The Fall and Rise of Social Housing: 100 Years on 20 Estates 9781447351368

Table of contents :
Front cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of illustrations
Note on the author
Acknowledgements
Part I: Introduction
1. Learning from 100 years on 20 less successful estates
2. The debatable rise and fall of social housing
3. How neighbourhoods and estates change over time
4. The 20 estates
5. The scope of the book
Part II: The falls and rises of the 20 estates
6. The fall in housing quality
7. The rise in housing quality
8. The fall and rise in safety and order
9. The fall and rise in popularity
10. Changes in the mix of residents
11. The estates’ social environments
12. Residents’ access to opportunities
13. The survival of the 20 estates
14. The fall of council housing tenure
Part III: Explaining the changes over 100 years in 20 estates
15. Summarising the changes over 100 years in 20 estates
16. National and local factors influencing estates’ housing quality
17. National and estate factors influencing safety and order in estates
18. National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix
19. Conclusions: 100 years on 20 estates and the implications for all social housing
Appendix 1: Data and methods
Appendix 2: Summary tables
References
Index
Back cover

Citation preview

THE FALL AND RISE OF SOCIAL HOUSING 100 Years on 20 Estates Rebecca Tunstall

First published in Great Britain in 2020 by Policy Press University of Bristol 1-9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 [email protected] www.policypress.co.uk

North America office: Policy Press c/o The University of Chicago Press 1427 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637, USA t: +1 773 702 7700 f: +1 773-702-9756 [email protected] www.press.uchicago.edu

© Policy Press 2020 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested 978-1-4473-5135-1 hardback 978-1-4473-5137-5 paperback 978-1-4473-5138-2 ePub 978-1-4473-5136-8 ePDF The right of Rebecca Tunstall to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Liron Gilenberg Cover image: Universal Images Group Printed and bound in Great Britain by CMP, Poole Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

For Anna Woodiwiss, who worked for a sweeter-smelling world.

Contents List of illustrations vii Note on the author xiii Acknowledgements xiv Part I: Introduction 1 Learning from 100 years on 20 less successful estates

3

2

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

13

3

How neighbourhoods and estates change over time

23

4

The 20 estates

37

5

The scope of the book

53

Part II: The falls and rises of the 20 estates 6 The fall in housing quality

65

7

The rise in housing quality

93

8

The fall and rise in safety and order

115

9

The fall and rise in popularity

135

10

Changes in the mix of residents

145

11

The estates’ social environments

173

12

Residents’ access to opportunities

193

13

The survival of the 20 estates

209

14

The fall of council housing tenure

227

Part III: Explaining the changes over 100 years in 20 estates 15 Summarising the changes over 100 years in 20 estates

239

16

National and local factors influencing estates’ housing quality

247

17

National and estate factors influencing safety and order in estates

257

18

National and local factors influencing demand for estates, 267 popularity and resident mix

v

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

19

Conclusions: 100 years on 20 estates and the implications for all social housing

289

Appendix 1: Data and methods 301 Appendix 2: Summary tables 303 References 309 Index 337

vi

List of illustrations Boxes 1.1 4.1 8.1 15.1

Some examples of the impact of world events on the 20 estates and their residents, 1926–2019 E16 as described in local newspaper headlines, 1971–90 Headlines in local newspaper stories about crime linked to E14, 2004/05 How selected key dimensions of estate outcomes appear to be causally related

7 48 118 245

Figures 2.1 4.1 4.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

9.1

The proportion of households in England in the three main 15 tenures, 1918 to 2017/18 Maximum number of floors in estate buildings when 45 completed Mix of homes with different numbers of bedrooms in the 45 20 estates when built ‘Building for Life’ scores for the estates, 2010 74 Proportion of households in the estates’ local authorities 80 with worse amenities than estate households, 1961–2001 The age in years of the estates over their lifetimes, 85 1926–2018 Proportion of national housing stock older than and 87 younger than the 20 estates, 1977/78 and 2016/17 Proportion of council housing in the surrounding local 87 authority which was younger than E6 (1949/600/fl/L), E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE), 1926–80 Age of kitchens in estate homes in years, 1926–2018 96 Periods of estate lifetimes without and with at least 99 some form of central heating, 1926–2018 Reorganisation of public space and dramatic 105 redevelopment in the 20 estates, 1926–2018 Costs per home and sources of funding for improvement, 107 reorganisation and redevelopment at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE), 2017 prices Fall in ranking of popularity relative to other estates in 137 their local authorities over their lifetimes (three estates)

vii

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

9.2

9.3 9.4

10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 12.1 12.2

13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 14.1 14.2

Fall and rise in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (3 of 13 estates) Rise in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (two estates) Stability in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (two estates) Unemployed estate residents as a percentage of economically active residents (aged 16–74), 1981–2011 Estate unemployment rate as a multiple of the national unemployment rate, 1981–2011 Estate unemployment rate as a multiple of the estate local authorities’ unemployment rate, 1981–2011 Percentage of households in estates composed of a lone parent with dependent child or children, 1981–2011 Percentage of the estate populations aged under 16, 1981–2011 Percentage of the estate populations of pension age, 1981–2011 Minority ethnic residents as a percentage of estate residents, 1981–2011 Student performance at age 16 at estate-linked schools, their local authorities, and England, 1994, 2004, 2017 Residents’ satisfaction with their area in ten estates, 2005 in the most deprived 10 per cent of neighbourhoods in England, in social housing in England, and in England as a whole, 2004/05 Age in years of oldest homes in the estates in 2018 The proportion of homes initially built in estates surviving in 2018 Home-years provided by estates and potential home-years lost to demolition to 2018 Proportion of total potential home-years lost to demolition by 2018 Age in years of homes in estates and comparators in 2017 Owners and managers of the 20 estates across their lifetimes, 1926–2018 Tenure mix after redevelopment in the eight estates where work was completed by 2019

viii

140

142 142

160 161 162 164 165 166 168 197 206

220 221 222 223 224 231 234

List of illustrations

16.1

Average annual local authority capital spending per existing council home in England, 1971/72–1995/96 (at 2016/17 prices) 16.2 Sources of regeneration funding for the 20 estates, 1970–2010 17.1 Degree of decentralisation of housing managers responsible for the estates, 1982–2018 Percentage 17.2 of adults who were victims of crime each year, England and Wales, 1981–2017/18 18.1 The deficit or surplus of dwellings over households, as a percentage of dwellings, Great Britain, 1921–2010 The relationship between social housing supply and 18.2 potential working-class demand, Great Britain, 1951–2011 18.3 The occupational class and education of parents with young children in home ownership, Great Britain, 1950–2005 18.4 The population of the 20 estates’ local authorities, 1921–2011 18.5 The proportion of council and new town homes (horizontal axis) and of men in working-class occupations (vertical axis), in English local authorities, 1981 18.6 Net core demand for social housing: the difference between the number of men in working class occupations and the number of social rented homes in the 20 estates’ local authorities, 1961–2011 18.7 The relative status of social housing at national level and the implications for selected estates, 1918–2010/11 18.8 Median income of renting households as a percentage of median income of owners, England, 1953/54–2015/16 18.9 The occupational class and education of families with young children in social housing, Great Britain, 1950–2005 18.10 Economic status of household reference persons (HRPs) in social housing relative to HRPs overall, England, 1984–2016/17

249

252 259 264 268 270 272 274 276

277

282 284 284 286

Photos 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in 2004, aged 75 years E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 2005, when it was aged 53 years Second-generation E6 (1949/600/fl/L), seen in 1950 when it was aged one E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 2018 when the main part of the estate was aged 85

ix

42 42 43 43

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

4.5 4.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6

6.7

6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.3

7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3

Housing association houses added at E13 in the 2000s, when the main part of the estate was in its 70s, seen in 2018 E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in 2006, aged 36 years A kitchen in a high-quality new flat at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1936, when the first homes in the estate were aged three Part of E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), in 2007, when it was aged 40 The same place in 2018, when it was aged 51 E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) in 1970, four years after opening E18 in a resident’s photo from the 1980s when it was about 20 years old The built-in fridge (left) and drying cupboard (right) provided in every flat in the tower block at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) A small front garden created for a ground floor flat from public space at E6 (1949/600/fl/L) in c1982 when it was aged 33 The same place in 2018, 36 years later, when the estate was aged 69 E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in 2005, when it was aged 76 Homes at E14 under improvement in c1982, when it was aged c56 Secured access introduced at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the early 1980s, when the estate was in its 40s, here seen in 1994 The footpath leading to the footbridge out of E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) over one of the adjacent railway lines, in 2018 when the estate was aged 85 E10 in 1982 when it was aged 11 The same view in 23 years later in 2005, after movement round the estate has been reorganised New homes for market sale under construction at E18 in 2005, when the estate was aged 39 Homes at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in 2005, ten years after redevelopment Refurbished homes at E15 in 2005, ten years after redevelopment, aged 58 New homes at E15 in 2005, aged 10 A former resident at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) in the late 1970s Access deck at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) in c1980 when the estate was aged 9 years The same spot in 2005 when the estate was aged 36

x

44 44 69 76 76 77 77 82

89

89 91 97 101 104

106 107 109 111 112 112 124 126 126

List of illustrations

8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7

10.1

11.1

11.2 11.3

11.4 12.1 12.2 12.3

12.4

12.5 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6

Vandalism and graffiti at E5 (1949/700/fl/L), c1980, when the estate was aged 31 The same place soon afterwards The same place in 2018, 38 years later, when the estate was aged 69 A poorly overlooked area in a cul de sac at the redeveloped part of E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) in 2018, when it was aged about 14 (Perhaps unsuitably) smartly dressed residents using the carpentry workshop in the tenants’ rooms at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1950, when the estate was aged 17 A professional photograph of children’s play in public space at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) in 1971, when the estate was in its first year A resident’s photo of public space at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the 1970s, when the estate was in its 40s Some resident members of the board of E1’s Tenant Management Organisation outside their office in the estate in 2005, when the estate was aged 76 and the TMO had been operating for two years. Young residents (and dogs) at E20 in the 1980s A block of flats with a parade of shops beneath it, at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) in c1982 when the estate was aged c33 The same spot in 2018, when the estate was aged 69 The signpost outside the closed pub at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), in 2018 when the estate was aged 51, and the pub had been closed for over a decade Rubbish and signs of arson in the playground of the primary school at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) in 1994, when the estate was aged up to 48 years old The same school 15 years later in 2009 E14 (1926/900/h/NE) aged 68 in 1994 The same view in 2007, when the estate was aged 81 Bomb damage at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1941 when it was 8 years old E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), here seen in 2018, when it was in its 70s Continuing clearance around the site of E19 in 1965, when the first homes in the estate were aged 29 Planners, architects and councillors discussing plans for E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), portrayed in a mural used to decorate an underpass

xi

127 127 128 129

157

182

183 186

191 195 195 196

198

198 210 211 211 212 214 219

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

14.1 16.1

Homes at E14 seen here in 2005, ten years after redevelopment An empty home at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 2018, when the estate was aged c70

230 254

Tables 4.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 10.1 11.1 A1 A2 A3 A4

Twenty estates: age, size, main built form, and regional and local authority context Crime in ten estates according to residents, 2005, and in all deprived areas, all social tenants and all England, 2004/05 Vandalism and graffiti in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05 Dogs in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05 Noise in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05 Socioeconomic status of 20 estate residents relative to other residents of their local authorities, 1926–2011 Neighbour nuisance in ten estates according to residents, 2005, and in England, 2004/05 Selected measures of estate quality Selected measures of estate popularity relative to other local estates Selected measures of estate population mix Selected measures of estate survival

xii

39 120 125 131 133 170 187 304 305 306 307

Note on the author Becky Tunstall is Joseph Rowntree Professor Emerita of Housing at the University of York, Visiting Fellow at the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences. She was previously Director of the Centre for Housing Policy at the University of York, Course Director of the MSc/Diploma in Housing at the London School of Economics, and research assistant on the 1995 and 2005 rounds of research on the 20 estates funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

xiii

Acknowledgements This book would not have been possible without the more than 600 estate residents, local authority and housing association staff and others who have given their time and ideas in interviews since 1982. It also benefits from the viewpoints of almost 150 residents and former residents from oral history interviews and from public areas of the internet. This book originated in a project led by Anne Power. Since 1982, interviews and data gathering have been carried out by Helen Beck, Alice Coulter, Deborah Georgiou, Brenda Jones, Margaret Pitt, Anne Power and Caroline Paskell, as well as by me. These are the ‘visiting researchers’ whose notes are sometimes quoted. The data were gathered with financial support from the Priority Estates Project and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Thanks are due to Dominic Church for assistance with Building for Life scoring. Data provided through www.VisionofBritain.org.uk uses statistical material which is copyright of the Great Britain Historical GIS Project, Humphrey Southall and the University of Portsmouth. Numerous local studies librarians helped me. Many thanks are also due to those who commented on drafts of this book and authors of previous reports on the same estates, including members of Joseph Rowntree Foundation advisory committees, Katharine Knox, members of the Housing Studies Association, Policy Press’s anonymous reader and amazingly patient staff, and Helena, Sylvia and Jeremy Tunstall. I’d like to thank my family and friends, and students and colleagues at LSE and York, for their ideas and long-term support. I also want to acknowledge the former council homes at Kiln Place, Fifth Avenue and Carr Street in which this book was written. Finally, special thanks are due to Tony Baker, Geoff Blackman, Melanie Casson, Zoe Chester, Lorna Gambell, Mandy Goodfellow, Jim Hendry, Lorraine Humphries, Jan Kos, Nova Moore, Scott Ptolemy and Stan Remmer.

xiv

PART I

Introduction

1

Learning from 100 years on 20 less successful estates

What we need to learn At a time when new housing schemes are being planned on a nation-wide scale, it is a vital topical interest to trace in detail the story of one of the ‘problem estates’ created in the 1930s  … [which] stands today as a monumental example of how new communities must not be planned. (White 1946:12) This impassioned plea comes from a community worker named Les White, based at ‘E13’, one of the 20 estates this book is based on. Worried and angry, White was writing in 1946, only ten years after the first residents moved in. Nonetheless, this ‘problem estate’ of the 1940s survived. It continued to provide homes for hundreds of families for another 70 years after his urgent comments, albeit losing some homes to demolition, and in 2019 it was still home to about 1,000 households. Over its lifetime of over more than 80 years to date, it has generated costs and benefits, some quantifiable, others less so, for tenants, for the local authority which owns and runs it, for its neighbours, and for the nation overall. Is this estate still a ‘monumental example of how new communities should not be planned’? Was it ever? Were lessons from the impassioned analysis of the 1940s learnt or applied? What can we learn from any investigation we carry out today? The perception and assessment of social housing is a product of history, politics, diverse viewpoints and diverse realities. Social housing was once seen as evidence of the England’s growing prosperity and progress, as slums were cleared and housing conditions were improved. However, as Alison Ravetz noted, no firm criteria of success or failure were ever established for social housing, so it could enjoy ‘small scale successes’ while ‘moving forward with a mounting sense of failure’ (Ravetz 2003:4). Council housing’s role and value has been in doubt for most of its lifetime, even as it grew to eclipse private renting in 1967, and to house one in three UK households by 1981 (Holmans

3

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

2005). There was interparty consensus that council homes should form some part of the national house building programme. There was no agreement on what size or type of role it should play. From 1981, with the Right to Buy, the tenure began to shrink in size and role. Since then, it has been the subject of continual criticism and fundamental reassessment. The tenure’s size and status, the influence of its residents, and its public support have all declined. Council housing has been described as being in ‘crisis’ (Audit Commission 1986), having been ‘eclipsed’ (Cole and Furbey 1994), and being ‘abolished’ (Walker 2010). Academics have waved it ‘goodbye’ (Clapham 1988), and talked about what comes afterwards (Pawson and Mullins 2010). Even neutral House of Commons researchers observed that council housing was undergoing its ‘demise’ (Fears et al 2016). Now, in the early 21st century, housing has become a high-profile political issue once more. From 2015 onwards more than a fifth of the Great Britain population saw housing as the most important issue facing the country (Ipsos MORI 2019), and 69% of the public said there was a housing ‘crisis’ (Tigar 2016). At the 2017 general election, and again in 2019, national politicians of all parties made ambitious pledges to boost housing development, returning to the language of big numbers last used by their mid-20th century predecessors. In 2019, all main parties promised at least one million new homes in England by 2025, or an average of 200,000 a year, a marked increased on the 164,000 completed in 2018. The Conservatives pledged to build homes ‘in all tenures’. The Liberal Democrats promised at least 100,000 new homes for social rent annually by 2025, compared to an output of 30,000 in 2018. Labour promised 100,000 new council homes specifically each year by 2025, compared to an output of just 2,000 in 2018 (Conservative Party, Liberal Democrat Party, Labour Party 2019). Thus there was cross-party consensus that the country needed a major increase in house building, and substantial agreement that there should be a historic increase in new affordable housing. Community groups, members of the public, planners, architects, housing associations, local authorities and developers as well as policy makers are also passionately interested in building more affordable homes. All of these groups can and should learn more from the experiences of the places created in the 20th century and those who have lived in and worked on them, just as White urged 70 years ago. Just after the 2017 election, a fire got out of control at Grenfell Tower, a recently renovated tower block in the London borough of Kensington and Chelsea, owned by the council and mostly occupied by social renting tenants. Seventy-two people died. Hundreds of

4

Learning from less successful estates

people lost their homes. The responses of the local authority and the housing management organisation were widely seen as inefficient and insensitive. The tragedy provoked a national outcry and a wave of sympathy, and increased interest in social inequality and social housing. In a statement on the fire, Prime Minister Theresa May said: ‘for too long … under governments of both colours, we simply haven’t given enough attention to social housing’ (May 2017). Those who have followed social housing policies would have argued that there had been substantial activity in the 2000s and 2010s, with challenges to low rents and secure tenancies in social housing, and reductions in regulation (Tunstall and Pleace 2018). Nonetheless, there were signs of a change in presumptions and emphasis. Sajid Javid, then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, said: ‘We need to return to the time, not so very long ago, when social housing was valued … treasured. Something we could all be proud of whether we lived in it or not’ (Javid 2017).

Learning from 20 social housing estates This book provides a unique and detailed examination of the experience of 20 English social housing estates and their communities, through their entire lifetimes across the 20th century and into the 21st. It analyses past trends, and aims to provide useful ideas for the planned future development of hundreds of thousands of new affordable and market rate homes. In total, the 20 estates had about 18,000 homes at their peak, a good fraction of the national annual social house building output of the 21st century to date. At any one time, 40,000 to 80,000 people lived in these estates, amounting to several hundred thousand people over estate lifetimes. The study tracks these estates and their residents through up to 93 years of life to date, from 1926 when the first homes at the oldest estate were first let, to 2019. The study is qualitative, quantitative and longitudinal, and combines evidence from repeated waves of interviews, national and local statistical data, archive research and social media. Like the assessment of council housing as a whole, assessment of the 20 estates is contested. Each has been seen as both success and failure at different points in time, and even at the same point in time by different people. Nonetheless, basic facts can be established, and need to be kept up to date. This book builds on four previous reports on the same case study neighbourhoods, which referred to them as ‘twenty unpopular council estates’ (Power 1984, 1991; Power and Tunstall 1995; Tunstall

5

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

and Coulter 2006). However, by 2019, not one part of this epithet remained true. There were no longer 20  estates, as one had been entirely demolished and not replaced. The remaining 19 estates were no longer unpopular, and some were in high demand relative to other local estates. Although they all remained majority social housing, only 12 remained mainly council-owned, and all had become mixed-tenure neighbourhoods. The book charts these and other significant changes in the 20 estates and across social housing as a whole, and aims to explain why they have occurred and what they mean.

Learning from 100 years When considering housing, ‘history matters’: ‘the very bricks and mortar of housing are in a sense peculiarly historical because the current stock consists only of buildings built in the past’ (Lowe 2004:4). Buildings are peculiar as products or investments, whether private or public, because they are costly, fixed in place, long-lived, and mostly not in first-hand use (Marsh and Gibb 2011). The location of housing reflects past patterns of economic activity and housing demand, which are vulnerable to economic change and the development of transport and communications over the generations. In addition, almost every imaginable aspect of an estate’s social, economic, geographic and political contexts has changed over their lifetimes. This has affected both how estates have worked, and how they have been judged. In this book, the 20 estates are not named; each is referred to by a code number from E1 to E20, followed by some key characteristics of the estate in brackets. These are: • the date at which they were first let; • the number of homes; • the main built form (‘h’, houses, ‘fl’, low-rise flats, ‘mixed’ lowand high-rise, and ‘deck’, large estates of flats with non-traditional design and construction reached by decks); • the region (L – London; Mid – Midlands; NE – North East; NW – North West). For example, ‘E14’ is the oldest of the estates, and its details are ‘1926/900/h/NE’. The first residents of any of the 20 estates were those who moved into new homes in the half-completed E14, on the outskirts of a large town in the North East in 1926. The first Labour government had taken power as a minority government two years before, but had lost

6

Learning from less successful estates

power, and Conservative Stanley Baldwin was prime minister with a narrow majority. George V was on the throne. The nation had nearly a million coal miners, who went on strike early in the year, leading to the General Strike, and for some months the nation was under martial law. The electoral roll for E14 indicates that while men aged 21 or more and women aged 30 or more were enfranchised, jury service was restricted to home owners and tenants of homes above a certain minimum rateable value (including new council homes), a relic of past voting rights. However, at this point, 14-year-olds could leave school and take on full-time work. By this time, there were about 100,000 council homes in England and Wales, making up about 1 per cent of all housing (Holmans 2005). E14’s local authority had a relatively large stock of 6,000 homes by 1920 (Byrne 1994). It was one of about a thousand local authorities (county and non-county boroughs, London boroughs, and urban and rural districts) in England alone (Local Government Boundary Commission for England 1972). At the 1921 census it had 275,000 residents, including 27,000 people aged under 5 and 1,000 aged 80 or more. Its economy was based on shipbuilding and arms manufacturing. By 2019, E14 was aged 93. There were fewer than a thousand miners in England (DBEIS 2012). All 18-year-olds had the vote and could serve on juries (and 16-year olds could vote in some elections in Scotland). Although young people could leave school at 16, most stayed on until 18 or beyond. E14’s local authority had owned almost 50,000 homes at the peak, but by 2019 owned 25,000 and did not manage any of them. The local authority was one of just under 400 in England. At the most recent census in 2011, it had 280,000 residents, almost the same as 90 years before, although on a larger land area. The mix of residents was very different, however, with just 17,000 people under 5 and 11,000 over 80. The economy had been completely transformed, and was based on services, including higher education, the NHS and financial services.

Box 1.1: Some examples of the impact of world events on the 20 estates and their residents, 1926–2019 In 1936, a 17-year-old from E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) was found with a younger boy at Lowestoft after going missing from home. They had been trying to go to Spain to get involved in the Civil War (it is not clear on which side). After the Second World War, a disused military camp adjacent to E8

7

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing (1936/1,000/h/Mid) was being squatted by people who had no other housing. A resident of E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) spent 18 months being held in the Soviet sector of East Berlin before escaping to the American sector, and eventually getting back home. In 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy toured E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), which was seen by its local authority as an international showpiece. In the mid-1970s, the oil price crisis made the district heating system at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) too expensive to run, and the local authority had to install a system based on gas. In 1979, one resident moved to E3 after imprisonment in Chile by the Pinochet regime and arrival in the UK as a refugee. In the early 2000s, after a period in which E7 had a very poor reputation, people came to see the physical and social improvements there from as far away as France, Germany, the US and Russia.

Over their lifetimes, the estates and their residents could not avoid the influence of world events (Box 1.1). Social attitudes and behaviour have changed over estate lifetimes. In 1938 the Minister of Health (whose responsibilities then included housing) did the council that built E4 (1938/300/fl/L) the honour of opening the new estate. As he toured the site, he was offered a cigarette by a workman, and a local paper reported, ‘he smilingly accepted’ (ANON. E4 (1938)). In 1969, there was a parliamentary debate on paying for emergency strengthening of tower blocks following the Ronan Point disaster, which affected the part-completed E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), and foreshadowed debates on responses to the Grenfell Tower disaster. One MP commented that getting the Treasury to agree extra funding was, ‘the nigger in the woodpile’. Some details of estate and domestic life have changed so much over the 90-year lives of the oldest estates that they now seem quaint, if not entirely incomprehensible, for example, open coal fires at many of the estates, keeping cows at E1 (1929/300/h/NW), and the gas-powered iron remembered by one early resident at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L). The estates have been influenced by trends in population, labour markets and housing markets, which have affected patterns of demand for housing. These include population growth, ageing, increasing ethnic diversity, the changing shape and size of households,

8

Learning from less successful estates

suburbanisation and counter-urbanisation, the decline of workingclass employment, the rise of home ownership, and the fall and rise of private renting. The estates have passed through several stages in the periodisation of the development of housing systems, and, arguably, from the pre-social housing era to the post-social housing era. Other less quantifiable society-wide changes have also had an important influence on how estates have worked, some slow, some sudden, some reversed. There has been a fall and possible rise in the relative status of social housing, and a rise and fall in the socioeconomic disadvantage of social housing tenants. The nature of relationships between individuals and authorities, including landlords and tenants, and attitudes to individuals’ rights, have shifted. The operation of informal social control and its relationship to formal social control have changed. The relative use of private indoor and public outdoor space has shifted, meaning the decline of the free-range child and dog, and of the vegetable garden. Mass use of electricity, and mass ownership of cars, domestic durables, telephones and information technology emerged. Poverty has fallen and risen. Litter has risen, and crime and vandalism have risen and fallen.

The evidence the book is based on This book is based on a unique archive of material collected in over the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s from and about the 20 estates. Five sets of in-depth interviews were carried out in 1982, 1988, 1994, 2005 and 2018, by an evolving team of researchers, including myself in 1994, 2005 and 2018. This totalled 242  interviews, involving 537 individuals. These included: • 81 interviews with council or housing association staff with job titles including ‘estate manager’, ‘housing officer’ and ‘neighbourhood manager’, leading small teams with day-to-day responsibility for managing homes and tenancies in the estates (chasing rent arrears, ordering repairs, dealing with tenants’ queries, assisting in letting empty homes, and in some cases overseeing cleaners, caretakers and repair workers) and often based in offices in the estates; • 30 with mid-ranking housing officers, with titles like ‘area manager’ or ‘assistant director’, overseeing several estates, totalling a few thousand homes; • 64 with ‘directors of housing’, with overall responsibility for housing for a local authority or housing association, totalling tens of thousands of homes in most cases;

9

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

• 42 with tenants’ or residents’ associations, based in the estates and aiming to represent residents in interactions with housing managers, including 337 individuals; and • 25 with others, including police officers, tenant participation workers and community workers. In addition, in 2005 we carried out a further 89 brief interviews with residents who were not involved in groups but were encountered at random in the streets of ten estates. This took the total number of interviewees to 626. Research colleagues and I made a total of 235 visits to the estates on foot, some unaccompanied and some with housing officers or tenants, taking notes and photographs. Interviews and visits have been supplemented with an additional round of research over the period 2016–18. Census data were gathered for estate populations for the period 1981–2011, and for estate local authorities and England for 1921–2011. Additional information came from local history archives at 15 of the estates’ local authorities, the British Library oral history archive, the Mass Observation archive, national newspapers’ online archives, databases of academic publications, and general internet searches. Comments and opinions from almost 150  residents and ex-residents of 18 of the estates, who were mainly not involved in residents’ groups, came from public groups on Facebook and other social media (see Appendix 1). Some residents agreed to contribute their personal photos. Interviewees were promised that their estates and even local authorities would not be named and would not be identifiable in reports, to allow them to speak without concerns regarding the effects on estate reputations or other repercussions. This is why estates appear under what some might find to be frustrating codenames. Many of the photos are not of perfect quality. Many were taken by non-professionals or have been scanned from old prints. Quotes from interviews appear in double speech marks in the text (and single quote marks if they are in a separate paragraph); quotes from documents and posts on the internet appear in single speech marks in the text (and no quote marks if they are set out in a separate paragraph).

The structure of the book Part  I of the book explains how social housing rose in size and significance over most of the 20th century, and how perceptions of parts – and then all – of social housing fell in the late 20th century.

10

Learning from less successful estates

It introduces the 20 estates that have been seen as problems at least at some points in their lives and which form the basis of the book’s empirical material. Part II explores the extent to which the 20 estates ‘rose’ and ‘fell’. It considers different dimensions of estate life and estate ‘success’, including housing quality, safety and order, popularity, population mix, local services and opportunities, housing tenure, and home and estate survival. It demonstrates that trends and the extent of problems varied between dimensions, between estates and over time. Part III explores potential explanations for the experience of the estates and their residents described in Part  II, covering most but not all dimensions. It considers the role of estate characteristics, local contexts, and national and temporal contexts.

The key arguments the book makes Using evidence from the 20 estates as a sample of less successful estates, and evidence on the local, national and temporal contexts, this book demonstrates that: • The 20 estates generally started their lives, whether in the 1920s or the 1970s, offering high-quality housing. Many were of middling status and popularity compared to other local housing, and provided for people on middling incomes. • By the early 1980s, all 20  estates were seen as ‘problematic’ by the local media and public, and also presented real problems for residents and landlords. They could not provide good-quality housing or normal levels of safety and order. They had residualised populations, most were among the least popular estates in their local authorities, and in some there had been some demolition. • Nonetheless, the estates made an important contribution to local housing supply over their lifetimes, and many had numerous positive features. The experiences of different residents, even of the same estates at the same time, could vary from despair to delight. • The estates’ biographies were not just stories of ‘decline and fall’. From about 1980 onwards, all the estates experienced rises in quality, safety and order, popularity, and resident employment rates, and began to be integrated into the local housing market. By 2019 the ‘twenty unpopular council estates’ the study was originally based on (Power 1984; Power and Tunstall 1995) were nineteen mixed tenure neighbourhoods that are mostly somewhat less popular than

11

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

•

•

• •

•

•

average. However, local and national public and political opinion about the estates and social housing in general remains out of date. The estates were varied when they became problematic, making it harder to identify estate-level causes of problems. For example, they included estates of houses with gardens as well as estates with tower blocks, which demonstrates that non-traditional design is not a necessary factor for problems. The nature and degree of problems also varied. For example, three of the estates were close to average popularity for social housing in their areas when assessed across their lifetimes, while four were on average in the handful of least popular estates in their areas. Some of the explanation for falls and rises lies with individual estate characteristics and with estate improvement efforts. However, these are not sufficient to explain falls and rises. Much of the explanation for changes in the 20 estates lies outside the estates themselves, with the characteristics of their local authorities and local housing markets, and how estates compared to them. Some of the explanation lies further afield, in national policies and long-run national trends. Despite their varied individual characteristics, the estates were all located in urban local authorities with big working-class populations and serious deprivation, where the population was falling for much of the estate lifetimes. All the estates were most seriously affected by problems between the 1970s and the 1990s, a period associated with social and economic problems nationwide and locally, and when there was also a pause in the core demand for social housing. However, individual estate characteristics made them more vulnerable to negative national and local trends. Other estates in the same local authorities as the 20 cases, and estates in more advantaged areas, were able to avoid the marked falls seen in the 20 estates, although all were affected by difficult contexts to some extent. Some of the problems experienced by the 20  estates and their residents could have been predicted and some could have been avoided, or their severity and longevity reduced, through different actions by central government, landlords, residents and others. This would have reduced suffering for residents, might have been more cost-effective, and would have maintained a better reputation of social housing as a whole. In 2019, the estates, like social housing as a whole, generally offered good living environments and were generally in demand.

Part I introduces the estates on which the book is based. Parts II and III set out the detailed empirical evidence for these arguments. 12

2

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

Introduction The terms ’rise’ and ‘fall’ have provided a useful, if reductive, approach to categorising and periodising change over time since the late 18th century (Gibbon 2000). Social housing rose in scale and importance for most of the 20th century, and, as part of wider housing policy, made an important contribution to social progress in the UK. However, this contribution has been taken for granted, debated, challenged, and sometimes overshadowed by perceived problems. Since the first years of council housing, some estates have been seen as ‘problems’ in some senses and by some people. From the 1970s, the idea that larger parts, or even all of social housing had fallen in quality and status become more widespread. From the 1980s, social housing began to fall as a proportion of all homes and households. However, the extent, nature and causes of problems have often been unclear, even to those trying to solve them, and they remain debatable.

‘Social housing’ Social housing is rented housing, owned and managed by local authorities (or ‘councils’) and by housing associations. Local authorities were the main builders of the UK’s social housing stock. They were also the main owners and managers of social housing in England until 2011, when they were overtaken by housing associations. Housing associations grew rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s, partly because of transfers of homes from councils. They have been described as private, public, voluntary and third sector organisations, and as ‘hybrids’ (Mullins et al 2014; ONS 2017). Social housing organisations have generally received subsidy from government to build and, to some extent, to maintain homes, and many tenants receive help to pay the rent through housing benefit (or Universal Credit). (It should be noted that private house building and ownership receives support too). Social landlords are regulated

13

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

on building standards, management standards, rent levels and financial stability to a much greater extent than private landlords. Today, rent levels in social housing are largely controlled by government and are usually 50–60 per cent of private sector rents in the same area (Stephens et al 2019). Social housing is let to households that can demonstrate housing need to social landlords, or to local authorities making decisions on their behalf. Most social housing is for ‘general’ needs. Some is designed to meet the physical needs of older people or people with disabilities, and some, known as ‘supported housing’, has extra staffing to help people with particular health or other needs. Between 1980 and 2019, council tenants had indefinite ‘secure’ tenancies, although from the 2000s, these were often only granted after an introductory year. Today, social housing is the main and lowest-cost form of affordable housing. ‘Affordable housing’ is a confusing and contested term. According to the National Planning Policy Framework, it includes social housing, ‘affordable’ rented housing and ‘intermediate’ rented housing. However, the term is sometimes used to include subsidised and low-cost home ownership, including ‘part-buy, part-rent’, and some ‘key worker’ accommodation (Barton and Wilson 2019). From 2011, the government enabled and then required English social landlords to let homes at ’affordable rents’, higher than was traditional for social housing, at up to 80 per cent of market rates (Stephens et al 2019).

The rise of social housing Social housing formed a small but growing part of the emergent welfare state from the Housing and Town Planning Etc Act 1919 onwards, and has become ubiquitous in UK cities and neighbourhoods. Homes at sub-market rents for households on low incomes were first built by charities and philanthropists to provide an alternative to the private rented slums of Victorian England (Wohl 1977). Local authorities in the large cities also became involved in housing improvement, first through slum clearance, then slum replacement, and from 1890, through the ownership and management of homes built to replace slums. After the First World War, local authorities began larger-scale development of low-to-medium-cost and medium-to-high-quality flats and houses, known as ‘council’ housing, using subsidy from central government and their own funds. By 1939, an estimated 10 per cent of all households were in social housing, mainly council housing (Holmans 2005). Council building increased after the Second World

14

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

War as part of a drive to increase housing supply. By 1961, social housing housed 24 per cent of all households. From the mid-1960s, housing associations gained access to central government funds for building too. By 1971 ‘social housing’, including both council and housing association homes, overtook private renting, which had been the main tenure but was in sharp decline. The number of social rented homes and the proportion of all households in the UK living in social housing grew continuously from the start of social housing until 1981, when the numbers of homes began to reduce, following the introduction of the Right to Buy (Figure  2.1). At the peak in 1981, a total of 31  per cent of households were in social renting, including 29 per cent in council housing and 2 per cent in homes provided by other social landlords, mainly housing associations. Higher proportions of people spent part of their housing careers in social housing than snapshots reveal. For example, fully 55 per cent of people born in Britain in 1946, who in 2019 were in their early 70s, spent at least some of their childhood living in social housing, and more may have spent time in the tenure as adults (Lupton et al 2009). How have that 55 per cent fared in life? Where would they have lived if they did not have social rented homes, and how would they have done there? No overall assessment of the costs and benefits of social housing, compared to potential alternatives, has ever been undertaken. Attempts are plagued by relative assessments, and rising expectations, and ideological arguments aplenty. However, some suggestive facts can Figure 2.1: The proportion of households in England in the three main tenures, 1918 to 2017/18 % 80

Home ownership

Social renting

Private renting

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1918

1939

1953

1961

1971

Source: MHCLG (2019b), Table FT1101 (S101)

15

1981

1991

2001

2011 –12

2017 –18

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

be assembled. If Figure 2.1 is the best-known housing chart in UK housing studies, the second best-known is the chart (not shown) that shows the number of homes built by public and private sectors over the 20th century. People who see this chart feel pressed to conclude that social landlords made a substantial contribution to housing development in Britain in the 20th century. In their book on the ‘blunders of our governments’, political scientists Anthony King and Ivor Crewe rated the post-war housing programme, including the development of council housing, as one of the UK government’s most notable successes (King and Crewe 2013). The chart also suggests that the sharp reduction in new social housing since the late 1970s is partly or even mainly responsible for the subsequent undersupply which has been universally recognised as a key problem in the 21st-century housing system, and that an increase in social housing development is a plausible solution. Social housing has not only contributed quantity. As this book will show, the building of new, good quality social housing accounted for 29  per cent of the overall improvement in housing quality between 1951 and 1981, and a greater fraction at some points, for example, 46 per cent over the period 1967–71 (see Chapter 6). In terms of the improvement of life expectancy, late 19th-century and early 20th-century investment in water supply and sewers probably made more difference through the effect on infectious disease (Musterd et al 2009; Harris 2014). Improvements to housing supply and quality, however, contributed to change in these and other vectors of ill-health: overcrowding (linked to infectious and respiratory disease); damp and mould (linked to respiratory disease, eczema, asthma and rhinitis); indoor pollutants and infestation (linked to asthma); low temperature (linked to respiratory infection, hypothermia, bronchospasm and heart disease) and homelessness (linked to multiple conditions) (Marsh et al 2000; Marmott et al 2010). Social housing also influenced the way in which improvements in housing conditions were distributed through society. Housing systems can leave inequalities generated by the labour markets and welfare systems unchanged, but can also ‘do much to “correct” for… poverty’ (Stephens et  al 2010:4). As this book shows, people on the lowest incomes or in greatest housing need have not always had access to social housing (see Chapter 10). However, the years in which there was a substantial social housing building programme (1921–61, 1971–81), were the years when the worst housed gained more space and when housing space inequality reduced, in contrast to the period 1981–2011 (Tunstall 2015). People on low incomes in the UK, who have the worst health, also have less good housing conditions than average (Murie 1983; Hills et al 2010).

16

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

However, there is less of a penalty for poor people for housing than for other aspects of consumption (Berthoud et al 2004) and less of a penalty in the UK than other European countries (Lelkes and Zólyomi 2010). The housing system may outperform the health system, where the ‘inverse care law’ persisted for more than half a century after the establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) (Tudor Hart 1971; Watt 2002). However, for four decades housing has been described as the ‘wobbly pillar’ of the welfare state, not only in the UK but across Europe (Torgerson 1987; Doling 1997; Malpass 2003; Ronald 2008; Kemeny 2013). Government intervention in housing has been less accepted than for the more stable pillars of health, education, pensions and income support. Housing has been more susceptible to intentional wobbling, as part of wider efforts to reshape welfare states over the late 20th century (Pierson 1994; Castles 2004). Social housing, the most visible form of intervention in housing, is the part of the UK welfare state most efficiently targeted on people with low incomes, which means it is the most redistributive part (Sefton 2002), but also the part with the narrowest and potentially the weakest support base.

The fall of some parts of social housing For most of the 20th  century, the main problem associated with council housing was the need for more of it. National and local politicians campaigned on the numbers of homes they would get built (Malpass 2005). Once the principle and practice of council building had become established in the 1920s, the local authorities that built the 20 estates featured in this book were, like others, under constant pressure to build for the next 50 years. In 1925, the local authority that would build E2 (1937/300/h/NW) wanted a new civic centre but: ‘the Ministry of Health [then responsible for housing] looked with some disfavour … fearing that it might delay solution of the then pressingly urgent housing problem’ (Anon. E2 1939:1). In 1935, a commentator from the local authority that was building E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) said, ‘even the development of an entirely new suburb [including E8]  … did not by any means resolve the shortage of homes’ (Waddington nd:84). As late as 1966, the chief housing officer for the local authority that owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW) reported that the city still had 33,000 ‘slum’ homes that needed to be demolished and replaced with new council homes (E19’s local authority 1974).

17

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

However, from the very earliest years of council housing nationwide, some tenants and staff reported some problems with their homes, estates or quality of life to senior staff, councillors and local newspapers (Macey and Baker 1965; Power 1993; Glendenning and Muthesias 1994). New estates may experience ‘teething’ problems and, necessarily, some parts of a growing local social housing stock will be less popular than others. However, some individual estates appeared to have severe or persistent problems, or multiple problems, which seemed to reinforce each other, and thus some estates acquired poor reputations which began to be entrenched. E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) was first described as a ‘problem estate’ in 1946 when it was aged 13 (White 1946). The term ‘difficult estate’ was in use by researchers by the late 1950s (Wilson 1963) and first appeared in Parliament in 1968. The terms ‘depressed estate’ and ‘sink estate’ appeared in the 1970s (Spicker 1998; Slater 2018). By the 1970s, a minority of estates, including some that were brand new, were not only causing problems for some residents, but were actually difficult to let to any eligible applicants, which was a serious problem for landlords too (Wilson et al 1981). The emergence of unpopular and even empty council homes was an unpleasant and bewildering surprise for local authority landlords and for government. In 1974, the local authority which owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW), appointed John Macey, director of housing at the Greater London Council and housing textbook author, to advise the council on the ‘housing management problems’ it was experiencing (E19’s local authority 1974). In the same year, the Department for the Environment (DoE) surveyed all local authorities in England, asking them to list up to three ‘difficult-to-let’ post-war estates. These studies launched decades of research and activity by academics, policy makers and practitioners in the UK and elsewhere. However, the fall of parts of social housing remained debatable, because it was never clearly established what problems (and what underlying problems) existed in what parts of social housing, or why. The 1974 survey defined ‘difficult-to-let’ estates rather vaguely, as estates with ‘high’ proportions of empty homes, ‘high’ turnover or a concentration of so-called ‘problem’ families. Out of all local authorities, 38 per cent had at least one such ‘difficult-to-let’ post-war estate, and 12 per cent had at least three, including 40 per cent of metropolitan authorities (which had larger stocks) (Power 1985). The survey found a minimum of 60,000 difficult-to-let post-war homes, amounting to less than 1 per cent of the total council stock. Of the difficult-to-let homes, 58 per cent had been built in the most recent decade, 1964–74. Full details

18

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

were never reported, which housing academic Anne Power, who was then advising the DoE, believed was because results were too politically sensitive (personal communication 2010). From 1978, the government’s annual Housing Investment Programme (HIP) survey, used to assess need for housing improvement funds, asked how many ‘difficult-to-let’ homes each local authority had. The definition used was different but again, rather subjective: homes: ‘frequently rejected or … accepted very reluctantly even by applicants in urgent housing need’ (Power 1985:280). In 1983, 7 per cent of local authority homes in England were ‘difficult to let’ by this definition, a substantial increase on the 1974 result, only partly due to the inclusion of homes of all ages (Power 1985). Concern about unpopular and otherwise ‘problematic’ council housing persisted over the 1980s, with a growing concern about concentrations of deprivation and deprived estates. In the 1990s, there was a second wave of concern about low demand that appeared to go beyond individual estates, and to suggest regional or structural problems. Housing associations, then taking on the role of main builders of new social housing, experienced the same shock as their local authority predecessors had in the 1970s, when some newly built developments in northern regions proved difficult to let (Holmans and Simpson 1999; Power and Mumford 1999; DETR 2000). Some were even demolished after only a few years’ efforts to let and manage them. Areas of older private housing were also affected by low demand (Bramley and Pawson 2002), which led to the government-funded Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder project to redevelop affected areas. Over time, journalists, politicians and members of the public began to refer to ‘difficult’, bad’, ‘deprived’, ‘excluded’, ‘marginalised’, ‘poor’, ‘stigmatised’, ‘sink’, ‘unpopular’, ‘ghetto’, ‘no go’, ‘troubled’ and ‘worst’ estates, all vague and some unarguably pejorative terms. Hansard provides some evidence of the extent and nature of public debate over time. Negative terms for social housing estates with problems were used more frequently in Parliament in the 1970s, appeared about once a month in the 1980s and 1990s, and more often in the late 2000s, with peaks which reflected announcements and discussion of government policy and funding (see Chapter 16). Forty years after the DoE’s first interest in problematic social housing, in 2016, Prime Minister David Cameron returned to the topic and painted a vivid if unscientific word picture: ‘in the worst estates … you’re confronted by concrete slabs dropped from on high, brutal high-rise towers and dark alleyways that are a gift to criminals and drug

19

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

dealers. Decades of neglect have led to gangs and antisocial behaviour. Poverty has become entrenched’ (Cameron 2016:np). How widespread were problems? The 1974 DoE study found that 5 per cent of council homes were ‘difficult to let’. Power estimated that in 1991 there were ‘at least’ 2,000 unpopular estates, with 500–1,000 homes each, which would amount to 20–40 per cent of the UK total. Another researcher also suggested their might be 2,000 ‘deprived estates’ in England at around the same time (Taylor 1995). In 1997 a report for the DoE found 1,370 ‘deprived estates’, defined as census enumeration districts which were in the 5 per cent most deprived nationwide and where at least half of households were council tenants, ‘Deprived estates’ made up 19 per cent of all neighbourhoods dominated by council housing. However, the authors noted firmly, ‘it is not the definitive list of the worst estates, nor can there be such a list’ (Harvey et al 1997:1). They also decided not to name the places on their list, in order to avoid contributing to stigma. The 1997–2010 Labour government initially said that it would prioritise the ‘worst estates’ (Social Exclusion Unit 1999), but ultimately identified only 39 neighbourhoods in England as requiring support from their most intensive regeneration programme, the New Deal for Communities. Problems have been identified in social housing estates in most other European countries, the US and elsewhere (Emms 1991; Power 1993; Harloe 1995; Rowlands et al 2009; Hess et al 2018), and there have been similar problems in defining and counting affected places (HUD 1992; CGET 2018). What were the problems and what caused them? Over the past 50 years, a wide range of problems and possible causes have been identified alongside low demand in some social housing estates. In the 1974 DoE survey, local authorities told central government that they believed relative unpopularity was due to design, particularly high-rise design, but also to vandalism, stigma, appearance, environment, lack of facilities and poor location and transport links, and to combinations of these factors (Power 1985). In the late 1970s, textbook authors Macey and Baker told their trainee housing manager readers that the ‘main problems’ in high-density housing were the lack of play facilities for children, noise, lack of privacy, lack of clothesdrying facilities, problems with parking, lack of facilities for hobbies, ‘the problem of lifts’, the ‘problem of refuse disposal’, and ‘general

20

The debatable rise and fall of social housing

adjustment’ to a new way of life for those coming from other types of areas (Macey and Baker 1978). The DoE said the problems of difficultto-let estates included out-of-town location, poor environment, flats near houses, large size, impersonal public spaces, unattractive building, lack of play space, no community facilities, no shops, damp and condensation, other structural defects, noise, unpopular design, problems with heating, outdated fittings, lack of caretakers and managers, poor repairs service, vandalism, physical neglect, lack of community spirit, problem families, overcrowding, fear of crime, and isolated young mothers (Wilson et al 1981). In 1982, the 20 estates on which this book is based had problems including high levels of crime and vandalism; neglected and rubbish-strewn environments; poor repairs services; concentrations of unemployed residents, oneparent families and minority ethnic residents; and high proportions of empty homes (Power 1984). Distinguishing symptoms from ultimate causes, the proper targets for any attempts at improvement, has always been a challenge.

The fall of all social housing? ‘Difficult-to-let’ or otherwise problematic estates appeared to be a minority of all social housing. However, it was a minority that loomed large for landlords and politicians, because even one estate with such problems could create ideological dissonance, reputational damage, huge costs and substantial extra work; it also created challenges for housing policy, and could became part of, or even symbolic of, wider political and ideological conflicts. In 1986 the Audit Commission reported that there was a ‘crisis’ in council housing management (Audit Commission 1986). The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA), including England’s biggest landlords, ran a defensive campaign, with reports on ‘achievements in council housing’ and attempts to challenge the ‘myth … [that] council housing is badly run’ (AMA 1986a, 1986b). Gentrification scholar Tom Slater argued that derogatory terms and debatable generalisation could even be used on purpose: ‘sink estate … is the semantic battering ram in the ideological assault on social housing’ (Slater 2018:np). In ideological debates on the role of government in housing, and probably in public perception, the extreme cases came to represent the whole, and their images have persisted for decades and continued to affect public policy. From the late 1970s the national council building programme slowed down. This was largely because both Labour governments and Conservative governments wanted to restrict public spending

21

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

(Malpass 2005). However, worrying problems in some council housing, especially in some new council housing, provided an additional rationale for both parties. From that point onwards, council housing has fallen in terms of numbers of homes and households. It has also fallen in public and political approbation, and its right to exist, certainly on any scale, has been challenged repeatedly. Prime Minister Thatcher was hostile to the ideas of publicly funded and owned housing, as well as its cost and to the reality of some problematic estates. The Housing Act 1980 introduced the Right to Buy, which reduced council housing and increased ownership. The Housing Act 1988 introduced methods to privatise whole estates and, in the same year, local authorities themselves devised ways to transfer their whole housing stocks to housing association ownership. By the 1990s, after a further debatable generalisation, social housing could be said to have come to stand as a symbol of all social problems. Images of homes and neighbourhoods identifiable as social housing are frequently used to illustrate news stories about social problems in general. Prime Minister David Cameron said explicitly that, ‘housing estates … epitomise both the scale of the challenge we face and the nature of state failure’ (Cameron 2016). The history of council housing can thus be seen as a history of ‘rise and fall’ (Boughton 2018).

Conclusion ‘Social housing’ is the generic term for council and housing association homes, which form a minority of all homes and are available at belowmarket rents to households that can demonstrate need for them. Social housing has risen and fallen in terms of both the number and proportion of homes and households in the tenure. At least some parts of the tenure have fallen in quality, status and reputation over their lifetimes and, arguably, the whole tenure has fallen in the same ways. However, the extent, nature and causes of problems remain debatable. The next chapter explores what is known about how neighbourhoods in general, and social housing estates in particular, rise and fall or remain the same over time.

22

3

How neighbourhoods and estates change over time

Introduction There is a substantial body of theory and evidence on the ‘rise’ and fall’, ‘trajectories’ or ‘dynamics’ of neighbourhoods, including areas dominated by private housing, areas with mixed tenure, and social housing estates. This chapter sketches out some of the main themes of the literature, focusing on characteristics and dimensions which can be used to define change over time, and the factors that may cause or prevent it.

What we know about neighbourhood change Building age, deterioration and ‘obsolescence’ Buildings are a key part of neighbourhood infrastructure, and building deterioration is often seen as indicator, effect and cause of neighbourhood decline. Buildings deteriorate continually through use and the passing of time, in a potentially predictable way. It has been suggested that building age is a reasonable proxy for the quality of homes and environment (Leather and Morrison 1997). Deterioration can be prevented or remedied, at a price, though repairs. However, when repairs costs mount, or outweigh likely repaired value, or if a new land use might provide more net value in the medium term, buildings may become ‘obsolescent’ and be abandoned or demolished. In theory, designers and initial builders can create buildings that can adapt to all the potential uses they will be put to, which deteriorate slowly and which can be repaired easily and cheaply. However, ‘all buildings are predictions. All predictions are wrong’ (Brand 1994:178). Deterioration is likely to be faster where initial costs were emphasised over cost-in-use or life-cycle costing; where untested, unfamiliar designs, materials and components were used; design or construction were ‘poor’; use was ‘inappropriate’ or very heavy; or if there was insufficient maintenance. All of these factors apply to at least some

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

social housing, and Prak and Priemus (1986) commented that much post-war social housing lacked ‘robustness’, the ability to cope with changes in use over time. Building obsolescence, however, is not simply physical. It may be almost independent of age or the extent of deterioration. Obsolescence may be affected by social, economic and technological change. Demolition can be caused by changing land values, changing user requirements and the decay of non-structural building elements. Rates of obsolescence are likely to be faster in areas of high or rising land values, where land and building owners are most responsive to changes in the most profitable uses. They are likely to be faster for buildings designed for particular users and particular, specialised uses. Public sector property owners of course have different goals from those in the private sector, which could mean their buildings could remain undemolished and ‘continue to support inappropriate functions at unnecessary locations’ in the absence of pressures for greater efficiency (Nutt et al 1976:3). From the 1960s in the UK at least there was a ‘30-year hiatus in studies of obsolescence’ (Kintrea 2007a:336), and, as consultants said in the 1990s, ‘a general shortage of data on life expectancy of buildings’ (DTZ Pieda 2000:351), which has continued (Holmans 2005). Looking at homes built in the 1940s in the south of the US, 6 per cent no longer existed in 1959, 14 per cent had gone by 1967, and 22 per cent did not make it to 1977 (Gleeson 1981). As with human mortality, the highest rates of housing mortality per year were at the lowest and highest ages. In another study in the US in the 2000s, only 2 per cent of demolished houses were under 25 years old, and only 4 per cent were aged 25–50; 20 per cent were aged 50–75, 54 per cent were 75–100 and 19 per cent were over 100 years old (calculated from Horst et al 2005). The median age of homes demolished in the US in the 2000s was 75–100 years old. About half of homes built in New Zealand between 1860 and 1980 had been lost by the time they were 90 years old (Johnstone 1994). A 1990s study found, ‘just as people are growing older in the United States, so is its housing’ (Baer 1991:323). This will be true in the UK too, as building rates have slowed in recent decades (Stephens et al 2019). One piece of data from the UK shows that 66 per cent of homes in existence in England in 1918 were still in existence in 1991, at the age of at least 73 (Holmans 2005).

24

How neighbourhoods How neighbourhoodschange change

Neighbourhood decline Early urban geographers argued that all neighbourhoods tend to decline in physical condition and resident social status over time (Park and Burgess 1925). As they aged and were superseded by newer homes in newer, more desirable locations, homes experienced ‘filtering’, passing from households of higher to lower status and income (Grigsby et al 1977), and neighbourhoods experienced ‘succession’, where the average status or income of residents declined (Grigsby et al 1987). Park and Burgess saw social change as the key cause of loss of neighbourhood status and decline (1925). Grigsby et al (1987) also saw social change as the cause, rather than consequence, of physical deterioration. However, as neighbourhood decline continued over the 20th century, evidence and theories developed. The timing and location of decline suggests that some neighbourhoods were particularly affected by national or international processes of industrial restructuring or counter-urbanisation. Some have suggested that neighbourhood decline is a result of market failure, where investors are reluctant to make investments that could release latent value or growth potential (Oxley 2004; Marsh and Gibb 2011). Others have suggested that state failure, whether failure to intervene or inappropriate intervention, could cause decline. Researchers have suggested there may be ‘neighbourhood effects’, so that living in deprived areas or areas dominated by social rented tenure can have negative effects on residents in addition to the effects of their own deprivation (Galster 2007; Musterd et al 2012; Manley et al 2013). There has been relatively little research on successful neighbourhoods and neighbourhood revival (Musterd et al 2009). Neighbourhood stability Another body of evidence suggests that most neighbourhoods do not rise or fall much in comparison to others in the area. When looking for urban change, 35 years is ‘not a long time’ (Hulchanski 2010:7), and we need a ‘long term perspective (20–40 years), because significant changes are only visible after longer periods’ (Zwiers et al 2017:363). Once a neighbourhood has been fixed in position relative to others, it will tend to remain there, despite changes in absolute property values or resident characteristics. The social status of neighbourhoods in inner London in 1896 closely matched their ranking by deprivation in 1991, and could predict 20th-century mortality rates (Dorling

25

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

et al 2000). There is a similar pattern for ranking by infant mortality rates, overcrowding and unskilled workers for travel-to-work areas (much larger than any definition of neighbourhoods) (Gregory et al 2001). Of all neighbourhoods (postcode sectors) in England, 72 per cent saw either no change, or a change of one decile only in their ranking by unemployment benefit claim rates between 1985 and 2005 (Tunstall 2015). Neighbourhoods at the extremes of rankings may be particularly slow to change. Of postcode sectors in the top 10 per cent in England for unemployment benefit claim rate in 1985, 65 per cent were in the top decile again in 2005, and only 1.7 per cent of this group per year changed decile. After 70 years, only 19 per cent of neighbourhoods in the local authorities identified as ‘depressed areas’ in 1934 had below average unemployment rates (Tunstall 2016). This and other similar evidence has led to the idea that neighbourhoods become fixed on ‘paths’ (Robertson et al 2010; Meen et al 2013). Theorists have suggested that location and initial quality of housing and environments largely determines initial and long-term ranking (Prak and Priemus 1986; van Kempen and Musterd 1991; Byrne 1994; van Beckhoven et al 2009; Zwiers et al 2017). ‘Path dependency’ may be created by reputation, or levels of disorder, which are ‘sticky’ over time (Sampson 2009:6). Poor reputations may be harder to change than objective conditions (Hastings and Dean 2003; van Beckhoven et al 2009). Neighbourhood renewal Another body of literature focuses on evidence of areas that do change, and rise in value, physical conditions and social status. It has been argued that it may be possible for neighbourhoods to break an established path and reverse decline if there is substantial demolition; building; tenure mix or other change in population mix; new transport infrastructure; renaming; change in appearance or other effort to alter reputation. However, market forces may be unlikely to make the change on their own. Since the 1960s, national and local governments and other agencies in the US and most European countries have made many efforts to improve urban areas which have developed problems. Some aim to rectify market failures, with new infrastructure, improved human capital and pump-priming investments. Some aim to introduce new uses for areas and buildings and some to introduce new populations. Some aim to overcome neighbourhood effects. The extensive evaluation of UK programmes of the 2000s showed that conditions improved in areas that received regeneration funding,

26

How neighbourhoods change

and did so faster than in less deprived areas (AMION 2010; Batty et al 2010). However, neighbourhood regeneration activities reduced over the course of the 2010s (Lawless 2010; Matthews 2012; Lupton 2013; Hastings et al 2017). Commentary on area regeneration policy in the UK has also noted that, despite absolute changes, there has been only modest change in the rankings of local authorities by deprivation over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. However, this should be seen in the context of the relative limited rate and distance of neighbourhood change generally (Tunstall 2016). On the other hand, since the 1960s it has become clear that, even in the absence of policy, neighbourhood decline is not inevitably continuous, and areas which have experienced some decline in physical condition, value and the social status of residents can experience a reversal as a result of population movement, usually termed ‘gentrification’ (Glass 1964). Gentrification could be seen as a form of population ‘mixing’, which could reduce concentrations of poverty and negative neighbourhood effects. However, it has been widely seen as problematic because neighbourhood value and conditions improve at the expense of the displacement of original residents (Lees et al 2008). There has been some crossover between studies of regeneration and gentrification, for example discussing ‘state-sponsored’ gentrification (Uitermark and Bosker 2014).

What we know about change in social housing estates ‘Estates’ The term ‘housing estate’ is usually used to refer to a physical cluster group of homes which was originally built as a single project with a common design and contracted by a single organisation. It is usually, but not exclusively, used to describe homes owned and managed by a social landlord. In 1987, 48  per cent of people in all tenures in England said they lived a ‘housing estate’, including a large number on ‘private estates’. By 2000 the figure had fallen to 38  per cent. The concept of a housing estate derives from the pre-20th-century concept of a country estate. When E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) was being planned in 1924, the local authority purchased a country ‘estate’, complete with stately home, which they then transformed directly into a council housing ‘estate’ (E8’s local authority Housing and Town Planning Committee 1924:39). In 1991, just 14 per cent of census enumeration districts, which are small neighbourhoods containing on average 125 households, were dominated by social renters (Harvey et al

27

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

1997). The number of clusters of social housing reduced as the tenure shrank after 1981. In 1997, just 11 per cent of enumeration districts had 40 per cent or more households in council housing (Johnston et al 2000). By 2003, on average, only 48 per cent of homes in areas originally built by local authorities remained for social rent, while 34 per cent were owner occupied and 19 per cent were private rented (author’s calculations from Hills 2007), and concentration of social housing would continue to reduce over the 2000s and 2010s. Social housing estates are distinctive neighbourhoods, because of their ownership, the ability of people to move in and out, their management and patterns of investment. They also generally have distinctive locations, types of homes, public space, facilities and services, and populations (Ravetz 2003; Boughton 2018). Caution is needed when applying neighbourhood theory and evidence mostly derived from other neighbourhoods to estates. However, estates themselves can be diverse. A group of 29 large post-war housing estates in 10 countries, including the UK, ‘was highly differentiated by origin and history, the recent trajectory and problems, their local contexts and their prospects for the future’ (Musterd et al 2009:1). Researchers have proposed informal distinctions between ‘popular’ and ‘unpopular’ estates, ‘poor’ and ‘less poor’ resident populations, and estates with more and less mixed tenure. Landlords have often developed their own categorisations of estate quality. Neighbourhood typologies such as ACORN and MOSAIC, developed by commercial organisations for use by local authorities and businesses in planning and marketing, divide areas with high proportions of social housing into different types according to location, built form and population mix. Stephens (2005) described three types of ‘council built’ neighbourhoods 25 years after the Right to Buy: one close to mono-tenure home ownership, another with substantial sales but still dominated by social renting, and another still with very few sales. Estate decline There is a wealth of fascinating and authoritative scholarly books and articles on social housing and on problematic social housing in particular. Some examples which have been important to the thinking underlying this book are: Ravetz (1974, 2003), Swenarton (1981), Dunleavy (1981), Harloe (1981, 1995), Wilson et al (1981), Coleman (1985), Reynolds (1986), Clapham (1988), Damer (1989), Emms (1991), Hughes and Lowe (1991), Power (1993, 1997), Cole and Furbey (1994), Glendenning and Muthesias (1994), Hills (2007),

28

How neighbourhoods change

Kintrea (2007b), Rowlands et al (2009), Kemeny (2013), Hess et al (2018), and Boughton (2018). Ravetz argued in 2003, ‘the commonest estate biography is a hopeful beginning, which provides a longremembered “Golden Age”, followed by gradual or occasionally sharp decline’ (2003:190). This reflects the idea of mono-directional decline and ‘filtering’ from neighbourhood dynamics literature. As with neighbourhoods in general, there has been much less research on more successful or unproblematic estates, as a corrective to generalised ‘problematisation’, and as an aid to understanding and remedying problems elsewhere (Musterd et al 2009). This book cannot review this work in any depth, but the next sections sketch some of the main characterisations and explanations for estate decline. Estate design and construction Estate design has attracted the most public attention of all potential causes of estate decline. The construction of ‘tower blocks’, blocks of flats at least five storeys high, peaked in the late 1960s. Some were soon associated with vandalism and social isolation, and seen as unsuitable for children or families (Wilson et al 1981; Glendenning and Muthesias 1994). However, some lower rise deck-access estates had also problems: ‘water penetration and condensation with consequent high heating costs … poor provision of lifts … the anti-social use of the deck … inhuman appearance  … stigma’ (Bacon 1982:6). Non-traditional design of all kinds became particularly associated with crime. Jacobs argued that traditional design and layout enabled effective informal social control, so that anti-social behaviour was deterred or acted on, and a safe and convivial atmosphere was created (Jacobs 1961). Houses on streets, a mix of uses, small units, and activity day and night created numerous and varied ‘eyes on the street’. Newman (1972) found a correlation between crime rates and public housing size, design and layout in New York. If buildings and public space avoided anonymity, multiple escape routes and poorly surveilled areas they were more ‘defensible’, and more conducive to informal social control. A study of council and private housing in England found correlations between design features such as block size, number of homes per entrance, and overhead walkways, and ‘social malaise’ (litter, graffiti, vandalism, excrement and the proportion of children in care) (Coleman 1985). Coleman argued that social housing was particularly likely to have space that was not clearly public or private and was less ‘defensible’. Coleman was awarded DoE funding for costly and disruptive reorganisation in seven council estates, removing

29

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

overhead walkways to simplify access routes, and turning public spaces into private gardens. By the early 1980s, the ‘conventional wisdom’ among those commenting on ‘problematic’ social housing was that poor design was the main culprit (Reade 1985). Coleman’s analysis and proposed remedies proved influential over the 1980s and 1990s. Other common features of large developments, such as problems with modern communal services including heating and lifts, have been important for individual estates but relatively neglected in research. However, many argue that the role of design and construction in estate decline has been overstated (Reade 1985; Musterd et al 2009; van Brockhoven et al 2009). It could not be a complete explanation, as a substantial proportion of ‘difficult-to-let’ estates, at least in the UK, have been traditionally built houses (Wilson et al 1981). Coleman’s work, in particular, has been challenged for errors of methods (Hillier 1986), and the eventual evaluation of schemes based on her ideas showed limited effects on crime (Price Waterhouse 1997). Housing management Anne Power, who started the data collection on which this book is based, has argued that insufficient, inefficient, physically remote and uncaring housing management was at least as important an explanation of problems as design; design and could explain problems in estates of houses. Therefore it should be at the heart of improvement efforts (Power 1985). Any neighbourhood requires maintenance and improvement of homes and other infrastructure, and formal and informal policing of behaviour. Social housing neighbourhoods depend on a single social landlord to carry out these tasks, and to collect rents and manage tenancies (Pearl 1997). Critically, managers also allocate housing, influencing neighbourhood social mix. Poor social housing management may be a symptom of unpopularity (which makes its task more difficult). In the 1970s and 1980s the DoE supported experiments with local, intensive management for estates with problems through the ‘Priority Estates Project’ (PEP). This book originated in a study of local, intensive housing management projects (Chapter 1). The PEP ‘model’ involved intensive housing management of tenancy issues, repairs and rent collection through an estate office, with opportunities for tenant involvement, some estatebased cleaning and repairs staff, and some capital investment (Power 1984). Past reports on the 20  estates on which this book is based have found that local management was necessary, if not sufficient, for improvements (Power and Tunstall 1995; Tunstall and Coulter 2006).

30

How neighbourhoods change

Evaluations using controls found that it was modestly effective, if more expensive than mainstream management (CAPITA 1993; Glennerster and Turner 1993). However, better housing management has also been criticised as a partial solution and an expensive one (if less expensive than redevelopment). One commentator said: ‘The PEP approach is not, to be frank, much better informed about causation than Utopia on Trial [Coleman’s 1985 study] … eclectic, and mainly symptom centred’ (Spicker 1987:291). Estate age and quality Media coverage of the early days of estate-based housing management at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) attracted a letter to The Guardian in 1982 which claimed that a conflict of interest between central and local government was impeding analysis: It suits Mr  Heseltine [then Secretary of State for the Environment] … that we should believe that the causes and solutions of the so-called sink estates problem lie entirely in the sphere of local housing management … these dwellings are difficult-to-let … because they offer standards which are unacceptable to today’s applicants. (Smart, 1981) European research has suggested that building and neighbourhood age has played a role in decline. As ‘new and more attractive areas were constructed … existing early post-WWII [social housing] areas gradually saw their position in the urban hierarchy decline’ (Musterd et  al 2009:14). Based on the Netherlands, they argued that postwar social housing was initially high status, but aged, and developed technical problems, and had to compete against new housing in all tenures, leading to loss of relative position (Zwiers et al 2017:376). In the UK, when ‘difficult-to-let’ housing emerged, the DoE initially focused entirely on the youngest estates (Wilson et  al 1981), in defiance of theories on filtering over time and obsolescence linked to age. In the UK, cohort or time context appeared to be more important than age. Age alone was not sufficient to either cause or avoid problems, and appeared to interact with other factors in complex ways. Interwar UK estates of houses could be unpopular if their age (in their 50s and 60s) was combined with insufficient maintenance and modernisation, or if estates had few facilities and were far from a town centre (Shankland Cox/ICS 1974; Power 1984). Early postwar estates of low-rise flats estates could be unpopular if they had

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

high density, small rooms and poor management. The youngest estates might be unpopular due to problems associated with non-traditional design and construction (Power 1984). In the 1980s, Bulos and Walker (1988) argued that the decision that an estate was ‘obsolete’ or beyond repair and improvement was a social rather than technical process. In decisions on tower blocks, local government focused on its own interests while central government in effect subsidised demolition (Yelling 2000), and decisions were often ‘ad hoc, parochial’ (Bulos and Walker 1988:52). Images of demolition have played a role in representing the whole of social housing and a potential solution to problems, but were, as before, not actually representative of social housing as a whole (Glendenning and Muthesias 1994). Social residualisation and ‘unmixed’ communities Almost without exception, estate decline has been at least partly defined by the development of increasingly disadvantaged population, or ‘social residualisation’, a form of area ‘succession’. Wilson et al (1981) said that declining relative estate popularity was simply one and the same as increasing social residualisation. Musterd et al (2009:12) said that physical and design problems went ‘hand in hand’ with social residualisation. However, like Grigsby et  al (1987), Musterd et  al thought that difficulty in letting homes and residualisation were both caused by ‘increasing availability and accessibility of attractive housing elsewhere in and around the city’ (Musterd et al 2009:11). The development, distribution, management and exchange of social housing is only party ‘decommodified’ and insulated from markets (Harloe 1981; Priemus 2002, 2003). All theories of estate decline at least implicitly assume that individual estates form a kind of market with other local estates, and that some forms of supply and demand processes are at work. One rationale for public sector involvement in housing was that it would distribute housing in a different way to the market, but instead it was argued that council housing ‘painstakingly reproduces very much the same pattern’ (Reade 1985:35). Numerous studies have found that allocations policy and practice have either intentionally and unwittingly ‘sorted’ residents of different types into different estates (Bird 1976; Corina 1976; Byrne 1994). Rex and Moore (1967) argued that the quality of housing a household has, even in the private sector, depends not only on income but also on other resources, including information and social networks. Those with fewer ‘resources’ end up in less attractive estates, and once estates have become ‘less attractive’,

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How neighbourhoods change

they get residents with fewer resources. Since the introduction of ‘choice-based lettings’ into UK social housing in the 1990s, the existence of an ‘internal’ or ‘quasi’ market has been recognised and facilitated (Bartlett et  al 1998). In fact, some early arguments for council housing were based on the belief that ‘filtering’ operated across whole local housing markets. Building high-quality new housing to form a new top rung of the housing ladder for skilled working-class people would enable all other working-class people to ‘filter up’ by one rung (Macey and Baker 1978). Similarly, the term ‘filtering’ was popularised in the US by the Federal Housing Authority, the funder of public housing (Harris 2012). Processes that ‘sort’ residents between different neighbourhoods can create atypical or ‘unmixed’ populations. Areas with relatively low levels of employment and income have attracted the greatest attention (Meen et al 2004), but other dimensions have been considered, and a thread of research in the US was concerned with patterns of ethnic succession (Ford 1950). In US and European social housing, high child populations have been linked to higher rates of crime and vandalism or seen as a ‘problem’ generally (Bright 1997). Child ‘densities’ of more than 30 per acre (Shankland et al 1977), a third of all residents (Wilson 1974), or children in half of all households (Marcus and Sarkissian 1986) could lead to more marked problems of noise, vandalism and neighbour disputes (Shankland et al 1977). Concentration of particular groups could lead to ‘tipping points’, which could trigger or accelerate decline; when more advantaged residents left at higher rates, as in the case of ‘white flight’ or neighbourhoods ‘going downhill’, or where ‘neighbourhood effects’ could set in. Others have argued that seeing people as a problem is itself problematic: ‘Nothing could represent more vividly the failure of public housing than the overwhelming verdict by housing officers and government experts that children are an actual measure in themselves of unpopularity’ (Power 1985:350). Over the 1990s and 2000s, housing and urban policy in the USA and many European countries aimed to create more mixed income communities through mixed tenure and other measures (Tunstall 2003, Galster 2007, van Ham et al 2013). The role of location and local contexts All theories assume that the characteristics of estates themselves are part of the explanation for their decline, but some argue that estates must be seen in context (Rowlands et al 2009, Hess et al 2018). ‘Age’ or ‘unpopularity’ are often inherently relative to other places. Musterd

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

et al said, ‘problems in estates or neighbourhoods should not always be addressed as problems of the estates or neighbourhoods’ (2009:15). Lupton said, ‘Neither cities nor neighbourhoods can be seen in isolation but as having specific functions relative to others’ (Lupton with Power 2004:19). Priemus (2005:4) said that to understand low demand in one estate, ‘we first need to gain insight into the housing market’. A PhD on E15 (1946/400/h/NE) argued that understanding its decline required ‘a historical, social, political and economic perspective embracing the conurbation within which the estate is located’ (Vamplew 1992:3). Different local contexts could impose different risks of problems on estates that were otherwise similar. ‘Difficult-to-let’ housing was concentrated in London and the north of England, and in urban local authorities with large housing stocks (Wilson et al 1981), and ‘premature obsolescence’ of council housing was concentrated in the industrial north (Reade 1985). In addition, how individual estates fit into other local contexts will affect the extent to which they are affected by them. In a ‘tight’, high-demand local housing market, all homes are likely to be let. In an area with lower or falling demand, the first vacancies will appear in those estates where homes are least ‘isorentable’ and have the worst price:quality ratio (Prak and Priemus 1986). Similarly, resident employment rates or other characteristics will be affected by local labour markets and population (van Kempen and Musterd 1991). The role of national, global and temporal contexts Arguments about local contexts and the supply and demand for housing naturally extend to national, global and temporal contexts (van Beckhoven et al 2009). It has been argued that demographic change, economic change, and national policy can affect neighbourhoods (Grigsby et al 1987), and international ‘megatrends’ can play a role in supply and demand, for example for high-rise housing (Wassenburg et al 2004). Problems in social housing from the 1970s were themselves part of an international trend. By the 1980s, ‘in the European welfare states, the premature deterioration of the housing stock has emerged  … as a major concern’ (Nesslein 1988:217). Large postwar housing estates across Europe had developed a ‘multitude of problems in different spheres’ (Musterd et al 2009:11). Initial national investigations of problems in public housing in the US started in 1979 (HUD 1992), and have been followed by decades of research and policy. Investigations also started in France in the 1970s, increased following riots in the 1980s, and have continued since. There are

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How neighbourhoods change

numerous comparative studies of problems in social housing across Europe (in English alone) (Emms 1991; Power 1993; Power 1997; Turkington et al 2004; Rowlands et al 2009; Hess et al 2018). These suggest some cross-national causes at work. However, it should be noted that ‘problems’ emerged at different times and took different forms in different countries (Musterd et al 2009). Social housing was generally the product of distinctive early 20thcentury social, political and economic contexts (Harloe 1995). Harloe (1981) described succeeding periods of commodification of housing, decommodification – including a significant but never universal role for social housing, followed by commodification again from the late 20th century. Murie (1982) described the whole existence of social housing as transitional, helping the housing system (and working-class people within it) to move from private renting to home ownership. The emergence of problems in social housing and the problematisation of the tenure could be seen as a consequence of the changes as much as a cause of them. What appeared to be the effects of age of homes and neighbourhoods might really be differences between cohorts due to changes in national contexts over time (Myers 1990). Estates of similar design and location can perform very differently according to when they were first let (van Kempen and Musterd 1991). Priemus (2005) said that there had been changes in the relative importance of explanatory effects for estate fortunes over the 1980s and 1990s, and estate location, image, crime, and high demand had become more important. Combinations and models Many writers have suggested that potential causes of decline may reach ‘tipping points’ that lead to more significant or rapid change, such as with child densities. Many researchers have observed that problems in one dimension may be partly responsible for causing problems in another. For example, estate age may affect quality, although this might be mediated by maintenance and improvement. Estate housing quality can affect popularity. Popularity can affect population numbers and characteristics. Population can in itself affect relative popularity, depending on whether populations are seen as high or low status or likely to be good neighbours. Most researchers, including Coleman (1985) and Power (1985), argued that more than one factor is usually implicated in estate decline. Combinations of causal factors can create cumulative effects or ‘fatal combinations’ (Ravetz 2003), or lead from one to another in a ‘spiral of decline’ (Wilson et al 1981; Reade 1985; Power 1987; Nesslein 1988; Stewart and Taylor 1995). Tipping points

35

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

and interactions provide a means to unite the seemingly contradictory ideas about stability and change in neighbourhoods, by providing an explanation for how estates can move from one established path to another. Prak and Priemus created a model of estate decline which attempted to be comprehensive, describing decline in technical, social and financial dimensions. They pointed to housing management, housing market supply and demand, government policy, and demographic, economic and technological trends and developments as causes (Prak and Priemus 1986). Models create a tension between detail and generalisation. For example, in the Netherlands and in some other countries, each social housing development is separately funded and can experience its own financial decline; this has been much less true in the UK which has complex national–local funding and ‘pooling’ between estates. No model has been able to explain what amount and combination of factors might be necessary or sufficient to cause decline, to predict which estates may experience problems or when, or if and how decline might reverse. Some researchers have commented that the main characteristics of large estates and their trajectories was their variety (Hess et al 2018).

Conclusion This sketch of some of the main themes of theory and evidence on the ‘rise’ and fall’ of neighbourhoods over time has found two partly overlapping literatures on neighbourhoods in general and on social housing estates. Neighbourhood decline may be indicated by or caused by building age, physical condition or value. Neighbourhood decline may reverse through state investment overcoming market failure, or through the activities of the market and gentrification. However, neighbourhood stability may be as significant a phenomenon as neighbourhood change. The literature on the decline of social housing estates, a specialised type of neighbourhood, implicates estate age and quality, design and construction, housing management, social residualisation and ‘unmixed’ communities. However, factors outside the estates themselves, including local, national, global and temporal contexts, all appear to be important too. Most researchers argue that multiple factors are involved in explaining estate decline or revival, but none has conclusively described how factors interact. The next chapter introduces the 20  estates on which the book is based, and which provide the empirical evidence to describe and attempt to explain change in social housing neighbourhoods over 100 years.

36

4

The 20 estates Introduction This book is based on detailed information on 20  English social housing estates (Chapter 1), and this chapter introduces the estates. It describes how the sample was selected, and sets out some basic characteristics of the estates, including their location, age, size, main built form and size of homes. It discusses the extent to which the 20 are representative of less popular estates, and what evidence from the sample can and can’t tell us.

How the estates were selected The sample of 20 estates on which this book is based is an accident of history, and in formal terms it represents a ‘convenience sample’. The research on which the book is based started with a small 1981–82 project on the decentralisation of council housing management services from central offices to estate offices, a new approach to difficult-tolet estates. This project was carried out by Anne Power and others on behalf of the Priority Estates Project (PEP), a unit set up by the Department of the Environment (DoE) in order to promote local housing management. The report of the first study was duly called Local housing management, and found local management to be effective and good value (Power 1984). The longitudinal element developed incrementally. The original study was repeated with fieldwork in 1988, to track developments in local management in the same 20 estates over the 1980s (Power 1991). It then continued with a wider brief to investigate the impact of other landlord policies, national policy, and social and economic change, with further fieldwork in 1994 and 2005 (Power and Tunstall 1995; Tunstall and Coulter 2006). The most recent research has used archives to go back to estates’ origins, and interviews and desk research to bring evidence up to date and to provide context (Appendix 1). In 1994, 2005 and 2018, residents and local authority staff interviewed were promised that efforts could be made to ensure that they and their estates would not be identifiable in publications.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

The 20 estates were selected in 1981 for the purposes of the original management study. Power contacted every local authority in England known to have started local housing management projects on difficultto-let estates. These projects were a very new idea: just two years before, in 1979, only three councils had them. Power selected the 19 local authorities with at least one permanent estate office open at least three days a week (Power 1984). These comprised the 18 local authorities remaining in the study today, plus the Greater London Council (GLC), which built and owned homes until the mid-1980s when they were transferred to London boroughs. Where the local authorities had more than one project, Power chose the longestestablished one (with caveats, to be discussed). Thus neither the estates nor local authorities in the study were selected to be typical of all social housing, or of all ‘difficult-to-let’ or ‘less successful’ social housing. The project grew over time, and the evidence is now being turned to a wider purpose. The group of 20 does not contain ‘control’ cases of more popular or typical estates, but few social science and historical studies are able to achieve this. Instead the estates are compared to each other, to other local estates and neighbourhoods, and to national patterns.

Basic characteristics of the estates This chapter describes some basic characteristics of the 20 estates: their regional and local authority location, age, size, main built form and size of homes. These characteristics are likely to have influenced the experiences of the estates and their residents over time, and will be referred to throughout the book. However, other characteristics may prove as or more important both in describing and in explaining estates’ rises and falls. All of the estates were built as ‘estates’ (Chapter 3). They were all built by their local councils, generally with similar designs throughout the development, and formed identifiable and distinct groups of homes in the surrounding urban context. Some estates had some variety in age, built form and even in the tenure of homes. E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW) formed a single management area but contained several smaller ‘estates’ of varied built form and age, and several of the estates had small numbers of homes which had been added after the main period of development. Table 4.1 summarises some of the basic characteristics of the estates. The group includes estates first let from 1926 to 1971, estates of houses, flats and archetypal tower blocks, small and large estates, in local authorities all over England.

38

Table 4.1: Twenty estates: age, size, main built form, and regional and local authority context

Main home type and built form Houses Houses Walk-up flats Houses Walk-up flats Houses Walk-up flats Houses Walk-up flats Houses Houses Walk-up flats Walk-up flats High and low-rise flats High and low-rise deck access flats High and low-rise flats High and low-rise deck access flats High and low-rise deck access flats High and low-rise deck access flats Low-rise deck-access flats

Region North East North West London Midlands North West North West London Midlands London North East North East London London London London London North West London London London

Proportion of households in council tenure in the estate local authority in 1981 (%) 45 35 45 35 40 25 35 45 45 35 50 55 55 30 20 45 40 40 45 45

Estate code E14 E1 E13 E8 E19 E2 E4 E11 E3 E15 E12 E5 E6 E9 E18 E17 E20 E7 E16 E10

Note: The number of homes is the number in 1981, which was the peak for council housing for most estates. The numbers of homes in estates and proportions of council homes in the local authority are rounded to help preserve anonymity. The next sections of this chapter describe the 20 estates, covering the basic characteristics included in brackets after the estate ‘codes’. Source: Documents, Census 1981 via casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk

The 20 estates

39

Generation (date first let) First (1926–29) First (1929, 1938/39) First (1933–37) First (1936–37) First/Mixed (1936–74) First (1937) First (1938) First (1938) First (1938–c1945) Second (1946/47, 1954) Second (late 1940s, 1953–59) Second (1949–1960s) Second (1949–52, 1967–68) Third (1966–69) Third (1966–70) Third (1967–71) Third (1968–c71) Third (1970) Third (1971–74) Third (1971–74)

Size (number of homes in 1981) Medium (900) Small (300) Large (1,100) Large (1,000) Large (1,100) Medium (500) Small (300) Small (350) Large (1,000) Small (400) Large (1,000) Medium (700) Medium (600) Medium (800) Large (1,600) Large (1,100) Large (1,000) Large (1,100) Large (2,000) Medium (900)

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Date of first letting and age The date on which first residents of the estates moved in ranged between the estates from 1926 to 1971 (Table 4.1). By 2019, the estates had been occupied for between 48 years at the youngest estates and 93 years at the oldest. The 20 estates can be seen as falling into three ‘generations’. The nine ‘first-generation’ estates were first let before the Second World War, from 1926 to 1938. The four second-generation estates were first let in the late 1940s or early 1950s. The seven third-generation estates were first let between 1966 and 1971 (Table 4.1). Homes of different generations were obviously of different ages at any one time. Each generation formed a different cohort, planned, built and living through particular national and local contexts and serving different cohorts of residents. Each generation also tended to have different design, layout and size. Four of the estates were built in two or more periods. The first phase of E1 (1929/300/h/NW) was among the first in its local authority, and a decade later another phase was added with slightly different design. The development of E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) was interrupted by war. A small second phase with a different design was also added at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE). Homes at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) were first let in 1936, but it was unusually mixed in age, with new homes added at various stages until the 1970s. In three estates, additional council or housing association homes were added later in estate lifetimes. Second-generation E5 (1949/700/ fl/L) and E6 (1949/600/fl/L) had small third-generation tower blocks added. At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) 200 homes were added by the GLC in the 1970s, meaning the estate had two council landlords for about ten years, before these homes, in turn, were transferred to the London borough. In ten estates, substantial amounts of new housing in a mix of tenures was built following major demolition and redevelopment, introducing design and tenure diversity, and in most cases slightly increasing the total number of homes (Chapters 7, 14). Number of homes Estates ranged in size from 300 to 2,000 homes (Table 4.1). ‘Large size’ has been identified as a risk factor for unpopularity in comparative research on social housing, although none of the estates were ‘large’ by continental European or US standards (Chapter 3). The last additions of new phases had been made by 1974; in 1981 the Right to Buy

40

The 20 estates

started to reduce the number of council homes and most estates experienced some demolition (Chapter 13, 14). Thus the estates were generally at their peak number of council homes and close to the total peak for all tenures in 1981. The total number of people living in estates varied according to the size of homes, and how they were occupied (Chapter 10). Building type and layout The 20  estates fall into three main building types, each with its associated layout, access routes to homes and amount and type of public space. Six estates were mainly made up of houses with gardens, reached from standard streets. Six were mainly made up of ‘walk-up’ blocks: low-rise blocks of flats up to five storeys, originally reached by stairs and short balconies attached to the outside of blocks (although lifts may have been added later). Eight were mainly made up of flats or maisonettes in low- and high-rise blocks. Flats in these estates were reached by lifts and ‘decks’, outdoor walkways that were usually larger and longer than the earlier balconies and which sometimes linked blocks. These estates had ‘non-traditional’ construction as well as design. Estates of houses and walk-up flats were all from the first and second generations, while ‘mixed’ and deck-access estates were all from the third generation. The ‘mixed’ and deck-access estates were all among the larger estates. Thus in this sample, estate design and layout are intertwined with estate age and cohort, and estate size. Photos 4.1 to 4.6 give some idea of the early 21st-century appearance of individual estates of each type. The 20 estates included more estates made up of flats than council housing as a whole. Even in 2018, after nearly four decades of the Right to Buy, council housing remained dominated by houses with gardens (MHCLG 2018). However, the mixture of home types in the 20 estates broadly reflects that of post-war difficult-to-let estates in the DoE 1974 survey (Chapter 2). Estates solely made up of houses had a maximum of two floors, although some had a few small blocks of flats (for example, E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE)). Buildings in estates of walk-up blocks of flats generally had no more than four or five floors. Some mainly ‘walk-up’ estates had a few higher buildings, which had been added later (for example, E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E6 (1949/600/ fl/L)). Most third-generation estates contained some high blocks, even if the majority of homes were in lower-rise buildings (Figure 4.1).

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Photo 4.1: E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in 2004, aged 75 years. It was built by a small urban district council, transferred to the newly formed metropolitan council in 1974 at the age of 45, and then transferred again to a new housing association created for this purpose in 2000 at the age of 71. It is the smallest of the estates, and is almost entirely made up of semi-detached and terraced houses with front and back gardens. It is at the urban fringe with moorland in the background.

Photo 4.2: E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 2005, when it was aged 53 years. It was built by a large county borough, which still owned it in 2019, although from 2004 it was managed by an Arm’s Length Management Organisation (ALMO) set up by the council. It is made up of terraced and semi-detached houses with front and back gardens, with small numbers of houses of non-traditional construction and flats.

Source: Photograph by Alice Coulter

42

The 20 estates Photo 4.3: Second-generation E6 (1949/600/fl/L), seen in 1950 when it was aged one. Residents have settled in, but the area around the block has luxuriant weeds and has not yet been mown and laid with grass.

Source: London Metropolitan Archive, City of London (COLLAGE: the London Picture Archive). Photographer unknown.

Photo 4.4: E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 2018 when the main part of the estate was aged 85. Upper flats are reached by walking up the brick stair tower, and then along the open balconies. Balconies were originally brick but replaced by railings in the 1970s, and are used for access, drying washing, and storage. Here they are shared between two flats. Ground-floor flats are reached directly across the open yard. Some blocks in the estate had lifts installed some decades into their lives.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Photo 4.5: Housing association houses added at E13 in the 2000s, when the main part of the estate was in its 70s, seen in 2018. The new homes are a combination of three-storey houses with small front and back gardens, and flats in three-storey blocks. The new homes have similar design and layout to those they replaced, but are built in smaller groups, and homes are reached by internal staircases rather than by balconies. Houses and ground-floor flats have pedestrian and car access and front and surface parking.

Photo 4.6: E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in 2006, aged 36 years. It was built by the London borough that still owns it, although from 2005 it was managed by an ALMO. Homes are almost entirely flats and maisonettes, in buildings ranging from 2 to 18 storeys. They are reached by pedestrian decks at first-storey level which link blocks, and by lifts. At ground level there are roads and parking for cars.

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The 20 estates Figure 4.1: Maximum number of floors in estate buildings when completed 25 20 15 10 5 0

E1 E2 E8 E11 E14 E15 E4 E12 E3 E10 E13 E18 E20 E5 E6 E16 E7 E19 E9 E17

Source: Estate visits

Figure 4.2: Mix of homes with different numbers of bedrooms in the 20 estates when built % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 E9 E10 E20 E18 E16 E2 E13 E6 E17 E9 E15 E1 E12 E14 E11 E19 E4

Bedsit

1

2

3

4

5

Note: Some figures for E1 (1929/300/h/NW), E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and (1946/400/h/NE) are estimates. Data were not available for estates E3 (1938/1,000/ fl/L), E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L). Source: Interviews

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Number of rooms in homes The mix of home sizes in the estates varied significantly (Figure 4.2). First- and second-generation estates had high proportions of two- and three-bedroomed homes, while third-generation estates were generally designed with a wide range of home sizes. Homes with two and three bedrooms made up the majority in all estates. Most estates had some four-bedroomed homes to provide for larger families. E4 (1938/300/ fl/L) was exceptional as half of all homes had four bedrooms. Most of the estates had no bedsits and only small proportions of onebedroomed homes. However, nearly half of the homes at thirdgeneration E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) were bedsits or one-bedroom homes. Thus in this sample, estate design and layout are intertwined with the mix of home sizes. Overall, individual estates had between 800 (E1) and 4,000 bedrooms (E18). Because of different mixes of home sizes, E12 provided 2,400 bedrooms while E20 had 1,900, although both had about 1,000 homes. Locations The estates’ local contexts range from inner London boroughs to the outskirts of large northern towns, and include areas with varied past and present patterns of population and household growth, housing tenure and employment. Of the estates studied, 11 were built in London, 1 in the East Midlands, 1 in the West Midlands, 3 in the North East and 4 in the North West (Table 4.1). All the estates were built by local authorities and were local authority owned and managed for most, if not all, of their lives to date (Chapter 14). In 2019, the 20 estates were located in a total of 18 local authorities. Two local authorities each had two estates in the study; one had E3 (1938/1,000/ fl/L) and E10 (1971/900/deck/L), the other E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L). One in each pair had originally been built and owned by the London County Council or Greater London Council. The size and salience of council housing in these local authorities varied. The total number of homes managed by estate landlords at the peak in 1981 varied from under 20,000 to over 70,000 (and 120,000 for the GLC). The proportion of households in the local authorities in council housing varied from 20 per cent for the council that owned E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), to 55 per cent in the local authority for E5 (1949/700/fl/L) (Table 4.1). The 20 estate local authorities had particularly large absolute and proportionate numbers of difficult-to-let homes, with 1 in 6 homes

46

The 20 estates

affected in 1974 compared to the national average of 1 in 20 (Power 1984). They were selected for being early adopters of one type of improvement initiative (local management) (Chapter 1). They were and remained atypical in other ways. They had relatively large populations and high population density, although in all of them the number of residents fell for much of estate lifetimes. They were all metropolitan authorities, where ‘difficult-to-let’ estates were concentrated in the 1974 survey (Power 1985). More than half had higher proportions of people in working-class occupations than the national average at this time (defining ‘working class’ as people in manual occupations) (Rose and Pevalin 2003; Atkinson 2015). Most had higher than average unemployment in 1981. In 2000 and again in 2015, the majority of the local authorities were in the most deprived fifth of local authorities in England according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (MHCLG 2015). At the census in 2011 all the estates’ local authorities were above the national average for population density, lone-person households, lone-parent households, people using public transport to get to work, and unemployment, and all but one for minority ethnicity and longterm unemployment. All were over the national median for social renting in 2011 as in 1981, and most were over the national average for the proportion of households without central heating. The population and other characteristics of each of the local authorities changed over the estate lifetimes. However, because of their location in urban areas, all of the estates and their tenants were effectively locked into housing markets and labour markets which were deindustrialising and declining for much of the 20th century. From the very point the first sods were cut in the 1920s onwards, the 20 estates, like others in their local authorities, had a higher risk of low demand and concentrations of unemployment and poverty at some point in their lifetimes than estates in other local authorities.

The 20 estates as a sample of ‘less successful’ estates All 20 of the estates were seen as ‘problems’ at some point in their lifetimes, by council staff, when they found it difficult to let homes in the estates or more expensive or difficult to manage them, and by residents, potential residents, other local people, councillors and politicians, school teachers, local police, deliverers of bread, milk and pizzas, and sometimes by national media and politicians. Individual estates among the 20 have been referred to as ‘Sing Sing’, ‘Dodge City’, ‘Beirut’, ‘The Bronx’ or ‘like the Divis’, according to the most prominent urban dystopias of the time. At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L),

47

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

a resident created a bleak blank verse poem entirely out of negative newspaper headlines about the estate (Box 4.1).

Box 4.1: E16 as described in local newspaper headlines, 1971–90 That dreadful estate Dead End Estate Appalling Estate Estate of Violence and the Vulnerable Dreadful Estate Infested Estate The Hostile Environment of [E16] Estate Siege of Transit Camp Brooding Mass of Manmade Stone That Dreadful Estate That Dreadful Estate Residents on a Troubled Estate Tenants on a Notorious Estate [E16] Glowers Grey Eminence Living Nightmare That Dreadful Estate That Dreadful Estate. Source: Tricia Alexander, quoted in O Coileain (1995)

Not the ‘worst estates’ Media coverage of earlier reports in the study (including in the Economist and Independent as well as local papers) described the 20 estates as definitely the ‘worst’ 20 in the whole country, despite efforts by me and other authors to avoid this fake as well as potentially stigmatising news. The 20 estates were not typical estates. However, as far as I am aware, the 20 estates have never been ‘the worst’ of any national group on any reliable definition or measure. The study did not necessarily include the estates that were the most problematic even within the selected 19 local authorities. In 1982, only two of the estates were described by their managers as the least popular in their

48

The 20 estates

local authorities, and most were not the least popular in their local authorities at any point in their lifetimes (Chapter 9). Power told me that she had rejected some potential cases because they appeared too difficult to manage (personal communication 2010). A senior manager recalled in 2005 that when she was starting her career in the early 1980s, E2 (1937/300/h/NW): ‘was never the worst estate in [the local authority]. [PEP] chose it because of that. Good place to test things.’ Broadly typical of ‘less successful’ estates There is no convenient sampling frame describing the characteristics of all English social housing or housing estates over time, which could be used to assess how the ‘sample’ of the 20 estates fits into the overall distribution of characteristics at different points (Chapter 2). However, as far as can be discerned with the available comparative evidence, as a group the 20 estates were broadly typical of all council housing that was ‘less popular’ or ‘less successful’ on a variety of measures, at least in the later 20th century. The 20 estates were broadly typical of the roughly 5 per cent of all estates that were ‘difficult to let’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s in terms of location, age and built form (Chapter 2). All were in local authorities with high rates of difficult-to-let homes in the late 1970s and 1980s. Fifteen of the 20 were said to be ‘difficult to let’ by their landlords at this period, although five were not (Power 1984). The 20 were also broadly typical of the larger group of roughly 19 per cent of estates which were ‘deprived estates’, and many probably were in this group (Harvey et al 1997) (Chapter 2). All had at least several of the symptoms described in contemporary reports into the emergence of ‘difficult-to-let’ council housing (Macey and Baker 1978; Wilson et al 1981; Power 1985; Taylor 1995; Social Exclusion Unit 1998). All were described by public figures in the sorts of negative terms used by parliamentarians to refer to broader, vaguer problems in social housing from the 1970s onwards. E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) was one of the so-called ‘sink estates’ recommended by the prime minister for demolition in the 2010s (Cameron 2016). There are two ways in which the sample is not fully representative of ‘less popular’ or ‘less successful’ estates as they appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The location of the sample of 20 estates, focused on London, the North East, North West and Midlands broadly reflects the location of estates identified as ‘difficult to let’ in DoE surveys (Chapter 2). However estates in London were over-represented. In 1978, 28 per cent of all difficult-to-let homes were in inner London (which had just

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

11 per cent of all council homes in England) (Power 1985), while 9 of the 20 are located in inner London and 11 in London as a whole. In addition, the 20 estates were located in local authorities that were experimenting with new estate-based management initiatives, which marked out both estates and their local authorities somewhat from other less popular or less successful estates nationwide.

What this sample and these data can and can’t tell us This sample of 20 estates provides many of the advantages of detailed case studies, which have proved enlightening in earlier studies (Chapter  3). Twenty cases amount to a small sample survey, with more scope for generalisation, and some scope for comparison within the group, which has also proved valuable in some international comparative studies (Rowlands et al 2009; Hess et al 2018). As a group, the 20 estates were broadly typical of the small minority of estates that were ‘difficult to let’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although estates in London and estates in local authorities that pioneered responses were over-represented. In the sample, estate design and layout are intertwined with estate age and cohort, estate size, and home sizes. Some care will be needed in interpreting the effect of location and design and layout. The sample is focused on estates which were acknowledged to have problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and does not provide direct information on estates which developed and overcame problems before this time, or which developed problems only afterwards. This book is based on a unique archive of longitudinal qualitative and quantitative and longitudinal data (Chapter 1). There are nonetheless some gaps and weaker points in evidence. The longitudinal nature of the data is a real strength. However, evidence is more limited for the early decades of estates, particularly the first- and second-generation estates, than from the late 1970s onwards, when systematic interview and population data begin. This means it is more difficult to assess problems and achievements in these early decades, and to identify any causes of later problems or achievements that had early roots. Qualitative evidence is valuable for understanding the perspectives of different groups, and for learning about processes and causation. However, some interviewees may have had motivation to over- or underestimate both problems and achievements, and to point to particular causes. Residents’ groups and residents who contributed oral histories or public social media posts are unlikely to be representative of all tenants. Published information of all kinds may tend to

50

The 20 estates

emphasise negative empirical material, and to over-attribute causation. Quantitative data is not always available for long time series or for the exact area and population of the estates. However, in all these cases, information and arguments about the nature and causes of estates’ problems and achievements can be extrapolated to other contexts and other types of estates. In particular, once the extent and nature of their ‘problems’ have been assessed, these estates can be seen as a group of at least ‘somewhat extreme’ cases, in comparison to UK social housing as a whole. The extent of any problems uncovered in these estates can be used to set a limit to the extent of problems in other estates and across social housing.

Conclusion This chapter has briefly introduced the 20 estates on which the book is based. They were never ‘the worst estates’ on any dimensions. However, they have been atypical estates, in atypical locations, and with atypical problems, at least at some points in their lifetimes. They were broadly representative of less popular estates at the time unpopularity became a policy concern, and they have at least at some point fitted at least part of the image of ‘problematic estates’, which have loomed large in the media, public and political imagination. However, just what the estates’ problems were, how serious they were, how long they lasted, whether they varied in nature and severity between the estates, and what caused them, remain to be explored. Part II will describe the fortunes of the 20 estates over their lifetimes. It explores the size, nature, timing and implications of the estates’ ‘problems’, when and where they had them. It discusses variations between different aspects of estate quality, between individual estates and the perspectives of different groups and individuals. Part II also demonstrates estate achievements, and periods when estates’ fortunes were rising rather than falling. Part III explores the causes of problems and achievements, and patterns of rising and falling fortunes over time and between estates.

51

5

The scope of the book Introduction: the best of times, the worst of times In 2008, a former resident of E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) posted on the internet: ‘just think of the people who lived in those houses, the good times, sad times, the laughter and the crying, weddings and the birthdays’. As Charles Dickens pointed out, not only can one place experience both the ‘best of times’ and the ‘worst of times’, but these times can exist simultaneously in the same place for different people, and even simultaneously in the same place for the same people (Dickens 2003:1). A series of vignettes show how each of the estates and their residents have experienced both periods of bare survival and periods when they genuinely thrived. Assessments depend on the point of view, which differed among residents, and between residents, staff, politicians and others. Assessments also depend on the aspects of estate life considered, and the time period or age of estates. The best and worst of times at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) In 1933, an alderman was reported in the local paper arguing for building E1 (1929/300/h/NW) and other new council homes in the local authority, because: ‘Corporation houses would at the end of 40 years become a capital value and were contributing to the health and morality of the people’ (Anon. E1 1933). However, in the late 1970s, when E1 was in its 40s, the local authority’s director of housing said: “[it] was in a very poor order and grossly stigmatised … [it] served mainly as a receiving area for homeless families, – many of whom did not want to live there” (Director of Housing, E1’s local authority 1987). A visiting researcher noted in 1982 that: ‘Building Services, Recreation, Engineers and Environmental Health [departments of the local authority] had virtually given up trying on the estate and political parties did not dare to canvass there’, and the repairs service was ‘almost non-existent’. Only 60 per cent of tenants had rubbish collected, and the roads were entirely unswept. The director of housing acknowledged that E1 had been the ‘poor relation’. However, 20 years later, in the 1990s, local authority debts were indeed paid off,

53

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

as the long-gone alderman had hoped. By 2000, estate homes available for sale on the open market were selling for an average of £66,000 (at 2019 prices). This was below the average for the local authority area, but over the original construction costs of £1,000 (or £62,000 at 2019 prices) (albeit net of loan costs and depreciation). Tenants’ association members had been involved in improving the local natural environment and setting up a BMX track. They organised Easter bonnet contests, car boot sales, discos, trips, camping weekends and bonfires with potato pie for fellow residents. The best and worst and best of times at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) When a man born in 1930 in the North West of England came into the world, his family shared a private rented house – and the toilet at the end of the corridor – with another family. However, when he was seven: ‘we got a new house on the [E2] estate… it was great, we had a bathroom inside and a toilet as well and a garden back and front’ (E2 LHG 1989:20). However, thirty or so years later, a local paper recorded in 1979 that a 78-year-old resident, who had also moved in soon after the first letting, told the visiting housing minister that her kitchen was cold and she: ‘has to wear a woolly jumper, coat and scarf if she has a long job to do … “I told him the house was alright in summer but hopeless in winter”’ (Wood 1979). The chair of the local authority’s housing committee said, ‘for too long the main complaint of our tenants has been … that we treat them as if they don’t exist as human beings’. However, by 1983 homes, housing management and landlord–tenant relationships had improved. The deputy director of housing told the local paper, ‘it’s … likely to become a model for progressive authorities throughout the country’. Another housing minister visited the estate and praised the improvements as ‘marvellous’ (Anon. E1 1983). The best and worst of times at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) A woman who had grown up at E4 in the 1970s, when it was in its 40s, wrote to me in 2011: it was like one big community of people who looked out for each other and there was always an available baby sitter somewhere, i remember playing outside all the time and sometimes way into the night, there was always so many kids about i remember it being a fun place to live … we

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The scope of the book

didn’t have much in the way of toys but we always managed to have fun playing hide and seek, knock down ginger, [and] skipping. However, at the same time, the local MP visited E4, and told the local paper: work needs to be done regarding maintenance, provision of play space for children and additional car parking for families. Years of dripping water from toilet overflows had rotted woodwork of windows below … cisterns installed when the estate was built in 1938 had received little or no maintenance. (Anon. E4 1971) A few years later, while children’s play no doubt continued unabated, cockroaches were found in every flat and tenants were up in arms. In 1981, the incoming council leader was reported as saying, ‘the estate had deteriorated through lengthy municipal indifference … failure to complete repairs was aggravated by vandals and plunderers’ (Anon. E4 1983). The best and worst of times at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) Residents and ex-residents posting in the 2010s on the ‘[E18] those were the days’ Facebook group recalled ‘best times’ in their childhoods in the estate in the 1980s and 1990s, when the estate was in its 20s and 30s: [E18] was alive everyday but more so on sunday people playing their music cooking their Sunday rice and Peas and chicken with a side helping of mac and cheese, the climbing frame and the monkey bars, afterschool club and play centre the trips to [the seaside] and the coach driver left half of us behind definitely some of the best memories of my life!… Man, I think I cried for about two days when my parents said I had to leave [E18] School, I was vex for about a year!! I’ve always been proud of the fact that I was raised in [estate nickname], a lot of good times! dam I miss those days.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

However, social media users recalled ‘worst times’ simultaneous to the ‘best’: pissy lift’s and stair ways, mountin’s of split open bin bags, the stench of dieing(already dead) O A P’s, the letter box’s you could put your whole arm in..!! u know, hole’s in walkways like it had been under attak by missle’s moved to Canada in 1992. That was the best thing that ever happened to me. The worst and best of times at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) In 2005, when the various phases of E19 were aged from their 30s to their 70s, the two local authority managers responsible for the estate were both trying to leave their jobs. When asked by a researcher about what might happen next in the area, they said, “we won’t be here then, hopefully”. The council had a deficit of £25 million for the coming year (at 2019 prices). It had offered voluntary severance to up to 500 of its 19,000 staff, but received 5,000 applications. A resident activist said, “There is no housing service  … I won’t go to meetings anymore. There was better tenant involvement under Thatcher. It’s unbelievable!” In 2018 the estate had been owned and run by a housing association for ten years. The local housing manager I met said she loved her work, and was at ease with senior colleagues when we all met together. She said, “[residents] are generally happy there … things have got quieter, quieter, quieter … it’s an area that doesn’t take up a lot of my time, it just ticks over … if you asked people, the main problem is parking.” This contrasted not only with the past, but with other parts of the city. The director of housing said, “It horrifies me the level of gun crime and drugs that housing officers have to deal with, but not at [E19].” The best and worst and best of times at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) A senior manager told me that in the 1970s, when it was still in its first decade, the estate was: “a very interesting community … You’d get an Asian family living next to some punks and an old lady with no problems, except for the occasional noisy party … it was very much ‘live and let live’.” A former resident, who had a young family

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The scope of the book

at the time, described what could certainly be called ‘very interesting’ living conditions in the same period, but with almost a nostalgic air: “[I] remember the body in the bins, the man who kept a horse in his flat, a prostitute with a wooden leg, a woman who set fire to the flat after only living there for three weeks so she could get a move.” He felt “at the time it was still ok to live there”, but conceded, “[it] got really rough in the late 70s”. By then, residents were complaining of fights, drunks sleeping in corridors, graffiti and urine, ‘moonlight flits’ and tenants selling the keys of their flats to illicit new arrivals. In 1976, a young couple found that thieves had taken all their new flat’s furnishings, and one partner told the local paper, ‘I don’t care where we live as long as it’s as far away from [E20] as possible’ (Anon. E20 2006). However, the estate was redeveloped over the late 1980s, and when I visited in 1994 and asked residents if there were any problems with their homes or living in the estate, they found it hard to come up with negatives. One mentioned that her flat was painted in magnolia and looked “boring”. The moments when estates were first opened were fairly well recorded, and tended to be ‘best’ times. When the first turf was cut for homes in the wider development that would include E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), a local reporter was on hand among the dignitaries to note the ‘vivid word pictures’ of the future estate created by the chair of the housing and town planning committee (and to record that ‘after the ceremony tea was served’) (Anon. E8 1926). Moments when new initiatives were launched after problems were also fairly well recorded, and sometimes these were followed up by positive progress reports. However, many of the ‘best times’ are likely to have been private times, as the E11 resident suggested, which haven’t made their way into reports and documents, but do now exist in public to some extent via social media. In contrast, the most dramatic worst times are likely to have been well recorded, by avid local journalists and concerned local authority staff and councillors. Almost everyone would find the ‘worst times’ in the estates unpleasant, even shocking and hard to endure. They were bad enough to force responses from local authorities, police, residents’ groups or other agencies. The worst of times alone set these estates apart from most other estates and neighbourhoods, and are worthy of investigation and understanding. They often had a scarring effect, particularly if amplified through local and national media, and created a lasting poor reputation and notoriety, which in turn shaped behaviour and attitudes of potential residents, staff or local authorities and other services, local

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and national politicians, and residents of neighbouring areas. However, these ‘worst of times’ generally only lasted for a few years in estate lifetimes. They were not necessarily experienced by all residents even at one time, and did not fully characterise resident experience. Musterd et  al (2009:1) found that estates across Europe were ‘highly differentiated’, including by ‘recent trajectory and problems’. Chapter 4 emphasises the characteristics of the 20 English estates as a group, which, while of more varied ages and sizes than Musterd et al’s sample, were all ‘less successful’. The current chapter can already confirm that the 20 were also highly differentiated from one another and, in addition, different periods within one estate were differentiated, and different people had different viewpoints. However, just what the estates’ problems were, how serious they were, how long they lasted, how much they varied in nature and severity between the estates, and what caused them, remain to be explored.

The approach this book takes This book builds on what is known, but aims to take a slightly different approach to many earlier studies of social housing estates (see Chapter 3). It is based on unusually rich and varied sources. While it is based on case study estates, it includes a relatively large number of them, almost amounting to a small survey. The 20 cases enable the exploration of variation and similarities, and also support generalisation from the cases to other areas. The book is also unusual because of its longitudinal approach, which includes developments over almost a century, including times before the estates had any problems, and up to the most recent period, which has been covered less intensively in the existing UK literature and offers some surprises. While the book is based on case studies, it is also unusual because it sets these cases in their local, national and temporal context. Existing studies have asserted that contexts influence estate fortunes, but this book is able to investigate and assess the role of local, national and temporal contexts. The book focuses on many but not all dimensions of estates’ problems and successes, and residents’ experiences: • • • • • • •

housing quality safety and order popularity resident social mix access to opportunities housing survival and housing tenure 58

The scope of the book

Each of these has featured in existing research as an important characteristic of estate problems, and as a potential explanation for these problems. A substantial strand of the existing literature (and of public and policy debate) has focused on the role of housing and estate design and layout, particularly non-traditional design, as a causal factor in problems. The book focuses instead on housing quality, including design but also other elements, such as amenities, internal space and condition. Another substantial strand of the literature focuses on crime and, to some extent, on vandalism as an indicator of problems and poor quality of life for residents, and as a potential cause of knockon consequences. Again, this book broadens its focus to safety and order, aiming to cover some forms of non-criminal but still anti-social behaviour, and also to explore the social environment and the role of informal social control in maintaining (or subverting) norms of behaviour. Popularity, or in practice, unpopularity, has been seen as a key indicator of estate problems, or even as the problem itself, as well as a cause of further problems, including wear and tear on homes and estates, poor safety and order, unpopularity, and reduced opportunities for residents and tenure change. The book explores estates’ relative popularity over time, using a range of measures. Disadvantaged and atypical social mix has also has been seen as a key indicator of estate problems, or even as the main problem itself. The book is able to present detailed data on residents’ socioeconomic characteristics for a thirty-year period, and also to describe more qualitative aspects of the estate social environment. The book covers the access to opportunities that estates gave residents, in terms of important public services, shops, and jobs, and the potential influence that estate reputation had on residents. It also assesses the ‘survival’ of homes and estates and their avoidance of demolition. Measures of survival are key to any assessment of costs and benefits, social value, and the environmental suitability of estates, but relatively rare in the existing literature. The book emphasises survival by including one measure of it, the proportion of potential ‘homeyears’ achieved, in the codes used to identify the anonymised 20 case studies (see Chapters 1, 13). Tenure mix is important as a measure of the impact of the national policy context in estates. It may be an indicator of popularity, and may have knock-on effects on estates population. The dimensions have different characteristics, including the potential for change over time, the causes and cost of disruption, and what agencies could create change. For example, estate location cannot be changed (short of demolishing the estate and rebuilding new housing elsewhere, which is what ultimately happened to E11). However, over time, the significance of estate location in terms of the access to

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opportunities it provides may change, through landlord, local authority or private sector activity, as estate facilities or others nearby open up or close down. Some aspects of housing quality, such as built form and layout, are almost completely fixed, and can only be altered at great expense and inconvenience, while fixtures and fittings, such as in kitchens and bathrooms, may change in quality spontaneously and relatively fast, and can also be altered more easily. Population mix can change relatively quickly, in periods when a large number of residents are arriving or leaving. The dimensions are interrelated, and many are potential explanations for outcomes in other dimensions. For example, housing quality is affected by safety and order and management. In turn, housing quality affects safety and order, popularity, resident mix, management, and housing survival. Safety and order are affected by housing quality, social mix and management, and in turn safety and order affect housing quality, popularity, and housing survival (Chapter 3). This book has many limits. It does not aim to develop a comprehensive theory of estate or neighbourhood trajectories over time, or a model which can be used to make predictions. Several potential dimensions of estate fortunes and potential explanatory factors are not covered, not because they are not important, but due to a shortage either of space or data. Although the data on which the book is based originated in a study of decentralised housing management with substantial tenant involvement, the book does not cover these two issues in great depth. The book aims to give some sense of the diversity of experiences and viewpoints of residents, including people perhaps underepresented in existing literature, including those who loved the estates, children, and people from ethnic minorities. However, it inevitably misses out many groups and nuances, and cannot describe an ‘overall’ or ‘average’ experience. The book has relatively little to say on the critical issue of the costs and cost–benefit ratio of estate construction, management and improvement relative to those of other estates or other options, partly because data were hard to come by. National policies are only covered where they had a marked and overt effect on the estates, and the role of local politics in local housing policy and policy towards individual estates is only touched on. The 20  estates remain anonymous, but are labelled with codes, and these form part of the analytical strategy. Each case has a number ranging from E1 to E20, referring to the extent to which its homes have avoided demolition. All original homes at E1 have survived and avoided demolition to date. At E20, only 9 per cent survive to date, and the 91 per cent of homes lost were demolished early in the estates’

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lifetime. (The measure, which is the proportion of potential ‘homeyears’ actually provided over their lifetimes to date, is explained fully in Chapter 13.) The bracketed suffixes aim to give readers an image of each of the estates, and allow the reader to trace the extent to which estates which shared characteristics also shared experiences.

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PART II

The falls and rises of the 20 estates

6

The fall in housing quality Introduction This chapter explores housing quality, as a dimension of estate success and problems, and a potential cause of unpopularity. It covers building design and estate layout, which have been singled out in the literature (see Chapter 3), but also other elements such as amenities, internal space and condition, expert assessments of layout, and expert and resident assessments of aesthetics. It focuses on the period from the start of estate lifetimes to the 1970s, when housing quality, initially high, had fallen or was falling across the estates. The period from the 1970s to date is covered in the next chapter.

Measuring housing quality The physical quality of housing and the quality of experiences it gives its residents has been an important concern for researchers and policy makers since the 19th century or earlier, particularly due to the link with health (Burnett 1978; Marsh et al 2000; Thomson et al 2009). Statisticians wanted to measure overcrowding as early as 1891 (GRO 1904). From 1935, the ‘room standard’, and from 1960 the ‘bedroom standard’, attempted to take into account different space needs of adults and children (Holmans 2005). In 1949, a set of ‘standard’ housing ‘amenities’ was set down for England and Wales in legislation, due to concern about the effect of their absence on health (Leather and Morrison 1997). The list of ‘amenities’ has changed over time, itself a testimony to rising quality. In 1951, the census asked about a cooking stove with oven, kitchen sink, fixed bath or shower, toilet, hand basin and indoor piped water. In 1961 an indoor toilet was required but sinks only specified in shared homes. In 1981 only a fixed bath and indoor toilet were required, and the other amenities were assumed. In 1991 central heating was added. By 2011, only central heating was asked about (Holmans 2005). From 1999, the Decent Homes programme set a new standard to encourage further improvement, particularly in social housing. A ‘decent’ home met statutory minimum standards,

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was in reasonable repair, with modern facilities, and provided thermal comfort (DCLG 2004).

The quality of other housing in estates’ local authorities This section presents a broad, subjective view of housing quality in estate local authorities through the testimony of selected residents. The rest of this chapter draws on quantitative evidence. In the 1920s and 1930s, Eli Hague was a resident of the ‘slum’ area of mainly private rented 19th-century housing, where most of the initial residents of E1 (1929/300/h/NW) came from. There were six people in his two-bedroom house: ‘my brother and I shared the back bedroom and saw nothing unusual in our two sisters sleeping in the front room with Mother and Father’ (Hague 1987:82). Hague’s family had no access to an indoor toilet, running hot water or bathroom. However, there were other problems not captured by any of the 20thcentury housing quality measures: poor design, lack of management and maintenance, and the manual labour required of residents to maintain heat and cooking facilities and to keep the home clean: as regards their construction and amenities, I suppose one could call them barely adequate. Most of the faceless landlords employed rent collectors  … more often than not pleas [for repairs] were either ignored or brushed aside  … Never in all the [at least 16] years that I lived there did I see a paint brush applied … unless it was by some enterprising tenant  … There was a living room, in which we all gathered in the evenings, and a flagged kitchen with a stone sink, a copper [to heat water] and a doorway leading to the coal cellar. In that room, with its whitewashed brick walls, we washed ourselves, the pots and the clothes. When the coalman came he carried the sacks though the front door … leaving a not inconsiderable cleaning up job, especially in wet weather … The living room had an unevenly laid flagstone floor, the despair of my mother since its protruding joints cut up the cheap lino into unsightly squares. And then there was the bane of my young life – the fireplaces and appurtanenances: the big elaborate steel fender, the fire irons, the enamelled hearth plate, the ash pan with its riddle, the copper kettle and the ladling can … my responsibility … Gas was laid on … but at that time it was solely for lighting. So the importance of

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the range was paramount. Besides the warmth it provided, it served both to boil water for teas, for washing pots and for personal ablutions. All cooking was done either on the fire or in the oven. (Hague 1987:72–3) A man described housing conditions in the city centre slums of the local authority of E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) in the 1930s, the type of area the estate’s first residents came from: ‘There was about six houses in a yard, and they had two toilets, outside toilets to be shared by the six tenants, and then there was … one cold water tap in the middle of the yard, there was no other water at all in the houses. And they were slums, no question about it. And anybody would be very hard put to try and improve them, which we did against all sorts of odds.’ (EMOHA 1) A woman who lived in the same area at the same time said: ‘It was really terrible, I mean you always, you paid for what you could get but it used to be that damp paper come off, and the floors were all uneven … dark. Our kiddies were always ill … and then they had chimneys what were, used to smoke. Sometimes we slept in one room, sometimes the other, because all depends which way the wind went, you know, because of the fumes … [to wash clothes we had to] to fetch buckets of water into the kitchen, fill this big copper up, light the copper … take it back into the yard and rinse them under the tap … mangle them out.’ (EMOHA 2) A newspaper in the local authority that was shortly to build E2 (1937/300/h/NW) headlined reports on a housing survey in 1932, ‘Deplorable slums  … “indescribably squalid and depressing”’ and ‘No escape for mothers: Endless struggle in appalling slum homes: Superhuman efforts to do task’ (Anon. E2 1932a, 1932b). During the Second World War, Mass Observation studied married women in their 20s and 30s in private rented homes in a neighbourhood next to where E5 (1949/700/fl/L) was to be built after the war. More than a decade after Hague’s experiences, and at the other end of the country, there were the same space and quality problems. The women were mostly sharing a two-storey Victorian house and its amenities with another household or with their parents.

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They wanted a home of their own, and were very dissatisfied with the space and condition of what they had. Many were limiting the size of their family because of the lack of space. A woman in three rooms with children aged 11 and 13, said: “there’s not enough houses for one thing … the houses are rotten, they’re not suitable for bringing up children, and those that are nice are too expensive” (MOA 1). A woman with a 4-year-old, living in two furnished rooms with relations, said: “if you have your own home, you’ve only got your own children to pay attention to … not carting the pram up and down the stairs, wondering what the lady downstairs is going to say” (MOA 2). The women complained about the quality, cost and the amount of space they could find and afford. One with a young baby, said, “I’m living in an old place which you can’t keep clean for five minutes. It seems to be work all the time and it doesn’t look any different and it’s back breaking and heart breaking” (MOA 3). Another, living in three rooms with her husband, a baby and a toddler, said: “I certainly hope there’ll be better homes for the poorer people [after the war] … where everything is modern … I think the younger people do want more conveniences in their homes. Such as a bath and hot water” (MOA 4).

The quality of estate homes relative to other housing when first let The amenities of homes in the estates relative to national standards and local norms Homes in the 20  estates nearly all had sole access to all standard amenities at the time when they were built and afterwards. The only exceptions were a small number of flats at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L). This meant that residents of the first- and second-generation estates were immediately better off than 48 per cent of the nation’s households would be years later in 1951 (GRO 1956). They remained better off than 25 per cent of English households in 1967 (MHLG 1968). Because most of the estate local authorities had worse housing conditions than the national average, many of the first- and secondgeneration estates were better off than even bigger proportions of other local residents. For example, even among those that were not sharing a home, 49 per cent of households in the local authority for E14 (1926/900/h/NE) did not have sole access to standard amenities by 1951. At E14 residents had had these amenities for 22 years. In 1971, 27 per cent of households in the local authority for E18 (1966/1,600/

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Photo 6.1: A kitchen in a high-quality new flat at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1936, when the first homes in the estate were aged three. It shows (left to right), a food safe (precursor to the fridge), a gas cooker with oven, and a bath with water heater above. A wooden lid, folded against the wall, can be moved down to convert the bath into a (rather low) kitchen worksurface. Other photos of the same room show a Belfast sink with wooden draining board opposite the cooker. Thus this room alone provided three of the amenities that would be part of the ‘standard’ set 15 years later in 1951, and the flat also had its own toilet.

Source: London Metropolitan Archives, City of London (COLLAGE: the London Picture Archive). Photographer unknown.

deck/L) did not have sole access to standard amenities, which E18 provided from the start. The estates made an important contribution to improving overall housing quality in some local authorities. For example, homes at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) made up more than a tenth of all local homes meeting the standard in 1951, years after they were first let. In E1’s local authority archives, I found a 1955 postcard showing that the estate still inspired civic pride 20 years after completion. E1 was depicted in a vignette as one of the sights of the town, alongside pictures of the three formal parks, the library, market place, bridge and main road. Similarly, E5 (1949/700/fl/L) was still captioned as ‘modern’ and presented as the object of pride in a council brochure over a decade after it was completed.

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The size of homes in the estates relative to national standards Internal home space and layout affect the activities and relationships that can be accommodated (Holmans 2005). From the late 19th century onwards, enabling and enforcing minimum housing space has been an important element of housing policy in the UK (Wohl 1977; Mullins and Murie 2006; Gallent et al 2010). In the 21st century, renewed concern about the size of homes led to new, higher space standards (GLA 2010; DCLG 2015). In 2015, 35  per cent of all homes in England aged 50 or more (like most of the estates) had been extended (MHCLG 2018). However, initial decisions on size are particularly important for social housing and flats which are impossible for tenants and difficult for landlords to extend. Throughout the period in which estates were being built, central government required minimum room sizes as a condition of subsidy. Minima generally rose over time until the Parker Morris standard, which was set in 1967 and maintained until 1980. However, sizes varied according to the subsidy system in operation. At the local authority that built E14 (1926/900/h/NE), there was ‘a progressive reduction in size and building cost’ over the years 1920–32, which meant reductions in the number and size of rooms as E14 was completed (E14’s local authority 1932:23). These remained noticeable to managers and residents throughout the estate’s 93 year lifetime to date. I found home sizes for 13 of the estates from construction archives and recent online adverts for estate homes available for sale and private rent. Only the youngest estates were subject to the Parker Morris standard. Nonetheless, one first-generation estate met it, over thirty years before it came into force, E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid). Two secondgeneration estates also met the standard: E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E11 (1938/400/h/Mid). All third-generation estates met the standard, including those planned before it came into force, E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L), and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW). Nine of the 13 estates with data available, including some which met the Parker Morris standard, nonetheless provided less space than the average homes of the same generation with the same number of bedrooms which survived in 2012 (MHCLG 2018). For example at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), a two-bedroom flat had just 50m2 compared to a national average of 68m2 for homes of the same age surviving in 2012. The figures for three-bedroom flats were 70m2 compared to 87m2. However, homes in four third-generation estates not only exceeded Parker Morris but were larger than the contemporary national

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average, and thus offered a relative space advantage: E7 (1970/1,100/ deck/L), E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). For example, three-bedroom maisonettes at E7 had 107m2, compared to 60–102m2 for a 3–6 person home under the Parker Morris standard, and to an average of 88m2 for threebedroomed homes of the same generation. Moving to new estate homes The great difference in quality between the former homes and new council homes of many first- and second-generation estate tenants was marked by a cruel ritual and an urban myth, and it lives on in vivid word pictures. One of the first arrivals at the new E1 (1929/300/h/ NW) recalled council representatives telling clearance area residents that they were going to ‘beautiful houses’. The contrast between conditions old and new was thought so great by officials that residents’ property was forcibly and publicly fumigated to prevent transmission of vermin. The resident recalled, ‘you weren’t allowed into your new house, you couldn’t even have the key, until you’d been fumigated … my mum was … crying; she was feeling the shame’ (Southall 2003:39). There is a long-lasting urban myth that residents of high-quality new homes, unaccustomed to having a bath, might use it to keep coal in. An early resident at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) felt the need to deny the story (White 1946:16–17). A Mass Observation correspondent at the local authority for E2 (1937/300/h/NW) wrote rather piously in 1938: The popular conception of certain sections of the public that working class tenants of estates do not avail themselves of their new amenities is erroneous. It has been said that coal has been stored in the bath etc, but this is totally untrue of the large majority of estate tenants. (MOA 5) The quality of estate homes relative to initial residents’ experience and expectations There was a quality gap between what was offered by estate homes and many others in the local area. The jump in quality experienced by initial residents could be even greater, because many came from some of the worst local housing, particularly where subsidies and lettings were linked to slum clearance. The cumulative effect is reflected in the strength of many early resident reactions to their new homes. The

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significance of this transformation for family life, and its likely lasting benefit for individuals, shines out from oral histories, and constitutes one of the greatest hits of the welfare state. One of the first residents at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) recalled the excitement of the new home and its amenities in the 1930s: ‘To me it was like Buckingham Palace. Press a switch and a light came on; we had a bathroom, where you could have a bath with hot water. We had a front garden and a back garden. And we had a toilet in the house! … it was magic.’ (Southall 2003:20) A woman who had been living in what she called “really terrible” city centre slums in the local authority for E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) described moving either to E8 or an adjacent estate: ‘it was like heaven when we got in here. We hadn’t got a lot of furniture and that, but what a difference, you know, it was warmer, all lovely … and oh dear … to have a bath where you could just turn the water on, that was everything.’ (EMOHA 1) Another woman grew up at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), where her family had the home and all its amenities to themselves. At 22, in 1948, she married. When the couple got their own place, her housing conditions worsened decidedly, and they joined the 48 per cent of households in the local authority who at that time shared amenities: “we had nowhere to live. [We] had [an] old gentleman that lived in other part of the house – he wasn’t averse to walking through. Having a bath – [it was] hot at front – cold at back and then [you] have to dump water outside” (BLMMB 1). A selection of original residents who moved into E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L) in the 1930s were interviewed in 1977. Moving to E13 was a big improvement for everyone. Their previous homes had lacked running water or fixed baths, suffered damp, or had unpleasant live-in landlords. For example, one had previously been “in a basement with two children … the council had condemned the place”. Another said: ‘I couldn’t get over it that we had got everything separate [did not have to share with another family] and we’d got our own street door… we’ve always been very thankful for

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this flat … we were thrilled to have our own water taps, our own toilet, and our own bath.’ One recalled the vulnerability of living as a lodger and said that in her new home, ‘the freedom was lovely’. Another said: “It was like a little palace. Everything was new. There were two bedrooms, front room and a scullery. There was a gas cooker, a copper and a sink. The sink board covered the coal cellar.” Another said: ‘we’d been used to living by gas light. To suddenly walk into a room and switch on a light was marvellous … it was funny to see my old dad plug his wireless into the wall. Also my mother had a gas iron when she came up here. Then she saved up to buy herself an electric iron. It was really good.’ (E13 LHP 1977: 2–3, 4, 7, 8) Meanwhile, the private housing around the estate was mostly still using gas. A local paper commented: ‘undoubtedly from the material point of view [the tenants] have a better bargain now, and already the children are improving in health and physique’ (Anon. E13’s local authority 1938). Of the 20 estates, all 7 estates of houses had individual front and back gardens. Some flatted estates included a few houses with gardens, and flats in some third-generation estates had large patios or terraces. One woman who moved to E2 (1937/300/h/NW) in 1961 with her children, reported, ‘the houses were better and there was a garden, she felt a lot better’ (E2 LHG 1987:17–18). A resident who moved to E10 (1971/900/deck/L) posted, ‘took me a while to get used to having gardens!!’ In contrast, moving to a flatted estate might mean giving up a garden for some new arrivals. At E13 (1933/1100/fl/L), the lack of gardens ‘was a real hardship for those men who had been used to spending their Saturday afternoons and Sundays growing flowers and vegetables in their backyards’ (White 1946:17).

Expert assessment of estate design and layouts So far, this book has categorised the design and layout of the 20 estates into three simple groups, houses, walk-up flats and mixed or deckaccess estates. In the 2000s, the UK Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) developed a checklist to assess individual designs and layouts in more detail, called ‘Building for Life’. This was based on evidence of the relationship between design and

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crime and anti-social behaviour, management problems and resident satisfaction. It draws on Newman (1972) and Coleman (1985), but incorporates more recent work, and is aimed at British housing of all built forms and tenures (CABE 2008). I estimated scores for the estates, based on visits and discussions with CABE staff (Figure 6.1). Two estates of houses scored enough to meet CABE’s ‘gold standard’ (16/20), E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) and E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE). Three more scored enough to meet the ‘silver standard’ (14/20), E1 (1929/300/h/NW), E2 (1937/300/h/NW), E4 (1938/300/fl/L) and E11 (1938/400/h/Mid). Thus 5 of the 20 estates achieved silver standard or above. In 2009 only just over half (54 per cent) of all new private and social housing achieved this standard (CABE 2009). Estates of houses scored on average 15/20, estates of walk-up flats on average 12/20, and mixed and deck-access estates scored on average 7/20. These fell down on questions such as, ‘Do buildings and layout make it easy to find your way around? Does the scheme integrate with existing roads, paths and footways? Are public spaces and pedestrian routes overlooked and do they feel safe?’ This was after five of the estates had experienced reorganisation of access and public space, intended to reduce problems (see Figure 7.3). Any public space or route could enable a range of uses: sitting, playing, dog walking, parking, clothes drying – or anti-social or criminal activity. It might require cleaning, maintenance, and formal and informal surveillance to prevent anti-social behaviour or crime. However, larger spaces and more complex spaces would need more Figure 6.1: ‘Building for Life’ scores for the estates, 2010 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20

Note: Further versions of Building for Life were developed after 2008. Source: Estate visits and CABE (2008)

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management, and more ‘eyes on the street’ (Chapter 3). E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L), made up of tower blocks and maisonette blocks, scored 7.5/20 on the Building for Life measure. At planning stage, a local paper reported that the aim was, ‘to create as much space as possible … the land between the blocks will be landscaped and semi-mature trees planted’ (Anon. E9 1968). The trees were not forthcoming, and within a decade, the director of housing was complaining about the ‘vast open areas’ which required ‘special equipment for litter and other equipment for cleaning’ (Babbage 1979:8), while housing officers called it ‘no man’s land’. At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), by 2000 a councillor saw public space as one of the problems of the estate: ‘it acts like a moat around it. It traps people in’ (Leese and Cordwell 2000: np). E16 was entirely demolished and was still being rebuilt in 2019 (see Chapters 7 and 13). Ironically, the replacement mixed-tenure development on the site also had ‘extensive open/public spaces’. These provided a selling point for the private homes, but researchers warned, ‘they are an asset now, but what will happen when the scheme is complete?’ (Scanlon et al c2015:24).

Expert views of aesthetics The aesthetics of social housing building materials and design has been a big topic of public and expert debate since before the first-generation estates were built (Burnett 1978; Glendenning and Muthesias 1994). Whether or not any particular material or design is attractive is subjective. It hard to photograph places without making or inducing aesthetic and social comment, and different photos of the same estate can tell very different stories. Nikolaus Pevsner (1902–83), who was and remains probably the best-known British architectural critic of the late 20th century, took interest in social housing. His gazetteers continue to be updated, and include recent comments on eight of the estates. E6 (1949/600/ fl/L) was described with mild approval: ‘the interwar blocks with streamlined balconies contrasting with neat pale brick additions of the 1950s’. The earliest part of E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) was ‘ambitious’. E5 (1949/700/fl/L) was mildly disapproved of: ‘a loose grid plan which fails to give the area a distinctive identity’. However, all the third-generation estates commented on were slammed. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), ‘the disadvantages of overwhelming size and high density outweigh the amenities’ that local authority architects had included. E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) was a ‘coarsely-detailed concrete megastructure  … crude  … bleakness and artificiality  … isolated

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Photo 6.2: Part of E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), in 2007, when it was aged 40. The estate had several patches of open land like this, which were not planted or provided with benches or play equipment, and had no specific purpose. In 2007 they appeared to be not well-used or well-maintained. The estate scored 8.5/20 on the Building for Life measure.

Photo 6.3: The same place in 2018, when it was aged 51. The trees have grown, and the fence has disintegrated further, but not been removed. Little else has changed over the 11 years.

from the more neighbourly surrounding streets’. E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L) was a ‘typically deadening example of late 1960s mixed development’. E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) was ‘grim grey concrete … an extreme example of the stark geometry produced by industrialised building methods’, and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) was, if anything, even worse: ‘a repelling maze’ (quotes from, respectively, Cherry and Pevsner 2002a:542, 531, 589, 2002b:143; Pollard and Pevsner 2006:379; Cherry and Pevsner 2003: 278, 374, 409).

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Photo 6.4: E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) in 1970, four years after opening, in a professional photo taken for the local authority on an almost cloudless day. The predominant surface is concrete; and the estate’s size and architectural simplicity can be seen in its full glory, but the children create an important humanising note. Note the newly planted trees and rough grass.

Source: E18’s local authority. Photographer: John McCann.

Photo 6.5: E18 in a resident’s photo from the 1980s when it was about 20 years old. Little concrete is visible, and the estate appears very leafy as the original planting has matured. At the centre of the picture, swings and other play equipment can be seen, demonstrating how parents could keep an eye on children from above.

Source: Former E18 resident

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Residents’ views of aesthetics Relatively little attention has been paid to social housing residents’ aesthetic judgements. As a rare exception, a survey carried out at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) in 1979 asked for opinions. More than half of residents (54 per cent) scored the ‘outlook’ from their house at five out of ten or less, compared to 19 per cent across the local authority as a whole (Vamplew 1992). One resident in this study complained about “the grey pebble-dash – it should be coloured or bricks – it’s depressing as it is”. Others said, “it’s like a tip”; “it reminds me of a concentration camp”; “a wilderness”. Thus estates that were built in the form of houses, which did not attract professional comment, could still have aesthetic deficiencies for residents. Other residents have made occasional spontaneous complaints about the appearance of homes and estates through interviews, in other publications and on social media. Some have used very strong, emotive and negative words and metaphors to describe where they lived. Walk-up estates were sometimes compared to barracks, and one resident thought that E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) looked “too much like Sing Sing”, a notorious American prison of the time (White 1946:19– 20). The mixed and deck-access estates attracted negative comments from residents as well as from Pevsner. While E20 was still being let, local reporters recorded that while many tenants were pleased with their new flats, there was some discontent, ‘some describing the flats as being like a prison or an army barracks’. One resident of E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said: ‘This grey concrete monster … I’ve lived on council estates most of my life … [but] I was just amazed that anyone lived in that kind of environment  … so bloody ugly’ (Edwards 1995:39). When E16 had been largely demolished, exresidents posted, ‘it did look bad’, ‘such an ugly design’, ‘it looked so awful’, ‘an eyesore … it was modern when built we didnt no any better’. Intended ‘improvements’ could also attract aesthetic criticism. Another ex-resident of E16 recalled past improvement efforts in the 1990s: ‘Whose idea was it to paint all the front doors gay rainbow style colours.’ On the other hand, some residents of estates at the urban fringe got aesthetic pleasure from being close to natural environments. One of the first residents at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) recalled: ‘we had a wonderful view of the moors. I heard the skylark, and I heard the cuckoo, which I’d never heard before in my life’ (Southall 2003:40). One of the first at the maligned E16, in the London suburbs, said

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the location was: ‘all lovely, with fresh air, no chimneys, no smoke, nothing of the nastiness’ (Green 1995:134).

The disappearing relative advantages of estates in their local markets over the estates’ lifetimes Over estate lifetimes, new home building and rising incomes resulted in dramatic reductions in the proportion of households in England sharing their homes, and living without sole access to basic amenities. By the 1970s and 1980s, parts of the national social housing stock and some of the 20 estates were disadvantaged rather than advantaged compared to other local housing in terms of quality. National improvements in housing quality over estate lifetimes In 1921 there were 8  per cent more households than homes in England, meaning some had to share, but by 1971 there were more homes than households and in 2011 just 1 per cent of households were sharing (see Figure 18.1). The proportion of people in England and Wales living at more than one person per room fell from 48 per cent in 1921 to just 4 per cent in 2011. In 1951, 14 per cent of households in England and Wales shared a home, and of the remainder, 41 per cent still had to share amenities (Holmans 2005). Things improved fast from this point onwards. By 1961, 59 per cent of household had sole access to all amenities. By 1971 sole access to amenities was nearly universal, at 92 per cent. The few exceptions mostly lacked only an inside toilet (Leather and Morrison 1997). There was rapid change between and within generations. Only 56 per cent of children born in 1946 were in a home with a bathroom (a room with a fixed bath and hot and cold running water) at birth, and nothing had changed two years later, but by 1957, when they were aged 11, 76 per cent had a bathroom. By the time the cohort born in 1958 reached age 11, 97 per cent had a bathroom (Lupton et al 2009). There was a substantial financial cost, and improvements, particularly for the worst off, could have been achieved faster or more efficiently (Tunstall 2015). Nonetheless, the extent of this improvement constitutes a great and only partly recognised national achievement, despite occurring within living memory for many. The development of new council housing, including the 20 estates, made an important contribution to the improvement of housing conditions in England. Over the period 1951–81, new council housing was responsible for 29 per cent of all progress on providing sole access

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to standard amenities for households in England (calculations from Holmans 2005; MHCLG live table 104). Like new homes intended for owner occupation, new council homes almost always had all modern amenities, and many directly replaced poor-quality homes demolished as part of slum clearance, mostly in the privately rented sector. From 1981 on, however, there was little new council housing development, and although New Towns continued to build and housing associations began to grow, this did not compensate for sales under the Right to Buy (see Figure 2.1). Better-quality homes were more likely to be sold (Murie 2016), and the whole tenure was ageing. Relative quality of social housing thus depended on the amount and quality of maintenance and improvement of existing older homes, and whether it could keep up with new and improved private housing. Local improvements in housing quality over estate lifetimes The estates’ local authorities faced unusually poor conditions early in the 20th century, and many made slower progress than other areas in improving housing. For example, the local authority that owned Figure 6.2: Proportion of households in the estates’ local authorities with worse amenities than estate households, 1961–2001 E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

% 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1961

1971

1981

1991

Notes: Proportion of households without all contemporary standard amenities. Sources: GRO (1956, 1964), OPCS (1974), casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk

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2001

The fall in housing quality

E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) ‘fell behind’ other large cities in clearing ‘slum’ homes and reducing ‘unfitness’ (Edwards and Simpson 1972). Several of the local authorities had relatively slow growth in home ownership, which was a major source of improved quality elsewhere. In the London local authorities which owned E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), E4 (1938/300/fl/L), E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L), conditions actually got worse over the 1950s, probably due to increased sharing. The 1890 public baths in the local authority that owned E4 were still in use in 1960, more than two decades after E4’s residents had their own bathrooms (Gerhold 1988). However, housing conditions improved dramatically in estates’ local authorities over the late 20th century, through clearance, council and private development, and reduced sharing (Figure 6.2). Poor conditions lingered for some, particularly as a result of sharing. In 1984, when the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was investigating racial inequalities in the local authority that owned E5 (1949/700/fl/L), it noted, ‘Many families live in overcrowded accommodation, lacking basic amenities such as baths and inside toilets’ (CRE 1984:12). E5 residents had had basic amenities for more than thirty years. However, the relative advantage of third-generation estates over other local housing when they were first let in the late 1960s and early 1970s was markedly smaller than that of the earlier estates. By 1971, only E1 (1929/300/h/NW) could be placed in the top half of homes in its local authority in terms of access to amenities, and after particularly rapid improvement in the 1970s, by 1981 the proportion of households lacking sole access to key amenities was in single figures in most of the local authorities. Housing conditions nationwide and in estate local authorities continued to improve. The proportion of households with central heating rose from 6 per cent in 1961 (Holmans 2005), to 37 per cent, in 1972, to 88 per cent by 1996 and virtually all households by 2000 (Holmans 2005; ONS 2013). Similarly, ownership of telephones, fridges and washing machines rose from 42 per cent, 58 per cent and 66 per cent respectively in 1972, to virtually all households, and colour TVs spread from 60 per cent of households in 1978 to ubiquity. In each case, quality improved over time too. Along with wide access to consumer durables, people nationwide were able to keep their homes better decorated, furnished and repaired as time went on.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Beyond the basics Some of the estates in each generation went beyond the standard amenities to offer forward-looking conveniences. At E4 (1938/300/ fl/L), lighting was electric, paid for by slots in the hallways, but flats also had gas in case tenants wanted to swap fuel. The living rooms had ‘gas-coal’ fires, the ‘best bedrooms’ had coal fires, and others had ‘panel type gas fires’. Bathroom hot water came from coppers in the bathrooms, and the kitchens had points for water heaters residents could add themselves (Anon. E4 1938:5). At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) and E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), living rooms had fireplaces, but some flats also had gas or electric heating as well. E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) had no ‘old fashioned’ ranges in living rooms, as designers aimed to move cooking out of this room, and onto a gas stove in the kitchen (Burnett 1978). Heating from open coal fires persisted for some second-generation estates. However, at others, for example, E5 (1949/700/fl/L), which was urban and mainly made up of blocks of flats, there was a district heating system rather than individual open fires. None of the thirdgeneration estates had fireplaces, and all had some kind of central heating. This again put residents well ahead of most of those who lived in the rest of the housing stock. Large new estates were suitable for Photo 6.6: The built-in fridge (left) and drying cupboard (right) provided in every flat in the tower block at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L)

Source: Anon. (E9) 1968

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built-in and communal heating systems. E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) had individually controllable central heating through warm-air ducts (Anon. E9 1968). E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) had central heating in kitchens and living rooms also through warm-air ducts. Third-generation estates had some other innovations. For example, E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) offered the novelties of a built-in fridge, drying cabinet (Photo 6.6), and double glazing. At the time, only about half of English households had a fridge, and very few had double glazing (Wilson 2011). At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), ‘No dustbins would be needed, as all of the rubbish would be chewed up by a waste disposal unit in the flat’s kitchen sink!’ (Grant 2012:4). New estates were still ahead of the curve, but the older estates fell behind, and all estates aged. It became increasingly difficult to delight new residents, and more likely that they would be disappointed. The slower decline in relative advantage from size In contrast to the case of amenities, there was no marked national improvement in home size over the estates’ lifetimes. Within the 2012 national housing stock, the largest one- and two-bedroom homes were those from the interwar periods, built at the same time as the firstgeneration estates. Only among homes with four or more bedrooms did homes built in the forty years after 1980 offer some advantage (MHCLG 2018). Thus the sizes of homes in the estates relative to other homes in the areas changed little over their lifetimes. Although estate agents’ claims should not be over-interpreted, size could be a selling point in adverts for homes in the estates for sale or rent after the Right to Buy. For example, in 2018 a home in the E18 estate (1966/1,600/deck/L) had a ‘large reception with big windows and space to dine’. Likewise, a one-bed flat at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) was described as ‘spacious’. Where new or replacement homes were added to estates (Chapters 4 and 7), they were sometimes smaller than the original ones. A former tenant activist at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) which was redeveloped in the 1990s, commented: ‘I don’t like the design of the new build, it’s atrocious. You can tell it wasn’t done by a woman. The front door goes into the sitting room … the sitting room is basically a corridor … mine’s supposedly a three-bed but we’ve lost a third of the space.’

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

The architects, whether male or female, would have made these decisions in order to reduce costs. Similarly, new two-bedroom private homes built after redevelopment at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) in the 1990s had no hall. The three-bedroom houses had a small hall, the kitchen could only be reached through the living room (Photo 7.9). Some new private homes built at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) as part of redevelopments exceeded both the Parker Morris standard and the size of former estate homes. However, these were aimed at buyers, or subsequently, private tenants with relatively high incomes. In 2018 a three-bedroomed flat at E16 was on offer for £2,500 a month.

Resident views of housing quality over time The transformative effect of arrival at a home in the 20 estates lasted for some residents into the 1960s and 1970s, even when only a small minority of households nationwide lacked basic amenities, and when some existing households in some of the estates had become dissatisfied. A man who moved into E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) with his family as a 5-year-old in 1950, when the estate was aged 12, said, ‘My parents were overjoyed finally to have a place where we could be alone as a family, and [my sister] and I had our own bedrooms’ (Livingstone 2011:7). For a woman who moved to E2 (1937/300/h/ NW) in 1961, when 31 per cent of households in England and 48 per cent in the local authority lacked exclusive access to all amenities: ‘This was the first house she had lived in that had running hot water and a bath … circumstances really changed with the move up onto [E2], even though she had to move empty stout bottles from all over the house’ (E2 LHG 1987:18–19). A resident arriving at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) in 1968 said it was ‘marvellous’ not to have to share a toilet. One of the first residents at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) said in 1968: “In our old house … the kitchen was not big enough to swing a cat around. But my kitchen now is marvellous and the central heating is quite cheap. We never hear rows or anybody moving about in the flats above or below us” (Anon. E20 2006:np). Another new arrival said, “Life today is heaven compared to hell. It is so peaceful here … Here when the sun shines it comes into every room at the same time.” One who arrived in 1973, said: “It was a Godsend … because it had everything which we hadn’t got in the house we lived in, which was hot water, running water, bathroom, toilet in the house, and bedrooms we could all sleep in” (transcribed from Granada TV 1991). An early

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The fall in housing quality

resident of E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) posted in 2008, ‘my family were on cloud nine’. Another posted, ‘We moved from the dive that was [a Victorian-built inner London area], to [E16], which at the time felt like we had moved to a paradise in comparison’, and a third posted, ‘it was all luvly and new everything smelt new’. However, different residents could react differently to the same accommodation, depending on past experiences and expectations. For example, some initial estate residents were not satisfied with lower standard flats at E13. One said: first they sent me all over the first block they had built up here, with the old dresser in the living room. I said I’d rather stay where I am, bombed out, I have got a decent home, I’m not going in them places (the bath was in the kitchen). (E13 LHP 1977:3) The postman told her to request one of the most recent blocks with better (and more expensive) homes, which she did.

Ageing and relative disrepair Homes in all the estates, of course, aged over time (Figure 6.3). Figure 6.3: The age in years of the estates over their lifetimes, 1926–2018 E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

19 2 19 6 2 19 9 32 19 3 19 5 3 19 8 41 19 4 19 4 47 19 5 19 0 5 19 3 5 19 6 5 19 9 6 19 2 6 19 5 6 19 8 71 19 7 19 4 7 19 7 8 19 0 8 19 3 86 19 8 19 9 9 19 2 9 19 5 9 20 8 0 20 1 0 20 4 0 20 7 1 20 0 1 20 3 1 20 6 19

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Note: E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) was entirely demolished in 2008 and not replaced. Source: Figure 4.1

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Some estates had new council, housing association and private homes added after the initial developments (see Chapters 4, 7 and 13). These reduced the average age of homes somewhat, particularly in estates that underwent redevelopment. The age of estate homes can be compared with the age of housing nationwide. In 1977/78, 27 per cent of homes in England were built pre-1919 and were older than all of the estates, but by 2016 only 21 per cent of homes nationwide were older than all estate homes. In 1977/78, 49 per cent of homes were built after 1945 and were younger than first-generation estates; 17 per cent of all homes were built after 1970 and were younger than almost all the estates. By 2016, 24 per cent of all homes had been built after 1980, so more than a quarter were younger than all the estates (Figure 6.4). The estates also aged relative to other council housing in their local authorities. When E14 (1926/900/h/NE) was first let, it was of course the youngest of the local authority’s housing, but within a decade more than half of the council housing in its local authority was younger than it was. By 1981 more than 90 per cent of local council homes were younger than those in E14. Second-generation E6 (1949/600/ fl/L) was also in the oldest half of its local authority’s stock within a decade, while the process took slightly longer for third-generation E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), as development in its local authority there was slowing down (Figure 6.5). Predictable ageing All the estates fell behind other housing nationwide and in their local authorities as they aged. Homes, fixtures and fittings deteriorated both in absolute terms and relative to other homes in the surrounding market, as new homes were built, private owners improved their property, and average standards rose. Looking back in 2007, a man who grew up at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) in the 1930s and 1940s, with coal fires, noted, “since then housing facilities have improved greatly, houses then had no central heating and double glazing etc.” The 20 estates were not able to keep up with rising standards, or the effects of ageing, because almost all 20 experienced decades of almost nil reinvestment. Early generation estates were particularly affected, going for periods of forty years or more with no expenditure on wiring or roofs, for example, while new homes were built and others were improved faster than those on the estates. Some residents’ groups felt they and their areas were particularly hard done by, but it was not just the 20 estates that were affected, but most or all other older estates

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The fall in housing quality Figure 6.4: Proportion of national housing stock older than and younger than the 20 estates, 1977/78 and 2016/17 1977/78

% 45

2016

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Older than all estates

Contemporary with 1st gen estates

Younger than all estates

Contemporary with 2nd and 3rd gen estates

Sources: Manchester City Planning Department (1981), MHCLG (2018)

Figure 6.5: Proportion of council housing in the surrounding local authority which was younger than E6 (1949/600/fl/L), E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE), 1926–80 %

E6

E14

E7

1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Sources: E14’s local authority (1935, 1955), E6’s local authority (1982), casweb.ukdataservice. ac.uk

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in their local authorities. In 1972, 18 per cent of the homes owned by the landlord for E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) were ‘unmodernised’, and 13 per cent were actually ‘unfit’ for human habitation (Housing North West 1982). In 1976, when they were aged 42 years, some homes at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) still had baths in the kitchen and no separate bathrooms (Photo 6.1) (Anon. E13 1976), which had been described as unsatisfactory more than thirty years before (White 1946). By 1981, E19’s local authority had both ageing interwar housing in need of repairs and improvement, and newer housing in which problems had emerged rapidly, so ‘the poor condition of a large number of council dwellings continues to be the dominant local housing problem’ (local strategy document quoted in Friend 1981:17). In 1987, the most senior housing officer for E1 (1929/300/h/NW) said that ‘the extent of disrepair was high due to a lack of maintenance since 1938’ – in other words for 49 years! Expenditure on improvement, as opposed to repair, had been limited to kitchen cabinet renewal in the 1980s. In the 1990s, many flats at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) still had the original 1940s and 1950s metal window frames which had warped, were difficult to shut and caused mould. The third-generation estates also experienced ageing. When E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) was aged 45, some flats had very poor energy efficiency ratings, partly due to original design and partly due to deterioration: ‘chipping and fragmentation (spalling) of concrete, previous failed repairs, damp penetration and interior condensation’ (Bates et al 2012:14). Premature ageing Some estates were handicapped by fixtures that aged particularly fast – for example, heating from open fires, or faulty lifts in multi-storey blocks. Some were affected by periods of unpopularity, high turnover and vandalism, which could mean exceptional wear and tear. In addition, in the early 1980s, the Royal Institute of British Architects said: ‘simple problems that had been solved for generations reappeared with the advent of “modern construction”’ (quoted in Friend 1981:17). These problems included condensation, heat loss, water penetration, sound transmission, leaks, fire risk, high maintenance costs, and structural weakness. The seven third-generation mixed and deck-access estates, the houses of non-traditional construction found E12 (1947/1,000/h/ NE) and E15 (1946/400/h/NE), and the maisonette blocks at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW), all experienced what could be called ‘premature ageing’ – early and unexpected failures in fabric or equipment and

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The fall in housing quality Photo 6.7: A small front garden created for a ground floor flat from public space at E6 (1949/600/fl/L) in c1982 when it was aged 33. The photo was taken because this garden had won the estate’s gardening competition.

Source: PEP

Photo 6.8: The same place in 2018, 36 years later, when the estate was aged 69. The pergola has been renewed, with slightly different design. The flat has a different front door and windows.

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other problems linked to their design and construction. Estates of flats enabled and required shared systems, which could go wrong, and then affected many residents. For example, district heating systems were intended as a cost-effective way to provide a modern amenity. However, at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), residents’ reps said the heating system needed servicing every year to remain in operation, and parts had already been replaced by 1984, when it was aged 16 (E20 EMDG 1987). At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) there were heating fluctuations and cut-offs in part of the estate for two months in 1986, due to vandalism (E16’s local authority 1986a). In the 1990s, pharaoh ants infested the whole estate through the heating ducts. Oil-fired district heating systems, such as that at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), suddenly became much more expensive after the oil price shock in 1973. In addition, as individual central heating spread in the wider population, residents appear to have become less tolerant of their lack of control. For example, at E16, the winter heating system switched on in October, and an early 1970s resident posted that, ‘no heating in the bedrooms … meant it was freezing in winter’. In 2018 a senior staff member who had worked in the city for decades recalled that in the 1970s there had been “lots of water ingress, [problems with] rainwater gutters, seepage”, at the maisonette blocks at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW). Gardens While gardens constituted private space that was the responsibility of tenants to maintain, front gardens, which were visible to other residents and visitors in particular, acted as a kind of public good. At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), a resident told me in 1994 that some of those with gardens, “spend a lot of money which benefits everyone”. However, gardens could be eyesores. Because of the state they had got into, at some point in the 1960s or 1970s, the council decided to convert private gardens to public space at E1 (1929/300/h/NW), and according to the DoE regional office, ‘bulldozed the gardens… without ever bothering to ask the tenants’ (Walsh 1990:12). Gardens were later returned to individual tenants by re-fencing. In contrast, many schemes to reorganise public space at flatted estates in the 1900s and 1990s included allocating parts of public and space to ground floor flats as private gardens, to provide ‘defensible space’, to reduce landlords’ responsibility for maintenance and to exert informal social control over these areas (see Chapter 7).

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The fall in housing quality Photo 6.9: E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in 2005, when it was aged 76. Gardens or other private outdoor space permit personalisation within the scope of the tenancy agreement. Semi-detached homes have additional space, which enables the creation of sheds, garages or extensions, where permitted.

Gardens illustrate tensions between the notional and real roles of residents and landlords, and the impact of social change. Throughout estate lifetimes, tenants were obliged in their tenancy agreement to keep gardens tidy, and landlords and tenants were troubled by the failure of some to do so. A 1938 letter to the local paper for E1 (1929/300/h/NW) betrayed fairly high expectations: ‘some of the gardens look as if a spade had never been put in the ground this season; others gave some promise, but plainly demonstrated that the tenants know little about gardening’ (Anon. E1 1938a). On the other hand, in the 1970s keen gardeners at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) complained about poor soil, apparently a legacy of corner-cutting by the developers: ‘a quarter of a century later its consequences were still making themselves felt’ (Vamplew 1992:221). Residents at several estates complained about poor or missing fencing, and it was often unclear who should take the blame and who should put it right. In 1988, a resident representative at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) said that there were two reasons some gardens were untidy: “poverty, [and] a lot don’t try to help themselves”. Fifty years after these concerns were first noted at E1, there were still poorly maintained gardens, and the director of housing told councillors that tenants were: ‘unable to pay for the all-important visual improvements that one sees on more popular estates – good fencing, well-stocked gardens … [so] estates

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with large numbers of low-income tenants necessarily tend to have a “run-down” look about them which is not the fault of the tenants’ (Director of Housing E1’s local authority 1987).

Conclusion The 20 estates generally started their lives providing homes of at least average and often well above average quality, which placed them in a strong position when compared to other local options. They had sole access to all the expected amenities of the time, good internal space, and were initially brand new and in good condition. On home sizes, the situation was less clear cut, but estate residents rarely shared their homes, and some estates were able to offer more space than much housing nationwide. Initial residents were delighted with the quality of their homes. However, third-generation estates offered less relative advantage in terms of quality, and all estates experienced marked falls in relative quality and relative advantage from first letting to the 1970s. Standards and expectations rose, newer housing was built in estates’ areas, all estates aged, and some estates, particularly third-generation mixed built form and deck-access estates, aged prematurely. The seven thirdgeneration flatted estates with high- and low-rise flats and deck access, form a distinct group because of their less high initial relative quality (except perhaps in terms of space). They had complex access routes, scored poorly on Building for Life, and aged prematurely. However, much social housing nationwide would also have experienced the processes that led to this fall in relative quality over the mid20th century. Housing quality in the 20 estates over the period from the 1970s to 2019 is covered in the next chapter.

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7

The rise in housing quality Introduction This chapter continues to describe housing quality in the 20 estates, focusing on the period from the 1970s to 2019. It covers maintenance, improvements, reorganisations and redevelopment. After the falls in relative housing quality from first letting up until the 1970s (Chapter 6), over this period relative housing quality in the estates rose again. However, quality rose belatedly, there were more downs as well as ups, and quality generally did not get back to the high relative level of many estates in their earlier years.

Maintaining absolute housing quality through repairs and planned maintenance Throughout estate lifetimes, there were often day-to-day, legal and conceptual tensions between landlords and tenants over who or what caused wear and tear and breakages, and who should carry out repairs. At E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in 1982, the local repairs team leader said that the large number of repairs requests were at least partly due to the “particular lifestyle of a number of tenants”. However, he thought it was impractical to try to charge residents for this work, given low incomes and the fact that “extreme internal wear and tear, eventually leads to properties being impossible to let”. However, the big backlog of incomplete repairs was “possibly accentuated by the fact that residents considered that it was not worth reporting work” (in Andrews 1979:4). The number of requests jumped when estate-based management started (Director of Housing E14’s local authority 1980). A visiting researcher noted, ‘tenants do very few repairs themselves’. In 2005, a resident at E14 said, “there is a real problem with repairs … they are more concerned with the looks – gardens, dogs [than with the fabric]”, and another said, “they make you do your own repairs”. By the 1970s, it was widely acknowledged that ‘repairs backlogs’ had built up in many local authorities. In addition, while manuals recommended a programme of ‘planned’ or ‘cyclical’ maintenance to monitor, repair and replace the structure and services of a home

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over time, to counter the effects of wear and tear and for the natural safe functioning life of particular elements (Macey and Baker 1978), in practice, large parts of estate lifetimes passed while their local authorities did not have such systems in place. For example, in 1966 when the estate was aged 28, E4 (1938/300/fl/L) residents had been promised about £2,600 per home of modernisation (at 2019 prices), but nothing actually happened for another ten years (Anon. E4 1973). In 1971, when the estate was aged 33, a local journalist reported on what the area’s MP saw on a visit: ‘Years of dripping water from toilet overflows had rotted woodwork of windows below. Part cause was the fact that many of the cisterns installed when the estate was built in 1938 had received little or no maintenance. Many were filled with rust’ (Anon. E4 1971). The next year, a councillor noted that the estate ‘holds a priority position on the borough’s improvement programme’, which meant it was in fourth place behind three older estates in the local authority (Anon. E4 1972). Improvement work finally started in 1981 when the estate was aged 43. The leader of the council admitted to a local paper, ‘the estate had deteriorated through lengthy municipal indifference’ (Anon. E4 1973). When work took place, it cost £55,000 per home (at 2019 prices). In 2005, another 22  years later, there was some Decent Homes work under way. At E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) in the late 1980s, the local manager said that ‘cyclical maintenance’ only included free internal decorations for old age pensioners and any minor repairs prior to external decorations. In the 1990s, the local manager at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said there was “no particular cycle” for planned maintenance. The local manager at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) said, “some programmes were slipping back to as much as 21-year cycles!” The same pattern continued over the 1990s. At E6 (1949/600/fl/L), the local manager said, “we’re trying to move to more planned maintenance, as it is more cost effective”. At E5 (1949/700/fl/L) in 1994, the local manager said, “planned maintenance covers windows … but some in the estate were due to be replaced in 1989 [five years before]”. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), the local manager said, “properties need major work to get them into a state where they would benefit from planned maintenance”. E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) had received £24,000/home (at 2019 prices) of improvements in the early 1980s, but 14  years later, there was no prospect of more:, the local manager said, “cyclical and planned maintenance is idealistic, we are responsive”.

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Kitchen replacement The drawn-out sagas of kitchen replacement provide examples of unplanned planned maintenance. Kitchens have a big impact on quality of life, but other building elements not discussed here such as rewiring, windows and roofing may have a greater impact on resident safety and health. The ‘kitchen’ as a room mainly for food preparation and related equipment only crystallised in the 20th  century. All estate homes were initially built with kitchens, although some first- and secondgeneration kitchens were too small for eating in or for late 20thcentury appliances. The 1930s kitchen at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) seen in Photo 6.1 had changed little by the 1970s (E13 LHP 1977). By this time, new and private sector kitchens increasingly included stainless steel sinks, continuous worktops, and fitted storage space. In the 1970s, estate landlords started to respond by including kitchens in modernisation programmes. However, these tended to start long after kitchens had fallen behind, and then to drag on. Replacement of the old Belfast sinks and water heaters started at E14 in 1978, when the estate its sinks were 45 years old (Andrews 1979). Original kitchens were replaced at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in the early 1970s, when it was aged 36, as part of a wider improvement programme (Wolmar 1987:12). Despite the fact the estate had only 300 homes, improvements continued in fits and starts for over ten years, until, as the manager said, “in 1989/90 the [Housing Improvement Programme] money just ran out and we stopped with some houses done and others completely untouched. This caused resentment.” Pressurised by tenants, who believed their landlord was prejudiced against the estate, the landlord and tenants made three attempts to get Estate Action borrowing approval from central government (this is discussed further in Chapter 16), which were all unsuccessful. In any case, this money could not be used for internal work like kitchens. In the 1990s, the local authority decided to transfer its housing to a new housing association to escape borrowing restrictions (this is discussed further in Chapter 14). A ‘show home’ was set up to demonstrate the new kitchens and bathrooms that transfer would provide. However, five years after transfer in 2000, the formerly ‘new’ 1970s kitchens and bathrooms were still there and were over thirty years old (Wolmar 1987:12). A resident group member said: “it looks, at face value, as if there’s been a lot of skullduggery”. They got their new kitchens in the late 2000s.

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Kitchens aged even at the youngest estates. By 1994, when E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) was aged 23, a residents’ rep said (1971/2,000/ deck/L), “kitchens, bathrooms, windows – it’s starting to deteriorate … all chipboard stuff from 1971, 1972”. In 2000, the Decent Homes Programme (see Chapter 16) specified that social rented homes must have kitchens no older than 20 years. This launched another wave of improvements (and transfers of ownership and management; see Chapter 14). At the end of the programme, estate residents had better kitchens than for many years (Figure 7.1). Figure 7.1: Age of kitchens in estate homes in years, 1926–2018 E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

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E15

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80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 1941 1944 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016

0

Sources: Interviews and documents

However, by 2019, these kitchens themselves were ageing, and normal replacement cycles elsewhere in the housing system were much shorter than 20 years. Comprehensive catching up Maintenance of individual elements such as kitchens was often carried out as part of a more comprehensive attempt to catch up on maintenance and replacement, and to improve estate environments,

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social conditions and, hopefully, popularity. Until the 1980s, homes at the oldest estate E14 (1926/900/h/NE) were ‘basically … unimproved’ since first letting more than fifty years before (Andrews 1979:1). From 1979 to 1983, the local authority started comprehensive improvements, costing about £22,000 per home (at 2019 prices) funded through the Housing Investment Programme (HIP; see Chapter 16). This included new fitted kitchens, central heating, rewiring, new window frames, painting and repairs (Photo 7.1). The work was disruptive and some families moved away temporarily. Housing management was moved to an estate-based office as part of the work (Chapter 1). The impact on resident ‘morale’ was ‘dramatic’ (Director of Housing, E14’s local authority 1980:1), and managers pointed out that several residents had begun doing their own decorations. Transfer requests reduced, but absolute and relative popularity did not improve significantly. An observer said, ‘three years is a very short period in which to attempt to encourage fundamental long-term changes’ (Chivers 1982:np). However, Department of the Environment (DoE) observers later said that the improvements ‘helped to alleviate some of the worst aspects of the physical condition, at least temporarily … [but] social problems persisted’ (DoE 1992:6). In the late 1980s, a residents’ rep said that the improvements were still appreciated, but there were still many empty homes, high turnover and vandalism. Local and area managers thought “the problems had only been contained … [E14] would always need extra resources”. Photo 7.1: Homes at E14 under improvement in c1982, when it was aged c56

Source: Anne Power/Margaret Pitt

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Maintaining relative quality though improvements In contrast to repair or maintenance, ‘improvement’ involves adding additional or higher quality elements to homes or estates. In practice, the distinction is not sharp. In the 1990s, the area manager for E1 (1929/300/h/NW) maintained a slush fund to cover work that the local authority’s direct labour organisation refused to do because they felt it should be defined as ‘improvement’ not ‘repair’. The main types of improvements that estate homes had over their lifetimes were the installation of central heating in the first- and second-generation estates from the 1970s to the 2000s and entryphones and lifts in estates with flats from the 1970s to the 1990s. Installation of central heating in first- and second-generation estates All homes in all the first-generation and some in the secondgeneration estates were originally heated by open coal fires, although in some cases these were supplemented by some other heating. At E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), ‘a coal yard [for coal retail] was thought necessary’ (Brown 1972:86) when planning shops for the estates. The patchy, limited heat, and the dirt and labour associated with coal were aspects of ‘slum’ or poor-quality working-class housing that residents had to import into council homes. Managing heavy and dirty coal fuel was problematic, particularly in blocks of flats. At E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L), residents later recalled that the ‘coalman’ was not allowed in the blocks to avoid dirt, but the estate had no ‘coal bunkers’ (individual outdoor storage areas), and only some flats had an indoor coal store (under the bath) (E13 LHP 1977). An early resident referred to the well-known slur on early council tenants: “we don’t keep our coal in the bath. We have to pile it outside on the balcony” (in White 1946:19–20). At E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), a resident recalled that as a child in the 1950s, they had some of the same tasks that Hague recalled from his ‘slum’ childhood in the 1920s and 1930s (see Chapter 6): ‘my daily chore was to get up first, clean out the ashes from the grate and light the fire. Central heating was a distant luxury and in winter there was often ice on the windows’ (Livingstone 2011:13). Among the second-generation estates, E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) was built next to a colliery and the local authority was content to stick to the local product. An early resident posted that his family heated their water, ‘by coal … picked [scavenged for free] from the local coal lines [private coal industry railways]’. On the other hand, E5 (1949/700/

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fl/L), its big city flatted contemporary, was built with a district heating system providing central heating. The third-generation estates that had at least partial central heating were ahead of most other homes (Chapter 6). However, things changed rapidly over the 1970s and 1980s in private housing. By 1991, 75 per cent of households in England had central heating, and the average indoor winter temperature without central heating rose from 11.2°C in 1970 (without central heating), to 17.7°C in 2010 (with central heating) (Palmer and Cooper 2014). Central heating is also associated with reduced damp, condensation and mould and lower risk of fuel poverty (Holmans 2005). Estate residents increasingly complained about the cost and inconvenience of heating. In 1982, most homes at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) were still heated only by an open fire in the living room only, supplemented by any costly electric or oil heaters residents provided themselves. Many told a visiting researcher ‘it was difficult to keep their homes warm’. At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) half the tenants had ‘resultant damp and condensation problems’. At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), the visiting housing minister promised that something would be done (Wood 1979). It was, although it took a decade (E2 LHG 1987). Retrofitting of central heating to first and second generation estates started relatively early, in the early 1970s (Figure 7.2), when central Figure 7.2: Periods of estate lifetimes without and with at least some form of central heating, 1926–2018 Years without central heating

Years with at least some central heating

E14 E1 E13 E8 E2 E11 E15 E12 E6 E5 E18 E9 E17 E20 E7 E16 E10 1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

Note: Data for E3, E4 and E17 are missing. Source: Interviews and documents

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1990

2000

2010

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heating was still found in only about a third of homes in England, mostly newer ones (ONS 2013). In some cases this was very soon after estates lost their advantage on sole access to amenities (Appendix 2, Table A1, Chapter 6), and could have acted to maintain their high position. However, the process tended to drag on for years, and even decades, as priorities and funding came and went. This meant that some of the estates fell behind local and national standards. The first homes at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) were fitted with central heating and hot water systems, and the then-innovative combi boilers in 1972/73 (Director of Housing E1’s local authority 1987). However, two decades later, in 1994, some homes in the estate were among the 3,000 of the local authority’s homes that still did not have central heating. The council planned to complete installation by 1997. E1’s local manager noted grimly that, as in the case of kitchens mentioned earlier, “then we will have to deal with the obsolescence of older ones”. However, in 2005 residents at E1 told me that some homes in the estate had been missed out, despite the fact that their new housing association’s database said no further work was due on the estate. Some second-generation flatted estates were built with district heating, which residents could not control themselves. However, ageing central heating systems were themselves a major cause of repairs requests and dissatisfaction, and were gradually replaced with individual gas central heating systems. Third-generation estates were all built with forms of central heating, mostly district heating, which was also gradually replaced. At E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), the original individually controllable warm-air heating was replaced with individual gas central heating in 2012, after 46 years of life (Bates et al 2012). E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) switched from an individually controlled but expensive and ineffective electric heating system, to a cheaper but landlord-controlled one, and then to individual programmable central heating. It should be noted that retrofitting of central heating into the whole older private housing stock by its millions of owners also took about thirty years. In 2018, forty years after the work had been done, it emerged that the retrofitting of individual gas boilers at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) created problems which threatened the whole future of the estate (see Chapter 13). Entryphones, concierges and other access control ‘Entryphones’, concierges and CCTV were introduced into all the flatted estates from the 1970s onwards, to improve the security of blocks of flats where multiple homes were reached from individual

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street doors. Entryphones allow the street-level access to be secured with a locked door. Visitors press a button to speak to residents, who can open the street door remotely to those they trust. This technology could substitute for or assist formal and informal social control, and reduce vandalism, nuisance and crime. Entryphone systems were first widely available to local authorities in the 1970s (Bright et al 1985). A pilot system was installed in one block at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) in 1975, when the estate was aged 9, representing ‘a British “first”’ (Anon. E9 1974). Two years later a video link was added, and then extended to all three tower blocks. For this period, the system was ‘very sophisticated’, according to a visiting researcher, with video available to managers and to all tenants via their TVs. Entryphones arrived at all other flatted estates in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Photo 7.2). Former residents of E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) posted recollections of the systems that arrived in the late 1980s: ‘people thought we were posh coz we had a buzzer/intercom that let people in’; ‘it was clean, had talking lifts and a reception desk! how kool was that’. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), entryphones were added in the Photo 7.2: Secured access introduced at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the early 1980s, when the estate was in its 40s, here seen in 1994. Stairwells giving access to flats on upper floors were originally open and, over time, attracted vandalism and nuisance. A small porch has been built in front of the stairwell. It has a locked door and an entryphone. There is space for a shared rubbish bin at the rear. Controlled parking (indicated by the sign) and pergolas (on the extreme right) were introduced at the same time. All elements of the project are in good condition over ten years after installation, although there had been repeated vandalism in the 1980s and 1990s.

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1990s, which meant that one webposter, who had grown up in the estate in the 1970s, couldn’t reach his old front door when he went on a nostalgia tour. A professional magazine noted in 1982, ‘an entry-phone is a delicate “system” which requires good preventative maintenance by technicians’ (Smith 1982:15). By this point, planned maintenance for the pioneering system at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) had been cut, and it survived on reactive repairs; a visiting researcher said: ‘this is not satisfactory’. Entryphones supplement formal or informal social control, but themselves require at least some informal cooperation by at least most users, and generally became targets of vandalism themselves. Another former E18 resident posted, ‘When you forgot your fob [electronic key] … you could either hammer fist punch or running BOOT, the panel.’ Entryphones were installed at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) in 1976, but were often vandalised. In 1982 at least £27,000 (at 2019 prices) was spent on repairs, but some break-ins still occurred. As the system’s fail-safe was leaving doors open, any delays in repairs were periods without access control. Non-violent residents could also subvert the system, by leaving doors open, or allowing strangers to follow them in. By the mid-1980s at E5 (1949/700/fl/L), the local manager said most entryphones were “broken or vandalised too often to be effective”, while at E4 (1938/300/fl/L), the manager said they were working only about 85 per cent of the time. In 1994, at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) the local manager blamed drug users, while at E4, the manager blamed “tenants forgetting keys”. At E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L), two entryphones had been out of action for nearly a year. In any case, intruders could sometimes get in using the ‘tradesman’s bell’, and intercoms actually allowed intruders to find out whether flats were occupied. In 2005, the estate services manager still said, “One of our biggest bugbears is front entrance door vandalism. You fix it and it’s broken the next day. But it’s better than it used to be.” Because entryphones seemed insufficient in most of the largest tower block and deck-access estates, a new, much more expensive entry security idea was developed in the 1990s and 2000s – ‘concierges’ – and introduced at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L), E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). A resident at E16 said, “I don’t like that word, let’s have plain English, a receptionist or whatever. The way they used to say it, ‘concierge’, as though they were the cream of the world!” (in Green 1995:132). This approach had staff based at block doors to oversee access directly and via CCTV. Some also patrolled or cleaned. Many staff were needed to

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cover most of the 24 hours in the day. At E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), concierges introduced in 1999, had by 2005, led to an “almost total drop in burglary and squatting”, according to the local manager. However, at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), a residents’ rep said in 1994 that the concierges were a “terrible waste of money. The politicians are fully aware they don’t work properly.” The area manager agreed: “concierges are a people management nightmare, we can’t get the right staff and have a lot of discipline problems”. Concierge bases at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) were ultimately demolished when the estates were redeveloped (Chapter 13). However, they were still in operation at the other two estates after two decades in 2019. Estate-wide CCTV was another general security option, building on use by local authorities in town centres from the 1980s (Stollard 1991). Despite initial fears about civil liberties, CCTV was extended into residential areas in the 2000s, assisted by support from the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and other funds. At E11 (1938/400/h/ Mid), CCTV was introduced in 2002, after a vote in the estate. While capital costs were met by the local authority, residents were asked to make a £3.50 weekly contribution to running costs. By 2005 all of the mixed built form and deck-access estates except E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) had CCTV, as well as and some estates of houses: E2 (1937/300/h/NW), E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) and E15 (1946/400/H/ NE). In every case, staff and residents felt that CCTV was having an effect on crime and fear of crime, although there were problems such as poor images and the need for supporting evidence for court. Like entryphones, CCTV could also fall victim to the problems it was intended to solve. In the mid-1990s, cameras at E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L) were vandalised and then stolen, but the response of the landlord was to install more. At E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), a camera post had been rammed by a car, but the manager felt that most residents supported the system, and his main concern was that residents might feel less responsibility to produce witness statements. The system at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) resulted in at least a 55  per cent drop in reported crime in its second year (E10 Community Trust c2004). Landlords persisted; systems evolved, social pressures eased and norms changed. When I visited the estates in 2018, I did not find any entryphones or CCTV systems that were visibly damaged or not working. Overall, residents appear to have better-secured access to their homes than in previous generations. Estate agents’ claims should not be over interpreted, but in 2018 agents made ‘security’ a selling point for homes bought under the Right to Buy being resold

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Photo 7.3: The footpath leading to the footbridge out of E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) over one of the adjacent railway lines, in 2018 when the estate was aged 85. Tenants had campaigned in the 1930s to get the footbridge opened as a shortcut to school, against the opposition of residents on the other side of the tracks, who were fearful of the estate’s ‘slum’ residents. Fifty years later, in the 1980s, a woman was raped on the path, and residents campaigned for better lighting and fencing. The blue post supports two different generations of CCTV cameras, installed in the 2000s in response to continuing concern about crime.

on the open market, including at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW), all of which had once had reputations for high crime.

National and local investment to transform estates ‘Reorganisation’ of public space and access Five of the seven third-generation estates with mixed built form or deck-access and long and complex access to homes underwent costly and disruptive demolition and rebuilding in order to reorganise public space and access routes (Figure 7.3). The aim was to overcome problems associated with the interaction of the physical and social environments, including crime and disorder, and to set estates on a new path (see Chapters 3, 6, 8, 11). Reorganisations were partly inspired by ideas about ‘eyes on the street’, ‘defensible space’ and other specific recommendations from Jacobs, Newman and Coleman (see Chapter 3). The exception among the third-generation estates were E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L).

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The rise in housing quality Figure 7.3: Reorganisation of public space and dramatic redevelopment in the 20 estates, 1926–2018 E14 E1 E13 E19 E8 E2 E11 E15 E12 E6 E5 E18 E9 E17 E20 E7 E16 E10 1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

Initial state Post-reorganisation

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Reorganisation

Redevelopment

Post-redevelopment

Sources: Visits and interviews

Just ten years after first letting, E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) had already accumulated high proportions of empty homes, very serious vandalism, and fear of crime. The local authority considered both complete and partial demolition, and additional intensive management, but chose reorganisation and agreed to spend £6.1 million (or in a later figure £9.8  million) (at 2019 prices) (E20 EMDG 1987). A senior councillor described the cost as “fearsome”, but said there was no choice (Anon. E20 2006:np). Some overhead walkways that linked blocks were removed, stair and lift towers were refurbished and new ones were built for the separated blocks, entryphones were added, alongside renewed electrics and improved landscaping. The works prefigured Coleman’s ideas by several years, and were later followed by other third-generation estates within the 20 estates and elsewhere. A senior housing officer was quoted by the local paper: ‘we have to act now … We will start on the worst areas and work our way through’ (Anon. E20 2006:np). However, at E20, and also at E16 and E18, this approach was ultimately seen as insufficient. Looking back nine years later, the same manager told me that it had been a mistake to start in the least popular part of the estate, which was beyond retrieval, and

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that improvements were undercut by rising local authority rents and falling overall demand for council housing in the area. E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) also became one of the least popular in the local authority and had high levels of crime and vandalism soon after first letting. A pilot in 1980/81, divided decks, carpeted them and provided them with seating. A few years later, the 1989-93 the local authority won Estate Action funding to extend the pilot, and over 1989–93 it reorganised access, with bridges removed, new access towers and fire escapes, entryphones, concierge bases, and CCTV. In 1994, soon after completion, residents said that the system was out of action half the time, and could be circumvented by children or wrongdoers. Concierge staff couldn’t recognise intruders, or were afraid to confront them. One resident said, “If he’s doing bugger all it is a waste. If he’s not even there to do that, it’s even worse.” Residents, echoing theorists Newman (1972) and Coleman (1985) (see Chapter 3), said, “you need to have only small numbers sharing”. Photos 7.4 and 7.5 show E10 (1971/900/deck/L) before and after reorganisation. Even after reorganisation of access and public space, the average Building for Life score of the mixed and deck-access estates was only 7/20 (see Figure 6.1). In four of the five reorganised estates, except E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), the changes were subsequently seen to have been insufficient, and estates went on to experience more dramatic redevelopment. Figure  7.4 shows how costs could mount up, as successive improvements, reorganisation and redevelopments were carried out. Photo 7.4: E10 in 1982 when it was aged 11. The estate is made of low-rise brickfaced blocks of maisonettes. People on foot are intended to circulate at deck level, two storeys above the street, and to cross between blocks by footbridge. The photo is taken from another bridge like the one in view. Both upper and lower maisonettes are reached only from the deck. Street level is intended for cars only. There are large garages under the blocks, but due to vandalism and crime, some have been blocked off. Residents mainly park on the street. Source: PEP, photographer unknown

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The rise in housing quality Photo 7.5: The same view in 23 years later in 2005, after movement round the estate has been reorganised. The bridge seen in Photo 7.4 has been removed, as has the one it was taken from, so this photo is taken from a slightly different angle. Upper maisonettes are still reached by deck, but now by separate stairs to each block, with access control. Lower maisonettes have been provided with individual access from street level through new stair towers. Pedestrians now use ground level, until they access an individual home or block. Pavements and lighting have been provided at street level. Bollards and speed humps control parking and traffic. In addition, all homes have received new windows. Trees have matured but other planting has been cut neatly. The ground level has taken on more of a standard ‘residential street’ appearance, although there is perhaps less sense of the street level being overlooked. CCTV has been provided.

Figure 7.4: Costs per home and sources of funding for improvement, reorganisation and redevelopment at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE), 2017 prices £ 100,000 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

E18 E18 pilot reorg. reorg. 1980 1989 HIP HA funds

E18 redev. 1998

E20 reorg. 1978

EA

E20 redev. 1991

Urban Programme

City Grant

Land sale

E14 imprvmt. 1979

E14 redev. 1991

HAG Other

SRB

Note: HIP = Housing Improvement Programme; EA = Estate Action; HAG = Housing Association Grant; SRB = Single Regeneration Budget. Sources: Interviews and reports

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‘Redevelopment’ with demolition, building and tenure change Ten of the 20 estates experienced redevelopment, involving substantial demolition, new building, and improvements to existing homes and environment (Figure 7.3). These included all the high-rise or deckaccess flatted estates, except E7, and four estates of other types, E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), E14 (1926/900/h/NE), E15 (1946/400/H/NE) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW). The earliest redevelopment, at E20, reduced the total number of homes and did not change tenure, and that at E14 reduced the total number of homes. In the other estates, schemes increased the total number of homes and the density OF DEVELOPMENT, as part of the finance, but MEANT a reduction in the number of local authority and social rented housing. The aim was to change estate ‘paths’, through improved quality, and more tenure mix and more social mix. Each project lasted for several years, and two remained in progress in 2019, E10 (1971/900/deck/L) and E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L). Seven years after reorganisation at E20 was completed, when the estate was just 21, the local authority decided to demolish 92 per cent of the homes, with no replacement (Figure 7.3). E20 pioneered the use of land sale to raise funding for improvements, but also used HIP and government Estate Action borrowing approval (Chapter 16). The DoE described the costs as “bloody staggering”. After demolition, part of the site was sold to a retailer and other developers for £3.4 million cash and £3.0 million in-kind demolition (at 2019 prices). The remaining blocks were strengthened, re-roofed, insulated, and provided with entryphones. Double glazing and central heating were installed, flats were rewired and provided with new kitchens and bathrooms (E20’s local authority 1991). The building was rendered, and the estate attractively planted. Finally, the development was renamed by the housing minister, Sir George Young (Chapter 9). In 1994, when I visited, one resident complained that her flat was painted in magnolia and looked “boring”, a very far cry from the kind of problems of the past (Chapter 4). In 2018, homes remained popular, and there had been no further major investment. In 1994, reorganisation at E18 was ten years old, and a staff member who had worked in the area for many years, said, “the estate is cleaner now than ever before, better managed and better repaired”. Ironically, however, this was just when the local authority decided on redevelopment. A new political administration, began reforms throughout the housing department. Two other deck-access estates in the area were already being redeveloped (Stewart and Rhodes 2003),

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and E18 was next. A senior manager told me, “we are in the business of transforming the estate”. At the time, the estate had two residents’ groups. One was campaigning for redevelopment: “We want streets with houses on them, not an estate … we want a leisure centre not a community centre.” The other was opposed to change: “[the council’s] way of improving the estate is to get rid of it”. All the deck-access flats were demolished, while houses and low-rise flats were retained and improved. The local authority used a combination of land sale and denser rebuilding to raise income and replace most of the social rented homes. Part of the site was sold for £36 million, of which £27 million (at 2019 prices) was used to support the redevelopment (Rhodes et al 2005), while the rest formed a windfall for the council. The rest of the site was used to build housing association homes to replaces most of the lost council homes, and private homes to create revenue and to mix tenure. The scheme also had SRB funding, and contributions from developers and housing associations, totalling £120 million (at 2019 prices). In 1994, a youth worker told me that the redevelopment would disperse the former residents but not transform their lives. Some replacement homes were built off-site and most residents who moved away during the redevelopment did not come back. Former E18 residents made up only 12 per cent of residents in the redeveloped Photo 7.6: New homes for market sale under construction at E18 in 2005, when the estate was aged 39. New homes were mainly low-rise housing association and lowcost home-ownership homes. It was controversial (and ironic) that some new homes for sale and rent reached six storeys. Residents I talked to in 1994 wanted to avoid any homes above two storeys or shared entrances.

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area (Stewart and Rhodes 2003), although former residents remained in the part that was just improved. Within a decade after the 1979–83 big maintenance catch-up at E14 (1926/900/h/NE), the estate officer said that it had “the same problems as when it all started. We’ve gone full circle. It now needs something new.” By then, HIP funds were in very short supply, but the local authority was about to receive its first Estate Action funding (Chapter 16). Soon it made a bid for E14, but this was rejected because it aimed only to ‘repair and renovate the dwellings for continued local authority renting’ (DoE 1992:10), rather than to diversify tenure and bring in private investment. At this point, 27 per cent of homes in the estate were empty. The local manager said, “We couldn’t keep on top of it, some were so badly wrecked, we couldn’t get people in them.” A shooting in the estate renewed staff and tenants’ motivation, and in 1990 the local authority made a much larger, more dramatic and successful bid for £17 million or £19,000 per home (at 2019 prices). Sixty homes were demolished; 190 were transferred to private developers, 50 to a housing association and 20 to households on the waiting list to refurbish; and 100  new housing association homes were built, meaning a small increase in the total numbers of homes, but a reduced percentage of both local authority and social rented homes (Chapter 14). All existing homes were refurbished internally, and outside there were new garden walls and fences, road surfaces, pavements and planters. The DoE believed it had, ‘reversed the spiral of decline which earlier attempts failed to achieve  … the overall impression … is that of a new estate’ (DoE 1992:15, 17). By 1994, E14 had average levels of empty homes and like her predecessor in the 1980s, the local manager commented on resident ‘morale’: “people, many of whom had been here for years, suddenly started sweeping paths outside their houses and taking pride in the estate. You can see their lives have been improved.” However, the DoE had noted that while crime had reduced, ‘burglary is still a problem … owner-occupiers’ homes are perceived as lucrative targets’ (DoE 1992:16). A housing association officer said vandalism was reducing, but, “it couldn’t have got any worse”. Tenants had wanted more emphasis on internal improvements, and a manager said, “they fought for bathrooms and kitchens, they couldn’t understand so much being spent on environmental improvements”. Despite these measures to attract outsiders, mixed tenure was not working as hoped. At a meeting I attended in 1994, the private developer said, “sales are slow! We feel we have reached saturation

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point with the ones already built.” The area manager said, “the line between success and failure in [E14] is very narrow”. Ten years after redevelopment in 2005, the estate was in good physical condition. However, more homes had been demolished due to low demand, and a senior manager said that E14 “continued to cause concern”. By 2010 the local authority’s view was that the redevelopment ‘began to fail before it was complete’. At E15 (1946/400/h/NE), a similar estate to E14, a similar redevelopment was more successful. E15 also had two main waves of investment. By the late 1970s, after problems with damp, ‘the majority of people just wanted the estate demolished’ (Anon. E15 1980). A few years later, the 30 ‘no fines’ houses (made from concrete containing coarse rather than fine gravel), which had the worst damp, were demolished, while others were improved. However, a resident told the local paper, “I don’t think [£16,000 at 2019 prices] should have been spent on the houses” (in Cunningham 1982). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, up to a third of homes were empty, there was extreme vandalism and arson, and incidents of public disorder attracting large numbers of police (Anon. E15 1993). In 1993, a small block of one-bedroom flats associated with anti-social behaviour was demolished. By 1994, redevelopment was under way. A partnership between the local authority and developers was established to demolish 130 council homes, and to rebuild 60 for housing association rent and 120 for sale (Anon. E15 1994). Photo 7.7: Homes at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in 2005, ten years after redevelopment. In the foreground are refurbished council homes aged 69 years. In the background are ten-year old homes built as part of the redevelopment, owned by one housing association and leased to another to house young mothers, which tended to attract anti-social behaviour.

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Photo 7.8: Refurbished homes at E15 in 2005, ten years after redevelopment, aged 58. Existing homes received new windows, doors, garden walls, and a choice of an extension (as in these cases) or a garage.

Photo 7.9: New homes at E15 in 2005, aged 10. New owner occupiers initially

opposed the introduction of a bus route through the estate as part of improvements. By 2018, some of the new homes originally intended for ownership were being rented out. A three-bed home similar to those in the photo was available for £500 a month, just above the 30th percentile in the local market, the level eligible for housing benefit.

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Ten years after redevelopment in 2005, the senior manager for the estate told me, “It’s right easy now, they [housing officers] don’t know they’ve been born!”

Conclusion By the 1970s, the relative quality of the 20 estates had fallen, due to ageing and some premature ageing in the estates, and rising standards and new-build elsewhere (Chapter  6). However, from the 1970s, relative quality rose again. Belated maintenance and improvements began to have an effect on the estates. Landlords started to replace kitchens in their older estates, most after forty years of wear and tear. They began improvements with central heating for older estates, and entryphones and other access control in flatted estates. As in the case of falls in quality (Chapter 6), the seven third-generation estates with mixed built form and deck access formed a distinct group. Six estates, all third-generation, underwent costly and disruptive reorganisations of public space and access routes. Eleven estates, including all but one of the third-generation estates, experienced redevelopment, with substantial demolition, and building with mixed tenure. While housing quality rose in the estates over the 1970s to date, it did not regain the high relative standards seen especially in the early years of the first- and second-generation estates (Chapter 6). Quality improved through a series of overlapping forward steps and backward slides, and ensuring there was ongoing maintenance and improvements remained a problem. In addition, despite eventual improvements, residents of the 20 estates experienced long periods with homes and estates that had aged prematurely due to initial design and construction problems: old kitchens, no central heating once it was becoming normal, and poor access control after formal and informal social control had failed to limit crime and nuisance in flatted estates. Nonetheless, the rise in housing quality in the estates helped to improve safety and order in the estates, and their popularity, and redevelopment changed tenure mix and influenced estate populations (Chapters 10 and 14). Again, despite the fact these estates have been presented as atypical, this slow and patchy progress is very likely to have been experienced by other more popular estates nationally and locally. The limited focus on maintenance and improvement, particularly in comparison to largescale building, was a national problem, although perhaps particularly serious in local authorities with large, problematic stocks. Nonetheless, the rise in housing quality in the estates helped to improve safety and

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order in the estates and their popularity, and redevelopment changed tenure mix and influenced estate populations (Chapters 10, 14). The causes of the fall and rise in housing quality will be examined in Part III. The next chapter explores safety and order in the estates.

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8

The fall and rise in safety and order Introduction Safety and order are basic needs, and their absence is a major threat to quality of life. The rates, causes and potential solutions to crime in housing estates form a substantial element of all studies of problems in social housing (Chapters 2 and 3). The chapter also describes non-criminal but threatening or annoying behaviour, including children or dogs out of control, noise, harassment, not disposing of rubbish properly, leaving building doors open, or offending other norms of residence or behaviour in public spaces. It extends beyond the perceptions of staff and residents’ representatives, to draw on evidence from former child residents, some of whom could have been defined as ‘perpetrators’ of annoyance or crime. ‘Broken windows’ theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) argues that poor maintenance and anti-social behaviour may be causal facts in individual and neighbourhood crime, and it has inspired ‘zero tolerance’ policing (Bratton et al 1998). However, non-criminal threatening or annoying behaviour is included here simply because of its effect on residents’ quality of life, and because, like crime, it has potential knock-on effects on estate population, resident mix, and other dimensions. The chapter draws on the theory of ‘social control’, that assumes that groups, whether nations or communities, set norms to define what is problematic, which may be legal or informal, clear or contested (Hirschi 1969). In order to control problematic behaviour, it must be observed, which may have a deterrent effect, or it must be acted on, whether by police, managers or others with formal responsibility, or by ordinary residents.

The rise and fall of crime Throughout the period 1982–2018 in which data were collected, recorded crime figures were only available for areas much larger than the estates. Evidence on crime levels in estates is mainly drawn from the impressions of housing managers and residents’ groups. Many interviewees commented that recorded crime did not match up to crime as experienced, as national victimisation surveys also

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demonstrate (ONS 2018). However, the absence of quantitative data makes detailed comparisons difficult. Nonetheless, at least from the 1970s to the 1990s, most of the estates appeared to have high rates of crime and disorder relative to other parts of their local authorities and to the national average. Some estates and their residents experienced extraordinary levels and unusual types of crime. There is strong evidence that, from the 1990s and 2000s, crime rates then fell markedly, with knock-on effects for other aspects of estate problems and successes. High rates of crime and extreme types of crime 1970s–2000s Crime was not invented in the late 20th century. Just a few years after E14 (1926/900/h/NE) was first let, a teenage messenger boy passing the estate with his employers’ cash bag was the victim of a ‘daring street robbery’ (Anon. E14 1929). While E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) was under construction, ‘a large contractors’ hut disappeared completely over night with all its equipment’ (White 1946:15). In 1938 two residents at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) were convicted of stealing boarding and paling from nearby contractors to fence their gardens (Anon. E1 1938b). However, at national level, after a drop in the 1920s (Knepper 2014), crime rates grew for most of the 20th century (Mooney and Young 2006; Tseloni et al 2010; ONS 2018). Wider social change was responsible for changes in types as well as the amounts of crime. For example, attitudes and criminal justice approaches to domestic violence have changed, and there could be little car crime until car ownership spread; reporting rates increased as insurance became more common. When burglary and street crime were growing at E10 (1971/900/ deck/L) in the late 1970s, they were also growing generally in the area (Dean 1980), and nationwide. However, from the 1970s, crime appears to have become a serious problem in the estates both in absolute and relative terms. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, ‘high’ levels of crime were among the reasons for establishing local housing management at 19 of the 20 estates (Power 1984). At E2 (1937/300/h/NW) in 1979, 12 per cent of residents had been burgled or experienced an attempted burglary in the past year, compared to 4 per cent nationwide in the first British Crime Survey carried out two years later (Burbidge 1984). In 1982, E14 (1926/900/h/NE) was assigned an extra beat officer, recognising its high crime rate. In the late 1980s, a resident from E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) recalled, “you used to take your life into your hands coming on this estate at night …”. At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), a visiting researcher said in 1982 that the estate had a ‘rough’ reputation,

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including for crime, which was ‘partly deserved’. Twenty years later, recorded crime remained 40 per cent higher than the London average (Stewart and Rhodes 2003). At E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) in 1992, 23 per cent of residents had been burgled and 4 per cent had been attacked or robbed in the past year (Blair 2014). That year, the rates across England and Wales were 7 per cent for burglary, 3 per cent for violence of all types and 0.4 per cent for robbery (ONS 2018). In 1984, the police superintendent for the area including E10 (1971/900/deck/L) said that the estate was ‘our biggest headache’ (Anon. E10 1984). In 2001, E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) was one of the estates in its local authority with high rates of crime, according to a police area report. Crime rates were high enough that some residents were affected repeatedly. For example, a resident at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) had been burgled three times in the early 1980s (Thomas 1981). Frequent victimisation at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) was reported with insouciance by webposters who had lived there as children: ‘our house used to get broken into once a month. They never took anything, they just trashed the place!’ Crime or a reputation for crime was central to the problematisation of individual estates and of social housing in general (Chapter 2). Fear of crime affected residents’ quality of life and their ability to use their homes and estate freely, and was responsible for requests to transfer. A former resident of E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) posted in 2008 that it had ‘yobbish behaviours and crime, so it was one of the worst place’s to live in [the local authority]’. A former resident of E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) posted that her family moved out in the 1990s: ‘my Mum … was in the supermarket … and witnessed a customer bottle the owner. That was it for us.’ While poor reputation might derive from poor quality or other problems, a reputation for crime inevitably led to an overall poor reputation and to unpopularity with potential residents (Chapter 9). A resident at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said in 1994, “the stigma came from the unusual layout, and after that it came from the crime and violence”. The media played a special role in spreading information about crime (Chapter 12). Box 8.1 gives examples of local headlines about E14 (1926/900/h/NE). Door-to-door rent collections were phased out at the local authority that owned E2 (1937/300/h/NW) in the early 1980s, because of the risk of robbery (as well as the development of other methods of payment) (Anon. E2 1983). In the late 1980s, the estate manager at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) reported one “potentially serious” attack on staff per week, and the office had bullet-proof glass installed after armed robberies on other offices. At E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), the estate office closed for a year in 1994 after threats to staff.

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Box 8.1: Headlines in local newspaper stories about crime linked to E14, 2004/05 Rogue pills linked to two more deaths High cost of crime Girl, 14, bought alcohol Yob crackdown Teenage tearaway is finally locked up Cocaine peddler is jailed for 20 months It’s prison cells to jingle bells Sex attacker is jailed for eight years Mother’s nightmare

Some of the estates experienced unusual or extreme types of crime. E14 was affected by theft of paving stones, roof tiles and central heating systems, and in the mid-1980s, fire engines were an ‘almost daily presence’ due to arson in empty homes (DoE 1992:8). E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), E14 (1926/900/h/NE), E18 (1966/1,600/ deck/L) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) had periods in the 1980s and 1990s with ‘street drugs markets’, where several people were regularly selling heroin and crack, which brought traffic, intoxicated people, robberies for money, violence between dealers, intimidation, and gang activity to the estates. The manager at E7 recalled a woman who came to the estate to buy drugs and carried out a mugging despite being encumbered with a baby in a pram. Two of the estates experienced serious public disorders, which lasted for several nights, involved large numbers of police and attracted national media attention (E7: 1970/1,100/deck/L and E15: 1946/400/H/NE), and a third was on the margins of serious disorders (E10: 1971/900/deck/L). Two were reported to be on the list of places most likely to riot which the Metropolitan Police (somewhat inexplicably) published annually in the 1980s: E10 (1971/900/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L)) (Parry 1986). Unusual types of policing indicate the severity of crime problems in some of the estates, and could itself be a burden for residents. A tenants’ association chair at E10 said that police activities tended to make things worse (Styles 1980). A community police officer recalled

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making 400 arrests in one month around the pub at E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L) (Steele 1993); 220 police took part in a single raid at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) searching for crack, and made 21 arrests in 1990 (Campbell 1990). E18 was also one for the first places in London where local authorities used Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) to control people who were suspected of crimes but could not be charged (Bright 2003). Lower rates of crime 1980s–2019 In almost all of the estates, residents and staff asked to make comparisons thought that the crime problem reduced over the period 1988–1994, and again from 1994 to 2005. By 2005, at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), the local manager said, “crime… is historically low”, although she added, “fear remains high”. At E7 (1970/1,100/ deck/L), the manager said that the drop in crime change “has made the biggest difference to resident’s lives. The issues now are of a different order”, and resident activists had been able to turn their attention to housing management, the community centre and economic development. At E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), the local and senior manager said “crime reduction is so stark. [It] is no longer a high crime area.” At E4 (1938/300/fl/L), by 2005 the main problems were anti-social behaviour, “intimidation and verbal abuse, mostly from teens”. At E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW), the main problem was “kids  … causing a nuisance by breaking windows and just being annoying”, according to managers. At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), crime levels had reduced so much that the local manager said it was a “double-edged sword”, because policing might be reduced. From 1988 onwards, staff, residents and police at increasing numbers of the estates made a point of saying that local crime rates were no longer exceptional or even abnormal. Despite disorders and a very poor reputation for crime at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), in the mid1980s the incidence of more common crimes was not exceptional for an inner-city estate (Lee et al 1986), although the local manager said there was an increase in the 1990s. In 1990, the police superintendent covering E15 (1946/400/h/NE) was reported as saying that crime there was no worse than in other local estates (Rennie 1990). In 1994, residents at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said it had “usual residential levels” of crime. In 1995 the police superintendent said that seven other parts of his patch had more crime than E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid). At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), the local manager said in 2005 “crime… is… low for London”. By 2005, although they were more worried

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Table 8.1: Crime in ten estates according to residents, 2005, and in all deprived areas, all social tenants and all England, 2004/05 Not a A problem but A serious problem (%) not serious (%) problem (%) Estates 35 32 33 Most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods 37 35 28 Social housing in England 48 33 19 England 52 37 11 Source: DCLG (2006), street interviews with 89 residents in 2005 at E4 (1938/200/h/ NW), E6 (1949/600/fl/L), E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), E10 (1971/900/ deck/L), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW)

about crime and harassment than the average person in England, the majority of residents interviewed at random in ten of the estates thought that crime was not a serious problem (Table 8.1). E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) was an exception to the general fall in crime. Street drug dealing had reduced by the 1990s, but in the 2000s the estate still had problems with gun crime and gangs, and all residents interviewed at random in 2005 mentioned crime as a bad thing about the estate. One said, with alarming understatement, “there’s always trouble, killings, robberies, silly stuff like that. Young people not knowing any better.”

Children as nuisances and vandals Adults, whether residents or non-residents, were probably the main perpetrators of crime, and could also create nuisances and dangers in the estates. The substantial literature which has developed since the 1990s on ‘anti-social behaviour’, has also generally focused on adult perpetrators (Burney 2009). However, it is enlightening to focus on children, mostly residents. Many children in the estates enjoyed freedom and opportunities for play (which will be discussed in Chapter 11). However, this could come at a price, and some children’s activities appear likely to be widely construed as anti-social, potentially dangerous, or even criminal. They demonstrate that different groups or generations of residents might have different views of what constitute acceptable behaviour, and different experiences of the estates and their problem and successes. Nuisances This section draws on posts made to public social media groups about the estates made in the 2000s and 2010s by residents and former

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residents reminiscing about their childhoods in the estates, from the 1970s to the 1990s (see Appendix 1 for further discussion of methods and ethics). Enjoyable play could sometimes be anti-social in its effects for at least some other residents. One poster on social media had been noisy at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW): ‘i used to skate on my rollar skates and annoy people in the flats… must have tortured them’. Another who grew up at E4 (1938/300/fl/L), recalled people, ‘hanging out the clean washing & then a football takes it out’. However, posters also confessed to intentionally annoying activities, including banging letter boxes, breaking milk bottles, and firing staple guns. One who grew up at E16 recalled, ‘Throwing water balloons at the Busses…. Sitting up in the roof by the lift giving old people frights. Snogging under the stairs’. A poster who grew up at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/ NW) apologised belatedly for throwing eggs over balconies: ‘sorry if we hit anyone’. In 1987, the manager at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) said children harassed the estate street cleaner. Ten years later another manager reported, defeatedly, that the tradition continued: “the kids throw stones at the man with the dandy cart [street cleaner’s hand cart]”. As a result the estate was not clean. In 1993 two councillors were pelted with stones during a walkabout at E2 (1937/300/h/NW), which, ironically, had been set up to investigate crime and anti-social behaviour (Harewood 1993). The management of estates affected the availability of missiles. Children’s play was often seen as a problem by caretakers, housing managers and many residents. At E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) in the 1990s, the housing manager said, “You’ve got quite a significant problem from like [age] 9, 10, 11.” A residents’ group member there said, “there’s nothing for them to do, the parents are quite happy for them [to be out] … it’s not fair for old people”. Sometimes landlords altered public spaces to frustrate play. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), anti-pedestrian and anti-football paving was added in the 1990s, and a man who grew up there in the 1970s commented, “We used to play football here and get chased daily … I can see they have now solved that problem.” Tensions over children’s play were not always straightforward conflicts between generations. Parents, in particular, often took different attitudes to other adults. In 2014 a resident at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) posted her annoyance with other adults who had complained to the landlord about football games in an area where children had played for decades: ‘all the letters sent out over the years the price of sending them could have built a five aside!!!!’

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Some play shaded into crime. An early resident at E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L), which was then at the city fringe, recalled stealing potatoes to roast as a boy in the 1940s or 1950s (E13 LHP 1977). Another, who grew up at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in the 1950s, recalled stealing apples and pears to eat, wood to make rabbit hutches, and old railway sleepers to sell for firewood. Former residents of E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L) posted about more urban types of nuisance and crime: making prank calls from the community centre phone, and throwing bangers into the nearby Indian temple. Ex-teenage residents in several estates referred to underage or unlicensed motorbike-riding and car-driving: E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), E15 (1946/400/h/NE), E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L). In 1993, a boy aged 17 from E11 (1938/400/h/ Mid) killed a pedestrian while joyriding in a car away from the estate (Anon. E11 1993). An E9 resident posted that they had stolen a delivery rider’s moped and pizza, and added, ‘I now suffer for that they will not come to my front door they ask me to meet them at the bus stop.’ Another resident using the same social media group pointed out that this activity was not victimless: they had worked as a team leader at the same pizza company. Vandalism ‘Destructive play’ becomes ‘vandalism’ when it becomes ‘too visible or excessive’ in the eye of the (adult) beholder, or if it occurs in the wrong context (Cohen 1973:26). Vandalism, graffiti and, more worryingly, arson, were seen as a serious problem by residents and staff at some point in all of the estates. Vandalism, like crime, was not a late 20th-century invention. In the 1930s, one of the complaints of tenants at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) was that the one public phone in the estate was often out of action because it had been attacked (White 1946). However, vandalism appears to have become more problematic from the 1970s. ‘High’ levels of vandalism were among the reasons for establishing local housing management at 19 of the 20 estates (Power 1984). In 1977, research in neighbourhoods around E10 (1971/900/deck/L) found that 11  per cent disliked their area because of vandalism and crime, compared to 5  per cent in England as a whole (Shankland et al 1977). By 1979, E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), then aged 12, had a ‘formidable reputation for vandalism, isolation and dirt’ (Mackie 1979). By the early 1980s, E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) was ‘notorious’ for vandalism, among other problems, according to visiting researchers (Wilson and Kirby 1980b:11). At E15 (1946/400/h/NE), 37 per cent of tenants had had

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windows smashed and 47 per cent had had theft or damages to homes (over an unstated time period in the early 1980s). In the mid-1980s, some garages at E20 had been ‘totally destroyed’ by vandals (E20 EMDG 1989:np). Similarly, at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), by 1990 the majority of garages were ‘unlettable being subject to constant vandalism’ (Brodie, Plant and Goddard 1990:4). Graffiti requires some equipment to make marks, a suitable surface, and poorly observed places. Graffiti was a problem at E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) by 1975 and at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) by 1978, when both were less than 10 years old (Anon. E20 2006; Pienaar 1978). By 1981, graffiti at E20 included Nazi and British Movement symbols and slogans. For much of estate lifetimes, children did not have much worse than chalk to write with. The tenants’ association chair at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said in 1974, ‘walls are chalked on, and ceilings blacked with smoke from paper torches’ (Anon. E16 1974). However, by the 1980s, permanent markers and spray paints were widely available, and were soon (ineffectively) banned from sale to young people in some areas because of their graffiti potential. Lifts and entryphones were particular targets. Vandalism could develop into a cat-and-mouse game as vandals tried to create a reaction from housing managers, and then responded to the reaction. At E20, the deputy director of housing said, “we had a lift repaired by Monday morning and it had been damaged again by lunchtime” (in Anon. E20 2006:np). In the late 1970s, when estate-based management was introduced at E14 (1926/900/h/NE), ‘staff commitment to the estate was tested by acts of vandalism on staff cars’ (Andrews 1979:2). Unpopularity and empty homes encouraged vandalism. Vandalism began in earnest at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in the early 1970s, when the number of empty homes increased. By the late 1970s, many empty homes had been systematically vandalised, probably by children, as well as being stripped of saleable items, presumably by adults. E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) was never fully let and when it was 6 years old, vandalism ‘had reached epic proportions’ (Anon. E20 2006:np). E4 (1938/300/ fl/L) in London also had a period in the early 1980s when a third of homes were empty or squatted, and many were vandalised (Anon. E4 1983). E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) had a similar experience in the late 1980s. Vandals attacked housing management offices, community facilities and estate shops, as well as homes. Graffiti and vandalism affected residents’ quality of life and put off potential future tenants. In flatted estates, vandalism to lifts, entryphones or rubbish chutes caused serious disruption. In 1974, when the estate was still new, the tenants’ group chair at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L)

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said, “we are all seriously concerned about the bad image the estate is getting – through reports of teenage violence and vandalism” (in Anon. E16 1974). At E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 1981, staff said that vandalism and crime were “immediately obvious”, and contributed to making the estate difficult to let. However, some residents were more tolerant. While in 1994 members of the residents group at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) told me that vandalism was a serious problem, mothers present in effect called their own children vandals and took a fairly sympathetic view: “kids vandalise because after tea they’ve got nothing to do, it’s obvious … they’re selective vandals”. The group said the children didn’t damage what was perceived to be their own, but were happy to attack some parts of the estate and its community centre. Arson is the most serious and potentially dangerous form of vandalism, and most estates experienced some attacks. At E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 1981, estate staff were pleased that, ‘there has not been one single house fire’ in one particular street in the past year, which was seen as a sign of improvement (E12 Joint Project Photo 8.1: A former resident at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) in the late 1970s. He posted that the photo shows ‘me throwing stones’. The open areas in the estate not only provide space for informal play but are littered with objects that might inspire it: ‘stones’ (broken concrete), a plank and a tyre. These may have been dumped by adults or brought to the spot by children from elsewhere. A tidier estate might provide fewer potential missiles. Children throwing things does not feature as much in experiences from the 1990s when estates were tidier.

Source: Former resident of E9

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1980:8). In the late 1980s, the local manager at E17 (1967/1100/ mixed/L) said drug dealers had threatened people who interfered with their business with setting their flats on fire. E11 (1938/400/h/ Mid) had a new community centre in the 2000s, but it didn’t last for more than a few months before being largely destroyed by fire. At E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), vandalism was ‘extremely serious’ from very early on, despite the formal social control provided by eight caretakers and three wardens (Smith 1982:12). In 1979 there was a crisis after half the lifts in the three tower blocks were out of action because of ‘deliberate arson attacks’ (Assistant Chief Executive E9’s local authority 1980:36). Sometimes there were no working lifts, and according to a visiting researcher, ‘This put an enormous strain on everyone but especially pensioners.’ It took a year to replace the old lifts, and the council felt obliged to install extra ones at great expense. Vandalism began to reduce in all estates at some point in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, it reduced at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) after estate improvements in the early 1980s, and it finally began to reduce at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) by the mid-1990s, although there was still some damage to lights and entryphones. I did not see any serious graffiti (of the type illustrated in Photos 8.2 and 8.4) when visiting the estates in 1994, 2005 or 2018. Vandalism and graffiti have developed into an essential part of the public image of problematic council housing (Chapter 2). However, by the 1990s, the 20 estates no longer fitted this image. When E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) was used in a BBC drama in 1993, the estate had no graffiti of its own, so the film crew painted some themselves, which upset tenants and staff (Edwards 1995). By 2005, although they were more likely to be worried about vandalism and graffiti than the average person in England, the majority of residents in ten estates thought that graffiti and vandalism were not serious problems (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2: Vandalism and graffiti in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05

Vandalism and hooliganism Graffiti

Estates England Estates England

Not a problem (%) 35 59 60 73

Source: As for Table 8.1

125

A problem but not serious (%) 30 31 27 18

A serious problem (%) 35 10 14  5

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Photo 8.2: Access deck at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) in c1980 when the estate was aged 9 years. The doors visible are cupboards for the storage of prams or bikes. Doors to flats are concealed, but are reached up a few steps. The handrails are visible. Children have used pens and paints to write on the poorly observed surfaces.

Source: PEP

Photo 8.3: The same spot in 2005 when the estate was aged 36. There is no visible graffiti. There have been persistent incremental changes. The base concrete of the original design has been painted in a standard white, to improve appearance and the reflection of light, and to allow any graffiti to be painted out easily. The lighting has been changed and improved. However, the electric box on the extreme left has been tampered with.

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The fall and rise in safety and order Photo 8.4: Vandalism and graffiti at E5 (1949/700/fl/L), c1980, when the estate was aged 31. Brickwork reachable from the ground has been painted and sprayed on. On the left, some graffiti has been painted out as an interim measure. No glass remains in the windows on the staircase. In addition, the pavement is weedy and unkempt.

Source: PEP

Source: PEP

Photo 8.5: The same place soon afterwards. The photo was taken to record the mural by local children, an anti-graffiti effort. There is still no glass in the stair tower, and although the graffiti has changed, much remains. A small brick shed has been added against the stair tower. Its vandal-resistant door has already been dented.

Source: PEP

127

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Photo 8.6: The same place in 2018, 38 years later, when the estate was aged 69. There is no graffiti and the spot appears reasonably orderly, if somewhat unappealing. The building on the left of the earlier pictures which supported the mural has been demolished and replaced by new private housing. The original block has new brown wooden window frames. The stair tower is no longer open but accessed through a locked blue door with entryphone, and decorative metal grilles have replaced glass in the staircase windows. The base of the stair tower has been painted red, perhaps to cover some relatively recent graffiti. New fire safety equipment has been attached to the outside of the tower. The original rubbish system – a chute in the tower – does not allow recycling, so new bins have been provided, but are full. Large planters have been placed on the pavement area and bollards added to control parking. A mattress left out for bulk rubbish collection completes the scene.

Dogs Pets provide companionship, and dogs can provide a sense of security. However, they can add to wear and tear on homes, and they may make public spaces dirty and frightening. Coleman counted dog (and human) excrement as part of her index of estate ‘malaise’ (Coleman 1985). Dog fouling in estates has been interpreted as evidence of residents’ fear of crime and need for protection (Bentley 1999). Dogs out of control can frighten others, and, depending on social norms, dogs roaming free may contribute to and symbolise a sense that an area is not under the usual informal or formal social controls. In several first- and second-generation estates, in the early parts of estate lifetimes, residents were either not permitted to keep dogs or other pets or else should only have done so after landlord permission

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The fall and rise in safety and order Photo 8.7: A poorly overlooked area in a cul de sac at the redeveloped part of E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) in 2018, when it was aged about 14. This area might have been expected to attract graffiti, vandalism, and litter, but has not done so, perhaps due to the CCTV (which the small notice on the wall warns of), occasional eyes on the street, regular cleaning or a combination of these. The tree that was planted in the bed in the foreground has not survived, however, although others in the street have.

had been granted. For example, early tenants at E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L), interviewed in the 1970s, recalled that, among numerous other restrictions, they were not initially permitted to keep dogs or cats (E13 LHP 1977). However, by the 1970s such clauses were not wellrespected or well-enforced. Residents complained about packs of dogs roaming E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in 1981 (Wilson and Kirby 1980b) and at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) in 1982, and about dogs and cats in general at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) in 1979 (Vamplew 1992) and in 1982. Residents posted complaints about dog mess in lifts at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), and the local authority estate management development group said that at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) in the late 1980s, ‘dogs  … are allowed to roam at will and also foul the staircases to a nauseating degree’ (E20 EMDG 1987:np). Dogs remained one of the ‘serious problems’ at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) in the late 1980s, according to the manager. In the early 1990s, one resident at E6 (1949/600/fl/L) said dogs and dog fouling were part of the reason she was ashamed to have people visit her. Several other residents

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also complained about dogs, although one said “people need dogs now” (for security). Dogs loomed fairly large in children’s experience of some larger, non-traditionally designed estates in the 1970s and 1980s Residents and former residents recalled in posts how as children they shared the extensive public spaces in these estates with free-roaming dogs. Dogs friendly and dogs scary were a recurring feature of their reminiscences. Many individual dogs were remembered by name, with affection and with fear. In 2010 a former child resident of E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW) asked if ‘anybody remember auntie maries dog killer … what a legend’. At E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) alone, dogs named Sandy, Zeus, Keg, Rebel, Norman Tebbit, Patch, Neville, Rubble, Anthrax and Prince were remembered, as well as some collies, a fox terrier and some Staffies. A former child resident of E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) recalled ‘the pack of dogs that used to roam the estate late at night’. For another, formerly of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), there had been ‘lots of frightening loose dogs’. At E5 (1949/700/fl/L), a dog officer was introduced in the late 1970s to catch loose dogs and take them to their owners or a dog pound. At E4 (1938/300/fl/L), similarly, there was a dog patrol in the early 1990s, which managers thought had contributed to improvement in the estate. The enforceability of no-pets clauses in tenancy agreements appeared to weaken over time, particularly after all council tenants were granted security of tenure in 1980. In 2005 a senior housing officer responsible for E6 (1949/600/fl/L) recalled how, in the late 1970s, elsewhere in the local authority, “five people were evicted for having dogs. It caused so much aggro.” The local manager at dog-infested E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) noted (probably with heavy understatement) that it was “hard” to enforce the clause in the late 1980s. A few years later, when much of the estate had been demolished and remaining blocks were being let after refurbishment, he took the opportunity not to offer flats to those with dogs (among others seen as likely to cause problems). By 2005 the senior officer for E6 said, “everyone’s allowed a dog, now you don’t have to ask permission. That changed within the last year or two and there have been no problems yet.” In the same year, although they worried about dogs slightly more than the average person in England, the majority of residents in ten estates thought that dogs were not serious problems (Table 8.3). I did not see any loose dogs myself when visiting the estates in 1994, 2005 and 2018.

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The fall and rise in safety and order Table 8.3: Dogs in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05

Estates England

Not a problem (%) 62 68

A problem but not serious (%) 29 16

A serious problem (%) 9 6

Source: As for Table 8.1

Noise Loud or intermittent noise can make it difficult to concentrate and can interrupt sleep. Loud noise may also create a sense of insecurity, if it is seen as a sign of illegitimate activity which is not being controlled. A number of early residents of some estates commented on the peace and quiet they found when they arrived, particularly in contrast to previous, less suburban homes. One arrival at E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L) in London said, “No factories and not much noise” (in Green 1995:130). However, at least some residents experienced moderate and serious problems with noise at all of the estates. Some estates suffered from their location, with heavy traffic, industry or places of entertainment nearby. Trains were noisy at E15 (1946/400/h/NE), and E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) were also close to tracks. At E16, residents were initially disturbed by milk delivery carts, although they successfully lobbied dairies to change to quieter wheels (Anon. E16 1972). Noise from traffic, as well as potential danger, became a more notable issue at several estates as car use increased over time. In the late 1980s, residents at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) were troubled by road noise, particularly from lorries. Some of the original estate designers tried to minimise disturbance to residents. For example, at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), kitchens were placed at the rear of flats to avoid noise from foot traffic on the access balcony (Burnett 1978), and E4 (1938/300/fl/L) was also said to be designed with quiet in mind (Anon. E4 1938). However, design could build in noise problems too. For example, at E7 (1970/1,100/ deck/L), E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) and E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L), some bedrooms were underneath walkways, so people in bed could be disturbed by late or early passers-by. At E7, soon after the estate opened, there were complaints about noise from one of the play areas, which had been located near the old people’s club, and visiting researchers felt that the estate’s high density exacerbated ‘usual neighbour problems’ including noise (Wilson and Kirby 1980b:30). In addition, poor sound insulation, which made homes vulnerable to

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neighbour and outside noise, was a problem soon after construction at some estates, such as E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) (White 1946), and E15 (1946/400/h/NE). Similarly, at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), noise complaints were very soon above average, due to the density of population, poor sound insulation, and parties. Noisy environments, to some extent tolerated by other residents and tolerated or at least not always successfully repressed by managers, formed part of a distinctive environment at some of the estates at some points in their lives (see also Chapter 10). The advent of affordable amplification played an important role. One former resident of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), quoted the band Madness: “there was always something happening and it was usually quite loud”. A former E4 (1938/300/fl/L) resident posted in 2015, ‘I remember one day asking [another resident] if he was moving because I could see these wardrobes with six guys helping. He said man they are speakers were having a party lol happy daze all night lol.’ Noise could also be generated by activities which, in theory, infringed tenancy agreements or which might be seen by some other residents or by managers as against social norms or illegitimate. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), by 1977 there were 60 officially empty flats and 37 occupied by squatters, some of whom had noisy all-weekend parties (Styles 1980). However, unamplified voices and everyday activities could be noisy. Children’s play bothered many. In an otherwise positive story about the opening of E16, a journalist commented with surely a little poetic exaggeration on children’s play: ‘a scream reverberates like an express train, a football like an atom bomb’ (Simkins 1972). Some residents enjoyed making noise, while others were disturbed by it and felt it broke norms. For example, one resident mailed me in 2011 to say that at E4 in the 1970s, ‘there was always adults somewhere sitting in big groups drinking, smoking, talking and the occasional argument which sometimes ended up in a fist fight or a very loud slanging match’. At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), noise complaints were one of the main problems for local managers in the 1990s, and were dealt with by “visits, occasional letters”. As with managing dogs mentioned earlier, the difficulties of trying to interpret the ambiguities of complaints, trying to get individuals to change their behaviour, and of prevention through better insulation made dealing with noise complaints a particularly unpopular task for managers. As the concept of ‘anti-social behaviour’ became established in the 1990s, noise nuisance problems took their place within this frame (Mooney and Young 2006). In 2005, the local manager at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) was using ASBOs as

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a last resort to reduce noise. From 2000, the Decent Homes Standard demanded adequate sound insulation, which most estates did not have. For example, in 2005, the local manager at E4 (1938/200/h/ NW) said that every home failed the requirement. Decent Homes works included some improvement of sound insulation along with the higher-profile issue of heat insulation (see Chapter 7). In England as a whole, the proportion of residents saying that noise was a problem was stable over the 1990s or 2000s. By 2005, although residents in ten of the estates were more worried about noise than the average person in England, the majority thought that noise was not a serious problem (Table 8.4). Table 8.4: Noise in ten estates according to residents, 2005 and in England, 2004/05

Estates England

Not a problem (%) 64 74

A problem but not serious (%) 24 20

A serious problem (%) 12  6

Source: As for Table 8.1

Conclusion All of the estates experienced high crime rates relative to other neighbourhoods in their local authorities at some points in their lifetimes, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Some experienced extraordinary levels and types of crime, and some experienced unusual types of policing. Chapter 6 showed that some estates had design and layout associated with higher crime and disorder, which placed greater demands on formal and informal social control (Chapter 3), but estates of all types were affected. Estates were also affected by other forms of disorder: vandalism, graffiti, arson, loose dogs and noise. The fact that children, parents and other residents had different views about whether play or vandalism were serious problems demonstrates how norms of behaviour were sometimes unclear or contested. Housing managers, as agents of formal social control, found it difficult to manage all these problems. However, in almost all cases, residents and staff said the crime and disorder problem reduced over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. From the late 1980s, staff, residents and police at increasing numbers of the estates made a point of saying that local crime rates were no longer exceptional or even abnormal. The causes of the fall and rise in safety and order will be examined in Part III. The next chapter explores the popularity of the estates relative to other housing in their areas. 133

9

The fall and rise in popularity Introduction The popularity of estates with current and potential residents is a key dimension of estate problems and successes. Popularity sums up estates successes and failures in other dimensions, and directly affects population mix (see Chapter 3). In turn, population can affect other dimensions, and may feed back to affect popularity. Popularity or demand can be measured in absolute and in relative terms. Absolute unpopularity – indicated by high rates of refusal of offers of homes, numbers of empty homes, and high turnover – is problematic for residents and managers. However, the most unpopular estate in an area may have few empty homes if there is overwhelming demand in that area. The focus here is on the linked measure of relative popularity, which examines estates’ position relative to other social housing in their local authority, independent of overall local demand. This chapter tracks trends in the 20 estates’ relative popularity over time, to explore how unpopular these ‘unpopular estates’ were, and for which parts of their lifetimes, and to investigate the balance between path dependency and change in terms of popularity (Chapter 3).

The 20 estates as small parts of growing housing stocks Due to the increasing numbers of local authority homes up to 1981 and homes in all tenures throughout estate lifetimes, each estate was part of a continuously increasing pool of housing. The prevailing situation nationwide and in estates’ local authorities was of generally high demand for council housing throughout estate lifetimes. Nonetheless, each individual estate was in effect experiencing increasingly large and varied competition for residents over time, from other local social housing estates and other housing generally, as well as greater competition for councillors’ and managers’ attention and resources. When E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) was ready for letting, another large estate was being completed, and the local authority was only midway through adding 4,000 homes to the 8,000 it already owned (Glendenning and Muthesias 1994). In 1971, the local authority that

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owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) had a total of 70,000 homes and provided for 37 per cent of households in the city. It reported, rather plaintively, ‘The sheer scale of the Housing Department’s workload, and its involvement with the people of the city … is not always fully understood’ (E19’s local authority 1974:1). In 1965 in London and in 1974 elsewhere, local authorities were reorganised and amalgamated, generally doubling their population and housing stocks. By 1981, all but three of the local authorities which owned the 20 estates had above average proportions of social housing (see Table 4.1), and even the largest estate, E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), made up only 7 per cent of the council housing in its area at the time. Thus the 20 estates faced growing, increasingly diverse, young and high-quality competition for prevailing demand over time. These are the conditions associated with mono-directional decline in neighbourhood dynamics theory (Chapter 3).

Changes in relative popularity over time Local housing managers were asked to assess the 20 estates’ relative popularity compared to the other estates in the local authority in 1982, 1988, 1994, 2004 and 2018. Supporting and additional information on turnover, refusal of offers of homes in the estate, and empty homes was gleaned from archives and reports. Figures 9.1 to 9.4 convert this information into a schematic ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes. For example, the local authority that owned E6 (1949/600/fl/L) had over a hundred estates of fifty or more homes at its peak. This suggests that being the least popular estate in this local authority would mean being in the least popular few per cent of the local stock, while to be in the least popular handful of estates might mean to be in the least popular tenth. Schematically, estates which were the least popular in their local authority are marked as at the 3rd percentile, those among the least popular two or three estates were marked as at the 10th percentile, those which were less popular than average were marked at the 33rd  percentile, those of average popularity were marked at the 50th percentile, and those which were above average but not among the most popular handful of estates were marked at the 66th percentile. All the estates spent most of their lifetimes in the less popular half of their local authorities’ housing. However, there was substantial variety in the paths they followed, and in their average position over their lifetimes to date. Three estates followed a mono-directional path of decline, starting out from an average or below average position

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The fall and rise in popularity

but later falling to be among the least popular estates in the local authority: E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE) (Figure 9.1). This fits with the idea that homes and neighbourhoods tend to ‘filter down’ and lose status as they age (Chapter 3). There is little information on the first four decades of the E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), and it may have been quite popular initially. However, in the 1970s this changed. In 1980, when the estate was in its 40s, a visiting researcher noted, “letting houses is a bit like filling a sieve”, and a resident later recalled, “the estate was in a terrible state … bloody horrible”. Over the next three decades, there were some physical improvements, and initiatives by managers, the police and the community, but the estate never became significantly or more popular. In 2004, it was not as unpopular as an adjacent estate, and according to the manager, “people at [E11] think they are a cut above” in comparison. However, half the homes in this neighbouring estate were empty. In 2008 E11 was entirely demolished and there the story ended. Figure 9.1: Fall in ranking of popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (three estates) % 100

E12

E11

E14

Average

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Sources: Interviews and reports

Most of the estates experienced this ‘classic biography’ – but, crucially, only up to the 1980s or 1990s. Then their paths changed, as will be revealed. E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) was intended to rehouse people from cleared areas closer to the centre of London, but plans were decried in the early 1930s by existing local residents as ‘class legislation’ which

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would hurt neighbours who, ‘lived in what were called “better class property”, who employed servants when they could get them, who furnished their homes nicely’ (Anon. E3 1936). In practice, the estate was initially more popular than average, and when one young resident arrived in 1950 with his parents and sister when it was aged about 10, it was ‘much-sought after’. However, the family left soon after in 1955 because the writer’s mother had noticed that ‘two or three “slum dwellers” as mum classed them had moved on … she feared that this was the start of a long decline’ (Livingstone 2011). There is little information on the estate for the 1960s, but this decline feared by the mentioned mother appears to have emerged. In the early 1970s, a substantial research study in E3’s local authority found that all ‘old’ (pre-war) local authority housing, including E3, was close to the bottom of the rankings according to residents’ assessments and desire to move (Shankland et al 1977). In 1977, when E3 was aged 39, 33 per cent of households moved out, a very high turnover (Toynbee 1982). In the 1970s, there had been a period when 13 per cent of homes were empty (Dean 1981), and in 1979 10 per cent were still empty, ‘despite London’s severe housing shortage’. Seventy of these 100 empty homes had been ‘ransacked’ and 26 were squatted. Ninety-five per cent of offers made to potential tenants were being refused (Toynbee 1982). E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), was linked to slum clearance when it was first let in 1938, with smaller homes and a pre-existing reputation attached to residents, which made it less popular than neighbouring earlier phases of local authority development on its side of the city. By the 1960s, when it was in its 30s, a social worker who had worked in various parts of the city said that E8 was “the most notorious” estate in the local authority (in Wilson 1997:127). In 1982, when it was aged 46, local housing officers told a visiting researcher that the estate had become “increasingly difficult to let over the years”, and was still was among the lowest status estates in the local authority. A few years later, by the late 1980s, unpopularity was a ‘big problem’, and by 1994 it was either the least popular or second least popular in the local authority. To continue E8’s story, the 2000s seem to have been the critical juncture. By 2004, the local manager said refusals [of offers of flats at E8] were “few and far between”, there was a waiting list for the estate, and both absolute and relative demand had increased. The assistant director said “[E8] has now come up [in relative status] and is very close to [the adjacent, long more popular estate] … I think now it’s finally getting away from that [original slum clearance stigma]”. This was nearly 70 years after the slums had turned to dust. Also in 2004, the chief executive of a local regeneration organisation said,

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The fall and rise in popularity

“houses in the paper [for sale or private rent] would usually say they were off [adjacent main road] and now they’re selling as ‘[E8]’ … That thrills me the most.” E15 (1946/400/h/NE), also experienced the classic downward trajectory, after some time on a popular path. It was not built to replace homes lost through slum clearance, and did not experience the stigmatisation associated with that. From at least 1954/55 to 1970/71, turnover on the homes first let in 1946/47 was never more than 4 per cent, indicating absolute popularity and suggesting relative popularity too (Vamplew 1992). However, problems with the new homes began to affect the whole estate. In 1972/73 turnover in the main part of the estate reached 6 per cent. By 1980, when it was aged in its early 30s, E15 had been termed a ‘problem estate’ by its local paper, and was among the handful of least popular estates in the local authority. Intensive housing management managed to maintain living conditions and limit the number of empty properties, despite serious crime and vandalism problems. In 1992 and 1993 there were several nights of disorder in the estate, which gave it additional local and also national notoriety, and by 1994 a quarter of homes were empty and two-thirds of households had applied to transfer elsewhere. Similarly, E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) became relatively unpopular while first letting was still under way. There were a number of small problems, such as slow lifts, blocked rubbish chutes, and wind tunnel effects. By 1979, when the estate was aged 13, a commentator said that residents, ‘often have no social ties on the estate and … would gladly move away’ (Babbage 1979:8). There was a period of crisis when two lifts in the tower blocks broke down for a long period, prompting an estate management initiative which ultimately lasted for decades. In 1981, when the estate was aged 15, the area manager said it was “unpopular”; 24 per cent of all tenants and 32 per cent in one tower block had requested transfer. Forty-three per cent of moves into the estate in the first eight months of the year were from homeless families (with least choice). Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, 13 of the 20 estates experienced a change of path, rising in popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities. These included estates in every generation, of every size, every built form and every region (Figure 9.2). Some experienced reorganisations and dramatic redevelopment, while some had only minor investment. Most of the estates spent parts of their lives with rising absolute and relative demand, and spent increasingly significant periods of time on average or even above average paths. In five of the estates, the

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 9.2: Fall and rise in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (3 of 13 estates) % 100 90

E3

E9

E15

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

Source: Interviews and reports. Other cases are not shown to improve legibility.

improvements were modest. E1 (1929/300/h/NW) changed from being the least popular estate in the local authority at its lowest point to being one of the least popular most recently. E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), E4 (1938/300/fl/L) and E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) went from being among the least popular in their local authorities to being of below average popularity. E5 (1949/700/fl/L) went from below average to average. However, in eight estates the improvements were marked. E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) changed from being among the least popular to being above average. Three went from being one of the least popular to being of average popularity: E6 (1949/600/fl/L), E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L). Four went from being among the least popular to being above average popularity: E2 (1937/300/h/ NW), E15 (1946/400/h/NE), E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1600/deck/L). These paths are less familiar than stories of decline, and deserve more attention and investigation. E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) moved away from the crisis situation at the end of the 1970s, but remained unpopular for the next two decades until modest improvement in the 2000s. In 1979, a pioneering local manager project had been established, with a local office, and local staff with control over caretakers, minor repairs and some discretion over lettings policy. Safety, cleanliness and repairs improved fairly rapidly, the number of empty properties decreased and relative popularity increased to some extent. However, the position of the estate was not transformed. In 1994, when the estate was aged 56, the local manager said: “people are afraid of [E3] and know the condition of the blocks is bad”. By 2005,

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the local manager said that all of that part of the local authority had become more popular and that E3 was in “moderate” rather than low demand. Mid-market private sector flats had been built adjacent to the estate. By 2019, the part of the local authority in which the estate was located was fashionable, and a flat in the estate sold under the Right to Buy was being advertised for private rent at £1,250 a month. The critical juncture for E15 was a major redevelopment, triggered by the disturbances and their aftermath, which included improvement to existing homes, demolition and replacement with housing association and private sector homes (Chapter  7). A woman who had lived in the estate since the 1970s told a local journalist, “it’s an amazing thing that’s happening around here these days. From the good old days to the bad, more recent times, it’s come full circle and things are looking good again.” In 2004, a senior housing officer told me, “It’s right easy now, they [housing officers] don’t know they’ve been born! It was Beirut – although we weren’t allowed to say that at the time! … The housing centre [estate office] was as well protected as a bank, there were tremblers in the roof to detect movement.” The area manager concurred: “it was awful, really awful 10–12 years ago”. The redevelopment programme manager was quoted insisting that, “[E15] is a typical estate.” In 2004, for the first time since the 1960s, E15 was relatively as well as absolutely popular. The local manager said, “Most of the demand is for about 25 per cent of the stock – and [E15] is in this popular 25 per cent … They’re snapping it up … Some people who left the estate before are now wanting to come back.” The estate had been in a special scheme to advertise homes in less popular estates but had been taken out. In 2019 the estate remained relatively popular. At E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), the mid-1990s appear to have been the turning point. In 1994, the area manager said that E9 was “not an estate that people want to get onto”, but the local manager said that demand was probably rising. Looking back from 2004, the local manager said that the estate had been “more middle in pecking order” in the 1990s, but by 2004 it was a ‘high demand’ estate. After extensive physical improvements, he said, “Where do I start? It’s the flagship estate for the borough.” In 2018, although the improvements were themselves getting older, the estate was still relatively popular. Two estates experienced the opposite of Ravetz’s ‘commonest biography’. They were both third-generation estates of high- and low-rise deck-access flats, which were unpopular from the very start of their lives, but rose in popularity over time. E7 (1970/1,100/ deck/L) rose modestly in popularity. The relative popularity of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) increased dramatically (Figure 9.3).

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 9.3: Rise in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (two estates) %

E7

E20

Average

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Source: Interviews and reports

Two more third-generation estates of high- and low-rise deckaccess flats were unpopular from the very start of their lives, but did not see any improvement in relative popularity over time, despite reorganisation and redevelopment in both cases: E10 (1971/900/ deck/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) (Figure 9.4). Again, this does not mean that they did not experience change in absolute popularity or in living conditions. Figure 9.4: Stability in ranking of estates’ popularity relative to other estates in their local authorities over their lifetimes (two estates)

%

E10

E17

Average

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

0 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Source: Interviews and reports

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Eighteen of the 20 estates went through at least a period, and in some cases several decades where they were the least popular or among the least popular estates in their local authority area. The exceptions were E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW). Twelve of the estates were of average popularity at some point in their lifetimes, and seven had at least some time as more popular than average, both early in their lifetimes and more recently. Rough estimates of average relative popularity for the estates over their lifetimes can be calculated from Figures 9.1 to 9.4 (see Table 10.1). None of the estates were of average popularity throughout their lifetimes. Three were close to average when assessed across their lifetimes, and had only spent short periods being less popular: E2 (1937/300/h/NW), E5 (1949/700/ fl/L) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW)). At the other extreme, four were on average in the handful of least popular estates throughout their lifetimes: E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E17 (1967/1100/mixed/L). The rest were below average or well below average across their lifetimes to date (see Appendix 2).

Conclusion Evidence from the 20  estates provides considerable additional detail and complexity to what is known about the ‘trajectory’ and ‘dynamics’ of social housing estates (Chapter 3). Of the 20 estates branded ‘unpopular’ in the titles of previous reports on these cases, including by me (Power 1991; Power and Tunstall 1995; Tunstall and Coulter 2006) three were actually close to average popularity for their local authorities when assessed across their whole lifetimes to date. It would be more accurate to describe these estates as relatively briefly unpopular, which emphasises that unpopularity is not a fixed state. The remaining 17 were below average, and in some cases well below average, in popularity for their areas across their lifetimes. This would put them, on average, in the least popular 20 per cent of local social housing. This confirms the estates as broadly representative of less popular and less successful social housing (Chapter  4). In addition, being in the least popular 20 per cent of local social housing would place the estates in a smaller, more unpopular fraction of all neighbourhoods. In 2003 Ravetz described the ‘commonest estate biography’ as one of continuous decline (2003:190). However, some of the 20 estates were relatively unpopular from soon after first letting. In addition, evidence here, from two decades further on in estate lifetimes than

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when Ravetz was writing, shows that the biography of ‘fall and rise’ was the most common among the 20 estates. The causes of the falls and rises in relative popularity will be examined in Part III. The next chapter explores the population and mix of residents over the estates’ lifetimes.

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10

Changes in the mix of residents Introduction This chapter describes the size and nature of estate populations over estate lifetimes, and how they compared to the national population and the populations of estates’ local authorities. Literature on neighbourhoods and social housing estates argues that resident characteristics are closely linked to neighbourhood or estate social status or popularity (Chapter 3), and can be seen as an indicator of, a cause of, and a result of other successes and failures. We also need to understand resident numbers and characteristics to assess the impact estates had on housing need and who was affected by the housing quality, the safety and order and other dimensions they provided. To describe residents’ characteristics, the chapter uses qualitative evidence and indirect evidence from rent levels and allocation policies for the early years of estate lifetimes. It then uses census data for the areas most closely matching the estate boundaries for the period 1981–2011.

The number of residents The sheer number of people living in the estates is a measure of their contribution to meeting local and national housing need in quantitative terms. The number of residents also affects the extent and way in which public areas and shared facilities in estates may be used, the wear and tear on individual homes, and the social environment. The 20 estates had a total of about 18,000 homes at their peak (Chapter 1). However, the total number of residents over estate lifetimes, and even at any one time, can only be estimated. Social landlords paid close attention to the size and composition of households when making allocations, but generally did not keep records of the number of people living in their homes over time, taking into account births, deaths and moves. I used electoral registers to identify all adult residents registered as electors in one street of 134 homes at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) at tenyear intervals from 1931 to 1991. A total of 1,238 named individual adults were living in the street at the seven time points. This figure

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misses out unregistered adult residents and those who moved in and out of the street between the time points, and given the typical ratio of children to adults, child residents might have added half as much again to the total population of the street. Thus a minimum of 2,000 or 3,000 individuals may have lived in the 134 homes at some point over the period 1931–91. E14 was not typical among the 20 estates. It had the so-called ‘commonest biography’ and fell from average popularity in the 1950s to being one of the least popular estates in the local authority by the 1970s, and had periods of high turnover and empty homes (Chapter 9). However, this suggests that the 20 estates have provided homes to several hundred thousand people over their lifetimes to date. It is safe to assume that the total population in the estates generally declined over estate lifetimes, due to falling household size. The population of first- and second- generation estates is likely to have roughly halved over their lifetimes to date, and to have reduced substantially in third-generation estates as well. The average number of people per household in England fell over estate lifetimes from more than four in 1921 to less than two in 2011. In the estates’ local authorities, the average household size also fell over the period. In 1921 the range was from 3.7 people per household at E6’s (1949/600/fl/L) local authority, to 4.7 at the local authorities for E11(1938/400/h/ Mid) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW). In 2001 the range was from 2.1 people per household at E6’s local authority to 2.6 per household at the local authority for E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). At the single street in E14 referred to earlier, the mean number of adults registered per home grew from 2.0 in 1931 to 2.3 in 1951, and then fell to 0.8 by 1991, when some homes were empty.

Occupancy and overcrowding Initial occupancy and overcrowding Concern about overcrowding and its links to contagious disease (and incest) motivated some of the earliest interventions in housing policy in the UK. Modern research shows that crowding affects family life, and increases mental stress (Marmott et al 2010). From 1935, a statutory occupancy standard set out the minimum number of rooms required for households of different size in England and Wales. From 1960, a slightly more generous ‘bedroom standard’ was introduced, which disallowed the sharing of rooms by more than two people aged 10 and over, sharing by two people of different

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genders aged 10 or over, and sleeping in kitchens. It remains in use as a guide to social housing allocations, and from 2012 was used to target the ‘bedroom tax’ or reduction in Housing Benefit for underoccupiers. By 2004 the bedroom standard was acknowledged to be at the ‘margins of acceptability’ (ODPM 2004b). A woman who had lived E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) in the 2000s in a one-bedroom flat with two children moved to the private rented sector where she could get more space. She posted, ‘I believe if you have 2 children then they should have a room each,i was told [by the local authority] children can share.’ The proportion of social renters in England who were overcrowded increased from 5 per cent in 1997/98 to 8 per cent in 2017/18, while the proportion who were under-occupying fell from 12 per cent to 10 per cent (MHCLG 2018). No reliable figures for occupancy exist for these estates, which is in itself problematic. However, despite the intentions of the original builders of the estates, sharing and crowding continued to be sources of dissatisfaction for a minority of residents throughout estates’ lifetimes. Three first-generation estates – E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), E4 (1938/300/fl/L) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) – were explicitly intended to contribute to ‘the relief of overcrowding’ as part of subsidy rules. However, first- and second-generation estates were planned for larger household sizes than those usual by the 21st century. The same estates planned to relieve overcrowding had what now appears to be high occupancy from the start. For example, E3 was planned for 4.7 people per home, at a not very generous 0.66 rooms per person (counting bedrooms and living room) (Burnett 1978:242). Plans for E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) were similar (LCC 1939). However, when an early resident at E13 recalled the size of families in her block (presumably their maximum size after all children had been born), it included ‘Mrs [X] [with] about 10 … Next door Mrs [Y] with 6 … Mrs [Z] with 8’ (E13 LHP 1977). At second-generation E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), the largest homes had four bedrooms, but the local authority told visiting Department of Environment (DoE) researchers that they could house ‘7–10 people’ (Wilson and Kirby 1980b:11), at as little as 0.6 rooms per person, well below the national average for that period. Among the third-generation estates, E10 (1971/900/deck/L) was designed at a slightly more spacious 0.9 rooms per person.

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Occupancy and overcrowding over time Estate homes were sometimes let to smaller households than the maximum allowed under the bedroom standard. For example, E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) was ‘underlet’ in the 1970s, after concerns about the effects of high rise flats on children and vice versa. E1 (1929/300/h/ NW) was underlet in the 1980s, in response to low demand. However, homes were generally let to the maximum the standard allowed, and, over time, overcrowding and sharing tended to develop, as families had extra children or were joined by other new members. A study in the 1970s at the local authority that owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) pointed out that letting at the standard meant, ‘that overcrowding [in the area] … was concentrated chiefly in council tenancies’ (Wilson et al 1977:127). Crowding was one of the problems which singled out E2 (1937/300/h/NW) for special attention in the late 1970s. By 1977, 9 per cent of households at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) had seven or more people, the highest figure for all wards in the local authority. ‘Overcrowding’ was one of the things tenants were complaining about by 1982 at E15 (1946/400/h/NE). At E5 (1949/700/fl/L), in 1988, the estate manager said that, along with noise, the prohibition on overcrowding was the hardest part of the tenancy conditions to enforce because it was difficult to know who was living in tenants homes and hard to enforce sanctions. In the early 1990s, a residents’ rep at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) warned that official statistics underestimated overcrowding because of unregistered occupants unknown to the landlord. A former resident at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) said that when his family arrived in 1970/71, it was him, his mother and his brother in two bedrooms, but they were later joined by his mother’s boyfriend, and then two more babies, a total of six people at 0.66 rooms per person. The boys shared a double bed in the living room, and the stepfather would watch TV while the children were trying to sleep: ‘it was awful! … I’d have to sleep practically rigid. Sometimes I would go in my mum’s room and try to sleep in her bed or on the floor there. She’d just shout at me’ (Wright 2016:np). In 1972/73 the local authority created some larger homes in the estate by knocking two or even three flats together (Wilson and Kirby 1980a:18), but in 1988, the local manager said there was still a “huge overcrowding problem” due to the shortage of transfers. In 1994, a resident at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) told me that she had two girls and a boy sleeping in her house’s second bedroom, which she had divided herself into two very small rooms with bunks. A resident at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) with a one-bed flat posted in 2016, ‘I’ve lived

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here my whole life. My two teenage sons share a room and I sleep in the living room.’ In 1994, two members of the residents’ group at E6 (1949/600/fl/L) said they had been overcrowded while their adult children had been unable to get council accommodation. In 2004, the manager at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) said: “the children can grow up and leave home while they are on the waiting list for a transfer”. Examples of ‘under-occupancy’ existed alongside crowding, and was a concern for landlords who tried to encourage under-occupying tenants to downsize where possible.

The impact of rents and allocations policies, 1926–81 Direct evidence on the characteristics of estate residents is sparse for the early days of the first- and second-generation estates, and mainly comes from oral histories created by residents themselves. However, evidence on rent levels and allocations policies shows what kinds of residents would have been excluded from estates or, conversely, directed towards them. Middling residents: standard local authority rents before rebates or Housing Benefit For the early part of first- and second-generation estate lifetimes, council rents across the country were non-profit and subsidised, but not necessarily low. Council housing was generally let at middling rents to middling people. Rents were generally set as the residual after building costs had been paid, taking into account loan repayments and government subsidy (which varied over time). Local authorities had to cut building costs if they wanted to make homes accessible to poorer tenants. Where they could afford council housing, poorer households tended to be funnelled to lower quality, cheaper estates. Six of the first- and second-generation estates had rents which meant they were only accessible to middle market people (Table 10.1). Rents at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) were initially twice as high as for some other contemporary local estates (E14’s local authority 1935). In 1932, the local authority that was to build E2 (1937/300/h/NW) surveyed tenants of poor-quality private rented homes and found that only one fifth would consider paying more than their current rents, which were only £23–26 a week for three or four rooms (at 2019 prices) (E2’s local authority Housing Survey Committee 1932). A man interviewed in the town one year after E2 was first let, said, ‘People doesn’t want these new bloody Council Houses – th’ rents are too high. People’s appy

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enough ’ere … It’s a shame the way they treat th’ poor folk’ (MOA 5, transcription as in original). From 1935, local authorities were allowed to ‘pool’ costs and even out rents between estates. However, even after this change, a survey showed that 29 per cent of households on the waiting list in the local authority that owned E15 (1946/400/h/NE) could not afford the estate’s initial rent of £18 a week (at 2019 prices) for three-bed homes. Poorer families were signposted to cheaper prewar housing (including estates linked to clearance) (Vamplew 1992). On a tour in London in 1956, Minister of Housing Duncan Sandys was told by a tenant in a new flat at E5 (1949/700/fl/L)] that ‘rents were too high’ (Anon. E5 1956). From the first generation, households on very low incomes were able to get help to pay their whole rents from local authority funds, then National Assistance (1948–66) and Supplementary Benefits (1966–88) (Cullingworth 1979). From 1930, local authorities were allowed to create rent rebate schemes for poorer tenants, but schemes spread slowly (Malpass 1990). The local authority that owned E4 (1938/300/fl/L) had a scheme by the late 1950s (Anon. E4 1958), and the one that owned E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) had a scheme by the time the estate was built (E9’s local authority 1966). However, one observer noted, ‘schemes vary enormously and some are very limited’ (Cullingworth 1969:17). Most poorer households in England and in the 20 estates’ local authorities could only finally afford most council housing after 1972, when local authorities were obliged to provide rebates for their own tenants, partly paid for via national social security budgets, and a large minority of all tenants began to claim rebates. From this point on, 20, 30 or 40 years into their lifetimes, above average rents alone should not have prevented access for lower income applicants to E2, E5, E6, E14, E15 and E19. For example, in 1982, 13 per cent of tenants at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) received rent rebates, and 22 per cent had their rent paid direct by the Department of Health and Social Security. That year, local rebates and DHSS support were combined into the national system of Housing Benefit. In general, social renting households were eligible for full Housing Benefit paying all their rent if there was no earner in the household, and partial benefit if they had low earnings. Soon a majority nationwide were claiming the support. Mixed communities and more advantaged communities In three of the estates – part of E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) – initial rents and lettings

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policies were explicitly intended to select more advantaged applicants than some or most other local authority housing. At E3, one third of homes were aimed at, ‘members of the working class who are willing to pay rents above those charged for the usual type of council flat, but who cannot afford the rents demanded for adequate accommodation provided by private enterprise’ (Anon. E3 1937a). Rents would be up to £393 a week for five rooms (at 2019 prices) (Anon. E3 1937b). The Chair of the Housing and Public Health Committee of the London County Council (LCC), said, ‘It was not felt right to put all the poor people together without the refining influence of the better off’ (Anon. E3 1937b:5). These ideas prefigure late 20th-century theories about mixed communities (Chapter 3). Third-generation E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) both initially had high rents and restrictive allocations, effectively a throwback to first- and second-generation targeting at ‘middling’ residents. These cases demonstrate the role of politics and local government finance in the targeting of social housing. In 1968, after a change of control to Conservative, the local authority which was part-way through building E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), was not enthusiastic about the estate, and was concerned about its debts and small majority. It tried to sell E18 to a housing association but was overruled by central government. The council then set rents from £105 a week for a one-bedroom flat to £170 for five-bedrooms (at 2019 prices) (Cunningham 2000), while controlled rents for poor-quality flats in nearby clearance areas were around £17 a week (Grant 2012). Only pensioners could get rebates, and about 90 per cent of those on the waiting list could not afford the estate (Hillman 1969; Wilson 1970). The council also demanded references, and in some cases, passports (Grant 2012). The opposition Labour Party, ‘were furious to see their dream scheme fade beyond the means of those for whom it was intended’ (Hillman 1969:3). Letting was slow, getting the estate off to a troubled start. It was partly due to cases like E18 that all local authorities nationwide were required to offer rebate schemes in 1972. Slum clearance, lower rents and stigma In contrast, eight of the first- and second-generation estates were built with special subsidies to provide affordable homes for people displaced from cleared ‘slums’ (Table 10.1). In addition, some homes in third-generation estates were let to people displaced by clearance, for example, at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L). Central government gave local authorities powers to demolish homes

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that were ‘unfit’ for human habitation in 1868 (Swenarton 1981). From 1930, government subsidies for new building were linked to clearance, and there were major programmes in the early 1930s and from the early 1950s to the early 1970s (Holmans 2005). All of the 20 estates’ local authorities had large clearance programmes over estate lifetimes because of their relatively old housing stocks. The local authority that owned E5 (1949/700/fl/L) announced that its clearance and rebuilding was largely completed in 1960 (Mander 1996), while the local authority that owned E15 (1946/400/h/NE) was still at work as late as 1982. At some points, more than half of new local authority homes across England might have been going to people displaced by clearance (Holmans 2005), and most of the eight estates linked to clearance would not have stood out from other new estates locally. The Housing Act 1930 assumed that half of those rehoused after clearance would not be able to afford typical council rents and provided extra subsidy to fill the gap (Yelling 1992). When E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) was first let, a local paper reported, ‘practically every family has been removed from a condemned house’ (Anon. E13’s local authority 1938). The community worker White reported that priority was given to: ‘the overcrowded, the tubercular, those from damp- and vermin-infested property … the general level and standards of a community such as this may possibly be even lower than those of the slum from which they came’ (White 1946:16). Researchers at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) also suggested that residents had been disadvantaged even when compared to others moving from ‘slums’: ‘built at the tail-end of a clearance programme they housed a core of families who had been difficult to place elsewhere … a collection of “difficult” families’ (Wilson and Kirby 1980b:11). New residents might arrive from areas designated or otherwise labelled ‘slums’, well into estate lifetimes, whether or not there was any initial connection. Textbook authors said that by the 1970s, families from slum clearance areas did not ‘differ appreciably from existing municipal tenants’ (Macey and Baker 1978:244). Nonetheless, at least until the 1970s, so-called ‘slum’ families were widely associated with low social class, poor behaviour and poor health (Tucker 1966; MHLG 1970a, 1970b; English et al 1976). In six estates, local managers and residents reported continuing stigma from the link to slum clearance in 1982. In 1995 there was still an effect in five estates, up to 60 years after the demolition had taken place. However, ten years on in 2005, the connection appeared finally to be broken.

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Standard local authority allocations policies with grading and the internal market Nine of the estates were initially let under standard local authority policies, and at standard rents for the period. The three estates initially aimed at higher income tenants and the eight linked to clearance subsequently moved to standard lettings policies too. Standard local authority policies and how they worked in more and less popular estates were probably the most important factor determining estates’ populations over their lifetimes. For most of the first- and second-generation estates’ lifetimes, their landlords ‘graded’ applicants and homes, and actively matched ‘high grade’ households to ‘high grade’ homes. When new, estates were generally seen as ‘high grade’ unless they were linked to clearance or had smaller, cheaper homes. Once estates had aged, or lost relative quality in landlords’ eyes, they would be allocated to residents with lower social status or worse perceived behaviour. As late as the 1970s, textbook writers said, ‘there must always be discrimination in  … selecting the fortunate few … the personal suitability of the applicant and his wife are a guide to the type of dwelling to be offered’ (Macey and Baker 1978:278). Grading was based on forms, interviews and home visits. Applicants might be assessed on income, rent paying record, housekeeping standards and character. In 1994, the local manager at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) showed me the file of a long-standing tenant which included a form recording a home visit, complete with tickboxes to grade housekeeping: ‘clean, acceptable, not acceptable’. Writers commenting on the practices of the local authority that owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) said that they paralleled those in the private sector, with high rents, an emphasis on selection of residents and preserving capital value (Pooley and Irish 1984). A former resident of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) recalled the role of connections in the late 1960s: ‘my mum was a friend of [the local MP] … so a quiet word and a quick phone call … and I got a brand new [flat]’. An early resident at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) who had waited twenty-years for her home posted ‘of course being a single woman I was very low on the list’. Over the 1960s and 1970s there was a gradual shift to emphasise ‘need’ in allocations. In 1977, when the local authority that owned the oldest estate, E14, had had free rein over allocations there for over fifty years, the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act required local authorities to prioritise certain groups, focusing on families at immediate risk of homelessness. However, matching continued after

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formal grading ended, through an internal market of non-monetary resources. Applicants who had more points, better current housing, more information and contacts were more likely to be offered the most desirable homes. In 1976, the senior housing officer for E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) said, “lettings made entirely on ‘need’ are only really workable when all housing is of a similar standard and type. Once there is considerable variety … those with more points inevitably hold on for the most desirable properties” (reported in Wilson and Kirby 1980b:16). Researchers commented on E19’s (1936/1,100/fl/NW) local authority: ‘applicants knew that once housed they were unlikely to be able to move. Those with bargaining power were thus encouraged to hold out’ (Wilson et al 1977:122). The 20  estates were all relatively unpopular compared to other local social housing for substantial periods (Figures 9.1–9.4). In these periods, they were likely to attract only those with less choice in the internal market, including households with low priority, who were displaced, homeless, or not already adequately housed. On average, households in these situations were more likely to have children, to be out of work or otherwise on a low income, to be from an ethnic minority and to have other vulnerabilities. One former resident of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) described how he got a flat there aged only 16, in a piece posted in 2011 by his brother: It was easy to get a flat there due to the prevalence of burglaries, robberies, car crime, muggings, drug dealers, junkies, paedophiles and the occasional mummified body. [this was not exaggeration]. I was at the bottom of the housing list; a single white male. I had no children  … no drug problems … I had not been sexually abused … I had not been recently released from a young offenders institute … In their lair the dead faced, dead souled, dead hearted minions of the council shifted their papers, peered at you, assessed you and finally revealed their decision pulled on their black caps and sentenced you to a slow death. ‘It’s [E20 nickname] for you boy …’. The local manager at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), said in 1994, “the reputation of the estate means that we tend to get those who have little choice”. Once estates were established as relatively unpopular, officer discretion also affected population mix by selecting those who could and would accept any offer made and then stay. In 1994, the assistant director of housing for E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) told me, “we

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have voids [empty homes] and we have homeless people in hostels, but it’s not as simple as that. It’s a matter of sorting out people who are going to make a contribution … There isn’t much other investment here – we need to invest in human resources.” The same year, the local manager at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) told me that, “use of discretion in lettings is essential but amounts to ‘amateurish social engineering’”. The estate manager at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) said that she would not let a home in the estate to lone parents or ethnic minorities due to the risk they would be harassed, despite the fact that race-based allocation decisions had been outlawed nearly thirty years before by the Race Relations Act 1968. Special policies to concentrate disadvantaged people in the estates: ‘dumping’ Local authority interviewees at four estates – E8 (1933/1,000/h/ Mid), E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) and E15 (1946/400/H/NE) – said that over some period in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, allocations staff intentionally concentrated the most disadvantaged or ‘problematic’ households in the local authority in these estates, to protect homes or residents elsewhere. For example, in 1998, a senior manager at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) told me that the estate had, “been outside of the council’s normal lettings rules for God knows how many years now … it was literally a dumping ground”. In four further estates, tenants said they believed that ‘dumping’ policies had been in operation at some point before the 1980s (Table 10.1). These policies were part of ‘matching’ and would exacerbate the effects of the internal market.

Resident employment and income, 1926–81 Further evidence on the characteristics of estate residents comes from oral histories created by residents themselves. Several older residents described the absolute poverty experienced by many in their childhoods, and the increase in income and material wealth they observed among their peers and in the general population through their own lifetimes. A former E1 (1929/300/h/NW) resident recalled selling lottery tickets to fund the estate football team in the 1940s: ‘By today’s monetary standards, ticket prices appear ridiculously low, as did the winnings. Tickets 1/– … daily winning 5/– … Wages and prices were, however proportionately low.’

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

One of the first residents at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) recalled poverty in his childhood in the 1930s: ‘I always had shoes but I was one of the lucky ones, and it was not at all unusual to see kids barefoot and with a bare backside too!’ (Berry 2010). A man who was born in the 1920s who lived at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) most of his life, said in 1999 that in contrast to his youth, “you don’t have to worry about every penny you’ve got – and whether you’ve got enough food” (BLMMB 2). Another man who grew up at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) said, ‘before the War there were no cars on the estate, as a youngster I could not have imagined that ordinary working class folk like us, would own cars to the extent that we do’. The spread of the consumer society meant that by the 1970s, when it was aged 40, residents at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) said the rubbish chutes in their blocks needed to be emptied more often. One resident said that before the war said she used to buy jam in a cup, but over time packaging had increased (E13 LHP 1977). Another resident commented in 2007 that one of the changes at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) since the 1930s was ‘the large increase in litter’. A man who grew up at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the 1970s posted that comparing generations was like comparing apples with Apples: ‘I remember me and [my brother] use to go to the dinner lady’s after school and get an apple each we were so easy to please my two girls are eight and nine and have these apple I pads.’ Unemployment was a marked feature of one resident’s childhood when he was growing up at and near E2 (1937/300/h/NW) in the 1930s. His dad’s dole was the main family income, and his grandad was also unemployed. In the winter, his father got casual work shovelling snow, and some week’s work on a council road building scheme: ‘The more children a man had the more weeks of work he got’ (Berry 2010). A local paper said that at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1938, ‘there are understood to be more persons in receipt of outdoor relief than in any other similar London area’ (Anon. E13’s local authority 1938). Some families did not have enough furniture for their new homes: one family of seven had only two beds (White 1946). Residents had mainly been in casual dock work, and the new location on the urban fringe took them away even from these opportunities. A long-term resident recalled queuing for cheaper day-old bread as a child (E13 LHP 1977:8). Similarly, the initial residents at second-generation E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) were disadvantaged even among those arriving in new estates from ‘slums’ (Wilson and Kirby 1980b); one former resident posted, ‘my parents’ wedding vows included the word “Poverty”’.

156

Changes in the mix of residents

At least some residents in some estates were more middling in income. In 1940, when E14 (1926/900/h/NE) was aged 14, one resident had enough of an income to advertise in a local paper for a servant: ‘Housekeeper wanted for man and boy (age 5)’. In wartime, another advert announced the conventionality and respectability of another family: ‘Mr and Mrs J Foster, 81, [X] Rd, [E14], announce the coming of age of their eldest daughter, Vera (ATS)’ (the ATS was the Auxiliary Territorial Service, the women’s organisation parallel to the army). However, some residents described serious absolute poverty as late as the 1970s. A woman who grew up at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) mailed me in 2011 to say there was, ‘not much food either in them days and i remember the odd occasion where i would steal food just to satisfy myself and take food to the other kids’. Another resident, born in the early 1960s, posted his memory of ‘the box woman she had orange boxes for tables’. Young residents, forming new households and typically on low incomes had particular difficulties meeting the costs of setting up home. One who arrived at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/ NW) in the 1970s aged 16 said, ‘The flat was uncarpeted and sparsely Photo 10.1: (Perhaps unsuitably) smartly dressed residents using the carpentry workshop in the tenants’ rooms at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1950, when the estate was aged 17

Source: London Metropolitan Archives, City of London (COLLAGE). Photographer unknown.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

furnished. By sparsely, I mean sparsely in the sense of a third world shanty town. A bed, a settee, an electric frying pan and a television were the sum total of my comforts.’ Another former resident recalled arriving at E20 aged 17 with no furniture and little money, but was given a few items by other residents: ‘Living the dream eh!’, and another said, ‘a few sticks of furniture was pretty spot on for everyone’. In 1979, the manager of E14 (1926/900/h/NE) said, rather vaguely, that unemployment was ‘around 50 per cent?’ (Andrews 1979). In 1980, the director of housing believed that residents’ standard of living was falling, due to increasing unemployment, benefits changes which reduced income for unemployed people and rising fuel costs (Director of Housing E14’s local authority 1980). Perceived high rates of unemployment, lone-parent headed households and rent arrears were among the factors which led their local authorities to start experimental estate-based housing management initiatives at this time (Power 1985).

Resident economic status, 1981–2011 For the 30-year period 1981–2011, it is possible to get detailed evidence on resident characteristics from the census for enumeration districts or output areas that formed reasonable proxies for the estate (Appendix  1). This was the period in which estate quality was improving in most estates, and relative popularity was improving in 15 out of the 20 estates (Chapters 8, 9). The fall in absolute deprivation The census data for estate proxies show that all the estates had unusually high rates of unemployment (and associated poverty) by 1981. Given that the data are for estate proxies, they probably underestimate the relative disadvantage of estate populations. In 1981, unemployment in England was high at 7 per cent and rising, but unemployment rates in the estates were extremely high compared to the nation as a whole, and compared to their local authorities. At E14 (1926/900/h/NE), 52 per cent of economically active adults were unemployed as were 53 per cent among residents at E15 (1946/400/h/NE). Unemployment rates were lower in London estates, although still high in absolute terms. For example, at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) the rate was 26 per cent and at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) it was 25 per cent. Nonetheless, a visiting researcher was told in 1983 that E14 wasn’t the poorest estate in the local authority and in another, 76 per cent of households claimed the

158

Changes in the mix of residents

newly introduced Housing Benefit. Unemployment and poverty in places like E14’s local authority were national political issues in the mid-1980s. In 1986, a local MP wanted to swap homes and incomes with an unemployed family at E14 for a week to meet a challenge set by a local newspaper. In the event the plans fell through: the mother of the family said, “we were told there would be a riot if we went through with it” (Anon. E14 1986). A journalist described the estate more dramatically as ‘an economic desert on the frontiers of comfortable suburbs’ (Campbell 1988). In most of the 20 estates, especially those in London, unemployment then increased further over the period 1981–91. The only exceptions were the estates which had had the very highest rates in 1981. Absolute unemployment rates are important because they reflect the numbers of people affected. In 1994, many estate resident group members interviewed reported that the characteristics of their fellow residents had changed over the 1980s, even if they didn’t mention employment status per  se. For example, members of the tenants group at E6 (1949/600/fl/L), mostly long-standing older residents, said in 1994 that new tenants were increasingly anti-social: “we are tolerant of the pests that we have now, for fear of something worse”; “we pray that nobody dies” [because this would mean a new letting]. “Their children are out of control, the gardens full of rubbish … abusing nice people.” Residents also said there were other residents with severe mental health problems who were being inadequately supervised or supported, “a danger to themselves and to everybody else”. At E18 (1966/1,600/ deck/L), residents’ group members told me in 1994: ‘it’s each one for himself … we’re afraid to mix’ ‘Jones [to keep up with] do help solve problems, but we haven’t got any Jones’ here’ ‘the homeless coming here have nothing, no furniture … they don’t tend to raise the level, they are fighting for life … there are a lot of people under care in the community who aren’t properly supported. It’s a mental strain for [other] residents.’ At E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) a residents’ rep said, “everyone with a young family and a little bit of intelligence wants to move off … and is being replaced by the homeless”.

159

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 10.1: Unemployed estate residents as a percentage of economically active residents (aged 16–74), 1981–2011 % 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1981 E1

1991

2001

E2

E3

E4

E7

E8

E9

E13

E14

E15

E19

E20

2011 E5

E6

E10

E11

E12

E16

E17

E18

Sources: Census data from www.casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk (for 1981 and 1991), and nomisweb.co.uk (for 2001 and 2011)

Then over 1991–2001, there was a dramatic turnaround. Absolute unemployment rates fell in all 20 estates. By 2001, the unemployment rate at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) had dropped from 52 per cent in 1981 to 20 per cent. Unemployment rates then stabilised at a much lower level over the next decade. In every one of the estates, unemployment rates in 2011 were lower than in 1981 (Figure 10.1). Residents and managers sensed these changes. A housing association housing manager at E15 (1946/400/h/NE), where unemployment fell from 42 per cent to 12 per cent over the period 1991–2001, said in 2005, “the estate had really high unemployment; a lot are now working”, and a senior housing association officer at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) said, with relief, “our customers have more money, they feel better, it is possible to lift people out of poverty”. In 2005, just 17 per cent of residents in street interviews identified job availability as one of the top three things to improve in the area, no different to the views of all residents in England. The proportion of estate residents of working age who were economically inactive (not in work or looking for work, due to care responsibilities, study, sickness, disability or retirement) rose slightly

160

Changes in the mix of residents

from 1981 to 2001, and moves out of the labour market could explain part of the decrease of unemployment in 1991–2001. However, over 2001–2011 both unemployment and economic inactivity reduced, and economic inactivity in 2011 was similar to or lower than it was 30 years before. Economic activity at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) was above the national average for the population of England (71  per cent compared to 70 per cent for England). The proportion of estate residents of working age who were in work fell from 1981 to 1991, but then rose between 1991 and 2011, to higher rates than seen 30 years before, ranging from 36 per cent to 59 per cent across the estates. However, the significance of employment as an indicator of income and living conditions has changed over time, with increasing variation in the quality of jobs. From 2008, there was little growth in real wages for a decade, and growing proportion of people in work but in poverty (DWP 2019). In 2011, estate residents were less likely to be in full-time, ‘breadwinner’ employment than the national average, and in some cases one third of those in work were working part time. Self-employment was below the national average in most estates. Nonetheless, in 2018 each sampled estate postcode had on average two Figure 10.2: Estate unemployment rate as a multiple of the national unemployment rate, 1981–2011 % 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1981 E1

1991

2001

E2

E3

E7

E8

E9

E13

E14

E15

E19

E20

Sources: As for Figure 10.1

161

E4

2011 E5

E6

E10

E11

E12

E16

E17

E18

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 10.3: Estate unemployment rate as a multiple of the estate local authorities’ unemployment rate, 1981–2011 % 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1981 E1

1991

2001

E2

E3

E4

E7

E8

E9

E13

E14

E15

E19

E20

2011 E5

E6

E10

E11

E12

E16

E17

E18

Sources: As for Figure 10.1

companies registered with Companies House, working in construction removal, ’talent’, investment, communications and consulting. However, estate unemployment rates need to be considered relative to the national and local contexts. National unemployment rates peaked in 1986, again in 1993 and then rose again between 2009 and 2013. In 1981, most estates had unemployment rates two to five times the national rate (Figure 10.2). In 1991 and 2001, the situation was, if anything, more extreme. The exceptions were the four estates which had had the most extreme unemployment in 1981, E8 (1936/1,000/h/ Mid), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E15 (1946/400/H/NE). In 2011, estate unemployment rates were again two to five times higher than the (now much lower) national rate. Despite dramatic changes in absolute levels, estate residents had not generally caught up with national level. In 1981, in some cases estate unemployment rates were similar to rates for surrounding local authorities, but in others they were four times higher (Figure 10.3). In 2011, estate unemployment rates ranged from about twice to about five times rates in local authorities. This suggests the estates had fallen slightly further behind their local authorities. This puts the dramatic fall in absolute rates of

162

Changes in the mix of residents

unemployment in estates in new perspective. The ‘rising tide lifted all boats’ to some extent, including the estates, but did not reduce the marked gap between estates and the nation. There was long-term stability in estates’ relative position. Another way of looking at estate unemployment also suggests limited changes over time. Chapter 3 showed how the ranking by unemployment rates of ‘neighbourhoods’ defined through ‘postcode sectors’ changed very little from 1985 to 2005 (Tunstall 2016). These ‘neighbourhoods’ have on average 3,000 households and are larger than all the estates. All estate neighbourhoods had higher unemployment than the national average throughout the period 1985–2005. In 1985, half of the 20 estates were in neighbourhoods that were in the top tenth nationwide by unemployment, 16 were in neighbourhoods in the top two tenths, and all were in neighbourhoods with above average unemployment. Twenty years later, only four of the neighbourhoods that had been in the top tenth had changed ranking, exactly the same rate as for all high unemployment neighbourhoods nationwide. However, the estates did draw closer to the national average for social housing tenants. In 1981 and 1991, estate residents had higher rates of unemployment than social tenants nationwide, but by 2001 rates were very similar (Tunstall 2011).

The decline of ‘male breadwinner’ households Most European welfare states have been based on the assumption that the economy would create jobs paying a ‘family wage’ and that most households would have a ‘breadwinner’ or principal earner, usually male, to support dependents (Pascall 2006; Trappe et al 2015). This model can be applied in housing (Kennett and Chan 2011), including council housing. Lone-parent headed households did not fit with this model, and would have faced barriers from early allocations policies. High proportions of lone-parent headed households are significant because they have had relatively low rates of employment and high rates of poverty (DWP 2019), and will potentially increase child densities. In 1981, the proportion of households in the 20 estates headed by a lone parent with dependent children ranged from 4 per cent to 15 per cent, compared to a national average of 4 per cent. The proportion of lone-parent headed households then rose sharply in the 1980s, rose further in most estates in the 1990s, before stabilising in the 2000s (Figure 10.4).

163

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 10.4: Percentage of households in estates composed of a lone parent with dependent child or children, 1981–2011 % 50 40 30 20 10 0

1981

1991

2001

2011

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

England

Sources: As for Figure 10.1

Lone parenthood increased nationwide over the period 1981–2011, and while in 1981, rates of lone-parent headed households in the estates were two to seven times the national average, by 2011 the gap had closed and they were one and a half to three times the national average.

Age mix In 1981, the proportion of children in estate populations was high relative to local authorities and the national average. Most estates had child densities above the ‘warning sign’ level of 25 per cent of the total population (representing three adults to one child) (Chapter 3). The only estates which did not have relatively high child populations in this period were E9 (1966/800/mixed/L), which had few family sized homes, and E19 (1936/1100/fl/NW). However, the proportion of children in estate populations generally reduced from 1981 to 2011 (Figure 10.5). In 1981, the highest proportion of children was 44 per cent at E15 (1946/400/h/NE), close to a 1:1 adult to child ratio. By 2011, the highest proportion of children was 34 per cent at E2 (1937/300/h/

164

Changes in the mix of residents Figure 10.5: Percentage of the estate populations aged under 16, 1981–2011 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 1981

1991

2001

2011

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

England

Sources: As for Figure 10.1

NW) and E12 (1947/1000/h/NE), a 2:1 adult:child ratio. Child populations were generally still above the national average, and ‘child densities’ generally remained above three adults per child, but the estates’ child populations were closer to average. The changes also significantly reduced the absolute number of children. For example, at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) there were about 400 under-16s in 1981 but about 260 by 2011. In 1981, the proportion of people of pension age or 65 or more in estate populations was higher than the national average in some estates but lower than the national average in most. The proportion of older people generally reduced from 1981 to 2011 (Figure 10.6). This meant that over 1981–2011, the proportion of older residents in the estates diverged further from the national average. As the proportion of children and older people reduced from 1981 to 2011, the proportion of residents of working age increased in every estate. If people under 16 and over pension age or age 65 are categorised as ‘dependants’, this in effect reduced the so-called ‘dependency ratio’. For example, in 1981 there was 1.1 ‘dependent’ person for every person of working age at E5 (1949/700/fl/L), while by 2011 there was only 0.4. The care duties of people of working age were likely to

165

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 10.6: Percentage of the estate populations of pension age, 1981–2011 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 1981

1991

2001

2011

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

England

Note: Pension age was 60 for women and 65 for men (1981–2001), and 65 for both genders (2011). This explains the slight reduction in the proportion of ‘pensioners’ at national level 2001–2011, despite an ageing population. Sources: As for Figure 10.1

have reduced, and the changes are likely to have affected economic activity rates, income per person and the social atmosphere of estates.

Resident ethnicity The origins of diversity, 1926–81 In the first- and second-generation estates, decades passed with ethnically homogeneous populations. For example, at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in the North West, in the 1960s the grocers’ shop in the estate was run by an Asian family, but otherwise the population was entirely white. At E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), one resident described the population when his family were living there in the early 1950s: ‘all our neighbours seemed to be called Henry, George, Albert, Agnes, Gladys or Bessie’ (Livingstone 2011). Things began to change in the 1970s: a group of people identified by other residents as ‘gypsies’ moved in as squatters (Toynbee 1982), and another resident recounted how she moved into the estate as a refugee from Chile (Locks 2001).

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Changes in the mix of residents

In contrast, at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) a local manager recalled in the 1990s that, “the Afro-Caribbean community were the first tenants on this estate”. This appeared to be a function of the fact that the estate was completed at a point where there were significant numbers of black local authority residents on the housing waiting list, and that the estate rapidly became one of the least popular in the local authority (Chapter  9). A visiting researcher said that until the 1970s, when letting high-rise homes to families stopped in the estate, ‘only people in the most acute housing need were rehoused on [E17] – including a particularly high proportion of young back single parent families in the tower blocks’. Rising ethnic diversity, 1981–2011 Census data show that black and minority ethnic (BAME) people formed increasing proportions of all 20 estates’ populations 1981– 2011. However, minority populations varied in composition between areas, and growth over the period had different starting points and different rates (Figure 10.7). Diversification had the effect of increasing difference between the estates. Some estates were among the national pioneers of very mixed communities. By 1981, three of the estates, all in London, were ‘majority minority’, providing homes to a variety of ethnic groups: E4 (1938/300/fl/L), E10 (1971/900/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/ deck/L). In six, 1 per cent or fewer residents were BAME, meaning in practice a few households and a handful of people: E1 (1929/300/h/ NW), E10 (1938/400/h/Mid), E14 (1926/900/h/NE), E15 (1946/400/h/NE), E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) and E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW). Some of these had other minorities such as people born in Ireland or people of Traveller origin. Fifteen of the estates were in local authorities with higher BAME populations than the national average in 1981, including all the estates in London, and some in the North West and Midlands. Five estates were in local authorities with lower BAME populations than the national average, all in the North East or North West: E1 (1929/300/h/NW), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), E14 (1926/900/h/NE), E15 (1946/400/h/ NE) and E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW). In ten of these estates, minorities were over-represented compared to the proportion they made up of the local population. By 1981, the local authority of formerly homogenous E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) was known as one of the centres of the black Caribbean population in London and in the UK. Twentythree per cent of the local authority’s population and 41 per cent of

167

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 10.7: Minority ethnic residents as a percentage of estate residents, 1981–2011 % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1981 E1

1991

2001

E2

E3

E7

E8

E9

E13

E14

E15

E19

E4

E20

2011 E5

E6

E10

E11

E12

E16

E17

E18

England

Note: Data for 1981 are the proportion of people in a household headed by someone born in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and ‘New Commonwealth’ Caribbean and African countries. Data for 1991–2011 are for ethnicity. The data for 1991 for E18 are estimated from interviews and literature sources and the data for E3 and E17 are missing. E11 was entirely demolished in 2008 and not replaced. Sources: As for Figure 10.1

the estate’s residents were in households headed by someone born in the New Commonwealth or Pakistan. In 1982, a visiting researcher said that in the local authority that owned E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), ‘Many of [the] ethnic minorities are concentrated on large Council estates.’ Over-representation relative to local populations is not surprising, as minority populations were younger and at household forming and house moving stages, and typically were in worse housing conditions than the rest of the population. In nine estates, people from BAME groups were under-represented in nine estates compared to the surrounding population, all estates outside London except E5 (1949/700/fl/L) and E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L). In the 1970s and 1980s, growing minority ethnic populations in some estates were initially viewed by housing managers as problematic. The so-called ‘unbalanced’ ethnic mix of the population was among a number of reasons for setting up local management projects in nine

168

Changes in the mix of residents

of the 20 estates (Power 1984). In 1978, when E4 (1938/300/fl/L) was aged 40, a local housing rights worker said that some second- and third-generation estates, including E4, had ‘an enormous concentration of ethnic minority groups – it’s absolutely staring us in the face’. At that point most landlords did not record applicants’ ethnicity, but staff believed that about 90  per cent of lettings at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) were to homeless households, of which 60 per cent were black. A councillor said that E4 had ‘a demoralised West Indian community and a demoralised white community, who are fast becoming supporters of the National Front’ (Anon. E4 1978). Meanwhile a photo from the same era posted on social media shows a former E4 resident as a child with a friend. One is white, one black, and they have their arms around each others’ shoulders. He posted, ‘we were inseparable as kids’. By 2011, people from BAME groups were over-represented compared to the surrounding local authorities in 17 of the estates, while they remained under-represented in the others: E1 (1929/300/h/ NW) and E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE). Change continued at the estates that had high BAME populations in 1981. Substantial populations of Black African residents appeared in most of the London estates, and by 2001 overtook Black Caribbean residents, while there were growing proportions of people on some London estates who identified as ‘White Other’ (not British or Irish).

Summary Piecing together indirect evidence on estate populations and census data to cover whole estate lifetimes shows that five of the estates appear to have had disadvantaged populations compared to their local authorities and other local estates throughout their lifetimes (E1, E4, E8, E12 and E13) and five others probably did (E7, E9, E10, E17 and E20). Two initially had a mix of different groups (E3, E19), five started their lives with average populations for local authority estates (E2, E5, E6, E14 and E15), and two started with more advantaged populations than some other local authority estates at the time (although this may not have meant they were more advantaged than the average for local authority residents as a whole) (E16, E18). However, there is evidence that by the 1970s, at least 11 of the estates had relatively disadvantaged populations compared to local authority populations and other local authority tenants in the local authorities. From 1981, all the estates could be termed ‘residualised’ or ‘deprived’, but by 2011, there had

169

Table 10.1: Socioeconomic status of 20 estate residents relative to other residents of their local authorities, 1926–2011

1920s S M

Indirect evidence from rents and allocations policy Census data 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s (s) (s) (s) (s) (s) M M M M NA S (s) (s) (s) (s) S (s) (s) (s), D D D S (s) (s) (s), D (s), D D S (s) (s) (s) (s) M (part), S (part) M (part), (s) (part) M (part), (s) (part) M (part), (s) (part) (s) M M M M d d S (part), H/E (part) (s) (part), H/E (part) (s) (part), H/E (part) (s) (part), H/E (part) NA S (s) (s), D (s), D D M M M NA M M M NA M M M, D D D H/E NA NA D d NA NA NA NA NA NA H/E, d D

Notes: Darker shading = more disadvantaged than average; lightest = average; S = initial allocations linked to slum clearance; (s) = continuing lower rents linked to slum clearance; M = middling rents and no rent rebate scheme; H/E = relatively high initial rents/exclusive allocations policy; D = dumping policy acknowledged; d = dumping policy alleged; NA = evidence not available. Sources: Interviews and reports

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

170

E1 E14 E4 E8 E11 E13 E19 E2 E3 E12 E5 E6 E15 E18 E20 E9 E17 E7 E10 E16

Summary Lower Average, then lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Mixed, then lower Average, then lower Mixed, then lower Lower Average, then lower Average, then lower Average, then lower Higher, then lower Na, then lower Na, then lower Na, then lower Na, then lower Na, then lower Higher, then lower

Changes in the mix of residents

been marked falls absolute rates of unemployment, and falls in child and older populations (Table 10.1).

Conclusion The total number of residents appeared to decline throughout estate lifetimes, which meant that estates were playing a reducing role in meeting national and local housing need. This did not mean that all residents were able to avoid overcrowding, however. At least in some estates, there was some serious absolute poverty and very high unemployment in the early decades of estate lifetimes. At least five and probably ten of the estates appear to have had disadvantaged populations compared to their local authorities and other local estates throughout their lifetimes. Two initially had a mix of different groups, five started their lives with average populations for local authority estates, and two started with more advantaged populations than some other local authority estates at the time. However, by the 1970s, at least 11 of the estates had relatively disadvantaged populations compared to local authority populations and other local authority tenants in the local authorities. From 1981, all the estates could be termed ‘residualised’ or ‘deprived’. This is of significance not only as an indicator of estate popularity or a possible contributor to problems, but because it means the deficits in estate quality, safety and order, and other dimensions at this time were affecting people who were already disadvantaged in other ways. This is a case of the housing system failing to protect disadvantaged people from poor housing conditions, and a housing example of the ‘inverse care law’ seen in the health system (Chapter 2). It could be the cause of adverse ‘neighbourhood effects’ (Chapter 3): this is examined in Chapter 12. The change in estate populations over the period 1981–2011 could be taken as evidence of ‘de-residualisation’, or a ‘rise’ in relative social status. Reductions in unemployment, child densities and dependency ratios are likely to have increased residents’ material wellbeing, to have altered the social environments (Chapter 11), to have reduced wear and tear and the demands on informal social control (Chapter 8). However, compared to national and local authority populations, estate residents remained relatively disadvantaged in terms of unemployment rates, with little sign of the gap closing between estates and other areas over the 30 years from 1981 to 2011. In this regard, estate residents could still be described as significantly ‘residualised’,

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and this could be taken as evidence of sustained ‘fall’ in social status and of ‘path dependency’ of the estates (Chapter 3). The causes of the changes in resident mix will be examined in Part III. The next chapter explores other aspects of the estates’ social environments, some partly related to population mix.

11

The estates’ social environments Introduction Census data cannot describe all the characteristics of the many thousands of people who have lived in the estates over their lifetimes, and the social environment they created. This chapter uses interviews and resident webposts to provide a broader account. As in the chapter on safety and order, this one has a special focus on children’s perspectives. The estates had distinctive communities and distinctive social environments. These created some special advantages, which should be recognised as among the successes of the estates, and which other neighbourhoods and communities might want to emulate. However, there were also distinctive disadvantages, which should be counted among estates’ problems and which will have contributed to their relative unpopularity.

Networks of families and friends In at least some of the estates, relatively low demand for homes on them meant high proportions of new residents were relations and friends of existing residents. Over time this could lead to the development of communities that were distinctive from those of other neighbourhoods not only in terms of socioeconomic statistics but also because of the extent of social relationships across estates, or because of the social norms established there. The local manager at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) recorded that 98 households moved out of homes in the estate in a six-month period in 1982, but almost half moved into other homes in the estate. In the late 1980s, the local managers said that only people with overriding social reasons for being at E14 would accept its homes, given the fact that many were undecorated or vandalised. At the same date, the local manager at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) said it, “has always had a close community due to it being historically stigmatised … resulting in new lets frequently being to family and friends of existing residents, over 50 years many family/friend networks have developed”. In 2004, a

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regeneration organisation chief exec at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) said, “the estate feels different [to others]. It’s very hard to put a finger on it. There are so many extended families, everyone’s related.” The pattern varied between the estates, and over time. At E15 (1946/400/h/NE), a survey in 1981 showed that 70  per cent of residents were living far from family and friends, compared to just 40 per cent in the region as a whole (Vamplew 1992). By 1994, the director of housing at the estate’s local authority saw existing longterm residents as its key market (Anon. E15 1994). Twenty years later, E15’s new housing association landlord was using the estate’s social networks almost as a marketing point in a corporate blogpost, saying that E15, ‘has become a place where many families have lived all of their lives, their children have followed suit. There is a strong sense of pride and community spirit.’ ‘Strong communities’ such as those described by the selected residents quoted earlier are generally viewed by policy makers and public as desirable, but unusual. Alongside discussion of communitarianism in theory (Etzioni 1998), there have been substantial efforts to develop and support local social networks (Robinson 2005). Many 20th‑century local authority allocations policies favoured children of existing tenants, to support networks and to reward good behaviour, although by the 1980s they were found to discriminate against newcomers and ethnic minorities. Ironically, the relative unpopularity of the 20 estates enabled access to sons and daughters, and the building of networks. This could mean friendship, informal support and social care. One former resident posted a picture of E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in 2016: I was born on the left at the front were the bay windows are in 1939 Feb, I was the first baby born there … my two sons were born in the flat 1961 and 1967 my brother sold it four years ago [after buying it under the Right to Buy]. Thus one flat on the estate had been in the same family from first letting for over seventy years, and at least three generations of the family lived there. At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), a former resident posted: ‘i lived in [one block] first with my parents then got a flat in [X] house then i moved into an upstairs maisonette … with my first daughter …. i then got married and had two more children and moved to the downstairs maisonette again.’ At E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) a former resident had lived in seven different homes in the estate by her mid-20s, and was able to get a home not only near to but actually next door to her mother’s flat.

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Another recalled her childhood at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid): ‘i love it at [my street] the best days of my life with my mom a[n]d brothers and sisters aunties uncles gran granddad best m8 sue’. One who grew up at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) posted, ‘i had family and “friends” of the family on most every walkway’. An ex-E20 resident posted, ‘it was about friendship, and got to [k]now a lot of top people on their, moved around form flat to flat that was the best thing about living…their’. Distinctive advantages Resident group members interviewed over the period 1982–2005 and ex-residents of the estates posting about them valued ‘community’ highly, and tended to say that it was one of the things they liked best about the estates. Changes in the nature of ‘community’ were the main changes they noted and sometimes regretted. Social networks could form the basis for self-help between individuals and within informal groups. Adversity, including delays in providing facilities and services to new estates, and problems with housing quality or safety and order that emerged over time (Chapters 6, 8), could also provide motivation for collective action. Parents were often motivated to improve conditions for their children. The presence of residents who were not in full-time work provided a pool of people with some time to get involved (Chapter 10). Strong estate identity, linked to an estate’s physical distinctiveness in some cases (Chapter 4) or unpopularity (Chapter 9), was probably an aid to collective action. Residents with experience of trade union organising, local politics or management, or skilled roles at work could make particular contributions. Diverse ethnicities in some estates each provided a potential core for identity and for religion, language and other culture-based groups and activities. The neighbourhood manager at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) said that the estate was an unusual community which created potential social roles for residents that were not available elsewhere. He gave the example of a woman who had become very involved in community activities at the estate in later life: ‘When she died, her family came from Wales to the funeral. They had thought of her as an ordinary elderly white working-class lady, but were astonished to see hundreds of people turning out and even lining the street – of all ages and ethnic backgrounds – because of her community work.’

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Communities with strong networks could operate strong informal social control and be self-policing to some extent. For example, at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) in the 1980s, staff thought the relatively low burglary rate was partly attributable to the nature of the population: “because of the length of residence, people look out for each other”. Slightly more ambiguously, at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in the 1990s, the estate manager said he did not have much involvement in conflicts or anti-social behaviour: “people and children in [E1] tend to sort things out for themselves”. Residents of some estates valued this strong informal social control as part of the special characteristics of their estate. In 2016, a current resident at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) posted, ‘what you see is what you get, if you have a problem with someone you go to see them n sort it out, rather than giving it large n ringing the coppers for pointless shit’. Ambiguities and disadvantages Those on the inside of strong networks could feel safe and supported, but strong ties between existing members of the community could make newcomers or outsiders feel isolated and vulnerable. A former E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) resident posted, ‘Back in the 1980s it was a place you could feel safe’; but then continued perhaps more ominously, ‘… and anyone coming on there to cause trouble would get sorted out pretty sharpish’. He was also tolerant of what was at least antisocial behaviour: ‘the chippy came to work many a morning to find someone had stolen all the scampi & Pies and thrown all the frozen chips into the fryer and turned it on…’. A young adult who lived at E16 in the 1990s posted, ‘i know these people round there won’t touch me coz they all know me and my family’. However, strong community could have a ‘dark side’. She added, ‘it still can be very scary’. In the late 1980s, the local manager at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) said, “some new people have come onto the estate, [they are] accepted as long as they don’t break the inhabitants’ ‘code’”. By the 1990s, a tenants’ group had formed at E11, made up of relatively recent arrivals. Members told me they felt different from: “what we call them ‘[E11ers]’”; “There’s one lad lived on here ten years and he’s still a stranger”; “People don’t speak to you. Do they? … it’s a very slow process.” At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), the close networks that had developed by the 1980s meant that there had been feuds which required management involvement. Vandals and rubbish dumpers (and possibly residents involved in more serious anti-social behaviour or crime) who were

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‘insiders’ were protected and not informed on. A visiting researcher reported that in the early 1980s residents at E8 had distinctive social norms (1936/1,000/h/Mid), and ‘regard informers and child batterers with great hostility and subject them to harassment, while thieving is regarded quite leniently’. At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), the manager said that by the 1980s ‘vandals and rubbish dumpers’ who were ‘insiders’ were protected and not informed on. Strong social networks might exert their own norms with their own social control, which could include resistance to formal social control. A worker commented in 1981 on reluctance to report crime and a general distrust of authority at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) (E12 Joint Report 1981). At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), the manager said that by the 1980s ‘the community’ tended to get together against ‘outsiders’ such as new tenants, tenants who became unpopular, council staff and the police. A resident at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) who had been burgled three times in the late 1970s, told a journalist, ‘The last time they took every bit of furniture I had. But nobody see nothing – nobody heard nothing’ (Thomas 1981). A visiting researcher detected ‘strong anti-authority feeling’ at E14 in 1980. In the late 1980s, the local managers at E14 said that tenants were afraid to testify against thieves – and their fears were justified. After one resident apparently reported another to the police for theft, the alleged thief fired a shotgun at the accuser, resulting in a charge of attempted murder. In 1994, another local manager at the same estate told me, “[it’s] still an area of extended families – which causes me problems if evidence is needed against someone”. She said, “people still don’t report crime so the [crime] figures don’t reflect what’s going on – we’re trying to be strict with people about reporting even broken windows. People are more willing to talk to us [than to the police] but still don’t want to give evidence.” However, she continued, “we lost 120 newly laid paving slabs on Tuesday and 200 on Thursday … people aren’t telling us because they must have seen”. She added that she thought there was quite a lot of domestic violence in the estate, but: “tolerance is higher here, we don’t know what people are putting up with”. In 2016 a resident of the city put out a warning on social media about a suspicious character in the E14 area: ‘keep ya eyes out for a black estate car undercover plod … currently sat on [a main road] towards [E14]’. Research on drugs use in the 2000s across the local authority that owned E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L) reported that tenants had complicated attitudes to cannabis use: ‘They moan about it, unaware that their kids are involved … they tolerate it until they are directly involved, then they demand to know why nothing is being done’ (Lindsell 2004:331). Crack users were

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looked down on by young teenagers on the estate, but the drug had a ‘certain status due to gangster associations and high cost’ among young adults (Lindsell 2004:215). Attitudes and behaviour towards crime and anti-social behaviour varied between residents and estates, and changed over time. In the 1970s, at least one resident at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) was a police sergeant. However, over time, policing has required more qualifications and offered higher pay, and the spatial and social distance between estate residents and police has probably grown. On the other hand, social mores across society, including the degree to which people should call on formal agents of authorities to deal with problems, changed substantially over estate lifetimes, and there have been changes in the estates. The resident at E3 who had been burgled three times in the 1970s told a journalist in the 1980s, ‘now things is a bit better and people call the police if they are suspicious’ (Thomas 1981). At E15 (1946/400/h/NE), in 1994 the landlord was using professional witnesses, people paid to live in the estate to observe goings-on, because the threat of intimidation meant it was impossible to get witness statements from residents. However, by 1997, a Neighbourhood Watch scheme was being set up, after redevelopment and other improvement efforts. The local police constable was quoted saying, ‘a few years ago we would never have believed [E15] would have a Neighbourhood Watch scheme. But attitudes have changed on the estate and the watch will further improve the relationship between residents and the police’ (Landells 1998). In general, however, there was a shift from self-policing of behaviour to more oversight and involvement on the part of landlords and other professional agencies. Self-policing featured among the characteristics of the now-gone ‘good old days’ in posted reminiscences of several former estate residents. Probably ironically, a former resident of E4 (1938/300/ fl/L) posted in 2016, ‘Everything was so simple in the old days. [S]tress what was that, we just use[d] to have a good old fight sorted’.

Children’s play Like part of Chapter 8, this section draws on webposts made by adults about their childhoods at the 20 estates, mostly in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Children made up an important fraction of estate residents (Chapter 10), and their perceptions and experiences were often very different from those of many adult residents and housing management staff. The earlier section demonstrated how the combination of the estates and children could create nuisance and vandalism (Chapter 8).

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This section demonstrates how it also created pleasures and experiences that in some cases were distinctive advantages of estate life, and should be counted as among their successes. Conducive environments Posters who grew up in the estates described a rich variety of play activities in the estates, which did not involve adult leaders, designated playing areas, or much equipment. All that was needed was some other children and some outdoor space. At E4 (1938/300/fl/L), they recalled playing British bulldog, cannon, catapults, cricket, cycling, fishing (in the adjacent stream), football, go-karting, marbles, paddling, playing with shopping trolleys, rounders, runouts, shooting with an air rifle, skipping, swings, ting tang tommy, and two balls up the wall, between the 1950s and 1980s. At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), they remembered back stop, basketball, body popping, breakdancing, British bulldog, camps, cricket, first base, football, hide and seek, knock down ginger, riding BMXs, roller skating (including while holding on to the back of the ice cream van), rounders, run outs, sliding in bread crates, squares, subutteo, tennis, test match, texan bars, and ting tang tommy. Posters from estates at the urban fringes recalled playing with the natural environment and ex-industrial sites, for example sliding on slag heaps, swimming in ponds, making bikes and ‘bogies’ out of scrap, finding conkers, and carol singing for money at E12 (1947/1,000/h/ NE) in the 1950s, sledging and swimming in the canal in the 1970s and 1980s at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), and making dens, ‘hay jumps’, and tree swings at E15 (1946/400/h/NE). Another described his childhood at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) in a large industrial city in the 1970s and 1980s: It was also a great place to collect frogspawn – and frogs – and ‘snails’ ! In spring we used to go picking the daffodils around the canal and in autum we picked all the blackberrys and raspberrys …. We used to also have picnics along the bank and used to swim … I used to go climbing the trees in the ‘forest’ that was near the stream and making ropeswings out of anything we could find … And the amount of ‘dens’ we made in there! We used go out early in the morning and return home when we got hungry – then go out again until the sun started to go down.

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Even in London, posters recalled making camps and making bonfires at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), and playing conkers and making camps at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L). Estate environments and communities enabled the independent child play culture that folklorists had described up to five decades before (Opie and Opie 1959), and which many 21st-century parents might wish for their own children. Estate upbringings provided some unusual conditions which, at least for many, facilitated enjoyable, even unusually enjoyable, childhoods: a large peer group, unsupervised and semi-supervised play, informal spaces to play as well as facilities intended for children, and networks of familiar adults. All of the estates had relatively high child populations during most webposters’ childhoods (Chapter 10). They could walk to each others’ homes and congregate in public spaces. A poster who grew up at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in the 1950s said ‘There was always a gang of us. Such fun.’ Another from E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW), said ‘there use to be about 30 kids playin at once’. One recalled the names of nearly forty children and adults he knew forty years before in the 1970s at E10 (1971/900/deck/L). Another, who did not live at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) but who had socialised there in his teens, listed 93 people he had known. Many children spent much of their time outdoors in estate public spaces, especially if their homes were crowded or it there were tensions at home. At E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L) a poster recalled, ‘I was never in!!’. Another who grew up at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) posted, ‘I was allowed to play if I could here my dad’s whistle’. The estates of flats all had grassed or hard-surfaced areas visible from homes, which allowed parents to let primary school-aged children play in relative safety with only light supervision. A former resident of E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), posted, ‘mum use to let me run loose coz she new i didnt need to go outside no worrys about a car knocking me over’. Another who was a parent herself at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) posted, ‘i … used to sit for hours watching the world go by whilst my kids played out on the square’ . Norms of child supervision have varied between classes and neighbourhoods, and over time. At least some staff and tenants thought some parents did not supervise enough, leading to nuisance or neglect. At E15 (1946/400/h/NE) in 1982, residents’ group members complained about “children running wild”. At E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in 1994, the manager said, “Kids are left out all night, [or] in the house on their own.” In 2008, a poster who had lived at E16 from childhood in the 1980s thought that parenting had changed for the worse, but in another way: ‘it used to be really good on here but can you see the parents of the people still on here

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coming out to join them in a game of run outs or rounders or even a big water fight? I think not!’ In estates of houses, despite individual gardens, children played on streets, in playgrounds, on cul de sacs and odd areas. Children commandeered spaces which had not been intended for play. One former resident posted a picture of apparently unstimulating space between blocks at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 2015, ‘I used to dig mud pies on that green.’ Hard surfacing, slopes, secluded spots, derelict sites, lifts and other equipment, and natural sites all stimulated play. A poster recalled life at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L): ‘I lived on skates, so many hills to go down.’ Another said ‘We [the girls] used to hang out in the car parks with our ghetto blasters whilst the boys did bmx.’ A poster from E18 recalled, ‘being on the walkway wid your peeps [friends] even though it was raining’. Lifts provided particular fascination. A poster from E16 remembered ‘going up and down in lifts in the tower blocks just for the fun of it’. Another from E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) recalled: ‘letting someone go up in the lift then pull the firemans switch down so the lift came back to the ground floor … wait for the adult in the lift to curse … this was often repeated several times. Lol.’ Family photos posted by residents on social media include children biking on balconies, posing for the camera with dolls, toy pushchairs, scooters and bikes, running and jumping, using slides and climbing frames, playing football and even using inflatable paddling pools in open space in the estates. Some pictures were taken not from ground level but from the parents’-eye-view at flat level above. Many children got to know many other residents through family networks and spending time outdoors. A poster who grew up at E4 (1938/300/fl/L), apparently in the 1970s, said ‘We grew up knowing our neighbours well (with so many people living so close to one another it’s hard to be anonymous), having lots of friends and a genuine sense of community and belonging.’ The supervision task could be shared between friends and acquaintances, which also added to networks. A poster from E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) said ‘All the mum’s used to watch out for each others kids which made it a lovely place to grow up, you knew you could go to anyone for help.’ Estate caretakers tended to play an informal role in managing children’s play at flatted estates. A poster from E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L) said ‘bless him poor man he was always having to chase us out of somewhere’. Thirty-seven years after leaving E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L), another could remember seven caretakers’ names, and webposters who grew up in the estates recalled caretakers, youth workers, shopkeepers, launderette workers and doctors by name

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Photo 11.1: A professional photograph of children’s play in public space at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) in 1971, when the estate was in its first year, showing cycling, dog walking and chatting in the space between blocks, which has planters and semi-mature trees. Other spaces used for informal play are in view – the covered walkways giving access to upper maisonettes (at third floor level at rear), and the semi-basement garaging area to the rear with openings onto the square. No adults are visible or appear to be actively monitoring children, although nearly 30 homes can be seen, but the design allows for passive monitoring (coming to the windows or onto the private terraces) and contact (shouting down).

Source: London Metropolitan Archives (City of London). Photographer unknown.

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Photo 11.2: A resident’s photo of public space at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the 1970s, when the estate was in its 40s. Public space is being used for clothes drying, as intended by the estate’s original planners, but also for rather disorganised parking of the growing number of vehicles owned by residents, not foreseen in the 1930s, and also for children’s play. Clothes drying faded out as use of driers at launderettes and ownership of individual driers increased. In the early 1980s, public space was reorganised with marked, allocated parking places and pergolas. This squeezed out informal play, although an improved playground was provided adjacent to the estate.

Source: Former resident of E4

from twenty or thirty years before at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). Former child residents also recalled eccentric adult residents, some perhaps with mental health problems, who they found fascinating and sometimes frightening. Some from E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) recalled: ‘[XY] (Steptoe) with the dog with three legs called Moss’, ‘black chicken Harry and no knickers, his girl’, and ‘Charlie Chuck’. One mentioned ‘the funny druggies’ at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), and another remembered, ‘old Dave that lived on the 10th floor … he always used to throw his dirty pants out the window’ at E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L). Risks to children The lack of close adult supervision, adventurous play, and some of the estate ‘eccentrics’ could pose real dangers. A man who grew up at the urban fringe at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in the 1950s said: “One day we were chased by this daft old bloke with a blunderbuss – what

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a noise it made.” Another, who grew up at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) in the 1970s, said: ‘we got exposed at a young age to things that most people don’t see. As a boy of about 8 I remember watching a woman coming screaming out of our block with blood pouring from her head after her husband had hit her with a meat cleaver. Similarly, I’ve seen people stabbed, beaten. However, I think that despite these things, I had a really enjoyable childhood.’ A poster who lived at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) until the age of 6 or 7 in the late 1980s and early 1990s recalled, ‘watching smack heads, prostitutes and pimps pootle about their daily lives shagging, mugging and dancing about mashed out of there trees’. Another reminisced, ‘Who can reme[mber] when the police brought in the six wheeld armourd tank to dispurse the drug dealers’ at E18 (1966/1,600/ deck/L). Another who grew up at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in the 1980s, and described the rich variety of life there: ‘the [public disorders], [the sweet shop], spray paints, the works!!’ There could be more than a little bravado in these comments, and children had different responses from adults partly because they less aware that some of their experiences were unusual and might have been ‘worst times’ for others. One poster commented in 2014 that when he grew up at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in the 1970s, ‘It was still all I knew and I thought it was fine… Social workers think I was deprived.’ However, a few posters described events that were clearly frightening at the time. A woman who grew up at E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) had experienced attempted assault or abduction: ‘I was almost grabbed by a man when I was five going from [an estate] shop to [one of the blocks] I held on to the stairwell doorframe and cried out loud when he was dragging me he ended up letting go and running.’ Another posted about an eccentric at E9 (1966/800/ mixed/L) perhaps with mental health problems, ‘I remember her chasing me with a screwdriver.’ In 1986, a boy was killed at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) after he got on top of a lift in one of the tower blocks (E16’s local authority 1986b). These risks meant that the estates were places of constraint rather than freedom for some children. Some parents kept children indoors or otherwise constrained children’s play due to fear of physical danger, racial harassment or bad influence. An early resident at E16 complained about insolent child vandals, and made her own children play indoors

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(Tracey 1974). A later resident posted in 2008, ‘I cant let my daughter play on the landing because of the smell of skunk!’ When another resident moved to E16 from a rural area, her children: ‘had to be educated to become streetwise … to cope with children who had a lot of stress in their lives, and who unfortunately take it out on other children’. Researchers said in 2015 that at the estate, ‘children and young people have a clear and sophisticated understanding of territory and how to manage and survive in it’ (Scanlon et al c2015:11).

Friendship, neighbouring and community events When asked what was the best thing about living in their estates over the period 1982–2005, many groups of residents’ representatives responded that it was ‘the people’. For example, in the late 1980s, residents’ group members at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) said that the best thing about the estate was “the people… if the housing was ok, this would be a good community”. According to a Mass Observation observer, in the early summer of 1938 on a new estate in the local authority that owned E2 (1937/300/h/NW): ‘life all along is one continuous chain of friendship’. A resident who arrived at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) after being bombed out in 1941 said, ‘People were very friendly round here… and it was a very good place to live’ (E2 LHG 1987:22). In 1988, the resident chair of the credit union at E14 (1926/900/h/NE), said, “There are a lot of good people on [E14] … people are friendly, I know everyone, we are all in the same position.” A former resident of E4 (1938/300/fl/L) posted the names of eight of the families who shared the same staircase in her block over sixty years before. A poster who was the daughter of pub tenants at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said, ‘everyone new everyone it was like Eastenders!’ In 2005, the local manager at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) said, “it’s a very warm community”. Individual residents interviewed in the street at E6 (1949/600/fl/L) said they liked the estate because it had “very good neighbours [who] do a lot of socialising together at the community centre” and that “neighbours [are] quite friendly; you don’t get any argy bargy”. A resident who had been at E16 for six years said in 1995, ‘Sometimes it takes me about an hour, without exaggerating, to walk to the shopping centre’ (Issifu 1995:68-69). In 2013, a resident at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) posted, ‘I so much love living here, I have just come back from my weekly estate walk about and chatted to ten people I know.’

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Wide acquaintance provided a sense of security. Another former resident of E16 posted, ‘everyone knew everyone and u always felt safe’. Some links led to mutual aid. In 1977 one of the first residents at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) recalled her welcome in 1934: ‘outside my door was a pint of milk, a loaf of bread and a 1/2lb of butter’ (E13 LHP 1977:7). Fifty years later, a resident posted about neighbours at E16 in the 1980s: ‘the best neighbours possible, even people you hadnt spoken to before would help you out. It was a real community, very hard to find these days. i do miss it.’ Communal events put on by informal groups of residents, tenants’ groups or community workers stood out in many memories. Residents recalled multi-generational events including May fairs, barbecues, summer festivals, coach trips, penny for the guy, bonfire nights, Christmas parties, and parties for royal celebrations. A former resident of E16 posted, ‘I.. miss new years eve there was no point going to bed b4 midnight as the square would just come alive with sauce pans lids being banged and everyone shouting “happy new year”.’ At E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), a former resident posted, ‘People on the landing left doors open and all were friendly and were forever popping in and out. There used to be some great carnival days and the bonfires Photo 11.3: Some resident members of the board of E1’s Tenant Management Organisation outside their office in the estate in 2005, when the estate was aged 76 and the TMO had been operating for two years.

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and firework displays really were something special.’ Residents’ photos posted on the internet include community centres with trestle tables set out for communal feasts, and crowds, barbecues, rock bands, brass bands, people in fancy dress and children with facepaint at outdoor carnivals. In addition, many residents owed strong personal friendships to the estates. E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) gave one resident ‘life long friends!’ Another said that she, ‘met some brill people that i can call friends’ at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE). In 1946, the community worker at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) quoted in Chapter 1 said, ‘one of the great evils of modern society is that in it the community spirit has withered’ (White 1946:12). Over forty years later, in 2005, residents told me that the people were the ‘best thing’ about E13. It is hard to trace trends over time, but there is certainly not good evidence to suggest that ‘friendliness’ or ‘sense of community’ in the estates declined over time, or was weaker than elsewhere, or that neighbour problems were any greater (Table 11.1).

Choice and constraint in the process of ethnic diversification The residential locations of people of ethnic minorities have often been discussed in terms of degrees of ‘choice’ or ‘constraint’. However, whether black and minority ethnic (BAME) populations in the 20 estates were high or low compared to populations in the wider area, the patterns were more to do with constraint than choice. Because the estates were relatively unpopular for large parts of their lifetimes (Chapter 9), many people of all ethnicities who moved in would have done so through constraint. However, many residents from BAME backgrounds experienced additional constraint, from overt or institutional discrimination within the allocations system, and from the effects of prejudice. Some residents in diversifying estates were well aware of these arguments. In 1980, the chair of the tenants’ association at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) said the fact that 51 per cent of the estate’s residents were black, compared to 23 per cent in the local authority, Table 11.1: Neighbour nuisance in ten estates according to residents, 2005, and in England, 2004/05

Estates England

Not a problem (%) 83 86

A problem but not serious (%) 10 10

Source: As for Table 8.1

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A serious problem (%) 6 4

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was due to the effects of discrimination and homelessness on black people (Styles 1980). When we met in 1994, members of one of the two residents’ groups at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) specifically asked me to record their view that minority ethnic people were overrepresented in council tenure because of low pay and prejudice. In 1983, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) served a notice on the local authority that owned E5 (1949/700/fl/L), after an investigation into the allocation of council homes (CRE 1984). The CRE found that applicants of West Indian, Asian and African origin did not get the same quality housing as white people, even after controlling for household type, area choice, rent arrears and medical need. Black applicants made up 45 per cent of the waiting list but were allocated 75 per cent of the less desirable homes, which, in the local authority at the time, were first-generation homes. Applicants’ files recorded race, and black applicants tended to get worse gradings. The local authority accepted the findings, but noted that similar patterns might be found in most urban authorities. At this time, E5 was not one of the oldest or least popular estates in the area (Chapter  9). BAME residents made up 13 per cent of the estate residents in 1981 compared to the local authority average of 28 per cent (Chapter 10). After the CRE report, the proportion of BAME residents at E5 grew, and by 2001 minority residents were no longer under-represented in the estate. At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) in 1994, residents’ group members, mostly black, gave examples of alleged corruption and racial discrimination on the part of council officers over jobs and housing allocation: “people not dealing professionally, personal matters come into it. It’s tribalism.” They said they had preferred the situation in the recent past when local authority staff were mostly white, and believed that there was now discrimination by Asians against blacks and by West Indians against Africans. At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), the manager of the community education centre in the 1990s said, ‘historically it’s been a very white community… largely because of the racist allocations policy’ (Edwards 1995:44). Initially, rents were relatively high and allocations restrictive (Chapter 10). However some white residents themselves may have been a more significant factor in constraining minority ethnic population. All the ethnic minority tenants at E16 who were involved in an oral history project in 1990 described repeated and serious incidents of racial harassment. One early child resident faced racism from students and teachers at her all-white school: ‘they weren’t used to seeing Asians a lot at that time’ (Muhammed 1995:10). When a black resident arrived in 1979, he said, ‘There was only one other

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black person living here … he got badly beaten in a racist attack at the pub’ (Gordon 1995:95). The part of London in which E16 was located had a reputation as a National Front and later British National Party stronghold throughout the estate’s lifetime. A resident of Tanzanian Asian origin said: Right from day one we started to be harassed, by children in particular. They knocked on the door every evening, shouted racist abuse through the letter box  … My children  … could not go out to play for fear of white children beating them up … our life was just … staying within four walls. (Jiwanai 1995:51) Between 1981 and 1991, the BAME population of the estate increased from 7 per cent to 27 per cent, and went from being under-represented to being over-represented. In 1994, white members of the estate residents’ group I talked to were dismissive about racial harassment: “95 per cent of the ethnic groups in the estate would say there are no problems … incidents of neighbour disputes and teenagers fighting are being automatically tagged [as racially motivated], some people want to get a transfer”. One said that the Asian off-licensee in the estate had reported racist abuse, threats and vandalism, but said: “I’ve never seen him with a bandage on his head to prove he’s been attacked.” Ironically, when in 2000 the local authority decided to demolish and redevelop, the estate’s new residents’ group challenged the decision, enlisting the support of the CRE (Chapters 7, 13). In their view, large numbers of black residents had been disadvantaged for many years by being housed in one of the least popular estates in the local authority, and now the community they had built would be broken up, and individuals might end up worse off (Weaver 2002). However, demolition and dispersal went ahead, and, although BAME residents made up 58 per cent of the partly completed mixed-tenure redevelopment in 2011, they were not over-represented in the attractive new area. At E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), where the local authority had a relatively high BAME population, from the 1960s, minorities were under-represented at least until 2011. In the 1990s, an E8 resident in her 70s, by all indications of white ethnicity, complained: “Asians – afro – that many of them – unbelievable. Nobody wanted to speak to them very much. Then they started putting them in the council houses – what could you do about it? I can’t see there’ll be many English people left” (BLMMB 1).

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At this point, white residents made up 92 per cent of the estate’s population. A man of Indian origin born in 1964 in the local authority experienced racism playing football in the city, and at E8 in particular: “We all dreaded going to play a team in [E8], our goal keeper was chased out with a Ford Cortina” (BLMMB 3). He noted that mainlywhite teams also feared harassment at the estate. In 1994, the local housing manager acknowledged and in effect acquiesced to racism in the estate: “Most people on [E8] don’t like Asians because they are quiet … The only Asians who’ve stayed are shopkeepers – who give credit.” However, from that point on the local authority began to confront racial harassment. The BAME population in the estate grew from 3 per cent to 5 per cent over the period 1991–2001. In 2005, a different local manager said, seemingly without irony, “the mix of ethnicities on the estate is unheard of. It’s fantastic! Some even come here through choice now.” By 2011, 26 per cent of the estate population was of minority ethnicity, although they were still underrepresented given that the local authority was majority minority.

A punk community E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) was among the least popular estates in the local authority for most of its lifetime (Chapter 9), and was ultimately almost completely demolished (Chapter 13). Only 75 per cent of homes originally built were ever filled, and until it was redeveloped, it always had high turnover. A former tenant posted that in the 1970s, ‘it had mainly working families’. However, because of its large number of empty homes and low demand, the estate developed a very unusual youthful population, and had a social environment that was distinctive in positive as well as negative ways. When the estate was only 4 years old, some tenants were already subletting flats to all-comers in exchange for ‘key money’ (Anon. E20 2006), and over the 1970s and 1980s, the local authority lost control of the estate’s population. One former resident said, ‘Half the flats were officially empty – though many of the supposedly vacant were squatted and many of the officially occupied were sub-let for a few quid a week in the local pubs.’ The estate was effectively opened up to a much wider, international market for those without family or work ties. In 1984, a researcher reported, ‘it is held that single male migrants from Donegal docked in Liverpool and headed straight for [E20]’ (Power 1984:303). In 2015, an ex-resident posted his memory of, ‘all young babyfaced paddy punks’. By the mid-1980s, the vast majority of new (official) tenants

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were single people, who were low priority and would struggle to be allocated homes elsewhere (E20 EMDG 1987), and nearly half were under 21, which was extremely unusual for council housing. Eighty-two per cent of tenants claimed housing benefit, indicating low income, and in 1987 ‘many tenants … are without gas and/or electricity supplies because of debts’ (E20 EMDG 1987). In the mid-1980s the estate’s tenants’ association, which was largely a relic of earlier lettings said, probably in understatement, that “young people have a lot of freedom on the estate  … some people have more room than they’d have elsewhere”. A former resident posted, perhaps with some exaggeration, ‘It was full of drug dealers when I was there … [the flats] were all connected at one time [ie via tunnels through walls].’ Another poster said the estate ‘was full of actual grown up adults who still sniffed glue’. The vast majority of the estate was demolished in 1989, and the area manager told me in 1994, “demolition broke up a very interesting community… we turned a blind eye to a lot of things, it wasn’t a usual council estate”. He and a colleague recalled almost wistfully the very unusual work environment of their time at the estate, with colourful if sometimes dangerous characters and events, and freedom from standard council policy and practice. Similarly, some former residents of E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) recalled the estate with warmth as an unusual place and unusual community which played an important Photo 11.4: Young residents (and dogs) at E20 in the 1980s

Source: Former resident and former visitor to E20

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role in their lives. Undoubtedly, however, many former residents found the estate unpleasant or frightening, and many left when they could. The transitions in population mix and the rival moral authorities of different groups were still the subject of tension twenty years later. A former resident posted in 2014: Puncks n skin heads had nowt to do with [E20 nickname] just hard workin top familys fuckin winds me up … [they] overrided al the good things like the play scheme for kids the disco the community them lot were shit and were just bypassers that gave the whole community a bad name. Another ex-resident, using the website to intervene to make peace between different views and rival claims to legitimacy, said: ‘everyone who lived on [E20 nickname] had something to do with [E20 nickname]’.

Conclusion Relative unpopularity for much of estate lifetimes, high crime at certain points, and absolutely and relatively deprived residents (Chapters 8, 9, 10) meant distinctive communities and social environments in the 20 estates. There were some distinctive advantages for at least some residents, at least some periods, which should be recognised as among the successes of the estates. Many residents recalled extensive family networks, friendship, neighbouring and community events, and unusual communities. Most of the estates provided conducive physical and social environments for children’s play, and some were remembered as ideal places to grow up. However, there were also distinctive ambiguities, tensions over social norms and over informal and formal social control, and distinctive disadvantages in some places, at some points, for some people, which should be counted among estate problems. There were difficulties for newcomers, dangers for children and threats to black and minority ethnic residents. These in turn will have played a role in estates’ relative unpopularity, and continued distinctive communities over time. The nature of the evidence means that it is not possible to say whether advantages or disadvantages were most significant and how this varied over time and between estates. However, it is important to acknowledge the strength of community and richness of play in these ‘less successful’ estates, advantages not achieved in all other areas. In addition, again, there was a lot of variation in individual experiences. The next chapter explores residents’ access to opportunities from their estates. 192

12

Residents’ access to opportunities Introduction The access to services and opportunities a residential neighbourhood offers will affect the relative popularity of an area. It may affect residents’ education, employment, standard of living and quality of life, and could contribute to ‘inverse care’ (Chapter 2) and to neighbourhood effects (Chapter  3). This chapter describes the availability, quality and cost of a range of estate and neighbourhood services, access to jobs, media representations of estates, evidence of any ‘estate effects’, and residents’ views of their estates, with a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures.

Estate shops and facilities Access to a reasonable selection of shops and facilities is particularly important for those on low incomes, who are less likely to have cars, for older people and families with children, all over-represented in the estates (Chapter 10). All the estates were in urban locations, although some were at the urban fringe: E1 (1929/300/h/NW), E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) and E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE). Most were built near existing high streets with a good range of shops. In 1938, a journalist reported that local shopkeepers were looking forward to the arrival of E4 (1938/300/ fl/L) (‘HD’ 1938). Shops and services near the estate in the 1970s and 1980s recalled by former residents included a fish and chip shop, pie and mash shop, bakers, sweet shop, clothes makers, café, pubs, swimming pool and cinema, as well as places holding jumble sales, and a department store. A former resident posted in 2016, ‘I remember the green grocers [stall] i used to go on Sunday morning to get Vinegar and fresh Mint.’ Shops and shopkeepers loom large in the online recollections of many who grew up in the estates. A former resident of E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) who became a professional rapper sang about her childhood pleasure in ‘bopping to the shops’ in the 1980s. Most estates included shop units, generally in small parades with flats above. However, businesses within estates were generally slow

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to set up, and then often limited and expensive. To some extent this is to be expected in estates with a maximum of 2,000 relatively lowincome households (Chapters 4, 10). When residents first arrived at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), the eight planned shops were not yet open, and one of the first residents said, ‘the Salvation Army used to come round with basin of soup. We used to have a van come round where we could buy things and pay at the end of the week. Otherwise there were no shopping facilities whatsoever’ (E13 LHP 1977:7). When the first residents arrived at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) a few years later, “there was no made up road, no transport, no shops, no schools, and it was just like living in houses in the wilderness” (EMOHA 1). One of the first residents at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) over thirty years later, said, ‘I cried when I got here and realised there was no shops, there was nothing.’ At that time the estate had a doctor’s surgery (Van de Vaart 1995:3), and the milkman and baker had started deliveries by the time the fourth household had arrived (Simkins 1972), but the closest shops were an off-licence and a grocer’s nearly a mile away. Residents living close to these shops asked for a wall to be built to keep E16 children out. Residents had to lobby and wait over a year to get a post box (Anon. E16 1971). In the early post-war period, the London County Council which developed E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L), E6 (1949/600/fl/L) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) planned one shop for every 120 homes (LCC 1957). This ratio would come to appear generous or even problematic as retail changed over estate lifetimes. Seven of the 11 shops at E10 (1971/900/deck/L) were empty in 1980, when the estate was aged 9 (Anon. E10 1980). Estate shops were often expensive even when compared to other small convenience stores in the same area. One of the early residents at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) said that when the shops eventually opened, ‘prices were sky high’ so she didn’t use them (E13 LHP 1977:8). An ex-resident recalled an argument with one of the shopkeepers at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) forty years before: ‘I had a go at him about the price of Mars Bars and him barring me!’ Similarly, in 1994, residents told me that the one shop in E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) was “extortionate”. Estate shopkeepers faced low-income customers, requests for credit and, in some cases, harassment or vandalism. One recalled it was hard to get his shoe shop going at E13 in the late 1930s, partly because ‘there was no work for the people when they came here. They were unemployed and living off the Relieving Officer’ (E13 LHP 1977:8). An ex-resident posted that an E20 shop ‘would sell single cigarettes, single slices of bread, single matches and no doubt a single breath of air if they could … They knew their market!’ Another

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posted that when he was a child at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), the chip shop ‘used to close at 8pm every night in fear of being robbed’. Basic types of estate shops persisted over time (Photos 12.1–12.2). Photo 12.1: A block of flats with a parade of shops beneath it, at E5 (1949/700/ fl/L) in c1982 when the estate was aged c33. There is a betting shop, a newsagents/ tobacconist/confectioners, and a bakers. There are signs of vandalism: a dead tree in the left foreground and broken glass in the stairwell.

Source: PEP

Photo 12.2: The same spot in 2018, when the estate was aged 69. The newsagent is closed, possibly permanently. The betting shop has been taken over by a national chain, and the bakers became a kebab shop about twenty years before. The entry to the block now has a ramp, locked door and entryphone, lighting on the stairs, and glass in the stairwell windows. The block has new windows and balconies, provided through the Decent Homes Programme.

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Estate shops and other local services were also affected by nationwide and local changes in retail (Photo 12.3). In 2019, the tenants of E13’s shopping parade included a charity shop and non-retail businesses such as an accountants and an employment agency. Shopping facilities did not improve at E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L) during the first 30 years of its life, despite promises. From 2009, it was demolished and rebuilt. Despite a planned higher population, with owner occupiers in the majority, initially facilities were improved only modestly (a convenience store, coffee shop, small chain supermarket, and florists). Just as with the development of the 20  estates, more was promised (‘restaurants and specialist shops’) (Scanlon et al c2015), but had not appeared by 2019. Photo 12.3: The signpost outside the closed pub at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), in 2018 when the estate was aged 51, and the pub had been closed for over a decade

Access to neighbourhood shops, GPs and schools From the 2000s, there is detailed Department of Transport data on access to services for all neighbourhoods in England (DoT 2018). In 2016, public transport and walking times from estates to ‘town centres’, food stores, GPs and secondary schools, and the amount of choice available within a 15-minute journey, were similar to those for other neighbourhoods in the same local authorities. Most estates were not badly located within their local authorities, but access and choice

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varied between local authorities. Residents of E1 (1929/300/h/NW), just outside a small town, could not reach the town centre within 15 minutes’ walk or bus journey, although they could reach a food store, doctor and school. In contrast, E6 (1949/600/fl/L) in inner London had ten food stores, nine GPs, three ‘town centres’ and three schools nearby. E10 (1971/900/deck/L), E15 (1946/400/h/NE) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) were the worst served. Notably, all three underwent complete or significant demolition (see Chapter 13). It should also be noted that car owners, whether in the estates or nationwide, would have generally had short journeys to a good choice of services. Schools are particularly important services as they may influence the life chances of young estate residents. The quality of local schools is important to theories of negative neighbourhood effects (Chapter 3). Some of the estates had a choice of secondary schools within very easy reach in 2016, mostly in London, some had just one nearby, and some had none, mostly out of London. In 1994, after national school performance tables first became available, I identified ‘estatelinked’ secondary schools by asking local managers and residents’ reps which schools took the biggest number of estate children. When compared to other students from the same areas and nationwide, in 1994 markedly lower proportions of school students from estatelinked schools achieved five or more GSCEs at grade C or above, the results needed for access to A levels and higher education (Leckie and Figure 12.1: Student performance at age 16 at estate-linked schools, their local authorities, and England, 1994, 2004, 2017 England

LAs

Estate-linked schools

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1994 5+ GCSEs Grades A–C

2004 5+ GCSEs Grades A–C

2017 Attainment 8

Note: Results are for 16 of the 20 estates. Consistent data could not be obtained for E9, E12 and E13. E11 was demolished between 2004 and 2017. Source: Tunstall and Coulter (2006; for 1994 and 2004), and Department for Education (2018)

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Goldstein 2017). By 2004, the gaps had reduced significantly. By 2017, the key measure was average ‘Attainment 8’ scores, the sum of results across the best eight GCSEs. On this measure, estate-linked schools were producing results no different to those in their wider areas and nationwide. This was a remarkable transformation over the 23-year period (Figure 12.1). Photo 12.4: Rubbish and signs of arson in the playground of the primary school at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) in 1994, when the estate was aged up to 48 years old. The school had survived despite clearance and depopulation across the twentieth century.

Source: Photograph by Paul Herrmann

Photo 12.5: The same school 15 years later in 2009. It was not possible to reach the same position because the playground had been fenced. The school has had a new roof and windows, and the playground has been redesigned. The population in the surrounding area was growing, and increased by at least 34 per cent between 2001 and 2016.

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Physical investment at least in schools near many estates over the 1990s and 2000s was visible from estate visits (Photos 12.4 and 12.5).

Access to jobs The number and quality of accessible job opportunities is also central to ideas about neighbourhood effects (Chapter 3). The Department of Transport data shows that in 2016 19 of the estates had an ‘employment centre’ with up to 500  jobs within 15  minutes’ walk or public transport travel. As with services, estate residents appeared to have similar opportunities to other residents of the same local authorities, but there were big differences between local authorities and, again, estates in London were favoured. For E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), which was poorly located for other services, the nearest employment centre was 23 minutes away. If residents were able to travel further, they could reach more opportunities, but local authority and regional location produced big variations. ‘Travel to work areas’ represent the commutable area across which residents might search for work, usually meaning travelling for longer than 15 minutes, including by car. In 2011, the travel to work area for E2 (1937/300/h/NW)) had 110,000 jobs, while all the estates in London had 4.2 million jobs in their travel to work area, and residents at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) could walk to the City of London from their flats. However, estate local authorities and neighbourhoods were also generally high-unemployment areas (Chapter 4), and even if jobs were physically accessible, there might be skills, timetable, transport or other mismatches.

Media representations of estates Residents and staff in all 20 estates referred to media coverage of the estates which they felt was disproportionately voluminous, negative and not objective. They thought media coverage contributed to significant and persistent relative unpopularity, and affected residents’ opportunities. A couple of the estates were the subject of local public debate during development: E4 (1938/200/h/NW) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). Several received extensive and generally positive coverage at opening (Chapter 5). Subsequent media appearances, however, concentrated on ‘problems’, crime or ‘scandal’. The earliest example appears to be from E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1938, just two years after letting was completed: ‘Problems of [E13]’ (Anon. E13’s local authority 1938). Journalists occasionally cooperated with residents. For example, in

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the 1990s when residents at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) felt neglected by the council, they had an ally on the local news desk, which they said led to stories like: ‘[E1] loses out – again’. However, in nearly all cases, residents’ group members and local authority staff alike bemoaned the difficulty of getting positive or balanced coverage. In 1994, tenants from E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) said, “The [local paper] is very unhelpful … we wish we had a good press, but they want good stories.” By 1982, E18 was ‘rarely out of the local news for one reason or another’ (Bacon 1982:218). Staff bemoaned the: ‘[E20] Media Syndrome … even if nothing particularly interesting is happening they can still use the name “[E20]” to generate the interest’ (E20 EMDG 1987). At least six of the estates attracted national newspaper attention at some point. E20 was the subject of regional TV documentaries in 1984 and 1990, and its landlord complained (unsuccessfully) to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission about one of them. As early as 1974, the local authority that owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) set up a unit tasked with ‘improving the image of the Housing Department (particularly that portrayed by the Press and Television)’ (E19’s local authority 1974:1). At E4 (1938/300/fl/L), a senior staff member noted in 1994 that dealing with the media, principally local papers, was one of the growing ‘crisis management’ aspects of his job.

‘Estate effects’ on residents Researchers have investigated the idea of ‘neighbourhood effects’, which can have negative effects on residents that live in deprived areas or areas dominated by social rented tenure in addition to the effects of their own deprivation (Chapter 3). Research using quantitative methods has found relationships between some neighbourhood characteristics and outcomes for residents, although the results are complex (Galster 2007; Musterd et al 2012; Manley et al 2013). This section uses very different, qualitative evidence to explore the same issues. It identifies processes through which ‘estate effects’ might operate, but cannot say how prevalent or powerful they were. Shame Estate unpopularity had psychological effects on at least some residents, engendering shame and stress and demanding ‘emotional labour’ to counter or ignore others’ attitudes, and this could have affected resident aspirations and outcomes.

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In the 1930s and 1940s, child and adult residents at E13 (1933/1,100/ fl/L) were actively combating the estate’s reputation as a ‘slum clearance estate’ and its effects. A former child resident recalled that when no-one ‘failed’ the initial delousing process, it ‘helped us a great deal’ (E13 LHP 1977:14). A former community worker recalled fights between kids from the estate and surrounding areas. The children from the estate stood out due to their ‘inferior physique, manners, speech and dress’ and the local headteacher ‘protested that the two groups of children would never mix’ (White 1946:16). A former resident said that when one of the estate children became head boy: ‘we were really proud’ (Wilson and Kirby 1980a:17). Forty years later, in 1979, a resident at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) said, ‘It’s a place you can’t say where you live. People class it as a down, rock-bottom area, class you all the same’, and another said, ‘You feel ashamed, down-graded by living here’ (Vamplew 1992: 228). In the late 1980s, the director of housing for E1 (1929/300/h/NW) referred to the ‘shame factor’ of living on the estate, which was ‘grossly stigmatised’ (Director of Housing E1’s local authority 1987:3). One tenant at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) said, ‘people turn up their noses and insinuate that you are socially unacceptable because you live in a socially unacceptable place’ (E20 EMDG 1987:np). A former resident posted in 2011, ‘I remember everyone’s negative reaction when I told them where I lived, as if I was some kind of leper who could never amount to anything and that I might taint them by association.’ A resident who moved to E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) in the 1970s as a child posted, ‘i, always stuck up for [E16],people always used to slag it off they didnt no what they were missing’. Another who lived at the estate for ten years posted, ‘wen i tell ppl i used to live there all they say all the time is omg did u get robbed and stuff..i never got robbed or nuffin it was always alrite there’. Concern about the appearance or the safety of the area prevented some from having friends or relatives to visit. A resident at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) told me in 2004, “It’s a dump and that’s being polite … you’re ashamed of telling people where you live. You’re on the bus and you want to stay on and go straight through.” When asked what was bad about E6 (1949/600/ fl/L), a member of the residents’ group said in 1994, “dogs, urine, dirt – I’m ashamed to have people visit”. Although a woman who grew up at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in the 1980s posted 20 years later, ‘OMG Good old [E7]’, she also recalled, ‘None of my friends parents wanted them to come to [E7]’. This shame must have been extremely painful for the thousands of residents who were likely to have experienced it. They might have reacted by responding assertively or even aggressively,

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by becoming depressed – or by attempting to move out, as many did. There may have been long-term effects on their self-image, and possibly on their mental health. Pride Several of those who grew up at the estates were proud of their origins, and said that estates had been important to the making of their identity, whether through shared experiences with their peers from the estate or through dealing with adversity, including the reputation of the area. In the 2010s, someone posted, ‘[E18] since 1980 … [E18’s nickname] … its in my blood’. Another poster said: ‘You can take the boy out [E16] but you cant take [E16] out the boy … love it born and bread.’ A former resident at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) posted: You know some people look down they’re noses at us from tough council estates but trust me, we have good hearts and are the salt of the earth … my kids grew up in [E13] and I’m proud of it, got some of the bestest long time friends for myself and both my kids still have friends from there. Several posters felt that the experience of growing up in the estates had made them able to deal with a wide range of people and situations. If there had been adversity, then ultimately they had benefited from it; or if they had had to adopt a certain identity, then it was one they were happy to accept. For example, one posted: E20 [1968/1,000/deck/NW] made us strong and accept that life isint going to be smooth all the way.im glad my mother moved to [the local authority] rather than a posh town to be a goody two shoes. To me that was the REAL LIFE and if it were still up i would take my kids to learn the same way. In 2011, a former resident said, ‘being brought up on E4 [1938/300/ fl/L], prepared you for anything you would face in life if you could get on there you would get on anywhere’. When E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) was redeveloped, the local manager recalled that the local authority decided against a name change, as “residents didn’t want to call it anything else”. Pride in place of origin was sufficiently common in the 2000s that a ready-made paragraph was circulating on Facebook, for residents of particular areas to adapt

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and re-post. A resident of E1 (1929/300/h/NW) posted it: ‘Re-post if you’re proud that you came from a close knit community and you will never forget where you came from!. Copy & Paste, just change where you were brought up, i would never change where I got brought up, [E1] taught me so much’. One aspect of pride was the claim to authenticity as a resident of a locally known and sometimes notorious neighbourhood. In 2010, a former resident of E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) taunted people from a nearby area for trying to claim they were from E19. In some cases, pride was at least partly perverse or defensive, and part of a negotiation by residents with poor reputation and, sometimes, discrimination that they met. This kind of pride could exist alongside narrowed horizons or opportunities. Effects on resident employment, income and social mobility A few interviewees believed that poor estate reputation affected residents’ job opportunities. At E1 (1929/300/h/NW) in the 1980s, the local authority’s director of housing said it was more difficult to get work if you lived in the estate than in other areas. At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in the 1990s, the local manager said, “I visited some local employers and found out they employed no-one from the estate and explicitly said they would not do so because the youth on the estate were thought to be trouble.” At E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), nearby, at the same time, residents said, “people lie about their address in order to apply for jobs because otherwise they probably wouldn’t get an interview”. Research I carried out found no evidence of a neighbourhood reputation effect on the chance of being called to a job interview (Tunstall et al 2014), but it is possible that there was some discrimination at various times against residents of the 20 estates. Some posters were aware of the community’s or outsiders’ expectations of them, or of the typical trajectories of residents. One who grew up in E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in the 1970s, looked back in 2014: What I rebelled against: Everything I reckon, basically authority. Fell out with my Dad, my bosses … Looked all the time for friends and largely found them. Loved [as I still do to this day] [the local football team]. Liked music of course as most working class boys did. Went out … a lot …

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Typical low horizons but I’m happy with that. [Nonetheless, he owned his own business.] One poster, born in 1984, spent some of his childhood at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and posted that this start in life made him aware that the term ‘working class’ (rather than the estate address) was a label associated with unemployment, benefits, poverty, being prejudiced, and experiencing discrimination. He consciously tried to avoid fitting this stereotype, but felt some constraint from the estate and its social environment. At school he met people from a wider class mix, and said that when he went ‘up town’ (to central London), ‘you can be more yourself, there’s freedom. There’s no criteria or expectations.’ Another poster recalled: ‘My claim to fame back in the [E4: 1938/300/fl/L] Days. Was I promised my self I wouldn’t work for [a local factory] And I never did.’ A number of web posters referred, with irony or defiance, to outsiders’ low expectations of them. Low expectations could be a burden, but could be defied or exceeded. In 2011, one said, ‘ha, i found a quote yesterday stating that all who lived on [E20: 1968/1,000/deck/ NW’s nickname] were no-ones and never will bees, thats ironic cos i know so many richly talented people who rose up from the rubble.’ Another former E20 resident posted, ‘now I live elsewhere in Europe, and am fluent in that language … not bad for an [E20] reject who was never supposed to amount to anything’. Some estate residents, particularly from London estates, literally went far. For example, in the 2000s, some people who grew up at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) were reminiscing on social media about the estate from their new homes in the US and Australia. A few ex-residents commented that the estate environment had actively positive effects on them, providing important opportunities which led on to education and employment. One who had a degree in drama, and had worked for BBC and Arts Council recalled two youth workers from her childhood at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), ‘who had the foresight to run drama classes  … they are still paying off even now!’ Exceptional individual examples of achievement cannot be taken as evidence that there are not serious barriers. However, the achievements of residents or former residents of problematised neighbourhoods or estates is not well recorded or recognised, and is worth stating. The 20 estates provided childhood homes to a number of people who became national-level politicians, actors, comedians, singers, and sportspeople whose names most British readers would know, and who also had effects further afield. When my colleague

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interviewed the chair of one of the tenants’ groups at E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L) in 1994, she commented to me (off the record) that he seemed particularly able. By the 2000s, he was governor of a state in an African country with a population of several million. Effects on the cost of living Living in the 20 estates imposed extra costs of living through more expensive shops and higher charges for financial services, regardless of individual risk, and was another example of the ‘inverse care law’. Residents and housing managers from seven estates said that, at some points, all residents were barred from mainstream credit, hire purchase or deliveries, or the right to pay utilities bills in arrears. In 1979, residents at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) said: ‘Living here you are “blacked”, unable to get hire-purchase’ (Vamplew 1992: 228). In the 1980s, it was hard for residents at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) to get mainstream credit (Campbell 1988). A man who lived at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) in the 1980s, posted that the ‘whole estate [was] blacklisted’. Another posted that when his brothers lived at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) in the mid-1980s, ‘they could not get a rented TV never mind credit if they mentioned where they lived!’ The local paper reported that in E20 the tenants were blacklisted by local traders, or charged large deposits (Anon. E20 2006). In the 1990s, the local and area managers at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) said that residents were charged a 25 per cent premium on hire purchase and insurance, and residents’ reps at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) had the same experience. Residents’ reps at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) and E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) complained about loan sharks operating in the estate in the 1990s and 2000s (Hirsch 2004).

Residents’ assessments of their areas In 2005, a large majority of the residents interviewed at random in ten of the estates were satisfied with their area. The proportion who were very satisfied was below the average for deprived neighbourhoods and the average for social housing, as well as the national average. However, the proportion who were satisfied was higher than for social housing on average and close to that for England (Figure 12.2). This suggests a marked rise in the opportunities that estates provided, through improvements in quality, safety and order, social environments. Nineteen of the estates were located in the most deprived tenth of

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 12.2: Residents’ satisfaction with their area in ten estates, 2005 in the most deprived 10 per cent of neighbourhoods in England, in social housing in England, and in England as a whole, 2004/05 % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Estates

Deprived neighbourhoods

Social housing

Very satisfied Neither

Fairly dissatisfied

England

Fairly satisfied Very dissatisfied

Source: As for Table 8.1

neighbourhoods, but on this evidence they did better than other deprived neighbourhoods.

Conclusion The access to opportunities an area offers affects its popularity, residents’ quality of life and life chances. The evidence is patchy and does not cover all the estates’ lifetimes. However, it is clear that there were gaps in services when the 20 estates were being completed or new. Shops within estates were generally expensive and, at least at some points, estate addresses meant good value credit was difficult to obtain. Some estates at the urban fringe and in suburban London were poorly served. In the 1990s and 2000s, estate-linked schools performed below local and national averages. Particularly in periods when estates were very unpopular and had problems, many residents suffered shame and some experienced discrimination because of estate reputation. Most of the estates appeared to have had reasonable access to local services for most of their lifetime. By 2005 resident satisfaction with their areas was close to the national average. By 2018 estate residents had better pedestrian and public transport access and more choice of shops, schools, GPs and employment centres than many

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other neighbourhoods locally and nationwide. Schools serving the estates performed as well as the national average, and estate reputations had improved. Overall, however, there is little evidence that estate locations conferred any advantages in terms of services, jobs and cost of living, and there is more evidence that they created disadvantages. The next chapter investigates the ‘survival’ of homes in the estates, and the extent to which they avoided demolition over their lifetimes.

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13

The survival of the 20 estates Introduction Demolition of homes, or at least early demolition of homes, represents a clear policy, economic and environmental failure; it has come to provide a visual symbol of purported failures across the tenure (see Chapter 2). Survival over an extended period appears to be a necessary, if not sufficient, element of success. This has been reflected throughout the book in the design of the codes used to refer to the 20 estates, from E1 to E20. The numbers refer to the proportion of potential ‘home years’ provided over each estate lifetime to date (see Chapters 1 and 5). When demolition occurs, potential home years are lost. The proportions of potential home years provided to date range from 100% at E1–E7, to 47% at E20. This chapter explores the extent of demolition and survival, the rationales for decisions in individual estates, the ages homes reached, the homes and home-years provided and lost, and how estate demolition and survival compared to rates for other homes and buildings (Chapter 3).

Demolition and survival Estates’ local authorities all had experience of demolishing 19thcentury ‘slum’ homes formerly owned by private landlords. However, by the 1970s, local authorities and urban researchers were forced to acknowledge: ‘We are presently facing a new phenomenon on the British urban scene – public housing only a decade or so old is being vacated and demolished’ (Taylor 1979:1305). Thirteen of the 20 estates were affected to varying extents. The demolition decision-making process was always drawn out, often incremental, and influenced by changing assumptions and contexts. Small-scale demolition Six of the estates experienced some relatively minor demolition by 2019, involving fewer than 30 per cent of the original number of homes (Figure 13.2). This demolition was often precipitated by

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‘exceptional’ repairs costs or ‘exceptional’ low demand for particular spots or types of homes. For example, at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), a few bungalows designed for older residents were demolished in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it became difficult to find tenants. In estates made up of houses, demolition can proceed house by house, while in estates made up only of blocks of flats it is very difficult to remove less than a whole block. At one part of E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW), however, that is just what happened in the early 1990s, where four-storey maisonette blocks were ‘down topped’ or cut horizontally, to form two-storey houses, at great expense. This same idea was considered, but rejected at E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) (E20 EMDG 1987). Several of the estates experienced more than one episode of relatively minor demolition. This small-scale demolition, ostensibly for a variety of ‘special’ reasons, could mount up incrementally over time, and suggested broader underlying problems in the estates, or beyond. For example, at E14 (1926/900/h/NE), by 2019, 16 per cent of homes had been demolished (Photos 13.1 and 13.2). At E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), one of the 30 blocks was lost in the Blitz (Photo 13.3). Photo 13.1: E14 (1926/900/h/NE) aged 68 in 1994. This is the gable end of the pair of houses which were converted from housing use into the council’s neighbourhood housing office as part of a local management project in 1978, when the estate was aged 52. The housing office has a high-security door. It has been damaged by graffiti, and by attempts to ram the building with a car and to start a fire next to it. In the background, there are new housing association homes built just a year or so beforehand, on the site of council homes demolished in the years before that, in response to low demand.

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Photo 13.2: The same view in 2007, when the estate was aged 81; 89 per cent of the original homes in the estate were still in existence. Piecemeal demolition continued across the estate in the 2000s, in response to low demand and vandalism on empty homes. In 2006, the estate’s housing management team merged with another team and moved to a new office. The council felt converting the office back to housing use was not wise, so it was demolished.

Photo 13.3: Bomb damage at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in 1941 when it was 8 years old. Eighty people were killed coming down the stairs on their way to the shelter in front of a neighbouring block.

Source: E13’s local authority. Photographer unknown.

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In the mid-1970s, the Greater London Council built 200 new homes on a site within the estate (Chapter 5). Nonetheless, soon after, one more of the original blocks was demolished by the local authority landlord ‘to create more space’ (Anon. E13 1978). A resident told the local paper that the block had been improved only a few years before, and thought demolition was wasteful (Anon. E17 1977). In 1980/81, two blocks had been vacated so that improvement work could take place, but then ‘were so badly vandalised that [the local authority] decided to demolish them’, according to a visiting researcher. This illustrates the fine and sometimes obscure balance between investing to improve homes, and condemning them as a lost cause. In 2000, another block was knocked down at the age of 64 years, followed by two more in 2005. By 2019, 21  per cent of homes had been demolished and 6 per cent of potential home-years had been lost. At E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), some homes were demolished in the 1970s following fire damage. There had been some cases of fires caused by paraffin heaters, which tenants were using after their electricity was Photo 13.4: E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), here seen in 2018, when it was in its 70s. Some homes were demolished 20 years before in the 1990s, leaving an exposed gable end and an open area, which has been fenced to keep vehicles off. The fencing has not been vandalised, there is no litter, dumping or sign of fires, and the rough grass has been mown. The owner of the house we see side on, bought under the Right to Buy, has felt secure enough to build only a low front garden wall and to create an extension with lots of glass facing onto the open area.

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disconnected for non-payment. However, staff believed some fires were set on purpose by residents who wanted to be rehoused, itself surely a measure of estate failure (Wilson and Kirby 1980b). A few years later, further demolition was being considered: a consultant said, somewhat unconvincingly, ‘selective demolition is not to be regarded as an act of despair but as a positive exercise’ (Chivers 1982:np). By 2019, 10 per cent of homes had been demolished and 4 per cent of potential home-years had been lost. Substantial demolition Five estates experienced substantial demolition, resulting in the loss of more than 30 per cent, but not all, of the original homes by 2019 (Figure 13.2): E15 (1946/400/h/NE), E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) and E20 (1968/1,000/DECK/NW). In each case this demolition took place as part of estate redevelopment projects. Demolished homes were at least partly replaced by new homes in a mix of tenures, in an attempt to set the estates on new paths (Chapter 7). E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) was 89  per cent demolished over the period 1977–95, from age 16 to 47 years, and partially replaced with mixed-tenure housing and other uses. The area on which E19 was built was an archetypal ‘inner city’ in a large city, and was the subject of almost continual redevelopment throughout the 20th century, mostly at the hands of its local authority (Vereker and Mays 1961). E19 was a mixed-generation group of buildings, built in a nearly forty-year sequence of local authority clearance and redevelopment. The first homes were built to replace demolished 19th-century ‘slum’ housing, and were first let in 1936. The final generation, also replacing 19thcentury slums, was completed in 1973. The first demolition of local authority homes on the site came in 1977, soon after the completion of the last new ones. The demolished homes had reached the age of 42. What a visiting researcher called the ‘new slum clearance’ continued in the early 1980s, targeting not only ageing council developments but also some under 20 years old. The main reason for demolishing council homes was perceived poor condition. In the 1980s, the local manager for E19 noted that Liberal councillors preferred improvement, while Labour preferred demolition and building due to the “failure of improvement schemes to make properties popular”. Most of the oldest group of blocks in the estate were demolished in about 1983. Two further blocks built in 1965, including the tower in Photo 13.5, were demolished in 1985 (Alton 1985).

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Photo 13.5: Continuing clearance around the site of E19 in 1965, when the first homes in the estate were aged 29. The tower block in the background formed part of the estate and at this time was just 3 years old. It was only to last another 20 years and was demolished in 1985, at the age of 23.

Source: E19’s local authority archives, photographer unknown

A researcher visiting the estate in 1988 saw derelict sites and emptying blocks. In one block close to the city centre, ‘people didn’t want to move … [the] local councillor started listening and the decision to demolish was reversed’. However, in 1995, some blocks aged just 22 were knocked down. By 2005 about 79 per cent of the local authority homes which had been within the management area boundaries in 1978, just 27 years before, had been demolished. When my colleague talked to local authority staff in 2005, she found that they were in a state of “massive confusion about where the ‘estate’ is”, due to the scale of demolition and rebuilding. The lost local authority homes had been partially replaced by new housing association homes, as well as private housing, and other buildings, including a hospital. By 2018, 37 per cent of potential home-years from E19 had been lost to demolition. E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) was 92 per cent demolished from 1989 at the age of 21, with the remaining 8 per cent of homes refurbished (Chapter 7). Uniquely among the 20 estates, E20 was never fully let, due to low demand and low popularity. After attempts to reduce the number of homes by bricking flats up, the local authority turned to demolition. A former tenants’ association member said in 1994 that she believed that the original plan was to demolish just two or three blocks

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most affected by damp or subsidence and squatting, and she thought that rest of the estate could have been saved, but staff were out of their depth and a crisis was allowed to develop. Also interviewed in 1994, a senior housing manager said the decision on large-scale demolition came during “secret” discussions between senior councillors and a business which was interested in buying part of the site. The plan for demolition and land sale was presented as a “fait accompli” to staff as well as to residents. E20 is an example of ‘obsolescence’ partly due to the prospect of a new land use (Chapter  3). Councillors were interested in the revenue from a large land sale, and potential jobs in the new business. Central government had some involvement, because demolition before the end of the expected minimum 40-year life and loans would affect the original plan for central and local shares of construction costs. In 1994 the senior officer recalled, “I would have demolished all the blocks … so would the regional DoE [Department of the Environment] officer as he told us afterwards, but he didn’t want to interfere.” Councillors had wanted to retain 200 flats, but after the DoE said it thought this was too many, only 78 were kept. The local MP gave E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) a rather downbeat eulogy: ‘when [E20] was built, we believed it would make a major contribution towards solving the housing crisis in [its local authority]. And to be fair, for some years it did’ (transcribed from Granada TV 1991). E20 achieved just 47 per cent of its potential home-years to 2019. In 2018, almost thirty years later, a senior officer at E20’s then housing association landlord, who was battling with low demand for housing across the area, mailed me to say, ‘I think it is fair to say that the decision to demolish [E20] and replace with current nonresidential uses was the right one.’ Total demolition Two estates were completely demolished, both in the 2000s (Figure 13.2). E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) was completely demolished, starting in 2008, at the age of 70. Eight homes had been demolished in 1982 when the estate was aged 44, with the rather vague aim to ‘reduce density and improve the visual amenity’, according to a visiting researcher. In 1998, 17 ‘older persons’ bungalows, which had become difficult to let, were also demolished. A plan to replace them with ‘40-odd’ new homes came to nothing. In 2003, the estate transferred, along with all the local authority’s social rented stock, to a new housing association (Chapter 14). The next year, the new landlord stopped new lettings to the estate, and commissioned consultants to

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report on options (Taylor Young/GVA Grimley 2004). In 2007, the housing association made a video about E11, ‘to capture the views of residents about the estate … And … where residents would like to be in the future.’ A local resident commented on it: ‘you were pissing in the wind, four months after filming this video [the housing association] decided they were gonna bulldoze the f** lot’. Both the council and a majority of residents selected the so-called ‘pragmatic’ option of complete demolition. The local authority’s rationale was that E11, ‘suffered for many years from a very high housing void [empty] rate … extreme vandalism, theft of materials and incidents of arson … anti-social behaviour and criminality’. They also claimed that E11 lacked some features recommended by ‘Secured by Design’, a Home Office-sponsored anti-crime housing design standard based on Coleman’s work (1985) (although it scored highly on the Building for Life standard). At this point, 36 per cent of homes were empty, partly due to four years without new lettings. After demolition had started, the leader of the council said that there were plans to build at least some homes on the site, and some residents thought they were going to be rehoused there. Later the local authority and housing association decided to leave the site as open land. After problems emerged at other sites, attention switched back again, and in 2014 the local housing association was awarded £7 million from the Regional Growth Deal to build 300 homes there, about the same number as in the estate. However, in 2019 the site remained empty. E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) underwent redevelopment from 2009 that involved complete demolition at the age of 38 (Chapter 7). It was to be replaced with more homes, in a mix of tenures, but only 68 per cent for social rent (Weaver 2004). The possibility of demolishing the estate was raised sporadically throughout its life. One resident recalled a meeting about the future of the estate in 1985, when it was aged just 14. ‘All the big boys were there’, but when she recommended demolition, they said it was too expensive (Bowie 1995:124). In the late 1980s, the local authority won government Estate Action borrowing approval for two projects to reorganise public space on the estate, totalling £19 million, or about £32,000/home (at 2019 prices) (Coleman 1987; Brodie, Plant and Goddard 1990). However, one of the councillors who had helped get the money said later, ‘there isn’t very much you can do in a remedial sense to estates of this character … eventually this estate will be demolished … [but] … we cannot get approval from the government to borrow the money to do it’ (McParland 1995:88).

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He thought that some homes, such as those on the ground floor, could be kept. The resident said she had thought ‘there’s method in their madness’, and that the local authority was improving the estate in order to privatise it (Bowie 1995:125). Others did not get improvements or thought they were insufficient. One said, ‘for the majority of us, demolishing the estate is the only way we’ll ever get off the estate’ (Anon. E16 1992). At this point, the local authority said it had no plans to demolish. However, just eight years after reorganisation was completed, in 2000, when E16 was aged just 29, the local authority decided to demolish it entirely. As with E20, this also represents obsolescence through the prospect of more profitable land use. As a council-led displacement of lower income residents in favour of higher income residents, this was a case of ‘state-sponsored gentrification’ (Chapter 3). Further refurbishment was rejected, because it had been priced at £88 million or £63,000/home (at 2019 prices) (Leese and Cordwell 2000), and because, after the end of the Estate Action scheme in 1995, local authorities had no means to borrow such sums. Complete demolition, however, made land sale, replanning and densification possible, as pioneered at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). However, the local authority was also frustrated with incremental improvement: the leader said, ‘Time and time again we’ve spent money trying to improve the areas and the quality of housing on [E16], but we’ve never been able to get at the root of the problem’ (E16’s local authority 2000). The local authority also altered its identification of the ‘root of the problem’, and its goals. In addition to improving physical living conditions for estate residents (and raising the funding to pay for it), they also wanted to increase total housing numbers, and to reduce the concentration of low-income people. The director of housing suggested that redevelopment would allow more substantial physical improvement to keep up with expectations: ‘we have entered the twenty first century  … this means higher standards than a lot of existing council properties’ (Leese and Cordwell 2000). However, none of the improvement she mentioned – mixed tenure, energy efficiency, design for people with mobility problems or pushchair access – appear futuristic enough to justify demolition (and the estate already met Parker Morris standards; see Chapter  6). In addition, compulsory moves away to other sites would not reduce resident poverty (unless it was at least partly due to ‘neighbourhood effects’) (Chapter 3). One residents’ group campaigned against demolition, due to concerns about disruption, compensation, incomplete replacement of social housing, the choice of homes for displaced residents, and the fact that black

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and minority ethnic residents, who made up 41 per cent of the estate population in 2001, were disproportionately affected. Nonetheless, people began moving out in 2005, demolition began in 2009, and the last residents left in 2011 (Twinch 2011). Building on the estate site was due to be completed in 2022. The absence of demolition Seven of the estates had had no demolition by 2019. However, survival, like failure to survive, is not an objective measure of ‘success’. In some of the seven, the option of demolition had been raised, more or less seriously, at various times, by tenants, councillors, staff or the media. For example, E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) became unpopular early in its life largely due to a crisis when lifts were put out of action (Chapters 8, 20). The local authority chose to replace lifts and introduce entryphones, rather than demolish any buildings, which cost £7 million or £11,000 per home in the towers (at 2019 prices) (Chapter 7). An area manager said: ‘I have never claimed that the scheme is cost effective … even though you do save on bills for vandalism. But we have got to do something to try to improve the quality of life on these estates … Simply to dynamite unpopular blocks … is the sort of defeatism I could never condone.’ In 1983, when improvement work was starting belatedly at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) (Chapter 7), the secretary of the tenants’ association said, ‘If they hadn’t done something they would have ended pulling the estate down and that would have been a shame because we would all far rather live here than anywhere else’ (Anon. E4 1983). At E5 (1949/700/fl/L), in 2002, the regeneration body working in the area planned to demolish some homes to replace them with a greater number in a mix of tenures, as at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L). However, after opposition from residents on the regeneration body’s board, demolition was rejected, and instead the regeneration body turned to sale of small sites for infill around existing blocks. E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) survived repeated and vociferous calls for major demolition, from residents, local and national politicians and other commentators, but it may yet succumb. Demolition was rejected by the council in the 1980s at least partly for reasons of political prestige and ideological commitment to the estate, which had become

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not only a ‘symbolic location’ for the police after public disorders, but also for council and the local black population. In addition, demolition would have been costly and finding replacement homes for residents from a large estate would have been difficult. In the 2010s, the local authority was seeking sites for new building for a borough-wide project to add new homes and improve housing on a grand scale, and campaigners believed E7 was earmarked as a demolition and rebuild site. When in 2016 the prime minister announced a small fund for redevelopment of some so-called ‘sink estates’, E7 was one of the named candidates for demolition, perhaps at the local authority’s suggestion (Cameron 2016). Redevelopment proposals were set aside amid conflict within the local authority’s majority party. However, in 2017, the issue emerged again after the Department for Communities and Local Government asked all local authorities with large blocks built using ‘panel’ systems to check their estates. One block at E7 was found not strong enough to meet current regulations for the use of gas. The Arm’s Length Management Organisation (ALMO) managing the local authority’s homes began investigating removing the gas supply, which would involve a new district heating system and block strengthening. Surveyors produced an estimate of £25 million for strengthening just two blocks and £8  million for other work, Photo 13.6: Planners, architects and councillors discussing plans for E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), portrayed in a mural used to decorate an underpass in the estate in the 1990s, as the mural looked in the 2000s

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which would be almost impossible for the local authority to raise except through redevelopment. The ALMO started moving residents out prior to what was called ‘strengthening or demolition’. In late 2018, demolition was agreed by councillors.

Homes and rooms provided and lost Despite the public perceptions of social housing overall, and of less popular estates in particular, these 20 estates have largely survived the slings and arrows of the 20th century, which were mostly unavoidable, many unpredicted and some unpredictable. Figure 13.1 shows the age in years of the oldest homes in each estate in 2018, from the year when the first new homes were first let. Several first-generation estates had homes that were over 80 years old in 2018. By this date, those who had planned the 20 estates, designed them, built them, let them to their first residents, voted for the councillors who took part in these processes and who cut the ceremonial ribbons were all dead. Almost all the first residents, with the exception of those who arrived as babies and very small children, must have passed on too. Eighty-one years later in 2019, the vast majority of homes in the estate were still standing. A large minority had been bought by tenants under the Right to Buy from 1981 onwards. At any one time, some of these homes were available for resale through local estate agents and property websites. These homes were eligible for mortgages of Figure 13.1: Age in years of oldest homes in the estates in 2018 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

E14 E1 E13 E8 E19 E2 E4 E11 E3 E15 E12 E5 E6 E9 E18 E17 E20 E7 E16 E10

Note: The ages are the maximum ages in 2018 (or at demolition for E11). Sources: Interviews and documents

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The survival of the 20 estates

30 years or longer, and were in practice expected to have an indefinite life. E14 (1926/900/h/NE) was the oldest estate, and homes first occupied there in 1926 were still in use in 2019, 93 years later. Homes in a further five estates were 80 years old or more. Most of the estates had reached and exceeded the minimum 40-year life expected in central government subsidy regulations under the Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1938, and first- and second-generation estates had reached and exceeded the extended 60-year minimum expected under the 1956 Housing Act (Macey and Baker 1978). Most of the homes in the estates were expected by their owners, residents, and in some cases their mortgagors and insurers to continue in use for decades more. However, the great majority of homes across the 20  estates did survive the 20th century and persisted in use into the 21st. Figure 13.3 shows the potential role each estate could play in housing the local population in a newly coined unit, ‘home-years’. One home-year is housing for one household for one year. Every estate has provided tens of thousands of home-years of accommodation and, overall, the 20 estates have provided 845,000 ‘home-years’ to date (Figure 13.3). Figure 13.2: The proportion of homes initially built in estates surviving in 2018 % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20

Estates Notes: Because of the incremental nature of demolition decisions and activities, figures have been pieced together and some data for E8, E9, E10, E11, E12, E13, E14 and E19 are estimated from best available information. The baseline for estate size is set at 1981, and the small number of additional homes built in estates after 1981 are not included. Sources: Interviews and documents

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 13.3: Home-years provided by estates and potential home-years lost to demolition to 2018 Thousands 120

Provided

Lost to demolition

100 80 60 40 20 0

E4 E14 E1 E20 E15 E6 E20 E17 E9 E10 E5 E7 E12 E18 E16 E19 E3 E11 E8 E13

Estates Note: The ages are the maximum ages in 2018 (or at demolition for E11). Sources: Interviews and documents

Larger, older estates have been able to provide more home-years up to 2018 than smaller or newer ones. E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), a large old estate (Table 4.1), provided the greatest number of home-years to date, over 90,000. There was little demolition at the estate so it has provided the vast majority of all the potential home-years its developers might have hoped for. Figure 13.3 also shows the proportion of potential home-years lost when homes were demolished. E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) performs very badly again, with just over half (53 per cent) of the potential home-years to date lost through large-scale demolition early in life. In all, 14 per cent of total potential years of accommodation across the estates from first building to 2019 were lost to demolition. The estates that lost the most potential home-years to demolition were a mixture of first- and third-generation estates, the oldest and youngest and are located in all the regions. They include almost all the estates made up of tower bock and deck-access high- and lowrise flats, E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L), E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW). E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) has been an

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The survival of the 20 estates Figure 13.4: Proportion of total potential home-years lost to demolition by 2018 % 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20

Note: The ages are the maximum ages in 2018 (or at demolition for E11). Sources: Interviews and documents

exception to date. They also include those made up mainly of traditionally built houses with gardens, like E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) and E15 (1946/400/h/NE). These estates all had all or some of the characteristics associated with faster obsolescence: emphasis on initial rather than lifetime costs, new designs and materials, poor design or construction, and heavy use (Chapter 3). If estates continue to survive without further demolition, the proportion of homes lost to past demolition will reduce over time. The 20 estates in the book have been referred to not by name but by code, from E1 which achieved all potential home-years to date, to E20, which achieved only 47 per cent. In addition to homes, individual and communal garages were knocked down at several estates. Three third-generation estates originally had multi-storey car parks. At E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), the three multi-storeys were problematic from the start, and in 1978 a local journalist said, ‘the council provoked an outcry when they said they could not afford to install play facilities and yet managed to spend £500,000 [£2.5 million at 2019 prices] on multi-storey car parks which no-body used’ (Anon. E17 1978). These car parks were demolished in 1979, after eight years of less than useful life (Mackie 1979). At E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) the car parks had been demolished by 1994, when they were no more

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 13.5: Age in years of homes in estates and comparators in 2017 % 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Homes in 20 estates 0–15

15–27

Council housing in England 27–37

Social housing in England 37–53

53–73

All housing in England 73–98

98+

Sources: Interviews and documents; MHCLG (2018)

than 27 years old. All cars parks at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), were demolished with the estate from 2009. Some basement-level and single-storey car parks were also demolished in the 1990s and 2000s at four other estates.

Survival rates of estate homes relative to other homes In 2017, all homes in the 20 estates were at least 46 years old and had survived longer to date than nearly about a quarter of all homes in England (Figure 13.5). Forty-nine per cent of homes in the 20 estates were built before the Second World War and thus were older than nearly two thirds of homes in England. For comparison, a typical English interwar semi built in the 1930s was in its 80s in the 2010s. The first demolition of estate homes was at E12 (1947/1,000/h/ NE) in 1973. Two other estates, E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) and E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), experienced demolition in the 1970s, when council house demolition was described as a ‘new phenomenon’ (Taylor 1979). E15 (1946/400/h/NE) and E20 (1968/1,000/ deck/NW) experienced demolition in the 1980s. Four estates first experienced demolition in the 1990s and four more in the 2000s, when council home demolition had become more common at national level (Holmans 2005). Some of the estates where homes were demolished experienced the first demolition when they were very

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The survival of the 20 estates

new, in their 20s: E10 (1971/900/deck/L), E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE), E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW). Others survived intact until their 30s, 40s, or, in the case of E8 (1933/1,000/h/Mid), E11 (1938/400/h/ Mid) and E14 (1926/900/h/NE), into their 60s, before their owners and managers took this step. There is a shortage of evidence on building survival rates or age at demolition, of UK housing or housing in general, to compare this record to. The first-generation estates can be compared to Holmans’ calculation of building survival (Chapter  3), although his method can’t be extended to later generations of housing, because the data sources he used become increasingly incompatible over time. Holmans found that 66 per cent of homes in existence in 1918 survived to at least 73 years (Holmans 2005). All of the 9 first-generation estates had homes which were at least 73 years old in 2019 (Figure 13.1). Overall, averaged across all the first-generation estates, 80 per cent of homes survived to at least 73 years. Overall, the homes in seven of the nine estates first let in the period 1926–38 exceeded the survival rate of an earlier generation of housing of all tenures existent in 1918. The exceptions were E10 (1971/900/deck/L) and E16 (1971/2,000/ deck/L). Overall, all homes in the 20 estates, achieved 67 per cent survival to a mean age of 68 years in 2019 (when weighted by number of homes in each estate), broadly similar to Holmans’ rate of 66 per cent to (at least) 73  years (Holmans 2005). However, the thirdgeneration estates had lower survival rates, even though they were only in middle age in 2019.

Conclusion Evidence from the 20 estates fits with evidence from the literature that ‘obsolescence’ is a social as much as a physical process (Chapter 3). Decisions to demolish or retain estate homes were not evidenced and fully rational assessments of estate performance. Nonetheless, demolition, or at least early demolition, indicates problems and is a problem in itself. Thirteen of the 20 estates lost some homes to demolition over their lifetimes to date. In total, 33 per cent of homes and 14  per cent of the potential ‘home-years’ of accommodation were lost by 2019. Throughout the book, estate survival in terms of the proportion of potential home-years provided, has been indicated through estate codes (E1 to E20). However, in 2019, homes in the oldest of the 20 estates were up to 93 years old, and even the youngest of the estates was 48 years old. A large majority of homes in most of the 20 estates survived the 20th century. Overall, the estates

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provided more than 90 per cent of the home-years that their original developers could have hoped for up to 2019. In addition, most of the homes in the estates outlived the life expectations of some theories of building and neighbourhood obsolescence, and their survival rates are comparable to what is known for other buildings and neighbourhoods. Thus estates which were broadly typical of less successful estates mostly did not experience abnormal or ‘early’ demolition. The next chapter explores the development of tenure diversity in the estates.

14

The fall of council housing tenure Introduction From when the 20 estates were first built until 1981, all homes in all 20 were owned and managed by local authorities. From 1981, successive governments created a range of methods to change the ownership and management of council housing, including the Right to Buy, stock transfer and estate redevelopment (Chapters 7 and 13), some of which were particularly targeted at less popular estates. This chapter describes the impact of these mechanisms in the 20 estates.

The impact of the Right to Buy The Right to Buy, introduced in 1981, gave tenants of councils and non-charitable housing associations with at least three years tenancy the right to buy their homes at a substantial discount, depending on the length of their tenancy. It is the best-known of all housing policies in the UK and is also well known abroad. Annual Right to Buy and other sales peaked at 167,000 in 1982/83, and by 2009/10 they had fallen to 6,000 per year (Stephens et  al 2019). Between 1980/81 and 2017/18, 1.9  million council homes and 0.1  million housing association homes were bought in England (MHCLG 2019a). By 2017/18, 6 per cent of all households in England lived in homes that were originally built and owned by social landlords, but had changed tenure through the Right to Buy. Sales reduced as the most attractive homes were bought and discounts fell behind prices (Murie 2016). The Right to Buy took a long time to have a direct effect on the 20 estates. By 1995, 15 years into the policy, an average of only 5 per cent of homes had been bought, and only 3 per cent in the mixed and deck-access estates. This compared to an average for the estate local authorities of 19 per cent, and a national average of 26 per cent. The manager at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) described the early purchases at his estate as “very strange”. Purchase is a sign of at least minimum confidence, indicating that buyers were willing to stay in the home for at least five years (to avoid having to repay the discount on moving), and that homes were accepted by lenders as security. However, for

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

the first 20 years of the policy, the main effect of the biggest effect of Right to Buy on the 20 estates was the indirect effect of sales in other estates reducing supply of social housing in their local authorities. Other things being equal, this would have the effect of channelling more demand to the 20 estates. Rates of purchase began to increase in the 2000s as prices rose nationwide. A manager at E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) said, “Right to Buy has accelerated … we’re starting to sell in very difficult areas.” Residents in mixed built form and deck-access estates began to take up the right. In 2004/05 for example, more homes were sold at E7 than in the previous 24 years of the policy. Managers commented that, for the first time ever, rates of sales at least, if not prices, were following trends for the rest of the local authority. By 2005, some of the estates could no longer be called mono-tenure council estates. For example, at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), 30 per cent of homes had been bought, 23 per cent at E4 (1938/300/fl/L) and 21 per cent at redeveloped E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW), although sales were lower in the other estates. I did not collect data for the period after 2005. This book has argued that social housing estates should be seen as been part of the wider housing market, if a semi-detached part (Chapter 10). However, the take-off of the Right to Buy placed estate homes literally in the market. In the 2000s former council homes in the estates began to appear in estate agents’ windows and in Land Registry data, which had happened in other council-built areas 10 or even 20 years before. I examined evidence on sale of homes within 10 of the 20 estates in 2008, at the national price peak before the global financial crisis in 2008. Prices for estate homes moved with national and local authority trends, but they were always below local authority averages. Homes at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) got the closest, averaging £100,000 (at 2008 prices) which was 83 per cent of the average for its local authority. This estate provided semis and terraces in an area dominated by terraced houses and flats. In contrast, homes sold at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) reached £118,000 but this was only 36 per cent of the average in their high-priced local authority, dominated by terraces and converted flats. Right to Buy has been described as the ‘most significant and lucrative act of privatisation’ by a UK government (Murie 2016:1). However, the subsequent capital gains from resale may constitute the greatest ever ‘leakage of value’ from public investment into private hands. Some original tenants made big gains. One winner from the Right to Buy process at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) said in 1995, “I bought it for £8,700 and now it’s worth £100,000. Four beds and a

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The fall of council housing tenure

garden, it’s lovely.” Notably, she had not moved to cash in. Tracking resale shows that large capital gains were made by subsequent sellers, rather than the former tenant. Several estates saw multiple sales of the same home, often within a fairly short time period. One street of 56 homes at the redeveloped E15 (1946/400/h/NE) generated 80 sales over the period 2000–08. The biggest capital gains were in the highest value estates. A flat at E5 (1949/700/fl/L) sold for £95,000 in 2002, for £146,000 in 2003 and £190,000 in 2004. The highest rates of growth in prices were in the lowest price estates. At E14 (1926/900/h/NE) a house was sold in 2002 for £9,000 and again in 2006 at £51,000, a gain of nearly 500 per cent in four years. Multiple sales on the same day suggest portfolios of homes being traded. Across the ten estates, the total value of transactions for the period 2000–08 was at least £97 million (at 2019 prices). A tenants’ leader from E10 (1971/900/deck/L) said in 2011 that social housing should be, “an asset for the working class … The carpetbaggers see the buying up of multiple bits of social housing as just another business proposition” (Fawcett 2011:np). The development of a private rented sector in the estates meant additional tenure diversity and, although it was likely to add to population turnover, it could have increased social mix. However, during the 2000s more than half the estates remained less popular than average for their local authorities, and were unlikely to form part of local private rented sector serving people with higher incomes (Chapter 9). Residents and staff felt that the emergence of the private rented sector in the estates had generally caused management problems and in some cases anti-social behaviour. Residents said, “you don’t know who is responsible, the owners couldn’t give two hoots, there is no control over them” (E11: 1938/400/h/Mid), and that landlords were “giving houses to any kind of people” (E20: 1968/1,000/deck/ NW) (Photo 14.1). I did not collect data for the period after 2008. There were some signs of price drop at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) already in 2008 and it is likely that many of the estates would have been affected by local price falls, perhaps disproportionately.

The impact of stock transfer and ALMOs ‘Stock transfer’ is a shorthand for the transfer of homes from council to housing association ownership and management. In 1988, the first local authority in England transferred its entire housing stock voluntarily to a housing association newly created for that purpose.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Photo 14.1: A home at E14 seen here in 2005, ten years after redevelopment. By this point, more than half the homes transferred to the private sector, making up about a tenth of the total in the estate, had been rented out. The estate remained one of the least popular in the local authority. Some landlords did not manage homes well and some private tenants were anti-social. Tenants in this home were subject to an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). The picture is poorly composed, because the local manager I was with had told me to walk past quickly.

The practice initially spread through district councils with smaller stocks under the 1997–2010 Labour governments. With subsidy support, to take account of the fact that poor-quality homes with sitting social tenants could have a negative net value, from 1997 it extended into urban areas (Walker 2010). Local authorities were relieved of financial and management responsibilities, and the new housing associations were freer than councils to find funding to make improvements. Tenants played a critical role in permitting stock transfers, after the principle of transfer requiring evidence of tenant support through a ballot became established (Hickman 2006). By 2015/16, a total of 1.3  million homes had been involved in 119 transfers of entire local authority stocks and 187 partial transfers (Wilcox et al 2017), and housing associations had become the main owners of England’s social housing. In 2016/17 they provided homes for 10  per cent of all households in England, compared to 7  per cent for councils (MHCLG 2019a). Access to borrowing and the opportunity to restructure led to improvements in housing quality and housing management following transfers (Pawson and Mullins 2010). Many housing associations have merged over the 2000s and 2010s, to achieve economies of scale, and in 2017 31 per cent were

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The fall of council housing tenure

in group structures. Large housing associations or groups own homes well beyond a single local authority area. All of the 20 estates experienced transfer between different local authority landlords, as local authorities were reorganised (Chapter 4). However, the first transfer away from local authority ownership happened in 1997, when homes at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) began to transfer, one by one, to an existing housing association. This was one of the first ‘urban’ transfers in the country and was used to enable borrowing for redevelopment, also supported by other sources, including land sales (Chapter 7). Individual homes changed hands if tenants agreed or when they were relet. Some residents took legal action over the way the consultation process was handled, while others participated intensively in consultations, for example on designs for new homes. Eight more estates transferred along with the entire local authority stock to new housing associations (Figure 14.1). Although the 20 estates’ local authorities were atypical (Chapter 4), the fact that half transferred their stock matched the national pattern. The main motive for councillors, staff and residents was to get money for maintenance, improvements and redevelopments. A resident representative from Figure 14.1: Owners and managers of the 20 estates across their lifetimes, 1926–2018 E11 E18 E16 E10 E1 E20 E15 E19 E2 E17 E13 E7 E9 E12 E14 E3 E6 E5 E8 E4 1920

1930

1940

1950

Council

1960

1970

ALMO

1980

Council/HA

Housing association Sources: Interviews and reports

231

1990

2000

2010

TMO/council

TMO/private

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) said in 2005, “The council didn’t have any money to invest but nevertheless they [tenancies] were very secure [and] the rents were low. Quite frankly, most of us signed up to get [new] kitchens.” In the local authorities which built and owned E1 (1929/300/h/ NW) and E11 (1938/400/h/Mid), senior staff thought transfer would not only enable investment but also reforms that had been prevented for years by close ties between councillors and unions. The residents’ group at E1 (1929/300/h/NW) was the only one in the local authority to campaign against transfer, arguing that councils should be able to borrow, but transfer went ahead. At E10 (1971/900/deck/L), where residents had already established a Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and a trust, they initiated estate transfer to an existing housing association to get investment and to continue the estate’s tradition of estate-based management and resident involvement. Twelve of the estates were in local authorities that transferred management but not ownership of all their homes to Arm’s Length Management Organsations (ALMOs). The ALMO option became available in 2000 as an alternative to stock transfer. After proving resident support and management performance good enough to get a score of two stars out of a possible three from the Housing Inspectorate, local authorities with ALMOs could access new funding for reinvestment in housing without losing ownership. In two cases, the local authorities later returned management in house, while in four the ALMO was followed by stock transfer, so by 2019 only six estates were still managed by ALMOs. Central government’s attempts to get new organisations to manage council housing have run alongside those for ownership change since the 1980s. From 1980 to 1988, initiatives focused on the organisation of local authority housing departments, and the 20 estates typified that process. From 1985, local authorities were allowed to delegate management to other organisations, but this had little impact and, from 1995, local authorities were obliged to put management services out to tender under the Compulsory Competitive Tendering regime. Similarly, in 1993, tenants’ ability to set up TMOs, available since 1975, was strengthened with the Right to Manage, which enabled them to go ahead even where their landlords were opposed (DCLG 2013). From first letting to the late 1980s, local authorities remained the main managers of the social housing in all 20 estates. By 1994 this was still true for 18 estates. E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) was managed by a TMO and E5 (1949/700/fl/L) by a private company. Ten years later, after stock transfers and the development of ALMOs, only seven of

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The fall of council housing tenure

the estates were mainly managed by local authorities. By 2019 this had reduced further to just four. In 2005 a senior manager for E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) admitted that immediately after transfer, “it was utter chaos”, and a junior manager at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) said that with the setting up of an ALMO, “it feels like we’re in a washing machine!” For residents, a change in owner or manager sometimes appeared to be “just a change of name”, as a resident group member at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) said in 2005. Sometimes even the name change didn’t register. A year after stock transfer at E1 (1929/300/h/NW), a third of residents in the estate reported erroneously to census enumerators that they were still council tenants in 2001. It was not only residents who could failed to register the changes: when I visited E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) in 2005, a year into the life of the ALMO, reception staff did not recognise the name of the new organisation and erroneously said they worked for ‘the council’.

The impact of redevelopment Ten estates experienced dramatic redevelopment, which involved demolition, and in nine cases, substantial numbers of new homes were added for housing association rent and for sale (Chapter 4). New building might result in a net increase in total numbers of homes, or might constitute partial replacement of homes demolished, but all meant increased tenure diversity. However, the degree of mix resulting from these schemes varied widely. In E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E15 (1946/400/h/NE), privately owned homes approached half of the new total after the work. This brought estates much closer to the typical neighbourhood nationwide, which was dominated by home ownership. In others, social housing remained the dominant tenure even after redevelopment. Two of the redeveloped mixed-tenure estates – E19 and E20 – were later part of whole stock transfers. All redevelopments made homes more valuable and more mortgageable, and tended to increase the takeup of the Right to Buy. The housing manager at E17 (1967/1,100/ mixed/L) said in 2005, “where there are regeneration schemes, people have bought, as they know they are going to get their money back”.

The estates as mixed-tenure neighbourhoods The estates became mixed-tenure neighbourhoods as soon as the first homes were sold under the Right to Buy in the early and mid-1980s.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 14.2: Tenure mix after redevelopment in the eight estates where work was completed by 2019 Council

% 100

Housing association

Home ownership

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 r)

0

sfe

sfe

ra n rt fte (a 0 E2

E1

9

(a

fte

rt

ra n

E2

r)

9 E1

8 E1

7 E1

5 E1

4 E1

3 E1

E9

0

Note: Redevelopments at E10 and E16 were not completed in 2019 and ultimate tenure mix was not established. Sources: Interviews and reports

However, in 1995, home ownership accounted for an average of just 5 per cent of homes in the estates. This meant that the estates remained in the top few per cent of neighbourhoods nationwide in terms of the concentration of social housing. At this point, when estates were 95 per cent council housing, only 6 per cent of neighbourhoods of 1,000 households in England and Wales had 60 per cent or more council housing in 1997 (Tunstall 2003). By 2005, on average 81 per cent of remaining homes in the estates were social rented, but the estates were all mixed-tenure neighbourhoods through the Right to Buy and redevelopment. For example, a senior manager at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) said, “there’s a reasonable mix of leasehold and tenancies now”. Home ownership accounted for an average of 19 per cent of homes in the estates. Eight per cent of homes were privately owned through the Right to Buy, and 11 per cent through estate redevelopment. When compared with neighbourhoods nationwide, the estates remained in the top few percent according to the proportion of social housing. However, they had begun to reduce the gap with home ownership levels in the surrounding local authorities and in England as a whole.

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The fall of council housing tenure

Conclusion While the 20  estates and their local authorities were atypical (Chapter 1, 4), they were nonetheless affected by the mechanisms introduced by central government from 1980 to restructure the ownership, management, finance and built form of social housing. The Right to Buy had a much slower and smaller impact on the 20 estates than on other council housing in their local authorities and nationwide. However, whole stock and partial stock transfer had a similar impact on the estates to that felt elsewhere. Demolition and mixed-tenure redevelopment had a particularly significant effect on the 20 estates, and within them, on the third-generation mixed built form and deck-access estates (Chapters 7, 13). Together, these mechanisms have left only 11 of the estates mainly local authority-owned and only 4 mainly local authority-owned and managed. They also meant a marked increase in tenure mix within the estates. This has made the 20 estates more like other former mono-tenure council estates and other neighbourhoods in general. Estate redevelopment and the development of mixed tenure have broken path dependency and set several estates on different paths (Chapters 3, 7, 13). However, there are limits to the extent of social change implied by tenure change. Given the estates’ relative unpopularity, at least before tenure change, homes available for sale in the estates have joined the lower priced half of the local markets. This chapter completes Part II’s description of trends in the 20 estates in different dimensions across their lifetimes. The next chapter summarises the falls and rises across dimensions in the 20 estates.

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PART III

Explaining the changes over 100 years in 20 estates

15

Summarising the changes over 100 years in 20 estates

Introduction This chapter summarises the falls and rises in the 20 estates across the dimensions covered in Part  II. It emphasises the different measures within each dimension, similarities and differences between dimensions, and the cumulative experience of different dimensions in individual estates. Appendix 2 provides additional estate-by-estate detail for selected measures of quality, popularity, resident mix and survival. This chapter begins to explore potential explanations for changes in estate fortunes, both falls and rises, drawing on ideas from the existing literature (Chapter 3) and on comparisons between the estates.

Summarising the changes Part II has shown that just like the 29 large post-war housing estates in 10 European countries studied by Musterd et al in the 2000s, the 20 mixed size, mixed age English estates were also ‘highly differentiated by origin and history, the recent trajectory and problems, their local contexts and their prospects for the future’ (Musterd et al 2009:1). In addition, Part II has shown that different residents, staff and others could experience the same time in the same place in different ways. However, longitudinal quantitative and qualitative evidence in Part II has shown that, over their lifetimes to date, all of the 20 estates experienced falls and then rises across most of the important dimensions explored: • Absolute and relative housing quality fell in all first- and secondgeneration estates from first letting until the first improvements began. Third-generation estates all started off with less relative advantage over other local housing in terms of amenities and most experienced premature ageing. Various improvements, reorganisations and redevelopments led to rising absolute and relative

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

• •

•

•

• •

quality, alongside further falls due to ongoing ageing and rising standards. All 20  estates experienced rising and then falling problems with crime and vandalism, according to qualitative sources. Some estates were relatively unpopular compared to other council housing in their local authorities from first letting, while others were initially of average or even above average popularity. Thirteen fell in relative popularity over time, before rising again. Seven experienced other trajectories: a fall in popularity, a rise after initial unpopularity, and stable unpopularity. Available evidence suggests that total estate populations fell throughout estate lifetimes in all 20 estates, meaning they were playing a decreasing role in meeting national and local housing need. Five of the estates appear to have had disadvantaged populations compared to their local authorities and other local estates throughout their lifetimes, and five others probably did. The remaining ten had more advantaged, average, or mixed populations, but then experienced rises in disadvantage. From 1981, all the estates could be termed ‘residualised’. By 2011, there had been marked falls in absolute rates of unemployment, and falls in child and older populations in almost all the estates. This could be seen as a marked deresidualisation, which would suggest that continuing residualisation is not inevitable or irreversible, and goes against filtering theory, at least for this period of estates’ lifetimes. However, compared to national and local authority unemployment rates, estate residents remained relatively disadvantaged over the 30 years from 1981 to 2011, and the gap between estates and their areas actually increased. In seven estates, all homes have survived to date, but in the others the total numbers fell through demolition ranging from a few per cent to 92 per cent of the total. All estates started their lives as entirely council rented neighbourhoods, but experienced rising tenure mix, to include housing association renting, owner occupation and private renting.

Evidence of falls and rises across dimensions in what have been relatively unpopular and less successful estates counteracts theory, evidence and wider discussion that tends to assume neighbourhood and social housing estate decline is generally unavoidable and generally irreversible (Chapters 2 and 3). More average estates have experienced more limited falls, and so has social housing as a whole. This evidence

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places responsibility on Part III to explore explanations for both falls and rises over time.

The timing of falls and rises Part  II has shown that, although there was considerable variation between dimensions and estates, many of the ‘worst times’ were in the 1970s and 1980s and many of the turning points were in the 1980s and 1990s: • Absolute and relative housing quality fell in first- and secondgeneration estates from first letting to the 1970s and 1980s, when improvements began. First-generation estates may have been in the older half of local social housing as early as the 1930s, and first- and second-generation estates had lost relative advantage in amenities over most other housing in the area by 1961 or 1971. Various improvements, reorganisations and redevelopments led to improved absolute and relative quality in the estates over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, when the estates were of very varied ages. • There is a gap in data for the early years of first- and secondgeneration estates, but all estates were affected by high rates of crime and vandalism by the 1970s and 1980s, when they were of various ages, and problems reduced in all estates from the 1980s or 1990s. • Some estates were relatively unpopular from first letting. However, in many cases relative popularity fell in the 1960s or 1970s, when estates were of various ages, and in most it improved in the 1980s and 1990s. • Some estates had concentrations of disadvantaged residents from first letting, while others had middling populations. There is a gap in quantitative data, but all the estates had high absolute and relative levels of unemployment by 1981. Absolute unemployment rates fell in all estates over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, but relative rates did not. • The first demolition of estate homes took place in 1973, but the main period was in the 1990s and 2000s, when estates were of various ages. • Tenure mix first began to develop in the estates in the 1990s, although it only became significant from the 2000s, again when estates were of various ages. The timing of falls can give clues to causes of changes, both in individual estates and across all estates. While estates of the same

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generation could have varied experiences, simultaneous changes in varied estates in varied locations suggest that time context may be more important than age or generation effects, and that national (or even international) contexts may be more important than local contexts or estate characteristics in explaining falls and rises. The extent of falls and rises The 20 estates all stood out from most neighbourhoods and most or many estates in their local authorities in terms of the extent of the falls they experienced, and the low absolute levels of quality, safety and order, popularity reached at the ‘worst times’ (Chapter 2), although there were variations between dimensions and estates. For some estates and some dimensions, the rises experienced more recently appeared to fully restore the estates to average or close-to-average positions compared to other neighbourhoods and estates. In other cases, more recent rises did not fully compensate for the extent of past falls: • While absolute and relative housing quality improved in stages from the 1970s onwards, progress was incremental and there were also periods of absolute and relative decline in individual estates. The rises in quality have only partially compensated for the falls, and the estates have not regained the relatively high position they held in terms of quality until the 1960s or 1970s. • On the basis of qualitative data, some of the 20 estates experienced extreme, unusual forms of danger and disorder, and all experienced high rates of crime and vandalism relative to other estates and neighbourhoods. In almost all estates, the rise in safety and order appears to have mostly or fully overcome the earlier fall. • Eighteen of the estates spent at least some time among the least popular estates in their local authorities. When considered across their whole lifetimes, three estates were close to average popularity for their local authority. For these estates, unpopularity was a more short-lived experience and less significant overall. However, nine were on average below average popularity, four were well below average, and four were on average among the least popular estates in their local authority across their lifetimes. In more than half the estates, the more recent rise in relative popularity appears to have mostly or fully overcome the earlier fall. • In 1981 all of the estates had extremely high absolute rates of unemployment, and most had unemployment rates double those of their local authorities. By 2011, absolute rates had fallen, but

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Summary

relative rates were double, triple or quadruple those of their local authorities in all but one case. • Estate social environments were distinctive in ways that were advantageous but also at least ambiguous, if not negative, for residents. Access to opportunities from estates was at least somewhat below average, although by the 2000s the quality of estate-linked schools was typical for their local areas and resident satisfaction was similar to other neighbourhoods. • Survival rates of estate homes to date ranged from 100 per cent to 9 per cent, which was broadly similar to other housing nationwide, and the proportion of potential home-years lost to date ranged from none to 53 per cent. • The estates were mono-tenure council renting from first letting to 1981, putting them in a small minority of all neighbourhoods, and only started to move slightly closer to typical local and national tenure mixes in the 2000s. Links between estate characteristics and dimensions This study allows us to compare within the large sample of 20 estates to explore links between estate characteristics and outcomes, and different dimensions of outcomes. However, there were few clear and consistent relationships between the estate age, size, built form or location, and the extent and timing of estates’ falls and rises in quality, safety and order, popularity, resident mix, tenure mix and survival. This confirms and extends evidence from across Europe that less popular social housing estates are varied and are on varied pathways (Musterd et al 2009; Chapter 3). It suggests that one important lesson for researchers, policy makers and others is simply to avoid generalisation about social housing and about ‘less popular’ estates. For example, the relationship between estate design and quality and estate popularity and survival are more complex than public discourse or literature has suggested (Chapters 2 and 3). Certainly, the fall in relative quality estates experienced from the 1960s onwards matched the timing of the fall in estate safety and order and in relative popularity. Estates of deck-access flats with low Building for Life scores and expert opprobrium experienced premature ageing and were conducive to play, including anti-social or criminal play. However, most avoided ever being the least popular estate in their areas, which by definition depends on the nature of other local estates, and were able to avoid substantial or indeed any demolition. Estates of houses with high Building for Life scores (Chapter 6) could become the least

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popular in their local authorities (Chapter 9), and some underwent redevelopment and demolition (Chapter 7). However, this generally occurred only after they had lost relative advantage on amenities and had reached their 40s (Chapter 9). I carried out informal correlation tests on relationships between all the quantitative and categorical measures in Appendix 2. There was a strong correlation between better Building for Life score and higher proportion of potential home-years achieved to date. Greater numbers of homes in estates and younger estate age (being in the third generation) were correlated, albeit weakly, with more potential home-years lost. Reorganisations of deck-access estates, in line with theory (Chapter 3), mostly did not lead to sustained improvements in safety and order or popularity (Chapters 8 and 9). However, qualitative evidence shows that decisions on demolition should not be accepted as rational, evidenced assessments of estate performance, and were conditional on local and national politics and finance (Chapter 13). Redevelopment mostly led to improvements, but this was not always the case and projects could falter in estates of houses as well as deck access, as E14 (1926/900/h/NE) shows. On the other hand, E1 (1929/300/h/NW) shows that even older estates with minimal investment could rise somewhat in relative popularity. The walk-up estates which had very similar design and layout had different fortunes in terms of quality, popularity and population, even just within London (Chapters 6, 7, 9 and 10). Finally, while quality and popularity appeared closely interlinked, low relative popularity could occur even before falls in relative quality. On the other hand, interviewees suggest that high crime and disorder (or at least a reputation for them), whether or not linked to non-traditional design, could be sufficient if not necessary for a decline in relative popularity. The relationship between estate popularity and estate populations was important, and worked in both directions. There were strong correlations between high absolute unemployment rates in 1981 and, in particular, in 2011, and low average relative popularity over estate lifetimes (although less so for high unemployment relative to local authority averages). This confirms and adds to existing evidence, which provoked the idea that unpopularity and residualisation were one and the same (Chapter 3). Distinctive social environments appear to have played a role in making estates popular among people with links to the estates, but unpopular for some others, including people from ethnic minorities in some cases (Chapter 11). Perhaps surprisingly, there was little correlation between the proportion of larger homes in the estates and the ratios of children to adults: lettings policy, occupancy rates, and

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perhaps estate age may have been more important. Greater tenure mix was associated, somewhat contrarily, both with popularity and with redevelopment, but at least until the 2000s was not associated with lower rates of unemployment. There were considerable variations on all dimensions within regions, and even within local authorities (comparing within the two pairs of estates in the same local authorities: E3 and E10, and E13 and E17). However, location also played a role in the absolute and relative characteristics of estate populations. The highest unemployment figures, especially in 1981, were in estates in the North East, North West and Midlands. Many of the biggest gaps between estate and local authority rates were in London. Ethnic diversity was strongly associated with location in London, parts of the North West and East Midlands (Chapter 10). Box 15.1 summarises the relationships between key dimensions of estate outcomes.

Box 15.1: How selected key dimensions of estate outcomes appear to be causally related Housing quality is affected by safety and order and management. It affects safety and order, popularity, resident mix, management and housing survival. Safety and order is affected by housing quality, social mix and management. It affects housing quality, popularity and housing survival. Popularity affects population mix, management and housing survival. It is affected by all other factors. Resident mix is affected by popularity and tenure mix. Access to opportunities affects popularity and housing survival. Housing survival is affected by all the dimensions. Poor survival is linked to greater tenure mix (as demolition enables redevelopment). Housing tenure mix affects popularity and population mix. It is linked to poor housing survival. Other characteristics of estates and other factors entirely may also be involved.

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The strength of these connections and the extent to which change in one necessarily or just probably causes change in another vary.

Conclusion Part II showed that all the 20 estates experienced falls and then rises over their lifetimes to date across several of most of the important dimensions explored: housing quality, safety and order, popularity and absolute measures of resident advantage. This is a substantial challenge to theory and public discourse about so-called ‘problematic’ or ‘unpopular’ estates (Chapters 2 and 3). Many of the turning points between falls and rises were in the 1980s and 1990s. There was considerable variety within the estates in characteristics and outcomes, and three estates were close to average popularity for their local authority across their lifetimes. However, the 20 estates and their residents all stood out from most neighbourhoods and most or many estates in their local authorities in terms of the extent of the falls they experienced, and the low absolute levels of ‘worst times’ (Chapter 5) they went through. Recent rises in popularity and safety and order appear to have restored many of the estates to positions at least close to average compared to other local estates. However, in the case of relative quality and population mix, more recent rises did not fully compensate for the extent of past falls which had built up over decades. However, characteristics of the estates such as age, size, built form, quality and popularity do not seem to offer sufficient explanation of the timing and extent of falls and rises across these dimensions. The remaining chapters in Part III explore explanations for the falls and rises of the 20 estates from outside the estates themselves. They focus on four of the main dimensions covered in Part II: housing quality, safety and order, popularity, population and social mix. Part III argues that the fall and rise of the 20 estates cannot be understood through the characteristics of the estates themselves but only in the context of changes that affected society, housing and social housing nationwide over estate lifetimes. National contexts, and the way they manifested in estates’ local authorities, including rising incomes, the decline of the working class, deindustrialisation, counter-urbanisation and the impact of national housing policy strongly influenced the development, timing and extent of problems in the 20 estates and others like them in the 1970s and 1980s. National and local contexts also played an important part in the improvement of the estates in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

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16

National and local factors influencing estates’ housing quality

Introduction The seven third-generation flatted estates with high- and low-rise flats and deck access, along with the houses of non-traditional construction at two estates, form a special case among the 20 estates in terms of the fall and rise of housing quality. They experienced particular problems linked to their design and construction (Chapter  6), and received particularly costly and disruptive improvements (Chapter 7). A wealth of sources have explored the root explanations for the use of these designs in the politics and finance of council housing development, and noted that choices were constrained in most cases by the nature of sites and limited budgets (Burnett 1978; Dunleavy 1981; Glendenning and Muthesias 1994; Power 1993; Malpass 2005; Rowlands et  al 2009; Boughton 2018). The responsibility for the choice and success of designs was shared between architects, local authorities, central government’s subsidy systems and private companies. These included Wimpey who built the problematic houses at E15 (1946/400/h/NE) and maisonettes at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW), and Crudens who built E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW). This chapter focuses instead on explanations of housing quality after estates had been completed and let. It cannot explore the history of central–local government relations and local government finance in the depth they deserve (Dunleavy 1980; Gyford 1985; Laffin 2009). However, evidence from the 20 estates shows that this is where most of the explanations for the fall and rise of housing quality in the estates (Chapters 6 and 7) can be found.

Funding for planned maintenance, improvement and redevelopment For much of estates’ lifetimes, local authorities had the power to maintain and improve their existing homes within rent and subsidy income and what they could borrow. The local authorities which

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developed the 20 estates had plans, and initially had funds, to carry out cyclical maintenance, for example for renewing kitchens (Chapter 7). However, given pressure of poor quality ‘slum’ housing and the need for new homes, over time English central and local governments both tended to concentrate on and prioritise redeveloping ‘slum’ areas and building new homes. In the early part of estate lifetimes, neither central government nor landlords envisaged or planned for improvements to their homes beyond cyclical maintenance. However, both were aware that when loans to build homes were paid off or substantially reduced by inflation, rents would be providing an increasingly significant net income and, in theory, this would be available for reinvestment. The first-generation estates would notionally reach this point in the 1960s and 1970s. For second-generation estates (with loan periods extended to 60 years) it would arrive in the 2000s, and for the youngest estates – E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L), E10 (1971/900/deck/L) and E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) – it will be in the early 2020s. In practice, most estates needed investment over the 40- or 60-year loan period that had not been planned for, and unexpected physical problems developed in some. In a few cases some rent income leaked out to reduce rates and support other local authority spending. Meanwhile, local authorities were occupied with new building. Housing textbook writers noted, ‘housing looms large in the local government Capital Programme’ (Macey and Baker 1978:81). This in itself makes housing vulnerable to any policy of constraint or cuts. Housing had occupied a relatively privileged position within local government, but by the late 1970s was ‘increasingly subject to “rationing” by Government’ (Macey and Baker 1978:445). Central government took increasing control of the financial responsibility, incomes and outgoings it initially shared with local authorities. From the 1970s, the balance of power between local authorities and central government shifted as the national building programme and finance available for housing reduced. In 1971/72, renovation formed only 16  per cent of local authorities’ total direct capital investment in housing, but as new build declined, renovation grew to more than half (53 per cent) in 1982/83 and 94 per cent in 1995/96 (author’s calculations from Holmans 2005). However, the total amount spent by local authorities remained relatively modest throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, peaking at £1,351 per home per year in 1989/90 (at 2017 prices). In 2016/17, the average UK household (including tenants) spent £1,804 on housing maintenance and repair, alteration and improvement; home owners would generally have spent considerably more.

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National and local factors influencing estates’ housing quality Figure 16.1: Average annual local authority capital spending per existing council home in England, 1971/72–1995/96 (at 2016/17 prices) £ 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

19 71 19 /72 72 19 /73 73 19 /74 74 19 /75 75 19 /76 76 19 /77 77 19 /78 78 19 /79 79 19 /80 80 19 /81 81 19 /82 82 19 /83 83 19 /84 84 19 /85 85 19 /86 86 19 /87 87 19 /88 88 19 /89 89 19 /90 90 19 /91 91 19 /92 92 19 /93 93 19 /94 94 19 /95 95 /96

0

Source: Holmans (2005) and MHCLG (2019b)

Local authorities’ own borrowing: HIPs from 1977 In 1977, English central government introduced the Housing Investment Programme (HIP) system, which required local authorities to submit proposals for all forms of investment for approval, within a capped national budget, and provided the framework for local government investment to date. The aim was to encourage a comprehensive strategic approach, but above all to control public expenditure (Watson et  al 1979). Many local authority proposals were not agreed in full (Gibson and Langstaff 1982:129). The annual allocation, four-year planning cycle and changes in policy made it hard to plan (Darley 1978; Friend 1981; Cooper 1985). The cuts to public expenditure on housing at the start of the 1980s were ‘awesome’ (Malpass and Murie 1982:72), and HIP reduced from £9.3 billion in 1978/79 to £1.7 billion in 1989/90 (at 2017 prices) (Pinto 1993). All 20 estates received HIP investment over the 1980s and 1990s, but as funds reduced, local authorities’ explanations for the problems with planned maintenance switched from internal management to central government. In 1988, the local authority that owned E8 (1936/1,000/h/ Mid) calculated it needed £47  million a year for its pre-war stock like E8, then at least fifty years old, but after cuts in the 1980s it had only £17 million (at 2019 prices). From the perspective of the 1990s, however, the previous decade appeared plentiful to some. The director

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of housing at the local authority that owned E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) said, “in the 1980s we were having to find ways to spend money”. In 1994, the local manager at E11 (1938/400/h/Mid) said, “the heyday of improvements was as long ago as 1984/85”. At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), work was delayed, and residents said, “Phase two get sod all!” At E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), then aged only 23 but already years into damp, infestation and crime problems, the manager said: ‘I would like to address disrepair … in a more strategic and efficient manner … we’re really at the fringe of what we’d like to do. We haven’t touched the west side of the estate … We need [£57m (at 2019 prices)] but we can’t see much from HIP in the next two years.’ Borrowing with strings: Estate Action, 1986–95 In 1985, central government took further control over the nature of local authority investment in existing council housing. The Estate Action programme ‘topsliced’ an increasing proportion of the HIP budget to direct it to more problematic estates. It demanded a particular approach, incorporating physical, economic and social changes, including ‘tenure diversification’, private investment, local management, and signs of tenant involvement (Pinto 1993; Cole and Goodchild 1995). In effect, it aimed to shift from improving housing quality, quality of life and popularity, to the additional aims of changed ownership and management, private investment and positive neighbourhood effects from ‘mixed communities’ (Chapter 3). The local authority that owned E5 (1949/700/fl/L) initially boycotted the Estate Action programme on ideological grounds, before launching into a series of schemes for its large deck-access estates (not including E5). Council staff encountered in the 1990s were keen to point out that the programme granted borrowing approval rather than cash. At E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L), the local manager complained: “government interference, the hoops you have to jump through, the amount of bureaucracy and red tape … the amount spent on consultants and surveys … how much really makes its way to the poorest and most vulnerable people on the estate?” In 1994, residents at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) said, “We had our arms twisted by the director [of housing] to show interest in a [Tenant Management Organisation], to help get the Estate Action.” The area manager acknowledged, “We’re really dependent on money from Estate Action or SRB [Single Regeneration Budget].”

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Ten of the estates ultimately received support from Estate Action This included all the mixed built form and deck-access estates, and two estates of houses: E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E15 (1946/400/h/ NE). Problems of estates of houses and walk-up blocks seemed to be overshadowed by the serious and expensive design and construction problems at many tower block and deck-access estates elsewhere in their local authorities and nationwide. In 1988, the local authority that owned E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) bid for Estate Action for its tower blocks, but E8 waited another ten years for major investment. Three Estate Action bids were made for E1 (1929/300/h/NW), but all three failed. The manager said, “Residents really thought we were going to get it this time, it’s bad for morale.” E17 (1967/1,100/mixed/L) got Estate Action in the 1990s, but E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L), in the same local authority, waited until 2000, when a senior councillor said, “we are finally going to do something about [E13]” and the MP said, “it’s long overdue” (Wilks 2000: 29). Estate Action supported four of the major reorganisations of public space and access at mixed built form and deck-access estates. It also paid for part of six of the ten major redevelopments involving substantial demolition and tenure change (Chapter 7). It provided millions or even tens of millions of pounds in borrowing approval for individual estates (Figures 7.4, 16.1). Other area regeneration schemes, 1968–2010 Over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, central government developed numerous programmes to kickstart or support regeneration in deprived and declined areas. Most expenditure, including in the 20 estates, went on economic projects, but there was some money for basic investment in housing and residential environments. Before the late 1990s, these programmes were mostly directed at larger areas than estates, for example Urban Programme funding was directed to whole local authorities, and the Inner City Partnerships to large parts of local authorities. In 1995, a large number of existing regeneration schemes were amalgamated into the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), which could be spent on physical or social projects. The 1997 Labour government introduced a range of new area-based programmes. Over the period 1980–2018, the 20 estates have been all or part of the catchment areas for at least 60 major schemes, an average of 3 each (Figure 16.2). E14 (1926/900/h/NE) received support from the Urban Programme, Estate Action and SRB, and was in the area for Sure Start, an Education Action Zone and a Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder. Some, particularly small estates perhaps overshadowed by

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Figure 16.2: Sources of regeneration funding for the 20 estates, 1970–2010 UP

ICP

CG

CC

Estate Action

SRB

Sure Start

EAZ

HAZ

Neighbourhood wardens

Children's fund

NDC

E16

E18

Neighbourhood management

NRF

HMR

10 9 The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

8 7 6 252

5 4 3 2 1 0

E2

E4

E1

E5

E6

E11

E3

E12

E9

E20

E7

E13

E19

E8

E10

E15

E1

E14

Note: UP = Urban Programme, ICP = Inner City Partnership, CG = City Grant, CC = City Challenge, SRB = Single Regeneration Budget, EAZ = Education Action Zone, HAZ = Health Action Zone, NDC = New Deal for Communities, NRF = Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, HMR = Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder. Sources: Interviews and reports

National and local factors influencing estates’ housing quality

others, got much less, despite also being in deprived local authorities and having their own needs. Residents at E11 said in 1998, “This area was always on the periphery, and it has always missed any grants that have been going, any government hand-outs, either City Challenge or Agenda 21.” It received some SRB support in the 1990s before demolition in the 2000s. The sums of money and what they were spent on varied widely. While the New Deal for Communities of the 2000s could provide investment in housing equivalent to a medium-sized Estate Action scheme, as well as social and economic projects, some schemes had no money for housing, and some were very modest, for example, paying for temporary wardens and neighbourhood managers at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in the 2000s. By the late 2000s, many regeneration programmes were coming to an end, and the new 2010 government did not replace them (Lawless 2010; Matthews 2012; Lupton 2013). The Decent Homes Programme, 2000–10 In 2000, the government required all social rented homes to meet the Decent Homes standard by 2010. A ‘decent home’ met statutory minima, was in a reasonable state of repair, had reasonable modern facilities and services, and provided a reasonable degree of thermal comfort (ODPM 2004a). This in effect forced a specific cycle of maintenance on all social landlords and most homes. Like HIP, the Decent Homes policy required landlords to take a long-term, strategic approach. However, it offered local authority landlords no extra money or borrowing approval, unless they transferred housing ownership or management to organisations whose borrowing would be outside the public sector borrowing requirement statistics: either housing associations or new Arm’s Length Management Organisations. In 2004, as the programme was just starting in most areas, staff and some residents’ groups were enthusiastic, although they commented that the standard was quite low and had no environmental element. For example, a maintenance manager at E9 (1966/800/mixed/L) said, “You could just repair the electrics – that’s an easy job and might make properties compliant but most tenants might not spot the changes.” Most of the estates’ landlords had developed their own local, higher standard, in most cases after resident consultation. For example, the local authority that owned E6 (1949/600/fl/L) decided that kitchens would be renewed after 20 rather than 30  years. By 2019, all the estates had received some Decent Homes work. For example, E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) had received little from earlier schemes. Under

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Decent Homes its kitchens, bathrooms, electrics, gas and boilers were improved, at a cost of £7,100 per home (at 2019 prices), although the work only took place in 2012–14, after the official completion target. At E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) in 2005, only a decade after Estate Action, staff thought the estate would have little to gain. In fact, although the estate was also towards the end of the programme, all homes got new kitchens, bathrooms and fencing. In 2018, improvements at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) were still visible and in good condition (Photo 16.1). Photo 16.1: An empty home at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in 2018, when the estate was aged c70. The windows, render and garden fencing were renewed under the Decent Homes Programme. The entrance is protected by a steel door which has been graffitied (possibly at another site).

Sale of estate land From the 1980s onwards, local authorities (which had in the recent past been active participants in land markets), occasionally part-funded housing improvements though land sales. From the 1990s, when estate regeneration projects more frequently involved demolition, and partnership with private developers, local authorities became reawakened to the value of the land under their homes, and to the potential to release this value through demolition. This source of funding had more potential in London, and other areas where

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development land was scarce and increasingly valuable. Redevelopments at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) from 1990, at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) from 1998, and at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) from 2002 were reliant on significant land scales, and other redevelopments involved small sales of sites for private house building. Explanations for estate redevelopments The dramatic redevelopments and tenure mixing in ten estates (Chapter  7) took place because landlords believed that previous improvement initiatives, including local housing management, resident involvement, improvement and reorganisations, had not overcome problems sufficiently or sustainably. However, like decision to demolish (Chapter 13), the decision to redevelop cannot be treated as evidenced, rational assessments of estate performance. Redevelopments were directly and indirectly encouraged by central government policy. Estate Action supplied increasingly large sums for estates’ reorganisation and redevelopment in the 1990s (Chapter 7). Ironically, its withdrawal in 1995 also acted to encourage redevelopment in some estates. Increasingly local authorities were being asked to raise their own finance for planned and later centrally mandated maintenance, improvements or redevelopment via transfer of estates and whole stocks to new landlords, and use of assets such as land. Government increasingly advocated and supported ‘mixed communities’ directly (Tunstall 2003). Stock transfer in itself prompted the new housing association landlords to plan transformative redevelopment.

Conclusion Between them, central and local government were responsible for the relatively high quality of the 20 estates relative to local and national standards when they were first built (Chapter 6). However, between them, central and local government were also responsible for laggardly and patchy maintenance and improvements, which caused the estates to fall behind other local housing in quality, which in turn contributed to falling relative popularity and other problems (Chapters 8, 9 and 10). Estates with non-traditional design and construction aged prematurely and started their lives with vulnerabilities to changes in population, crime and management, which were exposed relatively early on. These problems might have been predictable and might have been preventable, but were only resolved after delays and successive costly and disruptive reorganisations and redevelopments which central government permitted, enabled and influenced. 255

17

National and estate factors influencing safety and order in estates Introduction Chapter  8 described the falls and rises in safety and order in the 20 estates, and rises from the 1980s or 1990s onwards, which had effects on estate popularity and population. This chapter explores estate-level and national factors influencing safety and order in the 20 estates over their lifetime.

Potential estate levels explanations for falls in safety and order since the 1970s All the estates had multiple characteristics which were likely to have contributed to the falls in safety and order over the 1970s and 1980s. The seven third-generation estates had mixed or deck-access design and layout believed to increase opportunities for crime and to reduce the effectiveness of informal social control (Chapter 3), although 13 did not. Over the 1970s and 1980s, all the estates developed populations with high proportions of unemployed and child residents (Chapter 10). Many estates were conducive to children’s play, which sometimes shaded into vandalism and anti-social behaviour (Chapter 11). Some estates had distinctive communities, and some residents did not want or feel able to contribute to informal social control (Chapters 10 and 11). Anne Power, who commenced the study this book is based on, believed that the absence of effective housing management contributed to the development of problems, including crime and disorder (Power 1984, 1985). Additional evidence provided in this book demonstrates how housing management took some responsibility for contributing to or failing to prevent the development of problems with safety and order (Chapters 6 and 8). For example, council housing allocations played a role in the development of residualised populations and unusual social environments in the 20 estates, through ‘dumping’ policies, through ‘matching’ and through failing to prevent the differentiating effects of

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standard allocations policy across housing stocks of varying popularity (Chapter 10). Inadequate or slow responses to minor crime or antisocial behaviour due to insufficient or remote management might allow more serious problems and unusual forms of crime to become established.

Potential estate-level explanations for rises in safety and order since the 1980s All the estates, then, experienced multiple changes from the 1970s onwards which were likely to have contributed to rises in safety and order. Formal social control through policing in the estates and their areas appeared to play a role in reductions in crime at certain points in certain estates, but according to local managers’ and residents’ interviews in 1982, 1988, 1994 and 2005, it was not consistent enough to explain the overall rise in security and order. For example, the arrival of beat PCs in the early 1980s at E2 (1937/300/h/NW) in the early 1980s and at E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) in the late 1980s had some effect on crime rates (Burbidge 1984). However, over estate lifetimes there was a trend away from beat policing. Over the 1980s and 1990s, residents’ and local managers’ main comment on policing was that they wanted more of it. This was true even for teenagers, for example at E2 (Burbidge 1984), and even where almost all groups in the population had complaints about police behaviour, as at E7 (1970/1,100/deck/L) in the 1980s (Lee et al 1986). Very localised factors could also affect crime rates, at least over the short term. At E14 (1926/900/h/NE), the local manager said in 2005 that “crime and [anti-social behaviour] go up and down. It depends on who is inside [prison].” More significant was the fact that from the 1970s, all the flatted estates had access control and additional security measures such as entryphones, stronger doors and better lighting made it easier for staff and residents to exercise social control and to prevent burglary and mugging. In the 1980s and 1990s, public space was organised at six of the mixed built form and deck-access estates to reduce hiding places and improve surveillance, although this was generally perceived as at best partially effective and in most cases was overtaken by further redevelopments (Chapter 7). In 1994, some residents at E6 (1949/600/ fl/L) pointed out to me that they had made individual and costly contributions to crime prevention, buying car alarms, burglar alarms and steel gates to cover their front doors. This book originated in a study of the impact of the decentralisation of housing management staff and functions to estate-based offices and

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staff, intended to address a wide range of estate problems, including high crime and disorder in most cases (Chapter 1). The extent and impact of decentralised housing management will be discussed in more detail. In 1982, all 20 estates were managed from an office and group of staff based in the estate, with public access for the majority of the working week, and covering repairs requests, rent payments and tenancy issues. At the time, this was an unusual practice both in the estate local authorities and nationwide. Power, who commenced the study this book is based on, believed that the decentralisation of staff and devolution of powers was a necessary if not sufficient element of attempts to improve them (Power 1985). Over the 1980s, local management became part of the accepted good practice for estates that were less popular, had management problems, or where improvement projects required day-to-day liaison between managers, building workers and residents. However, it was never accepted by housing researchers and senior professionals as good practice for all estates, or for these 20 estates for all times (Bines et al 1993). The 20 estates mainly kept their local offices for over twenty years, although the powers and responsibilities of offices fluctuated. By 1988, one estate, E4 (1938/300/fl/L), was being managed from a central local authority building, although it was only a few minutes’ walk from the estate. By 1994, three estates were managed from area Figure 17.1: Degree of decentralisation of housing managers responsible for the estates, 1982–2018 Estate office Area office in the estate Area office outside estate Central council/regional housing association office 20 15 10 5 0

1982

1988

1994

2005

Sources: Interviews (1982, 1988, 1994, 2005), desk research (2018)

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

offices covering part of the local authority and three from central offices. However, as with ownership, and managers, changes in forms of management accelerated over time. In 2005, only seven estates had estate-based offices. By 2018, two estates had a full-time estate-based office covering just the estate, although one of these was due for closure, and one had an office base that was only open for short hours, while in three cases where was an office in the estate which covered a much larger area. Seven were managed from various off-estate offices covering part of the landlords’ homes. Seven were managed from a central office covering all the landlord’s housing, or a regional office covering at least part of a housing association’s homes. Photo 13.1 shows the estate office at E14 (1926/900/h/NE) in 1994, shortly before estate management was moved to an off-estate area office. Previous research on the 20  estates focused on local housing management and found that over the period 1982–95 and to a lesser extent 1995–2005, more local and more intensive housing management played an important role in addressing problems and in helping to reverse falls in safety and order, as well as in estate quality and popularity, while also influencing population mix (Power 1984, 1991; Power and Tunstall 1995; Tunstall and Coulter 2006). Key housing management performance indicators (empty properties, transfer requests, rent arrears, and repairs requests and performance) improved markedly after the estate offices were set up, and generally continued to improve over time, albeit with some ups and downs. For example, by 2005 the level of empty properties in the estates, a measure of absolute (rather than relative) popularity, was below local authority and national averages, and managers were collecting average proportions of rent due. Sixty-five per cent of residents interviewed in the streets at this time in ten of the estates were satisfied with their landlord, compared to 69  per cent nationwide, and estate residents were more positive than tenants across England about trends in management over the previous two years (DCLG 2006). This represents an achievement for landlords in estates formerly seen as unpopular and difficult to manage and disorderly. Managers, caretakers, repairs workers and other housing staff played a role in controlling crime, providing formal social control, liaising with police, collecting evidence, responding to vandalism and minor offences, and providing reassurance. At E7, when the estate office reopened in 1995 after closure due to intimidation, the local manager walked through the area of the estate where drugs were sold on the street and talked to people there every day: “make sure you get to know even the baddest people”. At E2 (1937/300/h/NW), residents

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said in the mid-1990s that even during a long hot summer, the manager could defuse tensions, “just by her presence”. However, the relationship between the number of local staff and crime was complex. Many managers felt frustrated that they could do little to address crime directly, and complained about limited funds, insufficient policing, weak liaison, and resident fear of reporting. Crime rose in the period when all of the estates had estate-based offices. It fell alongside the subsequent decline in estate-based housing management staff. Perhaps not surprisingly, local housing staff interviewed in 1982, 1988, 1995 and 2005 all felt that decentralised and intensive housing management had been necessary if not sufficient for the improvements in safety and order and other changes in the estates. Most residents’ group members also said that a local housing office had made a difference to the area over the same period. As late as 2005, residents’ groups such as E1’s (1929/300/h/NW), which still had offices in their estates said: “it’s convenient, it’s on our doorstep”; “they keep things under control”. However, by the 2000s, most senior staff were more equivocal about the continuing value of decentralised management. For them, the key question was not just the effectiveness but the relative cost–effectiveness of different management structures, relative to budgets and practice elsewhere in the organisations. This varied according to the difficulty of management in the estate, management practice elsewhere in their organisations and the availability of technology. The ‘recentralisation’ of management was a return to the longterm historic norm of practices for the 20 estates and other estates, which reflected reductions in crime and disorder, unpopularity and deprivation in the estates. The local manager at E7 (1970/1,100/ deck/L) said that when he arrived in 1995, “the main aim was to get control of the estate, and then to normalise the conditions and practices”, but by 2005, this had broadly been achieved. By 2005, a senior manager said that E4 (1938/300/fl/L) was “very very quiet, almost run of the mill”. However, ‘recentralisation’ cannot be accepted uncritically as evidence that crime and order and other problems had been fully and permanently ended. Recentralisation was partly due to changes in estate ownership and management (Chapter 14). Housing associations have not traditionally used estate-based offices, because their housing has been scattered, and from the 1990s they increasingly operated in more than one local authority, with offices covering a whole region. Changes also provided an opportunity and motivation for cost-cutting reorganisation, and

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none of the ALMOs which managed 12 of the 20 estates at points over the 2000s used estate-based offices. ‘Recentralisation’ was also partly due to changes in the availability and use of technology by both tenants and landlords, and was partly modelled on changes in other organisations. For most of the 20th century, changes in technology affected how landlords could operate and structure themselves. In 1934, the housing department of E2’s local authority had two telephones, and by 1937 it had two typewriters (E2’s local authority 1934, 1937). In the 1940s, it bought an ‘adding machine’ and a reproduction machine (E2’s local authority 1940:41), and 40 years later, it announced the arrival of its first two computers, which were large objects ‘called “Freda” and “Fred”’ (Anon. E2 1984). However, late 20th-century and early 21st-century technology affected how landlords and residents could communicate. The take-up of landlines, then mobile phones and the internet was slower among social housing residents, who were older and poorer than average, than for the population overall, but over the 1990s and 2000s the new technologies eroded part of the rationale for physical decentralisation. For example, in 2004, 59 per cent of E6’s (1949/600/ fl/L) local authority’s tenants generally contacted housing management by phone, compared to 34  per cent using neighbourhood offices. At this stage only 40 per cent had access to the internet (some via libraries) and only 1 per cent of contacts with housing management were via email (Kwest 2004), but internet access increased rapidly with the spread of smartphones in the 2000s and 2010s. Housing staff were changing from generic roles and local teams into specialised and often centralised ones. By 2005, all the 20 estate managers had set up call centres for handling resident queries or were in the process of doing so. While in 1995 some housing officers complained that chasing rent arrears dominated their jobs, by 2005 several landlords had centralised and automated rent accounts. Repairs matters were also increasingly dealt with through call centres or via the internet rather than through face-to-face contact. Given the reduced roles of housing officers, numbers of staff in the remaining local offices reduced. In 2005 a doubtful local manager at E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) said, “The council is trying to adopt a supermarket management style to housing, but it can’t work.” A resident at E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) referred to “that abomination of a single phone number: ‘press one for this, two for that’ …”. Some residents interviewed in the street in estates which had lost their local office were unhappy. A resident at E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) said, “it was better before when we could talk to them … now you get passed from person to person”, and one at E11

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(1938/400/h/Mid) said “there’s nobody on our side now”. However, more in effect agreed with the rationales of senior managers that ways of accessing services were changing for tenants as well as society as a whole: “the rent is paid through the bank” (E17: 1967/1,100/ mixed/L); “it’s ok because we have a car” (E11: 1938/400/h/Mid). The extent to which more centralised and restructured management can meet the varied needs of all tenants, including more vulnerable ones, can be responsive and can pre-empt new problems, remains to be proven at the 20 estates and across social housing. Evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has shown significant problems in relations between tenants and their housing manager and landlord prior to the tragedy. Significantly, communications technology may be used to observe or report crime and anti-social behaviour, but cannot on its own act against it.

The national rise and fall in crime since the 1970s However, it appears that the main explanation for falls and rises in safety and order in estates at least since the 1970s may lie outside estates or their local authorities, in the dramatic rises and falls in recorded crime and victimisation nationwide over that period. Across England, reported crime and crime victimisation rose markedly in the 1980s and then fell by at least half or three quarters from the 1990s to the 2010s (Figure 17.2). Car crime, burglary, ‘mugging’ (robbery combined with snatch theft) and violence of all kinds rose throughout the 1980s. Characteristics of estates appear to have made the estates vulnerable to national rises in crime over the 1970s and 1980s. For example, one of the early residents at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L) said, ‘of course graffiti and vandalism weren’t confined to [E16], it was worldwide, but it came here quite quickly’ (Green 1995:130). In 1976, a senior housing officer at the local authority that owned E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) said that when the estate was built, ‘vandalism was not such a serious problem. Now we no longer build homes like these’ (Anon. E20 2006:np). However, burglary, violence of all kinds, arson and criminal damage and ‘mugging’ all peaked in between 1993 and 1997 (ONS 2018). The proportion of people seeing crime, vandalism, hooliganism and graffiti as problems also reduced over the 1990s and 2000s (MHCLG livetables Table  FA5322). Most other developed countries also experienced a substantial fall in crime in the same period (Tseloni et al 2010). Explanations for the drop in crime are still hotly debated among

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 17.2: Percentage of adults who were victims of crime each year, England and Wales, 1981–2017/18 Violence Theft of/from vehicle

Mugging Arson/criminal damage

Domestic burglary

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

20 99 01 20 /02 03 20 /04 05 20 /06 07 20 /08 09 20 /10 11 20 /12 20 13/ 15 14 /2 0 20 16 17 /1 8

97

19

95

19

93

19

91

19

87

19

83

19

19

19

81

0

Note: ‘Mugging’ combines robbery and ‘snatch theft’. Source: ONS (2018)

criminologists. Explanatory factors that have been suggested include ageing populations, improved economic opportunities, changes in policing and criminal justice policy, and improved home and car security (Mooney and Young 2006; Farrell 2013). Each of these factors has been experienced at estate level. Changes in the estates from the 1970s onwards described in Part II could probably best be seen as enabling them to benefit from the changes at national or society-wide level, at least to a significant extent. Without more detailed evidence it is not possible to say if estates experienced the same falls in crime as other areas, or if the gap in crime rates between estates and other areas reduced at all. However, while social housing tenants nationwide experienced a fall in crime over the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s, they did not experience as big a fall as for households in other tenures (Grove et al 2012).

Conclusion Numerous developments at estate level were likely to have contributed to falls and rises in safety and order. Fully explaining the changes is difficult without more detailed estate-level crime data (Chapter 8), and

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more evaluations of estate-level and local crime prevention initiatives. However, despite the likely cumulative impact of numerous changes and initiatives in estates and their areas, and in particular a contribution from decentralised housing management, it seems likely that the main explanation for falls and rises in safety and order in estates since the 1970s was the dramatic falls and rises in safety and order nationwide.

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18

National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix Introduction The popularity of the majority of the 20 estates fell and rose over time (Chapter 9). It was affected by their own characteristics, in terms of quality, safety and order, and, to some extent, population and social mix, and by how these compared to other local options, as has been shown in Part II. In addition to their own characteristics, however, all 20 estates were affected by factors well beyond their boundaries, as some theories have suggested (Chapter 3). This chapter explores national and local changes in the amount and type of demand for social housing over estate lifetimes, as part of the explanation for changes in the relative popularity of the 20 estates.

The national fall and rise in the demand for social housing over estate lifetimes The rise and rise of English populations and households In 1921, the census immediately before the first of the 20  estates was first let, there were 36.2 million people in England and Wales, living in 8.7 million households. In 2011, the most recent census, the population had increased by about half to 53.7 million people, but the number of households had almost tripled to 24.0 million. Population increase was slowest over the period 1971–2001, and fastest over 2001–11. Household numbers increased most slowly from 1971 to 2001 and fastest over the period 1921–51. From 1901 to 1981, the rise in numbers of people and households mentioned earlier was more than matched by an increase in the supply of housing. The building of the 17,000 homes in the 20 estates was a very small part of this overall development. Huge private, public and social resources went into the creation of the additional homes and housing space. The state directly subsidised the building of over

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5 million council and latterly housing association homes; it controlled the use and price of land, and used taxation to encourage development and to influence occupation patterns (Malpass 2005; Mullins and Murie 2006). In 1921 and for four more decades, there were more households than homes, meaning many had to share. However, housing development gradually closed the gap, finally achieving net surplus during the decade 1961–71. Some surplus is needed to take account of vacancy due to house moves, major repairs and second homes. The size of the surplus as a proportion of total dwellings peaked in 1981 at 4 per cent, and then fell to 2 per cent in 2001 (Figure 18.1). Figure 18.1: The deficit or surplus of dwellings over households, as a percentage of dwellings, Great Britain, 1921–2010 6 4 2 0

%

–2

1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2010

–4 –6 –8 –10 Source: Census of population, and Labour Force Survey for households in 2001 and 2010

The rise and fall of social housing and other changes Even basic housing data such as the size of major tenure groups are hard to come by for the start of the first-generation estates’ lifetimes. The most authoritative numbers are Holmans’, which put home ownership at 23 per cent of households in 1918, and 32 per cent in 1939 (Holmans 2005). Other estimates for 1938 vary from 25 per cent (Crisp 1998) to 35 per cent (Swenarton 1981). It is clear, however, that Britain started the 20th century as a nation of tenants and completed it as a ‘nation of home owners’ (Saunders 1990). In the 21st century this became somewhat less true (Figure 2.1). Home ownership peaked in 2003 at 71 per cent of households before falling to 63 per cent in

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2016–17, largely due to a reduction among younger and working-class householders (MHCLG 2019a). Mortgaged home ownership peaked as early as 1995 at 43 per cent. Council housing (and social housing as a whole) rose to a peak of 31 per cent of households in 1981, when the scale of state-owned housing made Britain, ‘unique amongst western capitalist countries’ (Hamnett 1989:209). From 1981, with the introduction of the Right to Buy and a sharp reduction in new building, council tenure reduced. Ironically, the Right to Buy helped to sustain the last two decades of growth in home ownership. If Right to Buy sales are stripped out, ownership peaked in 2001 at 63  per cent. Homes built for social renting have also played a role in the rise of the private rented sector from 1999 onwards. In 2018 an estimated 40 per cent of homes bought under the Right to Buy were being rented out (Barker 2017). Analysis in the following sections is based on male working-class heads of household as the core demand for social housing for most of estate lifetimes. This focus, while somewhat stylised, reflects the key intended demand for most of the 20th century. Most European welfare states have been based on the assumption that the economy would create jobs paying a ‘family wage’. Most households would have a ‘breadwinner’ or main earner, usually male, to support dependents (Lewis 1992; Pascall 2006; Trappe et al 2015). Social housing was indeed built on the assumption that households would generally contain a male breadwinner who was tenant and rent payer. As late as 1978, textbooks referred to ‘the applicant and his wife’ (Macey and Baker 1978:27). However by 2015/16 56 per cent of heads of household (the highest earning or oldest adult) in social housing were female, compared to 40 per cent for all tenures (Tunstall and Pleace 2018). The most important source of demand for social housing has always been people in working-class occupations. From its inception in 1890 until 1949, council housing was officially exclusively for ‘the working classes’, the largest class group of the period (Hamnett 1984). The ‘working classes’ were never exactly defined, but some local authorities assessed applicants’ income, ‘judged perhaps from way of life and type of employment’ as a housing textbook suggested (Macey and Baker 1978:27). From 1949 onwards, councils were tasked with meeting needs across classes, but given continuing shortages, renewed slum clearance and growing access to home ownership, council housing never reached universal status or provided for fully ‘mixed communities’ (Lancaster 1994; Harloe 1995).

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This focus on working-class men as the core demand for council housing allows measures of demand for different times and places, and it can show when and where social housing would be likely to be over-subscribed, and undersubscribed. The decline of the working class In 1951, more than half the adults in England were in working-class occupations, defined as skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual jobs. Fewer than 20 per cent of households could be housed in social housing (Figure 2.1). Thus there was a surplus of core working-class demand for council homes in the first and second generations. By 1971, the proportion of individuals in working-class occupations had fallen, while the proportion of households in social housing had risen, which significantly reduced core demand for new homes in third-generation estates. When social housing was at its peak in 1981, the class and tenure groups were closest in size. After this point, the proportion of people in working-class jobs continued to fall, but the proportion of households in social housing also fell. In 1951 there were three times as many men in working-class occupations as there were social rented homes. By 1971, this had fallen to one and a half times. After a low period 1971–91, over 1991–2011, it grew again to one and three quarter times (Figure 18.2). Figure 18.2: The relationship between social housing supply and potential working-class demand, Great Britain, 1951–2011 Social housing as a percentage of all households Men in working class work (as a percentage of all men) Women in working class work (as a percentage of all women) 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0

1951

1971

1991

2011

Note: Housing tenure figure is for 1953. Sources: Goldthorpe (2016) and on the Census 1951 and 1971 via www.visionofbritain.org.uk and www.casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk

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The rise and fall of working-class home ownership One resident who grew up at E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid) in the 1930s and 1940s commented in 2007, ‘as a youngster I could not have imagined that ordinary working-class folk like us, would own … our houses’ (EMOHA 1). Over the estates’ lifetimes, the proportion of working-class households in home ownership varied from a few per cent to about a third. Working-class home ownership had significant effects on politics and culture (Crisp 1998; Holmans 2005; Scott 2014), and took up some of the core demand for council housing. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were ‘two competing tenures for the aristocracy of labour, both subsidised by the state’: council housing and home ownership (Byrne 1994:87). Home ownership provided highquality homes without a waiting list, and was increasingly accessible to working-class families with steady incomes due to lower interest rates, more accessible mortgages and reduced relative prices (Byrne 1994; Scott 2014). An analysis of the British birth cohort studies, which track children born in 1946, 1958, 1970 and 2000, divided their families into five ‘class’ groups according to the father’s occupation status and both parents’ education. Twenty-two per cent of the least advantaged two fifths of families, equivalent to a narrow ‘working class’, were home owners in 1950. Working-class home ownership grew with each cohort, as home ownership grew overall, reaching about a third by 2005 (Figure 18.3). Overall home ownership rates in England began to fall in 2003 (Figure 2.1), and in 2016/17, very few new home owners had incomes in the lowest 40 per cent of incomes, which would broadly overlap with the ‘working-class’ category (MHCLG 2018). The late 20th-century pause in demand for social housing In the late 20th century, there was finally a surplus of homes over households in Great Britain, which grew until 1981 (Figure 18.1). Social housing supply grew continuously until 1981 (Figure  2.1), while the key market of working-class male breadwinners reduced (Figure 18.2) and a large minority of working-class households went into home ownership (Figure  18.3). In combination this led to a national pause in the demand for social housing in the 1970s and 1980s, after the seemingly insatiable demand experienced for most of the century. However, there was substantial potential demand from outside the core demand from male working-class heads of household. In addition, the pause in core demand was only temporary.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 18.3: The occupational class and education of parents with young children in home ownership, Great Britain, 1950–2005 Most advantaged 5th Next most advantaged 5th Middle group Next least advantaged 5th Least advantaged 5th

% 100 80 60 40 20 0

Age 4 in 1950

Age 7 in 1965

Age 5 in 1975

Age 5 in 2005

Note: Thirty-nine per cent of the 1958 cohort had the same advantage score, so two of the fifths are merged. Source: Lupton et al (2009)

The 21st-century rise in demand for social housing From the end of the 20th century and into the 21st, housing ‘surpluses’ declined (Figure 18.1), social housing supply declined (Figure 2.1), the proportion of people who were working class continued to fall but at a slower rate (Figure 18.2), and rising prices closed off working-class access to home ownership. This meant that demand for social housing strengthened once again, and ‘difficult-to-let’ social housing faded as a problem.

The local fall and rise in the demand for social housing in estates’ local authorities over estates’ lifetimes This section explores trends in the demand for social housing on the estates’ local authorities, using the same methods and data. The skewed location of the national social housing stock In its period of growth from the start of the century to 1981, council housing developed at different rates in different parts of the country. The pattern reflected local government finance, capacity and politics,

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as much as differences in needs, and there was little connection between housing investment and crude deficit of homes compared to households (Nicholson and Topham 1971). When social housing peaked in 1981, it was slightly over-represented in the northern regions of England. There was a correlation between the proportion of homes in council tenure in English local authorities and the proportion of households with people of working age, a working-class head, and people who were unemployed and permanently sick. At this point, the UK was on the threshold of a rapid phase of deindustrialisation and a dramatic increase in unemployment, and it was the local authorities with the highest proportions of council housing that were the most affected by the changes (Rose et al 1984). The 20 estates’ local authorities and housing markets Most of the 20 estates’ local authority areas were outliers even among local authorities with high proportions of social housing. By 1961, when census data on housing tenure commences, their proportions of local authority housing ranged from 26 per cent at the local authority that owned E18 (1966/1,600/deck/L) to 65 per cent for the one that owned E5 (1949/700/fl/L), while the national median was 25 per cent. Right to Buy sales reduced the proportions of social tenure nationwide, but because sales were slower in these areas, their tenure systems actually became more distinctive after 1981. While national population rose consistently over the estates’ lifetimes, the populations of the 20 estates’ local authorities fell. When the firstgeneration estates were being built, Britain had been urbanising for ‘at least 1500 years’ (Champion 1989:51), and was still doing so. However, by the time the second and then third generation of estates were built, this long-established process altered. In hindsight, ‘deconcentration was underway in the 1950s’ (Champion 1989:54). For example, London lost population due to new towns and other ex-urban housing and industrial development, and official policies of ‘dispersal and balance’ (Shankland et al 1977). In 2010, the proportion of the British population in ‘metropolitan’ areas had been falling for at least 60 years (Hatton 2014). All the 20 estates’ local authorities experienced early and large-scale counter-urbanisation and population falls. The population of the local authority that owned E19 (1936/1,100/fl/ NW) fell from 800,000 in 1931 to 450,000 in 1991, with minimal boundary changes. The city’s rise had been ‘prodigious’; its decline was ‘dramatic’ (Munck 2003:3). Even while E1 (1929/300/h/NW) was being built, its local authority’s population was falling, and continued

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to do so for fifty years until 1971. Population change was sometimes hard to see given incremental local authority boundary changes and large-scale local government reorganisations in 1965 and 1974 (Figure 18.4). However, from the 1980s, a new process emerged, ‘the resurgence of cities and especially of the big cities’ (Champion 2014:5). The timing and extent of change varied by region, city and local authority, but the 20 estates’ local authorities were all affected. The term ‘deindustrialisation’ is usually defined as the decline of the share of employment in manufacturing (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997). Britain was the first industrialising nation and became the first deindustrialising nation (Rose et al 1984). Deindustrialisation affected some parts of the UK much more than others. Some authorities with first-generation estates were significantly affected by job losses in the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1936, unemployment reached 17  per cent in the North West, where E1 (1929/300/h/ NW) and E2 (1937/300/h/NW) were about to be opened, while unemployment was just 5 per cent in the South East and London (Eichengreen 1989). A former local resident of the local authority Figure 18.4: The population of the 20 estates’ local authorities, 1921–2011 E1

E2

E3

E4/10

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E20

450,000 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 1921

1931

1951

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

2011

Note: The local authority for E19 (1936/1,100/fl/NW) is excluded because of its much larger population. Sources: Censuses 1921–2011

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

that owned E1 said, ‘the once prosperous town … certainly suffered. During this calamitous period seven cotton mills closed down’ (Hague 1987:79–80). A resident of E8 (1936/1,000/h/Mid), who was born in 1926, commented: ‘we had a marvellous shoe industry and hosiery’, but it had all gone (BLMMB 1). A man who grew up at E8 in the 1930s and 1940s commented on the shift to a post-industrial economy: ‘The change from a manufacturing nation, where almost all were employed, to a wealthy comparatively non-producing country, in my opinion has by no means been successfully accomplished.’ Second- and third-generation estates were built in areas that had been undergoing industrial transformation for decades and already had long histories of unemployment. The local authority that owned E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) lost many heavy industries, including an iron works, collieries and chemical factories, even before the 1920s, and its population was falling at least two decades before the estate was first let (Byrne 1994). The area received ‘Special Area’ funding in the 1930s, which was used to establish an innovative trading estate. (Seventy years later the trading estate was still operating, and in 2004, when the local authority transferred housing management to an Arm’s Length Management Organisation [ALMO], the new organisation marked its independence by a move out of the town hall into this legacy of the depression. Ironically, attempts to reduce costs forced the ALMO back into the council building in the 2010s.) The London economy had a different history, with a greater historic role for services and lighter manufacturing and services. Nonetheless, it was also affected by the relocation of industry to suburban and new town sites, from before the Second World War and for several more decades (Watt 2003). A resident at E16 (1971/2,000/deck/L), who had been a welder, said that in the 1980s, ‘[I] got made redundant, in common with a lot of other people … lots of factories were closing down … robots were taking over’ (Gordon 1995:95). He described being depressed, and having to make a pint of beer and a newspaper last all day, although he later got a degree, and relaunched his career in a non-manual job. The late 20th-century pause in demand for social housing in estates’ local authorities Over the period 1931–2001, more than 700,000 working-class men vanished from the areas within the 20 estates’ 1951 local authority boundaries, presumably moving away or into better jobs. (Using constant 1951 boundaries avoids the problem of boundary changes.) In 1981, despite the national pause in demand for social housing,

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

most local authorities in England still had more men in working-class jobs than council housing. In contrast, most of the 20 estates’ local authorities had higher proportions of council housing than workingclass men. This means not only a pause but an actual deficit in core demand. Council homes would have to compete with each other for core demand, and some would need to attract heads of household who weren’t men in working-class occupations, even before taking working-class home ownership into account (Figure 18.5). The 20 estates’ local authorities shared these characteristics, but were outliers even among this group, with unusually large stocks of council housing, even when compared to their high working-class populations. They experienced a more significant pause in demand than other areas. By 1981 or 1991, in most of the estates’ local authorities, the pause in the demand for social housing turned into an actual deficit, where Figure 18.5: The proportion of council and new town homes (horizontal axis) and of men in working-class occupations (vertical axis), in English local authorities, 1981 % 60

50

40

30

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

% Note: The 20 estates’ local authorities are marked in heavy points. The 20 estates were in a total of 19 local authorities in 1981. Source: Census 1981 via www.casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

there were more social rented homes than working-class men, the key demand group (Figure 18.6). All of the estates’ local authorities had more working-class men than local authority homes in each of the estates in 1961 and 1971. However, by 1981, seven local authorities had more council homes than working-class men, mostly in London (the local authorities for E5, E6, E7, E9, E11, E13 and E19). By 1991, they had been joined by seven more in various locations (the local authorities for E3, E4, E10, E12, E14, E16 and E17). In the remaining local authorities, while there was still net core demand, it paused and was at its lowest in these years. Figure 18.6 may even exaggerate core demand and underestimate deficits from 1981 onwards, due to the effects of the Right to Buy (because those who had bought were no longer in the market for social housing).

Figure 18.6: Net core demand for social housing: the difference between the number of men in working class occupations and the number of social rented homes in the 20 estates’ local authorities, 1961–2011 E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

E12

E13

E14

E15

E16

E17

E18

E19

E20

000s 90 70 50 30 10 –10 –30

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

2011

Note: Trends over time are affected by boundary changes, especially 1961–71 and 1971–81. From 1991, data include housing association as well as local authority and new town homes. Sources: Census data via www.visionofbritain.org.uk (1961), www.casweb.ukdataservice. ac.uk (1971, 1981, 1991), www.nomisweb.co.uk (2001, 2011)

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

The late 20th-century rise in demand for social housing in estates’ local authorities Then, in a change perhaps as unexpected as the original development of difficult-to-let estates (Chapter 2), from the end of the 20th century, housing ‘surpluses’ declined, social housing supply declined, numbers of working-class people continued to fall but at a slower rate, counter-counter-urbanisation began, and working-class access to home ownership decreased. The national pause in demand for social housing ended over the period 2001–11. In some of the estates’ local authorities, atypical in many relevant ways, the pause ended as early as 1981–91. By 2011 all the estates’ local authorities had more working-class men than social rented homes. In some, such as the local authorities for E2 (1937/300/h/NW) and E20 (1968/1,000/deck/ NW), the difference was huge. These areas were small towns within wider metropolitan areas, and had experienced substantial Right to Buy sales, and great population growth, including in numbers of men in working-class occupations. Even if some or many working-class men were in home ownership, this change meant more competition for social rented homes. As a senior officer at the local authority for E15 (1946/400/h/NE) said to me in 2006, “maybe we demolished too much”. The implications for the 20 estates The significant falls and rises in core demand for social housing in estates’ local authorities can be seen clearly from the statistics, even if only after lengthy argument and calculation. However, national and local changes in demand were experienced in in daily life and in real time by staff and residents at the estates over the period. E12 (1947/1,000/h/NE) provides an example. In 1981, there was positive core demand – more men in skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs than there were social rented homes in the local authority (Figure 18.6). However, by 1991, the situation had reversed. In 1994, the local manager at E12 said, “we are struggling … especially [with] getting demand for family-sized accommodation  … all [the local authority] is having problems – but especially the priority [problematic] estates” and she thought all council housing faced competition for residents: “There may be opportunities elsewhere – such as the private rented sector.” The director of housing said, “we’re chasing voids around” meaning that no sooner was an empty home let than another became vacant.

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

Looking back a few years later, the new holder of the equivalent position (the chief executive of the local authority’s ALMO) said that the local authority had had three ‘difficult’ estates at the time, one of which was E12: “In 1998 there was a significant reduction in [overall] demand and these estates became impossible to let.” However, as at national level, the local pause in demand for social housing in estate local authorities was only temporary. By 2004, demand for social housing in E12’s local authority had increased markedly. Although E12 remained one of the least popular estates, it had ‘moderate’ rather than low absolute demand. In 2018, the ALMO chief exec said, “[E12] is never going to be the most popular estate … but we don’t have a problem of letting that we used to have.” The deficit or pause in core demand in estates’ local authorities exposed the 20 estates to more intensive competition for residents, particularly residents from households with male heads in workingclass jobs, or households with more choices. Fifteen of the estates were in local authorities with a deficit of core demand for council housing in the 1970s or 1980s. All of these estates had at least one vulnerability which made them stand out from most other local estates and made them more vulnerable to low demand. Five were third-generation estates at or close to first letting, when they were taking in a lot of new residents and at maximum exposure to the current demand. All but one were the least popular or among the least popular two or three estates in their local authorities so had relatively high turnover and high exposure to current demand while being avoided by potential tenants with most choice. Eight were relatively large, and needed to attract relatively high numbers of new residents even if turnover rates were not high. These estates were likely to be affected particularly early or particularly severely by the pause in demand. Chapter 7 described E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and E15 (1946/400/h/ NE) as similar estates which had similar redevelopments. However, the redevelopment at E15 was much more successful, as the new and improved homes in all tenures found ready demand, relative popularity improved and there was no further demolition. One likely explanation for the difference in the effects of the two redevelopment schemes is the fact that there was a big difference in the length and depth of the pause in demand for social housing in their local authorities. E15’s local authority always had a relatively small council housing stock (Table 4.1), and over the period 1961–2011, it always had more men in working-class occupations than social rented homes, providing strong underlying core demand. However, the local authority that owned E14 (1926/900/h/NE) always had a relatively large social housing stock

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

(Table 4.1). It had a deficit in core demand from 1981 to 2011, and E14’s less successful redevelopment took place in the middle of this period. By the time the deficit or pause in demand for social housing in estates’ local authorities ended (Figure 18.6), many of the estates were experiencing an increase in relative popularity, and may have been particularly affected by this change in demand too.

The national fall in the status of social housing over estates’ lifetimes The ‘social status’ of any type of housing is important because it will affect demand, residents’ characteristics, and residents’ lives (Chapters 3 and 5). Housing appears to be partly a ‘positional good’ which is of value because it can signal social position (Bramley et al 2008; Marsh and Gibb 2011). Over time, as average incomes rises, ‘the number of good locations and the supply of social status does not keep pace, so their relative price increases’ (Offer 2014:215). The proportion of growing income spent on ‘housing, housecare and transport’ has risen throughout the 20th century (except in wartime), and has come to be the largest or one of the largest single items of expenditure (Offer 2014). Many homes built at the start of the 20th century and still standing a hundred years later not only retain their original real value, but exceed it several times over. However, over estate lifetimes, social housing as a whole and individual estates have shifted from mainly middling status to partly or mainly low status. Mainly middling status: origins to 1960s Among early 20th-century working-class housing, ‘Tudor Walters influenced council houses’ provided housing quality, ‘formerly achieved by the lower middle classes – the semi-detached house in a low-density development, the “parlour”, the kitchen instead of scullery, the bathroom and internal WC’ (Burnett 1978:308). George Orwell said, ‘The modern Council house, with its bathroom and electric light, is smaller than the stockbroker’s villa, but is recognisably the same kind of house’ (1941:52). However, not every middle-class household had a home of better quality or higher status than a council home. Evidence from the North East suggests that in the 1930s ‘good’ council housing was of middle status, equivalent to ‘good’ 19th-century private rented homes occupied by white-collar and skilled manual workers, and to new cheaper home ownership. However new slumreplacement council estates, occupied by unskilled working-class and

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

benefit-dependent households, were of no higher status than homes in the slums themselves (Byrne 1994). Population segmentation or early market research also put ‘cottage dwellings in less congested parts of town’, including suburban council homes, in a middle category, alongside 5–8-room detached or semi-detached owner-occupied homes. These came ahead of ‘cheaper’ council houses, which, in turn, came ahead of ‘the worst slum quarters’ (Harrison and Madge 1987: 222–3). The 1961 census was the first to ask about housing tenure, indicating growing interest in tenure as a social indicator, and used an explicit (if unexplained) ranking of tenures. All council housing was placed in the middle of the market, and above all forms of private rented housing (GRO 1964). In 1967, Rex and Moore argued that residential property ownership, as well as ownership of the means of production, should be included in description and analysis of class in a capitalist system. Like the GRO, they put council tenure in a middle category, above private renters and home owners who had to rent rooms out to pay their mortgages (Rex and Moore 1967:274). Partly or mainly lower status: 1960s onwards From the 1960s onwards, council housing is assessed as partly or mainly lower status. In 1966, Tucker, a journalist with a wide-ranging interest in housing, argued that, regardless of its quality or residents’ social status, council housing was all of lower status than any private housing, and council tenants were universally stigmatised. In addition, there were gradations within the tenure: ‘an acrimonious hierarchy establishes itself among council tenants and is strengthened day by day’ (Tucker 1966:12). In 1974, Department of the Environment research in inner London, close to E3 (1938/1,000/fl/L) and E10 (1971/900/ deck/L), ranked neighbourhoods based on residents’ satisfaction, their desire to move, and the quality of housing and neighbourhood. New local authority housing was in the middle, between owner occupation and private renting. However, ‘older’ local authority housing was at the bottom, possibly due to the status of its residents (who were, ironically, generally young) (Shankland Cox/ICS 1974). In the 1970s and 1980s, home ownership became the empirical and social norm for most types of UK households from young adulthood onwards (Flint and Rowlands 2003), recognised even by school children (Rowlands and Gurney 2000). By the 1980s, some housing theorists and political activists were suggesting that home ownership was inherently superior to renting of all kinds, as a ‘natural’ tenure that provided security and promoted

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

saving, caring for home and neighbourhood (Saunders 1990). In this context, commentators have referred to social housing as the third choice or ‘last resort’ (Dwelly and Cowans 2006; Feinstein et al 2007). In fact, over the period 1975–2016, social renting retained second place, ahead of private renting, and support grew slightly after the 2008 global financial crisis. While 80 per cent of all people hoped to be owners in ten years’ time, only 60 per cent of those with household incomes under £15,000 did so, and only 39 per cent of social renters (Pannell 2016). Social renting was seen as a ‘good tenure’ by a 75 per cent of tenants in 2004/05, and by 83 per cent in 2015/16, compared to 46  per cent and 67  per cent for private renters (DCLG 2006; MHCLG 2018). Among renters, there is, ‘near universal agreement … that the social rented sector provides a superior residential offer when compared with the private rented sector’ (Fletcher et al 2008:14–15). Figure 18.7 shows a schematic representation of the status of the highest and lowest status social housing relative to all other housing over estate lifetimes, as the overall status of social housing declined from middling to lower status (Figure 18.7). The overall decline in Figure 18.7: The relative status of social housing at national level and the implications for selected estates, 1918–2010/11 %

Lowest status social housing

Highest status social housing

E14

E2

E19

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1918

1939

1953

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001 2010/11

Note: This assumes that all social housing was literally of ‘middling’ status from 1918 to 1961, then all of it was below home ownership but above private renting from 1971 to 1981, and that from 1991 did not gain relative status, despite the growth of private renting. This may overstate social housing status. In reality, parts of social housing may have been higher or lower status than some parts of the other tenures, and there would have been local variations. Source: Figure 2.1, Figures 9.1–4

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

the status of social housing over estate lifetimes means that evidence on estates’ popularity relative to other social housing in their local authorities needs to be recalibrated (Chapter 9). Figure 18.7 includes examples of how this affected selected estates. Both first-generation E14 (1926/900/h/NE) and second-generation E2 (1937/300/h/ NW) started their lifetimes of average popularity compared to other council housing in their local authorities (Chapter 9). However, from the 1960s, when the overall status of social housing began to fall, this meant their overall status began to fall too. Then both estates also began to lose popularity relative to other local estates. From the 1970s, E14 was among the least popular estates in its local authority and has remained so to date. However, given the declining status of social housing as a whole, its popularity relative to the whole housing market was not stable but fell. E2’s relative popularity compared to other estates in its local authority was lowest in the 1970s, and from the 2000s E2 was actually of above average popularity for social housing in its local authority. However, given the fall in relative status of all social housing by this time, it remained well below average popularity across the housing market as a whole. When first let, E18 was among the least popular estates in its local authority and has remained so to date, but its popularity relative to other housing fell.

The national ‘residualisation’ of social housing residents over estate lifetimes In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, observers commented that the poorest households were under-represented in council housing (Cullingworth 1969). In 1953/54, when good survey evidence of incomes and tenures starts, the median income of council tenants was close to that of owners, and ahead of private renters. Council tenants were distinguished only by their middlingness (Figure 18.8; households with heads who were economically active were over-represented) (Hamnett 1984). Among families with children, generally newer arrivals in the tenure, in 1950, the least advantaged two fifths were somewhat overrepresented in social housing, and more advantaged two fifths were somewhat under-represented (Figure 18.9). However, from the 1960s, owners and council tenants began to diverge. Households leaving the fairly mixed private rented sector were increasingly divided into sheep and goats. In addition, overall income inequality started to grow sharply in the late 1970s, increasing the absolute difference between the two types of herbivores (Brewer et al 2009). Researchers and policy makers began to be concerned

283

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 18.8: Median income of renting households as a percentage of median income of owners, England, 1953/54–2015/16

%

LA and NT renters

Private renters (unfurnished)

Private renters (furnished)

All private renters

Social renters

100 80 60 40 20

6 /1

2 20

15

/1

8 20

11

/0

5 20

07

/0

3

04

/0 20

02 20

19

99

/0

0

83 19

79 19

76 19

73 19

63 19

19

53

/5

4

0

Notes: Income is gross income before housing costs, and does not take account of household sizes. NT = new town. Sources: Bentham (1986); Table S114 English Housing Survey 1999/00–2015/16

Figure 18.9: The occupational class and education of families with young children in social housing, Great Britain, 1950–2005 Most advantaged 5th Next most advantaged 5th Middle group Next least advantaged 5th Least advantaged 5th

% 100 80 60 40 20 0

1946 Age 4 in 1950

1958 Age 7

1970 Age 5

2000 Age 5

Note: Thirty-nine per cent of the 1958 cohort had the same advantage score, so for this year the next least advantaged and middle fifths are merged. Source: Lupton et al (2009)

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

about ‘polarisation’ between ownership and council renting, and by the ‘residualisation’ of residents of social housing in terms of income and working status. In the mid-1970s, council tenants’ median incomes were 73 per cent of home owners’, but by 1983, they were just 45 per cent, and by 1999/2000, just 33 per cent (Figure 18.8). In 1984 heads of social renting households were two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than average (Bentham 1986), but by 2000/01, they were five times more likely to be unemployed (Hills 2007:102). The occupational class and education of social renting families with young children also went through a process of residualisation (Figure 18.9). In the 1980s and 1990s, social science and medical research studies regularly used social rented tenure as a proxy for general disadvantage (Gordon 1995; Gordon et al 2000), and social housing became by far the most targeted and redistributive aspect of the entire welfare state (Sefton 2002). Social housing as whole shifted from being targeted on the ‘neat and tidy’, as at the times when the first- and secondgeneration estates were first let, to providing to the ‘tight and needy’ by the time the third-generation estates were completed (Donnison and Ungerson 1982). The changing status of social housing and the changing socioeconomic status of its residents occurred alongside each other, and are likely to have reinforced each other. However, residualisation peaked in the 1990s. The proportion of social housing household reference persons (HRPs) in the lowest income fifth of the population stopped increasing in 1991 (Pearce and Vine 2014). Council tenants’ incomes as a proportion of home owners’ stopped falling in the late 1990s (Hills et al 2010). The proportion of social tenants in poverty (below 60 per cent median income) fell from 54 per cent in 2000/01 to 46 per cent in 2008/09, while there was no change for owners (Tunstall 2011). In the early 2000s, social housing tenants’ economic activity, employment and unemployment rates stabilised, and then started to converge with the average (Figure 18.10).

Conclusion Three major processes of change at national level affected the demand for all social housing, its status and the social mix of residents within it across estate lifetimes. Social housing status fell from the 1960s onwards. The social mix in social housing became residualised from the 1960s onwards. There was a national pause in demand for social housing over the 1970s and 1980s. Since the 1990s, core demand for social housing has increased, and while there is substantial demand

285

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing Figure 18.10: Economic status of household reference persons (HRPs) in social housing relative to HRPs overall, England, 1984–2016/17 % 100

Economic activity

Employment

Full-time employment

80 60 40 20

1 19 984 99 20 /00 00 20 /01 01 /0 2 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 20 08 08 20 /09 09 20 /10 10 20 /11 11 20 /12 12 20 /13 13 20 /14 14 20 /15 15 20 /16 16 /1 7

0

Note: One hundred per cent means the rate for HRPs in social housing is 100 per cent of that of all HRPs. Sources: Bentham (1986); Table S114 English Housing Survey 1999/2000–2015/16

outside the core, there has been some deresidualisation of the tenure overall. It is not clear if there has been any similar change in the national or local status of social housing Further analysis is needed to understand how these national and local trends were experienced at estate level. However, we can be confident that this changing national and local context partly explains the changes over time in the 20 estates. This national pause and local deficits in core demand is an important factor in explaining why ‘difficult-to-let’ local authority housing emerged as a problem, and why it emerged when it did at the national level and in the 20 estates (Chapters 2 and 15). It adds an extra reason for the link between ‘difficult-to-let’ estates and social residualisation. It appears to partly explain why more than half of the difficult-to-let homes identified by the DoE in 1974 were among the newest (Power 1985). The fact that the third-generation estates of the 20 studied arrived on the market at the time of the pause contributes to explaining their early relative unpopularity, and supports the evidence that their distinctive design was not sufficient explanation for their problems (Chapter 9). Chapter  9 described the falls and rises of the popularity of the 20 estates relative to other social housing in their local authorities. Evidence in this chapter shows that this estate-level and local change needs to be recalibrated against change at national level. Most estates

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National and local factors influencing demand for estates, popularity and resident mix

experienced a rise in absolute popularity and popularity relative to other local estates from the 1990s, which in some cases restored them to the relative position before the fall in popularity of social housing. However, given the overall decline in the relative status of the tenure at national level, these local rises were diminished in significance and some were entirely cancelled out. The residualisation of social housing at national level started in the 1960s and appears like to be both cause and effect of the declining social status of the tenure at national level, which also started in the 1960s. Chapter  10 described the rise of residualisation of the populations of the 20 estates, at least from 1981, and in many cases from before that as evidence shows. The national pause in core demand for social housing in the 1970s and 1980s is also likely to have contributed to residualisation at national and estate level. As core potential demand from male working-class heads of households reduced, landlords would have increasingly been willing to – or forced to – look for tenants beyond core demand. By this period, middleclass heads of household were very likely to be in home ownership. Additional sources of demand would have included female heads of household in working-class employment, or male heads of household who were not in employment or who were outside the labour market because of disability, caring responsibility or retirement. All these groups were likely to be on lower incomes than men in good working-class employment, particularly given the nationwide increase in income inequality from the 1970s (Hills et al 2010). It seems likely that these national-level trends partly explain the residualised status of the 20 estate populations from 1981, with high levels of unemployment both absolutely and relatively, and a high and rising proportion of female-headed households (Chapter 10).

287

19

Conclusions: 100 years on 20 estates and the implications for all social housing Introduction This final chapter summarises findings from the study of 100 years on 20 estates, and draws out the implications for social housing as a whole. It discusses opportunities and missed opportunities to learn from the experiences in the estates and others like them, and describes what can be learnt for new development today.

What we have learnt from 100 years on 20 estates This book started with the impassioned pleas of a community worker who worked at E13 (1933/1,100/fl/L) in the 1940s (Chapter  1). He referred to E13 as: ‘one of the “problem estates” created in the 1930s … [which] stands today as a monumental example of how new communities must not be planned’ (White 1946:12). Whatever measures were used, others assessing E13 in the 1940s might have agreed with him that it was a ‘problem estate’ and could provide many lessons about what not to do in developing new communities. White argued that new estates should be built on a smaller scale. Access by four- or five-storey stairs should be avoided. New features such as hot water boilers were expensive and did not always work well. Concentrating the poorest households in particular areas should be avoided because the community would be less likely to find natural leaders. Estates should be in places where suitable employment was accessible. Additional services for the new population such as school places, playgrounds and shops should be ready in time for their arrival. Extra social services or voluntary sector support should be in place to help people settle in and to develop community organisations, and to help avoid negative feelings or prejudice from people and services in the local area (White 1946). These lessons were not learnt by local authorities, architects, planners and service providers, or at least not applied in practice in every case.

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Part II showed how early problems similar to those experienced at E13 went on to be experienced at many of the 17 estates built after it, right up until the third-generation estates almost thirty years later in the early 1970s. The desire to meet housing need resulted in many large estates, where space was available (including E3, E7, E8, E12, E16, E17, E18, E19 and E20). Local authorities continued to use technical innovations, but this involved an element of risk, as demonstrated at all six third-generation estates. Developments linked to slum clearance continued to concentrate disadvantaged residents and to attract poor reputations (E3, E4, E8, E11, E12 and parts of E19). Subsequent local authority allocation practices added to this, both intentionally and unwittingly at all the estates. E13 had a poor reputation and poor population from the start due to its association with slum clearance, which was painful for some residents, and there were problems with estate shops and services, although most homes were initially high quality compared to others in the area, and people built up friendship networks and groups. In addition to a difficult start, the estate and its residents faced additional challenges from changes in the local and national context which emerged over its lifetime. The relative quality of social housing reduced nationwide and in estates’ local authorities. This could have been predicted, must have been observed and could have been responded to earlier and more comprehensively, both by local and central government. The status of social housing also declined nationwide. This could not have been predicted in 1933 when E13 was being built, and was not foreseen in 1946, but was being recognised from the 1960s. Again, the change in status could probably have been recognised earlier, and responded to earlier and more comprehensively. E13 and its residents experienced long periods with homes that were ageing and falling in quality relative to other local estates and housing; there was high crime, vandalism and nuisance, and continuing prejudice against residents. E13 became one of the least popular estates in the local authority in the 1970s, and by 1981, through the operation of standard allocation policies, it had developed high unemployment, a high child population and a mainly BAME population, with some overcrowding. Some children at least found E13 a good place to grow up. However, residents and others assessing the estate again in the 1970s or 1980s might have said that E13 not only still had problems but also that they were worse than in the 1940s, and that the estate was then a ‘monumental example of how ageing communities should not be managed and maintained and supported’. Then, from the 1970s onwards, E13’s homes were improved in several

290

Conclusions

waves, to increase internal space, add central heating, renew kitchens, and to install entryphones, lifts and CCTV. The total number of homes was reduced, and the design diversified, through small-scale demolitions and building by housing associations (Photo 4.4). Most recently, homes have been brought to Decent Homes standards. There have been multiple waves of community activity in the estate. Crime has reduced. In summary, in 2019, the estate, like social housing as a whole, was generally offering a good living environment, of average popularity and in steady demand. Looking at E13’s whole lifetime to date, another thirty or forty years on from the turning points in the 1970s and 1980s, it would be hard to assess it as an ‘example of how new communities should not be planned’. Across its whole lifetime, E13 has been less popular than average for the local authority, but not markedly so. It has provided more than 90,000 home-years to date, making up 94 per cent of those expected originally. Assessment of success depends not only on the dimensions being considered, and who is making the judgement, but also on when the judgement is made. For example, 3 of the 20 ‘unpopular estates’ were actually close to average popularity for their local authorities when they are assessed across their whole lifetimes. Evidence from the 20 estates suggests that a new judgement on social housing as a whole is overdue. Nonetheless, many opportunities to avoid and reduce problems for residents and landlords have been missed.

Key findings Chapter 15 summarised the falls and rises in the 20 estates across the dimensions covered in Part II. This section integrates these findings with those from Part III, which explored some of the explanations for change over time. The 20 estates were not typical of all council estates in England, but nor were they ‘the worst estates’ in any sense. They were broadly representative in terms of age, size and built form of estates which became unpopular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Chapter 2 noted that ‘problems’ in social housing, while widely acknowledged, have often been only vaguely defined. Chapter 9 allowed us to compare different degrees of relative unpopularity and to look at changes over time. It shows that, on average, the 20 estates have been in about the least popular 20 per cent of local social housing across their lifetimes of 48 to 93 years to date. This suggests that this book could have been written about several or, in some cases, many other estates in these

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

local authorities, and many nationwide which were equally or more unpopular. Thus findings from these 20 estates are directly relevant for at least a minority of all social housing. The estates were varied when they were developed, and varied when they became problematic. They included large and small estates, estates of different generations, estates intended mainly for families and those intended for a mixture of residents. They included estates of houses with gardens as well as those with deck-access flats and tower block estates. This confirms and demonstrates for the UK the argument that social housing estates are ‘highly differentiated by origin and history, the recent trajectory and problems, their local contexts and their prospects for the future’ (Musterd et al 2009:1). Longitudinal analysis shows that while 18 of the estates spent at least some time among the least popular in their local authorities, for most this was a temporary position, and only 4 of the 20 were on average among the least popular handful of estates in their local authority over their lifetimes (Appendix 2). In fact, three of the so called ‘unpopular’ estates were close to average popularity once their whole lifetimes are considered to date. The other 17 estates varied in their long-run popularity relative to other local estates. Thus ‘unpopular estates’ can be ‘highly differentiated’ even in terms of unpopularity. By the early 1980s, however, when the 20 estates were aged from their teens to their fifties, they all had a series of serious problems which affected residents and landlords, and they were also being defined as ‘problematic’ by their local media and public. These included poor relative housing quality, poor safety and order, relative unpopularity and empty homes, and high proportions of residents who were unemployed or on low incomes. Some residents were affected by poor access to opportunities, negative social pressures, risks for children, and shame and discrimination. Some individual residents experienced their ‘worst times’ in the estates, and at points most estates offered conditions that most people would find unacceptable or even frightening. Given that for large parts of estate lifetimes, residents were relatively disadvantaged (Chapter 10), poor conditions in the estates contributed to an ‘inverse care law’ in housing. Most of the estates experienced some demolition, and two have been completely demolished (Chapter 13). All of the estates proved to be ‘wrong predictions’ as Brand (1994) suggested, in that building designers and landlords did not appear to predict emergent pressures, including concentrations of disadvantaged groups, high child populations, high crime and vandalism and a pause in demand. All the estates lacked sufficient ‘robustness’ or ability to

292

Conclusions

cope with the changes in use and management they experienced over time (Prak and Priemus 1986). However, these ‘less successful’ estates have nonetheless achieved a great deal. They provided a total of about 18,000 homes at their peak, or somewhat under 1 per cent of the national social housing stock at the time, and they have provided a total of 845,000 home-years for residents to date. While most of the estates experienced some demolition, and two have been completely demolished, the ‘survival’ rates of estate homes to date are similar to those for other housing and buildings. The estates provide new data on building survival for the UK. Sixty-seven per cent of homes survived to 2019 when they had a mean age of 68, very similar to the figure of 66 per cent survival to 73 years in 1991 for homes in all tenures (Chapter 13). All the estates had positive features for at least some periods of their lives, including high-quality homes relative to many locally and nationwide, large homes (Chapters 6 and 7), friendship and community life, and conducive environments for children’s play (Chapter 11), and relatively convenient locations (Chapter 12). They could provide freedom, support and social life that few other neighbourhoods offer. Some residents felt the estates were outstanding or even ideal places to live and to grow up. However, the experiences of different residents, even of the same estates at the same time, could vary from delight to desperation, depending on their individual home, past experiences, norms, social networks, age and ethnicity. This adds another dimension to the idea that social housing estates are ‘highly differentiated’. Social housing residents, and their experiences are also very varied, and probably cannot be fully captured by most common research methods. No single estate characteristic is sufficient to explain the ‘falls’ the estates experienced across multiple dimensions. Chapter 6 showed that ageing appeared to be a significant element of the decline in estates’ relative quality, but only given insufficient maintenance and improvement over time. The experience of the 20 estates fits with evidence from the literature that ‘obsolescence’ is a social as much as a physical process, and land values played a role in determining where and how much demolition occurred (Chapter 3). The seven estates of mixed and deck-access design and construction had particular problems due to premature ageing and generally had lower average popularity over their lifetimes. They also had lower survival rates than the other estates. However, in this sample, as for this type of estate in general, design is confounded with size, generation and, to some extent, with local contexts (Chapter 4).

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

Although they were in varied regions, the estates did not vary in terms of the type of local authority area they were located in, and the type of landlords they had. The estates’ local authorities were in urban areas with high proportions of social housing and workingclass residents, and high rates of deprivation. These areas were disproportionately affected by deindustrialisation, unemployment and loss of population over the 20th century. In addition, the most serious problems in the 20 estates were concentrated in the period between the 1970s and 1990s. The timing of the emergence of problems was partly linked to the choice of the sample (Chapters 1 and 4). However, it appeared to reflect significant changes in national and local contextual factors at the time which had knock-on effects at estate level. Chapters 16, 17 and 18 showed that these included a nationwide pause in the core demand for social housing and actual deficits at local level, combined with national and local increases in unemployment, inequality and crime. These difficult national and local economic, demographic and social contexts may have been sufficient to create problems in at least some estates in the case study local authorities. The 20 estates, and some other local estates, were particularly vulnerable to pauses and deficits in core demand, because they were all already unpopular or in some cases very unpopular, which appeared to be linked to ageing or premature ageing, crime and disorder, and population mix. The third-generation estates all shared mixed and deck-access design which proved problematic, but they all had other vulnerabilities, including being large and being launched onto the market just at the time of the pause and deficits. The estates’ biographies did not stop in 1980, and they were not just stories of ‘decline and fall’. At various points from about 1980 onwards, each of the 20  estates experienced multiple incremental improvements. There were improvements in housing quality and in management, falls in crime, increased employment rates, and increased popularity compared to other local estates, with significant take-up of the Right to Buy (Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13). This meant that this book, which grew out of a 1984 study of ‘20 unpopular council estates’, has become a study of ‘19 mixed-tenure neighbourhoods that are mostly somewhat less popular than average’. Local media, members of the public and even local politicians and council staff were relatively quick to acknowledge estate problems, but much slower to acknowledge improvements. National public and political opinion remains out of date, given improvements over the 2000s and 2010s in quality and popularity, and some ‘deresidualisation’

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Conclusions

of estate residents, not only in the 20  estates but across all social housing. The causes and timing of estate ‘rises’, like those of estate ‘falls’, appeared to reflect some estate factors. This book has only touched on housing management, but estate-based intensive management with resident involvement appeared to have played a role in overcoming the worst conditions and, perhaps, in lobbying for improvements and staving off demolition in some areas. However, estate-based management did not prevent rising crime in the 1980s, and it was being withdrawn from the 1990s, even as the relative popularity of estates improved. Catch-up investment was necessary to maintain relative quality, but not sufficient unless it was timely, and as carried out did not appear to have a significant effect on relative popularity. Most of the ‘reorganisations’ of public space and access in the 1980s and 1990s in mixed and deck-access estates, which were inspired by theory and intended to influence informal social control (Chapter 3), had a modest effect on housing quality, security and order, and estate popularity. They were mostly subsequently superseded by redevelopment, although again the obsolescence of the improvements appears to be partly a result of social and political processes. More dramatic and disruptive redevelopments, partly inspired by theories about mixed communities and mixed tenure, were more effective in improving quality, reducing crime and improving relative popularity. While schemes varied in detail, the changes did have significant economic and social costs in substantial demolition, and net loss of social housing and displacement of some existing residents. In addition, some estates received little investment but still experienced improvements in safety and order and popularity. Similar schemes in similar estates could have quite different results. As with falls, rises also reflected changes well beyond the estates, in the local and national context, including rising demand for social housing falling unemployment and crime, residualisation of social housing, and changing social norms. ‘Problematic’ and ‘unpopular’ estates have been prominent in public discussions and perceptions of social housing for decades, and this small minority of estates has sometimes wrongly come to stand for all social housing. Nonetheless, the experience of the 20 estates is relevant to understanding social housing as a whole. First, we can be sure that the vast majority of social housing and of social renters had fewer and less severe ‘worst times’ and more ‘best times’ than the 20 estates and their residents. The vast majority of social housing nationwide and in estates’ local authorities has had better quality homes, better

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

standards of safety and order, more mixed populations, better social environments and probably better neighbourhood opportunities, as well as less demolition and more mixed tenure. However, most of the changes in the national and local contexts which have affected the 20 estates have affected social housing as a whole. Second, all social housing has experienced falls and rises, if not to the same extent as the 20 estates. As Chapters 6 and 10 showed, English social housing was of high quality relative to the national average, and was middling in social status, in rent levels and in resident income until the 1960s. This reflects national and local housing policy, as well as wider social trends. Social housing was in high demand despite continuous increases in supply from the beginning of the century up to 1981. As Chapters 6 and 18 showed, from the 1960s the social status of council housing decreased; by the 1970s it had lost almost all its relative quality advantage; and by the 1980s the population had become residualised and there was a nationwide pause in demand for social housing. Again, this reflects national and local housing policy, including the promotion of home ownership and central–local government relations as well as wider social trends. However, over the 1990s and 2000s, many of these national and local processes partly reversed. Much council housing received investment, access to home ownership tightened, the pause in demand ended and some (modest) deresidualisation began. In 2019, social housing provides the highest average quality of any tenure, and demand is intense in most parts of the country (Tunstall and Pleace 2018). Policy makers and the public need to keep up to date, and need to predict and prepare for future changes in the factors that affect social housing estates, other neighbourhoods, and their residents.

Lessons for housing development and management today In 2019, it seems likely that housing, and affordable housing in particular, will continue to be relatively high-priority issues for some years. Just as in the early post-First World War period, in the early 21st century there is currently cross-party consensus that the country needs a major increase in house building, and that social landlords – and councils in particular – should play at least some role. The century-long experiences of the 20 estates and their residents can provide lessons for housing development and management today. Some of the problems experienced by E13 and its residents, and by the other estates, could have been prevented, diminished or not allowed to go on for so long. This would have reduced the severity and length of ‘worst

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Conclusions

times’, the suffering of residents and the costs for landlords. It would probably reduced the extent of demolition, and would have increased the value and usage of the potential home-years provided. The estates would have been more cost–effective and so could have contributed more to reducing the housing ‘inverse care law’, and this would have helped to maintain a better reputation for social housing as a whole. Different actions by central government, local government, landlords and other agencies could have prevented, diminished or brought an end to problems more quickly. It was noted previously that many of the ‘lessons’ identified in 1946 from the experiences of E13 were not applied to further developments, including others of the 20 estates. Some of the very same lessons are again identified here. Many will not be news to those familiar with less successful neighbourhoods or social housing estates, but the challenge is to ensure they are applied. Potentially different past actions of central government that could have prevented, diminished or dealt with problems more quickly, and which could prevent problems in future include: • less rhetorical, fiscal and institutional support for home ownership, which would have supported the status and population mix in social housing as a whole; • greater support for areas undergoing deindustrialisation and depopulation; • targeting public service expenditure more on disadvantaged areas; • initiating policies to limit social and income inequality generally; • not introducing the Right to Buy or introducing a more modest form with smaller discounts, or greater ability for local authorities to retain and spend receipts, which would have supported the quality of social housing, its status and the population mix within it; • enabling and indeed enforcing greater and more planned investment in social housing to maintain relative quality; • initiating earlier and sustained interest in monitoring landlord performance in housing quality, investment, management and tenant participation. Different actions for both central and local government together include: • designing and administering slum clearance or other housing subsidy schemes to avoid concentrating perceived lower status or disadvantaged residents in particular sites;

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• not building E20 (1968/1,000/deck/NW) as this large estate, built at the end of its local authority’s major building programme along with other large deck-access estates, swamped the market just as the local core demand for social housing was decreasing; • not building the last handful of estates of around a thousand homes in local authorities that experienced a pause in core demand for social housing between 1971 and 1991; • avoiding sites poorly located for jobs and services; • being cautious in the use of new designs and construction methods, and equipment; • ensuring that critical planned and promised facilities for new estates were provided on time; • avoiding both ‘reorganising’ and then redeveloping estates. Different actions for local government and other social landlords include: • not using active ‘dumping’ policies that directed disadvantaged residents to certain estates; • monitoring the effect of rent, rebate and allocation policies on social mix in different estates; • energetically protecting all residents from intimidation and racial and other harassment; • considering compensating residents of estates which had problems in one or more dimensions with advantages in other dimensions, such as lower rents, faster repairs or better schools; • maintaining sufficient and effective (although not necessarily decentralised) management, so that problems could be prevented or identified early; • providing higher quality repairs services throughout estate lifetimes; • monitoring repairs, management, estate cleaning and investment to ensure fairness between estates; • working more in partnership with residents’ groups, and supporting residents’ community activities more generously; • providing or lobbying for support for disadvantaged residents and those outside the ‘male breadwinner model’; • challenging perceptions of the 20 cases and other less popular estates among councillors and staff, as well as in the media, and pressuring services to provide equal access to estate residents. The police could have provided more and more consistent policing for estates and their residents; other public services – such as schools,

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Conclusions

and private services, including financial services – could have ensured they provided at least equal services for estates and their residents. Local neighbours could have avoided prejudice against estate residents and built links across estate boundaries. Finally, the experience of the 20 estates suggests that policy makers and landlords need to be able to predict, or at least to recognise early and respond to, new and potentially very unexpected problems. This includes those which may be about to affect the remaining 19 estates and others like them as the oldest are about to enter their second century.

299

Appendix 1: Data and methods Data on estate populations for 1981–2011 in Chapter  10 were extracted from online census data sources www.casweb.ukdataservice. ac.uk and www.nomisweb.co.uk for one or more enumeration districts (1981, 1991) and output areas (2001, 2011) which I identified as the best matches for estate boundaries. I included all the enumeration districts or output areas in which all the homes or a majority of homes were inside the estate boundaries. This method of creating ‘proxy’ areas for estates or neighbourhoods has been very widely used, and has been given the authoritative name of ‘best fit’ method (ONS 2019). However, it involves some judgement, and means that some estate households were excluded, and some non-estate households were included. Between 1991 and 2001, the boundaries of the units changed, and the average size reduced, which could very slightly exaggerate differences over the period (Boyle and Dorling 2004). Interviewees were promised that their estates and even their local authorities would not be named or identifiable in reports, to allow them to speak freely without concern for estate reputations or their careers. I have tried to ensure that quotes sourced from books, reports and websites cannot be traced back to residents or be used to identify estates or local authorities through searches using Google and on social media sites. One fifth of quotes used proved traceable in their original form, so I made minor changes to word order or spelling to protect anonymity. I would ask readers to avoid the temptation of trying to identify the estates. Publicly accessible social media provided a rich source of residents’ views, although, as with interviews, did not include a full crosssection of residents. Debate continues about the ethics of the use of this material in research (Zimmer 2010; Convery and Cox 2012; Sormanen and Lauk 2016). I attempted to contact all posters whose words I wanted to quote, to inform them about the project. Although the material was publicly viewable, contributors probably did not expect that it might be used in research or republished. I offered those contacted about written material the chance to opt out rather than to opt in. Only one person refused permission for the use of their words, and several responded with approval and good wishes. I only used publicly posted photos after active express permission, on the grounds that photos are more intimate than text.

301

Appendix 2: Summary tables

303

Table A1: Selected measures of estate quality Initial quality Expert opinion NA NA NA NA NA Positive NA NA NA Negative NA NA NA NA NA Negative Negative Negative Positive (part) NA

% homes 3+ beds 30 50 48 65 40 85 NA NA NA 26 26 33 31 45 22 37 30 58 79 48

Ageing and improvement Size of homes NA NA Below NA Below Average Above, PM Below NA Average, PM NA Below NA NA Below PM PM NA Below Below/PM

Lost advantage 1971 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1971 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961

First full/ partial CH 1972 1980 NA NA 1982 1987 1970 1982 1966 1971 1981 1976 1976 1978 1982 1971 1967 1966 1968 1976

Age in 1981 52 44 43 43 32 32 11 45 15 10 43 34 48 55 35 10 14 13 45 13

Access control CCTV E E E E E, C, CCTV CCTV E, C E, CCTV

E CCTV E, C, CCTV E, CCTV E, C, CCTV E E

Reorg./ Redev.

Reorg. Redev. Reorg., redev.

Redev. Redev. Redev. Reorg., redev. Reorg., redev. Reorg., redev. Redev. Reorg., redev.

Note: ‘NA’ means information is not available; ‘Size of homes’ = as compared to national average for all homes of similar age; PM = at or above Parker Morris space standard; ‘Lost local relative advantage’ = the date the estate no longer offered advantage over most homes in local authority on access to amenities’ ‘E’ = entryphones added; ‘C’ = concierge added; ‘Reorg.’ = reorganisation, ‘Redev.’ = redevelopment. Sources: Chapters 6 and 7

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

304

Estate E1 1929/300/h/NW E2 1937/300/h/NW E3 1938/1,000/fl/L E4 1938/300/fl/L E5 1949/700/fl/L E6 1949/600/fl/L E7 1970/1,100/deck/L E8 1936/1,000/h/Mid E9 1966/800/mixed/L E10 1971/900/deck/L E11 1938/400/h/Mid E12 1947/1,000/h/NE E13 1933/1,100/fl/L E14 1926/900/h/NE E15 1946/400/h/NE E16 1971/2,000/deck/L E17 1967/1,100/mixed/L E18 1966/1,600/deck/L E19 1936/1,100/fl/NW E20 1968/1,000/deck/NW

Building for Life score 14 14.5 11.5 14 12 12 6 16 7.5 12.5 13.5 17 11.5 15 13.5 7 8.5 7 10 5.5

Summary tables Table A2: Selected measures of estate popularity relative to other local estates

Estate E1 1929/300/h/NW

Popularity over lifetime to date Fall and rise

Average relative popularity over estate lifetime to date Well below average

Schematic ranking 10th

E2

Fall and rise

Close to average

40th

1937/300/h/NW

E3

1938/1,000/fl/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E4

1938/300/fl/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E5

1949/700/fl/L

Fall and rise

Close to average

40th

E6

1949/600/fl/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E7

1970/1,100/deck/L

Rise

Among the least popular

10th

E8

1936/1,000/h/Mid

Fall and rise

Among the least popular

10th

E9

1966/800/mixed/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E10 1971/900/deck/L

Little change

Well below average

20th

E11 1938/400/h/Mid

Fall (then demolition)

Below average

33rd

E12 1947/1,000/h/NE

Fall

Well below average

20th

E13 1933/1,100/fl/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E14 1926/900/h/NE

Fall

Among the least popular

10th

E15 1946/400/h/NE

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E16 1971/2,000/deck/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E17 1967/1,100/mixed/L

Little change

Among the least popular

10th

E18 1966/1,600/deck/L

Fall and rise

Below average

33rd

E19 1936/1,100/fl/NW

Fall and rise

Close to average

40th

Well below average

20th

E20 1968/1,000/deck/NW Rise

Note: A schematic ranking at the 10th percentile means that on average throughout its lifetime, 10% of social rented homes in the local authority area were less popular than the estate, and 90% were more popular. Source: Chapter 9

305

Table A3: Selected measures of estate population mix

1929/300/h/NW 1937/300/h/NW 1938/1,000/fl/L 1938/300/fl/L 1949/700/fl/L 1949/600/fl/L 1970/1,100/deck/L 1936/1,000/h/Mid 1966/800/mixed/L 1971/900/deck/L 1938/400/h/Mid 1947/1,000/h/NE 1933/1,100/fl/L 1926/900/h/NE 1946/400/h/NE 1971/2,000/deck/L 1967/1,100/mixed/L 1966/1,600/deck/L 1936/1,100/fl/NW 1968/1,000/deck/NW

Rent levels/resident advantage Lower Average, then lower Lower/higher, then lower Lower Average, then lower Average, then lower NA, then lower Lower NA, then lower NA, then lower Lower Lower Lower Average, then lower Average, then lower Higher, then lower NA, then lower Higher, then lower Higher/lower, then lower Lower

Estate unemployment as multiple of local authority unemployment 1981 2011 2.8 3.8 1.8 3.1 NA 2.7 2.6 4.8 1.2 2.3 1.4 2.2 2.3 3.1 2.9 3.7 1.8 4.6 3.9 na 4.0 4.9 2.5 3.6 1.9 2.4 1.7 1.9 3.8 3.3 1.8 3.7 1.0 2.2 NA 2.5 2.3 2.5 1.6 1.9

Notes: ‘Rent levels’ and ‘resident advantage’ are as compared to average for the local authority over the estates’ lifetimes to date. Source: Chapter 10

Adults per child under 16 1981 2011 1.7 2.1 3.8 1.9 NA 2.2 1.5 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.9 3.2 5.3 1.9 3.8 1.8 NA 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.6 1.3 2.2 1.8 3.8 2.7 3.3 NA 3.2 4.0 4.0 2.4 2.3

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

306

Estate E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20

Estate unemployment (%) 1981 2011 31 17 21 14 NA 14 25 13 19 14 18 10 26 18 36 20 20 18 21 10 52 NA 40 17 20 12 57 22 53 17 17 16 24 13 NA 11 29 14 21 10

Summary tables Table A4: Selected measures of estate survival Age of % of potential % of homes oldest home-years homes surviving provided by in 2018 by 2018 2018 Estate E1 1929/300/h/NW 100 100 89 E2 1937/300/h/NW 100 100 81 E3 1938/1,000/fl/L 100 100 71 E4 1938/300/fl/L 100 100 80 E5 1949/700/fl/L 100 100 69 E6 1949/600/fl/L 100 100 69 E7 1970/1,100/deck/L 100 100 48 E8 1936/1,000/h/Mid 82  99  92 E9 1966/800/mixed/L  98  93 52 E10 1971/900/deck/L 39  97  74 E11 1938/400/h/Mid  97   0 80  96  90 70 E12 1947/1,000/h/NE  94  79 85 E13 1933/1,100/fl/L  88  84 E14 1926/900/h/NE 92  87  56 E15 1946/400/h/NE 72 47 E16 1971/2,000/deck/L  82   0  74  43 51 E17 1967/1,100/mixed/L E18 1966/1,600/deck/L  71  59 52 E19 1936/1,100/fl/NW  63  21 82 E20 1968/1,000/deck/NW 50  47   8 Source: Chapters 4, 13

307

Age relative to average for homes in England in 2010s Older Older Older Older NA NA NA Older NA NA Older NA Older Older NA NA NA NA Older NA

References Alton, D. (1985) Speech in debate on housing co-operatives. Hansard, HC Deb 20 December, vol. 89 cc745–54. AMA (Association of Metropolitan Authorities) (1986a) Achievements in council housing, London: AMA. AMA (1986b) Council housing: The myths and reality, London: AMA. AMION (2010) Evaluation of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal: Final report, London: Communities and Local Government. Andrews, C.L. (1979) Notes of a meeting with team leader, [E14] project, and Department of the Environment officer, 10 May. Anon. E1 (1933) Untitled. [E1’s local authority] Reporter, 25 March. Anon. E1 (1938a) Untitled. [E1’s local authority] Reporter, 13 May. Anon. E1 (1938b) Untitled. [E1’s local authority] Reporter, 24 June. Anon. E1 (1983) ‘Minister praises estate’, [E1’s local authority] Evening News, 24 August. Anon. E1 (1991) Untitled. [E1’s local authority] Reporter, nd. Anon. E2 (1932a) ‘Deplorable slums: Conditions in [X] ward revealed by survey “indescribably squalid and depressing”’, [E2’s local authority] Evening News, 4 April. Anon. E2 (1932b) ‘No escape for mothers: Endless struggle in appalling slum homes: Superhuman efforts to do task’, [E2’s local authority] Evening News, 6 April. Anon. E2 (1939) ‘[E2’s local authority’s] civic pride expressed in noble architecture: Official opening by Rt Hon, the Earl of Derby, KG Tuesday June 20 1939’, [E2’s local authority] Journal and Guardian Supplement, 23 June. Anon. E2 (1983) ‘Weekly collection may have to be stopped’, [E2’s local authority] Evening News, 31 August: np. Anon. E2 (1984) ‘Just good friends: The computer couple’, [E2’s local authority] Evening News, 1 June, np. Anon. E3 (1936) ‘Fight for lovely [area of E3’s local authority]: Is the fine residential area to be turned into a workers’ colony? Proposed flats for 7,000 of the working class: Where Minister of Health opposed County Council’, [E3’s area] Free Press, 16 October. Anon. E3 (1937a) ‘LCC’s £657,800 flats plan: To house 4750 people: Average cost £205 a room: Sun balconies’, The Observer, 21 November:23. Anon. E3 (1937b) ‘First- and second-class flats: Two-type dwellings at [E3]: New schools in the offing’, [E3’s area] Free Press, 26 November.

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Anon. E4 (1938) ‘[E4 local authority’s] housing achievements: New flats on the “[E4]” estate – opening ceremony by the minister of health’, [E4’s local authority] News, 3 June: 4–5. Anon. E4 (1958) ‘Council to increase rents to meet housing deficiency of £239,000’, [E4’s local authority] Boro’ News, 4 July p4. Anon. E4 (1971) ‘MP tours [E4] with tenants’, [E4’s local authority] Boro’ News, 27 August:1. Anon. E4 (1972) ‘[E4] want bridge’, [E4’s local authority] News, 28 July: 6. Anon. E4 (1973) ‘Modernisation scheme for estate in postponed again’, South Western Star, 27 July:1. Anon. E4 (1978) ‘Only thing to do with ghetto flats “pull them down”, says councillor’, South London Press, 27 January:53. Anon. E4 (1983) ‘New life for worst estate in the borough’, South Western Star, 6 May. Anon. E5 (1956) ‘Women heckle Mr Sandys: Tour of East End slums’, Manchester Guardian, 22 March. Anon. E8 (1926) ‘Advantages of new [E8]: Stated to be half as big as [nearby town]: New station to be built’, [E8’s local authority] Mercury, [no date], p11. Anon. E9 (1968) ‘24-storey skyscraper opened’, West London Observer, 21 March. Anon. E9 (1974) ‘Tower block problem solved at [E9’s local authority]’, Somebody Cares, March. Anon. E10 (1980) ‘They’ve just learned how blacks talk to each other and then they move on’, The Guardian, 19 November:18. Anon. E11 (1993) ‘Joyrider who killed girl gets seven years’, The Guardian, 8 October:3. Anon. E13 (1976) ‘Pre-war flats get a face-lift’, News Shopper, 7 October. Anon. E13 (1978) ‘A new look for [E13]’, Outlook 6(6), March. Anon. E13’s local authority (1938) ‘“C.O.S.” move to [X]: Fine work for the poor: Problems of [E13]’, [E13’s] Borough News, 18 January. Anon. E14 (1929) ‘Daring street robbery’, Manchester Guardian, 19 November:14. Anon. E14 (1958) ‘Council to increase rents to meet housing deficiency of £239,000’, [E4’s local authority] Boro’ News, 4 July:4. Anon. E14 (1986) ‘Dole swap threatened’, The Guardian, 27 October:2. Anon. E15 (1980) ‘Houses stay in “siege area”’, Evening Gazette, 12 July. Anon. E15 (1993) ‘Growing angry’, Evening Gazette, 29 May. Anon. E15 (1994) ‘Estate plans £90,000 bid to beat crime; a plague of their houses’, Northern Echo, 28 November.

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335

Index

Note: page numbers in italic type refer to illustrations.

A

access to homes in 20 estates (physical) 100–4, 258 access to opportunities/services from 20 estates 59, 298–9 job opportunities 199, 203 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 245 residents’ assessments 205–6 shops, GPs and schools 193–9 aesthetics of 20 estates 75–9 affordable housing, definition 14 see also social housing; council housing age of buildings in 20 estates 4–5, 39, 40, 85–6, 220, 307 and deterioration and obsolescence 23–4, 32, 215, 217, 293 and disrepair in 20 estates 85–92, 293 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 244 role in social housing decline 31–2 age of residents of 20 estates 164–6, 190–2 allocations policies of landlords in 20 estates choice-based lettings 33 ‘dumping’ policies 155, 257, 298 ethnic minority residents 187–200 grading and the ‘internal market’ 153–5 impact on social mix 32, 153–5, 170, 187, 188, 290, 306 impact on social networks 174 links to slum clearance 151–2 lone parents 163 ‘middling’ rents 149–50 mixed communities and more advantaged communities 150–1

see also popularity/unpopularity; demand for social housing; homelessness ALMOs 219–20, 232–3, 262, 275 amenities (bathrooms, hot water etc) improving trends in England and Wales 79, 81, 82–3 national standards 65, 66 in 20 estates 68–9, 84 20 estate residents’ pre-estate experiences 66–7 anonymity of interviewees and 20 estates 6, 10, 39, 301 anti-social behaviour 120–8, 132, 176, 178 Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) 119, 132–3, 230 Arm’s Length Management Organisations see ALMOs arson 118, 124, 213

B

BAME residents of 20 estates see ethnicity of 20 estate residents benefits claimed by some 20 estate residents Housing Benefit 13, 147, 150 National Assistance 150 outdoor relief 156 rent rebates 150 Supplementary Benefit 150 Universal Credit 13 see also low income ‘broken windows’ theory 115 Building for Life measure see quality of housing

337

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing building types see construction; design of 20 estates; houses; walk-up estates/flats, high-rise estates/ flats; mixed and deck access estates/flats

C

call centres 262 Cameron, David 19–20, 22 car parks 223–4 caretakers 9, 21, 121, 125, 140, 181 CCTV 100, 102–4, 106–7, 129, 293, 306 census data see research methods children’s housing ‘child density’ 33, 165, 244 housing quality 79 housing tenure 15, 271–2, 281, 283–5 space needs of 65, 146–7 children in 20 estates ‘child density’ 33, 165, 244 ‘estate effects’ on 201 experiences of estates 130, 178–185, 192 in estate populations 33, 164–5, 180 in high rise flats 146, 148, 167 identity as ‘estate’ children 202 in lone parent headed households 163–4 as nuisances and vandals 120–8, 132, 189 risks to 183–5 schools for 193–9 supervision of 180, 181 play 120–2, 132, 178–83, 257 coal fires in 20 estates 71, 73, 82, 98, 99 Coleman, Alice 29–30, 105, 128 Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) 73–5 Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) 81, 188 community in 20 estates 54, 56, 109, 173–8, 181, 185–7, 298 community centres 109, 119, 122, 124, 125, 185, 187 community events 186–7 neighbouring 185–7 punk community 190–92

role in informal social control 9, 29, 59, 90, 176, 177, 178 concierges in 20 estates 100, 102–3 construction of 20 estates later additions 83–4, 86, 233 non-traditional 29–41, 247 premature ageing 23, 88 role in decline 30, 88, 90, 223, 292 of social housing 29–20, 32 ‘core demand’ for social housing see demand for social housing cost of living in 20 estates 205 council housing definition 13 development 14–17 problematisation 17–22, 29, 35, 117 quality 16, 79–80 see also residents of social housing; Right to Buy; social housing; stock transfer councils see local authorities counter-urbanisation 273 crime in 20 estates burglary 110, 117, 176, 177, 263 community responses to 176–8 data on 115–16 drug use, drug crime 118, 120, 177–8, 183, 184, 191, 260 and estate-based management 261 and estate design 29, 257, 258 and estate reputation 117 influences on 103, 110, 258 rise and fall 116–20, 240, 241, 242, 263–4 robbery/theft 116, 117, 118, 122, 176, 177, 263 violent crime 117, 263 see also safety and order; vandalism crime trends in England 263–5

D

Decent Homes programme 94, 96, 133, 253–4 Decent Homes standard 65–6 deck-access estates see mixed and deckaccess estates deindustrialisation 273–5, 294, 297 demand for social housing ‘core demand’ for social housing in England 17, 19, 267–72, 269, 271, 276–7, 279, 285–6, 287, 294

338

Index ‘core demand’ for social housing in 20 estates’ local markets 272–80, 298 see also popularity/unpopularity demolition of housing 19, 23, 24, 32 see also ‘slums’ demolition in 20 estates 240, 241 absence of 218–20 age of homes at 24, 224–5 car parks 223–4 decisions about 24, 244 home-years lost to 60, 222–3. 307 opposition to 189, 217–18 in redevelopment 108–11 in reorganisation of public space 103, 104, 105 small-scale 110, 209–13 substantial 108, 111, 191, 213–15 total 137, 215–18 dependency ratio 165 Depression (1920s–30s) 274–5 design of social housing 20, 23, 29–30 design of 20 estates aesthetics 75–9 ageing/premature ageing 85–90 expert assessments 73–7 gardens 73, 90–92 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 243–4, 293 and noise 131–2 non-traditional construction 29–41, 247 public space 54–55, 74–5, 121, 180–1, 182–3 reorganisation 29–30, 104–7, 216–17, 244, 295, 298 residents’ views 78–9 role in safety and order 29, 216, 257, 258 size of homes 45, 46, 70–1, 83–4 wider influences on 24–7 see also construction; houses; walkup estates/flats, high-rise estates/ flats; mixed and deck access estates/flats; redevelopment of 20 estates deterioration/disrepair of buildings 23–4, 55 in 20 estates 85–92 difficult-to-let council housing 18–19, 20, 31 see also popularity/unpopularity discrimination see racial discrimination; cost of living in 20 estates disrepair see deterioration/disrepair

dogs 128–31 drug use, drug crime 118, 120, 177–8, 183, 184, 191, 260

E

economic status of 20 estate residents 155–63, 170, 240, 241, 242–3, 283–5, 286, 307 see also unemployment; low income; access to job opportunities empty homes in ‘difficult to let‘ estates 18 in 20 estates 110, 123, 132, 138, 139, 190, 216, 254, 260, 278 entryphones in 20 estates 100–2 estates, definition 27, 28 ‘estate effects’ in 20 estates 200–5 see also neighbourhood effects ethics see research methods ethnicity of 20 estate residents 155, 166–9, 175, 187–90, 245, 298

F

family networks in 20 estates 173–5, 181 ‘filtering’ between neighbourhoods 25, 33, 137 fires in 20 estates 212–13 see also arson flats see tower blocks; mixed and deckaccess estates/flats; ‘walk-up’ flats/estates friendship amongst 20 estate residents 173–5, 181, 185–7 fumigation on moves into 20 estates 71, 201 funding see housing policy

G

garages 123, 223 gardens 73, 89, 90–2 gentrification 27, 217 global context of UK social housing 20, 34–5 graffiti in 20 estates 123, 125, 126, 127, 263 Grenfell Tower disaster 4–5, 8, 263

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

H

health and illness of 20 estate residents 16, 65, 73 mental illness 159, 183, 202 heating in 20 estates central heating 82–3, 90, 98–100 district heating 82–3, 90, 100 high-rise flats/estates see tower blocks/ flats; mixed and deck-access flats/estates historical context of 20 estates 6–9 of rise and fall of social housing 14–22 home ownership 15, 54, 220, 268–9 and government policy 22, 227–9, 269, 297 and social class 269–272, 278 status 281–2 and tenure mix in 20 estates 227–9, 233, 234, 269, 297 see also Right to Buy ‘home-years’ provided by 20 estates 59, 209, 221–3, 244, 293, 307 homelessness 139, 152, 153, 154, 159, 169 houses, estates of 6, 12, 30, 31, 39, 41–42, 73–4, 78, 88, 109, 181, 210, 233, 243–4, 251 households ‘male breadwinner model’ 163, 269, 271 trends in numbers in England 267–8 trends in size 146 types in 20 estates 155, 163–4 Housing Acts see housing policy housing associations 13, 15, 19 and building in 20 estates 40, 44, 110, 111, 141, 214–6, 229–34 and demolition in 20 estates 215–16 recentralised management 261 staff 9, 56 transfer of council housing stock to see stock transfer housing development see construction; design of 20 estates; housing policy; redevelopment of 20 estates Housing Investment Programme (HIP) 19, 95, 97, 249–50 housing management in social housing 18, 21, 30–1, 36 housing management in 20 estates 258–62, 295

by ALMOs 219–20, 232–3, 262, 275 decentralised housing management 30–1, 37, 258–62, 295 and crime, vandalism 116, 122, 123 estate offices 37, 38, 117, 141, 210–11, 258–60 Priority Estates Project model 30–1, 37 recentralisation 261–2 role in rise in safety and order 257–8 and sample of 20 estates 30–31 estate-based housing management see decentralised housing management and estate trajectories 140 by housing associations 22, 46, 56, 95, 19, 110, 131, 229–233 housing managers and staff 9, 56, 117, 123, 130, 132–3, 260–1 local housing management see decentralised housing management repairs 21, 23, 30, 93–97 technology in 262 by Tenant Management Organisations (TMOs) 4, 186, 232–4, 252 see also allocations policy; housing associations; local authorities; residents’ associations; repairs; stock transfer; tenancy agreements housing markets see local housing markets of 20 estates housing ministers 8, 54, 99, 108, 150 ‘housing need’ 14, 153–4 housing policy, central government 65, 146–7 development of social housing 4, 16, 17, 70, 267–8 legislation Housing and Town Planning Etc Act 1919 14 Housing Act 1930 152 Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1938 221 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 153 Housing Act 1980 22 Housing Act 1988 – 22 Race Relations Act 1968 155 see also amenities standards; space standards; Right to Buy

340

Index funding for construction 13, 14, 15, 151–2 cuts in funding 248, 249 for improvement, reorganisation, redevelopment 36, 104–113, 217, 247–255 for repairs and improvements 8, 95, 97, 98, 247–50, 253–4 see also ALMOs; stock transfer effects of 227–34 regulation of social landlords 13–14 potential alternatives 297–8 relations with local government 18, 30, 37, 108, 110, 215, 247–254 see also slum clearance; Right to Buy; stock transfer housing policy, local government potential alternatives 298 see also allocations policy; housing management; ALMOs; stock transfer housing quality see quality of housing

I

improvements to 20 estates 98 absence of 86–8 access control 100–4 central heating 98–100 and demolition 217, 218 funding for 8, 95, 97, 98, 247–50, 253–4 see also planned maintenance; repairs in 20 estates income of residents see low income interviews/interviewees xiv, 9–10, 50, 301 ‘inverse care law’ 17, 171, 205, 292

K

kitchens in 20 estates 69, 82, 83, 95–6

L

land sales of 20 estates’ land 108, 109, 215, 254–5 legislation see housing policy lessons from 20 estates 289–91, 296–9 lifts and building design 41, 43, 44 and children’s play 181 and vandalism 123, 125, 139, 218

local authorities and access to job opportunities 199, 203 and access to opportunities/services 197–8, 206 deindustrialisation in 274–5 as developers of social housing 13, 14, 135–6 as locations of 20 estates 6, 39, 46 see also housing policy; regions local housing markets of 20 estates ‘core demand’ for social housing in 34, 273–7 and estate residents’ characteristics 163–9, 190–2 quality of housing in 66–73, 80–1, 86–8 and relative popularity of 20 estates 136–44, 240, 241, 242, 283, 286–7 supply of social housing in 135, 278–80, 86–88 tenure trends in 273–5 local housing management see housing management; housing policy low-rise flats/estates see mixed and deck-access flats/estates; ‘walkup’ flats/estates low income in 20 estates 91, 155–61, 163, 191 in social housing 16, 283–85

M

maintenance see planned maintenance, repairs in 20 estates ‘male breadwinner’ model 163, 269, 271 see also ‘core demand’ for social housing Mass Observation 67–8, 71 May, Theresa 5 media representations of 20 estates 47, 48, 57, 117, 118, 199–200 mixed communities 26, 27, 255, 269, 295 see also residents of 20 estates; tenure mix in 20 estates mixed and deck-access estates 29, 41, 44, 78, 105, 106, 108–9, 141–2, 243, 244, 293 see also construction; design of 20 estates

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The Fall and Rise of Social Housing

N

national context for trends in 20 estates 34–5, 246, 294 changing social norms 103, 115, 128, 132, 133, 177, 180, 295 core demand for social housing 267–72 crime trends 263–4 historical events 6–9 housing quality trends 16, 79–80, 82–3 occupancy and overcrowding 16, 65, 81, 146. 147 population trends 267–8 residents of social housing 32–3, 149, 169, 171–2, 240, 280–5, 287 rising incomes 155–6 status of social housing 280–3 tenure trends 268–9 see also regions neighbourhood change 23–7 ‘neighbourhood effects’ 25, 26, 27, 33, 171, 197, 200–7 see also ‘estate effects’ Neighbourhood Watch 178 neighbouring in 20 estates 185–7 Newman, Oscar 29 noise in 20 estates 121, 131–3 nuisance in 20 estates 120–2 see also anti-social behaviour

O

obsolescence of buildings 23–4, 32, 215, 217, 293 occupancy and overcrowding in 20 estates 146–9 in England 16, 65, 81, 146. 147 see also space standards older residents of 20 estates 159, 165, 166, 201

P

parenting 180–1, 184 Parker Morris standard see space standards paths/trajectories of 20 estates 104, 130–43, 235, 239 of neighbourhoods 26 ‘path dependency’ 26, 172, 235 of social housing estates 28, 36, 38 pets 128–31

Pevsner, Niklaus 75 planned maintenance 66, 93–100, 247–50, 298 see also repairs play space 54–5, 121, 180–1, 182–3 policing 118–19, 177–8, 258, 298 popularity/unpopularity of 20 estates 59, 291–2, 305 absolute and relative 135 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 243–4, 245 trends in relative popularity 136–44, 240, 241, 242, 283, 286–7 see also demand for social housing; difficult-to-let estates; empty homes population trends in 20 estates’ local housing markets 9, 5, 198, 246, 273–4, 278, 297 in England and Wales 267–8 see also urbanisation population of 20 estates and estate popularity 244 mix and trends 145–72 occupancy and overcrowding 146–9 size 145–6, 240 see also residents of 20 estates poverty see low income Power, Anne 19, 20, 30, 37, 38, 49, 257, 259 pride of residents in 20 estates 202–3 Priority Estates Project (PEP) 30–1, 37 private rented housing 15, 269 on 20 estates 229, 230 quality 66–8, 80–1 status 281, 282 see also ‘slums’ problematisation of 20 estates 47–50 of social housing 17–22, 29, 35, 117 see also media representation public expenditure targeting 297 public space in 20 estates see design of 20 estates

Q

quality of housing in 20 estates aesthetics 75–9 ageing/premature ageing 85–92

342

Index decline in relative quality over time 79–91 expert assessments 73–7 initial quality 68–73 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 243, 244, 245 residents’ experiences before 20 estates 66–8, 72 residents’ views 78–9, 84–5 Building for Life measure 73–5, 92, 106, 243, 244 in England 179–80 in local markets of 20 estates 66–73, 80–1, 86–8 measures and standards 65–6, 70, 73–5 Secured by Design measure 216 of social housing 16, 79–80 see also improvements to 20 estates; reorganisation of public space; redevelopment of 20 estates

R

racial discrimination 187–90 racial harassment 155, 188–9, 190, 298 redevelopment of 20 estates 108–13, 295 and demand 279–80 demolition 212, 213–14, 216–18, 219–20 explanations for 255 funding for 108, 109, 110, 216, 217, 231–2, 251, 254–5 links with other dimensions of estate 20 outcomes 244 and popularity 141 tenure mix following 108, 109, 110–11, 233 regeneration of neighbourhoods, social housing 20, 26–7 regeneration affecting 20 estates Estate Action 95, 110, 216, 250–1, 255 Housing Investment Programme (HIP) 19, 95, 97, 249–50 Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders 19, 251–2 Inner City Partnerships 251–2 New Deal for Communities 20, 252–3 Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 103, 107, 250–2

Special Areas 275 Urban Programme 105, 251, 252 see also redevelopment of 20 estates; Decent Homes programme regions of England and access to services in 20 estates 197–8, 206 and access to jobs in 20 estates 199, 204 and ‘core demand’ for social housing in 20 estates’ local markets 34, 273–7 deindustrialisation in 274–5 and ethnicity of residents in 20 estates 167–9, 245 location of 20 estates 6, 39, 46 and sale of estate land for regeneration in 20 estates 254–5 and sample of 20 estates 38, 49–50 and unemployment in 20 estates 158–9, 245, 274–5 and variation in outcomes in 20 estates 245 see also local authorities relative popularity 135, 136–43 relative quality 98–104, 239–40, 241, 242 rents in 20 estates 149–53, 170, 248, 262, 306 effect on resident mix in social housing 149–50 effect on resident mix in 20 estates 149–53 help for tenants to pay rent 150 see also benefits for social housing 14, 22, 149, 150 reorganisation of public space in 20 estates 29–30, 104–7, 216–17, 244, 295, 298 repairs in 20 estates 21, 23, 30, 93–7 see also planned maintenance reputation of 20 estates 18, 53, 57–8, 122, 139 and allocations policies 154 challenging perceptions 298 and crime 117, 244 effects on residents 201–6 and slum clearance 138, 151–2, 290 reputation of social housing see status of social housing research methods 9–10, 50, 58, 301 anonymity of participants and estates 6, 10, 39, 301 case study approach 50, 58

343

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing census data 10, 158–71, 267–8, 270, 273, 277–8, 281, 301 data 10, 50–1, 301 ethics 10, 301 interviews xiv, 9–10 sample of estates 37–8, 49, 50–1 social media 10, 50, 102–2, 302 residents of social housing in England ‘deresidualisation’ 285–6 lower income and status 281–3 ‘middling’ income and status 149, 280–1 ‘residualisation’ 32–3, 169, 171–2, 240, 283–5, 287 residents of 20 estates, characteristics of 59, 170, 298, 306 age 164–6, 190–2, 306 ethnicity 166–9, 187–90 family networks 173–5, 181 household type/lone-parent headed households 163–4 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 244, 245 and tenure mix 229 unemployment 156, 158–63, 170, 240, 241, 242–3, 306 residents of 20 estates ‘estate effects’ on 200–5 impact of rents and policies on 149–55 impact of world events on 7–8 interviews with 10 needs of 14, 153–4 number of 145–6, 240 occupancy and overcrowding 146–9 opportunities for see access to opportunities/services pre-20 estate experiences 66–8, 72 responses to 20 estates 71–3, 84–5 role in stock transfer 230, 231, 232 satisfaction of 78–9, 84–5, 205–6 views of aesthetics 78–9 views of housing quality 84–5 views of neighbourhoods 205–6 residents’/tenants’ associations in 20 estates 298 communal events 54, 186 and community networks 176 concerns about social mix 159 interviews with 10 opposition to demolition 189, 217–18 responses to redevelopment 109 TMOs 186, 232

‘residualisation’ see residents of social housing Right to Buy 220, 227–9, 269, 297 in 20 estates 220, 227–9, 269, 297 effect on national supply of social housing 15, 22, 80 resale of 20 estate homes after Right to Buy 54, 228–9 rubbish and rubbish disposal in 20 estates 21, 29, 53, 83, 101, 115, 123, 128, 139, 156, 159

S

safety and order in 20 estates 59, 115 access control improvements 100–4, 258 dogs 128–31 and estate design 29, 216, 257, 258 impact of redevelopment on 110, 258 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 243, 244, 245 noise 131–3 nuisance and anti-social behaviour 120–8, 132–3, 176, 178 policing 118–19, 177–8, 258, 298 problems caused by children 120–8 rise and fall of 57, 240, 241, 242, 257–64 risks to children 183–5 role of community 176, 177, 178, 186 see also crime; vandalism sample/sampling of 20 estates 37–8, 49, 50–1 satisfaction of residents in 20 estates 78–9, 84–5, 205–6 schools linked to estates 196–9 Secured by Design measure see quality of housing services in 20 estates see access to opportunities/services shame of residents of 20 estates 200–2 see also reputation of 20 estates size of 20 estate homes 45, 46, 65, 66, 70–1, 83–4, 146–7 size of 20 estate households 146 size of 20 estate populations 145–6 size of 20 estates 39, 40–1, 244 ‘slums’ 17, 66–7, 98, 152, 215, 250 slum clearance 14, 17, 151–2, 213, 297

344

Index slum clearance stigma affecting 20 estates 138, 152, 290 social class 284, 285 see also working class social control and access control 101, 102, 258 and estate design 29, 257, 258 informal 9, 29, 59, 90, 176, 177, 178 policing 118–19, 177–8, 258, 298 theory 115 see also crime; safety and order social environments 243, 244 children’s play 178–85 community 173–8, 185–7 ethnic diversification 187–90 social housing ‘core demand’ for in England 267–72 definition 13–14 impact of 16, 79–80 lessons for 3, 296–9 perceptions and assessment 3–5, 17–2 population 280–7 potential alternative policies problematisation of 4, 17–22, 27–9, 117, 269 quality 16, 79–80 rise of 14–17, 135–6, 269 status of 280–3 see also council housing; estates; housing associations; housing policy; Right to Buy; residents of social housing; stock transfer social media 10, 301 social mix see residents of social housing; residents of 20 estates social mobility 203–5 social networks 173–8, 181, 185–7 social order see safety and order space standards ‘bedroom standard’ 65, 146–7 ‘bedroom tax’ 147 Parker Morris standard 70–71, 89, 304 ‘room standard’ 70, 146 squatting 132, 138, 190 status of social housing 20, 29, 26, 280–3, 290 stigma see reputation of 20 estates; status of social housing stock transfer 13, 22, 229–30 affecting 20 estates 22, 46, 56, 95, 19, 110, 131, 229–233

‘succession’ in neighbourhoods 25, 32 surveillance 74–5, 126, 178, 258, 265 ‘eyes on the street’, 29, 75, 104, 129 survival of homes in 20 estates 59, 209, 218–20, 243, 307 homes and rooms provided and lost 220–4 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 245 relative to other homes 224–5, 293 see also demolition

T

tenancy agreements 14, 91, 130, 132, 148 Tenant Management Organisations (TMOs) 4, 186, 232–4, 252 tenants see residents tenants’ associations see residents’/ tenants’ associations tenure national trends 268–9 and status 280–3 trends in 20 estates’ local markets 273–5 tenure mix in 20 estates 39, 59, 240, 241, 243 estates as mixed tenure neighbourhoods 233–4, 235 following redevelopment 108, 109, 110–11, 233 impact of Right to Buy 227–9 impact of stock transfer and ALMOs 229–33 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 245 see also home ownership; private renting Thatcher, Margaret 22 tower blocks/flats 22, 29, 32, 102–3, 125, 167, 222, 251 see also mixed and deck-access estates trajectories see paths/trajectories

U

unemployment in 20 estates’ local markets 47, 199, 274–5 of 20 estate residents 156, 158–63, 240, 241, 242–3 links with other dimensions of 20 estate outcomes 244, 245

345

The Fall and Rise of Social Housing see also access to job opportunities; deindustrialisation urbanisation 273 and counter-urbanisation 9, 5, 198, 246, 273, 297 and ‘counter-counter urbanisation’ 198, 278

V

W

vandalism 20, 21, 29, 33, 59, 102–3, 105–6 by children 122–8 community responses to 176–7 impact of housing management on 139, 222 impact of improvements and redevelopment on 110, 218, 222 as precursor to demolition 211–2, 216 rise and fall of 240, 241, 242, 263 of security measures 102, 103

‘walk-up’ flats/estates 39, 41, 43, 74, 78, 244, 251 welfare benefits see benefits working class and ‘core demand’ in 20 estates’ housing markets 4, 47, 276, 269–70, 272, 275–7, 278, 279 and ‘core demand’ for social housing 33, 35, 279, 283–5 decline 246, 270, 275, 278 definition 269, 270 in higher cost, higher quality rented homes 149–151, 280 in home ownership 269–272, 278 myths about behaviour 71 world events, impact on estate residents 7–8 World War I 14, 298 World War II 67–8, 211

346