The Europeanization of National Administrations: Common Agricultural Policy in Denmark and Greece [1st ed.] 9783030472214, 9783030472238

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xii
Introduction (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 1-21
Europeanisation and Domestic Administrative Adaptation (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 23-54
The Danish Case (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 55-97
The Greek Case (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 99-136
Comparing in Administrative Adaptation to CAP in Denmark-Greece (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 137-155
Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 157-177
Conclusions (Sevasti Chatzopoulou)....Pages 179-190
Back Matter ....Pages 191-228

Citation preview

Sevasti Chatzopoulou

The Europeanization of National Administrations Common Agricultural Policy in Denmark and Greece

The Europeanization of National Administrations

Sevasti Chatzopoulou

The Europeanization of National Administrations Common Agricultural Policy in Denmark and Greece

Sevasti Chatzopoulou Department of Social Sciences and Business Roskilde University Hellerup, Denmark

ISBN 978-3-030-47221-4    ISBN 978-3-030-47223-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to my children Marilena and Adonis.

Acknowledgements

We rarely connect the writing of academic books with our personal experiences, which is not the case with this book. My endeavour with agriculture started many years ago when, as a Masters student, I tried to avoid studying agricultural economics in Canada. I did not succeed, for various reasons, and not only did I study agricultural economics, but I continued to do research on food and agricultural policy and politics. Growing up in a farming family in Northern Greece provided me with first-hand experience of the challenges that Greek agriculture has faced. My father, grandfather and uncles were all farmers, who had experienced a shared agony: the weather, agricultural loans and the cost of inputs during the different seasons, which defer among agricultural activities. During the summer, I worked at the local cooperative, helping with the harvest sales administration. As many of my family members were members of the cooperative board, it was easy to get a summer job there. There, I became acquainted with the hardship of agricultural life, especially during the harvest. While most families were on holidays on the Greek seaside, farmers’ children had to help at home. As a child, I did not like agricultural life conditions, a feeling that I shared with my mother, who always reminded us how important it was to study hard so we would have a better life. In contrast, my dad loved being on the farm, where he spent endless hours and knew the status of all the crops in the plain, not just his own. I feel lucky that I followed my mother’s advice. This book is a result of my studying where, as an academic, I have been able to see Greek agriculture through a different lens. To understand the challenges of the sector but most importantly the politics involved, which has always been of great interest to me. This book is not only about Greek agriculture, it is a comparative study of the Europeanisation of national administration, in Greece and Denmark, with respect to agriculture. Although I first examine the Danish case in the book, my interest in agriculture started in my life in Greece. However, the Danish case is also directly linked to my personal experience, as Denmark is my adopted home where by now I have lived more years than in any other country, including Greece. When I first came to

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Denmark, I worked at Copenhagen University (then KVL – the Danish Agricultural University), as a research Assistant. I then did an internship at Axelborg in the heart of Copenhagen (the then Danish Agricultural Council and umbrella organisation of the sector) which enlightened me on Danish agriculture. I was fascinated especially as I realised how closely the history of the Danish state was linked to agriculture, not only during very difficult times at the end of the eighteenth century, but also in recent history. As I write in this book, the agricultural sector has been determining for the Danish accession in the European Union (EU), which falls within my main academic area of interest: EU integration of policy and politics. Therefore, beginning from where I started my life in Greece and ending where I am in Denmark, I hope this book can close a cycle of my life and mark the beginning of new endeavours. Living in both of these countries and not feeling that I belong in either of them represents my strong European identity. Writing is a lonely process, but my personal connection to all these experiences and people made this book less so. During the writing period, I met many new people, who taught me new things and perspectives, colleagues who supported me when I was feeling stuck and frustrated and people who invited me for research stays. I would like to thank them all because they all played a significant role in this process. First of all, I would like to thank my institution  – the Department of Social Sciences and Business, at Roskilde University  – and my colleagues at research groups (the Globalization and Europeanization and the Roskilde School of Governance) for reading parts of the book and providing me valuable, constructive comments, which helped make my points more clear and convincing. Special thanks to Birgitte Poulsen, Peter Triantafyllou and Kennet Lyngaard for their constant support. I would also really like to thank a group of people who supported and shared similar challenges to me during the writing process: Caroline Grøn, Catharina Sørensen, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Ulrik Pram Gad, Rasmus Leander Nielsen and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. I owe a great debt to two people who have been important for my academic development, as they have helped to develop my ideas through their questions, suggestions and feedback. Susana Borrás who believed in me and gave me the opportunity to proceed with my academic career and Chris Ansell for outstanding hospitality at the Department of Political Science at Berkeley University and for always asking the most interesting and challenging questions. I also thank Wyn Grant and Vaggelis Divaris for their kindness to read and endorse my book and all the interviewees who provided valuable knowledge and expert information. I, particularly, would like to thank Niels Madsen Lindberg at the Danish Food and Agricultural Council, Professor and Previous General Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture in Greece, and Tassos Haniotis from Directorate General in the Commission. Lastly but most importantly, I owe my greatest debt and thanks to my family, my parents, who believed in the women of this world, for always encouraging me to study and be an independent woman. Special thanks go to my sisters for being there, sharing my frustrations and being good listeners. My children Marilena Karantininis and Adonis Karantininis and my husband and life companion Kostas Karantininis

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paid the highest price for this book, as I could not spend time with them very often when they needed me. I apologise for this and since I cannot go back, I hope for their understanding in the future. I want them to know that they have been my constant inspiration and encouragement. Kostas has been my sounding board for ideas throughout, critically challenging many of my views with his insightful and the indepth knowledge of agriculture and agricultural economics. My family taught me the most important lesson in life: that there is more than academic knowledge, theories and methods. I dedicate this book to my children Marilena and Adonis.

Contents

1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     1 The Common Agricultural Policy������������������������������������������������������������     4 Europeanisation of the Domestic Administration������������������������������������    12 Measuring Domestic Administrative Adaptation������������������������������������    15 Mixed Methods and Europeanisation������������������������������������������������������    17 Main Objectives of the Book ������������������������������������������������������������������    18 Mapping of the Book ������������������������������������������������������������������������������    19 2 Europeanisation and Domestic Administrative Adaptation��������������    23 Conceptualising Europeanisation������������������������������������������������������������    25 Europeanisation and Domestic Impact����������������������������������������������������    28 Identifying the Domestic Factors������������������������������������������������������������    34 Typology of Domestic Factors: Organisation of the Sector, Domestic Politics and Network Governance ��������������������������������������    35 Administrative Adaptation ����������������������������������������������������������������������    42 Comparative Mixed Method��������������������������������������������������������������������    45 Country Case Selection����������������������������������������������������������������������������    49 3 The Danish Case������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    55 Mapping the Actors in Danish Agriculture����������������������������������������������    56 The Agricultural Policy-Making Process������������������������������������������������    59 Europeanisation of the Danish Agriculture����������������������������������������������    61 The Organisation of the Sector����������������������������������������������������������������    61 Domestic Politics ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    69 Network Governance Patterns������������������������������������������������������������������    79 Administrative Changes��������������������������������������������������������������������������    89 4 The Greek Case��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    99 Antecedent Conditions and Pre-1981 EU Agreements����������������������������   100 Mapping the Actors and the Organisational Characteristics in Greek Agriculture��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   103 The Agricultural Policy-Making Process in Greece��������������������������������   106 xi

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Europeanisation of Greek Agriculture ����������������������������������������������������   107 The Organisational Structure of the Sector������������������������������������������   107 Domestic Politics ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   113 Network Governance Patterns��������������������������������������������������������������   118 Administrative Adaptation to CAP in Greece��������������������������������������   126 5 Comparing in Administrative Adaptation to CAP in Denmark-Greece��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   137 Domestic Factors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   137 The Organisational Structure of the Sector����������������������������������������������   139 Domestic Politics ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   142 Network Governance Patterns������������������������������������������������������������������   147 Variation in the Administrative Adaptation to the EU CAP��������������������   150 6 Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis��������������������   157 Organisation of the Sector�����������������������������������������������������������������������   158 Domestic Politics ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   165 Network Governance Structures��������������������������������������������������������������   170 Administrative Changes����������������������������������������������������������������������   171 7 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   179 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   179 Research Findings������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   180 What Have We Learned?��������������������������������������������������������������������������   185 Contributions of the Book������������������������������������������������������������������������   187 Further Research��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   189 Appendices������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   191 References ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   207 Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   219

Chapter 1

Introduction

Since 1957, the creation of the European Union1 (EU) has resulted in a dynamic integration process with the transfer of policy decisions and competences from the member states to EU institutions. This transfer of decisions and competences had significant implications for both the EU and the member states with respect to almost all aspects  – economic, social or political  – of people’s lives (Anderson 2002; Tsoukalis 2003). Despite common decisions, regulations and financial support of policies across the EU, the impact of the EU varies among the member states and policy areas, more than 60 years later (Heritier 2001; Börzel 2002). Europeanisation scholars have extensively studied the impact of European integration on the domestic politics, polity and policy. However, a limited number of recent studies have examined systematically the Europeanisation of the administrative change. There are a few significant exceptions (see Knill 2001; Laffan 2003), while a number of studies focus on compliance and implementation of policy decisions (see Treib 2014). Although the EU’s common policy decisions do not prescribe any administrative demands by the domestic level apart from new regulatory policies, domestic administrative arrangements matter for the success of the implementation of policies. However, there is a strong link between policy content and domestic administrations (Knill 2001), and thus EU common policies are relevant in studying domestic administrative change. An important question that then seeks answer is: Does Europeanisation of policies lead to administrative change and convergence among the member states? For example, does the Europeanisation of the agricultural policies under the CAP – decisions, regulations and financial support – and its reforms lead to administrative convergence or variation among the EU member states, more than 50  years later? And, what are the factors that determine domestic administrative change, convergence, or divergence? As this book demonstrates, the domestic administration of the EU CAP has remained domestically

1  EEC and EC are included in the analysis, but for simplification, the acronym EU is also used for the period before the Maastricht Treaty.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_1

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designed and monitored, resulting in divergence among the member states and gaps and imbalances in the performance in EU CAP decisions. In this book, I investigate and compare the administrative responses specifically to EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) decisions in Denmark and Greece. For this purpose, I will examine how we can understand variation in domestic administrative adaptation to the EU CAP in the member states. More specifically, this study aims to shed light on the different domestic responses of the administrative structures, practices and styles to the EU CAP that constitutes an especially integrated and regulated EU policy area. Such a study can be relevant for other EU policy areas. Furthermore, I develop relevant explanations about agricultural administrative variation between Denmark and Greece, two old and small EU member states, which have not been researched thoroughly in a comparative perspective until today. These two member states represent the North-South dimension in the EU.  Their long-time EU membership makes possible a systematic and dynamic investigation of their administrations and the comparison of their responses to the CAP over time. Domestic administrative arrangements provide the ‘appropriate instruments’ (Hill and Hupe 2002:5) for administering the policy objectives set and decided by policy decisions. The way these administrative arrangements respond and adapt to EU policy changes can affect the performance of policy decisions in achieving their initial targets. The administration plays a considerable role in the interpretation, enforcement and implementation of policy decisions. When domestic administrations either acquire or develop over time a certain capacity, they are enabled to extract available resources and ensure their appropriate use in the implementation of policy decisions. This capacity demonstrates the inherent ability or trait of an organisational structure to respond and adapt to new demands arising from either the domestic or the international environment. Nevertheless, administration does not refer to the actual implementation, application and enforcement of decisions, but rather it supports and enables it. Domestic administrative responses do not usually constitute a direct reaction to specific requirements of EU policy decisions. Instead, domestic responses happen in an indirect way when domestic administrations cope with the challenges of managing and administering specific EU policies. The Commission emphasised the crucial role of the modernisation of the domestic administrative capacity in the implementation and enforcement of the acquis during the 2004 enlargement negotiations (European Commission 1997). Studying the administrative adaptation to the EU CAP in the Danish case is intriguing because Denmark represents, at least formally, one of the high compliers to EU decisions. This compliance has been attributed to the robust and highly institutionalised public administration in Denmark (Martinsen 2014). Chapter 3 in this book unfolds the administrative structures, practices and styles and their adaptation to EU CAP decisions. In the Greek case, such a study is relevant in understanding the backdrops in administrative adaptation, due to weak domestic administrative arrangements, as discussed in Chap. 4. The EU Commission emphasised the importance of administrative weaknesses in Greece during the Eurozone crisis. Although the EU rarely imposes specific administrative demands on member states, the Troika (the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund)

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demanded administrative changes in Greece through the memorandum in 2010 (Ladi 2014). In order to study the administrative adaptation to EU policies, this book begins with the state-society relations with respect to agriculture. State refers to the political system that is broadly involved in the domestic policy and decision-making process – e.g. the government. Society refers to the actors involved directly or indirectly in the agricultural sector that have no formal decision-making competences (interest organisations and industry). Theoretically, the book draws on the top-down Europeanisation perspective in order to explain administrative adaptation and variation in the two countries examined. Having as a point of departure the empirical evidence, this book identifies three domestic factors, namely, the organisation of the sector, the domestic politics and the network governance, and develops three hypotheses. Although the EU CAP and the Eurozone crisis constitute exogenous events/shocks and thus drivers for change, the domestic factors determine or hinder the degree and direction of change. Therefore, unpacking these domestic factors is crucial in explaining and understanding domestic administrative change. These factors include both institutional structures and actors at the macro and micro levels, and their relevance in explaining administrative adaptation to the EU is discussed in depth in the next chapter. Identifying and analysing the domestic factors provide valuable insight into the choice of administrative structures, practices, norms and styles and their embeddedness in the domestic institutional settings. Such an examination generates knowledge with respect to what administrative adaptation means in relation to EU ‘common’ policies. In this book, I acknowledge that administration can involve politics but may also be affected by politics, a view that differs than the classic theoretical contributions on theory of bureaucracy where ‘administration starts where politics ends’ (Hill and Hupe 2002:8). Moreover, administrative adaptation includes both the formal and the informal elements of the administrative structures. Therefore, this study, inspired by Knill’s (2001) work, divides the administrative structures into administrative patterns and administrative practices and styles, respectively. Empirically, this book focuses on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which represents an EU policy area that has been for a long time ‘more than common in name only’ (Grant 1997:10). The Treaty of Rome, Article 39, established the CAP that absorbs a high share of the EU budget (starting with almost 75% of the EU budget in 1959 and accounting for around 30% today). The CAP faced a lot of criticism for creating structural divergences (Grant 1997:10) due to not considering ‘structural divergences that lie at the root of the divergent national interests that lead to conflicts and tensions’ in (a) the development and reform of the CAP and (b) the adaptation and implementation of the CAP at the national level. This book acknowledges the great complexity of the CAP policy programmes and regulations. Additionally, it recognises that the CAP that has been mostly financed by the common EU budget has become the most integrated policy during the last 60 years, which cannot be ignored or underestimated. In other words, one cannot deny either (1) the significance of the provision of the CAP financing to all member states’ agricultures or (2) the strong relevance of market regulation mechanisms of the

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CAP. Therefore, the CAP constitutes a useful policy area in understanding administrative adaptation to policy decisions within the EU multilevel governance system. Furthermore, Europeanisation scholars, who mostly focused on positive integration and regulatory policies, have not studied administrative adaptation to CAP (Treib 2014). Economists have studied the CAP extensively mostly by focusing on maximisation of efficiency and increase in productivity based on neoclassical economic theories (Burrel 1993; Ritson and Harvey 1997; Grant 1997). These studies have not paid adequate attention to the way these particularly complex and technical policy decisions increasingly created demands and administrative requirements from the member states, although not necessarily directly. Thus, the existing contributions take insufficient account of the administration of the CAP policy decisions by member states, which ultimately is responsible for the performance of the implementation of the policy decisions. Consequently, these existing studies fail to understand the domestic institutional aspects of the agricultural policy within the EU multilevel governance, which also require political and sociological explanations. This book aims to fill this gap in the literature.

The Common Agricultural Policy In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the CAP, signifying the importance of the policy area since the early days of the EU. Article 32 (38) defines the legal basis of the CAP for the whole Community and sets the objectives and principles governing the common organisation of the agricultural market (European Commission 1957; Benedictis et al. 1993; Fearne 1997; Ritson and Harvey 1997). These objectives are: –– To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and ensuring the optimum use of the factors of production, in particular labour –– To ensure a fair standard of living for farmers –– To stabilise markets –– To assure the availability of supplies –– To ensure reasonable prices for consumers The principal aims of the CAP were not to balance supply and demand but to affect directly the distribution of income among the farmers.2 While these objectives have not changed in substance over time, demonstrating path dependence and lock in effects, they have been reformulated so that they consider climate change and sustainability challenges. The reformulated aims are to support farmers and improve agricultural productivity, so that consumers have a stable supply of affordable food; to ensure that the EU farmers can make a reasonable living; to help tackle climate 2  The cost of this system was born by the taxpayers not by the consumers, and it was applicable in situations in which the farmers constituted a relatively small percentage of the population (Maravegias 1996).

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change and the sustainable management of natural resources; to maintain rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and to keep the rural economy alive through promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. In sharp contrast to a free market and efficient production, in order to achieve results which the market presumably would not achieve on its own, the CAP used political power to offset or modify the operations of the market. Consequently, the policy has been guided by different values than those forces that determine the open market. The member states have to comply with CAP decisions ‘issued in Brussels, and not with the signals of market forces or the wishes of consumers’ (Rieger 2005:169). As a result, ‘the basic economic orientation of farmers is not profit-­ making, in terms of income generated by markets, but rent-seeking, through exploitation of economic opportunities based on political relationships. Under these circumstances, such a strategy is not wrong-headed, but rational choice’ (Rieger 2005:169). This rationale is reflected in the strong presentation and organisation of agricultural interests at both the domestic and the EU level in order to benefit from the CAP. However, this representation and organisation differs among the member states, both in type and degree. The CAP has fulfilled certain of its objectives, such as the availability of supplies and stable income for farmers. However, the CAP has been contested due to its high cost and the concentration of benefits in only certain parts of the society (Fischler 2003). A number of countries applied pressure to reduce or abolish the CAP (e.g. the UK and Northern member states), while others are protective of its commonly financed policy characteristics (France and Southern member states). ‘High pro-EU attitudes in Ireland and Greece3 are greatly influenced by perceptions about the economic benefits of membership, especially in agricultural and structural policies’ (Greer 2005:78). Despite the consistent criticism and differences in views among the member states concerning the agricultural exceptionalism and the special treatment of agriculture both at the domestic and the EU level (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007), the CAP survived over time. Responding to critiques and to emerging socioeconomic demands and changes in the EU politics and policy priorities, the CAP has undergone a number of important reforms over time. These reforms have redesigned the policy scope and instruments, have had an important impact on the share of the CAP in the EU budget but also maintained the core aims of the CAP (Appendix I). The CAP and the various reforms have to be implemented at the domestic level. This implementation requires administrative capacity and instruments at the domestic level that the CAP reforms most often do not prescribe or specifically demand of the member states. Thus, these reforms operate as exogenous events to the domestic administrative structures and can potentially lead to critical junctures and introduce significant changes and legacies in the administrative structures. This book focuses precisely on this aspect: if there are administrative changes and adaptation to CAP

3  In 1998, 80% of Greeks regarded the EU protection to farmers as a priority objective (Eurobarometer 49, 1998), while in 2000, 72% of Greeks believed that their country benefited from the EU membership (Greer 2005:78).

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decisions and how differences in member states’ administration adaptation can be explained. Initially, the CAP introduced the common organisation of the agricultural markets (COAMs), a core policy mechanism, to regulate the production and trade of agricultural products in all the EU member states. The COAMs were based on three principles, (a) unified market,4 (b) Community preference5 and (c) financial solidarity, and gradually replaced national market organisations in those subsectors where this was necessary.6 As a result, all member states had to join the COAMs. Although the COAMs did not prescribe domestic administrative arrangements, the member states were confronted with administrative adjustments, as the COAMs meant a different system of market intervention. This mechanism replaced existing domestic regulatory arrangements and required coordination between the EU and the member states’ administrations but also among administrative units. In order to deal with these changes, the member states needed to establish relevant units in the ministries and employ qualified experts that could manage this policy mechanism. During the years, the CAP faced increased criticism by the civil society and environmental organisations, due to agricultural overproduction and high cost for the EU budget due to CAP financial support. Moreover, in the context of trade liberalisation and an expected growing world food demand, the European Council emphasised the need to improve the competitiveness of the EU agricultural and agri-food sectors on internal and world markets (European Council 1992). This led to the 1992 MacSharry reform that changed the architecture of the CAP.  The MacSharry reform was based on three main guidelines: (a) substantial reduction in the prices of agricultural products, replaced by direct payments; (b) full and ongoing compensation for this reduction, but compensation that would not be related to the quantities produced; and (c) the control of production, tied to the compensatory subsidies, by setting aside part of the land on farms exceeding a certain production threshold (European Commission 1991; Swinbank 1997). The MacSharry reform is considered one of the most radical CAP reforms that shifted the EU farm policy away from a reliance on price support towards direct payments and a more market-oriented approach, with the establishment of the decoupling mechanisms from production (Burrel 1993; Ingersent et  al. 1998; Swinbank 1999; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007). The reform introduced measures concerning early retirement, reforestation of agricultural land and the ­encouragement  Free movement of farm products between member states.  No trade agreement should affect negatively EU states farmers. 6  ‘The COAMs cover the production of cereals, pig-meat, eggs and poultry, fruits and vegetables, bananas, wine, milk products, beef and veal, rice, olive oil and table oils, sugar, flowers, dry fodder, processed fruit and vegetables, tobacco, flax and hemp, hops, seeds, sheep and goat and other agricultural products for which there is no specific market organisation, the only major exceptions being alcohol and potatoes. Because of the particular location of parts of the Union, special arrangements existed for products from the outermost regions (Madeira, the Azores, the Canary Islands and the French overseas departments) and the islands of the Aegean. Special account has been taken of their individual situations since the 2003 reform of the CAP’ (http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l11047.htm). 4 5

The Common Agricultural Policy

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of more environmentally friendly agriculture. These measures had diverse impacts on the implementation of the member states’ agricultures (Tracy 1994; Fischler 1995:2; Alden and Boland 1996). The MacSharry reform also introduced reductions in agricultural prices combined with various market mechanisms. These measures aimed to reduce production surpluses and introduced compensations for the producers in order to cover these reductions. It also responded to international pressure by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on Agriculture that in 1994 introduced new agriculture measures7 (Final Act, 4 UR Agreement 1994; Harvey 1997:384). Moreover, the reform aimed to increase efficiency and competitiveness of agricultural production in internal and world markets and protecting the environment (Appendix I). The reform changed ‘fundamentally the socio-political climate with respect to the development of the agricultural policy in future at the international level’ (Harvey 1997:384; IATRC 1994:48). Due to EU budgetary constraints, the new measures required a combination of national and EU agricultural financing. Some countries were less willing to provide financial assistance (i.e. Denmark) compared to others (i.e. France), while others did not have the capacity and resources (i.e. Southern European countries, Greece, and Portugal). In response, the Commission proposed a simplification of legislation at the EU level and a substantial decentralisation of policy implementation (EU Commission 1997). Besides, the 1992 reform introduced specific administrative demands in order to improve efficiency, through the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture, namely, the Integrated Administration and Control System8 (IACS), which is a direct administrative requirement from the member 7  ‘(a) Agriculture does no longer constitute a special case within the GATT, with all waivers and special exemptions for agriculture removed from the trade rules; (b) domestic farm policies are now subject to international governance through the GATT (now established within the WTO under the UR) and to binding international commitments itemised in country schedules, especially on border measures’ (Harvey 1997:384). 8  ‘The Regulation provides for each member state to set up an integrated administration and control system, hereinafter referred to as the “integrated system”, applying: in the crop sector, to the scheme established by Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92; and in the livestock sector, to the premium schemes established by Regulations (EEC) No 805/68, No 3013/89 and No 2328/91 hereinafter referred to as ‘Community schemes’. In order to be eligible under one or more Community schemes governed by this Regulation, each farmer must submit, for each year, an ‘area’ aid application indicating: agricultural parcels, including areas under forage crops, agricultural parcels covered by a set-aside measure for arable land and those laid fallow, where applicable, any other necessary information provided for either by the Regulations relating to the Community schemes, or by the Member State concerned. The Community is to contribute towards the costs incurred by the Member States, in response to an annual request to the Commission, for the use of aerial or satellite remote sensing during checks on agricultural areas’. Day of entry into force 12.12.1992 (Official Journal L 355, 05.12.1992, Official Journal L 165, 29.01.1994, Official Journal L 338, 28.12.1994) (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33034.htm). The IACS makes distribution and check of aid for farmers in member states possible. Implementation and application of IACS guarantees that transactions financed from the European Union budget within the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) are performed in accordance with the binding provisions under national law and EU legislation (Journal of Laws Dz. U. of 2004, o 10, item 76/).

8

1 Introduction

states and thus relevant for this study. The IACS constitutes the basic tool used for managing the system of payments to agricultural land by the CAP budget and applies to all direct payments. It was introduced by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 of 27 November 1992 and amended by the Council Regulation (EC) No 165/94 of 24 January 1994 and No 3235/94 of 20 December 1994. The main idea behind this system was that the area-based schemes subsidisation would be improved by identifying the agricultural parcels that received financial support (Pérez 2005). As part of the integrated system, each member state therefore had to establish a computerised data system comprising an alphanumeric system for the identification and registration of applications for livestock farming support and an integrated control system Council Regulation (EEC) (No 3508/92 Art. 2). The implementation of this administrative system was expected to use cadastral maps, photographs or spatial images (ibid. Art. 4). In 1997, the Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000’ report unanimously agreed on the need for further CAP reform, especially with the prospect of enlargement with 12 new members (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania) (Harvey 1997; European Commission 1997:10). Additionally, the prospect of ‘a new trade round, the risk of new market imbalances, the aspiration towards a more environmentally friendly and quality oriented agriculture and the WTO negotiations contributed to the reform. The need for a fully-fledged rural development policy was also included’ (Commission 1997:10; Grant 1997; Daugbjerg 1999:415). This reform introduced market-oriented policies coupled to direct income aid. Besides, this reform ‘reduced the restrictive border measures that protected the EU’s agricultural policy area and facilitated the EU’s negotiating stance’ (Swinbank 1999:42). On March 1999, the Council agreed on an agriculture reform package in Berlin, which slightly increased the total EU budget CAP expenditure over the period 2000–2006. This agreement aimed at allowing EU agriculture prices to move closer to world prices in order to benefit consumers. It also proposed the reduction of export subsidies and further ‘substantial tariff reductions on a limited range of products that would facilitate the EU negotiations in the following WTO Round’ (Nugent 1999:424). In order to increase administrative efficiency, the Agenda 2000 modified the IACS system by Reg. (EC) 1593/2000 of the Council that introduced the Land Parcel Identification System (LIPS), which registered all agricultural land with the use of aerial or spatial orthoimagery techniques (details in Reg.1593/2000 Art.4). This is another direct CAP administrative measure. Each member state should define its own reference parcel in the LIPS based on the domestic administration and cadastre system. The deadline for implementation was set on 1 January 2005. On September 20039 another CAP reform focused on a more sustainable agricultural policy due to internal EU factors (environmental concerns, budget restrictions, 9  ‘The legal texts were formally adopted at the Agriculture Council of September 2003. The implementation of the reform follows the three Commission Regulations. Regulation 1 refers to cross-compliance, controls and modulation. According to these provisions with regard to cross compliance, the Single Farm Payment depends on the farmers’ respect

The Common Agricultural Policy

9

overproduction) and external international pressure (trade agreements) (European Commission 2003). During 2003–2005, the IACS system developed further in order to meet the requirements of single-area payments and ensure the correctness and traceability of the payments to farmers. Therefore the IACS10 required ‘the creation of a database for public health, animal health, environmental and animal welfare, EU norms and good agricultural practice. Regulation 2 refers to the decoupling of the payment from production, allowing the farmers to have their incomes ensured and base their decisions about production on the needs of the markets and the demands of the consumers. Payments are, however, only paid in full if the above crosscompliance provisions are respected. At the same time, decoupled payments meant that a major share of support to agriculture is moved from the trade distorting classification under WTO rules (Amber Box) towards the minimal or non-trade-distorting category (Green Box). Regulation 3 covers those areas of support, which in the future are still product specific, or where the Member States have the option to retain a certain element of coupled support in the future. Such possibilities have in particular been foreseen in the area of animal premia (beef and sheep), where the concern with regard to the effect on production and decoupling has been mostpronounced’ (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm). 10  ‘Member States must establish electronic registers that contain all the information about each parcel required for cross-checking claims, including the identity of the holder, date of establishment, date of last activation, the origin (such as whether acquired by purchase, lease or inheritance) and the kind of entitlement, as well as their locations and accurate measurement. There is a measurement tolerance of 5% of the parcel area or 1.5 metres to the perimeter, up to a maximum tolerance for each parcel of 1 hectare. Member States can use remote sensing as a check. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have had to adopt IACS as part of the acquis. They cannot apply the single payment system until they have in place a Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) to identify the parcels on which aid applications are made and their areas. This means they must have a computerized database of agricultural holdings, parcels and aid applications. The Czech Republic, for example, created an LPIS using aerial photography (Sitewell Information Systems 2004). Legal power to create the LPIS was given in an Act of 2003, after an earlier experiment in using voluntary communication and an off-line system had not proved effective. The system was deployed in 2004. At its heart are a series of detailed rules designed to prevent problems such as multiple applications for aid for the same parcel or from the same farmer, and to ensure that those applying are eligible and that the application is for eligible land. The pre-2004 Member States also had to improve their systems as a result of the 2003–2005 changes. These reflect developments in technology and improvements in the information available, which have been incorporated into the specifications for IACS. For example, in the United Kingdom a Rural Land Register (RLR) has been created, containing digital maps of all IACS land parcels. When IACS was first started, the age of maps used to compute field areas varied considerably, and some did not achieve the current required standards of accuracy. The RLR involved the use of up-to-date mapping, with farmers being sent maps for comment and payments for areas adjusted to reflect improved accuracy in measurement’ (Rural Payments Agency 2002). ‘IACS is essentially a database of agricultural land parcels with their sizes and geo references, which is linked to records of farmers and their aid applications. It does not, however, contain information on land tenure because it does not record ownership. It does not need to concern itself with tenure or the ownership of the land because it is a management device for the payment of aid to farmers. IACS records could be linked to ownership records from cadastres or with returns made under agricultural surveys to create land tenure databases. Its importance is that it covers the whole UAA and includes precise locations and sizes of parcels. This makes it of potential importance in spatial planning because it locates the units for which there are data from other sources’ (http:// www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0464e/A0464E09.htm).

10

1 Introduction

that identified each parcel or block of agricultural land in a unique manner, its size and who was eligible to claim the payments to be made in connection with that land. In essence, each member state should have a cadastre for agricultural land that forms part of the (Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA) showing who farms which part of the land. This system would allow identification of whether a claim for support was made by an individual or legal person, and whether this person was eligible to make such a claim, and thus avoid incidents of multiple claims made for the same piece of land and ensure that the land was part of the UAA. As land can be transferred between farmers and agricultural land parcels may be joined together or divided, the system should be able to contain a means by which the registers are updated without compromising the integrity of the data. Finally, the system should also record when land is removed from the UAA’ (FAO, http://www.fao.org/ docrep/009/a0464e/A0464E09.htm). Regulation (EC) 1782/2003, Art. 18 of the Council, complemented by Decision 796/04 of the Commission, reproduce and redefine in detail the LIPS. ‘These regulations changed the simple alphanumerical identification of parcels to a new Land Parcels Identification System (LPIS) and aimed to increase efficiency in the management of the CAP. According to this regulation, land parcel identification is established on the basis of maps or land registry documents or other cartographical references, using computerized geographical information system (GIS) techniques, including aerial or spatial orthoimagery, with an accuracy equivalent to 1:10,000. The establishment of the new system can be adapted to each Member State, however, following the recommendation for using recent orthoimagery. For precision purposes on how agricultural land should be defined, Regulation 796/2004 was introduced and defined the “reference parcel” as ‘a geographically delimited area retaining a unique identification as registered in the GIS in the Member State’s identification system’ (European Commission 2004). These administrative requirements contribute to Europeanisation of agricultural administrative structures by establishing in praxis a similar administrative system across the member states with respect to the administration and management of the CAP subsidies. Although the orthoimagery part of LIPS of these regulations was initially non-­compulsory but strongly recommended, all member states decided to use this technique in one way or another in their LIPS. Nevertheless, the individual member states have the discretion to decide how they organise their administrations in order to apply these administrative instruments. Yet, these administrative instruments had to be introduced by all EU member states. The 2003 reform was expected to change significantly the way the EU supports the agricultural sector by considering consumers’ and taxpayers’ interests while giving EU farmers the freedom to produce what the market wants. The vast majority of the new subsidies, known as ‘single farm payments’, are paid independently of the volume of production. But in order for the member states to avoid abandonment of production, states may choose to maintain a limited link between subsidy and production under well-defined conditions and within clear limits. The reform linked the new subsidies to environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. Decoupling the subsidies from production aimed to increase the EU farmers’ competitiveness and orient production to markets while ensuring income stability. These

The Common Agricultural Policy

11

aims were in accordance to the CAP initial objectives demonstrating consistence and continuity with the CAP initial paths. The reform that entered into force in 2004 and 2005 also strengthened the EU’s bargaining in the ongoing WTO trade negotiations. Depending on the specific agricultural conditions of the member states, the single farm payment entered into force between 2005 and 2007. On 20 November 2008, the Council of Agricultural Ministers reached a political agreement on the Health Check of the Common Agricultural Policy, an Impact Assessment. The Health Check introduced a range of measures, such as the abolishment of arable set-aside and increase in milk quotas gradually aiming towards their abolishment in 2015 and preparing the farmers for such changes. The Ministers agreed to increase modulation and the transfer of direct payments to farmers to the Rural Development Fund. These changes aimed to improve responses to the new challenges and opportunities faced by European agriculture, including climate change, the need for better water management, the protection of biodiversity and the production of green energy. Member states should assist dairy farmers in sensitive regions to adjust to the new market situation. Although the CAP has become more liberalised and market-oriented, its initial policy objective to subsidise ‘and protect of farmers from market forces remained intact’ (Nedergaard 2006:213). Despite hard negotiations over the years on the EU budget and the discussions about the elimination of the CAP share in the EU budget after 2013, the then Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Mariann Fischer Boel (26 February 2007), envisioned more reforms of the CAP concerning what the CAP could and should look like after 2013. In her speech ‘Farming for the Future at the National Farmers Unions’, she stated: ‘I emphasise very strongly that this must not simply be a quest for savings. European agriculture will continue to face challenges and expectations after 2013, just as it does now. The demands placed on it could even grow heavier, depending on developments in global food production, energy use and climate change. Therefore, as far as possible, we must decide what kind of policy we want and then, find the money to pay for it.’ Concerning the Budget Review she added, ‘Our starting point would probably be that direct payments to farmers would still have a valuable role to play – in whatever form and at whatever level. Once we get past 2013, if there are still any exceptions to the principle of full decoupling, we should probably end them. Traditional market tools would probably be back under the microscope. This time, we would be deciding whether they still had a role to play at all. We should also develop our thinking about managing risks and crises’.11 The CAP remained the sharpest edge of EU redistributive politics, absorbing, even 50 years after the EU creation, almost 40% of the EU annual budget. Thus, agriculture not only had but still has the potential to become the arena for vicious political struggle, between the member states at the EU level, between political

 Speech by Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel, Annual Conference in Birmingham, 2007, held within the Budget Review.

11

12

1 Introduction

p­ arties of left and right and between the beneficiaries (producers) and losers (taxpayers) as well as consumers who could be part of both groups. Finally, in 2013 the most recent CAP reform aimed to strengthen the competitiveness in the agricultural sector, focus on environmentally sustainable farming and innovation, create jobs and growth in rural areas and support financially the use of land in a productive manner. This is in accordance with the 2020 EU strategy for sustainability. On 1 June 2018, the European Commission presented a number of legislative proposals on the future of the CAP for the period after 2020, which are under examination. They concentrate on the current and future challenges of climate change and scarcity of natural resources. The CAP constitutes a representative example of the EU multilevel governance system. The CAP is designed and decided supranationally and includes a widespread framework of common regulations and directives, which confronts the member states with considerable challenges of administrative adjustment. The CAP thus involves the EU at national, regional and local levels and in this way provides a particular analytical advantage to the study of administrative adaptation to EU policy decisions. Due to increased politicisation and competing interests, the CAP has been one of the few policies that until recently were decided according to the consultation procedure, and thus the European Parliament had no deciding competences (Chatzopoulou 2004). In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced the ordinary legislative procedure to the CAP, which provides the European Parliament with co-decision competences along with the Council of Ministers based on the policy proposal by the Commission, and it is implemented by the member states (Cunha and Swinbank 2011). Besides, the CAP is characterised as a regulatory patchwork of different policy instruments, principles and strategies combined with market intervention and distributive policy instruments, which results in a complicated and often incoherent policy. The enforcement of these policy instruments remains tied to the competence at the domestic level and, thus, largely also the selection of the agricultural administrative structures, styles, practices and norms. Therefore, the CAP’s long-time existence as a common policy makes possible the collection of a great variety of diachronic data on the administrative adaptation of the member states to CAP.

Europeanisation of the Domestic Administration Drawing on the existing literature, I understand ‘Europeanisation’ as a dynamic process that refers to the impact of European integration on the domestic responses and changes in individual member states, with respect to policy, polity and politics in these countries, which can lead to convergence/divergence (Börzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Börzel and Panke 2013). I am interested in explaining domestic administrative change over time, which indicates institutional change. Thus, an institutional approach that has been extensively used by both public administration and Europeanisation scholars constitutes a useful ­theoretical

Europeanisation of the Domestic Administration

13

perspective in explaining institutional change. More specifically, having as a point of departure that institutions matter, and taking into account history and time, historical institutionalism (HI) is particularly relevant in explaining to what extent institutional change is embedded in pre-existing institutional structures, leading mostly on continuity and path dependence than change (Schmidt 1996; Knill 2001; Börzel 2002). I combine HI with network governance (NG) perspective. NG complements HI and adds an actorness dimension in the study by investigating the role of actors’ interaction in administrative change and adaptation (see Chap. 2). Moreover, using social network analysis statistics, this study provides a thorough and detailed understanding of the role of actors’ interactions on resource exchange and strategic choices of domestic administrative arrangements. To our knowledge, such an analysis has not been conducted in Europeanisation studies. In this book, I specifically investigate the Europeanisation of domestic administrative responses to the CAP and their variation among the member states. Although the CAP does not specifically prescribe administrative demands, I accept that there is a ‘relation between policy content’ (Knill 2001:1) and that administrative arrangements affect whether the policy objectives are achieved or not and whether a policy succeeded or not (see Hill and Hupe 2002:9). The CAP represents the driver that triggers the Europeanisation process and impacts on domestic change (or not). I propose a typology of three domestic factors, in order to explain domestic administrative adaptation to the CAP and variation between the examined member states, Denmark and Greece. When the CAP decisions and rules hit home, the domestic factors – organisation of the sector, domestic politics and network governance and their specificities determine the degree of administrative change and adaptation to the CAP. These factors that are embedded in the domestic political systems condition the type and degree of domestic change and adaptation to EU (Börzel 2002; Radaelli 2003; Knill 2001). Taking into account both institutional and actorness dimensions, the typology of domestic factors in this book includes: (1) The organisation of the sector (2) The domestic politics (3) The network governance patterns. The three domestic factors are interconnected and complement each other. These factors are distinctively studied as they provide different types of explanations with respect to impact on domestic administrative responses. The first two factors organisation of the sector and domestic politics are concerned with the institutional structures  – macro and micro  – and the way they affect the domestic administrative responses within the EU CAP context, through continuity and/or change. In this respect, historical institutionalism is useful in explaining how domestic institutional structures that characterise the state-society relations (macro) and the sector (micro) affect administrative adaptation and change. The third factor, network governance, provides an actor dimension of the state-society relations, namely, the actors’ interactions and their role on administrative adaptation. This way NG complements the institutionalist approach and impedes institutional determinism (Knill 2001).

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1 Introduction

The first factor is the organisation of the sector (the agricultural society). Organisational structures in a sector provide frameworks for using and learning from experiences, developing procedures for reducing transaction costs and creating norms and practices for appropriate behaviour and physical boundaries, which inform the actors and enable them to develop autonomous preferences (Egeberg et al. 2016) about policy decisions and administrative choices for their implementation. The organisation of the sector reflects the information channels among the members, the development of strategies and the adaptation of practices in interacting with the political elites to ensure the inclusion of the agricultural preferences and interests in policy decisions so that the implementation of these decisions can be feasible. A strongly organised agricultural society can facilitate administrative change and support the effective implementation of policy decisions but also impede change and maintain the status quo by providing knowledge and information to decision-makers. As the analysis shows, a well-organised and professionalised agricultural society can support the administration with specialised in-depth knowledge about the problems that policies aim to address and the feasibility of the management solutions. Organisation empowers the sector and can even strengthen its involvement directly in the management and the administration of the policy decisions due to its expertise, especially in a complex policy such as the CAP. In this way, the agricultural society can affect administrative choices during reforms and/ or facilitate change and adaptation. In contrast, a weakly organised sector misses such an opportunity, and the administration fails to address certain problems through adequate management of policies. The second factor, the domestic politics, concerns the formal and informal rules, norms and standard operating procedures of policy decision-making. The domestic politics and their specificities reflect the structures of the state-society relationships and show how these structures affect administrative choices and policy instruments used for the implementation of policy decisions. For example, how the interactions among the political elites and the agricultural interest groups or the civil servants influence the domestic administrative structures and who benefits over time and/or to what extent the existing institutional settings encourage or impede such interactions. The way the domestic politics determine administrative appointments processes, allocation of competences and authority also matters, as it affects the autonomy of the administration to take action or the way it interprets the EU decisions at the domestic level. This analysis can generate valuable knowledge on how these relations affect administrative successes or failures of EU policies. Therefore, the specific characteristics of domestic politics, namely, centralisation/decentralisation and professionalisation/non-professionalisation, are investigated starting from the accession of Denmark and Greece to the EU. The third factor, the network governance patterns, also concentrates on the state-­ society interactions and complements the analysis of the domestic politics. This factor provides a relational perspective of the actors’ contacts within a network and the way actors’ interaction may affect administrative choices and responses to EU decisions. Network governance moves beyond the hierarchical government understanding to a broader non-hierarchical structure, where the role of the state is to

Measuring Domestic Administrative Adaptation

15

steer and coordinate delivery of policy that is decided in a decentered structure, which includes public and private actors. Network governance demonstrates the links and the gaps in the structure and the way these contribute to administrative choices. For this analysis, I use the social network analysis (SNA) method. First, I map the network governance patterns. These patterns present the interactions among the actors involved in the agricultural policy in Denmark and Greece which are visualised in a SNA graph. Then, I assess the characteristics of these relations (e.g. frequency, strength and density, etc.) based on SNA statistics. The analysis shows that inclusive and dense network governance structures allow diffusion of information and knowledge among the involved actors, which can support administrative choices and avoid ineffective administrative instruments; by contrast, exclusive and loose network structures impede the diffusion of knowledge, hindering effective administrative patterns. The network governance analysis based on the SNA method is new in the Europeanisation literature and particularly so with regard to the agricultural policy area to which this book contributes.

Measuring Domestic Administrative Adaptation One of the challenges in Europeanisation studies is how to measure adaptation and change (Börzel 2002). Measuring adaptation is useful for drawing comparisons among the member states. In this book, I follow Radaelli’s (2000, 2003) typology of four ‘measures’ for assessing the different levels of adaptation, namely, retrenchment, inertia, absorption and transformation12 (Table  1.1). The first category, retrenchment, indicates a paradoxical effect, implying that national policy becomes less ‘European’ than it was. Héritier and Knill (2000) show that – in the Italian case at least – EU pressure to liberalise road haulage has objectively strengthened coalitions of domestic actors opposing reform and led to increased intervention, rather than liberalisation. In our case, it could mean that the member states establish an administrative system that impedes the Europeanisation of domestic agricultural policy. When administrative changes are limited and formal, delays in the transposition of directives and resistance to in-depth change are characterised as inertia. This happens ‘when a country finds that EU political architectures, choices, models or policy are too dissimilar to domestic practice’ (Radaelli 2003:37). Long-term inertia can produce crisis and abrupt change (Olsen 1995; Radaelli 2003). It is evident that long-term inertia in administrative adaptation has contributed to the severe economic implications of the Eurozone crisis in Greece. In other words, the Greek  Börzel and Risse (2003) divide the degree of adaptation in three main categories: absorption, accommodation and transformation. However, they also refer to inertia in their explanations. Featherstone (2003:19) points out that the contemporary reality of asymmetrical patterns of absorption, accommodation and transformation by Börzel and Risse (2003), who outline institutional impacts in response to pressures emanating within the dynamics of EU integration, requires careful investigation.

12

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1 Introduction

Table 1.1  Measuring the domestic administrative adaptation Retrenchment − Administrative Establishment structures of extreme nationalised administrative patterns

Administrative Extreme nationalised styles and style in doing practices and practices

Inertia 0 Change in formal administrative structures in order to respond to formal EU requirements

Absorption + Change in formal administrative patterns with actors’ mobilisation in administrative policy-making (e.g. increase coordination among units) Change in No change in administrative style informal introducing norms administrative style and norms such as inclusiveness and access in administrative arrangements; flexibility; coordination among units (e.g. introducing new norms – communication)

Transformation ++ Radical change in the logic and forms of the pre-existing administrative structures

Radical change, in the logic of the pre-existing informal administrative style: transfer of administrative competences to broader actors and their mobilisation in administrative arrangements/ combined with learning process

Source: Based on Radaelli’s categorisation (Radaelli 2003)

administrative system did not develop the administrative capacity and instruments that would support the enforcement of the CAP rules that remained at the formal level and often with considerable delays. For example, Greece did not adapt in time the Integrated Administration and Control System introduced by the 1992 MacSharry reform, which impeded the adequate administration of the EU subsidies for years. Adaptation that includes a level of accommodation of the formal ‘policy requirements’ combined with changes in informal practices (e.g. information diffusion) is characterised as absorption. For example, the expansion and the change in the employment of experts and civil servants in the Ministry of Agriculture in Denmark after the country’s EU membership to cope with the management of the CAP rules and demands, demonstrates absorption. Domestic structures and policy legacies provide a mixture of resiliency and flexibility; they can absorb certain nonfundamental changes, but maintain their ‘core’ (Radaelli 2003:37). For example, Fabbrini (1998 as cited in Radaelli 2003:37) argues that ‘the Italian institutions have flexed like bamboo in the wind to accommodate the pressure to qualify for the single currency’, but once this goal was achieved, they returned to the original position. Absorption, as specified by Héritier (2001:21), ‘is accommodation of policy requirements without real modification of the essential structures and changes in the “logic” of political behaviour’. Absorption enhances administrative coherence and flexibility, is more inclusive and encourages the involvement of various actors in the administration. Finally, ‘transformation’ refers to fundamental systemic changes and completely new formal and informal institutions and results in high Europeanisation

Measuring Domestic Administrative Adaptation

17

(Radaelli 2003:37). ‘Transformation’ is similar to what Hall labels ‘third order’ or ‘paradigmatic’ change (Hall 1993). Paradigmatic change occurs when the fundamental logic of political behaviour changes – for example, a change in the format and mechanics of party systems, or the adoption of a new orthodoxy in monetary policy, or a completely new administrative system transforming a silo hierarchical rigid structure to a more collaborative, consensual and inclusive.

Mixed Methods and Europeanisation ‘Understanding the conditions under which administration adapts or fails to adapt to changing circumstances and shifting public opinion requires first-hand observation of the political system in action’ (Olsen 2004:69). Developing an adequate research design and data collection for such studies involves methodological challenges. Europeanisation studies face similar challenges, particularly with regard to finding thorough explanations for change and adaptation to EU integration or globalisation (Haverland 2007; Radaelli and Pasquier 2007; Lyngaard 2011), or in identifying and measuring EU impact (Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2000; Radaelli 2003). Furthermore, as Bauer et al. (2018) suggest, there is a gap in the study of administrative change as a response to outside transformations and pressure that has not been systematically addressed by the public administration scholars. In this book, I pursue a temporal comparative method in order to investigate and compare the conditions under which the administrative structures adapt to EU CAP over time in two member states, Denmark and Greece. Such a comparison provides a dynamic understanding of administrative change and adaptation as a response to changes in the EU. Comparison ‘sharpens our power of description and plays a central role in concept formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases’ (Collier 1993: 105): For Denmark, the first period starts when the country joined the EU in 1973 up to 1991, when the MacSharry reform was introduced.13 The respective analysis for Greece starts in 1981, the year that Greece joined the EU, until 1991. The second period for both countries starts in 1992 with the MacSharry reform (see previous section) and ends in 2009. Lastly, the comparison takes place starting in 2009 with the Eurozone crisis up to 2017. I employ a carefully structured ‘mixed method’ that enables the development of new hypotheses, better assessment strategies and causal inferences. I combine qualitative primary qualitative data that I gathered through interviews, secondary documents and social network analysis (SNA) statistics. The interview data concentrates on the informal state – society relations and the institutional memory of the organisa The arrows indicate that for Denmark, the analysis covers 1973 to 1991 and 1992 to 2009 and for Greece, the analysis covers 1981 to 1991 and 1992 to 2009. The darker arrows indicate comparisons between the two countries for the respective periods.

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1 Introduction

tions  – and provides a better understanding of what shapes domestic politics, e.g. views concerning efficiency and organisational and administrative style. The interview data is complemented by secondary data, EU and domestic official public legal documents, ministerial and legal decisions and press releases, which provide the context within which decisions are made. The descriptive statistics of the agricultural sectors in the two examined countries (e.g. imports, exports, share in GDP and employment) provide the background of the specific sectors and enables the comparison of the structural changes over time (e.g. change in share of employment in agricultural can indicate societal structural change). Finally, for the analysis of the network governance patterns, I gathered SNA data on actor interactions and their characteristics within the network through SNA questionnaires that all the interviewees filled out.

Main Objectives of the Book This book aims, first, to join the theoretical and methodological academic debates on Europeanisation, with a specific focus on domestic administrative adaptation to the EU CAP decisions in two member states, Denmark and Greece, that exhibit many similarities but also significant differences and represent the North-South dimension. The book concentrates on an in-depth comparative case-based understanding of the specific characteristics, quality and content of state-society relations and their impact on administrative responses to EU policies. It does so by applying a ‘mixed methodology’ that includes both qualitative (interviews) and quantitative (SNA, statistics) methods, which is new in the Europeanisation studies. Theoretically, the book contributes to the Europeanisation literature by identifying the domestic factors that condition administrative responses in two old member states to the EU CAP. This theoretical contribution provides valuable knowledge on what affects administrative successes or failures of EU policies and, more broadly, how. This aspect has not received adequate attention in the Europeanisation studies that focus on either policy instruments or implementation. Administrative structures do not represent policy implementation, but they can be important conditions for the implementation. Studying the domestic administrative adaptation to the CAP is interesting, from a normative point of view, because the agricultural policy concerns a broad number of groups in the society (producers, consumers and taxpayers) indicated by intensive critiques with regard to CAP spending. These critiques raise various questions concerning the broader societal benefits and the future of the existing CAP.  Although this book does not address directly these normative questions, it shows how the agricultural interest groups and their interactions with the political elites influence the domestic administrative structures and who benefits over time. Empirically, the comparative analysis demonstrates variation in administrative change and adaptation to the EU CAP in Denmark and Greece. Although the two countries’ agricultural policies have been subjected to CAP rules since their accession to the EU, more than 40 years, and both have a strong interest in agricultural

Main Objectives of the Book

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policy for economic, political and social reasons, their administrative adaptation to CAP varies significantly. In Denmark, administrative patterns have been centralised, collaborative and flexible in style, which demonstrates high level of absorption. In Greece, administrative choices have been determined by the personal conviction and willingness of the responsible politician, characterised by clientelism and patronage instead of professionalism and merit, which characterise the Danish case. These characteristics have led to administrative patterns that focus on formalities and technicalities, are short-term task oriented and did not allow flexibility and prompt adaptation to the emerging challenges of the CAP reforms. While the Danish administration has been coherent, the Greek administration has enhanced privileged administrative services to certain receivers and nurtured an inefficient and incoherent administrative style. I attribute this variation in the pre-existing sectoral organisation, domestic politics and network governance patterns, which confirms their path-dependent characteristics. Strong organisation of the sector in Denmark versus weak organisation in Greece empowers and enables the involvement of the sector in shaping the administrative choices. The centralised and professional characteristics of the Danish domestic politics, in contrast to the Greek, impede or weaken clientelism and nepotism promoting administrative choices and responses based on merit and expertise qualifications contributing to trust. Finally, dense and strong network patterns in Denmark enable deliberation and diffusion of information between the state and the society enabling informed and relevant administrative decisions and transfer of knowledge and learning. In the meantime, the actors’ interactions demonstrate different relations among the actors, which affect their influence. In Greece, the network patterns are loose and the actors’ relations often weak. As a result, information is the privilege of the few who preserve it and use it as power in determining administrative choices, often maintaining the status quo and impeding change. The book takes the Europeanisation studies further in two ways: (a) By developing a typology of the domestic factors based on the theoretical considerations found in the Europeanisation literature. A thorough and in-depth analysis of these domestic factors is of foremost importance for understanding the specific domestic particularities and the way they affect variation in domestic administrative adaptation under European integration. (b) By gathering in-depth empirical evidence, which supports the theoretical arguments concerning the institutional and actor interaction aspects.

Mapping of the Book Following this introduction, in Chap. 2, I present the theoretical concepts and the typologies used in understanding the administrative adaptation to the CAP and the differences in two small member states, Denmark and Greece. These concepts draw on the Europeanisation top-down approach from a historical institutional perspec-

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tive combined with network governance analytical understandings. I offer a critical assessment of historical institutionalism in explaining social and political phenomena. I discuss the need to consider the actors’ interactions and the emergence of network governance patterns on domestic adaptation, which constitutes a theoretical contribution of this book. Chapters 3 and 4 aim to fill the gap in Europeanisation empirical studies. I present a thorough systematic investigation of the characteristics of the domestic factors in each country and analyse the way these characteristics induce variations in the administrative responses to the EU CAP. There is growing literature on the domestic impact of Europeanisation with respect to domestic institutions or policies. Despite this scholarship, empirical studies are divided on the causal mechanisms through which Europeanisation may bring about domestic change as well as under what conditions Europeanisation affects the institutions of the member states. In Chap. 3, I focus on the impact of the CAP decisions on the Danish administrative responses, because of the Danish accession into the EU.  Hence, the chapter analyses the responses and changes by the Danish administrative structures (patterns and styles) to the CAP over time. Agriculture is a sector with a long history with an economic, political and organisational significance in Denmark, which dates back to the 1700s. Danish agriculture, together with the food processing industry, remains a dynamic and successful innovative sector that contributes considerably to the country’s economic growth through significant exports (agricultural exports accounted for 18.4% of the total exports in 2010). During the financial crisis, both politicians and the sector emphasised the contribution of the agri-food sector to the economy. The chapter shows that the administration of the Danish agricultural policy underwent a significant restructuring during the first period (1973–1991) under examination with respect to administrative patterns and style as a response to the adaptation process to the EU CAP. During the second examined period (1992–2009), domestic administrative adaptation was smooth and followed the paths initiated at the time of the Danish accession, indicating the continuity of elements in the process. This produced a high level of promptness in adaptation and changes induced by the CAP reforms after the first period. In Chap. 4, I focus on the domestic administrative adaptation to CAP in Greece from the country’s accession to the EU in 1981, which subjected the country’s agricultural policy to the CAP regime. A significant part of the accession negotiation process concentrated on agriculture because of the importance of the policy area in the Greek economy and the importance of the CAP in the EU at the time. Adaptation to EU policies was expected to improve domestic policy-making and administration and to provide solutions to problems that could not be solved nationally. The Greek administrative structures are shown to present a high degree of inertia with regard to the EU CAP. This is attributed to the specific characteristics of the domestic factors. Lack of professionalism combined with the highly politicised and centralised political system impedes administrative adaptation and change over time. In Chap. 5, I present the results of the comparative analysis of the administrative adaptation to the EU CAP policy instruments and requirements in Denmark and Greece. Based on the main arguments of this book, despite the commonly decided

Mapping of the Book

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CAP at the EU level with participation of member states, variation in the member states’ response to the EU and the Europeanisation of the agricultural policy prevails. This is attributed to three domestic factors (organisation of the sector, domestic politics and network governance patterns). While Denmark presents a high degree of absorption in administrative adaptation to the EU, Greece presents a high level of inertia with respect to the administrative practices and style required to carry out policy. These differences show that administrative adaptation in the two countries varies considerably. I added Chap. 6 to the book, in order to reflect administrative changes as a response to the Eurozone crisis that severely struck the economy in 2007. These responses follow broader EU administrative demands and institutional and policy changes at the EU level. The chapter analyses how the Eurozone crisis and the management of the crisis by the EU institutions triggered political and administrative changes that have not been specific to agriculture in Greece. In Denmark, the changes were initially more apparent in a sector that has been particularly responsive to external shocks and events combined with proactive and intensive interactions with the state. Moreover, the changes demonstrate increased concentration in the administrative structures. However, they are not radical; instead they indicate path-dependent characteristics. In Chap. 7, I present the conclusions. Despite the EU integration of policies and transfer of competences to the EU that drive domestic change, the study shows that domestic factors condition the type and degree of administrative change. Consequently, administrative responses to the EU policy vary among the member states. The chapter also proposes possible further research in relation to the findings of this book.

Chapter 2

Europeanisation and Domestic Administrative Adaptation

Over the last decades, ‘Europeanisation’ studies have proliferated both theoretically and empirically (Caporaso et  al. 2001; Börzel 2002; Radaelli and Featherstone 2003; Schmidt 2002; Knill 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Ladrech 2010; Börzel and Panke 2013; Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015b). Traditional European integration theories, such as neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, are useful in the analysis of the potential redistribution of power and competences between the EU and the domestic level (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Haas 2004). However, Europeanisation studies go further and seek explanations on the domestic changes due to European integration of decisions and policies (Bulmer 1997; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Radaelli 2003: Ladrech 2010). The redistribution of power between the EU and the domestic level can be a basic condition for inducing domestic change, but it cannot explain the general conditions under which such domestic changes take place or why variation in administrative adaptation to EU policies prevails among member states. Europeanisation studies emerged in the late 1990s as a response to this need, following European integration (history making decisions) and EU governance (decision-making and system governing). Europeanisation studies focus on how EU decisions impact on domestic polity, policies and politics adaptation and institution building (Ladrech 1994; Börzel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2003). The EU constitutes a ‘political opportunity structure’ above the domestic level. This structure provides new resources and access for but also constrains policy influence, which can trigger domestic change for the domestic actors and institutions (parliaments, interest groups but also executives). Despite the wide range of studies, Europeanisation is often not treated ‘as a new form of theorisation’. Instead, it is ‘seen as the “orchestration” of existing concepts and theories, with major theoretical ideas borrowed from comparative politics and policy analysis (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Radaelli 2004: 5). The plethora of definitions of the concept of Europeanisation, which has been criticized for ‘concept stretching’, reflect this diversity in views (Radaelli 2000: 1). Europeanisation studies largely focus on the EU-domestic impact (top-down). However, even though EU policies mostly affect the domestic level (top-down), the domestic level, ­government © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_2

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preferences and actors’ interactions shape and determine the EU policies and institutions (bottom-up) (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Later on, the scope of Europeanisation studies was expanded to include the ‘cyclical’ or ‘sequential’ approach. This approach combines the bottom-up and top-down approaches and analyses ‘policy cycles or long-term interactions between the EU and the member states’, through learning and policy transfer (Börzel 2002; Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Panke 2013: 116). Europeanisation literature mostly explains domestic impact with respect to public policies and polities, politics and identities (Vink 2005), for example, the Europeanisation of national political systems (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008), of political parties (Ladrech 2009), or Europeanisation beyond Europe (Schimmelfennig 2012). Yet, these significant contributions do not examine adequately or systematically administrative adaptation to EU decisions, apart from a group of studies that focus more on the enforcement and application of EU policy decisions (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Knill 2001; Laffan 2003; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Treib 2014; Benz 2015) with respect to regulatory policies and positive integration (e.g. environmental policy). These studies examine specifically how a directive or decision is transposed at the domestic level or on compliance of the implementation of policies with the EU rules (Treib 2014; Mastenbroek 2017). Thus, these studies are mostly preoccupied with the transposition of EU directives and some with the application and enforcement of policy decisions and regulations (Treib 2014). Moreover, these studies concentrate mostly on positive integration that prescribes specific goals and standards and not with negative integration that introduces broader rules that lead to discontinuation of certain national activities (e.g. distortion of free trade) (Treib 2014). Mastenbroek (2017) examines the EU-related roles of the legal drafters at the national level and their impact on compliance. This interesting work unfolds the various characteristics of the national civil servants EU-related roles. However, this research ‘adopts a “performance” view on compliance’ and not a top-down adaptation and focuses on the role of the legislative drafters in relation to EU policy who develop legal arguments in order to accommodate domestic policy demands (ibid:1292), not on the civil servant as administrator of policy decisions. Consequently, these studies do not pay attention on the Europeanisation of the domestic administrative decisions and thus the administrative changes, structures and styles, in response to EU policies, which lies between the decision-making and the actual application and enforcement and compliance of policies at the domestic level that is the core interest of this book. To address this gap in the literature, this book investigates how the EU policy decisions affect domestic administrative adaptation and change, the dependent variable, within the EU multilevel governance in a comparative perspective (Börzel 2002; Olsen 2002; Ladrech 2010). Thus, this book investigates the domestic level administrative apparatus, its characteristics and change as a response to EU policies. The characteristics and readiness of the domestic administrative apparatus have implications on the policy decisions performance during application and enforcement of EU policy decisions. Administration refers to structures, capacity, internal formal and informal rules and procedures, organisational cultures and styles that

Conceptualising Europeanisation

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guide interactions among the administrative authorities and the groups affected by the policy. While decisions are made at the EU level, the member states are most often provided with discretion on how they administer and implement these decisions taking into consideration regional or local circumstances and capacity (Treib 2014). My main interest is thus to unravel an interesting puzzle, why do the domestic administrative responses to the EU CAP differ if the member states create, decide and finance a common policy. To do so, I address the research question: how do domestic factors affect administrative adaptation and variation among the member states, and why? Thus, I investigate how the European integration of a policy, more specifically the CAP, affects domestic administrative adaptation and change when it hits home. Although my point of departure is a ‘top-down’ Europeanisation process, at the same time, I consider that this process EU interacts with the domestic level and thus Europeanisation also ‘emerges from home’ (Bauer et al. 2018). I pursue an ‘Europeanisation’ governance approach that is sensitive to the EU and the national context. I consider both macro and micro dynamics at the domestic level, and thus I examine the organisation of the sector, the domestic politics and the interactions among a wider range of actors and how these, at key junctures (e.g. when external events/shocks occur), transform and determine administrative adaptation and change. Furthermore, I consider in this book both the formal and the informal characteristics of these administrative structures, which has a profound impact on the behaviour of the administrators and their decisions (Peters 2010:166). Therefore, I adopt Knill’s (2001) typology on administration, namely, (a) the administrative structures and (b) administrative style and practices. Empirically, this book addresses the implications of the Europeanisation of agricultural policy, the CAP, on the domestic administrative machinery in a comparative perspective in two member states, Denmark and Greece. The next sections of the chapter present the theoretical concepts of Europeanisation and domestic change that I employed in the analysis and the method.

Conceptualising Europeanisation In general, scholars view Europeanisation as a dynamic ‘process’ that derives from European decisions and impacts member states institutions, policies and politics (Heritier 2001; Börzel 2002: 6; Schmidt 2002). Ladrech (1994: 69) defined ‘Europeanisation as the incremental process that reorients the direction and shaping of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making’. Later, Cowles and Risse (2001: 3) defined Europeanisation as ‘the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance – that is the political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative EU rules’. In his later work, Ladrech (2010: 1) attributes the

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Europeanisation process to the ‘continual empowerment of the EU… illustrated by changes to institutions, policies and politics’ ‘within domestic political systems’. Anderson (2003:51) include ‘changes in domestic configurations of interests, ideas and institutions that follow from the process of European integration’. Radaelli (2003, 2004: 3) introduced a broader definition of Europeanisation as ‘processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’. This plethora of Europeanisation definitions demonstrates the confusion of the Europeanisation concept and indicates the need for research systematisation and clarity. Nevertheless, ‘Europeanisation’ constitutes a useful concept in understanding ‘the emergence, development and impact of a European, institutionally-ordered system of governance’ (Olsen 2002: 922–923). In order to understand Europeanisation, the first step is ‘to separate the different phenomena that the term refers to’ and what is Europeanised. Europeanisation research distinguishes between three different processes: ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘cyclical’ or ‘the sequential’ processes. These processes represent different research designs (Lyngaard 2011; Radaelli 2004). In the top-down Europeanisation approach, the researcher starts from the EU decisions and policies and investigates whether these EU decisions, policies and institutions cause changes in domestic policies, institutions and practices. The ‘top-­ down’ Europeanisation process represents a vertical structure and usually concentrates on how specific regulatory frameworks trigger change at the domestic level (Lynggaard 2011). The domestic level can be EU member states, candidate countries for EU membership or near-neighbours of the EU (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Börzel and Panke 2013). The bottom-up Europeanisation research design starts from the domestic level (bottom) and investigates how the actors (domestic agents), the ideas and beliefs, and the rules influence changes either in the EU institutions or in policies over time (Lawton 1999; Börzel and Panke 2013). The ‘bottom-up’ approach has been criticised for ‘open[ing] up to a wide range of explanatory factors which can affect clarity and coherence, especially with respect to causal relationship between independent and dependent variables’ (Lynggaard 2011: 24). However, it is worth noting that this very ‘openness’ of the bottom-up approach contributes valuable knowledge about the role of actors’ ideas and beliefs, and of the informal process within multilevel governance systems such as the EU, and of how policy decisions are determined within non-hierarchical structures. The third approach, the cyclical or sequential, includes a continuous sequence of bottom-up and top-down processes where the member states respond to EU policies, institutions and decisions, which they first shape and then download and adapt (Radaelli 2003). In this book, I adopt the top-down ‘Europeanisation’ governance perspective to investigate how the EU policy decisions affect the domestic administrations (Marks et al. 1996; Börzel 2002; Olsen 2002; Ladrech 2010). The EU decisions and policies can be drivers for domestic change, through specifically prescribing the adoption of

Conceptualising Europeanisation

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policies and domestic arrangements (e.g. positive integration) or by eliminating barriers (negative integration). However, ‘Europeanisation’ does not occur due only to EU direct pressure but also voluntarily due to the emergence of new opportunity structures and new dimensions of national policy problems or through mechanisms of learning, best practice and competition (horizontal) (Radaelli 2003). Thus, Europeanisation does not only focus on the result (Kooiman 1993). A number of cross-country, cross-sector comparative Europeanisation contributions show that EU policy decisions do not always enforce change, or not in the same way, among member states or policy areas (positive versus negative integration) (Scharpf 1996; Börzel 2002; Héritier et  al. 1996; Schmidt 1996; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Besides, while some studies tend to treat the EU as an independent variable that affects the dependent variable of domestic level, ‘the language and logic of fixed dependent and independent variables, can become a strait jacket preventing an adequate theoretical and empirical analysis of European dynamics of change’ (Olsen 2002: 21). Although the EU policy decisions are the drivers for change, a number of domestic factors shape domestic adaptation within the EU multilevel governance. This book seeks to provide thorough and well-founded explanations of the way these domestic factors, both macro and micro, in interaction with the EU decisions determine the type and degree of administrative adaptation and change to EU policies, more specifically to CAP. These factors differ among states, sectors and institutional settings, which explains variation in adaptation to the EU decisions and policies. To this end, I identify the domestic factors and formulate the three hypotheses rather inductively, by drawing on the empirical evidence gathered in this study, while their conceptions are informed by the existing Europeanisation literature. Domestic administrations need to follow the policy developments at the EU level within the different policy areas and adjust to the transfer of policy decision competences to the EU level in order to administer these EU decisions at the domestic level. To what extent this transfer of competences to EU changes the domestic opportunity structures and thus enables the actors to challenge the status quo and induce administrative change remains to be investigated. In order to capture the link between the EU-domestic dimensions, I follow a Europeanisation ‘governance’ approach, which refers to governing various political and administrative levels, both vertically and horizontally by including different types of actors, such as interest organisations and civil society, that are formally or informally involved in public decisions-making (Marks et  al. 1996). The governance perspective has been criticized as a “messy” and broad that fragments the field of study by using different kinds of existing theories for different problems and impedes the development of systematic cause-effect explanations (Peters and Pierre 2008). Nevertheless, the governance perspective is analytically useful in capturing how administrative changes occur at the domestic level within the EU multilevel governance which involves supranational decisions implemented nationally (Marks et al. 1996). The ‘governance’ concept is sensitive to national context but differs from the traditional hierarchical understanding of delivering of public services exclusively by the state government. The governance perspective is closely linked

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to comparative politics as it connects the macro-systemic level behaviour to the specific institutions, their choices and the behaviour of actors at micro level (Peters 2013). Moreover, the concept captures in a non-hierarchical manner the dynamics of the Europeanisation process, both the formulation of decisions and the way they are managed between the supranational, national and subnational levels (Treib et al. 2007: 3; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Stephenson 2013). The governance approach allows a better understanding of how the EU works because it takes into account all the involved institutions, formal and informal, and a wider range of actors and their constellations, public and private, in the steering process (Rhodes 1995; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2007; Versluis et  al. 2011; Christiansen and Neuhold 2013). However, power among these actors is not diffused equally; some are more involved and more influential than others are. ‘Governance’ reflects a shift towards a sharing of tasks and responsibilities or towards doing things together, instead of doing them alone (Rhodes 1997; Peterson 2003), and allows studying the emergence of networks among the different actors and institutions characterised by interdependence and resource exchange (Rhodes 1997; Milward and Provan 2000: 239; Peters and Pierre 2002). Networks represent an institutional systemic setting of rules that impact on the administrative procedural aspects which guide interaction among the administrative authorities and the affected groups (Börzel 1997, 1998). A key challenge has been to what extent Europeanisation, either vertical or horizontal, produces convergence or divergence.

Europeanisation and Domestic Impact Europeanisation studies on domestic impact differ in scope, direction and focus. Börzel and Risse (2003) identify three categories of Europeanisation impact, namely, on polity, politics and policy. Polity refers to the institutional arrangements of a system; politics denotes the patterns of decision and policy-making process, the actors involved and their interactions; and policy indicates the output and outcome of a political system in practice (rules, regulations, legislation and strategies in order to pursue a specific purpose) (Börzel and Risse 2003; Knill and Tosun 2012: 15). Radaelli (2003) distinguishes between domestic structures (political and structures of representation), cognitive and normative structures and policy. Others focus on the impact of the EU decisions and policies on domestic opportunity structures and interest constellations (Majone 1996; Schneider 2001), national parliaments (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2010), national executives (Laffan 2003; Knill 2001) and single regulatory policy areas that prescribe distinctive policies that are enforced by domestic administrations, such as environmental policies (Knill 2001; Börzel 2002). Another group of studies emphasises the impact of European policies on belief systems, ideas and the expectations of domestic actors (Checkel 2001; Lyngaard 2011). Some scholars examine the economic impact on certain domestic sectoral structures (e.g. agriculture, environment) based on statistical and econometric analysis (Soares and Ronco 2000; Soares 2005). Radaelli (2003) ­distinguishes

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between ‘vertical’ Europeanisation, when adaptation pressure occurs in a hierarchical way due to the presence of a precisely prescribed European model, and ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation triggered by diffusion of ideas, discourses and actors’ individual choices. Finally, others investigate the conditions for cross-national convergence under Europeanisation (Knill and Lenshow 2005). Consequently, what causes Europeanisation or what is Europeanised differs greatly among studies that indicates the complexity and confusion in understanding Europeanisation and domestic impact. This diversity challenges Europeanisation scholars to systematically provide consistent explanations with respect to the scope and direction of domestic developments as a response to EU impact and to identify relevant measurements of the magnitude and direction of Europeanisation and change in the member states (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000). Such an analysis is important in understanding to what extent Europeanisation leads to harmonisation, convergence or divergence and how. Some authors observe convergence, e.g. in national styles and structures (Harcourt 2000; Schneider 2001), others suggest that nothing at all or little change happens, e.g. countries may resist complying when they already have relatively strict national laws and procedures (Knill and Lenschow 1998, 2001; Heritier and Knill 2001; Caporaso et al. 2001). To account for the domestic impact of the EU, (Duina 1997; Duina and Blithe 1999) introduced the ‘goodness of fit’ concept as a mechanism of change in his comparative work on the implementation of the 1975 equal pay directive in France, Italy and the UK and the 1980 air pollution directive in the UK, Italy and Spain. The degree of ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘misfit’ demonstrates the level of similarities and differences between specific institutional structures or policy in the EU and the domestic level at a given time (Börzel 2002). Similarly, Börzel and Risse (2003) identify the institutional or policy compatibility between the European and domestic arrangements as an important condition for change. When there is ‘misfit’ or incompatibility between European and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions, Europeanisation is inconvenient (Risse et al. 2001). The greater the inconvenience, the ‘higher is the pressure for adaptation and the more likely is the institutional change to take place’ (Risse et al. 2001: 7). Although the ‘goodness of it’ concept can be valid under very specific requirements and certain conditions, it has been criticised for not offering a general explanation and for applying best to positive integration (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005). Empirical work has shown that the existence of European adaptation pressure is not a necessary condition for domestic change because national reforms take place despite full compatibility between European and domestic arrangements (Heritier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2003). Börzel and Risse (2003) also acknowledged that a degree of fit or misfit is necessary for adaptation pressures but is not a sufficient condition for triggering domestic change. Besides, the adaptation pressure argument cannot explain the degree and direction of domestic changes that are triggered through domestic strategic opportunity structures, constraints and actors’ beliefs systems (Sabatier 1988; Radaelli 2003). In their thorough critique of the ‘goodness of fit’ concept, Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006: 332) propose that ‘theories on Europeanization gain parsimony if the goodness of fit is left out, while domestic

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preferences or beliefs are brought to the forefront of theory-building and analysis’. They suggest that both the ‘status quo’ and ‘the response to the EU’ ‘are contingent upon the preferences or beliefs held by domestic political and administrative actors’ and thus the ‘goodness of fit’ cannot explain change if the degree of fit or misfit only is considered. In agreement with that view, I suggest that the ‘goodness of fit’ concept is also unable to capture the dynamics of change. I therefore concentrate on the domestic state-society relations, the organisation of the sector, the politics and the network governance patterns in order to unpack the domestic factors and their impact on administrative adaptation to EU CAP decisions. I do so in a dynamic comparative perspective in two member states, Denmark and Greece. In this book, ‘state’ denotes the political system in the two selected countries in a broad sense. ‘Society’ refers to the non-state actors that have direct and indirect interests and are involved in the policy area. Specifically, ‘society’ mainly refers to the agriculture sector and its organisations, but it also includes consumers and environmental organisations, especially after 2000. Starting largely from the assertion that ‘institutions matter’, Europeanisation scholars reverted to the broad spectrum of ‘new institutional’ theories, which is also a tradition in comparative politics (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 1999). Moreover, institutionalism has been at the core of public administration in analysing administrative transformations. However, public administration scholars mostly focus on the micro-level administrative practices at the national level, performance assessment of public management as part of the New Public Management approach, the organisational structures of Ministries and their impact on national policy-­ making or provide cross-country comparisons focusing on formal administrative changes (Peters 1996; Knill 2001; Bauer et al. 2017). In this respect, they do not provide the relevant theoretical concepts with respect to administrative adaptation to the EU, a multilevel governance system that involves intergovernmental and transnational decisions and policy-making processes. Furthermore, the institutional theories provide a range of explanations and research methods on how institutions matter (Peters 2013). Institutions are mostly defined as the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions that are embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Bulmer 1993; Hall and Taylor 1996). Initially, institutional theories focused on organisational cultures in the governing process (March and Olsen 1989). Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three main institutional schools of thought or approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996). Rational choice (RC) institutionalists focus on domestic structural features of government such as formal institutions, rules and veto points. Moreover, they treat institutions as means that actors use to reach their goals, while actors’ interests and preferences are predetermined and developed independently of institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996). For RC institutionalists, institutions represent the incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties that are created by the various individual preferences and issues. Their view is basically ‘functionalist’ and ‘they explain institutional choices in terms of the functions a given institution is expected to perform and the effects on policy outcomes it is expected to produce, subject to

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the uncertainty inherent in any institutional design’ (Pollack 1997: 102). Instead, taking into account the social context and the role of agency, sociological institutionalists (SI) emphasise the ‘logic of appropriateness’ that, in contrast to the ‘logic of consequentiality’, defines what is socially valuable and thus appropriate for shaping social behaviour and choices (March and Olsen 1996). Historical institutionalism (HI) prioritises time and history in order to understand change and ‘focuses on the initial formation of institutions and policies’ (Peters 2013: 132). HI is useful in explaining how domestic political institutions structure relations among the legislators, sectoral interests and other actors affecting policy outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). Furthermore, HI claims that ‘the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have a continuity and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’, known as the path dependence concept (Peters 1999: 63). HI conceptualises institutions as incorporating both formal and informal institutions, such as unwritten rules, norms and culture, which shape behaviour and expectations and create opportunities and constraints (Hall and Taylor 1996). Taking institutional evolution seriously requires tracing change over time (Bulmer and Burch 1998). The main critique of HI has been that it is better in explaining persistence and continuity than change. However, understanding change has been important for comparative politics. Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) important work addresses change within the context of HI. More recently, discursive institutionalism (DI) concentrates on the role of the micro-level ideas and values of individual that are the substantive content of discourse, though interactive processes affect policy-making and institutional change (Schmidt 2008, 2010). In this book, I adopt a Europeanisation framework combined with HI and network governance. First, HI is analytically useful in understanding Europeanisation of domestic change, as it considers political developments as a process that unfolds over time (Pierson 1996). By considering the dimension of ‘time’, HI can capture how early external events in a sequence may shape later choices and change within countries. In such analyses, HI considers the historical contexts, internal forces and phases of political change that may respond differently or at different times to the same events (Schmidt 1999; Pierson 2000). Thus, HI, by taking into account ‘time’, offers a dynamic understanding of the role of domestic institutions on continuity and change, which emphasises ‘the institutional organisation of the polity as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). Moreover, HIs ‘typically prefer to analyse sectoral developments against the background of the general macro-institutional context’ (Knill 2001: 27). In this book, HI is useful in analysing variation in administrative arrangements in agricultural policies in addressing the CAP decisions and reforms, in light of different domestic politics and sectoral organisational structures. ‘Path dependence’ and ‘critical junctures’ are two core HI concepts. ‘Path dependence’ refers to ‘how initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction’; in other words, there are self-reinforcing mechanisms or positive feedback (Kay 2003: 406). Path dependence explains why there is a tendency for initial choices to persist; even when change happens, it is not usually radical but rather tends to take place along institutional paths where existing practices and structures

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are substituted with new ones. Path dependence can create ‘lock in’ effects in the long run, which can lead to an institutional juggernaut that impedes change (Pierson 1996). This occurs due to a ‘conjuncture of a variety of internal forces that individually were not capable of generating significant change but which together can produce such movement’ (Peters 1999:69). Besides, external forces, events or shocks, such as economic crisis and military conflict, or internal political forces at the domestic or regional level, ‘can be sufficient to overcome the inertia created at the inception of the program’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942). When external shocks disrupt institutional continuity, they may result in unintended consequences that lead to institutional changes and ‘lock in’ future developments to a new path (Hall and Taylor 1996). Such changes enable new legacies, referred to as ‘critical junctures’. A crucial question is what precipitates such critical junctures. Historical institutionalists mostly attribute them to external events. According to Hall (2009: 205), ‘institutional change happens when ceteris is no longer paribus’. Collier and Munck (2017: 2) view ‘a critical juncture as (1) a major episode of institutional innovation, (2) occurring in distinct ways, (3) and generating an enduring legacy’. The ‘critical juncture’ analytical concept intertwines with processes of change (Collier and Collier 1991: 1). Transitions and change happen in distinct ways in different cases. HI rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere. Instead, HI favours the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation, often inherited from the past, based on its premise that time and history matter. While an external event or shock may happen simultaneously across many countries, such a shock can trigger different responses. Thus, HI is also useful in understanding differences in various institutional contexts. However, HI faces various challenges. Institutions define the parameters of domestic politics within which the actors act and make choices. However, HI cannot explain the motivations of the political actors, the way actors are empowered or constrained by the institutions or the differences between intended and unintended consequences (Pierson 1996; Knill 2001). Consequently, focusing only on the institutions can be deterministic and misleading because to do so ignores agency, actors’ interests and strategies and crucial aspects of the patterns of state-society interactions (Knill 2001; Radaelli 2001; Woll and Jacquot 2010). Therefore, I combine HI with network governance that complement each other so as to capture the role of the actors and the characteristics of their interactions in the Europeanisation process. HI ‘allows for the development of ex ante hypothesis concerning institutional change’ complemented by the actor-based network governance approach which explains the role of the actors’ interactions on change or continuity within a certain intuitional context (Knill 2001: 25). Second, network governance analyses the coordination of joint actions among interconnected actors across different sectors and multiple levels of governance (Mayntz 1993; Scharpf 1997; Lewis and Chatzopoulou 2015). Network governance is useful because it captures the complexity of the actors’ interactions, their negotiations and exchange of resources and ideas among interdependent levels of

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g­ overnance. Network governance affects ‘the construction of interests and identities and the dynamics of interaction that matter’ (Ansell 2006: 75). The study of the network governance patterns in this book provides an additional dimension of the state-society relations, namely how the actors’ interactions affect Europeanisation of domestic administration. Thus, domestic administrative choices are not analysed as previously in relation to the macro institutional context. Instead, administrative choices are examined in connection to the actors’ constellations and their role in the network. To my knowledge, there are no systematic studies of the domestic network governance patterns in the Europeanisation context until now. Networks bring together groups of actors in policy sectors with the aim of exchanging resources, knowledge, policy ideas and practices in order to affect policy outcomes but also through interactions to identify effective solutions to common problems. When actors come together in ‘relevant and contingent interactions through network governance, they may become subject to processes of institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation that construct a regulative….framework for negotiation and joint decision making’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 26). Consequently, the actors’ interactions become intertwined with the structure that affects the actors’ choices and responses to policy decisions. Nevertheless, a group of actors that interact does not necessarily represent a network. Interactions can indicate network governance patterns ‘if they are of some duration (not one-off meetings), have some degree of membership stability and continuity (are not completely open and constantly changing), and they may have an ongoing agenda (on a policy sector or specific issue)’ (Lewis and Chatzopoulou 2015). Daugbjerg (1999, 2003) identifies three dimensions that describe a network: a network’s membership; difference among members’ interests and inclusion; and degree of institutionalisation. The actors’ role differs among different network governance patterns, such as closed network governance systems or loosely interlinked systems. When the actors’ relationships are characterised by stability, continuity, a restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and limited horizontal articulation, they represent a policy community network, and their level of influence is expected to be high (Rhodes 1988). If the networks represent a dominant specific interest, they are very resistant to change. When networks include large numbers of diverse actors (stakeholders) and limited degrees of interdependence, they tend to be atomistic, stability and continuity are at a premium, and the networks are characterised as ‘issue networks’ (Heclo 1978; Rhodes 1988: 78). Such networks focus on specific issues, and the network structures are unstable with limited level of influence. Policy networks focus on the ‘power of the ‘shadow structure’ generated by connections between interdependent actors’ (Lewis and Chatzopoulou 2015). Furthermore, understanding the network governance characteristics provides another dimension of the operation of interest groups and representation. For example, network governance can enable administrative efficiency. This can happen when gaps are filled between decision-making and implementation by including public authorities at all levels, from local to the EU, and incorporating a broader

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range of societal actors and non-governmental organisations. These diverse actors can provide crucial information about the feasibility of policy decisions within a specific context within which EU policy decisions are implemented. Theoretically, network governance is also useful in understanding how the corporatist/pluralist domestic structures may affect differently domestic adaptation; these aspects have not been investigated in Europeanisation studies. For example, in contrast to a pluralist system, in a corporatist system, ‘interests are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’ (Schmitter 1979: 13).

Identifying the Domestic Factors In the EU multilevel governance system, decisions are taken at the EU level, while the domestic level defines priorities and objectives in order to put these decisions into practice (Peters and Pierre 2000: 1). The previous section presented the theories that this book combines in order to explain administrative adaptation and change to the EU CAP and variations of administrative adaptation between member states. As the above theoretical reflections may be general and abstract, this and the next section will present the analytical framework in order to address the research question: how do domestic factors affect administrative adaptation and variation among the member states, and why? Therefore, the identified domestic factors (explanatory variables) and the administrative adaptation and change (the dependent variable) are discussed in detail. Although the EU policies, reforms and crises, as external events, can become drivers for domestic change, the domestic factors can condition and affect the direction and degree of domestic change and either facilitate or impede this change. Pierson (2000) suggests that there must be an account of why differences occur, by which he implies that significant divergences emerge between the actual functioning of the institutions and policies. Therefore, it is crucial to identify and map systematically the domestic factors in order to understand domestic administrative adaptation and change with respect to EU policies. This has been challenging, particularly with respect to Europeanisation of institutional structures, because policy seems to be more permeable (Radaelli 2003). Despite their differences, Europeanisation scholars mostly pursue institutional and/or actor-based perspectives to identify domestic factors often referred to as ‘mediating factors’, ‘facilitating factors’ and ‘intervening mechanisms’ (Börzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, Versluis 2004; Laffan 2003; Knill 2001). Mediating or intervening factors are in reality also independent variables and affect the phenomenon that we aim to explain, but they are not directly part of the theory (Burnham et  al. 2008). Drawing on rational institutionalism, Börzel and Risse

Identifying the Domestic Factors

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(2003) identify (a) the number of veto points and (b) formal institutions as such intervening variables. According to the ‘veto point’ mechanism, the more power is dispersed across the political system and the more actors have a say in decision-­ making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce institutional changes in response to Europeanisation pressures (Haverland 2000; Börzel and Risse 2003). Heritier (2001) argued that this fails to include informal interactions and processes, while Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) criticised the veto point idea as rather abstract and general. In such systems, the focus on formal institutions is often insufficient; informal institutions ‘ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to patterns of clientelism’ often have a profound and ‘systematic effect’ on policy outcomes and policy performance (Helmke and Levitsky 2003: 4). Additionally, despite a high degree of adaptational pressure, centralised domestic political structures with fewer veto points and less dispersed decision-power can inhibit change, and thus they do not necessarily imply a high level of Europeanisation and adaptation. When the number of veto points is small in centralised political structures and thus power is concentrated, any attempt to introduce change is even more controlled and difficult. Thus, adaptation depends on the will of these actors who hold the power and competence to decide. In contrast, this book demonstrates that despite the presence of veto points, multilevel, multi-actor network governance facilitates administrative adaptation. For this to occur it is necessary to establish transparent and institutionalised coordination among the involved institutions supported by high level of professionalism and qualified expertise. In addition, the willingness of the involved actors in network governance, who are connected by clear common goals, facilitates and strengthens adaptation of EU decisions. Börzel and Risse (2003) complement the rational choice understanding with sociological institutionalism and add as the intervening variable the change agents who act as norm entrepreneurs and political culture and informal institutions, which conduct consensus building and cost-sharing. Versluis (2004) added one more mediating factor to these, namely, ‘issue salience’ (publicity) that ‘in general terms refers to the visibility of and the importance attached to a topic and it is assumed that visibility of an issue conditions behaviour’ (Roberts et  al. 2002 as cited in Versluis 2004: 61). Other scholars incorporated aspects of political economy and institutionalism and mapped domestic factors such as economic vulnerability, political institutional capacity, policy legacy and discourse (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004).

 ypology of Domestic Factors: Organisation of the Sector, T Domestic Politics and Network Governance In order to address the existing inconsistencies in the Europeanisation literature and provide a more integrated understanding on Europeanisation and domestic change, I developed a typology of three domestic factors, namely, the organisation of the sector, the domestic politics and network governance. I draw on empirical evidence

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in identifying the domestic factors and I formulate three hypotheses, while their selection is informed theoretically by the Europeanisation literature. In the case of the CAP that combines both market regulation and more new regulatory policy instruments, the domestic administrative provisions are other times prescribed in more detail and thus imply administrative transformations and other times more implicit and provide administrative discretion. Thus, the domestic factors are crucial in defining administrative responses and shaping administrative arrangements in the preparation for the implementation of policy decisions. The three identified factors incorporate institutions and actors and consider both the micro-domestic (organisation of the sector) and macro-domestic dynamics (domestic politics and network patterns) that characterise the domestic level. The specific characteristics of these domestic factors may differ among the member states, and thus they can lead to variation in administrative choices and mechanisms in the process of adaptation to EU policies. The administrative choices can contribute to none or long-term gaps among the policy goals and policy outcomes and thus lead to differences in implementation and performance of policy decisions. Consequently, administrative choices are not the actual application and enforcement of the policies, but are crucial for effective implementation, and can result in imbalances in EU governance, as we observed during the Eurozone crisis. For analytical reasons, these factors are examined separately, but in reality they are interconnected. Examining these factors separately provides different analytical insights. These factors are identified as domestic, yet they are not sealed off from the external environment, such as the EU or the international level, because being a member of the EU matters for actors’ interactions, legislation and institutions across the different levels from the domestic to the EU. Organisation of the sector, the first factor, refers to the number, type of actors and homogeneity of membership, boundaries, formal rules and shared understandings about the expected roles of the involved actors in an interest organisation (Beyers et al. 2008). The ‘organisation’ sets the frames and the procedures but also the channels for diffusion of complex information, norms and physical boundaries. This factor that focuses on the micro-level is useful in understanding the ability of agricultural society to initiate, develop and coordinate strategies and collective activities, build coalitions and represent the members’ interests in the domestic or EU political arena. Organisation of the sector reflects the way the sector shapes its strategic preferences, allocates competences among the sub-sectoral organisations and formulates responses to domestic or EU policy decisions about their feasibility and their administration. Further, organisation provides insight, professional knowledge and information about specific sectoral needs to the policy-makers and the administration and directly or indirectly supports domestic adaptation to EU decisions (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Consequently, organisation constitutes a ‘key feature’ for the sector’s ability to influence policy outcomes and develop contacts and access to policy-makers and public authorities.

Identifying the Domestic Factors

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More specifically, the organisational structures can be centralised or decentralised, professional or unprofessional, and can support cooperative or conflictual strategies in a policy sector. The level of centralisation can affect collaboration and information diffusion among the members of the organisation. When centralisation is combined with cooperative structures, winners and losers are willing to share any outcomes. In cooperative structures, the involved actors have more incentives to support the necessary changes and to maintain or re-establish the institutional equilibrium that has been disturbed by a Euro-induced redistribution of power. While cooperative cultures may promote common action, confrontational understandings may act as a constraint to change. In contrast, in conflictual organisational structures, actors strive to shift the costs to each other, which prevents the adjustments needed to re-establish the institutional equilibrium. Consequently, conflictual or adversarial strategies of cost-shifting prohibit adaptation. A sectoral organisation can be broad and inclusive of heterogeneous members or be more homogeneous and exclusive. The organisation can operate as a policy network where the members appreciate the benefits of building a more permanent relation of resource dependence and exchange, enjoy dense interactions and can endorse an integrated representation. Heterogeneous organisational structures include diverse or complementary actors such as individuals, firms, sub-sectoral organisations, non-governmental organisations but also business associations (e.g. cooperatives of primary producers, food processing industry, slaughterhouses, etc.) (Eising and Lehringer 2013). The ‘intra’-organisational dynamics of the heterogeneous organisations reflect the relations of the sub-groups. Broad membership strengthens resource capacity, while low homogeneity can prolong and affect the efficiency of the decision-making process as disagreements arise. This can result in vague articulation of the interests that may be crucial for the sector’s interest representation and level of pressure (Eckstein 1963). Instead, if the ‘intra’-organisational dynamics allow internal disagreements to be bridged and succeed in reaching timely agreements, more membership can be attracted. Integrated organisation leads to privileged ‘representational monopoly’, empowers access to public authorities and political actors and increases their bargaining power (Jordan et  al. 2004). Public authorities find it convenient to deal with highly concentrated sectoral representatives, as it is easier to reach agreements with one organisation than negotiate with each sub-group separately. Organisational structures can provide valuable resources, consultation services, expertise and knowledge that develop an adaptability capacity that can support the effective administration of policy decisions and adequate responses to internal and external challenges. Adaptability capacity refers to the ability of an organisation to adjust, reorganise and restructure in response to changing circumstances. When a sector has developed this adaptability capacity, the sector can create strategies to avoid or reduce adaptational costs and can play a crucial role in facilitating or prohibiting adaptation to Europeanisation. Adaptability is particularly important when policy is decided at the non-domestic level. This is because changes or cooperations can be instigated with other heterogeneous groups at the EU level, which represent more diffuse multi-national interests. In Europeanised policies, sectoral ­organisations

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turn ‘to new arenas’ and ‘shopping venues’ of influence to pursue multilevel strategies and seek various points of access to policy-makers (Eising and Lehringer 2013). These strategies are not rigid but can be moderate or intense when specific events happen (e.g. enlargement) or circumstances change (e.g. WTO agreements). These strategies often respond to emerging changes by redefining and re-­establishing their contacts at all levels and by reorganising themselves (ibid). Professionalism constitutes a significant mechanism in an organisation, e.g. it can facilitate administrative adaptability to EU demands and provisions, enhance flexibility and corroborate the production and diffusion of specialised knowledge. In narrow terms, ‘professionalism’ refers to the type of service a person provides in exchange for payment in accordance with established protocols for licencing, procedures and standards of service. This type of professionalism refers to formal qualifications such as knowledge and expertise derived from training or certification. However, professionalism also entails norms, work ethics, ideas and personal skills that complement the formal qualifications. In this book, ‘professionalism’ encompasses, both formal and informal qualifications, written and unwritten rules and norms and ideals. Additionally, the level of professionalism in an organisation enhances the organisation’s autonomy and the use of independent judgement in carrying out professional responsibilities. Professionalism counteracts the impact of personal relations and networking because of the greater weight on the organisations performance. Professionalism in an organisation is based on institution-led processes of specialised qualifications development (expertise knowledge, skills and working norms and ethics). Based on the above, I propose the first hypothesis: The higher the centralisation and professionalism of the organisational structures, the greater the administrative adaptation to EU policy decisions. The second identified factor, the domestic politics, refers to the macro-level and the state-society relations, the governing institutions and their characteristics. Domestic politics reflect political cultures and legacies and indicate whether the political elites are interested in hierarchical authoritarian state apparatuses, or they encourage coordinating collaborations and develop connections with various organisations in the society in pursuit of certain common goals. While it is difficult to isolate and measure precisely the political culture concept, it is also difficult to ignore or to dismiss the concept as meaningless for understanding politics and governing (Peters 2010). Domestic politics involves policy-making processes in which actors interact and exchange resources and benefits (Versluis et al. 2011; Knill and Tosun 2013). During these processes, new opportunities for participation emerge but also boundaries of interest are formed, which constitute the formal and informal institutional context of decision-making. These institutional dynamics and processes of the political structures, complemented by uncodified rules and norms, determine the use and sharing of available resources to administer EU decisions and policy outcomes. Consequently, domestic politics determines who will acquire responsibility and competences and who will benefit, thus empowering some groups and imposing burdens and constraints on others. Thus, domestic politics are linked closely to and determine how administrative competences and responsibilities are allocated and to whom over time. Domestic politics is useful in understanding how

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Europeanisation of policy can affect the domestic administrative structures, patterns and practices. Domestic politics may represent centralised hierarchical structures where powers and competences are concentrated among few actors in the political system. Alternatively, these politics are represented by decentralised structures with many involved actors. Centralisation refers to division of political power – unitary power, federal governance system, governments formed by a single party or coalition of parties. While centralisation facilitates flow of information in a rigid, top-down, hierarchical and exclusive system, centralisation can also have the opposite effect and hinder collaborations and create barriers to communication. Highly centralised, unitary and single party political systems do not involve many actors at different levels and are characterised by limited coordination among political actors. In federal systems, coordination among the levels (vertical and horizontal) is more complex and power more diffuse. Similarly, in multi-party coalition governments, coordination is complex and decisions are often consensus-driven, take longer or are vague in content in order to satisfy the various viewpoints. These characteristics of domestic politics reflect the administrative choices and responses to EU policy decisions. When domestic politics are centralised but encourage collaboration and actively promote strong ties between political elites and society, administrative structures are similarly inclusive and collaborative. Domestic politics may represent centralised, hierarchical, adversarial and rigid domestic politics, or consensus-driven, flexible and collaborative, may promote merit based on professionalism or be determined by political patronage and favouritism. Similarly to the organisation of the sector, the level of professionalism of domestic politics represents a functional or normative mechanism. This mechanism may facilitate or impede continuity but may also support change and adaptability of the domestic politics when responding to the EU policy decisions. On the one hand, professionalism refers to the development of specialised expertise, knowledge and skills, derived from extensive formal academic and practical training (Andersen and Pedersen 2012; Grossman 2003; Negrine and Lilleker 2002). Professionalism in politics enhances autonomy in decisions and independent judgement in carrying out professional responsibilities, beyond political loyalty (Mastenbroek 2017). On the other hand, normative refers to the norms and ethics that characterise professional interactions and determine the choice of practices. Professional interactions and practices are to ‘withstand external interference, reduce the risk of arbitrary use of agency discretion’ (Majone cited in Newman 2006: 386; Shapiro 2005) and achieve efficient and impartial allocation of resources by the involved actors within political systems (Featherstone 2005b; Kazakos 2004). The role of professionalism in domestic politics differs among political systems. In some political systems, professionalism is seen as politically safer. This is because professional qualifications (expertise knowledge but also skills and working norms) weight significantly so that decisions can lead to the achievement of set targets (e.g. administrative adaptation and change). Moreover, the emphasis on professional values and norms counteracts the impact of, for example, clientelism and nepotism. This does not mean that clientelism and nepotism do not exist in domestic politics, but they are not the main

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characteristic of the state-society relations. Although clientelism does not disappear, it is hidden behind formalities. In other systems, it is considered easier and even efficient to make appointments within a close circle of acquaintances because their loyalty and qualifications are easier to evaluate and trust. This is characterised as political patronage. The appointed civil servants are expected to ensure the implementation of the government’s political strategies. The main aim is re-election and not necessarily adaptation and change according to EU decisions and demands. Such choices may result in ossifying the system and privileging the insiders to the exclusion of the outsiders and create distrust in the political system. In other systems, professionalism plays an active role in ensuring that appointments are based on merit and ascriptive criteria. Based on the above discussion of the domestic politics, I propose the second hypothesis: The higher centralisation and professionalism of the domestic politics, the greater the domestic administrative adaptation to EU policies. The third factor, the network governance patterns, investigates the role of the actors’ interactions within the multigovernance process of agriculture. The study of network governance patterns offers another analytical approach to state-society relations, which has not received adequate attention (Helmke and Levitsky 2003: 1), namely, how the interactions of the actors in the network affect administrative adaptation and change. This analysis complements the findings of the organisation of the sector and the domestic politics in understanding domestic administrative adaptation and change within the Europeanisation policy process. ‘One of the ideal characteristics of network governance is the level of political action that embraces higher levels of coordination and lower levels to include those who are affected by a policy and whose active support is needed for implementation. Moreover, the joint problem-­solving becomes functionally more specific. Any policy that is geared to mobilize indigenous resources and joint learning has to be decentralised and carried out in smaller units and lower levels’ (Kohler-Koch 1999: 26). Network structures provide ‘either opportunities for or constrains on the individual actions and the network structure is conceptualized as lasting patterns of relations among actors’ (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 3). Actors constitute non-autonomous interdependent units, whose relations and interactions operate as channels for transfer or flow of resources. ‘Governance through networks is considered a non-coercive mode of governing where flexible self-organising is often issue oriented and deliberate or involves elements market-like mechanisms’ (Olsen 2003: 97). Network governance analysis within the EU multilevel governance looks for explanations in different sets of actors that interact formally and informally or in exchanges that separate different levels in a system of multilevel governance where multiple institutions wield a slice of power. Actors in the network are linked by common policy interests and interact across different governance levels, supranational, national and subnational institutions, in order to influence policy outcomes. The actors’ ‘relationships can have both an instrumental (exchange) and a social (affectual) dimension’ (Ansell 2006: 77). In the instrumental case, one ‘should not expect them to provide the basis for

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the kind of trust or reciprocity necessary to produce exchange where goods are ill defined or the time frame for exchange is poorly specified. The social character of network relationships built on loyalty and mutual obligation that allows us to think them as social structures’ (ibid). In sum, ‘the networked polity is a structure of governance in which both state and societal organisation is vertically and horizontally disaggregated (as in pluralism) but linked together by cooperative exchange (as in corporatism)’ (Ansell 2000: 310–311). Specialised technocratic knowledge and information, ideas and organisational characteristics constitute resources, offer bargaining and negotiating powers and contribute to knowledge transfer, learning and trust building within network structures that can become source of power and change (or impede change and maintain the status quo) at the domestic level. These mechanisms lead to interdependence, support coordination and development of collaboration in joint problem-solving and affect administrative choices and responses to EU. The above understanding of network governance leads to my third hypothesis: H3, The more dense and more inclusive the network patterns are, the more they facilitate administrative adaptation to EU policies; and the more loose and exclusive they are, the more they impede domestic administrative adaptation to EU policy. The three hypotheses also reflect the mixed method employed in the book. The first and the second are addressed by the qualitative research while the third by the quantitative. Table  2.1 presents the typology of the three proposed domestic factors – organisation of the sector, domestic politics and network governance patterns and the mechanisms that facilitate or impede administrative adaptation. The combination of the three interconnected factors aims to provide in a dynamic manner a thorough understanding of domestic administrative adaptation to the EU CAP and how administrative adaptation varies among the member states. Table 2.1  The typology of the domestic factors and mechanisms of Europeanisation (explanatory variables) Domestic factors Organisation of the sector

Domestic politics

Network governance patterns

Source: Developed by author

Characteristics Vertically and horizontally integrated Strongly/weakly organised Hierarchical/collaborative Corporatist/pluralist Conflictual/consensus Unitary/federal Patronage/merit Issue network/policy network Dense/loose Frequent/infrequent interactions Strong/weak interactions

Mechanisms Centralisation/ professionalism Centralisation/ professionalism

Knowledge Information diffusion Learning

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Administrative Adaptation The core aim of this book is to explain variation in the ‘domestic administrative adaptation’ to the EU CAP policy between two member states. In order to fulfil this aim, inspired by Knill (2001), the book examines the domestic administrative structures, procedures and rules, styles and practices that guide interactions among the administrative authorities and the groups affected by the policy and their response to EU CAP decisions. The administrative responses do not always happen as a direct reaction to explicit and specific administrative requirements from the EU policy; the EU decisions rarely1 directly impose administrative requirements on member states even as regards regulatory policies and positive integration. However, EU regulatory policies may introduce requirements with respect to the institutional structures of the national regulatory authorities such as the establishment of an agency as part of the EU agencification system or demand uniform methods of reporting and data collection for reasons of consistency, coordination and comparisons among the member states (Knill 2001). EU rules may also require changes in the administrative style, such as administrative interest mediation. For example, the CAP encourages the role of the stakeholders in the policy-making and implementation. Nevertheless, domestic administrative adaptation happens indirectly, when domestic administrations cope with the challenges of managing and administering EU policy decisions, for example, Regulation (EC) 1782/2003, Art. 18 of the Council, complemented by Decision 796/04 of the Commission, and the Land Parcels Identification System (LPIS) which aimed to increase efficiency in the management of the CAP. The member states’ administrations could choose how to manage this system in each country. This discretion in domestic administrative choices leads to variation in administrative adaptation among the member states, which then affects differently compliance to and transposition of the EU decisions. Non-compliance to EU rules has been attributed to ‘administrative inefficiencies and difficulties’ (Hartlapp 2009: 472), while high compliance has been attributed to robust administrative machinery (Martinsen 2014). However, the precise role of administrative features on compliance remains unclear. This phenomenon has been particularly salient during the EU Eurozone crisis since 2008 and has resulted in administrative demands by the EU in severely hit member states (e.g. Greece, Spain). My starting point is that ‘there is often a relation between policy content and the necessary domestic administrative provisions’ (Knill 2001: 1) ‘because in many instances decisions about policies imply decisions on corresponding administrative structures and the practices for proper implementation’ (Knill: 36). Based on this assertion, my aim is to provide clear explanations concerning administrative adaptation to the CAP, an EU common policy, and variations in two member states, Denmark and Greece. Empirical evidence shows contradictory patterns concerning both the scope and the direction of domestic administrative adaptation and change to EU decisions.  The MacSharry reform of the CAP introduced administrative changes.

1

Administrative Adaptation

43

Table 2.2  Administrative change – the dependent variable Centralised/fragmented Hierarchical/non-hierarchical Merit driven/patronage Command and control Collaborative/managerial Administrative styles and practices Coherent/incoherent Consensual/conflictual Formal/informal Inclusive/exclusive Rigid/flexible Adaptive/non-adaptive Willing and communicative/uncommunicated and reserved Administrative structures

Adopted by Knill (2001: 41)

Some authors emphasise that EU policy has led to convergence at the national level with respect to structures (Harcourt 2000; Schneider 2001). Others underline how the EU has had different impacts across policies and countries (Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 1998; Héritier and Knill 2000; Börzel 1999). However, what leads to convergence or divergence needs to be unpacked. Inspired by Knill’s work (2001), I examine administrative adaptation with respect to (a) the administrative structures (domestic administrative polity) and (b) administrative styles and practices, and their dimensions, which are presented in Table 2.2. Administrative adaptation does not refer directly to application and enforcement of the policy or the policy output and performance in implementation, neither ‘the direct result of the EU decision process, which involves the adoption of a certain programme, law or regulation’ (Knill and Tosun 2012: 29). The policy output ‘allocates advantages and disadvantages to people’ (Knill and Tosun 2012: 29). Thus, I do not examine the policy outcomes and impact, which assess whether a specific decision achieved the expected targets and results, which are thus linked directly to the policy implementation and evaluation of the policy decision (Knill and Tosun 2012: 29). Instead, by focusing on the administrative adaptation, I investigate how policy decisions at the EU level affect the formal and the informal characteristics of the administrative apparatus that contribute to the domestic implementation of EU decisions (Chatzopoulou 2015). These characteristics, from formal procedures and rules to styles, organisational cultures, norms and practices, guide the administrative authorities and their interactions with the groups affected by the policy decisions. Domestic administration represents the public civil service that has the executive responsibility and is separated formally from public policy formation. Administrative systems are characterised by a certain level of hierarchy, appointment procedures, collaborative processes, expertise, practices, levels of effectiveness, efficiency and adaptability to external governmental structures (e.g. the EU) (Woodrow 1887). Domestic administrations respond to the functional needs in the political system, which expand with the internationalisation of policy-making. Such structures incor-

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porate ‘a coercive and a service function’ (Sotiropoulos 1995: 243). They link the ‘macro’ political (institutions, legal structures, political parties, intergovernmental relations, etc.) with the ‘micro’ (policy instruments, resources) domestic structures within the EU policy multilevel governance (Radaelli 2003: 35). Domestic administrations differ among policy areas, but they matter in all areas because they support and consult the political executive (the Minister) on the feasibility of domestic and EU policy decisions and the conditions of their effective implementation in praxis. By intervening between the decisions and the actual implementation, the domestic administrations connect or obstruct the policy-­making sequence and play a constructive role in the success of the policy decisions. They ensure and facilitate continuity of policy strategies even during changes in the legislative bodies and government and complement ‘lack of skills relevant to understanding policies that must be made’ (Peters 2010: 21). The administration can provide the necessary knowledge and information which, based on previous experiences, constitute institutional memory that can hinder similar failures. Moreover, the administration can ensure accountability and transparency of policy implementation. The first category, the administrative structures, refers to the formal rules, organisation, procedures and provisions of the administrative settings and the allocation of responsibilities and competencies between different administrative authorities (governmental/non-governmental). These structures include consistent rule-­ bounded actions and a series of micro decisions that contribute to continuity of the execution of policy decisions across changes in governments (Olsen 2007). Administrative structures can be hierarchical, top-down, and characterised by ‘command and control’, concentration of power and authority, collaborative and/or managerial, client and service based. As a consequence, they may enhance or impede coordination of initiatives. They can be hierarchical and adversarial, formal or informal in their interactions with the addressees, collaborative or managerial. These characteristics are interconnected with nonbinding rules in response to prescribed demands by policy decisions. During the adjustment process, the allocation of administrative competences may lead to inter-ministerial coordination and collaborations among broader administrative structures2 or even among different governmental levels (regional-local), depending on the administrative system. The type of coordination processes and their change reflect the adaptability or not of the domestic administrative system. I investigate the extent to which the Europeanisation of the domestic agricultural policies influences and leads to coherent and uninterrupted versus fragmented and disjoined or flexible versus inflexible administrative patterns. The administrative style refers to the normative characteristics and behaviour of the civil servant, the informal practices and styles adapted in the administration process, such as conflictual, consensual, regulative style, flexible or rigid, delibera2  These include the cabinet, cabinet sub-committees, horizontal inter-ministerial committees dealing with cross-sectoral issues through their interactions with political leadership, parliament and even regional and local government bodies that are potentially involved in the administration of EU decisions depending of the administrative system (Laffan 2003, pp. 12–13).

Comparative Mixed Method

45

tive, inclusive and participatory (governmental, non-governmental, civil society), communicative with the use of instruments and resources, such as technology, inclusive or exclusive. ‘Style’ denotes the ‘way of doing’ administration, the internal dynamics in the administration and its interaction with the external world, the chosen administrative behaviour in order to translate and enforce EU policy decisions at the domestic level. This way of doing administration is affected by political ­culture, political values and political structures changing technologies but also ‘expectations about service’ by the citizens or specific sectoral demands (Peters 2010). Administrative style and practices can be guided by political loyalty to the Minister or superiors’ interests or more autonomous based on expertise and professional principles (Mastenbroek 2017). When it comes with interactions both internally and with the society, administrative style may be coherent or incoherent, facilitate dissemination of information and knowledge, be flexible and adaptive and allow equal access to knowledge and policy information to everybody. In some cases, bargaining, negotiation and collaboration is combined with hierarchy and authority. The administrative structures, styles and practices are the dimensions with respect to which, this book analyses administrative adaptation and change.

Comparative Mixed Method In this book, I pursue a diachronic comparative method in order to investigate and compare the conditions under which domestic administrations adapt to EU CAP over time in two member states, Denmark and Greece. Comparative analysis has gained interest among scholars over the years (Immergut 1992; Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1994). The comparative method that is based on a ‘small N’ has been criticized for using too many variables and small number of cases, selection bias and lack of systematic procedures that do not pay adequate attention to rival explanations (Collier and Mahoney 1996; Lieberman 2005). In response to this critique, qualitative scholars argued that in order to study complex phenomena, comparative small number case studies allow in-depth analysis (Collier et al. 2004b). The indepth comparative small N studies can contribute to the development of new hypotheses and theory building. Thus, they do not necessarily only lead to empirical generalisations. Small N comparative case studies can benefit significantly from within-case temporal analysis, namely, comparisons within individual systems across time (Collier 1993; Haverland 2007; Peters 1998, 2010). Temporal comparisons of a sequence of events or phenomena help us understand how specific events and decisions can impact within a country or within specific institutional settings at different points in time. ‘In comparative politics, scholars use within-case analysis to locate the intervening mechanisms linking a hypothesized explanatory variable to an outcome’ (Mahoney 2007: 132). In this way, such analyses increase confidence in differentiating between correlation and causal relationships (Mahoney 2007:

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132). Therefore, employing temporal comparative analysis in this book permits better explanations concerning the impact of the EU integration of policies at the domestic level over time. Furthermore, I adopt a mixed method also referred to as ‘integrated strategy of nested analysis’ (Lieberman 2005: 435). This mixed method combines qualitative and quantitative data in order to integrate and bridge methodological divisions. Mixed methods provide a considerable potential to address issues that each of the methodological approaches cannot do alone. Since both qualitative and quantitative methods have their shortcomings and no single method can resolve the complex issues involved in the study of politics and actors’ behaviour, I use a mixed method. The mixed method offers better assessment strategies and causal inferences. The mixed method enables both triangulation and completeness. The former refers to provide greater validity as the two sets of data from the two research strategies are crossed checked and corroborate each other. The latter provides a more comprehensive account in the research and more complete answers (Bryman 2012). In this book, the qualitative data gathered through semi-structured interviews, public official documents and secondary literature. The quantitative data gathered through social network analysis (SNA) forms that the interviewees filled out (Appendix V). First, I gathered the primary qualitative data that concentrates on the informal state-society relations and the institutional memory of the organisations. This data provides detailed information of the characteristics of the organisation of the sector and the domestic politics and enable a better understanding on how these characteristics affect administrative adaptation and change. However, interviews may provide biased views, which the researcher needs to take into account in the interpretation of the interview material. One of the challenges that an interviewer faces when he/she conducts interviews in more than one country is to be able to hear the meaning of ‘what is being expressed by respondents in different countries’ institutional contexts and which precautions might be taken to enhance the capacity to ‘hear’ what the respondents tell’ (Zølner et al. 2007: 128–129). An advantage in this study has been the author’s in-depth knowledge of the domestic institutional contexts, languages and especially the cultural aspects concerning approaching interviewees in the examined countries before the interviews. The 46 semi-structured interviews conducted in both countries with EU and domestic policy officials, parliamentarians, sectoral actors and interest groups provided data on domestic informal institutions and actors’ interactions. These interviews also furnished factual qualitative data that is not always available in documents (e.g. the context within policy decisions were taken over time). As Zølner et al. (2007: 128–129) indicate, ‘While official documents can reflect policy decisions, such as what a procedure should be, which bodies or organisations should be involved, and the policy in a certain field, they rarely tell us about what actually happened in the process of making a decision and writing a policy document…That is.. about the way in which a document came into being, about the way in which the negotiations concerning a particular policy outcome took place, the identification of policy actors present and their level of activity and, subsequently the way in which a particular policy document was used’. Second, the interview data is complemented by secondary data, EU

Comparative Mixed Method

47

and domestic official public legal documents, ministerial and legal decisions and press releases, which provide the context within which decisions are made (Lyngaard 2011). Third, descriptive statistics of the agricultural sectors in the two examined countries (e.g. imports, exports, share in GDP and employment) provide the background of the specific sectors and enable the comparison of the structural changes over time (e.g. change in share of employment in agricultural can indicate societal structural change). Fourth, in order to analyse the actors’ interactions, I apply the social network analysis (SNA) analytical and methodological tools. SNA focuses on ­‘relationships among social entities, and on the patterns and implications of these relationships’ (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 3). The SNA method is a mathematical approach that encompasses theories, models, concepts and applications that portray actors’ relations (Borgatti et al. 2009). The SNA analysis complements the qualitative analysis. A systematic and detailed study of these interactions provides a valuable understanding of network governance patterns and the way the network patterns affect administrative adaptation and change. In order to gather this data, all interviewees filled out SNA questionnaires. These provided information about the actor’s interactions, as organisations, the frequency of their interactions and the importance of these interactions in relation to their work. This information has been used to map and evaluate the characteristics of the actors’ interactions in the network. The SNA statistics permit a systematic comparison of the actors’ interactions. Moreover, the SNA techniques enrich the analysis by providing snapshot visualisations of the structure of the network, the pattern of the actors’ interaction choices (e.g. A interacts with B, does B interact with A?), their positioning and/or ‘embeddedness’ in the overall network and explore whether there is reciprocity in actors’ choices. The SNA statistical measures assess more specifically the frequency, strength, and density and the variability among the actors’ interactions (Scott and Carrington 2014; Lewis and Chatzopoulou 2015). The SNA method also uses statistical indicators to calculate the different positional roles of actors within networks. Such indicators are the ‘centrality’ measurement, the number of cliques that exist in the network and the in-degree and out-degree measurements. The centrality statistical measurement, for example, shows how an actor is at the nexus of a web of networks that enables the actor to adopt a critical brokerage role in bringing actors together. For example, state organisations may play a leadership role, especially when state organisations have a high degree of network ‘centrality’, which differs from centralisation. The ‘clique’ measure refers to a subset of a network in which the actors are connected closely to each other compared to the rest of the members in the network. Cliques demonstrate the sub-structures in the network. For example, in a sector, the firms or organisations form ‘cliques’ based on common interests and problems but also interdependence in relation to resources and information. Insights such as these can help us understand how the different actors may affect the administrative adaptation to EU CAP. Lastly, an actor can play various roles in a network such as ‘source of information’, ‘communicator’ or ‘facilitator’. Differences in roles also demonstrate the extent to which the network is inclusive or exclusive. According to Gould and

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Fernandez’s (1989) typology of actors roles in a network, there are five types of roles that an actor can take in a network. These roles are coordinator, gatekeeper, consultant, representative and liaison. This typology is based on the sequence of interactions (e.g. 1-->2-->3, where 2 is the broker). A coordinator is an actor that connects two other actors (a source and a recipient of information) from the same group (A->A->A). A gatekeeper is an actor that is a source of information and belongs to a different group, but the intermediary and recipient are from the same (B-->A-->A (source belongs to different group)). An actor acts as a representative (A-->A-->B, recipient belongs to different group) when the source and the intermediary are from the same group but the recipient is from a different group. A consultant is an intermediary belonging to a different group than both the source and the recipient (B-->A-->B, broker belongs to different group). Lastly, liaison is when all three (recipient, source and intermediary) belong to different groups (B-->A-->C, all nodes belong to different groups). A significant challenge of the SNA method is to define the kind of data that are appropriate for network analysis. This data are ‘attribute data’ and/or ‘relational data’. Attribute data relate to the characteristics, opinions and behaviour of agents, and they are regarded as the properties and qualities that belong to these agents as individuals or groups (for more see Hanneman 2001). Relational data are the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachments and meetings, which relate one agent to another and so cannot be reduced to the properties of the individual agents themselves. Relations are not the properties of the agents, but they do connect pairs of agents into larger relational systems (Scott 2000). The combination of the interviews with study of documents and SNA statistical analysis operates as a form of triangulation that increases the reliability and validation of the data. Moreover, this approach enables the profound understanding of the implications of the European integration in the agriculture of the two states for over 40 years. In this book, I conduct a temporal within case comparative analysis complemented by a cross-country case comparison over time (Fig. 2.1) in order to some extent to overcome the small N methodological concerns. Such a comparison provides a dynamic understanding of administrative change and adaptation as a response to changes in the EU. These periods are defined in relation to important external events, namely, the counties’ accession to the EU and the 1992 Macsharry reform of the CAP. These events are treated as external shocks and are expected to affect the initial decision paths taken at the domestic level in the historical institutionalist terminology and potentially lead to ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier 1991). For Denmark, the first period starts when the country joined the EU in 1973 up to 1991, when the MacSharry reform was introduced.3 The respective analysis for Greece starts in 1981, the year that Greece joined the EU, until 1991. The second period for both countries starts in 1992 with the MacSharry reform (see previous section) and ends in 2009. The MacSharry reform was chosen because it is consid3  The arrows indicate that for Denmark, the analysis covers 1973 to 1991 and 1992 to 2009, and for Greece, the analysis covers 1981 to 1991 and 1992 to 2009. The darker arrows indicate comparisons between the two countries for the respective periods.

49

 Country Case Selection

1973 Denmark

1981Greece

1991 Denmark

1991 Greece

2009 Denmark

2009 Greece

Fig. 2.1  Time frame of the study of the Danish (1973–2009) and Greek (1981–2009)

ered one of the most significant reforms in the history of CAP in that it separated farm subsidies from production, a process known as decoupling. According to Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007), although the 1992 CAP reforms (under MacSharry) and again in 2003 (under Fischler) were substantial, those of Agenda 2000 in March 1999 were limited. First, the domestic administrative responses to CAP are examined and compared between the two periods of examination for each country. Then follows a comparison between the two countries for the corresponding period (Fig. 2.1). The years 1973 for Denmark and 1981 for Greece, which signify their accession to the EU and the subordination of domestic agricultures under the CAP (EU, CAP) together with the 1992 MacSharry CAP reform are considered exogenous events that act as shocks to domestic agricultural policy.

Country Case Selection This book compares the administrative change adaptation to the CAP in Denmark and Greece. Case selection in comparative studies has been crucial, especially because case studies have been criticised as not being helpful for drawing generalisations. Nevertheless, case studies contribute to in-depth intensive examination of the selected case and allow identification of explanatory variables and causal relations that help generating hypotheses and confirming theories (Collier et al. 2004a). One methodological question in the literature concerns whether ‘case selection’ focuses on similarity or difference. The advocates of the most ‘similar countries comparison’ argue that the neutralisation of certain differences allows for a better analysis of the others (Anckar 2008). Such neutralisation has been criticised for ‘over-determination’ (Mackie and Marsh 1995). Those who support the comparison of ‘different cases’– e.g. countries – argue that ‘a maximum degree of differences in relation to the factors that are the most significant given the theoretical concerns aims to force analysts to distil out of this diversity a set of common elements that prove to have a great explanatory power’ (Collier 1993: 112). A useful route is to compare countries that share enough common characteristics, which justify a com-

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parison, while they differ in many aspects (Mackie and Marsh 1995: 179). For example, countries may follow similar formal legal rights or be under similar democratic regimes, while they differ with respect to history or economic development and formal or informal organisational and political structures. Instead of focusing on whether X affects Y in a rigid manner, the main aim in this book is to understand in depth what affects Y, namely, the variation in administrative adaptation to the CAP in two member states, which as EU member states have both followed the same CAP rules for a long time. In contrast to a single case study, the comparison allows for unravelling the specific characteristics of the domestic factors in Denmark and Greece, which lead to variation in domestic administrative adaptation to EU policy. The choice of the cases is particularly interesting from a research point of view since such cases have been rarely studied or compared in Europeanisation studies (Treib 2014). Existing comparative studies mostly focus on large EU countries: France, Britain, Spain and Germany (Börzel 2002; Knill 2001), the Netherlands, Britain, Germany (Versluis 2004), Scandinavian countries (Kallestrup 2004) and rarely small countries (Greece, Portugal) (Hibou 2005). This book aims to complement and contribute to comparative politics Europeanisation scholarship by examining and comparing distinctive cases, like Denmark and Greece, other than the old large member states which have been extensively studied in the literature (McMahon 2005; Treib, 14). By providing insightful systematic knowledge on the two countries’ organisational and institutional structures and politics, I cover the potential range of counterfactuals implied by the overall argument, and I lay the foundation for new discussions and understandings on the Europeanisation of domestic administration and variation of administrative adaptation to EU policies among the member states. Denmark and Greece represent the north and south dimension in the EU. Denmark is representative of the Northern welfare corporatist system, and Greece represents the Southern quasi-corporatist system. Nevertheless, they constitute important comparable cases because they are both small countries, democracies and highly homogeneous member states. Both have been EU member states for a long period, Denmark since 1973 and Greece since 1981. As small-sized member states, they are expected to adjust and adapt more easily to various challenges and engage in policy learning compared to large powerful ones, particularly when they acquire as small state efficient bureaucracies and/or specific corporatist elements4 (Katzenstein 1985: 10; Börzel et al. 2010). In both countries agriculture, which represents a large share of the economy, has followed the CAP rules since the countries’ accession to EU. The long period of membership combined with the countries’ small size assisted the collection of the relevant data concerning the countries’ responses to the same CAP reforms, rules and decisions, since both countries have had the opportunity to change their policies and adapt to the EU. Consequently, despite their differ4  The other two elements are (a) an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level and (b) voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining among interest groups, state bureaucracies and political parties, which elements are expected to facilitate domestic adaptation (Katzenstein 1985: 10).

Percentage of agricultural employment

 Country Case Selection

51

40 30 20

Greece

10

Denmark

0 1973 1978 1981 1985 1990 1992 1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 2010

Years

Fig. 2.2  Share of employment in agriculture out of total employment in Denmark and Greece, 1973–2010. (Source: author based on Eurostat)

70.0

Hectares

60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0

Denmark

20.0

Greece

10.0 0.0 1973

1980

1987

1994

2001

2008

Years Fig. 2.3  Average farm size in Denmark and Greece, 1973–2010. (Source: author based on Eurostat)

ences, the two examined cases provide significant similarities through which to draw comparisons. In order to provide a first view of the agricultures of the two countries, the rest of this section illustrates the structural characteristics of agriculture and their similarities and differences in both countries, based on descriptive statistics. ­ Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the share of agricultural employment and the average farm size, respectively, for the period of examination. Both variables differ in the two countries and reflect socio-economic structures. The average farm size indicates concentration in agricultural structures, which can be accompanied by economies of scale. Both countries had high levels of agricultural employment when they joined the EU, but their share in agricultural employment developed increasing differences over time. In recent years, the share of agricultural employment has fallen in Denmark but has remained relatively high in Greece. These numbers signify differences in the social and economic role of agriculture in the two countries. Average farm size also differs between the two countries (Fig. 2.3). The average farm size has increased constantly in Denmark since the country’s accession to the EU, while it has remained almost stable in Greece. Thus, in Greece agriculture is

2  Europeanisation and Domestic Administrative Adaptation 20.0 15.0 Denmark

10.0

Greece

5.0

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

0.0 1973

Percentage of agriculture in GDP

52

Years Fig. 2.4  Share of agriculture in GDP in Denmark and Greece, 1973–2010. (Source: author based on Eurostat)

Percentage of imports and exports out of total in each country

characterised by many small sized farms that are often economically unsustainable. This is combined with highly fragmented production, which does not allow for economies of scale. Yet agriculture remains an important economic sector in both countries as indicated by the share of agriculture in GDP (Fig. 2.4) and by agricultural trade, imports and exports (Fig. 2.5). With respect to these aspects, the difference between the two countries was greater at the time they joined the EU.  Furthermore, although the share of agriculture in the economy of these countries has decreased over time, it remains significant particularly when considered in relation to the food processing industry and to exports as shown in the figures below. In both countries, exports are higher than the imports, and so the balance between imports and exports is positive (Fig. 2.5). Lastly, both countries receive a considerable share of the CAP budget (Fig. 2.6). The CAP is financed by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) that was set up in January 1962. The EAGGF constitutes a set of appropriations in the EU’s general budget, it is not a separate fund and the related resources are approved similarly to other expenditures, according to the normal 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

Imports Denmark Imports Greece Exports Denmark Exports Greece 1973 1978 1981 1985 1990 1992 1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010

Years

Fig. 2.5  Share of agricultural out of total imports and total exports in Denmark and Greece. (Source: author based on Eurostat)

Amount

 Country Case Selection

53

1900 900 -100

1998

2000

2003

2005

2007

2009

2010

Years Guarantee Denmark

Guarantee Greece

Guidance Denmark

Guidance Greece

Fig. 2.6  EAGGF guarantee and guidance expenditure, (Mil Euro) 1998–2010. (Source: author based on Eurostat) (1) Expenditure from appropriations for commitment (2) Direct expenditure made by the Commission (EAGGF-Guarantee Section, 1998 to 2006 financial years/EAGGF 2007 to 2009 financial years) and Technical Assistance EAFRD (3) EAGGF An amount of EUR 551.4 Million for 2007, of EUR 1284.1 Million for 2008, and of EUR 3017.7 Million for 2009, paid for the Sugar Restructuring Fund, are not included in this table (4) EAGGF: Figures include recoveries for a total amount of EUR −30.03 Million for 2007, EUR −14.05 Million for 2008 and EUR −13.28 Million for 2009, in relation to ex EAGGF-Guarantee programmes (2000–2006)

budgetary procedure (European Commission 1985) Since 1964, the EAGGF has been split into two sections: the Guarantee Section and the Guidance Section. The Guarantee Section, the larger part of the EAGGF, consists partly of refunds for exports to third countries granted under the common organisation of the agricultural markets (COAM) and partly of intervention payments to regularise agricultural markets. The Guarantee Section, which includes fisheries, finances expenditure resulting from application of the market and price policy. The Guarantee Section also finances measures, which are not strictly related to the management of agricultural markets. Such measures are specific veterinary and plant health instruments intended to provide information on the Common Agricultural Policy including evaluation actions and rural development measures outside Objective 1 programmes (except the rural development Community initiative). The Guidance Section finances expenditures on agricultural structures and rural development measures that the Guarantee Fund (Regulation 1258/99) does not cover (https://www.europarl. europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/106/la-financiacion-de-la-pac) (Appendix IV). The above figures describe various dimensions and developments, such as contribution of Danish and Greek agriculture to the domestic economies (GDP and exports), since the countries joined the EU.  Although the agricultures of the ­countries developed differently, they remain for different reasons significant for these countries’ economies (employment vs. economic aspects). Territorial differences, e.g. the north-south dimension, do not represent differences with respect only to the landscape and climate that affect types of agriculture production. As this book shows, these differences also reflect dissimilarities in the political systems and the organisation of the sector that are important with respect to administrative adaptation to EU policies.

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2  Europeanisation and Domestic Administrative Adaptation

In sum, this chapter presents the theoretical and methodological choices in this book, in the aim to explain domestic administrative adaptation and change to EU CAP. Therefore, the analytical framework adopted in this book combines i­ nstitutional and network governance perspectives that complement each other. HI enables the development of hypotheses on administrative change, while network governance provides an actor perspective in unfolding the role of actors’ interactions, acts as theoretical triangulation and reduces institutional bias. Furthermore, the methodological discussion shows how a mixed method can provide relevant methodological tools in analysing a variety of data that combined can contribute to a more integrated understanding of a the administrative adaptation and change.

Chapter 3

The Danish Case

Danish agriculture and the food processing industry contribute significantly to the Danish economy with respect to food production, technology, innovation, employment and trade (O’Rourke 2006). Agriculture was an early contributor to the development of the Danish state and its position in the world, such as the accession of the country into the EU in 1973 (Christensen 1983). Since 1973, like all EU member states, Danish agriculture has followed the CAP rules. Today, the Danish agri-food sector employs around 140,000 people, while agricultural exports account for 148  billion DKK (around 20% of the total exports). The agri-food industry has remained a dynamic, successful and innovative economic sector over time and succeeded in sustaining its economic activities both domestically and internationally during the financial crisis. Beginning with state-society relations, in this chapter, I analyse the administrative adaptation of the Danish agriculture to the CAP since the country’s accession to EU in 1973. The analysis focuses on two periods: 1973–1991 and 1991–2009. During these periods, Denmark’s EU membership in 1973, the MacSharry reform in 1992, and the 2003 CAP reform1 constitute important events that set new paths in the agricultural administration. These events created historical legacies of institutional innovation at the domestic level, which over time have been reflected in the adaptation process to the CAP. In order to adapt to the CAP, the Danish agriculture underwent a significant restructuring during the first period, 1973–1991. Increased centralisation combined with high level of professionalism in the organisational structures of the sector and the domestic politics, supported by robust pre-existing institutional settings, reinforced administrative adaptation to the CAP. While politicisation is evident, it was not a barrier to administrative adaptation and change. During the second examined period, 1992–2009, domestic administrative adaptation built on the changes that

 See Chap. 2.

1

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_3

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3  The Danish Case

were introduced during the first examined period. Consequently, the domestic administrative changes were more radical in the first examined period. The administrative responses in the first period generated an administrative legacy which was followed in the second period, demonstrating continuity and path dependence in the administrative adaptation process. I attribute the administrative adaptation to the CAP in Denmark to domestic factors and their specific characteristics. In the next section, I map the agricultural actors and unravel the formal agricultural policy process in Denmark. I then present the three identified domestic factors, (a) organisational structure of the sector, (b) the domestic politics and (c) network governance patterns, which reflect different aspects of the state-society relations. These factors are analysed one by one in relation to administrative adaptation to the CAP within the EU multilevel governance system from the time of Denmark’s accession in the EU. The analysis of the administrative structures, style and practices, and their changes, shows that the administrative changes present a high level of absorption especially in the first period and follow these paths in the second period of examination.

Mapping the Actors in Danish Agriculture Figure 3.1 presents the actors involved in agricultural policy-making in Denmark, namely, the state (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries2 (MINFAF) and Directorates), the agricultural society (the Danish Food and Agriculture Council3 (DFAC)) and the administration (agencies). In the two top triangles are the state and the agricultural society, while the administration is at the bottom. The Ministry of Food, and Agriculture and Fisheries (MINFAF) has the formal competence to design policy strategy and make policy decisions in Denmark in accordance with CAP rules. The Department (Permanent Secretariat) acts as a secretariat, coordinates the work of the Minister’s portfolio and supports his tasks in designing and formulating the domestic agricultural policy strategy and the management of the CAP decisions in Denmark. The Department may act on its own initiative in political matters within the relevant sectors of the Ministry and follow up on political measures taken in the Danish Parliament (Folketing) relating to agriculture, food, fisheries and environment policies. The Department maintains contact with relevant departments in other ministries (i.e. Ministry of Finance) and, with

2  In June 2015, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (MINFAF) and the Ministry of Environment merged to become the Ministry of Food and Environment. 3  For simplification reasons, the term DFAC is mostly used even in the period that the organisation was named Danish Agricultural Council (DAC). Until 2009, members of the DAC were divided into A-members that have direct influence on the decisions in the Council and B-members that did not participate in the Council’s decisions processes but do enjoy tangible, individual benefits from the Council’s secretariat (Table 3.1).

57

Mapping the Actors in Danish Agriculture

Europeanisation process of agriculture Parliament EU Committee/ Committee for Agriculture

Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Fisheries State

Agricultural Society Administrative adaptation

Local Government

Danish Food & Agricultural Council Sectoral Organisations Farmers

Administration Agricultural Agency

Fig. 3.1  Actors involved in the agricultural policy-making in Greece until recently

other partners, has responsibility for communication and information dissemination and IT policy and conducts international negotiations. Furthermore, the Department coordinates the legislative work, the management of the directorates and the Ministry’s personnel policy. On the agricultural society side, the DFAC constitutes the agri-food umbrella organisation with various sub-sectoral organisations and represents the agricultural interests. The DFAC includes the Danish farmers’ associations, the Federation of Danish Cooperatives and a number of professional food companies, which are both cooperatively and privately owned. Danish agriculture has a long tradition of cooperativism (O’Rourke 2006; Borish 2004) (Table 3.1). In 2009, the Danish Agricultural Council (DAC) (Landbrugsraadet) merged with the Danish Bacon and Meat Council, Danish Pig Production and Danish Agriculture4 and was renamed as the DFAC. There is no specific legislation that defines the functioning of cooperatives. Instead, the members of each individual cooperative establish the organisation’s regulations and by-laws. Any individual or organisation can join a cooperative providing a certain level of production is sustained. By becoming a member of a cooperative, the producer has to supply his/her entire production to the cooperative company, which is in turn committed to pay the best possible price to the producer. Consequently, the cooperative is not under pressure to look for primary production elsewhere, while the producers have secured a market for their products. This process has created trust among the members and the agricultural cooperatives over

 http://agricultureandfood.dk/members

4

58

3  The Danish Case

Table 3.1  The A and B Members of the DAC A-members AKV Langholt a.m.b.a. Arla Foods a.m.b.a. Brancheudvalget for Frø Daka a.m.b.a. Danish Crown a.m.b.a. Dansk Akvakultur Dansk Gartneri Dansk Landbrug Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening Danske Slagterier Danske Sukkerroedyrkere Danæg a.m.b.a. Den Lokale Andel a.m.b.a. Det Danske Fjerkræraad DLF a.m.b.a. DLG a.m.b.a. Kartoffelmelscentralen (KMC) a.m.b.a. Kopenhagen Fur a.m.b.a. Kødbranchens Fællesråd LandboUngdom Mejeriforeningen Tican a.m.b.a. Økologisk Landsforening

B-members Alm. Brand AP Pension BG Bank Cimbria Unigrain A/S Codan DANESPO A/S Danmarks Biavlerforening DANPO A/S DAT-Schaub a.m.b.a. Det Kgl. Danske Landhusholdningsselskab DLR Kredit A/S Gasa Nord Grønt a.m.b.a. Jyske Bank A/S Grønttorvet København A/S Landsforeningen Danske Maskinstationer Nordea Bank A/S Nykredit OK a.m.b.a. Realkredit Danmark SALA Scanagri A/S Topdanmark Tryg

Source: Danish Agricultural Council

time. When a producer withdraws from a cooperative, which can be done at any time, the producer must relinquish and is not allowed to sell their membership share. The producers are the ultimate decision-makers in the cooperative. Each member of the cooperative is entitled to one vote at elections, independently of farm size. A board is responsible for appointing a professional management group for the cooperative company that manages the cooperative’s tasks. The cooperatives undertake almost all manufacturing of dairy products, pig meat products, fur and seeds.5 The cooperatively owned companies provide the producers with fodder, seed grain, pesticides, fuels and fertilisers in competition with private companies. In order to increase their competitiveness in the international markets, several cooperatives have merged to form larger, more effective units that have increased concentration. There is no evidence of bankrupt cooperatives in Denmark. Although they do compete, Danish cooperatives have developed strong cooperation on quality development, veterinary issues, technological development, etc. both individually and through their trade organisations (Landbrugsraadet 2006).  In the egg, beef and vegetable sub-sectors, cooperatives compete with private companies.

5

59

The Agricultural Policy-Making Process

The DFAC constitutes a common forum for the discussion and coordination of its members’ activities. The DFAC evaluates and analyses the national and international economic and political trends in agriculture. The DFAC offers consultation (for a fee) and information and secretariat services for its own member organisations and businesses, which costs less than the membership subscription (Nedergaard et al. 1993). These include export-promoting activities, organisation of seminars, property administrations and investments. The DFAC develops activities and represents agricultural interests both in Denmark and at the EU level. The sub-sectoral member organisations of the DFAC maintain direct contact with their members and the government when it concerns their specific interests. The DFAC supports the cooperation between the sector and the government, the Danish Parliament, the administration and other domestic and international trade organisations in order to maintain and empower agricultural interests.

The Agricultural Policy-Making Process The agricultural policy process6 in Denmark begins with the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA) in the Ministry. The SCA consists of civil servants who discuss the agricultural issue(s) that are brought to the policy agenda due either to EU or national level concerns (Table 3.2). The policy process starts formally before the Minister joins the Council of Ministers in Brussels. The SCA prepares the Ministry’s policy proposal on the specific issue and simultaneously sends the proposal to two committees involved in the policy-making process: the §2-Committee and the Coordination Group Committee (CGC), which is an intragovernmental committee

Table 3.2  The Danish agricultural policy-making process (before reaching the Council of Ministers) Committees

Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Sector Ministries Committee Inter-ministerial Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Parliament

Phases 1 2 3 4 Special Committee for Food and XX XX X Agriculture ‘Paragraf §2’ X XX Coordination Group Committee XX (CGC)

5

6 XX

X PEAC+PSCA

X XX

Source: compiled by the author

6  The description of the formal procedure specifically for agricultural policy was not available anywhere; parts of it are described in government documents and parts were obtained via interviews in the Ministry and the industry.

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chaired by the Ministry of Finance. These two bodies send their comments on the proposal to the Ministry’s SCA. After taking into account the suggestions by the two previous committees, the SCA finalises the policy proposal, which is then forwarded to the Ministry (Interviews7 2006) that then sends this proposal to the interparty Parliamentary European Affairs Committee8 (PEAC, Europa Udvalg) and the Parliamentary Special Committee for Food and Agriculture (PSCA). Generally, the mandate given to the Minister is based on a consensus reached at the PEAC. When the parliamentary committees reach their agreement, they communicate their position to the Ministry, usually on a Friday. Then the Minister presents this position at the Council of Ministers’ meeting in Brussels (usually on Monday) and tries to ensure the inclusion of the Danish agricultural interests and positions in the EU-level decisions. The PEAC’s role in policy formulation and direction is illustrated in the following account: ‘It is clearly the European Affairs Committee that formulates all the mandates and actually puts restrictions on the agricultural Minister before he goes to Brussels to negotiate, and not the agricultural committee. Nevertheless, a dialogue among the European Affairs Committee and the Committee for Food and Agriculture in Parliament goes on continuously. The European Affairs Committee is an inter-­ party committee and because the Danish governments are almost always minority [coalition] governments, policy decisions always have to go through the European Committee to actually have the mandate confirmed. When the cases are not high level discussions, because you can have proposals that go directly to the EU affairs committee, they are not coordinated by the government through the coordination committee. This coordination group mainly has an economic interest within the budget. In addition, there is an intragovernmental [interministerial] committee within the government that looks after the EU matters and examines whether for

 Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Fisheries officials and AMA, Dairy Board  Parliament’s most influential standing committees are the PEAC and the Finance Committee. The PEAC was set up in 1972 in connection with Denmark’s accession to the EU in 1973. The main task of the PEAC is to coordinate the reading of EU matters in the Parliament. The Government must consult PEAC on questions of major importance so that the impact of the Parliament and the Government’s freedom to negotiate are taken into consideration. No formal votes are taken within PEAC, but as a rule, the Chairman of the Committee may conclude after discussions that there is no majority against the Government’s mandate for negotiation (though changes in the various positions may have occurred during the discussions). The Administration employs a number of academic staff. Normally one staff member serves on two or three committees. The PEAC and the Finance Committee have their own secretariats. Since 1973, in practice the Chairman of the Committee counts the ‘votes’ on the basis of the number of seats that the party in question has in Parliament. This means that the mandate for negotiation is only rejected if the spokesmen for the parties together can muster all 90 seats or more against the mandate (e.g. more than half the 179 Members of Parliament (Folketing)). Since 1989, an EU Counselor has been permanently attached to the European Affairs committee to provide members with impartial advice and analysis. The EU Information Centre was established in 1994 to facilitate the general public’s access to information about the EU.  The priorities of the EU Information Centre are clearly focused on the ordinary Danish citizen with no special background knowledge about the EU system but with a keen interest in obtaining information on EU affairs. 7 8

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example this proposal ties in with the Lisbon strategy, or if it contradicts with something that the other Ministries do. For ages, there were governments that constantly faced a minority opposition which tells the government what to negotiate in Brussels. These commands refer to some of the administered policies areas that were not in the government’s interest, nor part of its policy program (i.e. export restitutions and liberalisation of the CAP)’ (Interview9 2006). Similar to most member states, the Danish legislation for food, fisheries, agriculture and environment to a large degree is based on the EU CAP. Specific domestic agricultural issues follow Danish agricultural law.10 The purpose of domestic law is to preserve family-based farming, maintain soil and water quality and the environment and ensure the correct management of the cultivation of land, ownership and tenancy. Ownership of agricultural land is normally based on buying and selling.

Europeanisation of the Danish Agriculture This section analyses theoretically the domestic factors and how they affect the administrative adaptation to the CAP in Denmark. The analysis draws on the Europeanisation literature (Knill 2001; Laffan 2003; Börzel and Risse 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Versluis 2004). Institutional with actor-based perspectives are combined to provide a dynamic account of the nature and degree of the changes in Danish agricultural administration in response to the EU CAP. The analysis is based on data from 24 interviews with political and administrative officials involved in Danish agriculture plus a number of public national and EU documents. The analysis demonstrates that in the first period of examination, the domestic ­factors facilitated significant administrative changes that contribute to more continuity and path dependence in the second period.

The Organisation of the Sector In order to analyse the impact of the organisational structures of the Danish agricultural society on the administrative adaptation to CAP since the country’s EU membership in 1973, this section addresses the first hypothesis: the higher the centralisation and professionalism of the organisational structures, the greater the administrative adaptation to EU policy decisions.  AMA, Dairy Board  In 2007, a working group of participants from the Ministry of Justice, the Food Administration, the Danish Meat Association, the Danish Pig Production, the Danish Agricultural Council, Dyrenes Beskyttelse, a committee from the Animal Welfare organisation and the Danish Veterinary Doctors Association introduced agricultural legislation changes concerning animal welfare, including a proposal for increase in size of an animal holding from 750 animals to 950 per farmer.

9

10

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The Danish agricultural cooperative system consists of collectively owned commercial companies and was established more than a century ago in response to high competition in the international markets. The founding of the first Danish cooperative creameries in 1882 exemplifies the early development of the agriculture organisational structures (O’Rourke 2006). The number of cooperatives increased drastically and reached 1200 cooperatives as early as in 1914. The farmers’ associations have maintained a liberal and progressive view over time. The development of an agricultural elite introduced successful marketing strategies and supported the organisation and leadership in the sector. According to Bogason (1992:222) ‘the bourgeois elites and the farmers weary of mercantilism and royal administrations regulating economic life and the daily lives of the citizens, wanted to get rid of the state bureaucrats. They wanted to strengthen the economically competitive marketplace and the forces within civil society working for local self-organisation and initiative. Farmers’ strategy was based on action in civil society not on the state. By centering their action at the local level and being skilled on organisation and eager to act in the market developed the cooperative movement, which is strong until today. Farmers were organised but also interested in developing their knowledge and skills. Their regional economic societies acted as information and knowledge catalysts – the research and development centres at the time were backed up by the founding of a national Agricultural College in 1857 by act of the parliament, which constituted the state’s contribution. However, the initiative came from pressure by farmers rather than from ideas of the governmental elite’. The first interactions between the sector and the state date back to the 1800s when the agricultural elite offered resources to ‘strengthen the economically competitive market place’ of the sector (Bogason 1992:222). In 1919, agricultural interests joined forces and established the DAC, an umbrella agricultural organisation that represented the interests of the entire sector. A few years later, the state intervened with the introduction of the 1934 law (Forligsinstitutionen) that aimed ‘to centralise the conclusion of collective agreements to their peak levels’ (Blom-­ Hansen 2000:164). This signified a high level of concentration in the organisation of agricultural interests. The ‘highly formalised’ sectoral organisation under DAC provided ‘the ability to cope with complexity via differentiation’ as is the case with most interest organisations (Eising and Lehringer 2013:184). These initial ­organisational arrangements determined the paths followed by Danish agriculture over time. For example, despite various organisational changes in Danish agriculture since the EU accession, concentration remains high today, indicating continuity and path dependence. Until the country’s EU membership in 1973, the sector was responsible for and managed the export regulations. Therefore, the sector established the agricultural committees that regulated agricultural exports and introduced fees to finance their activities (Just 1992). Such activities provided the sector with administrative expertise and knowledge and formalised the sector’s role in the policy process.

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In 1972, the Danish agricultural society financed and launched a national campaign to support the country’s EU membership11 (Christensen 1983; Buksti 1994). Various actors suggested that the campaign contributed to the ‘yes’ result in the 1972 referendum.12 The campaign informed Danish society about the economic benefits of the CAP and the challenges for Danish exports in connection with the imminent British EU membership at the time. Since then, the highly organised agricultural society and the expertise capacity of DAC have become important resources in the coordination of Danish-EU agricultural politics and have strengthened collaboration between the government, the administration and the DAC. The subordination of the domestic agricultural policy under CAP rules in 1973 operated as an exogenous shock for Danish agriculture and led to reorganisation. Some of the sectoral administrative competences (management of exports) moved to the public authorities, creating a critical juncture in the administration. As most of the agricultural decisions were moved to Brussels, the lobbying activities for interest representation also changed. Business associations started to join the EU system of interest organisations (Sidenious 1999) in order to strengthen their contacts with EU institutions. Similarly, the Danish agricultural society reorganised and established an office in Brussels in order to be in closer collaboration with EU-level interest organisations. This office provided insight information and access to the EU but also directly represented Danish agricultural interests to the EU governance bodies. These changes signified a process of Europeanisation of Danish agriculture. However, the established patterns of interest intermediation in Denmark did not face progressive disintegration. Instead, the EU added one more channel of influence that strengthened agricultural interest representation. The frequency and regularity of contacts between DAC and the state increased in response to EU-level policies and the CAP reforms. Since Denmark joined the EU, DAC has broadened and diversified its membership and changed the ‘intra’ organisational dynamics. Bound by a common interest, the various sub-sectors interact in a dense policy network, driven by resource and information exchange and the development of common strategies. Despite such developments, however, the organisational changes in the sector signify both change and continuity because some of the changes have been built on the pre-existing paths. To support its members, DAC acted as the nodal point in the policy network, organised meetings, promoted member interactions, facilitated the sharing of information and emphasised the coordination of collaboration among the members and with public authorities. Such deliberative institutions and processes contribute to trust building (Katzenstein 1985). Nevertheless, broad membership with diverse interests may lead to disagreements with respect to decisions and trigger conflicts. As an interviewee stated: ‘it is necessary [for DAC] to clarify if a problem on the policy agenda refers to common or sub-sectoral interest’.13 This clarification process sometimes results in long nego-

 Interview EHJ, 2001  Interview EHJ, 2001 13  Interview JL, 2001 11 12

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tiations before a compromise is reached. Attempts to include the diverse interests result in vague policy proposals, challenge the coherence of the agreements and strategies and weaken representation and influence of some interest groups. As an interviewee asserts, [DAC] ‘cannot always formulate clear proposals and ends up presenting insubstantial positions on important issues, having as [its] main objective to reach a common position and not to ensure a common position’; it is ‘a reactive interest organisation that follows the CAP decisions and responds to them’.14 These challenges have been reflected in critiques of DAC by its members for being ‘moderate’ and ‘reactive’ and lacking concrete proactive policy initiatives15 and strategies. Nevertheless, the DAFC usually succeeds in overcoming internal disagreements and conflicts and in the long term consistently ensures the representation of the collective agricultural interests through deliberation and internal negotiations (Altinget 2012). Through formal and informal interactions among the members, DAC achieves effective coordination of collective initiatives towards common goals while ensuring compliance with the EU CAP.  According to an interviewee, ‘the existence of a common position, traditionally, has been accepted and it is considered beneficial by the Danish farmers’.16 Another interviewee said ‘DAC is not really different than we are’.17 These statements indicate the integration of the diverse agricultural groups under DAC.  If disagreements on specific issues cannot be resolved, which does not happen frequently, sub-sectors take action independently. Day-to-day information and first-hand professional knowledge shape DAC’s opinions on current agricultural issues. This enables DAC to promptly bring together the diverse views and suggest plausible specific solutions internally, but also to identify relevant policy proposals for the authorities for administration of CAP decisions. The consensus-driven decision-making process reflects the DAC ‘intra’-organisational dynamics. When an agreement is reached, DAC communicates its position to the committees of the public authorities where they are negotiated either formally or informally. Campbell and Hall (2006:33) suggest that ‘compromise and consensus building have been important to modern Danish politics for other reasons too. Denmark’s strong agricultural sector and late industrialisation produced a large and well-organised rural petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry as well as a working class that was largely craft-based and an urban population that was also predominantly petit-­ bourgeois in character. The Danish system of proportional representation frequently required the social democrats, representing labour, to form coalition governments with the liberals (large farmers) and radical liberals (leftist peasants) during the twentieth century, and especially during the 1930s, when the country struggled with economic depression’. ‘Moreover, the institutional political, economic, and cultural  Interview JBH 2001  In 1984, Denmark cooperated with Germany and won the case against the UK.  The dispute, known as butter case dispute versus vegetable fat, is considered a proactive lobbying initiative by DAC (Interview 2001). 16  Interview OHL 2001 17  Interview PG 2006 14 15

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characteristics – of Danes to engage in well-organised, cooperative, and consensus-­ oriented deliberation and negotiation – have helped them to adjust to the challenges and opportunities within the EU and the increasingly global economy. They have been able to engage in policy learning and to respond flexibly at both the micro and macro levels’ (ibid:27). Danish agriculture has developed a high production capacity that ensures a competitive position in international markets but also provides high-quality raw materials and produce for the food industry. This connection has strengthened collaboration among all levels in the agri-food industry. Danish agricultural and food processed products represent a high share of the total exports (e.g. ingredients and various additives), contributing to recognition of the products in international markets. High exports have also strengthened interdependence and collaboration between primary agriculture and the food industry. This collaboration is formalised by contracts among the producers and the different sub-sectors in the food processing industry, which reduces transaction costs and guarantees the availability of certain quantities of products at specific times and of specific quality standards and financing (Karantininis 2007); such collaborations have even led to organisational mergers within the industry and also in their representation. The contracts guarantee the formal duties for both parties: the producers’ duty to produce certain quantities and quality standards in a specific time and the industry’s duty to absorb the production and guarantee payments. The close collaboration between the primary agriculture and food processing has reinforced the development of the Danish agri-food industry that consistently has been addressing the needs of farmers and companies for technology. The agricultural manufacturers provide a full range of agro-industrial equipment and advanced machinery used on the farm, including technology and equipment for dairies and slaughterhouses, cold storage for processing plants and supply and construction of grain cleaning and storage facilities as well as feed mills. Manufacturers often complement these with consultancy and services in the form of turn-key solutions, to worldwide customers. The food sector employs advanced technology in the field of biotechnical processes, enzymes and food ingredients, spray drying and ultrafiltration. The distinguished Danish Meat Research Institute, run by the country’s cooperative slaughterhouses, pioneered in developing methods and equipment for determining carcass quality. The equipment for meat classification is under continual development, and equipment for the analysis of milk is produced in Denmark. The Danish manufacturing plants in the meat and dairy sectors are among the most modern and efficient in Europe. In order to satisfy sectoral demands, individual farms have introduced rigorous structural changes and become highly specialised. These organisational structures also support research and innovation in new products, manufacturing methods and use of technology. Consequently, Danish agri-­ food has become a highly professional sector, ready to respond to sectoral needs and adapt to market conditions. By joining forces over the years under DAC, the agri-food industry has developed integrated organisational structures. This integration has resulted in a highly concentrated representation of the entire agri-food value chain interests that

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strengthened and solidified the institutionalisation of the actors’ relations. Besides, DAC has enjoyed a privileged position and access to public authorities compared to other interests over time (e.g. consumers, environmentalists), characterised as ‘representational monopoly’. This representational monopoly increased the influence of agricultural interests on policy decisions. This integrated representation has also been supported by the government because it is easier to collaborate and negotiate with one strong actor than many diverse ones. However, there have been certain incidents that have affected this integrated representation. In 2002, responding to external developments and as a demonstration of their dissatisfaction with intensive agriculture represented by the majority of DAC members, eight organic suborganisations founded Organic Denmark (Økologisk Landsforening (ØL). ØL aimed to connect and represent all parts of the Danish organic food sector – from farmers to consumers and from researchers to companies, supermarkets and private people interested in strengthening and developing organic food production (amounting to 4600 members in 2011). Nevertheless, this organisation has not been able to decrease the DAC role. The highly centralised organisational structures of the agricultural society have been strengthened over time by specialised professional training, which is one of the DAC priorities. Private companies, advisory service organisations, research institutes and training and education centres cooperate under the umbrella of DAC to develop a series of initiatives on knowledge, expertise and skills development and to offer training services. This training can focus on rural development, natural resources management and cooperative structures or on integrated agricultural and food production projects. These professional skills provide the sector with an ‘adaptability capacity’ that enables the sector to adjust to various sectoral and external challenges (e.g. CAP reform and the BSE crisis in the late 1990s). The well-­ founded Danish agricultural training system advances individual farmers’ learning and knowledge and strengthens sectoral professional capacity. Professional training originated with Grundtvig and is embedded in Danish culture and is part of the modernisation of the society and the state (Boris 2004:6–15). For Danish farmers to be eligible for the agricultural loans, subsidies and other benefits provided by either the national or the EU level, they must complete compulsory agricultural education: ‘The Danish agriculture school system was the result of a private initiative as opposed to other countries where the rules state officially that the state owns and runs these types of schools. The schools receive significant financial support from the state, paid partly directly to the schools and partly to the students’ (Kued 2000:81, own translation). Every year, 1000 young people start agricultural studies, which is 3% of the national young adult year group (Landbrugsraadet 2006). Over half of the students do not even have a rural background. The prospective students must have completed 9 years of formal schooling to be eligible for these studies. The professional training of Danish farmers is institutionally under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. The 20 or so agricultural colleges across the country, which are mostly affiliated with a farming unit, are independent institutions with governing bodies recruited from regional farmers’ unions, student associations, trade unions and industry groupings. In accordance with the law and guidelines

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from the Ministry of Education, the colleges are responsible for their curriculum. The basic education consists of three schooling periods of 2.5 and 6 months supplemented with practical training.18 Ownership of a farm larger than 30 hectares and access to loans and subsidies requires this certificate of theory and practice, which will prepare the farmer for responsible management. A farmer can receive a loan from a commercial bank or lender institutions that specialise in servicing the agricultural sector. Farmland and buildings are usually not sufficient collateral to obtain a loan (credits), and the farmer must also present a thorough assessment of the projected annual turnover. The state plays only a minor role in extending loans to farmers. All land areas exceeding two hectares must be cultivated, and the owner is obliged to maintain agriculture on his land. Furthermore, a full-time farmer is required to live on the farm premises. Professional development and training constitute a lifelong process, often through the organisation of supplementary training seminars, in accordance with national legislation on supplementary training. In 1971, the Danish Agricultural Associations (De samvirkende danske Landboforeninger) and the Family Farmers Associations (De samvirkende danske Husmandsforeninger)19 established a unique extension service system under the name ‘the Professional Agricultural Center’, which complements the formal agricultural training system. The extension service is operated by the agricultural society until today and provides consultation and professional development advice on agriculture (Bogason 1992; Kued 2000). Its establishment aimed to support the Danish farmer’s economy, work and living, helping them to develop quality products while considering ethical and environmental aspects and enabling them to compete internationally. In November 1987, the Agricultural Advice Center (AAC, Landbrugets Rådgivningscenter) replaced the Professional Agricultural Center on a 1.12 hectare site in Udkærsvej, Skejby. Additionally, a number of agricultural centres, under the auspices of local branches of the Danish National Farmers’ Union and the Family Farmers Associations, support the work of the AAC at the regional level and advise farmers directly. These centres differ in size depending on the number of farmers they serve. Their services are funded 90% by the agricultural sector and receive less than 10% state funding. An additional layer of advisory (or extension) services at the national level offers the latest information on each distinct agricultural topic area (agricultural economics, arable farming, pigs, cattle, buildings and machinery, education, young farmers’  The theoretical schooling consists of natural science and applied business economics, modules on organic farming, food quality and environmental studies. This is supplemented by two practical work placements of 12 and 17  months of direction at two different farms where the student is introduced to the daily practice and planning of the farm. For the first level of training, the farm in question must be certified. The student arranges the terms of employment with the farmer. Students can opt to extend their education and qualify to become a farm manager, thus acquiring a so-called Green Certificate. Approximately one third of the students choose this option. No tuition fees are involved, but as the colleges are boarding schools, the students pay for board and lodgings. The students do, however, receive a government grant when undertaking theoretical training and a salary when on work placement. 19  Family Farmers Associations 18

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in-service training, organic farming and law) to local farmer association branches. These national level advisory services also support the agricultural management services and budgets, develop new software, conduct experiments and run surveys and other tasks, determined by elected committees. The extension service employs approximately 5000 people providing services to around 53,000 farmers. In order to signal the collaboration between the largest part of the Danish agricultural centres and the Agricultural Advisory Center (Landbrugets Rådgivningscenter), the Agricultural Advisory Center (Landbrugets Rådgivningscenter) changed its name in April 2003 to the Danish Agricultural Advisory (Dansk Landbrugsrådgivning, Landscentret). All interviews acknowledged the need for agricultural training in their answers to the questions: ‘Do you think that the training level of the farmers in Denmark is satisfactory? Do you consider that there is a relation between the level of training of the farmers and the economic development of Danish agriculture?’ Interviewees link professional training and the sectors’ economic development and organisation. The following statement reflects this view: ‘of course, today as a farmer, you need so many… specialised skills to be an efficient farmer. You need to be a damned good farmer but at the same time you almost need to be able to match the EU specific lawyer, you need to match the accounting people with the best skills from the best accounting companies like Deloitte, you really need to have all these skills, you really need to be a businessman, perhaps even more a businessman than a farmer, because if you want to have a stable farm today you need the businessman and then you can employ someone who can actually ensure that you have an efficient pig production or someone who can take care of the grain or whatever you were growing out in the fields. We used to say that the best money and also during all these years that we have all this high subsidy level, the best money you have earned at your desk in your office at the farm and not in the stable or the field. Unfortunately, that’s the way it is. You could say now when you have a more simple Common Agricultural Policy, when you have a more decoupled, then some could say ah there is more time to drive the tractor now you have to be even more aware of how to sell your produce by cheapest input possible, get the best bargains and again go out sell your output at the best possible price. So you really need to be even more a businessman today’ (Interview20 2006). Another interviewee added, ‘I think what is very important is that by the formal schooling of the farmers before they become farmers, they also learn that it is necessary to attract information afterwards and they are fairly, at least the developing ones of them, they join a lot of meetings and a lot of short term courses - we do tons of meetings during the winter time and we tell them what is happening in the European Union, what is happening in the WTO negotiations, and just by looking at the delegations we get in from other countries, our farmers would have a higher level of perspective of the reform development process in the European Union level and also in the international level. Also because some of their companies will be engaged and give them a lot of information about market

20

 TK, DAC

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development and by that they constantly develop themselves. That is very important if you want to develop yourself and keep up your competition’ (Interview21 2006). The integrated organisational structures combined with professional development and training have enhanced coordination among the different sub-sectors and the public authorities. Thus, the organisational structures operate as the LINCHPIN for relations between the Danish state and agricultural society, building trust, contributing to professional exchange and supporting administrative adaptation and prompt responses to EU demands. For example, the sector is interested in ‘how to get the most out of the policy, more specifically the CAP’ and ‘how the sector can contribute to the best management of the EU CAP at the domestic level’. The government is interested in complying in the most effective way with EU policy decisions. The close contact between the sector and the administrative bodies enables the dissemination of the relevant information and knowledge, and their collaboration facilitates smooth adaptation to the CAP. For example, during the preparation phase of the decision-making process in agriculture, a significant part of the national agricultural administration tasks are concentrated within the Special Committee for Agriculture22 (SCA) in Brussels. The SCA consists of national civil servants who meet regularly (often weekly) in order to provide knowledge, expertise information and the necessary means to the domestic level. Supported by its organisational structures, DAC is active during this process. As a consistent and influential expert, DAC advises the MINFAF, develops strategic activities in order to influence SCA decisions and supports indirectly the domestic administration process of the CAP. In sum, despite the Europeanisation of agricultural policy and the organisational changes in the sector as a response to various challenges (merger of sub-sectors, i.e. see MA in the next section), the level of centralisation in the sectors’ organisation has remained high, while new developments mostly build on pre-existing organisational structures.

Domestic Politics This section moves the analysis from the micro level of the sectoral organisation to the macro level of the domestic politics. Specifically, I analyse the state-society relations, the interactions of the interests within the political institutions and the way these are articulated and carried out within the policy-making process. Domestic politics determines how decisions are administered, who manages these decisions, how politicisation affects the administrative choices, what resources are available, what processes are followed and when. Domestic politics are shown to differ over time, as a response to exogenous events and internal conditions (e.g. subordination  AMA, Dairy Board  In most policies, negotiations take place in the Committee of Permanent Representations (COREPER) that supports the work of the Council of Ministers. In the case of the CAP, this role is undertaken by the Special Committee for Agriculture.

21 22

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to the CAP or to reforms of the CAP) but are often embedded in pre-existing decisions, institutional settings and actors’ constellations. In institutionalised political systems, domestic politics is based on clearly defined rules and processes and can be centralised or decentralised, corporatist or pluralist, transparent, professional and competent or unprofessional. In order to analyse how domestic politics affect administrative adaptation to CAP, this section formulates the following hypothesis: the higher the centralisation and professionalism of the domestic politics, the greater the domestic administrative adaptation to EU policies. The governance of the agricultural policy in Denmark happens within a multi-­ party centralised, corporatist and highly institutionalised political structure. The formal decision-maker is the government in cooperation with the Parliament.23 The agricultural society has a consultative role with no formal powers of decision, but the sector has always been very involved in the decision-making process. This involvement has enhanced the interactions among the political leadership, the sector and the administration and has become institutionalised. The interactions focus on exchange of information and expertise knowledge in relation to technical issues but also political strategies and have enabled the sector to influence the policy decisions with their insightful expertise. The 24 interviewees (government officials, administrators, policy advisors, sectoral representatives) have all confirmed the consistent and solid relationship between the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries and the sector. One interviewee from the sector stated ‘we don’t always agree but we have a very good relationship with the Ministry, the dialogue is good’ (Interview24 2006). While state-society interactions are deeply rooted in the Danish corporatist structures and traditions, they are particularly present in agriculture; this policy has been at the core of the country’s politics and economy since the beginning of the nineteenth century when the first institutional and organisational paths were established in relation to agriculture. The agricultural society participated actively in the political debates concerning the Danish accession process to the EU in 1973 (Interview25 2001). The agricultural society recognised the significance of the Danish EU accession for the sector’s future (Christensen 1983) due to British membership in 1973. Had Denmark not joined the EU, it would have meant that Danish exports would have been subject to tariffs that would have increased the cost of production. Faced with such a risk, the agricultural society mobilised and supported financially the campaign to join in 1971–1972 (Interview26 2001). Acknowledging the significance of the sector in the Danish economy, the political elites agreed with the agricultural society and promoted accession to the EU as being in the entire country’s interests. This pro-EU position has strengthened collaboration between the agricultural society and the government in responding to the challenges that emerged as a result of accession

 In Denmark, several parties are represented in the National Parliament (Folketinget).  OL, Dansk Landbrug. 25  EHJ, DAC 26  EHJ, DAC 23 24

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due to subordination of Danish agriculture to CAP rules. This cooperation has become institutionalised in the domestic agricultural politics and has contributed to the articulation of common goals and responses to CAP, so that Danish agriculture could benefit in the best possible way (e.g. absorbing a high share of the EU agricultural subsidies). Moreover, the institutionalisation of agricultural politics has strengthened professionalism in domestic politics in order to ensure transparency in the state-society relations. To act in a ‘professional’ way in politics means ‘to display a range of skills’, to be able to use ‘modern’ communication facilities and techniques (see Gould 1998), while participating in a political or organisational process (Negrine and Lilleker 2002). Besides, the need for a robust, professional and adaptive administrative system in order to manage the complex CAP policy decisions over time has become evident. Accession to the EU in 1973 and the subordination of agriculture to the CAP have reduced the monopoly of information of Danish agricultural organisations. New policy issues and actors (food safety and environment) became important after 2001 and have competed with agricultural interests. Nevertheless, the state agricultural society relations have remained strong despite the Europeanisation of policy decisions (the Brussels game), and their collaboration has even strengthened. In 1973, following the country’s accession, the government established the §2 Committee that formalised the involvement of the agricultural society in the policy process. ‘The Paragraph 2 Committee27’ (§2) was expected to advise the Ministry, and consisted of 17 members, namely, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (2 members), Ministry of Industry (2 members), Danish Industry (2 members), The Danish Chamber of Commerce (2 members), Labour Union’s Council (1 member), Consumer’s Council (1 member) and agricultural organisations (7 members) (law nr. 595, 1972 on administration of the European membership statutory instruments and market organisations for agriculture). During the election process, the agricultural sector insisted that the Ministry’s representatives would not be elected, which resulted in the agricultural organisations being allocated 7 out of the 17 seats (Daugbjerg and Just 2003). Participation in the §2 Committee meetings enables the agricultural interest representatives to promote sectoral interests and ensures their inclusion in agricultural policy decisions. In these meetings, experts, civil servants and representatives from the agricultural industry and the agricultural sector discuss, deliberate, negotiate and exchange their expert knowledge about various policy issues in the effort to reach efficient and high-quality policy outcomes. For a long time, other societal interests (e.g. consumers, environmentalists) were not included in the §2 Committee, but their membership has increased over time. The proposals made by the agricultural organisations were often MINFAF often adopted the proposals provided by the agricultural organisations because of their well-prepared arguments based on exper-

 Paragraph (§2) Committee is so named because it is described in the second paragraph of law nr. 297 27/4/2004. This paragraph clearly states the establishment of a committee to advise the Minister for the administration of the EU agricultural policy in Denmark.

27

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tise and insightful knowledge. For example, MINFAF adopted the DAC proposal on the implementation of the 2003 CAP reform (Interview28 2006). The corporatist structures increased the sectors’ influence in domestic agricultural politics and decision-making (Cawson 1986; Schmitter 1979). This influence was particularly evident during the first years of the Denmark’s EU membership when there were no disagreements with other sectors in the society (consumers and taxpayers). The EU accession was also considered positive for the economy and the society in Denmark in the first 15 years of membership (Brown 1987, 1990a, b). The economic benefits of the CAP freed up resources within the domestic budget, and therefore the involvement of the agricultural organisations was encouraged by the government (e.g. compared to the consumers) and resulted in a smooth macro-­ political coordination at the domestic level. This relationship was maintained to a certain extent independently of whichever political party was in power. Besides, the sector promoted a liberal market-oriented view and financial independence from the state, which was supported by the government. The agreement on the liberalisation of the CAP (e.g. economic openness to international markets and a low degree of state regulation and financial support) strengthened the state-agricultural society relations and collaboration over time. The sector therefore focused on developing a relationship with the state (political leadership) based on cooperation in developing and achieving common goals and access to international markets. This view is reflected in the statement that ‘sometimes in Denmark the CAP has been a problem because it has been very political … and the Danish political system has been too slow to change the policy’.29 This view is also confirmed by an interviewee:30 ‘liberalisation of the CAP has been backed up from the Danish side. We are in a way some of the most liberal (farmers) in the European Union. Together maybe with (those from) the UK, Sweden and few other countries, and with a little bit of paper in the mouth, they agree [the farmers] on more liberalisation’. The sector accepted liberalisation as necessary for responding to the general criticism that the CAP has been facing in broader society, but only under certain conditions, such as common responses for all the member states, and not in the near future. The following ­statement reflects this view: ‘We are in favour of more liberalisation, not pulling the carpet out from under our feet from 1 day to the next, but going in a liberal direction… we have supported liberalisation because we could also see the need and we must also see the political pressure in Denmark. In a way, we would put ourselves in a bad situation if we didn’t. We need to go a little bit away and see what the society wants as well, but we cannot go to total liberalisation from 1 day to the next…… We still hope, we still need to have a common agricultural policy. Liberalisation does not mean to give up a common agricultural policy. It is still necessary to have an agricultural policy and it will never, or at least not in your or my time, be reached, a situation which is total liberalisation. There will still be food security questions,

 OK, DAC; SS, DFFE  Personal discussion with the Ministry officials 30  PG, DAC 28 29

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73

environment questions, animal welfare questions, and also questions about intensive or extensive farming. So, liberalisation will be under certain regulations…. We support going in a direction where we are dependent on the market instead of on payments from politicians’ (Interview31 2006). In 1992, the MacSharry reform, considered to be one of the most comprehensive CAP reforms, introduced a more restrictive price policy and a shared responsibility-­ duty (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007). Unlike earlier reforms, this reform involved a shift in policy instruments in the arable market regimes. Guaranteed prices were lowered and a substantial share of agricultural support was paid directly to farmers. The MacSharry reform affected the social-political elements in the agricultural policy in all member states and resulted in a significant increase in the national expenses for agriculture that had already started in the 1980s. The Agenda 2000 reform of March 1999 continued along this path by further reducing guaranteed prices and increasing direct payments (Daugbjerg 2003b). At the time, the specific goal in Denmark was in particular to separate the Danish agricultural production costs from the national budget and to guarantee sales (export support) through the EU budget to which all member states contribute. These changes added to the extraordinarily high Danish interest rate which generated a particularly high capitalisation of Danish agricultural land32 (Nedergaard et al. 1993: 136) (own translation). ‘However, Danish policy decision makers managed to reach a compromise agreement accepted fully by the Danish producers’ (Nedergaard 1993: 134–136) (own translation). Following long negotiations, the sector agreed with the political leadership in the effort to establish the basis for a sustainable policy proposal for Danish agriculture in the future. This process indicates continuity in Danish agricultural politics and strong state-society relations. Furthermore, a long-term policy strategy was created, which determined but also corroborated policy adjustments and adaptation to internal or external challenges. As part of the EU multilevel governance system, agricultural politics has ramifications at many levels in both Denmark and the EU (the Brussels game). However, the Danish agricultural society has adjusted smoothly to the new circumstances introduced by the EU and has maintained the close relationship with the state. Smooth adjustment is a characteristic of corporatist structures compared to statist ones which have more difficulties in adapting (Schmidt 1999). Consequently, the obvious ‘clash’ between the EU and national governance patterns that was observed in the statist countries was not observed in Denmark. One interviewee from the agricultural sector stated, ‘the proposals are prepared within the Ministry of Food , Agriculture and Fisheries and the sector is in close dialogue with the Ministry as well as the “paragraph §2” committee. Before things become a proposal within the Ministry, the sector is even in close contact with the Commission because the Ministry in Denmark in most cases just takes [considers] what the Commission

 PG, DAC  This point also appears in many interviews (FS, FOI; HJ, FOI, LO Dansk Landbrug, TV, Landscentre)

31 32

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3  The Danish Case

wants to discuss. To actually place [present] your interests, you have to see if the proposal of the Commission is actually the right proposal and includes the areas that we want to have secure things’ (Interview33 2006). The transfer of competences of the Danish agricultural policy-making process to the EU has expanded the Ministry’s information sources since a lot of information is provided directly by the Commission to the Ministry. This change has undoubtedly affected the monopoly of the sectoral organisations over information. In order to maintain its access to information and influence, the agricultural organisations have mobilised at both the domestic and the EU level. They have increased the frequency of interactions with the state in order to develop common positions in response to EU-level policies (such as with regard to the emergence of new issues and actors after 2001, e.g. food safety and the environment). This change in activities signifies an Europeanisation process. However, the purpose of collective action differs between the two levels. One interviewee1 said ‘in the Danish setting, we would say we want to do two things: we can try to influence the Commission again or try to influence Danish implementation’. As Buksti (1980: 289) underlines, although the formal role of the agricultural organisations in agricultural policy decision-making may have been weakened, ‘their political influence has not necessarily changed’. The strategies of the sector’s interest representation have changed focus at the domestic level and are mainly concentrated on the coordination and the effective management of the EU policy decisions. The sector emphasises the importance of and support for a functioning administrative system that could inform, support and prepare the sector and facilitate administrative adaptability to CAP demands. At this stage, the government defines the broad policy objectives and strategies based on EU decisions, the definition of eligible areas and the selection of the administrative actors. The government also decides the division of tasks and responsibilities among the selected actors involved in the process. As suggested by one interviewee, ‘The DAC constitutes in a way the representative of the civil society [farming society] which is worth using [the policy makers] for some time because you can actually have some intrinsic [challenging] discussions [through DAC]. Most of the time we (DAC, DFFE,34 Ministry) are not really discussing what could become problematic political issues, it is more technical elements. That’s what is up and down in this issue, what are the consequences from a Danish perspective, from a farmer’s perspective, from tax-­ payers’ perspective, how is that going to influence this…. So we have a very good relation, many meetings, with the Ministry and the civil servants, share knowledge, analyses, opinions, information’ (Interview35 2006). After joining the EU, the Danish agricultural policy-making process and the administrative model was modified. Initially, the policy administration was transferred to the Ministry after having been delegated to the sector. Then various domestic administrative bodies were established. Finally, in 2001, the Ministry’s political

 AMA, Dairy Board  Danish Food Industry Agency 35  TK, Danish Agricultural Council (DAC) 33 34

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leadership separated from the official administrative body of the policy, DFFE, which resulted in a division of competences and provided the sector with one more level of influence. As a result, the agricultural administration of CAP decisions in reality remained a rather corporatist bureaucracy. With accession to the EU, the Danish agricultural sector was integrated into the EU system of interest organisations. A growing number of contacts with EU institutions, closer cooperation with EU-level interest organisations and a growing number of offices in Brussels were established (Sidenious 1999). Supported by strong agricultural organisations, Denmark has often been able to form alliances with large EU members, especially in interactions within the SCA, although the Danish point of view has not always been supported at EU level. The then President of DAC, Peter Gemælke, became very involved in COPA (as President of COPA, 2003–2005). Similar developments have occurred in other Danish interest organisations, i.e. Rasmus Kjeldahl, the director of the Danish Consumer organisations, the then President of the EU-level consumer organisations. This path of close state-society relations remained after 1992, despite emerging challenges in the EU level and in Denmark, such as the emergence and involvement of other interests, e.g. consumer organisations, due to food safety issues and concerns. This is confirmed by an interviewee: ‘the consumer and environmental organisations appear more and more in the picture. They have often [held] very critical views about the way we farm in Denmark; they are among the actors that are very visible and easy to find in a critique and debate. They are not that important when it comes to the CAP as such, at least not when it comes to the subsidies, the market organisations etc, this is so technical I guess that most of these other partners give up. When you talk about BSE,36 animal welfare, food safety, it is a different story. When it comes to implementation, there are even fewer players’ (Interview 2006).37 Even when consumers and taxpayers started to apply pressure for CAP reforms, it was the Ministry of Food , Agriculture and Fisheries in collaboration with the agricultural organisations that agreed on which agricultural policy model was the most attractive. This confirms the agricultural organisations’ impact on many policy decisions after EU membership, despite changes in the corporatist negotiation patterns among the administrators and the agricultural sector in the 1990s. The introduction of the management model in 1996, which separated the administration from the political leadership, has enabled the Department to concentrate on policy formulation and strategic policies, while the administrative functions were transferred in the special directorates. The state-society relations have been smoother and strong but were challenged during specific events and exogenous shocks. In 2001, Denmark like other countries in the EU faced a BSE crisis. Ritt Bjerregaard (2001), the then Minister of Agriculture, refused to provide financial support to the beef producers for the extra

36 37

 In 1986 started the crisis of “mad cow disease” or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy).  SS, DFFE, 2005

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3  The Danish Case

cost of testing their animals for BSE38. The then DAC President, Gemælke, turned for support to the then Commissioner of Agriculture, Fischler, who in public supported the Danish farmers in their efforts to put pressure on the Danish government (Agra Europe 2001). This indicates that DFAC, like other interest organisations, moved their mobilisation activities to the EU when these did not produce results at home; this strategy is referred to as the pull argument, where organisations migrate towards other arenas of influence, such as the EU (Binderkrantz 2005). As an interviewee from the industry said, there are two ways of mobilisation: a) ‘we go either to our own authorities (Ministries), we inform them; or b) we try to influence them through the EU level, our very good organisation AVEC,39 and ask them to send a delegation to the Commission’; however, the way through the AVEC is by far the most strong’.40 This development demonstrates the adaptability of the Danish sector to external factors, such as EU integration, supported by agricultural sector organisations and resources. Domestic agricultural politics exhibits a high level of professionalism. This has contributed to the robustness of the state-agricultural society relations, restricted decision-making processes based on personal short-term interests and instead encouraged merit. This does not mean that there is no politicisation and strong attachments to political parties, but these attachments do not determine the processes. Instead, these relations affect the direction of policy strategies and targets and the concentration of interests. Thus, professionalism in agricultural politics has impeded clientelism and nepotism and prevented scandals because the process has been based on clear norms and rules for targeting specific goals, i.e. the best way to adapt and administer EU CAP decisions. In shaping its policy decisions, MINFAF relies on expert professional knowledge offered by the agricultural society in order to produce effective, credible policy proposals. Delivering ‘the better argument’ in influencing policy outcomes is important, as has also been stressed in other policy areas such as the ‘EU monetary policies-euro’ despite the Danish opt-out (Marcussen 2005:59). Being well prepared, willing to engage regularly in dialogue, being proactive and competent policy can lift an actor at the centre stage (Marcussen 2005:59). Consequently, decision-making processes have been mostly transparent in focusing on effective problem-solving solutions and administration and have been based on informed choices of policy instruments and administrative processes. As all interviewees indicate, there are clear processes and instruments for policy influence, namely, dialogue, strong arguments, well-prepared reports based on competence and expertise knowledge and frequent contact with the MINFAF often on the sector’s initiative. We ‘DAC employees we have been attending many meetings (100 and more) with the civil servants, DFFE; we see the papers, we have an open dialogue, we receive all the papers. But again that’s not the problem, because then the

 http://www.maskinbladet.dk/artikel/claudi-maerkelig-facon-hos-minister  AVEC represents the European poultry industry, and its members include national organisations representing poultry processors and poultry trade in 17 EU member states. 40  Interview AV, 2006 38 39

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political decision is taken in the Danish Parliament; well this is the amount that Denmark will give, we have a framework and now it’s a question of which farmer should have what and so on. I have a little problem seeing why it is very interesting and important for an organisation or whatever, if one or other farmer gets more. So, it becomes very technical and not very politically interesting and therefore it is harmless; I would say that we have had such a good relationship because we are just civil servants on each side of the table working together in finding the most efficient and fair way of distributing funds’ (Interview41 2006). The Danish response to the 2003 CAP reform was to propose the hybrid42 model concerning the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), which has been followed until today. This model was mainly proposed by the sector. After consistent collaboration and dialogue with the administrative officials in DFFE, MINFAF accepted the model and brought it to the Commission for negotiation. This process confirms the effective collaboration for reaching plausible administrative decisions that take into account the expertise knowledge-based resources provided by the sector to the state. The interviewees linked this outcome to the Danish organisational structures, culture and mentality. They suggest that sectoral professionalism responds to the broader perceptions of Danish society where strikes are generally not supported as forms of contestation or policy influence (for instance, happens in other EU member countries, i.e. France, Greece) because strikes mainly disturb public order and do not provide effective alternative solutions. Instead, negotiations and dialogue within the institutionalised corporatist structures enable arguments based on expertise and specialised knowledge to legitimise decisions and actions. Deliberation has reinforced professionalism in the state-society relations because it has created a formalised process of exchange of professional knowledge, expertise and learning on how to communicate and provide well-founded evidence-based arguments and feedback on policy proposals. The state acknowledges the significance of professional specialised knowledge. Therefore, MINFAF meets with DAC or the sub-sectoral representatives to discuss day-to-day problems and for updates on changes in EU rules and national legislation that are of direct interest for agriculture. For example, subsidies and financial support have varied among different kinds of production (i.e. cereals, sugar beets and tobacco). Besides, policy changes have often demanded administrative changes that had to be discussed. For instance, policy changes resulted in the establishment

 2006, TK, DAC  The main difference lies in the calculation of SPS on the basis of individual farmers’ direct payments during a past reference period and thus producing a patchwork of different payments, or calculating an average and paying uniformly all payments over a region or state, though payment levels may vary between arable land and grassland. An in-between system is also available. This allows Member States either to operate a mixed historic/flat rate approach that stays the same over time (‘static’), or to choose a mixed system that alters over time (‘dynamic’). Usually the latter is chosen so that the proportion of SPS based on historic references reduces as the flat rate element increases, offering a means to transit from the basic to the flat rate approach (Appendix III).

41 42

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3  The Danish Case

of the Ministry of Family and Consumers (MINCON) and the transfer of competences from MINFAF on food safety issues in 2004. ‘Discussions always arise about other sectoral issues on an informal basis’ (Interview43 2006). In this way, the interest organisations empower themselves and can facilitate and strengthen administrative adaptation to the EU because the channels of information are faster and usually involve direct knowledge of the problems and specialised expertise. The high level of professionalism in domestic politics has enhanced continuity in the policy strategies, irrespective of governmental changes, effectiveness and flexibility and also increased coherence in the administrative adaptation. Table 3.3 presents all the Ministers of Agriculture from Denmark’s accession to the EU up to and including 2010. There were 16 ministerial changes (12 Ministers) over 37 years, which indicates an average turnover of 2.5 years. This confirms a degree of stability in ministerial posts, which can be an advantage because it is less probable that a politician will change his views radically in a short period of time due to the political costs of being seen as unreliable by his electorate. Government changes do not imply changes of the directors in the Department nor of civil servants. This stability ensures continuity of policy strategies and implementation processes in the long term, maintains institutional memory and avoids the risk of unintended consequences. It also contributes to stability in the interactions between the state and the agricultural society.44 All the interviewees characterised this relationship between the political leadership and the sector as ‘good’, ‘cooperative’, ‘strong’ and ‘long’ (Interview45 2006). While continuity impedes disruptions, it does not hinder changes and adaptation to emerging EU policy reforms. Professionalism and expert knowledge-­based politics enable adaptability to emerging challenges, especially in a complex and technical policy like the CAP, which requires information both on recent and previous decisions and rules. Nevertheless, continuity and stability in personnel over long periods can also maintain interactions among specific actors while excluding certain affected societal groups from the policy-making process, i.e. either agriculture or non-­agriculture (e.g. environmental agriculture), and hence lead to representation monopoly and capture. For example, the involvement and impact on policy of diffuse interest groups, such as consumers or environmental groups, have been low in Danish agricultural politics. This is changing over time and these groups have started to become organised.

 B, MA (2006)  Although the focus of the book is on agricultural organisations, due to changes both at the EU and the domestic level, consumers and environmental groups’ interests have been taken into account since 2001 because the then Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries included them in the policy-making. Nevertheless, policy decisions directly on consumers and environmental issues remained under the respective ministries. 45  OL, Dansk Landbrug 43 44

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Table 3.3  Ministers of Agriculture in Denmark, 1971–2010 Name 1. Henry Christensen 2. Ib Frederiksen 3. Niels Anker Kofoed

Role Minister for Agriculture Minister for Agriculture Minister for Agriculture

4. Poul Dalsager

Minister for Agriculture

Social Democrats

5. Bjørn Westh

Minister for Agriculture

Social Democrats

6. Britta Schall Holberg 7. Laurits Tørnæs 8. Henrik Dam Kristensen

Minister for Agriculture Minister for Agriculture Minister for Agriculture and Fishing Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries

9. Ritt Bjerregaard 10. Mariann Fischer Boel 11. Hans Christian Schmidt 12. Eva Kjer Hansen

Political party Liberal Party

From 14/7/1970

Social Democrats

11/10/1971 19/12/1973

Liberal Party

Liberal Party

19/12/1973 30/8/1978 10/9/1982 13/2/1975 26/10/1979 20/1/1981 25/1/1993 12/3/1986

13/2/1975 26/10/1979 12/3/1986 30/8/1978 20/1/1981 10/9/1982 27/9/1994 10/9/1987

Liberal Party

10/9/1987

25/1/1993

Social Democrats

27/9/1994

23/2/2000

Social Democrats Cabinet of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen IV

23/2/2000

27/11/2001

Liberal Party Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen I

27/11/2001 2/8/2004

2/8/2004 Liberal Party Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen I And II 12/9/2007 Liberal Party Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen II, III and Cabinet Lars Løkke Rasmussen I

To 11/10/1971

12/9/2007

23/2/2010

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Ministers_for_Food2C_Agriculture_and_Fisheries_ of_Denmark

However, the agricultural society supported by its organisation and resources is strongly embedded in the domestic politics, which makes it difficult for other groups to compete.

Network Governance Patterns Although the analysis of the network governance patterns still focuses on state-­ society relations, such an analysis provides a different understanding of the characteristics of these relations and their impact on the domestic administrative adaptation

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3  The Danish Case

to the EU CAP. For this purpose, this section addresses the following hypothesis: the more dense and more inclusive the network patterns are, the more they facilitate administrative adaptation to EU policy; and the more loose and exclusive they are, the more they impede domestic administrative adaptation to the EU. A network is characterised by its inclusiveness of members, the diversity of members’ interests, the duration of members and their interactions (Daugbjerg 2003a). The Danish agricultural network demonstrates frequent interactions among the actors, fairly common interests and stable duration of membership and interactions, which characterise it as a policy community network (Rhodes 1997). Based on SNA statistical indicators, the structure of the network and the relations patterns were assessed. Data was gathered from 24 interviews in 17 organisations with actors involved in all phases of the agricultural policy-making process. These actors were identified based on the snowball method (Table 3.4). All these actors filled out the social network analysis questionnaire (Appendix V).The SNA tools were used to measure the density of the network, strength of interactions (frequency), the number of cliques in the network and the variability among the actors’ interactions. The size of a network46 represents the number of actors (nodes). These are sectoral and subsectoral actors. In the SNA visualisation, the Danish agricultural network looks as a circle which shows that most actors are connected, many of them directly to each other. Both MINFAF and DAC are positioned centrally in the network (Fig. 3.2). Figure  3.3 presents the strength of the ties (interactions) among the actors and reflects the frequency of the actors’ interactions. Interaction frequency is measured by the number of times an actor (node) is identified as a contact by another actor in the network and is shown by the thickness of the connecting line: the thicker the line, the more frequent are the interactions between the actors. As indicated in Fig. 3.3, the interactions among DFFE-DAC-MINFAF are frequent and strong. This could be expected since the triad of actors, MINFAF, DAC and DFFE, deals with the CAP subsidies and EU funding. The DFAC-DFFE pair of ties also shows frequent interactions. This confirms the analysis presented earlier, which showed that these actors, DFFE, the administration and DAC exchange information about the day-to-day problems but also provide feedback on the feasibility of policy and administrative proposals both to MINFAF and DFFE. DAC appears centrally in the network and acts as the link between MINFAF and DFFE. This result agrees with the qualitative analysis, which shows the usefulness of mixed methods. This is confirmed by the following two statements. One interviewee stated ‘we find out in the various meetings that the MINFAF and DFFE have either different views or different information or work in

 In the SNA terminology, these are referred as nodes. In any network, there are (k * k-1) unique ordered pairs of actors (i.e. AB is different from BA, excluding self-ties) where k is the number of actors. So, in our network of 17 organisations (actors), if the data are considered to be directed and actor A has a relation with B but not necessarily B with A, there are 272 logically possible relationships; if the data are undirected or symmetric ties, the number would be 136, since the relationship AB would be the same as BA.

46

Network Governance Patterns

81

Table 3.4  Actors involved in the Danish Agricultural Network Network Nno actors 1 MINFAF 2

DFFE

3

DFAC

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

DF FØI CΟΝ DLG MA A B C

12 13 14 15 16

D SB DD DL ECO

17

DI

18 19 20

ENV DSCO MINCON

21

EU

Name of the organisation Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Directorate for Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness Danish Food and Agriculture Council Danish Agriculture Institute of Food Economics Consumers Organisation Danish Cooperative Farm Supply Danish Meat Association55 The Danish Poultry Council Danish Slaughter Houses The Danish Livestock and Meat Board The Danish Egg Board Danish Sugarbeet producers Danish Dairy Board Danish Agricultural Centre Ecological Agricultural Association The Danish Confederation of Industry Environmental organisations Danisco Ministry of Family and Consumers EU

Name in Danish Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri, FVM Direktoratet for FødevareErhverv DFFE Dansk Landbrug og Fødevare Dansk Landbrug Fødevarer economisk Institut FØI Forbrugforeningen DLG MA Danske Fjerkræraad Danske Slagterier Kødbranchens Fællesråd Dansk æg Danske Sukkerroedyrkere Mejeriforeningen Dansk Landscentre Økologisk Landsforening Dansk Industri Miljø Danisco Familie of Forbrug Ministeriet EU

Source: Documents, interviews

different directions on the same matter’ (Interviews 2006)47. Then DAC intervenes and tries to bridge the different views and combines pieces of information, as indicated by the following: ‘there is a risk of those two levels moving away from each other but we also have, we constantly try to make up for that risk in order to have our dialogue and negotiate. There has been very close cooperation between us as a lobby group and the experts within DFFE, the political experts within the Ministry, and we see clearly if they are not talking [among] themselves we try constantly [to] keep that triangle, and in fact that works. And we will also go directly into the Ministry if we think that the DFFE is not doing its job and the other way around. There are cases where this happened and there were cases before that as well…..

47

 AMA Dairy Board, TK, DAC

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3  The Danish Case

Fig. 3.2  Danish Agricultural Network

You could have two employees within the Ministry that did not talk to each other at the right point, and you can also have that in DFFE, in the Dairy Board as well’ (Interview48 2006). In spring 2006, The Danish Poultry Council, Danish Slaughter Houses, The Danish Livestock and Meat Board and The Danish Egg Board merged. This merger increased concentration and introduced a new actor into the network, MA, which represents the main meat exporting sub-agricultural organisation. The meat producers were significantly affected by the safety, food and animal welfare regulations. They did not receive subsidies like the grain producers but benefited from the CAP exports’ support. As Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 show, the MA is centrally positioned in the network and interacts frequently with the at the time newly established49 Ministry of Family and Consumers (MINCON) and DFFE. The interactions focused on specific problems related to food safety and animal welfare that are decided at the EU level. MA was a member of DAC and acted as bridge between MINCON and DFFE. The transfer of responsibilities to MINCON fragmented the network. This is reflected in the response of one interviewee who said: ‘I do not agree with that 48 49

 AMA, Dairy Board  2 August 2004

Network Governance Patterns

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Fig. 3.3  Danish agricultural network (2007). (Based on tie strength)

(transfer of competences to MINCON) because it separates two bodies where one is involved in the rule making in the EU and the other one is implementing them in Denmark. It’s not logical to have these two Ministries’ (Interview 2006)50. He ­continues: ‘the implementing authorities (e.g. DFFE) do not affect the policy decisions because it is not their job. They just have to make [it] function, what is decided’ (Interview51 2006). Another interviewee said: ‘DFFE people sometimes are asked about the practical issues but they are not a political organ. When there are problems in Parliament, especially over recent years, with the Danish Peoples party, the implementation body [DFFE] is asked by the Ministry. DFFE, by providing the relevant information to the Ministry, acts as a facilitator in clarifying [the] policy implementation (Interview52 2006). Another said: ‘We are very concerned about the fact that you could move all the research on the agriculture area into the Research Ministry and by that loose, or be in competition with areas of research, to see that the food area and our competition in that area on a worldwide scheme as enhanced, and I guess looking at the development in the latest budget, there has been a focus

 P, and B, Meat Association  M, Danske Slagterier 52  M, Danske Slagterier 50 51

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3  The Danish Case

on food issues so we haven’t really lost that fight, but it is clear that we didn’t really get what we wanted and we didn’t secure our interests well enough so it might be slipping away in that respect’ (Interview53 2006). DFFE attended the working group meetings at the EU level because its professional expertise and knowledge was best in representing Danish positions in the EU committees, although MINFAF and MINCOM were the formal decision-makers. The direct contact between the Danish administration (DFFE) with the EU management committees provided first-hand information that was important for adaptation of the policy decisions. One of the interviewees stated, ‘We are happy that it is people from the implementation body [DFFE] who go down to the management committees meetings in Brussels and decide what has to be done’ – (he refers to the MINCON) (Interview54 2006). Moreover, most interviewees confirmed that ‘luckily’ this transfer did not affect the implementation of the policy, which they attributed to the strong connection among the different actors in the network, their organisational structures and overlap of responsibilities and competencies among the actors (Interview55 2006). From a network governance perspective, these characteristics signify a dense and close (but not exclusive) network. This transfer of competences has expanded the agricultural network and broadened the type of actors involved in the process but has also increased the interdependence among the actors in the network, i.e. DFFE and MINCON.  However, the expansion did not decrease the impact of DAC in the process. Besides, expansion also created a new lobbying venue, though in this case not for agricultural producers but for the consumers in line with developments at the EU level after the BSE crisis in 1996. MINCON closed in 2007, and the MA merged with the Danish Food and Agriculture Council in 2009, which increased concentration both in the political and organisation representation. Another SNA measure is the k-core which denotes the actors with the same number of connections in the network, e.g. actors with three other connections (e.g. k = 3) (Hanneman 2001:85). If the value of k changes, the number of actors in the group will adjust. Figure 3.4 presents the 3-core visualisation of the Danish agricultural network. There are eight actors (red colour), each with three ties to other actors. MINFAF, DFFE and DFAC appear in the 3-core group and all interact among themselves. As they are very connected, actors in a core group have more opportunities for collaboration and thus sharing resources, exchanging information and finding solutions to common problems. The three figures (Figs. 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) show that the sub-sectoral organisations are situated more in the periphery of the sociogram. In reality, these organisations have very specialised interests and are in contact with MINFAF indirectly as ­members of the DAC, except in cases of a very specific decision related to their

 AMA, Dairy Board  M, Danske Slagterier 55  B, Meat Association 53 54

Network Governance Patterns

85

Fig. 3.4  Danish agricultural network. (based on k-cores)

activities (Interviews56 2006). Next, the analysis of the network patterns focuses on the information flow among the actors in the network based on SNA measures. The data is asymmetric, which means that the relations are directed (directed ties). Thus, we know who initiated the contact with whom, i.e. A sends to B, and we are given a specific picture of the way actors transmit or receive information. In this way, the ties can be distinguished as being sent or being received. Figure 3.5 shows the actors as ‘sinks’ or ‘receivers’ of information (in-degree). The larger the size of an actor, the more information the actor receives. Actors may receive information from many sources because they are viewed as prestigious (other actors want to be known by the actor, so they send information), or they are viewed as powerful. Information and knowledge empower actors. When actors receive a lot of information, they may suffer from ‘information overload’ or ‘noise and interference’ due to contradictory messages from different sources (Hanneman 2001). The ‘mean’ of the univariate statistics varies among the actors as receivers of interactions (Appendix II). MINFAF (actor #1), DAC (actor #2) and DFFE (actor #7) are considerably greater receivers than the others as is also indicated by their 56

 B, Meat Association

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3  The Danish Case

Fig. 3.5  In-degree interactions

larger size. Interestingly, the same three actors, which represent all three levels of the state (political leadership), the agricultural organisations and the administration, appear consistently in all the statistical tests. MINFAF (#1) receives information from 25 actors, DFFE (#7) from 19 actors and DFAC (#2) from 14 actors. Figure 3.6 shows the actors as senders of information. The larger the size of an actor, the more information the actor sends. DFAC and MA appear as the largest actors in the Danish agriculture network, followed by DFFE and MINFAF. FOI is also a large sender of information, which confirms its role as a policy analyst. These results may be an indication of the resources that the organisations are using in public relations, and thus they have more resources for gathering and sending information. Actors in ‘the middle’, with a medium number of ties, are influential if they are connected to the ‘right’ type of actors; otherwise, they might have very little influence. Similarly, actors with a small number of ties have a lower potential to be influential. Finally, actors with few out-ties, or many out-ties, have less variability than those with medium levels of ties. When actors are connected to almost all other actors or have ties to almost no other actor, their behaviour is more ‘predictable’ towards any other given actor than those with intermediate numbers of ties. In a sense, actors with many ties at the centre of a network (i.e. DFAC, DFFE, MINFAF) and actors at the periphery of a network with few ties (DB, SB, etc.) are more con-

Network Governance Patterns

87

Fig. 3.6  Out-degree interactions

strained and predictable. Actors with only some ties can vary more in their behaviour, depending on the actor to which they are connected. MINFAF (actor #1) in particular is a receiver and a sender of a lot of information; therefore, it could be characterised as a facilitator and decision-maker. MA (actor #14) sends relatively more information than it receives. One might suggest that it is an ‘outsider’ that attempts to be influential or acquires mainly specialised information, which is more probable. When the role of the actors’ interests is also considered, this is consistent with the SNA outcomes. For instance, DLG (actor #4) is a private company which does not benefit directly from the CAP (Interview57 2006) but is a significant expert on market developments and thus a useful information sender. The main activity of FOI (actor #6) is to prepare policy reports for MINFAF on a contract basis and on specific topics and thus it is also an information sender (Interview58 2006). Variation among the actors’ contacts shows that actors choose differently whom they interact with. For instance, FOI, which is not a central actor and mainly provides policy reports to MINFAF on a contract basis, interacts with MINFAF as well as with DFFE, DAC and DF that are the main sources of information for these

57 58

 HOH, DLG  SF, FØI

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reports. Variation of actors is also important because strong relations among similar actor may become redundant due to similar actors tending to have similar views. In contrast, weak relations between diverse actors may lead to new ideas and innovation, but also establishment of new collaborations. Based on SNA statistics, such as cliques, in-degree and out-degree, the characteristics of the structure of the network were analysed. Table 3.5 presents the number of cliques of actors with at least three interactions. There are nine such ‘cliques’ in the Danish agricultural network (first column). The other columns indicate the actors in each clique in horizontal order. For example, the first clique (first row) consists of MINFAF, DAC, DFFE, FOI and DF.  Some actors appear in more cliques than others. Both MINFAF and DFAC appear in almost all cliques, which demonstrates their ‘central’ actorness in the network. This result also shows that DFAC remains a central actor despite the transfer of decisions to the EU level and transfer of competences to MINFAF. Lastly, the Danish network is inclusive according to Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) typology. At the same time, the actors that have a brokerage role represent various levels of the policy process, political leadership (MINFAF), the administrative bureaucracy (DFFE), the research institution (FOI), the farmers’ umbrella organisation (DAC), Danish farmers (DF) and the sub-sectoral organisations (MA). This indicates not only that the different actors involved in the policy are connected but also that there are links that can contribute to share of specialised information and knowledge. DF (Danish farmers) acts as a coordinator and connects two other actors from the same group (a source and a recipient of information) (A- > A- > A). DF (Danish farmers) and MA (Meat Association) act as gatekeepers (B-- > A-- > A, the intermediary and recipient are from the same group, but the source belongs to a different group). DAC (Danish Agricultural Council) and DF (Danish farmers) act as representatives (A-- > A-- > B, the source and the intermediary are from the same group but the recipient is from a different group). DFFE, MINFAF and MA act as consultants (B-- > A-- > B, the because intermediary belongs to a different group but both the source and the recipient belong to the same group). Lastly, DFFE, MINFAF and MA act as liaisons (B-- > A-- > C, all nodes – recipient, source and Table 3.5  Cliques in the Danish agricultural network Number of cliques 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Source: SNA

Actors in each clique MINFAF DFAC MINFAF DFAC DFAC MINFAF MINFAF MINFAF MINFAF

DFAC DFAC DFAC DFAC

DFFE DFFE DFFE

FOI MA FOI FOI SB MA CON FOI

DF DD DLG DF, DL, DB EU EU EU DF, DB

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intermediary – belong to different groups). Based on the Social Network techniques, the Danish agricultural network is shown to consist of actors that play various roles and act as brokers in different ways (Table 6 in Appendix II). The administrative body, DFFE, plays both a consultative and a significant liaison role. Once again, this is consistent with the qualitative analysis. It is actually DFFE that tries to find solutions that satisfy both the sectoral interests and MINFAF decisions, and it is DFFE that tries to realise these decisions while adapting them to the EU CAP. In sum, the SNA sociograms and statistical measures help us understand, in different ways, the network and its special characteristics, the actors involved and their roles within the network. Both in the sociograms and the statistical measures, MINFAF, DFAC and DFFE are the central actors that function both as facilitators and policy determinants and as information and power owners. The SNA statistical analysis complements the qualitative analysis, which justifies the usefulness of applying different methodological tools for data triangulation. Moreover, SNA provides a solid verification of the outcomes in the previous sections, which are based on interviews and documents. The interaction among the state, the administration and the sector is continuous and strong. The same outcome is visualised in the SNA sociograms but also generated by the SNA statistical measures. This interaction varies among the actors, with strong ties noted between MINFAF, DAC and DFFE.  Moreover, the specific interaction that was mentioned in the interviews between MA and MINCON, especially after 2001, is also indicated both in the sociograms and by the univariate statistics.

Administrative Changes In 1973, Denmark joined the EU market along with the UK, which together with Germany were significant importers of Danish agricultural products. EU membership replaced the bilateral trade regimes for agricultural products, guaranteed the free access to the consumers of all the member states and assured the existence of a market for Danish agricultural exports (Daugbjerg and Just 2003). Like all EU member states, ‘Denmark established a series of corrective mechanisms to influence the policy decisions and to enable the national level to participate in both the preparation and the implementation phases of the EU level agricultural decisions’ (Nedergaard et al. 1993: 40, own translation). These changes created a number of administrative demands. Denmark’s response to these demands was as follows. The International Matters Division 2 in the Ministry’s Permanent Secretariat (Department), which until 1972 consisted of a nationally and an internationally oriented Division (Fig.  3.7), expanded to five Units and became more specialised (Fig. 3.8). The new EU Affairs Unit was responsible for the general preparation and coordination of meetings of the Council of Ministers for the CAP. Three other Units were specialised in the different types of production, and one Unit dealt with trade affairs beyond the EU, exports to and imports from the world markets (import-export licenses and export support) for

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3  The Danish Case Ministry of Agriculture

Permanent Secretariat (Department)

1 Division Domestic matters Agricultural matters office

2 Division International matters Domain

Bilateral matters EFTA countries and EC countries

Veterinary matters

Debts

Bilateral matters EFTA countries and EC countries, Danish participation in UN, FAO and GATT

Fig. 3.7  Organisation of the Agricultural Ministry in 1972, (from Daugbjerg and Just 2003) Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretariat (Department) Secretariat Division 2 International

Division 1 National 1. European affairs EU Directorate

3. Markets for vegetables and grains

2. Markets for animal production 4. Administration for fruits and gardening matters

5.Trade matters

Fig. 3.8  Organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1973 (from Daugbjerg and Just 2003)

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agricultural products and in collaboration with customs authorities collected import levies (Hjelmer 2003). Following the establishment of the common organisation of the agricultural markets (COAMs), as in all EU59 member states, the Directorate for Market Organisations became the EU Directorate that was responsible for the daily CAP administration (Daugbjerg and Just 2003). The EU Directorate was both physically and in context an independent entity, and the directors referred directly to the Permanent Secretariat (Daugbjerg and Just 2003). The administration of agricultural policy had been the competence of the agricultural interest organisations until then, while the Ministry had been considered as the service office of the agricultural interests, as long as the various agricultural organisations agreed on a common position (Hjelmar 2003). The transfer of CAP subsidies management from the organisations to the Ministry increased the competences of the Ministry, due to its technocratic and specialised administrative knowledge and expertise, and decreased the role of the agricultural organisations in the administration of agricultural decisions. The number (from 55 to 90) of civil servants in the Permanent Secretariat’s office also increased. In the effort to accommodate the economic technicalities and complexities of the CAP aid schemes, the majority of the newly hired civil servants were economists,60 reflecting the professional mentality of policy-makers. They were selected based on merit in an open call, which is the recruitment process in the Danish public administration. This administrative reorganisation within the then Ministry of Agriculture introduced a change in patterns and style, since economists focused more on efficiency and compliance compared to civil servants educated in law. As a result of Denmark’s membership of the EU, a number of civil servants are posted at the Permanent Committee of Representatives in Brussels, which in the case of Agriculture is the SCA. This Committee supports the work of the Council, advises the Commission and allows the member states to interact, negotiate informally and prepare the basis for policy outcomes. The Danish representatives have played an important role over time; they are well prepared both with respect to the actual issue but also in participating in negotiations because they have been exposed professional training. Being in close and continuous contact with the national authorities (e.g. DFFE), they manage to promote the Danish positions and interests in an effective manner. The administrative changes were a direct response to the CAP and reveal the Europeanisation of the agricultural administrative process in Denmark. These changes facilitated the prompt administrative adaptation to the CAP at the domestic level. There were formal changes through the establishment of new Units but also informal changes in relation to the type, style and quality of change, which confirms an Europeanisation process categorised as absorption. The administrative changes were the result of dialogue and close consultation in the §2 Committee but also with DFAC within strong and inclusive network governance patterns with a common  EC at the time, but the abbreviation EU is used throughout in this book for reasons of simplification. 60  Until then the greater number of the Ministry’s employees had law backgrounds (Interview 2006, AL). 59

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goal to ensure an effective and plausible implementation of policy decisions. The administrative choices were supported by the professionalism of the domestic politics and were not affected by partisan politics. Moreover, the agricultural society’s strong organisational professionalism provided expert information that corroborated the choice of the administrative measures and their feasibility. Although they were based on consensus and did not create serious conflicts, these administrative changes were also contested. The administration department of the Ministry of Finance in 1988 in its critique emphasised the coordination challenges faced by subdivision and fragmentation in the Ministry. The changes might not have been ‘radical’, as Daugbjerg and Just (2003) suggest; these changes were built on pre-existing paths, indicating path dependence, but they also introduced significant transformations that have been the basis for future developments. These changes altered the role of the agricultural society in the administration, empowered the Ministry’s competences and established new institutional structures for ­collaboration and deliberation (committees), all of which have contributed to the establishment of a legacy. In 1992, which marks the beginning of the second period of examination (1992–2009), the EU introduced the MacSharry reform of the CAP.  This reform introduced the IACS data computer system for the registration and management of subsidy payments and created a new administrative critical juncture. The Danish administration responded promptly. DFFE started the preparation for this system a year earlier than the actual implementation, which demonstrates a high level of professionalism but also high administrative adaptation. The administrative changes at the ministerial level mostly adjusted to the changes in the first period, indicating path dependence. On 1 January 1995, by Royal Resolution, the Ministry of Food , Agriculture and Fisheries merged with the Ministry of Fisheries (which had operated independently until 27 September 1994) to become the Ministry of Food , Agriculture and Fisheries and Fisheries which, a year later, on 30 December 1996, finally became the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries.61 The National Food Agency responsible for food safety and nutrition legislation transferred from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (see footnote 58). These changes increased concentration of competences and signified a policy paradigm shift by linking agriculture with food, nutrition and health. Changes along the same lines were also taking place in the EU and other member states, reflecting a process of Europeanisation. While the focus on food safety increased as reflected in the organisational changes in the Danish agricultural administration, it has not been politicised as in the rest of the EU and especially Britain after the BSE crisis in 1996. Instead, under the support of the then Minister, Henrik Dam Kristensen (1994–2000), consumers’ interests were clearly included under the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (Daugbjerg 2003a), which encouraged the role of consumers and environmental organisations in policy-making.

61

 https://en.mfvm.dk/the-ministry/objects-and-history/

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In the attempt to separate the political responsibilities of the agricultural policy-­ making from the administration, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries introduced new changes on 1 April 2000. The Ministry established three separate Directorates, namely, (a) the Danish Food Industry Agency (DFFE),62 (b) the Plant Directorate and (c) the Danish Fisheries Agency63 and the (d) Foreign Services Unit64 (Fig. 3.9). The establishment of the Directorates was in accordance with the law on administration of the European Union regulation on markets for agricultural products through the merging of the Danish Directorate for Development and the EU Directorate (Bemyndigelsesloven, lovbekendetgørelse nr. 285, 8 May 2002). The Directorate was responsible for the payments of subsidies from the EU agricultural guarantee fund to producers and fishermen,65 administration of the Law of Land Holdings, land consolidation and acquisition of land (DFFE, homepage). Moreover, the Directorate administered the grants and subsidies, compensation including set-aside schemes, export refunds outside the EU, livestock and investment subsidies for the improvement of farms, the modernisation of fishing vessels and product and quality development schemes as well as organic farming (DFFE, homepage). Thus, DFFE was a key actor in the administrative adaptation to CAP activities. Apart from managing the CAP, the Directorate also promoted healthy and secure food, the protection of the environment and nature under agricultural production and the competitiveness of the food industry. Therefore, in collaboration with the Ministry, DFFE coordinated research activities on the improvement of environmental conditions in the countryside and structural adjustments to increase productivity and innovation of the food industry and affiliated sectors. The separation of competences from the Ministry has not been always positively accepted. The Ministry viewed this separation of the daily tasks from the political responsibilities as a way to strengthen efficiency and define the actors’ roles and responsibilities clearly (Interviews66 2006). The sector’s view was not positive about this separation as stated by an interviewee: ‘the established units for the different specialised tasks of management and monitoring resulted in fragmentation and incoherence of the implementation policy and under-estimated the importance of the transfer of knowledge and expertise of a very complicated policy’ who states further that ‘there is not always enough feedback among the parties involved.

 Direktoratet for FødevareErhverv (FIA in Danish)  Direktoratet for Fiskeri 64  The Service of Counsellors (Food, Agriculture and Fisheries) consists of highly qualified employees with expertise and knowledge on the agri-food sector. They are posted in a number of Danish Missions abroad (11 countries: Japan, China, Italy, Germany, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, USA, EU-Brussels and Hungary) to coordinate and promote Danish agri-food exports and safeguard Danish interests. They develop interactions with host countries’ governments, authorities, experts, trade organisations and enterprises as well as with news media. They act as ‘economic diplomacy’. They are selected based on their competences and merit (www.mfvm.dk). 65  Fruit and horticultural produce and fisheries 66  Two interviewees asked for anonymity. However, we have the information of LL, PA (MIN), AMA and Dairy Board 62 63

1.5 Research

Foreign Services Plant Directorate

2.2 Sustainability Agriculture and environment

2.5 National Fisheries Policy

Directorate for Fisheries

2.4 International Fisheries Policy

Directorate for Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness (DFFE)

2.3 Agribusiness

Fig. 3.9  Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 2006. (Source: Ministry Homepage 2006)

1.4 Legal matters.

2.1 European Policy and international affairs

1.3 Information Technology

1.1 Finance

1.2 Human Resources and development

2. Division –Agriculture and Fisheries

Communication

1. Division –Corporate Management and Research

Secretariat for the Minister

Permanent Secretary (Department)

Ministry of Food Agriculture and Fisheries

Administration

Political Leadership

94 3  The Danish Case

Administrative Changes

95

Sometimes they do not know what the other is doing’… ‘they lost some possibilities of talking together and sometimes in the Ministry they do not know in fact what they are talking about’ (Interview67 2006). On 2 August 2004, the government established the Ministry of Family and Consumers (MINCON) and under its auspices, the Food Administration Unit (Fødevarestyrelsen). Food safety and animal welfare issues were also transferred to MINCON from DFFE and the Danish Food and Veterinary Research (later renamed Danish Food Research). These changes followed developments within the industry, the decreasing number of farmers and the strengthening of consumers’ interests whose concerns about intensive agriculture in Denmark had intensified. Some attributed the transfer of the food safety responsibilities from MINFAF to MINCON to developments in the international environment and the EU Commission, as this change happened almost during the same period (one and a half years later) (Interview68 2006). During the 1995–1999 Santer Commission, consumer policy was under the Fisheries, Consumers and the European Community Humanitarian Office. Under the 1999–2004 Prodi Commission, a new Directorate was created specifically on Health and Consumer Protection, DG SANCO. That development at the EU level was a response to the BSE crisis in some member states and was an indication of the Commission’s special interest in these issues. The BSE crisis affected directly the extensive beef animal production in Denmark (47% of the total number of farms in 2003). Nevertheless, one of the interviewees indicates that domestic policy change was more nationally inspired and affected by domestic politics while under the EU: ‘they [the government] needed an extra Ministry in order to create…to give the small party69 in the government coalition a Ministry. So that’s very impractical but they have done that in other areas and it just followed. I think what you can see is that Anders Fogh Rasmussen is very inspired by the way Tony Blair has developed his government, and you have (there) that split in the UK administration. They had that for a period and you also see that split in other countries. I still think it was part of a plan that said we don’t need to have a Fisheries Ministry, we don’t need to have an Agricultural Ministry. If you take the most important part, the food safety, out you can move the rest from the Agriculture Ministry in the next government to the Business Ministry and particularly when you phased out all the market organisations’ (Interview70 2006). This reorganisation was not viewed positively by all actors. As indicated by one interviewee, ‘We didn’t like that separation and still don’t like it. We think it [these Ministry Departments] belongs together and we believe it could be part of a plan basically to undermine the Ministry (of Food and Agriculture) and perhaps even say  M, Danske Slagterier  AMA, Dairy Board 69  This point – that this move of competences was determined by the national conditions and the need to satisfy the Danske Folkepartie (People’s Party) that asked for strengthening the importance of these policy areas – has been also done by others (L L; PA-Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Fisheries), along with the trend to undermine the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. 70  AMA, Dairy Board 67 68

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we don’t need specific Ministries for specific sectors any more. So we believe it is an undermining of our Ministry13. On the other hand, it hasn’t really created many very big obstacles of course. In some respects we can see that the Directorates are moving apart from each other and there are areas where the coordination is not as good any more as it used to be and that’s a problem. But in a general manner on a day to day basis it hasn’t really produced a lot of problems’ (Interview71 2006). Following the resignation of the government, MICON closed on November 2007. Although the lower levels of government, the local and regional (‘kommuner’ and regioner’),72 have not been involved in the policy-making and implementation process of the CAP in Denmark, the local and regional government reform in 2005 introduced some changes. The reform implemented in 2007 by Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s coalition government and offered the subnational levels of government partial competences over the control of environmental issues in relation to agriculture (Interview 2006). Under the 2003 CAP reform, environmental considerations were strengthened, and new directives (water directive, nutrient directive) were introduced that also related to agriculture. These changes brought new administrative demands and increased the role of the local administrative level while they weakened the role of the regions. Until then, the regional level authorities had had management responsibility for environment issues, but there were differences between regions because of loosely defined implementation guidelines (Interview73 2006). Thus, there have been a series of changes during the second study period that built on pre-existing paths at the domestic level. These changes have responded to and followed developments in the EU; there has been strengthening of environmental and health concerns, a switch in focus away from production and a combining of efficiency in production with food safety and environmental protection. All these changes suggest/indicate a Europeanisation process. Besides, there are changes in the organisational structure of the Ministry that are parallel to changes in the organisation of the agricultural society, such as the emphasis on food, which becomes part of both the agricultural society organisation (change also in name) and the Ministry. Moreover, as technology has become a significant factor in agriculture and especially in food processing, the food industry has also become a significant actor in state-agricultural society relations through the umbrella organisation DFAC. One could argue that a paradigm shift has taken place despite the embeddedness of the changes in the pre-existing settings. Nevertheless, the state-agricultural society’ relations remained strong. Agricultural administrative changes have taken place over time in response to the EU CAP since Danish accession to the EU in 1973. In the first period, 1973–1991,  Ministry of Food and Agriculture  There were 14 Amts (counties) in Denmark, which due to the structural reforms, were reduced to five regions in 1 January 2007. The Danish counties (Amts) and municipalities (kommuner) have a high degree of autonomy, which means that they have their own elections and regional administrations (Chatzopoulou and Poulsen 2017). 73  TV, Landscentre 71 72

Administrative Changes

97

Danish administrative adaptation to EU CAP was clearly in evidence and took place in an uncomplicated manner. The Ministry became the link between the domestic and the EU level but also the administrator of CAP subsidies at the domestic level. In this process, the administrators became translators of the EU into national law, advisors to the Minister for the feasibility of the policy and administrative measures but also the link between the policy-makers and the sector. The domestic administrative adaptation to the CAP was the result of consensus among the various actors. There was a common purpose, namely, effective adaptation to CAP; functioning of agriculture at home; a competitive, innovative and export-oriented agricultural sector; and safe food production. This adaptation happened through institutionalised processes and was administered by highly qualified civil servants, recruited on merit, both at home and in the SCA in Brussels.

Chapter 4

The Greek Case

The successful application of the Community’s structural policy largely depends on the ability of the Greek administration to provide a correct diagnosis of the problems existing in the different agricultural areas of Greece as well as to implement the Community’s policy A. Pepelasis 1980

Agriculture has always played a prominent role in the Greek economy and constituted a significant issue during the EU accession negotiation process in the late 1970s. The extensive literature on Greek agriculture has examined the economic aspects of productivity, resources and types of production and the share of the sector in imports and exports (Demoussis and Sarris 1988; Kamenidis 1992; Zioganas 1993; Lianos et al. 1996; Maravegias 1992, 1996; Baltas 1998; Labrianidis 2002; Polyzos and Arabatzis 2006). In this chapter, I employ a state-society perspective to investigate systematically the domestic factors and their characteristics and the way they facilitate or impede adaptation of the domestic administration to the EU CAP, which has been under researched. Here, the organisation of agriculture, domestic politics and network governance patterns since the accession of Greece to the EU in 1981 are examined in two periods, 1981–1991 and 1992–2009. Greece joined the EU in 1981. At that time, the EU CAP was facing budget pressures, environmental concerns and challenges due to the approaching enlargement of the EU with two agricultural Mediterranean states. In 1986, the Spanish and Portuguese EU membership changed the character of the EU’s agricultural landscape and decreased the homogeneity of a predominantly affluent club of northern industrial nations. Greek agricultural production and exports within the EU faced greater competition by the other Mediterranean countries. The transportation issue became even more prominent in the early 1990s because the Yugoslavian wars forced Greek agricultural products to be redirected through Italy, increasing both land transport time and cost. In contrast, the direct geographical proximity to most existing EU members of Spain and Portugal gave them a comparative advantage because their products were delivered to their destinations faster and fresher, and © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_4

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related transportation costs were lower. Transportation of agricultural products is particularly costly due to specific standards of temperature and packaging for long distances and for different seasons (summer versus winter), which increases costs. In spite of their commonalities, agriculture differs substantially between north and south in the EU member states with respect to type of production, structures, climate conditions, policy-making processes, political and administrative systems and state-agricultural society relations. The CAP was expected to transfer financial support from the wealthier to the disadvantaged regions and decrease the ever-widening north-south divide in the EU. The EU elites treated the ‘enlargement to the South’ as politically inevitable for strengthening democracy in the applicant countries after their long periods under dictatorship. Greece’s accession to the EU in 1981 and to the CAP raised expectations concerning the reform and development of agriculture in Greece. In order for Greek agriculture to respond effectively to the EU CAP demands, a number of administrative changes were needed that could ensure policy performance. As the analysis shows, agricultural administrative changes have been mostly formal and dispersed in Greece, which has led to inertia in the administrative adaptation to the CAP.  These characteristics are not specific for agriculture, but they constitute a general pattern of the Greek administrative system, which was emphasised during the recent Eurozone crisis (Ladi 2014). The chapter is structured as follows. First, the antecedent conditions, pre-1981, are presented, which contextualise the accession of Greece to the EU. Next follows the mapping of the actors involved in Greek agricultural policy and the policymaking process. Then each of the three identified domestic factors is analysed over time in order to understand agricultural administrative change and adaptation. Lastly, the administrative structures and their changes are discussed.

Antecedent Conditions and Pre-1981 EU Agreements This section presents the ‘antecedent conditions’ of the agricultural policy prior to the accession of Greece to EU in 1981, in order to set the context within which the country joined the EU. The antecedent conditions explain the rationale behind the various phases of the Greek membership to EU. ‘Antecedent conditions encompass diverse features of economy, society, and politics that set the parameters for subsequent change’ (Collier and Munck 2017). Pre-accession Association 1961–1980  The accession negotiation process between Greece and the EU concluded on 9 July 1961with the Athens Association Agreement that came into force in November 1962. The Association Agreement (Art. 72) meant that Greece would eventually join the EU.  An Association Council and a Joint Parliamentary Committee were established (Journal Officiel des Communautés

Antecedent Conditions and Pre-1981 EU Agreements

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Européennes 1963).1 The Association Council was responsible for the effective implementation of the goals set by the Agreement of Association. The Association Council composed by the member states’ governments, the EEC Commission and members of the Greek Government. The Association Agreement created ‘a customs union between Greece and the then Community, the conclusion of a financial protocol and the harmonisation of certain policies, with particular regard to agriculture and taxation’ (ibid). According to the agreement, Greek agricultural products enjoyed the same advantages as those of the existing member states, on the condition that the Greek agricultural policy would harmonize with that of the Community.2 ‘Harmonization implied that Greece should participate in the institutional and financial arrangements of the Community’s agricultural policy before accession, a view that was rejected by the then Community. The problems encountered in the course of the implementation of the pre-accession association agreement made the Community increasingly parsimonious and pragmatic towards its other agreements with third countries’ (Tsalicoglou 1992:19). A significant share of the Greek trade tariffs was lowered over a period of 12 years (free movement of persons, services and capital) and the rest over a period of 22 years. The 1962 Association Agreement ensured in practice that all Greek industrial products would enter the Community free of customs duties, eliminated the quantitative restrictions on Greek industrial exports and introduced a special provision for a number of products3 (Der Spiegel 1976).4 In order to fulfil the aims of the Association Agreement5 and increase productivity in the Greek economy, Greece could apply to the European Investment Bank for financial support (loans and investment projects of 125 million dollars) for 5 years after the negotiation. However, diplomatic relations with the EU halted between 21 April 1967 and 24 July 1974, due to the dictatorship in Greece. The customs union for agricultural products was suspended and the Association Agreement interrupted. Doubts intensified within economic circles about the country’s ability to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome before the end of 1979. However, with the support of the existing member states, the EU readmitted Greece on 28 November 1974

1  Accord créant une association entre la Communauté économique européenne et la Grèce (9 juillet 1961), in Journal Officiel des Communautés européennes (JOCE), 18.02.1963, No 26, pp. 296–313. 2  Note by the EEC Council on the Agreement of Association between the EEC and Greece (24 August 1962), in Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs Committee: A retrospective view of the political year in Europe 1962, March 1963, pp. 63–64. 3  Special provisions applied to raw tobacco and raisins (Der Spiegel 1976). 4  ‘On 16 February 1976, commenting on the opening of negotiations for Greek accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel analyses Greek economic structures’. Source: Ins Wasser, in Der Spiegel, 16.02.1976, No 8; 30. Jg, pp. 113– 114 (Translated by the CVC). 5  A retrospective view of the political year in Europe 1962. March 1963. Note by the EEC Council on the Agreement of Association between the EEC and Greece (24 August 1962) in Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs Committee, pp. 63–64.

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4  The Greek Case

­ ithout the requirement for a pre-accession trial period (ibid). Bringing democracy w to the country was more important than the Commission’s rather negative economic assessment of Greece (Der Spiegel 1976).6 Despite the great economic and institutional differences, Greece declared its readiness to join the EU and comply with the requirements that this entailed. Any delay could lead to more difficult accession negotiations due to upcoming Spanish and Portuguese EU candidacies. Due to concerns of the then existing members,7 Greece was granted a 7-year transition period. The Commission introduced a number of aid programmes, under the regional policy and the CAP in particular, in order to support the Greek accession (Der Spiegel 1976).8 The official accession negotiations during 27 July 1976 to 23 May 1979 ended with the signing of the Treaty of Accession on 28 May 1979  in Athens.9 Greece became the tenth member state of the European Community on 1 January 1981. The EU membership is considered a personal achievement of the then Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis.10 Similar to all EU enlargements (e.g. 1985 with Spain and Portugal, and 2004 with the 12 applicant countries), the agricultural policy chapters were particularly important during the accession negotiations as the CAP budget redistributed funds and supported economically the member states’ agricultural sectors.

 ‘On 16 February 1976, commenting on the opening of negotiations for Greek accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel analyses Greek economic structures’. Source: Ins Wasser, in Der Spiegel. 16.02.1976, No 8; 30. Jg, pp. 113– 114. Translated by the CVC. 7  The free movement of Greek workers and agricultural products such as peaches and tomatoes did not come into force until 1 January 1988. Exemption from part of the payments relating to value added tax (VAT) also meant that Greece was a beneficiary rather than a net contributor to the Community budget. 8  ‘On 16 February 1976, commenting on the opening of negotiations for Greek accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel analyses Greek economic structures’. Source: Ins Wasser, in Der Spiegel. 16.02.1976, No 8; 30. Jg, pp. 113114. Translated by the CVC. 9  On 31 January 1976, K. Karamanlis declared the Commission’s reservations morally and politically unacceptable and convened the ambassadors of the nine member states of the Community in order to inform them of his disappointment. In the meantime, he expressed his hope that the mistake would be rectified. The Greek population and particularly the industrialists and retailers received the accession news well as it was expected to open up new opportunities. 10  On 11 February 1976, GERSON, Harry, Un succès pour Constantin Caramanlis, in Le Figaro. 11.02.1976, No 20346, p. 3. 6

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 apping the Actors and the Organisational Characteristics M in Greek Agriculture Figure 4.1 illustrates the three types of actors linked to the agricultural policy-­ making process in Greece. The two top triangles include the state and the agricultural society, while the administration is in the bottom triangle. On the state side, the Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry was established by the Law ΓΨΚΔ (N. 3724) in 1910 as the seventh Ministry of the government. It was renamed as the Ministry of National Economy in 1911–1917 and was called Ministry of Agriculture and Land and Ministry of Agriculture from 1917 to 2004. In 2004, the Ministry was again renamed as the Ministry of Rural Development and Food (MINRDF),11 in response to the expansion of issues related to agriculture both in Greece and at the EU level. MINRDF constitutes the formal decision-maker of the policy strategies and the administration and implementation process of the EU CAP decisions at the domestic level and represents the Greek government at the EU Council of Agricultural Ministers. In order to develop its policy strategy, MINRDF formally consults with the Prime Minister, the ministries of Finance and Regional Development and various stakeholders. This consultation aims to identify the appropriate areas of policy strategy, the coordination of the government’s policy objectives and strategies and the allocation of responsibilities and tasks for administration of the decisions among the actors. MINRDF is divided into units that correspond to the kinds of production and Europeanisation Ministry of Rural Development and Food

Ministry of Regional Development

Ministry of Finance Regional Government (13)

PASEGES

Agricultural cooperatives State Government

Society Agricultural

Administrative adaptation

Local Cooperatives

Prefectures 52 Local Government

Administration

OPEKEPE

Fig. 4.1  Actors involved in the agricultural policy-making in Greece

11

 Law 1558/1985.

SIDASE

GESASE

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4  The Greek Case

s­pecialised sub-sectoral policy areas (plans, veterinary, fish, etc.). This structure also reflects the silo structure organisation that constitutes the first indication of sectoralisation. The General Secretariat for Common Agricultural Policy and Management of European Funds in MINRDF is the relevant unit for this study because of the direct link of its tasks to the CAP. The General Secretariat (GS) supports the Minister’s tasks in the formulation of the domestic agricultural policy strategy in Greece. The GS acts as a secretariat and coordinates the work of the Minister’s portfolio and the management of the CAP. Moreover, the GS maintains contact with relevant departments in other ministries (i.e. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Growth) and with other partners has responsibility for communication and information dissemination about the agricultural policy strategy in various fora within the country and abroad and participates international negotiations. Besides, a number of organisations are under the auspices of MINRDF, such as agricultural training bodies, research centres and agricultural insurance organisations (Table 4.1). For example, The Organisation of Agricultural Vocational Education Training and Employment (O.G.E.E.K.A-DIMITRA) constitutes a legal entity under the auspices of MINRDF. O.G.E.E.K.A-DIMITRA was established by Law No. 2520/97 Table 4.1  Organisations under the aegis of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

Name Benaki Phytopathological Institute Geotechnical Chamber of Greece Institute for Agronomic Studies Central Agriculture, Veterinary and Forestry Organisation for Greek Agricultural Assistance National Foundation for Agricultural Research Greek Organisation for milk Organisation for Agricultural Education, Training and Employment

Organisation for the Certification and Supervision of Agricultural Products 10 Organisation for Reinsurance Co-ordination 11 Organisation for Payments and Control of Community Guidance and Guarantee Fund 12 National Committee for Milk

Translation in Greek (ΕΠΩΝΥΜΙΑ) Μπενάκειο Φυτοπαθολογικό Ινστιτούτο Γεωτεχνικό Επιμελητήριο Ελλάδος (ΓΕΩΤ.Ε.Ε.) Ινστιτούτο Γεωπονικών Επιστημών (Ι.Γ.Ε) Κεντρικό Ταμείο Γεωργίας Κτηνοτροφίας and ∆ασών (K.T.K.Γ. and ∆ασών) Οργανισμός Ελληνικών Γεωργικών Ενισχύσεων (ΕΛΓΑ) Εθνικό Ίδρυμα Αγροτικών Ερευνών (ΕΘΙΑΓΕ) Ελληνικός Οργανισμός Γάλακτος (ΕΛ.Ο.Γ.) Οργανισμός Γεωργικής Επαγγελματικής Εκπαίδευση Κατάρτισης and Απασχόλησης (Ο.Γ.Ε.Ε.Κ.Α) ∆ΗΜΗΤΡΑ Οργανισμός Πιστοποίησης and Επίβλεψης Γεωργικών Προϊόντων (Ο.ΠΕ.ΓΕ.Π.) Οργανισμός Αντασφάλισης & Συντονισμού (ΟΑΣΙΣ) Οργανισμός Πληρωμών and Ελέγχου Κοινοτικών Ενισχύσεων Προσ/σμού and Εγγυήσεων (Ο.Π.Ε.Κ.Ε.Π.Ε.) Εθνική Επιτροπή Γάλακτος

Some of the actors changed after 2009, which is discussed in the postscript chapter that examines the period after the Eurozone crisis

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(Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic 173/[A]/1-9-97) and reformed by Law N. 2637/98 (Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic 200/27-8-98/[t].[A]’) and N. 2945/2001 (Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic 223/8-10-2001/[t].[A]’). O.G.E.E.K.A-DIMITRA was responsible for the development of the professional training of the primary producers, aiming to enhance the effectiveness and competitiveness of the agricultural sector within the EU and the international environment. In 1989, the government founded the ‘Development and Exploitation of Agricultural Research and Technology’ under the Decree 1845/1989, which became The National Agricultural Greek Institute for Research (NAGREF). NAGREF was a legal private entity and constituted the main research institution for agricultural research, technological improvement and development in agriculture (e.g. forest, and fish production, veterinary research, management of marine resources, soil science, land reclamation, processing and preservation of agricultural products, and agricultural economy and sociology) (http://www.nagref.gr/profile/scope_en.htm). On the agricultural society side, the main organisation representing agricultural interests has been until recently the Pan-Hellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (PASEGES)12 that was founded in 1935. PASEGES came into existence after the founding of the first agricultural organisations in 1914, which then was followed by the first Law Ν.602/1915 on cooperatives. PASEGES constituted the third level organization and formally represented 114 Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (second level), 6350 agricultural cooperatives (first level) and 746,812 Greek farmers. The three levels together had a total turnover of more than 1 billion Euros in 2006 (Pezaros 2005, Cooperatives statute). PASEGES consisted of the general assembly that included the elected representatives of all active cooperative organisations. Cooperatives with 10–250 members had one representative, those with between 251 and 500 members had two representatives and one more representative for every additional 500 members. The general assembly elected the administrative board made up of 21 members for a 4-year period. These 21 members elected the five members of the presidium. The administration and external scientific advisors supported the presidium’s work (PASEGES, homepage). The administration had a General Director and 52 permanent employees with higher education qualifications13 who had a representative in the administrative board. After the country’s accession to the EU, PASEGES became a member of the General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union (COCEGA), which was established on 24 September 1959.

12 13

 http://www.paseges.gr/el/profile  http://www.paseges.gr/el/organization-chart

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Table 4.2  The agricultural policy-making process in Greece Committees Ministry of Rural Development and Food

Inter-ministerial

Ministerial Special Committee on Agriculture Coordination group committee CGC

Parliamentary Committee for Production and Commercea

Step 1 X X

2 3 4 X

X X

Source: Compiled by author The Parliamentary committees established by article 68 of the Constitution. The relevant parliamentary committee for agriculture is the long-term committee for production and commerce, which is responsible for the areas decided under the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, Ministry of Environment and Energy, Ministry of Infrastructure and Networks, Ministry of Nautilus and Island Policy and the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food

a

The Agricultural Policy-Making Process in Greece In Greece, the agricultural policy-making process has followed the CAP decisions and rules since 1981. The Greek government, like all other EU member states, is responsible for the enforcement and implementation of these decisions. Like all other members, Greece can introduce complementary special national provisions, such as the ‘Special Final and Transient Provisions’ for rural property, forests, expropriations and built-up regions, which are defined by Article 117, based on the laws that were published until 21 April 1967 in accordance with Constitution Article 104 (1 January 1952) (Pezaros 2005). Table 4.2 presents the steps in the formal agricultural policy process in Greece. At the domestic level, the policy-making process formally begins in MINRDF under the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) (Table 4.2, step 1). MINRDF is the central decision-making actor on agricultural policy. When an issue arises, MIRDF consults with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of National Economy and previously also the Ministry for Regional Development (Coordination Group Committee) (step 2). This decidedly centralised process aims to ensure that the policy strategy is feasible while allowing coordination with other governmental policies. There is an agricultural Parliamentary Committee for Production and Commerce which, after deliberating with the stakeholders (agricultural organisations), provides feedback to the Ministry (step 3). Then when MIRDF has received feedback from all actors, it designs its strategy and develops the position that is presented at the Council of Agricultural Ministers in Brussels. The government may introduce policy strategies or a specific national agricultural policy issue but always does so in accordance with EU law and the CAP. These policy decisions are either Ministerial Decisions (Executive Power Acts)14 that 14

 The state often introduces Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Decisions.

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introduce secondary legislation, called ‘legislative decisions’ (e.g. taxation), or issues of an administrative natu to the state into six periods re that are called ‘executive’ (e.g. redundancy, promotion, change, etc. employees). Ministerial Decisions are specialised compared to the provisions of law and regulate in detail on specific issues, under the authorisation of law. In addition, the Ministry can modify or introduce specific implementation and administration strategies for an effective management of CAP decisions.

Europeanisation of Greek Agriculture In order to investigate the administrative adaptation to the CAP, the rest of this chapter systematically analyses the three domestic factors that affect administrative structures: the organisational structure of the sector (micro level), the domestic agricultural politics and the emergence of network patterns (macro level). The analysis is based on data gathered through interviews (18 in 14 organisations) combined with a number of public national and EU documents and also draws upon the Europeanisation literature. As a response to EU membership, a number of formal changes are revealed in the administrative structures, which may indicate a critical juncture. However, the administrative practices and style demonstrate continuity and path dependence and are embedded in the pre-existing domestic settings.

The Organisational Structure of the Sector In this section, I analyse the organisational structures of the Greek agricultural society and their contribution to administrative adaptation to the CAP, during 1981–2009. For this purpose, I suggest the following hypothesis: the higher the centralisation and professionalism of the organisational structures, the greater the administrative adaptation to EU policy decisions. During the Greek accession negotiations with the EU, the agricultural society acknowledged that the loose agricultural organisational structures did not support domestic collective action, in contrast to corporatist developments in northern EU member states. The organisations recognised the need for new organisational cooperative structures to respond to new circumstances (Pezaros 2005). Besides, loose organizational structures have impeded the role of the sector in the choice of effective administrative instruments for the management of the CAP. Therefore it is relevant to understand the development of the agricultural organisational structures over time and their link to administration of policy decisions. Patronis (2002) divides the evolution of the agricultural organisations and their relations to the state into six periods. (1) The 1914–1920 period of establishment of the cooperative organisations. The first agricultural unions law was introduced in 1915 (Law 602/1915) and aimed to ensure that farmers are not exploited by intermediar-

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ies or other actors in the chain. Moreover, this law introduced guidelines for the functioning of agricultural organisations and cooperatives. (2) The interwar period (1921–1939) with state intervention and control in the organisation of the cooperative organisations. (3) The post-war period (1950–1973) when the cooperative organisations were treated as part of the state administration and were directly under the command of the dictatorship. (4) The 1974–1980 period during which the cooperatives became increasingly politicised despite the fact that they were still part of a system of state corporatism. (5) The 1981–1989 period characterised by increased politicisation of the cooperatives. During this period, Greece became a full member of the EEC/EU. (6) The post-1990 period constitutes a period of reforms and reorganisation as the agricultural society cooperatives realised they needed to introduce changes to be able to react to future challenges. I add one extra category (7) The post-crisis period characterised by reorganisation, fragmentation and even dismantling of organisations with highly partisan characteristics. In 1981, which marks the first period of examination 1981–1991, the agricultural policy-making competences were transferred to the Council of Agricultural Ministers in the EU. In Greece, producers have always had an uneven status as political or economic actors, which has both supported and hindered the organisational endeavours of the cooperative movement. The agricultural organisations were paternalised and financially dependent on the state and were mainly attached to the governing political party. This pattern dates back to the interwar period and was maintained by the military dictatorship (1967–1974). ‘At that time, the state enforced its direct supervision upon the cooperative organisations and formulated a new institutional context for providing agricultural credit. This [institutional context] in reality abolished the joint liability of partners in the cooperative and safeguarded the primacy of the banks at the expense of the elected representatives of cooperatives with respect to agricultural financing’ (Patronis 1997 as cited in Patronis 2002:3). Initially, the National Bank of Greece (ETE), followed by the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATEbank), provided agricultural credit to the agricultural organisations. For years, the autonomous operation of the cooperatives was paralysed. Agricultural organisational changes were nationally shaped. The cooperatives became ‘the “long hand” of the administration in transferring the Governmental policy to the farming society’ (Pezaros 2005:8). The highly fragmented and weakly organised agricultural society determined the functioning of the cooperatives, which were formed in a highly sub-sectoralised manner. In reality, ‘the Greek agricultural sector never developed an ideology of its own nor created a coherent and massive social movement and an agrarian party’ (Dertilis 1977:53 as cited in Patronis 2002). The agricultural organisations were formed according to partisan connections that affected their relations with the different governments and did not allow them to respond to the emerging challenges and their role in the administration of the CAP. Besides, the partisan connections affected the communication and relationships between the leadership of the organisations and their members and with the state. In the early 1980s, the agricultural society constituted an important part of the electorate compared to other EU member states (30.7% in 1981, 17.3% in 2000 and

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12.9% in 2015). At that time, the producers were strongly attached to the socialist party, which was known as the ‘farmers’ party’, and with their support, the socialist party won the elections in 1981. In return, the socialist government (1981–1991) encouraged the involvement of the agricultural society in the policy-making process. In an effort to democratise the functioning of the Cooperative Associations, the government introduced a new cooperative legislation15 (Cooperative Law 1257/1982; 1541/1985)16 on the election of the agricultural representative organs. This legislation introduced the simple proportional system for the election of the boards of the cooperatives at all scales (Administrative Council and the President of the confederation of the Agricultural Associations). The simple proportional system separated ballots based on the relations of political parties instead of having different candidates in one ballot. In principle, this rule was deemed positive, but in reality, it encouraged partisan relations and increased politicisation in the cooperative movement.17 In an endless competition, the political parties tried to influence the agricultural organisations, while the real purpose of the cooperatives was ignored. In order to represent the agricultural associations’ interests, a new agricultural trade union organisation established, the General Confederation of Greek Agricultural Unions of Greece (GESASE). GESASE joined the corresponding organisation at the EU level, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA), which had been established on 6 September 1958. Due to internal partisan disagreements, GESASE split, and a new trade union organisation, the Confederation of the Greek Democratic Agricultural Unions (SYDASE), was created that was attached to the conservative opposition party and was not recognised by the socialist government until it joined COPA (Pezaros 2004). The Secretariat of COPA18 and COGECA19 merged on 1 December 1962. The notably ‘eurosceptic’ socialist government supported the agricultural sector, and in a climate of hard negotiations (particularly between the EU and the then Greek socialist government), the Council of Ministers introduced the Integrated Mediterranean Programs20 (IMP) in 1981. This was done to prevent possible regional imbalances between the old member states and the incoming members caused by the Community’s enlargement to the south. The IMP focused on the modernisation of agricultural structures and income support to small-sized farms in France, Italy and Greece and introduced special programs for specific agricultural productions (e.g. fruits). In addition, the government encouraged the cooperatives to buy the farmers’ production at the highest market price in its efforts to ensure farmer  Cooperative Law 602/1915; 921/1979; 1541/1985; 2169/1993; 2810/2000; 4015/2011.  The National Law (2000) for the agricultural cooperatives replaced the 1985 Law in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the organisations’ interactions and encourage the cooperatives to become independent and act independently of the state. 17  This view has also been expressed during the interviews, July, August 2005. 18  European farmers. 19  European agri-cooperatives. 20  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-89-808_en.htm?locale=en 15 16

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4  The Greek Case

incomes. This was beyond the cooperatives’ financial capacity. Under the then newly elected leadership of PASEGES, the cooperatives had to store the overproduction, increasing costs and distorting competition. This ‘state intervention’ created budget deficits for the cooperatives. Lack of institutionalised organisational structures resulted in various forms of mobilisations, such as protests and demonstrations, which disrupted the national transportation system. The protestors’ demands concentrated on financial support, which in turn created negative reactions in the rest of the society. The policy-makers, who were ‘trapped’ by the financially distressed cooperatives in 1980s, introduced later on a series of populist measures combined with loans issued by the state-owned Agricultural Bank. During the second period 1992–2009, the organisational structures in the agricultural society present continuity and path dependence despite the MacSharry reform in 1992. This shows that the legal and organisational changes in the first period had created a legacy. Although these changes were driven by the accession to the EU, they were domestically shaped and not based on objective economic criteria but on partisan politics. The producers continued borrowing without being able to pay back their loans. These financial interventions violated the CAP rules and regulations and were characterised as national subsidies. Upon the instigation of the Commission, the European Court of Justice imposed a fine on Greece, and the case was settled in the mid-1990s at a high cost while also downgrading the credibility of Greek agriculture (European Court of Justice 1992). This state of affairs was expressed in an interview as follows: instead of solving the problems of corruption and bringing the cases to the rule of law, the support of the cooperatives in the beginning of the 1980s by the socialist government, limited the cooperatives’ role to politicised consultation (Interview 2004).21 The President of PASEGES and his personal contacts concentrated all power in the umbrella organisation. The farmers started to contest the role of the cooperative movement and criticised their organisations for lack of transparency and authoritarianism of the leadership. The farmers left their organisations, and membership of the cooperatives decreased. An old-fashioned sector combined with lack of professionalism and highly politicised agriculture kept the sector away from international markets. The agricultural organisations mainly relied on the government’s resources and financial support. One of the interviewees complained that the government did not support the creation of a database which could link the farmers directly with their organisations (Interview 2005). 22 In losing the support of its members, PASEGES’ consultative role weakened both in policy-making and the administration of the CAP subsidies. Additionally, the farmers started to contest the CAP decision process. One interviewee said there is a huge democratic deficit in the EU level bureaucracy. I would also say that we have essentially to rely on the [national and EU] bureaucrats and the employees of the EU level, because we either don’t trust the farmers’ representative organisations [COCEGA] or because we don’t have the

21 22

 ENOSI Ptolemaida.  K, PASEGES.

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possibility of common influence because everybody thinks of himself or his own country (Interview 2005). 23 Consequently, the organisational structures remained formally unchanged during the second period, while their role in responding to internal or external challenges and opportunities was contested. Centralisation of power in a few persons in the agricultural organisations was combined with an agricultural society that represented the older segment of society (40–50 years old). Greek farmers lacked training and education, a situation which did not contribute to their professional development and expertise. They had not gone through any formal institutionalised and systematic education and training system. Farmers, mainly men, often inherited their farms from their parents and maintained the traditional methods of agricultural production. They followed their parents’ paths and professional culture, and the majority of farmers had remained unskilled over time. Lack of professional training affected considerably the farmers’ activities, investment decisions and choices of production methods. Although the state established, in 1951, an organised and systematic integrated advisory system (extension) for agriculture, its role changed substantially with the EU membership. Instead of advising the producers, this system became fragmented and bureaucratic and supported the administration and control of the CAP (Koutsouris and Papadopoulos 1998). The extension service consisted mainly of agronomists, and the majority of civil servants in MIRDF were also agronomists. This situation reflected the domestic policy strategy and the focus on productivity but also the lack of advisory capacity and expertise on public administration and policy development. The extension service disappeared in the 1990s, when the decentralisation process and the restructuring of the Ministry were combined with ‘the establishment of semi-autonomous organisations for training and research’, which were not able to create any substantial positive effects (Koutsouris and Karanikolas 2018:2). Thus, for years, no formalised education and training system had existed which certifies farming as a profession, although the interviewees acknowledge the significant need of this function/system. According to an interviewee, the education level of the farmers is very low. We need to start from education and education and education. The agricultural schools where someone would go for two or three years, two years of general education, and the third more specific relevant to his activity, and then should come back and get new information from time to time. Otherwise, we will never be able to solve the problems of agriculture. Moreover, the sector will not be able to organise itself (Interview 2006). 24 Lack of formal training impedes the development of knowledge in agriculture and constrains the use of technology to the detriment of productivity and innovation. Furthermore, lack of training affects the relations – type, quality and content – among the farmers and their organisations and also with the administration and the state. According to one interviewee, the failure of the cooperative movement is closely connected to the educational level of

23 24

 K, PASEGES.  B, Prefecture Thessaloniki.

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4  The Greek Case

the farmers and their participation in the procedures. Those who were taking the initiatives and were at the front of the cooperative movement often were not even farmers. Whenever they were farmers, they have been controlled by the political parties. You cannot expect more of the farmers whose education level is so low to accomplish more (Interview 2005).25 After the 2003 CAP reform, MINRDF established an organisation responsible for farmer training, the E.GE.KA-DIMITRA.26 The EU programmes for young farmers supported this organisation financially. Such initiatives demonstrate a degree of Europeanisation of the agricultural training in Greece. Nevertheless, the organisation provided agricultural training programs sporadically and inconsistently, which does not ensure continuity in the farmers’ training and impedes the institutionalisation of farmers’ professional development. Lack of professionalism reflects the agricultural society’s inability to respond to various domestic political challenges or demands from the CAP reforms (e.g. cross-compliance) over time. The Greek agricultural society has been profoundly incapable of modernising, innovating and adjusting to the requirements of the CAP. Additionally, the primary agricultural sector has not been able to develop collaborations with the agri-food processing sector, which could enhance the use of technology and increase productivity, as has happened in other EU member states. ‘Primary agricultural production is squeezed between two highly non-competitive industries – upstream inputs and downstream inputs’ (Karantininis 2017:45). The role of the intermediaries has been particularly prominent, and as a result, while the final product is sold at a high price, the primary sector does not benefit. ‘The discrepancy between input and output prices in the Greek food supply chain is indicative of market power’ (Karantininis 2017:46). This remains largely unchanged today. In sum, the organisational structure of the agricultural society in Greece is embedded in the pre-existing paths, reflecting path dependence and locked-in effects. It is highly politicised and characterised by ‘disjointed’ or ‘disconnected’ communication among all levels. This lacuna affects the efficient use of organisational resources in the policy-making process and administrative adaptation to the CAP. The agricultural society has been unable to use the opportunity structure created by the EU CAP. Neither has the agricultural society been able to provide expertise to the public administration for the adequate management of the CAP decisions in Greece. Consequently, the central administration remains far from the actual problems in the agricultural sector, which results in inefficient management and inertia. This becomes even more complex due to great diversification that characterises Greek production (cotton, tobacco, cereals, fruits, etc.) and the small size of holdings that fall under very diverse rules and financial support schemes.

 B, Prefecture of Thessaloniki, member of the governing party and academic.  E.GE.KA-DIMITRA was renamed as the Greek Agricultural Organisation-DIMITRA (ELGO DIMITRA) in 2011.

25 26

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113

Domestic Politics Before joining the EU, agricultural policy in Greece focused on self-sufficiency and protection of domestic production through intervention in agricultural markets. This intervention mainly involved minimum guaranteed prices (so-called safety) and subsidies in support of farmer incomes (e.g. short-term loans). The state’s agricultural support was negotiated between the state and the agricultural society, indicating corporatist characteristics. Following the country’s accession to the EU in 1981, the exogenous event, Greek agriculture as all EU member states followed the CAP institutional and regulatory framework. Thus, domestic direct financial support to the producers was no longer allowed. The national subsidies were replaced by EU subsidies that were expected to ensure the producer’s incomes and agricultural activity. These changes affected the content and type of collaboration between the state and the agricultural society, and their relations became more quasi-corporatist. The particular technical and complex CAP requires professional expertise both at the political level during the negotiations in the Council of Ministers and at the administrative level during the management of the implementation of the CAP decisions. In Greece, agriculture is governed by a highly centralised and hierarchical ‘traditional statist mode of governance’, which is embedded in conflictual, quasi-corporatist, state-society relations. This is a common situation in many policy areas in Greece (e.g. for banking, see Pagoulatos 1999:30; for environment see Koutalakis 1997; pension provision, Featherstone 2005a, b). MINRDF as part of the government is the formal decision-­maker (Table 4.2) taking into account the CAP rules and guidelines. The centralisation of decisions in the capital Athens increases the distance between the centre of decisions and the agricultural problems in the rural areas. Consequently, information relies on the interaction between the government and the agricultural society’s representation through the latter’s organisations. The absence of direct interactions and cooperation among those who decide and those who are affected by these decisions often leads to lack of proactive policy strategies and responses. The governance of Greek agriculture is furthermore characterised by frequent rotations in the leadership of the Ministry in downtimes of the domestic politics, which leads to a change in persons but not in the real political processes, similarly to other policy areas. For example, over a 28 years period, from 1981 to 2009, there were 24 Ministers, and the average tenure of Ministers of Agriculture and Rural Development was about 1 year (Table 4.3). These changes did not allow the political leaders to develop a thorough understanding of the technicalities of the CAP.  Therefore they developed incoherent rushed policy proposals to frequently urgent CAP policy issues. These proposals often lacked professional expertise and knowledge, as they had not been the result of deliberation among the political or administrative level and the stakeholders. Furthermore, a change in the Minister was followed by a change in the cabinet and of the General Secretary (Director) and the special secretariats, which disrupted the institutional memory and impeded continuity in policy strategies and the administrative adaptation to CAP demands. According to Law 1558/1985 (FEK 137), the General Secretary is appointed and dismissed by

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Table 4.3  Ministers of Agriculture (1980–2009): (blue Conservative, green Socialists) 1. KANELOPOULOS

ΑTHANASIOS

10/5/1980

21/10/1981

2. SIMITIS

KONSTANTINOS

21/10/1981

5/6/1985

3. ΜORAITIS

GEORGIOS (SUB MIN)

8/2/1984

5/6/1985

4. SIMITIS

KONSTANTINOS

5/6/1985

26/7/1985

5. POTAKIS

IOANNIS

26/7/1985

2/7/1989

6. ΜORAITIS

GEORGIOS (SUB MIN)

26/7/1985

25/4/1986

7. DIMAS

STAVROS

2/7/1989

12/10/1989

8. LIAPIS

GIORGIOS

12/10/1989

23/11/1989

9. DIMAS

STAVROS

23/11/1989

13/2/1990

10. LIAPIS

GIORGIOS

13/2/1990

11/4/1990

11. PAPAKONSTANTINOU

ΜΙCHALIS

11/4/1990

8/8/1991

12. CHATZINIKOLAOU

PANAGIOTIS (SUB MIN.)

12/4/1990

8/8/1991

13. KUVELAS

SOTIRIOS

8/8/1991

31/10/1991

14. HATZIGAKIS

SOTIRIOS

31/10/1991

27/11/1992

15. ΚΟSKINAS

HRISTOS

27/11/1992

13/10/1993

16. ΜORAITIS

GEORGIOS (SUB MIN)

13/10/1993

15/9/1995

17. STATHIS

THEODOROS

15/9/1995

22/1/1996

18. TZOUMAKAS

STEFANOS

22/1/1996

30/10/1998

19. ANOMERITIS

GEORGIOS

30/10/1998

24/10/2001

20. DRIS

GEORGIOS

21. ΤSITOURIDIS

SAVVAS

10/03/2004

22. BASIAKOS

EVAGELOS

23/09/2004

17/09/2007

23. KONTOS

ALEXANDROS

19/09/2007

07/01/2009

24. HATZIGAKIS

SOTIRIOS

08/01/2009

07/10/2009

24/10/2001

10/03/2004 22/09/2004

Source: Ministry of Rural Development and Food

a joint decision of the Prime Minister and the Minister, participates in meetings and has no voting rights. As in many policy areas, agricultural politics in Greece has become an arena for achieving personal benefits and career opportunities. This is combined with low level of professionalism in domestic politics that allows for clientelistic. Those seeking jobs have constantly exchanged their votes for benefits from those in power. This ‘trade-off’ has distorted the core objective of developing sustainable agricultural strategies, policy agreements and viable solutions to agricultural problems and led to mismanagement. Interactions between MINRDF and the agricultural society organisations aim to legitimise the governments’ decisions. Trust ‘in our people’ is interpreted as numbers of ‘voters’ who can do the job. This logic systematically enhances clientelistic relations and impedes knowledge-informed policy administrative strategies of CAP decisions.

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In the first period, 1981–1991, that starts with the country’s EU membership, the socialist party won the elections and formed a government led by Andreas Papandreou. In an attempt to broaden the governance process and strengthen sectoral involvement in policy-making, the then Socialist government established a ‘European unit’ (YSELEK)27 to strengthen the communication between the Ministry and the affected agricultural actors (Pezaros 2004). The role of Parliament and the agricultural society in the decision-making process was limited. However, instead of increasing inclusiveness and establishing collaborative governance structures, the government introduced legislation on cooperatives (see above) that intensified partisan28 attachments. Until 1981, the National Agricultural Bank of Greece financed agriculture and controlled the economic management of the cooperatives. After 1982, the establishment of a Supervising Council took over economic management of the cooperatives and the functioning of the management board. This failed, and the cooperatives became highly indebted. Consequently, the agricultural organisations became constantly financially dependent on the government, which determined the clientelistic character of the agricultural society-state relations. These relations focused on exchanges of personal benefits and votes, instead of developing the necessary channels for dissemination of information and collaborations to find sustainable solutions for the agricultural sector. An interviewee from the sector states that despite the agricultural groups’ efforts to create better communication channels, flow of information and data distribution, we are always faced with the government’s resistance’ (Interview 2005).29 He continues: governments main interest is to maintain and strengthen their power not to create collaborations with the sector (Interview 2005).30 The agricultural cooperative organisations viewed the development of collaboration as ‘the state responsibility’. Accordingly, an interviewee states that the relationship between the Ministry [MINRDF] and the agricultural cooperatives is often difficult because the farmers’ interests often contradict those of the Ministry. The cooperatives that represent the farmers cannot be against the Ministry’s positions because the Ministry threatens them with cutting the financial support to them, since they are funded by the government, but at the same time they cannot betray their members, the producers. Meanwhile, the cooperatives threaten the Ministry with their votes or by closing the roads with tractors, a frequent threat that has often been used in the past. Although this might not affect the policy, it affects the image and it can cost politically for the government. Sometimes, this relationship is very

 “Ypiresia Scheseon Ellados - EK”– (unit for the relations between Greece and the EU). It was a Unit, headed by a Director General (alternate) and consisted of five Directorates: Legal EU-Affairs, Plant-Production, Animal-Production, Agricultural Economy and Agri-Structures (Pezaros, personal contact). 28  http://www.elzoni.gr/html/ent/891/ent.46891.asp 29  K, PASEGES. 30  K, PASEGES. 27

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dynamic, very strong and harmonious and at other times there is no channel of communication [among them] (Interview 2005).31 These patterns of interaction from the first period, which were locked into the pre-existing institutional setting, followed the same paths and continued in the second examined period that starts with the MacSharry reform in 1992. This period also started with a change in government as the conservative party won the elections and formed a new government. The conservative government, that lasted only 2 years, established the Council for Agricultural Policy (SAP Συμβουλιο Αγροτικης Πολιτικης-Greek acronyms) 32 by a law which entered into effect in 1997. SAP was expected provide expert knowledge, consult and ‘define priorities and alternative policy measures directed towards a national strategy for agriculture’ (Pezaros 2005). Thus SAP would contribute to the development of agricultural policy and implementation strategy. The Minister chaired the SAP meetings that included representatives of the agricultural organisations, the academic community, the administration of co-responsible ministries, the most important bodies and boards of agricultural interest (Agricultural Bank, Agricultural Pension and Insurance Boards, agricultural product boards, etc.), processing industries and consumer organisations, etc. The functioning of the agricultural organisations became uncontrollable and resulted in mismanagement and tremendous debts, which turned out to be of major significance during the financial crisis33 (Interview 2016). In February 1999, the then Minister of Agriculture emphasised the need for institutional restructuring and sectoral reorientation of the domestic agricultural policy. Following the Agenda 2000 CAP reform and the launch of the third EU Financial Framework and the Community initiatives in agriculture (1999), MINRDF tried to introduce reforms and ‘institutionalise’ the role of SAP. SAP was expected to meet three to four times per year in order to generate a broad forum for the exchange of information and knowledge. Such exchange could offer expert advice to the administrative authorities and enhance the dialogue between MINRDF and the agricultural society. The reformed SAP had decentralised functions across the three governance levels  – national, regional and Prefectures – and encouraged a higher representation of the regional level actors. The SAP meetings were chaired by either the Head of each Prefecture, the Secretary General of the Region or the Minister for Rural Development and Food. The broader agricultural sector (not only primary producers but also processors and suppliers) was invited in an attempt to increase transparency and accountability and to increase responsibility of those involved but also to achieve better cooperation for problem-solving solutions. In practice, SAP met sporadically, once or twice a year, and failed to strengthen the state-agricultural society  D, MEP consultant and previously Ministry of Rural Development and Food.  Art. 44, Law No 2093/92 (published in Governmental Gazette, No A181/25.11.1992). SAP started operating regularly only in 1997 under a socialist government (Governmental Gazette, No B4163/1997). In this respect, it constituted one of the least cases in Greek political ethics, where continuation and consistency in action were kept between two successive governments of different political direction (Pezaros 2005). 33   http://www.tovima.gr/finance/article/?aid=476553 and A, Agricultural Association. 31 32

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relations. The few meetings held did not succeed in introducing a true dialogue or exchange of information and knowledge among the actors. As an interviewee expresses it, SAP has never become more than another bureaucratic body that lacks clear competences, goals and strategies (Interviews 2005).34 The meetings are held so that the Minister presents his views while the other actors do not participate actively (Interview 2005).35 On 23 July 2001, and after a unanimous agreement among the SAP members, the socialist Minister, G.  Anomeritis, established the National Committee for Rural Policy (ETHEAP).36 ETHEAP was expected to include all the relevant institutions of the agricultural policy area (Greek Federation of Farmers’ Cooperatives, GESASE, SYDASE, the GEOTEE, the Association of Greek Industrialists and the Chairman of National Inter-professional Organisations of products). The Minister chaired the ETHEAP meetings that would meet every 2 months. Like SAP, ETHEAP would consult on the agricultural policy and administration and provide guidance on specific implementation issues and not general policy strategies (Agrotypos 2001). Instead, MINRDF remained the main actor in policy strategy and in the administration of the CAP decisions, without deliberation and consultation with the agricultural society. Borrowing Rothstein’s (2004:871) words, ‘the rhetoric of consultation differed substantially from the actual consultation action’ in the Greek case. The relation between the government and the agricultural society remained substantially unchanged and path dependent within pre-existing settings. During 2002–2004, the agricultural sector faced serious economic challenges that increased frustration in the agricultural sector and divided the agricultural organisations. Farmers mobilised, organised protests and demonstrations, closed the national roads and interfered with crucial points of the national transportation system, as they contested the agricultural policies. Demonstrations and protests remained a common form of mobilisation and contestation against the political elites in Greece and is a characteristic of non-corporatist systems. After almost two decades of socialist governments (with a 2-year break in between), the conservative government won the elections in 2004 with support particularly from the agricultural constituencies, indicating a change in party-agricultural society attachment. The agricultural sectors in Greece perceived the undergoing enlargement negotiations at the time (2003) and the CAP reform discussions as a serious threat to their share of CAP financial support. These changes made the farmers vulnerable to promises. Centralised decision-making processes excluded qualified experts from the policy process led to poor representation of Greek agricultural interests in the CAP decisions. Moreover, the domestic politics have not been able to support the restructuring in the administration that stayed rigid, adversarial and hierarchical and inaccessible. As a result, the administration of the CAP decisions faced delays, inefficiencies and mismanagement, as the repeated financial penalties imposed since

 ET, NAGREF.  ET, NAGREF. 36  ΕΘΕΑΠ http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/9173/sugkroteitai-ethniki-epitropi-agrotikis-politikis 34 35

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1992 by the European Court of Justice demonstrate. The absence of Ministerial Annual Reports did not ensure the transfer of knowledge, expertise and even ­evaluation of the Minister’s achievements, strategies and evaluation. As one interviewee said, I think nobody really designs a long-term agricultural policy in Greece. There is no organised policy, not even by the political leadership in the Ministry. Why doesn’t this happen? Maybe it happens because of the ailments of the Greek public administration. There is no continuity either in people or in interest in specific things. We often have to move our concentration from one situation (issue) to another because the second just needs to be dealt with immediately or requires a direct response (Interview 2006; own translation).37

Network Governance Patterns The analysis of the domestic politics focuses on the characteristics of the state-­ agricultural society relations based on qualitative data. This section complements that analysis and adds a new dimension based on SNA data, namely, the presence of network governance patterns in Greek agriculture and their role in administrative adaptation to the CAP. The analysis of the networks is useful in order to explain how the actors through their interactions and deliberations exchange resources, disseminate information, engage in collective learning and develop collaborations and trust. Networks enable the creation of innovative problem-solving solutions and new knowledge that enhance performance, reduce costs and increase representation of interests and democracy. In this process, the various actors play different roles, such as facilitators, brokers, etc. This section examines systematically these relations in the Greek agricultural network. For this purpose, I address the hypothesis: the more dense and more inclusive the network patterns are, the more they facilitate administrative adaptation to EU policy; and the more loose and exclusive they are, the more they impede domestic administrative adaptation to the EU. To shed light on these patterns, the interactions among the actors involved in agricultural policy were analysed, mapped and visualized in sociograms. In order to operationalise this approach, data were collected through 20 interviews in 13 organisations during which the interviewees completed social network analysis questionnaires (Table  4.4). I conducted the interviews in Athens and in Western and Central Macedonia in Northern Greece, specifically the three prefectures of Thessaloniki, Kozani and Pieria before the last administrative reform in 2010. These prefectures represent three extensively agricultural geographical areas that differ in size with, respectively, a large (1,099,598 inhabitants), small (56,807 inhabitants) and medium population (134,739 inhabitants). Though the data do not cover the entire geographical area of Greece, they do illustrate network patterns in Greek agriculture because they include particularly agricultural areas in addition to

37

 D, Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food and EP advisor.

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Table 4.4  Actors included in the Greek Agricultural Network No 1 2 3

Network actors PIO1 GIO2 EP1

Name of the organisation PASEGES GESASE OFFICE EP SOCIALIST

4

EP2

OFFICE EP SYNASPISMOU

5

MINRDF

6 7 8 9 10 11

NAGREF REGTHES PRTHES PRKOZ PRPIE EASPIE

Ministry of Rural Development and foo NAGREF Regional Government Thessaloniki Prefecture Thessaloniki Prefecture Kozani Prefecture Pierias Cooperative Union Pierias

12 EASPTOL 13 EASTHES 14 MINECO 15 ELGA

Cooperative Union Ptolemaidas

Cooperative Union Thessaloniki Ministry of Economics Greek organisation for agricultural Insurance 16 OGEKADHM OGECA DIMITRA 17 EU European Union 18 SIO3 SYDASE 19 OPEKEPE OPEKEPE 20 LOCGOVKOZ Local Government KOZANI GOVERNMENt KOZANI

Name in Greek ΠΑΣΕΓΕΣ ΓΕΣΑΣΕ ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟ ΕΥΡΩΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΣΟΚ Γραφείο Ευρωβουλευτή του Συνασπισμού ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΑΓΡΟΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗΣ ETHIAGE Περιφερεια Θεσσαλονικης Νομαρχια Θεσσαλονικης Νομαρχια Κοζανης Νομαρχια Πιεριας Ενωση Γεωργικων Συνεταιρισμων Πιεριας Ενωση Γεωργικων Συνεταιρισμων Πτολεμαιδας Cooperative Union Θεσσαλονικης Υπουργείο Οικονομικών Οργανισμος Ελληνικών Γεωργικών Ασφαλήσεων ΟΓΕΚΑ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΑ Ευρωπαική Ενωση ΣΥΔΑΣΕ ΟΠΕΚΕΠΕ Δήμος Κοζάνης

Source: Interviews

Athens where decisions are made and managed. Moreover, this data also serve as triangulation to the domestic politics analysis and to the qualitative method. Figure 4.2 presents a visualisation of the actors (nodes) and their relations (ties) in the Greek agriculture network in 2006.38 The type of actors and their ties in the Greek agricultural network differ greatly. The network looks like a ‘star’ or as a ‘Y’, with one actor in the centre, and many actors not directly connected, a pattern usually referred to as ‘centralised networks’ (Borgatti et al. 2009). A centralised network structure often indicates a hierarchical governance structure. Additionally, this type of network structure demonstrates that there are gaps in the connections among the actors, in contrast, for example, to a ‘circle’ structure sociogram (see Danish case). Gaps in a network hinder the flow of information, and thus information is not necessarily shared to the non-connected actors in the network or takes longer to

38

 Most of these actors exist today, some under a different name.

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4  The Greek Case

Fig. 4.2  Greek Agricultural Network. (Based on tie strength) (2006)

reach them. In this case, the communication between two non-connected actors (absence of ties) depends on the presence of a third actor that in the SNA terminology can act as a bridge (e.g. PASEGES). A ‘bridge’ actor connects (bridges) two actors, creating an indirect second-degree relationship (e.g. MINRDF and PRPIE). Bridges are actors that do not necessarily have strong ties with others in the network but are significant because they fill up gaps in the network and connect actors that would not otherwise be linked (e.g. EASPIE is a bridge between PRPIE and OPEKEPE). OPEKEPE has various different connections with the regional administrations: a first-degree relation (direct connection) to the largest of the three examined regional administrations, PRTHES; a second-degree relation with the second large regional administration, (PRPIE) via the sectoral organisation (EASPIE); no connection to PRKOZ, the smallest regional administration of the three. Similarly, MINRDF is directly connected only to PRTHES while being indirectly connected to PRPIE through two sectoral organisations, the national and the local agricultural group, which act as bridges. The absence of ties between MINRDF and the smallest regional unit PRKOZ, either directly or indirectly, demonstrates a gap in the network. These ties or interactions reflect the importance of size in relation to resources: the larger the organisation, the more resources and capacity or interest in maintaining communication. This situation can also represent a hierarchical network structure, determined by resources and capacity.

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The network patterns demonstrate inconsistencies in the connectivity between the regional administrations, which can result in fragmentation and discontinuity in the administrative process. Importantly, such gaps impede knowledge dissemination and do not support innovation and generation of problem-solving solutions to emerging circumstances. REGTHES represents the regional level in one of the examined areas. REGTHES is an isolate in the network since it is not linked to any actors, which is not surprising because it had no administrative competences at the time. Direct connections among the actors, both as receivers and senders of information, can be significant because such connections ensure timely information exchange, which is relevant for feedback in the administration process. In contrast, the absence of ties portrays a lack of flow of information and can negatively affect the administrative process, leading to delays and even failures. As one interviewee states, there are Prefectures that really participate in the administration of the policy…either because of the presence of some active and qualified employees or because the leaders of the Prefectures belong to the Government’s party and they try to support in any way possible their political party’s reputation. However, if the specific leader is not elected in the following elections or his party is not the governing party, this relationship is interrupted automatically (Interview 2005).39 Consequently, the presence of specific actors matters, which demonstrates a personification of the process. Furthermore, the three agricultural organisations (PIO, GIO2 and SIO3) are all directly connected to MINRDF and, interestingly, to the MEPs (Greek Members of the European Parliament). This is natural because ­decisions at the EU level are important and confirm the high level of politicisation; MEPs act as channels of information in Brussels and promoters of Greek agricultural interests at the EU level. The SNA centrality measures the frequency of interactions among actors in the network and demonstrates the number of times an actor (node) is mentioned as a contact by another actor. Centrality is visualized by differences in the thickness of the lines (ties) or connections among actors (the thicker the line, the stronger the relation). The higher the frequency of actor interactions, the stronger the relation. For example, MINRDF is clearly a central actor in the network and as expected is strongly connected to OPEKEPE, the central administration of CAP subsidies. MINRDF is connected either as a receiver or a sender to all agricultural organisations, but not always with strong ties. This is consistent with the qualitative analysis. MINRDF also has a strong connection to the Research Institute, NAGREF, which is also expected because NAGREF is under the auspices of MINRDF. Differences in the characteristics of relations between MINRDF and the other actors also reflect the different levels in the governance process, decision-making, consultation and administration. Nevertheless, a high centrality of actors’ relations does not necessarily imply a high impact on outcomes, because the nature of these interactions might not always be important or relevant. If information spreads through frequent interactions, this

39

 D, Ministry of Rural Development and Food and MEP consultant.

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4  The Greek Case

Fig. 4.3  Greek Agricultural Network. (Based on k-cores)

might indicate ‘homophily’ and signify that interactions are taking place among actors with similar views and characteristics and thus that the information may be redundant. In contrast, weak relations (ties) may connect more nodes in the network, which otherwise might have been disconnected, and thus these ties act as sources of novel information (Granovetter 1973). Based on Granovetter (1973), while there are strong ties at the micro level of the network, the influence of the network is low within fragmented network patterns and disrupted flow of information. Thus, weak ties that act as bridges (e.g. EP1-GIO2) can play an important role in sharing of information, while the strong ties indicate power and leadership. The sociogram in Fig. 4.3 presents the group of actors that are connected to at least three other actors in the Greek agriculture network. These actors are distributed in three levels (distinguished by red, blue and black colours). While the political level is well connected (e.g. MINRDF and the MEPs), the political leadership of MINRDF is located at a different core than the two regional administrations (the Prefectures and the local government) which are the actual administrators of the policy and the sector (local sectoral organisations, SIO, GIO), while the third regional administration belongs to a third core. This visualisation once again indicates lack of connectivity and gaps in channelling information to the lower levels of the administration. It also reflects a hierarchical and centrally governed system.

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Table 4.5  Cliques in the Greek Agricultural Network N# of cliques 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Actors in each clique MINRDF MINRDF MINRDF MINRDF MINRDF PIO1 MINRDF PIO1 MINRDF PIO1 MINRDF PIO1 MINRDF GIO2 MINRDF SIO3 PIO1

OPEKEPE OPEKEPE OPEKEPE OPEKEPE

EP2 EP1

RI PRTHES EASPIE

EP1 RI EASPIE EU EP1 EP1 PRPIE, EASPIE

Source: Based on SNA

The connectivity in a network matters because it indicates socialisation processes that can lead to experiential learning40 and may promote feasible and e­ ffective administrative adaptation of practices and rules. Lack of connectivity, however, can lead to the opposite outcomes, such as fragmentation and lack of coordination in both policy-making and administrative strategies and practices, which have also been identified by qualitative analysis (OECD 2001). In Greece, attempts to provide expertise to the decision-makers depend clearly on individual initiative and personal relations and not on institutionalised processes. For example, actors positioned at the edge of the network do not receive or send timely and adequate expert knowledge on the regional sectoral problems. Besides, these actors have no incentives nor do they feel any responsibility or pressure to make policy proposals since this is not part of their formal competences. Thus even actors who are qualified do not participate in any decision-making process or play a consultative role. Therefore the impact of the local and regional government is minimal or non-existent according to all the interviewees (Interviews 2005). This can also be linked to low absorption and delayed administration of the EU funds or inadequate management. Table 4.5 presents 11 cliques, each with at least three members, in the Greek agricultural network, based on the SNA measure of cliques. MINRDF appears in almost all cliques, apart from the one formed by the local actors. This confirms the centrality of MINRDF that often acts as a bridge between multiple actors. It is noteworthy that the regional administration, the Prefectures, which are the actors in the final part of the policy process, do not often appear in the cliques. Finally, local authority connections do not appear in almost any of the cliques. This finding confirms the lack of a strong link between the political level (decision-makers) and the administration level (the Prefectures).

 By ‘experiential learning’, I mean learning by experience and practice instead of formal training.

40

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4  The Greek Case

Fig. 4.4  In-degree interactions

Since the data are asymmetric and represent directed ties, they thus distinguish between the ‘sent’ and ‘received’ ties as visualised in Fig. 4.4 (column-wise univariate statistics). Accordingly, MINRDF, the decision-maker (actor #1), is a receiver of interaction (contact) from 11 actors, OPEKEPE (actor #3) receives interaction from 9 actors, while PIO1 (actor #10) and the EU receive interaction from four actors. Actors that receive information from many sources may be prestigious (i.e. other actors want to be connected to them, so they send information) and often highly influential. Nevertheless, receivers of a lot of information could suffer from ‘information overload’ or ‘noise and interference’ due to contradictory messages from different sources (Hanneman 2001). EASPIE (actor #14) a regional union of agricultural cooperatives that receives interactions from six other actors (i.e. almost from one third of the actors). This is a relatively high percentage. According to information that was gathered during the interviews, this high percentage reflects the direct connections of the leadership of EASPIE to the government and its attachment to the governing party (conservative) at the time (2005–2006). This further confirms the role of the leadership’s partisan relations. Once again, these are the same three central actors that appear in all the statistical ‘tests’ above. Figure 4.5 is

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Fig. 4.5  Out-degree interactions

based on the univariate statistics for the Greek agricultural network (Appendix II) and indicates actors as senders41 of interactions or ‘source’ of ties (in a directed graph). Actors with many ties (at the centre of a network) – e.g. MINRDF, OPEKEPE and PIO1 – and actors at the periphery of a network (few ties) – e.g. local government – present more predictable patterns of behaviour than those with intermediate numbers of ties. Actors with only a few ties present great variations in their behaviour, depending on whom they connect with. MINRDF is important both as a receiver and as a sender, which reflects centralisation of competences, a finding that it is consistent with the qualitative analysis. Specifically, NAGREF (actor #2), whose main activity is to prepare reports on specific topics for MINRDF on a contract basis, is a noticeable actor as a sender but not as a receiver and mainly provides information and knowledge (Interview 2006).42 PIO1 (actor#10), the sectoral organisation, which is significant both as a receiver and as a sender also agrees with the qualitative analysis. 41 42

 Out-degree shows the number of actors to whom a specific actor sends interaction.  E,NAGREF.

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4  The Greek Case

Lastly, according to Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) typology, as in the Danish case, actors can have different roles in a network (Table  3.9, Appendix II). Differences in roles also demonstrate the extent to which the network is inclusive or exclusive. MINRDF acts as a consultant (B-- > A-- > B, intermediary belongs to a different group than both the source and the recipient) and liaison (B-- > A-- > C, all nodes – recipient, source and intermediary – belong to different groups) in the network, and as a meta-governor that facilitates the governing of the CAP. PIO1 (PASEGES) acts as liaison (B-- > A-- > C, all nodes – recipient, source and intermediary – belong to different groups). Interestingly, MINRDF and PIO1 (PASEGES) mostly play a brokerage role in the network. In Greece, these measures of the actor’s roles show that those directly affected by the policy are not necessarily included in the highly centralised policy-­making system and thus most probably do not contribute to the administrative adaptation. The network analysis thus confirmed that the state-agricultural society relations are hierarchical, centralised, fragmented and politicised. Gaps exist between the decision-makers and the central administration in both the regional administrations and the agricultural organisations. As a result, the characteristics of the network governance patterns (gaps in connections and information flow) do not facilitate agricultural administrative adaptation.

Administrative Adaptation to CAP in Greece The EU membership in 1981 marks the subjection of Greek agricultural policy to the CAP rules. As an EU member state, Greece introduced the CAP basic instruments, the COAMs, which formally abolished any domestic administrative arrangements that could distort the operation of the internal market. This indicates a degree of formal adaptation and Europeanisation. Until then, the Greek agricultural policy objectives focused on ‘increasing productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for the producers, stabilise markets in relation to demand both at home and abroad and maintain consumers prices at levels compatible with the general economic situation’ (Pepelasis 1980:251). The CAP subsidies replaced domestic financial support and combined with agricultural exports to the EU internal market, alleviated ­domestic budgetary pressures. The EU subsidies were expected to ensure a reasonable income for the producers. Despite being subject to CAP rules, the conditions for Greek readmission to the EU in 1981 were flexible and lacked monitoring of both the administration and the implementation of CAP decisions either nationally or at the EU. Greece’s administrative response started, at least formally, early, before 1981. In 1977, Presidential Decree N 433 (FEK 133) on the reform of the public services ruled that a unit be established under the central administration of the Ministry of Agriculture (Chapter (ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ) Θ, Art. 63) specifically to address relations with the EU in order to prepare for the EU membership. This followed Law 445/1976 proposed by the Ministry of Coordination and the Minister of Agriculture on representation of

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Greece in the EU and the organisation of administrative structures in order to implement EU rules. Moreover, Art. 68 introduced a series of guidelines in order to design measures and address issues of organisational effectiveness and administrative decentralisation. In addition, this article included provisions for the training of the administration through seminars and other training programs in collaboration with the Greek Center for Productivity.43 These changes indicate administrative adaptation to the CAP, and they reflect formal changes in administrative structures, characterised by the legislative inflation in Greece. Nevertheless, there has not been change in informal agricultural administrative style and practices. Administrative adaptation focused on political loyalty and combined with the absence of a skillful political leadership could not ensure the effective management of the CAP policy decisions. The administration did not use the necessary computerised technology in order to manage the subsidies. Consequently, Greece was unprepared and lacked the necessary administrative capacity to support timely adaptation of the CAP. This in turn delayed correct implementation of policy decisions, a shortcoming which has been characteristic of the domestic administration of the CAP over time. The appointment of civil servants did not often follow standardised procedures based on merit. Instead, a number of officials were mainly political appointments based on personal connections, employed as advisors to the Minister and the junior Ministers. These officials were appointed at the General Secretariats and the special secretariats. This process already started before the EU membership by the Karamanlis government, inspired by the French model (Sotiropoulos 1999). The number of these appointment increased under the Papandreou government since 1982 by Law1232/1982 (ibid). Their role was justified by the demands of the EU rules and regulations (ibid). As shown in Fig. 4.6, under each General Secretariat, there are the Directorate Generals, equipped by the senior civil servants. These administrative structures introduced an extra layer of politically appointed civil servants between the Ministers and the senior civil servants and increased hierarchy and politicisation in administration. These appointments and their changes reflect the distrust to the existing administration by any incoming government. Besides, they show that the civil servants’ decisions, practices and style are based on political loyalty and not professionalism. Politicisation expands to the promotion process of civil servants. The Service Council in each Ministry is responsible for the promotion and decides who can be appointed to top posts. There is a parallel promotion process that is linked to increase in salary and depends on seniority, but it does not imply increase in authority (Sotiropoulos 1999). The absence of intra- or interdepartmental mobility and communication hindered coordination among the higher civil service between departments but also among the middle and lower levels or with other relevant ministries, as well as between the policy-makers and the administration. This has created a compartmentalisation and fragmentation of the administration and resulted in differentiated administrative

43

 Ελληνικό Κέντρο Παραγωγικότητας (ΕΛ.ΚΕ.ΠΑ).

General Directorate of Administrative Support and Documentation Management General Directorate of Agriculture Structures

General Dir. of Plant Production

General Secretary

Vice Minister

Minister

Fig. 4.6  Organogram of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 2006

General Directorate Economic Support and Inspection

Self-existent Office of Facilitation of Individuals with Disabilities

Council for Agricultural Policy SAP

Directorate of Control of Expenses of European Agricultural Fund of Orientation and Guarantees

Directorate of Rural Policy and Documentation

General Secretariat Rural Policy and International Relations

Service of Delegate

Service of Budgetary control

Special Office Advisor

Legal Advisors Office

General Directorate of Growth and Protection of Forests

General Directorate of Fishery

Address of Political Protection

General Directorate of Veterinary

Office of Press and Public Relations

Directorate of Processing, Standardisation & Quality Control of Plant Products and

Directorate of Political Designing of Emergency

Directorate of inspection

General General Directorate Directorate of of Animal Agricultural Production Applications and Research

Department of Parliamentary Control

Directorate of Management of Registrations

Directorate of biological agriculture

Administrative Sector of Planning and Application of Third Community Frame of

128 4  The Greek Case

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cultures and structures that impeded any institutionalised coordination. For example, the ‘permanent career’ culture without any performance evaluation over time did not encourage career development and training programmes. Consequently, the administration did not acquire updated knowledge and information on new developments. As the individual civil servants were not equipped with the capacity to design skillful administrative strategies to meet the demands of the CAP administrative challenges, administrative adaptation failed. These top-down hierarchical, rigid and formal administrative structures resulted in delays of the implementation and in frustration among the administrative staff who were unable to deliver adequate task performance. Importantly, this outcome indirectly led to sanctions by the ECJ. Under a Presidential Decree (π.δ.398/1990 (ΦΕΚ 159 Α’), the government established the local centres for agricultural development and created a total of 650 positions in the 52 Prefectures that constituted the administrative units of the CAP. These units were the scientific, professional and technical support for the farmers, provided information especially with respect to the kind, quality and variety of agricultural production, the production technology and its use in everyday practice, the market situation and its expectations as well as the link between agricultural research and the implementation of the outcomes (own translation) (Interview 2005).44 The objectives of these administrative decisions were not clearly justified on professional grounds. The recruitment process was not based on open calls and merit. It became a way of ‘paying back’ for votes and were linked to partisan attachments, indicating politicisation and clientelism. Instead of developing ‘competence management’ skills, which would lead to a ‘combined effort of the organisation and civil servants to develop the personal qualities and skills’ (van der Meer and Toonen 2005:842), professionalism has been often confused with narrow disciplinary academic qualifications and focused on increasing productivity and attracting more EU subsidies. The selection was based on specific discipline qualifications (e.g. academic degrees in agronomy and law), and thus the personnel in these units often lacked the necessary professional training to support administrative institutional changes. Similar to other policy areas, the recruitment of economists or public administration experts has not been given adequate attention. This is a general characteristic of recruitment in the Greek public sector. The administration was demonstrably unable to develop administrative strategies, increase coordination among administrative levels and develop practices beyond adapting to formal demands by the CAP but finding innovative and effective administrative solutions in order to avoid penalisation from the EU and ensure the domestic agricultural policy interests. Furthermore, the administration did not acquire an organisational adaptability, which would strengthen the personal development of the civil servants and the organisational flexibility needed to address and perform new tasks and address emerging challenges. While administrative adaptation is the formal responsibility of the public administration, it requires the support of the sector and the stakeholders who can support

44

 D, EP advisor.

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and share the necessary relevant information. However, this relationship between the administration, the industry and the agricultural society was not there as shown by the network governance patterns. I attribute this lack of connection to the hierarchical, centralised and unprofessional domestic politics, the characteristics of the network governance patterns and the fragmented, disorganised and unprofessional agricultural society in Greece. As a result, diffusion of information and knowledge among the different administrative levels were impeded, and the ineffective administrative patterns and style hindered the prompt adaptation to CAP demands. In sum, administrative adaptation in the first period remained formal and embedded in the pre-existing administrative structures, indicating path dependence characteristics. Thus, the country’s EU membership did not lead to a critical juncture and did not create an administrative legacy. The second period of examination, 1992–2009, begins with the 1992 MacSharry reform. In order to prepare for the reform, the Ministry by Presidential Decree (PD) 484/1991 (Art. 1 §1) established the General Secretariat for Agricultural Policy, the EU and International Relations in MINRDF. The General Secretary is responsible for the design and control of the implementation of the government’s policy with respect to management of EU subsidies. This measure amended PD 402/1988 (A. 187) (FEK A 177) on the Organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture (Fig. 4.6). This PD from 1991 was also amended by Art 1 §1 of Presidential Decree 385/1994 that complemented and reformed PD 402/1988 on the Organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture (Α’ 187) (FΕΚ Α’ 216). These changes aimed to respond to the administrative needs of the MacSharry reform. The MacSharry reform in 1992 created new domestic administrative demands. In order to cope with the emerging administrative requirements, the government established the ‘payments agency’ along with a unit for the Management of Guaranteed Agricultural Markets (YDAGEP) in 1992. The YDAGEP managed and monitored the distribution and payments of the CAP subsidies but was actually unable to perform such demanding and potentially contradictory tasks (Pezaros 2004). However, the MINRDF treated this reform as primarily a technical issue and appointed a number of experts from different disciplines for the negotiations of the reform (Pezaros 2004). Administrative interventions created internal competition and conflicts among the civil servants and with the politically appointed advisors in the various units in the Ministry (e.g. during the 1992 CAP reform), with staff blaming each other for the low level of ­absorption of CAP subsidies, which confirmed problems in the administrative structures. As in the first period, one of the ailments in the administration was the silo structure which impeded coordination and exchange of expert knowledge between and among the various units. The IACS program by the MacSharry reform introduced new requirements for all member states. The existence of a national cadastre was essential for the functioning of the IACS system (Louloudis and Beopoulos 2002). A cadastre is a single, systematically informed methodology for recording of the geometrical description and the property status of each plot of land under the responsibility and the guarantee of the state. The cadastre enables the registration of the agricultural land parcels that are eligible for receiving CAP subsidies. Greece received financial support

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from the EU structural funds for the development of the Hellenic cadastre, a project that started in 1993 (Louloudis and Beopoulos 2002). This project aimed to ensure traceability and correct payments of subsidies to producers. However, Greece failed to do so and remains even today the only EU member state without a fully developed national cadastre. This failure raised concerns and created disagreements between the Commission and the Greek authorities concerning the financing and progress of the Greek cadastre.45 Despite some modernisation and administrative reforms in the mid-1990s due to these external pressures, domestic administrative responses were slow, and the administrative structures were unable to adjust to the new needs. The high state interventionism adopted a rigid and costly administrative approach, which focused on details rather than results, did not allow changes in practices and administrative strategies (OECD 2001). OECD has suggested some regulatory alternatives and recommendations on practices, like in other OECD countries where these had been adopted, but these recommendations failed in Greece (ibid). These administrative practices have been general characteristics of the administrative structure in Greece. In his programme declaration to Parliament on 22 April 2000, the then Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis emphasised the need for changes in the public service mentality and for simplification of administration to increase efficiency and facilitate investment. Simitis decreased the number of ministries. In addition, the OECD (2001:8) stated that ‘administrative practices favour legalism and formalism instead of management based on results and market-­ orientation. Skills tend to be focused on procedure and conformance rather than substantive policy analysis’. This phenomenon of regulatory inflation has been present during the whole period of examination. In 1998, MINRDF established by law (Nr. 2637) the Organisation for Payments and Control of the Community Guidance and Guarantee Fund (OPEKEPE) and the Agricultural Land Development Company. Since 2001, OPEKEPE has operated under the auspices of MINFAF that constitutes a private legal entity whose main task is the monitoring, control and payment of CAP aid schemes according to EU and national legislation (Article 24 Greek Law 2045/01). A board of directors that consists of 11 members governs OPEKEPE. OPEKEPE is headquartered in Athens and has six regional branch directorates, four regional units and 39 local offices at prefecture level (OPEKEPE, homepage). 46 OPEKEPE approves and monitors the payments to the producers and the implementation of measures that concern imports and exports in the internal market according to the EU legislation (ibid). The first payments were made by OPEKEPE in 2006 to 900,000 beneficiaries (farmers, farmer associations, export companies, investors of the agricultural sector, manufacturing enterprises, etc.) and accounted for approximately 3 billion euros (ibid). The establishment of OPEKEPE aimed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the CAP and signified Europeanisation of administrative structures.

 2002/C 93 E/190 and WRITTEN QUESTION P-2562/01 by Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. 46  http://www.opekepe.gr/english/ 45

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OPEKEPE induced administrative formal changes that mainly responded to specific EU legislative demands (Pezaros 2004). These changes did not eliminate a number of infringements against Greece for mismanagement of the EU aid schemes. For example, the EU flagged Greece, and not only once, as the worst offender for not controlling agriculture expenditure, for example, in 2005 in the Court of Auditors annual report (See AE2231, 27.10.06, EP/1). The then EU Agriculture Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, indicated in her speech to the Budget Committee of the European Parliament in November 2006 that ‘I am requiring the Greek authorities to fix clear goals and deadlines to measure the progress for solving the remaining issues. If these deadlines are not respected, I will suspend advance payments’ (Agra Europe, December 1, 2006). The importance of the cadastre reemerged during the financial crisis. Until 2009, the special unit for agricultural administration in each of the 54 Prefectures47 was responsible for the administration of the agricultural policy and the implementation of the IACS system. The Prefectures were financially, administratively and politically subordinate to central government and did not acquire their own financial resources. Besides, the Prefectures linked MINRDF (national level) with the Municipalities48 (local level). This was important because central administration is distanced from the everyday problems and needs of the rural areas as indicated by the statement the farmers really enjoy life, fresh air, they have no problems, and they do not really work, just some months per year; they use immigrants and spend their time in the coffee shops (Interview 2005). 49 However, the Prefectures had limited involvement in the formation of policy strategies in the highly centralised decision-making process, unless there were personal links as shown in the network analysis. Consequently, there has been less diffusion of knowledge and information about local needs and insufficient advice available to the government for the effective administration of the CAP. As stated: There are Prefectures that really participate in the administration of the policy. There are Prefectures that have very good relations with the Ministry either as a result of the presence of some active and qualified employees or because the leaders of the Prefectures belong in the Government’s party and they try to support their political party’s reputation in any way possible. However, if the specific leader is not elected in the following elections or his party is not the governing party, this relationship ceases automatically. On the contrary, there are Prefectures that declare, in any attempt at contact from the Ministry, that they are not interested. Following the change of political leadership in a Prefecture, the attitude of its unit of Agriculture also changes (Interview 2005).50

 The Prefectural leaders were appointed by the government until 1994 that are directly elected.  Municipalities constitute the third level of Greek administration, their number is around a thousand and they have been directly elected since 1833. 49  Ministry of Rural Development and Food. 50  D, Ministry of Rural Development and Food and MEP consultant. 47 48

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In 2003, another CAP reform took place. The EU Council Regulation 1782/2003 complemented by the Commission Decision 796/04 introduced the computerised geographical information system. In 2005, a newly elected government led by the conservative party proposed the transfer of the administration of the IACS data computer systems from the Prefectures to the agricultural organisations (e.g. cooperatives). This transfer aimed to strengthen the organisations’ competences in the implementation process of the CAP.  The Prefectures were dissatisfied with this change, as it decreased their competences. They stated that the interest organisations had neither the necessary human capita, knowledge and expertise nor the financial resources to administer such complicated tasks (Interview 2005).51 As an example of this understanding, an interviewee stated that ‘the transfer of administrative competences to the farmer’s Union will be disastrous because these organisations lack not only the resources but also the qualified employees to implement the policy requirements (Interview 2005).52 Delays in the distribution of the CAP subsidies led to protests against the government and OPEKEPE for incompetence in the administration of the CAP payments. The protests disrupted the national transportation system (www.in.gr, 06/12/2006). Despite the various formal administrative changes, Greece has not been able to introduce the necessary sustainable structural administrative changes that would impede management discrepancies. Administrative mismanagement has repeatedly led to fines by the European Court of Justice, as in 2006 as the EU Court of Auditors report shows: in certain member states, in particular Greece, the EU farm accounts system was not fully implemented, leading to farmers making exaggerated declarations and being paid inflated subsidies. The Court declared that the quality of inspections in Greece was low and that the reporting of results was unreliable. Farmer’s Unions are responsible in Greece for putting all data into the computerised system and can make changes whenever they want - without the changes being recorded. Consequently instances of farmers exaggerating the size of their land are not uncommon, Greece was signalled out as the worst offender, but other countries also had their wrists slapped for irregular behaviour (i.e. Spain, the Netherlands and France) (Agra Europe, October 27, 2006). In 2007, the government re-established the ‘agricultural police’ in order to monitor the rural districts (3585/5-7-2007, ΦΕΚ 148 τ. Α’). This decision brought back memories of the dictatorship, raised concerns of politicisation and fears of bureaucratic drift, which were viewed as clientelism (exchange for votes). Through Law 3938/31-3-2011, ΦΕΚ 61, the agricultural police merged with the forest police. The high expectations of the conservative government did not last long. A low percentage and ineffective absorption of the EU financial support over time reflected the administrative incapacity at the domestic level. As one of the interviewees stated, in general the CAP support hasn’t been used in the right way. Instead (of introducing infrastructure changes), because of lack of the right management, it

51 52

 M, Thessaloniki Prefecture.  ET, NAGREF.

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was directed into keeping the farmers in farming. Moreover, it has not been able to introduce reforms in the modernisation of cultivation nor generated any strategies and targets for the future. This resulted in losing the opportunity to exploit the advantages that we were offered by the CAP for a sustainable agriculture that could respond to the challenges of globalisation (Interview 2006).53 The hierarchical and rigid structures impede communication of information not only vertically but also horizontally since there is no interaction between the higher level of the administration and civil servants at the lower levels of the hierarchy. The civil servants do not participate or are not prepared to intervene timely in the committees meetings at the EU level due to shortage of funding by the economic unit. As a result, there is no adequate representation of the Greek positions (Interview 2017).54 As an interviewee points out, in the Greek MINRDF learning/ training depends on the individual interest, will and curiosity of the employees or personal ambitions (Interview 2005).55 Moreover, in MIRDF, as in other ministries, there is a culture of ownership of knowledge and also of responsibility, which does not facilitate or enhance the sharing of information and knowledge. Those who acquire specialised knowledge and information use it to gain individual or political bargaining power, and therefore they do not disseminate it. Knowledge and information become an asset that links the political leadership with the person who ‘knows’. Besides, civil servants use knowledge and information as a political weapon against the rule party, if they are appointed by or attached to another government. Similar ailments exist in the permanent representations in Brussels. In the CAP, the national permanent representatives participate in the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA) instead of Committee of Permanent Representations (COREPER) that addresses other policy areas. The SCA supports the work and prepares the policy folder for the Council of Ministers meeting, after collaborating, deliberating and negotiating with the corresponding permanent representations from the other member states. Despite the fact that the Greek permanent representation in Brussels consists of a large number of persons compared to other representations of small member states, the civil servants are not prepared professionally. They do not receive any training on negotiation techniques or clear directions from the Ministry, and often they participate unprepared to negotiate56 with the other member states. Moreover, there is no an institutionalised selection process. The Minister appoints the civil servants in the permanent representation. Similar to the Permanent Representation, the national administrative representatives who participate in the working groups in the Commission often lack professional training and expertise; the result is that the vote has already taken place before they have had a chance to either be informed thoroughly on the issue or been in contact with the Ministry on

 B, Prefecture of Thessaloniki.  MINRDF, K. (11/2017). 55  Agricultural Unit, Prefecture Katerini. 56  PERREP, M, 2016. 53 54

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the country’s position about the specific issue. This is not due to lack of academic knowledge but absence of professional training or even not available relevant and timely information on the issues for discussion on the agenda. Civil servants have been sent to a particularly diverse environment, culturally, professionally and politically. There it is essential to form alliances to influence and ensure the representation of domestic policy interests in the SCA’s proposals to the Council of Ministers. Instead, interactions rely on informal personal relations, which depend fully on the civil servants’ ability, will and effort. These characteristics have hindered the professional representation of Greek agricultural interests at the Council of Ministers. Although there has been frequent and consistent interaction between the Greek central administration and the other national representatives in the working groups in the Commission and COREPER, lack of resources and preparation has impeded effective performance. The Greek permanent representatives have been unable to proactively present policy proposals founded on expert knowledge, and the Greek interests were not taken into account in a timely way in EU decisions. When Greece joined, the EU was self-sufficient in most crop production apart from maize. Greece also was not self-sufficient in beef and milk production that were imported. The CAP continued to support agricultural production in the North significantly (e.g. milk production absorbed a high share (40%) of the EU budget support).57 However, the quota for dairy production was very high for Greece in 1984, in comparison with other countries which deteriorated self-sufficiency and was the result of unsuccessful negotiations in Brussels. It took almost 20 years until a new quota allocation was agreed in the 2003 reform (EU 2003). Another example is the choice of the historical model combined with full decoupling58 of the 2003 CAP reform, with reference to the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) (Appendix III). According to an interviewee, this was not the best option for Greek agriculture that is mainly characterised by small scale farms. He states that the full payment historic model was mainly supported and benefits the farmers that are either planning to quit farming after 2013 and thus try to capitalise from the CAP as much as they can until then, or farmers that are not necessarily dependent on the CAP subsidies (larger farmers)’ (Interview 2006). 59 Another interviewee also criticises the historical model choice and states that ‘this model reproduces inequalities, it was chosen for clientelistic reasons and it is to the detriment also of the new young farmers because, by entering now, they cannot claim historical benefits. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to change it along the way because of administrative but also individual farmers plans (Interview 2017).60  Le 31 décembre 1980, le quotidien allemand Die Welt analyse les dispositions transitoires qui accompagnent l’adhésion de la Grèce à la Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Source: HADLER, Wilhelm, Franzosen und Italiener sorgen sich um ihre Pfirsiche und. Tomaten, in Die Welt. 31.12.1980. Translated by the CVCE.. 58  Ministers’ Decision No 324032, 14 December 2004, http://www.minagric.gr/greek/agro_pol/ KAP/1921B_.pdf 59  Farmer, Thessaloniki. 60  MIRDF, K, 2017. 57

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Despite the subjection of the Greek agricultural policy to the CAP for many years, the administration has not undergone any ‘experiential learning’ as a major source of institutional strategy change in a response to Europeanisation pressures (Stacey and Rittberger 2003). Agricultural administrative structures practices, and styles remained hierarchical and adversarial. Human capital and resources have not used adequately to facilitate administrative adaptation to the CAP. Administrative recruitment processes and practices, from the administrative leadership in the Ministry to the lower level civil servants, have been determined by personal contacts and partisan attachments and not professional qualifications and merit. Similarly, civil servants in the supervising organisations constitute political appointments. For example, the leadership of NAGREF, the national research advisory body of MINRDF, has been politically appointed. This had hindered continuity in the organisation’s work. The relations between NAGREF and MINRDF focused on formalities and on clarification of administrative matters because of lack of resources and competences (Interview 2005).61 For example, there were periods when the institute was functioning without leadership during government changes because of political conflicts (Interview 2005).62 The administration has been exhausted following blindly the political demands of each government and Minister instead of establishing norms and principles for long-term administrative structures and practices whose institutionalisation could ensure the long-term operation of the administrative system and compliance to EU policies. The embeddedness of the administrative structures in the political system has hindered administrative innovation and institutional changes. This has led to discrepancies and administrative failures. Consequently, Europeanisation and administrative adaptation have been limited to formalities, lacked vision, leading to inertia and the preservation of pre-­ existing ailments.

61 62

 ET, NAGREF.  ET, NAGREF.

Chapter 5

Comparing in Administrative Adaptation to CAP in Denmark-Greece

The two preceding chapters analyse the domestic factors and their changes in Denmark and Greece since the two countries joined the EU. Based on this analysis, in this chapter I compare systematically the three domestic factors and their characteristics – the organisation of the sector (the micro level), the domestic politics and network governance (macro level) – in the two countries examined in this study. This comparison generates original insights and well-supported explanations on how domestic factors affect administrative choices, patterns, practices and style differently in the two examined countries. The differences in these factors have led to variation in adaptation to CAP decisions as addressed in the main research question in this book: How do the domestic factors affect variation in the member states’ administrative adaptation to European agricultural policies and why? Specifically, the analysis shows that Denmark presents a high degree of administrative ‘absorption’, whereas Greece displays ‘inertia’ even though agricultural policy in both countries has followed the CAP rules since they joined the EU. The following sections present the comparison of each domestic factor over time in the two examined countries. Then the administrative responses in the examined countries and their adaptation to CAP are compared and discussed. The chapter closes with a conclusion.

Domestic Factors Drawing on the Europeanisation literature, in this chapter I concentrate on the comparison of the domestic factors (Table  5.1), their differences and similarities and their impact on the type and degree of domestic administrative adaptation to the EU CAP decisions. First, comparison of the organisational structures in agriculture in Denmark and Greece provides insights into the differences in the relationship between formation of interests in agriculture and the administrative choices in the

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Organisation of the sector Denmark Centralised Professional Vertically and horizontally integrated Highly organised

Greece Fragmented Unprofessional Non-integrated Low organisation

Table 5.1  Domestic factors Denmark-Greece compared Domestic politics Denmark Hierarchical Centralised/unitary Corporatist/collaborative Coordinative/consensus Professional/merit Greece Hierarchical Centralised/unitary Disjointed corporatist Clientelist Conflictual Patronage

Network governance patterns Denmark Greece Frequent Frequent Strong Weak Consistent Sporadic Professional Personalised

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two countries in relation to a policy that is decided at the supranational EU level. Second, comparison of the domestic politics allows a better understanding of the formal and informal aspects of the state-society relations in the two countries and their impact on the administrative choices, structures, style and practices. The diachronic analysis of these two factors captures and connects the micro and macro dimensions in governance of agricultural policy and their changes over time, especially as a response to external challenges such as EU integration or CAP reforms. Third, comparing the actors’ interactions and their specificities (e.g. frequency, strength, etc.) in the two countries furnishes knowledge on the structure of the network, the network characteristics of the actors involved in the process and their positioning in the network governance of the two countries.

The Organisational Structure of the Sector The organisation of the agricultural sector in Denmark and Greece differs significantly. The organisational structures of Danish agriculture are highly concentrated1 and centralised under the umbrella organisation, the DAC (Table  5.1). The high degree of centralisation has facilitated the access to and spread of information to all members with regard to interest representation, resources, emerging problems and potential solutions. Information sharing and deliberation among the members of the DAC has also contributed to the development of long-term strategies about the potential risks and gains involved in cooperation and has enabled collective learning and trust building. In contrast, the organisational structures of the large number of farmers in Greece who own small-sized farms are characterised by fragmentation. The farmers interests are represented by various organisations, namely, PASEGES, GESASE and SYDASE that follow a similar path over time. This fragmentation has hindered deliberation and cooperation and impeded the sharing of information, which has affected the building of trust over time. The Danish cooperative model of agricultural organisation has strengthened the sector’s capacity to reach decisions and develop long-term strategies. Despite the diverse and competing sub-sectoral interests (e.g. pork, beef, mink, grain, etc.), the producers have managed to reach compromises and consensus-driven agreements. The cooperative structures have increased integration of the agricultural interests and empowered the sector’s bargaining capacity during negotiations with the government. Furthermore, the development of agricultural cooperatives boosted the agricultural modernisation and further stimulated agricultural exports that paved the way for the development of domestic markets in the rural areas for a variety of goods. Despite attempts to introduce a cooperative model in Greek agriculture, even by law, these efforts collapsed. Instead, various attempts have strengthened politici1  Concentration within the agricultural sector is measured by average farm size: high farm size indicates concentration, and low farm size indicates dispersion of the agricultural sector (Chap. 2 and Bowler 1992).

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sation and clientelism over time. Moreover, this fragmentation and balkanisation in the sectoral organisation has decreased the sector’s bargaining power in negotiations with the state and hindered the agricultural society’s involvement and support of the policy and administrative process. These characteristics have also influenced the way the state has addressed agricultural policy problems; the latter have been treated as specific short-term emerging issues due to absence of a long-term policy strategies (e.g. focus on broader structural problems linked to specific kinds of production, such as cotton). Consequently, the organisation of the sector in Greece in contrast to Denmark has not been able to enhance development of integrated solutions and policy mechanisms for agriculture as a whole. Moreover, failure to promote the agricultural interests has led to intense criticism of the agriculture organisations. These organisations have been criticised for partisan attachments and lack of transparency and authoritarianism, which has led to decrease in membership of these organisations. Professionalism has been a significant mechanism of the agricultural organisation in Denmark. To this end, DAC has consistently and regularly organised lifelong training activities. Through institutionalised training, the sector has developed its professionalism and has generated specialised knowledge, skills and expertise. In this way, the sector has articulated its strategies and developed collaborations and interactions internally and with the government, the administration and broader society over time. The sectoral organisations have acknowledged the necessity of professional training early on. Professionalism has enabled the sector to update its necessary knowledge. Besides, the producers have learned how and where to seek the right information at the right time. Consequently, professionalism has enriched the sectoral adaptability to changes and external challenges and events over time (e.g. financial crises, climate and natural challenges) and has strengthened the sector’s effective and timely responses to EU CAP demands. Lastly, professionalism has ameliorated the sector’s image among the other sectors and with society. In Greece, absence of compulsory institutionalised training has impeded the development of professionalism in agriculture and hindered the professional integrity of farmers, their position and image both in the economy and in society. Moreover, lack of professionalism has affected the organisational structures of the sector but also its interactions and collaboration with the government and the administration. This is reflected in the agricultural sector’s ineffective forms of contestation (e.g. the blocking of the national roads, almost once a year) of the government’s policy decisions to sectoral problems. E.GE.KA-DIMITRA organised for a number of years sporadic and inconsistent training activities. These activities that were supported financially by the government and the EU programmes have not operated on a regular and consistent basis, and have not been able to provide an integrated agricultural training based on a thoroughly designed curriculum. In order to address the lack of an institutionalised extension service, a number of private or semiprivate organisations organised various short-term training initiatives, funded by the EU or other private foundations. However, such types of activities do not constitute an integrated cohesive agricultural training programme that can develop long-term agricultural professionalism. Apart from being inconsistent and sporadic, these

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training interventions and thematic seminars have mostly concentrated on advising and consultation on an irregular basis. They are on a voluntary basis and do not condition professional agricultural activities. Consequently, the agricultural society in Greece has not developed the professional capacity over time and has not learned how to seek the relevant information and knowledge and adapt to emerging challenges. In Denmark, the establishment of the advisory professional community has supported farmers’ activities, entrepreneurship and competitiveness. This advisory system functions at two levels, the regional and the local. The farmers finance the advisory system through their organisations (90%), which establishes a principal-­ agent relationship. Thus farmers have an incentive not only to use the advisory system but also to evaluate and reform it. The advisory centres cooperate closely with the national agricultural research institutes that are supervised by the government. This has resulted in a policy community that links the actors, formally and informally, within the entire agricultural policy process, from the decision-making to administration. Despite efforts to establish an extension system in Greece, this became bureaucratic, fragmented, ineffective and non-existent over time (Koutsouris and Karanikolas 2018). In Denmark, primary agriculture is linked directly to the other levels of production and the food processing industry, while in Greece such connection does not exist. The close collaboration and vertical integration of the different levels in the Danish agri-food value chain has fostered entrepreneurship and strengthened the development of professional relations. Besides, this integration has generated incentives for consistently high standards in primary production and enabled professional mobility, since farmers also work in the food industry. Finally, collaboration and integration has encouraged technological innovation and modernisation in the sector by identifying and addressing the needs at all level in the industry and among consumers. In addition, the relatively early Danish integration into the international economy due to high agricultural exports has contributed to a comparatively open economy. The expansion of the agricultural markets has led to industrialisation and further economic success. This economic independence has enabled the sector to respond effectively to the societal criticism concerning the financial support by the CAP and use of resources to the detriment of the taxpayers. Instead, Greek agriculture failed to establish such organisational structures between the various levels of production in the industry. In contrast, in Greece the ‘intermediaries’ between the primary production and the industry have hindered their direct connection and the development of collaborations and synergies, which has increased prices for the consumers and reduced the farmers’ profit. Farmers activities have concentrated on bargaining with the intermediaries for higher prices instead of introducing innovation and technology to modernise the sector. Thus, the two countries’ agricultures have faced different challenges in terms of organisation, training, competition and goals. While the Danish agricultural system has targeted effective production, high standards and competitiveness in international markets, the Greek agricultural organisation has exhausted itself through domestic politicisation and clientelism.

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The EU membership added an extra level in the decision-making for agricultural policy, which also introduced new arenas for interest representation. Both the Danish and the Greek agricultural sectors are present at the EU level. However, they have used different means, articulation and interaction forms with the EU institutions to affect the EU decisions. The high level of centralisation and professionalism has enhanced the sectoral adaptability and adjustment to new challenges over time since 1973 in Denmark. Most importantly, the sector has become a significant actor in the administration of the CAP either directly through the transfer of administrative competences or as a supportive consultative actor. The Danish sectoral organisations have been directly present in Brussels in order to proactively influence the EU decisions and processes, either through their umbrella organisation, the DAC, or through sub-sectoral organisations (e.g. the pork sector). The Greek representation of agricultural interests at the EU level has presented similar patterns to those at the domestic level. Representation by PASEGES in Brussels has mostly been reactive to EU decisions and focused on sub-sectoral policy issues through inconsistent, broad, unclear and not always professional interventions on EU policy proposals. In addition, the Greek agricultural sector has not been able to support, advise or get involved in the administration, as it has not been able to develop professional qualifications for such roles. In sum, the organisation of the agricultural interests has differed between the two examined countries and has had different implications for domestic agricultural administrative adaptation to the EU CAP. This difference in representation is attributed to differences in resources – human capital and material – and organisational structures, which are also reflected in the relation between the sectoral organisational structures and the administration in the two examined countries.

Domestic Politics In this section, I compare the domestic agricultural politics based on the separate analysis of each country in the preceding chapters since they joined the EU (Table 5.1). Domestic agricultural politics present similarities and differences in the two countries. The domestic agricultural politics are formally hierarchical and centralised both in Denmark and Greece and coordinated in the capitals Copenhagen and Athens, respectively. However, in Denmark hierarchy and centralisation is combined with broader forms of participatory network governance and involves various actors from the sector and the society (Chatzopoulou and Poulsen 2017). For example, the Ministry of Food Agriculture and Fisheries (MINFAF) represents the country’s position at the Council of Agricultural Ministers in the EU based on the opinions provided by the interparty parliamentary committees on EU affairs and Agriculture that are actively involved in the decision-making. Besides, the various relevant groups − agricultural, environmental and consumers − are participating in the §2 Committee that advices the Minister. When it comes to specific rules, such as the pollution of the water by agriculture, the local-level government is also involved.

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In Greece, in ­contrast, the Parliament plays an advisory informal role at almost all stages. Instead, a significant number of ministerial acts and Presidential Decrees introduce secondary legislation for agriculture as also in other policy areas in Greece. The government formally interacts frequently with the sector in both countries. In Denmark, despite the high centralisation of domestic politics formally, informally the government coordinates and consults with the agricultural organisations, for the allocation of resources and long-term agricultural policy strategy. This statesociety collaboration provides the government with the necessary information to make informed decisions. This type of collaboration does not exist in Greece. The frequent interactions between the political elites with the sector focus on personal favours, financial support and allocation of resources to short-term oriented tasks, which is a common characteristic in Greek politics. In Greece, in the ‘generally centralised political system the national government in Athens determines the allocation of resources, sets the rules and determines planning, with subnational authorities highly dependent on its authorization and favour’ (Featherstone 2005a: 230). Besides, those who acquire the information and knowledge in the centre do not disseminate it; instead, they tend to use it as a bargaining power for personal interests, reflecting the high level of politicisation and hierarchical and clientelistic domestic politics. Lack of the necessary channels for information sharing (e.g. with the subnational level) combined with the centralisation of decision competences at the ministerial level has disrupted the communication between the centre and the periphery and hindered effective and coherent administration and management of the EU policy decisions over time. Various institutional changes at the domestic level followed the subordination of domestic agricultural policies to the CAP due to the countries’ membership to the EU. These institutional changes have varied between the two countries; they have been nationally specific and have combined continuity but also path dependency. Following the EU membership in 1973, the Danish agricultural interests became the interests of the entire country due to the importance of the sector in the country’s economy. This view has determined the government’s policy strategy that focused on representing agricultural interests effectively in Brussels at the Council of Ministers, through well-prepared policy proposals, founded on expert knowledge. The role of the domestic administration has been crucial during the policy agendasetting and policy formulation phase; the administration provides expertise and administrative support in close collaboration with the permanent representation on the preparation tasks for regular, once a week, SCA meetings after consulting with the domestic stakeholders (e.g. agricultural sector). At this stage, the Ministry identifies the necessary policy instruments and mechanisms for effective agricultural policy and administration of CAP decisions at the domestic level. In Greece, in contrast, despite the frequent interactions between the MIRDF and the permanent representatives, the latter do not always receive clear directions from the Ministry, and often they participate unprepared to negotiate with the other member states. This is not due to lack of academic knowledge but absence of professional training in negotiation techniques or even lack of relevant and timely information on the issues for discussion on the agenda. This process has hindered the professional and

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well-informed representation of Greek agricultural interests at the Council of Ministers. As a result, the permanent representatives rely on informal personal relations with the fellow colleagues from the other member states (Interview,2 2017). In Denmark, domestic administrative changes due to the transfer of policy competences to the EU have undoubtedly weakened the agricultural organisations’ monopoly over information and affected the corporatist patterns of the policy process. Due to ministerial reorganisation, the channels of influence have been modified. In reality, the administration model has changed from delegating administration to the sector to corporatist administration. Nevertheless, the agricultural organisations have maintained their involvement and influence on agricultural policy formally through the established ‘Paragraph §2 committee’ and informally through continuous interactions. In Greece, the subordination of the agricultural policy under the CAP, in 1981, triggered institutional changes at both the Ministry and sectoral levels. Yet these changes maintained the formal hierarchical character, remained centralised top-down and treated the CAP as a purely technical issue and not as a strategic policy. In Denmark, the government and the administration recognised the importance of the sectors’ insightful expertise and knowledge on the policy. Through the consultation process, the sector has had the opportunity over time to promote its interests and consistently influence the policy decisions. Besides, the agricultural organisations became even more organised and prepared to pinpoint their concerns with respect to government or EU policy proposals and decisions when these did not represent the sectoral interests adequately. The government-organisations interactions have thus strengthened the ‘iron triangle’, which demonstrates continuity and path dependence. In Greece, intense and frequent interactions between the state and the leadership of the agricultural organisations but also with the political parties have focused on personal benefits and networking. Consequently, the introduced changes could not eliminate the politicisation and clientelistic patterns (e.g. attracting farmers’ votes) in the various constituencies. Thus, the meetings and interactions of the agricultural organisations became fora for political campaigns and party politics. These interactions have nurtured competition rather than cooperation among the fragmented agricultural organisations. Politicisation and clientelism in agricultural politics led to populist policy instruments (e.g. loans by the state-owned Agricultural Bank based on personal connections) and legislation (e.g. cooperative law). These measures have resulted in penalties and loss of credibility of the Greek agricultural sector at the EU level (European Court of Justice 1992). Consequently, as had already begun at the start of the 1980s under the socialist government, economic and administrative discrepancies and corruption have impeded institutional change and diminished the cooperative movement similarly to other policy areas (Featherstone 1990; Kazakos 2001). The content and frequency of the state-society interactions supported participatory governance in Danish agricultural politics, through professional collaboration

 Greek Permanent Representation, Brussels.

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and maintained continuity in policy strategies. In Greece, the highly centralised hierarchical agricultural politics have been combined with frequent changes in the political leadership, accompanied by changes of administrative leadership. The administrative changes were based on personal relations, attachments to political parties and patronage, instead of merit and objective qualifications. As a result, domestic politics failed to develop a professional culture and have nurtured clientelism. Importantly, these changes have disrupted the institutional memory and delayed or cancelled existing policy strategies. This has had negative implications for the administrative adaptation process to the EU CAP policy decisions (e.g. the establishment of the IACS system of administration of the CAP, or failure to establish a cadastre). Similar patterns have been observed in most policy areas in Greece (i.e. regional and environmental policy areas) (Pagoulatos 1999; Koutalakis 2001). In 1992, the MacSharry reform affected the economic and socio-political aspects of the agricultural policy. Despite pressure by consumers and taxpayers for CAP reforms, in Denmark MINFAF maintained its close collaboration with the agricultural organisations during this period. Based on consensus and after intensive negotiations, which is a process deeply embedded in Danish politics since the early nineteenth century, it has been possible to reach compromises on agricultural policy decisions and strategies. Under the representation of DAC, which provides an integrated view for most of agriculture, the sector has strengthened its bargaining position, while it has been easier for the government to respond to one common sector proposal than to negotiate with each sub-sector separately. Deliberation in domestic politics and collaborative governance has enhanced the adaptability capacity of Danish agriculture to new or unfamiliar challenges and has enabled development of well-informed professional diagnoses of the emerging situations and consensusdriven agreements (e.g. the BSE case). These embedded norms in the domestic politics have helped the development of shared understandings among the involved actors, strengthened coordination among them and cemented cooperativism over time, which indicates the path dependence elements of the agricultural policy development in Denmark. The national economic patriotism and the link of agriculture to national identity have been reflected in expressions of classical liberalism and social democracy within a well-developed state apparatus. Nevertheless, politicisation has been apparent also in Danish agricultural politics. Large-scale farmers have been closely connected to the liberal party (Venstre3), while small-scale farmers have been attached to the Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre). These party-agricultural society connections confirm politicisation characteristics. Moreover, the strong government-­agricultural society connections enabled the creation of a common agricultural vision and defined specific strategic targets. In addition, in close collaboration with and support of the administration, Danish agriculture identified and adopted sustainable and feasible solutions and facilitated effective adaptation to the EU CAP at minimum cost (e.g. the early preparation for the adaptation of the 2003

3  Although Venstre means ‘left’ in Danish, its name refers to its liberal and democratic ideas and aimed to differentiate it from the conservative party.

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reform at least 3 years before the reform was applied in 2005) irrespective of the governing political party. In Greece, following critiques of the Papandreou government for populism, the Simitis (1996–2004) socialist government attempted to strengthen technocracy and increase professionalism in domestic politics and policy-making processes (Featherstone 2003). However, this technocratic attempt did not last long. Domestic politics maintained politicisation and embeddedness in the pre-existing institutional settings, demonstrating continuity and path dependence. Consequently, neither the CAP and the following reforms nor changes in governments have created a critical juncture in domestic politics. The ‘disjointed’ corporatist model was combined with opportunistic rent-seeking relations (Lavdas 2005), which have impeded the building of strong state-agricultural society relations. Lack of organisational professionalism and collaboration among the state, the administration and the sector has hindered the absorption of the EU funds or delayed the processes, a problem that Greece has faced over time also in other policy areas. In 1992, MINRDF reorganised into specialised units corresponding to the different kinds of agricultural production in order to increase specialisation and respond to the demands of the 1992 MacSharry reform. This reorganisation resulted in conflict among experts in MINRDF, because they were not involved actively in the decisions concerning the reform, and resulted in their view in lost opportunities to introduce structural changes and adapt to CAP decisions. Similar patterns of unpreparedness were observed during the 2003 CAP reform, demonstrating once again path dependence. Following pressure from the agricultural organisations, the Greek government suggested to strengthen the role of the farmers and their involvement in the policy implementation process. However, this proposal triggered a lot of conflict as the Prefectures claimed that the sectoral organisations had neither the expertise nor resources to undertake such tasks. In reaction, the sectoral organisations responded that they had the necessary insight, knowledge and expertise and they could fulfil the job better (Interview,4 2005). Similarly, the MINRDF decision to support full decoupling of the CAP generated a lot of conflict and disagreement among the involved actors. Overall, decisions seemed to be sporadic, addressing short-term targets and lacking consistent communication and coordination between the political and administrative system and the sector. The failure to establish the necessary settings for the IACS administrative system, which in Denmark was already ready in 1991, is another example. In sum, the domestic politics have been and have remained hierarchical and centralised over time in both countries, embedded in pre-existing institutional settings and presenting continuity and path dependence. In Denmark, domestic politics operate within a ‘networked polity’, where centralisation and hierarchy is combined with coordination and inclusion of the relevant actors within corporatist structures. These structures have encouraged and enabled administrative choices based on collaboration and professionalism. In contrast, the Greek domestic agricultural politics

 K, PASEGES;B, Prefecture of Thessaloniki.

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has maintained hierarchical, asymmetrical political power relations over time, which has impeded the development of robust relations between the government, the administration and the agricultural society and failed to introduce long-term policy and administrative strategic choices. Thus, despite the subordination of the agricultural policies under the CAP in both countries, domestic agricultural politics differ over time.

Network Governance Patterns Similarly to the two preceding sections, this section compares the agricultural network governance patterns in Denmark and Greece. More specifically it compares, the type of actors that are involved in the policy network, their interactions and their positioning in the network structures, their similarities and/or differences (Table 5.1). In Denmark, the presence of strong network patterns facilitates exchange of resources and joint learning through inclusion of the affected actors in policy decisions and coordination among the various levels of the policy-making process. In Greece, weak and disconnected network patterns create gaps in the flow of information and impede collaborations and collective learning. Based on the social network analysis (SNA) method, the comparative analysis of the agricultural network patterns demonstrates that these differ between the two countries. The differences concern the structure, the type and the roles of the included actors, frequency (dense versus sporadic) of interactions, the content of interactions (well prepared and specific versus general and ambiguous) and the direction of the relationships (who contacts whom). Figures 3.2 and 4.2 presents the SNA visualisations of the networks and demonstrate the differences between the two networks with respect to structure. The Danish network is represented by a circle O structure, whereas the Greek network is a Y structure (Borgatti et al. 2009). The circle-type network demonstrates more horizontal structure and inclusiveness and more direct connections. The Y network demonstrates more top-down hierarchical structure and fewer direct connections. The frequency of interactions among the actors in the network refers to the actors’ opportunity to affect policy and/or administrative choices. The ministries MINFAF and MINRDF have many formal competences but also frequent interactions with the other actors in the policy and administrative process. This finding matters because the more competences an actor has, the more influential are that actor’s frequent interactions in this process. The Danish circle network is dense; actors are connected and interact frequently, and their interactions indicate duration. The visualisation of the network shows strong ties among the centrally positioned actors in the closely connected agricultural network (e.g. MINFAF, DFFE and DAC). In the network, DAC provides expertise that supports MINFAF policy decisions and administrative strategies, as the qualitative analysis has also shown. MINFAF provides access to policy information to DAC. In Greece, many actors are not connected, so there are gaps in the actors’ interactions. These findings are in accordance with the domestic politics analysis. The especially

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dense contacts of MINRDF with OPEKEPE and the sectoral organisation PASEGES are loosely coupled with the lower administrative levels (i.e. Prefectures and local government have few interactions) in the process. These characteristics contribute to a high degree of asymmetric power relations between the actors and reveal hierarchical centralised structures. This indicates gaps in flow of information that depends on personalised contacts and inconsistency in the coordination of the process and reveals the hierarchical centralised network patterns in Greek agriculture. The networks differ with respect to type of actors and their roles. The Danish network includes more and diverse types of actors, which provides more opportunities to gather and share diverse knowledge and information and inform the policy process. Following Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) typology, many actors in the network play a brokerage role.5 These actors represent various levels of the policy process: political leadership (MINFAF), the administration (DFFE), the farmers’ umbrella organisation (DAC) and the sub-sectoral organisations (e.g. DF, MA). MINFAF acts as a meta-governor in this process. In the Greek network, two actors are prominent.6 In Greece, MINRDF and PIO1 (PASEGES) played a brokerage role. MINRDF facilitated but also decided on policy and received directly all the information concerning EU policy decisions, which confirms centralisation and concentration of competences. PASEGES, the sectoral organisation, acted as a facilitator in Greece. The lower-level actors (local authorities and local farmers unions) were in contact with MINRDF through the Prefectures and the subnational level government. The Prefectures acted as the intermediaries between the sector (the local cooperatives) and MINRDF, but they did not play any brokerage role. Similarly, the administrative bodies (OPEKEPE) did not play a brokerage role (e.g. the Prefectures), whereas in Denmark, the administration played both a consultative and a liaison role. Once again this is consistent with the qualitative analysis. The content of the actors’ interactions also differs between the two networks. In Denmark, interactions among the actors provided and exchanged technocratic knowledge through professional reports by the highly specialised and qualified expert personnel at all levels and through formal and informal personal interactions (e.g. phone, e-mail). The aim of the interactions is to develop well-founded policy decisions, proposals and problem solutions and influence the EU level. In contrast to this, in the Greek network, the actors’ personal interests determine the content of the interactions. Lack of lifelong training programmes at all levels turns the production of knowledge into a personal responsibility. Moreover, high politicisation and attachment to political parties do not support professional and technocratic interactions, which is reflected in their content and purpose. The direction of an interaction demonstrates if an actor is a receiver (acceptor) or a sender (initiator) of an interaction. The direction of the actors’ interactions differs between the two countries. If an actor acts as sender or receiver, is characterised as

5  A coordinator (DF), two gatekeepers (DF, MA), two representatives (DAC and DF), three consultants (DFEE) and three liaisons (DFFE, MINFAF and MA). 6  Two liaisons (MINRDF and PASEGES) and one consultant (MINRDF).

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‘communicator’ and/or ‘facilitator’ in the network. The ones who receive information are usually prestigious influential decision-making actors, or they are connected with significant actors in the network and act as bridges. These actors could be overloaded with information. The actors who send act as communicators. This makes sense intuitively, since decision-makers receive information from various actors that are interested in influencing the policy outcomes. In contrast, a decision-­ maker informs those interested or affected by the policy outcome, and so they initiate the contact. The higher the number of interactions, the higher the potential influence. Resources (e.g. specialised divisions for public relations, human capital) enable an actor to be active and influential in the network. Actors with a small number of ties have a lower potential to be influential. Actors with a medium number of ties, in ‘the middle’, can be influential if they are connected to the ‘right’ actors; otherwise, they might have very little influence. For example, in Denmark, MINFAF (actors #1), DFFE (actor #7), DAC (actor #2) and MA (actor #14) are high receivers with 25, 19, 14 and 8 contacts, respectively. Besides, DAC (#2), MA (actor #14), FOI (actor #6) are significant senders of contacts, with 20, 16 and 15 contacts, respectively, while MINFAF (actor #1) and DFFE (actor #7) send to 8 actors. These numbers tell us that actors act differently and interact with various other actors in different settings. The SNA statistics show that three actors are particularly salient in the Danish network, namely, MINFAF, DAC and DFFE, which also confirms the high centralisation. Similarly, in the Greek network, MINRDF (actor #1) and OPEKEPE (actor #3) are high receivers with 11 and 9 contacts, respectively. PASEGES (PIO1 actor #10), the EU (actor #7), EP (actor #9) and EASPIE (actor #14) receive from four actors. However, MINRDF (actor #1) and PIO1 (actor#10) are also prominent senders, with 11 and 8 contacts, respectively, indicating centralisation of power. NAGREF (actor #2) as a research institute was also a significant sender with five contacts. The interaction between the Prefectures and the Ministry varies among Prefectures because of the specific characteristics of the relations between the subnational and national levels, i.e. political parties-government and subnational leadership relations. These findings demonstrate differences in the network patterns between the two countries, with respect to density of interactions, the direction but also structure. These differences matter as they help us understand the role of the network patterns in administrative change and adaptation. For example, in the closed and connected network in Denmark, the diffusion of professional information supports informed, inclusive and more effective administrative choices. The Danish network patterns include actors at all levels of the policy process, and information and knowledge are highly spread. The available information make the actors aware of developments in the policy area and prepare them to adapt to these changes, establish the necessary changes and reorganise the allocation of resources for the best use of the agreed policy instruments and mechanisms. Domestic actors increasingly have been able to reflect on their initial strategy and initiate new strategies of administering CAP decisions. In order for this to occur, the actors need to be able to interact, communicate and obtain professional knowledge. Consequently, the Danish network patterns support the administrative adaptation of practices, rules and the restructuring and use of

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resources through a learning process. In contrast, the loose, disconnected network in Greece did not allow administrative choices to be thought through carefully through deliberation and coordination among the actors. The learning process has been dependent on individual will and curiosity of the employees or on personal ambitions, and it is not institutionalised and professional. Thus the network patterns do not facilitate administrative adaptation but instead induce inertia and low implementation performance. In Denmark, the sociograms show that the actual policy process moves from MINFAF to the other actors involved in the sector. MINFAF interacts with DAC as well as with FOI etc. (Fig. 3.2). In Greece, as shown in the sociogram (Fig. 4.2), the policy process moves from MINRDF to the Prefectures and the local-level authorities, but a different set of actors with different responsibilities and competencies is involved every time. The fragmentation and the gaps in the connections in the network patterns lead to incoherent, administrative structures, style and practices, which are embedded in the pre-existing administrative settings. The strong Danish agricultural network represents a ‘policy community’, while the loose Greek network is an ‘issue network’ in accordance with Rhodes’ (1997) typology. The Greek network looks more like an issue network due to the greater diversity of actors, the large number of participants and their limited degree of interdependence. The actors influence the policy decision-making process on specific issues and not on an integrated policy strategy. For example, when discussions at the EU level started concerning withdrawal of the tobacco subsidies, there were frequent interactions between MINRDF and the sub-sectoral organisations on tobacco (National Boards for Tobacco). However, these interactions did not last after the EU decision to stop the subsidies, and the ‘network’ collapsed. Similarly, cotton producers were in frequent interactions with the government during the time that the cotton policy was changing in the EU, but not before or after. Both examples indicate lack of continuity and stability in interactions, which is an important characteristic in policy networks.

Variation in the Administrative Adaptation to the EU CAP This section compares the agricultural administrative structures in Denmark and Greece, their changes over time and the similarities and differences in their administrative adaptation to the CAP since 1973 and 1981. Table 5.2 categorises the findings on the administrative adaptation in Denmark and Greece based on Europeanisation literature indicators such as inertia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment (Radaelli 2003; Börzel 2002, 2005; Börzel and Risse 2003). Agriculture constitutes an important economic sector with a high share of agriculture exports in both countries. Both countries represent centralised governance systems, but they also have significant differences with respect to the policy-making

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Table 5.2  Variation in Europeanisation of domestic administration

Administrative structures

Administrative style

Inertia Greece Decentralised and fragmented Hierarchical Patronage Changes: COAMS, YSELEK in MINRDF, EU Unit in MINRDF, IASC Hierarchical and formal Fragmented Incoherent Adversarial/rigid Nonadaptive Conflictual Exclusive Uncommunicated and reserved No change

Absorption Denmark Centralised Hierarchical and collaborative Merit based Changes: COAMS, EU Unit in MINFAF, EU affairs Committee in Parliament, §2 Committee in MINFAF, IASC Hierarchical and coordinated Formal and informal Coherent Consensual Adaptive Inclusive Willing and communicative Changes: Increased coordination among the different departments and the stakeholders, through processes of learning

Source: Based on Radaelli’s typology (Radaelli 2003)

processes but also domestic factors, which explain the differences between the administrative adaptation of the two countries to the CAP since joining the EU. Administrative differences were already present when Denmark and Greece acceded to the EU and remain until today. Since these countries joined the EU, the responsible ministries for agricultural policy, MINFAF in Denmark and MIRDF in Greece, formally shape and decide the policy strategy and administration at the domestic level. Both ministries consist of specialised units according to different products and policy areas. MINRDF in Greece consists of more units that reflect the great variety of agricultural sub-sectors in the country but also the high degree of fragmentation in the policy-making and the administration process (Figs. 3.9 and 4.6). Following EU membership, both countries introduced specific agencies (DFFE in Denmark and OPEKEPE in Greece) in response to the needs of administering the CAP at the domestic level, which is an indication of a domestic Europeanisation process. These agencies are responsible for the administration of the payments for subsidies (Pillar 1) and the agricultural growth and rural development (Pillar 2) under the ministries’ supervision. When Denmark joined the EU in 1973, the Danish agricultural decision-making process and agricultural organisations were modified to cope with the EU CAP. The political and administrative resources were restructured and the EU policy unit was established, which increasingly strengthened the administrative competences of the Ministry’s permanent secretariat. This administrative change ended the delegated administration of the agricultural market policy to the sectoral organisations. The Ministry became the link between the domestic and the EU level but also the administrator of the CAP subsidies and COAMs at the domestic level. These changes

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increased the number and type of administrative staff, mostly economists, so that they could cover the administrative needs of the technicalities and the complexities of the CAP. This change confirms the Europeanisation of both the administrative patterns and practices at the domestic level. Furthermore, the establishment of the EU affairs committee in the Parliament has played an important role in the domestic agricultural policy positions that were taken next at the Council of Ministers in Brussels, another indication of Europeanisation process. During the same time period, along with these reorganisations, a 17-person advisory committee, The Paragraph (§2) Committee, was established, which was expected to advise the Ministry of Agriculture for meetings at the Council of Ministers as well as on the administration of the CAP in Denmark. These two developments in the Ministry and in the Parliament suggest Europeanisation that goes beyond the administrative level to include domestic patterns and practices that complement Europeanisation of administration. This adaptation process to CAP represents ‘absorption’ in the measurement typology. Similarly to Denmark, after Greece joined the EU in 1981, MINRDF remained the central decision-maker of policy at the domestic level. In contrast to Denmark, Parliament played a minimal role in the formulation of the domestic agricultural policy. MINFAF attempted at various times to reorganise (i.e. hiring a number of experts from different disciplines to prepare the presentation of the domestic interests), as in Denmark. MINFAF established different units and organisations, such as the ‘European unit’ YSELEK,7 an indication of Europeanisation. These attempts aimed to facilitate the administration of EU CAP subsidies and the COAMs at the domestic level, which confirms formal administrative adaptation to CAP, as also in Denmark. Nevertheless, most changes remained at the formal and technical level and were locked into pre-existing paths of managing and administering the CAP with respect to practices and style in Greece. Domestic structural and administrative changes were concentrated on the alignment of the domestic prices to the higher EU level, which consequently could increase and assure farmers’ incomes. The monitoring and evaluation was poor at both the domestic and the EU levels, resulting in the lack of substantial feedback to the domestic-level administration. The administration has focused mostly on legalism and conformance than performance and results. As long as domestic responses met the EU formal requirements, there was no impact assessment process or long-term strategy. For example, when Greek agriculture came under the CAP rules, production was directed to the most subsidised sectors because doing so would contribute to gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, absence of annual reports of the Ministry’s and the administration’s work did not allow any comparison with and avoidance of pre-existing mistakes. Therefore Europeanisation in administration in Greece represents a process based more on inertia rather than absorption. 7  ‘Ypiresia Scheseon Ellados – EK’ (Unit for Relations between Greece and the EC). It was a Unit headed by a Director General (Alternate) and consisting of five Directorates: Legal EU-Affairs, Plant-Production, Animal-Production, Agricultural Economy, Agri-Structures (P, Ministry, personal contact).

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The 1992 MacSharry reform introduced the decoupling of the CAP mechanisms, and the gradual reform of the price support towards direct payments introduced new parameters. The Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture developed the Integrated Administration and Control System8 (IACS). This system required the establishment of institutions and administrative structures for the coordination of the policy supported by a cadastre system. Denmark adapted effectively to the new requirements. The administration in collaboration with MINFAF and the sector had been well prepared to adjust to the changes since 1973. The essentials of the Danish cadastre system had already been established in 1844,9 which confirms adaptation. In contrast, in the Greek case, domestic administrative change and adaptation to the 1992 reform was slow. The necessary cadastre system in order for the IACS to be enforced did not exist in Greece, which resulted in administrative discrepancies. Greece was the only EU15 member state that did not have a national cadastre10 (Louloudis and Beopoulos 2002). This situation resulted in variation in the administrative adaptation between Denmark and Greece and indicates inertia in Europeanisation of administration in Greece. In 2001, MINFAF established three Directorates that mainly separated the political responsibilities of the agricultural policy-making and the administrative tasks. The various actors that were involved in the process viewed this division of tasks differently. The Ministry officials and some sectoral organisations considered it positive because the separation of the daily tasks from the political responsibilities strengthened efficiency and the roles and actors’ responsibilities became clearer (Interviews,11 2006). The policy department in MINFAF, Denmark, was able to concentrate on policy strategy and formulation, while the Directorate for Market Organisations focused on purely administrative functions. This represents a change in administrative patterns. Similarly, in Greece, since 2001 the Organisation for Payments and Control of the Community Guidance and Guarantee Fund (OPEKEPE) has operated under the auspices of MINRDF and is responsible for the monitoring,  See Chap. 2.  ‘Since the beginning the cadastre consisted of two parts: the cadastral register and the cadastral maps. Both of these components have been updated continually ever since. The resulting property framework from the enclosure movement formed the basis for the new cadastral maps. Even if the primary purpose of the cadastre was to levy land taxes (based on the yielding capacity of the soil), the cadastral identification was also used to support the land ownership and land transfer system. The Land Registry System was established 1845 at the local district courts for recording and protecting legal rights of ownership, mortgage, easements and leases for land’ (Enemark 2003). 10  For example, under the Digital Registers, the Danish concept of integrated land information is organised as a network of interactive subsystems containing the most relevant information such as the Cadastral Register, the Land Book, the Building and Housing Register, the Communal Property Data System (property valuation and taxation) and the Central Population Register. Responsibility for spatial information registers is distributed among different public authorities at the state, county and municipal level. The registers can be linked by common identifiers such as cadastral number, property identification, and geo-referenced addresses, which are maintained in the Cross-Reference Register (Enemark 2005). 11  Two interviewees asked for anonymity. However, they provided the information LL, PA (MIN), AMA, Dairy Board. 8 9

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control and payment of CAP aid schemes according to EU and national legislation (Article 24 Greek Law 2045/01). The establishment of OPEKEPE aimed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the CAP and signified Europeanisation of the administrative patterns. However, since these remained formal in response to specific EU legislation, they did not change the administrative practices and style. Greece faced a number of infringements for mismanagement of the EU aid schemes by the ECJ. Therefore these changes represent ‘inertia’ in administrative adaptation. A significant difference between the two countries’ administrative settings constitutes the degree of participation of the subnational levels of government in the process. In Denmark, the lower levels of government, regional level (at the time termed Amts) and municipalities (kommuner) have not had competences in agricultural policy. In Greece, on the other hand, the 52 Prefectures at the subnational level have been much involved in the domestic administration of the CAP. The Unit for Agriculture in every Prefecture was the body to mainly administer the CAP and coordinate interaction between the central government and the producers (local-­ level farmers’ union) (Chap. 5). These administration settings have fragmented the administration process over time. One example that shows variation in administrative adaptation to the CAP is the administration of the differences in the single payment scheme (SPS) (Appendix III) introduced by the 2003 Fischer reform. Denmark proposed the SPS dynamic hybrid that moved towards flatter rates and considered Denmark as one administrative region.12 There were two reasons behind this selection. First, the choice of no reallocation of the historical distribution of payments could prevent income effects due to changes in the ownership of land over time; second, this partial coupling could maintain certain types of production. This model had been proposed by the sector in close collaboration and in negotiations with the administrative officials in DFFE. And after much negotiation with the sector and DFFE (the negotiation process had started 2  years before the 2003 reform (Interview,13 2006)), MINFAF accepted this model as the best possible for the needs of Danish agriculture and proposed it at the EU level. This indicates the adaptation of administrative practices and style which confirms Europeanisation in the form of adaptation. In Greece, the conservative government chose to follow the SPS historic model (EC 2007b) with full decoupling14 for the SPS, which triggered conflicts between two groups of producers. The first group of farmers argued that the full decoupling SPS system would lead to farms being abandoned or to severe market disturbance and they would be forced to quit their farming activity after the 2013 CAP reform. The second group was interested in receiving as much of the subsidies

 Complete decoupling, except for special male bovine premium (75% coupled) and sheep and goat premium (50% coupled). Share of the farms that receive SPS of the total number of farms (percent of total), estimate 99.99%. Tradability of SPS: payment entitlements are tradable within the member state (Denmark is one region) (DCRA, RLG 2007). 13  SS, DFFE. 14  Complete decoupling. Application of Article 69: 10% of the ceiling for arable crops and the beef sector and 5% of the ceiling for the sheep and goat sector, dairy premium in 2007. 12

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as possible in the short term because they chose to quit their farming activity anyway and thus they would not be affected. Table 5.2 presents the dimensions of the administrative structures and styles (the dependent variable) as described in Chap. 2 (Table 2.2) and their variation based on the analysis in Chaps. 3 and 4 in Denmark and Greece. These are categorised according to Radaelli’s typology of Europeanisation measurement, namely, retrenchment, inertia absorption and transformation that are presented in Chap. 1. Table  5.2 shows that there is variation in the Europeanisation of administrative change in the two examined countries. In Denmark, the administration was able to adjust over time and adapt to the CAP and its reforms, leading to absorption. There are formal and informal administrative changes that led to administrative adaptation, but these changes present both continuity and path dependence characteristics. The initially introduced changes (first period) were more radical and created a critical juncture in the administration. The changes in the second period followed the same paths and showed continuity. The pre-existing strong institutional settings enabled administrative adaptability and allowed a flexible and coherent, prompt and smooth adjustment and adaptation, during the important CAP reforms in 1992 and 2003. The administrative structures are centralised, merit based and collaborative. In Greece, by comparison, the fragmented, incoherent administration maintained most of its characteristics over time despite formal changes and adjustments, leading to inertia. As a result, administrative adaptation remained only in the formal level, maintained its hierarchical, fragmented characteristics and is based on patronage. In Denmark, the administrative style and practices combine hierarchy with coordination and formal and informal practices; they are coherent, consensual, inclusive, willing to address change and communicative, indicating learning processes. In Greece, the administrative style and practices maintained their characteristics over time. Administrative practices remained fragmented, incoherent, rigid and adversarial, exclusive and conflictual and uncommunicated and reserved.

Chapter 6

Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis

Since 2009, a number of significant events, such as the Eurozone crisis that followed the global financial crisis in 2008, have struck the economies of the EU member states, particularly Greece. This additional chapter focuses on the administrative adaptation to CAP in the two examined countries in this study, during the Eurozone crisis period, an aspect not analysed in the preceding chapters. In this respect, this chapter examines how the domestic agriculture responded to the Eurozone crisis that consitutes an external event/shock. Following the Eurozone crisis, the EU institutions acted as managers of the crisis and introduced a series of austerity measures that have been contested by the civil societies in the EU member states (Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015a). The EU established new institutions for the management of the crisis, such as the Troika (European Central Bank, European Commission and the International Monetary Fund), followed by the Quartet (the European Stability Mechanism was added to Troika). These developments led to a critical juncture in the EU’s role in relation to domestic politics and policy and strengthen the political role of the Commission. In addition, the EU institutions have established a number of financial agencies since 2010, such as the European Financial Stability Facility as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism within the euro area countries, which has been followed by the European Stability Mechanism in 2013 that provided financial assistance to Greece,1 Portugal and Ireland. The emergency credit that they provided (2010, 2012 and 2015) was conditional to the memoranda of understanding (MoU) and introduced detailed restructuring programmes. In general, these developments were not directly connected to the CAP. However, the EU institutions connected the Eurozone crisis to ineffective administration2 particularly in the Greek case, and the austerity measures that were introduced by the MoU required administrative reforms, reduction of public employment and wages 1  The EU and the IMF provided Greece with three successive emergency loans (bailouts) totalling 289 billion euros (2010, 2012 and 2015, respectively). 2  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f1557fb3-aac4-4fb2-ac57df1ed8146ba1/language-en

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_6

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(European Commission 2011). Furthermore, one of the important concerns throughout the country’s membership has been the absorption3 of the EU CAP funds and their administration, which has been ineffectively managed. As a result, a series of cofinanced investments fell apart during 2007–2013 (5% funded by Greece and 95% by the EU). Consequently, the EU measures during the Eurozone crisis are very relevant for the domestic agricultural administration. Moreover, the 2013 CAP reform introduced changes in response to the emerging climate and sustainability challenges. The CAP has been directly connected to green economy, which among other aspects introduced new domestic administrative demands. Similar to the preceding chapters, I examine and compare one by one the three domestic factors and the administrative changes and adaptation during the course of the Eurozone crisis 2009–2017, a period that also includes the 2013 CAP reform. I show that there have been administrative changes in both Denmark and Greece. These changes are domestically shaped and embedded in the organisation of the sector, the domestic politics and the network patterns that reflect the state-society relations and thus path dependence.

Organisation of the Sector The EU member states responded to the Eurozone crisis in various ways. In Denmark, the crisis along with the 2013 CAP reform challenged the highly export-­ oriented agricultural primary production. In an effort to respond promptly, prevent economic shocks and seek stability in the agricultural markets, the Danish agricultural sector reorganised. In 2009, five organisations (Danish Agriculture, the Danish Bacon and Meat Council, the Danish Agricultural Council, the Danish Dairy Board and the Danish Pig Production) merged. This merger was intended to strengthen competition and resulted in DAC being renamed as the Danish Agriculture and Food Council (DAFC). This change signalled the prominent role of the agri-food sector but also the direct link and collaboration between primary agriculture and the processing sector. Consequently, the membership of DAFC expanded, both in numbers and type of members, and a number of sub-sectoral cooperatives and private businesses were brought together in the agricultural network. The DFAC includes associations, companies, 30,000 primary producers and 300 cooperative and private enterprises from the primary agriculture and the secondary food processing industry sectors (DAFC, homepage). By sharing ownership with these companies, the agricultural sector

3  w w w . e k a t h i m e r i n i . c o m / 1 4 8 3 9 9 / a r t i c l e / e k a t h i m e r i n i / b u s i n e s s / extra-eu-funds-is-big-achievement-but-absorbing-them-will-be-tough

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empowered itself and expanded its activities in the international markets (e.g. DLG, Arla and Danish Crown4). The above reorganisation in the Danish agricultural sector increased centralisation and concentration in representation of sectoral interests but also strengthened the sector’s bargaining capacity with the state. In the meantime, the broader and diverse membership of DFAC changed the ‘intra’-organisational dynamics and the balance of power and scope within DFAC. The change in the DFAC membership increased the focus on the representation of the interests of the processing industry undermining to a certain extent the interests of the primary producers. Although due to the cooperative organisational structures the primary producers are members of the processing sector, the reorganisation of the DFAC creates power and representation imbalances that can have significant future implications. A strong food processing sector depends on a strong primary sector, as Danish agriculture has shown over time, and thus the economic viability of the primary sector is important. In 2009, in the wake of the EU developments on environmental policy and climate change and the upcoming CAP reform, the government introduced the Green Growth agreement5 which marked a paradigm shift in Danish agricultural policy (Riis 2015). The introduction of relevant national legislation6 combined with the global financial crisis raised demands concerning environmental production. Such demands increased the cost of production and require new investments but also administrative capacity. In response, the primary sector and slaughterhouses expressed their concerns about both the domestic and EU regulations and contested the Green Growth agreement. They argued that over-implementation of these regulations affected the sector’s competiveness especially with the neighbouring countries (e.g. Sweden and Germany) and resulted in transferring their activities abroad (e.g. Poland), which led to loss of many jobs in the primary sector (around 20007 according to the DFAC). At the same time, Danish agriculture experienced growth in the early 2000s, and primary producers increased their investments on loaned money. During the Eurozone crisis, falling prices of agricultural products and thus lower earnings accompanied by depreciation of the value of their assets led to solvency, lack of liquidity and more expensive loans8 (Altinget 2020, own translation). In a reaction to these challenges, a number of producers founded the Sustainable Agriculture (SA) group (Bæredygtig Landbrug) in 2010 (Altinget9 2010). The founding members of SA criticised the DFAC for being particularly politicised and  Interview MB 06/2014.  https://mfvm.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/FVM.dk/Dokumenter/Servicemenu/Publikationer/ Groen_vaekst.pdf 6  LOV nr.591 af 14/06/2011 Gældende (Randzoneloven), Offentliggørelsesdato: 15-06-2011, amended by LOV nr 563 af 18/06/2012 Gældende, Offentliggørelsesdato: 19-06-2012, Fødevareministeriet. 7  Jyske Vestkysten, ‘Randzoner spænder ben for danske arbejdspladser’, 13 November 2013. 8  h t t p s : / / w w w . a l t i n g e t . d k / f o e d e v a r e r / a r t i k e l / ifro-hvis-der-er-styr-paa-indtjeningen-er-gaeld-ikke-et-problem 9  Altinget ‘Vrede landmænd vil stævne staten’, 1 September 2010. 4 5

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for concentrating on the food processing industry and large producers that focused on exports and not on the actual problems of the producers. The SA consisted of around 2011 members, many of whom interestingly also remained members of the DFAC.  However, these internal disagreements intensified differences within the DFAC. On the one hand, the SA group claimed that they were overloaded by the numerous regulations and rules. Therefore, they demanded the abolishment of the economically costly aspects, taxes and charges of the Green Growth agreement from agricultural policy. SA producers also blamed the lobbying activities of the Society for Nature Conservation and the Social Democrats10 for Green Growth. The SA group has been close to the political party, Liberal Alliance, which has been part of the Liberal Party minority government. On the other hand, the DFAC formally supported the policy strategy of MIRDF, which responded to economic challenges and provided opportunities but also societal demands for greening the economy. In the meantime, concerns about the environment and climate change, and critiques of the particularly intensive animal agricultural production in Denmark, became salient in the media. Food production has been identified as one of the highest polluters of the environment and sources of CO2 production nationally and internationally (FAO11 2015). In reaction to these economic and societal changes, the DAFC encouraged organic agriculture as demonstrated by the establishment of a specific section for the promotion of organic agricultural interests. The DFAC acknowledged that it was necessary for agriculture to address the concerns of society about intensive agriculture and the environment and on the need to reach a compromise. Since then, the SA has not succeeded in expanding its membership and has not been able to compete in influence with the DAFC.  These reorganisation and strategy changes in the DFAC reveal its adaptability capacity that has been present over time. In Greece, since the Eurozone crisis in 2008, the agricultural organisations have faced increased financial and organisational problems. The state has been unable to provide financial support to the agricultural organisations. This has created conflicts between the state and agricultural society, whose relations with the state have been focused on financial support over time. Nevertheless, the organisations have realised the need for serious organisational changes due to the new economic circumstances. Moreover, the Troika that represented the EU demanded, as part of the conditionality for the first bailout in 2010, the creation of a compulsory registration system of agricultural organisations and producers. In the meantime, Greece was undergoing a number of elections and government changes. On 21 September 2011, the then newly elected socialist government led by Prime Minister Yorgos Papandreou established the National Registration of Agricultural Cooperatives and Trade Unions (Art. 2, Law 4015/2011), which introduced an electronic data and information base for the registration of agricultural organisations in Greece. Furthermore, the government launched a control of the registered members and the finances of PAGEGES,

10 11

 Party Spokesman for the environment Mette Gjerskov.  http://www.fao.org/resources/infographics/infographics-details/en/c/218650/

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which triggered a serious conflict between the state and the agricultural organisations. Thus, during the Eurozone crisis period, the agricultural sectors in both countries present organisational changes. These changes demonstrate a domestic Europeanisation process but differ. In the Danish case, the reorganisation of the sector was concerned with competitiveness, exports and the greening of agriculture. In contrast to the Danish case where the organisational changes were instigated at the domestic level, in Greece, the changes in the organisation of the sector were triggered as a response to the EU demands but also lack of finance. Thus, Europeanisation differs between the two countries: in Denmark, it was nationally shaped and decided, while in Greece, it was enforced by specific external demands but also nationally designed. The 2013 CAP reform that addressed environmental and budgetary concerns in the EU and the domestic society was approaching. In order to prepare for the CAP reform, a number of dairy producers started to restructure their production, especially because removal of dairy quotas was expected to affect significantly the Danish dairy sector. They turned their conventional production into organic production, a significant structural change in primary agriculture. Since then, domestic organic production and consumption but also exports of organic agricultural products have increased significantly. In 2017, the Danish organic production enjoys the highest share in the domestic market in the world and accounts for 8% of the total Danish food market, 6% of the total production and 7% of farming land area.12 These results reflect the increasing support of organic production by primary producers, the government and the consumers and a change in Danish agricultural organisational structures. Interestingly, the DAFC’s movement towards more greening in agriculture does not reflect the Danish position towards the voluntary greening of the CAP system after 2014. In the meantime, the appointment of Karen Hækkerup as DAFC Director in October 2014, who was a Member of the Social Democratic Party and Minister of Agriculture under the social democrat coalition government, was a benchmark in the sectoral organisation. As agriculture has been traditionally attached to the Liberal Party, the directors of DFAC came from this party, e.g. Søren Gade, a Member of the Liberal Party and previous Minister in the Liberal coalition government. These organisational developments, which started in 2009, demonstrate the adaptability capacity and the adjustment efforts of the DAFC towards market and societal changes. In Greece, on 10 October 2014, a new conservative government was elected led by Antonis Samaras. The agricultural organisations met with the government to reconsider the role and form of the agricultural organisations and triggered a number of changes. On October 2016, PASEGES fell apart and COPA-COGECA removed it from the members’ list. Not long after, in January 2015, the Syriza (left)Anel (independent/right) coalition government won the election. This government

12

 http://www.organicdenmark.dk/uk/about-us.aspx

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introduced a new legislation on agricultural cooperatives (Law 4384/2016 (ΦΕΚ Α΄78)), which required the organisations to revise their constitutions and comply with the requirements of Arts. 1 and 4 of the law concerning the number of members under the supervision of MINRDF. A new law 4492/2017 (ΦΕΚ Α΄156/18-10-2017) created 13 federations of cooperatives, 1 in each region, and 1 National Confederation. Article 13 (§5) of this law postponed the revision of the constitutions of the registered organisations until 31 December 2017. Moreover, this article allowed the organisations that had not been registered or had been considered passive to merge with a registered one or declare that they will close.13 The legislative inflation, thus, followed the pre-existing paths, confirming path dependence. In addition, new agricultural organisations have emerged, increasing fragmentation and decreasing coherence of the agricultural society organisational structure. This has resulted in three main agricultural organisations that represent the interests of the agricultural society: First, the New PASEGES which in 2015 had 242 registered members (New PASEGES,14 homepage). PASEGES has an Administrative Board of 21 members who are elected by the General Assembly (full members have the right for vote). Second, under the initiative of ex-Minister of Agriculture Alexandros Kontos (19 September 2007–7 January 2009), who also acts as the current General Director of the organisation, the Association of Agricultural Cooperative Organisations and Enterprises of Greece (SASOEE) was established in April 2017. SASOEE consists of 100 cooperatives and enterprises with an annual turnover around 500 million euros, many of which have export interests. The main objective, in their own words, is to ‘create a strong, united, trustworthy organ for the cooperative space in order to address the problems of the organisation of agricultural society and influence the implementation of strategies that will consolidate and empower the cooperatives and through them support more effectively the Greek farmers’ (SASOEE15 homepage, own translation). The Association is self-financed and aims to influence the political leadership in MINRDF through consultation on agricultural issues. Its General Assembly consists of the representatives of the full members. The higher the turnover, the higher the number of representatives16. Third, GAIA ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ is a private company, 25% financed by the Piraeus Bank. This organisation represents 701 unions of agricultural cooperatives and cooperative enterprises that are shareholders and a number of others who but are interested in becoming shareholders. GAIA ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ also closely collaborates with NEUROPUBLIC A.E., a company whose activities concentrate on the development and use of technology and computerised organisation in agriculture. One of the important services that GAIA ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ provides is the administration of the  http://www.minagric.gr/index.php/el/for-farmer-2/sillogikes-agrotikes-organoseis  https://www.neapaseges.gr/el/products/details/Dioikisi/Dioikisi 15  http://sasoee.com.gr/ 16  1 representative if the average turnover over the last 3 years is between 300,000 and 1,000,000 euros; 2 if the annual turnover corresponds to 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 euros; 3 between 3,000,000 and 6,000,000 euros; 4 between 6,000,000 and 10,000,000 euros; 5 between 10,000,000 and 15,000,000 euros; and 6 over 15,000,000 euros. 13 14

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CAP support to producers (OSDE administration17). Today, there are around 380 centres which receive farmers’ applications for CAP support. Interestingly, GAIA ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ represents the agricultural interests as the current Greek member of COGECA. Consequently, the changes in Greece show that the pre-existing system, which was dominated by the PASEGES, has opened up to both private and public actors that are able to provide relevant services. Moreover, these actors are involved in the administration of the CAP subsidies. Nevertheless, the reorganisation changes during 2009–2017 followed to a great extent the same pre-existing paths of fragmentation. Once again, organisational changes have not been able to radically reform the organisational practices of the agricultural groups and their impact on policy or administration of the policy decisions. Besides, partisan relations and attachments have been maintained, indicating politicisation, while the agricultural society’s role in shaping domestic agricultural strategies for either policy or administration remained dispersed. Some of the changes were responses to EU demands, while others were a reaction to the domestic politics. During 2009–2017, as before, professionalism remained important in the organisation of the Danish agricultural sector. In the attempt to re-establish its position in the society, the Danish Agricultural Advisory Center (Landbrugets Rådgivning­ scenter) was renamed as the ‘Knowledge Center for Agriculture’ in 2010. The ‘Knowledge Center’ was part of a broader initiative, namely, the establishment of the Agro Food Park within the greater Business Park in Skejby close to Århus, with the support of the Danish agriculture and food industry. In 2015, the Knowledge Center for Agriculture merged with the Knowledge Center for Pork production and became known as SEGES, a palindrome inspired by Latin, which means cornfield, corn, crop and development. The name had been chosen as visually attractive and easy to pronounce in most languages.18 In a similar trend, Greece introduced changes targeting agricultural professional development. Nevertheless, these changes followed the same pre-existing paths, and professional training remained dispersed and focused on developing sub-­ sectoral technical skills, mostly in secondary education (e.g. dairy school). A joint decision No. 919/131869 of the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Development and Food established the ‘Greek Agricultural Organisation-­ DIMITRA19’ (ELGO DIMITRA) in October 2014, from a merger of the National Foundation for Agricultural Research (NAGREF) and the Organisation of Agricultural Vocational Education Training and Employment (E.GE. KA-DIMITRA). This merger indicates an increase in the centralisation of the supporting institutions, which might improve coordination among the different activities. Along similar paths as before, the new organisation organises training seminars and innovation activities and supports a number of secondary agricultural technical  There are around 600,000 farmers who apply for support, of which 200,000 are professional farmers (Interview, K GAIA). 18  http://lf.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2014/november/videncentret-faar-nyt-navn#.WosyfKjOU2w and https://stiften.dk/navne/Ny-projektdirektoer-i-SEGES/artikel/251549 19  http://www.elgo.gr/images/pdf/2889.pdf 17

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schools that specialise in specific sub-sectors, such as cheese processing. Recently, ELGO DIMITRA and the professional schools under the Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) announced the establishment of new agricultural training programs in collaboration between the Ministries of Agriculture and Education. These programs are expected to be complemented by a training system for young farmers as part of the new agricultural development programme (Pillar II of the CAP) and a system of advisory services supported financially by the MINRDF according to the type of agricultural activity. The ELGO DIMITRA is also responsible for a number of agricultural development centres that are established by the MINRDF in order to provide advisory support to producers but also quality control in rural areas. These efforts signify a change in the right direction. They do not establish an institutionalised coherent compulsory education and training system for the agricultural profession, which can cover training needs and skills development. Thus, the results remain to be seen. A proposal by the Agricultural University of Athens on the establishment of a Farm Advisory Network provides some interesting suggestions and acknowledges the need for a systematic extension training service (Koutsouris and Karanikolas 2018). However, this proposal maintains a lot of the pre-existing institutional settings and has the embedded potential for failure. For example, the idea mainly and specifically promotes the role of agronomists. However, modern agriculture requires much more than agronomic and economic advice with a focus on productivity, agricultural technologies and so on. It also requires expertise on nutrition and other sciences, such as business and public administration. These disciplines foster development of policy strategies that are innovative, consider social concerns and can create a bridge between modern societal challenges and sustainable agriculture. In sum, there are significant changes in the organisation of the agricultural sectors in both countries during the Eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, these changes differ and address different targets. The changes present continuity as they are embedded in the pre-existing domestic organisational structures. The introduced organisational changes in Denmark lead to even greater centralisation and concentration; in Greece, they maintain and even increase fragmentation and non-concentration. Lastly, in Denmark, the agricultural society has introduced and manages changes for professional development through innovation and knowledge. In Greece, the sector relies on state resources and financial support for the development of professional skills and training. Similar to the previous periods, the high level of centralisation and professionalism enables the agricultural organisations in Denmark to provide expertise and knowledge to the policy-makers concerning the feasibility of the introduced changes and their administration (e.g. the overloading of administration of the green economy policy measures). Instead, in Greece, the changes reflect the high level of politicisation and fragmentation, maintaining the clientelist and partisan characteristics in the organisational choices of the sector. Consequently, the sector’s input on administrative choices and directions remained minimal or non-existing.

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Domestic Politics On 3 October 2011, the government led by Social Democrat Helle Thorning Schmidt (in coalition with the social liberal party) won the elections. The government reorganised the Ministry of Agriculture. Although agriculture had been traditionally attached to the Liberal Party (Venstre), due to the party’s close links originally with the peasants, these relations had changed and loosened over time as the Liberal Party tried to attract urban voters (Christiansen 2012). In the meantime, the social democratic coalition government (2011–2015) maintained cooperation with the agricultural organisations. This was reflected in the discourse by the coalition government led by the Social Democrat Party, which acknowledged the significance of the sector in the economy,20 especially the high agricultural exports during the economic crisis (Altinget 2013a). However, the state-agricultural society relation was also challenged. The agricultural organisations strongly contested the introduction by the social democrat coalition government in 2011 of legislation for a 10 m buffer zone21 around cultivated areas. This legislation aimed to ensure clean drinking water, unpolluted by high levels of nitrogen that affects both the environment and the people’s health. The buffer zone (randzoner) legislation became one of the hardest negotiation policy issues during this period, because it increased the cost of production that added to the already high land prices in Denmark. The government justified the proposal on the basis that having to purify water that had become polluted due to agricultural practices would increase water prices and thus transfer the cost to the taxpayers. Despite the legal implications22 of no compliance with the buffer zone legislation, farmers refused to comply with the law, despite being financially compensated when they implemented the law, thus showing their discontent through refusal. This triggered a lot of public discussions that aimed at reforming the buffer zone legislation to the dissatisfaction of environmental groups (Altinget 2013b). The appointment of Dan Jørgensen as the Minister for Agriculture in Denmark, in December 2013, intensified the environmental views of the coalition government and sparked attention in the media. The agricultural society did not receive positively his appointment due to his active role as a Member of the European Parliament on environmental protection issues, his critique on the use of pesticides and chemicals in intensive agriculture and his views about animal welfare. During the same period, domestic politics were also characterised by a number of changes in Greece. First, at the very start of the Eurozone crisis, Agriculture 20  The social democratic coalition government viewed positively Gade’s appointment and contributed to the smooth collaborations among the different governments and DAFC (Interview TD 2013; Interview, MB06/2014 and NLM 2015). 21  LOV nr.591 af 14/06/2011 Gældende (Randzoneloven), Offentliggørelsesdato: 15-06-2011, amended by LOV nr 563 af 18/06/2012 Gældende, Offentliggørelsesdato: 19-06-2012, Fødevareministeriet. 22  https://www.landbrugsinfo.dk/MILJOE/VANDPLANER/BRAEMMER-OG-RANDZONER/ Sider/Politianmeldelser-i-randzonesager_pl_ri_13_236.aspx

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Minister Kontos introduced a package with financial benefits for agriculture in 2008, which also contributed to the election results. This followed another package by the conservative government, known as the Hatzigakis package. During 2009–2011, the majority government led by the Socialist Party Leader George Papandreou raised high expectations of resolving the severe problems caused by the Eurozone crisis. At that time, there were concerns about the role and contribution of the agricultural organisations to the economy and the sector and about their financing by the government. These concerns created a series of discussions in the Parliament, and Prime Minister Papandreou asked for an evaluation of their role and their necessary reform. The then Minister Batzeli established an electronic deliberation system where civil society was invited to provide feedback and suggest ideas concerning legislation for reform of the agricultural organisations,23 the registration system of the farmers, the definition of the farmer as a profession24 and the modernisation of the agricultural insurance system.25 The deliberation process was new and indicates a change in practice. Following a government rotation, Skandalidis became the Minister of Agriculture. Skandalidis introduced a new cooperative law 4015/2011, continuing the tradition of legislative activities. Yet the overloading of legislation overburdened the bureaucracy and did not have an effective impact. During November 2011–June 2012, the EU ‘appointed’ a government in Greece, in order to respond in a less politicised and more technocratic manner to the Eurozone crisis, raising concerns about democracy and the role of the EU in managing the crisis. In June 2012, the Samaras government won the elections and asked for a review of the financial support and its use by the agricultural organisations. This was conducted by the Ministry in collaboration with the State General Accounts. The review demonstrated a misuse of the budget by PASEGES for personal expenses of the leadership and for the office in Brussels.26 The coalition government (July 2012–January 2015) among the political parties of New Democracy, PASOK and DIMAR and led by Samaras, decided to abolish the financial support to the organisations. In June 2012, a common Ministerial Decision 324/67715 FEK1885 between the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Economics under the coalition government led to a reform of the Council of Agricultural Policy (SAP).27 The new SAP consisted of the Minister (Chair), three civil servants from the Ministry and two persons (Professor or Associate Professor) from the Agricultural University of Athens, complemented by a number of academics whose research was related to agriculture (one from each university in Greece). This reform neglected the role of stakeholders and

 http://www.opengov.gr/ypaat/?p=4. The first deliberation took place from 22 January 2010 until 5 February 2010. 24  http://www.opengov.gr/ypaat/?p=23 25  http://www.opengov.gr/ypaat/?p=28 26  Most news media were publishing about this control https://www.agro24.gr/agrotika/agrotikesorganoseis/ta-porismata-gia-ti-hrimatodotisi-tis-paseges-theloyn-sto-fos-9 27  The National Council for Agricultural Policy was reformed last under Hatzigakis in 2009. 23

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along the same lines as before maintained the distance between the state and administration and the sector. In January 2015, Syriza, a left wing party, won the elections led by Prime Minister Tsipras. SAP was abolished, and although Minister of Agriculture Apostolou (since 23 September 2015) announced its renewal, this did not happen. In 2016, in Greece, the government introduced a new law 4384/2016 (ΦΕΚ Α΄78) on cooperatives that defined ‘a cooperative’ and its characteristics. As Minister of Agriculture Apostolou (2017) stated in an interview: ‘it has been attempted many times to readjust the farmers, cooperative and agricultural businesses loans by the introduction of a series of laws such as Law 2008/92, 2237/94, 2538/98 and 3259/2004, known as the over-interest law. Despite their extended application, they did not manage to resolve radically the problem of excessive debt (...) Instead, many times, these adjustments, such as the cooperatives loans, have been declared as illegal by the ECJ as violations of the EU law, and the EU institutions are demanding today that they be repaid with an amount that comes to over the 573 million euros’28 (own translation). Once again, despite a number of changes introduced, these changes represent the strong legalism of Greek bureaucracy. Moreover, their implementation follows pre-existing paths embedded in pre-existing structures. In Denmark, following the election on 28 June 2015, a new minority government was led by the Liberal Party and Lars Løkke Rasmussen and supported by the Liberal Alliance and the Danish People’s Party. The newly elected government decided to merge the Ministry of Agriculture and Food with the Ministry of Environment, increasing concentration at the political level. Eva Kjær was appointed the Minister of the renamed Ministry of Food and Environment. This reorganisation aimed to go beyond the silo structure and establish coherence among the two interconnected policy areas. As the two merged, Ministries represented often conflicting interests, namely, environmental protection versus agricultural interests, internal dynamics and decisions became complicated. The new Ministry underwent a transition period, during which a new administrative culture was developing. The Ministry acknowledged the significance of Danish agriculture in the economy and instigated a number of policy and financial initiatives supporting the sector. In December 2015, shortly before Christmas, the Liberal Party, the Danish People’s Party, the Liberal Alliance Party and the Conservatives introduced a farm package of 30 specific initiatives to help the agricultural sector.29 The package suggested the abolishment of the buffer zones, allowing farmers to cultivate that part of their land again. A completely new environmental regulation was planned. The agricultural package aimed to improve food and agriculture business, increase commodity exports and strengthen collaboration so as to create growth and new jobs in Denmark in relation to nature and the environment.30 The package also put to rest d­ issatisfaction about  Βαγγέλης Αποστόλου (2017), «Τι θα γίνει με τα «κόκκινα» δάνεια και την περιουσία των αγροτών», Το Βήμα της Κυριακής, 14 Μαΐου. 29  https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/overblik-forstaa-dramaet-om-landbrugspakken 30  http://mfvm.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/FVM.dk/Dokumenter/Landbrug/Indsatser/Foedevare-_ og_landbrugspakke/Aftale_om_foedevare-_og_landbrugspakken.pdf 28

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Table 6.1  Ministers of Agriculture in Denmark 2010–2017 1. Henrik Høegh

Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2. Mette Minister for Food, Gjerskov Agriculture and Fisheries 3. Karen Minister for Food, Hækkerup Agriculture and Fisheries 4. Dan Minister for Food, Jørgensen Agriculture and Fisheries 5. Eva Kjer Minister for Food, Hansen Agriculture and Fisheries 6. Esben Minister for Food, and Lunde Larsen Environment

Liberal Party Cabinet 3 February Lars Løkke Rasmussen I 2010 Social Democrats Cabinet Helle Thorning-Schmidt Social Democrats Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt Social Democrats Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt Liberal Party Cabinet Lars Løkke Rasmussen II Liberal Party Cabinet Lars Løkke Rasmussen II

3 October 2011

3 October 2011

9 August 2013

9 August 2013

12 December 2013 28 June 2015

12 December 2013 28 June 2015

29 February 2016

29 February 2016

strict environmental regulations in Denmark within the agricultural society, since the previous legislation on buffer zones (randzonerne) had prevented the agricultural sector (primary agriculture and agroindustry) from achieving its full potential. The controversial agricultural package proposal reflected the strong relations between the Liberal Party and DAFC and were criticised by the media and the environmental groups for capture. The change in government had revived the stateagricultural society relations, confirming the traditional attachments of agriculture to the Liberal Party. These developments indicated politicisation and capture of decision-making by agricultural interests and path dependence. After increased pressure to the government by the Conservative Party and despite the full support of Prime Minister, the Minister of Food and Agriculture Eva Kjær31 resigned as she was accused of being responsible for the contested agricultural package, and Esben Lunde Larsen replaced Eva Kjær in February 2016. The package remains controversial.32 During 2010–2017, there have been six Agriculture Ministers in Denmark and nine in Greece (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Once again the duration of a Minister’s tenure in Denmark is longer than in Greece (around 1.1 years and 8 months, respectively) but short in both countries. Interestingly, there is a greater rotation in Denmark than before, which reflects the increasing politicisation of agricultural politics during this period. The Greek case confirms the path dependence characteristics.

 She was also accused earlier of misleading the Parliament in relation to MRSA (a potentially deadly disease transmitted from pigs) (http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-minister-accused-of-misleading-parliament-on-mrsa.html). 32  https://www.b.dk/nationalt/bred-enighed-om-at-kigge-paa-landbrugspakken-igen, http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-minister-on-the-verge-of-being-sacked.html 31

Domestic Politics

169

Table 6.2  Ministers of Agriculture (2009–2017), (blue Conservative, green Socialists) 1. BATZELI

KATERINA

07/October/2009

07/September/2010

2. ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΙΔΗΣ

ΚΩΣΤΑΣ

07/September/2010

17/May/2012

3. ΜΑΡΑΒΕΓΙΑΣ

ΝΑΠΟΛΕΩΝ

17/May/2012

22/June/2012

4. ΤΣΑΥΤΑΡΗΣ

ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΣ

22/June/2012

10/June/2014

5. ΚΑΡΑΣΜΑΝΗΣ

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ

10/June/2014

27/January/2015

6. ΛΑΦΑΖΑΝΗΣ

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ

27/January/2015

18/July/2015

7. ΣΚΟΥΡΛΕΤΗΣ

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ

18/July/2015

28/August/2015

8. ΓΚΟΛΙΑΣ

ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ

28/August/2015

23/September/2015

9. ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΥ

ΕΥΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ

23/September/2015

Source: Ministry of Rural Development and Food (http://www.minagric.gr/index.php/el/the-ministry-2/history/former-ministers)

A number of reorganisations have occurred at the ministerial level in Denmark, which is reflected in frequent ministerial rotations (Table 6.1). These changes have accompanied the reorganisation in the DFAC and represent realignment of state-­ agricultural society relations and an emphasis on the food processing industry instead of the primary producers. These changes have marked a new type of politicisation in the Danish state-agricultural society relations. In Greece, the frequent elections have resulted in continuous ministerial rotations and reorganisations since 2010 (Table 6.2). These rotations have been accompanied by changes of high-level civil servants. These appointments (general and special secretariats) were political, and they were not based on merit, professional expertise and direct knowledge of the sector’s problems, but were mainly determined by party patronage. Similar to before, the domestic agricultural politics has maintained the same patterns during 2010–2017, despite EU interventions and CAP reform. Consequently, the domestic politics have failed to ensure effective administrative choices and have led to low absorption of the EU financial opportunities33 that could induce innovation and effectiveness in agriculture. Instead, they have focused, as before, on formal requirements and on ensuring short-term financial support and subsidies. As an interviewee stated: ‘Despite great financial support, the infrastructure changes did not take place. Instead, the financial support that was provided for all the 24 years that Greece has been an EU member state, has been consumed by short term everyday management’ (Interview,34 2005). For the last 30 years, it has not been sustainable to direct EU financial support towards complementing the short-term incomes of farmers. Another interviewee added ‘If we had the right

 For example, Greek agriculture received 7.6% in 1995, 6.5% of the CAP budget in 2001 and 6.2% in 2005, while Danish agriculture received 3.7, 2.4 and 2.3  in 1995, 2001 and 2005, respectively. 34  A, MINRDF, 2006. 33

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administration and management of the EU decisions and support, we could achieve a lot in Greek agriculture’ (Interview,35 2017). In conclusion, both countries demonstrate changes in the domestic agricultural politics. These changes did not affect significantly continuity in the administrative structures, style and practices in Denmark and are consistent with the pre-existing paths. In Greece, they also followed the same paths as before, impeding continuity and long-term administrative strategic choices, as indicated by low absorption of the CAP funds.

Network Governance Structures Due to increased concentration and centralisation, the network governance patterns have become even more connected in Danish agriculture. The subnetwork structure within the DFAC has changed to include a greater number of actors due to the merger in 2009. However, the network governance patterns have remained strong, dense and characterised by frequent interactions. Both the state and agricultural society were vertically and horizontally disaggregated but closely linked together by cooperative exchange (as in corporatism). The state interacts frequently with the agricultural organisations, and these interactions have even intensified in the effort to address the emerging challenges due to the reform of the CAP but also BREXIT, as many Danish agricultural exports are directed to the UK. This interaction allows close exchange of information and knowledge among the various actors and thus follows to a great extent similar paths as before. In Greece, the actors’ interactions have remained dispersed since 2009 and even deteriorated with the collapse of PASEGES. The state lost contact with the only and main channel of interaction with the agricultural organisations. Thus, the government found itself in the uncomfortable situation of not having collaboration with the sector, whose situation also changed at the EU level. The emergence of new agricultural organisations (SASOEE and GAIA) has increased the number of actors and changed the interactions among the actors in the different levels (e.g. PASEGES is not connected to the EU level, while GAIA has become connected to the EU institutions and COPA-COGECA). In other words, the network patterns have become even broader over time. This has had significant implications for the exchange of information, knowledge and other resources but has also affected the potential of building a policy community.

35

 K, MINRDF, 2017.

Network Governance Structures

171

Administrative Changes In Denmark, following a ministerial reorganisation in 2011, the Danish Food Industry Agency (FIA), the Danish Plant Directorate and the Danish Fisheries Agency that were all part of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, merged on 1 October 2011 (Fig.  6.1). This merger resulted into one agency, the Danish AgriFish Agency (AFA), under the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. This merger has increased centralisation and concentration. The merger was intended to ‘establish stronger synergies and administrative cohesion in tasks related to the management of EU Funds (pillar 1/Single Payment, EAFRD and EFF)’ (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2012: 418). The reorganisation integrated under one agency ‘tasks related to the verification of schemes in the form of on-spot controls, which formerly were carried out separately by either the Danish Plant Directorate or the Danish Fishery Agency’ and ‘included the former FIA responsible payment and support commitments operations’ (ibid: 418). The integration between administrative areas was expected to benefit overall policy-making and promote more integrated and coherent policy solutions to the benefit of applicants under the EAFRD. This reorganisation did not affect the effectiveness of the administrative adaptation to CAP. I attribute this finding to the strongly institutionalised relations between the state and the agricultural society, which remained centralised and highly professional. A significant change was decided by the minority government led by Lars Løkke Rasmussen as part of the decentralisation process and the greater relocation of public institutions away from the capital to other parts of the country. This raised controversies because many employees of the Environmental Protection Agency did not want to relocate to Odense from Copenhagen. However, this decision was implemented. In Greece, the EU institutions (Troika36 and Quartet37) emphasised the need for changes in the Greek administrative system during the Eurozone crisis, in order to increase effectiveness and performance in agriculture. Public administration has been one of the areas targeted by the Troika that demanded significant administrative reforms and decrease in the number of civil servants but also increased efficiency and performance (Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015b). Consequently, most changes aimed to comply with the technical requirements that the EU demanded. The government introduced the LPIS-GIS, using recent orthoimagery, which started to operate in 2009 under a private company, AGRORI, but was managed by OPEKEPE (Dimopoulou 2012). On 3 May 2010, the Papandreou government signed with the Troika the First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece and the first bailout package, also known as the first memorandum. This programme provided €107.3 billion of financial assistance, and €72.8 billion had been disbursed  Troika consists of the Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF.  In 2015, Troika included the newly established EU institution, the European Stability Mechanism, and became Quartet or quadriga (http://thecorner.eu/news-europe/from-the-troikato-the-quartet/47475/).

36

37

1.2 Human Resources and Development

1.3 Information Technology

Foreign Service

Directorate of Fisheries

1.4 Legal matters

Danish Food Insustry Agency

1.5 Research

Permanent Secretary

2.1 European Policy and International Affairs

Agribusiness

2.3

Food and Veterinary Complaints Board

2.2 Fisheries Policy

Department Agriculture and Fisheries

Audit Department

Danish Veterinary and Food Administration

3.1 Food Policy

Plant Directorate

Sustainability Agriculture and Environment

Department Food Policy Sustainability Agriculture and Environment

Fig. 6.1  Organogram of the Ministry of Food and Environment, Denmark 2011. (Source: Ministry of Food and Agriculture)

1.1 Finance

Department Corporate Management and Research

Secretary

MINISTER of Food Agriculture and Fisheries

172 6  Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis

Network Governance Structures

173

on 1 March 2012. After that date, the programme was superseded by the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, comprising the undisbursed amounts of the first programme and an additional €130 billion for the years 2012–2014. In order for this to be implemented, the Troika demanded a number of administrative changes. One of the most significant administrative structural reforms in Greece, known as Kallikratis,38 was introduced in 2010. Similar administrative reforms occurred in other EU countries. This reform aimed to decentralise the nature of the state, enhance and institutionalise the centre-periphery relations and strengthen the subnational levels of governance in Greece. The regions had initially been established as another level to the national governance system in 1980; they were headed by government appointees and added another level to the national governance system (Koutalakis 2003: 23). Their role was limited in the administration of agricultural policy and aimed to connect the national level with the periphery (Interview,39 2005). Kallikratis abolished the 52 prefectures and established the 13 regions and 72 regional units. The regions and the local authorities became the second and third level of governance. There are 13 directly elected regional leaders. Each of the regional unit is led by a vice regional leader who is not directly elected and belongs to the same party as the regional leader. This reform formally increased centralisation as the number of administrative entities decreased from 52 to 13. Nevertheless, in reality, the transfer of administrative competences from the national to the regional level indicates actual decentralisation. Under each of the regional units, there is a general direction for regional agriculture and veterinary services. This general direction (DAOK40) is responsible for the coordination and functioning of the subunits, provision of guidance to ensure the best functioning and performance according to competences assigned by the ministerial decision 2545/2016 and introduced relevant rules. The DOAK is in continuous collaboration with the Ministries. Along with the management of the aid schemes under Pillar I of the CAP, the regional level is involved in management of agricultural development (Pillar II) and participates in the Surveillance Committee (επιτροπή παρακολούθησης). The importance of Pillar II of the CAP has increased over time as the EU provides an allocation of resources as part of the Agricultural Development Plan. The Surveillance Committee consists of representatives from the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Economics, the regional directorates and units and the managing authority of the Rural Development Programme. The regional directorates manage many of the measures. According to Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 (Art.67, §6), the member states receive support from the Integrated System for Management and Control (Ολοκληρωμένου Συστήματος Διαχείρισης και Ελέγχου-ΟΣΔΕ41). At the domestic level in Greece,  Νόμος.2010.3852 Καλλικράτης, http://gym-eleous.ioa.sch.gr/law/el/n.2010.3852.html  All interviewees over time agreed on this point. 40  DAOK are under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 41  https://www.espa.gr/elibrary/sde_AgrotikiAnaptyxi2014_2020.pdf 38 39

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6  Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis

the Ministry with the authority to manage the Rural Development Programme prepares calls for the management of the programme for rural development (Pillar II). Then agronomists receive the information, and through their own network, they distribute the call to the interested parties in the rural areas. The administrative organisational structures have improved, especially in relation to payments of subsidies, which has ameliorated trust between the state and the agricultural society and has led to a more dialectic relation (Interview,42 2017). Moreover, MINRDF has reactivated certain processes of deliberation and consultation between all these levels, also electronically, and between the Ministry and the broader society. However, gaps between these two levels remain, and the role of the regional branch directorates and 4 regional units and 39 local offices has not always been active. The newly established private organisation, GAIA EPEIXEIREIN, is to a great degree involved in the management and control of payments. Finally, there are a number of private development organisations that in collaboration with local action groups administer and manage the INTERREG programs. These processes confirm fragmentation in the administration, which continues over time. In Denmark, the most recent reorganisation was the merger between the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment in 2015, which demonstrates once again increased centralisation. The new Ministry consists of the permanent secretariat (the Department) and four divisions (Fig.  6.2): Corporate Management and Analysis, EU and International, Nature and Agriculture, and Food Minister

Department Corporate Management and Analysis Division Ministerial and Management

Press Research and Digital

Corporate Human Resources

Corporate Legal

EU and International Affairs Division

Food and Environment

Nature and Land Use Division

Agencies

Environmental Protection Agency

Corporate Finance

Nature Agency

Veterinary and Food Administration

Agrifish Agency

Danish Coastal Authority

Fig. 6.2  Organogram of the Ministry of Food and Environment, Denmark 2015. (Source: http:// en.mfvm.dk/the-ministry/the-department)

42

 MINRDF, K. 11/2017.

Network Governance Structures

175

and Environment. Besides, there are a number of specialised units for human resources and digitalisation, legislation, communication and economic analysis. The EU and International Department is responsible for the CAP in Denmark. These changes followed policy developments in the EU agricultural, food and environmental policies where these areas became highly interdependent and linked. The circular economy platform that the EU introduced in 2014 has become significant in the Danish context. As an example of this, MINFAF established a Circular Economy Advisory Board within the Ministry in 2017, which confirms Europeanisation and domestic adaptation to CAP. In Greece, a census system was introduced for the registration of the civil servants and employees to map the Ministry’s human capacity (Fig. 6.3). Surprisingly, this did not exist before, which shows gaps in the institutional development of the administrative system. Apart from a recent change in their selection (under the Syriza government), which introduced, at least formally, a merit-based procedure, such appointments were political and decided by the Minister of the time. The SYRIZA government also adopted a new selection system of the permanent representation is Brussels (COREPER), that was based on merit and aimed to increase transparency and professionalism. For this purpose, an evaluation committee has been established to assess and select the members of the permanent representation. The Minister remains the final formal decision-maker in this process, not the permanent secretary. In addition, there have been discussions for separating the appointment of the general director in the Ministry from the governmental changes in order to introduce continuity and decrease politicisation. The Greek coalition government has tried to introduce changes; however, these require institutional administrative changes, also at the farmer level, which the government has been unable to adopt (Interview43, 2017). Another recent example of the Ministry’s efforts for change has been related to the disagreement on feta as a protected product due to its origin during the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Negotiations with Canada and Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa. Despite efforts through legal scrubbing to introduce changes to this agreement, it was too late, and Greece was not in a position to impose a veto during the crisis. Since the Greek coalition government did not have any roots in the political and administrative system before 2015, the government did not have the support of the administration and lacked institutional memory. There has been a transition period of trust and connection building between the policy-makers and the administration, which has not always been smooth but was instead often conflictual. In order to enhance sharing of information and expertise, a new type of ad hoc meeting not based on hierarchy has been introduced based on the capacity and relevance of the civil servant to a particular issue; this procedure has often triggered reactions, reflecting embeddedness in the pre-existing institutional settings and administrative culture (Interview,44 2017). The coalition government introduced a number of ­inter-­professional working groups/committees since 2015 for deliberation process 43 44

 MIRDF, K, 2017.  MIRDF, K, 2017.

Directorate General Administrative Services and EGovernance

Six SubDirectorates

Directorate General of Sustainable Rural Development

Six SubDirectorates Four SubDirectorates

Directorate General of Financial Services

Secretary

Deputy

Six SubDirectorates

Directorate General of Agriculture

Six SubDirectorates

Directorate General of Veterinary

Four SubDirectorates

Directorate General of Fisheries

Press and Public Relations Office

Internal Auditing Unit

Strategic Planning Council

Crisis Management Division

Parliamentary Control Division

Four SubDirectorate

Directorate General of Food

Eight SubDirectorate

Directorate General Decentralised Structures

Development and Food

Division of Economic Control, Auditing and Cooperative Affairs

Division of Geotechnical Control and Auditing

Fig. 6.3  Organogram of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, Greece 2015–2017. (Source: Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food)

Managing Authority of Fisheries and Maritime Operational Program

Implementing Authority of Rural Development Program

Managing Authority of Rural Development Program

Sectoral Secretariat of Agric. Policy and EU Funds Management

Alternate Minister

MINISTER

176 6  Administrative Adaptation During the Eurozone Crisis

Network Governance Structures

177

with the various actors. Interestingly, even when decisions are agreed, often the issue needs to be renegotiated as the participants face reactions by their organisations. Although such committees have been also introduced in the past, their functioning and establishment remains unclear. The Ministry does not prepare annual reports that prescribe and assess the work of the Ministry each year. The current working groups consist of civil servants from the Ministry, OPEKEPE, managing authority (Pillar II), regional authorities and professional organisations such as the Confederation of Agricultural Exports and the New Farmers’ Organisation and academics and aim to provide feedback and consultation to the MINRDF leadership. However, the process of establishing these working groups is unclear, there are no open calls, and are selected by the Minister. These working groups meet often. Even today, the politicians try to intervene in the administrative processes in order to satisfy opinions and expectations in their constituencies. Nevertheless, although these reforms seem to be moving in the right direction, they have not been institutionalised, and they are not legally binding, so their continuity in the future is not assured. Holes and gaps in communication between the policy-makers and the administration at the different levels persist as a result of lack of resources and human capital with the competences and qualifications for high-­ performance administration. Consequently, the problems in the administration of the CAP remain even today. Similar to previous periods, the civil servants who are appointed at the Committee of Permanent Representatives are not well prepared. They are still sent in to a particularly diverse cultural, professional and political environment. Here, it is important to form alliances to ensure representation of domestic policy interests in the Special Committee for Agriculture’s proposals to the Council of Ministers, yet these civil servants are not trained nor do they have the necessary skills. This does not mean that they do not have the academic qualifications but they are not prepared for the job. These characteristics hinder professional representation of Greek agricultural interests at the Council of Ministers. Apart from the recent change in civil servant selection (under the Syriza government which introduced a new procedure), such appointments have been political and decided by the sitting Minister. In conclusion, I suggest that the Eurozone crisis triggered a critical juncture that led to changes and created legacies in both countries. There were a number of reorganisations and administrative changes in both Denmark and Greece during 2010–2017. These administrative changes have increased centralisation in administrative adaptation in Denmark and brought agriculture, food and environment together. This process has not always been smooth. However, it has responded to policy changes at the EU that link these policies together, demonstrating a significant degree of Europeanisation, formally and informally. In Greece, the changes are significant and noticeable in many levels. They were often triggered by the demands of the EU institutions as part of the management of the crisis. These responses confirm a domestic Europeanisation process that could be categorised as being between inertia and adaptation. However, the degree and type of these administrative ­adjustments in patterns and style have been determined by the domestic level and are embedded in the pre-existing structures, confirming path dependence.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

Introduction This book project began as an endeavour to provide a profound understanding of the domestic administrative change and adaptation to the EU integration of the agricultural policies for more than 50 years in two small and old EU member states. The main objective was to unravel an interesting puzzle, namely, why do the domestic administrative responses to EU common policy decisions differ if the EU member states create, decide and finance a common policy at the EU level? Understanding administrative responses to EU policy decisions is interesting because the way these decisions are administered is directly connected to how well a policy achieves its initial targets. However, not all member states have or establish the necessary administrative changes and develop the administrative capacity to ensure policy performance. Yet, if governments are interested in being re-elected, why do they avoid or overlook the establishment of the necessary institutional structures that can create and maintain highly performing domestic administrations, particularly when the positive effects of well-managed policies are obvious? What are the domestic factors that in certain states impede and in others facilitate domestic administrative adaptation and induce differences in the administrative adaptation to policies among the member states? In other words: How do domestic factors affect variation in the member states’ administrative adaptation of European agricultural policies and why? Following the subordination of agriculture of Denmark and Greece to the CAP, one would expect that the administrative responses to the CAP would follow similar paths in managing the same decisions and rules of the CAP and its reforms over time. However, as this study shows, this did not happen. The CAP constitutes an interesting policy area to study because not only it is decided at the EU level but it also combines both regulatory and market intervention instruments. In this respect, it differs than EU regulatory policies that aim explicitly to replace existing domestic regulatory arrangements and often define specific administrative changes. Instead, the specificities of the administration of the CAP decisions are mostly left at the © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8_7

179

180

7 Conclusions

discretion of the member states. In this chapter, I briefly summarise the main findings based on the methods and explanations provided in this book. Moreover, a number of new questions that seek answers have emerged, which are not within the scope of this book. At the end of this chapter, I therefore present a future research agenda.

Research Findings In order to accomplish the research objectives of this book, I employed a dynamic and top-down Europeanisation governance analytical approach. The Europeanisation governance approach was useful because it allowed combining and linking evidence at the EU level, where the decisions are taken, with the domestic level, where the decisions were carried out by the administration in practice. I complemented Europeanisation with historical institutionalism to analyse the domestic institutional setting and their change over time and with network governance in order to examine actors’ interactions in specific institutional settings and their impact on administrative choices over time. The combination of the theoretical perspectives complemented each other and addressed various levels of analysis (macro and micro). Moreover, the theoretical perspectives helped me to develop a typology of the domestic factors that includes both institutional and agency approaches. The domestic factors that facilitate or impede domestic administrative adaptation to the EU policy are (a) the organisation of the agricultural sector; (b) the domestic politics that refers mainly to the domestic political system and the practice of politics; and (c) the network governance patterns that indicate the interactions and constellations among all the actors involved in the agricultural policy. These domestic factors are interconnected, but separating them allows for conceptually separating and grouping various dimensions of the state-society relations. The typology of the domestic factors enabled a systematic evaluation of the relationship between the identified factors and the member states’ administrative responses to the EU CAP, as well as variation among member states. I am interested in administrative change at the domestic level. However, I haven’t focused on public administration theories as such as these do not consider public administration changes as a response to policies developed and decided within a multilevel governance system, as the EU. Moreover, I am not interested on the micro-level analysis of the implementation of policies, as public administration scholars often investigate. Furthermore, most Europeanisation studies in relation to public administration investigate the actual implementation of policy decisions (Treib 2014). Such studies examine the actual enforcement of policies and the performance of EU policies and legislation when it is transposed into national law. However, this book tries to unfold what happens in between the policy decisions and their enforcement at the domestic level, namely, what are the administrative structures, the norms that inform administrative practices and styles that then lead to the types of implementation of policy decisions. Thus, this analysis is important because administrative choices affect how

Research Findings

181

policies are implemented. For example, as Mastenbroek (2017) shows in her study of a number of Dutch Ministries, political loyalty and/or professionalism in the administration matters. However, she also focuses on the performance of policies based on these roles. The analysis of the domestic factors in this book investigates the conditions, namely, the domestic factors, the domestic politics and the institutional setting that affect the different administrative in domestic administrations. This book shows that despite the high level of politicisation in both countries, centralisation combined with professionalism in the domestic factors can hinder clientelism and nepotism and guard transparent and legitimate administrative choices. These administrative choices then ensure policy performance and compliance to EU decisions. While in Denmark, the administration adapts to EU policies, similarly to the Dutch, and mostly reconciles political loyalty with professionalism which strengthens adaptability, in the Greek administration case, the organisation of the sector, the domestic politics and the network governance patterns and their characteristics guide these administrative changes and adaptability. These characteristics guide and encourage political loyalty maintaining the status quo in the administration, and impeding change. I employed a comparative historical case study perspective in two EU member states, Denmark and Greece. The comparison has been useful for understanding the conditions that determine the type and degree of administrative adaptation to changing circumstances in the domestic political systems under the EU integration and their differences over time. To conduct the comparison, I used a carefully structured ‘mixed methodology’ that includes both qualitative and quantitative tools and first-­ hand collected data. The combination of two sets of data  – interviews and social network analysis (SNA) statistics – that complement each other captured the richness and causal narrative of case-based analysis, while the vividness of the integrated visualisations supplied by SNA supplemented the rigour and generality of statistics. My starting point was the domestic ‘state-society’ relations in agriculture and their characteristics, which has been at the core of research on farm politics as part of the European integration of domestic agriculture. I define ‘state’ in the broad sense of government and ‘society’ as the actors involved in agriculture or that have direct and indirect interests in the policy area. In order to answer the main research question How do domestic factors affect variation in the member states’ administrative adaptation of European agricultural policies and why?, I formulated three hypotheses presented in Chap. 2: Hypothesis 1: The higher the centralisation and professionalism of the organisational structures, the greater the administrative adaptation to EU policy decisions. Hypothesis 2: The higher centralisation and professionalism of the domestic politics, the greater the domestic administrative adaptation to EU policies. Hypothesis 3: a. The more dense and more inclusive the network patterns are, the more they facilitate administrative adaptation to EU policies; and b. the more loose and exclusive they are, the more they impede domestic administrative adaptation to EU policy.

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7 Conclusions

In Chap. 3, I analysed the organisational structures of the agricultural sector, the domestic politics and the network governance patterns in Danish agriculture starting from the country’s accession to the EU in 1973 until 2009. This analysis reveals that the subjection of Danish agriculture to the CAP triggered a series of administrative changes, in structures, practices and style immediately after the country’s accession to the EU. The strong, highly professional and well-trained organisational structures of the agricultural sector, along with the centralised and highly professional domestic politics, supported a coherent but also flexible administration of CAP decisions over time. Moreover, the dense, inclusive and close network governance patterns allowed deliberation and participation and strengthened the interactions between the state-society actors. The frequent actor interactions corroborate the sharing of information and exchange of resources, knowledge and expertise. Such interactions have also included different views and interpretations of the policy decisions and enabled the agricultural society to provide expert knowledge to the administration. These interactions foster dialogue and build trust and collective arrangements that enable consensus-driven administrative choices, as exemplified by the intervention of the sector during the 2003 reform. This process did not only contribute to continuation of pre-existing patterns of cooperativism but also to the development of synergies and thus cemented the state-society relations with respect to agriculture. In this process, the Danish government acted as metagovernor that designs, facilitates and coordinates by combining hierarchical and network governance in order to accommodate administrative responses and changes that allow effective responses to the CAP. In this process, the inclusive and professional organisational characteristics enabled well-founded administrative proposals building on input from the sector and the political leadership, to be formulated and implemented by the administration. For example, responding to the 1992 MacSharry reform Denmark adapted promptly the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) system, supported by the sectoral organisation. Similarly, when there were concerns about the feasibility of the EU proposals, the Minister was responsible for promoting an alternative proposal at the EU Council of Ministers, as shown by the hybrid model proposal of the 2003 reform. In Denmark, administrative responses to the EU CAP present continuity and indicate path dependence characteristics. Additionally, the administrative choices are not determined by the political leadership will alone but supported by the organisational capacity of sector, based on professional and expertise knowledge. Despite the close links between the agricultural sector and the political parties and politicisation of agricultural policy, high level of professionalism impedes clientelism and ensures administrative adaptation to EU CAP. Consequently, administrative choices become legitimised, ensuring trust and support in the sector. As a result, Denmark demonstrates high degree of administrative adaptation to CAP decisions, characterised as absorption in Europeanisation terms. This in-depth analysis of the national specificities in this chapter, based on qualitative and quantitative, contributes to a better understanding of the Danish agricultural administrative adaptation. In Chap. 4, I analysed the organisational structures of the sector, the domestic politics and network governance patterns with respect to agriculture in Greece from

Research Findings

183

the country’s accession into the EU in 1981 until 2009. Most studies on Greek politics focus on clientelist relations between the state and the organised interests, which I also acknowledge. However, I have taken the existing literature a step further by unravelling the state-society relations in agriculture, analysing the organisation of the sector, the institutional settings within which these relations develop and the characteristics of the network patterns in agriculture. This analysis shows that the subjection of the Greek agriculture to the CAP triggered a series of policy changes. However, the examination of the impact of formal and informal aspects of the domestic factors domestic administrative responses to CAP revealed inertia and limited change particularly with respect to practices and styles. The weak and fragmented organisational structures of the agricultural society have not been able to enhance the involvement of the sector in shaping administrative practices and strategies that would enable an effective implementation of the CAP policy decisions. This sectoral organisation has been combined for decades with low to non-existent training arrangements impeding the development of professionalism at all the different levels in the sector – primary, sub-sectoral and sectoral. As a result, distrust and distance between the leadership and the members of the organisations increased over time and hindered information flow and knowledge sharing. A high level of concentration of powers centrally and among a few persons has maintained the distance between the political leadership, the administration and the sector and nurtured politicisation and nepotism. Sporadic initiatives by the responsible organisation for training under the auspices of the Ministry have not been able to provide consistent high-level professional development. Various actors, both in the sector and the administration, emphasised the lack of systematic advisory services over time. Moreover, high politicisation and clientelism encourages exploitation of the sector by certain public officials, who exploit their positions and provide information and knowledge to producers as private consultants, another indication of lack of professionalism. Low level of professionalism and training that characterises all the levels of governance has contributed to ill-equipped responses to external challenges and to the CAP rules, demonstrated by failures in the monitoring and low absorption of EU funds. The various governments have focused on short-term solutions in order to satisfy voters’ demands and ensure the support of constituencies. These tactics have impeded the development of long-term agricultural policy strategies in Greece. Consequently, the characteristics of the domestic factors reflect the state-­agricultural society relations and explain why these factors have not been able to reinforce flexible and coherent administrative structures and style and enhance administrative adaptation to the EU CAP. The loosely coupled network patterns and lack of strong and frequent interactions among the actors have resulted in asymmetry of information and involvement in the administrative choices process. Similarly to Denmark, domestic administrative structures, practices and styles are embedded in the pre-­ existing institutional structures, demonstrating path dependence characteristics. The accession to the EU and the CAP reforms (1992 and 2003) that constitute important exogenous events have not been able to induce radical administrative change and thus operate as critical junctures that create a legacy. The establishment of the relevant administrative bodies responsible for monitoring agricultural policy at the

184

7 Conclusions

domestic level has been ill-equipped and untrained. The result has often been dissatisfaction among the actors directly affected by the policy, the farmers, and has led to EU sanctions for mismanagement. Administrative changes have remained formal and followed similar paths at different points in time. Pre-accession administrative patterns, practices and styles have been maintained, failing to introduce the necessary problem-solving administrative instruments, demonstrating inertia. The in-­ depth analysis of these national specificities contributes to the investigation of agricultural administrative adaptation and offers a new understanding of administrative adaptation to the EU CAP in Greece. In Chap. 5, I compared the administrative adaptation process to the EU CAP in Denmark and Greece, based on the analysis in Chaps. 3 and 4. Variation in administrative adaptation has remained significant in Denmark and Greece since their accession to the EU in 1973 and 1981, respectively, despite the subjection of their agricultural policies under the CAP rules for more than 50 years. Denmark presents a high level of absorption; Greece demonstrates inertia in administrative adaptation. In Denmark, administrative patterns have been characterised by centralised combined with collaborative practices and flexible style and have thus been able to respond and adapt to emerging needs and challenges. These characteristics reflect the values, attitudes and orientation of the administrative structures and style, based on trust and inclusion of sectoral and societal expectations. The Danish agricultural administrations have been adaptive over time. While the civil servants try to ensure the government’s policy objectives, they also interpret the EU policy decisions, inform the policy-makers of the potential risks and challenges in order to introduce the relevant policy administrative instruments so that they are according to the EU legislation but also ensure the Danish agricultural interests. In Greece, administrative choices have been determined by the personal conviction and willingness of the responsible politician, political loyalty, characterised by clientelism and patronage instead of professionalism and merit. These characteristics have led to administrative structures and practices that focus on formalities and technicalities, are short-­ term task-oriented and did not allow flexibility and prompt adaptation to the emerging challenges of the CAP reforms. While the Danish administration has been coherent, the Greek administration has enhanced privileged administrative services to certain receivers and nurtured an inefficient and incoherent administrative style. The developments of the two contrasting systems are embedded in pre-existing structures, which confirms their path-dependent characteristics. In Greece, shortage of economic resources combined with lack of skilled and updated personnel, not necessarily due to their responsibility, have not facilitated initiatives at subnational levels of administration. Even when certain civil servants did acquire the qualifications, they did not acquire any autonomy to make decisions and take action. Instead of being the link in the flow of information between the producers and the policy-­ makers, the EU and the national level, their contact with the Ministry concerns ­clarifications and is driven by political loyalty. In sum, although agricultural administrative adaptation of the EU decisions in Denmark is characterised by absorption, inertia has prevailed in administrative adaptation in Greece.

W hat Have We Learned?

185

In Chap. 6, I analysed and compared one by one the three domestic factors, the administrative changes and adaptation during the course of the Eurozone crisis 2009–2017, including the 2013 CAP reform. Since 2009, a number of significant events, such as the Eurozone crisis that followed the global financial crisis in 2008, struck the economies of the EU member states and particularly Greece. Following the Eurozone crisis, the EU institutions acted as managers of the crisis. The founding of the Troika and the Quartet introduced new actors in the management of the crisis process and led to a critical juncture in the EU’s role in relation to domestic politics and policy. The EU institutions have established a number of financial agencies since 2010, such as the European Stability Mechanism that provided financial assistance to Greece,1 Portugal, Spain and Ireland. These events were not directly connected to the CAP. However, they also affected the domestic agricultural administrative structures. Moreover, the 2013 CAP reform introduced changes in the CAP and prepared for even more changes in the near future EU agricultural strategy after 2001. These changes responded to the emerging climate and sustainability challenges and connected the CAP directly to the green economy, which among other aspects introduced new domestic administrative demands. In this chapter, I examined the relevance of these events to the examination of administrative adaptation to the CAP, an aspect not analysed in the preceding chapters. As was the case with the preceding chapters, I show that there have been organisational and administrative changes in both Denmark and Greece. Administrative changes remain domestically shaped and path dependent in both countries.

What Have We Learned? Since 1957, the dynamic integration process of transfer of agricultural policy decisions and competences from EU member states to EU institutions has induced significant changes in the EU and in these member states. However, more than 50 years of EU integration of agricultural policies – decisions, regulations and financial support – has not necessary led to administrative convergence of these decisions among the member states. The domestic administration of EU policies remains domestically designed, administered and monitored and differs from case to case. Administration of policy decisions provides the relevant instruments and mechanisms that enable the achievement of the policy objectives in practice. Adequate administration matters because it can ensure effective policy performance and compliance with the EU level and suitable implementation of the initial policy targets at the domestic level. Yet the administration of policy decisions is not self-evident, but depends on the way the sector is organised and involved in the process, the domestic politics and the actors’ interactions in order to develop the necessary domestic

1  The EU and the IMF provided Greece with three successive emergency loans (bailouts) in 2010, 2012 and 2015 totaling 289 billion euros.

186

7 Conclusions

administrative capacity, choose the relevant policy instruments and monitor the use of these instruments. For example, the actors’ interactions matter in shaping policy strategy, policy formulation and policy adoption and thus the administration of policy decisions, since all actors provide their own knowledge and expertise. Similarly, the organisation of the sector enables or impedes collaborations with the decisions-­ makers and administration and thus can also have a significant impact on the way EU policy decisions are administered in the domestic level, since the sector is the final addressee of these decisions. However, these domestic characteristics differ between the member states within the EU as this book has systematically shown. These divergences lead to differentiated administration of common policies, and while administration succeeds and adapts in one state, it does not necessarily do so in another. As a result, differences in the domestic factors lead to differences in administrative structures, practices and styles, and consequently they create differences in the formulation and performance of the implementation of policy decisions. Therefore it is striking that some member states have not paid adequate attention to establishing the necessary institutional structures; despite the costs of doing so, domestic institutional settings could create the necessary administrative capacity to maintain a highly performing domestic administrative system. The domestic administrative capacity enables policy and administrative adaptability to new demands arising from either the domestic or the international environment. Centralisation of power and professionalism are important qualitative characteristics of the domestic factors. While concentration of power determines the direction and scope of a policy and its administration, a high level of professionalism enables the use of power for achieving the policy stipulations and impeding politicisation. Besides, centralisation of interest representation and professionalism in the organisation of the sector support and strengthen feasible and pragmatic administrative choices of policy decisions. At the macro level, the synergy and collaboration between the state and the society in domestic politics and in the network governance patterns facilitate effective and plausible administrative solutions for carrying out the objectives of policies through exchange of expertise knowledge. Despite suggestions that small states are expected to adapt more easily to various challenges and engage in policy learning due to the presence of social partnerships and continuous coordination and bargaining characteristics (Katzenstein 1985: 10), the analysis in this book shows that small member states differ significantly in the way they respond, adapt and learn when faced with common external challenges. I have attributed these differences to the domestic specificities of small countries, which affect the degree and type of differences in the domestic administrative structures, practices and styles, as shown in Denmark and Greece. Lastly, although the administration and management of EU policy decisions is the primary task of the member states, the efforts of the EU in the coordination of domestic administrative activities are necessary both in the short and the long term. This coordination between the EU and the domestic level is necessary not only in the case of the CAP or of the two specific states; it is also important in other policy areas, such as energy and environment, and in all member states. The administrative coordination between the EU and the member states can increase policy perfor-

Contributions of the Book

187

mance in the individual cases but also harmonisation and coherence among the member states.

Contributions of the Book This book contributes to the existing Europeanisation literature both empirically and theoretically. First, the domestic agricultural administrative adaptation to CAP has not been examined systematically, theoretically nor empirically by Europeanisation scholars apart from some attempts to open the discussion for further research on this policy area (see Roederer-Rynning 2006). The few existing studies that examine the CAP policy area or similar country cases, from a state-society relations point of view, limit their analysis to the interest representation and state negotiations and the corporatist/pluralist decision-making models. In this book, I introduce a different understanding of the member states’ agricultural administrations and their responses to the CAP from a Europeanisation comparative perspective. Moreover, despite the extensive literature on the effect of Europeanisation at the domestic level, the existing studies have not traced and unfolded the mechanisms that induce or impede domestic administrative adaptation and change. The systematic empirical analysis of the domestic administrative adaptation to the EU CAP in this book aims to fill this gap and contribute to the ongoing discussion by political scientists about the role of norms and rules in agricultural policy-making under the CAP. Nevertheless, it is not within the scope of this book to investigate the role of institutions as consensus seekers from a normative point of view for a common social life. This aspect will hopefully trigger new research studies. Second, I use a ‘mixed methodology’ of both qualitative and quantitative methodological tools, which has not been employed in the Europeanisation literature. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis provides a robust and integrated understanding of the domestic administrative responses to the European integration of agricultural policy in the two member states over more than 40 years. The qualitative method corroborates the understanding of the specific characteristics of the interactions with respect to quality and content. The quantitative SNA analysis of the network patterns – type of actors, their interactions and their positioning in the network – links the network governance with the EU governance literature and offers an insight into the accuracy, the frequency and the strength of the actors’ interactions. The comparative historical perspective of the examination of the domestic agricultures helps us understand variation in administrative responses over time. Through choosing to investigate Denmark and Greece as the country cases, and the CAP as the policy area, we can learn about north-south differences but also about differences between small EU member states. Examination of two small countries that have been member states for a long period with respect to a complicated policy area, the CAP, thus complements the Europeanisation studies on either large EU countries (France, Britain, Spain, Germany), small similar countries

188

7 Conclusions

(Greece, Portugal; Belgium, the Netherlands) or Scandinavian countries. The specific choice to compare Denmark and Greece aims to introduce a new research agenda in the study of small EU member states and examine the extent to which this kind of analysis can be generalised not only in other policy areas but also in other country cases. Third, this study is theoretically enriching (a) by identifying and mapping the factors of Europeanisation in a consistent and thorough way and (b) by including both formal and informal institutions and actors and their interactions in an integrated way. This provides evidence of the way politics is done in a country, the partisan preferences, the interactions and relations among the political parties and the society. The examination of specific characteristics – the levels of centralisation and professionalism – and their differences are crucial to tracing variation in domestic adaptation to the EU among the member states. The analysis demonstrates that even if a policy process at the domestic level is highly politicised when the level of professionalism is high, domestic policy change and adaptation can still occur. Professionalism adds a new dimension to the study of the role of the institutions (both formal and informal) in providing actors with resources. A high level of professionalism affects distribution of resources within politicised-depoliticised political systems in a more effective and objective way. Centralisation of power combined with professionalism functions as balance mechanisms to integration and disintegration, formalisation and de-formalisation, bureaucratisation and de-­ bureaucratisation and determines the way a country responds to European integration and the level of adaptation. When these elements differ between member states, variation in response to the EU is observed. Fourth, historical institutionalist analysis often lacks the inclusion of actors in analysing change and impact. In order to fill in this gap, I examine the actors and their constellations. Including the actors’ interactions and the way they organise themselves enables a more complete and broader explanation of the factors that affect the EU impact on the member states. I show that the way the actors organise themselves and interact is path dependent, reinforces their role in the policy process and increases their impact on the administrative adaptation process because adequate and effective administration of policies is also to their own benefit. Moreover, I demonstrate that the particularities of the network patterns affect variation in domestic administrative adaptation between the member states, Denmark and Greece which can be the case for other EU member states. The combination of the informal institutions and the actors’ organisation and interaction allowed me to show that the two countries differ in the way they make politics, their sectors organise themselves and the actors involved interact. In Denmark, the allocation of administrative competencies is concentrated, coherent but also flexible so that they can accommodate changes that allow effective responses to the CAP.  In Greece, these patterns are fragmented and focus on technicalities and formalities, which does not allow flexibility and prompt reaction to the CAP challenges. In addition to the variation in adaptation with respect to the administrative structures, the formal administrative arrangements, the two countries present variation in the administrative styles, practices and norms. The Danish administrative style is

Further Research

189

coherent in allowing and enhancing the distribution of information and knowledge and providing a substantive administration and in mobilising and consulting the relevant actors. This style does not remain rigid in formal procedures that satisfy detailed rules and provisions but is able to adjust and be flexible according to the needs of each case and time. Administrative alternatives are provided that are often able to use practical and effective problem-solving approaches that are open to those administered and enable equal access and information exchange. In contrast, the Greek administrative style enhances privileged administrative services to certain receivers and contributes to bureaucratisation, ineffectiveness and an incoherent administration. This style impedes information and knowledge sharing about the CAP policy instruments and mechanisms with these directly interested and does not mobilise the relevant actors in the process.

Further Research This book contributes to the Europeanisation literature on the impact of European integration of policies on domestic administration by shedding light in a detailed, solid and quantitative perspective on the domestic structures and actors in the agricultural sector in Denmark and Greece’. However, at least three aspects, which have not been included in the objectives of this book, have been triggered by the analysis and could be considered in future research. First, the extent to which the findings of this study on the CAP in two EU member states apply to other member states, and also to other policy areas, would be of interest. Thus, further research is required to pursue a cross-sectoral, cross-country analysis and find out what generalisations could be drawn from them. Second, policy effectiveness and the role of domestic factors in ensuring effective policy change under Europeanisation need more attention. How could changes in the EU multilevel governance contribute to effective policy outcomes and outputs and ensure the right choice of policy instruments across the member states and policy areas? For this purpose, we need further research on the necessary methodological tools to measure efficiency. Third, how can the EU integration make domestic governance not only more efficient but also more democratic? In addition, to what extent does higher efficiency assume a lower level of democracy and where do we set the limits for each of the two dimensions? The democracy and legitimacy aspects are also considered in relation to the impact of the EU on the level of the broadening of the policy-making process at the domestic level and on the inclusion and mobilisation of more informal actors and social partners. Fourth, what is the role of the civil servant at the micro level in the administrative process? What is the level of autonomy and authority when working at the domestic level but dealing with EU policies within a multilevel governance system. Lastly, in connection with the third ­suggestion, to what extent do the domestic network governance structures not only affect democracy but also induce new policy areas while mobilising the involvement of more actors in the policy-making process? Sørensen and Torfing (2007)

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7 Conclusions

suggests that ‘governance networks will often define the policy problem they are dealing with in ways that cut across pre-established and well-defined policy areas, and sometimes even create a new policy area’. The evidence that I present in this book shows that some of the actors can play double or triple roles, as in the Danish case within the agriculture network. For example, the MA that belongs to DAC (the agriculture umbrella organisation), after changes at the EU level, merged and started to interact with the new Ministry of Family and Consumers. However, it would be stimulating to examine whether it was the new policy area (food safety) established by the EU that triggered these interactions, or the emergence of networks with specific sectoral interests (after the BSE and other food crises), or the broader society’s needs and the emergence of new network structures inducing new policies (Chatzopoulou 2019).

Appendices

Appendix I: Important reforms of the CAP1

 The table has been the authors elaboration based on a number of historical sources.

1

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Chatzopoulou, The Europeanization of National Administrations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47223-8

191

Agenda 2000

MacSharry Reform 1992

1972

The introduction of farm development schemes providing low-interest loans and loan guarantees

To ensure common prices at higher than world levels

To ensure a ‘fair’ standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture

Full and ongoing compensation for this reduction through the compensation that will not be related to the quantities produced To improve the Union’s To guarantee the food safety agricultural competitiveness and quality to consumers both on both internal and external within and outside the Union markets

To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress, by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production in particular labour To set up agricultural structures which are competitive but family based the encouragement of farmers to leave the land and the provision of a retirement pension (not less than 500 ua2 per year for farmers between the ages of 55 and 65) Substantial reduction in the prices of agricultural product

Treaty of Rome March 1957

1958

Objectives

Year

To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and contributing to the stability of farm incomes

Control of production

The setting-up of information and advisory services

To protect against outside competition

To stabilise markets

The prevention of new land coming into agricultural production

To ensure that supplies reach the consumers at reasonable prices

To integrate To deepen and extend the 1992 reform environmental through further shifts from price support goals into the CAP to direct payments and develop a coherent rural policy to accompany this process and to create complementary or alternative income and employment opportunities for farmers and their families

.

The encouragement of producer groups and co-operatives, to improve marketing

To assure the availability of supplies

192 Appendices

2

A single farm payment for EU farmers, independent from production; limited coupled elements may be maintained to avoid abandonment of production

Phasing out milk quotas, abolition by 2015 Cross compliance Intervention mechanisms

Economic: Enhanced competitiveness (viable food production)

Fischler Reform 2003

Health Check 2008

CAP Reform 2013

 ua: units of account, replaced by ECU.

Objectives

Year

Additional funding for EU-12 farmers

Assistance to sectors with special problems (so-called ‘Article 68’ measures) Environmental: Improved sustainability (sustainable management of natural resources and climate action) Territorial: Greater effectiveness (balanced territorial development)

Extending SAPS

This payment will be linked to the respect of environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (‘cross-compliance’)

Decoupling of support

Strengthened rural development policy with more EU money, new measures to promote the environment, quality and animal welfare and to help farmers to meet EU production standards starting in 2005, revisions to the market policy of the CAP

Using currently unspent money Shifting money from direct aid to Rural Development

A reduction in direct payments (‘modulation’) for bigger farms to finance the new rural development policy

A mechanism for financial discipline to ensure that the farm budget fixed until 2013 is not overshot and revisions to the market policy of the CAP: asymmetric price cuts in the milk sector: reduction of intervention price for butter by 25% over four years; for skimmed milk powder a 15% reduction over three years (Agenda 2000) is retained;  reduction of the monthly increments in the cereals sector by half, current intervention price maintained  reforms in the rice, durum wheat, nuts, starch potatoes and dried fodder sectors

Appendices 193

Appendices

194

Appendix II: SNA Statistics Univariate statistics with respect to columns: The density for each row and for each column can inform about the way in which actors are embedded in the overall density. The ‘column-wise’ univariate statistics are presented in Table 1 for Denmark and Table 2 for Greece; refer to the actors as ‘sinks’ or ‘receivers’ of information. The sum of each column in the adjacency matrix is the in-degree of the point (connection). That shows the number of other actors that send information (or have ties) to this specific actor (the receiver). The means from the statistical measures present a lot of variation among the actors and thus in the in-degree influence. Table 3 (Denmark) and Table 4 (Greece) present the ‘row-wise’ univariate statistics of the networks and refer to the actors as senders of information. The sum of each column in the adjacency matrix is the out-degree of the point. Statistics on the rows tell us about the role that each actor plays as a ‘source’ of ties (in a directed graph). The sum of the connections from the actor to others indicates the number of actors that the specific actors send information. For example, in Denmark the MA (actor #14) sends information to 16 other actors in the network while he receives from 8. The out-degree measure refers to how influential an actor may be.

Table 1  Univariate statistics with respect to columns (actors as receivers) – Denmark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

MINFAF DAC DF DLG DD FOI DFFE EU DSC0 CON MINCON SB DI MA DL ENVI ECO

Source: SNA

Mean 1.563 0.875 0.438 0 0.313 0.063 1.188 0.438 0.063 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0

Std. dev. 2.15 0.992 0.704 0 0.583 0.242 1.74 0.704 0.242 0 1.225 0 0 0.791 0 0 0

Sum 25 14 7 0 5 1 19 7 1 0 8 0 0 8 0 0 0

Variance 4.621 0.984 0.496 0 0.34 0.059 3.027 0.496 0.059 0 1.5 0 0 0.625 0 0 0

Appendices

195

Table 2  Univariate statistics with respect to columns (actors as receivers) – Greece 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Actors MINRDF NAGREF OPEKEP MINEC0 ELGA OGEKAD EU EP1 EP2 PIO1 GIO2 SIO3 EASTHE EASPIE EASKOZ PRTHES PRKOZ PRPIE LOCGOV REGTHE

Mean 0.579 0 0.474 0.105 0.053 0.053 0.211 0.053 0.053 0.211 0.105 0.105 0.053 0.316 0.158 0 0 0.053 0.105 0

Std. dev. 1.042 0 0.939 0.307 0.223 0.223 0.694 0.223 0.223 0.521 0.307 0.307 0.223 0.921 0.67 0 0 0.223 0.447 0

Sum 11 0 9 2 1 1 4 1 1 4 2 2 1 6 3 0 0 1 2 0

Variance 1.086 0 0.881 0.094 0.05 0.05 0.482 0.05 0.05 0.271 0.094 0.094 0.05 0.848 0.449 0 0 0.05 0.199 0

Source: SNA

Table 3  Univariate statistics with respect to rows (actors as senders) – Denmark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

MINFAF DAC DF DLG DD FOI DFFE EU DSCO CON MINFCON SB DI MA DL ENVI ECO

Source: SNA

Mean 0.5 1.25 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.938 0.5 0 0 0.313 0 0.25 0.125 1 0.125 0 0

Std. dev. 0.935 2.016 0.583 0.583 0.845 1.749 0.866 0 0 0.583 0 0.433 0.331 1.581 0.331 0 0

Sum 8 20 5 5 5 15 8 0 0 5 0 4 2 16 2 0 0

Variance 0.875 4.063 0.34 0.34 0.715 3.059 0.75 0 0 0.34 0 0.188 0.109 2.5 0.109 0 0

Appendices

196 Table 4  Univariate statistics with respect to rows (actors as senders) – Greece 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Actors MINRDF NAGREF OPEKEPE MINECO ELGA OGEKADHM EU EP1 EP2 PIO1 GIO2 SIO3 EASTHES EASPIE EASPTOL PRTHES PRKOZ PRPIE LOCGOVKOZ REGTHES

Mean 0.579 0.263 0 0 0 0 0 0.263 0.263 0.421 0 0 0 0.263 0 0.211 0.263 0.158 0 0

Std. dev. 0.99 0.547 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 0.909 0.936 0 0 0 0.547 0 0.408 0.784 0.67 0 0

Sum 11 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 8 0 0 0 5 0 4 5 3 0 0

Variance 0.981 0.299 0 0 0 0 0 0.194 0.825 0.875 0 0 0 0.299 0 0.166 0.615 0.449 0 0

Source: SNA

Table 5  Danish agriculture network (brokerage) Coordinator MINFAF MINCO FOI DFFE DFAC DF DD MA SB DL DLG DI DSCO DC CON EU Source: SNA

Gatekeeper

Representative

Consultant

Liaison 1

N 2 1

1 1

1 3

1 1 1

Appendices

197

Table 6  Greek agriculture network (brokerage) Coordinator MINRDF NAGREF OPEKEPE MINECO ELGA OGEKA DHMHTRA EU EP1 EP2 PIO1 GIO2 SIO3 EASTHES EASPIE EASKOZ PRTHES PRKOZ PRPIE LOCGOVKO REGTHES

Gatekeeper

Represent

Consultant 3

Liaison 5

2

Source: Based on SNA

 ppendix III: The three models of single payment schemes A (SPS) National/regional flexibility – three main options for member states Member states have options in how they calculate and make payments. The main difference lies in whether they calculate SPS on the basis of individual farmers’ direct payments during a past reference period, thus producing a patchwork of different payments, or whether all payments are averaged out and paid uniformly over a region or state. In the latter approach, payment levels may be varied between arable land and grassland. An in-between system is also available which allows member states either to operate a mixed historic/flat rate approach that stays the same over time (‘static’); or they may choose a mix that alters over time (‘dynamic’), usually so that the proportion of SPS based on historic references reduces as the flat rate element increases, offering a transition from the basic to the flat rate approach. The three main SPS3 options work as follows (taking the various stages of the SPS):

 https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/direct-support/pdf/factsheet-single-paymentscheme_en.pdf

3

198

Appendices

Basic (historic) Reference amounts (based on historic reference period: 2000-2002)

Flat rate (regional) Individual farmer’s direct aids in period

Payment entitlement allotment

Active farmers with historical reference (or with inherited entitlements; or entitlements from national reserve) when SPS applied by member state (MS) All agricultural land except land used for permanent crops and land used for non-agricultural activities

Eligible hectares

Mixed (hybrid) system For some sectors, individual amounts relevant for historic element (calculated for basic option). For other sectors, regional amounts calculated All active farmers All active farmers in region when SPS applied using land in region when SPS by MS applied by MS

Individual amounts not relevant. Regional amounts calculated in period instead

Idem

Idem

The main options for partially decoupled payments Full decoupling is the general principle from 2005 onwards. Member states may maintain some product-specific direct aids alongside the SPS where this is justified in order to avoid production abandonment or severe market disturbance as a result of moving to the SPS. Member states may apply a limited number of options, at national or regional level.

Appendix IV: Financing the Common Agricultural Policy Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy [pdf] applies since 1 January 2007. Summary In order to attain the objectives of the common agricultural policy defined by the Treaty and finance the various measures falling under it, including rural development, a European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and a European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) are set up by this regulation. The EAGF shall finance, in accordance with Community legislation, certain expenditure in a context of shared management between the Member States and the Community and certain expenditure in a centralised manner. The EAFRD shall finance, in a context of shared management between the Member States and the Community, the Community’s financial contribution to rural development programmes implemented in accordance with the Community legislation on support for rural development by the EAFRD.

Appendices

199

Legal Basis Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the financing of the common agricultural policy [pdf] Summary The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), set up by Regulation No 25 of 1962 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 728/70), consumes a large part of the general budget of the European Union. The Fund’s Guarantee Section finances, in particular, expenditure on the agricultural market organisations, the rural development measures that accompany market support and rural measures outside of Objective 1 regions, certain veterinary expenditure and information measures relating to the CAP. The Guidance Section finances other rural development expenditure (not financed by the EAGGF Guarantee Section). The Fund is administered by the Commission and the Member States, cooperating within the EAGGF Committee. The Fund Committee consists of representatives of the Member States and of the Commission. The Member States designate the authorities and bodies empowered to incur expenditure. Paying agencies are approved authorities and bodies of the Member States which offer sufficient guarantees that: • the admissibility of claims and compliance with Community rules are checked before payment is authorised; • the payments effected are correctly and fully recorded in the accounts, and • the necessary documents are submitted within the time and in the form laid down in Community rules. They must hold supporting documents relating to the payments made and documents showing that the required administrative and physical checks have been carried out. Each Member State must forward to the Commission: • details of the authorities and bodies it accredits to pay expenditure; • where more than one agency is accredited, details of the authority or body responsible for collecting the information to be supplied to the Commission and promoting the harmonised application of Community rules; • the names, status and acts of accreditation of the paying agencies; • details of the administrative, accounting and internal control conditions under which payments are made relating to the implementation of Community rules within the framework of the CAP. • The paying agencies make payments to beneficiaries in accordance with the Community rules. Only expenditure incurred by accredited paying agencies may be the subject of Community financing. • expenditure together with an attestation regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts transmitted. The Member States forward statements of expenditure to the Commission each month.

200

Appendices

The financial resources required to cover EAGGF expenditure are made available to the Member States by the Commission by means of advances on the provision for expenditure incurred. In effect, the Commission reimburses expenditure incurred (pre-financed) by the Member States. In addition, working capital can be made available to the Member States for the implementation of rural development programmes. At the end of the financial year, the Member States forward to the Commission their annual statement of expenditure together with an attestation regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts transmitted. The Commission clears the accounts of the paying agencies before May. Its decision covers the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts submitted. This clearance of accounts decision does not prejudice the adoption of subsequent (ad hoc) decisions excluding expenditure from Community financing if it has not been incurred in compliance with Community rules. The amounts concerned (financial corrections) are recovered from the Member States. Before July each year the Commission presents a financial report on the administration of the Fund to the Council and Parliament. If any action is required, the representative of the Commission submits to the Committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The Committee delivers its Opinion on the draft within a time which its Chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. Opinions are delivered by majority (Article 205(2) of the Treaty on European Union). If the Committee’s Opinion is favourable, the Commission adopts the measures, which are directly applicable. If the Opinion is unfavourable, the Commission forwards the measures to the Council. In that case, the Commission may defer application of the measures which it has adopted for not more than one month from the date they were forwarded to the Council. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may adopt a different decision within one month. The Committee is also consulted: on the assessment of the Fund’s appropriations to be entered in the Commission’s estimate for the next year; on draft reports on the Fund to be submitted to the Council. This Regulation replaces Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 with effect from 1 January 2000. The third subparagraph of Article 15 and Article 40 of Decision 90/424/EEC, which concern the financing of certain veterinary expenditure, are deleted. The measures needed to facilitate the transition from the arrangements provided for in Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 to those laid down in this Regulation are to be adopted in accordance with the Committee procedure h­ ttp://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fin/index_en.htm

Appendices

201

Appendix V: Interview Questions General Information If these were the questions asked, you should not change the English Initials of respondent:_______________ 1 . Name of the organisation you work for:_____________ 2. Gender of respondent F___ M____ 3. Education.

a. Scientific-technical education b. Social sciences education 4. Agricultural education 5. How long have you worked in your current position for? ____years ____ months 6. How long have you worked within the agricultural sector for?

Open Questions Questionnaire for Individual Interviews: Groups of Questions: 1. Role of Europeanisation of the agricultural policies in the member states on (effectiveness) 2. Role of process (decision-making implementation process) 3. Roles of various institutions on implementation (national level) (institutions) Group 1: Question 1: Does your organisation consider the existence of a Common Agricultural Policy as an important and relevant policy for improving the situation in the agricultural sectors in the EU members states in general and in Denmark more specifically? Why? Question 2: Do you think that the CAP until today has generated the expected results? Which of the CAP’s objectives have been successful until today? And which have not? Why? a. On competitiveness b. On economic development c. On farmer’s income stabilisation d. On the cohesion of the agricultural and rural areas

202

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Question 3: Do you think the CAP has contributed to the economic development of the agricultural sectors and the rural areas in Denmark? Has the CAP been an efficient policy? Question 4: What is your view about the reform and liberalisation of the CAP that has been extensively discussed the recent years? (The determination of the agricultural prices by the international market) Question 5: What is your view about the existence of a CAP after the enlargement? Is it possible a common agricultural policy to solve the problems in the 25 agricultural sectors? Question 6: Could repatriation-renationalisation of the CAP be an alternative today?

Group 2: Process Question 7: Do you think that the consultation procedure (CNS) (Commission proposes, Council votes, member states implement) that is followed for the CAP is an effective instrument to achieve the goals of the CAP? If not why? Question 8: How do you consider any replacement of the consultation by co-­ decision procedure? (positive/negative impact)? Question 9: What is the general atmosphere like during the policy decision-making with respect to the CAP (consensus/conflict among member states)?

Group 3: Implementation Question 10: What is the agricultural policy (strategy) making process in Denmark? Question 11: Who are the actors involved in this process? Question 12: What is the implementation process of the CAP in Denmark?

Appendices

203

Question 13: Who are the actors involved in the implementation of the CAP in Denmark? Question 14: Who are the actors involved in both the policy making and implementing of the CAP in Denmark? Do you think that it could have any effect double involvement of persons or institutions in the result? Question 15: Do you think there is enough feedback and flow of information among the policy makers and the implementing authorities? Question 16: Do you think that the implementing authorities affect the policy decisions with respect to agriculture in Denmark? Question 17: What are the means of influence used by the actors involved (all levels)? Do you have any suggestions for improvement? Question 18: What is the role of your organisation in the implementation of the CAP? What are your main responsibilities? Question 19: What is your opinion? Is the CAP decided by all the members at the same time but implemented separately? Is such a setup effective? Question 20: Do you think that the training level of the farmers in Denmark is satisfactory? Do you consider that there is a relation between the level of training of the farmers and the economic development of the Danish agriculture? Question 21: Do you think that the existing CAP generates any learning process among the member states with respect the implementation? Question 22: Do you find the flow of information about the agricultural policies decided at the EU level through the different levels satisfying? (farmers’ organisations, research institutions, regional and municipality authorities and the ministry)

Appendices

204

Question 23: How would you assess the relation between the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the institutions involved in the agricultural sector in Denmark?

Appendix E: SNA Questionnaire Denmark Network Analysis Question 1: Please state the following for the five most important persons to the CAP with whom you interact for the implementation of the CAP in Denmark: Name: Organisation: How long have you been in contact with these persons? a. Less than 1 year b. 1 to 3 years

c. More than 3 years

How often do you interact with these persons?

How would you rank the influence of each of these persons in the CAP process (1=not significant) to (5=most influential)?

a. At least once a week b. At least once a month c. Less than once a year

Please indicate if any of these persons know each other and for how long: a. Less than 1 year b. 1 to 3 years

c. More than 3 years (A) knows: (B) knows: (C) knows: (D) knows: (E) knows:

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)

Question 2: How would you rank the influence of these organisations in the policy making process?

Organisation/department European Commission DG agriculture European Council Special Committee for Agriculture European Parliament COPA

Most influential

Moderately influential

Little influential

I do Not influential at not know all

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Organisation/department Environmental organisations Ministry of Agriculture (Denmark) Local Authorities (Municipalities etc.) National farmers organisations (Lanbrugsraadet, Andelselskab etc.)

Most influential

Moderately influential

Little influential

I do Not influential at not know all

Question 3: In your opinion, how far have the expected outcomes of CAP been achieved? 5 High degree of achievement

4 Moderate degree of achievement

3

2 Mostly not Intermediate achieved

1 Not achieved at all

I do not know

Reduce disparities in the rural areas among states Improve employment ratios in rural areas Improve environmental standards in the member states Improve agricultural products quality in lower price Promote EU competiveness

Question 4: To your mind, which organisations have been most influential in implementation of the CAP? (tick maximum 3 organisations) Council of Ministers

European Commission

European Parliament

Special Committee for Agriculture

Committee of the Regions

European economic and Social Comittee

COPA

Environmental Committees

Ministry of National local Agriculture authorities

National Farmers organisations

Appendices

206

Question 5: Do you think the relevant actors are included/ or should be in the process? (tick only one) a. Farmers organisations [  ] yes, to a large degree [  ] To a limited degree [  ] No b. Environmental organisations [  ] yes, to a large degree [  ] To a limited degree [  ] No c. Consumers organisations [  ] yes, to a large degree [  ] To a limited degree [  ] No Question 6: Who of the following is your organisation representing? a. [  [  b. [  [  [ 

] Representing the general European interest ] Representing the general national interest ] Representing the special interest of your members ] Representing the special interest of taxpayers ] Representing the special interest of environmental groups

Question 7: To your mind, is the CNS in the CAP a participatory and open governance instrument? (please tick one) Participatory = The active involvement of the greatest number of stakeholders (social partners and others) at EU level Highly participatory Policy decision Policy implementation Monitoring Evaluation

Partly participatory

Not participatory

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Index

A Absorption, 16 Adaptability capacity, 37 Administrative adaptation CAP, 4, 13, 18 domestic agricultural policy, 15 EU CAP, 2, 18 EU policies, 3 Greek administrative system, 15–16 HI, 13 long-term inertia, 15 measures, 16 measuring adaptation, 15 policy requirements, 16 political behaviour changes, 17 retrenchment, 15 transformation, 16 Administrative adaptation process, 184 Administrative adaptation, variation administrative changes, 152 administrative differences, 151 administrative practices, 154, 155 administrative settings, 154 administrative structures, 155 administrative style, 154, 155 agriculture, 150 CAP reforms, 155 centralised governance systems, 150 COAMs, 152 Danish agricultural decision-making process, 151 Danish cadastre system, 153 domestic structural changes, 152 EU affairs committee, 152 EU formal requirements, 152 EU membership, 151

Europeanisation, 150, 151 Greek case, 153 IACS, 153 inertia, 153 MacSharry reform, 153 MINFAF, 152, 153 Ministry’s permanent secretariat, 151 MINRDF, 152 Parliament, 152 SPS, 154 Administrative arrangements, 188 Administrative changes, 145 agricultural organisations, 91 agricultural society, 96 civil servants, 91 collaboration, 91, 93 Denmark, 89 DFFE, 93 Directorates, 93 domestic level, 96 domestic policy, 95 EU Affairs Unit, 89 EU CAP, 96 EU Directorate, 91 EU membership, 89 export-oriented agricultural sector, 97 local and regional government reform, 96 MacSharry reform, 92 MINCON, 95 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 93 National Food Agency, 92 separation, daily tasks, 93 Administrative practices, 155 Administrative structures, 18, 155 Administrative style, 155 Agenda 2000 reform, March 1999, 73

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222 Agricultural Advice Center (ACC), 67, 68 Agricultural education, 66 Agricultural manufacturers, 65 Agricultural policies, 1, 179, 182, 187 Agricultural policy decisions, 185 Agricultural policy-making process Denmark, 59–61 Greece, 106 Agricultural sector, 180, 182 Agricultural society, 14, 183 Agriculture, 20, 55 employment, 51 GDP, 52 imports/exports, 52 Agriculture society, 70 AgriFish Agency (AFA), 171 Agri-food industry, 55, 65 Agro Food Park, 163 Antecedent conditions, 100, 101 B Business Park, 163 C Cadastre, 130 CAP reforms, 5, 6, 8, 12, 19, 20 Case selection, 49 Centralisation, 37, 39, 47, 111 Centralised governance systems, 150 Centralised political system, 143 Circular Economy Advisory Board, 175 Clientelism, 129, 133 Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000, 8 Committee of Permanent Representations (COREPER), 134, 177 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 3 administrative adaptation, 12 agricultural market, 4 agricultural productivity, 4 agricultural sector, 12 characteristics, 12 civil society, 6 COAMs, 6 Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000, 8 environmental organisations, 6 EU budget, 11 EU budgetary constraints, 7 EU multilevel governance system, 12 European Council, 6 farmers, 4 GATT, 7 Health Check, 11

Index IACS, 8, 9 LIPS, 8, 10 MacSharry reform, 6 objectives, 5 ordinary legislative procedure, 12 policy characteristics, 5 policy instruments, 12 reforms, 5 Rural Development Fund, 11 socio-economic demands, 5 sustainable agricultural policy, 8 Common market organisations (COAMs), 6 Common organisation of the agricultural markets (COAM), 53 Comparative method, 45 Compliance, 1, 2 Confederation of Agricultural Exports, 177 Conservative Party, 168 Continuity, 164, 170, 175, 177 Cooperative system, 62 Cooperativism, 57 Coordination Group Committee (CGC), 59, 60 Corporatist, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77 Council of Agricultural Policy (SAP), 166 Council of Ministers, 177 Critical junctures, 32, 183, 185 D Danish administrative structures, 20 Danish agricultural administrations, 184 Danish Agricultural Advisory Center, 163 Danish Agricultural Associations, 67 Danish Agricultural Council (DAC), 57, 58, 88 Danish agricultural law, 61 Danish agricultural policy, 20, 159 Danish agricultural sector, 159, 163 Danish agriculture actors involved, agricultural policy-­ making, 56 actors, agricultural policy-making, 57 agri-food industry, 55 CAP, 55 cooperatives, 57, 58 Danish economy, 55 Department, 56 DFAC, 57, 59 Europeanisation, 61 MINFAF, 56 organisational structures (see Organisational structures, Danish agricultural society) producers, 58

Index Danish Agriculture and Food Council (DAFC), 158 Danish cadastre system, 153 Danish circle network, 147 Danish cooperative model, 139 Danish farmers (DF), 88 Danish Food and Agriculture Council (DFAC), 56, 57, 59, 76, 84, 89, 96 Danish sectoral organisations, 142 Deliberation, 77, 145 Denmark actors involved, agricultural policy-­ making, 56 agricultural policy process, 59–61 domestic politics (see Domestic politics, Denmark) network governance patterns (see Network governance patterns, Denmark) Denmark–Greece, CAP domestic factors, 137–139 domestic politics administration model, 144 administrative changes, 145 agricultural organisations, 144 asymmetrical political power relations, 147 CAP, 144 centralisation and hierarchy, 146 country’s economy, 143 DAC, 145 deliberation, 145 domestic administration, 143, 144 government-organisations interactions, 144 hierarchical, 147 institutional changes, 143 interparty parliamentary EU committee, 142 MacSharry reform, 145 MINRDF, 146 MIRDF vs. permanent representatives, 143 national economic patriotism, 145 Parliament, 143 politicisation, 145, 146 the 2003 CAP reform, 146 network governance patterns adaptation, 149 administrative change, 149 circle O structure, 147 communicators, 149 content of interactions, 148 DAC, 147 decision-maker informs, 149

223 direction, actors’ interactions, 148 learning process, 150 MINFAF, 147 MINRDF, 147, 148 policy community, 150 policy decision-making process, 150 prefectures, 148, 149 resources, 149 SNA, 147, 149 sociograms, 150 types of actors, 148 organisational structure, agricultural sector administrative process, 140 advisory professional community, 141 centralisation, 142 challenges, 141 collaboration, 141 DAC, 139 Danish cooperative model, 139 Danish sectoral organisations, 142 domestic agricultural administrative adaptation, 142 EU membership, 142 farmers, 141 integrated agricultural training programme, 140 integration, 141 policy, 140 politicisation, 139–140 primary agriculture, 141 primary production vs. industry, 141 professionalism, 140, 142 variation (see Administrative adaptation, variation) Discursive institutionalism (DI), 31 Disjointed’ corporatist model, 146 Domestic actors, 149 Domestic administrative adaptation, 42 administrative structures, 43, 44 administrative style, 43–45 discretion, 42 empirical evidence, 42 policy areas, 44 public civil service, 43 Domestic administrative arrangements, 2 Domestic factors, 20, 21, 30, 34, 35, 41 administrative choices, 36 Domestic politics network governance structures agricultural organisations, 170 Danish agriculture, 170 Denmark, 174 EU institutions, 171 management, 173

224 Domestic politics (cont.) Organogram of the Ministry of Food and Environment, 172 policy-making, 171 regional leader, 173 state and agricultural society, 170 Domestic politics, 14, 38–40 Domestic politics, Denmark administrative model, 74 Agenda 2000 reform, March 1999, 73 agricultural interest, 71 agricultural policy decision-making, 74 agricultural society, 70, 71 CAP, 72, 75 collaboration, 70 corporatist structures, 72 Danish agricultural organisations, 71 decision-making processes, 76 deliberation, 77 EU institutions, 75 EU multilevel governance system, 73 expert knowledge-based politics, 78 formal decision-maker, 70 government, 74 institutionalisation, agricultural politics, 71 institutionalised political systems, 70 interviewees, 70 knowledge-based resources, 77 liberalisation, 72 MacSharry reform, 73 MINFAF, 71, 72, 76 Ministers of Agriculture, 75, 78, 79 policy-making process, 69, 78 political leadership, 72 professional specialised knowledge, 77 professionalism, 76, 78 societal interests, 71 SPS, 77 state-society interactions, 70 state-society relations, 75 the 2003 CAP reform, 77 E EAGGF guarantee, 53 Embeddedness, 175 Environmental Protection Agency, 171 EU affairs committee, 152 EU Affairs Unit, 89 EU Common Agricultural Policy (EU CAP), 2 European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), 52 European Stability Mechanism, 185 European Stability Mechanism in 2013, 157 European Union (EU), 1

Index Europeanisation administrative adaptation, 2 administrative change, 1 agricultural policies, 1 agricultural society, 14 bottom-up process, 26 CAP, 13 challenges, 29 Commission, 2 cyclical/sequential, 24, 26 Danish agriculture, 61 definition, 25, 26 domestic administrative adaptation, 25 domestic administrative arrangements, 2, 13 domestic factors, 13, 27, 34 domestic impact, 24, 28 domestic level, 27 domestic politics, 14 dynamics, 28 EU CAP, 2 European integration, 1, 12 governance perspective, 27 Greece administrative adaptation, 126–129 administrative interventions, 130, 131 agricultural network, 122 agricultural organisations, 107, 108 banks, 108 CAP, 110, 117 cliques, 123 COREPER, 135 decentralisation process, 111 disjointed/disconnected communication, 112 domestic politics, 113–116 farmers party, 109 financial interventions, 110 homophily, 122 in-degree actor, 124 intermediaries, 112 MIRDF, 134 mobilisations, 110 network analysis, 126 network governance, 118, 119 network structure, 120 OPEKEPE, 131–133 organisational structures, 107 out-degree actor, 125 political parties, 109 SAP, 116, 117 SNA, 121 visualisation, actors, 119 HI, 13 institutional change, 12

Index mediating/intervening factors, 34 mixed methods, 17, 18 network governance patterns, 14, 15 organisation sectors, 14 performance view, 24 policy content, 1 policy instruments/implementation, 18 policy process, 40 public administration, 30 SNA, 13 theory-building, 30 top-down process, 26 Eurozone crisis administrative adaptation, 157 agricultural activity, 164 agricultural cooperatives, 162 agricultural development programme, 164 agricultural issues, 162 agricultural markets, 158 agricultural organisations, 160–162 agricultural products, 159 agricultural sectors, 161, 164 business and public administration, 164 civil societies, 157 climate change, 159, 160 compulsory registration system, 160 cooperative organisational structures, 159 DAFC, 158 domestic agricultural administration, 158 domestic politics agricultural insurance system, 166 agricultural organisations, 165, 166 agricultural package, 167 buffer zone legislation, 165 EU financial opportunities, 169 legislative activities, 166 Ministers of Agriculture (2009–2017), 169 Ministers of Agriculture in Denmark 2010–2017, 168 state-agricultural society relation, 165, 168 economic and societal changes, 160 environment, 160 environmental policy, 159 EU CAP funds, 158 EU member states, 158 food processing industry sectors, 158 food processing sector, 159 food production, 160 global financial crisis, 157, 159 management, 157 network governance structures census system, 175 communication, 177

225 institutional administrative changes, 175 institutional development, 175 policy developments, 175 political and administrative system, 175 organic agricultural products, 161 policy decisions, 163 political role, 157 public employment and wages, 157 SA, 159 shareholders, 162 state resources and financial support, 164 Extension service, 67, 68 F Farm Advisory Network, 164 Farm size, 51 First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, 171 Food Industry Agency (FIA), 171 Food processing industry, 55 Formal decision-maker, 70 Fragmentation, 108, 121, 123, 127 Future research, 189, 190 G General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 7 General Confederation of Greek Agricultural Unions of Greece (GESASE), 109 General Secretariat (GS), 104 Geographical information system (GIS), 10 Greece actors, 103 agricultural policy-making process, 106 agricultural production, 99 aid programmes, 102 GS, 104 inertia, 100 Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 104 PASEGES, 105 trade tariffs, 101 Greek administrative structures, 20 Green Growth agreement, 159 H Health Check, 11 Historical institutionalism (HI), 13, 31 critique, 31 formal/informal, 31 intended vs. unintended consequences, 32 time, 31

Index

226 I IACS data computer systems, 133 Implementation measuring adaptation, 7, 15 Inertia, 100, 112, 136 Institutional changes, 143 Institutional structures, 186 Institutional theories, 30 Institutionalised political systems, 70 Institutionalist analysis, 188 Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS), 7–9, 16, 153, 182 Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMP), 109 Intra organizational dynamics, 37, 63, 64 K Knowledge Center for Agriculture, 163 L Land Parcel Identification System (LIPS), 8, 10, 42 Liberal intergovernmentalism, 23 Liberal Party, 165 M Macro-domestic dynamics, 36 MacSharry reform, 6, 16, 73, 92, 110, 145, 153 Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED), 164 Measuring adaptation, 15 Meat Association (MA), 88 Member of the Social Democratic Party, 161 Memoranda of understanding (MoU), 157 Metagovernor, 182 Micro-domestic dynamics, 36 Minister of Agriculture, 161 Ministers of Agriculture (2009–2017), 169 Ministers of Agriculture in Denmark 2010–2017, 168 Ministries of Agriculture and Education, 164 Ministry of Agriculture, 165 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 92, 93 Ministry of Economics, 173 Ministry of Education, 67 Ministry of Environment, 173 Ministry of Family and Consumers (MINCON), 78, 82, 95 Ministry of Food Agriculture and Fisheries (MINFAF), 142, 145, 147–154 Ministry of Food and Environment, 167

Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 173 MINRDF, 146–153 Misfit/incompatibility, 29 Mixed method, 18, 41, 46, 54 N National economic patriotism, 145 National Registration of Agricultural Cooperatives and Trade Unions, 160 Neo-functionalism, 23 Network governance, 30–33, 35, 40, 41, 47, 54 actors role, 33 administrative efficiency, 33 dimensions, 33 theory, 34 Network governance patterns, 14, 15, 40 Network governance patterns, Denmark actors, 80, 81 cliques, 88 policy, 88 senders of information, 86, 87 transmit/receive information, 85, 86 characteristics, 80 DAC, 80, 81 Danish agricultural network, 89 DF, 88 DFAC-DFFE, 80 DFFE, 83, 84, 88 DFFE-DAC-MINFAF, 80 FA, 88 frequent interactions, actors, 80 k-core, 84, 85 MINCON, 82 MINFAF, 80, 88 policy community network, 80 SNA, 80 sociograms, 89 state-society relations, 79 statistical measures, 89 sub-sectoral organisations, 84 type of actors, 84 variation of actors, 87 Network patterns, 188 New Farmers’ Organisation, 177 North, 187 Northern welfare corporatist system, 50 O Økologisk Landsforening (ØL), 66 Orchestration, 23 Ordinary legislative procedure, 12

Index Organisation centralised/decentralised, 37 first factor, 36 heterogeneous, 37 sector, 37 Organisational structures, Danish agricultural society administrative adaptation, CAP, 61 Agricultural Advice Center, 67, 68 agricultural education, 66 agricultural manufacturers, 65 agricultural policy, 69 agri-food industry, 65 CAP, 68 collaboration, 63, 65, 69 consensus-driven decision-making process, 64 cooperative system, 62 coordination, 64, 69 DAC, 62, 64, 66 DAFC, 64 decision-making process, 69 deliberative institutions, 63 domestic agricultural policy, 63 DUC, 63 EU membership, 62, 63 Europeanisation, 63 extension service, 67, 68 farmers, 62 high exports, 65 high production capacity, 65 interviewee, 63, 64 LINCHPIN, 69 loans, 67 Ministry of Education, 67 ØL, 66 organisational changes, 62, 69 processes, 63 professional development, 67 professional training, 66–68 regional economic societies, 62 SCA, 69 technology, 65 Over-determination, 49 P Parliamentary European Affairs Committee (PEAC), 60 Parliamentary Special Committee for Food and Agriculture (PSCA), 60 Path dependence, 31, 158, 162, 168, 177 Permanent Secretariat (Department), 56 Policy community, 33, 80, 150

227 Policy decisions, 182, 186 Policy learning, 186 Policy network, 37 Policy process, 188 Politicisation, 145, 146 Pre-accession association, 100 Professional Agricultural Center, 67 Professional qualifications, 39 Professionalism, 35, 38–40, 76, 140 formal qualification, 38 informal qualification, 38 Public administration, 30 Q Quasi-corporatist, 113 R Rational choice (RC), 30 Rational institutionalism, 34 Research findings, 180, 181 Retrenchment, 15 Rotation, 166, 168, 169 Rural Development Fund, 11 Rural Development Programme, 174 S Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, 173 Sectoral organisation, 183 Silo structure, 167 Single farm payments, 10 Single payment scheme (SPS), 77, 135, 154 Social Democrat Helle Thorning Schmidt, 165 Social Democrat Party, 165 Social network analysis (SNA), 13, 15, 17, 147, 181 challenge, 48 communicator/facilitator, 47 consultant, 48 coordinator, 48 descriptive statistics, 47 interaction choices, 47 interview data, 46 qualitative analysis, 47 qualitative data, 46 representative, 48 statistical measures, 47 Society, 3, 30 Sociograms, 150 Sociological institutionalism (SI), 31, 35 Southern quasi-corporatist system, 50

Index

228 Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), 69, 134, 177 State-society relations, 75, 181, 187 Surveillance Committee, 173 Sustainability, 158 Sustainable Agriculture (SA) group, 159

T Transformation, 17 U Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA), 10