, who had been born and brought up in Isfahan,1 and had entered the Company’s service there, hastened to Surat to give warning of what would ensue unless prompt remedial measures were taken. The Company thereupon in 1673 sent Geston, one of its two Directors-General at Surat, to Persia with some valuable gifts for the Shah. Geston, unfortunately, died at Shiraz whilst on his way to Isfahän, and his place as envoy was taken by a young man named de Joncheres who had only recently arrived from France. On reaching the capital, de Joncheres was given the honours befitting an ambassador, but, owing to his youthfulness, his attempts at negotiation were not taken seriously by the Persians, a fact of which the English East India Company was quick to take advantage. Nevertheless, with the aid of Père Raphael and Louis de 1’Estoile, he obtained permission for the Company to trade freely in Persia, but without enjoying any exceptional or exclusive privileges. For the next thirty years no further official attempts were made actively to further French trade with Persia, with the result that the Compagnie des Indes could do no more than carry on a somewhat fitful business during that period.2 Its main difficulties were due to the active opposition of the English and Dutch East India Companies, particularly the latter. Furthermore, the wars in which France was involved during the closing years of the seventeenth century were not favourable for trade; also, the endeavours of the Compagnie des Indes to establish trade with Siam and China prevented it from giving much attention to its relations with Persia.3 During those years such interest as Louis XIV and his ministers took in Persian affairs was confined to the activities of the Capuchin and Jesuit missions. 1 His father, Isaac Boutet de 1’Estoile, a native of Lyons, went to Isfahän about the middle of the seventeenth century. Except for a visit to France, he spent the rest of his life there. 8 The comment of the Governor of Gombroon to Chardin on the absence of French (and English) shipping there in 1674 will be recalled; see p. 367 above. 8 Schefer’s introduction to the Estat de la Perse, p. Ivi.

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France in the second half of the seventeenth century was by no means solely dependent on ecclesiastics for her knowledge of Persia; in fact, as the century wore on, she obtained a preponderant share of her information from lay sources, such as the works of Tavernier, Thévenot, Daulier-Deslandes and last, but not least, Chardin. Of the Voyages of the last-named, C. Schefer was fully justified in saying: “C’est le livre qui nous fait le mieux connaître l’esprit de la nation persane, et il doit être entre les mains de toute personne désireuse d’étudier une époque brillante de l’histoire des souverains Sèfèvïs.”1 These French travellers and merchants gave their own country­ men, through their books, an excellent idea of what the Persia of those days was like. They also, by their journeys and, in some cases, residence in Persia, familiarised its inhabitants with the name and prestige of France. In these ways, they certainly exerted a beneficial influence on Franco-Persian relations. Lesser known, but nevertheless in some cases worthy of mention, are the French clock-makers, jewellers and artisans who, from the reign of Shäh ‘ Abbäs I, settled in Persia, most of them being in the royal service. We have already mentioned Isaac Boutet de 1’Estoile and his son Louis Guilherme.2 The latter had a son named André who likewise joined the Compagnie des Indes, which he served until his death in 1745. These men, with their intimate knowledge of the country and the language, rendered valuable service to French commercial interests. Reine de 1’Estoile, who was probably Louis Guilherme’s daughter, married in 1737 Jacob (or Jacques) Rousseau, a clock-maker and jeweller from Geneva, who had settled in Isfahän some thirty years earlier.3 Their son JeanFrançois-Xavier, who was born in Isfahän in 1738, became a well-known French diplomat and orientalist.4 In the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain a French soldier of fortune, 1 Loc. cit. p. Ixxix. 2 His second name is thus given on his tombstone in the Armenian cemetery near Julfa; see Sir T. W. Haig, “ Graves of Europeans in the Armenian cemetery at Isfahan ”, JRAS, 1919, vol. xi, p. 342. 3 Jacob Rousseau had accompanied the ill-fated Fabre mission to Persia in 1705, particulars of which will be found in the next chapter. He was a cousin of the famous Jean-Jacques and a kinsman of Samuel Rousseau, the English orientalist. He died in Isfahan in 1753. 4 Jean-François-Xavier’s son, Jean-Baptiste-Louis-Jacques, who was born in France in 1780, likewise became a French diplomat and orientalist. 28

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Philippe Colombe by name, after serving in the Russian army, entered that of the Shäh: he was in charge of the Persian artillery for a number of years and lost his life at the battle of Gulnäbäd.1 The treaty of Ryswick, which was concluded on 21 September 1697, gave France a breathing space, which enabled her to turn her attention once more to her eastern trade. By virtue of that treaty, she had gained Pondichéry from the Dutch, thus greatly strengthening her position in India.The power of Holland was before long to begin to decline,1 2 although the Dutch East India Company was still a formidable competitor in the Persian Gulf, while the English East India Company was strengthening its position there. Notwithstanding the difficulty of competing successfully against such powerful and long-established rivals, the Compagnie Française des Indes, fortified by its new stake in India, determined to renew its bid for commercial supremacy in Persia. In 1698, de Châteauneuf, the French ambassador at Constantinople, sent Jean Billon de Cansevilles, a competent and enterprising merchant from Marseilles, to Isfahän, where he was to act as secretary to the Capuchin mission. The main object of this appointment was to enable him to gain a thorough insight into trading conditions in Persia. He remained in Persia until 1705, when he went back to France. In 1707 he paid a second visit to Persia. Being an observant and intelligent man, he was able, in the course of these two visits, to carry out very adequately the purpose for which he had been sent to that country. As the seventeenth century drew to its close, the Persian government became increasingly concerned at the situation in the Persian Gulf, where the depredations of the Muscat Arabs were causing much loss. As related in earlier chapters, the Persians, besides seeking naval help from the Portuguese, also applied to the English and Dutch for it. As the Portuguese aid proved ineffective and the English and Dutch declined to help at all, the Persian government turned to France. In August 1699 the Ftimäd al-Daula gave to Père Martin Gaudereau, who was then on the 1 See p. 142 above. 2 According to C. H. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the XVIIIth Century (Cambridge, 1941), no serious decline in Dutch trade in general set in until about 1730. As pointed out on p. 422 above, the decline in Dutch prestige and trade in Persia and the Persian Gulf began in 1729. I have to thank Mr D. M. Joslin, of Pembroke College, Cambridge, for bringing Mr Wilson’s book to my notice.

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point of leaving Persia in company with the Archbishop of Ancyra,1 a letter from the Shäh to the king of France. He asked Gaudereau to hand this letter to the French authorities at Surat for trans­ mission to France. This letter was to the following effect:

(i) The Shah wished to send an ambassador to the King of France to ask for his friendship and for the establishment of trade on reciprocal lines between the two nations. (ii) He wished to enter into an alliance with France for the conquest of Muscat. (iii) For this purpose, 30,000 French troops would be required, to­ gether with a French naval squadron to convey them to the scene of action. (iv) The cost of the expedition would be shared equally by the two countries, and the spoils of Muscat would be divided on the same basis. (v) The two forts on the landward side of Muscat would be given to the Persians, while the two facing the sea (named al-Jaläli and Mirânï) would be allocated to France. (vi) The Shah would give the French Company a port on the coast of the Persian mainland between Bandar ‘Abbas and Kong, and would also provide it with suitable houses at Isfahän, Shlräz and Tabriz.1 2

It is not known when this letter reached France, if indeed it ever did so.3 It is therefore uncertain when the French government first became aware of the Shäh’s desire to enter into closer relations with France or when Louis XIV decided to accept the invitation to send a diplomatic mission to Isfahän. It is possible that the decision to send a mission to Persia may have been spontaneous. All that can be said for certain is that, before the end of July 1703, this decision had already been taken, since it is known that Pétis de La Croix drew up on the 20th of that month a list of the presents that were to be given to the Shäh.4 In the previous month a 1 See pp. 51 and 76 above. 2 The substance of this letter is given in a memorandum by Gaudereau dated 25 January 1715; it is in AEP, vol. in, fols. 386a-8a. Gaudereau made no mention of this letter in his Relation II, because the Ftimäd al-Daula had stressed the need for secrecy. The terms proposed in this letter are similar to, but more detailed than, those which the Persian government had previously put forward to the English East India Company; see p. 392 above. 3 The supposition is that it failed to reach Paris. It could not be found in the archives in 1715, and it was for this reason that Gaudereau had to write from memory a summary of its contents. 4 These presents included a Gobelin tapestry, a large clock, a gold watch set with diamonds, ten smaller watches, two small cannon, two small mortars, and a breech-loading carbine. See AEP, vol. 1, fol. 237 b.

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memorandum had been written emphasising the importance of re-establishing French-Persian trade at that particular juncture by using either the long sea route via the Cape of Good Hope or the overland one through Turkey. It was stated that the French goods most suitable for the Persian market were cloth of all kinds, ironmongery, clocks, mirrors, paper and cochineal. From Persia could be obtained silks, cotton, goatskins, lapis lazuli, pearls, diamonds, sapphires, turquoises, etc. It was claimed that very large profits could be made. In conclusion, it was said that the Shäh was most desirous of being on friendly terms with the King of France and that he was willing to grant great privileges to the latter’s subjects.1 Not knowing the fate of the letter which had been entrusted to Gaudereau for transmission to France, the Shäh addressed a further letter to Louis XIV in March 1703, inviting him to send an embassy to Persia. In the following year, he conceived the idea of sending a mission himself to Paris, and chose a certain Mïrzà Ahmad, who was governor of Astaräbäd, as one of its members; furthermore, the mission was to be accompanied by J. Billon de Cansevilles. As soon as the representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies in Isfahän heard of this proposed mission, they bribed Mirzä Ahmad to refuse to go to France, and they drew the attention of the Persian ministers to the fact that Louis XIV had omitted to send an ambassador to Persia to congratulate the Shäh on his accession. The result was that the idea of sending a Persian mission to France was abandoned. As for de Cansevilles, he remained in Isfahän until May 1705 before returning to France.1 2 It thus came about that it was France and not Persia which took the step of sending a mission. 1 This memorandum, which is not signed, is dated June 1703. It is not clear whether it was based on one which had been prepared by de Cansevilles in Persia some time previously or whether it was written by him and received in Paris at a later date. It is preserved in AEP, vol. 1, fols. 232b and 233 a. 2 The Dutch artist Cornelius de Bruyn, who met de Cansevilles in Isfahän in April 1705, described him as ".. .Mr Billon, a French gentleman, and minister of Malta at the court of Persia. He had acted in that character only from the month of December, and had already obtained his audience of leave on 22 March 1705. He likewise paid a visit to our director, with whom he supped; and he regaled us, in his turn, the 12th and 13th in the Easter Week.” See his Travels, vol. II, p. 54.

436

CHAPTER XXXV

THE FABRE-MICHEL MISSION AND THE FRANCO-PERSIAN TREATY OF 1708 Louis XIV and his ministers, having decided to send an embassy to Persia, chose as its head a merchant named Jean-Baptiste Fabre; in the event of Fabre’s death, Monseigneur Pidou de St Olon, the Bishop of Babylon, was to succeed him. Fabre, who was a native of Marseilles, was born about 1652. He went to Turkey when a young man and spent many years there in business. On returning to France at the beginning of the eighteenth century, he spoke in very exaggerated terms of his knowledge of the Levant and of his influence with persons of importance. It was doubtless for this reason that he came to the notice of the authorities when they were looking for a suitable man to send as envoy to Persia. Had they, before making their choice, consulted the French Embassy at Constantinople, they would have learnt that Fabre, who was really of little account, was most unsuited to represent his country as ambassador; they would, moreover, have discovered that he was deeply in debt.1 For a number of reasons, the choice of Fabre as envoy was extremely galling to the Comte de Ferriol,2 the French ambassador to the Porte. De Ferriol had put forward the name of Pierre Victor Michel,3 one of his secretaries, as a suitable candidate for the post, but his suggestion was ignored. The ambassador, moreover, was well aware of Fabre’s lack of qualifications and of his burden of debt.4 In addition, de Ferriol was then carrying on an intrigue 1 O. Noel, Histoire du Commerce du Monde depuis les Temps les plus reculés, vol. 11, p. 25 (Noel is incorrect in stating that the Fabre mission left for Persia in 1703). 2 Charles, Comte de Ferriol, Baron d’Argental, was ambassador at the Porte from 1699 to 1711. 3 More will be said later on the subject of Michel. 4 In a letter to M. Blondel de Jouvancourt dated 6 December 1707, de Ferriol said : “ Si M. Ie Comte de Pontchartrain avoit voulu me croire, il n’auroit pas envoyé M. Fabre en Perse.” See the Correspondance du Marquis de Ferriol, Ambassadeur de Louis XIV à Constantinople, avec une introduction par M. Emile Varenbergh (Anvers, 1870), p. 241.

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with Fabre’s wife, whom he had forced, during her husband’s absence in France, to take up her abode in the Embassy.1 When Fabre began his preparations for departure, he was so much in need of money that he had to borrow what he required for his expenses from his mistress, Marie Claude Petit. This remarkable person, who was destined to figure so prominently in the adventures of the mission, is said to have been the illegitimate daughter of a lawyer and a washerwoman.12 She was born at Moulins about 1675. Despite her origin, she was given a fair education, and she was soon to show that she had plenty of character and a super­ abundance of the spirit of adventure. In 1702 she was keeping a gaming-house in Paris. It was at or about this time that Fabre formed an association with her (to which he may have been driven by the conduct of de Ferriol). In a curious document that has been preserved in the French archives,3 she undertook to accom­ pany Fabre wherever he wished and to make no financial claim against him. Although the French government had decided, early in 1703, to send a mission to Persia, Fabre did not receive his letters of credence until 24 July 1704, and he did not actually set out for Persia until the beginning of March in the following year. He was accompanied by a numerous suite, consisting of his nephew Jacques Fabre, a surgeon named Louis Robin (who afterwards wrote a history of the mission),4 Jacques (or Jacob) Rousseau,5 and a number of other persons. Amongst these last was a “cavalier”, who turned out to be Marie Petit in male guise. Fabre and his suite travelled by sea to Alexandretta and thence overland to Aleppo; they had the intention of going on through Erzurum, Erivan and Tabriz to Isfahän, but the Turkish authorities at Aleppo, incited by Blanc, the French consul (who was doubtless acting on de Ferriol’s instructions), raised such difficulties that the mission could proceed no further. Marie Petit, who was then masquerading as the wife of du Hamel, the maître d'hôtel of the 1 See the articles on Marie Petit in the Nouvelle Biographie Générale, vol. xxxix, and in Michaud’s Biographie universelle, vol. xxxn. 2 See the article in the Nouvelle Biographie Générale, 8 AEP, vol. I, fol. 222 b. 4 This record, which was entitled “Histoire de I’Ambassade de Perse de MM. Fabre et Michel, pendant les Années 1705-1709”, cannot now be traced. 5 See p. 433 above.

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mission, caused great umbrage to the Turks by appearing unveiled in the streets, and she scandalised the no less rigid Jesuits there by her conduct in other respects. Despairing of ever being able to proceed further, Fabre and Marie went to Constantinople, where they remained for a month. The Grand Vizier, who failed to see how Turkey would benefit if anything were done to facilitate trade between France and Persia, was at first against giving permission for the mission to proceed; he gave way eventually, however, and Fabre and Marie (who was now in Georgian dress) left for the Persian frontier, in company with the Persian ambassador to Turkey who was returning to Isfahän. Arrangements were made for the rest of the party to leave Aleppo and travel independently to Persia. In January 1706 Fabre and Marie crossed the Persian frontier and reached Erivan, where they were well received by the governor, Muhammad Khän, who sent word to the court to announce Fabre’s arrival and to ask for instructions. Fabre, who had a very inflated idea of his own importance, asked Muhammad Khän for an ambassadorial allowance of 600 livres a day (which was ten times the usual rate) and for one of 100 livres a day for Marie Petit as “Déléguée des Princesses de la maison de France”. He appointed one of the Jesuits at Erivan, Père Léonard Mosnier,1 as his almoner. Not long afterwards, one of Fabre’s French servants attempted to murder Marie Petit because, it appears, she had thrown an orange at him.12 Marie, who by this time had acquired great influence over the Khän of Erivan, made him arrest the man and imprison him in the town gaol. Mosnier, who was no friend of Marie Petit, wrote to the other members of the mission (who, after a long detention at Erzurum,3 were now nearing the Persian border) to inform them of this incident. When, very soon after, these Frenchmen arrived, they went straight to the gaol to rescue the servant. Forcing the gates, 1 Mosnier, who was a native of Aquitaine, was bom in 1675. He was for many years a missionary in Armenia, and became Superior of the Jesuit missions in Persia. He died in 1724. For his writings, see the bibliography. 2 See Michaud’s Biographie universelle, vol. xxxii. 3 According to the article on Marie in the Biographie universelle, she persuaded the Khan of Erivan to send money to the Päshä of Erzurum in order to induce him to send on the presents for the Shäh which he had impounded, and to allow the members of the mission to proceed.

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they released the man and marched in triumph to the building that had been allotted to the mission. On learning of this rash action, the Khän demanded the surrender of the prisoner, but the Frenchmen refused to give him up. The Khän thereupon had the building surrounded ; in the fighting which followed, two Persians were killed and several were wounded. In the end, the Persians’ superior numbers enabled them to carry the building by assault, and all the occupants, including Père Mosnier and Fabre’s fourteen-year-old son Joseph (whom Madame Fabre had allowed to join the mission en route) were imprisoned. The Persians were so angered at what had occurred that they wanted to put Père Mosnier to death, but Marie Petit is said to have gone down on her knees before the Khän to plead for his life and for the release of the other Frenchmen.1 The Khän thereupon reprieved Mosnier and released him and the other Frenchmen, but he had two Armenian servants belonging to the mission executed, in retaliation for the deaths of the two Persian soldiers. Seven weeks after Fabre’s arrival at Erivan, the Khän received a favourable reply from the court, whereupon the ambassador and his party began to prepare for their onward journey. Before they were ready to leave, the Khän invited Fabre and Marie to a farewell hunting party, at which, or as the result of which, Fabre contracted a violent fever from which he died on 16 August. Some of Marie’s enemies afterwards alleged that the Khän had murdered Fabre because of his infatuation for her,2 but Michel (who, as will be seen, was extremely hostile to Marie) accepted the fact that he had died a natural death. In his “Mémoire”, Michel said “Dieu qui ne laisse jamais le crime impuni luy envoya une maladie violente qui le mit au Tombeau dans peu de jours.”3 A period of wild confusion followed the news of Fabre’s death. Some of the Frenchmen were in favour of making young Joseph Fabre head of the embassy, while his cousin Jacques Fabre and 1 M. F. Brosset, “ Documens originaux sur les Relations de la Géorgie avec la France vers la fin du Règne de Louis XIV”, Nouveau Journal Asiatique (1832), vol. ix, p. 202. 2 See the biased and inaccurate account of this affair given by Bishop Pidou de St Olon in a letter from Erivan dated 9 July 1707; an English translation of this letter is given in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. 1, pp. 535-6. 3 “Mémoire du Sr. Michel sur le Voyage qu’il a fait en Perse en qualité d’Envoyé extraordinaire de sa Majesté dans les années 1706, 1707, 1708 et 1709”, MS. Fonds français 7200, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, p. 2.

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Mosnier wrote to the Bishop of Babylon to inform him of what had happened and to ask him to come and take charge of the mission. The Khan of Erivan, however, prevented this message from reaching the Bishop (who was then at Hamadän) until the advent of the rains made it impossible for him to undertake the journey (he was then aged 60 and in poor health).1 Marie Petit ended the period of confusion by proclaiming herself head of the mission “in the name of the Princesses of France”, and took possession not only of Fabre’s effects, but also of the presents for the Shäh and the papers of the mission. Neither Mosnier nor anyone else dared to restrain her, as she (according to Michel)2 “se faisoit craindre et.. .menaçoit tout le monde de bâton et des fers, attendu la protection du Kan, qu’elle s’étoit attiré pour avoir esté plusieurs fois dans son Harem”. The Khân of Erivan informed the Pâshâ of Erzurum of Fabre’s death and of these strange happenings, and the news eventually reached Constantinople, where it came to the ears of de Ferriol. Without waiting for authority or for letters of credence from France, he sent his secretary Michel post-haste to Persia with orders to overtake the mission at the earliest possible moment and to take charge of it himself. As for Marie Petit, she was to be sent back to Constantinople immediately. Meanwhile, Marie had been laying her plans for her next move, the great moment of her career, which was the visit to the Persian court. Being in high favour with the Khän of Erivan, she easily persuaded him to let her leave and to give her a letter of recommen­ dation to the Governor of Tabriz. The Khän also provided her with an interpreter named Imäm Qulï Beg, a renegade Armenian who, under the self-conferred title of the Comte de Zagly, had had a chequered and highly discreditable career in Europe.3 At the beginning of December, when Michel was approaching the Persian frontier, the members of the mission set out from Erivan on their journey to the Persian court. At their head were Marie Petit, the youthful Joseph Fabre (who was given the title of Elchi or “Ambassador”) and the Jesuit Mosnier, surely as strange a trio as could be found to lead a diplomatic mission. 1 Bishop Pidou de St Olon’s letter quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. i, p. 535. a Michel, “Mémoire”, p. 4. * See pp. 77-8 above.

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Michel, travelling as fast as he could and avoiding Erivan for fear of being detained and possibly poisoned by the Khän, overtook the oddly assorted party at Nakhichivän, but he found that he could take no action against Marie, as she was protected by a bodyguard which her friend the Khan had provided. After a secret conference with Mosnier, Michel travelled independently to Tabriz, where he stayed with Père d’Issoudun, the head of the Capuchin mission there. Michel explained the situation to Père d’Issoudun and his colleagues, and all agreed that Marie should not be left as head of the mission. However, when the embassy arrived a few days later, Michel was unable to dislodge her, as she was now under the protection of the Governor of Tabriz, in virtue of the letter from the Khän of Erivan. Michel could do no more than proclaim himself ambassador and write to the Shäh informing him of Marie’s true character, and saying that he had orders to arrest her and send her back to France, but that the Persian officials had prevented him from so doing.1 This letter, however, failed to reach its destination, as the messenger who took it was held up and robbed whilst on his way to the court. Marie’s renegade interpreter, Imäm Qulï Beg, informed the Khän of Tabriz that Michel was obviously an impostor, as it was impossible for him to have received letters of credence in the comparatively short time that had elapsed since Fabre’s death. He pointed out, moreover, that Michel not only had no retinue, but also that he had no presents for the Shäh. The Khän was greatly impressed with these remarks, and gave Michel a very cold reception in consequence. Then followed an interview between Marie and Michel, at which Mosnier and another missionary were present. In apparent humbleness, Marie asked whether she would be hanged; to this question Michel replied in the negative. He then asked her for a list of the presents for the Shäh, whereupon (according to his version of the interview) she became furious, abused them all roundly and threatened to apostatise; she would then, she said, urge the Shäh and his ministers to expel all the missionaries from Persia. Eventually, however, she calmed down, and gave Michel the inventory. He then bade her stay in Tabriz while he went on to see the Shäh.2 Through the kindness of an English merchant named Eston or ’ Michel, “Mémoire”, p. 15. * Ibid. p. 18.

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Easton, Michel obtained some funds on the strength of a bill of exchange on Aleppo,1 and so was able to go to Qazvïn, where he was well received by the Governor. His satisfaction was, however, short-lived, because Marie, armed with letters of recommendation from the Khans of Erivan and Tabriz, reached Qazvïn the next day, and soon made her influence felt. On her way from Tabriz she had, according to her enemies, abandoned the title of Déléguée or Envoyée des Princesses de France in favour of a higher one, which made it appear that she was the wife of the Shah.12 Michel was impatient to go on to the court, which was then encamped some distance to the east of Tehran (the Shäh and his ministers and courtiers were then making a pilgrimage to Mashhad), but the Persian authorities refused to allow him to proceed, partly because of the effect of Marie’s letters and partly because they had been heavily bribed by the English and Dutch. The consequence was that, while Michel could do nothing, Marie was allowed to go on to the court. On her arrival there, she was received by the rtimäd al-Daula who conducted her to the royal harem, where, according to her own account, she received “ all possible honours ”.3 On the following day, on being given her congé by the Shäh, she returned to Tabriz. After some delay, Michel also managed to reach the royal camp, but his enemies prevented him from seeing anyone of importance. With his lack of credentials and the powerful influences that were acting against him, he was in a very weak position, and had no option but to retrace his steps. At Sultânïya, which he reached at the end of April 1707, Michel met Bishop Pidou de St Olon who had at last gathered sufficient strength and energy to make the journey from Hamadän. They travelled in company to Erivan 1 For taking this action, Easton was subsequently reprimanded by the agent of the English East India Company, who thereupon issued strict orders that no money was to be lent to Michel on any pretext whatsoever. Michel had much need of this money, as his expenses were heavy in view of the fact that he had to provide not only for himself, but also for thirty-two other Frenchmen and eighteen servants. See de Ferriol’s Correspondance, p. 190. 2 Evidence for the prosecution at Marie’s trial, AEP, vol. 11, fol. 282 b. 8 Evidence for the defence at Marie’s trial, AEP, vol. 11, fol. 259 a. This printed document is entitled : “ Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Procès de Demoiselle Marie Petit, querellée en prétendue Vie licentieuse à la Requête de Monsieur le Procureur du Roy... Contre Monsieur le Procureur du Roy et Sieur Pierre Victor Michel. ”

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where, at the instigation of Imam Quli Beg, they were thrown into prison. The renegade then advised Michel and the Bishop to escape to Turkey, but they rejected this course as cowardly and unworthy of their position.1 By some unexplained means, they regained their liberty and went to Tabriz, where they found Marie. She had been unwell, and she came to the Capuchin mission to crave Michel’s forgiveness. As she was under orders from the Khän of Tabriz to leave Persia, she asked Michel to provide her with an escort and sufficient funds for her travelling expenses.12 Michel then gave her two men as an escort and 200 écus in cash ; he also handed her a bond on Aleppo (which later proved to be worthless) for 12,200 livres, to reimburse her for the money which she had lent to Fabre.3 She left Tabriz on 8 July 1707, on the first stage of her long homeward journey.4 Having successfully rid himself of his bête noire by these discreditable means,5 Michel returned to Erivan, where he demanded restitution from the Khän for the attack on the French mission in the previous year. This attack amounted, he said, to an affront to the French nation. The Khän agreed to put to death the man who was mainly responsible for this attack, namely Imäm Qulï Beg, the spurious Comte de Zagly; the consequence was that the renegade was beheaded on 2 August.6 The Khän then, at Michel’s express request, allowed the Jesuit mission to be re­ established (it is not recorded when it had been forced to close), and ordered the “schismatic” Armenians to cease their persecution of the Catholics. Michel also arranged for the bells of the Armenian Catholic church in the town to be replaced in the belfry, 1 Bishop Pidou de St Olon, loc. cit. p. 536. 2 Michel, “Mémoire”, pp. 34-8. 3 Bishop Pidou de St Olon, loc. cit. p. 536, said: “Monsieur Michel was so skilful as to get out of her a bond for 12,000 francs [wc] of the late Sieur Fabre’s which she had and which might be useful to us here, by giving her other and useless papers and promising her 600 piastres for her return to France.” 4 For an account of her subsequent adventures, see my article “ Marie Petit and her Persian Adventure”, The Asiatic Reviewy July 1946. 6 M. F. Brosset had an unfavourable opinion of Michel, whom he described as “une espèce d’intrigant”. See his “Documens originaux sur les Relations diplomatiques de la Géorgie avec la France”, loc. cit. p. 201. 6 De Ferriol, Correspondance, p. 210, said that Imâm Qulï Beg was “le plus perfide de tous les hommes”. Notwithstanding Imâm Qulï Beg’s bad character and record, Pontchartrain afterwards wrote to Michel expressing regret that he had had the man put to death; see Michel’s “Mémoire”, p. 213.

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whence they had been removed at the orders of one of the local mulläs.1 So far, Michel had been strikingly successful, but he could do nothing more unless and until his letters of credence arrived. He ignored an order from de Ferriol to return to Turkey, and remained in Erivan in the hope that these letters would eventually reach him there. His patience was rewarded at the beginning of March 1708, when he at length received the long-awaited documents; they had been signed at Versailles on 4 August in the previous year. Practically at the same time, the Khän of Erivan obtained per­ mission from the court for Michel to proceed there. He accordingly left Erivan soon after for Isfahän where he arrived in the middle of May. He was well received by the Mihmändär-bäshi and the Därügha of Isfahän. On 7 June, Shäh Sultän Husain received Michel in audience for the first time. The Shäh, who was seated on a low dais, was wearing a red satin coat with diamond buttons. Michel was given a stool opposite the Shäh, while the other envoys present were kept some distance away. After the Shäh had received Michel and had asked some questions regarding the war in Europe, Michel gave him the remaining presents.2 After the audience, Michel was invited to dine at the palace, an invitation that was not extended to the other ambassadors. The dinner was served on gold plates, and when it was over, Michel was summoned to the royal presence again. The Shäh, as before, was very gracious; in Michel’s own words: “Jamais le Sophy n’avoit tant parlé à aucun Ambassadeur.”3 On 27 June, Michel had a long interview with the Ftimäd al-Daula. The minister, who had been well prompted by the English and Dutch, began by asking why the king of France had omitted to send an envoy to congratulate him on his accession. Michel replied that this omission was not surprising, as ’the Shäh had sent no word to the king of France, but the latter had now paid the Persian monarch the great compliment of sending an envoy, 1 Michel, “Mémoire”, pp. 44-50. 2 See p. 435 above. Some of the presents, including the two small cannon, had been seized by the Turkish authorities at Aleppo and Erzurum, while others had been “ dissipated ” by Fabre and his “ concubine ” ; see Michel, “ Mémoire ”, pp. 127-9. 8 Michel, “Mémoire”, p. 126.

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despite the fact that none had been sent to the French court. The minister then inquired what goods France could send to Persia and by what route they could be despatched. Michel answered that France could supply cloth of all kinds and colours, including cloth of silver and gold, serge and lace. These goods could be sent overland through Turkey or by sea to Bandar ‘Abbäs. In return, France could take silk, wool and carpets as the English and Dutch did. Michel added that it would be very advantageous if a French factory could be established in Isfahän. The minister, doubtless mindful of his prompting from the English and Dutch, said that Persia was under an obligation to those nations which had rendered her military and other assistance. Michel’s rejoinder was that he could see no evidence of such help. The Muscat Arabs were able to attack Persian vessels even at Bandar ‘Abbäs, while the English and Dutch seemed pleased to be able to persuade Persian merchants to use their shipping. It is clear that Michel found this interview trying, because he afterwards said in his “Mémoire”: Il est certain qu’on ne sçauroit s’imaginer la peine qu’il y a de traitter avec les Orientaux. Les Persans ne sont pas si violens que les Turcs, mais leur Fourberie est bien plus grande. Elle est accompagnée d’une Fierté que leur donne la quantité d’ambassadeurs qu’ils voyent dans leur Cour, sans qu’ils en envoyent aucun.1

It was apparently at this juncture that Michel first conceived the idea of negotiating a treaty, for he very rightly stated in his “Mémoire”, after giving details of this interview, that something more than a series of decrees was required to establish and maintain good relations between France and Persia, and he then suggested that a treaty was therefore necessary.2 The great advantage of a treaty, as he had no doubt discovered by this time, was that, unlike raqams, it did not need renewal whenever a monarch died and another succeeded. On 27 July, during a private audience with the Shäh, Michel gave him a detailed account of the war in Europe and of the French plans against England. He claimed that he had made a great impression. The Shäh, who was “toujours gay et fort attentif”, said that he would like to send an envoy to France, but that, in view of the manner in which the Turks had treated Fabre,

2 Ibid. p. 137.

1 P. 136.

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he did not see how it could be done. Michel replied that there were various routes that could be utilised, and that, if the ambassador travelled incognito and had only a small suite, he could even go through Turkey. This audience lasted an hour, and Michel was so pleased with his reception that he said “Cette audience fut assurément la plus belle que jamais ambassadeur ait eue en Perse.”1 The negotiations for the treaty began almost immediately, but scarcely had they started when the rtimäd al-Daula stopped them. According to Michel, the reason for this action was that the English and Dutch had heavily bribed the ministers concerned.2 Michel, however, took advantage of a rumour that James the Old Pretender (the Chevalier de St Georges) had landed in Scotland, to induce the Ftimâd al-Daula to resume the negotiations,3 and the Shäh thereupon ordered the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa to enter into the discussions with Michel. Michel, however, was at first averse to dealing with this man because he was friendly with the English, but he changed his mind when he found him to be capable and enlightened.4 When Michel asked why the English, Dutch and Portuguese had special privileges, the Mustaufi-yi-Khässa replied that the English had rendered valuable service over the capture of Hormuz, while the Dutch trade was of much value to Persia. Lastly, the Portu­ guese had been given certain privileges to compensate them for the loss of Hormuz. The French were new friends of the Persians, 1 “Mémoire”, p. 141. This claim was similar to the one made nine years later by John Bell of Antermony on behalf of the Russian envoy Artemii Petrovich Volynsky. See Bell’s Travelst vol. 1, p. 92. 2 Michel, “ Mémoire ”, p. 141. It is not surprising that the English and Dutch did their utmost to put obstacles in Michel’s way. De Ferriol, in his Corres­ pondance, p. 189, informed his brother that Fabre was the original cause of the hostility of the two Companies, as he had boasted in Aleppo that he would chase them out of Persia and install the French in their place. 8 This rumour had some basis, as Louis XIV, in order to assist the Old Pretender, gave orders for thirty ships to embark 6000 troops at Dunkirk and, escorted by five warships, to sail to Scotland and land the force on the east coast. The fleet, which was under the command of the well-known sailor Claude de Forbin, of Gardane, duly set forth in March 1708, but, on sighting a superior British fleet in the approaches to the Firth of Forth, it prudently returned to France. 4 Termed by Michel the “Moustaffi Kassi”. He had formerly been Persian Ambassador to Siam, where he had come into contact with two French envoys named Farges and du Briant.

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but they had as yet done nothing for them. It was probably at this stage of the discussions that Michel made a verbal promise to arrange for French naval help against the Muscat Arabs. Then ensued a long discussion on what duties the French should pay on their imports and exports. The Persian negotiator began by demanding a duty of io per cent in each case, together with 3 per cent for räh-däri or road-tax, but later offered a rebate. Michel refused to agree to any duty at all, since the English paid none, but when he realised that some compromise was necessary over trade if he was to do anything for the Catholic missions, he agreed to a 3 per cent duty on imports and exports, but he insisted that the French merchants should have exemption from this duty for 6 years so as to enable them to see whether the trade could bear such a burden. The Shäh agreed, provided that the exemption period was limited to five years. That difficulty being disposed of, the treaty seemed as good as signed. The English, Dutch and Portuguese, however, threatened the Shäh that if the treaty were concluded, they would menace the Persian coast ; at the same time, they heavily bribed the ministers.1 The Shäh was so alarmed at this threat that he was on the point of refusing to conclude the treaty. Michel thereupon hastened to the ministers and, in return for some slight modifications in Persia’s favour, succeeded in getting the treaty referred back to the Shäh, who then gave his approval. Michel’s feelings at this stage may be gauged from the following extract from his “Mémoire”:

On est bien embarassé l’ors qu’on se trouve dans une Cour craintive des Etrangers qu’elle souffre dans ses Etats, et que vos négociations tendent à la ruine de ces Etrangers établis de plus de cent ans dans un Empire, et qu’ils peuvent dépenser des millions pour vous faire Echouer. Pour peu de reflexion qu’on fasse sous l’embaras dans lequel un envoyé se trouve dans de pareilles occasions, je suis persuadé qu’on avouera que le traitté que j’ay obtenu du Roy de Perse est le plus beau qu’on peut jamais faire, le dit traitté me fut remis le 14, et c’est celuy qui est compris dans ces mémoires.1 2 Michel then quoted the French text of the treaty, using a translation made, apparently, expressly for him by the French 1 This is MicheFs version of the matter, which may well be correct; see his “Mémoire”, pp. 172-3. 2 Michel, op. cit. pp. 173-4.

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Carmelite Fr Basil de St Charles, who was well versed in Oriental languages.1 The exact date when the treaty was signed is difficult to determine. Michel said that it was handed back to him on 14 (September), but the wording at the end of the document makes it clear that it was concluded at the beginning of Rajab, 1120. What probably occurred was that the agreed text was handed back to him on 14 September (28 Jumâdï II, 1120) and that it was finally drafted and signed two days later, at the beginning of Rajab. The treaty contained thirty-one articles, the most important provisions of which were as follows:

(i) As already agreed, the duty on imports and exports was fixed at 3 per cent, after the expiry of the five-year exemption period (article 11). (ii) In two somewhat obscurely worded articles (vn and vm), the French were empowered to import and export annually gold and silver to the value of 300,000 Sevillian piastres (21,000 tomans or £69,999). They were further empowered to import annually Indian and other goods to the value of 100,000 Sevillian piastres (7000 tomans or £23,333), as well as goods from Turkey and Europe such as cloth, serge and “others which have nothing in common with Indian goods” to the value of 200,000 Sevillian piastres (14,000 tomans or £46,666). The usual duty of 10 per cent was to be paid on all goods exported or imported in excess of these values. (iii) No more than 500 loads of goods were to be exempt from the tolls of the râhdârs or road guards (article ix). (iv) After the ratification of the treaty and the arrival in Persia of the chief business representatives of the French, they were to be allocated one of the Shäh’s houses in Isfahän, if they wished to stay in that city (article in). They were to be given houses at Bandar ‘Abbas, Kong and “Ric” (presumably Bandar Rig) and were to be permitted to hoist the French flag over these premises “à l’exemple des autres Européens” (articles iv and v). (v) Merchants and other persons of French nationality and up to twenty of their servants, Armenians and Indians, were to be exempt from the payment of tribute or poll-tax (kharâj) (article xi). (vi) In the event of a dispute occurring between two Frenchmen or of one murdering another, the French consul was to be the sole judge. 1 Ibid. pp. 181-99. Another French translation of this treaty, by Pétis de La Croix and dated 8 March 1710, is in AEP, vol. 11, fols. 35-40. Yet another version is given by Padery, “Négociations en Perse”, fols. i6b-2ib. Both Fr Basil and Padery combined certain of the articles, reducing the number from 31 to 29. 29

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If the French on the one hand and the Muhammadans or other Europeans on the other became involved in a dispute or a murder, the Muhammadan legal authorities were to investigate the matter and deal with the case in the presence of the French consul. No Frenchman was to be imprisoned. or punished for murder without proof and conviction (articles xvi and xvin). (vii) A head of a factory, captain or consul appointed by the King of France, was to reside in every Persian port (article xxm). (viii) In article xxvn, the Shah undertook that “the French bishops and [other] religious residing in the whole of our empire shall be able to say their prayers and carry out their religious duties in the places and houses where they shall be lodged, without anyone being able to prevent them or trouble them, on condition that, outside their houses, they shall do nothing that may be contrary to the religion of the Twelve Imams; as to the Europeans living at Nakhichivân and other places in our empire, nobody shall contravene the decrees which have been granted to them in the past or shall trouble them. We promise, besides that, to confirm and ratify the decrees which our predecessors have granted them, and if those of the Armenian nation or the religious of the other nations of Europe have attacked them and maltreated them... against right and reason, they shall, after proof and conviction, be made to pay into the royal treasury the sum of 50 Tabriz! tomans y The article went on to say that the Carmelites, Dominicans, Augustinians, Jesuits and others who were established in Shirvän and other places in Adharbaijän or in Media, Isfahan, Tabriz, Ganja, etc., were to be at liberty to remain there or to go elsewhere as they wished.1

It will be noticed that there was no mention in the treaty of French naval aid against Muscat. As will be recalled, Michel had, during the negotiations, touched upon the failure of the English to protect the Persians against the Arab pirates in the Gulf, whereupon the Persian negotiator had said “Then protect our coasts”. It was apparently later, perhaps after the treaty was signed, that Michel undertook to arrange for the despatch of French warships to the Gulf to undertake this task. He also promised that if the French corsairs were to capture any enemy vessels carrying goods belonging to Persians, the said goods would be handed back to their owners.2 The conclusion of this treaty was no mean achievement on the 1 This summary of the treaty has been made from Pétis de La Croix’s French translation of it. * Herbette, Une Ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV, p. 250.

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FRANCO-PERSIAN TREATY OF 1708

part of Michel. His début in Persia, owing to Marie Petit and her friends, had been most inauspicious, and he had had to overcome very serious difficulties; in so doing, he had shown much resource­ fulness and pertinacity. He had had no support or encouragement from his own government; in fact, he had been instructed to return to Turkey, but he had refused to comply in order that he might remain longer in Persia so as to take advantage of any improvement in the situation that might occur. In his negotiations, he had had to contend not only with the active opposition of the very influential Dutch and English East India Companies, but also with the hard-bargaining Persians. In the face of all these obstacles, he had concluded the first official Franco-Persian treaty. Hitherto, such privileges as the French had obtained had been merely the raqams or decrees granted to commercial or religious representa­ tives. Moreover, this treaty was an official instrument which had been concluded by the duly accredited representatives of the two nations. From the religious point of view, the treaty was, on paper at any rate, eminently satisfactory, while its judicial provisions seemed adequate. Commercially, however, it left a good deal to be desired. In fact, as Michel himself admitted, it had been necessary to make some commercial sacrifices in order to ensure signature and so secure the grant of the religious privileges and safeguards. First and foremost, the treaty failed to put the French on an equality with their English and Dutch rivals, neither of whom paid any import or export duties. Secondly, it imposed irksome restrictions on the volume of French trade. It will thus be clear that, while Michel certainly had some grounds for self-satisfaction,1 he was guilty of exaggeration when he described his treaty as being 4‘le plus beau qu’on peut jamais faire”.2 Just before the signature of the treaty, Michel secured the issue of a number of decrees amplifying the privileges granted to the religious missions. One of these decrees was addressed to “ Vagtan Mirza vice Roy des Principautez de Georgie et de Ghuriel”3 1 De Ferriol, in a letter to Jouvancourt dated 3 February 1709 (Correspon­ dance, lettre xlix, p. 357), stated that the treaty “me paraitroit fort avantageux, si le chemin de France en Perse étoit bien libre”. a “Mémoire”, p. 174. â Ibid, p. 167. Although Wakhtang was Valï of Georgia at that time, he did not become King of Kartli until 1711 (there was an interregnum from 1703 to 1711).

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29-2

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ordering him to prevent the French missionaries in his country from being molested. Similar decrees were issued for the Khans of Shamakhi and Tabriz. Another decree, dated 22 September, exempted the missionaries from the tax on running water. Having successfully completed his task, Michel was treated with great distinction by the Shäh and his ministers. Hearing that he wished to obtain some mummy, a substance that was highly esteemed in Persia and neighbouring countries because of the marvellous curative properties which it was supposed to possess,1 the Shäh sent him a small quantity in a silver box. He also presented him with a suit of armour, a horse with a gold bridle and a valuable coat of honour.12 Michel had his farewell audience with the Shäh on 23 September, but he did not leave Isfahän until just over a month later. When four stages to the north of the capital, he passed, travelling southwards, the Armenian Israel Ori, of whose mission to Persia an account has been given in ch. v.3 Ori, who had a very large retinue, sent fifty horsemen to salute Michel and to ask for an interview. Michel, having heard that Ori had been responsible for the bad treatment of the Catholics at Shamäkhl, refused to see him, and sent a messenger back to Isfahän to warn the Ftimad al-Daula that Ori’s plans were of an evil nature.4 Travelling via Erivan, Erzurum and Constantinople, Michel arrived back in France on 3 August 1709. After playing a leading part in the prosecution of Marie Petit,5 he left France some time later to take up his appointment as consul-general at Tunis, a post which he held until his death in 1720. 1 For a description of this substance, see my article entitled: “Histoire du Pétrole en Perse jusqu’au début du XXe Siècle”, Revue Pétrolifère (Paris, 1938), nos. 810 and 811. 2 Michel, “Mémoire”, p. 165. 2 See pp. 63-4 above. 4 Michel, “Mémoire”, pp. 210-n. 6 See my article “Marie Petit and her Persian Adventure”, The Asiatic Review, July 1946, p. 6.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

FRANCO-PERSIAN RELATIONS FROM 1708 TO 1715 Although Shäh Sultän Husain ratified the treaty of 1708 without delay, France was extraordinarily dilatory in following suit. There were various reasons for this delay. In the first place, the com­ mercial provisions of the treaty failed to arouse any enthusiasm either amongst the merchants of Marseilles or the directors of the Compagnie des Indes. Secondly, France was still embroiled in the war of the Spanish Succession. Thirdly, partly because of this war, communications between France and Persia were not only very slow, but also insecure.1 Consequently, it was not until 1711 that the French government ratified the treaty. In the meantime, the French government had not only neglected to send a diplomatic or commercial representative to Persia, but it had not even arranged for any goods to be sent there. France’s enemies, on the other hand, were extremely active in Persia. The English and Dutch East India Companies joined with the Armenian mercantile community in bringing strong pressure to bear on the Shäh and his ministers to abrogate such privileges as the French had obtained, while, in the religious field, the redoubtable Catholicos Alexander, of Echdmiadzin, had secured the cancella­ tion of the decrees which Michel had obtained in favour of the Catholic missions. In the face of this hostile activity, the only action that France took was to appoint as consul the elderly and infirm Bishop of Babylon, Monseigneur Pidou de St Olon, who was then resident in Hamadän. Owing to his age, ill health and poverty,1 2 he found the journey from Hamadän to the capital too arduous to undertake; moreover, it was long before the Persian government deigned to recognise his consular appointment.3 1 De Ferriors proviso that the communications between the two countries must be unrestricted was thus shown to be well-founded; see p. 451 above. 2 Like the Archbishop of Ancyra eleven years earlier, he had received no allowances from Europe for a long time and was consequently in dire straits for money. 8 Carmelites in Persia, vol. 1, p. 539.

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FALL OF THE ÇAFAVÏ DYNASTY

The ill-treatment to which the Catholic missionaries in Persia were subjected in consequence of the machinations of the Catholicos and the bigotry of the Shfl mujtahids and mulläs came eventually to the ears of the French government and the Pope, with the result that Monseigneur Gratien de Galiczen, titular Bishop of Agathopolis and coadjutor Bishop of Babylon, was sent on a mission to Persia in order to lodge an official protest and to secure redress. Bishop Galiczen, who reached Isfahän in April 1712, was accorded several audiences by the Shäh. He succeeded in obtaining a decree in favour of the Catholic missionaries which resulted in some improvement in their treatment, but, after his sudden death in September of that year, their troubles began afresh.1 Due to the influence of the Catholicos Alexander, the Shäh intended to send an unfavourable reply to Louis XIV and the Pope by the hand of the Abbé Jean Richard,12 but just at that juncture the news reached Isfahän of the French victories at Denain and Marchiennes and of the subsequent raising of the siege of Landrecies. Richard was consequently able to induce the Shäh and his ministers to modify their attitude towards France. Moreover, the repeated failure of the Persians to obtain any naval assistance from the English or Dutch in order to combat a revival, on an increased scale, of the activities of the Muscat Arabs,3 led them once more to seek such aid from France. The consequence was that the Persian government decided to send an envoy to the French court. With their usual ineptitude, the Shäh and his ministers made no attempt to see whether there was anyone in Isfahän possessing the necessary qualifications for so difficult and delicate a mission. In fact, they were just as careless and casual over this matter as the French had been over the appointment of 1 AEP, vol. in, fol. 43 b. 2 The Abbé Richard had formerly been on the staff of the Seminary for Foreign Missions in Paris. He left France for the Levant in 1710. After studying Turkish for some months, he went to Erivan. Père Pierre d’Issoudun, the head of the Capuchin Mission at Tabriz, had an unfavourable opinion of Richard, whom he described as inexperienced and obstinate; see his letter to Michel from Tabriz of 12 July 1717, in AEP, vol. v, fols. 138b and 139a. Herbette, in his Ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV, p. 11, erroneously stated that he was a Jesuit, apparently having confused him with Père Pierre René Ricard, S.J., who was at the Jesuit mission at Erivan at this time. 3 This increased activity was due to the strengthening of the Muscat fleet by the warlike and vigorous Sulfän ibn Saif II. See pp. 68 and 392.

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FRANCO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, 1708-15

Fabre. As the Abbé Richard was then (May 1713) on the point of returning to France, the Shäh entrusted to him the presents for Louis XIV, and charged him, on reaching Erivan, to hand them over to Muhammad Khän, the Governor of that town. At the same time, he sent orders to Muhammad Khän to choose a suitable person to act as envoy to France. On receiving these instructions, Muhammad Khän fixed his choice upon the local cavalry commander, but he refused to go. He thereupon asked Muhammad Ridä Beg, the Kaläntar or Mayor of Erivan, and the third most important personage there, to undertake the mission. Although he was aware that the journey to France was long and likely to be dangerous, Muhammad Ridä Beg accepted. Sending on in advance the presents for Louis XIV, which he had carefully hidden in some bales of silk, the newly appointed ambassador left Erivan secretly in March 1714. The reason for these precautions was that he feared that he would be prevented from entering Turkey if he proceeded openly on his way; the difficulties met with by Fabre and other envoys on Turkish soil had not been forgotten. It is unnecessary to describe at any length the adventures of Muhammad Ridä Beg in Turkey, as the story has been told in detail by Herbette in his admirable Ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV. Suffice it to say that Muhammad Ridä Beg, despite his elaborate precautions, was suspected time and again by the Turks, who ultimately arrested him and threw him into prison. Protesting that he was merely a pilgrim on his way to Mecca, he secured his release, but the Turkish authorities, taking him at his word, placed him on board a pilgrim ship. However, largely through the pertinacity and resource of Etienne Padery, the Levan­ tine interpreter whom the Comte des Alleurs, the then French ambassador at Constantinople, had sent to his assistance on hearing of his plight,1 Muhammad Ridä Beg made his escape and boarded a French ship off Alexandretta. It had taken him nearly six months to cross Turkey. Muhammad Ridä Beg reached Marseilles on 23 October 1714. Herbette has graphically described his two months’ stay in Marseilles, his protracted journey to Paris and the troubles which his extraordinary whims and sudden outbursts of rage caused to 1 For a brief account of Padery’s antecedents, see p. 116.

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the unfortunate persons who had been deputed to meet him and escort him to the French capital.1 After demanding and being given exceptional honours on entering the larger towns through which he passed, Muhammad Ridä Beg rèached Paris on 7 February 1715. His entry into the city aroused much public curiosity.2 On 19 February Louis XIV received the ambassador formally at Versailles. The aged monarch showed his appreciation of the compliment paid to him by the Shah in sending Muhammad Ridä Beg by appearing on his throne in the great gallery at Versailles for the first time for forty-seven years. The ambassador, wTho seemed somewhat overwhelmed by the magnificence of the scene, paid his respects to the King and delivered his letter of credence. The casket containing the Shah’s presents was then laid before Louis XIV and opened. The mediocre nature and comparatively low value of these gifts produced a feeling of anti-climax. This fact, together with the strange behaviour of the envoy on a number of occasions, led many highly placed persons, including Montes­ quieu,3 to believe that he was an impostor. On the other hand, the 1 Amongst these were the Abbés Richard and Gaudereau and François Pidou de St Olon, the brother of the Bishop of Babylon. Gaudereau had just been appointed secretary-interpreter for Oriental languages to the king. 2 Herbette, op. cit.t pp. 115-33. 8 C. P. Duclos, in his Mémoires secrets sur les règnes de Louis XIV et de Louis XV (Paris, 1791), vol. 11, pp. 134-5, after describing the brilliant reception at Versailles, stated: “ Beaucoup de personnes prétendirent que cet ambassadeur n’étoit qu’un aventurier, produit pour tirer le roi de sa mélancholie, en lui rappelant sa grandeur passée.” According to Duclos, Gaudereau also considered Muhammad Ridä Beg an impostor. Montesquieu, in his Lettres Persanes, letter no. 92 from Usbeck to Rustan, dated 29 Gemmadi II, 1715 [sic], said: “ II paraît ici un personnage travesti en ambassadeur de Perse qui se joue insolemment des deux plus grands rois du monde. Il apporte au monarque des Français des présents que le nôtre ne saurait donner à un roi d’Imirette ou de Géorgie et par sa lâche avarice il a flétri la majesté de deux empires. Il s’est rendu ridicule devant un peuple qui prétend être le plus poli de l’Europe et il a fait dire en Occident que le roi des rois ne domine que sur les barbares. Il a reçu des honneurs qu’il semblait avoir voulu se faire refuser à lui-même: et, comme si la Cour de France avait eu plus à cœur la grandeur persane que lui, elle l’a fait paraître avec dignité devant un peuple dont il est le mépris. Ne dis point ceci à Ispahan; épargne la tête d’un malheureux. Je ne veux pas que nos ministres le punissent de leur propre imprudence et de l’indigne choix qu’ils ont fait.” It seems not unreasonable to suppose that it was Muhammad Ridä Beg’s mission which gave Montesquieu the idea of writing his Lettres Persanes.

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FRANCO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, 1708-15

Shah’s letter to Louis XIV and another from the Governor of Erivan to the Marquis de Torcy,1 the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with the testimony of the Abbé Richard, should have served to convince the King and his ministers of the genuine nature of Muhammad Ridä Beg’s mission. Nevertheless, the French authorities interrogated Marie Petit regarding the ambas­ sador’s antecedents, and she informed them that she had known Muhammad Ridä Beg when she was at Erivan and that he had, in fact, been Kaläntar of that town. It was believed at the French court that the negotiations with Muhammad Ridä Beg would be of short duration. Immediately after the audience of 19 February, Louis XIV nominated as his negotiators the Marquis de Torcy, the Comte de Pontchartrain (the Secretary of State for the Marine) and Nicolas Desmarets, the Comptroller-General of Finance. The choice of three such highly placed persons is of interest for two reasons. In the first place, it indicates clearly the importance which the King attached to the coming negotiations. Secondly, all three ministers were convinced of the necessity of finding overseas outlets for French trade, preferably at the expense of hostile or rival nations. Pontchartrain, as Colbert had done before him, went to great pains to collect all the information available on the subject of Franco-Persian trade. He and his two colleagues consulted Jean Billon de Cansevilles, and it was no doubt at their request that he wrote his memorandum dated 20 March 1715. In this optimisti­ cally worded document he made the following points:

(i) Factories (magasins) could be set up in the provinces of Astaräbäd and Khurasan for trading not only with those provinces, but also with Great Tartary. French ironmongery, cloth, paper, mirrors, clocks, etc. could be sold. Similar factories could be set up in the other provinces, so that trade could be carried on with Russia, Circassia, Kurdistän, Mesopotamia, Arabia and India. (ii) France could obtain from Persia all kinds of drugs, wool, precious stones, pearls, silks, cottons, carpets, etc. (iii) Goods which were not allowed to be imported into France could be advantageously disposed of in Spain and Italy. 1 Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Marquis de Sablé et de Torcy, was a nephew of the great Jean-Baptiste (who had died in 1683). He was a diplomat of some distinction and had inherited his uncle’s aims and those of Père Joseph de Paris in regard to France’s need for interests overseas.

457

FALL OF THE SAFAVI DYNASTY

(iv) Once the King’s subjects were well established in all the Persian provinces, in the event of war between France and England or Holland, French corsairs could attack the shipping of those nations in Indian waters and bring the booty to Persia for disposal there or in Turkey; any surplus goods could then be sent to Marseilles. (v) In the district of Nakhichivân there were 12 convents of Armenian Dominicans “qui suivent depuis plus de 500 ans le vit [sz’f] de l’Eglise Romaine protégés par les Rois de France près ceux de Perse. Je ne parle pas des Révérends pères Gesuittes établis en diverses provinces de Perse et autres Révérends pères capucins italiens et français, Dominicains, Carmes Deschaussés et Augustiniens qui, par moyen de cet établissement de commerce, seront traités plus favorablement dans ce pays, et le Roy en recevra tout l’honneur et la gloire comme l’unique protecteur de la Sainte Eglise et de toutes les missions orientales et occidentales.”1

De Cansevilles concluded the commercial part of his memoran­ dum with the words: “C’est à Votre Grandeur, Monseigneur, de procurer aux marchands de France un vaste et étendu commerce.” By inserting his paragraph on the advantages that would accrue to the religious missions, he hoped no doubt to make his argument all the stronger. The hopes that the King and his ministers had that the negotia­ tions would soon be completed were disappointed, as it became obvious that Muhammad Ridä Beg was in no hurry to bring matters to a head. The fleshpots of Paris (where he was living sumptuously at the royal expense) and other attractions of a more romantic nature, combined with the thought of the long and dangerous journey back, made him loath to do anything to hasten his departure. Consequently, it was not until 13 June that the first discussion took place. It was then agreed that the French objec­ tions to the 1708 treaty should be put into writing and translated into Persian for the ambassador’s consideration. It was also agreed that a small committee should be formed for drafting a new treaty which would embody all the points and modifications required.12 On 6 July the first meeting of the ambassador with the members 1 This memorandum is in AEP, vol. iv, fols. 303-323; it was addressed to de Torey. Herbette, op. cit. p. 259, rightly remarked that de Cansevilles did not take sufficiently into account the difficulties and the great length of time involved in the communications between France and Persia. 2 For the membership of this committee, see Herbette, op. cit. pp. 265-6.

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of this committee took place. Progress thereafter was rapid, and by the 12th of the month agreement had been reached on all the main points. A serious difficulty then, however, arose because Muhammad Rida Beg insisted on the retention of the old treaty, thus making it necessary to abandon the new draft treaty and to draw up a new and shorter instrument in which specific provision was made for the maintenance of the old treaty in force in so far as it did not conflict with the modifications. It was at this stage that Muhammad Rida Beg, realising the great advantages that France would derive from the new agreement, demanded a quid pro quo. After pointing out that he had orders not to return to Persia unless he were accompanied by the French ambassador, consular officials and merchants, he asked the French government to honour the pledge that Michel had given verbally in 1708 to send warships to assist in the conquest of Muscat and to protect the Persian ports and shipping. Up to this moment he had made no mention of this point, and nothing whatever had been said regarding it in the letters which he had brought with him because of the need for secrecy. Nevertheless, Padery was undoubtedly right when he said that the ° vrai motif” of Muhammad Ridä’s mission was the alliance against the Muscat Arabs.1 On receiving this request, Pontchartrain considered it in­ advisable to make any commitment in writing in respect to it,1 2 and he and his colleagues decided instead to paint in as favourable colours as possible the advantages that Persia would obtain from the new treaty without saying a word on the Muscat project. Padery was therefore ordered to draw up in Persian a document setting forth all the benefits that would result from the treaty with France. It was to be pointed out that the Shäh would be able to obtain from that country engineers and other technicians who were not to be found in his own realm, and he would be in a position to buy some ships from France. The trade of the Persian Gulf, which had been ruined by the fraudulent behaviour of foreigners and by the depredations of the Arabs, would be completely re-established, while the Bahrain islands and the port of Kong (from which the pearl fishing was carried on) would be protected from attack. 1 “Négociation en Perse”, fol. 29b. 2 Such caution was fully justified in view of the state of the country and of its fleet so soon after the end of the war of the Spanish Succession.

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Gaudereau drafted some additional articles which were based upon his recollection of his discussions with the Ftimad al-Daula in 1699, in the hope that, by conferring certain benefits on the Persians, the provisions of the treaty might be made more palatable to the ambassador. At a final conference between the three French ministers and Muhammad Ridä Beg, all outstanding matters were settled and the new treaty was signed at Versailles on 13 August 1715. This treaty contained the following main points: (i) The treaty of 1708 was to remain in force except in so far as it conflicted with the new treaty (article 1). (ii) Frenchmen or others trading with Persia under the French flag were entitled to import freely into Persia or to export therefrom any goods from India or Europe without any restriction as to quantity and without paying any duty (article 2). (iii) The Shäh was to provide the French merchants free of charge with suitable houses at Isfahän, the ports of the Persian Gulf and on the borders of Turkey and Georgia, for their accommodation and for that of the French consul, as well as for their offices and factories. The French flag could be flown over all these buildings (article 4). (iv) The French ambassador was to have precedence over all others at the Persian court, while the French consuls, agents or factors were likewise to have precedence over those of other nations (article 5). (v) All Frenchmen were to be exempt from the capitation tax (article 6). (vi) No limitation was placed on the export of horses, provided that they did not belong to the Shäh (article 9). (vii) Disputes between Frenchmen and those of other nationalities were to be dealt with by the Muhammadan legal authorities, in the presence of the consul (article 10). (viii) In addition to the immunities and other privileges granted to the French, whether by the treaty of 1708 or the present one, they were to enjoy the same privileges that had been or might later be granted to other nations (article 11). There were some supplementary points, namely: (i) Persian merchants going to Marseilles were to enjoy there the same privileges and exemptions as the nationals of other nations, but they were not to be allowed to import into France any goods on the prohibited list. 460

FRANCO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, 1708-15

(ii) There was to be a Persian consul at Marseilles who was to adjudicate in all cases between Persians. Cases between Persians and persons of other nationalities were to be dealt with by the French legal authorities. (iii) If a Persian merchant died in France, his goods and effects were to be handed over to the Persian consul, but if he left any debts, these were to be paid out of his estate.1 So far as French interests were concerned, the new treaty was a vast improvement over its predecessor. Gone were the import and export duties and the irksome limitations on exports from and imports into Persia. Moreover, in the diplomatic sphere, the French ambassador was to have precedence over all others. Persia certainly gained some advantages too, but these were slight in comparison with the privileges granted to the French, while the real object of Muhammad Rida Beg’s mission, namely the alliance against Muscat, was not mentioned at all. On the other hand, according to Padery (who was always strongly in favour of the Muscat project), it was verbally arranged that a French naval captain named Geraldin was to go to Isfahan as ambassador in order not only to secure the ratification by the Shäh of the new treaty, but also to make a careful study of the country and of the arrangements that would have to be made for carrying out the Muscat scheme, so that, if the enterprise were to be undertaken, it would be done in a proper manner. It was also agreed that Padery was to leave for Persia in advance, in company with Muhammad Ridä Beg, in order that he might make the necessary arrangements for the arrival of Geraldin’s mission.12 The Chevalier Ange de Gardane, the Seigneur de SainteCroix,3 who was under orders to go to Persia as consul, was likewise to accompany the Persian ambassador on his return journey. Muhammad Ridä Beg was given his farewell audience on the same day that the treaty was signed. It was the last public function at which Louis XIV, who was now failing fast, was present. The 1 The text of this treaty is in AEP, vol. iv, fols. 235 a-243 a; it is reproduced by Herbette, pp. 370-7. 2 “Négociation en Perse”, fol. 32b. There seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of Padery’s account. 8 For particulars of the Gardane family and their connection with the East, see pp. 533-4 below.

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ambassador left Paris for Le Havre on 30 August, and sailed for St Petersburg on 13 September. Meanwhile, Louis’s death on the ist of the latter month caused some changes in the final arrange­ ments. Geraldin’s appointment as ambassador to Persia was cancelled, while Ange de Gardane’s departure for that country was postponed for several months. In consequence, Muhammad Ridä Beg was accompanied only by Padery.

CHAPTER XXXVII

FRANCO-PERSIAN RELATIONS FROM 1716 TO 1730 Muhammad Rida Beg’s departure from France was by no means devoid of sensation. When the cases containing his belongings were being taken on board the ship at Le Havre, it was noticed that one of them, which was very large, had a number of holes pierced in it. This case was taken immediately to the ambassador’s cabin; as it was said to contain his devotional books, it was kept under constant guard lest some infidel hand should pollute its sacred contents. Once the ship was well out at sea, this case was opened; it was found to contain a devotional object of quite a different kind, in the person of the Marquise d’Epinay, a young lady of fashion who had fallen madly in love with the ambassador. She had, it was discovered, escaped from her mother’s house in Paris and had joined him at Rouen. When the couple reached Le Havre, she was placed in the case and was thus smuggled on board.1 Unfortunately for the lovers, a gale soon sprang up which made them both so sea-sick that Muhammad Ridä insisted on leaving the ship at Copenhagen. He then quarrelled so violently with Padery that they parted company. When the ambassador and his inamorata resumed their journey, Padery stayed behind on the pretext of illness. When Muhammad Ridä at length set foot once more on his native soil, he found that his former chief and patron Muhammad Khän had been dismissed from his post as Governor of Erivan and that a nephew of Fath ‘All Khän DäghistänT, the Ftimäd al-Daula, had replaced him. Feeling that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give a satisfactory explanation of his dilatory ways and deeply conscious at last that he had greatly exceeded his powers in concluding the treaty with France, he did not dare to go to Isfahän, but went instead to his native town of Erivan, where he arrived at the end of May 1717. An additional reason for anxiety was the fact that he had had to sell a number of Louis XIV’s 1 This romantic episode is described in detail by Herbette, op. cit. pp. 226-30.

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presents for the Shäh in order to obtain funds for his travelling expenses. These anxieties preyed on his mind to such an extent that he poisoned himself three weeks after his arrival in Erivan, thus forestalling the fate that would assuredly have been his had he gone on to the capital.1 As for the Marquise d’Epinay, she embraced Islam after Muhammad Ridä’s suicide, and is said to have married his brother. She discharged one of the obligations of the late ambassador by taking to the Persian court all that remained of the presents that had been entrusted to him in Paris. There are a number of points of resemblance between the missions of Fabre and Muhammad Ridä Beg. In the first place, both the envoys lacked the necessary qualifications for carrying out successfully the difficult tasks to which they had been assigned. In fact, if their distinguished contemporary, François de Callières, could have examined their personal records, he would have found that in no single respect did they fulfil the requirements which he laid down as essential for the perfect diplomat.2 Secondly, there was an element of romance of an unusual nature connected with each embassy. Thirdly, both ambassadors met with a sudden end, the one from fever and the other from his own hand. Whilst Muhammad Ridä Beg was wending his way slowly across Russia, Ange de Gardane, accompanied by his younger brother François and a small suite, left France for Persia. He was travelling as ambassador to the latter country, and he was, on reaching Isfahän, to take up the position of consul there. After some rough treatment by the Turks in Asia Minor, the mission reached the Persian frontier near Erivan in July 1717.3 Gardane and his suite stayed for over three months at Erivan, and he was later delayed for six weeks at Tabriz owing to illness. It was not until April 1718 that the mission reached the Persian court, which was then at Käshän en route for Qazvïn. At the latter town Ange 1 Ange de Gardane, who reached Erivan in the following July, stated that Muhammad Ridä had died there of chagrin in the previous month, but he later made the much more probable statement that he had poisoned himself. See his despatches from Erivan and Isfahän, dated, respectively, 5 October 1717 (AEP, vol. v, fol. 146 a) and 15 September 1718 (AEP, vol. v, fol. 176 a). 2 De Callières, De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains, de V Utilité des Négociations, du Choix des Ambassadeurs et des Envoyez, et des Qualitez necessaires pour réussir dans ces Emplois (Brussels, 1716), pp. 24, 28, 38, 49, 50 and 67. 3 Letter from Père d’Issoudun to Michel from Tabriz, dated 12 July 1717 (AEP, vol. v, fol. 138b).

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de Gardane was well received by Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäm, who was always well disposed towards the French.1 Fath ‘Ali Khän expressed great pleasure at the terms of a letter which Gardane handed him from the Council of State, and promised to give special protection to French commercial interests. However, when Gardane told him of the terms of the new treaty, he was extremely surprised, saying that Muhammad Ridä Beg had neither communicated its text nor even mentioned its existence to the Shäh and his ministers. He then asked for a copy of the treaty, which Gardane gave him. On the following day Fath ‘Ali Khän informed Gardane that Muhammad Ridä Beg had exceeded his powers when he concluded this treaty, as he had been authorised only to ask the French government to carry out the provisions of the one concluded in 1708, adding that he would have been punished had he not taken his own life. In a further interview, Fath ‘Ali Khän declined to say anything respecting the new treaty until the French ships arrived in the Persian Gulf. Notwith­ standing this development, the Shäh received Gardane very graciously on 26 May.2 Soon afterwards, however, Gardane’s relations with the court were complicated by the arrival of Etienne Padery. After his quarrel with Muhammad Ridä Beg at Copenhagen, Padery had returned to France, but in 1719 he left that country for Persia in order to take up his post as consul at Shïrâz and also to discuss the Muscat project with the Persian government.3 Whilst Padery was whole-heartedly in favour of this proposed Franco-Persian alliance against Muscat, Gardane was opposed to it, as he feared that if the Arabs heard of it, they might take action against French 1 Krusinski, The History of the Revolutions of Persia^ p. 171, said of Fath ‘All Khan: He loved all Europeans in general, but particularly the French, to whom he endeavoured to procure the Preference in Trade to all the other European Factories: and this he did, not only out of an Inclination to them, but much more from a Reason of State, having a Notion that the too great Privileges which Schah-Abas had granted to those Companies were prejudicial to the Kingdom; and that the Government could only gain by the Diminution and Decay of their Trade. 2 Gardane’s despatch of 15 September 1718, AEP, vol. v, fols. I75a-6a. 3 See the “Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Chevalier Padery notre Secrétaire et Interprète pour les Langues Orientales Nommé Consul à Chiraz et qui nous avons chargé de traitter avec le Roy de Perse pour la prise de Mascatte conformément aux propositions qui furent faites au feu Roy par son Ambassadeur Mehemet Riza Beg”, AEP, vol. v, fol. 352b. 30

465

LSD

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shipping and interests.1 Despite Gardane’s opposition, Padery discussed the matter with Fath ‘Alï Khän soon after his arrival at Qazvïn in August 1720. Gardane was still further annoyed at Padery’s claim to be regarded as an ambassador and to be given the title of monseigneur. Not long afterwards, when Padery heard that Lutf ‘Alï Khän was negotiating with the Portuguese for the use of their fleet against the Muscat Arabs, he took action which, he claimed, led to these negotiations being broken off.12 Gardane’s position was rendered easier when Padery left the court to take up his consular post at Shiräz. On the other hand, his hopes of obtaining an early ratification of the treaty were dashed by the sudden overthrow and disgrace of Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäni in December 1720. Neither Gardane nor Padery seemed to realise that there could be no prospect of the Persian government ratifying this treaty until the French carried out their undertaking to send their ships to the Persian Gulf. As had happened before, they were very dilatory in carrying out their promises, and it was not until the summer of 1721 that the vessels of the Compagnie des Indes anchored off Bandar ‘Abbäs.3 Gardane, in reporting their arrival to Paris, said that it was very opportune, as it would dispel the Persians’ doubts and offset the efforts that were being made by the English and Dutch to harm the French. However, despite the arrival of these ships, Gardane could obtain no definite promise from the Persian government that it would soon ratify the treaty. Unlike Padery, he appears to have been rather easy-going over this matter,4 and he was, of course, handicapped by having no good quid pro quo, such as the alliance against Muscat, to offer. Padery, on the other hand, was determined to arrange for this alliance and also to get the treaty 1 Gardane had doubtless heard of the action taken by the Muscat Arabs against the Portuguese in 1696-8. a “Compte au Roi”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 406a. 3 An interesting longitudinal section, with explanatory diagram, of the Ecueil, a French ship of this period of some 500 tons burden, is given by J. Sottas between pp. 466 and 467 of his Histoire de la Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales, 4 Padery, in a letter to Cardinal Dubois dated 10 March 1722, said that Gardane was " fort tranquil, sans avoir jamais pu rien obtenir de cette cour depuis trois ou quatre ans qu’il y réside”. One must, however, treat Padery’s statements regarding Gardane with some reserve.

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ratified. With these ends in view, he returned to Isfahan in October 1721. Gardane, needless to say, was greatly angered, and wrote to Padery (they were not, apparently, on speaking terms by now) that he must abstain from negotiating with the Persian government.1 Padery refused, and the relations between him and Gardane became so strained that the interests of France greatly suffered; in the words of Bishop Barnabas Fedeli:2 “There [has] come to the capital the French consul at Shïrâz...nor are there any relations between the two consuls, and the one upsets the business of the other.” Early in 1722 Gardane reported to Paris that when he en­ deavoured to get the rtimäd al-Daula to ratify the 1715 treaty, he found that the minister’s attitude had changed very much since Padery had made his proposals.3 It was eventually Padery who obtained the long-delayed ratification in Rajab 1134 (April/May 1722),4 but it was a Pyrrhic victory, as Isfahän was by then besieged by the Afghans and a situation was shortly to develop that would prevent France from reaping any advantage whatever from the treaty. Both Gardane and Padery were in Isfahän when the siege began in March 1722, and their reports on the course of events during that siege are of great interest and value. Gardane, like the chief representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies in the city, had the foresight to lay in a good stock of provisions before the investment of it began.5 Like the Dutch, he kept a diary or journal during the greater part of the siege.6 In June the government, being short of money to pay the garrison, asked Gardane for a loan, but he could do little to help, “car j’ai grande peine à vivre et cache mon embarras ”.7 As Padery was in Isfahän until he made his escape and was presumably living with the small French community, it must have been very awkward 1 Gardane’s despatch of 28 October 1721, in AEP, vol. vi, fols. 107 b and 108 a. 2 Quoted in A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. I, p. 610. 8 Gardane’s despatch of 20 January 1722, in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 141 a. 4 The original raqam (decree) bearing the seal of Muhammad Qulï Khän, the rtimäd al-Daula, at the foot, was issued in Rajab, 1134; it is in AEP, vol. xvn, 1700 à 1800, Pièces Diverses en Langues Orientales, no. 21. See also Padery’s despatch of 20 May 1722 in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 173 b. 6 Clairac, vol. I, pp. 336^7 (on the authority of Joseph Apisalaimian). 6 This journal is in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. 7 Gardane’s journal, 16 June 1722, in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 193 b.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÏ DYNASTY

for both him and Gardane, since relations between them con­ tinued to be strained.1 Gardane must have heaved a sigh of relief when Padery escaped from the city on the night of 8 August. As already related in ch. xiv,12 as soon as Gardane realised that the Shah was about to surrender, he ordered his capable secretary­ interpreter Joseph Apisalaimian to go, regardless of risk, to the Afghan headquarters at Farahäbäd to ask Mahmüd to protect the French nationals and property in Isfahän, as well as the missionaries. Joseph successfully ran the gauntlet and delivered Gardane’s request. Mahmüd, it is said, was flattered at being recognised in advance as Shäh of Persia by the representative of a European nation, and gave orders for the French to be allowed to continue in their house, to go on flying the French flag and not to be molested in any way.3 As Joseph had been ordered by the Afghans not to leave their master of ceremonies, he was present at the fateful meeting between the unfortunate Shäh Sultän Husain and his conqueror on 23 October 1722. He later rejoined Gardane who, with the other members of the French community, went to pay his respects to Mahmüd after his triumphal entry into Isfahän. Mahmüd treated the French in Isfahän more leniently than the English and Dutch, possibly because he knew that their financial resources were very much less. It is true that he made the Capuchins give up their convent in Isfahän, but he did not take this action on account of religious bias, but because it was situated too near the citadel.4 He forced Gardane to make a cash payment, but it amounted to only 30 tomans, a negligible sum in comparison with what the English and Dutch had to pay.56 Owing to the troubled state of the country, trade was, as we 1 Padery complained on 15 June 1722 that he was still being “ persecuted” by Gardane; see his despatch of that date in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 182a. 2 See pp. 171-2. 8 “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Revolution de Perse jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1724”, in AEP, vol. vi, fol. 358 a. (This memorandum was apparently written in the French Embassy at Constantinople on the basis of information supplied by Joseph Apisalaimian.) Notwithstanding Mahmüd’s orders, some Afghans broke into Gardane’s house and forced him to give up his watch. 4 Joseph Apisalaimian, “Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 289 a. 6 “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Revolution de Perse jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1724”, AEP, vol. vi, fol. 365 a.

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have seen, almost non-existent. Dupleix, in a memorandum on the East Indies which he wrote in 1727, said: “La Compagnie [des Indes] avait autrefois une loge au Bender-Abassy, dont elle n’a jamais tiré une grande utilité; elle tombe actuellement en ruine.”1 Such was the result of all the strenuous and prolonged efforts of Colbert and his successors. It is true that, in later years, a partial recovery was made, but French trade in Persia and the Persian Gulf was never, except on rare occasions, able to compete success­ fully with that of the English. When we look back on the French commercial connection with Persia up to 1730, we see that, although some striking successes were achieved, often in the face of most serious difficulties, they were seldom, if ever, properly followed up. Moreover, the unfortunate propensity of the French commercial and consular representatives to quarrel with one another proved most harmful to the interests of their country. Unlike the employees of the English East India Company, they never developed a “team spirit”; instead, they preferred as a rule to act merely as individuals and only too often allowed personal likes and dislikes to influence their conduct. Such behaviour naturally did not lead to success, especially in the face of the very strong opposition which the Compagnie des Indes met with from its older and much richer rivals in Persia.2 One cannot, of course, blame the Compagnie des Indes for the collapse of the Persian trade when the Safavi monarchy came to its inglorious end, but its defects and the shortcomings of certain of its personnel greatly weakened its powers of recovery when at length trading conditions improved. Although French endeavours in the commercial field were thus, on the whole, disappointing in their results, in other directions they met with more success. As regards religion, there can be no doubt that the continued presence of the French consular represen­ tatives in Isfahän until 1730 contributed greatly to the maintenance and security of the various missions in Persia, particularly those which were predominantly French in character. That little 1 Quoted by Alfred Martineau in his article “ Le Premier Consul de France à Bassora (1730-1745)”, Revue de VHistoire des Colonies Françaises (1917), p. 8. 2 One might add that France’s active sponsoring, through de Bonnac, of the Russo-Turkish treaty for the partition of Persia would inevitably have had a harmful effect upon her trade with that country, had not circumstances arisen which rendered that treaty inoperative.

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FALL OF THE SAFAVÎ DYNASTY

or nothing was accomplished in so far as the conversion of Muhammadans was concerned was not the fault of the French missionaries (or, indeed, of those of other nationalities) who laboured so hard and so long in Persia.1 It was in the cultural sphere that France met with most success. Her nationals were undoubtedly far ahead of those of all other European countries at that time as regards the collection and dissemination of knowledge of Persia, her people and her literature ; in the teaching of the Persian language in Europe she was also the real pioneer. Realising that a knowledge of the languages was essential for those officials who would be sent to the East for the maintenance of French interests there, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the Ecole de Paris, an annex of the Collège Louis le Grand in Paris, for the teaching of Arabic, Turkish and Persian2 under the supervision of the three Secretary-Interpreters for Oriental languages. The pupils in this school, who were known at first as the ‘‘Elèves de la Chambre du Roi”, were later called the “Jeunes de Langue”.3 François Pétis de La Croix and the Abbé Gaudereau were amongst the early teachers of Persian at this establishment. In conclusion, something must be said respecting the fate of Etienne Padery and the Gardane brothers. Padery, who had made his sensational escape from Isfahan in August 1722, reached Shïrâz on 21 September after enduring much hardship and running a great deal of risk. Having appointed the 1 See p. 77 n. 1 for the reason for this failure. 2 The teaching of Arabic and Turkish in France had begun much earlier, particularly of the former. Moreover, from the latter part of the seventeenth century, Arabic and Turkish were taught at the Capuchin mission schools at Constantinople and Smyrna, the expenses of the pupils at the former place being paid by the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce. From 1700 onwards, Arabic and Turkish were taught at the Jesuits’ College in Paris, the pupils being young men destined to work as diplomats or missionaries in the East. So far as can be ascertained, Persian was not taught at these establishments. See Gustave Dugat, Histoire des Orientalistes de VEurope du Xlle au XIXe Siècles, précédée d'une Esquisse historique des Etudes orientales (Paris, 1868), vol. I, pp. xxiii and xxiv. See also de Guignes,“ Essai historique des Caractères Orientaux de l’imprimerie Royale sur les Ouvrages qui ont été imprimés à Paris, en Arabe, en Syriaque, en Arménien, etc.”, Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi (Paris, 1787), vol. 1, p. Ixiii. 3 Dugat, op. cit. p. xxiv, described the term “jeunes de langue” as an “ expression formée d’un idiotisme turc, traduit mot à mot en français, où elle ne présente en réalité aucun sens

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Abbé Rebuffa,1 a French ecclesiastic, consul at Shiraz, he went on to Bandar ‘Abbas, where he remained for a year before going on to India. He returned to France in 1725. Nothing further seems to be known of him; the probability is that he went back to the Levant. Owing to the almost complete cessation of trade, Ange de Gardane and his brother François had little or nothing to do in regard to commercial matters during the Afghan occupation. They nevertheless remained in Isfahän mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of protecting so far as they could the Catholic missions there and elsewhere in the country. In 1726 Ange de Gardane had a stroke, which left him speechless and incapable of movement for a long while. François took over his functions as consul and was eventually recognised as such by the Afghan authorities. François wished to take his stricken brother back to France, but Ashraf, while willing to allow Ange to go, refused to let François accompany him. It was not until after the final defeat of the Afghans and the enthronement of Tahmâsp that François had hopes of escape. Writing to Paris on 8 March 1730, he said:

...il n’est pas nécessaire que je.. .représente avec quel excès de plaisir nous avons vu cette heureuse deliverance, nous qui destitués de tout secours et détenus dans une espèce d’esclavage avons plus de raison que tout autre à soupirer après notre liberté ; j’ay commencé à travailler pour obtenir notre congé, et je profite de l’absence de Thamas Kouli Kan, ce fameux Général qui a opéré toutes ces merveilles, pour traiter directement avec le Roy, et j’ay déjà lieu de croire que j’en aurai toute la satisfaction que je puis souhaiter.1 2 François de Gardane concluded his despatch by asking for funds to defray the cost of the long journey of himself and his still incapacitated brother to France; like the missionaries in Persia, the Gardanes had had practically no remittances from home for a number of years and they were consequently in great financial straits by this time. François de Gardane subsequently had a satisfactory audience with Tahmâsp, who gave him and Ange (who seems by this time to have made a partial recovery) leave to go. The Shäh also renewed 1 The Abbé Rebuffa was killed during the siege of Shîrâz in 1724; see p. 204. 2 Despatch to the Comte de Maurepas, of 8 March 1730, in AEP, vol. vn, fol. 100 a.

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all the decrees relating to the rights and privileges of the Catholic missions, confirmed the gift by the late Shäh Sultan Husain of the house in Isfahän in which the two Gardanes had dwelt for so long, and granted exemption from dues for all French ships calling at Bandar ‘Abbäs. The brothers were now able to take their departure.1 Travelling via Basra, Baghdäd and Aleppo, they finally reached Marseilles in February 1732, after an absence of sixteen years. The unfortunate Ange’s troubles were not, however, over, for he was arrested for debt on landing and thrown into prison. François thereupon appealed for him to be released, pointing out that all his debts had been contracted while he was in the king’s service.12 When it is considered that Ange de Gardane had been stationed in Persia during one of the most trying and dangerous periods of her history, that he had gone through the siege of Isfahän and that he had remained there throughout the Afghan occupation (for part of the time stricken with paralysis), the French government’s treatment of him seems harsh in the extreme. Later, however, the govern­ ment relented, compensated Ange and François and granted them pensions.3 1 They left behind, in the Consul’s house in Isfahän, a Capuchin friar and a Georgian interpreter. See F. de Gardane’s letter from Aleppo of 13 February 1731 in AEP, vol. vn, fol. 100a. 2 François de Gardane’s appeal, in AEP, vol. vn, fol. 112 b. 3 Ange de Gardane was not destined to receive his pension for long, as he died at Marseilles in 1735. As for François, the Compagnie des Indes considered for a time sending him back to Isfahan to take charge of its factory there, but the fall from power of the pro-French Grand Vizier Topal ‘Osmän Päshä and the outbreak of war between Turkey and Persia caused it to abandon the idea. See Masson, Histoire du Commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe Siècle, P‘ 532.

472

APPENDIX III

THE CITY OF ISFAHAN IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY The city of Isfahän is situated in the valley of the Zäyanda-rüd, the “ Life-giving River”, a little to the east of the point where that river, after cutting its way through the Zagros mountains from its source on the eastern flanks of the Kührang, debouches on to the central plateau of Persia. The river divides the city into two unequal portions, by far the larger one being to the north of it. Its altitude of some 5200 ft. above sea-level gives Isfahän a relatively temperate climate. The alluvial soil of the surrounding district is very fertile and is well provided with water both by wells and by irrigation canals from the Zäyanda-rüd.1 In 1598, the year in which Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great made Isfahän his capital in place of Qazvïn, it was already a city of some 80,000 inhabitants. It had been embellished by the Seljüqs and other rulers with some fine buildings such as the Masjid-i-Jami‘, but it was Shäh ‘Abbäs who really conferred greatness as well as a beauty of a rare kind upon it, thereby making it one of the leading cities of the world of those days. It was he who provided some justifica­ tion for the proud boast of the Isfahânïs that their city is “half the world” (Isfahän nisf-ifahän). There can be no doubt that Shäh ‘Abbäs showed great wisdom in making Isfahän his capital. Situated far from any frontier, it was, it seemed, safe from enemy attack. It has an excellent climate and it stands in the midst of a very fertile agricultural district. Shäh ‘Abbäs replanned and largely rebuilt the city. He endowed the great Maidän-i-Shäh or “Royal Square” with its noble buildings, namely, the impressive Masjid-i-Shäh at the southern end, the exquisite Lutfullah mosque on the east side, opposite it 1 The water supply has recently been considerably augmented as the result of the completion of the Kührang scheme whereby water from the Kärün river, which rises on the western side of that mountain, has been diverted to increase the supply from the Zäyanda-rüd.

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the ‘All Qäpü, which served as the entrance to the vast palace area that lay beyond it to the west,1 and the Qaisariya or Imperial Bazaar, the entrance to which at the northern end of the Maidan faces the Masjid-i-Shäh at the southern extremity. By creating the famous thoroughfare known as the Chahär Bägh, Shäh ‘Abbäs provided his new capital with a worthy approach.2 Instead of carriage-ways as at present, there were promenades on either side of the Chahär Bägh, while down the centre ran a small canal with basins at intervals; in these basins fountains played. Parallel with the promenades were rows of trees which afforded welcome shade in the heat and glare of the summer. Fryer, who was in Isfahän in 1677, said: “At nightfall, all the Pride of Spahaun was met in the Chaurbaug, and the Grandees were airing them­ selves, prancing about with their numerous Trains, striving to outvie each other in Pomp and Generosity.”3 Allahverdi Khän, the famous military leader, built the magnificent bridge over the river at the southern end of the Chahär Bägh, thus enabling that thoroughfare to be continued in the same alignment to the huge Hazärjarib garden4 on the south side of the Zäyanda-rüd. Shäh ‘Abbäs was also responsible for the construction of other important buildings such as the Chihil Sutün. In order to ensure the commercial prosperity of Isfahän, Shäh ‘Abbäs not only added greatly to the then existing bazaars, but also had 6000 Armenian families forcibly removed from Julfa in north­ western Persia and re-settled in a new suburb to the south and south-west of the capital. To this suburb the name of New Julfa was given (by degrees the epithet “new” was dropped, and the suburb became known simply as “Julfa”). To these industrious and commercially minded people the Shäh gave many privileges, including liberty of worship, the right to construct their own churches and to elect their own mayor. Shäh ‘Abbäs I was by no means the only Safavî sovereign to beautify Isfahän. Shäh ‘Abbäs II contributed to its embellishment by building the Khwäjü bridge, the Sa‘ädatäbäd palace and park, 1 Only the ‘Ali Qäpü itself and the small building known as the Tälär Ashraf are still standing. 2 Pierre Loti, in his Vers Ispahan (Paris, n.d.), p. 216, aptly termed the Chahär Bägh the “Champs Elysées d* Ispahan”. 8 A New Account of East India and Persia (London, 1698), p. 290. 4 For some details of this garden, see p. 481 below.

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i. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Sketch map of Isfahan as it was Farahäbäd Palace Pul-i-Mamän. Allahverdi Bridge. Madrasa-yi-Mädar-i-Shäh. Chilil Sutün. ‘All Qäpü. Masjid-i-Shäh. Luffullah Mosque. Maidän-i-Shäh. Factory of the English East India Company«

in the early eighteenth century. il. Factory of the Dutch East India Company. 12. Masjid-i-Jämi‘. 13. Tabarak Citadel. 14. Pul-i-Jübï. 15. Sa‘ädatäbäd Palace. 16. Haft Dast. 17. Khwäjü Bridge. 18. Shahristän Bridge. 19. Ruins of Shâh-Diz. 20. Pul-i-Vargän.

and, possibly, the Tälär Ashraf.1 The miserly Shah Sulaiman, on the other hand, undertook no major construction work, but he made some additions to existing monuments, such as the smaller 1 Professor Pope, in his article on architecture in the Safavi period in the Survey of Persian Art, vol. 11, p. 1194, attributes the Tälär Ashraf to his reign, but M. Godard, in his article on Içfahân in the Âthâr-é-Irân, vol. n, fasc. 1, pp. 161-2, states that it may have been built at the end of the reign of Shäh Sulaimän or during that of Shäh Sultän IJusain. It is now used as a government office.

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APPENDIX III

of the two domes of the fifteenth-century Darb-i-Imäm and the Majlis! chapel in the Masjid-i-Jämi‘; he also had a number of buildings repaired. Numerous European visitors of varying degrees of competence have given us accounts of the city as it was in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By far the fullest and most authoritative of these descriptions is the one by Sir John Chardin, who spent ten years in all in Isfahän between 1665 and 1677, when it was still in its heyday.1 Also of much interest are the excellent drawings of the city by the talented Dutch artist Cornelius de Bruyn, who was there in 1704/5 and again in 1706/7. His extensive panorama which forms plate 74 in the first volume of his Travels is of much help in enabling us to visualise Isfahän as it was then. In general, these European residents in, or visitors to, Isfahän gave unstinted praise to its great monuments and general lay-out, but some of them commented adversely on the lesser thoroughfares and numerous lanes, most of which were narrow, tortuous, ill-paved (if, indeed, they were paved at all), and dirty. Moreover, there were many holes and pitfalls in them which made it dangerous to use them by night.3 Although the state of many of the streets and lanes of Isfahän often left much to be desired, the houses, on the other hand, were kept scrupulously clean and free from vermin.2 We have no accurate figures for the population of Isfahän as it was at the end of the seventeenth century or the first quarter of the eighteenth. Chardin states that, in his day, some put the total as high as 1,100,000, while others maintained that it was no more than 600,000. Whilst not committing himself to any figure, Chardin considered Isfahän to be as populous as London, which was, he said, “la ville la plus peuplée de l’Europe”.4 He was in a good position to judge, as he knew both cities extremely well. As we know from other sources that London contained some 670,000 1 Chardin, Voyages, vol. vn, pp. 273-492, and vol. vm, pp. 1-143. 2 Ibid. vol. vn, pp. 285-6. See also Erasmus Petter’s “ Korte Beschryving van de Stad Spahan”, in Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiên, vol. v, part 1, p. 256. (Petter accompanied J. van Leenen of the Dutch East India Company to Isfahan in 1690 and remained there until the following year.) 3 Gaudereau, Relation des Différentes Espèces de Peste que reconnaissent les Orientaux, pp. 42-3 (this statement was of a general nature and did not apply exclusively to Isfahan). 4 Chardin, Voyages, vol. vn, p. 274.

476

PLATE Vil

The walls of the Tabarak citadel as they were in 1927. (The citadel has since been demolished.)

APPENDIX III

souls at the end of the seventeenth century, we shall probably not be far wrong if we estimate the population of Isfahän at that time as 650,000, including the 30,000 inhabitants of Julfa. In the course of a century, Isfahän had increased its population eightfold. With nearly three times as many citizens as it has at the present time, Isfahän had then a built-up area vastly greater than it has now. Fryer said that, together with Julfa, it covered “more ground by far than London and Southwark with their suburbs, but then the most part is filled with gardens; however, I believe them not to be so populous”.1 The walls of the city, which were of mud brick, had a circum­ ference of 20,000 paces or just over 11 miles, but, as there were over 8000 houses and many gardens situated outside the walls, the actual perimeter of the city was appreciably greater. Kaempfer estimated it at no less than i6| farsakhs or some 57 miles, but this seems an exaggerated figure unless he included some of the adjacent villages. Through long neglect, the walls were in a bad state of repair; in fact, in some parts all trace of them had vanished. The process had, no doubt, been accelerated by the builders of the many new houses, who found it most convenient to obtain their material from the walls in their vicinity.1 2 The citadel, which was known as Tabarak, was situated just to the north of the Khwäjü quarter, approximately i| miles to the east of the mid-point of the Chahär Bägh. This citadel contained a number of buildings which were grouped round a parade ground. The royal treasures were kept in the donjon. Like the walls of the city, the citadel was in a ruinous condition.3 In early times, Isfahän had twelve gates, but when Chardin was living there their number had been reduced to eight; there were also six false gates or openings.4 Starting from the Tauqchï gate on the north and going clockwise round the walls, the other gates were as follows: the Jubära(or ‘Abbäs) on the east, the Hasanäbäd 1 A New Account of East-India and Persia, p. 293. 2 In May 1954 I saw large quantities of mud bricks being made from the remnants of the city walls in the former quarter of Nür-Bärän, which lies to the south-east of the inhabited part of the city. 8 See de Bruyn’s Travels, vol. 1, p. 194. The citadel has now completely disappeared, it having undergone the same process of attrition as the walls at Nür-Bärän. 4 Voyages, vol. vn, pp. 289-90.

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on the south-east, the Sayyid Ahmad and the Karaun on the south, the Daula and the Lumbän on the west, and the Där-Dasht on the north-west. Some twenty or thirty years later, the number of gates had been raised to ten, possibly by enlarging two of the false gates mentioned by Chardin.1 At the present time, as at Tehran, all trace of these gates has been lost. The Zäyanda-rüd, when it was in flood, provided the city with its strongest line of defence. In spring, when swollen with the rains and the melting snows of the Zagros, it could not be crossed except by the bridges, which at this season of the year were therefore of the highest military importance. At other times, the river presented no real obstacle.12 In late Safavï times, Isfahän had four main bridges and two subsidiary ones; of these all except one of the subsidiary bridges are still in existence. As one follows the river downstream, from west to east, one comes first to the Pul-i-Marnän.3 It is a simple, unpretentious structure with eighteen arches and low parapets; it links the ‘Abbäsäbäd quarter of Isfahän with the western part of Julfa. A mile and a quarter downstream is the Pul-i-Allahverdi Khän, which is far more impressive than the Pul-i-Marnän. Built in the reign of Shäh ‘Abbäs I, it has high parapets on either side, and is thus easier to defend than the Pul-i-Marnän. It forms the main link between Isfahän and Julfa, for which reason it is sometimes called the Julfa bridge (it is also known as the “Bridge of thirtythree Arches”). As already pointed out, this bridge forms the connecting link between the northern and southern parts of the Chahâr Bàgh. It is 968 ft. long and 45 ft. wide.4 Twelve hundred yards downstream from the Allahverdi bridge is the small Pul-i-Jübï (“stream-bridge”).56 Built originally for the purpose of carrying an aqueduct across the river, it is now used for light vehicles and pedestrians. 1 Valentijn, op, cit. vol. v, part 1, pp. 207-8 ; de Bruyn, Travels, vol. 1, p. 292. 2 Once, in November, when the river was at its lowest, I walked across its bed dry-shod. 3 The correct name is Pul-i-Marbanän ; it derives its name from the near-by village (which is now a suburb of Julfa) of Marbanân. 4 Professor Pope, “Islamic Architecture: M. Bridges’*, A Survey of Persian Art, vol. II, p. 1236. 6 It is sometimes erroneously called the Pul-i-Chübl or “Wooden Bridge”.

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Six hundred yards further downstream is the Khwäjü bridge which Shäh ‘Abbäs II constructed on the ruins of one built by Uzün Hasan, the Äq Qoyunlû ruler, some two centuries earlier. Professor Pope considers that Shäh ‘Abbäs II, in the construction of this bridge, “achieved the culminating monument of Persian bridge architecture and one of the most interesting bridges extant.”1 This bridge serves also as a barrage; the channels through which the water flows can be opened or closed at will by means of sluices. The Shäh had the bridge constructed in this way so as to be able to raise the level of the water in the reach above sufficiently to form an artificial lake in front of the Sa‘ädatäbäd palace and the other buildings which he also erected on both sides of the river as far upstream as the Pul-i~Jübï. A light wooden bridge (which no longer exists) connected the Haft Dast and other apartments of the monarch on the south bank with the women’s quarters on the north side of the river. On the south side of the river, below the Haft Dast and close to the Khwäjü bridge, was the Äyina-Khäna or “House of Mirrors”, which was similar to, but smaller than, the Chihil Sutün. All of these buildings have now vanished, the majority having been destroyed by the Zill-i-Sultän a century ago.2 Their sites are now occupied for the most part by textile mills. The barrage portion of the Khwäjü bridge is now used to raise the level of the river sufficiently for it to fill the irrigation canals which supply water to the land on both sides of the Zäyanda-rüd below the bridge. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the bridge was usually called the Pul-i-Hasanäbäd, after the quarter of that name which lay just to the south. When the Afghans destroyed this quarter during the siege of Isfahän, the name of the bridge was changed to Khwäjü, after the quarter lying immediately north of it.3 The oldest of the Isfahän bridges, the Pul-i-Shahristän, spans 1 Professor Pope, loc, cit. p. 1237. 2 When Curzon visited Isfahän over sixty years ago, the Äyina-Khäna was still standing, but it was “in the last throes of dissolution”. See his Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892), vol. 11, pp. 48-9. 8 This bridge has had various other names in the past, namely, the Pul-iHasan Beg (after Üzün Hasan), the Shïrâz bridge (because the road to Shîrâz formerly crossed the river by it), the Baba Rukn al-Dïn bridge (because the shrine of that name lies to the south of it), and the Pul-i-Gabri (because the Zoroastrian quarter was formerly on the south side of the river close to it).

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the river 2| miles downstream from the Khwäjü. It rests upon massive masonry piers of great age that suggest Sâsânian origin or influence, but the superstructure is medieval. At the northern end is a fortified bridge-head which, though now very ruined, in late Safavi times constituted a formidable obstacle. The village of Shahristän lies just to the north of this bridge. In Shäh Sultän Husain’s reign there were three other bridges over the Zäyanda-rüd in the Isfahän district. Two of these bridges, the Chüm and the Dashti, were, respectively, 4 miles and 9 miles south-east of the Shahristän bridge. The Chum bridge is still standing and has recently been repaired, but only the foundations remain of the Dashti bridge; they are a short distance to the north of the village of that name. Upstream from Isfahän and 11 miles to the south-west is the Pul-i-Vargän, which dates probably from the seventeenth century; it is in good repair. Although Shäh Sultän Husain was an indefatigable builder, comparatively few of the monuments constructed during his reign remain today. He lavished enormous sums of money on the erection of new palaces, mosques and religious schools and on the repair of older buildings. The most important and also the most beautiful addition to the monuments of Isfahän during his reign is the Madrasa-yi-Mädar-i-Shäh, the religious school which stands on the east side of the Chahär Bägh midway between its northern end and the river. This building, together with the large caravan­ serai which adjoins it on the east, was erected by the Shäh’s pious mother. Construction began in 1118 (1706/7) and ended in 1126 (1714/15). Professor Pope has described it as “...a striking demonstration of the continued artistic vitality of the country.... This combined mosque, college and caravanserai... is the last construction in Persia that in any sense deserves the qualification ‘great’.”1 On a further page, Professor Pope added: “The Madrasa Mädar-i-Shäh is a building with dignity, charm and personality. The gorgeousness of the faience is not overdone, for it merges well with the structural forms, which are simple and strong. The purity of the elemental architectural motifs has been admirably maintained at a time when building in the rest of Isläm was losing its grasp on its traditions.”2 Many other European visitors to Isfahän have 1 A Survey of Persian Art, vol. 11, p. 1213.

480

1 Ibid. p. 1215.

PLATE VIH

The courtyard and dome of the Madrasa-yi-Mâdar-i-Shâh at Isfahan.

APPENDIX III

voiced its praises. When Pierre Loti was in Isfahän over seventy years ago, he greatly admired the building, but expressed deep regret at its ruinous condition;1 happily, at the orders of the late Rezä Shäh, extensive repairs have been carried out, and the building is now in an excellent state of preservation. Amongst the other buildings in Isfahän for which Shäh Sultän Husain was responsible, mention may be made of the following: (i) The Jalâlïya School. Situated on the north side of the Khiäbän-i-Häfiz, in the eastern part of the city; it was built in 1114 (1702/3). It is a simple, unpretentious structure with a courtyard in the centre. On the north side, facing the entrance, is a small aivân ornamented with tiles and stucco. It is still in use as a school. (ii) The Madrasa-yi-Shamsäbäd. This religious college, which is on a much smaller scale than the famous Madrasa in the Chahär Bägh, is in the central part of the city, in the district of Shamsäbäd. As in the case of the Jalâlïya school, the ornamentation of this building is simple; it was completed in 1713/14. (iii) The Masjid-i-Mîsü. This small and very simple mosque, which was completed in or about 1116 (1704/5), is situated in the Jubära quarter, between the site of the Tauqchi gate (which no longer exists) and the Chihil Dukhtaràn minaret. Besides erecting the above buildings, Shäh Sultän Husain added to and restored a number of others, notably the Imämzäda-yiIsmä‘11, the Darb-i-Imäm and the Masjid-i-Shayä‘ (Isaiah). However, all the Shäh’s building enterprises in Isfahän, not excepting the Madrasa in the Chahär Bägh, paled into insigni­ ficance beside the grandiose palace and garden of Farahäbäd. The construction of this Persian Versailles was begun about 1700, but was not completed until several years later.1 2 We shall never know why Shäh Sultän Husain was not content with the Sa‘ädatäbäd palace and park and also with the extensive Hazärjarib garden, with its 500 fountains, its fine kiosks and beautiful trees.3 We can 1 Op. cit. pp. 224-5. 2 The walls were still far from finished in 1704, as can be seen from de Bruyn’s panorama of Içfahân in the first volume of his Travels (see plate 74). 3 This garden, part of the walls and some of the towers of which still remain, covered an area of some 700 acres, thus being slightly larger than Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens combined. It was laid out on ground that sloped gently down towards the river. This garden has been described by numerous travellers,

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LSD

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only hazard a guess that he, like many another oriental monarch, wished to create something which would eclipse all that his predecessors had done. The site chosen for Farahäbäd lay on the south side of the Zäyanda-rüd, about a mile to the west of the Hazârjarïb garden; as in the case of the latter, the ground sloped down gradually from the top or southern end towards the river, thus enabling the water from the feeding canal to run down through the small tiled channels, pools, waterfalls and fountains to the river at the foot. Owing to the ravages of time and to spoliation by builders and cultivators, it is difficult now to obtain any very clear idea of the general layout,1 but enough can still be seen to show how very extensive Farahäbäd must have been. In the summer of 1932 Monsieur E. E. Beaudouin, whilst a pensionnaire of the Academie de France at Rome, spent some time studying the ruins. The process of disintegration was then evidently much less marked than it is now, because he was able to make a very detailed plan which he contributed, together with some drawings, to Urbanisme in the same year.2 This plan has been reproduced in the Survey of Persian Art to accompany the article on Farahäbäd by Professor Pope and Dr Phyllis Ackerman.3 The water supply for this enormous garden presented a difficult problem, because the canal which Shäh ‘Abbäs I had constructed for the Hazârjarïb garden was not of sufficient capacity to supply Farahäbäd as well. Krusinski stated that, as Shäh Sultän Husain had built his palace and garden: “.. .in a Place that was extremely dry, the greatest Expence he was at in this Undertaking was for Water, which was absolutely wanting there, and which they were fain to bring thither from a great Distance by Stone Troughs, the Expences and Labour of which cannot be conceived... but by amongst whom may be mentioned Sir Thomas Herbert, Travels (London, 1928), pp. 132-4, Chardin, Voyages, vol. Vin, pp. 33-5, and Kaempfer, Amoenitates exoticarum (Lemgo, 1712), pp. 193-5. By ^ar the most recent account is by Miss Sack ville-West in her chapter on Persian gardens in The Legacy of Persia (Oxford, i953)> PP- 270-1. 1 Farahäbäd has long suffered the fate of Tabarak citadel and most of the walls of Içfahân. 2 His article is entitled “Ispahan sous les Grands Chahs, XVIIe Siècle”, Urbanisme (Paris, 1932), no. 10. 3 A Survey of Persian Art, vol. 11, pp. 1434 and 1436. See also M. A. Godard’s article on Isfahan in Athâr-é-lrân, vol. 11, fasc. 1, p. 167.

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PLATE IX

The ruins of the Palace buildings at Farahäbäd, showing (left-centre) the hill known as the Atash-Kada.

APPENDIX III

those who have seen it.”1 Although Krusinski was correct in saying that the water had to be brought from a great distance, there is no trace whatever of any stone troughs or indeed of any canal other than the one which Shäh ‘Abbas had made a century or so earlier. One can only conclude that the existing canal was enlarged so as to increase the supply sufficiently to supply both Hazârjarïb and Farahäbäd. Owing to the high level at which the water had to be delivered to these gardens, the point of off-take from the Zäyanda-rüd was as far upstream as the village of Misra, 17I miles south of Farahäbäd. Owing to the configuration of the land, however, this canal had to pursue a very winding course and was actually over 30 miles in length. At one point, where a spur of the hills projected across the alignment, a siphon (which is now silted up) had to be constructed. This canal had to be cut out of the hillside to the east of the river for considerable distances ; numerous breaches in its walls now render it useless. The construction of the original canal by Shäh ‘Abbäs I and its enlargement by Shäh Sultän Husain must have been undertakings on a vast scale.1 2 Nevertheless, Shäh ‘Abbäs’s abortive attempt to divert some of the waters of the Kärün into the Zäyanda-rüd by means of an open cutting on the flanks of the Kührang mountain in the heart of the Zagros range must have been an even vaster enterprise.3 Shäh Sultän Husain, concerned at the amount of water required for Isfahän and also for the maintenance of the Hazârjarïb and Farahäbäd gardens, thought for a time of reviving the Kührang project, but, although he levied a tax to finance it, he failed to put it into execution, possibly because of the Afghan invasion. Farahäbäd was not the only pleasure resort that Shäh Sultän Husain had in the neighbourhood of Isfahän. He also had a large garden called the Bägh-i-Vahsh, part of which, as the name indicates, was used as a menagerie. It was situated 17 miles to the south-west of the city. It was a vast square enclosure, the sides of 1 History of the Revolution of Persia, p. 91. 2 I have to thank Dr Minasian for taking me on an inspection tour of this canal in May 1954. 3 Shäh Tahmâsp I tried by means of a tunnel to carry out this project, but the attempt had to be abandoned through lack of ventilation. Shäh 'Abbäs II likewise tried on two occasions to tap the Kärün waters, but, although he had the services of a French engineer, he also was unsuccessful. It is of interest to note that the project has recently been carried out.

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which were at least 11 miles in length. The walls on three of the sides are still standing, though now in a sadly ruined condition. The northern wall has been demolished by the inhabitants of a nearby village in order to enable them to cultivate the northern part of the former garden; being relatively low-lying, this portion can be irrigated from the river. Pierre Victor Michel, Louis XIV’s envoy to Persia, was taken to see the Bägh-i-Vahsh shortly before his return to France. He saw some wild beasts there, but did not state what kind they were.1 Something remains to be said on the subject of Julfa as it was in those days. Due to the wise and tolerant policy of Shäh ‘Abbäs the Great and the energy and ability of its inhabitants, the town prospered greatly and rapidly increased in size. Shäh ‘Abbäs II added to its numbers by transferring more Armenians from the north-west. These newcomers named the parts of the town in which they settled after the places that they had left; Julfa is thus, to this day, divided into quarters bearing such names as Julfa, Erivan and Tabriz. Over a score of churches were built, of which thirteen are still in existence. The two largest are All Saviours Cathedral, which was originally constructed on a small scale in 1606, but was rebuilt in its present form in 1655, and the Bethlehem Church, dating from 1627. The town, which was surrounded by a wall, had broad, tree-lined streets which were always well kept. Unfortunately for the people of Julfa, some of the successors of Shäh ‘Abbäs I treated them with great injustice and often cruelty, levying heavy taxes on them and sometimes abducting young women and girls for their harems. The citizens also suffered at times from the application of the unjust law whereby a renegade to Islam could claim the property of his relatives.12 Notwithstanding such harsh and unfair treatment, Julfa was in a relatively prosperous state in the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain. It made a most favourable impression on the members of the 1 Michel, “ Mémoire”, p. 162. Michel was also taken to another royal garden at “Bakoma”, which appears to have been at or near the small village of Koma, i J miles to the south-west of the larger village of Bägh-i-Abrisham and 2 J miles east-south-east of the Pul-i-Vargan. One of the inhabitants of Koma informed Dr Minasian that there is a plot of land in the neighbourhood which is still known as the Qasr or “palace”. Michel’s “Bakoma” was no doubt intended for Bägh-i-Koma or “Garden of Koma”. 2 See p. 73 above.

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mission of the Archbishop of Ancyra who stayed there for a short time in 1699. They greatly admired the many magnificent houses and their beautiful gardens and the well-kept streets, and they rejoiced in the excellent situation and pure air of the town. The French missionary Père Gaudereau, who had for long resided in Persia and who was attached to the suite of the Archbishop, was enthusiastic in his praise of Julfa, saying “On a fait [là] un petit abrégé de FUnivers.” He added that the inhabitants were very prosperous, as they had trading connections with all parts of the world. He estimated the population at that time as between 30,000 and 4o,ooo.x Julfa, while escaping the horrors which the inhabitants of Isfahän underwent during the siege in 1722, nevertheless suffered greatly not only from the brutal behaviour of the Afghans, but also from the complete stoppage of trade which was brought about by the Afghan, Russian and Turkish invasions and also by the numerous rebellions that occurred in so many parts of the distracted country. Like Isfahän, Julfa has never fully recovered from its experiences during those troubled times. 1 Gaudereau, Relation II, pp. 94 and 97.

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APPENDIX IV

ART AND LITERATURE IN THE LATE SAFAVÎ PERIOD In art and literature, as in other fields, the characteristic note of the last thirty to forty years of the Safavî era was, generally speaking, one of decadence and decline, but there were, neverthe­ less, some important exceptions. In regard to architecture, for example, no epoch that could produce such a monument as the Madrasa-yi-Mädar-i-Shäh in Isfahän can be regarded as entirely lacking in good taste and artistic skill. As regards carpet-weaving, the late Mr A. C. Edwards, in his contribution entitled ‘‘Persian Carpets” to the Legacy of Persiay said It has been truly said that every movement in art carries within itself the seed of its own degeneration ; and that without the perennial stimulus of patronage, praise, and a congenial atmosphere, genius will wilt and fail to flower. The successors of Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas failed to maintain their interest in the art of carpet weaving. The royal patronage was withdrawn from the designers and master weavers who had worked for Shah Abbas. They were soon scattered, or died, and were not replaced. Although their designs endured, craftsmanship degenerated. It became slovenly, inexpert. Finally, in 1722 Shah Husain, the last of his line, surrendered his capital and throne to the Afghans, and the great period came to an inglorious end. Those hundred years of decline witnessed the gradual decay of the art of carpet weaving: and the short but bloody rule of the Afghan chiefs almost extinguished what was left of it [p. 253].

While there is undoubtedly much truth in what Mr Edwards has said above in regard to carpet-weaving in general, he ignored the fact that in certain cases there is no evidence of decline at all, as, for example, in respect to the squared garden carpets that were made probably in Kurdistän in the late seventeenth century and early in the eighteenth.1 An excellent example of this type of carpet is in the 1 See Vorderasiatische Knupfteppiche aus alter Zeit, pp. 135-6, by W. von Bode and E. Kühnel (Brunswick, 1955).

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collection of Lord Aberconway.1 These carpets, in the opinion of Mr Basil Gray,2 belong to the tradition of the Kirmän tree carpets. In so far as brocaded textiles are concerned, the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain was by no means a period of decadence. There are, for example, some fine specimens of such textiles dating from this time in the shrine of the Imäm ‘All at Najaf3 and also in some private collections in the United States and elsewhere.4 In architecture and the art of decoration the decline is not very marked, as is shown by the construction of the beautiful Madrasa in the Chahär Bägh in Isfahän. However, if one examines that building really closely, one finds that the tile-work, pleasant though the general effect undoubtedly is, falls decidedly below the high standard set by the master-craftsmen of earlier centuries. When we come to painting, we find that there is serious deterioration. This falling off in quality was due not only to the lack of artists of first-rate ability, but also to insufficient patronage and an unfavourable atmosphere. Furthermore, the impact of western ideas had an unsettling effect, resulting in what Mr B. W. Robinson has well described as “split-personality”.5 That is to say, while certain artists clung to the old traditional styles, others, whom we may term the “progressives”, preferred European methods of pictorial representation. In one case, as we shall see below, there was a curious blending of the two schools. The most eminent exponent of the purely Persian style of painting was Mu‘m, who styled himself Musawwir or “the Painter”.6 Born as far back as 1617, he was one of the pupils and imitators of the celebrated artist Ridä-yi-'Abbäsi, who flourished in the reigns of Shäh ‘Abbàs I and Shäh Safi. Professor Ernst Kühnel, in his contribution to the Survey of Persian Art entitled 1 See plate 1270 of the Survey of Persian Art, vol. vi. 2 Expressed in a personal letter to me. I am deeply indebted to Mr Gray for a number of most helpful suggestions in regard to Persian art during this period. 3 See Mehmet Aga-Oglu, Safawid Rugs and Textiles in the Collection of the Shrine of Imam Ali at al-Najaf (New York, 1941). 4 See N. A. Reath and E. B. Sachs, Persian Textiles and their Technique from the Sixth to the Eighteenth Centuries including a system for general Textile Classification (New Haven, 1937). 6 In a personal letter to myself. 6 Hajji Husain, a well-known Persian painter of the present day, has taken the title of Musawwir al-Mulk or “Painter of the Kingdom’’. His house, which is in Isfahan, was built in the Safavi period, but probably before the reign of Shah Sultän Husain. Internally, it has some characteristic stucco decoration.

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“ Book Painting. C. History”,1 after describing Ridä-yi-‘Abbäsi and his work, referred to Mu‘m as follows: “Of his [i.e. Ridä-yi‘Abbäsl] numerous pupils, none stood so close to him as Mu‘in, who seems to have been the strongest personality, artistically, in all the great workshop, though he was very dependent on the Master.” In the same article, Professor Kühnel, after speaking of a study of lion-taming by Mu‘in, stated that a comparison with similar studies by Ridä-yi-‘AbbäsI made it evident that Mu‘ïn did not ever approach him either in composition or in the rendition of expression and movement.1 2 Mu‘m was already an old man when Shäh Sultän Husain came to the throne, and he produced but little thereafter. A number of examples of his work were on view at the Persian Art Exhibition in London in 1931, but most, if not all, of these dated from the reigns of Shäh ‘Abbäs II or Shäh Safï.3 We now come to the “progressive” school, the inception of which was due to Shäh ‘Abbäs II. To quote Professor Kühnel again, it was this monarch “who first clearly realised that Persian painting was in danger of complete stagnation in the Riza tradition and needed an impulse from without if it was to develop renewed creative energy”.4 Shäh ‘Abbäs decided that the best way to obtain such an impulse was to send a number of promising young artists to Rome for training. The most successful of these artists was Muhammad Zamän, whose work exhibits “a strange blend of the traditions of East and West”.5 The old and the new styles are to be seen side by side in an interesting Shäh-Näma which is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. Those in the traditional style are the work of Mu‘ïn and of an anonymous artist of less skill but of even more strongly marked traditional tendencies, while those of the Italianate school are by ‘All NaqI and Äqä Nuyän.6 The late Laurence Binyon, J. V. S. Wilkinson and Basil Gray, 1 Vol. in, p. 1892. a Ibid. 8 See Persian Miniature Painting, by Laurence Binyon, J. V. S. Wilkinson and Basil Gray, pp. 178-9. On p. 161 of the same work, the authors expressed an unfavourable opinion of Munn’s work. 4 A Survey of Persian Art, vol. in, p. 1896. 4 Laurence Binyon, J. V. S. Wilkinson and Basil Gray, op. cit. p. 180. 6 See, in particular, plates 23 and 24 in Mr B. W. Robinson’s book The Metropolitan Museum of Art Miniatures : Persian Painting ; these are reproductions

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The Nau Rüz presentation ceremony.

APPENDIX IV

in their Persian Miniature Painting, expressed the interesting view that Muhammad Zaman and his companions brought back from Rome some examples of Italian paintings “.. .which may have had something to do with the output of representations of the Holy Family, Christian saints and angels which was so curious a phenomenon for a Muhammadan country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”1 In the British Museum is an important drawing by another contemporary artist named Muhammad ‘All. It bears the date 1133 (1720/1), and its subject is the presentation ceremony at Nau Rüz (21 March). The central figure in the magnificent turban is certainly not Shäh Sultän Husain, as can be seen from Cornelius de Bruyn’s portrait of that monarch (although this picture was painted seventeen years earlier). This central figure is therefore, in all probability, that of the Ftimâd al-Daula or Grand Vizier. If this drawing represents the Nau Rüz ceremony in 1132, it would in that case be that of Fath ‘All Khän Däghistäni, but if it is of the ceremony in the following year, it would be his successor Muhammad Qulï Khän. The persons shown in this drawing are depicted with much skill; a striking feature is that most of them are looking extremely depressed.2 We may fittingly conclude these remarks on Persian painting in late Safavï times by giving the views of the contemporary Dutch artist Cornelius de Bruyn: They [the Persians] have even professed painters among them, the two best of which, in my time, were in the service of the King. I had the curiosity to pay a visit to one of them, and I found his works far above the idea I had conceived of the matter; they consisted only of birds in distemper, but extremely neat. Indeed, I cannot say he knew anything of lights and shades, and in this all the country are ignorant, whence it is that their paintings are very imperfect. This painter is busy, for the King, in copying a printed book of flowers which came from our country, and in the colouring of which an European ecclesiastic had in colour from this Shäh-Näma of, respectively, Mu'in’s “ Bahram Gur Hunting ” and Äqä Nuyän’s “Rustam leading the Persian Army”. 1 It is perhaps noteworthy that Muhammad Zamân professed Catholicism for a time. 2 See plate 10 for a reproduction of this drawing. The fact that so many of the persons shown in it are looking so sad may perhaps be regarded as indicating that the ceremony was that of 21 March 1721, when the situation in Persia was rapidly deteriorating.

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instructed him the best he could: and for this purpose they have the most admirable colours.... They themselves make ultramarine which is the finest blue in the world, for they have the stone in their own country.... There are also painters among them who paint canes with a certain gum which has a very pretty effect, and Standishes in the form of boxes, upon which, with the utmost neatness, they represent figures, animals, flowers and all sorts of ornament.1

De Bruyn’s views are of interest, because they show, inter alia, that, while Shäh Sultän Husain did extend some patronage to artists, he had evidently inherited in some measure Shäh ‘ Abbäs H’s zest for western art. Persian art, or perhaps we should say in this connection, highly skilled craftsmanship, found what may have been its highest expression in this period in the sphere of metal-work. We know from the Tadhkirat al-Mulük2 that the royal workshops (of which there were thirty-three) were still functioning in the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain, and it was probably in them that the beautiful astrolabes which are now in the British Museum and the Victoria and Albert Museum were made. In the British Museum is a superb instrument made by ‘Abd al-‘Alï ibn Muhammad Rafi* al-Jazï, of Isfahän; it is dated Sha‘bän, 1124 (3 September1 October, 1712). The calligraphy on this instrument was the work of Muhammad Bäqir, a brother of ‘Abd al-‘Alï.3 Although it represents no scientific advance as compared with instruments made in the time of Ulugh Beg, its workmanship and finish are of a high order. Another fine astrolabe, made by ‘Abd al-A’imma, another wellknown craftsman,4 is in the Victoria and Albert Museum.5 It dates from 1127 (1715). 1 Travels, vol. 1, p. 220. 2 Pp. 48-50. 3 For a most detailed description of this astrolabe, see W. H. Morley’s Description of a Planispheric Astrolabe constructed for Shah Sultan Husain Safawi, King of Persia, and now preserved in the British Museum (London, 1886). R. W. T. Gunther reprinted Morley’s description of this astrolabe at the beginning of the first volume of his book, The Astrolabes of the World (Oxford, 1932), pp. i-5. Gunther himself, on p. 147 of his book, describes this instrument as being perhaps the most beautiful one in the British Museum. It came, he said, into the national collection as part of that of Sir Hans Sloane in I7S34 In A. H. Christie’s article “ Islamic Arts and their Influence upon European Work”, The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1931), the name of this craftsman is wrongly given as ‘Abd al-IJamid. Fig. 16 in that work is reproduced from a photograph of this astrolabe. 8 No. 458-1888.

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When we turn our attention to literature, we find that there were no outstanding writers of prose or poetry in the reign of Shah Sultan Husain, unless we include that prolific and indefatigable writer on Shî‘ï theology, Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisi. The era of Shah Sultan Husain did not differ, in fact, from the rest of the Safavi period during which literature had sunk to a very low ebb. Struck with the apparent anomaly that an epoch that was so glorious in many respects should be so barren in the field of literature, the late Professor Browne asked his friend Mirza Muhammad Qazvini whether he could explain why there was such an extraordinary dearth of talent in those times. Mirzä Muhammad replied that the chief reason for this dearth seemed to be that the Safavi monarchs

... by reason of their political aims and strong antagonism to the Ottoman Empire, devoted the greater part of their energies to the propagation of the Shi‘a doctrine and the encouragement of divines learned in its principles and laws. Now although these divines strove greatly to effect the religious unification of Persia (which resulted in its political unification), and laid the foundations of this present-day Persia, whose inhabitants are, speaking generally, of one faith, one tongue and one race, yet, on the other hand, from the point of view of literature, poetry, Sûfïism and mysticism, and, to use their own expression, everything connected with the “Accomplishments” (as opposed to the * ‘Legalities”), they not merely fell far short in the promotion thereof, but sought by every means to injure and annoy the representatives of these “Accomplishments”, who were generally not too firmly established in the Religious Law and its derivatives. In regard to the Sufis particularly they employed every kind of severity and vexation, whether by exile, expulsion, slaughter or reprimand, slaying or burning many of them with their own hands or by their sentence. Now the close connection between poetry and Belles Lettres on the one hand, and Süfîism and Mysticism on the other, at any rate in Persia, is obvious, so that the extinction of one necessarily involves the extinction and destruction of the other. Hence it was that under this dynasty learning, culture, poetry and mysticism completely deserted Persia... A The above remarks, although applying to the whole Safavi period, are particularly apposite as regards the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain, when the rigid and fanatical Shi‘i theologians obtained so much influence and power. 1 Quoted on pp. 26-7 of Persian Literature in Modem Times. 491

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There was, it is true, something of a literary world in those days, as can be seen from Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Hazïn’s Tadhkirat al-Ahwäl, but all the poets and prose writers of his time, himself included, were far from being in the front rank. Lutf ‘All Beg “Adhar”, when writing of the brief Afghan era and of the troubled years that followed up to the re-establishment of peace and order by Karim Khan Zand, ascribed the lack of men of letters during that time to the prevalent chaos and misery which, he said, “.. .have reached such a point that no one has the heart to read poetry, let alone to compose it.”1 1 Quoted from the Ätash-kada by Professor Browne, in his Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. 282.

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NOTES ON THE MAPS The preparation of the maps that accompany this book has been attended with no little difficulty. In the first place, in the course of the two and a half centuries that have elapsed since the accession of Shah Sultan Husain there have been many changes in the geographical nomenclature of Persia. While certain towns and villages have changed their names, others have ceased to exist; some, moreover, have been merged with neighbouring places (as, for example, Ben Isfahän, which is now part of Seh-Deh). Secondly, as has been shown in the opening chapter of this book, the frontiers of Persia in the Safavï period were not accurately defined and were never demarcated,1 and their alignment, especially in the east, was often only vaguely known. Thirdly, the provincial boundaries of those times have been even more difficult to ascertain than the frontiers. In the interests of accuracy, modern maps have been used for the purpose of fixing the natural features of the country, such as the coasts, mountains and principal rivers, as well as the chief towns, but where the nomenclature has undergone much change, recourse has been had wherever possible to contemporary or near­ contemporary maps, such as the excellent one which G. Delisle produced in 1724. In the case of Peter the Great’s Persian campaign in 1722, Russian maps have been largely utilised. An excellent idea of the extent of the geographical knowledge of Persia that was available in Europe at the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century may be obtained from Delisle’s map. This map, especially in its western portion, represents a great advance on those prepared by travellers in Persia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Anthony Jenkinson’s map, the Caspian Sea is given a very queer shape, and “Backow” (Bäkü) and “Dirben” (Darband) are shown on, respectively, the south­ eastern and southern coasts, while Shamakhi is placed approximately 1 As pointed out in ch. 1, p. 4, the first attempt actually to demarcate a frontier by means of boundary-marks was made by Russia and Turkey in 1727, when they divided north-west Persia between them in the manner laid down by the partition treaty of 1724.

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in the position of Tehran. Although the map accompanying Olearius’s Travels of the Ambassadors from the Duke of Holstein into Muscovy, Tartary and Persia1 is better than Jenkinson’s one, it places the Caspian Sea too far to the east and still gives it an odd shape, while the Persian Gulf is made to extend almost due west from the Straits of Hormuz. The map in Père Sanson’s2 Voyage ou Relation de VEtat présent du Royaume de Perse (Paris, 1695) is on such a small scale that few details can be given ; in it the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf are hardly more accurately shown than they are in Olearius’s map. How, it may be asked, was it possible for Delisle to improve so vastly on Sanson’s modest map of thirty years earlier ? The answer is that, during those years, a great many persons, travellers, missionaries, diplomats, merchants and others, visited Persia, and a number of them brought back with them geographical data which they placed at Delisle’s disposal. Amongst those who were helpful to Delisle in this way were the Swedish envoy Ludvig Fabritius who, between 1679 and 1698, was in Persia on three occasions.3 Another was Zurabek, a Catholic Armenian of Shamâkhî whom Shäh Sulaimän had despatched on a mission to the King of Poland and who, in 1698, was sent by that monarch on a return mission to Isfahan.4 Then, in 1713, Wakhtang VI of Kartli sent his maternal uncle Sulkhan Saba to France to beg Louis XIV to persuade the Shäh to allow him to recover his throne without apostatising.5 Whilst in Paris, Sulkhan Saba met 1 This map is at the beginning of the fifth book (between pp. 195 and 196) of the London edition of 1642. 2 One wonders whether this Père Sanson (whose Christian name does not seem to have been recorded) was related to his contemporary namesakes Adrien and Guillaume Sanson, the well-known geographers. 8 See pp. 51-2. 4 See p. 52. See also the abridged journal of the Jesuit Père de la Maze (who accompanied Zurabek from Shamakhi to Isfahän) in Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, vol. iv, pp. 53-112. 6 Sulkhan Saba’s mission was unsuccessful, despite Wakhtang’s promise that, in return for such assistance, he would give special facilities for French trade in Georgia and also for Catholic propaganda there. See p. xiii of Sir O. Wardrop’s English translation, entitled The Book of Wisdom and Lies (London, 1894), of Sulkhan Saba’s fables, the Dsigni Sbrdzne Sitsruisa. Sulkhan Saba also went to Rome where he was received by Pope Clement XI. See, in addition to Wardrop, Brosset’s “ Documens originaux sur les Relations diplomatiques de la Géorgie avec la France vers la fin du Règne de Louis XIV”, Nouveau Journal Asiatique, vol. ix, pp. 340-66.

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Delisle to whom he gave some geographical data relating to Georgia.1 Delisle was also indebted to Peter the Great, whom he met when the Tsar was in Paris in 1717. Peter is said to have corrected with his own hand the maps of Russia which the Académie des Sciences presented to him.2 On returning to his own country, Peter showed increased interest in the geography of the Caspian region, for already his Persian expedition and his scheme for trading across the Caspian were taking shape in his mind. When Soimonov and van Verden had completed their joint map of that area, Peter sent a copy of it to Delisle,3 and asked him to bring out a new edition that would embody any necessary amendments. Except for some slight errors in the north-east corner of the Caspian Sea and along the Trans-Caspian coast, this map is extremely accurate, as can readily be seen from the composite fourcolour map4 in K. E. von Baer’s “Peter’s des Grossen Verdienste um die Erweiterung der geographischen Kenntnisse”.5 On receipt of this Russian map, Delisle, as requested by the Tsar, embodied the data contained in it in a new one which was entitled “Carte Marine de la Mer Caspienne levée suivant les Ordres de S.M. Czarienne par Mr Cari Vanverden [wc] en 1719,1720 et 1721, réduite au Méridien de Paris par Guillaume Delisle, Premier 1 R. Mintslov, Pierre le Grand dans la Littérature étrangère (St Petersburg, 1872), p. 32. 2 Another of Delisle’s sources of information was his brother Joseph Nicolas, who was a friend of Peter the Great and who was for many years in charge of the observatory at St Petersburg. See R. V. Tooley, Maps and Map-Makers (London, 1952), pp. 42-3* 8 Etienne Padery, when he was at Qazvin in 1720, sent another Russian map of the Caspian region to Paris ; this map was probably an earlier edition of the one which Peter sent to Delisle. See AEP, vol. v, fol. 315 b. As there is no trace of this map in the archives, it seems probable that it was sent to Delisle. 4 This interesting map shows, each in a different colour: (i) The actual coastline of the Caspian Sea. (ii) The coastline, as shown on the map by Soimonov and van Verden. (iii) Olearius’s map. (iv) Ptolemy’s map. Peter must have thought highly of van Verden, as he made him his chief cartographer; see S. F. G. Wahl, Altes und Neues Vorder- und Mittel-Asien, p. 43. To judge by his name, van Verden must have been of Dutch extraction. L. Bagrow, in his Die Geschichte der Kartographie (Berlin, 1951), p. 369, described him as a Russian. 6 Included in the Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angrenzenden Länder Asiens (St Petersburg, 1872), pp. 241-2.

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Géographe du Roy, de l’Académie Royale des Sciences”.1 This map was reproduced in Dutch in a smaller format and also in English by Hermann Moll.2 The information contained in this new map was em­ bodied in the general one of Persia which Delisle published in 1724.3 Extremely important though these new data were to Delisle, they related only to the north-western part of his general map. Conse­ quently, if we examine this map as a whole, we find that it becomes progressively less accurate as one goes eastwards. For example, the delineation of the Mughal frontier with Persia represents no advance over Sanson’s map. In fact, such phrases as “Desert rempli de Voleurs” that one finds in the eastern portion of Delisle’s map put one in mind of Jonathan Swift’s well-known lines:4 So geographers, in Afric maps, With savage-pictures fill their gaps : And o’er inhabitable5 downs Place elephants for want of towns.

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings in its eastern portion, Delisle’s map of 1724 must be considered a remarkable achievement. The map of Isfahän and its immediate surroundings in the early eighteenth century has been prepared from a number of sources, including a sketch-map which M. Sumbat very kindly made for me and those accompanying M. E. E. Beaudouin’s article “ Ispahan sous les Grands Chahs, XVIIe. Siècle”, Urbanisme (1932), no. x. The diagram of the battle of Gulnäbäd is based to some extent on M. Sumbat’s sketch-map and also on the results of a personal reconnaissance which I carried out with Dr Minasian in 1954. The details of the disposition of the Persian and Afghan forces are taken from contemporary sources. Note. Since this appendix was written, I have received from Mr. W. E. D. Allen a copy of his most interesting article entitled “The Sources for G. Delisle’s ‘Carte des Pays Voisins de la Mer Caspiene’ of 1723” which was published in Imago Mundi, no. xiu, p. 137-50. This article contains some additional information taken mostly from books and articles by Turkish and Soviet authorities. 1 Mintslov, op. cit. p. 31. 2 Mintslov, op. cit. p. 30, had a poor opinion of Moll, whom he described as a " géographe médiocre ”. 3 This map also served as a basis for a number by Homann and other cartographers. 4 “On Poetry”, 11. 177-80 4 In Swift’s day, “inhabitable” had the meaning of “uninhabitable”.

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NOTES ON THE SOURCES GENERAL REMARKS

The material on the period of Persian history from 1694 to 1730 is great in extent, besides being both diverse and polyglot in character; sources in fifteen different languages, oriental and western, have had to be consulted. Enormous though the volume of this material seems at first sight, it can be considerably whittled down by the elimination of what are mere paraphrases or glosses; this is particularly true of books on Peter the Great’s invasion of Persia. In compiling this book, I have gone on the principle of utilising so far as possible purely contemporary or nearly contemporary material, but I have supplemented such sources by frequent references to the works of such later authorities as Clairac, Sir John Malcolm, Brosset and Soloviev. Moreover, when modern writers have drawn attention to some newly discovered facts or have made some illuminating comments, I have not hesitated to make use of them. In this last category are (i) M. N. MiklukhoMaklai’s most valuable article on Avramov’s “Zapiski”1 and (ii) the very useful bibliography contained in P. T. Arutunian’s Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye Armyanskogo Naroda v pervoi Chetverti XVIII Veka? Some of the books that I consulted, I was able to discard almost immediately. Such are: (i) Vita di Pietro il Grande, Imperadore della Russia (Venice, 1748), by that ignorant plagiarist Antonios Katephoro; (ii) L'Illustre Paisan ou Mémoires et Aventures de Daniel Moginié, by Maubert de Gouvest.3 On the border line are (i) Mémoires du Règne de Pierre le Grand, Empereur de Russie (Amsterdam, 1728), and (ii) Mémoires du Règne de Catherine, Impératrice de toute la Russie (The Hague, 1728). Both these books are by Jean Rousset de Missy, who wrote under the pseudonym 1 “Zapiski S. Avramova ob Irane kak istoricheskii Istochnik”, Ucheniye Zapiski: Istoriya i Philologiya Stran Vostoka (Leningrad, 1952). 8 Moscow, 1954. 8 See p. 544 below for a brief mention of this book. 33

497

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of Ivan Nestesuranoi (the latter name was, apparently, intended to be an anagram of Jean Rousset). In a letter to me, the late B. H. Sumner described the first of these two books as “a con­ coction of anecdotes; I think that it is the case that any that are of any value are borrowed from elsewhere”. A. ORIENTAL AUTHORITIES

The number of historical works in Persian and other oriental languages that are concerned with the period covered by this book is very large, but comparatively few are of outstanding importance; of the latter, separate notices will be given below. Many of the books and MSS. are of only secondary importance; in this category we may place most of those which deal with the history of the Ghalzai and Abdâlï Afghans and their relations with the Safavî rulers. There are a number of cases in which authors have borrowed material from earlier writers, often without making any acknow­ ledgement (it must be admitted, however, that this is a practice which is by no means confined to oriental writers or to any particular period). It is very satisfactory to learn from a recent article by a Soviet scholar1 that the first volume of Muhammad Kazim’s great biography of Nädir, which was for long thought to be irretrievably lost, has now been found. i. Muhammad Muhsin

Particulars of the life of Muhammad Muhsin are very scanty, being confined to the few facts about himself that he gives in his “Zubdat al-Tawârîkh”. We know nothing of his parentage, his birth or his early years. We do know, however, from his own statement that he was occupying a responsible position in the treasury department of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä at Mashhad in 1132 (1719/20). He must have left Mashhad soon afterwards for Isfahän, because he went through the siege of that city. Whilst in Isfahän he was doubtless employed in one of the departments of the Khässa. It seems probable that he returned to Mashhad after the siege, as he displays an intimate knowledge of the complicated series of events in that city which culminated in the 1 N. D. Miklukho-Maklai. See p. 510 below.

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establishment of Malik Mahmud Sïstânï as the ruler of western Khuräsän. At some unrecorded date he entered Nädir’s service and rose to be the mustaufi or treasurer of a branch of the Khässa known as the Department of the Sarkär-i-Faid.1 We know, once again from his own statements, that Nädir ordered him to write his “ Zubdat al-Tawârïkh ” for the information of his eldest son Ridà Qulï Mïrzâ in the year 1154 (1741/a). We have no knowledge of the date of Muhammad Muhsin’s death. The “Zubdat al-Tawârïkh” was compiled as a general history, beginning with Adam, and it does not become at all detailed until the chapter on the Safavï dynasty is reached. Rieu is fully justified in saying:12 “The latter part of this last chapter is of special importance, as being a contemporary record of the decline of the Safavï dynasty and of the rise of Nädir Shäh down to the time of his assumption of the royal title.” Only brief comment is needed on what Muhammad Muhsin has to say of the revolts of the Ghalzais and Abdâlïs and of the vain and futile attempts that were made to suppress them. With regard to the fall of Fath ‘Alï Khän Dâghistânï, Muhammad Muhsin makes it clear that the Shäh’s mind had been poisoned against him by his enemies, in particular, Muhammad Husain, the Mulläbäshi, and Rahïm Khän, the Hakïm-bâshï. Two points that emerge clearly from this part of the “Zubdat al-Tawârïkh” are the weakness of the Shäh and the never-ceasing intrigues and squabbles of the nobles, ministers, courtiers and eunuchs. The consequence was that the state drifted on from one disaster to another; when action was taken, it was always too late and had insufficient strength and resolution behind it. Regarding the crushing defeat at Gulnäbäd, Muhammad Muhsin, while praising the heroic conduct of the Georgian Rustam Khän, vehemently denounced the cowardice and ineptitude of the other leaders.3 Although it is brief, Muhammad Muhsin’s account of the siege of Isfahän is illuminating. Very striking indeed are his illustrations of how money can, in certain circumstances, cease to have any value.4 1 2 no. 4

For a definition of the duties of this official, see the TM, p. 84. Supplement to the Catalogue of the Persian MSS. in the British Museum, 36. 8 ZT. fol. 207 a. See also p. 143 above. ZT. fol. 208 a. See also p. 166 above.

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The accuracy of what Muhammad Muhsin has to say of the successive appointments as heir apparent of the Shah’s sons Sultan Mahmud Mïrzâ, Safï Mïrzâ and Tahmâsp Mïrzâ is fully attested by the Dagregister and other first-hand sources. More­ over, he rightly condemns the failure of Tahmâsp and his com­ panions to make any attempt to relieve Isfahän after their escape from it in June 1722. Of particular value is what Muhammad Muhsin has to say on the subject of Fath ‘Alî Khän Qäjär and of how, after his revolt, he joined Tahmäsp and soon obtained high office for himself and other posts for his tribal leaders, only to find his ambitious aims thwarted by the advent of the still more forceful Nädir. Unlike Mïrzâ Mahdï,1 Muhammad Muhsin did not hesitate to show that the Qäjär chief then attempted to enter into treasonable corres­ pondence with Malik Mahmüd Sïstânï; what he has to say in this connection is fully confirmed by the completely independent testimony of Semeon Avramov, who was also in a position to know the facts.2 After the fall of Mashhad (which he shows to have been due to treachery on the part of Malik Mahmüd’s commander), Muhammad Muhsin relates how Tahmäsp’s minister’s alienated him from Nädir by their baseless allegations. From what we know from other contemporary sources, such as Avramov, of Tahmäsp’s weakness of character and of the mass of sycophants and intriguers who surrounded him at this time, we may well believe that Muhammad Muhsin was fully justified in making this statement, and that he did not write as he did merely in order to please Nädir. Although the book suffers to some extent from its occasional chaotic arrangement, some repetitions and its frequently inaccurate dates,3 it is, without a doubt, the most important of the Persian sources for this period. 2. Shaikh Muhammad ‘All Hazin

Shaikh Muhammad ‘Alî Hazïn ibn Abi Talib was born in Isfahän on 27 Rabï4 II, 1103 (17 January 1692). As he himself states,4 he was descended in the eighteenth degree from Tâj al-Dïn 1 See p. 310 above and also p. 513 below. 2 See p. 310 above. 8 Certain of these faults may have been due to a careless copyist. 4 See p. i of Belfour’s English translation of the Ahzuäl.

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Ibrâhîm, the Zahid or Hermit of Gïlân, who was the spiritual director of the celebrated Shaikh Safi. His great-grandfather, grandfather and father were all men of learning, and he soon showed that he had inherited their taste for scholarship. As a child, Muhammad ‘All was taken to see the great mujtahid Muhammad Bâqir al-Majlisï on several occasions, and in later years he was much in the company of other Shii theologians, but he never allowed himself to adopt their warped and narrow outlook. In 1715, while his father Abu Talib lay dying, in prophetic vein he urged his son not to remain for long in Isfahän “because it were meet that some one of our race should survive”.1 No one paid any heed to these words at the time, and Muhammad ‘Alï and the other members of his family were still living in the city when the siege began seven years later. All except Muhammad ‘Alï succumbed, and he very nearly died himself. When sufficiently recovered, he made his escape from the city a few days before it fell. Before the Afghan invasion, Hazïn1 2 had already begun to write poetry, but the troubles that ensued soon forced him to postpone such activities until calmer times. After his escape from Isfahän, Hazïn went to Khurramäbäd, which was still being held for the Safavï line by ‘Alï Mardän Khän, the Vâlï of Luristän. The Vâlï received him kindly, but he was soon compelled to leave because of the Turkish invasion of western Persia. He came into contact with the Turks, who treated him well and allowed him to go to Hamadän, which they had just captured. From Hamadän he travelled to the Bakhtiârï country and thence to the Persian Gulf, where he took ship with the intention of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.3 His ship, however, was wrecked, and he got no further than the Yemen, whence he returned to Persia. Once again he came into contact with the Turks, who were kind to him as before, allowing him to visit the Shiï shrines at Karbalâ and Najaf. After spending three years at Najaf, he journeyed to Adharbaijän and thence to Gïlân, 1 2 3 the

Ibid, p. 14. Hazïn (“sorrowful”) was Muhammad ‘Alfs takhallus or pen-name. He had performed the pilgrimage for the first time before the outbreak of serious troubles in Persia.

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Mâzandârân and Astarâbâd. In 1729 he reached Mashhad, where Tahmäsp received him well and pressed him to accompany the royal army which was about to set out on the campaign against the Ghalzais. Hazin was obliged to accept, but, as he was no warrior, he soon made his excuses to Tahmäsp; to use his own words, he then “.. .retired to the rear of the line, where I performed my journey to my heart’s content, always leaving a small interval between myself and the troops.”1 The fact that there was always this judicious gap between him and the army explains how it was that his account of the battle of Mihmândûst leaves so much to be desired.2 One may apply the same remark to his descriptions of other military engagements. After the liberation of Isfahän and the expulsion of the Afghans, Hazïn returned to the capital, where he remained for five months, but it was no longer the Isfahän that he had known. In his own words, he “...beheld that great city, notwithstanding the presence of the King, in utter ruin and desertion. Of all that population and of my friends scarcely anyone remained.”3 On going to Shïrâz, Hazïn found it in the same sad state as the capital; not a single one of his friends there had survived. He therefore did not linger there, but went on to Bandar ‘Abbäs, where he took ship to Surat and thence to Jedda, from which port he went to Mecca for the second time. On his return to Persia, he found the affairs of that country once more in confusion. Wherever he went, the people were in misery and were complaining of the exactions of Nâdir’s officials. The sight of so much unhappiness was too much for Hazïn, with the result that in 1146 (1734) he left his native land for ever and settled in India. Eight years later, Hazïn wrote his Ahwäl, in which he set down all the salient facts of his life up to his departure from Persia. In 1779, at the age of 87, he died at Benares. The above outline of Hazïn’s career will serve to show that he had ample opportunity to observe what was happening in his distracted country during those fateful years. Except as regards military affairs, his record is a most valuable one.4 On a number 1 Ahwäl, p. 192. 2 See p. 331 above. 8 Ahwal, p. 205. 4 K. F. Neumann, in his “Persien seit dem Niedergang der Sefi”, p. 454, described the Ahwäl as “eine höchste schatzbare Quelle”, adding that I4azïn was an admirable, noble-minded man who was greatly esteemed by his fellow­ believers.

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of occasions Sir John Malcolm, in his History of Persia, quoted from the Ahwäl, and spoke most appreciatively of its value to him when he was compiling his chapter (no. xvi) on the reigns of Mahmud and Ashraf.1 Hazîn was outspoken in his condemnation of Tahmäsp’s ministers and courtiers, and, although he was a loyal supporter of the Safavï dynasty, he was by no means blind to the defects in the characters of Shäh Sultän Husain and his son Tahmäsp. Brief allusion has already been made to Hazïn’s references to the literary personalities of his time;2 in this connection, Professor Browne stated: “The accounts of contemporary scholars and men of letters (many of whom perished during the siege of Isfahän in a.d. 1722) with whom he was personally acquainted constitute one of the most valuable features of this interesting book.”3 As already remarked, although Hazîn was frequently in the company of the rigid formalists of his day, he never allowed his association with them to modify his attitude towards religious and philosophical matters, which always remained tolerant and free from bias. Sir William Ouseley, in his introduction to his English translation of extracts from the Ahwäl, said of him His liberality in religious opinion (although he seems sincere in his attachment to the religion he professed) exceeds that of any Muslim writer with whose works I am acquainted and is eminently conspicuous in the praises he bestows on some learned and amiable Magians. His tribute of approbation was never withholden from any who could justly claim it, of whatever sect or nation.4 Some years later, Sir William paid the following further tribute to Hazîn :“... of the many hundred Musulman authors whose works I have perused, he is one of the few (five or perhaps six) entitled to the epithet “liberal”.5 Ouseley’s translations of extracts from the Ahwäl (which included the Persian text) appeared in 1798. Thirty-two years later F. C. Belfour published a complete English translation, and in the following year (1831) he brought out a companion volume containing the Persian text. In 1311 (1893/4) the Persian text was reprinted at Cawnpore and included in the volume of Hazïn’s Kulliyät or complete works, a bulky volume of 1 History of Persia, vol. 11, p. 4211. 8 Persian Literature in Modern Times, p. 281. 4 Oriental Collections (London, 1798), p. 37.

5°3

2 See p. 492 above. 5 Travels, vol. 1, p. 416,

APPENDIX VI

1032 pages. The most recent work to appear on the subject of Hazïn is Muhammad 'Ali Hazin, his Life, Times and Works, by Sarfaraz Khan Khatak; it was published at Lahore in 1944.

3. Joseph (Hovsep) Apisalaimian

We know nothing of Joseph Apisalaimian’s early history except for the very meagre particulars which he furnished in one of his Turkish memoranda.1 He says, it is true, that he was born in Tiflis, but he omits to give the year or to say anything at all in regard to his parents. They must, however, have been people of some means, for they were able to send him to Europe when he was still a mere boy, in order to acquire a good knowledge of western languages. We may assume that, as he spent his boyhood in Tiflis, he was thus able to learn Georgian, Turkish, Persian and possibly Arabic, in addition to his native tongue, Armenian. He does not state where he studied in Europe, but, as he obviously had a good knowledge of French in later years, it is reasonable to suppose that he spent part of his time at any rate in France. He may have been educated at the Jesuits’ College in Paris, where, as stated by Dugat,12 from about 1700 to 1721 “L’Etat entretenait à ses frais.. .22 jeunes Orientaux, la plupart Arméniens, destinés à remplir la double mission d’interprètes pour les relations diplomatiques et des missionnaires pour la propagation du catholicisme.” If this supposition is correct, it may have been during his time at the Jesuits’ College that Joseph embraced the Catholic faith. As Joseph later showed that he was at least as conversant with Italian as he was with French, it is possible that he spent some while studying in Italy as well as in France. All that we know for certain is that he took ship from Venice to Constantinople on the completion of his education in western Europe. We have, apparently, no means of ascertaining whether Joseph, on reaching Constantinople, was immediately engaged as a junior 1 See Professor T. H. Weir’s condensed English translation of a memorandum in Turkish by Joseph; it is entitled “The Revolution in Persia at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century”, A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to Edward G. Browne, pp. 480-90. 2 G. Dugat, Histoire des Orientalistes de l'Europe du XHe au XIXe Siècles (Paris, 1870), pp. xxiii-xxiv. 5°4

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interpreter at the French Embassy, but it seems quite likely that this was the case. So far, this narrative has been built up to a most regrettable extent upon the flimsy foundation of conjecture, but we now, fortunately, come to a few facts. In November 1716 Ange de Gardane and his brother François reached Pera on their way to Persia. As Ange de Gardane had need of an interpreter, Joseph was attached to his suite in that capacity, and travelled to Persia with him. As already related, Gardane and those with him were much delayed for various reasons en route, and it was not until the end of March 1718 that they reached the French court at Käshän.1 Gardane and his mission followed the court to Qazvïn, and, after a stay of some months, went to Isfahän. There can be no doubt that Joseph, with his remarkable linguistic qualifications, was of great service to Gardane, who, at the outset at any rate, knew no oriental language and was also ignorant of eastern ways. Gardane must have derived from or through Joseph most of the information in his despatches regarding the course of events in Persia during the critical years that followed his arrival in Isfahän. The fact that Gardane sent Joseph as his special representative to Mahmüd just before the fall of the city to ask the Afghan leader to arrange for the protection of French nationals and interests when he and his troops entered Isfahän shows that the consul must have had great confidence in him. Joseph’s successful accomplish­ ment of his mission is proof not only of his diplomatic ability, but also of his courage, for it was extremely hazardous, even at that late state of the siege, to traverse the Persian and Afghan lines.2 Joseph was graciously received by Mahmüd at Farahäbäd, and he was still there when Shäh Sultän Husain came to surrender his crown. He was actually in the hall of audience when the fateful meeting took place between the Shäh and his conqueror. It was due to this fact that Joseph was able to give his valuable first-hand report of what occurred on that occasion.3 At the end of January 1723 Joseph wrote a memorandum entitled “ Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse ”.4 This memoran1 See p. 464. 8 See p, 172 above.

1 See pp. 171-2 above. 4 AEP, vol. vi, fols. 202b-3o8a.

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dum begins with a brief statement regarding the Abdâlïs and the Ghalzais, and then goes on to describe Mir Wais’s revolt, his murder of Giorgi XI and the futile endeavours that the Persians subsequently made to restore their authority. It then mentions Lutf ‘Ali Khän’s measures for meeting the threat from the Muscat Arabs, Mahmüd’s first invasion of Persia (it is, perhaps, significant that Joseph says nothing respecting Lutf ‘Ali Khän’s alleged victory over Mahmüd),1 the Lezgï revolt and Mahmüd’s second invasion. The battle of Gulnäbäd is then briefly described. Apart from a few words on the terrible famine in Isfahän, nothing is said regarding the siege. Joseph thereupon describes his mission to Mahmüd at Farahäbäd, Malik Mahmüd’s relations with Mahmüd the Ghalzai, Mahmüd’s levy on the people of Isfahän and the revolt of the Qazvinis. The memorandum concludes with the wording which Mahmüd put on his coins. A brief addition to this memorandum, apparently a little later in date, refers to the inclination of some Turks to send an army to Persia either to mediate or to support one or other of the contending parties. In February 1723 Joseph, as already related,2 had two interviews with ‘Osmän Äqä, the Turkish ambassador to Mahmüd. It was probably a few months later that Joseph relinquished his post at the French Consulate at Isfahän, and travelled first to Hamadän and thence to Resht. At Resht Joseph made contact with a fellow-Armenian named Petros di Sargis Gilanentz, to whom he supplied the greater part of the material for the latter’s journal.3 Much of the data thus given are not contained in other memoranda by Joseph or, indeed, in works by other contemporary authorities. The account of the battle of Gulnäbäd contains some inaccuracies, but the part concerning the death of the Georgian prince Rustam is of interest. Then follows a lengthy description of the siege of Isfahän, with many particulars of the Afghans’ capture of Julfa and their illtreatment of its inhabitants. Joseph describes the meeting between Shäh Sultän Husain and Mahmüd at Farahäbäd on 23 October 1722 in similar terms to those employed in his (later) Turkish memorandum.4 The rest of the information that Joseph contributed 1 See p. 112 above. 2 See pp. 199 and 200 above. 8 Eighty-two out of 132 sections. 4 This is the memorandum referred to on p. 505 above.

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to Gilanentz’s journal relates to events in the early part of Mahmud’s reign, such as the rising of the Qazvïnïs, their rout of Amänullah and his men, Mahmud’s subsequent massacre of the Persian notables, Joseph’s conversations with ‘Osman Äqä, the Turkish envoy, Mahmud’s levies on the Armenians and on the English and Dutch East India Companies. Gilanentz’s journal, which was dated 22 August/2 September 1723, was written in Armenian, with a Russian translation for the information of General Levashov, the commander of the Russian troops in Gïlân. The Armenian text was published in the Tiflis monthly periodical Krunk (“ Crane”) in February and March 1863 and seven years later this article was translated into Russian by Professor Patkanov (or Patkanian) and published by the Imperial Academy of Science at St Petersburg.1 There is no doubt that Gilanentz’s journal, in particular the portion contributed by Joseph,2 is a most valuable source for the history of the period. How long Joseph remained in Gïlân we do not know, but he appears to have reached Constantinople early in 1724. Either on his arrival or a little later, he was given employment at the French Embassy. It is evident from a letter dated 15 October 1725 from the Vicomte d’Andrezel, the French ambassador, that, as had been the case in Isfahän, Joseph was not employed merely as an interpreter. D’Andrezel stated in this letter that Joseph had just been granted an audience by the Grand Vizier, in which he had discussed some question relating to the Patriarch of Georgia. M. F. Brosset, in quoting this letter,3 said of Joseph that he “...faisait metier d’espion pour le service de l’ambassadeur”. Brosset’s statement is not altogether fair, as Joseph was not a mere spy. Joseph’s pen was very active at Constantinople. Besides supplying copious material to the French ambassador (who sent 1 It is not known what happened to the original Russian translation. The Armenian text, as printed in Krunk, has recently been translated into English by my friend Dr Minasian of Içfahân, and it is hoped that it will soon be published. 2 The rest of Gilanentz’s journal is concerned with Caucasian affairs, such as the persecution of Armenians by the Persians and Turks, the strife between Wakhtang and Constantine of Kakheti, and the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus. 3 H. de la G. vol. 11, part I, p. 126.

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to Paris a document entitled ° Mémoire sur la dernière Revolution de Perse à la fin de l’année 1724” which was based on material supplied by Joseph),1 he wrote a lengthy memorandum in two sections in Turkish for the information of the Grand Vizier; the second part of this memorandum covered the course of events to the end of 1725. Joseph supplied Louis-André de La Mamie de Clairac with an Italian translation of this Turkish memorandum, to which he gave the title “Relazione della Rivoluzione di Persia, composta dal Signor Giuseppe... Giorgiano, Interprète del Console di Francia a Ispahan”.1 2 It will be noticed that Joseph’s surname was omitted from the title of this °Relazione” and also that he termed himself a Georgian. The omission of the surname and the fact that it is not to be found on any of the documents in the archives at the Quai d’Orsay excited my curiosity, but, although I conducted a diligent search, I could not discover it until I read Gilanentz’s journal, where the name is given as Apisalaimian.3 This name in itself shows that Joseph was an Armenian, and Gilanentz states categorically that he was of that nationality. He regarded himself as a Georgian presumably because he had been born in Tiflis. One wonders whether he suppressed his obviously Armenian name in order to support his claim to be a Georgian, but in that case he would have had to invent some suitable surname, and that he does not appear to have done. As will be explained more fully in the notice on La Mamie de Clairac, Joseph was of great assistance to him not only in providing him with much material for his book, such as the “ Relazione”, but also in answering numerous queries. That he was, in fact, a major contributor of information to the French historian is apparent from the latter’s work. Clairac had, in fact, a very high opinion of Joseph’s attainments, as the following extract from the preface to his Histoire will show:4 “Ce Géorgien, Interprète du Consul de France à Ispahan, avant et pendant le siège, joignoit à la connois1 AEP, vol. vi, fols. 341-70 b. 2 See Clairac’s “Catalogue des Ouvrages”, in vol. 1 of his Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle, p. Iv. I have been unable to find a copy of this “Relazione” or of the Turkish memorandum of which it is a translation. It is obviously not a translation of the Turkish memorandum mentioned by Professor Weir. 8 See section v of Gilanentz’s journal. 4 Vol. 1, p. vi.

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sance de la plupart des Langues Européennes et Orientales, beaucoup de mémoire, un esprit vif et juste, et une érudition assez étendue sur ce qui concerne la Géographie et l’Histoire.” Besides providing so much information, much of which was first-hand, to the French and Turkish governments and to individuals like Gilanentz and Chirac, Joseph was also of some help to Krusinski.1 He must therefore be regarded as one of the most important of our contemporary authorities. Like Krusinski, he made some errors now and again, as, for instance, his mistake over the name of Mir Wais’s brother and immediate successor ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (whom he called Mir ‘Abdullah), thus misleading Chirac (and therefore Hanway) and some more recent writers.1 2 But such errors are really of small importance when viewed in relation to the vast amount of accurate and useful data that he provided. What eventually became of Joseph does not appear to be known. It is probable that he remained in Constantinople for the rest of his life. It is, however, possible that he may have returned to Isfahän to assist the Gardanes, for when François and his invalid brother returned to France in March 1730 the former stated that they had left behind, in the consul’s house, a Capuchin friar and a Georgian interpreter.3 It is of some interest to note that a Georgian historian, N. Gabash­ vili, has recently written an article on Joseph entitled “loseb K’art’veli, XVIII s-is diplomati da istorikosi”, in the Masalebi Sak'art'velosa da Kavkasisiis istoriisat'vis (Tiflis, 1955).4* As Gabashvili has not read Gilanentz’s work, he not unnaturally regarded Joseph as a Georgian; he has, however, had access to a number of western sources, such as Chirac, Professor Weir and Dr D. M. Lang.6 1 D’Andrezel, in a despatch to Paris dated 15 October 1725, said: . .je crois que ce Joseph est l’auteur de la Relation géorgienne et italienne des événements du temps, dont parle si souvent, sans le faire mieux connaître, le Père Krusinski.” 2 See Professor Weir’s translation, loc. cit. p. 486, and Clairac, vol. I, pp. 99 and 106. 8 AEP, vol. vu, fol. 100a. 4 Fasc. 32, pp. 111-21. 6 It is through the kindness of Dr Lang that I have been able to include this reference to Gabashvili’s article.

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APPENDIX VI 4. Muhammad Käzim, of Merv

It is very fortunate that the first volume of Muhammad Kazim’s detailed biography of Nädir Shäh has recently been discovered in Russia, and it is now available, together with the other two volumes, in the Institut Vostokovedeniya in Leningrad.1 The Soviet scholar N. D. Miklukho-Maklai has used this first volume as one of his sources for an article in the Ucheniye Zapiski entitled “ Iz Istorii Afganskogo Vladichestva v Irane (20-Godi XVIII v)”.1 2 It appears from this article that the full title of this work is the “ ‘Älam-ärä-yi-Nädiri ”.3 No copy of this first volume is yet available in this country, so it has not been possible to examine it. So far as one can judge from N. D. Miklukho-Maklai’s article, it should prove to be at least as valuable a source for the period from 1694 to 1730 as the earlier portion of Mïrzâ Mahdï’s Tarikh-i-Nädiri. Although the emphasis will, no doubt, prove to be mainly on Nädir, it should nevertheless provide us with much interesting and valuable data on the general course of events in the country during those years. 5. Muhammad Khalil Mar'ashi

Muhammad Khalil Mar‘ashl was descended in the female line from Shäh Sulaimän, as his great-grandfather Mïrzâ Dä’üd, the mutawalli or administrator of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä at Mashhad had married Shahribänü Begum, the eldest daughter of the monarch. His uncle Sayyid Muhammad, who was also mutawalli of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä, deposed and blinded Shahrukh, Nädir’s grandson, in December 1749, and reigned as Shäh Sulaimän II ; he occupied the throne for only forty days, as he was then in his turn deposed and deprived of his sight. Muhammad Khalil began his Majma‘ al-Tawärikh with the Ghalzai revolt in 1120 (1708/9) and continued his history up to 1207 (1792/3), the year in which he completed it. M. ‘Abbäs Iqbäl, who has edited and annotated the printed edition of this 1 The reference in the Institut Vostokovedeniya is AN SSSR, no. D 430. 2 Series no. iv, 1954, pp. 138-58. 8 The titles of the second and third volumes are, respectively, the “ Kitâb-iNâdirï” and the “Nädir-Näma”. Photostat copies of these two volumes are in the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

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APPENDIX VI

book,1 has described it in his introduction as being one of the best and most important historical works in the Persian language, despite some faults of omission.12 The first half of the book is devoted to events in the reigns of Shah Sultan Husain and the two Afghan usurpers. In a number of places it throws light on matters that would otherwise have remained obscure. For example, the author shows that Lutf ‘Ali Khän Däghistäm, far from defeating Mahmüd and forcing him to fly from Kirmän to Qandahär on the occasion of his first attack on Persia, remained inactive with the bulk of his large army at Kong. All that Lutf ‘All did in response to the frantic appeals for help which reached him from Kirmän was to send a totally inadequate force to its relief.3 There therefore seems to be no doubt that the story recounted by certain European historians of Lutf ‘ Ali Khän’s glorious victory over Mahmüd is purely apocryphal, and that the sole reason for Mahmûd’s abrupt withdrawal from Kirmän was the revolt that had broken out at Qandahär in his absence. Most interesting is Muhammad Khalil’s account of the state of affairs at the Persian court in the latter part of the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain. He had quite a favourable opinion of Fath ‘All Khän Däghistäm, although he was so hostile to his nephew Lutf ‘Ali Khän. He showed that whenever Fath ‘Ali Khän wished to take proper steps for the restoration of order in the country, he was thwarted by some other minister. He said that whoever could gain the ear of the feeble Shäh and ask for the issue of some order, invariably was answered with the words Yakhshi dir (“Very good”), and so had his own way, but only until some other minister went to the Shäh, when the previous answer was countermanded.4 The natural consequence was chaos and ultimate disaster. Muhammad Khalil recounts at considerable length the adven­ tures of Sayyid Ahmad, the great-grandson of Shäh Sulaimän I, relating how he left Tahmäsp in disgust because of his drunkenness and ignorance, and describing his subsequent struggles with the Afghans, Turks and even Tahmäsp’s forces, his coronation at Kirmän in Rabï‘ I, 1139 (October-November, 1726), and finally his surrender to Ashraf, who later put him to death. 1 Published in Tehran in 1328 (1949/50). 2 Majma* al-Tawarikh, p. ii. 3 Ibid. pp. 53-4. See also p. 112 above.

511

4 Majma* al-Tauârïkh, p. 48.

APPENDIX VI

So far as our period is concerned, the book, although excellent in many respects, is somewhat uneven. It would have been better as a general history of the period if rather less space had been devoted to Sayyid Ahmad and more to the siege of Isfahän, the abdication of Shäh Sultän Husain and the vicissitudes of Tahmäsp. There are a number of gaps in the narrative; for example, nothing is said regarding the controversial question of Fath ‘Alî Khän Qäjär (fortunately, this particular gap can be adequately filled from other sources). 6. Mïrzâ Mahdi Although the relevant portion of Mïrzâ Mahdï’s Tarïkh-iNädiri is relatively short, it is nevertheless of sufficient importance to justify some mention here. Mïrzâ Mahdï’s introductory remarks are of interest in a number of respects. He deals briefly, but quite accurately, with the Ghalzai revolt and the murder of Giorgi XI, and it is he who gives the correct name of Mir Wais’s brother and immediate successor, Mïr ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (not ‘Abdullah). He then goes on to describe the revolt of the Abdälis (who were, he points out, more numerous than the Ghalzais),1 and the various ineffectual measures that the Persian government took to suppress the two rebellious tribes. Considerably later in his book he gives us some valuable information on the struggle for supremacy between the various Abdâlï chiefs. Mïrzâ Mahdï has but little to say either of the battle of Gulnäbäd or of the siege of Isfahän; this reticence is quite under­ standable, as Nädir was far away in Khuräsän at that time. He describes cursorily and not very accurately the Russian occupation of Gïlân, and alludes rather briefly to the Turkish invasion of Persia. Of greater value is what he has to say of certain of the claimants (for the most part impostors)12 to the Persian throne who led rebellions in various parts of the country after Mahmüd’s slaughter of the royal princes early in 1725. With Mïrzâ Mahdï’s account of the birth, childhood and early 1 TN, p. 4. 2 Except for Sayyid Ahmad, who was descended from the Safavis through the female line.

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career of Nadir we are not concerned here, and it is not until he relates how Nädir first came into contact with Tahmäsp that our interest is really aroused. Then comes the struggle for supremacy between Fath ‘Ali Khän Qäjär and Nädir. Very curious indeed is Mirzä Mahdi’s version of what took place when the Qäjär chief was disgraced and executed. Instead of stating the facts, namely, that Fath ‘All Khän had been caught red-handed in his endeavour to betray Tahmäsp, Mirzä Mahdi makes the singularly un­ convincing statement that Fath ‘Ali Khän was disgraced and executed at Tahmäsp’s orders because he had asked for permission to leave the army whilst the siege of Mashhad was in progress in order to go to Astaräbäd to levy fresh troops. It was the divergence between the accounts which Muhammad Muhsin and Mirzä Mahdi gave of this incident that led me astray when I was attempting to deal with the matter in my Nadir Shah, I imagined, quite wrongly as I see now, that Muhammad Muhsin had invented the story of Fath ‘Alï Khän’s treason in order to deflect any blame from Nädir. As we now know from Avramov, Nädir was quite innocent, despite the fact that the sudden removal of his rival from the scene was singularly opportune for him. Why did not Mirzä Mahdi give the true explanation? Possibly the reason is to be found in his desire, eleven years after Nädir’s death, to ingratiate himself with Muhammad Hasan Khän, Fath ‘Alï Khän’s son, as is apparent from the concluding paragraph of certain editions1 of the TN which contains fulsome praise of that Qäjär chief. 7. The “ Tadhkirat al-Mulük” It is impossible to exaggerate the extent of our indebtedness to the anonymous author of the TM, whose work Professor Minorsky rightly regards as of really outstanding importance for the study of Safavï institutions. In its somewhat dull and prosaic way, it provides us with a wealth of detail on the complicated govern­ mental machinery of the Safavis. In his introduction to his English translation of the TM, Professor Minorsky, after appraising the works of such European writers as Père Raphaël du Mans, Chardin, Kaempfer, Sanson and de Bruyn, says that where their books “merely describe, the Tadhkirat al-Mulük gives the 1 These bear at the end the date 1171 (1757/8). 33

5 J3

LSD

APPENDIX VI

ipsissima verba of Persian administrators”. He adds, moreover, that it contains many items that are not otherwise known.1 The book was written in or about 1726, the second year of Ashraf’s reign, as a manual of instruction for the Afghan conquerors of Persia who, by reason of their comparatively obscure origin and upbringing, were without the experience or knowledge required for governing a large country. As Professor Minorsky has so adequately described this book in his introduction and commentary, it is unnecessary to say more here than that it is indispensable for a proper understanding of the administrative machinery of Persia as it was immediately before the catastrophe of 1722. It is, indeed, a most fortunate thing that this work has not only been preserved, but also that it has been rendered into English and annotated by so competent an authority. 8. Ridä Qulï Khän “Hidäyat”

Ridä Qulï Khan, who was afterwards poetically called “ Hidâyat ” was born in Tehran on 15 Muharram 1215 (8 June 1800). He was a descendant of a well-known fourteenth-century poet, Shaikh Kamal Khujandï, who was a contemporary and friend of Häfiz. Charles Schefer, in the introduction to his French translation of Rida Qulï Khän’s Relation de P Ambassade au Khwarezm, said he was a man “ que l’on peut, à juste titre, mettre au premier rang des littérateurs et des érudits qui ont fleuris en Perse dans le cours de ce siècle”.2 With Ridä Qulï Khän’s poetical works we are not concerned here, and mention will be made only of his edition and con­ tinuation of Mirkhwänd’s history which, in compliment to Näsir al-Dïn Shäh, he entitled Raudat al-Safä-yi-Näsiri. It was published in Tehran in ten volumes of which the last three contain Ridä Qulï Khän’s continuation of the history down to his own time. These volumes were published between 1270 and 1274 (1853-6). The period from 1694 to 1730 is covered in the eighth of these volumes; an unfortunate feature of this volume is the absence of pagination, thus making it impossible to give precise references. A point of some interest is Ridä Qulï Khän’s anticipation of Oswald Spengler’s identification, in his Der Untergang des 1 TM, p. ii.

2 P. x.

5*4

APPENDIX VI

Abendlandes; Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte (Munich, 1920), of civilisations with animate beings when he, in writing of the decline and fall of the Safavï dynasty, draws a parallel between the setting up, growth, decline and fall of dynasties and the birth, growth, decline and death of human beings.1 With regard to his narrative of events, Rida Qulï Khän follows Mirzä Mahdi and other earlier writers fairly closely, but the scale is necessarily reduced. His narrative has to be used with care, because his chronology is not always above reproach, as, for instance, when he is writing of the mission of Ismä'il Beg to St Petersburg and the Russian occupation of Gilän. When we come to the controversial matter of the death of Fath ‘Alï Khän Qäjär, we find, as we might expect, that Ridä Qulï Khän accuses Nädir of having poisoned Tahmäsp’s mind against the Qäjär chief. Ridä Qulï Khän’s description of the course of subsequent events down to the end of the Afghan epoch calls for no special comment, except that there is occasional inaccuracy over dates. Schefer was undoubtedly justified in saying that Ridä Qulï Khän had “... pour presenter exactement les faits, puisé aux meilleures sources et il a pu consulter des ouvrages qui ne sont point parvenus en Europe.” 2 On the other hand, although he had certainly consulted the best sources, he did not, at least in so far as this part of his book is concerned, always make the best use of them. 9. Miscellaneous

Amongst the regional histories which may be consulted to advantage are the Färs-näma-yi-Näsiri, by Hasan ibn Hasan, called “Fasâ’ï”, and the Tärlkh-i-Pan-Sad Säla-yi-Khüzistän, by Sayyid Ahmad Kasravî. Fasâ’ï’s work, which, like Ridä Qulï Khän’s continuation of the Raudat al-Safä, was called Näsiri in honour of Näsir al-Dïn Shäh, was lithographed in Tehran in the year preceding the assassination of the monarch in 1896. It is geographical as well as historical. Although primarily, of course, concerned with Färs, it is also of value for the information which it provides of events in other parts 1 See p. 17 above. 2 Relation de V Ambassade au Kharezm de Riza Qouly Khan traduite et annotée par Charles Schefer (Paris, 1879), p. xx.

5X5

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APPENDIX VI

of the country. The author has derived his facts from western as well as Persian sources. The late Sayyid Ahmad Kasravi’s Tär'ikh-i-Pan-Sad Säla-yiKhüzistän, which was published in Tehran in the solar year 1312 (1933/4), is of value particularly in elucidating the tangled history of the great Musha‘sha‘ family, to which the traitor Sayyid ‘Abdullah, who was Väli of ‘Arabistän during the last year or two of the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain, belonged. Also of interest is what the author has to say of the Persian occupation of Basra and of the adventures of the spurious Safi Mirzä in ‘Arabistân. Of much more limited value than either of the two works described above is the “Zubdat al-Tawârïkh-i-Sinandijï”, by Muhammad Sharif ibn Mullä Mustafä, who was Qädi of Ardalän in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth. He compiled his work for Khusrau Khän, the governor of that province. Despite its title, it is by no means concerned solely with Kurdistän, its earlier portion being of a much more general character. The part covering our period is on fols. 203b to 206b. This work, which exists only in MS., is no. 18 in the Browne Collection in the University Library, Cambridge. In an entirely different category, and worthy of mention only as a curiosity, is a biography of Ashraf Shäh by an anonymous author. It is in the Malay language, and is entitled Hikäyat Sultän Hashraf [szc] dhikri ‘Ajam ; an extract from it is given by P. P. Roorda van Eysinga at the end of his Malay dictionary. B. EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES

i. Father Krusinski, S. J. Father Tadeusz Juda1 Krusinski was born at Brzezic, in Poland, on 6 May 1675. He entered the Society at the age of 18, and subsequently showed such an aptitude for Oriental languages that, in 1707, he was sent to Persia to join the Jesuit missions there. His energy and ability were such that, in 1720, he was made ProcuratorGeneral of these missions. 1 I have adopted the Polish spelling of these names, as given by Gabrjel Korbut in his Literatura Polska, vol. n, p. 10. The name Tadeusz or Thaddaeus was sometimes taken by missionaries going to Persia because the Saint of that name (who was otherwise known as St Jude), according to a legend, had preached the Gospel to the Persians. 516

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Bishop Barnabas Fedeli, of Isfahan, had recently received three briefs from Pope Clement XI,1 as well as letters from the Emperor and Louis XIV, directing him to seek redress from the Persian government for the destruction of the Capuchin missions at Tiflis and Ganja by the “ schismatic” Armenians. It was doubtless because of this development that the Bishop, knowing of Krusihski’s linguistic attainments, appointed him his secretary and interpreter, and sent him to Tehran, where the Persian court then was, to conduct the negotiations. Krusinski accomplished his task to the best of his ability, and returned to Isfahän early in December 1720, just before the fall of Fath ‘All Khän Däghistäni, the rtimäd al-Daula. He had to make a second journey soon after­ wards, but no dates are given.2 In April 1721 the Shäh and his court returned to Isfahän, and Krusinski was thenceforward in frequent touch with it. Although he did not play so conspicuous a role there as Père Raphael du Mans had done in the latter part of the previous century, his contact with the ministers and court officials enabled him to gain an insight into all that was happening. This knowledge was to stand him in good stead later, when he was writing his memoirs. Krusinski was in Isfahän at the time of Mahmud’s second invasion of Persia, and he remained in the city until just before the end of the siege, when he received a special dispensation from Mahmüd to go to Julfa. This dispensation was granted because the Jesuit father who had remained in Julfa (whose name has not, apparently, been recorded) had managed to cure, by purely veterinary methods and medicaments, a high Afghan official after his own physicians had given up his case as hopeless. This Jesuit informed his grateful patient that Krusinski was even more skilled than he was in such matters, with the result that Mahmud readily gave permission for him to come to Julfa.3 Krusinski was favourably received at Mahmud’s court and remained as closely in touch with it as he had been with that of Shäh Sultän Husain during the last two years of his reign. He was in Isfahän at the time of Mahmüd’s illness, and his account of the 1 For an English translation of these briefs, see A Chronicle of the Carmelites, vol. I, pp. 554“62 Ibid. p. 556. 3 See pp. vi-ix of the preface to Père du Cerceau’s recension of Krusinski’s memoirs, entitled Histoire de la Dernière Révolution de Perse (The Hague, 1728).

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curious episode of the reading of the Red Gospel over his head has a very authentic ring about it, despite Voltaire’s gibe.1 Krusinski left Isfahän for Europe early in June 1725, a few weeks after Ashraf’s accession to the throne. He travelled in company with ‘Abd al-‘Azïz, the ex-muleteer whom Ashraf had appointed as his ambassador to Turkey. For reasons that have already been given, ‘Abd al-‘Azîz and those with him did not reach Scutari until 20 January 1726.2 Krusinski had thus been continuously in Persia for eighteen years, that is, from just before the outbreak of the serious troubles until the early part of Ashraf’s reign. Due to this fact and to the posi­ tion that he had occupied, particularly in later years, he had been able to acquire first-hand knowledge of many important events. Soon after reaching Turkey, Krusinski became confessor to Prince Francis II Rakdczy at Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora, where the Prince had settled some years previously.3 We do not know whether Krusinski had written part of his memoirs before he left Persia; all that can be said for certain is that he completed his task at Rodosto. He apparently used Latin instead of his native Polish: for reasons which will be given later, this question of Krusinski’s original text is a difficult one to solve. It is possible that the Latin work which he published in 17404 may be a slightly amended version of this original text. However that may be, we have it on the authority of La Mamie de Clairac (who was in Constantinople from 1724 to early in 1727) that Rakoczy ordered his first secretary, a Frenchman named Bechon, to translate these memoirs into French and that this work was done “sous les yeux du Père Krisinski”.5 There can be no doubt that this was the French translation which Krusinski sent to Père Fleuriau d’Arménonville, the Procurator of the Jesuit missions in the Levant and editor of the Nouveaux Mémoires des Missions de la Société de Jésus dans le Levant.* Before saying anything more respecting this French translation, mention must be made of a mysterious work in Latin by Krusinski which, according to Sommervogel, was published in Rome in 1727 under the title Relatio de Mutationibus Memorabilibus Regni 1 See p. 209 above. 2 Seep. 283 above. 8 Von Hammer, vol. xiv, p. 197. * See p. 524 below. * Clairac, vol. i, p. li. 6 Published in Paris in seven volumes between 1715 and 1729.

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Persarum. Sommervogel admits that he never saw this work. When in Rome in 1954, I searched in vain for it in the Vatican Library, and my friend Father J. P. Smith, S.J., very kindly made inquiries in a number of other libraries in the city, but he likewise met with no success. He came to the conclusion that, if this work still exists, it is only in MS. K. Estreicher, in his Bibliografia Polska, also mentions this Relatio and makes the surprising statement that French and English translations have been made from it.1 He has, apparently, confused it with Clodius’s later Latin translation of the Tarïkh-i-Sayyâh, Père Fleuriau d’Arménonville did not include Bechon’s trans­ lation of Krusihski’s memoirs in his series of volumes on the Jesuit missions in the Levant, presumably because he did not consider them to be in suitable form. This presumption is based on the fact that he sent the text to another Jesuit, Père Jean-Antoine du Cerceau, to be edited and amended. Du Cerceau, who was born in Paris in 1670 and who entered the Society eighteen years later, was a man of some literary eminence. He was the author of a number of poems in Latin and French, and also of several plays. He was more successful as a poet than as a playwright, and was considered to be in the second or third class of poets.2 He was a rapid writer, and it has been said of him that he often failed to read through and correct what he had written. This failing may account for some of the errors in his version of Krusihski’s work. As he states in his preface,3 du Cerceau made considerable alterations in the memoirs. He radically changed the order of the contents, so as to get the events described into chronological sequence. Krusihski’s work, as we know from du Cerceau, was divided into three parts. The first dealt with the arrival of the Ghalzais before Isfahän, their siege and capture of the city, the 1 Krakow, 1905, vol. xx. Korbut, in his Literatura Polska> vol. n, p. 10, goes even further, saying that this Relatio was translated into Turkish, Dutch and German, as well as French and English. 2 Voltaire was somewhat unfair to du Cerceau in the following notice in his Oeuvres (Paris, 1834, vol. xix, p. 102): “ On trouve dans ses poésies françaises, qui sont du genre médiocre, quelques vers naifs et heureux. Il a mêlé à la langue épurée de son siècle le langage marotique, qui énerve la poésie par sa malheureuse facilité et qui gâte la langue de nos jours par des mots et des tours surannés?* 8 Vol. I, pp. xiv and xv.

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abdication of Shah Sultan Husain, Mahmud’s reign and terrible end, and Ashraf’s reign up to the end of 1725. The second part went back to the origin of the Afghan revolt, Mir Wais’s career and that of his successor ‘Abd al^Azîz,1 Mahmüd’s accession and his first invasion of Persia. The last part, which was as long as the other two combined, described the chaotic state of the country and laid emphasis on the evil consequences of rule by eunuchs.1 2 Du Cerceau, besides rearranging the narrative chronologically, greatly condensed the last part. He also contributed a short history of the Safavi dynasty from its foundation in 1499 (sic) up to the beginning of the epoch described by Krusinski, and he added a continuation of the work up to the conclusion of the peace treaty between Ashraf and the Turks in October 1727. He expressly pointed out in his preface that a distinction must be drawn between the part that was based on the original memoirs and this supplementary matter which was, he admitted, merely culled from periodicals. The first edition of du Cerceau’s recension was published in two volumes at The Hague (though the printing was done in Paris) early in 1728; it was entitled Histoire de la Dernière Révolution de Perse. There can be no doubt that du Cerceau’s more logical rearrange­ ment of the subject matter was a great improvement. Also, as du Cerceau was a practised writer of some note, it is highly probable that the style was better than that of Bechon’s translation. There are naturally some faults to be found in the book; here we are confronted with a difficulty because, in default of Krusinski’s original version and of Bechon’s translation, it is sometimes hard to determine whether du Cerceau or Krusinski is to blame. In some cases we can, however, be reasonably sure. Let us take the apocryphal story of Lutf ‘All Khän’s victory over Mahmüd in 1720. Here it is plainly Krusinski who is at fault, because du Cerceau expressly stated that he inserted no facts or statements in his narrative other than what were to be found in the memoirs themselves.3 The same remark applies to the incorrect statement on page 255 of the second volume that Safi Mirza was the eldest 1 Du Cerceau does not give his name; in Krusinski’s 1740 work, p. 281, it is given as Abdulla (sic). 2 This arrangement is similar to, but not identical with, that of the 1740 work. 8 Vol. I, p. xiv.

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of Shah Sultan Husain’s sons, whereas he was really the second son. Here again, it must be Krusinski and not his editor who was to blame. Some further points arise in the following passage on page 62 of du Cerceau’s second volume: “Machmet-Wali étoit Prince d’Hacvuza dans cette partie de l’Arabie qui dépend de la Perse. Ses Etats, qui sont considérables, touchent à la Province des Aghvans de Hazaray.. First, “Machmet” is intended for “Muhammad”, but, as we know from other sources, the Väli of ‘Arabistän (not “Arabie”) at that time was named ‘Abdullah, who had recently replaced or supplanted his son Muhammad as Väli. Evidently, Krusinski had confused them; in his 1740 work, Krusinski added to the confusion by stating that the Väli was Sayyid Farajullah, ‘Abdullah’s father and therefore the grandfather of Muhammad.1 “Hacvuza” is du Cerceau’s rendering of “Hawiza” ; elsewhere in the book he got nearer the correct form with “Havousa”.1 2 These are only trivial points; more serious is the geographical error in placing ‘Arabistän alongside the country of the Hazäras; this is a mistake that Krusinski could not have made. Such errors, however, must not be stressed unduly. It is essential to keep a sense of proportion; by so doing, we see that the good points of the book greatly outweigh the blemishes. As for du Cerceau, we must make allowance for the fact that he knew no Oriental language. Moreover, until he began work on Krusihski’s memoirs, he had probably read little or nothing of Persian history. The following comment in Elphinstone’s Account of the Kingdom of Caubul is fair neither to Krusinski nor to du Cerceau:3

There is also a particular history of the Ghiljie conquest, drawn up from the notes of a Père Krusinski, who was in Isphahaun at the time ; but the easy faith of the good Jesuit, and the lively imagination of his French editor, have produced an historical romance, which, though not destitute of information, requires as much knowledge to distinguish between the truth and the falsehood as would have sufficed for the production of a correct history. That the book was popular amongst the contemporaries of Krusinski and du Cerceau is clearly shown by the number of 1 P. 315, where the name appears as Feredz-ulla-Vali. 2 On the same page, Krusinski gives this name as Havuzae. 8 London, 1815, p. 436n.

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editions of it that appeared and by the fact that it was translated into English and other European languages.1 Du Cerceau did not long survive the publication of the book, as he was accidentally shot and killed by his pupil, the young Prince de Conti, on 4 July 1730. Meanwhile, however, the book had attracted notice as far afield as Turkey. The Grand Vizier ordered Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa, a learned and cultured man of Hungarian origin, who was super­ intendent of the then newly founded imperial press in Constanti­ nople, to translate the work into Turkish. Although it has sometimes been asserted that Krusinski himself translated his memoirs into Turkish, this is clearly erroneous, as is also the belief that Ibrâhîm Efendî used Krusinski’s Latin text. If one compares Ibrâhïm’s Turkish translation with du Cerceau’s text, one finds that the general arrangement is very similar, and obviously quite unlike that of Krusinski’s memoirs as they were in their original form. Moreover, if Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa used Krusinski’s Latin text, why was it necessary for a Latin translation of the Turkish book to be made later? The argument in favour of Ibrâhîm having used du Cerceau’s rendering is therefore very strong, if not unassailable. In translating the work, Ibrâhîm corrected a number of errors, consulting where necessary some Persians who were then in Constantinople. He finished his translation on 1 Dhu’l-Hijja 1141 (28 June 1729), and the book was issued from the press two months later, on 1 Safar (26 August), under the title Tarikh-i-Sayyäh dar bayän-i-zuhür-i-Aghväniyän u sabab-i-inhidäm-i-DaulatA-Shähäni-Safavïyân (“Chronicle of a traveller in explanation of the appearance of the Afghans and the reason for the overthrow of the government of the Safavi Sovereigns”). The book, which is well printed, consists of some introductory pages (including a table of contents) and ninety-seven folios of text. The table of contents and the chapter headings are in Persian. 1 See the bibliographies of Krusinski and du Cerceau by Sommervogel, Estreicher, Korbut, Babinger (Stambuler Buchwesen im 18. Jahrhundert, Leipzig, 1919), A. T. Wilson and others. Some of these authorities have wrongly attributed to Krusinski and du Cerceau the Abbé de Claustre’s Histoire de Thamas Kouli-Kan, nouveau roi de Perse, ou Histoire de la dernière révolution de Perse, arrivée en 1732. This book figures twice in the catalogue of the Biblio­ thèque Nationale, Paris, once wrongly under du Cerceau, and once correctly under de Claustre. It should be obvious from the date given in the title that du Cerceau could not have written it.

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When one examines this Turkish translation, one can clearly discern the hand of Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa here and there, although his rendering is faithful enough on the whole. He omits Krusinski’s interesting account of the ceremony of the Red Gospel,1 and he occasionally inserts allusions and phrases that the Jesuit author would never have used, such as the quotation from the Qur'an on folio 56b,12 and some epithets of a flowery nature. Evidently with the aid of some Persian, he amended the account of the death of Giorgi XI at the hands of Mir Wais, and added that the former was “drowned, like Pharaoh the faithless [i.e. infidel], in the sea of annihilation”.3 However, Ibrâhim’s changes and insertions did not result in improvement in every case. For example, while Krusinski had omitted to give the name of Mir Wais’s brother and immediate successor, Ibrahim gave it as ‘Abdullah.4* It would appear that he got this name from the Armenian Joseph Apisalaimian, with whom he must have been acquainted; the correct name of Mir Wais’s successor is ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.6 Not content with this Turkish text, Dâmâd Ibrâhîm, the Grand Vizier, gave orders for a Latin translation of it to be made. Through Mustafâ Efendi, the Turkish ambassador at Vienna, Johann Christian Clodius, the well-known Professor of Arabic at Leipzig, was invited to undertake the work. Clodius was reluctant to agree, as he was unwell at the time, but, stung with the taunts of some of his enemies that he knew no Turkish, he gave his consent and worked with such vigour that he completed his translation in the amazingly short space of six weeks. Clodius’s Latin translation was published by the firm of Gleditsch of Leipzig in 1731, under the title Tärikh-i-Sayyäh [in Arabic characters] Hoc est Chronicon peregrinantis seu Historia ultimiBelliPersarum cum Aghwanis gesti* We must now return to Krusinski. It appears that he continued to be Rakoczy’s confessor at Rodosto until late in 1728, when it was intended that he should return to Persia. He did not go to that country, however, as he considered the roads to be unsafe, and he 1 See p. 208 above. 2 Curiously enough, this quotation is incomplete. Owing, perhaps, to a compositor’s error, part of it has been omitted. The full quotation, which is from Sura xv, v. 46, reads: Udkhulaha bi-salämin aminina, meaning: ‘‘Enter ye therein [i.e. into Paradise] in peace, securely ”, but bi-saläm'* has been left out. 8 Fol. 27 b. 4 Fol. 34 b. 6 See p. 93 above. 6 For the complete title, see the bibliography.

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thereupon went back to his native Poland where, it seems, he remained for the rest of his life.1 Although Krusinski never returned to Persia, he retained an interest in it and its history as long as he lived. In 1733 he published at Lemberg (Lwow) his Latin translation of Durri Efendi’s account of his mission to the Persian court in the winter of 1720/1, and seven years later, also at Lemberg, he had this translation reprinted and bound up with a new edition of his history entitled Tragica vertentis Belli Persici Historia per repetitas clades, ab anno 1711 ad annum 1728 continuata, post Gallicos, Hollandicos, Germanicos ac demum Turcicos Autores.... As Dr D. M. Lang has remarked in a recent monograph,2 1 ‘this juxtaposition is highly appropriate, since Durri Efendi predicts in his report the impending doom of the Persian monarchy”. It is, moreover, possible that Krusinski’s interest in Durri Efendi’s report may have been due, in part, to his having met the Turkish envoy during his second visit to Tehran, but we have no proof that such a meeting took place. They could not have met in Turkey, as Durri Efendi died in 1722.3 In 1755 Krusinski’s last work on Persia appeared; it was called the Analecta ad tragica belli Persici Historiam. In the following year, on 22 May, he died at Kaminiek at the age of 81. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century a copy of the Tarikh-i-Sayyäh came into the possession of ‘Abbas Mirza, the eldest son of Fath ‘Ali Shäh. The prince found the book of such interest that, at his orders, ‘Abd al-Razzäq, the author of the “Ma’äthir-i-Sultäniya”, translated it into Persian in condensed form, under the title “ Basirat-näma dar gudhärish u istilä-yiAfghän bar Isfahän dar zamän-i-daulat-i-Shäh Sultän Husain”.4 In 1840, George Newnham Mitford translated Clodius’s Latin version into English, terming it The Chronicles of a Traveller: or a History of the Afghan Wars with Persia in the Beginning of the last 1 In his brief notice of Krusinski, Sommervogel is in error in stating that he spent five years in Rome after reaching Europe from Persia. 2 “Georgia and the Fall of the Safavi Dynasty”, BSOAS (1952), vol. xiv, p. 529. 3 Professor F. Babinger, Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke, p. 326. 4 See Rieu, Supplement to the Catalogue of the Persian MSS. in the British Museum, no. 63. See also C. A. Storey, Persian Literature, a Bio-Bibliographical Survey, sect. 11, fasc. 1, pp. 321 and 335. 524

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Century, from their Commencement to the Accession of Sultan Ashruf To this translation Mitford added a brief and not altogether accurate account of events in Persia up to the murder of Tahmäsp and his two sons in 1740? In Poland, naturally enough, Krusihski’s career and historical works have on a number of occasions attracted the attention of scholars. For example, in 1935 St Brzezinski published his Misjonarze i dyplomaci polscy w Persji w.XVII i XVIII’, in which he made particular mention of Krusinski and his works.2 More recently, J. Reichman has made, I understand, some reference to Krusihski’s writings in his book entitled Znajomosc nauczania jçzykow orientalnych w Polsce (Wroclaw, 1950).3 In conclusion we may say that, although Krusinski was not by any means infallible as an authority, we are, nevertheless, greatly in his debt, because he has provided us with a mass of information which is obtainable from no other source. It is no exaggeration to say that his work is the most valuable of the contemporary sources that have come down to us. 2. Louis-André de La Mamie de Clairac

Nothing seems to be known of the early life of Louis-André de La Mamie de Clairac. According to Michaud’s Biographie univer­ selle ancienne et moderne, he was born about 1690, but it appears from the preface to his Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle* that his birth did not take place until 1692 or the following year. We do not know who his father was, but it seems possible that he may have been Etienne de La Mamie de Clairac who, as we learn from Pinard,6 had a distinguished military career and was promoted to the rank of brigadier in 1706. The name is an uncommon one, and it therefore seems not unreasonable to put forward this suggestion, especially as Louis-André also adopted 1 Mitford incorrectly gave this date as 1739. 2 See the reference to this work in the Archivorum Historicum Sodetatis Jesu, vol. vi, p. 181. Fr Jean Simon, S.J., has very kindly drawn my attention to the existence of this book. 3 This reference has been taken from V. N. Gabashvili’s article “ loseb K’art’veli, XVIII s-is diplomat! da istorikosi”, in the Masalebi Sak'art’velosa da Kavkasisiis istoriisat’vis (Tiflis, 1955), fasc. no. 32, pp. 111-21. DrD. M. Lang, with his usual kindness, has given me this reference. 4 Vol. I, p. xxiii. 5 Chronologie historique-militaire (Paris), vol. vm, p. 185,

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a military career, entering the infantry when aged about 16. The family came originally from the town or district of Clairac, in the Departement of Lot-et-Garonne, but the present town clerk, in answer to an inquiry by me, said that no members of the family were now living there or in the neighbourhood. After serving in the infantry until 1712, Louis-André transferred to the Génie or Engineers, and took part in that same year in the sieges of Quesnoy and Bouchain. He retired from the army after the war of the Spanish Succession came to an end, but he appears to have rejoined it in 1723 with the rank of captain. In 1724, however, he evidently left it again, as he was able to go to Con­ stantinople in the summer of that year actuated, as he says himself, by “Fesprit de la curiosité”. He remained in the Turkish capital until the beginning of 1727, when he was recalled to France owing to the “faux bruits d’une guerre”. Clairac reached Constantinople at a time when Persia and her affairs were attracting much attention there. On 24 June was signed the iniquitous treaty between Turkey and Russia for the partition of a large part of Persia, the successful conclusion of which was so largely due to the efforts of the Marquis de Bonnac, the French ambassador. As Clairac himself says in his preface : “ Ce qui venoit de se passer en Perse, faisoit, vers la fin de 1724, tant de bruit à Constantinople, qu’on n’y parloit presque d’autre chose.. ..ni It is not therefore surprising that Clairac should then have begun to take an interest in Persia and the course of events there. The first written information that Clairac obtained on the subject of the Persian upheaval was a French translation of a memorandum in Turkish by a Bavarian renegade who had taken the name of Mustafä Efendi; this French translation was made for Clairac by d’Usson d’Alion, de Bonnac’s kinsman.1 2 Then came some belated despatches from Ange de Gardane. The next development was the arrival in Constantinople of Père Jérome, a French Carmelite, who had been in Isfahän during the siege.3 1 Histoire, vol. I, pp. iv and v. 2 I have been unable to trace either this memorandum or d’Alion’s French translation of it. 8 His full name was Père Jérome François de St Joseph. A letter from him on the siege of Isfahän was published in the Mercure de France in September 1726. For Père Jérome’s curious behaviour in Isfahan after the Afghans had occupied it, see A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia, vol. 11, p. 904.

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He wrote in Italian what Clairac described as 4‘une Relation fort succincte et assez fautive de ce qui s’y étoit passé”. The idea of writing his Histoire came to Clairac after he had read Père Reynal’s Relation de ce qui s’est passé dans la dernière Guerre de Persey pendant les années 1722, 1723, 1724 et 1725.1 Clairac must have seen this book in MS., because it was not published until 1727. Père Reynal’s Relation, though by no means free from errors, is a far more detailed and valuable source than Père Jerome’s book. It was at this juncture that Clairac first came into contact with Joseph Apisalaimian, who had recently arrived from Persia. He said to Joseph that he intended to write a book on the troubles in Persia, and Joseph approved the idea. Thereafter, Joseph and Clairac used to meet almost daily; on these occasions, Clairac used to consult him “la plume à la main” on Joseph’s own memoranda and those of other writers.12 Chirac’s search for material was greatly facilitated not only by Joseph, but also by his friends at the French Embassy who, besides placing consular reports and other official documents at his disposal, put him in touch, by correspondence, with the Gardanes, some of whose despatches and reports he had already seen. Clairac was also able to clear up certain obscure points by exchanging letters with Krusinski, but the latter refused to let him see his memoirs as he was intending to publish them.3* 6 De Bonnac was very helpful to Clairac, as he not only gave him a copy of the partition treaty, but also prepared specially for him an abridged version of his Mémoire historique sur VAmbassade de France à Constantinople, par le Marquis de Bonnac, avec un précis de ses négociations à la Porte Ottomaneï D’Usson d’Alion, in addition to translating Mustafä Efendi’s memorandum for Clairac, later translated Durrï Efendi’s account of his mission to Persia,5 1 This is the title of the MS., a copy of which is in AEP, vol. vn. For the title of the published work, see under Reynal (I) in the Bibliography. 2 Clairac, vol. 1, p. vi. 8 Clairac, vol. 1, pp. viii, ix and x. 4 De Bonnac entitled this abridged account: “Mémoire abrégé de ce qui s’est passé dans la négociation du Traité conclu à Constantinople entre les Moscovites et les Turcs”. I have not been able to trace this “Mémoire”, but I have made extensive use of de Bonnac’s official account. 6 I cannot trace this French translation. De Fiennes, one of the secretaries at the French Embassy at Constantinople, made a fresh translation in 1745, which Langlès published in Paris in 1810 under the title Relation de Dourry Efendy, Ambassadeur de la Porte Ottomane auprès du Roi de Perse.

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besides providing him with much information from his own personal experience. Clairac was recalled to France before he could complete more than the earlier portion of his book, and was thus cut off from direct contact with Joseph Apisalaimian and his other informants in Turkey. He took with him, however, a mass of material, and his friends in Constantinople and elsewhere in the Levant continued to supply him with information by letter. Clairac was naturally disappointed to find himself forestalled when, in 1728, du Cerceau’s recension of Krusinski’s memoirs appeared, but he was not discouraged for long. Soon afterwards, he set to work with even greater ardour than before. Moreover, he now had Krusinski’s book as an additional source. He was not, however, able to give undivided attention to his book. In fact, he took so long in writing it, owing to various interruptions, that one of his friends chaffingly predicted “que je serois plus de terns à écrire la conquête de la Perse, que Mahmoud, et aucun des Conquérans qui Ton précédé, n’en avoit employé à la faire.”1 The reasons for this delay were twofold. In the first place, he had to revert to an active military career. He was present at the sieges of Kehl and Philipsburg in 1733 and 1734 respectively. At Philips­ burg he was wounded in the arm, but he escaped lightly in comparison with his commanding officer, the Duke of Berwick, who was decapitated by a cannon-ball on 12 June 1734, a few weeks before the town surrendered. Clairac made rapid progress in the army, becoming in turn engineer-in-chief, colonel and finally, in 1748, brigadier. He took part in the sieges of Menin, Ypres, Furnes; Namur and Bergen-op-Zoom. In addition to his military duties, Clairac devoted much time to the compilation of a treatise on field engineering; for this task his long and varied experience as a military engineer was, naturally, of the utmost value. In 1749 the first edition of the first volume of Chirac’s Ingénieur de Campagne, ou Traité de la Fortification passagère, appeared, but he did not live to complete the second volume. Although he finished writing his Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle, his death, which occurred at Bergue on 6 May 1750, 1 Vol. i, p. xi.

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prevented him from seeing it in print; it was published post­ humously a few months later in the same year. Chirac’s former work, on field engineering, was held in high esteem for the best part of a century,1 but his Histoire de Perse, on which he had lavished so much time and trouble, has never received the recognition which it deserves. This book, besides being very clearly written, is admirably arranged. Each section or livre, of which there are nine, is preceded by a summary in which reference is made to the principal sources consulted. This feature and the quite extensive bibliography add very appreciably to the value of the work. The ninth livre ends with the expulsion of the Ghalzais, but the narrative is continued in somewhat disconnected fashion by a series of documents received from various sources up to Nadir Shah’s invasion of India. No doubt, if Clairac had had more time to spare, he would have incorporated this supplementary matter in some further livres or sections. Naturally enough, the book is not free from errors, but these, on the whole, are not serious; at least one of them is due to inaccuracy on the part of Joseph Apisalaimian, namely, the statement on p. 106 of the first volume that Mir Wais’s brother was called ‘Abdullah. In passing judgment, it must be borne in mind that Clairac knew no Persian, and that, moreover, the chief sources in that language on which we now rely, such as Muhammad Muhsin’s “Zubdat al-Tawârïkh” and Mirzä Mahdï’s Tâ'rïkh-iNädiri, were not available in Europe until long after his death. Jonas Hanway made very extensive use of Clairac’s book in the preparation of the earlier part of his own Travels, In his intro­ duction, when referring to the troubled period preceding the rise of Nädir, Hanway said:2 “The account which we have hitherto had of this matter is imperfect: I should not however have launched so deep, but that I found a French piece lately published, the author3 of which has taken great pains in collecting the best materials.” When we compare Hanway’s book with that of Clairac, we find 1 A second edition was published in 1757 and extracts from it appeared in the works of Lecointe and other writers. John Muller, Master of the Royal Academy at Woolwich, who was himself a prolific writer on military engineering, made an English translation, The Field Engineer of M. Ie Chevalier de Clairac, which ran to two editions. 2 Travels, vol. 1, p. xii. 8 Clairac’s name is given, but only in a footnote.

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that parts n to v of the former’s third volume and parts I to m of his fourth are, for the most part, translations of livres I to ix of Clairac’s Histoire. When we consider to what an extent Hanway was indebted to Clairac, his acknowledgment, if such it may be termed, is most perfunctory. Furthermore, Hanway omitted all Clairac’s valuable bibliographical material and references from his book. There is no doubt that Clairac’s Histoire is broader-based and better written than Krusihski’s work. It is not, however, a first­ hand account, and for that reason I have, after some hesitation, given pride of place to Krusinski. 3. Semeon Avramov Semeon Avramov was in Persia from 1720, when he was appointed Russian consul at Resht, until January 1729, when he returned to Russia. Of his earlier activities in Persia, we have not, so far, any account from his own pen,1 although we are told a good deal about his exploits at certain times by Soimonov and other writers. Fortunately, N. D. Miklukho-Maklai has recently published, with valuable explanatory matter, a number of extracts from Avramov’s “ Zapiski” which cover the period from June 1726 to January 1729, when he was occupying the post of Russian secretary to Tahmâsp. In this capacity, he was in very close contact with the prince. The period is a short one, but it is nevertheless very important. It was during it that Tahmäsp’s fortunes underwent a trans­ formation when he was joined by Nädir and achieved the first great step towards recovering his realm when he and his new supporter occupied Mashhad. Subsequently, a number of further steps were taken which resulted, after Avramov’s departure, in the recapture of Isfahän and the expulsion of the Ghalzais. Besides fully corroborating Muhammad Muhsin in regard to the treasonable activities of Fath ‘All Khän Qäjär, Avramov confirms what we have learnt from that writer and other con­ temporary Persian authorities of the prince’s weakness of character and dissolute ways, but the Russian’s account is so much more graphic and vivid that the prince becomes a living figure. He 1 It is possible that such an account may exist in the Moscow archives.

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describes him in his drunken moods (when he sometimes made Avramov fear for his life), but he also shows that Tahmäsp, on the comparatively rare occasions when he was sober, was by no means destitute of ability and common sense, Avramov also gives us a good insight into the character of Nadir, and he makes it abundantly clear that the contest between him and Tahmäsp was an unequal one. It was, indeed, impossible for a man of Tahmäsp’s calibre to resist so ruthless and determined a man as Nädir for long. Also of interest is what Avramov has to say of Nädir’s attitude towards the Russians, illustrating the change from his boastful utterance in January 1727 that he would kill them all to his realisation only a few months later that it might be politic after all if they were allowed to remain in Gïlân. One may sum up this brief survey of Avramov’s “Zapiski” by saying that they must be regarded as a major contribution to our knowledge of the period which they cover.

4. Other Russian Authorities

I have had, perforce, to utilise that rich repository of information, the Russian Archives at Moscow, at second- or third-hand. This I have done through the excellent medium of such works as Soloviev’s Istoriya Rossii, Butkov’s Materiali dlya novoi Istorii Rossii and the far more recent publications of N. D. MiklukhoMaklai and P. T. Arutunian. I am, however, painfully conscious of the fact that, even with such material at my disposal, I have been able to cover only a fraction of the ground. It is, for example, a matter for regret that I have not been in a position to gain access to Soloviev’s “Petr Veliki na Kaspiyskoe More”.1 A contemporary Russian authority of great value is Feodor Ivanovich Soimonov who, as related elsewhere in this book, did so much to explore the coasts and harbours of the Caspian Sea, besides rendering most useful service to his country in other ways. In 1762, G. F. Müller published, in his excellent Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. vu, pp. 155-530, the “Auszug aus dem Tage-Buch des ehmahligen Schif-Hauptmanns und jetzigen 1 Published in Vestniki Evropi, St Petersburg, March-April 1868.

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Geheimen Raths und Gouverneurs von Sibérien, Herrn Fedor Iwanowitsch Soimonow, von seiner Schiffahrt auf der Caspischen See”. In the following year Müller edited and published the Russian text of the above-mentioned work under the title of Opisaniye Kaspiyskogo Morya i chinennikh na onom rossiyskikh zavoevaniy. Soimonov also wrote a book on the subject of trade beyond the Caspian Sea with the title O Torgakh za Kaspiyskoe More drevnikh srednikh i novishikh Vremen, which was published in St Petersburg in 1765. A most useful work on the bibliography of Peter the Great is K. R. Mintslov’s1 Pierre le Grand dans la Littérature Etrangère (St Petersburg, 1872).

5. French Official Sources The French official sources are to be found in (i) the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, (ii) the Archives Nationales, and (iii) the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The most voluminous and at the same time the most valuable collection of official documents on Persia is at the Quai d’Orsay, in the series of volumes entitled ° Affaires Etrangères, Perse”. This series contains, inter alia, several memoranda on commercial matters by Jean Billon de Cansevilles, correspondence on the Fabre mission, the Marie Petit case, reports by Michel, despatches and reports from the Gardane brothers and Padery, memoranda by Joseph Apisalaimian, and sundry letters from French missionaries in Persia, such as Père Pierre d’lssoudun, the head of the Capuchin mission at Tabriz. From the economic point of view de Cansevilles’s memoranda are of considerable interest. Not only has he much to say on French commercial achievements and aspirations, but he also provides us with some most useful data on the trade carried on in Persia by the English and Dutch East India Companies and by the Armenians. De Cansevilles was a merchant of Marseilles and had an extensive knowledge of trade in the Levant. He was in Persia from 1698 to 1705 and he returned to that country on a shorter visit in 1707. His only fault was that he was rather too optimistic 1 The name is sometimes given as Minzloff. I am indebted to the late B. H. Sumner for drawing my attention to this book.

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as to the prospects for French trade with Persia.1 His commercial information was of great value to the French government at the time of the mission of Muhammad Ridä Beg to France and the negotiations for the 1715 treaty with Persia. He was still living in 1749, but was by then evidently in his dotage, as he sent in that year a memorandum eighty-four pages in length to Monseigneur de Rouillie, the Secretary of State and Minister of Marine, concerning a universal remedy.2 Included in vol. VI of the AEP series is the journal which Ange de Gardane kept during part of the siege of Isfahan; he un­ fortunately discontinued it after 1 July 1722, but, so far as it goes, it is a most valuable source, especially when read in conjunction with the Dagregister of the Dutch East India Company.3 Else­ where, in vols, v and Vil, are a number of despatches and letters from Ange de Gardane and, later, his brother François, which are also of interest. Here, in parenthesis, something may be said of the Gardane family and its connection with the east.4 It was a well-known family of Provence, and the first member of it to serve in the east was Louis de Gardane, who was consul at Sidon in 1611. Ange de Gardane, the elder son of Charles de Gardane and Claire de Cornier, after serving for some years in the Regiment des Gardes du Corps, entered the consular service in 1701.5 Fourteen years later, as already related, he was under orders to accompany, in the capacity of ambassador, Muhammad Ridä Beg on the latter’s return journey to Persia and then to take up his duties as French consul at Isfahän. The death of Louis XIV caused his departure for Persia to be postponed, and it was not until 1717 that he and his younger brother François reached that country. They were both in Isfahän during the siege and remained there throughout the reigns of Mahmüd and Ashraf. In 1726 Ange was partially paralysed by a stroke, when his consular duties were taken over by François. They returned to France greatly burdened with debt in 1732.6 1 See p. 458 above. 8 AEP, vol. vn, fol. 206b. 8 See p. 540 below. 4 I am greatly indebted to M. Ie Comte de Gardane, the great-great-greatgrandson of Ange de Gardane, for much of the genealogical and other data given here respecting this family. 8 AEP, “Mémoires et Documents”, vol. I, fol. 28a. 6 See p. 472 above.

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Ange de Gardane’s son Ange Nicolas was consul at Tripoli and Cyprus. Ange Nicolas, by his second marriage, had two sons, named Claude Mathieu and Ange Paul Louis. Claude Mathieu had a most distinguished military career and became a general under Napoleon. In 1807 he was sent as French ambassador to Persia, and was accompanied by his brother Ange Paul Louis as his first secretary. They returned to France in August 1809. In 1809 Ange Paul Louis published his Journal d’un Voyage dans la Turquie et Perse. It is surely a strange coincidence that two pairs of Gardane brothers should have served their country in Persia separated by an interval of seventy-seven years. In this series of archives are a number of despatches from Etienne Padery, the French consul at Shiraz, which are well worth perusing, but, owing to his hatred of Ange de Gardane, some of his statements regarding the latter must not be taken too seriously. Padery was of an active and enterprising nature, and he often encroached on Gardane’s field of activities. His principal achieve­ ment was the ratification by Persia of the treaty of 1715 with France; as already explained, this was, however, a Pyrrhic victory.1 Vol. xvii of the AEP series, entitled “Pièces Diverses en Langues Orientales”, and covering the period 1700 to 1800, contains three documents in Persian relating to the reign of Shäh Sultän Husain. The first of these, no. 13, is from the Khän of Erivan announcing the departure of Muhammad Ridä Beg for France; the second, no. 21, which is dated Rajab 1134 (6 January5 February 1722) is from the Shäh to Padery announcing the ratification of the treaty, while no. 23 is a raqam (decree) issued to the authorities at Kirmän authorising the establishment of a French factory there. Amongst the other documents in this volume is a letter (no. 35) from the Mihmändär-bäshl in Isfahän to the Comte de Maurepas asking for the nomination of François de Gardane in place of his paralysed brother. In vol. lxvi of the “Affaires Étrangères, Turquie” series are the Turkish text and Italian translation of the partition treaty of 1724 between Russia and Turkey. The Italian translation, which was signed by Gregorio Ghika, bears the Marquis de Bonnac’s ratification.2 2 Fols. 220 a to 228 b.

1 See p. 467 above.

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In the Archives Nationales are the Papiers de Paderi,1 which are supplementary to those at the Quai d’Orsay. They are not of great importance. Pierre Victor Michel’s official account of his mission to Persia in 1706-9 is not in the official archives, but is to be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale.2 It is a manuscript consisting of 248 pages and bears the title “Mémoire du Sr. Michel sur le Voyage qu’il a fait en Perse en Qualité d’Envoyé extraordinaire de sa Majesté dans les Années 1706, 1707, 1708 et 1709”. As numerous quotations from, and references to this most interesting and valuable source have already been made, no more need be said here except that it throws much light on the Marie Petit affair and the serious difficulties which Michel encountered when carrying out his mission. He concluded his “Mémoire” with a lengthy account of his negotiations for the treaty of 1708, and showed himself to have been very satisfied with his own efforts. Michel, who was born in Marseilles in 1678, was the son of a carpenter.3 He went to Turkey in 1703, where he was given employment at the French Embassy. Soon after his arrival in Constantinople de Ferriol sent him on a mission to Prince Rakoczy, from which he returned in 1705. In the following year, as we have seen, he set out on his Persian mission, on which he was engaged for three years. After a short stay in Constantinople, he went back to France, where he gave evidence against Marie Petit. He was subsequently appointed Consul-General at Tunis. At one time, the French government thought of sending him to Persia again, but, as we have seen, it sent Ange de Gardane instead. Michel died at Tunis in 1720. Brosset, not without reason, called Michel “une espèce d’in­ trigant”.4 Although one must make some allowance for the trouble that Marie Petit caused him in Persia, his conduct towards her was certainly reprehensible. In addition to the sources mentioned above that are to be found at the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, the Archives Nationales 1 The name is usually spelt with a final “y”. 2 The reference there is: Fonds français 7200. 8 “Documens originaux sur les Relations diplomatiques de la Géorgie avec la France vers la fin du règne de Louis XIV, recueillis par M. Brosset jeune*’ the Nouveau Journal Asiatique (1832), vol. IX, p. 201. 4 “Documens originaux”, loc. cit. p. 201.

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and the Bibliothèque Nationale, many documents of an official nature are quoted by C. Schefer in his edition of de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique sur U Ambassade de France à Constantinople.1 6. The Marquis de Bonnac

Jean-Louis d’Usson, the Marquis de Bonnac, who was born in 1672, began his career in the army,1 2 but, through the influence of his uncle, François de Bonrepaux, who had achieved distinction both as a naval officer and as a diplomat, he embarked on a diplomatic career in 1696. He soon showed an extraordinary aptitude for negotiation, and he achieved great success at a number of posts before being appointed as ambassador at Constantinople. The eight years (1716 to 1724) that he spent in the Turkish capital were, in Schefer’s opinion,3 the most brilliant of his whole career. His wife, who was a daughter of the Duc de Biron, was a friend of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. St Simon, in his Mémoires^ expressed a very favourable opinion of de Bonnac, saying that he had “ de l’esprit, de l’expérience et de la capacité dans les négociations où il avait passé sa vie, alors assez peu avancée”. After de Bonnac’s appointment as ambassador to Spain had ended, “l’emploi délicat, mais fort lucratif de Constantinople parut tout à la fois une dot et une récompense pour lui”.4 Never­ theless, according to Schefer, de Bonnac was at first reluctant to accept the Constantinople post, as he wished to go to Berlin instead.5 Enough has been said in ch. xvn of the great diplomatic ability which de Bonnac displayed in preventing war between Turkey and Russia over the spoils of Persia to render unnecessary any further mention of it here. On the other hand, the point must be stressed that his Mémoire is quite indispensable if one is to get a clear understanding of the very intricate, protracted and often highly critical negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the partition treaty of 1724. Schefer has said of this Mémoire

son récit ne saurait être lu avec trop d’attention, car il fait ressortir les procédés multiples de la diplomatie orientale et les efforts heureux 1 For an appreciation of this work, see below. 2 An account of de Bonnac’s military career and other details of his life will be found in Pinard, Chronologie historique-militaire, vol. vu, pp. 112-13. 3 See Schefer’s introduction to de Bonnac’s Mémoire historique, p. Ixii. 4 Paris, 1829/30, vol. xiv, p. 25. 6 Schefer, loc. cit. p. xx.

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que fit l’ambassadeur de France pour écarter toutes les difficultés qui pouvaient compromettre le succès des pourparlers et ne donne une idée plus nette et plus exacte de la manière dont les fonctionnaires ottomans traitaient, et traitent encore aujourd’hui, les affaires diplo­ matiques.1

Schefer’s high praise of de Bonnac’s Mémoire is certainly justified, as is also his eulogy of the ambassador’s great skill and dexterity as a negotiator, but, on the other hand, the moral aspect of the matter, in so far as the partition treaty is concerned,2 has escaped him. One must add, however, that moral considerations had but little importance in the eyes of Peter the Great, who rewarded de Bonnac for his services as mediator by giving him the Order of St Andrew. 7. The State Papers at the Public Record Office

As Great Britain had no diplomatic representation in Persia in the early eighteenth century, there are no documents in the Public Record Office of a diplomatic nature that emanate directly from, or were sent to, that country during that period. On the other hand, there are documents to be found in both the SP 91 (Russia) and the SP 97 (Turkey) series which contain references to the trend of events in Persia, but their main concern is, of course, with Russo-Turkish relations in so far as they were affected by happenings in that country. The papers in the SP series from St Petersburg are of little importance, and call for no comment here. In the Turkish series there is, however, a great deal that is of value. The papers in this Turkish series consist mainly of despatches from Abraham Stanyan, the British ambassador to the Porte (he succeeded Edward Wortley Montagu in 1719 and was himself succeeded by the Earl of Kinnoull in 1730); there are also a few despatches and letters from London which contain instructions on matters of policy. 1 Ibid. De Bonnac also wrote a number of other important memoranda whilst at Constantinople, but since they have no real bearing on Persian affairs, no mention of them is made here ; for particulars, see Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant au XVIlie Siècle, p. 254 n. a See pp. 236-7 above.

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It is of much interest to compare Stanyan’s despatches stage by stage with those from the successive French ambassadors to the Porte during his term of office.1 For reasons which have been given in ch* xvn,2 it was the aim of George I’s Government to get Turkey involved in war with Russia, and Stanyan had specific instructions to do all that he could to achieve this. On the other hand, it was for some time the object of the French Government to keep the two Powers at peace. Consequently, Stanyan had to act in opposition to his French colleagues until France swung round and entered into an alliance with England.3 The clash between Turkey and Russia over Persia seemed to present Stanyan with an excellent opportunity to carry out his instructions from London with success, but in this he was frustrated by the indefatigable de Bonnac and by the pacific inclinations of the Turkish Grand Vizier. It was not because of any lack of initiative or energy that Stanyan failed. In his reports on the situation, he made many shrewd comments on men and affairs. Lord Kinnoull was most unfair in describing him as . .a well-behaved Gentleman of an indolent Temper.. .whose Life here these twelve Years past, as I am informed, has been upon a Sofa with the Women.”4 In conclusion, one may say that Stanyan’s despatches are a valuable contemporary source of information regarding the very complicated and involved situation that developed between Turkey and Russia from 1722 onwards in connection with Persia.

8. The Records of the English East India Company The bulk of the records of the English East India Company in so far as its connection with Persia from 1694 to 1730 is concerned is contained in vols. 1 to iv, xiv and xv of the Persia and the Persian 1 Namely, the Marquis de Bonnac, 1716-24, the Vicomte d’Andrezel, 1724-7, and the Marquis de Villeneuve, 1728-41. 8 See pp. 220-1 above. 3 Also, after the death of George I, England’s suspicions of Russia lessened. * SP 97, vol. xxvi. See also Dr A. C. Wood, ‘‘The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762”, English Historical Review, vol. XL, p. 551, where (apparently basing himself upon Kinnoull’s dictum), he says that Stanyan was of “a slow and indolent disposition”. On the other hand, Dr Wood did quote the Grand Vizier’s tribute to Stanyan when he left Constantinople (see p. 552). The notice on Stanyan in the DNB is most inadequate in so far as his service in Turkey is concerned. 538

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Gulf series, which are in the India Office Library. Sundry letters are also contained in the volumes entitled Original Correspondence, which are likewise in that Library. The most important of all these records is unquestionably the Gombroon Diary, which was kept by the agent and Council of the Company at that place. A study of this diary is indispensable for anyone wishing to acquire an understanding of the Company’s affairs, not only in the Gulf area but also at Isfahän, Shlräz, Kirmän and other places inland. Unfortunately, there are a number of gaps in this record, some of which are of long duration, as the following table will show: Vol. I contains the Diary from i November 1708 to 31 July 1710. Vol. 11 contains the Diary from 23 March 1726 to 14 March 1727. Vol. in contains the Diary from 15 March 1727 to 31 July 1727. Vol. iv contains the Diary from 20 November 1728 to 31 July 1739. There are also a few fragments of the Diary in vol. xiv. Besides these fragments of the Diary, vol. xiv contains some most interesting letters from Isfahän which were written during and just after the siege. Some references to and quotations from certain of these letters have been made in chapters xm and xxxn. In addition, letters from Isfahän dated 6/17 July, 20/31 October 1722 and 28 June/9 July 1724 and a letter from Basra of 28 July/ 8 August 1724 were published in The Asiatic Quarterly Review (vol. 11, pp. 156-210), under the title “The Afghan Conquest of Persia. Unpublished Contemporary Correspondence”. Amongst the letters contained in the Original Correspondence series, no. 6285 in vol. lii from William Lee at Mashhad is noteworthy; it is dated 9/20 October 1696.1 As in the case of the Nädir period, additional letters and memoranda are to be found in the Bombay records of the Company, but it is difficult to dissociate these from the enormous mass of documents relating to India. A very considerable amount of further information on the Company’s Persian operations is contained in John Bruce’s Annals of the Honourable East India Company,2 Alexander Hamilton’s A New Account of the East Indies? and Charles Lockyer’s An Account of Indian Trade.* 1 See pp. 389 and 390 above. 8 Edinburgh, 1727, vol. 1.

8 London, 1810, vol. in. 4 London, 1711.

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9. The Records of the Dutch East India Company

The Rijks Archief at The Hague contain a number of documents relating to Persia during the period 1694 to 1730; practically all of these appertain to the Dutch East India Company. Of these documents only a small proportion has, so far, been published. By far the most valuable of these documents is the extract from the Dagregister,1 the manuscript journal kept by Nicolaus Schorer, the chief merchant of the Company at Isfahan, and his assistants. This extract contains the entries from the beginning of March to the end of August 1722, thus covering the battle of Gulnäbäd (though no first-hand account of that engagement is given) and the greater part of the siege of Isfahän. It consists of 172 folios, and it is the most detailed record of that siege that we possess, there being entries nearly every day. In consequence of the almost unbroken nature of this record, we can not only get most of the important events of the siege into their proper sequence (which it is impossible to do from the other sources), but we can also assign the correct dates to them.2 It is fuller than Gardane’s journal (though that also is of much value), and it continues for two months after that record came to an end. On reading the Dagregister, one can see how this handful of Dutchmen, shut up in their strongly guarded and relatively wellprovisioned house and factory, viewed the tragic march of events. As day succeeded day, and famine and pestilence took an everincreasing toll of the luckless Persian inhabitants, one comes across entries such as this: “God [alone] knows how long these troubles will last.” Naturally, rumours as well as facts were often recorded, but, if the former were found to be false, as they often were, a correction was usually inserted later.3 It is to be regretted that the extract from the Dagregister ends with the entry on 31 August 1722. However, by that time the siege had become static, Mahmud being content to keep the city closely invested and wait for famine and disease to bring about its 1 The full title is “ Extract uijt het Spahans’ Dagregister beginnende met den eersten Maart en eijndigt den laatsten Augusto des jaars 1722”. 2 E.g. Tahmäsp’s escape from Isfahän on the night of 7/8 June 1722. 3 For example, it was first reported that it was Safi Mirza who had escaped from Isfahän, but this was corrected three days later when it was stated that it was Tahmäsp who had escaped.

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fall; the fact that it did not continue after the end of August is not, therefore, of much consequence. Nevertheless, it would have been of interest had the extract included entries in the Dagregister after Mahmud’s accession. As it is, however, we can feel that, after reading this extract, we have a very much clearer idea of the siege than would have been the case had it not been available. I regret that I have been unable to make a thorough exploration of the material that has been preserved at The Hague, as there are doubtless a number of other documents there that would well repay perusal. It is, in fact, only through the great kindness of my friend Mr David Dunlop, of Amsterdam, that I have been able to study the extract from the Dagregister, as he was kind enough to have it copied for me. Furthermore, I have read in Perzië Voorheen en Thons, a book by the late Mr Henry Dunlop, Mr David Dunlop’s father, a number of letters from Nicolaus Schorer and other officials of the Dutch East India Company that he reproduced from the originals in the Rijks Archief. Those printed on pp. 258 to 260 of Perzië throw light on events in the Persian Gulf in 1727 and the following year, particularly in regard to the abortive attempt of the Dutch to seize the island of Hormuz, an attempt which cost them the lives of three of their representatives. Also in the Rijks Archief at The Hague, but not directly connected with the Dutch East India Company, is the “Kort Narigt” or “Brief Account” of the Carmelite Friar Alexander of Malabar, which is quite an important source for the siege of Isfahän and the first few months of Mahmud’s reign.1 It is much to be hoped that the Dutch government will one day see its way to complete its most valuable series of volumes entitled the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publication so as to cover, inter alia, the records of the Dutch East India Company in Persia in the eighteenth century. One of the earlier volumes in this series was the work of Mr H. Dunlop, namely, the Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis derOostindische Compagnie in Perzië, which was published at The Hague in 1930. Apart altogether from these records at The Hague, an outline of the history of the Dutch East India Company’s enterprise in Persia from its beginning up to 1725 is given by François Valentijn 1 Koloniaal Archief MS. no. 1893. The Dutch text was included by Mr H. Dunlop in his Perzië, pp. 242-57, and an English translation by him was published in the RCAJ, 1936, vol. xxin, pp. 643-53.

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in the fifth volume of his Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indi'én (Dordrecht and Amsterdam, 1726) entitled the “Keurlyke Beschryving van Choromandel, Pegu, Arrakan, Bengale, Mocha, van’t Nederlansch Comptoir in Persien, en eenige fraaje Zaaken van Persepolis overblyfzelen”. The information in this book is not confined to commercial matters, as a fairly detailed account of Isfahän is given, as is also a description of Persepolis by the learned Herbert de Jager. Dr J. Ph. Vogel, in his introduction to the Journaal van J, J. Ketelaar naar den Groot Mogol te Lahore, 1711-13, published by the Linschoten Vereeniging at The Hague in 1937, gives a brief account of Ketelaar’s subsequent mission to Isfahän, in 1715.1 References to other works on the Dutch East India Company will be found in chs. xxix to xxxni concerned with it and the English East India Company.

10. Miscellaneous (i) Paul Lucas, the son of a prosperous merchant, was born in Rouen in 1664. Although he was not a serious student of any particular subject, he took some interest in natural history, antiquarian research and medals. He was also fond of, and did some business in, precious stones, but the absorbing passion of his life was travel. Lucas was not an accomplished writer, and the account which we have of his travels in the Levant (which included a sojourn in Persia from the autumn of 1700 to July or August in the following year) was written, from notes made by him, by C. C. Baudelot de Dairval, of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.2 The description of the Persian portion of this journey occupies the first 126 pages of the second volume of the Voyage du Sieur Lucas au Levant, which was published in Paris in 1704. For the rest of his life, Lucas continued to indulge his zest for travel; he died in Madrid in 1737. Although Lucas’s record of his experiences in Persia is super­ ficial, it is nevertheless worth reading, and reference has been made to it in this book on several occasions. 1 It is to be hoped that it may sometime be possible to publish J. van Dinter’s first-hand record of this mission. The MS. is in Overgecomen Brieven 1719, Boek 3, Koloniaal Archief, bündel 1793, fols. 975-1209, in the Rijks Archief at The Hague. a H. A. Omont, Missions archéologiques françaises en Orient aux XVIIe et XVnie Siècles (Paris, 1902), p. 318.

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(ii) “ H. H.”. Despite exhaustive research by Miss J. R. Watson, of the India Office Library,1 it has not been possible definitely to establish the identity of “H. H.”, the author of a MS. in English (to which a Persian translation is appended) entitled: “Persia; Short Sketch of the Different Tribes which inhabit Persia and some Account of the Revenues of that Country, taken from the Tohfeh Shahee at Isfahan with additions by the late Mehdi Ali Khan”.12 Much of the tribal and other information given (which is not of any particular value) relates to the time of Shäh Sultan Husain. So far as one can judge from internal evidence, “H. H.” appears to have been connected with the East India Company. Henry Hodgson, Hugh Hope and Henry Huthwaite were all serving in India at or about the time this MS. record was written, but there is no evidence to show that any of them ever visited Persia. (iii) The Persian Cromwell. When the news of the astonishing success achieved by Mahmud the Ghalzai leader reached Europe early in 1723, it created a considerable sensation, with the result that his name and that of his father Mir Wais became well known. An anonymous writer, who described himself as “a Swedish Officer who.. .for many years was Domestick Slave to Miri-Ways”, published in 1724 a book entitled The Persian Cromwell, in which he recounted what purported to be the life and adventures of the Ghalzai chief. The author of this curious book, whose imaginative powers were far in excess of his zeal for accuracy, after giving a completely fictitious account of Mir Wais’s origin and upbringing, stated, inter alia, that he was very fond of reading and that he used to have books sent out to him from England via Surat. “Amongst the several Histories that thus came to Miri-Ways’ Hands none pleas’d him more (as afterwards he own’d himself) than the Life of the famous Cromwell.” The author, disregarding (or perhaps ignorant of) the fact that his hero had died in 1715, described how he not only captured Isfahän in 1722, but also defeated the forces of Peter the Great near “Alburnaf ” on the coast of the Caspian Sea. The extent of the author’s knowledge of the geography of Persia may be gauged by his assertion that Demavend is visible 1 I take this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to Miss Watson for this work. 2 It has not been possible to trace either the Tuhfat-i-Shähl of Isfahän or Mahdi All Khän.

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from Isfahan, being only 4 leagues from that city. Another of his absurd statements is that Mir Wais was offered the crown of Persia on condition that he turned Sunni ! I have tried in vain to discover the name of the author of this spurious book. When I found that James Cassidy had written an article on it in the Calcutta Review (1927, vol. xxn, pp. 255-76), I had hopes that the mystery would be cleared up, but Cassidy merely gave a summary of the contents of the book. (iv) Another anonymous work purporting to be on Mir Wais is included in Muhammad Akram’s Bibliographie analytique de rAfghanistan. The title is: Mirweis, Prinz von Candahar und vornehmstes Haupt der itzigen Rebellen in Persien vorgestellet in einer Unterredung zweyen reformirten Studenten deren einer neulich aus Persien wieder in Deutschland angelangt. Akram describes it as “une pièce très rare”; according to him, it is in the form of a dialogue. I have not seen this book, but so far as one can judge from its title, its authenticity would appear to be very doubtful. (v) In so far as imaginative powers are concerned, even the author of The Persian Cromwell lags far behind the Abbé de Tallemand, the reputed author1 of the Mémoires de Schach Tamas II ... écrits par lui-même et adressés à son Fils. This book, which fills two bulky volumes, was published in Paris in 1758. Some idea of its value may be gained by the author’s assertion that Tahmäsp was really the son of a Frenchman named Jolyot who had gone to Persia late in the seventeenth century and had then entered the service of Shäh Sultän Husain.2 (vi) Possibly a little less meretricious than The Persian Cromwell or the Mémoires de Schach Tamas II is L'Illustre Paisan ou Mémoires et Aventures de Daniel Moginié, by Maubert de Gouvest.3 This author’s geographical knowledge, however, is comparable with that of the creator of The Persian Cromwell. For example, on p. in it is stated that the battle of Dämghän (presumably Mihmändüst) was fought 7 farsakhs or leagues from Qum. 1 According to J-M. Quérard, Les Supercheries littéraires dévoilées (Paris, 1870), vol. in. 2 As I pointed out in my Nadir Shah (p. 312), a number of stories were current in Nädir’s lifetime that he was of European parentage. There was, of course, no foundation whatsoever for such a belief. 3 Published at Lausanne in 1754.

544

BIBLIOGRAPHY * Works of special importance. t Works which it has not been possible to consult. ‘Abd al-Karîm ‘Alavi. Tä'rikh-i-Ahmad, Lucknow, 1850. ‘Abd al-Karîm ibn ‘Alî Rida al-Sharîf al-Shahâvarî ; joint author with Muhammad Rida Tabriz! of “Zînat al-Tawärikh”, BM. Add. MSS. 23515, vol. n. ‘Abd al-Karim “Nadîm” ibn Ismâ‘11 Bukhârî. Afghan u Kabul u Bukhärä u Khivaq u Khöqand Khänlarinin, vol. 1 (Persian text). Bulaq, 1873. Vol. 11 (French translation), Histoire de V Asie centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand) depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Clâh (1153), jusqu'en 1233 de VHégire (1740-1818) par Mir Abdoul-Kerim Boukhary publiée, traduite et annotée par Charles Schefer, Paris, 1876. ‘Abd al-Razzâq ibn Najaf Qulï Khân Dunbulî (1) “ Ma’âthir-i-Sultânïya”, Rieu Supplement nos. 68 and 69. English translation by Sir Harford Jones Brydges entitled The Dynasty of the Kajars. London, 1833. (11) “ Basîrat-Nâma ” (see under Krusihski (iv)). ‘Abd al-Wahhâb “ Qatra ", “ Shams al-Tawârïkh ”, Browne MS. G. 17 (9) in the Cambridge University Library. ‘Abdullah ibn Nur al-Dln ibn Ni‘matullah al-Husainl al-Shushtari, “Tadhkirat-i-Shushtarïya”, BM. Add. MSS. 23534. Abu’l-Hasan ibn Ibrahim Qazvïnï. “ Favâ’id-i-§afavïya”, MS. no. 62 (Oo. 6. 41), Cambridge University Library. Afshàr, Dr Mahmüd. La Politique européenne en Perse ; quelques pages de l'histoire diplomatique, Berlin, 1921. Aga-Oglu, Mehmet. Safawid Rugs and Textiles in the Collection of the Shrine of Imam Ali at al-Najaf, New York, 1941. Alexander à Sigismundo of Malabar, Fr. “Kort Narigt van de seer droevig ondergang der residentie-stad Spahan”, MS. no. 1893, pp. 364 ff. in the Rijks Archief (Koloniaal) at The Hague. Text published by the late H. Dunlop in his Perzië Voorheen en Thans (Haarlem, 1912), pp. 242-57. English translation by H. Dunlop entitled “The Story of the Sack of Isfahan by the Afghans in 1722”, in the RCAJ, vol. xxm, part iv, pp. 643-53. ‘All Qui! Mîrzâ, Ptimâd al-Saltana, ibn ‘Abbâs Mirza ibn Fath ‘All Shäh. Tä'rikh-i-Waqä'i' u Sawänih-i-Afghänistän. Tehran, 1273 (1856/7). Allen, W. E. D. (1) A History of the Georgian People from the beginning down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century, London, 1932. (11) “The Sources for G. Delisle’s ‘Carte des Pays Voisins de la Mer Caspienne’ of 1723”, Imago Mundi, no. xin, pp. i37*“5°. 35

545

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Anonymous Works : (i) A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries, 2 vols. London, 1939. (2) “Dhikr dar bayän-i-Awläd-i-Abdäl Walad-i-Tarïn”, BM. MS. OR. 1877. (3) “Extrait d’une Lettre de Constantinople à M...le 28 janvier, 1727”, Mercure de France, March, 1727. (4) “Lettre écrite d’Ispahan à Alep le 26 mars sur la Bataille de Gulnabat”, Gazette de Hollande, 18 August 1722. (5) “Lettre sur l’investissement de cette première ville (Isfahän) et sur la taxe imposée à Julfa”, Gazette de France, 22 August 1722. (6) “ Mémoire sur la Dernière Révolution de Perse jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1724”, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 34ib~37ob. (This Mémoire, which was based on one by Joseph Apisalaimian, was sent to Paris by the Comte d’Andrezel, the French Ambassador at Constantinople.) (7) \Mirweis, Prinz von Candahar und vornehstes Haupt der itzigen Rebellen in Persien vorgestellet in einer Unterredung zweyen reformirten Studenten deren einer neulich aus Persien wieder in Deutschland angelangt. 1723. (8) The Persian Cromwell. London, 1724. (9) “Projet de Commerce pour les Français en Perse dans le Sein persique et aux Indes”, AEP, vol. 1, fols. 33b~39a. Neither the name of the author nor the date is given, but it was probably written by Jean Billon de Cansevilles (q.v.) about 1716. (10) “Relation de la Bataille des Perses avec les Arrevans”, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 148 b-153 b. Ange de Gardane, who sent this “ Relation ” to Paris, was the probable author. (11) Relation de la Suite des Révolutions de Perse et le Rétablissement du Prince Thamas, 9 Avril 1730. Paris, 1730. (12) “Relation de la Victoire remportée par l’Armée de Perse sur les Turcs par le Sophi de Perse”, Débats, Paris, n.d., but about 1730. (13) f“Sharh-i-Waqâ’i‘ u Sawânih-i-Dâr al-Saltana Tabriz.” Berlin MS. No. 438 (see Storey, Persian Literature (London, 1935), sect. 11, fasc. 2, p. 321). (14) Suite des Révolutions de Perse. Nouvelles de Perse écrites de Zulpha le 28 Août 1727. Paris, 1727. (15) Suites des Révolutions de Perse, extrait d'une Lettre dyIspahan, du 1 Mai 172g. Paris, 1729. (16) *Tadhkirat al-Mulük, a Manual of Safavid Administration (circa 1137I1725). Persian text in facsimile (BM. OR. 9496), translated and explained by V. Minorsky. Cambridge, 1943. (17) Turkish MS. beginning with the words (in Persian): “Kishvär-iQandahär bädia kard... ”, dated 29 Rabi1 II, 1136 (26 January 1724). Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 240b250a. French translation (also in MS.), vol. vi, fols. 254b-20ib. (This MS. was apparently based on material collected by members of Durri Efendi’s mission to Persia in 1720-1.)

546

BIBLIOGRAPHY (i8) Victoire remportée par le Roi de Perse contre Pusurpateur de sa Couronne, où il y a 50,000 de tués. Paris, 1730. Apisalaimian, Joseph (Hovsep) (1) “Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse”. MS. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 2Ô2b-3o8a. (11) *“The Revolution in Persia at the Beginning of the XVIIIth Century”, a condensed English translation by Professor T. H. Weir of a Turkish MS. in the University of Glasgow, and included in A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to Edward G. Browne, pp. 480-90. Cambridge, 1922. Arutunian, P. T. (1) Osvoboditelnoe Dvizheniye Armyanskogo Naroda v pervoi Chetverti XVIII Veka. Moscow, 1954. (11) “Borba Armyanskogo i Azerbaidzhanskogo Narodov v 20-kh Godakh XVIII Veka za Prisoedineniye k Rossii”, Ucheniye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya, vol. m, pp. 108-38. Leningrad, 1951. Audiffret, P. H. J. J. B. Article on Marie Petit in Michaud’s Biographie Universelle (Paris), vol. xxxn, pp. 592-4. Avramov, Semeon. See under Miklukho-Maklai, N. D. Babai b. Lutf (and Babai b. Farhâd). “Les Juifs en Perse au XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècle, d’après les chroniques poétiques de Babai b. Loutf et de Babai b. Farhad”, French translation by W. Bacher, Revue des Etudes Juives (1906), vol. lui, pp. 88-94. Babinger, Professor F. Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke. Leipzig, 1927. Bachoud, Père Louis, S.J. “Lettre du Père Bachoud, Missionnaire de la Compagnie de Jésus en Perse, écrite de Chamakié le 25 Septembre, 1721 ”, Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, 1780, vol. iv, pp. 113-24Baer, K. E. von. “ Peter’s des Grossen Verdienste um die Erweiterung der geographischen Kenntnisse”, Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angrenzenden Länder Asiens. St Petersburg, 1872. Barthold, V. V. (1) La Découverte de VAsie, Histoire de V Orientalisme en Europe et en Russie, French translation by B. Nikitine. Paris, 1947. (11) Sundry articles in EI. Batatzes, Basil, üepcrucà: Histoire de Chah-Nadir, publiée par N. lorga (Greek text with French table of contents). Institut Roumain d’Etudes Byzantines, Bucharest, 1939. Baudelot de Dairval, Charles César. Voyage du Sieur Paul Lucas au Levant, Paris, 1704, vol. 11. (This book was based upon Paul Lucas’s notes of his travels in the Levant.) Bayânî, K. Les Relations de VIran avec VEurope occidentale à VEpoque Safavide (Portugal, Espagne, Angleterre, Hollande et France). Paris, 1937. Beaudouin, Eugène Elie. “ Ispahan sous les Grands Chahs, XVIIe Siècle”, Urbanisme, no. x. Paris, 1932. Beketov, P. Pis'ma i Ukazi Levashovu. Moscow, 1808.

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35-2

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bell, John, of Antermony (i) *“ A Journey from St Petersburg in Russia to Ispahan in Persia, with an Embassy from his Imperial Majesty Peter the First, to the Sophy of Persia, Shach Hussein, Anno MDCCXV”, in vol. I of Bell’s Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to Diverse Parts of Asia. London, 1764. (11) *“A Succinct Relation of a Journey to Derbent in Persia with the Army of Russia ”, in vol. 11 of Bell’s Travels. Bellew, H. W. (1) The Races of Afghanistan. Calcutta, 1880. (11) An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan. Woking, 1891. Berchet, Guglielmo. La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia. Turin, 1865. Berdzenishvili, N. A. Joint author, with I. Javakhishvili and S. Janashia, of Istoriya Gruzii, vol. 1. Tiflis, 1946. Berezin, I. N. Puteshestvie po Dagestanu i Zakavkaz'yu. Kazan, 1849. Bobek, Hans (1) “ Das Kartenwesen von Iran (Persien) ”, in Mitteilungen Reichamts Landesaufnahme, no. 12, pp. 112-26. Berlin, 1936. (11) Die Landschaftsgestaltung des sued-kaspischen Kuestentieflands. Stuttgart, 1936. Bonnac, Jean-Louis d’Usson, Marquis de, *Mémoire historique sur rAmbassade de France à Constantinople, par le Marquis de Bonnac, avec un précis de ses négociations à la Porte Ottomane, par M. C. Schefer. Paris, 1894. Bonnassieux, Pierre. Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce. Paris, 1892. Bouvat, L. “Essai sur les Rapports de la Perse avec l’Europe, de l’antiquité au commencement du XIXe Siècle”, Revue du Monde Musulman, vol. xxxvi, pp. 58-101, vol. xlvi, pp. 23-101, vol. xlvii, pp. 26^72. Breitenbach, Georg August von. Geschichte von Georgien. Memmingen, 1788. Brenner, Henrik. Unterthäniges Memorial betreffend die letzte KriegsExpedition der Czaaren wider Persien, präsentiert im Kgl. Schwe­ dischen Cantzeley-Collegio anno 1722. See under Rabener, J. G., Leben Petri des Ersten. Leipzig, 1725. Broadfoot, J. S. “Reports on parts of the Ghalzai Country”, JRGS, Suppl. (1885), vol. I, part 3, pp. 341-400. Brosset, L. See under Butkov, P. G. Brosset, Marie-Félicité (1) *Histoire de la Géorgie. St Petersburg, 1856-7. 2 vols. (11) Matériaux pour servir à Vhistoire de la Géorgie. St Petersburg, 1841. (ni) “Documents des Archives de Moscou”, Histoire de la Géorgie, vol. il, part 1. (iv) “Documens originaux sur les Relations diplomatiques de la Géorgie avec la France vers la fin du Règne de Louis XIV ”, Nouveau Journal Asiatique (1832), vol. IX, pp. 193-221 and 339-60. (The first part of the above was also published separately in Paris under the same title in 1832.)

548

BIBLIOGRAPHY (v) Collection d'Historiens Arméniens, vol. n. St Petersburg, 1876. See also under Sekhnia Chkheide, Wakhusht, Shahumian, and Zakaria the Deacon. Browne, E. G. A History of Persian Literature in Modern Times, Cambridge, 1924. Bruce, John. * Annals of the Honourable East India Company, vol. in. London, 1810. Bruce, Peter Henry, ^Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce... containing an account of his Travels in Germany, Russia, Tartary, Turkey, the West Indies, etc, London, 1782. Brückner, Dr Alexander. Peter der Grosse, Berlin, 1879. Bruyn, Cornelius (or Cornelis) de. ^Travels into Muscovy, Persia, and part of the East Indies, Translated from the original Dutch, 2 vols. London, 1737. Bruzen de la Martinière, Antoine Augustin. Introduction à VHistoire de VAsie, de VAfrique et de VAmérique, vol. 1. Amsterdam, 1735. Butkov, P. G. *Materiali dlya novoy Istorii Kavkaza, 1722-1803, 3 vols. St Petersburg, 1869. (Vol. m contains a summary by L. Brosset.) Cansevilles, Jean Billon de (1) “ Mémoire à Monseigneur le Marquis de Torcy ”, dated 20 March 1715, AEP, vol. iv, fols. 3ob~32a. This memorandum, which is on the subject of French trade with Persia, has been included, with modernised spelling, in M. Herbette’s Une Ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV, pp. 260-1. *(n) “Commerce des Anglois en Perse”, dated 15 July 1718, AEP, vol. v, fols. 184 b-i 91 a. This memorandum describes not only the trade of the English East India Company with Persia, but also that of the Dutch East India Company and of the Armenians. In addition, it gives some details of the transit trade across Russia. Although unsigned, it is undoubtedly the work of de Cansevilles. (m) “ Mémoire sur le Commerce de Perse. ” C. Schefer included this memorandum, as appendix xlix, in his edition of Père Raphaël du Mans’s Estât de la Perse en 1660, pp. 364-72. It is unsigned, but the similarity of the wording with (1) and (11) above leaves no doubt that de Cansevilles was the author. No date is given, but from internal evidence it was written about 1730, shortly after the restoration of the Çafavî monarchy. Cassidy, James. “The Story of the Persian Cromwell”, Calcutta Review (March, 1927), vol. xxn, pp. 255-76. Castonnet des Fosses, H. “Les Relations de la France avec la Perse”, Bulletin de la Société de Géographie de Tours, Angers, 1889. Chardin, Jean (later Sir John). Voyages du Chevalier Chardin en Perse, et autres Lieux de VOrient,.. .Nouvelle Edition, soigneusement conférée sur les trois éditions originales, augmentée d'une Notice de la Perse, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à ce jour, de Notes, etc, par L, Langlès, 10 vols. Paris, 1811.

549

BIBLIOGRAPHY Chelebï-zâda, Musjafä ‘Asim Efendi. Author of the concluding portion of Mehmet Rashid’s Tâ'rïkh-i-Râshid Efendi, vol. m. Constantinople, Ii53(i74o/4i)Clairac, Louis-André de La Mamie de, *Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle, 3 vols. Paris, 1750. Claustre, Abbé André de. Histoire de Thamas Kouli-kan, Sophi de Perse, Amsterdam, 1740. Clodius, Johan Christian. See under Krusinski, J. T. Dam, Pieter van. Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, Tweede Boek, Deel III, uitgeven door Dr F. W. Stapel. ’s-Gravenhage, 1939. Dames, M. Longworth. Article entitled “Afghanistan”, El, vol. 1. Danvers, F. C. “The Persian Gulf Route and Commerce”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol. XV (April, 1888), pp. 384-414. Dinter, Joan van. |MS. journal of J. H. Ketelaar’s Persian mission, in “Overgecomen Brieven 1719” (Boek 3), Koloniaal Archief, bündel 1793, fols. 975-1209, Rijks Archief, The Hague. Dom, Bernhard (1) “Caspia, ueber die Einfälle der Alten Russen in Tabaristan”, Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, vol. xxin (7th series). St Petersburg, 1875. (11) “Geschichte Shirwans unter den Statthaltern und Chanen von 1538-1820, vorzüglich nach Persischen Quellen”, in the “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker aus Morgen­ ländischen Quellen”. Mémoires de VAcadémie des Sciences, vol. v. St Petersburg, 1841. Downing, Clement. A History of the Indian Wars, edited with an Introduction and Notes by (Sir) William Foster. Oxford, 1924. Driault, Edouard. La Question d'Orient depuis ses Origines jusqu'à la Grande Guerre, Paris, 1917. Drouville, Colonel Gaspard. Voyage en Perse, vol. 11. Paris, 1828. Dugat, G. Histoire des Orientalistes de l'Europe du XIle au XIXe Siècles, précédéé d'une Esquisse historiques des Etudes orientales, 2, vols. Paris, 1870. Dumont, Jean. Corps universel diplomatique du Droit des Gens: contenant un Recueil des Traitez d'Alliance, de Paix, de Trêves, de Neutralité, de Commerce, d'Echange, etc,,vol. vi 11 ,part 11. Amsterdam and The Hague, 1731. Dunlop, H. (1) Perzi'è Voorheen en Thans, Haarlem, 1912. (11) Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië, ’s-Gravenhage, 1930. See also under Alexander of Malabar, Fr. Durrî Efendî. *Prodromus ad tragicam vertentis belli Persici Historiam seu legationis a fulgida Porta ad Sophorum Regem Szah Sultan Hussein a 1720, expeditae authentica relatio, quant redux e Perside Legatus Durri Effendi Turcarum Imperatori Achmet III in scripto consignavit. Ex turcico, additis scholiis, latine facta a P, Thaddaeo Krusinski Sodetatis jfesu Missionario persico, Leopoli, 1733. (Latin translation

550

BIBLIOGRAPHY by Père J. T. Krusiûski, S J., of Durri Efendi’s account of his mission to Persia.) Relation de Dourry Efendy, Ambassadeur de la Porte Othomane auprès du Roi de Perse, en 1720, présentée au Suithan Ahmed III. Paris, 1810. (This French translation of the Turkish text of Durri Efendi’s Relation was made by M. de Fienne at Constantinople in 1745, and was annotated by L. Langlès before publication.) East India Company, Dutch (Oost-Indische Compagnie) (1) ‘ ‘ Deerde Deel der Brieven en Papieren van Batavia overgekommen, 1724”, Koloniaal Archief no. 1879, Rijks Archief, The Hague. (11) *“ Extract uijt het Spahans’ Dagregister beginnende met den eersten Maart en eijndigt den laatsten Augusto des jaars 1722”, Koloniaal Archief no. 1879, Rijks Archief, The Hague. (hi) “Overgekommen Brieven 1719”. See under J. van Dinter. East India Company, English. (1) *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records, India Office Library, vols. I to iv, xiv and xv. (11) Original Correspondence, India Office Library, vols, l to lxii. (hi) *The Gombroon Diary (contained in (1) above). (iv) The Afghan Conquest of Persia. Extracts from sundry letters of the representatives in Persia of the East India Company. (v) Catalogue of Correspondence from India with Collateral Docu­ ments originating at any Place between England and Japan, vol. 11 (1671-1708), Home Series, Mise. 712, India Office Library. Eretz, Stepanos. “Meditations on Past and Present Events”, Armenian MS. in the Cathedral Library, Julfa. Erevantsi, Abraham. History of the Wars of 1721-1736 (in Armenian), published by Armfan, Erivan, 1938. Russian translation entitled: Istoriya Voin 1721-1736 gg. Erivan, 1939. Evgeny (Bolkhovitinov), Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia. Georgien, oder historisches Gemälde von Grusien, in politischer, kirchlicher und gelehrter Hinsicht. Aus dem Russischen uebersetzt von F. Schmidt. Riga, 1804. Ezov, Gerasim Artemievich. Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom. St Petersburg, 1898. Falsafî, Dr Nasrullah. Tä'rikh-i-Rawäbit-i-Lrän u Uröpä dar Daura-yiSafaviya. Tehran, 1316 (1937). Farïd al-Dïn Ahmad. “ Risäla-yi-Änsäb-i-Afäghina”, RAS MS. no. 75. Fasâ’î. See under Hasan ibn Hasan, Hajjî Mïrzâ. Felice Maria da Sellano, Padre. “Relazione dell* Ambasciata fatta al Re di Persia dal Padre Felice Maria da Sellano, Missionario Cappuccino della Provinzia dell’ Umbria, dall’ anno 1692 sino all’ anno 1702”; text included by C. Schefer, as appendix li, in his edition of Père Raphaël du Mans’s Estât de la Perse en 1660, pp. 376-97. Ferrier, Joseph Pierre. History of the Afghans, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Captain William Jesse. London, 1858. Ferriol, Charles, Comte de, Baron d’Argentai. Correspondance du Marquis de Ferriol Ambassadeur de Louis XIV à Constantinople, avec une introduction par M. Emile Varenbergh. Anvers, 1870.

551

BIBLIOGRAPHY Flassan, Gaëton de Raxis de. Histoire générale et raisonnée de la Diplomatie française, vols, iv and v. Paris, 1811. Forest de Bourgon, M. de la. Relation de Perse, où Von voit VEtat de la Religion dans la plus grande partie de V Orient. Angers, 1710. Fraser, James. The History of Nadir Shah, formerly called Thamas Kuli Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia. London, 1742. Frizon, Père Nicolas, S.J. See under Villotte, Père Jacques, S.J. Gabashvili, V. N. “ loseb K’art’veli, XVIII s-is diplomat! da istorikosi” in the Masalebi Sak'art'velosa da Kavkasisiis istoriisat'vis (Tiflis), no. 32, pp. 111--21. Gärber, Major Johann Gustav (1) *“ Nachrichten von denen an der westlichen Seite der Caspischen See zwischen Astrachan und dem Flusse Kur befindlichen Völkern und Landschaften, und von derselben Zustande in dem Jahre 1728 ”, in G. F. Muller’s Sammlung Russischer Geschichte, vol. iv, pp. 1-147. (11) f“ Journal von der Commission wegen der Grenzscheidung in Persien”. This “Journal” is in the Königliche Bibliothek (now the Preussische Staatsbibliothek) in Berlin. Gardane, Ange de, Chevalier de Sainte-Croix (1) “Nouvelles de Perse”, news-letters which Ange de Gardane sent frequently to Paris from 1718 to 1722, AEP, vols, v and vi. *(11) “Journal”, which Ange de Gardane, doubtless with help from Joseph Apisalaimian, wrote at intervals from March to July during the siege of Isfahän, AEP, vol. vi. (in) Many despatches and letters from Isfahän dating from 1718 to 1726, AEP, vols, v and vi. Gardane was also probably the author of the “ Batailles des Perses avec les Arrevans ” {see Anonymous no. (10)), but of this we have no proof. Gaudereau, Abbé Martin (l) Relation de la Mort de Schah Soliman Roy de Perse et du Couronne­ ment de Sultan Ussain son fils, avec plusieurs particularitez touchant Vétat présent des affaires de la Perse et le détail des Cérémonies observées à la Consecration de V Evêque de Baby lone à Zulpha les Hispahan. Paris, 1696. (il) Relation d'une Mission faite nouvellement par Monseigneur VArchevesque d'Ancyre à Ispaham en Perse pour la Réunion des Armeniens à VEglise Catholique. Paris, 1702. A somewhat condensed version of the earlier part of this Relation forms appendix L of C. Schefer’s edition of Père Raphael du Mans’s Estat de la Perse en 1660, pp. 373-6. It is entitled : “Relation du Voyage de l’Archevesque d’Ancyre, envoyé légat du Pape et ambassadeur extraordinaire de Sa Majesté Impériale, vers le Grand Sophy de Perse: où l’on verra de quelle manière ce légat du Saint-Siège a esté reçu dans le Royaume de Perse, et son entrée dans Hispaham, ville capitale de Perse.” (m) Relation de Perse, écrite par un Missionnaire à un de ses Amis en France (neither the place nor the date of publication is given, but the book was probably published in Paris between 1700 and 1702).

552

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Nikuradze, Aleksander (“A. Sanders’1). Nordkaukasien, Aserbeidschan, Armenien, Georgien: Geschichtlicher Umriss. Munich, 1942. Noel, Octave. Histoire du Commerce du Monde depuis les Temps les plus reculés, vol. 11. Paris, 1894. Noradounghian, Gabriel. Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, vol. 1. Paris, 1897. Oliver, E. E. “The Safwi Dynasty of Persia and their Coins”, JRAS, Bengal, vol. 1, pt. 1. 1887. Olivier, Guillaume-Antoine. Voyage dans I'Empire Othoman, l'Egypte et la Perse, vol. in. Paris, 1807. Omont, Henri Auguste. Missions archéologiques françaises en Orient aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles. Paris, 1902. Oost-Indische Compagnie. See under East India Company, Dutch. Otter, Jean (Johan) (1) Voyage en Turquie et en Perse. Paris, 1748. (11) “Journal des Voyages du Sieur Otter”, MS. no. 989, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. Padery, Etienne (1) “ Mémoire sur les Monoyes de Perse ”, AEP, vol. v, fol. 219 b, n.d. but about 1718. (11) “Compte au Roi”, AEP, vol. vi, fols. 4o6a~44oa, n.d. but about I725(m) Also many despatches and reports from Shamakhi, Isfahän, Shîrâz, etc. in AEP, vols, v and vi. (iv) The “Papiers de Paderi” (sic), in the Archives Nationales, Paris, A.F. iv, 1686, 4e. dossier. Perry, Captain John. The State of Russia under the Present Czar. London, 1716. Peter the Great. Neueste ausführliche Historische und Geographische Beschreibung des Caspischen Meeres, Daria-Stroms, und der übrigen da herum liegenden Länder, Städte und Völker nebst denen von Ihr. Russisch-Kays. Majest. ertheilen Nachrichten von dero gethanen March von Astracan bis Derbent. Danzig, 1723. (This German translation from the Russian contains (i) Peter the Great’s “ Rescript” concerning the capture of Darband, (ii) an extract from his “Journal” of the Persian campaign, and (iii) Brigadier Veterani’s account of his expedition to Andreyeva (Enderi).) An English translation of the above is contained in T. Consett’s book The Present State and Regulations of the Church of Russia establish'd by the late Tsar's Royal Edict. Also in a second Volume a Collection of Several Tracts relating to his Fleet's Expedition to Derbent, etc.. Translated from the Originals in the Slavonic and Russian Languages, with an accurate Map of the Caspian Sea. London, 1729. Petter, Erasmus. “Een Korte Beschryving van de Stad Spahan”, in F. Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, vol. v, pt. 1. Peyssonnel, C. C. de. Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Géorgie. Paris, 1754.

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564

INDEX ‘Abbäs I, Shäh, although he restores greatness of Persia, he sows some of the seeds of ultimate disaster, 16, 25, 57; crushes özbegs and expels Turks, 2i ; reforms army, 21 ; cruelty in Georgia, 57, 75, 257; wisely makes I§fahän capital, 473 ; rebuilds city, 473-4; transfers Armenians to (New) Julfa, 474 ‘Abbäs II, Shäh, 22-3, 28, 29, 33 n., 34, 57-8, 73, 75, 474, 484 ‘Abbäs III, Shäh, 339-40 ‘Abbäs Mïrzâ (brother of Shäh Sultän Husain), 35-7, 49, 115, 156, 160 ‘Abbäs Mïrzâ (heir-apparent of Fath ‘All Shäh), 524 ‘Abbäs Quli Khän Shämlü (Beglarbegl of Herat), 96, 97 ‘Abd al-‘Azïz (brother and immediate successor of Mir Wais), 93, 160, 509, 512, 518, 520, 523 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (ex-muleteer and Afghan envoy to Turkey), 282-4, 353 Abdäll tribe, area inhabited by, 10, 95; aids Persians against Ghalzais (1710-11), 88, 90-1; early history of, 95, 96; freed from Ghalzai pre­ dominance, 96; numbers of, 96; principal clans of, 96 ; defeats several Persian forces, 97-8; be­ sieges Mashhad (1716), 98; routs Persian force under Safi Quli Khän, 99 ; defeated by Ghalzais at Diläräm, 100; internal quarrels, 101; cam­ paign by Tahmäsp and Nädir, 3213 ; their inconclusive expedition against Herat (1728), 325-6; tribe finally subdued by Nädir, 344 ‘Abdullah, Mufti of Turkey, 251-2, 282, 285-6 ‘Abdullah Khän (Georgian renegade, made Governor-General of Qandahär in 1698/9), 83, 84 ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai, 88, 90, 96, 97, 101 ‘Abdullah Köprülü Päshä (Governor of Vän, commander of one of the Turkish armies in Adharbaijän), 261-5, 286, 342

‘Abdullah, Mirzä (Tahmäsp’s Ftimäd al-Daula\ 305, 317 ‘Abdullah Musha‘sha‘, Sayyid (Vâlï of ‘Arabistân), 133-6, 138-40, 1446, 148-9, 155-6, 159, 163-4, 174, 191, 420-21, 516, 521 Abivard, 3, 279, 307 Adharbaijän, 4, 5, 19, 189, 259-60, 265-6, 287, 344-5, 501 ‘Ädil Girai, Shamkhäl of the Qumüq, 176, 180, 182-3, 187, 267 n., 355-6 Afshär tribe, 8, ion., 19, 287, 308, 316, 337 Agrakhan bay, 180, 221 Ahmad III, Sultän of Turkey, no, 118, 123, 213, 219» 227, 230-1, 2356, 261^271, 282 Ahmad Aghä, succeeds Rustam Khän as Qullar-äqäsly 147; beats off an Afghan attack on Isfahän, 150; and on the Shahristän bridge, 155; deprived of his command, 159; dies of a broken heart, 159, 164 Ahmad Khän Abdäli (later Ahmad Shäh Durräni),95n., 101,102,3240. Ahmad Khän, the Great Usmi of the Qaräqaitäq, 127, 177, 183, 187, 188 Ahmad Päshä, of Baghdäd, 268, 2702, 285, 288-92, 332-3, 345 Ahmad, Sayyid (Safavï claimant to the throne), 300-2, 514 Aleppo, 59,104, 292, 368,370,438,443 Alexander (son of Luarsab and nephew of Giorgi XI of Kartli), 87, 88, 90 Alexander Archilovich (grandson of Wakhtang V and nephew of Giorgi XI), 60, 103 Alexander à Sigismundo, Friar, of Malabar, 131 n., 164, 166, 198, 413, 415. 541, 545 Alexis Mikhailovich, Tsar, 57 ‘All Mardän Khän (chief of the Fail! Lurs and Vail of Luristän), 54, 135, 137, 138, 141, 146, 159, 160-2, 193, 253, 272, 501 ‘Ali Musha’sha4, Sayyid, 53, 134 Alion, d’Usson d’ (kinsman of the Marquis de Bonnac), 231-2, 237, 353-4, 358 n-> 526-7

565

INDEX Allah-Yär Khän (Abdäll leader), ioi, 324-6 Amänullah Sultän (Ghalzai general), 138, 140, 143, 172-4, 193-7, 204-5, 207, 210, 276, 412, 414-15 Amü Daryä (Oxus), 1, 3, 61, 106 Ancyra, Archbishop of, 51, 73, 75, 435, 453 n., 485 Andrezel, Vicomte d* (French Am­ bassador to Turkey), 227, 283, 3523, 5°7 Apisalaimian, Joseph (Armenian in­ terpreter and secretary to Ange de Gardane and to the French embassy in Constantinople), 96, 132, 142, 171-2, 174, 193, 199-200, 468, 504-9, 527-9, 532, 547, 552 Apraxin, Admiral Feodor Matveivich, 179,184 ‘Arabistän (Khüzistän), 2, 5, no, 272, 301, 420 Arabs, Huwala, 62, 115 n., 116 n. Arabs of Muscat, piratical activities, 51; oust Portuguese from Muscat and later build up a powerful fleet, 66-9 ; hostility to Portuguese, 67-8 ; they take Bahrain, Qishm and Lärak and threaten Bandar ‘Abbäs, 115; capture English ship (1706), 398; refused naval aid by English and Dutch, Persia turns to France, 434-5, 448, 450, 461-2 Arabs, Persian, 10, 11 ; see also Arabs, Huwala Ardabïl, 5, 18, 20, 22, 232, 234, 248, 259, 264 n., 266, 286, 302, 334, 345, 348, 352, 358-9 Ardalän, 14, 47, 72 n., 268, 292, 516; see also Kurdistän Arghandäb, 3 ‘Ärif Ahmad Päshä, of Raqqa, 258, 260-1 Armenians, Persian, distribution of, 8, 9, 74; the majority belong to the Gregorian church, 9, 74; persecuted by the Shi‘i fanatics, 32, 74; control bulk of Perso-Russian trade, 59; of (New) Julfa, 74; friction between Gregorian and Catholic, 76-7; of Julfa, forced to surrender to Ghalzais, 151; Ghalzais* brutal be­ haviour, 152-3, 193; movement for

union with Russia, 189; encouraged by Peter the Great to settle in Gilän, 249; fight against the Turks, 259-60, 287; Ashraf’s opinion of them, 299; Sighnakh Armenians attacked by Turks, 354; Avan Yüzbâshï and his forces attacked by Choläq Surkhai Khän, 357 Army, Persian, in early Safavï times, 19-21 ; reformed by Shäh ‘Abbäs I, 21 ; deterioration after his death, 22, 27, 44; fails to subdue Ghalzai and Abdäli rebels, 91, 97; sad state at time of Mahmüd’s invasion, 130; reasons for defeat at Gulnäbäd, 143 ; reorganised by Nädir, it defeats the Abdâlïs and later the Ghalzais, 3257»331-6 Art, the late Safavï period one of decline, 486-7; architecture, 487; “progressive” school of painting, 488-9 ; astrolabes, 490-1 Asadullah Khän ibn ‘Abdullah Khän Sadözai, 96-100 Ashraf (son of ‘Abd al-'Aziz and Shäh of Persia, 1725-9), arrested by Mahmüd (1722), 160; accompanies Amänullah against Qazvïn, 194; es­ capes to Qandahär, 194; his return demanded by Afghan soldiery, 207 ; imprisoned by Mahmüd, 207 ; during Mahmüd’s illness released and placed on throne, 210-11; insecure position, 274-5; puts to death Mahmüd’s supporters, 275; speciously offers crown to ex-Shäh, 275 ; tries to trick Tahmäsp, 277-8; defeats Tahmäsp’s forces, 278; sends envoy to Turkey (1725), 2823; Turks declare him a rebel, 2846; insulted by Ahmad Päshä, he puts ex-Shäh to death, 289; triumphs over Turks, 290-1 ; recog­ nised as Shäh by Turks, 292; receives Turkish envoy, 293-4; sends ambassador to Turkey, 294; war with Russia, 295-6; peace concluded at Resht (1729), 296-7; measures to meet threat from Tahmäsp and Nädir, 328-9; de­ feated at Mihmändüst, 330-2; re­ tires to Isfahän, 332; routed again

566

INDEX Ashraf (cont.) at Murchakhür, and abandons Içfahân, 333; defeated at Zarqän, 336; flees eastwards and is inter­ cepted and killed, 337-8 Ashraf (town), 281, 304-5 Astärä, 242, 248, 358 Astaräbäd, province of, 7, 238, 243, 316, 345; town of, 7, 274, 278-81, 304, 306, 319 Astrakhan, its annexation by Russia (*556) gives her a port for Caspian trade, 55 ; revolts early in eighteenth century, 63; Peter the Great ap­ points Volynsky governor to watch developments in Persia, 108, 128, 176; port of embarkation for Peter the Great’s Persian expedition, 179, and for his return, 188 Augustinians in Persia, 427, 450, 458 Aurangzïb, Mughal Emperor, 65, 83, 109 Austria, 54, 123, 212-14, 219, 220, 235, 237 Avramov, Semeon (Russian Consul at Resht and later Russian secretary and interpreter to Tahmäsp), 125, 177, 241, 248, 304, 310, 314-15, 324, 346-7, 497, 513, 530-b 547 Azov, 61 Bäbä, Küh-i-, 2, 3 Bachoud, Père Louis, S.J., 128 n., 547 Baghdad, 1, 5, 27, 30, 124, 137-8, 291, 430 Bagratids (royal line of Georgia), 45 Bahrain islands, 1,99,110,115,116,404 Bakar (son of Wakhtang VI), 118, 159, 255-6 Bäkharz, 101 Bakhtiârï tribe, 6, 146, 161, 162, 193, 205, 272 Baku, Russian demand for free entry (1700) leads to its fortification by Persia, 62 ; appeals to Russia for aid against Dä’üd Beg, 186, but later refuses to admit Russian envoy, 245 ; surrenders to Russia after bombard­ ment (1723), 246; restored to Persia (i735), 348 Baluchi tribes, 7, 46-7, 84, 129, 204, 405-6

Balüchistän, province of, 7, 302

Bam, no Bandar ‘Abbäs, 6, 46, 58, 68, 115, 199, 204, 301,435,449, 469, 502; see also Gombroon Basidü, 419 Basil of St Charles (Carmelite friar), 88, 90, 449 Baskakov, Alexis (Russian army officer sent to Gllän to collect information of military importance), 126 n., 177 Baçra, 52-4, 199, 212, 337, 365 n., 396, 472, 516 Bastäm (formerly Bisfäm), 281,307,330 Baudelot de Dairval, C. C. (editor and part-writer of the Voyage du Sieur Paul Lucas au Levant), 542, 547 Beglarbegîs (Govemors-General), posi­ tion and powers of, 14 Bell, John, of Antermony, 100, 105, 107, 402, 548 Ben Içfahân (Venisfadarän), 165, 200i, 493 Block, Commodore, 365, 391 n. Bonnac, Jean-Louis d’Usson, Mar­ quis de, 219-20, 224, 226-8, 230-4, 236-7» 526-7, 536-8, 548 Brangwin, Captain Benjamin (agent of the English East India Company in Persia), 370-1, 391-2 Britannia (frigate of the English East India Company), 398, 416, 419 Browne, Professor E. G., 16, 20 n., 71, 137, 491, 549 Bruce, Peter Henry, 182, 187, 549 Bruyn, Cornelius de (Dutch artist and traveller), 48, 62, 244, 476, 489-90, 513, 549 Buinaq, 9, 183 Bukhärä, 59, 60, 105 n., 176, 180 Butkov, P. G. (author of Materiali dlya novoy Istorii Kavkaza, 17221803), 249, 531, 549 Campredon, de (French ambassador to Russia), 224, 228 n., 232 Cansevilles, Jean Billon de (French merchant and expert on Persian commercial affairs), 59 n., 355 n., 384 n., 434. 436, 457~8, 532-3, 549 Cantemir, Demetrius (ex-Hospodar of Moldavia), 128 n., 179

567

INDEX Capuchins in Persia, 427-9, 432, 434, 442, 454 n., 468, 472 n., 517, 532 Carmelites in Persia, 32, 77 n., 78 n., 269, 415» 427, 429, 458 Caspian Sea,'opened to Russia by her seizure of Astrakhan (1556), 55; its strategic and commercial import­ ance to Russia, 59; surveyed (1699), 60-1 ; Russian ships on, 62 ; supre­ macy over it planned by Peter the Great, 176; more detailed surveys made (1720-2), 176-7; crossed by Peter and his army, 179; Turkey’s fears aroused, 217; Peter deter­ mines to thwart Turkish designs on Caspian and Black Seas, 222; Peter uses it in preference to land communications with Persia, 239; various maps, 493-4; Delisle’s sources of information for his map, 494-5 Catherine I, Empress of Russia, 182, 183, 345, 346, 352 Catholic missions in Persia, 63, 65, 76-7; see also Augustinians, Ca­ puchins, Carmelites and Jesuits Cerceau, Père Jean-Antoine du, S.J., 519-22, 528 Chahär Aimäq tribe, 10 Chahär Bägh (in Isfahän), 48, 147, 153. 474-5> 477-8 Chaldirän, Shäh Ismä‘Il’s defeat at the battle of, 19, 20 Chamishgazak Kurds, 98, 308-9, 319 Chardin, Sir John, 16, 24, 31, 58, 366, 400, 476, 478, 513, 549 Chechens (of Enderi), 182 Chelebî-zâda, Muçtafâ ‘Äsim Efendi, 283-4, 550 Cherkassky, Prince Alexander Bekovich, 105, 106, 185 Chihil Sutün (at Içfahân), 37, 42, 479 Choläq Surkhai Khän (chief of the Ghâzï Qumûq tribe), 127, 177, 266, 267, 356-8 Christians in Persia, in the early Safavl period, 8, 9, 27 ; persecuted by Shäh Sulaimän, 32; under Shäh Sultän Husain, 76-7; reason for mis­ sionaries’ failure, 77 n. ; feud between Catholic and Gregorian Armenians, 64, 77 ; a law discriminating

against Christians, 77; encouraged to settle in Russia, 249, 359 Chukhûr-i-Sa‘d (Erivan) province, 2, 4» 5, 9, 74, 123 Clairac, Louis-André de La Mamie de, 497,508-9,518,525-30,550 Clodius, Professor Johann Christian, 523, 556 Cloth, Dutch exports of, to Persia, 386; English exports of, to Persia, 360, 389, 391 Cockell, William (of the English East India Company), 329, 331, 399,422, 424 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 426, 429 n., 430-1, 457, 469 Colombe, Philippe (French artillery­ man in the Persian service), 135, 142, 155, 434 Compagnie Française des Indes, see France Connock, Edward, 360-1, 372, 374 Constantine III, of Kakheti (also known as Muhammad Qulï Khän), 253, 258-62, 271, 288, 305 Constantinople, 212-14, 217-19, 221, 226-7, 232, 258, 261, 271, 283, 291, 294, 343, 351-2, 400, 504, 518, 522 Cossacks, 179, 184, 187; Grebentsi, 55» 56, 65, 106 n.; Don, 58,129,188 Crimea, Khän of, 217, 221 Crowther, John, 360

Däghistän, 1, 3, 8, 56, no, 117, 212, 222, 237, 240, 345» 349, 354-6 Dämäd Ibrâhîm, see under Ibrâhîm Urgüplü, Dämäd Dämghän, 281, 306-7, 331 Darband, sent copy of Peter the Great’s manifesto, 180; inhabitants receive Peter, 185; he leaves for Russia, 187; Russian garrison left, 186; Turkish envoy requests Rus­ sian withdrawal (1723), 222;. re­ stored to Persia (1735), 348 Dargazln tribe, 202-3,205,288,299,424 Dä’üd Beg (originally the Mudarris Hajjï Dä’üd), 127-8, 177, 186, 216, 223,229,232, 243,248, 254, 267,356 Dä’üd, Mîrzâ (Mutawallî of the shrine of the Imäm Ridä at Mashhad and grandfather of Sayyid Ahmad), 300

INDEX Dä’üd, Mudarris Hajjl, see Dä’üd Beg David Beg (Armenian patriotic leader), 259, 260, 287 Delhi, 66, 82 Delisle, Guillaume, French geo­ grapher, 52, 493-6 Dhu’l-Fiqär Khän (Abdâlî leader and elder brother of Ahmad Khän, later Ahmad Shäh Durrânï), 101, 102, 324, 326 Dhu’l-Fiqär Khän (one of Tahmäsp’s partisans), 281, 319-20 Dhu’l-Qadar (Dulghadir) tribe, 19 Diläräm (battle of, between the Ghalzais and Abdälls), 100 Diza (fortress on the outskirts of Zunüz, in Adharbaijân), 265, 287 Dolgoruki, Prince (Russian com­ mander in Gilän), 345, 357 Domenti (brother of Wakhtang VI), 87 Dubois, Cardinal, 219, 224 n., 227 Durri Efendi (Turkish envoy to Persia in 1720-1), 107 n., no, 1235, 177, 524, 550-1

East India Company, Dutch (OostIndische Compagnie), rivalry with English East India Company in Persia, 362-3; its great strength, 363; its factory at Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbäs), 378-9; its factory at Içfahân, 381-2; emoluments of its officials, 383; nature of its Per­ sian trade, 386-7; its advantages over its English rival, 391 ; refuses to give naval aid to Persia against Arabs, 392; Hoogkamer’s mission (1701), 397, 403 ; difficulties in 1712, 401; Ketelaar’s mission (1717), 401-4; experiences of representa­ tives during siege of Içfahân, 40811 ; Mahmüd’s exorbitant demands, 413-14; Afghans destroy factory at Içfahân, 415; mediates between Persians and English (1723)» 4*6; payments to Afghans, 419; en­ deavour to seize Hormuz castle, 420; serious consequences at Gom­ broon, 420-1; gives up claim to Hormuz, 421 ; decline in power and prestige begins, 422 ; factory at

Içfahân looted, 433; harsh treat­ ment by Afghans at Shlräz, 425 East India Company, English, begin­ ning of connection with Persia, 360-1 ; establishes factories at Jäsk and Içfahân, 361; helps Persians against Portuguese (1622), the ad­ vantages derived, 362; transfer of factory to Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbäs), 362; advent of Dutch Company, 363-4; rivalry ensues, 363-5; difficulties, 365-7; improve­ ment, 368; headquarters moved to Içfahân (1695), 370; factory at Gombroon, 378; emoluments of staff, 383 ; nature of trade, 384-5; struggles, 388-9; sends representatives to Tabriz and Mash­ had (1696), 389-90; refuses to aid Persians against Muscat Arabs, 390-2; Shäh Sultän Husain visits Isfahän factory (1699), 393-4; set­ backs due to various causes, 395-6; rival company formed in England, 395 ; amalgamation of the two companies, 396; builds two frigates for service in Gulf, 398; tries to prevent conclusion of FrancoPersian treaty (1708), 400; despite Arab piracy, many ships call at Gombroon (1720), 404; raiders attack Gombroon factory, 405-6; frequent violation of its rights, 407 ; experiences of staff during siege of Isfahän, 408-11; difficulties with Afghans, 414; serious incident at Gombroon (November 1723), 416; trading conditions deteriorate, 41819; staff imprisoned in Isfahän by Ashraf, 423 ; harsh treatment of Shlräz staff, 425 ; hopes of improved conditions under new régime dis­ appointed, 425 East India Company, French, see France Echmiadzin, 5 n., 74, 77 n., 453 Elburz mountains, 7, 278, 281 Enzell, 58 n., 239, 242 Erivan (town), Persian garrison of good quality, 253; a main Turkish objective, 259; its strength, 259; besieged and taken by Turks (1724),

INDEX Erivan (town) (cont.) 260-1 ; allocated to Turkey by treaty of 1724, 292 Erzurum, 221, 255, 354,438, 439, 441, 452 Estoile, Louis Guilherme de 1’, 432-3 Estoile, Reine de 1’, 433 Eunuchs, pernicious influence in late Safavî times, 17, 25, 29, 30; parallel with Achaemenian period, 26, 29; promote accession of Shäh Sultan Husain, 36-7; their control over the Shäh challenged, 38, 44; induce the Shäh to take to drink, 40-1 Fabre, Jean-Baptiste (French envoy to Persia in 1706), 400,437-41,455,464 Fabritius, Ludvig (Swedish envoy to Persia in 1679, 1682 and 1697), 51, 52, 494 Faräh, 89, 100, 101, 324 Farabäbäd (palace and garden near Julfa), 48, 126,150-3,157, 171, 178, 278, 411, 481-3, 505-6 Farajullah, Sayyid, of the Musha^ha* family, 53, 54, 134 m, 521 Färs, 6, 23, 24, 27, 115, 117, 193, 203, 374, 336 Fath ‘Ali Khän Däghistäni (Ttimäd al-Daula), iqü, 11311., 114-23, 43, 405-6, 463, 465-6, 489, 499, 5”, 517 Fath ‘Alï Khän Qäjär (chief of the Âshâghîbâshï Qâjârs of Astaräbäd), birth, 280; defeated by Malik Mahmüd Sistani in 1720, 123; alleged attempt to relieve I§fahän, 280; rebels and defeats Tahmäsp, 281; rejoins Tahmäsp, 304; his ambitious character, 305; influence over Tahmäsp, 306; rivalry with Nädir, 308-9; executed for treason, 309-10 Fath ‘Ali Khän Turkman (Mir Shikär-bäshl), 97 Fedeli, Bishop Barnabas (Bishop of Isfahan), 129, 467, 517 Ferriol, Charles, Comte de (French ambassador at Constantinople from 1699 to 1711), 400, 437-8, 441, 535, 551

Fowler, Henry (chief merchant of the English East India Company at Gombroon), 416-17 France, endeavours to prevent Turkey and Russia from going to war, 21933; reasons why she abandoned this policy in 1726, 353; early con­ tacts with Persia, 426-7; reasons for establishment of Capuchins in Persia, 427-8 ; services of Père Raphaël to France, 428-9; forma­ tion of Compagnie des Indes Orien­ tales (1664), 431; it opens factory at Gombroon, 431-2; spasmodic efforts by French to develop trade place them at disadvantage with rivals, 432; French contributions to knowledge of Persia in the west, 433; de Cansevilles sent to study Persian trading conditions (1698), 434; Persia tries to obtain French naval aid against Muscat Arabs, 435Î Fabre’s mission, 436-7; his death at Erivan, 440-1 ; Michel sent to take his place, 441-4; he concludes treaty with Persia (1708), 445-8; terms of treaty, 449-50; France fails to follow up her ad­ vantage, 453 ; tries to secure redress for Catholic missionaries, 454; mission of Muhammad Ridä Beg to France (1715), 455-62; conclu­ sion of treaty of 1715 and its terms, 460-1; Ange de Gardane sent as ambassador to Isfahan, 464-5 ; friction between him and Padery, 465-8; Padery obtains ratification of 1715 treaty (1722), 467; ex­ periences of French in Isfahän during siege, 467-8; disappointing results of France’s commercial endeavours; more success in religious and cul­ tural spheres, 469-70; govern­ ment’s harsh treatment of Gardane brothers, 472 Fraser, James, of Reelig (author of Nadir Shah), 329, 399, 552 Frescurati Veronese, Giuseppe (Italian surgeon), 88, 90 Frontiers, Turco-Persian, 1, 2; PersoMughal, 2; Russo-Turkish (in oc­ cupied Persia), 4 n., 353'5, 357, 359

570

INDEX Frost, the Rev. John (Chaplain of the English East India Company at Içfahân), 169, 408 n., 415

Gaerber, Major (later Colonel) Jo­ hann Gustav, 235 n., 246, 351, 355, 552 Galiczen, Monseigneur Gratien de, titular Bishop of Agathapolis and coadjutor Bishop of Babylon, 454 Ganja, 5, 189, 254-5, 258, 266, 292, 348, 517 Gardane, Chevalier Ange de, Seigneur de Sainte-Croix, 163, 171, 280, 288, 461-2, 505, 509, 526, 533*5, 553 Gardane, François de, 464, 471-8, 509, 533-4 Gauderau, Père (later Abbé) Martin (French missionary and Persian scholar), 37, 38 n., 39 n., 47, 51, 434-6, 456 n., 470, 485, 552 Gaz (village 9 miles north-north-west of I§fahän), 159, 200-1, 334 Geekie, John (of the English East India Company), 329, 424 Georgia, Persian, 1, 4, 5, 45, 50, 84, 159, 212, 221, 225, 228, 238, 240 Georgians, 8, 9, 46, 74-5, 85, 87, 88, 91, 157, 161, 186, 249, 258-9 Ghalzai tribe, origin, 80-1; prefers Persian to Mughal rule, but later relations with Persia deteriorate, 83 ; Mir Wais, Ghalzai chief, arrested by Giorgi XI, he ingra­ tiates himself with Shäh, 86; he murders Giorgi XI and leads suc­ cessful revolt, 87-8; for further developments, see Mir Wais, Mah­ müd and Ashraf Ghazi Qumüq Qoisü, 9 Ghâzi Qumüq tribe, 3, 9, 127, 177 Ghika, Gregorio (Chief Dragoman of the Porte), 230-1, 235 n. Ghuriän, battle of, 97 Gïlân, 7, 8, 23, 177, 193, 238-43, 247-9, 257, 296, 302, 345, 347-9, 352-3, 358-9, 507 Gilanentz, Petros di Sargis, 506-9, 553 Giorgi XI (King of Kartli and Vali of Georgia); also known as Gurgln Khän and Shäh Naväz Khän III), deposed by Shäh Sulaimän, 45 ;

reinstated, again deposed, restored to favour, 45; his character, 45-6; defeats Baluchi raiders, 46; he is sent to Qandahär as commanderin-chief, 47, 84; Ghalzais revolt against him, 85; he arrests Mir Wais, 85-6; Mir Wais’s propaganda against him, 86-7; discredited and murdered by Mir Wais, 87 Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbäs), factories of English and Dutch East India Companies at, 361-2; English share of customs dues usually in arrears, 365-6, 391; early history, 372-3; advantages and disadvantages, 3747; becomes chief port of Persia, 377; the factories, 378-9; Ketelaar reaches Gombroon, 402, his tragic death there later, 404; occupied by Ghalzais, 417; trade almost at a standstill, 419; Dutch attempt to seize Hormuz leads to serious inci­ dent (1728), 420-1; town reoccu­ pied by Persians but soon aban­ doned, 424 ; Ghalzais take possession, but are finally expelled (1730), 424; French factory opened, 431-2; see also Bandar ‘Abbäs Gombroon Diary (kept by the Agent and Council of the English East India Company at Gombroon), 539, 55b 553 Government, system of, in late Safavl times, 12-14; in earlier Safavl period, 18, 20, 21 Great Britain, endeavours to embroil Turkey with Russia, 220, 223 ; reasons for this policy, 220-1 ; trade with Persia via Aleppo, see Levant Company; trade with Per­ sia via the Cape of Good Hope and Persian Gulf, see East India Com­ pany, English; trade with Persia via Russia, see Russia Company Gregorian (Armenian) Church, 9, 74-5 Gulnäbäd, battle of (8 March 1722), 137-43, 146-7, 217, 498, 512, 540 Gulnäbäd (village of), 132, 136, 154, 157, 167 Gulpälgän, 5, 159, 204

571

INDEX Gurgln Khän, see Giorgi XI Haidar, Shaikh, father of Shäh Ismä‘11 I, 19 fjaklm-bashl, see under Rahim Khän Hamadän, province of, 5, 225, 292; town of, 10, 109, 200, 202, 225, 234 n., 258, 261, 268-72, 288, 453, 501 Hamilton, Captain Alexander, 42, 115, 373, 376, 405, 553 Hanway, Jonas, 249, 509, 529-30, 554 Harî-rüd, 3, 99, 325 Hasan ‘All Khän (Governor-General of Ardalän), 47, 72 n. Hasan ‘All Khän (Governor of Shlrvän), 117 Hasan, Hajjï Mïrzâ, author of the Fârs-Nâma-yi-Nâçirï, 1, 515-16, 554 Hasan Päshä (of Baghdad), 53, 124, 199, 258, 267, 268 Hasanäbäd (Zoroastrian quarter in Içfahân), 73 Hawlza, 6 n., 53, 134, 292, 521 Hazära tribe, 10, 11, 85, 109, 130 n>, 521 Helmand river, 2, 10, 89 Herat, 7, 88, 91, 93, 97, 99, 101, 116, 323“6, 330 Herbette, Maurice (author of Une Ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV)t 455, 554 Holland, 59, 214, 364-5, 366-8; see also under East India Company, Dutch Hoogkamer, Jacobus (Director of the Dutch East India Company at Gombroon), 397, 403 Home, John (Agent of the English East India Company at Isfahan), 422, 424-5 Hötakl clan (leading clan of the Ghalzais), 81, 85 Husain Khän (Governor of Shamäkhl), 127 Husain (Mahmud’s brother and ruler of Qandahâr), 210, 279, 283, 329 Ibrâhîm Mutafarriqa (Hungarian renegade, Director of the Imperial

Press at Constantinople and trans­ lator of Krusinski’s Memoirs into Turkish), 213, 522-3, 556 Ibrählm Päshä (Governor of Erzurum and commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in north-west Per­ sia), 255-6, 258 Ibrählm Urgüplü, Dämäd, see under Urgüplü, Dämäd Ibrâhîm Imäm Qui! Beg (Armenian renegade and adventurer, also known as the Comte de Zagly), 77-8, 441-2, 444 Imäm Qulî Beg, Deputy Governor of Darband, 185 Imamst the 12 of the Ithna ‘Asharlya, 11, 19 India, see Mughal Empire Inji (Russian fortified camp in Däghistän), 184, 188 ‘Iräq (Persian), 5, 319 ‘Isin (village near Bandar ‘Abbäs), 374, 379 Içfahân, scene of coronation of Shäh Sultän Husain (1694), 36-7; Chihil Sutün partially destroyed by fire (1706), 42; court removed to Qazvïn (1717-18), 99; returns (1721), 126; country round ravaged, 129; alarm at news of Ghalzai in­ vasion, 133; army sent to Gulnä­ bäd, 133-4; survivors return and spread panic, 142-4; decision to defend city, 145; first Afghan attack, 150; gradual investment, 151-8; importance of the bridges, 154-7; food shortage, 158; Tah­ mäsp Mïrzâ escapes, 160; failure of attempts to relieve city, 161-2; famine and disease, 165-8; sur­ render, 169; triumphal entry of Afghans, 174-5; Mahmüd en­ throned, 175; he slaughters mini­ sters and nobles, 197-8; Mahmud’s slaughter of Safavl princes, 208; death of Mahmüd and accession of Ashraf, 210; murder of the exShäh, 289; bad conditions in city, 294; defences strengthened against Nädir and Tahmäsp, 328; Ashraf sets out to oppose them, 329; Ashraf defeated, abandons city, 333*, Tahmâsp enters in triumph,

572

INDEX ïçfahân (cont.) 334Î staffs of English and Dutch East India Companies during siege, 408-11; the city as it was in early eighteenth century, 473-85 Ismä‘il Beg (Tahmäsp’s envoy to Russia), 240-1, 245-8, 314, 345 Ismä‘11 Khän (Persian commander in Khuräsän), 122, 279 Ismä‘11 Mîrzâ (son of Shäh Sultän Husain), 302 Ismä‘11 I, Shäh, 8, 11, 17, 19-21 Ismä‘11 II, Shäh, 21 Issoudun, Père Pierre d’ (head of the Capuchin Mission at Tabriz), 454 n., 464 n., 532 Ithna ‘Asharîya sect, 11, 19 Ivan the Terrible, Tsar, 55, 56

Jabbara Kaukäni, Shaikh, of Tähiri, no Jacob the Cour lander, 155 Ja’far Khän Ustajlü (also known as . Ja‘far Khän IJätimi), 97 Jar, Lezgî colony in the Qäniq valley, 3» 10, 117 Jäsk, 2, 360-2 Jawäsmi (also known as Jawäsim or Qawäsim) Arabs, 115, 129, 404 Jean Joseph (Carmelite Friar), 269-71 Jesuits in Persia, 52, 62, 127, 429, 432, 439,450,516-17 Jews, distribution of, in Persia, 8, 10, 11 ; persecution of, 28 n., 32; Ashraf ranks them sixth amongst the peoples of Persia, 299 Joseph de Paris, Père (“Eminence Grise”), 426-30 Julfa (suburb of Içfahân), 9, 39, 48, 74, 77, 150-3, 192, 370, 390, 477-8, 484-5, 517 Kabul, province of, 65, 83 Käfir Qal‘a (now known as Isläm Qal‘a), 99, 3*4 Kai Khusrau (of Georgia, son of Levan and nephew of Giorgi XI), quells disturbances in Içfahân (1707), 49, 50; commands force against Ghalzais, 88-9 ; defeated and killed, 90 Käkarl tribe, 2, 87, 88 Kakheti, kingdom of, 4, 8, 56, 57, 74

Kartli, kingdom of, 2, 4, 8, 74 Käshän, 5, 105, 160, 161, 196, 204, 274, 333, 464, 505 Kasravi, Sayyid Ahmad (author of the Tä* nkh-i-Pan-Sad-Säla-yi-Khüzistän\ 515, 555 Ketelaar, Joan Josua (Envoy of the Dutch East India Company to Persia), 107 n., 383, 399, 404, 542 Khabüshän (Qüchän), 306-7, 316-17 Khalaj tribe, 80-2 Khcfaa (royal demesnes), expands at expense of Mamalik, 17, 23, 24 Khiva, 61, 105 n., 106 n., in, 176, 185, 188, 198 Khoi, 262, 264, 292 Khurramäbäd, 5, 272, 288, 292, 501 Khuräsän, 5, 7, 10, 21, 23, 97-8, 116, 119, 122, 164, 167, 279-80, 306-7, 316, 318-19, 321, 330, 335-6, 345 Khusrau Shäh, Mir (Baluchi leader), 46 Khüzistän, see under ‘Arabistän Khwäja Rabi‘ (shrine on the northern outskirts of Mashhad), 308, 336 Khwär valley, battle of, 332, 423 Khwärazm, 3, 59, 61, 105, 106; see also under Khiva Kirmän (province), 6, 7, 23, 46-7, 82, 84, 110—11, 164, 192, 330, 336; goats’ wool from, 369, 422 Kirmän (town), 6, 10, 73, in-13, 129, 133. 384. 4°5> 4°7> 487. SIO> 534; factory of the English East India Company at, 405, 407 Kirmänshäh (province), 2, 5, 225, 268, 292 Kirmänshäh (town), 5, 234 n., 258, 271, 291-2 Kong, 67, 68, 391, 435, 449, 459 Krepost Svyatogo Kresta (“Holy Cross Fort”), 187, 188, 222 Krusinski, Father Tadeusz Juda, S.J., 39, 49, 134 n., 135, 142, 190-1, 201, 208, 213, 277-8, 280, 509, 516-25, 555-6 Kühgilü, 6, 138, 141, 193, 205, 417 Kura river, 229, 234, 239, 249, 256 n., 348 Kurdistän, 2, 5, 47, 122, 486, 516; see also under Ardalän

573

INDEX Kurds, 5, 8, io, 109, 120, 289-91, 316, 319, 322; see also under indi­ vidual Kurdish tribes, such as the Chamishgazak, Qarâchorlü, etc. Kusüya, 97, 325

Lähijän, 302, 386 Lam, Pieter’t (President of the Dutch East India Company at Gombroon), 419-21 Lär, 204, 337, 405, 417 La(îf Mirzä (Safavï prince and military leader), 271-2 Lee, William (English East India Company’s representative at Mash­ had in 1696), 389-90, 539 Lesur, C. L. (author of Des Progrès de la Puissance Russe depuis son Origine jusqu'au Commencement du XIXe Siècle), 104 Levan (brother of Giorgi XI of Kartli), 46, 49 Levant Company, 366, 368-9, 389 Levashov, Brigadier (later General) Vasili Yakovlevich, 242-3, 248, 296, 345-7, 507 Lezgi tribesmen, 3, 11, 50, 61, 65, 117-19, 124, 127, 159, 177-9, 189, 222-3, 254; see also under Ghazi Qumûq, Jar and Tala Literature, at a low ebb, 491 ; reasons for this, 491-2 Lockyer, Captain Charles, 68, 377, 379, 383, 384 n., 398, 539, 557 Louis XIV, 367, 395, 431, 430-3, 435-7, 435-7, 463, 533 Louis XV, 219, 227 Lucas, Paul (French traveller), 45, 542, 547 ; see also under Baudelot de Dairval, C. C. Lucke, Lieut.-Colonel von (one of the Russian representatives on the Russo-Turkish frontier commis­ sion), 351, 354 Luristän, province of, 2, 5, 54, 135, 161, 272, 292 Lurs, 5, 54, 137, 160, 162, 193 Luff ‘Ali Khän Däghistän!, 112, 113 n., 115-17, 146, 201, 404, 406, 506, 511, 520

Mabür (village in Shirvän), 354, 355

Madrasa-yi-Mädar-i-Shäh (at Isfa­ han), 48, 72 n., 289 n., 480-1,486-7 Makrän, 7 Mahmüd (elder son of Mir Wais), murders his uncle, becomes chief of Ghalzais, 93; ambitious nature, 93-4; invades Persia (1719), 11113; returns to Qandahär to quell revolt, 112; second invasion (17213), 130-3; probable strength of his army, 136 ; wins battle of Gulnäbäd, 138-43; his indecision after the battle, 148-9; marches on Içfahân, 149; begins siege, 150; captures Julfa and occupies Farafoäbäd, 1512; fails in first attacks on Isfahän, 153-6; captures the Pul-i-Mamän, 157; encircles I§fahän, 158; blames Ashraf for Tabmäsp’s escape, 160— 1; maintains close blockade of city and finally forces surrender, 165-9; is crowned and enters Isfahän, 173-5 ; receives Russian envoy, 178; Mahmud’s appearance and charac­ ter, 190-1; his precarious position, 192; sends Amänullah to attack Tahmäsp, 194; massacres Persian nobles, 197; receives Turkish envoy (1723), 199-200; kills Lutf ‘All Khän, 201; takes Shiraz, 201-4; fails to subdue Kühgilû, 205; also fails to take Yazd, 206; his mind becomes unhinged, 207; murders Safavï princes, 207-8; attempts at cure, 208-9; he dies or is put to death (1725), 210 Mahmüd Mirzä (eldest son of Shäh Sulfän IJusain), 147, 148, 192, 340 Maidän-i-Shäh (at Isfahän), 37, 39, 49, 301, 473-5 Malakent, Russian fortified camp at, 185-8, 221 Malcolm, Sir John, 20 n., 25, 28, 497, 503, 557 Malik Ishäq (brother of Malik Mah­ müd Sistäni), 317 Malik Kalb ‘Ali (brother of Malik Mahmüd Sistäni), 322 Malik Lu$f ‘Ali (brother of Malik Mahmüd Sistäni), 322 Malik Muhammad ‘Ali (brother of Malik Mahmüd), 317

574

INDEX Malik Mahmüd Sistänl, his descent, 123; defeats Fath ‘Ali Qäjär (1720), 123; becomes practically indepen­ dent, 123, 279; is persuaded to abandon relief of Isfahan, 167; extends his power to Nishäpür, 279; defeats Tahmäsp’s general, 279 ; defeated by Nädir, 279 ; main­ tains his power in western Khura­ san, 280; is attacked by Nädir and Tahmâsp (1726), 306-7; besieged in Mashhad, 308; submits, 311-12; incites revolt in Merv and is put to death, 316-17 Malinky, Semeon, Russian merchant, travels to Persia and India with Andrei Semeonov (q.v.), 58, 105 n. Mamälik (state provinces), 7, 13, 14, 17 Mäni‘ ibn Mughamis, Shaikh of the Muntafiq, 53, 54 Marägha, 287-8, 292 Marand, 263, 265, 287 Marüchäq, 101 Maryam Begum (aunt of Shäh Sulaimän), character, 36; helps to secure accession of Shäh Sultan Husain, 36; persuades the Shäh to take to drink, 39-40; urges him to reassert his authority and crush rebel Afghans, 99; discovers plot to place Shäh’s brother ‘Abbäs on throne, 115 Mashhad, Shäh’s pilgrimage (1706), 49; Fath ‘Ali Khän Turkman melts down ornaments of shrine, 97 ; unsuccessfully besieged by Abdälis (1716), 98; rises against Ismä‘il Khän, 122; made his capital by Malik Mahmüd Sistänl, 279; be­ sieged by Nädir and Tahmâsp (1726), 308; it falls through trea­ chery, 311 ; importance of its fall, 311 ; Nädir receives Tahmâsp there, 318 ; they set out from there against Ghalzais, 330; William Lee sent there (1696), 389-90 Matyushkin, General, 245, 248-9 Mäzandarän, 7, 23, 243, 278-9, 281, 304, 307, 316, 333, 330, 336, 345-6 Maze, Père Jean-Baptiste de la, S.J., 52, 557

575

Medvediev (Russian interpreter and traveller), 60, 105 n. Merv, 3, 7, 307, 316, 318 Mescherski, Prince Boris, 248 Miangi (Mahmüd’s tutor), 277, 337, 413-14 Michel, Pierre Victor (French envoy to Persia), 63, 64, 88,400,437,441-52, 535, 557 Mihmändüst, battle of (29 September 1729), 330-1, 423 Mikhail Feodorovich, Tsar, 57 Miklukho-Maklai, N. D., 315, 497, 510, 530-1, 557 Minasian, Dr C. O., xii, 132 n., 496 Minorsky, Professor V., xii, 3 n., 4, 6 n., 17, 20, 22, 513-14, 557-8 Montagu, Lady Mary Wortley, 214 n., 536 Montesquieu, 456 Morier, James, 169 Moscow, 57, 60, 193, 221-2, 427 Mosnier, Père Léonard, S.J., 439-40, 442, SS8 Mughal Empire, 2, 65-6, 82-4, 96 Muhammad ‘All Hazin, Shaikh, 143, 145, 166-7, 194, 270, 299, 338, 492, 500-4, 558_ Muhammad Äqä, Mir ‘alam Dervish, 218, 254-5, 353-5 Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisl, his fanaticism, 32, 70, 72, 73, 117; his influence over Shäh Suljän Husain, 38, 40, 72; his appointment as Mulla-bäshly 72; his prolific writings, 71, 72; his share of the respon­ sibility for the persecution of Sunnis, 71 Muhammad Hasan Khän Qäjär, 310, 513 Muhammad Husain, Mir (Mulläbäshl), 71-3, 116-18, 120-1, 148, 156, 160, 317, 499 Muhammad Ibrâhîm ibn Zain al‘Abidln (author of the Dastür-iShahriyärän), 37, 539 Muhammad Ja‘far Beg (Persian envoy to Batavia in 1715), 401 Muhammad Khalil Mar‘ashi-yi-Safavl (author of the Majma' alTawänkh), 2, 112,113, 115, 510-12, 559

INDEX Muhammad Khän Afghan (father of Dhu’l-Fiqär Khän and Ahmad Khän, the future Ahmad Shäh Durrânî), ioi, 324 Muhammad -Khan Baluch (Ashraf’s envoy to Turkey), 294-5 Muhammad Khän Turkman (one of Tahmäsp’s generals), 279, 307 Muhammad Khudäbanda, Shäh, 21,56 Muhammad Mahdi Kaukabi Astaräbädi, Mirzä, 112, 280, 307, 310, 313, 325, 330, 5i2-i3> 559 Muhammad Mirzä (son of Shäh Sultän Husain), 302 Muhammad Muhsin (author of the Zubdat al-Tawärlkh), 21 n., 99, 119, 122, 130, 133, 142, 143, 166, 192, 280, 310-n, 313, 498-500» 559 Muhammad Musha'sha*, Sayyid, 134, 52i Muhammad Nishän (Mahmüd’s mace-bearer), 277, 413, 415 Muhammad (Mehmet) Räshid Efendi (author of the Tä'nkh-i-Räshid Efendi and Turkish envoy to Ashraf in 1729), 293, 298, 328, 561 Muhammad Qulï Khän Shämlü {Qurchi-bäshl and later I'timad alDaula), takes part in plot against Fath ‘Alï Khän Däghistäni, 123; receives Durri Efendi, 124; made rtimäd al-Daula, 126; his cowar­ dice, 133 ; shares command of army at Gulnäbäd, 136; his fatal inaction, 140-3; urges abandonment of Içfahân, 145 ; is retained in his post after Mahmud’s accession, 191; his life is spared, 197; assists English East India Company, 414 Muhammad Ridä Beg (Persian am­ bassador to France in 1715), 45564, 533 Muhammad Saidäl Khän (Afghan general), 196 n., 210, 277, 296, 330, 336 Muhammad, Sayyid {Vâlï of ‘Arabi­ stän), 134, 521 Muhammad Shäh (Mughal Emperor, known before his accession in 1719 as Raushan Akhtar), 109 Muhammad Taqi al-Majlis! (father of Muhammad Bäqir), 70

Muhammad Taqï Sipihr (author of the Näsikh al-Tawärtkh}, 280-1, 559 Muhammad Zamän Khän Sadözai (Abdâlï chief), 98 n., ioi, 324 Muhammad Zamän Khän Shämlü {Qurchl-bâshî), 91, 96 Muhammadäbäd (village on the Isfahän-Yazd road 2j miles east of Gulnäbäd), 132, 133, 136, 149, 150 Mujtahids (chief exponents of the Shî‘ï religious law), 38, 47 ; see also under Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisi and Muhammad Husain Mullä-bäshly post of, 13; Muhammad Bäqir al-Majlisî is appointed, 72; he is succeeded by Mïr Muhammad Husain in 1699, 72 Muntafiq tribe, 53, 267; see also under Mani‘, Shaikh Muqaddam tribe, 287 Murchakhür, battle of, 333, 423 Murtadä Qulï Beg (Tahmäsp’s envoy to Turkey in 1723), 226, 232, 258 Murtadä Qulï Khän (Persian am­ bassador to Turkey in 1721-2), 125, 215-16, 226 Muscat (Masqat), 51, no, 114; see also under Arabs of Muscat and ‘Omän Musha‘sha‘ family, 5, 6, 53, no, 516; see also under ‘Abdullah, Sayyid; Farajullah, Sayyid; Muhammad, Sayyid Mustafä Päshä, Hajjï (Turkish Gover­ nor of Ganja), 354 Mustauft-yi-Khässa, Treasurer of the royal demesnes, 13, 14 Muslaufî al-Mamâliky Treasurer of the state provinces, 13 Müsä al-Käzim, the 7th Imäm, 6 Nädir (Nadr Qulï Beg, later Nädir Shäh), joins Tahmäsp (1726), 3078; he fails to take Mashhad by assault, 308; his rivalry with Fath ‘Ali Khän Qäjär, 308-9; he is not responsible for Fath ‘All’s death, 309-10; importance to him of fall of Mashhad, 311; wins Tahmäsp’s favour, but soon clashes with him, 313-16 ; he takes Tahmäsp prisoner, 319; he prevents Tahmäsp from

576

INDEX Nädir (cont.) committing suicide, 319; his opera­ tions against the Abdälls and Ghalzais delayed by intrigues and revolts, 319-20; his formidable task, 321-4; his efforts to train his troops, 322; successful campaign against Abdâlîs of Sangän and Behdâdïn, 322-3 ; inconclusive expedition against Herat (1728), 323-4; subdues Abdälls of Herat (1729), 325-6; reorganises Persian army, 326-7; after repeatedly de­ feating the Ghalzais, he enters Isfahan, 334; restores ßafavl mon­ archy, 334; makes conditions for continuing services, 336; finally defeats the Ghalzais, 336-7; he expels Turks and induces Russia to withdraw, 345-8; attitude towards Russia, 346-7 Najaf, 124, 487, 501 Najafäbäd, 161 Nakhichivän, district of, 4, 292; town of, 261, 442, 450, 458 Naphtha (from Baku), 58, 244,246,269 Na$rullah Khän (Afghan general), 138, 140, 167, 202-3 Nepluyev, Ivan Ivanovich (Russian Resident at Constantinople), 21719, 223-6, 228-31, 233, 283, 342, 352-3, 358 Niäzäbäd (small port on the Caspian coast 40 miles north-east of Shamäkhl), 105, 108 n., 244 Nieuhoff, John, 374, 376 Nihävand, 271, 292, 344 Nikitine, Athanase (Russian traveller to Persia and India in 1466-72), 58 Nlshäpür, 98, 279, 323, 330 Nishii Muhammad Äqä (Turkish envoy to Russia), 218, 221-2 ‘Omän, 66-8, 129, 338, 365, 405 ‘Omän, Arabs of, and Arabs of Mus­ cat, 66-9, 365 ; see also under Muscat Ordübäd, 254, 261-2, 292 Ori, Israel, son., 63,64,86,103,400,452 ‘Osmän (‘Uthmän) Äqa (Turkish Ambassador to Mahmüd Shäh), 199, 200, 223 n., 225, 506-7 37

Ostermann, Count Andrei, 247 özbegs, 21, 42, 51, 98, 178, 389

Padery, Etienne (French Consul at Shlräz), 116, 121, 136 n., 146-7, 164, 167, 455, 459, 462-3, 465-8, 470, 532, 560 Passarovitz, Treaty of, see under Treaties Perry, Captain John, 60, 61, 560 Persia, extent of the country in late Safavi times, 1; frontiers, 1-4; provinces, 4-8; peoples, 8-11; system of government under Safavls, 12-15; internal situation (16941709), 44-50; relations with foreign powers, during early reign of Shäh Sul{än Husain, 51-69; effects of revival of Shl'ism, 70-9; state of country in 1717, 106-8; disquieting developments, 114-18; Durri Efen­ di’s report, 124-5; incident in Shamäkhl (1721), 127-9; Mahmüd’s victory at Gulnäbäd, 137-43; siege and capture of Içfahân by the Afghans, 150-70; beginning of Afghan rale, 172-5; Russian in­ vasion, 180-9; Afghans extend their conquests, 200-5; death of Mah­ müd and accession of Ashraf, 210; Turco-Russian partition, 232-6; Russians capture Baku (1723), 23846; Russo-Persian treaty (1723), 247-8; Turkish invasion, 251-73; under Ashraf, 274-81; temporary subjection of Abdälls, 326; restora­ tion of Safavi rale, 328-40; relations with Turkey and Russia (1725-30), 341-50; relations with English and Dutch East India Companies in later Safavi period, 360-411, and during Afghan occupation, 412-25; relations with France up to 1706, 426-38; Franco-Persian treaty of 1708, 437-52; relations with France from 1716 to 1730, 463-72 Persian Gulf, 2, 10, 51 Peter the Great, of Russia, policy to­ wards Persia, 59; he aims to expand Russian trade, 59; influenced by Georgians; his designs on Caspian Sea, 60-1 ; sends mission to Isfahän

577

LSD

INDEX Peter the Great (cont.) (1697), 61-2; sends Volynsky as ambassador (1715X i°3*» instruc­ tions to Volynsky, 104; so-called “Political Testament”, 104; ap­ points Volynsky governor of Astra­ khan to watch developments in Persia (1720), 108, 176; receives Volynsky’s report, 108; receives message from Wakhtang VI of Kartli suggesting alliance, 108; appoints Volynsky governor of Astrakhan to watch developments in Persia, 108, 176; sends Avramov to Tehran to report, 126; embarks for invasion of Persia (1722), 179; marches southward, 180; reaches Darband, but cannot advance fur­ ther, 184-6; receives threatening message from Turkey, and requests for help from Persians, 186; his homeward march, 187; harassed by Däghistänl tribes, who later mas­ sacre garrison at Inji, 188; lands at Astrakhan, 188; heavy losses during campaign, 188; receives Turkish envoy (1723), 222; asks de Bonnac to mediate with Turkey, 224; crisis with Turkey aggravated by treaty of 1723, 228-9; treaty of Con­ stantinople signed (1724), 233-4; sends troops to Gïlân, 239; delight at capture of Baku, 246; settles Armenians in conquered territory, 249 ; wishes to revive British trade with Persia across Russia, 249; after his death Russia loses her aggressive spirit, 250; his interest in maps, 495 Pétis de La Croix, François, 429, 435, 449-50, 470 Petit, Marie, 400, 438-44, 451-2, 532, 535 Petroleum, see under Naphtha Peyssonnel, Charles Claude (author of Essai sur les Troubles actuels de Perse et de Géorgie), 45, 560 Phillipps, Owen (Agent of the English East India Company during the siege of Içfahân), 408-9,412,414-15 Pidou de St Olon, Bishop of Babylon, 430, 441, 443-4, 453, 45^ n.

Pontchartrain, Jérome Phélipeau, Comte de, 457, 459 Popalzai (Abdâlî clan), 96 Portugal, naval aid important to Persia, 66, 434; expelled from Muscat (1650), 66, 365; given privileges at Kong, 68 n. ; attacked by Muscat Arabs in retaliation for naval aid to Persia, 68, 392; her help vainly sought for recapture of Bahrain, 115-16, 466; ousted from Hormuz (1622), 361; opposed by English and Dutch in Persian Gulf, 363 ; attempts to prevent conclusion of Franco-Persian treaty of 1708, 448 Pul-i-Fasä, battle of, 337 Qadam-Gäh, 98 Qaitäq tribe, 9, 10, 127, 183, 188; see also under Qaräqaitäq Qäjär tribe, 7, 19, 122, 280; Äshäghibäshl branch, 7, 122-3, 280; Yüqâribâshï branch, 7, 122-3 Qalamrau-‘Alï-Shakar, 5 ; see also under Hamadän Qalmuqs, 179, 188 Qandahär, contended for by Persia and Mughal Empire, 27-8, 65-6, 82, 96; district occupied by Ghal­ zais (seventeenth century), 82; raided by Baluchis, saved by Giorgi XI, 84; Giorgi appointed GovernorGeneral, 84; his clash with Mir Wais, 85; Mir Wais makes himself independent, 87-8 ; nearly taken by Kai Khusrau, 90; subsequent Per­ sian operations likewise fail, 91-3; death of Mir Wais (1715), 92; Mahmüd leaves city on first Persian expedition, in; returns to crush revolt, 112 ; leaves on second Persian expedition (1721), 130; Ashraf escapes to city, 197; Mahmüd’s in­ secure lines of communication, 205 ; Ashraf leaves for Içfahân, 207; Ashraf cannot expect help from Qandahär, 274, 305-6; Ashraf, intercepted and killed by Husain of Qandahär, 337-8 Qâniq valley, 3, 10, 117, 118 Qapänät district, 254, 259, 287

578

INDEX Qaräbägh, district of, 4, 5, 260, 292 Qarâchorlü Kurds, 287, 318-19, 337 Qaräqaitäq tribe, 9, 10, 127, 177, 182 Qârç, 2, 255, 258, 260 Qashqai tribe, 8, 82 Qäsim Khän (chief of the Bakhtiäri tribe), 146, 161 Qazvin, court moved there, 1717-18, 99 ; remains until 1720,117 ; reached by Tahmäsp Mïrzâ after escaping from Isfahan (1722), 161 ; Tahmäsp proclaims himself Shäh there (No­ vember, 1722), 193; Mahmüd sends force to attack Tahmäsp, who retreats to Tabriz, 195; city is taken by Afghans, but is soon freed by its inhabitants, 196; coins struck there to celebrate Ashraf’s succes­ sion, 274; Russians and Afghans negotiate truce there (1728), 296; although reinforced, Afghans have to abandon city (1729), 329-32 Qishm, 2 n., no, 115, 361, 365 Qizilbäsh (“Redhead”), origin of term, 19; power of leaders in early §afavi period, 19-21 ; their monopoly of military power broken by Shäh ‘Abbäs I, 21 ; Qizilbäsh (Persian) troops accompany Amänullah to Qazvin (1722), 194; Mahmüd’s slaughter of Qizilbäsh guards, 198 Qubba, khanate of, 355 Qullar (“Slaves”), corps founded by Shäh ‘Abbäs I, 23, 134, 138 Qullar-äqäsi (Commander of the Qullar) y 138 Qum, 5, 49, 210, 276 Qümisha, 5, 133, 135, 200, 202 Qumüq tribe, 9, 56 Qurchï-bâshï, 13

Rahim Khän (tfakîm-bâshï or Chief Physician), 116, 120, 145-7, 156, 160, 192, 208, 499 Raphaël du Mans, Père, 66 n., 428-31, 513, 517, 561 Rashid, Shaikh, of Basidu, 419 Räshid, Muhammad (Mehmet) Efen­ di, see under Muhammad (Mehmet) Räshid Efendi Râvar district (in Kirmän), 384, 386, 422

Rawlinson, Canon G., 26, 29 Rdzin, Stenka (Stephan), 23 n., 29, 51 n., 52 n., 58, 239-40 Rebuffa, Abbé, French Consul at Shiräz, killed during the siege of that town, 204, 471 Resht, 7, 58 n., 125, 177, 186, 238-41, 243, 245, 249, 296, 346, 348, 506, 530 Ribät-i-Pariän (battle of), 325 Ricard, Père Pierre René, SJ., 45, 454 n., 561 Richard, Abbé Jean (French eccle­ siastic and diplomat), 454-7 Ridä Quli Khän Ghuläm (one of Tahmäsp’s generals), 279 Ridä Quli Khän Hidäyat (author of the continuation of the Raudat alSafä)t 16, 17, 280-1, 514-15, 562 Ridä Quli Khän Shämlü (Tahmäsp’s envoy to Turkey), 344 Ridä Quli Mirzä (Nädir’s eldest son), 340 Roe, Sir Thomas, 360 Rousseau, Jacob, 76, 78, 433, 438 Rümlü tribe, 19 Rumyantsev, Major-General Alek­ sander Ivanovich, 237, 249, 351-4, 357 Russia, early relations with Persia, 55-6; importance of her occupation of Astrakhan, 55; southward pene­ tration by Cossacks, 55-6; her aid invoked by Alexander II of Kakheti (1586), 56; mission to Persia (1664), 57-8; unfavourable Persian atti­ tude, 58; Stenka Räzin’s raids on northern Persia, 58; growth of Russian trade, 58-9; Peter the Great’s aspirations, 59-60; em­ bassy to Persia (1697), 61-2; de­ mands free entry into Baku (1700), 62; mission of Israel Ori, 63-5; Volynsky’s mission and RussoPersian treaty of 1717, 103-8; Wakhtang of Georgia offers to co­ operate against Persia, 108; effect in Russia of Shamâkhï incident, 1289; reasons for invasion of Persia, 176-8 ; Russian activities on Caspian coasts and in Gilän, 177; Avramov appointed Consul at Resht, 177; he

579

INDEX Russia (cont.) is sent on mission to Içfahân, 178; invasion of Persia, 179-89; Arme­ nian movement for union with Russia, 189; Russia a potential danger to Mahmüd, 193; risk of war with Turkey over Persia, 21721; encouraged by England, but discouraged by France, 223-32; French ambassador at Constanti­ nople mediates between Russia and Turkey, 228-31; Russo-Turkish treaty for partition of Persia, 233-5 J terms of treaty and its effects, 2337 ; death of Peter the Great and its effects, 237, 249-50, 266 ; brief war with Afghans, 295-7; Empress Catherine’s offer, 345 ; Tahmâsp unwilling to recognise Russia’s territorial claims, 346-7; Nadir’s attitude, 346-7; high death rate of Russian troops leads to eventual complete withdrawal, 348; realisa­ tion of Peter’s aims only partial, 349; delimitation of Russo-Turkish frontier in Persian territory much delayed, 352; it is finally carried out (1727), 355; revolt of Shamkhäl ‘Adil Girai quelled, 356; frequent raids by Choläq Surkhai Khän, 356-7; other causes of friction with Turkey, 358-9; see also Peter the Great Russia Company, 56, 249-50 Rustam Khän (illegitimate son of Levan and half-brother of Wakhtang VI of Kartli), 118, 135, 13841, 147, 499 Rustam Muhammad Sa‘dlû (Gover­ nor of Kirmän), 113, 131 Sa‘ädatäbäd palace (at Içfahân), 37,479 Sabaeans (or Mandaeans), 8, 10, 11 Sabzavär, 318, 321, 323, 330 Safavl Dynasty established in 1501, 19; its early theocratic nature re­ placed by absolute monarchy, 21; reasons for its decline after death of Shäh ‘Abbäs I, 22-34; its fall after the Afghan capture of Içfahân (1722), 171-3; temporary restora­ tion (1729), 334

Saft Mirzä (second son of Shäh Sultän fusain), 148, 151, 153, 1556, 192, 207, 301, 340, 500 “Safi Mirzä” (impostor from Garra’l, in Khüzistän), 301 “Safi Mirzä” (impostor, whose real name was Muhammad ‘All Rafsinjäni), 301, 344 Safi Qull Khän Turkistän-oghlu, 98, 99 Safi, Shäh, 1, 23, 26-8, 30-1, 61 Safi, Shaikh (of Ardabil), 5, 18, 501 Saif ibn Sultän I (Imam of ‘Omän), 66, 68, 391 St Petersburg, 108, 237, 241, 246, 249, 345, 351, 353-4, 462 Salyän (projected Russian entrepôt at), 239, 249 Samandar, Mir, Baluchi chief, 84 Samur river, 3, 355, 357 Sangän, 322-3 Sanganian pirates (from Kathiwar and Cutch), 129 Sanson, Père N., 7n., 29, 31, 35, 67 494, 513, 562 Säri (capital of Mäzandarän in later Safavî period), 304 Särü Taqi, Grand Vizier in reign of Shäh Safi and in early part of that of Shäh ‘Abbäs II, 23, 27 Scattergood, John (of the English East India Company), 399, 562 Schorer, Nicolaus (Chief Merchant of the Dutch East India Company at Isfahan, 408-9, 412-13, 415, 540-1 Sekhnia Chkheidze (Georgian his­ torian), 46 n., 85 n., 87 n., 562 Semeonov, Andrei (Russian merchant and traveller), 58, 238 Shäh, position and powers of, in §afavi times, 12, 20, 21, 22 Shäh ‘Alam (afterwards Bahädur Shäh), 65, 83 Shäh Husain (putative ancestor of the Ghalzais), 80-1 Shâhî-sevan (“devotion to the Shäh”), principle of, 20-1 Shäh-Sevan tribe, 20, 286-7, 302, 354, 357 Shamäkhi, 8, 52, 56, 58, 60, 62, 105, 108, 221, 274

580

INDEX Shamkhâl, title of the ruler of the Qumuq tribe, 9, 56; see also under ‘Adil Girai Shamkhâl, Prince T., 9 n. Shamakhi, capital of Shirvän, 8; Russian merchants settle there, 56; Russian consul appointed, 58; Volynsky and Bell there (1716-17), 105 ; Bell’s description of the town, 105 n.; sacked by Lezgls (1721), 127; losses of Russian merchants, 127-8; serious consequences, 1289; Turks appoint Dä’üd Beg governor of Shirvän, 128, 218; citizens appeal to Russia for aid against him, 186; allocated to Turkey by partition treaty (1724), 234 Shämlü tribe, 19 Shaqâql Kurds, 286, 302, 354 Shariman family (of Julfa), 77, 78 n,, 282 Sheltrup (Danish surveyor), 60-1 Shi‘ism in Persia, Shäh Ismä‘11 I makes Ithna ‘Ashariya form the state religion, 19-20; fanaticism leads to war with Turkey and defeat at Chaldirän, 20; neverthe­ less Shi‘ism helps to unify Persia in early Safavï period, 20; in reign of Shäh ‘Abbäs I it ceases to play a dominant part in relations with Turkey, 21; harmful effects of Shi‘i persecution of Persian Sunnis, 31, 71; revival of Shi‘ism in late seventeenth century, 70-2 Shipov, Colonel Ivan Afanasevich (Russian commander in Gllän), 239-42, 249 Shïrâz, 24, 116, 121-2, 203-5, 277, 333, 336, 409 Shir Ghäzl Khän, of Urganj, 98 Shirvän, province of, 8, 107, no, 117, 127, 186, 216, 218, 223, 240, 248, 349, 356-7, 386 Sighnakhs (Armenian mountain strongholds), 260, 354 Silk, Persian, 7, 58, 59, 103, 106, 218, 364-5,368n., 369-70,384-6,390,397 Sinandij, 5, 292 Sïstân province, 7, in, 164, 192, 274 Smyrna, 59, 104, 369, 389, 395

Soimonov, Feodor Ivanovich, 177, 180, 217, 241, 495 n., 531-2, 563 Soloviev, Sergei (author of the Istoriya RossU), 497, 531, 563 Stanyan, Abraham, English Ambas­ sador at Constantinople from 1718 to 1730, 215, 223, 229, 236 n., 295, 342“4> 347. 359. 537-8 Steele, Richard, 360 Sufi guards at the Persian court, 38 Sufis, Order of, 18, 22, 38, 70, 491 Sulaimän I, Shah, 29-33, 35, 36, 45, 300, 371, 388, 428, 475, 494 Sulaiman II, Shäh, 510 Süläq river, 182-3, *87, 348 Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani (brother-inlaw of Giorgi XI), 75, 90 n., 494 Sultän Husain, Shäh, birth and up­ bringing, 35; character, 35-7; early piety, 35; coronation (1694), 36-7; promulgation and rescission of decree against wine, 38-40; in­ fluenced by Muhammad Bäqir alMajlisi, 38, 72; hatred of blood­ shed, 41; indifference to affairs of state, 41-2; relations with Giorgi XI, 45-6; uxoriousness, 47-8; refuses to take Maryam Begum’s advice, 115 ; prevents Wakhtang VI from crushing Lezgls, 118-19; agrees to dismissal of Fath ‘All Khän Däghistänl, 120-1; receives Durri Efendi, 124; influenced by Sayyid ‘Abdullah Musha‘sha‘, 134; belief in astrology and magic, 137; persuaded to remain in Isfahän after Gulnäbäd, 145; makes Tahmäsp Mïrzâ heir-apparent, 156; retains the treacherous Sayyid ‘Abdul­ lah in office, 159; urged to abdi­ cate, but refuses, 160; surrenders to Mahmüd and gives crown to him, 168-73; rides in Mahmud’s procession, 174; imprisoned, 174; wounded by Mahmüd when pro­ tecting his children, 208; put to death by Ashraf (1726), 289 Sultän ibn Saif I (Imäm of ‘Omân), 66 J Î Sultän ibn Saif II (Imäm of ‘Omân), 68-9, 115, 129 Sultän Mahmüd Mïrzâ (one of the J sons of Shäh Sultän Husain), 419,500

581

INDEX Sultän Mahmüd (of Utemish), 183, 188 Sultänäbäd (town in the Turshïz district), 323 Sunnis, Persian, 10, 11, 20, 70-1, 79, 105, 117, 127, 19z. 202, 212, 216, 251 Surat, 360, 369, 398, 432, 435, 502 Svyatoi Krest (Krepost Svyatogo Kresta or “Holy Cross Fort”), 187, 188, 222, 356 Sweden, 51, 62, 63, 65, 125, 177

Tabarsarän, 10, 18 Tabas, 162 Tabriz, Shäh Ismä‘11 I crowned there (1501), 19; Tahmäsp Mirzä takes refuge there (1722/3), 195; allo­ cated to Turkey by partition treaty of 1724, 233-4; Tahmäsp leaves for Ardabil, 259; city resists first Turkish attack (1724), but falls in following year, 263-5 Tahmäsp I, Shäh, 20, 21, 55 Tahmäsp II (third son of Shäh Sultän fusain), made heir apparent during siege of Isfahän, 156; weak character, 156; escapes from city, 160; instead of joining ‘All Mardän Khän in Luristän he goes to Qazvïn, 161, 194; proclaims himself Shäh there (1722), 193; disbands army and is forced to flee to Tabriz, 195 ; invited by Ashraf to co-operate with him, 209-10; Turkey’s atti­ tude towards him in 1723, 226; his envoy concludes treaty with Russia (1723), 228, 246-8; precarious posi­ tion in 1723, 253; he antagonises Wakhtang VI and also the Armen­ ians, 253-4; forced to leave for Ardabil, 259; attempts to relieve Hamadän, 270; Ashraf tries to trap him, 277-8 ; defeated by Ashraf, he escapes to Mäzandarän, 278; de­ feated there by Fath ‘Ali Khän Qäjär, 281; momentary show of spirit, 304; comes under influence of Fath ‘Ali Khän, 304-5; Nädir joins him, 308; he puts Fath ‘Ali Khän to death, 309; comes under Nädir’s influence, 313; relations

with Avramov, 314-15; clash with Nädir, 315; forced to yield, 318; attempts to commit suicide, 319; incites revolts against Nädir, 320; sets out with Nädir to attack Ghalzais, 330; recovers throne, 334-5; relations with Turkey from 1725 to 1730, 341-5; and with Russia, 345-8 Tahmäsp Qulï Khän, see under Nädir Tala, Lezgl colony in the Qäniq valley, 3, 10, 117 Tarkhû (capital of the Shamkhäl of the Qumüqs), 9, 56, 108, 183, 187, 355-6 Tasüj, 263-5 Tehran, 5, 117, 121, 123, 125, 201, 277-8, 329, 332, 443 Teke Turcomans, 98 Terek river and valley, 55, 56, 65, 179, 217, 348 Terki (town near the mouth of the Terek), 179, 180, 188 Tiflis, 4, 75, 118, 189, 239, 254-8, 292, 504, 508, 517 Trans-Caspia, 59 Treaties, of Zuhäb, between Persia and Turkey, 7 May 1639, 2, 22, 27, 212, 345; of Isfahän, between Persia and France, 16 September 1708, 448-51; of Paris, between Persia and France, 13 August 1715, 460-1, 466-7; of Passarovitz (peace treaty), between Turkey, Austria and Venice, 21 July 1718, 123, 212-13; of Passarovitz (commercial treaty), between Turkey, Austria and Venice, 27 July 1718, 123, 215; of St Petersburg, between Persia and Russia, 23 September 1723, 247-8, 345, 376; of Constantinople, between Turkey and Russia (for the partition of north-west Persia), 24 June 1724, 4, 233-7, 266, 3514, 534 Î between Ashraf and Turkey, 12 October 1727, 292-3, 520; of Resht, between Ashraf and Russia, 24 February 1729, 296-7; of Constantinople, between Persia and Turkey, June 1730, 344; of Resht, between Persia and Russia, 1 Feb­ ruary 1732, 348; of Ganja, between

582

INDEX Treaties (cont.) Persia and Russia, 21 May 1735, 348 Tükhî (Ghalzai clan), 81 Turcoman tribes, 8; their support of Shäh Ismä‘ll I, 19, 20; they take advantage of the weakness of Shäh Ismä‘il II and Muhammad Khudäbanda, 21; Shäh ‘Abbäs I breaks their power, 21; see also under Qizilbäsh Turkey, her frontier with Persia, 1, 2; at her zenith in early Safavl period, 20, 22-3; conquers north-western Persia, 21 ; ousted by Shäh ‘Abbäs I, 21; treaty of Zuhäb (1639), 22, 27; is little affected by Persian occupa­ tion of Ba§ra. 53-4; angered by persecution of Sunnis in Persia, no, 216 ; sends Durri Efendi to report on Persia, 123; his impres­ sions, 124-5; brilliant epoch under Grand Vizier Dämäd Ibrâhîm Urgüplü, 213; his devotion to peace, 214; military decline begins, 214; Persian mission to Turkey (1721), 215-16; Dämäd Ibrâhîm receives appeal from Persian Sun­ nis, 216; alarm caused by reports of Peter the Great’s military prepara­ tions, 217-18; Dä’üd Beg appointed governor of Shîrvân, 218; risk of war between Turkey and Russia over Persia, 219; France’s desire to preserve peace, 219; influence of de Bonnac, the French ambassador at Constantinople, 219—20; Great Britain strives to aggravate RussoTurkish relations, 220-1; Turkish mission to Russia (1723), 221-2; peaceful settlement attempted, 2257 ; news of Russo-Persian treaty causes new crisis, but is resolved by de Bonnac, 228-31 ; partition treaty of 1724, 231-3; its terms, 234-5; comments, 235-7; death of Peter the Great, 237; Turkey declares war on Persia, 251-2; occupies Tiflis, but fails to take Ganja, 255, 258; brutality of Turkish troops, 259-60; capture of Erivan, Khoi and Nakhichivân, but failure to

take Tabriz, 262-3 ; Turks succeed in taking Tabriz on second attempt, 264-5 ; other military successes, 268-72 ; Turkey at war with Ashraf, 283-6; Ashraf’s clever propaganda gives him the victory, 290-2 ; peace concluded with him, 292; Turkey recognises Ashraf as Shäh, 292-3 ; Afghan mission to Turkey, 294-5; relations between Turkey and Tahmäsp, 341-4; Tahmâsp’s envoy bargains for return of occupied provinces, 344; Nädir denounces Tahmäsp’s peace treaty with Turkey and recovers provinces by force, 345

Urganj, 98 Urgüplü, Dämäd Ibrâhîm (Turkish Grand Vizier from 1718 to 1730), 186, 213-20, 223, 226, 235, 251, 254, 258-9, 282, 295, 342-3, 352-3, 358, 522, 538 Usmi, Great, title of the chief of the Qaitäq and Qaräqaitäq tribes, 9, 10, 183, 187-8; see also under Ahmad Khän Usmi, Little, title of the chief of the Lezgls of Jar and Tala, 10 Ustäjlü tribe, 19 Utemish, 183, 184, 188 Vali (Viceroy), the post of 4, 5, 14; order of precedence of the Vâlïs, 14 Vän, 2, 261-2 Varâmïn, 281, 332 Varsäq tribe, 19 Vazïrs (or Intendants), high officials of the Khäs$at 14 Venice, 51, 54, 123, 212, 214, 223 n., 237 Venisfadarän, see under Ben Isfahän Verden, Captain Carl van, 177, 185, 217, 495 Veterani, General, 179,180, 182,188 n. Volga, 55, 58, 241, 245 Volga-Don canal, 60 Volynsky, Artemii Petrovich, sent as Russian ambassador to Persia (1715), 103 ; his instructions from Peter the Great, 103-4; despite difficulties, he concludes treaty with Persia (1717), 106 ; his unfavourable comments on

583

INDEX Volynsky (cont.) the Shäh and Fath ‘All Khân Dâghistänl, 106; receives message from Wakhtang VI of Kartli suggesting alliance, ioÔ; appointed governor of Astrakhan to keep watch on develop­ ments in Persia (1720), 108, 176; re­ ports Shamakhi incident (1721), 178

Wine, Georgian, 38; Persian, 28, 3840» 365, 388, 416 Wool, goats’, from Rävar, m, 384-6, 388, 422 Wool, Persian, 369, 407 Worms, Johann Gottlieb (author of Ost-Indien- und Persianische Reisen), 107 n., 402 n., 564

Wais, Mir, chief of Hôtakî clan of the Ghalzais, 85; his wealth and in­ fluence, 84-5 ; arrested by Giorgi XI and sent to Içfahân, 85; he in­ gratiates himself there, 86; obtains at Mecca a fatwä authorising revolt, 86; puts Giorgi XI to death, 87; defeats all attempts to subdue him, 89-91 ; rules Ghalzais as Wakïl, 912; dies (1715), 92; his character and abilities, 92-3 Wakhtang VI (King of Kartli and Väli of Georgia), deposed, 108; offers to co-operate with Russia (1718), 108; restrained by Shäh from crushing Lezgis, 117-19; prevents his son from relieving Isfahän (1722), 159; receives Rus­ sian envoy with news of Peter the Great’s invasion of Persia, 179; serious consequences of Peter’s failure to join him, 189; dismissed by Tahmäsp, 253-4; attacks his successor, 254; temporarily joins Turks, 255-6; takes refuge in Russia (1724), 257; sent to Gilän to conduct anti-Turkish propaganda (1726), 358-9 Wakhusht (Georgian historian, son of Wakhtang VI), 87 n., 257, 564 and Appendix II

Yamût Turcomans, 7, 98 Yazd, city, 10, 46, 131-3, 136, 205-6 Yazd, province, 17, 23, 47 Yésé (son of Levan and brother of Wakhtang VI), 90, 108, 255-6 Yevreinov, Matvei Gregoriev (Rus­ sian merchant at Shamäkhi), 127,238 YüzbäshI, Avan (Armenian patriot), 260-1, 287, 357 Zabardast Khän (Afghan general), 200-4, 277 Zagly, Comte de, see under Imam Quli Beg Zagros mountains, 144, 204, 272, 473, 478 Zain al-‘ÄbidIn Khän Shämlü, 364 Zainal ibn Ibrähim (pretender to the Persian throne), 302 Zamlndävar, 82, 100 Zarqän (battle of), 336 Zäyanda-rüd, 10, 37, 132, 144, 149, 150, 153, 167, I7L 473-4, 478-80, 482-3 Zoroastrians, distribution of, in Per­ sia, 10; persecution of, by Shl'I fanatics, 73, 74, 79, m; Ashraf’s opinion of them, 299 Zuhäb, see under Treaties ZunQz, 265 Zurabek (Catholic Armenian), 52, 494