The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta: Values, Legitimation, and Polarisation 3031232895, 9783031232893

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction
1.1 Europeanisation and Malta´s Identity
1.2 Europeanisation and Malta´s Culture
1.3 Europeanisation and the Party Leaders
1.4 The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community
1.5 Malta and the Four Stages of Europeanisation
1.6 Book Structure
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Europeanisation and Party Politics: A Review
2.1 Conceptualising Europeanisation
2.2 Functions and Mechanisms of Europeanisation
2.3 Europeanisation and Domestic Politics
2.4 Europeanisation and Political Parties
2.5 The Direct and Indirect Impact of Europeanisation on Political Parties
2.6 The Conditionality Clause
2.7 Europeanisation and Political Conditionality
2.8 National Political Parties and European Party Groups
2.9 Political Parties and Their EU Approach
2.10 Europeanisation and Euroscepticism
2.11 Politicisation of the EU
2.11.1 Politicisation and Framing
2.12 Political Parties Role in the European Elections
2.13 Europeanisation and Party Politics
Bibliography
Chapter 3: The Two Sides of Maltese Politics
3.1 The Road Towards the Two-Party System
3.2 Ideologies and the European Union
3.3 Political Participation, Partisanship, and Polarisation
3.4 The Single Transferable Vote
3.5 Civil Society and Malta´s Political System
3.6 Political Parties and Media Pluralism
3.7 Party Financing
3.8 Trust in the Main Political Parties and Party Leaders
3.9 Malta and Its Two Sides of Politics
Bibliography
Chapter 4: Europeanisation and Membership in the European Union
4.1 Ideologies, Neutrality and European Membership
4.2 The EU Influence and Malta: The 1987 Election
4.3 The Second Stage of Europeanisation and the 1992 National Election
4.4 Reforms and EU Membership
4.5 Malta´s Tax System and the Labour Party
4.6 The 2003 EU Referendum
4.7 Malta and the European Union: The 2003 National Election
4.8 Malta´s Political Parties and EU Membership
Bibliography
Chapter 5: Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities
5.1 Second Order Elections and the First European Parliament Election in Malta
5.2 Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs
5.3 The Europeanisation of the Labour Party
5.4 Divorce and the European Union
5.5 The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party
5.6 Europeanisation and EU Membership
Bibliography
Chapter 6: Europeanisation and European Values
6.1 European Values and the Muscat Administration
6.2 A Decade of Membership and the 2014 European Elections
6.3 Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum
6.4 Malta´s 2017 EU Presidency of the Council of the EU
6.4.1 EU Presidency and Irregular Migration
6.4.2 The Maltese Presidency and the Other Priorities
6.5 The Panama Papers and the 2017 National Election
6.5.1 The 2017 National Election
6.6 European Values and Malta´s Political System
Bibliography
Chapter 7: Europeanisation and the Rule of Law
7.1 European Values and the Assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia
7.1.1 The Assassination of Daphne and the European Dimension
7.2 The Political Divisions and Valletta 2018
7.3 The Publication of the Inquiry on Egrant and the Pilatus Bank
7.4 The 2019 European Elections
7.5 The Murder of Lassana Cisse
7.6 The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and the Resignation of Muscat
7.7 The Role of MEPs in Malta´s Political System and the Election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament
7.8 The 2022 National Elections in Malta and the Covid-19 Pandemic
7.9 The European Union and Malta´s Political System
Bibliography
Chapter 8: Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: A Reflection
8.1 Malta and Membership in the European Union
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

Springer Series in Electoral Politics Series Editors: Daniel Stockemer · Daphne Halikiopoulou

Jean Claude Cachia

The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta Values, Legitimation, and Polarisation

Springer Series in Electoral Politics Series Editors Daniel Stockemer Canada

, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON,

Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading, Reading, Berkshire, UK

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on voting behaviour and election-related topics, with a global, regional and country specific focus. Electoral Politics welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as electoral turnout, electoral campaigns, political parties, voting behaviour, electoral systems and related fields. Manuscripts can also link elections and political behaviour to broader political concepts, including democracy, the economy and foreign policy. All books published in this series are peer-reviewed.

Jean Claude Cachia

The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta Values, Legitimation, and Polarisation

Jean Claude Cachia Institute for European Studies University of Malta Msida, Malta

ISSN 2524-8103 ISSN 2524-8111 (electronic) Springer Series in Electoral Politics ISBN 978-3-031-23289-3 ISBN 978-3-031-23290-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Craig, Kirsty, Crystal, Conor, Keanan, and Khloe

Acknowledgements

This book has been a long dream of mine. When I completed my Ph.D. at the University of Lincoln, I started to look at a way of turning this research into a book. Several years have gone by, and this book is finally published. There are few studies on the political system in Malta, and even fewer on the impact which the European Union has on the country’s political system. Whilst this book provides an overview, I hope it can encourage others to evaluate the political system of the smallest state in the European Union. Whilst Malta is small, it does not mean that the impact of the EU is less interesting. This book explains the role of the European Union and takes into consideration the events which took place in the last few years including the Panama Papers, the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the debates which took place within the EU over the state of the Maltese institutions. I hope that this book will be of interest to those who want to understand the way Europeanisation can influence political systems and to those who are interested in Malta’s political system. It would not have been possible to publish this book without the support and feedback from the editor Mr Niko Chtouris (Springer). Thank you for making the process much easier and for your constant feedback. Special thanks go also to Mr Parthiban Gujilan Kannan, Ms Kali Gayathri, and the reviewers that helped to make this book better. This book started with my Ph.D. journey. For this reason, I would like to thank my parents Tessie and Joe, my sisters Alison and Veronica, my brother-in-law Eric, and my relatives Aunty Mary and Uncle Paul for their constant support. I am grateful to my friend (more like a brother) Andre who helped me in the editing process. Special thanks go to Prof Edward Warrington, Dr Mario Vassallo, Mr René Monseigneur, Mr Godwin Ellul, Ms Sarah Borg, Mr Matthias Portelli, Mr Maverick Vassallo, Ms Antonella Pace, Ms Roseanne Calleja, Mr Mark Piscopo, and Mr Fabian Vella (and the Yue team). By now, I am sure that you are fed up with hearing about this book, but thank you for your feedback and for helping me to complete it. I am also grateful for the support given by my Ph.D. tutors Prof Hugh Bochel and Dr Ben Kisby from the University of Lincoln. Thanks for believing in me and in my vii

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Acknowledgements

project, when few others did. This book would not have been possible without you. I will always be grateful for your help. Teachers play a very important role in a student’s life, and throughout my educational years, I have found several teachers who inspired me to pursue my dreams. These include Ms Angele Galea, Dr Roberta Cauchi-Santoro, Ms Brigitte Buttigieg, Ms Olivia Stivala Cauchi, Ms Rachel St. John, and Prof Colin Hay. Thank you for helping me to become the person I am today. I still have a lot to learn, but will always cherish your teachings. Special thanks go to the Institute for European Studies and my colleagues, particularly to Prof Mark Harwood and Prof Roderick Pace. Special thanks go to all the participants who agreed to be interviewed. I had the opportunity to interview some participants in 2013 and 2022. This provided me with the opportunity to discuss how the political system evolved within that period. Unfortunately, Lino Spiteri passed away in 2014, a year after he allowed me to interview him. He was a great writer and politician. My Ph.D. could not have been written without the use of his extensive work which is extremely valuable for all political scientists. Last but not least, special thanks go to my students. I hope you learn from me as much as I learn from you. I understand that this list is quite long, but these individuals made this dream of writing a book on the Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta possible.

Contents

1

2

3

Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction . . . . . 1.1 Europeanisation and Malta’s Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Europeanisation and Malta’s Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Europeanisation and the Party Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Malta and the Four Stages of Europeanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Book Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 5 9 11 14 21 22 24

Europeanisation and Party Politics: A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Conceptualising Europeanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Functions and Mechanisms of Europeanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Europeanisation and Domestic Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Europeanisation and Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Direct and Indirect Impact of Europeanisation on Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 The Conditionality Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Europeanisation and Political Conditionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 National Political Parties and European Party Groups . . . . . . . . . 2.9 Political Parties and Their EU Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 Europeanisation and Euroscepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11 Politicisation of the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11.1 Politicisation and Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.12 Political Partiesʼ Role in the European Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.13 Europeanisation and Party Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27 30 31 32 34

The Two Sides of Maltese Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Road Towards the Two-Party System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Ideologies and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 64 66

36 37 39 41 43 44 47 49 51 54 54

ix

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Contents

3.3 Political Participation, Partisanship, and Polarisation . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Single Transferable Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Civil Society and Malta’s Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Political Parties and Media Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Party Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Trust in the Main Political Parties and Party Leaders . . . . . . . . . 3.9 Malta and Its Two Sides of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

5

6

. . . . . . . .

72 73 81 83 86 87 88 88

Europeanisation and Membership in the European Union . . . . . . . . 4.1 Ideologies, Neutrality and European Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The EU Influence and Malta: The 1987 Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Second Stage of Europeanisation and the 1992 National Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Reforms and EU Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Malta’s Tax System and the Labour Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The 2003 EU Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Malta and the European Union: The 2003 National Election . . . . 4.8 Malta’s Political Parties and EU Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93 95 98 104 109 117 123 131 136 137

Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Second Order Elections and the First European Parliament Election in Malta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Europeanisation of the Labour Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Divorce and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party . . . . 5.6 Europeanisation and EU Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

145 153 160 169 172 179 180

Europeanisation and European Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 European Values and the Muscat Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 A Decade of Membership and the 2014 European Elections . . . 6.3 Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Malta’s 2017 EU Presidency of the Council of the EU . . . . . . . 6.4.1 EU Presidency and Irregular Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 The Maltese Presidency and the Other Priorities . . . . . . 6.5 The Panama Papers and the 2017 National Election . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1 The 2017 National Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 European Values and Malta’s Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

185 186 196 203 216 218 228 232 245 260 261

. . . . . . . . . . .

143

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7

8

Europeanisation and the Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 European Values and the Assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 The Assassination of Daphne and the European Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Political Divisions and Valletta 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Publication of the Inquiry on Egrant and the Pilatus Bank . . . 7.4 The 2019 European Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 The Murder of Lassana Cisse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and the Resignation of Muscat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 The Role of MEPs in Malta’s Political System and the Election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament . . . . 7.8 The 2022 National Elections in Malta and the Covid-19 Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 The European Union and Malta’s Political System . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

277 278 285 291 295 298 306 310 323 327 339 342

Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: A Reflection . . . . . . . . 353 8.1 Malta and Membership in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

List of Abbreviations

AB AD ADPD AEA AFD ALDE AMLD AN CASH CET CHOGM CMTU CNI CoC CPC CSCE CVM DNP DOI EASO ECHR ECtHR ECJ ECR EDD EEA EEC EIGE EIM EFDD

Alleanza Bidla (Alliance for Change) Alternattiva Demokratika (Malta’s Green Party) Alternattiva Demokratika-Democratic Party Annual Emission Allocations Alternative for Germany Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Anti Money Laundering Directive Azzjoni Nazzjonali (National Action) Coalition for the Abolition of Spring Hunting Customs and Excise Tax Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Confederation of Malta Trade Unions Campaign for National Independence Capital of Culture Consumer Protection Cooperation Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Democratic Nationalist Party Department of Information European Asylum Support Office European Convention of Human Rights European Court of Human Rights European Court of Justice European Conservatives and Reformists Europe of Democracies and Diversities European Environment Agency European Economic Community European Institute for Gender Equality External Incentives Model Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy xiii

xiv

ENISA ENP EP EPP EU EURODAC FAA FATF FKNK FMI FOI FŻL GDP GDPR GHG GNP GRECO GRTU GWU HSBC IIP IĠM ILGA IOM IPU IVF KNŻ KSU Lm LIBE LGBTIQ MEUSAC MFSA MGRM MHRA MLP MTA MEP MP MŻPN

List of Abbreviations

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity EU Neighbourhood Policy European Parliament European People’s Party European Union The European Union Fingerprint Database for Asylum Seekers Flimkien għal Ambjent Aħjar (Together, for a better environment) Financial Action Task Force Federation for Hunting and Conservation Front Maltin Inqumu Federation of Industry Forum Żgħażagħ Laburisti (Labour Youth Forum) Gross domestic product General Data Protection Regulation Greenhouse gas Gross national product Group of States against Corruption Malta Chamber of Small and Medium Enterprises General Workers’ Union Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Malta Individual Investor Programme Institute of Maltese Journalists The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association International Organization for Migration Inter-Parliamentary Union In vitro fertilisation Kunsill Nazzjonali taż-Żgħażagħ (National Youth Council) Saint Hubert Hunters Maltese Lira European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and gender diverse, Intersex, Queer and questioning Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee Malta Financial Services Authority Malta Gay Rights Movement Malta Hotels and Restaurants Association Malta Labour Party Malta Tourism Authority Member of the European Parliament Member of Parliament Moviment Żgħażagħ Partit Nazzjonalista (Nationalist Party Youth Group)

List of Abbreviations

NATO NGO OECD OSCE PANA PD PDN PES PESCO PfP PL PN Pulse RE RN S&D SaR SDM SHout SLAAP SMEs STV TEU TPPI UAE UEDC UĦM UK UKIP US USSR VAT V18

xv

North Atlantic Treaty Organization A Non-profit organisation Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Inquiry Committee into Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Democratic Party Partit Democratiku Nazzjonalista Party of European Socialists Permanent Structured Cooperation Partnership for Peace Labour Party Nationalist Party Social Democratic Students of Malta Renew Europe National Rally (France) Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Search and Rescue Area Studenti Demokristjani Maltin (Maltese Christian Democrat Students) Spring Hunting Out Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation Small and Medium Enterprises Single transferable vote Treaty of the European Union Today Public Policy Institute United Arab Emirates European Union of Christian Democrats Voice of the Workers (Union) United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Value-added tax Valletta 2018

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1

The impact of Partiesʼ Foreign Policies on Maltaʼs Economy . . . . . . 19 The impact of Europeanisation on Political Parties .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. 30 Policymaking in national and European institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Political Parties and clientelism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 PNʼs approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 The Labour Party’s Policy Shift .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . 116 Renegotiation of the accession treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Arrival of irregular migrants by boat in Malta (2001–2017). Source Vassallo and Cachia (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

xvii

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6

The Main Characteristics of Malta’s Political Leaders . . . . . . . . . . Different perspectives on Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The European principles . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 1987 Election Results . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 1992 Election Results . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 1996 Election Results . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . Reference to the EU in the manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998 Election Results . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . The 2003 EU Referendum Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2003 National Election Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The results of the 2004 EU elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2008 national election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2009 EU elections results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The divorce referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2013 national election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discussion on the IIP in the European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2014 European elections results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2015 hunting referendum results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Priorities of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU . . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. Politico’s assessment of the Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2017 national election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reaction to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia . . . . . . . Reaction of EU politicians to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia at EU level .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia as a critical juncture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malta MEPs and their reaction to the discussion on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2019 European election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reaction to the murder of Lassana Cisse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 16 16 103 108 115 118 121 131 134 150 157 166 170 176 192 202 213 216 231 256 280 280 283 287 305 307 xix

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Table 7.7 Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 8.7 Table 8.8 Table 8.9 Table 8.10

List of Tables

The 2019 protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malta MEPs and their reaction to the 2019 protests and resignation of Prime Minister Muscat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2022 national election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electoral gap between the main political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Four Stages of Europeanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assessing the Impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs Party Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assessing the impact of Europeanisation on Party Politics in Malta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Most important values to you personally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What are values which best represent the EU? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What does the EU represent to you? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . You feel a citizen of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mutual Defence Clauses of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trust in the Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main issues for the Country . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

311 313 336 337 356 358 359 361 362 365 367 368 369 374

Chapter 1

Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

The path of civilisation is fatal, the idea of the monarchy is irreconcilable with that of a republic, governments do not trust the working class. Therefore there is no disarmament— no declaration of the cessation of hostilities—increasing war costs—and a dark tumultuous night at the last horizon, from which the worse that can emerge is a United States of Europe which every government and governing class believes is utopia (Manara, 1892).

Ernesto Manara, a nineteenth-century Maltese politician, drew a link between his vision of a ‘United States of Europe’ and peace in the continent. Manara wrote the above statement in 1892 when the European Union was still a far-fetched idea; when the continental powers of France and Germany were heading from one conflict to another and when Malta was still a British fortress colony with no plan for actual independence. This statement expresses the desire of seeing Malta as part of a larger European conglomerate. Manara could not have foreseen that Europe would experience two world wars, leaving millions of victims and crippling European powers and their economies. It was this environment that led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the European Union in 1992 following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Manara’s vision of a united Europe, conceived on Europe’s geographical and political periphery more than a century ago, provides a contrasting vision to the challenges being faced by the European Union today. As the European Union came into being, and as politicians attempted to give it a constitution that would have brought it closer to the concept of a United States of Europe, a growing tide of Euroscepticism not only halted the Constitutional project but together with the financial crisis, the Syrian migration crisis, Brexit referendum, and even the Covid-19 pandemic threatened the future of the European project. Apart from this, the European Union was further challenged by developments, first in the European periphery and then in Central and Southern Europe with member states ignoring or rejecting Europeanisation. This led to a confrontation with the European Union on issues regarding the rule of law, political standards, and governance norms.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_1

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

Decades later, the same vision would be proposed by other politicians. Following the end of the Second World War, movements for the country’s independence gained traction and discussions were underway about Malta’s future constitutional arrangements. This was a time when most European powers were revisiting their colonial commitments. Herbert Ganado was the first politician in Malta to propose membership in the European Economic Community. The Electoral Manifesto of the Democratic Nationalist Party for the 1962 election states that ‘the D.N.P. will do its best to make of Malta the ‘Free Port’ and Entrepot of the Common Market in the Mediterranean placed as it is between Europe and Africa, between East and West’ (PDN, 1962). The proposal was, once again, made at a time when Malta was still part of the British Empire. Still by the end of the Second World War, the main Empires in Europe could not keep their colonies. Once a symbol of pride and nationalism, these colonies slowly became a burden, and Empires such as Great Britain opted to provide sovereignty to these states to focus on national matters. Whilst empires were in decline with colonies, including Malta and Cyprus, gaining their Independence, the European Economic Community developed and became more influential. This led various states across Europe, to show their interest in forming part of this organisation. These included Malta. For nearly two decades after the country achieved full sovereignty, one of the main political divisions would be on the kind of relationship should Malta have with this community. Malta is not the only country in Europe in which the question surrounding membership in the European Union created political divisions. Even though much of the literature on Europeanisation focuses on the larger states, Malta provides an interesting study of how the European Union can influence party politics in member states. Malta is located in the Central Mediterranean, approximately 290 kilometres from the North African coast and 96 kilometres south of Sicily. It consists of a small archipelago with few natural resources. It has an important geopolitical position and its official language, Maltese, is a testament to the history of occupation which shaped the archipelago’s development since this Semitic language, written in the Latin script, incorporates elements of Arabic, Anglo-Saxon, and Romance languages. Malta’s first inhabitants arrived from Sicily in 5000 BC. The archipelago then was home to a succession of regional powers, including the Carthaginians, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Knights of Saint John, and the French, before finally being incorporated into the British Empire. Malta gained its independence in 1964 and became a republic in 1974. The rule of the Order of St John was especially important as it exposed the country to a primitive form of Europeanisation. The Knights not only fortified the country but also helped to integrate Malta into the European artistic, cultural, and political mainstream because most of the Knights came from different parts of Europe. Their rule served to reinforce Malta’s perceived European Identity, despite being an island on the periphery of this continent (Warrington, 2022). Membership was first mentioned by the Nationalist Party in 1979 as a response to the departure of the British forces from Malta in that same year. Malta eventually became an EU member state in 2004.

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

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Malta merits a study and a consideration of its own, particularly regarding Europeanisation, the term scholars used to evaluate the impact of the European Union on member states. Firstly, its political groupings were not formed around ideological standpoints but around charismatic individuals who turned politics into a second religion for the Catholic Island. Secondly, as these parties developed, the struggle for power between them increased, and this influenced their supporters who followed their leaders blindly. This polarisation, encouraged by the main political parties, reached an unprecedented high in the last two decades, with turnouts reaching over 90% in national elections and a continual political struggle (Baldacchino, 2002) which split the country into two main divides, the Nationalists (blue) versus the Labourites (red). On this matter, Pirotta wrote: Since their emergence in Malta over one hundred years ago, political parties have come to exercise enormous hold and influence over the Maltese electorate. Every five years or so, during the general elections, over ninety percent of those entitled to vote, although, under no legal compulsion to do so, they are out to cast their vote in favour of one of the contending parties and its candidates (Pirotta, 1994, p. 9).

Maltese citizens breathe and eat politics. Politics and political parties are at the heart of Maltese social life. National elections are a huge event, and more often than not, these are divisive and polarised. Massive campaigns are developed by major political parties, and mass meetings see the mobilisation of thousands of Maltese people, with a number of these treating party leaders like political messiahs. It is therefore not particularly surprising that the issue over European Union accession and the impact of the EU membership on Malta, which was fought along party lines, led to strong divisions between those who were for and against membership. This combination of politics and public adoration is a political tool that leaders use to maintain their vote levels and limit the impact of emerging political parties. This has in turn supported the duopolistic status quo in Maltaʼs political system and enabled the leaders to frame and politicise the EU to their advantage. However, there is a cost to this divisive political environment since it reinforced the divisions within Maltaʼs society and strengthened political tribalism and patronage (Pace, 1990; Hirczy, 1995). Harwood (2020) and Verney (2017) argue that Malta is an anomaly. It did not experience the same economic problems as its Mediterranean neighbours and the country did not require any austerity measures. Beyond Malta’s economic policies, the country has a different political system than the other new member states and both major political parties are now considered to be Europhile. Still, this does not mean that Malta did not face any challenges or that Euroscepticism does not exist. Irregular migration has long been a problem within the country. One of the reasons for this problem is Malta’s Search and Rescue area which covers 250,000 km2, roughly equating to the size of Great Britain (Mainwaring, 2014). The size of this area posed various challenges for many administrations (Cachia & Vassallo, 2020). This is because Malta had to protect irregular migrants within a vast area and with limited resources. These challenges increased from 2004 onwards as the country had to abide by the Dublin regulations. This means that Malta had often requested

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

support and solidarity from the EU. However, finding a long-term solution is often a struggle with such a diverse area of opinions. Irregular migration became one of the main priorities promoted by Malta during the 2017 EU Presidency. Irregular migration would become one of the major problems within the European Union, as would spring hunting. Spring hunting led to a long-term debate on whether Malta negotiated a concession in the European Birds Directive and whether the European Union was threatening the Maltese traditions and identity. Society has moved forward, and the mentality has changed. Many began to look outwards at the ‘European Ideal’ and civil society groups became more vocal in the fight for rights. During various liberal reforms towards safeguarding minorities, the country witnessed the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. Caruana Galizia was not simply a journalist. Long critical of the country’s political system, its political parties, and some of its political leaders, she was behind some of the most controversial corruption allegations which were made against the Muscat administration, including the Hospital Deals, Individual Investment Scheme (IIP), Panama Papers and Malta files. She was also very critical of the approach political parties took towards irregular migrants. Two years after the assassination of Caruana Galizia, Lassana Cisse (a migrant) was killed in a racially motivated drive-by shooting. The assassinations of Caruana Galizia and Cisse raised several questions on whether the two were victims of institutional failings and whether the country was ready to tackle problems such as intolerance and racism. Europeanisation of party politics has multiple dimensions. The European Union is a complex entity. It is not only made up of legislation but also of values. It provides rights but also obligations. The reality concerning the European Union is usually built by political parties. They form a narrative and promote the European Union in one way or another. This promotion usually takes place during elections, but instances exist when referring to the European Union is made during parliamentary legislation. The European Union can be a challenge, an opportunity, or both. Yet, political parties have also been facing the rising challenge from civil society groups who are also looking at the European Union for guidance. The European Union can be used as the guarantor of European values. Yet, even the European Union has its limits, and it has always faced the dilemma of how to safeguard these values without undermining national sovereignty. This book takes a deductive approach by making use of Europeanisation to observe the influence of the European Union on party politics in Malta. To provide a comprehensive study on the Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, this book utilised various sources. These include newspaper articles, speeches, manifestoes, minutes from the European and national parliaments, press releases, interviews, and surveys. Interviews were extremely important to understand the evolution of Malta’s political system. Several participants were interviewed twice, once as part of the Ph. D. process and for the book. This meant that it was possible to understand how the political system evolved and how political decisions were being taken. The study also took into account new sources of information such as official social media accounts. Social media statuses can provide an insight into the way parties and politicians behave especially as it is much easier for them to use such sources when

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Europeanisation and Malta’s Identity

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they need to react quickly to something which is happening in the country. Some of these sources used in the study tend to be ignored by the electorate especially as during elections, they are flooded with leaflets, manifestoes, and other promotional material. Still, this material is valuable resources to understand political parties and leaders. This information was essential to understand the behaviour of political parties and their politicians, and the way they used European values in their attempt to legitimise their policies. In addition, these sources were important as they reflect the way these political parties approached the European Union over the decades and their reaction to the intervention of the European Union in Malta’s political system.

1.1

Europeanisation and Malta’s Identity

As a young and small state, the issue of national identity became an integral part of the debate on whether the country should join the European Union. The notion that membership would reaffirm Malta’s European identity would be used in the first and second stage of Europeanisation as the Nationalist Party sought to persuade the electorate that membership would bring more opportunities for the country and its people. The identity of the Maltese does not fit with the prevailing categories of the nation-state. Over the centuries, this identity has been continuously (re)negotiated due the domestic and global political concerns as the country shifted from one power to the other. Official nation-state ideologies traditionally refer to two important identities: the country’s ‘Mediterranean’ identity and its ‘European’ background. The European and Mediterranean identities of Malta and whether these identities would be threatened by a potential membership would become an issue when membership in the European Union was proposed by the Nationalist Party (Sant Cassia, 1993). The origins of Malta’s European identity can be traced back to the shipwreck of Saint Paul in Malta in 60 AD. This period is important as it is considered as the time the country converted to Christianity. This is why the Feast of Saint Paul in Valletta is considered a feast of Malta’s shift towards Europe. Still, the country fell under Arab rule between 870 and 1090. There is a debate (see Wettinger, 1986; Luttrell, 2017) on whether the Maltese converted back to Islam. Still, this debate goes beyond the scope of this book. The narrative states that Count Roger the Norman would again establish Christendom in Malta. The Great Siege of 1565 between the Knights of Saint John against the Ottoman Empire is seen as the triumph of Christianity over Islam. The siege strengthened Malta’s Christian credentials and built the narrative that by defeating the Ottoman Empire, Malta saved Europe from the threat of Islam. Following the victory of the Knights over the Ottoman Empire, Valletta would be built. The capital was considered a symbol of modernity and a projection of the power and glory of the Knights of Saint John (Mitchell, 2012). With the arrival of the British Forces in Malta, a new issue would emerge in the fight over the Maltese identity. This concerned which official language should the country have. The issue was not simply on whether English or Italian should be the

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

official languages of the country, but extended to the identity and culture of the Maltese. The debate emerged in the early nineteenth century and lasted until the middle of the twentieth century. The Language question would lead to the establishment of the first political parties, with these becoming the ancestors of the Nationalist Party and Labour Party. The language question concerns the conflict between English, the official language of the Empire, and Italian, the official language of the Roman Catholic Church and Italy. The country’s culture was linked to Italy. For two centuries, Malta was ruled by the Knights of Saint John. The Knights brought the influence of the Renaissance through art, architecture, and music. This was also helped by the Italianisation of the country (Cassar, 2001). By the nineteenth century, Malta was part of the British Empire, even though Italian was still considered the language of the Church and the Courts (Mitchell, 2003). Still, English was required for those who wanted to work directly with the British forces or around the harbour areas. It was the language that could help the Maltese to secure their economic future (Debattista, 2022a, b). However, whilst Italian was the cultural high language of Malta and the main language of communication amongst the higher society and English was the language used by the British Empire and those Maltese working with it, Maltese was the language used for communication by the ordinary people (Cassar, 2001). English was considered by Italian-leaning Maltese as the ‘foreign’ language and the language of the country’s colonisers. The language question would end up as a conflict between dignity and power and between tradition and imperialism (Friggieri, 1988). The debate on the official language would only be solved during the Second World War. At the time, Italy formed part of the Axis powers, whilst Malta as a colony of the British was part of the Allied powers. The decision by Mussolini to bomb Malta led to the decline in the popularity of the language with the notion of italianità losing its appeal. Maltese (alongside English) would only become an official language in 1934. For years, the Maltese nationalists resisted the upgrading and spreading of Maltese language education in schools, as they perceived the introduction of Maltese as a threat to the influence of Italian and as a tool that the British could use for the promotion of English (Frendo, 1994). Maltese would only have a standard orthography by 1931 and would only become the official language of Malta after the British granted Malta Independence in 1964 (Cassar, 2001). The language issue would also become part of the debate surrounding Malta’s EU membership. With the country having a national language, that is Maltese, with English also considered an official language, the fear was that Maltese would be sidelined by not being recognised as an official language. The Nationalist Party used the example of Ireland with the Gaelic language an official language in the European Union to highlight how Maltese would be treated the same way and would not be excluded by the EU (Frendo, 1996). The debate on the importance of the Maltese language is still ongoing. A reflection of this could be the decision by the European Commission to nominate Latvian economist Martins Zemitis as the European Semester Officer of the Commission Representation in Malta. He was chosen even though the post required candidates to have a good command of the Maltese language. The Commission defended itself by declaring that the working language

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Europeanisation and Malta’s Identity

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is English. Still, the decision was criticised by Labour MEP Alex Agius Saliba for treating the Maltese Language as a second-class language (Vella, MaltaToday, 19 August 2022). In the post-independence period, a debate often ensued about Malta’s identity. The discussion was based on the ‘European’ and ‘Mediterranean’ components of this identity and whether membership in the European Union would strengthen the ‘European’ element at the expense of the ‘Mediterranean’ element. George Borg Olivier described the Maltese at the Council of Europe as European and Mediterranean. Borg Olivier believed that the Council of Europe was the country’s natural home. The turn in Malta’s politics in the 1970s towards a greater emphasis on Mediterranean relations and the disagreements with the Council of Europe and the EU on the renewal of the 1970 Association Agreement led to some concerns on whether Malta was drifting away from Europe. However, at no point did Malta seek to end its membership of the Council of Europe or severe ties with the EU (Pace, 2022a, b). During his term as Prime Minister of Malta, Dom Mintoff promoted the Mediterranean dimension of Malta’s identity. At the international level, between 1973 and 1975, Mintoff pressured the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe which would later be renamed The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to insert Mediterranean security into the conference agenda and Helsinki Final Act (Il-Gżejjer, July 1973). As Prime Minister of Malta, Mintoff’s rhetoric was very hostile to the culture of Western Europe. On the other hand, he insisted on fostering Arab culture and Arabic language instruction, which was declared mandatory in the secondary educational system from 1975 to 1987 (Pace, 2011). On this matter, the anthropologist Boissevain (1991) declared: the Labour government broke off relations with NATO and sought links with the Arab world. After 900 years of being linked to Europe, Malta began to look southward. Muslims, still remembered in folklore for savage pirate attacks, were redefined as blood brothers. . . (Boissevain, 1991 p. 88).

The promotion of Neutrality and non-alignment by Mintoff and the Labour Party would add to the confrontation over the EU membership issue. The issue of neutrality was, over the years, embedded in the country’s political history. Whilst the enshrining of the country’s neutrality was a political bargain between the two main parties over other political issues, including the need to change the electoral system, it was also a clear-eyed view of Malta’s security need. Neutrality has become part of Malta’s diplomatic identity, and this has had certain strengths. For example, it has allowed Malta to play the role of a neutral interlocutor and to focus on questions related to global social justice. For a country the size of Malta, neutrality also makes sense to a degree, and it reflects the country’s past colonial experiences (Fiott, 2022). Following the turbulent 1990s in Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the independence of several countries in Europe. A number of newly established republics in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were interested in joining the European Union. During this period, Malta applied to join

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the EU. At the time, the need to emphasise Malta’s European identity increased. Malta did not wish to be left out of the new Europe that was taking shape after the fall of the Iron Curtain. By affirming its Europeanness, Malta also felt more confident in playing a stronger role in the Mediterranean through the EU. European identity and EU membership also stopped Malta’s ‘drift’ in international relations, a temptation that becomes stronger for a neutral country when it interprets this as entailing isolation and independence from ‘alliances’. These included the European Union (Pace, 2022a). Therefore, Identity remained an important issue because of its link to narrative and, consequently, of the way political actors can set the scene. Identity issues also tap into the need for individuals to have a sense of belonging. Thus, framing the debate on identity issues provides benefits that go both ways; the political actors have a context within which to explain their proposals, while the citizens have a narrative to make sense of their place in the world. The referendum in Malta before EU membership brought out some interesting strands for political scholars, including, but not limited to the notion of EU membership and its link as being a safeguard of European values, the contrast between the Mediterranean nature of Malta and the European aspect of its identity and, whether one could hold European values and not be part of the EU. The latter point was deemed to be impossible by the PN, and it successfully framed its arguments to this effect (Debattista, 2022a). Identity is also important as it ‘anchors’ individuals, groups, and peoples within a particular culture, with its politics, values, and virtues. Therefore, identity is not a static ‘concept’ and it is based on multidimensions elements which evolve over time (Frendo, 2002). When the Nationalist Party promoted Malta’s European identity, it wanted to convey an image of a state and nation that were part of the mainstream of [Western] European culture, one that has been identified with liberal democracy, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, peaceful coexistence, shared sovereignty, and solidarity. How true (as opposed to mythical) and authentic (as opposed to pretence) this ‘European identity is, of course, open to a wider discussion on what is the European Union and whether there is an actual European Identity (Warrington, 2022). The importance of Malta’s European identity was also reflected in the discourse being used by the European institutions. The European Commission, for example, highlighted in 1993 the fact that Maltese were considered Europeans: Maltaʼs culture and history reflecting the deep links with several of the peopleʼs of Europe, have for century developed a European Identity (European Commission in Avery & Cameron, 2001).

For the Nationalist Party and the Europeanist camp, Malta not only shared several principles and beliefs with the EEC, but membership was a tool that could enrich Maltaʼs Maltese, Mediterranean and European identity, as well as Malta’s historical heritage in a globalised world (Fenech Adami, 2014). The Nationalist Party managed to successfully link Malta’s Identity with the Christian European Heritage. The European Union became to be known for democracy, peace, and rule of law, though it was also seen as a threat to tradition and morality. Whilst this was a challenge for

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Europeanisation and Malta’s Culture

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the Nationalist Party, it still managed to overcome it by promoting the role of Christian Democratic Parties in the foundation of Europe (Mitchell, 2012). The opposite position was taken by the majority of Labourites, who felt that European integration and Europeanisation (the promotion of the EU values and principles) would threaten Malta’s identity and the Mediterranean heritage of the country. There was also the fear that the vision of the European Union to adopt a ‘European Identity’ would lead to the loss of national identity. Still, there were doubts on whether the EU had the ability to influence national identities and whether the adoption of a ‘European Identity’ would be at the expense of the national identities (Cini, 2001). There are those who believe that the European Union is a place where national identity can be affirmed, rather than threatened. In addition, the discussion on the influence of the European identity have often focused on whether the European Union is able to converge all the national cultures into a one European Identity (Debattista, 2022a, b). The debate surrounding Malta’s EU membership application produced a clear division in the country. It ultimately rested in the hands of the voters, who were given two options during the 2003 referendum and subsequent general election, either to: (1) embrace the European Union and reaffirm Malta’s European Identity, or (2) maintain the strong relationship which Malta enjoyed with North African countries and safeguard the country’s Mediterranean heritage.

1.2

Europeanisation and Malta’s Culture

To understand how the European Union was politicised by the main political parties, and how European values were framed in their effort to gain legitimacy, it is essential to understand Malta’s culture, folklore, and political environment. Within this culture, prestige is still seen as important. Prestige reflects the social standing of that individual or family (Boissevain, 1980). One of the ways this prestige can be achieved is through education. The traditional courses in Malta are medicine and law. Membership in the European Union and investment in the economy have increased the popularity of several subjects, including Information Technology, engineering, sciences, and gaming. Still, law and medicine are seen as the most prestigious courses, especially for those who want to improve their social mobility. Law is considered the best and most prestigious route for politicians. The tradition of the party electing lawyers as party leaders and candidates still persists. Whilst Labour Party has elected leaders with different academic backgrounds, with Mintoff being an architect and Sant and Muscat being economists, the Nationalist Party has retained the tradition with all of its leaders being lawyers. An important tradition in Malta is linked with towns and villages. These are ‘festas’ or feasts. Whilst politics and society may have changed, these festas have remained popular and have become more vibrant for the residents of towns and villages (Sant Cassia, 1993). Feasts are a celebration of the patron saint of the towns and villages around Malta. They provide the opportunity for the community to meet

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during a week filled with activities to celebrate the patron saint (Boissevain, 1964), The first feasts in celebration of these patron saints originated in the sixteenth century. However, during this period, these celebrations were mostly liturgical. The modern-day functions of these feasts including the outdoor festivities (beyond the procession) emerged in the late eighteenth century. Festas would continue to evolve during the nineteenth century under British colonial rule when band clubs were formed, and fireworks began to play an important role throughout the celebrations (Cassar, 2005). The statue of the patron is accompanied by a brass band, as it goes around the streets across the town or village. Along the way, confetti are thrown from windows and balconies. The procession is traditionally accompanied by the ringing of the church bells and the ignition of fireworks. The main streets and the church are also decorated and illuminated (Koster, 1988). Over the centuries, the religious context of the feasts paved the way for divisions and competition amongst the villages and neighbouring towns. The reason for this is that every town and village has its own patron saint. Some towns are luckier than others, enjoying two patron saints rather than one. If a town or village has one patron saint, then it will traditionally have two band clubs. If they do not have two band clubs, then they have two fireworks factories. These strengthened the tradition of pika (competition or hostility) between the various factions. These factions would later find a way in the country’s political culture. As the main political parties were established, they opened their clubs in every village/town in Malta. Villages and towns were used to recruit members of these political parties through social clubs. This led to more divisions within these communities and strengthened the rivalry between one party and the other (Boissevain, 1980). This promoted a two-way mentality in the country. Political Parties began to organise mass meetings that were very similar to the traditional feasts. In these mass meetings, thousands of Maltese gather in an area of the town and which includes food stalls, fairs, fireworks, and entertainment (Frendo, 1994). Until the country’s independence in 1964, this division was reflected in the narrative of the Maltese ‘ġewwieni’ against the ‘barrani’ foreigner (Friggieri, 1981). This narrative will be discussed in more detail in the next few chapters. When the main political parties or NGOs felt that the European Union was gaining too much influence, it was usually branded as ‘il-barrani’, the foreigner, to outline how the organisation was behaving like a coloniser. This division was even reflected in the dates chosen by the government as national holidays. As a tradition of former colonies, Malta began to celebrate the date of Independence on 21 September as a national holiday. The decision was taken after an agreement was reached in parliament by Prime Minister Borg Olivier in 1965. The election of the Labour Party in 1971 led to various disagreements on which dates should be considered national holidays. Mintoff removed Independence Day as a national and public holiday when he assumed office in 1971. Instead, he opted to celebrate the 13 December (1974) as a national day being the day Malta became a republic. The day would later be replaced by Freedom Day. In fact, on 31 March 1979, the military agreement between Malta and Britain expired, and the British forces left the country. The return of the Nationalist Party in 1987 led to the

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Europeanisation and the Party Leaders

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reinstatement of Independence Day as a national holiday. Because the main political parties could not reach a consensus on which date should be used as the national day, five national feasts were proclaimed. Beyond, Independence Day, Republic Day, and Freedom Day, the country included 8 September (1565/1943) as the feast of our Lady of Victories (Great Siege/Second World War) and 7 June (1919) (Sette Giugno) as the day when the Maltese revolted against the British (Frendo, 1989). The main political parties would take ownership of these national holidays. The Nationalist Party celebrates Independence Day, given that the country gained its independence under the premiership of Borg Olivier. On the other hand, the Labour Party has placed more emphasis on Freedom Day, given that it took place under the premiership of Mintoff and was seen as the day Malta finally gained its full sovereignty. This two-way mentality has transformed itself into a ritual (Mitchell, 1996). Pika or the intense rivalry between the main political parties shaped the European Union membership issue. The main political parties claimed ownership of the national interest, highlighting their support/opposition to European membership to protect the country and secure its future (Cini, 2002). Still, it also meant that the issue was radicalised and led to the strengthening of the two main factions rather than a mature dialogue over the advantages and disadvantages of membership in the EU (Friggieri, 2002).

1.3

Europeanisation and the Party Leaders

A study on the impact of Europeanisation on Malta’s political parties cannot take place without including the role of party leaders. Decisions surrounding the impact of the European Union were and are taken by Maltaʼs political leaders. They can enact legislation passed by the European institutions, react to the development of the European Union, ‘use’ the European Union to promote themselves and their parties, and use the European institutions against their competitors. These opportunities are easier to use in Malta, which has a statist system with power concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and his (so far) executive. This enables these individuals to introduce significant reforms and leave their mark on the country’s development, without the threat of being seriously challenged by potential competitors. With only two major parties competing for power, the Maltese electoral system displays a personalised style of politics, with the image of political leaders, agendas, and political decisions shaping partiesʼ political campaigns and their EU approach (Hirczy, 1995). Table 1.1 provides an illustration of the characteristics of the political leaders which dominated the country’s political system from 1980 onwards. Malta has seen some very strong political leaders, who, although loved by their traditional supporters, were also quite divisive because of what they represented. The Nationalist Party under the helm of Edward Fenech Adami proposed Malta’s EU membership in 1979 and included this in the 1981 political manifesto. This was strongly opposed by

Table 1.1 The Main Characteristics of Malta’s Political Leaders

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

1.3

Europeanisation and the Party Leaders

13

the Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Dom Mintoff, whose opposition towards membership was based on ideological and economic grounds. Mintoff dominated the country’s political system until 1984 when he resigned as Prime Minister and as Leader of the Labour Party. He was replaced by his hand-picked successor. Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici maintained the party’s approach towards the European Union, which meant complete resistance to any Nationalist challenge to make Malta part of the then European Economic Community. The Labour Party was voted out of office in the 1987 General Election. In 1992, Labour leader Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici was replaced by Alfred Sant who took a more Euro-realist approach towards the European Union. Nonetheless, his vision was that of ‘partnership’ rather than ‘membership’ with the European Union. From 1992 until the eventual EU membership in 2004, the Nationalist Party leader Fenech Adami and Labour Party leader Sant fought alongside party lines over the EU issues with the matter only settled with an eventual referendum and national election—both of which took place in 2003. Following EU accession, the vision of these party leaders continued to evolve, and so did that of their political parties and party members. Soon after the country joined the EU, Fenech Adami resigned as party leader and as Prime Minister to be replaced by Lawrence Gonzi. The latter’s vision and approach towards the EU was similar to that of his predecessor, even though as Prime Minister, he had to face the new challenges arising from membership, the loss of the 2004 European Parliament Election, and a financial crisis that threatened the country’s economic system. At the same time, whilst Alfred Sant accepted the 2003 national election results, he kept his scepticism towards the European Union. In 2008, the party elected Joseph Muscat as the party leader. Muscat, a former Eurosceptic, quickly embraced the European Union and transformed the party, eventually leading to several electoral successes in national as well as European Parliament elections. This was largely due to the various reforms he introduced, including that of civil unions and same-sex marriage which turned Malta into one of the leading countries when it comes to LGBTIQ rights. The rising popularity of Joseph Muscat and his vision of a growing movement to safeguard the national interest came at a time of a rapid decline of the Nationalist Party, which had been plagued by internal struggles with the party failing to provide an alternative vision to that of Muscat. The election of Joseph Muscat also transformed the role of MEPs. They now took a more prominent role within their parties and being elected to the European Parliament was seen as a necessary step to raise the profile of those who were eyeing the party leadership. Yet, Joseph Muscat and the Labour administration faced an unprecedented amount of opposition within the European Parliament mostly due to the Individual Investment Programme—dubbed the ‘cash for passports’ scheme— introduced by the administration in 2014. This was also due to the investigations on the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, which in December 2019 led to the resignation of Tourism Minister Konrad Mizzi and the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff Keith Schembri, and Economy Minister Chris Cardona. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat announced his resignation in December 2019 and left office in January 2020, with the Labour leader being replaced by Robert Abela. On the Nationalist front, Lawrence Gonzi resigned soon after obtaining a disastrous result in the 2013 national election. The Nationalist Party lost by more than

14

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

35,000 votes and only gained 43.34% of the total votes, whilst the Labour Party won 54.83% of the votes. He was succeeded by Simon Busuttil, also a former MEP. During his tenure as leader of the party, he maintained the party’s pro-EU approach. Known to be a staunch Europeanist, and more respected within the EU than in Malta, he fought for closer cooperation between the country and the EU. However, his crushing defeat in the 2017 national election led to his resignation as leader of the party. He was followed by Adrian Delia, a relative newcomer to the political scene who was more EU realist than his predecessors. Whilst promoting the EU, he was often critical of the increasing number of third-country nationals working in Malta and the rising flow of irregular migrants reaching the Maltese shores. Still, Delia, like his predecessor, struggled to unite the party and promote an alternative agenda for the country and was ultimately replaced by Bernard Grech, barely three years after winning the leadership contest. Most of the electoral campaigns of the main political parties are centred on the persona of their party leaders. The attempt is to energise grassroot voters and encourage them to vote, and they must mount effective campaigns against other parties. This is done to secure the support of the median voters, to win the elections, and govern the country. Still, although party leaders have a certain degree of independence to pursue their visions, they cannot act alone. Hence, whilst political leaders are the pillars that hold the party together, they nevertheless have to rely on the party on the ground (supporters at the local level) and the party executive to gather enough support within the party to pursue their visions and agendas. If they fail to do so, a number of internal disagreements may arise and this may lead to several scenarios; party members may resign, several politicians may leave, or the power of the party leader may be challenged, leading to a party struggle. Such a scenario, as will be explained in the following chapters, took place in both the Labour and Nationalist Parties.

1.4

The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community

When the European Coal and Steel Community was established, Malta was still a British Colony. Whilst the Maltese politicians and parties could not seek an alliance with the new organisation, it did not mean that they did not look at a future with it. When the country gained its independence, it was possible to establish a foreign policy. During the 1960s, Great Britain began to look at a potential membership with the EEC. This would have had an impact on Malta. In 1962, Prime Minister Borg Olivier declared in parliament that he would be leading a delegation to London to discuss with the British Government a potential membership with the EEC whilst also attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference on the Common Market. On his return, Borg Olivier declared in parliament that it would be impossible for the country to stay outside the EEC. Ganado of the DNP and Mintoff of the Labour Party wanted a discussion in parliament over potential membership with the

1.4

The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community

15

EEC and its potential impact of it on Malta’s industries (Pirotta, 2017). After Malta had just gained its independence, Borg Olivier was troubled that two of Maltaʼs natural allies, Italy, and Great Britain, were going to be members of the European Economic Community whilst Malta was going to find itself isolated. Concerns over the potential isolation of Malta intensified when Britain decided to apply for membership in 1967.1 Borg Olivier moved swiftly to establish a relationship with the rising organisation, with an Association Agreement reached in 1971, which eventually led to full membership (Zammit-Dimech, 2013). Indeed, in the report accompanying this agreement it was highlighted how the EEC’s economic sector was important for countries like Malta, which had to survive by competing with other economies for investment: In an age of economic groupings and trade areas, it is becoming increasingly difficult for some countries not to belong to one of such organisations. For developing countries, particularly small countries with very limited small markets, such as Malta, some form of association with a major trade group has become a vital necessity (Mizzi, 1995, p. 78).

Still, in 1971 the Labour Party was elected to power. Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici were convinced Eurosceptics. They were opposed to European Integration and the potential impact of Europeanisation. They were ideologues who believed in the influence which the Mediterranean region could play in world politics and who worked to safeguard peace within it and around it. This is why the agreement was short-lived with the Labour Party promoting neutrality and non-alignment over membership with the EEC. The incoming administration ignored the Association Agreement signed by the former Nationalist government (Pirotta, 2012). The Nationalist Party, now in opposition, sought to establish talks towards accession by bypassing the government and seeking the help of Italy. In fact, after its defeat in the 1971 election and helped by the strong relationship that the party had with the Italian Christian Democratic Party, De Marco and Fenech Adami established talks with Aldo Moro to discuss Maltaʼs possible membership. Nevertheless, it could not maintain these talks as in 1981 the Labour administration was re-elected despite the Nationalist Party winning a majority of the popular vote (De Marco, 2009). The early 1980ʼs saw the clash of these leaders; the Catholic and charismatic Eddie Fenech Adami versus the Socialist and populist Duminku Mintoff. Fenech Adami projected Maltaʼs future within the European Union and Mintoff identified a future with the Non-Aligned Movement. The Labour leader’s main priority was peace in the Mediterranean, which he argued was crucial for Maltaʼs wellbeing: European security cannot be meaningfully discussed if the problems of the Mediterranean were to be excluded from the agenda of this Conference (Mintoff, 2012a, p. 532).2

Mintoff and Fenech Adamiʼs discourses reflected their different ideological visions and the divergent perceptions which they held of Western Europe. These

1

The application ended up being vetoed by De Gaulle. Mintoff addressed the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on 6 July 1973 as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Malta. 2

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

Table 1.2 Different perspectives on Western Europe Labour Party For Western European arrogance towards our people was carried to such lengths that when combined with intrigues and machinations of Britain, NATO, and the Maltese Catholic Church-for eight years, it was a mortal sin in Malta to attend a public meeting addressed by the Labour Party, to read a Labour newspaper and, of course to vote Labour (Mintoff, 2012b, p. 541).

Nationalist Party You will note that I have expressed myself somewhat differently from my predecessors with regard to the logic of Maltaʼs new status although as I have already pointed out, I am underlining a policy of consensus. My government intends to be forthright in conducting its foreign policy because we do not believe in the tactics of playing one side against another, at whatever level and we shall always be saying what we mean and meaning what we say (Fenech-Adami, 1987a).

Table 1.3 The European principles Mintoff I verily say to you all gathered here that in the Western Europe of today, I do not recognise any of the old virtues which, with the French Revolution, the unflinching support of American independence, the setting up of the Commune, the October Revolution in Tsarist Russia, and the struggle against Nazism, forged the way for our European civilisation to grown in national freedom and social justice (Mintoff, 2012b, p. 542).

Fenech Adami With the present members of the European Communities we share the ideal of a United Europe as set out in the recently adopted Single European Act. When a European Union finally takes concrete shape, it will give a new positive dimension to international equilibrium. My government strongly believes that Malta should find its rightful place in such a union and this is why my government is convinced it is in Malta’s interest to seek the right conditions which would enable it to become a full member of the European Economic Community (Fenech-Adami, 1987b).

differences ignited a political struggle between them as illustrated in Table 1.2 and offered the Maltese the opportunity to either embrace the Mediterranean vision of Mintoff and his successors or the European vision of Fenech Adami.3 Whilst the Mediterranean region was part of Fenech Adamiʼs European vision, Mintoff was highly critical of the EEC and Western Europe, as revealed in his speech at the Council of Europe in 1978 in which he accused Western Europe of trying to interfere in Maltaʼs politics.4 Fenech Adami promised a political shift and a complete overhaul of the foreign policy, with the European Economic Community, being placed at the centre of Maltaʼs foreign policy, as outlined in Table 1.3. 3 The statement was made by Fenech Adami to the Ambassadors and other representatives accredited to Malta on 9 June 1987. 4 Mintoffʼs approach towards the EEC was very similar to the Irish Labour Party which in 1987, was the only Eurosceptic party in Ireland. The Irish Labour Party believed that the Union was a capitalist elite club and that membership was going to have a negative impact on the countryʼs Neutrality Status. However, by 1992, the party shifted towards Europeanism by supporting European integration (Holmes, 1996).

1.4

The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community

17

The difference between the two most important political leaders in Malta did not stop here. The Nationalist leader enjoyed a close relationship with Italy and several European Christian Democrats, whilst Mintoff was widely respected by the Mediterranean and Arab leaders for his support of the Palestinian cause and promotion of peace in the Mediterranean. Mintoff was not known for his diplomatic skills, but for his direct approach (Dalli, 2012). There was, however, suspicion by both the Europeans and Americans that Malta was flirting with Communism and the Arab states, and could not be trusted, at a time when the world was in the midst of the Cold War (Manduca, 2008). Part of the rationale behind parties’ Eurosceptic/Europeanist approaches is likely to lie in their economic visions for the country. The EEC was perceived as an economic power, which Malta’s parties had to consider as they were developing the country’s economy. The partiesʼ economic visions developed after Maltaʼs Independence when they had to promote their visions to improve the quality of life of the Maltese citizens. Both parties understood the need for an injection of funds to make a leap of quality and attract more investment. Indeed, conflict and turmoil in the Middle East could have been a disaster for Maltaʼs economy, which was still not ready to face the economic shocks coming from a radical increase in the prices of oil and gas. At that time, the EEC was seen by some as a way to protect and strengthen the emerging economy by linking Maltaʼs economy with those of the EEC countries. When Mintoff was elected in 1971 he sought several economic alliances: Mr Mintoff applied pressure on the USA to become an aid donor but without success, unsuccessfully bludgeoned the USSR to offer to buy more Maltese goods than they were prepared to take, accepted aid from China and offered a loan in return; acquired arms from North Korea; flirted with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania, in the hopes of orders, technology and investment; exerted every conceivable form of pressure on the main Western European Countries to extract bilateral aid and more assistance from the European Community than it was prepared to offer (Manduca, 2008, p. 258).

To help develop Maltaʼs economy in the early 1950s, Mintoff believed in full integration with Great Britain. This could have led to fiscal integration and equalisation of wages, but the plan was rejected, and Mintoff subsequently sought the removal of British Forces from Malta. Interestingly enough, by 1953, Mintoff even threatened the UK with eventual EEC membership if integration talks failed (Pollacco, 2004). Although this idea was largely used to encourage the UK to speed up the process, Mintoff knew that some sort of relationship had to be established with the European supranational organisation. However, as a source of investment, Mintoff did not rely on the EEC, but elsewhere. He developed economic relations with several Arab states, the Soviet bloc, and China, amongst others (Times of Malta, 25 April 1987, p. 28). These relations were developed at a time when Malta was considered to be part of the Western sphere of influence. For this reason, they were described by some as a slap in the face to the EEC, NATO, and the USA.5

5

This was the time of the Cold War, so any relationship with Communism was seen as dangerous by the USA and its allies.

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

To develop and safeguard Maltaʼs industries, the Labour Government favoured state intervention within a mixed economy (Briguglio, 2009). To achieve such protection, Mintoff limited the importation of several products and introduced high tariffs and quotas on imports whilst also banning various products’ entry into Malta (Agius, 2009). Mintoff’s decision to restrict imports reduced the choice available to Maltese consumers and forced them to either buy several products from the black market or Sicily or to save their money, which most did (Mullard & Pirotta, 2008). These trade restrictions were challenged by the European Economic Community, which was one of Maltaʼs closest trade partners. This decision severely tested the relationship between the two entities. Although Malta achieved record economic growth between 1973 and 1980, this could be attributed to the heavy expenditure on the fixed capital formation (Spiteri, 2002). The country’s economy was still not stable enough, and with a minimum wage of just Lm 39 (€69.88) and growing unemployment, thousands of Maltese opted to emigrate to Canada, Australia, or the USA to seek a better future (Delia, 1994).6 However, not everything was negative. By the early 1970ʼs, the country’s manufacturing industry had grown, with 28.4% of GDP coming from textiles, clothing, and other growing industries (Spiteri, 1998). For the first time in decades, the manufacturing industry surpassed the Dockyard in terms of value-added exports and employment. Figure 1.1 illustrates the fact that although the 1971 Association Agreement was never implemented, it did attract a large number of investors. These included investments from the Federal Republic of Germany, with exports to Great Britain falling from 28.5% to 17.7% in 1976 and exports to West Germany growing by 373% between 1974 and 1976. Companies including Merit Malta, De La Rue, and Toly opened in Malta and employed hundreds of Maltese workers. Moreover, exports of Maltese products to France and Italy increased in significant development since those countries were highly regarded as founding members of the EEC (Vella, 2012). These figures reveal that whilst Mintoff sought an alliance with several powers, trade continued to be dependent upon benevolent EEC tariffs and quotas (Oglethorpe, 1985.) In addition, Italy became one of the most important economic allies for Malta. By 1972, it had agreed to a Financial and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Malta for two years, to be extended for a further two years, with another agreement also reached on another four projects. These included the development and modernisation of the civil abattoir, and the setting up of an Italian shoe-making factory to employ 400 Maltese workers. Italy also gave £120,000 (€141,820) worth of equipment to develop trade schools and opened its Cultural Institute in 1973 to improve the cultural heritage of Malta and Italy (Coleiro, 1997).7

The euro replaced the lira as the official currency of Malta on 1 January 2008. The fixed exchange rate is that of €1 per Lm 0.4293 7 The currency conversions were made in October 2022. 6

The Relationship Between Malta and the European Community

European Economic

Manufacture Industry

19

Germany

1.4

China, Libya, USSR, and North Korea

Financial Agreements

Italy

Labour Party

European Economic Community

Tourism

United Kingdom

Naonalist Party

Malta's Economy

Community

Fig. 1.1 The impact of Partiesʼ Foreign Policies on Maltaʼs Economy

Apart from these economic agreements, Italy and Malta agreed to have an Italian Military Mission in Malta. This was established in 1973 and carried out several projects, including essential ones concerning transport and communications. Even though the mission had several problems, it was another way to inject funds into Maltaʼs economy, with Italy providing 40 technicians and Lm182,000 (€423,950) worth of equipment which were needed to continue to develop the island (Coleiro, 1997). Therefore, whilst the Labour Party was Eurosceptic due to the negative economic impact of European Integration, it was nevertheless relying on two founding members of the EEC to create employment and attract foreign investment. Whilst today Malta can be considered a hub for tourism, it was not the same after its independence. With the decline of the British presence in the Mediterranean which had a direct impact on Malta, tourism was one of the areas which were considered crucial to invest in. A considerable effort was needed to build the proper infrastructure. From 1955 to 1959, there were only 25 hotels in the country (Inguanez, 1994), with Malta’s tourism sector consisting overwhelmingly of Italian and British tourists. Tourism was given a boost with the creation of the Malta Government Tourism Board set up in 1958, and the development of Maltaʼs national airline Air Malta in 1974. To attract more tourists, Mintoff encouraged the construction of more hotels. The number of tourists increased from 211,196 in 1973 to

20

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

618,310 in 1979. The Anglo-Maltese cooperation established in 1986 helped the arrival of thousands of British tourists, which increased to 329,300 by 1986 and which helped to continue to generate more money for this sector (Spiteri, 2002). One of the prime examples of protection and a key reason why the Labour Party was against potential EEC membership was Maltaʼs Dockyards. After the departure of the British forces from Malta, the company proved to be a burden for every government. By 1972, the company had already accumulated a loss of £2.5 million (€2.96 million) (Spiteri, 1998), with Mintoff handing its workers full responsibility for it. This was beneficial at first, as by 1974 the value of work rose to £10.5 million (€12.45 million), and for the first time since the war, it achieved a surplus of £0.5 million (€590,000) (Spiteri, 2002). However, it was evident that in the long run, the Dockyards were not profitable. With debts piling up, the industry came to be dependent on the funds being pumped into it by the government, funds which only stopped when the government decided to privatise it after Maltaʼs EU accession. With all this investment, and with several companies from Italy, Germany, and the UK employing thousands of Maltese workers, Mintoff sought another agreement with the EEC in 1981. Membership was still out of the question, but Mintoff wanted to access the European Communityʼs structural funds and wanted the European organisation to allow exports of Maltese agricultural products into European markets. He wished to do so without being obliged to adopt the customs union tariff as demanded by the EEC in the 1971 Association Agreement (Neumeyer, 2007). Whilst this was a good step, the EEC was not impressed by Mintoff’s demands and was certainly not going to let a non-member country access its structural funds. His demands were, therefore, rejected. Post-republic years had been good for Maltaʼs economy. The number of industries established in Malta grew and the economy was becoming more financially independent. Nonetheless, there were still various challenges. Malta was dependent on two sectors for economic growth: textile industries and tourism (Oglethorpe, 1985). These sectors were also dependent on foreign direct investment and the external market (Sultana, 1994). This made Malta dependent on external conditions which made it vulnerable and at risk of an economic shock as it had no control over world prices. To protect it from outside forces, Maltaʼs governments had to subsidise a number of companies for them to flourish. This raised doubts about whether Maltaʼs economy would ever be strong enough to compete against other European markets. Until the membership proposal found itself on the Nationalist Partyʼs electoral programme, awareness of the EEC was extremely limited due to a lack of education and a lack of understanding of how it operated. During this period, the priorities of the parties and voters had been to strengthen Maltaʼs economic pillars by securing employment, improving education, and investment and seeking a better healthcare system that could improve citizens’ quality of life (Spiteri, 2002). Yet, by the 1980s, the EEC membership issue was contributing to the atmosphere of division. The EEC exerted a considerable influence on the Nationalist Party due to its Pro-Western agenda and its strong relations with many European Christian Democrat Parties.

1.5

Malta and the Four Stages of Europeanisation

21

This, as the next chapter will outline, was going to help the party during the political turmoil of the 1980s. The potential impact of membership on the party’s grassroots voters was becoming more apparent as the Nationalist party-in-government began to introduce the necessary reforms to seek accession to the EU. It was then clear that potential EEC membership was going to turn into a hotly contested issue. This issue would lead to the 2003 EU referendum and national election with the Maltese voting to join the European Union. This would take place in 2004.

1.5

Malta and the Four Stages of Europeanisation

This research will move away from the traditional studies on Europeanisation in Malta by not only using a theoretical framework based on Ladrech’s party dimensions but also by evaluating the potential impact of Europeanisation on Malta’s political parties in four different stages. The First Stage (1979–1990) covers the period during which the Nationalist Party proposed EEC membership until Malta’s application was submitted in 1990. This period is particularly important to show how the influence of the European Union is not simply linked with the application and membership process but can be part of a wider discussion within the party system. The Second Stage (1990–2004) is important being the period when parties began to use Europeanisation to campaign for/against European integration. Throughout this period, the main question surrounding membership was not just about the way membership, and thus European integration was going to influence the daily life of the Maltese people. It was also about how Europeanisation, that is the top-down impact of EU regulations and the dissemination of EU principles, was going to alter their norms, culture, and identity. The Third Stage (2004–2013) concerns the impact of Europeanisation following Malta’s 2004 EU membership. This is the period when Malta’s political and administrative systems had to adapt to the European Institutions. The latter stage is particularly interesting since several shifts can be observed in Malta’s political system; the political parties promised a new way of doing politics based on the EU political system, whilst the Labour Party shifted its approach from Euroscepticism to Europeanism, thereby promoting Malta’s membership within the EU. The Fourth Stage (2013–2022) will take into consideration the limited impact of far-right parties on the country’s political system and the debates surrounding irregular migration and the country’s EU Presidency in 2017. With the latter, Malta experienced the culmination of its ‘European adventure’ when it hosted the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat called the presidency ‘a fantastic experience’ (Muscat, 2022) for the smallest country within the European Union to take a leading role in Brexit talks and the Syrian refugee crisis. Yet, even during the EU presidency, the country had to face political turmoil caused by the ongoing corruption allegations, the passport scheme, and the Panama

22

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

Papers scandal, which ultimately led the Prime Minister to call for an early election during the last months of the presidency. Political turmoil certainly increased with the assassination of Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia on 16 October 2017. In addition, the largely ignored murder of the Ivorian national Lassana Cisse and the attempted murder of three other irregular migrants in Malta on 6 April 2019, exposed the long political and social divisions which exist in the country, the growing xenophobia against third-country nationals, and challenged the political system since debates surrounding the government and political parties approach to corruption and the rule of law were addressed in the European Parliament. This reignited the debates surrounding possible ‘foreign intervention’ in a domestic context. Evaluating these Four Stages provides an innovative study of the way Malta’s political parties have been affected by the European Union. More importantly, it will enable readers to understand the multi-dimension of Europeanisation and whether this concept managed to have some kind of effect on the country’s political culture.

1.6

Book Structure

This book will continue with an in-depth analysis of the process of Europeanisation and its impact on political parties. The second chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will evaluate the characteristics of Europeanisation whilst the second section will provide an evaluation of the impact of Europeanisation on political parties. The various studies concerning the impact of Europeanisation, including those of Ladrech, Bulmer, and Radaelli, will be considered. This will lead to the third chapter which will offer an evaluation of Malta’s twoparty system based on extensive clientelism, political patronage, and personal charisma. This analysis will serve to provide much-needed background to the context of Europeanisation in Malta and the way political parties framed and politicised the EU issue. The first part of the analysis will be provided in the fourth chapter, evaluating the first and second stages of the impact of Europeanisation. It will provide a historical outline of parties’ EU approaches and the wider concept of European Integration. The chapter will then outline the way the Nationalist Party proposed EU membership and used EU institutions as a tool against the Labour administration. The second section will look at the impact of Europeanisation after the membership application was submitted in 1990, the then European Economic Community which was expected to have a greater indirect influence on Malta’s political system. During this period, Malta experienced traditional ‘top-down’ influence since the Nationalist administration was introducing the required laws to be able to conform to the Community acquis. This stage is particularly important as there was a certain level of Euroscepticism in the country that the Nationalist Administration did not consider. As a result, in 1996, the Labour Party succeeded in winning the general election and amongst other things, proposed the freezing of Malta’s EU application. By 1998, after a parliamentary vote of confidence brought down the Labour-led

1.6

Book Structure

23

administration, the Nationalist Party was re-elected and used Europeanisation to promote European Integration. It went on to win the 2003 EU referendum and the subsequent election. The fifth chapter will outline the way political parties changed their structures to give a role to their newly elected Members of the European Parliament. The chapter will analyse the way national parties used European Party Federations to legitimise party programmes. It will examine the Labour Party’s shift from a Eurosceptic party to a more Euro-enthusiast platform whilst using EU ‘principles’ to promote civil liberties. In contrast, the Nationalist Party struggled to provide a counter-narrative to the EU one of Labour Party which began to promote these civil liberties as ‘European values’ which Malta had to embrace to be truly European. The chapter will also discuss the narrative used by the main political parties to promote a more ‘mature’ political system based on the conciliatory approach used by the European Union. The sixth chapter will focus on Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The chapter will provide an evaluation of the fourth stage of the Europeanisation of party politics in Malta. It will evaluate several important areas including irregular migration and hunting. This will be done due to the disagreements between the EU and Malta on how to tackle migration and hunting. The chapter will also deal with the Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the priorities promoted by the country. It will also look at the role of the European Union in the Panama Papers revelations, and their influence on the 2017 national election. The seventh chapter will continue to discuss the fourth stage of the Europeanisation of party politics in Malta. It will provide an in-depth evaluation of the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the reaction of the European Union and the Council of Europe towards this assassination. It will showcase the reaction of the European Parliament towards the assassination and media pluralism in Malta. The public inquiry surrounding the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia will also be explored as it showcased the repeated institutional failings and the failure of the main institutions to abide by the standards expected by the EU and the Council of Europe. It will also deal with the decline of the Nationalist Party, the rise of civil society groups, and the 2022 national election which was the first election for Bernard Grech and Robert Abela as party leaders of their Nationalist Party and Labour Party. The last chapter will address whether Europeanisation has had any influence on party politics in Malta. It will also address whether the influence of Europeanisation was influenced by the European Union or promoted by the main political parties themselves, in their quest for power and legitimacy. The overall research will argue that the impact of Europeanisation on political parties is mostly self-induced and used by political parties as a tool in their political battles. Nonetheless, as this case study highlights, there have been clear examples of top-down influence, especially on controversial issues such as hunting and state aid which clashed with the traditional standpoint of the parties. The conclusion will refer back to the literature on Europeanisation in particular to Ladrech dimensions, providing a final evaluation

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Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: An Introduction

of the Europeanisation of party politics in Malta. The chapter will use Eurobarometer data gathered from 2004 to 2022 on Malta to provide an in-depth evaluation of the influence of the European Union on the country. This data will also be used to provide a brief overview of the challenges that political parties might face as they seek to retain their popularity and support.

Bibliography Agius, N. (2009). Global development and malta. In J. Cutajar & G. Cassar (Eds.), Social transitions in maltese society (pp. 329–344). Agenda. Avery, G., & Cameron, F. (2001). The enlargement of the European Union. Wiltshire Cromwell Press. Baldacchino, G. (2002). A nationless state? Malta, National identity and the EU. West European Politics, 25(4), 191–206. Boissevain, J. (1964). Factions, parties, and politics in a Maltese village 1. American Anthropologist, 66(6), 1275–1287. Boissevain, J. (1980). A village in Malta. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Boissevain, J. (1991). Ritual, play and identity: Changing patterns of celebration in Maltese villages. Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 1(1), 87–100. Briguglio, M. (2009). Politics, the state and civil society – A theoretical framework. In J. Cutajar & G. Cassar (Eds.), Social transitions in Maltese society (pp. 125–146). Agenda. Cassar, C. (2005). The Maltese festa: A historical and cultural perspective. Paper presented at the First international conference on the SIEF Working Group on the ritual year. Cini, M. (2001). European Union Membership and the politics of national identity. In P. Xuereb (Ed.), Malta and the EU: Together in change? (pp. 62–78). EDRC. Cini, M. (2002). A divided nation: Polarization and the two-party system in Malta. South European Society and Politics, 7(1), 6–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/714004966 Coleiro, C. (1997). A propitious partner. PEG Publications. Dalli, H. (2012). Il-Kariżma ta’ Mintoff: Fejn ħadmet u fejn ma ħadmitx. In M. Cutajar (Ed.), Mintoff: Il-bniedem u l-istorja (pp. 115–130). SKS. De Marco, G. (2009). Il-Politika tal-Persważjoni. Allied Publications. Debattista, A. P. (2022a). Assistant Lecturer at University of Malta. Expert on Malta's Political System/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Debattista, A. P. (2022b, 7 August). A new kind of slavery. Times of Malta, p. 24. Delia, E. P. (1994). A labour market in transition. In R. G. Sultana & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), Maltese society: A sociological enquiry (pp. 461–482). Mireva Publications. Fenech Adami, E. (2014). Eddie: My Journey. Allied Publications. Fenech-Adami, E. (1987a). Statement by the Prime Minister of Malta to the Ambassadors and other representatives accredited to Malta. Malta: June 9. Fenech-Adami, E. (1987b). Diskors tal- Prim Ministru. L-Assemblea Ġenerali Tal-Gnus Maqgħuda: Sessjoni 42: 9/10/87. Fiott, D. (2022). Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)/ Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Frendo, H. (1989). Malta’s quest for independence. Valletta Publications. Frendo, H. (1994). National identity. In O. F. H. Frendo (Ed.), Malta culture and identity (pp. 1–26). Ministry of Youth and the Arts. Frendo, M. (1996). Europe-the case for membership. Offset Press Ltd. Frendo, H. (2002). L-identità Ewropea: Teżisti? In Jean Monnet Seminar Series (Ed.). Malta European Studies Association. Friggieri, O. (1981). Malta Teħtieġ Politika Moderna. Malta.

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Friggieri, O. (1988). The language question in Malta: The consciousness of a national identity. Friggieri, O. (2002). Malta F’Salib it-toroq: L-Unjoni Ewropea u l-kwistjoni kulturali. In Jean Monnet Seminar Series (Ed.). Malta European Studies Association. Harwood, M. (2020). From Euroscepticism to euro-enthusiasm: How Malta weathered the Eurozone crisis. South European Society and Politics, 1–22. Hirczy, W. (1995). Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta. European Journal of Political Research, 27(2), 255–272. Holmes, M. (1996). Irish parties and the EU. In J. Gaffney (Ed.), Political parties and the European Union (pp. 191–204). Routledge. Inguanez, J. (1994). The impact of tourism in Malta: Cultural rupture or continuity? In R. G. Sultana & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), Maltese society: A sociological inquiry (pp. 343–352). Mireva Publications. Koster, A. (1988). Church and state intervention in feasts and rituals in independent Malta. Economic & Social Studies, 4. Luttrell, A. (2017). The making of Christian Malta: From the early Middle ages to 1530. Routledge. Mainwaring, C. (2014). Small states and nonmaterial power: Creating crises and shaping migration policies in Malta, Cyprus, and the European Union. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 12(2), 103–122. Manara, E. (1892, 20 April). L’Ex-Ministro Colombo e gli Stati Uniti d’Europa. Gazzetta di Malta Corriere Mercantile Maltese. Manduca, J. (2008). The favour of the mintoff era: Secret negotiations made public. Printwell. Mintoff, D. (2012a). Is-Sigurtà u l-kooperazzjoni fl-Ewropa: Dom Mintoff f'Ħelsinki, 1973. In M. Cutajar (Ed.), Mintoff:il-bniedem u l-istorja (pp. 530–534). SKS. Mintoff, D. (2012b). Ewropa: Dom Mintoff fi Strasbourg 1978. In M. Cutajar (Ed.), Mintoff: il-bniedem u l-istorja (pp. 535–542). SKS. Mitchell, J. P. (1996). An Island in between: Malta, identity and anthropology. South European Society and Politics, 3(1), 142–149. Mitchell, J. P. (2003). Looking forward to the past: National identity and history in Malta. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 10(3), 377–398. Mitchell, J. P. (2012). Ambivalent Europeans: Ritual, memory and the public sphere in. Routledge. Mizzi, E. (1995). Malta in the Making 1962–1987: An Eyewitness Account. Beck Graphics Limited. Mullard, M., & Pirotta, G. A. (2008). The politics of public expenditure in Malta. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46(1), 128–141. Muscat, J. (2022). Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Neumeyer, J. (2007). Malta and the European Union: A small islands state and its way into a power community. CINTEUS. Oglethorpe, M. (1985). Tourism in a small island economy: The case of Malta. Tourism Management, 6(1), 23–31. Pace, R. (1990). Malta u l-Komunità Ewropea. Stamperija Indipendenza. Pace, R. (2011). Malta: Euroscepticism in a polarised polity. South European Society and Politics, 16(01), 133–157. Pace, R. (2022a). Jean Monnet Chair at University of Malta/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Pace, R. (2022b). Losing votes, losing touch? The beginning of a ‘Great Refusal’? Party Systems and Governments Observatory-University of Notthingham. Retrieved from https://whogoverns. eu/4566-2/ PDN. (1962). Electoral Manifesto for the 1962 national election. Pirotta, G. (1994). Maltese political parties and political modernization. In R. G. Sultana & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), Maltese society: A sociological inquiry (pp. 95–112). Mireva Publications. Pirotta, G. (2012). Mintoff, il-Ħelsien u-Newtralità ta' Malta, 1947–1972. In M. Cutajar (Ed.), Mintoff: il-bniedem u l-istorja (pp. 505–529). SKS. Pirotta, G. (2017). Malta’s Parliament and the European Dimension: The Early Years 1962–1987. In M. T. Vassallo & C. Tabone (Eds.), Public Life in Malta II (pp. 53–82). Gutenberg Press. Pollacco, C. (2004). European integration: The Maltese experience. Agenda.

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Sant Cassia, P. (1993). History, anthropology, and folklore in Malta. Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 3(2), 291–315. Spiteri, E. J. (1998). Malta an Island in transition: Malta economic history 1954–1974. Progress Press Company Limited. Spiteri, E. J. (2002). Malta from colonial dependency to economic viability. Sliema Interprint. Sultana, R. G. (1994). Perspective on class in Malta. In R. G. Sultana & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), Maltese society: A sociological inquiry (pp. 27–54). Mireva Publications. Vella, M. (2012). Forgetting Industry: The scarce and selective visibility of Malta’s industrial experience in the field of Malta’s sociology. In J. Chircop (Ed.), Revisiting labour history (pp. 175–254). Horizons. Vella, M. (2022, 19 August). Brussels picks non-Maltese speaker in sensitive Semester post in Valletta. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/118356/ brussels_picks_nonmaltese_speaker_in_sensitive_semester_post_in_valletta#. YwOG6HZByM8 Verney, S. (2017). Losing loyalty: The rise of polity euroscepticism in Southern Europe. In The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (pp. 168–186). Routledge. Warrington, E. (2022). Associate Professor of Public Policy and a political analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Wettinger, G. (1986). The Arabs in Malta. Zammit-Dimech, F. (2013). Former PN Minister and Former MEP/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia.

Chapter 2

Europeanisation and Party Politics: A Review

Europeanisation is a fashionable but contested concept. Measured by the number of titles using the term, research on Europeanisation is an academic growth industry. But questions have been raised as to whether ‘Europeanisation’ is useful or understanding contemporary European transformations, whether we are in danger of misunderstanding European transformations because the term is misused, and whether the term is so unwieldy, and so lacking in precise, and stable meaning, that it is futile to use it as an organising concept (Olsen, 2007, p. 68).

The ‘impact’ of the EU on domestic politics and political parties is usually referred to by scholars as Europeanisation. Yet, even though multiple studies have been published on the subject, there is still debate as to how best to define the concept, what kind of impact the EU has on some states, and whether Europeanisation can be considered a process that is shaping Europe. The statement by Olsen (2007) outlines the various misconceptions which exist about the concept of Europeanisation and the limited understanding that scholars and students have of the subject. This is why to understand the impact of Europeanisation on Malta’s politics and political parties, it is essential to understand and evaluate the general characteristics of Europeanisation. The recent literature on Europeanisation shifted from the debate on whether there is an impact of the European Union on states, to more of a focus on what is causing the rise of opposition against the European Union. Having said this, even contemporary literature on Europeanisation has struggled to define the term. The lack of definition is not only a problem for those seeking to evaluate the role of the European Union in the region and elsewhere, but also a challenge posed to political scientists seeking to comprehend the functions of the EU, its role in the decision-making process within its member states and, its impact on political parties. Europeanisation, defined as a concept (or a process) that explains the impact of the European Union, originates from the attempt made by various European politicians over the centuries to work for peace or stability in Europe. Still, this collaboration was often marred by a series of wars that devastated the region. Such cooperation was facilitated by the creation of Europe’s supranational organisation © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_2

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after the Second World War; although the term Europeanisation only began to be associated with European Integration and the growing impact of the EU following Ladrechʼs 1994 study of the impact of the European Union on France (Bache et al., 2014). Flockhart (2006) and Clark and Jones (2008) provide key analyses of Europeanisationʼs historical roots based on the European collectiveness aspect of modern Europeanisation (Clark & Jones, 2008), and recognise that: Europeanisation is not a new phenomenon, but a historical process, which has changed over time in response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities (Flockhart, 2006, p. 91). From a historical point of view, Europeanisation describes the European collectiveness and European conceptions that can be traced back to the rise of the Greek and Roman Civilisations, which promoted their own ‘vision’ of European values and cultures (Mannin, 2003). The Greek civilisation was based on democracy whilst the Roman Empire would soon embrace Christianity and its heritage (Mannin, 2003). As these empires fell, part of this European cultural heritage was lost. However, this idea of European collectiveness would re-emerge in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, with the Roman Catholic Church at the centre of the common European culture based on art, architecture, music, philosophy, and theology (Clark & Jones, 2008). The idea of European values and traditions would be transformed during the Enlightenment. This was due to revolutions and new values spreading throughout Europe which would lead the region to various conflicts throughout the eighteen and nineteenth centuries (Mannin, 2013; Beichelt et al., 2019). The historical definition of Europeanisation is also linked with the idea of a European Identity. The notion of Europeanisation is a phenomenon that did not emerge with the European Union but centuries before it, during the Enlightenment. This notion was also present during the establishment of the Westphalia Treaty. Europeanisation is seen as an attempt by several European officials to encourage the different European countries which shared common principles and cultures to cooperate to prevent further wars. From Westphalia onwards, European values emerged and flourished, although it would be the end of the First World War, with the greater participation of the USA in Europeʼs affairs that directed several Western European countries to join forces politically and economically to develop the region. This cooperation became more of a reality after the end of the Second World War, with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community as a solution for the Franco–German rivalry. For this reason, Europeanisation can be seen as a process that has developed over the centuries and has adapted to the different structural, cultural, economic, and political conditions which Europe has been through (Flockhart, 2006; Clark & Jones, 2008). The historic and contemporary definitions of Europeanisation have several common characteristics. The contemporary definition looks at Europeanisation as the emergence and development of the European Union as a regional and international player (Mannin, 2013). Europeanisation is based on common European values which became linked to the EU when it began to promote liberal democracy and free markets. Both historical and contemporary definitions are based on shared

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European values, beliefs, principles, and ideas which brought together the founding members of the EU as a means of achieving peace in the European region.1 Since the concept of Europeanisation as the impact of the EU on states is new, there are still many ongoing debates concerning its definition and characteristics. Ladrech (1994) defines Europeanisation as a process that could re-orient and shape national political systems within the EU’s political and economic dynamics, pressuring national systems to change and adapt to the challenges of EU membership. A similar definition is embraced by Mair (2006), who defines Europeanisation as a factor related to the EU which is external to the national experience and which influences national systems and forces in order for these to change. On another note, Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) look at Europeanisation as the impact of European Integration on domestic policy, politics and policy, and the reaction which this impact produces. However, the definition taken into consideration in this book is that of Radaelli (2002), who provides a multi-dimensional definition of this process by taking into consideration various components. In fact, he defines Europeanisation as: processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (p. 4).

Although this definition gives a basic idea of what Europeanisation incorporates, there are still a number of disagreements surrounding this process, its mechanisms and dynamics, which not only highlight the lack of clarity of what constitutes Europeanisation, but weakens the overall literature centralising focusing on this debate, as confirmed by Radaelli (2000a, b) and Olsen (2007). The result of this is that several changes may be attributed to Europeanisation when in reality, they are the result of a multitude of varying processes (Buller & Gamble, 2002). The further development of these ongoing discussions, debates, and studies on Europeanisation may enable scholars to understand the evolution of this concept and its ever-constant development, with the EU as the source of power. However, a significant first step in clarifying this disorderly field of study would be to have an agreed definition with clear properties of what Europeanisation incorporates (Marciacq, 2011).

1

Beichelt et al. (2019) provide another interesting interpretation of Europeanisation. They believe that Europeanisation is the transition period between historical and modern processes. These periods are usually dominated by conflicts and political crises in Europe.

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Fig. 2.1 The impact of Europeanisation on Political Parties

2.1

Conceptualising Europeanisation

Given all the different ideas and definitions surrounding the evolution of Europeanisation, this study will engage with the modern definition of Europeanisation and it will be based on a developed version of Radaelli’s (2002) perception of it. In this study on the impact of Europeanisation on political parties, Europeanisation is firstly contextualised as a process that could infiltrate political systems, and secondly as a political tool that may be used by political parties in seeking to achieve their visions. Europeanisation is seen as the impact of EU integration and the reaction with which this impact produces at national levels. Europeanisation is therefore a multi-way interaction between the EU, states, political parties, and other actors, which promotes, implements, and in certain cases rejects, changes produced by EU integration (Ladrech, 2000). Figure 2.1 shows how Europeanisation can influence states and their entities in multiple ways. The EUʼs decision-making powers are reflected in its top-down, bottom-up, and cross-loading approaches which the EU can use to pressure states to respect its regulations and principles. All of these can lead to a ‘spillover’ effect which could influence political parties. This impact has the potential to re-orient and shape the politics of national states to the extent that the EUʼs political and economic dynamics become an integral part of national politics and its policymaking process (Ladrech, 1994), due to the EUʼs impact on national cultures, institutions, politics, and policies (Blavoukos & Oikonomou, 2012).

2.2

Functions and Mechanisms of Europeanisation

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The European institutions could influence national politics through the EU’s four freedoms and its principles, including subsidiarity, human rights, peace, liberty, and democracy. These are all important elements that states must abide by to join the European Union and European party groups. Whilst the aforementioned definition looks at Europeanisation as a process, this research also considers another element, that is, that Europeanisation can be manoeuvred and framed by political parties (Vasileva-Dienes & Schmidt, 2019). Political parties might do so because they believe that the European Union may have significant implications on the member states. The EU, its regulations and principles may limit states as well as their political parties and leave less room for them to manoeuvre at will. This is because they seek to use the EU in their political campaigns to promote their approach towards EU integration or to debate a particular issue. They usually do so in relation to their preferred policies or because they want to use the EU to reposition themselves on several issues and thus gain political advantage. Whilst this definition may be considered broad, one has to keep in mind that the EU is a complex supranational organisation made up of different institutions meaning that it influences states and disseminates its values and principles in several ways. Europeanisation might be considered a personal experience as states or regions (if one wants to take a macro perspective) have different regulations, norms principles, and political systems, meaning that the impact will be felt differently. In addition, scholars usually consider Europeanisation (or the European Union) as an independent variable. However, states can influence the policymaking process and principles of the European Union, and politicians can frame the European Union to their own advantage. This means that at times, Europeanisation should also be considered as the dependent variable (Buller & Gamble, 2002).

2.2

Functions and Mechanisms of Europeanisation

In addition to defining Europeanisation, it is also essential to understand its mechanisms to assess its impact on national political parties. Early studies on the impact of Europeanisation focused on the top-down impact of the EU on states. The downloading or top-down approach is arguably the most frequent way in which the EU and its regulations influence domestic politics, polities, and policies.2 Whilst

2 The difference between the two is that the first-generation literature (1970–1990) focuses on the direction and development of the European Union as an agent of change (Adshead, 2002) by taking the classical top-down approach (Radaelli 2000a, b; Börzel & Risse, 2003). Whereas secondgeneration literature has moved away from the assumption approach embraced by first-generation scholars in order to focus on finding empirical evidence of the change which the EU is producing within national systems (Adshead, 2002). In fact, most of this literature (1990–2008) reflects the development which the European Union has gone through including the accession (from 1995 onwards) of 16 new member states (the last being Croatia in 2013). A third-generation literature is

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Hang (2011) believes that the top-down approach so the European Union’s ability to shape the decision-making process of member states has enabled scholars to understand the way Europeanisation leads to domestic change. This approach has been challenged and criticised by others. Amongst those critics are Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) and Börzel (2005), who believe that the Europeanisation process is not linear and that there are several ways by which the EU can influence states, and in return, states influence the EU’s decision-making process. Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) and Börzel (2005) argue that the top-down approach is static and leads to a narrow conceptual and empirical focus since it fails to understand the complex relationship which exists between the European Union, political parties, and party leaders, as these respond to the changes the EU is promoting. For this reason, second- and third-generation scholars, including Howell (2009), Radaelli and Pasquier (2007), Ladrech (2012a, 2022), Bulmer and Radaelli (2004), Hang (2011), Cianetti et al. (2018), and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2020), began to look at other ways of understanding the interactions between the EU and states, the impact which EU policies were having on these states and the interaction between member states. These include the crossloading approach, defined as the ability of states to interact with each other within the European political space (Bélanger, 2014), which may lead to institutional isomorphism and further domestic change. In this case, the EU can be utilised as a political tool to facilitate interaction and closer cooperation (Radaelli, 1999, 2000a, b; Featherstone, 2003), and the bottom-up approach, the ability of states and parties in government to influence the EUʼs decision-making processes (Kassim, 2003; Börzel & Risse, 2003).3 Still, Radaelli (2007) believes that using a combination of these perspectives allows political scientists to understand the nature of Europeanisation and the way it infiltrates national political systems and influences political parties and party systems.

2.3

Europeanisation and Domestic Politics

Concerns over domestic changes in policy were raised by various scholars due to the possible impact of over 5000 EU regulations, which involve a wide range of issues, including the economy, human rights, environment, and migration. These EU regulations could impact the policies, politics, and polities (Mastenbroek, 2018; Radaelli, 2018; Schmidt, 2004) of the EU member states. The impact of Europeanisation on the field of public policy is seen as having both a direct and

currently emerging which is attempting to explain the rising Euroscepticism in Europe, trying to find a rationale for Brexit and its impact on the future of Europe. 3 Most of the studies on the impact of Europeanisation on small states focus on their role in influencing EU policies rather than the impact of the EU on them. Others do not distinguish between small and large states in their studies.

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Europeanisation and Domestic Politics

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indirect impact on political parties, party leaders, their manifestos, and their Europeanism/Euroscepticism. The political aspect involves the impact of Europeanisation on political discourse and the shifting of discussion on various policy areas including migration and the economy from the national level to the EU level. This is linked with the third element as Europeanisation involves the impact of the EU on various institutions and entities and the internal changes which they go through in order to abide by EU regulations. The top-down impact of Europeanisation on policies, polities, and politics will often depend on the goodness of fit and reaction within the national systems. This is particularly important for this research as Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) and Börzel and Risse (2003) believe that this impact can produce a reaction from parties (with this top-down impact able to influence areas of party competition, organisation change, and partiesʼ political manifestos) depending on whether they fit or misfit with national regulations. Misfit, defined as the incompatibility of EU regulations with their national counterparts, has received widespread attention from Europeanisation scholars, including Börzel (1999), Börzel and Risse (2018), and Cowles and Risse (2001). These scholars have outlined how this incompatibility between national and European regulations allows the EU and its politicians to pressure states and their actors to introduce the requested domestic policy changes. On this issue, Woll and Jacquot (2010), Ladrech (2008) and Radaelli (2018) have analysed the impact which misfit might have on parties and their leaders, concluding that parties in government will be forced to rally behind their leaders to introduce the needed changes without displeasing their electorate. A similar but more detailed approach was taken by Börzel and Risse (2003), Dyson (2002), and Borrass et al. (2015), whose studies link misfit with the logic of consequentialist perspective, concluding that misfit can only be resolved when strong leaders take this challenge and successfully defend EU policies, introduce the needed changes, and pursue their interests without being vetoed by party members or votes in national parliaments. If this is unsuccessful, politicians will either refuse to comply and risk infringement proceedings being taken by the EU Commission or bargain with the EU to opt-out of them. As argued by Jacquot and Woll (2004), whilst the literature surrounding misfit focuses on domestic change, the role of political parties and party leaders as the intermediary variables between the EU and domestic change should be taken into further consideration. The reason for this is that political parties and party leaders are amongst the most important groups and individuals that must deal with the adjustment process as they are the entities that compete for power and, if elected, their leaders and politicians are responsible for the running of the state.

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Europeanisation and Party Politics: A Review

Europeanisation and Political Parties

Understanding political parties and party systems is important because of the role they play in national political systems. Political parties structure the popular vote and compete against each other in a range of elections to gain power and legitimacy. This allows them to govern, organise governments, recruit leaders, and officials, and formulate public policy (Wildernmann, 1986). They are a key link between the state and the citizens as they seek to promote their citizens’ interests within the different governmental institutions (Mair, 1997; Gauja, 2016). Political Parties are also entities that can shift support towards the European Union. At the same time, the political parties’ approach towards the EU can also be shaped by their supporters, electoral needs, or the needs of the state (de Vries, 2018). When analysing the impact of politics at EU level, parties in government inevitably have a larger role as they nominate officials to be placed at the helm of the EU decision-making process and have a role in the Council of Ministers. Still, from a top-down perspective, debates have arisen over the way parties have been challenged by the growing power of the EU, and the role of political parties within this organisation: Political parties are key gatekeepers in the process of political representation. They play a crucial role in the selection of key members of European institutions (most importantly the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). They also play an indirect role in the selection of Commissioners. Parties play a vital role in referenda over European issues when they mobilise sentiment, set the agenda and structure the competition over the issues. Most importantly, political parties, although much demeaned of late, still exercise the key role in determining the shape and content of politics at the domestic level (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 2).

Political parties compete within a party system framework, with the most widely used definition of it being that of Sartori (1976), who argues: a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in a mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties (Sartori, 1976, p. 44).

Whilst party systems are known to regulate party competition, they are directly influenced by electoral laws.4 Changes in the electoral laws might have a direct

4

Sartori (2005) classifies the different party systems depending on the strength of these parties and the number of parties represented in national parliaments. His classifications include; two-party systems with two parties competing for the absolute majority of votes; and multiparty systems which he divides into limited pluralism with not more than five relevant parties competing for power, and extreme pluralism with up to eight relevant political parties (Wolinetz, 2009). Siaroff (2000) offers an alternative approach by categorizing eight different party systems which include; (1) pure two-party systems with two parties sharing at least 95% of the total votes, (2) moderate multiparty systems with up to five parties surpassing the 3% threshold, (3) moderate multiparty systems, with one party dominating the rest, (4) moderate multi-party systems with two main parties, (5) moderate multiparty systems with different parties enjoying equal support, (6) extreme

2.4

Europeanisation and Political Parties

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impact on the party systems and the number of parties that elect their representatives in the National Parliament and European Parliament amongst others. This occurred in New Zealand after the electoral law was changed which transformed their twoparty system into a multiparty system. Ultimately, parties in government can change these laws or maintain the status quo (Peters, 2012) with parties in various countries, including Malta, preferring to maintain the latter. Political parties have been facing several challenges in the last decades including a decrease in party membership, a decline in party identification, polarisation, partisanship, and party ideologies (Mair, 1997), and competition from anti-establishment and digital parties. These are changing the face, design, and function of political parties. This is further complicated by the fact that in Europe, many political parties are facing further challenges from the European Union which can restrict their movement due to the supremacy of European law. The accession of thirteen new member states to the European Union (Külahci, 2012), the financial crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit referendum, and Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, have all led to a series of academic debates and studies on the impact of Europeanisation. Whilst this literature is a recent addition to the growing corpus of Europeanisation literature, several theories have emerged to explain the role of the EU in national political systems. This direct and indirect impact of Europeanisation on political parties can be divided into various analytical areas, including; political manifestos; ideological change; party identity; patterns of party competition; policies of the party-in-government; relations beyond the party system; and relationships between parties and voters (de Vries, 2018; Enyedi & Deegan-Krause, 2017; Bartolini, 2012; Jones, 2011; Hix, 2000; Haughton, 2009; Ladrech, 1994, 1997, 2008, 2010, 2012a, b, 2022). Ladrech (2002) has become one of the main scholars on the Europeanisation of political parties. His five dimensions on this potential impact have become a valuable tool for political scientists seeking to understand the way the European Union influences political parties. What makes Ladrechʼs party dimensions so important is the fact that they provide a multi-dimensional analysis of the impact of Europeanisation. This is because he promotes five areas of investigation which might be influenced by the EU or European party groups. These are (1) Policy change, the additional influence of EU policies on parties’ programmes; (2) Organisational change, change of party rules and statutes because of parties’ new role in the European Union. The European Union also provides national political parties with the possibility to compete in the European elections and to cooperate with European party groups; (3) Party Competition: European issues are politicised as part of political parties’ electoral strategies; (4) Party-government relations; political parties will encourage their government and politicians, especially those who take part in European Union forums or MEPs to take positions which are

multiparty systems with one dominant party, (7) extreme multiparty systems with two main parties competing dominating the others, and (8) extreme multiparty systems with a number of parties enjoying similar popularity (Wolinetz, 2009; Siaroff, 2000).

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in line with the ideology of the party and national interest and relations beyond the party system. In addition, political parties will use their MEPs to defend the national interest; (5) Relations beyond the party system; Cooperation with several political parties across the board, and the opening of new cooperation outside the nation-state. Nonetheless, Ladrech’s dimensions do have their weaknesses. Firstly, these dimensions do not address the positions that parties take on the EU issue (Sikk, 2009) and secondly another major issue concerns the ideological dimension, which is missing from these five dimensions. European values and principles have the ability to shape the ideologies or principles of political parties, even though the common conception is that ideologies have long been replaced by pragmatism or more modern values. Still, the rise of anti-establishment political parties has showcased how certain long-standing ideologies can still be considered popular, but the question is whether these ideologies will reflect the policies these parties will promote in both the national and European arenas.

2.5

The Direct and Indirect Impact of Europeanisation on Political Parties

Within the growing literature on Europeanisation and political parties, there are two areas in which scholars have shown great interest in; these are the direct and indirect impact of Europeanisation on political parties. This may be because: EU legislation restricts the policy alternatives available to governments and, due to the electoral link, to parties and citizens. The more responsibility is assigned to the EU, the less room there is for parties to offer credible policy alternatives that differ markedly from EU legislation (Nanou & Dorussen, 2013, p. 71).

The direct impact can arise from European Integration and the transfer of sovereignty from states towards the European Union, whilst new member states have to face the Conditionality clause. It might be suggested that each of these might help the development of far-right or far-left parties that oppose the growing influence of the European Union and the restrictions that it places on national governments. On the other hand, European Integration enables political parties to compete in the European Union elections for them to have their representatives elected to the European Parliament. In addition, with EU membership, political parties can deepen and strengthen their relationship with European party groups with which they can cooperate in various areas to safeguard national interests. The indirect impact might also arise from the top-down impact of the EU as the transfer of sovereignty restricts political partiesʼ movements. This may challenge existing patterns of party competition (which can then have an impact on states’ party systems) by helping the rise of small far-right and left parties. These small parties have demonstrated the ability to be extremely competitive in local and European elections.

2.6

The Conditionality Clause

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Bartolini (1999) makes an interesting argument surrounding the direct and indirect impact of Europeanisation. He concludes that the indirect impact of Europeanisation might be less visible, but is more important for political parties and party systems than the EUʼs direct impact (Binnema, 2002; Ladrech, 2010). This is because Europeanisation challenges the party competition dimension and restricts partiesʼ manifestos. This produces a reaction from political parties. In some instances, they will have to re-think their EU stance and the policies they are proposing (especially when there is a reaction from their voters) to retain their popularity and safeguard national interests. This is especially evident in light of the recent financial crisis which challenged various mainstream parties across Europe and helped the emergence of new political parties which rejected the economic policies of the European Union which included the promotion of a series of austerity measures and its influence on member states (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). These new emerging parties would receive an additional boost with the Syrian migration crisis which allowed these parties to expand their influence within their electorate (Börzel & Risse, 2018). It is not surprising that some scholars (see Lewis, 2011) believe that, in general, Europeanisation has had a negative impact on political parties. Overall, it is clear that whilst the level of impact of Europeanisation is debatable, most scholars recognise that some form of influence exists. The evidence presented below discusses this influence and highlights the potential ability of the European Union to alter the relationship between parties, voters, and the state (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016; Ladrech, 2012a; Raunio, 2002; Kritzinger & Michalowitz, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2006; Walecki, 2007).

2.6

The Conditionality Clause

The Conditionality clause introduced by the EU as a requirement for states to become full members has enabled the Union to have a larger role in the domestic affairs of candidate states. Yet it also challenged and is still challenging the main political parties in these countries, which not only have to persuade voters to embrace the EU but need to make sure to abide by its criteria. The Conditionality clause requires candidate states to approach the EU with a different starting position when compared to most of their Western counterparts. The reason for this is that the EU could impose more top-down pressure on them to comply with its regulations. Countries that joined the Union before 2004 faced a less intrusive Union as conditionality was still being developed and there was less awareness of the risks that the EU was incurring by allowing them to become part of it. Much has been written about the Conditionality clause and its impact on candidate states (Zhelyazkova et al., 2019, Börzel, 2016, Lewis, 2006; Ladrech, 2012a) with these regulations being defined as:

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a set of mutual arrangements by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance (Killick, 1998, p. 6).5

The Conditionality clause was introduced for various reasons including the fear that the party systems in Eastern Europe were not stable enough, as well as the fear that several Western states had of parties from Central and Eastern Europe embracing extremism and populism to gain power. From this point of view, Richter and Wunsch (2019) and Pridham (2011) concluded that political conditionality is one of the tools which the EU could use to enforce national governments and political parties to abide by its regulations and respect democracy and human rights. The European Union wanted to make sure that political stability is achieved with the help of the European party groups, which could pressure these parties to follow a particular agenda prior to accession.6 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2020) developed the External Incentives Model (EIM) to explain the top-down impact of Europeanisation on states. They argue that Europeanisation uses conditionality as the main tool to enforce the EU regulations on candidate states. Enforcement is usually based on the threat of sanctions and rewards. These sanctions and rewards alter the cost-benefit calculations in these candidate states. Governments of these states usually lobby the EU for more incentives (Börzel & Schimmelfennig, 2017) including additional funds and resources to promote membership and reduce the impact of the adjustment on their institutions and citizens. Even though the European Union has established its mechanism to make sure that candidate states introduce the required reforms, the long-term impact of the Conditionality clause is contested. Still, scholars do agree (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020; Ladrech, 2012a; Trauner, 2009; Grabbe, 2002) that the introduction of the Acquis communautaire gave the European Union more coercive routes to influence states and their entities. The impact of Europeanisation on domestic politics and policymaking is considerable at this stage since the EU could stall the accession process should its criteria not be met.

5

The Conditionality clause makes an interesting case study as until now, scholars have failed to discuss its place within the EU literature. As the regulations within the Conditionality clause are decided by the EU technocrats, the Conditionality clause can be seen as an element of European Integration. The conditionality clause could also fit in the EU-isation literature. The reason for this is that this process analyses the impact of the EU during the negotiation stage. Still, much of the available literature on Europeanisation places the top-down impact of the Acquis communautaire within the Europeanisation process. 6 Whilst countries will have to abide by these regulations, bargaining usually takes place during the negotiating process. Therefore, countries have tools which they use to achieve some concessions.

2.7

2.7

Europeanisation and Political Conditionality

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Europeanisation and Political Conditionality

Even though some second-generation scholars believe that Europeanisation has played a more substantial role in Central and Eastern Europe, empirical research on these states is challenging such conclusions and suggesting that the impact of the European Union was largely limited (Grabbe, 2006; Buller & Gamble, 2002). The impact of the Conditionality clause is questioned by Richter and Wunsch (2019), Vachudova (2008), and Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig (2010), who are sceptical about the long-lasting impact of conditionality, declaring: However, as the overpowering, externally mandated influence of EU accession conditionality wanes after membership is attained, we can assume that legacies will regain causal relevance after accession determining, for example, when and where backsliding, non-compliance, or even over-compliance will occur. Further democratic consolidation, political behaviour, policymaking, and administrative practices might be shaped by cleavages and cultures inherited from a more distant past than the ‘revolutionary’ period of EU enlargement and membership—at least in those areas that are not subject to continued EU monitoring and sanctioning (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 434). Vachudova (2008) argues that even though states introduce the required policies, they do so superficially. The ‘Potekim village organisational structure’ theory outlines how politicians from several countries only changed their behaviour for a limited period to appease the EU and most reforms introduced by them were superficial. A similar argument has been provided by Vachudova (2008), Zhelyazkova et al. (2019) and Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig (2010). They believe that conditionality has led to domestic changes. However, their evidence suggests that this was only apparent before those countries’ accession, with the EU having little or no influence on parties afterward (Chiva, 2009, 2014). Richter and Wunsch (2019) and Elbasani and Šabić (2018) outline how conditionality provided government effectiveness within these countries but failed in installing effective democracies within the region. Subsequently, questions surrounding rule of law and human rights emerged in various states, including Malta. Some countries, including Poland and Hungary, did introduce measures to strengthen the rule of law before EU accession but reverted to authoritarianism in recent years (Ágh, 2016). With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU introduced the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as a monitoring instrument aimed at encouraging or enforcing judicial and institutional reforms in these countries, yet it was not that effective in enforcing the required reforms. This is because the EU has limited tools which it can use to enforce its regulations (Gateva, 2013; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). Richter and Wunsch (2019) developed the ‘state capture’ theory, highlighting how conditionality strengthened such clientelist practices at the expense of proper democratic reforms. The links between conditionality and state capture are money, power, and glory for the individuals involved. Firstly, the liberalisation of markets (money) within this region has strengthened the informal clientelist networks between the economic elite and the political class. This is especially damaging for

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the European Union when funds are being used to strengthen such practices. Secondly, the strict agenda and deadlines imposed by the European Union are being used as an excuse (power) to justify the lack of accountability and checks and balances. Responsibility for accountability was also transferred to the European Union with the latter failing to pressure states to comply with its rules and regulations. This top-down influence of the European Union has also strengthened the executive within such states at the expense of their national parliaments. Thirdly, the integration of governments and parties with others within the EU provided legitimacy (glory) to their agendas which they usually use during electoral campaigns in their quest for power (Vachudova, 2008).7 The European Union does have legal instruments in place to sanction states which do not comply with its regulations, even though these are limited (Meijers & van der Veer, 2019). One of these legal instruments can be obtained through the triggering of Article 7 of the Treaty of the EU, which can be used by the European Council when the founding principles of the EU are not respected, thus suspending the voting rights of particular states. Still, it is difficult for the European Council to vote against one state. However, as highlighted during the Schengen crisis caused by the Syrian migration crisis, states rarely agree to impose sanctions on other states. In addition, even when sanctions were imposed, they rarely had any impact on their national governments. If one considers the cost/benefit of these sanctions, sanctions are seen as less costly than barring states from joining the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). It is evident that whilst studies on the impact of conditionality have increased, there is a gap in the current literature surrounding the Conditionality clause. Grabbe (2002), believes that the current Europeanisation literature on Conditionality does not consider the difficulty that candidate states and their entities, including political parties, have in appeasing the European Union (including its different institutions) and other players, such as existing EU member states. The latter have to vote to allow new states to join the European Union. This means that bilateral negotiations must take place to prevent any candidate state from being vetoed by another member state. In fact, before the 2004 enlargement process, there were still diplomatic rows within Central and Eastern Europe over borders or debates about migration, and even nuclear energy issues. This means that candidate states had to reach an agreement with these countries over multiple issues. Some issues were raised when Romania (the Roma issue was a problem for Italy and the UK amongst others), the Czech Republic (Austria was not happy with the opening of the Temelín nuclear power station), and Croatia (border issues with Slovenia) applied to join the EU. Whilst the literature surrounding the Conditionality clause provides several examples of the pressure placed on candidate states to comply with EU regulations, there is a recurrent problem with these studies. Scholars have generally sought to

7

These three elements are especially important as they highlight the limitations of conditionality not just in Central and Eastern European states, but as it will shown in the next chapters, also in other states such as Malta.

2.8

National Political Parties and European Party Groups

41

uncover the impact which Conditionality had on Central and Eastern European states without considering the membership benefits, which may be seen to exceed the adaptational and political costs and are the driving force behind these countries’ attempts to comply with EU regulations and meet all accession criteria. In addition, Grabbe (2006) believes that it is worth exploring politicians’ behaviour during this critical period, and the level of compliance achieved, to understand how effective the Conditionality clause is in ensuring that change is taking place (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002; Böhmelt & Freyburg, 2018).

2.8

National Political Parties and European Party Groups

Political parties from Central and Eastern Europe had to face another set of regulations to be accepted into one of the European party groups.8 The latter EU structure has a central role within the European Parliament. Whilst studies of the relationship between European party groups and political parties from Central and Eastern Europe are still ongoing, early studies hypothesised that these European parties could exert influence over new member states’ parties.9 European party groups have the potential to restrict some parties’ programmes due to the ideological compatibility and democratic requirements needed to be accepted in these groups. European party groups are becoming extremely important within the European Union. They gained legal personality in 2014. This was important to raise the profile of these groups and strengthen their role in the EU policymaking process. These groups are required to comply with several international standards and have to comply with specific rules including the protection of data, political accountability, and political transparency particularly where funding is concerned (Norman & Wolfs, 2022). European party groups are perceived in many states to be important international entities, even though in many West European states, there is still scepticism about their role. Political parties from Central and Eastern Europe seek membership in

8 As of 2014, the traditional right-left parties in the European Parliament are the European Peopleʼs Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), with other parties including the Renew Europe group (RE), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and the Greens/European Free Alliance. 9 The literature has told us little on the rationale behind the national political parties’ decision to join a European party group. National political parties will traditionally join a European party group with a common doctrine based on Christian Democracy (right) and Social Democracy (left) (Charalambous, 2011). However, whilst this element is important when choosing a European party groups to align themselves with, political parties will be also aided by another important element; that is their EU approaches, as Eurosceptic parties have no place within the EPP or S&D, no matter how ideological similar they are. In addition, parties’ ideologies (Ennser, 2012) and EU approaches evolve over time, which is one of the reasons why parties shift from one European party groups to another according to their needs.

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these groups since they give a voice to these political parties and can legitimise their programmes (Delsoldato, 2002). New and emerging political parties may seek to use endorsements from these European party groups in their attempt to gain international recognition, develop a European dimension within their EU or national election campaigns, improve their electoral performances, and strengthen their political legitimacy and ideological identity (Vachudova, 2008, 2021). From 2004 onwards, European party groups placed their pressure on national political parties. There was concern amongst Western European states that national political parties from Central and Eastern Europe were more prone to embrace nationalism and populism in their quest for power. For this reason, the party groups within the European Parliament have the ability (even though there are no studies on whether this has ever taken place) to analyse parties’ programmes and interview party leaders to prevent any extreme programmes, with the threat of being expelled from these larger groups (Schmitt & van der Eijk, 2008). Numerous scholars have insisted (see Hix, 1995) that these entities will never dare to expel political parties as their influence is limited. If European party groups expel national political parties, it will negatively impact their support within the European Parliament. Yet, evidence reveals that whilst European party groups traditionally take a cautious approach when national parties have not abided by their principles, there have been cases that forced them to expel such parties. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko - HZDS) and the Hungarian Smallholdersʼ Party were both expelled from European party groups because of their threat to democracy, and for their extreme programmes that clashed significantly with those of their European counterparts. The latest controversy surrounding these political parties within the European Parliament involved the European People’s Party (EPP) and Fidesz. On 12 September 2018, the European Parliament overwhelmingly voted for a proposal to have the European Council initiate infringement proceedings against Hungary for its breach of European values.10 Yet, Orbán’s Fidesz party was still being protected by the EPP, the largest group within the European Parliament (Wolkenstein, 2018). Whilst various members of the EPP voted to start infringement proceedings against Hungary, there was a certain degree of reluctance to break ties with this party, partly because EPP did not want to lose 12 seats within the European Parliament as this would weaken the party. The party was also threatened by the possibility that Orbán could join other right-wing parties in the European Parliament which could strengthen the Eurosceptic bloc. Fidesz was finally suspended from the EPP in May 2019 partly due to anti-immigration posters which featured George Soros and the President of the Commission Jean- Claude Juncker. Even though the party was suspended from the EPP, the President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen, still required the support of Fidesz to get the necessary votes to be approved

10 Another vote had taken place in 2015, but due the opposition from the EPP, the vote was narrowly rejected by 3 votes.

2.9

Political Parties and Their EU Approach

43

by the European Parliament. The party quit the EPP in 2021 when rules were changed which would have led to the expulsion of Fidesz from the centre-right bloc. The case surrounding Fidesz highlights the contradictions which exist within such party groups. With no party group within the European Parliament having a working majority of votes, with the main groups EPP and Socialists and Democrats (S&D) losing further support, it is becoming more difficult for these parties to take a stand without the risk of damaging the party grouping because if a national party is expelled, they will lose several MEPs within the European Parliament. Holmes and Lightfoot (2007, 2011) are sceptical of the influence which these party groups can have on their members. Holmes and Lightfootʼs (2007, 2016) empirical evidence from their study of the impact of the European Socialists suggests that the impact of European party groups on Central and Eastern political parties is not as effective as Ladrech (2008) and others have hypothesised, with these European party groups playing only a superficial role. New literature on the role of the European party groups on the changes which took place in the political systems of Central and Eastern Europe highlights how the impact of Europeanisation on political parties is often inflated, and that the EU needs proper mechanisms to force states and its entities to comply with its rules and regulations. However, several scholars, including Külahci and Lightfoot (2014), believe that the role of these European party groups can grow as their promotion of policies based on the left-right dimension becomes more evident and their political weight increases. They certainly have the tools to influence national political parties especially as there is more scrutiny on their electoral campaigns. However, it will be difficult for them to use these tools to prevent further erosion of democracy in national states, especially since parties can move to other party groups and increase their influence within the European Parliament.

2.9

Political Parties and Their EU Approach

Political parties’ approach towards the European Union depends on multiple factors including the party model and type of organisation (Vasilopoulou, 2018). A distinction must be made between mass political parties as their approach and behaviour towards the EU will be partially influenced by the party’s ideology and will use this ideology to defend their position. Conversely, catch-all parties, cadre parties, and the emerging digital parties’11 approach to the EU will be based on other factors, including public mood, electoral strategy, political marketing, and party leader. These parties’ approach towards the EU will also be based on whether they are

11 For Gerbaudo (2019) digital parties are political parties which use digital technology to provide new forms of political participation. These are considered as internet parties which are using digital technology, mostly internet and the social media, to campaign against the traditional political parties and establish a closer relationship with the electorate.

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policy, vote, or office-seeking parties. For policy-seeking parties, the approach towards the EU will be based on the policies the EU is promoting. Voters-seeking parties will base their approach on the public mood towards the EU whilst Officeseeking parties will usually base their approach on the impact which the EU could have on the state and the government powers. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) and Sitter and Batory (2008) believe that political parties’ EU approach depends on a cost/benefit analysis and the potential impact on their state. In addition, their perception will change depending on whether they are in government or opposition, the popularity of the EU at a particular time, and the possibility of winning more voters with this conversion (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008; Sitter & Batory, 2008). Another perspective is provided by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) who state that political parties endorse voters’ preferred policies and their perceptions of the European Union. European citizens who favour parties of the hard left or nationalconservative parties may not be in favour of transferring to the EU further legislative power and deeper European Integration as this is perceived as a threat to national interests, nationalism, and national politics (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). These voters are more likely to reject any referendum or treaty for further European Integration which might strengthen the impact of Europeanisation. In contrast, those voters who see themselves as ideologically at the centre are more likely to support the European Union, EU policies, and Europhile political parties. Whilst more time is needed to understand the approach taken by political parties towards the EU, one has to take into consideration the fact that criticism towards the European Union has grown and is challenging the development of the EU, as well as the major partiesʼ status quo (de Wilde et al., 2013; Trenz, 2022). The financial crisis, Schengen crisis, and Brexit referendum have certainly challenged the party competition, party ideology, and party-organisation dimensions of political parties. Until a few years ago, these dimensions were thought by many scholars, including Mair (1997), to have resisted the impact of the European Union on them and were only influenced by events that took place at a national level. Evidence of the impact of Europeanisation on these dimensions is to be found in partiesʼ electoral manifestos and their performance in both national and European elections.

2.10

Europeanisation and Euroscepticism

For years, scholars have attempted to understand political parties and their leaders’ behaviour towards the EU. Several scholars, including Kriesi (2007) and Hix (2007), developed two distinct poles: the first is made up of those who are in favour of the EU, including entrepreneurs who will benefit from the decentralisation of economy and the opening of national borders (Kriesi, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2018); these are referred to as Euroenthusiasts (Hix, 2007) Europhile, or Europeanist. The second pole consists of those who are against the institutional design of the EU, its principles and purposes, and European Integration, and seek to protect the power and authority

2.10

Europeanisation and Euroscepticism

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of the state as well as the safe being of the community; these are known as Eurosceptic. However, as the literature on Europeanisation and Euroscepticism progressed, more poles were added to reflect the evolving nature of political parties and the EU. These included; Euroenthusiasts; the support for further EU integration; Europragmatists; the support for the EU even though there is an awareness of its vulnerabilities; Eurosceptics; support for the EU but not for further EU integration and Eurorejects; a complete rejection of the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018). Four types of political parties’ approaches towards the EU have also been developed by de Vries (2018). These include Exit scepticism; parties promote the withdrawal of their country from the EU; Policy Scepticism: Belief in the European Union but do not support further EU integration; Loyal Support; political parties support the European Union and European Integration and Regime scepticism; the awareness that the EU has various shortcomings, but the project is still beneficial for the people. Whilst they are very similar to the ones developed by Vasilopoulou (2018), the main difference is that they are based on a negative and positive side. Under the negative side, one can find policy scepticism and Exit scepticism whilst on the positive side, one can find loyal support and regime scepticism. The problem with this theoretical framework is that whilst Exit scepticism and loyal support are on the opposite side of each other, it is quite difficult to distinguish between policy scepticism and regime scepticism. Whilst both share similar beliefs, policy sceptics believe that their country should leave the European Union, whilst regime sceptics support membership even though they are aware of the problems challenging the European Union. Within the study of Europeanisation, various scholars have made their contribution to the study of Euroscepticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2008) divided Euroscepticism into two types: Soft and Hard Euroscepticism. Political parties’ anti-EU approach depends on the way they view the European project, and whether they agree on the further development of the EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). It is known that some political parties are in favour of the European project, but do not share the same goal as those who want to further empower the EU to create a federalist Europe and allow further political and economic integration; these are known as soft Eurosceptics. Other parties perceive European Integration and the growing influence of the EU on states as a threat to national sovereignty, meaning that their country should be shielded from the impact of Europeanisation; these are known as hard Eurosceptics. Vasilopoulou (2018) has developed the concept of Euroscepticism, and concluded that it is based on four fundamental features; cultural, principle practice, policy practice, and future of integration. Whilst she used these four features to understand the correlation between Euroscepticism and far-right parties, these can also be used to understand the Eurosceptic approach of left political parties. Vasilopoulou (2018) categorises three types of Euroscepticism; rejectionist, conditional, and compromising patterns. Rejectionist Eurosceptics believe in the common cultural and historical roots which are at the foundation of the European Union. Yet, they do not agree with European Integration, and they do not support further empowerment of the EU at the

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expense of nation-states. They aim to gain sovereignty back from the European Union so that states can take their own decisions. Conditional Eurosceptics are also believers of a common European heritage and support the basic concept of cooperation within the European region and the EU itself. However, they do not agree with the integration of European polity, and they reject the supranational authority over nation-states. They do agree on the creation of confederations that do not threaten the sovereignty of nation-states. The third and final type of Euroscepticism consists of Compromising Eurosceptics. Compromising Eurosceptics agree with the idea of common European heritage to support some aspects of European Integration, as this might be beneficial for European citizens. Moreover, they are willing to cooperate with the EU to introduce the required reforms. Still, they do not support the creation of a European polity. Whilst these three types of Eurosceptics agree on the concept of European heritage, they tend to disagree on what kind of powers and responsibility the EU should have and how the EU should be shaped in the future. The emergence of new Eurosceptic parties, including the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in Germany, the Brexit Party in the UK, and the rebranding of others such as the National Rally (Rassemblement NationalRN) in France, is a phenomenon that is relatively common within the EU area. Euroscepticism has arguably risen for several reasons, including the fact that the EU is seen as eroding states’ sovereignty, and encouraging globalisation, whilst also being an institution with limited accountability and popular legitimacy (Schmidt, 2004; de Vries, 2018). On the other hand, Europeanist politicians perceive Euroscepticism as a threat to the development of the European Union (Hartleb, 2012). The rising contestation against further European Integration was highlighted by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands12 and the Brexit referendum results. This was the latest in a series of upsets for the European Union, and it was clear that, apart from the rise of Euroscepticism, there is not enough civic engagement to identify and discuss the issues which concern European citizens. In terms of Globalisation, it is difficult to find a party that punishes electorally for its effects, even though the tide against globalisation has helped the emergence of various political leaders including Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the USA and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK. The reason for this is that globalisation is seen as a consequence of the spread of capitalism. On the other hand, in terms of Europeanisation, the EU is seen as the source of power. For this reason, Eurosceptics are turning against Europhile parties (Ladrech, 2000). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) offer various examples of the way by which the EU approaches of parties across Europe have had an impact on their eventual governments. One of the cases which they highlighted took place in Slovakia, with the Eurosceptic Peopleʼs Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, and its

12

The Dutch case is particularly interesting as a study discovered that 85% of the Dutch parliamentarians were in favour of the Constitutional Treaty and campaigned in favour of it. In the end, only 39% of the Dutch voted yes (de Wilde et al., 2013).

2.11

Politicisation of the EU

47

leader, former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, excluded from the government in 2002, even though the party won the largest number of votes (20%). This occurred because no other party wanted to join a coalition with this Eurosceptic party since the general aim amongst the country’s main politicians was to build an alliance with the European Union which could have been impossible with political parties in government opposed to EU membership (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, 2008). Whilst this is just one example, it reveals how the impact of the EU can vary from one country to another, highlighting the importance of analysing the impact of the EU in every member state.

2.11

Politicisation of the EU

Pro and Anti-European parties are often placed in a position where they have to defend their standpoints. Anti-EU political parties have often politicised various EU issues to gain political advantage, particularly in European elections, whilst until a few decades ago, mainstream political parties have traditionally focused on other salient issues to try to avoid controversy over the European project (Dolezal & Hellström, 2016). With Brexit and the Syrian migration crisis, it has become apparent that political parties can no longer ignore the issues surrounding the European Union in national debates, especially as these were being used by Eurosceptic parties to gain political advantage. de Wilde and Zürn (2012) define politicisation as ‘the demand for or the act of transporting an issue into the field of politics – making previously apolitical matters political’ (p. 139). They postulate that politicisation takes place when decisionmaking powers and interpretation of facts become an issue within the political system and become part of the political discussion. Grande et al. (2016) provide three dimensions of politicisation; issue salience, actor expansion and intensity of conflict (p. 8). Regarding issue saliency, they argue that politicians and political parties will discuss an issue depending on how important it is for them and the electorate. This leads to the second dimension, action expansion as an increasing number of politicians, with actors debating an issue that can influence public opinion. The last dimension of actor polarisation highlights how public debates might not lead to a high level of politicisation, but rather the polarisation of conflict between the various actors and political parties. Moreover, the media reportage of this conflict might increase public awareness and the intensity of the conflict. Schmidt argues that the concept of politicisation can be utilised by scholars to understand (1) the increasing importance of the EU in national political debates; (2) the growing of cross-cutting cleavages which are shaping public debates; (3) the mainstream parties and their struggle to cope with electoral divisions and (4) the emergence of new political parties which use these electoral divisions to challenge mainstream political parties.

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The issue surrounding the politicisation of the EU can involve various areas in the EU decision-making process including migration, the economy, and the enlargement process. Bartolini (2005) makes a distinction between three main categories related to the European Union; constitutive issues which are issues linked with the nature of EU Polity including transfer of sovereignty and decision-making rules; policy issues (referenda and discussions on EU policies can force states to take a stance for or against such policies) and general orientation towards the European Union (which can shape its future) (Papadopoulos & Magnette, 2010). These three issues are being politicised since they are having an impact on the way of life of European citizens whilst also having the ability to shape the future of the EU and the region. Schmidt also argued that the politicisation of the EU issue can be in two forms: politicisation at the top and politicisation at the bottom. She argues that the latter is taking place because of the growing contestation of the European Union due to its lack of legitimacy, austerity measures, or migration policies which were partially responsible for the Brexit vote against the EU. On the other hand, politicisation at the top means that this growing contestation is having an impact on the European institutions which are having to address public fear and anger to save the European project. Magnette and Papadopoulos (2008) believe that the politicisation of the EU issue can have both advantages and disadvantages for states and their political parties. From a positive point of view, Hix (1999) suggests that this politicisation (within the left-right political spectrum) would create a healthy public debate about the EU and its development. This debate is usually based on stable positions of the conflicts being discussed, either in favour or against. With regard to the European Union, this discussion is traditionally based on three important conflicts based around sovereignty, identity, and solidarity (Maag & Kriesi, 2016). Questions surrounding sovereignty produced some of the most controversial discussions surrounding the EU and its impact on states. This leads to the second conflict in which the EU is seen as a threat to national identities due to its influence on cultures and traditions. The third conflict is mostly based on the struggle in establishing redistribution of resources. The issue is problematic when you have confrontations between states on the type of funding the EU should provide and how the EU should make sure that all European citizens can enjoy the same standard of living. However, Bartolini (2005) believes that this politicisation would hinder the development of the European Union and encourage further Euroscepticism. The reality is that politicisation did create more awareness around the EU and produced a series of public debates surrounding its future. However, it also raised questions surrounding its legitimacy and encouraged further Euroscepticism, evident in the recent 2014 and 2019 European Elections which saw the rise of a number of far-right parties at the expense of the mainstream parties. The politicisation of the EU issue was encouraged by the accession referenda in candidate states and the Brexit referendum. Such states put their future relationship with the European Union through an electoral test. Candidate states were expected to meet a series of strict criteria to join the European Union. This enabled political parties to take different stances on the EU issue, which proved to be more

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controversial in some countries within the EU (Cini, 2004). It also influenced the party competition dimension as parties were even created to encourage people to reject EU membership (EU integration) and the potential negative impact of Europeanisation. Schmitt and Thomassen (2006) conclude that the growing politicisation of the ‘EU’ in Central and Eastern Europe was helped by the willingness of their national political parties to place the European issue (either the issue concerning membership, EU policies, or the idea of further European Integration) into national debates and electoral campaigns. The reason behind this is that the European Union has helped these political parties by strengthening their international image and by helping them to achieve political stability (Schmitt & Thomassen, 2006; de Wilde & Zürn, 2012). This is in direct contrast with the approach embraced by political parties across Western Europe (Lewis, 2011; Magnette & Papadopoulos, 2008), even though they would later face the same questions in the Greek Financial Crisis and the Syrian migration crisis. In fact, Mair (2001) concludes that Western political parties preferred to de-politicise the issue and sideline the subject. For Mair (2001) the reason for this is that the EU is neither a popular subject nor salient enough to attract voters, with parties preferring to be protected from electoral constraints and public opinion by eliminating the EU from their public dialogue and electoral campaigns, leaving it up to national elites to take decisions surrounding it (Ladrech, 2008; Grande et al. (2016). However, the Brexit referendum highlighted the fact that the EU could turn into a popular and controversial subject even though its importance during national or European elections is still questionable.

2.11.1

Politicisation and Framing

For political parties to politicise the EU issue, they will be required to develop an agenda and calculate the costs of framing an EU issue for their advantage. The attempt to politicise an EU issue or to frame it will be based on three instruments that political parties enjoy; (1) issue emphasis, (2) arena choice, and (3) issue framing (Grande et al. (2016). When it comes to the first instrument of issue emphasis, political parties will have the ability to politicise or de-politicise a particular EU issue, as already discussed in the previous section. If they want to use the second instrument, they will have to select the arena where to frame the issue, especially as parties compete in multiple elections including national, regional, local, and European. This leads to the third instrument, issue framing, as political parties will have to frame the issue in a way that fits their ideology or political programme. This may be done to advance their interests by using Europe in the party competition dimension. As argued earlier, the European Union might not be an issue salient enough for many parties to campaign on during European and national elections, as will be outlined in the case of Malta’s European elections. However, European Integration and Europeanisation (the reaction which EU regulations and principles

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produce within national systems) are nevertheless tools which political parties can use to compete with other parties: Governments may paint EU-induced conditions in too rosy colours, which may reflect negatively on its own performance. Conversely, opposition parties may be too negative about integration; this may in turn reflect positively on the current performance of the government (Kumlin, 2010, p. 5).

Kumlin (2010) has written extensively on this argument, offering a new perspective on how framing can allow political parties to promote their agendas, which might not necessarily be linked with the European Union. Statham and Trenz (2012, 2015) distinguish between three types of frames; (1) campaigning frames, i.e., when there is an emphasis on strategic considerations; (2) issue-specific frames that outline the attributes of a political issue; (3) justification frames which means that political parties will be required to explain to the public why an issue is on the agenda and why it should be an interest to them. Grande et al. (2016) distinguish between two types of framing which are cultural framing and utilitarian framing. Cultural framing is the attempt by several political parties, particularly Conservative and Christian Democrats, to use the European Union to either highlight how the identity of the nation will be strengthened, or to improve the concept of a European Identity which could be used to promote European values including human rights within and outside the European region. On the other hand, this cultural framing can have a counter-effect as these European values might be seen as a threat to national values. Additionally, European values are used to prevent potential candidate states (such as Turkey) to join the EU. This means that framing can have Nationalist Identarian (on a national level) and multi-cultural universalist (European level) typology depending on the issue which is being framed by the parties. Utilitarian framing is established during the policymaking process of the EU. This is based on two other typologies: ‘economic’ and ‘other utilitarian’. The economic typology is used by parties to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of European Integration and its monetary policies and promote further reforms. The other utilitarian typology is used to promote the reduction of EU bureaucracy or the removal of the country from the EU due to this bureaucracy and the need to protect the national interest or to highlight the need to protect the EU citizens by securing the borders and prevent crime and terrorism (Grande et al., 2016). Cultural and utilitarian framing takes place when political parties and politicians believe that EU regulations are producing a negative impact. Political parties frame the EU issue to give the impression that they are either powerless and unable to intervene in the EU decision-making process or that they have managed (credit claiming) to upload their preferences within the EU institutions. Kumlin (2010) proposes one scenario in which parties frame the EU issues; to avoid any blame which voters might attribute to them for introducing reforms, with this framing having the ability to shape up to defeat their opponents (Rotte & Zimmermann, 1998; de Vries, 2018). Regarding framing and blaming the EU institutions for the policies being introduced by national governments, Maltaʼs first EU Commissioner highlighted how EU

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Political Partiesʼ Role in the European Elections

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politicians understand the need for parties in government to shift the blame onto the European institutions in their attempt to safeguard their support and legitimise the government’s performance (Borg, 2013). Still, he suggests that there may come a point when EU institutions will have to start defending their role and decisionmaking powers. This may have to be done to combat the negative attitudes which are growing against the EU institutions (Serricchio et al., 2013; Hartleb, 2012). However, the issue which should certainly be raised is the way this shift blaming is encouraging several Eurosceptics, as in the UK, to demand a referendum to decide whether to stay in the European Union or leave and reclaim the powers which have been transferred to it over the years. Future literature should reflect this issue as it could have serious implications for the future development of the European Union.

2.12

Political Partiesʼ Role in the European Elections

The European elections might provide the best opportunity for political parties to politicise and frame EU issues to their advantage. The European elections are an important element of study and a key element within the study of Europeanisation as, with membership, political parties have the opportunity to compete in the European arena using the European Parliament elections. These elections were developed to allow EU citizens to have a say in the EU decision-making process (Wallace & Smith, 1995; Van der Brug et al., 2016) and its development. These elections are complex events to analyse as they involve several factors which can influence voter behaviour. Amongst these, there is the crucial role that major political parties play in understanding the needs of voters and setting the political agenda to gather support. European Parliament elections have traditionally been analysed in terms of the second-order model, as there is less partisanship involved, low turnout, and an increase in support for smaller parties (Hix & Marsh, 2007). Apart from the second-order approach, there are two other under-developed approaches surrounding European elections. The second approach claims that the EU influences partiesʼ electoral programmes and the eventual electoral results. The third approach concerns the European effect model. For this to work, voters base their vote on the performance of the European party groups within the European Parliament and their role in the EU decision-making process (Hix & Marsh, 2011). Other approaches concerning the role political parties take in the EU elections which have not received much attention include those of Nanou and Dorussen (2013), Binnema (2002), and Mair (2001). When combined, these approaches offer an important and comprehensive contribution to our understanding of political parties’ options when campaigning for the EU elections. According to these scholars, parties have the choice of either promoting the EU dimension and EU issues, or to ignore the EU and its regulations, and the restrictions which the EU and the European party groups impose on them. The party choice models (mostly the second-order model) have contributed to the literature by offering various

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mechanisms by which scholars can analyse the European elections and offer an explanation for their poor turnout. The low turnout for the European elections is a problem for the European Union. Across the decades, various attempts has been made to try and mobilise voters by highlighting the role which their representatives can have in the European Parliament. The turnout did increase in the 2019 European elections to 50.6%, the highest since 1994 with several campaigns being funded by the EU to raise more awareness on the role of the European Parliament. Still, there are several challenges that are linked with the European elections. These include apathetic European voters and limited campaigns by political parties to minimise a potential voter backlash. Statistics show that turnout for national elections will almost always be higher than the turnout for European local or regional elections. One can speculate that this is because national elections enable political parties to govern the country and gain legitimacy from voters to pursue a particular agenda, whilst the European elections enable parties to elect their representatives to the European Parliament. Another explanation would be the fact that European and national elections have different institutional designs and political environments. On this issue, Downs (1957) suggests that in national elections, voters in a democracy act primarily to maximise the value of their vote (even though the majority of the voters will vote for the party which is ideologically closest to them)13 as these elections are the ones which can determine their standards of living and future. On the other hand, the scenario in European elections is completely different. Olsen (2007) believes that voters perceive the European Union to be an elite organisation, with no accountability to its citizens. Voters do not feel the need to be informed about candidates or issues competing for their votes. An effort has been made by the European Parliament to deal with this issue during the 2019 Electoral campaign, using the ‘This time I am voting’ slogan to increase awareness of the EU. Whilst the turnout was still relatively low and studies have not been made on the 13 Colin Hay (1999) provides an important critique of Downsʼ (1957) voting behaviour model. Hay believes that one of the main weaknesses in Downs’s theory is his assumption that voters are wellinformed and that they will use their time to acquire information through political parties and experts amongst others before going to vote. In addition, the fact that people go out and vote when their individual vote will hardly make any difference is seen as irrational, with Downs failing to provide any real explanation of why people still vote in the first place. Hay rejects Downsʼ electoral system explanation that votersʼ preferences are fixed as this does not explain why political parties work to shape the distribution of policies indicating that political strategies are indeed important during electoral campaigns. Regarding these critics, Gray and Wuffle (2005) believe that there is no other model which explains the rationale behind votersʼ decision to vote (even though the Michigan School of Voting emerged as an alternative to Downsʼ model) with Downsʼ critics only questioning his approach without giving any alternatives. In addition, Downs himself understood the weaknesses of his electoral participation model which was elaborated and strengthened along the years by Shubik (1968), Ledyard (1984) and Riker (1982) amongst others. Even though Downsʼ model has a number of shortcomings, Olters (2001) believes that the model is still useful to understand politicians and votersʼ behaviour (which is the reason why it is still one of the most sought models) as it brings together economics and political science, using economic tools to investigate political process.

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Fig. 2.2 Policymaking in national and European institutions

impact of the campaign on the turnout, the latter did increase. Still, the relatively low turnout in most European member states, together with the fact that these elections are fought mostly on national issues, certainly raises questions about their purpose (Van der Brug et al., 2016; Franklin, 2014; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). In addition, the EUʼs policymaking process relies on several institutions. As shown in Fig. 2.2, the EU decision-making powers are shared between the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers (Crombez & Hix, 2011), with only one of these being directly elected by the European voters. Whilst efforts have been made to empower the European Parliament and enhance its role within the EU, it is still considered the weakest of the three European organs, with national actors not keen on transferring more decisionmaking powers to it which could result in further loss of national sovereignty (Williams, 2018; Rittberger, 2003). European elections do not have the political responsibility and pressure that national elections have, but they form part of another system that is more volatile (Ladrech, 2012a). Thus, results have a lesser impact on voters and EU states’ political systems than their national counterparts. In the European elections, voters are less pressured by the political system to vote for the major parties. This widens the competition, alters the party system, and allows smaller parties to build more controversial and populist agendas to gather attention and elect some of their candidates (Hartleb, 2012). The characteristics of the European elections and the ways in which these elections are tackled by the major parties offer an opportunity for smaller parties to gain prominence in the European arena as highlighted by the results of the 2014 and 2019 EU Elections.14 This could be a point of departure from where these small

14

Regional and Local Elections can also offer the same opportunities.

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parties could build their support for competing in national elections. Therefore, European elections are effectively first-order elections for these entities as they are competing in a different setting and a different party system, and utilise much of their funding to campaign and attract disappointed voters who are ready to shift sides.

2.13

Europeanisation and Party Politics

Europeanisation can be a fashionable concept used by many to outline the impact of the European Union and the transformation that the latter is undergoing. This transformation will often require the support of political parties. Whilst the term concerning Europeanisation can be misused as the process of understanding its characteristics is ongoing, theories on the phenomena have helped political scientists in understanding how the European Union functions and the way it can influence entities. Political Parties are only one group out of many that the European Union can shape. Still, they are an important entity, elected by the people and provided with legitimacy to enact their manifesto. Within the decision-making process, these political parties may be influenced by the European Union or other international organisations. They can defend the European Union as well as oppose it. They can use the European Union as a political tool in multiple ways and they can also promote their candidates for an important role within EU institutions. On its part, the European Union can also pressure parties to make sure that its values and principles are respected and can support their projects through its funds. Political Parties and politicians’ behaviour are not always rational and they do not always follow a particular pattern. In a small country like Malta where every little movement of parties and politicians is evaluated and scrutinised, all these elements can cause controversy and end up being an issue in the national as well European elections campaigns.

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Külahci, E. (2012). Conclusion: Country comparison. In E. Külahci (Ed.), Europeanisation and party politics: How the EU affects domestic actors, patterns and systems (pp. 171–202). ECPR Press. Külahci, E., & Lightfoot, S. (2014). Governance, Europarties and the challenge of democratic representation in the EU: A case study of the Party of European Socialists. Acta Politica, 49(1), 71–85. Kumlin, S. (2010). Claiming blame and giving credit? Unintended effects of how government and opposition frame the Europeanization of welfare. European Union Politics, 12(4), 575–595. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116511417296 Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of France. Journal of Common Market Policies, 32(1), 69–88. Ladrech, R. (1997). Partisanship and party formation in European Union politics. Comparative Politics, 29(2), 167. https://doi.org/10.2307/422078 Ladrech, R. (2000). Social democracy and the challenge of the European Union. Rienner Publishers. Ladrech, R. (2002). Europeanisation and political parties: Towards a framework for analysis. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403. Ladrech, R. (2008). Europeanization and the variable influence of the EU: National parties and party systems in Western and Eastern Europe. Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans, 10(2), 139–150. Ladrech, R. (2010). Europeanization and national politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Ladrech, R. (2012a). Europeanization and political parties. In S. Bulmer & C. Lequesne (Eds.), The member states of the European Union. Oxford University Press. Ladrech, R. (2012b). Party change and Europeanisation: Elements of an integrated approach. West European Politics, 35(3), 574–588. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665741 Ladrech, R. (2022). Social democracy and the challenge of European Union. In Social democracy and the challenge of European Union. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ledyard, J. O. (1984). The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice, 44(1), 7–41. Lewis, P. G. (2006). Party systems in post-communist Central Europe: Patterns of stability and consolidation. Democratization, 13(4), 562–583. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340600791863 Lewis, P. G. (2011). Introduction: Europeanising party politics? Central and Eastern Europe after EU enlargement. In P. Lewis & R. Markowski (Eds.), Europeanising party politics? Comparative perspective on Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 1–24). Manchester University Press. Maag, S., & Kriesi, H. (2016). Politicization, conflicts and the structuring of the EU political space. In S. Hutter, E. Grande, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), Politicizing Europe. Integration and mass politics (pp. 207–239). Cambridge University Press. Magnette, P., & Papadopoulos, Y. (2008). On the politicization of the European consociation: A middle way between Hix and Bartolini. European Governance Papers No.C-08-01. Mair, P. (1997). Party system change: Approaches and interpretation. Clarendon Press. Mair, P. (2001). The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. In K. H. Goetz & S. Hix (Eds.), Europeanized politics? European integration and national political systems (pp. 22–51). Frank Class. Mair, P. (2006). Party system change. In R. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp. 63–73). SAGE Publications. Mannin, M. (2003). Advocating EMU: The institutions faultlines of monetary union. Politique europeenne, 2, 33–57. Mannin, M. (2013). Europeanization and European politics. In The Europeanization of European politics (pp. 3–21). Springer. Marciacq, F. (2011). The political geographies of Europeanisation: Mapping the contested conceptions of Europeanisation. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 8(1), 57–74. Mastenbroek, E. (2018). Europeanization of policies and administration. In The Palgrave handbook of public administration and management in Europe (pp. 823–840). Springer.

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Chapter 3

The Two Sides of Maltese Politics

After loyalty to the family comes loyalty to the partit (political party). Political relations are still characterised by intense and destructive factionalism that effectively inhibits any form of cooperative long-term planning. The twin loyalties to families and party effectively obstruct loyalty to the state (Boissevain, 2006).

The Maltese political system reflects the historical configuration of power in Maltese society, partly as a result of the islands’ political economy, and partly on account of its long history as a fortress governed as a benevolent autocracy. From its Independence in 1964 onwards, the socioeconomic development of the country and its institutions has been influenced by a two-party system that shaped various constitutional and governmental reforms. It has also notably helped the country establish a relationship with the European Union until the country’s eventual membership in 2004. This chapter evaluates the development of Maltaʼs political characteristics which in turn will help uncover the potential implications of Europeanisation on Malta’s politics and political parties. It begins with an evaluation of Maltaʼs electoral characteristics, including its two-party system and the use of the single transferable vote (STV), while examining the development of the ideologies and principles of the main political parties. Understanding the impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs politics and political parties requires an overview of its political system. The latter reflects an intermixing of polarisation, partisanship, political patronage, populism, and a leadershipdominated political arena with an organised popular base. The Maltese political scene also features several customs that are reminiscent of the practice of the Catholic faith in Malta. As already discussed in the introduction, some of these customs include weekly Sunday meetings in clubs (reminiscent of Sunday mass), the annual party celebrations with Independence Day considered to be the ‘Nationalist’ national day and Freedom Day considered to be the ‘Labour’ national day. These are reminiscent of the annual village feasts and, similar to these, are celebrated with much pomp. One can also find home visits which politicians use to get to know their electorate and promote themselves. These are considered reminiscent of the annual © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_3

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Easter house blessings, the use of commemorative plaques and monuments commemorating former leaders and party milestones, the secular rituals of mass meetings, party anthems, and party symbols (DeBattista, 2017). These characteristics, in addition to its small size and Mediterranean culture, have turned Maltaʼs elections into spectacular events which could easily be mistaken for one of Molièreʼs tragic comedies. This is due to the drama and confrontation between both politicians and supporters alike where political tension, high emotions, and hyperboles are the order of the day. This is what makes the Maltese system so different in many ways, and what helped Maltaʼs major parties to maintain their popularity and electoral dominance, and shape the discourse on the European Union:

3.1

The Road Towards the Two-Party System

Malta is considered to be the perfect two-party system with two political parties competing for power and legitimacy (Carammia & Pace, 2022). Yet, this was not always the case, since, between 1921 and 1966; the country had a multi-party system that sometimes required coalitions between two or more political parties. Unlike in Central and Eastern European states, Maltaʼs main political parties emerged over a century ago, at a time when Malta was under British rule and their strong and charismatic leaders managed to win public support, develop a stable party system after Maltaʼs Independence, and maintain a consistent rivalry. The Labour Party, rose out of the ashes of the Riformista Party (Reform Party), headed by Sigismondo Savona. This party was created in 1879 to support the substitution of the Italian language in primary classes and courts with the English language. However, historians suggest that the proper ancestor of this party was created in 1921 by Sigismondo Savonaʼs son, William Savona, who called his party Chamber of Labour, although the Maltese would nickname it Il-Partit tal-Ħaddiema—the Workers Party. This party participated in the 1921 national elections—the first under the self-government Constitution promulgated earlier in the year. The Chamber of Labour was a traditional left-wing party sustained by the working class cleavage. Most of these workers used to traditionally work for the British Services at the Maltese dockyard, considered to be one of the hubs of Malta’s economy and the only industrial mass-production complex until the 1960s, thus being a hotbed for left-wing militancy (Chircop, 1991). Apart from the Chamber of Labour, Lord Gerald Stricklandʼs Constitutional Party also emerged. The Constitutional Party, like the Chamber of Labour, was also in favour of retaining Malta’s strong links with the British Empire and supported Anglicisation. After the Second World War, the Labour Party’s leader, Sir Paul Boffa, and its future leader, Dom Mintoff, clashed. Boffa left the Party after losing a vote of confidence in his leadership and established the Malta Workers Party, which like several other breakaway parties, had limited success and disappeared after a few years. Consequently, Maltaʼs Labour Party which in 2009 undertook a complete rebranding and was renamed Partit Laburista (Labour Party) under the leadership of

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The Road Towards the Two-Party System

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Mintoff became the only party representing socialist values in Parliament (Chircop, 2012). The origins of the Nationalist Party can be traced back to 1880 when Fortunato Mizzi founded the Partito Anti-Riformista (Anti-Reform Party). This pro-Italian party surfaced to resist the efforts to reduce the influence of the Italian language and the policy of gradual Anglicisation. Italian was the main language spoken in Malta by the professional class with the Italian culture influencing Malta’s art, literature and religion. This party was supported by peasants, the professional class, and the clergy, and wanted to maintain strong links with Italy and Europe (Frendo, 1993; Pace, 2008). The Anti-Riformista Party changed its name to Partito Nazionale (National Party) in 1884. The right-wing party split several times; most notably with the creation of the Unione Politica Maltese (Maltese Political Union) and the Partito Democratico Nazionalista (Democratic Nationalist Party), more to the right than the former. After a few years, they merged back into the Nationalist Party. The party split again after the Second World War, with the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) and the Nationalist Party competing against each other in the 1962 and 1966 national elections, until the DNP disappeared, with many of its supporters joining the Nationalist Party.1 From 1966 onwards, Maltaʼs political system has been shaped by its polarised and partisan duopolistic party system (Cini, 2002) even though in 2018, the Democratic Party (PD) managed to get two of its representatives elected in Parliament.2 It managed to do this due to its coalition alliance with the Nationalist Party, with both parties contesting under the Nationalist Party ticket.3 Marlene Farrugia, a PD candidate managed to get directly elected, whilst the other MP, Godfrey Farrugia, was elected in a casual election in the seventh district as Beppe Fenech Adami had to renounce the seat. This happened because he was elected in another district, allowing Godfrey Farrugia to win enough votes to gain a seat in Parliament. The degree of polarisation has arguably been a mixed blessing for the country’s political system. On a positive note, the polarised duopolistic political system empowers (or pressures) the Maltese to vote, with national elections traditionally enjoying nearly universal turnout. A high turnout is also registered in local and European Parliament elections. Nevertheless, this vote is usually reserved for the two major parties, with few political parties succeeding in challenging this duopoly. Whilst various political parties emerged, they did not have the resources, the political

1

In his autobiography, Fenech Adami (2014) reveals that the partyʼs name did create some problems with its European partners. The PN was invited to join the European Union of Christian Democrats (the party would evolve into the EPP in 1976) in 1960. At the time, a number of Christian Democrat Parties believed that the name showcased the partyʼs support of Nazism and Fascism. However, they quickly learned that the partyʼs name developed from Partito Nazionale to evolve into the popular Partit Nazzjonalista, in 1927 (Fenech Adami, 2014). 2 Still, in the history of the Maltese legislature, a number of MPs resigned from their political groups and sat in the House as independent MPs. 3 In a two-party system, one party will achieve enough electoral support to govern by itself. Furthermore, power is alternated between the same two parties (Cini, 2002).

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weight, or the ability to use patronage to establish themselves within the Maltese political system. The Alternattiva Demokratika (Green Party) did achieve respectable results in various local elections, notably in the 2004 European election, and the 2008 and 2013 national elections. Yet, due to the STV and the way electoral districts are divided, it has only had success at the local level whilst failing to reach the required vote quota to elect a Member of Parliament. On the other hand, and as already argued, during the 2018 national election campaign, the newly created PD managed to establish a coalition with the Nationalist Party, opting to contest the national election under the Nationalist banner. Whilst it managed to elect two of its representatives, the coalition with the Nationalist Party was dissolved with the election of the Nationalist leader Adrian Delia. The party eventually merged with Malta’s Green Party in 2020 to form the Democratic Alternative/Democratic Party (ADPD). This new party contested the 2022 election. The new party will continue its participation in Malta’s political arena. Whilst Malta is known to have a ‘perfect’ two-party system, the 2019 European elections and 2022 national elections has reconfirmed the dominance of the Labour Party over the political system. Over the years the main political parties have competed for this dominance, with the Nationalist Party winning five national elections between 1987 and 2008, the gap between the main political parties has never been so large. The Labour Party managed to win the 2019 European elections by over 42,656 votes and obtained four out of the six available seats. In 2022 the gap between the national political parties stood at 39,474 (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). The gap between the two main political parties has been increasing from one election to another. With the Nationalist Party struggling to elect a leader which can compete and win against the Labour Party, Malta could soon end up with one and a half party system, with the Nationalist Party maintaining the basic support (around 40%), but unable to win enough floating voters to win elections. This is not only producing an internal struggle within the party, but it is also raising further questions on what approach the party should take to restore its popularity and electability with the electorate, and whether there is any place left for its Christian Democratic ideology in the country’s political system. On the other hand, in the 2022 election, both main political parties decrease their share of vote, meaning that apathy towards the political system and the main political parties is increasing. This could give the opportunity for small parties to try and attract these voters.

3.2

Ideologies and the European Union

One of the main elements that this research will discuss is the impact of the European Union on the ideologies of Malta’s main political parties. Ideologies had an important role in the creation of the main political parties. These ideologies not only had to be adapted to the challenges of an Independent Malta but shaped the early approaches of the main political parties towards the EU. It was arguably relatively

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Ideologies and the European Union

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easy for the Nationalist Party to embrace European Integration and Maltaʼs European Union membership, given its strong Christian Democrat roots. In his autobiography, the President Emeritus of Malta Ugo Mifsud Bonnici (2015) describes how the Nationalist Party needed to find a new vision after Independence was achieved. Discussions on a potential membership within the European Community had already started; still, the main issue was what vision was the party going to have for the country. He highlighted how the inspiration came from the European Union of Christian Democrats (UEDC) which helped the party to establish a strong link with Christian Democratic Parties across Europe. The relationship that the Nationalist Party built with these Christian Democratic Parties helped it to base its ideology on a liberal economic agenda and traditional principles including the respect for the dignity of every person and the promotion of democracy and social justice (PN, 1986) and shaped the aspirations of Fenech Adami to make Malta a member of the European Community. For the Nationalist Party, the ‘Christian’ element meant that politicians in the group should use power to safeguard the interests of the community and to be a service to all citizens. Whilst the party was inspired by the principles of the Roman Catholic Church, the party is a firm believer in the separation of the church and state (PN, 1986). The traditional principles of the Roman Catholic Church, which the party was inspired by, included respect for human dignity, rule of law, human rights, solidarity, and justice (Gonzi, 2013). All of these values and principles were promoted by the Nationalist Party in a resolution which it then forwarded to the then European Economic Community in 1979 after the British forces withdrew: Malta not only forms part of Europe geographically, historically and culturally, but shares with the European Community the ideals of peace, freedom, social progress and the constant improvement to living standards provided for it in the Treaty of Rome. It is in Maltaʼs interest to start negotiations with the EU, with a view to obtain the proper conditions for Malta’s full membership. (Fenech Adami, 2014, p. 294)

Both the EU and the Nationalist Party share common principles including the liberalisation of the economy, solidarity, and freedom of choice. The Nationalist Party has traditionally promoted these principles alongside its Christian Democratic values (PN 1986; Fenech, 1988; Schiavone, 1991). In this way, the party promoted Maltaʼs Christian and European traditions (Mitchell, 2003) to convince the electorate that Malta’s ‘rightful’ place was within the EU. This approach was first used to justify and legitimise its decision to seek membership. The first stage was to persuade the party structures (as party leaders needed their support to promote membership) that membership was the way forward for the country. The second stage was to convince the electorate that the EU was going to enhance the protection of their rights and improve their quality of life. Over the years, the Nationalist Party projected and promoted the effort made by Christian Democrat Leaders, De Gasperi, Adenauer, and Schumann, the founding fathers of the EU, who set aside their differences for the wellbeing of the European citizens. For a number of Nationalist Party leaders, including Fenech Adami, Gonzi, Busuttil, Delia and Grech, the EU

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has been an organisation that can be used to promote peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Maltaʼs membership in the EU was subject to economic reforms which would meet its criteria, including the strengthening of the economy, and consolidation of public finances. The Nationalist Partyʼs ideology had to be flexible enough to withstand the changes the party was going through. The party retained its popularity till 2013, due to the sense of continuity that extended from one leader to another, starting with Borg Olivier and running through Fenech Adami and Gonzi. All political leaders including Busuttil, Delia, and Grech promoted Maltaʼs EU membership and European values at one point or another. The party’s decision to shift towards the centre of the political spectrum was electorally successful at least until the 2013 national election, when the party, due to various austerity measures introduced, corruption allegations, and the general appetite for change, lost with a wide margin of the vote—a result which was to be repeated in the 2017 and 2022 national elections and 2014 and 2019 European Parliament Elections. Whilst there was a sense of continuity between one leader and the other, all of them brought a different dynamic to the party. Party leaders in Malta have a certain degree of independence to pursue their visions. Still, it does not mean that they can act alone. Maltese political parties share some characteristics with mass party models, even if in the last few years both main political parties have shifted towards the catch-all model. Hence, whilst political leaders are the pillars that hold the party together, they nevertheless have to rely on the party on the ground and the party executive to have enough support to pursue their visions and agendas. Failing to do so can produce several internal disagreements which could either force several politicians to leave the party and/or cause a struggle for power with several politicians challenging the power of the leader, something which has already happened in both the Labour and Nationalist Parties. Catch-all parties have become the most common party type in Europe, with a large number of mass parties shifting towards the catch-all party model in an attempt to remain viable and withstand the competition from emerging parties (Puhle, 2002). Whilst in Malta the main political parties are still dominating the political system, party identification is slowly declining. Forestiere (2009, p. 573) argues ‘the catch-all party is a single party that aims to capture as much of the vote as it can, oftentimes by converging its policy preferences on the centre political space’.

The way catch-all parties approach the EU depends on the strategies embraced by their party leaders and the way the European Union fits into their agenda. Catch-all parties have embraced the development of new technologies within opinion research (Smith, 2009) and raised the profile of their leaders. This enables these leaders to make swift decisions without being undermined by the parties and other entities (Mair, 2009). These parties have shifted their focus from a particular group or class to the centre of the political spectrum to appeal to a wider range of voters from different social strata (Kirchheimer, 1966). Nevertheless, a large number of major political parties in Europe are still supported by a particular cleavage, even though their ideology may no longer be at the centre of the party. The relationship between these parties and voters is not as strong as that between voters and mass parties. In

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addition, given the fact that in theory, catch-all parties do not have a particular cleavage to cater to, they can focus their attention on introducing policies to protect the state and its finances. To attract a wide spectrum of voters, these parties usually elect a moderate leader to promote a centralist economic agenda (Norris, 2004). Leaders are empowered to deal with and decide on European Union issues without being pressured by party members. Unlike mass parties, these parties emphasise conditional support instead of identification. For this reason, whilst mass parties will have to take into consideration the way the EU fits their ideology, which is a rather complex process, catch-all parties will look at the potential impact which the EU will have on the development of the state and the economy, and whether it will help or deter the intrarelationship between them and the voters. Since their voters are less loyal, as they do not rely on ideology and partisanship, catch-all party leaders have to rely on civic engagement and persuasion to defend their Eurosceptic and Europeanist agendas. In addition, the fact that they do not rely on a particular social class as a determinant of voting behaviour means that these parties can be more vulnerable if their approach is not well received. This contrasts with mass parties which have thousands of supporters to rely on. To make up for it, the catch-all party model encourages voters to vote on the effectiveness of parties in policymaking based on retrospective and prospective voting, meaning that voters should base their vote on the government’s work and programmes being proposed rather than based on the skills of the candidates. Catch-all parties have been particularly relevant in the last two decades because of their relative ease in dealing with post-materialist issues. Green parties and other Left catch-all parties embrace the European Union due to its stance in favour of individual rights. This favours minority rights, rights towards immigrants, same-sex marriage, and environmental protection laws (Ladrech, 2012). These socially liberal policies could be used as short-term propaganda to attract the median support and to attack the traditional mass political parties, especially Christian Democrats. These were, and still are, more cautious in implementing these policies, even though, since the 1990s many Christian Democrat parties have embraced a moderate approach towards such issues (Gerard & Van Hecke, 2004). Catch-all parties are very competitive and seek to make the most out of political marketing, with campaigns based on media experts, studies of voters’ needs through political market, and campaigns built around the leader (Panebianco, 1988). The Labour Party has been more successful in shifting towards catch-allism. Under the leadership of Muscat, the party has made several internal changes to attract voters from beyond its traditional cleavage. The Nationalist Party has struggled to do this. After the debates and confrontations surrounding Malta’s EU membership application were brought to an end by the results of the 2003 referendum and subsequent election, the liberal and conservative factions of the Nationalist Party became at odds with each other. This weakened the party leadership and limited the ability of the party to promote itself as the alternative party-in-government. Throughout their years as party leaders and Prime ministers of Malta, both Fenech Adami and Gonzi outlined the need to promote ‘the common good’. Fenech

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Adami (2014) firmly believed in the motto of the Nationalist Party Religio et Patria. His main vision was to create a society that offered equal opportunities to everyone, especially in the areas of education and employment. Gonzi’s (2022) vision for the party was based on numerous principles including safeguarding the dignity of the human person within a framework of human rights, justice, and equality in a vibrant, healthy, and active democracy. In his first speech as party leader, he promoted various principles and ideas including politics based on dialogue and mutual respect and an economy that creates jobs and generates wealth that is distributed equally. He also promoted the need to safeguard the environment notwithstanding the challenges and the difficult decisions that need to be taken. He promoted priority investment in education for all and in an inclusive framework, a cultural shift that would instil a sense of collective discipline and responsibility towards the nation and make EU membership the watershed moment for deep changes that would provide opportunities to all Maltese citizens, of whatever political creed, civil status, age, or ability. Busuttil (2020) was a firm believer in one of Fenech Adami’s catchphrases that the ‘truthfulness will always prevail’. Still, he believed that for this to succeed, one had to work hard. He firmly believed in the four pillars of democracy with these being the government, parliament, the courts, and the media. Busuttil was much more liberal than his predecessors, though Christian Democracy was still an important part of the political party. Still, at the time of his election as party leader in 2013, political parties were gradually embracing principles rather than ideologies. These principles were often a reflection of the values promoted by the EU. Adrian Delia promoted another slogan of Fenech Adami ‘Work, Justice, and Liberty’, reminiscing the glory days of the former leader of the Nationalist Party, outlining how he would continue the fight against corruption whilst tackling other major issues in the country including poverty (The Malta Independent, 22 September 2017). Delia was the only leader of the Nationalist Party for 3 years, making it difficult to evaluate his ideologies and principles, yet one could note that he was a firm believer in the tradition of Christian Democracy. The traditional characteristics of the latter include the Christian commitment to elementary human rights and liberal democratic values (Kalyvas & Van Kersbergen, 2010). Bernard Grech has been elected leader of the Nationalist Party in 2020. Since he has been the leader for 2 years, it is difficult to evaluate his approach. Still, in his first speech, the focus was on promoting the party’s social democratic values whilst addressing the economic policies of Malta. Grech takes a very similar stance towards the economy of the previous Nationalist Party leaders, shifting towards the left and outlining the need re-distribute wealth to make sure that no one is left behind (Grech, 2022; Debono, MaltaToday, 21 October 2021a). Until the early 1990s, the Labour Party was distinct from the major European social democratic parties, as most of these parties embraced European Integration (which was being encouraged by the process of Europeanisation) and eased their resistance towards the neo-liberal ideology which the EU and centre-right parties were promoting. After Maltaʼs Independence from the UK, the Malta Labour Party focused on the Non-Aligned movement, campaigned strongly against Maltaʼs EU accession, and at the same time promoted the strengthening of relations with the

3.2

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People’s Republic of China and Libya. These decisions isolated the party from European socialist parties (Vella, 1994). The Labour Party went through several transformations which, as the following chapters reveal, began following the election of Alfred Sant as leader of the Labour Party and underwent a complete overhaul with the election of Joseph Muscat. Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici promoted socialism as an instrument of Labour movement to protect the working class and protect their wellbeing (Spiteri, 1988). They also focused on the main principles of the Labour movement, including social justice, and invested in various areas such as education and health, to improve the life of the Maltese. Their foreign policy was based on the notion of nationalism and the need to put the national interest, first with Mintoff using the famous catchphrase ‘Malta first and foremost’ (Sant, 2004). Alfred Sant was closer to modern socialism. Whilst attention was always placed on the need to safeguard the working class, he also promoted other issues. During his tenure as leader of the Labour Party, he promoted other policies linked with modern social democracy (Keman, 2017). These included the need to strengthen the public finances of the country. Sant believed that the welfare state programmes should be used invest in the individuals and help them to be less dependent on the state. For this reason, he believed in the promotion of individual responsibilities in the labour market (Muscat, 1998). Whilst Sant promoted various economic reforms in order to strengthen the labour market, he believed that the country was not ready to join the European Union and needed more time to strengthen its economy and protect the economic wellbeing of its citizens (Muscat, 1998). When Joseph Muscat took on the leadership of the party, he shifted towards progressive liberalism, promoting various principles including meritocracy, justice civil liberties, and several reports to make Malta’s economy more competitive (Heywood, 2021). Still, Muscat was also influenced by Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ approach. This modern approach towards socialism was seen as the tool which helped Tony Blair to win three elections in a row and to provide a new brand to the British Labour Party. The main principles of New Labour include; (1) prioritising the economy, to attract investment and improve the labour market; (2) shifting towards the centre to appeal to more voters; (3) pursuing social justice and providing more opportunities to those in the working class bracket; (4) invest in public service including education and healthcare; and (5) do not allow the right (or centre-right) to provide better solutions (Bevir, 2000; Giddens, 2007). With Joseph Muscat at the helm of the party, the Labour Party promoted the liberalisation and the need to restructure Maltaʼs economy (Engerer, 2013). This would help the party to transition into a progressive one (Harwood, 2015) by pushing various reforms including the introduction of civil unions in 2014, the banning of gay conversion therapy in 2016, and the introduction of same-sex marriage in 2017. The only controversial issue that the Labour Party has so far not tackled is the introduction of abortion. Prime Minister Muscat has repeatedly declared that the issue was not in the manifesto, so he has no legitimacy to introduce it. However, with Prime Minister Abela taking over the helm of the party and the country and several lobbying groups emerging for/against the legalisation of

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abortion, there are expectations that the parties will have to have at least an in-depth discussion surrounding it in the near future. The decision to propose a legal amendment that would allow a pregnancy to be terminated if a woman’s life or health is in danger is seen by many as the first step in the fight for women’s rights in Malta. The new Labour leader Robert Abela has embraced the principles promoted by his predecessor, promoting civil liberties, women’s rights, social justice, equality, and unity. He vowed to continue the work with the various Labour administrations, including the legalisation of the recreational use of Cannabis and amendments to the In vitro fertilisation (IVF) legislation in 2022, to strengthen the country and its people (Galea, The Malta Independent, 12 January 2020).

3.3

Political Participation, Partisanship, and Polarisation

The fact that partisanship and polarisation dominate the Maltese political system, accompanied by the high level of interest in politics in the country, makes it easier for politicians and major parties to retain their dominance over it. In Malta, active political participation is often required and expected during political campaigns, with thousands of Maltese flocking to the streets to give their support and loyalty to their preferred political party. Interest in politics does not necessarily correlate to substance and ideas, but rather reflects an interest in the political symbols, which in Maltaʼs case are the red (Labour) and blue (Nationalist) colours giving Malta’s longstanding and strong political levels of political identification. Furthermore, whilst active public participation in politics is healthy since it solidifies the government’s legitimacy, it can potentially be a problem when political parties are unable to rein in more violent and vociferous supporters. To take one instance as an example, the level of polarisation is so high that the country’s youth are raised to compete in this dualistic political environment. Student organisations including the Christian Democratic organisation SDM and the Social Democratic Students organisation Pulse are active in Maltaʼs post-secondary colleges, Malta College of Arts and Sciences (MCAST), and University and are seen as a reflection of the two-party mentality which thrives in the country. Still, these groups are encouraging youth participation in Malta’s political system and are actively promoting political activism, which is essential in order to give a voice to the younger generations. A number of youth groups including KNŻ the National Council of Youth, Labour’s Youth Forum Żgħażagħ Laburisti (FŻL), Pulse, SDM, and Nationalist Party’s Youth—Moviment Żgħażagħ Partit Nazzjonalista (MŻPN), played a huge part in the decision taken by parliament to reduce the voting age in the local councils in 2014 to 16, and to lower the voting age for national and European elections to 16 in 2018. By doing so, Malta became the only second country in Europe to lower the voting age to 16. Still, the lowering of the voting age might do little to reduce political fatigue, since generations after each other are being fed this belief that politics needs to be confrontational, polarised, and partisan. This is hindering social development

3.4

The Single Transferable Vote

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in Malta (Hirczy, 1995). It is also failing to improve the image that politics has with the younger generation, and, although there is a high degree of interest, many keep their distance from politics due to the negative image that has developed (Gonzi, 2013). Indeed, it has been suggested that in Malta, clientelism and party ownership of elements of the media are helping parties maintain their influence over a large part of the electorate (Boissevain, 1993; Sammut, 2009) at a time when their European counterparts have been losing much of their support and credibility. Clientelism is also fuelled by house visits that candidates for national, local, or European elections undertake to win votes. As will be discussed in the next section, the STV empowers candidates to develop their campaigns to be able to gain the necessary votes to be elected.

3.4

The Single Transferable Vote

The electoral system used in Maltaʼs national, local, and European elections is the STV. The system has certainly helped the main political parties to maintain their support within the political system. Malta’s STV system has a dual function since, by choosing their preferred candidates, voters also choose the party which should govern the country. Candidates are elected through proportional representation. In 1953 and 1981, this system enabled political parties to win the majority of seats rather than the popular vote. As outlined in the next chapter, constitutional amendments were introduced in 1987. These amendments aimed to safeguard the popular vote by safeguarding proportionality and by providing a one-seat majority to the party with the largest amount of first preference votes (Vella, 2016). This means that STV has two important purposes. The first one is to elect the Maltese representatives in parliament, whilst the second is to determine which party controls the government (Hirczy de Miño & Lane, 2000). STV system encourages competition amongst candidates of the same political group who compete to make voters aware of their qualities. Their campaigns are often a cause of internal party struggles between different factions, candidates, and alliances, which can reveal divisions that exist within the parties (Gallagher et al., 2001). STV enables cross-party voting as Maltese voters are able to vote for candidates from different political parties. However, due to the strong political divisions within the country, cross-party voting is a rare occurrence (Howe, 1987; Hirczy, 1995). In a small number of cases, especially where less partisanship and polarisation are involved, cross-party voting has been noted. This occurs most frequently during European and local elections; however, it has very rarely shifted the balance of power. Cross-party voting has never been popular in Malta and this is reflected in the support received by the smaller parties which inherit very few votes from the main political parties. The Single Transferable Vote does not encourage cross-party voting, but it does facilitate clientelism. Clientelism is considered to be a recurrent

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Political Parties

Party Officials

Candidates During candidatesʼ traditional house visits, voters demand jobs and permits in return for their vote and loyalty.

Lobby and Business Groups demand policies and permits. In return, they promise financial support and political endorsements.

Lobby & Business Groups

Voters

Government Fig. 3.1 Political Parties and clientelism

problem in Southern European countries (García, 2013) as electoral systems are sometimes manipulated to legitimise, strengthen, and favour nepotism and patronage (Spiteri, 2013). Maltaʼs electoral system is based on 13 districts with each district having around 25,000 voters (Baldacchino, 2002). Candidates are allowed to contest in two districts in the national election, and as already discussed; they have multiple tools which they can use to interact with their electorate. This encourages the collusion between the political class and voters, lobby groups, and business empires, with the loyal ones awarded after an electoral victory (Pirotta, 2012). This raises serious issues about the integrity and legality of these interactions and the ways candidates are being elected. During electoral campaigns, the major parties accuse each other of utilising these relationships to win votes whilst little attempt is made to combat political patronage and restore a greater degree of transparency within Maltaʼs political class. In addition to the intimate relationship between the political class, lobby groups, and businesses, there is a relationship that exists between the candidates and the electorate, which might raise further ethical questions especially when jobs are granted in exchange for votes. House visits are seen as beneficial for voters since they get to know their candidates, which need 3000–4000 votes to get elected. As outlined in Fig. 3.1, house visits also allow voters to get to know these candidates. This becomes important when choosing their representatives as they might ask a favour or two in exchange for their vote. Social media is also helping these candidates to interact with the electorate and promote their agenda (Veenendaal, 2019). During this interaction,

3.4

The Single Transferable Vote

75

voters have learned to use the opportunity by welcoming these candidates into their homes and communicating with them through social media to demand favours, which might include jobs and permits, amongst other things, in return for their electoral support. This informal networking is used by voters as multiple candidates from the same political parties are competing against each other in relatively small districts (Vassallo, 2022). This competition drives candidates to offer resources to gain the required votes. This is seen by some as turning elections into business transactions between those involved (Cassola, 2013). The clientelist relationship between politicians and voters can influence political partiesʼ programmes and can create other major problems as parties in government are unable to introduce major economic reforms, for example, to introduce austerity measures, as this would upset a particular social group and might damage their popularity with a segment of Maltese voters. This is further aggravated by domestic populist governments’ subscriptions to nationalistic appeals and corporatist tactics to control the labour force (Vassallo, 2012). This intimate relationship between the political class, the electorate, and business community not only has had implications for parties’ programmes but also for the formation of Parliament and the cabinet. Maltese voters tend to know other familiesʼ political affiliations. A surname can be indicative of the political values a particular family holds or the support a family gives to a particular politician. This sophisticated network (Boissevain, 1974) has shaped Maltaʼs political landscape and helped candidates focus on several families to gather the votes needed to get elected (Mullard & Pirotta, 2008). Thus, this relationship helps those candidates who are able to promote themselves in their districts. This can have serious implications for prime ministers’ cabinet choices.4 The situation is not helped by the lack of enforcement of the code of ethics and the Standards in Public Life Act. The necessity to modernise the Standards in Public Life Act, which includes the code of ethics for ministers, has long been debated. The Standing Committee for Standards in Public Life of the Parliament, which is presided over by the Speaker and is made up of two MPs from each side, has yet to approve the recommended reforms of the code of ethics proposed by the Commissioner for the Standards in Public Life, George Hyzler. The updated code of ethics would forbid Members of Parliament from misusing their authority and utilising improper influence. A register for the gifts, perks and hospitality received by cabinet members and MPs was also suggested. MPs were required to declare their spouses, partners, and family members, as well as their financial and non-financial interests (Debono, MaltaToday, 9 June 2021b). The updated code of ethics recommended that MPs maintain an annual register of their assets, financial interests, and other non-financial interests. Additionally, any

4

Wikileaks published documents between the United States ambassador Molly Bordonaro and the Prime Minister of Malta Lawrence Gonzi that revealed the difficulty which the latter had in putting together an efficient executive filled with new faces, as requested by the electorate, when the latter kept voting for the same faces (Times of Malta, 2 September 2011).

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meetings that cabinet members have with lobbyists must be recorded. The revised rule would also restrict ministers’ ability to work for 3 years following their resignation. However, these restrictions were only going to apply to the lobbying and employment that ministers did with private corporations in the 5 years before leaving office (Bonnici, LovinMalta, 19 May 2021). The 2021 Greco report concluded that the updated code of ethics provided an improvement in terms of the fight against corruption. Still, they also reported several shortcomings including the fact that it did not establish any provisions of sanctions for those found in breach of the code of ethics (De Gaetano, The Shift, 31 May 2021). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2022 report on Malta’s Standards in Public Life Act revealed that Malta has carried out several changes in the last few years to improve public integrity, notably for elected and appointed officials. The 2017 Standards in Public Life Act was one of these measures with the other being the decision to appoint a Commissioner for Standards in Public Life in 2018. The Commissioner is given the authority to assist elected and appointed officials in discharging their public duties in the public interest by the Standards Act, which applies to Members of Parliament, Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, and other persons of trust. They outlined how these reforms were triggered by the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. Their recommendations were based on three main areas: strengthening the role of the Commissioner for Standards, strengthening the Standards in Public Life Act, and strengthening rules on lobbying. Their main recommendation is that the functions of the Commissioner should be enshrined in the Constitution to strengthen the Office of the Commissioner and provide this office with the needed legal personality to continue to investigate the standards in public life. The OECD report also recommended that Parliament’s committee for standards in public life should be strengthened by the inclusion of non-MPs and should be presided over by a retired judge chosen by all political parties and not by the Speaker who is often criticised for siding by the opposition and several NGOs to side with the government (Camilleri, The Malta Independent, 11 July 2022; OECD, 2022). Another issue covered by the report is the need to close the loopholes within the legislation and amend the Constitution to prohibit elected officials from obtaining secondary employment in all public functions. There is also the recommendation to restrict the usage of people of trust and political advisers especially when these have various conflicts of interest due to their private work. In addition, the OECD report highlights how proper rules and regulations are needed to prevent former politicians from lobbying on behalf of the private sector, an issue that had already been highlighted by the Commissioner for the Standards in Public Life George Hyzler (Debono, MaltaToday, 11 July 2022). The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report (2022) on the 2022 national election in Malta revealed the various practices that political parties use to try and win votes. Whilst these practices might not be illegal they are seen as unethical. The power of incumbency is seen as extremely important given the ability of the party-in-government to provide funds and subsidies to retain their support. A tradition has been that of giving tax refunds at the dawn of the elections.

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The Single Transferable Vote

77

This was brought up in the report highlighting how in the 2022 election campaign, the government distributed tax refunds and stimulus cheques with a personalised letter signed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. They declared that such actions make it hard to distinguish between the party-in-government and the state. They concluded that such practices do not conform to international standards and good practices and recommended that no financial allocations should take place during electoral campaigns. One of the reasons why the code of ethics needs to be updated is also because the STV contributes to a more clientelist environment. The system encourages voters to gather information about candidates to distribute their votes according to their preferences (Vassallo, 2022). On the other hand, gathering information is timeconsuming and this deters voters from doing so. Still, some of the work is done by political parties which have managed to accumulate extensive data on voters including their personal information and potential voting preferences which are then used by candidates and their canvassers. The fact that parties have accumulated this data raises questions on whether parties are following GPDR rules, on who can access this data. Data protection is especially important since holding this data makes political parties, and in turn voters, vulnerable to any potential cyber-attacks. Main political parties suffered various breaches of their data with the Labour Party admitting that its data was breached in 2020 and the Nationalist Party admitting that it suffered a cyber-attack in 2022 (Martin, Times of Malta, 2 April 2020; Magri, Times of Malta, 20 April 2021). Another issue with STV is linked with donkey voting. This takes place when voters opt to vote for candidates based on the sequence as listed on the ballot sheet, instead of numbering them according to their personal preferences. Moreover, voters might focus on a candidate or two and then distribute the rest of their votes alphabetically as they appear on the ballot paper. This might give an advantage to those candidates at the top of the list, something which happened in the 2009 European election when Labourʼs John Attard Montalto, although popular, got a boost after inheriting most of the votes of Claudette Abela Baldacchino whose name sat above his, after trailing the other candidates throughout the counts. Candidates are also resorting to changing their surnames so that they are at the top of the voting list which increases their chances of getting elected in the various elections (Diacono, LovinMalta, 23 October 2018). STV highlights another problem within Malta’s society, which is the lack of women’s representation in the national parliament. Whilst in the 2014 and 2019 European Elections, the Maltese electorate elected three women for the European Parliament, the scenario in the national parliament is completely different with only 8 women out of 67 being elected in the national parliament in the last legislature. Due to this, Malta is ranked 143rd in an Inter-Parliamentary Union ranking of countries’ share of women MPs (IPU, 2017). The country’s position would improve with the Gender Mechanism climbing to 75th place in 2022 (IPU, 2022). Political Parties have developed programmes to encourage stronger participation of women in politics. The Labour Party has established a set of quotas in place since the 1990s to encourage more women to participate in the decision-making process of

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the party. It has an optional 20% quota for women on party lists, and its rules dictate that at least 4 of the party’s national executive’s 12 ordinary members are women. In its local government department, the party has similarly established a quota of one-third of women. The party was so successful in attracting more women that quotas are not needed anymore as more women are being elected to the main structures of the party (Muscat, 2022; Cutajar, 2022). In 2008, the Nationalist Party took voluntary party actions to improve female representation in the party. Between 2008 and 2014, the Nationalist Party had policies in place that required 4 out of 13 members of the general council and executive council to be female. In 2014, new procedures were established and The Equal Opportunities Movement (Moviment Opportunitajiet Indaqs) was founded. This new branch of the party was given statutory rights so that it could be represented in party structures. On the executive committee, nine women and nine men were elected from two separate lists. Local sectional committees are subjected to the same exercise (Cutajar, 2014). To promote and encourage more women to contest the elections, the Labour Party has established various programmes including ‘Lead’. This has been a very successful programme with several women managing to get elected in local and national elections. Still, whilst this is a positive initiative, it does not solve the problem that the political culture favours men candidates over women candidates. Before the 2022 national election, only 13% of the MPs elected were women. The underrepresentation of women constitutes a serious democratic deficit, which undermines the legitimacy of a political system. Parity democracy and the promotion of women in decision-making positions are therefore important areas of action (Cutajar, 2022). For this reason, a ‘Gender Balance in Parliament Reform’ was discussed and the ‘gender corrective mechanism’ was approved by the main political parties in parliament in April 2021. The corrective mechanism has a ‘sunset clause’ which means that this mechanism will automatically terminate in 20 years (Sammut, 2022). The first time that it was used was in the 2022 national election. To introduce the Gender Mechanism Act XX of 2021, the Constitution had to be amended. This required the support of two-thirds of the members of parliament. The Constitution, through the amended Article 52A, outlined how a process would be initiated to provide additional seats to balance gender representation after all stages of the election referred to in Article 52 of the Constitution are completed (Bencini, 2022). Article 52A of the Constitution outlines: If a general election which is contested at a general election which is contested by two or more political parties and in which only candidates of two parties are elected or in the eventuality of an election result as provided for in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the proviso to sub-article (1) of article 52 and in the event that the number of Members of Parliament of the under-represented sex, elected by virtue of article 52, inclusive of those members elected at a casual election in terms of the relevant regulations, is less than forty percent (40%) of all the Members of Parliament, then the number of Members of Parliament shall increase by not more than twelve (12) Members of the under-represented sex. (Constitution of Malta, 2021)

The gender corrective mechanism outlines that if the ‘unrepresented sex’ participation in parliament does not reach 40%, then a mechanism is applied that would

3.4

The Single Transferable Vote

79

allow the allocation of extra seats (maximum of 12 unelected candidates which are to be divided amongst the parties elected to parliament to safeguard the proportional vote) to encourage gender balance. This is done to encourage more women to participate in the political system. In the long term, the mechanism can help to change the male-dominated system so that more women can be directly elected without the need for a quota. The need for gender balance in parliament is not simply to increase the number of women in parliament, but for women to have a stronger representation of women in the cabinet as well as parliamentary committees. Until the 2022 national election, due to the low number of women, various parliamentary committees, including health committees, were dominated by men. This meant that issues that are more likely to affect women such as contraception, IVF, or even abortion, are often discussed by men (Sammut, 2022), and therefore the new mechanism would be trying to fix this. For various scholars, gender quotas (or gender corrective mechanisms) are a temporary but necessary measure to increase the political participation of women. Dibben’s (2022) opinion is that whilst gender balance mechanisms do not address structural or cultural barriers, they can provide women with the opportunity to establish themselves. An effort was already seen in the 2022 national election, with an increase of ‘1’ from 2017, but still, only 42 out of the 173 candidates were women (Magri, Times of Malta, 15 March 2022). The results highlight that for the main political parties, the mechanism was a mixed blessing. Compared to the eight women who were directly elected in the 2017 national election, just four were elected in 2022 (Abbas Shalan, The Malta Independent, 28 March 2022b). In the casual elections, the Labour Party added four more candidates, whilst the Nationalist Party added two more female candidates. The big political parties could then elect six more female candidates to represent their different groups thanks to the gender balance process. This circumstance demonstrates the necessity for further cultural reform. This means that the Gender Balance Mechanism was utilised to allow the main political parties to elect six additional female candidates to form part of their respective groups. One of the first analyses of the Gender Mechanism shows how more awareness should be raised on the issue and that a culture change is still required (Muscat, 2022) to enable more women to get involved in Malta’s political system. In 2022, there was also considerable misinformation about the Gender Balance Mechanism including the belief that women will take the place of elected men and that women with few votes would be elected anyway thanks to the mechanism. The case of Janice Chetcuti did not help to improve the perception of the electorate on the Gender Mechanism. The Nationalist candidate had the opportunity to be elected through casual elections. Still, she decided not to put her name forward for the casual election, which she was expected to win, to allow another candidate to get elected in the casual election. She argued that she was doing this out of loyalty to the party and because with this decision, there would be more representatives in parliament from the third district (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 7 April, 2022). This case highlights another problem within the political system, that party loyalty prevails over that of the country.

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The Gender Mechanism can only be analysed in the long term to understand its effect on the political system. Former Prime Minister of Malta Joseph Muscat (2022) and Professor Carmen Sammut (2022) both agree that the mechanism encourages more women to contest elections and that women will showcase to the electorate that they can be as successful (if not more) as male politicians in safeguarding the national interest. The election of these women and the fact that some of them are very passionate about women’s rights might encourage the main political parties to deal with issues concerning women’s rights which have long been ignored by the national parliament. This is particularly important given that in 2021, Malta was only in 13th place (in the EU) in the Gender Equality Index (EIGE, 2022). Several issues have to be discussed including the regulation of sexual services, the equality bill, and a proper discussion of sexual and reproductive health policies (Dibben, 2022). Still, other reforms are required to increase female representation in Malta’s parliament. This was confirmed by Professor Marcelline Naudi, an activist and scholar who declared that in Malta ‘men are still seen as the breadwinners. Male politicians have a mother or wife somewhere, who is looking after everything else in their life – women, on the other hand, are unlikely to have someone who is supporting them so they can give their full priority to politics’ (Naudi, in Magri, Times of Malta, 15 March 2022). The fact that members of the national parliament are part-timers and parliament usually convenes in the evening is an obstacle for women who are interested in joining the political arena. Parliament also has no childcare facilities even though reforms are being discussed to make parliament more family-friendly to facilitate the work of its members (Sammut, 2022). Some believe that the corrective mechanism should have been introduced at the party level. The reason for this is to help political parties encourage more women to compete in various elections (Flask, 2022). During the discussion on the gender balancing mechanism, a proposal that emerged was to provide public funds to political parties to encourage gender parity by training more participants from the ‘unrepresented sex’ and encouraging them to contest in national elections (The Technical Committee for the Strengthening of Democracy, 2019). Yet, party funding is still a controversial issue in Malta and parties have so far reached no consensus about it, meaning that this proposal was eventually disregarded. Whilst Maltaʼs electoral system has its advantages and disadvantages and female representation is still one of the lowest in Europe, national elections enjoy a nearuniversal turnout which provides strong legitimacy to the winning parties. This is due to several reasons, including the concentration of power, extreme campaigning, very competitive elections, maximisation of the voting system, and strong partisanship (Hirczy, 1995). Whereas countries such as Australia and Belgium have compulsory voting, and other countries in Europe face lower turnouts, Malta is one of the only countries where, during the national elections, voters go out of their way to vote. The turnout is usually over 93% in the national elections and around 75% in the European elections, which is still one of the highest rates in Europe.

3.5

3.5

Civil Society and Malta’s Political System

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Civil Society and Malta’s Political System

With the country’s political system based on two main political parties, there is little space for other political parties to establish themselves. Still, this does not mean that political parties are not facing any competition. Membership in the European Union outlined the role which various civil society groups could have to promote or oppose Malta’s EU membership with others emerging to tackle a variety of issues. Some of these civil society groups include hunting lobby groups such as the Federation for Hunting & Conservation (FKNK) and Saint Hubert Hunters (KSU) which campaigned (and still do) for hunters’ rights to be safeguarded. These groups often clash with Birdlife Malta which for 60 years has been campaigning for the protection of wild birds and their natural habitat. When the membership issue was sealed, other groups established themselves to campaign on particular issues. Civil society groups such as the Malta Gay Rights Movement (MGRM) were successful in lobbying for the introduction of civil rights in Malta (Harwood, 2022). The movement was followed by the Allied Rainbow Communities (Malta) which was established to raise more awareness of Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, Intersex, and Queer/Questioning (LGBTIQ) issues in the country. With Malta’s membership in the European Union, other groups became more involved in the country’s political system to deal with a variety of issues including the environment, migration, rule of law, and human rights as well as women’s rights. As the needs of Malta’s society changed, some of these civil society groups tackled issues that were unpopular in the country and used various institutions to make sure that European and national regulations are respected. At times, these civil society groups faced strong resistance to their work. With the increasing influx of migration, several groups including Aditus and Jesuit Refugee service in Malta promoted the rights of these migrants. The Jesuit Refugee Service had faced numerous vandalism attacks due to its work with these migrants. Both Aditus and the Jesuit Refugee Service had used the Council of Europe so that asylum rights are respected in the country. This is an example of how civil society groups began to monitor the Maltese institutions in making sure that there is accountability and respect for national, European, and international laws. The economic development of Malta and the need for more development led to the creation of various groups in safeguarding the environment. Groups such as Flimkien għal Ambjent Aħjar (FAA/For a better environment), Din l-Art Ħelwa (National Trust of Malta), Moviment Graffitti (Left-wing environmentalist group), and even a new group branded ‘Għawdix’ (Gozo) are raising awareness on the need to safeguard the environment from further construction. Moviment Graffitti has been a leading organisation in the fight against inequality and the environment and has been successful in appealing various planning permits by using the available institutions including the Maltese Courts, in its fight against the planning authority. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia led to the creation of various civil society groups which emerged to make sure that justice is served and the rule of law

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would be respected. Groups such as ‘Repubblika’ (Republic), Occupy Justice, and Civil Society Network are using the available institutions including Malta’s Courts, European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council of Europe, in their fight for democracy and accountability in the country. One of the most controversial issues in the country surrounds women’s rights. The question surrounding women’s representation in parliament is a symptom of a larger patriarchal problem that makes up Malta’s society. In the last few years, various movements emerged to support women. These include the ‘Women’s Foundation’ which became a major advocate for women’s rights in Malta and fought to include femicide in the criminal code. This was one of the first organisations beyond Doctors for Choice which is pressing for the introduction of safe abortion in Malta. The issue concerning reproductive rights has led to the establishment of other civil society groups including Doctors for Life. These emerged to campaign against the introduction of abortion. Due to the sensitive issue, the reactions have so far been divisive as reflected in the decision made by the Maltese government to introduce a legal amendment in November 2022, to allow doctors to terminate a pregnancy when a woman’s life is in danger. With various organisations emerging for or against the legalisation of abortion, this is a topic, which the national political parties might have to tackle in the near future. Whilst various civil society groups have established themselves to promote one cause or the other, many of them faced support as well as opposition. One of the reasons for this is because these groups have also the ability to lobby the European Union, promote a particular agenda, and outline issues that are not tackled by the national institutions. Professor Vicki Ann Cremona (2022), an activist and a member of the civil society group Repubblika, outlined how it was a European entity that enabled the organisation to expand its influence and promote more causes. She explained that social media has enabled the European Union to access various civil society groups to gather information. She outlined how the resistance towards civil society groups is great, but that they have a very important role to play in outlining the issues which need to be tackled in Malta. She explained how the European Commission has established a communication line with the organisation, bypassing the government, which might not refer to such organisations if needed by the EU. Various challenges are being faced by activists and civil society groups. Wayne Flask (2022) outlines how one of the main problems in the political system is that subsidiary or the decentralisation of power has not been achieved in Malta with power still distant from the people. Within this system, one can find various lobby groups which, through their resources, are being provided information. These lobby groups end up using this information to expand their influence on the policymakers. On the other hand, citizens usually have one source of information, which is coming from political parties. This makes it difficult for them (beyond the elections) to exercise their power and influence the decision-making process of the government. Another challenge includes the reluctance to accept these groups within the political system. Online threats and abuse are rampant and faced by various organisations (Dibben, 2022; Cremona, 2022) especially when they tackle issues that

3.6

Political Parties and Media Pluralism

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might be unpopular with a segment of society or because they might go against the mainstream. They also face resistance from political parties who are now being challenged by these entities and their ability to influence a section of the electorate. Whilst civil society groups are slowly gaining support, they still face several challenges. Farrugia Bennett (2022) from the MGRM described the several challenges which NGOs face including those relating to the capacity building and funding for the NGO, as well as the political will, to create the necessary changes to policy and laws to protect LGBTIQ individuals and couples. Another important point that she underlined is the fact that society at large might not always appreciate or understand the work done by NGOs in the field and the way they cater to safeguard individuals and minorities. Simone Azzopardi (2022) from the group ‘Għawdix’ believes that the organisation is finally providing a voice to various Gozitan youths who have had enough of the over-development and destruction of Gozo. Still, even though many organisations are finding support, they are finding it difficult to mobilise it (Dibben, 2022) as there are cultural barriers, including the fact that many still find it difficult to express their opinions, which have to be tackled. Still, these organisations might provide the required impetus to work on these barriers in a changing society.

3.6

Political Parties and Media Pluralism

In most European countries, mass political parties were facing several challenges by the 1970s, not least a slow decline in party identification and party membership. However, the scenario in Malta was different. Maltaʼs major political parties became extremely influential and powerful during the same period and competition between them escalated to a whole new level. As many European political parties were adapting to the decline in party membership and identification, their Maltese counterparts were turning into business corporations. The main political parties in Malta own television and media outlets, online news portals, newspapers, and other businesses such as the travel agency owned by the Nationalist Party and the telecommunications provider owned by the Labour Party. This has enabled these parties to use these outlets to retain their popularity and status quo. In addition, the fact that Maltaʼs major parties developed their own media structures, enabled them to expand their influence and helped them to maintain a good level of party membership. This started with the establishment of party clubs in every village, which were intended to maintain contact between voters and the party at the local level (party on the ground). Such clubs also serve a social function since they bring people of similar political persuasion together. The party’s business interests expanded to include ownership of newspapers, radio stations, and eventually television stations. The only other recent significant case in Europe where a politician is also an owner of several media companies has been Italy, where Silvio Berlusconi is also the

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leader of the centre-right party Forza Italia (Forward Italy).5 However, this media empire is the property of Berlusconi and his family and is not owned by his party. Whilst European political parties rely on the independent media for support, Malta’s major parties have managed, to a certain extent, to commercialise their companies and use them during electoral campaigns to strengthen their communications with grassroots voters (Sammut, 2009). Nevertheless, this was achieved at a price, as polarisation and partisanship were strengthened whilst political divisions grew. Party-owned television and radio stations have also become an important source of funding, with yearly television marathons developed to collect money for their electoral campaigns and for projects which the parties have invested in for the economic survival of the party. Sammut (2013) believes that party-owned media stations balance each other out and even enhance political scrutiny, based upon the view that with the variety of media outlets, a proximation of truth will likely emerge. For this reason, whilst party media ownership is safeguarding partisanship, she suggests that it is also safeguarding pluralism (Sammut, 2013). For smaller parties, however, the scenario is completely different. The fact that Maltaʼs major parties own several media companies has strengthened dualism at the expense of pluralism (Cassola, 2013). It limits the exposure of smaller parties as they struggle to find alternative media to promote their agendas and candidates during electoral campaigns and attract more voters. The situation is not made any easier by the fact that the public broadcaster has always been under constant criticism for its positive bias towards the party-in-government. Over the decades, calls have been made to make the main television and radio stations operate independently from the government. A report completed by the think tank The Today Public Policy Institute (TPPI) suggests that party stations do not balance each other out.6 This is not only because national stations have been constantly accused of political bias (due to government interference and the fact that recruitment to the newsroom is the responsibility of the Minister responsible for broadcasting) with this helping the party-in-government. The 2022 OSCE report (2022) recommended that reforms should take place during the formation of the Broadcasting Authority. The recommendation outlines how the appointment procedure for the members of the governing boards of the Broadcasting Authority and the Public Broadcasting Services should be brought in line with international standards and good practice. This is needed to strengthen the independence and transparency of the Broadcasting Authority. This is particularly important given that many viewers watch only one news bulletin when they need to watch the bulletin from other stations to counter political bias (Caruana Dingli & Vassallo, 2014). This was again confirmed in 2017 when the report on media pluralism from 5

Even though Berlusconiʼs media empire is not a property of his party, a number of ethical questions were still raised in Italy, especially by the centre-left parties. This was due to the potential conflict of interest which existed. In fact, the coalition headed by Berlusconi was accused of introducing a series of laws which were meant to safeguard his media empire. 6 The Today Public Policy Institute, the only independent, non-partisan, and not-for-profit thinktank, closed down after 11 years. This leaves Malta without any single think tank.

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Political Parties and Media Pluralism

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the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom highlighted how in Malta there is political control over the media outlets (not social media). The country generated criticism for allowing the government to control and be responsible for various media outlets, including national television and radio stations, and for allowing political parties to have such influence over broadcasting. A 2022 study on media in Malta revealed that only 4.4% of the Labour voters and 13.7% of the PN voters do not trust the information being provided to them by the media. At the same time, four out of five of those surveyed, are in favour of the parties retaining their media and continuing to broadcast news bulletins. The study revealed that only 21.6% believe that Independent media. The independent media in Malta is mostly made up of English newspapers in Malta. What is interesting is that 47.4% of the participants argued that they only look at one source for news (Carabott Times of Malta, 19 February 2022). This means that as many of their supporters look at their news bulletins for information, the party media has a large influence on the information which is distributed to the electorate. This is one of the reasons why in 2021, Lovin Malta, one of the most popular online news portals, started constitutional proceedings against the media of the main political parties declaring that a part of the Media Broadcasting Act (a proviso of Article 13) was in breach of the spirit of the Constitution. One of the main issues is that party television stations are breaching the requirement for impartiality which is outlined in the Constitution (Martin, Times of Malta, 10 January 2021). The constitutional case can have huge implications for the future of media in Malta. Whilst pluralism is the reason why these parties exist, their business investments are proving to be a financial challenge. In the last decade, social media has facilitated the rise of online portals which attract thousands of readers with this, slowly replacing traditional newspapers which were also negatively impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions. A recent study revealed that only 1.2% of the participants read physical newspapers (Abbas Shalan, The Malta Independent, 19 February 2022a). This means that the future of physical newspapers is threatened. An option for newspaper agencies would be to either focus on the online versions and close down the printing press or to simply end the publication of newspapers which would limit pluralism and the fight against misinformation. Party-owned television stations are also being challenged by the popularity of streaming services such as Netflix, which are attracting thousands of subscribers. Party-owned media outlets employ a considerable number of people, meaning that political parties have to commercialise them to make a profit, pay wages and prevent the accumulation of debt. Both parties have ended up with a serious shortfall of income due to the failure of their commercial activities and have not filed their accounts of their media stations since 2003 (NET-PN) and 2008 (ONE-LP) respectively (Diacono, LovinMalta, 11 January 2022). For example, the Nationalist Party found itself in a financial crisis from 2013 onwards, with over €32 million in debt as of 2022, some of it due to the failure of some of its media outlets in turning in profits. The Labour Party has over €10 million in debt. Most of the debt is linked to its media and includes unpaid VAT, stamp duty, and water and electricity bills (Vella, MaltaToday, 3 May 2022). Notwithstanding its debt, the Labour Party is in a better

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financial position than the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist Party had to sell some of its fixed assets to reduce this debt, and in 2018, some of its media outlets, including the radio station, were rebranded in an attempt to attract more listeners. However, even though these outlets carry a risk, parties have managed to use them to their advantage. Still, their survival has long been questioned especially as the competition from other media corporations will only continue to grow.

3.7

Party Financing

In 2017, the Nationalist and Labour parties collected €3.9 million and €2.7 million, respectively, through fundraising events (Malta Electoral Commission, 2018). But there remains a lingering doubt about the real financiers of these parties. Political parties in Malta do not receive government subsidies beyond a grant of €150,000 a year which parliament gives to political parties for research purposes (Meilak, MaltaToday, 22 May 2022). This means that most of their funding comes from party memberships, fundraising marathons, and private donations. Within this system, the media outlets of the main political parties serve as a tool for financing given the fact that political parties use them to organise yearly marathons in which their members vote to donate money. With clientelism, political parties have often been accused of colluding with the business class with the latter providing vital sources for these political parties. Daphne Caruana Galizia was one of the main journalists critical of such practices. Before her assassination, she used her blog to expose the collision between the political and business class and potential corruption allegations between the two sectors. These investigations would continue after her death which, as already discussed, resulted in the resignation of various officials including the Prime Minister of Malta. The Group of States against Corruption (Greco) had long called for Malta’s authorities to regulate party funding, especially concerning anonymous donors. In 2015, the party financing law was introduced to provide more scrutiny on party finances. The Electoral Commission was handed the task of regulating party funding with donations over €500 having to be registered on the party accounts, donations over €10,000 registered directly with the Electoral Commission, and donations over €50,000 banned. Criticism was levelled against the party financing law because the Electoral Commission is made up of representatives from the main political parties. In addition, questions were raised on whether the Electoral Commission could be the investigator and judge in party financing cases. A 2018 decision by Malta’s Constitutional Court ruled that the Electoral Commission was not a court in terms of Article 39(1) of the Constitution, which means that part of the Party Financing Act was declared unconstitutional as it was deemed to go against the principle concept of ‘independence and impartiality’ outlined within Malta’s Constitution (Times of

3.8

Trust in the Main Political Parties and Party Leaders

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Malta, 8 October 2018).7 The government has declared that it will make the necessary modifications to ensure that the Financing Act is inconsistent with the country’s Constitution.

3.8

Trust in the Main Political Parties and Party Leaders

With polarisation, partisanship, high turnouts, and direct communication between voters and major parties, one might anticipate that political parties would be extremely well respected and trusted by Maltese society. However, higher turnout does not easily translate to higher trust ratings. The Eurobarometer survey published in 2021, reveals that only 25% of Maltese trust Maltaʼs political parties; although this compares well to the 21% across the rest of the EU (European Commission, 2021). Whilst the Maltese tend to trust their political parties more than their European counterparts, it is still perhaps a poor result considering the efforts made by party officials to safeguard their grassroots vote. Such a low level of trust might be attributed to the confrontational approach to politics, which, whilst popular amongst certain politicians and citizens, is seen by others as tainting the image of the country’s political system (Gonzi, 2013). There is also the issue of electoral promises which may not be kept and the fact that parties in government have frequently favoured loyalty and rewarded those individuals who worked for the party’s victory, instead of embracing real meritocracy. As already discussed in the introduction, examining internal party structures demonstrates how Malta has been ‘presidentialised’, with more attention being placed on party leaders than their political parties. One must also keep in mind that during the last decade attention has shifted from political parties to individual politicians, particularly party leaders, with their popularity being closely correlated to the image of their political parties. In the last decade, party campaigns have curtained around these party leaders with much of the resources spent on portraying them as not only capable of leading the Maltese nation, but also as individuals capable to defend the national interest within the European Union. In 2008, Lawrence Gonzi was deemed to be more popular than the Nationalist Party, with this being the reason why the national campaign was based around him. Joseph Muscat can be another example of a popular politician. He won all elections held between 2013 and 2019. Most of his party campaigns were based around his figure as leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister of Malta. Present party leaders have a threefold challenge: campaigns are mostly centred on their persona, they must energise grassroots voters and encourage them to vote, and 7

The case concerned the Nationalist Party. In March 2017, the party was accused of breaching the law as Silvio Debono, one of the main hoteliers in Malta, was asked to finance two salaries of Nationalist officials. The Electoral Commission began to investigate these irregularities with the Nationalist Party declaring that the Commission could not act as the judge, jury, and executioner of the case (Brincat, Times of Malta, October 8, 2018).

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they must mount effective campaigns against other parties. This is done to secure the support of the median voters, to win the elections and govern the country. With Maltaʼs EU membership, and with both political parties moving towards the centre of the political spectrum, it might be argued that both parties are failing to offer real alternatives to the Maltese electorate on issues such as immigration and the environment. For instance, even though both parties continuously pledge to protect the environment, several controversial construction permits have been granted to developers who have links to the parties. Many issues are encouraging voters to distrust political parties. However, the question is whether this distrust can encourage some of these voters to switch their allegiance from the main political parties to vote for a potential third party in parliament. This is also, especially since the economy is doing well, with the country having one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe, standing at 3.4% (NSO, 2022) as of December 2021.

3.9

Malta and Its Two Sides of Politics

Malta’s political system has seen its fair share of political struggle, especially as the main political parties adapted to maintain their position in a system which still requires loyalty. These two political parties have created two perceptions of the country and voters are given the task of picking one of these two sides. Whilst today’s political parties have taken a similar approach towards the country’s economy, the country’s political system is still based on the ‘siege mentality’ with divisions and confrontations at the centre stage. The political scene is seen as toxic, which is certainly discouraging to many who are interested in playing an active part in the country’s political system. The only difference is that the changing needs of society have let the establishment of various civil society groups which are pressuring these parties for reforms. The political divisions which exist are certainly not healthy for a society struggling to promote consensus and dialogue, which could help citizens look beyond the two political monoliths to understand the realities they live in. It is this environment that led the two parties to a confrontation concerning Malta’s role in the European Union before and after the country’s 2004 EU membership, with both the national and European political arenas used to undermine each other.

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Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promotingintegrity-i/1680a69ed2 Harwood, M. (2015). Adopting same-sex unions in catholic Malta: Pointing the finger at ‘Europe’. South European Society and Politics, 20(1), 113–131. Harwood, M. (2022). Malta’s Political Conundrum: Europe’s leading country for LGBTIQ rights and the ban on abortion. International Journal of Sociology. Heywood, A. (2021). Political ideologies: An introduction. Bloomsbury Publishing. Hirczy, W. (1995). Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta. European Journal of Political Research, 27(2), 255–272. Hirczy de Miño, W., & Lane, J. C. (2000). Malta: STV in a two-party system. In Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the single transferable vote (pp 178–204). University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Howe, S. (1987). The Maltese general election of 1987. Electoral Studies, 6, 235–247. IPU. (2017). Women in politics. Retrieved from https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/ infographics/2017-03/women-in-politics-2017 IPU. (2022). Monthly ranking of women in national parliaments. Retrieved from https://data.ipu. org/women-ranking?month=6&year=2022 Kalyvas, S. N., & Van Kersbergen, K. (2010). Christian democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 13, 183–209. Keman, H. (2017). Social democracy: A comparative account of the left-wing party family. Routledge. Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The transformation of the Western European party systems. Political Parties and Political Development, 177–200. Ladrech, R. (2012). Europeanization and political parties. In S. Bulmer & C. Lequesne (Eds.), The member states of the European Union. Oxford University Press. Magri, G. (2021, 20 April). Cyber-attackers hold PN to ransom with major data leak threat. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/cyber-attackers-hold-pn-to-ran som-with-major-data-leak-threat.865968 Magri, G. (2022, 15 March). Wonder why so few women candidates are contesting? Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/wonder-why-so-few-womencandidates-are-contesting.940965 Mair, P. (2009). Party system change. In R. S. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp. 63–74). Sage. Malta Electoral Commission. (2022). Election results. Retrieved from https://electoral.gov.mt/ Martin, I. (2020, 2 April). Labour Party distances itself from massive data breach. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/labour-party-holds-emergency-meetingover-data-breach.782906 Martin, I., Brincat, E., Leone-Ganado, P. (2021, 20 March). As it happened: Keith Schembri arrested and charged with corruption. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta. com/articles/view/keith-schembri-set-to-be-questioned-possibly-arraigned.859222 Meilak, N. (2022, 22 July). Election cheques ‘do not conform with international standards’, says elections watchdog. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/ national/117913/election_cheques_do_not_conform_to_international_standards_says_interna tional_elections_watchdog#.Yul3EHZByM8 Mifsud Bonnici, U. (2015). Konvinzjoni u Esperjenza. Klabb Kotba Maltin. Mitchell, J. P. (2003). Looking forward to the past: National identity and history in Malta. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 10(3), 377–398. Mullard, M., & Pirotta, G. A. (2008). The politics of public expenditure in Malta. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46(1), 128–141. Muscat, J. (1998). Mandat Ġdid. SKS. Muscat, J. (2022). Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia.

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Norris, P. (2004). Electoral engineering: Voting rules and political behavior. Cambridge University Press. NSO. (2022). Unemployment Rate: December 2021. Retrieved from https://nso.gov.mt/en/News_ Releases/Documents/2022/01/News2022_011.pdf OECD. (2022). Review of the standards in public life act of Malta. Retrieved from https://www. oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/INT(2022)9/ FINAL&docLanguage=en OSCE. (2022, 26 March). Malta, early parliamentary elections. Final Report. Retrieved from https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/7/522712.pdf Pace, R. (2008). Malta’s 2008 Election: A vote for continuity and change. South European Society and Politics, 13(3), 377–390. Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties: Organization and power. Billing & Sons. Pirotta, G. (2012). Bringing good governance to Malta. In M. T. Vassallo (Ed.), Public life in Malta (pp. 17–24). University Printing Unit. PN. (1986). Fehmit Bażiċi. Eagle Press. Puhle, H. J. (2002). Still the age of Catch-allism? In R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, & J. J. Linz (Eds.), Political parties: Old concepts and new challenges (pp. 58–83). Oxford University Press. Sammut, C. (2009). Reassessing the Maltese media system. In J. Cutajar & G. Cassar (Eds.), Social transitions in Maltese society (pp. 80–90). Agenda. Sammut, C. (2013). Associate Professor and Pro-Rector at University of Malta/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Sammut, C. (2022). Associate Professor and Pro-Rector at University of Malta/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Sant, A. (2004, 19 May). Prodigies in amnesia. Times of Malta, p. 8. Schiavone, M. J. (1991). B’Imħabba u b’Solidarjetà. Stamperija Indipendenza. Spiteri, C. (1988). Wara l-maskra tal-poter. Malta. Spiteri, L. (2013). Writer, Economist and Former Labour Finance Minister/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. The Technical Committee for the Strengthening of Democracy. (2019). Gender balance in parliament reform-consultation document. Retrieved from https://meae.gov.mt/en/Public_Consulta tions/OPM/Documents/FINAL%20-%20CONSULTATION%20DOCUMENT%20-%20WEB %20VERSION.pdf Vassallo, M. T. (2012). Interest representation in Malta: Identifying features of Europeanisation. In M. T. Vassallo (Ed.), Public life in Malta (pp. 209–239). University Printing Unit. Vassallo, M. T. (2022). Senior Lecturer at the University of Malta. Political Analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Veenendaal, W. (2019). How smallness fosters clientelism: A case study of Malta. Political Studies, 0032321719828275. Vella, M. (1994). That favourite deam of the colonies: Industrialization, dependence and the limits of development discourse in Malta. In R. G. Sultana & G. Baldacchino (Eds.), Maltese society: A sociological inquiry (pp. 55–78). Msida Mireva Publications. Vella, M. (2016, 4 April). EXPLAINER | From Panamagate to Panama Papers. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/63723/explainer__from_ panamagate_to_panama_papers#.YrR3vnZByM_ Vella, L. (2022, 3 May). Labour Party media house €10 million in the red. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/116598/labour_party_media_house_10_ million_in_the_red#.YpfCqahByM8 Xuereb, M. (2022, 7 April). PN candidate gives up casual election to give other district candidates a chance. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/pn-candidategives-up-casual-election.946741

Chapter 4

Europeanisation and Membership in the European Union

European ‘union’ has always been in the Nationalist Party’s DNA. The concept of countries working together is a Christian principle that the PN naturally embraced. (Fenech Adami, 2014, p. 292)

Malta’s membership in the European Union was part of the Nationalist Party’s long-term vision for the country. This vision was defined by Eddie Fenech Adami, the leader of the Party at the time and who in 1979 pushed a resolution that led the party to embrace membership and proposed the opening of negotiations with the European Community. This had to lead the country to find the rightful conditions for it to join the European organisation (Borg, 2022). Fenech Adami, a convinced Christian Democrat, firmly believed Malta should form part of a greater organisation. In his autobiography, he highlighted the importance of the EU and its Christian roots, which were also at the heart of the Nationalist Party’s ideology. These Christian roots and the party’s strong relationship with the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) would certainly help the Nationalist Party to achieve its dream in 2004. Yet, it would challenge the party when the issue surrounding Malta’s EU membership was solved and new issues started to emerge, including the introduction of divorce and civil unions which challenged the party’s Catholic foundation. In 1962, it was the Partit Democratiku Nazzjonalista (PDN), that first political party to propose membership in its electoral manifesto. The party, which had split from the Nationalist Party and was headed by Herbert Ganado, used its manifesto Nagħmlu Malta Aħjar (Make Malta Better) to propose Malta’s membership in the European Community, explaining why joining the Common Market was essential to strengthen Maltese economy (PDN, 1962). The party was dissolved after the 1966 election and its supporters re-joined the Nationalist Party. In 1981, Malta’s membership in the European Union would once again be proposed by the PN which used its manifesto to highlight how a potential Nationalist administration would apply to make the country a member of the European Economic Community. When proposing membership, the Nationalist Party referred to the Catholic founders of the European Coal and Steel Community namely, Schumann, De © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_4

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Gasperi, and Adenauer, highlighting how they created an organisation to provide peace and stability in the region (PN, 1981). The party has consistently promoted its ideology based on Christian Democracy. The party used the values and principles of Christian Democracy including safeguarding human dignity, individual freedoms and social justice to promote the party’s vision of making Malta a member of the European Economic Community. In the 1980s the European Economic Community was seen as an organisation that could promote peace by reducing the tensions between the two main superpowers and by reducing poverty to provide stability across the globe. Over the decades, the Nationalist Party began to promote the concept of European Unity. Reference to ‘European Unity’ can be found in the literature and campaign material of the party. The party’s belief has always been that European Unity is one of the principles of Christian Democracy, and a vision that the party and the Maltese should work for notwithstanding the challenges they may face (Galea, 1987). On the other hand, Mintoff was famously known for his statement given during the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, in which he declared that there can be no peace and stability in Europe without security and stability in the Mediterranean. This concept was at the heart of the foreign policy advocated by Mintoff, who had a vision of developing a Mediterranean community free from the two superpowers and in peace with itself (Fenech, 2012; Mintoff, 1977, 2018). This is why Mintoff believed so strongly in neutrality and non-alignment and emphasised the need to de-militarise the Mediterranean Sea. For Mintoff and the Labour Party, neutrality and membership within the European Community could not co-exist. During the 1980s, Eddie Fenech Adami and the leader of the Labour Party Duminku Mintoff had divergent ideologies on the place of Malta within the European Community. The approach towards the European Union of the main political parties until membership was based on ideological, political, and economic grounds which the Nationalist and Labour parties highlighted throughout their numerous electoral campaigns. In this scenario, elections were extremely important. Few events in Malta generate such high levels of enthusiasm as national elections. Every 5 years, Maltese citizens find themselves at the centre of an elaborate courtship that ends with one of the parties elected to government. Maltaʼs national elections are hotly contested events dominated by personalities and with issues fought along party lines. The time leading to and during an electoral campaign consists of political billboards, partisan leaflets, invitations to coffee mornings and dinner dances organised by candidates, and non-stop playing of the anthemic political songs based on the electoral slogans, and carcades becoming a daily occurrence. This politicised electoral environment shaped various stages of the impact of Europeanisation on the country’s political parties and the membership question. The issue surrounding membership was not simply about whether Malta should join the European Union, but it raised questions surrounding the country’s struggle to establish an identity and whether this should be European, Mediterranean, or both. Another important question was whether Malta should relinquish some of its

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sovereignty, after spending so many decades fighting for independence. It also put forth questions on what kind of impact would the European Union have, not only on the country’s political and economic policies but also on the Maltese citizens. This influenced the way the European Union was framed by the Nationalist and Labour parties over the decades. The evaluation of the Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta is not just a study of how the main political parties approached and used the European Union across the decades, but it is also a study of the impact of the European Union on the political system. This political system is made up of several entities. These include civil society groups. The role of such groups would be further enhanced post-accession as civil society began to take an active role in influencing the agenda of the main political parties and promoting/promotion of a variety of issues on behalf of Maltese society

4.1

Ideologies, Neutrality and European Membership

The first stage of Europeanisation emerged when the path towards Malta’s European membership was laid in 1981. This is the year when the Nationalist Party decided to include Malta’s membership in the EEC in its electoral programme. The party would then have another five years before securing power and being able to apply for EU membership. At the same time, the Labour Leader Mintoff declared that Malta would only join ‘Europe’ when this will opt for a foreign policy based on ‘neutrality’ with the Great Powers not being allowed to have any military basis within it (It-Torċa, 31 May 1981). Whilst at the time, the European Union’s foreign policy approach was rather limited, as this was an area in the hands of member states, it would have been rather difficult to pressure member states to remove the military bases of NATO or the USA from their territory, especially as it had no legal instruments to do so. This period is particularly important in terms of Europeanisation, as it showcased the influence that the European Economic Community could have on a country that is neither a member nor an applicant state. The 1987 national election was one of the most polarised elections in Maltaʼs political history. Following the 1981 election, during which the Nationalist Party (PN) won the popular vote and the Labour Party (MLP) won more parliamentary seats, political turmoil plagued Maltaʼs political system. Whilst constitutionally, the Labour Party had every right to govern (DeBattista, 2012), the strange (perverse) result in 1981 raised a series of questions surrounding the strength of the popular vote and enflamed both parties and their supporters. The Opposition rejected the results, boycotted parliament for 2 years, and refused to take its seats in Parliament. It never stopped its electoral campaign. This was not helped by the fact that state broadcasting was highly partisan, and the Nationalist Party was not given any coverage on this medium (Sacco, 1986). It took two years of negotiations between the Government and the Opposition, with these negotiations

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being presided over by the then President of the Republic. An agreement was reached to have constitutional reforms to the electoral process (De Marco, 2009).1 In addition, Mintoff resigned as Prime Minister in 1984 and was replaced by Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, who did not have the charisma, influence, and popularity that his predecessor had enjoyed. With an escalation of political violence, and the Nationalist Partyʼs effective and constant mass campaigning with more than 77 mass meetings during the period (Schiavone, 1993), the country faced a deep political crisis. The rising violence shook both major parties and led to a critical juncture that enabled a series of constitutional changes (Spiteri, 2007), designed to alter the electoral system by strengthening the importance of the popular vote.2 This is the environment in which the European Economic Community membership issue emerged, and which encouraged the EEC institutions to intervene in Maltaʼs political system. Early signs that the Maltese major political parties were aligning themselves in favour or against EEC membership were reflected in the discussion surrounding Neutrality Clause. Legal provisions regarding neutrality began during the early 1970s and were introduced by the Labour administration in 1980, being then guaranteed through a treaty with Italy which concluded in 1983. During the mid-1980s, the Labour administration was working to enshrine the Neutrality Clause in the Constitution. This required the votes of the Nationalist MPs. To secure their vote, Labour ministers promised to introduce the required electoral reforms to give the party with the greatest share of the popular vote, regardless of the distribution of seats in Parliament, the right to govern the country. This would be accepted on the provision that the Nationalist Party accepted the inclusion of the Neutrality Clause in the country’s Constitution (Spiteri, 2007). Neutrality provided one of the main divides for potential European membership. For the Labour Party, neutrality was essential to protect Malta from a potential war, strengthen peace in the Mediterranean and allow the country to build a closer relationship with several countries without being restricted by superpower forces within and outside Europe. On the other hand, for the Nationalist Party, neutrality was seen as a stumbling block that would delay a potential membership within the

1

Therefore, they all lost their places in Parliament and had to be co-opted once they decided to resume their Parliamentary seats on 6 March 1983 (Sacco, 1986). 2 A militant Labour faction was getting out of control. A potential change in the party-in-government seemed to intimidate these supporters who wanted to retain the privileges gained under Labour and resorted to violence to threaten the opposition. Ultimately, the Labour administration proved to be too weak in controlling the rising violence. There were repeated warnings that violence was on the increase with various attacks taking place between 1979 and 1987. These including the arson on Strickland House in Valletta which was the home of the Times and Sunday Times of Malta, and the ransacking of the leader of the opposition’s house on 15 October 1979. This would be known as ‘Black Monday’ due to the threat which this violence posed to rule and law and press freedom in Malta (Aquilina, 2019). This violence escalated after the 1981 national election. This produced a series of tragic events including the murder of Raymond Caruana in a PN club and a critical juncture which forced the main political parties to agree on a series of constitutional reforms which were introduced before the 1987 national election.

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European Economic Community, even though the party was in favour of a form of neutrality in terms of foreign policy (Fenech Adami, 2014). The Neutrality Clause was rooted in the Labour Party’s belief that peace could be achieved in the Mediterranean through neutrality. With Maltaʼs Neutrality status, Mintoffʼs vision was to achieve the same status of freedom and stability that Switzerland enjoyed in Europe (Sant, 2013). For the Labour Party, Neutrality meant that Malta could not become a member of the EEC, which was considered by the party to be a modern colonial power which had the ability to threaten the recently acquired sovereignty of the country (Saliba, 2013). Indeed, some individuals within the Labour Party, including Prime Minister Mifsud Bonnici, ‘not only believed in neutrality but were convinced to the point of obsession’ (Spiteri, 2013). This could explain why during the 2003 EU Referendum, these politicians were to use this Neutrality Clause to campaign against Maltaʼs EU membership application. The Neutrality Agreement provided a number of financial incentives for Malta. The reason for this is that when it was signed in 1980, it was guaranteed by Italy. This produced a financial settlement for the country. Maltaʼs closest neighbour promised to grant $12 million (€12.04 million) and a further $4 million (€4.01 million) per annum, to be spent on projects and to be used by the end of 1983 (Coleiro, 1997).3 In the following years, Italy would provide substantial help for the country to join the European Union. Whilst the Nationalist Party did vote for the Constitutional amendments, it was clear that the party had a different perception and understanding of what neutrality meant for the country. Whilst for the Labour Party, neutrality meant that Malta could not join the EU, the Nationalist Party believed that as an organisation that promoted peace, the EU was the rightful home for the country.4 These constitutional amendments which were approved just before the 1987 national election, declared that ‘the number of members of the House of Representatives shall be increased as necessary so that the Party obtaining more than fifty per cent as aforesaid shall have one member more than the total of the other members elected from any other Party or Parties’ (Mizzi, 1995, p.4). In addition, Neutrality was enshrined in Malta’s Constitution, highlighting how Malta is a neutral state actively pursuing peace, security, and social progress amongst all nations by adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in any military alliance. Yet, the status of Malta’s neutrality provided various interpretations on whether Malta could form part of the European Community. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system transformed with the United States becoming the hegemonic power. Within this system, the EU began to accept various neutral states as its members. These included Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. This meant that it was going to be difficult for the Labour Party to legitimise its approach towards the European Union by basing it on Malta’s neutrality status when the EU itself had already embraced other neutral member states:

3 4

The conversion was made in August 2022. Constitutional amendments require the support of at least two-thirds of the elected MPs.

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The Austrians faced a similar situation. They mentioned the term permanent but gave it a different definition to the strict international concept of permanent neutrality. They had to overcome this issue when they joined the EU, which benefitted us during our membership negotiation years later because we quoted their arguments. (Fenech Adami, 2014, p. 185)

The question surrounding Malta’s neutrality was going to become one of the major issues in the debate on whether Malta should join the European Union. With the main political parties providing different interpretations of the neutrality clause and whether it would be challenged by a potential membership, it would be up to the Maltese voters to decide on the matter in the 2003 EU referendum.

4.2

The EU Influence and Malta: The 1987 Election

The 1987 election is important for the study of the impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs political parties for the way the European Economic Community was used to pressure the government to respect its democratic commitments. The Nationalist Party kept pressuring the government to introduce the aforementioned electoral reforms. During this period, the country was not a member of the EEC and there were only limited financial agreements between the European organisation and Malta (Mifsud Bonnici, 1987). Still, between the 1981 and 1987 national elections, the tense political environment encouraged the Nationalist Party to lobby extensively within European institutions to place additional pressure on the Maltese government. The decision of the Nationalist Party to use international organisations to pressure the government can be explained by using the boomerang model. The boomerang model is defined as the attempt by NGOs and political parties to seek international allies, including international organisations, to pressure their governments from the outside when the latter is violating various human rights or that organisationʼs regulations (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). The Nationalist Party escalated the national confrontation by using the EEC institutions as a political tool to place pressure on the Labour administration. For the first time since Independence, this ‘boomerang’ approach allowed the involvement of several European institutions, including the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, in Maltese affairs. This can be considered as an early example of the impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs political arena, even though it was not induced by the EEC itself, but by the Nationalist Party. This issue also highlights how ideologically different the two parties were towards the foreign policy of Malta. Whilst the Nationalist Party had close links with Europeʼs Christian Democrats and the European Peopleʼs Party, the Labour administration had not yet established a relationship with the European Socialists and did not have the same knowledge that the Nationalist Party (cf. Fig. 4.1) had of how lobbying worked within the European Community. This meant that it could not defend its interests within the European institutions. Although Malta was not a member of the EEC and technically the EEC had no right to dictate how the

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The EU Influence and Malta: The 1987 Election

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European Economic Community

The EU instuons discuss a number of opons including the blockage of funds towards Malta to pressure the government respect the rule of law

PN pressures the EU instuons to act to safeguard Maltaʼs Democracy

European Commission

European Parliament

EU takes acon against the Maltese government

Government implements the Foreign Intervenon Act to prevent the EEC from interfering

Foreign Intervenon Act

PL Opposion Government Fig. 4.1 PNʼs approach

government should act, it could not stop the European organisation from criticising its actions. This early impact of Europeanisation, which was induced and encouraged by the Nationalist Party, produced a strong resistance. Intense discussions took place on whether the Nationalist Party was working against the national interest by using European institutions.5 The Labour administration introduced the Foreign Intervention Act to prevent exogenous forces, in this case, a number of European politicians, from intervening in Maltaʼs political system. The most controversial one was the Foreign Interference Act, introduced by the Labour government in 1982, which sought to deter further interference by European officials in Maltaʼs internal affairs by prohibiting foreign speakers from addressing Maltese mass meetings. The ban was extended to foreign journalists who were not allowed to report from Malta. This further exacerbated political instability.

5

The same accusation would be levelled against the PN opposition during the period 2015–2022 over several investigations pushed by the EU into various policies pursued by the Government of Malta.

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The Foreign Intervention Act which would be deemed unconstitutional by the Maltese Courts due to the violation of Article 42 of the Constitution which concerned freedom of expression (Il-ħajja, 17 July 1986). The introduction of the Foreign Intervention Act generated further criticism of the Maltese government from the EEC. Having a Western European country introducing anti-liberal laws was not something the European Community was going to tolerate. The Committee of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe decided to act after a petition, signed by Christian Democratic politicians with the support of the Political Bureau of the EU, supported the Nationalist Partyʼs claims that the government was threatening Maltaʼs civil liberties (Sacco, 1986). This produced a reaction from the European party groups, as the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Maltese government and its policies, and on 29 March 1983 approved the withdrawal of funds until political liberties were guaranteed (Mizzi, 1995). The resolution was later withdrawn after the Labour Party threatened the future participation of Malta in European institutions. This European pressure not only underlined the role that the EEC in the country and the importance of the European party groups which the Nationalist Party was lobbying, but also highlighted how economically dependent Malta was on other entities and the EEC in particular. Due to this economic dependence, the EEC could exert some influence Maltaʼs political system even though the Labour administration was responding with hostility to its moves. The Government refused to allow Kai-Uwe von Hassel, President of the European Christian Democrats, and Flaminio Piccoli, President of the Italian Christian Democrats, to address a meeting of the Nationalist Party. This occurred on 25 September 1985. Massimo Gorla, President of the Christian Democrats Youth, and Andreas De Guttry, President of the European Democratic Youth, were even arrested and freed soon after they decided to speak during a PN activity (Pace, 1990). The election took place on 9 May 1987. It was one of the most controversial in Maltaʼs political history. Accusations of human rights abuses and corruption against the Labour administration, together with political violence and intimidation, revealed the tribal divisions which existed between the two factions. The major political party manifestos were rhetorically based and ideologically driven. The Nationalist Partyʼs political manifesto was based on the slogan, Employment, Justice, and Liberty (PN, 1987), with the party explicitly proposing a series of institutional and economic reforms. On the other hand, Labour utilised the manifesto title, With Labour for Peace and Progress (MLP, 1987), and pledged to safeguard and strengthen Maltaʼs employment and industry, and to secure peace within the Mediterranean region. For the second time, the Nationalist Party placed Maltaʼs potential EEC membership on its agenda. Still, this was not seen as a priority at a time when institutional and economic reforms took precedence. The decision to include a potential membership in the electoral manifesto was largely due to the Nationalist Party leader, Fenech Adami, who was influenced by the EU’s traditional principles and strongly believed in the benefits of the European Community and the positive influence that this could have. Its agenda was very ideologically oriented and used cultural framing to promote the EU. The party espoused the tenets of Catholic Social Teaching, with

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the works of Pope Leo XIII and Pope St John XXIII used to highlight the importance of peace, subsidiarity, and solidarity - principles that the EEC promoted (PN, 1987). This message was aimed to emphasise the shared bonds between Malta and the EEC and was used to emphasise and justify the Nationalist Party’s decision to seek membership. The European Union had little influence on the Labour Party’s 1987 manifesto as its agenda focused on Malta’s economic development, seeking to highlight its success rate in that regard. Labourʼs foreign policy was concentrated on the Mediterranean, with regular references to the Malta-Libya relationship, the need to demilitarise the region, and the role that the Mediterranean could play in the development of the country (MLP, 1987). The EEC was seen as an obstacle to a greater alliance with non-EEC Mediterranean countries. Still, Labour also sought a closer collaboration with France and Italy, both EEC members.6 It is important to understand the political environment which existed in 1987 to apprehend the way parties approached the EEC issue. The 1987 electoral campaigns were characterised by an intense struggle for power (Fenech, 1988), with polarisation, populism, and partisanship dominating them. The Nationalist Partyʼs emphasis on Maltaʼs EEC membership was met with hostility by the Labour Party. With membership, Labour foresaw a negative impact arising from European Integration and Europeanisation, and in particular the deterioration of the relationships that Malta could enjoy with Eastern European and North African countries (Times of Malta, 5 April 1987e).7 The Labour Party justified its Eurosceptic approach by declaring that its foreign policy, which was based on safeguarding peace in the Mediterranean, would be hindered by potential EEC membership at a time when it was bearing its fruit. The party declared that even Israel appreciated Maltaʼs diplomatic efforts (Mifsud Bonnici, L-Orizzont, 13 April 1987) even though the relationship between the two countries was strained during that period. However, Mifsud Bonnici never successfully explained why Maltaʼs potential EEC accession would have damaged Maltaʼs role in stabilising the Mediterranean and achieving peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, he issued several contradictory statements that did nothing to justify his opposition to the EEC, including his accusation that the EEC would push Malta into the hands of the United States at a time when Malta was effectively neutral (Debate, 1987). Still, with Cyprus and Turkey submitting their applications to join the EEC, it was going to be difficult for the Labour Party to project the EU as a threat to peace in the Mediterranean. The party found itself unprepared to deal with the EEC issue at a time when the Nationalist campaign was much more organised and effective, as it

6 If one looks at the Palestine issue, the Labour Party believed that the EEC would hinder Maltaʼs role as a peace keeper in the Mediterranean; on the other hand, the Nationalist Party saw the European Community as a means of safeguarding the rights of the Palestinian people. 7 A number of Eastern European countries are now EU members. In addition, North African countries supported Maltaʼs EU membership application.

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had spent years establishing links with Euro-Mediterranean states and the European organisation. Labour’s campaign arguably made several plausible statements on the way Malta could have been negatively affected by a potential EU membership. Labour focused on the role of the Opposition in tainting Maltaʼs image abroad as it sought to use the EEC institutions against the Maltese government at a time when the Maltese government was negotiating a second financial protocol with the European Community. It accused several Nationalist Party politicians, including party leader Fenech Adami, of working against the national interest by seeking the help of foreign countries and organisations such as the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe (Mifsud Bonnici, 1987) at a time when Malta was still trying to establish a second financial agreement with the European Community and threatening Malta’s relationship with Libya—one of Maltaʼs largest investors (L-Orizzont, 30 March 1987d). During the campaign, reference was still made to the European Union with Prime Minister Mifsud Bonnici labelling Maltaʼs economic partner Italy as ‘Mafia’ and denouncing the EEC (the whole project and not just potential membership), dubbing it a ‘Ġisem mejjet u bla ruħ’ (a dead body without a soul). Fenech Adami criticised Mifud Bonnici for declaring that membership could even spread the AIDS virus in Malta (Times of Malta, 2 May 1987f) due to freedom of movement. During this period, within the Labour Party, there was tangible fear of foreign domination in post-colonial Malta, especially amongst Labourites who experienced war or, who were afraid of Malta being the centre of another confrontation due to the ongoing Cold War. This could explain the Euroscepticism being generated amongst Labour supporters. Still, the reaction of the Labour Party towards the EEC was utilised by the Nationalist Party to warn that the actions of Mifsud Bonnici could lead to a diplomatic row between Malta and the country’s economic partners (In-Nazzjon Tagħna, 29 April 1987a). The Labour Party leader warned about the potential negative top-down impact of European Integration and economic Europeanisation which could arise with Maltaʼs membership and the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT). Mifsud Bonnici warned that this taxation would damage the treaty between Malta and the USA, which guaranteed the removal of tax on 3,000 Maltese products which were exported at the time. Furthermore, he argued that a potential membership would result in the halting of incoming investment from the USA and increase unemployment (L-Orizzont, 27 April 1987c). He also warned about other potential negative implications which could arise with European Integration and the loss of economic sovereignty, including the loss of 2500 jobs with Libyan companies, and that over 800 Maltese workers in Libya risked being forced to return to Malta (It-Torċa, 15 March 1987b) due to visa regulations. This highlights the fact that the membership issue was not going to be only ideological and political, but also an economic one, which was going to produce further divisions within Maltaʼs society. The results of the election were nearly the same as those of the 1981 national election. As shown in Table 4.1, in 1981, the Nationalist Party won 114,132 votes and 50.9% of the popular vote. In 1987, the party won 119,721 votes and 50.9% of

4.2

The EU Influence and Malta: The 1987 Election

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Table 4.1 1987 Election Results

MLP PN Turnout

1987 Results Seats Votes 34 114,132 35 119,721

Votes (%) (50.9%) (50.9%) 95.57%

1981 Results Seat Votes 34 109,990 31 114,936

Votes (49.1%) (48.9%) 94.1%

the popular vote. The Labour Party won 114,936 and 48.9% of the total votes in 1981, close to the 109,990 and 49.1% of the total votes it achieved in the 1987 election. The high degree of polarisation and partisanship of the electorate helped the overall turnout, with 95.57% of registered voters exercising their right to vote (Hirczy, 1995). These results showcase the support which these two mass parties enjoyed. The main difference from the previous election was that, as a result of constitutional changes, the Nationalist Party formed the new government, being given additional seats to ensure that it had a one-seat majority in Parliament. Very few voters switched allegiance, which probably meant that the short-term campaign and the controversy surrounding Malta’s potential membership in the European Community mattered little, as voters had already made up their minds before this commenced. One can conclude that at this stage, Europeanisation did influence the Nationalist Party. However, the impact of Europeanisation was not induced by the EEC, but by the Nationalist Party itself, which seized the opportunity of Maltaʼs dependence on the EU for trade to bypass the government and encourage the intervention of the European Community in Maltaʼs politics. Concerning the impact of the EU on Maltaʼs party dimensions, at the time of the 1987 election, it can be argued that the party competition dimension, party-government relations, and relationships beyond the party system were influenced by Europeanisation. By 1987, the EEC membership issue was internalised by Maltaʼs party system and absorbed into the main patterns of party competition, with the Nationalist and Labour Parties endorsing opposite approaches. The Labour Party portrayed Maltaʼs potential membership as a threat to its foreign policy and warned about the potential negative impact of economic Europeanisation on the working class and industrial base. In contrast, the Nationalist Party promoted European norms and principles, as it believed that these were contributing to the establishment of a European Identity. The party believed in the political idea of Europe which promoted peace, democracy, solidarity, and subsidiarity; principles that the party shared with the EEC as a means of fostering economic growth and strengthening democratic institutions. However, the issue of EEC membership did not have a great impact at the popular level in 1987. In the hierarchy of issues, institutional and economic reforms took precedence as the country was in desperate need of them following 5 years of political turmoil. Still, the European membership issue did contribute to the atmosphere of division that prevailed as it was highly politicised and debated along party lines (Cini, 2003). At this stage, one of the most controversial issues was the way the Nationalist Party

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used the EEC institutions and politicians to pressure the government. This was a risky move, which was perceived as an act against the national interest by the Labour Party, and which could have damaged the image of the country with potential foreign investors. After the 1987 electoral victory, Fenech Adami embarked on fostering closer ties with the European Economic Community, arguing that: Maltaʼs membership of the European Community will be beneficial to Malta. It will also be beneficial to the European Community. Economically, my country is already well integrated in the Community: 70 per cent of our trade, 80 per cent of our tourism, are with the Community countries. But our main motivation in seeking closer ties is political. (Fenech Adami, 1988)8

However, he did not pursue membership at the start of his legislature. He understood that the country was facing serious institutional and infrastructural problems. On the European dimension, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the emerging Eastern European states were a more pressing concern for the European organisation. Malta finally applied for membership in 1990 (De Marco, 2009) as political stability had been achieved and the Nationalist administration felt that the EEC was ready to take into consideration Maltaʼs application to join. The period is particularly important given the threat faced by the Mediterranean due to the Gulf War and the fear that this war could have on the economy of the country (Evans, Malta Financial Times, 28 January 1991). This continued to strengthen the belief of the Nationalist Party that Malta’s place was in the European Union.

4.3

The Second Stage of Europeanisation and the 1992 National Election

The 1992 election had one of the shortest campaigns (32 days) in Maltaʼs political history which was contested for the first time by Maltaʼs Green Party (AD). The election was particularly important for the fact that parties could now own media stations. This transformed the electoral campaigns in the country. One can look at this period as the emergence of the second stage of the impact of Europeanisation on Malta’s political parties. This was because by now, Malta’s membership application was submitted and the government had to enact various reforms in order to be able to join the European Community. The Nationalist Party entitled its manifesto, ‘Solidarity – Always –Everywhere’, whilst Labour entitled its manifesto, ‘Today we can Rebuild’. Membership (and so European Integration) was again included in the Nationalist Party programme, with both parties maintaining their Europeanist/ Eurosceptic approaches. The Nationalist Party’s (1992) manifesto was based on the concept of solidarity which is one of the most important values of the European Union. The Nationalist Party used solidarity to promote further national 8

Address by the Prime Minister of Malta Fenech Adami at the opening session of the congress of Europe, The Hague: 6 May 1988.

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The Second Stage of Europeanisation and the 1992 National Election

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reconciliation. It declared that it wanted to pursue reforms that would allow Malta to join the growing European Community. The party highlighted how Malta served as a bridge in the Mediterranean and promoted further security and cooperation within the region through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In its manifesto, the Labour Party (MLP, 1992) maintained its opposition to EU membership. Still, it declared that it wanted a closer alliance with the European Union to establish a free trade zone that would still allow the country to be a free trade zone with other countries. The Labour Party (MLP, 1992) also declared that an agreement with the European Union would provide Malta with funds which could be used for research and development. The campaigns were based on the manifestos which these parties were presenting. Still, the main debate was the concept of Solidarity between the Nationalist Party and socialism which was at the heart of the Labour Party campaign. The Labour Party complained that the Nationalist campaign was simply based on the persona of Prime Minister Fenech Adami, arguably the most popular figure within the Nationalist Party (It-Torċa, 16 February 1992a). This approach would be used decades later by the Labour Party as its leaders became more popular than the party. The Nationalist Party promoted the introduction of the European Human Rights Convention Act, outlined its economic achievements including record employment and increased job opportunities, and promoted further economic reforms. Still, solidarity was the main theme of the campaign. The Party declared that it would promote further dialogue for the reforms that were required. The leader of the Nationalist Party used cultural framing to promote European Integration. The party outlined how its ideology was rooted in the Roman Catholic Church which was at the centre of the party’s beliefs. The party promoted further European Union values including the principle of subsidiarity (decisions are taken as closely as possible to the people) which involve social values-oriented programmes of action (Times of Malta, 1 February 1992b). The campaign surrounding the European Union was based on the idea that the European Community was the natural home for Malta. The European Union was framed as a space where several countries that had common values and principles could meet and strengthen their relationship. This could be an example of how the European Union was seen as a supranational public sphere where dialogues could be established, and relationships extended. The European Union was perceived as an institution that was essential for the economic wellbeing of Malta (Pollacco, 2004), and also a means to achieve peace and stability within the region. This was particularly important for the country especially due to the instabilities which existed in the Mediterranean due to the conflict in Libya (Times of Malta, 17 February 1992c). The Nationalist leader was endorsed by Senator Angelo Bernassola from Italy’s Christian Democracy Party who congratulated the Nationalist Party for its social reforms and for taking the path towards European membership. He said that Malta would have a major role in the European Community and that Fenech Adami was a statesman who was well respected in Europe (In-Nazzjon Tagħna, 24 February 1992d).

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Fenech Adami believed that Malta had all the qualities for membership including geographical position, a democratic system, the ability to compete economically, and a solid social services sector. By 1992, there were already questions on whether the issue could be decided by a referendum, leaving it up to the Maltese citizens to decide whether Malta should join the European Union. Although by 1992, there were no plans to hold a referendum, Fenech Adami declared that he had no difficulty in consulting the people through a referendum. However, a potential referendum had to take place once an agreement between the EU and Malta is reached and before an election, to prevent multiple interpretations of the eventual result (Times of Malta, 1 February 1992). Still, years later, the Nationalist Party would reject the idea of a referendum only to propose it again after the party lost the 1996 national election when there was a sense that the public had turned against a potential membership. The approach of the Nationalist Party towards the European Union and the promotion of the concept of solidarity were criticised by the Labour Party. The Labour Party understood the need to establish a relationship with the European Union. Still, this relationship was not membership. The main issue for the Labour Party concerned the reforms being introduced in the country with Labour officials declaring that these reforms and an eventual membership would lead to an increase in prices and further privatisation of national companies. This cultural framing used by the Nationalist Party was based on the idea that the European Union had Christian foundations, with solidarity being at the core of its values. Mifsud Bonnici was extremely critical of this. He warned that the Maltese did not require to be impressed by talk of Christianity, democracy, and human rights as reasons to join the European Community. He believed that the country had become Christian before various member states, so Malta would not need to join this organisation to protect its beliefs. Mifsud Bonnici also explained that the Vatican was not a member of the European Union, declaring that the Christian element of the community was non-existent. Non-existent was also the concept of solidarity with the Labour leader campaigning how the European Union was ignoring all the homeless living in Europe. On this matter, the Labour Party outlined how it had always promoted the principle of solidarity especially as the party had built the foundations of the Maltese economy. At the time of the election, the European Union was also being linked to the notion of democracy, with the European Community seen as a guarantor of democracies across Europe. The Nationalist Party had promoted the importance of democracy in various annual conferences. The Nationalist Party portrayed the European Union as a guarantor of democracies in Eastern Europe and a guarantor of peace in the European region (PN, 1990, 1991). The principle of democracy was particularly important as the country had spent years in political turmoil with institutional reforms being introduced to strengthen the country’s main institutions. On this matter, Mifsud Bonnici declared that voters should ignore those who spoke of democracy as another reason to join the European Community because the Maltese had long fought for their independence against countries that were now part of the

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community (Times of Malta, 19 February 1992e).9 This is particularly interesting as reference is made again to Malta’s colonial past and the notion that membership would threaten Malta’s hard-fought sovereignty and neutrality. For this reason, the European Union was perceived as a threat to the country. Another element of Euroscepticism within the Labour Party concerned the impact which the European Union could have on the Maltese economy. On this aspect, the future leader of the Labour Party, Alfred Sant, declared that full membership of the Community did not make economic sense. He promoted the setting up of a new system by which Malta would move towards an industrial-free arrangement with the Community. This would be within the agenda of the Labour Party until the country’s eventual referendum on whether Malta should join the European Union. During the campaign, Sant maintained that this arrangement would safeguard the national interest especially as protective mechanisms were still needed in Malta (Sant, Times of Malta, 30 January 1992). This was the foundation on which Sant would later develop the partnership plan which would be proposed as an alternative to membership. The approach taken by the Labour Party over the EU was based on the fact that the Malta’s economy needed further protection and was not strong enough to be able to compete with other European economies. Mifsud Bonnici had repeatedly warned of the threat the European Union could have on socialist values and hence the ideology of the Labour Party. The party warned that various sectors would be threatened by the European Customs Union. The Labour Party believed that Malta’s economic ties with Libya, and Malta’s business would suffer due to the European Community’s regulations on international trade. This was used to highlight how it was the Labour Party which would safeguard and strengthen the economy of the country whilst protecting the Maltese working class (Times of Malta, 31 January 1992f). The different perceptions which the main political parties had on the impact of the European Union on socialism and the welfare state, highlighted how the EU issue was not simply a political and economic decision but also had ideological foundations. On the issue of socialism, the Nationalist Party believed that the socialist approach endorsed by the Labour Party resulted in a stagnated economy. Multiple campaigns of the Nationalist Party criticised Labour’s socialism declaring that this only produced political violence which was extremely different from the notion of peace which the party was now promoting (Times of Malta, 20 February 1992g). The leader of the Nationalist Party Fenech Adami criticised the Labour Party for its scare tactics against the European Union. At the same time, he promoted the economic policies introduced by the party-in-government. Fenech Adami declared that the economy was flourishing with the employment sector increasing by 10,000. This was achieved by protecting the needs of consumers, farmers, and fishermen, with the number of full-time farmers rising by 153 and net earnings had risen by Lm1.2 million (€ 2.79 million) reaching Lm26 million (around €60.56 million) 3.3% 9

The European Community would be renamed the European Union in 1993.

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of GNP (Gross National Product) (Times of Malta, 6 February 1992h; Times of Malta 16 February 1992i). Other issues which were tackled in the election, and which would be directly and indirectly impacted by a potential membership were the future of the dockyards and hunting. On this matter, the new party Democratic Alternative (Alternattiva Demokratika - AD) proposed a referendum to allow the Maltese people to decide whether to ban hunting. The Association for Hunting and Conservation (FKNK) had already declared itself against potential European membership due to the threat that it could have on hunting in Malta (The Times of Malta, 16 February 1992j). This was not the first endorsement of an organisation in Malta for or against EU membership. In fact, by 1992, The Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU), The Malta Federation of Industry, and The Malta Chamber of Commerce, had already spoken in favour of membership. These endorsements would become extremely useful in 2003 when the Maltese voters had to decide on whether Malta should join the European Union. In the end, the Nationalist Party won the election receiving 127,932 votes (51.77%) with the Labour Party receiving 114,911 votes (46.5%). In its first election, Maltaʼs Green Party received 4186 votes (1.69%) (Schiavone, 2013). As the results in Table 4.2 show, the Nationalist Party was given another mandate to make Malta part of the European Union. Europeanisation has both direct and indirect impacts on the main political parties. In one of his first speeches, Fenech Adami declared that for the third time the voters had voted to make Malta a member of the European Community. He said that the country was ready to look forward to European membership as this was the next political step for the country (In-Nazzjon Tagħna, 26 February 1992). The political ideologies of the main political parties were reflected in the way framed and politicised the European Union. Their EU approach was reflected in the discourse for or against the European Union. The Nationalist campaign promoted the potential economic impact of the EU on Malta outlining how the country was going to gain millions of funds for the development of the economy. On the other hand, the Labour Party warned against the impact of the EU on socialist values in Malta. The economic impact of European Integration was more evident in this election, than in the 1987 national election. The main political parties had to take into consideration the way the EU could impact the Maltese economy. The Nationalist and Labour Parties tackled various issues during the election including hunting, the dockyards, and democracy. These issues would become more important with the country’s 2004 membership in the EU.

Table 4.2 1992 Election Results

MLP PN AD Turnout

Seats 31 34 –

Votes 114,911 127,932 4186

Votes (%) 46.5 51.77 1.69 96.08

4.4

Reforms and EU Membership

4.4

109

Reforms and EU Membership

Following its poor result in the 1992 election, the Labour Party went through several internal changes. This is important as they would change their approach towards the EU. Once Mifsud Bonnici resigned, Alfred Sant was elected as party leader. The new Labour leader was a respected economist and scholar who embraced the restructuring of Maltaʼs economy. Whilst nominally committed to socialist ideology, a guarantor of the working class and the welfare state, Sant understood the need to shift Labour’s policies towards the centre of the political spectrum by promoting, amongst other things, further economic incentives for the business class (MLP, 1996). The new Labour leader injected a new vision and a new approach within the Labour Party, and this attracted new voters even though the stance towards the European Union remained very similar. Under Santʼs helm, the party went through several transformations which modernised the party and brought it closer to the Maltese citizens. However, the party also retained its Eurosceptic nature, even though Alfred Sant was less ideological on the issue and not against the European Union project per se/as a whole. However, he felt that there were not the right conditions for the country to join the European Union: As a result of membership, our cost structure would go haywire, we will lose exports, imports, will come in and therefore there will be a net transfer of funds from Malta at the balance of payment levels, plus unemployment, for all of which the incoming funds from the EU will not compensate. From the political point of view, we would be committed to a security and defence system, both potentially and as of now, which would contradict our position of neutrality. (Sant in Grech & Montanaro, Times of Malta, 13 October 1996a, p. 6.)

Even though supporting membership was still not considered a viable option, the Labour Party declared that it wanted to build a stronger alliance with the EU in areas such as security and free trade (Cini, 2000). The Nationalist Party maintained its approach in favour of EU membership. However, the party faced a series of challenges with its membership proposal. Membership in the European Union had not materialised as the European Union decided to focus on Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Whilst this made it possible for a neutral state like Malta to join the European Union, the Nationalist Party had long promised to make Malta a member of the EU by 1995, something which did not take place. Instead, the European Union recommended that negotiations continue with Malta and Cyprus so that they could join the European Union at a later date (Busuttil et al., 1999). Fenech Adami (2014) would later reveal that it was the German Chancellor of Affairs Helmut Kohl who vetoed Maltaʼs EU membership. Kohl believed that it was too early to let Malta join the EU as he was suspicious of Maltaʼs relationship with Libya. Another argument on why Malta was left out of the 1995 enlargement was that economic reforms were still required for the Maltese economy to be able to flourish within the EU area (Busuttil et al., 1999). Whilst one might never know the reasons behind the exclusion of Malta, the decision placed the Nationalist Party in a difficult position. During this election, the Nationalist Party’s economic reforms took the centre

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stage in the debate between the main political parties. These included the introduction of VAT, a requisite for EU accession, with the Nationalist Party declaring that it was not introducing it as a requisite to join the EU, but because it was an efficient tax system that would facilitate tax collection. Still, the introduction of VAT produced strong criticism against the government and the EU (Fenech Adami, 2014). By 1996, the political environment had been radically altered by the Nationalist Partyʼs socioeconomic reforms and the domestic impact of the EU, in particular, due to the introduction of the VAT. The Nationalist Party entitled its manifesto, ‘Dialogue, Solidarity and Commitment’ (PN, 1996), with the party re-proposing EU accession and pledging a greater effort to attract investment and create more job opportunities for Maltese citizens. The vision of making Malta a member of the European Union evolved from being a general aspiration of the Nationalist Party to becoming a reality due to the submission of the application to join the European Union. This raised the contestation by those who believed that Malta would not benefit from membership, as the realities of a potential accession began to take shape. Labourʼs manifesto, ‘Citizen First: A vision for a Modern Malta’ (MLP, 1996), proposed the removal of VAT, the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan as an alternative to EU membership, and safeguarding peace in the Mediterranean. The Labour Party, with its new leader, image, and modern policies, was more dynamic and put forward a voter-friendly agenda with the electorate at its centre. Its foreign policy promoted peace in the Mediterranean and a stronger alliance between Mediterranean states in areas such as the environment and the economy. The Labour Party promoted the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan—a partnership agreement with the EU as an alternative to membership, which aimed to strengthen the links between Malta and the EU without actual accession. The Labour Party still safeguarded the neutrality status of Malta, declaring that it was against the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The PfP was perceived as a threat to Maltaʼs relationship with non-EU and non-NATO countries and the country’s neutrality status. For this reason, it proposed Maltaʼs withdrawal from this programme. The parties were therefore still on opposite sides of the spectrum over the EU membership issue, and this was evident as the Nationalist Party attacked Labourʼs foreign policy agenda: The lack of credibility is again when they speak of Malta as a ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’. What does it mean? If it means neutrality, they say Partnership for Peace is against neutrality, and yet, Switzerland will soon join the PfP. (Fenech Adami in Grech & Montanaro, Times of Malta, 20 October 1996b, p. 6)

The Nationalist Party’s election agenda was largely a continuation of its two previous election programmes. Still, rather than simply proposing membership, the party-in-government was introducing the required reforms to meet the EU criteria. Such requirements including the introduction of the VAT system were unpopular with a large segment of the electorate, including some of the party’s own grassroots voters. The party had failed to anticipate the impact which the introduction of VAT would have on the business community. It also failed to defend its economic

4.4

Reforms and EU Membership

111

policies, which dominated the national agenda (PN, 1996; Gonzi, 2013). The Nationalist administration left office with a deficit of 9% of GDP, whilst servicing the debt amounted to Lm 57 million (€132.77 million) (Mullard & Pirotta, 2008). These economic problems brought tangible electoral benefits to the Labour Party. Being in Opposition, it was in a better position to offer more incentives to widen its support and use Maltaʼs economic problems to campaign against the EU membership proposal by removing VAT (which was required by the EU) and replacing it with a Customs and Excise Tax (Sant, 2013). The electoral campaign was dominated by several debates which were more or less interlinked with the EU membership issue. These included the impact of a potential EU membership on Maltaʼs sovereignty and the negative impact of the VAT. The election also saw the first political alignments surrounding membership (mostly due to the introduction of VAT), with interest groups forming part of the party competition dimension and a degree of economic convergence between the Nationalist and Labour parties. The Labour Party was much more organised, and its campaign was much more dynamic and effective than had been the case in 1987 and 1992.10 For the first time, the campaign centred on an issue that was directly linked with Maltaʼs EU membership application, which is the introduction of VAT. The unpopularity of the latter was used to highlight the inefficiencies of the Nationalist administration and the need to safeguard the national interest, something which the Nationalist administration was failing to do in its attempt to meet the EU criteria. As it was heading for the 1996 electoral campaign, the Nationalist Party was in difficulty as it failed to define the modalities of membership and the parameters required by the EU to accept Malta as a member state. By 1996, the potential impact of the EU on the country’s sovereignty proved to be another contentious point within the country’s political system. This was a sensitive issue, due to the nationalistic sentiment which existed and a desire to protect the countryʼs self-determination, which the Labour Party used to legitimise its Eurosceptic stance. The Nationalist Party declared that Malta’s sovereignty was going to be strengthened within the EU, as the European supranational organisation was made of various states that all transferred part of their sovereignty to offer a better future for them and their children (Fenech Adami, In-Nazzjon, 20 September 1996). At the same time, the centre-right party kept promoting the EU as an instrument for economic development, by highlighting the Lm 45 million (€104.82 million) of Structural Funds Malta might gain for economic development (In-Nazzjon, 19 September 1996; De Marco, In-Nazzjon, 23 September 1996). Malta’s membership application, so the prospect of economic, political, and cultural integration with the EU was salient enough for the Nationalist Party to keep promoting it in its manifestos and campaigns (Zammit, Times of Malta,

10

The campaign of the Labour Party was developed by Phil Noble and contained elements of personalisation of politics. The reason for this is that much of the campaign was centred on the Labour leader.

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25 September 1996b; Gonzi, 2013; Zammit Dimech, 2013). At the same time, the Nationalist Party made a strategic mistake in rejecting the possibility of letting the Maltese electorate decide for themselves on the EU issue through a referendum. This idea of a referendum, was proposed by some party officials, but it was not taken on board by the leadership. This strengthened the perception that the Nationalist administration was repeatedly failing to take into consideration Maltese citizens’ views on the issue by refusing to allow the Maltese voters to decide on the matter (Saliba, 2013; Zammit Dimech, 2013). This ultimately made the Labour proposal of a partnership, which itself might be seen as another form of European Integration, rather than membership, more attractive. In addition, the Nationalist Party faced a series of problems with a potential membership date. Accession in 1995 did not take place with the European Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek, declaring that the next enlargement was going to take place around 2002 (Vella, L-Orizzont, 21 September 1996b). This legitimised Labour’s claim that the EU was not interested in Malta. The foreign policy programme of the Labour Party was based on a pragmatic assessment of the potential damage that EU membership and the PfP programme could have on Maltaʼs role in the Mediterranean. However, unlike his predecessors, Sant, who served as a Maltese representative to the EU during the 1970s, recognised that a close relationship with the EU was inevitable due to its growing importance within the European and Mediterranean regions. At the same time, the Labour Party warned that Malta in the EU was going to turn into a ‘fortress’, which would have threatened its hard-fought sovereignty and Malta’s neutrality (Vella, Times of Malta, 15 October 1996a). On the other hand, the Labour government proposed strengthening of the relationship with the EU, so that the country could enjoy some benefits from Europe’s Single Market and its educational programmes. These remarks encapsulate the challenge for the Labour Party. Despite being against the country’s EU membership, the new Labour leader understood the realities surrounding the growing influence of the European Union which meant that Labour could not risk scaring away any direct investment coming from the EU and its member states such as Germany and the UK. Whilst the leader of the Labour Party did not want the country to become an EU member state, he proposed the freezing and not the withdrawal of Malta’s application. For the Labour Party, Malta’s EU application was a zero-sum game, since contributing to safeguarding peace in the Mediterranean (which shaped its foreign policy) while being within the EU was seen as not being achievable (Grech & Montanaro, Times of Malta, 13 October 1996a). This highlights the ideological fear of the European Union threatening Labourʼs longstanding approach towards the country’s foreign policy. This led to the approach towards the European Union being, at times, contradictory. The party favoured a formal relationship with the EU, yet at the same time, it kept portraying it as a menace to Maltaʼs identity and neutrality. The Labour Party’s approach to the EU came into direct collision with that of the Nationalist Party, which used Labour’s policies to question whether Labour was safeguarding Maltaʼs interests or those of other countries:

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113

They imagine that other countries in the Mediterranean have an interest that Malta should not join the EU. That is not true. I do not think that any country, including Libya, has any interest in Malta not joining the EU. It is really a function of the way the socialist party still thinks that they should put, even before Maltaʼs interests, some other country’s interests. (Fenech Adami, in Grech & Montanaro, Times of Malta, 20 October 1996b p. 7)

Still, in the country’s political system, civil society groups began to express their opinion on a potential membership in the European Union. Whilst Malta, as a small state, was known for the influence political parties enjoyed, civil society groups and various organisations provided support for the two campaigns. The role of these groups would become more important in the 2003 referendum and national election. For the second time, a potential EU membership and the threat of the negative implications of EU regulations encouraged various groups from different sectors to come together and oppose it. These included the Labour Party, and the General Workers Union (GWU). This was considered as the first movement to campaign against the Nationalist Partyʼs EU membership proposal. On the other hand, the Malta Federation of Industry and the Malta Chamber of Commerce revealed their support towards Malta’s membership declaring it was beneficial for the country’s economy. Whilst Maltaʼs Green Partyʼs involvement in the campaign might not have helped the small party to win votes, it certainly shifted the political balance towards the left. The party was made up of several former Labour politicians who had left or were removed from the Party and had launched the Green Party. Whilst the Green Party was not against the European Union, it was against the idea that membership should be rushed and promoted a more mature discussion on the matter (AD, 1996). The party was one of the first to propose a referendum over the matter. Whilst the party did not consider itself as Eurosceptic, the discourse used to describe the Nationalist Party’s approach towards the EU based on ‘submissive behaviour’ and membership ‘at all cost’ could have strengthened the narrative being promoted by the Eurosceptics that the EU was another form of colony. This could have helped to shift the discussion on the realities of EU membership, something which the Labour Party was successfully using to its advantage. The Nationalist Party had rejected the criticism that it was trying to please the European Union by introducing VAT. The party rejected claims that it had opted for submissive behaviour towards the European Union. It outlined how this criticism was a ploy to use the insecurities of the electorate and persuade them to turn their back on the changes that the country required (Frendo, 1996). The Nationalist Party could rely on the support of the Malta Chamber of Commerce, and the Malta Federation of Industry (FOI). A survey also revealed that 61% of students interviewed were in favour of Maltaʼs accession (The Malta Independent, 29 September 1996a). The FOI and Malta Chamber of Commerce both favoured Malta’s accession, although they failed to answer the myriad of concerns that surrounded the new tax system (Malta Federation of Industry, Times of Malta, 17 October 1996b). The GWU declared that the VAT was threatening Malta’s labour market and was negatively influencing the country’s inflation (Zammit, Times of Malta, 6 September 1996a). Maltaʼs Green Party and the Labour Party accused the Nationalist administration of trying to appease the EU by introducing

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this new tax system when this was not suitable for the country. This is the reason why they also accused the Nationalist Party of working against the national interest (It-Torċa, 13 October 1996c). The Nationalist administration failed to explain the implementation of the reforms and their long-term benefits for the country. Defending the VAT by declaring that it was needed to simplify tax collection and to ensure that everyone pays taxes (Zammit, Times of Malta, 25 September 1996b), failed to convince voters about the long-term benefits of the new tax system at a time when numerous political parties and lobby groups were campaigning for its removal. The Nationalist Party, driven by its membership vision, had to take into account the abolition of customs duties, an EU prerequisite, at the beginning of the year, which produced a record deficit. Private consumption in Malta expanded by 14% during 1995 and the share of investment in GDP was around 35%. However, the country needed further economic reforms to bring down the deficit, strengthen the economy in case of an economic shock and develop the tourism sector. The latter employed thousands of workers and was facing a series of difficulties due to the decline in tourist arrivals (The Malta Independent, 1 September 1996d). On the other hand, Labour successfully campaigned on the negative impact of European Integration and economic Europeanisation on the agricultural and fishing industries, and the threat it posed to the state-owned dockyards which were constantly registering heavy losses11 The Labour Party claimed that a potential EU membership would damage these industries since they could not withstand the intense competition (L-Orizzont, 4 October 1996e) produced by the single market which is the reason why they asked Maltese voters to elect Labour to safeguard the national interest.12 The election took place on 26 October 1996, and the turnout reached 96.3%. As outlined in Table 4.3, the election was won by the Labour Party. The new Labour administration interpreted this as a victory for its anti-membership approach. It garnered 132,497 votes (50.7%) whilst the Nationalist Party obtained 124,864 votes (47.8%). The Labour Party won 17,587 more votes than in the previous election and its share of the vote increased from 46.5% to 50.7% in just 5 years. Labour did not win enough seats to have a Parliamentary majority; however, thanks

Fenech Adami insisted that the government was investing in the first two industries by transferring Lm 373,000 (€868,000) to them between 1992 and 1995 to buy and develop new technology for milking parlours and irrigation equipment to be able to withstand potential competition (In-Nazzjon, 18 October 1996f). The dockyards remained one of the most hotly debated issues between both sides. The company was weak, uncompetitive, and debt-ridden. Labour proposed to transform it into the best shipyard in the Mediterranean (Times of Malta, 12 October 1996g). Registering a loss of Lm12.5 million (€29.12 million), Fenech Adami planned to privatise the company and prevent it from being a burden on Maltaʼs finances. 12 Alfred Sant argued that a Labour administration would favour further privatisation as a means of reducing the countryʼs inflation. He wanted to encourage the private sector to thrive whilst protecting Maltaʼs consumers. This had to be done by working closely with the commercial sectors to enable them to retain their competitiveness (Calvert, Times of Malta, 8 October 1996). 11

4.4

Reforms and EU Membership

Table 4.3 1996 Election Results

MLP PN AD Turnout

115 Seats 35 34 –

Votes 132,497 124,864 3820

Votes (%) 50.7 47.8 1.46 96.3

to the Constitutional clause introduced in 1987, the party was given additional seats to secure a one-seat majority over the Nationalist Party (Table 4.3). By the end of 1996, Maltaʼs EU membership application was frozen, and the country had withdrawn from the PfP programme. During the discussion in parliament on Malta’s application, George Vella, who at the time was the new Foreign Minister, discussed in detail the decision to freeze and not withdraw Malta’s application. On this matter, he declared that Malta’s future was linked with that of the European Union but that does not mean membership. He defended this position by highlighting how the Labour Party was simply placing the citizen first and protecting the country’s Neutrality Clause. Still, the fact that the application was frozen and not withdrawn meant that the EU and Malta could discuss and study the best way to improve the relationship between the two parts whilst also protecting the national interest (Parliamentary Minutes, 1996 Session 4). The lack of information surrounding the European Union and the negative impact of the VAT changed the electorate’s perception of the EU (Borg, 2013). In a survey published in May 1996, 59.5% believed that the EU was going to be detrimental to Malta; with only 40.8% of those surveyed declaring that it would have a positive impact on the country (Pace, 2011). This was a serious problem for the Nationalist Party, which had spent a decade campaigning on the potential positive impact of the EU on the Maltese quality of life, economy, and identity. However, it had failed to justify the introduction of the needed economic reforms including that of VAT, and this was used against Maltaʼs EU membership application. For this reason, it had to adjust its position and strategy in light of the drop-in support for membership. By 1996, it was clear that the top-down influence of the European Union and the requirement of economic reforms which Malta had to introduce to comply with these rules, were not received well by the Maltese citizens. The Labour Party managed to frame the EU issue better than the Nationalist Party. The Labour Partyʼs decision to declare that this was voters’ last opportunity to step away from membership and shield the country from the EUʼs negative implications proved to be a winning gamble (Sant, L-Orizzont, 30 September 1996; Debattisa, KullĦadd 20 October 1996) By politicising the VAT issue the Labour Party managed to attract the votes of the business cleavage (cf. Fig. 4.2) which traditionally voted for the Nationalist Party. This election showcased how the EU issue could be politicised by the main political parties. For this reason, Europeanisation had an indirect impact through the party competition and the policy change dimensions. For the first time, a number of groups, joined forces to campaign against Maltaʼs potential membership, and this helped to overshadow the Nationalist Partyʼs campaign. The introduction of VAT

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Fig. 4.2 The Labour Party’s Policy Shift

raised a series of issues about the economic impact of a potential membership. In addition, another important element was the EU’s decision to ignore Maltaʼs application to focus on other countries, which then negatively hit the Nationalist Party, and taken within the context of Maltaʼs political environment, legitimised Labourʼs declaration that the EU was not interested in Malta. The Nationalist Party had to re-evaluate its electoral campaign especially as the Labour Party had suspended Malta’s EU membership. This was certainly an enormous challenge for the Nationalist Party Leader Fenech Adami, who as highlighted below, was still convinced that Membership was essential for the country to safeguard its future. The future of the Nationalist leader was also in doubt, with the belief that his political career was over with the party members being asked whether he should retain the party leadership.13 If there was something that truly bothered me after the 1996 election defeat, it was that all our hard work to make Malta an EU member appeared to have been in vain. I was convinced membership was the way forward for our island. We had battled long and hard to persuade the EU we were a serious candidate, and the thought of that going to waste preoccupied me a great deal. (Fenech Adami, 2014, p. 265)

The persistence towards defending the introduction of the VAT, as a requirement for EU membership, did not help the Nationalist Party which until now, had failed to discuss the potential membership with civil society. The Nationalist Party believed it was up to stakeholders to gather their information (Bugeja, The Malta Independent, 22 September 1996) whilst voters, entrepreneurs, interest groups, and consumers expected the government to provide information on the European Union, something which it did not do (Gonzi, 2013). This is the reason why some of these voters opted

13

The Nationalist Party leader was reconfirmed with 596 votes in favour and 15 votes against (Schiavone, 2003).

4.5

Malta’s Tax System and the Labour Party

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to vote for the Labour Party and the idea that partnership rather than membership would be beneficial for Malta. The party’s cultural framing of the EU as a tool to strengthen Maltaʼs European Identity and its European heritage failed to convince the electorate that they were going to benefit from membership. After this electoral loss, the party decided that if membership was going to be achieved, this was going to be done using a referendum (Zammit-Dimech, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). To do this, it initiated an information campaign surrounding the EU to prevent further setbacks (Borg, 2013). The changes within the party started with a pledge to offer a referendum on EU accession if it had to win the next election and use the campaign to inform voters about the EU.

4.5

Malta’s Tax System and the Labour Party

For the new Labour administration, the VAT system which it successfully used to highlight the negative impact of European regulations turned into a problem for the Labour administration. The Minister of Finance, Lino Spiteri, believed that the VAT system could be adapted. He had to introduce a complicated new tax system and implemented a 3% reduction in the budget (Mullard & Pirotta, 2008), reduced public spending, and removed a stipend given to University students. Spiteri disagreed with Sant over the introduction of the Customs and Excise Tax, with Spiteri resigning and retiring from politics (Spiteri, 2007). The CET proved not to be as successful as anticipated as small and medium businesses were negatively hit. This forced several former voters who had voted Labour for the first time, to vote again for the PN. Whilst the new Prime Minister of Malta Alfred Sant decided to freeze Malta’s EU application, he did sign the Luxembourg Agreement with the European Union on 28 April 1998. This agreement was important for Malta to establish a Free Trade Agreement between the country and the EU which would exclude the areas of framing and services (Muscat, 1998). This outlines the vision of Sant who wanted a close relationship with the EU (similar to that of Switzerland with the EU) without the need for the country to join the organisation. Still, the relationship between Malta and the European Union would take another turn with the early elections. With a one-seat majority, the new Labour administration soon found itself fighting for survival in a parliamentary vote linked with a vote of confidence over a rehabilitation project of the Cottonera region – a region from which the party drew considerable support and where allegiance to Mintoff was at its strongest. One of its members of parliament and former Prime Minister, Mintoff voted against the Labour administration, and fresh elections were called barely 2 years after its electoral victory (Schiavone, 2003). This allowed the Nationalist Party to again promote Malta’s membership in the EU, this time using a different strategy from that used in 1996. This election was not only unexpected, but it allowed the Nationalist Party to re-propose Maltaʼs EU membership. This was certainly helped by the fact that, by

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Table 4.4 Reference to the EU in the manifesto PN As the world awaits the start of the new millennium, there is particular optimism in Europe, where the divisions and confrontations of history have been laid to rest. Though there are many problems and setbacks, these are outweighed by much that is positive. One has only to consider the huge progress that has taken place in a relatively short period of time. Countries which were poor, like Ireland, have succeeded, with the help of the European Union, in taking giant strides forward (PN, 1998).

MLP On the other hand, the New Labour Government appreciates and supports the process of economic, social, and political integration spearheaded by the European Union. It is also aware that this country can only enjoy the concrete benefits of full membership in this Union once we have adequately consolidated the economic foundations of our own home— our Maltese Home in Europe (MLP, 1998).

1998, and due to a change in its leadership, Maltaʼs Green Party shifted its approach towards the European Union, highlighting how Malta’s place belonged within the EU. The potential impact of the EU on the island again took centre stage, with an emphasis on the direct and indirect impact of the EU on the environment, consumers’ rights, gender equality, and post-materialist values (Briguglio, 2009). To avoid a repetition of the 1996 electoral defeat, Fenech Adami was more communicative about the need to safeguard Maltaʼs interests through EU membership. On the other hand, Alfred Sant failed to articulate his alternative to EU membership. For the 1998 elections, the Nationalist Partyʼs manifesto was Wealth, Trust, and Direction (PN, 1998). As revealed in Table 4.4, the importance of the European Union membership issue increased as this was essential to persuade their voters that EU membership and VAT were going to translate into long-term benefits. On the other hand, Labourʼs manifesto was ‘Iċ-Ċittadin l-Ewwel’—‘Putting the Citizen First’ (MLP, 1998). The centre-left party pledged to be a guarantor of the working class by defending their interests and working for peace in the Mediterranean. The party’s European approach had ideological and economic foundations, arguing for the rejection of Malta’s EU membership bid to safeguard the country’s neutrality. The Nationalist Party’s rationale for membership had both economic and ideological foundations. It highlighted how the European Union had become a symbol of peace and declared that Malta’s economy would be strengthened as it did for other small states such as Ireland. Fenech Adami promoted several economic reforms which were needed to meet EU criteria, portraying the EU as an instrument to achieve Maltaʼs needed economic development. His strategy of linking the European Union issue with the need to strengthen Malta’s identity and Malta’s historical heritage was risky yet proved to be successful. Fenech Adamiʼs discourse was highly ideological, bringing together Catholic Social Teaching and European elements including solidarity which were always at the core of his campaigns and speeches. In this way, he could win over the conservatives and moderates in his party by envisaging the development of the country and Maltese society in respect of the country’s Catholic heritage.

4.5

Malta’s Tax System and the Labour Party

119

The language used by the Labour Party in the manifesto reflected the struggle for the party to address the negative implications of an EU membership. Within this manifesto, the party took a positive approach towards European Integration and declared that Malta could find its place in Europe once the economy is strengthened so that it was able to compete with other economies. Rather than membership in the European Union, it proposed a stronger economic relationship without necessarily joining the EU. For the second time, Sant proposed the partnership agreement which had to open the European markets to Maltese industries, together with the ability of Maltese students to participate in European projects. In 1998, the political environment was shaped by the internal struggles of the Labour Party and the attempt by the Nationalist Party to persuade voters of the viability of potential EU membership. The major partiesʼ foreign policy approach was based on two main issues that European Union membership proposed by the Nationalist Party and the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan and a wider debate on Malta’s relationship with the EU by the Labour Party (Brincat, The Malta Independent, 1 August 1998). The EU membership question was widely discussed during the campaign. The Labour Party employed the fear of the unknown approach again, by warning about the freedom of movement and the risk of having foreign nationals working in Malta. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party rejected such projections declaring that Maltaʼs standard of living and wages were lower than the average of the EU member states, meaning that it was not an attractive market for immigration (Vella, The Malta Independent, 18 August 1998). The Labour Party kept promoting its vision for a partnership with the European Union as opposed to full membership. However, this vision had several problems. Few understood the rationale behind it; there was no clear mapping of how this was going to take place and what parameters the EU might use to establish this agreement. Labour had to persuade voters that it would be possible to agree to a formal relationship between Malta and the EU and establish cooperation on security and foreign policy matters, whilst safeguarding Maltaʼs special relationships with non-EU countries (L-Orizzont, 6 August 1998a). The impact of Europeanisation on the Maltese economy was a strong contentious point, and as usual, the main political parties had opposite views. The opinion of the main political parties was also different as to how much funding Malta would have received if it joined the EU. This was directly linked to the question of whether Malta was going to end up being a net contributor as claimed by the Labour Party, or a net receiver, as claimed by the Nationalist Party. On this issue, Fenech Adami declared that Malta was going to be a benefactor and described the net contribution claim as ‘idiocy of the first order’, as Maltaʼs GNP was half the EU average (Vella, The Malta Independent, 25 August 1998). Both political parties agreed that the economy needed dramatic restructuring, and both proposed a series of policies to attract more investment and create more jobs. Still, for the Labour Party, these economic reforms had to be done outside of the EU

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whilst for the Nationalist Party, the EU would have helped the economic recovery of the country through its funds. They both emphasised the need to curb inflation whilst reducing the national debt to 60% of GDP, which was a requisite for membership. The Economic Intelligence Report on Maltaʼs second quarter revealed that Malta had sluggish economic growth, which was stuck at 2.4% (Aloisio & Mangion, The Malta Independent, 23 August 1998). Both parties laid the blame on each other. The Labour administration had governed for barely 2 years, so they blamed the Nationalist administration for its excessive public expenditure to generate economic expansion. Labour claimed that under the previous administration, national debt spiralled and Labour was now promising to reduce this (Aloisio & Mangion, The Malta Independent, 23 August 1998). On the other hand, the Nationalist Party accused Sant’s government of throwing away the Lm 100 million (€232.94 million) worth of funds Malta could have gained if its EU membership application had not been frozen in 1996, funds which could have been used to generate investment (In-Nazzjon, 17 August 1998b). This economic discussion focused on what kind of impact would European Integration and economic Europeanisation have on the country. These included discussions on their impact on VAT, Electricity, Water Bills, and Industries. On the VAT issue, the Nationalist Party pledged that it was going to be re-introduced at no more than 15%. However, Sant declared that the VAT was going to be raised to 26% to cover the costs of membership. He believed that this would increase the country’s debt and that a future Nationalist administration would increase electricity and water bills in Malta as required by the EU, something which the Nationalist Party denied. On the impact of the European Union on Maltaʼs Industries, the Nationalist Party highlighted how the EU favoured small enterprises declaring that 933 out of every 1000 businesses in the EU were small enterprises (PN, 1998). On the other hand, Labour warned that the EU will force the abolition of duty-free, therefore hindering the sale of this industry which its profits amounted to Lm 6.7 million (€15.67 million) in the first half of 1998. For the Labour Party, this was going to threaten Maltese jobs and lead to an increase in unemployment levels (MLP, 1998). The indirect impact of Europeanisation enabled interest and lobby groups to strengthen their role within Maltese society. Various NGOs and trade unions including the Malta FOI, Malta Chamber of Commerce, and GWU opted to use the EU issue to join the national debate by giving their opinion about membership, endorsing either membership or Santʼs partnership plans, and along the way, finding their own space within Maltaʼs political system. Their role was not only important for political parties to legitimise their approach, but it had the potential to alter the party’s competitive dimension as they promoted one party’s programme instead of the other. The Nationalist Party was the main benefactor of these endorsements, with the majority of the interest and lobby groups shifting towards membership and the

4.5

Malta’s Tax System and the Labour Party

Table 4.5 1998 Election Results

MLP PN AD Turnout

121 Seats 30 35 –

Votes 124,220 137,037 3209

Votes (%) 47 51.8 1.21 95.4

party’s Europeanist stance.14 For example, the Malta Hotels Restaurant Association (MHRA) favoured membership as it believed that Malta had the potential to attract more tourists from the European market to strengthen the tourism sector (In-Nazzjon, 18 August 1998c). At the same time, and because this was an endorsement purely based on the partiesʼ EU approach, the MHRA was also keen on Labour’s proposal to reduce the accommodation tax to 5% compared to the Nationalist Party’s 10% (Vella, L-Orizzont, 12 August 1998a). For the Malta FOI, it was useless to stay isolated and waste the opportunity to compete in the European market and be able to export Maltese products (The Malta Independent, 21 August 1998d). As these endorsements were based on the policy and not on the party, not every organisation embraced the idea of EU membership. Some organisations endorsed Santʼs Switzerland in the Mediterranean plan. Still, there was a belief that the plan was strategically unclear, and a potential detriment to business interests which favour stability and clarity. This showcased that perhaps the Labour Party was required to do more to promote its alternative for EU membership. These unions and lobby groups which endorsed the Switzerland in the Mediterranean plan included the GWU and the Federation of Hunters and Trappers. These organisations were concerned that membership and Maltaʼs need to converge with the EU laws on hunting, would restrict the activity, which was one of the traditional hobbies in Malta and a hotly contested issue across the island. On this, Labour courted hunters by reminding them of the ʻWild Birdsʼ 79/409/EEC Act, (Baldacchino, KullĦadd, 9 August 1998) which prohibited hunting. The Maltese government would find it hard to opt out of this directive. In addition, these endorsements reflected opinion shifting in favour of membership. The issue surrounding hunting would become a major issue after the country’s membership which would lead to a hunting referendum in 2015. The election took place on 5 September 1998, with a turnout reaching 95.4%. As shown in Table 4.5, the Nationalist Party managed to win the election gaining back the votes it had lost in the 1996 national election. Whilst it was known that the Labour Party was in difficulty due to the internal crisis which plagued it (Saliba, 2013), no one expected such a significant vote for the Nationalist Party. In fact, it received 137,037 votes (51.8%) whilst the Labour Party received 124,220 votes

14 These included the Malta Employers Association, National Pensioners Association, MUT, Chamber of Commerce, Malta Hotels and Restaurants Association (MHRA), Federation of Industry (FOI), General Retailers and Traders Union GRTU (in 2020, it would be rebranded as Malta Chamber of SMEs), and Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU).

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(47%). The Nationalist Party managed to win back 12,073 votes compared to the 1996 election and had a majority of 12,817 votes. The Labour Party lost 8277 votes (Schiavone, 2003). The Alternative Democracy (Green Party) managed to earn just 1.2% of the votes. Fenech Adamiʼs victory was seen as a win for his European vision, with The Malta Independent newspaper headline being, ‘Bonjour, Europe’, as this was seen as a victory for the EU membership proposal and the younger generation who were going to benefit from EU membership (The Malta Independent, 7 September 1998, p. 1). The new government immediately re-activated Maltaʼs EU membership application. Reactivating Maltaʼs application was not easy as the PN expected as European Commissioner Hans van den declared that Malta could not switch its position every time there was a change in the party-ingovernment. However, the PN administration persuaded the EU to reopen negotiations with Malta, as the party restarted its reforms to converge with the EU criteria and prepare the country for the EU Referendum which was going to take place in 2003 (Fenech Adami, 2014). In this election, the norms and principles of the European Union were promoted by the Nationalist Party agenda to build an aggressive information campaign in favour of European Union membership. It was evident that these norms were embedded in the Nationalist Party ideology and discourse, and were espoused by Fenech Adami (PN, 1998). The potential benefits of Structural Funds were framed to promote and legitimise the party’s decision to pursue membership and as an incentive for voters to embrace the Nationalist’s political programme. Evidence suggests that two-party dimensions were particularly influenced by Europeanisation. The party competition dimension was influenced by the EU as interest and lobby groups aligned themselves in favour or against the EU. A number of interest and lobby groups understood the importance of this election for Maltaʼs potential EU accession, which is the reason why they sought to find their space within the national political system and influence the party competition dimension by endorsing the major parties’ Eurosceptic/Europeanist approaches. Reactivating Maltaʼs application was not as easy, as was expected by the PN. This was confirmed by European Commissioner Hans van den who declared that Malta could not switch its position every time there was a change in the party-in-government. However, the PN administration persuaded the EU to reopen negotiations with Malta, as the party restarted its reforms to converge with the EU criteria and prepare the country for the EU Referendum which was going to take place in 2003 (Fenech Adami, 2014). The country faced a long and complicated path subject to the Conditionality clause, which had been introduced to ensure candidate states respected EU criteria. This meant that with the reactivation of Maltaʼs membership application, the EU and its top-down impact were going to directly influence the policy reforms (dimension one) that the Nationalist Party was proposing to respect the imperatives imposed by the EU. Ultimately as in the 1996 election, due to the framing of the EU norms and principles, Europeanisation was primarily the product of the Nationalist Party and its leader Fenech Adami, and their aspirations to raise the stature of Malta by pursuing EU membership.

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The 2003 EU Referendum

123

With a redesign of its vision of Malta as a member of the EU, and by projecting the positive implications of Europeanisation on Malta, the Nationalist Party initiated a national information campaign on the economic, ideological, and technical values of the European Union and the long-lasting benefits of potential membership. This was not a simple task, as it sought to shape the dynamics of the national election to win back the voters it had lost. At the same time, it was shaping the electorateʼs opinion on the EU, which was now even more necessary as the party had promised a referendum on the issue (Zammit-Dimech, 2013). A survey carried out in February 1998 revealed that the European Union was viewed positively by 51.60% of Maltese voters and negatively by 47.40%, suggesting that the Nationalist Party’s campaign was bearing fruit. Still, the perceptions of Maltese citizens on the EU were very much based on the political parties’ approach and it could easily shift in one way or another. In addition, one has to question the level of knowledge people had about the European Union and whether this knowledge was based on the information being provided by the parties themselves through their media organisations. This also meant that European membership was going to be a hard-fought politicised issue with public opinion swinging either way (Saliba, 2004). The Labour Party kept promoting the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan as an alternative to membership. For the Labour Party, neutrality and the Mediterranean were at the core of its foreign policy agenda, and the feeling was that the issue was going to be extremely divisive as the country was heading towards a potential referendum over the issue. After the election, Alfred Sant was reconfirmed leader of the party. As the country was slowly heading towards the 2003 European referendum., Sant pledged to defend Maltaʼs interests, its neutrality, and its role in the Mediterranean by refusing to link Malta to any form of European membership.

4.6

The 2003 EU Referendum

The 2003 referendum and the subsequent national election were held to determine the relationship which Malta was going to have with the European Union. This is the reason why the 2003 referendum and eventual election were dominated by the EU membership question and the potential impact of Europeanisation on the island. At this stage, the Europeanisation of political parties involved various elements, including the establishment of new Pro-Europe and Eurosceptic movements which were put in place to support/oppose Maltaʼs EU membership. This is the first time that political parties would ally themselves with NGOs and other entities to promote or oppose EU membership. The first example can be that of the Nationalist Party and Malta’s Green Party which decided to work together with several lobbying groups to promote Maltaʼs EU membership. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the Labour Party proposed a different agenda basing its campaign on two issues; encouraging voters to vote against membership whilst promoting its ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan.

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The EU membership referendum brought a series of challenges and opportunities for Maltaʼs major parties. These included the creation of new pressure groups which were established to campaign against potential European Integration and thus block Europeanisation and the influence that the European Union could have on Malta. These hard Eurosceptic pressure groups; The Campaign for National Independence (CNI) movement and Front Maltin Inqumu (FMI) (Malta Arise! Front), were headed by former Labour Prime Ministers Mifsud Bonnici and Mintoff. These Eurosceptic groups were extremely ideological and fought to preserve the country’s sovereignty. However, the anti-EU alliance faced stiff competition from the Nationalist Party, the Green Party, and various lobby and interest groups that sought Maltaʼs EU accession. This enabled the Nationalist administration to transform the party and government into a powerful Pro-EU machine to persuade voters to vote for membership: The EU had become the fulcrum of our policies. This was the culmination of everything, we had to win. The political consequences of a negative vote would not have had an effect on me, as such, because I was already in the twilight of my career. But it held huge significance for our younger generation. (Fenech Adami, 2014, p. 315)

This unusual collaboration between the Green Party (AD) and the Nationalist Party, can be considered one of the early ‘movements’ within the country’s political system. It was a similar ‘coalition’ that one could find within the European Parliament where coalitions are made between parties on major issues and where cooperation is promoted and is often required. Still, The Green Party (AD) and the Nationalist Party had very distant ideologies. Malta’s Green Party was considered a liberal party that believed in the liberal principles of the EU and the Nationalist Party was promoting the Christian Democratic values of the EU. This liberal wing was a problem for conservative-minded individuals and could have been seen to jar with the centre-right party’s Christian credentials. It was known that the AD championed civil rights and campaigned for the introduction of same-sex marriage and divorce. The PN did not declare its position on the matter with Fenech Adami pledging to not introduce these civil liberties (In-Nazzjon, 12 February 2003). Fenech Adami declared that same-sex marriage and divorce were not going to be enforced by the European Union and were not proposed in the manifesto. The Nationalist Party and its leader Fenech Adami opted to promote the EU’s universal values of hope, solidarity, and trust based on Catholic Social Teaching and Christian Democracy in the campaign (In-Nazzjon, 9 February 2003). However, indirectly and, as will be outlined throughout this book, Malta’s eventual membership into the EU would not prevent society from discussing and campaigning for the introduction of these rights. The Nationalist Party launched a strong campaign of information surrounding the European Union. Their campaign was helped by the setting up of two government institutions, the Malta Information Centre and Malta-EU Steering and Action

4.6

The 2003 EU Referendum

125

Committee (MEUSAC)15 which were developed to offer information and a platform for public discussions surrounding the European Union and the relevant negotiations which were taking place between the EU and Malta. Whilst Malta’s Information Centre was headed by the PN’s former leader Simon Busuttil, MEUSAC was chaired by Malta’s Foreign Minister which in 2003 was Joe Borg (Borg, 2013). Malta’s Information Centre was formed to inform the public about the EU. On the other hand, MEUSAC was developed to communicate directly with several bodies to discuss the EU’s Acquis communautaire to understand what special clauses needed to be negotiated with the EU. To understand these campaigns, one has to take into consideration the political system in Malta which was always extremely polarised and divisive. Political parties had to find a way to overcome these divisions if they wanted to win the referendum. To do so, Prime Minister Fenech Adami projected himself as a leader of the coalition in favour of Malta’s EU membership. The government’s strategy was to use this to encourage the Maltese voters to put aside their political affiliations in the referendum: People can make their partisan choice at the general election. In the referendum we are talking about the future of the country. Do not throw away the future. The countryʼs future is not something to toy with so that a party leader would keep his seat. (Fenech Adami in Fenech, Times of Malta, 3 February 2003)

The language used reflected Fenech Adami’s attempt to move away from the traditional discourse of the Nationalist Party, as he needed the votes of those who did not identify with the party, but who were in favour of membership. The idea was for people to move away from party identification and vote to safeguard future generations. The Nationalist Partyʼs Europeanism and the attempt to de-politicise the issue were reflected in its decision to use the European Union symbols, including the European Union flag and light blue merchandise, instead of its party symbols. This was also done to attract Labourite voters who were in favour of the European Union, but who were finding it difficult to break their political allegiance and vote for the Nationalist Party. The Ngħidu Iva għall-Ewropa ‘Yes for Europe’ campaign was heavily supported by the EU institutions and the EPP, with both actively participating in the electoral campaigns as Malta was one of the few countries (from the ten countries which were heading for the 2004 accession) which risked voting against the proposed accession (Saliba, 2013; Fenech Adami, 2014). The ‘Yes for Europe’ movement promoted the shared norms and beliefs which it shared with the EU, including peace, human rights, democracy, and the special conditions which Malta had negotiated in several areas including shipyards, fishing, and farming (Fenech, Times of Malta, 3 February 2003b). This gave it a huge advantage over the ‘No’

15

Malta-EU Steering Action Committee was renamed Servizzi Ewropej f’Malta in 2021.

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campaign which had to work harder to mount a serious challenge against EU membership (Sant, 2013).16 Labour decided to use a different strategy by opting to treat the referendum as non-binding and encouraged its supporters to vote ‘No’, invalidate their vote, or abstain from voting (Times of Malta, 2 February 2003a). Questions over the purpose of the referendum arose when the Labour Party declared that for it to respect the referendum results, the ‘Yes for Europe’ had to win over 60% of the total votes. This was effectively impossible due to the intense political environment with the country firmly split in two over the issue. The referendum campaign saw the active participation of several EU politicians who intervened to encourage the Maltese to vote for Europe. This involvement was widely sought by Maltaʼs political parties due to the country’s small size and limited international influence. The endorsement of party programmes by European politicians was seen as a matter of prestige which gave these programmes an international dimension that they otherwise lacked. The President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, a convinced Europeanist and a Social Democrat visited Malta and informed voters that Malta would have a major role in the development of the Mediterranean as well as in that of the European region (In-Nazzjon,19 February 2003b). He emphasised that partnership, the Labour proposal seen as an alternative to membership, and membership were not the same thing: You can also stay outside. I should be sorry but. . . You can opt for that choice, but I do not want you to think that you would have the same advantages as being inside. (Prodi in Grech, Times of Malta, 14 February 2003a, p. 5)

The Labour Party had to not only deal with Prodi, a European Socialist who was promoting membership and undermining the Party’s proposal, but it also had to face some of its former Labour politicians, including former Finance Minister Lino Spiteri, who endorsed the Nationalist Party’s EU membership project and encouraged others to cross-party lines for the first time and vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum (Fenech, Times of Malta, 14 February 2003a; In-Nazzjon, 14 February 2003c). This was a very strategic move to win some Labour supporters, who were in favour of the EU but not necessarily keen to vote for the Nationalist Party. The ‘Yes for Europe’ movement sought to promote the positive economic aspects of membership, which was arguably the most important element for Maltese voters. This again was done with the help of EU politicians (Gonzi, 2013). As a strategy, the Nationalist Party kept promoting membership by focusing on the positive implications of Europeanisation and European funds. The Party had always declared that the EU was an economic power that was going to help Malta, through the Structural

16 From 2003, the Union Ħaddiema Magħqudin (UĦM), which was the second most important Trade Union in Malta, and the Association of Farmers, had joined the other associations in favour of the European Union (Briguglio, 2009). Just before the European Referendum, an MHRA survey revealed that 90% of respondents from the hotelier sector were in favour of Maltaʼs European Union membership. They believed that with Malta in the EU, the island could compete in more markets and attract more tourists (Grima, The Malta Independent, 5 February 2003b).

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Funds, to develop its economy, and Michele Schreyer, Budget Commissioner, declared that between 2004 and 2006 Malta was going to receive Lm 154.71 million (€360.38 million). This meant that Malta was going to benefit by Lm 81 million (€188.68 million) since its contributions amounted to Lm 73.75 million (€171.79 million) (Grech, Times of Malta, 13 February 2003a).17 The announcement that Microsoft was going to invest Lm20 million (€46.59millon) in Malta was also used to the advantage of the ‘Yes for Europe’ campaign. The decision could not have arrived at a better time as it was framed within the context of EU membership (In-Nazzjon, 5 February 2003d) as the Vice President of Microsoft Corporation, Jean Philippe Courtois, argued that the EU could help Malta to become an information centre which would attract more investment (Kelleher, The Malta Independent, 9 March 2003). In addition, this Pro-EU movement also used a study on the potential impact of the EU on Maltaʼs economy by Professor Ali Bayar, a professor of economics at the Free University of Brussels. The research by Professor Bayar concluded that Maltaʼs economy had the potential to grow by 5.9% over the medium to long term, with a GDP increase of Lm 95.8 million (€223.15 million) (Grima, The Malta Independent, 12 February 2003a; Galea-Debono, Times of Malta, 12 February 2003). Despite this, it was evident that the EU regulations had the potential to damage Maltaʼs agricultural and fisheries industries, and on this issue, Fenech Adami declared that he was ready to invest Lm 18 million (€41.93 million) of the Structural Funds over four years to make these industries competitive enough to withstand the challenges arising from European industries (In-Nazzjon, 22 February 2003e). During this particular period, Maltaʼs economy was shifting from a manufacturing-based industry to one based on IT and financial services. Even though the Labour Party blamed the negative impact of this on the EU, it was Chinaʼs export-oriented economy based on high production levels and low wage value which was proving attractive to several firms. The Nationalist Party was successful in understanding this and promoted the European funds as a means of investing in other sectors to create more jobs. One of the difficulties for the Labour campaign was promoting its alternative of ‘partnership’, which was not on the ballot papers since the referendum was simply on whether or not Malta should join the European Union. The partnership proposal can be considered the weakest part of Labourʼs campaign, as the information given on an eventual partnership was too little and too abstract to base a campaign on. The ‘partnership’ proposal replaced the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean Plan’. This concept was too distant for the Maltese as it was not clear to them what it meant. The rationale behind this lies in the fact that the leader of the Opposition Alfred Sant, spent several years in Switzerland. For this reason, he wanted Malta to have the same relationship that Switzerland had with the EU. His vision was for Malta to have a closer relationship without the need for the country to join (Vella, 2022). Still, whilst

17

The campaign against Malta’s EU membership campaign rejected this statement and kept insisting that Malta was going to become a net contributor.

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‘partnership’ replaced the ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’ plan, the concept was vague and voters required more information on what it meant in practical terms. A formal discussion with the European Union about a potential partnership never started, and there were still no clear modalities of how this was going to be achieved. Sant declared that it would take from 2 to 10 years to reach a final agreement (GaleaDebono, Times of Malta, 4 March 2003). This statement generated uncertainty and made it difficult for voters to choose partnership over a concrete membership plan, especially when there was still no idea of what regulations Malta would need to respect for the partnership to become a reality, and which it could opt out of to safeguard the national interest. On a regional level, Labour declared that a partnership would safeguard Maltaʼs neutrality which the party had an ideological attachment to, as well as sovereignty. It would also allow the country to retain its status as a bridge between North Africa and Europe and to maintain a strong relationship with all its Mediterranean neighbours (L-Orizzont, 10 February 2003f). Partnership will be achieved in respect and safeguarding of Maltaʼs Independence and Neutrality which is built on the principles of non-alignment as written in Maltaʼs Constitution. The Labour Party does not believe that Malta should not take part in military alliances, but at the same time, it doesn’t have to take a step back from cooperating with those non-military structures which work to safeguard peace, political and economic cooperation, and development of measures which help to enhance trust amongst the nations, on a global scale as well on a Euro-Mediterranean regional level. (MLP, 2003, p 13)

In reality, ‘partnership’ can be seen as another form of European Integration, although with no accession. The rationale behind it was to give more opportunities to Maltese workers, students, and self-employed individuals without having their jobs threatened by an EU membership. The rationale was that the Maltese manufacturing industry was going to remain protected from excessive competition (Vella, L-Orizzont, 3 February 2003e). In addition, it had to safeguard the dockyards, which was projected to be negatively affected by the impact of EU regulations. The Labour Party warned that if membership had to take place, the government was going to be prevented from transferring further money (apart from the Lm 420 million (€978.34 million) which the government was allowed to transfer to attempt to make the company competitive by 2008) in the form of subsidies to keep the company afloat (In-Nazzjon, 11 February 2003g). This meant that the dockyards were now in danger of being closed down. However, whilst the Labour Party built a strong campaign against the European Union, information surrounding its plan was virtually non-existent. A more detailed plan and more enthusiasm for the project might have made it possible for it to attract more voters towards its partnership proposal. Various politicians intervened in the referendum campaign to discuss the partnership proposal. Whilst those interventions might have added a touch of glamour and external support to the partiesʼ campaigns, they also could undermine them. For example, Claudia Roth, a German Green Party MP, and Ronald Gallimore, Head of the EU Commission Delegation, both denied that Malta could ever have partnership status with the EU as proposed by Labour (In-Nazzjon 3 March 2003h), arguing that

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129

trade agreements without obligations were something which the EU was never going to accept (Chetcuti, The Malta Independent, 25 February 2003): Reading the arguments against membership, I have to say that they are totally unrealistic. I think the MLPʼs partnership option is just a pretext to vote against EU accession. It is very irresponsible to promise the Maltese population unrealistic propositions. (Roth in Vella, MaltaToday, 2 March 2003c)

Whilst there were several other EU politicians and officials open to discussing a possible partnership, there was scepticism about how this could be achieved. Diana Wallis, a UK Liberal Democrat in the European Parliament, and Jean-Luc Dehaene, former Prime Minister of Belgium, stated that partnership could only exist in the European Free Trade Area as all other sectors were restricted to member states (Bonello, Times of Malta, 5 February 2003; Grech, Times of Malta, 15 February 2003a). The campaigns were extremely intense. The Labour Party had two campaigns to develop: one promoting its partnership plan and the other persuading voters to vote against Maltaʼs EU membership in the referendum. In this campaign, the Labour Party was joined by the newly formed CNI and FMI. In addition, the GWU, GHIMA (entrepreneurs within Maltese industry), and Progressive Farmersʼ Union were all campaigning against Maltaʼs EU membership (Briguglio, 2009). As might have been expected, the strongest opposition towards membership was mounted by former Labour leaders Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici. Their campaign was highly ideological, nationalistic in tone, and emphasised the need to safeguard Malta’s relationship with Libya, Malta’s Neutrality, and its Non-Aligned status (Times of Malta, 7 February 2003i) and safeguard the country from the threat which European Integration and economic Europeanisation posed to its grassroots voters.18 In addition, the Labour Party declared that the European Union would promote the introduction of same-sex marriage in the country (Farrugia, The Malta Independent, 16 February 2003), whilst others claimed that the EU was going to force Malta to pay for abortions for people in third world countries (Vella, L-Orizzont, 22 February 2003d). From an economic perspective, the anti-EU movement warned that the Copenhagen Criteria were going to bind the government to increase the pensionable age to 65 and introduce the Euro, thereby undermining the sovereignty of the Central Bank of Malta (L-Orizzont,14 February 2003j). The Euro issue was rarely addressed by the PN due to the controversies and questions which were being raised about its impact as its introduction at a later stage was a prerequisite for membership. The issue highlighted the restrictions that EU membership could impose on future Labour

18 Labourʼs warning that Malta was not competitive enough for membership was not received well by the MHRA (The Malta Independent, 18 February 2003p). The MHRA criticised the Labour Party for failing to reveal the true motive behind its Eurosceptic agenda. In return, the Labour Party accused the MHRA of ignoring the national interest as Malta was risking losing revenues up to 19.5% with membership since VAT would increase (Mifsud, The Malta Independent 7 February 2003).

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administrations and future Labour manifestos, and as argued in the previous section, in relation to the dockyards and Malta’s economic relationship with Libya. This was due to the EU’s visa and Schengen regulations, which were seen as likely to threaten Maltese jobs in Libya, deter Libyan companies from investing in the country (KullĦadd, 9 February 2003k) and limit the investment which Maltese companies, including Air Malta, Corinthia Group of Companies and Libya Arab Maltese, had in the North African country (MaltaToday, 9 February 2003l): When you go to Libya, you see the Maltese interests everywhere: duty free at the airport, a new hotel, a furniture consortium. Hundreds of Maltese work there. Libya is our natural market. Do you think you would ever be able to go to the EU and see so many Maltese interests there? (Sant in Macdonald, Times of Malta, 3 February 2003, p. 48)

The European party groups also played a role in this referendum. Whilst the Labour Party could not count on the support of the European socialist group, it did have European politicians endorsing its anti-EU membership stance, but not its partnership plans. The Labour Party was not pleased with the participation of Prodi, who was the left-wing President of the European Commission. His participation was met with resistance that highlighted diverging opinions which existed between the Labour Party, the European institutions, and the European Socialists. The Deputy Leader and Labour’s former Foreign Minister, George Vella, chided the intervention of European Union officials declaring: ‘The issue of the European Union membership is the business of the Maltese people and the choice is ours’ (The Malta Independent, 1 February 2003). Labour’s campaign did receive the support of British Eurosceptic MEPs, including Jeffrey Titford, William Abitbol, Daniel Hannan, and Nigel Farage, who encouraged Maltese voters to safeguard their sovereignty by voting against Maltaʼs membership. Nigel Farage warned the Maltese electorate to stay away from the EU as its decision-making process was shady (Grech, Times of Malta, 4 March 2003a). Anthony Coughlan, from the Irish National Platform, warned that the EU had caused unemployment in Ireland since half of the employment in the manufacturing industry was eliminated by 1981. He warned Maltese voters that Malta was going to lose control over its Central Bank and that with EU accession it could become a slave of German and French interests (Vella, L-Orizzont 1 February 2003b). Sharing the same opinion was Kelvin Hopkins, a Member of the House of Commons, who declared that the EU protected the interests of larger companies so that small and medium businesses, including Maltese businesses, were going to be negatively impacted. His premise was that the EU was a threat to unions and workers’ rights as it encouraged a low inflation rate by restricting its consumers’ demands (Vella, L-Orizzont 4 February 2003b). However, such support raised a series of questions as many of those who backed the Labour campaign, including the British Eurosceptics, had staunch right-wing ideologies. This illustrates that collaboration with European party groups and parliamentarians may not just be based on common ideologies and principles, but also based on their approach towards the EU. The referendum took place on 8 March 2003, and the turnout was 90.9%. This turnout, although high, was lower than the average turnout for national elections. As

4.7

Malta and the European Union: The 2003 National Election

Table 4.6 The 2003 EU Referendum Results

Yes No Turnout

Votes 143,094 123,628

131 Votes (%) 53.6 46.3 90.85

shown in Table 4.6, the ‘Yes for Europe’ movement managed to gather 143,094 (53.6%) votes, with the ‘No for Europe’ camp, receiving 123,628 votes (46.3%). A degree of uncertainty arose when Sant gave an alternative interpretation of the results, declaring that the ‘No’ campaign had won since the ʻYesʼ vote had only achieved 48% of the electorate’s support. Both camps took to the streets to celebrate, and the Prime Minister called for an early election to seal the decision (Fenech Adami in Manduca, MaltaToday, 6 April 2003). Labour took a strategic risk by declaring that the official results had to consider the votes of those who opted to abstain from voting and those who invalidated their vote, which meant that the ‘No for Europe’ campaign enjoyed the support of 52% of the electorate. The Labour Partyʼs decision to reject the official results and produce its own might have discouraged some to vote for it in the national election as public opinion had swayed towards membership. For the first time, there seemed to be several voters who had switched their political allegiance to vote in the referendum on their conception of the EU rather than on party lines. Whilst this was important, it was questionable what decisions those people would take in the national election. Still, the referendum suggested that Labour’s vision of preventing Maltaʼs EU membership (Fenech Adami, 2014) was neither sufficient nor flexible enough to attract people with different opinions and ideologies. Still, with an election deciding the matter, questions would be raised on whether voters would still vote for the Nationalist Party and the European Union membership project.

4.7

Malta and the European Union: The 2003 National Election

The 2003 national election had to close the chapter on the EU membership question. Unsurprisingly, the national election mirrored the referendum campaign as both major parties maintained the same rhetoric, although the coalition between the Nationalist and Green parties quickly collapsed over voting strategies. The electoral campaign dynamics remained the same, with Labour calling for another referendum so that voters could decide between partnership and membership.19 The Nationalist 19

This was not taken well by Maltaʼs interest groups and mocked by a number of lobby groups. The Malta Employers Association, MHRA, Federation of Industry and General Retailers and Traders Union refused Labourʼs proposal of holding another referendum (Grech, Times of Malta, 22 March 2003b) since for them, it would have undermined the countryʼs credibility.

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Party fought to maintain the same level of support it achieved in the referendum with its manifesto so that Malta grows in Europe (PN, 2003). Conversely, the Labour Party, with its manifesto, Partnership: The Best Choice (MLP, 2003), re-proposed the partnership plan as an alternative to the Nationalist Party’s EU accession project. The Nationalist Partyʼs membership proposal and Labourʼs partnership plan dominated their political programmes. Whilst in the referendum voters had only the option to vote for or against membership, this time they could decide between membership and partnership. The Nationalist Party’s campaign was based on the benefits of EU accession and the way this accession would strengthen Maltaʼs national identity. Its political machine went beyond the usual means to reach beyond its core voters. The party needed a wider spectrum of voters to maintain the support it had received in the referendum. To achieve this, it sought to appeal to the electorate’s conscience by making them aware of the historical importance of this election. Therefore, it asked the electorate to safeguard the future of the next generations by giving them access to several opportunities on a European-wide level. The Labour Party pursued a very aggressive campaign against EU membership. Its agenda relied on the negative impact of the European Union and the eventual positive aspects of its partnership plan. Santʼs pronouncements were more nationalistic in tone (when compared with his pronouncements during the referendum campaign), as he sought to defend the national identity and the Neutrality Clause to argue that Malta should never become an EU member state. The party was again supported by the FMI and CNI as both wanted to prevent membership at any cost. The 2003 election was arguably one of the most important elections in recent history (Gonzi, 2013). Strategically, the Nationalist Party campaign was based on a national reconciliation agenda with the vote based on membership and peace: We are living at a moment where images of a war are being transmitted as it happens all across the world. No one certainly agrees that we should see more wars. It is a world that has changed for the better and there is need for a new international order that safeguards peace, order and human rights. I am saying this because the choice we are to do is related to this international order. Part of this new international order for peace is without doubt the European Union. (Fenech Adami in Vella, MaltaToday, 13 April 2003a, p. 5.)

The language used by the main political parties reflected the prioritisation of foreign policy over other areas. Fenech Adami refers to peace, order, and human rights values at the heart of the European Union. The Nationalist Party declared that Malta needed to bear witness to its faith in Europe by opting for membership, as highlighted by John Paul II. It sought to promote EU membership alongside the party ideology which was based on Catholic principles. It highlighted how even the Supreme Pontiff believed in EU membership and its principles based on the rule of law and respect for human dignity. For the party, these would help Maltese society in its growth (Grima, The Malta Independent, 27 March 2003a). The coalition of the Nationalists and the Green Party on membership, quickly collapsed as the Green

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Party (AD) attempted to encourage its supporters to give their first preference to the Nationalist Party and then switch to the Green Partyʼs candidates.20 On the other hand, Labour maintained its Eurosceptic approach by proposing the partnership plan. Its campaign focused on nationalism, patriotism, and national identity. The anti-EU membership campaign did help to heal the rifts which existed between Sant and Mintoff on the Labour side, with Mintoff calling on his supporters to vote for Labour to prevent Maltaʼs membership (Sansone, MaltaToday, 23 March 2003). The Labour Party believed that the country’s Neutrality and Non-Aligned status could not co-exist alongside EU membership. Sant insisted that membership posed a threat to Maltaʼs freedom and sovereignty while partnership would respect and safeguard the rights which Maltaʼs citizens had fought so much for (Meli, L-Orizzont, 1 April 2003). Still, the party failed to give a specific time frame for partnership apart from a projection of two to ten years for negotiation and ratification (Massa, Times of Malta, 8 April 2003). In addition, the Labour Partyʼs approach reignited the animosity which existed between it and the European Socialists. Enrique Baron Crespo, President of the European Socialists, called on the Labour Party to respect the outcome of the referendum (Grech, Times of Malta, 10 April 2003a) and chided the party for collaborating with Eurosceptic right-wing parties. Antony Beumer, the secretary of the European Socialists, declared that the alliance of the Labour Party with the group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) was damaging the potential relationship that the Maltese socialist party could have with the European Socialists (Schembri, The Malta Independent, 6 April 2003). Both campaigns were affected by the economic climate of the time. At the time of the 2003 election, the Iraqi war was having a direct impact on Maltaʼs tourism sector as Italians and French were reluctant to travel in such a scenario (Xuereb, The Malta Independent, 23 March 2004). This was proof, for many, that Maltaʼs economic structures were unable to withstand international economic shocks, and this was used by the Nationalist Party to highlight the importance of using membership to strengthen our economy by utilising the funds provided by the European Union. On the other hand, the Labour Party proposed to tackle economic growth by ensuring efficiency and productivity and by tackling wastage. The Labour Party declared that European Union membership was not at the heart of this election. The party still vehemently criticised membership warning that the government was going to be forced to increase its taxes. Santʼs tax break was heavily criticised by the PN declaring that this plan was going not going to improve productivity (Fenech, 2003b), to increase tax revenue by approximately Lm 120 million (€279.52 million)

20 As the electoral system is based on the Single Transferable Vote, this strategy would have allowed the Nationalist Party to obtain most votes to govern, with the Green Party candidates inheriting the second preference votes. This would have enabled the AD Party to elect some of its candidates in parliament, and so, break the two-party system. This is the reason why the Nationalist Party rejected this idea and pleaded with its voters to vote for all its candidates at a time when the party needed to retain its support.

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annually to reduce the deficit which stood at Lm 110 million (€256.23 million) (The Malta Independent, 25 March 2003m). It proposed the reduction of public spending by Lm 22 million (€51.25 million) and an increase in capital expenditure of 6% to finish several environmental and educational projects. Sant pledged to maintain VAT (after his administration had removed it in 1996) whilst removing the excessive tax rates on the tourism sectors, education, culture, and sports (MaltaToday, 30 March 2003n) amongst other areas. The Labour Party was also critical of the privatisation in 1999 of Maltaʼs second largest bank (Mid-Med bank which was renamed Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) and proposed to reopen the negotiations with HSBC as the bank was now mostly in the hands of foreign shareholders. Therefore, Sant proposed a series of changes in the banking sector to prevent small and medium foreign enterprises from operating freely in Malta (Grech, Times of Malta, 28 March 2003a). The Nationalist Partyʼs economic agenda was effectively a projection of its membership plans. Retrospectively, the party highlighted how the national debt had been reduced to Lm 80 million (€186.35 million) whilst the 11% GDP debt left by the Labour government had fallen to less than 4% during the 1998–2003 legislature (Il-Mument, 6 April 2003). The centre-right party underlined that more reforms needed to be introduced to abide by rigid EU obligations. However, it pointed out that EU funds and subsidies could be used to revive several sectors including the agricultural sector, which attracted Lm 77 million (€179.36 million) (Vella, MaltaToday, 23 March 2003c). The party proposed the injection of Lm81 (€188.68 million) worth of EU funds into the economy to help regeneration, safeguard employment and create more jobs (Il-Mument, 6 April 2003o). The turnout for the 2003 election was 96.90%, 6.05% higher than in the EU accession referendum. As shown in Table 4.7, the Nationalist Party won the election with 146,172 votes (51.80%). The Labour Party did in fact gain ground from the EU Referendum and garnered 134,092 votes (47.51%). This meant that whilst some people may have chosen to vote across party lines during the referendum, many still opted to vote in a traditional partisan way during the national election. The Green Party received 1929 votes, equivalent to 0.68%. The Nationalist Party won by a majority of 12,080 votes, although it received slightly fewer votes than it received in the 1992 and 1998 elections (Schiavone, 2013). However, the party scored a landslide victory by Maltese standards, and the necessary mandate to sign the accession treaty on behalf of Maltese citizens.

Table 4.7 The 2003 National Election Results

MLP PN AD Turnout

Seats 30 35

Votes 134,092 146,172 1929

Votes (%) 47.51 51.8 0.68 96.95

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Malta and the European Union: The 2003 National Election

135

Both the referendum and the 2003 national election were dominated by the potential impact of European Integration and Europeanisation; including the costs of the loss of sovereignty, the impact of European policies and regulations on Maltaʼs economy, and the shared values which Malta had with the EU. Several EU politicians came to Malta to campaign for or against European Union membership and endorsing partiesʼ campaigns. These had a direct impact on these campaigns, particularly that of the Labour Party given that several European Socialists came to Malta to promote membership and questioned Labourʼs partnership plan. In addition, the Nationalist Party used EU symbols as a means of de-politicising the EU issue to encourage Labour supporters who were in favour of the EU to vote for the Nationalist Party. This was certainly helped by the promotion of EU membership by former Labour officials, who encouraged Labour supporters to embrace membership. The fact that a number of Labour supporters did vote for membership and the Nationalist Party, is quite a feat in itself given the dominance of polarisation and partisanship in the country. Several Nationalist-leaning voters did indeed vote against their party, but as the Party had spent years persuading its grassroots voters of the positive implications of European Integration and the top-down impact of the EU, its losses were minimal (Saliba, 2013). This vote switching was an important factor as it highlights how salient the EU membership issue was for parties as well as voters, which forced some to break their political allegiance for once in their lifetime (Fenech Adami, 2014; Saliba, 2013; Zammit-Dimech, 2013; Spiteri, 2013). The electoral discourse of the Nationalist Party was a testament to its ideological belief in Europe, Malta’s European credentials, and EU values and principles. These ideological beliefs were constantly promoted alongside the party’s traditional Catholic values and enabled the party to attract both conservatives and liberals. Europeanisation also had an impact on relations beyond the party system, party competition, and policy change dimensions. Concerning the policy change dimension, the EU had an impact as more reforms would be required to respect the Conditionality clause and several economic regulations imposed by it. This was one of the reasons why the Labour Party campaigned against Maltaʼs membership application on both economic and political terms, as it argued that these policies would, directly and indirectly, impact Maltaʼs industries. As the impact of the European Union intensified, so did Labourʼs opposition towards it. The intense campaign surrounding Maltaʼs EU membership led to the founding of the CNI and FMI, two movements that were born to prevent Maltaʼs EU accession. These movements sought to find their space within Maltaʼs political system and campaign against EU membership. This was primarily based on ideological terms, as both Mintoff and Mifsud Bonnici had an ideological attachment towards Maltaʼs Neutrality and Non-alignment status and the working class. Both former Labour leaders believed that Malta’s non-alignment status was going to be negatively influenced by integration first and Europeanisation after. European party groups played a major role in strengthening political campaigns. This confirms Pridhamʼs (2008) theory that these parties will warn their national

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counterparts if they embrace an ideology that does not fit with their own. This happened to the Labour Party as it was chided and threatened by the PES (Party of European Socialists) for working closely with the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) during its referendum campaign. The PES warned the Labour Party (the Nationalist Party did not have this problem as it worked closely with the EPP) that it would reject its membership of the PES due to its Euroscepticism and strong links with far-right parties (Schembri, The Malta Independent, 6 April 2003). The Nationalist Party’s effort to educate the public about the EU enabled it to make the European Union popular with the electorate (Saliba, 2013). Its alliance with the Green Party quickly dissolved during the national election campaign, but this was not a surprise given the ideological differences between the two. Still, the party was able to build a coalition made up of people with different ideas to work together to promote Maltaʼs membership. The Labour Party failed to propose a viable alternative for the European Union membership. Whilst its proposals arguably contained several good initiatives, it was overshadowed by the European membership question which dominated the national agenda. Just days before Election Day and as occurred in 1996, Alfred Sant and his deputy leaders opted to sign a pact with the Maltese people. This pact outlined the party’s work in ensuring transparency and accountability. It promised a one-off bonus to students, pensioners, and the unemployed, a series of tax breaks for workers, and a 5-to-10-year exemption from income tax for farmers, herdsmen, and fishermen amongst others (Pisani, L-Orizzont, 8 April 2003).

4.8

Malta’s Political Parties and EU Membership

The Nationalist Party’s victory enabled Maltaʼs 2004 EU accession, with the country joining the supranational organisation alongside nine other countries. During these years, the Nationalist Party was considered more effective and more trusted than its Labour counterpart (Mullard & Pirotta, 2008). After the signing of the accession treaty, Fenech Adami resigned from his position as Prime Minister, closing an era where strong ideologies dominated Maltaʼs political system. He was replaced by Lawrence Gonzi. Alfred Sant remained at the helm of the Labour Party, but the party was going to shift its approach towards the country’s EU membership. Until Malta’s eventual accession to the European Union in 2004, the Europeanisation of Malta’s political parties was linked to the European Membership question and had an impact on their ideologies and policies. The issue has been internalised into Malta’s political system with political parties’ approach towards it based on their ideologies and the economic outlook of the country. During the first stage of the impact of Europeanisation, it was clear that the Nationalist Party attempted to provide an ideological foundation for its membership plan. Still, in the second stage, this ideological plan had to be supported with economic incentives especially as both political parties highlighted the impact which the European Union could have on the country.

Bibliography

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The European Union issue was extremely divisive and reflected the state of the country’s political system. Public perception of the European Union was mostly based on the approach of the political parties, even though in the referendum and the subsequent election, there was a small shift of people who voted based on the issue rather than aligning with their parties. The issue surrounding the EU membership did help to carve a space for civil society and this role would only increase as more issues began to be dealt with by the country. The EU membership question closed a chapter in Maltese politics as the issue was now settled. Still, challenges remain. The Europeanisation of political parties would take a different form after the country’s EU membership in 2004. These political parties had to face multiple issues linked with the European Union including the issue surrounding irregular migration, increasing calls to introduce civil liberties, and an attempt to shield the country from the negative impact of the financial crisis all the while also tackling questions surrounding rule of law in Malta.

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Kelleher, D. (2003, 9 March). Microsoft sees EU accession as key to Malta’s ICT plans. The Malta Independent, p. 33. Macdonald, V. (2003, 3 February). EU membership referendum motion approved. Times of Malta, p. 48. Manduca, J. (2003, 6 April). A man at his pinnacle-Interview with Dr. Fenech Adami. Maltatoday, pp. 8 & 9. Massa, A. (2003, 8 April). MLP makes give promises “in pact” with the people. Times of Malta, p. 1 & 15. Meli, B. (2003, 1 April). Il-valuri tal-ħelsien u newtralità m'għandomx prezz. L-Orizzont, p. 3. Mifsud Bonnici, K. (1987, 13 April). Issa anke l-Iżrael wera li jappoġġja l-isforzi tà Malta. L-Orizzont, p. 1 & 2. Mifsud, A. (2003, 7 February). MHRA-Garbage in, garbage out. The Malta Independent, p. 28. Mintoff, D. (1977, 25 April). [Il-Prim Ministru Mintoff Ikellem In-Nazzjon]. Mintoff, D. (2018). In D. Mainwaring & Y. Mintoff (Eds.), Mintoff: Malta Mediterra-My Youth. Gutenberg Press Ltd.. Mizzi, E. (1995). Malta in the Making 1962–1987: An Eyewitness Account. Beck Graphics Limited. MLP. (1987). Mal-Labour ġħall-Paċi u l-Progress. MLP. (1992). Flimkien Nibnu mill-Ġdid: Electoral Manifesto for the 1992 national election. MLP. (1996). Iċ-Ċittadin l-Ewwel: Viżjoni Għal Malta Moderna. Electoral Manifesto for the 1996 National Election. MLP. (1998). L-Ewwel Int: Electoral Manifesto. Electoral manifesto for the 1998 national election. MLP. (2003). Partnership L-Aħjar Għażla. Marsa Press. Mullard, M., & Pirotta, G. A. (2008). The politics of public expenditure in Malta. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46(1), 128–141. Muscat, J. (1998). Mandat Ġdid. SKS. Pace, R. (1990). Malta u l-Komunità Ewropea. Stamperija Indipendenza. Pace, R. (2011). Malta: Euroscepticism in a polarised polity. South European Society and Politics, 16(01), 133–157. Parliamentary Minutes. (1996). Debates in the Maltese Parliament iv Sess. PDN. (1962). Electoral Manifesto for the 1962 national election. Pisani, B. (2003, 8 April). Iffirmat il-patt mal-poplu. l-Orizzont, p. 1 & 3. PN. (1981). Il-Bidla Meħtiega: Programm ta' Gvern Nazzjonalista Għas-Snin Tmenin. PN. (1987). Xoġħol,Ġustizzja, Libertà: Is-Sisien ġħall-Ġejjieni. Progress Press. PN. (1990). Annual conference 25–28 January. Pietà: Pin Publications. PN. (1991). Politika Ġdida f’Soċjeta Ġdida: Annual general conference 24–27 January. Pietà: PIN Publications. PN. (1992). Solidarity – Always –Everywhere: 1992 Electoral Manifesto. PN. (1996). Dialogue, Solidarity, Commitment. Electoral Manifesto for the 1996 National Election. PN. (1998). Ġid, Fiduċja, Direzzjoni. Electoral Manifesto for the 1998 National Election. PN. (2003). Biex Malta Tikber Fl-Ewropa. Manifesto for the 2003 national election. Pollacco, C. (2004). European integration: The Maltese experience. Agenda. Sacco, R. (1986). L-Elezzjonijiet Ġenerali 1849–1986: Il-Ġrajja politika u Kostituzzjonali ta’ Malta. Klabb Kotba Maltin. Saliba, J. (2004). Referendum and general elections in Malta. In EAPC (Ed.), Election time: The year of political campaigning 2003 (pp. 99–121). Austria: Hartinger Consulting. Saliba, J. (2013). Former PN Secretary General/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Sansone, K. (2003, 23 March). Rapprochement between Mintoff and Sant in sight. Maltatoday, p. 1 & 3. Sant, A. (1992, 30 January). Strands for Future economic policy. Times of Malta, p. 5. Sant, A. (1996, Monday September 30). ‘l-Ewropej iridu li t-taxxa tal-VAT tiżdied għal-25 filmija’. L-Orizzont, p. 3. Sant, A. (2013). Prime Minister of Malta 1996–1998/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia.

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Chapter 5

Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

The challenges facing Malta in the European Union will need more than fine words. They will need hard work and attention by the government and civil society, to ensure that the conditions negotiated for accession-deficient though they are-will be implemented in the most advantageous way for our economy and society (Sant, 2004, p. 34).

Malta’s EU accession brought a new set of challenges and opportunities for the country’s major political parties. As highlighted in Sant’s (2004) statement, whilst the dream concerning ‘European membership’ has been sold to the public, the realities of membership were emerging and the government had to make sure that society would benefit from it. After opposing Malta’s EU membership bid, Sant (2004) declared that he would use the EU institutions to make sure that the country benefits from this membership and so that the funds earned by Malta could be distributed to create wealth among everyone. He also pledged to use the EU institutions to establish a dialogue between European and Mediterranean countries. Reference to the dream was also made by the new prime minister Lawrence Gonzi (2004) who outlined how it was important for the country to harness the opportunities arising from membership. In his statement, he also referred to the challenges the country was going to face. ‘Some of the challenges are formidable and will test our endurance further’ (p. 35). Still, he was positive that the country could overcome these challenges, which included further economic reforms. Firstly, the reason for this was that due to the EU conditionality clause, Malta had to join the Eurozone, which it did in 2008. This meant that the country had to implement further reforms to meet the criteria for entry into the Eurozone. Secondly, Maltaʼs political parties had to react to several international events, including the economic recession which spread throughout the Eurozone. Thirdly, membership helped contribute to the emergence of several smaller parties that had the potential to threaten the duopolistic status quo, at least in local and European elections. Each of these created possibilities for both direct and indirect impact on Maltaʼs political parties and party systems. This chapter will evaluate the third stage of the Europeanisation of party politics in Malta. Malta’s membership in the European Union provided the Maltese political parties with the possibility to participate in the European political arena by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_5

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competing in the European elections. This arena has become extremely important for the country’s political parties due to the possibility to elect their representatives in the European Parliament. When it comes to the EU elections, Malta would face the same dilemma as other EU states. This dilemma concerns whether the campaigns (and the electorate) would end up prioritising national issues over European issues and whether the electorate and political parties would approach them as secondorder elections. In this scenario, the Maltese approach would not be particularly different from the rest of the EU countries. For the party-in-government, the European elections were seen as an evaluation on the performance of the government, whilst for the party-in-opposition, the elections were important to understand whether it had managed to attract new voters. Membership in the European Union provided both opportunities and challenges for the main political parties. They had to select their candidates to contest the European elections, which was not an easy task given the size of the country and the perks which were linked to the job. The size of the country and the way the media worked in Malta would help these MEPs to establish their role within the political system and rise in status above their MP counterparts. This status would help various individuals to compete for the top posts within their political parties. Yet, these MEPs began to be under increased scrutiny to safeguard the national interest in matters concerning various issues, including irregular migration and hunting. These were pressing concerns for the main political parties which the European Union had various regulations on. This leads to the question of the pressure that the European Union could impose on the country and the reaction it had on the main political parties. The third stage of Europeanisation is particularly important as it deals with the impact of the European Union on a member state. Various theories have been developed on whether the EU could have any impact on member states and whether its regulations could be enforced after a state joins the EU. Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig (2010) concluded that the European Union is unable to force member states to meet its criteria. Yet, another element to take into consideration is whether a perception emerged amongst parties and voters that the EU was restricting the policy programmes of the country’s political parties due to its regulations. This is something that the main political parties had to face especially as they were trying to develop an agenda with the EU at the centre of it and defend their approaches towards the European Union. These approaches were extremely important especially as Labour’s approach had continued to evolve. The 2003 referendum on EU accession and the subsequent national election effectively resulted in two significant defeats for the Labour Party. As the party was heading for the 2004 European Parliament elections, it understood that there was less mileage to be gained by continuing with its opposition to membership, and it, therefore, articulated an alternative notion of the EU. The party shifted from its ideological opposition to membership to a more pragmatic approach which, whilst still Eurosceptic, adopted a more accommodating attitude as Malta was now a member of the EU and needed to maximise the opportunities it offered. The party’s attempts to find a European dimension and potential space in the

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Second Order Elections and the First European Parliament Election in Malta

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European arena started with the establishment of formal talks with the Party of European Socialists after the two had publicly clashed in the 2003 referendum and the subsequent election. Under the leadership of Alfred Sant, the Labour Party pledged to work with the European Union and European Socialists to try and ease the negative impact of accession on the Maltese welfare state. At this stage, Europeanisation had an impact on Labour in respect of its attitudes towards the EU and its membership with the European Socialist Group. In addition, both the Nationalist and Labour Parties reorganised their internal structures to take into account the existence and the role of MEPs. Indeed, both parties decided that their future MEPs should form part of their parliamentary group, and that, as part of their duties, MEPs would report to the party’s national executive periodically to give an update on their work (Pace, 2005; Briguglio, 2009).

5.1

Second Order Elections and the First European Parliament Election in Malta

The first European election was as hotly contested as national elections (Pace, 2005). Maltese voters were beginning to understand what accession was all about, with the impact of Europeanisation intensifying as more reforms were being introduced to respect EU regulations. The Nationalist Party, now led by Lawrence Gonzi, embarked on a subdued campaign based on the European Union which was overshadowed by Labourʼs vigorous one based on national issues. The centre-right party opted for a campaign based on European issues. Its political manifesto, entitled To grow in Europe (PN, 2004), proposed further investment and promised to safeguard the national interest. Labour presented a manifesto entitled, Growing Stronger Together (MLP, 2004). Labour promised to develop Maltaʼs economic sector and justice and campaigned against the introduction of the Euro currency (Pace, 2008; Briguglio, 2009). Evidence of the European dimension can be found in the parties’ political programmes, with both emphasising the need to work with the European party groups, by having the EPP on the Nationalist side and PES on the Labour side, to safeguard the national interest. Interestingly enough, the Nationalist Party was still using the cultural framing of the European Union to highlight how the EPP and Malta’s MEPs within this group were going to safeguard and defend Malta’s identity and traditions, together with the fact that the EPP was based on Christian values (PN, 2004). On the other hand, there were few traces of the Eurosceptic approach of the Labour Party. Apart from outlining its collaboration with the PES party, the Labour Party proposed the need to endorse a holistic approach towards irregular migration based on social inclusion and integration (MLP, 2004). Irregular migration was going to be a point of contention between Malta and the EU for many years to come. On the issue of migration, the Nationalist Party believed

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that it was important to use the MEPs to promote the concept of burden sharing. This was going to be an approach that Malta’s MEPs are still promoting through their parties and European Parliament, but it is an issue which there is no consensus upon. The issue surrounding irregular migration would provide various challenges for the country’s political parties due to the struggle to find a solution and the limitations which European regulations pose for political parties. With European elections considered second-order elections by many, it provided the opportunity for Malta’s smaller parties to establish themselves within the country’s political system. As this was the first European election to be held in Malta, no one knew how the voters were going to react. Still, Maltaʼs Green Party was encouraged by the fact that smaller parties traditionally stand to gain in these elections. It also campaigned relentlessly in an attempt to win at least one of the seats available. Even though the European dimension was evident in partiesʼ programmes, this was not so apparent in their campaigns, with national issues taking precedence over European issues since the former were at the top of voters’ concerns. Expecting a protest vote against the Nationalist administration, due to the health and pension reforms that the party was thought to be discussing (MLP, 2004), Prime Minister Gonzi declared that a potential defeat in the European elections was not going to hinder the government’s work (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 17 May 2004a). The Nationalist Party effectively opted to take the Second Order and European Dimension approach in this campaign. In fact, not only did it play a relatively low-key campaign compared to its competitors, but it projected a European dimension by choosing to argue for the merits of the EPP and the values which the Nationalist Party shared with the group. These values included solidarity, the benefits of training and education, employment, environment, and European security (In-Nazzjon, 9 June 2004a; In-Nazzjon, 1 June 2004b). The party’s EU-centred campaign also focused on the failings of the European Greens and PES—the European party groupings of which Maltaʼs Labour Party and Alternattiva Demokratika. This was done in an attempt to encourage voters to vote according to the European party groups programmes (even though this would have a strictly limited impact, given the fact that Malta had only five seats at its disposal) to influence the EU’s decision-making process. The Greens were criticised for encouraging taxation on tourism (Il-Mument, 16 May 2004.) since this would have negatively affected Maltaʼs tourism industry and increased unemployment. Concerning the PES, the Nationalist Party criticised its proposal to limit overtime, stating that the EPP was against this policy as it believed in the worker’s right to decide how many hours they should work, provided this is not detrimental to their health (Cini, Times of Malta, 7 June 2004). However, this strategy was ineffective as the Labour Party managed to shape the orientation of this election. This was done by embracing a national approach to tackling issues that voters were concerned about (Saliba, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). The Labour Party dominated the nationwide debate by highlighting corruption allegations levelled against the government. One of these allegations involved John Dalli, a Nationalist Party minister who was embroiled in a corruption case involving several businesses in Libya for which he resigned to defend his reputation (Busuttil,

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Times of Malta, 31 May 2004.) It warned about the potential impact of the pension and health care reforms, which were salient issues for voters, and criticised the way the government was handling the economy (Xuereb, The Malta Independent, 27 March 2004; Grech, Times of Malta, 7 June 2004). Still, as illustrated below, these were indirectly influenced by the top impact of Europeanisation as the EU was pressing the Nationalist administration to accelerate its reforms. The Nationalist campaign had to deal with several issues, some of which were linked with the European Union, and had to meet people’s expectations of the positive impact of European Integration on the country’s economy. Yet, some of these expectations which were promoted during the 2003 referendum and election, could not be met in such a short time especially as the realities surrounding membership began to emerge. The Nationalist administration had to legitimise its policies and convince voters that it was strengthening the pillars of Maltaʼs economy. In addition, it had to convince Maltese citizens that they were going to benefit from these reforms in the long term. By focusing on the European dimension, rather than justifying and defending its policies, the party looked out of touch with the needs of its citizens (Saliba, 2013). The first European election took place just a few months after Maltaʼs accession and several Maltaʼs entrepreneurs were still adjusting to the new realities linked with membership and were still not profiting from the long-term benefits of economic Europeanisation (Gonzi, 2013). The new realities included the negative impact of economic Europeanisation, such as the increased competition brought about by the Single Market. This had serious implications for Maltese industries, which in turn created pressure for the Nationalist Party which had promoted the benefits of EU membership. The government was under pressure from various interest groups to take precautions to prevent such competition from threatening Maltaʼs industries. The Farmers Association was the first to use the elections to pressure the government to implement the ‘safeguard clause’ which was negotiated to protect farmers from excessive competition (Times of Malta, 23 March 2004). The Association declared ‘the only reason farmers voted for EU membership was the safeguard clause, negotiated by the government to protect the sector from this situation and give the farmers breathing space to restructure’ (The Farmers Association in Times of Malta, 23 March 2004c). A number of other associations, including the Federation of Industry, were also accusing the government of failing to protect their interest (Vella, L-Orizzont, 15 May 2004). Membership also affected the Nationalist administration as the government found itself under pressure to contain the deficit and prevent infringement proceedings. This came after the European Commission issued a warning against Malta to reduce its deficit, which had reached 94% of GDP (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 17 May 2004a).1 The government’s response was to seek to achieve this by introducing additional taxes, including increasing VAT on summer schools (from 15%) to 18% (Sansone, MaltaToday, 30 May 2004), increasing the cost of public transport, and

1

This also included a one off payment operation in the shipyard which increased GDP by 3.2%.

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imposing an additional 5% VAT on all printed material. These were viewed as punitive and unnecessary by most of the public and further alienated the party supporters. In an attempt to reverse the pessimism on the state of the economy, the Nationalist Party highlighted the positive implications of economic Europeanisation. These included the injection of part of Maltaʼs Structural Funds into Maltaʼs industries and the export of over 8000 tonnes of potatoes (In-Nazzjon, 4 June 2004d) facilitated by the Single Market. However, this did not stop the pessimism surrounding shortterm economic prospects. Official figures revealed that the economy contracted by 2.9% in the first quarter, 1.6% in the second quarter, 0.3% in the third quarter, and 1.3% in the last quarter of 2003. The main reason for this was the general decline in exports and re-exports, whilst tourist arrivals declined by 7.2%, with unemployment rising to 5.7% (Grima, The Malta Independent, 23 May 2004). Even though this was not due to EU accession, there had been general expectations that tourist arrivals would increase after membership (Manduca, MaltaToday, 23 May 2004).2 Being in opposition and conducting a campaign in an environment that was being affected by the convergence targets, rigid EU regulations, and severe economic reforms, the Labour Party opted to emphasise national issues as it had a lot to gain by turning these elections into an indictment of the government’s policies. Alfred Sant (2013) declared that Labour’s emphasis was on the social impact of decisions— through social protection for workers and marginalised sectors of the community, cost of living, and new job opportunities—being taken at a national and a European level, an issue that had been completely disregarded during the previous year’s campaigns. Whilst its manifesto contained various elements of Europeanisation, including reference to its membership in the Party of European Socialists and its decision to seek to influence the EU decision-making process, the Labour campaign was overwhelmingly based on national issues. Nevertheless, the party benefitted from the newly established relationship with the European Socialists, as it earned an endorsement from the European Parliamentʼs Vice President Schmidt (Busuttil, Times of Malta, 31 May 2004) who approved Labourʼs programme. The Labour Partyʼs campaign tone was as intense as its national election campaigns (Pace, 2005). The leader of the Opposition highlighted the decline in manufacturing, with 53 factories closing down and shedding over 1400 workers (L-Orizzont, 13 May 2004; Grech, Times of Malta, 7 June 2004) claiming that this was not the future economic wellbeing linked with the EU that the Nationalist Party had campaigned for in the previous elections. Sant declared that They are claiming that things are not so bad after all. EU membership will do wonders for Malta. Changes for the better will happen naturally and painlessly, all because we are in Europe. On the other hand, the argument is that we need to restructure, given the globalisation of the world economy. (Sant, Times of Malta, 19 May 2004, p. 8)

2

With the decline of tourist arrivals, the decision reached by the government to slash the MTA budget as well as that of Heritage Malta was seen as irrational by those bodies and ultimately did nothing to improve the partyʼs image as it was heading for the European elections.

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The discourse used by Sant is a reflection of the way the European referendum campaign and eventual election were played. The main political parties took polar opposite sides on membership with the Nationalist Party providing an overoptimistic assessment of the potential impact of the European Union on the country’s economy. These optimistic assessments and the realities of membership favoured the Labour Party. At this stage, the Labour Party was still largely Euro-realist or Eurosceptic, even though it had accepted Maltaʼs EU membership and joined the Party of the European Socialists.3 Not only was the Nationalist administration blamed for failing to safeguard the national interest within the European institutions, but EU membership was perceived as having a negative impact on the country, with Labour blaming the EU and the Maltese government for the rising cost of living, which increased by 3.5% in 3 months (L-Orizzont, 14 May 2004e). The reasons behind the continuing Euroscepticism were many. One of them surrounded the impact on the dockyards, which proved to be another polarising issue. As already argued in this study, most of the dockyard workers were Labourleaning, and the party needed to be seen to be safeguarding their interests to maintain its popularity. The government was now prohibited from transferring any more subsidies apart from those agreed with the EU. With the prospect of privatisation looming, the Labour Party kept insisting on maintaining it as a state company to safeguard its workers. However, the government was arguing for its privatisation as it was not meeting its financial targets (Times of Malta, 2 June 2004f). The other major issue which dominated the national debate was a sensitive World Bank Report that the cabinet was discussing surrounding Maltaʼs pension system. Whilst this was a controversial issue with a decision postponed several times, the report was a powerful tool for the Labour Party as it recommended painful cuts that the Nationalist administration had to introduce to safeguard fiscal stability (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 27 May 2004b). This placed more pressure on the Nationalist administration to reveal its approach on the matter. The Green Party (AD) campaigned heavily in this election. This was due in part to the fact that smaller parties traditionally gained more support in second-order elections. It argued that: ‘Malta must choose between becoming a European multi-democracy or remaining isolated from European political culture’ (Cassola in Zammit, Times of Malta, 17 May 2004, p. 12.).

The party embraced both European and national approaches as it sought to maximise its chances. Harry Vassallo, the party Chairman, declared that the Greens were a threat to the major partiesʼ status quo (Times of Malta, 7 June 2004g) as they sought to promote a stronger voice for Malta in Europe by highlighting the need to have politicians from the three main political parties to represent Maltese citizens in 3 Sant declared that he was not Eurosceptic since the rationale behind his decision to oppose membership was not because he did not believe in the European Union project, but because he was aware of the realities and limitations which Malta faced if it had to become a member of the EU. The term euro-realism is rarely used by Europeanisation scholars since they incorporate the parties’ decision to support or oppose the European project under the terms Euroepticism and Europeanism.

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Table 5.1 The results of the 2004 EU elections

Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

MLP PN AD Imperium Europa Turnout

Seats 3 2 – –

Voters 118,983 97,688 22,938 1603

Voters (%) 48.42 39.76 9.33 0.65 82.39

the European parliament. This was needed to safeguard the national interest and to break the duopolistic party system which was so entrenched in Maltaʼs political system. The election took place on 13 June 2004, with a turnout of 82.39%, compared with the average European turnout of 45.47%. Whilst this was one of the highest in Europe, it was still relatively low when compared with levels of turnouts in national elections. As outlined in Table 5.1, the Labour Party won a significant victory taking three seats of the five seats available, and the Nationalist Party won the remaining two. It was clear that the lower turnout and vote switching favoured the Labour Party and, to some extent, Maltaʼs Green Party. The Labour Party won 118,983 votes, equivalent to 48.42%. The Nationalist Party earned 97,688 votes, equivalent to 39.76%. Although the use of STV denied the Greens any representation in the European Parliament, they still earned 22,938 votes, equivalent to 9.88% (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). Evidence suggests that the majority of the votes lost by the Nationalist Party went to Maltaʼs Green Party (AD) (Saliba, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). With regards to the elected candidates, both Simon Busuttil and David Casa, who were elected on the PN ticket, were behind the Nationalist Pro-EU campaign. From the Labour side, Joseph Muscat was the clear protagonist having led the Anti-EU Referendum and Labours eventual campaign, followed by Louis Grech (who although not very active was a very respected technocrat and businessman) and John Attard Montalto, who was very active and popular within the Labour Party grassroots, with the latter being also a Member of Parliament. Interestingly enough, both Simon Busuttil and Joseph Muscat would later become leaders of their parties, with Muscat becoming Prime Minister of Malta after the 2013 national election. This continued to raise the status of the country’s MEPs. A Euro barometer survey revealed that although the European election campaigns were dominated by national issues, the majority of the Maltese electorate declared that they voted for candidates who had expertise in both national issues (81%) and EU issues (80%) (Pace, 2005). The majority of Maltese voters opted to use these elections to send a signal to the Nationalist administration to change its course. For this reason, this election can be seen as aligning with the Second Order Model (Franklin et al., 1994). The European dimension did play a role in the partiesʼ programmes, however, that was much less the case in the campaigns. It is also necessary to take into consideration the indirect impact of Europeanisation. Whilst, in the hierarchy of issues, European issues were overshadowed by national ones,

5.1

Second Order Elections and the First European Parliament Election in Malta

151

Europeanisation did play a role as voters were mostly concerned with the state of the economy, with various economic reforms introduced by the government to abide by EU regulations. These regulations restricted both the Nationalist administration movements and Labourʼs options for the dockyards. Another important element was the involvement of the EU in Maltaʼs affairs. As noted above, the Maltese government was warned by the European Union to respect EU regulations on debt and finances. This produced further pressure on the Nationalist administration. In addition, this warning from the European Commission could have favoured the Labour Party, as it was in the ideal position to criticise the government’s economic policies. However, one might argue that in 2004, Maltaʼs Green Party (AD) was the greatest beneficiary of the Europeanisation process, as the party achieved its best result at the expense of the Nationalist Party. The impact of Europeanisation on political parties was felt on multiple fronts including policy change, relations beyond the party system, and party competition. Still, Maltese voters used these elections to test the government rather than voting on European issues. Maltaʼs major political parties felt the constraints arising from EU regulations, particularly on the reduction of subsidies for the dockyard, with both unable to promise further funding due to these regulations. The same thing could be said about the economy, as the European Commission had already warned Malta, which meant that the government had to restructure or sell the company to prevent infringement proceedings from being initiated against it. The Nationalist Party based its agenda on a European platform and the party’s ‘European’ credentials were exploited to their full potential. The party developed what might be considered by some as the ‘perfect’ EU-based campaign by opting for a European approach, placing European affairs and European party groups at the centre of its manifesto and campaign. By embracing the European dimension, the Nationalist Party attempted to encourage voters to have a say in the EU decisionmaking process, and by doing so, influence the agenda of the European Parliament. However, this approach backfired. On the other hand, as discussed throughout this section, whilst the Labour Party worked closely with European Socialists, it remained largely pessimistic about the impact the European Integration and Economic Europeanisation were having on the country’s economy. However, for Labour this was arguably not a particularly important aspect of its campaign, as for voters its emphasis on national issues was extremely successful. The Prime Minister accepted the results of the European elections and declared that he understood the message that the electorate wanted to convey to the Nationalist administration. The Eurobarometer survey revealed the fact that unemployment, the environment, pensions, economic growth, and terrorism were the issues that were salient to the Maltese voters (Pace, 2005). The Labour Party dealt with the first four during its campaign and was rewarded with a victory over the Nationalist Party and the election of three of its candidates. Following this success, the party declared that it was now the largest party in Malta, vowing to safeguard the national interest in the European institutions (Pisani, L-Orizzont, 14 June 2004).

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The Nationalist Party, however, did not appear to understand that European affairs could not eclipse national matters, especially with the electorate worried about the state of the economy. The European Union did, indeed, have an impact on the economy. Other issues which were being discussed, such as pension reforms, were also unpopular but most of the blame was being placed on the Nationalist Party as the party-in-government, and not on the European Union. The party failed to deal with the economic management of the country, as had already happened in 1996. It also failed to justify the policies it was implementing. This, and the underwhelming campaign produced by the party, contributed to the loss of thousands of voters, barely a year after the national election. Now that the European issue had been resolved, the party needed to propose other policies which would help to retain its voters, who as noted in previous chapters, were not as loyal as their Labour counterparts. Still, concerning the results, Gonzi declared that his executive was going to continue working for the best of the country (Times of Malta, 14 June 2004h) by working with all the elected MEPs to safeguard the national interests. The Labour Party conducted an excellent campaign focusing on the unpopular policies which the Nationalist administration was introducing to meet EU criteria. This campaign was also assisted by the endorsement of the European Socialists, which helped legitimise Santʼs electoral programme. This helped the party move closer to the electorate as it was seen as catering to their needs. In addition, Labourʼs vigorous and passionate campaign framed several issues and used them against the Nationalist administration. These issues included the corruption allegations against one of the leading Nationalist ministers—John Dalli, the negative impact of economic Europeanisation, and the government’s economic problems. The Labour Party understood that the Nationalist Party’s campaign tools were limited, as the government had to meet the requirements set in place by the EU. This gave Labour a chance to campaign heavily and win back some of the supporters it had lost over the years. The Labour victory injected new enthusiasm within the Labour Party and eased the pressure which had been mounting on its leader, Alfred Sant, who had lost the 1998 and 2003 national elections. For Sant and his supporters, this was an election that suggested that Labour was now the largest party in Malta and that this election could pave the way for a future Labour administration (Pisani, L-Orizzont, 14 June 2004) ‘The MLP has succeeded in making a difference. It is now the biggest and most important party in the country. This fills us with courage. What we have been telling the people is better understood. We have been telling the truth, not half-truths’ (Sant in Times of Malta, 14 June 2004). However, Labour had to be extremely careful as the majority of the votes the Nationalist Party lost went to the Green Party (AD) candidate, Arnold Cassola. In addition, they also had to consider the fact that national elections have a higher turnout, with polarisation being more intense. This meant that both major parties had to seek further votes to win the 2008 national election.

5.2

5.2

Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs

153

Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs

The first national election after EU membership took place in 2008. The political environment was radically altered by Labourʼs 2004 landslide triumph in the EU elections and by the good showing of Maltaʼs Green Party. For this reason, there was an implicit assumption that the Labour Party was going to achieve a runaway victory (Saliba, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). The Nationalist Party, being the incumbent, was in great difficulty having lost a string of elections (Fenech, 2008). However, national elections have different characteristics, including higher turnout, strong polarisation, and partisanship, which could ultimately make the difference between one party and the other. The political manifesto of the Nationalist Party was a continuation of its previous programmes, with the manifesto named, Yes, together everything is possible (PN, 2008). This manifesto had a family-oriented and EU-centred agenda. Once again, the Nationalist Party highlighted its ideology outlining that it still retained the characteristics of a mass party. It outlined how its ideology was based on solidarity, subsidiarity, liberty, and the citizen at the centre of its politics. The party also highlighted how its vision was based on principles and traditions linked with the Maltese identity including its language, history, tradition, culture, and faith (PN, 2008). The party’s programme was certainly impacted by various European regulations, with the party promoting further reforms in the economy and the utilisation of European funds to improve various sectors. On the issue of migration, the party kept promoting the idea of ‘Burdens sharing’ and using EU funds to strengthen Frontex. In addition, the party declared that the EU could be used to achieve peace in the Mediterranean. This is a narrative that the party had been using for over two decades, highlighting how the EU could have a major role in the development of the Mediterranean Sea by establishing a closer relationship with all Mediterranean states. On the other hand, Labourʼs manifesto, ‘Plan for a new beginning’ (MLP, 2008a, b), focused on the education system, Malta’s economy, and the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist administration’s policies. The party also promoted the use of funds to develop various sectors and the strengthening of Malta’s foreign policy with various countries including Russia and China (MLP, 2008b). The election took place a few months after the introduction of the Euro currency; the first signs of the economic recession within the Eurozone, especially in Greece, provided an interesting international backdrop to the campaign. This pressured the Nationalist Party into justifying its decision to opt for further integration by joining the Eurozone. To do this, it highlighted how Malta could have ended up like Iceland (which was going through a financial meltdown) if it had not joined the Eurozone. In addition, it outlined the positive impact which the Single Currency was having on the country and its economy. Its campaign contained strong elements of personalisation of politics, as its leader, Gonzi, was more popular during that period than the actual party. Therefore, Nationalist strategists decided to use Gonzi and brand the campaign

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around his persona: ‘You could not elect Gonzi, without electing the Nationalist Party’ (Saliba, 2013). The Labour Party projected itself as a champion of civil and workers’ rights. Both parties retained different ideas on how to utilise the structural funds to develop the countryʼs different economic sectors to generate thousands of new jobs. Energised by its good electoral showing in the 2004 European election, the Green Party also put forward a strong agenda based on its slogan, ‘Working together in a Coalition’, which it hoped would attract enough voters to elect some of its representatives. Amongst other things, its agenda was based on environmental protection. The political environment in 2008 was influenced by the impact that EU regulations were having on the island. The direct impact of these regulations certainly affected the party competition dimension. The controversy over EU regulations on irregular migration and the economy amongst others helped the emergence of a National-Conservative party, the Azzjoni Nazzjonali (AN).4 In 2008, Malta was going through a wave of radicalism due to the growing influx of irregular migrants, the rising fear that migrants were going to take over the country, and the economic pressures that this was placing on the country’s finances. This party, with its nationalistic pronouncements, pledged to fight irregular migration and the influence that the European Union was having on the Maltese government. Due to rising immigration and the debate on the future of the dockyards, Maltaʼs accession treaty and the country’s EU membership were again questioned. Indeed, both the Labour Party and the AN proposed the reopening of Maltaʼs accession treaty albeit for different reasons. Another area that was directly affected by the regulations of the European Union was hunting. The EU’s restrictions on hunting had already created a series of controversies which led the hunting lobby group to pressure political parties to safeguard their interests. The scenario did not change, but the realities did. Hunters felt deceived by the Nationalist administration as it had declared that the hunting season was going to be safeguarded after membership—even though the EU was forcing it to shorten the hunting season.5 Muscat, the AN party leader, believed that hunters were deceived by the Maltese government (L-Orizzont, 9 February 2008a) and that this activity had to be safeguarded by opening up the accession treaty. Riding on the country’s wave of radicalisation, which was being blamed on the EU and on the inability of the major parties to provide concrete solutions to solve the irregular migration issue, the AN proposed a referendum on illegal immigration so that Malta could opt out of the Dublin Convention, which restricted the repatriation of irregular immigrants. The party believed that the European Union enjoyed excessive power on this issue and that the government needed to reclaim its

4

The National Action Party was founded by Josie Muscat, a former Nationalist Party MP in 2007. The Eurosceptic party was dissolved in 2010 following its poor electoral results. 5 The unofficial explanation about the hunting derogations were that hunters broke the conditionality placed by the European Union which in turn, took the case against Malta in the European Courts of Justice (Borg, 2013).

5.2

Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs

155

European Union

Accession Treaty

Renegotiate the Labour Party

Renegotiate the AN

To be able to transfer more funds to the dockyards and make it competitive and profitable.

Get a better deal and safeguard hunters and trappers’ rights.

Fig. 5.1 Renegotiation of the accession treaty

sovereignty to defend the national interest (Vassallo, MaltaToday, 10 February 2008; Brincat, The Malta Independent, 23 February 2008): Maltaʼs sudden service to Brussels signifies only one thing: that we have ceded our sovereignty to the EU. We used to have a bit of bargaining power, even if we were a little speck in the middle of the Mediterranean, now we have surrendered everything... (Muscat in Vassallo, MaltaToday, 10 February 2008, p. 12).

The language used by the leader of the AN Party is very similar to that of other far-right parties in Europe who blamed the European Union for stealing their sovereignty and leaving them powerless in the international system. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the decision of the Labour Party to seek to reopen the negotiations raised questions about the party’s EU approach. On one hand, Alfred Sant proposed the strengthening of Maltaʼs position within the EU, and on the other, he demanded the renegotiation of the accession treaty on several sectors, including the dockyards and agriculture (Bedingfield, L-Orizzont, 15 February 2008). Questions remained, however, over whether renegotiation was possible. This encouraged some European politicians to discuss the issue. This is another classic example of how the intervention of European politicians can strengthen or weaken political partiesʼ arguments. The European Union poured cold water over this possibility by confirming that the accession treaty was now signed and could not be reopened (Ciappara, In-Nazzjon, 2 February 2008). The spokespersons for both the Agriculture Commissioner, Marianne Fisher Boel, and EU Competition Commissioner, Nellie Kroes, stated that it was impossible to renegotiate for more funds:

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What is agreed in the Accession Treaty is a done deal... Of course, policy changes happen all the time and Malta has the possibility to influence that process. Sometimes, member states can win some little ʻsweetenersʼ in the negotiating process during reform discussions (Boel in Camilleri, Times of Malta, February 10, 2008a).

This statement reflects the ability for the country to influence the decision-making process of the European Union. It also makes clear that the accession treaty could not be altered. The spokespersons declared that the EU could not allow more funds to be transferred to the dockyards, and after 31 December 2008, all subsidies were going to be illegal in the eyes of the EU (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 10 February 2008a). The Labour Party was much more cautious on hunting and trapping (Vella & Darmanin, MaltaToday, 17 February 2003), stating that it was going to respect the decision reached by the ECJ over Maltaʼs hunting season before expressing its views about the issue (Massa, Times of Malta, 13 February 2008). Still, this emphasis on the need to reopen the accession treaty was used by the Nationalist Party to promote itself as the natural party of the government, declaring that what Labour was proposing was not sustainable (Gonzi in Calleja, Times of Malta, 6 February 2008a). With the financial crisis in its early stages, it was apparent that questions were going to be raised about the government’s decision to introduce the Euro currency barely a few months before the Greek economy was hit by the crisis. However, although Labour questioned the Nationalist Party’s swift move towards further economic integration and its influence on the rising cost of living due to the introduction of the Euro and the financial crisis, such negative effects had not yet become apparent (Fenech, 2008). This may be a reason why Labour’s economic statements were not a priority when choosing between one party and the other. The transition from the Maltese Lira to the Euro went very smoothly, and by the end of January 2008, 73% of the Maltese were already paying in euros (The Malta Independent, 6 January 2008b). The use of the dual pricing system restricted increases in the cost of living, which many had anticipated with the currency changeover. At the time, the deficit stood at 1.8% of the GDP and the public deficit stood at just 63% of the GDP, with both meeting the EUʼs requirements, whilst the FDI stood at €650 million. Maltaʼs statistics revealed that the country achieved a GDP growth of 4.3% in the third quarter of 2007 (Lindsay, The Malta Independent, 15 February 2008b). A World Trade Organisation (WTO) report highlighted the country’s economic performance as it achieved a 10.9% growth in tourist arrivals; more than double the rate of the EU area which stood at 4% (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 22 February 2008b). However, not everything was going well (Lindsay, The Malta Independent, 14 February 2008a). The Nationalist Party believed that globalisation rather than Europeanisation or further economic integration was harming Malta and Europe since manufacturing industries were slowly shifting to Asia, with 900 textile workers being laid off in Malta and 30,000 in Europe by 2008 (Gonzi in Vella, MaltaToday, 13 January 2008). Despite the apparent problems, these changes also created the perfect opportunity for the government to use the EUʼs structural funds to legitimise its approach of

5.2

Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs

Table 5.2 The 2008 national election results

MLP PN AD AN Turnout

157 Seats 34 35 – –

Votes 141,888 143,468 3810 1461

Votes (%) 48.79 49.34 1.10 0.5 93.3

turning Malta into a centre for excellence and a hub for IT services. The funds were also deemed to be important to invest in the tertiary sector of the economy to create thousands of new jobs (Lindsay, The Malta Independent, 28 February 2008c, pp. 1 and 3). However, once again membership proved to be a double-edged sword for the Nationalist Party as the European Commission intervened to admonish the government for its decision to continue using energy subsidies to prevent the rise in the cost of living. In addition, it warned the government not to rely on volatile forms of tax for revenue. The European Commission was also not convinced by the government’s attempt to achieve a surplus by 2010 since the government needed to introduce healthcare reforms, pensions reforms, and fiscal consolidation. These issues, including welfare retrenchment, public wages, and public spending, were matters which Maltese governments and parties tended to shy away from, with no clear view on how these could be restructured (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 14 February 2008c, p. 16), as well as the fear that they could lose thousands of votes after introducing these reforms. The warning that the government received from the European Commission to regulate its finances, might have raised further questions about the programme which the Nationalist Party was proposing and with which it damaged its electoral campaign. Still, this warning was largely ignored as the economy was not seen by most voters to be at risk from the financial crisis (Cassola, 2013). The Labour Party pledged to remove tax placed on overtime, whilst Maltaʼs Green Party pledged to reduce taxes from 35% to 30% and increase bank taxes to 40% (Sansone, Illum, 10 February 2008). These economic incentives were focused on safeguarding their core vote. With the lack of a central issue in the campaign, political parties struggled to convince floating voters to vote for them. Although voters believed Labour was going to emerge as the winner based on the results of the 2004 EU Elections, surveys suggested that the election could have gone either way. The election was held on 8 March 2008, with a turnout of 93.3%, and the result saw the Nationalist Party edging out Labour. As shown in Table 5.2, the Nationalist Party received 143,468 votes, equivalent to 49.34%, of the total votes, whilst the Labour Party received 141,888 votes, equivalent to 48.79% of the total votes. AD won 3810 votes and 1.10% of the total votes. (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). Calculations that were made following the 2004 European elections, suggesting the

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win of the Labour Party in the national election, and the winning of parliament seats of Maltaʼs Green Party turned out to be incorrect, not least because the European election had different characteristics, as highlighted in the eventual post-election reports (Cacopardo et al., 2008; MLP, 2008b). In this scenario, Europeanisation had a direct as well as an indirect impact on the political parties. In this electoral context, it played a role at the party level as the EU and its obligations were restricting political parties’ movements on economic and migration issues. This helped the emergence of AN, a right-wing Eurosceptic party, but it did not necessarily have any significant impact at the popular level as this party received little electoral support. As with the 2004 EU election, the 2008 national election demonstrated that there the European Union could intervene if it felt that a country was not abiding by EU regulations. For the second time, the European Commission issued a report concerning Maltaʼs energy subsidies, which at that stage could have worked against the Nationalist Party as it was the party-in-government. However, this warning was largely overshadowed by Maltaʼs particular electoral characteristics, including populism, partisanship, polarisation, and clientelism, with the election turning into a contest between the Nationalist leader Gonzi and the Labour leader Sant. In addition, during the campaign, several European politicians voiced their opinions about the possibility of reopening Maltaʼs accession treaty. Many explained that this could not be done. This indirectly favoured the Nationalist Party. The mainstream political parties were certainly restricted by the policies of the European Union and were unable to propose populist solutions to safeguarding Malta’s dockyards, curbing irregular migration, or the hunting season. Whilst both parties showed restraint towards hunting and irregular migration, they had differing opinions on the dockyards, which is not surprising given the fact that many dockyard workers (most of them Labour voters) were at risk of losing their job. This is the reason why the Labour Party wanted to reopen Maltaʼs accession treaty to be able to transfer more funds to the ailing company. Europeanisation also had a direct impact on the party’s competition dimension as the AN group emerged seeking to safeguard Maltaʼs national interest by fighting illegal migration and safeguarding hunting by repealing some of the powers granted by the European Union. Maltaʼs MEPs also played an active part during the campaign, which gave them further exposure and enhanced their role within Maltaʼs political system. In addition, the Nationalist Party used its close relationship with the EPP to highlight its Europeanism and give an international dimension to its campaign. The traditional European Union principles, norms, and values, were again framed by the Nationalist Party to highlight the affinities which existed between the two entities. In addition, the Structural Funds were used to propose further economic development and improvement in the standard of living. The evidence suggests that in this election, the politicisation of the EU issue was not a useful tool for the Labour Party, but this was going to change with the election of Joseph Muscat as the leader in 2008.

5.2

Personalisation of Politics and EU Affairs

159

The Nationalist Party was by this stage facing several problems. It had to defend its decision for raising oil and gas prices and of colluding with the construction tycoons, which alienated many voters (Frendo, Times of Malta, 11 March 2008). There was a widespread perception that the Nationalist administration was unable to safeguard the environment and could not control several politicians, including the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, and Communications, Austin Gatt, who, although popular amongst their constituents, were seen as highly divisive by the electorate. Whilst the party-in-government was focusing on meeting the convergence targets, bringing Maltese laws in line with their European counterparts, and reducing debt as a means of joining the Eurozone (Gonzi, 2013), it was attacked for its lack of accountability (Calleja, Times of Malta, 18 February 2008b). Moreover, the party seemed to be unaware of the changing electoral mood and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. Still, the party successfully managed to market its GonziPN brand and to highlight the inconsistencies in Labourʼs 2008 electoral manifesto, to ultimately win the election. It managed to legitimise the economic decisions it had taken in the previous legislature, including the introduction of the Euro and the way the Structural Funds were being spent, and to turn the corruption charges levelled against it to its advantage by highlighting the inability of the Labour Party to provide information to support these accusations. This is what gave the party its narrow majority (Saliba, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). The Labour Party failed to convince the electorate that it could reopen the accession treaty and substantiate the corruption allegations levelled against some of the Nationalist candidates.6 These events overshadowed the party’s policy proposals which were narrowly rejected by Maltese voters. One can argue that the Labour Party was going through institutional fatigue. It needed to update its principles and ideologies, with a constant emphasis on social democracy and the welfare state, reorganise its structures, and provide a fresh new approach on several issues including the European Union to regain the popularity it once had (Muscat, 2013): The democratic left, in Malta and elsewhere, has been compelled to conduct continuous testing of its ideological relevance in the context of twenty-first century political economy. The apparent triumph of free market economics, the rolling back of the state as an economic player, the minimisation of economic regulation, the integrative effects of globalization in general and of the European Union membership in particular, all contributed to create the impression that ideology was, so to speak, homogenized into some vague pragmatism, somewhere into the no man’s land of the right-left spectrum. (Fenech, 2012, pp. 337–33)

Labourʼs campaign was marred by several problems. The party had an interesting electoral programme; however, it had a poor campaign, with the party losing hundreds of votes along the way. The Labour Party could not expect to win the election by default. Furthermore, the party’s vision did not go beyond its core voters. For this reason, the Labour post-electoral report highlighted the need for the party to 6

The most famous case involved Nationalist Candidate Pullicino Orlando. He was accused of trying to turn one of his properties outside the development zone into a massive discotheque, with an initial permit granted for 4000 people and then extended to 8000 people (L-Orizzont, 4 March 2008d). Pullicino denied these allegations and accused Sant of trying to ruin his reputation.

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find an alternative approach to its bland and narrow negative campaign which was limiting its appeal (MLP, 2008b). This is important, as this electoral loss enabled the election of the charismatic and media-friendly Joseph Muscat, an MEP, who, as leader of the Labour Party, brought about considerable changes. During the leadership contest, Muscat was even endorsed by the European Parliamentʼs President and S&D leader Schulz (Times of Malta, 24 May 2008c). This not only raised his profile as a candidate for leadership but also helped to strengthen the role of MEPs in the country’s political system. Under his leadership, the party went through a radical modernisation which would result in one of the largest victories in Maltaʼs electoral history.

5.3

The Europeanisation of the Labour Party

The 2009 European Parliament election was the first election with Joseph Muscat as the leader. In 2003, he had campaigned against Maltaʼs EU membership; however, by 2009 he had shifted his position and expressed himself in favour of EU accession after his experience as a Member of the European Parliament. Because of this, he produced a series of changes within the party. After the 2008 election and as the party was heading for the 2009 European Parliament election, the Malta Labour Party was officially renamed Labour Party, its emblem was modernised, and its structures reorganised. The renaming of the party was particularly important for the new party leader as the name was linked to the era when Malta was a British colony and outlined the need to move forward when Malta was now fully independent and a proud member of the European Union (Muscat, 2022). Furthermore, the party borrowed some characteristics of the catch-all party model, including campaigns based on the persona of the leader and the promotion of issues that cater to all society. The new Labour leader Muscat declared that the Labour Party needed change. Muscat believed that the issue of the European Union membership hijacked all other policy debates and dwarfed all other issues. This was a problem for the Labour Party. Muscat argued that rather than focusing on its reforming soul, the Labour Party was branded as the anti-EU party (Muscat, 2022). This is why the party needed a change in its structure and identity, to reclaim the reformist agenda. This is the reason why the party underwent a series of changes between 2008 and 2013, to regain its credibility and provide a new perception to attract voters beyond its traditional cleavage that is the working class. The new Labour doctrine was inspired by the new political doctrine advanced by Blair and Schroeder in the UK and Germany. The new labour doctrine borrowed elements from social liberalism and neoliberalism in its economic approach. The modern Labour Party began to publicise its developed socialist credentials and its acceptance and framing of the EU liberal principles during various campaigns, including the promotion of civil rights which made it extremely popular. This politicisation of the European Union and the utilisation of the EU liberal values challenged the Nationalist Party’s Conservative ideology and the party’s

5.3

The Europeanisation of the Labour Party

161

Europeanist approach. The think tank group, IDEAT, was placed at the heart of the party, with various discussions taking place between this group, the Labour Party, and students, which helped attract the latter (traditionally Nationalist leaning) towards the party. Most importantly, these developments enabled Labour to change its attitude and image, whilst the party also embraced the European Union and used its liberal principles to legitimise and defend its decision to introduce further civil rights, including divorce and civil unions for same-sex couples. At the same time, it is important to note that while the Labour Party was going through a series of internal changes, the Nationalist Party was being weakened by internal disagreements which plagued it. This is the reason why the 2009 EU election was going to be a test for both the Nationalist and Labour Parties. The Nationalist administration’s one-seat majority produced a weak government, with several backbenchers openly disagreeing with the work carried out by the executive. This was quite uncommon in Malta since party loyalty is highly valued. The party started to implode: it failed to resolve its internal conflicts and various factions emerged, thereby undermining the credibility of the party leadership. For the 2009 European election, its political manifesto was Together, we will generate more employment opportunities (PN, 2009). The Nationalist Party’s strategy was similar to that of the 2004 European election: ideologically led with a constant promotion of Catholic Social Teaching. The campaign was centred on European issues and left more space for individual candidates to introduce themselves to the electorate. It focused mostly on addressing the issues surrounding irregular migration, highlighting how its MEPs were going to work for the establishment of a European Agency for Refugees, emphasising the need for the EU to endorse burden sharing. It also wanted to work towards strengthening Frontex, and the utilisation of the European funds for various projects to improve the quality of life of the Maltese citizens. The Labour Party’s manifesto was ‘Aiming to be successful: Believing, Working, Succeeding’ (PL, 2009), with the party opting to focus much of its campaign on its criticism of the Nationalist administration’s policies. Still, there were some European elements in the campaign. The Labour Party promoted itself as a progressive and moderate movement and the natural home for those who believe in the social progress of Malta and Europe. This is especially important as this European progressive element would be at the centre of the various campaigns and issues promoted by the Labour Party, including the introduction of divorce; civil unions; same-sex marriage, and adoptions by same-sex couples which would transform Malta into a progressive leader with regards to LGBTIQ rights. The Labour Party also declared that it would defend the national interest, especially on irregular migration, within the European Parliament. The Labour Party promoted its socialist principles and links with European Socialists by highlighting how they were going to work together to develop more employment in Europe. The party also sought to use the EU to pressure the Nationalist administration to remove the VAT on car registrations and highlighted how EU funds were going to be used for the benefit of the Maltese people. The main political parties took a similar approach by highlighting the role of their MEPs in fighting the national interest and the importance of keeping a close

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relationship with their European parties. This was required to influence the EU agenda. A similar approach by both parties was also taken for the promotion of EU funds to improve the lives of the Maltese people. This is particularly important as Malta was a net beneficiary of these funds. Yet, the way the European Union was framed before and after membership might have a negative implication because the European Union could simply be seen as a funding machine when funds are only one of the opportunities linked with the European Union. This could become a problem when Malta stops being a net beneficiary and instead becomes a net contributor to the European Union. What is interesting is the shift of the Labour Party towards Europeanism. Under the leadership of Joseph Muscat, the party had opted to leave behind its historical approach towards the European Union to highlight the benefits of membership and the need to work closely with the party’s European allies. This has been confirmed by one of the top party officials Leo Brincat, who declared: PL makes it clear in its fresh and innovative manifesto, we as European citizens must increasingly believe that economic, social and environmental issues, such as the challenges of the credit crunch, the widening social divide, the overall economic slowdown, energy security and climate change, do and must have a European dimension. (Brincat in Times of Malta, 27 May 2009, p. 8)

The language used reflects the narrative surrounding European Unity. This unity was required in the fight against the challenges being faced by the region, including the financial crisis and climate change. This European dimension was going to have a very important role as Joseph Muscat would make additional changes within the party structures and policy programmes. The 2009 European election was dominated by national and international events. There was the fear that the economic recession which had emerged within the Eurozone was going to spread throughout Europe. The constraints that European Union membership placed on the Maltese government on immigration were visible as both parties failed to find alternative solutions to ease the immigration problem and prevent more migrants from reaching the Maltese shores. Both parties pledged to pursue the national interest within the European Union, and to work with the EPP and S&D groups respectively, to ease the immigration burden on Malta. Maltaʼs third political party, the Greens (AD), promised to work with the European Greens to safeguard the civil rights of all minorities and to introduce divorce and same-sex marriage. Perhaps more importantly, they pledged to safeguard Maltaʼs environment in the European Parliament by pressuring the Maltese government to stop the overdevelopment of the country which was threatening the wellbeing of the Maltese citizens (AD, 2009). At the 2009 EU election, a Eurobarometer survey revealed that immigration (27%) employment (19.30%), and wages (9.30%) were the most important issues for the Maltese electorate (Eurobarometer, 2009). The rising preoccupation with immigration occurred due to an influx of immigrants that had arrived. This helped with the creation of Imperium Europa, a Eurosceptic far-right racialist party which,

5.3

The Europeanisation of the Labour Party

163

along with the AN party, proposed drastic measures to prevent the landing of more immigrants on Maltese shores. The rising immigration problem led to several diplomatic rows with Italy over Maltaʼs Search and Rescue area. Many blamed the EU for not doing enough to support Malta. Maltaʼs far-right parties used this issue to promote a radicalised agenda. Moreover, the fact that several factories were closing down shifted attention to employment and wages. Voters needed some assurances that their jobs were going to be safeguarded. This overshadowed the problems that existed within Malta’s environment, which were completely ignored (Debono, MaltaToday, 15 March 2009). In a way similar to the 2004 EU election, political programmes were strongly based on the European dimension with emphasis on the partiesʼ role within the European party groups and the use of strategic funds to strengthen the country. In addition, the party did try to outline the contradictions of the Labour Party over the European Union; however, it was clear that the issue was not important to voters. The Labour Party fought an excellent campaign by revising its commitments and basing this campaign on the electorateʼs cues. The new Labour Party was promoted as a Progressive Movement, which welcomed everyone within its structures. The Labour Party even asked its supporters to use the European flags instead of the traditional Labour flags to showcase the party’s newly found Europeanism. This is particularly significant given the approach taken over the EU membership issue, by the new party leader in 2003 when he campaigned against Maltaʼs membership. The Labour Partyʼs campaign was based on four key issues: the government’s economic performance, the economy including the introduction of new taxes and rising utility bills, migration, and healthcare. The centre-left Party took a national approach in the EU election campaign by using the government’s position on transport reform, rising utility bills, and the introduction of a tax on car registration, which hit many segments of society (L-Orizzont, 21 May 2009a), to encourage voters to use the election as a protest vote against the Nationalist administration and provide the needed political change for the country. For the first time, the Labour Party used the ‘boomerang’ approach by using European Institutions (as the Nationalist Party had done during the 1980s) as a means of pressuring the Nationalist administration to repeal the newly introduced VAT on new vehicle registrations. The party echoed the sentiments of those who were negatively hit by the tax policy. It claimed that this tax did not comply with EU regulations and promised to refund all those hit by the new tax. The issue which dominated Labourʼs campaign was irregular migration, which proved to be extremely controversial (L-Orizzont, 4 May 2009b). Its transition from a mass party model to catch-allism might be seen as evident in its decision to endorse a more right-wing stance on immigration. This could be seen as a way for the party to compete with new far-right parties. This highlighted the decision of the party to substitute some of its socialist ideas for a more pragmatic approach. On the rising influx of irregular migrants, Muscat criticised the European Union for failing to help Malta and for pressuring its government to halt the repatriation process when this could have eased the perceived immigration burden. This was placing further pressure on parties to safeguard the national interest, especially as

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there was a threat arising from the far-right parties which had a much stronger message against irregular migration. Another important area that the Labour Party focused on, and which was also directly and indirectly influenced by the European Union, was the economy. Labour criticised the Nationalist administration, highlighting how only 37.2% of the Maltese people declared that they were faring better. There was also the threat the European Commission was going to initiate infringement proceedings, as Malta broke the Stability and Growth Pact by registering a 4.7% GDP deficit. At the time, Maltaʼs inflation (at 4%) was the highest in the Eurozone area and Tourism decreased by 20% in the first months of 2009, with spending decreasing by 30%. Still, in this period, government expenditure increased by €27.1 million (L-Orizzont, 8 May 2009c, p. 1; Xuereb, Times of Malta, 30 May 2009a, b). Interestingly enough, 66% of the Labour voters declared that Malta should even opt out of the European Union (Debono, MaltaToday, 3 May 2009) as the government and the EU were responsible for the country’s economic problems. The electoral survey conducted by the independent newspaper MaltaToday highlights various issues within the country’s political system. It was a reflection of the political divisions which existed over the European Union and how these divisions were mostly fought along party lines. It also raised questions on whether Maltese voters’ approach towards the European Union was simply based on voters’ personal opinion and their understanding of the European organisation, or just based on how their parties viewed it. The survey also provided a contrast to the Labour Partyʼs promotion of the EU and the country’s membership and questioned whether there was any political space left for Eurosceptics within the party. The last major issue raised by the Labour Party in the campaign was healthcare reform. This is significant since the European Commission had warned the government to implement such reforms to safeguard its finances, even though no action had been taken towards improving the healthcare system. Labour accused the government of discussing the privatisation of Maltaʼs health care system without initiating a public discussion surrounding it. For this reason, it asked voters to send a message to the Nationalist administration by voting Labour (Sansone, Times of Malta, 25 May 2009a). The Nationalist administration was struggling to enact the required reforms with its one-seat majority. It developed a low-key campaign and opted to focus on the European dimension, highlighting European issues rather than national ones. This was done as an attempt to divert the focus away from the government’s performance since, both the Labour Party and other interest groups, were protesting against the policies the government was introducing. The centre-right party attempted to shift the focus onto the Labour Party by questioning Labourʼs newly found Europeanism, citing its attack on the EU over the immigration issue. The Nationalist Party accused Labour of embracing the European Union out of convenience rather than conviction (In-Nazzjon, 16 May 2009d) since its discourse and statements, as discussed above, showed that in many respects it was still highly critical of the EU. On this issue, Muscat rebutted these accusations and declared that he did not see his criticism of the EU as Eurosceptic, but as a way of improving things within it:

5.3

The Europeanisation of the Labour Party

165

People have the idea that in order to be truly European you need to constantly praise the European Union. But in order to be a European, one needs to analyse freely the way things are running within the EU and state how things can improve. (Muscat, 2013)

Muscat’s view was that Labour Party was not against the European project, but it wanted to improve the European Union and the way it was functioning. Nonetheless, Labourʼs Europeanism (or lack thereof) would not be the determining factor in this election as other issues were a priority, including the state of the economy and irregular migration. The latter certainly had a direct impact on the rise of xenophobia, which was evident from an EU survey that highlighted how two out of every three Muslims living in Malta felt discriminated against (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 29 May 2009). While the majority of the electorate was in favour of Labourʼs stance on migration, perceiving the rise of irregular migration as a serious threat, the politicisation of the issue and the wave of radicalisation prompted further criticism directed towards the EU. By placing itself on the centre-left of the political spectrum on migration, the Nationalist Party angered its supporters at a time when it could not afford to lose more voters, especially as the Labour Party was becoming more popular and was challenging its supremacy over its previously core voters. The Nationalist party attempted to highlight the divergent opinions which existed within the Labour Party in this campaign. It argued that the Labour Party was declaring one thing and its MEPs at the European Parliament voted the opposite way. This is particularly interesting as it reveals how important MEPs were for the country, and the media attention that was placed on them and their voting patterns within the European Parliament. Further evidence of this is seen in the Nationalist administration’s attack on the Labour Party for embracing a hard stance on irregular migration when at the same time its MEPs voted in favour of giving immigrants the right to vote, abstained on the vote to ease repatriation, and voted against keeping irregular migration as a priority in the European Parliament (In-Nazzjon, 6 May 2004j). On the rising costs of the healthcare system, the Nationalist Party used the comments made by Professor Edward Scicluna, then a Labour MEP candidate, that Malta needed to privatise the healthcare system and remove the stipend system to remain economically viable (In-Nazzjon, 28 May 2009e; Il-Mument, 31 May 2009f). This was used to reveal Labourʼs internal disagreements on the issue, with the latter promoting the strengthening of the welfare state, safeguarding of the public health care system, and the removal of excessive taxes, whilst its politicians were recommending privatisation and cuts. On Maltaʼs economic performance, the Nationalist Party defended the impact of economic Europeanisation consisting of the top-down impact of the Single Market and Single Currency regulations and defended its economic reforms by explaining that the financial crisis was harming Maltaʼs tourism sector and Foreign Direct Investment. Still, whilst the party was struggling to convince voters of its reforms, the Nationalist administration was warned, yet again, by the European Commission to restrict its public spending or else face infringement proceedings. This warning helped the Labour Party in its

166 Table 5.3 The 2009 EU elections results

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Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

PL PN AD Imperium Europa AN Turnout

Seats 4 2 –

Voters 135,917 100,486 5802 3637 1595

Voters (%) 54.77 40.49 2.34 1.47 0.64 78.8

critique of the government’s economic performance and placed more pressure on the Nationalist Party. At this delicate stage, the centre-right party repeatedly promoted the use of Structural and Cohesion Funds as a means of shielding the country’s economy from the worst effects of the financial crisis. These included the €1.159 million used to improve the standard of living by attracting more investment and safeguarding employment (Muscat, In-Nazzjon, 4 May 2009). Furthermore, €5.3 million of European Union funds were being utilised to retrain workers and help them seek alternative employment (Cremona, In-Nazzjon, 13 May 2009). Another €17 million were channelled to the University of Malta, an institution that had already received €42 million from the Regional Development Fund (Zammit, InNazzjon, 15 May 2009). Nonetheless, voters wanted Maltaʼs parties to come up with credible solutions which could safeguard jobs and meet basic needs, since the general perception was that these were being threatened by the financial crisis (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 30 May 2009a, b). In the end, the internal conflicts, including the continuous threats being made by some of its MPS of voting against the government, essentially forcing an early election, which plagued the Nationalist Party, were laid bare in its European election campaign. This ongoing drama worked against the party and overshadowed the work which was being done by the Nationalist administration.7 The election took place on 6 June 2009, with turnout reaching 78.79%, and the Labour Party winning an absolute majority of votes. As Table 5.3 shows, the Labour Party received 135,917 votes, equivalent to 54.77%, winning four seats of the six available. The Nationalist Party received 100,486 votes, equivalent to 40.72%, and won the remaining two seats (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). This was a huge defeat for the Nationalist Party and one that produced further internal disagreements. The Prime Minister declared that he respected the peopleʼs judgement. More importantly, he stated that there was a need for his administration to listen to the electorate. Still, he also declared that he was ready to sacrifice his political ambitions (of winning the 2013 national election) to ensure strong economic performance, fiscal stability, and healthy employment levels (Sansone, Times of Malta, 8 June 7

The fact that Austin Gatt, who was not a popular Minister, was well known and his decision to introduce a series of unpopular reforms, including the Delimara Power station project, which was plagued by corruption accusations, made him unpopular even with the partyʼs own grassroots voters (Grima, The Malta Independent, 14 June 2009; Vassallo & Stagno-Navarra, Illum, 24 May 2009).

5.3

The Europeanisation of the Labour Party

167

2009b). This decision would have a long-term implication for the party which would struggle to find a charismatic leader and an attractive programme to win back the voters it had lost over the decades. The results injected further enthusiasm into the Labour Party and its new leader, Joseph Muscat. Muscat claimed that, with the convincing success of the EU election, a progressive movement had been born in Malta. He claimed that this had replaced the traditional party divisions even though the next stage of Europeanisation would highlight how these divisions would still dominate the country’s political system. Muscat declared that this was not just a victory for him and his officials, but a victory for the Maltese people (Peregin et al., Times of Malta, 8 June 2009), who wanted to be part of the movement and wanted to be part of the change which the country was heading towards: A progressive movement was born today. The people have made a clear choice between yesterdayʼs political parties and tomorrow’s progressive movement. There are no blues or reds, no yes or no votes but a coalition of people ready to change. (Muscat in Ameen, Times of Malta, 8 June 2009. p. 7)

The discourse used by Muscat reflects his ability to communicate with voters and the way he proposed a new political system based on movements rather than parties. This was meant to unite voters with different visions and ideas. This was very similar to the approach used by the Nationalist Party during the EU Referendum campaign and eventual election. By 2009, both major parties in Malta had embraced the European Union. Still, the electorate did not entirely embrace Europeanism. This was due in large part to the problem of irregular migration, with many blaming the EU for the rising influx of migrants. Several voters felt that the European Union was not doing its utmost to ease Malta’s burden. Others believed that the government was unable to defend national interests within European institutions (Grech, Times of Malta, 31 May 2009). Concerning irregular migration, Imperium Europa, AN, and the Labour Party incorporated elements of populism, nationalism, and patriotism in their language, to win the support of those voters who were not happy with the way the Government was dealing with this problem. On this issue, one of the problems was the inability of the majority of the Maltese citizens to differentiate between the ECJ and ECHR (it was the latter that was warning Malta to respect the European Convention on Human Rights on irregular migration), with the EU being constantly blamed for the rising problem (Debono, MaltaToday, 15 March 2009). This forced both major parties to pledge to defend national interests within EU institutions by encouraging them to strengthen the Frontex programme (PN, 2009; PL, 2009). It was clear that Europeanisation had both direct and indirect impact on political parties. The European Union influenced Maltaʼs policy change dimension as the Nationalist administration was restricted by EU regulations over migration. The Labour Party, AN, and Imperium Europa ignored the EU regulations and proposed extreme measures to send migrants back to Libya. In addition, the European Commission once again criticised the Maltese government for failing to reduce its debt and public spending and warned the government to respect EU obligations and criteria.

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Organisation-wise, Joseph Muscat offered a new approach towards the European Union, espousing its principles and norms and pledging to work closely with the EU for the benefit of the Maltese citizens. This also influenced the relations beyond the party system dimension. The reason for this is that the new Labour leader worked closely with the S&D Party, of which he was a member as an MEP. This enabled him to earn the endorsement of Schulz, the party president during the party leadership contest and the subsequent European election. This helped legitimise Muscatʼs approach within the Labour Party and with Maltese voters by promising a new political season, a new political style based on consensus rather than a confrontational approach, which was typical of Maltaʼs political system (Peregin et al., Times of Malta, 8 June 2009; Muscat, 2013). In return, he was rewarded with one of the largest victories ever, with the margin between the two parties reaching 35,431 votes. From 2008 onwards, the Labour Party followed in the Nationalist Party’s footsteps by framing and utilising the European Union, its norms and beliefs, and the structural funds as a political tool. This was done to attract more voters to the party, to give it an international dimension by showing that it was respected by the majority of Europeʼs Socialist Parties, and to promise a better quality of life (L-Orizzont, 1 June 2009g). It did, however, face certain challenges, since the party and its MEPs seemed to be working in opposite directions. The Nationalist Party used this to highlight the inconsistencies they claimed existed within the Labour Party. However, this did not have an impact on the eventual results. This election highlighted the fact that there was a certain degree of convergence between the political agendas of Maltaʼs two major parties. Only by dwelling on European issues did the Nationalist Party programme differ from that of the Labour Party. The Nationalist Party failed to ignite public interest in its European approach. On the other hand, the Labour Party managed to rally a strong degree of support by focusing on national issues (even though these were still being directly and indirectly influenced by EU regulations) and by promising to defend the national interest within EU institutions. Both parties were pressured to propose concrete solutions to solve economic and irregular migration problems whilst fighting off competition from the emerging far-right Eurosceptic parties, AN and Imperium Europa, which in turn managed to find their own space in Maltaʼs political system. The large-scale defeat of the Nationalist Party was a clear sign that the party’s popularity and support were dwindling, increasing the threat that the country was posing by slowly moving to a one-and-a-half party system. Whilst in the 2004 European election some of the party support had shifted towards the Green Party, the votes it lost went to the Labour Party (Saliba, 2013). Muscat’s premise of transforming Malta and its political system based on the way things are done within the EU was attracting thousands of new voters. The Nationalist Party was riddled with institutional fatigue. Its campaign was a strategic failure since it was based on European issues. In addition, it failed to understand that people needed guarantees on the economy, something which the Nationalist administration had failed to give (Saliba, 2013; Spiteri, 2013).

5.4

Divorce and the European Union

169

Not only was the Nationalist Party effectively detaching itself from the electorate and becoming extremely unpopular within certain segments of Maltaʼs society, but it was clear that a number of its officials were not happy with the way things were running. The Nationalist administration needed to defend the country against a gloomy economic scenario that had already damaged several European economies. At the same time, the party was being pressured by the European Commission to enact a series of reforms. Its voters, on the other hand, were keen to safeguard their interests—regardless of what EU legislation dictated. These opposing views made it difficult to please everyone. The revamped Labour Party managed to exceed expectations by winning by a very large margin. This was achieved by embracing catch-allism and dominating the national debate by responding directly to the electorate’s preferences (Farrugia, 2013). Whilst Labour maintained its core support, which as noted in the previous chapters, identified more strongly with their party than their Nationalist counterparts, the party also pledged to be more accountable to the Maltese electorate. Labourʼs attitude was based on a pragmatic assessment of the national interest and its astute political strategy on matters such as immigration, civil rights, the welfare system, and political accountability, and enabled it to achieve a wide consensus which helped it to win by such a large margin. Labour succeeded in utilising its new European approach to portray itself as a modern and innovative party, which was going to replace partisanship and polarisation with political consensus to safeguard the country and its people (Muscat, 2013).

5.4

Divorce and the European Union

It is impossible to analyse the impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs political parties without providing a brief analysis of the divorce issue and its impact on the 2013 national election. Indeed, the events of 2013 showed that the dynamics of Maltaʼs political system had been altered, and it highlighted the way Maltaʼs society had changed after EU accession. The introduction of divorce had been in the Green Partyʼs electoral manifestos for decades and appeared in Labourʼs election manifestos from 1998 onwards. However, with the Nationalist Party in power from 1998 onwards (and known to be opposed to its introduction), and with no real pressure from the Labour Party on the government to discuss the issue as it had both supporters and opponents of its introduction, the issue was always side-lined. Divorce was still a sensitive issue for the Nationalist Party in 2003 prior to the referendum over EU accession. The Nationalist Party guaranteed that the EU was not going to force Malta to introduce divorce, civil unions, and abortion, although a number of groups were demanding the introduction of at least two of these. As this research shows, the Nationalist Party had highlighted its European credentials by promoting Europeanism and the traditional principles of the EU. However, the European Union was perceived by Labour and Maltaʼs Green Party to be a guarantor

170 Table 5.4 The divorce referendum

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Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

Yes No Turnout

Votes 122,547 107,71

Votes (%) 52.67 46.44 72

of the liberal principles which did not particularly fit with the Nationalists’ socially conservative ideology. This produced a dilemma and a series of ideological schisms, which disappointed those members who wanted the party to embrace a more pragmatic approach over its preference for the main tenets of traditional Catholic Social Teaching. This issue turned into a strategic and logistical nightmare for the Nationalist Party when one of its MPs, Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, used a private members bill backed by some members of the Opposition, to propose a referendum on divorce. Whilst the Nationalist Party took an official position against divorce, the Labour Party opted for an official position, even though Muscat was campaigning for its introduction and the Labour media was biased heavily in favour of divorce. This, and other internal divisions, caused a split within the Nationalist Party. The Party was struggling to keep together the main forces within the party; the traditionalists and the liberals. These two elements were important for the party to maintain its popularity during the 1980s and 1990s. To legitimise its position, it argued that its stance against divorce was due to the party’s concern over the family structure and family values. The Nationalist Party felt that it needed to safeguard the Catholic principles envisaged by its founding fathers (Zammit-Dimech, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). This is because according to several PN officials, these Catholic values were thought to be challenged by the impact of globalisation and the liberal principles of Europeanisation, which were being replaced by other liberal values with more focus on civil rights (Zammit-Dimech, 2013; Gonzi, 2013). However, that does not mean that there was not a strong opposition to them. Maltaʼs pro-divorce campaign, which consisted of several entities including Maltaʼs Green Party, the Labour Party, and some Nationalist Party members, deployed the centre-right party European strategy by promoting the EU motto ‘Unity in Diversity’. This provided an alternative notion of the EU, this time based on its liberal principles. The campaign projected these liberal principles as a means of encouraging civil rights and strengthening Malta’s European credentials. Concerning family values, the divorce movement declared that it was through the introduction of the right to divorce that family values would be safeguarded, since divorce gives couples the right to remarry (Times of Malta, 22 May 2011a). The referendum took place on 28 May 2011 with a turnout of around 72%, with the result in favour of introducing the right to divorce in Malta. Whilst the turnout could be considered relatively low when compared with national elections, it was similar to the participation levels in local council elections. As Table 5.4 shows, 122,547, or 52.67%, voted for the introduction of divorce, whilst 107,971, or 46.44%, of voters, opposed it (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). The fact that

5.4

Divorce and the European Union

171

Joseph Muscat told those who were against divorce to abstain from voting, could have influenced the turnout. The question asked to the voters was also interesting. Indeed, the Referendum Question was: Do you agree with the introduction of the option of divorce in the case of a married couple who has been separated or has been living apart for at least 4 years, and where there is no reasonable hope for reconciliation between the spouses, whilst adequate maintenance is guaranteed and the children are protected? The question was not simply an issue of whether someone could opt for divorce, but the message it conveyed highlighted how it attempted to win over voters by emphasising the fact that spouses and children were still going to be protected. The rationale behind the decision to use this question to voters suggests the fear that Maltese voters were simply too traditional, so they needed reassurances to introduce divorce in the country. The vote strengthened the Labour Party, its leader Joseph Muscat, and his social movement approach. Muscat was managing to accommodate and address the demands of different voters and groups with diverse ideologies and beliefs. The Labour leader declared that his party (which as argued in the previous section, was being projected as a movement made up of various individuals with different opinions and ideas with the desire of changing Maltaʼs society), was now the champion of civil rights and the rightful home for liberals within the country (Zahra, L-Orizzont, 30 May 2011). In the divorce referendum, European principles were promoted to encourage voters to vote for the introduction of divorce for them to have the same rights as other EU citizens. In this instance, there was no top-down influence of EU regulations and no impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs party dimensions since there was no intervention by European politicians. The referendum was considered to be a national issue that the countryʼs citizens had to decide upon. Europeanisation was, nevertheless, an effective political tool that was utilised against the Nationalist Party. The latter had spent years framing traditional European principles in its favour and found itself in difficulty when others started to use them against it since divorce and other civil rights issues clashed with the Party’s ideology. This exasperated the internal struggles in the Nationalist Party. Due to the way it framed the European principles, the perception was that the Labour Party was now closer to European values than the Nationalist Party (Muscat, 2013). The Prime Minister declared that the people’s wishes had to be respected. However, the debate on the introduction of divorce raised the question of political morality as for several MPs, it is a matter of conscience. This led to several Nationalist MPs opting to abstain or vote against the divorce legislation (Schembri, Times of Malta, 30 May 2011). The decision for some to abstain or vote against the divorce legislation fuelled further divisions within the Nationalist Party. Several voters were arguing that the government did not respect their will, which further reduced its popularity (Times of Malta, 15 March 2011). The Nationalist Party, which had spent years projecting itself as the party which could safeguard free thinking and the liberalisation of thought, ended up. After membership, the party struggled to find its identity and revert to the traditional values by opposing the introduction of divorce and other civil rights (Saliba, 2013), which made the party

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unpopular and old-fashioned. As the 2013 national election approached, it was clear that the Nationalist Party needed to bring together its different elements to understand and address the demands of the electorate and to develop a strong campaign to recover the thousands of votes it had lost over the years. Although the Labour Party faced internal disagreements about the divorce issue, the Labour Party leader was able to contain them and achieve a common stance. The party was successful in using a political morality issue, that is the failure of the Nationalist Party to adapt to the challenges being faced by a contemporary society. It did so, by promoting the liberal element of European values. The European Union’s values had been consistently promoted by the Nationalist Party over the years. The Labour Party managed to outmanoeuvre the Nationalist Party and in doing so it weakened its competition, portraying itself as the party which ultimately could bring about the political changes the country needed.

5.5

The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party

With a one-seat majority and internal rebellion, which the leadership found impossible to contain, the inevitable occurred as several Nationalist MPs voted against the government on key votes. By the end of 2012, many Nationalist supporters felt that Gonzi could not be held to ransom by a number of the party’s MPs, while Labour felt that an early election had to be called as the government had lost its majority.8 The 2013 election is important because of the role which Maltaʼs MEPs played and the way these took centre stage in the national political system. This was certainly helped by the fact that just a few months prior to the election, MEPs Louis Grech from the Labour Party, and Simon Busuttil from the Nationalist Party, became deputy leaders of their parties, replacing Anġlu Farrugia and Tonio Borg, with the latter nominated as EU Commissioner after the resignation of Maltaʼs EU Commissioner, John Dalli. The election coincided with several international crises, including the Libyan War and in particular, the financial crisis which emerged in Greece, and spread throughout the entire region. The EU exerted some pressure on Eurozone governments to contribute to the bailouts which were being offered to several states. The Nationalist administration also faced a number of other national as well as international issues, which had an impact on its domestic and international policies. First, there was the Libyan crisis, in which Malta played a major role by becoming a hub for those non-Libyans who wanted to leave the country. The Libyan crisis is an important event as it outlined the role which Malta could play in the Mediterranean (Cassar, 2014). The role played by Malta during the Arab Spring and

8

With Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando becoming independent, the government had actually lost its majority in parliament.

5.5

The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party

173

especially during the uprising in Libya was not limited to its function as an evacuation centre but extended to other areas. It provided logistical support to aid agencies, a free hospital and medical facilities to all injured persons, and diplomatic support in providing a communication channel between all parties. It also granted political asylum to the two pilots who landed in Malta after they defected from the Gaddafi regime, refusing to return the two Libyan Air Force mirage jets on the moral and ethical grounds that this would have rendered Malta an accomplice in the horrors that were being perpetrated on innocent civilians. It also implemented all United Nations (UN) resolutions including the ones relating to the imposition of a no-fly zone. This was achieved whilst retaining its status of an active neutral state, a policy that was still important for the Maltese (Gonzi, 2022). Still, criticism over the role of Malta was present especially since Malta was known to have a closer relationship with Libya. Former Prime Minister of Malta, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici reiterated his position that Malta should safeguard its neutrality by not supporting any military interventions in Malta (Times of Malta, 3 March 2011b). Discussions on what neutrality meant were still going on. Some argued that the conflict would encourage Malta to have a proper discussion on the meaning of neutrality and the way the principles of neutrality were reflected in Malta’s foreign policy (Fsadni, 2013). The role of Malta in the conflict was appreciated by the country’s international partners. Whilst the conflict helped to elevate the status of Malta within the international system, various allies publically thanked the country for the support provided. These included the visit of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In 2011, during her visit to Malta, the US Secretary of State declared that Malta is a small country that provided a huge contribution to the region. She thanked the Maltese government and the Maltese people for helping in the evacuation of US citizens from Libya (StagnoNavarra, MaltaToday, 18 October 2011). British Prime Minister David Cameron also praised Malta and the support which the Maltese provided to evacuated British citizens from Libya (Times of Malta, 28 February 2011c). Whilst Malta’s reputation within the international sphere rose due to the role it had in the evacuation procedures from Libya, the government had to face several internal issues. These included the forced resignation of Maltaʼs EU Commissioner since a collaborator of Dalli was accused of seeking a €60 m bribe on Dalliʼs behalf. In addition, the government had to organise several meetings with the EUʼs European party groups to encourage them to vote for Tonio Borg, Dalliʼs replacement, due to the difficulty he was facing in getting the approval of the European Parliament. Tonio Borg, the Deputy Prime Minister, faced an unprecedented level of disapproval over his conservative views and ideas within the European Parliament. The fear was that the European Parliament was going to reject his nomination embarrassing the Maltese government. He was ultimately accepted by the European Parliament, although the government had to resort to serious negotiations to encourage various parties to vote in favour of his nomination. These events forced the government to use all of its energy to engage with these issues. However, to do this, it ignored other political problems including the perceived lack of accountability, corruption allegations, and internal disagreements within the party, which finally brought down the government. This took place at the end of 2012 when the

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Nationalist administration lost the Budget vote since Franco Debono, one of its MPs, voted against it. At the subsequent election, the Nationalist Party, with its slogan, ‘Another Quality Leap: Work- Health-Education’ (PN, 2013a), projected itself as the party which could bring about positive change in the country; on the other hand, the Labour Party, with its ‘Malta belongs to us all’ slogan (PL, 2013), projected itself as a movement which could unite the country and foster progress. Both manifestos had an element of Europeanisation in them. The Nationalist Party referred to the EU presidency, highlighting its prestige for the country. Other prestigious events included the 2015 Commonwealth Heads of Governments meeting in Malta and the Capital of Culture in 2018 with Valletta becoming the first city in Malta to host the event. These events were very important and were promoted throughout the years. They could elevate the status of the country and its leaders, and this election was going to decide which party was going to do that. European funds were another important tool that parties framed. This is not surprising. In a country where bread and butter issues such as employment and healthcare were still at the top of voters’ concerns, funds could be used to tackle these matters. The electoral programme of the Nationalist Party focused on how European funds could be distributed in the country. It proposed the Strengthening of the Economic Aid Programme by utilising EUʼs Structural Funds, strengthening of the Employment Aid Scheme partly subsided by the European Structural Funds, and the creation of a natural water management plan and a natural water catchment plan co-financed by the EU. It also proposed the use of European funds to assist farmers and allocate 10% of the European Structural and Cohesion Funds to Gozo. The party also proposed the reduction of income tax. However, the Nationalist Party remained very unpopular due to recent events related to its position on divorce, internal divisions and unpopular economic policies. The divorce referendum had highlighted the internal disagreements which existed between two factions in Malta, the Conservatives, and the Liberals, with these two factions struggling to work together after the entrance of Malta into the European Union. The internal crises within the party tainted the image and highlighted its weakness after nearly 25 years in power. The Labour Party had several factors which were helping it. The death of Maltaʼs former Prime Minister and Labour leader, Mintoff, helped the different party factions to unite with Muscat. In addition, it brought back a sense of nostalgia for when the party was at its peak under the Socialist leader. Their electoral programme also dealt with the events the country was going to be hosting, including the EU Presidency of the Council of Europe and the Capital of Culture event. The Labour Party (2013) also framed the European funds highlighting how they could be used for the Creation of an Employment Aid Programme. The party also proposed the safeguarding of hunting, in respect of EU regulations, the reduction of utility bills and income tax, and the introduction of civil unions. The latter was especially important as it highlighted how the party was going to endorse a liberal agenda based on EU principles and the need to fight for equality. Labour was now projecting itself as a movement that was embracing people with different ideas and political ideologies to work together for the national interest

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The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party

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(Engerer, 2013). Labour’s popularity was also helped by Muscat’s message that drew on social democracy, neoliberalism, and nationalism. This was raising the popularity of the Labour Party. Both political parties have also sought to initiate the process for constitutional reforms. The new political movement headed by Joseph Muscat was seen as ideal to initiate this process as it had promised to steer away from polarisation and political partisanship and endorse a political system based on consensus, which is very similar to the way the European Union functions. Yet, this expectation of a new political system would soon clash with the traditional way of doing politics in Malta as divisions persisted and grew stronger. Unlike previous elections, it was quite evident that no particular over-arching issue would dominate the debate. The major parties’ manifestos contained elements of the European dimension, including their role within their European party groups and the way they are going to utilise the Structural Funds. However, significant attention was placed on the internal disagreements within the Nationalist Party and the unpopular policies it had introduced over the years. At a time when in Europe many national political parties were shifting towards welfare retrenchment and austerity measures to reduce public spending, their Maltese counterparts were proposing the exact opposite, with both parties pledging to increase spending on the welfare state. The country’s economy was indeed in better shape than many other countries. The deficit stood at 3.3% of GDP and the Ministry of Finance was expecting this to be reduced to 2.7% of GDP by the end of the year. Even though the European Commission warned the government that its deficit was going to rise to 3.7% of GDP (Briguglio, MaltaToday, 6 May 2013), the major parties’ programmes promised to increase public spending at the risk of straining the country’s finances. Increasing public spending whilst reducing the government’s revenue was seen as dangerous by economists (Balzan, MaltaToday, 27 February 2013). The economy needed to be strengthened to withstand another economic shock that could have arrived from an increase in oil or gas and further economic recession within the Eurozone. Furthermore, unemployment amongst youth, which at 15% was considered to be a low figure compared with countries such as Spain which stood at 56%, was still a problem for the country (Balzan, MaltaToday, 27 February 2013). The Nationalist Party failed to articulate these immediate economic concerns. This ended up working against it. The party-in-government had spent years strengthening Maltaʼs economy by reducing its deficit and investing in the IT sector, the financial services industry, pharmaceutical companies, aircraft maintenance companies, and others in wholesale and retail, which helped to shield Malta from the impact of the financial crisis (The Malta Independent, 18 January 2013). Due to this, the state of the economy was not a major issue in the national campaign, even though the Nationalist Party attempted to use the economy and the recent acquisition of €1.12 billion from the 2014–2020 European budget to highlight its effort in safeguarding national interests. Nonetheless, the party failed to project itself as a modernised party that could withstand a variety of challenges whilst remaining a popular and credible choice for the electorate. It could not extol its European credentials as there were still ongoing disagreements about the EUʼs liberal principles, as illustrated clearly by the divorce issue. The Nationalist administration had

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Table 5.5 The 2013 national election results

Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities

PL PN AD Turnout

Seats 39 30 –

Votes 167,533 132,426 5506

Votes (%) 54.83 43.34 1.80 93

also failed to clear its name in relation to scandals that were being attributed to it. These included the oil procurement scandal which was investigated by the independent newspaper MaltaToday, revealing that commissions were being paid to an oil procurement committee member for the oil into a Swiss bank account. In the end, there was a claim that one of the oil traders being investigated in this scandal, George Farrugia, handed the Finance Minister a €5000 Maltese-style clock (Barry, The Malta Independent, 10 March 2013). It failed to maintain unity and remained a passive spectator as a number of the party’s former members endorsed the Labour Party and its leader Muscat. The Labour Party dominated the national agenda and produced a positive and effective campaign which was centred on the modernist Muscat, and a vision of a new style of politics based on the way things are done within the EU institutions. Muscat set the tone by declaring that the old style of politics had ended (Muscat, 2013), and that under his leadership a progressive movement was going to encourage meritocracy based on the way things are done within the EU, empowering Maltese citizens, and making institutions accountable. He also promoted a radical change in direction by increasing opportunities and equality. This was going to be achieved by curbing bureaucracy and corruption and fighting for civil rights which reflect Maltaʼs European Identity (Engerer, 2013). For the Labour Party, Divorce and Civil Union form part of the European Identity. This identity is based on respect of minorities and individual freedoms. Therefore, for the Maltese to be fully European and enjoy the same rights as their EU counterparts, these rights needed to be introduced in Malta. This showcases the fact that the Labour Party had started to use the same narrative as the Nationalist Party had done in the past, linking membership with the Maltese identity. The only difference now was that the cultural framing was based on the EU liberal rather than historical foundations. Muscatʼs pronouncements on the need to revitalise and modernise Maltaʼs political system and safeguard civil rights, the environment, and quality of life, seemed to attract the attention of the public, many of whom were annoyed with the way the Nationalist Party failed to deal with such issues. The Labour Party catered for every cleavage (Farrugia, 2013). Whilst this was seen as a strategic risk, as governments cannot please everyone, it did manage to gain widespread support as the election results revealed. The election took place on 9 March 2013, with a 93% turnout. As outlined in Table 5.5, the Labour Party received 167,533 votes, equivalent to 54.83%, obtaining not only an absolute majority of votes but the largest percentage of votes since Malta’s Independence, with a swing of over 6.04%. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party received 132,426 votes, equivalent to 43.34%, the lowest level of support

5.5

The 2013 National Election and the Rise of the Labour Party

177

it had received since Independence (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). This was an emphatic victory for the Labour Party and its leader, Muscat, who successfully legitimised his approach and sold his vision to the majority of the electorate. It was evident that Maltese voters had already made up their mind before the start of the campaign. The official result confirmed the surveys that projected a huge majority for the Labour Party (Gonzi, 2013; Sammut, 2013). It was also evident that the Prime Ministerʼs decision to postpone the national election led to a further loss, as the Maltese voters were fed up with the instability which emerged throughout the last 2 years of government. The Nationalist Party leader, Gonzi, conceded immediately, taking full responsibility for the results, and confirming his intention to resign as party leader and as a Member of Parliament. In this election, Europeanisation had a role at the party level, but it did not have any significant impact on the outcome. The EUʼs norms and principles did influence the electoral discourse of the two parties, with both articulating a different vision of Europe. Labour declared that the country needed to embrace meritocracy to be European, (Muscat, 2013; Farrugia, 2013), whilst the Nationalist Party pledged to strengthen Maltaʼs future within the EU (PN, 2013a). Both parties promoted the European principles which they believed in, with Labour promoting democracy, liberty of expression, and human rights, and the Nationalist Party focusing on the principle of subsidiarity and distribution of power. Both parties stressed the benefits of the Structural Funds for the creation of thousands of new jobs. This election was interesting due to the growing role of MEPs within the national political system. With three out of six former MEPs also sitting in the National Parliament, MEPs were beginning to have a wider role in Maltaʼs political system at the expense of their national counterparts. Maltaʼs MEPs returned (with the majority contesting the election) to campaign for their respective parties. In addition, both parties were endorsed by their European party groups, with Schulz endorsing Muscat and his movement and Daul endorsing Simon Busuttil (for vice-leader first and leader afterwards) and the Nationalist Party. This helped both parties to justify their electoral campaigns and programmes. The Labour Party triumphed in 2013 for several reasons. It was extremely successful in repositioning itself over the European Union issue and situated itself to become the hub for liberals (by formulating several policies which were meant to attract minorities), even though there was some danger of annoying the conservatives within the Party. Its campaign was based on principles of national unity, accountability, and transparency, which were all major concerns for the electorate (Muscat, 2013). Labour also focused on several traditional issues, including the role of Malta in the Mediterranean and workers’ rights. Its campaign centred around its popular leader who was portrayed as a widely respected European statesman, and his positive pronouncements centred around the achievements of previous Labour administrations and the creation of a popular movement. This popular movement was framed as an agent of change for the country. This helped the party to establish a strong relationship with the Maltese electorate. With a renewed focus on youths and students, it managed to win over many young people who had traditionally

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supported the Nationalist Party. It developed a campaign under the slogan ‘Iʼm in’ to attract new voters. The Labour Party also successfully developed the Nationalist Party’s previous campaign strategies, utilising and projecting European principles to confirm its European credentials while highlighting the conflicts within its main competitor and legitimising its agenda by proposing a new political system. The Nationalist Party faced several difficulties in this election and, whilst it was arguably expecting to lose the election, no one assumed it would lose with such a large margin. The party had been in government for decades, which explains the defeat it incurred, yet it does not explain the scale of the defeat (Saliba, 2013). The party faced several problems. The one-seat majority following the 2009 election weakened the government, producing various internal disagreements. These divisions not only produced a weak government but also, a weak campaign. This campaign emphasised the safeguarding of Maltaʼs economy, throughout the financial crisis. However, the Maltese electorate was more interested in the economic measures introduced in Malta. The electorate was interested in the micro trends and not in macro ones (Zammit-Dimech, 2013), meaning that the voters took into account the government’s actions and movements throughout its period in office. This resulted in thousands of Nationalist supporters which were hurt by the way the party treated them as it not only failed to address their needs but failed to explain the policies it was introducing, with many of these being required to adhere to EU regulations. Moreover, several supporters felt that the policies, including the increase in utility tariffs, went against the promises the party had made in the 2009 political campaign (PN, 2013b). In addition, several unpopular politicians were kept within the party despite being highly divisive and controversial. The aftermath of the divorce referendum should also be taken into consideration as the party emerged from it badly bruised. At the same time, the party and its executive were unable to deal with some of the party rebels, who ultimately resigned from the party and voted against the government in some crucial parliamentary votes. All of these elements explain why the party was seen as out of touch with the electorate (PN, 2013b). In addition, the pressure to implement EU regulations was, directly and indirectly, pressuring the Nationalist administration to introduce unpopular policies to converge with the EU regulations especially those concerning the Single Currency. The partyʼs strong ideology produced a series of conflicts, with the leadership failing to assuage them to produce a coherent image. In addition, Maltaʼs political character expects politicians to retain close contact with their constituents, something which the Nationalist Partyʼs officials failed to do. The party should have understood that it needed to maintain a constant dialogue with Maltese voters and place them at the centre of its policy-making process. The lack of energy and enthusiasm within the party rank and file, the institutional fatigue, as well as the lack of new blood made the party less interesting to the new generation of voters. This was reinforced by a campaign filled with flaws that ultimately further undermined the party’s chances (PN, 2013b). The party failed to legitimise its decisions, motivate its internal organisation, to weaken the Labour Party and its movement, highlight the problems with its electoral programme, and persuade voters that another Nationalist government would deliver the changes they needed and wanted.

5.6

Europeanisation and EU Membership

179

This election provided the Labour Party with a large consensus to enact a series of reforms. These reforms were meant to make Malta one of the best countries in the European Union. This shift in the narrative would accompany the Labour Party as it began to govern the country under its leader, Muscat. The 2013 national election ended the supremacy of the Nationalist Party on the political system. It led to the rise of Joseph Muscat and the Labour Party, which promised to make Malta one of the most successful states in the European Union.

5.6

Europeanisation and EU Membership

The third stage of Europeanisation provided various challenges and opportunities for the main political parties. Various political parties’ dimensions were affected by the impact of Europeanisation, even though it was mostly a tool again, used by political parties and by politicians in their attempt to influence voters. As Sant had outlined in 2004, the realities of membership would mean that the government had to work harder to protect the Maltese citizens. For the Nationalist Party, the party-ingovernment, this proved to be a challenge. The financial crisis and the rising irregular migration problem challenged the party which had to abide by EU regulations whilst trying to protect the national interest. Malta did suffer the economic recession that other states in the Mediterranean did, including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. This was helped by the conservative banking system which was unexposed to high debt risks as other banks in Europe. In addition, the economy was still aided by state intervention through subsidies, loans, and other incentives, which enabled the country’s economy to overcome the financial crisis (Pace, 2020). Still, a number of measures were introduced by the Nationalist administration proving to be unpopular including the privatisation of Malta’s Shipbuilding which had long been a burden for the different administrations. Whilst the Nationalist party managed to defend these policies in the 2008 national election, it struggled to do the same in the 2009 European election and 2013 national election. The country’s political parties became more restricted due to EU regulations, and this was reflected in their political programmes with the parties’ main narrative shifting towards using the members of the European Parliament to safeguard the national interest. This was especially important with regard to the irregular migration issue, with both parties pledging to use the European party groups to promote their cause. The endorsement of these Federations was still sought in campaigns and was highly publicised. This was not only important because parties sought to portray themselves as international players especially as one takes into consideration, the limitations of a small state, but it was seen as a way of legitimising their political parties. The Nationalist Party developed the narrative that Malta’s place should be in the European Union. Various leaders including Fenech Adami and Gonzi believed that membership would reaffirm Malta’s European Identity. Still, after the election of Joseph Muscat, it is the Labour Party that took over the narrative of a European Identity. The party promoted the liberal principles of the European Union in its

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attempt to promote equality. Muscat pledged to give the Maltese the same rights as their European counterparts. This proved to be extremely successful as it elevated the status of the leader of the party, managing to attract thousands of new voters. The country’s political system had to find a space for the members of the European Parliament and the European Elections. When it comes to members of the European Parliament, they did not have any difficulty in raising their status. The European Parliament would become a stepping stone for various candidates who desired to take up senior postings within the country’s political system. Concerning the European elections, whilst the turnout was high, they shared the same secondorder characteristics as in other European states with the main political parties challenged, to some degree, by various far-right political parties. Still, unlike various countries within the EU area, the rise of these parties was contained. This was especially because they could not match the campaigns of the main parties, due to the polarisation and partisanship which helps to maintain the status quo, and because parties’ approach towards irregular migration kept shifting from the left to the right of the political spectrum to ease off the challenge from these parties. Personalisation of politics, which was already rooted in the country’s political system, grew stronger and campaigns began to be centred on the main political parties. This proved to be beneficial for Lawrence Gonzi in 2008 and Joseph Muscat from 2013 onwards. This stage is particularly important due to the rise of Joseph Muscat, the transformation of the Labour Party, and the decision of the party to shift from Euroscepticism to Europeanism. As the Nationalist Party grew weaker and struggled to adapt to the realities of membership after spending almost two decades in power, the Labour Party grew in influence and managed to win a large consensus with the gap between the political parties. This gap was so large that it might have had a longterm impact on the political system of the country. The premise of a new political system based on the consensus approach typically used within the European Union was alluring. Yet the next Europeanisation stage would not be known for the transformation of the country’s political system, but rather for the liberal reforms enacted by the government, Malta’s EU Presidency, the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the controversial corruption allegations which were levelled against several government officials. All of these led to the direct and indirect influence of the European Union on Malta’s party politics.

Bibliography AD. (2009). Green New Deal: Energija, Esperjenza, Ewropa. Manifest Elettorali Alternattiva Demokratika Parlament Ewropew 2009. Ameen, J. (2009, 8 June). A progressive movement is born-Joseph Muscat. Times of Malta, p. 7. Anon. (2004a, 9 June). Deċiżjonijiet li se jiddeterminaw l-ewwel ħames snin tas-sħubija fl-UE. InNazzjon, p. 5. Anon. (2004b, 1 June). Iva Nikbru fl-Ewropa. In-Nazzjon, pp. 20–21. Anon. (2004c, 16 May). Prioritajiet fl-interess tal-poplu. Il-Mument, pp. 1 & 3.

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Anon. (2004d, 23 March). Furious farmers call for safeguard clause implementation. Times of Malta, p. 1. Anon. (2004e, 4 June). Il-bdiewa igawdu mis-suq liberalizzat ta' lesportazzjoni tal-patata. InNazzjon, p. 3. Anon. (2004f, 14 May). Minflok kuxjenza soċjali tal-PN qed joffru VAT fuq il-kotba. L-Orizzont, p. 1. Anon. (2004g, 2 June). If targets are not reached, yard will be closed down. Times of Malta, pp. 1 & 17. Anon. (2004h, 7 June). AD goes for politics of change. Times of Malta, p. 7. Anon. (2004i, 14 June). Labour wins EP elections. Times of Malta, pp. 1 & 4. Anon. (2004j, 6 May). Il-liġijiet ta' L-UE jippermettu sahra ta' aktar min tmien sigħat xogħol. InNazzjon, p. 2. Anon. (2008a, 9 February). L-għaqda tal-kaċċaturi u n-nassaba ma tafdax lill-PN. L-Orizzont, p. 4. Anon. (2008b, 6 January). Malta second only to Holland in Euro changeover. The Malta Independent, p. 5. Anon. (2008c, 24 May). Labour leadership contenders fume over Schulz endorsement of Muscat. Times of Malta. Anon. (2008d, 4 March). Pullicino Orlando kien jaf bil-permess. L-Orizzont, pp. 1, 4 & 5. Anon. (2009a, 21 May). VAT fuq ittaxxa tarreġistrazzjoni. L-Orizzont, p. 1. Anon. (2009b, 4 May). Il-Gvern sieket dwar il-"każ VAT". l-Orizzont, pp. 2–3. Anon. (2009c, 8 May). Gonzi bla garanzija li l-kontijiet tad-dawl ma jerġgħux jogħlew wara Ġunju li ġej. L-Orizzont, p. 2. Anon. (2009d, 16 May). Konferma li l-U turn fuq l-UE saret biss għall-konvenjenza. In-Nazzjon, p. 32. Anon. (2009e, 28 May). Id-dikjarazzjoni ta' Scicluna kienet ċara-Lou Bondi. In-Nazzjon, p. 5. Anon. (2009f, 31 May). L-Istipendji wkoll fil-mira ta' Scicluna. Il-Mument, pp. 1 & 2. Anon. (2009g, 1 June). Għażla waħda.."il-kandidati tal-PL". L-Orizzont, pp. 2–3. Anon. (2011a, 22 May). Family values should include remarriage’ AD. Times of Malta, p. 5. Anon. (2011b, 3 March). KMB: Don’t take sides in a civil war. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/don-t-take-sides-in-a-civil-war.352800 Anon. (2011c, 28 February). Cameron thanks Malta for Libya assistance. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/cameron-thanks-malta-for-libya-assistance.352457 Anon. (2013, 18 January). Malta’s economy comparable with Germany’s - PM. The Malta Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-01-18/news/ maltaseconomy-comparable-with-germanys-pm-710705159/ Balzan, J. (2013, 27 February). Low unemployment guaranteed with PN’s 25,000-job pledge – Busuttil. Maltatoday. Barry, D. (2013, 10 March). Election Campaign 2013 Highlights. The Malta Independent. Bedingfield, G. (2008, 15 February). Il-Partit Laburista jrid isaħħaħ il-pożizzjoni ta’ Malta fl-UEAlfred Sant. L-Orizzont, pp. 1–3. Borg, J. (2013). Malta’s First EU Commissioner/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Briguglio, M. (2009). Politics, the state and civil society – A theoretical framework. In J. Cutajar & G. Cassar (Eds.), Social transitions in Maltese society (pp. 125–146). Agenda. Briguglio, M. (2013, 6 May). Malta’s deficit, beyond fiscal populism. MaltaToday. Brincat, E. (2008, 23 February). AN wanted referendum on Lisbon Treaty. The Malta Independent, p. 4. Brincat, L. (2009, 27 May). Do not blame the EU! Times of Malta, p. 8. Busuttil, C. (2004, 31 May). Sant urges voter turnout. Times of Malta, p. 1 & 7. Cacopardo, C., Bonello, C., & Sansone, K. (2008). AD: Analysis of the 2008 national election. Calleja, C. (2008a, 6 February). PM unveils economic stimulus package. Times of Malta, p. 5. Calleja, C. (2008b, 18 February). Sant pledges better quality of life. Times of Malta, p. 1 & 2. Camilleri, I. (2008a, 10 February). Brussels scotches Sant’s EU plans. Sunday Times of Malta, p. 1. Camilleri, I. (2008b, 22 February). Malta beats world averages. Times of Malta, p. 1 &15.

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Camilleri, I. (2008c, 14 February). Brussels feels Malta should pursue further fiscal consolidation. Times of Malta, p. 16. Camilleri, I. (2009, 29 May). Discrimination against Muslims highest in Malta. Times of Malta, p. 1. Cassar, J. (2014). Gonzi and Malta’s break with Gaddafi. Recollections of a Premier. Kite Group. Cassola, A. (2013). Former Chairman of the AD and Independent Candidate/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Ciappara, A. (2008, 2 February). Sant jinsisti li jiftaħ il-pakkett tas-sħubija ma’ L-UE. In-Nazzjon, p. 1. Cini, G. (2004, 7 June). PM cautions supporters on EP vote. Times of Malta, p. 6. Cirtautas, A. M., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2010). Europeanisation before and after accession: Conditionality, legacies and compliance. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(3), 421–441. Cremona, R. (2009, 13 May). €5,3 miljun mill-Unjoni Ewropea għat-taħriġ ta' aktar ħaddiema. In-Nazzjon, p. 1 & 4. Debono, J. (2009, 15 March). Fourfold increase in concern about immigration. MaltaToday, pp. 8–9. Engerer, C. (2013). Joseph: Malta li rrid ngħix fiha. SKS. Eurobarometer. (2009). The 2009 European elections. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/ eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2476 Farrugia, M. (2004a, 17 May). Gonzi laments lack of support of EP sixth seat claim. Times of Malta, pp. 1, 13 & 14. Farrugia, M. (2004b, 27 May). PM accuses Sant of ‘sheer irresponsibility’. Times of Malta, p. 5. Farrugia, M. (2013). Former leader of the PD Party and former MP/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Fenech, D. (2008). The 2008 Maltese general election: The tortoise and the hare. Western European Politics, 31(5), 1049–1054. Fenech, D. (2012). Labour’s ideology and the dilemmas of adapting. In J. Chircop (Ed.), Revisiting labour history (pp. 337–355). Horizons. Franklin, M., Marsh, M., & McLaren, L. (1994). Uncorking the Bottle: Popular opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(4), 455–472. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1994.tb00509.x Frendo, H. (2008, 11 March). Why the PN lost-and won. Times of Malta, p. 8. Fsadni, R. (2013, 25 April). The meaning of neutrality. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https:// timesofmalta.com/articles/view/The-meaning-of-neutrality.467064 Gonzi, L. (2004, 1 May). A new journey. Times of Malta-1 May 2004 Magazine, p. 35. Gonzi, L. (2013). Prime Minister of Malta 2004–2013/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Gonzi, L. (2022). Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Nationalist Party/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Grech, H. (2004, 7 June). Pension, health systems “to be changed by year’s end”. Times of Malta, p. 6. Grech, H. (2009, 31 May). Never mind the global recession. . . immigration tops Maltese concerns. Times of Malta, p. 9. Grima, N. (2004, 23 May). ‘Substantial contraction’ in Maltese economy in 2003. The Malta Independent, p. 1. Grima, N. (2009, 14 June). MPs within the PN parliamentary group want Austin Gatt out. The Malta Independent, pp. 1–2. Lindsay, D. (2008a, 14 February). EC lukewarn on Malta’s 2010 budget surplus goal. The Malta Independent, p. 14. Lindsay, D. (2008b, 15 February). Eurostat upgrades Malta’s GDP to 4.3 per cent. The Malta Independent, p. 1. Lindsay, D. (2008c, 28 February). Malta’s record employment growth defies conventional wisdonPM Gonzi. The Malta Independent, p. 1 & 3. Malta Electoral Commission. (2022). Election results. Retrieved from https://electoral.gov.mt/ Manduca, J. (2004, 23 May). No indication of increased tourism from EU accession. Maltatoday, p. 10.

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Xuereb, M. (2009b, 30 May). Vat being charged on injections-Muscat. Times of Malta, p. 13. Zahra, C. (2011, 30 May). Illum twieldet Malta ġdida. L-Orizzont, p. 3. Zammit, R. (2004, 17 May). History ‘may be written’ in June elections. Times of Malta, p. 12. Zammit, M. (2009, 15 May). Fakultà ġdida tal-ICT b’investiment ta’ €17-il miljun mill-UE. In-Nazzjon p. 5. Zammit-Dimech, F. (2013). Former PN Minister and Former MEP/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia.

Chapter 6

Europeanisation and European Values

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail (Lisbon Treaty Article 1a).

The European Union has for decades, promoted its founding values inside and outside its borders (Coman, 2018). The so-called European values are voluntarily accepted by member states as a requisite to join the supranational organisation (Diaz Crego et al., 2020). Values are important as they help politicians and political parties develop, propose, and implement their policies (Foret & Calligaro, 2018). Values can be a source of unity and division. The common European values were a source of unity that allowed various actors together to develop the European Coal and Steel Community and are still essential for the development of the European Union. As the European Union is a guarantor of these values, it has the right to intervene to make sure that they are respected (Aldrin & Hubé, 2018). The political intervention of the European Union against various states has traditionally been seen by the parties in government as a threat and instruction on the national systems. Whilst European values are used by politicians and civil society to promote change, they can be seen as intrusive (Oleart & Bouza, 2018) and can threaten the identity and values of a particular society (Euchner & Engeli, 2018). Discussions have taken place on how to interpret these values and what is safeguarded and what is not. These discussions have also been played alongside other factors such as political majority. Institutional crises within the European and national institutions have often highlighted the lack of proper implementation of these values. It also reveals the need for the EU to do more in order to make sure that such values are promoted at the national level. The debate surrounding European values will be essential in understanding the fourth stage of the impact of Europeanisation on party politics in Malta. The 2013 national election provided a clear electoral mandate for the new Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and his administration to introduce various political and economic © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_6

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reforms which would reflect their understanding of European values. The new Prime Minister had created a movement made up of people with different ideologies and principles. This posed a challenge as questions were being raised on the role of the Labour Party within this movement (Baldacchino, 2012) and what kind of policies was the Muscat administration going to introduce to reflect this movement and the changing society. The prime minister had already outlined his vision to promote civil liberties during the divorce referendum and was given a clear mandate to enact his vision and make Malta a leading country in the promotion of civil liberties. The promotion of civil liberties as European values would add to the turmoil within the Nationalist Party. The party that had long championed these values as part of its EU membership plan had already struggled to provide an opposition to civil liberties during the divorce referendum. With the election of Muscat in 2013 and Robert Abela in 2020, this struggle would intensify especially as other issues, including civil unions, adoptions by same-sex couples, and the legalisation of the recreational use of Cannabis, would be discussed. With various politicians looking at the political morality of these issues and whether they reflect their beliefs, the Nationalist party headed by former MEP Simon Busuttil would struggle to become an alternative to the Muscat administration. During the leadership contest, Busuttil was endorsed by the European People’s Party (EPP) Leader Joseph Daul. As the new leader of the Nationalist Party, he had to initiate the process of rebuilding the Party to seek to win back the thousands of voters the party had lost over the years. Still, this was going to be an uphill struggle not just for Busuttil, but also for the next Nationalist Party leaders, with Adrian Delia taking the helm of the Party in 2017 and Bernard Grech in 2020. Muscat and the Labour Party went through a radical transformation and began to attract new voters with this being evident in the 2013 national election. Not only the party received widespread support, but it would take the responsibility to host the Presidency of the European Union in 2017. Promoted by both main parties in the 2013 national election, it was the Labour Party headed by Prime Minister Muscat who was given the legitimacy to promote an agenda that reflected Malta’s values and needs for its society. In 2013, a decision was also taken by the Commonwealth to have the 2015 Heads of Government meeting in Malta. This meant that over 4000 heads of state, ministers, and policymakers came to Malta to discuss various issues including irregular migration. The country had also the opportunity to showcase these values in 2018 when the capital city of Malta Valletta became the Capital of Culture. During this event, the country had the opportunity to display its culture, history, and heritage with various events planned to commemorate this.

6.1

European Values and the Muscat Administration

The 2013 Labour manifesto had pledged to promote LGBTIQ rights in Malta. The party, headed by Muscat, achieved some of the biggest victories in Malta’s political history. For this reason, it had the mandate to enact the policies pledged in the

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manifesto. Muscat had declared that the policies introduced by the Labour Party would make Malta the envy of other countries. This was going to be achieved by the introduction of civil liberties which would reflect a society based on European values (Harwood, 2015). The idea for the country to become the best in Europe would become a synonym with Muscat who would use it to defend various economic policies introduced by him and his administration. The Nationalist Party had long championed these European values but by 2013, it had found itself in difficulty due to its resistance to introducing these reforms. Its monopoly came to an end with the call to safeguard minority groups in Malta. From 2013 onwards, it was the Labour Party who was framing the liberal section of these values to highlight the need to protect minority rights in Malta. This framing of European values became a political tool in the hands of Prime Minister Muscat who managed to attract civil society groups including the Malta Gay Rights Movement (MGRM), and Drachma (representing LGBT Catholics) by seeking a dialogue on the way forward. This dialogue let the party to establish its first LGBT group within its hierarchy, branding it LGBT Labour. The group was established in 2009 as a means of promoting equality within the country. During the discussion on the introduction of civil unions which would give same-sex couples the same rights as married couples, Muscat pleaded for the Maltese to not be afraid of change by declaring that the Civil Union Act reflected the liberal values of the European Union (Micallef & Sansone, Times of Malta, 14 April 2014). Muscat criticised the Nationalist Party for failing to endorse these liberal values of the European Union by abstaining from voting and declaring that the Labour Party and the movement it had created were on the right side of history. The legislation was approved on 14 April 2014, a few months before the European elections. MRGM had a very important role to play in the introduction of civil unions in Malta. The role which MGRM is an example of the importance of civil society groups within the country’s political system. MGRM has been the longest-standing NGO working for LGBTIQ rights in Malta, and its advocacy efforts over the last two decades included lobbying for the introduction of civil unions, adoptions by samesex couples, and marriage equality. In addition to this, MGRM became one of the stakeholders involved in the LGBTIQ Consultative Council that was set up in 2013 following the election of the Labour Party. The council had a very important role in advising the government on policy and legal changes that were necessary to achieve LGBTIQ equality in Malta. MGRM also contributed to drafting legislations concerning the various legislations for the protection of LBTIQ rights in Malta (Farrugia Bennett, 2022). One of the main issues for the Nationalist Party was the fact that the Civil Union Legislation Act would have also given the rights for same-sex couples to adopt. The Party’s decision to abstain from the final vote was criticised by various segments of Malta’s society. There were internal disagreements within the party on adoptions by same-sex couples with some members of the party rejecting the legislation due to their moral beliefs. The other issue was that the party did not want to alienate the traditional Christian conservative voters which had supported the party across the decades. The new Nationalist Party leader Simon Busuttil had defended his decision

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to not give a free vote to his MPs by declaring that Malta’s society was not ready for adoptions by same-sex couples, declaring that the government should have separated civil unions from adoptions by same-sex couples (Sansone, Times of Malta, 15 April 2014). Simon Busuttil would later declare that the vote was taken a few months after the election, so he did not have a strong hold within the party. It was clear that there were strong divisions between the conservative and liberal elements on how to approach the vote. So, abstention was seen as a way of keeping a united front without fuelling further divisions within the party (Busuttil, 2022). The fact that the Nationalist Party was still struggling would also be beneficial for the Labour Party as the country was heading for the European elections. These elections, often referred by political scientists as second-order elections, are usually considered a test for the incumbent. Beyond this, various surveys suggested that over 60% of the 18- to 25-year-olds in Malta were in favour of same-sex marriage even though most of them had reservations about adoptions by same-sex couples (Harwood, 2015; Debono, MaltaToday, 18 November 2013). The new generation of voters was a particularly important cleavage that the Labour Party had attracted by the establishment of its ‘movement’. The decision for the Nationalist Party to abstain from the final vote made it difficult for the party to attract new voters, even though it did table a private member’s bill to include a clause in the Constitutions which would prohibit sexual discrimination and launch an equal opportunities movement within the party in 2014 (Balzan, MaltaToday, 5 April 2014b). The Nationalist Party did support the banning of gay conversion therapy in 2016 with Malta being one of the first states in Europe to ban such practices, with the majority of its MPs voting in favour to legalise same-sex marriage in 2017. Still, the feeling was that more should have been done by the Party to initiate a dialogue with minorities in the country (Carabott, Times of Malta, 15 April 2014). Whilst the Muscat administration was successful in transforming civil liberties in Malta in reflection of the liberal European values, two of its decisions would be seen as going against other elements of these values. One of the issues is the approach of the new administration towards irregular migration. The latter had already been an issue with the Nationalist administration and was going to become a concern for the Labour administration as well. Joseph Muscat would repeatedly outline how his approach towards irregular migration evolved from being a security issue in the first years of his premiership, to become a humanitarian and a security issue in the latter years of his premiership (Muscat, 2022). The new administration’s approach towards irregular migration was much more conservative than its approach towards civil liberties, this being reflected in the way irregular migration was perceived, largely as a security threat to the country and its citizens. The threat of pushbacks was endorsed by Norman Lowell, the leader of the far-right party ‘Imperium Europa’ (Balzan, MaltaToday, 19 July 2013). Lowell was known for his hard stance on migration and was indicted on various hate crime charges. Yet, he remained relatively popular with the electorate, gathering thousands of votes in the 2004 and 2009 European elections. This was not the first time that Muscat had threatened to use the pushbacks to deal with the problem. He had already warned before the 2013 election, that if the EU does not act to provide solidarity with

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Malta and other Mediterranean states, he would use the ‘veto’ on other issues to send a message to the European Union. He also outlined the possibility of using ‘pushbacks’ to safeguard the country and the national interest. Still, various NGOs, including Jesuit Refugee Service, Aditus Foundation, Solidarity Overseas Service (SOS) Malta, Integra Foundation, Migrants Network for Equality, Kopin, and the Emigrant’s Commission, reminded the Prime Minister of the case of Hirsi Jaraama and others versus Italy. The Green Party (AD) and the Nationalist Party also criticised such an approach. In this case, the European Courts of Human Rights had declared that Italy had violated the principle of non-refoulement, breaching Article 3 of the Convention, when it returned a group of asylum seekers to Libya as part of its agreement on migration with it (Cooke, Times of Malta, 28 February 2013). On 4 July and 9 July 2013, over 394 migrants reached the Maltese shores. The first group was made up of 291 migrants out of whom 282 were Eritreans. The second group was made up of 102 Somali arriving a few days later. This high influx of irregular migration led the Prime Minister to decide on the immediate return of 45 Somali asylum seekers to Libya. The reaction of several civil society groups was swift. Over 69 lawyers filed a judicial protest against the government for its plan to deny these migrants the right to seek asylum. At a European level, 11 NGOs, including the Jesuit Refugee Service and Aditus Foundation, requested interim measures against the government. On 9 July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ordered Malta to safeguard the rights of these asylum seekers so that their asylum applications could be processed (Dalli, MaltaToday, 9 July 2013). The issue concerning irregular migration led to the intervention of the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmstrom. She reacted on the issue by declaring that Any return operation has to respect in full these obligations and in particular the principle of non-refoulement inscribed in the EU Law and in the International Conventions. The European Commission will use all the tools at its disposal to make sure member states fully respect their obligations in this regard. (Malmstrom in The Malta Independent, 9 July 2013a)

What her statement meant was that the Commission had the option to seek infringement proceedings against Malta if EU rules on migration were not respected. Following this migration crisis, Prime Minister Muscat had a meeting with the then President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Sadiq Abdulkarim Abdulrahman in Malta on 11 July 2013. During the meeting, Muscat stressed the need for the European Union to do more to help the Southern Mediterranean states in dealing with the irregular migration crisis and not simply provide funds. He defended his position by declaring that the perception which existed amongst the Maltese people was that Malta has been abandoned and left to deal with the problem by itself. He also highlighted the lack of solidarity that was shown by the EU institutions and member states and asked the civil society groups which campaigned to prevent forced repatriations to shoulder their responsibilities (Dalli, MaltaToday, 9 July 2013; Vella, MaltaToday, 10 July 2013a). The issue surrounding migration would remain one of the major concerns in the

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following years. Beyond the issue of migration and the lack of solidarity which was provided by the European Union, this case highlighted the role of civil society groups as guarantors of these European values. This would not be the only time where civil society groups would challenge the authority of the state, and this was a new reality to which Malta’s political parties had to become accustomed to. Whilst the new administration opted for a hard approach towards irregular migration, it decided to create investments by introducing the Individual Investment Programme. In September 2013, Prime Minister Muscat established a scheme for individuals to buy Maltese passports. The Individual Investor Programme (IIP) was established to award citizenship by a certificate of naturalisation to third-country nationals and their families. The Prime Minister defended the establishment of the programme by declaring that this was a way for Malta to attract talent and for these individuals to contribute to the economic development of the country (Muscat, 2022). The law required individuals to pay €650,000 into a national development fund, with any subsequent spouses or dependents under the age of 18 paying an additional €25,000 each. Muscat declared that he was going to place the limit of 1800 on the individuals who could buy Maltese citizenship. After the limit was going to be reached, the IIP would close down. To make the IIP a success, Muscat established a new state agency, Identity Malta, incorporating all departments responsible for passports, identity cards, work, and residence permits. To promote the investment scheme across the globe, the Muscat administration signed an agreement with Henley and Partners Holdings to operate a passport sales programme (Daphne Foundation, 2021). It would later be revealed that the Prime Minister was contractually bound by Henley and Partners to promote the IIP across the globe (Vella, MaltaToday, 23 February 2015a). This initiative was met with widespread resistance in Malta and within the EU institutions. It was voted through parliament on 13 November 2013. The Prime Minister defended IIP by declaring that his party was amongst the pro-business parties in Europe and he knew that criticism of the initiative would emerge especially as this was a new way to attract investment. He said that Maltese society would benefit from this scheme as funds would be injected into Malta’s economy and the Maltese society would be able to embrace people of talent (Dalli, MaltaToday, 24 January 2014a). The vision was to use the funds to ‘Make Malta the best in Europe’, a slogan that would be linked with the premiership of Muscat. Beyond that, the Prime Minister also highlighted the fact that there are quite a number of European Union member states that sell their citizenship on an obscure basis. He outlined how other member states had introduced similar schemes, not just because of lineage, but because of some sort of cultural identity to thousands of people in a very short period providing the example of Hungary and Bulgaria. He also explained that in this scenario, no one dared to criticise such countries because when these systems were introduced, due diligence takes place on those who are interested in such schemes. Prime Minister Muscat also outlined how most countries in Europe are open to the idea of attracting potential investors through citizenship to investors, with some of these countries introducing such schemes in a less aggressive manner (Muscat, 2022).

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Still, the scheme proved to be controversial at both the national and EU level. Former Prime Minister Gonzi (2022) was always against the selling of Maltese citizenship under any circumstance whatsoever. He revealed that the proposal was put forward to him at least three times during his terms as Prime Minister of Malta, but he refused to endorse it on the basis that citizenship is not an item that can or should be put up for sale. He outlined how citizenship is priceless and as such it can and should be granted only in exceptional and objectively justifiable circumstances. He believed that one of the dangers of such schemes, and one of the reasons why he rejected introducing a similar scheme. His opinion is that such schemes had the potential to threaten the reputation of countries such as Malta. This was problematic as Malta’s economy was based on a services industry with the risk of threatening this sector if the reputation of the country is tainted. There was the danger that this would deter companies from investing in the country. Another debate surrounding the IIP concerned the criteria to choose suitable candidates interested in this programme. In fact, under the original citizenship bill law, candidates were not required to have any business ties with the country. They were also awarded anonymity as the legislation included a secrecy clause that would prevent the names of the buyers to be published (Caruana Galizia, 2013; Borg, Times of Malta, 24 April 2021a). The naturalised citizens were also awarded the right to vote in Malta’s elections (Buttigieg & DeBono, 2015). The criticism of the IIP was not simply about the legislation. What made it so attractive was certainly Malta’s EU membership and the rights which naturalised citizens would benefit from as EU citizens. Through Maltese citizenship, investors from outside the EU area were going to gain access to the benefits of European membership including the freedom of movement (Carrera, 2014). This posed several risks to the security and immigration rules of the European Union. These rules had the potential to be indirectly threatened (Baldacchino, 2014) as potential criminals would be attracted by the scheme, using it to infiltrate the European Union. It was generally a known fact that most of those who were interested in Malta’s IIP were not going to stay on the island, but rather move freely within the EU area. The European Parliament and Commission reacted swiftly to the programme. In a plenary session within the European Parliament which took place on 14 and 15 January 2014, a number of MEPs raised their doubts about the programme (European Parliament, 2014a, b). The vice president of the EU Commission, Vivian Reading, confirmed that legislations on national citizenships were within the sovereignty of member states. Still, she also added that ‘do we like the idea of selling the rights provided by the EU Treaties? My answer is: certainly not. Citizenship must not be up for sale’ (Reading in European Parliament, 2014). This outlines the uneasiness which existed with such types of programme which had the potential to provide further challenges to the European Union. Within this discussion, a number of MEPs provided their own opinion. Weber the leader of the EPP highlighted the importance of European citizenship, declaring that it was the foundation for a European Identity. He criticised Malta for selling citizenship to people, and so the gift of a European Identity, to individuals which had no historical links to the country. A similar opinion was provided by Kinga Göncz, a member of the

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Table 6.1 Discussion on the IIP in the European Parliament EP Roberta Metsola (EPP)

David Casa (EPP) Joseph Cuschieri (S&D)

Marlene Mizzi (S&D)

Discussion We are talking about the sale of citizenship which is taking place almost without any commitment and the need for the person to stay in the country but with all the benefits that citizenship brings. This European Parliament is also our parliament, of the Maltese. We are elected by the people to represent them. Let’s be clear: all of our rights are not for sale. Due to the new citizenship being introduced in Malta, we do not want our fellow Europeans to treat the Maltese with suspicion. I want that when Maltese and Gozitans come with their passports, they are trusted in your country. As Europeans we have to choose between a European economy that is open to the rest of the world or a European economy that is afraid to look ahead. We must have the courage to open the doors to those who want to invest in Europe; investment that grows economies and creates jobs. It is gratifying to see a country like Malta, which is economically successful, without raising the taxes of those which are most vulnerable. The granting of citizenship is part of the sovereignty of member states. So the discussion is not in the merit of this Parliament which is discussing an issue which goes beyond its competence.

Progressive Alliance for Socialists and Democrats (S&D) who called for a stronger reflection on European citizenship highlighting how the citizenship programmes across Europe had the risk of undermining the European project. Ján Mulder from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) also called for a deeper reflection on the conception of European citizenship, outlining how this is a privilege that should not be up for sale. The most interesting element of this discussion was the approach taken by Malta’s MEPs. The discussion presented by the Maltese MEPs which can be seen in Table 6.1 is a reflection of the debate which was taking place in Malta’s parliament, based on the polarisations and divisions which were present in Malta’s political system (European Parliament, 2014a). Still, the European Parliament decided to send a message to the Maltese government, and on 16 January 2014, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution, criticising the IIP legislation. The resolution was supported by all major political groups and adopted by an overwhelming majority of 560 votes which included the votes of Roberta Metsola and David Casa. On this, the other four MEPs representing the S&D (and the Labour Party) voted against it, with Claudette Abela Baldacchino declaring that the European Parliament was used by Malta’s opposition to gain political advantages. Joseph Cuschieri highlighted how the resolution was against the values of the European Union and a barrier to the economic development of Malta (European Parliament, 2014b). Even though the European Parliament wanted to send its message, it was the European Commission that could pressure the Maltese government. From a political level, the MEPs of the Nationalist Party were accused of working against the national interest within the European institutions even though various members of the S&D including its President Hannes Swoboda, were against the scheme. The criticism towards the Nationalist MEPs Roberta Metsola and David Casa would intensify as issues

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surrounding money laundering and rule of law in Malta would be debated within the European Parliament. The European Commission and the Maltese government did enter into negotiations on the IIP. In a press release between the European Commission and the Maltese government, the latter pledged to include some modifications to the Maltese Citizenship Act and enhance the criteria for those interested in acquiring citizenship. The modified legislation required a link between those interested in the scheme and Malta through the introduction of residence status, and no certificate of naturalisation could be issued unless these investors provided proof of their stay in Malta for at least 1 year. The secrecy clause which was a point of contention was also removed. An important element within the press release was the statement that the Maltese government would inform the Commission if the original cap of 1800 investors increased over time (European Commission, 2014). The agreement, alongside the clause on the number of individuals who could buy Maltese citizenship, was considered a big victory for the Labour administration who declared that its IIP was one of the few approved by the European Commission. The IIP proved to be extremely successful with more than 200 applications received by August 2014. This meant a Foreign Direct Investment of over €200 in just 6 months (Dallison, 2014). By 2020, the scheme reached its full capacity with over 1800 applicants and more than €1.5 billion generated over 6 years (Carabott, 19 November 2020). Still, questions surrounding the criteria used and whether the citizenship scheme was undermining European values remained. A report had already been published by the European Commission in 2019 which established that schemes such as the one of Malta could have been used for money laundering and tax evasion purposes, as well as for potential criminals to infiltrate the EU area. The report highlighted how a decision by one state (in terms of the ‘golden’ passport scheme) could have serious repercussions on the other 26 member states (European Commission, 2019). An investigation by The Guardian, Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, and independent media in Malta, revealed that foreign investors were managing to bypass the residency status of 1 year by either renting empty properties in Malta or simply providing receipts as proof of their residence (Pegg et al., 2021). Notwithstanding the allegations which existed against the IIP, the quota of 1800 investors was reached in 2020. Following the conclusion of the programme, Prime Minister Abela opted to establish a new residency programme that would lead to citizenship against a fee of €600,000. The new scheme outlined how the investors were going to pay €50,000 for every dependent and purchase a property costing at least €700,000 or rent one for at least €18,000 a year. A €10,000 philanthropic donation to NGOs in Malta of the investors’ choice was now also required (Diacono, LovinMalta, 3 July 2020). The new scheme, which was deemed to be an important asset to safeguard the Maltese economy during the COVID-19 pandemic, was also seen as controversial. The European Commission decided to open infringement proceedings against Malta and Cyprus as their schemes were seen as giving access to European citizenship in the form of passports. The European Commission declared that the schemes went in

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violation of the sincere cooperation and the definition of citizenship of the Union as laid out in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Petkar, 2021). Following the start of the infringement proceedings, Cyprus opted to close its scheme after having to rescind the passport of 26 investors who were found to be politicians and high officials from Colombia. Another scandal emerged after politicians including the parliamentary speaker Demetris Syllouris were filmed by an undercover investigation by Al Jazeera selling the scheme to a fictitious Chinese businessman with a money laundering conviction (Pegg, 2021). The investigation revealed how rules and regulations surrounding the due diligence procedures were being ignored in return for more money. Still, the Abela administration rejected the comparison between Malta and Cyprus schemes, highlighting the procedures which existed in Malta and attacking the national MEPs Roberta Metsola and David Casa for going against the country’s interests within the European Parliament (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 20 October 2020). Malta’s parliamentary secretary for citizenship Alex Muscat declared that the European Commission had no legal basis to initiate proceedings against Malta and that the national interest was going to be safeguarded within the EU institutions (Meilak, 2020). Roberta Metsola (2021) called the attack by Prime Minister Abela pathetic, highlighting the limited influence which individual MEPs have. David Casa (2021) focused on the bad management of the scheme, accusing Prime Minister Abela of blaming everyone rather than himself for the infringement proceedings. Another debate in the European Parliament (2020) concerning the passport schemes took place after the Cypriot scandal. The debate outlined how it was important for the EU to investigate all schemes and not simply those of Malta, Cyprus, and Bulgaria. During this debate, European Commissioner Didier Reynders revealed that the European Union was going to continue to monitor such schemes and will try to find a political solution to the way these schemes were being used for third-country nationals to enter the European Union. Joachim Stanisław Brudziński from the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) outlined how the practices of selling passports and citizenships pose security threats for all member states and that due diligence procedures needed to be followed. Dominique Bilde from the Identity and Democracy Party (ID) discussed the threat that such schemes posed if used by terrorists. Evin Incir from the S&D criticised the European Commission for not taking action immediately to regularise such markets. Rasa Juknevičienė from the EPP declared that people had fought and died for their citizenship, outlining how such schemes were being abused to allow third-country nationals in Europe. The decision of the Maltese administration to issue a new scheme was defended by the country’s MEPS Josianne Cutajar and Alfred Sant, both from the S&D party. During this debate, Josianne Cutajar declared that the issue of citizenship was a remit of national states and not the European Union, highlighting how the scheme was allowing states such as Malta to invest in various sectors including the economy and healthcare. Alfred Sant used the same argument highlighting how these schemes form part of the sovereign rights of member states, outlining how all member states

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have a system or another which grants citizenship to third-country nationals (European Parliament, 2020). Sant (2022) criticised the approach of the European Parliament which, according to him, considers IIP and similar programmes as distortive of European values, undermining cohesion within the single market as potentially dangerous given the terrorist threat, and supporting tax dodges. He believes that this is a contradiction as in reality, national programmes that allow non-EU nationals freedom of movement in the EU ‘for a fee’ have long been in place in various states across the EU. Still, with various party groups in the European Parliament including the S&D Party clearly against the selling of citizenships, it meant that the four Maltese MEPs within this group, Alex Agius Saliba, Alfred Sant, Cyrus Engerer, and Josianne Cutajar, had limited support in their fight for safeguarding the national interest. As it happened in the case of Cyprus, several investigations were conducted on Malta’s passport scheme by Maltese and foreign reports to outline the loopholes which existed. Pegg et al. (2021) published a joint investigation by the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, The Guardian, Dossier Centre, and five independent Maltese media organisations, which evaluated thousands of leaked emails from citizenship advisory firm Henley & Partners. They revealed how various potential investors used loopholes in the residency rules to stay only a minimum amount of time in Malta to establish a genuine link with the country as requested in the regulations concerning the IIP. Another aspect was that some of the new citizenships were from countries such as Saudi Arabia where dual citizenships are not allowed (Pegg et al., 2021). The Prime Minister continued to defend the scheme, highlighting how the new residence scheme promoted residency first and citizenship afterwards. In addition, even the opposition changed its approach towards the scheme with the Nationalist Leader, Bernard Grech declaring that he would keep it but make it more transparent if he was elected to government (Muscat, The Shift, 27 April 2021). Still, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine had renewed calls for the EU to scrap such schemes to prevent Russian oligarchs from using them to maintain their influence in the European markets. The newly elected President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola called for such schemes to be suspended to prevent Russian oligarchs from sidestepping the economic sanctions being taken against them. She declared on her official Twitter page: The Kremlin has long thought it could buy its way into Europe. It is time to close any loopholes, end the dangerous phenomenon of so called golden passports that provide a backdoor to European citizenship, and ensure that Russian cash does not become the next Russian gas. (Metsola, 2022)

The approach taken by Metsola as President of the European Parliament placed her at odds with her party in Malta and the Abela administration. Soon after Metsola’s declaration, the leader of the Nationalist Party Bernard Grech appealed to the Prime Minister to stop selling passports to Russian nationals (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 25 February 2022), The Prime Minister replied by defending Malta’s scheme accusing the Nationalist Party of demonising anyone from Russia (Borg, Times of Malta, 27 February 2022a). Still, the pressure kept piling up until the government

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eventually suspended the sales of passports to Russians and Belarussians (Meilak, MaltaToday, 2 March 2022). Former Prime Minister Muscat’s (2022) opinion is that there has been a shifting political argument toward the citizenship schemes. One of the issues that he outlined is the lack of ‘unity’ within the European Parliament over the matter. He believes that there are some committees within the European Parliament that brand such schemes as corrupt and security risk as they might attract terrorists. Others are against them because of the notion of ‘European citizenship’. He also argues that it would be appropriate for the European Commission to regulate such programmes, which would then shape the way member states approach them. Still, such schemes could be potentially regulated by the European Court of Justice. It is up to the European Court of Justice to establish exactly whether ‘European citizenship’ can be considered as a legal entity and the legal parameters which the European Union might have in controlling those who want to gain access to it. A decision by the European Court of Justice on the future of such schemes will shape the way they are viewed, used, and promoted by Maltese politicians.

6.2

A Decade of Membership and the 2014 European Elections

The 2014 European elections outlined the different approaches the main political parties had toward these elections. The 2014 European elections were the first for Simon Busuttil, as a party leader. Busuttil had already faced an internal crisis due to the Civil Union Act. Various political parties contested in the elections including Alternattiva Demokratika (AD-the Green Party), the far-right Imperium Europa, the Eurosceptic Alleanza Bidla (the Alliance for Change), the Alleanza Liberali (Liberal Alliance), and the one-man party Partit tal-Ajkla (the Eagle Party) (Pace, 2014). This European election took place a decade after Malta joined the European Union. Throughout the election and with various proposals being discussed, there was a lack of a meaningful discussion on European membership and the way Malta was adapting to the changes Europe was going through. The main political parties did however outline how they were going to make Malta the best country within the European Union. The narrative on making Malta ‘the best’ would become a trademark in Malta’s elections with such statements used by the main party leaders to promote their policies and to highlight their positive impact on the country and its people. The Nationalist Party used the slogan ‘A better Malta’ whilst the Labour Party focused on ‘Positive Energy’ outlining the need for a positive campaign. The Green Party in Malta’s manifesto was based on the concept of ‘We are Europe’ promoting a series of reforms within the EU and national political systems. The Nationalist Party’s manifesto (2014) was based on the European dimension providing an overview of the role of MEPs in the European Parliament, and outlining the vision for a better Malta. The manifesto pledged to maintain the work for the national

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interest within the EU so that the latter continues to be of support to the economic and social development of Malta. It stated how with the support of the European Union, Malta could strengthen the employment sector through investments in various sectors such as gaming and financial services, and how funds could be used for research in alternative energy, to safeguard the environment so that Malta could meet the EU environmental targets and become a pioneer in this sector. The Nationalist Party also pledged to strengthen Malta’s reputation with the European Union, highlighting how this reputation was built across the decades with Malta taking a leading role during the conflict in Libya. The manifesto criticised Prime Minister Muscat and the Labour Party for insulting the European Union on issues such as irregular migration, referring to the judgment of the European Court of Justice which prevented the immediate repatriation of 45 Somali. It denounced the approach of the Labour Party towards irregular migration and the decision of the Labour administration to start selling Malta’s citizenship and turning its back to European values. The pledge was that through the EPP, the Maltese MEPs would restore Malta’s reputation and they would work for the national interest. The Labour manifesto (2014) was based on ten promises which included the need to continue the fight against youth unemployment at the EU level; the need to continue utilising the EU funds to strengthen Malta’s economy and Malta’s businesses; the need to continue to protect Malta’s consumers; the need to use the EU energy standards to provide a cleaner environment; the need to use the European Parliament to protect patients’ rights; the need to make the 2017 Presidency of the Council of the European Union a success; the need to pressure the EU institutions to help Malta and other countries in the fight against irregular migration; the need to continue the right against discrimination and for civil rights in Europe; the need to continue to attract funds for Gozo; and the pledge to be the voice of the national citizens within the European Parliament. The manifesto of Malta’s Green Party (AD) can be considered the most Europeanised out of all manifestos. The party used the manifesto ‘We are Europe!’, highlighting how the party would work to make the European Union more accountable, strengthen the EU institutions, and how the European Parliament would be used to promote climate change and alternative energy and a new Green deal to safeguard future generations. The party also pledged to support the move towards a new migration policy and to safeguard the rights of European citizens within the EU institutions (AD, 2014). A decade after Malta’s entry into the European Union, a Eurosceptic party ‘Alleanza għall-Bidla’ (Alliance for Change) proposed an EU Referendum on whether Malta should remain in the European Union. The party headed by Ivan Grech Mintoff said that it enjoys widespread support and accused the mainstream parties of breaching the Constitution to appease Brussels (Micallef, Times of Malta, 10 April 2014). Whilst the manifestos contained a European element, the campaigns shifted towards tackling national issues with the introduction of the Civil Union Act, a newly planned electricity-generating plant in Marsaxlokk (Carammia & Pace, 2014)

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and the IIP dominated the campaigns.1 The party-in-government used the introduction of the Civil Union Act to remind the electorate that the Nationalist Party opted to abstain as it was split on the issue. The divisions within the party were used throughout the campaign, showcasing how the Labour Party was on the right side of history by promoting the liberal values of the European Union and safeguarding the rights of minorities (L-Orizzont, 14 April 2014). The Labour Party also outlined how Malta was now an example for other European countries that had yet to introduce civil unions in their respective countries (the Prime Minister declared that this was an election between him and the opposition leader Busuttil). This was important as the Prime Minister was much more popular than the Opposition leader as shown in a survey which was carried out, highlighting how 44% of the electorate trusted the Labour Leader whilst only 28% of the electorate trusted the opposition leader (Debono, MaltaToday, 21 April 2014a). Busuttil declared that this election was not about the party leaders but the quality of the MEP candidates who had to represent Malta within the European Parliament (Mizzi, MaltaToday, 27 April 2014). In this election, both main parties portrayed themselves as the underdog, though it was clear that the Labour Party had an electoral advantage after dominating the 2013 national election. Prime Minister Muscat called for the Labour ‘soldier of steel’ to turn up and vote in the European election. The call for the ‘soldiers of steel’ was a reference to the core Labour supporters and a phrase that Mintoff, the former Labour Party leader, had used in the 1950s onwards as a reference to the need for the Labour Party supporters to stand up for the national interest. Muscat believed these ‘soldiers of steel’ were at the core of the changes the country had gone through throughout the decades (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 2 May 2014). Still, calling back the soldiers of steels could have irritated the median voters that Muscat had won in the 2013 elections and brought back memories of the tumulus period between 1981 and 1987. From the Nationalist side, the campaign was not made easy by the Civil Union Act and the internal divisions which continued to weaken the party. Still, the party attempted to provide a European dimension by highlighting how membership in the European Union provided new opportunities to the Maltese people. Throughout the campaign, the leader of the Nationalist Party warned that the European values in Malta were being threatened. The party warned of the threat which existed to maintain the independence of the Maltese institutions and that democracy and media pluralism needed to be safeguarded. Busuttil criticised the Prime Minister for turning his back on European values through this lack of transparency over contracts that were being given to various officials, including the wife of Konrad

1 The LNG controversy concerned a gas tanker which was permanently moored at the Marsaxlokk Bay. The tanker was to serve as a floating gas storing unit for the Delimara power station. The controversy emerged on whether the tanker was considered safe and the negative impact which a leakage or a potential explosion would have on the area (Debono, MaltaToday, 21 October 2016).

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Mizzi. It was discovered that she was being paid €13,000 each month.2 The PN campaign pledged to make Malta the best country in Europe (In-Nazzjon, 1 May 2014). At the time of the campaign, a survey revealed that 30% of the electorate chose irregular migration as their main issue in the 2014 European election. Other priorities were the LNG Tanker (12%), the IIP (8%), hunting (7%), the Civil Union Act (7%), and the environment (5.8%). It is interesting to look at the priorities when political allegiance is taken into consideration. For Labour voters, irregular migration (42.4%), Malta’s interests in Europe (9%), the environment (7.6%), and the Civil Union Act (4.1%) were the main priorities. For the Nationalist Party, LNG Tanker (22.5%), Irregular migration (17.1%), IIP (14.7%), hunting at 12.1%, and the Civil Unions Act (6.2%) were the main priorities (Debono, MaltaToday, 4 May 2014c). Still, the main question was whether these issues would be important enough for voters to base their vote upon. Irregular migration has always been a controversial issue in Malta from membership onwards, and it was a cause of major clashes between Malta and the European Union for the lack of solidarity offered. The issue of migration was a subject that the spitzenkandidaten discussed during their visits to Malta. Whilst in other countries, the visits of Juncker and Shulz might not have attracted much interest, their visit to Malta, due to the small size of the country and intensive campaigns, was documented by the majority of the country’s media. On the topic of irregular migration, both candidates in the run for the Presidency of the European Commission declared that more should be done by the European Union to help states struggling with the growing influx of irregular migrants. Juncker declared that he would not make any empty promises on migration as it happened before, but more should be done to deal with the issue (Camilleri, The Malta Independent, 3 May 2014b). On the other hand, Shulz provided a much more detailed discussion on the matter describing irregular migration as unfair on the Mediterranean states being challenged by the ongoing problem. He outlined how he was in favour of integrating irregular migrants so that they could contribute to the development of both the member states and the European Union. He pledged that if elected, he would push for the required reforms on the matter (Dalli, MaltaToday, 11 March 2014e). Both candidates for the Presidency of the European Commission endorsed the campaigns of their respective parties in Malta. Shultz praised the economic reforms which Prime Minister Muscat was introducing in the country, highlighting how they strengthened the economy of the country (Gauci Cunningham, It-Torċa, 11 May 2014). During his visit to Malta, Shulz created controversy by speaking openly in favour of the legalisation of abortion (Attard, Newsbook, 2014). This was used by the Nationalist Party to outline how the S&D party would be promoting the Sai Mizzi Liang received around €160,000 a year as Malta Enterprise’s envoy to Asia. The package included a salary of more than €73,000 a year, a representation allowance of €3261 a year; a child allowance for her two children of around €3000 a year; a fully paid ambassadorial-level residence; an official car with fully paid expenses and fuel; and the full reimbursement of the use of her mobile phone (Camilleri, The Malta Independent, 3 May 2014b). 2

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legalisation of abortion in Malta if Shulz had to be elected as President of the European Commission. Still, Prime Minister Muscat declared that the legalisation of abortion was not on the agenda. On the opposite side, Juncker defended the agenda of the Nationalist Party highlighting how the party was the one that pushed the membership of Malta into the European Union and that other parties were promoting membership when they had spent decades speaking against membership (Camilleri, The Malta Independent, 3 May 2014b). Whilst the Labour Party had shifted its attitude towards European membership, the decades of campaigning against membership affected the electorate. Whilst 51% of Labour-leaning voters were in favour of membership, 30% still believed that membership was a bad thing for the country, with 23% being open to the idea of Malta withdrawing from the European Union. On the other hand, 94.8% of Nationalist-leaning voters agreed with European membership (Debono, MaltaToday, 4 May 2014c). Still, the issue concerning European membership was not a priority in this election. The main political parties were split on the IIP. Whilst the Nationalist Party declared that this scheme went against European values, the Labour Party criticised the Nationalist MEPs, David Casa and Roberta Metsola, for voting within the European Parliament against the national interest. Both MEPs, who were re-contesting in the elections, defended their positions with Metsola rejecting the accusation that she is a traitor and highlighting how the Malta citizenship scheme was the only one that placed a price tag on citizenship for those with little or no links to the country (Vassallo, 2014). Several candidates from the Labour Party were also subject to various criticism. The decision by Alfred Sant to contest the European elections was seen as surprising given his stance toward Malta’s EU membership. Still, the main criticism focused on the former Nationalist councilor Cyrus Engerer. He had been given a suspended sentence of 2 years for distributing pornographic material to the detriment of his former partner. The Nationalist Party criticised the decision to select Cyrus Engerer as a candidate for the European elections. They also called his crime ‘homophobic’. On this issue, the MGRM declared that the act was not homophobic and Helena Dalli, who at the time was Minister of Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs, and Civil Liberties, confirmed that she would retain him as a consultant (Camilleri, The Malta Independent, 12 May 2014a). Still, criticism over the decision to maintain Engerer grew after the Appeals Court overturned his acquittal on the distribution of pornographic material vilifying his former partner the decided to withdraw from the European elections. Prime Minister Muscat praised Cyrus Engerer for his decision to withdraw to safeguard the interests of the party. Muscat commended Engerer for his activism and role in the introduction of the Civil Unions Act and called him one of Labour’s soldiers of steel (Dalli, MaltaToday, 11 May 2014b). Beyond the political divisions among the candidates who were representing the main political parties, there was also the issue of hunting which had constantly been a major one since the country’s EU membership. This period is especially important as Birdlife, alongside other environmental groups, had been collecting signatures to force a referendum on whether Spring Hunting should be allowed in Malta. This is

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particularly important as it would be one of the first times that civil society groups would bypass the main political parties to let the electorate have a say on whether spring hunting should be allowed. During the European elections campaign, a controversy between the environmentalist and hunting lobbies, with Birdlife, on one side and the Federation for Hunting and Conservation (FKNK) and Saint Hubert Hunters (KSU) on the other, over the shooting of protected birds. The issue for Birdlife was that the authorities were not enforcing the regulations due to the risk of frustrating the hunting lobby, which was being courted by the main political parties. Birdlife outlined how there were 11,000 registered hunters when Malta could only allow the hunting of 11,000 turtle doves and 5000 quail. Birdlife criticised the lack of action which was required to safeguard protected birds from being shot (Dalli, MaltaToday, 4 May 2014d). Tensions over spring hunting were not made easy when BBC Reporter Chris Packham was held in custody and accused of breaching the privacy of hunters during his investigation on Spring Hunting in Malta (Vella, Times of Malta, 27 April 2014). On hunting, Prime Minister Muscat declared that he had kept his promise. At the same time, he criticised Nationalist Party for failing to take a stand especially since a referendum on the matter was deemed to be imminent. For this reason, Muscat said that it was the Labour Party that was safeguarding hunting (Dalli, MaltaToday, 27 April 2014c). On the matter, the Nationalist Party leader said that Malta had the right to use the derogation for Spring Hunting, but it would be up to the people to decide on the matter (Balzan, MaltaToday, 20 April 2014a). The Nationalist Party’s approach towards the European Union was certainly based on the second-order model, even though it did try to put the European dimension at the heart of the campaign, whilst trying to focus on national issues such as the economy. The party outlined how Malta received less European funds for financial incentives for small and medium enterprises and warned that due to this, Malta was going to be less attractive to potential investors. Busuttil also warned that unemployment reached 8000 people and that public debt increased by €400 million (In-Nazzjon, 20 May 2014a). Still, the perception was that the economy was doing well, especially as Eurobarometer data revealed that growth in GDP will be between 2.3% for 2014 and 2.1% for 2015. Whilst optimism in the economy in Europe was 24%, in Malta it was 46% (Vella, L-Orizzont, 13 May 2014). Muscat provided other incentives to encourage people to vote for the Labour Party, including the pledge to compensate residents in Marsaxlokk for the environmental woes brought by the LNG Tanker (Borg, The Malta Independent, 7 May 2014), the pledge to reduce electricity bills, and that minimum wage earners would receive a financial top-up from the state (Barry, The Malta Independent, 3 May 2014). The election took place on 25 May 2014 with the Nationalist Party receiving 100,785 votes (40.02%), the Labour Party receiving 134,462 (53.39%), AD receiving 7418 (2.95%), and the far-right party Imperium Europa receiving 6761 (2.68%). The turnout was 74.8% which, although high especially when compared with the turnout of other European states, was still lower than the previous European elections. As shown in Table 6.2, this was another huge win for the Labour Party which again dominated the political campaign and outlined the strength of its leader

202 Table 6.2 The 2014 European elections results

6 Party PL PN AD Imperium Europa Turnout

Europeanisation and European Values Seats 3 3 – –

Votes 134,462 100,785 7418 6761

Votes (%) 53.39 40.02 2.95 2.68 74.8

Muscat. The Nationalist Party failed to reduce the gap between the main political parties even though for the first time, it won a third seat in the European Parliament. Another positive result was that four female politicians were elected to represent Malta in the European Parliament, which was a surprise given that no female representatives were elected in 2014 even though three were elected in by-elections after three of Malta’s members of the European Parliament opted to contest the national elections (Carammia & Pace, 2014). The Labour Party managed to provide a strong campaign based on the economic and political reforms by highlighting the strength of the economy, and the policies introduced to safeguard minorities including the Civil Union Act with Malta leading International Lesbian and Gay Association’s (ILGA) Europe annual benchmarking on equality laws and policies, and by branding the Opposition as divided and negative. Prime Minister Muscat was certainly aided by the statement made by Schulz that economic reforms were helping the economic growth of the country. It created the narrative of Malta becoming one of the best countries in Europe, and this certainly elevated the figure of Muscat. Muscat’s decision to base the campaign on him and the Opposition leader certainly helped, though it did little to provide a European dimension to the campaign. Whilst political manifestos were based on European issues and the endorsements from the spitzenkandidaten provided an added boost to the campaigns, it was national issues that mattered. The Nationalist Party headed by Busuttil was not helped by the decision to abstain from the vote on the Civil Union Act. It campaigned on issues that were important, but which had little impact on the eventual results. The fact that the Labour Party had managed to retain its dominance in the election and managed to win more than 30,000 votes more than the Nationalist Party, meant that it could have strengthened the notion that it was now the natural party-in-government (Debono, MaltaToday, 1 June 2014b). One of the most interesting things that took place after the election was the promotion of the newly elected MEPs Roberta Metsola (foreign affairs) and Therese Comodini Cachia (education) in the shadow cabinet. This was the first time that two MEPS were nominated to be in the shadow cabinet which were not elected in the national parliament. Beyond the fact that this decision could be seen as a way of promoting technocrats in the shadow cabinet, it highlighted the importance which MEPs were having within their parties and within the country’s political system (Dalli, MaltaToday, 12 January 2015e). Whilst the small parties failed to elect any candidates, AD and Imperium Europa did achieve respectable results. This highlights that whilst voters’ elasticity was limited, second-order elections in Malta do encourage some to vote for third parties.

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The fact that Imperium Europa received so many votes highlights the problem of irregular migration and the frustration which existed in finding a long-term solution for it. Beyond the issue of irregular migration, it would be spring hunting the next issue to divide the Maltese, even though for the first time in decades, the main political parties would play a backbencher’s role in the decision on whether it should be banned in Malta.

6.3

Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum

The 2014 EU election had already showcased the impeding discussion on whether spring hunting should be continued in Malta. Spring hunting was another divisive issue in Malta. Whilst the main political parties did not have such a divergent view on hunting in Malta especially as the hunting lobby was extremely important for parties to win elections, a growing segment of the electorate began to make its opposition towards spring hunting heard. The reasons for this are many including the growing awareness of conservation and the belief that hunting irregularities were taking place with no serious repercussions. The case of hunting concerns the way a European regulation was implemented in Malta. This means that the hunting question was an issue of whether the European Union allows the possibility of spring hunting based on Directive 2009/147/EC on the Conservation of wild birds established in 1979 and updated in 2009. This derogation in itself allowed for countries to request a derogation, with this derogation being used by the various Maltese governments since the implementation of the Wild Birds Directive in Malta in 2006. The European Commission’s 1979 Wild Birds Directive is important as it prohibits member states from allowing spring hunting as it is the period in which birds are migrating toward European breeding grounds. This means that hunting during this period might have an impact on bird populations, with Malta being the only European Union member state to allow recreational wild bird hunting in spring (Caruana Galizia & Fenech, 2016). For decades, there has been a debate in Malta on whether the country would manage to gain a concession to allow spring hunting. The Nationalist Party had always insisted that Malta did gain a concession on spring hunting (Borg, 2022b; Busuttil, 2022) even though the regulation itself allows states to apply for derogation. This is confirmed by Article 9 of the Conservation of Wild Birds Directive which outlines: In order to prevent commercial interests from exerting a possible harmful pressure on exploitation levels, it is necessary to impose a general ban on marketing and to restrict all derogation to those species whose biological status so permits, account being taken of the specific conditions obtaining in the different regions. (Wild Birds Directive, 2009, Article 9)

Whilst, the European Wild Birds Directive allows states to seek derogations to allow the hunting of wild birds during periods when they receive particular

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protection, the derogating only applies to certain birds in small numbers and within strict conditions approved by the European Commission. In 2003, the European Court of Justice in Case C-182/02 confirmed the right of member states to use the derogation as permitted by the Wild Birds Directive (EJC, 2003). Soon after the release of the judgement, the Maltese government declared that the European Court of Justice had sided with Malta on the interpretation of Article 9 of the Wild Birds Directive (DOI, Press Release, 1231, 2003). Still, the main issue in Malta was always whether such rules were being respected or whether there was a misfit between the EU and the Maltese rule on the matter. Just a few months after Malta’s membership in the European Union, Birdlife was already reporting that the EU regulations on Spring Hunting were not being followed. With membership in the European Union, Birdlife could communicate directly with the European Commission. The Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom sent a letter to Birdlife confirming that EU legislation should have been implemented and enforced from the first day of EU membership (Grech, Times of Malta, 25 June 2004). Due to the potential threat that the European Union posed on spring hunting, the President of the FKNK even decided to contest in the 2004 EU elections, and whilst he failed to get elected, he did manage to gather 3119 first count votes. In 2005, the first representation of the European Commission headed to Malta to study the way the Wild Birds legislation was going to be transposed into Maltese law. The representation from the European Commission met with several organisations including Birdlife and the hunting lobby to understand the issue surrounding hunting and trapping in Malta. Malta had to register all the trapping sites so that a study could take place on finch mortality and to establish a quota. The deadline provided by the European Commission of 1 May 2005, and even by this date, the registration of the trapping sites had still not taken place. The meeting outlined how Malta did gain a concession to open spring hunting for turtle dove and quail and gained a 5-year transitional period for trapping. This meant that trapping had to be banned from 2009 onwards (Cini, Times of Malta, 29 March 2005). The agreement which Malta had signed within the Treaty of Association to the European Union in 2003 declared that: The way of derogation from Article 5(a), 5(e), 8 (1) and Annex IV (a) of Directive 79/409/ EEC, Carduelis Cannabina, Carduelis serinus, Carduelis Chloris, Carduelis carduelis, Carduelis spinus, Fringilla coelebs and Coccothraustes coccothraustes may be deliberately captured until 31 December 2008 by traditional nets known as calp-nets within the Maltese islands exclusively for the purpose of keeping them in captivity. (EU, 2004)

To gain this concession, Malta agreed to meet several targets which included to establish an Ortis committee by the date of accession (1 May 2004) and to register all trapping sites. It also pledged to establish a captive breeding project and a study on the mortality of finches in capacity. The study had to be presented to the European Commission. Malta had also agreed to introduce a captive breeding programme by 30 June 2005, to analyse the captive breeding programme by 31 December 2006, to assess the number of captured wild birds needed to sustain genetic diversity by June 2007 with the Ornis committee (DOI, Press Release, 1096, 2005d). A permanent

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issue concerning the Ornis committee meant that the representatives are chosen by the party-in-government and that the committee would rely on these parties in order to decide on the parameters of hunting and trapping. Malta’s Ornis committee is made up of 11 members who are appointed by the minister responsible for hunting for 1 year. Among the voting members of the committee are the governmentappointed chairman, two representatives from the hunting lobby FKNK, and two representatives from Bird Life Malta. Because most members are chosen by the party-in-government, they rarely go against the government’s position. The trapping of finches was more controversial than spring hunting. The treaty of EU membership outlined the derogation of the finch species of linnet, greenfinch, goldfinch, siskin, serin, chaffinch, and hawfinch, and these could only be captured until 31 December 2008. The treaty specified that the Maltese could use traditional nets (known as clap-nets) to keep these birds in captivity, with the country having to abide by the targets established by the European Union (MaltaToday, 10 June 2014b). The Nationalist administration had consistently defended its position on spring hunting, reaffirming that it had kept its premise to keep spring hunting open (DOI, Press release 0978, 2005c). Still, the PN had declared that to keep spring hunting open, the regulations surrounding hunting would need to be respected and illegal hunting curtailed (DOI, Press release, 0640, 2005b). The arising issue concerning hunting outlines how the impact of the European Union or membership was not restricting the movements of the main political parties who had to face the European regulations and enforce their implementation, especially as both main parties were courting hunters for votes. From a European perspective, it could also highlight the limitations of Europeanisation in promoting the required changes, especially as there was strong resistance towards the implementation of the 1979 Wild Birds regulation. Whilst resistance was emerging in Malta towards the Wild Birds regulation, opposition towards Malta’s spring hunting was emerging within the EU institutions. The MEP Robert Evans referred to a report by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) entitled illegal hunting of birds in several countries in Southern Europe. He asked the Commission to stop such illegal practices which were leading to the death of millions of birds every year in the Mediterranean, including 100,000 birds of prey. During a plenary session, he outlined how these totals may be more than 15% of the total numbers of birds that spent the winter or migrate to that area. He said that as a result of uncontrolled shooting, the number of species breeding in Malta had declined from 32 in 1916 to about 16 in 2005. Evans gave the example of a 2003 amnesty which was granted by the government for illegally shot-stuffed birds with nearly 270,000 birds registered even though only 2589 hunters submitted their lists. The then environment Minister Pullicino played down the report concluding that hunting was a sensitive issue and that regulations were being implemented (Times of Malta, 4 July 2005). The first report on spring hunting and trapping in Malta was officially presented to the European Commission in 2005 with the government highlighting how everything was being done to keep spring hunting and trapping in Malta (DOI, Press

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Release, 1769, 2005a). In the meantime, in the same year, a legal notice was issued for Malta to begin transposing the Wild Birds Directive into national law. This meant that the government had to establish the Ornis Committee in 2006 as a prerequisite of the Wild Birds Directive (DOI, Press Release, 1184, 2006). The government adopted the European Union’s Birds Directive in March 2006. With the implementation of the legislation, the pressure would be placed on the country to safeguard and maintain the populations of all wild birds at levels determined by scientific studies (Mallia, Times of Malta, 30 March 2006). Even though Malta introduced the Wild Birds Directive, it did not mean that opposition towards it would cease. In fact, by the same year, not only was the European Commission not pleased by how spring hunting was retained with the EU institution opting to initiate infringement proceedings against Malta, but the hunting lobby began to brand themselves as a minority group that had to be safeguarded from the EU institutions. The fact that the hunting lobby group was a strong cleavage that both political parties were courting made things difficult. This is an example of how the European Union and its regulations were constraining political parties’ movements on this issue. The importance of this cleavage was reflected in the 2006 controversial decision given to the police to temporarily refrain from taking legal action against hunters. Birdlife and the European Commission criticised this decision which created more controversy. This decision was eventually taken back (Grech, Times of Malta, 23 November 2006). By 2007, both main political parties had agreed that hunting was part of Malta’s society. The then Minister for the Rural Affairs and Environment George Pullicino declared that hunting and trapping are deeply rooted in Malta’s society and that it was illogical to think that such tradition can simply be taken away with one decision (Pullicino, Times of Malta, 2 March 2007). From the Labour Party, MEP John Attard Montalto outlined how hunters should continue to enjoy their hobby. The MEP also warned the Nationalist administration to not bow down to the EU pressure to stop spring hunting as this would destroy a tradition that goes back hundreds of years. He said that he will do his best to protect the interests of hunters within the European Parliament (Attard Montalto, 2006). The first protests against restrictions on hunting took place in 2007 and 2008 with some individuals resorting to violence and vandalism against Birdlife and journalists amongst others, to convey their message (Galea Debono, Times of Malta, 7 March 2007). The FKNK had already warned the party-in-government that it was ready to encourage its voters to vote Labour in the next national election which took place in 2008 and which elected the Nationalist Party again with a much smaller majority. The Nationalist administration had to face a new challenge from the European Commission on Spring Hunting. The reason for this is that the European Commission requested interim measures to prevent Malta from using the derogation to open the Spring Hunting season as the country failed to abide by the required regulations (Briguglio, 2015a). On 24 April 2008, the European Court of Justice ordered Malta from:

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refraining from adopting any measures applying the derogation in Article 9 of Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conversation of wild birds-as amended by Council Directive 2006/105/EC of 20 November 2006 adapting Directives 73/239/EEC, 74/557/EEC, and 2002/83/EEC in the field of environment because of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania-for the hunting of quails (Cotunrix cotunrix) and turtle doves (Streptopelia turtur) on the 2008 spring hunting. (ECJ, Case No. C-76/08R 2008)

For this reason, the Spring Hunting seasons of 2008 and 2009 were not opened. This not only irritated the hunting lobby in Malta but also the political parties which were busy campaigning to attract voters during the 2008 national election. The hunting saga in Malta showcases how an issue could quickly escalate and lead to rising Euroscepticism in any member state. The ban on Spring Hunting, led small pressure groups including the Campaign for National Independence (CNI) headed by former Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, to call for the country to be taken out of the European Union (Borg, The Malta Independent, 29 April 2008). Whilst this small party had little influence in the country’s political system, it highlights the feeling of betrayal which existed, with the blame for this being shifted towards the European Union by the main political parties. Still, in 2009, the European Court of Justice, whilst underlining how Malta failed to comply with the Birds Directive, also noted that hunting for quail and turtle doves in autumn was not a satisfactory solution which meant that Malta could use the derogation (DOI Press Release 1494, 2009). The Nationalist government subsequently opened spring hunting seasons in 2010, allowing the hunting of turtle doves and quail under strict regulations (Briguglio, 2015a). The FKNK ad already warned the party-in-government that it was ready to switch allegiance and a 2010 report by the party revealed that the majority of hunters had followed its instructions to vote Labour in the 2009 EU elections with their favourite candidates being John Attard Montalto who was voted by 65% of its members (and was eventually elected), with 15% of its members voting for the known Eurosceptic Sharon Ellul Bonici. A survey commissioned by the FKNK revealed that only 5% of the members opted to give their vote to the Nationalist Party. The survey and the report published by the FKNK concluded that the hunting lobby was much more influential than the environmental lobby which would explain why none of the members of the AD (Green Party), the only known party in Malta to be against hunting, were elected to serve as members of the European Parliament (Peregin, Times of Malta, 25 September 2009a; Calascione, 2009). The relationship between the Federation of Hunters and Trappers and the Labour Party would strengthen through the decades, especially after the election of Muscat in 2008. During this period, the confrontation between Hunters and Birdlife volunteers escalated with these volunteers being attacked, cars being torched and trees vandalised (Attard, The Malta Independent, 23 April 2010; Johnston, Times of Malta, 25 August 2010). The Federation of Hunters and Trappers and their President Lino Farrugia blamed the government for the escalating violence highlighting how hunters were being discriminated against and accusing Birdlife of provoking hunters by monitoring the countryside for illegal hunting (Schembri, Times of Malta, 23 April 2010). In 2011, after years of confrontations between the EU Commission

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and the Maltese government, Prime Minister Gonzi declared that an agreement was reached with the European Commission which would allow Malta to open the Spring Hunting season and allow hunters to shoot up 5000 quails and 11,000 turtledoves (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 30 March 2011). A few days later, the Commission rejected that such deal was ever agreed on, even though it confirmed that Malta could apply for the derogation (Zahra, L-Orizzont, 5 April 2011). It was later in 2013 that the Labour Party revealed its position towards hunting with leader Muscat declaring that a future Labour government would give the same rights to Maltese hunters as their European counterparts. During the campaign for the 2013 national election, the Labour Party declared that it will keep the Spring Hunting derogation. More importantly, the hunting lobby declared that Labour would restore the dignity of hunters, trappers and their respective families. The FKNK outlined its support for the Labour Party as it had reached an agreement with the hunting lobby for a closer collaboration (Times of Malta, 13 March 2013b). This obviously meant that the Labour Party enjoyed the support of the hunting lobby during the 2013 national election campaign. At the same time, however, with the new Labour administration and the hunting lobby signing an agreement for closer cooperation, environmental groups were cooperating to find a common stance towards hunting. A group of NGOs including Malta’s Green Party (AD), Bird Life Malta, Din l-Art Ħelwa, Nature Trust, and the Rambler’s Association met to thrash out a common strategy against legal hunting in spring. Whilst the meeting was deemed to be positive between all parties involved no deal was reached (MaltaToday, 14 July 2013c). With the new government resisting calls to close Spring Hunting, discussions began to take place by environmental organisations on a potential referendum on Spring Hunting with an estimated 34,000 signatures required to force a referendum on the issue in Malta (Vassallo & Vella, MaltaToday, 10 April 2013). The European Commission warned the new administration not to increase spring bird bag quotas as it would hold Malta in violation of the Wild Birds Directive (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 14 April 2013). Again, the parties in government had the difficult task of trying to find a balance between the regulation and the hunting lobby, and more often than not, the decision taken was appeasing neither side. In several cases, the hunting seasons had to be closed early because either protected birds were being shot or because a number of hunters were not adhering to the regulations imposed on them. By the end of 2013, there was a push to start collecting the required signatures to enforce a referendum on spring hunting. This led to the abolition of a Spring Hunting group being created. This is the first time that a number of civil society groups joined forces without the support of the main political parties and outlined the role that such groups could have in the country’s political system. The groups included the Ramblers Association of Malta, Nature Trust, Moviment Graffitti, International Animal Rescue Malta, Greenhouse Malta, Gaia Foundation, Friends of the Earth Malta, Flimkien GħalAmbjent Aħjar (FAA), Din l-Art Ħelwa, Coalition for Animal Rights, Birdlife Malta and Malta’s Green Party (AD).

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Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum

209

In the first statement as a coalition group, the Coalition for the abolition of Spring hunting (CASH), discussed various issues which would be at the forefront during the 2015 Spring hunting referendum, including the need to put pressure on the Maltese government and the European Commission to act on the problem. Another important question was whether hunters in Malta could be considered a minority. The discussion on this aspect is particularly important as it showcased how various terms were used in the political system with little understanding of them. On this issue, the coalition branded hunters a minority group. This meant that their rights had to be protected given that hunting had been a longstanding tradition in Malta with deep roots in the country’s history. For this reason, banning hunting would affect their rights. Still, this coalition argued that minority rights are linked with human rights and these were not established to defend the anti-social behaviour of a particular segment of society (CASH, 2013). The CASH clarified that the referendum would only affect spring hunting and that winter hunting would still take place. Still, this issue would be forgotten during the discussion for or against Spring hunting, and if prioritised, it might have encouraged more voters to side with this group. The 2015 hunting referendum is especially important in the study of the implications of Europeanisation on Malta’s political parties due to the impact of EU regulations, in this case the Wild Birds Directive, on member states. With membership in the EU, Environmental NGOs could use European institutions to pressure the state to comply with its environmental regulations. On 28 March 2014, the Coalition for the abolition of spring hunting submitted 44,376 signatures to force a referendum on the matter. This meant that the 40,351, and thus, the 10% required by law to trigger the mechanism was reached. The reaction of the hunting organisations was swift. As the petition was submitted to parliament and to the evaluation of the Electoral Commission, both main hunting organisations in Malta, the FKNK and Saint Hubert Hunters outlined how this was a war against tradition and how they would work towards safeguarding minorities in Malta (Mifsud Bonnici, MaltaToday 24 January 2014; Martin, Times of Malta, 1 March 2015b). The campaigns surrounding the hunting referendum were as divisive as any other campaigns and reflected the duopolistic divisions in the country. Two sides were created and offered two distant realities, with the electorate asked to choose the two options. Hunting was linked with the concept of Malta’s identity, the notion that this tradition was part of our cultural heritage and had to be safeguarded. The others were made up of environmental and animal rights supporters who believed that the declining population of certain species meant that spring hunting had to be abolished. The divide over hunting was not simply based on voters’ political beliefs, but also based on their level of education. A survey conducted by one of Malta’s English newspapers MaltaToday revealed how 50% of those with primary education wanted to retain spring hunting. The percentage decreased with secondary and postsecondary education citizens, with only 31.6% supporting spring hunting. Those citizens with tertiary education were the most opposed to Spring hunting, with only 11.1% supporting spring hunting. The division on the issue could also be noted based on the electorate’s support of the main political parties. The majority of

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Labour voters reaching 47.7% were in favour of maintaining the spring hunting derogation. On the opposite side, only 19.3% of the Nationalist voters wanted to maintain the derogation (Debono, MaltaToday, 1 June 2014b). Still, the study took place before the party leaders announced their decision to vote to retain the derogation, which might have shifted in more ways than one, the attitude of the electorate towards the issue. The two camps which had a major role in the campaigns were the hunting lobby and the SHout (Spring Hunting out) groups. SHout was made up of entities including the CASH, independent media, and AD with notable individuals like Moira Delia, Saviour Balzan, Birdlife President Joseph Mangion, with these becoming the faces of the organisation. The idea was that the abolition of spring hunting would give people access to the countryside occupied by hunters. On the opposite side, the ‘Yes campaign’ was fronted by the hunting groups which were FKNK and Saint Hubert Hunters (KSU). The first approach that they took was to challenge the petition to hold a referendum by appealing to the courts to stop it from taking place, as they argued that it would breach Malta’s EU’s treaty obligations. Still, it was going to be difficult for the Constitutional Court to uphold this claim. Objectives for a referendum could only take place if a referendum had already taken place within the previous 2 years, which in this scenario, was not the case. Another important point was that the referendum was not seeking to remove a law that cannot be altered through an abrogative referendum. These laws included the Constitution, the general election act, fiscal legislations, and any laws which might have had a direct and indirect effect on treaties signed by the country. Another important point was that the Wild Birds Directive allows states to use the derogation, but it did not force them to use it especially as most of the member states were against spring hunting (Cordina, The Malta Independent, 2 January 2015). Therefore, Malta’s Constitutional Court rejected the claims made by the FKNK and KSU, with the courts declaring that the referendum could take place (Borg, MaltaToday, 9 January 2015). Prime Minister Muscat accepted the court’s decision, declaring that the people’s decision will be respected (Muscat, 2015b). The decision was made to have the hunting referendum on 11 April 2015. This meant that the Maltese citizens were given the right to decide on the matter. Both Muscat and the leader of the Opposition Simon Busuttil declared that they would be voting for the right for Malta to use the derogation to open spring hunting. One of the main issues concerning a referendum is always the question to put forward. In this case, it was not simply on whether the Maltese wanted to retain spring hunting but was mostly concerning both the Wild Birds Directive and the derogation. This is particularly important as the way questions are formulated might sway the electorate on one side on the other. The decision was taken to put forward this question to the electorate; ‘Do you agree that the provisions of the framework for allowing a derogation opening a spring hunting season for turtle dove and quail regulations’ (subsidiary legislation 509.94) should continue in force?’ One could argue whether the majority of the Maltese citizens had any knowledge of the Wild Birds Directive and the derogation that Malta was using to open spring hunting. For the first time, information was not being provided by the main political

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Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum

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parties, but by the main camps for or against spring hunting. The choice of the question was defended by the Muscat administration, outlining how it was based on the petition presented in Parliament in conjunction with the legislation and feedback from the Attorney General. For the first time, 16-year-olds in Malta were allowed to vote in local elections, that were being held on the same day as the referendum; still, they were not allowed to vote for the latter (DOI, Press Release, 150043, 2015). Within this press release, the Prime Minister again confirmed his intention to vote to maintain the derogation, boosting the campaign of those in favour of retaining spring hunting. The leader of the Opposition was much more cautious because the majority of its supporters were known to be against spring hunting. The Nationalist Party declared that a referendum was a form of democracy that the party will continue to safeguard, highlighting how the hunting referendum gave the Maltese citizens the right to decide on spring hunting (Busuttil, 2015). One of the options discussed by the ‘Yes campaign’ was to boycott the referendum so that the required threshold of 50% turnout could not be reached (Gauci Cunningham, L-Orizzont, 11 January 2015). Still, this plan was soon abandoned with the movement developing a very sophisticated campaign that targeted the masses. The ‘Yes campaign’ integrated the ‘European element’ using the slogan ‘Yes, as Maltese and Europeans’. The rationale behind this was to outline how Maltese citizens should have the same rights as their European counterparts. This is important as the narrative that was being used was that hunting was a minority right rooted in Malta’s culture and history and if it had to be removed, then other traditions such as fireworks and fishing would also be threatened. The pro-hunting campaign lobbied was very similar to the 2013 campaign of the Labour Party. Its campaign was built around pro-hunting, with the main speakers surrounded by the youth generation wearing bright and colourful t-shirts. They developed a positive campaign based on the need for a fair balance and for traditions to be tolerated and respected (Dalli, Times of Malta, 5 March 2015a). During the campaign, the ‘Yes campaign’ decided to boycott the English newspaper Times of Malta, MaltaToday, and The Malta Independent, due to their stance on hunting and their support of the SHout campaign (Dalli, MaltaToday, 1 February 2015d). This outlines how divisive the issue became during the campaign. Throughout the campaign, reference was made to how the hunting referendum was a ‘war’ between those minorities who were fighting to safeguard their rights with the threat that other hobbies being targeted, and those who wanted to destroy the country’s heritage (Dalli, MaltaToday, 1 March 2015b). Fireworks enthusiasts were encouraged to vote in favour of hunting because as ‘minorities’ they might be the next victims of a potential referendum (Vella, L-Orizzont, 9 March 2015b). These factors are important not only because the Prime Minister had just introduced civil unions and outlined the need to safeguard the rights of minorities in Europe so that they could enjoy the same rights as their EU citizens, but because there was an underlining narrative based on nationalism and the need to protect the country’s cultural heritage. The SHout campaign attempted to influence the electorate, highlighting how this was not a political issue and that the electorate could decide based on their view on

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the matter. Whilst surveys consistently highlighted the potential impact which party leaders, especially the Prime Minister who had consistently highlighted his stance towards safeguarding spring hunting, could have on the eventual result. The fear was that the referendum would be politicised by the main political parties and hijacked by the country’s politicians. Various politicians declared their position to safeguard spring hunting. It was clear that the majority of Labour MPS were in favour of maintaining spring hunting with many of them declaring their position in favour of spring hunting. The Labour Party criticised the Nationalist Party and its leader Busuttil for staying silent on the issue, even though the Nationalist leader did declare his intention to vote in favour a few days later. However, he did criticise the Labour administration for not allowing 16-year-olds to vote in the referendum (L-Orizzont, 14 January 2015; Busuttil, 2015). Therefore, politicisation of the issue was taking place even though parties declared that it would leave it to the electorate to decide on the matter. This politicisation was having an impact. A survey commissioned by the English newspaper MaltaToday revealed that after Prime Minister Muscat’s declaration for the derogation to be kept, 19% of the Labour supporters switched their position and were not in favour of retaining the derogation. The Prime Minister had already removed licence fees for hunters, extended hunting times and allowed some of the Labour Party members to support a motion to stop the hunting referendum (Debono, MaltaToday, 12 April 2015a). The survey also highlighted the limited influence of the Nationalist leader Busuttil, with 79% of the Nationalist voters still against Spring Hunting, and his statement having little effect on voters’ attitude towards the matter (Debono, MaltaToday, 1 February 2015b). The SHout movement promoted two scientific reports undermining the arguments that the population of turtle doves and quail were not declining. These reports confirmed that the turtle population had declined by 77% since 1980. The number of quail was seen to be stable due to the large population numbers, but the population was still considered depleted. This was seen as in contradiction to the report used by the Ornis Committee, which highlighted that the population of both species was stable and recommended the opening of spring hunting in 2015 (Ganado, Times of Malta, 11 March 2015). With the decision by the Ornis Committee to open spring hunting, the European Commission warned Malta once again that it would initiate infringement proceedings against the country because the rules within the Wild Birds Directive were being deliberately ignored. On this matter, the Prime Minister said that he would defend Malta’s position to open the season (Muscat, Times of Malta, 18 March 2015a). The ‘Yes movement’ rejected these accusations, declaring that the hunting of turtle doves and quail in Malta does not have such an impact on the population of the species. They outlined how Malta can only hunt 11,000 turtle doves and 5000 quail, only 0.7% and 0.4% of the population of about 16 and 12.5 million, respectively. They declared that if these populations were at risk then the European Commission would not have included a derogation and would have refused to allow the seasons to be opened (Dalli, Times of Malta, 18 March 2015c). It was clear that the hunters’ campaign was much more appealing. Hunters used billboards that showcased youth and families enjoying nature and highlighted the notion that a balance could be

6.3

Minority Rights and the 2015 Hunting Referendum

Table 6.3 The 2015 hunting referendum results

Yes No Turnout

213 Votes 126,434 124,214

Votes (%) 50.4 49.06 74.8

reached between hunting, conservation, and sustainability. On the opposite side, the SHout campaign criticised the ‘Yes movement’ for only promoting hunting as a traditional hobby and not revealing the ugly side of it including the tens of protected birds being killed during the hunting seasons. The campaign against hunting used photos of birds being hunted and clips and posters which represented the intolerance of hunters towards others, to convince the electorate to vote for the banning of Spring Hunting. The SHout campaign also used a study that revealed that out of 579 cases of illegal hunting in 2014, only three hunters had lost their licence. This was seen as proof of the lack of discipline which existed amongst hunters (Micallef, Times of Malta, 6 March 2015). Even without political parties taking a major role, both camps traded insults at each other. Controversy emerged over the right to access Miżieb, a woodland area in Mellieħa with the FKNK declaring that the government had granted a concession over the area to the FKNK in 1986. The SHout campaign challenged the FKNK to publish the lease agreement to confirm that the area was entrusted to them. The hunting group branded the SHout campaigners as extremists who were being influenced by foreigners who were coming to Malta to tell the Maltese what to do (Schembri Orland, The Malta Independent, 15 February 2015). The use of the term ‘foreigner’ is particularly interesting within this context. This was a term used at a time when Malta was a colony, with decisions taken by others rather than the Maltese. This provides an interesting perspective as these ‘foreigners’ were coming from the European Union. Therefore, the EU was framed in opposite ways by the ‘Yes movement’. On one side, it was essential for the Maltese to have the same rights as their European counters, on the other, the EU and its citizens could not force the Maltese to act in a certain way. In the first stages of the campaign, the main political parties declared that they would not get involved in the campaign. In the end, they did have an indirect role in the campaigns. Towards the end of the campaign, the Prime Minister declared that law-abiding hunters should not get the blame for few criminals and that the Maltese hunters should be treated like their European counterparts. He highlighted how the government would bring down illegalities. This certainly helped to strengthen the message of the ‘Yes Campaign’ which was based on the idea that Maltese hunters should have the same rights as their European counterparts. The legally binding referendum was held on 11 April 2015. Turnout for the referendum was 74.8% which although high, was still low compared to national or European elections. As Table 6.3 shows the ‘Yes’ movement, which campaigned in favour of hunting in spring, emerged victorious, winning 50.4% of the vote, a mere 2220 vote advantage over the ‘No’ movement which received 49.06% of the votes (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). The FKNK declared that it was not a victory

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for hunters but a victory for Malta. In their first statements on social media, the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition both declared that they would respect the results of the electorate to safeguard spring hunting in the country (Carabott, Times of Malta, 13 April 2015; Zerafa, L-Orizzont, 13 April 2015). The results of the referendum could be analysed from different angles. Whilst the referendum concerned a European regulation, the campaign had little European element in them. Still, for the first time, civil society groups managed to come together and challenge the influence that political parties had on one important area which is the environment. The results highlighted how nearly half the electorate ignored the standings of the main political parties over hunting and voted to end spring hunting. Still, the anti-hunting campaign was too sophisticated and mostly targeted a particular cleavage, that is the post-secondary and tertiary educated citizens. Most of the campaign was in English and did not reach the Maltese speaking (Briguglio in The Malta Independent, 20 April 2015b). The faces of the SHout campaign did not have the appeal or support which politicians had, which limited their role of providing awareness on the subject. The ‘Yes’ campaign was much more positive, branding the anti-hunting movement as extremists who were threatening Malta’s culture. The ‘Yes movement’ also branded themselves as minorities with the European element of the campaign being that hunters should enjoy the same rights as their European counterparts. Certainly, the Prime Minister helped to push the support toward hunters, highlighting his growing influence on the country and its citizens. The referendum was directed to the Wild Birds Directive of the European Union. However, the campaigns did little to educate the voters on what the directive is all about and why the European Commission had initiated various infringement proceedings against Malta. Terms such as ‘minorities’ and ‘human rights’ were used with little or no explanation on how a sport or a tradition can be considered a minority right. Whilst the electorate opted to safeguard spring hunting in Malta, the controversies surrounding it did not end with the referendum. In 2015, the European Commission opened infringement proceedings against Malta for allowing finch trapping. The decision of the European Court of Justice delivered on 21 June 2018 in Judgement in Case C-557/15 Commission v Republic of Malta, ruled that the 2014 and 2015 decision of the government to open autumn trapping of finches does not comply with the Directive since no reference was made to the Commission on why there could be no alternative for finch trapping. The European Court of Justice also ruled that Malta had not respected the Wild Birds Directive which allows states to use the derogation only for a ‘small number’ of birds. Malta also failed to abide by the regulations for derogation, mainly strictly supervised conditions. The European Courts of Justice concluded that Malta had over 4000 trapping states with little checks (ECJ, Press Release, 90/18, 2018). The reaction was swift, with the FKNK and Saint Hubert Hunters criticising Birdlife for manipulating the courts with false information, highlighting the ‘crusade’ which was taking place against hunters. The government declared that it was going to study the decision of the European Court of Justice to

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understand the way forward. On the other hand, the AD, Birdlife, and Cabs welcomed the decision declaring that European law should be respected. Resistance towards the law was again evident when the Minister for Gozo, Clint Camilleri, who was handed the responsibility of the hunting portfolio in 2017, announced an autumn trapping season for six bird species including greenfinch, goldfinch, linnet, serin, chaffinch, and siskin for scientific research in October 2020. In 2021, the European Commission decided to start infringement proceedings against Malta as it did not believe that finch trapping was taking place for scientific research, with Malta again accused of failing to respect the Wild Birds Directive. The hunting lobby FKNK accused Birdlife and the German Cabs because they believed that these environmental groups were unable to accept the success of the scientific research because it is not being done by them. The government has already declared that it will defend Malta’s position within the European Court of Justice (European Commission, 2021; Balzan, Newsbook, 12 November 2021). In 2022, the new Labour administration decided to lift the moratorium on turtle doves, which had been established in 2017, due to the decrease in the population of the species, with Birdlife filing a juridical protest over the matter (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 10 April 2022b). This outlines the fact that the battle on hunting will keep going for long years to come. The influence of hunting lobby groups over the country’s political system has certainly increased in the last decade. In 2020, the government handed over the management of Miżieb and Aħrax woodlands to the hunters’ federation. The deal was challenged in courts by various NGOs including Birdlife, Graffitti, Din L-Art Ħelwa, Friends of the Earth, FAA, and Ramblers Association (Vassallo, LovinMalta, 9 October 2020). In November 2022, the Maltese Court of Appeal ruled that the agreement over the management of Miżieb and Aħrax was illegal (The Malta Independent, 9 November 2022a). In addition, the responsibility over hunting was retained by the Gozo Minister, an avid hunter, after the 2022 election even though environmentalists had called the government to place hunting under the environment portfolio. The controversy around hunting certainly highlights the way a European law could restrict the movements of political parties, the influence which various lobby groups could have and the way political parties shift to win over such groups, and the difficulty of the European Commission in enforcing its rules. The hunting issue also highlights the problem when it comes to respecting regulations. Enforcement is made even more difficult as fines were reduced and replaced with a point system for hunters (MaltaToday, 19 February 2022b). The hunting issue in Malta highlights the impact which misfit between European and national regulations can have on political parties and lobby groups. Whilst resistance towards the Wild Birds Decades has existed for decades, the Birds Directive encouraged various civil society groups to take a stance for or against spring hunting. With controversies over the issue still ongoing, it might be the European Court of Justice who will have the last word on the matter. This will undoubtedly have an impact on the way the political parties approach the hunting lobby in the future.

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Table 6.4 Priorities of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU Priorities Migration

Security Single market

Social inclusion Neighbourhood policy Maritime sector

Importance The need to have an EU asylum agency and promote burden sharing between all EU member states. The Maltese government also pledged to continue discussions on the need to reform the Dublin Regulations and to reach agreements with African states to facilitate to mitigate migration in Europe. Malta would work so that there is better management of the EU external borders and improve the cooperation between states on criminal justice. The need to focus on small and medium enterprises and meet the challenges these entities face. Another priority was to remove roaming charges across EU states and the need to have free wifi in major cities around the region. On the agenda, there was also, the need to complete the Internal Energy Market and improve the Capital Markets Union. Malta was proposing the extension of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). The need to improve LBTIQ rights in Europe by endorsing a progressive approach and by embracing social inclusion. Increase effort to stabilise South-Mediterranean states such as Tunisia and Libya. Improve relationship with Russia The need to improve the Blue Growth economy through research and innovation. Malta was also proposing the strengthening of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy and to launch the Western Mediterranean Sea Basin Strategy.

Source: European Council (2016)

6.4

Malta’s 2017 EU Presidency of the Council of the EU

The Presidency of the Council of the EU is certainly an important event for EU member states. This is especially important for those states which use the Presidency to promote issues that are important to their citizens. For a small country like Malta, this was not only an opportunity to promote its priorities but also for politicians or for the party-in-government to strengthen their image within the country and within EU institutions. Due to their limited financial capabilities and human resources, the presidencies of small states are usually met with a certain degree of scepticism. The belief is that due to their limitations they cannot promote their priorities and influence their decision taken process. However, small states are managing to overcome these challenges and the Presidency allows them to shape the EU agenda (Panke & Gurol, 2018). The Presidency of the Council of the European Union provided the opportunity to showcase the country’s EU values and strengthen the image of Malta within the European Union. It was also important as for a small country like Malta, it revealed the respect that it had gained within the European Union (Vella, 2022a). The Presidency of the Council took place at a crucial time in Malta with the revelations of the Panama Papers scandal and with various officials linked to the Muscat administration suspected of having secret bank accounts. Beyond that, there were other international issues that the EU had to deal with, including the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA and the long-term impact of the Brexit referendum. The latter provided an opportunity for the Maltese government to lead some of the discussions between the UK and the European

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Union. This was certainly an important role for Malta, a former British colony with strong ties with the UK. For this reason, Malta had the opportunity to gain a very important role in helping to establish new ties between the UK and the EU. This also meant that the Prime Minister of Malta could elevate his status at an international level, by not only welcoming the top EU technocrats but also by having a leading role in the discussions concerning Brexit. For the EU Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Malta opted for six main priorities as shown in Table 6.4. These were migration, security, single market, social inclusion, neighbourhood policy, and the maritime sector. In the opening ceremony of the Presidency, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk highlighted the role of the Presidency in such as challenging time for the European Union, declaring: We were indeed lucky that this difficult role fell upon Malta. Few have a better understanding of Italians, who will host the Rome celebrations, and few have a better understanding of the British, who we will begin to divorce. And, as we know, divorces—without mutual understanding of the partners involved—can turn their lives into a nightmare. Finally, few have a better understanding of the essence of the migration tragedy in the Mediterranean. (Tusk, 2017)

The speech not only highlights the role Malta could have in the Brexit talks, but also the role it could have in securing the future of the European project. In his first speech as the host of the Council of the EU Presidency in the European Parliament, Prime Minister Muscat’s discourse was more ‘European’ since the audience was not comprised of Maltese citizens, but of members of the EU institutions. Unsurprisingly, one of the main issues he dealt with during his speech was the issue surrounding migration. On this matter he declared: You know very well Malta’s position on this issue. We have been harping for more than a decade that the migration situation in the Mediterranean is unsustainable. We were amongst the first to sow the seeds, within this Parliament, on the need of responsibility sharing, and that the burden of managing the flows cannot fall exclusively on the shoulders of front line member states. Yet, we were left almost alone, for many years, trying to overcome a crisis which was not our making. (Muscat in EP, 18 January 2017a)

The lack of solidarity on irregular migration toward Malta and other Mediterranean states has always been a problem within the European Union. Vast discrepancies which exist between the EU states on how to deal with the matter make it difficult for the EU to find a solution for the problem especially as there is no consensus on burden sharing. The lack of solidarity on irregular migration was not only highlighted by Malta, but by other Mediterranean states. Beyond the issue of irregular migration, Prime Minister Muscat had the opportunity to leave his mark on the Brexit talks. The Presidency highlights again the way the EU Presidency elevated the status of the Prime Minister with him using a section of this speech to call for a stronger role of the European Parliament and to try and establish a close relationship with the United Kingdom, which was still one of Malta’s closest allies: I advocate that Parliament should be involved as much as possible within the process. Having been part of this institution myself, I am aware of the organic dynamics that are within. I am of the opinion that not involving Parliament is not the best choice, comes at its

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own risk, and that even the fairest of deals could be scuttled. While saying this, I do appeal to all institutions to adopt a consistent approach that is aimed at safeguarding the European project and not punishing a particular country. (Muscat in EP, 18 January 2017a)

The discourse used by the Prime Minister is different from the one usually used in the country’s political system. It outlined the larger audience that the Presidency of the Council of the European Union provided. The reason for this is that with the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, Malta was going to lose one of its natural allies in all institutions of the European Union (Harwood, 2022). Therefore, to safeguard the national interest and the ties that Malta had with the United Kingdom, it was important for the Prime Minister to call for a compromise between the EU and the UK whilst also seeking new bilateral ties with the latter.

6.4.1

EU Presidency and Irregular Migration

Beyond the issue of Brexit, the Prime Minister had also the responsibility to pursue the six priorities which were agreed upon. Certainly, the main priority out of the six was the issue of irregular migration. The approach taken by the main political parties over irregular migration was very similar to each other during their legislative terms. Being the smallest country in the European Union, Malta’s strategy was to modify rather than define policies surrounding this problem (Fiott, 2010). Malta did agree with the European Union to create a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) and European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which was established in Malta in 2011 and was rebranded as the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in 2022. Malta also agreed to the establishment of the Refugee Fund and External Border Fund and the European Pact on Migration and Asylum (Pace, 2021b). The main political parties had constantly used their MEPs to highlight the dissatisfaction which existed with the Dublin Regulation and the way the European Union was approaching the issue. Irregular migration has been constantly one of the main issues in the country and with membership in the European Union, irregular migrants have often been portrayed as ‘invaders’ and ‘illegal’. On this matter, Caruana Galizia (2013) had written an opinion piece criticising the approach taken by the Maltese society over irregular migrations, criticising the conditions in which these migrants were forced to live in (referred to as concentration camps) and the attitude which existed towards them. She wrote that ‘the attitude of the Maltese towards Africans remains firmly grounded on the eighteenth century when “natives” were paraded for the amusement of politicians’ (Caruana Galizia, 2013). Lemaire (2014) describes how irregular migrants in Malta are incarcerated upon their arrival (because they are considered illegal immigrants), placed into detention centres, and isolated from the rest of the community until their asylum applications are processed.

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3000 Number of Arrivals by boat 2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Fig. 6.1 Arrival of irregular migrants by boat in Malta (2001–2017). Source Vassallo and Cachia (2020)

The discourse used by Malta’s politicians over irregular migration has often nationalistic undertones, to highlight the crisis the country is facing in defending the national interest, their pushback policies, and to reinforce the narrative that Malta is being left alone to deal with the problem (Mainwaring, 2014). By often embracing populist approaches toward irregular migration, the main political parties have managed to neutralise the rise of popular right-wing parties in the country (Vassallo & Cachia, 2020). Still, such an approach meant that they repeatedly faced plenty of criticism from civil society groups and humanitarians over the way they dealt with the problem. As illustrated in Fig. 6.1, for several years there was a gradual increase in the arrival of irregular migrants in Malta. The problem of irregular migration started emerged before Malta’s actual accession to the EU. In 2002, there were already discussions on the impact of the so-called klandestini (irregular migrants) and whether Malta had enough resources to control the increasing influx (L-Orizzont, 7 October 2002). This year was important due to the controversies surrounding an Eritrean group that was sent back, even though they were at risk of being persecuted on their return (Vella, L-Orizzont, 4 October 2002). In 2003, the Council of Europe was already being critical of the way irregular migrants were being treated in Malta due to the cramped conditions in which they were living in, and the long detainment policy. What is interesting is that the Council of Europe expressed the need to use the term ‘irregular’ rather than the more popular term in Malta ‘illegal’, especially as this was providing a false perception of these migrants and the reasons they were ‘moving away’ from their respective countries (Grima, Times of Malta, 22 October

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2003). In 2002, a study undertaken by the Times of Malta on the irregular migration problem revealed that over 69% of the Maltese population believed that Malta should consider these migrants as law-breaking criminals. On the other hand, only 57.3% of the population knew the difference between an irregular migrant and a refugee (Times of Malta, 20 October 2002). Whilst more awareness has been raised on the issue from 2002 onwards, the negative perception of these individuals still persists. With Malta’s EU accession in 2004, calls were being made for the EU to show solidarity towards Malta and other Mediterranean countries facing the same problem. On this matter, Frendo (2004) declared that humanist solidarity was required and that burden sharing and the need to look at the problem ‘collectively’ was required to find a long-term solution. Yet, irregular migration is one of the issues which the European Union has struggled to tackle due to the longstanding disagreements which exist between member states. Irregular migration is one of the topics which has been politicised over the years by various political parties in their attempt to gain political advantage. It is also an area that highlights the limitation of Europeanisation, that is the role of the European Union, in shaping the agenda due to its failure in reforming its irregular migration policies. The European Union has usually tackled irregular migration with three different approaches; discouraging irregular migrants from leaving their countries, managing the inflow of migrants through its regulations, and promoting the integration of irregular migrants to prevent isolation and potential radicalisation (Pace, 2021a). Still, the European Union has over the decades struggled to come up with a proper solution that deals with the problem. Sant (2022) outlines how irregular migration raises deep political problems across the board for most member states. Populist strategies feed on it. Important human rights issues which cannot and should not be ignored are involved. The difficulty that ordinary communities feel when required to accept the presence of different lifestyles in their midst cannot be brushed aside either, especially given the competition for work opportunities that migrants might seem to pose. Racist and ethnic prejudices have not been absent in all this. Ironically, however, the EU needs an infusion of migrants to bolster its labour market which is falling short of people. The regulations and approaches of the European Union towards irregular migration are often confused with those of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), with member states requested to abide by European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in their approach toward irregular migration. The main political parties’ approach toward the problem shifted depending on whether they were the party-in-government or the opposition party. Still, throughout the years, there was a certain degree of agreement between them on how to tackle the problem. One of them was to establish an agreement with Libya to discourage irregular migrants from leaving its shores and to facilitate the repatriation process if they managed to reach Malta. When Italy’s former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya’s Gaddafi, Malta was one of the countries to support this agreement. The reason for this is that Article 19 of the Treaty referred to the irregular migration problem with both countries

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pledging to cooperate to reduce the problem (Pace, 2012). Whilst human rights activists condemned this agreement as they felt it ignored the human rights of migrants, for Malta’s politicians it was a way of safeguarding the national interest by facilitating the repatriation policies (Pisani, 2012). In the end, the treaty was not implemented due to the instabilities which plagued Libya, which led to the removal of Gaddafi. Another approach was to use Malta’s MEPs to outline the challenge which the island was facing due to the rising influx of migration. Still, even this approach has its limitations because Malta has only six MEPs within the European Parliament and in this area. It is the European Council rather than the European Commission or European Parliament which usually agrees on the way to proceed due to the strong national interests which exist (Cutajar, 2022). The main political parties in Malta had consistently agreed with the detention of ‘illegal migrants’ and both believed that the EU could do much more using funding and promotion of burdens sharing to alleviate the problem (Times of Malta, October 24, 2003). This detention usually lasted between 12 and 18 months, with Malta often being criticised by various human rights agencies over this detainment. In 2013, in the case ‘Suso Musa versus Malta’, and ‘Aden Ahmed versus Malta’ the ECtHR criticised the long detainment of these individuals and the conditions in which they were placed, with Malta violating various articles within the European Convention of Human Rights. These included Article 5(1) (concerning liberty and security) and Article 5(4) (the failure of the authorities to make sure that the right of lawfulness of detention is decided by a court in a short amount of time) for the first case, and Article 3 (treatment of these migrants), Article 5(1) and Article 5(4) in the second case (Carabott, Times of Malta, 16 December 2013). In November 2016, as Malta was about to take over the Presidency of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR gave its judgement in the case ‘Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta’. The Court delivered its judgement on the long detention of two children, highlighting once again how Malta violated Article 3 of the Convention of Human Rights due to the treatment which these children received, and Article 5(4) of the Convention due to the lack of speedy remedy in processing their applications and ineffectiveness of the proceedings to challenge the unlawfulness of their detainment (ECtHR, 2016). Malta’s approach towards migrants and its asylum procedures where again crticised by the ECtHR. In December 2022, in the case of ‘S.H. v. Malta’, the court ruled that Malta violated Article 3 (risk assessment of the asylum seekers) and 13 (Asylum Procedures) when processing the asylum application of S.H. These examples are interesting as the tendency is to blame the European Union for these sentences when in reality it was the Council of Europe that was pushing the country to respect international law, the convention of Human Rights, and the rights of these migrants (ECtHR, 2022). The different parties in government did introduce various legislations to abide by the European Union regulations and ECtHR judgements against Malta. The National Refugee Act was established in 2000 with various updates being made, the latest one being in 2015. The National Refugee Act introduced the Commissioner for Refugees and established procedures related to asylum, protecting vulnerable people being persecuted in their country. To improve the asylum application process, the Maltese

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government established the International Protection Act. The office of the Refugee was abolished and the legislation established the International Protection Agency (Legal Notice 194 of 2020). Beyond these regulations, the Labour administration introduced the New Migration Strategy in 2015 to improve the procedures for asylum seekers with the detention period shortened to 9 months and the detention centres reorganised and improved. The new strategy also made it easier for migrants to challenge the lawfulness of their detention as recommended by the ECtHR (Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, 2015). Another strategy was introduced towards the end of 2017. The Migration Integration Action Plan dealt with some of the major issues linked with irregular migration including integration. It proposed several measures including the delivery of courses in Malta, English and Cultural Orientation within the ‘I Belong’ programme and awareness campaigns to remove the stigma linked with these individuals (Human Rights and Integration Directorate, 2017). With the struggle of the European Union in finding a long-term solution for the problem, Malta traditionally relied on bilateral relations to try and ease the problem. Malta has been a member of the Med-Group, a group of seven EU Mediterranean states that coordinate their positions before critical EU Council sessions when migration is discussed. Malta has also benefitted from the US relocation programme financed by the US Refugee Admissions Programme (USRAP) and supervised in Malta by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Over 3500 irregular migrants in Malta used the programme to relocate to the USA. The programme operated from 2007 until 2017 when it was essentially stopped by the Trump Administration (Pace, 2021b). When it comes to migration, the period before and after Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the EU is particularly interesting. As the table showcases, there was a general decline in the arrival of migrants between 2015 and 2017. Various speculations emerged for the reason behind this, including the fact that with the ‘Mare Nostrum’ missions headed by Italy, the latter had opted to rescue all migrants at sea. The decline took place after a series of confrontations and diplomatic tensions between Malta and Italy. These included the case of Pinar, a Turkish cargo ship that rescued 154 migrants in April 2009, with both Italy and Malta refusing to allow the ship entry in their reports. Malta insisted that the closest port was Lampedusa, whilst Italy declared that the migrants were within Malta’s search and rescue area. Italy ultimately decided to allow the ship to enter its ports declaring that it was only doing it for humanitarian action (Peregin, Times of Malta, 20 April 2009b). The Maltese government has always denied that an agreement was reached between Malta and Italy. This agreement was also discussed in the 2018 Italian election with Berlusconi declaring that if he had to win the election, the agreement with Malta would be stopped (Pace, 2021b). Speculations were made on know whether this agreement had taken place. Yet even though there is no proof of any agreement being reached, reference to this agreement was made during the 2018 election in Italy. The new coalition government made up by Lega Nord (Northern League) and Five Star Movement declared that the agreement between Malta and

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Italy would not be observed and Malta would be responsible for its search and rescue (SaR) area. From 2018 onwards, the arrival of irregular migrants by sea increased, with the party-in-government looking at various possibilities to solve the problem. Due to the growing influx of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea, the European Council decided to call an international summit to discuss the matter. The summit had to take place in Malta few months before the country was going to host the 2015 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting and bringing together African and European heads of state. The priorities discussed by these heads of state were five; (1) root causes, the need to support economic and political development in host and transit countries; (2) legal migration, the need to provide a legal channel for migration and mobility between African states and Europe; (3) protection, the need to reinforce protection for refugee and other displaced individuals; (4) tackling trafficking, the need to enforce the right against human trafficking and (5) return and readmission, the need to collaborate more with the African states to facilitate the repatriation processes (Council of the European Union, 2015). During the Valletta Summit, leaders from EU and African states met in Malta to try and find a long-term solution to the irregular migration problem. At the time, the European Union was being challenged by the Syrian Migration crisis which was putting an extra burden on various states across Europe. Due to this, Malta was pushing the European Union and its member states to do more to protect irregular migrants. The country was the only member state to embrace burden sharing and take its share of refugees (168 migrants from Greece and Italy and another 17 were relocated from Turkey) as part of the EU effort to relocate at least 120,000 Syrians who escaped from the civil war afflicting the country (UNHCR, 2019). This was simply one of the examples which reflect the deep divisions which existed on irregular migration which made burden sharing difficult to achieve. The Maltese Prime Minister adopted a conciliatory tone and declared that the European Union has to do more to deal with the problem. This is a reflection of the fact that Prime Minister Muscat repeatedly outlined the plight of irregular migrations and the need to find a long-term solution to the problem. In the opening speech of the summit, he declared ‘the Schengen rules are outdated and need to change. Safeguarding borders is not building Fortress Europe. We need rules which work for everybody’ (Muscat in Grech, Times of Malta, 12 November 2015). In his speech in the Maltese Parliament, the President of the Council of the European Union, Donald Tusk (2015) declared: Malta has always been at the crossroads of European history. This was true in the Great Siege of 1565 and also during the pivotal defence of this nation in World War II. Today, it is again true—although in quite a different way—in this new age of great migrations. And that is why Valletta is a particularly fitting place for African and European leaders to meet this week to begin really managing the disruptive and dynamic migration phenomenon through a rekindled partnership (Tusk, 2015).

Beyond using some of the main events in Malta’s history to highlight the role of the country in Europe, Donald Tusk outlined Malta’s role in the Mediterranean and the need for more cooperation between the Southern Mediterranean states and the North African countries to deal with the problem.

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During the summit held between 11 and 12 November 2015, Prime Minister Muscat declared that Malta was going to contribute €250,000 as part of the €1.8 billion Emergency Trust Fund set up by the European Union for African states. The final political declaration and action plan signed by the African and EU member states outlined the need to address the migration problem; improve cooperation between African and European states on legal migration and mobility; the need to protect the human rights of irregular migrants (and asylum seekers); the need to fight human trafficking; the need to improve repatriations and the need to allocate the required resources in a form of an emergency fund to address the problem (Council of the European Union, 2015). Prime Minister Muscat called the agreement a historic one that could allow the EU to finally start dealing with the problem of irregular migration. The Nationalist Party was cautious of the final agreement, declaring that the European Commission could have provided the needed funding without the need for a Summit to be held in Malta. There was also the question of how the emergency fund was going to be spent by the European Union (Martin, Times of Malta, 16 November 2015a). For the agreement to be successful and for the European Union and African states to work together to find a solution for the long-term problem, they had to abide by three parameters: partnership (a joint approach), shared responsibility (cooperation between the EU and African states) and solidarity (the need for collectivity). Still, with several countries including Hungary sceptic of this cooperation, there was little optimism that the targets could be achieved (Tawat & Lamptey, 2021). Critics argued that the European Union did not make it clear whether the fund was going to be spent on protecting the human rights of these migrants or on the security of the EU member states. In addition, EU member states disagreed on the way forward meaning that much-needed reforms within the Schengen system were not discussed (Traynor, The Guardian, 11 November 2015). Few weeks after the Valletta Summit, Malta hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM). The meeting took place between 23 and 25 November 2015, and one of the main priorities was again the issue of irregular migration. In the final communication report, there is again a reference to migration. However, migration is seen as a positive element. The report concluded that if regularised, migration could provide economic and social benefits not just for the individuals who decide to leave the country, but also for the host countries. The report also outlined the need to fight terrorism which was displacing millions of individuals in Africa and the need for Commonwealth countries to cooperate to combat human trafficking (CHOGM, 2015). By the end of 2016, as the country was about to take over the Presidency of the Council of Europe, the discourse on the need to remove walls in Europe drastically changed. One of the main events during the Presidency of the Council of Europe was the Malta Summit between the heads of states of the EU member states concerning irregular migration. Still, by the end of 2016, the idea of ‘walls’ became fashionable again. During a plenary session in the European Parliament, the Prime Minister declared:

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To wall or not to wall. At the end, the only way in which the flow was stemmed was through an agreement with Turkey. We all know it is not the perfect deal, and that it is not a long term solution, but we have to admit that this is what until now has made some difference. (Muscat in the European Parliament, 2017b)

In the speech, Muscat criticised the lack of solidarity offered by the European states towards Malta and other Mediterranean countries. He outlined how the migration agreement with Turkey could be replicated in Libya so that safe passageways could be established for asylum seekers in Europe. Still, there were concerns on whether Libya was stable enough and whether the European Union was doing enough to help the stabilisation of the country. Malta’s MEP Miriam Dalli highlighted how there could be no security in Europe without security in the Mediterranean. A similar statement was used by Mintoff decades earlier in the OSCE Conference (Miriam Dalli in the European Parliament, 2017c). The Malta Summit is considered one of the main events during Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the EU. The informal meeting between the heads of states of the EU member states took place on 3 February 2017. The meeting was hosted by the Prime Minister of Malta Joseph Muscat and chaired by the European Council President Donald Tusk. The informal summit was divided into parts. During the first part, the EU member states had to discuss ways to deal with the migration flows from Libya whilst in the second part, EU member states had to discuss the upcoming 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome which the Prime Minister of Malta used to promote the social dimension of the EU (Illum, 26 March 2017c). The summit concluded with the Malta Declaration. This Declaration stated that the European Union would support the Government of National Accord which was recognised by the United States. It outlined that to secure its external borders, the European Union needed to cooperate with the national, regional, and local authorities in Libya. It again pledged to continue the training of the Libyan national coast guard and other agencies linked with the fight against irregular migration. The Malta Declaration highlighted the need to strengthen the socioeconomic situation of the Libyan people, particularly in coastal areas and along the migratory pathways of the Libyan land borders. The declaration also outlined the need for the European Union to support the IOM, particularly on voluntary returns and information campaigns targeting migrants (European Council, 2017). Several human rights organisations criticised the deal reached during this informal summit. The Organisation for World Peace (OWP) declared that the argument on how scaling back EU naval operations would save lives was fallacious because, while this would spare lives at sea, it did nothing to solve the humanitarian crisis on shore. The organisation highlighted how migrants and refugees will not willingly stay in an unsafe country and should not be forced to do so unless the country’s conditions improve. The main issue was certainly the instability that existed within Libya and whether the country had the required institutions to safeguard the rights of irregular migrants and potential refugees. The OWP argued that the Malta Declaration illustrated the attempt by the EU and its member states to shift the responsibility of migrants and ignore their human rights during this process (Shefik, 2017).

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Other criticism towards the Malta Declaration concerned whether the EU took into consideration the rights of these refugees. These include the premise to give the Libyan coastguard extra training and support to deal with the business organisations behind smuggling and whether this was enough to deal with the issue or whether organisations were going to simply find another way to smuggle people. They criticised the refugee centres in Libya and whether the European Union was doing enough in protecting the vulnerable people within such centres. Criticism was also made on whether the EU or the United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) were making sure that the conditions were being observed and whether human rights were being respected. They also criticised the European Union for not pressuring Libya to remove the automatic detentions of migrants (Philipps, 2017). Beyond the Malta Summit, the Presidency kept looking at all avenues to reduce the migration flow from Libya. During the Presidency, Malta led talks on seven proposals initiated by the two previous presidencies, the Netherlands and Slovakia. These included discussions on the Qualification Regulation (QR), Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), Reception Condition Directive (RCD), and Dublin IV Regulation (Fernandes & Lilleorg, 2018). Some of these discussions ended up being incorporated into the new proposals on migration. However, the major issues on how the EU should approach the irregular migration problem were transferred to the next set of Presidencies. Some of the recommendations included the need to revisit the Dublin IV Regulation. With no consensus among the heads of states of the members of the European Union, many of the discussions ended up with little progress. However, the European Union did introduce the return policy package which was established in March 2017. The package was important to facilitate the repatriation process across the European Union. The main proposals were presented in the 2018 Recast Return Directive which proposed a series of common standards and procedures in member states to facilitate and improve the procedures for returning irregular migrants (Moraru, 2021). These improved standards were seen as a way for the EU to find a compromise between facilitating the return of these irregular migrants whilst respecting their fundamental rights (European Commission, 2018). The new return package was part of the initiative of the European Union to establish a Common European Return System and so, to restructure the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). These were all incorporated in the New Pact on migration and asylum which proposed an asylum and migration management regulation, the improvement of asylum procedures, the strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to make returns more efficient and provide the needed support to the member states. The Commission also agreed to appoint a return coordinator to support the operation strategies for the return of irregular migrants to their counties of origin (European Commission, 2020). Whilst the new pace made various references towards the need for providing solidarity, there was no reference to the need for a burden-sharing mechanism, an issue that Malta and its political parties had been demanding for decades. One of the initiatives proposed by the Maltese government which was not received with a lot of support was the suggestion that during periods of heavy

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migrant arrivals, the distribution of asylum seekers across the European Union would be required. This would oblige every EU member state to take several irregular migrants based on the size and income of the country. Over 5 years, EU member states that took more migrants than the quota agreed on by the European Union would receive €60,000 for each additional migrant. The Maltese government also proposed that those countries that would take less than the quota established by the European Union would be required to pay the same amount (€60,000) for each asylum applicant they do not accept (Kroet, 2017). Not surprisingly, this proposal did not receive much support within the European Union, with no reference to such a plan in the proposal being put forward. Whilst Malta faced an uphill struggle during the Presidency of the Council of the European Union to persuade member states to agree to a mandatory burden sharing or even solidarity, the Presidency did highlight that more had to be done by the EU to deal with the problem. The last report of the European Council on the Presidency highlighted the need to work towards an external border management and to strengthen the returns framework. Between 2015 and 2017, the EU saw an increase in irregular migrants being returned to their countries of origin going from 37% to 46% (Fernandes & Lilleorg, 2018). The work of the Maltese government and the MEPS on irregular migration would not stop with the Presidency and more pressure would be imposed on the EU especially as the number of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean continued to grow with thousands dying trying to reach the European shores. Drastic decisions would be taken by the government over the lack of progress in reforming the migration policies and lack of solidarity towards the countries being challenged by the irregular migration problem. On 23 September 2019, during the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Interior Ministers of Malta, Italy, Germany, France, representatives of the European Commission, and Finland, who had the responsibility of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, met in Malta to discuss the controversies regarding the search and rescue area (SaR) and disembarkation and relocation of migrants within the EU. The mini-summit concluded with a Joint Declaration which, amongst other things, outlined the need to establish a temporary solidarity mechanism to ensure a more respectful disembarkation of irregular migrants. The declaration proposed a fast-track system of relocation which would be based on agreed standard procedures and on using in full EURODAC (The European Union fingerprints database for asylum seekers). The declaration also highlighted the need to repatriate those who did not meet the criteria for international protection (Joint Declaration, 2019). The text had to be discussed at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 7 and 8 October 2019 but the text received lukewarm reactions from the other member states of the EU. Little progress was made on the matter (Frasca & Gatta, 2020). This led to other drastic decisions from the Maltese government including that to stop providing military assets towards Operation Irini which was tasked with preserving the military embargo on Libya. The country would also veto any decisions concerning the spending procedures of the operation and disembarkation of migrants, as this was negatively affecting the country (Vella, MaltaToday, 8 May 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic would lead to the decision to temporarily close off

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the Maltese ports. This was done as the resources were being shifted to fight the pandemic and to protect the Maltese citizens. A 2022 Council of Europe report would criticise this action and the lack of effort of the Maltese authorities within the country’s SaR area, outlining the need for Malta to comply with the non-refoulment obligations which protect asylum seekers. The report also criticised Malta’s cooperation with Libya, highlighting how the country is not a safe place and the Libyan authorities have struggled to guarantee that the basic human rights of these individuals are respected (Council of Europe, 2022). The death of 4-year-old Loujin Ahmed Nasif who died days after being rescued at sea in a hospital in Crete has regained the debate on Malta’s approach towards irregular migration and its failure to rescue migrants who find themselves in difficulty. With the European Union unable to reinforce its regulations on the matter, one would expect irregular migration to become one of the main priorities in the 2024 European Elections.

6.4.2

The Maltese Presidency and the Other Priorities

Although irregular migration was at the top of the agenda for the country, other priorities were being promoted throughout the Presidency. The issue of irregular migration goes hand in hand with the need to place more emphasis on the external borders of the European Union. This also provided another opportunity for Malta to highlight the need for the European Union to establish a stronger relationship with Mediterranean countries. Beyond the issue of Brexit, the presidency could not ignore the Arab Spring and the impact it was having on several North African countries. Indirectly, this was also linked with the issue of irregular migration. Political reforms were taken place in various countries including Libya and Tunisia (Biagi, 2018) which provided the EU with the opportunity to export its values including rule of law and good governance. Beyond that, political stability of these countries was required before finding a long-term solution to the irregular migration problem. During the Presidency, Malta presided over the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union. The council is presided by the country which is hosting the Presidency and chaired by the Higher Representatives of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which in this case was Federica Mogherini, brings together defence ministers and at times Ministers for the Economy all the EU member states. The meeting on 6 February 2017 was important as it led to the formation on the Quartet on Libya with these being the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union and the European Union. One of the main aims of this quartet was to promote political stability in Libya. Apart from the need to strengthen the relations between the EU and North African countries and to strengthen the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Pace, 2018a), Malta also pushed various reforms to promote sustainability in the area. These included the need for the EU to promote Blue Growth, an area which by 2017 was, directly and indirectly, contributing to 26% of the country’s GDP. This was an area that was also being promoted by Malta’s EU Commissioner Karmenu Vella, who was responsible for Environment, Maritime Affairs, and Fisheries

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(2014–2019). Various meetings were held on the need to promote sustainability in the Mediterranean. These included the MedFish4Ever Minister Council held on 30 March 2017 which discussed illegal fishing in the Mediterranean, the safeguarding of fish stockings, and the discussion of maritime and coastal economic activities in a sustainable way. On 24 March 2017, the Council of the EU adopted the conclusions of the ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’. Although the recommendations discussed by the MedFish4Ever Council were non-binding for EU member states, they still promoted the creation of work in the maritime sector, the need to strengthen maritime security and tackle climate change, and promoted further research and innovation in maritime research through the Horizon 2020 programme. A number of these proposals were discussed during the meeting of the European Ministers for the Blue Growth which met in Malta on 20 April 2017, including the development of the 2012 Blue Growth Strategy through policy initiatives and research and innovation (Pace, 2018b). One of the other priorities for the country was the internal market. The Muscat administration prioritised small and medium enterprises (SMEs) so that funds could be injected in these companies, and the need to provide better working mobility which would allow Europeans to move to countries where their skills are needed. The deepening of the EU internal market could be helped through investment in the digital internal market digitalisation. Digitalisation is an area in which the country had been investing heavily, so it is not surprising that further investment was being encouraged at the EU level. One of the most successful legislations was the agreement to end roaming charges, with much of the discussion taking place during the Slovakian Presidency. This was an important decision that would allow Europeans to remain in contact with others within the EU area. Various discussions were initiated during the Presidency including the need to help SMEs through the Single Market Strategy (Sammut, 2018). This was required to ensure mobility and to help potential business models flourish across the region, allowing businesses to invest in other countries. This could not be achieved if an investment was not made in e-commerce. One of the main problems for the European Union was to establish proper regulations on geo-blocking and safeguarding European consumers. This was especially needed to provide more opportunity for consumers and preventing to buy products from traders which are in other European states especially as online shopping keeps increasing year after year. Online shopping is particularly important for small countries with the 2015 Eurostat data revealing that 68% of Luxembourgers, 44% of Maltese, and 20% of Cypriots made use of cross-border purchases (Ciantar, 2018). Consumers were also protected through the strengthening of the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) which is a network established to protect European consumers. Still, the development of e-commerce and further legislation to protect European consumers could not take place without investing in cyber security, particularly in the EU agency ENISA (The European Union Network for Information Agency). In June 2017, as the Presidency of the Council of the EU was heading towards its end, a Digital Assembly was held which discussed several key priorities including data economy, new digital opportunities, cyber security, and internet of things, and digital transformation. Another important area

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in which discussions were held was e-privacy and the need to reform the E-Privacy Directive which had been established in 2002 (Directive 2002/58/EC), and to establish common rules on General Data Protection with the General Data Protection Legislation (GPDR) coming into effect in May 2018 (Sammut, 2018). Digitalisation was an area of great interest for Estonia, which took over the Presidency in July 2018, with the country pushing for further investment in this sector. Another important proposal being promoted by the Commission and supported by the Maltese government was the need to introduce free internet in town halls, hospitals, parks, and in the main public spaces around the EU. The Maltese EU Council Presidency achieved an informal agreement with the European Parliament on the EU-sponsored project ‘WiFi4EU’. An agreement was reached between the main EU institutions to fund the WiFi4EU programme. This agreement meant that the European Union agreed to allocate €120 million for free Wifi services in 6000–8000 towns across all member states. For the President of the EU Commission Juncker, the WiFi4EU programme is projected to provide Wifi in all public areas across the EU by 2020 (Times of Malta, 30 May 2017d). With the introduction of civil unions and same-sex marriage in Malta and civil rights promoted by the Labour administration, it is not surprising that LGBTIQ rights were also in the list of priorities of the Maltese government. The fact that Malta became a world leader in LGBTIQ rights leading the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) Europe index for several years, meant that the country could push its agenda to strengthen civil liberties within the EU area. The Maltese administration had three main priorities under social inclusion which were the improvement of female participation in the labour market, combating gender-based violence, and LGBTIQ issues. Whilst the European Union has little competence over LGBTIQ matters, civil liberties are slowly becoming part of the fundamental values of the European Union. A ministerial-level conference was held on the 22 and 23 February 2017 on LGBTIQ rights in Europe. During this meeting, discussions took place on the need to provide more awareness of the rights of LGBTIQ individuals and to provide more education to fight the intolerance and attitudes that LGBTIQ individuals had to face (Harwood, 2018). Whilst the Presidency of the Council of the EU did not lead to any new legislation on LGBTIQ due to the lack of competence of the EU in this area and disagreements which exist, it certainly provided the opportunity for the Maltese administration to highlight the policies it had introduced towards safeguarding the rights of these minorities. It also raised more awareness on the impact which homophobia can have on the quality of life of these individuals. The Labour Party and its leader Prime Minister Muscat had the opportunity to use the Presidency of the Council of the European Union to showcase the reforms introduced in Malta in an attempt to shape the agenda of the European Union. The Nationalist Party had the opportunity to host the EPP annual congress between 29 and 30 March 2017. The congress brought together various parties in government and parties-in-opposition members of the EPP. These included Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, Prime Minister Marjano Rajoy of Spain, and Prime Minister Victor Orbán of Hungary with the Leader of the Nationalist Party Simon Busuttil

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Table 6.5 Politico’s assessment of the Presidency Agriculture Brexit

Climate and environment Digital single market

Employment and social policy

Energy

Financial services Health

Positive Reform of the Omnibus Regulation Agreement on Organic Food Unity between the 27 EU member states over Brexit and the negotiation process Reform of the EU Carbon marketEmissions Trading System The end of the mobile phone roaming charges Agreement on free wifi in public places across the EU Member states persuaded to sign the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence Agreement on the targets and rules for improving energy efficiency as part of the EU 2020–2030 climate framework Revival of the EU’s securitisation market Agreement on double taxation disputes Valletta Declaration on sharing information on drug prices

Maritime and fishing Migration and neighbourhood

MedFish4Ever declaration to save Mediterranean fish stocks Agreement to establish an EU agency for Asylum

Security and justice

Agreement to establish the EU Public Prosecution’s Office New rules on money laundering and a common definition of a terrorist act

Trade Transport

Agreement on new anti-dumping rules Agreement on new “type approval” rules for vehicles

Negative Failed to promote plant health and welfare standards No formal agreement with the UK reached Failure to reach an agreement on other targets Failure to find an agreement on geo-blocking and Audiovisual Media Services Directive Failure to update EU Employment LAWS

Failure to reach common goals on energy efficiency Failure to amend anti-money laundering rules Failure to find an agreement on an Erasmus-style scheme post Brexit for young doctors which would have benefitted Maltese students Failure to deal with the multiannual plan for the Adriatic Sea Failure to agree on a long-term solution for the irregular migration problem Failure to agree on the establishment of a European army, failure to develop the EU counter-terrorism coordination, and lack of progress on the Minsk 2 accord with Ukraine Failure to upgrade EU trade defences Failure to agree on a mandate for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

giving the concluding speech. The congress was important as it dealt with various issues which the EU was dealing with including security and defence. In addition, it continued the talks on a very important area, which is the future of the European Union (EPP, 2017). The issue concerning the future of the EU would lead to the Conference on the Future of the European Union in 2021.

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The Presidency of the Council of the European Union provided an important milestone for Malta to highlight its capability in handling a vast number of formal and informal meetings. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of such a Presidency, and only few scholars and journalists attempted to provide one. The decision to call for an election during the 2017 Presidency might not have been appreciated by the European Union. Elections during the Presidency are seen as deterrents as they might shift the focus from priorities to the actual campaigns. Table 6.5 provides a brief evaluation of the progress report published by Politico (Anon, 2017t). Politico is traditionally one of the only newspapers which closely analyses the Presidencies of the Council of the European Union. The effort done by Malta to tackle a variety of issues was appreciated by both the EU and member states. Whilst Malta had several limitations, it certainly promoted its priorities throughout its term. The main criticisms the country received were that it had too many priorities and whilst agreements were reached in various areas, the country failed to leave a mark on its Presidency due to its lack of personality (Panke & Gurol, 2018). However, the Presidency gave the Prime Minister of Malta and the Labour Party an international stage to promote an agenda that safeguarded the national interest. Whilst Prime Minister Muscat used the Presidency to gain international credibility, he still had to face the revelations concerning the Panama Papers and the decision to call for an early election in the midst of the Presidency. The 2017 election would have some of the most polarising campaigns in the country’s political history.

6.5

The Panama Papers and the 2017 National Election

When the Panama gate revelations came to light in 2016, nobody expected that it would become a dominant issue within the country’s political system and a point of division between the main political parties. Corruption allegations in Malta are a norm, and revelations usually come to light close to an election. The majority of corruption allegations are usually ignored by the electorate and rarely do they have any implications. However, this time, it was an international consortium of journalists and it was not simply a national issue but became an international issue due to the involvement of the EU. Libel cases are usually fine by the politicians involved, but it can take years and even decades for the courts to decide on an issue. The period between the Panama Papers in 2016 and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017 was one of the most polarising in the country’s political system. Between the two events, there was the Presidency of the Council of the EU and the 2017 national election, therefore it was quite an eventful period for the country’s political parties. In 2015, a whistleblower transferred the records created by Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, to German journalist Bastian Obermayer of the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung. The data was so huge that it required a team of over 370 journalists from 76 countries to analyse it taking it public. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) began publishing data concerning information on

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214,488 secret offshore accounts on 3 April 2016. The files included 11.5 million documents in form of data emails, records, and personal information of individuals including politicians, artists, drug smugglers, criminal organisations, corporations, billions and millionaires, and professional athletes from over 200 countries, which were analysed and published by the ICIJ. Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian distributor of offshore companies with dozens of offices around the world, was at the heart of these leaks. The company was selling its shell companies in places like Zurich, London, and Hong Kong, often at a discount. For as little as $1000 (€1012), clients were able to purchase an anonymous corporation. However, at this price, it is nothing more than a shell. Mossack Fonseca could supply an inexperienced director and, if required, hide the company’s genuine stockholder for an additional charge. As a result, an offshore company’s genuine purpose and ownership structure could be hidden from the public eye. Thousands of corporations were formed, sold, and maintained by Mossack Fonseca. The records illustrate how the company was engaging in business activities to help individuals circumvent money laundering and tax evasion legislations across the globe (Obermayer et al., 2016). The European Commission’s first reaction was to admit that its existing reform efforts including the Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive were insufficient and that more needed to be done to fight money laundering and tax evasion in member states (Bowers, 2016). In June 2016, the European Parliament established the PANA committee of inquiry which had the role to investigate potential maladministration in the application of EU Law towards tax avoidance, tax evasion, and money-lauding. At the same time, political fallouts began to emerge within Europe. The first casualty of the Panama Papers was the Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson who, together with his wife Anna Sigurlaug Pálsdóttir, bought an offshore company ‘Wintris Inc’ in the British Virgin Islands in 2007 to invest funds which Anna Sigurlaug Pálsdóttir received from the sale of her father’s business. He was forced to resign after protests erupted in Iceland over these companies (Henley, 2016). Meanwhile on 22 February 2016, Daphne Caruana Galizia had already hinted at potential offshore companies that the then Energy and Health Minister Konrad Mizzi and his wife Sai Mizzi had in New Zealand. In her blog she declared: It’s traditional to eat lamb on Easter Sunday, so Konrad Mizzi and his estranged wife Sai Mizzi Liang will be getting theirs from New Zealand, courtesy of their fixer Brian Tonna, who has a desk at the Auberge de Castille. (Caruana Galizia, 2016a)

Konrad Mizzi was one of the closest aides of Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and a star candidate in the 2013 national election (Bonini et al., 2019). Meanwhile, Brian Tonna was one of the owners of Nexia BT, an audit firm that was closely linked to Prime Minister Muscat and Mizzi. The revelations of Daphne Caruana Galizia led Minister Konrad Mizzi to acknowledge the existence of a family trust in New Zealand on 24 February 2016. He declared that he was planning to provide information about it to parliament as part of his declarations of assets. At the time, Konrad Mizzi was campaigning for one of the two deputy leadership positions of the party. He was contesting for the post of deputy leader for party affairs. Being the

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only candidate for the post, it was inevitable that he was going to be elected. At the same time, he was handed over the responsibility of delivering a new LNG plant. This plant started its operations in 2016. The tender for the plant’s construction and gas supply was open to an international expression of interest. A consortium made up of a number of national and international groups was chosen. These groups included Maltese business group GEM (Gasan and Tumas Groups), the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR, and Siemens. Gasol plc, formerly a 25% shareholder, left the consortium in 2015 (Vella, MaltaToday, 24 February 2016b). By 2017, the agreement would also be a cause for great controversy, with Daphne Caruana Galizia highlighting the potential corruption allegations linked with the project and with one of the members of the Tumas Group, Yorgen Fenech, linked with the assassination of the Maltese journalist. With Daphne Caruana Galizia hinting at a potential offshore company of Minister Konrad Mizzi, the latter quickly confirmed his ownership of a trust in New Zealand. He defended his position by outlining how New Zealand was one of the most transparent countries in the world and that these allegations were simply an attempt made by the Nationalist Party to damage his reputation (Vella, MaltaToday, 24 February 2016b). The issue got more complicated when it was revealed that his company in New Zealand was incorporated in Panama, which was not only a country known for its secretive accounts but was a jurisdiction block-listed by the European Union (Caruana Galizia, 2016b). The issue was branded as Panamagate. Questions began to emerge on whether there would be a proper investigation of these offshore companies. During a debate in the Maltese Parliament, the leader of the Opposition Simon Busuttil asked whether the Prime Minister was going to release a statement on Konrad Mizzi and questioned whether the trust was created after he was chosen to be part of the cabinet. He highlighted how Panama accounts were usually created for money laundering. He asked whether the Prime Minister would release a statement in light of this and the fact that Minister Mizzi was behind the controversial privatisation of Malta’s main hospitals and gave the contract for the development of a gas-fired power plant to a consortium that included SOCAR which is the state-owned company of Azerbaijan (Malta’s Parliament Sitting No. 351, 2016). The government refused to release the contract for both the privatisation of hospitals and power plants. Whilst the government did not release any statement at that time, it did issue a press release on Minister Mizzi in which he challenged the leader of the Opposition to repeat his allegations outside parliament (and without the parliamentary privilege) and re-affirmed that his company and trust did not have any holdings, with the trust being created only as a means of family estate planning (DOI, Press Release, 160394, 2016) and that it would be closed once a tax audit had taken place (Times of Malta, 29 February 2016b). The Prime Minister defended Mizzi’s position, with the latter declaring that he never had any funds in these accounts. Muscat attempted to shift away from the allegations against Mizzi by promoting the economic and civil liberties reforms introduced by the government. He defended Mizzi declaring that he was aware of the company before the news was leaked. He also declared that Schembri had resigned from his board of directors and that his company was not competing for government

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contracts. The claims, according to Muscat, were ‘superficial’. He backed Mizzi’s ElectroGas contract with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, emphasising that it was done to safeguard the national interest (Vella, MaltaToday, 13 March 2016e). Minister Mizzi refused to apologise, declaring that he had done nothing wrong as it was money that he had worked for (Borg, Times of Malta, 26 February 2016). Few days later, Daphne Caruana Galizia would reveal that Brian Tonna and Keith Schembri, the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister of Malta, had also a trust in New Zealand which held a company in Panama. The companies were alleged to have been established after the Labour Party returned in government in 2013. Caruana Galizia also revealed that Brian Tonna had set up an offshore company for Keith Schembri just before the 2013 national election, with this company being in the British Virgin Islands, another tax haven country (Caruana Galizia, 2016c). Whilst the political system in Malta was embroiled in another controversy, the relationship between the European Union and the party-in-government was being challenged as the Maltese candidates for various posts within the EU institutions were being turned down. In March 2016, Chief Justice Silvio Camilleri failed the screening to sit on the European Court of Justice because he did not meet the criteria for the post after he was found to have insufficient knowledge of EU Law. He was replaced by the dean of the Faculty of European Law Professor Peter Xuereb (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 3 March 2016). Once again in March 2016, Malta’s candidate for the Court of Auditors Toni Abela (he would become a judge in the Maltese Courts in 2017) was rejected by the European Parliament after he failed to convince the European Parliament Budgetary committee that he was a suitable candidate for the post. Toni Abela failed to convince the members of the committee of his role in the white block case. This case refers to a recording that emerged during the 2013 national election in which the outgoing deputy leader Toni Abela was referring to a story on how one of the PL club leaders discovered a barman carving a ‘white block’. Allegations were made that this white block referred to a block of drugs. The issue concerned the fact that Toni Abela did not report anything to the police. Whilst he attempted to defend himself by saying that he went willingly to speak to the Police Commissioner on the matter and that he always maintained his integrity during his political career, and that he was ultimately investigated and judged by the electorate, he failed to win enough support, with 9 members voting in his favour and 17 against. During the interview process, he struggled to defend his decision to support Konrad Mizzi. He also refused to comment on whether Konrad Mizzi should have assumed his responsibilities and resigned from the cabinet. The process revealed how particular discourse or statements could easily work in Malta, but not with the European Union which prefers a more sophisticated language. These included the declaration that Mizzi was ultimately judged by the electorate. In a democratic country, voters have the right and responsibility to elect politicians. However, other institutions, including the police force and the courts are tasked with the powers to investigate and rule on a matter. Toni Abela was not the only candidate being rejected by the committee, with those of Poland and Slovakia suffering the same faith. The rejection of Toni Abela ended up causing further divisions within the political system. On his official Twitter account, the leader of

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the opposition Simon Busuttil declared that this was a sad day for Malta as the Prime Minister continued to embarrass the country and the Maltese (Busuttil, 2016b). On the other hand, the Labour Party shifted the blame to the Nationalist Party declaring that the latter and its MEPs were working against the national interest, highlighting the misinformation which existed behind the candidature of Toni Abela and that he did not deserve to lose votes (Grech, The Malta Independent, 15 March 2016). of the process concerning Toni Abela’s nomination and the way the process was overshadowed by the Panamagate revealed little tolerance which the European Parliament had towards allegations of corruption. This case is particularly interesting for the way it was politicised by the main political parties. The Nationalist Party branded the Labour Party as embarrassing, and the Labour Party branded the Nationalist Party and its MEPs as ‘traitors’ for working against the national interest. The divisions and the discourse used by the main political parties and their leaders would not only be reflected in the Maltese and EU institutions but would be a cause of further divisions throughout the nomination of Leo Brincat for the Court of Auditors, the 2017 national election and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Whilst Caruana Galizia had revealed the existence of several offshore accounts in Panama, the extent of these accounts would be revealed with the leaking of the full information regarding the Panama Papers on 3 April 2016. In total, 237 Maltese were featured in the publications, with a number of them being politically exposed individuals. The publication of the Panama Papers made international headlines and provided more information on the accounts of several individuals linked with the Labour Party. The Mossack Fonseca documents revealed that Keith Schembri used a Spanish adviser to establish Colson Services Ltd. in the British Virgin Islands on his behalf back in January 2011. On the same day, Malcolm Scerri, the managing director of Schembri’s company Kasco Limited, had Selson Holding Corporation established in the BVI. In April 2011, Adrian Hillman, who was the director of Allied Newspapers, one of the main English newspapers in Malta, set up his own company BVI Company, Lester Holdings Groups to transfer funds he received from the purchase of newsprint from Kasco (Vella, MaltaToday, 3 April 2016c). Hillman had to resign in the previous months after Daphne Caruana Galizia revealed that he received secret payments from Keith Schembri (Brincat, Times of Malta, 22 March 2022). Mossack Fonseca documents revealed that Nexia BT acquired several Panamanian companies from Mossack Fonseca-related firm ATC Administrators Inc, respectively Hearnville Inc (belonging to Keith Schembri), Tillgate Inc (belonging to Konrad Mizzi) and Egrant Inc (owner unknown). A fourth company, Torbridge which was registered in the British Virgin Islands would be transferred to Chen Cheng, one of the main negotiators in the ElectroGas Power Deal. Chen Cheng is another important figure in this issue as he was alleged to be the owner of Macbridge, a company which, along with 17 black, another company owned by Yorgen Fenech, the ElectroGas power station director, were funneling money into Hearnville and Tillgate (Borg, Times of Malta, 5 April 2021b).

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Tillgate, Egrant and Hearnville were formed in June 2013. In 2015, the ownership of Tillgate and Hearnville was transferred to the controlling trustees of the Mizzi Offshore Trust in New Zealand—Rotorua—and to the Schembri Offshore Trust— Haast. Both funds were operated by the Orion Trust (New Zealand). This is important since under New Zealand law, these companies were exempted from paying taxes on their profits. However, New Zealand regulators could always request this information. Notably, this information was not disclosed to foreign governments who might have requested information on money laundering. In August 2015, Nexia BT, which was linked to the Labour Party and Mossack Fonseca franchise in Malta, attempted to open an account in Dubai for Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi. Still, due to their high positions within the Maltese government, they were considered as politically exposed persons. This meant that the plan was ultimately abandoned (Vella, MaltaToday, 3 April 2016c). Further investigation by Daphne Caruana Galizia would ultimately reveal that Brian Tonna of the Nexia BT, was selling Maltese passports through his company in the British Virgin Islands, Willerby Trade Inc with Tonna allegedly having a table within the office of the Prime Minister. Tonna was also linked with Keith Schembri and his companies being the accountant of the companies (Caruana Galizia, 2016d). The Panama paper scandal had the potential to ruin the reputation of the politicians linked to it. In Malta, the scenario was a bit different. To understand this, one needs to look at the way the political system works. Whilst the economy had expanded since Malta joined the European Union, considering that the island had one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU, bread and butter issues were still seen as the main priority. Other societies shifted towards post-materialism, but Malta was still in transition. For this reason, whilst corruption was an issue, it would not prompt voters to switch from one party to the other. However, due to these revelations, the profile of Caruana Galizia’s blog was elevated. She became one of the main forces of the opposition to the Muscat administration, at a time when the Nationalist Party was still struggling given the poor results it was receiving in one election. The party was weakened by the growing divisions between the various factions and the failure in casting itself as the alternative party-in-government. In this scenario, Caruana Galizia was seen as an alternative to the opposition. She was not a politician, this meant that she was not going after votes, but started to build a following, the extent of which would be revealed after her murder in 2017. Whilst some of her controversial blogs created more sensation than the actual corruption allegations, her revelations on the Panama Papers and various other corruption allegations exposed her to more attacks and threats. The Panama Papers revelations had an impact on Malta’s brand across the globe. With accusation of Malta being a tax haven and with little effort put in investigating the secret Panama companies, many feared that this was going to have a negative impact on the country’s financial services (The Malta Independent, 6 April 2016c). Whilst it is not illegal to have bank accounts in other countries, it is illegal to use them to hide money. To prevent people and organisations from hiding money from tax authorities, the European Union passed the European Savings Directive (ESD). Because EU banks are required to reveal information on every depositor from any

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member state, the ESD made it much harder to hide personal money in Europe (Vella, MaltaToday, 4 April 2016a). Another problem was that Malta was going to take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU, and there were doubts about whether the country would be willing to fight money laundering and tax evasion. For the European Union, this was not just an issue of national matter, but also an issue which concerned all EU states. The PANA committee was expected to request Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi to face questions by members of the committee which also wanted to have a closer look at Malta’s relaxed attitude towards money laundering (Cooper, 2016). The Opposition and its leader Simon Busuttil reacted by organising various protests against corruption. The opposition leader presented a motion of no confidence against the government after both Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri failed to resign from their respective posts. The Nationalist Party was aware that it did not have the votes to win this but regarded this as a moral statement to highlight the need for more political transparency. The confidence vote was won comfortably by the government. During the debate, Justice Minister Owen Bonnici stressed that there is no corruption in Malta, declaring that opening accounts in other foreign countries does not necessarily breach any laws, even though it might not have been a politically wise decision to open such accounts. On the other hand, the opposition leader Simon Busuttil accused Konrad Mizzi of corrupted practices due to the fact that the Panama account was only set up 5 days after the Labour Party won the 2013 national election. Marlene Farrugia, who had resigned from the Labour Party in 2015, and was now an independent MP, criticised the Labour administration for ignoring the values promoted through its own manifesto, with these being accountability, transparency and meritocracy. She also decided to present a motion of no confidence against Konrad Mizzi, which would be also voted down the following month. After the vote was taken and the opposition’s motion was defeated, the Prime Minister declared that he would act on the Panama Papers (Grech & Schembri, The Independent, 4 May 2016). In a cabinet reshuffle that took place on 28 April 2016, Konrad Mizzi was stripped of the Energy and Health Portfolio but was retained as a Minister (without a portfolio). Konrad Mizzi was also forced to resign as deputy leader of the Labour Party. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of Prime Minister Keith Schembri retained his place (Schembri, The Malta Independent, 28 April 2016). The controversy was certainly not helped by the resignation of the director of the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU), an agency that established the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Manfred Gales. Whilst Gales declared that he was resigning for personal reasons and not for something related to the Panama Papers investigations, the timing was not necessarily ideal. Later on, during the public investigation into the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, he would reveal that he had not only passed on information about politically exposed persons including Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri, and their companies to the Police Commissioner of the time, Michael Cassar. However, he ultimately resigned because it was difficult for the FIAU to exert its duty as established by the law and because the government was

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not providing the required resources to fight money laundering and terrorism effectively (De Marco, The Shift, 20 January 2020). One of the main issues in Malta’s political system was always whether the code of ethics was being enforced. This is particularly important given that parliament is one of the most important institutions in democratic countries and MPs should practice the same values they are promoting to their voters. For several years, there have been questions that the code of ethics should be updated. This is especially important in a country where there is a blurred line between something unethical and/or illegal. The Muscat administration had pledged to update the code of ethics (Vella, MaltaToday, 1 June 2013b) yet, there still were questions on whether the updated code would make it more difficult for politicians to participate in unethical and illegal dealings and whether there would be actual consequences for those who are found to be in breach of this code of conduct. The scandal of the Panama Papers continued to have an impact on the country’s political system. After Toni Abela’s nomination for the Court of Auditors was rejected, the government opted to nominate Leo Brincat. Leo Brincat performed well during the Budgetary Control committee interview. Again, the committee was not convinced of Brincat’s decision to vote against the vote of no confidence against Konrad Mizzi. Leo Brincat did defend himself by declaring that Konrad Mizzi ought to have resigned and that he had no choice but to support Mizzi during the vote as he had to follow party lines. His statement failed to impress the MEPs. The committee was requiring a stronger reaction from the nominees (and so the EU) towards the fight against money laundering. On 13 September 2016, the European Parliament voted against the nomination of Malta’s candidate Leo Brincat. This led to another round of confrontation between the Nationalist Party and Labour Party. After the vote was taken, Simon Busuttil declared that the Prime Minister should stop tarnishing the reputation of Malta with the European Union (Busuttil, 13 September 2016a). The Nationalist Party’s MEPs Roberta Metsola and David Casa outlined how for the European Union, the revelations of the Panama Papers were serious and no excuse was acceptable. The Labour Party replicated by saying that the Nationalist Party was using the European institutions against Malta’s interests. The party defended Leo Brincat, his expertise and integrity declaring that his nomination would be moved to the next level as the vote was simply consultative with the decision in the hands of the Council of Ministers (Times of Malta, 13 September 2016d). Whilst Leo Brincat’s nomination was approved by the Council of Ministers, his nomination highlighted the negative impact which the Panama Papers and the way the main institutions in the country approached corruption and the money-laundering allegations, were having on the reputation of Malta. It also outlined the influence that the main political parties in Malta had on the European party groups, with various members of the S&D opting to also vote against the candidate which the Labour administration presented. Various confrontations took place between 2016 and 2017 over corruption allegations, with the Panama Papers dominating the political scene. More revelations would continue to cause divisions in the country’s political system. These divisions were not only apparent to the rest of Malta but even to the European Parliament,

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which had the representatives of the Nationalist and Labour Parties. In May 2016, another actor would be linked to the Panama Papers, Pilatus Bank. It was discovered that Willerby Inc, which was owned by the Nexia BT co-owner Brian Tonna had an account with Pilatus Bank. Pilatus Bank was registered in Malta in December 2013 and in August 2015 and was given the Category 2 licence from the Malta Financial Authority with a branch being established in Ta’ Xbiex (Sammut, 2016). Whilst the PANA committee began to discuss the controversy surrounding the Panama Papers leaks, the Maltese government defended its position declaring that the issue was being blown out of proportion. Finance Minister Edward Scicluna outlined that concerns over the Panama Papers were only raised by the European Parliament and not by the European Commission and European Council (Sansone, Times of Malta, 10 August 2016). The Portuguese MEP and Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s Panama Paper committee Ana Gomes, who become one of the most ardent critics of Prime Minister Muscat within the European Parliament, declared that the EU should pay attention to events taking place in Malta. German MEP Sven Giegold declared that Malta should do more to claim its credibility (MaltaToday, 9 August 2016e). Questions were raised on whether the country would cooperate with the PANA committee on the investigation concerning the Panama leaks. This was important as Malta would be hosting the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the following months, and money laundering ended up being at the top of the agenda. Leaks concerning the Panama Papers continued to be published. It was revealed that Konrad Mizzi opened his Panama accounts merely 2 days after the transfer of three hospitals in Malta to Vitals Global Healthcare. Still, it was the reaction of the main institutions outside Malta which were making the most headlines. The United Nations’ independent expert on international order Alfred Zayes urged the United Nations to not tolerate jurisdictions which facilitate tax evasions, labelling Malta as a tax haven (The Malta Independent, 23 October 2016f). Meanwhile, in Malta, top officials were refusing to meet the PANA committee. The PANA chairman committee Werner Langen informed the committee that Edward Scicluna was unable to attend. Langen also hinted that Scicluna would encourage the Council of Ministers to not allow them to give answers before the committee (Vella, MaltaToday, 24 November 2016d). This highlights another problem with the European Union with the leading institutions including the European Commission, Parliament, and European Commission not always in sync when it comes to major issues. This does not help the European Union’s attempt to promote further integration, especially since the Council of Ministers is traditionally much more cautious than the European Parliament. The PANA committee was not impressed by the approach of the European Council towards the Panama leaks. The conference, which groups together the Presidency of the parliamentary blocks and is the governing body of the European Parliament, rejected a request for the committee to visit Malta (Vella, MaltaToday, 24 November 2016d). The PANA committee would be allowed to visit Malta in February 2017, whilst the country was busy hosting the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The reaction

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of the Labour administration was to target the source of the Panama Papers leaks in Malta, that is journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. Attempts of blame-shifting were made by the Labour Party towards the Nationalist Party for using the EU institutions against the national interest. Beyond the Nationalist Party, the other leading figure being targeted was Daphne Caruana Galizia. She was accused of defending the interest of the Nationalist Party and accusing of harming the reputation of Malta within the EU institutions. The Labour Party criticised Caruana Galizia and revealed that she was being investigated for tax evasion for not declaring her income for several years (L-Orizzont, 21 December 2016a). During its visit to Malta, the PANA committee was expected to meet various officials and entities not only from Nexia BT, Keith Schembri, and Konrad Mizzi but also from the main political parties, journalists, and officials from the Police Commission, Malta Financial Service Authority and FIAU (Lindsay, Times of Malta, 20 January 2017). Finance Minister Scicluna decided not to meet the PANA committee, as did the co-owners of Nexia BT Brian Tonna and Karl Cini, who declared that they would only reply to the questions in writing. Keith Schembri remained evasive on whether he would meet the committee (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 15 February 2017a). One of the questions which the PANA committee asked was on who the actual owner of Egrant Inc was. Whilst the owners of the two other companies were revealed, the owner of Egrant remained a mystery. Konrad Mizzi did end up accepting the invitation of the PANA committee which the Labour Party promoted and highlighted how he had nothing to hide. At the same time, it maintained the strategy of blaming the Nationalist Party and its MEPs Roberta Metsola and David Casa, for the negative attention the party was receiving (L-Orizzont, 18 February 2017). Just a day before the PANA committee’s visit to Malta, Brian Tonna revealed that he was the sole owner of Egrant Inc. Still, the opposition, led by Simon Busuttil, believed that Egrant was owned by another person possibly linked to Prime Minister Joseph Muscat (Vella, MaltaToday, 19 February 2017a). Simon Busuttil revealed that in one of the leaked emails, Brian Tonna declared that he could not provide the details of the owner of the company due to professional secrecy (Grech, The Malta Independent, 20 February 2017a). On 20 February 2017, Konrad Mizzi’s independent audit on New Zealand’s company was published. A press release revealed that the trust structure was registered with the New Zealand tax department in 2015, that the structure was solely intended as a family trust and that there had been no trading activities undertaken by both Rotorua Trust and its subsidiary Hearnville Inv. In the Press Release, Minister Mizzi declared that this was a set-up from the Opposition in its effort to damage his reputation (DOI, Press Release, 180708, 2017e). Mizzi’s press release did not stop the mass demonstrations which were taken place on the island to pressure the government to remove both Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri. Pressure was also being put on the government to release more information on the ElectroGas deal and the loan guarantee of around €360 million which the government agreed to as a means of stop-gap measure until the European Commission evaluated the measure and gave its clearance for the supply of gas to Malta (Schembri Orland, The Malta Independent, 20 February 2017a).

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The reaction of the visit of the PANA committee in Malta was widely expected by the main political parties. The PANA committee declared that Konrad Mizzi’s involvement could be potentially linked to money laundry. Yet, they also declared that they did not find enough evidence, so the committee had to continue with its investigation (Leone-Ganado, Times of Malta, 21 February 2017). The committee was not pleased that Keith Schembri did not accept the invitation to meet to discuss his accounts in Panama. They were certainly not amused by the letter they received on his behalf in which he questioned their authority and mandate (Bonnici, The Malta Independent, 21 February 2017). The Maltese involved in the Panama Papers leaks were clearly using the disagreements which existed between the EU institutions to question the credibility of the committee. The fact that the European Commission and European Council took such a cautious, albeit weak, attitude towards the Panama Papers leaks, not only was another failed opportunity for the EU to rise above the challenge and be the leader it aspired to be, but it only helped to weaken the image of the European Union in the fight against money laundering. Keith Schembri did publish his financial statements and information on his accounts and similarly to Konrad, outlined how this was an attempt of character assassination from the hands of the opposition (Dalli, MaltaToday, 20 February 2017c). The Panama leaks were heavily politicised in the country and the polarisation which developed meant that the public opinion over the matter was influenced by the main political parties. It was another missed opportunity for political parties to promote political maturity over political shots and to address the real problems the political system was facing. This politicisation also included the PANA committee, although the committee declared that it was part of the political discussion which was taken place in Malta. Unfortunately, the PANA committee was not aware of the political system and political culture which existed in Malta, and it became part of the political divisions which existed. Whilst the Panama Papers leaks were relatively contained in Malta, thanks to the political parties’ influence on the media, the situation in Brussels was entirely different. A report by the European Greens highlighted how Malta was one of the worst tax offenders highlighting how it lacked the needed anti-tax avoidance measures. The report emphasised how between 2012 and 2015, €14 billion could have been paid in tax in EU countries but were not paid due to Malta’s tax imputation system. The European Greens were not impressed by the decision of the police in Malta to not investigate the Panama Papers leaks because according to them, there was no suspicion of any crime which might have been committed by those involved. This was seen as a contradiction to one of the notions of the European Union, that is the need to fight tax evasion and tax avoidance. With Malta in the midst of the Presidency, the European Greens criticised the lack of effort in delivering the antitax avoidance reforms which the European Union needed (Faccio, 2017). This report was not met with much enthusiasm in Malta. The Finance Minister defended the tax system in Malta and the tax measures that the government introduced to attract investment. Still, for the PANA committee, the report was based on EU criteria, which highlighted how the EU and Malta’s approaches towards tax measures and money laundering were out of sync. Ana Gomes, criticised Malta and

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its tax policy, outlining how this attracted money laundering schemes. She also criticised Malta for not doing enough in the fight against criminal organisations, showing how Malta was being used to divert money from criminal activities into legal business in Europe (Leone-Ganado, Times of Malta, 22 February 2017). The Commission had also doubts regarding the ownership of the third company in Panama, Egrant, accentuating how there was not enough proof on the matter. The Panama Papers and the failure of the institutions in investigating any potential criminal activities did not impress the EPP either. The EPP President highlighted how Malta’s reaction to the Panama Papers and the lack of cooperation with the PANA committee was casting shadows on the Presidency of the Council of the EU (Schembri Orland, The Malta Independent, 28 March 2017d). The saga concerning the Panama Papers took another turn in April. On 19 April 2017, Daphne Caruana Galizia indicated that a company belonging to the daughter of the Azerbaijani President Leyla Aliyeva transferred large sums of money from her Dubai company to the three Panama companies Egrant, Hearnville Inc, and Tillgage Inc. (Caruana Galizia, 2017c). In a series of press releases, the government rejected such a claim. In a press release, the Minister without portfolio Konrad Mizzi declared that this was a lie and that he would file libel proceedings against Daphne Caruana Galizia (DOI, Press Release, 171002, 2017a). Other press releases were issued by the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister, who like Mizzi, declared that this was a lie as his company was in liquidation and that he would also file libel proceedings against the Maltese journalist (DOI, Press Release, 171001, 2017b). A few days later, Caruana Galizia would reveal that the son and daughter of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, and Leyla Aliyeva, had Panama Accounts in Malta. The newly established bank was linked to several controversies, with the owner and chairman of the bank Ali Sadr considered to be a close collaborator of the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, Keith Schembri (Caruana Galizia, 2017a). A few days before Caruana Galizia published an article on the ownership of Egrant Inc, both Caruana Galizia and the leader of the Opposition Simon Busuttil called for information from potential whistle-blowers on the corruption practices which were allegedly being taken place. Busuttil reiterated the fact that any potential whistleblower would be protected by the party (Caruana & Borg, Times of Malta, 20 April 2017). In what should have been the culmination of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the feeling was that Daphne was about to publish more revelations on the Panama Papers. This further inflamed the political system and produced more political divisions, when they should have collaborated to promote Malta’s priorities. Just before the revelations concerning Egrant Inc, the Prime Minister declared that ‘people have to be put at the heart of all EU policies and decisions’ (Borg, Times of Malta, 20 April 2017b). Still, it was clear that this notion was not even being promoted in Malta, with the main political parties struggling to promote transparency and accountability, focusing more on political divisions and attacks against each other. The allegations by Daphne Caruana Galizia that Egrant Inc belonged to the wife of Prime Minister Michelle Muscat, and that a payment transaction of $1.07 million

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from Al Sahra FZCO, a Dubai company believed to be owned by Leyla Aliyeva, to Engrant Inc, created further turmoil in the political system. On 20 April 2017, Daphne Caruana Galizia revealed that documents on the ownership of Egrant Inc, were to be found in the kitchen of the Pilatus Bank. Caruana Galizia outlined how she had a copy of these documents, and she would make them public at a later stage (Sansone, Times of Malta, 23 April 2017). The main whistleblower in the case, which later on it would be revealed to be Maria Efimova, would fail to provide the required documents to confirm her accusations. This would lead the Maltese courts to start proceedings against her (Illum, 30 April 2017). With Pilatus Bank once again involved in the controversy, the reputation of the bank did not improve when on 21 April 2017, barely a day after the allegations concerning Egrant Inc, were made public, journalists were tipped off that officials from the bank were removing documents in the middle of the night, with the police failing to intervene to make sure that information on potential illegalities would not be removed (Caruana Galizia, 2017b). It would later be revealed that it was Attorney General Peter Grech who recommended to Deputy Police Commissioner Silvio Valletta not to intervene because he believed that there was no justification for the police to intervene (Bonnici, LovinMalta, 19 July 2020). The Prime Minister rejected the accusations against him and his wife and declared that the declaration in the hands of Daphne Caruana Galizia was forged. During a debate between the leaders of the main political parties, Prime Minister Muscat challenged the leader of the opposition and Daphne Caruana Galizia to reveal the document they were referring to. In addition, he ordered a magisterial inquiry on Egrant to clear his name and that of his wife (Micallef, Times of Malta, 22 April 2017). A press release was also issued in which the Prime Minister once again challenged the leader of the opposition and Daphne Caruana Galizia to release the documents to show whether he and his wife received any money and if any transfer of funds had ever been made (DOI, Press Release, 171025, 2017c). With the opening of the inquiry, headed by Magistrate Aaron Bugeja, Pilatus Bank would be raided to look for documents that would reveal potential money laundering (Grech, The Malta Independent, 22 April 2017f). The Panama Papers saga highlighted another problem in Malta. The country always had a love/hate relationship with journalists, with their job certainly not made easy by the divisions which exist and by the general perception that some have about politicians being ‘untouchable’. With political parties having their media, and with independent media promoting various issues across the years, freedom of expression has often been taken for granted. Whilst freedom of expression is an important part of democracy and one of the principles promoted by the European Union, it has often been under attack in various EU states. In Malta, the Institute for Maltese Journalists (IĠM) has often been at the forefront in making sure that journalists are respected and can do their job. However, as various incidents revealed, this was not always possible during and after the Panama Papers saga. During this political confrontation, and as more leaks emerged, the leader of the opposition requested the intervention of the President to solve the constitutional crisis, which the country was in. Still, many in Malta are not aware that the President

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has a ceremonial role. The office of the President has little influence on the executive, which is ultimately elected by the people. For this reason, the power of the President is dependent on the instructions of the Prime Minister and the cabinet (Vella, 2022b). Various Presidents have called for a discussion on the role of the President to initiate discussions on potential constitutional changes on the role of the President and how this can reflect the realities of the political system. Still, whilst political parties offered to open a dialogue about this, there was a reluctance to change the role of the President. The President of Malta Marie Louise Coleiro Preca did reaffirm that the Constitution limits the actions of the President. Still, she declared that she was following closely what was happening and was in close communication with the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition and that the law should be observed by everyone (DOI, Press Release, 171048, 2017d). Allegations continued to be made with the Chief of Staff of Prime Minister Keith Schembri accused of receiving kickbacks from the controversial passport scheme. The leader of the opposition revealed the collision between Keith Schembri and Brian Tonna, with the former being also the owner of an account at Pilatus Bank in which money from the passport scheme was being transferred to Schembri. Schembri rejected the claims saying that this was another lie produced by Simon Busuttil in his quest for power. The Labour Party rejected the accusations against Keith Schembri calling the leader of the opposition the biggest liar in Malta’s political history (Times of Malta, 25 April 2017e). The leader of the Nationalist Party presented evidence of the potential kickbacks to Magistrate Aaron Bugeja, who was investigating the revelations on the Panama Papers (De Marco, Times of Malta, 27 April 2017a).

6.5.1

The 2017 National Election

With all these new revelations, the Prime Minister opted to call for an early election which was then held on 3 June 2017. The Nationalist Party decided to start the campaign by organising several national protests, declaring that a National Force made up of those who wanted to fight corruption would be created. The Nationalist Party outlined the various corruption allegations which existed, including the sale of Malta’s €320 million with various offshore companies being opened in tax haven countries after this sale. Simon Busuttil outlined the damage that the corruption allegations were having on the reputation of Malta abroad and that the Maltese society felt cheated and betrayed by those who should have protected their interests (In-Nazzjon, 24 April 2017f). By doing so, Busuttil attempted to use the concept of a national movement to win back some of the voters that the party had lost over the years. Busuttil (2022) was aware that the Nationalist Party was still thousands of votes behind the Labour Party, with the latter remaining relatively popular. On the other hand, the PD did not find the support which was promised when it was established. Potential contributors preferred the safety of traditional party allegiance, which is always a challenge for small parties in Malta. The only option was to join

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forces with the PN in an attempt to consolidate the more liberal and honest current within PN (Farrugia, 2022a). For this reason, creating a new identity behind this movement was seen as a way of attracting voters who were worried about corruption, but who did not necessarily identify with the party. This was not the first time that political parties attempted to create a movement that goes beyond their political parties. The idea of a movement was important and had already been successfully used by Eddie Fenech Adami and Joseph Muscat, to win the required legitimacy to enact their policies. The Prime Minister called for the movement to continue to support the Labour Party and the policies it was promoting. Within the EU dimension, the PANA committee summoned Joseph Muscat for questioning. The Prime Minister refused to attend with the MEP Sven Giegold, financial and economic policy spokesperson of the Greens/EFA group declaring that, Prime minister Muscat has to explain the latest developments and allegations regarding the offshore company called Egrant. The credibility of the EU is at stake as Malta holds the Presidency of the EU and is currently negotiating on revising the anti-money laundering standards. It is highly unusual to call for elections during a Presidency. This election may not delay the inquiry of the European Parliament. (De Marco, The Malta Independent, 4 May 2017c)

Giegold declared that Muscat had already been invited twice to meet the committee but refused both invitations. His discourse is particularly interesting showing how the European Parliament did not believe that this was a national issue, but one which could have an impact on the image of the European Union. Still, within the national political system and as the political campaigns started, little interest was placed on how Malta was perceived outside its borders. The leader of the Labour Party started the campaign with an advantage as it was heading for the election, due to the positive impact on the economy. Unemployment decreased from 6% to 4.2% in 2017. Full-time employment increased by 3.5%, equivalent to 182,220. The number of tourists in Malta increased by 10.5%, double that of the actual increase in Europe which was 4.4%. Tourists in 2016 injected a total of €1.7 billion into the Maltese economy (Illum, 7 May 2017). Even through the political instability, Malta kept its economic output 13% higher than the Eurozone, despite the difficult years brought on by the world recession a decade earlier. Credit institutions gave Malta positive ratings; Moody rated it A3, S&P thought it was A- (good), and Fitch gave it an A+ (Stable). The Direct Investment abroad totalled €62.2 billion, while Foreign Direct Investment amounted to €165.5 billion (Vital Zammit, 2018). This meant that the economic policies of the government were working. This was going to be used by the Labour Party to highlight the economic gains achieved by Malta under the Labour administration and to persuade voters that it was the only party which was able to protect their economic wellbeing. The slogan of the Labour Party was ‘The best years for our country’ whilst the Nationalist Party opted for the slogan ‘I choose Malta’. The slogan used by both main political parties had a nationalistic undertone. The Nationalist Party wanted to encourage voters to choose transparency over corruption. On the other hand, the Labour Party hinted at the economic and civil liberties achievements as part of its

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re-election strategy. For this election, the Nationalist Party opted to make a coalition deal with the newly established Democratic Party. The deal meant that the PD, which was led by former Labour MP Marlene Farrugia, and the Nationalist Party led by Simon Busuttil, would be contesting the national election under the PN name and banner. Still, the PD candidates would have ‘Tal-Organjo’ (of orange) label behind their name. Both parties declared that they would be working together to present one electoral programme for the national interest (The Malta Independent, 28 April 2017g). Busuttil (2022) defended the alliance with the PD by claiming that this was no ordinary election and that the National Force was there to serve the interests of the country with the main principles behind the alliance being good governance, social justice, economic viability, job creation, and environmental sustainability. He claimed that individuals who care about the interests of the country should naturally reside in the National Force between the PD and the PN. As already discussed above, whilst the rationale behind this agreement between the PD and PN was to create a movement that could oppose the one built by Muscat (Busuttil, 2022), the leader of the opposition was taking a political risqué. There was the possibility that the PD would take seats usually won by PN candidates. This is the reason why not everyone was in favour of this agreement, and this would be visible after the election. The proposal of a coalition is not surprising given the background and experience that Simon Busuttil built within EU institutions, especially the European Parliament, where coalitions and consensus were required to strengthen the role of the European Parliament. The PN also attempted to establish an agreement with the AD (Malta’s Green Party); however, they could not find an agreement as the AD insisted that the coalition should contest the election under the umbrella name ‘Qawsalla’ (Rainbow) (Times of Malta, 1 May 2017h). Another political risqué taken by the leader of the Opposition was to base his campaign (not the actual manifesto) on clean politics and Egrant, when the interest of the electorate was on other issues. The main ‘movements’ for this election proposed a number of policies. One of the main priorities for the National Force was to clean the political system and restore the image of Malta. Other proposals included the establishment of a Metro system (which was meant to cost €2.3 billion) to reduce traffic congestion in Malta, increase free childcare for all, reduce income tax to those who earn below €20,000, and a solidarity fund to help NGOs around Malta. The National Force also published a manifesto that targeted the island of Gozo. This is particularly important given that Gozo was once a Nationalist Party stronghold, but the party’s influence on the island was diminishing with the Labour Party gaining in popularity. The National Force established 100 proposals for Gozo which included €250 million in European funds to continue the investment on Malta’s sister island. Other interesting proposals included an income tax exemption of up to €200,000 over a 3-year period, a €25,000 start-up grant and a €75,000 guarantee for Gozitan business, an undersea tunnel between the two islands, and the establishment of a fast-ferry service (PN, 2017). The Labour Party’s manifesto was a continuation of its 2013 manifesto. It was built on the idea that Malta was now one of the best countries in Europe. The notion of Malta being amongst the best and making the leap forward was at the heart of the

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manifesto. The Labour Party proposed various policies, including an extension of the first-time buyers’ scheme of properties to second-time buyers, the creation of a single regulator for the construction industry, and a tax discount for parents of Gozitan students studying in Malta up to a maximum of €5000 for travel and housing costs. It also proposed tax refunds ranging from €200 to €340 for those who earn less than €60,000 yearly, tax exemption for a year for MA graduates whilst those with a doctoral degree will be exempted for 2 years, the closure of the open migrant centre in Marsa, and free hormonal therapy for transgenders (PL, 2017). Malta’s Green Party used the slogan ‘Alternative Vote, Clean Vote’, with the party promoting various issues based on governance including limiting the number of persons of trust, making MPS full-timers to reduce the conflict of interest, legalisation of the recreational use of Cannabis, and a clause in the Constitution for the protection of the environment (AD, 2017). The party was trying to gain the votes of those who were unhappy with the main political parties. Other parties to contest in the election were the right-wing populist party Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM) and the right-wing party Alliance for Change (AB). Still, their campaigns were rather limited when compared to those of the main political parties. With the main political parties promoting various economic incentives, the Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise, and Industry warned all entities not to turn the election into a Christmas List. They warned that various proposals needed proper studies for them to be implemented and some of them could put further pressure on the economy and industries as well (Caruana, Times of Malta, 4 May 2017). Still, this warning, which is given in every election, is usually ignored by the main political parties. The reason for this is that political parties feel that economic proposals are the only way that allows them to win voters and maintain their popularity. The Chamber of Commerce and Malta Employers Association pleaded with Malta’s politicians from across the spectrum to work together against the ‘attack’ on Malta’s financial services (The Malta Independent, 22 May 2017i). Whilst the maniestos of the main political parties proposed various policies, the Panama Papers would be the main issue of the campaigns. The latter had various characteristics of the personalisation of politics with campaigns based around the figures of the party leaders. Numerous times, the leader of the Labour Party referred to the fact that this was an election between him and the leader of the opposition Simon Busuttil. This was going to be reflected in their campaigns. The election was taken at a precarious time for the country. Not only the Presidency of the Council of the EU was being hosted by Malta, but several legal proceedings were taking place following the Panama Papers leaks. These included (1) an investigation of the claims made by Daphne Caruana Galizia that the Prime Minister’s wife owned the Panamaregistered company ‘Egrant’; (2) an investigation of the claims that a Prime Minister’s adviser and his chief of staff received kickbacks in connection with the IIP, which was established by Legal Notice 47 of 2014 and allows for the granting of citizenship by naturalisation to individuals and their immediate families (FIAU), (3) two investigations of the FIAU, the primary watchdog established under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, to determine who leaked documents pertaining to Pilatus Bank’s operations (also linked to the ‘Panama Papers’); (4) a

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libel case brought by the chief of staff to the Prime Minister and the former managing director of Allied Group (publishers of the Times of Malta) regarding accusations that they received kickback payments in offshore accounts; and (5) an inquiry on whether people exposed by the Panama Papers broke any Maltese or European law (Pace, 2017). A number of surveys revealed that corruption and the Panama scandal (37%) were the main issues for the Maltese electorate. Still, the most interesting was the fact that 23.5% believed that there were no major issues in the election. 10.7% argued that lies were the main issue whilst 10.1% believed that the unstable political situation was the main concern Still, even though the majority believed that corruption was the main issue, it did not mean that they were going to base their vote on it. The surveys also highlighted that 42.1% of the electorate thought that Prime Minister Muscat was implicated in the Panama Papers. However, 50.2% believed that he should not resign for it (Grech, The Malta Independent, 7 May 2017d). This highlights the popularity that Muscat enjoyed and the benefits of his economic and social policies, and the promotion of minority rights which were deemed to be popular with the electorate. This is why the government approval ratings only decreased slightly during the Panama Papers scandal and rested at 52.8%, with the opposition being only seen as positive by 37.1% of the electorate (Grech, The Malta Independent, 6 May 2017b). The popularity of Muscat was also retained during the crisis with 48.1% believing that he was the best candidate for the role of Prime Minister, compared to the 38.5% that believed Busuttil was better suited. Whilst the surveys were certainly positive for the Labour Leader, another survey did highlight the fact that 44% of the electorate did not believe that the Maltese institutions were taking the necessary actions to fight corruption in Malta. Beyond that, 54.6% of the electorate believed that Keith Schembri should lose his position as Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister of Malta (Grech, The Malta Independent, 23 May 2017e). Still, after the election, the Prime Minister would decide to keep him in that position. Interestingly enough, the surveys did not include whether Konrad Mizzi should retain his place. The reason for this was that many believed that he was already punished by losing his portfolio. Furthermore, in his case, the electorate had the opportunity to decide his faith. Whilst the campaigns were ongoing, revelations surrounding money laundering continued to emerge. The son of Daphne Caruana Galizia, Matthew Caruana Galizia, an award-winning ICIJ journalist revealed that the former managing director of the Times of Malta, Adrian Hillman, allegedly laundered more than €600,000 after the 2013 Labour victory, with Keith Schembri allegedly laundering more than €700,000 from the 2013 election. The ICIJ journalist linked the attempt of money laundering to the selling of the power station to Shangai Electrics. Matthew Caruana Galizia also revealed that when the privatisation of the power stations took place, Mizzi had requested the services of Cheng Chen, an actuarial with a salary of about €100,000 a year (The Malta Independent, 8 May 2017j). Then there were the revelations named the Malta Files. These concerned a collaboration between European Investigative Collaborations (EIC), 13 media outlets and 47 journalists in 16 countries which included L’Espresso, Le Soir, NRC, DER SPIEGEL, The Romanian Centre for

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Investigative Journalism/TheBlackSea.eu, Mediapart, Politiken, NewsWeek Serbia, El Mundo, Expresso, Dagens Nyheter, MaltaToday, The Intercept and Agência Sportlight. The leaks highlighted the way Malta served as a hub for tax evasion within the EU. The revelations highlighted how Malta encouraged big businesses and millionaires who wanted to evade taxes in their home countries while still benefitting from EU membership. This obviously could have hurt the economies of other EU nations. It also exposed a flaw within the EU, which gives its members sovereign control over their revenue (Vella, MaltaToday, 20 May 2017c). It could also explain why the European Union, particularly the European Parliament, had been working hard to promote tax harmonisation, something which various Maltese administrations had consistently opposed. The Malta Files exposed various politicians’ attempts to hide their wealth. These included Berat Albayrak, the son-in-law of the President of Turkey, assisted in setting up an offshore structure in Sweden and Malta to escape taxes for his company. His company, Çalık Holding, is one of the biggest energy, textile, and construction groups in Turkey (Şentek & Shaw, 2017). The revelations concerning the Malta Files meant that discussion on money laundering was also taking place in other EU states, including Germany. The Finance Minister for North Rhine-Westphalia, Norbert Walter-Borjans, revealed that there were about 70,000 offshore businesses in Malta with as many as 2000 German taxpayers and firms involved. The Finance Minister for North RineWestphalia branded Malta the ‘the Panama of Europe’. He highlighted the need to fight money laundering (Borg, Times of Malta, 11 May 2017c). Whilst his claims were denied, it displays the impact which the Panama Papers and other leaks were having on the reputation of Malta. The Labour administration had consistently rejected the leaks concerning the Malta Files, declaring that they were fake news and that the Labour Party will continue to defend the national interest. Finance Minister Edward Scicluna vowed to protect Malta’s financial services and the tax system which allows multinational companies to pay 5% tax on their profits, one of the lowest within the EU area (The Malta Independent, 20 May 2017k). Whilst in their political manifestos the main political parties proposed several policies, the focus was clearly on the Panama Papers and the issue of money laundering. In an opinion column in the Times of Malta, Simon Busuttil provided a rationale for the Nationalist Party campaign. He used the 2013 slogan of the Labour Party ‘Malta belongs to us all’ and the concept of ‘meritocracy’ to highlight how the Labour Party only catered for its interests, with individual interest being prioritised over national interest. Throughout the campaign, the Nationalist Party promoted the brand ‘National Force’ to encourage voters to vote for this new alliance which would protect the interests of the Maltese. A further example of this is the attempt to frame the election as not a contest between the main political parties, but rather a choice between Joseph Muscat and Malta (Busuttil, Times of Malta, 14 May 2017). In his words, one can find hints of nationalism in the fact that responsibility is being placed on the voters to vote for the interest of the country, restore the reputation of Malta and to safeguard their future. The campaign positioned policies against principles, with the leader of the opposition outlining how this was an extraordinary election for Malta. Busuttil

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declared that no proposal can be as important as the principle of honesty, and said that honesty was a principle that not everyone could promise, but rather that the National Force could take it at the heart of its decision-making process (De Marco, The Malta Independent, 8 May 2017b). The approach taken by Busuttil reflected his experience at an EU level. Still, at the national level, politicians have often struggled to change the political culture. In a perfect political system, voters would gather information, evaluate what is happening around them, make sense of their political position, and base their decision on that. However, as the rational choice model highlights, gathering evaluation, and analysis of information carries a cost (Garzia et al., 2017). This is why in Malta; the process is made easier and less expensive as political parties have their media to provide this information. Other elements to consider are values. Inglehart provides a good overview of this showing the difference between materialism and post-materialism values. His theory outlines how voters prioritise economic stability and order, and their basic needs (materialist values) over other values including equality, transparency, environmental protection, and citizen’s rights. Whilst Inglehart provided two distant dimensions, scholars argued that voters do not simply choose one dimension over the other, but they simply start with the materialist values to then move on to post-materialist values, once their economic wellbeing is secured (Braithwaite et al., 1996). The problem in Malta is that the transition is still ongoing though bread and butter issues are prioritised. Due to this, the campaign of the Nationalist Party was clearly at a disadvantage. Whilst it proposed several policies, the campaign was based on post-materialist values when voters were still looking at their economic security. Another problem with the Nationalist campaign was that it was being overshadowed by the polished and vibrant campaign of the Labour Party. This was acknowledged by the Nationalist Party leader who declared that whilst the Nationalist Party did not have the resources to design billboards as nice as the Labour ones, the party (and the National Force) had truth on their side (De Marco, The Malta Independent, 8 May 2017b). Several surveys were highlighting a serious problem for the Nationalist Party. One of them suggested that 51.7% of the electorate did not see the Nationalist Party as the alternative government (Grech, The Malta Independent, 9 May 2017g). Another survey also outlined how 52.9% of the electorate believed that the Labour Party’s campaign was much more effective than the Nationalist one. In this scenario, only 25.8% believed that the Nationalist Party had a better campaign (Grech, The Malta Independent, 7 May 2017d). This highlights how the Labour Party was much more effective in promoting its policies and in shaping the agenda of the election. It is not surprising that 38.9% of the electorate believed in the Labour Party’s electoral promises, compared to the 19.3% who believed that the Nationalist Party had the best electoral programme (Grech, The Malta Independent, 24 May 2017h). This means that to a certain extent, the party was failing to get its message to the electorate, and this was particularly needed to win back the votes it had lost in 2013. From another point of view, it was through social media that the Nationalist Party was managing to compete against the Labour Party. Whilst in March 2017, the Labour Party’s engagement peaked at 71.1%, the Nationalist Party only scored

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28.9%. Still, by the third week of May, the Maltese public was engaging more with posts and other social media ads of the main political parties. With regard to this public sentiment, the Nationalist Party was getting 52% of social interactions compared to the 48% of Labour (The Malta Independent, 26 May 2017l). Still, whilst social media was becoming more and more important, many of the voters had already decided which party to vote for before the campaign. As already argued, the priority of the Nationalist Party was the promotion of good governance. The campaign was based on Joseph Muscat and the links with various corruption allegations, including Café Premier, the Gaffarena Land expropriation scandal, the transfer of land at Żonqor to a Jordanian land speculator, an 18-year electricity agreement, the privatisation of several hospitals in Malta and the involvement of Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi in the Panama Papers scandal. Throughout the campaign, Busuttil used one of the catchphrases ‘Malta First and Foremost’ to try and win support from traditional Labour areas (MaltaToday, 8 May 2017m). Yet, as it shall be discussed, Labour Party was much more successful and owned the narrative that it was the party that would safeguard the national interest against those who threatened the country and its future. The Nationalist Party and PD pressured the Attorney General to publish the reports of the investigations which were completed by the Financial Analysis Intelligence Unit (FIAU) over potential corruption practices by government officials. The criticism was focused on the Attorney General due to his role as chairperson of the FIAU and because a report had been passed from the FIAU to the Police Commissioner, but no action was taken to deal with the issue. The report was particularly important as it outlined how the FIAU had reasonable suspicion that Keith Schembri and Brian Tonna were involved in money laundering concerning bribes being taken from the selling of Maltese passports (Camilleri, Times of Malta, 7 May 2017b). The report also revealed that Pilatus Bank had dubious accounts of politically exposed persons. Within one of these accounts, a transfer of around a million euros was made into an account classified as high risk. The report also declared that Pilatus Bank was not observing the regulations concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Regulations (The Malta Independent, 5 May 2017). The reaction of the Attorney General continued to fuel the controversy. The Attorney General defended his actions and declared that he did not have the power to initiate an investigation, as this was in the hands of the police. Beyond that, he warned that leaks of FIAU investigations were punishable by law with 5 years of imprisonment and a fine of €166,468 (Diacono, MaltaToday, 8 May 2017). This raised many questions regarding the freedom of expression in Malta and whether it was one of the principles which the country was embracing. The European dimension of the election was based mostly on the investigation of the PANA committee and the approach taken by the country’s political parties over the matter. The leader of the Nationalist Party declared that as part of his foreign policy, he would visit various countries in and outside of Europe to showcase and restore the reputation of Malta after being branded the Panama of Europe (Busuttil, 2017). Malta’s Green Party through the European Greens was pressuring the European Parliament to hold a debate on Malta’s money laundering allegations

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and the politically exposed persons in the country that were linked to the Panama Papers (Times of Malta, 10 May 2017n). Still, on this matter, the Labour Party and S& D member Alfred Sant declared that they lobbied the European Parliament to make sure that the plenary discussion on Egrant and the Panama Papers would be postponed until after the national election as they believed that Muscat and his family were innocent (Cilia, LovinMalta, 23 March 2019). The Chairman of the EPP, Manfred Weber did come to Malta to endorse the leader of the Nationalist Party and his manifesto. During his speech at one of the traditional mass meetings held by the National Force, he outlined how Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the EU was damaged by the Panama Papers leaks. He concluded that Joseph Muscat was not Malta (In-Nazzjon, 29 May 2017o). This meant that obviously, it was not the whole country that was being branded as corrupt but only the Labour Leader and his administration. Beyond the corruption allegations, the leader of the Nationalist Party affirmed that to restore the reputation of Malta within the EU, he would also reform the IIP scheme. He declared that he was ready to reform the scheme so that it would better serve the country as a proper investors programme and in line with the principles of the European Union (Bonnici, The Malta Independent, 12 May 2017). Still, the decision of the Nationalist Party to soften its position on the matter was seen as an acknowledgement that the scheme was working and that the country was earning millions through this investment. Throughout the campaign, the Nationalist Party leader continued to present his evidence of potential irregularities to Magistrate Natasha Galea Sciberras. The latter was conducting a magisterial inquiry on potential kickbacks from the Chief of Staff of Prime Minister Keith Schembri and Nexia BT director Brian Tonna. A few days later, Busuttil alleged that Keith Schembri transferred €650,000 to the former CEO of the Times of Malta Adrian Hillman. The leader of the opposition criticised both individuals for failing to explain why such a transfer took place, with both individuals rejecting the claim (Cremona, In-Nazzjon, 20 May 2017). The election took a bizarre turn when Muscat published a statement in which he declared that he received information from two allied, secret service agencies that informed him that Russia was actually behind the Egrant Story and the whistleblower’s attack on him and his family. He declared that this was seen as a way for Russia to interfere in the country’s elections and to punish the Prime Minister for refusing to refuel Russian vessels heading to Syria (Vella, MaltaToday, 25 May 2017b). It would later be revealed that the Prime Minister did not inform the Russian Ambassador in Malta about the matter, with Russia categorically denying the fact that the ‘whistleblower’ was sent by Russia (In-Nazzjon, 26 May 2017a). Beyond that, the Prime Minister did not inform the National Security committee about the allegation and did not provide any proof of the link between Russia and the ‘whistleblower’ (The Malta Independent, 25 May 2017p). Whilst the story was certainly one of the major slip-ups of the election, it was only published few days before the actual election, which meant that after the results were announced, there was little effort in investigating it further. Simon Busuttil used this and the other corruption allegations to outline how in a normal country, many politically exposed persons would have

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resigned if they were linked with corruption practices. He also outlined how the alliance between the PN and PD would provide Malta with the stability that the country required to restore its reputation and would introduce the reforms that the country badly needed. The attempt by the leaders of the PD and PN to highlight how their alliance could provide a new opportunity for the country was also used against them by the Labour Party. In fact, in Malta over the decades, coalitions were never popular, and they were linked with political instability and confusion. The experience of coalitions in the neighbouring country Italy did not help the Nationalist Party and PD to persuade the electorate that their coalition would not lead to internal divisions and further divisions. Throughout the campaign, Muscat and Labour Politicians dubbed Farrugia and Busuttil ‘the most unstable couple’ in Maltese Politics which could destabilise the economic growth the country was experiencing (It-Torċa, 21 May 2017b). The Labour Party used the hunting issue, declaring that the rights of hunters would be threatened if they had to vote for the alliance between the PN and PD. In this election, Muscat shifted away from trying to win over the environmentalists, especially due to the controversies which emerged during his first term as Prime Minister (Debono, MaltaToday, 21 May 2017). Still, the hunting cleavage was being courted. Muscat focused on maintaining the support that he enjoyed with hunters. He outlined how it was important to reduce the penalties against hunters which he branded as ‘draconian’. Whilst the National Force suggested several important proposals in the manifesto, much of the campaign was based on Egrant and other corruption allegations. Labour produced a stronger campaign based on the economic success of the government and the civil liberties it had introduced. It moved away from the corruption allegations, even though Muscat did promise meritocracy, transparency, and accountability (Schembri Orland, The Malta Independent, 5 May 2017c) by focusing on the positive elements of the Muscat administration. Muscat defended his decision to keep Mizzi and Schembri, even though they were involved in several controversies. He highlighted the important role which both had in his administration, deeming them essential for the capital projects the country was working on (Schembri, The Malta Independent, 22 May 2017b). The Labour Party campaign was extremely effective. Muscat dubbed the election a contest between himself and Busuttil. This was another example of the ‘presidential style’ that Muscat was using for the elections. Various catchphrases were used throughout the campaign, influenced by nationalism including the need to work to achieve ‘the Maltese Dream’ and to make Malta ‘the best in Europe’. To achieve this, Muscat outlined how the election was between himself and the Labour administration, as having a real vision for the country against Busuttil and the Nationalist Party, which were only damaging the reputation of Malta within the EU. Throughout the campaign, Muscat promoted his economic policies, highlighting how they helped to create a new middle class that enjoyed the distribution of wealth. His campaign was based on four issues, which were social mobility, social justice, equality, and unity (Borg, Times of Malta, 14 May 2017a). Muscat pledged to introduce tax cuts and increase pensions (Schembri, The Malta Independent,

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4 May 2017a), highlighting how such schemes would make Malta one of the best countries in Europe. This was confirmed by Finance Minister Scicluna who argued that due to the level of growth achieved by Malta, it was now time for the Labour administration to focus on improving the income of the Maltese and Gozitans (Scicluna, The Malta Independent, 8 May 2017). The Labour Party used the political campaign to propose the introduction of same-sex marriage in the country. Whilst the opposition regarded this as the Labour administration’s attempt to shift the focus over the main issues, it was still seen by many as an important step for equal rights in the country. Another important point could have been that by promoting same-sex marriage, the bill would have led to another internal divide within the Nationalist Party which had abstained from the civil union’s bill. This time though, the Nationalist Party declared that it would support the legislation. In addition to same-sex marriage, Joseph Muscat also declared his support for legalising the recreational use of Cannabis. At this stage, only Malta’s Green Party (AD) had been consistently proposing the legislation. On this matter, Muscat declared that he would consult with the public on the matter. Busuttil also confirmed that he was in favour of an informed debate. He called for a debate based on scientific research which would provide an informed decision on the matter (Dalli, MaltaToday, 7 May 2017a). Another proposal outlined by Muscat was the need to introduce gender quotas to encourage more female participation in Malta’s political system (Borg, Times of Malta, 14 May 2017a). All of these proposals were used to outline the way the Labour Party was fighting for the rights of minorities, which were making Malta one of the best countries in regard to civil rights. Part of the campaign of the Labour Party was focused on building the narrative that the Nationalist Party was working against the national interest, with this threatening the economic wellbeing of the Maltese. Muscat outlined how he had never spoken against his country after the European Parliament decided to discuss the rule of law issues and the Panama Papers (Schembri Orland, The Malta Independent, 13 May 2017b). The Maltese MEPs Roberta Metsola, David Casa, and Therese Comodini Cachia, found themselves at the centre of this criticism and were accused of using the EU institutions against the national interest. They were accused of using the PANA committee to damage the reputation of Malta and its people, threatening the lives of thousands who would be affected if companies would shift their interest from Malta (Balzan, KullĦadd, 26 February 2017a). Tony Zarb, one of the leading figures in trade unionism in Malta and a known Labour supporter, posted various posts against the PN MEPs dubbing them as traitors and calling Malta’s patriots to rise against the Nationalist Party and its MEPs to defend their country (Vassallo, MaltaToday, 26 June 2017b). The issue concerning the role of MEPs and the national interest has been ongoing since Malta joined the European Union. One of the Nationalist Party’s MEPs David Casa (2022) defended the role of MEPs in the European Parliament. He outlined that the Labour Party-in-government has long adopted a populist line that conflates the party with the government. He criticised the Labour Party for being one of the most vociferous to criticise its record on journalistic freedom, corruption, and the rule of

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law. He said that safeguarding the national interest should mean working to improve our credentials on these points. He highlighted how it was rather easy to attack him and the other MEPs and to manufacture the narrative that they worked against ‘Malta’. Another important discussion is how the Maltese perceive the European Union institutions. Whilst several Eurobarometer surveys suggested that the majority of Maltese perceive themselves as Maltese and European, the European institutions might still be seen as ‘foreign’. The former European Commissioner Tonio Borg (2022c) believes that Malta is a member of the EU institutions. He acknowledges that the criticism of ‘foreign intervention’ has been spread by Labour for decades and resulted in the Foreign Interference Act 1982 which was declared to be unconstitutional by the Maltese courts. He criticises the Labour Party for accusing the Nationalist Party of working against the national interest when the Labour Party itself invites various European politicians for its meetings in an attempt to influence Maltese voters. Surprisingly enough, for the first time in a decade, the Labour Party did not have any politicians from the EU institutions to endorse their programme and their leader. Still, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi both endorsed the Labour Party and Joseph Muscat. Renzi praised the extraordinary economic results produced by Joseph Muscat and the Labour administration. Tony Blair praised the economic record of the Labour administration, the low unemployment in Malta as being one of the best in Europe, and highlighting the civil rights achievements of the country including the protection of LGBTIQ rights which made Malta one of the best countries in this area (Dalli, MaltaToday, 28 May 2017b). The election took place on 3 June 2017 with another big victory for the Labour Party. The turnout was 92.1%, showing a decline from the 2013 election. As shown in Table 6.6, the Labour Party gathered 170,976 votes gaining 55.04% of the total vote. The Nationalist Party (and PD) gathered 135, 696 votes and around 43.68% of the total votes. Malta’s Green Party gathered 2563 votes and around 0.83% of the total votes (Malta, Electoral Commission, 2022). The gap between the main political parties remained at 35, 280 highlighting the fact that notwithstanding all the corruption allegations, Muscat and the Labour Party managed to maintain their support. Although the Nationalist Party achieved another disappointing result, the PD managed to elect two MPs through the alliance with the centre-right party, Marlene Farrugia and Godfrey Farrugia. This led to various tensions in the party, especially among those who believed that the coalition was also benefitting the smaller party. After the election, Simon Busuttil immediately took responsibility for the result. He Table 6.6 The 2017 national election results

PL PN (& PD) AD Turnout

Seats 39 30 –

Votes 170,976 135, 696 2563

Votes (%) 55.04 43.68 0.83 92.1

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and his deputy leaders Beppe Fenech Adami and Mario De Marco resigned from the leadership posts within the Nationalist Party allowing for the party to renew itself (The Malta Independent, 5 June 2017u). Prime Minister Muscat welcomed, the victory outlining how the electorate chose positivity over negativity, providing the Labour Party with the mandate and legitimacy to continue with the economic and civil rights policies it had initiated in 2013 (Times of Malta, 4 June 2017q). The election highlighted again the importance of the media, even though it might not have contributed to the final result. A survey commissioned by The Malta Independent revealed that 76.9% gathered information on the elections from the media stations of the main political parties, 53.2% from social media, 27.2% from radio stations, 18.8% from newspapers and, 17% from news portals. More interestingly, in the 18–24 age category, 72.4% said they had followed the campaign via television, even though 84% also gathered their news from social media (Grech, The Malta Independent, 4 June 2017c). This highlights why the media of the main political parties are still important and why the political parties have continued to maintain such organisations even though they are an economic weight for the party. An analysis of the use of social media by the main political leaders showcased how Muscat’s Facebook page was used to promote proposals of the party through videos and images, rather than personal channels. On the other hand, Simon Busuttil used his page to provide an insight into his life. Results also outlined how Muscat had more followers than Busuttil, standing at 80,000 vs. 41,000 resulting in Muscat having more interactions on his posts. This stood at 26,000 interactions versus the 20,000 of Busuttil (Balzan, MaltaToday, 4 June 2017b). Several discussions took place on how the Labour Party managed to maintain its support. It built an effective campaign around its leader Joseph Muscat, who was more popular than the actual party. The popularity of Muscat is best described by Camilleri (2021, p. 97) who declared that ‘Despite the gross conspiracies he is implicated in, Muscat remains as of now the most important Labour politician in history, by far surpassing Mintoff in popularity, according to statistics. You can’t argue with numbers. Muscat for better or worse made people happy’ (p. 97). Muscat promoted various economic policies which were important for the electorate and managed to build a strong narrative that the Nationalist Party was working against the national interest, a narrative that would affect the party for years to come. Prime Minister Muscat ultimately decided to keep Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri in their posts. This would, later on, become damaging for him and his legacy, especially after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the subsequent investigations about the capital projects in which both were involved in. One of the issues pointed out by the independent media, is that Muscat turned down various invitations to have a debate organised by the three main independent newspapers, The Malta Independent, MaltaToday, and Times of Malta. The hostility between the independent media and various politicians across Malta would continue to grow. This raises the question of whether freedom of expression is being taken for granted. One of the major issues for the Nationalist Party was that most of the campaign was based on who was the owner of Egrant. The information on Egrant was still

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vague and questions were already emerging on the validity of the documents being presented. Still, a campaign based on negativity can have several consequences.3 A disadvantage of negative campaigning, including the language and tone used, might depress the electorate (Haselmayer, 2019; Walter et al., 2014). In this case, the Nationalist Party should have focused more on the policies it was promoting and why the party should be seen as an alternative to the Labour administration. Whilst corruption was an important issue in several elections, it was not a game changer for voters. An example of this could be the 1987 election. With all the political turmoil which took place between 1981 and 1987, the support for the main political parties remained the same. In an interview after the election, former Nationalist MP echoed the sentiment of many by declaring that corruption by itself, will not help political parties to win elections (Vassallo, MaltaToday, 18 June 2017c). On this matter, Marlene Farrugia (2022a) shared her own experience, highlighting how in 2017, it was agreed to make good governance one of the major issues. Still, she believes that more should have been done to discuss issues that were important for the Maltese. Beyond the actual campaign, she refers to one of the main problems in Malta’s political system; harassment and mudslinging. She shared her experience of how she and the leader of the Nationalist Party were being systematically, viciously, and constantly denigrated, ridiculed abused, as politicians, by massive propaganda machines with a bottomless pit of funds. She highlights how this made it difficult to connect with the electorate and convince them to vote for this National Force. Another problem which she refers to was the malicious allegations which were being made against her. According to Farrugia (2022a), this made it impossible for her to do house visits. Farrugia admits that the character assassination attempts against her and polarisation which existed during the campaign placed further pressure on her mental health (Farrugia, 2022a). The problems with harassment, constant divisions, and personal attacks would re-emerge with the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Character assassination and political harassment are common in Malta’s political environment. They certainly deter many from playing an active role in Malta’s political system, as it might hurt them and their families. On corruption, Casa (2022) believes that there are several problems including media pluralism and the need to engage more with the Maltese citizens on corruption. He believes that in Malta there has been little discussion between the politicians and citizens on good governance. Political values, which are also part of European values, and which include good governance and transparency, are hardly discussed in the political system. The fact that criticism has also been levelled against the national broadcaster on the dissemination of information on the matter, can have a large effect on how society engages with the problem. What was evident in this election was the level of polarisation which existed in the country. This was overshadowing any attempt at a mature discussion on the

3

Negative campaigning is usually defined as an attack on other parties or candidates during a campaign. On the other hand, positive campaigning is a focus on policies and the party’s record (in government or opposition) (Haselmayer, 2019).

6.5

The Panama Papers and the 2017 National Election

259

reforms which the country needed. The level of polarisation and partisanship was addressed by the President of Malta, Marie Louise Coleiro Preca. In her speech on the occasion of the Republic Day investiture ceremony, she declared, It was also a year in which we were democratically called upon, as a nation, to participate in a general election which, unfortunately, brought about a repetition of historical situations, where we once again witnessed unbridled partisanship at its worst. (Coleiro Preca, 2017)

This shows the limitation of the influence of the European Union or the EU principles on the country’s political system, with the country’s political culture based on tribalism, polarisation and partisanship dominating the system. The Nationalist Party was obviously still struggling after the 2013 election. The party required to understand what its role should be in the country’s political system and what it was going to promote as an ideology or principles. During the election, a famous catchphrase associated with Fenech Adami was repeatedly used, ‘rightfulness will prevail’. Yet, elections are not there to decide what is right and what is wrong, but for voters to decide which party should be given the legitimacy to govern the country. The decision of Simon Busuttil to resign allowed the party to start the process to elect a new leader. Still, this process led to further disagreements within the party. On 16 September 2017, a political newcomer Adrian Delia was ultimately elected as leader of the Nationalist Party. Delia was voted by 52.7% of the PN members over the 47.3% received by veteran Chris Said (The Malta Independent, 16 September 2017r). This election created further divisions in a party that struggled to move forward. His election would lead to more internal disagreements, making it more difficult for the party to reposition itself as an alternative party-in-government, which was badly needed as the party was heading for the 2019 European elections. One of the major implications of the election of Delia was the dissolution of the alliance between the Nationalist Party and Democratic Party. The alliance was never popular with a segment of the Nationalist Party. For this reason, a motion to dissolve the alliance was moved by the secretary general of the party, Clyde Puli, and endorsed by the party administration, with the party executive voting to dissolve it (Vassallo, tvmnews, 15 December 2017a). The PD reacted by declaring that it would continue to promote good governance and would put the interests of the citizens and the country before bipartisan politicians (Times of Malta, 15 December 2017s). Whilst the election was contested on national issues, the role of the PANA committee was widely discussed. The European Union clearly had an effect on the five dimensions outlined by Ladrech.4 Discussions took place on the role of the European Union and whether the EU was interfering in the country’s political system. It outlined how the European Union was still seen as ‘foreign’ by some who felt that its involvement was out of place, especially when dealing with national issues. Both parties promoted the idea of a ‘movement’ in their attempt to try and gain more voters. Whilst in the past, both Simon Busuttil and Joseph Muscat promoted the idea of reforming the political system based on the way things were The five dimensions are: policy change; organisational change; party-competition; party-government relations; and relationship beyond the party system (Ladrech, 2002).

4

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6 Europeanisation and European Values

doing in the EU, with the main values being ‘unity’ and ‘consensus’, this clearly did not happen. The political system was still resistant to any changes, and political divisions were still rampant. Whilst the national election was held which provided a very clear result and the Labour Party was provided with the legitimacy to enact its manifesto, it did not mean that the Panama Papers or the saga surrounded Egrant ended with the vote. The events that would follow the election would encourage the European Union to have a closer look at what was happening in Malta and to make sure that European values were being safeguarded by those in power.

6.6

European Values and Malta’s Political System

Muscat’s administration introduced several policies which transformed the country in various areas. Muscat injected new enthusiasm within the Labour Party which was used to gain the required legitimacy to enact his political programme. Over the years, Muscat became a sort of a paternal figure in the country, using the approaches of former leaders such as Fenech Adami and Mintoff to become more popular than the Labour Party. This was largely due to his charisma, communication skills, and economic and civil liberties policies. All these attracted a wide range of support. In this firm term as Prime Minister of Malta, the country went through a radical transformation when it came to civil rights, with the government introducing a number of laws to protect minority rights in the country. This enabled Malta to become one of the leading countries in LGBTIQ rights. Whilst European values were promoted by the main political parties, such values were not reflected in the stances they took towards irregular migration. Whilst the European Union had often struggled to provide help to Malta and other European states that faced this problem, irregular migrants are seen as a national threat with racism and prejudice against migrants becoming a problem. This would lead to a series of attacks against migrants, an issue which will be discussed in the next chapter. The referendum on hunting provided another interesting example of how the EU issue could be politicised. Whilst hunters demanded to have the same rights as their European counterparts, at the same time there was the issue with the European Commission and its stance against spring hunting. This led to the EU being branded as a ‘foreigner’ which was undermining Maltese culture. This also highlights how even though at that point Malta had been a member of the European Union for more than a decade, the EU was still seen as an external entity or a ‘colony’ which could impose its regulations on the country. On a positive note, the referendum, which was the product of various NGOs, highlighted how in certain issues, the electorate could vote beyond the party allegiance and base their vote on their own opinion on the matter. Malta’s political system underwent a period of extreme polarisation between 2013 and 2017. The concept of a ‘movement’ and of a ‘new way of doing things’ based on the European system, did not materialist, largely due to the extreme divisions which existed. This was also mostly due to the revelations concerning the IIP scheme, the Panama scandal and other corruption allegations linked to

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members of the cabinet and high officials within the government. Things were not facilitated by the fact that five different police commissioners were nominated in 3 years. This would do little to convince a segment of Malta’s society that Malta’s institutions were failing their purpose. The instability within some of the main institutions in Malta including the police force and the allegations concerning money laundering and tax evasion had an effect on the EU’s view on Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The Presidency was an example of the way the European dimension, with discourse of national politicians, turned on European issues and promoted national issues at the EU sphere. The Presidency was particularly important to shape (or at least try to) EU policies on various areas including civil rights, irregular migration and digitalisation. Whilst the Presidency was extremely well organised from the smallest member, it was tainted by the allegations of money laundering and corruption which forced the Prime Minister to call an early election in the midst of the Presidency. Many questioned why the issue of corruption and rule of law, one of the main principles of the European Union, was and would not be important during the 2017 national election and subsequent elections. Whilst these issues were of great concern, they did not lead to a change in government. The reasons for this are many, including an ineffective campaign by the Nationalist Party and the fact that the Labour Party in government introduced various economic and civil liberties policies which were widely popular. The economic policies led to strong economic growth and helped to reduce unemployment. These policies were essential for the Labour Party to build support amongst voters who were not traditionally Labour. Debattista (2018) provides an interesting discussion on this. He bases his argument on the controversial theory of ‘amoral familism’. The theory dictates how individuals maximise economic policies to gain economic benefits for the nuclear family. It is often based on individualism and short-term gains, with the assumption that others will do the same (Debattista, 2022). This could explain why voting is still based on ‘materialism’ rather than ‘postmaterialism’ with economic incentives still essential to choose between one party and the other. The Panama Papers and other scandals revealed the transformation of politics and the power of the business networks made up of political figures, business leaders, and professionals. This transformation took place over the decades and under various administrations, creating a sense of impunity (Warrington, 2022). The extent of this would be revealed with the assassination and public inquiry on Daphne Caruana Galizia.

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Schembri, G. (2017a, 4 May). PM insists tax cuts are sustainable and possible due to strong economy. The Malta Independent, p. 5. Schembri, G. (2017b, 22 May). PM Muscat says he kept Schembri, Mizzi because he wanted them for special projects. The Malta Independent, p. 4. Schembri Orland, K. (2015, 15 February). Argument between FKNK and anti-hunting lobby erupts over Mizieb land. The Malta Independent, p. 5. Schembri Orland, K. (2017a, 20 February). Government refuses to divulge ElectroGas loan maximum liability. The Malta Independent, p. 1 & 3. Schembri Orland, K. (2017b, 13 May). ‘I never spoke against my country,always in favour’-PM. The Malta Independent, p. 7. Schembri Orland, K. (2017c, 5 May). Muscat again promises accountability, meritocracy, and transparency. The Malta Independent, p. 2. Schembri Orland, K. (2017d, 28 March). Panama minister situation casts a shadow over EU Presidency -EPP Chairman. The Malta Independent, p. 1 & 4. Scicluna, E. (2017, 8 May). Our country’s best days. The Malta Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-05-08/newspaper-opinions/Our-country-s-bestdays-6736173987 Security, M. f. H. A. a. N. (2015). Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants. Retrieved from https://cdn-others.timesofmalta.com/ee87eb6093978ddf83 5be5759bc86d018724f3a8.pdf Şentek, Z., & Shaw, C. (2017, 19 May). Turkish President Erdoğan’s son-in-law in off-shore tax scheme. The Black Sea. Retrieved from https://theblacksea.eu/stories/malta-files/turkishpresident-erdogans-son-in-law-in-off-shore-tax-scheme/ Shefik, S. (2017, 7 March). The Malta declaration: The impact on migrants and human rights. OWP. Retrieved from https://theowp.org/the-malta-declaration-the-impact-on-migrants-and-humanrights/ Tawat, M., & Lamptey, E. (2021). The 2015 EU-Africa joint Valletta action plan on immigration: A parable of complex interdependence. International Migration. Traynor, I. (2015, 11 November). EU’s deep dilemmas over refugees laid bare at Malta summit. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/eus-deepdilemmas-over-refugees-laid-bare-at-malta-summit Tusk, D. (2015). Speech by President Donald Tusk at the special session of the Parliament of Malta. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/10/ tusk-speech-parliament-malta/. Tusk, D. (2017). Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the opening ceremony of the Maltese presidency, Valletta, 11 January 2017 [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/11/tusk-valletta-opening-ceremony/ UNHCR. (2019). Know the facts: A toolkit on asylum and migration for the European Elections [Press release]. Vassallo, R. (2014, 12 May). EU issues are Maltese issues-Interview with Roberta Metsola. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/38919/eu_issues_ are_maltese_issues_too__roberta_metsola#.YiJxNt_MKM8 Vassallo, A. (2017a, 15 December). PN and PD alliance dissolved. Tvmnews. Retrieved from https://tvmnews.mt/en/news/xolta-l-pn-and-pd-alliance-dissolved-bejn-il-pn-u-l-pd/ Vassallo, R. (2017b, 26 June). Only defending my country | Tony Zarb. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/interview/78402/watch_only_defending_my_coun try__tony_zarb#.YsxwXnZByM8 Vassallo, R. (2017c, 18 June). The Power of conviction: Interview with Tonio Fenech. MaltaToday, pp. 14–15. Vassallo, S. (2020, 9 October). Malta’s Government Signs Aħrax And Miżieb Handover To Hunters. LovinMalta. Retrieved from https://lovinmalta.com/news/maltas-government-signsahrax-and-miziebhandover-to-hunters/

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Vassallo, M. T., & Cachia, J. C. (2020). Domestic and European response to irregular migration: Malta’s moral dilemma 2002–2016. Vassallo, R., & Vella, M. (2013, 10 April). Hunters shoot down spring hunting referendum. MaltaToday, p. 7. Vella, V. (2002, 4 October). Tħassib serju għal ħajjithom. L-Orizzont. Vella, M. (2013a, 10 July). Migrant pushbacks | ‘We wanted Europe to wake up and smell the coffee’ – Muscat. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/2 8272/migrant-pushbacks-we-wanted-europe-to-wake-up-and-smell-the-coffee-muscat-20130 710#.YfXJg_7MKM9 Vella, M. (2013b, 1 June). Slimmer code of ethics for ministers, says Muscat. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/27222/slimmer-code-of-ethicsfor-ministers-says-muscat-20130531#.YrjZhXZByM8 Vella, M. (2014, 27 April). BBC Presenter held in custody for hours. Times of Malta, pp. 4–5. Vella, V. (2014, 13 May). 4% Aktar Ottimisti. l-Orizzont, p. 1 & 6. Vella, M. (2015a, 23 February). Prime Minister contractually bound to promote IIP passport sale. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/49898/prime_min ister_contractually_bound_to_promote_iip_passport_sale#.YfcXPv7MKM8 Vella, V. (2015b, 9 March). Tan-nar imħeġġin jivvotaw “IVA” fir-referendum tal-kaċċa. L-Orizzont. Vella, M. (2016a, 4 April). EXPLAINER | From Panamagate to Panama Papers. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/63723/explainer__from_ panamagate_to_panama_papers#.YrR3vnZByM_ Vella, M. (2016b, 24 February). Konrad Mizzi to declare New Zealand family trust. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/62554/konrad_mizzi_to_ declare_new_zealand_family_trust#.Yqz6nnZByM9 Vella, M. (2016c, 3 April). Panama Papers | Konrad Mizzi, Keith Schembri wanted to open Dubai bank account. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/63 704/panama_papers__konrad_mizzi_keith_schembri_wanted_to_open_dubai_account#. YrNylnZByM8 Vella, M. (2016d, 24 November). Panama Papers MEPs stopped from Malta visit, Scicluna skirts grilling. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/71894/ panama_meps_stopped_from_malta_visit_scicluna_skirts_grilling#.YwIzZnZByM8 Vella, M. (2016e, 13 March). Up to his neck-Interview with Joseph Muscat. MaltaToday, pp. 13–14. Vella, M. (2017a, 19 February). Nexia Boss ‘I own Egrant’. MaltaToday, p. 1 & 2. Vella, M. (2017b, 25 May). Russians refute allegations of meddling in Maltese election. Maltatoday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/election-2017/77573/rus sians_refute_allegations_of_meddling_in_maltese_election#.YwJLm3ZByM8 Vella, M. (2017c, 20 May). What are the Malta Files? MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www. maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/77384/what_are_the_malta_files#.YsRyn3ZByM-. Vella, M. (2020, 8 May). Malta vetoes Irini spending after withdrawing from EU naval mission. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/102202/malta_ withdraw_eu_naval_mission_irini_veto_spending#.Yp-3QahByM8 Vella, G. (2022a). President of Malta/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Vella, M. (2022b, 1 July). Remains of Lassana Cisse, killed in cold blood in 2019, finally repatriated. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/11 7608/remains_of_lassana_cisse_killed_in_cold_blood_in_2019_finally_repatriated#.Yt2W53 ZByM8 Vella, M. (2022, 17 June). Malta officially removed from FATF greylist after ‘significant progress’ to address deficiencies. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/ national/117354/live_fatf_to_announce_official_decision_on_maltas_removal_from_ greylisting#.YuFtKnZByM8

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Walter, A. S., Van der Brug, W., & van Praag, P. (2014). When the stakes are high: Party competition and negative campaigning. Comparative Political Studies, 47(4), 550–573. Warrington, E. (2022). Associate Professor of Public Policy and a political analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Xuereb, M. (2014, 2 May). Muscat calls on ‘soldiers of steel’. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/Muscat-calls-on-soldiers-of-steel-.517266 Xuereb, M. (2016, 3 March). Chief Justice fails in bid for European Court job. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/chief-justice-fails-in-bid-for-europeancourt-job.604431 Xuereb, M. (2020, 20 October). EU officially launches infringement action against Malta’s passport scheme. Times of Malta Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/eu-action-onmaltas-golden-passport-scheme-officially-launched.825982. Xuereb, M. (2022, 25 February). Bernard Grech: Stop Russians from applying for IIP. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/bernard-grech-stop-russiansfrom-applying-for-iip.937047 Zahra, C. (2011, 5 April). Tiċħad li hemm ftehim mal-Gvern. L-Orizzont. Zammit, G. V. (2018). Malta: The political situation. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook. Zerafa, R. (2015, 13 April). Rebħa għall-Iva, rebħa għal Malta. L-Orizzont, p. 3.

Chapter 7

Europeanisation and the Rule of Law

These incestuous relationships on many levels between public administration in the highest levels in the power scheme and big business and organised crime created a corruptive system which internally eroded many of the country’s institutions. A system which seriously weakened the framework of controls and balance established by the Constitution and the laws of the country to restrain the abuse of power and ensure good governance (Public Inquiry, in Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2021).

European values are seen as the guiding principles for the European Union in its promotion of democracy and rule of law. In Malta, political parties have promoted these European values in different political stages. Still, the main question is whether these values have been truly embraced by the political system. The public inquiry on the assassination of Caruana Galizia highlighted the many problems of the political system and indirectly pointed out the resistance of the political culture towards change. This means that in Malta checks and balances are rather limited. The assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia revealed how the political system has often ignored the basic principles of democracy which developed the notion of ‘impunity’ amongst many within it. Caruana Galizia’s last statement ‘There are crooks everywhere you look now. The situation is desperate (Caruana Galizia, 2017b)’ reflects not only her fight against bad governance but also the need for the country to safeguard the rule of law. Caruana Galizia was assassinated on the 16th of October 2017 by a car bomb a few metres from her house in Bidnija. Her last statement became one of the most important phrases used in the country. Caruana Galizia can be considered a major figure in Malta’s political scene. She was as controversial as any other politician in the country. Yet, her blog was one of the most read in the country. She had established a strong network in Malta and abroad. She was extremely critical of the country’s political system including the Single Transferable Vote, which was promoting further clientelism and political corruption (Cachia & Debattista, 2018). She was also one of the harshest critics of Joseph Muscat. Caruana Galizia became one of the harshest critics of the Labour Leader. As the Nationalist opposition struggled to reinvent itself after the historical loss of 2013, she became the main © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_7

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opposition in the country and the main investigator on issues concerning money laundering, corruption, and bad governance. She was critical of the introduction of Malta’s Individual Investor Programme (IIP) passport scheme and proved to be vital in exposing hidden accounts of Keith Schembri and Minister Konrad Mizzi in the Panama Papers, and various other corruption allegations between the country’s top businessmen and politicians. Her death contributed to the rise of various civil society organisations which pressured the government for a public investigation regarding her death. It also led to the intervention of the European Union and the Council and Europe in demanding that justice is done. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia received widespread coverage with various international journalists coming to Malta to report on the matter. Not the same can be said to the death of Lassana Cisse, a migrant, who was murdered in a racially motivated drive-by shooting in Ħal-Far. The death of Lassana Cisse and the attempted murder of two other migrants, Ibrahim Bah and Mohammed Jallow, led to the arrest of Francesco Fenech and Lorin Scicluna. They are currently being investigated for the murder and attempted murder of these migrants. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that they are members of the Armed Forces of Malta. The motive behind the murders of Caruana Galizia and Lassana Cisse is certainly different, but intolerance was a common denominator. These assassinations raise the question of what kind of European values did membership instil, whether political parties are simply promoting some values at the expense of others and whether these values were simply a façade to cover the real problems within the country political system.

7.1

European Values and the Assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia

The election of political newcomer Adrian Delia as the leader of the Nationalist Party took place at a time when the institutions were still waiting for the final report on Egrant. Delia was more social conservative than Busuttil, and in his first interview, he highlighted his support for civil unions but opposition to same-sex marriage (Diacono, LovinMalta, 23 September 2017). He wanted the Nationalist Party to find its roots and understand the needs of the electorate. Whilst he pleaded for unity, his election led to more disagreements within the party. One of the main critics of Delia was certainly Daphne Caruana Galizia. She alleged that Adrian Delia and Minister Chris Cardona were directors of Healey Properties Limited, the business that owned 52, Greek Street in London. The company was investigated and raided by London police as part of Operation Pabail, a probe into a prostitution ring. Shortly after the search, both Cardona and Delia resigned as directors of the company, even though Caruana Galizia hinted that Delia was given a part of the profits coming from this prostitution. Caruana Galizia also revealed that Delia was heavily in debt (Caruana Galizia, 2017a) and that he owed more than €60,000 in taxes (Farrugia, Times of

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Malta, 19 September 2017). This led Delia to initiate at least five libel cases against Daphne Caruana Galizia to safeguard his reputation (Brincat, Times of Malta, 30 August 2017). Delia would defend these libel cases after her assassination, highlighting how her constant criticism of him and accusation was another form of character assassination. After he was elected Nationalist Party leader, the influence of Caruana Galizia on the Nationalist Party decreased. Delia was no longer willing to shape the opposition based on allegations that Caruana Galizia’s made against the government or its politicians. He outlined how the Nationalist Party could no longer use corruption in order to win votes and that the party had to understand that notwithstanding all the corruption allegations, the economy was performing well (Vella, MaltaToday, 4 November 2017). With a segment of the Nationalist Party turning against the Maltese blogger, many believed that Daphne Caruana Galizia was at her weakest after the 2017 election. Whilst she was no stranger to threats, it never stopped her for providing her own opinion or from highlighting irregularities which were taking place in Malta. Whilst Caruana Galizia could be as polarising as any political figure, her level of criticism was something which the country was still not adapted to. Her sense of style, her use of provocation, and her harshness made her a political target (Delia, 2017b). At times, many felt that she had no boundaries, and whilst the opposition against her grew, so did the popularity of her blog. This made her a problem for those who were being exposed for their irregular activities. As already highlighted in the previous section, the 2017 election did not put an end to the Panama Papers investigations, the enquiry about Keith Schembri and Brian Tonna and Egrant. Instead, she kept focusing on investigations to reveal the collision between the political class and lobby groups in the country. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia shifted the spotlight on the Maltese institutions, on crime in Malta, and the level of corruption that existed in the country’s political system. It also raised questions about the threat to freedom of expression and how could a journalist be murdered in a democratic country (Cachia & Debattista, 2018). The assassination of Caruana Galizia would lead to the intervention not just of the European Institutions, but also of the Council of Europe. Whilst the investigation surrounding her assassination is still ongoing, it has already had wide implications. The assassination of Caruana Galizia was the second case involving a journalist in Europe. This was not simply a problem for the countries in which these murders took place, but also for the European Union which perceived the freedom of the press as one of its core values. Dujardin (2021) wrote that ‘Daphne Caruana Galizia’s last day became the first day for many people and many families of a long campaign to seek truth and justice for her’ (Dujardin in Delia 2021, p. 37). The country’s reaction to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was immediate (Table 7.1). There was an outright condemnation for the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Black blank portraits covered the profile pictures of many social media accounts in memory of the assassinated journalist. Many were stunned by the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the highly planned attack to silence her forever. These were some of the first reactions to her assassination. Whilst EU

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Table 7.1 Reaction to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia President In these moments, when the country is shocked by such a vicious attack, I call on everyone to measure their words, to not pass judgement and to show solidarity (Coleiro Preca in Times of Malta, 16 October 2017a).

Prime Minister This is a spiteful attack on a citizen and freedom of expression. I will not rest until justice is done. The country deserves justice (Muscat, 2017)

Leader of the Opposition This is the collapse of democracy and freedom of expression. We shall not be silenced (Delia, 2017a, 2017b).

Archbishop Great shock and sadness at the brutal murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia. An appeal for a unified resolve to promote true democracy. RIP (Scicluna, 2017).

Table 7.2 Reaction of EU politicians to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia at EU level European commission Today, the world takes leave of Daphne Caruana Galizia. We condemn this attack in the strongest terms possible (European Commission, 2017)

President of the European parliament Daphne Caruana Galicia murdered like Siani. They kill journalists when they know they are about to find out the truth. Now light on the murder! (Tajani, 2017)

Frans Timmermans Shocked and outraged by murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. If journalists are silenced, our freedom is lost (Timmermans, 2017)

Manfred Weber Shocked at murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta. My thoughts are with her and her loved ones. A dark day for democracy (Webber, 2017).

Sven Giegold Shocking! Maltese journalist, who revealed money laundering & corruption killed in attack. Is this Europe or Russia? (Giegold, 2017).

institutions and politicians condemned the attack and called for a proper investigation to find the minds behind the murder (cf. Table 7.2), Maltese politicians highlighted how this was an attack on freedom of expression, press freedom, and democracy in Malta (cf. Table 7.1). One of the main points which emerged immediately after the murder was the resistance of the political system to embrace freedom of expression. Whilst political parties promoted European values, these values were not being promoted in a political system where criticism had little space and blind loyalty was often required. In her last interview with Marilyn Clark and William Horsley, Caruana Galizia declared: I think it is actually pretty bad. We seem to have very good freedom of expression. And in fact when there are studies – you know, these routine tick-the-box-studies, how many newspapers, how many . . . it looks like, wow, we have a real free society. In reality we do not because people are all the time autocensoring, constantly (Caruana Galizia, in Clark and Horsley, 2017).

During this interview, Caruana Galizia tackled one of the main issues in Malta, which is the struggle for society to speak about the problems within the political system. Outlining the problem of corruption was always a sensitive issue with the

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Maltese citizens who were reluctant to speak about it and the cautious ways in which journalists tackled these stories. After her assassination, retired judge Giovanni Bonello (2017, p. 38) would declare that: How hollow it is to boast of the right to agree with the powerful, the right to kowtow in front of them, the privilege to praise them and the fearless prerogative to discover that the dominant are always faultless. The right to freedom of expression is exactly the opposite: the right to disturb the powerful, to expose them to scrutiny.. the right to scream outrage and to whisper subversion.

Bonello’s belief is that in the country there was a sense of misunderstanding of what constitutes freedom of expression and few have challenged the establishment in order to defend the right to speak their mind and outline the realities which the country was in. The majority of media corporations in Malta associated the assassination of Caruana Galizia as the ‘Black Monday’. ‘Black Monday’ is an important event in Malta as on 15 October 1979, the Progress Press in the country which was situated in Valletta was burned by Labour supporters. This was seen as a direct attack on freedom of the press and freedom of expression in Malta. More than three decades later, the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia outlinedhow hostility against the freedom of the press and freedom of expression was still evident in the country. The reaction of the Institute of Maltese Journalists was also swift. They declared that the assassination was a direct attack on freedom of expression in Malta. They also pleaded with fellow journalists not to let the assassination undermine their work and their duty to report all that is in the public interest and important for society and the country (Micallef Decesare, MaltaToday, 16 October 2017). A silent protest was held by Maltese journalists on 19 October 2017 to demand greater respect and protection for journalists for them to be able to keep doing their work. The assassination was also condemned by the International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) which chided violence against journalists and the state of freedom of the press in Malta (ICIJ, 2017). Blicher Bjerregård (2017) would later declare that this was not simply an attack on journalism in Malta, but because this was an attack on a journalist in an EU state, it was an attack on journalists in Europe. He also outlined that the issue of press freedom and freedom of expression was not only a problem in Malta but in many other states, which is why the EU and member states should do more to secure such an important element of democracy. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was seen by various politicians and NGOs in Malta as a threat to the country’s democracy. They believed that the fundamental principles of the European Union including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and rule of law were not being respected in Malta. One of the most important evaluations on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was that of Independent MP Marlene Farrugia. During her statement in parliament, she stated that Caruana Galizia was left isolated and she ultimately killed when most of the political forces in Malta were against her (Parliament of Malta, Session 27, 2017). In fact, Joseph Muscat would later recount that Caruana Galizia was assassinated when she was becoming ‘irrelevant’. Still, one should not mistake irrelevance for

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unpopular. Whilst it was clear that there was a segment of the Nationalist Party which turned against Caruana Galizia, her blog was still extremely popular. In addition, because she was unfazed by the criticism against her, she was still dangerous to criminals who feared that she would explore their criminal activities (Diacono, LovinMalta, 13 July 2022). Farrugia (2022a) would later explain how the assassination of Caruana Galizia was the product of Institutional failures on many levels and described the murder as one of the most tragic episodes in the history of Malta. She believes that the political climate created by Delia and Muscat at that point, together with non-functional institutions and toxic political climate led to her assassination Farrugia’s opinion is that like other political murders which took place in Europe, the first action was to isolate, dehumanise, and demonise Caruana Galizia before she was actually assassinated. The former leader of the Nationalist Party Busuttil (2022) shares the same opinion on the institutional failures that led to the assassination of Caruana Galizia. He believes that the assassination, which took place a week after his resignation as leader of the Nationalist Party, sent a bad signal on the state of the Maltese institutions. Busuttil argues that Caruana Galizia was killed because of what she wrote and that the perception was that there were inside forces within the government which might have pushed for her assassination. Busuttil also shared his personal fears for himself and his family. The reason for this is that he was considered as public enemy for a number of individuals in Malta during a period in which the political environment was extremely polarised. Busuttil also outlined how the assassination highlighted the failure of the Labour administration in promoting various European values in the country, including the freedom of expression and press freedom and simply shifted away from these values in order to take over the main institutions in the country. As a sign of unity after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, the major political parties in Malta, the Labour Party, Nationalist Party, Malta’s Green Party, and the Democratic Party took part in a demonstration organised by the Civil Society Network to demand justice for Caruana Galizia and her family (The Malta Independent, 21 October 2017b). This would be one of the only times where the political system produced a united front. Rather than using the opportunity to promote the institutional reforms which the country required (Pace, 2017), the investigations and discussions within the national political system, EU institutions, Maltese Courts, and Council of Europe produced further divisions and animosities between the main political parties. The assassination of Caruana Galizia received extensive coverage across the globe. Antonio Tajani, the President of the European Parliament, attended her funeral on 3 November 2017, which was designated a day of national sorrow. The Archbishop of Malta officiated at the religious service. However, the family advised the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition not to participate in the funeral proceedings as many felt that the institutions did not do enough to protect the Maltese journalist (Pace, 2017). This would be exposed in the public inquiry which was established to determine whether there were any institutional failings in the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia.

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Table 7.3 The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia as a critical juncture Dr. Lawrence Gonzi The murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia is the first and foremost tragedy for her family. But it is also a grave national tragedy. It exposed the tip of a tainted iceberg that was there for everyone to see, years before the crime was committed. It shames all those who contributed directly and indirectly, overtly or covertly to her premeditated murder and unfortunately it will remain a taint on Malta’s reputation for years to come (Gonzi, 2022).

Professor Cremona When Daphne Caruana Galizia died, everybody was shocked, but not surprised. People had been afraid she was going to get killed one day or another. Apart from the way she was killed, the way she was portrayed and the way they tried to demonise her son, saying that it is his fault, and that he wanted his mother’s death, it outlined how the situation became unacceptable. That is when I drew a line. Personally, I said, this is enough. I cannot take, I cannot take this anymore. And I have to do something about it. And I started going, I mean, the day she died, I from the day she died, I started going to demonstrations (Cremona, 2022).

Dr. Robert Aquilina There are many things that should have been different when Daphne was killed that could, would have left her in life. We could not control most of them. But one thing we could have done was step into the streets and pronounce ourselves as ordinary citizens indignant at the corruption she exposed and indignant at the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators she exposed, until they turned on her and killed her (Aquilina, 2022).

Mr. Andre Debattista The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was a critical juncture for several reasons. Firstly, she was the first investigative journalist to be murdered for what she wrote and uncovered. In many ways, she was brave enough to reveal and question certain corrupt links and demand accountability from those in positions of influence. Secondly, it has also shown what had been known for a while. The same amoral familism was happy with some elements of corruption so long as individuals could benefit personally from it (Debattista, 2022a, b).

Table 7.3 highlights how various former politicians and political analysts in Malta viewed the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia as a critical juncture. This critical juncture led to the creation of a number of civil society groups. They were established in order to seek justice for Caruana Galizia and her family. They are doing so, by using the EU institutions and Council of Europe. The assassination of Caruana Galizia was an event which encouraged various individuals to embrace activism. Professor Cremona (2022) shares her personal experience on the matter. She outlined that when Daphne Caruana Galizia was assassinated, there were few civil society groups (beyond Moviment Graffitti) that were created to safeguard rule of law and human rights in Malta. Her sentiment was echoed by the current president of the civil society group Repubblika. Aquilina (2022) explains how in the wake of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, various individuals created a number of organisations (including Repubblika and Occupy Justice) to insist that justice is done and changes take place.

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This can be seen as one of the main differences between this assassination and the unresolved political murders which took place in the past. In fact, although memorials for the latter still took place, various governments have attempted to blindly move past these crimes, rather than deal with the consequences of these murders and introduce the required changes to prevent more from happening in the future. Table 7.3 provides an overview of the main reaction for the assassination of Caruana Galizia and the impact which had on party politics in Malta. Warrington (2022) and Debattista (2022a) believe that the assassination of Caruana Galizia catalysed the ‘coming of age’ of civil society which, even if it did not broken the back of these occult networks, has brought about some significant political changes and led to various resignations as more information would be revealed on the resignations. This is the reason why a number of organisations were created to take on such roles and challenge the government and main political parties to do more in order to make sure that justice prevails. In fact, within months of the assassination of Caruana Galizia, various groups emerged in order to make sure that this became true. This was one of the few times that civil society groups challenged the establishment. Repubblika and Occupy Justice emerged after the assassination of the journalist and worked closely with blogger Manuel Delia, an independent blogger and former candidate of the Nationalist Party, in the fight for justice for Caruana Galizia and her family. Both entities began to challenge the Maltese institutions in their fight against corruption and transparency. Repubblika emerged in 2018 in order to protect and defend democracy and rule of law. The organisation, which is often at the forefront of protests, has been pressuring both parties in government to initiate the required reforms which the political system needs (The Malta Independent, 18 November, 2018a). Occupy Justice is an organisation established by women in the fight against justice (Occupy Justice, 2021). All of these entities would have a very important role in the 2019 protests which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Muscat. Thus, a coalition of transformationalist civil society groups with different principles, ideologies, and objectives was formed within the country’s political system to provide resistance and demand political and institutional reforms (Vassallo et al., 2023). Apart from these civil society groups, the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation was established to protect the work of the Maltese journalist and continue the fight for justice (Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2022). Such resistance in the political system is often found in many states within and outside the EU. Still, in Malta, this is a new phenomenon. This means that these groups are still facing strong resistance from the main political parties and their politicians especially as they feel that these groups are undermining the work of the main political parties and reducing their support. Still, the more they outline the irrelevance of these civil society groups, the more influential these groups become. During this period, two very important symbols began to be used in the demand for justice and fight against corruption. These were the bay leaf plant and the raised pen. The Pen symbolised the courage of Caruana Galizia as a journalist and her work to expose corruption in Malta. The bay leaves from Caruana Galizia’s garden were sent to activities as a sign of gratitude by the Caruana Galizia family as they sought to block Castille (the office of the Prime Minister and symbol of its power) in the

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fight against justice (De Marco, The Malta Independent, 29 October 2017). Another important symbol in the fight for justice would be the Great Siege Memorial in Valletta. This site is important as it was in front of the Law Courts, the institution which had to guarantee that justice would prevail for Daphne Caruana Galizia and her family. The site would become a point for confrontation between civil society groups and the Labour administration. It was seen as a way of gathering attention and of putting pressure on the institutions to act. The government reacted by placing barriers to prevent the Great Siege monument from being used to place flowers, candles, photos, and messages in memory of Caruana Galizia (Aquilina, 2022). This led to one of the many constitutional cases between civil society groups and the Maltese government. On 30 June 2020, after a two-year battle initiated by civil society activist Manuel Delia alongside Repubblika and Occupy Justice, the First Hall of the Civil Court in its Constitutional Jurisdiction ruled that Justice Minister Owen Bonnici had breached their fundamental right of freedom of expression by repeatedly clearing the monument (Brincat &Carabott, Times of Malta, 30 January 2020). The judgement was seen as a moral victory for these civil society groups who had to resort to the Constitutional Courts in order to safeguard their rights and freedom of expression in Malta (Aquilina, 2022; Cremona, 2022). Another important battle for these civil society groups would be the public inquiry which would not only reveal information on the assassination of Daphne but would also cast a shadow on the country’s political system.

7.1.1

The Assassination of Daphne and the European Dimension

The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was not simply a national issue, but due to EU membership (and globalisation), it had a wide-reaching effect within the region. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia can be seen as an example of how EU institutions were used to pressure the Maltese administration. This boomerang approach was already used in Malta throughout the decades, notably between 1981 and 1987. This time, though, it was civil organisations that were using EU institutions (not just the EU, but also the Council of Europe) to pressure the Maltese state to find and prosecute the minds behind the assignation of Caruana Galizia so that justice would prevail. Immediately after the assassination of the Maltese journalist, the press room within the European Union was named after Caruana Galizia. The President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani claimed that the European Union could not promote freedom of expression and press freedom across the EU borders when it could not defend journalists within the EU states (Saeed, 2017). The European Parliament would also dedicate the prize for ‘investigative journalism’ to Daphne Caruana Galizia to honour her legacy (EPP. 2019). The reason why the EU decided to act on the assassination of Caruana Galizia is that the perception was that Malta was moving away from the core European values including freedom of expression

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and rule of law. It was important for the European Union to act to pressure states to safeguard these values and prevent illiberal democracies from taking over Europe. Whilst the EU institutions are rooted in the founding treaties, both politically and in law, several states are simply ignoring such rules which are a threat not only to their citizens but also to the whole European project (Casa, 2022). The European Parliament Committee of Inquiry’s (PANA) report on Malta was published in November 2017. The report was highly important given that Daphne Caruana Galizia was one of the first to publish the revelations linked to secret Panama accounts to various politically exposed persons in Malta, including Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri. The report revealed how Malta transposed EU rules and respected OECD standards in terms of transparency, the fight against tax fraud and money laundering. At the same time, the report also revealed that the institutions which are in charge of implementing and enforcing the EU rules on tax fraud and money regulations were highly politicised. The European Parliament decided to send the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee to Malta to provide a firsthand account of the investigation of Caruana Galizia’s assassination in December 2017. On 15 November 2017, the European Parliament had the first debate on the assassination of Caruana Galizia and rule of law in Malta. It outlined how the Maltese Police needed more resources to follow on the investigations initiated by the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU). The report also declared that some banks, including Pilatus Bank, were not respecting the regulations on mandatory Customer Due Diligence (CDD) measures and did not carry out the required due diligence to prevent money laundering. Where suspicions were brought up, they did not report them to the FIAU (European Parliament 2017a, b, c). A plenary session was held on 14 November 2017 in which a resolution was approved. During the session, Frans Timmermans from the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) outlined how Malta needed to show the work of institutions and rule of law in the country was respected. He defended the Muscat administration and the reforms which the country was undergoing. Still, others were not that positive. Esteban González Pons from the EPP outlined how in Malta, journalists were being harassed and highlighted how several officials within the Muscat administration were being accused of money laundering. Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, of the ALDE Group, declared that the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia showcased how the Maltese institutions were not working properly and outlined the need for EU institutions to do more to strengthen democracy in the country. Sven Giegold of the European Greens repeated some of the issues which had already been highlighted in the PANA committee report. These included the fact that Maltese institutions, whose role was to fight money laundering and tax fraud, were highly politicised. Giegold highlighted how companies such as Nexia BT and the Pilatus Bank were being directed by politically exposed individuals who were linked to several irregular activities. The most interesting element of the debate, beyond the way Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), perceived Malta and its approach towards money laundering and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was the reaction of the country’s MEPs. This reaction was again a reflection of the two-party system (European Parliament, 14 November 2017b).

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Table 7.4 Malta MEPs and their reaction to the discussion on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia MEPs Roberta Metsola (EPP)

David casa (EPP)

Marlene Mizzi (S&D)

Miriam dalli (S&D)

Alfred Sant (S&D)

Discussion Daphne Caruana Galizia was executed—Assassinated—And her killing exposed the urgency of the situation in Malta, where the ruling party has used its majority to ride roughshod over the rule of law. Malta is a great country, but we have to have the courage to say that it is unacceptable that journalists are killed with impunity, that it is outrageous that the press is under threat, and that it is disgraceful that the police refuse to investigate corruption. Because we know that there can be no rule of law without law enforcement, that there can be no true democracy with a shackled media, and that there can be no justice when those exposing crimes are the ones targeted. Do not continue (referring to Timmermans: The council and commission) to defend the indefensible. I call my colleagues in this chamber, to remember the values that unite us and make us Europeans. Fight corruption and be on the side of the people. This is not a fight against the Maltese people, this is a fight for the Maltese people. For the second time in five months the Maltese state is being accused, in the most discriminatory way—before the European Parliament; and this is not a normal thing. There are those who are using this parliament to undermine a member state and try to undermine a democratically elected government in order to serve a partisan agenda. Without any doubt, this resolution was written by a Maltese. It is a confusion of points and accusations intended only to cast an ugly shadow over Malta and many of which have nothing to do with the rule of law. The European People’s party is telling us that the rule of law in Malta has collapsed. I ask: In a country where the rule of law collapses, do new laws come into play, such as party funding law? Like the removal of the statute of limitations on acts of corruption by politicians? Like Whistle Blowers Protection Act? In a country where the government threatens freedom of expression, will a law be amended to amend the press act by proposing the abolition of a criminal libel, and a precautionary warrant in the event of a civil libel? In a country without a rule of law, are they among the best laws in favour of the LGBTI community. . . I refer here to the financial secrecy index from the tax justice network, which considers Malta more transparent than countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the USA. Luxembourg, which are big players in offshore financial services. A brutal assassination has taken place in Malta. It has shocked us all. Justice needs to be done. In the investigation, the Maltese government has called upon the Dutch and US police authorities, as well as Europol, for help, but the outcome of one murder investigation, whatever and whenever it is, cannot be held to reflect on the rule of law here or wherever. Malta is being assailed for perceived deficiencies in the rule of law on the basis of jumbled facts and semi-facts, unproven allegations taken at face value, innuendos and issues irrelevant to the rule of law. Is this being done as a tit-for-tat related to processes about the rule of law that other member states are being subjected to?

The reaction of the Maltese MEPs which is shown in Table 7.4 is again a reflection of the discussion which was taking place in Malta. The Labour MEPs perceived the discussion as a challenge to Malta’s sovereignty. The Nationalist

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Party’s MEPs pleaded for the European Union to make sure that the rule of law and fundamental values of the EU are respected (European Parliament, 14 November 2017b). Whilst the Maltese MEPs were against the resolution 466 MEPs including many from the S&D Party voted to support the resolution. The resolution called for Malta to protect its journalists, for an international investigation on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and that Europol assists the ongoing investigations. It also called for the safeguarding of whistle-blowers in Malta, and for the European Commission to intervene and initiate a dialogue with the Maltese authorities to make sure that the rule of law and other European values are respected. The resolutions also highlighted the lack of action of the police in investigating various money laundering allegations and called for Malta and for other EU institutions to continue their fight against money laundering and tax evasion (European Parliament Resolution, 15 November 2017d). The whistle-blower involved in the Egrant allegations, Maria Efimova, was issued with an arrest warrant when she left the county. She defended her actions by saying that she was in fear of her life. In August 2017, the Maltese Courts issued an international arrest warrant for Efimova for failing to show up to several proceedings against her. She failed to show up again in November when the cases had to be continued. She was accused of defrauding Pilatus Bank and of having made false accusations against Superintendent Dennis Theuma and inspectors Jonathan Ferris and Lara Butters (The Malta Independent, 15 November 2017c). The international arrest warrant was an issue that the European party groups opted to discuss. The EPP called for Greece to give Maria Efimova the full protection she required as she was one of the main witnesses in various investigations on corruption in Malta (Saliba, tvmnews, 16 November 2017). On the other hand, the S&D Party criticised the EPP for interfering in the independence of the Maltese judiciary system (S&D, 2017). The issue surrounding Maria Efimova would be partially solved on 14 June 2018, when the Greek Courts would reject the request to have her extradited to Malta and would be persecuted (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 14 June 2018b). This could be seen as one of the short-term implications of the assassination of Daphne and the fear which existed around Maltese institutions not working as expected. By January 2018, Malta dropped 18 places and ended in 65th place on the World Press Freedom Index. The report highlighted how the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the murder of Ján Kuciak, a journalist killed in Slovakia, were seen as a consequence of the decline of democracies and the threat to press freedom in Europe (The Shift, 25 April 2018b). The resolution agreed by the European Parliament on 15 November 2017 was not the only one on Malta. The PANA and LIBE committees of the European Parliament would make an ad-hoc visit to Malta on 30 November 2017. The PANA and LIBE committees’ visit to Malta highlighted the importance of rule of law and declared that the perception of impunity in Malta could not continue. Between November 30 and December 1, a delegation from the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee into Money Laundering, Tax Evasion, and Tax Avoidance visited Malta to assess the

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country’s legal system and the way that European Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) were being applied (European Parliament, 15 November, 2017d). The MEPs raised serious issues about the separation of powers in Malta. This was a particular problem for the mission due to the perception of impunity which existed. This was because of the lack of independence within the judiciary and police authority, the weak enforcement of anti-money laundering laws, and the lack of action against various politically exposed persons of the allegations within the Panama Papers. The mission also highlighted the problem surrounding private sector entities as Nexia BT and Pilatus Bank, and their strong influence on the government (European Parliament, 1 December 2017). The full report questioned the reasons why Malta had 5 Commissioners over four years and how 425 cases of corruption investigated by the Permanent Commission against Corruption did not lead to any criminal proceedings. The report provided recommendations for both the European Commission and Maltese government. For the European Commission and several other institutions and agencies, the recommendation was that the Commission evaluates whether the Maltese authorities are fully compliant with the European Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the Capital Requirements Directive, that the European Bank Authority that the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) is fully independent as required by law, and for the European Bank Authority to investigate whether the MFSA is meeting its obligations as it has repeatedly failed to take any action against Pilatus Bank and Nexia BT. The report also recommended that the European Commission investigates the actions of Pilatus Bank and Henley & Partners and the reports by the Mapping Media Freedom which revealed that these individuals were using Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP) practices to threaten Maltese journalists. They also recommended that the European Commission investigates whether the IIP scheme was distorting the internal market. With regard to the Maltese government, they recommended that politically exposed persons linked with the Panama leaks should not retain their position, stronger checks and balance system in the Maltese government, revise the Whistleblower Act to include the public sector, reinforce the separation of powers and Malta’s Juridical system, reform the Office of the Attorney General, and take a stronger stance against corruption and money laundering (European Parliament, 11 January 2018a). What emerges from these reports, beyond the recommendations, was that the committees were speaking directly to several NGOs in Malta, highlighting their increasing importance in the country’s political system. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia led to several debates on media pluralism in Malta. A report published in April 2018 on media pluralism in Europe showcased the concerns that EU institutions had on media pluralism in Malta in the wake of the assassination of Caruana Galizia, highlighting how she suffered various harassment through the freezing of her bank accounts and threats made by multinational companies (European Parliament, 12 April 2018b). Whilst the European Parliament took an active role in ensuring that justice prevailed, it was the Council of Europe that pressured the Maltese institutions for a public inquiry to be made. This is particularly important. For many citizens in the country, the Council of Europe is often associated with the European Union, when in

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fact it is an independent body. The European Union has often struggled to enforce its rules and regulations, a case in point being the migration issue (Flask, 2022). It is the Council of Europe that has often intervened to pressure states to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Many critics point out that the European Union is often focused on political conditionality and pressuring candidate states to comply with its regulations, failing to upload these regulations after they join the European Union. This is why the European Union has received its share of criticism for its failure to properly act to prevent democratic backsliding in several countries in Eastern Europe (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018). Traditionally, the European Parliament is the most outspoken of all the institutions, with one of its main roles being to supervise the work of the European Commission and other bodies of the European Union and to recommend which steps to be taken to protect the EU principles and regulations. Still, it is up to the European Council and European Commission to act. These European institutions often struggle to find the appropriate tools to use to make sure that rules are respected by all member states. For several years, the Council of Europe, through the Venice Commission, had insisted that juridical reforms needed to be implemented in Malta. A number of civil society groups including Repubblika, Occupy Justice, and the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation had called for a public inquiry on the assassination of the journalist, which the government had refused because there was already an investigation going on. Shortly after her assassination, four United Nations (UN) officials called for the Maltese government to seek an independent inquiry into the murder of Caruana Galizia (UN, 2017). These were Ms. Agnes Callamard, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions; Mr. Michel Forst, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; Mr. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and human rights; and Mr. David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Muscat administration had defended its position not to seek a public inquiry due to the ongoing police investigation, with this investigation leading to the arrest of the Degorgio brothers, Vince Muscat, and eventually Yorgen Fenech, one of the most influential business tycoons in Malta. These civil society groups turned to the Council of Europe, with the Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of Europe passing a resolution on 26 June 2019 to pressure Malta to open a public inquiry within three months and to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2022). Resolution 2293 of the Council of Europe outlined the various corruption allegations which were linked to the Maltese government and the various shortcomings within the main institutions of the country, including the politicisation of these institutions and the lack of cooperation with Europol and the German Police over the investigation. Therefore, the resolution called for the Maltese government to set up a public inquiry to ensure that justice would prevail. It also requested Malta to implement the reform packages recommended by the Venice Commission and Greco in their entirety and recommended that Malta’s law enforcement bodies fight the prevailing climate of impunity by investigating and prosecuting those suspected of being involved in the

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corruption allegations and eventual murder of Caruana Galizia (Council of Europe, 2019). Whilst the Labour Party’s delegation had defended the position of Malta within the Council of Europe and attempted to make more than 50 amendments to the final report, written by the Dutch MP Peter Omtzigt, this was ultimately approved (Bonini et al., 2019). The public inquiry would have series consequences as it would find the state responsible for the assassination of the Maltese journalist. This was only the first intervention of European Institutions and the Council of Europe in their attempt to strengthen rule of law in Malta. One of the common denominators between the Council of Europe and various reports and resolutions of the European Parliament was the so-called culture of impunity. Reference to this was made in various reports. Still, the culture of impunity and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia would continue to dominate discussions in both the national and European spheres. These would end up in the deliberations surrounding Malta’s Capital of Culture, which was considered the main event of 2018.

7.2

The Political Divisions and Valletta 2018

The title of 2018 European Capital of Culture (ECoC) was awarded to Valletta in 2012. The ECoC designation is an important event for various localities and is often used to invest money in particular localities. It is being used to promote tourism and showcase cultures and histories at a local and national level. The ‘European dimension’ is a very important element of the ECoC programme. The main objectives of the ECoC event are to encourage cooperation amongst cultural operations, artists, and cities throughout the EU area; promote cultural diversity in Europe; promote the common cultural elements which link together the EU member states (Carammia et al., 2018). The assumption is that by hosting an ECoC, feelings of ‘Europeanness’ will be enhanced among members of the host community. The ECoC provides the opportunity for the designated cities to work together to expand their activities. In this scenario, the impact of Europeanisation is not always the typical top-down, as it is not simply about regulations, but more of an opportunity to promote a locality. Still, the high level of polarisation in the country meant that the European Union had to look closely at what was happening in the country. All 68 of Malta and Gozo’s local councils supported the initiative. The European Union maintains several cultural programmes, even though it has no official policy for culture.1 The previous ‘Cities of Culture’ initiative, which was rebranded as ECoC, is designed to promote European cultures across the EU borders (Cremona, 2018). The Valletta 2018 Foundation (V18) was created to organise several cultural events and to implement a detailed programme to celebrate the Capital of Culture event. Still, as it happens in every event in Malta, rather than unifying to promote the

1 This is certainly a problem for a Union which is trying to promote a European identity, linking the concept with a European culture.

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Maltese culture in Malta and abroad, the event was plagued with political divisions and controversies. The Capital of Culture event was important for Valletta, the capital city of Malta. The country’s small size meant that all of the Maltese Islands were affected by the designation. Valletta became the centre of cultural activities which culminated in 2018. Valletta had a lot to offer due to its rich history and historical buildings which had to be used to showcase and promote the Maltese culture. The ECoC event was meant to bring together all Europeans through their shared history, values, and ideas (Ebejer et al., 2021). V18 was also used to regenerate the capital city of Malta and to attract Maltese and tourists alike. With this regeneration, the idea was not only to change the image of Valletta but also to provide an economic impetus to the businesses in the capital city which were now attracting more people (Muscat, 2022). Across the years, various governments had attempted to regenerate Valletta and attract visitors not only during morning hours but also in the evening. Various events began to be organised. The most popular was the Notte Bianca (white night), an annual event organised for the first time in 2006. The annual event attracts thousands of visitors to the capital city of Malta. During the event, historical places, including churches, museums, and shops, remain open till late in the evening with exhibitions, recitals, tours, street theatre, and poetry readings taking over the streets of Valletta. Other activities targeted an international audience, including the Valletta Baroque Festival, Valletta Film Festival, and the International Jazz Festival (Ebejer et al., 2021). Beyond regenerating Valletta, the V18 event was also meant to revive the arts in Malta. Whilst events such as Notte Bianca are popular, the arts, which include theatre, music, and art, struggle to attract a large audience. A study by Briguglio and Sultana (2018) on cultural participation in Malta revealed that the majority of Maltese people prefer watching television, listening to music, and using the internet rather than attending exhibitions, recitals, and dance festivals. The study highlighted the divide between secondary and tertiary level education. Individuals with a secondary level of education prefer traditional festivities such as village feasts, Carnival, and events linked with the holy week including pageants and processions, whilst individuals with a tertiary level of education prefer exhibitions, concerts, and museums. What was worrying was that Malta had one of the lowest attendances in cultural activities within the EU area. This is why the V18 events had to provide direct participation of the Maltese audience to attract more people and raise the popularity of the arts in the country. The Capital of Culture (V18) had four main objectives. These were to establish a sustainable culture sector in Malta; to raise more awareness of the social and cultural environment, not just for the tourists, but also for Maltese citizens; to have Valletta at the heart of the Capital of Culture events which had more than 140 projects and 400 events; and to use the opportunity provided by the V18 event to explore new ways of interaction through the landscape, architecture, maritime and citizens across Malta and Europe. Investment for the project was more than €47 million (van der Steen & Richards, 2021) though more was used to regenerate Valletta and provide the Maltese capital with a new image.

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Still, the instability within the political system following the assassination of Caruana Galizia was also felt during the V18 celebrations. The former executive director of the V18, Karsten Xuereb (2022a), outlined how multiple actions of the V18 team at the local level led to the decision of several EU officials linked with the Capital of Culture (CoC) event to snub all activities in Malta. The days leading to the start of the V18 activities reflected the general feeling of mistrust between Maltese and European officials. This was not made easier by the decision of the Prime Minister to call an early election during the Presidency of the Council of the EU when the Presidency could have been used to launch the V18 activities as a means of attracting more tourists to Malta. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia contributed to further diminish the cultural diplomacy efforts and standing that Malta had painstakingly made and built over the past years. One of the main issues within the V18 was the polarisation of the committee whose role was to establish the programme and promote the arts locally and internationally. The traditional system in Malta of employing persons of trust rather than people with the required experience led to various divisions within the committee. These divisions forced various individuals to leave the V18 Foundation. This can be considered a major problem given the important task that this foundation had which included the need to cooperate with the Dutch city which shared the CoC initiative Leeuwarden-Fryslân 2018. By 2017, it was already clear that there were problems within the main team behind the event. Seventy artists, including several high-profile figures, wrote to the Valletta 2018 Foundation board highlighting the lack of leadership and lack of accountability that existed within the foundation (Galea Leone, Times of Malta, 23 July 2017). The removal of various officials from the V18 Foundation, including the V18 executive director Karsten Xuereb, programme coordinator Margerita Pulé and visual arts curator Maren Richter, led to the intervention of the European Commission. The ECoC monitoring panel sought clarifications on these dismissals and urged the authorities to communicate immediately with the panel (Galea Leone, Times of Malta, 4 July 2017). The most serious decision of the Capital of Culture panel was made after a statement was posted by the head of the V18 Foundation, Jason Micallef, on Saint Patrick’s Day. Micallef posted a picture on social media of the crowds celebrating Saint Patrick’s Day in Malta, which was slowly turning into one of the traditional festivities in the country. He reworded the last statement of Caruana Galizia before she was assassinated turning it into ‘The situation is desperate. There are happy people everywhere you look’. This caused some commotion within the EU institutions. A cross-party group of 72 MEPs demanded the immediate resignation of Jason Micallef from the V18 Foundation. The MEPs called for the European Commission to pressure Malta to remove Micallef from the top post (Diacono, LovinMalta, 19 April 2018b). Justice Minister Owen Bonnici defended Micallef declaring that he respects freedom of expression and praised the contribution of Micallef to the V18 Foundation (Muscat, The Shift, 12 July 2018). The controversial comments by Micallef led to several boycotts. The chair of the committee that monitored Valletta as European Capital for Culture in 2018, Ulrich Fuchs, declared that he would refuse to attend activities held by the V18 for the fact

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that people within the V18 Foundation were not abiding by the European values (The Malta Independent, 24 April 2018). Whilst many did not really pay attention to this boycott the decision of some officials to boycott the events could have damaged the image of the country. The Dutch city of Leeuwarden, which was also designated as an ECoC, opted to follow the same path, deciding not to invite the V18 Foundation to its activities and refusing to attend any events which were taking place in Malta (Times of Malta, 26 April 2018c). The V18 programme contained several cultural activities, including ‘the big feast’ (Il-festa l-kbira). This event brought together the four traditional feasts of Valletta: St Paul, St Dominic, Our Lady of Mount Carmel, and St Augustine. The procession of these four statues had to come together at St George’s Square, then move to Republic Street before they return to their respective churches (Blagojevic Vella & Godhwani, 2018; V18, 2018). This was seen as a way of promoting the traditions which existed in Valletta and Malta’s Cultural Heritage. Still, some scholars argued that to showcase Malta’s European heritage, such an event should have included the non-Maltese communities, Greek, Russian, Serbian, Eritrean, Somali, and Italian which had their respective churches in Valletta, to highlight the sense of community and inclusion in the country (Ebejer et al., 2021). The idea of community was particularly important to not only offer a product of high culture but also to showcase the traditions which were popular amongst local communities (Baldacchino, 2018). The first evaluation of Malta’s Capital of Culture promoted the European element of the programme, with the European Commission praising the activities which showcased the cultural diversity of Europe, and which highlighted the common aspects of European cultures. It also praised the objectives of having a programme that showcased the European and international dimensions, highlighting the Mediterranean and European heritage of the country through various activities. The final report concluded that the V18 Foundation managed to establish a clear mechanism to continue the activities beyond 2018, promoting the Valletta Design Cluster as a way of continuing the regeneration of the capital of Malta. This regeneration was particularly important as Valletta was attracting more investment which in turn was attracting more businesses. Although this was helping the restoration of the historical landmarks, the investment was reducing the liveability of living in Malta, with many opting to move away with apartments and buildings being replaced by boutique hotels and evening leisure (Ebejer et al., 2021). This also means that there is the risk some historical traditions will be lost if people move away from the capital city. The committee that monitors the ECoC event referred to the problems surrounding the V18 Foundation. These included controversies and internal conflicts within the V18 Foundation. These were not helped by the departure of several key staff before the event had started, leading to various changes in the programme. The report also noted the various political appointees and controversies which led to both national and international criticism (European Commission, 2020). The ECoC provided the required opportunity to promote the arts and the artistic community in Malta. This led to the establishment of the ‘Create 2020 Strategy’ in 2015. The main aims of this strategy which was being promoted through the Arts

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Council in Malta were to encourage and promote creative potential and nurture this potential to turn it into a professional career through investment and start-ups. Another aim was to invest in artistic excellence to improve Malta’s cultural and creative products. The third aim was to establish a link between the artistic community in Malta and the international artistic community through the exchange of experiences and cooperation on several projects. The fourth aim was to provide more opportunities for people to engage in creativity. This was particularly important to increase cultural participation in Malta through closer collaboration between schools and the artistic community. The fifth objective was to build the capacity of Public Cultural Organisations (PCOs). This was important to encourage more cooperation between the cultural organisations to foster creativity, social wellbeing, and economic activity (Arts Council Malta, 2015). Much of these proposals were also incorporated into the 2025 strategy. The latter pledged to continue to work to strengthen Malta’s creative and cultural sectors (Arts Council Malta, 2022). There have been several reforms including the repeal of censorship laws in 2015. Still, culture is facing the same problem as other areas, that is the politicisation of these institutions and agencies, with leaders chosen not based on talent but based on political allegiance. As the artistic community in Malta is already small, it means that several individuals are being left out (Xuereb, 2018). The ECoC event showed that Malta could build a cultural programme on par with the other member states. Still, the country struggled not to put politics into everything. This is a problem in a country where the support for cultural activities (beyond traditional feasts) is still low compared to other European states. Xuereb (2022a) believes that it is up to every society to treasure the elements that contribute to its cultural identity and development and develop ways of working with them in innovative and beneficial ways. Despite the cultural events which took place providing a respite from the polarisation which existed, with the country promoting the historical heritage of the country, the aftermath of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia was still being felt. Polarisation would flare up again with the publication of the Egrant report and the start of the inquiry on the assassination of the Maltese journalist.

7.3

The Publication of the Inquiry on Egrant and the Pilatus Bank

The assassination of Caruana Galizia put further pressure on the Maltese Justice System to find the masterminds behind her assassination. Whilst civil society groups were awaiting justice to prevail, the main political parties were also awaiting the publication of the Egrant report. The report was particularly important given the allegation that Egrant Inc. was owned by the wife of the Prime Minister of Malta, Michelle Muscat. The report was finally published on 22 June 2018. Magistrate Aaron Bugeja found no evidence which would link the Muscat family to the Panama company and found no evidence that the Muscat family had any Panama accounts.

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The inquiry was based on the testimony of 477 witnesses and requested the assistance of several countries including Panama, Belgium, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Germany, and the USA. The report also outlined how various declarations of trust presented to the inquiry had falsified signatures. The person behind the falsified signatures used online information to falsify these documents. The inquiry also revealed that Pilatus Bank chairman Ali Sadr Hasheminejad did not have any important documents the night Caruana Galizia published the story concerning the Egrant allegations (Borg, Times of Malta, 22 July 2018a). Whilst the owner of Egrant Inc. remains a mystery, the publication of the Egrant report led to several changes. The report was only given to the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition demanded that he is given a copy. Still, the Leader of the Opposition decided to remove the former Nationalist Party leader Simon Busuttil from the shadow cabinet and asked him to shoulder responsibility by suspending himself from the parliamentary group until the investigations were over (Diacono, LovinMalta, 22 July 2018a). This led to another internal rift within the Nationalist Party, with Busuttil refusing to resign from the parliamentary group accusing his successor Adrian Delia of siding with Muscat, instead of focusing on the fight against corruption (Busuttil, 2018). The executive of the Nationalist Party would also start proceedings against Simon Busuttil over his actions towards the Egrant issue. These proceedings were then abandoned with the election of Bernard Grech as party leader. The divisions surrounding the publication of the report ended up in the country’s Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court presided by Chief Justice Joseph Azzopardi ruled that the Attorney General had breached the right of the Opposition leader when he handed the report to Muscat but not to him. The report was handed to the Opposition leader and he decided to publish it in its entirety (Diacono, LovinMalta, 17 December 2019). The full Egrant report revealed various recommendations which were not published within the main conclusions in 2018. It recommended an investigation into Nexia BT owned by Brian Tonna and Karl Cini, and Pilatus Bank owned by Ali Sadr Hasheminejad, over suspicious transactions which could have well been attempts of money laundering. The report also recommended a perjury investigation into the claims of Karl Cini, the co-owner of Nexia BT, Maria Efimova, and Jonathan Ferris because little evidence was found to their claims that Egrant belonged to Michelle Muscat. Little evidence was also found to Ferris’s claim that he had identified a $600,000 (€598,000) transaction from an Azeri politically exposed person to Buttardi, a company owned by a friend of the wife of Prime Minister Michelle Muscat (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 11 November 2020). The faith of the Pilatus Bank and its owner Ali Sadr Hasheminejad were sealed by international events. In fact, it was these events which gave the impetus to move and investigate the money laundering allegations which had plagued the bank. The bank had long been in the eye of EU institutions, particularly the European Banking Authority (EBA). In 2018, The EBA had issued a recommendation to the Maltese FIAU, due to the fact that the FIAU was found to have breached EU regulations in dealing with the Pilatus Bank. The EBA concluded that the FIAU failed to conduct an effective supervision on Pilatus Bank. This was due to a number of failures. These

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included procedural deficiencies and lack of supervisory actions by the FIAU. The latter did not act to investigate the shortcomings which existed within the bank and failed to act on the recommendations proposed by the EBA. These included the introduction of sanctions against Pilatus Bank. The EBA encouraged the FIAU to take the required actions towards the Pilatus Bank as stipulated by the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing Directive (AML/CTF) (EBA, 2018). The main political parties approached these recommendations differently. The party-in-government, through the Finance Minister Edward Scicluna, defended its reforms and criticised the European Commission for pressuring the EBA to act against the FIAU (Borg, Times of Malta. 23 July 2018b). The MEPs of the Nationalist Party reacted rather differently. David Casa declared that Pilatus Bank was left to operate with complete impunity, being the favourite bank of politically exposed persons such as Keith Schembri. He said that the institutions were protecting the politicians rather than the Maltese people. Roberta Metsola stated that Malta was again in the headlines for the wrong reasons. She argued that Pilatus Bank should have never been given a licence to operate in Malta (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 11 July 2018a). The owner of the bank was arrested on 20 March 2018 in the USA for breaching sanctions against Iran when he attempted to bypass these by channelling $115 million (€114.5 million) in payments to his Iranian family’s companies. Whilst the case against him would eventually be dropped, the faith of the bank was sealed. The FIAU removed Ali Sadr Hasheminejad from running the bank and an administrator was selected by the financial regulator. On 5 November 2018, after the recommendation of the FIAU, The European Central Bank withdrew the licence of the bank forcing it to close down. The European Central Bank did not have the legal powers to enforce the anti-money laundering legislation, but it could withdraw based on the feedback from national regulators (Jones, & O’Murchu, 2018). Pilatus appealed the sentence. In Pilatus Bank and Pilatus Holding v ECB (T-27/19), the European Court of Justice declared that the applicant failed to show that the European Commission and European Central Bank did not exercise their discretion or that they exercised it incorrectly. The Court said that based on the indictment of Ali Sadr in the USA, the European Central Bank was justified in withdrawing the licence of the bank (ECJ, 2022). The FIAU would decide to fine Pilatus Bank €4,975,500 for several systematic failures and lack of due diligence, especially when providing services to highrisk customers. The bank also failed to investigate suspicious transactions which might have led to money laundering (FIAU, 2021). Malta only issued an international arrest warrant for Pilatus owner Ali Sadr Hasheminejad and other banking directors in January 2022. This means that the case is still ongoing, and it might take months and even years to find the accused and complete the necessary procedures for them to be extradited to Malta (Vella, MaltaToday, 17 July 2022d). On 26 March 2019, the European Parliament published a resolution on financial crimes and tax avoidance in the European Union. In Malta, the resolution raised several questions on the allegations that several politically exposed persons in the country could be linked with another attempt of money laundering and tax evasion,

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this time with accounts in the UAE-based company called ‘17 Black’. It again raised several questions over the inaction of Maltese authorities which according to the document were not doing enough to investigate the case. The resolution recommended the Maltese authorities to investigate the case. The most important elements within the report were the questions that were raised on the lack of independence of the Maltese institutions, referring to the FIAU and the Commissioner of Police and their failure to make sure that 17 black accounts were frozen and investigations launched. It recommended that Malta establishes a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), based on an ad-hoc agreement to improve the quality of ongoing national investigations, with the assistance of Europol and Eurojust. Reference was also made on how Daphne Caruana Galizia was investigating the link between the owner of 17 Black (Jurgen Fenech) and politically exposed persons. The resolution outlined how Caruana Galizia had received information from the servers of ElectroGas, the company operating Malta’s power station, on how the owner of 17 Black was transferring money to various politically exposed persons (European Parliament, 26 March 2019a). This is important as this person would end up being accused of murdering the Maltese journalist. Malta’s tax policy and fight against money laundering and tax evasion ended up in the debates of the main political parties during the 2019 EU elections.

7.4

The 2019 European Elections

By 2019, the country was still in a political turmoil. As already argued, the resignation of Simon Busuttil led to the election of the newcomer Adrian Delia. This led to various internal disagreements with the Nationalist Party which weakened the opposition at a time when this was going to be tested in the 2019 European elections. This election was a test for both main political parties. For the Nationalist Party, there was a certain degree of scepticism on whether it would keep the third seat it had gained in the previous European elections. For the Labour Party, it was a question on whether the various investigations which were going on would have a negative impact on the popularity of the party and its leader. The 2017 national election revealed how the economic development of the country overshadowed the corruption allegations which emerged, with the electorate opting to reconfirm Muscat and the Labour Party (Carammia & Pace, 2019). The narratives used in the election were similar to the 2017 one, even though this election was less confrontational. The main political parties accused each other of working against the national interest. Both political parties proposed their own version on how the country should be represented in the EU (Cachia et al., 2020). The election was set to take place on 25 May 2019. Alongside the Nationalist and Labour Party, Malta’s Green Party was going to contest these elections. There were going to be joined by Norman Lowell from the far-right party ‘Imperium Europe’ the Maltese Patriots Movement the Democratic Party the right-wing political parties Alliance for Chance (AB) and the newly emerged party ‘Brain, not Ego’. Arnold

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The 2019 European Elections

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Cassola, the former Chairman of Malta’s Green Party would decide to leave the party and run as independent after disagreeing with the party over the issue of the legalisation of abortion, declaring that he was strongly against it. The national interest ended up being one of the main concerns for voters. A survey conducted by the English newspaper MaltaToday revealed that both Labour and Nationalist voters ranked defending Malta’s name as their top priority. The study did not specifically ask respondents to explain why they chose this as a priority and if they did, different reasons might have been provided given the different approach the main political parties had on this. The survey revealed that 36.4% of those voters who opted to vote for the PL in the 2017 national election said electing MEPs willing to ‘defend Malta’s name’ was a priority. This reveals the effectiveness of the Labour Party campaign in outlining the need to elect someone who could defend the interest of Malta within the European Parliament. The second most important issue for PL voters was ‘showing support for government’ (11.9%) with the third being the irregular migration problem (9.4%). For the Nationalist voters, 14.4% declared that priority should to defend the national interest within the European Parliament. The second most important priority was to elect capable MEPs (13.2%), with the third being environment destruction (11.5%) (Sansone, MaltaToday, 12 May 2019a). The Labour Party proposed the slogan ‘Malta in our hearts’, using vibrant colour in its campaign material with the theme of ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ at its centre. The slogan had a heart-shaped logo with the word ‘Malta’ in it, outlining how the Labour Party wanted to defend the national interest within the EU institutions. The Labour Party proposed ten priorities which included: 1. The MEPs of the Labour Party will always work for the national interest; 2. Having the biggest economic growth in Europe, the Labour MEPs would continue to safeguard the national interest through funds and economic incentives for all European citizens; 3. The European Union should become a window of opportunity for the Maltese with the Labour MEPs vowing to safeguard Malta’s tax system; 4. The Labour MEPs will promote the circular economy and will work to promote sustainable development; 5. The Labour MEPs will continue to safeguard LGBTIQ rights and will fight so that the gender pay gap is reduced in Europe; 6. The Labour MEPs will fight for a social Europe to improve the livelihood of the Europeans; 7. The Labour Party MEPs will continue working for future generations making sure that programmes such as Erasmus will get the needed funding; 8. The Labour MEPs will use the European Parliament to keep insisting on the need for solidarity to fight the irregular migration problem; 9. The Labour MEPs will support the government’s policy towards safeguarding the Maltese citizens; 10. The Labour MEPs will continue to work for Gozo and its citizens in order to get more investment and funding (PL, 2019).

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The Nationalist Party opted for the slogan ‘Together for our country’. This approach was very similar to that of the Labour Party with a hint of patriotism and outlined how the Nationalist Party and its MEPs would defend the national interest within the EU institutions. In the manifesto, the Nationalist Party Leader reminded the electorate that it was the vision of the Nationalist Party which led to Malta’s membership in the European Union. The main themes in the Nationalist Party’s manifesto were identity, solidarity, and common good. The Nationalist Party pledged to use the MEPs to fight social inequality with the Maltese MEPs using the European Parliament to promote social justice and to fight poverty across the region. The manifesto also pledged to fight cheap labour and promised that the Nationalist Party’s MEPs would work so that wages would be raised to improve the livelihood of the Maltese. The Nationalist Party also pledged to use the European Parliament to promote better health services for the Europeans and to insist on common strategies to fight illnesses such as cancer through research and innovation. The party also included various proposals on the environment in order to promote more sustainability. It also wanted to get more funds from the EU to help Malta’s farmers and fishermen. The Nationalist Party declared that the irregular migration was a security issue, with the party pledging to use the EU institutions in order to find a common solution to the problem. The last area which the manifesto tackled was good governance, pledging to use its MEPs in order to restore the reputation of Malta and continue to promote democracy across Europe (PN, 2019). Whilst Malta’s Green Party is considered a small party, it provided the most detailed manifesto. The slogan used was ‘Greener is the answer’, declaring that the manifesto was based on the one proposed by the European Greens including the fight against climate change, investment in the Green economy, and the need to use the EU Parliament to pressure the EU upload of its fundamental principles including democracy, good governance, and transparency. Malta’s Green Party was the first party to support a discussion on the legalisation of abortion in Malta. Whilst the party did not support the legalisation of abortion, it declared that society needed a discussion on the subject which should provide more awareness and a better understanding of how to deal with the issue (AD, 2019). The abortion issue would dominate the campaign of the Nationalist Party especially after the Party of European Socialists (PES) opted to include it in its manifesto. Still, the Labour Party in Malta did not include any reference to abortion, highlighting how this was a national issue rather than a European one (Micallef, The Malta Independent, 4 March 2019). The European elections provided two novelties. For the first time, 16 year olds could vote in this election. These were also granted the right to vote in the national elections, with them voting for the first time in 2022. An electronic system was introduced to facilitate vote counting with the result expected within few hours rather than days after the election took place (Carammia & Pace, 2019). Whilst the political manifestos of the European elections had a European dimension, the reality is that in the campaigns focused on national issues. The electorate had to decide which party was going to safeguard the national interest within the European Institutions. Both parties viewed national interest differently, with Labour

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looking at it as a way of safeguarding the image of Malta within the EU institutions. On the other hand, for the Nationalist Party, protecting the national interest could be achieved by safeguarding the institutions and promoting good governance. The Labour Party and its leader Muscat pushed for the election to be a test between Delia and himself, using his popularity to push the Labour Party and its candidates. Whilst in most European states there was a threat that these elections could be won by far-right parties, this was not a major issue in Malta. Imperium Europa and its leader Norman Lowell were known to attract thousands of votes in these elections. However, due to the Single Transferable Vote, these voters were never enough to elect one of their representatives in the European Parliament. This was largely due to the distribution of votes. The far-right in Malta lacked a charismatic leader which could shift way votes from the traditional political parties. In addition, the main political parties have always traditionally taken a conservative stance towards irregular migration, which meant that there was no need for other parties to defend the national interest (Debono, MaltaToday, 14 April 2019). However, whilst the far-right was not challenging the mainstream political parties, it does not mean that irregular migration was not a concern. For many Maltese, the only threat to national security is the irregular migration problem (Fiott, 2022). This is why the issue is one of the few whose presence is constant in electoral campaigns. Since Malta joined the EU, the main political parties have consistently proposed a collective solution rather than a national one. This is due to the fact, that without the support of the EU and its member states, there was little chance of finding a solution to the problem. Still, the murder of Lassana Cisse on 6 April 2019 would expose the deep issue of racism in Malta and the failure of the main political parties to deal with the rising problem. The Nationalist Party faced several challenges in this election. The party was still riddled with political divisions, with surveys predicting that it would lose the third seat in the European Parliament. There was also the fear that a segment of the party, specifically those loyal to Daphne Caruana Galizia, would decide to abstain from voting to send a message to the party. This threat would also mean that the party was at risk of losing even more votes. For the first time, the party’s campaign had a hint of policy scepticism or growing pragmatism, due to the belief that the European Union was becoming too liberal. Under the leadership of Delia, the party shifted again towards social conservatism, with the abortion issue becoming embedded in the party’s identity (Debono, MaltaToday, 14 April 2019). The Nationalist Party campaign was mainly based on three main issues: tax harmonisation, abortion, and the problem with foreign workers in Malta. All these issues were linked with the European Union. The party had traditionally approached the European elections as second-order elections whilst in government and opposition. Beyond that, the party had always tried to provide a European dimension to its campaign, asking voters to select the candidates which would be more suitable to deal with European issues rather than national ones. Whilst the European dimension of the campaign is admirable, given the effort that the European Parliament usually makes to have voters base their vote on European issues, it never really worked in Malta. Voters in Malta, like in many other countries, traditionally used the European elections to rate

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the performance of the government or to send a message to the main political parties. In both cases, the Nationalist Party had always been in trouble as it never managed to build an alternative campaign that would compete with that of the Labour Party. The Nationalist Party warned that the spitzenkandidaten of the PES, Timmermans, was promoting tax harmonisation and abortion. The party was still in favour of the European Union. However, it warned that the PES was forcing member states of the EU to introduce tax harmonisation and abortion to the detriment of the Maltese. The party’s stance towards foreign workers in Malta, in particular Sicilians, attracted widespread criticism as the party had long campaigned for European membership and highlighted the benefits of the freedom of values. This was seen as an example of how the party was regressing rather than moving forward (Debono, MaltaToday, 28 April 2019). A segment of the Nationalist Party campaign was based on the issue concerning the legalisation of abortion. Some of its billboards, social media, and newspapers advertisements featured babies with the slogan ‘Life is my right’. During the campaign, the party made reference to various times where the Labour MEPs voted in favour of abortion, linking them to the abortion policy promoted by Timmermans and highlighting the danger which the Socialists posed to Malta (Il-Mument, 3 May 2019). In fact, the Nationalist Party began to refer to the Labour Party as the Socialist Party in order to highlight the link which existed between the PES and the Labour Party in Malta. They party highlighted how each vote for the Labour MEPs would ultimately benefit the PES (and the S&D Group in the European Parliament) and they would enforce the legalisation abortion on the country. This is why the Nationalist Party defended its position, highlighting how the party and its MEPs would continue to defend the right of life within EU institutions (In-Nazzjon, 10 May 2019a). The issue of abortion would be the perfect example of how national issues are turned into European issues. Whilst the European Union had repeatedly expressed its opinion towards abortion, it was still considered a national matter. This meant that the European Parliament had little or no influence on the matter, with the European Council and its ability to give the European Union more responsibility over the matter. Another potential dispute between Malta and the European Union concerned tax harmonisation. Various governments have long resisted the attempts made by the European Union to develop a common tax policy amongst EU member states. For this reason, the Nationalist Party declared that its MEPS would safeguard the national interest within the European Parliament. They would do so by challenging the approach taken by the S&D and their spitzenkandidaten Timmermans to prevent them from introducing a common tax policy which would have a series of negative implications in Malta. They also emphasised how this could eventually result in loss of employment (In-Nazzjon, 4 May 2019b) and loss of economic sovereignty for Malta which would be unable to decide its tax policies without the intervention of the EU (In-Nazzjon, 6 May 2019c). The threat of tax harmonisation was also tackled by one of the leading candidates of the Nationalist Party, Roberta Metsola. Whilst Metsola was one of the targets of the Labour campaign, highlighting her role in various reports that the European

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Parliament concluded on Malta, she declared that it was the Labour Party that was damaging the country. In one of her columns, she outlined how the S&D had been insisting on introducing a corporate tax of 18% and how the Nationalist MEPs had taken a leading role so that Malta is not branded a tax haven. She, therefore, encouraged voters to vote for the Nationalist Party to defend the economic sovereignty of the country (Metsola, In-Nazzjon, 7 May 2019a). Just before the European elections, a plenary session was held in the European Parliament to discuss tax havens in the European Union and a resolution on rule of law in Slovakia and Malta. There were various references from multiple MEPs from different groups on whether Malta is a tax haven, with the country being heavily criticised for its lack of reforms to address these problems. During that discussion, reference was made to the fact that European values are Maltese values and the European Parliament should do its utmost to protest the interests of the Maltese. David Cassa, a fellow MEP of the Nationalist Party also outlined the need to defend the interests of the Maltese, including the prevention of tax harmonisation which would be detrimental to the Maltese people, and push for more juridical reforms. The Labour MEPs, including Alfred Sant, outlined how the European Parliament was discussing issues that were the responsibility of the member states. His fellow MEP Miriam Dalli praised the juridical reforms of the Maltese administration attacking the reforms which the Nationalist Party had introduced whilst in government (European Parliament, 26 March 2019a). As per tradition, the spitzenkandidaten of the EPP, Manfred Webber, visited Malta to endorse the campaign of the Nationalist Party. These visits are usually sought after by Malta’s main political parties in order to give their campaigns an international dimension and give further legitimacy to their programmes. During his visit, Webber declared that Malta is a small island but has a big role to play in the European Union. Webber outlined the need for the European Institutions to work together in order to find a long-term solution for the irregular migration problem and praised the approach taken by the Nationalist Party on climate change, healthcare, and the environment (Net News, 28 April 2019d). The Nationalist Party opted to use another set of reports by the European Parliament and Council of Europe to underline the problems which still existed in Malta’s institutions. On 28 March 2019, the European Parliament approved a resolution which recommended that the Maltese government launches an independent public inquiry on the assassination of Caruana Galizia, in order to uncover how this assassination was allowed to happen. The resolution also requested an investigation on the Panama Papers and 17 Black which were linked with a number of politically exposed persons to uncover whether any financial crimes and tax evasion had taken place (European Parliament, 28 March 2019c). Another report by the Council of Europe (Greco, 2019) revealed that even though corruption was one of the main concerns for the Maltese people, little was done to investigate and initiate proceedings or disciplinary actions even when allegations of crimes were confirmed by the National Audit Office. It also declared that Malta lacked an overall strategy and coherent risk-based approach when it comes to integrity standards for government officials. The report recommended stricter rules to prevent conflicts of interest

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and the enforcement of such rules. The report also recommended for sanctions to be introduced to deter public officials from violating the code of ethics rules (Greco, 2019). The Nationalist Party also used the latest report on World Press Freedom which in 2019, ranked Malta in 77th place, dropping from the 65th place from the previous year (Taylor, The Shift, 18 April 2019). The Nationalist Party referred to these reports to persuade the electorate to vote for its MEPs in order to restore the image of Malta and secure the interests of the Maltese. The Labour Party and its leader Joseph Muscat portrayed themselves as the underdog in these elections, even though various surveys had highlighted the dominance of the Labour Party and Muscat over the Nationalist Party and Delia. Being an excellent orator, Muscat often spoke in the third person, highlighting that everyone is involved in the manifesto. It was not simply what the party could do, but what the Maltese citizens could achieve if they worked together. By doing so, he made the electorate a part of the campaign. This approach enabled the Labour Party to win more votes. One of these was conducted by the well-known statistician and scholar Vincent Marmara. The electoral survey commissioned by the newspaper ItTorċa revealed that 59.5% trusted the Labour leader Joseph Muscat, who was again found to be more popular than the actual party, compared to 37% trust in the Nationalist leader Adrian Delia. With regard to party surveys, Labour was at 55.2% compared to the Nationalist Party’s 39% (Marmara, It-Torċa, 5 May 2019). The Labour campaign was mostly based on the economic interest and the threat that the Nationalist Party’s MEPs posed to the national interest. The economic development of the country was going to be an important area that the Labour Party promoted to secure another record victory over its opponents. Labour Party leader Joseph Muscat placed the Maltese citizens at the heart of his campaign. He declared that Malta could become a land of opportunity for the people who were living in it (Coleiro, L-Orizzont, 29 April 2019). The Labour Party opted to use the reports published by the European Union to showcase how the Nationalist Party’s MEPs were working against the national interest. The Labour Party promoted its European vision for the country, declaring that the Nationalist Party had no strategy, but rather thrived on divisions and worked against the interest of the Maltese (Farrugia, L-Orizzont, 3 May 2019a). The Prime Minister took a positive approach, highlighting that the Labour Party would bring more employment and would continue to promote unity whilst the Nationalist Party would only more divisions (L-Orizzont, 7 May 2019). The party shifted from the European dimension by highlighting how the European elections were an issue on credibility, outlining the economic success of the country which included a low unemployment rate (5.4%) and 5.2% economic growth expected for 2020 (Scicluna l-Orizzont, 3 May 2019). The party highlighted how it was the turn for the government to focus on the environment, with the plantation of 100,000 trees in order to improve various areas across Malta (L-Orizzont, 13 May 2019e). The spitzenkandidaten of the S&D group also visited Malta to endorse the manifesto of Muscat and the Labour Party. He praised the work done by the Labour administration towards civil rights and turning Malta’s economy into one of the most competitive in Europe. He highlighted the need for the European Socialists to

7.4

The 2019 European Elections

Table 7.5 The 2019 European election results

PL PN AD Imperium Europa PD Cassola Turnout

305 Seats 4 2 – – – –

Votes 141,267 98,611 1866 8238 5276 2127

Votes (%) 54.29 37.90 0.72 3.23 2.03 0.82 72.7

become the leading group in the European Parliament so that they could pursue their agenda (L-Orizzont 2 May 2019f). One of the major missteps of the campaign is the statement given by Muscat towards foreign workers in Malta. Whilst the Nationalist Party had campaign on the threat which these workers posed, the Labour Party leader Muscat declared that he did not want Maltese to pick up rubbish. This statement was criticised for being classist and for giving the perception that foreign workers in Malta were second class citizens, only good for low-skilled jobs (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 2 May 2019b). The attitude towards foreign workers would become an increasing problem in Malta especially as a number of foreign workers began to lose their lives on job sites with little or no empathy offered to these individuals. The Covid-19 pandemic would also mean that many of these foreign workers would end up without a job, with the country pushing them to return to their country of origin. Still, once restrictions had been removed, many ended up without the needed human resources to be able to open their businesses. In the end, the election was won by the Labour Party. As shown in Table 7.5, the Labour Party managed to win four out of the six available. The party received 141,267 votes winning 54.29% of the total votes whilst the Nationalist Party received 98,611 votes, winning 37.90% of the total votes. This was another victory for the Labour Party electing Miriam Dalli, Alfred Sant, Josianne Cutajar, and Alex Agius Saliba. The Nationalist Party only managed to elect Roberta Metsola and David Casa. Malta’s Green Party only managed to win 1866 votes (0.72%). They ended up being beaten by Imperium Europa with its far-right candidate receiving 8238 votes (3.23%), Democratic Party (PD) which received 5276 (2,03%), and Independent Candidate and former Chairman of the Green Party Arnold Cassola who gathered 2127 votes (0.82%). The turnout for the European elections was 72.7% and whilst this was generally high compared to other EU states, it was still far lower than the turnout of national elections in Malta (Malta Electoral Commission, 2020) (Table 7.5). The internal divisions within the Nationalist Party did not help the party to win some of the votes which it had lost over the years. The decision to focus on issues such as abortion and tax harmonisation was met with little interest by the voters who were more focused on the economic development of the country (Carammia & Pace, 2019). The party designed a campaign based on European issues which did not really engage the electorate. The fact that the European Union had declared numerous

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times that abortion was an issue of national sovereignty did little to help the party. The campaign was mostly based on negative issues and as showcased in the 2017 election, such campaigns were relatively unpopular in Malta. Whilst the main party leaders sought to play down the result, it was clear that there was a huge divide within the Nationalist party which could not be healed. The internal struggles over the poor campaign and approach which the Nationalist Party was taking over various issues would lead to a constitutional challenge. For the first time, the Nationalist Party MPs turned against their own leader Delia, opting to nominate their fellow MPs Therese Comodini Cachia as Leader of the Opposition. The rift between the members of Nationalist Party had the danger of splitting the party into two. This rebellion within the Nationalist Party posed a constitutional challenge as to whether Delia could be removed as leader of the Opposition by the President. The President of Malta George Vella concluded that he had no constitutional rights to remove Delia as Leader of the Opposition. Still, knowing that he enjoyed little support amongst his colleagues, the party executive voted to have another leadership contest (Times of Malta, 1 August 2020a). Expectations were that Comodini Cachia would compete against Delia in this new leadership election. This would have meant that Malta could have its first woman Leader for the Opposition. However, the contest ended up being between Delia and another political newcomer, Bernard Grech. The members of the Nationalist Party chose Bernard Grech over Adrian Delia. Grech won 69.3% of the total votes and on 3 October 2020 became the leader of the Nationalist Party (Times of Malta, 3 October 2020b). The Labour Party managed to produce another elaborate campaign based on positivity and the need to protect the interests of the Maltese. The party engaged continuously with voters through social media. It was the Labour Party leader Joseph Muscat who led the campaign rather than the candidates contesting the European elections. The party managed to win 4 seats which meant that it would have a stronger representation in Strasbourg (Cachia et al., 2020) Whilst these European elections can be considered as second lower elections in Malta due to the low turnout, with campaigns based on national issues, one can state that polarisation and partisanship help political parties showcase the fact that these elections matter. Whilst the turnout of the 2019 elections increased in most of Europe, there was still a problem with the idea of placing Europe at the heart of the campaigns. The Labour Party opted to place the European dimension in the manifesto. However, it promoted national issues in the eventual campaign, and this proved to be extremely successful given the result achieved by the party.

7.5

The Murder of Lassana Cisse

The racially motivated murder of Lassana Cisse took place in the midst of the 2019 European Elections. This murder exposed the threats of racism and hate speech and their negative impact on Malta’s society. The problem of online hate speech and racism had already been raised by various politicians and NGOs. In one of his

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The Murder of Lassana Cisse

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Table 7.6 Reaction to the murder of Lassana Cisse H.E President George Vella

Prime minister Joseph Muscat

The leader of the opposition Adrian Delia

H.G archbishop Scicluna

The President would like to convey his sincere condolences to the migrant and foreign community in the country for the heinous murder of a person from amongst their community, and for the others hurt, and assures them that this act does in no way reflect the sentiments of the Maltese and Gozitan people (The Malta Independent, 18 May 2019g). Words of hatred and division have no place in our society. It is a strong signal to all those who spread hate speech. There are consequences to spreading such ill-placed sentiments. We remain steadfast in our call for unity among the Maltese and all those who live in Malta (Muscat, 2019) PN fully condemns hate crime, racially motivated violence, and racial discrimination in all its forms. We demand an urgent, independent, transparent, and thorough investigation (Delia, 2019) Great sadness, shock, and shame as we confront the true evil face of the xenophobia, hatred and sense of impunity that poison a number of us Maltese: soldiers arrested for killing Ħal Far migrant because he was black (Scicluna, 2019)

speeches President George Vella (2019a) referred to the Constitution of Malta, which although does not make reference to online hate speech, it lists race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity as the fundamental rights that are to be protected and respected. The issue is whether these fundamental rights are ignored as political parties and politicians politicise these issue to gain political advantage. In the address which the President gave at the Solidarity Overseas Service (SOS) Malta Conference, he discussed how online hate speech was leading to intolerant and xenophobic messages which were seeping into mainstream politics and reproduced through social media. He warned that this was enabling individuals to induce threats, spread fear amongst society and build a number of stereotypes on individuals of different race, colour, or religion. Few months after this speech, the country would witness a racial motivated murder which raised a number of questions on the negative implications of racism in the country. On 6 April 2019 in Ħal-Far, a migrant was shot dead, whilst two others were injured. Ivorian Lassana Cisse Souleymane, a father of three, was killed after being shot in the head. The assassination of Lassana Cisse produced a number of reactions in the country as shown in Table 7.6. The murder led to the arrest of Lorin Scicluna and Francesco Fenech. These two army officials stood accused of shooting dead Lassana Cisse and injuring two others in a drive-by shooting. The men were also accused of having, on 1 February 2019, attempted to murder May Malimi, a Chadian migrant, in the same area. All of these crimes were thought to be racially motivated (Cilia, The Malta Independent, 19 May 2019). The two would be granted bail in December 2019, with the case still ongoing. The main political figures within the country condemned the murder, declaring that it

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was not a reflection of the attitude which existed within the army. They also praised the work of the Malta Police Force who managed to find the alleged masterminds behind these attacks. Still, for many, the murder of Lassana Cisse was another example of institutional failings and the high level of intolerance which existed within the country (Aquilina, 2022; Delia, 2021). Two of the leading MEP candidates pushed for the need to address the problem. Roberta Metsola (2019b) called for the need to tackle racism at every level of society whilst MEP Miriam Dalli (2019) declared that hate speech and hate crime had no place in Malta. For a number of NGOs, the murder of Lassana Cisse showcased the problem of racism in Malta. Moviment Graffitti, alongside other NGOs including Aditus and the Jesuits Refugee Centre, had long championed the rights of irregular migrants, even though not everyone appreciates the work towards irregular migrants. For Moviment Graffitti, Lassana Cisse’s murder was an eye-opener about the dire situation Malta has been facing in relation to racism. They outlined how racial discrimination is still a very present and serious problem, with the organisation still working to shed light on the injustice faced by migrants in the country and the consequences of having structures which do not protect minorities. The organisation outlined how effort has been made to change the way Malta’s institutions and cultures look at and treat black people and organised a number of events related to Lassana’s tragedy, including commemorations on the anniversaries of his death. The organisation outlined how migrants still face verbal and physical threats, as well as injustices stemming from unfair policies, judiciary processes, and institutions which are not providing the protection they need (Pisani 2022). A similar argument was made by Flask (2022) who referred to the institutional failings which led to the murder of Lassana Cisse. He outlined how if the institutions worked as they should have, the very murder itself could have been avoided. Whilst many have tried to play down the role of the party, the fact remained that two-armed officials stand accused of the murder. The two alleged murderers should have been there to protect the individual and everyone who resides in Malta. Flask outlined how they did not shoot a criminal at the end of the day, but an innocent man who was walking home after watching a football match. They shot two men, one of them surviving in cold blood. One of the leading problems which are often ignored in the discussions on racism in Malta is that narratives on racism have veered to the right over the years. This took place when various politicians began to buy air time in a number of private channels and established their own platform. They used this space to demonise migrants, labelling them as a security issue and a threat towards the country’s cultural identity. Warrington’s (2022) analysis focuses on the reaction that the murder and other accidents involving irregular migrants received. He declared that the murder of Lassana Cisse caught the eye of some news outlets and some NGOs, as did the abandonment of an injured immigrant construction worker in 2021. Warrington (2022) argues that these were shocking crimes for their callousness as for what they revealed about Malta’s economic system, buoyed up by the ruthless exploitation of vulnerable immigrants. Still, Warrington (2022) looks at the wider problem which is the little attention that is paid to the numerous deaths of immigrant workers on

7.5

The Murder of Lassana Cisse

309

building sites, a fact that also exposes the weakness of Malta’s legal frameworks and regulatory institutions. He believes that whilst this is certainly inconsistent with the professed values of the EU, the problem being faced by third-country nationals in Malta are also faced by third-country nationals across the EU. This is due to the economic systems and regulatory institutions which are consistently more virtuous than Malta and which do not protect the rights of these individuals. To add to this evaluation, hardly any reference to the racial murder of Lassana Cisse was made by the European Union, even though the country was being closely followed due to the ongoing investigation into the assassination of Caruana Galizia. Still, others believe that this was the work of individuals. The belief is that the racially motivated murder does not represent the attitudes of the vast majority of the people who had condemned this attack on irregular migrants (Gonzi, 2022; Vella, 2022). Gonzi’s (2022) opinion is that Malta’s ancestors were able to surmount divisions based on race, creed, or colour, also because of practical reasons. With Malta being such a small island, it always needed to cooperate with all its neighbours in North Africa or Southern Europe. There is also the issue that many Maltese migrated abroad for better economic prospects. This is why many understand what it feels like to leave their country and relatives in order to find a better life for themselves and their family. His opinion is that Maltese have consistently shown solidarity during the Arab Spring and Libyan crisis. Still, the danger is that both the governments and the media are accomplices in building the narrative on these migrants as being a threat to Malta and its culture. This means that more needs to be done to remove the stigma which irregular migrants have and to provide a more humane way to deal with the problem (Gonzi, 2022). In the end, many chose to ignore this murder. Still, various NGOs are demanding justice for Lassana and his family. Lassana Cisse would be remembered with a painting in the Basilica of Saint George in Victoria Gozo. The painting, by the young Gozitan artist Manuel Farrugia, features Lassana Cisse in a hospital gown being held by a priest, whilst another man gives him his back as he is focused on his mobile phone formed part of the parish priest project ‘Where is your brother?’. The painting created widespread criticism on social media with various racist statements against irregular migrants (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 29 October 2021). This highlights that the problem of racism is still growing, with institutions doing little to fight it. Whilst the painting of Lassana Cisse was met with widespread criticism, the same thing could not be said about the painting of Joseph Portelli, a business tycoon on a religious standard that was used to decorate the streets of Nadur as part of the feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul (Imnarja). It is clear that there is still a long way to go before the values of tolerance and non-discrimination are embedded in Malta’s society. Lassana Cisse’s body was repatriated to Ivory Coast in July 2022 so that his family could finally bury him (Vella, MaltaToday, 1 July 2022c).

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The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and the Resignation of Muscat

The inquiry into the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia was still ongoing when the European elections took place in 2019. Yet, events linked to the assassination of Caruana Galizia would lead to a political crisis in 2019. The year is also particularly important given the Court’s decision to side with the former leader of the Nationalist Party and to open an investigation on Minister Konrad Mizzi and the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister Keith Schembri on their accounts in Panama. Magistrate Doreen Galea ruled that the inquiry should be carried out within the inquiry on the Dubai company 17 Black. Whilst the government played down the ruling (Sansone, MaltaToday, 29 April 2019b), it would also affect both Schembri and Mizzi and their roles within the government. By the end of November 2019, as more revelations would come alight, a series of protests took place to demand justice. To understand how this evolved and the role of the European Union in the investigation, one must look at the impact which the first arrests had on the investigation and political system. The investigation into the assassination of Caruana Galizia led to several arrests after a number of raids were made across Malta. Around 10 people were arrested on 4 December 2017 in an operation between the police, Malta’s secret service, and the army, concerning the assassination of Caruana Galizia. Seven were released later that week and three of them were arraigned over her assassination. These three were the brothers Alfred and Robert Degiorgio and Vince Muscat. They were already known to the police and were linked with several crimes around Malta. Before the arrest of the three, the police had raided a warehouse in Marsa where criminal gangs were known to meet and plan their crimes (Martin, Times of Malta, 5 December 2017). The arrest of these 3 suspects did not stop the investigation. Beyond the myriad of appeals of Constitutional cases which the three suspects instituted against the Maltese government, many were still waiting for the start of the public enquiry which would reveal more information on the assassination. The inquiry on the assassination of Caruana Galizia entered a crucial state on 19 November 2019, when the Prime Minister confirmed that a presidential pardon would be given to the middleman after he was arrested on a separate case. The middleman promised to reveal more information on the assassination (Martin, Times of Malta, 19 November, 2019). The middleman would be later revealed as Melvin Theuma, who had already caught the attention of Malta’s Police and Europol over a money laundering ring. Theuma was given a presidential pardon on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The condition imposed to the pardon was that he would provide evidence in court on the assassination of Caruana Galizia (The Malta Independent, 26 November 2019h). Melvin Theuma had confirmed that the Degiorgio brothers and Vince Muscat were the ones who had assassinated Caruana Galizia. Still, the critical juncture which led to the political instability of 2019 was the arrest of business tycoon Yorgen Fenech. Daphne Caruana Galizia was very critical about him in her blog due to his links with Konrad Mizzi, Keith Schembri and Prime Minister Muscat. He was apprehended by the

7.6

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and. . .

311

Table 7.7 The 2019 protests Date 21-Nov-19 22-Nov-19 24-Nov-19 26-Nov-19 27-Nov-19 29-Nov-19 30-Nov-19 01-Dec-19 01-Dec-19 02-Dec-19 03-Dec-19 08-Dec-19 09-Dec-19 13-Dec-19 18-Dec-19 05-Jan-20 13-Jan-20

Civil Society Groups Venue Repubblika, occupy justice Auberge de Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Auberge de Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Parliament Repubblika, occupy justice Parliament-Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Valletta and Floriana Repubblika, occupy justice Valletta Moviment Graffitti Auberge de Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Parliament Prime minister Dr. Joseph Muscat announces that he is stepping down Parliament Repubblika, occupy justice Repubblika, occupy justice Auberge de Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Auberge de Castille Moviment Graffitti Auberge de Castille Repubblika, occupy justice Valletta European Parliament calls for the resignation of Dr. Muscat Repubblika, occupy justice Valletta Dr. Joseph Muscat resigns as prime minister and member of parliament

Source: Vassallo et al. (2023)

Armed Forces of Malta after being detained on his family yacht Gio as he sought to escape Malta through Italy. Before attempting to flee Malta, it was revealed that Fenech had removed himself from the Tumas Group companies in order not limit any potential damage which they might incur. He also resigned from his position as director of ElectroGas, the organisation in charge of the new Delimara Power Plant (Calleja, Times of Malta, 24 November 2019). The arrest of Yorgen Fenech as a suspect in the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia led to various protests by civil society groups. As seen in Table 7.7, Repubblika and Occupy Justice organised a number of protests across Valletta to pressure the Prime Minister and some of his closest associates to resign. Various protests were staged and this catalysed various civil society groups to come together and push for political and institutional changes (Warrington, 2022). A first-hand experience of the protests was provided by Aquilina (2022) who argued that the protests helped the removal of Muscat. Still, he believes that Muscat did not leave because he feared civil society groups. After all, various surveys revealed that his popularity remained high with the majority of the Maltese electorate. Aquilina (2022) argued that Muscat was encouraged to resign by the cabinet and the Labour Party, and he ultimately did so since he lost the support of the majority of the cabinet. The reflections of Aqulina (2022) are similar to those of Cremona (2022). Cremona (2022) believes that the cabinet played an important role in the resignation of Muscat. The fact that protests were taking place every day meant that extra pressure was being added which contributed to the political instability. Moviment Graffitti and the Independent media in Malta took part in some of the protests. Pisani

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(2022) from the Moviment Graffitti also agreed that civil society organisations provided the required pressure to ultimately demand the Labour Party to remove Muscat and some of the politically exposed persons linked to his premiership. She provides an interesting overview how such pressure, which was relatively new in Malta’s political parties, and many still do not understand the role which such organisations played, is vital. She highlighted how the main message of all organisations was clear and that Joseph Muscat was causing this instability and thus needed to be removed. The fact that civil society groups were protesting in front of symbolic buildings, including Parliament, Courts, Castille, and the Police Headquarters, meant that the institutions had to act to restore a sense of normality. After all, the latest revelations on the assassination of Caruana Galizia involved politically exposed individuals which were at the centre of various controversies. On 25 November 2019, during a heated exchange on the new revelations on the assassination of Caruana Galizia, the opposition decided to walk out of parliament The Leader of the Opposition Adrian Delia accused the Prime Minister of failing to shoulder political responsibility and undermining Maltese institutions (Schembri Orland, Times of Malta, 27 November 2019). During this period, many called for the President to act in order to restore normality in the country. Yet the President has limited powers, which he could not use beyond meeting the main politicians in the country to discuss how to move forward. In a message to the Maltese citizens, President George Vella called for the respect of the country and its values and declared that Malta deserved better (Vella, 2019b). The crisis led to the resignation of Konrad Mizzi and suspension of Chris Cardona from the cabinet, as well as the resignation of Keith Schembri from the post of Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister. According to reports, Schembri was mentioned in recordings between Mr. Fenech and suspected intermediary Melvin Theuma. The police would later search his home and interrogate him (Times of Malta, 26 November 2019i). As civil society groups placed further pressure on the Prime Minister to resign, Muscat would announce his resignation on 1 December 2019 declaring that he would resign as Prime Minister once a new leader of the Labour Party was elected (Grech, Times of Malta, 1 December 2019). Whilst the call for the resignation of Muscat was taking place, few had asked for the country to go back to the polls. It was clear that whilst there were these corruption allegations, the Labour Party still enjoyed the support of the majority of the electorate, and it would have been re-elected anyway. Therefore, many of these calls were for a reshuffle to take place, which would have removed a number of individuals from the executive. The European Parliament opted to discuss the political instability which emerged in Malta following the arrest of Yorgen Fenech. A debate was held on 18 December 2019. Věra Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission declared that the Commission was worried about the recent developments in Malta. She outlined how media freedom was the foundation of a democratic country. She declared that those responsible for the assassination of Caruana Galizia were to be brought to justice as soon as possible. In terms of reforms, she highlighted those which began in 2018 concerning these in the European Semester country-specific recommendations (European Parliament, 17 December 2019b). The debate in the European Parliament ended up projecting the divisions within the political parties as shown in Table 7.8.

7.6

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and. . .

313

Table 7.8 Malta MEPs and their reaction to the 2019 protests and resignation of Prime Minister Muscat MEPs Roberta Metsola (EPP)

David casa (EPP)

Alex Agius Saliba (S&D)

Discussion For years, our prime minister and his paid envoys have conducted a taxpayer-funded disinformation campaign of vitriol, targeting anyone and everyone who dared to stand up to them. They tried to intimidate, threaten, and silence by calling rallies to denounce us as traitors, but we knew then what the world knows now and we refused to give in. Now we want the world to know that we are not all cut from the same cloth as Joseph Muscat and the criminals that he empowers because, when the world looks at Malta, they should see our face, a people standing up. They should see people like Michael and Rose, Peter and Matthew, Andrew and Paul, Daphne’s family whose search for justice sparked a light that even the darkest of forces could not extinguish. We are closer to justice than ever before but we are not there yet. Muscat is still trying to cling to power for at least another 30 days of chaos—Interfering, influencing, and contaminating the investigation. He must resign immediately if my country stands any chance of moving forward. Do not continue (referring to Timmermans: The council and commission) to defend the indefensible. I call my colleagues in this chamber, to remember the values that unite us and make us Europeans. Fight corruption and be on the side of the people. This is not a fight against the Maltese people, this is a fight for the Maltese people. Mr. president, I start by asking for an apology for the way the Maltese government has acted and is still acting. In full honesty, I never thought I could ever be ashamed of my country’s government as much as I am today. I am ashamed of the group of criminals who have taken over the Maltese government. I am ashamed of the institutions found in my country that have not done their job. I am ashamed of the killing of Daphne Caruana Galizia. However, the Maltese government is not Malta. These few criminals do not represent the Maltese and Gozitan people. The real Maltese and Gozitan people can be found protesting in the streets of my country. They are resilient people, strong people, brave people. These are the true Maltese in my country. And while the Maltese government makes me ashamed, it is the Maltese people who make me proud. Proud of not letting anyone bring us down. We are proud to recognise that among the best journalists here on this continent, Daphne is one of them. Daphne is the real Maltese. However, now we want to take action on a European level. Enough empty words, vague sentences, and promises of monitoring. Action is now needed by the absent council and by the commission to do their duty. Get up and protect the Maltese and Gozitan people. Ensure that our institutions are citizens’ side. The Maltese and Gozitan people have the right to all this. I am proud that together with Roberta (Metsola), we are with the Maltese and Gozitan people. I am proud to be part of this family that has in these two years, always been in favour of the Maltese and Gozitan people! Mr. president, I am proud to be Maltese. I am proud of my country and I will never accept that because of the alleged greed of the few, my whole country, the whole of Malta, will be branded as if it were a mafia state. From the first day following this crime, the government gave all the tools to our authorities and institutions so that they have the resources needed to uncover this assassination. The police—assisted by Europol, assisted by (continued)

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Table 7.8 (continued) MEPs

Alfred Sant (S&D)

Miriam dalli (S&D)

Discussion the FBI—carried out a very thorough investigation. And today we have the alleged murderers and the alleged mastermind who are facing justice. The seriousness with which the police worked was also confirmed by the head of the European Parliament delegation that was in our country two weeks ago. Moreover, the courts are doing their work with absolute freedom based on the fundamental principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law. These are all clear signs that our institutions are working and that they are not being influenced by anyone, so that in the end justice will be done and this case will be resolved. Therefore I believe that this resolution that we have in front of us is a very unfair one with the current situation in my country. We recognise that no system is perfect, and no country is perfect. And because I am Maltese and because I love my country, I fully understand and believe that we have things that should be improved. But the government has already done and is still doing a lot of work to implement the recommendations of both the Venice commission and the European council. Until last week, one of the main recommendations regarding the attorney General’s powers was fully implemented. Madam president, that Malta faces serious problems of governance is clear. They arose in the context of the horrendous murder of journalist Ms. Caruana Galizia and also beyond. The murder has been duly investigated in the past years and disclosed the big result. There have been fatal failures of judgement even at the top level. The political price for them is being paid. The situation in Malta now is one of the transitions, both at the political level and of the criminal investigation. What is needed is a dispassionate review of the situation, leading to reforms that will ensure no future repetition of past mistakes. True, the criminal investigation arrived at sensational findings, even more, sensational allegations have been made on that basis. We have heard them being repeated during this debate, mostly for political jockeying. This runs contrary to the interests of the Maltese people whose commitment to European values is secure. When considering how European values are being respected, we must follow objective criteria applied, to all, by an institution that all can trust. The resolution on which we shall vote tomorrow combines findings, allegations, and one-sided interpretations in a statement that paints black everything Maltese. It also blacks out the economic, social, and cultural progress achieved in Malta during the past years, which is not fair. Soon in Malta, there will be a new prime minister, heading a new government. We are confident that the process under the oversight of the president of Malta to propose constitutional reforms will yield results. In the meantime, all alleged cases of corruption must be thoroughly investigated. No one is above the law, and the fact that time-barring on cases of political corruption was removed should ensure a judicial process in all cases, whenever they happened. Currently, there are five ongoing magisterial inquiries on cases of alleged corruption, and yes, we want these inquiries to be concluded as soon as possible, for the benefit of all. Malta is currently going through a period of political transition until a new prime minister is appointed, and it would be counterproductive if this parliament rushes into prejudgments that can also prejudice the ongoing investigations. I’m here to speak up for (continued)

7.6

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Investigation, the 2019 Protests, and. . .

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Table 7.8 (continued) MEPs

Josianne Cutajar S&D

Discussion a country that showed that it listens; a country that is open to the recommendations made; a country that implements; and yes, to respond to those who find it convenient to harm Malta and its people at this hour. One final comment to the European Commission. Ms. Jourová referred to this, but I urge you to propose, as quickly as possible, a rule of law mechanism made up of independent experts that monitors all the member states objectively and fairly. It is what we really need because conclusions that are not objective do not help anyone Madam president, I am Maltese and am aware of the seriousness of the revelations of the last few weeks. Like the rest of the country, I am in shock. We Maltese people are committed to see that justice is served to everyone who was involved. It would not be fair, however, that the ill-will of these individuals is used to cast a shadow over the entire Maltese state. I hope that the goal is to strengthen the values that make us European. It is not that we take a hasty position for partisan purposes when the investigations are still open. It is too premature a resolution to be reliable. We are at this stage because, as confirmed by the delegation of the LIBE Committee itself, the Maltese police has carried out serious work together with entities such as Europol. Malta stopped, understood, and decided. A process has begun to strengthen the institutions and we will not stop until we have the constitutional reform that is needed. This is how we are, in a systematic way, strengthening democracy in Malta and not the other way around. With responsibility, I maintain that in this time of change, action on Malta will neither do good nor be fair to the Maltese and Gozitan people.

The report of the European Commission on Malta acknowledged the various juridical reports promoted by the Labour administration. These included the establishment of a new prosecution service, independent from the Attorney General and the police, which was also recommended by the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through the Venice Commission in 2018. The main recommendations were for Malta to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. This was required in the area of judicial appointments and dismissals, and to establish a separate prosecution service. The report outlined the need to address the tax system, which had for long been closely looked at by the European Commission and to strengthen the governance framework and the fight against corruption (European Council, 2019). Birgel Siddip, on behalf of the S&D group in the European Parliament, declared that this was not simply an issue of corruption, but rule of law as well. She referred to the Venice Commission in the way people were appointed in Malta and the need to revisit the laws over these appointments to provide the required independence to the main institutions of the country and to have separation of powers. She declared that Malta is a symbol of corruption for many, which is why it was the responsibility of the EU to deal with the problem. Esteban González Pons, on behalf of the EPP group, outlined the various corruption allegations which emerged in Malta and the links between the Office of the Prime Minister and the alleged minds behind the

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assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. He called for the Prime Minister to resign immediately. Sophia in ‘t Vel, on behalf of the Renew Europe group, provided an interesting point on the lack of action of the Commission and the Council to enforce rule of law in Malta. This was one of the main criticisms that both institutions received, highlighting the lack of action when faced with a challenge. She also called for the immediate resignation of Muscat to safeguard the integrity of the investigation into the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Sven Giegold from the Group Alliance 90/The Greens praised the progress which had taken place on the assassination of Caruana Galizia, though he criticised the Maltese institutions for failing to act on the allegations against money laundering and called for the European Commission to act to safeguard the rule of law in Malta. The reaction of the Maltese MEPs also tackled some of these issues (European Parliament, 17 December 2019b). In general, the reaction of the majority of the MEPs within the European Parliament called for other EU institutions, mainly the European Council and European Commission, to act to make sure that EU fundamental principles are respected in Malta. Still, these institutions were known to always take a cautious approach, given that they were dealing with a member state and a party-in-government. This is an example of the limitations of the top-down impact of Europeanisation. Whilst EU institutions had the tools to act against Malta, this was rather difficult to do so, given the lack of consensus over the matter. Whilst the European Parliament might have produced a united front, things could not have been more different in the Commission and Council, where member states could exert their influence. The approach of Malta’s MEPs which is outlined in Table 7.8 was based on the national party lines. The Labour Party MEPs found themselves in a difficult position, given the position taken by the S&D group, Whilst Malta’s MEPs had established themselves in the group which led to Miriam Dalli being elected as vice president of the Group in July 2019, a very important position for her and the country, they were clearly in a minority on how to approach Malta. Still, they praised the reforms which were taking place in Malta, whilst calling for the EU institutions to support the country in this period of transition. The Nationalist Party MEPs criticised the Muscat administration and called for his resignation, highlighting how this was required to ensure that justice prevails. After the plenary discussion, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with 581 in favour and 26 against in which various concerns were raised about the integrity and credibility of the investigations of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. It also raised a series of concerns about the negative perceptions of the government’s actions in the fight against tax evasion and money laundering. Moreover, it expressed the concern of the European Parliament on the failure of the European Commission from taking any concrete action against the Maltese government. This was done by using Article 7 procedure of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) for the failure of Malta to implement the required juridical reforms, despite the repeated calls by the European Parliament (European Parliament, 18 December 2019d). The debate concerning how to deal with the situation in Malta was one of the issues which highlighted the different agendas of the European Commission and European Parliament. This debate is one of many

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which showcased the different layers which exist within the European Union, each layer having its agenda. This is why at times the European Union has a different task in trying to find a unified agreement when there are so many interests involved. Whilst the European Parliament could pass resolutions, it was the European Commission that had the legal right to act against a member state. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat would later be replaced by Robert Abela, who won the leadership contest against the Health Minister Chris Fearne. On 1 December 2019, Muscat gave his last speech as Prime Minister, outlining the role of the government and his failure to enact the Constitutional changes he had spoken about as Prime Minister of the Country (Micallef, Times of Malta, 1 December 2019). Robert Abela would be later sworn in as Prime Minister in January 2020. Muscat resigned as a member of parliament on 5 October 2020, declaring that he was proud of his achievements and had decided to retire from politics (Times of Malta, 5 October 2020). A few days after, it would be the Prime Minister’s time to resign from Parliament. Simon Busuttil had been one of the leading political figures in the fight against Muscat and his administration over the Panama Papers and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, after being appointed as Secretary General of the EPP Party. In his last speech in parliament, Busuttil provided his own opinion on the state of the country’s democracy. He spoke of the fundamental principles of democracy being the government, Parliament, and Courts, and adding a fourth, that is the media. He declared that in the first pillar, corruption became normality. He also referred to parliament and how it was not fulfilling its function of scrutinising the work of the government, because there is a clear conflict of interest with various MPs employed in the public sector in positions of trust. He also expressed his opinion on the state of the judiciary in Malta, a topic that is often sensitive due to the independence of the judiciary. He referred to the Panama Papers and citizenship scheme and the corruption allegations linked to them. He promoted the work of Repubblika which challenged the system by which magistrates and judges were elected to the Council of Europe. On the fourth pillar of democracy, he criticised media pluralism in Malta and the polarising political system which existed in the country, reflected in the attacks which took place on traditional media and social media (Busuttil, 2020). The investigation into the assassination of Caruana Galizia did not stop with the resignation of Muscat and the election of Robert Abela as Prime Minister. At some point in time, Yorgen Fenech and the Degiorgio brothers all requested a pardon to reveal the information they had on the case. In both cases, the cabinet refused their request. Another major implication was the report of the public inquiry. The first hearing of the public inquiry took place on 6 December 2019 with the family of Caruana Galizia being the first witnesses. At the same time, the investigation against Yorgen Fenech, Degiorgio brothers, and Vince Muscat was still ongoing. The most serious allegation was made by the middleman Melvin Theuma on how the accused were being informed about the investigation mostly by Keith Schembri (Brincat & Cacciatolo, Times of Malta, 27 August 2020). There was also the statement that Melvin Theuma was given a phantom job within the public sector, even though he never actually reported for work (Brincat, Times of Malta, 28 June 2022). These were clear examples of the institutional failings which took place, and which went

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against the main principles of good governance, with investigations still ongoing on how such things could have taken place. The fact that Yorgen Fenech was linked to ElectroGas, the company that operates the power stations, meant that the European Union could fund the energy project which was directly linked to the prime suspect in the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. This is why the family of Caruana Galizia pleaded with the EU institutions not to fund such projects as Fenech would have benefitted from it. This led to a series of discussions between EU institutions. The European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament agreed to allow Malta to apply for funding for the gas pipeline. Still, the European Union also declared that funding should in no way be directly or indirectly given to anyone with criminal activity (Borg, Times of Malta, 15 December 2021). The agreement placed the responsibility on the Commission to ensure that no one with criminal activity was linked to the project. Whilst the Caruana Galizia family was disappointed with the decision reached by the EU, the issue put further pressure on the Commission to make sure that its criteria were respected by the country. The civil society group Repubblika was insisting that several reforms take place to restore the legitimacy of the institutions. These include the need to change the way magistrates and judges were nominated, with the government having the final authority on this. The controversy centred on a constitutional lawsuit brought by the civil society organisation Repubblika to halt the appointment of six judges pending reforms in the nomination process that were demanded by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The Court, sitting as the Grand Chamber, declared that the EU law does not prevent constitutional provisions such as those within the Maltese law relating to the appointment of members of the judiciary. It also declared that Article (1) of TEU does not prevent the Prime Minister or the executive to have decisive power in the appointment of members of the judiciary when there is an independent body that is tasked with assessing the candidates.2 The Courts declared that it did not appear that those provisions might lead to those members of the judiciary not being seen to be independent or impartial (European Court of Justice, 2021). There were various interpretations concerning the decision taken by the EU Courts. On the one hand, the government praised the decision, outlining how the government was abiding by EU law when selecting members of the Judiciary. Others discussed the implications. Professor Laurent Pech, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Middlesex University, believes that the European Court of Justice did not assess the Maltese government’s rule of law record. It declared that as a matter of EU law, the involvement of the Prime Minister in selecting members of the Judiciary is acceptable as long as EU laws on rule of law and separation of powers are respected.

2

In Malta, the Judicial Appointments Committee was set up in 2016 as outlined in Article 96A of the Constitution. It is composed of the Chief Justice, two Judges elected by their colleagues for four years, a Magistrate elected by his/her colleagues for a period of four years, the Commissioner for Administrative Investigations (Ombudsman) and the President of the Chamber of Advocates.

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Still, he believed that the European Court of Justice created precedence by establishing the principle of non-regression. This meant that if governments go against Articles 2 & 49 TEU and threaten rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, they could be effectively challenged in front of the European Court of Justice (Pace, LovinMalta, 21 April 2021). This could give additional tools to these civil society groups to monitor the work being done during the selection of new members of the judiciary and request the intervention of the European Court of Justice if they feel that the EU rules and regulations are being threatened. The persistence of Busuttil to have an investigation on Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi was widely met with scepticism by those who believed that he had no proof against the two. Yet, on 20 March 2021, Keith Schembri alongside Brian Tonna, Karl Cini, and Malcolm Scerri were all arrested for money laundering, criminal conspiracy, fraud, and forgery (Martin Brincat, Ganado, Times of Malta, 20 March 2021). After having campaigned so hard for an investigation of the affairs of Keith Schembri, Simon Busuttil (2022) declared that: This is why in my main topic in my speeches for more than a year, almost a year and a half that followed was about corruption. Were focused on this, now you ended your question by saying Do you feel that you have been vindicated? I think I was not a prophet. I was not seeing things in the future. But I was seeing the things that everyone else could and should have seen. I did not assume that there was corruption. In that there was corruption, because I am an intellectual. I assumed because it is obvious that when you register a Panama company as the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister for crying out loud, or when you are the Minister for energy, and you register the debt, it is obvious that you are doing it for corruption. So yeah, I have been proved right. But what I want today is not to be proved right. All I want is justice (Busuttil, 2022).

The arrest of Keith Schembri made international headlines. He would be granted bail on 5 April 2021 with the case against him still ongoing. These events did not help in improving the image of Malta. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) would grey-list Malta on 23 June 2021. For a small island like Malta, dependent on foreign investments to compete, the grey-listing could have had negative implications. The Nationalist Party stated that it was unfortunate that Malta ended up being grey-listed and declared that everyone needed to work together in order to remove the country from that list. The Malta Employers Association declared that the crisis was self-inflicted due to dishonest politicians and bad governance. ADPD declared that Malta should close all the legal loopholes linked with the citizenship scheme, outlining how Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi had contributed to this grey-listing (Cordina, Newsbook, 23 July 2021). The government pledged to introduce the necessary reforms in order to take Malta out of the grey-listing. The country was taken off the grey-listing a year later on 17 June 2022, after various reforms were implemented in order to fight money laundering and tax evasion (Vella, MaltaToday, 17 June 2022b). Under Sect. 7031(c) of the US Foreign Operations and Related Programmes Appropriations Act, 2021, Keith Schembri and Konrad Mizzi would end up being barred from travelling to the USA. This was due to the allegations of corruption against them (Martin, Times of Malta, 22 December 2021).

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The public inquiry surrounding the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia officially ended on 4 June 2021. The report, which found the state responsible for the assassination of Caruana Galizia, provided a number of important evaluations of the country’s political system. It made reference to the various investigations which Caruana Galizia was underdoing including The Panama Papers Revelations, The ElectroGas Affair, The Egrant Affair, The Hillman Affair, The Golden Passports Affair, The Vitals Global Healthcare Affair, Nexia BT, and Pilatus Bank. Many of these scandals are still being investigated. The report made various references to the EU institutions and Venice Commission reports on Malta and their warnings that more should be done to ensure good governance and to protect the independence of the country’s institutions. Most of their recommendations would only be discussed after the assassination of Caruana Galizia. The public inquiry provided insight into the dark side of the country’s political system. These included institutional failures, conflict of interest, the lack of checks and balances, corruption, the collision between the political class and business groups, the collision between the political class and organised crime, the sense of impunity which exists, and the lack of good governance. All these contributed to the assassination of Caruana Galizia. It was clear that the main institutions of the country were not working properly: In this regard, it was not only the Police who had failed to exercise their duties, but also the regulatory authorities; such as the MFSA, the FIAU, authorities such as the Planning Authority, the Lands Development Authority and the Gaming Authority, all of which at some time or another abdicated from exercising their functions properly to ensure that the laws were observed and that abuse was restrained (Public Inquiry in Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2021).

Another example of institutional failure was the way the Deputy Attorney General of the time (the current Attorney General) Victoria Buttigieg was working closely with the ElectroGas lawyers regarding the Security of Supply Agreement. She gave the advice that this could be signed by the Minister without the approval of parliament or the cabinet. The report also dealt with the various leaks which emerged from the police force, with information on secret meetings and investigations being provided to various criminals within the country. The report concluded that the state was responsible for the assassination of the Maltese journalist because it failed to act to the immediate danger that Caruana Galizia found herself in, due to the investigative work she was doing. It was clear that journalists in Malta faced various challenges, including libel suits and SLAPP, which were being used to neutralise journalists. Beyond the responsibility for the state, the report outlined various problems within the country’s political system, including the lack of enforcement of the standards of public life through the code of ethics: There is no doubt that the laws, regulations and regulatory institutions intended to ensure good governance, transparency and accountability in the contract procurement sector and the approval of public expenditure have often failed. They were totally inadequate to protect against attempts of manipulation and abuse by whoever intended to make undue personal gains through illicit, illegal and corrupt conduct. More so when these acted in collusion with

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whoever has power in administration (Inquiry report in Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2021).

Part of the problem surrounding the corruption which existed was the mentality towards the problem. Corruption, tribalism, nepotism, and clientelism were seen as embedded in Malta’s political culture and seen as a normality for many within the country. A mentality which is unfortunately woven in society’s DNA, also enabling the black economy and corruption as it is based on bias and favouritism. Where importance does not lie with doing what is correct but on whom you know and who can be of service (Inquiry report in Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 2021).

The report criticised the lack of impunity that existed in the country, with various public officials within the main institutions, including the police force unable or unwilling to investigate various crimes which were taking place within the country. The report gave various examples of how attempts had been made to dehumanise Caruana Galizia before her assassination. This meant that she was constantly followed wherever she went, receiving multiple threats which made it impossible for her to live a normal life. This made her vulnerable to a potential attack especially since she was isolated in the last few months of her life. Whilst Caruana Galizia had received multiple death threats, the inquiry would reveal at least two assassination plans against her with one discussed in 2015 and the other before the 2017 national election. In the end, the conclusion of the report criticised the various institutional failures and lack of proper protection They concluded that even when it was obvious that the Maltese journalist was in imminent danger, the institutions failed to act. This contributed to her assassination. The judges agreed that the Maltese journalist was assassinated because she was making it impossible for those who wanted to continue the abuse the power they enjoyed. Whilst a report like this one could have led to various resignations, in Malta, it received little reaction. The party-in-government promised various reforms to address the institutional shortcomings, but more needed to be done to deal with the major issues within the country’s political system. When the report was published, the investigation of the assassination of Caruana Galizia is still ongoing. On 15 February 2021, Vince Muscat pleaded guilty to the assassination and received a fifteen-year sentence. He was granted a presidential pardon for the 2015 murder of Lawyer Carmel Chircop in exchange for more information on the assassination of Caruana Galizia (Borg, Times of Malta, 23 February 2022b). In July 2022, George Degiorgio also confessed to the murder, declaring that for him, her assassination was simply business and that had he known a bit more about her, he would have asked for more money for her assassination beyond the €150,000 he was given (European Parliament, 2019d). He then declared that he would reveal more information at a later stage. The Degiorgio brothers would both plead guilty for their role in the assassination in October 2022. The fact that the assassination of Caruana Galizia was regarded simply as business confirms one of the main issues within the inquiry report, that mafia exists through organisations that are becoming extremely powerful. The assassination of Caruana Galizia was often compared to the murders of

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public officials which took place in Sicily during the war between the Mafia and the state, and many of the judges fighting the organisation ended up largely isolated before they were killed. The experience in Italy has shown that to fight crime and corruption, it is not only proper institutions that are needed but also a change in culture through education and awareness of ethics and corruption. They were sentenced to 40 years in prison. The guilty pleas of the Degiorgio brothers mean that by the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, four individuals have admitted their role in her assassination. Another three, including Yorgen Fenech and the alleged providers of the bomb Robert Agius and Jamie Vella are still facing prosecution for their role in the assassination (Muscat & Lindsay, The Shift, 14 October 2022). The Maltese government introduced various institutional reforms to abide by the recommendations provided by Greco and the Venice Commission, including the introduction of the Anti-Fraud and Corruption Policy, the Police code of ethics, the Police Force Transformation Strategy, the Horizontal Movement Policy, and the Policy on Business Interests and Additional Occupations. However, more reforms have been requested by the various institutions. In addition, in 2021, the government introduced the ‘Protection of the Whistleblower (Amendment) Act 2021 to update the Whistleblower Act (Cap 527) of 2013. This was required to transpose the EU Directive 209/1937. The law came into force on 24 December 2021, few days after the 17 December 2021 deadline for the transposition of the legislation established by the EU (EU Whistleblowing Monitor, 2021). The legislation was required by the EU to protect individuals who report violations of EU law. The 2021 Greco report praised the reforms introduced by the Maltese government. Still, it pointed out that an anti-corruption strategy build on a risk assessment of the government and its officials is required to continue the reforms. The report also highlighted how the Council of Europe was not yet satisfied with the powers awarded to the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life and recommend that the Office is given the power to impose sanctions in order to fight corruptive practices. They also recommended changes to the way persons of trust are recruited, proposing that these should be kept at a minimum (Greco, 2021). In October 2021, Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of Europe, Dunja Mijatović, visited Malta to investigate human rights in Malta. A report was then sent to Malta and covered most of the issues already highlighted by the Venice Commission and Greco. The report provided a number of recommendations on various areas including irregular migration, reproductive rights, and freedom of expression. The report pointed out the impact which the polarising political system was having on the media in Malta. This polarising environment was not helped by the fact that political parties had their own and were using it to attack each other. This was making the work of journalists more difficult with hostility against them increasing over the years. The freedom of expression in Malta and protection of journalists was widely covered. An example was used of how Daphne Caruana Galizia was facing over 40 civil and criminal defamation suits in various jurisdictions, including Malta and the USA, at the time of her assassination. These included 43 civil and 5 criminal suits, brought by political representatives from across the

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political spectrum in Malta. The report also outlined how SLAPP were being used to undermine journalists and their work (Council of Europe, 2022). The report concluded that whilst Malta decriminalised defamation in 2018, the Commissioner raised questions on the various lawsuits being initiated against journalists and newspapers. She recommended for the burden of proof in libel cases against journalist to be reversed. The Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council for the Council of Europe also recommended for laws to be introduced for the protection of journalists and their work. The Commissioner also recommended that Malta ratifies the Council of Europe Tromsø Convention on Access to Official Documents and to ensure that journalists have access to data and information. There was also the recommendation for the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act of 2008 to be reviewed in order to add additional measures to secure the right of journalists to access information (Council of Europe, 2022).

7.7

The Role of MEPs in Malta’s Political System and the Election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament

The discussion throughout this book provides an insight into the role of MEPs and the way some of the discussions in the European Parliament, including those on the assassination on Daphne Caruana Galizia, are a reflection on the arguments taking place at a national level. In 2004, when Malta jointed the European Union, the country had to elect the first members of the European Parliament. The MEPs did not have an easy task. The reason for this was that at first, Malta only had five seats, which increased to six after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, these MEPs had to find their own space within the country’s political system. Still, over the years, MEPs established themselves, facilitated by the fact that they were only six and their role within the European Parliament was closely scrutinised by the Maltese media. They also took a great role within their political parties. This also led for a number of politicians to use the European Parliament as a stepping stone to join the national political system. Simon Busuttil and Joseph Muscat both started their careers as MEPs before becoming leaders of their respective political parties. Louis Grech, Edward Scicluna, Miriam Dalli, and Therese Comodini Cachia also started their careers as MEPs before contesting in national elections. There are exceptions to the tradition that the European Parliament is used as a stepping stone for the national parliament. These include the decision by Alfred Sant to contest the European elections. His decision was taken after resigning from because the Labour Party leader decided not to seek re-election as a member of parliament. The political culture in Malta places further pressure on these MEPS. These MEPs are expected to be constantly in Malta and Gozo to promote the work being done in the European Parliament (Cutajar, 2022). The transition from the

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European political system to the Maltese political system is not always straightforward either. The Secretary General of the EPP and former leader of the Nationalist Part provided a detailed evaluation of this transition. Busuttil described it as a cultural shock given that his training is in European politics. Busuttil describes the political system of the European Parliament which works more on negotiation, compromise building and consensus. On the other hand, Malta’s political system is still based on polarisation and partisanship. There is also the issue that the European Parliament is composed on various European party groups, therefore a compromise is often required in order to send a powerful message to member states or the other EU institutions. On the other hand, the Maltese system is based on the two-party system, or rather a ‘winner takes all’ system in national elections. This often means that consensus and compromise are often lacking and are only needed for Constitutional changes (Busuttil, 2022). After years of experience within the European Parliament, Muscat took over the leadership of the Labour Party. His experience and work in the European Parliament helped him to shape and rebrand the Labour Party. This was essential for the party to win one election after another from 2013 onwards. The former Prime Minister of Malta also explained that the European Parliament functions through a coalition building, not necessarily between different parties as even political parties from the same party families might have different ideologies and principles. He explained that although Malta’s system is based on a two-party system, there are various diverging opinions within these parties. This means that factions and coalitions are formed within the main political parties (Muscat, 2022). Beyond the transition from the European to the national political system, the Maltese MEPs managed to establish themselves in the European Parliament. Miriam Dalli and later on, Alex Agius Saliba, became vice-presidents of the S&D. After his experience as an MEP, Simon Busuttil would later re-join the EPP as its secretary general. Other MEPs have gained very important roles as rapporteurs in a number of committees which enabled them to shape the policies of the European Parliament. The election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament can be considered as a very important position for Malta. Metsola became the youngest and third female President of the European Parliament. In a number of promo videos produced by the EPP, she described her activity at the University of Malta and her love for Constitutional and European law, her reaction for the assassination of Caruana Galizia and gender equality and women empowerment in Malta, as well as the EU institutions with the European Parliament. She became an inspiration for young women who wanted to follow the footsteps of great women in politics like Simone Veil and Angela Merkel (EPP, 16 January 2022a). The EPP built a narrative around Roberta Metsola as a European from humble originals and the smallest state in the European Union to becoming the President of one of the main institutions of the European Union, who would then provide a clear leadership to the European Parliament at such a challenging time for the EU. In this clip, Metsola declared she wanted to become a beacon for the fundamental values of the European Union and principles that Malta and other countries had fought for in order to be able to join the

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European Union. She outlined the need for the European Parliament to be open, accessible and to provide solutions to the challenges that Europe is facing (EPP, 15 January 2022a). Still, Metsola faced a number of challenges. A number of politicians and European media branded her as a conservative. She was seen as a potential threat within the European Parliament which has traditionally taken a liberal stance towards reproductive rights. The brand ‘conservative’ or ‘anti-abortionist’ were often used to describe Metsola rather than focusing on her work within the European Parliament and her stances on other issues. A similar issue was faced by Tonio Borg when he was chosen to succeed John Dalli as Malta’s European Commissioner. This raised the question once again on whether the European Union is really open to its motto ‘United in Diversity’. Borg outlined that whilst these questions are often raised by the European Parliament, the fact that both himself and Metsola gained the support of the European Parliament meant that the motto is still important within the EU institutions. Busuttil (2022) shared his own experience on the matter. He describes how he also received the same treatment at first, even though he was considered liberal within the Nationalist Party. However, European Institutions have their own gauge on how to measure political ideology, meaning that Maltese politicians are often considered conservatives or antiabortionist. He outlined how Roberta Metsola also embraced a liberal approach fighting for equality and women’s rights within the European Parliament. Still, he agreed with Borg and that in the end, Metsola was voted by the absolute majority of the members of the European Parliament, receiving 458 votes out of 690 in the first round of voting. In her first speech as President of the European Parliament, Metsola spoke in Maltese, English, Italian, and French outlining how she would work hard for the European Parliament and European citizens. She also took a moment to remember the former President of the European Parliament David Sassoli and his sudden demise, highlighting how she honoured Sassoli by standing up for the fundamental principles of the European Union including democracy, dignity, justice, solidarity, equality, rule of law, and fundamental rights. She outlined the need for the European Union to take a leading role in safeguarding these values which were being challenged across the EU. This was particularly important given the debates which were happening in Malta and in the EU over Malta surrounding rule of law. It was not surprising that reference was made to Daphne Caruana Galizia and Ján Kuciak, two journalists killed in Europe due to the investigations they were doing. In her speech, Metsola also outlined the challenges being faced by the EU, including threat towards LBTIQ rights, climate change, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the need to bring back the enthusiasm for the European project. Roberta Metsola concluded her speech by discussing one of her main areas in the run-up for the election as President of the European Parliament, that is to inspire the youth generation and young girls to become the future leaders of the EU institutions. In order for this to become a reality, she stressed on the need to promote diversity within the EU institutions ‘Our Institution’s commitment to having more diversity, gender equality, guaranteeing women’s rights—all our rights—must be reaffirmed’ (Metsola, 2022a).

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Pierini (2022) provides an interesting analysis of the first speech of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament. His evaluation outlines how from a rhetoric and stylistic point of view, Metsola opted for a traditional speech similar to the first speeches of previous presidents of the European Parliament. He concludes that the speech was a projection of the diplomatic discourse used by the President of the European Parliament. The reason for this was that the European Parliament has a soft power outlook with the President of the Parliament leading the relationship between the European Union and national states. He outlines how such speeches are usually vague, meaning that they do not explain the process by which these politicians want to achieve their targets within the European public sphere and international system. Pierini (2022) outlined how within the discourse, a number of words of encouragement (also known as hooray words) were used to outline the European Union ideals and principles. These include values, equality, democracy, law, and principles. He also makes reference to Metsola’s use of the word ‘must’, outlining her commitment and moral responsibility to deal with the challenges faced by the European Union ‘we must burst through the Strasbourg and Brussels bubble’, ‘we must fight the anti-EU narrative’ (Metsola, 2022b). This also highlights her transition from being an MEP representing Malta to becoming an international figure and the leading figure of one of the main institutions of the EU. The election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament was also very important for the Nationalist Party. Whilst the party was plagued by international divisions within the national sphere, its MEPs were establishing themselves in Strasbourg. Still, the election of Metsola was not just a victory for the party, but also the smallest member of the EU. Gonzi (2022) outlines how the election of Roberta Metsola proves to everyone, that a person who achieves high levels of commitment, professional competency, and dedication and who has a track record of integrity, conviction, and fairness, can and will be recognised by the European Institutions for any position, however important it might be. For those who were still sceptical, they now had proof that the fact that Malta is the smallest member state of the EU has not stopped citizens from achieving the highest position in the EU’s parliamentary institution. If that can be done by an individual, it can also be done by the smallest member state of the Union—as long as it represents the same values of professionalism, competency, integrity, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. The same sentiment was expressed by Busuttil (2022) and Grech (2022a) both highlighting how this was a prestigious position not simply for Metsola but also for the smallest country in the European Union. Casa (2022) believes that the election of Metsola proves those who campaigned against EU membership wrong. He referred to the 2003 referendum and subsequent election when the Nationalist Party faced criticism that the country’s sovereignty would be lost with membership in the European Union. He outlined how this did not take place, but the election of Metsola as President proves that Maltese accession to the EU was the right choice that gave the country an unprecedented stage in the world. For a nation with an admitted inferiority complex, having Roberta Metsola represents the European Parliament is a reminder of what the Maltese can achieve. Roberta Metsola’s election came during a challenging time for the European Union as it was being challenged by the Covid-19

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pandemic, the conference on the Future of Europe, and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

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The 2022 National Elections in Malta and the Covid-19 Pandemic

The 2022 national election in Malta took place in the shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic. When the pandemic emerged, the main political parties provided a united voice in order to encourage the Maltese citizens to abide by the restrictions introduced by the government. The Maltese government introduced a number of measures to limit civic and economic activity. Whilst Malta did not impose the full lockdowns which other EU member states did to try and contain the pandemic, it still introduced various restrictions. These included the closing of all schools, universities, childcare services, in order to contain the spread of the virus. Elderly homes were closed to visitors to safeguard the vulnerable. Religious, sports, political, and cultural activities were also cancelled (Vassallo & Tabone, 2020). After the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, the wearing of masks was imposed to prevent the spread of the virus, and the Maltese, like the rest of the world citizens, had to adapt to the changes brought by the Covid-19 pandemic and get used to the new realities. The Maltese government announced various economic measures in order to protect the Maltese economy from the negative impact of the pandemic. It unveiled a €1.8 billion financial relief package aimed at easing some of the difficulties that both businesses and workers were experiences due to the pandemic. These included a wage supplement which was first introduced on 9 March 2020. This supplement meant that businesses or self-employed individuals that were severely struck by the outbreak began to receive €800 per month per full-time employee (€500 per month in the case of part-timers). The supplement would be extended to workers who lost their employment from 9 March 2020. This measure provided a new temporary benefit of €800 per month (€500 per month for part-timers). The government introduced various other measures, including aid to private entities which were forced to shift to teleworking and had to invest in various set-ups. These benefitted from a cash grant of up to €4000, capped at €500 per teleworking agreement, awarded against 45% of the eligible cost. In order to safeguard the property industry, the government reduced the income tax on the sale of a property from 8% to 5% and stamp duty levied at 1.5% instead of 5% for the first €400,000 (KPMG, 2022). The public face of the campaign against Covid-19 became the Superintendent of Public Health, Prof. Charmaine Gauci. In the first two waves of the Covid-19 pandemic, she provided daily updates on the number of swab tests taken, the number of people testing positive, and the health of those who were currently and had previously been infected (Baldacchino, 2020). She provided the stability required to convince the Maltese citizens that the government was doing its utmost to control the pandemic and to safeguard the lives of thousands. As it happened in other

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European states, Malta waited patiently for its share of vaccines, ordering around 830,000 doses from Pfizer and Moderna combined, one million doses from AstraZeneca (Vaxzevria) and 250,000 doses from Johnson and Johnson. Malta started immediately to roll out these vaccinations. The process started on 27 December 2020, with the country reaching herd immunity by May 2021. Due to the size of the country and a very organised vaccination programme, Malta had one of the highest numbers of vaccinated people as various centres opened in order to vaccinate as many people as possible (Cuschieri et al., 2021a). Even though the government worked effectively to curb the Covid-19 pandemic, there were some pitfalls. In summer 2020, several restrictions on organised events were eased, even though feasts and other activities were cancelled. As Malta was promoting itself as a safe tourist destination, the public officials were giving mixed messages. On the one hand, the Superintendent of Public Health emphasised vigilance and social distancing and on the other, outside parties were being organised across Malta. The Superintendent of Public Health Office, along with the Maltese government, issued ‘Standards for Gatherings’ mitigation standards, followed by a legal notice through the Public Health Act, and a fine of €3000 that would be imposed on those who were found to be in breach of the standards imposed. Still, various parties led to an increase in those infected by the virus, which resulted in more people requiring medical assistance. This led to several further restrictions being imposed on 7 August 2020 which banned events of more than 100 people indoors and 300 people outdoors, as well as a €50 fine for those found not wearing a mask (Cuschieri et al., 2021b). The same thing would happen at the end of 2021 and the first months of 2022, as the country was getting ready for the national election. During this period, the country faced another wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, as the standards imposed by the Public Health were not being met. Whilst the entertainment industry was complaining on the negative impact which the pandemic was having on them, photos and videos surfaced of the SiGMA (iGaming World Festival) European summit. Various reports outlined how masks were not being worn and social distancing was not being kept. A party organised by the committee was found to be in breach of the Covid-19 regulations and was stopped by the authorities (Magri, Times of Malta, 19 November, 2021). A similar thing would take place during the campaigns for the 2022 national election. Whilst the Superintendent of Public Health was recommending people to avoid crowds and to keep social distance, rallies were being organised by the main political parties. A number of individuals and groups criticised the Superintendent of Public Health for not enforcing regulations it was introducing to fight the pandemic. The entertainment industry felt that these political events highlighted the double standards which were evident in Malta, with most of the businesses closed whilst thousands were attending rallies organised by the main political parties. The Malta Entertainment Industry and Arts Association (MEIA) criticised this because standing events were still prohibited, resulting in millions in lost revenue (Calleja MaltaToday 28 February 2022). At the same time, graduations and other events were taking place, with social distancing rules imposed, meaning only a number of individuals

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could attend these events. The government pledged to lift most of the Covid-19 pandemic measures by April 2022. In September 2021, the European Commission gave a positive assessment of Malta’s recovery and resilience plan. Malta’s plan is being financed by €316.4 million in grants. The report submitted by Malta pledged to use 54% of the funds to support climate objectives. This included free transport. 26% of the funds were pledged to be used for investment in digitalisation, with €34 million to be spent on updating the government’s IT system. Another €15 million was pledged to support the digitalisation of small and medium enterprises. €49.9 million was pledged to be used to strengthen the health sector in Malta and €41.4 million to enhance the quality and inclusiveness of education and training (European Commission, 2021a). The Commissioner for the Economy Paolo Gentiloni declared said The implementation of the Maltese recovery and resilience plan over the coming years will help to transform the country’s strong economic rebound into a phase of sustained and sustainable growth. Supported by €316 million in funding from NextGenerationEU, the plan contains an impressive range of measures to green Malta’s economy, boost its digital competitiveness and further strengthen its health system. I also welcome the important commitments to safeguard judicial independence, strengthen the anti-money laundering framework and close off opportunities for aggressive tax planning (Gentiloni, in the European Commission, 2021b).

The funds allocated to Malta and the endorsement of the report by the European Commission provided more legitimacy for the party-in-government. The proposals submitted to the European Union were used for the electoral campaign to promote the policies which would improve the lives of the Maltese. Europeanisation had limited influence on this election. Beyond the issue of the Russian invasion on Ukraine, and the question surrounding Malta’s neutrality status, national issues dominated the agenda of the main political parties. Political parties did not even invite any European politicians to endorse their campaigns. Whilst this could have been due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the focus clearly was on national issues. The election was going to be the first one after the suffrage was extended to 16-year-olds. Given that the suffrage was a new cleavage, both main political parties opted to build their campaigns to attract these new voters. It was also the first time that the Gender Balance Mechanism was going to be used in the country which meant that if the threshold of 40% women’s representation in parliament was not going to be reached, the mechanism would give the main political parties an additional six seats each to ensure proportional representation. The 2022 national election was also the first election as party leaders for Bernard Grech and Robert Abela. Whilst two of them were elected around the same time, they faced different realities. Bernard Grech was elected leader of the Nationalist Party after the internal divisions which existed between a number of MPs and the Nationalist Party leader Adrian Delia. Even though Greche spoke of reconciliation and the need to unite the party, the reality was that the party was still divided. The party struggled to provide a united front after the defeat in the 2013 election. After losing the 2013 election, the party failed to convince voters that it was the alternative party-in-government. Internal fighting between the different factions, an identity crisis over a number of

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issues including divorce, civil unions, IVF and abortion, and high debts meant that the party was simply being outmanoeuvred by the Labour Party, with the gap between the main political parties continuing to increase. The Labour Party managed to label the Nationalist Party as an elitist political party and a party of the past. Whilst the Nationalist Party proposed a number of policies, it did not manage to remove this label. The party has struggled to re-invent itself in order to be seen as the alternative party-in-government. The slogans of the Nationalist and Labour Party were very similar, making it difficult for voters to distinguish between one party and the other. Both opted for vibrant colours to dominate their campaign literature and billboards. The Nationalist Party opted for the slogan ‘Miegħek, għal Malta’ ‘With you, for Malta’ (PN, 2022), while the Labour Party opted for ‘Flimkien, għal Malta’ ‘Together, For Malta’ (LP, 2022). ADPD opted for the slogan ‘Xkupa Ħadra Tnaddaf’ (Green Sweeps clean), with this election being their first after the merge between AD and PD (ADPD, 2022). Other parties competing in the election were the progressive pan-European Volt, the Christian Conservative Party ‘Abba’, the right-wing party ‘Partit Popolari’ (Popular Party) with Arnold Cassola deciding to contest again as an independent candidate. The manifesto of the Labour Party was based on 1000 proposals. The manifesto was only published two weeks before the national election, which should have made it difficult for the people to understand the policies the party was promoting and for the Opposition to react to it. Still, survey after survey revealed that the Labour Party had a comfortable lead, meaning that the manifestos were going to have little influence on the election results. The Nationalist Party proposed 540 measures. The Nationalist Party proposed a nationwide pilot project for the adoption of a four-day work week, and a one-time grant of €1000 for parents who had children as of January 1, 2017. The party also pledged to inject €1 billion funds to create new economic sectors and to allocate 50,000 square metres of land to Outside Development Zoning. Other important proposals included the building of a trackless tram, a €150 in children’s allowance, or €250 for families with an income lower than €12,000, and a 10% tax credit for those who earn less than €20,000. The party pledged to promote good governance by strengthening the role of the Ombudsman and reform the code of ethics (PN 2022; Borg, Times of Malta, 24 February 2022d). The Labour Party proposed increasing benefits for low-income households and expanding free day-care to all while investing €700 million in environmentally friendly urban areas. The party pledged to reduce corporate tax cut to 25% on €250,000 in income, an increase in pensions by €15 a week, a €30,000 subsidy for first-time buyers in particular localities, and a €700 m investment in ‘green lungs’ projects. The party promised to safeguard Spring Hunting and invest in land reclamation. The party also pledged to amend the Constitution to make it obligatory for governments to set aside funds every year in a contingency fund and to continue Malta’s Passport Scheme to attract investors to Malta (PL, 2022; Borg, Times of Malta, 11 March 2022a). The ADPD party also provided a detailed outline of its policies. These included the need to introduce the required reforms to make MPs full timers. For the party,

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this was needed to reduce the conflicts of interest and provide state financing for parties who get more than 1% of the total votes. It also pledged to establish an inquiry into all long-term contracts awarded by the government since 2013, including the ElectroGas and Vitals deals, and to set up a National Crime Agency. The party pledged to establish a national wellbeing index, promote the use of alternative energy, and address the law on abortion to clarify the situation on how to approach it when pregnant women are at risk (ADPD, 2022). As expected, bread and butter issues dominated the political campaigns. A survey led by the independent newspaper MaltaToday suggested that the economic outlook of Malta and people’s perception of the economy were going to favour the incumbent. The survey revealed that 70% had a positive outlook on their employment status, while only 15% rated it as poor. When compared with the rest of the EU, Malta’s positive outlook was 10 points higher than the average for the EU. The majority of the Maltese believed that the economy was doing well, with 60% stating that it was good and 37% stating that it was terrible. This was again a higher result than the rest of the European Union where an average of 59% of respondents in each of the 27-member states said their country’s economy was doing poorly. Only 39% of EU citizens thought that their national economies were doing well (Sansone, MaltaToday, 8 April 2022b). A survey published by a leading newspaper on the priorities of the Maltese people revealed the divisions which existed within the electorate. 45.9% of Nationalist voters placed corruption as the top concern. This was particularly important as Malta was grey-listed by the global anti-money laundering watchdog. For Labour voters, 15.3% of the main concern was a rise in car traffic followed by COVID-19 at 13.3% and cost of living at 12%. The Labour Party shifted the blame from the greylisting onto, the Nationalist Party outlining again how the party was damaging the reputation of Malta abroad. This could explain why corruption was only a cause for concern for 3.4% of Labour voters (Sansone, MaltaToday, 8 March 2022a). Still, the most important survey of the campaign was the trust rating of the leading political figures. With campaigns built around the leaders’ personalities and personalisation of politics being evident with the images of the main political leaders on all the campaign material, a survey revealed that 51% of the electorate wanted the incumbent Prime Minister Robert Abela to remain in office. On the other hand, only 32% were in favour of having Bernard Grech as Prime Minister. This was later used by Prime Minister Abela to encourage voters to continue voting for the Labour Party to retain political and economic stability (Borg, Times of Malta, 1 March 2022c). The Nationalist Party shifted from its previous campaigns which were mostly based on corruption allegations. Instead, it focused more on the policies it was presenting. Grech (2022a) revealed that the party had to promote good governance whilst promoting issues that were important to the electorate. These included issues such as climate change and sustainable development. He outlined how rather than simply criticising the policies of the government, the Nationalist Party wanted to provide a way by which the main challenges faced by the country, including sustainable development, and safeguarding the environment, could be dealt with.

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The election was extremely important for Robert Abela, as the target was to gain more votes than his predecessor Joseph Muscat. Muscat was still widely popular with the electorate and there was the risk that his endorsements of a number of candidates and intervention in various events could risk overshadowing the Labour campaign. It was widely known that the Labour Party was going to win the election. The real question was whether he could beat the results achieved by Muscat during his tenure as leader of the Labour Party. The fact that Muscat was still popular was revealed by a survey commissioned during the campaigns, which outlined how he still had the support of 36.3% of Labour voters compared to 47.1% of support towards Robert Abela (Borg, Times of Malta, 1 March 2022c). Former Prime Minister Joseph Muscat also played an active role during the election campaigns, endorsing many candidates with various posting photos with the former Prime Minister (Martin, Times of Malta, 23 February 2022). This participation was rarely reported in the Labour media. He also did not rule out the possibility of returning to politics though he declared that, if he ever had to return, it would not be in the immediate future. Nonetheless, Muscat was not involved in any official events. Still, Muscat was still popular with the electorate with this election not being a contest between Abela versus Grech, but a contest between Abela versus Muscat over control of the Labour Party. One of the most interesting factors about this election was that it was relatively quiet when compared to the 2017 elections. Grech and Abela were seen as less polarising figures than Busuttil and Muscat. There were no coalition buildings in this election, and the result was widely known by everyone. In this election, there were no polarising issues such as Egrant or the Panama Papers, and both political parties focused more on the concerns of the people (Debono, MaltaToday, 6 March 2022). One thing that was pointed out was the voters’ apathy. This could have been due to various reasons, including the fact that the party leaders and campaigns were not inspiring. It could have also been due to the pandemic and the restrictions imposed on the Maltese citizens. Still, the feeling was that political parties tried to hide the lack of inspiration and substance of their campaigns by publishing hundreds of proposals. During the campaign, Abela admitted that clientelism was still popular, which is why electoral reforms were required (Xuereb, Times of Malta, 17 March 2022b). It was known by everyone that the Labour Party was going to win this election. The question was not ‘‘whether’ the party was going to win the election but by ‘how much’. This meant that in terms of maximisation of votes, the belief was that 1 vote was not going to make any difference. For some people, this meant that there was no reason for them to vote (Calleja, The Malta Independent, 2 August 2020). Another reason why some decided to abstain from voting was that they were repulsed by the main political parties and could not identify themselves with any of the smaller parties or independent candidates (MaltaToday, 21 March 2022a). The Labour Party feared that a decline in the turnout would directly impact the party. This led to an intense campaign by the main political parties to encourage everyone to vote. The main political parties focused most of their attention on new voters. With 16 year olds voting for the first time, it meant that political parties focused much of their campaigns on social media. The main political parties spent a

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combined €240,000 per week on internet ads. The data reveals that political parties were spending as much on their social media pages as on the official pages of the main political leaders. This explains why the persona leader is important in order to attract voters and win the elections (Martin, Times of Malta, 19 March 2022). One of the main events that both political parties did not expect to have to deal with was the Russian aggression towards Ukraine. As discussed in the previous section, the debate in Malta was whether the country should continue to sell passport schemes to Russians and Belarusians. The country’s Foreign Minister Evarist Bartolo pledged to safeguard the neutrality clause and the country would stay out of any conflict. While continuing to promote peace (Vella, It-Torċa, 27 February 2022a), it did not find any reasons why it should stop selling the passport schemes for Russians. On this matter, Prime Minister Abela declared that the leader of the Nationalist Party was demonising anyone who is Russian (Times of Malta, 27 February 2022e). Yet, with the opposition to the sales of these schemes to Russians growing and with the European Parliament President Roberta Metsola declaring that countries could no longer sell passports to Putin’s friends, the government announced the intention to suspend the scheme for Russians and Belarusians (The Malta Independent, 3 March 2022b). The discussion on the conflict then shifted to its impact on the country’s economy. Being in the midst of an electoral campaign, the Labour Party declared how Malta needed proper leadership in order to safeguard the country. Abela outlined how more than €4.5 million was going to be used to assist the agricultural sector, which was one of the first industries that was hit by the conflict due to the importation of corn, barley, and wheat from Ukraine and Russia. In addition, the Prime Minister outlined how Malta was facing a problem buying Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Martin, Times of Malta, 9 March 2022). The comments by the Prime Minister caused alarm in the country with many rushing to buy gas cylinders, with Liquigas Malta seeking to calm the population by stating that the country had enough supply for months (Galea Debono, Times of Malta, 10 March 2022). Still, with Covid-19 and the conflict in Ukraine, prices began to rise. The government declared that oil and gas prices would remain unchanged. Yet, this also meant that the government had to allocate €200 million to cover the increase in international prices of gas and fuel. The Finance Minister reassured the electorate that the burden of the war was not going to be shifted on businesses and citizens, with the government pledging more subsidies to protect the country from the conflict (Farrugia, Times of Malta, 11 March 2022b). Covid-19 and the war were politicised by the party-in-government. The Labour Party campaign was very similar to the ones developed by Muscat and his team. Labour leader Robert Abela declared that the Labour Party was offering political and economic stability over the instability which the Nationalist Party could provide. He outlined the various economic incentives implemented by the Labour administration, emphasising how tax incentives were providing an extra €90 million to the Maltese families. This was used to show how the Labour Party was securing the future of Maltese children (Coleiro, l-Orizzont, 21 March 2022). Like his predecessor, Abela called for unity, outlining how during Covid-19 and the conflict in Russia,

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the Labour Party was managing to safeguard the economy and the Maltese people. He branded the Nationalist Party as ‘negative’, ‘divisive’, and the ‘party of the past’, with the Labour Party working for the future of the country. He outlined how initiatives, which were introduced by the Labour government including the Covidwage supplement (which was extended till April) and the income tax cheques, would be removed by a potential Nationalist administration. The Labour Party promised to take Malta out of the grey-listing, highlighting the positive feedback it had received from the FATF. At the same time, Abela said that he would introduce the needed legislation which would give the right for legitimate businesses to open a bank account. Whilst banks were under pressure due to Malta being grey-listed, Abela declared that due diligence checks would remain in place but would be centralised in respect of EU regulations (Zammit, The Malta Independent, 8 March 2022b). Still, questions remained on how this was going to work and how was the centralised due diligence process going to look like given the criticism the Maltese institutions received from the Council of Europe. The most important electoral move by the Labour Party in government was to send tax rebate cheques only a few days before the election. The amount spent by the government on this rebate was €70 million. Finance Minister Caruana declared that these cheques were not an electoral gimmick. These cheques reveal the influence which the incumbent could have on the election. The OSCE would later declare that such cheques did not conform with international standards as they removed the border between the state and the party (Meilak, MaltaToday, 22 July 2022). Another controversial issue emerged after the Labour leader proposed mandatory membership in a trade union (L-Orizzont, 17 March 2022c). Whilst this was proposed a few weeks before the actual election, little information was given on how it was going to materialise. The party was much more focused on the IVF reform. The Labour Party promoted the extension of the IVF eligibility to those who were already parents, make more IVF cycles available at no cost, extend the eligibility for IVF from 42 to 45, and make it easier to transfer embryos from other countries and donate eggs. However, the government’s proposal to permit genetic testing on IVF embryos before they are implanted into the womb was the most contentious issue. The government had defended this policy, declaring that testing was needed to find uncommon genetic disorders that the baby may carry and develop after birth, like Huntington’s disease (Zammit, Times of Malta, 8 June 2022a). The Labour Party used the divisions with the Nationalist Party over the matter to highlight how the Labour Party would maintain the promise and give hope to new families. The campaign featured several families who benefitted from the IVF reform and who would benefit from the legislation update. Minister Julia Farrugia used the IVF reforms to persuade the electorate to vote Labour. She declared that it was the Labour Party that was protecting the Maltese families (Farrugia Portelli, It-Torċa, 20 February 2022). Beyond the IVF issue, the Labour Party also opted to safeguard the support that it enjoyed with hunters. In fact, a legal notice outlined how hunters guilty of a number of offences would have fixed points deducted. If more than 12 points are deduced over two years, it would mean that they would have their hunting licence suspended

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for one year. Birdlife criticised the government, declaring that this was simply a way for hunters not to lose their licence (Arena, Times of Malta, 22 February 2022). Another issue was the controversial Marsascala yacht marina project. This project angered the people living in Marsascala as it meant creating more pollution and destroying the area. The party-in-government decided to shelve the project. During the campaign, the Labour administration had also decided to seek an agreement to take back the land which was transferred to the Sadeen Group to build the university residence in exchange to land at Smart City. The Prime Minister used this to show that the Labour Party was listening to the people (Attard, The Malta Independent, 23 February 2022). Still, whilst the Labour Party produced another effective campaign, it still faced various missteps and provided a number of mixed messages. The most embarrassing issue for the party was the speech of former Minister Joe Debono Grech. During one of the party events, Debono Grech declared that all politicians are corrupt, but at least people got something from the Labour (Times of Malta, 12 March 2022d). The Labour Party criticised the statement from Debono Grech. Still, the statement is a projection of the attitude of those who are willing to close an eye towards corruption, as long as they can take some benefits from it. The Nationalist Party attempted to promote a united front, yet internal divisions were again laid bare during the campaign. These included the statements made by Mario Galea after he was forced to withdraw his candidateship, declaring that it was difficult to work in such an environment and that the closest associates of the Nationalist Party leader were simply disposing of people (Azzopardi, MaltaToday, 23 February 2022). Such statements were damaging for a party that was still trying to encourage its voters to vote in the election. Most of the campaign was based on policies promoted in the manifesto. During the campaign, the island of Gozo was subject to various controversial development plans, with hundreds of apartments being built, with many fearing that the environment and ecosystem of the sister island would be permanently damaged. The Nationalist Party tried to use the over development in Gozo to highlight how the Labour Party was only catering for the interests of those around it. Another way to try and win back thousands of votes it had lost from Gozo was to promote sustainable hunting, even though the cleavage had very much shifted towards the Labour Party. The Nationalist Party proposed a number of other policies to try and regain Gozo. Historically, considered a ‘fortress’ of the Nationalist Party, the island had shifted to the Labour Party in the previous elections. This is why various Nationalist Party leaders had attempted to win back the Gozitan voters, declaring that a Nationalist administration would build a new hospital in Gozo. The Gozo hospital was one of the three which was transferred to Global Vitals Healthcare with the former Nationalist leader in a legal fight against the corruption to annul the contract. Revelations would include that the company bought luxury cars and apartments with the funds being transferred from the government. Another allegation would be revealed in July 2022, on how Vitals transferred some of the funds to the wife of Keith Schembri, Josette Schembri, for several designs (Bonnici, LovinMalta, 31 July 2022). Beyond the hospital deal, the Nationalist Party declared that it would offer various incentives for Gozitan teachers,

336 Table 7.9 The 2022 national election results

7

PL PN ADPD Cassola Turnout

Seats 38 29 – –

Europeanisation and the Rule of Law Votes 162,707 123,233 4747 904

Votes (%) 55.11 41.74 1.61 0.3 85.6

police, soldiers, and nurses and that they would be compensated for having to travel to Malta for work (Francalanza, Il-Mument, 13 March 2022a). The Nationalist party used a similar approach to that of the Labour Party, using patriotism and outlining how the former would provide a better future for Maltese citizens. This was done through the pledge of an investment in a new public service transport in the form of a tram and an investment to diversify the economy (Francalanza, Il-Mument, 7 March 2022b). The Nationalist leader used a controversy surrounding one of the properties of the Prime Minister. The leader of the Nationalist Party challenged the Prime Minister to publish the architect’s report as he accused Prime Minister Abela of using his position within the Planning Authority to sanction the illegalities within the property before buying it. He also claimed that Abela had bought the place under market value. Grech warned voters not to give any more power to Abela as he was going to do as he pleases (Sansone, MaltaToday, 21 March 2022c). The statement was particularly important as the fear was that the Labour Party would manage to gain more than 60% of the total votes which could have pushed the party towards gaining a two-thirds majority in parliament. The Nationalist Party also promoted its tax incentives which included a reduction of VAT for restaurants, and tax exemptions for parents of children participating in sports and art activities (Vella, MaltaToday, 23 February 2022a). One of the main proposals promoted by Grech was the investment of €1 billion in ten new economic sectors which included investments Metaverse, Compliance and Due Diligence Services, Artificial Intelligence, E-Sports, and 3D Printing (Francalanza, In-Nazzjon, 22 February 2022c). The PN also pledged to attract €42.6 billion in investments to create 32,500 employment opportunities in the country (In-Nazzjon, 24 March 2022e). The leader of the Nationalist Party also pleaded for unity, encouraging its supporters that together with the party, they could work for a better future for Malta (Ellul, In-Nazzjon, 28 February 2022). The election produced the results that most were expecting. As Table 7.9 shows, the Labour Party received 162,707 votes equivalent to 55.11% of the total votes. The Nationalist Party received 123,233 votes equivalent to 41.74% of the total votes. The ADPD party received 4747 votes equivalent to 1.61% of the total votes. Cassola, who contested as an independent candidate received 904 votes equivalent to 0.3% from just 2 districts. Still, the election had one of the lowest turnouts since Malta’s independence. The turnout fell below 90% with ‘only’ 85.5% opting to cast their vote (Malta Electoral Commission, 2022). Another important statistic was that 2.9% of the casted votes were deemed to be invalid. Whilst the Labour Party and Robert

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Table 7.10 Electoral gap between the main political parties

Election 2008

Votes for the Malta Labour Party/ Partit Laburista (PL) 141,888

Votes for the Nationalist Party/Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) 143,468

2013

167,533

132,426

2017

170,976

135,696

2022

162,707

123,233

Difference in votes + 1580 for PN + 35,107 for PL + 35,380 for PL + 39,474 for PL

Source: Cachia and Debattista (2023)

Abela managed to gain another big victory over the Nationalist Party, the Labour Party received fewer votes than it had received in the 2017 election. Whilst many believed that the lower turnout would negatively impact the results of the Labour Party, in the end, both main political parties were affected with the smaller parties unable to convince voters to go out and vote for them (Cachia & Debattista, 2023). The election results made it very evident that the majority of people were happy with the status quo, voting for economic stability over uncertainty. Events like the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, which led to the resignation of the Prime Minister, as well as accusations of corruption and a climate of impunity, large budget deficits in the executive branch, and Malta’s ‘grey-listing’ by the FATF and its removal a few months afterward, did not significantly affect the result (Pace, 2022a). Still, the low turnout compared to other elections highlights the rising apathy towards the main political parties. This would mean that the turnout can go even lower, as expected for the 2024 European elections and other elections afterward. This would weaken the legitimacy of the party-in-government. The results outline the struggle being faced by the Nationalist Party. As shown in Table 7.10, in over a decade, the gap between the Nationalist and Labour Parties widened, meaning that the Nationalist Party is still struggling to attract voters with the Labour Party being considered the natural party-in-government. There are several problems in the Nationalist Party. Firstly, since its defeat at the polls in 2013, it seems to be in permanent limbo. It is unable to articulate what it stands for, what its vision is and why that vision should be embraced by the electorate. It seems to be permanently divided and these divisions are irreconcilable between the liberal elements and conservative ones, since it lacks one unifying ideal, these two sides are becoming entrenched in their positions. This is leading to an existential crisis within the party (Debattista, 2022a, b). The identity crisis plagued the party after the country’s EU membership. The party has often struggled to deal with the liberal agenda proposed by the Labour Party. This means that on issues such as divorce, civil unions, and IVF, the party was unable to provide a united front. The ideology of the party rooted in the Catholic Social Teaching of the Church is seen as part of the problem. Given that the Catholic Church in Malta is no longer the benchmark for the

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people to make their moral judgement, the Nationalist Party is finding it hard to remain relevant and attract new voters (Vassallo, 2022; Pace, 2022b). This situation was not made easier by the fact that the Nationalist Party had three party leaders in four years. This meant that there was little continuation, with every leader bringing something different to the party. Beyond that, recent party leaders did not manage, as the Labour Party did, to unite the various factions, which weakened their leadership posts and made them more vulnerable to internal and external attacks. The Nationalist Party is struggling to catch up to Labour which managed to attract a vast number of cleavages that now support the party and provide it with the required legitimacy to govern (Baldacchino, 2022). This lack of motivation is also reflected in the nomination process for the top posts within the party. The recent nomination for the post of deputy leader elected Alex Perici Calascione reflected the problems within the PN. In this election, Calascione ended up as the only candidate vying for the post. Whilst this might have been an internal decision, it certainly raised more questions about the status of the party and its ability to attract new people. This brings to mind the reaction of Robert Arrigo in his last speech as deputy leader, on the way he was treated and how this sidelined the election of Calascione. The speech of Arrigo and the criticism he provided afterward outline the need for the party to have a constructive dialogue with its members on how to move forward and reinvent itself without losing any more support. There are disagreements on whether this dominance of the Labour Party is permanent and whether the Nationalist Party can recoup some of the votes it had lost. Pace (2022b) concludes that the Nationalist Party was in power for 25 years and thus it is natural for it to lose votes and popularity. Still, he believes that the Nationalist Party is stagnant and lacks the political dexterity to win votes. Its turn is likely to come at some stage if it can overcome its glaring difficulties, or else if it has lost its willingness to live, as it seems to have done, it can eventually be replaced by other political forces. The internal divisions within the party and the success of the Labour Party in neutralising by branding it as a ‘past’ and ‘elitist’ political party are undermining the role of the opposition. This is leading to the creation of two oppositions in Malta. The first is the one that acts and operates within parliament, what is known in the Westminster System as the ‘Loyal Opposition’, and the other is an opposition that is led largely by civil society groups, many of which have no intention of entering the political fray in a direct way as candidates (Debattista, 2022a, b). In the long term, the dominance of one party over the others could lead to dictatorial traits, including one narrative, one interpretation of history, one vision for the future, and one pathway to solve complex policy issues. These traits conflict with European values based on pluralism, diversity, and democracy (Vassallo, 2022). In addition, this could also mean that parliament will end up being a mere rubber stamp for the partyin-government (Debattista, 2022a). Yet, the European Union can step in to make sure that the rule of law and the independence of the institutions are retained. Still, as showcased by the situation in Poland and Hungary, it is not that easy for the European Union to intervene due to the disagreements which exist on how to deal with these problems.

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Whilst the turnout in the national, local, and European elections might decrease, the Labour Party might still look forward to large parliamentary majorities for the foreseeable future. Still, its most dangerous opponents might come from outside the parliamentary realm, in the form of journalism, civil society associations, environmental NGOs, and community associations, as already outlined in the case of Daphne Caruana Galizia, Juridical reforms, and the Panama Papers. These entities are increasingly becoming more linked with their peers in the EU (Warrington, 2022). However, these NGOs also face their challenges. The main political parties have often branded these groups as extremes or irrelevant and it might take a while before they are fully integrated into the country’s political system.

7.9

The European Union and Malta’s Political System

The sixth and seventh chapters of this book discussed the implications of the European Union on Malta’s Political System. The fourth stage of the impact of Europeanisation started with the election of Muscat and ended with the 2022 election. This election saw Robert Abela re-elected as Prime Minister of Malta after taking over from Muscat in 2020. The five dimensions of Ladrech’s theory on the impact of Europeanisation on political parties in Malta can help in understanding the role which the European Union had during this stage. The main political parties had to adapt to the reaction of the European Union towards national policies. This reaction, which was important to strengthen the legitimacy of their proposals or policies, was not always what they expected. Still, in some cases such as hunting, there is a clear misfit between what the European Union wants and what the national political parties are proposing. Whilst political parties have so far resisted any changes proposed by the EU towards Spring Hunting, it is the European Court of Justice that will ultimately decide on the matter. The Spring Hunting referendum showcased how NGOs can push their agenda without the need of the main political parties. The hunting lobby in Malta has submitted proposals to pressure political parties to amend the Referenda Act to remove the possibility of having referenda enforced based on signatures (around 10%), but political parties have so far refrained from promoting these changes. This might be because by doing so, they might alienate a segment of the electorate and threaten the principle of subsidiarity, a key principle for the European Union. This fourth stage is also important as the role of MEPs becomes more important, with the main political parties using their respective groups within the European Parliament to promote their issues. Malta’s MEPs have managed to fight their own space within the European Parliament and the fact that they are only six means that close attention is given to their work. Whilst several MEPs have risen within their party groups, including Miriam Dalli (when she was MEP) and Alex Agius Saliba, it is the election of Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament which raised the profile of the country. She became the first Maltese to head one of the main

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institutions of the EU. Whilst political parties had to adapt to the European Union, the political system has so far resisted any changes. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia led to the intervention of the European Union, Council of Europe, and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to provide their recommendations on the shortcomings which existed within the political system. The assassination of Caruana Galizia led to the creation of several civil society groups, which alongside several newspaper agencies, have become part of the resistance group in seeking justice for the journalist and her family. Whilst many expected a stronger intervention from the European Union in particular and the European Commission, the reality is that the European Union has limited tools which it could use to fix the institutions of the member states, and it cannot intervene, without the risk of being accused of abusing its power. This is why it was often the reports of the Council of Europe that pushed the Maltese administration to introduce reforms. The investigation into the assassination of Caruana Galizia is one of the many which are still ongoing. This means that the work of NGOs is still not over and many of them are expanding their role to fight political corruption and institutional failings in Malta. The assassination of Lassana Cisse outlines how the EU needs to do more to fight racism in Europe. His assassination is certainly not the only one motivated by racial discrimination, as unfortunately, these events are taking place in many other countries, with these victims ending up being forgotten by the institutions. One of the narratives that were often used during this stage was the need for Malta to be the best in the European Union. Whilst this narrative emerged after the election of Muscat, it was also used by the Nationalist Party to outline how it was going to make Malta the best country in the EU. Undoubtedly, Malta has achieved a lot since it jointed the European Union. Notwithstanding a lack of resources, the country’s peripheral position, and the country’s logistical disadvantages and size, various economic reforms managed to develop a thriving economy that is able to finance a strong social safety net, free healthcare and free education, apart from a myriad of other benefits (Gonzi, 2022). Still, this aspiration or vision can easily turn into an obsession with politicians looking inwards rather than outwards. This often leads to the promotion of parochialism, with politicians providing a narrow outlook of what is happening in Malta rather than providing a wide vision, being that the country is not a member of the European Union (Vassallo, 2022). Warrington (2022) provides an interesting evaluation on the matter as he sees this narrative as a psychological compensation for the country’s insignificant size and marginality. He believes that many Maltese people of all classes and conditions, from all political persuasions and all eras, were fond of using hyperbole. In the late nineteenth century, it was ‘Malta, fior del’ mondo’ (Malta, flower of the world). In the twenty-first century, it is ‘L-aqwa fl-Ewropa’ (The best in Europe). He sees it as one facet of myth-making and identity-building with ratings and rankings seen as better indicators of the country’s performance (Warrington, 2022). The narrative of becoming the best in Europe became extremely popular in the last decades. It was one of the catchphrases which Muscat used. The former Prime

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Minister aspired to improve the standings of the country and its people. He did so by introducing several economic and political reforms. These reforms included the promotion of LGBTIQ rights in Malta which placed it at the top of the ILGA in Europe, and Malta’s economy becoming one of the best within the EU area. The country has gained a seat, as a non-permanent member in the security council of the United Nations, which is a very important position for Malta and its role in the international system. Still, the progress came at a cost. Regulations on the environment and construction were eased. This meant more pollution, more development at the expense of the environment and the loss of heritage. At the same time, the cost of living and property prices were and are still rising (Flask, 2022). Moviment Graffitti believes that membership in the European Union should not be a competition between countries but more of an experience for the institutions and an opportunity for the people. The reason for this is that people’s lives and livelihood are at stake. The economic development of the country led to an increase in human exploitation with a number of third country nationals being taken advantage of whilst having little or no rights. They used the example of an incident in which a migrant employed by a construction company without a permit fell two storeys and was dumped on the road and left alone with his agony (Pisani, 2022). The Nationalist Party leader Bernard Grech believes that the narrative is based on a vision of the country which the people should aspire to have. Being the best means that reforms are needed and for states to do their utmost to improve the quality of life of their citizens. He believes that the narrative is not holding back reforms, but needs a broader discussion between civil societies, individuals, and NGOs to understand the way the country can move forward (Grech, 2022a, b). This reflection is similar to the one of former Prime Minister Gonzi who declared that the country’s ability to gain the trust and confidence of our business partners, the country’s ability to invest in educating our generations, and the country’s ability to retain a high national reputation within the European and international communities should underpin the narrative for the country to move forward. Whilst progress has been made, the country needs to be open to new ideas on how the system can change. Whilst reforms have been enacted, there are always ways to improve. Funds can be utilised to promote this progress. As the conclusion will highlight, in 2024 Malta will celebrate its 20th anniversary as a member of the European Union. Membership in the European Union has given the possibility to thousands of Maltese to go abroad and experience other cultures and political systems. A survey by Ernest and Young revealed that 60% of Maltese youth would rather live and work in another European state than in Malta. Several reasons for this were seen to be over-development and the lack of green areas, traffic, and international image (EY, 2021; Farrugia, 2022a). This means that for Malta to improve, the country needs to understand why all these youths want to leave the country. This should lead to a reflection on the country’s progress, what it has achieved, and what the country should aspire to. More importantly than that, it should also lead to an evaluation of the country’s political system and to a deeper discussion on what the European Union means for them as well as for the Maltese society.

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Vassallo, M. T. (2022). Senior Lecturer at the University of Malta. Political Analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Vassallo, M. T., & Tabone, C. (2020). Analytical introduction. In M. T. Vassallo & C. Tabone (Eds.), Public life in Malta III (pp. 1–30). Guntenberg Press. Vassallo, M. T., Cachia, J. C., & DeBattista, A. P. (Eds.). (2023). How civil society groups brought change to the Maltese Government: 2019–2020. Routledge. Vella, M. (2017, 4 November). Adrian Delia: ‘The Nationalist Party is going through some turbulence, but it’s no coup’. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/ news/national/81892/adrian_delia_the_nationalist_party_is_going_through_some_turbulence_ but_its_no_coup#.Ys3B33ZByM9 Vella, G. (2019a). Speech by HE George Vella, President of Malta at the SOS Malta Conference #STOPHATE. Vella, G. (2019b). Message of the President of Malta to the Maltese citizens. Retrieved from https:// timesofmalta.com/articles/view/president-vella-to-give-televised-address-three-days-afterappeal-for.754663. Vella, M. (2022a, 17 June). Malta officially removed from FATF greylist after ‘significant progress’ to address deficiencies. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/ national/117354/live_fatf_to_announce_official_decision_on_maltas_removal_from_ greylisting#.YuFtKnZByM8 Vella, V. (2022b, 27 February). Pajjiżna qed jintlaqat ħafna min din il-gwerra. It-Torċa, p. 2. Vella, M. (2022c, 1 July). Remains of Lassana Cisse, killed in cold blood in 2019, finally repatriated. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/11 7608/remains_of_lassana_cisse_killed_in_cold_blood_in_2019_finally_repatriated#.Yt2W53 ZByM8 Vella, M. (2022d, 17 July). Pilatus arrest warrants issued in January as waiting game beckons. MaltaToday. Retrieved from https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/117853/pilatus_ arrest_warrants_issued_in_january_as_waiting_game_beckons#.Ytmt1HZByM_ Warrington, E. (2022). Associate Professor of Public Policy and a political analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Webber, M. (2017). Reaction to the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Twitter. Xuereb, K. (2018). The impact of the European Union on cultural policy in Malta. Croatian International Relations Review, 24(82), 38–61. Xuereb, M. (2020, 11 November). Ferris and Efimova charged with perjury over Egrant, but magistrate abstains. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/ ferris-efimova-accused-of-perjury-over-egrant-magistrate-abstains.831103 Xuereb, K. (2022a). Former Project Coordinator at V18 Foundation/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Xuereb, M. (2022b, 17 March). Abela admits clientelism, blames electoral system. Times of Malta, p. 4. Zammit, M. L. (2022a, 8 June). All you need to know about the new IVF law that MPs will start debating today. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/all-youneed-to-know-about-the-new-ivf-law.960422 Zammit, S. (2022b, 8 March). PL would introduce laws to facilitate bank processes for legitimate businesses. The Malta Independent, p. 2.

Chapter 8

Europeanisation and Party Politics in Malta: A Reflection

Lill-Politiċi żgħażagħ Maltin kollha, li f’din il-foga parrokjali, jixtiequ jbexxu tieqa (Friggieri, 1981).

This is a statement by Friggieri which is difficult to translate to English without losing the meaning. It outlines how young politicians (Lill-Politiċi Żgħażagħ Maltin kollha) are blinded by parochial fog (li f’din il-foga parrokkjali). This parochial fog is reference to insularity which exists and which limits the exposure to other cultures and ideas. This is why these young politicians want to open the window (jixtiequ jbexxu tieqa) to clear the fog, look outwards rather than inwards, and inject new energy and enthusiasm within the political system. Professor Oliver Friggieri had written extensively on politics in Malta and was critical of the political culture and mentality which focused more on power and fanaticism rather than freedom of thought (Friggieri, 1994). As a poet, novelist, and academic, he would often refer to it directly or indirectly through his writings. In 1981, Friggieri wrote that Malta is still a political infant, led by an antiquated mentality, fraught with colonial prejudices, and in a state of decadence. He wrote that it is in the interest of a bad politician that the entire country remains infantile, and that Malta is led by classism, not politics. He argued that excessive politicisation is a recent version of old parochialism, that shifted from the church square to the square before parliament, a fake ‘church’ and that the fault of popular alienation lies with both Parliament and the State Media, both voices of an elite that wants to dominate. Friggieri work is a reflection of the political system in Malta. This is based on two extremes: black or white, right or wrong and left or right. The discourse used is traditionally divisive with a negative attitude against other parties. This divisiveness is usually targeting actors, as the entities which can promote change and is rarely based on ideas. The discourse used by politicians is based on critical thinking, but rather, on the approaches taken by their political parties. Friggieri (2002) argued that Malta’s biggest drawbacks were its inferiority complex, colonial mentality, insularity, and a politics based on divisions rather than consensus were seen as a heart towards the country’s growth. Friggieri (1981) believed that Malta required MPs © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9_8

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who would work for the interest of the citizens and not focus on clientelism. His opinion was that Political Parties should serve rather than ‘own’ the Maltese people. He concluded that there is the need to educate the political system and the citizens on politics which would nurture the concept of unity over partisanship and polarisation. Nearly four decades have passed since Friggieri (1981) wrote this pamphlet. In 1986, Friggieri would write a novel, ‘Fil-Parlament, ma jikbrux fjuri’ (Flowers do not grow in parliament) to reflect the divisions which existed within the main political parties and their struggle for power. Friggieri was critical of the system which exchanged money and gifts for votes (Friggieri, 1981). Since then, the political system is still toxic, making it little interesting for youths to get involved in. Political Parties still require loyalty and allegiance over critical thinking and political maturity. The dualism which was referred to in the introduction of this book still dominates the political system. The culture that the party people identify with is always right whilst the other is always wrong. This mentality has helped the main political parties to retain a basic support over the years. This is reflected in the state of the union survey which revealed how 71.6% of the Maltese always voted for the same party (Marmara, 2022). In 2022, in his collections of poems, Grech (2022b) described the political system in Malta as everyone sleeping on the same bed. The problem though is not that they all sleep in the same bed, but that they do it with other entities and groups, ignoring the Standards in Public Life and all ethical considerations. This is why Friggieri’s statement is still relevant, as it looks at the need for the country to open its horizons and to be able to introduce a new political culture which promotes critical thinking and places the community at the heart of its decision-making process. The evidence presented in this book suggests that Europeanisation, generally defined as the impact of the European Union’s norms and principles on states, has indeed had an impact on Maltaʼs political parties and party systems by influencing their political programmes, especially on controversial issues such as migration and hunting. Whilst the European Union has had an influence and the European Commission starting a number of infringement proceedings against Malta, it was the Council of Europe which has often pressured the Maltese institutions to introduce the needed reforms. Still, EU accession enabled Maltaʼs political parties to compete in the European arena and build strong relationships with a number of European party groups. This role has the potential to increase further especially as Malta’s MEPs continue to establish themselves within the EU institutions. At the same time, Maltaʼs political characteristics, including polarisation, partisanship, political confrontation and clientelism, have been largely unaffected by Europeanisation and are still prevalent and indeed encouraged within the countryʼs political system. These characteristics have helped to turn the European Union issue into not just the membership question, but also the promotion of the EU, its funds, education programmes such as Erasmus, its values, and the promotion of the European party groups into a salient and controversial issue. The European Union has been internalised by Maltaʼs parties and absorbed into the main patterns of party competition. For this reason, the impact or the role of the European Union was not always induced by the EU, but frequently by Maltaʼs political parties themselves. More often than not, the European Union was used by the main political parties to showcase how they were on the right side of history. Throughout these four stages

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highlighted in this study, the ‘right side of history’ has been one of those popular phrases that captured the superficial imagination of the press and politicians (Warrington, 2022). It often ended up in their campaign material and part of their discourse. It is certainly used by politicians to convince them that their policies are the best and will be beneficial to them and their families. Still, whilst it is often used, there is certain scepticism on whether it is properly used or simply a tool which is fuelling further polarisation and partisanship. An example of this can be the disagreement on the days to select as national holidays, with parties ending up in agreement on five, and having these national holidays being linked with either the Nationalist Party or Labour Party (Baldacchino, 2022). Debattista (2022a) believes that political parties like to think of themselves as being on ‘the right side of history’ because it fits into linear black-and-white narratives. It also fits in with what Herbert Butterfield described as the ‘Whig Interpretation of History’—where linear narratives of progress provide simple and easily digestible answers. He is of the opinion that there is no right side of history. History is not a judge and an arbiter—it is an academic discipline that aims to provide facts rather than judgement. Moreover, the ‘right side’ is often determined by the winning side, which, by definition, gets the place of honour in weaving the dominant narrative. Warrington (2022) shares a similar opinion, believing that there is no ‘right side’ of history, because there is no clear historical telos. He believes that there is a perception that liberal democracy and capitalism are the natural destiny of the human race, only to discover how deceptive this assumption is. More mundanely, he considers the Nationalist and Labour parties to have recognised certain powerful signs and trends at various points during the past seventy-odd years, and responded appropriately to them—seeking independence, neutrality, and EU membership, building the welfare state, positioning Malta to take advantage of transitory economic niches. These are considered as shrewd strategic choices, rather than being ‘the right side of history’. If there is a right side of history, it will be judged after a number of years once the benefits and consequences are apparent. History is subject to interpretation and construction (Baldacchino, 2022). Political Parties might prove one interpretation for this history but it would be others who will be required to provide a wider view to understand who was right and who (if anyone) was wrong (Pace, 2022a). Table 8.1 provides a brief evaluation of the different stages of the influence of Europeanisation on Party Politics in Malta. All four stages presented several challenges to the main political parties. The first stage is interesting as for the first time, the Nationalist Party used European institutions and European political parties during the political turmoil that the country was in between 1981 and 1987. This period is also important as the visions for or against the European Union became apparent. These visions would reflect the programmes proposed from 1991 till Malta’s eventual accession to the European Union in 2004. This period considered the second stage of the impact of Europeanisation, outlined the various reforms which the country needed to introduce to join the European Union. The decision by the European Union to focus on Austria, Sweden, and Finland believing that Malta

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Table 8.1 Four Stages of Europeanisation Stages First stage

Years 1979–1990

Type of Impact Crossloading (top-down)

Second stage

1990–2004

Top-down and bottom-up and crossloading

Third stage

2004–2013

Top-down, bottom-up and crossloading

Fourth stage

2013–2022

Top-down, bottom-up and crossloading

Main Events This is the pre-membership stage when the Nationalist Party proposed membership. There was an attempt to use the EU institutions to guarantee democracy and rule of law in Malta. The stage deals with Malta’s application to join the EU and the negotiations which took place between Malta and the EU from 1990 till Malta’s EU membership in 2004. Some scholars refer to this period as EU-isation. The promotion of European integration through Europeanisation. Political parties campaign for and against the European Union. There is also the use of European political parties to strengthen the campaigns for and against Malta’s European Union membership application. The initial stage of EU membership. The country had to adjust to the realities of membership. This was not made easier by the financial crisis. Still, membership offered a new arena in which political parties could compete. The European elections enabled parties to elect their representatives in the European Parliament. Possibly the most interesting stage of the impact of Europeanisation. Various events including the Presidency of the Council of the EU and the 2018 Capital of Culture event took place. During the 2017 Presidency, the country promoted its priorities including finding a long-term solution for the irregular migration problem. During the 2018 Capital of Culture events, the country had the opportunity to promote its history and heritage. The fourth stage was overshadowed by the assassination of Caruana Galizia and the pressure placed by various international organisations including the EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE on the Maltese government to introduce the required institutional reforms.

was not ready to join the European Union could have ended Fenech Adami’s vision of making Malta a member of the European Union. In a European setting, it also highlighted the cautiousness of the European Union towards accepting several states. Whilst countries such as Spain and Greece were allowed to join after the death of Franco and removal of the Greek Junta, it took a cautious approach to others by introducing a set of criteria to make sure countries would be ready to become members of the EU. In some cases, including the example of Turkey, the cautious approach meant that the country started losing interest in joining the EU as little progress was being made on its application.

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The decision of the European Union not to include Malta in the 1995 enlargement, meant that Malta had to abide by various criteria which the European Union established for the candidate states which wished to join the EU from 2004 onwards. This period led to various reforms in Malta including the introduction of the VAT system. Some of these issues were politicised with membership eventually suspended in 1996 and reactivated in 1998. The country finally joined the European Union in 2004. The third stage focused on the early experience of the country as an EU member state. The country’s political parties had to adapt to include the role of MEPs within their structures. This also meant that political parties had to focus on European elections, which similarly to the rest of the European Union, are often perceived as second-order elections. These elections attracted new political parties which were established to safeguard the national interest. Yet, these small political parties received little support. The electoral system and two-system mentality in Malta, are making it difficult for these parties to compete against the more established political parties. The financial crisis meant that ‘some’ austerity measures had to be introduced, even though Malta was one of the only Mediterranean countries not to be directly impacted by the crisis. By 2008, the election of the Labour Party leader Joseph Muscat brought new energy within the party, which began to use European values to promote civil liberties and other reforms needed in the country. He was elected as Prime Minister in 2013. The fourth stage can be considered the most interesting one. Various events including the Presidency of the Council of the European Union enabled the partyin-government to promote priorities set by Malta. The Capital of Culture event was also important to promote the country’s history and heritage as well as to inject the needed investment into the Capital to attract more people, locals as well as foreigners. It was also the period where the Prime Minister introduced various civil liberties including Civil Unions and later on, same-sex marriage. Still, this period will be remembered for the Panama Papers’ revelations and the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. This led the European Union and the Council of Europe, amongst others, to pressure the country to introduce much-needed reforms. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia led to the resignation of Muscat and a number of his associates in 2019 and 2020. Lassana Cisse, a migrant resident in Malta would be assassinated in 2019. The investigations on both assassinations are still ongoing at the time of the book being written. The assassination of Caruana Galizia led to the resignation of Muscat and some of his associates in 2019 and 2020. The racially motivated murder of Lassana Cisse outlined the need for the country to tackle racism. In terms of politics, the fourth stage outlined the problems of the Nationalist Party, struggling to close the electoral gap with the Labour Party. The party is facing an identity and financial crisis and has so far failed to convince voters that it can be the alternative party-in-government. The period is important as it led to strong divisions within the political system. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 provide an overview of the Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta. This book has moved beyond the dimensions of Ladrech to also take into consideration party ideology discourse, electoral campaigns, and leadership. This

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Table 8.2 Assessing the Impact of Europeanisation on Maltaʼs Party Politics Entity

Labour party

Characteristics Ideology/ principles Political Programmes Electoral campaigns

Discourse

Leadership

Nationalist party

Ideology/ principles Political Programmes Electoral campaigns Discourse Leadership

Minor political parties

Ideology/ principles

Political Programmes Electoral campaigns

Discourse

Leadership

Reason of Impact Influence of the EU liberal principles on the party including non-discrimination and equality Impact of the transfer of legislative powers to the EU. Promotion of the EUʼs funds. EU issue and its liberal principles framed along the years. The labour campaigns were traditionally based on national issues, even though from 2004 onwards, it included the use of EU funds and the need to embrace liberal European principles including non-discrimination and equality. Traces of Europeanism particularly in discourse used by Muscat. Labour leaders have declared that Malta needs to move beyond the EU in order to attract investment. A number of former MEPs including former Prime Minister Muscat opted to use the European Parliament as a stepping stone for the national parliament. The party is influenced by the traditional principles of the EU including freedom, democracy and rule of law Impact of the transfer of legislative powers of the EU. Promotion of EU ideals and funds. The European Union politicised across the years From 1987 onwards, the Nationalist Partyʼs campaigns promoted certain EU principles including democracy and rule of law and the role of the party within the EPP and the EU itself. EU traditional principles such as democracy and human rights and EU funds influenced the parties’ discourse. Nationalist party leaders are influenced by the EU and Europeʼs Christian democrats Some of the minor political parties can be considered as far-right or conservative. These include Imperium Europa and AN. AD and PD were considered as social democrats/ environmentalists. They have now merged into ADPD promoting a new system of politics based on transparency and accountibility. The influence of the EU Policies mostly includes those on irregular migration and hunting. ADPD promotes the environmental policies and targets set up by the EU. Based on their approach towards the EU. Beyond ADPD, which have consistently promoted the priorities of the European Greens, most of the other smaller parties have highlighted the threat of the EU towards Malta and its people. Far-right parties discourse is traditionally based on nationalism and patriotism. ADPD discourse is more liberal and often reflects their vision for the country and the EU. The smaller parties are usually guided by one individual. Beyond AD (now ADPD), most of the other parties are driven by 1 person. Their electoral success is rather limited even though candidates like Norman Lowell did manage to gain thousands of votes in various EU elections.

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Table 8.3 Assessing the impact of Europeanisation on Party Politics in Malta Party Dimensions

Party-Competition (Party Systems)

Organiational Change Relationship-beyond the party system Policy-Change

Party-Government relationship

Political system

Clientelism Political Confrontation Partisanship and Polarisation

Emergence of new far-right anti-EU parties which, together with the Green Party (now ADPD), might challenge the hegemony of the main political parties in the future. Political parties are now competing with civil society groups for influence. MEPs have been included in partiesʼ structures. They have a major role in Maltaʼs political system. Parties are collaborating with European Party Groups in order to promote the country’s priorities. Maltaʼs parties have to abide by EU regulations on issues such as the economy and migration. Yet there is some resistance on others including hunting. Most of the time, political parties are driven by populism and refuse to promote welfare retrenchment to safeguard their votes. Maltaʼs political parties (and civil society groups) are constantly using the EU institutions (or Council of Europe) to pressure their own governments. In certain instances, Maltaʼs MEPs base their vote on a common approach. Clientelism is still widespread. Premise of a new political style based on consensus never materialised. Still dominate Maltaʼs political system.

was done in an attempt to provide a wider perspective of how Europeanisation can infiltrate party politics and the work of political parties as they seek to maintain their support, shape the national and EU decision-making process and most importantly of all, win elections. Vasilopoulou’s (2018) theory on Euroscepticism based on four features can help to explain the initial approach of the Labour Party towards the European Union. The Labour Party had a cultural problem with the European Union as it perceived it as a ‘colony’ and a potential threat to the country and its sovereignty. This could have threatened the Foreign Policy approach of the Labour administration, as this was based on neutrality and non-alignment. The Eurosceptic approach of the Labour Party shifted with the election of Alfred Sant and it was more based on the policies being presented by the European Union which were seen as not adequate for Malta and the future of the European Union. The Labour Party considered a growing EU as a threat to the country and its economy. With the election of Muscat, the Labour Party shifted its support towards the European Union. The Nationalist Party’s Europeanism evolved from one leader to the other. The Nationalist Party has always believed in further European integration, though the party had concerns over further integration in two main areas: taxation and security. The approach of the Nationalist Party over tax harmonisation was very similar to that of the Labour Party. Another important area where there is a certain degree of

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scepticism is security. The decision not to join PESCO (Permanent Structure Cooperation) can be seen as a form of isolation in this area. Neutrality is still important for Malta, though joining PESCO was also an issue of resources. Malta does not have the institutional/financial resources to make a meaningful contribution to PESCO. As Malta has no defence industry, it is difficult for Malta to participate in capability development projects. Malta could participate in projects with a light touch of industrial dimension and a focus on training and education instead, but there is also a question of who would be Malta’s natural partners. However, even if Malta did not partake in capability projects, the binding commitments in PESCO implied a complete overhaul in Malta’s defence planning and budget planning (Fiott, 2022). Another important element in the study of Europeanisation is the way political parties approach European values. The Nationalist Party promoted the traditional values of the European Union based on Christian Democracy including solidarity, freedom, subsidiarity, and democracy. On the other hand, the Labour Party promoted equality and human dignity. The way political parties framed these European values can be seen from two distant theories on framing. Cultural Framing (Grande et al., 2016) was particularly important for the Nationalist Party to outline how the identity of the country was going to be strengthened through EU membership. The idea here is that the EU and Malta shared similar values and principles which made the EU, the natural home for the country. Membership in the European Union was also seen as a way of affirming Malta’s EU identity. The framing of the Labour Party of European values can be analysed through Statham and Trenz’s (2012) approach to framing. The three types of framing presented by the scholars are campaign framing, issue framing, and justification framing. All these elements were used by the Labour Party as it sought to introduce radical forms in Malta including civil unions and later on same-sex marriage, adoptions by same-sex couples, and IVF amongst others. Most of these rights were promoted in several national and European elections, with the Labour Party declaring that Maltese citizens were going to enjoy the same rights as their European counterparts, which was going to make Malta one of the best countries in Europe. Still, one of the main questions is whether society understands these values when there is little information about such values across the EU. The Eurobarometer surveys reveal the values which are important for the Maltese people and the values which they usually associate with the European Union. Table 8.4 gives an overview of the values which are important for the Maltese people. These include human rights and respect for human life. Whilst unfortunately the question was not asked annually which made it difficult to provide a longitudinal analysis of the result, it still provides a wide overview of the important values. From the list, rule of law slowly became more important, which is not surprising given how much attention was given to the matter by the European Union and the Nationalist Party. At the same time, democracy is slowly seen as becoming less important. This could be because people are more interested in the rule of law, or because they do not believe that democracy is a problem in the country. Respect for human life is the most important value, and this is particularly important given the movement of some NGOs and minor political parties towards a discussion on

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Table 8.4 Most important values to you personally

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Rule of Law – – 12 – 9 – 12 – 17 14 12 9 15 16 16 16 – 21

Respect for Human Life – – 42 – 45 – 48 – 46 47 36 38 48 41 50 44 – 44

Human Rights – – 38 – 35 – 41 – 41 38 33 43 42 45 44 50 – 53

Democracy – – 25 – 31 – 30 – 30 27 25 26 24 30 32 34 – 20

Peace – – 55 – 47 – 44 – 47 44 47 55 43 55 53 46 – 28

Religion – – 23 – 26 – 9 – 15 16 17 16 13 17 11 17 – 19

Individual Freedom – – 19 – 19 – 21 – 21 20 24 17 15 18 20 17 – 22

Equality – – 17 – 11 – 18 – 17 19 17 20 15 14 17 15 – 15

abortion. Another important value is religion. Whilst secularisation in Malta has reduced the influence of the Catholic Church, religion is still considered an important value. This was also confirmed by the 2022 study on the state of the nation which revealed that 58.1% of the Maltese still believe that religion has an important place in their lives (Marmara, 2022). The Eurobarometer surveys (2004–2022) have also revealed the values which the Maltese citizens associate with the European Union. Table 8.5 provides an overview of these values which is also a projection of the values which political parties in Malta promoted across the years. The European Union has often been linked with the values of Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law. The European Union is known to promote these main principles across the European Union though at times. However, the EU has struggled to enforce these principles. Solidarity is another important value that the Maltese feel represents the European Union. This is not surprising given the effort Malta has made from membership onwards to promote the principle of solidarity towards the irregular migration issue. Respect for human life has been less associated with the European Union. This might be simply because the others are promoted predominantly by the various EU institutions and politicians, particularly the European Parliament and are issues that are always relevant in a changing society. This book provided an in-depth reflection on how European values are being promoted in Malta. Whilst the promotion of these values is important, there is a

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Rule of Law – – 29 – 33 – 31 – 32 19 19 14 22 28 34 33 – 31

Respect for Human Life – – 21 – 18 – 17 – 18 21 30 22 21 22 19 15 – 9

Human Rights – – 32 – 34 – 30 – 33 41 42 39 37 31 26 36 – 37

Table 8.5 What are values which best represent the EU? Democracy – – 41 – 42 – 41 – 36 29 36 38 34 39 33 39 – 37

Tolerance – – 10 – 7 – 18 – 8 11 8 11 16 16 18 13 – 22

Solidarity – – 20 – 17 – 21 – 20 13 15 19 19 12 18 21 – 28

Equality – – 16 – 11 – 12 – 10 21 15 22 14 21 13 20 – 19

Peace – – 35 – 24 – 28 – 36 31 33 37 32 35 33 32 – 19

Individual Freedoms – – 11 – 11 – 19 – 19 22 20 17 13 15 16 12 – 13

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certain degree of scepticism on whether the Maltese citizens understand the importance of such values and the way these values can influence their daily lives. Some values which are framed as European ones include public life, community solidarity, a zealous desire for the universal application of fundamental rights, lack of deference for people in authority, commitment to community interests, honesty in fiscal and civic contribution, an international outlook, tolerance to people of different cultures and origins are considered universal values rather than European ones, even though they have been framed as European values across the decades (Aquilina, 2022). The main political parties have been selective of the European values they promoted. The Maltese society has often looked at the main political parties to give them guidance on such values, meaning that they are provided with a narrow perspective. This could also mean that society has little awareness of other values which are to be found in the treaties of the European Union, including fairness, truth, and justice, which are there to be used as guidance by the EU and member states (Pace, 2022a). Another important view is that the Maltese are an empirical people, who are averse to abstract ideas that are disembodied from everyday situations. This meant that values are honoured in name rather than substantively. The belief systems of the country as based on dogma, rather than reason, and arguments are often grounded in anecdotal, rather than grounded in unimpeachable data. Traditional responses are often emotional, rather than clear-eyed. This means that society does not fully understand and honour the so-called ‘European’ values promoted by the main political parties (Warrington, 2022). Others argue that the Maltese have an expectation for basic freedoms and democratic guarantees. Corruption is their main concern, and the fair administration of justice is a similar one. Reference to the fight against corruption was made by Pope Francis during his visit to Malta shortly after the 2022 national election. He declared ‘May you always cultivate legality and transparency which will enable the eradication of corruption and criminality, neither of which acts openly and in broad daylight’ (Pope Francis, in Zammit, Times of Malta, 2 April 2022). Controversy over the speech emerged after the public broadcaster failed to reference the statement opting to focus on other issues referred to in the speech. This was seen as an example of the lack of independence of the public broadcasting service (Borg, Times of Malta, 5 April 2022a). Whilst Malta has introduced various reforms in the fight against corruption, the country is considered a young democracy that is still maturing from a culture of patronage as documented in the 1950s and the 1960s. Therefore, reforms will take time and might take decades before their positive impact becomes visible. Still, from the country’s independence onwards, the EU and Malta share similar values, including democracy and rule of law, which are also enshrined in the Maltese Constitution. Institutions are the ones that should safeguard these values and not ordinary citizens. Still, the assassination of Caruana Galizia, the Panama Papers scandal and other inquiries have witnessed historic protests precipitated by a collapse in the rule of law, the emasculation of institutions, and the failure of politicians to live up to the values that the Maltese expect (Casa, 2022).

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One of the main values which is not usually referred to by the Eurobarometer surveys is the value of money and power. In Maltese there is a popular catchphrase that states ‘ħalli il-bniedem jaqla’ lira’. This is usually translated to ‘leave the person to earn some money’. Money is an important value especially when bread and butter issues are still prioritised by the electorate. Which is why European funds were heavily promoted throughout the years for the country’s economy as well as for its citizens. The value of money is reflected in the Ernest and Young Survey on Malta’s Generation X. The survey revealed how during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Maltese youth were more concerned about the economic impact of the pandemic rather than the impact on their health (EY, 2021). Vassallo (2022) provides a historical overview of this. He believes this is due to the historical, geographical, and cultural fabric of the Maltese. Reference is made to an archaic proverb that was popular during the reign of Queen Victoria (1837–1901), Ħobb lil Alla u lir-Reġina u tgħix mingħajr tbatija (Love God and the Queen and you live trouble-free). The proverb implies that those who love God secure eternal life, while those who side with the Queen improve their standing in the country. Whilst this proverb is no longer popular in Maltese society, it is a projection of the mentality which is still popular. During, their rule in Malta, the British turned the island into a fortress colony. Malta had an important geographical position to safeguard trade links through the Suez Canal. The economy of Malta was mostly dependent on the British military presence and the resources they were spending around the harbour area, which was the hub of the Maltese economy. Life in Malta was characterised by intermittent periods of famine and poverty and economic prosperity during a time of internal conflicts in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Under the British rule, the Maltese developed an inclination to please the Crown, with these loyalty rewarded through political patronage. This helped to establish a clientelist society that promotes jobs and favours for party loyalty. (Vassallo, 2021, 2022). Beyond the historical explanation of why funds and bread and butter issues seem to dominate all elections in Malta, there is also the political element. Malta is not the only country that was attracted to the European Funds, as most of the new member states saw membership and the utilisation of such funds as an opportunity to strengthen their economies and institutions. However, in the Maltese scenario, politicians tend to be short-term in outlook, and until the EU’s next 7-year perspective, there is no need to speak about losing funding. It will become an urgent public matter as the country approach the end of the seven-year budget and begin to transit to the next one (Pace, 2022a, b). There is the potential that Malta could become a net contributor given its economic development which has surpassed that of many other EU member states (Baldacchino, 2022). Political parties do not emphasise strongly enough the other aspects of membership which are also as important as outlined in Table 8.6; including the freedom of movement and the ability for Maltese students to study abroad, a stronger role within the International System, and the promotion of peace. These are only some of the advantages of EU membership which at times are taken for granted (Cutajar, 2022; Casa, 2022). Political Parties frequently take a very nationalistic position, emphasising the benefits of membership for the country. These benefits are usually European funds. It is important to start emphasising the

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Table 8.6 What does the EU represent to you?

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Euro 23 21 18 33 26 39 27 23 25 33 33 34 36 45 37 40 35 41 31

Peace 39 30 24 34 20 22 20 17 27 26 32 31 25 27 32 22 20 19 22

Democracy 41 38 25 29 27 24 29 25 26 28 32 34 31 35 31 29 15 26 27

Cultural Diversity 32 23 17 23 16 18 17 14 21 20 28 32 34 42 38 38 23 30 24

Freedom to Travel/ Study Abroad 64 55 43 56 44 50 50 38 45 46 57 60 58 63 60 59 47 56 56

Stronger Say in the World 43 37 30 30 32 33 31 20 29 29 42 39 37 42 38 43 28 45 34

role and responsibility which Malta can have in the European Union. Membership in the European Union has always been politicised by the main political parties in terms of funds. If political parties truly believe in the European Union, they should provide more awareness of it. This awareness should be based on the fact that the EU is not only an economic organisation but can provide various opportunities for the Maltese (Pace, 2022a).

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In 2024, Malta will celebrate its 20th anniversary as a member of the European Union. In two decades, many things have changed as the country and its society evolved. A new generation was born within these 2 years and was able to make use of all the benefits of the European Union. The Europeanisation of Party Politics is an evolving process. This means that the relationship between the European Union and Political Parties will continue to evolve, and so will the Maltese society and its interests. Whilst in 2004 the main political parties campaigned for or against the European Union, both sides were committing themselves on not introducing samesex marriage and divorce. In a changing society, both rights were introduced in Malta (Sammut, 2022).

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In the last decade, Malta has gone through rapid economic development. However, not everyone believes that this is linked with the European Union. The Labour MEP Alfred Sant argues that the Labour administration under the premiership of Muscat and Abela managed to build financial services and invest in areas such as tourism and gaming, without the support of the European Union. However, European Union membership led to a negative impact on several economic sectors in Malta, mainly agriculture due to the strict rules of the European Union. This meant that these sectors have lost their importance in Malta’s economic landscape (Sant, 2022). Notwithstanding the challenges being faced by Malta, membership with the European Union has provided plenty of opportunities for the Maltese people. Many doors have been opened for new generations. However, there is still a long way to go before all the possibilities and opportunities provided by membership are fully exploited by Maltese citizens (Pace, 2022a, b; Baldacchino, 2022). This sentiment is shared by the former President of Malta Marie Louise Coleiro Preca. In one of her speeches as President of Malta, she declared that it is the responsibility of the European citizens to build and develop the European Union for themselves and future generations (Coleiro Preca, 2018). The same could be said about the development of the country, with Maltese citizens ultimately responsible to promote the required changes for the country to move forward. One of the politicians who worked for EU membership, former Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi (2022), believes that membership so far has been a positive experience for the country. He argues that the country was initially divided on the issue but the attitude towards membership shifted after Malta’s entry in 2004. Both former Prime Minister Gonzi and Former EU Commissioner Tonio Borg agree that the country has managed to become a member of the Eurozone, was able to withstand the turmoil of the financial crisis, and is now able to compete in a market of over 500 million customers (Gonzi, 2022; Borg, 2022b). Before and after membership in the European Union, there was the fear that Malta, being the smallest country in the European Union, would have had little voice. The reason for this is that it had to compete with much larger states to influence the EU decision-making process. Nearly 20 years after membership, the country and various individuals still managed to succeed within the European Union. The perfect example is the case of Roberta Metsola, who managed to become the President of the European Parliament. Metsola is leading one of the main institutions in the European Union. This should be seen as an example to others who might wish to follow a similar path (Grech, 2022a). Membership in the European Union has also been a positive experience for the Maltese people. Table 8.7 reveals that the absolute majority of the Maltese people see themselves as citizens of the European Union. The percentage of those who see themselves as such is 10% more than the EU average. Whilst Malta is a small state, this is a very important result given how divisive the EU referendum and membership issue was for over a decade. Attitudes towards membership have been positive, even though various political scientists and politicians feel that more should be done (in terms of policies and

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Table 8.7 You feel a citizen of the European Union

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

367 Malta 72 72 81 87 84 84 82 82 81 72 83 81

EU 61 61 62 65 67 66 68 70 73 70 72 71

approaches) to reach its full potential. The President of Malta George Vella believes that the overall result of membership was positive. This does not mean that there were no negative impacts on certain aspects of Maltese life, but these have been overcome mostly due to the resilience and flexibility of the nation. Today, Malta compares very favourably in practically all aspects with other members of the EU. Belonging to a group of democratic countries, joined together to promote peace, economic growth, security, and stability, cannot bring anything but positive results (Vella, 2022a). Still, the relationship between the European Union and Malta is constantly evolving and new opportunities and challenges will certainly arise in the future. The European Union has gone through a financial crisis, a migration crisis, and Brexit. Throughout all of them, the feeling amongst some in Europe was that the European Union was doomed. Yet so far it has survived. One of the main issues between the European Union and Malta will be the issue of security. Whilst the European Union has used the Russian invasion of Ukraine to make its case for more security powers, it risks alienating several neutral states including Malta. For this reason, a key debate will be defence and how a potential defence area could fit the neutrality clauses of countries like Malta (Muscat, 2022). Since EU accession, Malta has joined the Partnership for Peace and CSDP operations, despite its neutrality clause. This possibility to participate in such missions is attributed to the very specific nature of Malta’s neutrality. Malta was given the possibility to sit around the decision-making table for CSDP as part of the Political and Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council. The main articles within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that could challenge Malta’s neutrality are Articles 42.7 TEU and 222 TFEU (EU, 2022b). These articles are shown in Table 8.8. The reason for this is that these articles presuppose that EU member states would aid each other in times of armed aggression. While Article 42.7 TEU is not as well developed as NATO’s Article 5, it still raises a series of questions on how far Malta would go to support a fellow EU member state. Whilst Malta’s defence resources are

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Table 8.8 Mutual Defence Clauses of the European Union Articles 42.7 TEU If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Articles 42.7 T222 TFEU (A) The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a)—prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;—protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;—assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. (B) Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

extremely limited, the issue would still test the national government and political parties on whether the country is willing to support fellow member states against the aggression of another country. So far, the EU did not manage to become a security player and cannot be compared to a military alliance like NATO. However, it is still a political community that calls on members to provide security and defence to each other. Malta would certainly expect such support in case of a major threat to the territory of the country (Fiott, 2022). Malta’s membership in the European Union meant that the country could play a stronger role in seeking to build an alliance between the Mediterranean countries. During the EU campaign and referendum, Malta’s role in the Mediterranean was a point of issue between the two opposite camps. The Pro-European movement believed that Malta’s place was in the European Union and promoted the idea that Malta could be a bridge between Europe and North Africa enhancing its role as a player within the region. The Eurosceptics argued that Malta would lose its alliances with several North African countries, including Libya and Tunisia, and its role within the Mediterranean. Twenty years later, the European Union’s role in the Mediterranean is limited. Malta can promote the crucial role of the Mediterranean Basin which is a bridge among three continents, full of history and challenges but also opportunities, especially in the geopolitical future of Europe (Cutajar, 2022). In the final report on the Conference on the Future of Europe, there was hardly any reference to the Mediterranean and the challenges being faced within this region

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Table 8.9 Trust in the Institutions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Political Parties 33 29 26 29 34 22 20 20 20 46 24 22 25 21 36 29 15 20 24

National Parliament 47 51 38 44 54 47 33 38 29 62 51 47 53 47 59 44 45 46 40

National Government 49 51 40 42 56 41 33 40 31 59 56 51 58 51 53 51 58 49 47

EU 50 53 53 56 65 62 54 52 45 53 55 46 56 51 56 53 45 61 61

(EU, 2022a). The European Union needs to do much more to tackle the issue of irregular migration, and this could be achieved by first understanding the problems being faced by countries in Africa and helping the African countries to address these problems. The European Union needs to go beyond providing financial resources and needs to cooperate with the African Union to fight instability and tackle the main problems within the area, including poverty, weak institutions, strong divisions, climate change, and sustainable development. The Syrian Migration Crisis has already shown how the issue can threaten the European project, and more should be done to tackle the problem and save the lives of thousands who try to cross the Mediterranean (Vella, 2022a). One of the major issues discussed in this book is how the Maltese political system has been resistant to changes, even though pressure is being placed on the parties to reform the political system. The Eurobarometer data from 2004 and 2022 (cf. Table 8.9) reveals a low trust in political parties in Malta. The European Union remains the most trusted institution when compared to political parties, national government, and the national parliament. This might be due to the growing corruption allegations within the party-in-government and the internal struggles within the party-in-opposition. Trust in political parties did rebound in 2008 and 2013, and this might be the time when Joseph Muscat was elected leader of the Opposition, becoming prime minister of Malta 5 years later. One of the main problems is that rather than the rule of law, political parties usually promote the rule of parties (Pace, 2017). The reason for this is that political parties have often

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believed to be above any laws and regulations which more often than not, were created by them. Politicians and parties often defend themselves by declaring that if they do something wrong; they will be judged by the electorate. They put ‘popular judgement’ over the checks and balances provided by the independent institutions. Whilst political parties have the potential to ‘manipulate’ the electorate through their policies, institutions are harder to manipulate (beyond choosing the members of the institutions) and open to more scrutiny. This is why as EU members, this scrutiny goes beyond the national institutions (Debattista, 2022a). Political Parties in Malta have to adapt to new realities in a changing society. This includes the fact that other entities are now being more trusted in the country. Political parties have traditionally sought legitimacy through elections. Still, they have often used values and polarisation in the promotion of their policies and to weaken their competitors. The European Union has opened the doors for civil society groups to have a say in the decision-making process. Whilst political parties have often played down the role of NGOs, recent events, including the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, showcase the willingness of such groups to fight the status quo of the main political parties and to highlight the problems which still exist within the political system. Beyond that, there is also the issue of the dominance of the Labour Party and the weakening of the Nationalist Party. In the next few years, it will be interesting to analyse whether this trend will continue or whether the Nationalist Party will manage to get over the internal divisions which have plagued it and be able to convince voters that it can be the alternative party-in-government. The fact that the European Union is more trusted than the Maltese institutions, as shown in Table 8.9, means that more should be done to gain public trust. Several Presidents of Malta including current President George Vella, President Emeriti Marie Louise Coleiro Preca, and George Abela, have called for politicians to initiate a discussion on the role of the President. Presidents have often ended up being the regulators of the Constitution with political parties requesting the intervention of the President in issues on which the Office of the President has no power or responsibilities on. The 2022 state of the nation survey, organised by the Office of the President of the Republic, revealed that the majority of the Maltese (46.9%) agreed that the President should nominate the head of the army and the police commissioner. Still, 33.3% of the Maltese surveyed did not know what kind of powers the President should have (Marmara, 2022). This highlights how many are unaware of the powers and responsibilities which the President has in the country. Any potential reforms will require an assessment of their potential impact on the Supreme Law in general, as well as any impact it could have on related legislation (Vella, 2022a). Any potential constitutional changes will have to be in respect to the parliamentary system in Malta which is based on the Westminster model with people directly electing the Members of Parliament whilst the President is elected by parliament (Grech, 2022a). The problem within the political system can be traced back to decades ago (and for some even centuries) and the way the political class began to interact with the Maltese citizens for votes or support. This means that it is not the fault of one government, but there were a series of oversights that made the problem grow across

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the decades. Therefore, the problem is not Constitution (Warrington, 2022; Debattista, 2022a, b) but the system in which it operates based on partisanship and polarisation. The constitution has also been undermined by the constant collision between the political class and organised crime and lobby groups. Regulations and the Public Life Act are increasingly being ignored, which creates a sense of impunity within the political system. Political reforms might consist of effective regulatory frameworks for party organisations, funding, and standards of conduct (Warrington, 2022). In addition, potential changes might require more checks and balances which would provide stronger transparency within the political system (Baldacchino, 2022). This can be achieved by strengthening the role of parliament as the legislative body and its function of scrutinising the conduct of the government. At the moment, parliament is made of part-timers, which means their role is rather limited, and they often work in public and private entities which could potentially lead to a conflict of interest. In addition, it makes it difficult to separate parliament from the government (Aquilina, 2022). Several legislations have been introduced to regular party funding. However, the problem is that political parties are not funded by the state at all beyond a contribution that is given to them for research. There are still questions regarding their sources of income which might hide the strong influence of moneyed elites on the country’s political process (Aquilina, 2022). Another problem that has often been highlighted by many is that the electoral system encourages clientelism. The system is leading to intense competition between candidates from the same party in a narrow village context. The system is facilitating clientelism for these candidates to gain the required votes (Azzopardi, 2022; Flask, 2022; Pisani, 2022; Aquilina, 2022). Recent constitutional reforms have curbed the patronage wielded by the Prime Minister. More reforms could be introduced to safeguard the autonomy of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Police and to hold them accountable. Yet, for this to be achieved, the country needs a reflection on creating political and constitutional systems that take account of the growing diversity of the country’s resident population, one-fifth of whom are disenfranchised and, for the most part, exploited and discriminated against (Warrington, 2022). Further political reforms will have to provide more insight on the recruitment in the public administration and the role of persons of trust, which the Council of Europe has been critical of, and introduce a mechanism that provides for situations where no political consensus is reached for the appointment of people in positions that require cross-party agreement. This will mean that a solution has to be found to prevent strategic positions of oversight remain vacant (Aquilina, 2022). In December 2022, Prime Minister Robert Abela has presented an amendment Bill in parliament to introduce an anti-deadlock mechanism for the appointment of the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life. The proposal allows the party-in-government to appoint the Commissioner through a simple majority vote if the nomination fails to garner a two-thirds majority in two previous voting rounds. The fear is that this could be used to undermine the autonomy of parliament and the moral authority of these offices (Meilak, Maltatoday, 4 January, 2023). Given the controversy surrounding this amendment, political parties and civil society groups are set to have an important role in the

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discussion concerning this amendment and to make sure that the autonomy of parliament and the Standards Commissioner are safeguarded. Beyond the constitutional reforms, education is also seen as essential and this has already been improved with the introduction of ethics in Maltese schools. Promotion of critical thinking and civic duties is required for society to not accept everything that is being presented to it, but to be able to provide feedback on the work which is being done by its representatives. As Friggieri declared in his writings, this could be one of the ways by which political parties could attract youths to participate more actively in Malta’s political system. More awareness should be raised about the country’s natural, architectural and cultural environment. This is required for the new generations which are more aware of their surroundings and coexist with nature, living as sustainably as possible (Farrugia, 2022; Aquilina, 2022). Still, any political reforms must require a discussion with all Maltese citizens and all entities concerned. Whilst across the years the principle of subsidiarity was heavily promoted to showcase how the European Union and Malta shared similar values, this has rarely been reflected in the policies parties introduced. Whilst local councils have been established, much of the decision-making process is left with the Prime Minister and cabinet. When constitutional amendments are required, some discussions usually take place between the main political parties, with little consultation with the Maltese citizens (Pace, 2022a). In addition to the political reforms, there is another threat that the main institutions will have to deal with, with this being the survival of press in Malta. As discussed in the third chapter of this book, there has been a rapid decline in the selling of newspapers. The 2022 state of the nation survey revealed that only 5.6% follow news through a traditional newspaper, with 56.2% of the Maltese preferring to follow national news through online portals often promoted through social media. The majority at 61% watch news through the normal news bulletins on the main media of the country (Marmara, 2022). This means that little investment is being injected into the area. This also means that journalists often end up shifting to other industries as their jobs are not secured (Sammut, 2022). With most of the independent press struggling, there have been talks of financing the independent press to secure media pluralism in Malta. Still, this would mean that independent media could become dependent on the state and whether this would threaten their ‘independence’. The European Commission has also encouraged the Maltese government to continue with the reforms to protect journalists in the country and the anti-corruption reforms recommended by the public inquiry surrounding the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia (2022). In 2022, various entities in Malta commemorated the anniversary of the assassination of the Maltese journalist. The EPP called for a debate to commemorate the assassination and voted on a resolution which called for the Maltese government to act decisively in the fight against corruption and money laundering and to safeguard media freedom and pluralism in the country (European Parliament, 2022b). On the issue of media pluralism and the need to safeguard journalists, the government is in process of updating the media legislation, yet these reforms should also include a consultation with NGOs and civil society groups, given the role that

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these groups have in the country’s political system (Flask, 2022). This is the reason why the implementation of the new Media Protection Legislation was suspended. The IĠM and other independent bodies had criticised the government for lack of consultation. For this reason, the bill was suspended in order to open a consultation process (Calleja, MaltaToday, 13 October 2022). This should be one of the main reforms introduced by the new Abela administration. Such reforms need to have a unifying force in Malta. The political system has been resistant to open up to the way of doing things in the European Union, based on collaboration rather than divisions to safeguard the national interest within and outside the European Union. President Vella has repeatedly called for unity, outlining the need for collaboration to deal with the challenges faced by the country. In one of his speeches he declared: We start with small steps but with a determination to slowly get there. I feel that this is our obligation towards all those of good will who are upset about the situation; towards those honest citizens, we have an obligation to offer them a less divided and more united society. We have the same obligation towards future generations – to pass on to them a better country than the one we are in today. (Vella, 2021)

Political Parties should also work closely together to fight the cultural indifference which exists within society. This is important to safeguard the country for future generations. This sentiment was reflected in one of the statements given by Pope Francis during his visit to Malta. Pope Francis declared: It must therefore be kept safe from rapacious greed, from avarice and from construction speculation. Instead, protecting the environment and the promotion of social justice are optimal ways to instil in young people a passion for healthy politics and to shield them from the temptation to indifference and lack of commitment. (Pope Francis in Zammit, Times of Malta, 2 April 2022)

The indifference or sense of individualism referred to by Pope Francis in his speech was dealt with by various figures around Malta. It was also embedded in one of the most popular songs in Malta called ‘X’jimpurtani’, (I do not care) sung by Maltese singer Philip Vella (Vella, 2022b). The song reflects the indifference which exists in the Maltese community with the prioritisation of money over everything. The sentiment that the value of ‘money’ is being prioritisied over any other issue including health and the environment has been outlined by various entities. For example, civil society group ‘Għawdix’, believes that many individuals only start caring for their environment when it begins to affect them personally (Azzopardi, 2022). On a positive note, culture is slowly changing. And groups like ‘Għawdix’ are finding ample support for their causes. Table 8.10 provides an overview of the main concerns of the Maltese people from the country’s membership from 2004 until 2022. The table is important to understand the challenges that Malta might face in the future. Beyond regaining the trust of Maltese voters, which is important to strengthen their legitimacy, political parties will have to deal with other issues as the Maltese society and the European Union evolve. One of the main concerns is rising inflation. Malta’s Central Bank revealed that inflation increased to 5.9% in 2022, from 0.7% in 2021 (Central Bank of Malta,

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 (autumn)

Economic Situation 42 42 33 16 10 31 28 27 32 28 17 6 9 6 2 1 18 36 20

Rising Prices/ Inflation 24 23 34 34 40 40 34 42 42 24 13 11 19 18 17 20 17 23 54

Table 8.10 Main issues for the Country Pensions 12 20 14 10 7 3 4 7 4 11 8 12 13 11 7 8 3 3 2

Taxation 10 12 14 7 7 6 6 4 6 5 2 1 3 6 3 2 1 2 4

Unemployment 57 40 37 25 9 24 15 13 16 17 19 5 5 2 2 1 4 4 3

Immigration 2 17 20 30 29 49 24 31 25 29 64 76 50 33 39 49 58 20 12

Environment 14 9 7 16 21 6 12 5 13* 22 13 26 17 19 21 39 14 23 30

Health – – – – – – – – – – – – – 11 8 4 25 41 25

Crime 14 14 11 14 11 4 6 11 8 6 17 7 11 19 30 10 7 7 11

8

1 2 2

Energy – – 13 16 18 12 42 16

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2022). The biggest increases were registered in Housing (14.85%) and Food (9.99%). Excluding takeaways and restaurants, food and non-alcoholic beverages had an annual inflation rate of 10.2% in June 2022 (NSO, 2022). This is why price inflation has slowly become a concern for Maltese citizens. The rise in inflation is being attributed to the Russian aggression in Ukraine. This conflict is leading to several discussions in Malta as well as in the European Union concerning security, the economy, energy, and social justice amongst others. Whilst tackling all of these areas might require another book, it is important to outline some of these issues. Table 8.10 reveals how rising inflation and price stability was the main concern in 2022. The survey also shows that unlike most of Europe, the Maltese prioritised price stability (63%) over democracy and freedom 32%. When compared with the average of the European Union, 59% prioritised freedom and democracy and 39% opted for price stability. The survey also reveals that 55% of the Maltese believed that the conflict had a negative impact on their standard of living and 41% stated that although it did not yet have any impact on them, they expected to be negatively impacted by it in the near future (Times of Malta, 14 July 2022). Price inflation, which is impacting several states within the European Union, will be another challenge which the EU member states, and national governments will have to face. The war in Ukraine has rekindled the discussion on neutrality in Malta. The special Eurobarometer survey on the EU’s response to the conflict revealed that only 33% of the Maltese believe that the European Union should provide greater military cooperation to Ukraine compared to the EU average of 33%. The survey showcased how Maltese citizens (68%), like their European counterparts (55%), believe that the European Union should be doing more to reduce the impact of rising energy prices on consumers and companies (European Commission, 2022). This could be because the Labour administration had defended the selling of passports to Russian citizens, declaring that Russian citizens should not be blamed for a war initiated by the Russian authorities. Still, this also questions the role of neutrality of the country. The granting of Maltese passports to Russian citizens does not go against Malta’s neutrality, yet these actions can also be seen as going against the spirit of it, prioritising economic profit over solidarity. Questions have been raised in the past on the need to update Malta’s neutrality clause. A debate emerged in 2020 when rumours circulated that the Maltese government had agreed to introduce the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Malta and the United States, which would have handed jurisdictional powers to the United States over its personnel in Malta. Whilst the Maltese government rejected such claims (Martin, Times of Malta, 29 September 2020), it certainly outlines the different approaches that Malta’s governments had towards the neutrality clause. A debate on Malta’s neutrality clause is something that future governments might be required to address to have a neutrality clause that is a reflection of today’s realities (Muscat, 2022). Malta is considered to be a safe country and security has often been linked to the threat arising from irregular migration (Fiott, 2022). Irregular migration has been a problem for several decades and it is an area in which the European Union has struggled to provide the solidarity it proposes. With the European Union unable to find a long-term solution for the problem, irregular migration has the potential to be

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politicised again by Eurosceptic parties as they seek to increase their support in the 2024 European Elections. A future debate on neutrality will require addressing other issues which might not be linked with the conventional threats of wars. The Russian threat to Europe is also bound to be one of the main issues in the upcoming European elections. The invasion of Ukraine has pushed the European Union to promote the need for security powers. These threats can come in various forms including cyber-attacks. Therefore, cyber security is particularly important given the investment which is being made in the digital economy. With Malta promoting the concept of digital economy, it might be more vulnerable to potential attacks which might threaten its financial services. Three major issues that Malta will have to face with growing importance in the future are cyber security, hybrid threats, and climate security. Malta’s EU membership means that no power will likely appear to invade the country militarily (Fiott, 2022). However, this does not mean that hostile countries will not try to target Malta through unconventional tactics, including cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures which can include the functioning of hospitals as well as energy, transport, and telecommunication (Fiott, 2022; Cutajar, 2022), FDI, and foreign interference. Malta is also particularly vulnerable to climate change and so there is a need for the country to push the issue of climate security even more forcefully at the EU level (Fiott, 2022). Inflation is a problem that all member states are required to tackle. Malta has gone through rapid economic development in the last decade, but more needs to be done to strengthen the economy even further. With Malta’s minimum wage being around €790 per month, many are unable to purchase the bare necessities, meaning they require the assistance of various organisations to provide them with food and shelter. As prices keep increasing due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, many others will struggle to survive with these low wages with data from the National Statistics Office (NSO) showing that 85,369 persons in Malta are under the poverty line as they earn less than €9744 (NSO, 2021). This should become a major concern, especially in 2 years, when the country will be in the midst of another campaign for the 2024 European elections. Whilst unemployment is at minimal levels, questions keep arising on whether the country is tackling poverty and how it is caring for the thousands of third-country nationals coming to live and work in Malta. The recent deaths of foreign workers living in Malta show that there is a problem that must be tackled before more fatalities take place. The European Union has developed a social policy to cater to the problem of workers being considered as factors of production. Still, sceptics argue that this is not enough to solve the problem. In Malta, various governments have struggled to tackle this, even though the economy needs these individuals to keep thriving. Most of the hazardous work in Malta is being carried out by these third-country nationals. Beyond the issue of safety legislation which has not always been enforced, the country has struggled to promote social policy for the protection of these individuals (Sant, 2022). It is not only a problem of safety but also an economic one with a number of these workers being treated as third-class citizens. In August 2022, most

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of the food delivery persons working with one of the main companies Bolt decided to go on strike, declaring that they were earning as little as €2.10 per delivery. These workers are mostly third-country nationals. Third-country nationals are often ending up in cramped apartments after spending around €8000 to relocate to Malta, to seek a better future for themselves and their relatives. Still, they are receiving little support from Maltese society as they fight for better rights (Debattista, Times of Malta, 7 August 2022b). More effort should be done to regulate the system and the agencies which bring these individuals to Malta. Regulations should be updated to place more emphasis on monitoring recruitment practices and the labour market in general, as well as in specific sectors. This requires the commitment of all authorities. More surprise visits by the authorities should take place to combat irregular and oppressive practices experienced by these workers (Vassallo, 2022). There should be more effort in combating the abuse and exploitation of these groups and tackle the issue of marginalisation that many face due to their status in Malta and the lack of information they often have on their rights within the country (Pisani, 2022). In addition, Malta is required to transpose Directive 2019/1152 of the European Union on transparent and predictable working conditions. This directive is important as it is aimed to target precarious work across the EU area (The Shift, Lindsay, 22 September 2022). The government has promised a new legislation will be introduced to prohibit zero-hour contracts and protect these individuals by providing them with adequate wages and working conditions (Balzan, Newsbook, 21 October 2022). The environment is another area that is of concern for Maltese citizens. Political parties have often ignored the problem since the environment is not an issue that voters use to choose between one party and the other. Whilst several individuals see migration as a threat to Maltese culture, they do not realise that the threat is an internal one. The overdevelopment and construction boom which the country has been facing in the last decades is slowly destroying the country’s heritage, history, and culture. In addition to that, there is also the issue of overdevelopment, pollution, and lack of proper regulations concerning the way construction material is collected and disposed of. Sustainable development is a concept that the country has struggled to embrace, even though various political parties have referred to it, whilst in government, this concept usually ends up being sidelined. Construction and environmental lobby groups have repeatedly clashed in Malta. Whilst various groups have emerged to safeguard the environment or what is left of it, these groups are still seen as a minority. Criticism has often been levelled against the main political parties for being dependent on the construction lobby for financial support. This is often one of the reasons why environmental NGOs have called for the introduction of party funding to prevent the collision between the construction lobby and the political class. On a positive note, youths are becoming much more vocal on the safeguarding of the environment, something which political parties have to consider as more of these youths opt to get involved in the political system. The short-term aim of getting the economy to move forward at all costs means that the incentive to let land

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development rip becomes overwhelming for all parties. Politically it pays, both by way of votes and financial paybacks (nationally and personally), as the economy grows on the back of capital appreciation of property generated by construction. However, Malta remains a small island and beyond land reclamation, which has been promoted by the main political parties at some point or another, land usage on this scale will lead to a situation where high-rise slum areas are created, instead of appreciated, and capital attached to property ownership will depreciate. But that is something that will happen in the future to the detriment of future generations (Sant, 2022). Awareness is certainly being raised on the need for environmental protection but is not enough. Society needs a deep understanding about the full-scale damage that is being done. Society also needs to be made aware on how constant construction can negatively impact their lives in the short- and long-term future (Pisani, 2022). The battle of greed and power has certainly shifted to the sister island of Malta, Gozo, with construction booming and permits being approved everyday with little attention being placed on whether these permits abide by the regulations established by the country. The NGO group ‘Għawdix’ has been at the forefront in raising more awareness on the problem and in pressuring the planning authority and government to protect Gozo and its environment. Gozo is known to be less populated than Malta, and there is less construction. Still, in the last few years, the construction of apartments increased due to economic development. Gozo is experiencing the depletion of agricultural land due to the demand for residential and industrial construction. In addition, its coastal zone areas are also feeling the pressure as the number of tourists keeps increasing (Briguglio, 1995). An effort has been made over the years to try and tackle the problems that the sister island of Malta is facing. These include double insularity which is a problem for Gozitans and an additional burden for firms doing business on the island. This double insularity has represented a hurdle in terms of economic, social, and territorial cohesion. Attempts have been made to try and address a number of these problems. These include the creation of the Gozo Regional Development Authority to support the process of adapting the economic model of Gozo to the challenges arising from the environmental transition and the overdependence of the Gozitan economy on tourism, as also underlined by several stakeholders at the local level. A Minister for Gozo is traditionally appointed with the ability to represent the island’s interest within the executive power, at the national level. The island of Gozo is also being allocated around 10% of the funds being given by the European Union to Malta. This means that for every million Malta receive, Gozitans receive more than €3 compared to €2 Maltese receive per capita (Cutajar, 2022). Even though an effort is being made to cater to the needs of Gozo, more can be done. The environmental degradation of Gozo is destroying the island. Whilst small targets are being set up to improve the environment and the surroundings through clean-ups and the promotion of alternative energy, the bigger goals are not being addressed. Construction is still being promoted and once again, planning regulations are being relaxed or ignored when irregularities are highlighted. This means that the environment is not being taken seriously when the negative impact of construction,

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including noise pollution and debris, is harming the people living in the country. It is only when voters start pushing for more reforms and using their votes to send a message to the political parties, that more awareness will be created of the environment. Yet, before that happens, the risk of having the landscape and ecosystems of Malta and Gozo permanently damaged remains (Azzopardi, 2022). The destruction of the environment will continue if the project to link Malta and Gozo by a tunnel moves forward without a holistic plan on its environmental impact and to prevent the degradation of Gozo through the exploitation of more land. On the issue of construction, Moviment Graffitti has published a set of proposals for reforming the construction industry in Malta (Moviment Graffitti, 2020). The document contained over 134 proposals spread over six different sectors including policies, authorities responsible for the environment and planning, large-scale projects, regulations of the construction industry, roads and transportation, and respect for our planet. This report aimed to introduce changes in the construction industry for the benefit of Maltese citizens. The document was received very well by the general public and local organisations. Many endorsed the various proposals. The Environment Ministry took note of the chapter related to the regulation of the construction industry by setting up the Building & Construction Authority. The proposal for a free public transport system has been introduced in the 2021 budget. However, it lacks the introduction of an efficient transport system with better and more frequent routes. Another important demand to repeal the system by which Infrastructure Malta is allowed to asphalt and widen country lanes without following the full planning application process was completely ignored (Pisani, 2022). One of the many challenges which the Maltese governments have faced since EU membership is their inability to meet the environmental targets set up by the European Union. Various reforms have been introduced including the abovementioned free transport, to reduce traffic and congestion, yet there is still a long way before Malta becomes a leader in this area. Still, the European Commission believes that Malta has made progress, but its strategies lack ambition. The Social Climate Fund is a potentially excellent tool to deliver results for Maltese households and transport users to reduce energy demand by investing in energy efficiency. The National Energy and Climate Plans are to be improved as a result of the Social Climate Fund (Casa, 2022). According to the 2018 assessment from the European Environment Agency (EEA), Malta is the only nation in the EU to have missed every single emissions target since 2013. The analysis also indicated that the government’s failure is placing an additional financial burden on taxpayers because Malta had to balance its surplus emissions by purchasing ‘Annual Emissions Allocations’ (AEAs) from Bulgaria (Taylor, The Shift, 5 December 2018). The National Energy and Climate Plan is a requirement of the European Union. In the 2019 report, Malta outlined how energy reforms, which included the shift from heavy fuel oil to natural gas and investment in an interconnector that linked Malta with mainland Europe, led to a significant reduction of approximately 50% in emissions from the energy sector. Some of the targets established by Malta include the increase by 11.5% of the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption by 2030, to reduce GHG emissions by

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19% compared to 2005, and to identify and implement various projects to enhance climate resilience in Malta (Ministry for the Environment Sustainable Development and Climate Change, 2019.). Still, more investment and focus are taking place in this area. Malta’s recovery and resilience plan reveals that a part of the funding which the country will be receiving as part of the NextGenerationEU plan will be directed towards sustainability. This will include investment for a green transition through large-scale electrification of road transport. The Maltese government will also invest €60 million in the purchase of zero-emission electric vehicles. Another problem that the country will tackle with the funding is public transport and congestion which exist within the country. The report submitted by Malta and approved by the European Commission proposes the buying of 102 electric buses for public transport for €34 million. This will also include the granting of free public transport to more than 100,000 Maltese citizens. Malta’s recovery and resilience plan also highlights how the funds will be used to improve waste management which is becoming a great concern in the country (European Commission, 2021). The governments of Malta have often introduced several policies to attract direct investment and to be able to compete in global markets. Much of this investment is being directed to the digital economy. The ranking of the Digital Economy and Society Index places Malta in the sixth position out of the 27 Member States in terms of digitalisation with the county Malta being one of the best performers among the Mediterranean countries (Cutajar, 2022). The European Union has at present an extended programme on digitalisation designed to put it at the forefront of this sector, which permeates into all levels of public governance, the economy, civil society, and the personal lives of citizens. It is an area where forward movement on a national basis will just not do to create excellence and technological renewal. It needs to be run on a continental basis to meet the technological requirements for economies of scale, in terms of innovation, production, marketing, finance and security of operations, among others. Though Europe is well advanced in terms of digitalisation it still requires more investment in cutting-edge technology in cyber security across the board. These include investments in areas such as cloud facilities, production of chips and cyber hardware core and accessory elements, and educational and training facilities that are effective. The legislative and investment programmes that are being run under the current cycle of the European Commission’s remit and the EU’s investment budgets amount to a very important step forward (Sant, 2022). In the next decade, Malta will have to continue enhancing its position as a digital hub as ICTs can prove to be an antidote to the country’s geographical disadvantage. Investment in digitalisation across the globe is focusing on four key areas: skills, the digital transformation of businesses, the digitalisation of public services and securing digital infrastructure (Cutajar, 2022; Sant, 2022). Digitalisation is not simply about technology, it is a way of life. It involves commercial enterprises, government bodies, and civil society operations. Beyond the investment in technology, the country needs to focus more on education and digital skills. Otherwise, it might end up in situations where investment is made in infrastructure without having the

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intangible assets which include digital skills and capabilities (Cutajar, 2022). Investment is also required in research and innovation which would encourage the launch of new products and programmes (Sant, 2022). Malta’s recovery and resilience plan supports the digital transition. The plan includes a €34 million investment into the digitalisation of public administration and public services. This is required to strengthen the government’s IT systems and enhance digital public services. The Maltese government will also invest €15 million in the digitalisation of at least 360 companies. These will include SMEs. Particular emphasis will be placed on the adoption of Malta’s Digital Strategy 2021–2027. This will be important to reduce the digital divide. This will be done by providing financial support to low-income families through the promotion of digital skills (European Commission, 2021). An area that has provoked various disagreements between the European Union and Malta is tax harmonisation. This is one of the few areas where both main political parties pledged to defend the national interest and safeguard the sovereignty of the country in deciding on the matter. Taxation is a matter of national sovereignty, and Malta has rejected efforts for corporate tax harmonisation, along with other EU nations. However, as the world moves towards a minimal tax rate for corporations, Malta will eventually have to stop depending on low rates to draw in foreign businesses (Sansone, MaltaToday, 7 April 2022). Tax harmonisation would mean that all states, regardless of their geographical position, and what their physical, economic, and social endowments are, should apply roughly equivalent or the same taxes on corporation profits. This has been a longstanding French objective which is now being supported by Germany. This is motivated by the fact that much larger states in the European Union have higher tax burdens than other countries such as Ireland and Malta (Sant, 2022). Malta has a unique, alluring tax structure with a very low effective tax rate. The nominal rate of corporate income tax in Malta is 35%. However, thanks to the full imputation system of taxes, the ‘real’ rate can be reduced to 5% (through rebates) if the owners register two companies in Malta (Lindsay, MaltaToday, 5 May 2021). The pressure for tax harmonisation increased within the European Union after US President Joe Biden called for a minimum corporate tax rate of 15% (Biden, 2021). Malta is one of the countries that have attracted FDI by providing preferential rates to multinational businesses. The government has so far insisted that it opposes any tax harmonisation, so this might be one of the biggest challenges that the country might face in the European Union. The disagreements over tax harmonisation highlight one of the main problems within the European Union. The fact that it is an organisation for 27 member states makes it difficult for it to cater to the problems being faced by individuals or groups of states. To move forward, the European Union needs to understand the realities being faced by individual states. Climate change for a small island like Malta is to be approached differently by a landlocked state such as Luxembourg or a larger state such as Italy. When it comes to Malta, the European Parliament is working on a report that priories policies for the benefit of island states. The Islands and Cohesion report, which was presented to the European Parliament in 2021 by the Committee

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on Regional Development, outlines the need to deal with the challenges being faced by various areas or states. The report, which was adopted on 7 June 2022, requires the EU to include ‘territorial proofing’ in impact assessments of its proposals. This is needed to assess how the proposed legislation would affect citizens and businesses based on the different regions. The report makes an important political declaration, recognising insularity as a permanent ‘structural handicap’. This will be essential to help small islands overcome the challenges they face. The challenges of small islands are also reflected in the discussion concerning State Aid. On this matter, the islands and cohesion report calls for a re-assessment of State aid schemes and measures to reduce the development deficit, including a complete revision of the current de minimis rule as all European islands should be exempted, for small islands to be less disadvantaged (Cutajar, 2022; European Parliament, 2022a). One of the areas in which Malta made big improvements from the country’s membership from 2004 to 2022, is civil rights (Dibben, 2022). Through membership in the European Union, the country has had the opportunity to be represented and collaborate with other countries in the union. Beyond the introduction of civil unions, and later same-sex marriage, support of the Union was essential in the transposition of various directives, including the Employment Relations Act. The reason for this is that the European Union provided guidelines to the country to ban discrimination in the employment sector based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Farrugia Bennett, 2022). Still, whilst Malta has been at the forefront when it comes to LBTIQ rights, more needs to be done towards gender equality. This could be achieved through more investment in the education system. In the long-term, this is seen as important to change cultural norms which are deeply ingrained in tradition. The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) index shows clearly that there is now a feminisation of responsibility. Women are expected to contribute to the labour market and there has been a lot of effort in pushing them to work, but of course, the mentality has to be changed about the responsibilities in the households (Dibben, 2022). The next decade should lead to more discussions on the policy towards sexual services and a greater emphasis on gender equality. The rise of several civil society groups to promote women’s rights is placing more pressure on main political parties to deal with issues that women have to deal with, including violence against women, femicide, and sexual and reproductive rights. There is also the issue of addressing intersectionality of women from ethnic minorities, disabled women, poor women, LGBTIQ women, and all these combined identities and how they intersect to exacerbate disadvantage (Dibben, 2022). Beyond the issue of whether one is in favour or against sexual and reproductive rights, expectations are that political parties will need to have a proper discussion on the matter (Muscat, 2022; Dibben, 2022, Harwood, 2022). The fear is that such discussions will end up being politicised by the main political parties which would mean that they can be turned into a partisan issue in the deeply polarised party system. This would leave little space for a proper consultation with the Maltese society.

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These are some of the issues which the Maltese political parties will likely face in the next few decades. Whilst support for membership in the European Union increased, the tide can quickly turn against the European Union, especially when dealing with issues such as irregular migration and tax harmonisation. In fact, whilst Malta wants more involvement from the EU in dealing with irregular migration, it wants little involvement when it comes to tax systems, for fear that these would have an impact on foreign direct investment in Malta. Still, the main reflection of Malta’s 20th anniversary is to understand the meaning of what it is to be a member of the European Union. Institutions and society are now more realistic about the impact which the European Union can have on the country and its entities (Sammut, 2022). Nearly 20 years have passed since Malta joined the European Union, but many have forgotten what the EU is all about (Flask, 2022; Cremona, 2022). Membership in the European Union has revealed the strengths and limitations of the country. Political parties should lead the way for a debate on whether the people have established themselves as Europeans and raise more awareness of the values of membership for the country and its people (Busuttil, 2022). This debate should also promote the idea of collective responsibility, giving the ability for each and every individual to have a say in what is happening around them. This reflection should move beyond the polarisation which exists and should not be limited to the borders of the country. In addition, this reflection should not only be on how the country can move forward as a member of the European Union but as part of a wide debate, on how the country can contribute to the development of the European project. This will be essential to secure and provide a better future for the generations to come in Malta and the EU (Vella, 2022a).

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Taylor, A. E. (2018, 5 December). Malta only country in EU to miss ‘every single target’ on emissions. The Shift. Retrieved from https://theshiftnews.com/2018/12/05/malta-only-countryin-eu-to-miss-every-single-target-onemissions/ Vasilopoulou, S. (2018). The radical right and Euroskepticism. The Oxford handbook of the radical right, 122–140. Vassallo, M. T. (2021). Politics and power in Maltese provebs and idioms. European Journal of Literature, Language and Linguistics Studies, 4(4). Vassallo, M. T. (2022). Senior Lecturer at the University of Malta. Political Analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Vella, G. (2021). Statement by the President of Malta during the Conference for National Unity held on the initiative of the President of Malta. Retrieved from https://president.gov.mt/ conference-for-national-unity/?lang=en. Vella, G. (2022a). President of Malta/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Vella, P. (2022b). X'jimpurtani. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= sjB7gAgJOc4&ab_channel=KurtHarmsworth Warrington, E. (2022). Associate Professor of Public Policy and a political analyst/Interviewer: J. C. Cachia. Zammit, M. L. (2022, 2 April). Pope Francis urges Malta to fight corruption and land speculation. Times of Malta. Retrieved from https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/pope-francis-urgesmalta-to-fight-corruption-and-land-speculation.945675

Name Index

A Abdulkarim Abdulrahman, Sadiq, 189 Abela Baldacchino, Claudette, 77, 192 Abela, H.E. George., Dr., 370 Abela, Robert., Dr., 13, 23, 72, 186, 317, 329, 331–334, 336, 339 Abela, Toni., Dr., 235, 236, 239 Abitbol, William, 130 Abubakar, Aweys, 221 Aden Ahmed, 221 Adenauer, 67, 94 Africa, 2, 224, 309, 364, 369 Agius Saliba, Alex, 7, 195, 305, 313, 324, 339 Albania, 17 Albayrak, Berat, 250 Ali Sadr, Hasheminejad, 243, 296, 297 Aliyev, Heydar, 243 Aliyev, Ilham, 243 Aliyeva, Leyla, 243, 244 Aquilina, Robert., Dr., 279, 281–283, 285, 286, 290, 293, 296, 298, 300, 303, 308, 311, 312, 315, 316, 318, 320, 323, 325, 326, 328, 331–334, 339, 363, 371, 372 Arrigo, Robert, 338 Asia, 156, 199 Attard Montalto, John., Dr., 77, 150, 206, 207 Auberge de Castille, 233, 311 Australia, 18, 80 Austria, 40, 97, 109, 355 Azerbaijan, 234, 235 Azzopardi, Joseph., Chief Justice, 83, 296, 335, 371, 373, 379

B Bah, Ibrahim, 278 Balzan, Saviour, 175, 188, 201, 210, 215, 255, 257, 377 Bayar, Ali., Professor, 127 Belgium, 80, 129, 296 Berlusconi, Silvio, 83, 84, 220, 222 Bernassola, Angelo, 105 Beumer, Antony, 133 Biden, Joe, 381 Bidnija, 277 Bilde, Dominique, 194 Blair, Tony, 71, 160, 256 Boel, Marianne Fisher, 155, 156 Boffa, Paul., Sir, 64 Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo, 290 Bonello, Giovanni., Judge, 129, 281 Bonnici, Owen., Dr., 238, 285, 293, 335 Borg, Tonio., Dr., 172, 173, 256, 296, 297, 318, 325, 331, 366 Borg Olivier, George., Dr., 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 68 Brincat, Leo, 87, 119, 155, 162, 236, 239, 279, 285, 317 Britain, 2, 3, 10, 14–18, 35 British Virgin Islands, 233, 235–237 Brudziński, Joachim Stanisław, 194 Brussels, 155, 197, 242, 326 Bugeja, Magistrate Aaron, 116, 244, 245, 295 Bulgaria, 17, 39, 190, 194, 207, 379 Bulmer, S., 22, 28, 32 Busuttil, Simon., Dr., 14, 67, 68, 70, 125, 146, 148, 150, 172, 177, 186–188, 196, 198,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9

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388 201–203, 210–212, 230, 234, 236, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247–257, 259, 278, 282, 296, 298, 317, 319, 323–326, 332, 383 Butterfield, Herbert., Dr., 355 Butters, Lara., Inspector, 288 Buttigieg, Victoria., Dr., 320

C Callamard, Agnes, 290 Cameron, David, 8, 173 Camilleri, Clint, 215 Canada, 18 Cardona, Chris., Dr., 13, 278, 312 Caruana, Clyde, 334 Caruana Galizia, Daphne, 4, 13, 22, 23, 76, 81, 86, 180, 191, 193, 195, 203, 218, 232– 238, 241, 243, 244, 248, 249, 257, 258, 261, 277–291, 293, 295, 296, 298, 301, 303, 309–325, 337, 339, 340, 356, 357, 363, 370, 372 Caruana Galizia, Matthew, 249 Casa, David, 150, 192, 194, 200, 239, 241, 255, 258, 286, 297, 305, 326, 363, 364, 379 Cassar, Michael, 6, 10, 172, 238 Cassola, Arnold, 84, 149, 152, 157, 298, 305, 330, 336 Cheng, Chen, 236 Chetcuti, Janice, 79, 129 China, People’s Republic of, 71 Cini, Karl, 11, 49, 65, 103, 109, 146, 204, 241, 296, 319 Cisse, Lassane, 4, 22, 278, 301, 306–309, 340, 357 Clinton, Hillary, 173 Coleiro Preca, H.E. Marie Louise., Dr., 245, 259, 280, 366, 370 Colombia, 194 Comodini Cachia, Therese, 202, 255, 306, 323 Corbyn, Jeremy, 46 Coughlan, Anthony, 130 Count Roger, 5 Courtois, Jean Philippe, 127 Cremona, Vicki Ann., Professor, 82, 166, 253, 283, 285, 291, 311, 383 Crespo, Enrique Baron, 133 Croatia, 31, 40 Cuschieri, Joseph, 192, 328 Cutajar, Josianne, 78, 194, 195, 221, 305, 315, 323, 364, 368, 376, 378, 380–382 Cyprus, 2, 101, 193–195 Czech Republic, 40 Czechoslovakia, 17

Name Index D Dalli, Helena., Dr., 200 Dalli, John, 17, 146, 152, 172, 173, 325 Dalli, Miriam., Dr., 225, 303, 305, 308, 316, 323, 324, 339 Daul, Joseph, 177, 186 Davíð Gunnlaugsson, Sigmundur, 233 De Gasperi, 67, 93 De La Rue, 18 De Marco, H.E. Guido., Dr., 245, 246, 251, 285 De Marco, Mario., Dr., 15, 96, 104, 111, 257 Debono, Franco., Dr., 70, 75, 76, 87, 163, 164, 167, 174, 188, 191, 198–200, 202, 210, 212, 254, 301, 302, 332, 333, 335 Debono Grech, Joe, 335 Degiorgio, Alfred, 310, 317, 321 Degiorgio, Robert, 310, 317, 321 Dehaene, Mr. Prime Minster of Belgium, 129 Delia, Adrian., Dr., 14, 66–68, 70, 186, 259, 278–280, 296, 298, 301, 304, 306–308, 312, 329 Delia, Manuel, 284 Delia, Moira, 210 Delimara, 166, 198, 311 Dubai, 237, 243, 244, 310

E Efimova, Maria, 244, 288, 296 Elmi, Abdullahi, 221 Engerer, Cyrus, 71, 174–176, 195, 200 Evans, Robert, 104, 205

F Farage, Nigel, 130 Farrugia, Anġlu., Dr., 172 Farrugia, George, 176, 177 Farrugia, Godfrey., Dr., 65, 256 Farrugia, Julia, 334 Farrugia, Lino, 207 Farrugia, Manuel, 309 Farrugia, Marlene., Dr., 65, 238, 246, 247, 256, 258, 282, 372 Fearne, Chris., Dr., 317 Federal Republic of Germany, 18 Fenech Adami, Beppe., Dr., 65, 67, 257 Fenech Adami, H.E. Eddie., Dr., 8, 13, 15, 16, 65, 67–70, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104–111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 127, 131, 132, 135, 136, 179, 246, 257, 259, 260, 356 Fenech, Francesco, 278, 307 Fenech, Yorgen, 234, 236, 290, 310–312, 317, 318, 322

Name Index Ferris, Jonathan., Inspector, 288, 296 Finland, 97, 109, 227, 355 Flask, Wayne, 80, 82, 290, 308, 341, 371, 373, 383 Fonseca, Mossack, 232, 233, 236, 237 Forst, Michel, 290 France, 1, 18, 28, 46, 101, 227 Franco, 356 Friggieri, Oliver., Professor, 6, 10, 353, 354, 372 Fuchs, Ulrich, 293

G Gaddafi, 173, 220, 221 Galea, Mario, 335 Gales, Manfred, 238 Gallimore, Ronald, 128 Ganado, Herbert., Dr., 2, 14, 93, 212, 319 Gatt, Austin., Dr., 159, 166 Gauci, Charmaine., Professor, 199, 211, 327 Gentiloni, Paolo, 329 Germany, 20, 46, 112, 160, 227, 230, 250, 287, 296, 381 Giegold, Sven, 240, 246, 280, 286, 316 Gomes, Ana, 240, 242 Göncz, Kinga, 191 González Pons, Esteban, 286, 315 Gonzi, Lawrence., Dr., 13, 67–70, 73, 75, 87, 111, 112, 116, 117, 126, 132, 136, 143, 145–147, 150, 152–154, 156, 158, 159, 170, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180, 191, 208, 283, 309, 326, 340, 341, 366 Gozo, 81, 83, 174, 197, 215, 247, 291, 299, 309, 323, 335, 378, 379 Grech, Bernard., Dr., 14, 23, 70, 186, 195, 296, 306, 329, 331, 341 Grech, Louis, 150, 172, 323 Grech, Peter., Dr., 244 Grech Mintoff, Ivan, 197 Greece, 153, 172, 179, 223, 288, 356 Gunnlaugsson, Sigmundur Davíð, 233

H Ħal-Far, 278, 307 Hannan, Daniel, 130 Hillman, Adrian, 236, 249, 253, 320 Hong Kong, 134, 233 Hopkins, Kelvin, 130 Hungary, 39, 42, 190, 224, 230, 338 Hyzler, George., Dr., 75, 76

389 I Iceland, 153, 233 In ‘t Vel, Sophia, 316 Incir, Evin, 194 Inglehart, 251 Ireland, 6, 16, 97, 118, 130, 381 Israel, 101 Istanbul, 231 Italy, 6, 15, 17–20, 40, 65, 83, 84, 96, 97, 101, 102, 105, 163, 179, 189, 220, 222, 223, 227, 254, 311, 322, 381 Ivory Coast, 309

J Jallow, Mohammed, 278 Jaraama, Hirsi, 189 Jordan, 252 Jourová, Vĕra, 312, 315 Juknevičienė, Rasa, 194 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 42, 199, 200, 230

K Kaye, David, 290 Kohl, Helmut, 109 Kremlin, 195 Kroes, Nellie, 155 Kuciak, Ján, 288, 325

L Lampedusa, 222 Langen, Werner, 240 League of Arab States, 228 Leeuwarden, 293, 294 Libya, 71, 101, 102, 105, 107, 109, 113, 129, 130, 146, 167, 173, 189, 197, 216, 220, 221, 225–228, 368 London, 14, 233, 278 Lowell, Norman, 188, 298, 301, 358

M Malimi, May, 307 Malmstrom, Cecilia, 189 Malta, 1, 27, 63, 93, 143, 145, 146, 153, 158, 163, 167, 170, 173, 176, 179, 180, 185, 277 Manara, Ernesto, 1 Mangion, Joseph, 120, 210 Marmara, Vincent, 304, 354, 370, 372

390 Marsaxlokk, 197, 198, 201 Meciar, Vladimir, 47 Mediterranean, 2, 3, 5, 7–9, 15–17, 19, 64, 67, 94, 96, 97, 100–102, 104, 105, 110, 112–114, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 143, 153, 155, 172, 177, 179, 189, 199, 205, 216, 217, 220, 222, 223, 225, 227– 229, 231, 294, 357, 368, 380 Merkel, Angela, 230, 324 Metsola, Roberta, 192, 194, 195, 200, 202, 239, 241, 255, 287, 297, 302, 305, 308, 313, 323–327, 333, 339, 366 Micallef, Jason, 187, 197, 213, 244, 281, 293, 300, 317 Middle East, 17, 364 Mifsud Bonnici, H.E. Ugo., Dr., 67 Mifsud Bonnici, Karmenu., Dr., 13, 15, 96–98, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 124, 129, 135, 173, 207, 209 Mijatović, Dunja, 322 Mintoff, Dom, 7, 9–11, 13–20, 64, 71, 94–97, 117, 124, 129, 133, 135, 174, 198, 225, 257, 260 Miżieb, 213, 215 Mizzi, Fortunato., Dr., 65 Mizzi, Konrad., Dr., 13, 198, 233–243, 249, 252, 257, 278, 286, 310, 312, 319 Mizzi, Marlene, 192, 287 Mizzi, Sai, 199, 233 Mogherini, Federica, 228 Molière, 64 Moro, Aldo, 15 Mulder, Ján, 192 Musa, Suso, 221 Muscat, Joseph., Dr., 13, 21, 71, 80, 87, 150, 158, 160, 162, 167, 168, 171, 175, 177, 179, 180, 185, 188, 225, 233, 241, 246, 250, 252, 253, 255–257, 259, 277, 281, 304, 306, 307, 311–313, 317, 323, 332, 357, 369 Muscat, Josie., Dr., 154 Muscat, Michelle, 295, 296 Muscat, Vince, 290, 310, 317, 321 Mussolini, 6

N Nadur, 309 Naudi, Marcelline Professor, 80 Netherlands, 46, 226 New Zealand, 35, 233–235, 237, 241 North Korea, 17 North Rhine-Westphalia, 250

Name Index O Obermayer, Bastian, 232, 233 Omtzigt, Peter, 291 Orbán, Victor, 42, 230 Our Lady of Mount Carmel, 294 Our Lady of Victories, 11

P Packham, Chris, 201 Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Maite, 286 Panama, 4, 21, 23, 232, 234–236, 238, 240, 242, 243, 249, 250, 252, 260, 286, 295, 310, 319 Pech, Laurent., Professor, 318 Perici Calascione, Alex., Dr., 338 Poland, 39, 235, 338 Pope Francis, 363, 373 Pope John Paul II, 132 Pope Leo XIII, 101 Pope St. John XXIII, 101 Portelli, Joseph, 309 Portugal, 179 Prodi, Romano, 126, 130 Prussia, 1 Pulé, Margerita, 293 Puli, Clyde, 259 Pullicino, George, 206 Pullicino Orlando, Jeffrey., Dr., 159, 170, 172

Q Queen Victoria, 364

R Radaelli, C., 22, 29–33 Rajoy, Marjano, 230 Reading, Vivian, 129, 191 Renzi, Matteo, 256 Reynders, Didier, 194 Richter, Maren, 38, 39, 293 Romania, 17, 39, 40, 207 Rome, 67, 217, 225 Roth, Claudia, 128, 129 Russia, 16, 153, 195, 216, 253, 327, 333

S Sadr, Ali, 243, 296, 297 Said, Chris, 259 Sammut, Carmen., Professor, 73, 78–80, 84, 177, 215, 229, 230, 240, 365, 372, 383

Name Index Sanders, Bernie, 46 Sant, Alfred., Dr., 13, 71, 107, 109, 114, 117, 118, 123, 127, 136, 145, 148, 152, 155, 194, 195, 200, 253, 287, 303, 305, 314, 323, 359, 366 Sassoli, David, 325 Savona, Sigismondo, 64 Savona, William, 64 Scerri, Malcolm, 236, 319 Schembri, Keith, 13, 133, 136, 171, 207, 234–238, 241–243, 245, 249, 252–254, 257, 278, 279, 286, 297, 310, 312, 317, 319, 335 Schmidt, President, 31, 32, 46–48, 148 Schreyer, Michele, 127 Schroeder, 160 Schulz, 160, 168, 177 Schumann, 67, 93 Scicluna, Archbishop Charles J., 307 Scicluna, Edward., Professor, 165, 240, 241, 250, 255, 297, 323 Scicluna, Lorin, 278, 307 Sicily, 2, 18, 322 Sigurlaug Pálsdóttir, Anna, 233 Slovakia, 42, 46, 226, 235, 288, 303 Slovenia, 40 Soros, George, 42 Soviet Bloc, 17 Soviet Union, 7, 97 Spain, 175, 179, 230, 356 Spiteri, Lino, 18, 20, 71, 74, 96, 97, 117, 126, 135, 168 St. Augustine, 294 St. Dominic, 294 St. Paul, 294 Stanisław Brudziński, Joachim, 194 Strasbourg, 306, 326 Strickland, Gerald., Lord, 64 Suez Canal, 364 Sweden, 97, 109, 250, 355 Switzerland, 97, 110, 117, 119, 121, 123, 127, 128 Swoboda, Hanness, 192 Syllouris, Demetris, 194

T Tajani, Antonio, 280, 282, 285 Temelín, 40 Theuma, Melvin, 310, 312, 317 Theuma, Denis., Superintendent, 288 Timmermans, Frans, 280, 286, 287, 302, 313

391 Titford, Jeffrey, 130 Tonna, Brian, 233, 235, 237, 240, 241, 245, 252, 253, 279, 296, 319 Trump, Donald, 46, 216 Tunisia, 216, 228, 368 Turkey, 50, 101, 223, 225, 250, 356 Tusk, Donald, 217, 223, 225

U Ukraine, 195, 231, 327, 329, 333, 367, 375, 376 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 17 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 296 United Kingdom (UK), 17, 20, 40, 46, 51, 70, 112, 129, 160, 217, 218, 231 United States (US), 1, 75, 97, 101, 173, 222, 225, 375

V Valletta, 5, 174, 186, 223, 281, 285, 291–295, 311 Valletta, Silvio, 244 Van den Broek, Hans, 112 Van Rompuy, Herman, 189 Vassallo, Harry, 3, 75, 77, 84, 149, 155, 166, 200, 208, 219, 255, 258, 259, 284, 311, 327, 338, 340, 364, 377 Vatican, 106 Vella, H.E. George., Dr., 115, 130, 306, 307, 312, 367, 369, 370, 373, 383 Vella, Karmenu, 228 Von der Leyen, Ursula, 42

W Wallis, Diana, 129 Wallstrom, Margot, 204 Walter-Borjans, Norbert, 250 Weber, Manfred, 28, 29, 191, 253, 280

X Xuereb, Karsten, 79, 133, 147, 164, 166, 194, 195, 198, 293, 295, 296, 332

Z Zarb, Tony, 255 Zayes, Alfred, 240 Zemitis, Martins, 6

Subject Index

A Abba, Christian Conservative Party, 330 Abortion, 71, 79, 82, 129, 169, 199, 200, 299– 302, 305, 306, 330, 331, 360 Acquis communautaire, 38, 125 Actor expansion, 47 Acts, Legislations & Regulations, 75, 76 abortion, legalisation of, 72, 199, 200 Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), 226 Cannabis, legalisation of, 72, 186, 248, 255 Civil Union Legislation Act, 187 Covid-19 regulations, 328 divorce legislation, 171 Dublin IV Regulation, 226 Dublin’s Regulations, 3, 216, 218 Employment Relations Act, 382 environmental regulations, 209 equality bill, 80 EU legislation, 36, 169, 204 EU regulations, 21, 32, 33, 38, 40, 49, 50, 113, 127, 128, 145, 148, 151, 154, 158, 163, 167, 168, 171, 174, 178, 179, 204, 296, 334, 359 European Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation, 289 European Human Rights Convention Act, 105 European regulations, 117, 146, 153, 203, 205, 214 fiscal legislation, 210 Foreign Interference Act, 99 Foreign Interference Act 1982, 256 Freedom of Information Act, 323

Gender Mechanism, Act XX of 2021, 78 General Data Protection Legislation (GPDR), 77, 230 Helsinki Final Act, 7 IIP legislation, 192 International Protection Act, 222 IVF legislation, amendments to the, 72 Malta’s Standards in Public Life Act, 76 Maltese Citizenship Act, 193 Market and Single Currency Regulations, 165 Media Broadcasting Act, 85 Money Laundering Act, 238, 248 Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Regulations, 252 National Refugee Act, 221 Omnibus Regulation Agreement on Organic Food, 231 Party Financing Act, 86 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 238, 248 Prevention of Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Regulations, 252 Public Health Act, 328 Qualification Regulation (QR), 226 Referenda Act, 339 Regulation of Sexual Services, 80 regulations on mandatory Customer Due Diligence, 286 safety legislation, 376 Schengen regulations, 130 Single European Act, 16 Standards in Public Life Act, 75, 76

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. C. Cachia, The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Malta, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23290-9

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394 Acts (cont.) Turtle Dove and Quail Regulations, 210 US Foreign Operations and Related Programmes Appropriations Act, 2021, 319 visa regulations, 102 Whistleblowers Protection Act, 322 Wild Birds Act, Regulations & Legislation, 121, 203, 204, 206, 208, 210, 214, 215 African Union, 228, 369 Agência Sportlight, 250 AIDS virus, 102 Aircraft maintenance companies, 175 Air Malta, 19, 130 ALDE Group, 286 Al Jazeera, 194 Alleanza Bidla (AB), 298 Alleanza Liberali, 196 Alliance for Change (AB), 196, 197, 248 Allied Group, 249 Allied Newspapers, 236 Allied Rainbow Communities (Malta), 81 Al Sahra FZCO, 244 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), 46 ‘Alternative Vote, Clean Vote’, 248 Alternattiva Demokratika (AD), 5, 66, 104, 108, 113, 115, 121, 124, 133, 134, 149– 152, 157, 162, 166, 176, 189, 197, 201, 202, 207, 208, 210, 215, 247, 248, 255, 256, 300, 305, 330, 358 Anglicisation, 64, 65 Anglo-Maltese cooperation, 20 Anglo-Saxon language, 2 ‘Annual Emissions Allocations’ (AEAs), 379 ‘Another Quality Leap: Work- HealthEducation’, 174 Anti-establishment, 35, 36 Anti-Fraud and Corruption Policy, 322 Arab culture, 7 Arabic language, 7 Arab-Israeli conflict, 101 Arab Spring, 172, 228, 309 Arab states, 17, 228 Archipelago, 2 Armed Forces of Malta, 278, 310 Artificial Intelligence, 336 Arts Council in Malta, 294 Assassination, 4, 13, 22, 23, 76, 81, 86, 180, 232, 234, 236, 238, 242, 257, 258, 261, 277–291, 293, 295, 303, 307, 309–313, 316–318, 320–324, 337, 340, 356, 357, 363, 370, 372 Association Agreement, 1970, 7

Subject Index Association Agreement, 1971, 15, 18, 20 Association for Hunting and Conservation, 108 AstraZeneca (Vaxzevria), 328 ATC Administrators Inc, 236 Authorities Broadcasting Authority, 84 Building & Construction Authority, 379 European Bank Authority, 289 Gaming Authority, 320 Gozo Regional Development Authority, 378 Lands Development Authority, 320 Malta Financial Authority, 240 Planning Authority, 81, 320, 336, 378 Axis powers, 6 Azeri, 296 Azzjoni Nazzjonali (AN), 154, 155, 157, 158, 163, 166–168, 358

B Band clubs, 10 Barrani, 10 Basilica of Saint George, 309 Bay leaf plant, 284 Berlin Wall, 7 Bird Life Malta, 205, 208 Birth, 334 ‘Black Monday’, 281 Blue Growth economy, 216 Bolt, 377 ‘Bonjour, Europe’, 122 ‘Boomerang’ approach, 98, 163, 285 Brexit, 1, 21, 35, 44, 46–49, 216–218, 228, 231, 367 The Brexit Party, 46 British Empire, 2, 6, 64 British Forces in Malta, 5 British fortress colony, 1 British Labour Party, 71 British rule, 64, 364 Brussels, Free University of, 127 Buttardi, 296 BVI Company, 236

C Café Premier, 252 Çalık Holding, 250 Campaign for National Independence (CNI), 124, 129, 132, 135, 207 Capital of Culture (CoC), 174, 186, 291–293, 356, 357

Subject Index Carduelis Cannabina, 204 Carduelis carduelis, 204 Carduelis Chloris, 204 Carduelis serinus, 204 Carduelis spinus, 204 Carnival, 292 Carthaginians, 2 Catch-allism, 69, 163, 169 Catch-all model, 68 Catholic Church, 337, 361 Catholic faith in Malta, 63 Catholic Island, 3 Catholic Social Teaching, 100, 118, 124, 161, 170, 337 Central Bank of Malta, 129, 373 Central Europe, 1, 38–41, 43, 49 Centre for Media Pluralism, 85 Chamber of Commerce, 248 Chamber of Labour, 64 Christendom, 5 Christian Democratic Parties, 9, 15, 67, 93 Christian European Heritage, 8 Christianity, 5, 28, 106 Civil liberties, 23, 71, 100, 124, 137, 186–188, 200, 230, 234, 246, 254, 260, 261, 286, 288, 357 Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), 286, 288, 315 Civil society groups, 4, 23, 81–83, 88, 95, 187, 189, 190, 201, 208, 214, 215, 219, 283–285, 290, 295, 311, 312, 318, 319, 338, 340, 359, 370, 372, 373, 382 Civil Society Network, 82, 282 Civil union, 13, 71, 93, 161, 169, 174, 176, 186–188, 196–200, 202, 211, 230, 255, 278, 330, 337, 357, 360, 382 Civilisation, 1, 16, 28 Clientelism, 22, 73, 74, 86, 158, 277, 321, 332, 354, 371 Clientelist networks, 39 Coalition for Animal Rights, 208 Coalition for the abolition of spring hunting (CASH), 209, 210 Coccothraustes, 204 Cold War, 17, 102 Colson Services Ltd., 236 Commissions & Commissioners Agriculture Commissioner, 155 Commissioner for Refugees, 221 Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, 76, 322 Commissioner of Police, 371

395 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 105 Electoral Commission, 86, 87 Emigrant’s Commission, 189 EU Commissioner, Maltaʼs first, 50 EU Competition Commissioner, 155 European Commission, 6, 8, 42, 53, 82, 112, 122, 126, 130, 147, 151, 157, 158, 164, 165, 167, 169, 175, 189, 192–194, 196, 199, 200, 203–206, 208, 209, 212, 214, 215, 221, 224, 226, 227, 233, 240–242, 256, 260, 280, 288–290, 293, 294, 297, 305, 312, 315–318, 325, 329, 336, 340, 354, 372, 375, 379–381 European Commission Representation in Malta, 6 Kopin, 189 Malta Electoral Commission, 66, 86, 150, 157, 166, 170, 177, 213, 256 Permanent Commission against Corruption, 289 Venice Commission, 290, 314, 315, 318, 320, 322 Committees Budgetary Control Committee, 239 Committee of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe, 100 Committee on Regional Development, 381 European Parliament Budgetary Committee, 235 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry’s (PANA), report on Malta, 286 European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, (LIBE), 286, 288 European Parliament’s Panama Paper Committee, 240 Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC), 124 Ornis committee, 204–206, 212 PANA committee, 233, 238, 240–243, 246, 252, 255, 259, 286 Political and Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council, 367 Standing Committee for Standards in Public Life of the Parliament, 75 Technical Committee for the Strengthening of Democracy, 80 Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 226 Common European Return System, 226 Commonwealth, 174, 186, 223, 224

396 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM), 224 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference on the Common Market, 14 Communism, 17 Community acquis, 22 Compliance and Due Diligence Services, 336 Conditionality clause, 36–41, 122, 135, 143 The Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU), 108 Conference on the Future of Europe, 327, 368 Confict, intensity of, 47 Conflict, polarisation of, 47 Conservative and Christian Democrats, 50 Constitution, 1, 76, 78, 85–87, 96, 97, 100, 128, 197, 210, 245, 248, 277, 307, 318, 330, 363, 370, 371 Constitutional Court, 86, 210, 296 Constitutional Party, 64 Constitutional Treaty, 46 Construction, 19, 29, 81, 88, 159, 234, 248, 250, 308, 341, 355, 373, 377–379 Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC), 229 Contemporary European transformations, 27 Contraception, 79 Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), 39 Copenhagen Criteria, 129 Corinthia Group of Companies, 130 Corrective mechanism, 78, 80 Corruption, 4, 21, 22, 68, 70, 76, 86, 100, 146, 152, 159, 173, 176, 180, 232, 234, 236–239, 243, 245, 246, 249, 252–256, 258, 260, 261, 277–280, 283, 284, 287–290, 296, 298, 303, 312–315, 317, 319–322, 331, 335, 337, 340, 363, 369, 372 Cottonera region, 117 Cotunrix cotunrix, 207 Council of Europe, 7, 16, 23, 81, 82, 100, 102, 174, 219, 221, 224, 228, 231, 279, 282, 283, 285, 289–291, 303, 315, 317, 318, 322, 323, 334, 340, 354, 356, 357, 359, 371 Council of Europe Tromsø Convention, 323 Council of Ministers, 34, 53, 98, 239, 240 Court of Auditors, 235, 236, 239 Covid-19 pandemic, 1, 85, 305, 325–339, 364 Covid-wage supplement, 334 Crime and terrorism, 50 CSDP operations, 367 Cultural activities, 292, 294, 295, 327 Cultural Institute, 18

Subject Index Cultural reform, 79 Culture, Mediterranean, 64 ‘Culture of impunity’, 291 Customs and Excise Tax (CET), 111, 117 Cyber-attacks, 77, 376

D Dagens Nyheter, 250 Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, 193, 195, 284, 290, 320, 321 Deaths, 86, 174, 205, 228, 278, 283, 308, 321, 356, 376 Decision-making process, 27, 32, 34, 48, 50, 51, 54, 77, 82, 130, 146, 148, 151, 156, 251, 354, 359, 366, 370, 372 Democracy, 8, 28, 31, 38, 39, 42, 43, 52, 67, 70, 78, 80, 82, 94, 103, 105, 106, 108, 122, 124, 125, 177, 185, 198, 211, 244, 277, 280, 281, 284, 286–288, 300, 315, 317, 325, 326, 338, 356, 358, 360–363, 365, 375 Democratic Alternative, 66, 108 Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP), 14, 65 Democratic Party (PD), 65, 66, 245, 247, 252, 254, 256, 259, 282, 298, 305, 330, 358 De-politicise, 49, 125 DER SPIEGEL, 249 Dialogue, Solidarity and Commitment, manifesto, 110 Digital Economy and Society Index, 380 Digitalisation, 229, 230, 261, 329, 380, 381 Digital parties, 35, 43 Din l-Art Ħelwa, 81, 208, 215 Directives anti-money laundering, 297 Audiovisual and Media Services, 231 Capital Requirements Directive, 289 Conservation of Wild Birds, 203–208, 210, 212, 214, 215 Countering Terrorism Financing Directive, 297 E-Privacy Directive, 230 European Anti-Money Laundering directive, 289 European Birds Directive, 4 European Savings Directive (ESD), 237, 238 European Wild Birds Directive, 203 Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 233 Recast Return Directive, 2018, 226 Reception Condition Directive, 226

Subject Index Wild Birds Directive, 2006, 206 Divorce, 93, 124, 161, 162, 169–172, 174–176, 178, 186, 217, 330, 337, 365 Doctors for Choice, 82 Drachma (representing LGBT Catholics), 187 Dublin Convention, 154 Due diligence, 190, 194, 286, 297, 334 Duopolistic party system, 65, 150 Duopoly, 65 Dutch, 287, 291, 293, 294 Duty free, 120, 130

E Economic Europeanisation, 102, 103, 114, 120, 129, 147, 148, 151, 152, 165 Economic Intelligence Report, 120 Education, 6, 9, 20, 70, 71, 134, 153, 202, 209, 230, 292, 322, 329, 340, 354, 372, 380, 382 Egrant Inc., 236, 241, 243, 244, 295, 296 Elderly homes, 327 Electoral laws, 34, 35 Electoral Manifesto of the Democratic Nationalist Party, 2 Electricity and water bills, 85 ElectroGas, 235, 236, 241, 298, 311, 318, 320, 331 El Mundo, 250 Emergency Trust Fund, 224 Emigration, 18 Employment, 18–20, 70, 76, 100, 105, 107, 130, 134, 146, 161–163, 166, 174, 197, 231, 246, 302, 304, 331, 336, 382 Employment, Justice and Liberty, N.P. slogan, 70, 100 Engineering, 9 English language, 64 Enlightenment, 28 Environment, 1, 3, 9, 32, 52, 70, 72, 77, 81, 88, 94, 96, 98, 101, 110, 116, 118, 119, 126, 146, 148, 151, 153, 154, 159, 162, 163, 176, 197, 199, 204–207, 214, 215, 228, 231, 248, 292, 299, 300, 303, 304, 322, 331, 335, 341, 372–374, 377–380 Environmental NGOs, 209, 339, 377 Equal Opportunities Movement, 78, 188 Ernest and Young, 341, 364 E-Sports, 336 EU accession, 13, 39, 110, 117, 122, 129, 130, 132, 134, 136, 143, 144, 148, 160, 169, 220, 354, 367 EU agenda, 162, 216

397 EU Carbon market-Emissions Trading System, 231 EU enlargement and membership, 39 EU funds, 134, 153, 161, 162, 197 EU membership, 3, 6–9, 11, 13, 21, 22, 29, 36, 47, 49, 68–70, 81, 88, 93, 95, 97, 102, 105, 108–129, 131–133, 135–137, 143, 147–149, 153, 154, 160, 163, 186, 191, 200, 204, 205, 250, 285, 326, 337, 355, 356, 360, 364, 366, 376, 379 EU monitoring and sanctioning, 39 EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 228 EU Presidency, 4, 21, 174, 180, 216–232 Eurobarometer, 24, 87, 151, 162, 201, 256, 360, 361, 364, 369, 375 Euro currency, 145, 153, 156 Euro-enthusiast, 23 Euro-Mediterranean states, 102 Europe, 1, 2, 5, 7–9, 15, 16, 27, 28, 35, 37–43, 45, 46, 49, 65, 67, 68, 72, 76, 80, 83, 88, 94–98, 103, 105, 106, 118, 119, 125–128, 131, 132, 135, 148–150, 155, 156, 161, 162, 168, 175, 177, 179, 187, 188, 190, 192, 194–197, 199, 201, 202, 205, 211, 216, 223–225, 230, 233, 238, 243, 246, 247, 250, 252, 254–256, 278–281, 286, 288–292, 294, 298–300, 304, 306, 309, 325, 340, 341, 358, 360, 364, 367, 368, 375, 376, 379, 380 European Agency for Refugees, 161 European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 218 European Capital of Culture (ECoC), 291–295 European Central Bank, 297 European Coal and Steel Community, 1, 14, 28, 93, 185 European conglomerate, 1 European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR), 194 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 220, 290 European Council, 40, 42, 189, 216, 217, 221, 223, 225, 227, 240, 242, 290, 302, 315, 316, 318 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 189, 220–222 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 156, 167, 196, 197, 204, 206, 207, 214, 215, 235, 297, 318, 319, 339 European Dimension approach, 146 European Economic Community, 2, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 67, 93–96, 98, 102, 104 European Economic influence, 22, 95, 164 European effect model, 51

398 European elections, 35, 36, 44, 47–49, 51–54, 66, 72, 73, 77, 80, 143–147, 150, 151, 154, 157, 158, 161, 162, 166, 168, 179, 180, 187, 188, 196–203, 213, 228, 259, 298–306, 310, 323, 337, 339, 357, 360, 376 European Free Trade Area, 129 European Greens, 146, 162, 242, 252, 286, 300, 358 ‘European Ideal’, 4 European identity, 2, 5, 8, 28, 50, 103, 176, 179, 191 European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) index, 382 European Integration, 9, 15, 16, 19, 21–23, 28, 29, 36, 44–46, 49, 50, 67, 70, 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 112, 114, 119, 120, 124, 128, 129, 135, 147, 151, 359 European Investigative Collaborations (EIC), 249 Europeanism, 21, 33, 125, 158, 162–165, 167, 169, 180, 358, 359 Europeanization, 1, 11 European law, 35, 215, 235, 249, 324 European Pact on Migration and Asylum, 218 European Parliament, 13, 22, 23, 34–36, 41–43, 51–53, 77, 82, 98, 100, 124, 129, 144, 146, 148, 150, 151, 160–162, 165, 173, 179, 191–198, 200, 202, 206, 207, 217, 221, 224, 225, 230, 233, 235, 236, 239, 240, 246, 247, 250, 252, 253, 255, 280, 282, 285–291, 297–303, 305, 311, 312, 314–318, 323–327, 333, 339, 356, 358, 361, 366, 381, 382 European Parliament Elections, 13, 51, 65, 68, 144–152, 160 European Party Federations, 23, 41 European Party groups, 31, 35, 36, 38, 41–43, 51, 100, 130, 135, 145, 151, 163, 173, 175, 177, 179, 239, 288, 324, 354, 359 European People’s Party (EPP), 42, 43, 125, 136, 145, 146, 158, 162, 186, 191, 192, 194, 197, 230, 231, 243, 253, 285–288, 303, 313, 315, 317, 324, 325, 358, 372 European security, 15, 146 European social democratic parties, 70 European Socialist group, 130, 145 European Structural and Cohesion Funds, 174 European Union (EU), 1, 27, 63, 185, 277 European Union accession, 3 The European Union fingerprints database for asylum seekers (EURODAC), 227 European Union funds, 166

Subject Index The European Union Network for Information Agency (ENISA), 229 European Union of Christian Democrats, 67 European Union, role of, 23, 27, 35, 220, 259, 310, 354 European values, 4, 5, 8, 9, 23, 28, 36, 42, 50, 68, 171, 172, 185–261, 277–291, 294, 303, 314, 338, 357, 360, 361, 363 European vision, 16, 122, 304 Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD), 133 Europe’s Single Market, 112 Europhile, 3, 44, 46 Europol, 287, 288, 290, 298, 310, 313, 315 Europragmatists, 45 Euro-realist, 13, 149 Eurorejects, 45 Eurosceptic bloc, 42 Euroscepticism, soft and hard, 45 Eurosceptics, compromising, 46 Eurozone, 143, 153, 159, 162, 164, 172, 175, 246, 366 EU, Treaty of the, 40, 316 Expresso, 250 External Border Fund, 218 External Incentives Model (EIM), 38

F Farmers Association, 147 Feast of Saint Paul, 5 Federation for Hunting & Conservation (FKNK), 81, 108, 201, 204–210, 213–215 Federation of Hunters and Trappers, 121, 207 Female participation, 230, 255 Femicide, 82, 382 Festas, 9, 10 Fidesz, 42, 43 ‘Fil-Parlament, ma jikbrux fjuri’, 354 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 319, 334, 337 Financial and Economic Co-operation Agreement, 18 Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU), 238, 241, 248, 252, 286, 296–298, 320 Fireworks factories, 10 First World War, 28 Fiscal stability, 149, 166 Flimkien għal Ambjent Aħjar, 81 Foreign Direct Investment, 20, 165, 193, 246, 383 Foreign policy approach, 95, 119, 359

Subject Index Forum Żgħażagħ Laburisti (FŻL), 72 Forza Italia, 84 Foundations Aditus Foundation, 189 Gaia Foundation, 208 Integra Foundationa, 189 Solidarity Overseas Service (SOS) Malta, 189, 307 The Valletta 2018 Foundation (V18), 291, 293 Women’s Foundation, 82 Four Stages of Europeanisation, 21–22, 356 Frames campaigning, 50, 152, 360 issue-specific, 50 justification, 50, 360 Framing cultural, 50, 100, 105, 106, 117, 145, 176, 360 utilitarian, 50 Franco-German rivalry, 28 Freedom Day, 10, 11, 63 Freedom of choice, 67 Freedom of expression, 100, 244, 252, 257, 279–282, 285, 287, 293, 322 Freedoms, 8, 16, 31, 67, 85, 97, 102, 119, 133, 176, 185, 191, 195, 255, 279–282, 285, 288, 290, 302, 304, 312, 314, 323, 353, 358, 360–365, 372, 375 ‘Free Port’, 2 Friends of the Earth Malta, 208 Fringilla coelebs, 204 Frontex, 153, 161, 167, 218, 226 Front Maltin Inqumu (FMI), 124, 129, 132, 135 Fundamental rights, 8, 285, 307, 325, 363

G Gaelic language, 6 Gaffarena Land, 252 Gaming, 9, 197, 366 Gasan, 234 Gasol plc, 234 Gay conversion therapy, 71, 188 Gay marriage, 71 GEM (Gasan and Tumas Groups), 234 ‘Gender Balance in Parliament Reform’, 78 Gender balancing mechanism, 80 General Data Protection, 230 General Election, 1987, 13 General Workers Union (GWU), 113, 120, 121, 129 German Cabs, 215 Ġewwieni, 10

399 ‘Għawdix’, 81, 83, 373, 378 Gio, (yacht), 311 “Ġisem mejjet u bla ruħ”, 102 Globalisation, 46, 148, 156, 159, 170, 285 Global Vitals Healthcare, 335 ‘Golden’ passport scheme’, 193 GonziPN, 159 Government of National Accord, 225 Government’s IT system, 329 GPDR rules, 77 Grand Chamber, 318 Great Powers, 95 Great Siege of 1565, 5, 223 Greco report, 76, 322 Greek and Roman Civilisations, 28 Greek Financial Crisis, 49 Greek Junta, 356 Greek Street, (London), 278 ‘Greener is the answer’, 300 Greenhouse Malta, 208 ‘Green lungs’ projects, 330 Green Party (AD), 66, 113, 122–124, 128, 131–134, 136, 149, 152, 154, 168, 169, 189, 196, 197, 207, 208, 247, 248, 252, 255, 256, 282, 298–300, 305, 359 ‘Growing Stronger Together’, 145

H Haast, 237 Healey Properties Limited, 278 Hearnville Inc, 236, 243 Henley and Partners Holdings, 190 Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (HZDS), 42 ‘Ħobb lil Alla u lir-Reġina u tgħix mingħajr tbatija’, 364 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC), 134 Horizontal Movement Policy, 322 Hospital Deals, 4, 335 House of Commons, 130 House of Representatives, 97 Human rights, 31, 32, 38, 39, 50, 67, 70, 81, 98, 100, 106, 125, 132, 167, 177, 185, 189, 209, 214, 220–222, 224–226, 228, 283, 290, 322, 323, 326, 358, 360–362 Hungarian Smallholdersʼ Party, 42 Huntington’s Disease, 334

I ICTs, 380 IDEAT, 161 Ident, 191

400 Identity and Democracy Party (ID), 194 Ideological opposition to membership, 144 Il-Mument, 134, 146, 165, 302, 336 Immigration, 88, 119, 154, 162–164, 169, 191, 374 Imperium Europa, 150, 162, 166–168, 188, 196, 201–203, 301, 305, 358 Imports, 18, 109 In vitro fertilisation (IVF), 72, 79, 330, 334, 337, 360 Independence Day, 10, 11, 63 Individual Investment Scheme (IIP), 4, 190–193, 195, 198–200, 248, 253, 260, 278, 289 Inflation, 113, 120, 130, 164, 373–376 Information Technology, 9 In-Nazzjon, 102, 105, 108, 111, 120, 121, 124, 126–128, 146, 148, 155, 164–166, 199, 201, 245, 253, 302, 303, 336 Institute for Maltese Journalists (IGM), 244 Integration, 17, 30, 31, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50, 111, 118, 135, 145, 153, 156, 220, 222, 240, 359 International Animal Rescue Malta, 208 International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (ICIJ), 281 International Conventions, 189 International Jazz Festival, 292 International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), 230, 341 ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’, 229 International relations, 8 International system, 97, 155, 173, 326, 341, 364 Inter-Parliamentary Union, 77 Investment, 9, 13, 15, 17–20, 70, 71, 85, 102, 110, 112, 114, 119, 120, 127, 130, 145, 166, 190, 192, 197, 216, 229, 230, 242, 246, 247, 253, 292, 294, 295, 299, 300, 319, 329, 330, 336, 357, 358, 372, 376, 379–382 Iron Curtain, 8, 104 Irregular migration, 3, 4, 21, 23, 137, 144–146, 154, 158, 161, 163–165, 167, 168, 179, 180, 186, 188–190, 197, 199, 203, 217–228, 231, 260, 261, 299–301, 303, 322, 358, 361, 369, 375, 383 Islam, 5 The Islands and Cohesion report, 381, 382 Issue salience, 47 Italianisation, 6 Italianità, 6

Subject Index Italian language, 64, 65 Italian Military Mission in Malta, 19 IT services, 157 It-Torċa, 95, 102, 105, 114, 199, 254, 304, 333, 334

J Jesuit Refugee Service, 81, 189 Jobs, 70, 74, 75, 102, 105, 110, 119, 120, 127, 128, 130, 134, 144, 148, 154, 157, 158, 163, 166, 177, 192, 244, 247, 305, 313, 317, 364, 372 Johnson and Johnson, 328 Joint Declaration, 227 Joint Investigation Team (JIT), 298 Journalism, 250, 281, 285, 339

K Kasco Limited, 236 ‘Klandestini’, 219 Knights of Saint John, 2, 5, 6 KNZ, the National Council of Youth, 72

L Labour manifesto (2014), 197 ‘Labour’ national day, 63 Labour Party, 6, 7, 9–11, 13–16, 19–23, 64, 66, 69–71, 77–79, 83, 85–87, 94–97, 100–123, 126–136, 144–146, 148–180, 186–188, 192, 196–198, 200–202, 206–208, 211, 212, 230, 232, 235–239, 241, 245–248, 250–257, 260, 261, 282, 291, 298–306, 311, 312, 316, 323, 324, 330–339, 355, 357, 359, 360, 370 Ladrech’s party dimensions, 21 Language question, 6 ‘L-aqwa fl-Ewropa’, 340 Latin script, 2 Law, course of studies, 9 LBTIQ, 187, 216, 325, 382 ‘Lead’, 78 Legal system, 289 Lega Nord (Northern League), 222 Le Soir, 249 L’Espresso, 249 Lester Holdings Groups, 236 LGBTIQ rights, 13, 161, 186, 187, 230, 256, 260, 299 Liberal democracy, 8, 28, 355 Liberalisation of markets, 39

Subject Index Liberalisation of the economy, 67 Libya Arab Maltese, 130 Libyan Air Force, 173 Libyan War, 172 Liquigas Malta, 333 Lisbon Treaty, 185, 323 LNG Tanker, 199, 201 Lobby groups, 74, 81, 82, 114, 120–122, 154, 215, 279, 371, 377 Lovin Malta, 85 ‘Loyal Opposition’, 338 Loyal support, 45 Luxembourg Agreement, 117

M Maastricht Treaty, 1 Macbridge, 236 ‘Mafia’, 102, 313, 322 ‘Make Malta the best in Europe’, 190 ‘Malta belongs to us all’, 174, 250 Malta Chamber of Commerce, 108, 113, 120, 248 Malta Declaration, 225, 226 Malta Employers Association, 121, 131, 248, 319 Malta Entertainment Industry and Arts Association (MEIA), 328 Malta Federation of Industry, 108, 113 Malta Files, 4, 249, 250 ‘Malta, fior del’ mondo’, 340 ‘Malta first and foremost’, 71, 252 Malta Gay Rights Movement (MGRM), 81, 83, 187 Malta Government Tourism Board, 19 Malta Hotels Restaurant Association, 121 ‘Malta in our hearts’, 299 Malta Independence, 1964, 6 Malta Information Centre, 124 Malta-Libya relationship, 101 Malta’s Capital of Culture, 291, 294 Malta’s Cultural Heritage, 294 Malta’s Digital Strategy, 381 Malta’s Foreign Policy, 153, 173 Malta’s Generation X, 364 Malta’s Identity, 5–9, 118, 145, 209 Malta’s Passport Scheme, 195, 330 Maltaʼs EU accession, 20, 70, 124, 135 Maltaʼs European identity, 117, 176 Maltaʼs Green Party, 104, 108, 113, 118, 146, 150, 151, 153, 157, 158, 169, 170

401 Maltaʼs political system, 3, 65, 95, 96, 99, 100, 120, 135, 136, 150, 158, 168, 169, 176, 177, 359 Maltaʼs Search and Rescue area, 163 MaltaToday, 7, 70, 75, 76, 85, 86, 129–134, 147, 148, 155–157, 163, 164, 167, 173, 175, 176, 188–190, 196, 198–202, 205, 208–212, 215, 227, 234–242, 250, 252–258, 279, 281, 297, 299, 301, 302, 309, 310, 319, 328, 331, 332, 334–336, 373, 381 Maltese dockyard, 64 Maltese language, 6, 7 Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM), 248, 298 Maltese political system, 63, 66, 72, 324, 369 Manufacturing industry, 18, 128, 130, 156 Mapping Media Freedom, 289 ‘Mare Nostrum’, 222 Marsascala yacht marina project, 335 Mass meetings, 3, 10, 64, 96, 99, 253 Materialism values, 251 Mediapart, 250 Media pluralism, 23, 83–86, 198, 258, 289, 317, 372 Media reportage, 47 Medicine, course of studies, 9 ‘Mediterranean’ identity, 5 Mediterranean vision, 16 Member of the European Parliament (MEP), 7, 14, 160, 165, 168, 186, 198, 205, 206, 225, 240, 246, 303, 308, 324, 326, 339, 366 Merit Malta, 18 Meritocracy, 71, 87, 176, 177, 238, 250, 254 Metaverse, 336 Metro system, 247 Microsoft, 127 Middle Ages, 28 Middleman, 310, 317 Middlesex University, 318 Mid-Med bank, 134 ‘Miegħek, għal Malta’, 330 Migrants Network for Equality, 189 Migration, 23, 32, 33, 35, 40, 48, 81, 145, 153, 158, 163, 165, 167, 188–190, 197, 199, 216, 217, 221–227, 231, 290, 354, 359, 367, 377 Military agreement, 10 Military alliance, 97, 368 Minorities, 4, 83, 162, 176, 177, 185, 187, 188, 198, 202–215, 230, 249, 255, 260, 308, 316, 377, 382

402 Misfit focuses, 33 Mizzi Offshore Trust, 237 Modern Malta, 110 Monarchy, 1 Money laundering, 193, 194, 231, 233, 234, 237–240, 242–244, 248–250, 252, 261, 278, 280, 286, 288, 289, 296–298, 310, 316, 319, 372 Monopoly, 187 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, 42 Moviment Graffitti, 81, 208, 283, 308, 311, 312, 341, 379 Moviment Żgħażagħ Partit Nazzjonalista (MŻPN), 72 Multi-cultural universalist, 50 Multi-party system, 35, 64

N Nagħmlu Malta Aħjar, 93 National Crime Agency, 331 National election results, 2003, 13, 134 National election, 2013, 13, 66, 68, 150, 166, 169, 172–179, 185, 186, 198, 208, 233, 235, 238 National election, 2022, 23, 66, 68, 76, 78, 79, 300, 305, 324, 327–339, 363 National Energy and Climate Plans, 379 ‘National Force’, 245, 247, 250, 251, 253, 254, 258 Nationalism, 2, 42, 44, 71, 133, 167, 175, 211, 250, 254, 299, 358 Nationalist Identarian, 50 Nationalist Party, 2, 5, 6, 8–11, 13–16, 20–23, 65–70, 72, 77–79, 83, 85–87, 93–127, 131–136, 145–154, 156–161, 163–172, 174–180, 186–189, 192, 195–203, 206, 207, 211, 212, 224, 230, 234, 236–239, 241, 245–247, 250–259, 261, 278, 279, 282, 284, 287, 296–298, 300–306, 310, 316, 319, 325, 326, 329–331, 333–338, 340, 341, 355–360, 370 National Parliament, 4, 33, 35, 40, 77, 80, 177, 323, 358, 369 National Platform, 130 National Rally, 46 Nature Trust, 208 Nazism, 16 Neo-liberal ideology, 70 Neoliberalism, 160, 175 Netflix, 85 Neutrality, 7, 94–98, 107, 109, 110, 112, 118, 123, 128, 129, 133, 173, 329, 355, 360, 367, 375, 376

Subject Index Neutrality Agreement, 97 Neutrality and non-alignment, 7, 15, 94, 135, 359 Neutrality Clause, 96–98, 115, 132, 333, 367, 375 Neutral state, 97, 109, 173, 367 ‘New Labour’ approach, 71 New Migration Strategy, 222 New Pact, 226 NewsWeek Serbia, 250 Nexia BT, 233, 236, 237, 240, 241, 253, 286, 289, 296, 320 NextGenerationEU, 329, 380 Ngħidu Iva għall-Ewropa, 125 NGO, 83, 187, 378 Non-Aligned movement, 15, 70 Notte Bianca, 292 NRC, 249 Nuclear energy issues, 40

O Occupy Justice, 82, 283–285, 290, 311 Official language, 2, 5, 6 Ombudsman, 318, 330 Operation Irini, 227 Operation Pabail, 278 Opposition, 11, 13, 15, 27, 44, 50, 76, 82, 95, 101, 102, 105, 111, 127, 129, 135, 144, 148, 170, 186, 192, 195, 198, 202, 203, 205, 206, 210, 211, 214, 220, 234, 236–238, 241–245, 247–250, 253, 255, 277–280, 282, 296, 298, 301, 306, 312, 330, 333, 338, 369 Orbán’s Fidesz party, 42 Organisational change, 35, 259 Organisations Christian Democratic Organization, SDM, 72 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 222, 225 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 7, 16, 17, 95, 110, 367, 368 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 76, 286 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 7, 76, 84, 94, 225, 334, 340, 356 Organisation for World Peace (OWP), 225 Public Cultural Organisations (PCOs), 295 Social Democratic Students Organization, 72 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 156 Orion Trust (New Zealand), 237

Subject Index OSCE report, 84 Ottoman Empire, 5 Outside Development Zoning, 330

P Palestinian cause, 17 Panamagate, 234, 236 Panama Papers, 4, 21, 216, 232–261, 278, 279, 289, 303, 317, 332, 339, 357, 363 The Panama Papers Revelations, 23, 237, 320 Parochialism, 340, 353 ‘Partisanship’, 35, 51, 63, 69, 72–73, 80, 84, 87, 101, 103, 135, 153, 158, 169, 175, 180, 259, 306, 324, 354, 355, 371 Partit Democratiku Nazzjonalista (PDN), 2, 93 Partit Laburista, 64, 337 Partito Anti-Riformista, 65 Partito Democratico Nazionalista, 65 Partit tal-Ajkla, 196 ‘Partnership’, 13, 110, 112, 117, 119, 126–129, 131–133, 223, 224 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 110, 367 Partnership plan, 107, 120, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135 Partnership: The Best Choice, 132 Party choice models, 51 Party Competition, 33–36, 44, 103, 115, 135, 151, 354, 359 Party competition dimension, 37, 49, 103, 111, 122, 154 Party-government relations, 35, 103, 259 Party identification, 35, 68, 83, 125 Party ideologies, 35, 44, 122, 132, 357 Party loyalty, 79, 161, 364 Party membership, 35, 83, 86 Party of European Socialists (PES), 136, 145, 146, 148, 300, 302 Party-owned television and radio stations, 84 Party systems, 21, 32, 34–38, 53, 54, 64, 66, 103, 135, 143, 151, 168, 259, 354, 359, 382 ‘Patriotism’, 133, 167, 299, 300, 336, 358 Patron Saints, 9, 10 Peaceful coexistence, 8 Pensions, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 157, 254, 330, 374 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 360 Personal charisma, 22 Pfizer, 328 Pharmaceutical companies, 175 Pika, 10, 11

403 Pilatus Bank, 240, 244, 245, 248, 252, 286, 288, 289, 295–298, 320 Plan for a new beginning, Labour party manifesto, 153 Pluralism, 84, 85, 185, 338, 372 Polarisation, 3, 35, 47, 63, 65, 72–73, 84, 87, 101, 103, 135, 152, 153, 158, 169, 175, 180, 192, 242, 258–260, 291, 293, 295, 306, 324, 354, 355, 370, 371, 383 Police code of ethics, 322 Police Force Transformation Strategy, 322 Policy change, 33, 35, 115, 135, 151, 156, 167, 359 Policy on Business Interests and Additional Occupations, 322 Political activities, 327 Political arenas, 63, 66, 80, 88, 98, 143 Political Bureau of the EU, 100 Political participation of women, 79 Political parties, 3–6, 9–11, 13, 14, 21–24, 27, 30–38, 40–45, 47–54, 63–66, 68–70, 72–88, 94–96, 98, 100, 104, 108, 110, 111, 113–115, 119, 120, 123, 125, 126, 136–137, 143, 144, 146, 149, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 167, 169, 175, 179, 180, 185, 190, 196, 200–203, 205–210, 212–215, 218–221, 226, 232, 236, 239, 241–246, 248, 250–252, 256–258, 260, 277, 278, 280, 282, 284, 295, 297–299, 301–303, 306, 312, 322–324, 327–330, 332, 333, 337–340, 353–361, 363–365, 368–373, 377–379, 381–383 Political patronage, 22, 63, 74, 364 Politicisation, 47–51, 165, 212, 242, 290, 295, 353 Politiken, 250 Populism, 38, 42, 63, 101, 158, 167, 359 Positive Energy, 196 Post-materialism values, 251 ‘Potekim village organisational structure’, theory, 39 Pragmatic approach, 144, 163, 170 Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 21, 23, 197, 216–218, 227, 230, 232, 243, 261, 357 ‘Presidentialisation style’, 254 President of the Republic, 96, 282, 370 Printing, 3D, 336 Privatisation, 106, 134, 149, 164, 165, 179, 234, 249, 252 Prize for ‘investigative journalism’, 285 Pro-European movement, 368

404 Progressive Farmersʼ Union, 129 Progressive movement, 163, 167, 176 Progress Press, 281 Public Broadcasting Services, 84, 363 Public policy, 29, 32, 34 Pulse, 72 ‘Pushbacks’, 188, 189 ‘Putting the Citizen First’, 118

Q ‘Qawsalla’, 247

R Raised pen, 284 Ramblers Association of Malta, 208 Rassemblement National-RN, 46 Referendum, 1, 8, 9, 13, 21, 23, 35, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 69, 97, 98, 106–108, 112, 113, 117, 121–137, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 154, 167, 169–171, 174, 178, 186, 197, 200, 201, 203–216, 260, 326, 339, 366, 368 Refugee Fund, 218 Regional Development Fund, 166 Religio et Patria, 70 Religion, 3, 65, 307, 361 Renaissance, 6, 28 Renew Europe group, 316 Repubblika, civil society group, 82, 283–285, 290, 311, 317, 318 Republic, 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 18, 40, 71, 82, 214, 259 Republic Street, 294 Riformista Party, 64 Roman Catholic Church, 6, 28, 67, 105 Romance language, 2 Roman Empire, 28 Rome, Treaty of, 67, 225 Rotorua Trust, 241 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), 205 Rule of law, 1, 8, 22, 39, 67, 81, 132, 137, 185, 193, 228, 255, 261, 277–341, 356, 358, 360–363, 369 Russian cash, 195 Russian gas, 195 Russian-Ukrainian war, 376

S Sadeen Group, 335 Saint Hubert Hunters (KSU), 81, 201, 209, 210, 214

Subject Index Saint Patrick’s Day, 293 Saint Peter and Saint Paul, feast of, (Imnarja), 309 Same-sex marriage, 13, 69, 71, 124, 129, 161, 162, 188, 230, 255, 278, 357, 360, 365, 382 Scepticism, 13, 41, 45, 129, 216, 298, 301, 319, 355, 359, 363 Schembri Offshore Trust, 237 Schengen, 40, 44, 130, 223, 224 Sciences, 9, 72 Search and Rescue area, 3, 222, 227 Second Order Model, 150 Second World War, 2, 6, 11, 28, 64, 65 Secularisation, 361 Security of Supply Agreement, 320 Self-government constitution, 64 Selson Holding Corporation, 236 Semitic language, 2 Sette Giugno, 11 17 black, 236, 298, 303, 310 Shangai Electric, 249 Shout, 210–214 Siemens, 234 SiGMA (iGaming World Festival), 328 Single currency, 153, 165, 178 Single Market, 114, 147, 148, 165, 195, 216, 217, 229, 231 Single Transferable Vote, 63, 73–80, 133, 277, 301 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 201, 216, 229, 329 SOCAR, 234, 235 Social Climate Fund, 379 Social democracy, 71, 159, 175 Social Democratic Students organization, 72 Social Media, 4, 74, 75, 82, 85, 214, 251, 252, 257, 279, 293, 302, 306, 307, 309, 317, 332, 333, 372 Social mobility, 9, 254 Socialism, 71, 105, 107 Socialists & Democrats (S&D), 41, 43, 160, 162, 168, 192, 194, 195, 199, 239, 253, 286–288, 302–304, 314–316, 324 Socialist values, 65, 107 ‘Soldiers of steel’, 198, 200 ‘Solidarity – Always –Everywhere’, 104 Solidarity, Concept of, 104–106 Sovereignty, 2, 4, 8, 11, 36, 45, 46, 48, 53, 94, 97, 102, 107, 111, 112, 124, 128–130, 133, 135, 154, 155, 191, 192, 287, 302, 303, 306, 326, 359, 381 Spitzenkandidaten, 199, 202, 302–304 Sports activities, 327, 336

Subject Index Spring hunting, 4, 200, 201, 203–215, 260, 330, 339 Stability and Growth Pact, 164 ‘Standards for Gatherings’, 328 Standards of living, 52 ‘State capture’ theory, 39 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 375 St George’s Square, 294 Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP), 289, 320, 323 Strengthening of the Economic Aid Programme, 174 Streptopelia turtur, 207 Structural funds, 20, 111, 122, 126, 127, 148, 154, 156, 158, 159, 168, 174, 175, 177 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 232 Superintendent of Public Health Office, 328 Sustainable development, 299, 331, 369, 377, 380 Swiss bank account, 176 ‘Switzerland in the Mediterranean’, 110, 119, 121, 123, 127, 128 Symbols, 2, 5, 64, 72, 118, 125, 135, 284, 285, 315 Syrian migration, 1, 37, 40, 47, 49, 223, 369 Syrian refugee crisis, 21

T ‘Tal-Organjo’, 247 Tax avoidance, 233, 242, 288, 297 Tax evasion, 193, 233, 238, 240–242, 250, 261, 288, 297, 298, 303, 316, 319 Tax harmonization, 250, 301–303, 305, 359, 381, 383 Textile Industries, 20 The Egrant Affair, 320 The ElectroGas Affair, 320 The Golden Passports Affair, 320 The Guardian, 193, 195, 224 The Guardian, Dossier Centre, 195 The Hillman Affair, 320 The Intercept, 250 The Malta Independent, 70, 72, 76, 79, 85, 113, 114, 116, 119–122, 127, 129, 130, 132–134, 136, 147, 148, 155–157, 166, 175, 176, 189, 199–201, 207, 210, 211, 213–215, 236–238, 240–244, 246–255, 257, 259, 282, 285, 288, 294, 300, 307, 310, 332–335 The Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism/TheBlackSea.eu, 249 The Vitals Global Healthcare Affair, 320 Tillgate Inc., 236

405 Times of Malta, 17, 77, 79, 80, 85–87, 101, 102, 105–114, 125–130, 133, 134, 146–149, 152, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164–168, 170, 171, 173, 187–189, 191, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201, 204–209, 211–215, 219–224, 230, 234–236, 239–245, 247–250, 252–255, 257, 259, 278–280, 285, 288, 293, 294, 296, 297, 305, 306, 309–312, 317–319, 321, 328, 330–335, 363, 373, 375, 377 The Today Public Policy Institute (TPPI), 84 ‘To grow in Europe’, 145 Toly, 18 Top-down approach, 32 Top-down influence of the European Union, 40, 115 Torbridge, 236 Tourism, 13, 19, 20, 104, 114, 121, 133, 134, 146, 164, 165, 291, 366, 378 Tourists, 19, 20, 114, 121, 148, 156, 246, 292, 293, 328, 378 Trade schools, 18 Training and education, 146, 360 Treaty of Association to the European Union, (2003), 204 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 220 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 194, 316, 318, 319, 367, 368 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 194, 367, 368 ‘Truthfulness will always prevail’, 70 Tumas Group, 234, 311 Tunnel, 247, 379 Two-party system, 22, 35, 63–66, 133, 286, 324 Typology, economic, 50 Typology, utilitarian, 50

U Unemployment, 18, 88, 102, 109, 120, 130, 146, 148, 151, 175, 197, 201, 237, 246, 256, 261, 304, 374, 376 Unione Politica Maltese (Maltese Political Union), 65 United in Diversity, 325 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 136 United Nations (UN), 173, 228, 240, 290, 341, 368 United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL), 226 United States of Europe, 1 ‘Unity in Diversity’, 170 University of Malta, 166, 324

406 ‘Unrepresented sex’, 78, 80 US Refugee Admissions Programme (USRAP), 222

V Vaccination, 328 Valletta Baroque Festival, 292 Valletta Design Cluster, 294 Valletta Film Festival, 292 Valletta Summit, 223, 224 Value Added Tax (VAT), 85, 102, 110, 111, 113–118, 120, 134, 147, 148, 161, 163, 336, 357 V18, 291–294 Vitals Global Healthcare, 240 Volt, 330

W ‘Ways of doing things’, 29 ‘We are Europe!’, 196, 197 Wealth, Trust and Direction, N.P. manifesto, 118

Subject Index West European states, 41 Westminster model, 370 Westminster System, 338 Westphalia Treaty, 28 “Whig Interpretation of History”, 355 ‘Whistleblower’, 232, 243, 244, 253, 289, 322 ‘WiFi4EU’, 230 Wild Birds Decades, 215 Willerby Trade Inc, 237 ‘Wintris Inc’, 233 Women, 77–82, 185, 231, 284, 306, 324, 325, 329, 331, 382 ‘Working together in a Coalition’, 154 World Bank Report, 149 World Press Freedom Index, 288

X Xenophobia, 22, 165, 307 ‘Xkupa Ħadra Tnaddaf’, 330

Y “Yes for Europe” movement, 125, 126, 131